Handbook of Human Mobility and Migration 1839105771, 9781839105777

Table of contents :
Front Matter
Copyright
Contents
Contributors
Introduction: human mobility as hallmark of our age
PART I RETHINKING
1 Is Homo sapiens a growingly mobile species (in the very long run)?
2 Have migrants become a distinct category in social stratification research?
3 Are migrants a select population?
4 Is there an end to mobility? Circular and onward migrants
5 Are international and internal migration distinct phenomena?
PART II MAPPING
6 How global is international mobility?
7 Are high-speed rail and airplane mobilities socially stratified?
8 Where, when and why are students internationally mobile?
9 Child migration: who, where, when and why?
10 International retirement migration: who, where, when and why?
11 Public opinion on immigration: is it converging globally or regionally?
PART III GOVERNING
12 Visas and border infrastructures: what makes them tighter or looser?
13 Does the forced/voluntary dichotomy really influence migration governance?
14 Free movement regimes: is the EU experience exportable?
15 Transnational mobility and welfare rights: are they compatible?
16 Who governs migration and mobilities globally?
Index

Citation preview

HANDBOOK OF HUMAN MOBILITY AND MIGRATION

ELGAR HANDBOOKS IN MIGRATION The Elgar Handbooks in Migration series provides a definitive overview of recent research in all matters relating to the study of Migration, forming an extensive guide to the subject. This series covers research areas including internal migration, the global impact of human trafficking and forced labour, and international migration policy, and constitutes an essential new resource in the field. Each volume is edited by an editor recognized as an international leader within the field and consists of original contributions by leading authors. These Handbooks are developed using an international approach and contribute to both the expansion of current debates within the field, and the development of future research agendas. For a full list of Edward Elgar published titles, including the titles in this series, visit our website at www​.e​-elgar​.com​.

Handbook of Human Mobility and Migration Edited by

Ettore Recchi Professor of Sociology, CRIS, Sciences Po, Paris, France and Part-time Professor, MPC, European University Institute (EUI), Fiesole, Italy

Mirna Safi Professor of Sociology, CRIS, Sciences Po, Paris, France

ELGAR HANDBOOKS IN MIGRATION

Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

© Ettore Recchi and Mirna Safi 2024

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2023949645 This book is available electronically in the Political Science and Public Policy subject collection http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781839105784

ISBN 978 1 83910 577 7 (cased) ISBN 978 1 83910 578 4 (eBook)

EEP BoX

Contents

List of contributorsvii Introduction: human mobility as hallmark of our agexii Ettore Recchi and Mirna Safi PART I

RETHINKING

1 Is Homo sapiens a growingly mobile species (in the very long run)? Massimo Livi Bacci

2

2

Have migrants become a distinct category in social stratification research? Mirna Safi

12

3

Are migrants a select population? Mathieu Ichou

34

4

Is there an end to mobility? Circular and onward migrants Louise Caron

53

5

Are international and internal migration distinct phenomena? Marine Haddad and Haley McAvay

70

PART II

MAPPING

6

How global is international mobility? Emanuel Deutschmann and Ettore Recchi

7

Are high-speed rail and airplane mobilities socially stratified? Yoann Demoli and Frédéric Dobruszkes

113

8

Where, when and why are students internationally mobile? Christof Van Mol, Joep Cleven and Benjamin Mulvey

128

9

Child migration: who, where, when and why? Chiara Galli

148

10

International retirement migration: who, where, when and why? Russell King

163

11

Public opinion on immigration: is it converging globally or regionally? James Dennison and Alina Vrânceanu

182

v

94

vi  Handbook of human mobility and migration PART III GOVERNING 12

Visas and border infrastructures: what makes them tighter or looser? Fabian Gülzau and Steffen Mau

203

13

Does the forced/voluntary dichotomy really influence migration governance? Hélène Thiollet, Ferruccio Pastore and Camille Schmoll

221

14

Free movement regimes: is the EU experience exportable? Rainer Bauböck

242

15

Transnational mobility and welfare rights: are they compatible? Maurizio Ferrera and Anna Kyriazi

257

16

Who governs migration and mobilities globally? Andrew Geddes

270

Index284

Contributors

Rainer Bauböck is co-director of GLOBALCIT, an online observatory on citizenship and voting rights. He is corresponding member of the Austrian Academy of Sciences and chairs the Academy’s Commission on Migration and Integration Research. He teaches at Central European University Vienna. From 2007 to 2018 he held the chair in social and political theory at the European University Institute, Florence. His research interests are in normative political theory and comparative research on democratic citizenship, European integration, migration, nationalism and minority rights. Louise Caron is a tenured researcher at the French Institute for Demographic Studies (INED), where she is a member of the International Migration and Minorities research unit. She is also a fellow at the IC Migrations. After receiving her PhD in Sociology at Sciences Po, she worked as a postdoc at UCLouvain. Her research primarily focuses on the links between migration itineraries and integration processes, and on the socioeconomic trajectories of immigrants and their descendants in France. Joep Cleven graduated from the MSc in Sociology at Tilburg University, the Netherlands, in 2023. His main interests are cultural and political attitudes, specifically voting behaviour. As part of his bachelor internship he assisted Dr Christof van Mol with his research projects on international student mobility. Yoann Demoli is an assistant professor of Sociology at the University of Versailles Saint-Quentin en Yvelines (UVSQ), France, and a research associate at the laboratory PRINTEMPS (CNRS). Currently head of the UVSQ Department of Sociology, his main research interests are social stratification, sociology of spatial mobilities and quantitative methods. He has co-authored Sociology of the Automobile (in French) and has recently devoted his research to the democratisation of air and rail transport. James Dennison is a part-time Professor at the Migration Policy Centre of the European University Institute and a Researcher at the University of East Anglia. His interests include political attitudes and behaviour, research methods, and migration, on which he has published in numerous scientific journals such as the Journal of European Public Policy, Political Psychology, West European Politics, to name a few. He has previously held positions at the University of Oxford, Harvard University, and the University of Stockholm and regularly advises media, governments, and international organisations on migration matters. Emanuel Deutschmann is an Assistant Professor of Sociological Theory at Europa-Universität Flensburg (Germany) and an Associate at the EUI’s Migration Policy Centre in Florence (Italy). He is the author of Mapping the Transnational World: How We Move and Communicate across Borders, and Why It Matters (Princeton University Press, 2021) and the lead editor of a 2023 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies special issue on ‘Computational Approaches to Migration and Integration Research’. vii

viii  Handbook of human mobility and migration Frédéric Dobruszkes is an FNRS Senior Research Associate at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Belgium, where he got his PhD in Geography (2007) and teaches ‘transport geography’ and ‘transport and the environment’. He chairs the IGU Commission on Transport and Geography. His main research interests are transport geography, especially the dynamics of airline networks, long-distance mobilities, social conflicts around aircraft noise, and air/rail competition. Maurizio Ferrera is Professor of Political Science at the University of Milan. He is currently one of the three PIs of the ERC Synergy project ‘SOLID’ (www​.solid​-erc​.eu). He has written extensively on the welfare state and European integration and his articles have appeared in major international journals. In 2005, he authored The Boundaries of Welfare (Oxford UP) and is currently completing a manuscript on Politics and Social Visions (Oxford UP, forthcoming). In 2020 he was awarded the Mattei Dogan Prize by the International Political Science Association. Chiara Galli is Assistant Professor of Comparative Human Development at the University of Chicago. She is the author of the book Precarious Protections: Unaccompanied Minors Seeking Asylum in the United States (University of California Press, 2023). Andrew Geddes holds a Chair in Migration Studies and, since January 2017, has been the Director of the Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy. For the period 2014–19 he was awarded an Advanced Investigator Grant by the European Research Council for a project on the drivers of global migration governance. Recent publications include Governing Migration Beyond the State: Europe, North America, South America and Southeast Asia in a Global Context (Oxford University Press, 2021) and The Dynamics of Regional Migration Governance (edited with Marcia Vera Espinoza, Leila Hadj-Abdou and Leiza Brumat, Edward Elgar, 2019). Fabian Gülzau is a member of the scientific staff of the Expert Council on Integration and Migration (SVR). Before joining the SVR he worked at the collaborative research centre 1265 ‘Re-Figuration of Spaces’ on border control infrastructure. Further research interests include border studies, migration policy and integration, and attitudes toward immigrants. His work has been published in various journals such as Applied Geography, Journal of Ethnic and Migrations Studies and International Migration. Marine Haddad is a tenured researcher at the French Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) and a fellow of the Institut Convergences Migrations (ICM, CNRS) and the Center for Research on Social Inequalities (CRIS, Sciences Po). Her work focuses on the links between migration and the life course, ethno-racial inequalities and population policies in a postcolonial context, with a specific focus on the French Overseas. Mathieu Ichou is a sociologist and tenured researcher at the French Institute for Demographic Studies (INED), where he heads the International Migration and Minorities (MIM) research unit. His research interests lie at the intersection between the study of migration and ethnicity, and social stratification. He is the co-PI of the TeO2 survey on immigrants and their descendants in France, and the PI of the ANR-funded 3GEN project on social mobility across three generations in immigrant and native families.

Contributors  ix Russell King is Professor of Geography at the University of Sussex. He has been researching migration for more than 40 years and has special interests in ageing and migration, youth mobilities, return migration and migration and development. He is a past editor of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, a premier journal in the field. At Sussex he founded the Sussex Centre for Migration Research in 1997 – one of the first of its kind – and established Masters’ and doctoral programmes in migration studies, all of which continue to flourish. Anna Kyriazi is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Milan. She holds a PhD from the European University Institute and has previously held a postdoctoral position at the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. Her research focuses on comparative European politics and public policy, migration, and political communication. Her articles have appeared in West European Politics, the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, the Journal of European Public Policy, the Journal of Common Market Studies, and Electoral Studies, among others. Massimo Livi Bacci is an Emeritus Professor of Demography at the University of Florence. He has been President of IUSSP (International Union for the Scientific Study of Population) and Senator of the Italian Republic (2006-13). He is a member of the National Lincei Academy, the American Philosophical Society, the Academy of Japan, and a correspondent member of Academia de la Historia, Madrid. He is Honorary President of Adeh, Asociación Española de Demografia Historica. Among his books are The Population of Europe. A History (1999); Conquest. The destruction of the American Indios (2008), A Short History of Migration (2012), Amazzonia. L’Impero dell’acqua, 1500-1800 (2012), A Concise History of World Population (2016, 6th ed.), The Shrinking Planet (2017), I traumi d’Europa. Natura e Politica ai tempi delle guerre mondiali (2020); and Over Land and Sea (2023). He is a founder and editor of the website Neodemos, a forum for the discussion and dissemination of population and social issues. Steffen Mau is Professor of Macrosociology at Humboldt University of Berlin. He has worked on issues such as European integration, transnationalism, border control and migration. He is author of several books including: Social Transnationalism: Lifeworlds beyond the Nation State (Routledge 2010) and Sorting Machines: The Re-invention of the Border in the 21st Century (Polity 2023). Haley McAvay is a Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of York (UK) and a researcher associated with the Sciences Po Center for Research on Social Inequalities (Paris, France) studying migration, residential segregation, race/ethnicity, citizenship, intergenerational inequalities, and political behavior. Her research has been published in leading journals such as Demography, Social Science Research, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Urban Studies, Political Behavior, and Population Place and Space. Benjamin Mulvey is a Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Equitable Education Systems and Policies, in the School of Education at the University of Glasgow. His research is focused on the sociology of international higher education, and has been published in journals such as Sociology, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Population, Space and Place, and British Journal of Sociology of Education. Ferruccio Pastore is the Director of FIERI, an independent research institute on migration based in Torino (Italy). He was previously Deputy Director of CeSPI (Centre for International Policy Studies, Rome) and a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Firenze. Besides research,

x  Handbook of human mobility and migration he has worked as an adviser for Italian institutions and international organizations. With a background in international law (PhD EUI 1996) and political sociology, he has written extensively on migration policies and politics. Ferruccio is a member of the Expert Group on Economic Migration (EGEM) of the European Commission. He sits on the Advisory Board of the Western Balkans Migration Network. He is also an international fellow of the French Institut Convergences Migrations and of the Euro-Mediterranean Research Network on Migration. Ettore Recchi is professor of sociology at Sciences Po Paris (CRIS), part-time professor of the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) and Fellow of the Institut Convergences Migrations. His papers feature in journals of migration studies (e.g., International Migration Review, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies), sociology (e.g., European Sociological Review, Socius), political science (e.g., West European Politics, Journal of Common Market Studies), demography (e.g., Demographic Research), geography (e.g., Political Geography), global studies (e.g., Global Networks), economics (e.g., World Development), general science (e.g., Nature/Scientific Reports), and data science (e.g., EPJ Data Science). His latest book is Everyday Europe: Social Transnationalism in an Unsettled Continent (Policy Press, 2019), a co-authored work on European integration through geographical and virtual mobilities. He has directed several projects on free movement in Europe, transnationalism, migration, global mobilities, and the impact of COVID-19 on social life and mobility. Mirna Safi is professor of sociology at Sciences Po Paris (CRIS), affiliated to the LIEPP and fellow of the European Academy of Sociology. Her work focuses on migration, ethnic and racial inequalities, discrimination and urban segregation. Her work has appeared in European Sociological Review, American Sociological Review, PNAS, Nature/Human Behavior, International Migration Review and Social Science Research among other leading journals. Her latest book is entitled Migration and Inequality (Polity Press, 2020). Camille Schmoll completed a PhD at the University of Paris Nanterre (2004) and a Marie Curie post-doctorate at the European University Institute, Florence (2005-2007). She has been a junior fellow of Institut Universitaire de France and an associate professor in geography at University of Paris Diderot. She is now Directrice d’Etudes at EHESS, member of the CNRS team “Géographie-cités” and a fellow of Institut Convergences Migrations. Her research topics include international migration; gender and space; urban approaches to migration patterns; cosmopolitanism and borders; gender, generation and the family in international migration; qualitative approaches to migration studies. She recently published Les damnées de la mer. Femmes et frontieres en Méditerranée (La Découverte, 2020). She has also published several articles in the field, in journals such as Identities. Global Studies in Culture and Power, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, International Journal of Migration and Border Studies. She has co-edited the following books: Méditerranée. Frontières à la dérive (2018, Le Passager Clandestin); Migrations en Méditerranée (with Catherine Wihtol de Wenden and Hélène Thiollet, 2015, CNRS Publisher), Gender, Generations and the Family within International Migration (with Eleonore Kofman, Albert Kraler, and Martin Kohli, 2011, Amsterdam University Press), and more recenty Migration, Urbanity and Cosmopolitanism in a Globalized World (Springer) with Hélène Thiollet, Catherine Lejeune and Delphine Pages El Karoui.

Contributors  xi Hélène Thiollet is a CNRS permanent researcher. Her research deals with the politics of migration and asylum in the Global South, and she focuses her empirical work on the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. She also works on crises and political transformations linked to migration and asylum. She teaches international relations, comparative politics and migration studies at Sciences Po and EHESS. She led several research projects on ‘The Politics of Asylum Crises in Europe’ PACE) funded by the French National Agency for Research and ‘Migration Governance and Asylum Crises’ (MAGYC) funded by the EC’s H2020 (822806). She is co-editor of the Research Handbook on the Institutions of Global Migration Governance (2023) with Antoine Pécoud, a special issue on Migration Politics across the World with Katharina Natter, in Third World Quarterly (2022) and Migration, Urbanity and Cosmopolitanism in a Globalized World (2021) with Camille Schmoll. Hélène is one of the promoters of the call for an International Panel on Migration (with Virginie Guiraudon and Camille Schmoll), based on the IPCC model. This call has garnered the support of more than 700 migration scholars worldwide. Christof Van Mol is assistant professor of Sociology at Tilburg University, the Netherlands. His main thematic interests are international migration processes, patterns and outcomes, with a specific focus on international student mobility (ISM). He extensively published on ISM in leading academic journals, such as Comparative Migration Studies, Higher Education, the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, and Sociology of Education. His work received several academic awards, including the 2020 ASHE CIHE Award for Significant Research on International Higher Education. Alina Vrânceanu is a postdoctoral researcher at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Political and Social Sciences, Barcelona (Spain). Her work focuses on immigration politics, public opinion and political representation. She has published in the European Journal of Political Research, West European Politics and Party Politics among others.

Introduction: human mobility as hallmark of our age Ettore Recchi and Mirna Safi

THE GLOBAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN MOBILITY Overlooking the importance of spatial movement in individual lives and social organization means to fail to understand our age. At all socioeconomic levels, people constantly imagine and practice mobility – albeit at different scales and intensities. For those living in low-income countries, moving to a more affluent environment is often the only honest way to a better life. In richer societies, travelling – if not migrating – can seem like an easy option when wanting to explore life. This is why, even in high income countries, no less than 18 per cent of the population affirm they are willing to “relocate permanently abroad” (Migali and Scipioni 2018, 9, based on Gallup World Poll). The urge to be “elsewhere” inhabits the minds and bodies of human beings. The motives vary along Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (McLeod 2007). Survival drives those facing wars, natural disasters and persecution. A better, more lucrative, or more dignified job encourages those who struggle and long for a brighter future. The thrill of swimming among sharks or taking pictures of aurora borealis inspires those who can afford adventurous gateways and new avenues of self-realization. Few are the people who do not project themselves onto another place. At the macro level, societal organization relies on goods, services and individuals coming and going through different places. Even the most self-sufficient society needs some movement to function – for instance, between rural and urban areas for food delivery. The wave of economic globalization sweeping the planet since the 1980s has dramatically intensified the shipment and movement of “things” through international trade and supply chains. The advent of internet-based IT has also created the “global village” that McLuhan (1964) foresaw based on radio and TV only, providing a potential worldwide audience to any message and publication – that is, moving “information” on an unsurpassed scale and scope. This enhanced and unprecedented mobility of “things” and “information” complements and fuels the movement of human beings who sell, buy, apply, repair, spread or simply follow objects and messages. Beyond its pervasiveness in contemporary societies, our claim in this volume is that human mobility is socially constitutive. Spatial movements position and shape people. “I am all the cities I have visited”, Jorge Luis Borges said in a famous interview (Fermosel 1981). We maintain that the places where individuals have spent their existence leave their mark on them as sources of capitals (e.g., language knowledge) and identities (e.g., sense of belonging). Borrowing from phenomenology, we hold that individuals’ “lifeworlds” – “the objects, events and persons encountered in the pursuit of the pragmatic objectives of living” (Schutz 1970, 320) – have a spatial component that exceeds the immanence of physical contexts. Each person is forged by memories and references to subjectively meaningful places – whether they correspond to where this person is physically present or not. Past or future mobility speaks about who we are, as well as who we want to be. At the end of the day, “where” (we are, come from, are going) is a representation, or a more nuanced embodiment, of “who” we are (Recchi xii

Introduction  xiii and Kuhn 2013; Recchi et al. 2021). Mobility connects the dots between these personal geographies of places, leading to that singular constellation of spatially situated experiences that coalesce in personal identities. As long as spatial movements tend to be heterogeneous even within apparently homogeneous social groups, mobility helps account for the idiosyncrasy of people in otherwise analogous conditions. Mobility is a key factor of what has been called “individuation” – thus addressing a persistent quandary of sociological explanations (as discussed for instance in Lahire 2003; Atkinson 2010). The title of this Handbook evokes both human mobility and migration. It is therefore important to clarify how we see the linkage between these two concepts. Mobility is a more encompassing concept and phenomenon than migration. However, it is the sine qua non of migration, for which we propose a minimal definition. We conceive of migration as the result of two events: spatial mobility from one origin to one destination plus settlement at destination. While the concept of settlement is fuzzy and its empirical assessment imperfect, a UN-backed convention considers “settlement” as having a stable residence in a given place for at least 12 months. On similarly conventional grounds, we can distinguish “international” and “internal” migration – depending on whether movements cross state borders or not. The scope and delimitation of human communities have continually changed over history, which in turn has affected the framing of human migration. Languages have been a central marker of community boundaries, and processes of differentiation and convergence of languages have been closely related to human movements across the globe. Along with genetics, linguistic evidence is the most commonly used indicator for inferring ancient patterns of migration. International migration currently indicates “cross-political-community mobilities” in a context where all of the earth’s land has been virtually claimed by about 200 globally-recognized sovereign entities called “nations” (Manning and Trimmer 2013). As national sovereignty expresses itself through “bordering”, it is this particular type of geographic mobility that is referred to as international migration. Much like the evolution of language boundaries, nation-building processes have been intertwined with the governance of human mobilities and continue to be affected by it.

DEFINING MOBILITY AND MIGRATION Regardless of political constraints that limit and categorize them, we suggest the simultaneous consideration of the spatial distance of movements and the temporal duration of settlements as a compass to single out different forms of human mobility. The Human Mobility Diagram in Figure i.1 maps out the wide array of mobility experiences that human beings practice depending on different combinations of space and time. Moving can be a routine, short-haul and short-stay event, like when people commute from home to their workplace. Moving can nonetheless also be a long journey entailing the crossing of different countries or even continents and a durable stay at destination. When mentioning these examples, we are aware of their ideal-typical nature: commuting is not the same experience for all social groups (e.g., Preston and McLafferty 2016) and international migration is socially stratified (e.g., Sladkova 2013; more generally, Safi 2020). However, thinking through the double lens of spatial distance and duration of settlement provides a parsimonious and unifying approach to human mobility. This double lens is also a way to overcome the debate on the “exceptionalism” of migration journeys (Schapendonk et al. 2021). Even when individuals engage in itinerant trajectories, or

xiv  Handbook of human mobility and migration

Figure i.1

The Human Mobility Diagram: Ideal types of mobility experiences depending on combinations of space and time

multiple migrations (e.g., Salamońska and Czeranowska 2021), they have moments of “settlement” (of varying length) that uniquely punctuate their experience of mobility. In other words, the diagram forces us to think of all people on the move as mobile persons, thus contributing to that “denaturalization” (Amelina and Faist 2013) and “demigranticization” (Dahinden 2016) of migration studies which has been advocated over the last decade (most recently, Favell 2022; Bloch and Adams 2023). A siloed view of “migrants” and “movers” has unavoidable performative effects, oversimplifying reality and possibly hierarchizing individuals. Being humans and being mobile, we are all movers – regardless of how far we travel and how long we stay. This leads us to state why we adopt a mobility perspective. In tune with the mentioned plea for “demigranticization”, we suggest an approach and research agenda that de-essentializes “migrancy”, rather highlighting it as the outcome of political processes and narratives. Being a “migrant” rather than a “mover” is the effect of a purely constructed – albeit most impactful – categorization. Such labelling can stem from public policies, public opinion, media framing, even academic discourses – with possible overlaps and echo effects between these different sources. Use of the UN conventional definition that we mentioned earlier is itself a performative act that distinguishes a subset of mobile persons on arbitrary grounds; this inadequate framework is advanced by the naturalization of political borders as a “given”, rather than interpreting them as purely artificial spatial discontinuities emanating from political constructs – i.e., nation states. In a nutshell, a mobility-centred perspective follows three rationales: Normatively, it intends to debunk the cognitive framing of “migrants” as a distinct category of human beings – a framing which is the backbone of all “them vs us” narratives. Such narratives are ultimately a source of prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination in society.

Introduction  xv Empirically, it corrects the “settlement bias” of traditional migration studies, which tend to assume that all incoming aliens are “here to stay” (Hugo 2014). In effect, as all immigrants are also always and unavoidably emigrants (Sayad 1999), studying migration without proper consideration of the underlying mobility experience – which encompasses myriad variants – tells an incomplete story and neglects the roots of different forms of adaptation to receiving societies. A stress on the movements that link migrants’ origins and destinations is also a fundamental lesson of the transnational approach in migration studies (e.g., Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Waldinger 2017). Methodologically, analysing different aspects of mobility events is an incentive to search for overlooked, under-reported and under-exploited information that enriches the empirical sensitivity of migration research – for instance, focusing on the trajectories of migrants, their transnational practices, the infrastructures shaping migration routes, etc. (Recchi and Tittel 2023).

THE AGE OF MIGRATION OR THE AGE OF MOBILITY? With little reference to migration research, the rise of “spatial mobility” as a generalized feature of our age has been given centre stage by the social theorists of the so called “mobility turn” in the early 21st century – Zygmunt Bauman (1998; 2013) and more explicitly John Urry (2000; 2007). Their agenda, which spans across sociology, geography and cultural studies, revolves around the pervasiveness of spatial movements in everyday life, with particular attention devoted to their phenomenological intricacies and system-related infrastructures (Cresswell 2006; Sheller and Urry 2006; Elliott and Urry 2010; Sheller 2014). While claiming no less than a “paradigm” status, this strand of social theory must be credited with highlighting the ubiquity and nuances of mobility in the contemporary world. As for theorizing, however, it does not move beyond innuendos to the structural origin of enhanced mobility in late capitalism, elements of which were already explored in the classics of sociology (Recchi and Flipo 2019). Building on earlier critical work (Lash and Urry 1987), Urry and his associates posit that increased and diffuse human movements are a by-product of the globalization and “disorganization” of capitalist societies. With clearer anchorage in Marxist theory, the argument has been subsequently spelled out by Hartmut Rosa (2013), who makes “acceleration” the template of “late modern alienation”. Rosa emphasizes the time dimension, but mobility is the implicit space-wise counterpart of the phenomenon he investigates. A spiralling drive to accumulation lies behind the fastening of lifestyles and the geographic expansion of individual experiences. The system-induced and interiorized urge to pile up meetings, visits, and encounters entails a rise of individual movements in space with a view to stretch what geographer Donald Janelle dubbed the “extensibility” of human beings (Janelle 1973). Given their epistemological positioning, scholars of the “mobility turn” have insufficiently documented their claim that we live in a mobile world. The transnational dimension of mobilities is also somewhat peripheral in their analyses (as referenced, for instance, by articles published in the journal Mobilities). However, the rise of transnational mobility is one of the most spectacular global “turns”. Cross-country travel – regardless of the reason, duration, and population involved – has soared tremendously from the 1960s (the first period for which reliable information is available) onwards (Figure i.2).

xvi  Handbook of human mobility and migration

Note: Absolute values for each of the three indicators are indexed to 100 in 1960. Source: Recchi (2015, 149); UN (2019a); UN (2019b); https://www.unwto.org/tourism-data/ unwto-tourism-dashboard (consulted 11/21/2022).

Figure i.2

Sixty years of global mobility and migration: The growth of international migrants and international tourists from 1960 to 2019

Migration scholars repeat the mantra that ours is the “age of migration” (de Haas et al. 2019). This is not false; since the late 20th century, the growth rate of international migrants – using the UN definition discussed above – has surpassed that of the world population. International migrants were 2.3 per cent of humankind in 1980, only to become 2.9 per cent in 2000, 3.1 per cent in 2010, and 3.5 per cent in 2019. While the number of human beings on Earth has risen by a factor of 2.5 in sixty years, that of international migrants has increased by a factor of 3.5. However, this notable rise pales in comparison to the growth rate of cross-border travels, which in 2019 was approximately 22 times that of 1960 according to the UN World Tourism Organization (note that the UNWTO’s definition of “tourism” includes all types of transnational travels, except day trips and returns to one’s country of residence). Even with the caveat that the number of cross-border trips captures flows (travellers can engage in more than one trip per year), what Figure i.2 illustrates is a wide gap between the expansion of mobility episodes and the otherwise rising “settled” migrant population (see also Deutschmann 2021, 79).1 In other words, over time migration forms a declining share of all transnational mobility. Short-term mobility has progressively become more common relative to long-term resettlements.

By also taking into account return trips, other estimates indicate about twice as many cross-border travels, thus further magnifying the intensity of human mobility across world nations (Recchi et al. 2019a). 1

Introduction  xvii Although less systematically, an expansion of human mobility within countries is also documented since the late 1970s by national household travel surveys, which initially used large samples and individual diaries that have been more recently replaced by GPS surveys (Brög et al. 1985; Stopher and Greaves 2007). In the US, for instance, the average resident moved 25.95 miles per day in 1977 and 36.13 miles in 2009 (Santos et al. 2011, 23). A recent estimate for France, which goes back to the early 19th century, shows that the average French resident moved about five kilometres per day, without any significant change, between 1800 and 1945. Thereafter, the increase has been exponential, averaging more than 55 kilometres per day in the 2010s (Bigo 2020, 184). Whatever the metrics and the scope, the bottom line is indisputable: ours is the age of mobility – even more so than the age of migration. While the COVID-19 pandemic created a discontinuity, leading to the first drop in overall human mobility – particularly transnationally (Recchi et al. 2022) – in six decades, the question remains whether the pre-existing growth trend will resume and, if so, for how long in light of its highly pernicious and unsustainable effects on Earth’s carbon footprint (Holden et al. 2019). With COVID-19, humankind experienced massive epidemiologically justified limitations on mobility; environmentally justified restrictions could be introduced in the near future. Another major takeaway of macro-level research on global mobility is that the simple equation “more (transnational) mobility = more globalization” does not reflect the actual distribution of transnational movements on the planet. Eight out of ten transnational trips occur within the same world region, mirroring a more general regionalization of economic exchanges and political alliances (Deutschmann 2021; Deutschmann et al. 2022). The bulk of international mobility hinges on Europe, where 46.9 per cent of world travel originates. Asia comes in second (34.3 per cent) and the Americas at a distant third (13.7 per cent). Overall, travel departing from an African or an Oceanian nation constitutes a minimal part of the total (3.9 and 1.2 per cent, respectively). Moreover, zooming in on the geography of global travel, what emerges is that, while the volume of travel grows, not all parts of the world are implied. More than half of the country-to-country combinations of travel flows amount to less than one hundred cross-border individual movements per year (Recchi et al. 2019b). The current structure of global mobility is thus extremely unbalanced, with a few highly prized destinations and many areas of the world that are excluded from transnational mobility.

BOOK ORGANIZATION AND OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS This Handbook is organized in three major sections dubbed Rethinking, Mapping, and Governing. The first section aims to establish the scene theoretically, discussing the historical, sociological and political backdrop of migration and rethinking some conventional categories of migration studies that are challenged by a mobility perspective. The second section intends to describe the geographic scope of transnational human movements and the characteristics of critical mobile populations. The third section revolves around the regulation and control of mobility and migration on a supra-national and global scale. In each section the contributions are designed to answer what the editors of this volume deem to be key research questions in the field – a list that, while far from being exhaustive, constitutes a first building block of readings for anyone wanting to explore mobility and migration studies. Adopting a “question mark” approach upfront, we aim to enhance the analytical import of the Handbook. In each chapter the reader will find an up-to-date literature review and original arguments or evidence that

xviii  Handbook of human mobility and migration attempt to answer the question asked in the title. Given the fact that most of these contributions have been written during the COVID-19 pandemic, we also nudged all authors to add, when pertinent, a reflection on the consequences of this major event for the research question that they address. Chapter 1 takes a long-term historical lens on Homo sapiens, questioning whether ours is an increasingly mobile species. Massimo Livi Bacci borrows the words of Seneca and Darwin to remind us of the ubiquity of movement throughout the journey of humanity. While emphasizing that any attempt to trace the history of human mobility is reductive, he proposes a historical guideline that focuses on the incessant and evolving interrelationship between the innate desire to move and the constraints that channel and determine that prerogative. Livi Bacci demonstrates how technology, energy and infrastructure have shaped the increase in human mobility worldwide over centuries, enhancing urbanization everywhere. He then focuses on the growing role of economic factors in shaping worldwide mobility and the generalization of migrant labour imports since the Industrial Revolution. This migration industry has been reflected by the gradual elimination of political obstacles to emigration. Ironically, the emergence of the right to emigrate coincides with more stringent immigration regulations. A shift occurred at the beginning of the 20th century from a world in which immigration was free to a world of normalized restrictions. Despite increasing limitations on international migration, the intensification of human mobility within nation states remains a distinctive historical feature of the modern age. Livi Bacci also provides an engaging analysis of the personal choice component of human migration on a spectrum that includes free migration on one extreme and forced migration on the other. He then sketches the long-term history of different choice situations within this spectrum before concluding on the future of international migration in the wake of pandemics and virtual social relations. Chapter 2 shifts to a major sociological issue by asking if migrants have become a distinct category in social stratification, theoretically advancing a research agenda on the migration-inequality nexus. Mirna Safi starts by highlighting how international migration is the by-product of political control and labelling, which entails an ascriptive, durable and transmittable status that renders it particularly relevant to social stratification scholarship. There is nonetheless a gap between the increasing use of migration status as a “control variable” in empirical studies and theory-building about the role of migration in social inequality dynamics. This chapter attempts to bridge the gap. Building on three core questions in inequality research (inequality of what; inequality between whom; and how does inequality work?), Safi unfolds the theoretical connections between these two fields – that is, migration studies and social inequality research. She argues that migration is a particularly interesting case for the study of inequality because it involves a wide range of resources and triggers specific categorization processes that consequently affect the fabric of social stratification. She subsequently discusses three channels at the core of the migration-inequality nexus – the economic, legal and ethnoracial channels – leading to categorization of migrants as types of workers, types of citizens and types of humans. After reviewing the empirical evidence relative to each channel and analysing their consequences in terms of social stratification, Safi concludes with some policy avenues to alleviate inequality stemming from migration. In Chapter 3, Mathieu Ichou uncovers the theoretical and methodological controversies related to migrant selectivity. He highlights how migrant selection is at the crux of misperceptions and misjudgements in both the scientific and political realms. Ichou offers a conceptualization of migrant selection that brings back the role of emigration context in the immigration

Introduction  xix debate. He distinguishes between individual approaches (i.e., focusing on unobserved differences in skills or personality traits between migrants and non-migrants in sending societies) and social embeddedness approaches (i.e., focusing on the role of networks, socioeconomic status and social resources in shaping migrant selection). Both approaches pose methodological challenges to direct measurements, which explains why the earlier empirical studies mainly relied on indirect proxies. The last decades, however, have witnessed an increasing availability of multi-sited surveys and other types of data that comprise both stayers and movers from origin countries, permitting direct measurements of the factors at stake. Drawing on a rich interdisciplinary literature, Ichou disentangles the diverse and multilevel forces (education, labour market characteristics, health, and personality traits) that drive migrant selection and reviews the empirical studies that have assessed their respective role. While a general pattern of migrant selectivity is observable in the empirical literature, Ichou insists on the heterogeneity of findings across the range of factors under scrutiny encompassing the wide diversity of combinations of origin and destination countries. The question of the consequences of selectivity are more empirically conclusive as a large number of studies consistently show that positively selected migrants, as well as their children, tend to be in better health and attain a higher occupational status in the destination countries. In Chapter 4, Louise Caron offers an elegantly structured reflection on the “sedentarist bias” in migration studies, predominantly depicting migrants as one-shot and permanent movers from an origin to a unique destination country. This often unconscious trope prevents the field from fully acknowledging – and hence analysing – the empirical elephant in the room: geographic movements rarely take the form of an unidirectional journey. Caron also argues that remigration – in its complex and diversified forms – has to be integrated into the core of migration studies. This contribution offers an analytical typology of forms of migrant remigration and a review of empirical studies that document their magnitude, patterns and trends. Caron starts with return migration, which accounts for 25 per cent of cross-border movements overall, and describes its economic, demographic and cultural driving factors. Noticeably, empirical findings suggest that return migration does not reflect lack of integration or failure of the migration project. If anything, socioeconomic hardship – be it in the host or origin country – tends to reduce return migration. The author then moves on to discuss “repeat” and “circular” migration, which designate subsequent movements to return migration. For some, return migration poses as much of an integration challenge as initial migration. Movements between sending and receiving countries tend to take the form of repeated back-and-forth mobility episodes, which are strategically chosen (circular migration) or a result of corrective adjustments to former migration decisions (repeated migration). The third type of migration analysed in the chapter focuses on onward movements from the destination country to one or several other destinations (also referred to as secondary or multiple migration). Caron describes patterns of onward migration and argues that they challenge assimilation theory, inasmuch as obtaining naturalization in a first destination country tends to facilitate, or even trigger, onward migration. While the diversity of migration types highlights the never-ending nature of the phenomenon – which is aligned with our general argument for the encapsulation of migration into the more general notion of mobility – the author acknowledges methodological challenges in disentangling the many forms of migration and points to a need for enriching, merging or complementing existing data about lifecourse trajectories of spatial mobility. In Chapter 5, Marine Haddad and Haley McAvay tackle the customary and important distinction between international and internal migration. They start by looking at traditional con-

xx  Handbook of human mobility and migration ceptualizations, which suggest that international migration entails longer and riskier journeys than internal migration, and highlight counter-examples. In reality, international and internal migrations are more closely intertwined than commonly thought. Their empirical analysis, drawing on two French datasets, illustrates how internal and international migrants can be considered as part of an integrated migration system. One of the key commonalities is the role of the state, which affects both selectivity at migration and modalities of integration for incoming migrants, and also shapes residential mobility within a country and indirectly segregates along ethnoracial lines. In the French context, mobile individuals tend to be positively selected by socioeconomic status, regardless of the type of migration (although international migration is more likely to entail negative selection), while household stability (being married, owning a home) is an antidote to international and national mobility. Haddad and McAvay also highlight a now sustained trend, for which evidence exists in both the US and Europe, with international mobility increasing and internal mobility decreasing over the last decades. Their main message, though, is that national borders are not always primary indicators of segmentation in migration dynamics, as spatial inequalities exist within countries and can be further accentuated by both internal and international migration. The second section of the Handbook faces empirical questions on mobility and migration, contributing to mapping macro- and micro-sociological regularities in trajectories and representations of the social actors involved. In Chapter 6, Emanuel Deutschmann and Ettore Recchi examine the spatial structure of worldwide transnational mobility, questioning the tendency of globalization research and other social sciences to view all cross-border mobility as global. Building on the Lévy-flight or power-law mathematical model to describe the shape of human movements across states, the authors highlight the pervasive tendency of cross-border travel to concentrate at relative proximity to their origin – regardless of whether the populations involved are tourists, asylum-seekers, economic migrants or international students. Deutschmann and Recchi leverage original data about transnational mobility during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic to show that the public health crisis did not affect the regional structure of transnational mobility: despite the massive reduction of travel, the overall global prevalence of intra-continental journeys was maintained in 2020. The second part of the chapter adopts a micro-level perspective, using individual data from France and Italy on biographical experiences of transnational mobility – or “space-sets”. From this different angle, the results are converging with macro analyses: the vast majority of cross-border trips takes place between neighbouring countries. Moreover, individual-level data show the strong stratification of transnational mobility – particularly along educational and occupational lines. In continuity with this last result, in Chapter 7 Yoann Demoli and Frédéric Dobruszkes delve into the social stratification of high-speed rail (HSR) and air transport services. Borrowing on research carried out in a variety of countries, the chapter first looks at HSR travellers, among whom men and persons of working age with higher income and higher education are significantly over-represented. The introduction of low-cost HSR services – sometimes justified on the grounds of a “democratization of mobility” – has only partially reduced social inequalities in within-country HSR use. In the case of air transport in Europe, survey results show that wealthier and high inequality countries have stronger rates of air travel in their population. Young people, those with higher education, and men are over-represented as air passengers. The case of France, where transport surveys have been carried out with some regularity since the 1970s, allows the authors to delve further into the historical evolution of air travel.

Introduction  xxi Over half a century, on top of an expansion in the population of air travellers, there has been an increasing equalization by gender and a stronger presence on board of younger people. Inequalities nonetheless remain in terms of income and occupational groups, with a persistent under-representation of farmers, blue collar workers and lower-level white collar employees. In Chapter 8, Christof Van Mol, Joep Cleven and Benjamin Mulvey focus on the growing population of migrant students and tackle the reasons why, where and when they migrate. Students move across international borders either for temporary exchange programs (credit mobility) or to pursue full degrees abroad (degree mobility). While acknowledging the many imperfections and inconsistencies in the data, the authors extract as much as possible from existing objective measurements of the phenomenon. Van Mol, Cleven and Mulvey highlight the specific patterns of international student migration, which traditionally concerns young people moving from East and South Asia as well as Sub-Saharan African to North America, North-Western Europe and Oceania. A few countries capture the overwhelming majority of the flows, among which one may list China and India on the origin side and the US and the UK on the destination side. Since 2008, however, East-Asia has emerged as a new destination region for international students, in particular, Japan, South Korea and China. The number of emigrant students from the Middle East has also been growing in recent years. As for Europe, the authors show that most student mobility within the continent is at the level of master degree for both credit and degree mobilities and argue that this pattern may be related to lifecourse sequencing. More generally, they discuss the wide range of factors that explain the international migration of students. In a Bourdieusian vein, economic, social, and cultural capital are held to shape student mobility in a context of “inflation of educational credentials”. From a meso-level perspective, however, the role of higher education institutions is also considered, as they increasingly foster the international mobility of students – for reasons that, at an organizational level, can coincide with a Bourdieu-inspired reading of the structuring of the global educational field. Chiara Galli’s contribution, in Chapter 9, sheds light on an often invisible mobile population: underage migrants, who are not only understudied empirically but also a blind spot in migration theory. Indeed, one underlying assumption of the literature on the decision to migrate is that those who take these decisions are adults. The author provides a thorough review of emergent research that factors in agency of migrant children, both independently and within their families, and pays full attention to their mobility trajectories. A first challenge facing this field is the very definition of the population under scrutiny, which leads Galli to rapidly clarify the concepts that she will use and uncover their legal foundations. Empirically, she describes global child migration (defined as comprised of migrants under 18 years of age) based on available statistics. Child migration forms 13 per cent of global migration and has been steadily and considerably increasing over the past three decades. The phenomenon tends nonetheless to concentrate within a finite set of countries, with the largest share occurring in the Global South and the largest absolute numbers living in the US. While Galli thoroughly reviews existing nationwide estimates, she also highlights the lack of consistent and reliable data on migrant children and the necessity to rely on small-scale qualitative studies documenting their experience. She then focuses on the ways in which this literature deals with migration aspirations and decision-making of children and how the latter differs from that of adults. Galli identifies the structural role of legally vulnerable forms of migration in durably separating parents from their children, preventing the former from regular visits and pushing their children to themselves migrate in order to see them. The interrelated economic and

xxii  Handbook of human mobility and migration family structural transformations in the sending countries are also important factors pushing working children, and children who live in single-parent households, to move. Violence against children is another major determinant of their migration. The chapter shows how the focus on child agency has enhanced lifecourse approaches in migration theory. Moreover, the case study of children migrants is a powerful illustration of the social embeddedness of migration decisions. Children deploy a wide range of strategies; they make migration choices and are influenced by family members, peers, social medias or even smugglers. These patterns are highly correlated with age and important stages in the lifecourse. Galli concludes with a discussion of the ways in which underage migrants are treated in Europe and the US, highlighting the legal and sociocultural specificity of their reception contexts. She describes the whole range of vulnerabilities facing this population despite legal protection principles and sometimes in the name of supposed protections. Here, again, age and lifecourse issues are key as migrant children rarely apply for social benefits; are often subject to age assessment and even to “performing childhood” (namely when teenagers); are sometimes suspected to be instrumentalized by their families; and are particularly exposed to different forms of administrative and bureaucratic violence. This growing and alarming evidence calls for future research that may rely on large-scale and longitudinal data to analyse the particular migration and integration trajectories of migrant children. Chapter 10, by Russell King, offers a thorough description of the retirement migrant population, outlining how this empirical case is insightful to migration theory. First, retirement migration highlights the value of lifecourse approaches in migration studies: because retirement regulations and practices vary significantly across countries and groups, establishing an age-based criterion poses an additional methodological challenge to migration research. Second, retirement migration also questions the settlement component of the definition of migration, as retirement may come with seasonal moves, long-term tourism or second-home ownership. The author distinguishes three forms of retirement migration – for lifestyle, return or assistance – and discusses their patterns and trends in subsequent sections that offer a rich assessment of the four questions asked in the title: who, why, where and when? The answers to these questions necessitate an in-depth multilevel analysis: while education and socioeconomic status are crucial at the individual level, demographic, geographic and economic factors also play an important macro-level role. Overall, this detailed review challenges the assumption that older migrants are passive and marginal actors in global mobility and stresses the wide scope of their mobility strategies. In Chapter 11, James Dennison and Alina Vrânceanu present a global overview of patterns and trends in public opinion about immigration. They assemble an admirable array of information regarding attitudes towards immigration from cross-country social surveys and examine variation in public opinion across world regions and over time. While their analysis mostly draws on survey data, the chapter also triangulates results with existing experiments exploring public attitudes to immigration. Theoretically, Dennison and Vrânceanu distinguish policy preferences from beliefs and perceptions, prejudice and the salience of immigration-related issues among sociopolitical attitudes. This latter aspect is most telling, showing a long-term increase in Europe particularly, although somewhat on the decline after the peak of the so-called “migration crisis” of 2015–2016, when 60 per cent of the population described “immigration” as one of the two most important issues affecting the EU. Interestingly, they also distinguish between “salience of migration” as a public and a private issue – with the latter being significantly lower. Overall, the picture they paint is one of heterogeneity in the attitudes

Introduction  xxiii towards migration across nations. The chapter concludes, however, with a note of methodological caution about the capacity to disentangle country effects from individual effects that may have their roots in early life socialisation and socio-psychological dispositions – that is, factors that are hard to identify in social surveys. The third and concluding part of the Handbook turns to political issues stemming from the governance of transnational mobility. Alongside descriptive approaches, this section discusses normative predicaments surrounding border control and integration of mobile populations into state territories. In Chapter 12, Fabian Gülzau and Steffen Mau examine the role of territorial borders, and particularly their demarcation, fortification, and protection, on a global scale. Their chapter outlines the history of borders in modern nation states and demonstrates the variability of the relationship between closing off a territory and cross-border connectivity. Gülzau and Mau start by reviewing the globalization literature of the 1990s and the unrealistic, naïve and widespread assumption of progressively weakening nation-state borders which failed to materialize in the following decades. Quite the contrary: physical infrastructures at nation-state borders, particularly walls and barriers, have proliferated in the 21st century. At the same time, visa requirements, as “paper walls” aimed at controlling people outside of national territory, have become more stringent between the Global North and Global South. Visas are de facto as effective as concrete walls since they limit undesired mobility even before travel starts. It is estimated that a visa requirement decreases the number of travellers to a given destination country by around 70 per cent. While a few countries, particularly those in North and South America and Europe, have successfully created visa-free travel for their citizens, the majority of states have not been able to provide an increase in mobility opportunities. Gülzau and Mau also observe that many regional integration projects have achieved internal openness in terms of visa-free travel, but at the same time have increasingly closed borders to third country nationals – the EU being a primary example. Chapter 13 interrogates the extent to which governance of migration takes into account the conventional “forced vs voluntary” dichotomy of human movements. Hélène Thiollet, Ferruccio Pastore and Camille Schmoll adopt a historical perspective and demonstrate the effectively limited regulatory role played by this distinction. The chapter underscores that forced migrations have been constantly treated as urgent issues and documents how they have been increasingly used as a migration management instrument. In the second section, the authors focus on recent events and analyse the categorical proliferation driven by complex processes of institutional taxonomy reflected in the example of “adhocratic” refugee policies. Building on a thorough review of empirical cases, the last section of the chapter documents how governance of “forced” and “non-forced” migration has eventually produced both forced mobility and immobility, hence transforming the very meaning of forcedness and its implications in migration governance. Forced migration has become a policy instrument of destination states rather than a description of the conditions under which people move globally. These trends have consequently increased the blurring of an already fragile distinction between forced and voluntary mobility at the international and national levels. Given its uniqueness as an area of transnational mobility rights, Chapter 14, authored by Rainer Bauböck, discusses whether the EU can serve as a model for other – existing or in the making – cross-national free movement regimes. Bauböck introduces a distinction between negative (merely consisting of non-interference at border crossing) and positive (entailing entitlements for settlement) conceptions of free movement. This key distinction constitutes an

xxiv  Handbook of human mobility and migration ideal continuum in terms of actual mobility rights. Historically, the chapter identifies three different ways to enable and promote free movement: multiple citizenship toleration, bi- and multilateral agreements between states, and regional unions such as the EU. Precisely by tracing back the origin and evolution of the free movement regime in the European Union, Bauböck highlights its specificities vis-à-vis other regional mobility agreements, such as those in place in Mercosur and Ecowas. Of the thirty free movement arrangements that exist worldwide, the majority are in fact limited to targeting movements of individuals related to trade and business or special categories of skilled workers. Regional models are shaped by a shared history and identity, as well as the dominance of one country within it. A critical conclusion of the chapter is that although the existence of a regional union strengthens the legal foundations of free movement regimes, particularly by furnishing a judiciary system to adjudicate controversies, free movement alone is not enough to integrate a regional union. The EU case shows that other challenges loom large. Brexit reveals that free movement can amplify policy dilemmas and societal divisions, primarily between mobile and immobile populations. Overall, the EU’s free movement regime provides a comprehensive benchmark for other regional mobility arrangements but does not necessarily predict their evolutions. Such a regime can hardly be replicated elsewhere. It can, however, be regarded as a reference point for what other regions could aspire to achieve through different trajectories. In continuity with this theme, Chapter 15, authored by Maurizio Ferrera and Anna Kyriazi, discusses the social rights of European free movers and places them in a larger context. There is a pervasive tension between large scale immigration and welfare rights, not only from a financial, but also from a cultural and political point of view. State authorities are thus faced with the challenge of finding a sustainable balance between the territorial admission of immigrants and their welfare entitlements. The European Union’s free movement regime is exceptional in that it combines open borders with non-discrimination of EU citizens, including equal access to welfare. After a brief discussion of the general topic, Ferrera and Kyriazi focus on the real and perceived challenges to reconciling free movement and welfare in the EU. Their assessment takes the perspectives of both countries of destination and countries of origin. Summarizing the most current research in the field, Chapter 15 shows that incoming intra-EU migration, despite high levels of politicization, has not led to the erosion of welfare states, but that the downside potential for welfare is considerably more pronounced in sending countries. Overall, transnational mobility and welfare rights do not seem to be programmatically incompatible as long as they are accompanied by adequate institutional and political buffers. In Chapter 16, Andrew Geddes critically reviews the existing forms of global mobility and migration governance. The chapter argues that while there is no single and overarching global framework for such governance, there is significant evidence of cooperation and integration beyond the state level involving a wide range of private and public actors. The term “governance” is used as a counterpoint to “government” and is understood as more diffuse, network-based, non-hierarchical and dispersed regulation across “levels”. Geddes warns about the hidden costs of such a regime in terms of inconsistencies and, at times, contradictory goals. However, he also hints to the fact that organizations dealing with migration – such as UNHCR, IOM, and ILO – have the power to shape policy-makers’ and the public’s framing of migration-related issues. This is especially relevant, inasmuch as supranational governance tends to be focused on capacity building and persuasion rather than the enforcement of binding rules. Geddes recognizes that the term “governance” is ambiguous and may be an empty signifier. Realistically, he finds that fragmentation will likely remain a characteristic of

Introduction  xxv global mobility and migration governance. This regime complex draws on a variety of norms including global, regional and national instruments, and is reflected in the controversial Global Compact for Migration of 2018. While the compact attempts to set an agenda for future cooperation, it does not amount to anything more than a non-binding commitment. The effects it will have on rights to move and settle and more generally on state regulations enforced on the ground remain to be studied. This conclusion resonates with themes discussed throughout the Handbook. In most instances, human mobilities and migrations are a potent manifestation of individual agency. However, their actual expressions are very much shaped, and frequently constrained, by the structure that more than any other defines and categorizes social actions – namely, the state.

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xxvi  Handbook of human mobility and migration Levitt, P. & Jaworsky, B. N. (2007). Transnational migration studies: Past developments and future trends. Annual Review of Sociology, 33, 129. Manning, P. & Trimmer, T. (2013). Migration in World History. London: Routledge. McLeod, S. (2007). Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Simply Psychology, 1, 1–18. McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press. Migali, S. & Scipioni, M. (2018). A global analysis of intentions to migrate. JRC Technical Report 111207. Ispra: European Commission. Preston, V. & McLafferty, S. (2016). Revisiting gender, race, and commuting in New York. Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 106(2), 300–310. Recchi, E. (2015). Mobile Europe: The Theory and Practice of Free Movement in the EU. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Recchi, E. & Flipo, A. (2019). Spatial mobility in social theory. SocietàMutamentoPolitica, 10(20), 125–137. Recchi, E. & Kuhn, T. (2013). Europeans’ space-sets and the political legitimacy of the EU. In N. Kauppi (ed.) A Political Sociology of Transnational Europe. Colchester: ECPR Press. Recchi, E. & Tittel, K. (2023). The empirical study of human mobility: Potentials and pitfalls of using traditional and digital data. In E. Bertoni, M. Fontana, L. Gabrielli, S. Signorelli & M. Vespe (eds) Handbook of Computational Social Science for Policy. Cham: Springer, 437–464. Recchi, E., Deutschmann, E., & Vespe, M. (2019a). Estimating transnational human mobility on a global scale. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper WP 30. Fiesole: European University Institute. Recchi, E., Deutschmann, E., & Vespe, M. (2019b). The Global Network of Transnational Mobility, N-IUSSP, October, https://​www​.niussp​.org/​migration​-and​-foreigners/​the​-global​-network​-of​ -transnational​-mobilityle​-reseau​-mondial​-de​-mobilite​-transnationale/​. Recchi, E., Flipo, A., & Duwez, E. (2021). “Ce monde que je connais”: les “space-sets” des Français. In P. Mercklé and E. Duwez (eds) Un panel français: L’Étude longitudinale par Internet pour les sciences sociales (Elipss). Paris: Ined, 255–280. Recchi, E., Ferrara, A., Rodriguez Sanchez, A., Deutschmann, E., Gabrielli, L., Iacus, S., Bastiani, L., Spyratos, S., & Vespe, M. (2022). The impact of air travel on the precocity and severity of COVID-19 deaths in sub-national areas across 45 countries. Scientific Reports, 12(1), 16522. Rosa, H. (2013). Social Acceleration. New York: Columbia University Press. Safi, M. (2020). Migration and Inequality. Cambridge: Polity. Salamońska, J. & Czeranowska, O. (2021). Mapping the diversity and structuring of migration patterns: One-off, repeat and multiple migrants in the European Union. International Migration, 59(6), 29–44. Santos, A., McGuckin, N., Nakamoto, H. Y., Gray, D., & Liss, S. (2011). Summary of travel trends: 2009 national household travel survey (No. FHWA-PL-11–022). United States. Federal Highway Administration. Sayad, A. (1999). La double absence. Des illusions de l'émigré aux souffrances de l'immigré. Paris: Seuil. Schapendonk, J., Bolay, M., & Dahinden, J. (2021). The conceptual limits of the ‘migration journey’. De-exceptionalising mobility in the context of West African trajectories. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 47(14), 3243–3259. Schutz, A. (1970). On Phenomenology and Social Relations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sheller, M. (2014). The new mobilities paradigm for a live sociology. Current Sociology, 62(6), 789–811. Sheller, M. & Urry, J. (2006). The new mobilities paradigm. Environment and Planning A, 38(2), 207–226. Sladkova, J. (2013). Stratification of undocumented migrant journeys: Honduran case. International Migration, 54(1), 84–99.’ Stopher, P. R. & Greaves, S. P. (2007). Household travel surveys: Where are we going?. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 41(5), 367–381. United Nations (2019a). World Population Prospects 2019: Highlights. New York: UN. United Nations (2019b). International Migration 2019: Report. New York: UN. Urry, J. (2000). Sociology Beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-First Century. London: Routledge. Urry, J. (2007). Mobilities: New Perspectives on Transport and Society. London: Routledge. Waldinger, R. (2017). A cross-border perspective on migration: Beyond the assimilation/transnationalism debate. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 43(1), 3–17.

PART I RETHINKING

1 Is Homo sapiens a growingly mobile species (in the very long run)? Massimo Livi Bacci

SENECA AND DARWIN Two thousand years ago, impressed by the intricacy of migration flows in the Roman world, Seneca (1900, 320) wrote: Nor have all men had the same reasons for leaving their country and for seeking a new one: some have escaped from their cities when destroyed by hostile armies, and having lost their own lands have been thrust upon those of others; some have been cast out by domestic quarrels; some have been driven forth in consequence of an excess of population, in order to relieve the pressure at home; some have been forced to leave by pestilence, or frequent earthquakes, or some unbearable defects of a barren soil; some have been seduced by the fame of a fertile and overpraised clime.

A well-written synthesis of the main forces and motivations behind migration, valid for all times. “The movement of the human race is perpetual” – added Seneca – “in the vast world some changes take place daily”. And, indeed, because of that perpetual movement, put in motion by Seneca’s motivations, Darwin (1871, 41) could write that: Man has spread widely over the face of the earth, and must have been exposed, during his incessant migration, to the most diversified conditions. The inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego, the Cape of Good Hope, and Tasmania in the one hemisphere, and of the arctic regions in the other, must have passed through many climates, and changed their habits many times, before they reached their present homes.

Improving on Seneca’s prose and Darwin’s clarity and concision is impossible. They both assumed that migration, or mobility or, even better, the ability to move from one place to another, is an inner quality – or endowment, or prerogative – of humans. The act of migrating includes a great variety of aspects, according to the distance covered (to a nearby village, or from England to Australia), the time scale (an immediate move like a sudden invasion, or a lengthy process such as that of our ancestors out of Africa), the duration of stay (seasonal or for life), and the nature of the constraints (physical, like mountains, seas or deserts; biological, like diseases and pathologies; social, like frontiers, jurisdictions), the motivations (as those described by Seneca) and many other defining features. For all these reasons, it is extremely difficult to draw a history of migration, unless the field is narrowed and the ambitions kept in check. For most of this long process, mobility has been hindered mainly by natural constraints: climate, deserts, mountains, rivers, sea. Increasing density and the emergence of an articulated society has added social constraints to the natural ones: jurisdiction on land, norms, regulations, barriers, borders, frontiers. The history of human mobility, therefore, must be interpreted in the light of the incessant and changing interrelation between the innate prerogative to move and the constraints that channel and shape that prerogative. There is also another basic feature of migration that must be considered when dealing with mobility and its development in 2

Is Homo sapiens a growingly mobile species (in the very long run)?  3 a historical perspective. This is the degree of personal choice involved in the act of migrating, over a spectrum that goes from an act “forced” upon the individual (or its family or clan), to an act that is the result of a free decision. At one extreme, stands “forced” migration, because of violence, conflicts or natural disasters. At the other extreme stands “free” migration, unhindered by social factors, but consequence of a motivated decision. Take the 290 million persons counted as belonging to the “migrant stock” by the United Nations (2021): one in ten is an “official” refugee, “forced” to abandon their country of birth, plus an unaccounted number of “past” refugees (think of the millions after India’s independence and partition, or of the refugees after World War II) now living in a country different from that of birth. On the other hand, the proportion of “free” migrants, who have moved unhindered by restrictions and regulations, is probably smaller than in the past, owing to the increasingly restrictive policies put in place by most countries of the world.

ENERGY, TECHNOLOGY AND MOBILITY The preceding considerations explain why it is so difficult to answer the question asked in this chapter’s title, or whether Homo sapiens is a growing mobile species. Difficult but not impossible, if we limit ourselves to explore the Western world in modern and contemporary times, during the five centuries following the permanent connection between Eurasia, Africa and America. In the first place, technology, energy and infrastructures have allowed more people to move, faster and farther. Before the Industrial Revolution, humans had at their disposal modest amounts of energy, in approximately equal amounts consisting of thermal energy (mainly burning of woods) and of mechanical energy (derived from human or animal source) and potentially used for hauling and travel. The contribution of wind and water was modest. It has been estimated that per capita energy consumption in Europe was of the order of 15,000 calories per day, used for heating, cooking, smelting, walking or travelling hauled by mules, horses or cows. Overall, mobility was limited because of the shortage of energy, particularly in those regions where beasts of burden were less numerous. However, from the late Middle Ages to the eve of the Industrial Revolution, caloric consumption presumably increased, especially because of the more widespread and efficient use of animal energy. Before the Industrial Revolution, increased mobility was also the result of a long series of innovations and of their gradual and uneven application. In America, indigenous populations didn’t use the wheel and lacked animals of burden – with the exception of the llamas – introduced by the Europeans. Horses became more useful and efficient thanks to a series of developments: the introduction of horseshoes, stirrups and other refinements (including the harnessing of shoulder and chest for traction rather than neck); the spread of the four-wheeled cart; new methods for harnessing teams of horses; the improvement of roads; the building of bridges; and the digging of canals. The growing use of internal waterways – of which Europe abounds – and the building of canals stimulated the transportation of merchandise especially, but also of passengers. Improvements in navigation and the better use of wind power allowed for the transoceanic transportation of goods and people. The effect was great given the small amount of total European energy consumption involved, and it was a development largely restricted to the Atlantic powers: the great sailing ships of Portugal in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries made longer voyages possible and so too the conquest of new spaces. There were develop-

4  Handbook of human mobility and migration ments in the Mediterranean too, both with regard to increased capacity and technological improvements, but the great advances came in the Atlantic: the development of advanced rigging, the transition from single-masted to triple-masted ships and the increase in tonnage. These improvements allowed for increased carrying capacity, greater security, faster travel and lower costs. The average length of a trip between Seville and America was about five weeks, not that long, if one considers that at the beginning of the twentieth century an ocean liner still took about ten days to make the same trip. In a word, the modern era saw a notable increase in the ability to move about. The harnessing of steam power, and a century later, the invention of the internal combustion engine, started the modern revolution by which almost every corner of the continents can be easily reached, the only limitations being cost and the entitlement to move. Another aspect of this increased mobility before the Industrial Revolution was the intensification of the urban fabric as the flow of population arriving from the countryside increased. The cities suffered from a chronic demographic deficit – deaths far exceeded births – and even to maintain a given population size they depended upon rural immigrants. Between 1500 and 1800 the urban population (centres with 10,000 inhabitants or more) grew almost everywhere, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total: from three to 20 per cent in England and Wales, from four to nine per cent in France, from six to 11 per cent in Spain, and from 12 to 14 per cent in Italy. Between 1650 and 1750, London’s population expanded by about 250,000, in spite of an equivalent increase in deaths relative to births. Those figures imply a net migration (the difference between immigrants and emigrants) during that century of about half a million. The population of Amsterdam grew from 30,000 to 200,000 between 1550 and 1700 and was a destination for immigrants coming from Flanders, Germany and Norway. Net migration to Rome during the eighteenth century exceeded 130,000; Naples grew from 150,000 to 280,000 in the sixteenth century and again, after the crisis of the seventeenth century, from 200,000 to 320,000 in the eighteenth. In this way, net migration can be seen as a major factor.

OPENING THE GATES FOR EMIGRANTS AND CLOSING THE GATES TO IMMIGRANTS Further testimony to increased mobility in Europe was the development of extensive labour markets characterized largely by seasonal and periodic work and employing mostly peasants, labourers and smallholders seeking supplementary income. At the end of the eighteenth century, the North Sea coast, and especially Holland, received a constant influx of migrant workers for maritime work and the building of dams; the Irish went to London and East Anglia for public works and agricultural work; while the Paris basin attracted workers from the Massif Central and the Alps. Other highly mobile labour markets could be found further south: Madrid and Castille attracted labourers for the harvest; while the coastal area from Catalonia to Provence drew labourers from the Pyrenees, the Massif Central, and the Alps. Important destinations in Italy included the Po Valley (from the Alps and the Apennines), southern Tuscany, Rome and Latium, and Corsica. Most of these migrants travelled on foot, but transport via both water and land also contributed to an intense migration that counted several hundreds of thousands of workers who supplemented the incomes of a similar number of families and contributed in a fundamental way to the economic balance of the Continent.

Is Homo sapiens a growingly mobile species (in the very long run)?  5 As already said, the Industrial Revolution created a completely new situation from a technological, economic and political viewpoint. Railways covered Europe and North America with a thick network, facilitating both internal and international mobility. In the 1840s, steam liners substituted sail ships, making navigation across the Atlantic, and elsewhere in the world, speedier, safer and less expensive. Investment in infrastructures – ports, canals, roads, bridges – increased everywhere. Mobility became easier. The gradual decline of the contribution of agriculture to the national product and the increase of industrial and tertiary activities, was associated with increasing urbanization and a more mobile labour force. The same effect, on an international scale, was determined by the process of globalization in the second part of the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth century. A globalization of goods and finance, but also of people: from 1840 to 1920 some 50 million Europeans emigrated to the Americas. This compares with a European inflow into America of two or three million people over the three centuries between 1500 and 1800. In the course of the nineteenth century a gigantic “wave of advancement”, westward migration, pushed millions of migrant-settlers across North America from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast: by 1890 the US Census Bureau declared the frontier officially “closed”. All these developments took advantage of a gradual relaxation of migration policies of the various states. Iberian colonies in America, for instance, were closed to the immigration of non-Iberian subjects. Only Spanish or Portuguese subjects were entitled – overcoming a series of restrictions – to migrate overseas. Similar regulations existed for other European settlements, in the Caribbean islands, and in Québec. In Europe, a mercantilist and populationist attitude prevailed, and emigration was stigmatized, restricted or forbidden, seen as a pauperization of the human capital and of the wealth of a nation. In most states of the German Empire, emigration was normally prohibited – but there was a consistent illegal emigration – and illegal emigrants were stripped of their citizenship. England, in a first phase, abolished the restrictions to emigration, in order to allow Irish emigration to North America and so diminish the pressure on the country. In 1840, a Colonial Land and Emigration Commission was created, emigration thus becoming substantially free from constraints and even sustained. A similar course was taken by the Scandinavian countries. In Austria the ordonnances of 1784 prohibited emigration, considered a treason of the state and incompatible with the feudal order; these regulations were only marginally relaxed in 1832, and in 1867 the new constitution decreed liberty of emigration if authorized by the military, authorization that was very difficult to obtain. Hungary had a similar normative. In Italy new legislation was introduced in 1881, recognizing the individual freedom to emigrate. It is a fact that over the nineteenth century, obstacles to emigration were gradually eliminated, and this was another factor that enhanced international mobility in Europe and beyond. But if the right to emigrate was widely recognized by national regulations, there was also a gradually increasing scrutiny, selection and restriction of immigration inflows. Typical is the case of the United States, where immigration was practically free in the first decades of the nineteenth century, but ended up by being severely restricted with the Immigration Acts at the beginning of the 1920s. The same can be said of South America: Argentina and Brazil encouraged immigration in a first phase, but introduced restrictive measures in the 1930s. So while the gates were gradually opening up in Europe for outgoing emigrants, they were closing up on the other side of the Atlantic for the incoming ones. On the other hand, there are no clear trends in national policies in the last hundred years, marked by the impact of the two World Wars, the Great Depression, the splitting of Europe because of the Iron Curtain, the decolonization process and the breakdown

6  Handbook of human mobility and migration of the Soviet empire and Yugoslavia. These events, and these processes, have had profound consequences on international flows. If a generalization must be attempted, one could say that national policies have strived to manoeuvre the gates of immigration, looking more at their immediate interests rather than to the long-term ones. International mobility, after the end of World War II, has increased, but not as much as one would have expected given the rapidly growing interconnection between the countries of the planet. In 1960 the stock of international migrants totalled some 76 million people (about 25 out of every 1000 inhabitants) that has grown to 290 million in 2020 (37 per 1000 inhabitants), an increase of about 50 per cent in relative terms. The impression that the West is overflowing with immigrants is an optical illusion. North America, in the last three decades (1990–2020), has had a positive net migration of the same relative level of the one that characterized the decades around the turn of the nineteenth century.

THE QUANTUM OF CHOICE: BETWEEN FORCED AND FREE MIGRATION International migration is only a component of human mobility. Internal migration – that in the case of large countries is often long-distance migration – has been on the increase over the last two centuries. Of course this has not been a continuous process, since changes of regime, wars, ethnic conflicts and economic crises have affected mobility, slowing down or even reversing the process. International and internal migration are similar and contiguous phenomena, except for one powerful distinction: all nationals of a country with democratic institutions are (in principle) entitled to move internally, but only a few are entitled to move internationally. The quantitative evidence of expanding internal mobility is overwhelming, in the Western, as well as in the rest of the world. Again, the growth of urbanization is closely associated with increasing mobility as attested, in the five continents, by the long-term process of the depopulation of the countryside and by the changes in the internal distribution of the population, as shown by the censuses. A recent example is the so called “floating population” – or the immigrants (with an illegal but tolerated status) in the rapidly developing coastal regions of China – which, over the last three to four decades, has grown from a few tens to a few hundred million individuals. Mobility, and its historical development, must be evaluated also with regard to the degree of personal choice involved in the act of migrating. This extends along a spectrum that includes “free” migration, at one end, and “forced” migration at the other. Free migration is an act involving a voluntary decision of the migrant (sometime the decision is negotiated with the family, clan or community to which the prospective migrant belongs). Even the escape from poverty implies a degree of personal choice, a costs and benefits balance, and a personal decision. On the other end of the spectrum one finds forced migration, that disregards the will of the migrant through the violence of a state, an army or an organized group. Or by a natural event – a drought, an earthquake, an epidemic – that imperils survival. Between free and forced migration there are other types of mobility, pushed or pulled by the action of institutions, or “organized” migration. This implies the consent of the migrant, who probably would not have moved without the incentive provided by the institution’s political will.

Is Homo sapiens a growingly mobile species (in the very long run)?  7

FORCED MIGRATION Generally speaking, when discussing migration, reference is made to free or organized migration: in both cases there is an evaluation of costs and benefits, and a decision is taken more or less voluntarily. These are types of migration that can be cast into a paradigm, analysed with quantitative methods and interpreted with models. Forced migration is treated as an exception, an exogenous shock, a background noise. But historically, forced migration has been an important component of mobility, has deeply shaped the society of many regions of the world, and in the long run, has had similar effects to those determined by free migration. A narrative of forced migration in modern times would fill volumes, with many chapters dedicated to expulsions, deportations, banishments, displacements, pogroms and ethnic cleansings. In the history of the West, the slave trade and the transportation of millions of Africans to America across the Atlantic, mainly in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, looms large. Africans constitute an important component of America’s population (practically the entire population of Haiti, half that of Brazil, one third of Cuba, one seventh of the US). Forced migration was a well-rooted policy in the expanding Inca empire, transplanting entire tribes and groups in newly acquired territories in order to control and integrate their populations. Episodes of deportation, expulsion and displacement at the hands of Europeans settlers form the sad story of the indigenous populations of America, north, centre and south. The transportation of convicts from England to Australia – the almost exclusive form of immigration until the 1840s – caused the collapse of the indigenous population and provided the demographic basis of the country. Religious and ethnic factors have been behind many episodes of forced migration in Europe: the expulsion of Muslims and Jews from Spain; of Huguenots from France; and of other reformed minorities from central Europe are notorious episodes. World War I caused the redesign of the map of Europe, with a forcible redistribution of millions of people from one country to another, not to speak of the delocalization during the war of masses of people in Central and Eastern Europe. Forced migrations were a consequence of the disgregation of the Ottoman Empire, with the population exchange between Turkey and Greece and the displacement and partial annihilation of the Armenian minority. World War II caused mass displacements of populations in Eastern Europe, as a consequence of the moving of the frontline and, inside the USSR, the displacement of millions of people belonging to ethnic minorities, deemed to be internal potential enemies or “fifth columns”: Germans, Finnish, Turks, Tatars, Ingush, and many other groups. After the war, some 16 million refugees moved back to Germany or to other destinations, leaving their often secular residences behind. The Shoah annihilated the European Jewish community and forced the survivors to move elsewhere. In the 1990s, the war in Yugoslavia and Kosovo produced a mass of refugees and displaced persons. Current statistics of the United Nations agency for refugees (UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/) estimate over 84 million people were forcibly displaced from their homes in 2021, within and without their own countries. Millions have fled crisis-stricken Venezuela and the overturn of the government in Afghanistan in 2021 has triggered the fleeing of hundreds of thousands of people out of the country. The aggression of Russia against Ukraine pushed four million people to leave their country in just the first five weeks of war. These fleeting examples attest to the importance of forced migration in the Western mobility system.

8  Handbook of human mobility and migration

FREE MIGRATION At the other extreme of the spectrum stands “free” migration. Which migration is free, it is difficult to define, but a theoretical way out can be based on two criteria: that there is a willing decision and that there are not obstacles of a legal or physical nature that cannot be reasonably surmounted. Short-distance and proximity mobility, in order to go to the market, to attend religious services or civil ceremonies, to visit family members and friends, and nearby communities, has always been reasonably free, otherwise a society cannot function. The same can be said of long-distance and even transnational labour migration when, from the late seventeenth century, large labour markets came into existence in Western and Central Europe. As for international migration, the emergence of recognized state jurisdictions, the definition and consolidation of citizenship and the drawing of effectively guarded frontiers have gradually raised obstacles to migration. But the great transoceanic migration was, by and large, a free movement. In Europe, at the beginning of the twentieth century, free mobility and migration were on the increase almost everywhere, sustained by the acceleration of the demand for labour of the growing industrial sector, by the increasing attraction of the expanding cities and by the acceleration of globalization. Overseas migration reached its maximum level, with record numbers of outgoing and returning migrants. Millions of Russian migrants populated Siberia and the Far East of the empire. Mobility had become easy and cheap, as the railway network covered all of Europe, and the price of transoceanic passages fell. The same can be said about internal mobility. Europeans were on the move, over short and long distances, for seasonal labour and long-term employment, for a variety of reasons and motivations. It was, by and large, a “free” movement, and even when determined by extreme poverty and destitution, there was an element of voluntary choice in the decision to move. For many, mobility provided a way out of poverty. But the troubled decades that followed, as has already been said, were characterized by massive forced migration – displacements, deportations, expulsions – either induced by war operations, or mandated by governments or occupying enemy forces, or in accordance with agreed international conventions and peace treaties. In North America, if international migration was kept under rigid control since the 1920s, free internal migration intensified responding to the vigorous economic growth. In Spanish America three centuries of Spain’s colonial domination left a common heritage to the States emerged after indipendence, made of similar institutions, close cultures, identical language and religion. Because of this, international migration within the continent has been, until recently, relatively free. However, now, the intensification of migration out of Central America, as well as the profound crisis of Venezuela, with the exodus of millions of its citizens, has jeopardized the traditional solidarity and induced many states to raise frontier controls.

ORGANIZED MIGRATION In the history of mobility, between the “free” and the “forced” categories, “organized” migration has kept an important place. In this case, as in the “free” one, there is a choice, a wilful decision, a cost-benefits evaluation on the part of the migrant, but migration would not have occurred without an external planned or organized input. History offers many instances of organized migration; in general, the organizers or planners were institutions, powerful elites, capitalists, religious orders, seigneurs – with means of an economic, political, logistic nature.

Is Homo sapiens a growingly mobile species (in the very long run)?  9 The colonization and germanization of Central and Eastern Europe in late medieval times – Drang nach Osten – was financed and organized by wealthy bishops, feudal seigneurs, religious orders, that selected the migrants, provided them with tools, seeds, draft animals, carriages for the colonization of the sparsely settled territories inhabited by Slavic peoples. Populationist governments, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, organized migration into unsettled frontier areas, regions susceptible to development but scarce in human capital. Catherine the Great organized the immigration of German settlers from the Palatinate into the sparsely settled Lower Volga region; Fredric the Great strived to populate the recently acquired Selesia; Maria Theresa of Austria supported the settlement of Danubian regions with a view of strengthening the frontier with the Ottoman Empire. Colbert and Louis XIV organized the migration of young women, drawn from charitable institutions, to Québec, in an attempt to redress the unbalanced sex ratio of the first French colonists. In the Antiquity, Greek settlement in the Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts – apoikia – was organized by the city-states of the mother country with groups of citizens. Mobility in the Roman Empire was largely sustained and organized by the army, with the settlement of veterans in new colonies; the tens of thousands of legionnaires that guarded the frontier, and settled the Rhine and Danube’s Limes, attracted visitors and immigrants from the barbarian tribes settled beyond the border. In all the above-mentioned cases, the external hand of a potentate was a driving force, and the migration of consenting individuals surged because of its action.

GLOBALIZATION AND POLICIES Regarding the future – will mankind continue to be an “increasingly mobile species”? Let us restrict the final considerations to international migration, and let us briefly discuss three aspects, the first concerning globalization, the second policies and the third the competition between physical and virtual mobility. Each one of these aspects have powerful impacts. Globalization generates mobility: a growing amount of goods and services exchanged between nations calls for increasing personal contacts and more intense mobility. In the long run, men and women follow the goods. Of course, globalization proceeds in waves and cycles, but around an ascending trend. In our age, as in past times, improved, cheaper and faster communications second this trend. Investment in infrastructures – roads, ports, airports, roads, railways – will continue to oil the mechanisms of planetary human circulation. The Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) contemplates stratospheric investments in order to multiply the land, sea and air links between Asia, Africa and Europe. On those “roads” goods will travel, as well as technologies, energy, information … and people. The second consideration concerns the development of migration policies that, since the beginning of the millennium, are becoming more restrictive. Not only do legislations increase the requirements for becoming eligible to cross a frontier and restrict the number of individuals allowed to immigrate, but physical barriers are put in place at the borders. The length of walls and barriers is increasing continuously, the latest additions being the walls between Greece and Turkey and between Poland and Belarus. Covid-19 has led most countries to close the borders for varying periods of time, millions of migrants have remained stranded in the countries of immigration, and also restrictions to internal mobility have been put in place in many countries. International mobility has declined rapidly and may not return to pre-pandemic levels for some time. Migration is a very sensitive issue, and policymakers are extremely atten-

10  Handbook of human mobility and migration tive to the course of public opinion. There are two opposite forces that shape public opinion on migration issues in pandemic times: on one hand the nativists, and all those that are hostile to immigration for a variety of reasons. These may find comfort in the ease with which countries have shut borders in order to keep contagion at bay. Why not do the same with immigrants that are “undesirable”, potential criminals, carriers of creeds, religions, attitudes deemed not coherent with the national culture? On the other hand, there are those that have perceived, in times of pandemic, how vital immigration is for a well-functioning society, and who may advance their arguments persuasively. What direction the public opinion, and the electorate, will take in the future cannot be guessed.

VIRTUAL RELATIONS AND PHYSICAL MOBILITY Our third consideration refers to the inadequacy of traditional classifications of migrants that describe less and less well the processes of human international mobility that, at present, is formed not only by people looking for a permanent or seasonal job, or reuniting with a partner, or old style rentier or new style investors. There is also an increasing number of people who move around as technicians of multinational firms; members of international organizations and NGOs; scholars, researchers and students; business people and technicians visiting or collaborating with their peers; visitors moved by parental ties, or friendship, or sentimental reasons, and tourists of all denominations; and, unfortunately, the millions of military personnel in “peacekeeping” missions, and warmongering activities, around the world. The so-called international tourists were less than one billion in 1995 and grew to 2.2 billion in 2019; Chinese going abroad for business or tourism totalled one million in 1990 and grew to 157 million in 2019 (UNWTO 2019). International university students in the OECD countries numbered 1.3 million in 1990 and 6 million 30 years later. Marriages and unions with partners living in different countries increase and produce “international children”. There is an intensification of relations among individuals who do not join migration flows (or cannot do so) but generate international bonds of affection, friendship, employment, or even simple knowledge or proximity to far away countries and societies. It is a complex and articulated tendency, and no metric has yet been identified for evaluating its overall strength. Finally, there is a stunning explosion in virtual means of communication: the day when access to the internet is universal and everybody is a more or less active user; when everybody owns a smartphone or other devices of more advanced generation; when everybody is active on social media; and when automatic translation wipes out any language barrier, is not far away. The world is shrinking and contacts, in person or virtual, are rapidly increasing. Will virtual technology be a substitute for physical mobility? This is happening now, with the increase of remote work stimulated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Or will the ever increasing and thickening virtual web that unifies the world generate a further demand for physical mobility, personal contacts and migration?

Is Homo sapiens a growingly mobile species (in the very long run)?  11

REFERENCES  

Darwin, C. (1871). The Descent of Man. New York: The Modern Library. Seneca, L. A. (1900). Of Consolation to Helvia, in “Minor Dialogs”, trans. by Aubrey Stewart. London: George Bell and Sons. United Nations (2021). International Migrant Stock 2020. UN Population Division (UN-DESA). New York: United Nations. UNWTO (2019). International Tourism Highlights 2019. Madrid: UNWTO.

2

Have migrants become a distinct category in social stratification research? Mirna Safi

WHO IS A MIGRANT? FROM DEMOGRAPHIC TO SOCIAL CATEGORY Migration is a movement in place between two observational moments. International migration is usually defined by relying on national categorization of space: international migrants move across national boundaries. Building on this definition, the international migrant population can be estimated worldwide: in 2020, the number of immigrants stood at almost 281 million, according to the UN Population Division; this means that about 3.6 percent of the earth’s inhabitants currently live in a country different from their country of birth. The definition also uses birth date as a time reference: international migrants move away from their country of birth. People cannot change their place of birth. Hence, from the point of view of the receiving country, and as long as settlement endures, immigrants remain immigrants. Here it is important to distinguish the concept of immigrant from the neighboring concept of foreigner: while foreigners may acquire citizenship and thus become nationals it is only when immigrants return back to live in their country of birth that they stop being immigrants. Consequently, immigrants remain immigrants even when they acquire their host country’s citizenship. One can therefore speak of immigrant status as a durable one. In social stratification terms, immigrant status shares the characteristics of what scholars consider as ascriptive factors such as gender and race. Moreover, the immigrant status itself tends to be transmissible. Indeed, debates on migration often go beyond the experience of migrants themselves to encompass that of their offspring, usually referred to as second-generation immigrants. Even when born in the host country—which means that they did not experience migration—and although when the host country grants them nationality (by birth or in early age stages), immigrant descendants are still part of the immigration debate both in the academic and political spheres and they are shown to experience specific disadvantages. Consequently, migration entails an ascriptive, durable and transmissible status. Social stratification theory highlights the particular potency of such characteristics in producing social inequality. This has major implications on access to resources in supposedly meritocratic societies that receive a considerable share of international migrants. Unsurprisingly, migration is increasingly used as a relevant category in inequality studies (Massey 2017; Safi 2020). Most empirical research on social attainment and inequality includes some migration status measurement and accounts for its effect even when the focus is not particularly on migration, at least as a basic control variable similar to gender and age. Research on structural inequality in education, the labor market, the housing market, health, etc. has been documenting the particular disadvantage of immigrants and their children in many immigration societies. On the cultural side, scholars have been stressing the framing of 12

Have migrants become a distinct category in social stratification research?  13 immigrants as “undeserving” and their increasing stigmatization. Empirical studies tackling immigrant integration in host societies and the impact of immigration on a myriad of dimensions such as employment, wages, economic growth, urban segregation, education, global welfare, etc. have been flourishing over the last decades across a wide range of social science disciplines. Has migrant status become a distinct category of social stratification? How do immigrants become unequal and are some immigrants more (un)equal than others? I try to address these questions focusing on the general social processes that relate migration to social inequality and building on an interdisciplinary literature.

SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN THREE QUESTIONS Three questions are at the core of social stratification theory. ● The question of the resources (Inequality of what?). The resources involved in inequality dynamics are multidimensional (Grusky and Ku 2008): economic, political, cultural, social, honorary, civil, human, physical, environmental, etc. Nonetheless, differences in attributes cannot always be interpreted in terms of resources that are relevant to the study of inequality. Adopting a historical approach, Charles Tilly (2003) defines inequality as the result of unequal control over value-producing resources; this means that attributes that contribute to a flow of valued goods or services are those that are central to inequality studies. This approach pays attention not only to market mechanisms but also to cultural and institutional processes that define certain resources as valuable and desirable. ● The question of the categories (Inequality between whom?). Interdisciplinary research on inequality challenges the simple model of inequality conceived in terms of “competitive sorting” which posits that individual differences in attributes are evaluated and ordered through organized social processes such as tryouts, auditions and elections. Access to resources hardly relies on individual-to-individual scrutiny but rather stems from assignment to and recruitment within readily available social categories that function as labels, markers or cognitive shortcuts (educational level, gender, race, age, phenotype, citizenship, ethnicity, etc.). These categorical distinctions that may exist outside and prior to market-like relations facilitate the matching of individuals to social positions, thus increasing the durability of inequality and solidifying social stratification systems. The processes that group humans, whether they are coercive, technological, legal, cultural or cognitive, are thus operative factors of inequality. ● The question of the mechanisms (How does inequality work?). Many distributional mechanisms have been studied in the literature on social inequality: innovation, distantiation, evaluation, hierarchization, claim-making, resource pooling, rent-making, etc. This variety of mechanisms forms a spectrum ranging from exploitation to opportunity hoarding – two elementary processes of inequality (Massey 2007; Therborn 2013; Tilly 1998). Contemporary scholarship tends to think of all these distributional mechanisms as being embedded in social relations (Tomaskovic-Devey and Avent-Holt 2019). This fundamentally means that inequality cannot be fully understood by focusing only on one group (e.g., the dominant, the top income, males, natives, whites). Rather, the focus should be on the interaction between groups and the identification of institutionalized spaces of encounters

14  Handbook of human mobility and migration that become “durable social networks” where the unequal distribution of resources is produced and reproduced (Tomaskovic-Devey 2014). In other words, inequality is a relational concept, not a stand-alone attribute. The separation between the what, whom and how questions allows us to sketch a threefold analytical framework. First, inequality studies are concerned with a wide range of resources. Second, categorization is a central process that feeds inequality. Third, once the resource at stake and the relevant categories of humans are defined, the distributive mechanisms may be analyzed on the exploitation-opportunity hoarding spectrum. Migration is a particularly interesting case for the study of inequality because it involves a wide range of resources, triggers specific categorization processes and is consequently able to affect the underlying processes of inequality. Table 2.1 summarizes the migration-inequality nexus in three channels: the economic, legal and ethnoracial channels. For each of them, the table addresses the three inequality questions raised above (the what, the whom and the how questions) and provides some examples that will be more thoroughly discussed below. Each of these channels involves a specific set of resources: labor and socioeconomic position in the economic channel; rights and political status in the legal channel; symbolic status, moral worth and respect in the ethnoracial channel. The three channels trigger three types of categorizations of migrants: as types of workers, types of citizens and types of humans. In the economic channel, exploitation is the most central mechanism through which migration reshapes inequality. In the legal and ethnoracial channels, opportunity hoarding is more pivotal. The next three sections review the literature that informs each of these three channels. Table 2.1

The three channels through which migration affects inequality Inequality of what?

Inequality between

How does inequality

whom?

work?

Examples

Economic

Labor and socioeconomic

Categories of workers,

Endogenous distribution

Post-World War II

channel

positions

migrant/native labor,

of economic resources,

European guest workers’

international social classes global division of labor, exploitation

migration Contemporary care workers’ migration

Legal channel

Rights, legal and political

Legally-enforced

Endogenous legal

Undocumented migrants

status

categories of citizens

and administrative

Refugees, family reunion,

categorizations (border

economic migrants

control, citizenship

Biomedical categorization

law, alien law, etc),

of migrants

opportunity hoarding Reconfiguration of white/

Ethnoracial

Status, moral worth,

Ethnic/racial/national

Group boundary-making

channel

respect

categories of humans

and ethnoracial formation. Black/Hispanic racial Potentially expanding to

boundaries in the U.S.

legal and socioeconomic

Circulation of ethnoracial

inequalities, opportunity

categorizations beyond

hoarding

national boundaries

Have migrants become a distinct category in social stratification research?  15

MIGRATION AND INEQUALITY IN THREE CHANNELS The Economic Channel The economic channel’s roots lie in the interference between migration and the division of labor, the latter being the central distributional process that allocates jobs, economic rewards and socioeconomic positions. This body of research intrinsically deals with migration as a source of labor; migration reshapes the division of labor and affects the allocation of different “types of jobs” and the uneven rewards that are associated with them. In short, migration creates different “types of workers”. International migration and more generally workers’ geographic mobility is closely related to the commodification of labor. The roles of rural exodus in the process of industrialization, or of forced-migration in the slavery regime are historical examples that highlight the intrinsic relations between labor mobility and stratification regimes. Contemporary techniques to manage workers’ mobility mainly rely on law and regulations that establish different forms of “labor controls” on migrant workers, while the overt use of violence, although not negligible, has become rarer.1 These theoretical insights may appear to fit the “great age of migration” that channeled workers to the “new world” at the turn of the 20th century. They also find sharp resonance in the massive and organized nature of the use of migrant labor in many European countries after the Second World War. These migrants were clearly perceived as flexible, temporary workers (guest workers) and were often hired by state agencies directly in the source country in order to fill the demand for labor, particularly in the industrial and construction sectors. This form of tied labor, which sometimes explicitly links workers’ entry to the employer’s identity (i.e., employer sponsorship) still exists in many societies in the world with considerable power in the hands of employers and clear evidence of migrant worker exploitation. The Kafala system in the Middle East is one of the most studied examples (Longva 1999; Mahdavi 2011). Yet, these perspectives are also useful in the study of contemporary migration even without formal tied labor. Some professions that are highly composed of migrant labor may be considered as migratory industries (the care sector, household services, the construction sector and some other industrial sectors in particular). Certain high-skilled economic sectors as well rely on forms of migratory industries; information and computer technologies are among the most studied, but doctors, engineers and other high-skilled occupations increasingly employ migrants. The overrepresentation of migrants at the top of the skills distribution has indeed become a stylized fact in many immigration countries; recent accounts show that, in 17 of 29 selected OECD countries, the proportion of highly-educated persons is greater among the foreign born than among the native workforce (OECD 2018, 94). This pattern is particularly salient in Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. In the US, the proportion of foreigners in STEM occupations (Sciences, Technology, Engineering and Math) has steadily increased

1 It is notable that migration is still tied to contemporary forms of slavery. While there is some disagreement on the definition of contemporary slavery, current estimations range around 50 million enslaved individuals worldwide. While most of these different forms of “forced workers” (including victims of sex trafficking and child labor) are concentrated in countries such as Mauritania and India, the figures remain shockingly high in developed countries where modern slavery seems to be closely tied to international migration, particularly its undocumented subset (ILO, Walk Free, and IOM 2022).

16  Handbook of human mobility and migration since the 1990s, exceeding 60 percent among those with a PhD (Hanson and Slaughter 2016). In addition to the direct involvement of corporations, the state-organized feature of migration is most manifest today in those immigration policies that aim at attracting high-skilled workers. It is notable, for instance, that the design of the intra-Europe free movement policy and its coupling with the harmonization of university education is tailored to enhance the mobility of the highly skilled (Recchi 2008; Recchi and Triandafyllidou 2010; Triandafyllidou and Isaakyan 2014). Although high-skilled migration helps put into perspective the representation of migrant labor as disadvantaged and vulnerable, its relation to the economic channel of inequality is similar on most lines to low-skilled labor migration. While high-skilled migrants imported to fill these gaps tend to be portrayed as “the cosmopolitan elite,” evidence of downgrading and lower wages in comparison with native high-skilled workers suggests that they more accurately form a sort of “high-tech braceros” (Alarcon 1999). Hanson and Slaughter (2016) show that it takes ten years of labor market experience in the US for immigrants in STEM occupations to earn equal to or more than native-born workers doing similar tasks. Beyond the inequalities experienced by migrant workers themselves, at the macro level, the economic channel highlights the ways in which migration is capable of reshaping inequality in the labor market of the receiving countries. From a descriptive point of view, migration contributes to overall economic inequality in most western societies through compositional effects. As migration tends to concentrate at the bottom of the distribution of earnings and/or fill up positions at both the top and bottom extremes in most immigration countries, the compositional effect is thus expected to increase the variance in the overall distribution of income. Overall, while existing, this effect tends to be small (Blau and Kahn 2015; Card 2009). Beyond this effect, the literature tries to tackle whether migration affects the configuration of socioeconomic inequality in the host society. Card’s (1990) influential paper on the Mariel massive and sudden boatlift migration from Cuba to Miami in 1980 —which finds no significant causal effects on employment and wages of native workers in Florida— provoked three decades of controversies among economists. While the overall effects tend to be small, up-to-date research stresses disparate impacts on different categories of workers, with migration mainly exacerbating inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution (Dustmann et al. 2013). While this evidence of overqualification of migrants might be at least partly related to the lack of specific human capital (such as language skills for instance), it also hints toward mechanisms of exploitation and reevaluation of native labor. The proportion of migrants with tertiary level education in low- and medium-skilled occupations is considerably larger than that of natives (the gap is around 12 percentage points in OECD countries) (OECD 2018, 94). Moreover, beyond its effect on natives’ socioeconomic outcomes, migration seems capable of transforming categorical hierarchies that organize the labor market. The mechanisms here tend to be due to the displacement/replacement of workers resulting from the injection of migrant labor in a highly categorical labor market. There is indeed a great amount of evidence on occupational sorting, niches and typification of tasks that document how particular jobs are matched to categorically distinctive workers (Tomaskovic-Devey 2014). Gender, nationality, ethnicity, race and other categorical divisions are powerful in mediating access to occupations and positions. Although these patterns are deeply related to the ways in which social norms shape preferences (what job seekers consider as the most desirable jobs for them), research on the hiring behaviors of employers also convincingly documents their role in this categorical matching of jobs to sub-populations. Of course, current evidence on employers’ direct

Have migrants become a distinct category in social stratification research?  17 taste-based discrimination in hiring is clear and convincing, but employers also discriminate “statistically” because of widespread beliefs that categorical distinctions correlate well with labor-relevant unobservables such as productivity, motivations, effort, etc. And discrimination in the form of “barriers” and denied access to opportunities is only one aspect of the picture. More generally, these differential tastes and beliefs also trigger the steering and channeling of workers into sectors, types of jobs and positions. Ethnographic research documents how, in their search for the most “appropriate workers,” employers rely on categorically framed “suitability,” in terms of gender but also in terms of migratory/ethnic/racial criteria that they argue are informative of labor-relevant worker attributes (Kirschenmann and Neckerman 1991; Ruhs and Anderson 2012; Waldinger and Lichter 2003). It is the conjunction of the desirability of jobs within some groups with this categorical typification of the preferences and behaviors of employers that produces systematic biases in the distribution of jobs, occupations and positions and the rewards that are associated with them. The arrival of “new migrants” as job seekers is capable of affecting this categorical organizational dimension of the labor market. Evidence suggests that rescaling of typical “old minority” and/or “native” occupations is a common mechanism; new migrants tend to fill the lower bottom of the occupational hierarchy, pushing earlier migrants, minority and natives up the occupational ladder. But other organizational mechanisms may also be at stake. Some are related to the transformation of power relations within the workplace (Melzer et al. 2018; Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2015). Migrant communities may also engage in a parallel organization of the labor market, creating business or occupational niches. The relation between migration flows and female labor is another example of the ways in which migration is capable of transforming categorical hierarchies that organize the labor market. The increasing participation of women in the labor market in many industrialized societies was accompanied by a growing reliance on “female migrant work” channeled to fulfill the shortage of labor provoked by the withdrawal of “native” women, namely in what is referred to as the “care service” (Anderson 2000). Nonetheless, while the congruence in the timing of increasing female migration and higher participation rate of women in migration societies is clear, the causality between migration trends and women’s behavior in the labor market is difficult to disentangle. Research shows that migration reduces the prices of non-traded services such as child care, housekeeping and elderly care, which in turn affects the labor supply of women, specifically those who are highly skilled (Barone and Mocetti 2011). While cultural shifts, the transformation of gender norms and the increasing gender egalitarian legal framework are often analyzed as the driving forces of the female conquest of the labor market and the overall improvement of their economic well-being in developed societies, migration is definitely a part—albeit one that is often hidden—of the female economic emancipation story. Not only has migrant labor made native women’s entry in the labor market possible, or at least easier—thus reconfiguring gender inequality in host societies—but it has also been driving inequality among females, widening the gap between highly and low-educated women. In other terms, women’s participation in the paid sector was made possible through the transfer of a considerable share of formerly unpaid female work to less-educated migrant women in the form of low-paid jobs (rather than through a more even allocation between men and women).

18  Handbook of human mobility and migration The Legal Channel The legal channel pertains to the ways in which migration interferes with the codification of modern citizenship, understood as encompassing the wide and stratified spectrum of individual relations and affiliations to the state. Contemporary migration gives rise to legal and administrative processes of human categorization that establish a continuum of membership positions, or “ranks,” within immigration countries. These formal categorizations create sharp boundaries between insiders and outsiders while at the same time unevenly distributing resources (such as rights and political status). In short, migration creates different “types of citizens.” From its very starting point, upon the crossing of state borders, migration brings about a series of legally enforced (re)classifications. States rely on a wide range of infrastructures, which may be referred to generally as legal infrastructures, whose fundamental role is to produce, enforce, warrant and reinforce these classifications with the aim of protecting the boundaries of political membership (Guiraudon and Joppke 2001). One of the most influential legal categorizations driven by migration relies on a basic criterion of legality of entry. Settling with or without legal approval automatically creates two categories of migrants: legal migrants on the one hand and what are variably called illegal, undocumented, irregular, unauthorized or unlawful migrants on the other hand. The administrative process of migration categorization mechanically constructs unauthorized migration as “outside the law” (Motomura 2014).2 Aside from this dichotomous categorization, migration management also creates “inside the law” entry-type categorizations distinguishing among visitors, labor migrants, seasonal or temporary workers, students, family reunion migrants, accompanying spouses, asylum seekers, etc. While most of these categorizations have been produced and enforced by nation-states, international laws or European laws, federal laws or other entities of legal categorization also affect the definition of migrant legal status. This is the case for the “refugee” category, which stems from international law and is used today, albeit with considerable variation in terms and conditions and requirements, in most state-level administrative categorizations of migrants. Another example is how the creation of the European Union led to the implementation of a variety of mobility categories for EU and non-EU residents (i.e., free movement migration, EU Blue Card, seasonal workers, posted workers, etc.) (Favell 2008; Recchi 2015). This proliferation of mobility categorization inevitably instills a form of civic stratification of migrants in Europe (Kofman 2002). Legal categorization continues to affect the lives of migrants and their descendants during residency in the destination country. Citizenship law defines the rules of allocation of membership, its transmission across generations and the conditions under which it could be revoked. They are more or less so depending on the extent to which this categorical transition (the passage from alien to citizen) is encouraged and facilitated. In the meantime, as non-citizen residents, these migrant “citizens in waiting” (Motomura 2007) are subjected to laws and regulations that apply to “aliens” or “foreigners” covering a wide range of issues such as work

Most undocumented migration is actually driven by “unlawfulness” constructed within the country rather than at its borders: expired visas, rejected asylum seekers, etc. (Donato and Armenta 2011; Vickstrom 2014). 2

Have migrants become a distinct category in social stratification research?  19 authorization, geographic localization, electoral participation, access to public services, access to welfare, taxation, etc. In most immigration societies, laws, and the diverse institutions that take part in their production and enforcement, have been functioning as a “migration categorization machine” inevitably feeding a system of civic stratification (Morris 2002) that becomes tied to social stratification dynamics. The first and the most obvious inequality mechanisms in this legal channel concerns access to legal resources. Migrants with different legal status do not have the same rights to move across international boundaries and sometimes within them, the same rights to long-term settlement, the same rights to work, the same rights to receive welfare benefits, the same rights to vote, etc. A cross-fertilizing scholarship in sociology and legal studies shows how laws are omnipresent in immigrant lives and how they may take total control among the most vulnerable categories such as undocumented migrants (Menjivar and Abrego 2012). In addition to unequal rights, legal inequality expands into “administrative inequality” which is embedded in all interactions with governmental bureaucracies to access status certifications in modern societies. Obtaining official documentation obliges migrants to dedicate a considerable amount of time and effort to red tape, paperwork, forms, fees, deadlines, etc. Loss of documents, translation issues, credential recognition, skills assessments, medical tests, language education and, more recently, civic and cultural training are all examples of costly bureaucratic processes that often come with complex and ambiguous eligibility requirements and a labyrinthine mix of formalities and constraints that inevitably lead to situations of administrative stress (Jasso 2011). Administrative inequality might be the most blatant when it takes the form of inequality of treatment; lack of courtesy, long queues, and sometimes adversity and disrespect in public administrations are repeatedly observed and documented during interactions with migrants. These aspects of migration-related inequality culminate in abuses in detention centers, border patrol brutality in various forms, including forced separation of children from their parents, and killings (Carling 2007; Diaz and Kuhner 2009). The police and military enforcement of migratory categorization, in particular, is a direct cause of death (Slack et al. 2018). In the context of the increasing militarization of borders, migration routes are becoming more dangerous than ever and security controls are more and more harmful as documented in the Missing Migrant Project. These forms of legal inequalities stemming from migration may be paradoxically regarded as somehow operating “outside the rule of law” (Motomura 2014). These regulations and practices are at odds with the democratic standards of human dignity, integrity and individual protections. This means that migration opens a certain amount of non-democratic space within the most committed democracies. In some countries, this space is institutionalized in immigration laws themselves; in most countries, it is at least present in practice and through the discretionary role of the state. In their treatment of migrants, state-level institutions and agencies somehow benefit from a sort of “dispensation” or an opt-out from the standards on equality of human rights with which they theoretically comply. In this respect, undocumented migrants become a form of pariah; they are constructed as unlawful and outside the law, which consequently often denies them access to basic rights and subjects them to high levels of abuse and disrespect, not to mention the risk of detainment and deportation (Wong 2015). Migratory categorizations also affect the distribution of other extra-legal types of resources. Once diffused in diverse social spheres and used in social interactions, legal categories of

20  Handbook of human mobility and migration migration exert spillover effects, channeling migrants to opportunities or disadvantages that range from the very material to the moral and symbolic. On the material side of the spectrum, legal categories of migration are implemented in labor market regulations, consequently determining access to jobs and positions (Massey and Gelatt 2010). The most obvious example is the explicit regulation of labor markets along nationality lines, as access to public sector jobs is restricted to nationals in most countries. Beyond the national versus non-national dichotomy of workers, labor market segmentation along legal categories is also multidimensional, and it is explicitly based on nationality of origin in some social settings. In EU countries, for example, a tripartite distinction between national, EU member states and non-EU member states is legally implemented and determines access to positions in the labor markets. And beyond nationality, migratory categorizations determining legal status, types of permit, duration of stay, etc. also feed the segmentation of the labor force. Migration legal categorization indeed creates de facto socio-legal hierarchies of workers, making some of them more protected and some others more “exploitable,” both fulfilling and reproducing the economic need for segmented labor markets (Massey et al. 2002). Legal categorization affects other dimensions of socioeconomic attainment in a variety of areas. Effects on health are shown to be mediated by health insurance coverage and medical expenditures (Torres and Waldinger 2015). Legal status also has tangible psychological effects, impacting well-being and self-esteem. These socioeconomic costs of the most vulnerable legal statuses might even affect second generations’ outcomes in relation to health and well-being (Hainmueller et al. 2017) but also in terms of educational attainment (Gonzales 2011). Finally, evidence shows that the criminal justice system treats citizens and non-citizens unequally (Light et al. 2014). And more generally, ethnographic research documents how legal status also affects lifestyles and social relations, feeding inequality mechanisms (Menjivar and Lakhani 2016). On the symbolic side of the spectrum, legal categorization potentially translates into moral hierarchies and scales of “deservingness” (Fassin 2005). The national/alien elementary categorization is again a powerful example; there is indeed an underlying “natural status” in the concept of “national,” most overtly expressed in the word “naturalization,” which literally means “becoming natural” (Sayad 1993). The term encapsulates a whole range of moral and symbolic values that are associated with citizenship. The US law specifies, for example, that “good moral character” is required for foreign petitioners. Numerous studies highlight the symbolic boundaries between legal and “illegal” migrants, emphasizing the role of anti-immigrant forces, the media and policymakers in the moral boundary work surrounding undocumented migration (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas 2012; Chavez 2008; Massey and Riosmena 2010). This “moral economy” of illegality plays an increasing role in anti-immigrant mobilizations, dividing between “good” and “bad” migrations and lauding the contribution of documented non-citizens while demonizing illegal migrants. And even within legality, categories of migrants are increasingly becoming the locus of moral and symbolic negotiations. Family reunion migrants, for instance, are constantly depicted as emblematic of the “undesired” nature of contemporary migration, which is mostly thought to be driven by supposedly non legitimate “welfare magnets.” The recent debate over “refugee” versus “migrant” in the context of the so-called “migrant crisis” also provides a powerful example of the moral and symbolic boundaries at work within the legal categorization of migrants (Crawley and Skleparis 2018; Zetter 2007). This “categorical fetishism” clearly reflects the ways in which legal categories of migration become cultural categories of worth and present

Have migrants become a distinct category in social stratification research?  21 scripts readily available to policymakers, the media and the civil society. Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas (2012) describe the undocumented migrants’ “fetishism of papers” in the way they scrupulously keep paper trails in the hope that this might help them prove deservingness in future legalization (namely in relation to work and tax paying). Migrants’ work toward fitting into categories of inclusion constructed by the law might have some pernicious effects, reifying these categories and solidifying their deservingness boundaries. These dynamics, for instance, are described in the efforts migrants deploy to comply with some specific humanitarian categories (victim of violence, child or unaccompanied minor refugees) (Berger 2009; Galli 2017). The Ethnoracial Channel The conventional wisdom is to consider migration as a source of ethnoracial diversity and to predict that it provokes either a romantic dissolution of ethnoracial categorizations (the melting pot) or, on the contrary, ethnoracial divisions of a supposedly homogeneous core society (fragmentation). A thorough review of the existing literature puts into perspective the depiction of migration as the “great diversifier”.3 A crucial starting point of any analytical approach to study the relation between migration and ethnoracial inequality lies in the very definition of contentious concepts such as ethnicity and race. A pragmatic conceptualization that is useful to specifically study the effects of migration through the ethnoracial channel is to consider ethnicity and race as both referring to human classifications into symbolic groups.4 These social distinctions acquire hierarchized social meanings through specific historical contexts. Population movements trigger the circulation of a variety of markers—virtually all those that may be associated with human classification (body-related markers, language, religion, family structures, norms, lifestyles, nationality, etc.). The ethnoracial channel precisely refers to the ways in which migration potentially affects and reconfigures these ongoing ethnoracial categorizations of “types of humans.” Table 2.2 attempts to synthesize the wide variety of potential effects of migration on ethnoracial formation. It separates within-nation and global ethnoracial dynamics and distinguishes two potential outcomes: solidification or destabilization of ethnoracial hierarchies. At the national level, migrants enter destination societies characterized by existing ethnoracial classification systems. Their arrival brings about the question of their categorization within this system, opening up “ethnoracial formation moments.” Migrants mobilize, whether individually or/and collectively, a wide range of socioeconomic, cultural, legal, and sometimes phenotypical resources while working out the ways in which they “fit in” existing classifications. During this endeavor, migrants sometimes manage to fit up and assimilate into the high status ethnoracial categories. Historians have documented the “struggle” of Italians, Jews, Irish and other immigrant groups to achieve their classification as white at the turn of the 20th

3 From a global human history perspective, it is well documented that migration societies are less diverse genetically and linguistically than the African continent considered as the source region (Galor 2022). Similarly, within-group variation in cultural diversity (in terms of norms, values, etc.) is higher than across groups (Desmet et al. 2017), which questions the conception of migration as the “great diversifier” (Vertovec 2007). 4 For a detailed conceptual discussion see Safi (2020, chapter 5).

22  Handbook of human mobility and migration Table 2.2

Solidification

Migration and ethnoracial boundary dynamics at the national and global levels Within-nation ethnoracial formation

Global ethnoracial formation

Fitting in, fitting up, fitting down

Nation-building

Boundary shifting, boundary crossing

Nationalistic backlash, (re)defining the national as

Introducing new categories

Transnational transfer of categorizations,

“Complex ethnicity”

reconfiguration of ethnoracial categories investing

Weakening the association between ethnoracial

transnational markers

anti-migrant Destabilization

categories and the allocation of resources

century in the United States. While the European migrant trajectory was traditionally analyzed as a success story of immigrant assimilation, contemporary research tends to more accurately portray it as an example of “boundary shifting” that fully incorporated these European migrants to the white category. Research stresses the crucial role of ethnoracial classification mechanisms, involving the self-distancing of European migrant communities from African American minorities but also that of local states as well as the federal state, which quickly considered these migrants as white. One of the most documented resources is the instrumental use of citizenship. The racialized conception of “white citizenship” created a space for the whitening of European migrants (Fox 2013). The instrumentalization of citizenship in the negotiation of one’s position in the ethnoracial order has been also at work for “return colonials” from Algeria to France (Couto 2014) and French overseas migrants (Haddad 2018). Commonwealth migration in the UK offers similarly interesting insights on the relation between migration, ethnoraciality and citizenship (Hansen 2000). Migrants’ strategies and struggles for categorization do not always pay off. Indeed, working toward fitting up is constrained by a variety of structural factors. In the US context, Mary Waters’s scholarship has powerfully shown that West Indian migrants’ “ethnic options” are much more limited than those of the European migrants. While first-generation West Indians emphasize the specificity of their national/geographic origin as a strategy to distance themselves from the African-American group (mainly drawing on differences in the meaning of skin color categorizations in the Caribbean and US contexts), they do not succeed in resisting their assignation, and that of their children, to the US understanding of blackness (Waters 1999). The evolution of their ethnoracial identification across the generations indicates a “fitting down” dynamic. This form of downward classification of migrants into stigmatized minority groups recalls the concept of “segmented assimilation” (Portes and Zhou 1993). These examples highlight the stability and even, in some cases, the solidification of the existing ethnoracial categorizations in reaction to migration flows. In other words, migrant groups might fit up or down in the ethnoracial hierarchy, but they ultimately fit in the order and do not challenge its symbolic organization (i.e., its hierarchy) nor its “effectiveness” in biasing the distribution of resources. In some contexts, migration is nonetheless capable of reshaping the ethnoracial order. Rather than fitting in, migrant groups may work toward the creation of new categorical positions in the ethnoracial order. One strategy consists in refusing to be classified in existing categories, building on the discrepancy between the perception and interpretation of racialized markers in the origin and destination countries. Ethnographic research documents the intrinsic difficulty of some migrants’ self-classification in the US ethnoracial system; Mexicans,

Have migrants become a distinct category in social stratification research?  23 Brazilians, New Indians, Puerto Ricans and African Blacks are the most studied in the US. The separation between the race and the ethnicity (Hispanicity) questions in the US census has been the result of a long “struggle for categorization” in the aim of expanding the domain of whiteness to Mexican and other Central and South American migrants, at least as an option for self-identification (Rodriguez 2000; Yancey 2003). Similar lines of interpretation emerge in the case of the debate over a potential Arab-American census category, primarily driven by their discomfort with existing available categories (Ajrouch and Jamal 2007; Tehranian 2010). This boundary-work toward additional categories does not only “nominally” change the categorization; it is capable of reshaping the hierarchy underlying it. The establishment of a non-white Hispanic category triggers dynamics of triangulation of the American racial order, diverging from the dialectic nature of the Black/white color line (Abascal 2015; Bonilla-Silva 2004; Frank et al. 2010). Moreover, rather than adding new categories, migration may introduce heterogeneity within existing ethnoracial categorization by rendering some “migration-related” distinctions salient within groups. In the United States, continual flows of migration since the 1960s have created what D. Massey calls “complex ethnicity” (Massey 1995). This “migration replenishment” introduced new lines of separation within the same ethnoracial group according to nativity (or immigrant generation), period of arrival and length of stay (Jiménez 2008; Waters and Jiménez 2005). Boundaries can even be reconfigured within groups of the same national origin, as shown in the case of Mexican immigrants. Wimmer (2013) also describes similar patterns of divisions between old and new migrants in Switzerland. Transformations occur not only through the production of “new categories” or the creation of subdivisions in existing categories; they might also consist of diluting the correlation between ethnoracial categories and social attainment outcomes. These dynamics take place when migrants retain different associations between clear-cut, categorizable markers in the host society and socioeconomic resources. African migrants, for example, are straightforwardly categorized as Blacks in the US (as a matter of fact, they tend to be “darker” than African Americans), while their experience of Blackness is quite different from that of African Americans. Moreover, most of these migrants are highly educated and quite successful in the labor market (Jasso 2011). This migration thus holds the potential to weaken the association between skin color and socioeconomic achievements in US society. If this type of migration becomes sizable and durable, it potentially constitutes a challenge to the general pattern of skin tone stratification in US society. Moreover, rather than lowering the equivalence of minority groups with social disadvantage, immigration is also capable of attenuating the association of the majority group with socioeconomic advantage. The socioeconomic success of Asian migrants, presented as a model minority in the US but also in some European countries, potentially “recasts” the traditional relationship between ethnoraciality and achievement (Jiménez and Horowitz 2013; Xu and Lee 2013). These insights clearly hint toward migration’s potentialities of destabilizing and reshaping the ethnoracial order within host societies. Migration may also affect global processes of human categorizations. The classification of humans in terms of nationalities—or what we can refer to as the “international classification” of humans—that emerged in the 19th and 20th centuries, extending to the planet’s population in the 21st century is a specific type of ethnoracial categorization that is coupled with claims for self-governance and independence, endorsed formally by state legal and military apparatuses. In other words, nation-states are specific forms of ethnoracial “groups” (Brubaker 2009). In a similar vein to its effects within societies, migration reshapes the international

24  Handbook of human mobility and migration classification because it consists in the circulation of national members across nation-states. By crossing their formal borders, migrants potentially affect the meaning-making processes surrounding the cultural boundaries of these entities. As summarized in Table 2.2, migration’s effects are twofold: redefining the “nation” in the nation-state—hence solidifying the international classification—and triggering transnational ethnoracial reconfigurations—hence reshaping the global processes of human categorizations. One of the most striking effects of migration concerns the “national bounding” of countries. By provoking the settlement of extra-territorial, non-citizen and perceived “culturally” different others in the nation-state, migration disrupts the “ideal-typical” model of the latter, which draws heavily on an integrated conception of territoriality, citizenry and culture (Brubaker 2010). This perspective stresses the capacity of migration in transforming and reshaping national “narratives” (Anderson and O’Gorman 1983). Historians tend to agree upon the determinant effect of accelerated migration and mixing through which the world’s population was considerably redistributed in the 18th and 19th centuries on the emergence of nations as forms of belonging. Noiriel offers a thorough analysis of the French case, the oldest country of immigration in Europe, stressing the role of migration and its increasing interpretation in terms of “foreignness” in the construction of Frenchness as national identity, thus provoking the fading of once-strong regional identities (Noiriel 1988). In the US, the use of migration in the construction of nationhood took quite a different direction, emphasizing the immigrant foundations of the nation and integrating it into “national narratives.” While the central role of immigration in nation-state building is extremely visible in “classic immigration countries” (Freeman 1995) (Canada, the US, New Zealand, Australia), it is virtually present in countries all around the world; Argentina, Brazil and Malaysia are among the most studied in this respect. Beyond its effects on the first stages of nation-states’ building, migration continues to impact their institutionalization via various legal and administrative logistics, solidifying and perpetuating the symbolic separation between nationals and aliens. With the immediate assigning of immigrants to the non-national out-group, the sense of belonging to the national group becomes increasingly shaped in opposition (or at least in reaction) to migration. By situating migrants outside the nation, the “migration state” enhances non-immigrants’ self-identification in terms of nativity, “indigenousness” and majority (Bail 2008; Waldinger 2003). Banton described this dialectic related to the construction of a majority group while assigning individuals to a minority group in terms of “minus-one” ethnicity (Banton 1983). Recent reforms in immigration and integration laws clearly illustrate this trend reinforcing “essentialized” understandings of national identities while increasingly dictating a form of “cultural” or “civic” integration with particular emphasis on the necessity for migrants to embrace the host country’s history, language, traditions and institutions. Consequently, migration potentially transforms the process of ethnoracial meaning-making that surrounds national identity within states. From this perspective, in a quite paradoxical stance, and in contradiction with the “romantic” representation of migration as a post-national driving force, international migration has in fact been contributing to the consolidation of the global ethnoracial categorization that consists in classifying the world’s inhabitants into culturally meaningful “nations.” Nonetheless, by decoupling place of residency from place of birth, migration-induced identity dynamics also hold the potential of destabilizing and reshaping global ethnoracial

Have migrants become a distinct category in social stratification research?  25 classifications triggering negotiations for alternative systems of human categorization that are situated at the transnational level. First, as a consequence of the transnational nature of migrant mobility, country-specific ethnoracial categorizations become mobile. In other words, ethnoracial meanings also migrate, actually “carried” by migrants themselves (Lorcerie 2010; Roth 2012; Waldinger 2015). In that sense, migration has a potential to weaken the specificity of national settings in the meaning-making process surrounding human markers. By studying how Puerto Rican and Dominican migrants contribute to the importation to and diffusion in their home country of the dichotomous view of race prevailing in the United States, characterized by the prevalence of more continuous racial classifications, Wendy Roth (2012) describes the migration of the ethnoracial categorizations themselves. Studies on migrant transnationalism contribute significantly to our understanding of these phenomena of cultural transfer across categorization systems caused at least in part by migration. Social remittances involved in migration indeed include ethnoracial meanings and classifications (Levitt 2001; Zamora 2016). Migration may also feed the reconfigurations of global ethnoracial categorization beyond the home-host country dynamics. This relates to the intrinsic global dimension to racial formation, closely related to large-scale historical processes such as imperialism, slavery and colonization with worldwide implications on the categorization of human beings (Emirbayer and Desmond 2015; Said 1978; Winant 2001). These macro-level processes of ethnoracial formation have in fact played crucial roles in state-building and the creation of nationality as an identification category. They continue to feed the global cultural repertoires invested in ethnoracial meaning-making processes. Commonly used classifications that proceed by the allocation of individuals and groups to large-scale transnational categories, including those that refer to more or less institutionalized boundaries (Europe, the West, the global South, postcolonial countries, etc.) emanate at least partially from these global processes of ethnoracial formation. And migration has a prominent role in the paths these processes may take. First, by creating “real spheres” of interactions in destination countries between migrants coming from different national contexts, migration may render salient cross-national commonalities such as religions, phenotypes, historical experiences, etc., which potentially destabilizes the ubiquity of the international classification. In other words, migration creates an avenue for re-grouping nationalities into aggregated categories, investing transnational categories of identity. Research has described the ways in which the experience of migration from diverse countries of Central or South America to the US has contributed to shape pan-national belonging or “panethnicity” (Mora 2014; Roth 2009). Similar dynamics are also described for the Asian panethnicity (Okamoto 2014). The reconfiguration of ethnoracial categories is not limited to simply grouping national categories; cross-national markers such as religion, skin color and language that share ethnoracial meaning across national boundaries may also be invested within these dynamics (Haller and Landolt 2005; Kastoryano 2006; Levitt 2003). These boundary-making processes are also shown to be related to common experiences in the host societies. A form of “transnational racism” (Castles 2005) that affects migrants in host societies in a lasting manner across generations may trigger a sense of belonging to transnational categories of identification based on skin color, religion, broad geographic or third-world origins. These dynamics hint toward a transnational or universal dimension of minorities’ struggle for ethnoracial recategorization (Goldberg 2009). Such reconfigurations do not only concern disadvantaged groups, however; they may also be at work within the dominant group. North-South migration may contribute to the reconfiguration of Westernness/

26  Handbook of human mobility and migration whiteness. Ethnographic research describes clear-cut hierarchies of migrants in massive immigration countries such as the Arab Gulf, where Western migrants and third-world migrants (mostly South Asians) experience sharp differences in the economic, legal and symbolic conditions of migration (Cosquer 2018; Jamal 2015). Unlike the global division of labor and legal categorization, the ethnoracial channel is not intrinsically tied to the distribution of resources and does not systematically lead to social disadvantage. National and transnational dynamics of ethnoracial categorization indeed imply that migrants neither arrive equally in a host country (as they are previously “sorted” according to existing ethnoracial schemes) nor evolve equally within it (since the wide variety of effects on ongoing ethnoracial categorizations lead to disparate results in terms of access to resources). This leaves room for some “uncertainty” in the degree to which their effect on inequality becomes durable, reproducible, potentially corrigible or even reversible. This uncertainty captures, at least in part, the heterogeneity observed between the socioeconomic destiny of immigrant groups. In this sense, immigrants do not uniformly become “ethnoracial minorities” in host societies.

BREAKING THE MIGRATION-INEQUALITY CHANNELS Disentangling the mechanisms that relate migration to inequality helps sketch avenues for policies. As far as the economic channel is concerned, labor market regulation policies are key to alleviate inequality related to migration. Instruments such as minimum wages, enhancing the inclusion of migrant workers in unions, monitoring equal pay policies taking into account nationality and foreign origin and combating labor market discrimination based on nationality and ethnoracial background are promising instruments. Socioeconomic inequality stemming from migration can also be curbed through legal de- and/or re-categorization. This is initially observable at the individual level; since migratory categorization is firmly connected to access to resources as discussed above, immigrant social mobility becomes closely tied to “administrative mobility,” or mobility across legal categories. The most impressive mobility is, of course, the one that governs the passage from foreigner to national. Recent scholarship has indeed been documenting significant effects of naturalization on the reduction of inequality between natives and immigrants, particularly in the labor market (Fougère and Safi 2009; Gathmann and Keller 2014; Hainmueller et al. 2015). Some of these effects are simply related to the fact that citizenship acquisition opens the way to the public sector, which constitutes a considerable share of the labor market in most economies. Some others are related to lower discrimination specifically facing foreigners. Although empirical work is scarcer due to a lack of data and the difficulty of disentangling strictly causal effects, de-categorization of unauthorized migration through legalization is also shown to lead to similar egalitarian dynamics (Hall et al. 2010). And beyond these most powerful categorical mobilities, obtaining work permits, moving from temporary to permanent residents and other changes in legal status probably have similar positive effects on access to resources (Lowell and Avato 2014). Beyond the enhancement of individual de-/re-categorization, collective regularization campaigns, changes in naturalization policies, immigration law reforms, etc. may present massive impacts. Some scholars argue that certain less visible forms of collective re-categorization have been progressively achieved within international law, through the (ongoing) building of global human rights legislation. The expansion of a legal apparatus that transcends national

Have migrants become a distinct category in social stratification research?  27 borders (through the UN, the European Union, the International Court of Justice, etc.) plays an important role in compelling nation-states to extend membership to their immigrant population, alleviating inequalities, at least in terms of rights and political status, provoked by migration (Soysal 1994). Empowering migrants’ struggles is hence an important leverage. One of the larger protests over immigrant rights in the world, the 2006 mobilization in the US against the Border Protection, Antiterrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act, powerfully demonstrates the social movement potentiality of “rallying for immigrants’ rights” (Voss and Bloemraad 2011). In France, the basilica of Saint-Denis became a symbolic place, recurrently at the center of pro-migrant demonstration and mobilizations for regularization (Barron et al. 2011). Though smaller in scale, recent pro-migrant demonstrations in European countries (in Germany and Spain in particular) urging governments to host more refugees show that grounds for such mobilization still exist despite the overall less favorable context to pro-migrant rallying. The role of immigrant offspring in participating in these “cultural shifts” that help promote migration may also be decisive, especially in countries where their legal and political membership is guaranteed since birth (Nicholls 2013; Street et al. 2017). These structural policies that combine integration, equality and inclusion instruments may seem too “optimistic” in the current context of overwhelmingly restrictive and exclusionist policies in vogue in immigration societies despite their high economic and societal costs. In order to create a more favorable context for the adoption of inclusive policy programs, they have to be conceived and implemented hand in hand with cultural and symbolic policies that combat negative attitudes and bias toward migration and immigrants and promote ethnoracial diversity. A flourishing literature on reducing prejudice and debiasing has been developing over the last decades in the social psychology and behavioral scholarships (Paluck et al. 2021; Paluck and Green 2008). This literature seeks to design interventions that aim specifically at increasing the likability of stigmatized group members such as immigrants and ethnic minorities. Most of these interventions are small in scale but, if regularly implemented in organizational contexts such as workplaces, schools and neighborhoods, they may in the long term be effective in enhancing cultural shifts and decategorization dynamics. Evidence suggests that “generating empathy” is one of the most promising avenues. Several experimental designs drawing on this mechanism have been tested: making connections with other groups, priming individual history and asking people about their family migration history as a way to reduce anti-immigration attitudes, as in Williamson et al. (2020), perspective taking (asking people to put themselves in the shoes of a refugee), as in Adida, Lo, and Platas (2018), increasing consciousness (revealing bias in the form of feedback after an implicit-association test) as in Alesina et al. (2018), or by the dissemination of information on existing bias as in Pope et al. (2018). There is also some evidence that accurate information about the characteristics of the immigrant population in host countries increases support for pro-immigrant policies, particularly among those who start off with the most negative views on immigration (Grigorieff, Roth, and Ubfal 2020). Promoting ethnoracial diversity (in the workplace, in schools, in residential areas) and inter-group relations is another important avenue. Nonetheless, the conception of such policies at a large-scale is structurally confronted with intense trade-offs. For example, the effect of increasing contact is not uniform. Some studies suggest positive and lasting effects of increasing contact on inter-group relations as measured by level of intermarriage (Merlino et al. 2019). Others show that increasing contact may backfire when it triggers competition, as

28  Handbook of human mobility and migration in the case of demographic change in relation to immigration in neighborhoods (Enos 2014). Recent evidence also suggests that there is a trade-off between short- and long-term effects of diversity and contact (Ramos et al. 2019). Public policy can specifically focus on building the sociopolitical environment that will trigger the positive rather than the negative effects of such interventions. All these interventions are inspired by Allport’s seminal work, which advocates for the necessity of securing equal status and collaborative framing, while also promoting inter-group contact (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2008). For example, in contrast with theories regarding the corrosive effect of ethnic fragmentation on trust and social cohesion, high levels of ethnic diversity in contexts of intense social contacts can trigger nation-state building when it is a collaborative endeavor (Bagues and Roth 2022; Bazzi et al. 2019). Research in cultural sociology can help inform public policy’s aim to create an “atmosphere” that enhances the positive effects of reducing prejudice interventions. Building on qualitative fieldwork conducted in different national and local contexts, this literature suggests that efficient pro-diversity and anti-discrimination policies need to tackle the “narratives” and “cultural repertoires” that feed prejudice. Some studies advocate for large-scale public policies that engage in de-stigmatization to tackle the specific contents of stereotypes surrounding stigmatized groups (Clair et al. 2016; Lamont 2018) such as the belief that “immigrants benefit from the welfare state” or “immigrants are more violent.” At the structural level, the literature on the stereotype content model suggests that emotions toward other groups are embedded in today’s socioeconomic inequalities and the social hierarchy that derives from them. Equalizing social position through policies that promote social mobility and equal opportunity may lead to the reduction of hostility toward immigrants and the most stigmatized groups in the long run. The fact that differences in income, wealth and other socioeconomic outcomes are sizeable between social categories based on immigrant status, race and ethnicity keep feeding the symbolic hierarchy of these categories. This advocates in favor of large-scale actions that seek to equalize social positions insofar as, by reducing the existing gaps, these policies bring about dynamics of de-categorization in the long term. From this point of view, the “equalizing outcome approach” may seem efficient in order to “equalize opportunity” (McCall 2016).

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Have migrants become a distinct category in social stratification research?  31 Kofman, E. (2002). “Contemporary European Migrations, Civic Stratification and Citizenship.” Political Geography 21(8):1035–54. Lamont, M. (2018). “Addressing Recognition Gaps: Destigmatization and the Reduction of Inequality.” American Sociological Review 83(3):419–44. Levitt, P. (2001). The Transnational Villagers. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Levitt, P. (2003). “‘You Know, Abraham Was Really the First Immigrant’: Religion and Transnational Migration.” International Migration Review 37(3):847–73. Light, M., M. Massoglia, and R. King (2014). “Citizenship and Punishment: The Salience of National Membership in U.S. Criminal Courts.” American Sociological Review 79(5):825–47. Longva, A. N. (1999). Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion and Society in Kuwait. Westview Press. Lorcerie, F. (ed.) (2010). Pratiquer Les Frontières. Jeunes Migrants et Descendants de Migrants Dans l’espace Franco-Maghrébin. Paris: CNRS Editions. Lowell, B., and J. Avato (2014). “The Wages of Skilled Temporary Migrants: Effects of Visa Pathways and Job Portability.” International Migration 52(3):85–98. Mahdavi, P. (2011). Gridlock: Labor, Migration and Human Trafficking in Dubai. Stanford University Press. Massey, D. (1995). “The New Immigration and Ethnicity in the United States.” Population and Development Review 21(3):631–52. Massey, D. S. (2007). Categorically Unequal. The American Stratification System. New York: Russel Sage Foundation. Massey, D. S. (2017). “Migration and categorical inequality.” In E. Castañeda (ed.), Immigration and Categorical Inequality: Migration to the City and the Birth of Race and Ethnicity. London, New York:Routledge, pp. 26–43. Massey, D., J. Durand, and N. Malone (2002). Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Massey, D., and J. Gelatt (2010). “What Happened to the Wages of Mexican Immigrants? Trends and Interpretations.” Latino Studies 8(3):328–54. Massey, D., and F. Riosmena (2010). “Undocumented Migration from Latin America in an Era of Rising U.S. Enforcement.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 630:294–321. McCall, L. (2016). “Political and Policy Responses to Problems of Inequality and Opportunity: Past, Present, and Future.” In I. Kirsch and H. Braun (eds), The Dynamics of Opportunity in America: Evidence and Perspectives. Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 415–42. Melzer, S., D. Tomaskovic-Devey, R. Schunck, and P. Jacobebbinghaus (2018). “A Relational Inequality Approach to First- and Second-Generation Immigrant Earnings in German Workplaces.” Social Forces 97(1):91–128. Menjivar, C., and L. Abrego (2012). “Legal Violence: Immigration Law and the Lives of Central American Immigrants.” American Journal of Sociology 117(5):1380–1421. Menjivar, C., and S. Lakhani (2016). “Transformative Effects of Immigration Law: Immigrants’ Personal and Social Metamorphoses through Regularization.” American Journal of Sociology 121(6):1818–55. Merlino, L. P., M. F. Steinhardt, and L. Wren-Lewis (2019). “More than Just Friends? School Peers and Adult Interracial Relationships.” Journal of Labor Economics 37(3):663–713. Mora, G. (2014). Making Hispanics: How Activists, Bureaucrats, and Media Constructed a New American. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Morris, L. (2002). Managing Migration. Civic Stratification and Migrants’ Rights. London, New York: Routledge. Motomura, H. (2007). Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Motomura, H. (2014). Immigration Outside the Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nicholls, W. (2013). “Making Undocumented Immigrants into a Legitimate Political Subject: Theoretical Observations from the United States and France.” Theory, Culture & Society 30(3):82–107. Noiriel, G. (1988). Le Creuset Français, Histoire de l’immigration (19ème, 20ème Siècle). Paris: Seuil. OECD. (2018). International Migration Outlook. Paris: OECD. Okamoto, D. (2014). Redefining Race: Asian American Panethnicity and Shifting Ethnic Boundaries. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

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3

Are migrants a select population? Mathieu Ichou

INTRODUCTION Who are those who cross borders and settle down in a new country? How do they compare to those who do not move? These questions are central in public debates and social sciences alike. They matter for both countries of origin and destination. Migrant selection1 simply refers to how migrants differ from people who do not migrate. Social scientists have long theorized that migrants are likely not a random (i.e. representative) sample of the population from their origin country (Ravenstein 1885; Lee 1966). In parallel, politicians have long lamented about the alleged negative selection of migrants coming to their country. As noted by Feliciano (2020, 316), these misconceptions are not new: “As early as 1753, Benjamin Franklin deplored that German immigrants ‘who come hither are generally of the most ignorant Stupid Sort of their own Nation’” (Feliciano 2020, 316). Like many other issues relating to migration, discourses on migrant selection are plagued by falsehoods. The goal of this chapter is to contribute to diffusing these misconceptions by reviewing interdisciplinary scholarship on this topic. The factors driving migrant selection are manifold and operate at several levels. The combination of these factors results in complex patterns of migrant selection that vary over time and between and within origin and destination countries. In my review of this scholarship, I first delineate the different ways in which migrant selection has been conceptualized in the social sciences. I then discuss the methodological challenges and empirical solutions adopted by researchers to measure migrant selection. Thereafter, I present the main findings from research that describe the extent of migrant selection on different dimensions across origin and destination countries. Finally, I show the most important consequences of migrant selection on migrants’ post-migration trajectory and that of their descendants.

CONCEPTUALIZING MIGRANT SELECTION The dominant theoretical paradigm in the study of immigration has long been that of assimilation with its overwhelming focus on the destination society, concentrating on the “context of immigration” and mostly ignoring the “context of emigration” (Luthra, Soehl and Waldinger 2018). By contrast, the issue of migrant selection entails a shift in perspective toward the origin context (Ichou 2014). While assimilation scholars need to compare immigrants’ characteristics with those of natives in the destination country, the concept of migrant selection requires a comparison between migrants and non-migrants in the origin country. There is no For sake of consistency, I will mostly use the expression “migrant selection” in this chapter, but there is no set phrase in the literature and “selectivity” or “self-selection” are often used as interchangeable synonyms. I will also do so from time to time to avoid repetitions. 1

34

Are migrants a select population?  35 unified and overarching theory of migrant selection. Yet, two types of conceptions can be distinguished in the literature: individualistic and socially embedded ones. Individualistic Conceptions of Migrant Selection Individualistic conceptions of migrant selection consider selection processes as occurring mostly at the individual level and independently from other social processes and structures. In the standard neo-classical economic conception, individuals self-select into migration as a result of a rational assessment of the economic costs and benefits of migration. Borjas’s seminal work provides influential arguments in this field (Borjas 1987, 1991). The expected benefits of migration depend on the returns to migrants’ skills in the destination compared to the origin country. The greater these relative returns are, the more positively selected migrants will be. In Borjas’s model, itself based on Roy (1951), the degree of selection of migrants to the United States (US) depends on the transferability of skills between the origin and destination countries, the shape of the earnings distributions in both countries and individuals’ position within these distributions: “Two conditions must be satisfied in order for positive selection to take place: a) there is a strong positive correlation between the earnings a worker may expect in the home country and the earnings the same worker may expect in the United States; and b) the United States has a more unequal income distribution than the home country” (551–552). Discussions, amendments and extensions of Borjas’s initial model (Chiswick 1999; Grogger and Hanson 2011) have rarely challenged the core individualistic conceptions of migrants as rational agents who decide whether and where to migrate depending on individual income-maximizing assessments. In this literature, the positive selection of migrants is usually defined in terms of unobserved individual traits such as motivation, ambition, overall quality, or skills. In the same individualistic vein, social psychologists have tried to identify a specific “migrant personality” (Boneva and Frieze 2001). High motivation, work orientation, openness to experience and risk have been related to migration intentions and behaviors (Boneva and Frieze 2001; Jokela 2009; Polavieja, Fernández-Reino and Ramos 2018). Socially Embedded Conceptions of Migrant Selection While not necessarily incompatible with these individualistic conceptions, sociological approaches to migrant selection have insisted more on the embeddedness of migration behavior, focusing on the way networks, socioeconomic status, and social resources shape migrant selection. Social demographer Douglas Massey and his colleagues put forward an influential theory on the role of networks in migrant selection (Massey 1987; Massey et al. 1993; Massey 1999) based on Mexican migration to the US. At first, because international migration is costly, migrants tend to be positively selected. With migration becoming more frequent and involving a larger share of the origin population, migrant networks develop and migration requires fewer resources to undertake. Thus, the stronger the migration networks are, the lower migrant selection becomes (McKenzie and Rapoport 2010). In the past decade, a new strand of sociological research on migrant selection has conceived it in relation to pre-migration social status and class position (Ichou 2014; Feliciano and Lanuza 2017; Engzell and Ichou 2020). In these studies, migrant selection refers to how

36  Handbook of human mobility and migration migrants’ socioeconomic status (SES), specifically educational attainment, in the origin country differs from that of non-migrants. These conceptions are especially useful for social stratification research as they provide a valid starting point in the analysis of intergenerational social mobility within immigrant families (Feliciano and Lanuza 2017). Indeed, immigrants’ SES at destination often differs dramatically from their pre-migration SES. This phenomenon manifests itself as status loss (Engzell and Ichou 2020). If migrant selection is viewed in terms of social status and prestige, positive selection can be associated with a subjective social status among immigrants that is higher than could be expected from their objective social position in the destination country (Ichou 2014). In the same vein, Feliciano and Lanuza (2017) coined the expression “contextual attainment” to capture “hidden dimensions of class background that matter for the intergenerational transmission of advantage or disadvantage” (232). A proxy for relative class background in the country of origin, migrant selection, especially educational selectivity, has been conceived of as an indicator of migrants’ cultural resources (or cultural capital) (Ichou 2014, 751). Contrasting with individual conceptions of selection that focus on usually unmeasurable personal traits, this line of theory insists on the measurable structural origins of migrants’ attitudes and dispositions (motivation, aspirations, etc.) (Fernández-Kelly 2008; Feliciano and Lanuza 2017). A further dimension of migrant selection’s social embeddedness is its link with geography. For example, migrant educational selection can vary systematically depending on regional differences in educational attainment distributions and regional emigration behaviors, embedded in local institutions and history of migrations. Recent scholarship has developed these arguments in the context of refugee and labor migration to Western Europe (Spörlein and Kristen 2019a; 2019b) and Mexican migration to the US (Hamilton and Huang 2020).

MEASURING MIGRANT SELECTION In relation to these theoretical discussions, scholars’ ever improving attempts at measuring migrant selection have moved the field forward in a decisive way. One way to determine the quality of a measure is to assess its validity, i.e. how closely it reflects the theoretical construct it is meant to capture. Here, it is worth restating the core definition of migrant selection: how migrants’ characteristics compare to non-migrants’ in their origin country. As Feliciano puts it, “the concept involves considering immigrants within the context from which they came: Are immigrants more or less healthy, educated, motivated, ambitious, optimistic, hard-working, etc. than nonmigrants from the same place at the same time?” (2020, 317). Indirect Proxies of Migrant Selection Until the middle of the 2000s, due to data limitation and a lack of conceptual clarity in the definition of the issue at stake, most empirical studies of migrant selection used indirect and often very remote proxies of selection. Some studies use macro-level characteristics such as differences in the level of economic development or income inequality between origin and destination countries (e.g. Cobb-Clark 1993; van Tubergen, Maas and Flap 2004; Levels, Dronkers and Kraaykamp 2008), geographical distance between the two countries (e.g. Jasso and Rosenzweig 1986; Cobb-Clark 1993; van Tubergen et al. 2004) or immigration policies (e.g. van Tubergen et al. 2004). These indicators are chosen because they are – sometimes

Are migrants a select population?  37 implicitly – assumed to be determinants of migrant selection. In fact, these measures are only indirectly and distantly related to the core definition of migrant selection. At times, scholars who use them have themselves recognized that these macro-level indicators “are necessarily ad hoc” (Cobb-Clark 1993, 987). While the above studies use the assumed determinants of selection as proxies, a symmetric (and still limited) way to measure migrant selection is to use its supposed consequences as an indicator. In an influential work, Borjas (1987) measures migrant selection using earnings differences between immigrants and natives in the US. Jasso and her colleagues (2004) take the differences in health conditions between immigrants and the US native-born as a measure of immigrants’ health selectivity. In the same vein, Dronkers and Heus (2010) take the difference in the academic performance between children of immigrants in Europe and students in their parents’ country of origin as a proxy for migrant selection. In all of these cases, the authors employ a circular measurement strategy: they use the phenomenon to be explained (the dependent variable or explanandum), i.e. the consequences of migrant selection, as an indicator of the assumed explanatory mechanism (the independent variable or explanans), i.e. migrant selection. This approach is often associated with the wrong reference group: comparing migrants’ characteristics with those of natives in the destination country, instead of the origin country. Other indirect attempts at measuring selection consist in using absolute pre-migration SES measures as proxies for migrants’ relative SES position within the origin society. Rumbaut (1997) and Lobo and Salvo (1998) measure migrant selection as the share of professionals among immigrants. These measurement strategies conflate selectivity per se (relative position of immigrants within their origin society) with the distribution of occupations in the country of origin. Direct Measures of Migrant Selection At first, the only direct measures of migrant selection that compared migrants to non-migrants in the origin context focused on internal migrants, especially Puerto Ricans in the US (e.g. Ortiz 1986; Ramos 1992; Melendez 1994; Landale, Oropesa and Gorman 2000; Borjas 2008), or international migrants from Mexico to the US (Massey 1987; Chiquiar and Hanson 2005; Ibarraran and Lubotsky 2007). The seminal work by Feliciano (2005b; 2006b) kicked off an era of dramatic improvement in the measurement of migrant selection that became increasingly direct and precise. Direct measures of migration selection are much more demanding because they require data on immigrants and comparable data on the origin country population. The majority of empirical work on migrant selection has relied on educational attainment, which has the advantage of being an important dimension of socioeconomic status that is relatively time-constant among adults, and thus not affected by the destination context if completed prior to migration. Group-level measures of selection Feliciano (2005b) gathered published data on the distribution of educational attainment in countries of origin from most of the top immigrant-sending countries to the US. She then compared the age-standardized educational attainment distributions to the educational attainment distribution of the corresponding national immigrant group in the US. From these comparisons, she constructed a measure of educational selectivity for each national immigrant group

38  Handbook of human mobility and migration in the US. This group-level measure of educational selectivity has been used several times in subsequent studies by Feliciano (2005a, 2006a) and others (Lessard-Phillips, Fleischmann and van Elsas 2014; van de Werfhorst and Heath 2019). The main limitation of this measure is that it considers national immigrant groups as homogeneous entities and disregards the variation in educational attainment that exists within each of these groups. Individual-level measures of selection One of the strategies used to measure selectivity is to focus on one origin country and sample emigrant households there, as was successfully done by the Mexican Migration Project (Massey et al. 1987) in the case of Mexican migration to the US, the “2,000 Families” survey (Güveli et al. 2017) in the case of Turkish immigrants to Europe and the Health of Philippine Emigrants Study (Morey et al. 2020) in the case of Filipino emigrants to the US. These surveys provide information on both “movers” (emigrants) and “stayers” (non-emigrants) in the country of origin and can thus be used to measure migrant selection at the individual level. Another less direct single origin/multiple destination approach compares the characteristics of immigrants from the same country of origin in different countries of destination, thus establishing the relative level of selection between destinations. Following this strategy, Cohen and his colleagues compared the socioeconomic characteristics of immigrants from the former Soviet Union in Israel and Germany (Cohen and Kogan 2007), and Israel and the US (Cohen and Haberfeld 2007). Others applied the same approach to Iranian immigrants in the United States, Israel, and Sweden (Haberfeld and Lundh 2014). A flexible and systematic approach to measuring educational selectivity in multiple destination and multiple origin countries was introduced by Ichou (2014). This measure is constructed by matching harmonized educational attainment distribution data on countries of origin from the Barro-Lee data set (Barro and Lee 2013) and individual-level data on immigrants in the destination country or countries (France in Ichou’s case). This setup makes it possible to compare the educational attainment of individual migrants with that of non-migrants of the same age and gender in their country of origin. “By considering sex-specific distributions, the measure takes into account differences between females and males in their access to educational institutions in the origin country; by considering age-specific distributions, it allows changes to be incorporated that are consequences of the educational expansion and, associated therewith, changes in the relative positional value of educational credentials over time” (Spörlein et al. 2020, 63). One advantage of Ichou’s approach is to uncover variations in educational selectivity not only between national immigrant groups but also within each group. This measure was later applied in several destination contexts to answer a range of research questions (Ichou, Goujon and team 2017; Chae and Glick 2019; Engzell 2019; Ichou and Wallace 2019; Brunori, Luijkx and Triventi 2020; Caron and Ichou 2020; Engzell and Ichou 2020; Florian, Ichou and Panico 2021; Nygård 2021b, 2021a; Tong and Harris 2021; Welker 2021; Schmidt, Kristen and Mühlau 2022). This measurement approach has benefited from two noteworthy extensions. First, Feliciano and Lanuza (2017) extend it to include natives of the destination country; hence, making it a more general measure of “contextual attainment”, i.e. educational level relative to the context in which it was attained be it the origin or the destination country. Second, Spörlein, Kristen and their colleagues (Spörlein and Kristen 2019a, 2019b; Spörlein et al. 2020) make the measure sensitive to sub-national (i.e. regional) variations in the educational distribution in migrants’ countries of origin. This provides an even more precise measure of educational

Are migrants a select population?  39 selectivity, especially when there are marked differences between regions in terms of educational attainment distributions and/or emigration flows (Spörlein and Kristen 2019a). Such precise measure of migrant educational selection is significantly more demanding, requiring individual-level information on migrants’ region of origin together with data on educational distributions in these regions. These data are still rarely available and the precision gain compared to national distributions is not always substantial (Spörlein and Kristen 2019b). All in all, the measurement of migrant selection, especially in education, has made tremendous progress in the past two decades, enabling the development of a rich array of research describing migrant selection levels in different destination countries along different dimensions of selection.

DESCRIBING MIGRANT SELECTION This section reviews research describing the level of migrant selection using direct measures of selection, i.e. comparing international migrants’ characteristics with those of non-migrants from their origin country.2 While the majority of scholars have focused on educational selectivity, others have described migrant selection on health, labor market characteristics, attitudes and personality traits. Selection on Education A few internationally comparative papers, mostly using aggregate (i.e. group-level) measures of educational selectivity have provided a general picture of migrant selection in OECD countries. Using harmonized data on 143 origin countries and six large destination countries in the OECD from 1975 to 2000, Brucker and Defoort (2009, 742) report that migrants tend to be “positively self-selected on observable skills” (i.e. educational attainment). Observing the educational selectivity of immigrants from 70 origin countries in 21 OECD destination countries in 2000 (part of the international database developed by Docquier and Marfouk 2006), Belot and Hatton (2012) also find an overall positive selection of migrants. Interestingly, they find that educational selection is affected by poverty (the poorest cannot migrate even if they are highly educated), differences in economic returns to education in the destination vs. origin country, but also that beyond economic factors “cultural similarities, colonial legacies, and

Because of space limitations, I exclusively review research on the selection of international migrants. Yet, some studies focus on other types of migrants (internal migrants, returnees, etc.). A frequent topic of investigation has been the return migration of less healthy migrants, known as the salmon bias, especially between Mexico and the US (Palloni and Arias 2004; Turra and Elo 2008; Ullmann, Goldman and Massey 2011; Van Hook and Zhang 2011; Bostean 2013; Riosmena, Wong and Palloni 2013; Arenas et al. 2015; Donato, Hamilton and Bernard-Sasges 2019; Cheong and Massey 2019). There is also research on the socioeconomic selection of return migrants from a range of destination countries, including the US (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1982; Duleep 1994; Reagan and Olsen 2000), the UK (Dustmann and Weiss 2007; Caron and Ichou 2020), Ireland (Barrett and Trace 1998), Germany (Constant and Massey 2002, 2003; Grigoleit-Richter 2017; Kuhlenkasper and Steinhardt 2017), France (Caron 2018; Solignac 2018), Romania (Ambrosini et al. 2015), Sweden and Finland (Rooth and Saarela 2007) and the Netherlands (Bijwaard, Schluter and Wahba 2014). Excellent review pieces already exist that summarize this field of research (Dustmann and Görlach 2016; Constant 2020). 2

40  Handbook of human mobility and migration physical distance are often more important determinants of educational selectivity” (Belot and Hatton 2012, 1105; see also Docquier, Lohest and Marfouk 2007, on factors affecting “brain drain” in origin countries). Using survey data from ten destination countries in Europe and North America and 34 origin groups, van de Werfhorst and Heath (2019, 358) report that “selectivity varies strongly between ethnic groups within countries, and within ethnic groups between countries”. For example, in Belgium, Italian immigrants appear negatively selected, while North Africans tend to be positively selected. In addition, Turkish immigrants in Germany appear more positively selected than those in the Netherlands or Belgium. Unsurprisingly, the destination context for most research on educational selectivity is the US. In her seminal contribution, Feliciano (2005b, 147) shows that “there is substantial variation in the degree of educational selectivity depending on the country of origin and the timing of migration from a particular country, but that nearly all immigrant groups are more educated than their nonmigrant counterparts”. Out of the 32 immigrant groups included, only Puerto Ricans (who are US citizens) appear negatively selected (Ortiz 1986; Ramos 1992 also found non-positive selection of Puerto Ricans). In a more recent study using an individual-level measure of educational selectivity, Feliciano and Lanuza (2017) show that even among positively selected national groups, some migrants are negatively selected. They report that, on average, Mexicans and Cubans tend to be positively selected, but less so than East Asian immigrants who appear to be the most positively selected group. Lee and Zhou (2015) identify Chinese immigrants as hyperselected since the share of college graduates among them is higher than that among both non-migrants in China and US natives. In the US, Mexican immigrants have been the specific focus of much research and much debate, with little agreement on the direction and extent of their educational selection. Studies that used US data (mostly the US Census) concluded that they were positively selected (Feliciano 2005b, 2008; Chiquiar and Hanson 2005), while studies relying on Mexican data sources to track emigrants found that they were rather negatively selected (Ibarraran and Lubotsky 2007; McKenzie and Rapoport 2010; Fernández-Huertas Moraga 2011; Ambrosini and Peri 2012; Rendall and Parker 2014). In the latest major contribution to this debate to date, Hamilton and Huang (2020) provide interesting empirical arguments to understand these discrepancies using the MxFLS survey, a nationally representative data source from Mexico that prospectively tracked migrants who moved between Mexico and the US – a strong design to study migrant selection. The authors find opposite biases in existing studies (see also, e.g. Ambrosini and Peri 2012). Studies that use “reports of migration by remaining household members and proxy substitution of migration education underestimat[e] migrant selectivity” (Hamilton and Huang 2020, 603). By contrast, studies that rely on US-based data tend to overestimate educational selectivity because lower educated migrants tend to be less well represented in these samples. Yet, their main finding relates to contextual variation in selectivity and confirms previous results (Ibarraran and Lubotsky 2007; Rendall and Parker 2014): the overall negative selection of Mexican migrants compared to non-migrants nationally comes from the fact that they mostly originate from rural Mexico where absolute educational levels are lower than in urban Mexico. However, when compared to the rural population, Mexico-US migrants from rural areas tend to be positively selected. In other destination contexts, Ichou (Ichou 2014; Ichou et al. 2017) showed that immigrants in France were mostly positively selected in education with large variations between and within groups. Relying on aggregated immigrant data in 25 OECD countries in 2000 and

Are migrants a select population?  41 assessing the selection of Israeli emigrants, Cohen (2011) concluded that positive educational selection was higher in English-speaking destination countries, especially the US, and lower in Scandinavian countries. Similarly, emigrants who left Iran in the years following the 1979 revolution were found to be most positively selected on education in the US compared to those who went to Israel or Sweden (Haberfeld and Lundh 2014). The same is true for emigrants who left Argentina and Chile during the mid-1970s to 1980s following military takeovers: those who settled in Sweden were the least educated compared to those who went to Israel or the United States (Birgier et al. 2018). Spörlein and his colleagues (2020) analyzed the selection of recent refugees in Germany. Even if they are less educated than native Germans, recent refugees have higher levels of education than non-migrants in their origin country or than recent labor migrants. Syrian refugees who settled in Germany are relatively better educated than Syrians in neighboring Jordan and Lebanon. In sum, at the most general level, immigrants are frequently more educated than their non-migrant counterparts in the origin country. Yet, there are variations in the degree and direction of educational selection depending on origin and destination contexts as well as measurement approaches. These variations are shaped by both economic and non-economic factors (e.g. Belot and Hatton 2012). Selection on Labor Market Characteristics Selection on other dimensions of socioeconomic status has more rarely been assessed. The seminal research by Abramitzky and his colleagues (Abramitzky, Boustan and Eriksson 2012; 2013) kicked off a series of historical studies on the socioeconomic selection of immigrants in the so-called “Age of Mass Migration” to the US (between the mid-nineteenth and the early twentieth century). Matching data from historical Norwegian censuses and information on Norwegian immigrants in the US, they found that the occupational background of migrants was lower than that of non-migrants, especially in urban areas (Abramitzky et al. 2012). They also found that wealthier Norwegian households were less likely to include migrants, indicating negative economic selection into migration (Abramitzky et al. 2013). Connor (2019) analyzed the selection of Irish migrants during the same period and also observed negative socioeconomic selection: farmers and illiterate men were more likely to emigrate to the US than more skilled men. Outside of Europe, Kihara (2021) studied the socioeconomic selectivity of Japanese male migrants to the US in the Age of Mass Migration and found a different pattern. He concluded that these migrants were positively selected in terms of educational attainment and father’s occupation. In a study on the contemporary period using Swedish data, Tibajev (2019) shows that migrants are generally less likely to have experienced self-employment prior to migration compared to the population in their origin country. Selection on Health Apart from socioeconomic status, health has been another dimension of selection investigated by researchers. As with education, the Mexico-US migration has been the main context for research on migrant health selection. Some studies find signs of positive health selection of (recent) Mexican migrants in the US. They tend to be less obese (Riosmena et al. 2013; Ro and Fleischer 2014), have less hypertension (Riosmena et al. 2013), fewer activity limitations (Bostean 2013) and report better self-rated health (Cheong and Massey 2019), including in

42  Handbook of human mobility and migration early-life (Ullmann et al. 2011). Rubalcava and colleagues (2008) also find some evidence that better health predicts migration from rural Mexico, but the statistical associations are weak and only significant for a few indicators. Similarly, Bostean (2013) finds very little difference in chronic conditions between Mexican immigrants and non-migrants in Mexico. Research on migrant health selection outside of Mexico is more limited. Mehta and Elo (2012) study the health selection of migrants from the former Soviet Union and find that Russian migrants in the US have lower levels of disability compared to Russians living in Russia. Focusing on US-bound emigrants from the Philippines, Morey and her colleagues (2020) find that migrants report fewer health conditions than non-migrants in general. But there are large variations according to visa type with marriage visa holders being the healthiest. In their study of health selection, Ro, Fleischer and Blebu (2016) include a wide range of migrant groups. They find that migrants from South American countries display the most positive health selection, while the two largest origin countries, Mexico and China, display the lowest levels of selection. Jasso and her colleagues (2004) find indications of substantial positive health selection of immigrants in the US in terms of life expectancy, with large variations across immigrant groups. Consistent with these findings, Mehta and his colleagues (2016) find that the life expectancy of older immigrants in the US is higher than in their respective region of birth (except for migrants from Canada and Oceania). The advantage is the largest for Asian and African immigrants. Riosmena and co-authors (2017) examine height and smoking levels just prior to immigration of migrants in the US from five major origin countries (India, China, the Philippines, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic). They find positive health selection, especially among male migrants from Mexico, the Philippines and India (in height) and Mexico and China (in smoking). Larger comparative studies of migrant health selection including several origins and several destinations are much rarer. Kennedy and his co-authors (2015) pool together national datasets from the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom and compare the health of migrants moving between these four countries to that of their counterparts in the country of origin. They observe positive health selection in all four destination countries. Feliciano (2020) provides a good summary of the diverse findings on migrant health selection: “it may not be simply that healthier people migrate, but that migrants from some countries are positively selected on some health aspects” (Feliciano 2020, 322). Selection on Attitudes and Personality Traits A last major dimension of interest for research has been migrants’ attitudes and personality traits and how much they differ from those of non-migrants in the origin country. In this newer field of investigation, the most rigorous empirical design consists in comparing some features of the attitudes and personality of migrants to the distribution of the same feature measured in population surveys in the origin country. In the Republic of Georgia, Hofmann (2014) draws on a survey oversampling households with an emigrant member and shows that women who migrate tend to come from households with more gender-egalitarian beliefs, while male migrants come from more ideologically traditional households. Other research studies the attitudes toward homosexuality of recent migrants from Poland to Ireland and the Netherlands combining survey data on immigrants in these two destinations with the European Social Survey in Poland (Röder and Lubbers 2015). The authors show that Polish migrants tend to have less unfavorable attitudes than those who

Are migrants a select population?  43 stayed in Poland. This is even truer for Polish migrants in the Netherlands compared to their counterparts who went to Ireland. In a larger scale study, Polavieja et al. (2018) match the European Social Survey to the World Values Survey in order to examine whether recently arrived immigrants in Europe are more motivated (specifically achievement-oriented) than their non-migrant counterparts in their origin country. Contrary to the expectations of a “migrant personality”, the authors do not find a universal pattern of positive selection on motivation. There is also no sign that the most positively selected migrants come from the poorest origin countries. Employing a more indirect but less data-demanding research design, some authors take migration intentions as a proxy for potential migration behavior and compare the attitudes of individuals who intend to migrate to those who intend to stay. Taking the Netherlands as an origin country, van Dalen and Henkens (2012) examine the difference in personality traits between individuals who report emigration intentions and those who do not. They show that Dutch people who intend to move tend to be more adventurous and less nationalistic than the rest of the Dutch population. Another study shows that Chinese adolescents who intend to emigrate are more optimistic than those who do not report migration intentions (Cebolla-Boado and Soysal 2018). Focusing on potential migrants from Eastern European and former Soviet countries, Berlinschi and Harutyunyan (2019, 831) find that, notwithstanding the notable heterogeneity by origin country, “individuals who intend to emigrate are more politically active, more critical of governance and institutions, more tolerant toward other cultures, less tolerant of cheating, more optimistic, and less risk averse”. Finally, a series of papers study the impact of religiosity on migration intentions in different origin contexts. Myers (2000) generally finds that involvement in local religious activities negatively correlates with migration aspirations among US citizens. Among Catholic Mexican students, “external religiosity” (e.g. religious activities) is negatively correlated with migration intentions to the US, while the opposite is true for “internal religiosity” (e.g. spirituality) (Hoffman, Marsiglia and Ayers 2015). In Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, adherence to radical Islamic values is shown to be negatively associated with migration intentions (Falco and Rotondi 2016). In the same region, Docquier and his colleagues (2020) investigate whether potential emigrants have specific levels of religiosity and gender-egalitarian attitudes. They show that individuals who intend to emigrate to high-income destination countries report lower levels of religiosity and tend to hold more gender-egalitarian opinions than the rest of the population.

ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRANT SELECTION The consequences of migrant selection on the trajectories of immigrants and their descendants are the object of a growing and diverse field of research, part of which has already been recently reviewed by Feliciano (2020). Given the limited space at my disposal, I will only briefly highlight the main findings of this lively research area. Effects on Migrants’ Health Positive migrant selection has often been hypothesized as an explanation for the “healthy immigrant effect”, i.e. the observation that recent immigrants – despite being socioeconomi-

44  Handbook of human mobility and migration cally disadvantaged – tend to be in better health than natives of the destination country. The empirical results directly testing this hypothesis are mixed. Some studies do not find that positive health selection explains advantages neither in life expectancy (Fenelon 2013) nor in self-rated health (Ro et al. 2016) in the US. But another study provides some evidence on the positive role of health selection on some health conditions on the healthier outcomes of Mexican immigrants in the US (Martinez, Aguayo-Tellez and Rangel-Gonzalez 2015). Finally, Ichou and Wallace (2019) examine the health effect of immigrant educational selection and conclude that positive selection helps explain a significant part of the health advantage of newly arrived migrants over natives in France. Effects on Migrants’ Labor Market Outcomes The positive effects of migrant selection on their labor market outcomes have also frequently been assumed in economics. Yet, rigorous tests including a direct measure of migrant selection are much rarer. Existing studies indicate that positively selected immigrants (in terms of education and pre-migration occupation) tend to succeed better on the labor market of destination countries. This is indeed the case for Iranian refugees in the US (Haberfeld and Lundh 2014), and Argentinian and Chilean refugees in Israel and the US (Birgier et al. 2018). On the other side of the Atlantic, two recent studies with convergent results (one in Italy, Brunori et al. 2020; the other in 18 European countries, Schmidt et al. 2022) conclude that immigrants’ educational selectivity has a positive effect on occupational status among migrants who have a job, but a negative effect on the likelihood of employment. Both studies explain this finding by hypothesizing that positively educated immigrants may be prepared to wait longer to find a better job. Effects on Other Migrants’ Outcomes In a study on several European destinations, Spörlein and Kristen (2019a) observe that positive educational selection is surprisingly not linked to a better mastery of the host country language. Yet, positively selected migrants do show quicker linguistic progress. Immigrants’ fertility behavior in the US is affected by the fertility prevalent in their origin country, but migrants who are positively selected on education are much less influenced by the average origin fertility level (Kahn 1988). Behrman and Weitzman (2022) provide a recent investigation of the fertility of African migrants in France in which they show the impact of migrant selection. Engzell and Ichou (2020) explore the determinants of immigrants’ subjective social status in Europe, measured by asking respondents to position themselves in society on a 0-to-10 scale. They show that, all things being equal, immigrants who ranked higher in the educational distribution of the origin compared to the destination country (i.e. positively selected immigrants who experienced a status loss) report a lower subjective social status. Investigating whether initial educational selection influences immigrants’ likelihood to remigrate from England, Caron and Ichou (2020) show that immigrants – especially males – who were initially more positively selected in terms of educational attainment are more likely to remigrate after an episode of unemployment or inactivity.

Are migrants a select population?  45 Effects on Migrants’ Children’s Outcomes Does the effect of migrant selection extend to the next generation? In general, research answers this question positively. Using a group-level measure of educational selection, Feliciano shows that immigrant parents’ educational selectivity has a positive impact on their children’s educational expectations (Feliciano 2006a) and actual attainment (Feliciano 2005a), playing an important role in accounting for ethnic and racial inequality in education in the US (Feliciano 2005a; 2018). With similar measures on the educational selection of 34 national immigrant groups in 10 European and North American countries of destination, van de Werfhorst and Heath (2019) find that children belonging to positively selected groups are less disadvantaged compared to destination country natives in terms of test scores and track placement. Using an individual-level measure of educational selectivity, Ichou (2014) demonstrates its positive impact on the educational attainment of children of immigrants in France, even after controlling for detailed information on immigrant families’ SES. Extending this approach, Feliciano and Lanuza (2017) show that immigrant parents’ educational selection (that they call “contextual attainment”) helps explain the educational attainment gaps between their children and those of US-born parents. In Sweden, Engzell (2019) adopts the same measure to predict a range of academic outcomes. Interestingly, he finds that parents’ educational selection is a strong predictor of children’s attitudes, aspirations (see Nygård 2021b for a similar result), and educational choices, but is less relevant to explain their test scores and school grades. Immigrant parents’ educational selection has also been shown to reduce the risk of early school leaving in Italy (Brunori et al. 2020). In another context, Chae and Glick (2019) show that the effect of emigrant parents’ educational selection extends to the school enrollment of children left behind in three African origin countries. The effect of parental educational selection on their children’s educational outcomes has been of particular interest to explain the high academic achievements of Asian American children. Based on qualitative data, Lee and Zhou (2015) show that the high educational selectivity of Asian American immigrant groups positively influences the educational outcomes of their children beyond families’ characteristics. They coin the concept of “hyper-selectivity” referring to a “dual positive selectivity in which immigrants are more likely to have graduated from college than non-migrants in sending countries and the host population in the United States” (Tran et al. 2018, 188). More recently, Tong and Harris (2021) conclude that the positive relationship between parental educational selection and academic advantages among Asian Americans was mediated by youths’ “academic culture (i.e. parental educational expectations and youths’ effort, school behaviours, and attitudes)” (4058). Finally, the effect of parental selection on children’s health has only recently been researched. Taking birthweight as an indicator of children’s health, Florian and her co-authors (2021) show that immigrant parents’ positive educational selection contributes to explaining the health advantages of children of immigrants over children of natives in France, especially among recent immigrants.

46  Handbook of human mobility and migration

CONCLUSION To summarize, migrant selection is an essential feature of international migration. It refers to the fact that those who migrate are different from those who do not. This difference has been conceived of in various ways. Most economists and psychologists see it as unobserved attitudinal features of individuals who decide to migrate. Other social scientists view migrant selection as socially embedded within the social structure of the origin country and relate it to migrants’ pre-migration social status and resources. Migrant selection has proved hard to capture empirically because a direct measure requires data on migrants and stayers in the origin country. As a result, most early studies used indirect ad hoc proxies of selection. Since the mid-2000s, scholars have carried out multi-sited surveys or astute matching of origin and destination information to construct direct measures of selection. Migrant educational selection has been the main focus of scholars in this field. In general, migrants tend to be positively selected, i.e. have more favorable characteristics than comparable non-migrants in their origin country. This is the case along several dimensions, i.e. education, other socioeconomic characteristics, health and personality traits. However, the main conclusion of this systematic review of research in this field is the absence of any simple general rule. The level of selection varies depending on the origin, the destination and the dimension considered. Heterogeneity exists not only between national groups but also between individual migrants from the same origin country. Beyond describing the level of migrant selection, scholars have also analyzed its consequences. They have shown that positively selected migrants tend to be in better health and attain a higher occupational status. Their children also reach higher educational attainment levels. Selection is thus a central issue in the study of migration. Researchers, as well as politicians and citizens, should always keep in mind that migrants are not representative of the population of their origin country. As Feliciano notes, ignoring this can lead to “erroneous theoretical conclusions, such as the notion that intrinsic cultural differences explain unequal outcomes among immigrants and their children in health, labor markets, or education” (Feliciano 2020, 316). Factoring in selection helps account for many gaps between ethnic groups in destination countries. In addition, the measurement of immigrants’ socioeconomic status risks being biased if it does not include a measure of selection and consider the origin society as a relevant reference point. In other words, measuring socioeconomic selection is necessary to provide a true pre-migration “starting point” for any study of social mobility within immigrant families. Research on migrant selection and its effects has made tremendous progress in the past years. To progress further, the collection of quality representative data, ideally longitudinal, multi-sited and/or with detailed pre-migration information would be a great asset. Knowledge in this field would also greatly benefit from more scholarship systematically analyzing the determinants and mechanisms accounting for the observed patterns of migrant selection.

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Are migrants a select population?  49 Feliciano, C. (2020). “Immigrant selectivity effects on health, labor market, and educational outcomes.” Annual Review of Sociology 46:315–334. Feliciano, C. & Y.R. Lanuza (2017). “An immigrant paradox? Contextual attainment and intergenerational educational mobility.” American Sociological Review 82(1):211–241. Fenelon, A. (2013). “Revisiting the Hispanic mortality advantage in the United States: The role of smoking.” Social Science & Medicine 82:1–9. Fernández-Huertas Moraga, J. (2011). “New evidence on emigrant selection.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 93(1):72–96. Fernández-Kelly, P. (2008). “The back pocket map: Social class and cultural capital as transferable assets in the advancement of second-generation immigrants.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 620(1):116–137. Florian, S., M. Ichou, & L. Panico (2021). “Parental migrant status and health inequalities at birth: The role of immigrant educational selectivity.” Social Science & Medicine 278:113915. Grigoleit-Richter, G. (2017). “Highly skilled and highly mobile? Examining gendered and ethnicised labour market conditions for migrant women in STEM-professions in Germany.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 43(16):2738–2755. Grogger, J. & G.H. Hanson (2011). “Income maximization and the selection and sorting of international migrants.” Journal of Development Economics 95(1):42–57. Güveli, A., H. Ganzeboom, H. Baykara-Krumme, L. Platt, Ş. Eroğlu, N. Spierings, S. Bayrakdar, B. Nauck, & E.K. Sozeri (2017). “2,000 families: Identifying the research potential of an origins-of-migration study.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 40(14):2558–2576. Haberfeld, Y. & C. Lundh (2014). “Self-selection and economic assimilation of immigrants: The case of Iranian immigrants arriving to three countries during 1979–1985.” International Migration Review 48(2):354–386. Hamilton, E.R. & P.-C. Huang (2020). “Contextualizing Mexican migrant education selectivity.” Population and Development Review 46(3):603–616. Hoffman, S., F.F. Marsiglia, & S.L. Ayers (2015). “Religiosity and migration aspirations among Mexican youth.” Journal of International Migration and Integration 16(1):173–186. Hofmann, E.T. (2014). “Does gender ideology matter in migration? Evidence from the Republic of Georgia.” International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 44(3):23–41. Ibarraran, P. & D. Lubotsky (2007). “Mexican immigration and self-selection: New evidence from the 2000 Mexican census.” In G.J. Borjas (ed.), Mexican Immigration to the United States. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 159–192. Ichou, M. (2014). “Who they were there: Immigrants’ educational selectivity and their children’s educational attainment.” European Sociological Review 30(6):750–765. Ichou, M., A. Goujon, & l’équipe de l’enquête DiPAS (2017). “Immigrants' educational attainment: A mixed picture, but often higher than the average in their country of origin.” Population and Societies (541):1–4. Ichou, M. & M. Wallace (2019). “The healthy immigrant effect: The role of educational selectivity in the good health of migrants.” Demographic Research 40(4):61–94. Jasso, G., D.S. Massey, M.R. Rosenzweig, & J. Smith (2004). “Immigrant health–selectivity and acculturation.” In N.B. Anderson, R.A. Bulatao, and B. Cohen (eds), Critical Perspectives on Racial and Ethnic Differences in Health in Late Life. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, pp. 227–266. Jasso, G. & M.R. Rosenzweig (1982). “Estimating the emigration rates of legal immigrants using administrative and survey data: The 1971 cohort of immigrants to the United States.” Demography 19(3):279–290. Jasso, G. & M.R. Rosenzweig (1986). “What's in a name? Country-of-origin influences on the earnings of immigrants in the United States.” Research in Human Capital and Development 4:75–106. Jokela, M. (2009). “Personality predicts migration within and between US states.” Journal of Research in Personality 43(1):79–83. Kahn, J.R. (1988). “Immigrant selectivity and fertility adaptation in the United States.” Social Forces 67(1):108–128. Kennedy, S., M. Kidd, J.T. McDonald, & N. Biddle (2015). “The healthy immigrant effect: patterns and evidence from four countries.” Journal of International Migration and Integration 16(2):317–332.

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52  Handbook of human mobility and migration Van Hook, J. & W. Zhang (2011). “Who stays? Who goes? Selective emigration among the foreign-born.” Population Research and Policy Review 30(1):1–24. van Tubergen, F., I. Maas, & H. Flap (2004). “The economic incorporation of immigrants in 18 Western societies: Origin, destination, and community effects.” American Sociological Review 69(5):704–727. Welker, J. (2021). “Relative education of recent refugees in Germany and the Middle East: Is selectivity reflected in migration and destination decisions?” International Migration Early View:1–16.

4

Is there an end to mobility? Circular and onward migrants Louise Caron

INTRODUCTION The traditional depiction of international migrations as one-time and one-way movements has long dominated and still partly continues to infuse the literature on migration and assimilation, which posits a narrative in which immigrants emigrate from their origin country to a unique destination and presumably settle there permanently. This sedentarist approach helps to understand the “weight of the assimilation narrative” (Ley and Kobayashi 2005, 112) in most research on immigration, especially in sociological studies that predominantly focus on integration processes for immigrants and their descendants in the host society (Safi 2020, 22–23). Yet, migration does not always end with definitive settlement in a single destination country. Some immigrants remigrate, either returning home or moving to another country. This phenomenon is far from marginal: in the developed OECD countries, 20 percent to 50 percent of immigrants leave the destination country within five years after arrival (Dumont and Spielvogel 2008). In the US, more than 20 percent of immigrants who arrived during the 1960s had left by the end of the decade (Warren and Peck 1980), while respectively 40 percent and 55 percent of male and female immigrants who entered the UK in the 1990s had remigrated after five years (Dustmann and Weiss 2007). Significant remigration rates are also found in Canada (Aydemir and Robinson 2008), Sweden (Edin, Lalonde, and Aslund 2000), Denmark (Jensen and Pedersen 2007), the Netherlands (Bijwaard, Schluter, and Wahba 2014), and France (Solignac 2018).1 While temporary migration has long suffered from being under-theorized, the magnitude of these out-flows underlines the need to further explore the complexity of migration trajectories for some migrants who are only “birds of passage” (Piore 1980). Studies on the out-migration of immigrants have evolved over the past two decades (Constant 2020; Dustmann and Görlach 2016; Jeffery and Murison 2011), and so has the vocabulary used to describe migration patterns as it keeps pace with these new areas of research. Among the qualifiers now used to describe different types of migration, we find return, repeat, circular, onward, multiple, or secondary, just to name a few. The variety of this terminology says it all: migration trajectories are diverse and often complex. Some immigrants return to their country of origin, others relocate to another destination, and still others move back and forth between their homeland and one or multiple destination countries. Does this mean that migration patterns have become more complex over time? To a certain extent, this is what some scholars argue, suggesting that the traditional distinctions between permanent and temporary migrations or internal and international migrations are now blurred and no longer reflect the heterogeneity of migration patterns and motivations, particularly in contexts

1

For a more exhaustive literature review, see Dustmann and Görlach (2016) or Constant (2020).

53

54  Handbook of human mobility and migration of free movement regimes such as the Schengen Area (King 2002; Sheller and Urry 2006; Urry 2000).2 However, empirical evidence tends to show that the volume of global migration between the 1960s and 2000s did not drastically accelerate but instead shifted directionally, with European countries in particular becoming the “new” destination countries attracting more diverse immigrants (Czaika and de Haas 2014). In any case, this historical lack of study on complex geographical trajectories points to methodological challenges in tracking individuals from one country to another. The degree of complexity of migration trajectories that we can monitor depends on the empirical tools available, and the “settlement bias” (Hugo 2014) of migration research is intrinsically linked to “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003) in data production. Administrative data such as censuses, which remain a major source of information on immigration, poorly capture departures and thus contribute to perceiving migrations as stocks rather than as dynamic flows.3 Not surprisingly then, the increasing literature on return and onward migration is also linked to the development of new surveys and datasets which better capture international mobility. This chapter highlights the diversity and potential complexity of migration trajectories and discusses these new perspectives for migration research. Sections 1 and 2 first review the literature on return and circular migrations with the country of origin, which have certainly been the most studied patterns of temporary migrations so far. Section 3 explores other forms of remigrations, specifically onward and secondary migrations that involve two or more (new) destination countries. Finally, from a methodological perspective, Section 4 considers the measurements of migration trajectories over individual life courses and generations.

MULTIPLE FORMS OF RETURN MIGRATIONS Most studies on the remigration of immigrants have focused on return movements (Cassarino 2004; Dustmann and Görlach 2016; Gmelch 1980), which we define here as first-generation immigrants moving back to their country of birth.4 Recent estimates suggest that return migrations represent a large share of international flows, accounting for about one out of four cross-border migrations (Azose and Raftery 2019). The reasons for return migration are complex and involve various dimensions of one’s individual life course, ranging from economic strategies to family and cultural motivations, which themselves interact with macro-level situations in both the origin and destination countries. This section considers some of the main mechanisms highlighted by the literature to explain return migration. Who remigrates? This key question was first addressed by the economic literature, which was interested in comparing the labor market performance of returnees at destination with those who remain in the host country, since the selectivity of remigration can significantly bias cross-sectional estimates of immigrants’ economic integration (Abramitzky, Boustan, and 2 Regarding the debates in the literature on distinguishing between internal and international migration, see Chapter 5 of this Handbook (Haddad and McAvay 2022). 3 Emigration coverage is theoretically better in population registers, where individuals are required to declare their departure. Yet, incentives to de-register are scarce and emigration rates are largely underestimated, sometimes by as much as 50 percent (de Beer et al. 2010; Poulain, Herm, and Depledge 2013). 4 As pointed out by Constant (2020), broader definitions of return migrations include moving back to a former country of residence or to the origin country of parents or ancestors. The issue of return migration over generations is discussed later in this chapter.

Is there an end to mobility? Circular and onward migrants  55 Eriksson 2014; Dustmann and Görlach 2015; Lubotsky 2007). Neoclassical models conceive of migration as the result of a cost–benefit optimization strategy based on the wage differential between origin and destination countries and the probability of finding a job (Lewis 1954; Sjaastad 1962; Todaro 1969). From that perspective, immigrants would remain permanently at destination unless they failed to achieve the economic positions they expect, and thus remigration is regarded as an abnormal outcome of the migration project (on this interpretation, see Constant and Massey 2002; de Haas and Fokkema 2011; de Haas, Fokkema, and Fihri 2015). In the 1990s, the new economics of labor migration (NELM) developed around Stark (1991) offered an alternative understanding of return migration. It conceptualized the decision to migrate as a long-term household strategy of risk diversification in regions where credit markets are often imperfect. Under this strategy, one family member migrates to financially support those left behind and, as a successful final stage of a pre-established plan, can return home once they have accumulated enough savings. While most studies do find that being unemployed or in a low-income position at destination increases the chances of remigrating (Abramitzky et al. 2014; Caron 2018; Constant and Massey 2003; Massey 1987b; Picot and Piraino 2013), greater probabilities of returning are also documented for migrants in high-income groups as well (Bijwaard and Wahba 2014). In fact, remigrants’ selection depends on their selection into initial migration (Borjas and Bratsberg 1996). In the UK, Caron and Ichou (2020) show that the positive effect of unemployment on remigration is larger among migrants who were more positively selected in terms of educational attainment and therefore could expect better socio-economic outcomes at destination. The role of economic integration also depends on the time spent at destination, thereby underlining different remigration strategies over the life course. This was first depicted for the US in a seminal work by Duleep (1994), which documents a bimodal pattern of immigrants’ out-migration: while most left within only a few years after arrival and were usually in poor economic positions in the US, another remigration wave occurred much later, for immigrants more economically successful who were no longer participating in the labor market. An important criticism leveled at these models is that they conceive of (return) migrants as rational agents driven by purely economic motivations. In contrast with this assumption, several studies underline that one’s economic position at destination has a weak or even non-significant effect on the probability of returning, highlighting the importance of non-economic reasons in migration processes (Gibson and McKenzie 2011; de Haas, Fokkema, and Fihri 2015; Haug 2008; de Vroome and van Tubergen 2014). Beyond the economic dimension, return intentions or behaviors are more largely shaped by the relative weight of the “integration-transnationalism matrix” (Carling and Pettersen 2014) that migrants develop with both the origin and destination countries. The chances of settling in the host country are generally enhanced by sociocultural attachments like having a family and owning property there, marrying a native, speaking the host country’s language, and becoming a naturalized citizen. Symmetrically, migrants who maintain strong ties with the country of origin are more likely to return (de Haas and Fokkema 2011; Massey and Espinosa 1997; Van Hook and Zhang 2011). Using the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), Constant and Massey (2003) show that migrants who send remittances and whose families stayed in the origin country are more likely to return, while the presence of a spouse or children in Germany is significantly associated with long-term settlement. The heterogeneity of these findings mirrors the multiple forms and motivations of return migration, which depend on the reasons for the initial migration, whether the return was

56  Handbook of human mobility and migration planned or spontaneous, and the timing in the life cycle. For example, family reunification is more likely to result in permanent settlement (Bijwaard 2008). Although a number of student migrants eventually stay in the host country after their studies (Baruch, Budhwar, and Khatri 2007), this type of migration is more often temporary (Hazen and Alberts 2006), as stayers represent only 15 percent to 30 percent of foreign students (OECD 2013). Returning home for retirement also accounts for a large proportion of elderly migration flows (Dustmann and Kirchkamp 2002; Serow 1978; Serow and Charity 1988). In Sweden, Klinthall (2006) finds that the probability of returning significantly increases around the legal retirement age of 65 but declines afterwards, suggesting that returning to the country of birth was anticipated and awaited. Strong differences can exist by origin, such as in France, where Dos Santos and Wolff (2010) show that return intentions at retirement are greater among the Portuguese compared to their Spanish and Italian counterparts with similar characteristics and who benefit equally from free movement within Europe, thus pointing toward possible cultural disparities in the prevalence of the “myth of return.”5 Migrants might also return when they become ill to seek social support from family and relatives, a selective remigration of the unhealthiest migrants also known as the “salmon hypothesis” (Abraído-Lanza et al. 1999; Di Napoli et al. 2021). Another reason is they intend to die and be buried in their homeland (Mazzucato, Kabki, and Smith 2006). Finally, return migrations depend on the evolution of migration and integration policies (Paparusso and Ambrosetti 2017), as well as on macro-level characteristics in regions of origin and destination, notably in terms of economic opportunities for potential returnees (Borjas and Bratsberg 1996; Hear, Bakewell, and Long 2018; Lindstrom 1996). Decisions to return evolve according to these contextual factors, either by hastening an unexpected remigration or delaying a planned return. Flahaux (2021) thus shows how migrants from DR Congo and Senegal living in Europe postponed their return due to the deteriorating economic and political situation at origin. More generally speaking, studies on remigration tend to mushroom at times of economic crises in immigration countries (Bastia 2011; Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2016). Once again, these relationships vary according to initial migration motivations. For example, the return migrations of refugees are related more to reductions in political tensions in the origin country than to economic variables (Zakirova and Buzurukov 2021).

IS RETURNING THE END? REPEAT AND CIRCULAR MIGRATION What happens to migrants once they return? A relatively large body of literature has investigated returnees’ reintegration and the way they contribute to the economic growth of their origin country (Wahba 2014). In this framework, migrants would accumulate skills and financial capital abroad (Mayr and Peri 2009; Sjaastad 1962; Yang 2006), making returnees “agents of development” for their homeland (Sinatti and Horst 2015). Most studies find that returnees hold better economic positions than non-migrants (Co, Gang, and Yun 2000; Wahba 2015) and are more often self-employed (Mezger Kveder and Flahaux 2013; Piracha and Vadean

Although the idea of returning is shared by many migrants, the realization of this project is often repeatedly postponed to the point of becoming considered a myth in migrant discourses and collective imaginaries (Anwar 1979; Safran 1991). 5

Is there an end to mobility? Circular and onward migrants  57 2010), although significant differences exist by origin and destination countries (De Vreyer, Gubert, and Robilliard 2010).6 Returning is, however, not necessarily the end of the migrants’ journey. Depending on the level of “preparedness” for their return (Cassarino 2004), some returnees face difficulties in their origin country (Barrett and Mosca 2013) and they sometimes ultimately remigrate to their former host society, as White (2014) shows for Poles moving back to the UK. More importantly, many migrants engage in a series of back-and-forth trips between their countries of destination and origin, multiple moves that are commonly referred to as repeat or circular migration. Constant and Zimmermann (2011) estimate that as many as 60 percent of migrants living in Germany are repeat or circular migrants. Before these works, such repeat migrations had already been underlined by the pioneering work of Massey and his colleagues (Massey 1987b; Massey and Espinosa 1997), who showed that these forms of remigration between Mexico and the US are more common than permanent return. Some researchers draw a distinction between circular and repeat migration. The former would imply regular mobility between origin and destination countries as a result of “a strategy chosen by the migrant” (Aradhya, Scott, and Smith 2017:26), specifically in regard to labor migration (Constant and Zimmermann 2011); while the latter corresponds to fewer moves as a form of “corrective migration due to unmet expectations, or a way of optimizing and re-optimizing one’s situation at every period” (Constant 2020:6). The idea of circular migration sometimes also refers to migration between the home country and a specific destination; while repeat migration encompasses those who immigrate once again to the same destination country after some time abroad, in the origin country, or elsewhere (Aradhya et al. 2019). Yet, there is no clear consensus on these definitions in the literature, as these two terms often overlap or are used interchangeably (Salamońska and Czeranowska 2021; Skeldon 2012). Do the determinants of repeat or circular migration differ from those of a long-term return? Using data on Albanese migrants, Vadean and Piracha (2009) find that circular migrants are more likely to be men and to have a low level of educational attainment compared to those who return permanently. Similarly, Garip (2012) shows that Mexican repeat migrants are negatively selected in education, but their multiple moves help them accumulate wealth over each trip. Institutional setting and the ability to move easily across borders matter in these decisions. Circular moves tend to be fostered by the context of free mobility, as Constant and Zimmermann (2011) show for EU-migrants and naturalized citizens in Germany, or as Weber and Saarela (2019) find for migrations between Finland and Sweden. Finally, the nature of both short- and long-term return migrations is likely to change over the life cycle, namely for those who no longer participate in the labor market. In Europe, some evidence points to regular back-and-forth trips to and from the country of origin among aging migrants at the time of retirement (Attias-Donfut and Wolff 2005; Dos Santos and Wolff 2010; Schaeffer 2001). The qualitative study by Hunter (2011) counter-intuitively shows that this is even the case for old men living in migrant worker hostel accommodations in France, whom we would expect to have returned permanently, given that they are rather poorly integrated in their host country and have their families at origin in most cases. Beyond the mythical permanent return, more and more migrants plan for dual residence, living one part of the year in their homeland and the other part in the host country (Bolzman, Fibbi, and Vial 2006).



6

See Hagan and Wassink (2020) or Wahba (2014) for a detailed literature review.

58  Handbook of human mobility and migration

ONWARD MIGRATION BETWEEN MULTIPLE COUNTRIES: PLANNED TRAJECTORIES OR MOVEMENTS TOWARDS NEW HORIZONS? As underlined in the previous sections, most studies on temporary migration focus on return movements, which illustrates how research on migration traditionally adopts a bipolar perspective on trajectories by typically limiting the possibilities to two countries: the origin country and a unique destination. Yet, migrants can also move from one host society to a third country – or more. Such movements are usually referred to as onward, secondary, or multiple migrations.7 A mostly qualitative literature on these migration patterns has started to grow lately (Ciobanu 2015; Jeffery and Murison 2011), with special focus being placed on intra-EU mobility targeting the UK (Ahrens, Kelly, and Van Liempt 2016; Della Puppa, Montagna, and Kofman 2021), since the free movement regime eases such multiple border crossings. Dissatisfaction with the initial country of destination is an important driver of onward mobility, as moving to a new country is often a way for migrants to escape economic difficulties in the labor market or experiences of racism and discrimination (Ahrens et al. 2016; Toma and Castagnone 2015; Van Liempt 2011), and to seek better opportunities for their children (Della Puppa and King 2018). Economic crises in the former host society (Mas Giralt 2017; Ortensi and Barbiano di Belgiojoso 2018; Ramos 2018) and the desire to join relatives or larger ethnic communities (Ahrens et al 2016; Morad and Sacchetto 2020; Toma and Castagnone 2015) can also foster an onward move. Although studies distinguishing between return and onward migration are still scarce, the latter would be more common among highly-educated migrants (Caron 2020; Nekby 2006) and forced migrants (Monti 2020). From a theoretical perspective, onward migration interestingly questions traditional assimilation theories. For example, naturalization is often regarded as the final step in the integration process of migrants (Gordon 1964), leading to their permanent settlement. However, acquiring citizenship has also been shown to provide “mobility capital” (Moret 2018) that facilitates further migration, as authorized migration is restricted to varying degrees on the basis of one’s nationality. The most striking example is that of EU citizenship: while naturalization is traditionally associated with settling permanently in the host society, studies underline that it can also help third-country nationals move again within Europe because it reshapes the legal structure of their European mobility opportunities (Ahrens et al. 2016; Della Puppa 2018).8 In that perspective, Della Puppa and Sredanovic (2017) distinguish between “citizenship to stay” and “citizenship to go.” In the study of migrations between multiple countries, another stream of research focuses more specifically on supposedly pre-planned trajectories. An illustration of such patterns can be found in the “stepwise international migrations” that Paul (2011) describes in relation to Filipino domestic workers living in the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Singapore. In a context of more restrictive migration policies, her interviews show that some migrants who lack the resources for directly settling in their preferred destination choose instead to first migrate to Multiple migrations may additionally involve returns to the origin country along the way (Salamońska and Czeranowska 2021). However, once again, no consensual definition emerges in the literature and “repeat migration […] can equally include onward migration” (Constant 2020, 6). 8 It could also foster stays in the origin country, as the insurance of a permanent residence permit makes it easier for migrants to temporarily visit their homeland. 7

Is there an end to mobility? Circular and onward migrants  59 intermediate countries with less restrictive migration regulations albeit less attractive living conditions. They can then move from one country to another, thereby working their way up through a personal hierarchy of countries until they are able to legally enter their “dream destination,” thanks to the capital they accumulated along their migration trajectory. An interesting feature of this strategy is that these hierarchized itineraries are pre-planned and actively implemented by the migrants themselves. This idea of a pre-defined trajectory also underlies transit migration, which became a popular concept in the 1990s to mainly characterize the journeys of illegal migrants crossing several countries to finally reach the EU (Düvell 2012). By contrast, onward migration would not be planned, thus “leaving open the possibility that after settling in one place, migrants may later decide to migrate to another place – or even a number of places – they had not considered at the start of their journey” (Ahrens et al. 2016, 85). This theoretical distinction is nevertheless now largely challenged, as many scholars question the term “transit migration” precisely for being too deterministic (Collyer and de Haas 2012). Focusing solely on the origin country and a presupposed final destination would reduce the migration journey to an insignificant transition (Collins 2021; Crawley and Hagen-Zanker 2018; Crawley and Jones 2020; Schwarz 2018). In fact, not all migrants necessarily have a specific final destination in mind from the beginning. The ethnographic work by Schapendonk and Steel (2014) followed Nigerians and Sudanese heading toward the EU, showing how their trajectories are modified step by step along the way as they adapt to unexpected difficulties and develop new social networks. Not only can migrants’ destinations and the time they intend to stay in each country evolve throughout their itineraries, but their aspirations and desires can also change more broadly over time (Boccagni 2017; Drinkwater and Garapich 2015). Collyer (2010) developed the concept that he called the “fragmented journey,” which better captures the dynamic nature of migration processes and the diverse experiences that lead individuals to reorient their migration project. The purpose of this chapter is not to identify the best terminology for characterizing the diversity of migration trajectories but to instead summarize the more interesting take-home message of this literature, which is namely that migration is a continuous process in which migrants can always move again – or at least make plans to do so – depending on the economic and legal restrictions they face.

METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS TO STUDYING ENDLESS MOBILITY Is there an end to mobility? This literature review shows that individual migration trajectories are never definitively over. Settlement in a host country that was initially planned to be permanent may turn into a new move, or a temporary stay may become permanent, and migration routes can be complex configurations that involve various countries and frequent trips. Nevertheless, existing data, surveys, and field studies are limited in the degree of complexity that they can capture. As mentioned earlier, the study of international movements is constrained by data availability, as most datasets fail to follow individuals across national borders. By matching censuses and population registers from different countries, better migration estimates can be provided by international databases such as IPUMS, the OECD’s DIOC, or the World Bank’s Global Bilateral Migration Database (Ozden et al. 2011; Pedersen, Pytlikova, and Smith 2008). Yet, they remain at an aggregate level and therefore cannot precisely monitor migrants throughout their – potential – complex journeys. Reconstituting lon-

60  Handbook of human mobility and migration gitudinal microdata by matching nominal files from different countries’ censuses or registers constitutes a step forward in tracking migrants from one country to another. Such a procedure has been implemented to study return migration between the US and Norway by Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2019), as well as between Sweden and Finland by Rooth and Saarela (2007). By definition, however, these ingenious methods are limited to a pre-defined number of countries. Similarly, multi-sited longitudinal surveys are based on a limited set of sending and receiving countries, as in the case of the Mexican Migration Project (Massey 1987a) or the Migrations between Africa and Europe survey (Beauchemin 2018). Still, collecting data simultaneously in sending and destination countries remains one of the most promising avenues for studying migration trajectories (Beauchemin 2014). The idea of a possible end to mobility also questions the continuity of the migration process over generations. Children of immigrants born at destination have proven to engage in transnational activities (Levitt and Waters 2002), although in different ways than their parents (Safi 2017). Similarly, they develop mobility aspirations that are embedded in their family migration history. Research on the migration intentions and behaviors of second-generation immigrants has grown in recent years, focusing almost exclusively on returns to the parents’ origin country (Christou 2006; Conway and Potter 2009; Fokkema 2011; Reynolds 2010; Wessendorf 2007). Although, strictly speaking, these migrations are not “return” movements to the birth country, most studies adopt this term because this mobility can be a way for second-generation migrants to re-connect to their ethnic homeland (Tsuda 2003). As King and Christou (2010:115) put it: “The second generation’s ‘return’ and the narration of this return are performative acts during which the migrant, through the story of the self, is (re)located in the story of the familial, the ancestral, and ultimately within the (trans)national diaspora.” Nurtured by the romanticized image of the homeland transmitted by their parents (Wessendorf 2007), several studies document how some disenchanted second-generation migrants consider “returning” in hopes of finding better socioeconomic opportunities in their parents’ homeland or of escaping experiences of discrimination at the destination (Bolognani 2007; Caron 2020; Kılınç and King 2017; Reynolds 2010). The continuous feature of migration across generations also refers to the formation of a culture of migration that Kandel and Massey (2002) first theorized in the case of Mexican communities, showing that previous migrations to the US by one or more members of a community facilitate further migration among other members of that same community. The intergenerational transmission of a “family migration capital” (Ivlevs and King 2012) could thus foster the migration of future generations (or at least the formation of such aspirations), who may target either their parents’ origin country or another one (Caron 2020). From a methodological perspective, these intergenerational considerations pose challenges to studying migration trajectories based strictly on administrative data, in which individuals’ connections and migration family background are more difficult to identify. Given the difficulty in measuring actual migration trajectories, some studies rely on indicators of migration intentions (specifically on return intentions: Carling and Pettersen 2014; Di Saint Pierre, Martinovic, and De Vroome 2015; Diehl and Liebau 2015; de Haas and Fokkema 2011; de Haas, Fokkema, and Fihri 2015). The results are mixed on the reliability of such subjective indicators: individuals who declare migration aspirations tend to be more likely to migrate (Creighton 2013; De Jong 2000), and some studies find a strong association between migration intentions and actual flows (Tjaden, Auer, and Laczko 2019) while others suggest that they are not always good predictors of real departures (Docquier, Peri, and Ruyssen 2014). Whether or not desires to migrate eventually turn into actual behaviors, these variables

Is there an end to mobility? Circular and onward migrants  61 are in any case valuable in themselves, as they provide interesting insights into the migration decision-making process and the ability to develop mobility aspirations (Carling and Collins 2018; Carling and Schewel 2018). Intentions to leave also help us understand the personal experiences of immigrants and their descendants at destination. For instance, plans for an anticipated remigration affect the way immigrants invest in the host society (Chabé-Ferret, Machado, and Wahba 2018; Dustmann and Görlach 2016). Migration intentions can also reflect identification processes, as illustrated by the key role played by the “myth of return” in migrants’ narratives over generations. The continuity of the migration process is thus not only embodied in new and concrete physical movements across borders, but also found in the possibility of considering another move and picturing oneself in another country. These envisioned migrations can only be captured in qualitative interviews or through dedicated questions in surveys, even though the variety in phrasing often makes it difficult to compare migration plans across surveys (Carling and Schewel 2018). Finally, given the minimum period of settlement that is often used to define a move to another country as a migration, the observable complexity of the trajectories is limited. The long timespan between most population censuses underestimates the circularity of individual migrations. As for surveys, they usually account for migrations involving only a relatively sizeable length of stay at destination – normally one year of residency, which is in line with the United Nations’ definition of migration (United Nations 1998). Due to this contradiction between the fluidity of international flows and the rigidity of conventional measures of migration, further questions arise regarding how to account for individuals who live simultaneously in two countries: while they cannot be traditionally defined and measured as migrants, their transnational lives can hardly be subsumed within our classic understanding of non-migrants (Carling, Erdal, and Talleraas 2021).

CONCLUSION This chapter has discussed the various forms that migration pathways can take. Far from the classical rigid conception of migration as a linear and one-time trajectory, migration is instead a continuous process that can result in diverse and more or less complex patterns. Under these circumstances, some scholars are shifting their focus from migration analysis to the study of mobility (Faist 2013; Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013; Sheller and Urry 2006). As this term encompasses a broader spectrum of practices, it would better take into account circular and short-term movements that are facilitated by legal structures, such as intra-EU mobility (Recchi 2015). Ultimately, our capacity to account for the complexity of individual geographical trajectories nevertheless inherently depends on the data available to measure them. While traditional administrative data and surveys are limited to monitoring the diversity of mobility practices, new methods based on geolocated data such as Facebook or Twitter could provide a complementary approach on migration dynamics (Hawelka et al. 2014; Willekens et al. 2016), although they are likely to target specific highly mobile groups (Armstrong et al. 2021). One may wonder whether these transnational practices will become more common in the post-COVID world, as lockdowns have led to some people working remotely from abroad,

62  Handbook of human mobility and migration although with unequal access according to social class and type of work.9 At this point, it is still impossible to predict the long-term consequences of the pandemic crisis. Although the first lockdowns and closures of many borders during 2020 led to massive and sudden return migrations for thousands of migrant workers (Guadagno 2020; Le Coz and Newland 2021), it is possible that in the long run tighter regulations on cross-border moves may have the opposite effect of motivating migrants to stay abroad more permanently than expected, as more restrictive migration policies tend to reduce circular and return migrations (Carling 2004; Flahaux 2017; Massey, Durand, and Pren 2015).

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Are international and internal migration distinct phenomena? Marine Haddad and Haley McAvay

INTRODUCTION The notion of migration relies on two equally important concepts: borders and distance. Traditionally, a migrant is someone who travelled a – geographical – distance and crossed a – politically controlled – border to live in a new place. The duration of stay can also play an important part in the definition of migration (e.g. seasonal workers vs. migrants who settle permanently). From this perspective, international and internal migration may appear at first very different: the assumptions are that states exert much more control on national borders than internal borders and that moving from one country to another requires a longer and riskier journey than moving from one region to another. The larger number of regional migrants compared to international migrants seems to back these claims (UNDP 2009). Yet, a growing literature shows that there are many counter-examples to such assumptions. The Chinese state regulates more strictly rural-to-urban mobility than the EU does movements between member states (at least for EU citizens). The French department of Reunion Island is an 11-hour flight across the ocean from mainland France, while Toronto, Canada is only a couple of hours by car from Buffalo, USA. The reshaping of borders in former Soviet Europe has turned regional migrants into international migrants. With the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, nation states have implemented strict controls not only on international travel but on local mobility with stay-at-home orders (Warren and Skillman 2020). Blurring the distinction between these two types of migration, some studies therefore argue that there is no discontinuity between internal and international mobility – that they differ only in the level of the associated risks, obstacles and returns to migration (King and Skeldon 2010; Ellis 2012; Brown and Bean 2016). In addition to the conceptual challenge of defining migration types, from an empirical point of view, rarely are internal and international mobility systematically analyzed together as a unique set of mobility choices potentially stemming from similar mechanisms. Empirical studies of international migration have often conceptualized migration as a rational decision made by income-maximizing individuals, or more recently, as the combined outcome of micro, meso and macroforces. These studies stress the role played by family and social relationships as well as the influence of broad “push” and “pull” factors that trigger migration for economic, political or environmental reasons (Massey et al. 1993). In contrast, the large body of empirical work on residential mobility – developed primarily in the U.S. and Western Europe – focuses on the micro-level individual or household determinants of movement within a nation state only, paying particular attention to life-course factors causing people to move, such as housing preferences, employment, union formation or dissolution, and retirement. Interestingly, this perspective typically prefers the term “mobility” over “migration”. These diverging approaches are moreover rooted in disciplinary differences: international migration 70

Are international and internal migration distinct phenomena?  71 typically comes from economics and sociology, while residential mobility studies are mostly grounded in geography, demography and urban studies. Given the conceptual and methodological differences in approaches to international and internal migration, few studies explore how the determinants and motivations of these types of movement converge or differ. Studying these two forms of migration conjointly is moreover a challenge due to the dearth of datasets that make it possible to measure internal and international migration simultaneously. In this chapter, we explore recent research on different types of migration contexts to investigate the distinction between international and internal migration. We first review the relevant literature on both forms of migration, before turning to research that attempts to “bridge the gap” between them. Second, we offer an original empirical analysis of both forms of mobility drawing on two French datasets, the Permanent Demographic Sample and the Trajectories and Origins Survey. These are two unique sources that enable the determinants and motivations of both types of migration to be analyzed conjointly. While the national border – and the types of political membership that go with it – remain an important structuring factor of migration, we show that migration and residential mobility studies would greatly benefit from considering the continuum of geographical distances mobile individuals can travel and the role of other borders, such as regional ones. Our findings do not suggest systematically studying all types of moves together, but rather advocate for giving up preconceived approaches based only on their international or internal nature. We suggest that researchers draw on both perspectives of migration and residential mobility when assessing the causes or consequences of population movements.

LITERATURE REVIEW Since the 1960s, international and internal migrations have been studied mainly separately, with a hegemonic place of international migration in the field of social sciences. Yet, such a divide was not always so important. The first attempts at typologizing migration did not even separate the two (Fairchild 1913; Petersen 1958). Today, calls for the bridging of this divide multiply (King and Skeldon 2010; Ellis 2012; Brown and Bean 2016), based primarily on three ideas. First, we should not assume that the national scale is the more relevant scale of analysis – this assumption stems from a ‘methodological nationalism’ bias (Levitt and Schiller 2004). Second, internal and international migrations are part of a common process – they are linked in migration systems (Zabin and Hughes 1995; del Rey Poveda 2007; Solignac 2018). Last, internal migration poses the same theoretical problems as international migration, especially in terms of impact on host societies and integration. We first review approaches to international migration and internal residential mobility separately, discussing how theories and methodological tools from one field can inform the other, before turning to studies that analyze them within a common framework. International Migration Combining macro and micro perspectives, social scientists have long associated international mobility with differentials in opportunities (demand for skilled or unskilled labour, returns to education, financial structures, etc.) modulated by varying levels of risks and barriers (means of transportation, laws regulating border-crossing, etc.). Neoclassical economics defines

72  Handbook of human mobility and migration migration as the outcome of rational individual strategies: migrations reflect differentials in wages, unemployment or returns to human capital between sending and receiving regions (Borjas 1989). In the new economics of migration, households seek to maximize income but also to minimize risk, by diversifying sources of income, and to maximize status, often in relation to a reference group (Stark 2006). In the segmented labour market theory, individual decisions matter less than the demand for cheap flexible labour (Piore 1979). To fill the bottom jobs that are always the least desirable in terms of status, employers need workers who are motivated by income alone, not status: distanced from their peers left behind in the home country, migrants are more likely to fit this category of employees. In the world system theory, the opposition between core nations and peripheral nations drives migration, because of the expansion of markets within a global political hierarchy (Sassen 1989). Depending on the field, researchers put the emphasis either on structural determinants or individual strategies, but the underlying assumptions remain similar and their frameworks are more complementary than rival (Massey et al. 1993). Over time, perspectives on the drivers of migration have become more complex. Migration combines the aspiration to migrate and the capacity to migrate (Carling 2002; 2014; Carling and Schewel 2018). On the one hand, studies have incorporated institutional and cultural dimensions, focusing on the meso level (Kandel and Massey 2002). The social capital theory underlines the role of migrant networks and infrastructures promoting mobility (Boyd 1989). The cumulative causation theory shows how past migrations participate in economic, institutional, but also ideological changes in the home society that encourage future migrations (Massey 1990). The “push-pull plus” framework helps understand the way structures “enable and constrain the exercise of agency by social actors” (Van Hear et al. 2018, p. 928). On the other hand, studies have refined their conceptualization of migrants’ motivations. The notion of ‘aspiration’ encapsulates issues of identity, subjectivity, emotions and transformation (Carling and Collins 2018). To assess these theories, empirical studies investigate the process leading up to migration and the specific characteristics of migrants compared to non-migrants. A large body of quantitative work especially focuses on migrant selection, comparing the profiles of migrants with those of non-migrants in the home society. The results vary with the countries of origin, the destinations and the time period, but general trends emerge. In numerous cases, wealth and skills share a bell-shaped relation with migration probabilities (Du et al. 2005; McKenzie and Rapoport 2007; Lu et al. 2013). Migration networks in the destination country increase the chances of migration (Davis et al. 2002; McKenzie and Rapoport 2010; Liu 2013). Finally, the effects of socio-demographic as well as network variables differ based on gender (Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003). In addition to these factors, recent literature has shown how migration policies structure migration opportunities and migrants’ paths. Because citizenship is a key determinant of freedom of movement versus controlled mobility, as well as access to social rights (Zolberg 1981; Brubaker 1992; Joppke 2010), social scientists have for long focused on this type of national membership. Yet, while citizenship matters, the law does not consider all non-citizens equally and citizenship is not the exclusive vector of social rights on a territory. In their study of immigration laws from the late 18th to the 21st centuries, Cook-Martín and Fitzgerald (2014) show how these policies determine racial exclusion and preferences. Not all prospective migrants have access to the resources necessary for authorized migration, even when they come from the same country: in their study of Mexican migration to the US, Asad and Hwang

Are international and internal migration distinct phenomena?  73 (2019) show how indigenous communities lack the economic vitality, financial institutions, and migrant brokers that would encourage documented migration and therefore display higher rates of undocumented migration. Access to documentation has become a key factor in migration. As legal residence increasingly grants access to rights, it reduces the divide between citizens and long-term residents while reinforcing the disparity between authorized and unauthorized migrants (Brown and Bean 2016; Soysal 1994). In this growing divide, the criminalization of migration intersects with racial boundaries (Kil and Menjívar 2006; Menjívar 2006). While migration policies have overall become more selective to the detriment of low-skilled or family migration (de Haas et al. 2018), some international migrants benefit from open-border policies that give them access to social rights in the host society, with little to no administrative procedure required. The most famous example is the free movement regime that citizens from the European Union benefit from, but there are other cases of uncontrolled international flows, for instance, between Thailand and Malaysia, or Riau Archipelago and Singapore (Klanarong 2003; Lyons and Ford 2007; Hugo 2016). The distinction between authorized and unauthorized migration could therefore be as relevant and fruitful as the one between internal and international migration. The distinction between authorized and unauthorized migration – or at least between controlled and uncontrolled migration – offers a frame of analysis useful for studying internal migration as well. There are many examples of state control over regional mobility. In China, the hukou, a selective system controlling internal moves, determines access to the labour market and social rights, such that the divide between hukou and non-hukou migrants is very similar to that between undocumented and documented international migrants (Chan et al. 1999). Similar systems have existed in Japan, with the koseki, in Vietnam, with the hộ khẩu, and in Korea, with the hoju (Hugo 2016). In the US, control over internal migration is less overt, but does exist through state regulation of professions; attempts to limit state citizenship rights and the benefits they confer by opposing federal and state regulation; and local, national and state policies that influence the geography of growth (Ellis 2012). States can also exert control over internal flows through mobility programs that actually encourage migration. In France, since the 1960s, targeted programs have promoted migration from the overseas departments of Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guyana and Reunion Island to mainland France, with increasing selectivity over time (Haddad 2018; 2022). Most recently, the Covid-19 pandemic has driven states all over the world not only to close their national borders but also to control internal mobility, by individually tracing movements or by restricting them through lockdown policies and regional border closures (Lee and Lee 2020; Tang 2020). We have focused here on the political dimension of international migration, as researchers often consider it the most salient line of divide between internal and international migrations (King and Skeldon 2010). We have shown how the motivations and consequences of controlling flows can apply as well to internal migration, and the study of international migration offers other heuristic tools to analyze internal migration. We conclude this section by underlining two of them. First, immigration studies that focus on integration have a lot to bring to our understanding of internal migration. The trajectories of African Americans who migrated from Southern to Northern US during the “Great Black Migration” highlight the importance of adopting the integration-perspective when studying regional migrants (Boustan 2016). Second, internal migration studies would also benefit from thinking of migration in relation to development. An example for that is the key role Shanghai plays in China’s development, as 39 percent of its inhabitants are interprovincial migrants (Hugo 2016).

74  Handbook of human mobility and migration Residential Mobility Residential mobility studies have a long history in the US and Europe, with somewhat contrasting disciplinary roots compared to international migration approaches. While international mobility stems primarily from sociology and economics, the analysis of residential mobility has its roots in geography and demography. The scope of these studies tends to be restricted to the analysis of short – or medium – distance mobility within the nation state, with little regard to mobility choices that surpass national boundaries. Residential mobility – particularly short-distance mobility – is typically conceptualized within theories of the life course (Mulder and Hooimeijer 1999; Clark et al. 2006; Coulter and Van Ham 2013; Coulter and Scott 2015; Findlay et al. 2015; Clark and Lisowski 2017). From this perspective, households decide to move in order to update their residential options – housing tenure, housing conditions or neighborhoods – as a function of needs, preferences and economic constraints that fluctuate over time. The housing disequilibrium model predicts that when household members become dissatisfied with their current residence due to life changes, they move as part of a strategy to “restore equilibrium” or readjust their residential situation to meet their new situation. If socioeconomic resources allow, this may involve moving to improve housing conditions, or to access better local services or amenities, such as schools (Clark et al. 2006). Because requirements for housing and location are tightly linked to family structure, mobility may be a precursor or consequence of life course events, such as union formation, dissolution, fertility or departures from the parental home in young adulthood. Given the emphasis on the life course, residential mobility studies draw heavily on the quantitative analysis of longitudinal data to track patterns and determinants of household moves over time. This methodological approach makes it possible to analyze individual residential “biographies” in tandem with life events (Coulter and Van Ham 2013). Empirical findings from multiple contexts indicate that, overall, mobility is higher among people who are young, unmarried, and who rent their homes (Lundholm et al. 2004; Clark and Lisowski 2017). Yet key life events such as getting married, separating or divorcing, and having children trigger relocations (Feijten and van Ham 2010; Clark and Lisowski 2017). Once children are of school age, residential mobility tends to decrease. Some research indicates that mobility may occur in anticipation of such events to the extent that they are planned. For instance, research from the Netherlands shows that residential mobility occurs shortly before having a child or getting married (Feijten and Mulder 2002; Michielin and Mulder 2008). In contrast, important life course events may trigger moves even among households who had no mobility plans or intentions. Research comparing mobility intentions with actual moves documents that family transitions such as marriage, separation/divorce and childbirth provoke residential mobility among households with no previous intention to move (Coulter et al. 2011; De Groot et al. 2011; Clark and Lisowski 2018). These ties between mobility, life course events and household-level determinants align with some empirical studies of international mobility that highlight how cross-border migration is triggered by factors such as marriage (González-Ferrer 2012; Toma and Vause 2014; Caarls and Mazzucato 2016) or the prior migration of family members (Palloni et al. 2001). The residential mobility literature further pays attention to how educational and employment opportunities shape moving decisions. In this sense, residential mobility studies converge with international migration approaches by taking the perspective of neoclassical economics. In other words, individuals may move strategically to seek out better educational

Are international and internal migration distinct phenomena?  75 or labor market opportunities, improve income and increase human capital. Overall, evidence suggests that internal migrants tend to be positively selected as the higher skilled are more mobile (Lundholm et al. 2004; Faggian et al. 2007; Faggian et al. 2017). Nonetheless, showing some similarities with the bell-shaped relationship between skills and mobility found in international migration research, it is also a common empirical finding that the unemployed have higher mobility rates compared to the employed, as they seek out better labor market opportunities in new places (Böheim and Taylor 2002; De Groot et al. 2011). Empirical findings indeed suggest that education and employment are key drivers of mobility, yet these motivations are often secondary to family or housing considerations (Lundholm et al. 2004; Morrison and Clark 2011). Research further documents that when individuals change location for educational and employment reasons, they are more likely to move long distances (Boheim and Taylor 2002; Lundholm et al. 2004; Niedomysl 2011). For instance, students frequently cross regional boundaries to enroll in higher education (Belfield and Morris 1999; Mak and Moncur 2003; Faggian and McCann 2009) in similar ways that decisions to move across national borders may coincide with university enrollment for students seeking educational opportunities abroad (King and Raghuram 2013). These individual residential mobility strategies are, of course, directly linked to inter-regional and international spatial inequalities, as students and workers are pulled by more attractive educational and labor market opportunities outside of their place of origin. All in all, the bulk of these residential mobility studies emphasize the micro-level as the crucial set of determinants of changing location. Still, more recent empirical work has acknowledged the role of broader structural mechanisms at the city or national level that shape moving behavior beyond individual or household-level characteristics. The local housing stock, local or national housing policies, and labor market characteristics have all been documented as relevant factors (De Jong et al. 2005; Clark and Coulter 2015; Coulter et al. 2016). The literature on ethno-racial residential segregation has, in particular, highlighted how individual mobility patterns are influenced by structural forces and the demographic composition of local spaces, such as their ethno-racial or socioeconomic makeup. The place stratification theory posits that dominant groups – particularly the racial majority or high SES groups – use space to secure access to privileged resources and maintain separation with minorities (Logan and Molotch 1987; Crowder et al. 2012). Thus, even though no political borders are crossed, race may act as a determinant of relocation, in ways similar to international migration. Prior studies have shown that racial minorities are more likely to live in and move into poor neighborhoods (Crowder and South 2005; Van Ham et al. 2014; Huang et al. 2021). In contrast, white households have been shown to move out of neighborhoods with high shares of ethno-racial minorities in a process called “white flight” (Crowder 2000; Van Ham and Clark 2009; McAvay 2018). Simultaneously, racial discrimination on housing markets constrains the relocation opportunities for targeted minorities. Further, just as the presence of coethnic networks in the destination country may trigger individuals to cross national borders, the spatial concentration of coethnics in cities or neighborhoods can discourage residents from moving out or act as a “pull” factor for incoming households. Such structural forces facilitate or hinder the residential mobility of ethno-racial minorities, above and beyond micro-level determinants.

76  Handbook of human mobility and migration Mobility Pathways Combining Internal and International Migration In the previous sections, we have presented the analytical frameworks in international and internal migration studies. We have highlighted their differences, but also how each field can draw from the other to enrich their analyses. Yet, bridging the gap between international and internal migration studies is not only a matter of sharing conceptual and methodological tools. Empirically, it is necessary to consider internal and international migrations simultaneously in three configurations: (i) when international migration follows internal migration; (ii) when internal migration follows international migration; (iii) when both are part of a common set of alternatives. These combinations can occur at the macro level or the individual level. First, in the most common sequence, internal migration precedes international migration. At the macro level, this means that mobility behaviors develop in a context of internal migrations and later on allow for emigration toward foreign countries to emerge. The inhabitants of Mirpur, in Pakistan, and Sylhet, in Bangladesh, are historically mobile populations with diverse flows of emigration within their country. With colonial involvement, they became the primary actors of Pakistani and Bangladeshi migration to the UK (Gardner 1995; Ballard 2003). Throughout the second half of the 20th century, northern Italy’s dynamic industry first attracted workers from proximate rural regions, then from southern Italy, before turning to international immigrants to meet its labour demand (King et al. 1997). Yet, there are also cases where internal and international migration from a region develop as two separate systems rather than the product of a common evolution, like in Kerala, India, where internal and international migrants do not share the same background or motivations (Skeldon 2006). At the individual level, internal migration is often the first step in a process leading to international migration. Most migrants who move from Thailand to Singapore or Japan first experience an internal mobility from their villages to the northeast of the country, especially Bangkok, before migrating internationally (Wong 2000; Ito and Chunjitkaruna 2001). Bakewell and Jónsson (2011) show how large cities in Ghana, Nigeria, Morocco, and the Democratic Republic of Congo act as places of transit for internal migrants from rural areas, preparing them for longer-distance migration whether they had planned it or not. Stepwise migration is also common for migrants from the rural parts of Mexico (Zabin and Hughes 1995; Lozano-Ascencio et al. 1999; Durand and Massey 2004). Second, internal mobility can also stem from international migration. At the macro level, large levels of emigration can fuel internal migration in the home society (Skeldon 2006; King and Skeldon 2010). Migrants from Kerala, Mirpur or Sylhet indirectly encourage influxes of migrant workers toward their home regions by creating labour shortages in the areas they left and stimulating the labour demand by sending remittances (Nair Gopinathan 1989; Gardner 1995; Kannan and Hari 2002; Ballard 2003). Similarly, in Mexico, the wage difference between the rural areas of Chiapas and Jalisco is such that migrants from Chiapas settle in Jalisco, replacing the migrants who moved to the US from Jalisco (Fitzgerald 2009). At the individual level, internal migration following international migration structures migrants’ paths at destination, with patterns that are distinct from non-migrants. In Europe and the US, a large body of research documents the specific residential mobility patterns for immigrants compared to natives. Spatial assimilation theory posits that, once settled in the host country, immigrants will experience upward residential mobility, improving their neighborhood and housing situations as they become culturally, socially and economically similar to natives (Massey and Denton 1985; Pais et al. 2012). Yet, disparities in the capacity to move and in

Are international and internal migration distinct phenomena?  77 relocation opportunities exist between immigrants based on their country of origin or race/ ethnicity due to place stratification dynamics mentioned above. Some research highlights that, because of lower socioeconomic status and/or housing market discrimination, immigrants are less mobile, and when they move, their mobility is restricted to specific residential areas, contributing to residential segregation between immigrant and natives at the macro level. Nonetheless, the assessment that immigrants move less often fails to account for international out-migration: drawing on the case of France, Solignac (2018) and Gobillon and Solignac (2020) challenge the supposed immobility of immigrants in France, showing that the low levels of immigrants’ internal mobility are coupled with higher levels of international mobility; while natives change cities or regions, immigrants change countries. Last, prospective migrants can consider internal and international mobility simultaneously, as has been shown across national contexts and historical periods (Brown and Bean 2016). A growing body of work studies internal and international migration simultaneously, in cases where they are part of a common migration system, whether alternatively or stepwise. Existing studies tend to reveal divergences between the factors associated with internal versus international migration. It is especially the case for Mexican migration within Mexico and to the US, where data availability has made it possible to engage in detailed analysis of different types of migration behaviours accounting for many factors at the individual, meso and macro level. Curran and Rivero-Fuentes (2003) show that migrant networks weigh more in migration to the US than in internal migration. Davis et al. (2002) compare the influence of ties on rural-to-rural, rural-to-urban, and rural-to-international migration. Using aggregated network measures, they also find that migrant networks have a more significant effect on chances of migration to the US, but differentiating ties based on the closeness of the bond nuances this result. Studying migration from Sotavento, del Rey Poveda (2007) shows how individual, family and local determinants differently affect chances of regional migration, North border migration and US migration. They stress how the different types of migration reflect different projects and family strategies. Studying internal and international migration in Nepal, Bohra and Massey (2009) also illustrate how sociodemographics correlate differently depending on mobility type. They find that skill levels are positively related to internal moves but not to emigration out of the country, while gender impacts internal and international moves in contrasting ways; women are more likely to undertake short distance moves, but substantially less likely to move between regions or out of the country.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE In this section, we draw on empirical evidence from France to simultaneously investigate the determinants and motivations of international and internal mobility, paying specific attention to the degree to which these two forms of migration are comparable. Individual mobility trajectories can be measured prospectively in the Permanent Demographic Sample (Echantillon démographique permanent, or EDP). Motivations for moving are explored drawing on retrospective data from the 2008 French survey Trajectories and Origins (TeO).

78  Handbook of human mobility and migration Determinants of International and Internal Mobility The Permanent Demographic Sample is a large, ongoing longitudinal data base produced by the French Census Bureau (INSEE) starting in 1967. The panel merges data from linked censuses as well as civil registries recording key life events. The data provides a representative sample of the French population. The sampling method relies on date of birth: individuals who were born on one of the first four days of October and for whom a census form or civil registry certificate are available are included in the panel. Respondents are then observed over census dates. The data are a rich source for studying mobility trajectories (Rathelot and Safi 2014; McAvay 2018; Solignac 2018). The analysis is restricted to years 1975–1999 during which the census provided full coverage of the population. We focus only on respondents living in metropolitan France at a given census date. Pooling all years, the sample size totals 718,055 respondents and 1,664,558 person/years. Repeated observations may exist per individual if they were observed in more than one census date. To account for this, the regression model is estimated using clustered standard errors at the individual level. Measuring Types of Migration Internal migration is defined as an observed change of place of residence between two consecutive census dates. We consider that mobility has occurred if respondents report a different zip code between waves. Two types of migration are defined: short-distance internal mobility, when respondents change municipalities within the same region, and long-distance internal mobility, when respondents change regions. Following past studies (Constant and Massey 2003; Bellemare 2007; Caron and Ichou 2020), we draw on panel attrition to measure international migration. If a respondent leaves the panel between two consecutive census dates, and their death is not reported in the civil registry, we consider that they have left the country. Because the French census provided full coverage of the population from 1967 until 1999, the loss of respondents from EDP over time due to typical panel attrition (non-response, the inability to relocate respondents, etc.) is minimal. We can thus be confident in the interpretation of panel attrition net of deaths as international mobility. Table 5.1  

Descriptive statistics on types of migration N

%

No Move

956,801

57

Short-distance move

367,460

22

Long-distance move

141,518

9

International move Attrition Total

35,859

2

162,920

10

1,664,558

100

Combining these measurements results in a dependent variable with the following outcomes: 1) no move (no change in zip code); 2) short-distance internal mobility; 3) long-distance internal mobility; and 4) international mobility. To ensure that results are robust to natural panel attrition, we also control for absence in the panel at the next census date due to a recorded

Are international and internal migration distinct phenomena?  79 death (5). Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics on types of migration. The majority of the sample did not move between two census dates. Short-distance moves were the most common form of mobility, at 22 percent. Only two percent of respondents emigrated from France over the period. Determinants of Migration Drawing on a multinomial logistic regression model, we investigate how socio-demographic factors correlate with these different types of mobility. Covariates include immigrant origin,1 age and age-squared, gender, education, occupation, marital status, number of children, housing tenure and period of observation. Results are presented in Table 5.2. The three types of mobility – short distance, long distance and international – are compared to respondents who did not move. The first finding of note is that short-distance and long-distance mobility share a number of similar mechanisms. Internal migrants tend to be positively selected, in that higher education and occupational status is associated with a greater likelihood of moving, whether within regions or between them. The only exception to this trend are the unemployed, who are also more likely to move short or long distances rather than stay put. Unmarried respondents are more likely to move than married persons, and renters have similar greater chances of changing location compared to homeowners. Finally, more children in the household is associated with greater odds of both types of internal mobility. Despite these similarities, the differential effects of some variables suggest that intra- and inter-regional mobility are not entirely identical processes. Distance does in this sense seem to matter to mobility decisions. In particular, gender, age, and immigrant origin show contrasting patterns across internal mobility types, and in some cases suggest comparable patterns between long-distance regional and international moves. Women are more likely to move short distances, but are less likely to move long distances – both between regions and between countries. While the likelihood of internal moving consistently decreases with age, the squared term reveals contrasting mobility trajectories later in life depending on distance. The probability of short-distance moves increases at an advanced age, but decreases when it comes to long-distance and international moves. Finally, as regards differences between immigrants and French natives, patterns are not entirely consistent across types of mobility. European origin immigrants are less likely to move short and long distances compared to natives. Non-European origin immigrants are similarly less likely than natives to move between regions. However, no significant differences are found between non-European origin immigrants and natives when moving shorter distances; moreover, the coefficient is positive, suggesting that non-Europeans may actually move within regions more frequently than natives. Nonetheless, sharp contrasts are still found between internal and international mobility, showing the distinctiveness of between-country moves. Immigrants of both origins are more likely to leave the country between inter-census periods than natives. Unlike the patterns shown for internal mobility, the likelihood of crossing international borders actually increases

1 Immigrants are defined as respondents who were born outside of France without French citizenship at birth. Country of birth is used to distinguish European origin and non-European origin immigrants.

80  Handbook of human mobility and migration with age, before diminishing later in life.2 The relationship between international mobility and social class also differs when it comes to changing countries. Although there is evidence of positive selection, as respondents with higher education and high occupational status (i.e. managers) are more likely to move to another country, higher international mobility is also found at the lower end of the social spectrum, indicating some negative selection as well. Persons with no education and the unemployed have increased chances of crossing borders. Marital status and housing tenure influence international mobility in the same way as internal mobility, but having children decreases the likelihood of emigrating. Table 5.2

Multinomial regression model predicting types of migration

 

Short-distance move

 

Reference: No Move

Long- distance move

International move

Ref: Natives European immigrants Non-European immigrants Age Age-squared

-0.086***

-0.333***

(0.013)

(0.022)

0.002

1.157***

(0.015)

(0.024)

-0.021***

-0.012***

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.002)

-0.000***

-0.000***

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.036***

-0.224***

(0.007)

(0.012)

0.000*** (0.000)

Female

-0.305***

1.186*** (0.022)

0.106*** (0.005)

(0.024) 0.014***

Education/Ref: No education Baccalaureat

0.600***

0.457*** (0.009) 0.984***

-0.098*** (0.016) 0.447***

(0.008)

(0.012)

(0.020)

-0.771***

-1.395***

-0.911***

(0.016)

(0.040)

(0.060)

Occupation/Ref: Blue collar Farmers Artisans/Small business owners

0.053*** (0.013)

Managers

0.100*** (0.013)

Intermediary professions

0.091*** (0.010)

White collar

0.107*** (0.008)

Never worked

0.170*** (0.035)

Students

0.499*** (0.010)

Inactive

-0.444*** (0.008)

0.317*** (0.020) 0.695*** (0.018) 0.456*** (0.015) 0.483*** (0.013) 0.663*** (0.049) 1.338*** (0.014) 0.247*** (0.013)

0.295*** (0.034) 0.196*** (0.033) -0.067* (0.028) 0.000 (0.024) 0.477*** (0.070) 1.010*** (0.023) -0.094*** (0.024)

2 To ascertain at what age the odds of moving decreases, we ran the model controlling for age categories. The likelihood of all mobility types begins to decreases starting with the 36-45 age group.

Are international and internal migration distinct phenomena?  81  

Short-distance move

 

Reference: No Move

Unemployed

0.219***

Long- distance move 0.709***

International move 0.519***

(0.012)

(0.018)

(0.029)

Marital status/Ref: Single Married Divorced/Widowed

-0.472***

-0.463***

-0.670***

(0.007)

(0.010)

(0.018)

-0.064***

-0.193***

-0.122***

(0.011)

(0.017)

(0.030)

Number of children/Ref: None One

0.171*** (0.006)

Two

0.237*** (0.006)

Three or more

0.362*** (0.008)

0.089*** (0.010) 0.156*** (0.009) 0.307*** (0.011)

-0.286*** (0.016) -0.505*** (0.016) -0.471*** (0.021)

Housing tenure/Ref: Owner Renter

0.849*** (0.005)

Other/Unknown

0.680***

0.851*** (0.008) 0.799***

0.711*** (0.014) 0.773***

(0.006)

(0.009)

(0.019)

-0.301***

-0.280***

(0.006)

(0.008)

-0.255***

-0.122***

(0.005)

(0.008)

(0.018)

-0.663***

-2.406***

-4.181***

(0.013)

(0.019)

(0.039)

1,606,649

1,606,649

1,606,649

Period/Ref: 1975–1982 1982–1990 1990–1999 Constant Observations

0.151*** (0.023) 1.734***

Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Outcome 5 (panel attrition due to death) is controlled for but not included in the table. *** p one week, in km)

Residential range (farthest distance > three months, in km)

Italy

4

4

6.0

6.1

(6.6)

(6.5)

2

1

3.8

2.7

(4.6)

(3.7)

1

1

2.4

2.1

(2.9)

(3.0)

2,078

1,899

4,252

4,118

(4,203)

(4,221)

1,634

1,484

3,900

3,471

(4,276)

(4,183)

962

1,173

2,017

1,952

(2,862)

(2,931)

Note:  N (FR) = 698; N (IT) = 1,004. Distances are computed between the largest airports in the countries of origin (France or Italy) and destination.

Table 6.2.

The sociodemographic determinants of the range of cognitive international space sets (farthest distance ever travelled) of French and Italian residents France

Gender

Ref = Woman

Age

Ref = less than 25 years old

Italy

.060

.070*

25–34 years old

.176**

.075

35–44 years old

.143*

.184**

45–54 years old

.223**

.179**

.416**

.097*

Education

55 years old and more Ref = lower than tertiary

.231**

.112**

Occupation

Ref = manual worker Routine white collar

.015

.163**

Self-employed, small employer

.063

.058

Manager and professional

.183**

.173**

Immigrant status

Ref = Born in France/Italy

-.044

Foreign origins

Ref = Both parents born in France/Italy

.007

.064

.057

N R²

 

698

1,004

 

.168

.088

Note:  OLS regressions with standardized beta coefficients. ** p