Ideology, Politics, and Government in the Soviet Union: An Introduction [4 ed.] 0030403669, 9780030403668

Table of contents :
PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION
CONTENTS
THE BACKGROUND
THE IDEOLOGY
THE PARTY
THE APPARATUS
INSTRUMENTS OF COERCION
THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE ECONOMY
THE SOVIETS AND THE NATIONALITIES
INTERPENETRATION OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY
A SUMMING UP
INDEX

Citation preview

Ideology, Politics, and Government in the Soviet Union

Ideology, Politics, and Government in the Soviet Union AN INTRODUCTION Fourth Edition

J o h n A. A rm strong University of Wisconsin

PRAEGER PUBLISHERS New York

To Roy and Leona Taylor

Published in the United States of America in 1978 by Praeger Publishers A Division of Holt, Rinehart and Winston 200 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017 © 1962, 1967 by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. © 1974 by Praeger Publishers, Inc. © 1978 by Praeger Publishers, A Division of Holt, Rinehart and Winston A ll rights reserved

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 77-89732 ISBN: 0-03-040366-9 Printed in the United States of America 890 008 987654321

PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION W hen I wrote the first edition of this book fifteen years ago, I believed there was a need for a brief, simplified survey of the m ain features o f the Soviet political system. Since that time, the reception given the book suggests that it has, indeed, served a purpose. I am convinced that a good part o f the book's utility has been due to its timeliness. T h e first edition appeared less than a year after the Twenty-second Congress of the Soviet Com munist Party; N ikita Khrushchev was then apparently at the height o f his power. T w o years later he was overthrown, and the oligarchical leadership which succeeded him systematically demolished his ideological and institutional innovations. By 1967, when the second edition o f this book appeared, it was already clear that the confident progress toward Communism which the Tw enty-third Congress had proclaim ed was at an end. Except in the foreign policy sphere, changes since 1967 have not been so spectacular. Instead, m inor institutional reorganizations, subtle ideological re-emphases, and gradual shifts in methods o f social and economic control have occurred. P aralleling these changes has been a notable increase in the am ount of inform ation about the nature of the Soviet system. T h e cum ulative im pact of systemic changes and new inform ation is so great that revised views of the Soviet polity are im perative every few years. Consequently, the fourth edition, like the third edition, has been thoroughly revised so as to provide an introduction focusing on current Soviet politics. As with the first edition, for the sake of brevity I have omitted almost all history of

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Soviet institutional developm ent and political rivalry from this volume. Governm ent in the Soviet U n ion is no longer a curiosity, and only in a very special sense can one describe it as an experim ent. Consequently, a prelim inary look at the system may w ell take for granted its relative stability, its capacity as a going concern. It seems to me that the historical exam ination of political institutions and behavior can reasonably be postponed. T h e great danger of this type o f approach is the loss of historical perspective. I have tried to avoid, or at least lim it, this danger by treating the more remote background o f present-day Soviet society in the opening chap­ ter. Furthermore, w hile institutions and behavior can be pre­ sented out of their historical context, the same does not hold true for Soviet ideology, which is incom prehensible except in its developm ental framework. Consequently, C hapter 2, though not chronological in organization, contains numerous refer­ ences to the precursors of the present Soviet ideologues. Discussion of foreign policy also requires attention to the radical transformations in

the international

environm ent

w ithin which the Soviet regime operates. Increasingly over the past decade, it has become apparent that Soviet foreign and domestic policies are so closely related that consideration o f the latter is hardly possible w ithout a close if brief exam ina­ tion of foreign affairs. In earlier editions, this exam ination was attempted in the form of brief interpolations, especially in the concluding chapter. Now, it seems to me, a m ore syste­ matic consideration o f the interpenetration o f foreign and domestic policy, as presented in C hapter 8, is the most effec­ tive way to sum up the underlying factors affecting the evolu­ tion o f Soviet policy during the 1970’s. Both the pre-Soviet background treated in C hapter 1 and the effects o f ideology discussed in C hapter 2 are part o f w hat social science theorists increasingly agree on callin g "p o litical culture." D uring the past twelve years, the conceptual fram e­

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work and vocabulary of systems analysis and structural func­ tionalism have rapidly become part o f the common fiind of knowledge o f social science students. Even those w ho do not intend to acquire specialized competence in analytic social science have frequently obtained at least a general fam iliarity with the approaches. A part from certain general difficulties involved in applying "whole-system” approaches, there are special difficulties involved in adapting them to the exam ina­ tion of Soviet politics. I think there is widespread agreement that, of all m ajor categories o f political systems, the totalitarian type is least readily susceptible to systems analysis and still less to structural functional analysis. Both approaches were developed prim arily from the consideration o f pluralist societies like the U nited States or from the adaptation of anthropological perspectives on traditional societies. T h e application o f these approaches to an extrem ely centralized political system, dom inated by a small, relatively homogeneous elite adhering to an ideology dem anding the com plete transformation o f hum an nature, requires fundam ental reconsideration. T h e organic analogies behind some of the newer social science models, which tend to assume the existence o f unconscious social processes tending toward an equilibrium state, are particularly hard to relate to the highly self-conscious goal orientation o f a Com m unist elite. O n the other hand, such approaches make it equally difficult to place adequate conceptual emphasis on the high degree o f in­ tra-elite conflict in Com m unist systems. For the tim e being, therefore, it seems to me preferable to use an eclectic approach, em ploying a "rational actor” m odel to interpret m uch o f the ideological developm ent and policy form ation in the U.S.S.R. and a "conflict m odel” to exam ine elite political processes. As a heuristic device, a systems conceptual point of view that does not im ply the assumption that there are systemswide functions is used throughout. In specific sections—especially

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the nationalities question and its relation to foreign policy— a modified systems model w ith explicitly functionalist char­ acteristics is utilized. H opefully this eclectic treatment w ill suggest the relevance of the newer social science approaches and some of their vocabulary, w ithout attem pting w hat I regard as the premature application o f a single conceptual framework. I hope that the m aterial presented on the nationalities question, particularly, w ill be stim ulating in a m ethodological as well as a conceptual sense. Increasingly, quantitative com­ parison of political and social units has become a significant exercise for undergraduate students as w ell as an im portant tool for more advanced researchers. Like language study, training in statistical techniques and com puter program ing becomes immensely more challenging for the social science student if exercises utilize substantively significant contem ­ porary materials. W hile the usual approach is correlation analysis of data relating to independent countries, com parative quantitative analysis o f sub-national units (as several excellent studies of differences am ong Am erican states demonstrate) is equally appropriate. O rdinarily, the unspecialized student wishing to pursue such analyses finds it difficult to obtain reliable data standardized for com parable aspects of each subdivision o f any national political system other than the United* States. D ata on m ajor Soviet nationalities (or on the U nion republics, which usually constitute their "hom e ter­ ritories”) are becom ing increasingly available. T hese data are highly standardized across nationality units. Nevertheless, specific problems such as access to scattered sources in Russian and other Soviet languages and the need for specialized evaluation and interpretation o f the Soviet data have pre­ vented their utilization in general com parative data books. Recently Ellen P. M ickiewicz and her collaborators have pro­ vided an impressive com pilation o f data on a ll facets o f Soviet

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society, Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data (Riverside, N.J.: T h e Free Press, 1973). However, most of her data on ethnic factors were—unavoidably—derived from the 1959 Soviet census, whereas the appearance o f 1970 census data calls for a fundam ental reappraisal of Soviet nationalities. T h e T a b le of M ajor N ationalities in Chapter 7 of my book provides fully evaluated data, including the results of the 1970 census and m any new data on Party membership. I hope that readers m ay find these data useful not only for systematic comparison o f Soviet units but also in extending the universe o f the readers* general com parative investigations, particularly in the sphere of social m obilization. Consequently, w hile the data are pre­ sented in a form suitable for quantitative m anipulation, I have by no means exhausted the potential for analysis in my verbal interpretation. W h ile expressing certain reservations concerning the use o f a single social science approach, I m ust emphasize, as I did in the earlier editions of this book, that a dom inantly legal or institutional approach to the study of the Soviet system w ould be utterly misleading. Emphasis on the constitutional system of Soviet government, or even on the formal structure o f the Com m unist Party o f the Soviet Union, w ould be inappropriate. Consequently, I have confined myself to brief explanations of w hat I consider to be the significance o f form al structure in both governm ent and Party. A dditional details on these struc­ tures are contained in the organizational charts accompany­ ing the text. T hese charts are not confined to the formal structures of Party and government, but attempt to suggest the dynamics of power relations as w ell as formal lines of subordination. In a short book, illustrations of this kind are exceptionally im portant. B ut even the most penetrating eluci­ dation of structural features could not furnish com plete in­ sight into the extent o f Soviet totalitarianism. Such insight requires an understanding of the com plex nationality question,

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earlier police terror as a background to contem porary repres­ sion, and the pervasive control o f the economy. B rief as m y treatment is, I have felt it essential to devote nearly a third of the book to these subjects. I hope that this work w ill serve as a useful elementary guide to the Soviet political system; it is not a com pendium of the opinions of others or even an abridgm ent of my own. T od ay, excellent specialized studies on nearly all aspects of the Soviet system are very numerous. Consequently, although “ Suggested Readings" in die present edition contain twice as m any items as did the first edition, a comprehensive bibliography w ould be im practicable. I can only plead that those books I do list seem to me to be most useful for the general reader and the nonspecialized student. W h ile I rely on these works, the emphasis and m any of the conclusions I advance are m y own; no other w riter on the Soviet system w ill accept all of them w ithout reservation. I am convinced that it is im possible to avoid a personal approach if one is to present a coherent analysis of Soviet politics, particularly in the international sphere, and it should be pointed out that m uch o f w hat is said in this book is not established beyond dispute. I have tried to indicate the most im portant points where the accuracy of available data is doubtful or where divergence o f inform ed opinion exists, but conciseness o f expression may, at times, have led to unwarranted generalizations. Some readers m ay question my evidence for certain statements. Elaborate foot­ notes seemed out o f place in so brief a survey. W here feasible, I have indicated my sources, such as the proceedings of the Soviet Com munist Party Congresses, in the text. Because the N ationalities T a b le, as indicated above, is intended to be a data resource, I have provided precise footnote indications o f its sources. Probably the general reader is more likely to be concerned w ith over-all inform ation about the workings of the Soviet

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political system than w ith my particular sources. A m ajor portion of our inform ation on Soviet politics and governm ent is derived from "overt” Soviet sources—for the most part Soviet publications. Even the neophyte w ill find that the Soviet press provides a revealing, if distorted, reflection of the system at work. T h e reader who wishes to cover a compre­ hensive range of Soviet publications must know Russian (and, if possible, some of the other languages o f the U.S.S.R.). Fortunately, the weekly Current Digest of the Soviet Press (2043 M illikin R oad, Colum bus, O h io 43210) provides Englishlanguage translations from an immense range o f Soviet pub­ lications. T h e coverage provided by the Current Digest, which a single scholar can hardly match, has been indispensable in preparing this book. B ut I cannot stress too strongly that the beginning student of Soviet affairs should not overrate his ability to understand and appraise Soviet press reports, whether in Russian or in translation. Soviet writings on general subjects, and particularly articles on p olitical affairs, w hile somewhat more candid in recent years, are geared to propa­ ganda. A fter a time, the student readily recognizes the propaganda “ lin e” and learns to discount it. It is not so easy to detect the bias of factual "exam ples” or statistics carefully selected for their propaganda effect. As a rule, only specialists, after painstaking com parative analysis o f Soviet materials appearing at different times and places, can extrapolate the facts behind such distorted selection. B ut the Soviet press is not only a propaganda medium ; it is also a functional m edium of com m unication in a highly com plex technological society. T h ere are facts to be discovered behind the distortion, for there is a lim it to the extent to w hich Soviet readers can be misled w ithout reducing the effectiveness o f their service to the regime. Increasingly, the Soviet regim e appears to recognize the significance of this lim it; as a result, published inform a­ tion on economic, social, and dem ographic subjects has become

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more abundant and diversified as w ell as more candid. It is significant that the severe restrictions imposed on literary expression (discussed in Chapter 5) since Khrushchev’s ouster have not been accompanied by a return to the m oratorium on sociological and economic publication w hich characterized Stalin’s rule. Instead, m ajor Soviet studies on social science topics, including several em ploying sophisticated techniques like survey research, increased m arkedly in the late 1960’s and the 1970’s. W hen internal political rivalries are at issue, however, the Soviet propagandist continues to put up a second screen be­ tween the reader and significant developm ents. T h is screen consists of “ esoteric language” —the use o f terms and allusions that the uninitiated fail to understand. In order to grasp the im portance of esoteric language, one must have an extensive detailed knowledge of Com m unist history from before the R ev­ olution to the present. Even with such knowledge, unraveling the m eaning of esoteric language is often a m atter of educated guess; but such guesses are crucially im portant in understand­ ing Soviet political developments. O ur ability to penetrate the Soviet com m unication screens has been immensely helped by occasional access to hidden sources of inform ation. D u rin g W orld W ar II, the Germ ans captured a number of extrem ely im portant secret documents, including the econom ic plan for 1941, the archives of a provin­ cial Party organization, and thousands of political directives to guerrillas and regular m ilitary units. In 1945, the U nited States forces seized these materials. Since the end of the war, only a few Soviet secret documents have come to light, but, on occa­ sion, Soviet defectors who had memorized fairly extensive out­ lines of m ajor documents—such as the secret letters of the Party’s Central Com m ittee—have furnished valuable inform a­ tion. N aturally, defectors were most numerous during the war, when the Soviet control system was disrupted. Social scientists

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(of the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System) could even construct a sample reflecting the attitudes and back­ grounds of the general Soviet population on the basis of inter­ views with defectors. While defectors have been fewer re­ cently, dissidents remaining inside the U.S.S.R. have been able to send out a wide variety of manuscripts commenting on the social and political situation. In some recent years hundreds of such “samizdat” manuscripts have reached Western countries. Since the 1950’s foreigners, including specialists on Soviet affairs from the United States and Western Europe, have been allowed some direct access to the Soviet Union. While all such visitors have been restricted to a considerable degree, they have obtained a “feel” for the Soviet system, which has helped them draw conclusions from the other sources described above. Exchange students have been able to study series of local news­ papers unavailable outside the U.S.S.R. and, sometimes, even to interview Soviet officials. No one who studies the Soviet system intensively would claim that any one of these sources, or even all of them taken together, are fully satisfactory. The social scientist dealing with the U.S.S.R. lacks many “tools,” such as survey research on public opinion, that his counterparts con­ cerned with the United States and Western Europe have developed to a high degree. Yet in some ways, the Soviet special­ ist has an advantage, for he is dealing with a system where de­ cisions are highly centralized and where all general media reflect, however obscurely, the central manipulation. If one can but find the clue, Soviet totalitarian politics may become- easier to interpret than the baffling flux that culminates in the ex­ pression of the popular will under democratic pluralism. It should be clear by this point that my principal debt is to the objective scholars and observers who have sifted the great

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mass of material dealing with Soviet political affairs. W ith ou t the numerous systematic studies available no summary treat­ ment could even be attempted; this Fourth E dition is partic­ ularly dependent on the innovative m onographic studies which younger Am erican and European students o f the Soviet system have published. I am also indebted to my colleagues in the University o f W isconsin Russian Area Studies Program for suggestions, and to those elsewhere w ho have used and criticized the first two editions of this book. I am grateful to M urray Feshbach and Brian Silver for help w ith the 1970 Soviet census data. Again, however, I must stress that the manner o f the treatment and the conclusions are m y own, and I must consequently bear full responsibility for them. Frederick A . Praeger first suggested the w riting o f a concise study of this type. T o him and the competent editorial staff of Praeger Publishers, particularly Denise R athbun, the w ork owes a great deal indeed. Lastly, I must acknowledge m y great debt to my wife, who made innum erable im provements in both text and illustrations of all four editions. J.A .A .

1977

CONTENTS P r e f a c e t o t h e F o u r t h E d it io n

v

1. T h e

5

B ackground

Absolutism/ T he “ Classless” Society/ The Intellectual Climate/ The Revolution and After/ Suggested Readings 2. T h e

Ideology

27

Theoretical Foundations/ The Directives/ Suggested Readings 3. T h e

Party

53

Membership: Status Aspects/ Membership : Functions/ The IndàclrïnatinnJiùin^tinn/ T h e Mass Media/ T h e Schools and the Military/ T he Party's Auxiliary Organizations/ Organiza­ tional Principles/ Suggested Readings 4. T h e A p p a r a t u s

81

Contrasting Fates of Collective Leadership/ Politburo and Cen­ tral Committee/ T h e Secretariat/ T he Indoctrination Machin­ ery/ T h e Party Organs Section/ Elite Social Characteristics/ Elite Attitudes/ Distribution of the Apparatus/ Suggested Readings 5. I n s t r u m e n t s o f C o e r c i o n

111

The Security Police/ Mechanisms for Labor Discipline/ ExtralegaT^Suppression of Dissent/ The Legal System/ Substantive Law/ From Terror to Repression/ Suggested Readings 6 T h e A d m in is t r a t io n a n d t h e

E conom y

Planning in the Command Economy/ Agriculture/ The K olk­ hoz/ Continuing Social Division between Town and Country/ Suggested Readings

XV

13 7

Contents

XVI 7. T h e S o v i e t s a n d t h e

N a t io n a l it ie s

15 9

The Soviets/ T h e Constitution/ Legislative Procedure/ Local Soviets/ T h e Soviet Executive/ The Ministries/ Local Executive Bodies/ T h e Functional Position of the Nationalities in Soviet Policy/ Suggested Readings 8. I n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n o f D o m e s t i c a n d F o r e i g n P o l i c y

197

The U.S.S.R. and the International Environment/ Transforma­ tion of the International Environment/ Defensive and Expan­ sionist Elements in Soviet Policy/ Soviet Prospects in the Third World/ American Retreat and Soviet Advances: Two Phases/ T h e Ambiguous Chinese Factor/ Soviet Alternatives / Sug­ gested Readings 9. A S u m m i n g U p

227

I ndex

235

Ideology, Politics, and Government in the Soviet Union

MAP OF

THE U.S.S.R.

1 THE BACKGROUND

A t the heart of all political systems is a paradox: political power is based on, and in fact requires, the m onopoly o f force in a given territory, yet force alone is an inadequate basis for a political systenl. T h e paradox is frequently resolved by explain­ ing that the m onopoly entails only the legitimate exercise o f force. But what is legitim ate depends on the attitudes o f the population o f the territory, or at least on the attitudes o f a dom inant element am ong the population. Attitudes reflect widely held expectations concerning proper political behavior. T ak en together, customs and beliefs constitute the political culture o f a society. O rdinarily, the effort to determ ine the po­ litical culture involves direct surveys of the attitudes of the population. In a closed system like the Soviet, this approach is rarely available. Instead, one must rely on two indirect sources for understanding Soviet political culture. T o a far greater ex­ tent than most political systems, the Soviet system is the creation of a consciously articulated body of ideas—the ideology. W e shall look at this ideology in Chapter 2 and, at many points in this book, we shall try to assess its influence on the political culture. But political culture, like most popular beliefs and customs, is extrem ely persistent. T h e Soviet ideology has en­ joyed a near m onopoly years. Nevertheless, it is ences, transmitted by word Russian literature, and by

in p ublic expression for sixty highly likely that earlier influ­ o f m outh, by reading the classic unconscious fam ily customs, con­

tinue to permeate political culture in the U.S.S.R. In the follow ing pages, those elements of the Russian past

5

6

Ideology, Politics, and Government

that seem to be related to present Soviet political culture w ill be described. It is impossible to establish direct connections between these aspects of Russian history and Soviet behavior, particularly since the regime explicitly disavows the connec­ tion in most instances. U n til the mid-i930's, Com m unist w rit­ ers m aintained that nearly all Russian developm ent before the Bolshevik R evolution of 1917, though a necessary stage of so­ cial evolution, was nevertheless an outworn and often shame­ ful memory rather than a proud heritage. Since the m id-i93o’s, the Soviet regime has been more selective in its evaluation o f pre-Revolutionary history; but the essential break with the past remains a m ajor element o f Soviet Com m unist thought. T h e outside observer, on the other hand, is im m ediately struck by the similarities as well as the differences between the Soviet system and the Czarist regim e that prevailed in m uch the same territory for centuries prior to the establishment of the U.S.S.R. Since Czarism was essentially a Russian phenomenon, and the Russians remain dom inant in the U.S.S.R., this chapter w ill concentrate on the Russian heritage. Chapter 7 w ill treat the significantly different heritages of the large non-Russian m inor­ ities.

A b s o l u t is m

O ne o f the most striking parallels between Czarism and B ol­ shevism is the existence o f an unusual measure of centralized, unrestricted power in both systems. T o the student o f govern­ ment at the beginning of this century, Czarist rule was synon­ ymous with autocracy, as indeed it was in the official parlance of the old regime. It is true that in the twelve years im m edi­ ately preceding the Bolshevik R evolution, some m odifications were introduced in the autocratic system. A lth ou gh the insti­ tution of an elected legislative assembly (Duma) did enable public opinion to exercise some pressure upon the Czar, the

The Background

y

governm ent of the Russian Em pire rem ained responsible to him alone. Sim ilarly, if one goes back far enough in the history of the East Slavs—from whom the Russians, along w ith other nationalities, descended—one finds evidence of em bryonic dem­ ocratic institutions. O n the whole, however, Russia has proba­ bly had less experience with lim ited governm ent or represent­ ative institutions than any other European country.

Orthodox Church and Czarist State Prom inent am ong the factors contributing to the absolutistic nature of Russian governm ent was the relation between church and state. T h e O rthodox faith, to which traditionally an over­ w helm ing m ajority of Russians have adhered, has been an ex­ trem ely im portant elem ent in the country’s history—so im por­ tant, indeed, that some historians (notably A rnold Toynbee) class the Russian O rthodox society as a civilization distinct from that of W estern Europe. In the Byzantine Empire, from which the Russians obtained their Christian faith in the late tenth century, O rthodoxy had developed the peculiar institu­ tion of “ Caesaropapism .” In this system, the emperor was both autocratic ruler of the state and supreme head of the church. Consequently, the separation o f ecclesiastical and tem poral power—whether between Pope and H oly Rom an Em peror, or between secular state and church—did not exist. T h e tension, latent or visible, between these two powers in the W est, which prevented either from assuming control of all aspects of. life, was largely absent in Byzantium . T h e O rthodox Church m ight admonish the ruler, but it had to subm it to him and support him, evil though he m ay have been. T h is doctrine, transplanted to the East Slavic lands, made the church a bulw ark o f abso­ lute monarchy, especially after the Czars, in the sixteenth cen­ tury, proclaim ed themselves to be the successors of the Byzan­ tine emperors.

8

Ideology, Politics, and Government N o one has depicted the relationship between Caesaropap-

ism and governmental absolutism more poignantly than the contemporary Russian N obel Prize novelist, A leksandr Solzhenitsyn. D uring Lent in 1972, in a letter to the official head of the Russian O rthodox Church, Patriarch Pimen, Solz­ henitsyn wrote: “A study of Russian history in the last few centuries w ill show that it m ight have been incom parably more hum ane and harm onious if the church had not sur­ rendered its independence and the people had listened to its voice, as for exam ple, in [Rom an Catholic] Poland. Alas, with us it has been different for a long tim e.” Solzhenitsyn saw a direct connection, moreover, between the subordination o f the O rthodox Church to the Czars and its present m anipula­ tion by the Soviet regime: " T h e entire adm inistration of the church, the appointm ent of priests and bishops (including even sacrilegious churchmen who m ake it easier to deride and destroy the church), all of this is secretly m anaged by the [Soviet] Council for Religious Affairs. A church dictatorially ruled by atheists is a sight not seen in two thousand years.” *

The Influence of Mongol Rule A second m ajor influence in the developm ent of absolutism —some historians consider it to have been m ore im portant than the O rthod ox doctrine—was the M ongol invasion of the thir­ teenth century. L ivin g in the broadest portion of the great Eurasian plain, almost unprotected by natural barriers, the East Slavs were easily subjected by the M ongol cavalry. A side from destroying or dispersing m uch of the old East Slavic civ il­ ization (which for some tim e had been on the wane), the M on­ gol invasion gave rise to new distributions of power in Eastern Europe. Indirectly, the principal Russian beneficiaries of M on­ gol rule were the princes of Moscow, w ho became the vassals and lieutenants of the khans. W h ile it is not altogether clear

• Translated by Ludmilla Thorne, New

York Tim es,

April 9, 1972.

The Background

9

where the Mongol khans found their patterns of rule, they re­ quired a degree of self-abasement from their subjects com­ monly associated with Oriental despotisms. The Muscovite princes adopted many of the despotic attitudes and practices of the Mongol rulers, and these attitudes and practices per­ sisted after the princes obtained a position of equality with the surviving Mongol (or Tatar) khans and ultimately subjugated them. Western Theories of the Divine Right of Kings

In noting these peculiarly Russian experiences that influ­ enced the rise of Czarist absolutism, one should not lose sight of the importance of Western ideas in the establishment of absolute rule. Probably the high-water mark of Czarist autoc­ racy came under Catherine II (the Great) in the eighteenth century. Catherine was German by birth, and most of the intellectual underpinning for her rule was provided by West Europeans. The era was the culmination of the “divine right” theory of monarchy in the West, a justification for absolute rule that had been developed quite apart from the abovenoted influences on Russia. In “perfecting” autocracy in the Russian Empire, Catherine and her immediate predecessors were following the almost predominant model of European statecraft. But the special features of the Russian heritage enabled Czarist reality to approach the model more closely than almost any other European country—and to last far longer. T h e “ C l a s s l e s s ” So c i e t y

There is a second feature of the Russian heritage that is not nearly so obvious as absolutism. For centuries, most men took social inequality for granted. Distinctions of wealth, rank, even legal privilege, were widespread. One of the most signifi­

io

Ideology, Politics, and Government

cant developments of the nineteenth century was the concern with such social stratification. As a rule, the phenom enon was described as a “ class" structure, though social thinkers pre­ sented, and continue to present, w idely varying definitions of “ class.” T o the casual W estern observer, the Czarist Em pire seems almost the epitom e of social stratification. T h e super­ ficial impression is of a glittering, if rather irresponsible, aris­ tocracy; an intense but m orbid intellectual m ilieu; and a downtrodden though enduring peasantry. T h ere is consider­ able validity in this picture, but it does not necessarily add up to a class society in the traditional pattern of W estern Europe. In fact, a whole school o f Russian thinkers o f the nineteenth century, the Slavophiles, sharply rejected the idea that Russia had classes at all com parable to those of the W est, and many Western historians share this view point.* T h e Slav­ ophiles, indeed, considered the absence o f classes in the R u s­ sian Em pire to be a significant indication of the superiority of the Russian social order over that of the West, a proof of Russian O rthodoxy’s devotion to hum an brotherhood.

The Nobility In W estern Europe, so the Slavophiles argued, the nobility considered itself to be a true aristocracy. T h o u g h usually o f the same race and nationality as the rest of its country's popu­ lation, the nobility had for centuries enjoyed the status o f a hereditary privileged class. A s a result, the nobles regarded themselves as w holly distinct and superior, entitled to rule and to enjoy the fruits of rule. N o doubt there is m uch that is exaggerated in this argument. B ut it does seem to reflect a fairly common attitude am ong a group of W est European * T h e Slavophile school, as the name indicates, fervently admired Slavic (in fact, mainly Russian) traditional culture. It contrasted sharply with the “Western-oriented” school of nineteenth-century Russian thinkers, which regarded emulation of Western Europe as a major basis for progress.

The Background

11

nobles with whom the Russians were in close contact. Since the early part of the eighteenth century, the Russian Empire had included the Baltic provinces, where a small ru ling class o f Germ an origin dom inated a Latvian and Estonian peas­ antry. T h ere, to quote a Baltic Germ an noble of a later generation,

The person of the peasant, as such, was completely in the back­ ground. If one considered him at all, for the most part one did so with the sort of inquisitive interest with which one today examines some interesting species of man or beast from unknown lands.* Such a concept of class differentiation, while extreme, no doubt influenced the Slavophiles’ view of the West European nobility's m entality. In the Russian lands of the Empire, the position of the upper stratum was different. T h e nobles were indeed legally and factually distinct from the rem ainder of the population, and they enjoyed m any privileges. U nlike the typical Western noble, however, the Russian noble was essentially a servant of the autocracy. N o traditions of fam ily honor or class au­ tonomy shielded him from the full force of absolute rule. H istorically, the Czars had made and remade the nobility in accordance w ith the exigencies of their struggle to strengthen and extend their power. Ivan IV (the Terrible) slaughtered m any of the nobles, filling their posts with loyal members of his bodyguard and entourage. Later Czars were somewhat less ruthless, but constantly raised large numbers of new men to the nobility. O n the other hand, surviving descendants of the princely families of m edieval Russia frequently lived as ob­ scure rustics scarcely distinguishable from the peasants. D ur­ in g the last century of Czarist rule, the equation of nobility * Astaf von Transehe-Roseneck, Die Reform der b'duerlichen Verhalt* nisse in Livland, 1165-1804 (Strasbourg: Karl J. Trubner, 1890).

12

Ideology, Politics, and Government

with service to the regime was codified by regularly conferring patents of nobility upon all who had attained high rank in the civil or m ilitary hierarchy. T hose who had attained top ranks were entitled to pass on their noble status to their sons. T h u s Ilya Ulyanov, Lenin's father,* became a hereditary noble on attaining the post of school superintendent. Lenin's career, though extreme, suggests the lack of regard for hereditary class status common am ong all but a small group of “ great” families in the Russian Empire. Instead o f a self-conscious ruling group, attached to the sovereign by concepts of feudal loyalty but jealous o f their rights even as against the crown, the Russian nobles constituted essentially a bureaucratic order, though initially they derived their mate­ rial support from landed estates rather than salaries. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the nobles’ im portance even as landlords dim inished, and except for a select group who turned to social welfare and educational work in the “ zemstvos” (provincial boards with lim ited legal authority), the landowners as a group did not constitute a decisive factor in the operation o f the im perial regime. T h e real core of the Czarist system was the great bureaucracy of the capital, St. Petersburg (now Leningrad), the m ilitary commanders in the field, the governors and police chiefs of the provinces, and the church hierarchy. T hese officials m aintained order, secured obedience to the Czar's commands (which, o f course, they often inspired), and even supervised much o f the social and economic development of the country. T hese bureaucrats (the term is used in the sociological rather than the pejorative sense) were often recruited from older noble families, but they were shaped by their careers rather than by their origins; and, as noted above, “ new m en” were constantly w ending their way upward via the bureaucratic system. * Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov has gone down in history under the name of “ Lenin/* originally an underground pseudonym.

The Background

13

The Peasantry Juxtaposed to the bureaucratic nobility was the vast mass of peasants, three-quarters o f the entire population. T hese were “ the nation” (narod), the “ dark people” indeed in the sense o f ignorance, but still, as the Russian word for “ peasant” (krestyanin) suggests, the Christians par excellence. T h e spe­ cial regard, almost awe, in which the peasant masses were held indicates the strong populist trend in Russian thought. H ow ­ ever, there was a chasm between the idealized image and real­ ity. U n til 1861, most of the peasants in the Russian Em pire were serfs, the property o f noble landlords or (almost as fre­ quently) of the crown. U nder Catherine the Great, the peasant had been little better than a chattel slave, subject to removal from his ancestral farm, to almost unrestricted sale as property, and to arbitrary and brutal chastisement. “ Em ancipation,” follow ing some m inor reforms earlier in the century, am elio­ rated the peasant’s position, but still his freedom was restricted from two directions. T h e governm ent kept close watch over his activities through the “ land captains.” Primary control of the peasant’s movem ent was left to the village community, or

mir, which, because it was collectively responsible for the tax and redem ption payments for the land allotted the peasants at the time of em ancipation, w ould not let its members leave freely. T h u s the peasant was subject to the group pressure of his peers as w ell as to the authority of the government. T h e power of the mir over the individual was by no means a w holly spontaneous developm ent; for centuries, the .Czarist regime had in various ways strengthened the mir as a con­ venient instrum ent o f control. B ut long-established custom also played a vital role. In m any areas of the Russian Empire, the practice of "repartitional tenure” m eant that each village commune periodi­ cally redistributed its land am ong the m ember families. As a re­ sult, the in dividual or the fam ily group had little incentive to

Ideology, Politics, and Government undertake long-range im provem ent o f the land. Methods o f cultivation tended to be set by custom rather than econom ic calculation. T o a considerable extent, this was the case even in those territories where repartitional tenure did not prevail, for even there the fam ily’s allotm ent of land usually consisted o f scattered strips. T h e size and location of these fragmented holdings required that many of the farm ing operations be con­ ducted in unison, ordinarily in accordance with long-estab­ lished patterns. W here new decisions were required, they were made by the mtr as a collective body in which the less efficient or enterprising members were at least as influential as those who favored modern innovations. In spite o f these circumstances, peasant institutions under­ went considerable change in the last years of the Czarist regime. From 1907 on, the governm ent itself fostered these changes in an effort to create a class of “ yeom en” farmers at­ tached to the principles o f social stability as guarantees for their own property and profits. Measures were envisaged, and to some extent implemented, to break tip the mix, consolidate the scattered holdings of each peasant fam ily, and thus give fuller scope to the initiative of the individual. T h ere is no doubt that many peasants were eager to become fully inde­ pendent farmers. By 1917, the less fortunate or less enterprising peasants were beginning to become differentiated in status and attitudes from their more successful brethren, and in some ways this developm ent was accelerated during the confused situation im m ediately follow ing the revolutions o f that year. T h e more a peasant had, and the more enterprising—and possi­ bly unscrupulous—he was, the more he was apt to receive in the breakup o f the nobles’ estates. Nevertheless, the peasant whom the Bolsheviks confronted was still deeply immersed in the customary life o f his village com m unity.

The Background

l5

The Workers By 1917, the peasants no longer comprised the entire lower stratum. A few m illion industrial workers gained an inordi­ nately im portant role in revolutionary activity, both because of their strategic location in the m etropolitan centers and rail­ road junctions and because of the importance ascribed to them by revolutionary doctrine. In the general perspective of pre-Revolutionary history, however, the “ proletariat” was rela­ tively insignificant; this was all the more true because the in­ dustrial worker was often really a peasant recently, perhaps only temporarily, transplanted to an urban environment.

The Intelligentsia T h e rudim entary nature of the m iddle class was in some ways a more striking difference between pre-Revolutionary Russia and the more advanced W estern lands than the lack of individualist farmers, numerous workers, or an independent aristocracy. W hile the exact relationship between the rise of the European m iddle classes and the growth of limited, repre­ sentative government is uncertain, the reciprocal influence of these developments is incontestible. Historically, the m iddle classes were based on commerce and industry. In the Czarist Em pire, however, commercial activities were relatively poorly developed, especially by members of the dom inant Russian national group. T h e post-1890 period saw phenom enal indus­ trial developm ent, exceeding in proportional growth (though not, of course, in absolute increment) that of most of the W estern countries. A large part of the industry, however, was controlled by W estern investors, and much of the rem ainder consisted of governm ent enterprises. T o the extent to which a Russian commercial and entrepreneurial class had emerged by 1917, it was a new social element, uncertain of its position, relatively unsophisticated, and narrow in its attitudes.

i6

Ideology, Politics, and Government Alongside the businessman, the professional has constituted

an essential element of the W estern m iddle class. T h e usual liberal professions were, of course, represented in the Czarist Empire. Physicians, lawyers, and teachers were numerous and increasingly important. W ithout the support—econom ic and psychological—of an independent aristocracy or a self-reliant farmer or business group, however, the professionals tended to become absorbed in the governm ental bureaucracy or to spend their lives in frustrating, if altruistic, efforts to im prove the lot of the peasantry. Because their professional skills, based on Western experience, provided them w ith an im age o f a more rationally organized society, the conditions o f Czarist Russia seemed the more repugnant to them. In particular, the illiter­ acy and high m ortality o f the peasants appalled the profes­ sional groups. M any of those w ith the most useful skills, such as physicians and teachers (engineers and agricultural techni­ cians, who m ight have been even m ore useful in the long ru n , were scarce and often hardly regarded as professionals), de­ voted themselves to work in the zemstvo. Others took more revolutionary steps. Most o f the professionals constituted a part o f a social group that had no precise W estern counterpart, as our very use o f the Russian term—intelligentsia—indicates. G enerally speaking, membership in the intelligentsia was a m atter of self-identifica­ tion. T h e highly educated bureaucrat or businessman m ight or m ight not regard him self as a member. A half-educated but ar­ ticulate clerk m ight aspire to membership. M ore im portant than its precise composition was the fact that the intelligentsia, as a com paratively self-conscious and active element, occupied the place between the governm ent and the inarticulate low er classes held by the m iddle class in W estern Europe. T h e stu­ dent (including m any middle-aged m en like C hekh ov’s "p er­ petual student”), the scholar, the artist, the professional, tended to constitute the intelligentsia proper. For the most part they

The Background

17

were discontented with the situation in the Russian Empire, em­ barrassed at the “ backwardness” of its econom ic and political developm ent compared to the W est (though often sim ultane­ ously extollin g the inherent superiority o f Russian traditions), and ashamed o f the oppression and neglect of the peasantry. T hese attitudes were com bined with feelings of frustration over their inab ility to exert influence on the autocracy, re­ sentment against curbs on intellectual activity, and, often, the bitterness engendered by poverty. Instead o f a stabilizing ele­ m ent, the intelligentsia tended to be the spearhead o f the forces w orking for profound disruption o f the Czarist order.

T h e I n t e l l e c t u a l C l im a t e

T h e im portance of the intelligentsia’s dissatisfaction as an elem ent in the clim ate o f opinion favorable to revolution is obvious. B ut there are other, more subtle ways in which the attitudes o f Im perial society seem to have prepared for subse­ quent developments. T h e collectivist aspects of the village com m unity hampered individual economic development, and the pressures o f conform ing to the peer group discouraged independent attitudes. Particularly interesting in this connec­ tion is the stress put on unanim ous decisions in the rural com­ m unity. W h ile a considerable measure of discussion took place in village meetings, where all heads o f households were, theo­ retically at least, equal, a decision by m ajority vote was unac­ ceptable. Instead, village opinion demanded unanim ity in the final decision, even if physical coercion was required to secure the m in ority’s assent.

Pressure for Unanimity A t higher levels o f Russian society, the demand for unanim ­ ity in the village took the form o f pervasive censorship o f expression. T h e most obvious side o f this censorship was the

,8

Ideology, Politics, and Government

official one; with varying scope and effectiveness, the regim e sought to suppress ideas hostile to it. In some respects, the “ censorship of the L eft,” however, was more effective and more interesting during the last years of the nineteenth cen­ tury.* T h e writer or artist who failed to express the concepts of protest and revolt dom inant among the intelligentsia was subjected to a type of unofficial ostracism and criticism few could withstand. W h ile the vectors of official and unofficial pressure represented opposing camps, both failed to honor the inviolability of intellectual freedom.

Rejection of Systematic Rationality T h e lack of concern on both R ight and L eft for fixed p rin ­ ciples of civil liberties was characteristic of the fragm entary reception in Russia of W estern ideas. T h e Slavophiles, and some of their successors, exp licitly rejected the systematic ra­ tionality of Western thought. T h e y argued that one o f the great merits of O rthodoxy, in contrast to both Catholicism and Protestantism in the West, was its stress upon mystic experience rather than rationalized philosophy. T h e piety o f the cloister rather than the systems of the scholastics was the glory of O rthodox monasticism. T o some extent, the in tel­ lectual attitudes that underlay this position were shared by the secular intelligentsia. As m entioned earlier, m any Russian intellectuals envied W estern rationality. Yet, w hile G erm an and French (less often British) philosophers were w idely read in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Russia, systematic indigenous philosophy developed only haltingly. Ideas were plentiful, and frequently highly original; but they served as spurs to the sentiments and activities of the intelligentsia rather than as starting points for great integrated systems of thought. * Its effectiveness declined in the last two decades of Czarist rule.

The Background

ig

In a somewhat related fashion, legal principles remained peripheral to Russian intellectual developm ent. T h e autocracy provided a system of courts that, after the 1860’s, provided for juries in crim inal cases—sometimes with startling results. H ow ­ ever, since the police possessed the adm inistrative right to exile political offenders, the concept of inviolable rights under law inherent in W estern legal systems did not exist. A nd it is notable that, in protesting the policies of the regime, the Russian intelligentsia laid little stress upon establishment of the rule o f law as a safeguard against tyranny.

Intellectual Progress A gain, one should not exaggerate the extent of differences between Western and Russian intellectual achievement. Legal scholarship in the last years of the Czarist Empire was im ­ pressive, and one m ight w ell have expected it to have a strong im pact upon social thinking in the next generation. T h e rapid growth of scientific thought in Russia, m arked by the emer­ gence of figures of w orld im portance such as the chemist D im itry I. M endeleyev, the psychologist Ivan P. Pavlov, and the m athem atician N ikolai I. Lobachevsky, indicates the ac­ ceptance of a kind of rationality that w ould inevitably have induced more systematic approaches to general problems of knowledge. T h e very considerable progress in general educa­ tion, which promised to reduce illiteracy to modest levels w ithin a generation follow ing the reforms of 1905, m ight have provided a solid foundation for liberal institutions and social progress.

Messianism O ne more aspect of the clim ate of ideas in the Czarist Em pire must be m entioned: the tendency toward messianic conceptions of Russia’s role in world history. T h e Slavophile

20

Ideology, Politics, and Government

conviction of the superiority o f O rthodoxy in the social and intellectual spheres form ed one foundation for this view. T h e Slavophiles’ more m ilitant successors, the Panslavs, envisaged a secular mission for the Russian nation—that o f u n itin g all the Slavic peoples, assuming a dom inant position in Europe, and reform ing the “ decadent” W est. Except for brief intervals, such radically ethnocentric and expansionist ideas had little influence on official foreign policy. T h e concept o f the civiliz­ ing mission of Russia—not basically different from the theories influencing contemporary W est European im perialism —was more im portant. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire embraced over 166 m illion inhabitants in an area of 8 m illion square miles. O ver half o f the population was non-Russian. T ru e, m any of the rem ainder were East Slavs, closely related to the Russians, and most o f the others were Europeans livin g in the border areas. T h e greatest ex­ pansion of the Em pire had taken place in Asia, however, and there the Czarist proconsuls believed that they were entitled to impose the benefits of Russian culture and m aterial progress.

The Absence of Racist Attitudes It should be pointed out that the Russians, on the w hole, did not share the rigid attitudes o f racial superiority and seg­ regation that characterized m any W est European colonizers. U nlike the W est European colonial empires, separated by thousands of miles of ocean from their home countries and in ­ habited by peoples whose physical characteristics differentiated them from the Europeans, the Russian Em pire stretched in an unbroken mass across Eurasia. T o a considerable degree, the physical characteristics o f the Em pire’s population represented a series of gradual changes from the blond, semi-“ N ord ic” types of the Baltic coast to the darker, flatter M ongol features o f the A ltai. T h en , too, in contrast to the dram atic “ expansion o f W estern Europe” in the sixteenth century, Russian contact

The Background

21

with non-Europeans had lasted for more than a m illennium , involving relationships of subjection as well as ascendancy. Some observers would also ascribe part of the differences in Russian racial attitudes to O rthodox influence, especially as contrasted to northwest European Calvinism . But whatever the reasons, this aspect o f Russian heritage—the com bination of strong national pride, to the point of a messianic com plex, and a relatively tolerant attitude toward racial differences—has exerted an im portant influence on more recent Soviet con­ tacts with the non-European world.

T he R evolution and A fter It w ould be fascinating to trace both the constant and the changing aspects of Russian thought and practice under the im pact o f revolution. Here, however, we can only note the most essential facts o f Soviet history; brief as it is, this sum­ m ary should provide the reader with a sense of chronological developm ent. T h e first revolution o f 1917, in M arch, was quite unplanned. U nder the terrible strain of W orld W ar I, the rigid and inef­ ficient structure of the Czarist regim e broke down. For a few months, liberals and moderates im bued with Western con­ cepts o f governm ental and social order m aintained a precari­ ous grip on the central authority. In Novem ber, they were swept away, almost w ithout bloodshed, by the Bolshevik R evo­ lution. A few thousand determ ined revolutionists, guided by the ideological and organizational theories that we shall exam ­ ine in the next chapter, inherited the place of the Czarist bu­ reaucracy. Am ong the m ain reasons for their success was their willingness to promise im m ediate distribution of land to the peasants (with covert reservations concerning the more distant future) and im m ediate peace negotiations with Germany. W ith in a few months, however, the Bolsheviks were engaged in a desperate struggle against a variety of domestic “ counter­

Ideology, Politics, and Government

22

revolutionary” movements, which were sporadically and inef­ fectively supported by the Central Powers and the W estern Allies. By 1920, the Bolsheviks had trium phed fully, except in some outlying areas o f the former Empire, but they did so at a terrible cost. M illions had died in battle or as a result of fam­ ine, and the relatively small industrial and transportation capital o f the country had been largely dissipated. A large part o f the old nobility, intelligentsia, and bureaucracy had fled or died. These catastrophic events m ade it easier for the Bolshe­ viks to carry out the rem odeling of Russian society, for m uch of the old social fabric had disintegrated. In the early 1920’s, their most urgent need, however, was to ensure a m inim al livelihood for the surviving population and to m aintain a modicum o f national strength. T h e long period o f the “ N ew Economic Policy” (1921-28) was essentially a holding opera­ tion in which the Bolshevik leadership sought time to prepare for the next stage.

Stalin A t the beginning o f this period, L enin, a truly charism atic figure, became incapacitated (he died in early 1924), and lead­ ership was gradually assumed by one o f his less prom inent lieutenants, Joseph V. Stalin. In a series o f crafty and ruthless maneuvers, Stalin defeated and discredited his rivals in the Com munist Party (as the Bolshevik group called itself after March, 1918). By 1928, Stalin ruled supreme. H e then launched a crash program of industrialization, the so-called Five-Year Plans. Simultaneously, he carried out the collectivization of agriculture, forcing the ind ividu al peasant-farmers into large kolkhozes (collective farms). C ollectivization was achieved at the cost of several m illion lives and a catastrophic drop in food production; as we shall see, its results are still by no means cer­ tain. It did, however, give the Soviet regim e com plete physical control o f the countryside. T h e more clear-cut successes o f the

The Background

23

Five-Year Plans greatly increased the industrial basis for Soviet m ilitary power. In the period between 1934 and 1938, Stalin consolidated his absolute dictatorship by a vast blood purge o f the Com m unist Party, which brought in its wake the destruc­ tion of most of the old Bolshevik leadership.

The Crisis of World War II Scarcely had this crisis passed before the U.S.S.R. was in­ volved in W orld W ar II, first as a quasi-ally of the A xis powers, then (when H itler turned on the U.S.S.R.) as a member of the anti-Axis coalition. T h e war, which at one point saw H itler’s forces occupying territory that had sheltered more than onethird of the Soviet population, wrought enormous destruction. T h e Soviet death toll—in the neighborhood of 20 m illion—was greater than that of any other belligerent, even the defeated powers, and the per-capita death rate higher than that of any other country with the possible exception of Poland and Y u ­ goslavia. Econom ic losses were also enormous, though the am azing success of Soviet evacuation and rebuilding of indus­ try in the Urals and other regions prevented complete economic collapse. T h e Nazi invasion revealed that a large proportion of the Soviet population was so alienated from its own govern­ m ent that it welcomed foreign “ deliverance.” But the cruel policies of the Nazis, com bined with the strength of the Com ­ m unist apparatus and residual Russian patriotism, enabled the Soviet regim e to m aintain enough popular support to win. It may, perhaps, never be possible to estimate the exact meas­ ure in which each m em ber o f the anti-Axis coalition contribu­ ted to the final victory; but unquestionably, the U.S.S.R.'s contribution was enormous. Consequently, and also as a re­ sult of G erm any’s and Japan’s elim ination, the prestige of the Com m unist regime greatly increased, though (as Stalin pri­ vately admitted) its m aterial strength had been sapped. T h e Soviet rulers have since taken advantage of this circumstance

Ideology, Politics, and Government

24

to claim that the superiority of the Soviet system has been proved in the test of war.

Khrushchev and His Successors For seven and one*half years after the end of W orld W ar II, Stalin retained his undisputed dictatorial powers. W h ile the U.S.S.R. rebuilt its physical plant, Stalin rigidly m aintained barriers to intercourse between the Soviet population and the outside world. His death in March, 1953, unleashed a period of sharp struggle among his lieutenants, culm inating in N ik ita Khrushchev’s victory at the Party m eeting in January, 1955, which ordered his rival G eorgi M alenkov’s resignation. In June, 1957, Khrushchev succeeded in rem oving his principal rivals (the “ anti-Party” group) from all m ajor posts. B ut he never acquired the undisputed authority that Stalin had enjoyed; and in October, 1964, Khrushchev him self was ousted. Since 1964, the idea of "collective leadership,’’ frequently proclaimed under Lenin, Khrushchev, and even Stalin, has acquired more significance. G radually the Party chief, Leonid Brezhnev, has acquired a degree of pre-eminence, but he has carefully avoided (or been obliged to avoid) the personal assertiveness which Khrushchev displayed, to say nothing o f the real despotism which Stalin exercised. For thirteen years, the Soviet regime has continued, therefore, w ithout an in ­ dividual dictatorship; it seems safe to assume that the particu­ lar brand o f government established in the U.S.S.R. does not

require highly personalized authority. SUGGESTED READINGS The following general histories of Russia are especially valuable. C larkson , J esse

D. A History of Russia. New York: Random House,

1961. E lliso n , H erbert J.

History of Russia. New York: Holt, Rinehart, fc

Winston, 1964. T . Russia: A History and an Interpretation. 2 vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953.

F l o r in sk y , M ic h a e l

The Background P ares , B ern ard . *

25

A History of Russia. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

953-

R ia s a n o v s k y , N ic h o l a s .

A History of Russia. 2d ed. London and

York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

The Russian Empire, 1801—1917. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967. S u m n e r , B. H. A Short History of Russia. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1949; Harvest paperback, 1962. T h a d e n , E dward C. Russia Since 1801: The Making of a New So­ ciety. New York: John W iley,-1971. V er n a d sk y , G eo r g e . A History of Russia. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1954. Se t o n -W a t so n , H u g h .

Very competent surveys of the Soviet period of Russian history and its immediate background of revolutionary ferment are: . A History of Soviet Rttssia. 6th ed. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. keadgold , D o n a l d W. Twentieth Century Russia. Chicago: Rand McNally 8c Company, 1964.

R a u c h , G eorg v o n

T

Those deeply interested in the Bolshevik Revolution and its im­ mediate aftermath should read: C arr , E dw ard H a l l e t t .

A History of Soviet Russia. 6 vols. New

York: The Macmillan Company, 1950-64. C h a m b e r l in , W i l l i a m H e n r y .

The Russian Revolution. 2 vols. New

York: The Macmillan Company, i960.

Red October: The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. New York: Scribners, 1967. A thorough, up-to-date narrative

D a n ie l s , R o b er t V .

of the principal events of the Revolution. The Life of Lenin. New York: Harper Colophon Paperback, 1964. The most up-to-date and comprehensive Lenin biography, strong on the events of the Revolution, rather weak on ideological development. Sc h a p ir o , L eo n a r d . The Origin of the Communist Autocracy. Cam­ bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955; New York: Praeger paperback, 1965. F isch er , L o u is .

Three Who Made a Revolution. New York: The Dial Press, 1948; Boston: Beacon Press paperback, 1955.

W olfe, B ertram .

Ideology, Politics, and Government

26

More specialized works on earlier Russian history of particular in* terest are:

The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretative His­ tory of Russian Culture. New York: Knopf, 1966. A fresh review

B il u n g t o n , J a m es H .

stressing religious, intellectual, and artistic factors. E. (ed.). The Transformation of Russian Society. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, i960. An impressive collaborative effort to compare pre-Revolutionary and Soviet so­ ciety.M a sa r y k , T h o m as G . The Spirit of Russia. 2 vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. A penetrating analysis of Russian thought in the nineteenth century by a great Czechoslovak states­ man. M a v o r , J a m e s . An Economic History of Russia. 2 vols. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1914. The only comprehensive treat­ ment of economic development under the Czars. M a y n a r d , J o h n . Russia in Flux. New York: The Macmillan Com­ pany, 1947. A controversial but stimulating interpretation of the main currents of Russian history.

B l a c k , C y r il

B. The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 1856—1870. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. A pene­

P etr o v ich , M ic h a e l

trating study of a crucial period in the development of Russian ideology. P ipes , R ich ard (ed.), The Russian Intelligentsia. New York: Colum­ bia University Press, 1961. An important collection of essays on the situation of the intelligentsia under the Czarist regime and the Soviet system. R o b in so n , G eroid T . Rural Russia under the Old Regime. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949. A masterful description of the peasant base of old Russia. St a r r , S. F rederick .

De-Centralization and Self-Government in Rus­

sia, 1850-1870. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. An intensive analysis of the development of liberalism and the zemstvo movement. W a l l a c e , D o n a ld M a c k e n z ie . Russia. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1905. In spite of its early date, this work has remained unsurpassed for its insight into Russian social conditions. L. The Systematization of Russian Government. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973. While mainly con­ cerned with administration, this work presents an impressive theory of the evolution of the political order in Russia.

Y a n e y , G eo rge

2

TH E IDEOLOGY

In all societies, political culture is an amalgam of traditional, often subconscious, influences, and deliberate indoctrination by dom inant institutions. In The American Dilemma, Gunnar M yrdal was able to identify an “ Am erican Creed,” which included those democratic principles inculcated by the schools, the churches, the mass m edia, and other institutions, as w ell as those traditions transmitted from generation to generation. Sim ilar political-cultural (deliberate-traditional) amalgams have been detected in most other modern societies. As we have seen, the traditional element is strong in the U.S.S.R.,. too. W h at distinguishes the Soviet political system is the near m o­ nopoly over the means of overt inculcation of political culture that is held by a single institutional com plex, which we may call the “ regim e.” T h e Soviet regim e claims to exercise its m onopoly in favor of a single body of ideas, the Com m unist ideology. U sing this ideology, the regim e seeks not m erely to influence a lim ited range o f political behavior but to rem ake the entire society. In order to carry out this totalitarian trans­ form ation, a new hum an personality must, according to the ideology, develop. M oreover, the ideology claims to be a sys­ tematic, indeed a scientific, doctrine capable of guiding the process of hum an transform ation. A n exam ination of this sup­ posed scientific approach to social problems is the prerequi­ site to understanding the present Soviet system. For, whether or not the regime has followed its purported blueprint, a doc­ trine given such intense overt allegiance must, inevitably, ex­ ert a strong psychological influence.

27

28

Ideology, Politics, and Government T h e o r e t ic a l F o u n d a t io n s

Officially, the body of Com m unist ideology is called “ M arx­ ism-Leninism.” * As the name indicates, the ideology is not an indigenous Russian growth, for Karl M arx and his collabora­ tor, Friedrich Engels, were Germ an by birth. T h e ir works and Lenin's constitute the “ classics” of present-day Soviet ideology. A lthough Lenin built upon the basic M arxist structure, he modified it in many respects—rarely adm itting that he had done so, however. H is successors have introduced additional modifications, but “ Leninism ,” to a m uch greater extent than “ M arxism ,” remains the foundation of Soviet ideological thinking. Indeed, several o f the most far-reaching m odifica­ tions o f Leninism made by Lenin's im m ediate successor, the Georgian Stalin, have been disavowed or allow ed to fall into disuse. T h is circumstance is im portant, not least because it represents a return to the peculiarly Russian aspect of Com m u­ nism. For Lenin (though of m ixed ethnic descent) was Russian to the core, and m any of the changes he introduced in M arx’s doctrine reflect the influence of the Russian heritage. T h e re­ turn to Lenin promoted by N ikita Khrushchev and his succes­ sors (most of whom are Russians) bears the stamp o f an earthy Russian m entality. Still, it m ay be argued, these national influences are secondary; for, through all changes, M arx’s aim —the creation of the “ new m an”—has rem ained.

Materialism M aterialism, probably the most fundam ental premise o f the doctrine, has also rem ained essentially unchanged since M arx. According to M arxism-Leninism, all being is determ ined by * T his chapter draws heavily upon Communist terminology. Its conno­ tation to the Western reader is often quite different from the real mean­ ing of the terms—sometimes designedly so, for Communists are skilled in using words to convey one meaning to the unaware outsider, another to the initiated. T o avoid misunderstanding, such terms will be enclosed in quotation marks when first used, and their implications explained.

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the nature of the m aterial “ base.” T h e situation of m ankind is said to depend upon the “ relationships of production.” In each epoch of hum an history, given types of tools (using the term in a broad sense) are available, and human labor utilizes them in a certain way. T h e nature of this relation of man to his tools requires a special form of social organization—“ the relationship of production,” or “ base.” A ll other aspects of hu­ man society—fam ily relations, religion, government, law, art, philosophy, literature—are included in the “ superstructure.” T h e elements of the superstructure are reflections of the base and change in their nature as m an’s organized relationship to his tools changes. Expressed in these simple terms (avoiding the numerous com plications and qualifications that Soviet and non-Soviet M arxists have discussed), materialism seems either self-evident or absurd, depending on the philosophical premises of the ob­ server. Accepted im plicitly by the Soviet Com m unist (and ap­ parently by most educated Soviet citizens outside the Party), however, materialism has tremendous psychological im plica­ tions. T h e world, all of human existence, is “ explained” w ithout reference to God. Consequently, Marxism-Leninism has always been rigorously atheistic, not m erely agnostic. No religious influence can encroach (so long as the doctrine is ac­ cepted) upon the Com m unist’s loyalty to the ideology and its spokesmen. T h e world, in both its physical and its human as­ pects, is explained "scientifically.” As a result, the discoveries of the natural sciences receive enormous emphasis in the U.S.S.R. Except in more or less isolated cases—when it seems to conflict with Leninist principles or with the personal in­ terests of a leader of the regim e—scientific investigation receives great support. It seems probable, however, that m ate­ rialism itself (as w ell as practical necessity) encourages em pha­ sis upon the more im m ediate aspects of scientific work—those perm itting im m ediate technical application—rather than upon

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the more abstract elements of scientific thought. T h u s, the stress in Soviet activity and p ublicity is upon the conquest o f nature, whether by Sputnik or polar exploration, rather than, for exam ple, on the theory o f relativity. Basic theory is often accepted ready-made from foreign sources.

Dialectic T h e striking and readily com prehended successes of Soviet science and technology in conquering nature have unquestion­ ably deepened popular confidence in the ability of science to explain and accomplish everything. In turn, this confidence strengthens the ideological teaching o f materialism . T o m any foreign observers it has seemed that the young Soviet-trained citizens are indeed attached to a m aterialism based principally, if not exclusively, upon the kind of natural scientific m ate­ rialism known (though not dom inant) in the W est for two centuries. T o the official Com m unist ideologist, such a view is anathema, for by om itting the second basic aspect o f MarxistLeninist doctrine, the “ dialectic," it reduces the system to “ vulgar m aterialism ." A ccording to M arx (whom Lenin osten­ sibly fully accepted on this count), “ dialectical m aterialism ” is an indivisible whole. U nfortunately, the dialectic aspects of the doctrine are very difficult to explain concisely—and indeed there appears to be considerable confusion am ong its adherents (including M arx) in the explanation o f this theory. Its fundam ental aspect is the sim ultaneous presence, in all phases of being, o f contradictory elements—“ thesis” and “ antithesis." T h e interaction o f the contradictory elements leads to change—the form ation of a new state (“ synthesis” ), which, however, also contains contradictory elements that w ill eventually result in change. M arx wisely refrained from apply­ ing this recondite concept to the w orld o f nature. H is disciple Engels was less cautious; for exam ple, he m aintained that the change of water when heat is w ithdraw n represented a dialectic

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transformation to—icel Lenin and subsequent Soviet Marxists have followed this interpretation, which to most outside ob­ servers appears to be a meaningless and absurd play on words. For exam ple, Soviet theorists assert that m ajor advances like determ ination of the structural variability of chromosomes were guided by Soviet scientists’ understanding of dialectics. Probably, however, a German biologist w ho has closely fol­ lowed Soviet scientific developments is right in concluding that “ today as in earlier periods there is a dialectic-materialist interpretation o f the results o f natural scientific research; but this interpretation is retrospective, after the research has been accomplished, and no longer has any influence on the question of w hat direction research may take or how it may be carried out.” * Even in Stalin’s last years ideological interference w ith serious research in the physical sciences declined, although the biological sciences were affected somewhat longer. Stalin, in fact, tended to detach whole fields of knowledge, like linguistics and formal logic, from the schematic division between “ base” and “ superstructure.” In some respects, the return to Leninism after his death meant more ideological content in these fields, but considerable variation continues to exist, especially in the approach to logic. In w hat are sometimes called the “hard sciences,” therefore, Soviet scholars proceed on much the same basis as their W estern counterparts. A m ajor aspect o f the dialectic transformation is the “ trans­ form ation o f quantity to qu ality.” A ccording to this principle, m inor, im perceptible changes (in “ qu antity”) occur in a sub­ stance or state w ithout altering its nature, or “ quality.” W hen the accum ulation of m inor changes reaches a certain point, however, the change of “ q u ality” occurs all at once—the “ dia­ lectic leap.” T h is “ leap,” according to all the “ classics,” up to and including Lenin, is always sudden—as the exam ple of • Arnold Buchholz, “Wissenschaftlich-technische Revolution,” in Ost-

europa, X X II (1972), 355. Emphasis in original.

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change of water to ice was intended to demonstrate. T h is ex­ planation probably contains a clue to why Com m unist theo­ rists are attracted to the dialectic explanation, for it provides a ready justification for revolution. Therefore, Stalin, w ho was bent upon the consolidation of his dictatorship, feared the “ explosive” leap and revised Marxism-Leninism to m aintain that dialectic change under some conditions was gradual.

Historical Materialism T h é practical im portance o f the dialectic to Soviet Com m u­ nism has, however, lain in its relation to the historical devel­ opm ent o f society rather than in its questionable philosophical validity or in its dubious application to the natural sciences. “ Historical materialism ,” that is, the application of the dialec­ tic to history, supposedly offers the only valid explanation of social development. However doubtful this assertion may be, M arx’s original stress upon dialectic developm ent did have the virtue of focusing attention on those elements of change and interrelation of social phenomena that m any of his contem ­ poraries and immediate predecessors had neglected. As noted in the discussion of m aterialism, M arx contended that every stage of history has been m arked by divisions of human society corresponding to m an’s relationship to tools. As the tools change, the relationships change; hence the existing social order becomes unstable as the contradictory elements w ithin it emerge. More specifically, a new dom inant class rises to replace the old; at the appropriate time, the new class seizes power by revolution, usually violent. T h u s, the feudal nobility replaced the slaveowners of antiquity, and “ capitalist” entrepreneurs (the “ bourgeoisie”) replaced the nobility. Obviously, the M arxist was really interested in the next stage—the replacement of the bourgeoisie b y the industrial workers, or “ proletariat,” for this final change w ould usher in the era of the “ classless” society, in which man w ould m ove

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toward perfection w ithout further recourse to violent revolu­ tions. From the philosophical standpoint, the insistence on the m otivating force of class conflict throughout all previous hu­ man history, to be superseded at an arbitrary time by harm o­ nious progress, seems untenable. Psychologically, however, the explanation has its appeal. It accepts, in part, the hard-headed skepticism of the cyclical theories o f history—each stage o f hu­ man society develops, unfolds its m axim um possibilities, and then declines, to be replaced by a new cycle o f human devel­ opm ent. T h e M arxist type o f cyclical developm ent, however, avoids ultim ate pessimism by the reassurance that, in terms of hum an progress, each cycle is higher than the preceding one. M oreover, each cycle constitutes a prerequisite for a still more progressive cycle. Finally, a stage (close at hand) is reached in which the necessity of the violent replacement o f an outworn social structure ends, and the type o f unilateral progress espoused by the eighteenth-century Utopians appears. In considerable measure, then, M arxism-Leninism has ap­ pealed to both optimists and skeptics; its avowed contempt for "utopias” is coupled to a promise of perfection in this world.

Imperialism Still, the emphasis o f the ideology is upon the transforma­ tion from “ capitalism ” to "socialism .” Prior to Lenin, this transformation was predicted for an advanced industrial coun­ try in which the workers constitute the overw helm ing m ajor­ ity o f the population. M arx developed immensely elaborate arguments to show that all value was produced by the workers, but that the capitalists systematically appropriated the "sur­ plus value,” i.e., all above that which the workers need to re­ produce their kind. T h e argum ent appears to have little factual validity or even systematic relation to the rest o f historical materialism, but its appeal for workers who are really desti­

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tute has been enormous. In the early part of this century, however, Lenin was confronted with the necessity of exp lain ­ ing why workers in many West European countries were not becom ing progressively more im poverished, but, on the con­ trary were m aking economic strides. His answer was the theory of “ imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism .” T h e essence of his argument was that the immensely concentrated capitalist monopolies in advanced industrial countries could afford to bribe their proletariats to assist the capitalists in “ ex­ porting exploitation” to less developed areas where (one could deduce from M arxist theory) capital returns would be higher. Thus, improvement of the condition of a m inority of the w ork­ ers (West European whites) was achieved at the expense of a huge m ajority of workers and peasants (largely colored) in co­ lonial and semi-colonial countries.

The Weakest Link In retrospect, Lenin appears to have been uncannily foresighted in advancing a theory of im perialism so w ell adapted to present Com m unist appeals to the underdeveloped nations. A t the time, however, he was more concerned with the course to be taken by the proletariat of W estern Europe and, above all, with the immediate future of revolution in Russia. It is true that Lenin hesitated for a long time before definitely as­ serting that a “ socialist” revolution could occur in so back­ ward a country as Russia, but he m aintained, at an early date, that a “ bourgeois” revolution in Russia could ignite “ proletar­ ian” revolutions throughout Europe. A ccording to Lenin's theory of the "weakest lin k,” revolution w ould not occur first in the more advanced industrial countries, where the workers were tem porarily bought off by m inor concessions, but in a country that was in the initial and more painful stages of in ­ dustrialization. Such a country’s capitalists, though in an early stage of developm ent, had to compete with those of more ad­

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vanced countries in securing colonies and spheres of influence. T o do so, the capitalists (like those in heavily industrialized countries) used the state machinery, the governm ent of their country, as an instrum ent. As the com petition among the cap­ italist-controlled governments became more severe, it was attended by international friction, armaments races, and, even­ tually, war—W orld W ar I. T hese developments imposed ter­ rible burdens upon the w orking classes of all the com peting and w arring nations. T hese burdens were most severe, to the point of being unendurable, upon the small, weak proletariat and the larger, inarticulate peasantry of the country that was only in the initial stage of industrialization, but that was fully engaged in the unequal im perialist contest. T h is country was, of course, Russia; and the theory justified what Lenin was really most interested in asserting—that Russia was ripe for revolution.

T h e D ir e c t iv e s

Russia was ripe for a revolution, but not yet inevitably drawn to proletarian revolution. For L enin, as for M arx, the strongly determ inistic theory of historical materialism was ac­ com panied by an insistence (which m any critics have felt to be philosophically inconsistent) upon the need for conscious, de­ liberate human action to speed and smooth the course of social developm ent. Both M arx and Lenin m aintained that theory and action are inseparable, but L en in ’s emphasis on organiz­ ing a revolution was m uch stronger than M arx’s. Indeed, m any students of Lenin's work have felt that he was prim arily interested in social engineering rather than in social theory.

The Party T o carry out the proletarian revolution, according to Lenin, a highly organized party was necessary. W ithout the leader­

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ship of this “ vanguard o f the proletariat,” the w orking class, he said, lacked consciousness o f its own true interests, to say nothing of the ability to im plem ent them. T h is party (which of course turned out to be the Bolsheviks, L en in ’s own faction o f the Russian Social Dem ocratic W orkers Party) should em­ brace all the “ conscious” elements o f the proletariat and per­ sons of other classes (like Lenin himself) who adhered to the proletarian cause. A ll members, Lenin held, must actively par­ ticipate in the party's work, which, under the conditions of the Czarist regime, had to be illegal, therefore conspiratorial. B u t even where the party was legal (as was briefly the case in R us­ sia), it must retain a conspiratorial substratum. In order to bring about the revolution, all means are legitim ate: “ M oral­ ity is that which serves to destroy the old exploiting society and to unite all toilers around the proletariat.” * A s recently as November, 1970, Brezhnev quoted this dictum o f L en in ’s as a guideline for all Communists.-)*

Democratic Centralism T h e guiding organizational principle o f the party was “ democratic centralism .” A ccording to Lenin, this concept meant choosing leaders (in a pyram idal system of indirect elec­ tion) by the rank and file, follow ed by binding decisions from above. Between elections, the party leaders were supreme, and any effort to agitate or com bine against their decisions was treason to the party. Sim ilarly, party policies m ight be debated openly (in the appropriate party m eetings or committees) be­ fore decisions were m ade; after that no opposition was perm it­ ted. H ow “ democratic centralism ,” still nom inally the gu idin g organizational p rin cip le o f the Com m unist Party and the Soviet state (according to the 1977 Constitution), works in practice we shall consider in the next chapter. Let us sim ply note here • Sochineniya (Leningrad: Partizdat, 1935), X X V , 392. f Pravda, November 25, 1970.

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that, in pre-Revolutionary times, debates and elections could not take place with any regularity in the underground party. Hence, democratic centralism meant, in practice, Lenin's con­ tinued dom ination. Even after the Revolution, however, he usually avoided the naked application of force within the party to accomplish his purposes.

Revolution In his last years, M arx had considered the possibility of a peaceful victory of the proletariat. H e held that in countries where elections and representative governm ent had some m eaning (specifically in G reat Britain and the U nited States) the workers’ parties m ight secure power by w inning control of the legislative bodies. U ltim ately, Lenin rejected this possibil­ ity: It [the cap italist state] can n ot be replaced by the p roletarian State (the dictatorsh ip o f the p ro letariat) through m ere "w ith erin g aw a y,” b u t, in accordance w ith the g en eral rule, can on ly be b ro u g h t ab o u t by a v io le n t revo lu tio n .*

Lenin did, however, envisage one exception: O n e can n o t deny that in in d ivid u a l cases, as exceptions, fo r ex­ am p le in some sm all state, it is possible that a fter the victory o f the social revo lu tio n in a large n eig h b o rin g state the bourgeoisie w o u ld p eacefu lly give u p its p ow er if it becam e convinced o f the hopelessness o f resistance an d p referred to save th eir h ea d s.f

For decades, L en in ’s dicta on the necessity o f violent revolu­ tion were not questioned by Soviet leaders (though often tac­ itly ignored, for diplom atic reasons). In 1956, however, N ikita Khrushchev and other Soviet spokesmen referred to the pos­ sibility of a “ parliam entary path to socialism.” T h e y denied that this constituted a contradiction of Lenin, and referred somewhat vaguely to exceptions he had envisaged. Apparently, • State and Revolution (New York: Vanguard Press, 1929), p. 128. t Sochineniya (4th ed.; Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1949), X X III, 57.

Ideology, Politics, and Government the exception the latter-day Soviet leaders really had in m ind was the “ small country” Lenin referred to (again w ith con­ siderable prescience) in the passage just quoted. Specifically, Soviet spokesmen alluded to the “ peaceful” Com m unist take­ over in Czechoslovakia, in 1948. T h is coup had indeed been accomplished w ithout m uch bloodshed; but it was brought off by mass demonstrations, hoodlumism, the threat o f un­ checked violence by Com munists w ithin the country, and the veiled hint of intervention by overw helm ing Soviet forces stra­ tegically deployed on almost all of the Czechoslovak frontiers. In contrast to the m onolithic rigidity demanded by Stalin, recent Soviet practice has granted the satellite regimes (some Com munist regimes like Yugoslavia, are not Soviet satellites) a certain degree of flexibility in conduct of local affairs. But all orthodox Communists agree that, however the “ workers’ party” comes to power, it must establish a “ dictatorship o f the proletariat.” T h e purpose o f the dictatorship is to sup­ press the exploiting classes (bourgeoisie and rem nants o f the nobility) and prepare the way for “ socialism.” Socialism, in its turn, is (according to M arx, Lenin, and their Soviet suc­ cessors) a necessary transitional stage to true “ Com m unism .” Under socialism, the means of production are placed in the hands of the workers’ state; private enterprise in commerce, m anufacturing, or farm ing is elim inated as quickly as feasible. Legal and social controls rem ain necessary, however, not only to suppress remnants o f the exp loiting classes, but to ensure proper work and social behavior on the part of workers and peasants who still are influenced by “ remnants o f bourgeois m entality.” T h e principle of socialism must be “ from each according to his ability, to each according to his w ork.”

Socialism in One Country Both M arx and Lenin had thought that the stage at which compulsion is still necessary w ould be brief. T o M arx, the great economic m achine bu ilt by capitalism , once in the hands

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o f the workers, would be almost able to furnish the abundance o f goods required by the form ula of true Com munism —“ from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.” Lenin realized that such abundance would not be achieved for m any years by the backward Russian economy, but he be­ lieved that the revolution, once started, would, via chain reac­ tion (to use an anachronistic analogy), spread to the more industrialized countries. T h e n the workers' governments o f these countries, com ing to the rescue o f the Russian socialist state, which had shown them the way, would aid Russia to build up its economy rapidly. Lenin never gave up this hope, but, being practical, he concentrated in his last years upon strengthening the proletarian dictatorship achieved in Russia. T h is was the beginning o f the practice of “ socialism in one country,” which Stalin elevated to the level of theory. T o develop the Russian economy rapidly w ithout outside aid, a Spartan regime o f m aterial privation was required, resembling the early period of capitalism with its harsh conditions of labor, long hours, and bare subsistence wages. Indeed, one Bol­ shevik economist explicitly avowed the necessity of a period o f “ the prim itive accum ulation o f capital under socialism” at the expense o f the mass o f the population. T h o u g h Stalin never officially accepted the theory of “ prim itive accum ulation,” it seems to have been his real gùide in the frightful deprivations occasioned by the collectivization of agriculture and the indus­ trialization o f the early Five-Year Plans (1928-41). Soviet lead­ ers assert today that the U.S.S.R. has reached a stage where economic progress is com patible with the provision of consider­ able consumers' goods. But the “ prim itive accum ulation” theory in fact, though not in name, is still the Com m unist prescription for underdeveloped countries.

The Omnipotent State M any M arxists (even in the U.S.S.R.) had anticipated that, as socialism developed, the state and its repressive organs

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w ould gradually dim inish in scope. Stalin, however, sharply denied this contention: W e stand fo r the w ith e rin g aw ay o f the state. A t the sam e tim e w e stand fo r stren gth en in g o f the d ictatorsh ip o f the p ro letaria t, w h ich is the m ightiest a n d strongest state p ow er th at has e v er existed. T h e highest d evelo p m en t o f state p ow er w ith th e o b je c t o f p rep arin g the co n d ition s for the w ith e rin g aw ay o f state p o w er —th at is the M arxist form u la. Is it contradictory? Yes, it is “ co n ­ tradictory.” B u t this co n trad ictio n is b o u n d u p w ith life , an d it fu lly reflects M a rx ’s dialectics.*

T h is passage suggests the psychological u tility of the con­ cept of the dialectic, however dubious its theoretical relevance may have been. In practice, the emphasis on the increased power of the state m eant not only forced industrialization and collectivization, but the m aintenance o f a vast m ilitary estab­ lishment and a ubiquitous police. In fact, Stalin, in the 1930’$, placed greater stress upon the need for defending the Soviet U nion (increasingly identified in his speeches w ith the R u s­ sian nation) than upon preparing the econom ic basis for C om ­ munism. A fter 1933, the rise o f N azi power in G erm any provided more than adequate reason for this emphasis. T h e view o f the Soviet state as the “ fortress o f revolu tion” in a hos­ tile "capitalist encirclem ent” long predated any m ajor threat from what the Communists described generically as “ fascist” regimes, however. Even in Lenin's day, foreign Com m unist parties had been obliged to subordinate their im m ediate inter­ ests to the aim o f bu ildin g up Soviet strength. U nder Stalin, this process was carried to extrem e lengths. A t the same time, he contended that the successes o f socialism in the U .S.S.R . made both its foreign and domestic enemies (the “ rem nants o f the exploiting classes” and those controlled by “ bourgeois m entality” ) more desperate in their efforts to overthrow the • Joseph V. Stalin, Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955), X II, 381.

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Soviet regime. T h is theory was the doctrinal justification for the G reat Purge of the 1930’s and the m aintenance of arbi­ trary and ruthless police controls. A fter Stalin’s death, the theory of the increasing antagonism of internal enemies was officially repudiated, doubtless because it was recognized as a weapon more readily turned against the Com munist Party it­ self than against the Party’s real enemies.

Transition to Communism T h e role of the state is very intim ately related to the transi­ tion to fu ll Com m unism , the ultim ate goal of all Marxists. W h ile stressing this goal, M arx him self was wise enough to avoid setting a precise schedule for its attainm ent or defining its characteristics. Both Lenin and Stalin were equally cau­ tious. In 1961, however, when Khrushchev was at the height of his power, the Soviet Com m unist Party adopted a new pro­ gram declaring that the U.S.S.R. was m aking the transition toward fu ll Com munism . T h e “ m aterial and technical basis,” the program declared, w ould be com pleted by 1980. By that time, two basic prerequisites were to “ come close” to being attained: the provision of goods “ to each according to his needs” ; and the establishment of a single system of public ownership of the means of production in contrast to the pres­ ent division between “ socialist” (state-owned) and “ coopera­ tive” property.

To Each According to His Needs—or Workt N either the 1961 program nor earlier Com m unist writings ever im plied that the form ula “ to each according to his needs” could mean satisfaction of unlim ited desires. Instead, m aterial production would be fully adequate to supply real necessities. O nce abundance was assured, concern for m aterial things w ould diminish, so that “ norm al” persons would be w holly satisfied w ith a moderate quantity of goods. Each w ould w ork

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according to his ability w ithout concern for m aterial reward. T h e rules of "Com m unist conduct” w ould become "an organic need and habit.” A nything short of this kind of abundance, however, would not be fu ll Communism, for it w ould not per­ m it the psychological transformation that w ould liberate the "new m an” from inordinate m aterial concerns; hence Soviet spokesmen derided w hat they called Chinese attempts to attain a "Com m unism of paupers.” Discussion im m ediately follow ing the 1961 program envisaged a gradual transition to the prin­ ciples o f full Com m unism through the replacem ent o f the money-exchange system w ith free distribution. M edical services and education were already identified as free items. By 1980, noon lunches, local transportation, and housing (including heat and utilities) would, Soviet writers speculated, also be free to all. Since Khrushchev’s ouster a gradual, subtle shift in this projection has occurred. T h e relatively m inor trend toward salary equalization has ended. T h ere has been little if any in­ crease in "pu blic consum ption funds” (i.e., the proportion o f personal income, about one-fourth, derived from benefits dis­ tributed outside the money wage system). M ore im portant it is recognized that even in areas like m edical care, w hich have been supposed to be free for decades, individuals m ay supple­ m ent their benefits by private payment. O ne article even sug­ gested that children m ight pay for nursing-home care for aged parents. Still more im portant, there has been a grow ing trend to relate individuals’ benefits from public-consum ption funds to their contribution. Recently, this principle has been ad­ vocated even for scholarships in higher education:

"T h e

stipend, as one form o f conferring m aterial goods at the ex­ pense of public funds, should share w ith, say, old-age pensions and temporary disability allowances the property of being directly related in size to the am ount and qu ality o f w ork done previously by the m em ber o f society in question. T h is cor­

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responds com pletely with the present-day nature of public funds, a large portion of which is distributed according to just such a principle.” *

Personal vs. Private Property U nder full Communism, some forms of personal property (a small collection of favorite books is sometimes m entioned as an example) w ould be legitim ate. B ut—to cite another Soviet exam ple—w hy should anyone w ant several suits of clothes, when he could select a free suit from the rack when­ ever he needed it? For the tim e being, such relatively m inor items of property were tolerated, bu t more valuable types of property were under attack in the early 1960’s. Construction (by individuals or cooperatives) o f private dwellings was par­ ticularly suspect. A n im portant novel by a regime spokesman, Vsevolod Kochetov, portrays the Party pressures on a veteran Com m unist to surrender the house he has bu ilt for p ublic use as a day nursery. His Party superiors adm it that he is law fully entitled to his house but contend that a man with his attach­ m ent to private property cannot remain a Com m unist in good standing. By the late 1960’s, a significantly different offi­ cial attitude prevailed. Construction through private means— w ith resulting differences in standards o f living—was hailed as a m ajor m ethod o f overcom ing the housing shortage. A 1969 article advocating real com m unal livin g arrangements denounced the “ bourgeois” attitude “ my home is my castle,” but the author was obliged to emphasize that join in g a com­ m une was strictly a m atter o f individual preference. T h e reversal in attitudes toward private transportation has been even more sweeping. Khrushchev firmly rejected mass produc­ tion of private automobiles, experim enting instead w ith a kind of car-rental service (which under full Com munism • Izvestia, October 22, 1970, as translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, X X II, No. 42, 22.

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would, of course, have been simply a “ car-borrow” service). By the end of the 1960’s, the hopeless inadequacies o f this experim ent were publicly admitted. A large-scale program of autom obile production has been started; increased private ownership is now officially regarded (possibly because Brezhnev himself is an avid motorist) as a benefit, not a curse. T h ere is no likelihood that Soviet citizens w ill have as many autos as Americans or W est Europeans, however. A s late as 1970 even Moscow had only one auto per hundred inhabitants. T h ere are several ways in w hich the developments just described can be viewed. O ne aspect, certainly, is the enormous claim on resources and output that a trend like private auto­ m obile ownership places upon a society. O ther aspects (con­ sidered in Chapter 6) are the effects on industrial and agricul­ tural organization of developm ents like renewed reliance on m aterial rewards and their im plications for continuing social inequality. T o a considerable degree renewed concessions to private ownership constitute part o f the regim e’s efforts to stim ulate lagging production by m aking m aterial rewards more attractive. A t this point in our treatment, the principal concern is the im plications for the basic ideology. T h e essence of Marxism-Leninism, as noted earlier, is the fundam ental importance of the base, i.e. relationships o f production. A c­ cording to the orthodox view point, the basic change from capitalist to socialist ownership o f the means o f production is the fundam ental way by which the “ new m an," w ith his changed attitudes toward work and consum ption, is created. T h e Soviet ideology continues to stress absolute control o f m ajor production means by the central authority. O ne article indeed went so far as to say that “workers’ collectives” (i.e., control o f each plant by its own labor force, as practiced in Yugoslavia and briefly in Czechoslovakia) w ould be more regressive than “ m onopoly capitalism " itself, which at least concentrates management.

The Ideology

45

Increasingly Soviet authors have asked how it is possible for bourgeois, individualistic attitudes to persist after a halfcentury of socialism. O ne answer is that they creep into the U.S.S.R. from capitalist countries—but this scarcely explains why these influences find such ready acceptance. A ll o f this ["p etty bourgeois lo ve o f abu n d an ce in m aterial goods an d p leasure” ] has already becom e the scourge o f cap italist society in the W est, and from there the tendencies reach us. T h e p ow er o f things w ill doubtless becom e a serious p ro b lem in the raisin g of new gen eration s.*

A nother answer is the inadequacy o f indoctrination. In spite o f the enormous indoctrination apparatus discussed in Chapter 4, earlier Soviet leaders did not place prim e reliance on re-education as a device for constituting the "new man.” Stalin was probably too preoccupied w ith more immediate problems, but, as noted above, he was strictly orthodox in assuming that the transformation of the economy he directed w ould in itself entail a transformation of attitudes. Khrushchev was generally optim istic about the imminence o f a funda­ m ental alteration o f personality. His more pessimistic succes­ sors appear to be toying, at the least, with the notion o f education as the m ain means for preparing for fu ll Com m u­ nism, not m erely an auxiliary to the change in production relationships. As early as 1967 a professor wrote in Pravda that Communism could not be achieved u ntil the "upbringing o f the people in accordance w ith the special features and principles of a Com m unist society” was completed. He added, significantly, that this meant that the state and its authorita­ tive regulation could not w ither away until it had completed supervising this upbringing. As w ill be discussed in Chapter 5, this view is in line w ith the increasing reliance upon legal regulation in the U.S.S.R. • I. Yefremov in Komsomolskaya Pravda, January 28, 1966, as translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, X V III, No. 6, 17.

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B ut the development poses problems for the Soviet system in two respects. A lthough the concept o f a schoolmaster-state has had currency from time to time in W estern societies, it is fundam entally contrary to M arxist-Leninist ideology. Further­ more, even the most sanguine educationalists recognize that m ajor changes in social attitudes are matters o f generations. Consequently, prim ary reliance on indoctrination must mean a very long postponement o f the kind o f social relations which accompany full Communism. In Novem ber 1967 an­ other leading academic figure pointed out in Pravda that " T h e period of the evolution o f socialism into Com m unism will no doubt take a rather long time, considering the scale o f the tasks that must be solved." Just three weeks earlier Brezh­ nev himself had strongly im plied that the "rather long tim e” w ould be more than h alf a century. These hints were accom­ panied by a tacit neglect o f the 1961 program (although officially it is still valid) in favor of less pretentious proclam a­ tions made at subsequent Party congresses in 1966 and 1971. A fter 1971 Brezhnev and his associates undertook a bolder revision o f the ideological formulas concerning the im m ediate future of the Soviet system. Instead o f being on the threshold o f complete Communism, the U.S.S.R. was now described as at the stage o f "developed socialism." T h is stage (which had no counterpart in L en in ’s original doctrine, or even Stalin’s and Khrushchev’s revisions) resulted, according to the new form ula, from the high rate o f econom ic growth attained by the Soviet U nion. In contrast to Khrushchev’s optim ism , however, the present leaders do not specify a tim etable for overtaking the W estern economies, nor do they envisage, w ithin any specific tim e lim its, attaining the econom y o f abundance which the M arxist-Leninist classics postulated as crucial. Instead, steady grow th in production and increasing satisfaction o f popular needs are emphasized. Some references to the strong "consensus" existing in Soviet society appear,

The Ideology

47

but essentially the state of developed socialism is the same as the “state of the entire people” announced by Khrushchev. T h e really new elem ent of developed socialism, therefore, is the emphasis on a distinctive Soviet “ way of life,” sharply dif­ ferent from the way o f life in the other mature industrial socie­ ties which are capitalist. Practically speaking, the distinction is in the scale and type of consumption. Com m unist ideals, one writer asserts, dem and that “ a single concept o f Soviet people's way of life ” be worked out as a basis for a “ra­ tional consumption budget.” N ot only w ill the “ rational” citizen be content with less than the pressures of advertising induce citizens of capitalist countries to seek; the Soviet decision-makers themselves must be firm in refusing to sur­ render to the “ whims o f dem and,” even in spheres such as the selection of books to be published. A s the stage of developed socialism unfolds, the Soviet way of life w ill diverge more and more from the capitalist way. T o a skeptical outside observer, the change in emphasis de­ scribed above seems only prudent. A s w ill appear in Chapter 8, the Soviet U nion has faced numerous reversals in foreign policy since the period when Khrushchev could see “ the shining image of a [Communist] Party that is m arching forward victori­ ously throughout the whole w orld” toward the 1961 program ’s achievem ent o f “ the final settlement of the contradictions between capitalism and Com munism in the world arena in favor of Com munism .” Moreover, the dissensions w ithin the “ socialist cam p” make attainm ent o f a favorable international m ilieu for full Com m unism highly problem atic. Khrushchev’s promise o f a m aterial base for Com m unism was exp licitly based on overtaking the U nited States in most branches of m aterial production by 1970. In fact, the most careful analyses indicate that the absolute production gap between the U nited States and the U.S.S.R. may even have widened, w hile the relative position o f the Am erican gross national product re­

48

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mains in the neighborhood o f twice the Soviet U n ion ’s.

Marxism-Leninism—A Science? T h e prudential considerations just exam ined explain the post-Khrushchev leadership’s retreat from the emphasis on fu ll Communism, but they cannot relieve its ideological discomfort. Obviously, the Soviet citizens w ho suffered terribly for decades and, more recently, endured considerable deprivation in order to move toward Com munism w ill be disheartened if the re­ gime reneges on the definite promise of the 1961 program : “ T h e Party solemnly proclaims: T h e present generation of Soviet people shall live under Com m unism .’’ But elim inating the tim etable for attaining Com m unism would not m erely cost the regime popularity. Com m unist ideology has always insisted that Com munism is not just a highly desirable goal that one should strive to attain but a his­ torical development that can be scientifically predicted. A c­ cording to the ideology, Marxism-Leninism is just as scientific in its analysis o f social developm ent as are the natural sciences. Again, to the outside observer, historical m aterialism exhibits little if any ability to predict—a m ajor attribute of true sci­ ence. M arx predicted the increasing im poverishm ent o f the proletariat in the industrialized countries; the opposite came to pass? Lenin adapted the original theory by adding the new concept of imperialism. Lenin himself, regarding im perialism as the last stage of capitalism ^ predicted im m inent w orld revolution. W hen, instead, dictatorships like Nazism arose, Com munist ideologues declared that these “ fascist” regimes represented capitalism ’s final attem pt to stave off revolution. Obviously, any theory can be "preserved” if it is altered w hen­ ever factual developments contradict it. B u t such a theory has neither predictive u tility nor scientific value. Occasionally, the spokesmen of Soviet Com munism adm it past ideological errors. Stalin, in 1941, “ corrected” Engels’s

The Ideology

49

derogatory evaluation of the role of the Russian commander M ikhail I. Kutuzov in the N apoleonic wars. T w o decades later, Khrushchev told a Rom anian audience that Lenin's views on the inevitability of war were subject to revision. T h e reversal of a tenet advanced by Stalin (who has, in fact, been dropped as a “ classic” ) was noted above. Ordinarily, however, Soviet Com munist statements stress the continuity and con­ sistency of M arxist-Leninist doctrine. As a recent theoretical article p ut it, “ a particular statement” of Lenin’s m ight be “out of date,” or conceivably a new “law ” m ight be discovered; but M arxism-Leninism as a theory is irreplaceable. T h is em­ phasis, instilled by an unchallenged system of indoctrination, has tended to strengthen the Soviet citizens’ belief that M arxism-Leninism provides not only a sure guide to social developm ent but an absolute assurance of eventual human perfection. U ntil recently, the association of the claims of the ideology with the manifest advances of natural science and technology lent pow erful support to this belief. T h e attainm ent of Com ­ munism, however, is by far the most im portant developm ent the ideology envisages. Therefore, once a prediction of the time for attaining Com m unism has been publicly incorpo­ rated into the body of the ideology, indefinitely postponing the time is tantam ount to renouncing the predictive power of the ideology. T h e problem , then, goes beyond mere disap­ pointm ent of the citizenry; Soviet citizens could actually lose faith in Com m unist ideology. Consequently it is by no means certain that Brezhnev's proclam ation o f the stage of developed socialism w ill convince Soviet citizens that the ideology is still reliable. Nevertheless, his “ solution” is ingenious; and more than once, in the past, Leninist ideology, backed up by the great propaganda resources of the Soviet regime, has successfully glossed over failures in prediction which were obvious to the outside observer.

Ideology, Politics, and Government

5°

Marxism-Leninism—A Dogma? T h ere is, however, another side to the unavowed flexibility of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Because the basic tenets are actu­ ally subject to revision, there is no dogma in the true sense of the word. T h e dom inant element in the Com m unist Party determines what is orthodox; those who cling to another in ­ terpretation, even one undisputed in earlier years, become heretics, and no exegetical appeal to the “ classics” can save them. Obviously, this aspect o f the ideology strengthens the absolutist claims o f the current leadership. By opening up a broad area of ideological uncertainty, it also promotes a high degree o f dynamism in the system. T h e Soviet Com m unist knows that he cannot justify him self by ideological orthodoxy; consequently, he tries to assure his position by m axim um prac­ tical service to the regime and by anticipation o f its shifting theoretical requirements. For the hard core of the regim e’s supporters, therefore, faith in the ideology as a consistent be­ lief system is not the only basis for loyalty. S U G G E S T E D R E A D IN G S T h e "classics” of Soviet ideolo gy, acco rd in g to the official d efin i­ tion, em brace the w orks o f K arl M arx, F ried rich Engels, V . I. L e n in , an d —u n til

the mid- i95o's—Joseph

S talin . M ost are

a va ila b le

in

English, b u t m an y o f them are o f interest m a in ly to specialists in social thought. T h e few listed b elo w are am o n g the m ost im p o rta n t for an u n d erstan d in g o f the U .S.S.R . an d are m ost re a d ily com p re­ h ensible to the nonspecialist. L e n in , V l a d im ir I.

Imperialism and State and Revolution. N e w

Y ork : T h e V an gu ard Press, 1929, an d m any oth er edition s. T w o o f the basic p o litical w orks o f the fo u n d e r o f Bolshevism . Im­ perialism tries to show that capitalism is to blam e fo r colon ialism and war, and that revo lu tio n w ill occu r in the “ w eakest lin k ,” w h ile State and Revolution sets forth L e n in ’s con cep t o f the P a rty an d the revo lu tio n it is to accom plish.

T h e Ideology

51

Stalin, Joseph V. The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks). New York: International Publishers, 1939, and many later editions also published by Communist agencies. A completely distorted history, but important as the book of in­ doctrination under Stalin. The section on “Dialectical and His­ torical Materialism” is a summary of Stalin’s version of Marxism. Stalin, Joseph V. Problems of Leninism. New York: International Publishers, 1942. An earlier and more extensive ideological work. Since Stalin’s death, a new History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, i960) has superseded Stalin’s version. While not yet a "classic,” the new book (which is scarcely less distorted) plays an important part in current Soviet indoctrination.

Critical works by non-Soviet writers:

De George, R ichard. Soviet Ethics and Morality. Ann Arbor: Uni­ versity of Michigan Press, 1969. A balanced analysis of an increas­ ingly important aspect of the ideology. Evans, A lfred B. “Developed Socialism and the Transition to Communism,” Soviet Studies, X X IX (1977), 409-28. A keen analy­ sis of Brezhnev’s latest doctrinal innovation. G ilison, Jerome. The Soviet Image of Utopia. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. A very interesting attempt to analyze Soviet understanding of complete Communism. Graham, L oren. Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974. A very useful survey. H istoricus. “Stalin on Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, January, 1949. A brief but revealing discussion of Stalin’s real consistency in ad­ vocating world revolution. Hunt, R obert N. C. The Theory and Practice of Communism: New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954; Baltimore: Pelican paper­ back, 1964. The best survey of the development of Communist ideas from Marx through Stalin. Madison, Bernice Q. Social Welfare in the Soviet Union. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968. The history and present organiza­ tion of family and child welfare activities, based on several visits to the U.S.S.R. and careful, unbiased examination of printed materials.

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Marcuse, Herbert. Soviet Marxism. New York: Columbia University Press, paperback, 1958. A personal but stimulating interpretation by a professor who has since become a guiding figure among the "New Left” in Germany and the United States. Meszâros, Istvân. Marx’s Theory of Alienation. London: Merlin, 1970. An unorthodox Hungarian Communist's attempt—with critical reference to Soviet experience—to make Marxism-Leninism relevant to modern conditions. Meyer, Alfred G. Leninism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957; New York: Praeger paperback, 1962. A comprehensive and objective analysis of Lenin’s theories, related to his person­ ality and political objectives. Moore, Barrington. Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Power. Cam­ bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950. A brilliant attempt to show how Bolshevik ideas changed when the Communists were confronted with the problems of running a great country. O sborne, R obert J. Soviet Social Policies: Welfare, Equality, and Community. Homewood, 111 .: Dorsey paperback, 1970. An excel­ lent survey, with much statistical data, of recent Soviet welfare policy and its relation to ideology. Wetter, Gustav A. Dialectical Materialism: A Historical Survey of Philosophy in the Soviet Union. New York: Praeger, 1958. A thorough examination of the development of Soviet philosophical concepts (especially the philosophy of science) by a Jesuit priest who formerly directed the Vatican’s Collegium Russicum.

3 THE PARTY T h e Com m unist Party is the core institution of the Soviet political system. M uch confusion results, however, from iden­ tification o f this “ party" with the fam iliar parties of pluralist political systems. In a pluralist system, there are almost always two or more parties. T h e leaders of each party assume the con­ tinued existence o f at least one opposing party, though they devoutly hope to keep their opponents out of power, in the role o f “ loyal opposition.” Each party acts as a legitim ate insti­ tution for articulating the political demands of a num ber of groups in the society. In a m ultiparty system, the range of de­ mands articulated by each such party is com paratively narrow, for every set of interests tends to be represented by a different party. In a two-party system, each party not only articulates a wide range of interests but also serves to “ aggregate” these in­ terests—that is, to com bine and compromise them in a way that usually promotes the smooth functioning of the pluralist political system as a whole. In its conception, the Soviet Com m unist Party was an en­ tirely different phenom enon. A s indicated in Chapter 2, Lenin regarded the Party as the indispensable instrument by which the M arxist vision of a perfect society was to be attained. From the outset, the Party was a conspiratorial instrum ent for- over­ throw ing the existing Czarist political system rather than a legitim ate instrum ent for articulating demands within the sys­ tem; the compromises that inevitably attach to legitim acy were rejected by Lenin, who saw them as tantam ount to “ reform ­ ism.” Follow ing the R evolution, the Party was the essence of the “ dictatorship of the proletariat,” a role it held for four

53

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decades. In this capacity, the Party (which became officially known as the “ Com m unist Party” in 1918, though the term “ Bolshevik” was retained u ntil 1952) was explicitly given the m onopoly of political articulation; all other parties were sup­ pressed. A t the same time, Lenin and his followers rejected the concept of the single party as an overarching institution of interest aggregation, for they regarded the Party as a force to transform, rather than to m ediate, the interests and the p oliti­ cal culture of the existing society. T h e Com m unist Party be­ came the institutional guardian and interpreter of the ideol­ ogy and was charged w ith indoctrinating the population w ith the ideas and values that w ould m ake them psychologically capable of living under full Com munism . A ll of these func­ tions of the Party are avowed by the Soviet regim e today. T h e 1961 Party program im plied that the Party w ill con­ tinue even after full Com munism is attained. In 1968, faced with the liberalization tendencies in Czechoslovakia, Soviet spokesmen drastically re-emphasized the m onopoly o f the Party in political affairs and ideological interpretation. In view of the enormous im portance that Lenin ascribed to the Party, it is hard to im agine that it could ever have been eclipsed. Yet many observers have viewed Stalin’s career as a victory over the Com m unist Party itself. T h ere is m uch to recommend this view. Because of his bitter animosity toward the O ld Bolsheviks, L en in ’s companions, Stalin evidently dis­ trusted the Party, which they symbolized. A s an absolute dictator, he distrusted any institutional locus o f power. Conse­ quently, he lim ited the sway of the Party, devolving many functions in the execution of his w ill upon state organs, par­ ticularly (as w ill appear in Chapter 5) the police. It took, however, all of the power of an absolute ruler to reduce the scope of the Party. Even then, Stalin never tried to reduce the theoretical significance of the Party. Every Com m unist was taught that the Party was the only in fallib le guide to the

The Party

55

course of history and that its command was beyond question. For the most part, the indoctrinating agencies of the Party (or agencies intim ately associated with the Party indoctrina­ tion machine) transmitted the teachings of M arx, Engels, and Lenin, even though they were partially distorted by Stalin’s reinterpretations. From his adolescence on, the Communist therefore is taught to accept the Party as the essential institu­ tion of the Soviet system. As a result, it is scarcely surprising that the Party regained com plete ascendancy soon after Stalin’s death. T his re-emergence of the Party as the dom inant institutional force in the U.S.S.R. is very closely associated with the rise of N ikita-K hru­ shchev. Even in Stalin’s lifetim e, Khrushchev had insisted on the param ount position of the Party: “ T h e Party is respon­ sible for everything. W hether it is A rm y work, Chekist [police] work, economic work, Soviet work—all is subordinate to the Party leadership, and if anyone thinks otherwise, that means he is no Bolshevik.” Shortly after Stalin's death, Georgi M a­ lenkov, who appeared to lead the field of possible successors, resigned as a member of the Party Secretariat while retaining the position of head of the Soviet Governm ent. Khrushchev, on the other hand, became the highest Party officer. In ret­ rospect, it is clear that the prestige and the power levers concentrated in the Party were m ajor factors in enabling K hru­ shchev to win in the struggle for supreme authority in the U.S.S.R. Regardless o f their rank in government agencies, other Soviet leaders were also Party members form ally bound t« ©bey orders issued in the name o f the Party. Recent direc­ tives form ally reiterate the rule that Communists who are members of governm ental or quasi-governmental bodies have an absolute duty, regardless of their personal views, to vote for nominees advanced by the Party. Moreover, within each branch of the Soviet bureaucracy, m any officials were tied to power alignments that led them to follow the Party leadership

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rather than their nominal superiors. T h u s, in June, 1955, when the head o f the police apparatus, Lavrenti Beria, sought to counter Party dominance, he was abandoned by many of the high-ranking police officers.(A year and a h alf later (January, 1955), a Party m eeting ordered M alenkov to resign as head of the government. He com plied the follow ing month. In 1957, the central econom ic directorates were fully subordinated to Party control. Later that year, the Party (vig­ orously supported by m any high m ilitary officers) successfully demanded the removal of M arshal G eorgi Zhukov, head of the Defense Ministry. Khrushchev’s words were prophetic: “ A rm y work, Chekist work, economic work, Soviet work—all is subor­ dinate to the Party leadership.” T h e nature o f collective leadership since Khrushchev’s ouster (October, 1964) has led to a modest recovery o f power by central governmental officials headed by the premier, A lek­ sei N. Kosygin. In contrast to Stalin and Khrushchev, Party leader Brezhnev has not assumed formal direction o f the gov­ ernment. Nevertheless, Brezhnev’s public stature has grown slowly but steadily. In certain areas like foreign policy, formally reserved for government officials, Brezhnev's increas­ ing prominence inevitably im plies dim inution of figures out­ side the Party apparatus. D uring the 1970's Brezhnev, rather than formal governm ent officials, has dom inated Soviet negoti­ ations both w ith other Com m unist states and w ith the U.S.S.R.’s principal “ capitalist” rivals, including the U n ited States. As an institution, though, the Com m unist Party re­ mains pre-eminent since fundam ental decisions o f the “ collec­ tive leadership” are m ade by its directing bodies. Even though these include officials of other bureaucracies,/Party officials predominate. T h e mere fact that Khrushchev’s rem oval was carried out by one o f these bodies (the Party Central Com ­ mittee) indicates this pre-eminence. D uring the follow ing decade, the dom inant role of the Party has been strongly reaffirmed. W hat has become clear during the years since

The Party

57

1964, as noted in Chapter 1, is that the Party’s institutional preeminence does riot depend on the existence of personal rule.

M embership : Status A spects T h e preceding discussion suggests that the significance o f the Party as an institution resides in its leadership. T o a con­ siderable extent, as w ill appear in Chapter 4, this is true. T h e role of the Party as a membership organization requires careful exam ination, however. In sheer size, the Soviet Com m unist Party resembles the mass membership parties of pluralist societies. T h e Soviet Party membership now includes approxi­ m ately 15,000,000 fu ll members and 640,000 probationary (can­ didate) members, constituting about 9 per cent of the adult population of the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, Soviet writers have always explicitly rejected the term “ mass organization” for the Party. Instead, they follow L en in ’s prescription that selection o f members be made w ith great care, so that the Party may act as a leaven w ith in the whole social structure rather than be­ come submerged in it. In sharp contrast to pluralist parties, the Com m unist Party does not solicit volunteer adherents, but chooses its members. T h e mere fact o f enrollm ent of nearly a ll em inent Soviet citizens provides a propaganda advantage. T h e regime constantly boasts that the outstanding citizens are Communists and uses this assertion as proof that the Party embodies the best of Soviet society. Consequently, the prize­ w inning physicist, the record-breaking m ilkm aid, the popular novelist, the renowned A rctic explorer are all prim e targets for recruitm ent into the Party. In crisis situations such as war, extraordinary effort (to the point o f com plete neglect of the ideological background or intellectual capacity of the can­ didates) is devoted to bring a ll “ heroic” figures into the Party to serve as exam ples to their fellows. O rdinarily, how­ ever, prospective members are carefully screened. Each must be recommended by three persons w ho have already been Party

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members for at least five years. In accordance with the prin­ ciple that a prime duty of each Com m unist is to “ safeguard the Party against the infiltration of persons unworthy o f the lofty title of Com munist,” sponsors are held responsible for a new member’s derelictions. Despite the care exercised in selection, the sense in which rank-and-file Communists constitute the “ elite” of Soviet so­ ciety is limited. Membership is, of course, a requisite for selec­ tion as a Party official, and it is useful, if not always essential, for advancement in the state bureaucracy. A t times, Party membership helps in a professional or intellectual career, b u t the need to utilize all highly qualified persons in such w ork limits the degree to which political preference is feasible. Rankand-file membership by no means connotes m embership in the ruling circles of the Soviet U nion; as w ill be shown below, such circles are confined to a much more select group. In effect, therefore, ordinary Party membership is more an honor than a privilege, and one that carries with it the onerous burdens of constant study, indoctrinating tasks, and occasional assignment to unattractive posts. For exam ple, w hile Soviet law ordinarily permits a worker to leave a jo b after two weeks’ notice, a Party member must ask his prim ary organization for permis­ sion, because “ he has consciously and voluntarily subordinated himself to another law —the C P SU Statutes.” Members m ust carry these burdens diligently if not cheerfully, or face ex­ pulsion. It is far worse to be an ex-Party m ember than a person who has never joined the Party, for the form er are pariahs in Soviet society. N orm ally the annual rate of expulsions is about 50,000, or .04 per cent of the total membership, bu t du ring 197 2—74 (a special period for checking and exchanging Party documents) expulsions were about 3 per cent per year. W h a t is very clear is that a person w ho views Party duties as dis­ tasteful is shrewder if he never becomes a member; in fact, m any talented Soviet citizens do evade joining. A bou t one-fifth of the Party members have higher educa­

The Party

59

tions, and another third have completed secondary education. In each case the proportion is much higher than among the general adult population (in 1970, 7 per cent twenty years o f age or older had some higher education, 25 per cent more had finished secondary schools). However, over one-fifth of the Party members have only elementary educations. T h is is an additional indication that membership in the Party, w hile selective, is not confined to those holding high-status jobs. D uring the 1960’s special efforts were made to enlist ordinary factory workers and farmers, w ho constituted 62 per cent of admittees between 1962 and 1966. W hite-collar workers have declined slightly (to 45 per cent o f the total 1971 membership), but they have always constituted the largest component. Pro­ portionately, the rural areas have fewer Party members than the cities: 35 per cent o f the Party as contrasted to 43 per cent o f the population. N om inally collective farm peasants con­ stitute 15 per cent o f the Party, although they are 20 per cent o f the general population; real "d irt farmers," as contrasted to rural officials, constitute a considerably smaller proportion o f the Party membership. O n the other hand, physicians and teachers are about three times as heavily represented in the Party as in the general population, w hile such favored—and strategic—groups as engineers and m ilitary officers are six or seven times as strongly represented as ordinary occupations. Officials (both of the state and the Party bureaucracies) are o f course even more heavily represented. W om en constitute only 22 per cent, although they are w ell over half of the adult population. As indicated in Chapter 7 and its accom panying table, some nationality groups, such as Russians and T rans­ caucasians, are much more heavily represented than such na­ tionalities as Central Asians.

M embership : F unctions T h e symbolic function o f Party membership has already been noted: Enrollm ent of the “ best" citizens demonstrates

6o

Ideology, Politics, and Government

that the Party comprises the best o f Soviet society. T h e general Party membership is also highly im portant to the regime as a reservoir of disposable m anpower. As noted earlier, every Com ­ munist must accept assignments made by the leadership. In a crisis, therefore, the leadership can freely command m illions o f the most energetic and talented Soviet citizens. For exam ple, every few years tens o f thousands o f urban Communists have been sent out to the villages to stim ulate lagging agricultural production and to perfect political organization. T h e principal activity o f the Party member as a stim ulator of production is carried out, however, w ithin his prim ary Party organization. T h e Party has always m aintained that these basic units should be formed in places o f work; today, this principle is generally applied. O f about 390,000 prim ary organizations, one-fourth are in factories, transportation, and the like, w hile one-eighth are on farms. T o d a y the average num ber o f mem­ bers (in the neighborhood of forty) in Party organizations in all of these types of economic activity does not vary greatly. T h e general average of prim ary organization m embership is somewhat reduced, however, by the large num ber o f units in various institutions, administrative offices, and m ilitary forma­ tions. T h e last kind of prim ary organizations are especially im portant, for, together w ith the deputy commander for po­ litical affairs (a m ilitary officer dependent upon the Party), the Party organization provides the regime with a pervasive curb upon the m ilitary. W hatever the agency of the Soviet system, the primary organization is charged w ith general supervision o f activities. O rdinarily the prim ary organization may not command an agricultural agency to take specific action, bu t its advice is often com pelling. In a m ilitary unit, on the other hand, the Party organization may not even discuss a purely m ilitary decision. Most prim ary organization policy actions have an effect somewhat in between these extremes and are consequently difficult to define; but there appears to have been a recent tendency for the authority of prim ary organizations

The Party

6i

in administrative institutions to expand. T h e design of the relationship in all institutions, however, is to expose officials to a constant flow of pressure and criticism from Party mem­ bers who are most fam iliar with the officials' operations. A t the same time, the prim ary organization is designed to stimu­ late its own membership (which almost always includes the officials concerned) to more strenuous efforts to further the regim e’s objectives. T h e prim ary Party organization’s significance is enhanced by its power to make the initial decision on the admission and expulsion of members. Adm ission or expulsion must be con­ firmed by the next higher Party echelon, however, and an ex­ pelled m ember may appeal to the Party Control Com m ittee attached to the Central Com mittee of the Com munist Party of the Soviet Union. Even in a “ quiet" year like 1967, 9,700 persons appealed to this highest level, but fewer than one-third had their expulsions reversed.

T he I ndoctrination F unction A third most im portant function of the general membership is indoctrination. T h e Party is the basic institution for m anip­ ulating the political culture both of its own members and of Soviet society in general. Every member has the duty to “ mas­ ter M arxist-Leninist theory, raise his ideological level, and contribute to the m olding and rearing of the man of Com ­ munist society.’’ T h e most systematic and concentrated in­ doctrination program is directed at the Communists them­ selves. Elementary and interm ediate political education.(fre­ quently provided in short-term evening courses) is designed to convey a m inim al knowledge o f Marxism-Leninism. T hese levels are centered upon study of L enin’s life, CPSU history, and political and economic affairs. A somewhat higher level— but still part-time study, usually for two years—is provided by the Evening Universities of Marxism-Leninism. For the “ ex­

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Ideology, Politics, and Government

ecutive cadres” of Party and state officials, on the other hand, full-time courses lasting as long as four years are provided. T h e most im portant full-time courses are at the H igher Party Schools in principal regional centers, as w ell as in Moscow, and the Academy of Social Sciences. Here officials obtain practical training in administration as w ell as instruction in ideological and academic subjects. Between 1946 and 1971, the latter in­ stitution graduated 3,400 Soviet Com m unist officials, as w ell as 400 foreign Communists. Currently about one hundred per year are graduated from the Academ y, and another three hundred by the Moscow H igher Party School. T h e im portance which the CPSU attaches to such intensive reindoctrination is indicated by the fact that at least fifty of the A cadem y graduates held top posts in 1971. In recent years these men have usually obtained their full-time Party schooling (the normal age lim it for admissions is 35) before being advanced to m ajor posts. In the imm ediate postwar years, however, it was common for a middle-aged official holding responsibilities as great as those o f an Am erican state governor to be detached for several years' retraining. A ll levels of Party indoctrination are designed not only to indoctrinate the Party m em ber but to prepare him to indoc­ trinate others with the current policy “ line” and w ith the con­ cepts and values the regime believes to be essential attributes /of members of the future Com m unist society. A t an early date, the Soviet leadership intuitively grasped the sociological prin­ ciple that transmission o f ideas is most effectively accomplished by “opinion leaders” w ho are in face-to-face contact w ith small groups. Com m unist Party members constitute the backbone o f the huge force of “ agitators” who im plem ent this principle. A gitation is officially defined as the presentation of a few ideas to the mass of the population, as contrasted to the more com­ plicated “ propaganda” directed toward groups like

Party

members. D uring a rest period in a factory workshop, for ex ­ ample, a Com m unist agitator w ill read an editorial from the

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Party newspaper, Pravda, em bodying the current “ line,” to his fellow workers, lest they idle away their time. W hile there is evidence that such emphasis on indoctrination often irritates the average Soviet citizen, the constant reiteration of the re­ gim e’s viewpoint, unchallenged by any public opposition, is bound to induce a considerable measure of acceptance. U n ­ doubtedly, the “ oral agitation” program vastly increases the impact of printed indoctrinating material.

T he M ass M edia Despite the emphasis on face-to-face indoctrination, the Soviet Communist Party has always had great respect for the printed word. Some publications (e.g., Pravda) are directly issued by the Party, others are issued by agencies that the Party closely supervises. Reproduction of materials for public dis­ trib u tion -even by m im eograph—is strictly forbidden, as is im ­ portation of such items as Bibles from abroad. U ndoubtedly this monopoly, reinforced by the agitators’ explanations, is effective. Since the mid-1960's, however, dissident elements have become bolder in circulating “ samizdat” (self-published) literature—some o f which is discussed in Chapter 5—criticizing regime policies. Since this m aterial is usually handwritten or typewritten and is clandestinely circulated at considerable risk, the audience for any particular item is very limited. W hen one considers, however, that an average of about one new samizdat w riting reaches W estern Europe every day, it is easy to see that the cum ulative impact of opposition views is great. T h is is particularly true since circulation is m ainly among young in­ tellectuals, who spread by word of m outh the views they have picked up from samizdat. ' Even official Soviet publications provide indications that their audience receptivity is dim inishing. Recent surveys con­ d u c te d by Izvestia, the second most im portant newspaper, 1indicate that a small proportion of readers (except older ones) read editorial m atter at all. By far the most popular items are

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Ideology, Politics, and Government

those dealing with personal conflict situations, “ astonishing” stories and questions o f m orality, w ith sports, foreign affairs, and literary items follow ing in popularity along w ith editori­ als; accounts o f governm ent activities and discussions o f eco­ nomic policies—m ajor topics of the current “ line” —receive least reader attention. T h e significance of these findings is en­ hanced by the fact that Izvestia readers are far better educated and more urban than the average Soviet citizen. Moreover, readers o f literary magazines, who are younger and still better educated, appear to be even less attracted by political and economic topics. In the bookstores, new fictional and essay ma­ terial sells out quickly, w hile most Party and economic p u b ­ lications remain readily available, because dem and for them is minimal. Most readers of the m ajor newspapers and magazines also have access to the electronic m edia—for exam ple, as early as 1967 three-fourths o f Izvestia readers had radio or television sets. Two-thirds of the population is w ithin T V reception range (only black-and-white is available for public broad­ casting); w ithin that range it is claim ed that there are nine sets for every ten families. Consequently, messages on elec­ tronic media can provide fairly complete coverage o f the population. T h e Soviet regime has never used these m edia as intensively for indoctrination as it has the printed word, how­ ever, or as much, for exam ple, as the Nazis used radio or American candidates use television. O ne reason, no doubt, is the prestige that Lenin's personal editorship o f Pravda and its predecessors lent to the newspaper. A nother reason, occasion­ ally admitted, is the difficulty o f controlling w hat goes out on the air waves, as com pared to the careful scrutiny that can be devoted to every word on a printed page. T h en , too, a popula­ tion that has recently become literate—as is the case w ith older Soviet citizens—tends to have more respect for the “ m agic” o f printed statements. A s the above data show, however, young

The Party

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people tend to be less impressed; perhaps, therefore, the regime w ill turn more to electronic indoctrination activities in the future.

T he Schools and the M ilitary Part o f the effort to reach the younger generation with in­ doctrination materials is carried out by the educational system. T extbooks in courses like history and literature are designed to stress Soviet achievements and inculcate principles advanced by the ideology. Despite the relatively strong position o f the Party am ong teachers, it w ould appear that relatively little emphasis on current Party policies is attempted. O n the other hand, psychologists like U rie Bronfenbrenner have found that the schools do play an im portant part in inculcating basic at­ titudes like team spirit (“ concern for the collective” ) and em­ phasis on group approval as contrasted to personal m aterial rewards. A t times, also, there has been extreme emphasis on status achievement, fostered by such devices as posting course grades. H ow much these values w ill be carried over to adult life—where, as noted in Chapter 2, individual material rewards are acknowledged to be very im portant—is questionable. It appears to be very significant that both the peer-group leaders and the school teachers are usually female (72 per cent). W om en teach an even higher proportion o f basic subjects such as mathematics and literature, since male teachers are predom inantly coaches or in vocational subjects. As in other cultures, Soviet women have become the bearers o f certain fundam ental cultural values, which they try to transmit to children. T h is “ fem inization” of the school

(to use a

Soviet m ale sociologist's term) corresponds to a "fem iniza­ tion” o f the fam ily due to the father’s absence or lack of interest. A ccording to this sociologist, the absence o f a strong male reference figure leads to lowered performance am ong schoolboys. T h e Soviet w riter does not say so, but it appears

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that boys are more influenced by the coarser "uncu ltu red” behavior which they actually observe am ong adult men than by the school. Hence there is a constant strain between "cultured” fem inine values and the dom inant m ale behavioral model. A powerful indoctrination reinforcem ent for young males is m ilitary service, especially in the ground forces. Brezhnev, who was once a m ajor figure in the m ilitary indoctrination system and who was recently named a M arshal of the Soviet U nion, stressed this point: In fulfilling military obligations, almost the entire male popula­ tion of the country serves for some period in the Armed Forces. And this takes place during the youthful years, when the per­ sonality is taking shape and a world view and a politically con­ scious attitude toward life are being molded. The army thereby becomes an important school of life for our young people and a component part of the whole system of Soviet upbringing.* W hile active service is becom ing somewhat less nearly uni­ versal, part-time m ilitary instruction has been w idely intro­ duced in the secondary schools. Both types of training are, o f course, designed to strengthen the country’s m ilitary power, but the opportunity to indoctrinate the young men is not neglected. Since about one-fourth of the m ilitary personnel (mainly officers and noncommissioned cadres) are Party m em­ bers, adequate personnel is available to reach all recruits. A very important aspect of m ilitary indoctrination is the op­ portunity it affords to reach rural youths, w ho previously have had little contact w ith the indoctrination media. For m any youths from more remote regions, political indoctrination goes hand in hand w ith introduction to m odern technology and the m inim al amenities of urban society. For many non-Rus­ sians, the army is also where they acquire a m inim um facility in Russian, the sole language of command. T o use a socio­ • Pravda, July 9, 1968, trans. in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, X X , No. 28, p. 10.

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logical term, these young men are socially “ m obilized" at the same time that they are made aware o f political affairs—i.e., p olitically “ m obilized.” Probably their awareness of how m uch they have to learn makes them receptive to indoctrination as w ell as instruction in instrum ental skills. In this way com* pulsory m ilitary service acts as an institution for inculcating loyalty at least to the symbols o f systemwide Com munist au­ thority at the same time that it makes a large proportion of the young male population more versatile and capable in jobs requiring a fam iliarity w ith modern technology. It is signifi­ cant, therefore, that from the standpoint of the Soviet regime maintenance of a large m ilitary force—although it unquestion­ ably ties up scarce m anpower—has positive political and eco­ nomic aspects.

T he Party ’s A uxiliary O rganizations As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the Party itself is not regarded as a mass organization. Consequently, several organizations w ith still larger membership were established at an early date to supplem ent the Party's activities by enrolling members on a less discrim inating basis. These “mass organiza­ tions” are very closely supervised by the Com munist Party. As the regim e’s emphasis has shifted, since 1964, toward longrange indoctrination programs as a principal means for pre­ paring the “ new m an” able to live in a fully Com munist society, the significance o f the mass organizations has increased. From the indoctrination standpoint, m uch the most im ­ portant mass organization is the Com m unist Youth League, or Komsomol. T h e Party itself is definitely an adult organization. In 1973 fewer than 6 per cent of the Party members' were under twenty-six, as com pared to nearly 28 per cent over fifty. T h ere is a small but grow ing group of elderly retired mem­ bers. It is true that one m ay secure admission to the Party at the early age o f eighteen, but all who are adm itted under the age o f twenty-three must have been members of the

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Ideology, Politics, and Government

Komsomol. In fact, during the 1970’s 65 per cent of new Party members have been Komsomols. T h a t organization serves, therefore, as a screening agency in which prospective Party members are indoctrinated and observed before the crucial step of admission to the Party. B ut the Komsomol is far more comprehensive in membership than the Party. O ne hundred thirty m illion Soviet citizens (about three-fifths of all over 14 years of age) have been Komsomols. T h e present enrollm ent is in excess of 34 m illion. T h is constitutes about four-fifths of the most relevant age groups (fourteen to twenty-four) and is perhaps about as close to saturation coverage as can reasonably be attained. Failure to cover the more remote rural regions is indicated by the fact that less than one-third of the membership is in rural areas (as contrasted to 39 per cent of the population); but in cities the high school age group is virtually universally enrolled in the Komsomol. Insofar as its indoctrination proves to be a lasting influence, the Komsomol has, therefore, a place of immense im portance in the Soviet system. B u t only oîie-tenth (2.6 m illion) of the huge num ber who passed through the Komsomol during 1953-61 actually went on to jo in the Com m unist Party; this proportion is only a trifle above the 9 per cent of the general adult population in the Party. It is true that the m ore severe principles of selection for the Party preclude adm itting most Komsomols. It w ould appear, however, that the K om ­ somol is no more effective than less specialized social mecha­ nisms in inducing young people to make a perm anent commitment to enlist as the “ best” and most active members of the Soviet political system. Komsomol members are expected to have an acquaintance with all m ajor ideological documents, from M arx’s Communist

Manifesto to resolutions of the latest Party congress. T o a considerable extent, however, more vivid works, such

as

The Party

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L en in ’s biography and the memoirs of w ar heroes, provide im plicit models for the younger readers. , ’ T h e organizational structure of the Komsomol is modeled on that of the Party. T o p officers are Party members, for a young person who enters the Party can retain Komsomol mem­ bership u ntil twenty-eight if he is elected to office. In recent years persons holding both Party and Komsomol membership have rapidly increased to 800,000; as a result, almost half the Komsomol prim ary organizations are headed by secretaries who also hold C PSU membership. In spite of the regim e’s efforts, however, there appears to be an increasing tendency to regard the Komsomol as a boring and restrictive institu­ tion. Precisely because it includes such a large proportion of the relevant age groups, Komsomol membership does not have the honorific significance of Party membership. Yet mem­ bership entails almost as m any burdens as Party membership. Komsomol youths constituted a high proportion of those sent to farm the “ virgin lands” in the 1950’s. Members are frequently called for short-term work details as w ell as for agitation tasks. T h e Komsomol tries to become popular by organizing recreational activities like open-air dances, but even these are often injected with an element of propaganda. Still more objectionable to m any youths is the role of the Komsomol as a guardian of morals, manners, and, o f course, political fidelity. In the past twenty years Komsomol patrols have been assigned auxiliary police power to control youths in the streets and in places o f amusement. A t first these patrols tried to enforce all sorts o f restrictions, such as banning “ loud” sport shirts. Even today excesses like illegal detention and beating of suspects are occasionally officially charged against the Komsomol patrols, although Soviet sources warn that such abuses “ should not compromise the noble idea of active participation by the public and the Komsomol in the struggle against those who violate public order.”

Ideology, Politics, and Government T h e Komsomol also exercises tutelage over the Pioneers, the organization for children o f prim ary school age—which in turn supervises the L ittle Octobrists (ages seven to eleven). T h e latter hardly has any significance for indoctrination (the or­ ganization was allowed to dissolve for several years), b u t the Pioneers are an element o f some importance in the indoctrina­ tion chain. T h e 23 m illion members comprise, like the Kom ­ somol, an overwhelm ing m ajority of the relevant (ten to fifteen) age group. M any of their activities (games, cam ping, and the like) resemble those of W estern youth groups like the Boy Scouts and the Cam pfire Girls. Perhaps overorganiza­ tion of these nonpolitical activities as m uch as indoctrination has often led (according to Soviet reports) children to be bored w ith the Pioneers, as are their elders w ith other Soviet organizations. Num erically, the Soviet trade unions, w ith 114 m illion members, are even more obviously mass organizations than the Komsomol. T h e immense size of the trade unions has been useful to the Soviet regim e in its foreign policy—their cor­ respondingly large representation in the W orld Federation o f T ra d e Unions enabled Communists to gain control over this international organization soon after W orld W ar II. Soviet trade unions also have im portant domestic functions. T h e usual units of trade-union organization are factories, w ith factory unions grouped by both industry and region. B u t prac­ tically the entire white-collar labor force is enrolled (39 m il­ lion) as w ell as industrial workers. L ike other mass organiza­ tions, the trade unions are relatively w eak in rural areas, how­ ever, with about 5 per cent o f the members there—inclu ding only a few m illion actually w orking on collective farms. Like other Soviet organizations m anipulated by the Party, trade unions cannot engage in conflict behavior like strikes. In recent years their role in the m anagerial process, though dis­ tinctly subordinate, has been slightly increased, however. A l­ though the trade unions have little practical effect on economic

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policy, they do play a restricted part in setting wage scales and in allocation of incentive funds between objectives like in­ dividual bonuses, housing construction, and amenities in the factory. T ra d e unions inspect sanitary and safety provisions. Perhaps their most influential role is in reviewing dismissals and (in collaboration w ith management) distributing coveted passes to vacation resorts and rest homes. From the regim e’s standpoint, however, the trade unions’ role in stim ulating production and prom oting “ socialist em ulation” is most sig­ nificant. T h rou gh their factory clubs and frequent meetings, the unions also have a direct role in the indoctrination process, though apparently a m uch more restricted one than that as­ signed to the Komsomol. Soviet sources adm it that only a m inority o f trade union members are “ activists,” although the regime regards “ public work in the trade unions [as] a good school for w orking people, fostering their Com munist educa­ tion and strengthening their concern for the interests of state and society.” A more im portant agency for indoctrination (not officially classed as a mass organization) is the Society for Knowledge. W ith a membership of over two m illion, the Society form ally resembles an adult-education organization. T h e bulk of its work is carried on by a body of part-time lecturers. T h e lectures, which are often delivered at factories and on farms, cover a wide spectrum o f subjects: Com m unist Party policies, peace, space exploration, and technological advances. Many lectures are undoubtedly designed to im part practical knowledge as w ell as indoctrination. Probably the most im portant theme, however, is “ debunking” religion. Finally, one should m ention D O S A A F —the conventional abbreviation of the organization now entitled the V olunteer Society for Cooperation w ith the A rm ed Forces. D O S A A F now has 80 m illion members. In close cooperation w ith the Komsomols, they perform a variety of tasks, including civil de­ fense functions, entertainm ent of servicemen, and cooperation

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in the indoctrination of m ilitary personnel. Its role in fostering military-type sports for schoolchildren is especially im portant.

O rganizational P rinciples In theory, the organization of the Com m unist Party is based on Lenin’s principle of “ democratic centralism.” A t the Twenty-third Party Congress (1966), Brezhnev defined dem o­ cratic centralism as “ free opinion in deciding questions and iron discipline after a decision is taken.” T w o years later, faced w ith the liberalizing tendencies in Czechoslovakia, Soviet writers emphasized stem central direction still more:

Indeed, an important law of Party development is that the greater the scope achieved by inner-Party democracy and the broader the rights of Communists, the greater their sense of responsibility will be for the common cause and for implementing Party policies and the more the work of each Party organization and each Com­ munist will be notable for its organization and discipline. . . . But is the CPSU’s experience in this case perhaps of limited signifi­ cance? Are the principle of democratic centralism and the require­ ments stemming fromit, including the inadmissibility of groupings, perhaps applicable only to the specific conditions in which our party has functioned? By no means. . . . Indeed, experience teaches that lack of unity of actions in carrying out a political line and commonly adopted decisions, when some actions pull in one direc­ tion and others in the opposite direction, when everyone is free to do anything he wants—in such a situation the Party is unable to perform a guiding role. And from legalization of fractions and groupings it is but a short way to the complete disintegration of the Party.* Each echelon of the Party is supposed to be free to discuss a m atter until a final decision has been reached by a higher echelon. T h e present statutes allow “ broad” Party discussion * P . Rodionov, “ T h e Immutable Principle of the Marxist-Leninist Party,” Pravda, August 9, 1968, translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, II, No. 32, 8-9.

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only if the need is recognized by several high-level Party or­ ganizations or by the Central Com m ittee itself. In practice, as w ill be discussed in greater detail, this means the central au­ thorities are free to perm it or forbid discussion on any matters that im pinge on general policy. O n the other hand, lower Party organizations are permitted, and indeed bound, to dis­ cuss im plem entation of policy at their own level and below. “ Criticism ” and “ self-criticism” are characteristic features of this discussion, through which inefficient or delinquent mem­ bers are brought to confess their sins and, presumably, mend their ways. In a very similar fashion, the nom inally free elections in the Party organizations (and organizations which the Party supervises) are guided from above. Ostensibly, the prim ary Party organization, for exam ple, annually elects a directing bureau and a secretary (usually not a full-time official), who serve as its chief officers. Every two years, the primary or­ ganization also elects delegates to a conference at the nexthigher level, the rayon, or district. O u r inform ation about the actual conduct o f these elections is far from complete. It is clear, however, that the nomenklatura system applies to elected as w ell as to appointed officials in the Party organization. U nder this system, higher officials make personnel assignments for a designated group of lower Party organizations and certain non-Party agencies. For exam ple, the top Party officials (Politburo and Secretariat) select the highest regional Party officials and the top state, Komsomol, and trade union offi­ cers. Even the lowest level o f Party organizations plays a role in selecting such officials as agricultural specialists. In m aking these assignments, the personnel officials not only take into account in dividual qualifications o f Party members, but “ balance” such factors as age levels of a class of lower officials to give each age group the impression that it is adequately represented (this does not, however, apply to

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Ideology, Politics, and Government

education levels, for 52 per cent of prim ary organization secretaries and an overwhelm ing m ajority of officials in higher Party posts have some higher education). O bviously the nomen­ klatura system would not work if the choice of im portant categories of officials were left to an entirely free elective process. Apparently, the procedure actually used is to “ suggest” to the Party body that it elect a specific slate—sometimes in­ cluding persons who are unknown to the Party members participating in the elections. Before m any im portant local elections, Party officials from Moscow arrive as visitors; they deliver speeches to the Party meetings and, either openly or covertly, pass on the wishes of the central authorities concern­ ing the slate to be elected. O bviously, these “ suggestions” deprive democratic centralism o f significance in m any cir­ cumstances, although blatant m anipulation of elections is oc­ casionally criticized by the Party press, and lower Party meet­ ings apparently do reject obnoxious candidates from time to time. T h e level of Party organization just above the prim ary or­ ganization is a geographical subdivision, the rayon, or district. T h ere are more than 3,400 district Party organizations, ap­ proxim ately 2,860 in rural areas and 570 that are wards of cities. In addition there are over 800 city Party organizations corresponding approxim ately to district organizations. In each district, a conference of delegates from the dozens of prim ary Party organizations takes place twice every five years. T h e conference form ally elects a committee, which, in turn, elects a bureau and three secretaries. T h e latter are full-tim e officials of the Party apparatus. T h e district conference also elects dele­ gates to the next-higher level, the oblast, or province (in some cases a very large city or a special nationality unit). T h ere are 166 such territorial units throughout the U.S.S.R. T h e pro­ vincial conference elects a committee, which, in turn, elects its bureau and secretaries (three to five in number) twice every

VERTICAL ORGANIZATION AND SUPERVISORY FUNCTIONS IN THE CPSU

UNION REPUBLIC CONGRESS (MEETS EVERY 5 YEARS)

---- Ï----

UNION REPUBLIC CENTRAL COMMITTEE (MEETS EVERY 4 MONTHS) ---------1 --------

I

_____ *_____ UNION REPUBLIC BUREAU

PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE

8S8VS& ----- ¥-----

PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE (OBKOM) (MEETS EVERY 4 MONTHS)

I + PROVINCIAL (OBKOM) BUREAU

-------------- 1------------DISTRICT CONFERENCE — -P (MEETS TWICE EVERY 5 YEARS)

DISTRICT COMMITTEE (RAIKOM) (MEETS EVERY 3 MONTHS) I

± DISTRICT (RAIKOM) BUREAU

PRIMARY PARTY ORGANIZATION (MEETS ONCE A MONTH)

PRIMARY PO BUREAU

Ideology, Politics, and Government

y6

five years. Every five years, the provincial conference continues the pyramidal process of indirect election by choosing delegates to a U nion R epublic Party congress.* T h e republic congresses elect central committees, which, in turn, elect bureaus and secretaries. In addition, every five years conferences in the provinces (or in the smaller republics, the congresses) elect delegates to the "A ll-U nion” Congress o f the Com m unist Party of the Soviet U nion itself. T h e Congress elects the C entral Committee and the Central Inspection Commission. T h e C en­ tral Com mittee then elects the G eneral Secretary, several other secretaries, the Politburo, and the Party Control Com m ittee. O ne may w ell ask at this point whether the purpose o f this elaborate system o f elections is m erely to preserve the appear­ ance o f democratic centralism, a purpose that m ay w ell be achieved as far as the feelings o f the ordinary Party m em ber are concerned. As noted in Chapter 2, the concept o f demo­ cratic centralism had little m eaning even in L en in ’s time, for the conspiratorial nature o f the pre-Revolutionary Bolshevik Party prevented regular elections. N ever having known any­ thing resembling the hotly contested free elections that char­ acterize Western political parties, it is likely that m any Soviet Communists do not realize how hollow their “ inner-Party democracy” is. T h ere are other purposes, however. T h e considerable in ­ vestment of man-hours o f im portant officials (for the congress and conference delegations embrace nearly all m ajor Party and state officials in the U.S.S.R.) is justified by the experience these officials get in discussing problem s with their peers and superiors, for higher officials obtain some idea of “ grass-roots” feeling by talking with provincial officials. Doubtless for this reason and to preserve an impression of "inner-Party democ­

• The largest republic, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) has no congress; on the other hand, the ten smallest republics have no provinces between the district and the republic levels.

The Party

yy

racy,” higher authorities have recently criticized meetings in which all speeches are prearranged. T h ro u gh personal contact —especially if it retains a measure of spontaneity—top officials have a chance to evaluate the loyalty and ability of promising subordinates. But spontaneity cannot go too far, especially at the top of the Party pyram id. T h e m ajor assemblies, especially the A ll-U nion Congress, provide a superb forum for setting forth and publicizing the Party line of the moment. N early 5,000 Congress delegates, m eeting for about ten days, could not (even in the absence o f m anipulation) debate and reach decisions on com plex issues. But they provide an impres­ sive backdrop for the speeches of the m ajor leaders of the Soviet regime and an appearance of “ m onolithic” support for the regim e’s policies. T h e occasion is, in fact, so useful that A ll-U nion congresses in recent years have several times been the scene of proclam ations of m ajor policy. SUGGESTED READINGS Most general histories of Russia (such as those listed in Chapter 1) discuss the Communist Party; so do the specialized works listed in the following chapters. There are now so many general textbook treatments of the Soviet system that only those which are extraordi­ narily useful for considering the Party can be mentioned here.

Fainsod, Merle. H o w Russia Is Ruled. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963. Although now rather out of date, this book was the first serious effort to relate institutions to the reality of the political process in the Soviet Union, and in some ways it is still the best work on the operation of the Soviet system. ------. Smolensk Under Soviet Rule. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958; Vintage paperback, i960. Although limited to a single province, this is one of the most impor­ tant books ever written about the U.S.S.R., because it is based on an extensive file of secret Communist documents originally cap­ tured by the German army and in turn seized by U.S. forces. All aspects of Soviet life in the 1920’s and 1930’s are covered, but the revelations on Party operations are especially important.



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ture becomes “ modernized,” that is, comes to resemble the urban industrial societies of W estern Europe and the U n ited States. As noted in Chapter 2, a m ajor objective of the Soviet regime has been modernization along these lines. Consequently, the functions performed for the regim e by each nationality are closely related to the nationality’s degree of social m obili­ zation. T h e proportion of urban inhabitants is, by definition, an indicator of social m obilization. Experience throughout the world indicates that the proportion of children is also very significant: It is high in traditional and transitional societies, lower in fully modernized societies. Most traditional societies place a much lower value on the education of girls than of boys; hence, the relationship between the proportions of males and females with more than the legally required elementary education is also a good indicator of social m obilization. In­ deed, all indicators of relative educational achievements are also indicators of the extent o f social m obilization. Since vir­ tually all people in the U.S.S.R. receive elementary educations, simple criteria such as the extent o f literacy (frequently used to compare developing nations) are worthless in com paring Soviet nationalities. Exam ination of higher educational achievement is m eaningful, and several indicators of such achievement are given in the N ationalities T a b le. O ne must be cautious in using these indicators, however, for some (par­ ticularly current enrollm ents in higher education) may reflect artificial stim ulation of the educational level by the regim e rather than long-term educational achievem ent by the nation­ ality group. Another m ajor indicator of social m obilization is the extent to which members of a group change their place of residence. Apparently, as figures on C entral A sian m igration presented below suggest, the Soviet regim e has not been able to influence such residential movments m uch d u rin g recent decades. Social m obilization indicators relating to wages and per

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177

capita income suggest the level of economic developm ent at­ tained by each nationality. Since such data are rather old and available only for territories (Union republics) rather than for nationalities as such, this group of indicators may be less reliable than other social m obilization indicators presented. In many U nion republics a large share of the higher-paying in­ dustrial and white-collar jobs are held by Russians and other ethnic groups such as m obilized diasporas. As colum n 20 in­ dicates, the proportion o f national groups engaged in highercome nonagricultural work has varied enormously. In several cases it is evident that relatively high average wage levels for a U nion republic are actually the result o f the presence of wellpaid Slavs in nonagricultural work there rather than high earnings by the local nationality. Finally, there are indicators (colùmns 24-28) of the extent to which each nationality has become Russified. In a sense, these indicators represent the "feedback” o f Soviet policy, for Russification is a general objective. However, the indicators do provide evidence o f Soviet policy intentions: T h e relative suc­ cess in Russification may provide clues to the extent to which the regime really is determined to pursue the objective. For some nationalities, Russification appears to be a feasible policy goal; for others, it seems virtually unattainable. Given the general rationality of Soviet policy, one may therefore hypoth­ esize that there is no serious, short-run concern for Russifi­ cation in such cases. O ne o f the best indicators o f Russification is the extent o f interm arriage. U nfortunately, Soviet sources provide few data (although the am ount is increasing) on this factor. Q uantitative indicators are generally lim ited to data on language habits: the extent to which members of a nationality group habitually speak their own language compared with the extent to which they adopt Russian for everyday use or at least as a second language. In this regard, it is im portant to note that rural inhabitants everywhere adhere to their own

Ideology, Politics, and Government

jy g

language, while significant numbers o f urbanites adopt the "all-U nion” language. T o put the matter another way, the in­ terrelation between social m obilization and Russification is intimate. But, as the N ationalities T a b le indicates, the rela­ tion varies enormously from nationality to nationality. O ne must, therefore, turn to a survey o f each m ajor group to assess its position in the Soviet system.

The Russians T h e Russians are the d o m in an t group in the U .S.S.R. N u ­ merically, they constitute a slight m ajority. W h ile the propor­ tion of Russians who are Party members is not qu ite the highest, it is m uch higher than the proportion am ong the other large nationalities. Central Com m ittee m em bership is over­ whelm ingly Russian, though the proportionate role o f U krain ­ ians and some smaller nationalities in the Central Com m ittee, at least during and after Khrushchev's time, has been com ­ parably large. Per capita availability of printed m aterial in Russian is high. These indicators suggest that the regim e places extraordinary reliance on the Russians, and there is a considerable am ount o f additional evidence that the Russian language is favored. T hese generalizations are borne out by historical evidence, w hich indicates that the Russians have constantly formed the most reliable and strongest elem ent supporting the regime. T h is was particularly true du rin g the C ivil W ar when, for m any months, Bolshevik power was vir­ tually restricted to the Russian core areas around M oscow and Leningrad, and during W orld W ar II when most o f the non-Russian population fell under G erm an control. W h ile Stalin was not Russian and relied, to some extent, on non-Russians in the police and the Party apparatus, key organ­ izations like the army officer corps have always been predom i­ nantly Russian in recruitm ent and tradition. O ne reason that the Russians have been so useful to the

The Soviets and the Nationalities

»79

regime is their high degree of social m obilization, suggested by all available quantitative indicators. In a very real sense, at least u ntil the 1950’s, the cities, which are predom inantly R us­ sian in population even in m any m inority-nationality repub­ lics, were fortresses from which the regim e dom inated the countryside. As an urban, educated group, the Russians have been the backbone of the program of forced m odernization.

The “Younger Brothers” T h e social m obilization of the Russians stands out strongly in comparison to the other East Slavic nationalities in the U.S.S.R. Num erically, the 50 m illion Ukrainians and Belorus­ sians are, next to the Russians, by far the most im portant nationalities. As East Slavs, they are also closest to the Russians in language. Party membership is fairly high among both the Ukrainians and the Belorussians, and for m any years has been increasing more rapidly than has Russian Party membership. Sim ilarly, proportional representation of both groups in the Central Com mittee has increased from a very low level to near parity with the Russians. T hese increases undoubtedly re­ sult from the regime’s desire to give symbolic recognition to Ukrainians and Belorussians, to convince them that they are really “ shareholders” in the Soviet system. A ll available evi­ dence indicates, however, that members of these groups who enter the Party, or at least those w ho achieve the elite status of Central Com m ittee membership, are highly Russified. T h e y ha­ bitually speak Russian and accept m uch o f the Russian histor­ ical tradition. As a result, the regim e’s policy implies individual equality of opportunity for the m inority East Slavs, but does not really mean that, as nationalities, they are on a par w ith the Russians. T h e indicators of printed m aterials strongly support this view. As com pared with the amount o f m aterial printed in Russian, the provision o f Ukrainian-language and Belorussian-language m aterials is, per capita, very low, lower

i8o

Ideology, Politics, and Government

indeed than for almost all other nationalities. In fact, we know that huge quantities of Russian publications are printed in the U krainian and Belorussian republics, or im ported from the R.S.F.S.R., while only half a dozen publications in U krainian or Belorussian are printed outside those republics. A sim ilar asymmetry exists in the school situation: Russian-language schools educate a sixth o f the children in the U krainian and Belorussian republics, bu t there are few if any native-language schools for the substantial U krainian and Belorussian m inori­ ties outside their republics. Even official statements refer to the Russians as the “ elder brothers” of the other East Slavs. T h e regime's aim appears to be to draw them closer to the Russians, toward eventual assimilation. W h ile rural U krainians still marry within their group to an overw helm ing extent, m arriage with the numerous Russians in U krainian cities is common. Outside the Ukraine, urban Ukrainians interm arry with R us­ sians to a very high degree. T h e Belorussian group appears to present relatively slight obstacles to the “ younger brother” role. T h e far larger U krain­ ian group, on the other hand, is influenced by factors strongly im peding Russification. H istorically, there has been consider­ able antipathy of U krainians toward Moscow. It is true that common adherence to the O rthodox religion led most U krain­ ians to look toward the Czars in Moscow for protection. B ut a significant portion (now about one-seventh) of the U krainians, in the western region, have been Rom an Catholics of the By­ zantine (now Ukrainian) rite. As a distinctive religious group, the W est Ukrainians opposed both the Latin-rite C atholic Poles and the O rthodox Russians. Prior to 1939, the W est Ukrainians were outside the boundaries o f the U.S.S.R. N a­ tionalist organizations were so prevalent am ong them and so bitterly opposed to Com munism and Russian dom ination that guerrilla activity against the Soviet regim e was strong until the late i94o’s. M ore im portant, perhaps, W est U krain ­

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181

ian nationalists, now incorporated into the U.S.S.R., still try to spread their doctrine of national independence for the U kraine among the large m ajority of East Ukrainians. T h e regime severely represses nationalist sympathizers, but it ap­ pears that their appeal arouses memories of independence am ong the East Ukrainians. D urin g the C ivil W ar, the East Ukrainians m aintained a precarious independent republic for some months. A fter the Bolsheviks gained control of the Ukraine, they felt obliged not only to establish a nom inally separate U krainian R epu blic but, until 1930, to encourage use of the U krainian language in education and publication. Probably more im portant as a source for U krainian dissat­ isfaction with the Moscow regime than memories of historical friction are social differences. Indicators of social m obilization clearly demonstrate the relatively low position of the U krain­ ians and Belorussians. In the U kraine and Belorussia, even more than in most other non-Russian territories, Russians (and Russian-speaking members of other nationalities) pre­ dom inated in the cities during the 1920’s and 1930’s. Yet, that was the period when “ prim itive accum ulation” of capital at the expense of the peasants took place. In practice, this meant that the hardships of collectivization were largely borne, in the U kraine and Belorussia, by the native inhabitants; urban ex­ peditions to enforce collectivization were predom inantly R us­ sian, or at least Russian-speaking. In Belorussia, the impact was not as severe as in the U kraine, for the impoverished peasants had less to lose. T h e U kraine contained, then as now, a high proportion of the best agricultural lands in the U.S.S.R. As a result, the peasants were com paratively well off. T h ey were also more attached to individual farming, for the mir had never been as strong in the U kraine as in Russian territories. Consequently, collectivization was a greater departure from tradition; as such, it was more repugnant to Ukrainians. Peas­ ant resistance in the U kraine was undoubtedly stronger, on

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the average, than in Russian rural areas. T h e regim e’s re­ pressive measures, including wholesale banishment to Siberia and ruthless collection of harvests, was correspondingly more severe. Mass starvation decimated the U krainian countryside in 1933. It is not surprising that m any U krainian peasants identi­ fied oppression, directed from Moscow and carried out by R us­ sian-speaking city men, with Russians in general, or that, at least during W orld W ar II, U krainians were receptive to ar­ guments for national independence. As the decades have gone by, memories of collectivization undoubtedly have become less im portant in the U kraine, es­ pecially to the increasing urban element. O n the other hand, West U krainian nationalism has had some chance to spread. T h e post-Stalin regime has tried to enhance U krainian loyalty but, apart from the im peding factors just outlined, emphasis on East Slav unity is hampered by other considerations. A unified nation of Russified East Slavs would undoubtedly be extremely powerful, for it would include nearly three-fourths of the Soviet population. T h e U kraine alone provides onefifth of the agricultural and industrial production of the Soviet Union. In terms of skills (as reflected in higher education), however, the "younger brothers" are below average. Moreover, official recognition of the dom inant position of the East Slavs w ould have extremely serious consequences for the over-all po­ sition of the U.S.S.R. How could it continue to claim to be a m ulti-national state, the prototype and progenitor of a future Communist commonwealth o f nations? W hat effect w ould avowed Russian dom ination have on Soviet claims to lead world Communism or even the Com m unist bloc of Eastern Europe? How could Moscow justify its continued control of admittedly non-Slavic territories in a world where national independence is an almost universally popular slogan? A sur­ vey of the principal non-Slavic nationalities underscores the complexities involved in the Soviet position.

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183

Mobilized Diasporas M any societies that are in the transitional stage from tradi­ tional to modern include ethnic m inorities that perform special functions in the social m obilization process. Such .spe­ cial-function m inorities are geographically dispersed (hence, "diasporas”) and, relative to other elements of the population, have attained a high degree of social m obilization (hence, “ m obilized diasporas”). Frequently, because social or political pressures have prevented them from follow ing the rural occu­ pations typical of a traditional society, these nationalities are more urban than other population elements. M obilized dias­ pora members have relatively superior educational attain­ ments, partly because education offers one o f the few channels of advancement open to their m inority group. Consequently, they provide a disproportionately large share of the moderniz: ing society’s highly trained m anpower (and womanpower, because m obilized diasporas are exceptionally ready to encour­ age the education of their women). M obilized diasporas are also very valuable to m odernizing societies because their members frequently have talents in commerce, negotiation, and adm in­ istration even highly educated members of the dom inant nationalities lack. These talents include a wide knowledge of languages, which is essential to members of dispersed national­ ities livin g am ong populations speaking different tongues, and a sensitivity to human-relations problems, which m inority members must have to survive. Because o f their useful qu ali­ ties, m obilized diasporas obtain a disproportionate share of the key positions in a m odernizing society. As the society becomes more modernized, this apparently favored position of the m i­ nority arouses jealousy am ong the increasing educated stratum of other nationalities. As a result, members of the m obilized diaspora are frequently subject to discrimination and usu­ ally cease to perform specialized functions when the society approaches complete m odernization.

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Ideology, Politics, and Government

Compared to other modernized countries, Russia has had an unusually protracted process of m odernization. It began the process in the mid-nineteenth century, roughly at the same time as the U nited States. W h ile the U nited States m ay be considered to have basically com pleted the transition by about 1920, the U.S.S.R. is still, in many ways, in the latter stages of modernization. It is not surprising, therefore, that several na­ tionalities in succession appear to have acted as m obilized diasporas. W e have already noted the place of the Germ ans among the nobility in the Czarist Empire. T h e y were also very prominent in adm inistration, diplom acy, and the professions. Since the Germans were largely displaced as a m obilized dias­ pora before the Revolution (though there are still nearly 2 m il­ lion Germans in the U.S.S.R.), they need not be Considered further. D uring the Czarist period, the numerous Jews of the Empire were persecuted more severely than in any other m ajor nation. Many Jews also suffered as a result of the disorders of the C ivil W ar. Jewish religious life was frowned on by the Bolsheviks; Jewish businessmen eventually lost their property. Individual Jews, however, especially if they were not religious, were not discriminated against. A fter the R evolution, several rose to prom inent positions in the Party and the state. M any other Jews (who, for the most part, preferred dem ocratic so­ cialism to Communism) were able to get higher educations and to move freely into skilled occupations all over the Soviet Uftion. Am ong other factors, the centuries-old urban back­ ground of most Jews and their traditional emphasis on learning made it relatively easy for them to adapt to the m oderniza­ tion process. As a result, in the 1920's and the 1930’s, the Jews assumed an im portant place in Soviet society as a m obilized diaspora. T h rough ou t the Soviet period, every Soviet citizen of Jewish parentage, regardless of his own religious attitude, has been required to carry a passport identifying him as a Jew by na­

The Soviets and the Nationalities tionality. T h e regime set this requirem ent partly because most Jews in the U.S.S.R. did have some characteristics o f a nation­ ality, especially in the habitual use, at the tim e of the R evolu ­ tion, of the Yiddish language. O bviously, however, compulsory identification according to parental background paved the way for treating individual Jews as members o f a group rather than in accordance with their personal attitudes and merits. T h is ominous potential for discrim ination began to be real­ ized in the early iq ^ ’s. R eliable reports indicate that, early in W orld W ar II, quotas setting an upper lim it on the number of Jews in Party and governm ent posts, in the arts and pro­ fessions, and in higher education, were secretly decreed. In 1948-49, Yiddish cultural institutions were almost totally abol­ ished and several prom inent Jewish cultural figures were secretly executed. In the notorious “ Doctors’ Plot," a predomi­ nantly Jewish group was falsely accused of atrocious crimes. O ne m otive for this persecution seems to have been Stalin’s personal prejudice, but, even after his death, thinly disguised accusations o f Jewish corruption and the revival o f old slan­ ders against widespread. Khrushchev occupied by

the Jewish religion suggest that anti-Semitism is W h ile this prejudice has m any sources, one (as once admitted) is jealousy o f the prom inent role Jews in highly skilled occupations. But, the nu­

merous Jewish scientists, physicians, and other highly trained personnel constitute an almost indispensable resource for the Soviet system. M oreover, the claim o f the U.S.S.R. to be a society o f brotherhood and equality is tarnished by evidence of discrimination. U nder these circumstances, the regim e has played an am bivalent game. Some indirect slurs on Jews as a group continue to appear; Judaism is discouraged as a re­ ligion. B u t anti-Semitism is, occasionally, officially denounced. Jews continue to occupy im portant positions, but their pro­ portion in the highly skilled occupations and in university student bodies regularly decreases (compare columns 17 and

i8 6

Ideology, Politics, and Government

18). Yiddish (and Hebrew) instruction is virtually precluded; as a result, Jews have rapidly Russified linguistically. N ever­ theless, a relatively low rate of interm arriage w ith non-Jews suggests that a large proportion of Soviet Jews cling to their ethnic identity. From the 1960’s on, m anifestations of Jewish ethnic consciousness (such as street gatherings on holy days) m ultiplied. W hile the Soviet regim e acted harshly to discour­ age these manifestations, it gradually relaxed restrictions on Jewish and German emigration, perhaps hoping that depar­ ture of the most dissatisfied elements in these diasporas w ould make absorption of the rem ainder easier. W ith the reduced im portance of the Jews as a m obilized diaspora has come the increased im portance of Arm enians in this role. As the indicators (columns 13, 17, 18, 19) in the Nationalities T a b le show, Arm enians do not reach the ex­ tremely high levels of urbanization, higher education, and skilled professional status attained by the Jews, bu t the A r­ menians equal or exceed the Russians in these indicators of social m obilization and are far ahead of most other n ationali­ ties. Curiously enough, though their women have nearly as high an indicator of educational attainm ent as their men (columns 15 and 16), indicators of Arm enian population increase (col­ um n is) remain very high. Arm enians are less concentrated in their home territory than any m ajor nationality other than Tatars. (Jews, Germans, and Poles, who, practically speaking, have no home territory in the U.S.S.R., are not included in this comparison). Arm enians are especially im portant as a m o­ bilized diaspora throughout the Transcaucasus, the N orth Caucasus, and the Transcaspian regions. T h e y also perform some specialized tasks in over-all Soviet institutions, especially in the area o f domestic and foreign commerce. Com pared to earlier m obilized diasporas, their im portance m ay be slight; one reason for this reduction in im portance of the m obilized diaspora is that Soviet society has become m ore m odernized.

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For the time being, the A rm enian group enjoys certain priv­ ileges. Its distinctive G regorian Church is subjected to less pressure than most other religious groups in the U.S.S.R.— partly because the regim e tries to use it to influence the nu­ merous Arm enians living in other parts of the world. T h e proportion of Russians in the Arm enian S.S.R. is unusually low. In some areas, Arm enians outside their republic are pro­ vided with their own language schools. T h e relatively low per capita rate of publication in Armenian- suggests that the re­ gime does not encourage linguistic autonom y in all respects, however. A t any rate, Arm enians, as a highly dispersed nation­ ality, tend, much more than most nationalities, to adopt Rus­ sian as their habitual speech. In the long run, the regime m ay hope to assimilate the Arm enians; in the meantime, it appar­ ently finds it worthw hile to encourage them to function as a m obilized diaspora.

The State Nations A glance at the N ationalities T a b le shows that most indi­ cators o f social m obilization for the Georgians, the Estonians, and the Latvians are o f the same order o f m agnitude as for the Russians and the Arm enians. In contrast to the Arm eni­ ans, however, the Georgians, Estonians, and Latvians are highly concentrated in their home territories. Each o f these territories has, in recent times, constituted a national unit o f special strength. Between 1918 and 1939, Estonia and Latvia were independent states with flourishing cultures and highly developed economies. Georgia was independent for only two years, but its favored position under Stalin, a Georgian him ­ self, provided a kind o f substitute for the cultural develop­ ment and national self-confidence that is usually an attribute of statehood. As a result, linguistic Russification has made rem arkably little progress among these three nationalities. M uch evidence suggests that a dom inant tendency among

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Ideology, Politics, and Government

them is the determ ination to m aintain their national identi­ ties. Consequently, we may designate these nationalities as “ state nations.” T h e situation of the Lithuanians and the M oldavians is rather different. In terms o f nearly all indicators o f social m o­ bilization, both nationalities rate w ell below the nationalities discussed so far. O n the other hand, both have a recent mem­ ory o f independence from Russia: during the interwar period, separate statehood for the Lithuanians, and incorporation into ethnically similar Rom ania for the M oldavians. B oth also show a strong resistance to Russification. Consequently, it seems desirable to include them, too, am ong the state nations. A ll of the state nations occupy highly strategic positions on the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. U nder Stalin, all except his fellow Georgians were severely repressed, and a heavy im m igration o f Russians into their republics was encouraged in order to estab­ lish what am ounted to frontier garrisons o f reliable elements. T h e increasing strength o f the U.S.S.R. has made such pre­ cautions less vital. A t the same time, the regim e seems to have recognized that Russification o f the state nations cannot be accomplished quickly and that strong overt pressures in this direction w ill increase dissatisfaction am ong them and disrupt their significant, though m inor, contribution to the Soviet economy. A s a result, a kind of stand-off appears to exist: T h e state-nation territories are firmly incorporated into’ the Soviet defensive and economic systems, but the regim e permits a rela­ tively high degree of cultural autonom y (indicated by high per capita publication rates) and a relatively low degree o f political integration (suggested by low Party mem bership and fluctuating Central Com m ittee m embership indicators) for the state nations.

Colonials T h e Russian Empire, in contrast to W est European colonial empires, expanded into adjoining land areas inhabited by

The Soviets and the Nationalities

i8 9

peoples representing a gradual transition of physical types. As a result, Russians com m only do not m aintain notions o f racial superiority. Nevertheless, as the Russian Em pire expanded into the vague borderlands of Europe and, then, into the heart of Asia itself, it absorbed nationalities that differed from the dom inant Russian culture as m uch as the typical colony of a W est European country differed from the metropolis. Even today, these nationalities, in their relatively low levels o f so­ cial m obilization, resemble typical colonies. T h e educational and skilled occupational attainm ents o f all seven (Azerbaidzhanis, Uzbeks, Turkm ens, Kazakhs, Kirgizes, Tatars, and T a ­ dzhiks) listed in the N ationalities T a b le are generally, though not universally, below those o f the Soviet nationalities con­ sidered earlier in this chapter. Residential m obility, at least in terms of movement to non-Central A sian republics, is strikingly low. Thus, in 1959, Russian residents of Central Asia were over one hundred times more likely to migrate to certain Siberian cities than were native Asians. O ther highly significant Asian differences in indicators of social m obilization appear in the extraordinarily high proportion under so years old and the great disparity between male and female educational attainment. Both o f the latter indicators reflect not only the less m od­ ernized situation o f the colonials but the wide traditional cultural gap between them and other m ajor Soviet nationali­ ties. A ll o f the colonial nationalities presented in the T a b le (as w ell as a num ber of sm aller Soviet ethnic groups) were traditionally Moslem. W h ile the Islamic faith does not require the relegation o f women to agricultural and household tasks, most Moslem cultures have, in fact, put a low value on fe­ m ale education and discouraged women from m oving into industrial and professional occupations. Even today, Soviet publications frequently com plain that the persistence o f these traditional attitudes associated w ith Islam prevent utilization of women in the work force o f the once-Moslem territories.

TABLE

OF

M A J O R

INDICATORS OF SOVIET POLICY

GENERAL INFORMATION

NATIONALITY

N A T I O N A L I T I E S

£ ©

c

& O

«

© © |

s * I ..y U * § f e S g; o 5 -g - a 3 .8 K s

a S

Os V s J *'1 1 2 ‘SS w C ••2 «3 3 05

.2 a •c .s CL03 v 8

Data for tional ities

C § *0 s i

WwÇ •° « * 3 .5 6S 3 political officers in, 94, 110 Armenian nationality, 186-87, 19091» 212 Atheism, 8, 29, 132, 230 Australia, 211 Azerbaidzhani nationality, 189, 190-91

Baku, 122 Balance of power, 199, 200, 224 Belorussia, 175, 179-80, 181, 19091, 203, 204 Ben Bella, Ahmed, 214 Beria, Lavrenti, 56, 84, 85, 87, 114, 117, 119

235

Birth rate, 156, 190 Bolshevism, 6, 21-23, 36, 76, 161, 228; in Civil War, 178, 184, 204; in revolutionary soviets, 16061 Bonapartism, 114 Bourgeoisie, 32, 34, 37, 38, 40, 45 Brezhnev, Leonid, 44, 49, 90, 93, 103, 104, 114-15, 165, 230; and foreign policy, 56, 89, 206, 207; rise of, 24, 88, 89; statements by, 3b, 4 6» 6 6 , 159-60 Broadcasting, 64-65, 95, 96, 231 Bulgaria, 2067? Bureaucracy, see Administration Byzantine Empire, 7 Caesaropapisin, 7-8 Cambodia, U.S. invasion of, 218 Capitalism, 38-39, 45, 47, 198; imperialism and, 33-35, 48 Castro, Fidel, 213 Catherine II (the Great), 9, 13 Catholicism, 18, 132, 180, 190 Censorship, 17-18, 97, 134 Central Committee, 61, 73, 75, 80, 90-92, 165, 230; and armed forces, 113, 115; election to, 76; Khrushchev and, 56, 98, 99; membership, 98-103, 108, 174, 178, *79» i 9°> *94î and nation­ alities, 178, 179, 190, 194 Central Inspection Commission, 76, 80 China, 207-10, 212, 217-18, 223, 228; Lenin on, 212; Soviet view of, 207-8 Civil War, Russian, 112, 113, 116, 178, 181, 184, 203, 204

236

Class structure, 9-17, 32-33, 156, 232 Coercion and repression, 17, 39— 41, 111-34, 232; intraparty, 87-

88 Collective farms, 22, 149-55 Collective leadership, 24, 56, 8389, 115

Colonialism, 188-94, 211 Communism, 28, 32, 39, 199, 212, 2*17, 231, 232; progress toward, 38-46, 122, 153, 160, 209; termi­ nology of, 28n; timetable for, 46-49, 229 Communist International, 199 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 22, 23, 35-37, 4 1» 4 3 - 4 4 » 5 3 - 7 7 » 127 » 128, 166; armed forces and, 60, 6667, 71-72, 94, 113-15; confer­ ences, 74-76; conflicts within, 81, 91-92; Control Committees, 61, 75, 80; membership, 57-61, 173, 1 7 4 » 178, 1 7 9 » l8 4 » 185» 19 °» *9 4 » 230; organization, 36-37, 60, 7277, 80-108, 141; orthodoxy in, 50, 230; preeminence of; 55-57, 94, 159, 160, 162, 163, 230; Sec­ retariat, 73, 75, 80, 93-100; see also Central Committee; Con­ gresses; Elections; Komsomol; Politburo; State Cmmunist Youth League, see Komsomol Computer technology, 141-42 Concentration camps, 117-18, 124, 133» 231-32 Congresses, CPSU, 75-77, 80, 82; Twenty-fourth, 159-60; Twentythird, 72 Constitution, Soviet, 159, 161-65, 17 1 Continuing arms limitation nego­ tiations (SALT III), 221 Council of Ministers, 138, 140, 165, 169, 170, 171 Courts, 19, 121, 123, 127-30, 13233

Crime, 118-20, 127, 130-31 Cuba, 207, 209, 211, 213, 220, 221, 228

Index Czarism, 6-21, 37, 113, 127, 180, 227-28 Czechoslovakia, 38, 44, 54, 72, 89, 202, 204, 209, 216, 224, 228 Daniel, Yuli, 131 Death penalty, 122, 147 Debray, Régis, 209 Decision-making, CPSU and, 8292, i n , 139 Defectors, 119 Defense, Ministry of, 56, 94, 171 Democratic centralism, 36-37, 72, 75» 80, 91 Dialectic, 30-32 Diasporas, mobilized, 177, 183-87 Dictatorship, 48, 206-7, 214, 231; military, 113, 115; of proletariat, 3 7 . 3 8» 3 9 . 5 3 - 5 4 » 82-83 Dissent, 118, 124-26, 127, 129, 131-34, 228 Doctor Zhivago (Pasternak), 124 “Doctor's Plot," 185 Drunkenness, 120, 123 Duma, 6 East Slavs, 7, 8, 20, 116, 175, 179, 180, 182, 194, 210 Economy, direction and planning of, 39» 94-95» 98, 103, 104, 122, 137 - 5 7 » 1 7 7 » 232 Education, 42, 45, 96, 156, 176; and CPSU, 58-59, 61-62, 65-66; of minorities, 183, 186, 187, 189, 19 °» 193; 5ee aI50 Indoctrina­ tion Egypt,, 213, 215, 219 Elections, 37, 87; judicial, 123, 128-29; Party, 73-77; Soviet, 161-63, 166 Engels, Friedrich, 28, 30-31, 484 9 » 55 Estonia, 11, 187-88, 190-91 Ethnic minorities, see Diasporas, mobilized; Nationalities Factionalism, 82, 85 Fascism, 40, 48, 120 Finland, 203, 204 Five-Year Plans, 22-23, 39 Food production, see Agriculture

Index Foreign Affairs, Ministry of, Foreign policy, 197-225, Brezhnev and, 56, 89, 206, Khrushchev and, 47, 208,

*37 171 232; 207; 213,

215

Iran, 211, 212 Israel, 211, 213, 215, 219 Italy, 199, 201, 224 Ivan IV (the Terrible), 11 Izvestia, 63-64

France, 142, 199, 200, 201, 211 Gandhi, Indira, 89 Garden plots, 152-54 Genghis Khan, 210 Georgia, 187-88, 190-91 Germany, 23, 40, 64, 184, 186, 199, 200, 202, 203; East, 206; invasion of U.S.S.R., 23, 114, 115-16, 178; West, 142 Ghana, 214 Great Britain, 37, 142, 166, 199, 200, 201, 211 Great Purge, 23, 41, 97, 101, 102, 105 Grechko, Andrei A., 86 Greece, 219 Gromyko, Andrei A., 86 Guevara, Ernesto “ Che,” 209 Higher Party Schools, 62 Hitler, Adolf, 23 Housing, 42, 43, 120, 121, 229 Hungary, 206, 208, 224 Ideology, 5, 27-51, 137, 160, 197, 200, 205, 209; central importance of, 27, 81, 111, 228; errors in, acknowledged, 48-49; Party as guardian of, 54-55, 112-13; see also Leninism; Marxism-Lenin­ ism Imperialism, 20, 200, 209, 214; Lenin on, 33-35, 48, 200 India, 209, 211 Indoctrination, 45, 54, 55, 68, 111, 118, 150, 231; CPSU and, 55, 61-67, 71, 72; machinery of, 959 7 » 132 Indonesia, 213, 214 Industry, 46-48, 60, 145-48, 155, 156, 164, 182; CPSU and, 9495, 141; development of, 15, 2223, 148, 176; work incentives, 121, 122 Intelligentsia, 15-19, 22, 227

Japan, 23, 142, 148, 199, 200, 214, 218, 222 Jews, 132, 184-88, 190-91 Jordan, 218 Judicial system, see Courts; Elec­ tions Kaganovich, Lazar, 85 Kalinin, M. I., 162 Kazakh nationality, 189, 190-91 Kazan, 125 KGB (Committee on State Secu­ rity), n6n, 119, 125 Khozraschot system, 143 Khrushchev, Nikita, 24, 28, 37-38, 45» 46» 49» 56» 114» 230; and col­ lective leadership, 84-88; and CPSU, 55, 56, 98, 99; and for­ eign policy, 47, 208, 213, 215; rise of, 55, 82, 123, 169; rule of, 41, 43-44, 82, 84-88, 91, 92, 93, 98, 99, 100, 122, 124-26, 140-41, 148, 150, 152, 153, 164 Kiev, 122 Kirgiz nationality, 189, 190-91 Kirilenko, A. P., 90 Kochetov, Vsevolod, 43, 105-8 Kolkhozes, see Collective farms Komsomol (Communist Youth League), 67-70, 73, 95, 98, 105, 119, 122-23, 132, 133 Konev, Ivan S., 114 Korea, 214, 219, 220 Kosygin, Aleksei N., 56, 86, 88, 103, 169-70 Kulaks, 149 Kutuzov, Mikhail I., 49 Labor camps, 118, 123 Land, ownership of, 12, 21; tenure of, 13-14 Latin America, 211 Latvia, 11, 187-88, 190-91 Law, 19, 126-34, 163-65; see also Courts

Index

238

League of Nations, 211 Legislative procedure, 163-66 Lenin, V. L, 12, 22, 24, 28, 30, 31, 3 3 - 3 5 » 4 L 4 6»4 9 » 5 5 » 5 7 » 61 » 69, 72, 137, 160-61, 165, 166, 2oo, 212, 217; decision-making under, 82, 83, 85, 111; on mili­ tary force, 113, 116; on prole­ tariat, 34, 35, 36; on role of CPSU, 53, 54, 81, 82; theories of» 3 4 “ 3 9 » 4 8» 2° 3 » 2 2 7 Leningrad, 12, 122, 125, 178 Leninism, 28, 31, 49, i 9 7 ~9 8» 213 “ 14; see also Marxism-Leninism Liberman, Yevsei, 144, 147 Literacy, see Education Lithuania, 188, 190-91 Little Octobrists, 70 Lobachevsky, Nikolai I., 19 Machine tractor stations (MTS), 150 McNamara, Robert, 216 Malenkov, Georgi, 24, 55, 56, 8488, 91, 97, 165, 169 Mao Tse-Tung, 209, 223 Marx, Karl: doctrine, 28, 30, 32, 33» 35» 55» 68; predictions, 38, 48; on transition to Commu­ nism, 37-39, 41, 137 Marxism-Leninism, 28-29, 3 °» 3 2» 3 3 » 4 4 » 46» 4 9 » 5 °» 6 l» 22°» 227 ~ 29, 231; non-Soviet adherents, 207, 208, 212, 213, 214; as sci­ ence, 48-49, 230 Mass media, 63-65, 95-97, 124-26, 179-80, 231 Materialism, 28-33, 230; historical, 3 2- 3 7

Medvedev, Zhores, 126 Mendeleyev, Dimitry I., 19 Messianism, 19-20 Middle East, see Egypt; Israel Migration, 174, 176, 189 Mikoyan, Anastas I., 141 Mir (village community), 13, 14, 181, 227 Moldavian nationality, 188, 190-91 Molotov, V. M., 84 Mongolian People's Republic, 199, 2o6n

Mongols, 8-9, 212 Moscow, 145, 171, 173, 174, 178, 182, 231; princes of, 8-9; Uni­ versity of, 156 Moslems, 175, 189, 190, 193-94 Myrdal, Gunnar, 27 Nationalism, 116, 181, 182, 194; underground, 118, 131 Nationalities, 59, 173-94; non" Russian, 66, 175, 179-94, 2° 5 i Russification of, 177-80, 188, 191» i 9 3 î Soviet of, 167 Nazism, 23, 40, 48, 64, 120, 200 “New Economic Policy," 22 Nixon, Richard M., 217, 218, 219, 225 Nkrumah, Kwame, 214 Nobility, 10-12, 22, 38 Nomenklatura system, 73-74, 95,

98

North Atlantic Treaty Organiza­ tion (NATO), 203, 216-17, 22425

Nuclear weapons, 201-2, 210, 21518, 223 Obkom

(provincial

committee),

75» 76, 105-8; election of, 74 Orthodox Church, 7-8, 12, 18, 20, 21, 132, 180, 190 Panslavism, 20 Party Control Committee, 61, 76 Pasternak, Boris, 124 Pavlov, Ivan P., 19 Pavlov, Sergei P., 133 Peasants, 13-14, 16, 59, 156, 231; and collectivization, 150-55, 181-82 People's Control Committee, 170 People's courts, 128 Pioneers, 70 Podgorny, Nikolai V., 86, 88 Poland, 8, 23, 199, 206; natives, 186, 203-4 Police, 19, 56, 69, 116-20, 133; Beria and, 56, 84, 117, 119; Stalin and, 41, 54, 116-19, 15 ° Politburo, 73, 75, 76, 80, 83-84, 86, 90-93, 100, 138, 215; char­ acter of members, 102, 230

Index Political culture, 5-6, 111; ideol­ ogy and, 81, 228; inculcation of, 27, 61 Pravda, 45, 46, 63, 64, 75, 96, 132 Pricing, 143, 144, 145 Profit regulation, 142-45 Proletariat, 15, 32, 34; dictator­ ship of, 37, 38, 39, 53-54, 82-83; Lenin on, 34, 35, 36 Propaganda, 62-63, 95-97, 131, 231 Property, CPSU on, 41, 43-44 Protestantism, 18, 21, 132, 190 Pskov, 132 Psychiatric confinement, 125, 127, *3 3 ' *34 Raikom (district committee), 75, 150; election of, 74 Red Army, see Armed forces Religion, 8, 190; “debunking” of, 71; suppression of, 131-33, 184, 230; see also Catholicism; Ortho­ dox Church; Protestantism Repression, see Coercion and re­ pression Revolution, Russian, 17, 21-22, 32, 161, 162; and Leninist theory,

34-38

Romania, 49, 188, 203, 204, 208, 224 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 200 Russian Empire, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 189 Russian nationality, 174, 175, 1787 9 * 19 0 -9 1 Sadat, Anwar, 89 St. Petersburg, 12 Samizdat literature, 63, 125-26 Science, 19, 29-30, 31, 49, 96, 230 Secretariat, 73, 75, 80, 93-100 Secretary of the Obkom (Koche­ tov), 105-8 Shcherbitsky, V. V., 90 Semichastny, Vladimir, 119 Shelepin, Aleksandr N., 86, 90, 100, 119 Shelest, Pyotr Y., 86, 90, 100, 205 Shepilov, Dmitri, 85 Siberia, 117, 149, 182 Sinyavsky, Andrei, 131

*3 9 Slavophiles, 10, 11, 18, 19-20 Social mobilization, 174, 176-70, 181, 183-87, 191 Social persuasion, 122-23 Socialism, 33, 34, 38, 44, 46, 47, 214, 229-30; “in one country,” 38-39, 198; parliamentary path to, 37, 160 Society for Knowledge, 71 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, 8, 124, 126 South Africa, 211 Soviets, 160-73; supreme, 138, 161, 163-67 Sovkhozes, see State farms Sovnarkhoz (Council of National Economy), 88, 138, 140-41 Stalin, Joseph V., 22-23, 24, 28, 31, 32, 39-41, 45, 46, 48-49, 185, 200, 201; and armed forces, 113, 114, 116; and CPSU, 54, 92, 97, 98, 100; expansionist tendency, 204; exposés of, 124, 126; and police, 41, 54, 116-19, 15°' rule 8288, 93, 101, 121, 138, 149-50, 153, 188, 198, 231, 232; and state structure, 159, 169; and terrorism, 87, 98, 117, 124, 125, *34

State, 152, 159, 160; CPSU and, 92, 93, 94, 100, 108, 138, 146, 160-61, 166, 172; “withering away” of, 37, 39-40, 122; see also Admin­ istration; Soviets State Bank, 146 State farms, 150, 151, 152 State Planning Committee, 139, 172 Sukarno, Achmed, 214 Supreme Court, 128, 129-30 Supreme Soviet, 138, 161, 163-67 Suslov, Mikhail A., 86, 88, 103 Syria, 218, 219 Tadzhik nationality, 189, 190-91 Tatar nationality, 186, 189, 1909 L *93 Taxation, 13, 143 ” 4 4 > *5 2 Technology, 30, 49, 103, 141-42, 229, 231

Index

240 Terrorism, and police, 116-19; under Stalin, 87, 98, 117, 124, 125, 134 Third World, 210-15, 228-29 Tito, Marshal Josip Broz, 89, 224 Torture, 120 Totalitarianism, 27, 96, 111, 227, 231 Toynbee, Arnold, 7 Trade unions, 70-71, 73, 95, 123 Transportation, 42, 43, 96, 121-22 Trotsky, Leon, 114 Tukhachevsky, Mikhail N., 114 Turkey, 212 Turkmen nationality, 189, 190-91, 212 Tvardovsky, Aleksandr, 124 Ukraine, 104, 132, 203, 204, 205; natives, 175, 178-82, 190-91 Ulyanov, Ilya, 12 Union Republic Party, 75, 76 Union republics, n6n, 123, 1707 2> 177 United Arab Republic, 213, 214,

215

United Nations, 211 United States, 37, 47-48, 56, 142, 148, 184, 199, 200, 207, 211; ne­ gotiations with, 56, 89, 214, 221; rivalry with, 201, 202, 215-20, 224-25; and Vietnam, 215, 217, 218, 219

Uzbek nationality, 189, 190-91

Vietnam, 207, 211, 215, 217-20 Village government, 13-14, 17, 168; see also Mir Volunteer Society for Coopera­ tion with the Armed Forces (DOSAAF), 71-72 Voronov, G. I., 86 Voroshilov, Kliment Y., 86 Wages, 71, 151, 154-55 Women, role of, 59, 65-66, 129, 183, 186, 190-91 Workers, 15, 33-34, 35, 36, 44, 58, 121, 156, 177, 232; agricultural, 151_55î discipline of, 121-24; rural vs, urban, 155-57; see also Trade unions World War I, 21, 35 World War II, 23-24, 89, 102, 105, 112, 154, 178, 182, 200, 202 Yepishev, Aleksei A., 113, 114-15 Yugoslavia, 23, 38, 44, 207, 224, 225, 232 Zemstvo, 12, 16 Zhukov, Georgi, 56, 114