Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Volume Two [2, 1 ed.] 0765680688, 1315704749, 9780765680686, 9781315704746

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BEEENCYCLOPEDIAOF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME

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SHARPE REFERENCE Sharpe Reference is an imprint of (M.E.Sharpe, nc.

cM.E.Sharpe, inc. 80 Business Park Drive Armonk, NY 10504

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Produced by Golson Books, Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,

without the prior permission of the copyright holders. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Encyclopedia of intelligence and counterintelligence / Rodney Carlisle, editor. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7656-8068-8 (alk. paper) 1. Intelligence service—Encyclopedias. 2. Espionage—Encyclopedias. I. Carlisle, Rodney P.

JF1525.16 E64 2004 327.12’03—dc21

2003013036

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z 39.48.1984.

DEV(C) GI0L9 87-6

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Golson Books, Ltd. Geoff Golson, President and Editor Rodney P. Carlisle, Ph.D., General Editor, Intelligence Kevin Hanek, Design Director

Laura Lawrie, Copyeditor and Proofreader History Associates Incorporated, Photo Researcher Gail Liss, Indexer PHOTO CREDITS: Central Intelligence Agency: 283, 538, 545, 641, 667; International Monetary Fund: 707; Library of Congress/National Archive and Records

Administration: 3, 19, 42, 57, 69, 89, 103, 114, 126, 127, 130, 136, 141, 164, 196, 199, 206, 210, 214, 216, 219, 229, 257, 266, 267, 270, 278, 288, 293, 296, 302, 305, 334, 339, 340, 343, 344, 348, 366, 375, 377, 378, 391, 400, 406, 407, 409, 416, 437, 452, 461, 462, 463, 476, 493, 495, 506, 519, 521, 524, 534, 536, 540, 543, 544, 562, 581, 589, 591, 596, 603, 611, 617, 648, 649, 664, 683, 689, 710, 719, 730; NATO: 4, 453, 457; National Park Service: 372; National Security Agency: 441, 514, 531; Photo Disc: 51, 81, 155, 161, 175, 215, 300, 309, 321, 504, 549, 567, 636, 637, 646; United Nations: 662, 663;

www.bookguy.com: 17; www.vam.ac.uk: 56; www.cs.utah.edu: 68; www.maybole.org: 45; unimelb.ieeevic.org: 77; w1.159.telia.com: 79: www.senate.gov: 87, 180; www.spaceimaging.com: 93; www.1914-1918.be: 107; www.ahtg.net: 106; www.defenselink.mil: 160; www.gwu.edu: 188; www.nyhistory.org: 239; www.1789-1799.org: 249; www.armyinkashmir.org: 320; www.csc.liv.ac.uk: 330; www.reformation.org: 346; www.geocities.com/battleog/propaganda: 356; www.atin.org: 425; www.camera-exchange.de: 492; www.worldciv1.homestead.com: 530; www.pickens.k12.sc.us: 550; www.bibl.u-szeged.hu: 583; www.acro.harvard.edu, Gunther Eichhorn: 599; www.globalsecurity.org: 612; www.chinfo.navy.mil: 621; www.dsto.defence.gov: 627; www.imagine-it.co.uk : 658; www.anistor.co.hol.gr: 696; www.history.navy.mil: 722.

Encyclopedia of

INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE Contents VolumeII

Articles L - Z Resource Guide Appendix: 9/11 Commission Report Excerpts Index

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Maclean, Donald D. DONALD Maclean goes down in history as one of the most unscrupulous traitors to his native England, yet he went to his grave steadfastly denying any participation in subterfuge. One of five Cambridge University graduates accused of working undercover as foreign agents for the Soviet Union, Maclean was the first to be identified by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Washington, D.C. He fled to Moscow, Russia, in 1951 before he could be arrested and lived under the Soviet communist regime until his death 33 years later. Born in London in 1913, Maclean was the son

of Donald Maclean, a member of Parliament of Scottish lineage with strong liberalist leanings. The son’s formative years were spent among London’s elite, and among friends whose parentage consisted of the high-ranking peerage of the time. Young Maclean’s opinions on most subjects were unyielding and often not within the norm, as suggested in an anecdote about his childhood. According to a biography written for the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), Maclean always rooted for the Indians when playing “cowboys and indians” with his friends. He claimed that America really belonged to Native Americans. An excellent student, Maclean garnered top grades at the presti-

gious Gresham School; continuing education took him to Eton and Oxford Colleges, then to Trinity College, Cambridge University. There he became acquainted with four fellow students who, together with Maclean, would later band together as agents for the Communist Party. In their own specific ways they would aid the cause of the Soviet Union by stealing high-priority government data. The four classmates, who would be unmasked separately in years to come by American and British intelligence units were Anthony Blunt, John Cairncross, Kim Philby, and Guy Burgess, purportedly Maclean’s closest associate. In appearance, Maclean was tall, light-haired, baby-faced, and overweight. Those who knew him attest to Maclean's “paunchy, ungoverned stomach.” Leonard Forster, a fellow classmate from Cambridge, later recalled Maclean as a good student, but unfriendly except to a certain clique. Author Andrew Boyle’s book, The Climate of Treason, quotes Forster: “We went to the same supervisor and often compared notes about our work. I found him to be a very flabby character, yet also unwilling to budge even when proved wrong or ridiculous. He read a good deal. . and had no marked sense of humor.” In 1935, Maclean enlisted in the British diplomatic service, eventually rising to the position of third secretary at the British embassy in Paris, France. He traveled often on steamer and rail between the French capital and London. It was during

405

The mistake was costly, for it was during this time, 1938-40, that Maclean’s operations proved effective and accurate. A self-confessed lover named Kitty Harris reported that, when visiting his upscale apartment in the Chelsea section of London, she helped him take photos of hundreds of official doc-

uments smuggled out of official files. Within that two-year period, an estimated 45 boxes of top-secret material were shot on film, the photos promptly and secretly directed to Moscow. German occupation of France forced Maclean to flee Paris in 1940. With him he took a woman he had met there and with whom he had become engaged, Melinda Marling. Back in London they wed, but their honeymoon was interrupted by British war setvice; he was needed at the Home Office. In 1944, with the war still raging in Europe, he was ordered to America and was appointed first secretary to the German Department of the British embassy in Washington, D.C. The BBC reports that in the American capital Maclean “served on the Combined Policy Committee, which dealt with atomic energy and the atomic bomb. He passed

An undated photo of Donald Maclean from the U.S. National Security Agency Archives.

these sojourns, apparently that the Moscow-based NKVD (a predecessor to the KGB), the Soviet Union’s espionage and intelligence agency, sought his aid. He accepted their offer and elected to serve the Soviet cause at no charge. Not long before the outbreak of World War II, a high-ranking KGB official defected to London and sought refuge with the British secret service. The official, Walter Krivitsky, told the British of dozens of agents posted around England; even though he did not know their names per se, he related excellent descriptions of many of them. He described one of the newer spies as “a Scotsman of good family, educated at Eton and Oxford, and an idealist.” Had his interviewers pursued these caricatures, it is believed that Maclean would have surfaced. Rather, Krivitsky was branded a liar. “[The British] were not convinced of Krivitsky’s testimony and his leads were not followed up,” explains the United Kingdom National Archives.

everything he could learn in this post on to Moscow.” From Washington, D.C., Maclean was transferred to the consulate in Egypt, but by this time the combined American and British secret services were suspecting a spy in their midst. Important documents had been missing during wartime, the brunt of them under the auspices of Maclean’s old de-

partment. At the same time, American investigators had deciphered coded messages between the Soviet Union and its embassy that hinted at a mediator between postwar Russia and Britain. One decoded communiqué, intercepted by the FBI, referred to the mediator under the pseudonym of Homer, and another mentioned that this Homer had recently taken a leave of absence to London to visit his pregnant wife. The FBI, upon checking, found out that only one member of the British embassy— Maclean—had, only months earlier, returned to London to visit his pregnant wife. Maclean learned of the FBI’s suspicions through his old Cambridge associate, Philby, then working in the British intelligence office in Washington, D.C. Fearing that it was only a,matter of time before the FBI snared them both, Philby joined Maclean on his escape to Russia. Both men never left the sanctuary of the Soviet Union.

MacLean died in Russia in 1983, a citizen of that country and a member of the Communist Party. By that time, each of the Cambridge Five had been identified; three of them—Maclean, Burgess, and Philby—had already escaped to Moscow. Neither Cairncross nor Blunt was ever tried, but both lived out their lives in disgrace in England. JOSEPH GERINGER Essays ON History, INC. SEE ALSO: Blunt, Anthony; Burgess, Guy; Philby, Kim; Cairncross, John; MI-5; United Kingdom.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Andrew Boyle, The Climate of Treason (Hodder & Stoughton, 1979); “The Cambridge Spy Ring,” “Donald Duart Maclean,” and “(Cambridge Spies Surface

in

Moscow,”

www.newsbbe.co.uk;

James Monroe had not much more success against another, far more amateur and foolhardy “walk-in” recruit who also “spied” for Great Britain: John Henry, apparently an American ex-army officer who offered his services to Sir James Craig and Herman Ryland, British spymasters in Montreal, Canada. Henry traveled throughout New England in 1808-09 reading and clipping anti-war editorials and calling them “intelligence” in letters to Sir James Craig. Angered by British refusal to pay him $160,000, Henry eventually sold the letters to Madison and Monroe through a “Count Edouard de Crillon.” The letters held nothing not found in newspapers, and Crillon (who promised a French

Michael

Smith, “Soviet Spy’s Big Secret Affair with Donald Maclean,” www.telegrapjh.co.uk/news.

Madison, James FOURTH PRESIDENT of the United States from 1809-17, James Madison (1751-1836) struggled but largely failed to meet the gigantic, unexpected intelligence-gathering and counterespionage needs posed by the War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain (1812-15). As President Thomas Jefferson’s secretary of state from 1801 through 1809, Madison was a key official participant in many intelligence covert activities, including the use of the Contingent Fund to pay William Eaton to invade the Barbary state of Tripoli with a force of mercenaries, and the largely unsuccessful efforts to prevent British espionage in the United States prior to the war of 1812. The conduct of the war, and the events leading up to it, revealed just how rudimentary and crude U.S. intelligence gathering and counterintelligence operations were during the early 19th century. As secretary of state and then as president during his first term (1809-13), Madison was unable to frustrate or impede the British spying missions of Lieutenant William Girod and John Howe of Halifax, each of whom reported to their controllers in Canada that the United States was militarily unprepared for war. Madison and Secretary Of sovate

During the War of 1812, James Madison presided over one of

the weakest periods in American intelligence history.

villa to the dazzled and greedy Henry) proved to be a French con artist. Madison was seriously embarrassed through Congressional publication of the Henry-Craig correspondence. Madison, before the War of 1812, also drew on the Contingent Fund to implement a secret Congressional resolution to occupy the Spanish territories of Florida, to deny them as a potential base for the British. Napoleon had conquered Spain for the French in 1808, and since the Spanish colonial authorities held no loyalty to the French ruler, Congress felt that the United States might need to temporarily hold the Florida territories to prevent the British from snatching them. Madison’s agents, General George Matthews and Colonel John McKee, took the surrender of a Spanish fort, but Madison ended the mission after Federalist politicians accused him of using Matthews and McKee to do to Spain exactly what the British and Henry had presumably tried to do to the United States: foment rebellion and collect illegal intelligence. Madison’s tumultuous record as a war president against the British has been detailed by many historians and biographers, but it is clear that his army and navy commanders let him down as well. The United States no longer had the military intelligence apparatus commanded by General George Washington during the Revolution, and inept generals could not even prevent the loss of critical government documents, most notably during the burning of the American capital in 1814. Though one general, William Hull, sent an agent to successfully gather intelligence in British Canada, the general was fooled by a forged dispatch into overestimating the strength of his enemy. The ensuing loss of Detroit and the retreat from Washington, D.C. (after ignoring information gathered by veteran Revolutionary War agent Allan McClane, and ignoring even Monroe’s intelligence), simply revealed the defects in American intelligence analysis by Madison’s staff. These defects were not remedied until long after Madison’s death in 1836. MICHAEL REIS History ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED

SEE ALSO: War of 1812; Jefferson, Thomas.

Barbary General: The Life of William H. Eaton (Prentice Hall, 1968); G.J.A. O’Toole, Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA (Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991); Edward F. Sayle, “The Historical Underpinnings of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (v.1/1, 1986).

Manhattan Project SEE: Los Alamos; Fuchs, Klaus.

Malaysia MALAYSIA’S INTELLIGENCE system is controlled by two key ministries, Defense and Home Affairs. The former operates a network of agencies and special military services under the chief of Defense Force. The latter oversees the Royal Malaysian Police Force, Marine Police, Border Scouts, and Anti-Corruption Agency. As of 2003, all departments ultimately answer to Prime Minister Mahatir Mohammed, who has run Malaysia since 1981, and whose party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), has dominated the country since its independence from Britain in 1957. All intelligence and security services in Malaysia work under protection of the Internal Security Act (ISA), which grants the government broad powers while curtailing individual freedoms. Military intelligence operates under the Defense Intelligence Staff Division. In addition, individual services within the Malaysian Armed Forces maintain intelligence operations. This includes the Royal Army Intelligence and the Inspectorate General and Navy Intelligence (IG). There are also a number of security forces within the services. The Royal Malaysian Navy has the Special Naval Task Force (PASKAL), while the Army has the Grup Gerak Khas (GGK). PASKAL is responsible for the defense of Malaysia’s coastline, as well as its off-

shore economic interests. The GGK is designed for BIBLIOGRAPHY. Richard H. Adelson, “Politics and Intrigue: John Henry and the Making of a Political Tempest,” Vermont History (v.52/2, 1984); Samuel Edwards,

unconventional operations, including guerrilla activity, subversion, sabotage, counterterrorism and jungle warfare. Both the navy and army contribute

to the Malaysian Special Operations Forces (SOF), which is also made up groups such as the police paramilitary wing, the Pasukan Gerakan Khas (PGK). Intelligence and counterintelligence operations of the Royal Malaysian Police fall to the Special Branch Intelligence Unit. One of the largest intelligence units in southeast Asia, the Special Branch deals with a wide range of problems and issues. Unquestionably, it is used by the Malaysian government for political objectives, such as monitoring any opposition to UMNO. In this respect the Special Branch targets legitimate organizations, such as the Democratic Action Party (DAP), which is made up mostly of ethnic Chinese, and the hard-line, conservative Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS), the main opposition party. Under the Internal Security Act, hundreds if not thousands of people have been arrested and detained indefinitely without specific charge or trial. Malaysia’s largely Muslim population is, for the most part, moderate. However, in recent years, and especially since the attacks of September 11, 2001,

Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian capital, was one of the cities in which al-Qaeda terrorists planned their September 11 attacks.

ment charge that Mahatir has only used the war on terror as justification for the arrest and detention of legitimate political opposition under the ISA. ARNE KISLENKO, PH.D. RYERSON UNIVERSITY, CANADA

Islamic extremism in Malaysia and its connection to

terrorism has become a major political and intelli-

SEE ALSO: War on Terrorism; Al-Qaeda.

gence issue.

On the domestic front, there is the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), that favors the overthrow of the Mahatir government and the establishment of an Islamic state made up of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the southern Philippines. Formed in 1995, it is believed to have a membership of at least 300, based in rural parts of the country. Its operations include bombings, assassinations, and rob-

beries aimed against the Malaysian government and foreigners. There are also a number of international terrorist organizations with cells in Malaysia, including Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), both with links to the alQaeda network of Osama bin Laden. In fact, one of the most important plan-

ning meetings for the September 11 attacks is known to have taken place in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia’s capital. After 2001, Malaysia moved toward greater international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, largely through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Joint Declaration of August 2002. This includes the sharing of intelligence information

and joint operations against terrorist

cells in the region. Critics of the Malaysian govern-

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Asia 2002 Yearbook (Far Eastern Economic Review, 2003); Malaysian Armed. Forces, http://maf.mod.gov.my/English; The Federation of American Scientists Intelligence Resource Program, www.fas.org; Global Security, www.globalsecurity.org; C. Dalpino, “Second Front, Second Time: Counterterrorism and U.S. Policy Toward Southeast Asia,’’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs (v.15/2, June 2002); John Hilley, Mahatirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition (Zed Books, 2001); R. S. Milne, Malaysian Politics Under Mahatir (Routledge, 1999); Andrew Tan, “Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (v.23, October 2000).

Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) AS THE paramount leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from the 1930s until his death in

1976, Mao Zedong held final authority over intelligence and security work, and at times provided crucial direction. The party’s strict control of the

military also applied to control over its intelligence. The CCP leadership exerted intelligence and security oversight from 1928 to 1949 through the Central Special Operations Commission (Zhongyang Teke Wei-yuanhui) and eventually through other party bodies that were not always clearly identified in the 1960s and 1970s; into the 2000s, the party oversees intelligence and security through the Central Political and Legal Commission (CPLC). Mao asserted strong personal control that was consistent with his political reach in other areas. China’s intelligence and security organs have only once been in a position to terrorize the CCP, and that was at Mao’s direction: in Yenan in the early 1940s, he decided that the communist movement needed cleansing, and he used the CCP intelligence organization of the time, the Social Affairs Department (SAD), to implement the infamous Salvation (qiangjiu) Movement (1942-44). SAD pursued many people believed to be spies among those newly arrived in Yenan from the Japanese-occupied areas. However, by 1945 the severity of this campaign and the resentment it caused led Mao to rein in his intelligence chief, Kang Sheng. Most accounts show that Mao relieved Kang of his intelligence duties that year, although one CCP source shows him as SAD director through March 1947. Later, during the Cultural Revolution (CR), Mao again used Kang Sheng to “investigate” cadres. He also used various lower-level intelligence operatives for his own political purposes. According to historian Fang Chu, in February 1970, Mao abolished the main foreign intelligence organization, the Central Investigative Department (Diaochabu, or CID) and placed all of its personnel into the Army General Staff’s Second Department (military intelligence). By this version of history, Mao’s intention was at least in part to use CID’s civilian intelligence officers as spies within the army in order to learn about the activities of General Lin Biao, who died in 1971 while fleeing from China. For the 20 years between the end of the Salvation Movement and the beginning of the CR, Mao’s influence on intelligence and security was more routine and driven more by practicalities such as the perceived threat from the United States. In 1956 the CCP leadership was shocked by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s “secret speech” denouncing Stalin and the unrest in Eastern Europe that followed. Mao ordered his deputy, Zhou Enlai,

to establish the Institute of International Relations (Guoji guanxi yanjiusuo, later known as the China Institute of International Studies) to build expertise outside of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the CID. Consistent with this were later moves by Zhou Enlai to establish additional bodies, including the College of International Affairs (Guoji guanxi xueyuan) to train intelligence personnel for the CID and clandestine officers assigned cover with Xinhua News Agency. When Mao launched the CR in 1966, the only one of these institutes he kept open was the justestablished (1965) China Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). Although it continued to function, CICIR had to send some staff to the countryside while others remained in Beijing to analyze important events such as the U.S. escalation in Vietnam, the USS Pueblo crisis, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the Chinese border crisis with the Soviets. By 1969, Mao allowed CICIR to be restored. The Foreign Ministry’s Institute of International Relations did not reopen until 1973, underlining the critical role of CICIR at a time when Mao recognized the Soviet threat and the opportunity for an opening to America. MATTHEW BRAZIL UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA

SEE ALSO: China; Soviet Union; Kang Sheng. BIBLIOGRAPHY. A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (Columbia University Press, 1967); Richard Deacon, The Chinese Secret Ser-

vice (Taplinger, 1974); Howard DeVore, China’s Intelligence and Security Forces (Jane’s, 1999); Fang Chu, Gun Barrel Politics (1998); Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin (Prentice Hall, 1999); Li Ping, ed., Zhou Enlai Nianpu (People’s Publishing House, 1997); Xiaohong Liu, Chinese Ambassadors (Hong Kong University Press, 2001).

Marchetti, Victor INTELLIGENCE ANALYST and author Victor Marchetti joined the CIA in 1955 after graduating from Pennsylvania State University with degrees in history and Soviet Union studies. He spent 10 years as a Soviet military analyst during the height of the

Cold War. In 1966, he became a staff officer in the office of the director of Central Intelligence. While

he witnessed the inner workings of the CIA, Mar-

cured the release of 40 more FOIAG

chetti grew disillusioned with the agency and resigned in 1969.

Troubled by what he believed the CIA had become, he wrote a novel, Rope Dancer (1971), based on his experience. Though fiction, it was apparently

too close to the truth. The CIA obtained a court order prohibiting Marchetti from publishing anything related to intelligence without CIA review and approval. The CIA claimed that he violated the secrecy agreement he signed. Marchetti unsuccessfully appealed the court’s decision. When he received the court order he was working on a nonfiction book, with assistance from former State Department intelligence analyst John Marks, about the CIA. He finished the manuscript in August 1973, and when he submitted it to the CIA it became the first American book subject to prior review. The CIA deleted 339 sections. In October, Marchetti, along with his publisher, Alfred A. Knopf, and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), filed suit to get the injunction and deletions overturned.

By the time the trial started in February 1974, the CIA reduced its objections to 168. The court ruled in Marchetti’s favor, stating that only 27 of the 168 questioned entries could be considered classified. Knopf published the book, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, in 1974 without the 168 sections pending the CIA’s appeal. The book was printed with blank areas where the text was deleted; the restored 171 deletions appeared in bold type. The format of the book was as much a statement about the CIA as the content. In the book, Marchetti and Marks argued that the CIA had grown too large and bureaucratic to be effective. They believed the CIA had grown too enamored with its covert, paramilitary activities, most of which failed, and ceased being a benefit to national security. They concluded that the CIA required a major overhaul and Congressional oversight. Marchetti updated the book in 1980 (Dell) with 25 deletions reinstated through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. He lost his final court appeal in 1981, when the appellate court ruled that the deleted portions had to remain classified. Marchetti was able to update the text again in 1983 when the Center for National Security Studies se-

passages through

MICHAEL C. MILLER

DALLAS PUBLIC LIBRARY

SEE ALSO: Central Intelligence Agency; Congressional oversight; literature and film. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Victor Marchetti and John Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (Knopf, 1974); Victor Marchetti, “The Consequences of ‘Pre-Publication Review:’ A Case Study of CIA Censorship of The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence” (Center for National Security Studies, 1983); Newsweek (July 1, 1974); The New York Times (August 9, 1981).

Markelov, Valery DURING THE Cold War, many spies from the Soviet Union were captured within the borders of the United States. Their missions ranged from obtaining nuclear secrets to merelyobserving the actions of an unsuspecting individual. Valery Ivanovich Markelov worked for the KGB during the Cold War and succeeded in infiltrating the United States. Markelov worked as a translator for the United Nations.

The FBI captured Markelov in 1972, by setting up a “sting” operation. Markelov was attempting to obtain classified military documents related to the

U.S. Navy’s F-14A fighter jet. The individual Markelov met with was working for Grumman Aerospace Corporation, and unfortunately Markelov, he also worked for the FBI.

for

The FBI tracked Markelov and his more than 11 meetings with the Grumman engineer. Markelov gave the engineer a copying machine and cameras in order to obtain and copy information about the classified jet. During the trial in a New York court, Markelov’s only defense was that he did not speak English well enough to have had the alleged conversations. Markelov’s position as an English translator at the United Nations did not assist him in proving his case. He was let out on bail and lived for a short time in New York City while the charges were being processed. The FBI eventually dropped the charges

against Markelov and allowed him to return to the Soviet Union. It may be no coincidence that President Richard Nixon was scheduled to meet with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev around the time of Markelov’s release. The FBI used the release of spies as diplomatic currency; captured spies were traded back and forth between the Soviet Union and the United States often during the Cold War. ARTHUR H. HO.stT, PH.D. WIDENER UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Cold War; KGB; Nixon, Richard M.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. John Barron, KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents (Reader’s Digest Press, 1974); Wendell L. Minnick, Spies and Provocateurs: A Worldwide Encyclopedia of Persons Conducting Espionage and Covert Action, 1946-1991 (McFarland, 1992); Ronald Payne, Who’s Who in Espionage (St. Martin’s Press, 1984).

Martin, Major William MAJOR MARTIN, who was “born” on March 29, 1907, in Wales, the United Kingdom, never existed. Nevertheless, he probably influenced the decisionmaking of the German general staff before the Allied landing in Sicily, Italy, during World War II (Operation HUSKY) to a decisive extent. In fact, Martin was a creation of the British intelligence services. Under guidance of the British intelligence coordinating body, the XX Committee, officers Ewen Montagu and Archibald Cholmondley fabricated a whole biography for the sole purpose of letting the Germans believe in fake Allied war plans. The plan was to place forged documents concerning the forthcoming Allied operations on a dead body, which would wash ashore on the Spanish coast. It was expected that the fascist Spanish regime would collaborate with German intelligence, whereby the documents would reach the German general staff. The documents, contained in a briefcase handcuffed to the body, implied the impending invasion was intended for Sardinia, and that the Sicily operation was merely a feint. A whole life had to be created that could be easily and credibly

checked by German intelligence. This life had to be reduced to small personal items carried by the dead body, to give the Germans hints how to research the body’s past. A range of everyday items (service documents, money, bills, personal letters, etc.) had to be created. Delivering the dead body to the Germans via Spain was solved by transporting Martin by submarine to the Spanish coast. The dead body had to be chosen from a morgue to fit the symptoms of death, which were expected to be analyzed by the Spanish authorities, of someone drowned after an airplane crash at sea. Once the body washed ashore, the fascist Spanish authorities fully complied with the expectations of the British intelligence officers, and gave the Germans full access to the documents recovered from Martin. Then, the body was transferred to British diplomats in Spain. Martin’s grave can still be visited at the cemetery in Huelva, Spain (the headstone says Martin “died” on April 24, 1943).

The Germans took the messages carried by Martin seriously. The British deception worked and the Allied Sicily landing was successful. Speculation about the true identity of the corpse was never acknowledged by the British officers in charge of what was codenamed Operation MINCEMEAT. OLIVER BENJAMIN HEMMERLE, PH.D. MANNHEIM UNIVERSITY, GERMANY

SEE ALSO: World War I]; XX Committee. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ewen Montagu, The Man Who Never Was: The Story of Operation MINCEMEAT (Evans Brothers, 1970); Janusz Piekalkiewicz, Spione, Agenten, Soldaten: Geheime Kommandos im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Herbig Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1988).

Mata Hari BORN TO A WEALTHY family in Leeuwarden, the Netherlands, Margaretha Zelle (Mata Hari) led a comfortable and sheltered life in her early childhood. Her father and mother, Adam and Antie, lavished Zelle and her three brothers with gifts. Then in 1889, when she was 13, her father was forced to declare bankruptcy. Soon the family’s new financial situation caused friction in the Zelle’s marriage; the

couple separated in 1890. Less than a year later, her

mother died and she was sent to live with an uncle

in Sneek, who sent Zelle to school to learn to be a teacher. The young woman, however, had no inter-

est in working with children. In 1895, Zelle answered a newspaper personal advertisement from a captain in the Army of the Indies who wanted a wife. The ad was placed as a joke, but she and 15 other women responded. She was the only woman to include a photo. The captain, Rudolf MacLeod, was enamored with the picture and the couple married in 1896; Zelle was 19 and MacLeod was 40. The couple had two children but the marriage did not last. Most historians attribute the failed marriage to MacLeod who frequently visited local brothels and was known for being meanspirited. While the family was stationed in Java, their children, John Norman and Non, fell ill from poison put in their food by one of MacLeod’s rivals. Non recovered but John died. Finally, in 1906 the couple divorced. Non, Zelle’s daughter, was sup-

posed to stay with her, but MacLeod abducted the girl and she never saw her again. Divorced and having lost her children, Zelle headed for Paris, France. In Paris, she debuted her dance routine under the name “Mata Hari,” a Malay phrase meaning “eye of dawn.” Her shows were wildly successful at least in part because she was almost nude; she wore jeweled breast cups and a flesh-toned body stocking. Almost 30, Mata Hari’s dance career was already cut short; her popularity peaked from 1905 until 1912. As her dancing career waned, she earned a living as a courtesan. From the time of her arrival in Paris, she also traveled and had numerous affairs with many men, especially military officers. Mata Hari’s career as a spy remains the subject of much speculation. Some accounts have her spying on the French for the Germans after attending a German spy school in Antwerp, Belgium, and earning the code name H 21. Mata Hari denied having attended the German school. She did, however, make frequent trips to Germany. Two days after the onset of World War I, Mata Hari left Germany, eventually returning to Paris. Since she had recently had a German lover, the French immediately began keeping her under watch. Shortly after returning to Paris, Mata Hari fell in love with a young Russian pilot named Vladimir Masloff. After Masloff was wounded, losing sight in one eye, she increased her work as a courtesan so

she could take care of him. She also wanted to visit Masloff in a hospital located in the war zone. As a suspected spy, she had a particularly difficult time obtaining a pass, so she sought help from Georges Ladoux, a French army captain in charge of counterespionage. Ladoux questioned Mata Hari extensively and she swore, as a Dutch citizen, she was neutral but sympathized with France. Ladoux approved her visit to Masloff in the hospital and offered her a job spying for the French. In desperate need of money, Mata Hari agreed. Her first assignment was to seduce the German general in charge of the Belgian occupation, but she never completed the mission. She was detained while on a trip to Britain and questioned by British police. The British authorities contacted Ladoux who instructed them to send Mata Hari to Spain, where she met and romanced German Major Arnold Kalle. By their second meeting, Kalle grew suspicious and gave Mata Hari false information. She returned to Paris, believing she had acquired new intelligence for the French. Meanwhile, Ladoux had received an intercepted German message that referred to H 21. Apparently, the Germans were sending messages about Mata Hari in a code they knew the French had broken. As a result she was arrested on February 13, 1917, interrogated, and tried before a military jury. The rules of military trials hindered her defense by 74year-old lawyer, and former lover, Edouard Clunet. While Clunet cared for Mata Hari, he did not specialize in criminal or military law. She was pronounced guilty and sentenced to death. Mata Hari was executed by firing squad on October 15, 1917. Two nuns and Clunet accompanied her to the execution location; all three were incon-

solable. Mata Hari refused to have her hands bound or to use the blindfold. As the execution began, she stared directly at the riflemen and blew them a kiss. Whether or not she ever really spied for Germany remains unclear. LisA A. ENNIS GEORGIA COLLEGE & STATE UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: World War I; women.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. “A Spy, Never! Mata Hari,” U.S. News & World Report (January 27—February 3, 2003); Russell Warren Howe, Mata Hari: The True Story (Dodd, Mead, & Company, 1986).

Maugham, W. Somerset BORN IN PARIS, France, in 1874 where his father was legal adviser to the British embassy, W. Somerset Maugham spent his childhood in France and spoke French as his first language. After his parents died, he was sent to England and King’s School, Canterbury, but his delicate health and pronounced stammer made him an unhappy student. After a period at Heidelberg University, where he became fluent in German, and an extended holiday on the French Riviera with suspected tuberculosis, he became a medical student at St. Thomas’ Hospital, London (1892). His contact with the London slums through hospital work inspired his first novel, Liza of Lambeth (1897). Drawn by literary lights, he abandoned medicine after graduating from medical school. In 1903 his first play, A Man of Honor, was staged, and in 1907 the success of Lady Frederick made him the country’s most popular playwright. In the years before World War I, he worked on his major novel, Of Human Bondage. Maugham was not only a foremost 20th-century writer but also a member of Britain’s intelligence service. He was clubfooted and too old to serve in the armed forces during World War I, but he did qualify as an ambulance driver. He was recruited into Britain’s secret service in 1915 after the authorities learned that he was fluent in German and French. His novel, Of Human Bondage, had just been published and he used his reputation as an author as a cover for his operational intelligence activities. He was assigned to Switzerland to expose German-agent networks and to coordinate with Allied counterintelligence services. He refused payment for his intelligence work as a patriotic gesture. Sir William Wiseman, the chief of British Intelligence in the United States, persuaded Maugham in 1917 to enter Russia on a mission to support the

Menshevik opposition against the Bolsheviks (the © communists) and to counter Vladimir Lenin’s plan to pull Russia out of the war with Germany. Maugham went to Russia under the codename SOMERVILLE, posing as a writer for U.S. publishers. He met with the Russian Socialist leader Aleksandr Kerensky. Kerensky sent Maugham back to London with a desperate appeal that the Allies form an anti-Bolshevik force to assist in the suppression of the Russian communists.

Maugham wrote several stories based on his experiences in the secret service during the war. How-

ever, he burned them after receiving a warning from the secret service that the stories would violate the Official Secrets Act. The surviving stories include his account of the mission to Russia later published in Ashendon (1928), the name given to Maugham’s alter ego in Of Human Bondage and hero of the book. He also used Somerville as the name of a character in the book. In the Foreword to Ashendon, Maugham complained that agent work for the intelligence services was “monotonous and uncommonly useless.” Maugham is believed to be the first author of spy novels to write from the perspective of a former spy. Norman Polmar and Thomas Allen cite the Times Literary Supplement in assessing Maugham’s contribution to espionage literature. Referring to Maugham’s Ashendon, they write: “Never before or

since has it been so categorically demonstrated that counterintelligence work consists often of morally indefensible jobs not to be undertaken by the squeamish or the conscience-stricken.” Ashendon comes closest to the real life experiences of its author. Maugham did some intelligence work for Sir William Stephenson, head of MI-6 (British foreign intelligence) in the United States during World War II. However, Stephenson informed Maugham’s biographer, Ted Morgan, that Maugham’s intelligence tasks were minor. Stephenson claimed that Maugham was typical of volunteers who did not have much fondness for the intelligence profession and became involved only because they could not see an alternative. Maugham’s controversial social life began during World War I. His affair with Syrie Wellcome led to her divorce from the pharmaceutical manufacturer Sir Henry Wellcome. They were married in 1916, but the relationship engendered considerable acrimony after Maugham and Syrie were divorced in 1927. A principle factor in the marital breakdown was Maugham’s relationship with a young American, Gerald Haxton, with whom he traveled and settled in southern France (1928). Maugham continued his output of bestselling novels, including The Moon and Sixpence (1919); The Painted Veil (1925); and Cakes and Ale (1930). He

also wrote short stories that were collected in such volumes as The Casuarina Tree (1926). Some of these stories were turned into motion pictures. Maugham’s last important novel, The Razor’s Edge,

was published in 1944, but he continued to write essays, short stories, and historical fiction. He also supplemented his earlier autobiographical works, The Summing Up (1938) and Strictly Personal (1941), with a notorious memoir called Looking Back (1962), reviving the bitterness between him and his former wife. Maugham died in 1965. GAIL H. NELSON, PH.D. ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO: LeCarré, John; MI-6; literature and film.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ted Morgan, Maugham: A Biography (Simon & Schuster, 1980); Asa Briggs, Longman Dictionary of 20th Century Biography (Longman, 1985); Asa Briggs, A Dictionary of Twentieth Century Biography (Oxford University Press, 1992); W. Somerset Maugham, Of Human Bondage (Bantam Classics, 1991).

The September 1945 defection of Igor Gouzenko, a code clerk in the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, Canada, led American and British intelligence officers to May, who had returned to England at the end of the war to accept an academic appointment. Upon his arrest on March 4, 1946, May refused to identify his contacts and gave a short statement confirming the facts already known. He justified his actions as an effort to make certain that the development of atomic energy was not confined to the United States. Tried in May 1946, May pled guilty to violating the Officials Secrets Act and received a 10-year sentence, avoiding a harsher charge since sharing information with an ally (as the Soviet

Union was during World War II) did not constitute treason. Released in 1952, he emigrated to teach in Ghana and died in exile. CARYN E. NEUMANN OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Gouzenko, Igor; Los Alamos.

May, Alan Nunn A BRITISH physicist, A.Nunn May became one of the atomic bomb spies by sharing secret Manhattan Project research with the Soviets during World War Il. Born in 1911 at King’s Norton, Worcestershire, England, May received a Ph.D. from Cambridge University in 1936. A colorless, quiet, and balding man with glasses and a small mustache, May visited Russia shortly after graduation but apparently never joined the communist party. In 1942, British intelligence cleared him for access to atomic energy materials and, upon joining the Tube Alloy project at Cambridge, he signed the Official Secrets Act promising never to divulge the nature or details of his duties. When Great Britain moved scientific work overseas in 1943, May joined the Canadian atomic team in Montreal. As an experimental physicist, May’s work involved the wider aspects of atomic research rather than the bomb itself. Nevertheless, he knew

about some of the steps leading up to the construction of the bomb, and it is this information that the Soviets sought when they approached him. May informed the Russians of the uranium-235 output of the plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and of plutonium-249 produced at Hanford, Ohio, and passed a small sample of uranium-233 to Soviet agents.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. H. Montgomery Hyde, The Atom Bomb Spies (Ballantine Books, 1980); Alan Moorehead, The Traitors (Dell, 1963).

McCarthy, Joseph SEE: United States; Communist Party; VENONA; Hiss, Alger; Hoover, J. Edgar.

McCone, John A. BUSINESSMAN and government official John McCone was director of the CIA from 1961 to 1965. A native Californian, McCone earned a degree in engineering at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1922. He subsequently joined Llewellyn Iron Works, where he rapidly rose to the positions of vice president and director. He helped found the engineering firm of BechtelMcCone-Parsons in 1937 and, during World War II, oversaw the construction of over 450 ships as president of the Californian Shipbuilding Company. Following the war,

clear missiles in Cuba well before any other official in the American government, while a combination of U-2 photo reconnaissance and skilled CIA analysis confirmed McCone’s suspicions and provided Kennedy with the hard evidence he needed to justify a firm response to Moscow’s provocative action. Meanwhile, McCone’s de-emphasis of clandestine operations fit well with the administration’s desire to manage covert operations directly. As a result, Attorney General Robert Kennedy assumed direct control of covert CIA activities such as Operation MONGOOSE, while McCone continued to reorient the rest of the agency toward technical intelligence gathering. McCone’s approach worked well with Kennedy, but it proved incompatible with Lyndon Johnson. Unable to maintain the access to the White House that he had enjoyed under Kennedy and more and more at odds with the new president as a result of the CIA’s increasingly pessimistic reports on the situation in Vietnam, McCone resigned in April 1965. ROBERT J. FLYNN, PH.D. GEORGIA PERIMETER COLLEGE

CIA Director John McCone de-emphasized covert operations after the failed Bay of Pigs Cuban invasion operation.

McCone entered government service as a member of the Air Policy Commission on U.S. air power. He served as a special assistant to Secretary of Defense James Forestall in 1948, and became undersecretary of the air force in 1950. He held the position of chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1958 to 1960. McCone returned to public service in September 1961, when President John Kennedy named him director of the CIA in the wake of the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion. McCone quickly restored the CIA’s damaged morale and credibility. First, he promoted Richard Helms to the post of deputy director of plans and named Ray Cline deputy director of intelligence. More importantly, he reoriented the CIA away from covert operations, and toward intelligence gathering and analysis and placed new emphasis upon the acquisition of intelligence through photo reconnaissance, satellites, and other technological innovations. McCone’s new approach paid immediate dividends. Improved intelligence and analysis led him to determine that the Soviet Union had placed nu-

SEE ALSO: Kennedy, John Agency; Cuban Missile Crisis.

EF; Central

Intelligence

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Nathan Miller, Spying for America: The Hidden History of U.S. Intelligence (Paragon House, 1989); John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (Simon & Schuster, 1986).

Mexican-American

War

THE ANNEXATION of Texas by the United States in 1844 resulted in the breaking of diplomatic relations between Mexico and the United States. Mexico considered the Texas territory to be a breakaway province, and the annexation of Texas was deemed an invasion of Mexican territory. In July 1845, President James K. Polk sent General Zachary Taylor to the southern border of Texas to prevent Mexican forces from launching a counterattack in Texas. On April 25, 1846, U.S. and Mexican forces clashed, which resulted in a number of American casualties. Despite the long build-up to the confrontation, Taylor had failed to establish a

formal intelligence network to collect information on the terrain, routes for advance, and Mexican forces in the region. The United States had initiated a number of efforts to raise support for the annexation of Texas and gathered intelligence from high-ranking Mexican Officials. In March 1845, Polk sent a small contingent

of

men

to

Texas

with

instructions

to

influence local politicians throughout the breakaway province to accept annexation by the United States. Other operatives were sent to Mexico to obtain information on Mexican troop strength. In November 1846, Polk sent Moses Y. Beach, the publisher of the New York Sun, to Mexico City to gather intelligence on Mexican activities. Because of the geographic proximity of Cuba, Beach went to Cuba, obtained a false British passport, and entered Mexico to collect information regarding the position of Mexican troops and the resources and supplies available to Mexican forces. Diplomats stationed in Mexico also provided significant information to the United States. The intelligence collection resources used by the State Department were particularly useful for the United States. Most notably, the wife of the U.S. consul in Tampico, Mexico, Anne McClarmonde Chase, routinely passed timely and accurate information to U.S. Navy officers, especially regarding conditions of Mexican fortifications. Chase also passed along misinformation to Mexican delegates. The two highest-ranking U.S. officers approached intelligence gathering from divergent perspectives. On one hand, Taylor rarely employed

intelligence operatives, with the exception of advance scouting parties that reconnoitered the area between the U.S. lines and the fortifications of the Mexican Army. On the other hand, General Winfield Scott employed members of the cavalry and engineer corps, including Robert E. Lee and P.G.T. Beauregard, to survey neighboring areas to gain operational and tactical information on Mexican forces. Scott also funded a band of Mexican agents, known as the Mexican Spy Company, to supply information to American military forces. Manuel Dominguez, a former highway brigand, led the Mexican Spy Company, which aided Scott’s advance from Vera Cruz to Mexico City. The members of the Mexican Spy Company, disguised as vendors, were paid $20 a month, and traveled ahead of U.S. military forces to gather information about

the terrain and troop strength of the Mexican forces, Members of the Mexican Spy Company, who acted as spies, couriers, and guides, were an invaluable aid to the advancing U.S. forces. During the Mexican-American war, the United States expended significant amounts of money on covert operations; Scott spent more than $30,000. The funds were used for the salaries of members of the Mexican Spy Company, to pay for the services of individual intelligence agents, such as Mexican officers offering sensitive information about military strength, and to bribe deserters from the Mexican Army and foreigners living in Mexico, including French and English nationals.

Mexican intelligence efforts. The Mexican Army also engaged in intelligence operations. General Santa Anna employed diplomats, especially Colonel Alexander Atocha stationed in Washington, D.C., to gather information about U.S. operations in the conflict. The advances of U.S. forces were routinely slowed by Mexican forces that knew the terrain, and intercepted American communications. High-ranking Mexican officials established the 3,000-man Army of the South, which guarded the line from Acapulco to Mexico City and intercepted Scott’s communications with Taylor. This resulted in Mexican forces capturing intelligence from Scott to Taylor about Scott’s landing in Vera Cruz. The information, however, was of little use to the Mexican forces. Mexico was ill prepared for a war against the United States. Most of the Mexican Army forces were poorly trained and carried flintlock muskets. The Mexican Army also possessed few good light cannons. As a result, the information regarding the landing of Scott’s forces in Vera Cruz was not used, due to the defeat of Mexican forces at the Battle of Buena Vista on February 22-23, 1847, by the numerically inferior American forces under Taylor. In March, Scott captured Vera Cruz, and Mexico City fell to U.S. forces in September, ending the conflict. A cessation of hostilities was enacted on February 29, 1848, and Congress ratified the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, formally ending the war. The intelligence operations during the war provided significant information to U.S. forces operating against the Mexican Army. The need for accurate information on the terrain and strength of Mexican forces resulted in the development of new tech-

niques of intelligence collection. After the war ended, however, no formal intelligence gathering service was established. TRIFIN ROULE

NORTHROP GRUMMAN

SEE ALSO: American Civil War; Mexico.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Karl J. Bauer, The Mexican War (Macmillan, 1972); A. Brook Caruso, The Mexican Spy Company: United States Covert Operations in Mexico (McFarland, 1991); John S.D. Eisenhower, So Far From God: The U.S. War with Mexico, 1846-1848 (Random House, 1989); Richard Bruce Widers, Mr. Polk’s Army: the American Military Experience in the Mexican War (Texas A&M University Press, 1997).

no identified terrorists have crossed the Mexican border into the United States. Mexico’s intelligence history is interweaved with the great events of the 20th century, especially playing a major role in the U.S. decision to enter World War I.

The Zimmermann Telegram. In High Command decided that the restricted submarine warfare was feat the Allies, even at the risk

1916, the German resumption of unthe best way to deof provoking the United States into joining the war. In an attempt to limit U.S. intervention in Europe by engaging the United States elsewhere, German foreign secretary Arthur Zimmermann planned to involve the United States in war with Mexico. To this end, on January 16, 1917, he sent a se-

cret telegram in code, through the German ambassador in Washington, D.C., to the German minister in Mexico, authorizing him to propose an alliance to

Mexico

Mexico’s President Venustiano Carranza. In return,

Germany promised to restore to Mexico the lost territories

AS AMERICA’S neighbor to the south, Mexico’s interests have been closely aligned with the United States for most of the 20th century. Into the 2000s, this alignment has also included Mexico’s intelligence efforts. According to Ricardo Sandoval, writing in the Dallas Morning News in 2003 on Mexican intelligence, “In the alphabet soup of the world’s intelligence services, Mexico’s CISEN is best known as a secretive espionage arm used by presidents and political strongmen to intimidate opponents, watch over the media, and maintain power. But Mexican officials now insist that CISEN, which translates as the Center for Investigations and National Security, is staffed by information professionals who have emerged as key allies of the United States since the September 11 terrorist attacks and, more recently, the war against Iraq.” CISEN was mainly occupied in the 1990s with drug smuggling between Mexico and the United States, while also overcoming the legacy of its predecessor agency, the Federal Security Department. That intelligence agancy was implicated in numerous scandals from political activities against rulingparty opponents to the assassination of a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration official. CISEN is actively involved with its American counterparts, the FBI and CIA, in counterterrorism and is cited by Mexican officials as the reason why

of Texas, New

Mexico,

and Arizona.

British Admiralty intelligence intercepted and decoded the telegram and sent it to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, who released it to the press on March 1, 1917. In convincing public opinion of German hostility toward the United States, the Zimmermann Telegram became a major factor leading to the U.S. declaration of war against Germany.

Intelligence in Mexico during World War II. Intelligence operations in Mexico during World War II were tied closely to the issue of oil. In 1938, Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas nationalized the country’s oil industry. While the United States did not send troops as it had in earlier disputes with Mexico, the multinational oil companies did call for a blockade of Mexican oil. In response, Mexico began to look for buyers for its oil. It found a willing customer in Adolf Hitler’s Germany. The Germans hoped that buying large amounts of Mexican oil would not only provide a source of fuel for their military machine, but also would make Mexicans reluctant to impede any German espionage activities

in Mexico. German intelligence envisioned using Mexico as a safe stepping stone to prepare for operations against the United States. ,

By 1940, the United States was becoming increasingly concerned with the German intelligence presence in Mexico. U.S. intelligence services wor-

tied that German agents could use Mexico to observe activities in the United States, or even cross the border. Thus, the United States sent both the FBI and a covert group to Mexico. The United States also made a secret surveillance agreement with Mexican security forces. Soon, U.S. intelligence services were intercepting messages sent by

suspected German agents. In November 1941, Mexico and the foreign oil companies agreed on a settlement of the oil issue. This settlement was soon followed by a U.S.-Mexican agreement on defense and intelligence cooperation. Soon Mexico was among the first Latin American countries to break relations with the Axis powers. Furthermore, Mexico contributed combat troops to the war effort, becoming the only Latin American country besides Brazil to do so. However, despite these seemingly improved relations between Mexico and the United States, the

Mexican government did little to curtail German espionage efforts. Mexico allowed a Nazi spy ring to operate with little obstruction throughout the

war. President Manuel Avila Camacho, who came to power in 1940, passed a new espionage law in November 1941 and created a special police unit in February 1942 to deal with espionage. However, the Mexican government tried only two people for espionage during the war. Two main factors account for this reluctance to crackdown on German agents in Mexico. First, support for participation in the war among the Mexican people was limited. And second, there was a substantial German community in Mexico that was influential.

Intelligence in Mexico after World War II. After its creation in 1947, the CIA was active in Mexico in

the fight against communism. The CIA helped to establish anti-ccommunist organizations among groups that included labor, students, and women. It recruited journalists in order to place anti-ccommunist articles in the Mexican press. The CIA also penetrated the Mexican Communist Party, interrupted communist meetings, and attempted to discredit communist leaders. Furthermore, U.S. intelligence bugged the embassies of communist countries in Mexico. CIA Director William Casey became concerned with the situation in Mexico during the 1980s. He felt that the potential for revolution existed in the country, due to a serious debt crisis and apparent

anti-American sentiment. Casey was also upset at

the Mexican government’s call for a negotiated settlement in Nicaragua, where the United States was supporting anticcommunist forces (Contras). The CIA was not willing to abandon the Contras. Indeed, Casey felt that he was protecting Mexico by fighting communism in Central America. He also worried that problems in Central America and Mexico would lead to immigration problems for the United States. Many of Casey’s fears resulted from a top-secret report from the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board that recommended that the CIA strengthen its station in Mexico City. Casey did just that, stepping up CIA intelligence activities in Mexico. Indeed, the CIA prepared an intelligence estimate claiming the country was unstable and close to revolution. However, the estimate was based on questionable intelligence information and led to much tension between Casey and John Horton, the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. Horton ultimately left his position at the CIA due to this dispute. RONALD YOUNG

GEORGIA SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Casey, William J.; Zimmermann Telegram. BIBLIOGRAPHY. A. Brooke Caruso, The Mexican Spy Company: United States Covert Operations in Mexico, 1845-1848 (McFarland, 1991); Harry Thayer Mahoney and Marjorie Locke Mahoney, Espionage in Mexico in the 20th Century (Austin & Winfield, 1997); Dirk W. Raat, “U.S, Intelligence Operations and Covert Action in Mexico, 1900-1947,” Journal of Contemporary History (v.22/4, 1987); Leslie Rout and John Bratzel, The Shadow War: (Greenwood, 1986); Barbara W. Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram (Random House, 1966); Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987 (Simon & Schuster, 1987); Ricardo Sandoval, ‘“Mexico’s Intelligence Agency Refines Image in Anti-Terror Efforts,” Dallas Morning News (May 27, 2003).

MI-5 FORMALLY known as the Security Service, MI-5 is responsible for countering covert threats to the

British homeland. Its current charter includes intelligence support to counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and some aspects of countering organized crime.

According to MI-5’s principal roles are: 1.

to

protect

mission

national

statement,

security

its

against

threats from espionage, terrorism, and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers, and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial, or violent

means; 2. to safeguard the economic well-being of the United Kingdom against threats posed by the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Isles; 3. to act in support of the activities of po-

lice forces and other law enforcement agencies in the prevention and detection of serious crime.

The third mission, added in 1996, represents a significant change to the group’s charter.

Organization. The chief of MI-5 is the director general, with a deputy director as an assistant. The agency is broken down into four branches. Two branches are directly responsible for intelligence investigations and countermeasures; the third branch is responsible for intelligence collection, production, and information management; and the fourth branch is administrative. A separate department handles legal advice to the agency. Finally, given the continued troubles in Northern Ireland, an additional position has the post of director and coordinator of intelligence in Northern Ireland, and reports both to the director general and to the secretary of state for Northern Ireland. MI-5 employs about 1,900 persons, down slightly from its Cold War strength. The staff members of MI-5 remain anonymous, including (usually) when giving evidence in court. Likewise, until 1992, the director general’s identity was kept out of the public record. Since that time, however, he or she has been publicly named on appointment.

Legal authorization. There are three main statutes that govern the current operations of MI-5 and provide an oversight mechanism. The Security Service

Act of 1989 (amended in 1996) places MI-5 under the authority of the home secretary and specifies the functions of the service and the responsibilities of the director general. The Intelligence Services Act of 1994 established the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) within Parliament to provide oversight of the expenditures, administration, and policy of all the security and intelligence services. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 established an external Commissioner for Interception, a Commissioner for the Intelligence Services, and a tribunal to examine complaints and hear proceedings regarding possible violations of the Human Rights Act of 1998. These statutes provide for a warrant system to be used for wiretaps and other forms of “intrusive” surveillance, with warrants issued by the secretary of state. MI-5 itself remains legally empowered to issue internal authorizations for the use of agents and for following suspects. Operations. The principal focus of MI-5 is domestic, and the bulk of its assets are in London. It does, however, maintain some presence abroad in an effort to determine potential overseas threats to domestic security. In these operations abroad, MI-5 is expected to coordinate closely with MI-6. It also maintains liaison with some 100 foreign security services.

For domestic missions, MJ-5 employs a number of the counterintelligence techniques used by most such agencies. These include handling covert agents (not actually members of MI-5); stakeouts and tails of suspects; communications intercepts; and other means of what the service calls “intrusive surveillance.” MI-5 officers do not have arrest authority and must rely on the police forces, particularly the Special Branch, for any arrests or detentions of identified suspects. At least in the late 1990s, Northern Ireland ter-

rorism remained the main mission focus of ML-5. A full quarter of its operational budget was devoted to this mission. In terms of budgetary priorities, international terrorism was second at 15 percent, and espionage was third at 12 percent. The relatively low priority devoted to counterespionage reflects the end of the Cold War, when the service devoted about half its budget to this mission. Although MI5 picked up the mission of assisting police in combating organized crime, thus far it appears to have devoted few assets to this role.

On a more mundane level, for many years ML-5

also has been responsible for vetting (conducting background checks on individuals for sensitive government positions). Although not as sexy as other MLI-5 operations, this has proven, in the past, to be one of its most critical functions. MI-5 reportedly normally does not do field investigations in conducting background checks, but instead relies on its extensive investigative records system. The service maintains an extensive series of files on previous or current investigations, including at least 13,000 currently active files on British citizens.

History. As might be judged by the MI (military intelligence) in its title, MI-5 together with its sister service MI-6, had its genesis as a military staff office. In October 1909, following increased British worries about German espionage against Britain, the Committee of Imperial Defence established the Secret Service Bureau. The two leaders of this organization were Army Captain Vernon Kell and Royal Navy Captain Mansfield Cumming. As it became clear that espionage and counterespionage required different focuses, Kell and Cumming split their responsibilities. Thereafter, ‘““K’’ became responsible for counterespionage within the United

Kingdom, while “‘C” was responsible for gathering intelligence abroad. Kell became a legend within the security community for his 30 years of leading British counterintelligence. Despite having a staff of only 10, including Kell, the bureau rapidly began operating against the putative German espionage offensive, helping to identify some 30 German spies for arrest before World War I. It remains very questionable as to whether these successes were due to the efficiency and effectiveness of British counterintelligence or due to the sheer amateurishness of the German agents. The bureau grew significantly after the start of World War I, and in January 1916 it became part of a new Directorate of Military Intelligence and was renamed MLEL5. During World War I, the British government added a number of new duties for MI-5, including the coordination of aliens control policy, vetting, and the establishment of security measures at government installations, particularly arms and munitions factories. ML-5 also assumed responsibility for supervising counterintelligence throughout the British Empire. MI-5 grew to a strength of about 850 and was involved in the identification and ar-

rest of 35 German spies. At the end of the war, however, the service was sharply cut to a few dozen. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in October 1917 brought a new mission focus to ML-5. Particularly in the 1920s, it devoted considerable time and effort to investigating possible communist infiltration of the military, subversion, and potential sabotage of government facilities. The anti-communist campaign led to an early political crisis for MI-5, the publication of the so-called Zinoviev Letter in 1924. This letter, later proved to be a forgery, secretly instructed the British Communist Party “to paralyze all the military preparations of the bourgeois” if a war appeared to be imminent. The public release of the letter, which MI-5 had attested to being genuine, was particularly ill-timed since it occurred only a few days before a general election. It resulted in the defeat of the ruling Labour Party. While the letter was leaked by outsiders, MI-5 took considerable heat over its publication, with a number of government insiders expressing concern that the service was being politicized. Despite these concerns, MI-5 survived the affair and continued its basic missions. In 1931, in fact, MI-5 was given formal responsibility for assessing all threats to British national security, other than Irish terrorism and anarchists. This date also marked the formal renaming of the agency as the Security Service, although MLI-5 is still used as its informal name. ML5 refocused on German threats as Nazi leader Adolf Hitler rose to power. During the early 1930s, the potential threats posed by possible or actual pro-Nazi sympathizers posed some political difficulties for MI-5. Rather than the typical working class background of many potential subversives involved with the communists, a significant proportion of pro-Nazi or pro-fascist sympathizers came from the upper crust of English society. Clearly, there were greater political sensitivities in

dealing with some of these persons. Fortunately for ML5 officials, as war came closer almost all the more prominent figures in these movements disavowed any support for the Germans. Despite the clearly emerging threat of Germany, in early 1939 MI-5 had only 30 officers with six surveillance persons. It faced several other issues at the beginning of the war. Shortly before the war began, the Security Service moved its headquarters to Wormwood Scrubs Prison, but then shifted most of its staff to Blenheim Palace. In September 1940,

many of its records were destroyed by German bombing. As part of Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s governmental reorganization for prosecuting the war, he formed a special secret cabinet subcommittee called the Security Executive to oversee MI-5 and to give political guidance on the handling of aliens in Britain. The Security Executive soon began to exercise practical control over MI-5’s operations. Finally, after some military security breaches, almost certainly not MI-5 s_ fault, Churchill summarily dismissed Kell as MI-5 director in May 1940. Many of MI-5’s missions during World War II were very similar to those of World War I. They included counterespionage; monitoring enemy aliens and providing advice on their internment; security checks for government ministries; and guidance to war industries on security precautions against sabo-

tage and espionage. Finally, MI-5 officers had to spend a considerable amount of time responding to public tips on potential German spies and saboteurs. Needless to say, the majority of these reports from the public had no basis, but all had to be followed up. Despite the bureaucratic difficulties and some missteps at the beginning of the war, the Security Service had considerable success during World War II. In large measure, this was aided immensely by the aggressive and effective internment policy for enemy aliens. The British managed to isolate potential enemy sympathizers from any attempts by Axis forces to recruit them. MI-5 also proved itself to be very effective in the counterespionage business. There were about 115 German intelligence agents who attempted to infiltrate Britain during the war. All but one were identified and captured. The one exception committed suicide before capture. A particular success for MI-5 was its ability to “turn” a number of the German spies and to use them as double-agents. Using what became famed as the Double-Cross system, the British fed false intelligence to the Germans throughout the war.

Postwar MI-5. Unlike the period after World War I, MI-5 was not gutted after World War II, maintaining a staff of about 850 in the early 1950s. Of this staff, 40 served in British Commonwealth countries and colonies as Security Liaison Officers. MI-5 once again turned from a German threat to potential operations directed from the Soviet Union. Particular attention was placed on the security

implications of pre-war communist recruitment of British citizens. In 1948, the prime minister declared that communists along with fascists were barred from positions “vital to the security of the state.” ML5 responded by setting up its vetting system. Throughout the Cold War, MI-5 engaged in a long-term chess game with Soviet espionage agen-

cies. The Soviets certainly had their share of successes against the British. Early cases involving British officials in extremely sensitive positions and working as agents for the Soviet Union, such as the nuclear scientist Klaus Fuchs, Kim Philby of Secret © Intelligence Service (MI-6), and Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean of the Foreign Office, in particular, displayed weaknesses in British counterintelligence. The Soviet espionage campaign continued in the 1960s, with MI-5 involved in the cases of Soviet agent George Blake, an MI-6 officer; a spy ring at the Portland naval base; and John Vassall, an Admiralty employee reporting to the KGB. In 1963, MI-5

became embroiled in the Profumo Affair in which Secretary of War John Profumo’s involvement with a call girl became intertwined with a counterespionage operation. Although a government investigation concluded that MI-5’s behavior in this situation was entirely appropriate, it involved the service in yet another political imbroglio. Several issues regarding MI-5’s performance in the 1950s through the 1970s should be noted. First, it did not have nearly the success against the Soviets as it did against the Germans during the war. The service seemed to have little or no success in turning Soviet agents. This was combined with an apparent reluctance of Soviet intelligence officers to approach the Security Service as possible doubleagents. Second, the vetting system initially implemented largely was a failure since, even if MI-5 had files that suggested possible security risks, they frequently were ignored by other government agencies in their hiring process. Moreover, the actual investigations that were to be conducted by the individual departments typically were pro forma if conducted at all. Finally, and most significantly, MI-5 spent much of the 1960s engaged in a mole hunt for a possible high-ranking penetration agent within its own ranks(up to and including the director general himself). The perceived existence of such an agent not only led to internal problems within ML5, but also to serious complications in intelligence-sharing with American intelligence agencies.

Since the late 1970s, MI-5 has been increasingly directed against Irish and international terrorism. This mission has received even further emphasis since the end of the Cold War. Although most of ML5’s counterterrorism activities remain classified, the service claims 21 convictions against Irish terrorists from 1992 to 1999 and the prevention of “many” terrorist attacks. Indications suggest that ML5 has adapted very well to the counterterrorism mission. LAWRENCE E. CLINE, PH.D.

form other tasks relating to the actions or intentions of such persons.” The act limits SIS operations to situations only “(a) in the interests of national security, with partic ular reference to the defense and foreign policies of Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom; or (b) in the interests of the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom; or (c) in support of the prevention or detection of serious crime.” The act also prohibits the service from taking any action that might further the interests of any political party.

AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Cumming, Mansfield; Kell, Sir Vernon; Fuchs, Klaus; Philby, Kim; Burgess, Guy; Maclean, Donald D.; Profumo Affair; World War II; United Kingdom. BIBLIOGRAPHY. MI-5, www.mi5.gov.uk; J.C. Masterman, The Double Cross System in the War of 1939-1945 (Yale University Press, 1972); Peter Wright and Paul Greengrass, Spycatcher (Dell, 1988); Nigel West, MI-5 British Security Service Operations, 1909-1945 (Stein & Day, 1981); Nigel West, The Circus (Stein & Day, 1983).

MI-6 ML6 IS THE commonly used name for what is properly called the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) of Great Britain. It is responsible for collecting foreign intelligence for the United Kingdom. The service traces its origins to the Foreign Section of the Secret Service Bureau formed in 1909. The original head of the section was Mansfield Cumming, who continued to lead the SIS when it became a separate service in 1922. Cumming created a tradition for MI-6 by signing all his correspondence with a “C” in green ink; all his successors have continued using “C” as their title. The SIS is called “The Firm” internally, and other British intelligence and security agencies have

nicknamed it “The Friends.”

Legal authorization. Operations of SIS are legally specified by the Intelligence Services Act of 1994. This law authorizes the SIS “to obtain and provide information relating to the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands” and “to per-

Oversight. The cabinet minister of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is directly responsible for overseeing all aspects of MI-6’s operations. There also is acommittee of Parliament, called the Intelligence and Security Committee, to examine the expenditures, administration, and policy of all three major intelligence services. The nine members of the committee are drawn from both the House of Commons and House of Lords and cannot be cabinet ministers. Finally, there is a tribunal to investigate complaints about the SIS or Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ, the signals intelligence agency).

SIS operations and organization. SIS is considerably more secretive about its operations and organization than is the Security Service (MI-5). There reportedly are about 2,000 persons working within ML6, and it is headquartered in London, with reported training centers in London and in Hampshire. During the Cold War, the principal focus of SIS was, of course, the Soviet Union. Since that time, MI-6’s publicly identified target missions have included: Russia and the Balkans, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, Iraq, and the international drug trade. In the annual public report on intelligence to Parliament (always heavily censored), the percentage of operational assets allocated for any particular mission is omitted.

Joint Intelligence Committee JIC). Although not a part of the SIS (in fact, a superior body to it), the Joint Intelligence Committee plays a critical role in the British intelligence system. SIS reports to the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The JIC is formed of senior officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defense, the Treasury, the directors of the Security Service,

the Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ, the Intelligence Coordinator, and the chief of the Assessment Staff. It is responsible for setting national intelligence requirements, assigning specific taskings to satisfy these requirements, recommending the funding levels required for the individual services, and providing intelligence assessments to ministers. The JIC is intended to meet weekly. The JIC is supported by the Joint Intelligence Organization,

consisting

of a permanent

assess-

ments staff, a coordinator’s group, a secretariat, and duty intelligence officers providing full-time coverage. The assessments staff, which is a mixture of officials attached from the various intelligence services and government departments, is responsible for drafting current intelligence assessments. These assessments are then reviewed and coordinated in sub-committees of the JIC, known as current intelligence groups, which bring together experts from a range of government departments. The text is then normally submitted to the JIC for approval before being circulated to senior officials. The JIC also maintains its own liaison with foreign intelligence services.

History. British espionage certainly predates the SIS. During the reign of Elizabeth I, her secretary of state, Sir Francis Walsingham, ran and largely personally financed his own secret service. Oliver Cromwell’s secretary John Thurloe served as his intelligence chief, reportedly profiting personally from his service; after Cromwell’s fall, Thurloe offered his services to Charles II. During the late 1600s and throughout the 1700s, Britain used a secret service fund to support activities by freelance agents. This fund reportedly was used more often for domestic political bribes than for foreign intelligence. Even the funds that were spent abroad apparently had only minimal impact. The Victorian era saw the continued use of secret-service funds, although prior to the Boer War the level of funding decreased even as the scope of empire increased. More importantly, the British government also continued the tradition of relying on amateur intelligence agents. The bulk of intelligence collection, such as it was, focused on British colonies, particularly in areas around India. At the start of Queen Victoria’s reign, even the military relied almost completely on tactical intelligence, particularly cavalry reconnaissance. By the mid-1800s, however, the military began to take a

greater interest in strategic intelligence. Thomas Best Jervis of the War Office founded the Topographical and Statistical Department to provide at least the rudiments of a strategic intelligence capability for the army. In 1873, this was replaced by the

Intelligence Branch, with a staff of 27, in turn to be renamed the Intelligence Department as it gained more authority. The Royal Navy followed in 1883 by establishing the Foreign Intelligence Committee at the Admiralty with a staff of five, soon to be replaced by the Naval Intelligence Department. Despite the increased focus on strategic intelligence within the military, it still largely relied on amateur field agents, most of whom were unpaid volunteers. Actual expenditures for collection were miniscule, with an annual budget for all secret-service work before the Boer War of only 600 pounds. Perhaps the most famous of these amateur agents was Robert Baden-Powell, best known for founding the Boy Scouts. Most agents from the period stressed the “great sport” of serving as a spy. In many cases, the value of the intelligence provided by these amateurs was of questionable value, even to officials at the time. The tradition of amateur intelligence collection has had some reflections in more recent periods. Most of the amateurs used in the Victorian and earlier periods were selected because of family connections or personal acquaintance with government officials or senior military officers. Even after the professionalization of British intelligence, the “old boy network” remained critically important in selecting field operatives. Coming from the right background, attending the right school (in practical terms, either Cambridge or Oxford), and knowing the right people tended to be much more important than any particular skills. The image of the gentleman adventurer remained strong in the SIS for many years. At least by the 1980s, SIS leaders recognized the need for broadening their employee base and made a concerted public recruiting effort to diversify their new entries. The Boer War, with its numerous British military failures, did not lead to major improvements in

the British intelligence structure or in assets devoted to intelligence. What did improve the attention paid to intelligence needs were a series of governmental propaganda scares of a Getman invasion threat in the early 1900s. These were combined with a number of spy scares. The combination of these concerns led to the formation in 1909 of the

Secret Service Bureau, initially divided into military and naval sections. It then was divided into a home department for counterespionage (to become MI-5) and a foreign department in charge of espionage (to become MI6). ML-6 initially focused more on naval than mili-

tary intelligence. During this early period of MI-6 through the 1920s, its most famous agent was Sid-

ney Reilly, operating in Russia. Reilly has achieved almost mythic stature for his exploits; although many of his purported achievements are more the stuff of legend (including legends that he created himself) than reality, he did have a number of intelligence coups to his credit. Cumming’s MI-6 achieved a number of successes during World War I. His agents shifted most of their focus to military intelligence. Agent networks were particularly important in tracking German troop movements via rail lines through Belgium. Although the overall British strategic intelligence system during the war was marked by overlap and some competition among intelligence agencies (some semi-privately run), strategic intelligence showed considerable improvement. British intelligence also became very involved in Russia during the Russian Civil War, but spent most of its efforts on what today would be called covert action rather than intelligence collection. This weakness became very apparent during the 1920s in a critical period for British-Soviet relations. SIS had serious difficulties in providing human intelligence to the British government, although this was offset somewhat by effective signals intelligence against the Soviet government. With the Great Depression, SIS faced serious financial difficulties. At times, the chief reportedly appealed to his relatives for money to fund operations. The already small number of official SIS agents stationed abroad (all of whom were assigned to British diplomatic missions as “passport control officers” or PCOs) were reduced to 18 in Europe and two in other countries. One anomaly for these PCOs was they were not to collect intelligence from the country to which they were assigned. For example, the PCO assigned to Austria collected intelligence from Italy, while the PCO in Italy handled Germany. In addition to this organizational peculiarity, SIS also endured several financial scandals in-

volving PCOs. The service also faced several government ministers who either ignored SIS or appeared hostile to

The modern MI-6 headquarters in London belies the long history of the service in British foreign affairs.

it. One innovation the SIS implemented during the 1930s was the collection of economic intelligence. This provided an additional payoff in the contacts forged between the SIS and businessmen, who later proved to be valuable assets for intelligence collection. In fact, a group called the Z Organization, kept secret even within most of SIS, was established to take advantage pf these business assets and others. Shortly before the start of World War II, the British established the Joint Intelligence Committee in much its current form, with it being further strengthened after some initial false starts. During the war, the SIS (in common with other intelligence services) had both significant successes and failures. One of its worst and most embarrassing failures occurred shortly after the beginning of the war in what became known as the Venlo Incident. An SIS officer provided German intelligence with the names of an entire intelligence ring, while SIS was fooled into thinking that it was dealing with an organized conspiracy against Nazi leader Adolf Hitler. The service also had difficulties in providing accurate assessments of German intentions and capabilities at the beginning of the war. There also were significant tensions between the pre-war SIS personnel and the wartime additions, leading to some internal inefficiency.

Nonetheless, SIS agents collected very important intelligence about the German V-rocket development program and heavy water plants (used for potential nuclear weapon development) in Norway. SIS also developed extensive intelligence liaison relationships with exile groups from occupied countries, many of which had considerable intelligence value. SIS also provided the genesis for the Special Operations Executive (SOE), intended to conduct special operations in occupied Europe. Formed in July 1940, SOE was an amalgamation of three existing organizations: D Section of MI-6 (D reputedly for Destruction); MI-R, Military Intelligence Research section of the War Office; and Electra House, a propaganda section. The military and naval intelligence services, together with the codebreakers at Bletchley Park, however, clearly took primacy over SIS during the war. Most SIS operations since World War II remain classified. It did, however, increase the number of assets for covert action as compared to its pre-war operations. One of its first, and completely disastrous, covert operations in conjunction with the CIA was in Albania, where British-trained anti-communist Albanian agents were quickly snared. The main focus for SIS covert action then shifted to the Middle East, including helping to overthrow the Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq (again in conjunction with the CIA). The service also developed proposals to engineer a coup in Syria and to topple President Gamal Abdel-Nasser in Egypt, neither of which was attempted. The major openly reported intelligence coup for the SIS was its handling of GRU (Soviet military intelligence) Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. Penkovsky provided thousands of classified Soviet documents for a two-year period until his arrest in October 1962. Although no details have been released on other SIS Soviet operations, is rumored to have had other significant, albeit lesser, intelligence assets within the Soviet Union. The service also reportedly provided excellent intelligence from the Middle East. The SIS also suffered from a disastrous situation from double-agents within its own ranks. Kim Philby, whom some had predicted would be ‘“C” someday, and George Blake had been recruited by the KGB and passed extremely critical intelligence to the Soviets. The amount of intelligence they apparently gave to the Soviets (some of which led to the deaths of agents) and the unwillingness of the

SIS to initially acknowledge the possibility of their treachery led to a poisoning of relations between SIS and both MI-5 and U.S. intelligence services that lasted for some years. LAWRENCE E. CLINE, PH.D. AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: United Kingdom; Cumming, Mansfield; Baden-Powell, Robert; Reilly, Sidney; World War II; Penkovsky, Oleg; Philby, Kim. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Christopher Andrew, Her Majesty’s Secret Service (Penguin, 1987); Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org; Nigel West, MI-6 (Random House, 1983); Verne W. Newton, The Cambridge Spies: The Untold Story of MacLean, Philby, and Burgess in America (Madison Books, 1993); Robin Bruce Lockhart,

Reilly: Ace of Spies (Viking, 1984).

MI-9 ML9 WAS a sub-branch of British military intelligence during World War II and a pioneering force in the development of escape and evasion methods that helped facilitate the successful return of thousands of Allied servicemen from behind enemy lines. Through clandestine communications with Allied personnel held in German prisoner-of-war (POW) camps and the systematic interrogation of captured German military forces, MI-9 proved to be an invaluable element of the overall British intelligence effort. The origins of MI-9 can be traced to the closing years of World War I, when senior officials of British Intelligence began to recognize the intelligence value of both German POWs and British servicemen returning to the United Kingdom (Uk) after escaping from German POW camps. This led to the creation of a small office within Britain’s War Office to examine ways to more effectively exploit these sources. Impetus for further action waned as the war ended. Nonetheless, as World War II unfolded, a formal directive from the British director af Military Intelligence (DMI) in December 1939 created a secretive sub-branch of military intelligence with the exclusive responsibility for POW-related intelli-

gence operations. Designated MI-9, the branch had little time to organize and equip for the monumental challenges ahead. After 50,000 British soldiers were taken prisoner during fighting at Dunkirk, France, in 1940, the intelligence gathering, and escape- and evasion-support mission assigned to MI-9 drew increased emphasis. Faced with such a challenge, the DMI selected a dynamic and colorful officer, Major Norman R. Crockatt, as the unit’s first chief. Under his command, the unit set forth the following primary objectives:

To facilitate escapes of British POWs, thereby getting back service personnel and containing additional enemy manpower on guard duties. To facilitate the return to the United Kingdom of those who succeeded in evading capture in enemy occupied territory. To collect and distribute intelligence infor-

into how POWs were handled and the security measures in place at various camps (a critical consideration in developing clandestine communica-

tion systems). These returnees could also offer critical data on enemy forces, defenses, and strategies, as well as on deficiencies in Allied weapon systems and doctrine, shortcomings that often caused the POW to have been captured in the first place. Operating under the cover of Intelligence School 9 (IS9), MI-9’s training center in North London provided instruction to intelligence officers on the art of escape and evasion. IS9 also provided a central office for a variety of executive functions to include escape and evasion planning, preparation of coded messages, and the development of specialized escape and evasion equipment. At the conclusion of the war, a section of IS9 also led the effort to identify and compensate the hundreds of supporters in France, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark who were

instrumental in facilitating the safe return of Allied military personnel. During the course of the war, MI-9 provided training in escape and evasion to over 600,000 ser-

mation.

vicemen from Commonwealth countries. Of these, only a small percentage of carefully selected indi-

To assist in the denial of information to the enemy.

viduals were trained in clandestine communications. The creative and tireless efforts of MI-9’s code section, IS9(Y), enabled MI-9 to securely communicate with those trained individuals who ultimately ended up in German POW camps. At the

To maintain morale enemy camps.

of British POWs

in

POWs, long overlooked as a source of intelligence, are commonly located near enemy military installations and lines of communication (i.e., rail lines, airfields, etc.). One of MI-9’s fundamental tasks, therefore, was to develop a system of clandestine communications that would facilitate “eyes on target” reporting from the legion of servicemen held as POWs throughout Europe. While this grew more challenging as POW camps were moved deeper into German-occupied territories and ultimately into Germany itself, the placement of POWs in the heart of the Reich only made their observations that much more valuable. A key step in the overall MI-9 process was the

thorough debriefing of repatriated Allied POWs. These individuals provided a wealth of unique intelligence on the German military. In direct support of ML-9 intelligence requirements, these repatriated POWs could provide confirmation of the status oi missing servicemen as well as important insights

same time, members of [S9(Z) created a broad array of escape and evasion devices that could be sent within seemingly benign packages by families and fictitious humanitarian organizations to Allied POWs.

Through their dedication, ingenuity, and relentless efforts, the officers and enlisted personnel of MLI-9 saved thousands of lives while making a major contribution to the Allied victory. STEVEN M. KLEINMAN ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO: ML5, World War II; United Kingdom.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ian Dear, Escape and Evasion (Arms and Armour Press, 1997); M.R.D. Foot and J.M. Langley, ML-49: Escape and Evasion 1939-1945 (Little, Brown, and Co., 1979); Lloyd R. Shoemaker, The Escape Factory (St. Martin’s Press, 1990); Donald P. Steury, The Intelligence Wars (Friedman/Fairfax Publishers, 2000).

Middle Ages THE

SPAN

of the Middle Ages, dating roughly

from the fall of the Roman Empire to the beginning of the modern age, featured numerous intelligence issues that grew especially critical in the renaissance diplomacy inaugurating the diplomatic structures of the modern age.

Byzantine intelligence. After Rome’s fall under the onslaught of barbarian invasions, the eastern Roman empire lived on. Its surviving remnant, the Byzantine Empire, spanned virtually the whole of | the Middle Ages (395-1453). Some institutional continuity thus survived, as with the functioning of the cursus publicus, the public roads system, continuing until Justinian’s reign (527-565). The empire had a sort of secret police with the agentes in rebus, or agents of public affairs, serving as a military corps of messengers and informers, maintaining surveillance of the operations of the postal road system, watching for spies and spying in turn. Their leaders were commonly and then officially known as the curiosi (inquisitive people). From the highest corps in the agentes, the principes were chosen to guard against conspiracy, arrest spies, and carry out missions at the request of the emperor or his top administrative aides, in effect, functioning as the empire’s secret police. As for the physical safety of the emperor, there were the cubicularri, responsible for the imperial apartments. Along with these intelligence services and missions within the empire, there were always the questions of securing borderlands and _ infiltrating enemy territory. Surveillance abroad became the assignment of the very best soldiers, forming prodigiously mobile bands of special-guard corps, akritai, posted at the empire’s frontiers. These corps watched for trouble on the frontiers and borderlands, collecting intelligence for the emperor by raiding the frontier and capturing prisoners. They also guarded against foreign spies and developed a communication system of optical signals. Yet, in the face of repeated Arab invasions of its territory, the intelligence services of the Byzantine Empire in Asia Minor underwent reorganization, and a new communications system based on the use of fire signals and clocks was perfected during Theophilus’s reign (829-842).

The Byzantines, like the Romans before them, also sent agents abroad to spy, while maintaining a military intelligence system that oversaw security for the garrisons of the provincial armies. At the tactical unit level, there were scouts and special corps, sometimes recruited from the local populace, who surveyed the terrain and reported intelligence to the army commander, the strategus. There was also a naval counterpart, who used warships to spy on the naval activity of foreign rivals. Captains in the Imperial Navy used an elaborate system of colored banners, or smoke and fire, as coded signals to communicate maneuvers.

There was also diplomatic intelligence on foreigners outside and within the capital of the empire, apparently delivered to the scriniium barbarorum, the Office for Barbarian Affairs, from the 5th to at least the 11th century. Beginning in 740, many of these activities became centralized in this imperial office, which organized the empire’s embassies abroad to collect intelligence. By 992, the office garnered the exclusive authority to search and inspect ships from the city-state of Venice, whose own fortunes emanated from its intermediary role between three civilizations: Islam, Western European Christendom, and Byzantium.

The golden age of Islam. The rise of the Arabs and the birth of Islamic civilization were crucially related to intelligence capabilities. After the death of the prophet Mohammed, Islamic culture spread rapidly though foreign conquest under the caliphs. In the reign of Caliph Abdalmalik (685-705), the old Persian and Byzantine postal road system was revived for administrative correspondence and _intelligence-gathering. Under his rule, the state was Arabicized, as was the language of public administration. During the dynastic succession of the Omayyad caliphs, Islam’s

supremacy was extended into central Asia to northern Africa, and over the Hamitic Berbers, who helped Islam conquer Iberia, after which the advance was halted in 872 by Charles Martel. The Omayyad Empire (661-750) was eventually replaced by the reign of the Abbasid Muslim Empire (750-1258), with their new capital in Baghdad during Islam’s golden age. Once again the old postal road system was used, albeit now it was more inte-

grally tied into espionage activities presided over by the head of these intelligence services, the postmaster general, who thus earned the nickname the “Eye

of the Caliph.” The Caliph also garnered numerous agents to do their bidding under the authorities of special intelligence heads, called KHAIBAR, who accompanied him in war. Control within the empire, as in Egypt for example, was regulated with passports, which allowed people to leave the territory. To ensure quick intelligence, carrier pigeons were used at least from the early 10th century into the 15th. Yet the Baghdad Caliphate came under recurrent challenge, most especially by the Fatimid dynasty, first in Tunisia and later in Egypt, which developed a wide-ranging intelligence service, including agents who brought their propaganda to the far reaches of the Orient. Eventually, after the Seljuk Empire was broken up, the intelligence services fell into disuse. Thereafter the Ayyubid rulers of Egypt, as with the Fatimids before them, saw a pronounced increase in their reliance on the Mamluk slaves, until 1250. Mamluk Aybak founded a new dynasty. Baybars (1260-1277), who defeated the 1260 Mongol invasion of Syria, is considered the Mamluk Empire’s founder, and he revived the intelligence system of previous Arab rulers while also rebuilding the navy. New postal systems, using horses and carrier pigeons, respectively, were revived on a more purely military-administrative basis for rapid movement of information, especially in regard to the Mongols and the Crusaders ravaging Arab lands. The use of optics re-emerged as well. The state post functioned in various incarnations for over 1,000 years until the Mongol Tamerlane’s invasion in 1400. In 1497, Vasco da Gama’s discovery of a new trading route to India led to the eclipse of many of these lands. The Malmuk Empire became incorporated into the new Ottoman Empire, and the Byzantine and Arab empires faded into the past. Yet during their time, the Arab empires often developed excellent intelligence systems, spying on their neighbors, including their bitter rival, the Byzantine Empire. They also drew on information from prisoners of war and from the development of medieval geography, which the Arab peoples virtually invented.

The Mongol hordes. Rising in the east during the heyday of the Arab empires were the Mongol or Tartar hordes, nomadic Asian tribes from the steppes who wandered in the north and west of China until the 1200s when they invaded large portions of Europe and the Middle East. By century’s end, they were unified under Genghis Khan, who

emerged as the ruler of central Asia, China, the Caucasus, and Persia, going on to conquer Russia,

Poland, and Hungary, thus extending the Mongol empire throughout much of Eurasia. Khan’s intelligence networks were critically aided by his spies, including the vast network of Muslim capitalist merchants whose trade hegemony held sway from China to central Asia. The merchants were intimately knowledgeable of the routes and local politico-economic conditions throughout the territories their caravans traversed. These merchants saw opportunities in Mongolian conquests,

as the conquests created the possibility of tighterlinked networks in which trading could prosper. Khan’s agents scouted out areas that he or his successors might conquer, sometimes engaging in years

of advanced reconnaissance, while paying attention to divisions in the ruling class that could be worked to the advantage of his marauding hordes. The Mongols’ intelligence system was so good that they were able to map out future European conquests. Kahn’s communication system included postal horse stations (jami) along the routes of his imperial highway every 25-30 miles, perhaps inspired by his Chinese predecessors. While good intelligence seems to have helped the Mongolian conquests, the lack of intelligence left many rivals, for example Muhammad II, Shah of the Khwarizmian Empire, losers of battles they believed they would surely win.

The rise of the Italian city-states. Rather than the larger empires leading the way, it was the Italian city-states whose innovations gave birth to modern diplomacy and intelligence. The great Crusades against the infidels were important, opening up the riches of the Eastern empires to Venice and others, which rather than colonizing directly, were content with the profit from trade while economizing on territorial expansion. The ruling classes of these merchant capitalist oligarchies put a premium on securing sole access to intelligence necessary for monopolizing the most lucrative aspects of long-distance trade, and managing the balance of power to their own advantage. The Italian Renaissance, in fact, gave birth to what Garret Mattingly (1955) called “renaissance diplomacy,” in which it became “progressively harder to distinguish between the resident representatives of the Medici bank and the political agents of the Florentine state.”

The Italian city-states derived inestimable advantages from the long-distance trade that provided them with already existing and self-financing foundations for modern diplomacy. Residential diplomacy, with the extra-territoriality of embassies and diplomatic immunity (so crucial for modern day espionage), were invented in the unique environment of the Italian city-state system, a regional forerunner of the modern capitalist world. No surprise then, that the ancient art of cryptology, invented by the Arabs, was revived. Resident ambassadors of the city-states, or “honorable spies,” stimulated the need for cryptology and fulltime cipher secretaries to encode and decode mes- . sages, with the most advanced form of it invented by Venice and controlled by its Council of Ten. So dazzling was the wealth of these tiny city-states that no only did the fortunes of the Genoese, for example, finance the Spanish discoveries and conquest of the new world, but France’s lack of access to similar liquidity led to its attack on Venice in 1494. France’s attack set off a global power struggle

that helped end the medieval order and gave birth to the modern age over the next two centuries, formally inaugurated at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years’ War and signaled the victory of the 80-year Dutch war for independence. THOMAS EHRLICH REIFER, PH.D. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE

SEE ALSO: China; ancient intelligence. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Perry Anderson, Passages from Antiguity to Feudalism (NLB, 1974); Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times (Verso, 1994); Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (Harper & Row, 1976); Francis Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services: The Ancient Near East, Persia, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, the Arab Muslim Empires, the Mongol Empire, China, Muscovy (Rutgers University Press, 1974); David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet (Scribner, 1996); William McNeill, The Pursuit of Power Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000 (University of Chicago Press, 1982); Garret Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Penguin, 1964); R. M. Sheldon, Espionage in the Ancient World: An Annotated Bibliography (McFarland, 2003).

Mitrokhin, Vasily VASILY NIKITICH Mitrokhin was an officer of the Soviet-era KGB intelligence service who is perhaps best known as the person who assembled, in secret, a massive portfolio on Soviet internal and external intelligence activities, which he took with him when he was ex-filtrated out of the Russian Federation in 1992 by the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS).

Mitrokhin was born in Russia in 1922 and began his career in the Soviet intelligence apparatus as a foreign intelligence officer in 1948. At the time | he began his career, foreign intelligence activities were carried out by the short-lived Committee of Information, a fusion of the foreign intelligence operations of a predecessor agency of the KGB, the MGB, and Soviet military intelligence, the GRU. Mitrokhin served in a series of foreign postings starting in 1952 whose locations he has not revealed. Mitrokhin’s gradual process of ideological alienation from the Soviet system, an alienation that ostensibly led him to begin secretly amassing the truly remarkable collection of notes that became the basis for the Mitrokhin Archive, began in 1956. Following Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s attack on Stalinism at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in February 1956, Mitrokhin “became too outspoken for his own good” in his criticism of the KGB, he related later. In light of the legacy of Stalinism and his questions about Khrushchev’s complicity in the waves of violent repression and purges, Mitrokhin exposed himself to arrest or worse. Toward the end of 1956, Mitrokhin was transferred from foreign operations to the First Chief Directorate (FCD) archives, where he was tasked with providing information to other departments of the KGB and provincial KGB offices. Some scholars of the Soviet internal security system have speculated that this transfer from foreign operations to the archives was a demotion as punishment for Mitrokhin’s open, albeit moderate, criticism of the

KGB. Mitrokhin would remain in these archives for the majority of the rest of his career as a KGB officer. j His position in the archives gave him an opportunity to view files and dossiers not only on foreign operations conducted by the FCD, but also a chance

to view archival material on operations against internal dissidents. The FCD also received information relating to both real and imagined contacts between internal dissidents and foreign intelligence services from the KGB’s Second Chief and Fifth Directorates which were responsible for internal security and countersubversion operations. Mitrokhin’s growing dissatisfaction with political repression was further stimulated by Khrushchev’s attack on writers such as Boris Pasternak (Dr. Zhivago), whom Mitrokhin supported with an anonymous letter in 1958 to the Literaturnaya Gazeta, a prominent literary magazine. By the early 1970s, Mitrokhin’s alienation had reached the point that he decided to attempt to covertly assemble a history of Soviet repression. In June 1972, Mitrokhin had an ideal opportunity to begin to collect and assemble this history when he was tasked with transferring the FCD’s archives as part of its moves from the Lubyanka, the KGB’s central headquarters in downtown Moscow, to new offices in Yasenevo, a suburb. Transferring the archives would consume the next 10 years of Mitrokhin’s life, as he “alone was responsible for checking and sealing the approximately 300,000 files that comprised the FCD’s archive.”

Mitrokhin began to assemble his secret parallel archive by taking thousands of pages of notes from the archives that he was transferring and smuggled the notes out of the FCD’s Yasenevo complex. He worked on his notes and secreted them in a milk churn and other storage containers underneath a family country home. Mitrokhin continued to gather and organize notes, and began to develop a plan to contact Western intelligence services to bring his secret archive out of the Soviet Union. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991, Mitrokhin decided to put his plan into action, and in March 1992 he made his first attempt to establish contact with British intelligence by visiting the British embassy in one of the Baltic Republics. On his second visit he managed to convince British intelligence officers, he wanted to arrange to leave Russia and come to England with his family. By November 1992, Mitrokhin, his family, and his secretly assembled archive were out of the former Soviet Union and in Britain. During an extensive debriefing process through-

out the 1990s, information leaked out of a major

defection of a former KGB officer who was capable

of revealing the identities of possibly hundreds of KGB agents. It was not until the publication of The Sword and the Shield in 1999 that the SVR (the Russian Federation’s successor to the FCD of the KGB),

despite earlier denials that any single defector would have been able to reveal that much information, realized that indeed it had a possibly catastrophic leak on its hands. The Mitrokhin Archives provided new information on a number of KGB foreign operations, and information in the book lead to one of the major spy scandals and investigations of the late 1990s in the United Kingdom. The archives identified Melita Norwood, who spied for the Soviet Union throughout her career in the British nuclear research establishment, and John Symonds, a former officer of Scotland Yard. Revelations from the archives triggered a series of hearings in the British Parliament into MI-5’s handling of counterintelligence operations.

Mitrokhin was given British citizenship and lived at an unidentified location in Britain under an assumed identity to protect him from reprisals by his former colleagues at the KGB or the SVR. The Mitrokhin Archives have had a major impact on Cold War historiography, although some experts on the history of the Soviet security apparatus question some of the details of Mitrokhin’s story, especially his ability to collect such an archive without assistance. Mitrokhin’s co-author on the book about the archive collection, Christopher Andrews, regards Mitrokhin as a hero who was a “secret dissident” and who “risked his life’? to assemble his archive and bring a vast amount of highly classified, and by now likely destroyed, information out of the archives of the KGB. CHRISTIAN W. ERICKSON ROOSEVELT UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: KGB; Soviet Union; Khrushchev, Nikita S.; defector; MI-5.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. “On-Line Moderated Discussion with Christopher Andrew,” www.abcnews.com; Christopher Andrew and Vasily Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (Basic Books, 1999); “MI-5 To Be Quizzed over Spies,” “Soviet Spy Inquiry,” “Idealist Who Sold Out

His Homeland,” www.news.bbc.uk; Amy Knight, “The Selling of the KGB,” Wilson Quarterly (v.24/1, 2000).

MOCKINGBIRD, Project A COLD WAR-ERA CIA propaganda campaign, Project MOCKINGBIRD was begun in the late 1940s under Frank Wisner, director of the Office of Policy Coordination. Project MOCKINGBIRD sought to manipulate media coverage of the Cold War by recruiting foreign and domestic journalists . to serve as clandestine propaganda agents for the United States. Enjoying mixed success in the 1950s and 1960s, the program was ended in the 1970s due to mounting popular opposition to the CIA’s covert operations and domestic activities. MOCKINGBIRD originated as a response to the Soviet Union’s increasingly successful effort to infiltrate and dominate key international media organizations. Shortly after World War II, communist agents had won control over a number of influential bodies, including the International Organization of Journalists, a professional association of newspaper reporters founded in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 1946. Fearing that the Soviet Union would enjoy unprecedented power over the European media as a result of its domination of the organization, Wisner and others in the American intelligence community moved quickly to restore the propaganda balance. Their answer was Project MOCKING-

and opinion makers at such key media giants as CBS, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and

Newsweek. In exchange for CIA news tips and funds, Project MOCKINGBIRD correspondents countered communist propaganda claims, highlighted the global danger posed by the Soviet Union, and, above all, worked to win the Cold War battle for the hearts and minds of people all over the world by portraying the United States in a positive light. More ominously, Project MOCKINGBIRD also allowed the CIA to influence domestic policy. In particular, Project MOCKINGBIRD correspondents took part in a successful campaign to pressure Congress and the Dwight Eisenhower administration to increase funding for air power and strategic missiles in the 1950s. Not all of Project MOCKINGBIRD’s propaganda campaigns proved so effective. During the early and mid-1950s, for instance, MOCKINGBIRD reporters supported an intensive CIA effort to foster discord in the Eastern Bloc by publishing stories suggesting that Washington would provide diplomatic and military assistance to anti-Soviet revolts. This campaign bore fruit in November 1956, when it helped spark a Hungarian revolt against Soviet domination. Success ultimately proved shortlived, however. Washington’s subsequent refusal to antagonize the Soviet Union by intervening in Hungary as promised not only doomed the uprising to failure, but also eroded America’s standing among the people of Eastern Europe and undermined the credibility of many of the reporters affiliated with

BIRD, a sustained and clandestine effort to recruit journalists into America’s Cold War crusade and to use them to promote and legitimate Washington’s propaganda line. Writing from an apparently objective perspective, Wisner believed, Project MOCKINGBIRD correspondents would be able to advance America’s diplomatic and political agenda in a more persuasive and genuine manner than Washington could through traditional press releases and official channels. Under Wisner’s direction, Project MOCKINGBIRD rapidly expanded. Appealing to the anticommunist sentiments of many journalists, and

Project MOCKINGBIRD.

sweetening the pot with annual payments ranging into the thousands of dollars, Wisner quickly recruited a large pool of correspondents. By the mid 1950s, the program employed almost 600 journalists globally and included a number of reporters

SEE ALSO: Central Intelligence Agency; Wisner, Frank; journalism and propaganda.

The project’s demise came in the 1970s after investigative reporters such as Carl Bernstein revealed details of the program to the public. Already smarting from lurid revelations of drug-testing, allegations of illegal domestic espionage, and the general anti-government atmosphere of post-Vietnam America, the CIA opted to drop Project MOCK-

INGBIRD. ROBERT J. FLYNN, PH.D. GEORGIA PERIMETER COLLEGE

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Carl Bernstein, “The CIA and the Media,” Rolling Stone (October 20, 1977); Deborah

Davis, Katharine the Great (National Press, 1979); Victor

Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (Knopf, 1974).

Montagnards FRENCH FOR “highlanders” or “mountaineers,” the term Montagnards refers to the indigenous inhabitants of the central highland region in Vietnam. They call themselves Anh Chu, or “sons of the mountains.” During the Vietnam War (1954~-75), the Montagnards occupied a strategic location, a major infiltration route from Laos into South Vietnam. This location made them important to both American and Vietnamese communist forces. The United States first began recruiting Montagnards in the late 1950s. The CIA and its South Vietnamese counterpart, the Presidential Survey Office, used recruited Montagnards to gather intelligence on communist

troop movements,

particu-

larly cross-border operations into Laos to monitor the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This involvement led to the development of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) under CIA agent Gilbert Layton, launched in 1961 at Buon Enao. The CIDG program, implemented by U.S. Special Forces but run by the CIA, entailed the creation of local self-defense militia combined with social and economic programs. The CIDG grew to include 40,000 militia and 11,000 strike force troops. Also in the early 1960s, the CIA launched, through the Vietnamese Bureau of Highland Affairs, the mountain scout program. Montagnards were trained as commandos to gather information on communist (Viet Cong) movements in the highlands and to spread pro-government propaganda. The CIA completed training of its first scouts in 1962. By 1964, the CIA had turned over most of its operational control of CIDG and the scouts to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) as part of a shift of paramilitary activities to the military. The CIA continued its involvement in the highlands and angered many in the South Vietnamese government by its meetings with representatives of the Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées (FULRO) or united Struggle Front for the Oppressed Races. The meetings were a CIA at-

tempt to ease tensions between FULRO and the Vietnamese government during the 1964-65 highland uprisings. Montagnards continued to be involved in clandestine activities as the Special Operations Group (SOG, also called Studies and Observation Group) took over most covert activities begun by the CIA. SOG recruited Montagnards for two cross-border operations, SHINING BRASS (1965-67) and DANIEL BOONE (1967-71). Teams of Montagnards (another ethnic minority, Chinese Nungs, also participated in the operations), usually led by a special forces sergeant, infiltrated Laos and Cambodia with the mission to gather information about the extent of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The teams also attempted to deny sanctuary to the communist forces by reporting troop movements and camp locations. Throughout the war, the Vietnamese communists attempted to gain favor and influence among the Montagnards, with little success. The Montagnards rarely trusted any Vietnamese, North or South. In 1975, some highland leaders made a secret deal with the North Vietnamese, leading to the capture of the village Ban Me Thuot, that opened the Central Highlands for the North Vietnamese forces and hastened the end of the war. MICHAEL C. MILLER DALLAS PUBLIC LIBRARY

SEE ALSO: Vietnam; Vietnam War.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Gerald Cannon Hickey, Free in the Forest: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands, 1954-1976 (Yale University Press, 1982); G. C. Hickey, Shattered World: Adaptation and Survival among Vietnam’s Highland Peoples during the Vietnam War (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993); Richard H. Shultz, The Secret War Against Hanoi (HarperCollins, 2000).

Morison, Samuel L. BORN IN 1944, Samuel Morison was the grandson of the eminent historian Samuel Eliot Morison. In 1985, Morison was convicted of espionage and theft of government property for stealing classified satellite photos from the Naval Intelligence Support Center, where he was employed as a civilian intelli-

gence analyst. He sold the photos to Jane’s Publishing Company, and they were published in Jane’s Defense Weekly while Morison was employed as a government intelligence analyst. His conviction was upheld on appeal, and

1998); Philip Weiss, “The Quiet Coup: U.S. v. Morison: A Victory for Secret Government,” Harper’s (September

1989). scpesespresunese

Morison was sentenced to two years in prison, serv-

ing almost eight months before being paroled. Following his release, he authored numerous books and scholarly articles on naval affairs and history. Morison received a pardon from President Bill Clinton in 2001. Morison was the first person convicted under U.S. espionage laws for “leaking” classified information to the news media. The government prosecuted

him

for a number

of reasons.

Leaks

of

classified information grew alarmingly after the Pentagon Papers (classified documents about the Vietnam War) release in the 1970s, causing great frustration in President Richard Nixon’s White House. Federal prosecutors felt that the facts in the Morison case made it possible to gain a conviction and thus prove the applicability of the espionage laws to possible other “leakers.” They also were encouraged by the recent tendency of federal courts to

favor

national

security

concerns

over

First

Amendment rights. The U.S. government hoped to make the Morison conviction a seminal case, however, justifying the use of the espionage laws to prosecute future leaks to the media. Given the narrow facts of the case this has not happened, and national news media continue to routinely report classified information. In 1997, the Washington Times published photos almost identical to the ones that Morison leaked with no ensuing prosecutions. The espionage laws have proved to be a poor tool to prosecute leakers and are unlikely to be used to prosecute the press itself. ROBERT D. BOHANAN JIMMY CARTER LIBRARY

SEE ALSO: Vietnam War; Nixon, Richard M.; Ellsberg, Daniel. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Steven Burkholder, “The Morison Case: The Leaker as ‘Spy’,” Freedom at Risk: Secrecy, Censorship, and Repression in the 1980s (Temple University Press, 1988); James W. Tankard, Jr, “Samuel Loring Morison and the Government Crackdown on the Leaking of Classified Material,” Journalism History (Spring

Morocco MOROCCAN intelligence agencies have played a key, if often controversial, role in supporting the Moroccan monarchy ever since the country de-

clared itself independent from French colonial rule in 1956. Though ostensibly a constitutional monarchy, the regimes of Mohammed V (1956-61) and his son Hassan II (1961-99) made extensive use of security forces, especially the Streté Nationale, to bolster their rule and silence internal opponents. However, this support has not always been beneficial to the regime. In 1971, members of the Sdreté Nationale were suspected of being involved in a failed coup against Hassan IJ. A year later, Mohammed Oufkir, former director of the Sdreté Nationale, helped organize an assassination attempt in which two Moroccan Air Force jets attacked a plane carrying the king. Following these events, Hassan II instituted political reforms and reorganized the Moroccan intelligence services to create two separate agencies. The

Direction Générale des Etudes et de la Documentation (DGED) became responsible for foreign intelligence activities, while the Direction Générale de la Surveillance du Territoire (DGST) undertook internal surveillance and policing operations. In 1975, the new director of the DGED, Ahmed Dlimi, helped engineer the Moroccan takeover of the Western Sahara, a Spanish colony on Morocco’s southern border. The operation included an “invasion” of 300,000 unarmed Moroccans who marched across the frontier to lay claim to the territory. After the rise of the local Polisario resistance movement against Moroccan rule, Dlimi played a key role in building a 1,600-kilometer fortified wall across the desert to prevent Polisario guerrillas from attacking Moroccan settlements. Despite these achievements, Hassan II clashed with Dlimi, who was removed from his position and executed in 1983 ‘ In the 1980s and 1990s, the DGST stepped up its internal operations against opponents of the Moroccan monatchy. These included leftist groups

pushing for more liberalization of the regime. In ad-

dition, when neighboring Algeria experienced vicious internal fighting between government forces and Islamic guerrillas in the mid-1990s, the DGST took steps to make sure the conflict would not spill over into Morocco. Since the death of Hassan II in 1999 and the accession of his son Mohammed VI to the throne, Morocco’s intelligence agencies have remained active, despite a growing human rights movement in the country. Both the DGED and the DGST collaborate with Western intelligence organizations, particularly in efforts to combat drug-trafficking and thwart suspected attacks from Islamic terrorist groups. JAMES H. LIDE History ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED

SEE ALSO: Algeria; France; de Gaulle, Charles.

BIBILOGRAPHY. Jacques Baud, Enyclopédie du reseignements et des services secrets (Lavauzelle, 1997); Henry Munson, Religion and Power in Morocco (Yale University Press, 1993); Ignace Dalle, Le régne d’Hassan II 1961-1999, une espérance brisée (Maisonneuve et Larose, 2001); Malika Oufkir, Stolen Lives, Twenty Years in a Desert Jail (Hyperion, 2001); Jacques Derogy and Frédéric Ploquin, Ils ont tué Ben Barka (Fayard, 1999).

Morros, Boris KNOWN MORE for his greed than his production as a spy, Boris Morros was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, in 1895, and then immigrated to the United States, leaving his family behind. He eventually began work as a minor film producer in Hollywood, California. Morros began his career as a Soviet spy in 1934. While visiting the Soviet consulate in New York City to arrange for his father’s travel to and from the Soviet Union, Morros met Soviet agent Peter Gutzeit. Initially, Morros offered to assist in establishing Soviet organizations in the United States, but Gutzeit, hearing of Morros’s Hollywood connections, proposed using Morros to place Soviet operatives in Paramount’s offices in Europe. With Moscow’s consent, Morros arranged for Soviet agent Vassily Zarubin to begin work in Para-

mount’s new Berlin office. With this initial success, Moscow immediately sought to use Morros for further placements. Unfortunately for the Soviets, Morros had exaggerated his importance in Holly-

wood and could not offer broader access to Paramount. Nonetheless, he was useful to the Soviets by serving as liaison for funds and information to and from agent Zarubin. In December 1941, after several years of relative inactivity, Morros was ordered to organize covers

for two Soviet agents operating in Switzerland. Following this operation, Morros used the funds of another Soviet agent, American millionaire Alfred Stern, to establish a music publishing company. It soon failed, prompting Morros to ask Moscow for more money. Morros threatened that he would terminate his service if the money was not paid. Astonished Soviet officials refused to pay. By the late 1940s, Morros had begun working as a double-agent for the FBI. In an attempt to increase Soviet interest in him, Morros, with the FBI’s help, concocted stories of his meeting with President Harry Truman, Supreme Court justices, Congressmen, Senators, and generals Eventually he visited Moscow as a supposed guest of SOVEXPORTFILM, with the public purpose of negotiating the

distribution of Russian films in America. Secretly, he met with Soviet intelligence officers, who criticized him for not providing them with concrete information and voiced their skepticism of his purported connections. In order to placate his Moscow superiors and potentially gain profitable film deals, Morros suggested that his son could gain a post in the Atomic Energy Commission. At this point, in 1957, the Soviets had become extremely suspicious of their agent, who continually described his high-power connections but never

delivered any useful intelligence. When it became apparent that he was to receive no further attention from his Soviet controllers, Morros testified before a grand jury leading to the indictment of several of his American colleagues. Morros died in 1963. GEORGE REKLAITIS, PH.D. NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Gutzeit, Peter; Federal Bureau of Investigation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Allen Weinstein, The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America (Modern Library, 2000);

Christopher Andrew and Vasily Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive (Penguin, 2000); William Turner, Hoover’s FBI (Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1993).

Mussolini, Benito THE ITALIAN dictator Benito Mussolini was a central figure in the history of Italian intelligence services. He was both the creator and the victim of several intelligence plots. In addition, the intelligence structures created by Mussolini, as well as the men he appointed as their directors, managed to survive the end of the regime and formed a dangerous element of continuity between the fascist regime and the republic. Even before the official constitution of intelligence groups and the establishment of the dictatorship, Mussolini always favored the formation of a secret police within the Fascist Party. The investigations of the murder of Socialist Party leader Giacomo Matteotti revealed the existence of the Ceka, a secret police whose name derived from the Italianization of the acronym for the Soviet political police (Cheka). This secret body was established thanks to the

meeting of several fascist militants with the press director of the prime minister, Cesare Rossi. Rossi was, therefore, the link between the Ceka and Mussolini, and he was also responsible for the recruitment of informants, most of whom were chosen among journalists. The Ceka was essentially a parallel structure that was later uncovered as being responsible for a long chain of aggressions aimed at purging elements adverse to fascism. After Matteotti’s murder,

the Ceka could no longer remain a secret organization, acting undisturbed. Its discovery posed to the fascist government the problem of establishing official organs of control and starting the process that would result in the formation of the dictatorship. In January 1925, before the Italian Parliament, Mussolini famously took responsibility for Matteotti’s murder: “I now declare before this assembly and before the entire people that I assume, I alone, political, moral and historical responsibility for all that has happened... Gentlemen, Italy wants peace, tranquility, calm in which to work. We shall give her

this tranquility by means of love if possible but by

force if necessary.” The Military Information Service (SIM) was created in the same year. It was instrumental in giving Italy tranquility (to consolidate fascist power) through force, since it played a crucial role in the repression of political opposition. In particular, the strengthening of its third section used for counterintelligence actions marked a toughening of control over the opposition. The funds given to the SIM doubled during the 1920s, and

new, cruel organizations of intelligence for the persecution of anti-fascists were created. The main purpose of these Organizations was to control the application of the so-called leggi fascistissime (very fascist laws), which erased any remaining democratic principles. These laws also marked the inclusion of high-ranking officers in the tribunals that were to judge people charged with crimes against the fascist state, and were a definitive step to include the armed forces into the fascist establishment. The officers in the armed forces became co-opted in the intelligence service to repress opposition against the party. In 1927, Mussolini created another important secret police, the OVRA. This acronym has never been completely deciphered. Some call it ‘“Voluntary Work for the repression of Anti-Fascism,”’ while others argue for “Organ of Vigilance for Crimes against the State.” Recently, Mimmo Fanzinelli has suggested that Mussolini coined the term in phonetic assonance with the word “piovra” (octopus) or with “Okhrana” (the Russian Tzarist secret police). IL Duce (as Mussolini was known) was fascinated by the sinister sound of the word and was persuaded that its ambiguous meaning would enhance the threatening impact of the new organization.

Countless operations were coordinated by the SIM and the OVRA both in Italy and abroad. These include the murder of the Rosselli brothers in France, the elimination of the anti-fascist group Giustizia e Liberta in Milan, and the discovery of the secret communist network in the north of Italy in 1927. Mussolini was not only the creator of intelligence services, he was also a target for many of them. There is evidence, for example, that a London-based plot to murder the Italian dictator was suppressed on government orders when details threatened to be made public in the early 1930s.

Mussolini, Benito

437

= ¥ a

nd

4:

Italian Fascist leader Benito Mussolini (left) and Nazi Party leader Adolf Hitler, two of the Axis allies at the height of their power in 1940. Mussolini named his intelligence services after Soviet spy agencies, implying but never achieving similar characteristics.

The plot was monitored by British intelligence, and details reached the Home Office and the Foreign Office under Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, pointing to the involvement of a businessman, Emidio Recchioni, who was suspected of providing money and weapons for the assassination attempt in Rome. Mussolini’s death in 1945 is also shrouded in mystery. According to the official record, the communist militant Walter Audisio, known as Colonel Valerio, was given the task of the dictator’s execution. Yet there are conflicting versions, including one

that attributes the death of the dictator to the British

intelligence services. LUCA PRONO, PH.D. UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM, ENGLAND SEE ALSO: Italy; World War II.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Mimmo

Franzinelli,

I tentacoli del-

l’Ovra (Bollati Boringhieri, 1999); Franco Fucci, Le polizie di Mussolini (Mursia, 1985); John Pollard, The Fascist Ex-

perience in Italy (Routledge, 1998).

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National Reconnaissance Office IN 1957, the successful flight of the first Russian satellite, Sputnik, came as a shock to many in the American intelligence community. Although launched in very low earth orbit (Sputnik was visible from earth with the naked eye), it meant that the Soviet Union had made major progress in claiming the ultimate high ground in any future war: space. It was in response to this threat that President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration opened, on August 25, 1960, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Moreover, the downing of the U-2 spy plane on May 1, 1960, piloted by Francis Gary Powers, showed that any plane was vulnerable to ground-based Soviet missiles. Hence, there was a real need to develop space satellites as a source of intelligence information. Even today, there is no known way to destroy or bring down a satellite from its orbit. Although Eisenhower gave the project to Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates for coordination, the effort was planned as a truly national enterprise, involving every major military and civilian intelligence agency. However, serious intramural infighting marred the National Reconnaissance Office from the beginning. The problem stemmed from a rivalry between the CIA and the U.S. Air Force over

which agency would steer the future of the NRO. Both services had strong hands to play, since the CIA was responsible for much of the analysis of the information gathered by satellite reconnaissance (along with the National Security Agency), but the U.S. Air Force supplied the missiles that launched the satellites. An attempt to settle this dispute came with the establishment in 1965 of the EXCOM, the Executive Committee, which was composed of the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCI), the president’s scientific adviser, and an assistant secretary of defense. Because of the increasing sophistication of satellite technology, by the 1980s the National Security Agency (NSA) had emerged as the senior partner in the NRO. In order to collect data for ultimate analysis at the main NSA facility at Fort Meade, Maryland, the NSA used three regional centers. In 2003, these were located at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas, which monitors the Caribbean basin, and Central and South America; Kunia in Hawaii, tasked with overseeing satellite data from Asia; and Fort Gordon in Texas, which, as James Bamford wrote in Body of Secrets: Anatomy of The Ultra-Secret National Security Agency (2001), “processes and ana-

lyzes [satellite intelligence] intercepts from Europe and the Middle East.” With the overwhelming attention placed on the Middle East since the bombing of the American embassies in east Africa in the summer of 1998, and the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, by Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda terror

439

group, reasoned speculation can assume that Fort Gordon has been by far the most active of the three NSA regional intelligence-collection centers. As well, since December 2002, with North Korea reactivating their nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, one can speculate that there was increased activity as well at the station at Konia in Hawaii. There has been close cooperation between the NRO and the NSA, since the former builds the intelligence satellites according to the specifications given by the latter. In 2003, both agencies were working together to build a new generation of spy satellites, the Integrated Overhead Signals Intelligence Architecture-2 (IOSA-2). However, the IOSA2 program has proven so sophisticated that, whereas 2002 was chosen for the year the first IOSA-2 satellite would launch, the new generation of satellites may not become space-borne until possibly 2010. Meanwhile, a whole new area of concern has opened for the NSA and the NRO which was unforeseen when the NRO was established in 1960: cyberwarfare. In the early 2000s, the main danger to U.S. satellites launched by the National Reconnaissance Office came from the massive computer networks used to operate them. From government and private sources, there are hostile entities throughout the world that have the technology to not only eavesdrop on the information gathered by U.S. intelligence satellites, but also potentially to interfere with their guidance systems and put them far off their programmed orbits. In October 2000, General Dale Meyerrose, director for command and control systems for the U.S. Space Command (Spacecom), told a military communications conference that “Spacecom is con-

sidering forming a unified subcommand to oversee computer network attack and defense missions.”’ JOHN EK MURPHY, JR. AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: satellites; National Security Agency; air force intelligence and counterintelligence; reconnaissance. BIBLIOGRAPHY. James Bamford, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency (Anchor Boos, 2001); Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare: Chaos on the Information Superhighway (Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1994); “When Point and Shoot Becomes Point and

Click,” The New York Times (November 12, 2000); Jeffrey Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Westview, 1989).

National Security Agency THE NATIONAL Security Agency (NSA) is a highly secretive U.S. cryptologic intelligence agency that collects, processes, and directs commercial, diplomatic, and military information derived from foreign electronic signals. NSA provides the decoded information to national intelligence agencies, uses the information for counterintelligence purposes, and assists the military in protective measures. Its two main tasks are to protect the U.S. information system and to produce foreign signals intelligence. It is one of 13 intelligence organizations in the United States and has its headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. The NSA engages in highly specialized activities, carried out in great secrecy and legally prohibited from being publicized. Banks, civil rights leaders, politicians, embassies, trade missions, terrorists, oil companies, newspapers, commodity dealers, radical political groups, and other people and organizations are monitored daily. The NSA computers are so huge that they cover an area of 11 acres at Fort Meade. As of 2004, the NSA was under the leadership of Director Lieutenant Gen-

eral Michael V. Hayden and Deputy Director William B. Black, Jr. It employs analysts, linguists, researchers, computer scientists, engineers, security

officers, physicists, managers, and data flow experts along with support staff such as clerical and administrative assistants The NSA’s mathematicians specialize in codemaking and codebreaking. The NSA’s number of civilian and military employees is classified. Nor is the agency’s budget disclosed to the public. Only the Office of Management and Budget of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Defense Subcommittees of the Appropriation Committees in the Houses of Congress are apprised of these budget figures.

Early history. The NSA was established by executive order under President Harry S Truman, as a re-

National Security Agency 441 sult of amemo from Walter Bedell Smith to James B. Lay, executive secretary of the National Security Council, indicating how ineffective intelligence communications were jeopardizing national security. Bedell Smith recommended a survey; the proposal was approved and a study was undertaken. The Brownell Committee Report, chaired by Herbert Brownell, was completed on June 13, 1952. It provided an historical overview and indicated that more intensified coordination and stronger direction were required for intelligence gathering and protection.

However, it was not until 1957 that the existence

of the NSA was confirmed by the federal government. In a democratic society, no matter how secretive an agency might be, some oversight is still required. The NSA is regulated by federal law, the executive branch, the Constitution, and the Department of Defense. An oversight procedure is in place to guarantee NSA’s compliance with various rules and regulations. It is headed by the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board and the Congress’s Select Commitees on Intelligence. The National Security Council, the Departments of Defense and Justice also provide oversight duties. The secretary of defense and the attorney general vet the regulations

with assistance from the two Congressional over-

sight committees. The NSA also has an internal oversight procedure that is administered by the office of the inspector general. The forerunner to the NSA was the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), which had been established under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense on May 20, 1949. The Joint Chiefs of Staff commanded the AFSA. However, the mandate for AFSA—to direct electronic and communications intelligence activities of the military service signals intelligence units of the Naval Security Group, Air Force Security Service, and Army Security Agency—did not function well in practice because the AFSA was not granted the power it needed to be effective.

Cold War activities. The NSA inherited the ECHELON program from AFSA. This global spy network, known as UKUSA, was a controversial program created in agreement with Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia in 1948 during the early stage of the Cold War to intercept threatening or enemy intelligence communications using contemporary methods of surveillance. Today, ECHELON is able to monitor the entire global electronic

c computers that cover some 11 acres. The National Security Agency headquarters in Fort Meade, Mar yland, has cryptologi structure. Codemaking and codebreaking by the NSA employs a classified budget and employee

spectrum: fax, email, telephone, telex, microwave, cable, and satellite systems anywhere in the world. It takes satellite pictures with all the accompanying extraordinary means to detect enemy buildup or infil-

NSA technology. The highly technological nature of the NSA requires that it be on the cutting edge of the communications field, and thus uses leading research and development programs. As such, it is re-

tration.

portedly allocated a huge budget from Congress.

The original mission of ECHELON was to detect Cold War antagonists’ positions through intelligence such as the infra-red photographs of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962. However, ECHELON added an unwieldy domestic surveillance agency

The rapidity of change in the technological arena also demands constant upgrading. Consequently, the NSA, through its National Cryptologic School, has wide-ranging employee training programs to maintain professionalism. This training is also beneficial to the Department of Defense. Moreover, employees of NSA are sponsored to earn Bachelor degrees and pursue graduate studies. Some select NSA employees take advanced degrees at the U.S. war colleges under the aegis of the armed forces. Critics question whether the results are worth the billions of dollars of expense. NSA cryptologic efforts have been criticized: information has become

that targets

suspect

American

citizens

who

are

deemed possible threats to national security. While many would argue this violates the civil liberties of American citizens, the ECHELON program reportedly persists with the rationale that it is a necessary evil that ultimately protects the nation. In 1984, Senator Frank Church warned Congress about the civil right violations committed by the NSA but to no avail. In fact, President Ronald Reagan increased the ECHELON budget. The agency expanded significantly after the end of the Cold War due to the growing threat of terrorism. The European Union has severely criticized the ECHELON program on the grounds it infringes upon the civil liberties of the peoples in member countries. ECHELON is structured so that foreign spy networks cannot circumvent or monitor the program. Several other NSA programs spied on American citizens. The NSA also inherited Project SHAMROCK, which had been established in 1945. Its role was to copy all the telegraphic information that entered or left U.S. borders. All telegraph companies complied with the initiative. Copies were first made on microfilm, later replaced by magnetic computer tapes. In 1966, a front company was created in a New York City office building that housed the telephone company offices. Thousands of messages were intercepted, printed, and analyzed on a monthly basis. Critics in Congress were appalled at the secrecy of Project SHAMROCK and forced NSA Director Lew Allen to dissolve it in 1975. Project MINARET was a watch list that operated from 1967 to 1973. It was meant to watch socalled subversives such as anti-war activists Jane Fonda, pediatrician Dr. Benjamin Spock, and singer Joan Baez among others. The NSA Office of Security also had reports, between 1952 and 1974, on at least 75,000 Americans. It had nearly 6,000 foreigners and some nearly 1,700 organizations under surveillance and elicited nearly 4,000 reports. Attorney General Elliot Petersen dissolved the project.

available on how the Soviet Union sent erroneous, often worthless messages because it knew the NSA

was intercepting communications. Only 25 percent of the Soviet Union’s coded communications were broken. The Soviets repeatedly duped the NSA with deliberate false information; the raw intelligence was seriously flawed, not worthy of transmission, and faked electronic signals were often sent deliberately. Although the NSA downplays its history with Soviet tactics, critics question the effectiveness of NSA operations in light of attacks on U.S. Navy ships, marine barracks, and embassies, and the events of September 11, 2001. ANNETTE RICHARDSON, PH.D. UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA, CANADA

SEE ALSO: cryptography; Church, Frank; congressional oversight; Cold War; War on Terrorism. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Walter Bedell Smith, “Proposed Survey of Communications Intelligence Activities,” Report to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense by a Special Committee (December 10, 1951); Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UK-USA Countries (Allen & Unwin, 1985); James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: Inside the National Security Agency: America’s Most Secret Intelligence Organization (Penguin Books, 1983); Phillip Knightley, The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century (W.W. Norton, 1986); The National Cryptologic School, On Watch: Profiles from the National Security Agency’s Past 40 Years (NCS, 1986); National Security

Agency/Central Security Service, NSA/CSS Manual 22-1 (NSA, 1986); Jeffrey Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Ballinger, 1985); U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, Book III: Foreign and Military Intelligence (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976).

National Security Council THE U.S. NATIONAL Security Council (NSC) was established by the National Security Act of July 26, 1947, to advise the president with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. The NSC provides guidance and direction for the conduct of all foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities on behalf of the president.

The NSC is also the primary consumer of national intelligence as the senior policymaking body in the executive branch concerning national security. The NSC staff is headed by the assistant to the president for national security affairs, generally known as the national security adviser. At the service of the president, the NSC adapts to the personal management preferences of each president. Accordingly, the NSC has been flexible in restructuring itself with every new administration.

NSC history. The history of the NSC has its roots in World War II, when coordination between the

United States and Britain revealed a lack of organization in the presidential administration for dealing with incoming intelligence. The conduct of the war, and the emerging global bipolarization after 1945, revealed the necessity for major structural and organizational changes in the U.S. intelligence and security system. During 1947-49, Congress enacted far-reaching legislation to reform the intelligence and foreign policy apparatus. The 1947 National Security Act stipulated that the NSC was to advise the president on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security, and enable government agencies to better coordinate and provide recommendations to the president. President Harry Truman was greatly influenced by the leadership style of the former president,

Franklin D. Roosevelt, and believed the newly created NSC had the potential of intruding on executive powers. He attended the NSC meetings infrequently and delegated his NSC chair to the secretary of state. In this way, he believed full freedom of action was preserved to him on matters brought to him from the NSC. The Korean conflict changed Truman’s perspective. He began attending the NSC weekly meetings and directed that all major national security policy matters be coordinated through the NSC. Nonetheless, he maintained the view that the NSC should only formulate recommendations, leaving final decisions to the president in coordination with an inner circle of advisers. The NSC developed enduring institutional practices during the Truman administration that persist to this day. It established a variety of interagency subcommittees devoted to specific areas of policy and global concern. Specialized policy studies and issue papers became the hallmark of NSC relations with the White House, including national security strategy papers,

bilateral and regional assessments, and a focus on functional issues including arms control, proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, regional and civil wars, and the other major issues of national security importance. Truman’s successor, President Dwight D. Eisen-

hower, critically evaluated the NSC system before entering office in 1953. He presided over 300 NSC meetings and revised NSC procedures to suit his personal requirements. He modeled the NSC after Britain’s War Cabinet, conceiving it as a corporate body of individuals advising the president in its own right, rather than as mere representatives of respective departments. The NSC’s task was to come to the most statesmanlike solutions rather than present mere compromises between bureaucratic positions. Eisenhower also added the offices of budget director and Treasury secretary to the NSC, and appointed a member of the White House staff as the first national security adviser. Nonetheless, Eisenhower remained dissatisfied with the NSC structure, favoring small informal meetings for making key security decisions. President John E. Kennedy was not impressed with the cumbersome NSC staff created by Eisenhower, and criticized the Republican administration for failing to create a structure responsive to Cold War demands. Kennedy took steps to create a small, streamlined NSC strongly tied to his personal lead-

ership. He created ad hoc arrangements that stressed the personal involvement of the president, the secretaries of state and defense, and the national security adviser. It included a reorganization of White House communications with various departments of government, keeping the president well-informed of State, Defense, and CIA activities. The NSC staff assumed responsibility for the day-to-day presidential briefing in addition to policy development. The personnel of the NSC staff shifted from careerists to appointees, and its members became presidential staff officers who assumed line responsibilities to implement policy decisions as directed. The NSC met 45 times during Kennedy’s presidency, but is- © sues previously handled through the NSC were increasingly administered through Executive Committees (EXCOM) and inter-agency working groups. President Lyndon B. Johnson retained the NSC system created during the Kennedy years. He presided over 75 NSC meetings. Almost half of them concerned Vietnam. He later complained that the NSC meetings were impossible to control and retreated into an inner council of close advisers. These closed meetings were not shared with government departments and agencies, leading sometimes to confusion over major policy direction and guidance.

The Kissinger National Security Council. President Richard M. Nixon entered the White House during a period of military conflict, but with prior NSC experience during the Truman-Eisenhower years. Nixon criticized Johnson for poor handling of the NSC, and restored the NSC to its pre-eminent role in national security planning. Under National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, the NSC became the principal forum for defense, intelligence, and foreign policy formulation and implementation. The NSC interagency and subcommittee infrastructure was revived. Option Papers and Consensus Papers were presented so that Nixon could clearly make the policy choices. The NSC staff was increased by 70 percent, and the NSC budget was tripled. The White House Situation Room became the locus for “backchannel” communications for foreign policy activity, instead of the State Department. Bold foreign policy initiatives on Vietnam, China, and Berlin were undertaken at the White House, leaving the State Department often unaware,

a source of frustration and lowered morale. The system changed when Kissinger became secretary of state in 1973. The powerful NSC was all but abandoned for a strong secretary of state acting with the complete confidence of the president. President Jimmy Carter tried to strike a balance between the State Department and NSC staff. He wanted to tap the strongest experts in both the NSC and State as circumstances dictated. Carter viewed the NSC as a small group of experts unencumbered by bureaucratic inertia, adept at incisive analysis and prolific in the production of new ideas. He appointed Zbigniew Brzezinski as the new national security adviser to head up this more aggressive . group, and appointed Cyrus Vance as the new secretary of state to lead those skilled in restraint and deliberate planning. The balance of these two different cultures dominated the Carter administration. The formation of a Special Coordinating Committee under Brzezinski handled crisis management and arms control, while senior departmental officials (often from State) chaired a Policy Review Committee to develop policy in areas where a specific department’s interests predominated. Carter welcomed the competition, but it led to cabinet rivalries between Brzezinski and Vance, who often could not unify their positions. These noteworthy cabinet disputes were evident in conflicting views over the Soviet-Cuban role in the Horn of Africa and the loss of Ethiopia as a long-time ally of the United States, implications for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the handling of the Iranian crisis, and a confrontation over normalization of U.S. relations with China. Carter attended 35 NSC meetings but, like Johnson, preferred the informal transaction of national security affairs with a few advisers. The NSC under Carter produced only a few policy studies or formal policy directives.

Reagan’s NSC. President Ronald Reagan worked to make a clean break with Carter’s NSC model. Reagan adopted the cabinet structure he knew as governor of California, making the cabinet secretaries his principal officers and ensuring that the NSC adviser was not a competitor. Reagan also enjoyed the collegiality of the NSC structure and participated in the more restricted forum of the National Security Planning Group. Nonetheless, the formulation of foreign, defense, and intelligence policy remained

under the control of the respective secretaries for these functions, leaving the NSC to head up interagency working groups to formulate new concepts but not circumvent cabinet members. Hence, the NSC adviser’s role and influence in directly advising the president was significantly reduced. President George H.W. Bush made many changes to the NSC organization following his experience as the former director of Central Intelligence and as vice president in the Reagan administration. On the day of his inauguration, on January 20, 1989, he issued a National Security Directive providing for an NSC Charter, the enlargement of the Policy Review Group to Committee, and other internal organizational changes intended to streamline authority of the national security adviser over subordinate committees. Eight Policy Coordinating Committees assumed regional and functional responsibilities in place of the multiple interagency groups from the Reagan era. NSC policy papers were renamed National Security Review papers (NSRs) and National Security Directives (NSDs) to distinguish them from the Reagan era documentation. General Brent Scowcroft was appointed national security adviser. Scowcroft’s direction of the NSC was distinguished by the informality but intensity of the relationship with the president. The NSC maintained good relations with the Departments of State and Defense. Through the collapse of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, and the coalition war against Iraq, the NSC worked effectively in facilitating foreign policy successes. President William Clinton, on inauguration day January 20, 1993, issued Presidential Decision Directive 1 (PDD 1) that revised and renamed the framework governing the work of the National Security Council. A Presidential Review Directive (PRD) series would be the mechanism used by the administration to direct the departments and agencies undertaking specific reviews and analyses. A PDD series would be used to promulgate presidential decisions on national security matters. The Bush administration’s National Security Review (NSR) series and National Security Directive (NSD) series were abolished. On January 21, 1993 in PDD2, Clinton approved an NSC decision-making system that enlarged the membership of the NSC and included a much greater emphasis on economic issues in the formulation of national security policy. The presi-

dent, vice president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense were members of the NSC as prescribed by statute. The DCI and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as statutory advisers to the NSC, attended its meetings. The new membership of the NSC included the secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. representative to the United Nations, the assistant to the president for national security affairs, the assistant to the president for economic policy, and the chief of staff to the president. Although not a member, the attorney general would be invited to attend meetings pertaining to his jurisdiction. Other executive departments and agencies could be invited to attend meetings. Among the most urgent issues the NSC dealt with in the first year of the Clinton administration were Bosnia, Haiti, Iraq, and Somalia. The several dozen other questions the NSC system dealt with initially included such issues as illegal drugs, United Nations peace-keeping, Zaire, arms control, China, and global environmental issues. During Clinton’s second term of office, the NSC focused on Eastern and Western Europe without provoking tensions with Russia; promoting open trade; improving defenses against transnational threats such as terrorism and narcotics; and promoting a stable Asian-Pacific community by seeking trade cooperation with China and avoiding confrontation on human rights issues. The NSC also became occupied in ratification of the Chemical Weapons Treaty, NATO enlargement, the Middle East peace process, the U.S.-Russian Summit at Helsinki, and the Denver Economic Summit. President George W. Bush remade the NSC more along the lines of his father’s administration and brought aboard Condoleezza Rice as national security adviser. In dealing with the War on Terrorism, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Bush took NSC policy recommendations balanced between Colin Powell at State and Donald Rumsfeld at Defense, legacies of the previous Bush leadership team. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, jolted the Bush NSC team toward more military action, thus following the lead coming out of Defense, including pre-emptive policy proposed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, among others. The cumulative evolution of the NSC from a guide and restraint on the presidency to a facilitator and integrator of interagency national security concepts is indicative of the role the NSC has played over time and, most importantly, the mission presi-

dents believe the NSC should exercise under their respective administrations. NSC roles are likely to fluctuate in the future as they have in the past, depending on the personality and personal preferences of the president. GAIL H. NELSON, PH.D. ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO: Kennedy, John FE; Central Intelligence Agency; War on Terrorism; Reagan, Ronald. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Alfred Maurer, Marion Tunstall, and James Keagle, Intelligence Policy & Process (Westview Press, 1985); Jeffrey Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Westview Press, 1989); National Security Council, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc.

Native American wars THE

NATIVE

American,

or American

Indian,

wars were a progressive series of regional armed conflicts fought between the indigenous peoples of North America and the American colonists or settlers beginning with skirmishes at Jamestown, Virginia, in the 1620s and ending with the Battle of Wounded Knee during the Pine Ridge campaign in December 1890. For the most part, these conflicts were not similar to wars fought on the European continent where commanders employed conventional tactics to achieve strategic objectives such as seizing vast territories and eradicating entire societies. In Europe,

static armies

under

a centralized

command

structure met on a fairly open, level battlefield and fired concentrated volleys of musket ball and cannon into huge formations of pike-wielding or mus-

ket-carrying infantry until one side either retreated or surrendered. Consequently, intelligence gatherers and their methodologies concentrated on the indicators of military leaders and their projected objectives plus the logistical trail left by the movements of huge armies. These tactics, and the associated intelligencegathering methods, were not effective against decentralized bands of lightly equipped, highly mobile, and logistically resourceful Native Americans who were formed locally, with little notice, into loosely

»

organized units. Additionally, it was difficult (if not impossible) for a white settler, by mere virtue of his skin color and cultural differences, to effectively spy ot provide meaningful and accurate information on an indigenous tribe and its leadership. After several resounding defeats, early colonial military commanders attempted to adopt Native American combat tactics and techniques, which relied heavily on tracking, moving silently through woodlands, leaving no trace of a presence, and utilizing surprise in an attack. Colonial commanders quickly realized that settlers possessed neither the basic knowledge of their woodland environment nor the time necessary to learn the required skills | for implementing such tactics and techniques. Therefore, commanders sought and secured sympathetic Native warriors who acted as trainers and teachers, but more importantly were able to provide a clear advantage to field commanders through quick and accurate intelligence reporting. These warriors became known as Indian scouts. In 1866, the U.S. Congress passed legislation that established a new branch of the army called the Indian Scouting Service. The U.S. Army enlisted among

others,

Pawnee,

Osage,

Klamath,

and

Apache warriors for service against Lakota, Cheyenne, Modoc, and Apache tribes. During the overwhelming majority of campaigns fought in the second half of the 19th century, the scouts performed admirably and contributed to battle successes over the whole of the Indian Territories, all lands west of the Mississippi River. These scouts were jealously protected by their commanders and rewarded for their particularly effective and courageous methods of gathering intelligence. Between 1872 and 1890, Congress awarded 16 members of the Indian Scouting Service with Medals of Honor. Of course, not all of the intelligence gathered was accurate or timely. Crow and Arikara scouts were providing intelligence on the Sioux to Lieutenant Colonel George Custer prior to the Battle of Little Big Horn (at which Custer and his troops were famously ambushed and killed.) Although the scouts were disbanded during World War II, another branch of the army, which utilized the same intelligence gathering tactics, techniques and procedures, the Special Forces, adopted their crossedarrow insignia.

R

MASTER SGT. GIFFORD MILES US. ARMY

SEE ALSO: special operations; Navajo Code Talkers, BIBLIOGRAPHY. The National Park Service, “A Brief History of the Modoc War,” www.nps.gov/labe/modoe; Warren A. Beck and Ynez D. Hasse, “The Modoc War, 1872-1873,” The California State Military Museum, www.militarymuseum.org; “History of Harmon’s Snowshoe Company,” Harmon’s Snowshoe Company, www.snowshoemen.com; “The MI NCO: Winning Military Intelligence Corps, U.S. Army Smart,” usaic.hua.army.mil.

Navajo Code Talkers THE IDEA TO use the Navajo Native American language as a code in military communications was developed by Philip Johnston in February 1942. Although he was not a Navajo, Johnston was raised on the Navajo reservation and learned the language as a child. As a World War I veteran, Johnston was familiar with earlier efforts to use Native American languages as secret codes. These efforts were reasonably successful, but Johnston believed the Navajo language had special qualities that would make it an ideal candidate for a secret code. Johnston presented his idea to Lieutenant Colonel James E. Jones of the U.S. Marine Corps. Once Jones was convinced, he and Johnston developed a simulation for Major General Clayton B. Vogel. Vogel was so impressed with the Navajo’s speed and accuracy in relaying messages that he recommended the Marines recruit 200 Navajo for the new code pro-

gram. The Marine Corps approved the program but only authorized the recruitment of 30 Navajos and required the men complete Marine Corps basic training before they moved on to become code talkers. On May 4, 1942, 29 Navajo, ranging in ages from 16 to 35 (some lied about their ages in order to enlist), entered Marine Corps boot camp in San Diego. If they failed to graduate basic training, the code program would be cancelled. The men, formed into an all-Navajo platoon, not only graduated but excelled in boot camp and moved on to the next step. The new marines were stationed at Camp Elliot, near San Diego, California, and assigned the task of actually writing the code. Their first effort was to

develop an alphabet code. For example, for the letter A they used the Navajo word for ant, wol-la-chee. Once the alphabet was complete the group moved on to common military terms, creating 211 Navajo substitute words, eventually growing to a 600-word dictionary. The Navajo language was perfect for this project for a number of reasons: It is based on guttural sounds, inflection, tone, pitch, and pronunciation, so the same Navajo word can have multiple meanings that are almost impossible for a non-Navajo to understand. Also, the Navajo language was incredibly pure, meaning the Navajo did not adopt foreign words into their language. The language was so complex very few Navajo could speak it fluently. The language also varied according to region, so the men also had to decide on a dialect. This was also kept secret making the code even more complex. As a test, U.S. intelligence tried to break the code, but since it had no repetitions, sequences, or patterns they were unable to decipher it. During field trials the code worked better than anticipated. Messages were sent, received, and translated into English within minutes, much faster than the military’s best machine codes. Once the program was proven, new groups of Navajo were recruited and trained in a threesegment program; first they completed basic training, then they learned the code, and finally they were trained in military communications. The original Code Talkers used the code in August 1942 on Guadalcanal on a limited basis, but it proved so effective that it became the primary mode of marine corps communications in the Pacific.

Deployed in teams of two throughout the Pacific theater, the Navajo Code Talkers participated in every Pacific battle, serving in all six Marine Corps divisions, Marine Raider battalions, and parachute units. Often cited as their greatest moment was the significant role the Code Talkers played at the Battle of Iwo Jima. During the first two days of the battle, six Code Talkers sent and received, without error, over 800 messages. The 5th Marines signal officer, Major Howard Connor, stated, “Were it not for the Navajos, the Marines would never have taken Iwo Jima.” The Japanese never broke the code. In all, 375 to 420 Navajo served in the Marine Corps as Code Talkers; 13 died. The veterans of the Code Talker program remained unrecognized for years. The program’s classified status was lifted in

1969, and the men were honored in 1982 with National Navajo Code Talkers day and in 2001 with a Congressional Gold Medal.

true intelligence agency, as it participated with the Naval War College in producing war plans and launched espionage and counterintelligence missions.

LisA A. ENNIS

GEORGIA COLLEGE & STATE UNIVERSITY

Naval signals intelligence. Installation of the first wireless radio set on a warship in 1903 predicted the

SEE ALSO: cryptography; communications. BIBLIOGRAPHY. “Senator Jeff Bingaman’s Navajo Code Talkers,” www.bingaman.senate.gov; “Navajo Code Talkers: Word War Two Fact Sheet,” www.history.navy.mil; Deanne Durrett, Unsung Heroes of World War II (Facts On File, 1998).

naval intelligence COLLECTING information about ships and the seas is as old as maritime travel itself. Ancient Greek and Roman navies gathered information about maritime affairs. Alexander the Great ordered exploration of nearby seas. The Italian city states of Florence and Venice included naval information-gathering as part of their Renaissance statecraft, and western European states featured map-making, charting the oceans and collecting information overseas as part of their exploration and colonization of the world between the 15th and 18th centuries. British naval officers during the Napoleonic Wars, particularly Horatio Nelson, widely employed naval espionage, codebreaking, and tactical intelligence. Early naval information-gathering lacked systemic collection, analysis, and interpretation through a single agency of government. Most often, foreign offices and even post offices collected and interpreted maritime and naval information as part of the European competition for overseas colonies and trade. No naval intelligence office existed until 1882, when the U.S. Navy organized the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). The British, French, Germans, and other naval powers soon followed. The Americans led the way in collecting technical information about foreign navies, ship design, ordnance, steam propulsion, and tactics because in 1882 the U.S. Navy was a second-rate naval power, lagging behind the others. Not until the SpanishAmerican War, though, could ONI be considered a

future of naval intelligence. By World War I, British and German naval intelligence organizations became proficient in intercepting and decoding encrypted ship-borne radio messages. The British led the way with Naval Intelligence Director William R. “Blinker” Hall developing a top-secret signals intelligence operation in Old Building 40 of the Admi-. ralty (OB 40). OB 40 intercepted signals and located German U-boat submarines sent to sink Atlantic convoys filled with war supplies and soldiers to help the Allies win the war in Europe. Hall’s people most likely intercepted, decoded, and leaked to the neutral Woodrow Wilson administration the Zimmermann Telegram that revealed German plots to get Mexico and Japan to help Germany if the United States entered the world war on the Allied side. Signals intelligence continued to dominate naval intelligence during the interwar years despite cutbacks in other organizations. Intercepts by Herbert O. Yardley’s Black Chamber allowed the U.S. to read Japanese intentions at the Washington Naval Arms Limitation Conference of 1922. British naval intelligence expanded its communications intelligence section of the Admiralty at Bletchley Park in response to Italian Fascist Benito Mussolini’s naval policy to control the Mediterranean Sea, and Adolf Hitler’s intention to rearm, including building new U-boats that again might threaten British interests in the Atlantic Ocean. Shortly before World War II, the Bletchley Park team acquired from Polish intelligence a top-secret German ENIGMA electro-magnetic encrypting machine, a vital step toward developing ULTRA, the decrypted product of German, Italian and later Japanese cipher machines’ coded communications. British shared ULTRA with U.S. naval intelligence, contributing to American reading of some PURPLE messages, the product of deciphered Japanese diplomatic codes and MAGIC, the product of decrypted Japanese naval codes. .

Pearl Harbor. During early stages of World War II, German and Japanese naval intelligence gained early

advantage with German U-boat commanders using intercepts to locate British merchant and naval ships. The Japanese placed radio operators, identified by U.S. intelligence as serving on aircraft carriers, on other ships that stayed in the western Pacific, all the while sending messages picked up by the Americans. Meanwhile, the carriers, without their usual codekey operators, maintained complete radio si-

lence as they moved through the north Pacific to launch the December 7, 1941, surprise air strike on U.S. bases at Pearl Harbor. Called America’s greatest intelligence failure, Pearl Harbor was the result of a flawed American intelligence system that had gathered too much secret information from communications intelligence and other sources (or noise) to be interpreted and distributed successfully on time.

American naval intelligence quickly rebounded from Pearl Harbor, warning that a Japanese task force was headed for Midway Island in time for the U.S. Navy to intercept and win the greatest carrier battle in history in June 1942. Meanwhile, British ULTRA and American High Frequency Direction Finding methods (HF/DF or Huff-Duff) began to reverse early success of German submarine warfare in the Atlantic. ULTRA provided Allied forces with decoded top-secret German U-boat signals and HF/DF triangulated those signals to allow naval air and sea forces to locate and sink submarines while on the surface. Historians estimate that naval intelligence saved nearly two million tons of vital Allied shipping in the Atlantic.

Silent Cold War. The development of nuclear weapons, nuclear-powered submarines, guided missiles, and computer technology provided the framework for the conduct of naval intelligence during the post-World War II period. Locked in a political, economic, and military Cold War confrontation, the United States and Soviet Union developed fleets of nuclear missile and nuclear-powered attack subs. The two nations fought a 40-year “silent war” under the sea to monitor the testing of stealth propulsion technology, underwater firing of ballistic missiles, and daily deployment and movement of each navy’s submarine and surface fleet on the oceans of the world. It was fought mostly through electronic warfare with signals intelligence intercepting and deciphering high-speed transmissions, and acoustic-intelligence listening to sonar emis-

sions, propeller revolutions, and other underwater sounds. The United States and the Soviet Union developed surface intelligence as well. Communist fishing trawlers, icebreakers, and merchant vessels collected data on every ocean, particularly off the coasts of the United States and in the Indian Ocean, Caribbean Sea, and Sea of Japan. The United States developed a tiny fleet of surface reconnaissance vessels to gather communications in-

telligence in the Indian Ocean, Baltic Sea, Mediterranean, and Caribbean. Off the North Korean coast in 1968, the American spy ship Pueblo fell into communist hands. Capture of the Pueblo was part of the most successful Soviet naval intelligence operation of the Cold War. It began in 1967, when U.S. Navy submarine communications specialist John Walker, stationed at the Atlantic Submarine Force Headquarters Communications Center in Norfolk, Virginia, began to sell the U.S. Navy’s most secret key listcards for cryptographic transmission and codebooks to the Russians. However, intelligence needed the encrypting

Soviet naval machines to

complete the compromising of the top-secret U.S. Navy nuclear submarine communications system. Seizure of the Pueblo provided the cryptographic machines, giving the Russians a decade-long advantage in the silent war and possibly causing the loss of the U.S. spy sub Scorpion. U.S. naval intelligence scored a victory in the silent war, as well. In partnership with the CIA, the navy built and outfitted the Glomar Explorer to locate and raise a sunken Soviet Golf-class nuclear submarine. Under the cover of deep-sea mining operations, Glomar Explorer recovered top-secret Soviet naval codebooks and nuclear warheads, and probably raised the submarine itself for study by naval intelligence. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended the Cold War but added a new complexity to the demands of naval intelligence. Instead of two primary intelligence targets for surveillance, many regional trouble spots multiplied the targets for gathering, interpreting, and applying information.

The 21st-century War on Terrorism added more counterintelligence and secret missions for naval intelligence. In order to keep pace, U.S. naval intelligence in the post-Cold War era developed better joint-intelligence coordination with the CIA

and other services, expanded aerial-photo intelligence and satellite imagery, and asked Congress for more Virginia-class spy submarines. JEFFREY M. DORWART, PH.D. RUTGERS UNIVERSITY, CAMDEN

SEE ALSO: Huff Duff; submarines; USS Pueblo; Glomar Explorer; ENIGMA; Bletchley Park; PURPLE. BIBLIOGRAPHY. John Pina Craven, The Silent War: The Cold War Battle Beneath the Sea (Simon & Schuster, 2001); Alan Harris Bath, Tracking the Axis Enemy: The Triumph of Anglo-American Naval Intelligence (University Press of Kansas, 1998); W. J. R. Gardner, Decoding His- © tory: The Battle of the Atlantic and ULTRA (Naval Institute Press, 1999); Ronald Lewin, The American MAGIC: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan (Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1982); Robert M. Grant, U-Boat Intelligence, 1914-1918 (Putnam, 1969); Jeffery M. Dorwart, Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy’s Intelligence Dilemma, 1919-1945 (Naval Institute Press, 1983); Wyman H. Packard, A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence (U.S. Navy Department, 1996); Richard Deacon, The Silent War: A History of Western Naval Intelligence (David & Charles, 1978).

Netherlands THE NETHERLANDS is a small country in northwestern Europe, 190 miles at its longest and 125 miles at its widest that was created in 1830. It is at least one-third below sea level and composed of low-lying lands—terrain that makes intelligence a difficult enterprise. During the Eighty Year War against Spanish tyranny in the 16th and 17th centuries, the intelligence gathering efforts of the Sea Beggars, loyal to William of Orange, were instrumental in helping to defeat the Spaniards. The Netherlands was at peace after 1648 and began a golden age that resulted in a vast overseas empire. After the Napoleonic era, the Netherlands had no need for a formal intelligence community.

By World War I the GSIII, Section III of the General Staff, served as the nation’s intelligence community. The goal during World War I was to protect the country’s coveted neutrality status. At the time, the Netherlands proved hospitable to

British spies, many of whom were trained on Dutch soil. However, organizational confusion and some German penetration hindered the success of intelligence operations. During the 1930s, this DutchBritish connection was reinforced. World War II brought disastrous results. The Dutch and the British intelligence network’s Secret Operation Executive (SOE) was duped by German counterintelligence who shot a Dutch officer and kidnapped two British (MI-6) agents on November 9, 1939. This is known as the Venlo Incident and it was a huge embarrassment. Intelligence failures were exacerbated with the Netherlands’ failure to prepare the country for Adolf Hitler’s invasion on . May 10, 1940. The Englandspiel was the capture of an SOE agent on March 6, 1942, and who was used by German counterintelligence to send false messages back to the British. The Germans intercepted 95 parachute drops, captured 54 agents, and shot 47 because intelligence security was not adequately handled. By late 1943, the intelligence gathering and dissemination improved significantly, but the Allies did not trust Dutch sources; this led to problems and contributed to the failure of covert operations in 1944. After World War I, a Royal Decree created the Internal Security Service (ISS) to handle Nazi collaborators, intelligence officers, and various Nazi organizations that remained in the country. ISS was disbanded in 1949. A full-fledged intelligence community was established in 1945; the army, navy, and air force were accorded their own intelligence units that had close ties to NATO. They merged in 1987 and became the Military Intelligence Agency (Militaire Inlichtingendienst, MID). Most of their efforts related to gathering information of foreign armed forces. In 1946 the Internal Security Service (de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, BVD) under the auspices of the minister of interior was created and was comparable to Britain’s MI-5. Counterintelligence purview was granted to the BVD, while investigative tasks, arrests and detentions were police responsibilities. It was dissolved in 1994, Thereafter, a new act created the General Intelligence and Security (Algemene Inlichtingenen Veiligheidsdienst, ATVD) and the Military Intelligence and Security (Militaire Inlichtingenen Veiligheidsdienst, (MIVD). No formal intelligence liaison exists between the two services, although there is opera-

tional collaboration with signals intelligence (SIGINT). The tacts with Germany, Denmark,

Netherlands has informal liaison conthe United States, United Kingdom, Israel, South Africa, Australia, Canada, Norway, Belgium, France, Portugal, Italy. ANNETTE RICHARDSON, PH.D. UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA, CANADA

SEE ALSO: World War II; North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Bob De Graaff and Cees Wiebes, Villa Maarheeze: De inlichtingendienst Buitenland 1946-1994 (The Hague, 1998); EA.C. Kluiters, De Nederlandse inlichtingen en veiligheidsdiensten (The Hague, Sdu, 1993); Philip Knightly, The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century (W.W. Norton, 1987); Hubert P. van Tuyll, “The Dutch Mobilization of 1914: Reading the ‘Enemy’s’ Intentions,” Journal of Military History (v.64/3).

Nixon, Richard M. RICHARD M. Nixon (1913-1994) became the 37th president of the United States (1969-1974) after winning a close election against Democrat Hubert H. Humphrey. Long before his presidency, however, Nixon was deeply involved in counterintelligence matters, and created his national profile chasing alleged communist subversives in the United States. After being elected to the U.S. Congress from California as a Republican in 1946, Nixon became a member of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). He made a name for himself as an investigator of Alger Hiss, a former high State Department official, who was not convicted of Soviet espionage but was jailed for perjury. Nixon was convinced that Hiss was hiding information about his relationship with suspected spy Whittaker Chambers. In his book Six Crises, Nixon noted that, “those who are lying or trying to cover up something generally make a common mistake: they tend to overact, to overstate their case.” Furthermore, the manner in which Hiss qualified his answers, saying “the name [Whittaker Chambers] means absolutely nothing to me,” while never stating “categorically that he did not know” the man,

indicated to Nixon that Hiss was hiding something. As we learned 20 years later from declassified and decrypted Soviet messages, Nixon was right. In 1950, Nixon defeated Representative Helen Gahagan Douglas, a Democrat, for the U.S. Senate. He was criticized for portraying her as a communist dupe. Nixon’s anticcommunism ideals, his Western roots, and his youth figured into his selection in 1952 to run for vice president on the ticket headed by Dwight D. Eisenhower. The ticket won easily in 1952 and again in 1956. Eisenhower gave Nixon substantive assignments, including missions to 56 countries. In Moscow, Russia, in 1959, Nixon won acclaim for his defense of U.S. interests in an impromptu debate with Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev. Nixon won the 1968 Republican presidential nomination. Committed to winding down the U.S. role in the Vietnamese War, Nixon pursued “Vietnamization”—training and equipping South Vietnamese to do their own fighting. American ground combat forces in Vietnam fell steadily from 540,000 when Nixon took office to none in 1973 when the military draft was ended. But there was heavy continuing use of U.S. air power. Nixon improved relations with Moscow and reopened the long-closed door to mainland China with a good-will trip there in February 1972. In May, he visited Moscow and signed agreements on arms limitation and trade expansion and approved plans for a joint U.S.-Soviet space mission in 1975. Nixon’s foreign policy, formulated and dominated by National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, was his true political strength. Watergate. Nixon’s downfall was triggered by a clumsy act of clandestine intelligence activity, one performed on behalf of politics rather than the national interest. On June 17, 1972, the Democratic national headquarters in the Watergate apartment complex in Washington, D.C., was burglarized. In January 1973, hints of a White House cover-up emerged at the trial of six men found guilty of the Watergate burglary. With a Senate investigation under way, Nixon announced on April 30 the resignations of his top aides, H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, and the dismissal of White House counsel John Dean III. Dean was the star witness at televised Senate hearings that exposed both a White House cover-up of Watergate and massive illegalities in Republican fund-raising in 1972. The hear-

caused Helms to be fired by Nixon on February 2, 1973. The firing of Helms was not unexpected; some historians point out Helms had never been considered a leader or director, only a caretaker. More trouble was in store when Helms appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee, prior to his assuming the ambassadorship to Iran. He swore at the time that the CIA had no part in attempting to overthrow the government of Chile under President Salvador Allende. The agency’s subversion of Chilean democracy was Helms’s undoing. Nixon resigned the presidency on August 9, 1974. In the next 20 years, he rescued a good deal of his reputation by becoming a statesman-at-large for various American Republican administrations, writing books, and advising on foreign policy. He died April 22, 1994. Josip MOCNIK BOWLING GREEN STATE UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Hunt, E. Howard; Hiss, Alger; Chambers, Whittaker; Helms, Richard M.; Chile. President Richard Nixon fired CIA Director Richard Helms after

Helms wouldn’t help with the Watergate cover-up.

ings also disclosed that Nixon had routinely taperecorded his office meetings and telephone conversations.

On July 24, the Supreme Court ordered Nixon to surrender subpoenaed Oval Office tapes. On July 30, the Judiciary Committee referred three impeachment articles to the full membership. On August 5, Nixon bowed to the Supreme Court and released tapes showing he halted an FBI probe of the Watergate burglary six days after it occurred. It was, in effect, an admission of obstruction of justice and impeachment appeared inevitable.

The CIA connection. CIA Director Richard Helms was also compromised by Watergate. Nixon ordered Helms to dissuade the FBI from its investigations, an order Helms refused. Moreover, one of the White House men directly involved in the Watergate scandal was an ex-CIA employee, E. Howard Hunt. When it appeared that the CIA would unavoidably be drawn into the Watergate affair, Helms did his utmost to protect the agency, a posture that Nixon interpreted as treacherous, and one that

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Stephen A. Ambrose, Nixon (Simon & Schuster, 1987-1991); John Robert Greene, The Limits of Power: The Nixon and Ford Administrations (Indiana University Press, 1992); Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (Basic Books, 1994); Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon (W.W. Norton, 1990); Franz Schurmann, The Foreign Politics of Richard Nixon (University of California Press, 1987); Melvin Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon (University Press of Kansas, 1999).

North Atlantic Treaty Organization THE NORTH Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a regional military alliance formed in the early years of the Cold War to contain Soviet expansion and provide for the defense of Western Europe. The alliance was formally created on April 9, 1949, under the auspices of the Washington Treaty (also known as the North Atlantic Treaty) and was originally comprised of France, Luxembourg, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Portugal,

the United

Kingdom,

Belgium,

and two North

American members: Canada and the United States. In 1952, Greece and Turkey joined NATO, and in 1955 West Germany was admitted. Spain became a member in 1982, and in 1999 the former Warsaw Pact nations Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined. In 2004, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia became full members, expanding the alliance’s membership to 26 nations.

The principal defense mechanism of the alliance is Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states: ...an armed attack against one or them in Europe or North America considered an attack against them consequently they agree that, if

more of shall be all, and such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Thus, NATO was founded as a collective defense alliance in which all the members pledged to repel an attack collectively against any NATO state.

NATO organization. The highest level of political organization within NATO is the Atlantic Council, where member states are represented at the ambassadorial level. The council meets at least semiannually and the secretary general is always a European. (As of 2004, the secretary general was Jaap de Hoop Scheffer of the Netherlands). NATO headquarters is in Brussels, Belgium, which houses council meetings and a staff of 3,150 professionals in areas such as the Division of Political Affairs, the Division of Defense Planning and Operations, and the various permanent national delegations.

The NATO military structure is headed by the

Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) who by tradition is an American army general. His duties are complemented by the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), an admiral who

U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson signs the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. President Harry Truman looks over his shoulder.

has his headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was NATO’s first SACEUR, appointed in 1950. NATO’s autonomous intelligence apparatus is minimal and exists under the aegis of the International Military Staff (IMS), which in turn is made up of military personnel who are sent by their home countries to work at NATO headquarters representing NATO interests rather than the interests of their countries. The Intelligence Division of the IMS provides intelligence assessments to the secretary general, the North Atlantic Council, and organizations within NATO such as the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation Center. The Division relies on NATO nations’ intelligence agencies for raw intelligence collection, although it provides its own analyses on topics such as strategic threat assessment. On the whole, NATO intelligence consists mainly of personnel and information contributed by the intelligence agencies of member countries such as the CIA, the Netherlands’ Military Intelli-

gence Agency (MID), and the German Intelligence Service (BND). For example during the 1990s conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, NATO used British Special Air Service (SAS) commandos for intelligence-gathering, including target selection during the Kosovo air campaign and as human intelligence agents working closely with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). KLA information helped NATO intelligence iden-

tify areas where Serb forces had disposed of Kosovar Albanian bodies they had incinerated. Germany, NATO doctrine, and world crises. In the early stages of the Cold War, with World War II a recent memory, the function of NATO was understood by European elites to be more than simply defending the West against the Soviet Army. Indeed, both the Soviet Union and France had a strategic concern in common: the specter of a unified, re-aarmed Germany. Whatever Germany’s fate (it was still occupied by Allied forces when NATO was formed), the future of European security had to be based as much on German good behavior as blocking further Soviet expansion. Lord Ismay, NATO’s first secretary general, summed up the alliance’s real function: “to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down.” Not everyone in the West was eager to see NATO’s creation. George Kennan, probably the most erudite and learned architect of containment policy, had serious misgivings, warning that the creation of NATO would be seen by the Soviets as a provocative act. How would the Soviets react to an encircling cordon of hostile capitalist states? And what of the German question? The last thing the Soviets wanted was an independent Germany participating in an anti-Soviet military alliance, but America’s Western European allies were almost as wary of Germany. Thus in 1955, soon after West Germany was granted sovereignty, the country was admitted into NATO, but with limitations imposed on its armaments production and national military forces. America’s presence in Europe, with a large force in West Germany, would serve as a deterrent to the Russians while keeping the Germans on a short leash. The French, for now, were placated. But with West Germany in the NATO camp, the Soviets created the Eastern Bloc’s own military alliance, the Warsaw Pact. NATO’s nuclear weapons and war-fighting doctrine has seen many incarnations during the last

half-century in response to the changing nature of the threat from the Soviet Union as well as reassessments of NATO’s capabilities. During the 1950s, NATO was faced with the problem of responding to the Warsaw

Pact’s quantitative

superiority

in

ground forces as U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration sought ways to curtail defense spending.

The Americans solution, articulated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, was the inassive retaliation doctrine. This doctrine stated that in response to Soviet aggression, the United States would “retaliate, instantly, by means and at places

of our own choosing.” It was not difficult to infer what this meant: The Americans were threatening overwhelming nuclear retaliation in response to Soviet aggression. The bankruptcy of massive retaliation was revealed in 1956 when the Soviet Union invaded Hungary after protests against Soviet domination erupted in the streets of Budapest. The United States was certainly not going to attack the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons over the fate of a Warsaw Pact country. America lost face over the invasion, and its relations with NATO partners France and Britain were

seriously damaged when Eisenhower demanded the two countries’ forces withdraw from Egypt during the Suez Canal crisis the same year. Adding insult to injury, the new Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev proclaimed that if the Anglo-French forces did not leave the Middle East, he would indulge in “country busting” in Western Europe with his nuclear weapons. NATO eventually moved to a “flexible response” doctrine that allowed for the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons as well as conventional forces on the battlefield. One of the most serious controversies within the alliance was the withdrawal of France from NATO’s formal command structure in 1966. French President Charles de Gaulle had, for some time, argued that European autonomy was undermined by American domination of the alliance, and as such, he ordered NATO to move its offices out of Paris and formulated France’s own nuclear deterrent, the Force de Frappe. When Czech leaders Alexander Dubcek and Ludvik Svoboda inaugurated political reform in 1968, NATO went out of its way not to provoke the Soviets, who publicly blamed the Prague Spring movement, in part, on NATO interference. Attempting to head off a possible invasion, NATO went so far as “reducing its state of readiness and letting some of its key officials go on vacation,” according to NATO scholar Vojtech Mastny. But invade the Soviets did, despite a NATO intelligence assessment the day before that the Red Army would not do so. As former British Defense Minister David Owen said, “The most bizarre feature of

what happened as far as I was personally concerned was the discovery of how bad was NATO intelligence.” If Western Europe ever needed a reminder of how important NATO’s collective defense was, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia provided it. European misgivings. Perhaps the most vexing issue within NATO during much of the Cold War was one of will: Would the United States risk its very survival over Western European security? As the Red Army continued its quantitative superiority over NATO forces (although some observers stressed that the Soviets’ edge was overestimated), NATO responded in a number of ways to enhance its security and credibility. The Soviet deployment of SS-20 mobile nuclear missiles beginning in the mid-1970s further undermined NATO security and sparked one of the most intense periods of destabilization in NATO history. During much of the 1970s and into the 1980s, European leaders worried that in any war with the Soviet Union, the United States would not “trade Chicago for Hamburg.” The new SS-20 missiles could easily hit London, England, or Bonn, West Germany, and even though NATO already had thousands of battlefield nuclear weapons, their very tactical nature meant that a future war might devastate Europe but leave the U.S. homeland untouched and American forces only partially involved. One answer was NATO’s refusal to declare a “no first use” policy for its nuclear arsenal, thus complicating Soviet war plans. U.S. President Jimmy Carter went further, first by announcing that the America would deploy the so-called neutron bomb, an enhanced radiation weapon designed to

kill advancing troops while having little effect on structures on the ground. Reaction was furious, with protest demonstrations throughout Europe decrying a perceived American escalation of the

arms race. Carter prodded NATO governments to accept the weapon, but when he suddenly changed his mind, American credibility was badly damaged both with the European people and their leaders. In direct response to Soviet SS-20 deployments, Carter then announced that the United States would deploy nuclear-tipped Pershing II and cruise missiles in NATO countries. The European elites were now satisfied that the new missiles would act as a “trip wire”—that is,

any Soviet attack that threatened to neutralize the Pershings and cruise missiles might trigger a NATO nuclear response. And if a Pershing II destroyed Moscow in a European war (which NATO’s previous tactical nuclear missiles and artillery could not do), this would lead to a Soviet second strike on the continental United States. In this way, the presence of the American Pershing IIs in Europe became a crucial component linking U.S. security to NATO security. But this strategic calculus was of little concern to the hundreds of thousands of Germans and others who took part in huge protests in Europe during much of the 1980s as U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s administration completed deployment. Finally, after the Soviets walked out of arms talks in 1983, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev accepted Reagan’s “zero option” proposal, in which both intermediate and short-range nuclear missiles were dismantled. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed in 1987 after years of negotiations, and Europe was beginning to seem truly

more secure.

Kosovo and NATO’s transformation. Close on the heels of Germany’s unification in 1990 was the end of the Warsaw Pact and the break-up of the Soviet Union in the following year. These momentous events signaled both the ultimate victory for NATO and a debate concerning its relevance in the post-Cold War era, a debate that continued into the 2000s. The demise of the Warsaw Pact led to NATO ironically taking on one of its key functions: imposing order in Eastern Europe. Doing so was not just filling the power vacuum left by the Soviet Bloc, but also a sign that NATO had evolved from an anti-Soviet alliance with collective defense as the central premise into a pan-European consortium of democratic nations whose interests were served by collective security. And collective security (as distinct from collective defense) meant that NATO could intervene militarily in Europe in order to prevent limited wars from spilling over to threaten continental security. NATO would, in the new era, even reserve the right to send forces into sovereign European (non-NATO, or out of area) states to prevent egregious human rights abuses such as ethnic cleansing. This change in emphasis, underscored by the creation of NATO institutions such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for

Peace, was a major shift for the alliance, and soon the military dimensions of NATO’s new role were

tested in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was here that NATO undertook air strikes against Serb positions outside Sarajevo. Continued bombing and international pressure forced the Yugoslav government to the bargaining table at Dayton, Ohio, which in turn set the stage for a large NATO peacekeeping force to enter Bosnia. NATO’s efforts in 1999 against Serbia were even more intense and can be considered to be the first war conducted by NATO, albeit without the insertion of combat troops on the ground. Yugoslav forces based in the province of Kosovo had embarked on a campaign of organized violence and intimidation against the majority Muslim Albanian population in an effort to establish a Serb majority. After the failure of diplomatic talks between the United States and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, NATO began a protracted bombing campaign in March 1999. After 11 weeks of bombing and Russian pressure on Milosevic to make peace, the air war ended with Yugoslav capitulation. NATO immediately sent peacekeeping troops to occupy Kosovo, but it was as these forces were establishing themselves that a new crisis emerged, one which may have brought NATO and Russia close to wat. Russia, which had traditionally seen the Balkans as in its sphere of influence, decided to send in troops to carve out their own

occupation

area in

Kosovo. A ragtag group of 200 Russian soldiers entered Pristina on June 12 and headed for the airport. The idea of the Russians taking control of the Pristina airport was unpalatable to General Wesley Clark, NATO’s supreme commander. Clark ordered his British subordinate, General Sir Michael Jackson, to send forces to seize the airport before the Russians could get there, but Jackson demurred, believing that such an act was unnecessarily aggressive and might even lead to combat with the Russian unit. As the two men argued over the telephone and Clark ordered Jackson again to take the airfield, General Jackson barked, “I’m not going to start World War III for you!” Not taking no for an answer, Clark then ordered Admiral James Ellis, commander of NATO’s Southern Command, to send in helicopters to land on the airport’s runways. Doing so would prevent Russian Ilyushin transport aircraft from re-supplying the Russian troops. Ellis also declined, saying

that Jackson, the commander on the ground, wouldn’t approve. When Clark and Jackson appealed up the chain of command, both the British government and the American administration backed Jackson. The Russian airplanes were turned back due to Hungary refusing over-flight rights, but the Russians were now in Kosovo for the long haul. Since then, they have been seen sympathetic to Serb concerns but, on the whole, have coordinated their efforts with NATO forces.

The “tragic mistake.” The Kosovo war also saw a stunning incident that threw open the whole ques- tion of NATO’s intelligence capabilities as well as seriously straining relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. On the night of May 7, 1999, an American B-2 stealth bomber hit the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, with precision-guided bombs, killing three Chinese journalists and wounding some 20 others inside the building. The bombing caused a firestorm of controversy, including a denunciation from the Chinese government, which called the bombing “a deliberate act.” Officials from NATO and U.S. President Bill Clinton’s administration stressed repeatedly that the bombing was a “‘tragic mistake.” The error, said NATO Major General Walter Jertz, occurred because the embassy had been mistaken for the Yugoslav Directorate of Supply and Procurement, which evidently was located in the neighborhood. The blame shifted between the CIA, which had a significant role in target selection for NATO, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), located in Bethesda, Maryland, and NATO intelligence. Responding to implied criticism from the CIA, a NIMA spokesman stressed that even if NIMA’s maps were outdated, targeting is not supposed to be derived from hard-copy maps alone. This incident, embarrassing the U.S. government and NATO, has been widely seen as a astonishing failure of NATO’s intelligence capabilities. Or was it? Several months after the bombing, Britain’s Observer newspaper published a story that asserted the bombing of the embassy, far from a mistake, was a deliberate act. Observer reporters John Sweeney and Ed Vulliamy, collaborating with Danish journalist Jens Holsoe, wrote in October 1999 that NATO had

_ North Atlantic Treaty Organization

457

Flags of the 19 member countries fly at half mast at the main entrance to NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.

discovered, through electronic intelligence, that the embassy was being used for a variety of purposes in support of the Yugoslav military. Citing several sources within the NATO intelligence community as well as the CIA, the article stated that NATO had identified the embassy as a “rebro” (rebroadcast) station for the Yugoslav military as well as an observation post monitoring NATO cruise-missile strikes on Belgrade. “The Chinese embassy had an electronic profile, which NATO located and pinpointed,” said one source who was identified as a NATO “air controller.” An unnamed source at NIMA told the reporters that the “wrong map” story was a “damned lie.” The embassy had been in its current location for over three years, the article pointed out, and anyone could buy a street map of Belgrade that accurately identified the embassy as well as the Directorate. That the CIA had used one source—obsolete hard-copy maps—for critical target selection was incredible to those who were disposed not to believe the NATO version of events. Responding to the Observer article, the British foreign minister insistea that there was “not a shred of evidence” that

NATO was after the embassy. Nevertheless, the NATO sources in the article said that as soon as the embassy was hit the radio traffic to the Yugoslav military abruptly ceased. NATO intelligence also engaged in electronic warfare in Operation MATRIX, which included spamming the e-mail of Serb leaders, intercepting telephone conversations, and even forewarning the owners of factories in Serbia that their facilities would be bombed. This is called “crony targeting” and is designed to attack economic targets owned by or enriching political leadership. By warning the owners that their factories would be bombed, NATO sent a message that the Yugoslav govern-

ment should surrender or face further economic attacks on selected members of the Serb inner circle. Lessons from Kosovo. The end of the Kosovo campaign was a NATO victory and certainly benefitted the Muslim population of the province. But the underlying issues were seen by some as driving a wedge, once again, between the United States and

its European NATO allies, who had been reluctant to take military action against Milosevic and who saw the U.S. as a latecomer to Balkan geopolitics.

The real winners were the former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army, now disbanded, who soon took over several key posts in the new government and were often seen as corrupt and undemocratic. Some observers asserted that in intervening, NATO had traded a Greater Serbia, with control over several of the former provinces of Yugoslavia, for a Greater Albania, which someday might include Kosovo. NATO’s expansion and its relevance are easily the most pressing issues facing the alliance in the new century. After the Clinton administration pushed through membership by the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999, it was felt by many that any further expansion would prove Kennan right after all. Russian President Vladimir Putin had no choice but to accept the former Soviet satellites as members of NATO, but he didn’t like it. The NATO war against Yugoslavia’s Serb government further angered the Russians, who severed their ties temporarily with NATO, a setback for NATO-Russian cooperation that had been patiently nurtured in previous years. By 2003, Russia was again a limited partner, if not a member, of NATO. But questions remain as to NATO’s relevance when its major adversary for over 40 years no longer exists. Once again, Russia had little choice but to stand aside in 2004 as the administration of President George W. Bush and NATO admitted seven nations—Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the former Soviet republics Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—to join the alliance. Why admit these states, with their insignificant military forces, into a military alliance without a clear mission? Echoing the standard argument by NATO advocates, The New York Times said that membership “can be a mechanism for reintegrating central and east European countries long artificially cut off from the continental mainstream.” But other intergovernmental organizations are more capable of building institutions and integrating the former

However, a unity of purpose within NATO is difficult to envisage in light of incidents such as France and Germany vetoing NATO assistance to fellow

member Turkey in the Iraq War of 2003. With conflict brewing just under the surface in places such as Macedonia, Montenegro, or Cyprus,

NATO may find itself dysfunctionally engaged or even operating at cross-purposes

in crises during

the first decade of the 21st century. KARL RAHDER, PH.D. INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

SEE ALSO: Warsaw Pact; Soviet Union; Cold War; United States; United Kingdom; France; Germany; Rus-

sia (Post-Soviet).

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Defense Newsletter (v. 18/6); “Sources: Top NATO Commanders Clashed Over Russians’ Actions In Kosovo,” www.cnn.com; Stuart Croft, ““The EU, NATO and Europeanisation: The Return of Architectural Debate,” European Security (v.9/3, 2000); Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000 (St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Josef Joffe, The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens of Alliance (Ballinger, 1987); Lawrence S. Kaplan, The Long Entanglement: NATO’s First Fifty Years (Praeger, 1999); George KF Kennan, Memoirs, 1950-1963 (Little, Brown, 1972); Guardian Unlimited, “NATO Bombed Chinese Deliberately,” www.guardian.co.uk; Vojtech Mastny, “Did NATO Win the Cold War? Looking over the Wall,” Foreign Affairs (v.78/3, 1999); Vojtech Mastny, “The New History of Cold War Alliances,” Journal of Cold War Studies (v.4/2, 2002); NATO Handbook (NATO, 2001); “The Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact,” www.isn.ethz.ch; Elizabeth Sherwood, Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security (Yale University Press, 1990); Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace (Princeton University Press, 1999).

communist societies into Europe as a whole. Moreover, an alliance that has 26 member states is one

with 26 agendas and 26 national interests and far more than 26 areas of potential internal conflict. Further, these 26 may well split into pro-U.S. policy and anti-U.S. policy camps, as happened in the United Nations in 2002-03. NATO may well evolve into a politico-military alliance that represents the interests of a united Europe at least as much as those of the United States.

Norwood, Melita S. MELITA Norwood worked for the Soviet intelligence service for 40 years, making her the longestserving Soviet spy in Britain. Recruited by the KGB on ideological grounds during the 1930s, at the

same time as the notorious Cambridge spies, Norwood survived the collapse of that and other spy rings, remaining undetected for decades. She was born Melita Sirnis in 1912, the daughter of a Latvian father and English mother, both strongly influenced by communism. She attended Southampton University for a year, joined the Communist Party, and in 1937 took a secretarial job at the British Non-Ferrous Metals Research Association, the home of Britain’s nuclear weapons research program. She began working for the Soviets five years later and was codenamed HOLA. Martied to a mathematics teacher who shared her political beliefs, Norwood photographed documents that “appeared interesting” and passed them to Soviet agents.

The information she provided on Britain’s atomic weapons project may have helped the Soviets develop their own bomb in 1949, three years before Britain exploded its own. Norwood continued working for the Soviets until her retirement in 1972. She had succeeded in recruiting at least one other spy, an unidentified British civil servant who passed intelligence on British arms sales in the 1960s and 1970s.On a visit to the Soviet Union in 1979, Norwood accepted the Order of the Red Banner (secretly awarded in 1958) but turned down a life pension. “I did not want the money,” she later said, explaining her motivation for spying. “I wanted Russia to be on an equal footing with the West.”

Norwood’s spying career was publicly exposed in 1999 with the publication of The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archives, the cooperative work of historian Christopher Andrew and former KGB archivist Vasily Mitrokhin. The book, based on hundreds of KGB files collected, archived, and smuggled out of the Soviet Union by Mitrokhin, received enormous attention in the British press. Most stories focused on Norwood, now an 87-yearold great-grandmother, quietly living in a London suburb. Unrepentant, she told reporters, “I know that I would do the same thing again.” The exposé prompted calls on the British government to explain why no action had been taken against Norwood even though her betrayal had been known by the security services since Mitrokhin’s defection in 1992. Despite the scandal, British authorities decided not to prosecute Norwood. ALEXIS ALBION HARVARD UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Mitrokhin, Vasily; KGB. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Christopher

Andrew

and

Vasily

Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (Basic Books,

1999); BBC News Special Report, “Spies Who Betrayed Britain,’ www.news.bbc.co.uk.

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Office of Strategic Services THE OFFICE of Strategic Services (OSS) was the United States’ premier intelligence agency during World War II. After World War I, America had only the most minimal espionage apparatus, consisting of army intelligence (G-2), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and an informal network of attachés and career State Department personnel who established contacts in their host countries. For some time, President Franklin Roosevelt had seen the need for an overarching intelligence service, and with another war looming on the horizon, he created a new agency, the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COJ), to oversee the dissemination and analysis of intelligence information. When the COI failed to meet Roosevelt’s expectations, he approached his former Columbia Law School classmate William J. Donovan and made him the chief of the organization on July 11, 1941. Donovan was an inspired choice. Known as “Wild Bill,” he had earned a Congressional Medal of Honor during World War I. After the war, he became an antitrust lawyer, traveled all over the world, and ran unsuccessfully for governor of New York. In the summer of 1940, Roosevelt asked Donovan to travel to Britain to assess the United Kingdom’s

An OSS civilian employee during World War II sorts through German documents captured in the field.

chances of resisting Nazi Germany. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill understood the importance of Donovan’s visit and made sure that he was privy to Britain’s sophisticated intelligence efforts, one of the few means by which the country could damage the German war effort. Donovan was impressed with what he saw and reported back to Roosevelt that Germany would not be able to successfully invade the home islands, due in no small measure to the UK’s intelligence organizations, such as the SOE (Special Operations Executive) which read German cryptography, sent agents abroad on sabotage missions,

461

Photographs of covert agent disguises were included in an OSS training manual. From businessman to bum, the disguised agents operated behind enemy lines, wreaking havoc and sabotage in Europe and Asia.

and spread disinformation throughout the Nazi-occupied territories. By 1942 the COI became the OSS, and with Donovan’s agreement it was placed under the auspices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its mission was to collect and analyze strategic information and to launch special operations behind enemy lines. The OSS was organized in five broad divisions and was active in nearly all combat theaters with the exception of Latin America and General Douglas MacArthur’s area of Pacific operations.

Special Operations (SO). The Special Operations (SO) division comprised Donovan’s means of wreaking havoc on the enemy through guerrilla warfare and sabotage in Europe and Asia. In collaboration with the British SOE, SO created the famous Jedburgh teams that parachuted behind German lines before and after the Normandy landings to support Allied invasion forces. Jedburgh teams were comprised of two officers (one British SOE, one American OSS) and an enlisted Free French radio operator. Among the 93 Jedburgh OSS personnel in France was William

Colby, the future head of the CIA. Virginia Hall, the colorful ex-State Department officer who first joined the SOE and then the OSS, worked in occupied France supporting Jedburgh teams and training the French resistance in guerrilla-war techniques. MacArthur refused to let the OSS operate anywhere in his area of operations in the southwest Pacific, so Donovan’s people went where they were tolerated: the China-Burma-India theater. The most important SO mission in Asia during the war was in Burma, where the OSS established its legendary Detachment 101, part of the SO division. Formed in 1942 with an original force of 56 American OSS personnel and ultimately more than 10,000 Burmese Kachin warriors, Detachment 101 probably came closest to Donovan’s ideal of an autonomous guerrilla and sabotage unit. The OSS agents and their Kachin natives blew up railroad bridges, harried Japanese troop formations, and rescued over 200 Allied aviators downed over enemy territory.

.

Elsewhere in Asia, the OSS provided intelligence on Japanese targets to General Claire L. Chennault, who founded the famous Flying Tigers and

went on to become the commanding general of U.S. Army Air Forces in China. One of the most romantic and adventurous of the OSS’s missions in Asia was the odyssey of Captain Ilia Tolstoy and First Lieutenant Brooke Dolan to Lhasa, capital of Tibet. Tolstoy, grandson of Russian author Count Leo Tolstoy, was a gentleman-adventurer who was asked by the OSS to travel overland from India to Tibet ostensibly to scout a possible alternative to “the Hump,” the aerial route into China, as well as to establish informal ties be-

tween the U.S. government and the Tibetans. Tolstoy, who requisitioned his clothing for the expedition from Abercrombie and Fitch, was accompanied by big-game hunter and explorer Brooke Dolan. After an epic trek on foot and horseback over the Himalayas, the two OSS men reached Lhasa in December 1942, where they stayed for several months as guests of the seven-year-old Dalai Lama. While there was only a minimal strategic justification for their mission, which has been described by one historian as “a good romp,” Tolstoy and Dolan’s presence was noted with concern by the British Tibetan representative, as well as China’s Kuomintang government, both America’s allies but both having imperial interests in Tibet and wanting no interference from the United States.

Research and Analysis (R&A). While the OSS’s cloak-and-dagger activities may have garnered more attention over the years, the Research and Analysis division was probably its greatest single contribution to winning the war. Engaged in what today would be called open-source analysis, R&A employed at its peak some 982 scholars, mostly from the Ivy League universities. R&A was headed by Harvard historian William Langer, who used his connections to bring in an extraordinarily talented group of economists, anthropologists, and political scientists, including Crane Brinton, Gordon Craig, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, and John King Fairbank. Both collegial and cantankerous, the division became what one historian has called “an unusually pure academic ghetto.” Its task was to report on the enemy’s society, politics, culture, military, and industrial capacity. Split into sections such as civil affairs, maps, current intelligence, and economics, R&A produced some of the most useful and sophisticated analyses of any intelligence organization during the war, something for which there was no analog in Germany’s intelligence community. RGA

studies (there were more than 3,000 in all) were in demand both in the U.S. government and in the UK’s office of the British Security Coordinator (BSC). They covered a wide range of topics, including an accurate survey of manpower shortages in Germany. (They predicted a manpower shortfall based on reading obituaries of German officers in newspapers and extrapolating from known ratios of officers to enlisted men.) A report in August 1945 on the impact on warfare of the atomic bomb predicted that the bomb would revolutionize the practice of war and would actually encourage the use of guerrilla warfare in much of the world. RGA’s Enemy Objectives Unit (EOU) correctly identified German fighter and oil production as the two chokepoints in its war effort and recommended that strategic bombing be focused on these two target sets. One of R&A’s most prescient reports was written by psychoanalyst Walter Langer, William Langer’s brother. Soon after the establishment of the OSS, Walter Langer wrote to Donovan of the importance of establishing a psychological warfare effort that would be “imaginative, subtle, and dar-

An OSS parachute team prepares its equipment for a mission to Sicily, Italy, in 1943.

ing” and that would take advantage of the most advanced psychoanalytic theory. Donovan agreed and began to utilize Langer and other psychoanalysts for the examination of the nexus between neurosis, personality, and culture. Langer’s magnum opus for the OSS was ‘“‘The

Mind of Adolf Hitler,” a psychological examination of the Fuhrer based on exhaustive interviews of Hitler’s associates (some of whom were prisoners of war at the time) and a deeply insightful analysis of his inner world. In this secret report, delivered to the OSS in 1943, Langer accurately predicts both Hitler’s continuing mental deterioration and his ultimate suicide. Secret Intelligence (SI). The Secret Intelligence branch came closest to traditional spycraft, employing human intelligence in Europe and Asia. But this attempt at espionage fell short in the usual sense since the OSS had judged that any agents it sent into Germany, for instance, would surely be apprehended. Thus, SI improvised, setting up networks in places such as the U.S. embassy in Berne, Switzerland. There, SI station chief Allen Dulles (another future CIA head) forged contacts with German industrialists visiting neutral Switzerland as well as members of the German resistance and what was left of the French military intelligence network. Dulles was able to glean information on the V-1 and V-2 missile plants at Peenemuende, as well as establish contact in 1945 with SS General Karl Wolff, with whom he was able to negotiate an end to the Italian campaign.

Morale Operations (MO). The Morale Operations division, created in 1943, was an offshoot of SO designated to perform a variety of “black propaganda” and fifth-column missions aimed at enemy troops and civilians. Black propaganda consisted of spreading false rumors and misinformation through media such as radio broadcasts, newspaper articles, and leaflets. Unlike “white propaganda,” which con-

sisted of news reports beamed to enemy territory that were mostly reliable, black propaganda was utterly false and often designed to look like it came from German and Japanese prisoners of war (POWs) Defectors who would praise their captors, urge their countrymen to surrender, and talk about the good life in Allied POW camps. Among MO’s black propaganda efforts was the radio broadcast Volksender Drei, beamed to German

audiences in the autumn of 1944. The host was a Wehrmacht officer named Hoffman, who told his listeners that his unit had “liberated” a German city from the Nazis and were waiting to hand it over to advancing Allied troops. He encouraged other German officers to do the same. Despite a feverish attempt by the U.S. Army to locate Hoffman and his city, he was of course never found. Even General Omar Bradley was unaware that Hoffman and Volksender Drei were concoctions of the MO branch of the OSS. Other MO efforts included dropping leaflets behind enemy lines, blackmail campaigns, and other “dirty tricks.” In Italy, MO propaganda asserted © that German troops had the best rations, were hoarding Italian goods, and were getting into fights with Italian army units. MO also dropped fake copies of Time and Newsweek into Germany with glowing stories of American POW camps and invented a completely bogus German resistance movement, Das Neue Deutschland, with its own newspaper (which German troops were forbidden to read on pain of court martial).

X-2. The X-2 branch was created out of the necessity to obtain ULTRA information (the successful British effort to crack the secret of Gemany’s ENIGMA machines) and thus read many of Nazi Germany’s most secret military communications. While the OSS had been integrated into the military, it was mistrusted by both G-2 and ONI, so much so that, incredibly, it was denied decryptions of both ULTRA and Magic (American interceptions of Japanese coded traffic). Never one to accept parochial stupidity, Donovan did an end-run around the American military establishment by creating X-2, the OSS liaison with Britain’s SOE specifically designed to obtain ULTRA decrpytions. So secret was X-2’s mission that only a handful of personnel within OSS knew its actual mission, and so important was the information it obtained that its officers could veto missions by SI and SO on the grounds that ULTRA intercepts might be compromised.

The end of the OSS and its legacy. The achievements of Donovan and his “private army” are extraordinary by any measure. In a breathtakingly short time, he created an espionage and intelligence agency in a country with virtually no competence or history in the field. By the end of the war, the

OSS had given aid to the French maquis, Yugoslav partisans, and Chinese and Burmese guerrillas, and

had even sent agents to assist Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam. Its analysts had studied the Soviet Army and German industrial strength, and the Morale Office discovered that 90 percent of German POWs taken in the summer of 1944 had listened regularly to OSS black propaganda radio broadcasts. OSS agents had blown up bridges, sunk ships, and wreaked havoc behind enemy lines in Indochina and Europe. At its greatest strength in 1944, some

13,000

men and women worked for the OSS. But its days were numbered. Unlike Roosevelt, President Harry Truman was not enamored of the OSS and in one of his more dubious decisions, on September 20, 1945, he dissolved it. Wild Bill had ten days to dismantle the agency. X-2 and SI were transferred to other government departments and formed the nucleus of the CIA, which came into being in 1947. KARL RAHDER, PH.D. INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

SEE ALSO: Donovan, William J.; Central Intelligence Agency; Jedburghs; special operations; Hall, Virginia. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Anthony Cave Brown, The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan (Times Books, 1982); Corey Ford, Donovan of OSS (Little, Brown, 1970); Barry M. Katz, Foreign Intelligence (Harvard University Press, 1989); Clayton D. Laurie, “Black Games, Subversion and Dirty Tricks: The OSS Morale Operations Branch in Europe, 1943-1945,” Prologue (v.25/3); Elizabeth P. McIntosh, Sisterhood of Spies: The Women of the OSS (Naval Institute Press, 1998); Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA (Basic Books, 1983); Maochun Yu, OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War (Yale University Press, 1996); Walter C. Langer, The Mind of Adolf Hitler (Basic Books, 1972).

Ogorodnikov, Nikolay NIKOLAY Ogorodnikov was born in 1932 in Kiev in the Soviet Union. At 11, he was a dispatch carrier for Soviet guerrillas battling the Nazis during World War II. When captured in 1945, he reportedly gave his name as Ogorodnikovy, an uncle’s

patronymic, instead of his Jewish name, Wolfson, to escape harsher punishment from the Nazis. Ogorodnikov served four prison sentences for charges including robbery and rape, in spite of his efforts on behalf of his country at such a young age. He finally became a taxi driver in Kiev, where he met his future wife and co-defendant, Svetlana Malutina. They married in 1969, had a son, and left the Soviet Union in 1973 on the pretext of emigrating to Israel. Instead of Israel, however, the family settled in West Hollywood, California, a strong Russian émigré community.

Once in West Hollywood, the Ogorodnikovs began fashioning their new life in the United States. Ogorodnikov quickly found that it was harder to make a living in the United States than in the Soviet Union. He did not object, therefore, when his wife made a connection with the Soviet consular-general in San Francisco to begin showing Russian films in their area. Svetalana’s ties to the consular-general resulted in permits to return to Russia occasionally and allowed their son to attend the prestigious Artek camp in the Crimea, something definitely not possible if they had stayed in Kiev. Svetlana was also in contact with the FBI during this time. She was noticed by the organization because of her contact with the consulate, but the FBI could never determine if she worked for the KGB. This involvement led Svetlana to FBI agent Richard Miller, a 20-year veteran beset by personal and financial pressures, and their relationship enabled Svetlana to acquire an FBI handbook. Ogorodnikov’s only direct involvement with Miller was when his wife introduced him to Miller as a fellow KGB agent. He appeared to have knowledge of his wife’s actions, however, and even counseled her on

how to handle Miller. The FBI arrested the Ogorodnikovs and Miller separately on October 3, 1984. Everyone who knew the couple expressed disbelief at the thought they were KGB agents, because they were considered incompetent. Ogorodnikov pled guilty in a joint-plea agreement with Svetlana and received a sentence of eight years, as his wife’s 18. Ogorodnikov finished his sentence in January 1990, but faced further detention while authorities tried to deport him. MELISSA F, GAYAN UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHARLOTTE

SEE ALSO: Federal Bureau of Investigation; KGB.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Russell Warren Howe, Sleeping With the FBI: Sex, Booze, Russians and the Saga of an American Counterspy Who Couldn’t (National Press Books, 1993); “FBI Agent Charged in Espionage-Soviet Couple also is Arrested in LA,” Washington Post (October 4, 1988); “Accused Spies Portrayed as Incompetents,” Washington Post (October 5, 1988); “Spy vs. Spy Saga,” Time (October 15,

1988).

Oldfield, Maurice THE HEAD OF Great Britain’s foreign intelligence : service, MI-6, in the 1970s and the first spymaster widely known to the public, Oldfield was born in 1915 in Over Haddon, Derbyshire, England. After receiving an M.A. in history at Manchester University, he joined an infantry regiment in 1941 during World War II. Oldfield’s fluency in French and German qualified him for a transfer to the Field Security Police, the most junior branch of the Military Intelligence Corps. Short, stocky, and bespectacled with a noted sense of humor and a cheerful demeanor, Oldfield never fit the stereotype of a spy. Assigned to the Suez Canal Zone, he bore responsibility for the security of military formations and installations in the area. In 1943, Oldfield joined Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) to provide counterespionage and countersubversion in all British-held territory in the Middle East. Finding the interpretation of intelligence data to be much like the interpretation of historical documents, Oldfield elected to remain in intelligence after the war. Though officially assigned to a series of diplomatic appointments, in reality he worked for the Security Intelligence Services (SIS) from 1947 until his retirement. As a London-based deputy chief from 1947 to 1949, Oldfield participated in one of his first clandestine operations when he helped British agents infiltrate Albania to establish an intelligence-gathering and resistance network. In 1950, he dampened local rivalries throughout the region and improved relations with American intelligence as a Singaporebased member of the staff of the commissioner general for the United Kingdom in southeast Asia. Throughout his career, Oldfield maintained that an intelligence service would lose respect if it confused

information collection with sabotage and assassination. He feared that the publicity resulting from any violent excesses would lead to tighter political control of the secret service and project a negative image.

Nevertheless, during a brief sojourn in London in 1953, Oldfield helped plan the joint BritishAmerican intelligence operation to destroy Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh’s regime and restore the Shah to the royal throne of Iran. After a short assignment in Washington, D.C., he returned to London in 1964 as the second-in-command at MI-6. t In 1973, Oldfield capped his career by becom-ing the newest “C,” the chief of MI-6, an accomplishment quickly reported by the German magazine Stern. Publication of this closely guarded secret exposed Oldfield to the risk of assassination, a possibility that almost became reality when the Irish Republican Army planted a bomb underneath a window of his apartment building. As directorgeneral, Oldfield welcomed all ideas for new spy gadgets and took pride in the development of the laser bug, which used light to measure voice vibrations on glass. He scored successes against the Soviet Union’s KGB intelligence service by masterminding two high-level defections and uncovering a joint SovietIraqi espionage plan targeting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Oldfield probably prevented the Falklands War from occurring in 1977 instead of 1982 by discovering that an Argentine naval party planned to establish a base in disputed territory. (The Argentines claimed the South Atlantic islands, known to them as the Malvinas.) Following his 1978 official retirement, Oldfield agreed to coordinate British intelligence in Northern Ireland and quickly remedied widespread breaches of security. He resigned this post in 1980, weakened by the cancer that would end his life on March 11, 1981. CARYN E. NEUMANN, PH.D. OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: ML6; United Kingdom; Iran.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Richard Deacon, “C”: A‘Biography of Sir Maurice Oldfield (Macdonald Publishers, 1984); Nigel West, MI-6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations, 1909-45 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983).

Operation BERNHARD SOMETIME in late 1939 or early 1940, the Nazi intelligence services during World War II, Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA), decided to produce forged foreign currency. The first phase in this program is known as Operation ANDREAS. By 1942, the production of those forgeries was transferred from RSHA offices to workshops constructed inside Sachsenhausen concentration camp to increase the output. This second phase was called Operation BERNHARD, as the name of the SS officer in charge was Bernhard Krueger. In Sachsenhausen all sorts of Allied documents were forged, but especially British pound notes and, from late 1944, U.S. dollar bills. By the end of the war, the workshops of the Sachsenhausen concentration camp were transferred to the Mauthausen camp and then to RedI-Zipf and Ebensee. There, the inmates were liberated by American troops. Nearly all knowledge in the public domain about Operation BERNHARD is based on the accounts of German officer Wilhelm Hoettl and of camp survivor Adolf Burger. The publications by or inspired by Hoettl are very biased and partly anti-Semitic, especially in accusing the prisoners engaged in the production of the forgeries being criminals in their own right before entering Sachsenhausen, a claim that can be disproved in all but one or two cases. The publications by Burger give good insight into the life and suffering of the inmates forced to participate in the forgery operation.

To gain knowledge of the decision-making process within the Nazi government and the RSHA during Operation BERNHARD, scholars rely to a large extent on the publications written by Hoettl. According to him, Adolf Hitler approved the operation. Historians know for certain, through archival Heinrich of documents, about the involvement Himmler, one of Hitler’s key ministers. The total number of inmates forced to participate in the forgeries was up to 160; the number of inmates killed during Operation BERNHARD varies according to the sources between five and eight persons. Knowledge of the actual use made of the forgeries is even more sketchy, except for the ClCERO case (when counterfeit funds were used to pay for intelligence). It seems that the forgeries were first intended as leaflets for air-dropping over

Britain, but later they were used for financing Nazi foreign intelligence operations. At the end of the war, a large quantity of forged banknotes was dropped into Lake Toplitz in Austria. Some boxes were recovered in the late 1950s and 1960s by reporters of the German magazine Stern, and Austrian police. OLIVER BENJAMIN HEMMERLE, PH.D.

MANNHEIM UNIVERSITY, GERMANY

SEE ALSO: CICERO; World War II; Hitler, Adolf. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior, Report on Forgery in Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp (Copenhagen Reprint, 1981); Wilhelm Hoettl, Hitler’s Paper Weapon (Rupert Hart-Davis, 1955); Anthony Pirie, Operation BERNHARD (Grove Press, 1963); Julius Mader, Der Banditenschatz (Deutscher Militaerverlag, 1966); Adolf Burger, Des Teufels Werkstatt (Verlag Neues Leben, 1997).

Operation CHAOS THE NATIONAL Security Act of 1947 prohibits the CIA from performing intelligence operations against U.S. citizens. However, from 1967 to 1974, a special unit within the CIA collected information on U.S. citizens and dissident groups and moni-

tored their activities through what came to be known as Operation CHAOS. Faced with urban race riots and growing protest against the war in Vietnam, President Lyndon Johnson became convinced that foreign communist elements were behind the domestic unrest. In August 1967, Johnson ordered Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms to gather intelligence on the foreign contacts of U.S. dissidents to determine if this was the case. Responsibility for establishing a special operations group fell to Chief of Counterintelligence James Angleton, who then selected Richard Ober to head the group. Ober was a CIA officer who had been involved in previous efforts to monitor American left-wing activists overseas. Initially, the operation was limited to monitoring the activities of U.S. dissidents abroad and compiling information submitted by other agencies, particularly the FBI. The

operation was assigned the codeword CHAOS in July 1968. The special operations group submitted its first report to the president in November 1967, providing little evidence of foreign involvement in domestic affairs and no evidence of foreign funding or training of U.S. protest groups. The administration’s response to this information set a pattern that would continue throughout Operation CHAOS: When confronted with a lack of intelligence to support the notion of foreign elements controlling U.S. dissi-

jority of the information within the files did not pertain to the operation’s primary objective—documenting connections between domestic turbulence and foreign influence. CHAOS also participated in ongoing mailopening operations within the CIA’s New York field office. The CHAOS staff provided the New York office with a list of individuals whose mail should be intercepted, and the field office then forwarded international mail being sent or received by those

dents, Johnson, and later Richard Nixon, did not conclude that their suspicions were unfounded. Instead, they expanded the scope of the operation in an attempt to gather even more intelligence and prove their theory. The problem was that, by law, the CIA was restricted from internal U.S. intelligence matters; its charter was foreign intelligence.

ceived intelligence from National Security Agency (NSA) wiretapping operations against U.S. citizens. The CIA never participated in the actual wiretapping or listened to recordings of intercepted conversations. Rather, the NSA provided CHAOS with so-called “booking slips” that listed the identity of the caller and receiver, as well as the date and time of the call. Knowledge of CHAOS and its activities was highly restricted within the CIA, and the operation was compartmentalized even within the Counterintelligence Division. The CHAOS staff, eventually growing to 52 people, was isolated in a basement vault at CIA headquarters, and dissemination of the information it gathered was determined on a “need to know” basis. The CHAOS chain of command was particularly murky—neither Angleton nor Helms claimed responsibility for supervising the operation. Helms also denied any knowledge of agents recruited by CHAOS or their domestic espionage. Nor was CHAOS subject to the annual reviews and budget audits required of other CIA programs. The result of all this secrecy was that the operation was not effectively supervised and strayed into areas not directly related to its mission. By late 1972, CHAOS was beginning to wind down as the U.S. withdrew from Vietnam and antiwar protests ceased. In August 1973, new DCI William Colby curtailed CHAOS activities, and terminated the operation altogether in March 1974. He then issued directions to all CIA field stations stating that any information regarding U.S. citizens uncovered in the course of operations should be immediately turned over to the FBI. Operation CHAOS did not remain a secret for long after its

CHAOS expansion. In June 1969, Nixon aide Tom C. Huston informed Helms that the president wanted to expand CHAOS and conduct intelligence operations within the protest movements. In September 1969, Helms issued an internal memorandum to all CIA directorate heads ordering them to support CHAOS objectives and supply the group with necessary intelligence. In response to growing

concern within the agency regarding the legitimacy of CHAOS, Helms stressed that the operation would not involve spying on citizens within the United States, in spite of Huston’s request. However, from October 1969, through July 1972, CHAOS recruited close to 30 agents, some with affiliations to antiwar and civil rights groups. These agents were ostensibly recruited for intelligence-gathering operations against U.S. dissidents abroad, but much of the information they collected pertained to domestic activities. Most of the CHAOS staff were analysts who examined raw intelligence received from CIA sources and other government agencies and then indexed the groups and individuals referenced in a database.

Eventually,

over

300,000

names

were

stored in the CHAOS database, and a printout ona particular individual or group would cross-reference all of the files in which the name appeared. The group created 7,200 files on U.S. citizens, 14 of whom were members of Congress. Helms often complained that CHAOS staff faced a huge backlog of raw intelligence. Consequently, they did not properly screen much of the material, and the ma-

persons to CHAOS

for review. CHAOS

also re-

termination. On December 22, 1974> journalist Seymour Hersch published a story in The New York Times detailing the activities of Operation CHAOS and accusing the CIA of domestic espionage.

The CIA confirmed the existence of CHAOS in a press release a few days later. As details of CHAOS and other CIA excesses became public in 1974 and 1975, several investigations were launched. President Gerald Ford appointed a commission, led by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, to investigate CIA activities within the United States, while the Senate and House of Representatives formed their own investigative committees, chaired by Senator Frank Church of Idaho and Representative Otis Pike of New York. Throughout the proceedings, Colby insisted that the CIA was acting on orders from the White House and that the agency’s involvement in domestic intelligence was the result of presidential paranoia and refusal to believe that the protest movements were purely indigenous. In February 1976, based on recommendations from the committees investigating Operation CHAOS,

Ford

issued

Executive

Order

11905,

which stressed the exclusively foreign mission of the CIA and reaffirmed the FBI’s responsibility for domestic intelligence. President Jimmy Carter followed up in January 1978 with Executive Order 12036, which stipulated that any intelligence activities against citizens within the U.S borders or abroad had to be coordinated with the FBI and approved by the attorney general. In addition, Carter’s order also prohibited mail-opening and electronic or physical surveillance of citizens within the United States except when required for background checks of potential employees. The CIA paid a high price for Operation CHAOS in damage to the agency’s reputation and loss of morale among its employees, particularly since the operation never uncovered any evidence of a foreign communist conspiracy to influence events within the United States. JENNIFER L. ROGERS History ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED

SEE ALSO: Church, Frank; Central Intelligence Agency; Nixon, Richard M.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (HarperCollins, 1995); Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1975); Richard E. Morgan, Domestic In-

telligence: Monitoring Dissent in America (University of Texas Press, 1980); Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans: Final Report (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976).

Operation DOUBLE-CROSS DOUBLE-CROSS, the British counterespionage program conducted against German intelligence during World War II, is arguably one of the most successful counterintelligence operations in history. The systematic capture of every covert German agent inserted into the United Kingdom enabled Britain’s counterintelligence agency, MI-5, to not only blind Germany’s premier intelligence agency, the Abwehr, but also repeatedly deceive it through the release of meticulously scripted disinformation (i.e., seemingly accurate data containing falsified elements designed to mislead an adversary). The systematic effort to double-cross the Abwehr was directed by a secretive body, intriguingly designated the Twenty Committee (commonly represented by the Roman numeral XX, or double crosses, for 20). The committee was led by the dynamic John Cecil Masterman, a brilliant counterintelligence expert, and was comprised of both experienced intelligence officers and talented specialists from academia. The DOUBLE-CROSS system, as envisioned by the Twenty Committee, would be employed in an attempt to actively control Germany’s espionage apparatus; capture German agents; gather information about Germany’s intelligence program, personalities, and methods; ascertain German plans and intentions; and influence German military planning through deception. Using knowledge of the Abwehr’s plans to insert German agents, obtained through an unprecedented breakthrough in signals intercepts, British counterintelligence was able to capture the majority of these agents immediately upon their arrival by land, sea, or air. Given the option of cooperating with British intelligence or facing possible execution at the gallows, many chose to work as double-agents throughout the course of the war. But MI-5 had to tread carefully. If news of the capture of even a sin-

gle German agent were made public, the Abwehr

could decide the entire network had been compromised and shut it down immediately. The evolution from German spy to British double-agent invariably led through Latchmere House, the fabled MI-5 detention center known as Camp 020, where Abwehr operatives were thoroughly interrogated. Those thought to have potential for employment in DOUBLE-CROSS were passed on to the skillful hands of the special agents section of ML5. At this point, the controlled agents were supervised by a case officer charged with managing the new agent’s communications via wireless telegraph with German intelligence. A critical element of making this operation a success was the knowledge that each agent had a unique style of sending Morse code known as a “fist.’? This meant that the agent would have to actually send the controlled messages, as faked transmissions sent by a British intelligence officer would likely be identified as such by German authorities.

Notional sub-agents. The genius behind this operation did not stop with the turning of captured agents. To make these double-agents, who were assigned colorful code names such as LIPSTICK, SNOW, and GARBO, appear to their Abwehr handlers to be fully operational, not only would the agents have to report apparently valid intelligence information, they would also have to build a network of recruited sub-agents. The Twenty Committee had to fabricate elaborate stories to backstop each of these notional sub-agents. Such stories, to be viable, would need to include a personal history, including an insight into the recruited agent’s motivation for working with German intelligence, a detailed description of the type of intelligence they could be expected to obtain, and standard operational data such as the activities and reporting assignments the sub-agent had been tasked with by the primary agent. To meet this challenge successfully required painstaking effort to ensure every detail was properly addressed. For example, to make the purported intelligence data believable, MI-5 quickly learned that they had to explore, in-depth, the life of a spy in wartime, security-conscious England. Officers were thus sent into the field to manage a collection operation similar in scope to what the agent would have conducted to obtain the intelligence they reported. This provided counterespionage officers with a realistic perspective on the nature of the in-

telligence that could be reasonably reported on military activities,

in such a restrictive environment,

without calling undue attention to themselves or their interests. Through this field experience, they learned that few collection requirements levied by the Abwehr could be completely satisfied. By reporting bits and pieces of information (once again incorporating disinformation along with actual facts) the reports, sent in coded messages back to Germany, were accepted as authentic. In turn, the misleading data was ultimately included in the Abwehr intelligence reports and briefings delivered to senior Nazi civilian and military officials, including Adolf Hitler and © his closest advisers. One of the major lessons learned from Operation DOUBLE-CROSS was the importance of assigning a single case officer to a given agent. In doing so, the officer was able to develop an in-depth understanding of the agent’s personality, background, and operational skills. This level of familiarity allowed ML-5 to create a degree of authenticity in the intelligence reports transmitted by the doubled agents that German intelligence never suspected they were being so profoundly defeated in the intelligence war. Despite the unprecedented success in capturing Abwehr agents, savvy MI-5 officials did not rule out the possibility that other agents had successfully entered the country and were actively reporting back to Germany. This, in part, led to the attention to detail in producing the fabricated agent networks just described. In addition, information obtained from ULTRA (intelligence gathered from the successful cracking of German communications encoded by the compromised ENIGMA system) was enormously helpful in gaining an understanding of both German intelligence requirements, as well as the nature of the information being reported back to the Abwehr from various sources. Fully aware of the content of messages transmitted between controlled agents and their Abwehr handlers, and with exhaustive insights provided by ULTRA, the Twenty Committee was able to manage this complex operation with great precision. Such an elaborate and longstanding counterespionage operation as DOUBLE-CROSS is not only a complex challenge, it is also expensive. With the cost of the war threatening the collapse of the British economy, yet another unique facet of DOUBLE-CROSS enabled ML5 to pull off this remarkable feat: it was self-financing. The Abwehr

continued to send payments to not only the agents they had dispatched to England, but also to the many sub-agents that formed the extensive DOU-

BLE-CROSS networks. These payments went a long way in financing the operation from beginning to end.

Perhaps the greatest contribution made by Operation DOUBLE-CROSS was its incomparable support to another deception operation. Operation FORTITUDE, the critical effort to deceive the Germans about the true location for the impending AL lied invasion of the European continent, could not have been successful without the disinformation passed by the controlled agents of DOUBLECROSS, who helped convince the German leadership that Allied forces would land at Pas de Calais and that Normandy, the real destination, was little more than a tactical diversion. The resulting redeployment of key German forces away from Normandy aided immeasurably in the success of the invasion. STEVEN M. KLEINMAN ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO:

ENIGMA;

World War IJ; Germany;

XX

Committee.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies (William Morrow, 1975); J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (Australian National University Press, 1972); Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies (Public Record Office, UK, 2000); Donald P. Steury, The Intelligence Wars: World War II Chronicles (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000); John Waller, The Unseen War in Europe (Random House, 1996).

Operation GOLD LIKE

OPERATION

SILVER,

conducted

a few

years earlier in Vienna, Austria, Operation GOLD involved the construction of a tunnel in order to tap Soviet telephone and telegraph lines. Operation GOLD, based in Berlin, Germany, became far better known and yielded, for almost exactly one year between March 1955 and April 1956, a treasuretrove of information for American and British in-

telligence.

Berlin was at the hub of transportation and communication lines that ran from Western Europe through Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union. As the Soviets began to shift from wireless radio communication to encrypted landlines for telegraph traffic in 1951-52, CIA officers concluded that the underground cables in East Berlin represented a potentially valuable target. Detailed plans for the tunnel were drawn up and approved by Allen Dulles, director of Central Intelligence, in January 1954. Construction began in February 1954, and on the American side of the line dividing Berlin, an air force radar site and associated warehouse provided the cover. However, as the planning moved forward even before approval by Dulles, CIA officials briefed British MI-6. The briefing audience included George Blake, a mole working for the KGB. Blake provided Moscow a full report a few weeks before the tunnel went into operation. The tunnel was about 500 yards long and was provided with air-conditioned ventilation entirely from the entrance at the radar facility. Deliveries of electronic equipment used in the tap would have seemed perfectly in accord with the radar mission. At the tap end of the line, a vertical shaft came up next to a well-traveled highway, the Schoenefelder Chaussee, to reach the buried landlines about 18 inches below the surface. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers distributed much of the excavated dirt inside the warehouse at the entrance site. The tunnel was 6.5 feet high, with its bottom about 20 feet below the surface of the ground. Over the year the tap worked, a vast amount of taped material accumulated, with hundreds of reels of recordings for both audio and code messages every day. Each week, a planeload of tapes would be transported back to both London and Washington, D.C., for analysis. Over the 11 months and 11 days of recording, some 40,000 hours of Soviet telephone conversations were taped and transcribed. Another 19,000 hours of German conversation were recorded, with some 17,000 individual conversations transcribed. The teletype center employed 350 people at its peak of operation, and some 98,000 hours of Soviet teletypes were transcribed, together with 66,000 hours of German teletypes. According to the CIA’s own statistics, if the messages had been printed in book form, they would have filled 120 cubic feet of shelf space. There was such a backlog of information that decoding and analysis of the material continued for

more than two years after the operation closed | down, until September 30, 1958. The total cost of the project was estimated by the CIA at $6.7 million. Because the KGB sought to protect its sources and Blake in particular, the agency kept the information about the tunnel very closely held, not even informing Soviet military intelligence, the GRU. A Soviet team located the telephone tap and then planned a scheme to find the tunnel, apparently by accident. Digging uncovered the tunnel on April 21, 1956, and the local Soviet officials invited the press to photograph the discovery. Below the tap room, a trap door led to a vertical shaft that went down to the tunnel below. The tunnel leading from the tap room was sealed off by a door, which carried a sign that read, in both German and Russian, “Entry is forbidden by order of the Commanding General.” At first the CIA and ML-6 concluded that the tunnel had been indeed discovered by accident when a signal team sought to repair a water-damaged cable, and recorded messages about the water damage and recordings of the actual discovery appeared to confirm the accidental nature of the discovery. The publicity surrounding the tunnel worked two ways. On one hand, the exposure of the tunnel was regarded as a coup by the Soviets. Yet the Western press tended to treat the tunnel as an intelligence success by the CIA. After Blake was exposed and arrested in 1961, many writers speculated that the tunnel had been used for disinformation. Eventually, however, the CIA concluded that the intelligence gathered was perfectly genuine; the information gathered was valuable in many regards. The operation yielded a total of some 2,000 names of interest, and it helped identify Soviet intelligence units by number and location in East Germany. Detailed reports were prepared covering a wide range of topics, including KGB radio intercept capabilities, personnel of the GRU in Moscow, and names and locations of intelligence units. Details of the Potsdam KGB office operations in East Germany, including tradecraft, liaison, security, and administration were uncovered. Information was collated into a detailed report on the organization and personnel of KGB headquarters. The quality of the political information retrieved was regarded as quite high, providing a clear picture of the confusion and indecision among Soviet and East German officials whenever

there was an incident in East Berlin that involved

citizens of a Western power. The tunnel disclosed the Soviet decision to establish an East German Army in October 1955, and yielded the plans for implementing the decisions of the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party. Tunnel information shed light on relations among key military and political figures and the relations between the Soviets and the Poles. Military information also proved interesting, including changes at the Soviet Ministry of Defense, changes in Soviet Air Force equipment, and details of the organization of the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Until the Bay of Pigs episode in 1961, the Berlin Tunnel Operation remained the most publicized CIA activity. RODNEY P. CARLISLE GENERAL EDITOR

SEE ALSO: Blake, George; Operation SILVER; Berlin, East and West.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. David E. Murphy, Sergie Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin (Yale University Press, 1997); David C. Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors (Ballantine, 1980); CIA, Clandestine Services History Program, History: Soviet Discovery of the Berlin Tunnel (n.d.); CIA, Clandestine Services History Program, History of the Berlin Tunnel Operation (n.d.).

Operation IVY BELLS OPERATION IVY BELLS was the codename for a 1970s covert mission undertaken by the United States to tap Soviet Union undersea communications cables in the Sea of Okhotsk. In the far western Pacific, inside the Kuril Islands in waters claimed as territorial seas by the Soviets, undersea communications cables connected major Soviet naval bases at Vladivostok and Petropavlosk. U.S. Navy Captain James Bradley, a former submarine commanding officer then director of undersea warfare in the Office of Naval Intelligence, conceived of Operation IVY BELLS. Captain Bradley’s reasoning was remarkably simple. As a boy growing up along the Mississippi River, he remembered signs warning boaters not to cast anchors over underwater cables. He assumed that

there would be similar signs over the cables running from the Kamchatka Peninsula to the Russian far

captain of Halibut, Commander John E. McNish, informed his crew that should they become trapped, they would not be taken alive. None-

eastern coast and that the communications system itself could be targeted, located, and exploited. He was correct. Once the cable was located by submarine and divers, a listening device would be installed. This bold operation of the U.S. Navy and the National Security Agency (NSA) required and received President Richard Nixon’s approval. The nuclear fast attack submarine USS Halibut (SSN 587) was specially fitted to carry out Operation IVY BELLS. Halibut carried a Deep Submergence Research Vehicle (DSRV). NSA personnel were embarked for the

B’Gosh” crew, who referred to their boat as the “DBat-boat.” The aftermath of the first operational patrol, when Halibut moored in Guam, had some tense moments as the realization of the danger set in. Over beer in the club, some of the crew questioned the wisdom of using submarines, and expressed concern that this particular action might be responded to as an act of war. Ultimately all the ship’s company returned to duty, with one excep-

mission.

tion.

Entry into the designated area was dangerous. The area had undersea detection cables to prevent the entry of unauthorized ships, particularly U.S. submarines. It was also a region of naval exercises by the Soviet Union. In the Sea of Okhotsk in 1971, in 400 feet of arctic-temperature water, U.S. Navy divers (having warm water pumped into their dive suits by special umbilical cords) located the cable and installed a 20-foot-long listening device. If the Soviets ever raised the cable for maintenance or repair, the bug was designed to detach and drift to the ocean bot-

The IVY BELLS mission continued with great success. There were some engineering mishaps, both

tom.

In Operation IVY BELLS, divers, on approximately a monthly schedule, retrieved recordings and installed a new set of tapes. The recordings were analyzed by the NSA. The transmissions included Soviet Navy, civilian, and KGB communications, particularly those of the seagoing border guards, Morskay Proganichinaya Ochrana. Obviously the Soviets felt their system was secure, as a surprising amount of classified information was being transmitted without having been encoded. The information collected by the divers was an intelligence gold mine, allowing for traffic analysis, order of battle information, and corroborative analysis. There were communications between sen-

ior commanders and government Officials, including actual conversations. There were tactical, engineering, political, and even personal discussions over some 20 lines. The NSA was able to compile it all. This was an incredibly sensitive and incredibly dangerous mission. Unlike many classified missions, in which certain essentials remain known to only a few, the entire crew was aware of what Halibut was doing and where it would be doing it. The

theless, morale was high among the “Oshkosh

within the submarine, with the DSRV, and among

the divers. However, the crew always managed to adapt, improvise, and overcome. Subsequently, other submarines were fitted to undertake the mission.

Soviet discovery. Operation IVY BELLS continued until 1981, when U.S. intelligence assets noted Soviet warships over the cable in the company of a salvage ship. USS Parche (SSN 683) was quickly dispatched to the scene to attempt to recover the listening pod. However, Parche could not locate the pod and realized that Soviet discovery had been total. Parche quietly withdrew from the area. After a long investigation, it was determined that NSA employee and traitor Robert Pelton had sold the secret of Operation IVY BELLS to the Soviet Union for $35,000. Indeed, a seized seafloor listening device eventually went on display in the KGB Museum in Moscow. There had been suspicions of a spy well before Pelton’s arrest, but Navy intelligence circles officially discounted the possibility, as sure of themselves as the Soviets had been that their cables were secure. The operation had been so closely held that the originator of the mission, Bradley, had not been permitted to see the product of the taps. Operation IVY BELLS remained classified, but word of the endeavor did appear in published works in Great Britain and America by the mid1980s. The tapping of telephone cables on the ocean floor, though not under the codename IVY BELLS, also reportedly took place in the Barents Sea and in the Mediterranean.

While Operation IVY BELLS and similar operations have had certain information placed in the public domain, much of the operations remain unknown or in the realm of informed speculation. Most documentation and knowledge remain highly classified, as well as quite technical. RAYMOND J. BROWN ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO: submarines; surveillance; National Security Agency; KGB. BIBLIOGRAPHY. James Bamford, Body of Secrets (Doubleday, 2001); Tom Clancy, Submarine (Berkley Publishing Group, 2001); Norman Friedman, The Fifty Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1999); Norman Polmar and Thomas Allen, Spy Book: The Encyclopedia of Espionage (Random House, 1998); Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff (Public Affairs, 1998).

Operation RYAN THE SOVIET POLITBURO, the nation’ supreme decision-making body, led by ailing General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev initiated a joint-intelligence mission named Operation RYAN in November 1981, amid Kremlin fears that President Ronald Reagan and NATO leaders were preparing for a surprise nuclear missile attack. The operation followed KGB Chief Yuri Andropov’s perception that Reagan was building a nuclear first-strike capability after the resumption of U.S. plans to build the MX ballistic missile system and the B-1 strategic bomber fleet of aircraft. Operation RYAN was one of the largest intelligence operations in Soviet history. The KGB issued top priority instructions to all stations in NATO countries to report twice monthly on any signs of preparation for a first-strike nuclear attack, including indications that sabotage teams armed with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons may attempt to penetrate Warsaw Pact territories. The KGB also was to watch for unusual military special forces activity and increased Western intelligence recruitments of émigrés from socialist countries.

Moscow discovered during the period 1981-85 that there was no information supporting a U.S. plan for surprise nuclear attack. Nonetheless, Operation RYAN created a vicious cycle of intelligence collection and assessment; the process itself gave credence to false assumptions. Mandatory reporting induced creative analysis that contributed to the alarm. Many KGB analysts, lacking credible sources, scavenged Reuters news service and BBC news to stay abreast of current developments. Other KGB analysts, specializing in American affairs, considered Operation RYAN a ruse, believing the true source of the paranoia emanated from Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov and Chief of Soviet General Staff Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov: those most concerned by U.S. strategic weapon system upgrades. KGB overseas stations including allied services (East Germany and probably Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) went along with the reporting requirement rather than challenge the wisdom of the KGB directive. Many factors contributed to Soviet paranoia, including Reagan’s speeches condemning the “Evil Empire” and declared plans of a strategic military buildup. The KGB source within the CIA, Aldrich Ames, believed that U.S. forces were superior in most categories to Soviet strategic forces and reported these views to his KGB handlers, thus compounding Soviet fears. The stalled Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks and NATO preparations for the installation of nuclear-tipped Pershing IJ and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) in the United Kingdom, Belgium, and West Germany (reaction to Soviet SS-20 missiles) must also have heightened fears that NATO would seek a nuclear solution. Soviet paranoia reached a peak during the NATO military exercise of November 1983. Moscow feared the exercise might mask the countdown to a nuclear first strike. The exercise scenario (plan) did involve procedures for transition from conventional to nuclear war. Imaginary NATO forces were moved through the alert phases from normal readiness to general alert. Soviet military liaison missions (GRU) in West Germany reported changed military patterns among NATO forces, though there were no real alerts involving NATO troops. , Erroneous Soviet intelligence reporting persuaded Moscow that NATO alert levels were increasing and that the countdown to nuclear war

may have begun. Only with the end of the exercise did tensions within Moscow begin to ease. Soviet leaders in 1984 began to show less concern for surprise nuclear attack after repeated inconclusive reporting from Operation RYAN. Meanwhile, the British MI-6 source within KGB, Oleg Gordievsky, reported Operation RYAN to his British contacts; thus, Western intelligence services were aware of Moscow’s fears. After his defection to Britain in 1985, Gordievsky prepared a 50-page report for MIL-6, “Soviet Perceptions of Nuclear Warfare.” Reagan read the report and subsequently toned down his evil empire rhetoric, thereby helping to lower Soviet fears of nuclear attack. Operation RYAN illustrated the fact that sometimes intelligence operations are no match for reality. GAIL H. NELSON, PH.D. ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO: Reagan, Ronald; Gordievsky, Oleg; Ames, Aldrich; Andropov, Yuri.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story (HarperCollins, 1990); Christopher Andrew and Vasily Mitrokhin, The Sword and The Shield (Basic Books, 1999); Stephen Dorril, MI-6 (Free Press, 2002).

The British monitored the communications by linking into the lines near a private house in the Schwechat suburb. They bought a house, and engineers tunneled some 70 feet under a highway to reach the telephone cables. In order to explain the increased activity at the house, British intelligence service MI-6 established a shop to sell British tweed clothes. Because

of improvements

in radio transmis-

sion, reliance on decoding radio messages no longer provided the rich trove of information that it had during the British cracking of the German ENIGMA machine codes of World War I. However, much of the information on the telephone lines was direct conversation. By 1951, the British and the Americans decided to cooperate in the single tapping operation. According to outside analysts, the steady flow of relatively good information from Operation SILVER allowed the CIA to offer assessments, through the early 1950s, that were realistic appraisals of the chances of a Soviet armed attack in Europe. The CIA had held and expressed the view that Soviet forces were not an imminent threat as early as 1947, and the evidence gleaned from Operation SILVER seemed to support that analysis. When Operation GOLD was established in Berlin, the prior tunnel experience in Vienna no doubt contributed to the decision. RODNEY P. CARLISLE GENERAL EDITOR

Operation SILVER

SEE ALSO:

Operation GOLD;

World War II; Berlin,

East and West.

FROM THE end of World War II in 1945 through May 15, 1955, Austria was divided among the four occupying powers: Britain, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union. Like Berlin, the capi-

tal of Vienna was also divided among the four powers. Realizing that the Soviets had based their command in the Imperial Hotel on the Ringstrasse, the CIA Office of Communications put together a blueprint of the underground cables and communication routes leading to the hotel. They began to draw up construction plans for a tunnel to tap the Soviet lines and gather information regarding the Soviet order of battle and policy. However, the British had already established a surveillance system in 1949 to tap the Soviet landlines, codenamed Operation SILVER.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (Simon & Schuster, 1987); David C. Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors (Ballantine, 1980).

Oppenheimer, J. Robert ALTHOUGH celebrated as the “father of the ABomb” in the early years of the Cold War, physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer lost much of his prestige in 1954 when the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) revoked his security clearance based upon unsubstantiated allegations of espionage.

Born in 1904, Oppenheimer attended a private school in New York where he honed a keen intellect studying science and the classics. In 1925, he earned a B.S. in chemistry from Harvard University and undertook postgraduate work in physics, first at Cambridge University and then at the University of G6ttingen in Germany, where he received his doctorate in 1927. Returning to America, he held a research fellowship at Harvard before moving west in 1928 to teach theoretical physics at the California Institute of Technology and thé University of California, Berkeley. In the 1930s, Oppenheimer befriended prominent West Coast communists and supported various Popular Front organizations at Berkeley. Despite his activism, he never joined the communist party, and his involvement with it ended in early 1942 after America entered World War II. However, by Oppenheimer’s own admission, he was a “fellow traveler” with communist sympathizers. His politics drew FBI attention in October of that year, when General Leslie Groves appointed him research director of the Manhattan Project. After an investigation revealed Oppenheimer’s pre-war communist connections, the FBI and the U.S. Army’s Counterintelligence Corps placed him under tight surveillance. Although finding that Oppenheimer maintained social contacts with former left-wing associates, the government discovered no palpable acts of espionage on his part during the project. After World War II, Oppenheimer worked, unsuccessfully, to bring nuclear weapons under international control and in 1947 became the first chairman of the General Advisory Committee (GAC) to the AEC, where he wielded enormous influence in shaping early American nuclear-weapons policy. Oppenheimer’s opposition to the development of the hydrogen bomb led to renewed government suspicions of his sympathies. A number of hearings conducted by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) and by Senator Joseph McCarthy’s investigations subcommittee re-examined his background and strained his relationship with the AEC. Heavily criticized and under increased FBI scrutiny, Oppenheimer left the GAC in 1952 but remained an AEC consultant. In late 1953, Executive Director of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy William Borden accused Oppenheimer of being a Soviet agent. President Dwight Eisenhower revoked his security clearance, and AEC Chairman Lewis

J. Robert Oppenheimer in a pensive moment in 1959, five years after being banished from America’s nuclear program.

Strauss presented him with a list of formal charges. Appalled, Oppenheimer requested a hearing before the AEC’s Personnel Security Board. During the hearing, which was held from April 12 to May 6, 1954, and included testimony from 40 witnesses, Oppenheimer’s case was severely damaged by his colleague, H-bomb developer Edward Teller, who questioned Oppenheimer’s trustworthiness. Also, Oppenheimer’s contradictory testimony concerning a 1943 encounter with a communist acquaintance, Haakon Chevalier, who had approached him with suggestions of espionage, cast further doubt on his integrity.

On May 27, the board ruled that although Oppenheimer was a “loyal citizen,” his past conduct and associations were inconsistent with security re-

quirements, and recommended permanent clearance denial. The AEC upheld the board’s findings

and effectively banished Oppenheimer from America’s atomic energy program. Devastated by the ruling, Oppenheimer resumed his academic career as the director of Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Study. In 1963, President Lyndon Johnson partially rehabilitated Oppenheimer by awarding him the Fermi Award but did not reinstate his clearance. Oppenheimer retired in 1966 and died

of throat cancer the following year. JAMIE RIFE History ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED

SEE ALSO: Los Alamos; Communist Party. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Peter Goodchild, J. Robert Oppenheimer: Shatterer of Worlds (Houghton Mifflin, 1981); Gregg Herken, Brotherhood of the Bomb: The Tangled Lives and Loyalties of Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Edward Teller (Henry Holt, 2002); Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (Simon & Schuster, 1995).

Ovakimyan, Gaik During the years between 1943 and_ 1991, Russia and the United States were embroiled in a battle of information, deception and double-crosses. There was no war ever declared by the United States Congress, no open acts of violence between national armed forces, and no dissemination of information to the public of either nation. This Cold War ended with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 in a public display of failed nationalism and broken promises. There were no soldiers in the war, but there were

strong figures who wielded the tremendous power of information in a war of words. Even prior to the Cold War, however, the Soviet Union used its diplomatic staff and contacts with American Communist Party members to establish an effective spy apparatus. One of these figures in the late 1930s and

early 1940s was

Gaik Ovakimyan

(also spelled

Ovakimian.) Ovakimyan was a Soviet spy who established networks to penetrate several classified projects in the United States. Starting in 1933 Ovakimyan controlled a vast network of Soviet spies which stretched across the United States, Canada, and into

Mexico. In the later years of his American infiltration, Ovakimyan cooperated with Soviet agents in New York to successfully penetrate the American nuclear research work. In fact, his primary field of work was scientific and technical information rather than political intelligence. As a member of the INO, or foreign intelligence department of the NK VD (forerunner of the KGB), he was an unusual character. He held a doctorate in science from the Moscow Higher Technical School, and had operated since 1933 as an agent through his cover as an engineer with the AmericanSoviet Trading Corporation (Amtorg), based in New York. In order to help locate potential agents, he enrolled as a graduate student in New York to study chemistry. Ovakimyan is credited with stressing the importance of technical espionage and was probably instrumental in establishing the network that eventually included Julius Rosenberg. According to at least one source, Ovakimyan personally recruited Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in 1938. Ovakimyan probably suggested the use of other INO officers to act under cover as exchange students. One such student, Semyon Markovich Semyonov (or Semonov), enrolled at MIT in 1938, and then worked for Amtorg. Semyonov was appointed as the control (handler) for Harry Gold in 1942, and Gold was the agent who worked closely with Klaus Fuchs. Fuchs also served at least once as a courier to pick up material from David Greenglass, Julius Rosenberg's brother-in-law. After I.A. Akhmerov was recalled to the Soviet Union, the “legal residency” or open intelligence gathering effort was moved under Ovakimyan. He found himself terribly overworked because he was dealing with some 200 agents and was expected to help coordinate the assassination of Leon Trotsky in Mexico City. British and Canadian investigators tipped off the FBI that Ovakimyan was the “rezident” in New York City, operating under the code name GENNADI. In May 1941, Ovakimyan was caught by the FBI while he was accepting documents from one of his agents and was put in prison for a short time, but was allowed to leave the United States in July. After his return to the Soviet Union he was recommended for the Red Banner Medal, and was put in charge of scientific technical espionage in 1943, where he served as coordinator of atomic intelligence operations. He also served as head of the American department of the NKGB.

He attained the rank of major general in the KGB,

but was purged in the late1950s, when Soviet premier Khrushchev dismissed numerous officers who had apparently been too close to Lavrenti Beria. ARTHUR H. HOLst, PH.D. WIDENER UNIVERSITY RODNEY CARLISLE GENERAL EDITOR

SEE ALSO: Akhmeroy, I.A.; Feklisov, Alexander; KGB.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (Basic Books, 1999); Central Intelligence Agency, “Venona: Soviet Es-pionage and the American Response, 1939-1957” www.cia.gov/csi; Cold War International History Project, “A NK VD/NKGB Report to Stalin: A Glimpse into Soviet Intelligence in the United States in the 1940s, by Vladimir Pozniakov,” wwics.si.edu; Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov, Special Tasks:The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness (Little, Brown, 1994).

Pakistan PAKISTAN, originally part of India, was founded on August 14, 1947, after India obtained its independence from the United Kingdom. It is a chronically poor country with a per capita gross domestic product of $2,100 (purchasing power parity); 35 percent of Pakistan’s population lives below the poverty line. Although its economic performance has picked up following large infusions of international assistance in 2001-03, its long-term economic prospects are uncertain.

Pakistan is the creation of a group of ideologues surrounding its charismatic founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948). According to the two-nation theory propounded by Jinnah and his political party, the Muslim League, the Muslims of India required a homeland to live free of Hindu religious and political domination. As such, Pakistan is one of only a handful of states in the world based on a religious identity. In the years just prior to Indian independence, the Muslim League and the Congress Party (the political party at the forefront of the Indian independence movement), held protracted negotiations to preserve a united India, but their differences proved insurmountable. By 1947, communal tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims (predominantly Hindus

and Sikhs) led to open conflict, and both Britain and the Congress Party acceded to the Pakistani demand. As originally proposed, the state of Pakistan was to consist of all the Muslim majority areas of the British state of India. At its founding, Pakistan had two “wings,” separated by over 1,000 miles of Indian territory. The west wing contained the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), East Punjab, Baluchistan, and Sindh, while the east wing consisted of East Bengal. From the outset, a number of factors prevented Pakistan from fully realizing its original vision. These included the Kashmir territorial dispute with India, Jinnah’s early death, the failure to integrate the east and west wings, and Pakistan’s unfortunate geographic location. As of 2004, Pakistan-controlled Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) still had not been integrated into the Pakistan federation, while India claimed the entire state

as an integral part of the Indian Union. The Kashmir dispute has been a prime contributor to four India-Pakistan military conflicts (1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999). As long as the dispute remains unresolved, India and Pakistan can drift into armed conflict at any time. Moreover, since both Pakistan and India have nuclear weapons, that conflict has alarmingly approached a nuclear level at times. The Pakistani Interservices Intelligence (ISI), an all-military intelligence agency which combines many aspects of the CIA and FBI, has been instrumental in Pakistan’s regional and domestic policies. Domestically, it has been accused of interfering in

479

electoral politics and backing political parties sympathetic to the government in power. Regionally, Pakistan has chosen to rely on covert action as a principal agent of policy, and ISI has a covert-action capability far greater than that found in most developing countries.

During the Cold War, Pakistan was actively courted by the United States. It joined the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1954 and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1955; the United States became Pakistan’s principal arms supplier. Pakistan viewed the U.S.-Pakistan alliance primarily as a means of overcoming Indian military superiority, while the United States wanted Pakistan to help contain Soviet expansion. In 1965, ISI launched Operation GIBRALTAR, aimed at starting an insurrection in Kashmir. In the 1970s, ISI worked closely with the CIA to provide assistance to Afghan insurgents during the war against the Soviets. ISI also provided aid to Sikh separatists in the Indian state of Punjab in the 1980s, and to Kashmiri insurgents after 1989. Its aid to the Taliban movement was instrumental in helping it come to power in Afghanistan. India has accused ISI of fomenting terrorism and launching and conducting a proxy war against it in Kashmir and elsewhere. The military has ruled Pakistan for over half of its existence (1958-69, 1969-71, 1978-88, and 1999-to date). Pakistan’s elected civilian leaders

were overthrown by the military after failing to control

endemic

corruption

or

prevent

economic

downturn and civil strife. The country’s military leader in 2004 remained Pervez Musharraf, who came to power in a military coup on October 12, 1999, and named himself president on June 20, 2001. A referendum held on April 30, 2002, confirmed his presidency for an additional five years. Pakistan’s clandestine and overt support of the Taliban in Afghanistan came to an abrupt end a few days after the September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda attacks on America. When it became clear the United States was going to take military action in Afghanistan, neighboring Pakistan had little choice but to join America’s anti-terror coalition. Thus, the ISI has been an active partner with American intelligence agencies in tracking down the al-Qaeda terrorist group in Pakistan and Afghanistan. JON P. DORSCHNER, PH.D. U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT

SEE ALSO: India; counterterrorism; al-Qaeda.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. M. Rafique Afzal, Pakistan: History and Politics 1947-1971 (Oxford University Press, 2001); CIA World Factbook (2003); Owen Bennet Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (Yale University Press, 2002); Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan: 1947-2000 (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001); Richard F. Nyrop, ed., Pakistan: A Country Study (American University Press, 1983).

Palestinian National Authority THE PALESTINIAN National Authority (PNA), the self-rule body of the Palestinian people, has been inventing an intelligence and internal security system as it has been developing a government. The CIA has been assisting in the creation of this system, which still showed significant weaknesses in 2003. Although the goal is to have a centralized intelligence and internal security structure, thus far both these critical areas display severe fragmentation. There are somewhere around 20 different security organizations, virtually none of which cooperate with each other, and at times actively oppose other groups. The two most significant intelligence and internal security groups ostensibly under central PA control are General Intelligence and Preventive Security. The main goal of the PNA administration is to reduce the number of these security groups and to bring them under central authority. If the reforms actually come about, the scheme for PNA security and intelligence agencies is to bring the security agencies, including the normal police forces and the Preventive Security Agency, under the umbrella of the Interior Ministry. The National Security Service and Military Intelligence would be run separately. Finally, General Intelligence would be run directly by the president’s office. The Preventive Security and General Intelligence agencies appear to have somewhat overlapping functions. Preventive Security focuses on internal security exclusively. General Intelligence also performs internal security functions, but additionally uses whatever assets it has for external security. An additional, somewhat unique stated function of General Intelligence is to prevent the

sale of Palestinian land to “foreign parties.” A major focus of both agencies has been tracking down Palestinian collaborators. As of 2002, the two most important figures in General ingallidencé appeared to be its chief, Major General Amin al-Hindi, and the West Bank chief, Brigadier General Tawfiq al-Tirawi. The General Intelligence Agency plays one other significant if somewhat non-traditional role for the PA. Although at times cancelled based on the ebbs and flows of the Palestinian uprising, General Intelligence has held fairly regular meetings with the Israelis on security issues in accordance with the Oslo peace plan. These security meetings normally have been held under CIA auspices. Even though the meetings have a clear focus on practical security problems between the two sides, they also have included a number of more general political issues. At least some of these meetings seem to have been used for quiet diplomacy and negotiations rather than pure coordination of security organiza-

and Preventive Security, which is reputed to be more independent. The PNA still has considerable distance to go before it has positive control over its intelligence and security organizations. LAWRENCE E. CLINE, PH.D. AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Israel; Central Intelligence Agency.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. International Press Center, “Palestinian Authority,” www.pna.gov.pn; Middle East Intelligence Bulletin; The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, www.washingtoninstitute.org; Foreign Broadcast Information Service (2002). —

Panama

tions.

SEE: Central America; Bush, George H. W.

Operations of these two agencies have been marked by a series of controversies. A number of Palestinians (perhaps up to 20) are alleged to have been tortured to death in Palestinian prisons by their security services. Also, although denied by the

Parker, Gilbert

leaders of the two main agencies, there have been several allegations that they have ties with the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in their attacks against Israelis. Conversely, some Palestinians have accused the General Intelligence Agency of being overeager in its attempts to limit Palestinian bombing attacks inside Israel, as it has agreed to do. Both General Intelligence and Preventive Security have suffered from the peculiar geographical realities of the PNA. The physical separation between the West Bank and Gaza Palestinian territories (with Israel in between) has created a situation in which the intelligence and security branches in those two areas have operated as virtually independent kingdoms. The independent power bases of the leaders in these areas have created a number of problems for the PNA. This was particularly evident in 2002 when Palestinian President Yasser Arafat fired his West Bank Preventive Security chief, resulting in major street protests by the official’s followers. The problem is worsened by competition between General Intelligence, which reportedly is stocked with officials believed to be more personally loyal to Arafat,

SIR GILBERT Parker was director of British propaganda in the United States during World War I (1914-18), leading a secret campaign to gain American support for Great Britain in the conflict. Parker’s efforts were so successful that few, if any, of the prominent Americans with whom he corresponded ever realized that they were the targets of a propaganda crusade run from London. Horatio Gilbert George Parker was born November 23, 1862, in Camden East, Ontario,

Canada. As a young man, Parker taught school before joining the Anglican clergy. In 1883 and 1884, he lectured in elocution at Trinity University, Toronto, and at Queen’s University, Kingston. In the meantime, he became well known for his orator-

ical skills, displayed in public dramatic readings. In 1885, he left the clergy and Canada, traveling extensively in the United States, Hawaii, and Australia.

He worked from 1886 to 1889 as an editor for the Sydney Morning Herald while writing articles, short stories, and poetry. Parker moved to England in 1890 to further his growing literary ambitions, eventually publishing

more than 30 novels about the Canadian frontier and the British Empire, including Pierre and His People (1892), The Seats of the Mighty 1896), The Right of Way (1901), and The Judgment House (1913). In 1900, Parker was elected to Parliament as a Conservative member for Gravesend, and in 1902 he was knighted for his contributions to Canadian literature. At the outbreak of World War I, Parker became director of the American Ministry of Information, a branch of the new War Propaganda Bureau established at Wellington House in London to distribute pro-British propaganda and monitor public opinion abroad, while counteracting propaganda from the Central Powers. Parker’s travels and literary prominence allowed him to have many. American friends and acquaintances, who received subtly pro-British letters, books, and “official” papers from his London address. Contacts selected from the directory Who’s Who enabled Parker’s seemingly casual correspondence to reach many more prominent Americans. Eventually, his list held 260,000 names. Parker’s staff conducted secret surveys that kept the British Foreign Office informed of U.S. popular opinion during the era of American neu-

trality (1914-1917), and reported on American newspapers and other publications sympathetic or hostile to British interests. Parker’s group evaluated the attitudes of American university faculties, planted pro-British articles by famous writers in sympathetic newspapers and magazines, and provided pro-British public speakers for American audiences. Among Parker’s wartime writings are The World in the Crucible, What is the Matter with England?, and Is England Apathetic?, all published in 1915. That year, Parker was made a baronet for his wartime services. When the U.S. entered the war in 1917, Gilbert resigned his propaganda post, considering that his work had accomplished the important goal of keeping the U.S. public sympathetic to British and Allied interests. Poor health led him to resign from Parliament in 1918. Parker died in London on September 6, 1932. He was buried in Belleville, Ontario. ELLEN J. JENKINS, PH.D. ARKANSAS TECH UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Wellington House; World War I; journalism and propaganda.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. M. L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor, British Propaganda During the First World War (Crane Russack, 1982); John Coldwell Adams, Seated With the Mighty: A Biography of Sir Gilbert Parker (Borealis Press, 1979); H.C. Peterson, Propaganda for War (Associated Faculty Press, 1939).

Pash, Boris BORIS PASH is one of the most mysterious characters in American intelligence history. He successfully investigated Nazi atomic research progress during World War II and played an important role in highly secret U.S. covert action programs of the Cold War. During World War II, Lt. Col. Boris T. Pash was the director of the ALSOS mission in support of the Manhattan Project, the U.S. atomic bomb development program. Pash commanded the mission from the beginning and was later joined by Dr. Samuel Goudsmit as chief of the scientific component. The mission was aimed at discovering the exact level of progress of Nazi Germany in its development of nuclear weapons. Coordinated by a central office in London, England, the ALSOS mission was divided into three stages that took Pash and his counterintelligence agents first to Italy in 1943, to France the following year, and to Germany in 1945. By this third stage, however, priorities had changed and the officials involved in the mission received firm orders that none of Germany’s nuclear materials and scientists must be allowed to fall into Russia’s hands. When a supposedly important German laboratory was destined to fall to the Russian zone of influence, as in the case of the Auergesellschaft Works in Oranienburg just to the north of Berlin, U.S. forces made sure that the plant was destroyed. ALSOS headquarters were established in Heidelberg, where prominent Nazi physicians such as Otto Hahn, Carl von Weizacker, and Max von Laue, whom Pash knew, provided crucial information. Von Weizacker revealed that important records about German atomic research were sealed in a metal drum that was stored in a cesspool in the back of his house. : The ALSOS mission was officially disbanded on October 15, 1945. After the war, Pash was ap-

pointed

the

army’s

BLOODSTONE

cluded

recruiting

representative

to Operation

in the spring of 1948, which in-

defectors,

smuggling

refugees

from behind the Iron Curtain, and assassinations of foreign officials. In March 1949, Pash was assigned by the U.S. Army to the Office of Policy Coordination of the CIA, where his unit, known as PB/7, was responsible for “assassinations, kidnapping, and such other functions as from time to time may be given it by higher authority.” He also co-directed with Dr. Sidney Gottlieb the CIA “Health Alteration Committee,” which carried out mind-control and torture experiments. LUCA PRONO, PH.D. UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM, ENGLAND

SEE ALSO: World War II; Los Alamos.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Samuel Goudsmit, ‘“ALSOS,”’ History of Modern Physics and Astronomy (Springer-Verlag, 1996); Leslie M. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (Da Capo Press, 1983); Boris Pash, The ALSOS Mission (Award House, 1969); Christopher Simpson, Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War (Collier Books, 1988); Thomas Gordon, Journey Into Madness: The True Story of Secret CIA Mind Control and Medical Abuse (Bantam Book, 1989).

Pelton, Robert W. DESCRIBED BY intelligence experts during the 1980s as perhaps the most damaging case to U.S. intelligence in recent memory, Robert W. Pelton, a former electronic signals (communications) specialist with the National Security Agency (NSA) for more than 12 years, was arrested in 1985 on espionage charges and ultimately convicted of selling national security information to the former Soviet Union. He was sentenced to three concurrent life sentences. Interestingly, Pelton’s arrest and ultimate conviction were not based on documents sold, but on his memory of details surrounding an underground cable-tapping intelligence system that he re-

vealed to the Soviets. Pelton’s troubles began with narcotics and alcohol abuse and eventually ran into financial prob-

lems, leading him to bankruptcy in 1979. Motivated largely by greed rather than ideology and in order to avoid losing his security clearance, Pelton resigned from the NSA and shortly thereafter made contact with the Soviet embassy, specifically with KGB Colonel Vitaly S. Yurchenko. Over the next five years, Pelton met at least nine times in Vienna, Austria, with his Soviet handlers.

Pelton, who was known by Soviet officials as Mr. Long, provided highly classified information regarding American submarine exploitation of Soviet communications through sophisticated electronic pods. These U.S. electronic intelligence devices were affixed to underwater cables that extended between military installations on the Soviet Kamchatka Peninsula and Siberian east coast. Codenamed IVY BELLS, a super-secret submarine intelligence-collection project and one of five projects Pelton disclosed to his Soviet handlers, it provided high-grade intelligence that ranged from command procedures and technological information to operational patterns, and typical locations of units. The revelations by Pelton denied the U.S. the ability to receive unambiguous warning of any Soviet military move or plan, considered priceless. Ironically, it was KGB defector Yurchenko (first meeting Pelton as a “walk-in” at the Soviet Embassy in 1979) who provided U.S. intelligence with information regarding Pelton in 1985. American counterintelligence officials, specifically the NSA, were able to eliminate the number of possible suspects because access to Operation IVY BELLS was restricted to a smaller pool of cleared employees. (Yurchenko then re-defected to the Soviet Union.) Pelton received a total of $37,000 from the Soviets for his betrayal. His actions risked the lives of 140 men on both the USS Seawolf and USS Parche submarines, which were sent in during a two-year

period to monitor the sensitive operation. The judge who presided over his case stated that Pelton’s betrayal had caused “inestimable damage.” DAVID JIMENEZ AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

SEE

ALSO:

Yurchenko,

Vitaly

S.; Operation

IVY

BELLS; Seawolf.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Sherry Sontag, Blind Man’s Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage (Public Affairs, 1998); Nathan Miller, Spying For America: The Hid-

den History of U.S. Intelligence (Marlowe & Company, 1997); Jeffrey T. Richelson, A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (Oxford University Press, 1995); George P. Morse, America Twice Betrayed: Reversing Fifty Years of Government Security Failure (Bartleby Press, 1995); Mark M. Lowenthall, Intelligence: From Secrets to Foreign Policy (CQ Press, 2000).

rank and citizenship in exchange for information he could provide. “I ask you to consider me as your soldier,” he wrote. “I believe in your Cause. I am ready to fulfill any orders. I await them.” British and American intelligence set up a system for jointly running Penkovsky as a defector-inplace, using British businessman and MI-6 agent Greville Wynne as a go-between. While on GRU assignments leading business delegations in London

and Paris, Penkovsky met secretly with a joint MI-6

Penkovsky, Oleg FROM 1961 to 1962, Colonel Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky supplied his British and American han- . dlers with thousands of documents on the current political and military conditions of the Soviet Union. These documents gave the West valuable insight into Soviet military capabilities and political intentions during one of the most tense periods of the Cold War. Penkovsky was born in 1919, the son of a White Army (anti-Bolshevik or anti-ccommunist)) officer killed in the Russian Civil War. While his father’s transgressions against the Bolsheviks would later come back to haunt him, Penkovsky was a rising star in the new Soviet state. He was a faithful party member, enjoyed a brilliant career during World War II, and afterward married the daughter of a general. He attended the distinguished Frunze Military Academy and then trained to become a professional military intelligence officer with the GRU (military intelligence). After a brief stint in Turkey as assistant military attaché, Penkovsky was sent to study rockets and missiles at the Dzerzhinsky Military Academy. Well connected, a decorated Russian soldier, and now a senior military intelligence officer, Penkovsky was well on his way to a distinguished career. But Penkovsky was dissatisfied. By the late 1950s, the GRU had caught up with his past, and when an assignment in India was canceled, it seemed only to confirm Penkovsky’s suspicions that his career path was being blocked because of his father’s wrongdoings. Resentful of the Soviet system to which he had given so many years of loyal service, Penkovsky turned to the West. In 1960, he made several attempts to communicate with the West that his services were now at their disposal. In a letter to top governmental officials in Britain and the United States, Penkovsky requested military

and CIA team. These extensive debriefing sessions were supplemented by secret exchanges of classified material back in Moscow, where Penkovsky met with the wife of an MI-6 officer under cover at the British embassy and with a CIA officer under cover at the U.S. embassy. The quantity and quality of material Penkovsky provided was astounding. The CIA and MI-6 had a combined total of 30 translators and analysts poring over the information that came in from more than 100 rolls of film, 140 hours of taped interviews, and even hand-copied documents, all during a period of only 18 months. The material was quickly recognized as top-grade, providing not only data on Soviet technological development (which helped confirm the myth of the missile gap between the U.S. and the Soviets) but also details on Soviet military preparedness and intentions, including the frictions within the Soviet high command over use of nuclear weapons. Such information may have been critical in President John Kennedy’s handling of two of the Cold War’s major crises. In 1961, tensions rose over Berlin as Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev forced the issue of a divided city, threatening to declare a separate peace with East Germany and eventually erecting the Berlin Wall. A year later, Khrushchev and Kennedy again faced a potentially explosive situation when images from the CIA’s U-2 flights over Cuba (corroborated by Penkovsky’s data) identified Soviet missiles being installed on the island. In both situations, Penkovsky’s information on the true state of Soviet military preparedness and insights into Khrushchev’s political intentions helped the Americans define the limitations of Soviet power, cut through Khrushchev’s rhetoric, and stand up to the Soviet challenge. Many have argued, for example, that Penkovsky’s data on missile capabilities were instrumental in Kennedy’s decision during the Cuban crisis, to forswear military action, including a pre-emptive nuclear strike, in favor of a

naval

blockade.

For

some,

this

has

earned

Penkovsky the title “the spy who saved the world.”

On October 22, 1962, in the midst of the missile crisis, Penkovsky was arrested by the KGB. He had come under heavy surveillance for almost four months, as his frequent meetings with a number of foreigners aroused suspicion. At a show trial with Greville Wynne in Moscow in May 1963, he was sentenced to death for treason and shot shortly thereafter. Wynne received a prison sentence but was exchanged for Gordon Lonsdale in April 1964. In 1965, the CIA published, through commercial channels, The Penkovsky Papers, edited transcripts of Penkovsky’s taped debriefings sessions with British and American intelligence. “I am not disappointed in my life or my work,” are Penkovsky’s parting words in the Papers, for “if I succeed in contributing by little bricks to this great cause, there can be no greater satisfaction.” In 1972, through the Church Committee hearings, the CIA acknowl edged that it had been behind the publication. ALEXIS ALBION

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Cuban Missile Crisis; Lonsdale, Gordon; ML6; Central Intelligence Agency.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Jerrold Schecter and Peter Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World (Scribner, 1992); Oleg Penkovsky, The Penkousky Papers (1965); Len Scott, “Espionage and the Cold War: Oleg Penkovsky and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Intelligence and National Security (Autumn 1999); CIA Popular Document Collection, “Lt. Col. Oleg Penkovsky: Western Spy in Soviet GRU,” www.foia.ucia.gov; National Security Archive, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991, Microfiche Collection (1995).

Perl, William A MEMBER of the infamous Julius and Ethel Rosenberg spy ring, William Perl was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on March 15, 1951, on charges of conducting espionage for the Soviet Union. He was later jailed for perjury. William Perl (born Mutterperl) was a successful student at the City College of New York, where, in

addition to his devotion to academics, he served as a member of the Steinmetz Club, the campus

branch of the Young Communist League. While at City College he met and befriended Julius Rosenberg, Morton Sobell, and Joel Barr, all of whom would later become involved with conducting intelligence operations. Perl graduated with a degree in engineering in 1939 and took a position with the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) at its Langley Army Air Base research facility the following year. He quickly demonstrated his penchant for aeronautical research and was transferred to the NACA Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1944. Once there, he was sponsored by NACA to complete doctoral studies in physics at Columbia University. While attending school in New York, Perl lived in the same Morton Street apartment as fellow spies Joel Barr and Al Sarant. Following the completion of his studies, Perl returned to Cleveland to work on jet propulsion projects related to supersonic flight. Recently released documentation and interviews suggest that Perl was passing secrets to the Soviets as early as 1943, and decoded VENONA cables from June 1944 report that Perl was awarded a bonus of $500 by his Soviet controller for supplying particularly valuable information about American air units. Both of his jobs with NACA provided him access to a wide variety of classified materials, including a great deal related to the research and development of modern American jet fighters. At Lewis, Perl was engaged in the design of supersonic wind tunnels facilities, consulting in engine development, and work related to America’s atomic plane program. Among the many secrets he stole, Perl supplied the Soviets with the complete blueprints, almost 5,000 pages long, of Lockheed’s P-80 Shooting Star, the first American jet fighter. The first sign of potential trouble arrived after he applied for a position with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and a security check revealed his association with Barr and Sarant (who at the time were still under investigation), resulting in him being denied the job. Then in 1950, the Rosenberg spy ring rapidly began to collapse. On February 2, Klaus Fuchs, a Rosenberg agent, was arrested; Harry Gold and David Greenglass followed soon

thereafter. Perl’s associate, Joel Barr, disappeared in Paris, France, in June 1950, and on July 17, Perl’s con-

troller, Julius Rosenberg, was arrested at his home. That same month, Joel Barr’s fiancée visited Perl in Cleveland, handed him $2,000, and advised him to flee to Europe. However, Perl decided to stay in the United States. His comrade, Morton Sobell, escaped to Mexico but was apprehended by local bounty hunters soon after and returned to American authorities. Still under investigation, Perl was ordered to appear before the Rosenberg Grand Jury in the summer of 1950 but, under continued questioning, he denied having any relationship with Julius Rosenberg. Still, the FBI had a strong suspicion that Perl was somehow involved in espionage and eventually arrested him. It was unable to acquire more than circumstantial evidence regarding Perl’s spying, but he was eventually tried and convicted on two counts of perjury for lying about his relationship with both Rosenberg and Sobell. William Perl served two concurrent five-year sentences at the New York House of Detention, maintaining his innocence throughout his incarceration. Recently declassified documentation and interviews with former Soviet KGB intelligence personnel have revealed that, in fact, all those indicted in the Rosenberg spy ring were actively engaged in passing classified information to the Soviets. Most damning perhaps, was the 1997 interview with Alexander Feklisov, a KGB officer from 1939 to 1974 who admitted that he was the controlling officer for Rosenberg, Perl, and others. His testimony and subsequent memoir all but dissolved any remaining doubt as to the guilt of the Rosenberg spy ring and Perl. ANDREW B. GODEFROY ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA

SEE ALSO: Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel; VENONA; Feklisov, Alexander; Greenglass, David and Ruth; Federal Bureau of Investigation. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Alexander Feklisov, The Man the Rosenbergs (Enigma Books, 2001); R. Radosh Milton, The Rosenberg File (Yale University Press, John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, VENONA: ing Soviet Espionage in America (Yale University

Behind and J. 1983); DecodPress,

1999);V. Mitrokhin and C. Andrew, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive, The KGB in Europe and the West (Basic Books, 1999); Jerrold and Leona Schecter, Sacred Secrets (Brasseys, 2002);

Perlo, Victor BORN IN 1912 in East Elmhurst, New York, the son of Russian-Americans who had emigrated in their youth from Omsk in Siberia, Russia, Perlo received a B.A. and M.A. in mathematics and statistics from Columbia University in 1933 and became one of the world’s leading Marxist economists. He served in various Franklin Roosevelt New Deal government agencies from 1939 to 1947, where he was one of the group of economists known as “bright young men.” From the 1960s until his death, he was the chief economist for the American Communist Party and one of its board members. Perlo’s career was damaged after World War II when, in 1945, he was accused by Elizabeth Bentley of being the head of a Soviet espionage ring which had supplied information about the U.S. Army during the war. Bentley claimed that she acted as a courier between Perlo’s ring and a group led by Nathan Silvermaster. Perlo had to appear before the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in 1948 and the Senate Committee on Internal Security in 1953. Bentley had always been considered a notoriously unreliable witness. Yet, the cables between U.S.-based Soviet agents and Moscow during World War II, decrypted within the VENONA project and disclosed by the National Security Agency (NSA) in 1995, confirm that Perlo had some contacts with the Soviets. The extent of his collaboration, however, is not clear.

Intelligence historians John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr go as far as charging Perlo with supplying the Soviets with aircraft production figures while he was chief of the Aviation Section of the War Production Board. Other experts, Jerrold and Leona Schecter, claim also that Perlo was responsible for passing to the Soviets the memoranda of Harry Dexter White, assistant secretary of the Treasury and the formulator of the so-called Morgenthau Plan for postwar Germany. Perlo discovered he had a security problem the year before he was summoned before HUAC, when officials denied him a passport he needed in order to become treasurer of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees in Europe. Because he had already resigned his post at the Treasury Department, he suddenly found himself unemployed. Forced to give up his career in public administra-

tion, Perlo became an economics consultant and

university lecturer. He taught at several universities, including Harvard, and wrote 13 books that ana-

lyzed the political economy of U.S. capitalism and the consolidation of the economics of racism in the United States. He died in 1999, LUCA PRONO, PH.D. UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM, ENGLAND

SEE ALSO: White, Harry Dexter; Bentley, Elizabeth.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, VENONA: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (Yale University Press, 1999); Jerrold and Leona Schecter, Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History (Brasseys, 2002); Athan G. Theoharis, Chasing Spies: How the FBI Failed in Counterintelligence but Promoted the Politics of McCarthyism in the Cold War Years (Ivan R. Dee, 2002).

Persian Gulf War ALTHOUGH THE Persian Gulf War, comprising Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, began with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, one of the period’s most important intelligence operations actually took place long before that date. Gerald Bull, who was born in Canada in 1928, had begun a joint project for the United States and Canada called Project HARP (High Altitude Research Program). Based on the long-range Paris Gun of 1918 with which the Germans bombarded the

French capital, Bull envisioned an extremely longrange cannon that could function as a low-cost alternative to rockets for launching satellites into orbit. Using a test range on the island of Barbados in the Caribbean, Bull proved his project feasible in 1961. The Vietnam War focused American energies in Southeast Asia, however, and Canada stopped fund-

ing because of the antiwar feeling in the country. Bull retained the rights to the technology behind HARP. Bull then embarked on a perilous stage of his career, in which he sought employment from states considered pariahs by most of the world. Bull went to work for South Africa, reviled at the time for its

racial apartheid, and developed 155 mm howitzers with 50 percent longer range than any other artillery pieces of that model. When President Jimmy Carter came to office in 1977, American foreign policy found renewed focus on human rights. Consequently, Bull’s work for South Africa brought him afoul of the Carter administration. In 1980, he served six months’ imprisonment for illegal arms activity. At the time, the Iraq of Saddam Hussein was embroiled in its war with Iran, and Hussein wanted the howitzers Bull had designed for South Africa. Bull also interested Hussein in his plans for the HARP “super gun,” a fatal miscalculation. The super gun, which now was called Project BABYLON, in addition to launching satellites into space, could launch artillery shells vast distances. Since Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin had ordered the destruction by the Israeli Air Force of Hussein’s nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981, Israel had considered Iraq a serious threat. As the Israelis knew, such shells could be either conventional high explosive shells or the dreaded NBC (nuclear, chemical, or biological) warheads. At the same time that Bull was working on the super gun for Hussein, he also was developing a longrange missile for Iraq. With both projects under way, Bull was perceived by Israeli officials as a serious threat to Israel. Anxious to stop work on the projects, on March 22, 1990, Bull was allegedly killed outside his Brussels apartment by katsas (agents) of the Israeli Mossad. Within weeks, intelligence evidence proved that, however brutal, the Mossad operation against Bull was not ill-conceived. Three weeks after his death, British customs seized sections of his gun barrels, which were being forged by a Sheffield, England, company on the cover story that they were intended for oil pipes. (During the Gulf War, soldiers of the Allied Coalition found the remains of one of

Bull’s super guns that had been destroyed in a bombing raid.) About the same time, there were also reports in the American press about how, on March 28, a joint U.S.-British undercover Customs operation seized “AQ electrical capacitors, devices designed to be used as nuclear triggers.’’After the war, nuclear scientist Andre Gsponer issued a paper claiming that Iraq had been interested in producing enriched uranium—a crucial step toward developing atomic bombs.

Military action commenced against Iraq on January 16, 1991, immediately following the expiration of a United Nations resolution aimed at forcing the evacuation of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Intelligence satellites were able to give Allied commanders almost real-time information on the movements of both Iraqi and Allied Coalition forces. During the war that followed, Hussein followed a strategy of trying draw Israel into the war, thus fracturing the Arab-Western Coalition that President George

H.W. Bush had taken such care to build. Hussein began to fire Russian Scud missiles, modified as the al-Hussein missiles, into Israel. (These may have been the very ones that the Mossad suspected Bull was fabricating for Iraq). With every missile launch, there came the fear that an NBC warhead would hit Israel. That Hussein possessed such weapons and was willing to use them had been documented in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88. The Iraqi dictator had employed mustard gas against Iranian troops in 1984. In 1987, Hussein’s cousin Ali Hasan al-Majid used a deadly “chemical cocktail” of mustard gas, cyanide, and

century. However, with its concern over nuclear, bi-

ological, and chemical weapons and with the use of satellites and drone aircraft, the Persian Gulf War, in many ways prefigured modern intelligence at the

dawn of the next century. JOHN F. MURPHY, JR. AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: satellites; reconnaissance; Iraq; Iraq War of 2003; Bush, George H. W. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Andre Gsponer, “Iraq’s Calutrons, 1991-2001,” www.nuketesting.enviroweb.org; William Lowther, Arms and the Man: Dr. Gerald Bull, Iraq, and the Supergun (Bantam, 1991); Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, 1990-91 (Princeton University Press, 1993); Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein (Perennial Press, 1999); David Miller and Gerald Ridefort, Modern Elite Forces (Smithmark, 1992).

Tabun nerve gas against Kurds who were rebelling against Hussein’s rule. (Ali Hasan, dubbed “Chemical Ali,” would

be captured in the Iraq War

of

2003.) Finally, with Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir beginning to threaten Israeli intervention, British and American special forces began what was called “the great Scud hunt.” Utilizing long-range intelligence reconnaissance, they began a furious search for the al-Hussein Scud missiles in the Iraqi western desert near Israel. The hunt was made even more

difficult because the missiles were

mobile,

being based on a truck chassis. When the ground offensive against the Iraqi forces began on February 23, 1991, Coalition forces benefitted from the most advanced technology, whose application to intelligence-gathering would be one of the great developments in the field in the last years of the 20th century. The vehicles of the Coalition were able to utilize the new GPS (Global Positioning Satellite) system for navigation, enabling them to move with as much precision during the night as in the day. To help with intelligencegathering, the first prototype drones, or pilotless aircraft, were used against the Iraqis. After 100 hours, with Kuwait liberated, Bush declared the war officially at an end. The Persian Gulf War was the last major armed conflict of the

Peru THROUGHOUT the 20th century, various authoritarian regimes in Peru have relied on their intelligence services to discredit political opponents. At the same time, Peru generally has not utilized its intelligence services to carry out kidnappings and killings on a large scale, as has been the case in certain Latin American military dictatorships. The use of intelligence services to control political adversaries began in earnest during the dictatorship of Augusto Leguia (1919-30). Leguia appointed his cousin, German Leguia y Martinez, as the minister of government. Martinez created a spy network in order to keep track of opponents of the government, and he used police forces to discredit the opposition or force them into permanent exile. Peruvian intelligence services harassed hundreds of intellectuals, politicians, journalists, and trade unionists, imprisoning many without trial. Among those persecuted by the Leguia spy machine was Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, later the founder of the APRA political party. Martinez became so powerful that it was rumored he wanted to become

president himself, before the dictator Leguia fired and imprisoned him. Intelligence services also played a major role during the dictatorship of General Manuel Odria, who took over the government in 1948 and ruled until 1956. Alejandro Esparza Zafiartu was the individual behind the elaborate state security system upon which the dictatorship was based. There was much persecution of the APRA political party, and this persecution often degenerated into outright terrorism. Peruvian intelligence routinely censored the press, spied on unions, universities, government of-

ficials, and detained and deported many opponents. Especially notable was the 1949 Internal Security Law, which eliminated habeas corpus and took power away from the judiciary, giving Zafiartu a free hand to carry out “preventive measures.” This law allowed the regime to eliminate political opponents before the 1950 elections. Furthermore, the Cold War played a role, as Odria was a favorite of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration and received much U.S. military aid, as well as the help of the CIA in developing an internal espionage system. Following in this tradition, spy chief Vladimiro Montesinos played a major role in the administration of Alberto Fujimori, who was elected president in 1990. Montesinos received his training in the National Intelligence Service (SIN) during the 1970s under a military government. He was released from the service for allegedly selling secrets to the CIA, but he maintained his contacts in the SIN and the military. The SIN declined during the civilian governments of the 1980s, but Fujimori allowed Montesinos to rebuild the SIN into a major component of the government. As in earlier regimes, Peruvian intelligence spied on political opponents to isclate and discredit them, especially when Fujimori assumed dictatorial powers after 1992. The SIN became a large operation, employing thousands of agents and informants. During the 1995 presidential elections, it tapped the phones of opposition candidates, including that of former United Nations Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar. Many Peruvians came to believe that Montesinos had become even more powerful than Fujimori.

However, the actions of the spy chief led to the downfall of the president when Montesinos was implicated in bribery scandals and illegal arms sales. Fujimori fled to Japan, while Montesinos went into hiding in Venezuela. Montesinos was later returned

to Peru, where he was charged and sentenced for numerous crimes. RONALD YOUNG GEORGIA SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Central Intelligence Agency. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Roger Atwood, “Democratic Dictators: Authoritarian Politics in Peru from Leguia to Fujimori,” SAIS Review (v.21/12, 2001); Ernesto Garcia Calderén, ‘‘Peru’s Decade of Living Dangerously,” Journal of Democracy (v.12/2, 2001); Benjamin Keen and Keith Haynes, A History of Latin America (Houghton Mifflin, 2000); David Scott Palmer, Peru: The Authoritarian Tradi-

tion (Greenwood, 1980); Frederick Pike, The Modern History of Peru (Harvard University Press, 1967); Thomas Skidmore and Peter Smith, Modern Latin America (Oxford University Press, 2000).

Petrov, Viadimir VLADIMIR

PETROV

joined the Soviet intelli-

gence service (OGPU) in 1933 as a cipher clerk. During the 1930s he observed at close hand those responsible within the NK VD (Soviet secret police) for carrying out dictator Josef Stalin’s orders for the execution of perceived opponents. Petrov knew many NKVD special operations personnel who also were executed during the Great Terror of 1937-38. He saw the NKVD operational file, reportedly four inches thick, involving the murder of Leon Trotsky by Ramon Mercader in 1940. Petrov was stationed at the Soviet embassy in Stockholm, Sweden, during World War II, a center for high level Allied and Axis espionage activities on neutral territory and an optimal vantage point for covert operations in the Baltic region and occupied Europe. In 1951, he was reassigned to the Soviet embassy in Canberra, Australia. However, his intelligence career turned for the worse; Petrov was implicated in the plot by Lavrenty Beria (NK VD chief) to seize control of the Soviet government following the death of Stalin in March 1953. After the execution of Beria in December, Petrov’s return to Moscow was ordered. Instead, he defected to the West in Sydney.

Petrov exposed Soviet global espionage networks and modus operandi, including Soviet NK VD organization, operations, and internal security apparatus during interrogation by Australian authorities. He also named covert Soviet intelligence officers assigned to major European capitals, including Paris. Petrov asserted that the Soviet embassy station chief in Paris was awash with French official papers, confirming a high-placed mole in the French government (Georges Paques). Finally, he confirmed the 1951 defection from Britain to the Soviet Union of Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess. He claimed to know this through his NK VD contact with the former Soviet cipher clerk in London, Filipp Kislitsyn. Kislitsyn processed Burgess’s materials, includ- — ing British Foreign Office documents that were photographed in the Soviet embassy and returned to him. Petrov claimed there was a third man involved in the British ring, setting British MI-5 counterintelligence experts on the path toward Kim Philby. Philby escaped the trap and defected to Moscow in January 1963. GAIL H. NELSON, PH.D. ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO: Philby, Kim; Burgess, Guy; Maclean, Donald D.; Beria, Lavrenty.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story (HarperCollins, 1990); Anthony Cave Brown, Treason in the Blood (Houghton Mifflin, 1994); Christopher Andrew and _ Vasily Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield (Basic Books, 1999).

Philby, Kim HAROLD Adrian Russell “Kim” Philby, a Soviet mole inside the British Secret Service (MI-6), played a unique and almost unbelievable role in the Cold War. From 1945 to 1951, Philby was simultaneously responsible for telling the West what Soviet Union leader Josef Stalin was secretly thinking, and telling Stalin what the West was secretly thinking. Today, scholars agree the Soviet cause were truly served by Philby’s activities. Philby was born January 1, 1912, to British parents in Ambala, India. His father, Harry St. John

Bridger Philby, later became a prominent “Arabist”’ and adventurer who converted to Islam and helped establish the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As a tod-

dler, Philby was nicknamed

Kim after Rudyard

Kipling’s fictional British orphan who grew up amid imperial intrigue in colonial India. As a boy, Philby boarded at the Westminster School in London. The character of Christopher Robin in A. A. Milne’s Winnie The Pooh stories is said to have been modeled on the young Philby. From 1929 to 1933, Philby attended Trinity College, Cambridge. There, he joined the Cambridge University Socialist Society and studied under Maurice Dodd, an outspoken British communist. Philby’s social circle at Cambridge included Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, and Donald MacLean, all of whom would later join Philby in spying for the Soviet Union. After graduating in 1933, Philby traveled to Vienna to fight against Austria’s recently established fascist dictatorship. In February 1934, Philby married Alice ‘“Litzi” Friedman, an Austrian communist activist. In May, Philby fled to England with his bride. In London, the Philbys were contacted by Edith Tudor-Hart, an Austrian-born British communist. In June 1934, Tudor-Hart introduced Philby to Soviet intelligence operative Arnold Deutsch, a Viennese sex therapist, who recruited Philby into clandestine Soviet service. To enhance Philby’s usefulness as a spy, Deutsch told Philby to distance himself from left-wing associations, including his wife Litzi. The Philbys immediately separated. Deutsch also asked Philby to write biographies of everyone he knew. From these _ biographies, Deutsch selected Philby’s Cambridge friend Donald MacLean for Soviet recruitment. In August 1934, Philby arranged MacLean’s first meeting with Deutsch, thereby initiating the Cambridge Five spy ring. In 1935, on Deutsch’s orders, Philby joined the Anglo-German Fellowship, a pro-Nazi organization. Soon, Philby became editor-in-chief of the Fellowship’s magazine, Germany Today. In that capacity, Philby visited Germany frequently in 1936 to interview leading Nazi officials. In February 1937, with Soviet financial backing, Philby traveled to Spain as a freelance journalist seeking to cover the Spanish Civil War from the fascist side. Soon, the London Times hired Philby as its Spanish War correspondent. From Spain, Philby

transmitted regular intelligence reports to his Soviet masters, though he disobeyed their order to assassinate fascist leader Francisco Franco. On December 31, 1937, near Aragon, Spain, a car carrying Philby and four other western journalists was hit by communist artillery. Two were killed, and Philby was slightly wounded. For courage under fire, Franco personally awarded Philby a military medal, further bolstering Philby’s false anti-ccommunist credentials. While Philby remained in Spain, his Soviet controller, Deutsch, was forced to flee London under suspicion of espionage. Deutsch’s espionage duties were assumed by Theodor Maly, a Hungarian expriest, and Alexander Orlov, a Russian lawyer and Bolshevik. In 1938, however, Stalin recalled both men to Moscow. Maly, an early victim of Stalin’s purges, was executed following a brief political show trial. Orlov, in contrast, fled to the United States, where he lived for decades, apparently without ever revealing Philby’s secret.

The mole in charge. In August 1940, Philby’s Cambridge friend Guy Burgess—already a fellow Soviet mole—helped Philby get a job in a propaganda unit of the British Secret Service. In July 1941, Philby transferred to a counterespionage unit, where he was assigned to confuse, deceive, subvert, monitor, or control foreign spies operating in Spain and Portugal, two important fronts in the espionage war between England and Germany. In 1942, Philby was promoted to chief of all British counterespionage operations worldwide. In this capacity, he helped to mislead Germany about the time, place, and weight of allied forces to be landed in occupied France, contributing significantly to the success of the DDay invasion in June 1944. In December 1944, Philby, a Soviet mole, was appointed chief of anti-Soviet operations in the postwar British Secret Service (MI-6). His career nearly ended in September 1945, however, when Konstantin Volkov, a Soviet diplomat stationed in Istanbul, Turkey, promised to identify several highranking Soviet moles in the British government if permitted to defect to Britain. Philby, as head of ML6’s Soviet Section, delayed responding to Volkov’s offer. After 21 days, Volkov, still in place in Istanbul, was murdered. In January 1947, Philby was dispatched to Istanbul to pass disinformation to the Soviets. Although

he disclosed this assignment to the Soviets, some KGB officials in Moscow began to suspect that MI-

6 had turned Philby back to the British side. At the same time, Philby’s botched handling of the Volkov affair led some British officials to question Philby’s loyalty. Nonetheless, in September 1949, Philby was promoted to serve as Britain’s top liaison officer to the U.S. intelligence services. In Washington, D.C., Philby regularly exchanged information about antiSoviet counterintelligence operations with his CIA counterpart, James Jesus Angleton, whom Philby first met in 1944. After such exchanges, Philby dutifully passed the CIA’s dearest secrets to the KGB. In the summer 1950, Philby’s old friend and fellow Soviet mole, Burgess, arrived in Washington and moved into Philby’s home. Around the same time, intercepted Soviet transmissions revealed that a Soviet mole was operating from inside the British embassy in Washington. The CIA asked Philby to help identify the mole, whom Philby knew to be Donald Maclean. Philby managed to delay the investigation for nearly a year, during which time Maclean was recalled to London. Then, in May 1951, Philby dispatched Burgess to London to warn Maclean that he would be arrested imminently. Following a KGB order, Maclean immediately fled to Moscow. To Philby’s surprise, Burgess accompanied Maclean. The suspicion cast on Philby by the defection of his houseguest Burgess led Philby to be fired from ML6. In 1955, however, British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan publicly cleared Philby. In 1956, ML6 rehired Philby and sent him to Beirut, Lebanon, where he remained until 1963. With his father’s assistance, Philby obtained unparalleled access to local intelligence on Arab politics that he channeled to both MI-6 and the KGB. In 1963, British authorities obtained powerful evidence that Philby had been a Soviet spy in the 1930s. Philby, still in Beirut, was offered immunity in exchange for a confession and complete account of his Soviet espionage activities. Philby did confess, but then disappeared from Beirut before interrogation could begin. He soon resurfaced in Moscow, where he remained until his death in 1988. Ironically, Philby never gained the complete trust of his KGB patrons. He was not permitted to enter KGB headquarters or to review Soviet intelligence information. His autobiography, published commercially in the West in 1968, was not published in the Soviet Union. In 1990, Philby’s name and likeness were recognized on one of the last postage

stamps issued by the government of the former Soviet Union. KENNETH D. KATKIN, J.D. NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO:

Maclean, Donald D.; Burgess, Guy; MI-6;

KGB; Cairncross, John. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Genrikh Borovik, The Philby Files: The Secret Life of Master Spy Kim Philby (Little, Brown, 1994); Anthony Cave Brown, Treason in the Blood: H. St. John Philby, Kim Philby, and the Spy Case of the Century (Houghton Mifflin, 1994). Phillip Knightley, The Master Spy: The Story of Kim Philby (Knopf, 1989); Yuri Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends (Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1994); Rufina Philby, Mikhail Lyubimov, and Hayden Peake, The Private Life of Kim Philby: The Moscow Years (Fromm International, 2000); Kim Philby, My Silent War (Modern Library, 2002); Ron Rosenbaum, “Kim Philby: The Spy Who Created The Cold,” The Secret Parts of Fortune: Three Decades of Intense Investigations and Edgy Enthusiasms (Random House, 2000); Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, The Crown Jewels: the British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB Archives (Yale University Press, 1999).

photography LIKE CRYPTOGRAPHY, photography has played a vital role in the world of intelligence, using the art and science of the craft to interpret intelligence. In the United States, there are numerous organizations that concern themselves with the intelligence applications of photography. Most of these organizations are located within the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. intelligence community. Typically, photography is implied in the terms photographic intelligence and imagery intelligence, referred to as PHOTINT and IMINT respectively. Photographic intelligence usually refers to photographic products that come from sources that are not air- or space-borne and use film as the medium, such as reconnaissance photos of a embassy taken by an agent driving by. Imagery intelligence typically encompasses photos, but also many other graphic representations from infrared images taken by satellites to digital graphics transmitted over the internet.

The miniature Minox has been a favorite spy camera since World War II and is still in production today.

Even with the replacement of film with digital images in the 2000s, the requirements for intelligence purposes usually concentrate on resolution. Sharp image definition has been the driving force behind development of photography. Black-andwhite film was usually used for PHOTINT because of its finer grain and corresponding higher resolution. Video was usually considered as lower quality than film, and was harder to interpret during the earlier periods of clandestine photography. The Minox. PHOTINT has also been exemplified by the Riga, or Minox camera. The Minox has been a favorite spy camera for over half a century and became so well-known that it was often used as a prop in espionage films. However, the Minox was not originally designed for espionage purposes: the Latvian engineer, Walter Zapp, had intended that the compact, sleek design would make the camera a fashionable accessory for photo-snapping tourists. Zapp learned that the Minox had more uses than he ever imagined. The Minox was produced at a factory located in Riga, Latvia, from 1937 to 1944 (and why it was called the Riga in the beginning of production). The Minox camera was easy to conceal and could accommodate a film cassette that held up to 50 exposures. The film was approximately one-quarter the size of standard 35mm film. There were numerous versions of the Minox. The Minox B, produced from 1948 to 1972, had a short focal length and took excellent photographs of documents at close range. The Minox C made its debut in 1969 and was supplied by the KGB to the convicted spy John Walker. Christopher Boyce, whose exploits were portrayed in the movie Falcon and the Snowman, was

supplied with a Minox C in the 1970s by the Soviets to photograph satellite codes while employed at USS. defense contractor TRW . Early during World War II, the Germans and the Russians fought to control the factory in Riga. There was a time when both Nazis and Russians controlled the factory that produced at least three camera versions. One version held German markings, one version had Russian markings, and yet another version was produced with no markings at all so that it could be used for clandestine purposes. At this same time, the U.S. military was also very keen on the camera and unable to meet the demands for the camera from various services. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS, precursor to the CIA), used the Minox, as did the CIA, FBI, and the Soviet KGB, GRU, and other intelligence agencies. The Minox was built into the handles of umbrellas, briefcases, suit coats, and many other innocuous locations for clandestine purposes.

Improved versions that offered less weight, improved lenses, color film, flash synchronization, and

an exposure meter came with time. The first version of the Minox to incorporate automatic exposure was the Minox C (1969). The easiest to use Minox is thought to be Minox Version EC, introduced in 1981.

Aerial photography. The production of IMINT became more prodigious with the introduction of aerial cameras and other types airborne sensors, the distinction being that the use of an aerial camera/sensor does not necessarily denote the use of film. The aerial camera or sensor can produce imagery from a variety of non-film media, including electro-optical,

infrared, multi-spectral,

radar, or

from an interferometer to name a few. The development of aerial cameras or reconnaissance cameras received its greatest impetus during World War II. The focal lengths of the cameras became longer and longer as the reconnaissance aitcraft that carried them were forced to fly at higher altitudes because of improvements in anti-aircraft fire. Most all aerial cameras currently in use can be

World War II is cumbersome compared with the The camera equipment used by agents of the Office of Strategic Services during miniaturized Minox camera (opposite page). OSS agents wanted more Minoxes.

classified as frame cameras. The other commonly used aerial camera is the panoramic or strip camera. These are not considered frame cameras. One of the earliest forms of IMINT or PHOTINT was produced in the second half of the 19th century by taking photos from hot-air balloons. The first record of successful airborne photography is attributed to Frenchman Gaspar Felix Tournachon who photographed the houses of a village from a balloon tethered at a height of 80 meters in 1858. Shortly thereafter, in 1860, James Wallace Black successfully photographed Boston, Massachusetts, from a balloon. Photo reconnaissance by balloons flying over battlefields was employed in the U.S. Civil War. Aerial photography took on some unique experiments in its early years of development. In 1903, Julius Neubronne manufactured a breast-mounted camera for pigeons. In 1906, Albert Maul used a rocket powered by compressed air to launch a camera upward that then parachuted back to earth. By 1918, during World War I, French units in balloons were printing as many as 10,000 photographs per day. With the advent of the airplane, the camera strobe was the next major development, allowing planes to take photographs at night. Another development was infrared film that penetrated enemy camouflage. With the better intelligence that photography brought to commanders in World War II, the military became responsible for most of the leaps in technology that are attributed to photography and remote sensing in general. The intelligence that can be gained from such a vantage point proved to be so valuable that the field of remote-sensing has become dominated by airborne and space-borne platforms. This area of intelligence increasingly demanded greater resolution of the images, a faster turn-around time, and improved analysis. Thus, the intelligence specialty of reconnaissance sensors or remote-sensing was born. One of the first airplanes that was designed specifically for taking reconnaissance photos was the F-101 Voodoo manufactured by McDonnell Aircraft Corporation beginning in 1954. The RF101, an improved version of the Voodoo, was the world’s first supersonic photo-reconnaissance

ait-

craft. The next aircraft designated specifically to do airborne photography was the RF-4C Phantom II. This plane served as the strategic photographic workhorse of the military for decades beginning in

the early 1960s and up to and including Operation DESERT STORM in the 1990s. The aircraft flying at these altitudes and speeds were still vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire, and the abrupt maneuvering needed to avoid being hit by

munitions was not conducive to efficient photography. Therefore, the natural progression was to build airplanes/platforms that flew faster and higher. This motivation sparked the development of the infamous U-2 and the SR-71. The U-2 was designed and built for the CIA and the U.S. Air Force. The operational altitude was above 55,000 feet, allowing the U-2 to fly its missions without having to be concerned about antiaircraft fire or obviously intruding on sovereign airspace. There was nothing in the world’s military arsenal that posed a significant threat at that altitude. The U-2 was also developed in the mid-1950s at the famous Lockheed “Skunk Works” in Burbank, California, where secrecy could be maintained. The very existence of the aircraft was kept secret until May 1, 1960, when one was shot down over Soviet territory. It was the photographs taken by a U-2 in 1962 that provided evidence that the Soviets were building offensive missile bases in Cuba. The next aircraft designed to continue this legacy of high-altitude and a dedicated photographic mission was the Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird. The SR-71 is a long-range strategic reconnaissance aircraft that performed missions for over 24 years. During this period, the technology of airborne cameras changed drastically. The resolutions were excellent and the time available over photographic targets for the cameras increased dramatically. The SR-71 was the world’s fastest and highestflying operational aircraft in the world, with maximum altitude and speed that were classified, but understood to be well over 80,000 feet high and over 2,000 miles per hour. The ability of the plane to photograph was just as impressive as its speed and height. The SR-71 could photograph approximately 100,000 miles of the earth’s surface per hour.

Space photography. The next evolution for strategic reconnaissance was space. This was the venue of cameras placed on satellites launched into a precise orbit for the lifetime of the mission,» providing faster access to more geographic area than ever before. Some historians argue the first photographs taken from “space” were from Nazi-designed V-2

rockets, though the German missiles did not technically fly above the earth’s atmosphere. The space-based program grew to dominate the

field of strategic photographic reconnaissance. The advancements in technology could barely keep up

with demand. Any country that had the capability to deploy space-based photographic platforms did so or sought to acquire or develop the capacity. The film/frame-based cameras that had to drop their payload into the atmosphere to be retrieved were being replaced by electro-optical cameras that could transmit their product (images) directly to the user in digital mode. The development of digital, highresolution, space-based, electro-optical cameras and sensors would bring the advent of a new era in photography. Along with this new technology came the field of photogrammetry, the science and art of obtaining reliable information from images. The development of photogrammetry or photo-interpretation became essential to capitalize on all strategic information that became available. The elements of image interpretation that are manipulated to derive information are those of tone or color, resolution, geometry, pattern, and association. Since digital photography was now the standard, computer-enhanced photographs could be used. The computer enhancement involved applying various filtering techniques and manipulating the digital data to improve the image or extract information from the images that is not visible to the naked eye.

Digital photography and other advances. Electrooptical sensors became widely used to supplement other forms of IMINT in the 1980s and 1990s. Geographic mapping could be done using laser altimeters and radar. Three-dimensional or stereoscopic cameras and panoramic digital cameras were developed that were much easier to work with than their film counterparts. The digital capabilities of the electro-optical photographic sensor are such that the product can be sorted and cataloged, or filed in a database for distribution. Storage is also much easier and degradation of the image is no longer a concern. It is also easier to gyro-stabilize electrooptic sensors in space. The digital format facilitates coupling the data with other systems such as the Global Positioning System (GPS). Digital thermal imaging or infrared imaging was another drastic improvement over film. One example that exemplifies the power of digital thermal im-

An aerial photograph of an unidentified Japanese city collected by U.S. Army Air Force intelligence in 1942.

aging is that of the Defense Support Program (DSP). DSP uses a series of satellites that carry digital thermal imaging sensors that are cryogenically cooled, and can detect a forest fire or a missile launch at a 250-kilometer altitude and report the event via encrypted data link in seconds. Multi-spectral, electro-optic imaging uses many of the same techniques as normal photography (analog) but the digital domain allows numerous sensors on a single payload that are more compact and lighter. The LANDSAT satellite was one of the first well-recognized thematic mappers. The ability to transmit data and information, ranging in spectrum from near infrared to ultraviolet and radar on the same payload gives the photo-analyst a variety of ways to examine imagery. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is based on photographic and optical technology but uses radar returns to generate its image. The SAR transmits radar frequencies to the target and receives and stores both the phase and amplitude of the reflected energy. The first benefit that becomes apparent when using SAR is that weather and lighting are no longer a concern as the radar can penetrate clouds and rain during the darkest of nights. An SAR can also reveal subterranean features and images below the surface of water, to varying degrees. An SAR has a resolution that is also independent of altitude; it has played an important role in the further exploitation and evolution of manipulating digital imagery.

Photographic management.

So valuable was this

mission of photographic reconnaissance that the

defense and intelligence community established organizations that were devoted solely to image-interpretation and the design, development, and maintenance of these space-borne remote sensing platforms. The U.S. National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) was established to coordinate these efforts and it was mandated that it consist of “all satellite and over-flight reconnaissance projects whether overt or covert,” and include “all photographic projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping purposes, and electronic signal collection projects for electronic signal intelligence and communications intelligence.” In 1961, the covert National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was created to manage the NRP. The © CIA and U.S. Air Force had primary influence on the NRO; the air force was responsible for program management and the CIA would concentrate on requirements and targeting. It wasn’t until 1992 that the existence of the NRO was revealed by the U.S. Department of Defense. In October 1996, the CIA was tasked with transferring its imagery infrastructure over to the Department of Defense’s National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). NIMA began operations on October 1, 1996 and serves as a clearing house and centralized location for the management of PHOTINT and IMINT products. NIMA would also consist of the Defense Mapping Agency and portions of the NRO, The National Photo-Interpretation Center (NPIC), the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

Unmanned aerial photography. Photographic technology further utilized electro-optics to include photographing planets and the development of a space telescope. The photographic abilities of the space telescope have literally revolutionized the fields of astronomy, astrophysics, and cosmology. With all this capability the need for a rapid deployment, near-real-time photographic reconnaissance mission at the battlefield or theater-level still existed. This requirement stimulated the development of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) or drone to carry the photographic payload. Numerous requirements and plans for UAVs were developed by the intelligence community during the 1980s. Some of the requirements were to be able to operate at close range (within 50 kilometers)

and be able to have the endurance to go beyond 50

if necessary, and have the maneuvering capability and feedback controls that would provide the remote operator with the capability to satisfy strategic or tactical requirements in a timely fashion. Most of the UAVs being deployed in the 2000s have a photographic and vidicon or charge-coupled device (CCD) capability accompanied by a real-time video transmission that assists in piloting the UAV. PAUL FE. KISAK ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO: reconnaissance; spy planes; National Reconnaissance Office. ; BIBLIOGRAPHY. “Manual of Remote Sensing” (American Society of Photogrammetry, 1983); ““Manual of Photogrammetry” (American Society of Photogrammetry, 1980); “The Minox Camera,” www.cia.gov/cia/information; NASA Wallops Flight Facility, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” www.uav.wff.nasa.gov; USAF Museum Strategic Reconnaissance Aircraft Index, www.wpafb.af.mil; Gibson and Power, Introductory Remote Sensing: Digital Image Processing and Applications (Taylor and Francis, 2000); M. I. Skolnik, Radar Handbook (McGraw-Hill, 1982); John C. Curlander and Robert N. McDonough, Synthetic Aperture Radar: Systems and Signal Processing (SciTech Publishing, 1992).

Pike, Otis IN 1975, IN THE aftermath of the Watergate scandal, the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, and startling revelations about U.S. intelligence agencies, Congress launched a series of investigations. In the House of Representatives, Congressman Otis Pike came to head the Select Committee on Intelligence, viewing his task as reclaiming the constitutional right of Congress as the sole appropriator of public funds, in which capacity he came to challenge the power of the national security agencies and the president. The committee studied the intelligence community in detail. In investigating the Tet offensive (a 1968 military campaign in which the North Vietnamese surprised U.S. forces during the Vietnam War), the committee re-examined how the CIA had been pressured

into

minimizing

estimates

of

enemy

forces by presidential advisers anxious to report progress in Vietnam.

Pike’s postmortem interim report on the 1973

Arab-Israeli war revealed steps Egypt had taken to prepare for the war, thus making public U.S. monitoring in the area. The intelligence community was furious at the release, arguing it endangered sources and methods, though it turned out that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had given this information over to his biographers, who also made it public. Pike saw the issue, instead, as whether Congress would be a co-equal branch of government to the executive. Others saw Pike’s committee as unreasonable, his requests as silly, and his tendency toward declassification as dangerous. A titanic struggle over the question of secrecy versus the public’s right to know between the executive and legislative branches ensued. The executive branch went on the offensive against Congressional subpoena power in the realm of national security, demanding the committee promise not to release additional classified information without prior approval, or no more secret documents or related briefings would be forthcoming. The CIA grudgingly released a minimal amount of documents, heavily expunged, prompting the committee to vote to ask the full House of Representatives to cite Director of Central Intelligence Agency William Colby for contempt of Congress. Colby relented, but exacted the proviso that the committee must obtain the prior consent of the president for future releases; or, if it was unable to secure a green light from the executive, to go to the courts, before any further disclosures of secrets. Soon the committee requested documents from those serving under Kissinger, who had good relations with the press and Congress. The White House refused the committee’s subpoena of documents from the State Department and National Security Council, then under Kissinger. This led the committee to ask the full House to cite Kissinger for contempt as well. The White House thus felt forced to comply with some of the subpoenas, such as the request to examine the records of the 40 Committee (which approved covert operations) while invoking executive privilege on others, thus forcing Pike to compromise. Still, the committee did learn, with the help of Kissinger’s testimony, that the president approved CIA covert actions, notwithstanding the usual doctrine of plausible de-

niability.

Yet, due to bureaucratic rules in Congress requiring authorization by various committees if the deadline for a report was to be extended, or failing that, the whole Congress, the report’s release was blocked. Missteps by the Pike committee, along with intelligence community and executive branch pressure, coordinated by the Intelligence Coordinating Group, including then Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld, all prevented the official release of the report. Eventually, an unauthorized version was released by veteran reporter Daniel Schorr. The Pike Committee, and other similar investigations, ultimately did result in important reforms in Congressional oversight on intelligence activities, though far less than its proponents hoped for. THOMAS EHRLICH REIFER, PH.D. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE

SEE ALSO: Congressional oversight; Church, Frank. BIBLIOGRAPHY. CIA, The Pike Report (Spokesman Books, 1977); Gerald K. Haines, “The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA,” Studies in Intelligence: A Collection of Articles on the Historical, Operational, Doctrinal, and Theoretical Aspects of Intelligence (Winter 1998-1999, Unclassified Edition); Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry (University Press of Kentucky, 1985); Kathryn S. Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI (University of North Carolina Press, 1996); John Prados, Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby (Oxford University Press, 2003).

Pinkertons FOUNDED BY Allan Pinkerton in 1855, this private detective agency embodied the changes taking place in private and public policing and in industrial spying in America in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Pinkerton left his native Scotland in 1842 because of police persecution over his involvement with the Chartists, a labor protest group. In 1850, he settled in Chicago, Illinois, and began doing detective work. He specialized in contracts with Illinois railroads, responding to the threat of regional crime in the absence of a regional police force. Convinced

that employee theft was the biggest problem facing the railroads, Pinkerton developed a testing program to find dishonest workers. Pinkerton operatives would pose as railway passengers and spy on the workers. The ensuing publicity of his successes exposed this spy system and further increased the tensions between railroad management and labor.

The Lincoln incident. In early 1861, while working on behalf of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, & Baltimore Railroad, Pinkerton uncovered a plot to assassinate Abraham Lincoln in Baltimore on the way to his presidential inauguration in Washington, D.C. Pinkerton persuaded the president-elect to bypass Baltimore. As the assassination plot was never proven, Pinkerton was accused of fabricating the threat in order to publicize himself and his detective agency.

Though wary of involvement in politics, Pinkerton was an outspoken abolitionist. This commitment, and his pre-war friendship with Union General George B. McClellan, put the Pinkertons at the center of espionage activities in the first months of the American Civil War. When McClellan was given command of the Army of the Potomac, Pinkerton headed an army spy ring in Virginia called the Secret Service. One of his spies, Timothy Webster, was caught and executed by the Confederates. Soon after, Pinkerton arrested a Confederate spy, Rose Greenhow, who resided in Washington, D.C. Both incidents generated publicity and controversy. When Lincoln dismissed McClellan for not being aggressive enough against the Confederates in 1862, Pinkerton was dismissed with him. Pinkerton returned to the testing program and brought his sons, William and Robert, into the business. He opened offices in New York City (1865) and Philadelphia (1866). In the 1870s and 1880s, the detective agency became famous for its pursuit of train robbers such as the Dalton, Younger, and Reno gangs. In 1874, the James gang murdered two Pinkerton operatives. In retaliation, the Pinkertons raided the home of Jesse and Frank James’s mother, thinking the outlaws were hiding there. The James brothers were not present, but their young half-brother was killed, and their mother was severely injured. The Pinkertons’ professional reputation suffered. In the most spectacular incident in this era, Pinkerton operative James McParlan infiltrated a radical Irish group, the Molly Maguires,

that had terrorized the Pennsylvania coalfields during the 1870s. McParlan’s testimony resulted in the conviction and execution of 13 men, and many in the nascent American labor movement began to see the Pinkertons as agents of capitalists.

Haymarket and Homestead. In the decade following Pinkerton’s death, the agency became involved in two of the most violent labor disputes in Ametican history. In 1886, a bomb killed several policemen in Chicago’s Haymarket Square during a demonstration for the eight-hour workday. Thirtyone well-known anarchists and socialists were arrested, and eight were held for trial. All eight were convicted, and four were hanged. The belief that Pinkerton agents provoked the incident was widespread. The identification of Pinkertons as enemies of the worker became even stronger after the Homestead Strike in 1892. Striking steelworkers had surrounded the Homestead Works of Pittsburgh to prevent non-union workers from entering. Homestead president Henry Clay Frick employed 300 Pinkertons to break the strike. The ensuing gun battle lasted more than 12 hours and resulted in the death of at least three Pinkertons and seven workers. After Homestead, the Pinkerton agency minimized its work as strikebreakers. Its primary concern became salvaging its public image and solidifying its position in the increasingly competitive national detective business. Alliances made with jewelers’ and bankers’ associations became important sources of revenue for the detective agency and helped to polish the agency’s image. The Pinkertons continued to pursue “gentlemen” burglars and forgerers in the 1890s and early 1900s under contracts with business associations. However, they also began to pursue a new class of burglar, the yeggsman, or hobo burglar. Responding once again.to the lack of rural or regional police, the Pinkertons used a system of paid informers to pursue these roaming hobos, who used explosives to rob banks. As local, state, and federal police professionalized in the early 20th century, they took over many of the social functions that the Pinkertons and other private agencies had performed. With the development of the automobile came the need for state police forces. By the 1920s, state police took over rural policing, once a lucrative field for the Pinkertons.

The emergence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a viable law enforcement agency in the 1930s left little room for private detecting at the national level. After William Pinkerton’s death in 1923, company leadership passed to Allan Pinkerton, Robert’s son. Grandson of the founder, he had

been gassed during World War I and died from the effects in 1930. Thereupon, Robert A. Pinkerton, great-grandson of the founder, assumed control of the agency and drastically revised its style. Crimefighting became less of a priority, and security and property protection were emphasized. Labor spying was also an important source of revenue in this petiod. Pinkerton had over 300 labor-investigation clients, the largest being General Motors. Pinkerton had spies in practically every union in America including more than 50 in the United Auto Workers alone. Pinkertons’ labor spying was exposed by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Civil Liberties chaired by Robert M. La Follette, Jr. In 1937, following the La Follette subcommittee report and a Senate resolution condemning industrial espionage as contrary to public policy, the Pinkertons company publicly divorced itself from labor spying. Thus, by 1940, most traditional Pinkerton revenue sources were gone, and Pinkertons transformed itself into a private security company. In 1999, Pinkerton’s Inc. was acquired by Securitas A.B. of Sweden, thus ending American ownership of the nation’s most famous detective agency. ROBERT D. BOHANAN JIMMY CARTER PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY

SEE ALSO: American Civil O’Neal; Lincoln, Abraham.

War;

Greenhow,

Rose

BIBLIOGRAPHY. James D. Horan, The Pinkertons (Crown, 1967); James A. Mackay, Allan Pinkerton: The First Private Eye John Wiley, 1997); Frank Morn, “The Eye That Never Sleeps”: A History of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency (Indiana University Press, 1982); Richard Rowan, The Pinkertons (Little, Brown, 1931).

Poe, Tony A CIA SPECIAL operations paramilitary expert, Tony Poe (Anthony Alexander Poshepny, also nick-

named “Po”’) was dispatched on covert operations across Asia from the 1950s to 1970s. Poe was one of the agency’s legendary operatives, and his exploits are legion. He was born September 18, 1924, in Long Beach, California. His father, John Poshepny, a U.S. Navy commander, had narrowly escaped being killed in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Raring to fight back, young Tony left school at age 17 with his mother’s permission to join the U.S. Marines. He served in elite airborne units, was wounded in the battle of Iwo Jima by machinegun fire, and later in the war by shrapnel. Discharged in 1945, he attended St. Mary’s college in San Francisco, California, and San Jose State College, graduating in English and history in 1950. In 1952, Poe was recruited by the CIA and was in the first class at the agency’s new training center called ‘““The Farm.” He graduated at the top of his class and was selected for the Agency’s paramilitary special operations group. Poe’s first CIA assignment

was to join commando raids behind enemy lines during the Korean War, where he displayed a mix of bravery and defiance that became the trademark of his CIA career. After the Korean War, Poe was based in Thailand and went on assignments to train the Khumba tribesmen resisting a Chinese communist takeover in Tibet. In 1958, Poe was infiltrated into Sumatra with a team to assist anti-government rebels, and was later exfiltrated by submarine. He trained ethnic guerrillas from southwestern China and nationalist forces from Taiwan for raids into the communist mainland. In 1961, Poe was one of the first operatives inserted into Laos to organize and train partisans to resist the communist takeover. Much of the Laotian Kingdom was controlled by communist Pathet Lao and pro-communist neutralist forces, reinforced by covert North Vietnamese Army troops and supported by a major Soviet airlift into the former French base Plaine des Jarres.

Covert action in Laos. In 1962, the U.S. and Soviet military departed Laos, in accordance with renewed Geneva Accords, but North Vietnamese troops continued to move in, adding to thousands who never left. Consequently, the CIA’s operations in Laos were put into higher gear, and deeper secrecy. Poe stayed under cover in the jungle living among the Meo tribes, later known as Hmong. He learned to dance their native dances to the beat of gasoline

drums, he drank their native rice whisky, and he earned their friendship and their trust. The mission of the CIA’s paramilitary teams in

Laos was to train special assault and reconnaissance units and to advise them during military and intelligence-gathering operations. In the chaos of Laos the rules of engagement, like everything else, were a confused state of affairs. Poe loved weapons and soldiering, wore a floppy Marine hat, and before long was out directing artillery fire and leading his hill-tribe guerrillas into combat. He carried an M1 Garand, a .45 Magnum, a 13-inch Bowie knife, and a string of hand grenades. Proficient in commando tactics, improvisational weaponry, and anything- . goes methods, he harassed the enemy with everything from 4.2 inch mortars and 75mm recoilless rifles, to homemade bombs and “round rocks” dropped from Air America (CIA-sponsored) planes. A mixed blessing to some of his agency superiors, Poe fought fire with fire, winning respect and loyalty from fellow guerrilla fighters and instilling fear in the enemy. A hardnosed, hard-drinking, battle-scarred fighter, he was not known for tactful diplomacy, yet Poe was a meticulous and effective paramilitary officer. His training strategies and guerrilla tactics were exacting, and in the best U.S. Marine Corps tradition he put the welfare of his tribal troops above his own. In 1964, at a remote site in northeast Laos, a scant 85 miles from Hanoi, North Vietnam, Poe’s guerrillas were ambushed by North Vietnamese regulars. His M1 rifle took a heavy toll on the attackers before a bullet shattered his left hip and exited though his stomach. He continued to fight until the enemy was silenced by his hand grenades. He managed to walk out to a command post using his M1 for a crutch, and he refused to be evacuated by helicopter without going back for his wounded tribesmen. In 1963, the CIA discovered the Ho Chi Minh Trail (North Vietnamese supply route) through Laos, and Poe took part in its first cratering. In 1965, Poe was inserted deep in the northwest corner of Laos where, for the next five years, he organized and ran a guerrilla army of diverse tribal groups. His guerrillas controlled large areas, posted roadwatch and reconnaissance teams, provided

In 1967, Poe’s guerrillas liberated an enemy garrison near the border of China, releasing thousands of Laotian refugees from conscript labor on Chinese roads. In March 1970, Poe’s guerrillas liberated a refugee center that was the jungle seat of famous USAID volunteer Edgar “Pop” Buell. Poe was wounded at least twice more in Southeast Asia. In 1971, ona training assignment near the Cambodian border, he was hit by an accidental mine explosion, losing two fingers from his left hand. Among his Purple Hearts and CIA commendations, is a medal from the prime minister of Thailand for heroic actions in Laos. CIA operations ended in Laos in 1975, and Poe’ retired and settled in Thailand with his wife, the

niece of a Hmong tribal chieftain, and their children. Poe moved back to his native California in 1993 and settled with his family in San Francisco. Poe’s eldest daughter says, ““When reporters talk to my father, they write down the silly things he says. They don’t appreciate the fact that he stayed with his people. He took care of them. He didn’t just rape the land and leave, like so many others. He didn’t just impregnate my mother and fly home. He took her with him.” Poe has been mistakenly identified as the character “Colonel Kurtz” in the Francis Ford Coppola film Apocalypse Now. The original Kurtz is a character in the Joseph Conrad novel Heart of Darkness, and the movie’s director Coppola and screenwriter John Milius have said they never once had Poe in mind when they wrote the script. In his later years, Poe was often the guest of honor at Laotian events in the Bay Area and Sacramento. Poe was much beloved by the thousands of families for whom he risked his life in the jungle. When reflecting on his career, Poe sometimes recited a line from Rudyard Kipling, “For it’s Tommy this, an’ Tommy that, an’ ‘Chuck him out, the brute!’ But it’s ‘Saviour of ‘is

country’ when the guns begin to shoot.” Poe, who narrowly missed being a star on the CIA’s wall of honor, is a true CIA legend. RICHARD A. GAy ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS SEE ALSO:

Air America; Vietnam War; Saute Intelli-

gence Agency; Montagnards.

covert support to Burmese anti-communist groups,

and

ran

China.

cross-border

intelligence

missions

into

BIBLIOGRAPHY. K. Conboy and J. Morrison, Shadow War: CIA’s Secret War in Laos (Paladin Press, 1995); David

Corn, The Blond Ghost (Simon & Schuster, 1994); Thomas Evans, The Very Best Men (Simon & Schuster, 1995); Rudyard Kipling, “Tommy,” Barrack-Room Ballads, www.everyport.com; Stephen Magagnini, “Agent in Secret War is Known as a Hero to Hmong,” Sacramento Bee (August 29, 2000); Matt Isaacs, “Agent Provocative,” San Francisco Weekly (November 17, 1999); Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets (Knopf, 1979); Roger Warner, Back Fire: the CIA’s Secret War In Laos (Simon & Schuster, 1995).

Poland POLAND’S INTELLIGENCE and security history is closely linked to the national liberation movements of the last 200 years. These movements operated open and covert networks in parallel with major European crises of the 19th and 20th centuries. Such challenges developed a great military tradition, leading to the autocratic leadership of Marshal Josef Pilsudski following Polish independence in 1918. Pilsudski was pivotal in the formation of the Polish General Staff and national security system during the turbulent interwar years. Recruitment of qualified personnel came from war veterans who fought the German, Austrian, and Russian imperial armies. These personnel, with diverse political loyalties, constituted the initial foundations of the Polish national intelligence service, and particularly the nation’s military intelligence. Within this milieu, Poland became a rich playground for espionage and counterespionage in the secret wars for control of central-eastern Europe. The intelligence service divided its efforts between monitoring foreign military developments and internal security duties. They also were the key to Polish underground activity and organized resistance during the Nazi occupation of 1939-44 and a source of inspiration for opposition to communist

rule during the Cold War era.

ENIGMA codebreakers. The Polish General Staff (GS) provided the framework for the creation of military intelligence (MI) within the Polish armed forces. The MI Cipher Department played a strategic role in the defeat of Nazi Germany: It broke the German ENIGMA codes that governed German during the communications High Command

buildup to war. The codebreaking effort began in 1928 in eventual coordination with French intelligence. German naval codes were broken by 1932 and German Foreign Ministry and High Command codes by 1933. The Poles deciphered over 100,000 German transmissions by 1939. The most important transmissions included preparations for the 1936 remilitarization of the Rhineland, the 1938 Anschluss (joining) with Austria, and the 1938 seizure of the Sudetenland from

Czechoslovakia. MI saw that Poland was next in Hitler’s war plans. The GS authorized sharing the ENIGMA transcripts with Allied intelligence services, and both France and Britain received Polishproduced ENIGMA machines in July 1939. The rapid 1939 German invasion of Poland forced the evacuation of the Polish government to Romania, France, and eventually London, England. A Polish underground state was created in the occupied territories to continue resistance activities. Pol-

ish agent networks operated throughout Europe including Athens, Berlin, Bern, Bucharest, Cairo, Lisbon,

Madrid,

Marseilles,

Paris,

Rome,

and

Stockholm. Centuries of foreign rule had already established a culture of intellectual conspiracy and underground activity. Hence, the transition to partisan warfare was

relatively efficient and secure from German penetration. A series of secret underground delegations operated in occupied Poland, including the Government of National Unity (RJN), composed of representatives from the major political parties in coordination with the government-in-exile (London). Only the Polish Workers Party (PWP) refused to join the RJN, preferring to remain dependent on Moscow for its legitimacy. The PWP formed a rival underground parliament, the National Council for the Homeland (KRN), composed of left-wing elements that eventually became Poland’s communistdominated legislature in 1947. The RJN formed the Union of Armed Struggle (ZWZ), based in Poland, to oversee underground political-military operations. The mainstay of Polish underground opposition to German occupation was the Home Army (AK). Created in 1942 out of a series of smaller factions, its strength was about 250,000-—350,000. It was loyal to the government-in-exile (London) but ran independent operations on its own. The AK operated in harmony with the ZWZ and Polish Armed Forces (PSZ) headquartered in London.

The PSZ had forces based in the Middle East and United Kingdom. Polish nationalists favored the PSZ and AK, while pro-Soviet communists and those caught in the evacuation from eastern Poland to the Soviet Union joined several partisan and guerrilla movements (AL). Others joined the Polish Army in the Soviet Union (SU). The SU joined with the AL to become the Polish People’s Army (PPA) in July 1944. It was considered the military wing of the PWP. The AK was the symbol of Polish resistance to German occupation. It was the umbrella organization most representing the combined underground factions operating during the war. It also was the chief source of Allied intelligence about the Eastern Front and Nazi arms production in central Eastern Europe. Polish forced-labor throughout occupied Europe supplied agent networks critical information, enhancing the Allied intelligence knowledge of German political, military, and economic

activities. Polish sources

reported on Ger-

man orders of battle, logistics, railroad operations, defense production, fuel depots, and synthetics manufacturing. The AK provided the Allies early warning of German military preparations for the 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union and technical details of the German missile program at Peenemunde. Other activities included sabotage, assassination of Nazi SS personnel, and illegal distribution of BBC news transcripts. Soviet dictator Josef Stalin viewed the AK as a threat to his strategic plans for Poland due to its loyalties to London, and his calculations led to the decimation of the AK by the Nazis in 1944. Soviet forces reached the gates of Warsaw by July 1944, and the proximity of Soviet troops encouraged the AK to start a mass uprising in August to win control of the capital and broaden support for forces loyal to the London government-in-exile. An AK strength of 45,000 men launched attacks against German occupying forces, with the result that 85 percent of the city was destroyed and most of the AK decimated by superior German firepower. In effect, there were no forces left to oppose Soviet domination of Poland after the German retreat and ultimate defeat by Soviet forces.

Soviet-controlled Poland. Remnants of the Polish wartime underground and other anti-Soviet formations maintained contact with Western intelligence services throughout the Cold War era. By the early

1950s, these sources had penetrated the Polish Defense Ministry (MOD) and reported on Soviet order of battle and military capabilities to the Western services. However, Soviet-Polish agent networks operating within the Western intelligence services compromised many of these covert operations. Predecessors to the Polish Intelligence Service (SB) ran the Polish component of these operations during the postwar period under the supervision of the NKVD and later KGB (Soviet intelligence services). The SB was established in 1956 as part of the Polish Internal Affairs Ministry and terrorized Polish society throughout the communist era. Stalin long recognized that the Poles would be hostile to the Soviet Union and communism. It is estimated that at least 80,000 armed, anti-regime guerrillas were operating in Poland. The weakness of the Moscow-backed Polish provisional government meant that the new regime enjoyed only a narrow social base. It was essential, in Moscow’s view, that tools of repression be installed at the moment Red Army troops crossed into Poland. Under the close supervision of the NK VD, the Polish Citizen’s Militia (MO) was established in 1944 to suppress anti-communist elements. Initial MO operations, with the aid of regular Polish troops, had limited success. The regime established the Internal Security Troops (KBW) in May 1945, patterned after special NK VD units, to serve as a reliable formation for internal security tasks. The MO, KBW, and People’s Army (PPA) conducted several thousand special combined operations during 1945-48 in the suppression of anticommunist groupings. This operational doctrine for suppressing internal dissent would dominate Polish internal security for the next 40 years, including heightened activities in 1944-47, 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1980-81. The lessons learned from each crisis scenario contributed to MO and PPA contingency planning, so that by 1980-81 the Martial Law Plan, based on former operations, was decisive in nullifying the threat posed by the anticommunist Solidarity workers’ movement. Red Army bayonets nonetheless backed the Polish People’s Republic during 1944-1956, ensuring communist rule while Polish internal security structures could organize and solidify. Soviet officers enjoyed disproportionate representation in the Polish armed forces. The Polish defense minister was a marshal in the Soviet High Command until 1956. Only with the emergence of a Polish brand of com-

munism after the de-Stalinization period of 1953-56 did Soviet direct rule within Polish security organizations begin to relax. The events of 1956 were the first major trial of

the Polish internal security system after World War

II. Soviet de-Stalinization had inspired intellectual ferment, and reformists concluded that communist structures could be modified to redress political economic ills without threatening Soviet strategic interests. The Polish United Worker’s Party (PUWP), follow-on to the PWP in 1947, was pushed to the brink of collapse as popular expecta-

tions rose well beyond the boundaries of communist orthodoxy. Poor working conditions, collectivization, and religious intolerance inspired the workers to riot in Poznan. The PPA was ordered in after the MO and KBW failed to breakup the demonstrations. The PPA refused to fire on the protesters but provided sufficient time for the MO and KBW to rally with tanks. At least 51 people were killed and 575 wounded. These events captured the attention of Poles already resentful of totalitarian rule. Realizing the peril, the regime promised reforms including decollectivization, religious freedom, and freedom of expression—a recipe for future confrontations. The 1956 events left an indelible mark on Polish workers and internal security organs alike. It set the pattern and rules of engagement for future conflicts between the regime and Polish people. 1968 crisis. The 1968 Polish crisis was inspired by rising intellectual ferment, sympathy for the Czechoslovak Prague Spring (demonstrations against communist rule), and frustration with com-

munist rule. The confrontation was restricted to the intellectual and student strata of society, giving the authorities the upper hand in suppressing youthful demonstrators. The MO easily quelled unrest in Warsaw, and the SB arrested the ringleaders. Polish literati learned from these events that in order to prevail in future confrontations with the authorities, the intellectuals and discontented workers would have to join forces. These events also forced the intellectuals into ereater conspiratorial deliberations, including production of an underground press and overseas publications focused on Polish liberation movements, memoirs,

and tracts

aimed

at regime

opponents.

These papers led to a flurry of authoritative books during the 1970s exposing the role and methods of

the PPA, MO, and SB in suppressing the anti-communist opposition.

1970 and 1976 crises. The 1970 Polish crisis, due to food-price increases, led to severe rioting and labor unrest in Szczecin and Gdansk shipyards. MO forces initially confronted the rioting workers, but as the situation escalated, local military units, untrained in crowd control, were called in as reinforcements. It resulted in an official death toll of 45, with 1,165 workers wounded. The regime backed down on price increases, and the PPA promised that it would never again fire on the Polish people. Regime promises of economic reform remained unfulfilled, setting the conditions for further confrontation. The 1976 Polish Crisis resembled the 1970 scenario in that the regime once again attempted price increases to relieve deficit spending. Strikes initially erupted in Ursus and Radom and later spread to other industrial centers. The regime immediately suspended the price increases to avoid another confrontation. The SB arrested hundreds of strikers and removed many from employment. These retaliatory regime measures led to a strengthening of ties between the intellectual community and workers. The Committee for the Defense of the Workers (KOR), composed of Polish intellectuals, went to the aid of workers and their families blacklisted by the regime. Moreover, KOR served as a catalyst for growing regime opposition and underground activity during 1976-79, a movement that would reach its full potential by 1980. Concurrently, the underground press and “flying universities” became the source of prohibited ideas and free-thinking. The underground culture brought to life the years of Polish conspiracy that had remained a source of national inspiration during the war years. These networks thrived on the historic exploits of old Polish patriots and learned from their memoirs the methods for group survival under tyranny. The fact that the SB had penetrated these underground networks in no way deterred their activity. The 1980 Polish crisis was the deciding confrontation between the pro-Soviet regime seeking perpetual control over a defiant anti-communist nation, and the Polish people seeking the abolition of totalitarian rule. The introduction of higher meat prices in July 1980 led to widespread labor unrest, but this time the workers and KOR were organized and prepared for confrontation. The regime faced

and Warsaw Pact contingency planning if Polish internal security measures failed. The Polish regime began contingency planning for the imposition of a state of emergency and martial law in mid-August 1980 (Operation SPRING) even before concessions to Solidarity were granted. The preliminary Martial Law Plan was completed by November 1980, requiring the partial mobilization of the PPA to include 250,000 reserves. The PPA mission was to secure lines of communication and provide general support while the MO was responsible for direct suppression of Solidarity demonstrators. The Polish SB penetrated Solidarity at every level to prepare lists of those to be arrested when martial law was imposed. Soviet leaders at the Warsaw Pact Summit on December 5, 1980 received copies of the plan. Warsaw Pact leaders agreed to their own contingency planning, authorizing robust military exercises in and around Poland during December 1980 and March 1981, in effect warning Solidarity that the PUWP was backed by Soviet power. The Soviet intervention scenario involved three Soviet armies totaling 15 divisions, plus one East German and two Czechoslovak divisions, a scenario of last resort.

The city of Gdansk, Poland, was the birthplace of the Solidarity union movement, which helped topple Soviet domination.

widespread labor disruptions, while workers demanded not only lower food prices, but also higher wages and unprecedented politicaleconomic reforms. Self-governing labor unions in defiance of communist orthodoxy formed throughout Poland under the guidance of Solidarity, the Gdansk shipyard workers led by Lech Walesa. KOR advised Walesa at every juncture. The August 1980 accords led to unprecedented regime concessions, sparking speculation of a Soviet intervention unless the concessions were reversed.

Confrontation with Solidarity. The regime adopted a conciliatory policy with Solidarity to buy time. The regime had sufficient forces in place trained just for such contingencies. Nonetheless, Moscow employed strategic deception, threat propaganda,

Soviet reluctance to initiate this plan ahead of Polish martial law rested on the primacy of Polish internal security and the larger strategic implications of intervention. The Soviet Group of Forces Germany (GSFG) was already postured against NATO while cadre divisions in the western Soviet Union were not mobilized or trained for occupation duties in Poland. Moreover, the Soviet occupation of Poland would involve a protracted civil conflict aimed against occupying forces, tying down Soviet forces indefinitely, leaving the Warsaw Pact alliance in disarray, and destabilizing communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe. The Polish internal situation continued to deteriorate during the summer and fall of 1981. Solidarity had unilaterally gone well beyond communist orthodoxy to begin planning for pluralistic political and economic institutions. Concurrent with the growing systemic threat from Solidarity, the PPA and security forces took up positions throughout Poland, sealing off cities and major transportation points during the evening hours of December 12, 1981. Martial law was declared at 6:00 A.M. on December 13. The Solidarity Trade Union Congress was to meet in Gdansk during the crackdown, thus allow-

ing easy decapitation and arrest of the Solidarity

leadership, including Walesa. All trade union activity was prohibited. Prior regime concessions were suspended. Resistance to the crackdown was limited due to the effectiveness of martial law operations. Nonetheless, clashes did occur, resulting in several deaths. Several thousand arrests were recorded. By fall 1982, the authorities felt confident enough to lift martial law and ban Solidarity. The Polish regime remained fatally flawed in the aftermath of confrontation. Polish military leaders and discredited PUWP bureaucrats attempted several renewal schemes that were to restore harmony between the Polish people and the regime. None of these schemes succeeded. Even the Solidarity underground attempted protest demonstrations in opposition to the state of affairs, but without effect. Exhaustion and failure had settled on both opposing forces.

Polish political renewal. The dysfunctional state continued to operate into the Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev era (1985-91), a time when Soviet reform was unprecedented and the opportunities for Polish renewal was optimal. In 1988, Walesa was invited to participate in roundtable discussions between the government and opposition on Poland’s political and economic future. The regime finally agreed to re-legalize Solidarity and reform the electoral system in 1989. The People’s Republic of Poland became the Republic of Poland in December 1989. Local elections in May 1990 were the first free elections in Poland for more than 50 years. A full revision of the constitution was initiated in 1992 and a new constitution adopted in 1997.

The 2000s. In the early 2000s, the Polish intelligence and security system remains in the shadow of its past. It may require a generation for the wake of totalitarianism to subside and free the political system from the awesome weight of collaboration and complicity. Meanwhile, security structures were undergoing organizational reforms under the scrutiny of the Polish parliament and press. A Polish National Security Council was formed in 1991 to determine defense policies for the post-communist era. Reform of the Polish armed forces included the removal of political officers from within the structure. Military force levels were drastically reduced, and the MO was renamed Preventive Units of the

Citizen’s Militia (OPMO). OPMO forces were restricted and subject to higher constitutional requirements for large-scale operations. The Militia Reserve (ORMO) was abolished by the Polish parliament in 1990. The SB underwent a name change to become the Office of State Protection (UOP). Seventy percent of the UOP were retired or reassigned during the 1990s in an effort to cleanse the system of communist-era bureaucrats. These efforts were only a partial success. The UOP was abolished in 2002 and its functions split into two main agencies: the Foreign Intelligence Agency (AW) and the Internal Security Agency (ABW). The AW is a typical foreign-intelligence service responsible for reporting significant foreign developments to the national leadership. The powers of ABW embrace counterintelligence, state protection of the constitution, anticorruption, and the fight against organized crime. Military Intelligence (MI) and Military Counterintelligence (WSW) have combined to become the Military Information Services (WSI). The Intelligence Community (WW) was formed in 2002 to serve as the top clearing house for AW, ABW, and WSI papers being disseminated to the government and parliament for review. It also established a single point of contact for official queries being placed on the intelligence services by political institutions. The role of intelligence and security within the new Poland will be protracted and subject to change. Polish democracy must first establish mature governmental institutions comfortable with the role of security services within a pluralistic society. Indeed, the Polish security services themselves will not reach maturity within the new democratic order until the legacy of the SB and associated archives are secure from exploitation by those seeking tactical political advantage. GAIL H. NELSON, PH.D. ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO:

ENIGMA;

World

War II; Soviet Union;

Cold War; cryptography. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Peter Raina, Political Opposition in Poland (Poets and Painters Press, 1978); George Blazynski, Flashpoint Poland (Pergamon, 1979); David Kahn, The Codebreakers (Scribner, 1996); Douglas MacEachin, U.S. Intelligence and the Polish Crisis (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001); Andrzej Zybertowicz, Transformation

of the Polish Secret Services From Authoritarian to Informal

Power Networks (2002).

Polk, James K. ELEVENTH PRESIDENT of the United States (1845-49), James Knox Polk was a slave-owning aristocrat from Tennessee whose political resemblance to his mentor, Andrew Jackson, especially in his religious belief in America’s Manifest Destiny, earned him the nickname “Young Hickory.” Best remembered in history books for being the first “Dark Horse” president, he also holds the distinction of being the only president ever to achieve all of his campaign promises: reduction of tariffs, settlement of the Oregon boundary dispute with England, re-establishment of an independent federal treasury, and the annexation of California to complete the nation’s expansion to the Pacific. The latter aim led directly to the Mexican-American War, the main focal point of intelligence during his administration. Among Polk’s first unofficial acts toward advancing America to the Pacific was sending secret envoys to the Republic of Texas to gain support for its controversial annexation by the United States. Polk also deployed General Zachary Taylor’s 2,200man force from Louisiana to Corpus Christi, Texas, as a show of muscle to dissenting Texans and to Mexico. Polk’s agents also urged armed Texan settlers to occupy the land between the Nueces River (the Republic’s southern boundary) and the Rio Grande River farther south, unofficially assuring them that the army led by Taylor would support them in the move. Polk sent his most valuable envoy, John Slidell (a Louisiana congressman who spoke fluent Spanish), to Mexico City, officially to negotiate the disputed boundary of Texas but secretly to negotiate the sale of California and New Mexico “for an amount upward to forty millions, though less would be preferred.” The Mexican government under Joaquin de Herrera refused to see Slidell, secretly or otherwise, and expelled him from the country. Shortly afterward, Herrera fell in a coup led by General Mariano Parades, who immediately dispatched 5,200 troops north to the Rio Grande.

President James K. Polk used unofficial armies and negotiators in the intelligence efforts of the Mexican-American War.

Further secret negotiations of the war convinced Polk to allow exiled Mexican president Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna (the victor at the Alamo) to “penetrate” the American blockade and resume power as an America-friendly dictator. Santa Anna betrayed Polk by continuing the war. Polk was also betrayed by his negotiator, Nicholas Trist, who disobeyed direct orders on treaty terms after the United States victory. Nonetheless, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the war in February 1848, expanding the border of Texas while adding all of what are now the states of Arizona, New Mexico, California, Nevada, and Utah and parts of Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Wyoming to the United States in exchange for $15 million. Polk did not seek re-election

and died from cholera a few months after leaving office. . JONATHAN DARBY GEORGIA COLLEGE & STATE UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Mexican-American War; Mexico.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Paul H. Bergeron, The Presidency of James K. Polk (University of Kansas Press, 1987); Nathan Covington Brooks, A Complete History of the Mexican War (Rio Grande Books, 1965); Allan Nevins, Polk: The Diary of a President 1845-1849 (Reprint Services, 1968).

Pollard, Jonathan JONATHAN Pollard, always “Jay” to his associates in the U.S. Navy intelligence establishment, spied for Israel against the United States in the 1980s. He was arrested by the FBI in 1985 and convicted of spying for an ally. He received a life sentence in 1987. A native of South Bend, Indiana, Pollard was a graduate of Stanford University and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Having been rejected in his application to work for the CIA in 1977—having failed to pass a polygraph test and perhaps not being free of illegal drugs—Pollard was nonetheless hired by the U.S. Navy as an intelligence research specialist in 1979 at age 25. The navy was unaware of Pollard’s rejection by the CIA. A Zionist, he worked diligently at the navy’s intelligence establishment in Suitland, Maryland, though was not above spinning tales that cast him under suspicion. At one juncture, Pollard’s security clearance was suspended and he was directed to undergo psychiatric evaluation. However, these pauses were not to curtail him any more than had his rejection by the CIA. In 1984, Pollard was assigned to the U.S. Navy’s Anti-Terrorist Alert Center, the nerve cell of the Naval Investigative Service’s Threat Analysis Division. He researched and analyzed threats to United States’ interests, specializing in the Caribbean and North American region. Pollard had a penetrating mind and was adept at discerning threats from the mass of data he reviewed. In October 1983, 241 Marines were killed in Beirut, Lebanon, by a truck bomb. Known among his colleagues for fabricating stories to make himself seem more accomplished and experienced than was actually the case, Pollard first showed some classified information to friends in 1983. This would grow into his becoming an agent of Israel,

though never publicly acknowledged as such by Israel until 1998. For 18 months prior to his arrest outside the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C., Pollard provided a wide variety of highly classified information to Israel. Pollard had worked within the naval investigative establishment and many of those in his immediate vicinity were counterintelligence officers. Some considered him arrogant, loud, and not part of the team. Nonetheless, his cover stories were never suspected by peers or superiors. Though Israel paid some $50,000 for his efforts, Pollard’s motivation was clearly ideological. He believed that the United States was not doing enough to protect itself in the Middle East, was withholding information vital to Israel, and was forcing Israel into situations dangerous to its own survival. Most of what Pollard passed was raw intelligence, that is, information that by its nature reveals highly valuable sources and methods. There are allegations that agents of the United States in the Soviet Bloc were compromised by Pollard. Having failed to gain asylum at the Israeli embassy on the day of his arrest, Pollard was summarily cut loose by Tel Aviv. To the anger of the U.S. government, Pollard’s principal handler, Israeli Air Force Colonel Aviem Sella, was given a major command after the arrest of the American intelligence officer, and Israel did not acknowledge Pollard as one of their own for over a decade. When Pollard realized that he was being abandoned, he cooperated with the United States, outlining the extent of his espionage. Pollard was awarded, in a plea bargain, a life sentence without parole. The charge to which Pollard pleaded guilty was espionage, not treason. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger sent a long letter to the judges advocating the strongest possible penalties. Pollard is occasionally visited in prison by Israeli politicians, many of whom make the commutation of his sentence a campaign theme. He has been granted Israeli citizenship in absentia. There are movements both within the United States and in Israel that call for a reconsideration of the legal proceedings and sentence. However,

the United

States

has stood

firm

against such entreaties. The navy has been particularly adamant in opposing any reappraisal. The U.S. attorney who prosecuted the case, Joseph di Genova, said, “Pollard ranks among the four most serious cases of national security damage in the history

of this country. Nothing matches what he did in terms of the compromise of the technical intelligence capability of this country and he put at risk human lives.” The United States has not been permitted to meet with Israeli intelligence officers who handled Pollard. RAYMOND J. BROWN ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO: Israel; naval intelligence; Reagan, Ronald. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Wolf Blitzer, Territory of Lies (HarperCollins, 1989); Eliot Goldenberg and Alan Dershowitz, The Spy Who Knew too Much: The Government Plot to Silence Jonathan Pollard (SPI Books, 1993); Eliot Goldenberg and Alan Dershowitz, The Hunting Horse: The Truth Behind the Jonathan Pollard Spy Case (Prometheus Books, 2000); Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Every Spy a Prince (Houghton Mifflin, 1990); Gordon Thomas and Martin Dillon, Robert Maxwell, Israel’s Superspy (Carol and Graf, 2002).

tain. Powers accepted the offer and, resigning from the U.S. Air Force in May, signed a CIA contract and undertook U-2 training at the agency’s secret base in Nevada. In early August, he deployed to Incirlik, Turkey, as part of the 2nd Weather Observational Squadron (Provisional), called Detachment B within the CIA, and started reconnaissance overflights of the Soviet Union, the Middle East, and China. During the next three years, Powers flew 27 successful U-2 missions. But on May 1, 1960, an ambitious overflight designed to photomap missile sites and nuclear facilities behind the Russian Ural

Mountains

ended

in disaster. Near the city of

Sverdlovsk, a Soviet missile struck his U-2, and Powers ejected without triggering the aircraft’s selfdestruct switch. Powers’s capture embarrassed President Dwight Eisenhower, who initially denied knowledge of the overflights. He finally admitted his authorization of the program after an outraged Soviet Premier

Nikita Khrushchev revealed the Soviets had Powers in custody and displayed the U-2’s wreckage and surveillance cameras as well as Powers’s unused, CIA-supplied suicide needle. At a Paris summit two weeks after the shootdown, Khrushchev confronted

Powers, Francis Gary CIA PILOT Francis Gary Powers gained international notoriety in 1960 when Soviet air defenses shot down his U-2 spy plane deep within the Soviet Union. Born into a coal mining family in 1929, Powers grew up in the Cumberland Mountains of southwestern Virginia. After high school, he studied biology and chemistry at Milligan College in Tennessee, graduating with a B.S. degree in June 1950, just as the Korean War erupted. Facing conscription, Powers chose a military aviation career

and enlisted in the U.S. Air Force, where he served as a photo lab technician until his application for flight training was approved in late 1951. He earned his wings in December 1952 and thereafter joined a squadron of the 508th Strategic Fighter Wing. In January 1956, the CIA approached Powers with a job offer to fly U-2 spy planes in top-secret surveillance missions for the government. The U-2, an unusual jet-powered glider with a maximum altitude of 72,000 feet and a range of 3,000 miles, carried sophisticated cameras for photomapping strategic and industrial targets behind the Iron Cur-

Eisenhower with demands for an overflight moratorium and a public apology. Eisenhower agreed only to the former, and Khrushchev stormed out, scuttling the summit. During the ensuing show trial, a seemingly contrite Powers confessed to the “grave crime” of espionage and apologized for his actions, without denouncing American policy. The Soviet court sentenced him to 10 years incarceration, but Powers served only two before President John FE. Kennedy’s administration freed KGB spymaster, Rudolph Abel, in exchange for Powers’s release. Criticized for failing to use the poisoned needle and for apologizing to the Soviets, Powers left the CIA. The agency found him employment as a U-? test pilot for Lockheed and paid his salary, but he lost his job in 1969 after he published his memoir of the incident. Afterward, Powers could only find work as an aerial traffic reporter for KNBC in Los Angeles. He was killed in August 1977, when his helicopter crashed near Burbank, California.

. JAMIE RIFE

HisTorRy ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED

SEE ALSO: spy planes; Eisenhower, Khrushchev, Nikita S.; reconnaissance.

Dwight

D,;

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair (Smithmark, 1986); Curtis Peebles, Dark Eagles: A History of Top Secret U.S. Aircraft Programs (Presidio, 1995); Curtis Peebles, Shadow Flights: America’s Secret Air War Against the Soviet Union (Presidio, 2002); Francis Gary Powers with Curt Gentry, Operation Overflight: The U-2 Spy Pilot Tells His Story for the First Time (Henry Holt, 1970).

Profumo Affair COMPLETE WITH atopless dancer, a society doctor, a Soviet spy, and a cabinet minister, the Profumo Affair was one of Britain’s most sensational spy-sex scandals. By the time it ended, the spy had fled to Russia, the minister had resigned, the dancer had confessed to perjury, the doctor had committed suicide, and the government had fallen. The central figure in the Profumo Affair was the urbane and witty Dr. Stephen Ward. He knew everyone in London—politicians, lords, and movie stars. They came to his office because of Ward’s skills as an osteopath and enjoyed his company at parties, in private clubs, and even on romps in the seedier parts of London, where Ward befriended waits, drug addicts, and prostitutes. Ward was also a gifted artist, and his sketches of luminaries such as Winston Churchill and Prince Phillip were shown at London galleries. As his medical practice grew, Ward found the perfect bachelor pad, a secondstory flat in a fashionable part of London, and soon began sharing it with two dancers he met at a local strip-tease cabaret. He would come to regret inviting them in, because Mandy Rice-Davies and Christine Keeler would play a key role in the destruction of his life. Among Ward’s friends was the wealthy Lord William Astor, who let Ward use a cottage on the grounds of his mansion along the Thames River. On a summer’s day in 1961, Ward had a few friends over to the cottage, including Keeler. In the evening, they decided to take a dip in Astor’s pool at the mansion. Astor was hosting his own party, and as he and his friend Jack Profumo, secretary of state

for war, stepped out to get some air, Ward grabbed Keeler’s swimsuit (she was swimming in the nude) and playfully threw it in the bushes. As she raced for a towel, Astor and Profumo arrived to witness a young, nubile and thoroughly soaked woman struggling with a much-too-small towel. The middleaged, balding Profumo was mesmerized by Keeler, and they soon began an affair, sometimes meeting for sexual liaisons at Ward’s flat, sometimes at Profumo’s house when his movie-star wife was away. Unfortunately for Profumo, Keeler was also seeing another friend of Ward’s, the 38 year-old Soviet assistant naval attaché Captain Yevgeny Ivanov. So the same woman was sharing pillow talk with the British secretary of state for war and a man who was not just a Soviet naval captain, but a GRU (Soviet military intelligence) operative. And what did they talk about? In the most explosive allegation, made by Keeler, Ward supposedly asked her to find out from Profumo when the Americans were going to send nuclear weapons to West Germany. Many people today doubt seriously that Ward ever asked her to do such a thing. What is far more likely is that Ward was a willing participant in a “honey trap” in which MI-5 (British intelligence) would dangle Keeler in front of Ivanov and then blackmail him into defecting or becoming a double-

agent. Profumo eventually broke off with Keeler, but by 1962 it was common knowledge that he had had an affair and that his lover was involved in some way with the Russian spy. Ivanov, sensing trouble, returned to the Soviet Union. Ward’s private life was becoming public fodder as well, with stories of upper-class orgies with members of the nobility and government officials in attendance. In an effort at damage control, Profumo made a statement in the House of Commons in March 1963, in which he denied any improper relationship with Keeler. This was accepted at the time, but by lying to the House, Profumo had sealed his fate. By April, Ward was under investigation for living off the earnings of prostitution and other charges, and in early June, Profumo resigned, admitting that he had lied about his relationship with the dancer. The London News of the World immediately published the sensational “Confessions of Christine Keeler,” for which she received about $35,000. Ward was brought to trial in July; Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s government was deeply embarrassed by yet another spy scandal and Ward

would make a suitable fall guy. Witnesses (including Rice-Davies) gave false evidence, Ward’s MI-5 control officer couldn’t be located, and the outcome was a fait accompli. As the jury deliberated, Ward took an overdose of sleeping pills and died three days later. The security aspect of the Profumo Affair was much ado about very little, for MI-5 had judged before the trial that there was almost certainly no exchange of secret information to the Russians through Keeler. The sensational nature of the affair had more to do with the British obsession with naughtiness in high places and the vicarious thrill of seeing privileged people’s lives ruined. Keeler was _ convicted of perjury in a case involving one of her many boyfriends and spent six months in prison. She went on to write her memoirs, as did RiceDavies and Ivanov. Profumo spent the rest of his life in relative obscurity, helping the poor in Britain’s inner cities. History has been kind to Ward, who is largely seen as a charming man who was betrayed by his government and deserted by his

friends. KARL RAHDER, PH.D. INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

SEE ALSO: Cold War; United Kingdom; MI-5.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Eugene Ivanov, The Naked Spy (Blake, 1992); Christine Keeler, The Truth at Last: My Story (Sidgwick & Jackson, 2001); Phillip Knightley and Caroline Kennedy, An Affair of State: The Profumo Case and the Framing of Stephen Ward (Jonathan Cape 1987); David Thurlow, Profumo: The Hate Factor (Robert Hale, 1992).

Project SR-POINTER A PROGRAM created by the Office of Security of the CIA, Project SR-POINTER had its origin in the general climate of concern over American internal security in the 1950s, as characterized by the Hearings of Senator Joseph McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). The project, which lasted from 1953 to 1973, has also been referred to by CIA records and other documents as Project HITLINGUAL, a codename given by the CIA counterintelligence staff.

The program began with a request in the spring of 1952 by the CIA's Soviet (SR) Division to run an extensive “mail cover” operation on all mail relating to the Soviet Union going through the U.S. Post Office in New York City, arguably the largest within the United States. According to Staff Reports from Senator Frank Church’s investigation, “Over the 20-year course of mail openings, more than 250,000 letters to and from the Soviet Union were opened and photographed by CIA agents in New York. Copies of more than 57,000 of these letters were also disseminated to the FBI, which learned of this operation in 1958, levied requirements on it, and received the fruits of the coverage until the project was terminated.” On May 17, 1954, CIA Director Allen Dulles and the agency’s chief of operations for the Plans Directorate (Richard Helms) met with Postmaster General Arthur E. Summerfield. Present also at the meeting was David Stephens, the chief postal inspector. According to a memo written by Helms, the general outlines of what would become Project SR-POINTER were worked out in detail at this gathering. Later, in November 1955, CIA Chief of Counterintelligence James J. Angleton proposed to Helms that ‘‘we gain access to all mail traffic to and from the Soviet Union which enters, departs, or transits the United States through the Port of New York.” An intermediate step was to photograph the exteriors of all pieces of mail. Angleton proposed that the letters and other pieces of mail be opened. Helms authorized Angleton’s proposal on December 22, 1955. According to author Mark Riebling, Angleton believed that SR-POINTER was “probably the most important overview that counterintelligence has.” Riebling commented that “‘precisely because the enemy regarded America’s mails as inviolate, mail coverage was likely to provide clues to the identities of Soviet agents.” Three years later, in January 1958, the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover learned of this CIA operation and was made part of it. Later, as with the National Reconnaissance Office, other intelligence entities became part of the project, including the National Security Agency.

In spite of the possible utility of Project SRPOINTER, questions began to arise during the Watergate era regarding the legality of the operation, a question that those involved over the years had tacitly ignored because of the hoped-for benefits for

American counterintelligence. Then, in the spring of 1971, Chief Postal Inspector William Cotter, according to the Staff Reports, “had received a letter from Dr. Jeremy Stone of the American Federation

of Scientists inquiring whether the Post Office per-

mitted any federal agencies to open mail.” An 18year veteran of the CIA, Cotter began to have serious doubts about the legality of SR-POINTER. His concern hinged whether the project had ever been approved “at an exceedingly high level in the U.S. government, ” as he worded it to the CIA’s Office of Security Director Howard Osborn. It was evident to Osborn and those in the CIA that Cotter meant the president, at that time Richard M. Nixon. Apparently, during the past 20 years, no American president had been informed of Project SR-POINTER—unless, of course, 1) no president had wished to be informed, to keep alive the need for ‘“‘deniability,” or 2) any such information had been kept at a most secret level. Meanwhile, the office of the inspector general of the CIA had already concluded that the results of SR-POINTER had been “of little value to this agency.” Angleton, however, remained an ardent supporter of the project in CIA counsels. At the same time, although the inspector general’s report had concluded that the FBI had been the main beneficiary of SR-POINTER, the bureau did not wish to assume its management. The final blow came when Cotter issued an ultimatum that if the president was not informed of the project, he would remove Post Office support for the operation, effectively killing it, by a deadline of February 15, 1973. James Schlesinger, then the director of the CIA, terminated Project SR-POINTER upon that date. JOHN FE. MuRPHY, JR.

(Spring 1996); John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, Deadly Illusions: The KGB Orlov Dossier Reveals Stalin’s Master Spy (Crown Publishing, 1993); Ernest Volkman and Blaine Baggett, Secret Intelligence: The Inside Story of America’s Espionage Empire (Berkley Publishing Group, 1991).

psychological warfare PSYCHOLOGICAL warfare seeks to achieve military aims by acting upon the minds of the enemy, often by manipulating information to mislead or demoralizing the enemy through non-lethal means. Historically, psychological warfare has been a stratagem of war since the dawn of organized violence. The Chinese military thinker Sun Tzu of the 4th century B.C.E. strongly emphasized it in his Art of War: “To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.” The use of elaborate armor, face painting, flags, banners, battle cries, and military music have all been used at a tactical level to psychologically boost one’s own morale while simultaneously intimidating the enemy. For example, the sight of Hannibal’s armored war elephants during the Second Punic War terrified the Romans at the Battle of Trebbia (218 B.C.E.), which contributed to their defeat. In World War II, the German Luftwaffe air force attached sirens to the undercarriages of their Stuka dive-bombers, creating a screaming whine as the aircraft dived. This produced such a fearsome effect that even trained troops, capable of withstanding an artillery barrage, fled.

AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

World Wars I and II. Psychological warfare adSEE ALSO: National Security Agency; Church, Frank; Angleton, James J.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Mark Riebling, Wedge: From Pearl Harbor to 9/11: How the Secret War Between the FBI and the CIA Has Endangered National Security (Touchstone Books, 2002); Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans of The Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities; John FE. Murphy, Jr, “The Alaskan Mystery Flights,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

vanced from a tactical ploy to a campaign strategy with the emergence of mass communication technologies in the early 20th century, significantly enhancing a government’s ability to disseminate propaganda. World War I saw the first systematic use of psychological warfare on a large scale. From the beginning of the war, the British sought to undermine international support for Germany by publicizing German atrocities, such as the alleged attacks on defenseless Belgian civilians in 1914 or the unprovoked sinking of the passenger liner Lusitania im L915.

Both the Germans and the French produced propaganda newssheets directed at soldiers and civilians in the frontline area. One German publication, the Gazette des Ardennes, reported that both Moroccan and British soldiers were fathering children with the wives of French soldiers away at war. Austria demoralized Italian soldiers with leaflets and agents provocateurs, which played a role in the disastrous Italian defeat at Caporetto in 1917. Toward the end of the war, Allied propaganda against the polyglot Austrian army did much to undermine its cohesiveness by encouraging anti-Austrian national dissent among Poles, Magyars, Serbs, Czechs, and others. Psychological warfare was further developed during World War II. The proliferation of the wireless radio in the 1930s meant that mass audiences could be targeted from afar. “Tokyo Rose” made English-language broadcasts for the Japanese, demoralizing American troops in the Pacific while becoming something of a sweetheart simultaneously. The Germans launched a similar English-language broadcast campaign in Europe by William Joyce, who was roundly ridiculed as “Lord Haw-Haw” by Allied personnel. In 1943, the Germans launched a radio broadcast campaign in which Soviet defectors would encourage Soviet soldiers to desert the Red Army. One of the most successful psychological efforts of the war was not aimed at the enemy but at friendly forces. The British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) transmissions to occupied Europe raised morale in target countries, provided generally truthful information about the war, and conveyed information to resistance groups. Leaflets were also used extensively during World War II; it is estimated that some 30 leaflets were dropped by American and British planes for every man, woman, and child in Western Europe. Operation FORTITUDE. Perhaps the most famous example of psychological deception in World War II was Operation FORTITUDE in 1943. Prior to DDay, the Allies successfully convinced German intelligence that the European invasion would take place at Pas de Calais and not Normandy in France. German High Command believed Pas de Calais was the most likely site for an Allied invasion because it marked the shortest distance between the British Isles and the continent, and it also contained many ports.

To enhance this German perception, the Allies fabricated the First Army Group in Kent, England, comprised of inflatable rubber tanks, mock aircraft, dummy landing craft, and fake camps, creating the illusion of a huge invasion force to German reconnaissance planes. False radio transmissions were broadcast regarding the status of the bogus invasion force, and double-agents planted stories and documents with known German spies. To complete the illusion, the Allies assigned one of their most respected officers to command it: General George Patton. The deception was continued during D-Day, as Allies heavily bombed Pas de Calais and three-foot — rubber paratroopers were dropped in the vicinity. In fact, the deception was so successful that the Germans thought the Normandy landings were a diversionary tactic to the anticipated invasion at Pas de Calais, and consequently they did not commit their Panzer tank reserves to repel the Normandy forces. Cold War psychology. In the second half of the 20th century, psychological warfare became a discrete branch of military operations, partly in response

to communist-inspired

uprisings.

Leading

theorists of modern revolutionary war, such as China’s Mao Zedong, affirmed that conflict was not merely military but political and psychological as well. Most of all, the mobilization and consolidation of popular support behind a revolutionary campaign was essential for success, hence Mao’s famous analogy likening the civilian populace to water and the revolutionary soldiers to the fish that swim in it.

Confronted by such challenges, nation-states were obliged to enhance their psychological warfare expertise, especially given the U.S.-led policy of containing the spread of communism. Using psychological warfare, the British successfully countered a communist guerrilla revolt in 1952 in Malaya, where General Sir Gerald Templer coined the phrase “the battle for hearts and minds,” which is at the core of psychological warfare. “The shooting side of the business,” he stated, “is only 25 percent of the trouble and the other 75 percent lies in getting the people of this country behind us.” The French established the Psychological Action and Information Service as part of their doctrine of guerre révolutionnaire, which enjoyed some success in Algeria in the late 1950s. In 1962, the U.S. Army published its first field manual (FM 33-5) on the topic, replacing the term

psychological warfare with psychological operations, or

PSYOPs for short. PSYOPs played a central role in the Vietnam War, where personnel trained in civil and political affairs were attached to Special Forces units. The army and CIA Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) organization used PSYOPs, among other tactics, to secure the “pacification” of territory, promote rural reconstruction, and encourage supporters of the Viet Cong to defect to the South Vietnamese side. As PSYOPs grew in prominence, it also grew in disrepute, partly in response to the growing controversy surrounding the methods of CORDS and partly because conventional forces mistrusted the intangible nature of PSYOPs. The experience of the Vietnam War also demonstrated that psychological warfare, no matter how sophisticated, is insufficient to achieve victory by itself. However, properly integrated and coordinated in the wider war effort, it can be a force multiplier and contribute to ultimate

success. Today, PSYOPs is an integral component of modern warfare in at least five essential ways. First, PSYOPs facilitates military operations by producing propaganda that seeks compliance or noninterference from hostile populations. Second, PSYOPs is influential in the military targeting process, producing either positive or negative Psychological Actions or PSYACTs. Third, PSYOPs can provide public information to foreign populations in order to support humanitarian activities and restore civil order. Fourth, PSYOPs can serve as the military commander’s voice to foreign populations. Lastly, PSYOPs counters enemy propaganda. The future of psychological warfare seems certain owing to its growing acceptance by the conven-

tional military, its broad spectrum of applicability, and the emergence of new PSYOPs opportunities in the information age. SEAN MCFATE

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

SEE ALSO: journalism and propaganda; World War I; World War II; Vietnam War.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. U.S. Army, FM 33-5 Psychological Operations: Techniques and Procedures (1979); U.S. Army, FM 3-05.30 Psychological Operations (2000); Richard Denis Johnson, Seeds of Victory: Psychological Warfare & Propaganda (Schiffer Publishing, 1997); Kathy J. Perry, “The

Use of Psychological Operations as a Strategic Tool,” USAWC Strategy Research Project (2000).

Pujol, Juan CODENAMED GARBO, the Spaniard Juan Pujol Garcia became one of the best known doubleagents of World War II. When the civil war erupted in Spain, he went into hiding to avoid military service. Two years later, he was discovered and briefly incarcerated, but by the time the civil war ended, he had fought on both sides. The outbreak of world war in Europe prompted Pujol to reach a momentous decision. Believing that Germany should be defeated, he would offer his services to the British. In January 1941, Pujol failed in his first attempt to convince the British to employ him to spy on the Germans. Believing that the British would take him seriously if he succeeded in gaining employment with the Germans, Pujol contacted the Germans and offered to become an informant. Pujol eventually convinced his German contact that he had found a legitimate reason for a move to London, England, despite the fact that he had not. Finally convinced, the Germans agreed to put Pujol on their payroll. He was off to become their agent in England, or so they thought. Instead, Pujol traveled to Lisbon, Portugal, set up shop, and hoped that he could soon convince the British to hire him as a double-agent. After a brief period, he began to send fictitious information to his contact in Madrid, Spain, and he claimed that he had begun to recruit agents to work for him. Because he had never been to England before, Pujol had to rely upon maps, tour books, and train schedules. Pujol unwittingly made up information that was close to the truth, which made British intelligence nervous about an unknown spy operating in England. Eventually, Pujol convinced the British that he was not really a German spy. Recognizing an opportunity to use Pujol, the British arranged to send him secretly to London. Once there, Pujol’s British controller helped him to expand his network and, by providing him with a combination of real and false information, he became better established with the Germans. Because the Germans came to rely upon him, Pujol assumed an integral role in the Nor-

mandy invasion cover plan. The Germans, who did not realize that he was a double-agent, demonstrated their appreciation for Pujol’s services by awarding him the Iron Cross. MARryY KATHRYN BARBIER, PH.D. UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH, CANADA

SEE ALSO: World War II; MI-5. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Mark Seaman, Garbo: The Spy Who Saved D-Day (Public Record Office, 2000); Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (St. Ermin’s Press, 1999); Michael Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War (Pimlico, 1990); Juan Pujol and Nigel West, Operation GARBO: The Personal Story of the Most Successful Double Agent of World War II (Random House, 1985). William F. Friedman was a pre-eminent cryptanalyst who led the effort to crack the Japanese PURPLE code.

PURPLE A MONIKER or codename provided by American cryptanalysts, PURPLE refers to a cipher machine introduced by the Japanese in 1939 to transmit the highest level of diplomatic messages. The Japanese title was 97-shiki O-bun In-ji-ki, meaning “Alphabetical Typewriter 97,” 2597 being the year of the Japanese calendar corresponding to 1937. The Japanese usually referred to the machine as “J.” It was a complex apparatus, producing a high-quality cipher. A thorough explanation of PURPLE’s workings may be found in David Kahn’s The Codebreakers. Because of the continuing Sino-Japanese conflict and an increasingly bellicose Japan with seeming pan-Asian aspirations, a small but capable group of British and American codebreakers dedicated efforts toward breaking Japanese ciphers. With Herbert O. Yardley, author of The American Black Chamber, leading related efforts, the United States had broken Japanese codes in the 1920s. However, when Secretary of State Henry Stimson proclaimed that “Gentlemen do not read other’s mail,” the effort was stood down. Indeed, legal proscriptions in the United States were concurrent with Japanese efforts to tighten security. In 1939 and 1940, William F. Friedman, the U.S. Army’s chief cryptanalyst, led an effort to crack the

Japanese diplomatic communications codes and ciphers trafficking between the Foreign Office in Tokyo and diplomatic posts abroad. Friedman was ably assisted by Frank Rowlett and John Hurt (the only member of the team who could read Japanese). These members of the Army’s Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) not only broke the Japanese diplomatic code, but built a duplicate PURPLE decoding apparatus. The intelligence product emanating from this cryptanalytic feat of genius was referred to as MAGIC. It is interesting to note that the United States broke the most difficult and highest level Japanese code first, and was at a loss for some time to break lesser and more mundane traffic. After a year-and-a-half of the most grueling efforts, which would end in health problems for Friedman, the first PURPLE codes were fully broken in the fall of 1941. At times, intercepted messages were delivered to Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt before Japanese ambassadors received them. However, it is important to note that this U.S. Army effort was directed at diplomatic traffic. No military traffic was being read. The U.S. Navy was making efforts, with some Success, to intercept and break the Japanese naval messages. Still, MAGIC was a remarkable accomplishment. Unlike the purloined ENIGMA machine of

Germany that made its way to Bletchley Park, the

SEE ALSO: World War II; Bletchley Park; cryptography.

duplication of Purple was an American product. It

made the nascent American intelligence establishment alliance-worthy in the eyes of the British. Indeed, the third machine constructed was delivered to England via the Royal Navy’s newest and largest battleship, HMS King George, in January 1941. MAGIC was never discovered by the Axis enemy throughout World War II. The U.S. Navy, though somewhat reluctant to join efforts with the U.S. Army, rendered valuable assistance in reproducing additional machines to decode PURPLE.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ronald Clark, The Man Who Broke PURPLE (Little, Brown, 1977); W. J. Holmes, DoubleEdged Secrets (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1979); David Kahn, The Codebreakers (Macmillan, 1967); Ronald Lewin, American MAGIC (Farrar Strauss, 1982); Bradley Smith, The ULTRA-MAGIC Deals (Presidio, 1992).

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Raborn, William F. AFTER HIS retirement from a successful military career in which he played a major role in the development of modern U.S. Navy submarine operations, weapons, and technologies, Vice Admiral William F. Raborn was appointed director of the CIA (DCI) by President Lyndon Johnson on April 12, 1965. Raborn’s appointment came at the height of the Vietnam War and followed John McCone’s resignation as DCI due to disagreements with Johnson over the expansion of the land war in Vietnam and the efficacy of U.S. bombing policy. Raborn’s tenure at the CIA lasted only to June 30, 1966, a little over one year. Agency administrators regarded the new DCI suspiciously. Raborn’s career in the navy had been impressive and had culminated with the Polaris missile program. Yet, officers were deeply concerned about his lack of intelligence or foreign affairs experience abroad. Johnson valued Raborn’s diplomacy in dealing with Congress, amply demonstrated in the Polaris program, as well as his personal loyalty. Raborn was severely put to the test by military and political crises during the first 100 days of his 14month term as DCI. His days as director seemed numbered from the beginning, and all domestic operations were left to his deputy, Richard Helms.

Raborn’s tenure began with a crisis in the Dominican Republic, where an uprising broke out to restore the democratically elected communist Juan Bosch, whom the United States had replaced with Donald Reid Cabral. Marines were sent in on April 30 after intelligence reports stressed, in Raborn’s own words, the infiltration of ‘“Castro-trained agents” within the rebel forces. “Your announced mission,” the commander of the U.S. forces was told, ‘“‘is to save American lives. Your unstated mission is to prevent the Dominican Republic from going communist.” Raborn focused his attention on Vietnam almost as soon as the Dominican crisis was over. The

CIA’s contribution to the war was rising, and Raborn moved decisively to consolidate his sources of intelligence and analysis. In early July 1965, he created a Vietnam Task Force and used it to support the CIA representative, George Carver, on the National Planning Task Force for Vietnam and to make independent recommendations to Johnson. By 1966, Johnson grew increasingly impatient with Raborn’s CIA perspective on Vietnam, and he was replaced by Helms. Raborn went into private business and died March 6, 1990. LUCA PRONO, PH.D. UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM, ENGLAND

SEE ALSO: Central Intelligence Agency; Vietnam War; Johnson, Lyndon B.

517

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Audrey Bracey, Resolution of the Dominican Crisis, 1965: A Study in Mediation (Georgetown University Press, 1980); Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutional Revolt and American Intervention (john Hopkins University Press, 1978); Abraham F. Lowenthal, Dominican Intervention (Harvard University Press, 1972); Brian VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Oxford University Press, 1991); Frank Vandiver, Shadows of Vietnam: Lyndon Johnson’s Wars (Texas A&M University Press, 1997).

radar RADIO DETECTION and ranging technology, popularly known by the acronym “radar,” has been credited with winning World War II for the Allies. Radar operates by sending a radio pulse into the atmosphere. If the waves strike an object such as an airplane, ship, or submarine, information is reflected back to the reflecting station. The distance from the transmitting object can be calculated be the angle and direction of the incoming echoes provide information on the exact location of the alien object. Before the use of radar, aircraft pilots were directed by ground observers through radio contact. This method of navigation was impossible for ships in the open seas, and it often presented problems for airplane pilots during night flights. The early days of radio technology were focused on detecting enemy aircraft; but as the need for offense became more urgent during the course of World War II, the focus shifted toward using radar to pinpoint targets for Allied fighter planes. As early as 1904, Christian Hillsmeyer, a German engineer, received a patent for the telmobiloskop, a primitive radar that was used to protect ships from colliding with objects. The first modern radar system was developed in the United States in December 1934 at the Naval Reserve Laboratory in Washington, D.C. Germany, France, Russia, Italy,

and Great Britain soon realized the potential of radar and developed their own systems. Radar in Great Britain. On January 18, 1935, the British government asked Scottish atmospheric physicist Robert Watson- Watts to develop a “death

ray” of electromagnetic beams that could virtually reduce human tissue to ashes or automatically explode bombs. Watson-Watts suggested that such a device was beyond the scope of current radar tech-

nology and suggested that the government divert its focus to the detection uses of radar. Watson- Watts began working with R.V. Jones, an agent with British Scientific Intelligence, to expand this concept. The first successful test in which one aircraft detected another in flight was conducted in April 1937. Jones continued tests on the use of infrared in detecting enemy aircraft and later proposed a pulsed searchlight that would guarantee even greater accuracy. His idea was that an aircraft could follow the beams of the searchlight to drop bombs that would ignite when they hit the ground, with the pilot at a safe distance from enemy response. In 1938, in Great Britain, where advancement of radar technology was fast becoming a necessary priority, the British Air Ministry asked the Post Office to develop a network of defensive radar systems because the Post Office had previously observed that static ensued when aircraft flew close to their receivers. The Post Office hypothesized that the technology developed by Guglielmo Marconi in 1922 to guide ships by reflected radio waves could be used to detect enemy aircraft. The result was a connecting network of reporting stations along Britain’s southern and eastern coasts. This radar system would become the core of Britain’s defense system. Two years later, technology was in place to cover all existing stations in order to monitor likely areas of enemy approach to the British Isles. From this point onward, the Chain Home Network, a radar defense screen, was established to monitor the approach of enemy aircraft from anywhere in Great Britain. Mobile stations were also developed that allowed intelligence agents to transmit information from safe houses within Britain

and from designated spots abroad. At least 66 different kinds of radar stations were developed, and the number of stations in operation rose to 365 fixed facilities and 644 mobile units. The radar stations used an electrical calculator to transmit intelligence information concerning map reference positions, the height in feet, and the number of nearby enemy aircraft. Pilots could transmit this information directly to a voice recorder that conveyed the intelligence to the proper personnel. During the Battle of Britain in 1940, offensive radar technology had developed to the point that

the Allies were able to destroy the German Knickebein, “X,” and “Y” radar systems. This was due in part to the extensive intelligence work that R.V. Jones had conducted on German radar. In his intel ligence work, Jones had identified a major difference between British and German outlooks on radar. The British saw it as a high-priority defense measure and a way to save British lives through selected offense, while the Germans viewed it as another way to wage all-out war.

Radar in the United States. Advancing radar technology was less a priority in the United States than in Britain because of geography and the fact that America was nominally neutral until the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Nevertheless, by 1938, the air corps war urging the signal corps to use existing radar technology to develop an early warning radar that would cover a range of 120 miles. The result was the development of the SCR270 and the SCR-271, which provided the technology for both mobile and fixed early warning detectors. On February 26, 1940, the first Air Defense Command was activated at Mitchell Field in New York. The advancement of radar technology became a priority in the United States when, in September 1940 during the Battle of Britain, the British government secretly transported the results of the Tizard Mission, a box containing a revolutionary radar transmitter, the cavity magnetron, to Washington, D.C., by way of Canada. The device was sent to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The top physicists from the United States gathered at what became known as the Rad Lab, which opened on November 19, 1940. Ten of the physicists would later win Nobel Prizes for their work on the magnetron. By the following year, both American and British aircraft were equipped with magnetron radar, and ships were equipped with the Huff Duff, a high-frequency detection finder. This advanced radar technology allowed the Allies to target German U-boats with devastating accuracy, and the Allies were able to destroy German submarines before Allied targets could be reached. Rad Lab set up a civilian training center in Jamestown, Rhode Island, which became known as Mickey. The project was so secret that it was housed in a farmhouse with the radar receivers in a disguised water tank. It was from Mickey that pilots set out to test the interception and night-fighting ca-

A radar mast, which could track enemy ships and planes, is adjusted on a U.S. Navy ship in 1945.

pabilities of the magnetron, which were instrumental in the Allied triumphs of World War II.

Radar in the Cold War. The advent of the Cold War necessitated a continued dependence on radar technology. Radar allowed the Allies to guide aircraft into Berlin during the Berlin Airlift in 1948-49 and provided the basis for interception and defense measures in the Korean War. Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF) continued to use magnetron radar until 1957. Once the Soviet Union gained nuclear

weapons technology, it became even more important for the United States to have a sophisticated early warning system to prevent surprise attack. By the late 1950s, the United States and Canada had blanketed the area from the southern tip of the United States to the northernmost arctic tundra with ground-based radars, an entire fleet of early warning

aircraft, and a civilian corps of ground observers. Additionally, the United States had embedded the Texas Towers, a radio platform, on the floor of the Atlantic Ocean. In case of an attack on either country, fighter interceptors, antiaircraft artillery, and both short- and long-range surface-to-air missiles were ready for deployment. Radar remains an important element of national and global security. In 1999, for example, the United States military announced that the AV-8B Harrier II plane with radar capabilities could be used to locate unfriendly aircraft before it could be spotted visually. This capability become even more important when hijacked aircraft attacked the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001. ELIZABETH PURDY, PH.D. INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

SEE ALSO: Huff Duff; reconnaissance.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. William Slater Allen, ‘““Mickey and the Night Flyers,” Naval History (October 2003); R.V. Jones, Most Secret War (Coronet Books, 1979); Joseph King, “Eyes in the Sky,” Marines (September 1999); P. A. Marchant, et al., “Post Office Equipment for Radar,” www.radarpages.co.uk; Robert W. Moorman, ‘The Technology Store,” Air Transport World (August 1999); Kenneth Schaffel, ““The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense, 1945-1960,” www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil.

radio TECHNOLOGICAL MARVELS SUCH as comicbook hero Dick Tracy’s wrist radio, once considered a figment of cartoonist Chester Gould’s imagination, have become reality. The parade of new radio technology continues to advance giving intelligence units in all countries the facility to communicate in the most secret fashions, under the most scrutinized environments.

Significant developments in radio technology include the microprocessor, labeled as a “computer on a chip,” which opened an entirely new field of handling telecommunications in the 1970s. The Landstat II satellite proved that “eye in the sky” transmission—sending pictures via radio-funda-

mental satellite—was feasible and a common practice by the end of the 20th century. Based on radio principles, the 1970s also saw the inauguration of the first cellular network in Japan (1978). A parallel network, not unlike Japan’s cellular operations, started operations in North America three years later. In the miniaturization of radio receivers, Sony’s credit-card thin radio of 1982 was particularly impressive. The satellite, the pocket radio, the minute transmitter, and tens of other devices, have made the industry of national intelligence more productive over the years. “[Radio] communication has played an important role in the collection of intelligence,” notes author Peter McCollum, “With the advent of the effective portable radio technology in the 1930s, it became feasible for an operative to send and receive information quickly and independently from enemy territory.” The History of Communications-Electronics in the United States Navy, prepared in 1963 by the Bureau of Ships and Office of Naval History, highlights radio history from its earliest stages to sonar and the radio-controlled aircraft of the latter half of the 20th century. According to the narrative, the years during and between World Wars I and II witnessed great improvement in the technology of clandestine data gathering; the radio was transformed with circuit development, radio telephony developments, amplifiers to aid reception, vacuum tubes, con-

densers, and high-power broadcast stations.. When the United States entered World War II against the Axis powers of Germany, Japan, and Italy in 1941, a great focus was placed on the importance of stimulating radio reception of information— quicker, clearer, and by longer distances—via highpowered transmitting devices, voice modulated transceivers,

and

receiving

equipment.

These

en-

hancements aided not only the Allied forces’ military intelligence and espionage units throughout the war, but also operatives of the CIA that came into existence as part of the National Security Act two years after the cease-fire of 1945. “The development of the RS-1 and other early CIA radios began at that time,” explains McCollum. One of the most popular clandestine radios to come out of World War II were the PRCs, known by Gls as suitcase radios. Designed by Radio Corporation of America (RCA), this series boasted portable high-frequency receivers, capable transmitters, and heavy-duty power supplies contained

Operatives of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services used this portable radio during World War II.

A U.S. soldier models the latest (1944) mobile radio unit for use on the front lines.

within a suitcase. In time, these became known as agent radios. Because the Nazis could not monitor

espionage groups, working closely with Allied forces and with their own national embassies temporarily relocated to London, England. The French Resistance underground was one of the most developed, as was the Dutch resistance to the Nazi occupation. These underground organizations, some loosely structured in appearance but effectively coordinated by radio, were later credited by Allied powers for helping to expedite the end of the war. One famous example of Allied use of radio was the British nightly broadcast of salutations to friends in France; these were actually coded messages to the French Resistance. Covert sabotage operations by the Resistance to aid the D-Day landing at Normandy were given the green light over radio broadcasts prior to the Allied landing June 6, 1944. Despite Nazi reprisals that consisted of banning all

the Americans’ UHF (ultra-high) frequencies between air and land, another well-used radio, the SSTR-6, was based on the UHF system and maintained communication between ground fighting

troops and overhead flyers. The National Defense and Research Committee, partnering with the Office of Strategic Services on several ideas, created a receiver that could ignite an explosion. As well, a signaling device/beacon transmitter called the IFL helped skydiving paratroop leaders locate each other and their supplies immediately after a parachute drop in the fog or at night. In Europe, many of the countries, which had been overtaken by the Nazis, conducted their own

radios and jamming the airwaves, inter-European radio communications continued. Much of what was designed during World War II saw resurgence, in enhanced fashion, later in the century. Developed in 1948, the RS-1 HF transceiver was considered the landmark of its kind. It possessed features vital to agents; it was portable, durable, waterproof and, most importantly, operable from a range of power sources. Many radio transmitters were charged up for both combat and espionage activity, born out of necessity to compete with German Nazi radio engineering. One of these transmitters was the URT-11, a portable transmitter-and-power-supply combination, the forerunner of other URTs used by the CIA. One of the latter, ultimately developed in 1950, “was used in a great number of embassies,’”” McCollum notes. Though transatlantic radio communication became a reality at the beginning of the 20th century (though its reception left a lot to be desired), by the end of the century the development of radio helped spur new communications technologies in intelligence. With hidden earpieces and minute microphones, the radio communications of today’s intelligence operative has reached the equivalent of Dick Tracy’s wrist radio, or for that matter, fictional agent Maxwell Smart’s infamous shoe-phone. JOSEPH GERINGER ESSAYS ON HIstTory, INC.

SEE ALSO: communications; electronic intelligence. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Captain L. S. Howell, History of Communications-Electronics in the United States Navy (Bureau of Ships and Office of Naval History, 1963); Corey Dietz, “Spy Another Day: With Radio,” www. radio.aboutcom.com; “History of Radio,” www.history.acusd.edu/gen/recording; Peter McCollum, “U.S. Clandestine Radio Equipment,” www.militaryradio.com/spyradio.

Rado, Alexander Born Alexander Radolfi and educated in Budapest, Hungary, Rado was the son of a wealthy Jewish businessman. He joined the Communist Party when he was a student at the University of Bu-

dapest. In 1919, he was named commissar and took part in the coup that briefly took over the Hungarian government. When the communists were driven out, he fled to Russia where he lived for several years, marrying fellow communist exile Helene Jensen. In 1931, he was trained in espionage by the NKVD (Soviet intelligence service), and in the following year he was sent to Berlin, Germany, where he posed as a clerk in the Soviet Union’s embassy. On several occasions, Rado organized armed communist resistance to Adolf Hitler’s storm troopers, resulting in many bloody battles in the street. When Hitler took power in 1933, Rado was earmarked for death. He escaped and moved to Paris, France, even as the Nazi death squad was looking for him. In Paris, Radolfi used the name Sandor Rado and worked undercover as a publisher of maps and current events. All the while, he was providing the NK VD with information on the French and German military. By 1936, Rado, considered the Soviet’s top spy in the West, was acquired by the GRU (Soviet military intelligence) and sent to Switzerland as resident director of Soviet intelligence. Rado established an intelligence network in Switzerland, which he dubbed Dora, an anagram of his name. In Switzerland, Rado went undercover as a car-

tographer whose maps appeared daily in Swiss newspapers. From the late 1930s, Rado’s spy network, numbering dozens of diligent agents, proved to be Moscow’s best source of information on Nazi Germany. One of Rado’s top agents was Ursula Ruth Kuczynski, also known as Ursula-Maria Hamburger, a British subject who later became the handler for the atomic spy Klaus Fuchs. Using the codename SONIA, she recruited an expert radioman, Alexander Foote, who, unknown to Rado, was a British SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) plant. Everything Rado gave him to send to Moscow, he also allegedly passed on to British intelligence. Also unknown to Rado, two of his agents were working for the Nazis. When the agents informed on their Nazi handler, the Germans demanded that the Swiss shut down Dora and arrest its agents, which they did in October 1943. Rado was ordered back to Moscow, where he was imprisoned until the death of Josef Stalin (1953). He resurfaced in 1955, teaching at the University of Budapest. FRANK R. DURR U.S. ARMy COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, RETIRED

wa a

se

SEE ALSO: Kuczynski, Ruth; Germany; World War II.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Anthony Read and David Fisher, Operation Lucy: The Most Secret Spy Ring of the Second World War (Putnam Publishers, 1981); David Kahn, The Codebreakers (Macmillan, 1972); Victor Suvoroy, Inside Soviet Military Intelligence (Macmillan, 1984).

Reagan, Ronald THE 40th president (1981-89) of the United States, Ronald Reagan moved to confront the Soviet Union, which he described as the “focus of evil in the modern world.” He sensed vulnerabilities in the Soviet system and changed the goal of U.S. foreign policy from containment or détente to victory. To do so, he sought ways to attack the Soviet economy and to support anticcommunist movements around

the world. Realizing the inherent inability of a communist economy to compete with dynamic capitalism, Reagan engaged the Soviets in an arms race for high technology rather compete with them in the production of large numbers of less sophisticated weapons. At the same time, the Reagan administration moved to limit Soviet ability to purchase high technology and to reduce Soviet profits from oil sales. To undermine

Soviet control of Eastern Europe,

Reagan ordered covert support for the Solidarity movement in Poland. In Afghanistan, the Reagan administration continued and later increased aid to the Islamic holy warriors, or mujahideen, fighting against the Soviet takeover of the country. The CIA, working closely with the government of Pakistan, supplied the Afghan resistance with money, weapons, and training. U.S. deployment of shoulder-fired Stinger missiles to Afghan mujahideen significantly increased their military effectiveness. Until the deployment of the Stingers, the Soviets succeeded through the combination of attack helicopters and special forces troops; after their deployment the mujahideen took a heavy toll on Soviet helicopters. As president, Reagan advanced two highly controversial ideas for defense: the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the so called Zero-Option. The former sought to research, create, and deploy a space-based missile defense shield against nuclear

missiles launched at the United States. Reagan viewed the protection of the American people as his highest duty and saw SDI as a way to render a Soviet attack impotent. The Zero-Option policy dealt with intermediate range nuclear weapons. These weapons, deployed in Europe by the United States and the Soviet Union, could be fired and could arrive on target more quickly than larger weapons, greatly increasing the risk of nuclear war. Reagan proposed that if the Soviet Union would withdraw its weapons from Eastern Europe, the United States would not deploy its weapons in Western Europe. Reagan also authorized direct action against communist aggression in the Western Hemisphere. The Caribbean island of Grenada became the focus of U.S. attention in 1983. The communist government of Grenada, controlled by Maurice Bishop, fell to a coup by even more radical Marxists. Construction of a runway capable of handling large military aircraft was underway, Cuban troops were present, and about 1,000 American citizens were on Grenada and in danger. American forces attacked Grenada on October 23, 1983, rescued the American citizens, and won control of the island after several days of fighting. America also faced a growing threat from international terrorism during the Reagan years. The same day that U.S. forces invaded Grenada, a U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, was attacked by a truck bomb, killing 346 marines. Islamic terrorists also took numerous hostages in the 1980s, including the CIA station chief in Beirut, William Buckley. While some hostages would eventually be released, Buckley died in captivity in 1985. The United States’ strongest response to terrorism came in 1985, after Libyans used a bomb to attack American servicemen at a Berlin, Germany, discotheque. Reagan ordered retaliation and on April 14, 1986, U.S. war planes bombed Benghazi and Tripoli, Libya, as a reprisal. Reagan’s anti-ccommunism and desire to rescue American hostages un-

luckily converged in what came to be known as the Iran-Contra affair. Members of the National Security Council developed a plan to sell weapons to Iran in exchange for Iranian help in securing the release of the hostages. By overcharging the Iranians for the weapons, funds became available to be diverted to the Nicaraguan Contras (anti-communist forces), cut off from American aid by the U.S. Congress. The revelation of these arrangements and the

public hearings that followed cast doubt on Reagan’s, or at least his staff’s, legal use of intelligence services.

In October 1986, Reagan met with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. Gorbachev offered sweeping agreements in exchange for the U.S. sacrifice of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Reagan refused, devoted to his mission of using every means available to protect the American people against nuclear attack. In December 1987, the pair met again, this time to sign the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, eliminating 859 American and 1,836 Soviet nuclear missiles over the course of three years. Reagan left office in January 1989; the Berlin Wall would be torn down later that year, marking the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet system. In the popular culture, if not among historians, Reagan’s legacy is identified as the president who won the Cold War. By the mid-1990s, Reagan withdrew from public life after learning that he had Alzheimer’s Disease. He died in June, 2004 at age 93. MITCHELL MCNAYLOR Our LADY OF THE LAKE COLLEGE

Ronald Reagan pushed America’s strategic forces to overwhelm Soviet technology and budgets.

SEE ALSO: Soviet Union; United States; Central Intelli-

gence Agency; Central America; Libya. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (Simon & Schuster, 1991); Lou Cannon, Reagan (Putnam, 1983); Dinesh D’Souza, Ronald Reagan (Free Press, 1997); Peggy Noonan, When Character Was King: A Story of Ronald Reagan (Viking, 2002); Peter Schweitzer, Reagan’s War (Doubleday, 2002).

reconnaissance LIKE SURVEILLANCE and collection, reconnaissance is a broad term in intelligence circles that can encompass

activities ranging from orbiting a Key-

hole satellite over the Iranian nuclear site at Busher,

to a soldier of the U.S. Army Special Forces spying on a cocaine-refining facility run by Marxist guerrillas in Colombia. Reconnaissance is used by military strategists to scout enemy strengths and weaknesses and can involve infiltration, inspection, and exploration to

gather intelligence data. In any area of intelligence throughout history where the gathering of information is the ultimate goal, reconnaissance has played a vital role. As just one example, during the Seven Years’ War, Austrian hussars, or light cavalry, were ordered to spread out across the battlefield to prevent Frederick the Great of Prussia from being able to carry out an accurate reconnaissance of the Austrian Army before the Battle of Leuthen (December 5, 1757). This did not help, Frederick won anyway. In whatever area of the world in which nations have competed, accurate intelligence gained from reconnaissance has been a prerequisite for success, whether the wars have been fought in the forests of central Europe or the deserts of the Middle East. This has been true both on the macro-scale as part of national strategy, as well as on the micro-scale of military campaigns and battles. A decisive reconnaissance mission. There are few examples of the decisiveness of accurate intelligence reconnaissance better than the British Palestine Campaign of 1917-18 against the Ottoman

Turks in World War I. On June 28, 1917, General Sir Edmund Allenby, known as The Bull for his straightforward determination, entered Cairo, Egypt, to replace General Archibald Murray as

commander of British troops in the Middle East. Allenby knew that the key to the Palestinian prob-

lem lay at Gaza, on the eastern side of the Sinai Peninsula. In seeking intelligence from the Arabs, he had recourse to one of the most remarkable figures in the history of the Middle East, Thomas Edward Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia. From December 1910 to December 1913, Lawrence took part in archaeological excavations at Carchemish in Syria. In July 1914, on the eve of World War I, Lawrence worked with the renowned British ar-

chaeologist Leonard Woolley on an extensive tour of the Sinai Peninsula, under the auspices of the British Palestine Exploration Fund. (Whether the Fund was a “cover group” for the SIS, the Secret Intelligence Service is, given the British Official Secrets Act, a fact that may never be known.) The plan for the Sinai expedition read very much like an intelligence briefing, including instructions “to take photographs of buildings and other points of interest,” and “to produce an accurate map of the country on the scale of half an inch to the mile,” as Jeremy Wilson recorded in his biography of Lawrence. Even more interesting is that the purpose of the expedition was given as exploring “from Rafah, on the Mediterranean coast about 20 miles southwest of Gaza, in an SSE [south south

east] direction, to the head of the Gulf of Akabah [Aqabah].” This was the very area which Allenby would target for his anticipated attack on the Turks. When war came, Lawrence was sent to the Arab Bureau in Cairo, the clandestine headquarters for British intelligence in the Middle East. On June 5, 1916, Sharif Hussein of Mecca summoned the Arabs to rebel against the hated Turkish overlords. In December 1916, Lawrence was sent to see how the British could aid the rebelling Arab tribes. Lawrence undertook a reconnaissance mission to

the Hejaz region where the Sharif’s son, Prince Faisal, was already engaged in fighting the Turks. The incisiveness of Lawrence’s report led him to be appointed as British representative to the Arab cause in December 1916. By 1917, he was heavily engaged in his guerrilla campaign aimed at disrupting Turkish troops movements and shipments of supplies. His desert warfare occupied

many Turkish forces who otherwise would have been able to engage Allenby. Lawrence’s reconnaissance missions proved invaluable to the British general staff. At the same time, Allenby was receiving reconnaissance reports from the Jewish NILI spy ring. (The name comes from the acronym for the phrase in Hebrew from I Samuel 13-29 in the Old Testament, “the glory of Israel will not lie.’”’) Increasingly, the Jews in Palestine feared an ethnic cleansing such as the Turks had perpetrated upon the Christian Armenians. In 1915, Aaron Aaronsohn, a respected agricultural scientist, had sensed the coming storm that lay ahead for the Jews in a Turkish-ruled Palestine. In that year, Aaronsohn served as one of the most successful British intelligence moles in history: He was employed as the Turkish ruler’s personal expert on agriculture in Palestine. Under the cover of his job, Aaronsohn was able to perform multiple reconnaissance missions, evaluating Turkish forces in Palestsine. Perhaps the most important intelligence information that he absorbed from his heavy field work in the southern Negev desert was that Beersheba, in the center of the desert, was the Achilles’ heel of the Turkish line. Twice, the British had thrown their troops against fortified town in vain. As soon as Allenby took over British intelligence operations in Cairo, he had Aaronsohn and the NILI ring focus its attention on the Beersheba region. The reconnaissance trips that the NILI members—all amateur spies—made to the Beersheba area had a major impact on British war plans. The Turks, however, caught on to the NILI ring, partly through Turkish collaborators in the Jewish community. The ring’s members were either killed, or died under mysterious circumstances, or in one

case, committed suicide. (Aaronsohn died in a plane crash over the English Channel in 1919.) Using information supplied by the NILI agents, Allenby

took the Turks completely by surprise and smashed through their defensive lines at Beersheba. America’s reconnaissance coup. History does not show a more stark view of the crucial role of intelligence gained through reconnaissance than the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. On September 8, 1962, the Soviet freighter Omsk docked at the Cuban port of Mariel with a

cargo hold full of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev (who

would be removed from power in November 1964 in large part due to his recklessness) had completely changed the balance of power in the Western Hemisphere. Now, missiles from Cuba, a Soviet ally, could endanger most American cities on the East Coast. On October 14, based on information gathered by a U-2 reconnaissance flight by U.S. Air Force Major Rudolph Anderson, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the military’s version of the CIA, recognized missile sites at San Cristobal in Cuba. Although President John Kennedy had repeatedly warned Khrushchev not to introduce offensive weapons into Cuba, apparently the Soviet premier believed the young president lacked the courage to resist the Soviet initiative. On the morning of Tuesday, October 16, the president summoned the executive committee of the National Security Council (NSC) to discuss the missile threat. A gradual level of response was decided upon, to avoid the risk of a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers. U-2 spy plane reconnaissance of the missile sites in Cuba was increased. Although not disclosed at the time, the Kennedy administration could act with confidence during the October Missile Crisis because the first satellite-intelligence system had been put into orbit by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). This Corona satellite program, and the imagery it transmitted back to earth, gave Kennedy and his team extremely accurate information about the missiles in Cuba. On the evening of October 22, 1962, Kennedy

appeared before a shocked American people in a televised address. He announced American reconnaissance had revealed the existence of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, and demanded that “Chairman Khrushchev halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace.” After several days in which both the Soviet and American forces escalated their alert levels and war preparations, Khrushchev finally backed down and withdrew the missiles from Cuba. Intelligence reconnaissance missions by the U-2 planes and the Corona satellites played an important role in revealing and resolving the crisis. Based on intelligence photographs, Kennedy and the NSC could follow the breaking-down of the missile sites. Reconnaissance provided accurate information that the missiles were indeed being crated and sent back to Russia aboard cargo ships.

For the future, as in the past, there will be few episodes in national strategy, or in military campaigns and battles, where intelligence reconnaissance does not play a key role in the perilous balance between success and failure. JOHN F. MURPHY, JR. AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO:

surveillance; Lawrence of Arabia; Cuban

Missile Crisis; spy planes; satellites. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Joseph Adler, “Aaron Aaronsohn and the NILI Spy Network,” Jewish Frontier (May/June 1997); Jeremy Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorized Biography of T. E. Lawrence (Collier Books, 1989); Frederic Lert, Wings of the CIA (Histoire and Collections, 1998); T. E. Lawrence, Crusader Castles (Hyperion, 1992); Anthony Verrier, Agents of Empire: Anglo-Zionist Intelligence Operations, 1915-1919 (Brassey’s, 1995); Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Pearson, 1971); William E. Burrows, Deep Black: The Startling Truth Behind America’s Top-Secret Spy Satellites (Random House, 1988).

recruitment THERE ARE SEVERAL methods employed in the effort to recruit the best personnel for the myriad of functions that encompass the intelligence profession. However, it is important to distinguish between overt and covert recruitment. Many are recruited by circumstances of birth, conviction, and location. The intelligence services overtly recruit university graduates and military personnel for employment as intelligence analysts. These positions are announced publicly and solicitations are often found in local newspapers and weekly magazines. Recruiters appear at job fairs and university job placement centers searching for the best candidates for a career in intelligence. Announcements typically include positions in political and economic Intelligence; military intelligence; current intelligence;

indications and warning; order of battle; counterintelligence analysis; collection administration; signals intelligence; imagery; and other non-sensitive administrative and production functions. Assign-

ments normally focus on intelligence centers in and around capital cities. However, personnel also are assigned to distant locations in support of diplomatic, military, or allied operations. Covert recruitment of foreign personnel for sensitive espionage activities and information collection is normally managed through the operational departments of intelligence agencies. The process is complex, involving special personnel assessments, vetting, and scrutiny of the recruit’s entire personal history. The tradecraft of espionage comes into play, a matrix of security procedures adopted for the protection of the individual involved in covert action and in protection of agency operatives man-

aging the “source.” Few intelligence services advertise their recruitment methods but enough is known about the KGB recruitment of the Cambridge Five (Anthony Blunt, Guy Burgess, John Cairncross, Donald Maclean, Kim Philby) for a classic understanding of the process. The later stories of American spies Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen bear witness to the ease in which spies can be recruited. Inducements can range from ideological comradeship to cash to blackmail. The major difference between the Cambridge Five and Ames-Hanssen is motive. The Cambridge Five acted, for the most part, out of conviction, while their American fellow-travelers acted out of greed (money). Intelligence services are adept in assessing motive long before the attempt to recruit an agent is undertaken. Nonetheless, hardened case officers are prepared for almost any motive provided the potential source is capable of delivering the desired information. Thus, the attributes of a determined case officer (or agent handler) are as important as the attributes of a potential spy. Classic recruitment includes targeting potential candidates for covert operations before they even enter official government functions or related industry. For example, the Cambridge Five were recruited during the 1930s while undergraduates at Cambridge University, having been spotted by a socialist member of faculty looking for recruits to join the Communist International. Soviet embassy staff in London assigned an NKVD/KGB (Soviet intelligence) case officer to assess the potential agents, a process involving several discrete meetings and several months of evaluation. The Cambridge Five went on to official duties in the British diplomatic corps, intelligence, and counter-

intelligence, all the while passing sensitive information to the Soviet KGB. The Cambridge Five remained covertly in the service of KGB handlers for well over 20 years before British MI-5 counterintelligence discovered the network and closed it down. The Soviet State Security (KGB) Handbook, dated April 4, 1927, for the recruitment of foreign diplomatic agents is quite thorough in the standards it expected from its agent-spies abroad. Former KGB operative Oleg Gordievsky pointed out that low-level diplomatic personnel provide excellent opportunities for the acquisition of valuable intelligence from wastebaskets, copy machines, and garbage cans. The Handbook guidelines include the admonition that agents are to be rewarded with only modest payments to preclude extravagance that would draw attention from counterintelligence officials. These types of recruited low-level agents often act as “mailmen” and are not necessarily informed of the value of information passed. They are given the impression that better information is required. These agents are encouraged to be professionally industrious and punctual in exercising their official duties, while being sensitive to the existence of false information that would not only indicate purposeful disinformation, but also counterintelligence surveillance of a suspected spy. The reliability of a potential recruit is critical and flamboyant candidates are not considered sustainable sources. Hostile Intelligence Services (HOIS) also receive offers to spy from various government and private individuals without solicitation. The prime motive for these “walk-ins” is money for secrets but the reliability of the individual source is often difficult to determine and many are quickly exposed by counterintelligence operations. A common misconception of all would-be spies is the naive belief that the intelligence service he or she is feeding is not also penetrated by HOIS, leaving many agents totally dismayed when they are uncovered. GAIL H. NELSON, PH.D.

ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO: Blunt, Anthony; Maclean, Donald D.; Hanssen, Robert P.; Burgess, Guy; Philby, Kim; Cairncross, John; Central Intelligence Agency; MI-5; MI-6.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Roy Godson, Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Counterintelligence (Free Press, 1982); Roy

Godson, Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s: Collection, Analysis, Counterintelligence, and Covert Action (Lexington, 1988); Roy Godson, Comparing Foreign

Intelligence: The U.S., USSR, UK, and the Third World (Brassey’s, 1988); Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story (HarperCollins, 1990); Pavel Sudoplatov, Special Tasks (Little, Brown, 1994); Genrikh Borovik, The Philby Files (Little, Brown, 1994); Anthony Brown, Treason in the Blood (Houghton Mifflin, 1994); Rufina Philby, The Private Life of Kim Philby (International Publishing, 1999).

Reilly, Sidney George BORN MARCH 24, 1874, the illegitimate son of a Jewish landowner in Odessa, Russia, Sidney Rosenblum achieved a graduate school education in Russia before stowing away on a ship for Brazil in 1895. In South America, the resourceful young man impressed a party of British intelligence agents for whom he was acting as a jungle guide, and he was recruited for the Naval Intelligence Department. Taking British citizenship and an Anglicized name, Sidney George Reilly, he quickly became the favorite agent of spymaster Mansfield Cumming on the strength of his fearlessness and linguistic skills. Reilly demanded a huge salary for his string of successful assignments, which included securing British rights to Persian oil while disguised as a priest, observing Russian fortifications at Port Arthur while posing as a timber magnate, and sneaking into the Krupp munitions works as a German employee. Reilly’s luxurious lifestyle and taste for women quickly led him to trouble. A multiple bigamist, Reilly sold plans and information not just to his British superiors, but also to the Russians and Japanese. His entrepreneurial activities, which yielded valuable information, also led him to engage in arms-dealing for the czarist Russians in 1916. The British demanded that he spy on the German Army, which he did spectacularly, posing as an officer and attending a staff briefing by Wilhelm II himself, but broke with the British after Cumming left what was now ML6. A free agent anxious for action and cash, Reilly joined Britain’s roving ambassador Robert Lockhart in a plan to keep Russia in World War I by befriending revolutionary Leon Trotsky and aiding

Felix Dzerzhinsky in setting up the Cheka, the Russian intelligence agency. When a bizarre assassination plot against Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin failed in August 1918, Reilly fled the country but was found guilty of spying in absentia and sentenced to death. In 1924, Reilly may have participated in the forgery of the Zinoviev letter, purportedly instructions from the Soviet Comintern (governing body) to increase agitation in Britain, publication of which resulted in the defeat of British Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald’s Labor government. Bored and running out of money in the postwar world, Reilly accepted an offerto return to Russia in order. to aid anti-Bolshevik forces, little suspecting it was a trap laid by Dzerzhinsky. Arrested and interrogated, Reilly offered to spy on behalf of the Soviet government, but his services were refused, and he was executed in November 1925. Reilly’s flamboyance, audacity, and conspicuous tastes for luxuries and women made him unusual among more traditional spies, and in part inspired Ian Fleming’s character James Bond. MARGARET SANKEY, PH.D. MINNESOTA STATE UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO:

Cheka; Envoy’s Plot; Bond, James.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Michael Kettle, Sidney Reilly: The True Story of the World’s Greatest Spy (St. Martin’s, 1983); Robin Bruce Lockhart, Reilly: Ace of Spies (Norden Publications, 1967); Edward Van Der Rhoer, Master Spy: A True Story of Allied Espionage in Bolshevik Russia (Scribner’s, 1981).

Rhyolite ALSO KNOWN AS Program 472, Program 720, and Aquacade, the Rhyolite series of electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellites deployed by the United States during the 1970s greatly increased its collec-

tion of microwaves from Soviet and Chinese ground emitters. The project later became public knowledge in the espionage trial of the so-called Falcon and the Snowman, Christopher Boyce and

Daulton Lee, which influenced the name change to Aquacade.

Experience gained with earlier ELINT satellites such as Ferret and Canyon during the 1960s demonstrated that the effective interception of communications required moving larger intelligence payloads to higher geosynchronous and elliptical orbits. Canyon had demonstrated the ability to combine ELINT and COMINT (communications intelligence) functions with a larger satellite, and also proved the quasi-stationary orbit concept. Essentially, rather than deploying to a 36,000-kilometer geostationary orbit, a quasi-stationary orbit had an apogee of 39,000 to 42,000 kilometers, a perigee of 30,000 to 33,000 kilometers, and an inclination from 3 to 10 degrees. In this type of orbit the satellite traveled a complex elliptical trajectory that increased the area of coverage and allowed the bearings of radio emitters to be measured from various points of the orbit. In turn, Rhyolite took this process of collection to maturity. Built by TRW and E-Systems, Rhyolite was considerably larger than its predecessor, with a receiving antenna 20 meters in diameter and an overall weight of approximately 680 kilograms. With an expected operational lifetime of five to seven years, the first Rhyolite was successfully launched on June 19, 1970 aboard an Atlas Agena D SLV-3A rocket. This flight was followed by three more launches on March 6, 1973, December 11, 1977, and April 7, 1978, respectively. All satellites reportedly entered service without malfunction. Rhyolite was able to pick up telemetry from Soviet missile tests, monitor weapons development, and check compliance with arms control treaties, but the most important aspect of the Rhyolite series was its ability to capture emissions from microwave links that were installed across the Soviet Union during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Although the microwave emissions were intended to be “line-of-sight” and thus reduce the possibility of interception, the Americans had determined that there was enough “spillage” from a Soviet microwave emission, shooting past the intended ground receiver and into space, that it could be picked up if a satellite was positioned at the proper point in space. As a result, communications

otherwise considered secure were being vacuumed up by the enterprising Rhyolite system. It has been suggested in a number of open sources that Rhyolite satellites were employed to monitor Arab air defenses and communications during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

Due to orbital and design constraints, data from the Rhyolite satellites was downloaded directly to sites both within and outside the United States. Stations were located at Pine Gap (Australia), Bad Aibling (Germany), Menwith Hill (United Kingdom), and Fort Meade, Maryland, for relay to Buckley Air National Guard Base, Aurora, Colorado. Considered extremely sensitive, data collected at sites outside the United States was airlifted back rather than retransmitted to avoid any possibility of interception. ANDREW B. GODEFROY ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA

SEE ALSO: electronic intelligence; communications; satellites; Cuban Missile Crisis. BIBLIOGRAPHY. D. Baker, ed., Jane’s Space Directory: Eighteenth Edition, 2002-2003 (Jane’s, 2002); J. McDowell, “U.S. Reconnaissance Satellite Programs Part 2,” Quest: The Journal of Spaceflight History (v.4/4, 1995); D. Ball, Pine Gap: Australia and the U.S. Geostationary Signals Intelligence Program (Unwin Hyman, 1988); M. Rip and J. Fontanella, “A Window on the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War of October 1973: Military Photo-Reconnaissance From High Altitude and Space,” Intelligence and National Security (v.6/1, 1991).

Richelieu, Cardinal de BORN IN PARIS, France, September 5, 1585, Car-

dinal de Richelieu was a younger son in a minor French noble family. He planned to enter military service until the resignation of his brother from the Bishopric of Lucon in 1605 offered him the opportunity to advance through the Catholic Church’s hierarchy. He made his name politically at the 1614 StatesGeneral, where he pledged to Louis XIII the clergy’s loyalty and the supremacy of the royal power over all other interests in France. Richelieu also insinuated himself into the circle of Marie de Medici, the queen mother, through enormous gifts and bribes, contacts that led to a 1616 appointment as secretary of state. Richelieu immediately began using state funds to establish a vast network of informers and agents throughout France, a move so threatening

claiming for the French king the right to tax church estates and select bishops. He enhanced French prestige through patronage of the Royal Academy and encouraged the acquisition of colonies in the Caribbean and west Africa (and the application of absolutist governing principles in all French possessions). A firm believer in punishing the most trivial transgression of royal law in the interest of maintaining order, Richelieu even had informers at the village level of French society to make him aware of tax evasion, talk against the monarchy, and regional interests.

Richelieu’s real genius, however, was in using his vast network of agents for the foreign-policy interests of France. An implacable enemy of the Austrian-Spanish Hapsburgs, he worked to ruin their military and diplomatic efforts in the Thirty Years’ War, most successfully using an agent close to the Emperor Ferdinand II to discredit his best general, Albrecht von Wallenstein. Richelieu also masterminded the backing and financing of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden as a combatant. Many of his agents throughout Europe used their positions as fashionable dancing masCardinal de Richelieu used an intelligence network to secure absolutist rule in France in the early 1600s.

that the queen mother accused him, in 1618, of complicity in the murder of her favorite royal ad-

viser and had him banished to Avignon until his return to power as a member of the Council of Ministers and a cardinal in 1624. Richelieu’s political ideas closely followed those of Niccolo Machiavelli (author of The Prince), and he sought to strengthen France through a powerful monarchy and the subordination of aristocratic, religious, and regional factions. In service of this goal, Richelieu used his revived intelligence network to strike at Huguenot Protestants using military force as well as blackmail, assassination, and intimidation. He also relied on his operatives to prosecute plotting members of the royal family such Gaston of Orleans and the queen mother, thus eliminating rivals within the Catholic Church hierarchy. In order to break down regional nobles, he instituted the system of intendents, provincial authori-

ties responsible to the crown, while supporting the buildup of a professional army and navy. The cardinal backed the Gallican church against the pope,

ters, tailors, maids, and fencing masters to obtain the secrets of Europe’s elite. Richelieu also deployed priests and nuns in his service as agents in

the interest of France. A source of vast patronage and influence, Richelieu created a more powerful French government from the medieval structures that survived the 16th century and ruled on behalf of a fundamentally weak monarch, Louis XIII. When he died in Paris on December 4, 1642, he had put in place a functional secret service of immense value to France, and passed it on to his successor, Cardinal Mazarin, and Louis XIV, who continued the absolutist and central-

izing policies begun by Richelieu. MARGARET SANKEY, PH.D. MINNESOTA STATE UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: France; Fouché, Joseph; Bonaparte, Napoleon. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Henry Hill, ed. and trans., The Polit-

ical Testament of Cardinal Richelieu (University of Wisconsin Press, 1964); David Parrott, Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France 1624-1642 (Cambridge University Press, 2001); C.V. Wedgwood, Richelieu and the French Monarchy (English Universities Press, 1949),

Rochefort, Joseph J. JOSEPH JOHN Rochefort had been serving as an intelligence officer aboard a U.S. Navy battleship when, in 1925, he was posted to a codebreaking group organized under Laurance FE. Safford. Saf-

ford’s charge was developing cryptographic skills to break the military and diplomatic codes of foreign nations, with a particular emphasis on Japanese codes. From Safford’s command, Rochefort was sent

for a three-year tour of duty as a naval attaché in Tokyo. Seldom has such a group, the Tokyo U.S. Navy attachés, played so important a role in American intelligence. One of them, Rear Admiral Edwin Layton, would later serve as fleet intelligence officer to Admiral Chester Nimitz during World War II, and later as director of the Naval Intelligence School. Another, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, would become director of Naval Intelligence before moving on to become a deputy director of the CIA. However, as the 1930s wore on and war seemed imminent between the United States and Japan, two devastating blows fell on Safford, Rochefort, and other cryptographers. The incredible number of Japanese coded messages simply overwhelmed the cryptographers and the Office of Naval Intelligence. Also, the Japanese changed the Able cipher, the main way of transmitting information throughout the Japanese fleet. Despite the onslaught of uncoded messages, in October 1940, only two to five people were assigned full-time to breaking the new Japanese naval military code. Tragically, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his advisers focused American cryptanalysis efforts on the Japanese diplomatic code, what came to be known as the PURPLE code. The result was the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese Navy on December 7, 1941. While the U.S. Pacific Fleet was reeling from the attack, renewed efforts were made from Station HYPO, which became the main Pacific Fleet’s cryptography center. Like the Pacific Fleet, Station

HYPO was located at Pearl Harbor. It was here that Layton, Rochefort, Alva Lasswell, and Joseph Finnegan aimed their assault on the Japanese naval code. While Layton was in overall command, Rochefort, in a uniform of a red smoking jacket and carpet slippers, directed the efforts of Laswell and

Vib Joseph J. Rochfort’s codebreaking efforts helped the United States in the decisive Midway battle of World War II.

Finnegan, the latter wearing a green eyeshade to protect his eyes from the florescent lighting. Finally, months of exhausting effort by Rochefort and his staff at Station HYPO bore results: By May 1942, as Ronald Lewin noted in his book, The American MAGIC (1982), “about a third of the code structure had been deciphered.” It soon appeared to an alarmed Nimitz that the Japanese were planning an attack that would complete the destruction of the U.S. fleet. But nobody knew where the Japanese would strike. Then, using a simple ruse, Rochefort and his compatriots realized that the Japanese under Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who had led the attack on Pearl Harbor, intended to strike at the American

base at Midway Island. Suspecting that Midway was the target, the U.S. Navy sent a message in a lowlevel code (intending it to be quickly deciphered by the Japanese) indicating the water desalinization plant at Midway was broken. When the Japanese soon noted in their communications that the target island needed a water supply system, the suspicion

was confirmed. On June 4, 1942, Nimitz was able to spring his trap on Yamamoto and the Japanese fleet.

Pearl Harbor was avenged in the battle of Midway. JOHN F. MuRPHY, JR. AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: PURPLE; World War II; cryptography; American Black Chamber; naval intelligence. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, Pearl Harbor Revisited (1994); Ronald Lewin, The American MAGIC (Viking Press, 1982); Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets (William S. Konocky Association, 1985); Herbert O. Yardley, The American Black Chamber (Aegean Park Press, 1931); Stephen Budiansky, Battle of Wits (Touchstone, 2000); Rudolf Kippenhahn, Codebreaking: A History and Exploration (Overlook Press, 1999).

Rockefeller Commission THE

COMMISSION

In May 1975, the commission concluded its investigation and issued a 300-page report to the president. The commission concluded that the CIA is secret by nature and that most of its activities were within its charter. They did acknowledge that a few activities were possibly illegal, but the agency’s own house-cleaning in 1973 and 1974 alleviated those problems. The report offered 30 recommendations, including: The CIA should be limited to foreign security matters and all domestic intelligence-gathering halted; an executive branch oversight committee should be formed; the agency’s budget should be public; and the CIA should not keep irrelevant files on American citizens. © During the investigation, charges surfaced that the CIA was involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and attempts on the lives of some foreign leaders. Though not part of its charter, the commission investigated these charges. It concluded that there was no evidence that the CIA was involved in Kennedy’s assassination and affirmed the findings of the Warren Commission that Lee Harvey Oswald was Kennedy’s assassin. The commission did not complete its investigation, but turned over the material to Ford.

on CIA Activities in the

MICHAEL C. MILLER

United States, or Rockefeller Commission, was created by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller to investigate charges that the CIA initiated certain activities that were beyond its charter. In light of allegations published in The New York Times in December 1974 and increasing public scrutiny of CIA activities, President Gerald Ford called for a White House investigation of the agency. Two days later, Rockefeller selected John T. Connor, C. Douglas Dillon, Erwin N. Griswold, Lane Kirkland, Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Ronald Reagan, and Edgar F. Shannon, Jr., to serve on the commission. Executive director David W. Belin and a team of 11 attorneys did the investigative work. The commission’s charge (Executive Order 11828) was to determine if CIA domestic activities, specifically the monitoring of the anti-war move-

DALLAS PUBLIC LIBRARY

ment, exceeded its charter and if existing safeguards were sufficient to prevent illegal activities. The first hearing started January 13, 1975, with testimony from CIA Director William Colby and his two predecessors, James Schlesinger and Richard Helms. The investigation continued for five months, two months beyond its original charter.

SEE ALSO: Church, Frank; Colby, William H.; Ford, Gerald R.; Central Intelligence Agency. BIBLIOGRAPHY. U.S. Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, “Report to the President,” (General Printing Office, 1975); Miles Copeland, “The Rockefeller Commission: Is There a CIA In Your Future?” National Review (March 14, 1975); “The Kennedy Assassination Investigation,” The New York Times (June tL, 1975);

Roessler, Rudolf BORN NOVEMBER 27, 1897, in Kaufbeuren, Bavaria, a small town near Munich, Germany, Rudolf Roessler became one of the most effective spies of World War II. After seeing service in the German Army in World War I, he entered a career in journalism, working as a reporter in Augsburg

and later in Berlin, where he became a literary critic. With the collapse of the Weimar Republic in 1933 and the rise of Adolf Hitler and Nazi party in Germany, Roessler, who detested the Nazis and their policies, moved to Switzerland where he established a publishing house, the Vita Nova Verlag (New Life Publisher), in Lucerne. A dedicated

anti-Nazi,

Roessler was never

a

communist. His publishing business was successful enough for him to make many trips between Switzerland and Germany where he was in touch with others who had similar opinions of Hitler and his policies. Many of his friends in Germany occupied high-level positions within the government and spied against Hitler’s regime. (This group was referred to by the Gestapo as the Red Orchestra, or Rote Kapelle). Through his contacts, Roessler came in possession of some of Germany’s strategic military plans. Not knowing what to do with the information, he contented himself with striking back at the Nazis

through a small Catholic publication, Die Entscheidung (The Decision). One of the sponsors of Roessler’s publication was Xaver Schnieper, an ardent Marxist. Schnieper soon realized that Roessler possessed an extraordinary gift; he could retain the details of troop movements down to the company level, or facts about the manufacturing of tanks, munitions, and planes. Roessler began feeding his high-level information to Schnieper and the Bureau Ha, the unofficial Swiss intelligence agency that collected data on Germany. Through Bureau Ha, Roessler provided the Allies with precise battle plans of the German armies as they invaded France, Belgium, and Holland. Roessler never communicated directly with the Soviet spy network in Switzerland, codenamed DORA, under an agent codenamed LUCY. Roessler’s information was given to DORA by a friend. Through LUCY, the Soviets learned the strength, location, and composition of all German forces on the Eastern Front. FRANK R. DURR U.S. ARMY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE Corps, RET.

SEE ALSO: LUCY Ring; Switzerland; World War II. BIBLIOGRAPHY. P. Accoce and P. Quet, A Man Called LUCY (Doubleday, 1968); Anthony Read and David Fisher, Operation LUCY (Coward McCann, 1981).

Romania THE FORMATION of Romanian intelligence services can be dated back to the Soviet Union’s oc-

cupation of the country following World War II. In 1948, shortly after the Soviet-supported communist movement

seized power, the new government

created the Directia Generala a Securitattii Poporului (DGSP), better known as the Securitate. The Securitate would become one of the most notorious and feared internal security agencies within the Communist Bloc. Between 1948 and 1964, when Romania was led by Gheorghe Gheaorghiu-Dej, the Securitate oversaw a widespread system of terror, mass arrest, and internal deportation modeled after the Stalinist regime. Many leading DSGP officials were in fact Soviet agents, and the agency’s primary function was to crush any internal opposition to the communist state and the continuing presence of Soviet troops in the country. Tens of thousands of Romanians were arrested and imprisoned. After the fall of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1964, and the death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in 1965, the new communist regime headed by Nicolae Ceausescu attempted to reduce direct Soviet influence in Romania. In an effort to bring the Securitate under tighter control and to eliminate any threat to his position, Ceausescu reorganized the Romanian security service and purged many high-ranking officials. From this point onward, the Securitate remained under the direct authority of Ceausescu. Although Ceausescu did not resort to the sort of mass arrests that characterized his predecessor’s regime, the Securitate engaged in numerous operations against Ceausescu’s internal and external enemies. These included widespread efforts to intimidate Romanian society with an omnipresent network of operatives and agents. At the height of its power, the Securitate had as many as 20,000 members in addition to over 70,000 informants. Romanian intelligence operations were severely shaken in July 1978 when Ion Mihai Pacepa, deputy minister of the Interior Department and head of the Securitate’s foreign intelligence operations, defected to the United States. Pacepa’s defection destroyed the Securitate’s overseas network and deeply undermined the authority of the Ceausescu regime.

the Department of State Security. The new agency includes divisions responsible for foreign intelligence, organized-crime investigations, electronic in-

telligence, and protection services for officials. JAMES H. LIDE History ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED

SEE ALSO: Soviet Union; Warsaw Pact.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, eds., Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies (Palgrave, 2001); Edward Behr, Kiss the Hand You Cannot Bite: The Rise and Fall of the Ceaucescus (Villard Books, 1991); Nicholas Dima, Journey to Freedom (Selous Foundation Press, 1990).

Roosevelt, Franklin D.

Ceausescu (shown with his wife in the 1970s) used intelligence services to repress pro-democracy movements.

In the 1980s, the Securitate played a large role in supporting Ceausescu’s efforts to build a personality cult. The agency also orchestrated a series of assassination attempts against prominent Romanian

exiles, including several that were carried out by the Palestinian Liberation Organization. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Ceausescu regime came

under increasing pressure from

the Romanian democracy movement. Unlike other eastern European communist leaders, however, Ceausescu responded by using the Securitate in a heavy-handed effort to repress pro-democracy supporters. On December 17, 1989, Securitate agents and army troops fired upon a rally being held in Timisoara, killing thousands. Rather than destroying the movement, however, the massacre energized Ceausescu’s opponents, who toppled the regime and executed Ceausescu and his wife a week later. After

fall of Ceausescu,

a new

democratic

regime disbanded the Securitate, replacing it with

PRESIDENT FRANKLIN Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR, 1933-45) intelligence policy developed in response to the pressure of great events. Originally, FDR’s principal source of intelligence was William Bullitt, who simultaneous with Roosevelt’s official recognition of Russia, became the first U.S. ambassador there (1933-36), subsequently serving as Ambassador to France (1936-40). Bullitt, who provided the president with information about Europe in general, as well as Asia and Africa, took an arsenal of talent with him to Moscow. With him went many who later helped define Cold War policy, including George Kennan, naval attaché Roscoe Hillenkoetter (who became the first head of the CIA in 1947), and Charles E. (“Chip”) Bohlen, an important U.S. diplomat. After France’s surrender to Germany in 1940 in World War II, Bullitt became the president’s ambassadorat-large. Another intelligence source was the informal secret society begun in 1927 called the Room, which included FDR’s childhood friend, Vincent Astor; grandson of former President Theodore Roosevelt, (FDR’s cousin) Kermit Roosevelt; Andrew Mellon heir David Bruce; Chase Bank’s Winthrop Aldrich; Trubee Davison (son of former J.P. Morgan partner), and other members of the Social Register, some with close links with British intelligence.

Many of these men participated in the World War I preparedness movement through volunteer military training at Plattsburgh, New York, or like FDR, in the National Security League. A number were also members of the Council on Foreign Relations, the unofficial policy planning organization, and many either had played or came to play important roles in the diplomatic and intelligence services. With their connections in private business, including banks and telegraph and cable companies, these members of the U.S. power elite allowed the president to gather intelligence unofficially.

Intelligence before Pearl Harbor. FDR expanded funding for intelligence activities, prompted by revelations of German spying in America and the worsening geopolitical situation. FDR sought at once to force coordination between existing branches of the intelligence community while creating new ones. Aside from the traditional intelligence sections within the military, in 1940 FDR created the Office of the Coordinator of InterAmerican Affairs, headed by Nelson Rockefeller and designed to promote U.S. interests in Latin America. Vincent Astor was eventually named intelligence coordinator for New York in 1940. The most important of FDR’s intelligence personnel, though, aside from those in signals intelligence, was William ‘Wild Bill” Donovan. Donovan became a sort of roving intelligence ambassador in the late 1930s, sizing up the globe from Europe to the Middle East. Of great significance here was the willingness of British officials to reveal much (though certainly not all) of their intelligence secrets to Donovan during his second mission to Europe and the Middle East on the president’s behalf in 1940-41, as they sought to create an equally strong secret service in the United States to help England in the war effort. Critical in the creation of a centralized U.S. intelligence service was the head of the MI-6’s U.S. cover organization, the British Security Co-ordination (BSC), Sir William Stephenson (codename INalso known as “Little Bill”), who TREPID, collaborated in these efforts with Donovan (“Big Bill”). The British, working with Donovan and others, thus helped lay the groundwork for the creation of the Coordinator of Information (COI) and Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Donovan headed both these predecessors to the Central Intelligence Agency. The director of British Naval Intelligence,

Admiral Godfrey, and his aide, Ian Fleming, author of the James Bond book series, played supporting roles. The COI was responsible to the president directly, while the later OSS was formally under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which was also modeled after its British counterpart. Donovan was to coordinate all intelligence information and assessment, along with carrying out related espionage and covert activities. Yet the decrypted Japanese diplomatic cables, MAGIC, along with the German ENIGMA and Japanese military intercepts the British decoded were denied to Donovan and his people throughout World War II. ULTRA was fundamental to the Allied victory in the war, playing an important role in the battle for the Atlantic, necessary for re-supply of British forces and for U.S. advancement toward Europe between 1939 and 1945. U.S. signals intelligence took some time to get up and running. After the early U.S. cryptography department, Black Chamber, had been shut down in 1929, the Army’s Signal Intelligence Service

(SIS) and the Navy Code and Signal Section largely took over these responsibilities in the 1930s. The SIS cracked the key Japanese diplomatic cipher in 1936. By 1937 the decrypted messages began to be delivered to the president just about every day. The intercepts revealed a host of information about the coming wartime geopolitical alliances, yet Roosevelt appears to have been more fascinated by his personal human-intelligence networks, allowing a bizarre division of labor between the U.S. Army and Navy, who alternated in producing the intercepts on odd and even days. Related inter-service rivalry and presidential lack of interest ensured that the distribution to the president was nototiously erratic and at times did not even reach him. Nevertheless, the intelligence intercepts did provide growing confirmation of Japanese plans for all-out war. Their messages of November 1941, for example, gave information in coded signals to their embassies to alert them of the imminent break of diplomatic relations with Washington, and hence the need to destroy codes and secret documents. Inter-service rivalry, presidential inattention, lack of resources devoted to cryptography, and too closely held distribution plagued U.S. intelligence. As noted, Donovan was unaware of this most important Japanese signals intelligence. Critically, the variant of the basic Japanese naval code, which would have revealed the contents of

Franklin Roosevelt (center) meets with Josef Stalin (left) and Winston Churchill (right) at the Tehran Conference in 1943. The three

allies shared intelligence on Nazi Germany, but Churchill and Roosevelt were suspicious of Stalin’s postwar intentions.

Japanese naval traffic and the coming Pearl Harbor attack, was not cracked. A major part of the reason the code wasn’t broken was that there were only two to eight cryptanalysts working on the entirety of Japan’s naval codes and ciphers, and the higher number only in late 1941. National Security Agency (NSA) historians and intelligence experts today believe the attack could have been foreseen.

FDR’s wartime intelligence policy. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor underscored the importance of intelligence and espionage activities throughout World War II in both Asia and Europe. Yet, various parts of the federal government remained protective of turf and influence, blunting FDR’s haphazard efforts toward a central intelligence system. With the country behind the war after Pearl Harbor, drastic anti-espionage measures were taken

at home, with tens of thousands of Japanese-American citizens (some 110,000 of Japanese descent altogether) interned in barbed-wire camps for three years. The distribution of signals intelligence to the president improved after Pearl Harbor. In the six months that followed, with the help of MAGIC intercepts of Japan’s war plans, the United States made increasing headway against Japanese forces in the Pacific, from the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942 to the Battle of Midway in June. Midway represented a real intelligence victory, allowing for a surprise attack on Japan’s forces seeking to capture the island of Midway in the north Pacific. Japan had planned to use Midway Island to repel U.S. forces, drawing them out so they could be destroyed, thus paving the way for Japan’s own advance toward Hawaii.

A major change in the intelligence situation was British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s abandonment of his initial reluctance to share signals intelligence with Roosevelt. At the end of 1942, Britain cracked the German U-boat ENIGMA code. Quickly a quantum leap in cooperation between the America and England occurred, formalized with the 1943 British-U.S. agreement. This cooperation was similar to the global division of responsibilities Donovan had worked out earlier in other realms between the OSS, MI-6, and later MI-5. The U.S.-U.K. agreements negotiated by Donovan and his British counterparts in the summer of 1942 provided for a global division of labor in intelligence operations. The British had sole responsibility for India, while the United States operated alone in China, Japan, Manchuria, and Korea. Responsibilities were assigned to each country for the rest of the world as well. The signals-intelligence agreements provided the basis for expanded Anglo-American intelligence cooperation with the British dominions of Australasia and Canada, in the highly secret U.K.-U.S. agreement of 1947.

Donovan’s COI and OSS under FDR. Despite the lack of signals intelligence access that undercut the reality of Donovan’s role as an intelligence coordinator, his leadership of COI and OSS nevertheless represented the beginnings of the centralization of U.S. intelligence. In this sense, Donovan’s reputation as the true founder of the post-World War I] CIA is well deserved. From a one-man operation utilizing his extensive connections before U.S. entry into the war, to the victory in Europe and Japan, Donovan built up his intelligence empire to well over 10,000 persons. There was much intelligence infighting, limiting the scope of Donovan’s global influence in Asia and Europe. Nevertheless, at the end of war, with the transfer of secret knowledge from the British, the scope of OSS influence undoubtedly eased the transition from British to U.S. global hegemony. Participants in Donovan’s COIJ/OSS read like the pages of Who’s Who, including power elites such as corporate lawyer Allen Dulles, who had facilitated

investment banking in Germany and Europe during the interwar period, the sons of J. P. Morgan, to journalist Joseph Alsop, the Vanderbilts, Whitneys, Duponts, Dillons and so on, not to mention future directors of the CIA, such as Richard Helms and William Casey.

The OSS proved its worth in a host of areas, from the various branches to Operation TORCH, the Anglo-American invasion of French Northwest Africa in November 1942, one of the first significant U.S. offensives of the war. The OSS helped prepare the groundwork through its liaisons with local sympathizers of French forces in the area who helped guide the invading forces when they landed. Donovan’s OSS also contributed to keeping the pressure on Germany’s Southern Front that was helpful in the overall efforts at strategic deception designed to ensure that Adolf Hitler would not shift his forces toward France. This was all part of the run-up to Operation OVERLORD, the codename for the largest amphibious land invasion in world history on the Normandy beaches in occupied France on June 6, 1944. The OSS was involved on many fronts, among the most impressive were the roughly 3,000 members of Research and Analysis (R&A). They drew on the resources and expertise of the Library of Congress and its staffers to produce literally thousands of studies by the end of the war. Some of the analysis was prescient, such as the support of air target-selection analysts for precision bombing raids instead of the strategic bombing doctrine proponents who carried out the fire-bombings of Dresden, Hamburg (Germany) and Tokyo (Japan). Additionally, RGA, unlike many later intelligence experts, explicitly analyzed not only capabilities but also intentions. Yet, many correct assessments by RGA, for example that the Axis would not be able to build an atomic bomb, were not taken into consideration by policy makers, who continued with their own Abomb project. Considered among the most significant intelligence gathered by OSS was the operation of Dulles in neutral Switzerland. Dulles had cultivated Fritz Kolbe of the German Foreign Ministry, who, beginning in 1943, supplied a massive number of documents to U.S. intelligence via Dulles, giving a striking picture of the beginning of the end of the Third Reich. Though the allies officially demanded unconditional surrender of enemy forces, Dulles personally helped negotiate with Nazi General Karl Wolff the surrender of roughly one million Nazi soldiers in Italy, in what was called Operation SUNRISE. Operation SUNRISE, the planning for which had begun before FDR’s death and was finished

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| it QEORET DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

December 27, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Subject:

Soviet Codes

set the stage for Cold War distrust between the Soviets and the Western allies. FDR’s abrupt death left a vacuum in the direction of the intelligence services, resulting in President Harry Truman’s dismantling of the OSS, and then his establishing of the CIA as part of the National Security Act of 1947. Ultimately, though, much of the massive intelligence community that we have today traces its roots back to the days of FDR.

You will recall our conversation on the Soviet: codes. I have informed General Donovan that he should send through General Deane in Moscow to General Fetin,

THOMAS EHRLICH REIFER, PH.D. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE

the Soviet General with whom Donovan deals on all

matters connected with the exchange of information

in his field, a message informing the Soviet Government that in dealing with other matters one of our agencies had run across certain material which purported to be related to Russian messages sent in code. He was also asked to explain that we had taken advantage of the opportunity to prevent this material

from failing into the hands of the enemy and that we would immediately make it available to the Soviet if they so desired.

Government

I feel sure that this will take care of the matter, as the Soviet Government will be informed and will see that we are fully disposed to cooperate with them and not retain any material which they themselves might desire to have.

DECLASSIFIED State Dept. Lettax, 1411-72

- ByJ. Seheuble Date FEB_18 1972

A declassified memo to Roosevelt discusses Soviet codes and

the sharing of intelligence.

soon thereafter, remains the subject of bitter historical controversy, being seen by many as implicated in the origins of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Wolff had been personal adjutant to Hitler’s deputy, Heinrich Himmler, in 1933 and by war’s end was second only to him in Hitler’s SS. The Soviets demanded inclusion in the Bern, Switzerland, negotiations of Operation SUNRISE. Since it was an area the Anglo-American powers considered their theater of war, they refused, inviting the Russians to come instead to later meetings in a liberated Italy. The Russians responded by breaking off communications on the subject. Soon-after FDR’s death, the secret surrender went ahead as planned, helping to

SEE ALSO: Donovan, William J.; Coordinator of Information; Office of Strategic Services; Central Intelligence

Agency. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (HarperCollins, 1995); Anthony Cave Brown, Wild Bill Donovan: The Last Hero (Times Books, 1982); William R. Corson, The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire (Dial Press, 1977); Burton Hersh, The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA (Charles Scribners, 1992); Thomas Powers, Heisenberg’s War: The Secret History of the German Bomb (Little, Brown, 1993); Bradley FE. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA (Basic Books, 1983); Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (University Publications of America, 1984); Thomas F. Troy, Wild Bill and INTREPID: Donovan, Stephenson, and the Origin of the CIA (Yale University Press, 1996).

Roosevelt, Kermit CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Agency officer Kermit Roosevelt led a 1953 coup that replaced Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh with Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Scion of one of America’s greatest political families, Kermit Roosevelt was the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt and the cousin of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Born in Buenos Aires, Argentina, he grew up on Long Island, New York, and later attended Harvard Uni-

versity, graduating in 1937. He taught at his alma mater and at the California Institute of Technology. During World War II, Roosevelt served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). After the war, he wrote the official history of the OSS and performed intelligence work in Egypt as well. In 1952, Roosevelt became involved in Iranian affairs. That year, pro-communist Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh moved against the shah and seized Western-owned oil fields for the Iranian people. During the early 1950s, Iran was a country of interest for both the Soviets and the West, offering access to vast oil reserves and the Persian Gulf for the Soviets, and providing the United States a position to observe the Soviet Union at close range. In 1953, British and American officials put into effect a plan called AJAX to preserve the shah in power and prevent Iran from falling to the communists. Roosevelt, head of the Middle East department of the CIA, was placed in charge and, after months of planning, slipped into Iran in July. In conversation with the shah, he stated that he planned to use four lines of attack, working with the Iranian mullahs (religious leaders), the army, the agents in the country, and seeking help from General Zahedi, who would replace Mossadegh as prime minister.

The coup began to take shape slowly the following month, often leaving Roosevelt with little to do but wait. The shah dismissed Mossadegh, prompting the prime minister to move to seize all power in the country. Although the shah fled the country and CIA headquarters gave Roosevelt permission to cancel the operation, Roosevelt kept his head. He continued

to

organize

demonstrations

against

Mossadegh and distributed money to Mossadegh’s opponents, and finally began to succeed. On August 22, the shah returned to Iran; Mossadegh went into hiding and was arrested several days later. Reporting to his superiors after his return to America, Roosevelt attributed the success of the operation to an accurate understanding of the situ-

ation inside Iran. He also warned that success would have been impossible without the help of the Iranian army and people. And he warned of dire consequences if other operations were undertaken without such an understanding and support. Although he was offered command of CIA operations in Guatemala, Roosevelt declined. He later resigned from the CIA and worked in business. Roosevelt published Countercoup, an account of his

activities in Iran, in 1979. He died in 2000 of complications from a stroke. MITCHELL MCNAYLOR Our LADY OF THE LAKE COLLEGE

SEE ALSO: Iran; Office of Strategic Services. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Burton Hersh, The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA (Tree Farm Books, 2002); Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle For the Control of Iran (McGraw-Hill, 1979).

Roosevelt, Theodore WHEN THEODORE Roosevelt assumed the presidency of the United States after the assassination in September 1901 of President William McKinley, he inherited an increasingly sophisticated system of intelligence collection from a variety of government and military sources. Roosevelt also inherited oversight of several foreign jurisdictions awarded to the United States at the conclusion of the SpanishAmerican War. The intelligence activities, largely overseen by the War, Navy, and State Departments, were essential for obtaining accurate and timely information on the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. These same agencies also provided Roosevelt with salient intelligence information on significant foreign policy issues that arose during Roosevelt’s time in office, especially the Russo-Japanese War, Panama’s secession from Colombia, and major events in China, Morocco, and the Caribbean. A variety of intelligence was collected by the United States. Reports filed by U.S. diplomats and naval attachés stationed throughout Europe and other sensitive areas; these were particularly useful intelligence estimates. On many occasions, agents from the U.S. Navy, who had a number of notable successes during the Spanish-American War, were also dispatched to collect sensitive information, and the Office of Naval Intelligence briefed Roosevelt through weekly bulletins. To supplement information collected by U.S. government and military personnel, the Roosevelt administration collected intelligence gathered by businessmen, newspaper reporters, and foreign diplomats.

Secretary of State John Hay sent a well-publicized telegram to the Moroccans, ordering “Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead.” Evidence was presented that Perdicaris was actually a Greek citizen, but Roosevelt wanted to avoid a loss of face that would have resulted from recalling the fleet. After a series of intelligence reports from U.S. personnel stationed in the region, Roosevelt determined that the Moroccans were willing to secure the release, despite the fact that quiet diplomatic efforts were on the verge of securing the captive’s release from Perdicaris. Humiliated Moroccan officials promptly released Perdicaris.

Caribbean and South America. Intelligence esti-

Teddy Roosevelt’s administration created the domestic intelligence agency that eventually became today’s FBI.

mates were also essential on two occasions when U.S. and European interests collided in the Caribbean and South America. In late 1902, German and British ships blockaded several Venezuelan ports in an effort to force payment of debts. Roosevelt said little publicly. After dispatching U.S. military vessels to the region, Roosevelt maneuvered behind the scenes to arrange a peaceful solution that would not involve a continuing European presence in the area. Roosevelt successfully employed a disinformation campaign to convince European interests that the United States would enter into a military conflict to prevent European

These networks of government and private interests frequently provided U.S. intelligence personnel with information on the strength of specific military units, locations and morale of troops, character of the officers, conditions of roads, and studies of topography for possible operational activities. The sophisticated intelligence networks routinely

sent valuable intelligence reports to military and diplomatic personnel about the military and political situations during the Russo-Japanese War, Panama’s secession from Colombia, and major events involving U.S. interests in China, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Morocco, and Venezuela.

Morocco. The north African nation of Morocco drew the attention of the Roosevelt administration after the capture of a Western businessperson by a Moroccan warlord. In May 1904, Ion Perdicaris, a wealthy merchant and apparently naturalized U.S. citizen living in Morocco, was seized by a Moroccan chieftain named Raisuli and held for ransom. Roosevelt hurriedly dispatched warships to Tangier, and

powers—particularly Germany—from gaining a foothold in the Caribbean, where they might become a threat to the construction of a canal that would link the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In 1904, U.S. and German interests collided over the Dominican Republic, which owed other nations, primarily European states, more than $32 million. Once again, an armed intervention by Germany loomed. The intelligence efforts that led to a successful conclusion of the Venezuelan controversy were employed, including information-gathering by naval attachés throughout Europe on German intentions in the region, and a disinformation campaign from U.S. diplomats stationed in Washington, D.C., which included routine threats to engage German vessels in combat. The ruse was successful. A treaty was negotiated in 1905, which required Dominican officials to earmark 55 percent of revenues for debt repayment. European investors cheered the agreement and demonstrated their appreciation by cutting the Dominican debt in half. The growing intelligence operations against U.S. interests resulted in the

successful removal of European threats to the U.S. sphere of influence and provided a period of relative stability and peace before the onset of World War I. Bureau of Investigation. Despite the contributions made by the increasingly sophisticated use of intelligence networks overseen by U.S. military and diplomatic personnel, the most important contribution by the Roosevelt administration to the U.S. intelligence community was the creation of a domestic intelligence agency that would become the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The creation of a domestic agency to investigate federal crimes required dogged determination from Roosevelt. Until this time, federal investigations were limited in scope, and most criminal acts were considered local matters. When agents were needed to investigate possoble violations of federal statutes, the Attorney General requested assistance from the Secret Service. However, by 1907, members of Congress had little taste for the reforms initiated by Roosevelt, especially his trust-busting activities, and threats to investigate the business dealings of members of Congress. In an effort to block the use of Secret Service agents, Congress adopted an appropriations rider on May 27, 1908, restricting Secret Service investigations to a small number of tasks, including investigations into counterfeiting rings, and protecting the president. Roosevelt was determined to create a federal investigative body. In late June 1908, after Congress retired for the summer, Roosevelt, with the assistance of Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte, created an unnamed agency of 34 special agents within the Justice Department. Members of Congress were incensed. After returning from the summer break, some in Congress called for the impeachment of Roosevelt, and, in early January 1909, a House of Representatives session was devoted to a debate over the newly created investigative unit. To appease critics of the plan, Bonaparte met with members of Congress and agreed that the special agents would have a restricted purview, such as investigations

on

antitrust

cases,

interstate

com-

merce violations, land fraud schemes, banking laws, crimes aimed at federal employees, and statutes not

overseen by other federal agencies. The restricted mandate lasted for only one year. The investigative powers of the agency were expanded under the

“White Slave” Trafficking Act of 1910, commonly known as the Mann Act, which outlawed the interstate transportation of women for immoral purposes. The addition of prostitution to the crimes handled by the new agency, staffed by investigators known as special agents, nearly doubled the staff of the small bureau to 64 employees, including nine support agents. Bonaparte’s successor, George W.

Wickersham, renamed the agency the Bureau of Investigation, and the number of criminal investigations overseen by the bureau increased with each passing yeat.

After the United States entered World War I, the bureau was invested with authority to investigate the activities of enemy aliens and acts of espionage, and after the war, the bureau was vested with power to conduct investigations into interstate commerce crimes. Since the early decades of the 20th century, the powers of the FBI have expanded well beyond the initial mandate approved by Congress. In short, Roosevelt’s lasting contribution to the intelligence community includes his efforts to maintain the intelligence capabilities developed during the Spanish-American War, and the creation of a bureau that evolved into the largest domestic intelligence-gathering agency in the United States. TRIFIN ROULE

NORTHROP GRUMMAN

SEE ALSO: Spanish-American War; Federal Bureau of Investigation; World War I. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ronald Kessler, The Bureau: The Secret History of the FBI (St. Martin’s Press, 2002); Nathan Miller, Theodore Roosevelt: A Life (Morrow, 1992); Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex (Random House, 2001); Athan G. Theoharis et al., eds., The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference (Oryx Press, 1999); Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., Theodore Roosevelt and the Art of Controversy (Louisiana State University Press, 1970).

Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel JULIUS ROSENBERG (1918-53) and Ethel Greenglass Rosenberg (1915-53) were the first married couple tried under the Espionage Act of 1917, the

first two Americans executed for espionage in peacetime, and the last two civilians executed for espionage in America. Their trial and execution sparked worldwide protests at the time and remains a topic of heated controversy more than half a century later. Julius Rosenberg and Ethel Greenglass did not meet until 1935, but they had similar backgrounds. Both were born into impoverished immigrant families on Manhattan’s Lower East Side. Neither childhood was happy, though Ethel’s was worse due to an emotionally abusive mother and a bout with rickets that left her with lifelong back problems. Both were very bright students at Downtown Talmud Torah (where Julius became a zealous student of Hebrew scripture), and both graduated early from Seward. Park High School (where Ethel excelled in theater). Both discovered Marxism during the Depression and saw it as the greatest hope for the world’s workers. In 1934, Julius Rosenberg entered the electrical engineering program at City College of New York (CCNY), and diminutive Ethel led 150 coworkers at her $7-per-week office job in a strike that soon turned violent. Julius joined CCNY’s branch of the Young Communist League to which many of his classmates, including his friend Morton Sobell, already belonged, while Ethel joined a women’s branch of the organization across town, often leading members in song. Twenty-year-old Ethel met 17-year-old Julius when she sang at a union meeting he attended. Their attraction was immediate, though they waited until after Julius’s 1939 college graduation to marry. The Rosenbergs were atheists by this time, yet they matried in a traditional Jewish ceremony. Ethel’s favorite brother, David Greenglass, stood at her side. Though Julius finished toward the bottom of his class, he found civil service employment as a $2,000-per-year engineer stationed at Emerson Radio Corps, a civilian contractor for the U.S Army Signal Corps. He lied about his political affiliations to get the job, claiming he was not a Marxist when, in fact, he was the chairman of Branch 16-B of the American Communist Party. He performed his job well enough that he received regular raises and promotions, earning $3,600 per year by the end of World War II. In addition to a comfortable middleclass lifestyle, the job provided Julius with access to design plans and prototypes for radio electronic devices.

(The details of the Rosenbergs’ lives from 1942 until 1950 are hotly debated. The following recon-

struction is based on trial testimony not later discredited, on uncontested records, and on informa-

tion supplied by’ former KGB colonel Alexander Feklisov in a 1997 interview.) At a Labor Day picnic in 1942, KGB (Soviet intelligence) officer Semen Semenoy, using the codename HENRY, recruited Rosenberg as a spy for the Soviet Union. HENRY fed Julius’s hunger for tales of Soviet guerrilla fighters and convinced him that the destruction of Nazism hinged on the Soviet Union being privy to American military technology. Already horrified by early accounts of Nazi atrocities against Jews and convinced that ideological bigotry was preventing aid to the Soviet people and prolonging the war, Rosenberg eagerly agreed to help. Rosenberg’s initial acts of espionage consisted of sneaking files from the plant to HENRY for photographing, then sneaking them back to the company. Though this was an extremely high-risk endeavor, he received only token compensation, his motives being ideological rather than financial. Around the same time, he began to recruit accomplices from among his friends, including Morton Sobell and neighbors Mike and Ann Sidorovich. HENRY returned to Russia in 1943 and was replaced with Feklisov, who used his real first name, ALEX, as his codename. ALEX and Rosenberg met more than 50 times, usually on Sundays (when, according to Feklisov, there were fewer FBI agents on duty) and always in public places. (Feklisov never met Ethel Rosenberg.) Feklisov provided Julius with a Leica microfilm camera that enabled him to photograph documents and electronics inside the factory. According to Ruth Greenglass, Feklisov also gave the Rosenbergs a console table with a secret compartment for hiding microfilm later used as physical evidence at their trial. Most of Rosenberg’s intelligence concerned military radio electronics manufactured at Emerson. The Soviet government’s greatest desire for knowledge, however, was the Manhattan Project, and when Feklisov’s superiors learned that David Greenglass was stationed at Los Alamos, New Mexico, Rosenberg was asked to recruit him. The holiday season of 1944 was the most audacious period in the short history of the Rosenberg spy ring. Just before Thanksgiving, Julius recruited his 19-year-old sister-in-law, Ruth, as an assistant in his espionage, giving her $150 for a trip to see her husband and word-of-mouth instructions for David

furlough in January 1945. Greenglass provided a crude diagram and a description, in his own handwriting, of the lens mold used on A-bombs and promised further information. Rosenberg announced that Ann Sidorovich would soon visit AL buquerque, New Mexico, where she would arrange to meet Ruth and exchange information. As a safeguard in case Sidorovich was not able to make the journey, Rosenberg cut an empty Jell-O box into two pieces, gave one half to the Greenglasses, and told them that whoever came for the information would bring the other half and say “I come from Julius.” The person who ultimately came was Harry Gold. According to Feklisov, the lens mold information had already been provided by Soviet spy Klaus Fuchs and other highly placed sources, and as such was essentially worthless to Moscow. The proximity fuse was the most valuable intelligence ever relayed by Rosenberg; it was used in 1960 to down an American U-2 spy plane over Soviet airspace. Ironically, it was the useless information and not the proximity fuse that cost the Rosenbergs their lives.

é

Julius Rosenberg, in an FBI photo, was found guilty of espionage and executed on June 19, 1953.

on what information was needed and how to channel it. ALEX and Rosenberg had actually become friends and, though Rosenberg was born Jewish and both men were atheists, they exchanged Christmas gifts on Christmas Eve 1944. Alex gave Rosenberg a steel watch for himself, an alligator handbag for Ethel, and a teddy bear for their 20month-old son, Michael. Rosenberg gave ALEX a completely functional proximity fuse he had assembled from parts and plans stolen from Emerson and smuggled out in his briefcase. Feklisov passed the piece to his superiors, who were delighted by the gift but furious at Rosenberg’s unnecessary risk. Rosenberg responded, “What I was risking was only one-hundredth of what a Red Army soldier risks when he attacks a tank.” The Greenglasses visited the Rosenbergs while David was on

The noose tightens. In late 1945, Rosenberg was fired from his position when the U.S. Army Signal Corps discovered his membership in the Communist Party. Julius and Ethel had not attended meetings or associated with known communists for years in order to avert suspicion.

Life was never

again comfortable for the Rosenbergs, financially or otherwise. Feklisov returned to Russia in 1946 and at their final meeting gave Rosenberg $1,000 “for possible emergencies.’ Concern that Rosenberg was under surveillance prevented Soviet intelligence from contacting him further. Rosenberg used the money for living expenses, for the machine business he opened with Ethel’s brothers that failed, and for the family’s medical bills. Ethel’s back problems and migraines left her a near invalid after the birth of her second son, Robert, in 1948.

The detonation of an A-bomb by the Soviet Union in 1949 increased government concern over information leaks. In February 1950, two events signaled the beginning of one of the darkest eras in American history: Fuchs was arrested for espionage and Senator Joseph McCarthy delivered his famous “205 Communists in the State Department” speech in Wheeling, West Virginia. There was panic among all who could be linked to Fuchs, and Rosenberg

heightening American fear of communism even further. On July 17, Rosenberg had just lathered his face for his morning shave when the knock came on

the door and he was formally taken into custody. Bail was set at $100,000.

The next morning’s New York Times described him as “the fourth American held ...in connection with the passing of United States atomic secrets to the Soviet Union.” While Rosenberg was frontpage news, the day’s largest headline, “Red Charges

Ethel Rosenberg, who had a far smaller role in the espionage ring, was executed shortly after her husband, Julius.

begged the Greenglasses to leave the country. The Rosenbergs and the Greenglasses both posed for passport photos in late May, and Rosenberg acquired $4,000 “from a friend” to help his in-laws relocate. After some equivocating, Greenglasses refused to flee.

however,

the

David Greenglass was arrested for conspiracy to commit espionage as defined under the Espionage Act of 1917 on June 16, 1950. Rosenberg was questioned and released the following day, but he was ordered not to leave the city. He retained the services of attorney Emmanuel Bloch and waited for the inevitable arrest. The knock on the door. On June 25, 1950, North Korea, with Soviet leader Josef Stalin’s approval, invaded South Korea, beginning the Korean War and

by M’Carthy [sic] Ruled False,” reported the majority opinion of a Senatorial investigative subcommittee that McCarthy’s allegations were “perhaps the most nefarious campaign of half-truths and untruth in the history of this republic.” McCarthy and his allies needed validity and villains if they were to retain power, and the Rosenberg ring supplied both. Much to her surprise, Ethel Rosenberg was arrested moments after testifying before a federal grand jury investigating subversive activities on August 11, 1950. She was officially charged with recruiting her brother to spy for the Soviet Union, though her attorney, Alexander Bloch (Emmanuel’s father), argued that her arrest was nothing more than a ploy to gain leverage against her husband. Her bail was also set at $100,000. The Rosenbergs refused to name names or testify against others in exchange for leniency. They were indicted by a federal grand jury, along with David Greenglass, Morton Sobell, and Soviet intelligence officer Anatoly Yakovlev, on January 31, 1951, though they were tried separately. Their trial began on March 6, 1951, the evidence against Ethel so slight that few informed spectators believed she would be convicted. The judge was Irving Kaufman, a young jurist known for his encyclopedic knowledge of law and his no-nonsense courtroom. U.S. Attorney Irving Saypol, who had convicted Alger Hiss, was appointed special prosecutor and was assisted by the young and ruthlessly ambitious, Roy Cohn. Cohn (dubbed “the polestar of human evil” by playwright Tony Kushner) became McCarthy’s right-hand man after the trial and in later years boasted of his ex parte discussions with Kaufman and Saypol and other illegal manipulations during the trial. The Greenglasses, who had turned state’s evidence in exchange for lighter sentences, gave by far the most damning testimony. After implicating Julius, Greenglass testified that his sister knew of her husband’s espionage activities and had even

21 September

1944

To VIKTOR [i). gress).

Lately

the development

of new people

[D% has been in pro-

LIBERAL[ii] recommended the wife of his wife's brother, Ruth GREENGLASS, with a safe flat in view. She is 21 years old,

& TOWNSWOMAN since

[GOROZhANKA] [iii], a GYMNAST [PIZKUL'TURNITSA] [iv] She lives on STANTON [STANTAUN] Street. LIBERAL and recommend her as an intelligent and clever girl.

1942.

his wife

[15 groups

unrecoverable]

(C% Ruth) learned that her husband[v] was called up b the army but he was not sent to the front. He is a mechanical engineer and is

now working at the ENORMOUS

[ENORMOZ] [vi] plant in SANTA FE, New

Mexico.

[45 groups

unrecoverable]

A portion of a decrypted and declassified VENONA message that implicated Julius Rosenberg and Ruth Greenglass. In the message, “LIBERAL” is Rosenberg and “ENORMOUS” is the Soviet codename for the U.S. atomic bomb project.

typed the 12 handwritten pages describing the lens mold. Years after his perjury caused his sister’s death, Greenglass admitted he lied about all information implicating her. After further testimony by Harry Gold and Elizabeth Bentley (who admitted she had never met either defendant), the Rosenbergs took the stand in their own defense. They confined their testimony to denial of their guilt and continual assertions of their Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate themselves. They made few friends among the press, who described Ethel as “cold and arrogant.”

The guilty verdicts. The trial ended on March 28, 1951, and the jury returned guilty verdicts against both Rosenbergs the following day. On April 5, Judge Kaufman stated that the Rosenbergs had committed “a crime worse than murder and” blamed them for the Soviet Union’s A-bomb capabilities, for the war in Korea, the deaths of more than 50,000 service men, and the possible death of every man, woman, and child in the United States. He sentenced them both to death by electrocution. The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals refused to

retry the case and the Supreme Court refused to even examine it. Bloch did manage to convince Justice William O. Douglas to stay the execution while investigating the legal matter of whether the Rosen-

bergs should have been tried under the Espionage Act of 1917 (which they were) or under the Atomic Secrets Act of 1946, the latter allowing only juries to sentence defendants to death, but the decision was against the Rosenbergs. The couple spent the last two years of their lives in separate 8-by-6-foot cells in the death house of Sing Sing Prison, where they corresponded voluminously and Ethel sang Julius to sleep at night through her bars. Outraged supporters rallied by the tens of thousands in major cities throughout the world while Pope Pius XII, Albert Einstein, and the Rosenbergs’ two small sons were among those who petitioned first Harry S Truman, and then Dwight D. Eisenhower for clemency, but to no avail. The executions. After many changes, their electrocutions were scheduled for 8:00 P.M. on Friday, June 19, 1953, the time chosen to ensure they would be dead before the beginning of Jewish Sabbath at sundown. Julius was electrocuted with the standard three jolts of 2000 volts each and declared dead at 8:06 P.M. Ethel was led into the chamber as soon as his body was removed, she kissed the matron, and after the administration of three jolts her tiny body was still alive. She required two additional jolts and was pronounced dead at 8:16, three minutes past sundown.

The number of articles, books, websites, documentaries, and other media dedicated to the Rosenbergs increases every year, some portraying them as

blood offerings on the altar of McCarthyism and others as piked heads on the gates of freedom. Though the declassification of KGB documents, the VENONA intercepts, and the personal testimony of those who knew them more often serve to implicate than to exonerate the couple, the Rosenbergs’ sons, Michael and Robert Meeropol (they took the surname of their adoptive parents) and millions of supporters continue the fight to reopen the case. Many legal scholars argue that, regardless of whether or not the couple was guilty, the trial was a miscarriage of justice and the death sentence was © influenced by the need for a scapegoat, rather than concern for national security. JONATHAN DARBY GEORGIA COLLEGE & STATE UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Feklisov, Alexander; Greenglass, David and Ruth; Fuchs, Klaus; Los Alamos; VENONA. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Marjorie Garber and Rebecca L. Walkowitz, Secret Agents: the Rosenberg Case, McCarthyism, and Fifties America (Routledge, 1995); Robert and Michael Meeropol, We Are Your Sons: The Legacy of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg (University of Illinois Press, 1986); Ilene J. Philipson, Ethel Rosenberg: Beyond the Myths (F. Watts, 1988); Ronald Radosh and Milton Joyce, The Rosenberg File (Yale University Press, 1997); Sam Roberts, The Brother (Random House, 2001); John Wexley, The Judgment of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg (Ballantine, 1977); Michael Dobbs, “Julius Rosenberg Spied, Russian Says; Agent’s Handler Contradicts Moscow in Controversial 50s Case,” Washington Post (March 16, 1997); “Fourth American Held as Atom Spy” and “Red Charges by McCarthy Ruled False,” The New York Times (July 17, 1950).

Rote Kapelle (Red Orchestra) WITH THE RISE to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany in 1933, the Soviet Union, long recognizing him as a political and military threat, organized many separate espionage rings inside Germany. The

most important of these rings came to be known as Rote Kapelle.

The Abwehr, Germany’s military counterintelli-

gence organization (abwehren, meaning to “ward off”) soon learned from secret broadcasts made by Soviet agents that Moscow referred to their agents’ radio transmitters as music boxes and their operators as musicians; hence the Germans called the Soviet intelligence group, Rote Kapelle (or Red Orchestra). Orchestra was used by the Abwehr as a term for the espionage network; the leader of the network was called a conductor; a spy’s radio transmitter was called a piano and the radio operator, a pianist. Red indicated the orchestra’s sympathies. The Soviet name for the ring was Kransney Kapel (or Red Choir). : , The original leaders of the Red Orchestra were two outstanding Soviet spies, Harro Schilze-Boysen and Arvid Harnack. Schulze-Boysen was an intelligence officer in the German Ministry of Air and had access to top secret information. Harnack, was also exceptionally well placed; he held a position within the German Ministry of Economics. Others who contributed valuable information were: Mildred Harnack, wife of Arvid, who worked

inside the Race Policy Department of Nazi theorist Alfred Rosenberg; Horst Heilmann, a cryptologist who worked in the coding department of the Wehrmacht Signals Division; Herbert Gollnow, who worked in German military counterintelligence; Johann Graudenz, who provided aircraft brakes for the Luftwaffe and had access to all of Nazi Air Force Marshal Hermann Goering’s airfields; and Gunther Weisenborn, an official with Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbel’s national radio

system. From 1939 to mid-1942, the Red Orchestra operated unfettered in Germany and most of Germanoccupied Europe. Though the Abwehr was aware of who the top spymasters were, they found it almost impossible to track them down. However, in mid1942, the story of the Red Orchestra turned from triumph to human tragedy. On June 30, 1942, a Belgian group, headed by veteran communist agent Johann Wenzel, whose expertise in radio techniques had earned him the sobriquet of “The Professor,” was raided by German counterintelligence agents; Wenzel was nabbed sitting in front of his radio set. When he was seized, he was given the choice of being “turned” and work for them, or being shot on the spot. He not only

agreed but he also informed the Germans of many of the Red Orchestra leaders.

In July 1942, about 85 suspects were arrested in Hamburg, Germany, along with another 118 in Berlin. Of the first wave arrested, two killed themselves, eight were hanged, and 41 were beheaded, among them was Mildred Fish Harnack, the Amer-

ica-born wife of Arvid Harnack. The fact that most were Germans betraying the fatherland inspired the frenzy of vengeance that poured down upon them when they were caught. From August to October 1942, the Germans “played back” captured agents who had, under torture, turned against their Orchestra comrades. Schulze-Boysen and Arvid Harnack were arrested by Gestapo agents on, respectively, August 30 and September 3, 1942. By December 22, when they were executed in Berlin, another 80 members of their networks had been rounded up. Leopold Trepper, nicknamed the “Grand Chef,” was captured while sitting in a dentist’s chair in Paris, France, on December 5, 1942. After agreeing to cooperate with the Gestapo, he became a double- or possibly a triple-agent, feeding misinformation, perhaps combined with warnings, back to Moscow. Remarkably, in September 1943, Trepper escaped and remained in hiding for the remainder of the war. Assessments of the effectiveness of the Red Orchestra, and its overall contribution to the Soviet war effort vary considerably. Soviet accounts tend to exaggerate the value of the intelligence supplied by the Schulze-Boysen and Harnack networks in order to stress the significance of the communist resistance inside Nazi Germany. Estimates that the intelligence provided by the network cost the Germans 200,000 casualties on the Eastern Front are somewhat exaggerated. Though valuable in assessing Luftwaffe air force strength and capabilities, their intelligence was not of major operational importance in helping stem the German invasion. FRANK R. DURR U.S. ARMY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE Corps, RET.

Trepper, SEE ALSO: Roessler, Rudolf.

Leopold;

Rado,

Alexander;

BIBLIOGRAPHY. P. Accoce and P. Quet, A Man Called LUCY (Doubleday, 1968); Victor Suvoroy, Inside Soviet Military Intelligence (Macmillan, 1984); Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB, The Inside Story

(HarperCollins, 1990).

Rowlett, Frank A CRYPTANALYST who broke the Japanese diplomatic code in the 1930s and developed a cipher machine that baffled the Germans during World War I], Frank Rowlett was born in 1908 in Virginia. After graduating with a B.S. in mathematics from Emory and Henry College in 1929, he briefly taught high school before taking a civil service exam for mathematicians. Based on his test results and knowledge of German, Rowlett was hired on April 1, 1930, by the War Department as a cryptanalyst with the Signal Intelligence Service. After learning cryptographic techniques and Japanese, Rowlett headed the team assigned to crack Japan’s diplomatic code. The solution of a cipher machine known as Type A by the Japanese and the Red Machine by the United States gave the American government access to information about Italy’s alliance with Germany and Japan in 1937. In 1939, Japan introduced a new cipher machine for diplomatic communication, Type B or PURPLE, which Rowlett’s team also solved. PURPLE information revealed that the Japanese were preparing for a breach in relations with the United States in the weeks prior to the 1941 attack upon Pearl Harbor. Messages intercepted during the war pertained to the Eastern European Front, revealed German plans, and provided detailed information about German defenses along the Atlantic Wall in 1943. PURPLE’s solution greatly aided the Allies in the Normandy invasion. Rowlett considered it more important to keep secrets than to uncover them. His invention of the SIGABA machine allowed the United States to keep its secrets during the war. Neither Japan, Italy, nor Germany ever solved a message encrypted by SIGABA and, after the Germans conducted tests showing that no breaks were possible, they stopped intercepting the five-letter SIGABA messages. Rowlett continued his cryptologic work after the war and briefly transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency. Much of his activities remain unknown. In recognition of Rowlett’s cryptological inventions, Congress awarded him $100,000 and President Lyndon B. Johnson decorated him with the National Security Medal in 1966. CARYN E. NEUMANN OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

War II;

the Russian Federation’s government that could not be weakened. Post-Soviet Russia was full of uncertainty—economically, socially, and politically.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Frank B. Rowlett, The Story of MAGIC: Memoirs of an American Cryptologic Pioneer (Agean Park Press, 1998); John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2001).

These problems resulted in a desire among much of

SEE ALSO: PURPLE; cryptography; Japan; naval intelligence.

World

Russia (Post-Soviet) MIKHAIL GORBACHEV’s perestroika and glasnost . liberalization policies brought hope to many in the Soviet Union that the secret police apparatus, long known for its extreme measures, would quickly and radically change. This sentiment only strengthened with the August 1991 coup attempt against Gorbachev as he moved to reorganize the Soviet system. The attempted coup tarnished the KGB’s image further because its leader at the time, Vladimir Kryuchkoy, was a key figure in the coup. The Ukraine was the first of a number of republics that declared their intent to nationalize KGB property and operations the following September. The Ukrainian declaration weakened some of the KGB’s power, and Gorbachev decreed that October the abolishment of the feared government organization.

Boris Yeltsin’s ascent to power in late 1991 as president of Russia after Gorbachev brought prom-

ises of democratic reform to the nation. His administration fell short of these promises though, especially in the realm of restructuring the intelligence and security services. The main security organization changed name and leadership six times in six years under Yeltsin, finally resulting in the Federal Security Service (FSB). Nevertheless, these new security services retained most of the staff and re-

sources of the KGB. These intelligence groups did experience heavy losses of power, including censorship powers; protection in the press from disclosing the agencies’ abuses and offenses; the ability to easily silence dissidents; unlimited resources as given during the Cold War; and use of terrorism, kidnapping, and murder as policy instruments. In spite of these significant losses of influence, the security agencies still retained a presence within

the population for a return to law and order or, at least, a stability that was always present during the Soviet Union. For example, people may have lived in poverty during the Soviet regime, but at least the government dependably paid them something. Workers could not depend on getting paid in this new Russia. As a result of this insecurity, the security services were still needed in the fledgling country; the situation was too precarious for politicians to institute wholesale changes to the security services. | Gradually, rather than reducing their powers, the government increased these security agency mandates in the name of fighting crime, corruption, and violence in Russia. In the midst of the uncertainty in the Russian Federation, Yeltsin clearly showed he was willing to allow the security services a degree of autonomy in order not to alienate them. Yeltsin needed their support and access to classified information against his political opposition. The Russian president also had three other needs for these services: Besides ceaseless political opposition, Yeltsin’s government was plagued by economic crises, violent ethnic conflict, and terrorism (Chechnya being the most prolific example, but also violence in the former Soviet republics as well.) Organized crime prolifereated as the Russian mafia flourished in such an unpredictable economic environment. The Yeltsin administration, largely connected with the lawlessness and corruption in Russia, used the security services for its own benefit many times. Possibly the most deadly event was associated with the fall 1999 apartment bombings in Moscow and southern Russia that killed more than 300 people. The government quickly placed the blame for the bombings on Chechen rebels, showing the public that Chechnya was again a threat. Russian troops quickly returned to Chechnya to begin another bloody conflict under the direction of Yeltsin and his new prime minister, Vladimir Putin, previously head of the FSB. The political developments from the bombings led many to speculate that the FSB was actually the responsible party. The bombings distracted Russians from dismal domestic conditions and gave them a common enemy to focus on.

rests and trials since Putin took over as president. Also, Putin’s handling of the October 2002 Moscow theater siege by Chechen rebels cast more doubt about his KGB past. The violent methods of regaining control of the theater notwithstanding, the Putin government’s delay in releasing information about the gas used in the rescue, to at least the hospitals treating victims, was reminiscent of Soviet policies. The aftermath of these decisions have yet to be determined. MELISSA F, GAYAN UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHARLOTTE SEE ALSO: KGB; Soviet Union; terrorism.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Amy Knight, Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB’s Successors (Princeton University Press, 1996); The Associated Press, “Putin Supreme: Beats Back Communist Surge to Take Presidency,” www.abcnews.com; Stephen Dalziel, “Soviet methods for a Russian crisis,” www.bbc.co.uk (October 28, 2002); Natalia Gevorkian, “The KGB: They Still Need Us,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,

From tzars to dictators to elected presidents, the Kremlin has been the focus of power in Russia.

Even though the second Chechen offensive was not a success, Putin initially emerged a hero. He succeeded Yeltsin as president at the latter’s resignation on December 31, 1999 and soundly won the presidential elections in March 2000. Many people worried about issues like human rights in Russia with the former KBG colonel and FSB head gaining the presidency. Putin has not reverted to the totalitarian rule that many feared would emerge. He has not, however, disavowed his KGB past. Putin’s KGB past also appealed to some Russians. The end of the Yeltsin administration left Russia just as unstable as when it began; Russian voters clearly expressed a support for ano-nonsense attitude toward law and order, especially in regard to crime and corruption, and Putin obliged. The final opinion on Putin and Russia’s security services is still forming. Russia has seen some progress in its economy and international standing. Activists in Russia still accuse the government of practicing Soviet style security procedures, citing ar-

www.thebulletin.org;

“Russia:

A

Country

Study,” Library of Congress Country Studies, www.memory.loc.gov; J. Michael Waller, ‘““Russia’s Security Services: A Checklist for Reform,” Perspective (v.8/1, September—October 1997).

Russia (Pre-Soviet) RUSSIA HAS A LONG tradition of using intelligence, from the days of Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century to the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) after the Revolution of 1917. The tzars and rulers of Russia varied the degree of disclosure that they gave to their private secret police forces, the Okhrana. In general, it was understood that the Okhrana existed solely to protecting the tzar and his family (okhrana means “guard” in Russian). It was not until 1891, under Tzar Alexander III, that the existence of the Okhrana was Officially disclosed.

Ivan the Terrible. In 1547, Ivan the Terrible (Ivan IV) came to the Russian throne. Ivan was ruthless in his desire for power and, in 1552, with the strategic use of domestic surveillance and espionage, he

started wars of conquest to the east and west of Russia. Ivan seized the territories known as the Kazan, Astrakhan, and Middle Volga River and fought a war against the Polish-Lithuanian state, trying to gain an outlet for Russia to the Baltic Sea. He ruled longer than any other tzar in Russian history. Historians attribute this successful expansion of Russia, and the long period of rule, to Ivan’s efficient system of Okhrana espionage, both inside and outside Russian borders.

that traveling under cover would help him gain access to the authorities and prevent any assassination attempts. Upon his return to Russia, Peter began westernizing the aristocracy by placing much of the nobles’ wealth under the control of the state. This effort caused much discontent among the nobility, which had difficulty in resisting the changes. In an effort to retaliate against Peter, the nobles tried Peter’s son, Alexis, for treason. Alexis was subsequently tortured to death in 1718.

Peter the Great. Peter I ruled from 1682 to 1725. He

Catherine the Great. Ruling from 1762 to 1796,

was motivated to make Russia a major power in Eu-

Catherine had a troubled marriage to future Tzar Peter III. In revenge for her discontent, she immersed herself in the Russian culture and found ro-— mantic satisfaction outside her marriage. When Peter became tzar, he proved immensely unpopular and Catherine and her followers had little trouble staging a coup to overthrow him. Peter was killed by one of Catherine’s lovers. In 1773, during the reign of Catherine the Great, a Cossack soldier named Emelian Pugachev deserted from the Russian Army. While Catherine had let the Okhrana’s power lapse, Pugachev claimed to be the dead Peter and enlisted common peasants, Cossacks, Tatar and Kalmyk tribesmen, in revolt against Catherine. During the course of the rebellion thousands of nobles and their families were looted and killed. The Pugachev Rebellion was eventually suppressed, but inspired fear in the nobility and forced Catherine to activate the Okhrana at a higher level. She became much more distrustful of her subjects and relied more heavily on her secret police.

ropean affairs, and one of his first conquests was the annexation of Azov, which was a part of the Ottoman Empire. Shortly after the Battle of Azov, Peter developed a secret plan to visit European royal courts with the hope forming an alliance against the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Peter wanted to spy on the technology of Western Europe in order to modernize Russia’s Army. His plan was to make the entire trip through Europe incognito. He believed

Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), Emperor of the French, proclaimed himself King of Italy in 1805. This proclamation caused a coalition

Catherine the Great ended up relying for security on her secret police, the Okhrana, as her reign neared its end in 1796.

to be formed against him by Britain, Austria, Russia, and Sweden. Napoleon placed a high regard on gathering intelligence and deploying scouts or spies to complement his battle strategies. The mature espionage efforts of Napoleon’s Grand Army were no match for the struggling Russian Army. Napoleon swiftly occupied Vienna, Austria, and decimated the Russians and Austrians at the Battle of Austerlitz on December 2, 1805. Russian forces were crushed again by Napoleon’s army at Friedland on June 14, 1807. Russia capitulated and the Treaty of Tilsit was established in 1807, which finalized the peace between France

and Russia, but left Napoleon virtually in control of western and central Europe. Further, Napoleon’s use of espionage helped him secure victories in the battles of Konigsberg and Danzig. With a lack of trained experienced manpower and a

deficient intelligence network, the Russian Army de-

cided to rely on the country’s harsh climate to subdue Napoleon. Moreover, the Russians made sure there were no resources left on Russian lands for the French Grand Army to confiscate. In the end, the Russian strategy worked: Russian spies soon discovered that Napoleon’s army was running out of supplies and was not prepared for the harsh winter. In the depths of the Russian winter, Napoleon had to retreat in defeat.

Crimean War. In 1854, a quarrel erupted between Russian Orthodox monks and French Catholics over who was to control the holy sites in Jerusalem and Nazareth. The Russian tzar, Nicholas I, demanded the right to protect the Christian shrines in the Holy Land, and started moving troops across the Ottoman Turkish Empire. To secure these troops, the Russian fleet was sent to destroy a Turkish flotilla in the Black Sea. The British were constantly concerned about the Russian domination of Constantinople; British intelligence felt that their interests in Afghanistan and central Asia were also being threatened. France, under the rule of Louis Napoleon HI, quickly aligned itself with Britain. Both France and Britain then dispatched reconnaissance forces to the Balkans. In 1854, the French and British forces began their aggressions against the Russian Army on the Crimean peninsula. In one of the earliest intelligence efforts of propaganda, British newspapers reported that the Russians had fired at Turkish wounded in the sea. Russian intelligence communicated to command forces that the British flank was weak, and as a result, the Russian Army struck the British right flank. Again, Russian intelligence forces reported that British forces were not prepared for the Russian winter.

Finally, in early 1856, the war was brought to a conclusion by the Peace of Paris. Historically, the

victorious British and their French allies pursued the war with little skill and the Crimean War became known for poor generalship, logistical incompetence, and ineffective intelligence efforts from the Russians and French.

Okhrana and the Revolution. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Okhrana became one of the most powerful and dreaded secret police and intelligence-gathering organizations in the world. It employed spies throughout Russia and Europe. These agents

spied against suspected

enemy

nations

as

well as Russian immigrants in foreign countries, and any radicals preaching the overthrow of the Russian monarchy. They also practiced terrorism and, as designated by the Okhrana chiefs, assassination of the tzar’s most dangerous enemies. By the 1910s, Russia’s working classes were in turmoil, starving, and radicalized to revolution. The Okhrana chiefs and spymasters, such as Yevno Azev, planned and executed drastic counterintelligence measures. Many revolutionary groups were formed and led by men who were really Okhrana spies. In this way, the Okhrana knew almost every active revolutionary and could quickly identify and arrest him. The Okhrana’s policies eventually failed when the social fabric of Russia fell apart in 1917 and the government was seized by the real revolutionaries. The Okhrana collapsed, and its spymasters were either tracked down and executed or they fled to western Europe. PAUL F. KISAK ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO: Russia (Post-Soviet); Soviet Union; Ivan the

Terrible; United Kingdom. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Isaac Asimov, Asimov’s Chronology of the World (HarperCollins, 1991); Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (Random House, 1987); Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution (1932, Pathfinder Press, 1996); “Peter I, Czar of Russia,’ Columbia Encyclopedia (Columbia University Press, 1991); Stephen M. Harris, British Military Intelligence in the Crimean War, 1854-1856 (Frank Cass, 1999).

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Safford, Laurance F. ONE OF THE FIRST U.S. Navy officers to specialize in cryptography, Laurance Frye Safford was born in Massachusetts in 1893. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1916 and spent World War I serving on destroyers. He later commanded several submarines. In 1924, Safford was in command of a minesweeper off the China coast when he was called to the newly established Cryptographic Research Desk of the Code and Signal Section of the Office of Naval Communication. He would remain at the desk through 1925. His first task was to break Japanese naval codes using a codebook stolen from the Japanese consulate in New York City. He commanded four civilian clerical employees. Among the cryptanalysts who worked for Safford were Joseph Rochefort, Joseph Wenger, and Agnes Driscoll. From 1926 to 1929, Safford was on sea duty. He resumed his work developing the cryptanalytical capabilities of the U.S. Navy through the outbreak of World War II, interrupted only by another stint at sea from 1932 until 1936. He organized a worldwide system of naval communications intercept stations. Safford brought mechanization to the effort by utilizing IBM equipment and built several cryptographic machines, including the SIGABA, the only

machine used by a belligerent to remain unbroken during the war. While commanding the Naval Security Group, Safford claimed to have seen a “winds code execute” message from the Japanese intercepted at the Cheltenham, Maryland, station on December 4, 1941. He forwarded the message to his superior officer, beginning a long controversy over whether the United States had advance warning of the December 7 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Safford spent the remainder of his life trying to convince skeptics of the existence of the message that had disappeared from his office. Safford served as assistant director of Naval Communications for Cryptographic Research during the war and into the immediate postwar years. He became special assistant to the director of the Armed Forces Security Agency in January 1949. Safford retired from that agency in 1951, but was recalled from retirement in January 1952 to serve as special assistant to the head of the Security Branch in the division of Naval Communications. He was completely relieved of active duty in 1953. For his service in cryptanalysis, the U.S. Navy awarded him the Legion of Merit in 1946. Since many of his inventions and systems could not be patented due to national security, Congress awarded him $100,000 in 1958; he died on May 15, 1973. JOHN DAVID RAUSCH, JR. WEST TEXAS AGM

UNIVERSITY

553

SEE ALSO: Wenger, Joseph N.; Rochefort, Joseph J.; cryptography; naval intelligence.

rising over the Arctic up to 24,000 miles above the surface of the earth and coming down to just 200 miles above it while shooting through the southern

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Roberta Wohlsetter, Pearl Harbor, Warning and Decision (Stanford University Press, 1962); L. Farago, The Broken Seal: The Story of “Operation MAGIC” and the Pearl Harbor Disaster (Random House, 1967); L. Safford and J. N. Wenger, U.S. Naval Communications Intelligence Activities (Aegean Park Press, 1994).

hemisphere. Then, in the 1980s, the Soviets sent up Cosmos satellites, believed to have had digital trans-

satellites THE INTELLIGENCE business has become increasingly technically sophisticated, and arguably, the most important of the new technologies are satellites. Satellites can provide intelligence on enemy weapons programs to guard against surprise attacks,

on

specific

targets

to

plan

pre-emptive

strikes, and on verification of arms control agreements or United Nations disarmament obligations. During the Cold War, the superpowers engaged in an arms race, seeking technologies to guard against surprise attack. The U-2 spy plane overhead surveillance came into operation in 1956, the year both the United States and the Soviet Union initiated projects to develop satellites. On October 4, 1957, the Soviets launched the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, into orbit using an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The launch shocked the world. As with many intelligence “‘surprises,” top-level U.S. officials knew the Soviets were going to launch a satellite. Yet with Sputnik, for the first time, the United States, a continent-size nation formerly invulnerable to attack, aside from outlying areas like Pearl Harbor, seemed at risk, given what appeared to be a massive Soviet ICBM lead. This so-called missile gap created the sense of national emergency that helped drive the arms race. Early Soviet and American programs. Sputnik represented only the beginning of Soviet innovation. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviet Union orbited the first radar and electronic-intelligence ocean and reconnaissance satellites (called Rorsat and Eorsat, respectively), designed to detect Western warships. The Soviets also created communications satellites in what was called a Molniya orbit,

mission in “real near-time.” The first U.S. satellite and earliest one to use photo-reconnaissance technology was the Discoverer, ostensibly built for peaceful experiments and authorized by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1958. The true purpose was to respond to Sputnik by providing cover for the U.S. development and launching of the first spy satellite, replete with photographic capability (and eventually electronic intelligence as well): Corona. The ClA-led project was overseen by its Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell, Jr, with the U.S. Air Force’s help. Eisenhower attempted to end infighting over the burgeoning satellite program and related strategic intelligence information (the equivalent of bureaucratic gold to the national security community) by creating a new agency.

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), whose very existence was a highly classified secret for some 31 years, was given the task of developing satellites, related technology, and establishing security procedures, the latter constituting the Byeman Control System. The Corona series of satellites, the first being the KEYHOLE system referring to the codename for U.S. photo-reconnaissance satellites, had hundreds launched, conducted missions over China, the Soviet Union, and around the globe. Early U.S. satellite programs came from many sources in the bureaucratic competition for budget and influence. The U.S. Air Force went forward in 1961 with Samos, relaying television pictures from film, but was so disappointed by the results that the effort was regarded as a failure and ended. Corona, in contrast, was a dramatic success, with a single flight able to cover over a million-and-a-half square miles of the Soviet Union, greater than the entire two-dozen previous U-2 spy flights combined. Different satellites in the KEYHOLE series specialized in taking different kinds of pictures, from specific targets to broad areas.

Almost immediately, the flights brought dramatic revelations, as in the photos of Soviet ICBM and strategic forces that led to a new September 1961 National Intelligence Estimate*(NIE). The new NIE revealed that earlier estimates had been totally wrong. The much touted missile gap predicted by

many in the intelligence community did exist, but it was dramatically in America’s favor. Yet given the special, higher than top-secret classification of Corona, the clearance that mandated that information exchanges only be shared with the relatively few persons on the list for its product, this gap fact

was so closely held that few knew. Thus, despite the revelation that the Soviets obviously did not have a crash program as previously

thought, the John EF. Kennedy administration went ahead with a decision to build 1,000 ICBMs. This number was far less than the 10,000 requested by General Tommy Powers, commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) from 1957 to 1964. Top U.S. officials did use the knowledge, though, during the period when the Kennedy and his advisers were seriously debating the possibility of a U.S. first strike against the Soviets during the Berlin Crisis, as newly declassified documents reveal. In the famous speech, largely written by RAND analyst Daniel Ellsberg, and delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to the Business Council of Hot Springs, Virginia, the U.S. announced its vast strategic superiority to the Soviets. The speech is believed to have played a major role in ending the Berlin Crisis. After one last push by the Soviets, they backed down from threats to conclude a peace treaty with East Germany and halt U.S. access to West Berlin, and from claims of strategic superiority. Soon thereafter, the Soviets began to denounce the U.S. satellite program as a threat to peace, with diplomatic battles over the issue ensuing in the United Nations (UN), though the actual programs of both sides went ahead. The Soviets put up the first of their own spy satellites in 1962, while following this up with a proposed ban on such satellite reconnaissance systems to the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, along with a host of related items, the next year. In actuality, though, the Soviets backed off from this issue.

American satellite development takes off. Other satellites in the Corona series included Gambit, launched in 1963, a “close-look spotting” satellite, the first of its kind. Gambit could hone in on a small area. This allowed for data analysis by the CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center

(in 1996 folded into the new National Imagery and

Mapping Agency, a combat-support agency of the Department of Defense). Gambit was designed to

complement

the

broader

swathe

of

the KH-4

Corona, which paved the way for its future closelook missions. Corona sent back hundreds of thousands of images from the Soviet Union and across the globe during these years. By the summer of 1964, the United States had photos of every single one of the Soviet’s 25 ICBM facilities.

The MIDAS system. A surveillance satellite developed and launched during this same period was the Missile Defense Alarm System (MIDAS), operational throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. The system was designed to use infrared scanners to detect blasts from ballistic missiles and for early-warning against the threat of a Soviet surprise attack. MIDAS development was actually phased-out for a host of reasons in the mid-1960s, especially when it became clear that new systems would be needed to pick up submarines and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). For this new post-MIDAS task, Program Code 949 was developed. It was tasked with placing a geostationary (staying over one earth location) satellite at an orbit of roughly 20,000 to 25,000 miles above the earth in a program lasting until 1972. By this time, the new Program 647 (soon renamed the Defense Support Program, DSP) was up and running, able to give near-immediate warning of Soviet ballistic missile launches and related data on their trajectories minutes thereafter. In the mid-1970s, the orbits of these, by then geostationary, satellites covered both the western and eastern hemispheres, allowing for surveillance of both the Soviet Union and China. In the summer of 1973, 1,014 missile launches had been detected by DSP satellites, and 18 months later the program had achieved a perfect record of recording ICBM launches. Another lowaltitude satellite developed during this period, the Hexagon, or Big Bird, combined both infrared photo and signals-intelligence capabilities. Weighing some 15 tons, the first of these satellites was launched in 1971, and then roughly two were orbited ever year thereafter until 1984. The late 1960s and early 1970s saw the orbiting of two satellite geostationary systems by the NRO, Canyon and Rhyolite. Canyon, first sent into orbit in 1968 from Cape Canaveral, was both the first high-altitude signals-intelligence and communications-intelligence satellite of the United States, and had its final launch in 1977. In 1970, the first of four Rhyo-

lite signals-intelligence spacecraft satellites were launched, it is believed close to the Horn of Africa and over Borneo, offering coverage of practically the whole globe except the western hemisphere. This system was capable of capturing even the lightest of microwave signals. The satellite was thus used to collect microwave “point-to-point” communications transmissions within China and the Soviet Union, along with their key target (telemetry intelligence), including from missile tests and space launches. Communications intercepts from the satellites included from parts of the Middle East, central Asia, as well as southeast and east Asia. All this data was then transmitted to ground stations in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. The Rhyolite program was renamed Aquacade after intelligence on the satellite was sold by two Americans to the Russians. The story is told in Ralph Lindsey’s book, made into a movie, The Falcon and the Snowman (1979). The Canyon and Rhyolite/Acquacade programs were eventually replaced by the Chalet (launched in 1978 and later renamed Vortex) and Magnum programs, the latter launched in 1985 from the Discovery space shuttle. Differences between the U.S. and Soviet launching procedures affected the rapidity and flexibility with which they could be sent into orbit. The United States tended to send relatively few, yet complex satellites out each year, using expendable launch vehicles or the space shuttle, while the Soviets relied more on rocket boosters, with some

35 or more launches of simple models per year. The U.S. Vortex satellites covered the Soviet Union itself and the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, as well as the Middle East, where they gave essential support to Anglo-American forces in the

Persian Gulf region, including up to the period during the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 and the Iraq War of 2003.

Satellite improvements. By the 1980s, satellites had vastly improved from the designs of the early 1960s and 1970s. Even the satellite imagery of the early 1970s had severe limitations. Most problematic was the lack of real-time transmission that rendered many intercepts only of historical interest rather than useful for crisis decision-making. This was evident when photos from Corona showed clear evidence of Soviet preparations for an invasion of their Warsaw Pact ally, Czechoslovakia, during the

1968 Prague Spring uprising that threatened to topple the Soviet-controlled government, but the satellite evidence was only available after Soviet tanks crushed the uprising. Similar problems ensued during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Even prior to this, the intelligence community had begun examining the problem. In 1969, the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) launched a study looking at the possible benefits of near real-time imagery for crisis decision-making, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1967 six-day Arab-Israeli war, and the Soviet’s 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. The findings were promising enough that the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology (DST) moved ahead with a project to develop just such a near real-time capability, approved by President Richard Nixon. The first new system to have real-time viewing, transmitted digitally through a charged-coupled device (CCD) to ground stations via relay satellites, was known alternately as KH-11, Byeman, Kennan, or Crystal, in the 5500 series. The CCD served as a

light-meter, zeroing in on radiated-energy emissions, out of which pictures were created from their amplification. The first product of the system was delivered to President Jimmy Carter the day after his inauguration in 1977. While a leap in technological capability, the real-time transmission of the system could only function between two to four hours a day. Nevertheless, the system was a real improvement, helped too by the use of computers to analyze pictures, which added significantly to the ability to interpret the data retrieved. The last KH-11 satellite came down in 1996, having been in orbit for over seven years. Already up in orbit were, minimally, two more satellites (advanced KH-11s) capable of infrared and thermal-infrared imagery, as well as an Improved Crystal Metric System (ICMS), which marks imagery so it can be mapped. A new breed of satellites using imaging-radar, first launched in the late 1980s, from the space shuttle Atlantis under a program called Indigo, Lacrosse, and Vega in succession, allowed for the penetration of cloud cover which had been a major problem. First designed to monitor the order of battle of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces, it was later used to monitor Iraq’s weapons programs and troop movements. . In July 1990, numerous U.S. satellites were zeroing in on the Iraq-Kuwait border as Iraq’s threats

against Kuwait escalated. The data from the satellites convinced the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was imminent. DSP satellites also played an important role in the U.S. victory over Iraq in Operation DESERT STORM, detecting Scud missiles and their launch location sites.

Commercialization and innovation. The end of superpower confrontation at the end of the 20th century resulted in dramatic transformations to the U.S. and global satellite industry, with vast implications for intelligence. As William Broad of The New York Times has noted, President Bill Clinton’s administration, in 1994, approved the use of satellite spy technology developed at public expense during the Cold War for private corporations to use for commercial profit. Specifically imagery, at a resolution of under a meter and hence of spy quality, was to be made available for a price to the public and foreign states. The commercialization of this technology was done both to soften the downturn in the aerospace industry in the early 1990s, and from the U.S. desire to challenge foreign rivals in the emerging commercial satellite industry. Already in the mid-1980s, France had developed the civilian Systeme Pour l’Observation de la Terre (SPOT) satellites. The satellites were also useful in espionage and, indeed, they were also used during the Persian Gulf War. The Soviets. also began selling satellite photos in the late 1980s. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the renewed nation of Russia began, in 1992, to sell even better imagery that gave a glimpse of troop movements, planes, and tanks. By January 1992, excluding the United States and Russia, there were 17 states and five international organizations that owned and operated 77 commercial or civilian communication satellites. Some of this activity came from Europeans pooling resources for space development within the European Space Program. The new U.S. satellites that came into operation in 1997 allowed, for the first time, private individu-

als and firms to purchase their product, as the United States joined other countries commercializing this technology. Increasingly, the former moheld once satellite intelligence, on nopoly brobeing was exclusively by national governments, ken. These developments also allowed governments unable to afford their own systems to benefit from this technology. Still, the U.S. federal government

retained the authority to shut the satellites down during crises, in what is called “shutter control,” as well as the ability to limit purchases from foreigners, though the strictness of export controls is another matter. Many of the lead U.S. companies in this new commercial satellite business were the same firms that developed the technology for the federal government in the heyday of the Cold War. The biggest player in the field in the late 1990s was Space Imaging, Inc. (which, in the early 2000s, managed the Ikonos satellite), headed by Jeffrey K. Harris, former director of the NRO, which built and managed the government’s highly secret satellite programs during the Cold War. The company sold its entire archive of Afghanistan imagery to the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). NIMA has since issued Space Imaging, Inc. and Digital Globe, Inc. up to $1 billion in future contracts.

The Chinese connection. In the aftermath of the U.S. decision to jump on the commercial satellite bandwagon, many of these same U.S. companies at the forefront of commercial applications developed anti-satellite weapons to destroy satellites owned by hostile powers during wartime. The issues posed by these new developments erupted into public view in the late 1990s following newspaper reports, and related Congressional investigations, of the easing of national security restrictions on China’s ability to launch U.S.-made satellites on Chinese rockets for U.S. companies. In a dramatic decision, which surprised many, the U.S. satellites were taken off the restricted munitions list, something opposed by the Pentagon and many in the U.S. intelligence community.

It has been suggested the decision may have been related to political donations by a Chinese national, Colonel Liu Chaoying, heading up one of China’s state military-industrial firms. Liu, the daughter of General Liu Huaquing, the highestranking member of the People’s Liberation Army, apparently funneled a large amount of funds from Chinese military-intelligence into Democratic Party coffers and President Bill Clinton’s campaign for a second term. At the same time, donations from U.S. companies involved in the project, in excess of $1 million, were also going to the Democratic Party. Another issue at stake during this period was the question of possibly lifting sanctions on China’s ability to buy U.S.-made satellites, that had

been imposed, in part, due to Chinese missile sales to Pakistan in 1991 and 1993. The Chinese sales were believed to be quite useful in Pakistan’s developing a nuclear weapons program. Since the encryption technology in the commercial satellites were similar to that used in U.S. spy satellites, the military and intelligence community feared that such sales could potentially allow hostile powers to gain control over spy satellites. Battles thus erupted over plans by U.S. corporations to sell well over a half-a-billion dollars in satellite exports to China. China desperately needed the technology, as its own domestically produced satellites, first orbited in the early 1990s, starting going into retirement by the decade’s end. At the time,. their planned replacements were beset by technical problems rendering them unworkable. One of the major contractors for the proposed sale, Hughes Electronics, the CEO of which headed the president’s Export Technology Control Panel, had hired the son of the head of China’s military satellite program, Army General Shen Rongjun, as a manager on the project. The waivers, which were granted by the Clinton administration, followed numerous waivers issued by President George H.W. Bush allowing China to buy U.S. satellites in the early 1990s. This was all made public in various articles in The New York Times in May and June 1998.

Satellites in the 2000s. The U.S. and global satellite industry are in rapid flux, with new technological innovations adding increased capability. For example, numerous new U.S. spy satellites now have measurement- and signature-intelligence sensors, designed to focus in on, track, and describe mobile or fixed targets. In 1993, the CIA and Department of Defense created a Central MASINT Office (CMO) in the Defense Intelligence Agency, subsequently upgraded in 1998 to a quasi-autonomous DIA organization. This was also the year that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the NRO and air force, moved ahead with plans to develop two satellites with synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) and moving-target-indicator (MTI) ability. This is for a planned constellation of 24—48 satellites in all, at 1-meter resolution for imaging of 29,000 square kilometers every hour, able to give the U.S. Air Force an all-weather surveillance capability.

Another innovation in recent U.S. geostationary satellite technology is the development of the Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) made for nuclear-targeting and navigation, as well as detection of nuclear explosions, in a constellation of 21 operational satellites and three active spares, deployed in six arrays of four satellites. Increasingly, GPS data is also being sold for commercial use in a host of areas, and has entered the consumer satellite-image market. Countries the United States is sharing or plans to share GPS satellite data with include Russia and Israel, though Israel is also now launching its own

satellites. The data will also be shared with NATO allies through the 270 Linked-Operations-Intelligence Center, Europe (LOCE) terminals, servicing the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Greece, Belgium, France, and Spain. Data from the U.S. SpaceBased Infrared System (SBIRS) High and Low, will go solely to allies cooperating with spaced-based military programs, such as Italy and Germany. Satellites are becoming ever more integral for a wide range of U.S. foreign policy tasks, including global power projection capability. As warfare and related intelligence becomes more capital-intensive and high-tech, demands for satellites are increasing. As the Wall Street Journal has noted, the revival of unmanned spy planes such as Predators and Global Hawks, beaming live pictures of enemy forces, are dependent on bandwidth. Bandwidth refers to the capacity for satellites and related instruments to handle data flows. With financial troubles within the commercial satellite industry in the 2000s, the Pentagon faced a massive shortage of bandwidth. The military estimated in the 1990s that by 2005 there would be some 1,000 new satellites for the Pentagon to use for weapons dependent on spacebased wireless communications, and decided in 1996-97 to lease capacity from the then-burgeoning commercial satellite industry. Yet, of some 675 commercial satellite launches expected in 1998-2002, only 275 actually went into space. In 2000, the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board noted that it needed 16 gigabytes per second of bandwidth, the rough equivalent of hundreds of thousands of simultaneous phone calls, if it fought a major conflict in 2010. The needed bandwidth is growing exponentially, with a single Global Hawk, for example, requiring roughly 500 megabytes, five times more than that used by the entire Pentagon during the Persian Gulf War.

In early 2003, the Wall Street Journal also noted the state of U.S. space programs, including the satellites necessary for the U.S. anti-missile system over the continental United States, were in serious trouble. The SBIRS High and Low, critical for this capability, is not expected to be launched into space until 2006-07. In addition, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite, necessary to process highspeed video data transmission, will not be ready for deployment until 2007-08. The NRO’s Future Imagery Architecture spy satellites have also been delayed, as have the new generation of GPS. There is also the problem of proliferation. Today, firms such as the U.K-based Surrey Satellite Technology (SSTL) are able to make microsatellites weighing as little as 50 kilograms. Missile launchers able to send such satellites into orbit can cost as little as $8 million. Some of SSTL’s recent customers

include Nigeria, Algeria, and Pakistan. The plunge in prices for such technology now opens up the possibility of terrorist organizations buying and launching their own communications or spy satellites. THOMAS EHRLICH REIFER, PH.D. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE

SEE ALSO: signals intelligence; communications; surveillance; photography.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. James Bamford, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency (Anchor Books, 2002); William E. Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (Berkley Books, 1986); Jeffrey T. Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. Keyhole Satellite Program (Harper and Row, 1990); Jeffrey T. Richelson, America’s Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security (University Press of Kansas, 1999); Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Westview, 1999); Jeffrey T. Richelson, Civilians, Spies and Blue Suits: The Bureaucratic War for Control of Overhead Reconnaissance, 1961-1965 (National Security Archive Monograph, January, 2003).

Saudi Arabia THE MIDDLE

EASTERN

nation of Saudi Arabia

is an oil-rich but barren country ruled by what

amounts to a benevolent monarchy. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia plays a critical role for U.S. and British interests in the region, and there is often close cooperation related to national security matters between these three nations. The ruling Saud family consists of several hundred princes. In order to satisfy the need for external intelligence to cope with security threats to the kingdom, Saudi Arabia has established a formidable intelligence apparatus, with the lead agency being the Directorate of Intelligence (primarily responsible for intelligence coordination and analysis). All of the military services in Saudi Arabia have an intelligence component coordinated by the Saudi Ministry of Defense. Of note, the Royal Saudi Arabian Air Force, via a cooperative security program with the United States, possesses a Boeing E3A Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) plane, that can serve as an intelligence collection platform as well as a flying command post. The Saudis have also established a program to boost their ability to detect, via radar, incursions along their northern border with Iraq. Called Peace Shield, a large amount of money has been invested in this system by the government, and Saudi Arabia has worked closely with the United States to ensure that it is efficient and effective. Internally, in addition to the intelligence gleaned by the Ministry of Interior Forces, the Saudis also use their religious police (the mutawwa) to gather information under the rubric of the Committees for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. The Saudi equivalent of a secret police (the General Directorate of Investigation) also has an intelligence gathering function, as does the Public Security Police. All told, at least the following agencies and organizations have some intelligence gathering capacity, and a few of them also possess the ability to analyze all-source intelligence: the Saudi Arabian Coast Guard; the Committees for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (the religious police); the Directorate of Intelligence; the General Directorate of Investigation (the secret police); the General Staff; the Intelligence Section (G-2); the

Ministry of Defense and Aviation; the Ministry of Interior Forces; the Ministry of State for Internal Affairs; the Ministry of the Interior; and the Public Security Police. Several factors complicate the intelligence situation for Saudi Arabia. First, until the 1990s, the northern border with Iraq was relatively porous.

1000 Mites

1500 Kilometres

An oil-rich country, Saudi Arabia is ruled by a royal family with direct power over intelligence services. The nation is located near several flash points in the Middle East, including Iraq, Kuwait, Israel, Iran, and Afghanistan.

Recent military programs to boost surveillance along that border (including the installation of thermal cameras and modern radar) should mitigate this problem. Second, a large swath of the country is covered by the Rub al Khali (“the Empty Quarter”), an inhospitable desert habitable only by the hardiest of Bedouin families; although this serves as a secu-

rity buffer against other Gulf Arab states, it also complicates border patrol issues. (Saudi Arabia has a long-standing dispute with Yemen along its southern border, and details of 1974 and 1977 agreements to settle a border dispute between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have not yet been made public.)

Third, interagency coordination between Saudi Arabian government bureaus is complicated by fragmentary lines of communication and a general lack of technological sophistication. (Much of Saudi Arabia remains undeveloped, and the kingdom owes all its wealth to the discovery of oil reserves their early in the 20th century.) Finally, the moderate rulers of the kingdom face the challenge of preserving their legitimacy despite a growing radical Islamic movement based in the kingdom (the Wahabbi strain of Islam) and increasing budget deficits. Internal intelligence collection and analysis are especially important for the Saudi royal family regime. This became even more apparent with terrorist bombings in Saudi Arabia in the 2000s, particularly the triple suicide bombings in the Saudi capital in May 2003 which led to renewed focus on internal intelligence. The fact that terrorist leader Osama bin Laden came from an extended and wealthy Saudi Arabian family, and that the majority of September 11 hijackers also hailed from the Saudi kingdom have caused continued suspicion from the American public of Saudi motives. Though expelled by the royal family in 1991, bin Laden has many followers in Saudi Arabia and it has become the Saudi government’s priority to eliminate radical extremists and members of the al-Qaeda network operating in the country. WILLIAM D. CASEBEER, PH.D. U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY

SEE ALSO: Iran; Iraq; Persian Gulf War; Bush, George H.W.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. “Saudi Arabia: Cameras to Monitor Borders,” www.ArabicNews.com (2002); CIA World Factbook (2003); “Saudi Arabia,” www.cia.gov; David E. Long, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (University Press of Florida, 1998); Jeffrey T. Richelson, Foreign Intelligence Organizations (Ballinger Publishing Company, 1998).

also part of Scandinavia. The four mainland states are bound to Western ideals by their culture and democratic governments, but their geography has historically required a certain amount of cooperation with Russia and the Soviet Union. This is particularly true of Finland and Norway which share a common border with Russia. During the Cold War, tensions were high in the Scandinavian countries because the shortest routes to and from the Soviet Union by both air and sea crossed Scandinavian territory. During the tense post-World War II days of the Berlin Blockade, which began in June 1948 when the Soviet Union attempted to force the Western sector of Berlin to cut off ties with the West, Sweden attempted to create a Scandinavian Defense Alliance comprised of the four mainland countries to protect the Nordic countries from aggression if another war broke out. The move failed because Norway saw alliance with the United States and Great Britain as a necessary, and ultimately more powerful, defense against Soviet aggression. In response to the Soviet blockade, President Harry Truman initiated the Berlin Airlift, in which 272,000 flights flew over Berlin with supplies to the beleaguered Germans. On April 4, 1949, Norway and Denmark joined NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), openly siding with the Western powers. Admitting defeat, the Soviets ended the blockade in May 1949. Beginning in World War II and continuing throughout the Cold War, the Nordic countries have been of strategic importance to the West and have engaged in a number of bilateral and trilateral intelligence agreements. Surveillance of communist activity within Scandinavia began during World War I, reached a high level of intensity in the years between the wars, and continued into World War

II, despite alliances with the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1945, both the United States and Great Britain placed intelligence agents in all Nordic countries.

Realizing that intelligence cooperation among the Nordic countries was necessary, the security po-

. Scandinavia Sweden, and Finland NORWAY, DENMARK, make up the mainland Nordic or Scandinavian states. In a broader sense, the island of Iceland is

lice of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark established a formal collaboration, meeting four times a year to exchange intelligence information and plan joint strategy. This strategy included surveillance of all communists within Nordic countries during the Cold War. Sweden dominated the intelligence meetings, and the Swedish security police later served as a model for Norway’s intelligence agencies. After

1948, Finland’s security police secretly joined the meetings.

The Norwegian security police chief established intelligence relations with MI-5 and MI-6 in Great Britain and with the CIA in the United States. Agreements with intelligence officers in Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, and briefly with Yugoslavia followed. Sweden’s SIGINT Agency (FRA) provided crucial signals intelligence. Norway and Finland provided detailed intelligence gathered when they cooperated in sending intelligence agents into the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Within Scandinavia, the Nordic countries work closely together to cooperate on non-military matters through the Nordic Council, established in . 1952. The Nordic Council meets twice a year to discuss commonalities in industry, trade, agriculture, labor, markets, and culture. The Nordic Council also works with northwest Russia to promote coop-

eration on the issues of children, youth, environment, energy, social security and health, and equal rights. Scandinavian cooperation is also promoted through NORDCAPS (the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support), which seeks to coordinate and effectively use Nordic re-

sources. Denmark. The smallest of the Scandinavian countries at 16,629 square miles, Denmark represents an important element in the defense of NATO. Internal security and intelligence in Denmark is provided by the chief of defense, who is the head of the Danish armed forces. Civilian intelligence is provided by Politiets Efterretningstjeneste, the National Security Service (PET), which is Department G within the Danish Police Force. PET is charged with both internal and external security and is involved with counterintelligence and counterterror-

Balstad Harbor in Norway exemplifies the vast remoteness of the Nordic border region with Russia, once the Soviet Union. The proximity led Norway to rely on the United States and Britain for intelligence on the Soviets during the Cold War.

ism. The Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste (FE) provides military intelligence.

Finland. Because of its extensive shared border with Russia, Finland has historically been in a unique position among Scandinavian countries. So-

viet documents show that during the Winter War of 1939-40, Soviet leader Josef Stalin believed that he could take this small country within three weeks. Even though Stalin underestimated the Finnish resistance, this Nordic nation of 130,559 square miles was no match for the Soviet war machine. Finland was again at war with the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1944. As a result of its vulnerability, Finland chose to remain neutral during the Cold War and signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (TFCMA) with the Soviet Union after World War II and extended it in 1953 and 1970. Finland was also bound by an agreeemnt negotiated in 1947 after World War II, limiting the size of its military. Finland maintains both military and civilian intelligence services. Military intelligence is provided by the General Staff Intelligence (Padesikunnan Tiedusteluosasto), which is answerable to the Finish Defense Ministry. It has been given the responsibil-

ity for defending Finnish boundaries and monitors Finland by land, sea, and air. The Finnish military is also responsible for signals intelligence through the Communications Experience Facility (VKL). The civilian branch of Finnish intelligence, the Security Police (Suojelupoliisi or SuPo) is directed by the interior minister and is equivalent to the FBI in the United States. Its responsibilities are counterespionage, internal and external Finnish security, and fighting terrorism. These functions are divided among the Unit of Counter-Espionage, the Security Unit, and the Unit of Development and Supportive Activities. Norway. Norway depends on NATO for the major part of its security and maintains close ties with the United States and Great Britain. This is due, in part, to the Soviet demand after World War II that the Norwegians share sovereignty of the Archipelago of Svalbard in order to give the Soviets a clear passage to the Atlantic Ocean. Despite the close ties to the West, Norway has established a “base and ban” policy that forbids the presence of nuclear weapons and foreign troops within its borders. In January

1981, when the Norwegian government allowed the

United States to store military equipment in the country, an acrimonious public debate ensued. Norway has three intelligence services: the National Police Security Service, which provides civilian intelligence, including internal security, counterespionage, and anti-terrorism; the Joint Defense Security Service, which provides military intelligence; and the Joint Defense Intelligence Service, which coordinates intelligence activity.

Sweden. With its historically neutral stance, Sweden has established a foreign policy of nonalignment with foreign powers. Swedish foreign policy is based on the position that national security is directed toward defense but never offense. In Sweden, military intelligence is conducted through the Military Intelligence and Security Directorate. The National Security Service is responsible for civilian intelligence, which includes internal security, counterespionage, anti-terrorism, and intelligence support for the Swedish government. The Joint Military Intelligence and Security intelligence group answers to the supreme commander of the Swedish forces and is charged with gathering, processing, and disseminating military intelligence.

Iceland. This small island country of 39,698 square miles is located between the Greenland Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean. Even though its history and culture have directed Iceland toward neutrality, its strategic location has resulted in defense alliances with the Western powers, particularly with the United States. Iceland has refrained from establishing its own military and has prohibited other nations from placing troops within its boundaries. Despite this neutral stance, Iceland is an important part of NATO and in 1951 signed a Bilateral Defense Agreement with the United States that allowed the presence of an American-manned NATO Defense Force (IDF) to be established in Keflavik. ELIZABETH PURDY, PH.D.

INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

SEE ALSO: World War II; Cold War. BIBLIOGRAPHY. David Arter, Scandinavian Politics Today (Manchester University Press, 1999); “The Danish State,” www.denmark.dk; “Finland: Intelligence,” www.fas.org; “Joint Military Intelligence and Security,” www.mil.se; Olav Riste, “Cold War Intelligence Cor-

poration in Europe,” www.sfu.ca; William J. Taylor, Jr. and Paul M. Cole, Nordic Defense: Comparative Decision Making (Lexington Books, 1985); Bjorn von Sydow, “Sweden’s Security in the 21st Century,” www .forsvar.regeringen.se; ‘““The Swedish Police Service,” www.polisen.se.

Schellenberg, Walter WALTER Schellenberg was born on January 16, 1910. In 1933, his early career was devoted to counterintelligence for the Nazis on the eve of World War II, and he was involved in the Venlo Incident. In this affair, Nazi intelligence officers crossed into neutral Holland and kidnapped two British intelligence officers, who were deceptively lured to the Dutch border town of Venlo. Other Schellenberg actions proved less successful: An attempt to kidnap the Duke of Windsor in the Iberian Peninsula to blackmail the United Kingdom or to get Nazi control of a British royal more favorable to Nazi Germany ended in disaster. The large files compiled under the direction of Schellenberg, concerning the infrastructure of Britain and a comprehensive list of people to arrest in Britain, proved worthless as the German invasion plans of the British Isles were never put into action. Nevertheless, Schellenberg was promoted inside the Nazi intelligence community. In 1942, he became head of Amt VI of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, which gave him overall control of the SS part of German intelligence abroad. After the dissolution of the Abwehr, the military intelligence branch, Schellenberg directed virtually all intelligence operations of the Reich against foreign countries. Schellenberg had direct access to Heinrich Himmler, a key minister of Nazi leader Adolf Hitler. With the German defeat approaching, Schellenberg led Himmler’s attempts to do a deal with the Western Allies. He used contacts in Sweden, especially Count Folke Bernadotte. When Himmler fell from grace with Hitler during the last days of April 1945, Schellenberg, as a Himmler minion, was removed from office as well. After extensive intelligence debriefing by the Americans, he was brought to trial and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment in 1949. Due to bad health,

he was soon pardoned and died on March 31, 1952. During his time in Nazi counterintelligence and intelligence, Schellenberg was engaged in nearly every major clandestine operation of the Third Reich, especially in organizing cells in the Iberian Peninsula and the Americas. And he was also charged with the follow-up operations of successful Soviet penetrations (Richard Sorge and his group, the Rote Kapelle, among them), which made him an asset to the Americans after World War II on the eve of the Cold War. OLIVER BENJAMIN HEMMERLE, PH.D. MANNHEIM UNIVERSITY, GERMANY

SEE ALSO: World War II; Sorge, Richard; Rote Kapelle;

Germany.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Walter Schellenberg, The Labyrinth: Memoirs of Walter Schellenberg, Hitler’s Chief of Counterintelligence (Harper, 1956); Walter Schellenberg, The Black Book (Imperial War Museum 1989); Reinhard R. Doerries, ed., Hitler’s Last Chief of Foreign Intelligence: Allied Interrogations of Walter Schellenberg (Frank Cass, 2003).

Schlesinger, James R. JAMES SCHLESINGER had a short and stormy tenure as the director of Central Intelligence (DCI) at the CIA. Viewed as a complete outsider within the agency, he assumed the mantle as the youngest DCI for five months, from February 2 to July 2, 1973, with the mandate to “shake things up.” Schlesinger sought to reassert the DCI’s control as the director of the entire intelligence community across the various government agencies, reform the agency’s infrastructure, and serve as “Nixon’s man,” thus bringing intelligence activities more directly under President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. James Rodney Schlesinger was born on February 15, 1929, in New York City. He graduated from Harvard University with a B.A. in 1950, M.A. in 1952, and Ph.D. in 1956. He entered academia and worked at the University of Virginia as a professor of economics, 1955-63. Schlesinger worked for several years at the RAND Corporation. From there, he embarked on 20 years of government service.

|

During the Nixon administration, Schlesinger served as assistant director and acting deputy director of the Bureau of the Budget, 1969-70, and then as assistant director of the renamed Office of Management and Budget, 1970-71. In these capacities, Schlesinger developed a reputation for managerial expertise and cost-cutting. He embarked on a study of the CIA and reduced Department of Defense spending by $6 billion. Schlesinger moved on to chair and reorganize the Atomic Energy Commis-

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy (Yale University Press, 1989); Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (Alfred A. Knopf, 1979); John Ranelagh, The Agency (Simon & Schuster, 1986).

Schragmiller, Elsbeth

sion, 1971-73.

By the time Schlesinger replaced Richard Helms as DCI, he had a reputation as a “comer and goer,” someone who would use his term at the agency as a stepping-stone. Unpopular within the agency, Schlesinger was seen as a political appointee at a

time when Nixon’s presidency was near the brink of collapse. Nixon nominated Schlesinger on December 21, 1972, the Senate confirmed him on January 23, 1973, and he assumed office on February 2, two weeks before Helms planned to leave. Schlesinger believed that an intelligence career should be limited to 20 years to make way for “new blood.” Ina few months, he fired or retired 1,500 employees, most from operations, and reorganized the Directorate of Plans into the Directorate of Operations. Schlesinger wanted to change the agency’s focus from covert operations to collection and analysis. In April 1973, Schlesinger learned about the CIA’s involvement in the burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist. (Ellsberg released the classified Pentagon Papers to the press.) With Deputy Director of Operations (and later DCI) William Colby, Schlesinger issued a directive on May 9, that ordered an inspector general’s investigation of the agency’s past, commonly known as “The Family Jewels” or “The Skeletons.” Two days later, on May 11, Schlesinger announced that he would leave the CIA by early July. He served as secretary of defense, 1973-75, and then secretary of energy, 1977-79, during the Carter administration. Since 1979, he has been a private consultant. LAURIE WEST VAN HOOK, J.D., PH.D. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SEE ALSO:

Helms, Richard M.; Nixon, Richard M.;

Central Intelligence Agency. BIBLIOGRAPHY. “Directors and Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence” (Central Intelligence Agency, 1998);

DR. ELSBETH Schragmiiller served the German Abwehr intelligence in World War I as a lead instructor at a training school for intelligence agents operated in Antwerp, Belgium. Known as Fraulein Doktor, she had completed her doctorate in economics at Freiburg University before the war started, with a dissertation on medieval stone-cutting guilds in the region of Freiburg and Waldkerch. Soon after the war started, Schragmiiller contacted the director of the Nachrichtendienst (the forerunnner of German military intelligence, Abwehr), Colonel Walter Nicolai and asked for a posting to the front. Instead, Nicolai offered her a post in the censorship bureau set up in Brussels, Belgium.

She took the position and soon came to the notice of her superiors for identifying encoded messages that appeared innocuous in outgoing mail, designating German ship movements and troop deployments. Her detective work came to the notice of General von Beseler, who was leading the attack on Antwerp. After recovering from surprise that she was a woman, the general and his staff soon realized she was a brilliant intelligence analyst and decided to make better use of her talents. The general had her transferred to an espionage training school in Baden-Baden, from which she graduated with high grades She was then promoted to the rank of major and transferred to the teaching staff of a new school set up in Antwerp to train agents who would penetrate England and the French ports on the English Channel, as well as to keep track of Allied espionage efforts in neutral Holland. As far as is known, she was the only woman hired by German intelligence to act as an instructor in either World War I or World War II, and for this reason, numerous legends grew up around her career. Furthermore, she never wrote a memoir, and after the war,

she returned to a very quiet and private life, refusing to grant interviews.

According to legends that rose around her, she had a singleness of purpose that intimidated her fellow instructors as well as her students, working 20 hours a day. She became known even in foreign intelligence circles as the “Beautiful Blonde of Antwerp,” or as the “Terrible Doctor Elsbeth.” One legend surrounding her is that she invented the concept of a sacrifice agent, or “discard.” That is, the intelligence agency would purposely let one of its agents of lesser competence be captured by the enemy, both to lull them into a false sense of security, as well as to learn about the enemy’s counterintelligence methods. In fact, the concept of asacrifice agent had been developed by the Okhrana, the secret police of the tsar in Russia. According to the Schragmiller legend, Mata Hari was such a sacrifice agent, selected by Fraulein Doktor herself. After the war, Schragmiiller dropped out of sight, quietly pursuing an academic career in Munich, Germany. However, in 1932, a woman was admitted to a Swiss sanatorium for drug addiction, and newspapers spread the tale that she was the notorious Schragmiiller. In order to deny the rumors, Schragmiuller gave a few interviews. She died in 1939. RODNEY P. CARLISLE GENERAL EDITOR

SEE ALSO: Germany; Mata Hari; women; World War I. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Nicholas Snowden (Miklos Soltesz), Memoirs of a Spy (Scribners & Sons, 1933); Ernest Volkman, Spies: The Secret Agents Who Changed the Course of History John Wiley, 1994).

scientific and technical

intelligence SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE concerns the collection of information on foreign developments in basic, applied scientific, and technical research. This includes engineering and production techniques, new technology, and weapon systems and their capabilities and characteristics; it also includes intelligence that requires scientific or technical expertise

on the part of the analyst in areas such as medicine, chemistry, health studies, and behavioral analyses. R.V. Jones defined scientific and technical intelligence (S&T) as the effort to obtain early warning of the adoption of new weapons and methods by potential or actual enemies. He outlined the fundamental sequence of new weapons development: It normally begins with general scientific research of an academic or commercial nature. These revelations incite someone sensitive to potential military

applications. Next, if convinced of the application’s

potential, the military will fund for small-scale research, development, and trials. If successful, the trials are expanded to advanced research, development, and ultimately employment by the service as a weapon system. The first stage of research and development (R&D) is generally common knowledge to all countries. However, latter stages of weapons development become increasingly more difficult to observe, to the extent that only espionage or human error reveals subsequent information. Access to advanced information becomes possible only through human indiscretions (alcohol, sex, blackmail, and defectors), deciphered messages, agent networks, or lost equipment.

The United States followed Britain in the development of S&T organizations by monitoring the Vweapons (rocket) program in Nazi Germany during World War II. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff set up an Office of Scientific Research and Development precisely for this purpose. The Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) provided the covert intelligence to assist in the effort. It ultimately resulted in foreign experts being settled in New Mexico for the Manhattan Project and the development of the atomic bomb. The strategic implications of the subsequent bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan in 1945 ensured that S&T would become a new but permanent function of major intelligence

services. Indeed, S&T expanded during the Cold War to comprehensively collect all aspects of the adversary’s military arsenal, including not only weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological), but also ballistic missiles, aircraft design, radars, and naval and ground force capabilities. The collected information fed directly into intelligence subspecialties within an agency, including order of battle, doctrine, indications and warning, and estimates.

Scientific and technical intelligence requires the experience of experts, such as medical researchers (above), to analyze information on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction.

The importance of S&T cannot be overstated. The Soviet NKVD/KGB monitored technical achievements not only in Nazi Germany but also among the Allies. Soviet leader Josef Stalin tasked the NKVD chief of special operations to collect everything possible about American plans for the atom bomb long before President Harry Truman revealed the capability to him at the Potsdam Conference. Indeed, the NKVD_ began receiving information on nuclear weapons theory in the West as early as 1940, utilizing extensive agent networks in Europe, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These networks targeted the “soft” (less secure) intellectual communities in and around university-applied science centers, rapidly revealing the details of the Manhattan Project and circumventing security and counterintelligence safeguards. Stalin began receiving regular intelligence reports about U.S. nuclear aspirations as early as March 1942, and was convinced of the feasibility of the atomic bomb when British commandos destroyed the German heavy-water (a key bomb ingredient) plant in Vemork, Norway, in February 1943. On February 11, 1943, Stalin signed a decree organizing a special committee to develop the Soviet atomic bomb. By the spring of 1943, the NKVD

had identified seven nuclear research centers and 26

scientists engaged in nuclear weapons research, and focused their collection activities. By July 1943, the NKVD had received 286 classified publications on nuclear research in the U.S. By February 1944, the NKVD had established a Special Department S for the sole purpose of nuclear espionage. By January 1945, the NKVD already had received the atomic bomb design, and by April 1945 it had obtained the characteristics of the anticipated nuclear explosion, the method for activating the bomb, and the electromagnetic method of disintegrating uranium isotopes three months prior to the first nuclear detonation in New Mexico on July 16, 1945. Following World War II the NK VD’s primary task was nuclear espionage. By 1949, it not only had produced the first atomic bomb, but also had received the theoretical outline for development of the hydrogen super-bomb. GAIL H. NELSON, PH.D. ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO:

Los Alamos; Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel;

collection; Fuchs, Klaus; KGB.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Jeffrey Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Westview Press, 1989); R.V. Jones,

Most Secret War (Coronet, 1979); Pavel Sudoplatov, Special Tasks (Little, Brown, 1994); Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge University Press, 1996); Stephen Dorril, MI-6 (Simon & Schuster, 2000); Director of Central Intelligence Office of Public Affairs, “A Consumer’s Guide to Intelligence,” Wwww.cia.gov.

Seawolf IN 1982, THE UNITED STATES embarked on defining the requirements for a new nuclear-powered attack submarine to counter the rapidly evolving submarine assets of the Soviet Union’s navy. Formally designated as the Seawolf program the following year, the project suffered numerous political, financial, and technical delays that subsequently

contributed to its near demise. The aim of the Seawolf program was to create a multi-mission submarine platform whose primary objective was to counter and destroy Soviet nuclear submarine (SSNs), which were then deployed to protect Soviet ballistic-missile submarines and the Soviet landmass,

or act as a threat to American

naval battle groups, shipping, and allied targets. Planning for a potential service life of roughly 40 years (1995 to 2035), the program team had to achieve a flexible design capable of incorporating both evolutionary and revolutionary upgrades to meet any future threats. As a result the program team (operating under the codename GROUP TANGO) built Seawolf around six baseline principles: quietness, speed, depth, weapons load, launch tubes, and the ability to operate under the Arctic ice.

Given the U.S. Navy’s desire to supplement its current fleet of Los Angeles-class submarines, the intent was to acquire a total of 30 Seawolf submarines, with the delivery of the first two boats expected in 1991 and a subsequent average of three boats delivered per year until the year 2000. Initial funding was approved in 1989, and construction of the first submarine, Seawolf (SSN-21), was soon un-

derway. The program ran into serious trouble almost immediately. The first challenge was funding. In 1990, the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee voted to delete all funding for Seawolf construction

and its future programs. The U.S. House Armed Services Committee rigorously opposed the vote, and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney subsequently approved the funding for one more Seawolf submarine under the following year’s budget. However, there was no indication of any further support after that. Next, technical problems flared. In 1991, US. Navy inspectors discovered serious cracks in the welding of the hull of SSN-21 that would require the replacement of all welds completed up to that point. An investigation later revealed that the wire employed to weld the HY-100 steel used to build the boat contained an unduly high amount of carbon, which in turn caused brittle and cracked welds throughout nearly 16 percent of the hull completed at that time. While scrambling to fix this mistake, problems were then encountered with the design and construction of the torpedo hatches. Eventually the titanium hatches were replaced with eight new HY-100 steel-breach doors. Combined with the weld cracks, however, this problem would ultimately delay the commissioning of the boat by at least two years. As technical difficulties consumed the project, politics also began to take over. There were increasing complaints that the program was too expensive and that the design failed to meet the six charter principles. There were also concerns about the level of technology incorporated into the design, the industrial base that would supply the equipment, and the potential impact on the final cost of the total intended shipment of 30 submarines. Although a third boat (SSN-23) was authorized in the 1992 defense budget, it was not provided until 1996 when funds were also released for the completion of Seawolf (SSN-21) and Connecticut

(SSN-22). The lead vessel, Seawolf, was finally commissioned in early 1997. At just over 107 meters in length and roughly 13 meters in diameter, Seawolf has a surface displacement of 8,060 tons and a submerged displacement of 9,142 tons. Exceeding design expectations for speed, stealth, and sensor performance, the boat can dive to much greater depths than the Los Angeles-class subs, to somewhere in the region of 600 meters. Weapons systems include eight 660 mm torpedo tubes and a payload of 50 torpedoes, a cache of 100 mines, and an assorted mix of Tomahawk, TLAM-N, and TLAM-C/D missiles. A crew of 133 including 12

officers currently mans the Seawolf, though it is expected that the Jimmy Carter (SSN-23) will also have accommodations for SEAL special operations teams and their equipment. ANDREW B. GODEFROY ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA

SEE ALSO: submarines; reconnaissance.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. N. Friedman and J. Christley, U.S. Submarines Since 1945 (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1994); D. Hinkle, ed., United States Submarines (Levin Associ-

ates, 2002); R. Burcher and L. Rydill, Concepts in Subma-

rine Design

(Cambridge

University

Press,

1995);

R.

Hutchinson, Jane’s Submarines: War Beneath the Waves From 1776 to the Present Day (HarperCollins, 2002). Bee *

pe

terprise. Secord, when prompted by a Congressional inquiry, said, “The Enterprise is the group of companies that Mr. Hakim formed to manage the Contra and the Iranian project. ...I exercise overall control.” Using The Enterprise, Secord purchased 1,000 missiles from the CIA for $3.7 million and turned a profit by selling them to the Iranians for $10 million. This action was part of a larger scheme of international arms dealers, secret Swiss bank accounts, and covert operations now known as the Iran-Contra Affair. Secord was indicted in March 1988 on charges of conspiring with Oliver North, John Poindexter, and Albert Hakim to defraud the U.S. government of money and services and for theft of government property. Secord pleaded guilty to the charge of lying to Congress regarding the illegal funds he provided to North, and received two years probation in 1990. ARTHUR H. HO st, PH.D.

Secord, Richard RETIRED U.S. Air Force General Richard V. Secord had a career that was both shrouded in secrecy and commended for valor. He holds the Department of Defense’s highest peacetime medal, the Defense Distinguished Medal. He holds a B.S. degree from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and a M.S. degree in international relations from George Washington University. He furthered his academic standing by graduating from the U.S. Air Force Air Command and Staff College and the U.S. Naval War College. Secord’s academic credentials dwarf those of the majority of his colleagues, but his real life experience came between the years of 1963 and 1968 in southeast Asia. During these years, Secord flew over 285 combat missions with the U.S. Air Force and was the air wing commander for the CIA’s covert war in Laos. In this position, he commanded all of the tactical air operations executed by the CIA and its secret airline company, Air America. In 1983, Secord resigned from his position with the U.S. Air Force due to negative repercussions from his association with arms dealers, including Edwin Wilson. Wilson was convicted of covertly selling arms, including 43,000 pounds of plastic explosives, to Libya, a sponsor of terrorism at the time. After his resignation, Secord joined Iranian businessman Albert Hakim and founded The En-

‘WIDENER UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Vietnam War; Reagan, Ronald; Iran; Central Intelligence Agency. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Richard Secord, Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos John Wiley, 1992); “Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Affairs,” www.fas.org.

Secret Service ALTHOUGH AN organization calling itself the Secret Service conducted espionage for the Union during the American Civil War, the entity known today as the U.S. Secret Service was founded only after the war had ended in 1865. As a division of the U.S. Treasury Department, its mission was to investigate and prosecute the counterfeiting of U.S. currency. Two years later, that assignment was ex-

panded to include the investigation of “frauds against the government,” including such crimes as smuggling, mail theft, and the anti-government activities of groups like the Ku Klux Klan. The Secret Service did not assume responsibility for protecting the U.S. president until 1901, following the assassination of President William

Mckinley by anarchist Leon Czolgosz. The protection mission was undertaken on an unofficial basis at first; it was not until 1913 that Congress passed legislation authorizing the Secret Service to protect both the sitting president and president-elect. In 1951, following an assassination attempt on President Harry Truman by Puerto Rican terrorists the previous year, Congress authorized the Secret Service to extend protection to the president’s immediate family and also to the vice president. After the assassination of U.S. senator and presidential candidate Robert Kennedy in 1968, the Secret Service protection mission was expanded to include presidential and vice presidential candidates and nominees, as well as to former presidents, their widows, and their children until age 16. Into the 21st century, the Secret Service also protects foreign diplomatic missions in the United States, as well as foreign dignitaries visiting the country.

Structure of the service. Although the popular conception of Secret Service personnel typically involves plainclothes agents in dark suits and sunglasses, the agency also has a large contingent of

uniformed officers. The Secret Service Uniformed Division was initially the product of a merger of the Secret Service and the White House Police in 1930. The Uniformed Division has responsibility for security at the White House, the vice president’s residence, the Treasury Department, and the foreign diplomatic missions. Far more than just security guards, the Uniformed Division includes teams of specialists trained in explosive detection, crime scene investigation, countersniper operations, and

SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) techniques. In 2003, the Secret Service had an annual budget in excess of $850 million. It employed approximately 1,000 officers in the Uniformed Divi-

sion and about 3,000 plainclothes agents. Agent recruits must complete the nine-week Criminal Investigator Training Program, which is one of the courses offered at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Upon graduation, recruits receive

more specialized training through the Special Agent Training Course, which is held at the Secret Service Training Academy in Laurel, Maryland. This 11week program includes instruction in counterfeiting investigation, protection techniques, computer

hacking detection, and emergency medical procedures, among other subjects. The Secret Service Training Academy also offers more advanced

courses in specialized subjects which experienced agents may take later in their careers. The protection function is the Secret Service’s most publicly visible aspect, given the drama inherent in the possibility that a president or other government official might be reached by an assassin. Although the specific details of Secret Service protection procedures are kept confidential, for obvious reasons, some general information is publicly available. Persons receiving ongoing security (“permanent protectees” in Secret Service jargon), such as the president and vice president, have full-time teams of agents (details) assigned to them. When a protectee is scheduled to leave a secure area (such as the White House) and visit another location, a Secret Service advance team visits the site and makes a detailed security survey. This analysis is designed to determine the personnel and equipment that will be needed to make the protectee’s visit secure, as well as emergency evacuation routes and availability of relevant services such as emergency medical care. In addition, plans are made to coordinate the Secret Service’s activities with local law enforcement agencies. Prior to the protectee’s visit, a com-

mand post is set up to coordinate control and communications, and a system of checkpoints and identification procedures is established, so that only authorized persons are allowed proximity to the individual who is being protected. In order to keep radio communications secure during a protection assignment, the Secret Service develops a code system used to refer to the people and places most likely to be involved in the operation. This is designed to confuse any who might intercept radio messages between agents, or between agents and their command post. These code designation are, of course, changed regularly. However, some of the code names used by the Secret Service during the previous administrations have come to light. President Jimmy Carter was known, for a time, as DASHER, and his wife, First Lady Rosalynn Carter, was DANCER. Their daughter Amy was codenamed DYNAMO. A few years later, President Ronald Reagan was given the designation RAWHIDE, while his wife Nancy was RAINBOW. President Bill Clinton was referred to as EAGLE, his wife Hillary was EVERGREEN, and on a state visit, Pope John Paul II was given the code name HALO. In addition, the Secret Service investigates security threats on an ongoing basis. Threats made

against the president (which constitute violations of federal law) are especially taken very seriously, and every effort is made to identify their source and ensure that any actual danger to the protectee is neutralized in advance of any visit. The Secret Service has established a record of success in protecting those who come under its purview. Indeed, the full extent of its success will never be known, since it is impossible to determine how many assassination plots have been abandoned by their would-be perpetrators in the face of Secret Service protection. However, over the years there have been some notable failures, the most dramatic of which were the assassination of President John E Kennedy in Dallas, Texas, in 1963 and the Washington, D.C., shooting of Reagan by John Hinckley in 1981. Some less disastrous security breakdowns involved President Gerald Ford (who twice in 1975 had pistols drawn in his presence by would-be assassins) and Clinton (who saw a small plane crashed into the White House and a man empty an assault rifle at the building, both during 1994). With the ongoing War on Terrorism, when weapons of all kinds have become immensely sophisticated and international terrorism poses a continual threat, the Secret Service’s protection responsibilities have become more difficult than ever.

Currency and computer crime. The Secret Service is also charged with protecting the nation’s currency. As the world of finance has become more complex, the range of this protection has expanded. In 1984, Congress made credit card fraud a federal crime, and in 1998 it added identity theft to the list of federal offenses. The Secret Service responded by establishing in 1987 the Electronic Crimes Special Agent Program, which trains selected agents as specialists in all aspects of computer crime. More than 200 agents have been given expertise under this

program. However, some of the agency’s investigations

have drawn protests from computer users and civil libertarians, who have charged that Secret Service agents in some cases have seized computer equip-

ment and shut down websites on grounds that were flimsy, if not purely speculative. In 1999, the Secret Service set up the Electronic Crimes Task Force, which serves as a clearinghouse for law enforcement agencies at all levels, federal, state, and local.

Operating out of the Secret Service’s New York City office, the task force has 240 agents assigned and shares relevant information with over 180 law enforcement agencies and 60 private corporations. The Secret Service also provides educational tools to law enforcement agencies nationwide to assist their detection and prosecution of computer-related crimes. The Secret Service has experienced some new challenges in recent years. In 1998, federal independent counsel Kenneth Starr subpoenaed several members of Clinton’s Secret Service protection detail. The subpoenas stemmed from Starr’s investigation into allegations that Clinton had committed perjury, an inquiry that eventually led to Clinton’s impeachment. Although the Secret Service fought the summons in court, three Secret Service agents

were forced to testify before a federal grand jury, the first time in U.S. history that such testimony had been required. In the period since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Secret Service’s capabilities have been stretched to their limits. The Patriot Act of 2001 increased further the Secret Service’s responsibilities in the area of computer crime. Concern over possible terrorist attacks has required the Secret Service to provide protective services at a number of special events, such as the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City, Utah, and the annual Super Bowl championship game. As of August 2003, the increased workload had not come with a corresponding increase in resources, and the stress

on Secret Service agents, both uniformed and plainclothed, began to take a toll, resulting in a number of agents seeking positions in other agencies or in the private sector. Many of the uniformed officers, in particular, sought transfers to the new Transportation Security Administration. In 2002, the Department of Homeland Security was created in an effort to coordinate the U.S. government’s efforts to fight terrorism. As a result of the new legislation, the Secret Service was transferred from the Treasury Department to the Department of Homeland Security effective March 1, 2003: JUSTIN GUSTAINIS, PH.D. STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, PLATTSBURGH SEE

ALSO:

War

on

Terrorism;

Homeland Security Department.

counterterrorism;

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Dennis V. N. McCarthy, Protecting the President: The Inside Story of a Secret Service Agent (Morrow, 1985); Phillip H. Melanson, The Secret Service: The Hidden History of an Enigmatic Agency (Carroll and Graf, 2002); Phillip H. Melanson, The Politics of Protection: The U.S. Secret Service in the Terrorist Age (Praeger, 1984); Harry Edward Neal, The Secret Service in Action (Elsevier/Nelson, 1980); Jane Takeuchi and Fredric Solomon, Behavioral Science and the Secret Service: Toward the Prevention of Assassination (National Academy Press, 1981); David Seidman, Secret Service Agents: Life Protecting the President (Rosen, 2002).

Shadrin, Nicholas ON THE NIGHT of December 20, 1975, Nicholas Shadrin, former Soviet naval officer, defector, and American double-agent, disappeared without a

trace in Vienna, Austria. Commander Nikolay Fydorovich Artamonoy, later known as Nicholas Shadrin, was highly regarded by his superiors in the Soviet Baltic Fleet, the youngest officer ever to command a destroyer and on the fast track to admiral. In June 1959, he was stationed in Gdynia, Poland, training foreign naval officers, when he fell in love with a Polish medical student and, with her, crossed the Baltic Sea in a small boat to asylum in Sweden. After a brief stay in Sweden, they decided to move on to the United States, where Shadrin provided the CIA and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) with a wealth of information about Soviet naval ships, weapons systems, and operating procedures. Shadrin married his companion, Ewa Gora, in 1960 and they settled in the suburbs of Washington, D.C., where he became an analyst and lecturer with ONI, and she returned to school to complete her studies to become a dentist. He later transferred to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Becoming somewhat disenchanted with his failure to rise higher in the U.S. intelligence community and blaming his slow advancement on the lack of a security clearance, Shadrin agreed reluctantly to join with the CIA and FBI in pursuing a doubleagent operation: He would appear to accept an offer to work for Soviet intelligence, while reporting to American intelligence on Soviet activities. It is speculated that by so doing he hoped to gain the security clearance he desired.

While most of his meetings with his Soviet han-

dlers were in the United States, he did make one trip to Montréal, Canada, and another to Vienna. At the time of his second trip to Austria in 1975, ostensibly for a ski vacation with his wife, he had one meeting with the Soviets in Vienna on December 18, and another scheduled for the night of the 20th. He departed his hotel about 6:00 P.M. and was never seen in public again. While speculation about his fate was widespread, it was not until October 1993 that Oleg Kalugin, former head of KGB counterintelligence, confirmed that Shadrin had died, reportedly of a heart attack during an attempted kidnapping by So- . viet counterintelligence on the night of his disap-

pearance. ALAN HARRIS BATH, PH.D. INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

SEE ALSO: Kalugin, Oleg D.; naval intelligence; KGB.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Henry Hurt, Shadrin: The Spy Who Never Came Back (Readers Digest Press, 1981); Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate (St. Martin’s Press, 1994); David Wise, Molehunt (Random House, 1992).

signals intelligence THE CENTRAL Intelligence Agency (CIA) defines signals intelligence (SIGINT) as, “the procurement and analysis of coded foreign messages.”’ Present means of acquiring this data, for the purposes of either intelligence or counterintelligence, include satellites, listening stations, and specialized military equipment including submarines, airplanes, and mobile listening vehicles.

Early history. Uses of signals intelligence goes back to the days of ancient Egypt when the pharaohs used night fires and colored flags as coded messages to troops located miles away. Over the centuries, Roman generals substituted fires and smoke signals with written letters, and over the subsequent centuries, in an attempt

to prevent

adversaries

from

gaining access to important information, political and military leaders would undertake basic encryption (in a written form) of their precious informa-

tion. However, until the creation of the telegraph wires and the introduction of the radio in the early 20th century, signals intelligence changed little. Radio transmissions provided political and military leaders a means by which they could effectively coordinate army logistics, artillery, and infantry on a large scale not available to past military leaders. With this ability came significant hindrance as each nation created specific groups designed to intercept and decode their adversaries’ messages. Although codemaking and codebreaking are ancient practices, modern communications

in-

telligence activities in the United States date from the World War I period and the development of radio communications technology.

World War I. In 1917 and 1918, the U.S. Army created, within the Military Intelligence Division (MID), the Cipher Bureau (MI-8) under Herbert O.

Yardley. MID assisted the radio intelligence units in the American Expeditionary Forces and in 1918 created the Radio Intelligence Service for operations along the Mexican border. The navy had established a modest effort, but it was absorbed by mutual agreement in 1918 into Yardley’s postwar civilian Black Chamber. Army continuity was assumed, however, in the small Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) of the Army Signal Corps under the direction of William F. Friedman. During World War I, the uses and countermeasures of signals intelligence increased at an exponential rate. For the navies of the warring powers, radio transmissions (signals) proved both a boon and a detriment as the Imperial German Navy learned after the war. The British Royal Navy’s intelligence unit, dubbed Room 40, used German radio transmissions to locate the German fleet prior to the battle of Jutland in May 1916, providing the British Navy with tactical surprise. Britain’s ability to break the German codes stemmed from the efforts of numerous individuals including Nigel de Grey, a navy lieutenant who worked as a codebreaker in Room 40. De Grey played a key role in breaking the infamous Zimmermann Telegram. Release of this message, which announced Germany’s hostile intentions toward the United States using Mexico as a surrogate, proved pivotal in President Woodrow Wilson’s decision to enter World War I. Following the war, de Grey was reassigned to School and Cipher Code the Government (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park. Alongside de Grey was

Commander Alistair Graham Denniston the first department head of GC&CS. During the interwar years, 1919-39, Dennison coordinated SIGINT with his counterparts in the U.S. Navy, establishing vital links which proved vital to the war effort during World War II. World War II SIGINT. In contrast to the British, the American Navy’s cryptanalytic function reappeared in 1924, after World War I, under the command of Commander Laurance F. Safford. This unit was dubbed the Research Desk in the Code and Signal Section (COMSEC) within the Office of Naval Communications, which was tasked to ensure the security of U.S. military communications including radio intercepts, radio direction finding, and processing. During World War II, it was the Americans’ turn for the use of SIGINT to increase at an exponential level. Successes for the United States included breaking the Japanese military codes prior to the battle of Midway Island. Historians have recently suggested that intelligence collected from SIGINT shortened World War II by at least one year. Some of the more celebrated accomplishments of SIGINT included the Allies breaking the German ENIGMA machine’s codes, and the U.S. decryption of Japanese military codes via a machine dubbed PURPLE. Conversely, during the war, the Soviet Union fell prey to German codebreakers who regularly deciphered Soviet military codes causing the Soviets to lose several important battles, including Sevastopol in January 1942. For the United States, wartime successes proved the value of communications intelligence (COMINT) to military and political leaders, and Congress approved hundreds of millions of dollars for research and development of SIGINT. In the latter stages of the war, the military services created a new organization to facilitate cooperation among the services. This organization was called the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (ANCIB). At the end of the war, the State Department joined the ANCIB, which was renamed the State-Army-Navy Communications Board (STANCIB). In addition to the State Department, in 1946, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was added and STANCIB evolved into its final form, the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB).

For the British, World War II proved that their diligence during the interwar period paid off; Britain’s SIGINT agency, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), had an extensive network of outposts throughout the British empire. From stations including Bermuda, Ascension, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Iraq, Singapore, and Hong Kong, radio operators tracked Italian, German, and subsequently Soviet and Chinese political and military developments. Other members of the British Commonwealth, including Australia, Canada and New Zealand contributed stations in the South Pacific and arctic regions. One of Britain’s most celebrated codebreakers during the war was Thomas Flowers, who, while working for GC& CS’s Research Section in 1943, led a team that designed and built COLOSSUS, the first large scale electronic machine and forerunner to the modern-day computer. COLOSSUS was designed to work against the German cipher machine FISH and had a processing speed of 5,000 characters per second, making it the most powerful computer in the world at the time.

important cryptographic developments, including the concept of Public Key Cryptography (PKC). This development remained classified for decades and was the primary method of securing communications for government officials. For today’s computer users, PKC provides the basis for all secure

Cold War developments. As SIGINT in particular, and intelligence in general, had proven to be crucial to victory in World War II, the U.S. Congress was in favor of creating and funding new intelligence initiatives. Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, reinforcing the direction in which the

States went to war in Vietnam, operators in Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and elsewhere worked directly in support of the American war ef-

intelligence community was moving: increased cen-

tralization. Among other things, the act established the National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Agency (NSA). The CIA became a member of USCIB, which received a new charter as the highest national COMINT authority in the form of an NSC Intelligence Directive, NSCID No. 9, dated July 1, 1948. In contrast, the newly created NSA was charged with coordinating all SIGINT material for distribution to government customers, including the newly created Department of Defense, Congressional Select Committees on Intelligence, and the White House. For Britain’s GCHQ, the Cold War proved to be a difficult time for the distinguished intelligence agency. When compared to the NSA, it appeared to many within the intelligence world as the junior partner. However, British scientists did provide critical developments toward SIGINT, such as James Ellis, a mathematician and one of the earliest computer scientists. Ellis is credited with a number of

transactions over the internet.

Prior to the Vietnam War, signals intelligence reached a new height in 1954 with the development of the American U-2 spy plane, designed to fly over the Soviet Union (operations codenamed GREEN HORNET) at a height of 13 miles and eavesdrop with photo reconnaissance on Soviet military installations. Though not necessarily considered pure SIGINT, the U-2 was pivotal in 1960 when the United States suffered a humiliating loss as the Soviets successfully shot down the roving U-2 and captured the pilot. During the Vietnam War, the purported attack on U.S. Navy’s intelligence ship USS Maddox off the coast of North Vietnam provided Congrtessional consent to expand the conflict with the passage of the Tonkin Resolution. When the United

fort. Britain, as a neutral country, was not supposed

to be involved. In practice, however, British operators at the GCHQ intercept station in Hong Kong monitored and reported on the North Vietnamese air defense networks, while U.S. B-52 bombers attacked Hanoi and other North Vietnamese targets based on the SIGINT provided by GCHQ.

Methodology of SIGINT. SIGINT consists of several categories. While most military communications are protected by encryption techniques, computer processing can be used to decrypt some traffic, and additional intelligence can be derived from analysis of patterns of transmissions over time. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is dedicated analysis of non-communications electronic transmissions. This includes telemetry from missile tests (TELINT), or radar transmitters (RADINT). In the early 2000s, the United States operated four constellations of signals intelligence satellites in geostationary, elliptical, and low-Earth orbits. The geostationary SIGINT constellation consists of three or four satellites. The first generations of these satellites, known as Rhyolite, were launched in

the early 1970s and each had a receiving antenna

with a diameter of over ten meters. The next generations of these satellites, known as Chalet or Vortex, were first orbited in the late 1970s, and had an antenna with a diameter of several tens of meters. The most recent models, known as Magnum, were first launched in the mid-1980s, and have a very large deployable antenna with a diameter of approximately 100 meters. Satellites with an even larger antenna are known to be under development. Increasing the diameter of the antennae of these satellites makes it possible to detect lower power transmissions, as well as to determine the position of a transmitter with increased precision. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and National Security Agency launched a third Magnum signals intelligence satellite on the space shuttle on November 14, 1990. This spacecraft joined the Chalet launched on May 10, 1989, and the second Magnum launched on November 23, 1989. In addition to these 1989 launches, the constellation also includes the first Magnum, launched on the shuttle in 1985. The methodology employed by the NSA to intercept and analyze SIGINT has been called Echelon. This system intercepts and processes international communications passing via communications satel-

lites which relay the information back to the Fort Meade, Maryland, headquarters of NSA. Echelon is part of a global surveillance system that is now over 50 years old. Other parts of the system intercept messages from the internet, from radio transmissions, from secret equipment installed inside embassies, or use orbiting satellites to monitor signals anywhere on the earth’s surface. The system includes stations run by Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, in addition to those operated by the United States. The first reports about Echelon in Europe credited it with the capacity to intercept within Europe all e-mail, telephone, and fax communications. This has proven to be false, as NSA officials have said that neither Echelon nor the SIGINT system are able to do this, yet. The Echelon system was established under a secret 1947 UK-USA agreement which brought together the British and American systems, personnel, and stations. This joined the networks of three British Commonwealth countries, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Later, other countries including Norway, Denmark, Germany and Turkey agreed to participate in

secret SIGINT agreements with the United Nations and became surrogate participants in the UK-USA network. Besides integrating their stations, each country appointed senior officials to work as liaison staff at others’ headquarters. The United States operates a Special U.S. Liaison Office (SUSLO) in London and Cheltenham, England, while a SIGINT official from GCHQ has his own suite of offices inside NSA headquarters at Fort Meade. In the post-Cold War world, signals intelligence has received mixed reviews. In 1990, one of the few warnings that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was likely came from U.S. signals intelligence. When the Soviet-built Tall King radar resumed operation in Iraq on July 29, 1990, U.S. electronic intelligence officers had some success in monitoring Iraqi military communications. The Iraqi Army was also using underground cables to communicate, making it difficult to determine exact Iraqi military intentions, thus surprising the U.S. military establishment who had not heeded the signals intelligence. In July 1995, the intelligence community ended a 50-year silence regarding one of cryptography’s most splendid successes, the VENONA Project. VENONA was the codename used for the U.S. SIGINT effort to collect and decrypt the text of Soviet KGB and GRU (intelligence agencies) messages from the 1940s onward. These messages provided extraordinary insight into Soviet attempts to infiltrate the highest levels of the United States government.

However, U.S. signals intelligence did not prove effective enough to predict or prevent the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. Since that date, the tracking, decrypting, and interception of terrorist communications has topped signals intelligence priorities. The use of SIGINT has been, and remains, a highly classified profession throughout the world. RAYMOND W. WESTPHAL, JR. UNIVERSITY OF EXETER, ENGLAND

SEE ALSO: reconnaissance; surveillance; cryptography; electronic intelligence; communications. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Central Intelligence Agency, www. cia.gov; National Security Agency, www.nsa.gov; James Bamford, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency (Anchor Books, 2002); Mitchel B. Wallerstein, “Scientific Communication and National

Security,” Science (v.224/4648, May 1984); David Kahn, “Codebreaking in World War I and II: The Major Successes and Failures, Their Causes and Their Effects,” The Historical Journal (v.23/3, September 1980); Colonel Frederick E. Jackson, Tannenberg: The First Use of Signals Intelligence in Modern Warfare (U.S. Army War College, 2002); David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writings (Macmillan, 1967); Duncan Campbell, “Inside Echelon,” Telepolis July 25, 2000).

Silvermaster, Nathan G. NATHAN Silvermaster, who also went under the codename POL, worked for a number of different U.S. federal agencies, starting in 1935 with the De-

partment of Agriculture’s Resettlement Administration and moving on to the U.S. Maritime Labor Board, the Farm Security Administration, the Board of Economic Warfare, and in 1944, Treasury’s War Assets Division. After World War II, Silvermaster was named by former communist Elizabeth Bentley to be the head of a Soviet espionage ring within the U.S. government. Bentley acted as a courier for Silvermaster’s ring that was led by Victor Perlo. Silvermaster passed on to Bentley documents by Harry Dexter White, the assistant secretary of the U.S. Treasury, after photographing them in his basement. White’s involvement in Silvermaster’s ring is a contested topic; historians James M. Boughton and Roger J. Sandilands claim that White’s inclusion is part of a conservative attempt to discredit New Deal economists.

The espionage investigation carried out by the FBI from 1945 to 1959, titled “Gregory” (Silvermaster’s middle name), exposed in its 1,950 pages of files, 27 individuals in Silvermaster’s ring who gathered information from at least six federal agencies to turn over to the Soviets. In spite of these findings, no indictments for espionage were returned against any subjects in the case by any grand jury. Throughout his life, Silvermaster firmly denied the charges, and family members, despite the significant evidence, continue efforts to clear his name of espionage charges. LUCA PRONO, PH.D. UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM, ENGLAND

SEE ALSO: VENONA.

White, Harry Dexter; Bentley, Elizabeth;

BIBLIOGRAPHY. James M. Boughton and Roger J. Sandilands, “Politics and the Attack on FDR’s Economists: From Grand Alliance to Cold War,” Intelligence and National Security (v.17/2, 2002); John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, VENONA: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (Yale University Press, 1999); Jerrold and Leona Schecter, Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History (Brasseys, 2002); Athan G. Theoharis, Chasing Spies: How the FBI Failed in Counterintelligence but Promoted the Politics of McCarthyism in the Cold War Years (Ivan R. Dee, 2002).

Sinclair, Hugh BORN IN ENGLAND in 1873, Hugh Sinclair entered military service in 1886. Sinclair’s nickname “Ouex,” was derived from Sir Arthur Pinero’s play The Gay Lord Quex whose central character, according to intelligence historian Christopher Andrew, was half-jokingly described as “the wickedest man in London.” Sinclair served in World War I from 1914 to 1918 and, during 1916-17, he was captain of HMS Renown. In these years, he earned a reputation as a bon vivant, and it was well known that while cap-

tain of the Renown, Sinclair had many intense debates in his quarters with his first wife whom he divorced in 1920. Sinclair’s early service record repeatedly praised him for his tact, exceptional administrative powers, and interpersonal skills. He rose through the ranks and succeeded Admiral Reginald Hall as director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) in 1919, and he also became naval aide to the king the following year. In 1923, Sinclair succeeded Mansfield Cummings as head of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). As SIS chief, Sinclair moved from the Admiralty to 21 Queen Anne’s Gate, which was the chief’s (“C”) official residence. His responsibilities also included overseeing the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) as director (although Alastair Denniston remained its operational head), and improving the coordination of signals intelligence generally. Like Vernon Kell, Sinclair earned a reputation as an extreme anti-Bolshevik. Sinclair played a lead-

ing role in the Zinoviev Letter conspiracy, which helped bring about the downfall of the first British socialist government of Ramsay MacDonald in 1924. Some scholars have essentially argued that

both Sinclair and Reginald Hall (a close friend and the Zimmermann Telegram decrypter) were in on the scheme from the very outset, while others have suggested that they were duped by Guy Liddell. In either case, there is a general consensus among scholars that at the very least both knew what consequences this information likely held for the election fortunes of the Conservative Party. Sinclair’s career is marked by a healthy mix of bureaucratic and operational successes and failures. At several critical junctures in the history of the service, Sinclair was able to raise funds that were required, which was no mean feat during the excep-

tionally lean times. For instance, shortly before he had assumed command of SIS, for economic and security reasons SIS headquarters had been moved

from Whitehall Court to Melbury Road, off Kensington High Street. Once the Conservative Party returned to government, Sinclair arranged to secure the funds required to move SIS and the codebreakers back to the seat of government at 54 Broadway. Likewise, in 1938 Sinclair arranged for sizeable increases in the secret service vote which made it pos-

sible to re-establish Section V, the SIS counterespionage branch, as well as Section D for Destruction, an organization responsible for political warfare, sabotage, and guerrilla forces. In general, however, Sinclair properly has been accused by his detractors of never being “strong enough” to withstand the pressures of continual government parsimony during the inter-war period and was an abetter of fiscal conservatism in running the service. To reduce costs, for example, Sinclair took to hiring ex-servicemen living on pensions which, historian Richard Deacon noted, meant that they were either too old, or if young, then no good. Sinclair was unable to wield the organization into an effective peacetime service; he was responsible for its compartmentalization into departments whose members never knew what the other branches were doing, and more often his intelligence approach was unorthodox and amateurish, according to Deacon

and other scholars. The Soviet Union remained Sinclair’s and the SIS’s number-one priority in the inter-war period, which meant that estimates on German rearmament were never sufficient in detail or accuracy. Sinclair

grew to respect the Soviet intelligence service but had little time for its army. At several junctures during his period as SIS head, such as 1923-24 and again after May 1927, major intelligence gaps resulted from the loss of Soviet codes. Sinclair’s service was never capable of filling these gaps. Sinclair’s greatest internal network operational success (on public record) also became one of his most significant failures. Almost all senior bureaucrats in inter-war European countries knew full well that foreign intelligence services operated through passport offices during this period. Recognizing this fact, Sinclair established a secret Z Section, a second string of agents quietly run from The Hague, Holland, which remained separate from MI-6 (British foreign intelligence) yet was controlled from London. Captain Payne Best ran the Z Section Office (under Claude Dansey), and his crew obtained much intelligence. However, Best was eventually one of two officers kidnapped (a third was fatally wounded) by the Germans. A thorough investigation was conducted, and Sinclair was blamed because a memorandum he had sent Dansey was intercepted. Sinclair contracted cancer in the late 1930s, and in 1939 he entered the King Edward VII Hospital for Officers in Beaumont Place, London, for treatment. The disease was later diagnosed as terminal and he died at age 60, on November 4, 1939. MICHAEL BUTT DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY, CANADA

SEE ALSO: Kell, Sir Vernon; Cumming, Mansfield; MI6; Zimmermann Telegram; Hall, William; signals intelli-

gence; Netherlands.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. H. Sinclair, Who Was Who, 1929-1940 (Adam & Charles Black, 1941); Christopher Andrew, Secret Service (Viking Penguin, 1985); Richard Deacon, ‘C’:

A Biography of Sir Maurice Oldfield (Macdonald, 1984); Anthony Brown, ‘C’: The Secret Life of Sir Stewart Menzies, Spymaster to Winston Churchill (Gale, 1987).

Singapore THE REPUBLIC of Singapore is located on an island at the tip of the Malaysian Peninsula in southeast Asia. The country is a highly developed

free-market economy with the fifth highest gross domestic product in the world. Adventurers knew Singapore as early as the 14th century. Around the early 16th century, the Malays included it as part of a new kingdom after being driven south by the Portuguese. The Portuguese burned their outpost in Singapore in the 16th century, and it remained largely ignored until the early 19th century when a permanent settlement was established. On January 28, 1819, Sir Stamford Raffles arrived with the British fleet and, after some subterfuge, gained permission from the Dutch, who then controlled the area, to set up a trading post. Modern Singapore was founded. In 1826, the British formed the Straits Settlements, adding Singapore to Malacca and Penang. The British in India governed them all until 1867 when Singapore became a single Crown colony. The Japanese captured Singapore in 1942 in World War II and occupied it until they surrendered in 1945. The British returned to Singapore to increasing demands for Singaporean and Malaysian independence. The British ruled Singapore under a state of emergency against the communist insurgency in Malaysia until 1960. Finally, in 1965, Singapore became an independent country. Singapore is a city-state that established its governing system based on the British parliamentary structure. It has a unicameral elected parliament and national and local government are the same. A prime minister leads the government. Universal suffrage exists, and voting is compulsory for all citizens. Although political parties are allowed, the People’s Action Party (PAP) has ruled since Singapore’s establishment. National service and preparedness are the cornerstones of Singapore’s security concept. It has an army, air force, and navy under its Ministry of Defense. One of the divisions in the Ministry of De fense is the Security and Intelligence Division (SID), the foreign intelligence agency of the government, equivalent to the American CIA. Internal security is the role of the Internal Security Department (ISD) of the Ministry of Home Affairs. A third security function, VIP protection, is per-

formed by the VIP Protection Section of the Singapore Police. While ISD used to focus on communist insurgents

in Singapore,

its main

mission

now

is

counterterrorism, working in conjunction with the U.S.-led War on Terrorism.

While a terrorist incident is highly visible, espionage cases are not. In 1982, according to the ISD, it exposed and expelled two Soviet spies for espionage activities in Singapore. One was Anatoly Alexeyvich Larkin, a Soviet military intelligence (GRU) officer who attempted to cultivate a Singaporean army officer to conduct espionage against the small nation’s forces. The other alleged spy was Alexander Alexandrovich Bondarey, another Soviet military intelligence officer, who was sent to take over a Soviet spy network, that had a local agent working for it since the 1970s. ISD describes more recent cases that include the arrest of two persons iri 1997 and another four persons in 1998 “for involvement in espionage and foreign subversive activities prejudicial to the security of Singapore.” ISD reported: “Of the two persons arrested in 1997, one was a male Singapore permanent resident who was a deep-cover operative of a foreign intelligence service. He had used the other, a female Singaporean, as a collaborator. Of the four Singapore citizens detained in 1998, three were controlled agents for a foreign intelligence agency. One of them recruited the fourth person to collect intelligence on and to subvert a local community organization. All six of them have been released.” Espionage in Singapore and ISD foreign intelligence operations may have more to do with industrial and corporate espionage than with major military efforts. Over the course of the past 20 years, Singapore’s relations with Australia have been strained at times with the revelations of Singaporean agents embedded in Australian corporations. “Singapore is more actively engaged in intelligence collection activities in this part of the world than any other southeast Asian country,” explained Des Ball of Australia’s Strategic and Defense Studies Center in an interview on Australian television. FLOYD PASEMAN ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO: Australia; United Kingdom; War on Terrorism.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Lesley Layton, Cultures of the World: Singapore (Marshall Cavandish); CIA World Factbook (CIA, 2003). Barbara Leitch LePoer, ed., “Singapore, A Country Study,” (Library of Congress, 1991); Ministry of Home Affairs, ISD, www2.mha.gov.sg/mha/isd; “Sin-

gapore Center of Spying Allegations,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation, www.abc.net.au.

Six-Day War THE SIX-DAY War of June 1967, in which the Israel Defense Forces rapidly crushed the armed forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, displayed the outstanding capabilities of the Israeli intelligence services at the operational level. The clear superiority of Israeli intelligence was a key component of the extraordinarily quick victory. Initial strategic estimates of Egyptian intentions by Israeli intelligence were not particularly accurate. Their assessment at the time was that Egypt would not be prepared to conduct military operations against Israel for several years, and Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser’s movement of his forces into the Sinai Peninsula apparently was a surprise to Israeli intelligence. Since recent accounts suggest that the Israeli government had already decided to go to war in any event, this strategic surprise was not fatal to the Israelis. Perhaps even more importantly, the Israeli intelligence agencies had extensive intelligence coverage of its opponents’ military forces. The war opened with the Israeli Air Force destroying the Arab air forces, mostly while their aircraft were still on the ground. On June 5, within a matter of hours, some 70 percent of Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian front-line aircraft were put out of action, and their airfields rendered temporarily unusable. In the case of the Egyptian Air Force, the Israeli raids were particularly eased by their intelligence services’ discovery that after flying dawn patrols (which was when the Egyptians expected a possible Israeli air attack), the Egyptian pi-

lots would return to their bases for breakfast at 7:00 A.M. When the Israeli pilots struck at 7:45 A.M., they enjoyed virtually defenseless airspace over Egypt. Beyond this particular intelligence success, Israeli intelligence had focused a considerable amount of time and energy to collecting intelligence on the

Arab air forces, rightly believing that destroying Arab aerial capabilities was a key to victory. King Hussein of Jordan, whose air force suffered the worst loss rate, noted that the Israeli pilots “had a complete catalogue of the most minute details of

each of the 32 Arab air bases, what objectives to strike, where, when and how. We had nothing like thats’ The Israeli air strikes also benefited from careful intelligence mapping of Egyptian radar and air defense deployments, all of which pointed east toward Israel. Israeli bombing missions instead were conducted from west to east or north to south. The unexpected routes of attack in fact led to initial Arab charges that U.S. or British aircraft had actually conducted the bombing from aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean or from Cyprus. Reports circulated of several agents within Egypt run by Israeli intelligence prior to the war, providing key human intelligence (HUMINT) reports on Egyptian military facilities. One Arab living near Alexandria harbor was in fact arrested after the war for spying on Egyptian naval facilities in the area. Likewise, a Mossad agent named Eli Cohen based in Syria provided very valuable reports on the Syrian military dispositions and government policies prior to his arrest and execution in 1965. Judging from some Israeli military operations against Jordan, Israel also had a very active and useful human intelligence network there before and during the war. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) also proved to be of major benefit to the Israeli campaign. In many ways, it is probably fair to say that this was due less to the efficiency of the Israeli SIGINT services (although very professional) than to the abysmal communications security practiced by the Arab governments and militaries. Although the Egyptian military did in fact use a code system for communications, this was broken before the war by Israeli military intelligence. As a result, commanders’ orders for some key Egyptian maneuvers were transparent to the Israelis. The Israelis were also able to issue false orders over Egyptian military nets, causing considerable confusion among their units. The Israelis also succeeded in intercepting key governmental communications. The best-known example (and an illustration of the Arab propensity at the time for ignoring basic communications security, since it took place over the regular civilian telephone system) was a conversation between Egypt’s Nasser and Jordan’s Hussein, in which Nasser falsely assured Hussein that Egyptian aircraft were attacking Israeli airfields. Despite some objections from the Israeli intelligence community, the Israeli government decided to publicly release the inter-

cept for political and propaganda purposes. Whatever effect the conversation’s release had politically, it did result in a significantly tighter control by Arab governments of their sensitive political conversations.

Beyond signals intelligence and human intelli-

gence, Israeli aircraft also conducted some highvalue photo reconnaissance missions before the war. Although initially limited in scope by diplomatic constraints, these missions intensified immediately before the war. During the war itself, photographic intelligence flights initially were abandoned since the Israeli air force used all its aircraft for combat missions. Tactical intelligence units played a relatively small part in the overall military. operations during the war due to the speed of advance and quick collapse of the Arab armies. The speed of the Israeli advance did, however, provide an intelligence windfall for Israeli intelligence services, as they captured large quantities of classified documents before they could be destroyed and numerous weapons systems for technical exploitation.

man-occupied countries. Very soon he had to deal with the former Axis allies of Germany’s Third Reich now imprisoned by or cooperating with the advancing Allied troops, or the local resistance movements. Most famous is his role in liberating Italian fascist leader Benito Mussolini, who was held under arrest by the new Italian government in Gran Sasso. It should be mentioned that, after the war, some of his fellow Nazis accused Skorzeny of exaggerating his role during this daunting raid. Undoubtedly, Skorzeny was essential in suppressing the coup attempt by German army officers against Nazi leader Adolf Hitler on July 20, 1944. In late 1944, he “convinced” (by means of kidnapping) the Hungarian

LAWRENCE E. CLINE, PH.D.

fascist leader Miklos Horthy not to make a deal with the advancing Soviet troops. The deception operation during the Battle of the Bulge, which comprised the use of fake Allied uniforms on a large scale, was his last major operation in World War II. Skorzeny’s postwar career is probably of no less importance than his war years, but the available sources on his activities are not as clear. Skorzeny surrendered to American troops in Austria, was somehow debriefed, and escaped from an intern-

AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

ment camp in Darmstadt, Germany, in 1948. His

SEE ALSO: Israel; Egypt; Jordan; Syria and Lebanon. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars: A History of Israel’s Intelligence Services (Grove Press, 1991); Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East (Random House, 1984); Richard B. Parker, The Six-Day War: A Retrospective (University Press of Florida, 1996).

Skorzeny, Otto BORN JUNE 12, 1908, in Vienna, Austria, Otto Skorzeny joined the Nazi movement long before the Anschluss (invasion) of Austria in 1938. An engineer with university training, he started his career as an officer participating in the military operations on Germany’s Western Front in World War I until

1943. Skorzeny then joined the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Amt VI, foreign intelligence) and was engaged in anti-resistance operations in the Ger-

engagement with Allied intelligence is certain, but despite recent archival releases, it has not yet been established in a reliable way. Although he had close links to Western intelligence, his main loyalty seems to have been with his former fellow SS officers and postwar neo-Nazis. He was crucial in organizing escape routes and financing, which he directed from exile in Spain, ruled by a sympathetic fascist dictator Francisco Franco. He also bought property in Ireland. His role as an ally, not only of former Nazis, but at the same time of Western intelligence organizations was publicized by Soviet Bloc communist propaganda and by the Western sensational press on a large scale. Skorzeny described himself as a humble businessman without any intelligence interest. The truth was somewhere in between, linking neo-Nazi activities, intelligence for Western services, and business deals. At some point Skorzeny seems to have worked for Israeli intelligence, which recruited him under the pretenses of another country. Skorzeny died in Madrid, Spain, in July 1975. OLIVER BENJAMIN HEMMERLE, Pu.D. MANNHEIM UNIVERSITY, GERMANY

sition of the CIA and established the fledgling agency as the pre-eminent intelligence and covert operations organization in the U.S. government.

Otto Skorzeny led a varied career of supporting neo-Nazis, Western intelligence, and secret business deals.

SEE ALSO: Mussolini, Benito; Hungary; Hitler, Adolf.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Charles Maurice O’Connell Foley, Commando Extraordinary (Hamilton & Co. Stafford, 1959); Otto Skorzeny, Skorzeny’s Special Missions: The Memoirs of the “Most Dangerous Man in Europe” (Greenhill Books, 1997).

Smith, Walter Bedell A FORMER ARMY officer and ambassador to the Soviet Union, Walter Bedell Smith proved to be one of the most influential and important directors of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). His administrative reorganization and promulgation of CIA-directed and -authored National Intelligence Estimates greatly strengthened the bureaucratic po-

Smith’s extensive military and diplomatic background rendered him well equipped to direct the CIA. A career army officer, he served as General Dwight Eisenhower’s chief of staff during World War II and planned the complex amphibious invasions of North Africa, Sicily, and Normandy. His wartime experience negotiating with Soviet officials led President Harry Truman to appoint him ambassador to Moscow in 1946. After a brief return to military service in 1949, Smith again retired from the service when Truman asked him to take charge of the recently formed CIA. The prestige and administrative acumen that Smith enjoyed as a result of his military and diplomatic service gave him the bureaucratic power to transform the CIA from a weak and fledgling agency into a powerful intelligence and covert-operations organization. Taking advantage of his personal prestige in military circles, Smith compelled the military intelligence services to subordinate themselves to the CIA in the development of intelligence estimates. As a result, the CIA would thereafter coordinate the production of interagency National Intelligence Estimates through the newly established Board of National Estimates. Smith also oversaw a major administrative reorganization of the CIA that included the establishment of the Directorate of Intelligence and the Office of National Estimates. More importantly, Smith used his skills to merge the Office of Special Operations and the State Department-dominated Office of Policy Coordination into the newly formed Directorate of Plans, and thereby established a CIA monopoly over covert actions.

By the time Smith stepped down as CIA director in February 1953, he had dramatically strengthened the agency and defined its previously vague responsibilities. Henceforth, the CIA would have the twin missions of drafting National Intelligence Estimates and engaging in covert-but-deniable operations on a global scale. ROBERT J. FLYNN, PH.D. GEORGIA PERIMETER COLLEGE

SEE ALSO: Central Intelligence Agency; Truman, Harry S; Office of Strategic Services.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ludwell Lee Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950—February 1953 (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992); John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (Simon & Schuster, 1986).

government witness at the trials of other suspected Soviet spies. BLAIRE M. HARMS U.S. MILiTaRy ACADEMY, WEST POINT SEE ALSO: Morros, Boris.

Soble, Jack BORN IN 1903 in Lithuania to a Jewish family, Jack Soble and his family emigrated to the United States in 1941 under false passports and on the instructions of the head of the Soviet intelligence service: (NKVD). In 1944, Soble replaced Vassily Zubilin (then head of the NK VD in the United States) as the head of the U.S. Morros spy ring. This ring had originated in 1934 when Boris Morros, Paramount Picture’s Russian-born musical

director, was approached by Zubilin and told to spy for the Soviets or risk his parents’ death. The spy ring included Soble, Soble’s psychiatrist brother, Dr. Robert A. Soblen (the brothers Americanized their Lithuanian name, Sobolevicius, differently), Soble’s Russian-born wife, and other members of Morros’s independent film company. In 1947, Morros revealed the spy ring to the FBI and was asked to be a double-agent. Morros agreed, and by 1957 most members of the ring were indicted or arrested, including Soble and his wife. After admitting to guilt for wartime espionage, Soble was given a seven-year prison sentence. In 1958, while at the federal penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, Soble swallowed a handful of nuts and bolts in what he later claimed was a protest of the conditions at the prison, not an attempted suicide. He was moved to the Danbury, Connecticut, federal prison, and in June 1961 he was a key prosecution witness in his brother’s trial for espionage. Despite defense attorney attempts to question Soble’s mental competency, Soblen was found guilty and given a life sentence. In July 1962, Soblen fled to Israel to escape punishment, but as he was being returned to the United States, he stabbed himself on the airplane, which made an emergency

landing in London. While appealing his extradition Soble successfully committed suicide. In August 1962, Soble was released from the Danbury prison early, with time off for good behavior and his work at the prison library. Soble continued to serve as a

BIBLIOGRAPHY. David Anderson, “Jack Soble Freed on Parole by U.S.,”” The New York Times (September 12, 1962); Allen Weinstein, The Haunted Wood (Random House, 1999); Boris Morros, My Ten Years as a Counterspy (Viking, 1959); William W. Turner, Hoover’s FBI (Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1993); Edward Ranzal, “Red Spy Regrets Acts Against the U.S.,” The New York Times (October 2, 1957).

Sorge, Richard DR. RICHARD SORGE remains the prototype and synonym for a successful Soviet spy. Born on October 4, 1895, in Baku, then part of Russia, he moved with his family to Germany in 1898. Sorge joined the German army in World War I. Deactivated for health reasons in 1918, he re-entered his university studies, obtained a doctoral degree in 1919, and joined the new German Communist Party. In this context he was recruited into Soviet intelligence during the 1920s. At the end of 1924, he went to Soviet Russia and it seems that by then his work as a journalist became a cover only. His first major appointment for Soviet intelligence was China, which he reached in 1929. There he met some of the people who formed his spy ring in later years, especially Max Christiansen-Clausen. After a stay in the Soviet Union in 1932, Sorge went to Japan, where he joined the local group of the German Nazi Party, NSDAP, for cover reasons and became a correspondent for several German newspapers. His most important appointment was

as a correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung from 1936 until his imprisonment. Although he traveled extensively all over the Pacific region during this period, his success in intelligence-gathering was based on the close personal relationship he formed with the German ambassador to Japan. As a confidant of this diplomatic link

Under the regime of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, Sorge was not publicly praised for his achievements because Stalin had neglected his early warning concerning the Nazi invasion threat. Only in 1964 did Sorge became a posthumous Hero of the Soviet Union and was transformed into a role model for Soviet Bloc and especially East German intelligence services. A monument to his achievements was built in Moscow. In more recent times,

there has been criticism of Sorge’s personal life (alcohol, affairs with women, etc.) as being unprofessional, but his importance as one of the most successful spies in history remains unchallenged. OLIVER BENJAMIN HEMMERLE, PH.D. MANNHEIM UNIVERSITY, GERMANY

SEE ALSO: World War II; Japan; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. United States Congress, House Committee on Un-American Activities (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951); Frederick William Deakin, The Case of Richard Sorge (Chatto & Windus, 1966); Bryan T. van Sweringen, The Case of Richard Sorge (Garland, 1989); Gordon Prange, Target Tokyo: The Story of the Sorge Spy Ring (McGraw-Hill, 1984); Charles Willoughby, Shanghai Conspiracy (Dutton, 1952).

Richard Sorge’s espionage career became an exemplary case study of successful Soviet intelligence.

Souers, Sydney W.

between the Axis powers, Germany and Japan, Sorge got crucial information about German and Japanese war-planning. Therefore, Sorge was able to inform his Soviet handlers not only of the precise date for the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, but also about the Japanese neutrality. This allowed the Soviets to redirect troops from their eastern borders against the German invader in the west. Not long after, the Sorge spy ring was uncovered. Although the German ambassador still believed in his friend, the Japanese authorities tortured and then executed him on November

7,

1944. More than a dozen of his collaborators were sentenced, too, and at least five were sentenced to death or died in prison.

IN SEPTEMBER 1945, as World War II drew to a close, President Harry Truman abolished Franklin Roosevelt’s Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the intelligence agency that helped the United States to win the war. Truman received subsequent intelligence reports identifying the Soviet Union as a potential threat to American security, and on January 22, 1946, Truman created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) by executive order. The president disliked receiving intelligence reports and advice from a range of sources and

wanted to centralize the intelligence function under the guidance of someone he could trust. Truman named his friend and adviser, Sidney director of CIG, which later evolved tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the National Security Act of 1947.

Souers, as the into the Centhe passage of The president

enlivened the swearing-in ceremony by presenting Souers with a black hat, a black coat, and a wooden dagger and dubbing him the “director of centralized snooping.’ Souers promised Truman six months at

CIG, where he served from January to June 1946. A reporter, looking for inside information on the goals of the new CIG, asked Souers what he wanted to do. Souers replied that he wanted to “go home.” Truman and Souers had a lot in common. The president had served as a reservist in World War I, and he admired Souers for his experience in the U.S. Navy Reserves. When Truman volunteered for duty in World War II, he was told he was too old to be useful. Souers, however, did return to active duty and was promoted to rear admiral in 1945, and named deputy chief of Naval Intelligence. Like Truman, Souers’s reserve career had sometimes made

him an outsider in regular military circles. While newspapers criticized Souers’s outsider status, Truman saw it as a distinct and useful advantage. Souers was well qualified for the job of director of CIG. In addition to serving in naval intelligence, he had extensive experience in business, management, and finance in the private sector. He had also written the section on central intelligence in the “Eberstadt Report,” which detailed the U.S. Navy’s objections to the effort to unify the different branches of the armed services under the control of the State Department. Souers contended that instead of limiting the intelligence roles of individual service branches, the role of military intelligence should be expanded. Souers took on the temporary job at CIG with definite plans for establishing a course of covert actions aimed at protecting the United States from the Soviet Union. However, in this temporary position, he never had the authority to organize intelligence activities on the level needed to deal with the Soviet threat. He also had to deal with the manipulations and territorial jealousies of agencies that already existed.

because of Souers’s preference for remaining in the background. Souers returned to private life in 1950 but continued to respond to calls for help on intelligence information. In 1952, Truman presented his friend Souers with a Distinguished Service Medal for “exceptionally meritorious service” to the United States government. In 1956, President Dwight Eisenhower named Souers to the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, which was made up of retired senior intelligence officers. Souers died in 1973. ELIZABETH PURDY, PH.D. INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

SEE ALSO: Truman, Harry S; Office of Strategic Services; National Security Council. BIBLIOGRAPHY. “340. Citation Accompanying Distinguished Service Medal Presented to Admiral Souers,” Public Papers of the President, Harry S Truman, 19451953, www.trumanlibrary.org; Scott D. Breckinridge, The CIA and the United States Intelligence System (Westview, 1986); Brian Freemantle, CJA (Stein and Day, 1984); John Hollister Hedley, “Truman’s Trial and Error with the CIA,” Christian Science Monitor (September 22, 1995); Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy (Yale University Press, 1989); Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones, “Why Was the CIA Established in 1947?” Eternal Vigilance: 50 Years at the CIA (Frank Cass, 1997); John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and the Fall of the CIA (Simon and Schuster, 1986); Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, ICS, and NSC (Stanford University Press, 1999),

source

In 1947, Truman named Souers as the first exec-

utive secretary of the newly created National Security Council (NSC). One of the functions of NSC was to oversee the activities of the CIA. Souers, who became Truman’s most trusted adviser, was called the “gray eminence” and “a sort of Harry Hopkins” by journalists. Souers had a hand in most decisions on intelligence and foreign policy during the early days of the Cold War. Critics say that Souers served more as a transmitter of information than an adviser to the president, but this was partly

AN INTELLIGENCE source can be generally described as a specific means through which information concerning a particular target of intelligence interest can be observed and recorded. That target could include an individual, a facility, a geographic location, or an activity. Tracing intelligence-collection back to the earliest period of civilization, sources were originally limited to persons or written documents. The range of sources, however, has expanded along with ad-

vances in technology to encompass increasingly sophisticated ground, air, and space-based technical sensors. For modern intelligence organizations, there are five fundamental intelligence sources (also called intelligence or collection disciplines): human intelligence, HUMINT; signals intelligence, SIGINT; imagery intelligence IMINT; measurement and signature intelligence MASINT; and open-source intelligence, OSINT. HUMINT. Human intelligence involves a variety of operational methodologies designed to collect information provided by human sources. Within the context of human intelligence, a source could be defined as any individual who provides intelligence information without regard to their awareness that this information may be used for intelligence purposes. HUMINT collection is commonly divided into overt or clandestine methods. Overt refers to collection operations where the source of the information is aware of the collector’s affiliation with an intelligence agency and/or the potential intelligence application for the information provided. While the relationship between the collector and the source can be sensitive, operational security not the foremost consideration. Overt operations commonly involve the debriefing of individuals who have had access to information of intelligence value such as refugees, defectors, or others who have traveled to a country of interest. Overt collection can also include the information obtained through the liaison between officials from intelligence agencies of two or more countries. Diplomatic personnel and military attachés assigned to overseas embassies are also considered overt of sources of intelligence. Conversely, clandestine operations are conducted to conceal both the operational relationship between the collector and the source, as well the identity of the government sponsoring the intelligence operation. Clandestine operations typically involve the recruitment of a foreign national (the agent) by an intelligence officer (the case officer). A defining element of clandestine operations is that the source is under the control of the intelligence activity and is cognizant of the fact that the information they provide may be used for intelligence purposes, and/or their activities are in direct support of an intelligence-gathering operation.

Clandestine operations also involve the employment of tradecraft, specific methodologies to en-

able case officers and their agents to operate within restrictive environments and communicate with one another without drawing the attention of internal security or counterintelligence forces. The interrogation of prisoners-of-war or other detainees is yet another form of human intelligence collection that does not neatly fit into either of the categories just described. Nonetheless, this form of intelligence collection dates back to antiquity and continues to be a valuable source of intelligence for decision-makers and military commanders. Because of the unique nature of these operations (and the potential for error and deception on the part of the sources), HUMINT officers spend a considerable amount of time and energy examining their sources’ access, reliability, and accuracy (a process sometimes known as vetting). Access refers to the source’s direct knowledge of information of intelligence interest.

Reliability involves not only the authenticity of the source’s information and personal background, but also willingness to respond to the direction or control of the case officer. Accuracy is the result of not only reporting true facts and observations, but also information that is comprehensive or complete in nature. These criteria can only be verifiably established by a source over time, and is the result of both the quality and quantity of the information produced.

SIGINT. Signals intelligence refers to information that has been obtained through the interception of targeted communications. It includes collection of such electronic transmissions as foreign instrumen-

tation signals (for example, telemetry data emitted by missiles) and radar emanations. Like HUMINT, SIGINT is often divided into two functional areas: electronic intelligence (ELINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT). ELINT is described as technical and geo-location intelligence (using signals emanating from a transmitter in order to iden-

tify the location of that transmitter) obtained from foreign, non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear or radioactive sources. COMINT tefers to technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications obtained by an entity other than the intended recipient. In general, ELINT refers to information gathered from the emanation of a transmitting target, while COMINT focuses on exploiting the intelli-

gence that can be derived from the communications a target transmits.

IMINT. Imagery intelligence is derived from the collection of information from visual photography, infrared and radar sensors, electro-optics, and lasers. Information collected from IMINT collectors can be displayed optically (a visual presentation on film) or electronically (a graphic display of electronic data). IMINT has evolved from poor resolution photographs taken from tethered balloons and slow-flying aircraft to extremely high-resolution images captured at a distance of hundreds of miles from space-based sensors. The effectiveness of IMINT as a collection discipline has been greatly enhanced through the use of computers programs to aid in resolving optical distortions and the ability to graphically display electronic data gathered through weather conditions that would obstruct visual observation. MASINT. Measurement and signature intelligence focuses on the collection of scientific and technical intelligence through both the quantitative and qualitative analysis of selected data and employs a broad spectrum of scientific disciplines to collect and analyze that data. MASINT targets information derived from. electro-optical, nuclear, seismic, acoustic, materials, laser and radio frequency sources. MASINT seeks distinctive features that can be associated with a specific source. The discipline is uniquely capable of providing highly reliable identification of targets as well as generating key measurement data to facilitate an in-depth assessment of capabilities and functions. MASINT plays a unique role in collecting intelligence on such areas of interest as nuclear, biological, chemical and directed-energy weapons. OSINT. Open-source intelligence refers to the potential intelligence data that can be gleaned from the massive amount of information that is available to the general public. OSINT seeks to exploit, through systematic filtering and careful analysis, the intelligence potential inherent in the vast array of accessible information sources. OSINT sources can be essentially divided into two categories: print form (newspapers, books, magazines, and professional or academic journals) and electronic form (the internet, computer databases, and television or

radio transmissions). The key to the effective use of

OSINT is twofold: refined search protocols and critical analysis. OSINT, despite its low cost and negligible risk, has proven to be an increasingly valuable source of intelligence. Although still subject to debate, many informed observers contend that a substantial portion of a nation’s intelligence requirements could be satisfied exclusively through an aggressive, well-managed OSINT collection effort. In most instances, intelligence derived from a single source is insufficient to draw hard conclusions, especially about important questions such as an adversary’s plans, intentions, and capabilities. As a result, watch officers at intelligence centers and intelligence analysts rely heavily on input from multiple sources (known as all-source intelligence). In meeting the intelligence requirements of a decision maker, the broadest possible matrix of collection disciplines is tasked with collecting the needed intelligence data. Despite the greater precision with which these collection disciplines are conducted, one element of intelligence remains constant: the data collected is only raw information, not intelligence. Regardless of the source, information collected must be subjected to rigorous analysis, examined against the mass of data already collected on a target, and placed in proper context before it can be considered finished intelligence. Intelligence analysts often spend a substantial portion of their careers specializing in a particular geographic or functional area. STEVEN M. KLEINMAN

ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO: human intelligence; signals intelligence; reconnaissance; surveillance; scientific and technical intelligence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age (Yale University Press, 2000); Angelo Codevilla, Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century (Free Press, 1992); Christopher Felix, A Short Course in the Secret War (Madison Books, 1992); Arthur S. Hulnick, Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the TwentyFirst Century (Praeger, 1999); Loch K. Johnson, Bombs, Bugs, Drugs, and Thugs: Intelligence and America’s Quest for Security (New York University Press, 2000); Gregory

Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (Cambridge University Press, 2001).

South Africa IN 1900, 90 percent of Africa was divided into colonies, diluting the traditions of the native African people. These traditions were almost eradicated in South Africa in 1948, when the Nationalist Party came to power, established legal separation of the races, and placed severe restrictions on the black community with the system of apartheid. Ironically, the idea for apartheid originated with Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, who had studied in Germany in the 1920s where he had come to believe that the white race was superior. The appeal of apartheid evolved from the promise of prosperity and justice for white South Africans. Apartheid was extended even further in 1958 after black resistance developed. In 1962, Nelson Mandela, the leader of the African National Congress (ANC) was sentenced to life imprisonment. From his cell, Mandela continued to lead the fight against apartheid. Over the next two decades, resistance to apartheid grew to such a point that South Africa became isolated from the rest of the world. The United States was made aware of apartheid in its early stages through CIA agents who chose to ignore the policy because of South Africa’s impottance to the intelligence community. However, as the world became aware of the realities of apartheid, South Africa felt pressure from within and without. For example, in 1976, Great Britain removed Royal Navy personnel from a South African naval base at Simonstown, and in 1977 Britain blocked the flow of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) intelligence to South Africa. In retaliation, South Africa refused to release intelligence data from the Silvermine monitoring complex, which had provided information on air and naval movements for a radius of 3,000 miles. Information from U.S. reconnaissance satellites in September 1979 indicated that South Africa had detonated a nuclear explosion. Over the next two months, radioactive fallout over New Zealand seemed to support the belief that South Africa had developed a nuclear bomb. The supply of enriched uranium from the United States was immediately halted. The U.S. Navy called South Africa’s domestic defense system “formidable.” Scholars of apartheid have identified a number of mistakes that South Africa made when it chose

to adopt the policy. First, they made no secret about what they were doing. Second, South Africa failed to realize that the atrocities committed in Nazi Germany had changed worldwide perceptions on racism. Last, South Africa should have realized that it was an impractical system that wasted enormous human, natural, political, and financial resources. In 1988, amnesty was granted to all political dissidents, and by 1990 President KW. de Klerk had lifted the ban on the ANC. Mandela, who was released from prison by de Klerk in 1990, became president of South Africa in 1994’s democratic elections. The intelligence community in South Africa then went through a major transformation, as agents were charged with implementing policies of inclusiveness and justice as opposed to earlier practices of repression and injustice. On September 1, 1996, South Africa created the Ministry for Intelligence Services. Its purpose was to support the Minister of Intelligence in supervising the various intelligence agencies, formulating policies for the intelligence community, and conducting intelligence for South Africa. Additional intelligence power was given in the National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Act of 1998, which allowed the intelligence community to react quickly in cases of emergency. The Ministry coordinated the intelligence activities of the two civilian intelligence services, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the South African Secret Service (SASS) with the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), and the South African Police Services. The National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (CICOC) coordinated intelligence and disseminated intelligence information. As of 2003, the NIA was responsible for promoting national security and domestic counterintelligence, while the SASS was responsible for foreign intelligence. SAPS provided crime prevention and control. SANDE, which operates under the Department of Defense, provided military intelligence. ELIZABETH PURDY, PH.D. INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

SEE ALSO: United Kingdom.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Chris Barnard, South Africa: Sharp Dissection (Focus, 1977); Jonathan Bloch and Patrick Fitzgerald, British Intelligence and Covert Action: Africa, Middle East, and Europe Since 1945 (Brandon, 1983);

Scott D. Breckinridge, The CIA and the United States Intelligence System (Westview, 1986); “The Intelligence Community,” www.nia.org.za/; Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study (Department of the Navy, 1981); “South Africa Government Online,” http://www.gov.za; “South African Intelligence Agencies,” Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org; John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (W.W. Norton, 1978); Leonard Thompson, The Political Mythology of Apartheid (Yale University Press, 1985).

Soviet Union THE UNION OF Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), more commonly known as the Soviet Union, was the result of the Russian Revolution of 1917. The origins of the Soviet intelligence apparatus can be traced to the pre-revolutionary security and military units of the Bolshevik Party. The Bolshevik Party was one of a number of dissident groups that embraced underground and armed struggle against the Russian Romanov dynasty, and they were the targets of sustained repression by the Okhrana and other security units of the tzarist regime. The formal security units, as well as informal security and disciplinary networks within the Bolshevik Party, were shaped by the experience of clandestine revolutionary struggle. Bolshevik armed formations and intelligence units were faced with the need to gather intelligence on the tzarist regime, and to engage in counterintelligence to both detect penetration agents and protect the network of secret meeting places, printing presses, arms caches. Moreover, intelligence units worked on the exfiltration and infiltration of dissidents in exile abroad, and the maintenance of dissident communication networks and support networks outside of Russia, which were targeted for disruption by the Okhrana’s foreign sections.

Vecheka

formation.

The

foundation

for

the

Vecheka, other security and intelligence units, and the Red Army was laid in early October 1917, before the seizure of power, when the Bolsheviks proposed the establishment of a Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) by the Petrograd Soviet Council. The MRC, which was firmly under

control of members of the Bolshevik Party, was the origin of party control over the national and internal security and intelligence systems of the Soviet state.

The MRC’s security and intelligence functions were supplemented by the creation of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NK VD), which quickly assumed the functions of the tzarist and then the Provisional Government’s Ministry of the Interior. (The NKVD of this time period was not the same organization as the later NK VD of the Josef Stalin period, which served as the umbrella organization for a recentralization of internal security organs, and was the lead agency in executing the Great Terror and purges that reached their peak in 1936-38.) In order to bolster the intelligence apparatus as a separate and distinct entity from the Red Army, the MRC struggled to develop a formalized national and internal security intelligence organization from the varied armed units that had sprung up during the chaotic revolutionary period. At the beginning of the Russian Civil War in early 1918, the intelligence responsibilities of the Vecheka overlapped with the Red Guards, Red Army, NK VD, militia, and other informal armed groupings associated with local soviets and independent anarchist fighting formations. The Vecheka was concerned primarily with political policing: securing the revolution against continued disorders and uprisings, and locating and neutralizing counterrevolutionary dissidents and foreign-intelligence networks and sabotage operations within Bolshevik-controlled territory. Due to the fluctuating boundaries of the fronts of the Civil War and the repeated revisions of the bureaucratic contours of the Soviet state, the Vecheka functioned as a parallel military organization that both competed against, and cooperated with, the Red Army under the command of Leon Trotsky.

When Germany and Soviet Russia signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty on March 3, 1918, this gave the Soviet regime some relief from one source of external threat, but the regime faced White and other counterrevolutionary armies, as well as the early stages of intervention by the Americans, British, and other states to suppress the Bolshevik revolution. (In Operation ARCHANGEL, a U.S. Expeditionary force was sent to Russia in support of the White army.) Additionally, the Soviet regime found itself besieged by ultra-revolutionary groups

operating in urban areas and by the need to consolidate control in rural areas that were stricken with peasant uprisings, criminal banditry, and guerrilla insurrections such as the Makhno movement in the Ukraine, which interfered with providing food and other supplies to the major urban areas suffering waves of strikes in the industrial sector. The Soviets attempted to reconstruct an economy shattered by the destruction of World War I, revolution, and civil war.

War communism and Red Terror. Many of the decrees and organizational expansions of the Vecheka and other intelligence organs were legitimized by the existence of impending external threats to the Soviet state. In response to the resumption of the German offensive after the collapse of an armistice signed on November 22, 1917, the Soviets issued a decree on February 21, 1918: “The Socialist Fatherland is in Danger.” This emergency decree established martial law throughout the front areas and was the catalyst for a series of memoranda from the executive body of the Vecheka, the Collegium, that ratcheted up the severity of rhetoric exhorting “merciless” defense of the revolution, and sanctioned the increasing levels of coercion and violence that were exercised by Vecheka units throughout zones of Soviet control. Mounting pressures on the Soviet regime cre-

ated an environment which was conducive to the outbreak of the officially sanctioned Red Terror, a term for the escalating violence used against counterrevolutionaries by the Vecheka and other Soviet internal security organs, as well as by spontaneous outbreaks of violence against perceived counterrevolutionaries by the supporters of the Soviet regime among the general population. During the first phase of the Red Terror from August until the end of 1918, the total number of “counterrevolutionar-

ies” executed has been estimated to have run into the several thousands. Vecheka repression was not without its critics within the Bolshevik Party and press, including criticism of arbitrary detention, executions, and corruption in both Izvestia and Pravda newspapers. Criticism of the Vecheka resulted in the abolition of district Chekas and the transfer of personnel from the district Cheka units under the administrative control of the NK VD. The Commissariat for Justice was also able to regain the power to judge counterrevolutionaries from the Vecheka.

Members of the U.S. expeditionary force to Russia outside their Archangel headquarters in 1918.

The effect of these reforms was short-lived because, with intensification of the Civil War in early 1919, the Cheka was able to use its extensive power in areas under martial law which increased in size in response to widening military zones of combat. Felix Dzerzhinsky was appointed the new head of the NK VD while retaining his directorship of the Vecheka. Dzerzhinsky’s dual appointment served to erase the tension between the Vecheka and the NKVD in the favor of the Vecheka, allowing the latter to expand its size and influence throughout the entirety of the Soviet intelligence apparatus. By late 1919, the Vecheka, which was supposed to be a temporary emergency institution, had evolved into a large bureaucracy that was largely free from oversight by the Communist Party and other compo-

nents of the Soviet apparatus. Throughout 1919, the Civil War raged on its multiple fronts and the Soviet intelligence apparatus, especially the core of this apparatus, the Vecheka, continued its expansion in response to the fluctuating fortunes of the war. During late 1918 and early 1919, the Red Army and Vecheka moved in to secure territories to the south and west that were vacated by the World War I Central Powers in November 1918, including the Ukraine. Maintaining security within the Red Army and

in areas at the front controlled by the Red Army fell under the control of the Vecheka, which led to

another period of growth. Vecheka and the Revolutionary War Council (Revvoensovet) cooperated on the establishment of a Vecheka Special Department (Osobye Otdely) to replace the Voenkontrol

that had formerly managed the internal security of the Red Army and Navy. Managing internal security within the branches of the Soviet military such as counterespionage, countersubversion, and punishing desertions was tasked to these Special Departments that were attached to army divisions and regiments. This move established one of the unique features of Soviet-era intelligence apparatus: Management of internal security functions of the military branches was placed under the control of the political police from the Vecheka to the KGB. The Vecheka Special Departments worked with the appointed commissars of the Political Administration of the Revvoensovet, the PUR (Politicheskoe Upravlenie Revvoensoveta), which. handled ideological agitation and propaganda within the military and monitored the ideological strength and morale for the Bolshevik/Communist Party. This period of organizational change and growth in the complex patchwork of Soviet security and intelligence institutions came to a close as the Civil War wound down, at least in terms of the cessation of fighting along the stabilizing frontiers of the Soviet state, and the end of the war

with Poland and Allied intervention. Both the Red Army and the Vecheka were demobilized and had their forces cut as fighting on the fronts terminated. The Soviet government and the Polish state concluded a preliminary peace treaty on October 12, 1920, resulting in a subsequent armistice that

brought the period of open military conflict between the Soviet state and military forces of other nation-states to a formal conclusion. On January 8, 1921, Dzerzhinsky declared that, “the external fronts are no more.” The cessation of hostilities on the external fronts, solidified with peace treaties, armistice agreements, and the normalization of diplomatic relations with Allied states that had intervened against the Soviet regime (for example, the signing of an Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement in March 1921) did not correspond to a lessening of tensions within the boundaries of the Soviet state. Post—Civil War, antiSoviet insurrections reached their peak in March 1921 with the Kronstadt Uprising by sailors based at Kronstadt, a fortress and naval base in the Gulf of Finland near Petrograd. The Kronstadt uprising began on March 1, 1921, and was triggered by growing labor unrest and industrial strikes in Petrograd in response to the privations induced by four years

of revolution and war communism. The Red Army used 50,000 troops to defeat the 15,000 rebels who defended the Kronstadt garrison, and the rebellion was quickly put down. Vecheka combat units provided assistance in storming the garrison, including placing machine-gunners at the rear of the Soviet assault force to prevent desertions, and helped to manage the arrest, imprisonment, and execution of many of the participants in the uprising.

Creation of the GPU. The Kronstadt uprising is cited by many analysts as ushering in the end of war communism and the most intense period of Vecheka repression. The Soviet intelligence apparatus had undergone accelerated growth and organizational evolution in the midst of tremendous internal and external threats to the Soviet state. In the midst of the Kronstadt uprising, Vladimir Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy that relaxed many of the economic controls of war communism and normalized relations with other states. In this changing political environment, the Vecheka could not survive in its current form due to its extrajudicial nature and the extreme repression that Dzerzhinsky, Lenin, and other Soviet leaders recognized it had inextricably become associated with. In the last months of 1921, at Politburo meetings in November and the 11th Party Congress in December, proposals were put forward aimed at re-

ducing the scope of the Vecheka, renaming the central political policing organ, and strengthening the rule of law and the courts. In January 1922, the Politburo abolished the Vecheka and created a new internal security organ, the State Political Administration (Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie, or GPU) which was placed under the control of the NKVD. The GPU quickly began to amass many of the Vecheka’s extraordinary powers. The GPU’s permanence and power were further entrenched with the foundation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics when the constitution was adopted in July 1923. The GPU became the OGPU (Obedinennoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie) or Unified State Political Administration, a name which lasted until 1934. Not only did this make political police a constitutionally mandated bureau giving it added legitimacy, but it placed the OGPU as a special national bureau. The OGPU was not subordinated to republic-level NK VD offices, but reported directly to the USSR and administered the

tepublic-level GPUs without having to act through republic-level NK VDs. This had the effect of making the OGPU a centralized internal security agency whose power would not be diffused by subordination to multiple layers of NK VD oversight, a position of power and autonomy resembling that of the

Vecheka. The resemblance to the Vecheka did not end there. Dzershinsky was named the first chairman of the OGPU and was involved in the running of the OGPU until he was made chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy in February 1924 and candidate member of the Politburo in June 1924. Dzershinsky retained his first chairmanship of the OGPU, but day-to-day administration of the bureau was left to the deputy first and second chairmen, Vyacheslav Menzhinsky and Genrihk Yagoda. Yagoda later became the head of the Stalin-era NKVD when it was first established in 1934 and during the first wave of the purges of the Great Terror. The GPU and OGPU possessed enough personnel and authorizations to continue the Red Terror, but the reduction of internal and external threats allowed the intelligence apparatus to reduce the general level of violence. Neither the GPU nor the OGPU had to rely on mass executions to as great an extent as the Vecheka, but instead used detention, concentration, and labor camps to isolate counterrevolutionaries and other dissidents. OGPU units did participate in armed actions on a large scale after the adoption of the first Five-Year Plan under Stalin and the initiation of land collectivization in 1928 and 1929. During this time, the OGPU, and its successor the NK VD, returned to the severe methods of terror and violence exhibited by the Vecheka during the Red Terror.

Stalinist state consolidation. The development of the intelligence apparatus during the period of the consolidation of Soviet state power, the hegemony of terror of the Stalinist elite network, and the Great Patriotic War (World War II) represents one of the most massive expansions of capacity, activity, and influence of an intelligence apparatus in the 20th century. Consolidation of the various components of the intelligence apparatus of the Soviet state was accomplished when the OGPU was disbanded and security functions placed under the

control of a newly reorganized NK VD. This was the organizational architecture that managed the inter-

Members of the Cheka security police patrol the streets of Moscow in 1920.

nal security of the Soviet state through the Great Terror until the end of World War II. The range of internal security and public-safety entities placed under the NK VD created a vast organization that was intimately bound up with ensuring the “security,” surveillance, and terrorization of the populace. Besides conducting mass arrests, the NK VD helped prepare for the Moscow-based show trials of party members in August 1936, This intensification of repression took place in the midst of a generalized anxiety over the threat of war posed by Nazi Germany and Japan whose rearmament, military aggression, and proclaimed ideology posed a material danger to the Soviet state. Fears of a fifth column (fascist agents in the Soviet Union) served to rationalize the increase in political repression exploited by Stalin and his allies, in order to deal with suspect populations viewed as representing a direct threat to the security of the Soviet state.

The Great Terror. The Great Terror is emblematic of the centrality of the intelligence apparatus of the Soviet state in the dynamics of inter-elite conflict, tensions between the central state and the regions or republics under its control, and the reaction of the Soviet state to the increasing international tensions of this time period. While studies of the Great Terror have long been crafted around the demonization of Stalin, it is clear that the dynamics of

the Great Terror extend beyond a single individual and his allies in Moscow and throughout the party apparatus. The Great Terror was initiated by a number of orders from the Politburo that propelled the intelligence apparatus to regard larger and larger segments of the population as harboring anti-Soviet sentiments and as potential sources for terrorism, espionage, and sabotage. A review of some of the directives that guided the NK VD’s security operations makes it clear that one of the impulses behind the repression was the neutralization of any potential fifth column through the location and arrest of foreign populations within the Soviet state, and Soviet citizens who had lived abroad or had contract foreigners. In 1937, the NKVD issued orders to register all foreigners “who had been granted Soviet citizenship since January 1936,” and identified ‘“counter-revolutionary national categories,” including ‘Poles, Latvians, Germans, Estonians, Finns, Greeks, Iranians, Chinese, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Macedonians.” Relocation of suspect populations from border areas occurred during the Great Terror due to fears that these populations would prove to be a fertile base for the espionage and subversion operations because of past resistance to integration into

the Soviet polity or ethnic similarities with neighboring and hostile states. The consensus among historians of this period is that the vast majority of those accused had no connection

to anti-Soviet conspiracies

or subver-

sion, espionage, or sabotage operations of enemy states. The accusations were largely fabricated on flimsy evidence provided by party members induced to testify against one another through various forms of physical and mental torture. Many of the accused were encouraged to confess to the crimes during interrogations, and later at show trials in order to promote party unity at a time of mounting international danger. The party also faced difficulties with the Soviet economy that was attempting to simultaneously meet the unrealistic production targets of the five-year plans and to place increasing emphasis on the military mobilization to meet the threat posed by Nazi Germany and Japan. Repression reached a crescendo when mass operations were ordered in late July 1937 that demanded the party and NKVD, at all jurisdictional levels, locate, arrest, and liquidate anti-Soviet cate-

gories of individuals, including landed peasants who had been arrested but subsequently released back into the population; any tzarist and Whites who had survived previous internal security programs; any individuals who had at one time been accused of counterrevolutionary crimes and had been released; and criminals. These mass operations, which were to be concluded before the end of 1937,

unleashed an almost uncontrollable vortex of repression that produced hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of casualties. Estimates of the costs of the Great Terror in terms of arrests, executions, and economic disruptions and dislocations vary widely. It had a severe impact on the Soviet polity and the ferocity of the repression came to define the Soviet state. It remains difficult to discern the total scope of the re-

pression and the fate of many of those arrested due to the secrecy of the security operations and the inadequate record-keeping of an NK VD office that was, at times, overwhelmed by the need to process all those arrested, even after the declassification of many of the archives. The Soviet central intelligence apparatus went through a series of reorganizations both right before the opening of the war and in the midst of fighting, but unlike previous reorganizations, these did not signal either a change in leadership or significant alterations in the repressive role of the means of coercion. The NKVD was split into two separate security organs: an NK VD which retained all of its security functions, except for the assignment of direct political policing and foreign intelligence operations that were assigned to a subordinate unit, the NKGB. This arrangement only lasted from February to July 1941, when the pressures of the German invasion forced a fusion of the two organizations into yet another version of the NK VD. Securing border areas was one of the NK VD’s major functions, and when German troops crossed into the Soviet Union, NK VD troops were some of the first forces thrown into the fighting. NKVD forces not only had a critical mission in securing the home front against subversion and espionage programs, including counterintelligence operations in the Soviet military, but contributed troops to the war effort who had significant combat experience. NKVD forces also provided assistance to the partisan resistance to Nazi occupation

in Soviet areas

that were lost to the Germans. In areas reoccupied by Soviet forces, the NK VD changed from proin-

surgency partisan operations to counterinsurgency

operations against remaining Nazi units and insur-

gents who opposed reoccupation by Soviet forces.

Soviet Russia: early Cold War. At the conclusion of World War II, the Soviet Union gained direct control of new territories that it occupied and engaged in a twilight war with Western intelligence and military intelligence organizations to establish mechanisms of influence and operations. The competition over access to the research and development projects of the Nazi war machine, in particular, produced one of the most direct early rivalries of the immediate postwar environment

with Soviet and U.S. intelligence and military intelligence units scouring the defeated Reich for scientific talent. Forced recruitment of scientists, engineers, and professionals workers into Soviet-run programs and into secret laboratories contributed to the array of difficulties that the Soviets faced, creating an intelligence apparatus in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany and amplified growing U.S. distrust of Soviet intentions in postwar Germany. Suspect Soviet populations, such as those who lived under Nazi occupation or were prisoners of war, were subjected to harsh security measures. A number of people from these categories were arrested and imprisoned in the labor camp system as a process of Soviet reoccupation. Military personnel who had fought against the fascist powers were confronted with the prospect of being imprisoned for harboring anti-Soviet sentiments without concrete evidence, and all were suspected of being possible agents of espionage for Western intelligence services who came to rely on the remnants of German military intelligence for assembling intelligence networks against their former Soviet ally. Extensive intelligence and internal security advisory operations were used by the NK VD to establish direct control over occupied territory through the creation of replicates of Soviet internal-policing systems in occupied states. In states such as Czechoslovakia where Soviet control was not immediately assured, the NK VD created networks of agents that penetrated the security and military forces. These networks of agents worked with local communist parties to engage in a series of actions that led to the collapse of postwar governments, which were replaced by communist governments under direct Soviet control.

In 1946, the NK VD and the NKGB were transformed from commissariats to ministries and relabeled the MVD (Ministry of the Interior) and MGB (Ministry of State Security). The MVD was designated as the security organ directly responsible for internal security affairs, and the MGB was given responsibility primarily for foreign intelligence operations and counterintelligence within the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence. Laventry Beria was promoted to full membership in the Politburo and lost direct control of the security organs. However, he maintained a great deal of influence over the security organs due to his placement of personnel throughout the intelligence apparatus during his tenure as direct leader of the security organs. In the uncertain atmosphere of the postwar period and increasing in tension with the Western nations, Soviet internal security policy again began to preoccupy itself with the potential presence of espionage networks throughout the Soviet state. The postwar period also saw a return to ideological criteria, rather than wartime nationalistic criteria, for determining appropriate political attitudes.

Doctors’ Plot. There was to be no postwar relaxation in internal security measures as the struggle among factions within the party created a rapid series of personnel changes and realignments of the various components of the intelligence apparatus. The conflation of intraparty intrigue and the antiSemitic overtones of postwar repression that was being used as a pretext to diminish the power of the Beria faction of the party culminated in the Doctors’ Plot that the MGB began investigating in late 1952 and was announced in Pravda in January 1953. The Doctors’ Plot (widely recognized now as a fictional conspiracy orchestrated by Stalin and the anti-Beria faction) was the discovery of a “terrorist conspiracy” by a group of physicians who provided medical care for prominent officials in Moscow. The doctors were accused of being espionage

agents of the British and American

intelligence

services working with Zionist groups. A number of the doctors had Jewish surnames and were of Jewish origin. The announcement of the discovery of the plot was accompanied by an unprecedented, open attack on the intelligence apparatus that was aimed at decrying the lack of vigilance of Beria’s allies in detecting and preventing the terrorist conspiracy from penetrating so deeply into the center of Soviet power.

Collapse of the Stalinist internal security. It seemed that all of the elements were in place for yet another violent purge of a faction that had dominated the intelligence apparatus and used this dominance to secure increasing amounts of power in the party, but for Stalin’s death announced on March 6, 1953. Stalin’s death created a power vacuum that provided Beria and his allies an opportunity to use components of the police system, which remained under their control, to seize state power and deal with their rivals. The day after the announcement of Stalin’s death, both the party and intelligence apparatus were reorganized, and the MVD and MGB were now merged into a single comprehensive internal security institution that was designated MVD with Beria as minister. This represented a recentralization of coercive power, giving Beria sweeping au-

thority that harked back to the pre-1943 division of domestic security functions between the NK VD and NKGB. Beria did not retain his newly found power for long and was arrested in secret on June 26, 1953. Fearing the rise of another leviathan in the person of Beria, “... Party rivals orchestrated a dramatic palace coup, ordering the Soviet Army to surround the security police headquarters and cordon off parts of central Moscow. . .” explains historian Louise Shelley. The now former minister of state security was charged with being a long-time agent of foreign intelligence services, interfering with agricultural reforms, being a proponent of bourgeois nationalism, and attempting to place the MVD above Communist Party control and outside the parameters of socialist legality. Beria was tried in secret and executed in December 1953. As the internecine combat unleashed by Stalin’s death stabilized, the Central Committee put in place a number of measures designed to strengthen party control over the intelligence apparatus and to prevent the concentration of authority over this apparatus in the hands of one high party official through special bureaus. Trials of security officials associated with Beria were conducted within the confines of “socialist legality.” And although trials of direct associates of Beria were “conducted under the draconian procedural laws that stipulated summary justice for cases of terrorism, wrecking or sabotage,” the extent of the purge through the lower ranks of the security organizations was quite restrained compared with the previous internal security regime, historian Amy Knight explains. :

There were five major trials of NKVD/MVD officials between Beria’s removal and execution, and Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization speech and the subsequent repeal of many of the severe penalties for subversive activities in the Soviet legal code in 1956 involving 28 officials. Out of these 28 officials, 22 were executed and six were jailed. The MVD was divided into a number of security organs and lost control over many of the key economic facilities that it had acquired during the war. Additionally, amnesties were granted to inmates of the gulag and labor camp system, depriving the security ministries of large bodies of labor. The purge of

Stalin-era personnel in the USSR did not extend much below the immediate network of Beria loyalists, leaving in place many Chekists who had been with the security organs since the OGPU and through the height of the Stalinist terror. In March 1954, the MVD lost responsibility for political policing and intelligence functions when the Supreme Soviet established a Committee of State Security or KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR) that was directly attached to the USSR Council of Ministers. While the KGB and MVD would again amass considerable power that at times seemed to threaten party rule, these two internal security organs never again reached the level of violence and autonomy that characterized the NK VD of the Great Purges. Soviet economic development and the pacification of resistance to Soviet rule created a situation in which more subtle and stable means of political policing came to predominate. Mass terror as a means of domestic political control was disavowed as a Soviet policy instrument. The disavowal was cemented by the de-Stalinization campaigns heralded by Khrushchev’s secret speech denouncing Stalin, and this led to the establishment of an internal security system which was initially more directly subordinated to Communist Party control.

De-Stalinization and “socialist legality.” Khrushchev and the party faction that supported his ascension to power moved gradually to place the security organs more directly under party control and give the newly created security organization an image that was not so directly tied to the excesses of the Stalin era. This reflected a key dynamic that governed the arrangement of the Soviet intelligence apparatus. The struggle between party factions directly affected the configuration of the intelli-

gence apparatus and the degree of autonomy and direct involvement in party politics that security organ officials were allowed to exercise, and, conversely the degree of politicization of the intelligence apparatus. The intelligence apparatus was one of the key arenas of inter-elite conflict, and as the institutions of security developed they also became one of the key institutional vectors for rising to positions of political leadership within the USSRlevel party apparatus. De-Stalinization moved slowly at first, and the selection of KGB leadership from the party apparatus, rather than from the ranks of the former NKVD members who were not tainted by direct participation in carrying out the purges, took almost three years. Khrushchev’s first appointment to head the KGB was a career Chekist, Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, who had been in the NKVB, SMERSH, MGB, and the consolidated MVD since 1939. Khrushchev and other high party officials viewed Serov as possessing critical organizational abilities that enabled him to direct the reformation of the intelligence apparatus. De-Stalinization represented a move to restrict the autonomy of the intelligence apparatus without detracting from the necessity to rely on the apparatus to continue to

maintain order in response to internal and external threats. The brunt of the reforms and criticism was aimed at the MVD, whose power was significantly diminished. The excesses of the Stalin period were blamed on a corrupt and unnecessarily brutal faction of the party elite. Criticism was not allowed to penetrate into the bulk of the personnel who staffed the policing apparatus of the Soviet state. Continued concern with external subversion and exploitation of internal security problems, such as dissident mobilization (or at least the potential for dissident mobilization that the presence of intellectual dissidents signaled), was evident even in the midst of de-Stalinization. In his speech to the 20th Party Congress that signaled the formal recognition and initiation of de-Stalinization, Khrushchev also stressed the need for “revolutionary vigilance” against external subversion. At the 21st Party Congress in 1959, he pointed out that enemy states were involved in a substantial effort to exploit Soviet internal vulnerabilities.

In 1957, the KGB and MVD agencies supported Khrushchev in his conflict with a faction of the Soviet elite opposed to him that was labeled the “anti-

party group,” and attempted to unseat Khrushchev during a Central Committee meeting. Serov was not involved in plotting against Khrushchev and supported the first secretary. Nevertheless, by December 1958, Serov was removed and replaced by a new KGB Chairman, Aleksandr Shelepin, who was a party member without an extensive career within the intelligence apparatus. Shelepin’s tenure as director of the KGB was portrayed in the Soviet press and party pronouncements as solidifying party control over the intelligence apparatus, and Shelepin was viewed as a strong proponent of de-Stalinization.

Reining in the power of the intelligence apparatus did little to ensure the normalization of leadership transitions at the level of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. In 1964, growing elite dissatisfaction with the leadership of Khrushchey, and fears of the consequences of continued liberalization and restriction of the power of the intelligence apparatus to ensure ideological conformity, led to another attempt to remove Khrushchev, which this time was successful. In October 1964, while Khrushchev was on vacation, the Central Committee met and the antiKhrushchev faction (which included Shelepin who had left the directorship of the KGB in 1961 but put in place his own handpicked successor) demanded that Khrushchev resign. When Khrushchev turned in his resignation, he was replaced by Leonid Brezhnev. The removal of Khrushchev and the ascension of Brezhnev to power signaled a reversal in the liberalization under Khrushchev. The reversal also resulted in a period of prolonged growth in the power and influence of the KGB.

Apparatus retrenchment and stasis. Under Brezhnev, the power and jurisdiction of the KGB were expanded, and the normal policing apparatus was also recentralized and rehabilitated. The KGB had articles added to its potential jurisdiction, including economic crimes such as currency speculation and misappropriation of state property.

These expansions of the purview of the KGB into areas of economic crime were later to haunt the Brezhnevite factions of the Soviet elite when Mikhail Gorbachev used the KGB to support perestroika liberalization and attack party corruption. Despite an attempt to increase the power and prestige of the MVD and the militia, these security organs were still much more openly criticized than the

stature of various party factions, and the removal of Shelepin from the Secretariat in 1967 was no exception. Shelepin was viewed as exercising control over the KGB through his handpicked successor, and Brezhnev attempted to assure that the intelligence apparatus was behind him when he elevated Yuri Andropov to the position of KGB chairman in May 1967. Unlike previous intraparty intrigue that reached into the intelligence apparatus, the elevation Andropov to command of the KGB was not occasioned by radical changes in the structure of the security forces. The period of Brezhnev’s rule, and the 15-year tenure of Andropov as KGB chairman, signaled a long period of stability in the configuration of power relations and bureaucratic formations that defined the Soviet intelligence apparatus from the late 1960s until its collapse in the early 1990s. KGB power and influence during this period significantly expanded, and the number of former KGB officers who achieved positions of prominence within the Central Committee also increased. One of the reasons for the expansion of the power of the KGB during this period was the lesson that Andropov and other Soviet leaders drew from the Czechoslovakian experiment with limited liber-

Under Leonid Brezhnev, the power and jurisdiction of the KGB were expanded.

KGB, which continued to have its image burnished by positive coverage in the state-controlled media. Dissidents, who had enjoyed a brief and incomplete relaxing of state political control, were targeted for increasingly harsh security measures, albeit nothing again approaching the level of direct physical violence of the Stalinist era. The 1965 arrest by the KGB of several prominent writers signaled a broad crackdown on internal dissent. The period of transition form Khrushchev to Brezhnev also was characterized by a series of arrests of individuals accused of working for the intelligence services of the United States and other Western powers. The arrest of these prominent writers also played a major role in the formation of the human rights movement in the Soviet Union. Changes in the leadership of the KGB and MVD continued to parallel the rise and fall of the

alization in the late 1960, which ended with the Soviet-led suppression of the experiment in 1968. The renewed power and influence of the KGB did not indicate a return to the use of physical violence against the Soviet citizenry. Rather, it signaled the perfection of nuanced, albeit ubiquitous, security strategies and tactics that were designed to more precisely target dissidents, and used harassment, arrests, internal exile, censorship, and pretext imprisonment in psychiatric institutions as means of social control. This new approach replaced the mass arrests and physical liquidation or assassination of large numbers of members of populations who were suspected to be anti-Soviet. The tolerance of dissenting views was one of the factors that laid the foundations for internal criticisms of deficiencies in the Soviet system that reached their full expression during the rule of Gorbachev. The various efforts of resistance to the So-

viet system included the proliferation of samizdat underground literature and the growth of the human rights movement. Although these movements were being harassed by the KGB and had many members arrested and sentenced to long

prison terms, exile, or psychiatric imprisonment,

they were nonetheless able to survive and grow.

Andropov’s rise to KGB chairman. Many analysts refer to the hardening of the internal security style of the Soviet regime under the early Brezhnev period as a re-Stalinization of the Soviet system, but it was a re-Stalinization within fairly tight and delimited control. The changes in security regulation during the Brezhnev period included a de-emphasis on the excesses of the Stalin era and attempts to rehabilitate the reputation of Stalin and the security services. But unlike the Stalinist era, Brezhnev and his supporters within the party, intelligence apparatus, and other ministries were not able to exercise unlimited control over the KGB and other security organs, but rather had to negotiate a consensus with other party factions about who would be the KGB chairman. Andropov possessed a power base of his own and was not directly beholden to Brezhnev and his power base. Under Andropoy, intelligence operations continued to be justified by invoking the need to defend the Soviet state against the subversive activities of the Western intelligence services. The KGB was the beneficiary of very positive coverage in the state print and electronic media, and party positions and honors were given to intelligence apparatus members. The 50th anniversary of the birth of the Soviet intelligence apparatus in 1967 and the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the birth of Dzerzhinsky in 1977 were examples of sustained propaganda campaigns designed to boost the reputation and importance of the KGB. The increasingly positive image of the KGB in the state-controlled media also contributed greatly to Andropov’s power, which also increased despite the misgivings of the Brezhnev faction. Andropov was able to use the expanded jurisdiction of the KGB to include economic crimes against the Brezhnev faction in the early 1980s, with a series of increasingly high-profile investigations of party members for economic crime and corruption. The opening of these investigations of core elements of Brezhnev’s power base, including investigations of his children, also occasioned the suicide of Brezhnev’s highest-level appointment in the KGB, Deputy Chairman Semen Tsvigun, who “himself a member of Brezhnev’s family by marriage, reportedly tried to stop KGB efforts to discredit

Brezhnev and ended up committing suicide,” Knight explains. The growing effectiveness of KGB anti-corruption investigations and the contribution these made to cementing Andropov’s power base, as well as the ability to use these investigations as a tool in interparty conflict, raised the specter of a intelligence apparatus that was perhaps gaining too much power. Despite these concerns, Andropov became general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in November 1982. Andropov’s successor as chairman of the KGB was a career Chekist, Vatialy Fedorchuk, the first KGB chair to be selected form the ranks of the intelligence apparatus since the mid-1950s. A number of other persons were appointed to key positions within the Council of Ministers and the Politburo who had extensive KGB connections and reputations for aggressive pursuit of anti-corruption investigations. Fedorchuk was quickly moved to head of the MVD. A full-scale reform of the MVD and use of the KGB to clean up the ranks of the MVD ensued, and were used as tools to disrupt the Brezhnev faction. The intended outcome of the use of the KGB for anticorruption investigations and the disruption of the Brezhnev faction and as a means to consolidate Andropov’s power remains unclear because of Andropov’s ill health and death in 1984, upon which Konstantin Chernenko was appointed general secretary. The appointment of Chernenko did not coincide with the selection of a new chair of the KGB during the rough period of transition between Chernenko to Gorbachev, who was immediately viewed as the likely successor due to Chernenko’s ill health. Despite a brief pause in the anticorruption investigations following Andropov’s death, when it became apparent that Gorbachev and the reform-minded, liberal faction would gain hegemony of the Politburo, the anticorruption drives re-intensified.

The Gorbachev era. Following Gorbachev’s ascendancy to the position of general secretary, he used the anticorruption drive, which was complemented by his good relations with the KGB and the remnants of Andropov’s power base, to carry out a purge of the Brezhnev faction whose corruption was now being openly blamed for the stagnation of the Soviet system in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The MVD was also targeted for extensive investigation that led to a large degree of turnover in the se-

curity organs, party factions, and state enterprises that served to solidify Gorbachev’s power base. These changes in the normal policing components of the intelligence apparatus were accompanied by an equally significant amount of turnover in the KGB. This “represented a fundamental change in terms of the formative experiences and education” of KGB officers, which may have made them more hesitant to use blunt instruments of coercion while the Soviet Union began to collapse in the late 1980s and early 1990s, because many of the new officers “were less orthodox in their political mindset due to their formative experience during the late Brezhnev to early Gorbachev periods,” explains historian Stephen W. Guenther. )

V. M. Chebrikov remained head of the KGB and received praise and promotion from Gorbachev, including elevation to full membership in the Politburo. As in the Khrushchev period, the KGB was shielded from direct critique for allowing corruption to become so widespread, despite having shared responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of economic crimes with the MVD and militia. The shielding of the KGB from the wave of criticism of Soviet institutions that Gorbachev and his supporters were unleashing with their liberalization policies of glasnost and perestroika would not last. In 1986 and 1987, criticism of the security organs, which first started obliquely in the context of discussions about the need to apply perestroika to the regulation of normal and political crimes, and the need to provide more legal protections for individuals, began to focus on the deficiencies and excesses of the KGB. In the context of this mounting criticism, the KGB also began to be concerned with political and economic instabilities that were beginning to develop in the context of perestroika and glasnost (liberalization policies), as well as the appearance of nationalist movements in the republics. KGB officials, including Chebrikov, used the media and speeches to signal to Gorbachev and his supporters that it was important not to let the forces unleashed by perestroika and glasnost create a highly disruptive internal security situation.

The collapse of the Soviet state. Despite the veiled and not-so-veiled threats from members of the internal security forces, and the leadership of national security institutions who were becoming concerned with the internal security situation and

the potential role that Western military and intelligence services were playing in the rapidly changing environment of the Gorbachev period, reforms continued throughout Soviet society. Gorbachev continued to consolidate power, and being mindful of the power of the internal and national security bureaucracies and their conservative supporters, he moved to reduce the influence of the military and the intelligence apparatus (some of the most important power ministries). In 1988, Gorbachev replaced Chebrikov with Vladimir Kryuchkov as chair of the KGB, but ina continuation of limiting changes to the intelligence apparatus to the upper leadership levels, the appointment of a new chair of the KGB did not initiate a wholesale purge of the KGB, despite the fact that KGB officials were becoming increasingly strident in their warnings that Gorbachev was unleashing forces that presented severe internal security threats to the Soviet state. As the internal security situation continued to

destabilize, Gorbachev approved the development

of internal security strategies and tactics designed to contain the most direct threats to the stability and sovereignty of the Soviet state, especially nationalist and independence movements that were using the more open environment of glasnost to engage in mobilization against the Soviet state and challenge the Communist Party’s political power. Internal security components of the KGB, militarized special units of the MVD, and certain detachments of the army were organized to police civil disorders and suppress secessionist movements. Some of the secessionist movements were quickly developing to the point that they would be able to acquire armaments and engage in guerrilla warfare against the central Soviet state, presenting the prospect of armed resistance to Soviet rule not seen since the late 1940s. The stakes of suppressing the rising secessionist nationalism throughout the non-Russian republics became clear in April 1989, when Russian internal security forces had to suppress civil disorders in Georgia resulting in the deaths of 29 demonstrators in Tiblisi. Gorbachev began to rely on the security organs to provide him with intelligence about the dynamics that he had unleashed and approved of a series of emergency measures that expanded the powers of the KGB and other internal security forces in order to at least provide the legal infrastructure for a crackdown if it became necessary.

Soviet Union

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The Lubyanka prison in Moscow was the headquarters of the KGB during the Soviet era. In an attempt to rehabilitate the historical image of the building, officials organized tours open to the public after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the ambiguity of the internal security situation was intensified as the KGB’s responsibility for enforcing political crimes, as defined by Soviet-era legal codes, was reduced. By early 1990, with the repeal of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, the CPSU was no longer legally recognized as the leading political organ in the polity, and the larger infrastructure of Soviet rule that the KGB had been organized to protect was rapidly dissolving. By early 1991, the Soviet regime and the political foundations on which the KGB was based were on the verge of being completely undermined. As the republic governments began to function autonomously from the central structures of the Soviet state, there were a number of attempts to set up republic-level KGBs, which served to divide the attention and loyalties of the KGB staffers in the various republics and served as a blow at the legitimacy of the overarching Soviet constitutional structure. These centripetal forces reached their maximum intensity when Gorbachev engaged in negotiations with the republics for the approval of the Union Treaty in July 1991, which would have

granted a great degree of autonomy to the individual republics of the USSR. The Union Treaty, if approved, would have represented devolution of authority that conservative elements within the KGB and the Communist Party recognized as having the potential to eliminate the Soviet Union as a functioning nation-state. In August 1991, a coalition of conservative political forces had coalesced to attempt to remove Gorbachev through a coup and engage in wide-scale security operations that would have arrested many of the proponents of glasnost and perestroika. The KGB and leaders of the army, who had been contemplating internal security operations, were creat-

ing contingency plans for the imposition of emergency rule throughout the Soviet Union as early as the autumn of 1990. A number of analysts, some of whom had access to declassified KGB archives, insist that Gorbachev was not only fully aware of the contingency plans but had participated in the use of emergency militarized KGB and MVD special security forces to put down nationalist uprisings and civil disorders. Thus, he should have either anticipated the

coming coup or encouraged the coup and then backed out to be able to neutralize potential political enemies. No matter what the definitive history based on fully declassified records eventually demonstrates about Gorbachev’s foreknowledge of the events in August 1991, the coup plotters struck while Gorbachev was isolated during a vacation at his villa in the Crimea. KGB special internal security units and components of the Soviet Army were deployed to key locations throughout Moscow in support of the attempted coup. The use of armed formations was met with both organized and spontaneous re-

ganizations and divisions of functions were insti-

sistance that in some areas, including Moscow, was embraced by reformist communist party leaders” such as Boris Yeltsin. The attempted coup lasted less than a week, and despite the declaration of emergency by the organization of the coup plotters, it was ultimately unsuccessful. The inability of the coup plotters to effectively

gence apparatus.

use and exercise command and control over the intelligence apparatus was emblematic of the divided loyalties that had come to characterize all sectors of Soviet society, as the governing structures began to

systematically unravel in late 1990 and early 1991. The coup plotters included many of the heads of the internal security organs who had been appointed by Gorbachev. Between August 18 and 21, when the coup leaders were arrested at Gorbachev’s vacation house after going to discuss their opposition to the signing of the Union Treaty, the Soviet political system had apparently become exhausted. The ensuing investigations led to the arrests of 15 of the key coup leaders and contributed to the final collapse of the Soviet political and security structures and the power of the Communist Party. The KGB was viewed by many Russians and others in the republics of the soon-to-be-former Soviet Union as one of the most important components of the Soviet system to be targeted for elimination. However, the changing political environment produced an outcome that was strikingly similar to the outcomes of inter-elite conflict during the Soviet era. Despite the gathering of huge crowds outside of the KGB headquarters at Lubyanka on August 27 to watch the destruction of the huge statue of Feliks Dzerzhinsky, this storm of dissent never resulted in a wholesale dismantling of the Soviet-era intelligence apparatus. Rather, yet another series of reor-

tuted among the various bureaucracies that were divided out of the KGB. The process of creating new security bureaucracies that recognized the new realities of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the need to create a Russian central internal security and law enforcement apparatus, would take several years to complete. In the end, the intelligence apparatus of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Russian Federation were staffed by many of the same individuals who had staffed the KGB, MVD, and internal security units of the Soviet national intelli:

Indeed, the forces unleashed by perestroika created an increasingly dire internal security situation, including the development of major criminal organizations or mafiya, which took advantage of the political and security uncertainty and the ambiguity of the conversion of state-owned means of production into privatized enterprises. The importance of the internal security and intelligence organs was as critical as ever. While the parameters of political criminality had fluctuated during the period from the collapse of the Stalinist security regime to the complete collapse of the Soviet system, the growth of ordinary crime and increasing levels of official corruption and economic crimes was one of the long-range trends that also shaped the configuration of the internal security system of the post-World War II Soviet system. The corruption of the Brezhnev era and the growing opportunities provided to criminal gangs during perestroika and glasnost created an environment conducive to the rapid explosion of crime and organized criminality. The KGB and other internal security organs were distracted by attempting to preserve the integrity of the Soviet Republic from the forces of nationalism. In the months following the attempted coup of August 1991, the KGB went through a rapid turnover in leadership and a series of organizational mutations that led to its final dissolution by December 1991. With Gorbachev’s power diminished as a result of the attempted coup, Yeltsin moved quickly to gain control over the KGB and reconfigure the intelligence apparatus to reflect the collapse of the Soviet state. The KGB was placed under the control of the presidency of the Russian republic. By October 1991, the KGB had its responsibilities portioned out to a series of newly created and

short-lived agencies, including the Central Intelligence Service, the Inter-republican Security Service, and the Committee for the Defense of the USSR State Borders. The rapid series of organizational changes did not stop there. In November 1991, the Russian republic KGB was christened the Federal Security Agency. In December 1991, the USSR and Russian KGB were fused with the respective MVDs, which were all merged into a new Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs, threatening a revival of the NKVD empire of the 1930s. The rapid evolution of the array of security agencies that composed the emergent Russian Federation’s intelligence apparatus continued through the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The legacy of the Soviet-era intelligence services included not only the transformed internal security service of the Russian Federation and the secessionist republics, who were largely staffed by former KGB and MVD personnel, but also left an ambiguous impact on the perceptions of the general population in Russia and other republics about the need for security services. Despite the reputation of the KGB and other Soviet era internal security services in the West, public opinion surveys demonstrated that the presence of some type of central internal security bureaucracy was still desired by large segments of the population. The need to maintain a strong central security service was justified in the minds of the respondents in order to deal with threats of “mafia, drugtrafficking, and terrorism.” The durability of the institutions of internal security, despite the revelation of past abuses and investigations by legislative bodies, mass media, and human rights organizations, has striking parallels with the durability of the institutions of the intelligence apparatus of the United States during the Cold War. CHRISTIAN W. ERICKSON

ROOSEVELT UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Beria, Lavrenty; Cheka; KGB; Russia (PreSoviet); Russia (Post-Soviet); Stalin, Josef; Cold War. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights (Wesleyan University Press, 1987); Edwin Bacon, “The Power Ministries,” Institutions and Political Change in Russia (Macmillan, 2000); Perry Biddiscombe,

“The Problem with Glass Houses: The Soviet Recruit-

ment and Deployment of SS Men as Spies and Saboteurs,” Intelligence and National Security (Autumn 2000); Robert Conquest, The Soviet Police System (Praeger, 1968); Robert Conquest, “The Human Cost of Soviet Communism,” The Human Cost of Soviet Communism (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970); Robert Conquest, Inside Stalin’s Secret Police: NK VD Politics 1936-1939 (Stanford University Press, 1985); Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (Oxford University Press, 1990); John Dziak, Chekisty: A History of the KGB (Lexington Books, 1988); Mark Galeotti, “The Mafiya and the New Russia,” Australian Journal of Politics and History (v.44/3, 1998); Mark Galeotti, ed., Russian and Post-Soviet Organized Crime (Ashgate Publishing, 2002); Lennard D. Gerson, The Secret Police in Lenin’s Russia (Temple University Press, 1976); J. Arch Getty, “The Politics of Repression Revisited,” Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 1993); Stephen W. Guenther, Post-Authoritarian Transition and the Russian Domestic Security Services, 1993-1997 (Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1998); Amy Knight, The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union (Unwin Hyman, 1988); Amy Knight, ‘The Political Police and the National Question in the Soviet Union.” The Post-Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR (Columbia University Press, 1992); Amy Knight, Beria: Stalin’s First Lieutenant (Princeton University Press, 1993); Amy Knight, Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB’s Successors (Princeton University Press, 1996); Louise Shelley, Policing Soviet Society: The Evolution of State Control (Routledge, 1996).

Spain SPAIN’S CIVIL War ended in 1939 with the victory, after three years of bloody conflict, of the Fascists led by Generalissimo Francisco Franco. Because Spain had no formal intelligence community before the war began, the intelligence apparatus that existed by the end of the conflict had something of a haphazard, improvised character. Three separate security services monitored the domestic political situation through the use of informants and secret police. The Information Service of the Movement (Servicio de Informaci6n del Movimiento), housed within the office of the Secretary General of the National Movement, was charged with gathering and distributing political information within Spanish territory. The General

Office of Security also had an intelligence branch which investigated citizens charged with politicalsocial crimes, meaning crimes against Franco

or

the ruling fascist junta. Further efforts to maintain domestic stability through both investigations and propaganda operations were undertaken by a third service from the Guardia Civil (Civil Guard). The primary missions of these intelligence services were monitoring, intimidating, and silencing opponents of Franco’s revolution: unionists, leftists, and especially communists. The agencies engaged in widespread surveillance of both the urban and rural elements of the Spanish population, keeping extensive background files. Citizens who were deemed subversive, criminal, or otherwise dangerous to the regime were often singled out for harassment and intimidation. Although each of the domestic information services was officially charged with a distinct mission, in practice distinctions broke down completely. The redundant organizations competed among themselves for funding, missions, and power, and without a central referee, redundancy was widespread. The Central Documentation Service (SECED) was created in 1972 as a way to centralize all espionage efforts directed at the Spanish population. SECED had three directorates, one focused on universities, one on labor and unions, and another on all other threats to regime stability. In the foreign and military intelligence spheres, the Franco regime was served by five organizations. Ground, sea, and air forces each maintained a Second Section at headquarters responsible for reporting on military developments abroad as well as providing tactical intelligence on the battlefield. The Foreign Intelligence Service and the Counterintelligence Service worked directly for the central government rather than the military. The death of Franco in 1975 and the subsequent transition to democratic rule under King Juan Carlos I initiated changes in Spain’s intelligence services. The police forces and intelligence agencies no longer had to concern themselves with rooting out political enemies of the state, but more serious threats were soon posed by terrorists in the Basque region of the country. For that reason, Spain continued to maintain a relatively large intelligence apparatus by the standards of a small state in a relatively safe world neighborhood. In 1977, the Higher Defense Intelligence Center (CESID) was created within the Ministry of De fense. The majority of CESID’s staff consists of

uniformed military, although civilians are thought to constitute some 30 percent of the work force. The agency maintains subunits focusing on domestic intelligence (especially secessionist terrorist groups), foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, economics and technology, and technical support. In 2002, the National Intelligence Center (CNI) was established, which basically renamed CESID and provided it with more money and authority. In addition to CNI, the individual services have also kept their intelligence operations. Coordination reportedly remains something of a problem between the four operations, with CNI theoretically at the head of the table but the services asserting their own prerogatives in practice.

The Ministry of the Interior supervises two domestic security agencies, the Civil Guard (rural area and border policing) and the National Police (nationwide investigations, urban security, and hostage situations), both with significant intelligence components. The National Police, in particular, includes the General Commissariat of Intelligence, focused on the counterterrorism mission, which performs liaison duties with foreign intelligence. All these services were called to action on March

11, 2004,

when al-Qaeda-linked terrorists exploded 10 bombs on Spanish commuter trains heading into Madrid during rush hour. TODD STIEFLER MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

SEE ALSO: World War II; counterterrorism. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Antonio Diaz, “The Spanish Intelli-

gence Services: An Overview,” Paper for the Political Studies Association Conference (UK, April 10-13, 2000); “Intelligence Monitor: Spain,” Jane’s Intelligence Review

(March 1, 1999); Robert D’A. Henderson, Brassey’s International Intelligence Yearbook (Brassey’s, 2002); John Pike, “Intelligence and Security Agencies,” Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org/irp; Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, www.cni.es/castellano.

Spanish-American War .

THIS SHORT WAR in 1898 that signaled the emergence of the United States as a world power, was a

U.S. President McKinley received intelligence information on the war in Cuba within an hour of the action.

harbinger of the use of intelligence in the 20th century, including the interception of supposedly private communications and the intrusive role of the press, for good and ill. The United States had been, for some years, in a state of protest over Spanish colonial policies in Cuba, only 90 miles from American shores. Moreover, both the U.S. Navy and the Revenue Cutter Service (forerunner of the Coast Guard) had been engaged in the interdiction of gunrunners departing the U.S. coastline to assist Cuban insurgents. Accordingly, the sinking of USS Maine in Havana, the Cuban capital, began operations in circumstances familiar to U.S. forces, at least in the Caribbean region.

However, this would be a world war, and neither the United States, nor Spain, nor any other power had a world-class intelligence organization. Accord-

ingly, there were a number of heroic individual efforts, the most memorable of which was Lieutenant Andrew S. Rowan’s carrying a presidential missive to the Cuban insurgents, immortalized in the book, A Message to Garcia. Similarly, in the Pacific, the Pa-

cific Fleet’s Admiral George Dewey (who had to

purchase his own charts to proceed to the Philippine Islands and defeat Spain’s Pacific Fleet), had his aide, Ensign KE. B. Upham, pose as a traveler in Hong Kong, interviewing those who had recently visited Spanish possessions in the Pacific. Such makeshift efforts of adapt-improvise-and-overcome were widespread and often remarkably effective. Perhaps the most consistently useful means of intelligence-gathering was an effort by the International Ocean Telegraph Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Western Union. The company manager in Key West, Florida, was a wounded U.S. Civil War Union veteran, Martin Luther Hellings. Western Union’s president, Thomas Eckert, had been the director of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton’s Telegraph Service throughout the Civil War. Both men played crucial roles as the cable service between Havana and Key West was kept open throughout the hostilities. Also prominent in the war’s intelligence annals, resident in Havana, was agent-in-place Domingo Villaverde. Villaverde’s access and status enabled him to retransmit internal cables and to send his own when information came into his hands. Items of importance were often placed before U.S. President William McKinley within an hour’s time. Another element which prefigured coming trends was the role of the press. Much has been made of the fourth estate’s role as the “yellow press” in fomenting the conflict of the SpanishAmerican War. However, there is no question that war correspondents, most notably writer Richard Harding Davis and illustrator Frederic Remington, were often the most accurate source of intelligence reporting and campaign assessments. Similarly, their influence on home-front opinion was profound. The British closely observed, and even quietly assisted in, the fledgling U.S. Army Bureau of Information’s intelligence collection activities. These methods would be repeated and expanded upon during Britain’s Boer War in South Africa a year later. U.S. naval intelligence emerged during the Spanish-American War. As ships were never easy to locate at sea, there were considerable U.S. Navy scouting efforts, often no more than expensive and time-consuming patrols, sent to quell rumors and false alarms, as when a Spanish battle fleet was believed to be cruising off the New England coast. However, U.S. Naval attachés overseas were quite

successful in both gathering intelligence and spreading disinformation.

Oman found his sultanate threatened by a communist insurgency. The SAS was sent in to bolster the Omani forces against the guerrillas, forming special

RAYMOND J. BROWN

squads known as the firgats. On July 19, 1972, a small SAS garrison was attacked by the guerrillas at

ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS SEE ALSO: naval intelligence; journalism and propaganda; Roosevelt, Theodore.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Michael Blow, A Ship to Remember: The Maine and the Spanish-American War (William Morrow, 1992); Jeffrey Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1979); H. Paul Jeffers, Colonel Roosevelt John Wiley, 1996); Ivan Musicant, Empire by Default: The Spanish American War and the Dawn of the Amer-. ican Century (Henry Holt, 1998); GJ.A. O’Toole, The Spanish War (W.W. Norton, 1984); Elbert Hubbard, A Message to Garcia (Pauper Press, 1983).

Special Air Service THE BRITISH SPECIAL Air Service (SAS), more properly the 22nd Regiment, Special Air Service, traces its origins back to the desert war in north Africa during World War II. The creation of Captain David Stirling, the SAS scored its first triumph in December 1941, when it destroyed two German airfields behind enemy lines. From there, led by men like Paddy Mayne, the SAS carved out its unique place in the history of the British Army, and particularly in the story of special operations warfare. (Director Blake Edwards’s movie The Pink Panther was an indirect tribute to the regiment. In the desert, the regiment painted their Land Rover trucks pink because it was a good camouflage color. The regiment called their vehicles the Pink Panthers.) When the war in north

Africa ended with the surrender of the Germans in Tunisia in May 1943, the SAS was sent to carry on its unique hit-and-run raids behind German lines in occupied France. Not only did the SAS inflict over 7,000 casualties upon German forces, but it also helped in hunting down wanted Nazi German war criminals. After World War II, the SAS found itself committed worldwide in “wars of peace” to help countries looking for protection from enemies, both

foreign and domestic. In 1970, Sultan Qaboos of

the old fort of Mirbat in Oman. After heavy fighting lasting over six hours, the guerrillas, or adoos, were repulsed. Along with the fighting in Oman, the SAS also served from 1948 to 1960 to aid the government of the new state of Malaysia during the War of the Running Dogs, a long-term insurgency against ethnic Chinese communists who were backed by the Peoples’ Republic of China. During the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982 (in which Argentina tried to reclaim small islands off its coast under British rule), the SAS, and its ally, the Royal Navy’s Special Boat Squadron (SBS), provided vital combat intelligence for the main British ground attack. Most recently, the SAS saw action during the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 and in the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2002, where it fought side by side with units of the U.S. Army Special Forces. The SAS is more than a first-response team sent in by the British government in foreign crises. It also embraces a unique role as a counterterror force as well. In May 1980, the SAS, which prides itself on its secrecy, received some unwelcome publicity when it was called on to end the hostage crisis at the Iranian embassy in London at Prince’s Gate. The London Metropolitan Police requested SAS support when a hostage was killed. Then, the world was greeted to the spectacle of the black-uniformed SAS soldiers attacking the embassy. All but one of the terrorists was slain. (The SAS is so concerned about the security of its soldiers that, unlike the American special forces or U.S. Navy SEALs, in photographs taken of soldiers currently serving with the SAS their faces are routinely blacked out). Although not confirmed officially, it is believed that the SAS, along with the SBS, is tasked with the security of the oil rigs in the North Sea from terrorist attack. In terms of intelligence, the SAS has raised reconnaissance missions to a high art. When the Falklands/Malvinas invasion force landed in June 19872, the British public was surprised to learn that the SAS and the SBS had been on station for weeks, both in the Falklands and on South Georgia Island. In fact, the SAS had been on the East Falklands is-

lands since May 1, only a month after the Argentines had sent in forces on April 2, 1982. JOHN F. MuRPhY, JR. AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Special Boat Squadron; United Kingdom.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. John Laffin, Fight for the Falklands (St. Martin’s, 1982); David Miller and Gerard Ridefort, Modern Elite Forces (Smithmark, 1992); “Special Air Service,” Www.specwarnet.com; “SAS: Special Air Service,” www-.hccnet.nl/22sas; Tony Geraghty, Who Dares, Wins: The Story of the Special Air Service, 1950-1980 (Arms and Armour Press, 1980); Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, Battle for the Falklands (Norton, 1983).

Special Boat Squadron WITH THE COMING of World War I, it was recognized in Great Britain that combined special forces operations required more than the ad hoc gathering of a force of sailors to make such operations successful. This change in tactical thinking led to the rise of the Special Boat Service (renamed Squadron in 1977), organized from commando operations in World War II. Hillary St. George Sanders wrote in Combined Operations: The Official Story of the Commandos (1943), “as with the soldiers, so with the sailors. They are trained to handle the strange diversity of craft used to put the army ashore, take it off after a raid, and keep it supplied when on shore.” The main development of the Special Boat Squadron had much to do with Royal Marines who carried out many of the amphibious operations. Instruction was given for the Special Boat Squadron at the Royal Marines’ Amphibious School. The tasks of the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) are described by David Miller and Gerard Ridefort in Modern Elite Forces (1992): “The major role of the SBS is in amphibious operations, especially on reconnaissance, sabotage, and demolitions.” The SBS is also believed to have specific duties in providing security to Britain’s offshore oil and gas rigs in the North Sea. Since the 1970s, much of the combined operations have been in cooperation with the elite 22nd

Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) which was also founded during World War II. The SAS began as the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), that was tasked with carrying out missions of sabotage behind German lines in North Africa. Because of the cooperation with the SAS, unusually high standards are set for members of the SBS. Not only are they trained in Royal Marine and Royal Navy skills in seamanship, navigation, and demolition for 15 weeks, but they are then put through a four-week parachute training course to make them able to mesh completely into any operations undertaken by the SAS. The SBS first achieved prominence in the Falklands War of 1982, when it assisted the SAS in the frigid southern hemisphere winter on South Georgia Island, as well as the later large-scale operations on the Falkland Islands themselves. As with the SAS, the SBS can be assumed to have been trained in counterterrorism warfare, in which their fourman patrol units would most likely be used. JOHN FE. MuRPHy, JR. AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: World War II; Special Air Service; special operations; United Kingdom.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. David Miller and Gerard Ridefort, Modern Elite Forces (Smithmark, 1992); Hillary St. George Sanders, Combined Operations: The Official Story of the Commandos (1943), James Adams, Secret Armies: Inside The Soviet And European Special Forces (Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987); David Eshel, Elite Fighting Units (Olympic Marketing, 1984); Barrie Pitt, Special Boat Squadron (General Publishing, 1983).

special operations SPECIAL OPERATIONS may best be defined as operations that regular military forces are incapable of doing particularly well, or which they are not particularly willing to do. In most cases, such operations aim at using small numbers of forces to conduct missions that have strategic implications. Virtually all modern militaries have found the need to establish special operations forces, and these units tend to be the most utilized portions of

military establishments. Despite their small size and frequently classified operations that receive no publicity, many countries’ special operations forces have achieved enviable reputations. The British Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Squadron, the Australian SAS, the Soviet and Russian Spetznaz, and the Israeli Sayeret MATKAL all have been used as models for other militaries to emulate. In the case of the United States, there is a broad array of special operations forces. Units assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) include the Army Special Forces (Green Berets); the Ranger Regiment; psychological operations and civil affairs units; U.S. Army special operations aircraft; navy SEALs; the U.S. Air Force’s 16th Special’ Operations Wing, equipped with specially modified aircraft; and the U.S. Army’s Ist Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, more commonly known as Delta Force. It also was announced in 2003 that certain U.S. Marine Corps units would also be assigned to USSOCOM. Although the bulk of U.S. special operations forces are in the military, the CIA also has special operations capability under the Directorate of Operations. The CIA calls its forces Military Special Projects (MSP), formerly known as Special Activities Staff. The MSP has ground, air, and maritime branches. The principal mission of MSP is to conduct paramilitary covert operations. Reports indicate that the individuals in this group are not formed into a regular unit structure, but instead are organized into Special Operations Groups based on particular missions. MSP missions appear to center

on what the military calls direct action missions, and the group reportedly recruits heavily, if not almost exclusively, from U.S. military special operations units.

Although terminologies differ somewhat, special operations forces generally have similar missions. In U.S. terms, these generally include direct action missions (“taking down” high value targets); counterterrorism missions; unconventional warfare

(training or supporting guerrilla forces); foreign internal defense (normally involving support of foreign governments in counterinsurgency operations);

and strategic or special reconnaissance. In recent years, special operations forces also have become much more involved in broader missions, such as

peace operations, counter-drug missions, and humanitarian operations. One point that should be stressed is that (especially in the case of U.S. special

operations forces) although many military special

operations missions are classified, few would fall under the rubric of covert operations, which largely remain under the purview of the CIA. In the modern era, particularly in the case of the United States, special operations forces share historical antecedents with national intelligence agencies. Both U.S. Special Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency can trace their roots to the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Although the OSS was disbanded at the close of the war, its legacy of strategic intelligence collection and unconventional warfare operations resonated with policy makers trying to cope with the chal-. lenges of the Cold War. As part of the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA assumed the OSS’s former role of collecting strategic intelligence and at least some of its paramilitary functions. The military was considerably more reluctant to sign on to the unconventional warfare concept, and it was not until 1952 that the first special operations unit, the 10th Special Forces Group, was formed under the command of Colonel Aaron Bank, an OSS veteran. Senior U.S. Army leaders tended to continue this underlying lack of support for special forces, commonly viewing them as immaterial to the Army’s primary mission of fighting conventional wars, or in some

cases considering them as rogue elements. It was not until the formation of USSOCOM in 1987, almost entirely due to Congressional initiative, that all the services’ special operations forces gained bureaucratic autonomy, and more significantly, an independent funding stream.

Doctrinal intelligence. Beyond normal military intelligence requirements, special operations forces also require more generalized political, cultural, and economic intelligence for conducting their missions. For U.S. Special Forces, doctrinal intelligence requirements include general area studies, psychological operations estimates, target intelligence packages, area assessments, and civil-military operations estimates. Target intelligence packages, in particular, are highly intelligence-intensive, requiring almost continual updating and verification of changes in important targets. Given the complexity of special operations missions and their significance, special operations

forces are voracious consumers of intelligence. A mission by a single 12-person Special Forces A

team, or by a single SEAL team, may require direct or indirect support from virtually all national intelligence agencies. Teams being inserted for an opera-

tion normally go through intensive preparation; intelligence support typically involves all the major intelligence disciplines, particularly human intelligence and imagery intelligence. For direct action missions, targeting intelligence must be much more detailed than normal, since it must also include infiltration and exfiltration routes for the forces and possible enemy response forces capabilities. With their requirements for extensive intelligence, special forces in particular have a much more robust internal intelligence support structure than do conventional forces. Internal intelligence elements begin at the 12-person Operational Detachment A (ODA or A team), which has two operations and intelligence sergeants. There are military intelligence detachments at both the battalion and the group level. Each battalion also has three organic Support Operations Teams-A (SOT-A) that provide signal intelligence and electronic warfare support. These teams normally deploy with ODA’s but may be deployed independently for forward operations. Beyond its electronic warfare missions, each SOT-A has the capability to support teams with limited interrogation, translation, interpretation, and communications support. Reconnaissance. Special operations forces are major producers of intelligence as well as being major consumers. Clearly, this intelligence contribution is most direct in the form of special reconnaissance

missions,

in which

teams

can

operate

hundreds of miles inside hostile territory. During the Vietnam War, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam-Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG) conducted significant (and hazardous) cross-border reconnaissance missions. In more recent times, during the Persian Gulf War, both SAS and special forces teams conducted SCUD missile hunts in the Iraqi desert. Beyond this direct intelligence mission, special forces and SEAL teams can provide valuable human intelligence. Special forces groups and most SEAL teams are assigned specific geographic areas of responsibility, with their personnel gain-

ing considerable cultural and political familiarity with their areas of responsibility, together with varying levels of language proficiency. As a result,

they are ideally suited to gather intelligence as an adjunct to their other missions. Psychological operations (PSYOP) units also are major producers of intelligence as an offshoot of their basic missions. Each battalion Product Development Center must conduct research on target countries and regions to develop detailed PSYOP campaigns. This research is normally very detailed and covers historical, political, diplomatic, social, and economic events and trends for PSYOP significance. The threat and counterpropaganda teams have interrogator capabilities and coordinate with military intelligence interrogators on PSYOP campaign assessments. Other organic PSYOP teams collect PSYOP-particular intelligence through surveys, interviews, and panels. The thrust of this collection is to obtain information on attitudes, beliefs, behaviors, and social organizations. The capabilities of special operations forces make them an extremely useful tool for the national intelligence agencies. In the past, these relationships created significant problems for special operations units and their missions. In the Vietnam War, the employment of special forces and SEALS in support of programs involving the CIA, such as the PHOENIX Program and the initial period of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, raised significant doubts about the special forces among the conventional military leadership, already uncertain and somewhat dubious of special operations’ strategic role. Later, some special operations in Central America during the 1980s also led to issues regarding cooperation between the CIA and special operations units.

More recently, however, reports from Afghanistan suggest that the level of CIA-special forces operational coordination has increased

markedly. Given the likelihood of a long counterterrorism campaign, it is important that such coordination continue to increase. LAWRENCE E. CLINE, PH.D. AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: reconnaissance; Office of Strategic Services; War; Kennedy, John FE; Central Intelligence

Vietnam

Agency.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. U.S. Army Field Manual FM 34-36, Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, www.fas.org; Richard H. Shultz, The Se-

cret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam (HarperCollins, 1999); Mark Moyer, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA’s Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1997); Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action (Frank Cass Publishers, 1998).

spy planes ARMED ONLY with surveillance equipment, high altitude capability, and speed, spy planes revolution- © ized intelligence gathering in the 20th century and became key geopolitical weapons in the arsenals of nations competing for global dominance. Due to the sensitive nature of their missions, spy planes have always been shrouded in official secrecy. Not surprisingly, an aura of mystique surrounds them, contributing to the popular imagination about their existence and operations.

Early efforts at aerial reconnaissance. The concept of aerial espionage is not new. As early as the third century B.C.E., Chinese General Han Hsin used a kite to calculate the distance between his army and that of an enemy. Much later, feudal Japanese commanders reportedly used large man-carrying kites to observe enemy movements, a technique that the British Army likewise experimented with in the late 19th century. Kites were inconsistent in their tasks and dangerous for their passengers. Military aeronauts therefore enjoyed better success with balloons as reconnaissance platforms, beginning in June 1794, when Jean Marie Coutelle, from his balloon Entreprenant, observed the Austrians in the Battle of Fleurus using a hand-held telescope. Early in the American Civil War, General George B. McClellan appointed inventor Thaddeus Lowe as chief aeronaut of the Army of the Potomac’s Balloon Corps. Lowe, fielding seven balloons, conducted aerial reconnaissance for the Union Army on numerous occasions, most notably during the Battle of Fair Oaks in 1862. Following the examples of Coutelle and Lowe, Prussian military balloonists observed French forces at Sedan and Paris, France, during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71. However, like kites, balloons are limited in their capabilities by their relative immobility over

a target area. It was not until December 1903, when Orville and Wilbur Wright successfully tested the first fully powered manned airplane, that aerial reconnaissance over enemy territory became feasible. The Wright brothers, believing that military aircraft could prevent wars if belligerents could watch one another and forestall advantages, originally intended to develop their Flyer design and market it to the U.S. Army Signal Corps for photographic reconnaissance work. But the U.S. Army was hesitant and only bought its first airplane in 1909. While the U.S. government was slow to grasp the Flyer’s value, European governments immediately realized its reconnaissance possibilities and eagerly encouraged their own inventors to duplicate and improve it. By 1911, European-built aircraft were advanced enough for military use, and in the Italian-Turkish war of 1911-12, Italian airmen conducted the first ever reconnaissance missions in airplanes.

The world wars. When World War I erupted in 1914, aerial photographic reconnaissance was a primary mission of the air services of both the Allies and the Central Powers. Specialized aircraft such as the British De Havilland B.E.2, the French MoraneSaulnier, the German Albatross and LVG series of reconnaissance planes, and the later American Curtis “Jenny,” carried trained “aerographers’”’ who photographed opposing trench networks, artillery emplacements, supply depots, and occupied cities and towns. Aerial reconnaissance played key roles in both the German victory at Tannenburg and the Allies’ halt of the German Army on the Marne River in 1914, as well as in the British defeat of Turkish forces at the Suez Canal in 1915. At sea, British aircraft hunted German warships and U-boats, while German scout planes, in conjunction with rigid, motorized airships called Zeppelins, reconnoitered the North Sea on behalf of the High Seas Fleet. At some point in the war, military intelligence officers studying enormous photographic maps of the Western Front coined the terms “tactical” intelligence, concerning conditions on the actual battlefield, and “strategic” intelligence, which referred to situations well behind the lines and in the enemy’s homeland.

Major technological advances made,during the interwar period not only resulted in greater speeds and altitudes for military aircraft, but also improved cameras and films capable of producing

higher-quality images. During World War II, the AL lied and Axis forces largely shied away from specialized reconnaissance aircraft in favor of conventional fighters and bombers stripped of armor and guns, and outfitted with cameras for photo-reconnaissance work. However, deep-penetration bombing of Germany and Japan presented the U.S. military with unique targeting and strike analysis problems that conventional aircraft could not solve. Army Air Force Colonel Elliot Roosevelt, who had flown reconnaissance missions and was acutely aware of the situation, believed that specially designed photo-reconnaissance aircraft were the answer. After hearing about a new aircraft called the D2, which Howard Hughes had secretly developed and test-flown in June 1943, Roosevelt visited the millionaire and inspected his prototype. Impressed with the design, Roosevelt recommended that the U.S. Army adopt it as a photo-reconnaissance aircraft. Despite the destruction of the D-2 prototype by a freak lightning strike and internal arguments over design principles, the U.S. Army finally contracted with Hughes to design and produce 100 of the aircraft, re-designated as the XF-11. World War II ended before the first plane was completed, but the U.S. Army allowed Hughes to continue working on the XF-11 because of postwar Soviet intransi-

gence. In July 1946, Hughes personally tested the XF11 for the first time. The flight ended in disaster when one of its propellers suddenly reversed, causing it to lurch into the ground. From his hospital bed, Hughes ordered a redesign of the propeller configuration, and in April 1947 he successfully flew the second XF-11. However, the U.S. Air Force cancelled the program shortly thereafter in favor of the less costly Boeing RB-50, an upgraded B-29 bomber that was specially modified for long distance photo-reconnaissance.

The post-war years. While Hughes developed the XF-11, the U.S. government authorized Republic Aviation to develop and test competing design for an all-weather photographic reconnaissance aircraft to meet the military’s requirements for pre- and post-strike target analysis, with a design emphasis upon speed, ceiling, and range. Consequently, in February 1946, Republic completed and tested the first XF-12, which could reach a height of 45,000 feet, with a top speed of 470

miles-per-hour,

and

a

range

of

4,500

miles.

Equipped with the latest photographic technology, including a dark room and 18 high-intensity photoflash bulbs to permit night photography, the streamlined, four-engine XF-12 could map broad stretches of enemy territory in all weather conditions with little risk of interception. The aircraft’s photographic reconnaissance capabilities were successfully tested in September 1948, during Operation BIRD’S-EYE, when an XF-12 flew coast-to-coast in just under seven hours and produced 390 individual photos covering a 490-milewide field of vision. Despite this impressive achievement, the XF-12 met the same fate as the XF11 when the U.S. Air Force cancelled the project in favor of the more economical RB-50. In the late 1940s, the Northrop Corporation, proposed a reconnaissance version of its revolutionary YB-49 Flying Wing bomber that was not only capable of high-altitude and long range flight, but also carried a small radar signature because of its unusual shape. Despite the YRB-49A’s early promise as a potential spy plane, the U.S. Air Force cancelled the entire YB-49 program in 1949 after it became clear that jet-powered aircraft would dominate military aviation in the future. After the Soviets successfully detonated their atomic bomb in 1949, a stunned Truman administration faced the same problem of target selection and strike analysis that had confronted the U.S. military during World War II, but on a vastly greater scale. Consequently, in the early 1950s, the U.S. Air Force struggled to procure spy planes capable of meeting the government’s new requirements for strategic intelligence within the Soviet Union. While making the transition to an all-jet bombing fleet, the U.S. Air Force utilized a reconnaissance version of its gigantic new B-36 Peacemaker intercontinental bomber. This spy plane, designated the RB-36D and capable of reaching an altitude of 58,000 feet, was a hybrid aircraft powered by four jets and six rear-mounted propellers and packed with photographic reconnaissance and electronic intelligence equipment. The RB-36D flew repeated missions along Soviet borders and over coastal

areas and islands from bases in both the United States and Britain, but its sheer size, high cost, and heavy maintenance requirements limited its use. For more substantial penetration missions into Soviet territory, the U.S. Air Force turned to the RB-45 and the RB-47, reconnaissance versions of

its first all-jet bombers. While the RB-45 Tornado performed well during quick photograph-and-run missions, the RB-47 became the real workhorse for air force intelligence. Modified from the B-47 Stratojet, the RB-47 spy plane first flew in July 1953 and demonstrated its worth later that year when the entire RB-47 force, during a spectacular mass raid over Vladivostok, Russia, caught Soviet air defenses offguard and collected valuable intelligence on Soviet naval facilities. RB-47s later conducted some of the riskiest overflight missions of the Cold War by repeatedly flying several hundred miles into the Soviet interior. During these deep-penetration missions, at least two RB-47s were shot down and

several others damaged by Soviet MiG interceptors, ~ but the U.S. Air Force discovered enormous radar coverage gaps in the Soviet polar regions. The U-2. Despite the successful deep penetration raids of the early 1950s, the Eisenhower administration still lacked satisfactory intelligence regarding industrial and nuclear complexes and bomber bases in the Soviet interior. While the RB-47s had been able to penetrate several hundred miles into the Soviet Union, they did not have the necessary range to complete an overflight of central Asia. Moreover, the Soviet Air Force was significantly improving its radar technology and building more advanced MiG fighters that were capable of detecting and engaging U.S. spy planes more effectively. As casualties mounted among American aircrews flying over Soviet territory (eventually numbering over 200 airmen killed or missing), the Eisenhower administration began considering new means of gathering strategic reconnaissance.

In March 1953, U.S. Air Force engineer Major John Seaberg completed a formal study recommending the development of a special jet-powered reconnaissance aircraft, undetectable by Soviet radar and capable of flying 3,000 miles per hour at 70,000 feet while loaded with the latest photographic and electronic surveillance equipment. Seaberg’s concept assumed critical importance after Eisenhower learned in early 1954 that the first nuclear-capable Soviet jet bombers were operational and that Soviet engineers had started researching intercontinental ballistic missiles. Alarmed, Eisenhower asked the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dr. James Killian, to chair a secret panel of experts tasked with studying potential new military and in-

telligence technologies that could defend America against a surprise Soviet nuclear attack. The socalled Killian Commission subsequently met with Seaberg, who briefed the panel on proposals submitted by four aircraft manufacturers, including one unsolicited design from Lockheed’s engineering genius, Clarence “Kelly” Johnson. Johnson’s design, the CL-282, consisting of an existing F-104 fuselage with long glider-like wings, emerged as the most capable aircraft for the mission, and after Johnson promised to have the prototype ready within eight months, the commission recommended its development to Eisenhower as Project AQUATONE. In November 1954, the president authorized the new spy plane, but insisted that the CIA develop and manage AQUATONE with civilian contractors in order to avoid the provocation of uniformed American military personnel flying so deep into Soviet airspace.

His design thus approved, Johnson pushed his

team of engineers at Lockheed’s “Skunk Works” plant in Burbank, California, to complete the prototype three weeks ahead of schedule and under budget. The final product, dubbed “Article 341” by the CIA but “U-2” (U for Utility) by the U.S. Air Force, weighed only six tons and excluded certain “unnecessary” control systems and instrumentation, including a fuel gauge, an ejection seat, and standard landing gear. However, the U-2 did mount a sophisticated, high-resolution camera, the Model 73B, designed by Edwin Land, the inventor of the Polaroid camera. To test the U-2, Johnson and Lockheed’s chief test pilot, Tony LeVier, had chosen an isolated dry lake bed in the Nevada desert called Groom Lake and had constructed a secret air base there. At the base, LeVier successfully tested the U-2 in August 1955, and shortly after its first flight, the spy plane exceeded Seaberg’s specifications by soaring to an altitude of over 70,000 feet, flying to the Alleghenies and back. Likewise, initial high-altitude tests of the Model 73B camera resulted in exceptionally high quality photographs of the San Diego naval base, leading an incredulous Eisenhower to exclaim that he could he easily count the cars on the streets and the lines in the facility’s parking lot. The CIA recruited pilots from deactivated Strategic Air Command fighter squadrons and, after requiring them to resign their commissions and sign civilian contracts, trained them at Groom Lake. The agency then organized its new U-2 units into Provisional

_

spyplanes 611

A U-2 reconnaissance aircraft takes off from Davis Air Force Base in 1975. The U-2 conducted reconnaissance missions at some

70,000 feet and at speeds that exceeded three times the speed of sound.

Weather Observational Squadrons and dispatched them to overseas bases to await Eisenhower’s orders to begin trans-Soviet overflights. Eisenhower authorized the first U-2 missions in June 1956. Over the next four years, U-2s overflew the Soviet Union with impunity and laid bare the entire Soviet military establishment. The missions revealed that the presumed Soviet strategic threat, at the time, was largely hollow. The overflights came to an abrupt halt in May 1960, after Soviet air defenses shot down a U-2 near Sverdlovsk and captured its pilot, Francis Gary Powers. Politically embarrassed after the Soviets displayed the wreckage and surveillance equipment and then convicted Powers of espionage, Eisenhower placed a permanent moratorium on reconnaissance overflights of Soviet territory. Despite the U-2 incident, the spy plane continued to play an important reconnaissance role elsewhere on the globe. In October 1962, a U-2 overflight of Cuba revealed the installation of Soviet ballistic missiles 90 miles from the American mainland, triggering a crisis that nearly escalated into nuclear war after a Soviet missile destroyed another U-2 in a follow-up mission over the island.

After the People’s Republic of China exploded its first atomic bomb in 1964, the CIA trained Taiwanese pilots to conduct U-2 overflights of western China to photograph the nuclear test facility at Lop Nor. These missions proved costly, however, as Communist Chinese air defenses shot down five U2s, while several others were destroyed in training accidents. U-2s later overflew Vietnam, the Middle East, and even cocaine fields in South America. More recently, U-2s photographed Iraqi military bases and SCUD missile sites in Operation DESERT STORM, mass grave sites in the Balkans during the Bosnian War, and cave complexes of alQaeda terrorist groups in Afghanistan. The U-2 operated as part of the U.S. Air Force’s 9th Operations Group and was expected to remain in service until 2020.

The SR-71. Two years before Powers’s shootdown, Johnson realized that the Soviets were making significant advances in their radar and surface-to-air missile systems and that it was only a matter of time before they shot down a U-2. In response to a government study that determined that supersonic speed, coupled with high altitude and low radar sig-

litical concerns precluded its deployment for another three years. As a cover for the more secretive CIA operation at Groom Lake, the Air Force, at Edwards Air Force Base, began openly testing a strike/reconnaissance derivative of the A-12, called the SR-71 Blackbird, that Johnson (the designer) had developed in 1962.

The SR-71 spy plane reached three times the speed of sound while flying at more than 80,000 feet.

nature, greatly reduced the chances of detection by enemy radar, he submitted a series of designs for a high-performance strategic reconnaissance aircraft capable of flying higher than the U-2 at speeds of Mach 3-plus (three times the speed of sound). In 1959, the CIA briefed Eisenhower on Johnson’s new concept, called the A-11, as well as competing proposals from other firms. That September, Eisenhower selected Johnson’s A-11 for development and authorized Lockheed to build, under Project OXCART, an initial run of 12 of the new spy planes. Facing enormous technological challenges, Johnson’s team struggled to construct the aircraft using radically new technologies developed specifically for the project, including an all-titanium airframe, radar-absorbent paint, and exotic engine nacelles. The spy plane also mounted improved cameras and sophisticated electronic countermeasure gear to further confound enemy radar systems. Design changes arising from the integration of new

technology led Lockheed to rename the aircraft the A-12. In April 1962, the first A-12 prototype made its maiden flight from Groom Lake. After test pilots gradually incremented its speed and altitude in succeeding flights, an A-12 finally reached Mach 3 at 80,000-plus feet in the summer of 1963. But further testing was necessary to bring it up to operational status. In February 1964, President Lyndon Johnson publicly revealed the spy plane’s existence, but po-

In May 1967, the A-12 finally conducted its first mission, overflying North Vietnam undetected and photographing 70 missile sites and nine other strategic targets. Successful follow-up missions over Vietnam and elsewhere proved OXCART to be an outstanding success, especially after an A-12 successfully overflew North Korea the following January and photographed the captured American spy ship USS Pueblo in Wonsan Harbor. However, the Johnson administration had earlier decided to terminate the A-12 in favor of the air force’s SR-71 for cost and political reasons, and as a result, the A-12 flew its last mission in May 1968. While the Johnson administration phased out Project OXCART, the tempo of U.S. Air Force SR71 reconnaissance operations dramatically increased, with the spy plane making its first overflight of North Vietnam in March 1968. The flight marked the beginning of a distinguished quarter-century career, in which the aircraft overflew virtually every trouble-spot in the world, including North Korea, Nicaragua, and Libya, and survived over 800 reported shootdown attempts without loss. In 1990, the U.S. Air Force deactivated the expensive SR-71 in favor of more economical and less provocative spy satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The spy plane was reactivated again in 1994 to overfly the Balkans, but the U.S. Air Force

again retired it in 1997. From start to finish, Lockheed produced a total of 15 A-12s and 31 SR-71s. Into the 21st century. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the public allowed its imagination to get carried away by media stories reporting the existence of a mysterious successor spy plane at Groom Lake. Supposedly sporting exotic “pulsing” engines and capable of Mach 5-plus flight, the so-called “Aurora” proved to be the combined product of wishful thinking and mistaken identity since the project really comprised the B-2 stealth bomber competition. Myth later yielded to reality, however, when the Defense Department finally revealed in 1995 the SR-71’s intended successor, the RQ-3A DarkStar UAV.

Jointly developed by Lockheed Martin and Boeing, DarkStar was an all-weather, short-range reconnaissance drone, capable of flying above 45,000 feet on extended missions at subsonic speeds. Incorpo-

rating the latest stealth and computerized photography technologies, DarkStar could transmit images directly to ground stations or to satellites, thereby giving military commanders nearly instantaneous intelligence. The first DarkStar flew in March 1996 at Edwards Air Force Base, but crashed during a second flight the following month. In June 1998, the second DarkStar flew successfully using the Global Positioning System (GPS), and its future seemed assured. In January 1999, however, the Defense Department terminated DarkStar in favor of the more promising RQ-4A Global Hawk UAV, developed by Northrop Grumman and unveiled in 1997. The Global Hawk reportedly displays flight characteristics similar to the U-2 with a range of 3,000 miles and a maximum ceiling of 65,000 feet. Unlike the U-2, however, the Global Hawk is able to remain on station for 24 hours before returning to base, and can take three-foot resolution ground images while surveying 40,000 square miles in a single day. In November 2001, the Global Hawk appeared in the skies of Afghanistan and, in conjunction with the CIA’s smaller but more lethal RQ-1A Predator UAV, played an important role in the defeat of the Afghan Taliban rulers and the subsequent hunt for al-Qaeda strongholds in the region. Today, the Global Hawk carries forth its predecessors’ legacy as it continues to overfly troubled regions, providing real-time intelligence to government decision makers and military commanders in a post—September 11 world. JAMIE RIFE History ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED

SEE ALSO: Powers, Francis Gary; Cuban Missile Crisis; reconnaissance; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; air force intelli-

gence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Michael J. Taylor, History of World Airpower (The Military Press, 1985); William E. Burrows, Deep Black (Random House, 1986); Curtis Peebles, Dark Eagles: A History of Top Secret U.S. Aircraft Programs (Presidio Press, 1995); and Shadow Flights: America’s Secret Air War Against the Soviet Union (Presidio Press, 2000); Paul FE. Crickmore, Lockheed SR-71: The Secret Missions

Exposed (Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1993); Ben Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works (Little, Brown, and Company, 1994); Bill Sweetman, Aurora: The Pentagon’s Secret Hypersonic Spyplane (Motorbooks International, 1993).

Spycatcher Affair IN SEPTEMBER 1985, the British government began proceedings in Australia to suppress publication of Spycatcher, the memoirs of retired British Security Service (MI-5) officer Peter Wright. According to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Wright was in violation of the Official Secrets Act, a law that bestows upon civil servants a life-long duty of confidentiality about their work. Thatcher thus embarked upon a battle to ban Spycatcher, not only in Australia but wherever Britons might read it. As the Spycatcher Affair unfolded between 1985 and 1988, the British government’s efforts to stop publication would be perceived as increasingly unreasonable, and ensured that Wright’s book became an international bestseller. Spycatcher told the story of Wright’s career of over 20 years with ML-5. In 1955, Wright had joined MLE-5 as its first scientific officer, specializing in electronic surveillance and countermeasures—reading ciphers, tracing emissions from radio transmitters, and planting ‘“‘bugs.”” He had been involved in some

extraordinary intelligence operations, such as the bugging of the telephone in the cipher room of the Egyptian embassy in London on the eve of the 1956 Suez Crisis, and the monitoring of French leader Charles de Gaulle’s attempts to keep Britain out of the Common Market. Wright also wrote about an abortive 1956 plan to assassinate President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and even a conspiracy against the Labor government of Harold Wilson, whom ML5 suspected of being a Soviet agent. Central to the controversy surrounding Spycatcher was Wright’s theory about Soviet infiltration of British intelligence. When Wright found that some of his interception activities were quickly being uncovered by the Soviets in the early 1960s, he became suspicious. Reports from Soviet defectors such as Anatoly Golitsyn seemed to confirm his misgivings that MI-5 had been penetrated and that treachery had reached the highest levels. This charge led to the formation of the FLUENCY Com-

Ste

mittee, an investigation into Soviet penetration of

British intelligence. Wright chaired the committee, and his suspicions eventually fell upon none other than Roger Hollis, director general of MI-5 from 1956 to 1965. Wright had already seen four members of the celebrated Cambridge Spy Ring unmasked—Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Kim Philby, and Anthony Blunt. He identified Hollis as being the “Fifth Man” in the conspiracy. Although no conclusive proof of Hollis’s guilt ever emerged, Wright never abandoned his conviction that Hollis was a traitor: “...I had faith in his treachery,” he wrote in Spycatcher, “as another man might have faith in God, or Mammon.” Wright retired as assistant director of MI-5 in. 1976, and moved to Australia. Finding his pension insufficient and bitter at the failure to expose the Soviet mole, he began to write about his theories on Hollis. Eventually, Wright worked with a British television producer, Paul Greenglass, to translate his manuscript into a readable and saleable book. When the British government heard that Wright was moving to have Spycatcher published in Australia, an injunction was obtained to stop publication. Thatcher assigned her principal adviser on intelligence matters, Sir Robert Armstrong, secretary of the Cabinet and head of the Civil Service, to present the Government’s case. Representing Wright was a young, brash Australian lawyer named Malcolm Turnbull. When the Spycatcher trial finally began in late 1986, the spectacle of the British government in court on the subject of spies attracted a large contingent of the British press. The trial turned out to be a sensation. The government’s argument rested upon Wright’s obligation under the Official Secrets Act not to disclose state secrets. Turnbull, however, challenged that obligation as well as the government’s moral authority to impose it. He focused on the government’s unequal treatment of Spycatcher as compared to a book that covered much the same ground, Chapman Pincher’s Their Trade Is Treachery, published in 1981. If the Thatcher government was justified in prohibiting publication of Spycatcher on the basis of principle, Turnbull asked, why had it done nothing to ban Their Trade Is Treachery—despite full knowledge that the main source for Pincher’s work had, in fact, been Peter Wright? The clear implication was that Their Trade Is Treachery had been published with implicit government approval—a controlled release of sensitive in-

formation that allowed the government to react appropriately. When Turnbull cross-examined Armstrong to see if he would acknowledge such a deception, he famously admitted to the court that the demands of government work occasionally required him to be “economical with the truth.” The unequal treatment of Pincher and Wright’s books as demonstrated by Turnbull de-legitimized the British government’s claim to be acting against Spycatcher on the basis of the rule of law alone, and Armstrong’s performance under cross-examination helped further undermine the court’s confidence in the government’s principles. In March 1987, the Australian court dismissed

the British action, and Spycatcher began to be pub-lished around the world, though not yet in Britain where even newspapers were legally restrained from publishing excerpts or details from the book. Only when the case made its way to a final hearing in the House of Lords, and the judges found themselves unable to uphold the obligation of confidentiality on which the government depended, did Spycatcher become a bestseller in Britain as well. Wright died in 1995. But the Spycatcher Affair remains a rallying cry to those who argue for the weakening of Britain’s strict secrecy laws as well as the government’s powers to withhold information from the public in the name of national security. ALEXIS ALBION HARVARD UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Golitsyn, Anatoly; Philby, Kim; Burgess, Guy; Maclean, Donald D.; Blunt, Anthony; ML5.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Peter Wright with Paul Greengrass, Spycatcher:; The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer (Outlet, 1987); Malcolm Turnbull, The Spycatcher Trial (Heinemann,

1988); Chapman

Pincher, A

Web of Deception: The Spycatcher Affair (Sidgwick & Jackson, 1987); Nigel West, Molehunt: The Full Story of the Soviet Mole in MI-5 (Berkeley, 1987); David Official Secrets (Secker & Warburg, 1987).

Hooper,

SS Mayaguez .

ON MAY 12, 1975, forces of the communist Khmer Rouge regime of Cambodia seized the SS

Mayaguez, an American merchant ship, in international waters 60 miles off the coast of that country and. took its crew of 39 prisoner. The ruling Cambodian Khmer Rouge had seized several non-U.S. ships in the preceding weeks as part of its campaign to extend Cambodia’s water rights to 90 miles from the coast and consolidate its control over nearby islands in the Gulf of Thailand. The Mayaguez crew had no knowledge of these earlier seizures. Barely two weeks earlier, on April 28, President Gerald Ford had ordered the evacuation of all remaining U.S. personnel in South Vietnam by helicopter from the roof of the U.S. embassy in Saigon—a humiliating spectacle broadcast throughout the world. The South Vietnamese government officially surrendered to Viet Minh and North Vietnamese forces on April 30. Ford was still reeling from the first lost war in U.S. history and plagued by questions from allies regarding U.S. resolve, and it was in this context that he confronted the Mayaguez crisis. Ford immediately decided on a military rescue rather than strictly diplomatic initiatives. He was determined to rescue the Mayaguez crew before the Khmer Rouge could get them to the Cambodian mainland in order to prevent the incident from becoming a repeat of the 1968 USS Pueblo incident, in which North Korean forces hijacked a U.S. vessel and imprisoned its crew for 11 months. Inaccurate intelligence and poor coordination plagued the operation from the start. Since the CIA

had no agents inside Cambodia and communications intelligence yielded nothing, efforts to locate the Mayaguez and its crew focused on aerial reconnaissance. On May 13, naval patrol pilots located the Mayaguez anchored off Poulo Wai Island and tracked it to Koh Tang Island, 30 miles off the Cambodian coast. American aircraft circling the area spotted the crew as it left the Mayaguez and boarded fishing boats, but one pilot incorrectly reported that some of the crew had disembarked onto Koh Tang. At the same time, Ford ordered the USS Holt to proceed to Koh Tang and marine units from the Philippines and Okinawa to deploy to U-Tapao, an

installation in Thailand that served as the launch site for the operation. Meanwhile, fishing boats containing the Mayaguez crew left Koh Tang surrounded by several Khmer Rouge patrol boats. The group proceeded to Rong Sam Lem Island where the crew members went ashore, and they remained there for the duration of the crisis. A U.S. recon-

naissance pilot reported seeing the fishing boat on its way to Rong Sam Lem, but the information inexplicably never reached the White House. On May 14, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Colby informed Ford that, according to the latest intelligence, some of the crew was on Koh Tang, some had left for the mainland, and some might be onboard the Mayaguez still anchored off Koh Tang. Ford then ordered the Holt to seize the Mayaguez, instructed the aircraft carrier Coral Sea to launch air strikes against mainland military installations, and directed the marines to storm Koh Tang and rescue the crew. Intelligence estimates had put the number of Khmer Rouge on Koh Tang at a few dozen, when in fact there were between 150 and 200 soldiers in well-fortified positions, Several marine helicopters were shot down, and those who made it ashore came under heavy fire. As the battle raged on Koh Tang, the Khmer Rouge released the crew, who departed Rong Sam Lem in a fishing boat. Naval patrol aircraft spotted the crew waving white flags, and the USS Wilson intercepted the vessel and took all of the crew members safely aboard. Although the crew had been released, a second wave of Marines landed at Koh Tang to help the first wave withdraw—in all of the confusion, three Marines were left behind. Upon learning of the crew’s release, Ford was ecstatic and declared the operation a resounding success. As he discovered the repeated intelligence failures and learned that 41 Americans were killed and 50 wounded attempting to rescue a crew that had already been released, his enthusiasm subsided. Critics charged that in the wake of defeat in Vietnam, Ford had allowed his desire to re-assert U.S. military strength to cloud his decision making. But Ford and his supporters, including members of the Mayaguez crew, firmly maintained that military action had prompted the crew’s quick release, even if they were not technically rescued. JENNIFER L. ROGERS History ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED

SEE ALSO: USS Pueblo; Ford, Gerald R.; Vietnam War.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Christopher dent’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence dency from Washington to Bush Christopher Lamb, Belief Systems

Andrew, For the Presiand the American Presi(HarperCollins, 1995); and Decision Making in

the Mayaguez Crisis (University of Florida Press, 1989); Ralph Wetterhahn, The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam War (Carroll and Graf, 2001).

Stalin, Josef JOSEF STALIN became the leader of the totalitarian Soviet government at a time when both national and world events provided fertile ground for his attempt to attain world power, not only through murder and treachery, but also through sabotage, espionage, lies, threats, and persuasion. Throughout his political life, Stalin used the Soviet intelligence services to achieve his own purposes. Yet, he never felt any personal loyalty to the agents who served him. Because his rise to power was accompanied by distrust and disloyalty, he expected the same of everyone else. He prized ruthlessness in himself and others, but he was always suspicious that it would be turned on him. This distrust brought about the deaths of many who were the most loyal to him. After the Russian Revolution, the communists replaced the Bolshevik provisional government in November 1917, and the Russian congress named Vladimir Lenin the chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars. Lenin’s repressive regime set the stage for Stalin’s succession to Soviet political leadership in 1925. Stalin had accepted a minor role as commissar of nationalities in 1918, and used that role to pave the way to a far more political position in 1922 as the general secretary of the Communist Party. As general secretary, Stalin gained access to all the party’s records and files and possessed the authority to appoint individuals to various positions within the party. Stalin, of course, appointed only his supporters, weeding out individuals who supported his opponents, particularly the supporters of military leader Leon Trotsky (1879-1940), who many saw as the likeliest successor to Lenin. Trotsky later escaped the country and was murdered by a Soviet agent in Mexico. Stalin created his own secret police, which was involved in general intelligence, special assignments, and other covert acts ordered by Stalin. On his orders, this group placed special telephones in other party offices, allowing Stalin to listen to confiden-

tial conversations. The agents were instructed to kill the individual who installed the secret lines. By 1927, Stalin had become the acknowledged leader of the Soviet Union. In 1928, Stalin set out to revolutionize the entire social and economic system of the Soviet Union. He sent agents into the countryside to stir up hatred for the richer peasants (kulaks) whom he saw as enemies, and to promote the idea of collectivism. The result was chaos. Some entire families committed suicide rather than give into the doctrine of collectivism. To spite Stalin, the peasants destroyed their own animals and refused to plant new crops. The result was predictable, and famine followed in the early 1930s. Stalin tried to hide the fact that over five million Soviets starved to death. Stalin’s use of his secret police was similar to Adolf Hitler’s (1889-1945) use of SS agents. The Russian secret police had begun in 1917 as the Cheka, an acronym for the Russian words for the Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage. In 1934, on Stalin’s orders, it became the NK VD (Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del) and assisted Stalin in his practice of arbitrary arrests and executions without trials. New laws were established that provided for the death penalty for children as young as 12. In 1936, when Stalin began to get rid of his political enemies in phony “show trials,” NK VD agents gathered “‘evidence” and carried out sentences. Defendants were always found guilty, and most were executed by Stalin’s agents. The NK VD was also responsible for overseeing labor camps, border and internal troops, and the Soviet militia. A special group of NK VD officials was given the power to hand down sentences that exiled Soviets or placed them in labor camps or in prison for up to five years. Stalin also purged his own military because he lived in fear of a coup attempt and reportedly never trusted a single branch of the military. A group of 20 experienced security and terrorist experts within NKVD made up the GUGB, the Chief Administer of State Security, which carried out the sentences of

high-ranking military officers who had been convicted of being German spies. Before Stalin’s purges were over, he had been responsible for the deaths of at least 50,000 Soviets, including communist officials, university professors, writers, artists, and other intellectuals. Generals and admirals were

killed, along with four-fifths of the higher officers corps. Even NKVD agents were not exempt. About 30,00 NK VD agents who had carried out the purges

were executed for sabotage. The 20 elite members of GUGB were also exterminated. During Stalin’s purges, at least 39 million Soviet citizens were sentenced to prison, where many of them died. Stalin declared an end to the purges in

1939 because he had other things on his mind,

namely the coming of World War II. The Soviets signed a Non-Aggression Pact with Germany in August 1939; and in the early days of World War II, the NKVD worked with the German Gestapo to terrorize citizens in occupied countries. By 1941, Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, so ending the supposed non-aggression pact. Part of Stalin’s problem, as he faced the new crisis with Germany, was that he had purged a large number of experienced Soviet military intelligence officers. The purges had understandably awakened feelings of fear and suspicion within Stalin’s intelligence community. Since all intelligence reports were shown to Stalin, agents were afraid to take initiative in decisions because they never knew when they might become victims of the next purge. The result was a tendency for Stalin to rely on intelligence data without accompanying analysis and predictions. At times, Stalin personally composed the messages sent to his intelligence agents. One agent, who went by the name of Litseist and who reported directly to Stalin, became a double-agent, giving the Nazis access to a plethora of Soviet secrets. Examination of World War II records later revealed that the Gestapo had provided Litseist with disinformation and fabrications to intentionally mislead Stalin. Scholars also concluded that intelligence agents gave Stalin accurate information, but his distrust often led to incorrect decisions based on the evidence. Throughout World War II, Stalin placed intelligence agents in other countries, regardless of whether those countries were supposed to be friends or enemies. A number of high-profile cases in both Great Britain and the United States revealed amazing successes. During the last days of World War II, President Harry Truman remarked to Stalin that the United States was in the process of testing an atomic bomb. Stalin was afraid that the bomb would give the United States unchecked power, and this kind of power was likely to thwart his plans for Soviet-dominated world communism. Stalin had already placed communist infiltrators in the United States, so he used agents to infiltrate the Manhattan Project, giving the Soviet Union the technical

Josef Stalin was notorious for how he used Soviet intelligence services to control the country’s population.

knowledge that allowed the country to develop its own atomic bomb. It is well known that Stalin took personal charge of planning many intelligence actions, especially those involving murder in other countries. Some individuals chose to become agents for the Soviet Union for ideological reasons. Many, however, were threatened or bribed into service. Stalin insisted that agents be paid because he believed it gave him greater control over their actions and loyalties. ELIZABETH PURDY, PH.D.

INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

SEE ALSO: Soviet Union; World War II; Cold War; Los Alamos; KGB.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Louis Allen, et al., Political Scandals and Causes Celebres Since 1945: An International Compendium (St. James, 1991); Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives (Knopf, 1992); Colin Campbell, Stalin: Soviet Leader, USSR, 1924-1957 (Macmillan, 1987); Helen Dmietriew, Surviving the Storms: Memory of Stalin’s Tyranny (California University Press, 1992); Gabriel Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stain and the German Invasion (Yale University Press, 1991); Eugene Lyons, The Red Decade (Bobbs Merrill, 1941); Michael Reiman, The Birth of Stalinism: The USSR on the Eve of the Second Revolution (Indiana University Press, 1987); Nikolai Tolstoy, Stalin’s Secret War (Pan Books, 1982).

Stephenson, William OFTEN REGARDED as the one of the most important figures of World War I], Sir William Stephenson was responsible for the development of intelligence operations in the Western Hemisphere for the British government. Not wanting to have attention called to him, he went by the codename INTREPID in his correspondence with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Stephenson was born in Manitoba, Canada, and served as a private with the Royal Canadian Engineers in World War I, earning a field commission in 1915. Exposed to mustard gas and declared unfit for service in the trenches, Stephenson joined the Royal Flying Corps and quickly rose to the level of flying ace with 12 enemy kills. He was captured and briefly served as a prisoner of war until he escaped and served out the remainder of his term as a senior test pilot in France. After World War I, Stephenson attended Oxford University and taught at the University of Manitoba. Stephenson became a millionaire by the age of 30 after having entered the emerging radio industry and purchased control of the General Radio Company. Through his diversified business interests, Stephenson learned of Germany’s expenditures in munitions and communications, including the ENIGMA code machines, which he passed along to Churchill. From businessman son was appointed ordination (BSC) Based in New York

to spymaster. In 1940, Stephendirector of British Security Coin the Western Hemisphere. City, Stephenson worked along-

side Major General William Donovan, head of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS, predecessor of the CIA), in cryptology, spy training, and coordinating efforts between the United States and Great Britain. Stephenson set up a training facility on the shores of Lake Ontario on an isolated 275-acre farm known as Special Training School 103 or Camp X. Opened on December 6, 1941, Camp X became the primary cryptology and espionage training facility for the Allies and collaborated on the ULTRA project to break the German ENIGMA code. Moreover, Camp X is credited with establishing the framework later applied to the creation of the CIA. Donovan is quoted as saying that the “British taught us everything we know about intelligence.” Shortly before the end of World War II, Stephenson was knighted by King George VI and later awarded the Presidential Medal of Merit by President Harry Truman. Stephenson founded the World Commerce Corporation, which focused on economic redevelopment, and consulted for British and American intelligence services during his semi-retirement in Jamaica. Stephenson died a Canadian hero at the age of 93 in January 1989. OJAN ARYANFARD UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, ENGLAND

SEE ALSO: ENIGMA; World War II; cryptography; Office of Strategic Services; Donovan, William J. BIBLIOGRAPHY. “The History of Camp X,” www.campxhistoricalsociety.ca; “Who’s Who of U.S. Army Military Intelligence,’ U.S. Army Intelligence Center, usaic.hua.army.mil; Colin J. Briggs, “Sir William Samuel Stephenson: Inventor, Innovator, Industrialist, INTRE-

PID,” Inaugural Meeting of the Intrepid Society, www.patriotforce.com (June 5, 1995); William Macdonald, The True INTREPID: Sir William Stephenson and the Unknown Agents (Timberholme Books, 1998); William Stevenson, A Man Called INTREPID (Ballantine, 1979).

Straight, Michael W. MICHAEL STRAIGHT belonged to a wealthy Anglo-American family. His brother flew for the Royal Air Force during World War II and became a British subject. His mother was the widow of an

American investment banker, and Straight resided

in Britain from the age of 10. He entered Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1934 after a year at the London School of Economics. Straight soon met Anthony Blunt and joined a secret society called the Apostles. He also joined a student communist cell in Cambridge, meeting other members of the Cambridge Five spy ring. Straight was recruited by Blunt for the Soviet Union’s COMINTERN (the Soviet organization promoting international communism) in February 1937, while he was mourning the death of poet John Cornford, a communist friend who had gone to fight on the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War. Blunt first suggested to Straight (codenamed NIGEL) that he honor his lost friend by working for

the COMINTERN and by returning to the United States after his Cambridge studies to become a banker. Later, that idea was withdrawn and Straight was told to await contact in the United States. Straight believed that Blunt was acting on the instructions from Guy Burgess, another Apostle who became a spy for the Soviet Union. Straight went to the United States and used family connections with President Franklin Roosevelt to become a volunteer worker in the State Department in 1938 and later in the Interior Department, where he wrote speeches for Roosevelt and cabinet members. He met a Soviet intelligence officer (Iskhak Akhmerov), the leading NK VD (Soviet intelligence) agent operating in the United States at that time. Akhmerov identified himself as Michael Green. Akhmerov wanted Straight to become a Soviet agent within the U.S. State Department but Straight had no desire to so. He later maintained that he gave the Soviets nothing except reports of his own opinion. Straight went on to become an influential liberal voice in the United States as editor of the New Republic, a magazine founded by his par-

warded to British counterintelligence officers. Straight was shocked in 1951 to encounter Burgess at the British embassy and warned him to leave the Foreign Ministry or face denunciation. Burgess warned Donald Maclean, another Cambridge spy, that Straight was unreliable and British counterintelligence probably was closing in on the ring. Nonetheless, Straight’s threats apparently were not the basis for the collapse of the Cambridge Five (Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, Donald Maclean, and John Cairncross). Straight was in line to become chairman of the Advisory Council on the Arts, a new federal agency being created by President John FE Kennedy. Concerned that a security check by the FBI might expose his communist past, he went to Arthur Schlesinger, a distinguished historian and adviser to the president. Schlesinger arranged an FBI interview for Straight, and he finally told the FBI about Blunt. Burgess was already identified as a spy. The FBI passed the information on to the British Security Service, MI-5 D1, that dealt with Soviet espionage in Britain. D1 already had been attempting to elicit a confession from Blunt, who was art adviser to Queen Elizabeth. Straight’s information confirmed D1 suspicions, and Blunt subsequently confessed. GAIL H. NELSON, PH.D. ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO: Akhmerov, Iskhak; Philby, Kim; Burgess, Guy; Blunt, Anthony; Maclean, Donald D.; Cairncross, John; MI-5; United Kingdom.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story (HarperCollins, 1990); Christopher Andrew and Vasily Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield (Basic Books, 1999).

ents. He wrote three novels and other books, and he

served as deputy chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts during 1969-77. Straight wrote in his memoirs, After Long Silence (1983), that he and his wife were living in Washington, D.C., in 1940 when Burgess visited them. Straight later informed his wife that Burgess and Blunt were Soviet agents. She informed her analyst, Dr. Jennie Welderhall, the wife of a British embassy official. Welderhall informed her husband. It is unclear whether the information was for-

submarines SUBMARINES ARE a 20th-century weapon. The Turtle of the American Revolution and the Hunley of the Confederate Navy were brilliant and valiant failures. The dreams and schemes of earlier centuries to attack beneath the waves were harbingers of the 20th century’s capital ships, but no more. Indeed, even the submarines of the two world wars

were actually surface ships capable of diving when necessary, usually for escape after attack. The true submarine that makes its home beneath the sea’s surface is actually a post-World War II phenomenon. A submarine’s principle means of defense is stealth. As effectual weapons, submarines came to the fore in World War I, when Britain came dangerously close to halting hostilities due to German Uboats severing the island-nation’s lifeline. In World War II, German U-boats created a second front in the Atlantic. Winston Churchill wrote that German submarines were the only threat that truly frightened him throughout the war. Germany’s war against allied shipping became the longest and most. crucial battle in naval history. The Allies did not achieve the upper hand until the spring of 1943. In the Pacific, American submariners overcame early equipment and command problems to inflict significant damage upon Japan. Submariners constituted less than two percent of the U.S. Navy’s personnel strength, but accounted for 55 percent of Japan’s shipping losses. One of the reasons for this disparity was the use of intelligence to hunt down submarines in the Atlantic and to target the Japanese fleet with them in the Pacific. In the Atlantic, the tremendous efforts at collating intelligence by the British Admiralty’s Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC) in Whitehall and the U.S. Navy’s OP-20-G intelligence watch in Washington, D.C., saved merchant ships and established the location of U-boats. In this effort, the

most important means of intelligence was ULTRA, the interception and breaking of German codes transmitted using ENIGMA machines. ULTRA remained completely classified until 1974, when the work of the codebreakers in London’s Bletchley Park was first unveiled. In the Pacific, U.S. Navy and U.S, Coast Guard codebreakers and analysts in Hawaii intercepted and broke both Japanese naval and merchant marine shipping message traffic. This enabled effective attacks by U.S. submarines on Japanese maritime assets. Intelligence gathering was a decidedly secondary role for submarines in World War II. However, both the United States and Germany employed submarines for the landing and evacuation of agents. U-boats landed spies and saboteurs on the Maine and Long Island coasts, though the efforts of the FBI and the Coast Guard stopped short what

was one of the less-professional Axis the Pacific, U.S. submarines were transfer Coast Watchers in the South During the Cold War, submarines

endeavors. In employed to Pacific. assumed new

roles in both nuclear deterrence and intelligence collection. The advent of nuclear submarines in the 1950s greatly increased the speed, endurance, and weapons payloads of submarines. Submarines could transit beneath the polar ice cap, remain submerged while circumnavigating the globe, and go deeper than their predecessors could have hoped. Both the United States and the Soviet Union (and to a lesser extent Great Britain, China, and France) deployed sea-based submarines as ballistic missile platforms around the world. Finding these sea bases, and executing other undersea espionage missions, became a critical and still little-known aspect of the Cold War. The Eastern and Western powers both did a remarkably good job at keeping submarine operations a secret, belying the widespread notion that maintenance of classified information was impossible in a democracy. Much of the undersea efforts still remains outside the public domain. However, over the years certain items did become known. The Soviets suffered a high number of disasters at sea, not all of which could be kept secret. The United States experienced several also. Similarly, there were occasional incidents of a trawler picking up an undersea cable allegedly used for listening to submarine movements from shore-side stations. There were also occasions of grounding, including a Soviet Whisky class submarine inside Swedish territorial waters, and a similar incident of a U.S. submarine on the shores of the Soviet Union, though that ship managed egress prior to official discovery. There were also collisions, often with considerable damage and loss of life. The U.S. public was most prominently informed about possible submarine operations by the novels of Tom Clancy. Whatever the few technical inaccuracies in his works, it was quite clear by the tight-lipped and uncomfortable reaction of some official sources that Clancy was uncomfortably close to the truth. With the demise of the Soviet Union, investigative reporters became more ageres-

sive and the U.S. Navy a bit more forthcoming in what had transpired. United States and British attack submarines had been remarkably successful in detecting and tracking Soviet counterparts, usually without hav-

submari nes _62 1 conferred only for direct combat. Certain submarine officers also received the Distinguished Service Medal. One commanding officer was personally received by President Ronald Reagan at the White House, where he was described by the commanderin-chief as a modern-day John Wayne. However, as with the Presidential Unit Citations, the explanations remain classified. Perhaps surprisingly, a plurality of submarines has been located by that most basic of sensors, the human eye. There has been only one verified, successful attack on another ship by a submarine since World War II. In the spring of 1982, when Argentine reclaimed by force the Falklands/Malvinas Islands in the South Atlantic, to which both Great Britain and Argentina lay claim, the British dispatched a task force of surface ships and submarines.

The crew of a U.S. Seawolf-class submarine move “top-side” after a three-day submerged sea trial.

ing been detected themselves. Indeed, the Allies had demonstrated near incredible technical competence and old-fashioned derring-do in tracking the potential enemy. Similarly, when national security directives demanded, reconnaissance was carried out throughout the world, wherever water was deep enough. Photographs taken from submarines were sometimes remarkable for both proximity to the object and for what may have appeared in the background. Submarines were also listening posts, at times tapping into telephone cables and recording conversations, as with Operation IVY BELLS. In the United States, a good number of submarines received Presidential Unit Citations, the na-

tion’s

highest

unit

decoration

and

normally

The first maritime casualty of the conflict was the Argentine cruiser Belgrano, sunk by the nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror. The British employed a World War Il-vintage torpedo in their modern, fast-attack sub. Subsequently, HMS Conqueror escaped a desperate hunt and depth-charge response by Argentine destroyers. For their own part, the Argentines deployed three diesel-powered submarines, very quiet vessels though having none of the impressive endurance and speed of nuclear submarines. The Argentine Navy accomplished no successful attacks on British ships, but it caused a tremendous diversion of energy and expenditure of weapons by the Royal Navy. This again demonstrates both the fear with which submarines are regarded and the difficulty in locating them at sea. During the 100-day Falklands/Malvinas conflict, British submarines also landed reconnaissance teams in a variety of places, reportedly including the Argentine mainland. For major naval powers (United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China) and for medium naval powers, such as the Netherlands, Japan, Italy, Spain, Chile, and others, submarines constitute both an awesome weapon and a unique concern. Great intelligence efforts are expended to discern both the capabilities and intentions of possible opponents. Similarly, the tool of choice to ascertain the submarine threat and other threats is often the submarine itself. RAYMOND J. BROWN ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO: Operation IVY BELLS; World War II; naval intelligence.

reconnaissance;

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Patrick Beesly, Very Special Intelligence (Doubleday, 1978); Clay Blair, Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2001); W. J. Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in World War II (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1979); WJ. Holmes, Undersea Victory (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1966); Donald McLachlan, Room 39 (Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1969); Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage (Public Affairs, 1998).

Sudan SINCE SUDAN gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1956, it has been embroiled in a civil war for all but 10 years (1972-82). Since 1983, the war and the resultant famine have led to more than two million deaths and over four million people displaced. The war pits the Arab Muslim majority in Khartoum against the non-Muslim African rebels in the south. Whereas the language of the north is Arabic and culture Islamic, southern Sudan is culturally animist and Christian. For the United States, Sudan represents a failure of intelligence. In early 1996, CIA Director John Deutch convinced Secretary of State Warren Christopher to pull U.S. diplomats out of Sudan

based on intelligence implicating the Sudanese government. Soon afterward, the CIA discovered that a key source had embellished information, and the agency had to scrap more than 100 of its reports on Sudan. For many years, Sudan has had ties with Islamic radicals, and the CIA considered Sudan to be second only to Iran as a staging ground for international terrorism. Sudan’s National Islamic Front, led by Sorbonne-educated Hassan Turabi, seized power in a 1989 coup. Turabi held annual conferences in Khartoum for Muslim radicals to articulate their political views. Osama bin Laden and his followers arrived in Sudan in 1991. The “Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abdel Rahman, an Egyptian later convicted of plotting to blow up the World Trade Center, received his U.S. visa from Khartoum in

1993.

By late 1995, however, many Sudanese leaders began to reconsider their embrace of foreign Muslim radicals. Sudan aided France in capturing the notorious terrorist known as “Carlos the Jackal,” and in February 1996, Sudan’s defense minister of state visited the United States and offered bin Laden’s extradition to Saudi Arabia in return for an easing of sanctions. The Saudis in Riyadh refused. After offering to hand bin Laden over to U.S. authorities, Sudan expelled him at U.S. urging. Although Sudan gave U.S. authorities permission to photograph two terror camps, Washington failed to follow up. In August, Turabi sent an “olive branch” letter to President Bill Clinton. There was no reply. In April 1997, Sudan dropped its demand that Washington lift sanctions in exchange for terrorism cooperation. Sudan’s president, in a letter delivered to U.S. authorities, offered FBI and CIA counterterrorism units unfettered and unconditional access to Khartoum’s intelligence. In 1998, Sudan repeated the unconditional offer to share terrorism data with the FBI only to meet with FBI rejection. The U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed six weeks later. MONTGOMERY MCFATE SAPONE

RAND CoRPORATION

SEE ALSO: Clinton, William J.; al-Qaeda; War on Terrorism; Saudi Arabia. BIBLIOGRAPHY. CIA World Factbook (2003); Mansoor Ijaz and Timothy Carney, “Intelligence Failure? Let’s Go Back to Sudan,” Washington Post (June 30, 2002); Lt. Col. Barnabas L. Wama, “Prolonged Wars: The War in Sudan,” (Research Department, U.S. Air Command and Staff College, March, 1997).

Sudoplatov, Pavel SOVIET intelligence (NK VD) Lieutenant General Pavel Sudoplatov was born 1907 in Melitopol, the Ukraine. He joined the Red Army in 1919 at the age of 12, and a year later he joined army intelligence. During the course of his life, which spanned most of the 20th century, Sudoplatov was responsible for kidnapping, assassination, sabotage, and, during World War II, guerrilla warfare.

Sudoplatov organized the murder of the Ukrainian nationalist leader Yeheven Konovalets in 1938 by booby-trapping a box of chocolates. By 1939, he had been promoted to the post of deputy chief of the intelligence services. In 1940, Sudoplatov coordinated the murder of Leon Trotsky in an operation codenamed UTKA (DUCK) in Mexico City by infiltrating NKVD agent Ramon Mercader into Trotsky’s home where the assassin killed the exiled communist by plunging an ice pick into his skull. In 1941, he was placed in charge of all subversive activities. Sudoplatov’s most important contribution to Soviet intelligence by far, however, was in his role as director of intelligence for the Special Committee on Atomic Energy. The “A” department, as it became known, was responsible not only for the development of a So-

viet atomic bomb, but also for carrying out atomic espionage in the United States. Whereas America’s Manhattan Project was run by Robert Oppenheimer, a pre-eminent physicist, the Soviet’s Special Committee on Atomic Energy, while staffed by noted Russian physicists, was run entirely by the NKVD under the direction of Lavrenty Beria, head of the NK VD. As Beria’s chief subordinate, Sudoplatov coordinated the Soviet atomic spy ring in America. Using members of the Manhattan Project such as Klaus Fuchs and Theodore Hall, enlisted man David Greenglass, and intermediaries Harry Gold and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Sudoplatov was able to gain detailed knowledge of the American atomic bomb project. This information was then passed on to the Russian scientists who used it to construct the first Soviet atomic weapon. Although Beria was in charge of the entire operation, the Russian scientists, in particular Igor Kurchatov, would often direct the intelligence operation with regard to the type of information that the scientists needed in support of their project. Following Stalin’s death in 1953, Beria was arrested by the party leadership and executed. Beof his close relationship with Beria, cause Sudoplatov was arrested and, although spared the death sentence, was imprisoned. After 15 years in Vladimir prison, he was released on August 21, 1968, the day after the Soviet invasion of Czecho-

slovakia. In 1994, Sudoplatov, with the help of his son Anatoly, published an autobiography, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness, A Soviet Spymaster. Sudoplatov detailed many of his activities

while serving the NK VD. The autobiography drew much criticism because of Sudoplatov’s accusations that noted Manhattan Project scientists Enrico Fermi, Neils Bohr, and Robert Oppenheimer were part of the Soviet atomic spy ring. Sudoplatov died in 1997. GEORGE REKLAITIS, PH.D. NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Fuchs, Klaus; Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel; Los Alamos; Beria, Lavrenty; Oppenheimer, J. Robert; KGB. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Allen Weinstein, The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America (Modern Library, 2000); Christopher Andrew and Vasily Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West (Penguin, 2000); Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoly Sudoplatoy, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness, A Soviet Spymaster (Little, Brown, and Company, 1994).

Sun Tzu THE ANCIENT Chinese writer of the Ping Fa, or The Art of War, Sun Tzu was born Sun Wu, the son of Chen Wuyu, a high official in the Chinese kingdom of Qi. In about 513 or 514 B.C.E., having gained his military training, Sun Wu, now known as Sun Tzu (“Master Sun’), went to the kingdom of Wu to seek his fortune. It was the time of the Warring States in China and professional soldiers always found their services at a premium. In Wu, Sun Tzu seems to have rapidly become not only a general, but the minister of war to King Helu. Within six years, Sun Tzu enabled King Helu to crush Wu’s hereditary rival, the kingdom of Chu. Because of his battlefield prowess, Sun Tzu’s espionage writings dealing with warfare gained the greatest currency. From what we can infer from his writings, Sun’s ministry of war in the kingdom of Wu had a strong military intelligence command. Some scholars believe Sun personally handled several agents and missions. Today, in light of the Robert Hanssen spy case (Soviet mole) in the FBI, and the danger of sleeper cells from the al-Qaeda terror network in the United States, what Sun wrote in the 5th century

B.C.E. remains just as vital. The Chinese term that Sun uses, yinjian, meaning “agents in place,” has taken on more sinister meanings in the United States in recent years. A yinjian can be a mole, a hostile agent who has penetrated deeply into the intelligence services of a country and feeds back to his employers highly sensitive information. The term yinjian can also mean a “sleeper agent.” Sleepers, who may sometimes be in a country for over a decade, wait for the word to come from their chiefs overseas to strike terror into their enemy. Meanwhile, they have identities, families, and friends within the society they seek to destroy. Above all, Sun placed maximum emphasis for the need for absolute secrecy to ensure the success: of any intelligence operation. In Chapter 13 of The Art of War, he stated this brutally: “before an agent’s activity is under way, if it is leaked, none of those agents nor those informed may live.” In all translations of The Art of War, the 13th chapter on espionage seldom takes up more than eight pages, including commentaries by later Chinese scholars and contemporary footnotes. But, from the use of moles in intelligence to the need for complete secrecy, there are few better guides written for the success of an intelligence mission than Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.

manders. Surveillance and countersurveillance are essential and vital elements of most intelligence operations. Surveillance establishes a means of watching or listening others without being detected; antisurveillance establishes a means of avoiding surveillance; and countersurveillance establishes a means of avoiding other security breaches and deceiving an ongoing surveillance operation. Most surveillance has physical and electronic aspects, and is preceded by active reconnaissance, and not infrequently, by a surreptitious entry to plant a monitoring device. Other surveillance systems are mostly passive, such as those used to monitor specific conditions from space. Successful application of the principles and techniques of surveillance usually requires a combination of human talent and technological innovation. Specialized equipment and devices, that are often miniaturized or concealable, are frequently used in those aspects of intelligence work involving monitoring devices such as taps or bugs. The capability of surveillance is part of the capability of power. With that capability comes responsibility, which is why surveillance is often legally regulated. There is a history, in the United States at least, of an ambiguity about surveillance

JOHN FE. MURPHY, JR.

pose has always been more regulated since it is concerned with producing evidence admissible in court. However, as Elizabeth Bazan (2003) documents, the national security or intelligence purpose seems to be moving in the direction of greater regulation given the impacts of FISA (the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) and FOIA (the Freedom of Information Act). Technology transfer and the internet has also put what was once expensive technology available only to authorized personnel and detectives into the hands of ordinary citizens and skilled hobbyists. The issues of free speech, search, surveillance, and and privacy have taken on wider implications in an era of “sleeper cells” of terrorists able to wreak havoc on society. There are many different types of surveillance. Julie Peterson and Saba Zamir (2000) list 17 types: audio, infra/ultra-ssound, sonar, radio, radar, infrared, visual, aerial, ultraviolent, x-ray, chemical and biological, biometrics, animals, genetic, magnetic, cryptologic, and computers. A shorter list would include four general types of surveillance: vi-

AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: China; Hanssen, Robert P.; al-Qaeda; War on Terrorism; ancient intelligence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. John FE. Murphy, Jr., “Sun Tzu,” Command Magazine (September 1992); J. H. Huang, translator, Sun Tzu, The Art Of War: The New Translation (Quill, 1993); Samuel Griffith, translator, Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Oxford University Press, 1971).

surveillance FOR INTELLIGENCE and counterintelligence purposes, surveillance is the clandestine collection and analysis of information. The knowledge acquired can be about persons or organizations and is communicated in a timely manner to those who need to know, from presidents to battlefield com-

for intelligence purposes or for investigative purposes. The law enforcement or investigative pur-

sual, audio, moving, and contact. An even shorter

list is the distinction frequently made between fixed

(stationary, stakeout, or plant) and mobile (moving, tail, or shadow) surveillance. Both of the short lists emphasize the importance of physical surveillance as the basis for theoretical principles and foundations of most techniques.

Axioms of surveillance. The theoretical principles of surveillance include the following basic axioms. One, whenever possible, target information should be individualized. Targets can be individuals in groups, but identities of associates are important to establish. Two, unexpected behavior on the part of the target should be expected. Uncertainty is avoided by having contingency plans in place for a variety of scenarios. Three, surveillance should be

clandestine or discreet. Knowledge of a surveillance operation in progress should be kept secret, but sometimes it is useful to notify local authorities so that suspicious person reports are avoided. Discreet means that every effort is made to ensure both that operators and the operation blend in with the surrounding environment. Plausible cover stories usually accompany surveillance operations. Four, surveillance is a systematic, team effort. Some experts argue that it takes the resources of 12 operators and six vehicles to put one ordinary individual under physical surveillance. Each member of the team must know his or her job and what the rest of the team is responsible for. Team members should be in constant communication with each other or a base, and briefings and debriefings ought

to accompany every surveillance operation. Five, surveillance must be eternally vigilant of countersurveillance. Countersurveillance is usually present whenever a target seems to have employed other individuals to monitor or mislead the opposing surveillance. Targets with extensive state-sponsored resources usually are capable of such countersurveillance. Six, surveillance is not a fishing expedition. It is seeking specific information about specific activities of specific individuals. Seven, personnel who analyze surveillance information should be different personnel from those who collect surveillance information.

Visual surveillance. The techniques of surveillance depend upon the type of surveillance being used. Visual surveillance almost always makes use of photography or videography. Special cameras are used that

allow good depth of field and are capable of zooming in on a target. Auto-focusing, auto-exposure single lens reflex (SLR) cameras tend to be standard, along with a variety of filters and lenses and a tripod. If the surveillance is stationary or fixed, there is little need for a concealable camera. In fact, a device similar to a robot camera may be used, enabling successive pictures at predetermined intervals, or a video system may be installed using an array of long-playing tapes. Digital photography or digital videography depends upon the need for computer enhancement and/or quality of printout. Infrared, ultraviolet, and x-ray photography are generally used in adverse weather conditions or when one is attempting to determine the composition of organic, inorganic, or crystalline substances. Satellite photography may be used for these purposes, but portable infrared devices have long existed that can be calibrated to see through walls, and detect body heat. The U.S. Supreme Court in Kyllo v. United States, cut down the use of warrantless in-

frared thermography by law enforcement when private residences are involved. The human element comes into play in determining optimal camera location. A fixed observation post in an adjacent or nearby building is preferred because the cover story can involve all the rights and privileges of a building tenant, such as watching out a window at all hours. If the visual surveillance is mobile or moving, then cameras must be concealable and blend in with the operator as effectively as the operator blends in with the environment. Subminiature cameras have been used in intelligence work since the Minox was first made in 1938. Ideally suited for document photography, the Minox and its many variations have become the model for matchbox, wristwatch, necktie, glove, briefcase, and waistbelt cameras. An even smaller, lightweight camera, the F21, has been sold commercially since 1990 along with a variety of pinhole cameras (referring to the pinhole size of the lens aperture).

A moving surveillance is difficult to maintain optically, and is usually supplemented by a close-tail technique. The idea is to keep at least one member of the surveillance team in a close contact position, and leapfrog, or rotate different members of the team into this position. A prearranged set of signals between team members indicates when rotation takes place or if the target has made the tail. A loose tail, as opposed to a close tail, is used only if the target knows he or she is under constant surveillance.

Likewise, a one-person tail, called a shadow, is rarely used because of the ease of detection. Moving surveillance can be on foot, by vehicle, from the air, or any combination of these. Radio communication is essential for coordination purposes. When vehicles are used, the perimeter box technique is often applied, where one car follows the subject, another leads, and another two maintain positions on parallel routes. Human ingenuity comes into play with the make and model of vehicles used. Vans and large vehicles are generally reserved for fixed stakeouts because they can be equipped with lavatories. Written notes and logs are the most frequent information product of moving surveillance. A variation of moving surveillance involves the’ use of electronic bugs. These devices are either affixed to the target or to the target’s vehicle, in which case, they are known as bumper beepers. The location of the target is then traced by monitoring radio transmissions. The U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Knotts upheld the use of scientifically enhanced bumper beepers, or transponder devices. Global positioning systems help pinpoint the exact places frequented by a target. Bugs that serve as microphones and transmit conversations can be used when the need is for audio surveillance.

Eavesdropping. Audio surveillance involves listening-in on other people’s conversations through electronic means. Such eavesdropping has been termed a “dirty business” by the U.S. Supreme Court as far back as Olmstead v. United States. The Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of that decision is known as the “place-based” right to privacy. Under Olmstead, warrantless electronic surveillance could easily be launched by any government official over the phone lines or any other open space that is not a private place in a household. Later, however, the case of Katz v. United States established what is known as the “person-based” right to privacy. Under Katz, a warrant would be required for electronic surveillance even in open spaces as long as the target was making a reasonable effort not to be overheard. Within months of Katz, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 was passed, legislating that authorities apply for a Title III warrant, called an eavesdropping order or ex parte order, issued by a federal judge, and that the standard would be “probable cause.” Title III did not adequately cover national security electronic

surveillance, however. That was addressed in the

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which set up a special review court in Washington, D.C., and made the standard a “proportionality test” (the benefits of surveillance outweigh the harms). Current judicial doctrine also stresses the “exhaustion test” (standard investigatory methods

have been exhausted, failed, are reasonably likely to fail, or are too dangerous to try). Audio surveillance is also regulated by legislation. In 1986, the U.S. Congress passed the Electronics Communications Privacy Act, which provides both civil and criminal penalties for violating Title III provisions. Subsequent legislation dealt. with telephone intercepts and computer privacy, culminating in appropriation requests to Congress

for the FBI’s 1999 plan to install a Clipper Chip on all computers and the Department of Homeland Security’s 2002 plan to implement Total Information Awareness by scanning all networked comput-

ers. The FBI managed to get approval in 2000 for CARNIVORE, which consists of boxes temporarily attached to the servers of recalcitrant internet service providers (ISPs) that capture the header information from e-mail addresses of interest. Great Britain’s Regulatory Investigative Powers (RIP) bill allows similar machines to be permanently affixed to ISP servers. That nation has also relied heavily upon fixed video-surveillance by planting closed circuit television cameras (CCTV) at places appropriate for monitoring populations of interest. Facial recognition systems are often used in conjunction with this type of surveillance. Roving wiretaps, which follow the person and not their equipment, and is an important consideration in the age of disposable cell phones and e-mail addresses, and have been used since 1998. Wiretaps are regulated, but the two basic varieties that do not normally need as much probable cause for legal use are a pen register, which records every outgoing call, and a trap-and-trace, which records every incoming eall. Bugging. When places or people are wired for sound, this is called bugging, and it is an entirely different subtype of audio surveillance than telephone taps, pen registers, and trap-and-traces. The U.S. Supreme Court in Dalia v. United States found nothing inherently illegal in bugging a premises as long as both the surveillance and surreptitious

surveillance _

An Australian warrant officer tracks a ship using a long-range electro-optical video sensor onboard an Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Test Bed (ISRTB) aircraft.

entry were judicially approved. Miniaturized bugging equipment has been part of the gadget arsenal of intelligence work for years. Embassies, for example, are constantly finding new and improved bugs that defeat anti-bugging devices. Such devices produce a weak signal, or do not even produce any signal (no batteries and no electrical circuits). A radio beam, instead, is aimed at the device, and the intercepted conversation is decoded from vibrations. The technique is similar to laser or particle beam devices that pick up vibrations on glass. New advances in covert bugging technology have evolved even more sophisticated devices, and the trend has been to enable audio surveillance from greater distances, whereas once it had to be accomplished by entry or through pinholes in walls or ceilings.

Another type of audio surveillance is consensual, sometimes called penetrative surveillance. This involves the use of informants or an undercover agent provocateur, generally an infiltrator or accomplice-witness who has agreed to be wired in exchange for an immunity deal or a witness protection plan. Use of informants and undercover operations is especially dangerous and has its own theoretical principles, but the main concern for the surveillance operator is avoiding entrapment, or inducing an individual to commit a crime which he or she would not normally contemplate. Of the vast amount of legal precedent in this area, one of the most interesting cases is Hoffa v. United States, which took up the issue of whether law enforcement agents must identify themselves in undercover

operations as intelligence operatives are often required to do when recruiting informants. Settled law on the matter requires that police admonish their informants to act naturally and try not to draw out any particular incriminating statements that would constitute the functional equivalent of an interrogation. Consensual surveillance takes a great deal of skill. Since one or more of the parties have consented, this type of surveillance requires no judicial authorization. It is the same as if one of the parties of a telephone conversation consented to a recording. A final type of surveillance, separate from the visual, moving, and audio types, is contact surveillance. The target is painted or stained with a tracer preparation that gives off a fluorescent glow when viewed through an ultraviolet device. Tracer preparations are weatherproof, cannot wash off, and are easily transferred to any persons or objects the target comes in contact with. The technique is similar to many anti-shoplifting and anti-counterfeiting schemes. It is used alone when visual, moving, and audio surveillance is not possible. The same methods used to acquire the target with a tracer in the first place are the same methods used in planting a miniature audio surveillance device on the target’s clothing or body. In summary, the purposes and rules for domestic surveillance may differ from the purposes and rules for foreign surveillance, but the theoretical principles and techniques are the same. In the United States, surveillance for intelligence (prevention) purposes is regulated almost as much as surveillance for investigation (prosecution) purposes. The rules are somewhat looser when the target is a foreign citizen in U.S. territory or is suspected of being under the influence of a foreign entity. Some nations, even Western democracies such as Great Britain and Germany, extend a great deal of discretion to their intelligence services in monitoring their own citizens, but the United States has followed a different path. FISA, mentioned previously, authorizes surveillance of U.S. citizens only if the activities drawing suspicion are not activities nor-

mally protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. FISA is the main exception to the rule that surveillance for intelligence purposes should be regulated in the same way as surveillance for law enforcement purposes. In existence since 1978, FISA provides for the clandestine surveillance of citizens and authorizes

intercepts, taps, bugs, and since 1994, physical searches. An executive branch agency must initiate the process of requesting such action. A district court (in the Washington, D.C., area) then holds a closed session to decide if the government should have the authority to conduct such surveillance. This closed session is referred to as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, or FISC. The executive branch submits its case to FISC whenever national security demands domestic surveillance. On average, there are about 600—1,000 warrants approved every year, and its scorecard since 1979 includes at least 13,000 warrants approved and one denied. FISA warrants can be issued on the basis of. far less evidence than traditional criminal warrants. In 2001, the United States passed tough, new antiterrorism laws that essentially made the standard any significant intelligence purpose. FISC sessions are held in an electronically secure room on a restricted floor of the Justice Department building on Constitution Avenue in Washington, D.C. The court’s members, appointed to seven-year terms by the chief justice of the Supreme Court, are federal judges who work most of the time in their home state on criminal and civil cases. They come to Washington to sit in FISA court in two-week rotations, working alone to review warrant requests. If approved, time-limited warrants are issued for up to 120 days, with extensions permitted for up to a year. This is a significantly longer period than the typical 30-day limitation on wiretaps issued to local law enforcement under Title III. Oversight also regulates surveillance activities to some degree. Each executive agency has its own inspector general office, the U.S. Congress has the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and agencies considered part of the intelligence community have the National Security Council (NSC) and two other boards, the PFIAB (President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board) and PIOB (President’s Intelligence Oversight Board), that exercise oversight functions. The NSC conducts by considering different points of view and the validity of intelligence from different sources. PFIAB and PIOB regularly conduct audits of IC policies and procedures in matters dealing with surveillance. : THOMAS R. O’CONNOR, PH.D.

NORTH CAROLINA WESLEYAN COLLEGE

SEE ALSO: reconnaissance; Congressional oversight; Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, President’s; collection. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Acm IV Security Services, Secrets of

Surveillance (Paladin Press, 1993); Acm IV Security Services, Surveillance Countermeasures (Paladin Press, 1994); Elizabeth Bazan, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Nova Science Publishers, 2003); Frank Donner, The Age of Surveillance (Knopf, 1980); Philip Heymann, Terrorism and America (MIT Press, 1998); Julie Peterson and Saba Zamir, Understanding Surveillance Technologies (CRC Press, 2000); Raymond Siljander and Darin Fredrickson, Fundamentals of Physical Surveillance (Charles C. Thomas, 2003); Paul Weston and Charles Lushbaugh, Criminal Investigation (Prentice Hall, 2003).

Switzerland THE STRATEGIC Intelligence Service (SIS) acts as Switzerland’s national foreign intelligence agency. In close cooperation with other federal offices, the SIS gathers information relative to the security of Switzerland for the political and military leadership, analyzes this information, and disseminates its findings. It deals with political, military, and technological and economic developments abroad. The Federal Office of Police (FOP) is Switzerland’s domestic security and counterintelligence agency. The FOP works with its international and cantonal (county) partners as a center for information, coordination, and analysis on issues of Swiss internal security. Its activities include the protection of people and sites considered to be at risk. The FOP is also tasked with criminal prosecution in connection with the fight against organized crime. Besides coordinating investigative procedures, the FOP conducts its own investigations into drug trafficking, including financing and counterfeiting. It also manages the Money Laundering Reporting Office of Switzerland (MROS). The MROS requires financial institutions to report any activity that may constitute money laun-

dering. The office gathers and analyzes the data and forwards the information to the appropriate cantonal authorities once there is reasonable suspicion. The office also represents Switzerland on national and international committees.

The FOP is comprised of several other departments or sections that are tasked with specific responsibilities relative to internal security and counterintelligence operations. The Service for Analysis and Prevention (SAP) carries out preventive national security tasks. It is also the analysis and situation-monitoring body of the Swiss Confederation in the area of internal security. The SAP works closely with the cantonal and federal criminal police as well as with other specialized Swiss agencies and offices abroad. Preventive national security involves the early recognition of risks relating to terrorism, violent extremism, illegal intelligence activities, illegal traffic in weapons, and illegal dealings with radioactive materials and sensitive technology. On the basis of its findings, measures are taken to prevent or prosecute such activities. The Federal Criminal Police (FCP) makes preliminary investigations and carries out criminal police proceedings in those areas in which the Swiss Confederation has jurisdiction. The FCP functions as the judicial police of the Swiss attorney general. It also coordinates inter-cantonal and international investigations and is responsible for the exchange of police information with Interpol. The Organized Crime Investigation Division (OC) is involved in the fight against organized crime internationally and on the inter-cantonal level. Such crimes include the participation in a criminal organization, the support of such an organization, and crimes that are committed as a result of such participation or support. The OC is primarily interested in the international trade in illegal drugs and trafficking of people. The Division for Investigations focuses on national security/special affairs under the direction of the attorney general’s office and investigates suspected crimes related to national security, including crimes against the state. The division conducts investigations within the context of international judicial assistance activities that go to the office of the attorney general of Switzerland, or come directly from the federal Office of Justice. The Coordination Division functions as a center for the exchange of information with Interpol offices outside the country. The division consists of four coordination units: Western Europe, Africa, the Near East; Eastern Europe, Russia, the Far East; North, Central, and South America, the Caribbean; and liaison officers. The Department for Special Po-

lice units conducts targeted operations and investigations against wanted individuals. The Federal Security Service (FSS) is responsible for supervising safety measures needed to ensure the security of foreign visitors, such as dignitaries and heads of state who are entitled to protection under international law during visits to Switzerland. The FSS also is responsible for the security of the federal councilors, the chancellor of the Swiss Confederation, and accredited diplomats. In addition, the Security Organization Section is tasked with the responsibility of guarding federal buildings in the Swiss capital and with controlling access thereto, including measures intended to deny unauthorized persons access to specific facilities, the guarding of buildings at night, and security measures when the Federal Assembly meets in the House of Parliament. JOHN FE. STAMPELI, PH.D. INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

SEE ALSO: World War II; Germany. BIBLIOGRAPHY. CIA World Factbook (2003); Swiss Federal Office of Police, www.swisspolice.ch; “Switzerland: Intelligence Agencies,” Intelligence Resource Program, Federation of American Scientists (FAS).

Syria and Lebanon SINCE SYRIA has predominant influence (some would argue complete control) over Lebanon today, the two countries are examined together in the intelligence and security fields. Although Lebanon has its own “independent” intelligence and security services, Syrian intelligence is ubiquitous throughout Lebanon. In common with most Arab countries, Syria has multiple intelligence and security services, with frequently overlapping roles and missions. This multiplicity serves to provide checks and balances, ensuring that no agency or service leader gets powerful enough to challenge the regime. It also givesthe various services the ability to watch each other for signs of potential disloyalty. Some background in Syrian political history is necessary to understand the dynamics of its intelli-

gence system. Hafiz al-Assad, a former air force of-

ficer, ruled Syria from 1970 to his death in 2000. His ascent to power was marked by a mastery of conspiratorial politics. A member of the minority Alawi sect of Islam, Assad ruled in a very personal manner, and he retained virtually all significant power in his own hands. One of his major competitors for control of Syria turned out to be his brother Rifaat. Assumed to be loyal due to his family ties, Rifaat was put in command of the elite Defense Companies, which were the main prop of the Assad regime due to their intense loyalty. Rifaat, however, was exiled by his brother after attempting a grab for power in 1984 (though nominally retaining the position of vice president until 1998). Assad suffered from a series of serious health problems for anumber of years. Clearly feeling his own mortality, he began grooming his son Basil to succeed him. Basil was assigned to a series of positions in which he could begin gaining understanding of, and control over the Syrian security apparatus. Unfortunately for Assad senior’s plans, however, Basil was killed in a car crash in 1994. Obviously unwilling to cede the mantle of the presidency to his brother Rifaat, Hafiz brought another son, Bashar, from London, where he was studying ophthalmology, to begin his political apprenticeship. Bashar was rushed through Syria’s military academy that same year, then appointed as a major in the Presidential Guards two months later, and promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1999. After his father’s death in 2000, Bashar assumed the Syrian presidency. It is far from clear that Bashar has, or will have, the same level of personal loyalty from the intelligence and security agencies as his father. Even with personnel shifts, transfers, and firings within these services (which Bashar began in early 2003), it likely will take time for Bashar to feel comfortable with the reliability and trustworthiness of his intelligence and security agencies. Given the country’s proneness to coups before Hafiz Assad’s rise to power, the prospects of having the security props of the regime less than completely loyal would make any president nervous. Also, even though Bashar’s uncle Rifaat has been in exile for many years, his previous strong connection with the

security apparatus makes him a potential stability risk, There are four major intelligence services in Syria. At least under Hafiz Assad, each reported di-

rectly to the president, and, in fact, some divisions within each service would report to the president

without reporting to the service chief. The first is the Political Security Directorate, responsible for monitoring organized political activity that may be anti-regime. It conducts internal surveillance of both Syrians and resident foreigners, together with monitoring all Syrian media. The General Security Directorate is a civilian intelligence agency. It has three divisions, including an internal security division for domestic surveillance, an external division for foreign intelligence, and a Palestine division that focuses on Palestinian groups in both Syria and Lebanon. The general security director, appointed in 1999, is Major General Ali Houri, a member of a Shia offshoot sect, an Ismaili. Prior to his appointment, the post had always been held by Sunni Muslims. The deputy chief is a leader of one of the more powerful Alawi clans, and the head of internal security is a key advisor and supporter of Bashar Assad. The Military Intelligence Service has the normal military intelligence functions but also provides support to various foreign opposition groups, mon-

itors political dissidents in exile abroad, and coordinates military activities in Lebanon. For well over 20 years, the chief of military intelligence was General Ali Douba, who held the post long enough that he had a somewhat independent power base. He also has two sons, allegedly with political aspirations including possibly the presidency. After Bashar took power, Douba retired, apparently at Bashar’s insistence. Douba was replaced by GeneralHassan Khalil. The deputy chief of the Military Intelligence Service, a brother-in-law of Bashar, is believed to wield the most power in the service. The fourth major intelligence agency is the Air Force Intelligence Service. The name is somewhat of a misnomer, since many of its most critical missions have had nothing to do with the Syrian Air Force. Hafiz Assad, who had commanded the Syrian Air Force, stocked the senior positions in Air Force intelligence with his most trusted allies. The commander of the service during Assad’s reign, Major General Muhammed al-Khouli, in fact, worked in an office adjacent to Assad’s in the presidential palace. Air Force intelligence has been entrusted with Syria’s most sensitive intelligence and covert operations. It has led many of the major governmental operations against domestic armed opposition groups. It also has been implicated as

the coordinator and supplier for several interna-

tional terrorist attacks. The most powerful intelligence service in Lebanon is Syrian military intelligence. The head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon, General Ghazi Kanaan, is reputed to have final authority over all major political and security decisions made by the Lebanese government. The head of the Lebanese General Security Directorate normally reports directly to Kanaan rather than his ostensible government superiors.

Syrian military intelligence officers in Lebanon are renowned for their involvement in criminal actiyities, including well-organized smuggling and the drug trade. Largely because of the prospects for personal enrichment, assignments to Lebanon are prized among Syrian intelligence officers. The Syrian government occasionally conducts anti-corruption drives against the officers involved, but this has seemed to be more theater than a sincere effort to end the activities. Although the Syrians dominate the Lebanese intelligence system, Lebanon also has its own security apparatus. The principal intelligence agency is the already mentioned General Security Directorate, concerned primarily with internal security. It is also in charge of media censorship regarding national security issues. The state security apparatus also focuses on hostile groups, with the Internal Security Forces’ mission revolving around law enforcement and searches. LAWRENCE E. CLINE, PH.D.

AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Israel; Palestinian Authority. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Middle East Intelligence Bulletin (January—February, July 2000); U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Lebanon (1999); Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (University of California Press, 1988); “Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Asad Regime,” Middle East Watch (1991).

Szabo, Violette VIOLETTE REINE Elizabeth Bushell Szabo was born in June 1921 in Paris, France. She served as an

British Special Operations Executive (SOE) agent during World War II, passing intelligence to the French Resistance, and she was the first woman to be awarded the British George Cross in 1946. From a young age, Szabo accumulated skills that would serve her, and eventually the Allied cause, well during her short life. Her French mother ensured that Szabo grew fluent in her native tongue and, according to family folklore, Szabo’s English father used to place apples on her head and then shoot them off with his pistol. This legend demonstrates the nerves of steel that saw Szabo through her missions and eerily foreshadows her death at the hands of the Nazis. Szabo was determined to do her part for the’ British war effort and worked as a member of the Land Army in 1940. That summer, during an excursion to Hyde Park with a friend, she met Etienne Szabo, a French Foreign Legion soldier. The two were married two weeks later. Etienne was forced to be away from Szabo for long periods of time, and during one of his absences in 1941, Szabo joined the Auxiliary Territorial Service. Six months after the birth of their daughter Tania in 1942, Szabo learned that her husband had been killed in the campaign at E] Alamein. The distraught Szabo now had an added ingredient mixed with her patriotic feelings: revenge. Shortly after her husband’s death, she was recruited by the SOE (which was attracted by her fluency in French and knowledge of the country’s geography) to help the French resistance. Eagerly accepting the offer, Szabo attended SOE’s training schools, where she became a skilled markswoman and learned to parachute. Her first mission required that she parachute into occupied France and confirm intelligence about the status of Resistance members. This required that she travel to Rouen, a city occupied by Germans. She completed her mission successfully and was smuggled out of the country in a small airplane. Having participated in the war effort in such

a direct way, Szabo was determined to return to France and further the Allied cause, which she did the night following the D-Day Normandy invasion of France. Parachuting in near Limoges, Szabo’s sought to alert Resistance groups on the path of Das Reich, the Germans’ SS Panzer division, so that they might block its advance. While traveling with the leader of a local resistance group, Szabo and her companion were discovered by a German patrol. After spraining her ankle while they attempted to escape, Szabo insisted that the man go on without her. She killed eight German soldiers, laying cover fire so that he could escape. Szabo was captured and eventually taken to Gestapo. headquarters in Paris where she was tortured for information. She refused to betray her cause and was transferred to Ravensbruck concentration camp. When the Nazis learned that the Allies had reached Germany, orders came from Berlin, and Szabo, along with two other female SOE agents, was executed with a single shot to the back of the head. After her death, Brigadier R. J. Minney wrote a book about Szabo, Carve Her Name with Pride, that was later made into a movie of the same title. In 2001, the Violette Szabo Museum was established at Cartref, a tiny cottage in the village of Wormelow in Heredfordshire, England, once owned by her aunt and uncle, where Szabo spent many happy summers as a child. KIMBERLEY R. BARKER GEORGIA COLLEGE & STATE UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: World War II; women; France.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. R. J. Minney, Carve Her Name With Pride (1956); S. Ottaway, Violette Szabo (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2002); Peter Millar, “Violette, Woman at the Heart of the Legend,” Sunday Times (January 23, 2000); Marcus Binney, “A Name to Recall with Pride,” The Times (August 9, 2000).

Taiwan INHABITED ORIGINALLY by indigenous peoples similar to those in Indonesia and the Philippines, Taiwan became increasingly populated by migrants from southern China in the 1600s and was eventually incorporated into the Chinese empire in 1683. Japan seized the island after militarily defeating China in 1894-95. After Japan’s World War II defeat, the Allies returned Taiwan to China under Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT). Taiwanese protests against KMT rule, beginning February 28, 1947, led to the massacre of some 18,000 in the ensuing weeks. After the Nationalists’ 1949 defeat by the Chinese communists, they fled to Taiwan with nearly two million military personnel, bureaucrats, and refugees, taking land and property from roughly six million native Taiwanese. U.S. Cold War policy was focused on maintaining containment, or attempting a rollback, of communist advances. U.S. assistance to the KMT and resettlement of Chiang’s armies to Taiwan (an island off the southeast coast of the Chinese mainland), was facilitated by rollback enthusiasts, notably General Claire Chennault, head of Civil Air Transport (CAT), who from 1943 on had commanded all Chinese air operations against Japan. The CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), under Frank Wisner, took over CAT

in the late 1940s. Another powerful rollback enthusiast, former Office of Strategic Services (OSS) chief William Donovan, provided military aid to the KMT in Taiwan through a subsidiary of his World Commerce Corporation, a veritable Who’s Who of Anglo-American intelligence. Battles between containment and rollback policy proponents raged inside the United States, as the China lobby, composed of Nationalists and U.S. supporters, gained great influence with the ““Who Lost China?” debates of the McCarthy era, especially after China entered the Korean war. The United States helped build Taiwan’s national security and intelligence apparatus. Desmond Fitzgerald headed the OPC/CIA’s Far East Division, based in Taiwan during the 1950s, while Ray Cline served as the CIA’s Taiwan station chief before becoming the CIA’s deputy director for intelligence. In 1954, Taiwanese and South Korean intelligence created the Asian and then World Anti-Communist League (WACL), with U.S. encouragement, linking anti-ccommunist regimes across the globe. With Taiwan as the Republic of China (ROC) and the mainland as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) each maintaining a one-China policy, tensions in the Taiwan Straits periodically erupted into military confrontation, as in 1954-55 and 1958. U.S. assistance to the KMT, which schemed to retake the mainland, and the buildup of thousands of U.S. military and intelligence operatives on Taiwan, sparked growing conflict. ClA-supported KMT

633

raids, airspace intrusions, guerrillas attacks, and psychological warfare operations were conducted

against China, including from Taiwan’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. U.S. plans for defense of the islands, in the face of PRC shelling, assumed the use of nuclear weapons against China, with U.S. nuclear threats helping prompt the PRC’s own nuclear program. Taiwan became an important base for U.S. operations in Asia, serving as an electronic listening post and providing Nationalist forces for covert operations against North Vietnam, including Oplan 34A leading up to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which was central in the U.S. escalation of the Vietnam War.

While the origins of many KMT intelligence organizations went back to their days on the mainland, their movement to Taiwan led to the creation

of the most powerful agency, the National Security Bureau (NSB, or Guo An Ju), in 1955. The KMT, with U.S. assistance, created approximately 10 individual security-intelligence agencies, including the Taiwan Garrison Command, overseeing martial law for the NSB; the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB), reputedly the most brutal; and the General Political Warfare Department (GP WD) in the Ministry of National Defense. In 1967, Taiwan created a National Security Council (NSC) which acquired control over the National Defense Council and NSB. KMT intelligence reached into the Chinese diaspora, even in the United States where they cooperated with U.S. intelligence, at least until the October 1984 assassination of Taiwan dissident and U.S. citizen Henry Liu. During this same period, WACL supported the Ronald Reagan administration’s global proxy wars, with Taiwan’s Political Warfare Academy training Central American military elites involved in death squads. After Congressional passage of the Boland Amendment, cutting off U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan Contras (anti-government guerrillas), WACL head, retired Army General John Singlaub, after discussions with Reagan’s NSC aide, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, secured Taiwan’s support for the Contras. Yet US. intelligence also acted against Taiwan. Colonel Chang Hsien-yi, recruited as a military cadet to spy for the CIA in the 1960s, became deputy director of Taiwan’s nuclear research institute. In 1987, when Taiwan was on the cusp of build-

ing a nuclear weapon that could have triggered war, Chang defected to the United States with secret documents and evidence that the United States used to force Taiwan to stop its program. In 1987, KMT martial law ended, under pressure from the democracy movement headed largely by native Taiwanese seeking independence and self-rule, as the United States moved to recognize the PRC. Though its leadership was jailed in 1979, by 1986 the democracy movement gave birth to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), whose candidate Chen Shui-bian was elected president in 2000. Chen agreed not to declare independence if the PRC refrained from thé military action it threatens to take to prevent Taiwan’s formal separation. Under President George W. Bush, U.S.-Taiwan military and intelligence relations grew increasingly close in the early 2000s as tensions between the PRC and the United States escalated and de-escalated periodically. THOMAS EHRLICH REIFER, PH.D.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE SEE ALSO: China; Wisner, Frank; United States.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Volume II (Princeton University Press, 1990); Robert D’A. Henderson, ‘Transforming KMT Intelligence on Taiwan,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (v.15/2, 2002); David E. Kaplan, Fires of the Dragon: Politics, Murder and the Kuomintang (Atheneum, 1992); Appu K. Soman, Double Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The United States and China, 1950-1958 (Praeger, 2000); Tim Weiner, “How a Spy Left Taiwan in the Cold: An Unsung American Agent Defused a Nuclear Weapons Threat,” The New York Times (December 20, 1997).

Tallmadge, Benjamin A DRAGOON OFFICER and intelligence officer in the American Revolutionary War, Benjamin Tallmadge was born in 1754 in Setauket, New York. Tutored by his father, a Congregational minister, he entered Yale University and graduated in 1773. Like his close friend and classmate Nathan Hale, Tall madge became a schoolteacher after graduation,

teaching at the same

Wethersfield,

Connecticut,

school. Tallmadge enlisted in Colonel John Chester’s Connecticut Regiment as a lieutenant and adjutant on June 20, 1776. While in the Connecticut Regiment, Tallmadge participated in the battles of Long Island (August 27, 1776) and White Plains (October 28, 1776). Tallmadge received a promotion to major, but transferred as a captain to the 2nd Continental Light Dragoons regiment and received a second promotion to major in April 1777. While assigned to the 2nd Continental Light Dragoons under Colonel Elisha Sheldon, Tallmadge participated in the battles of Brandywine, Germantown, and Monmouth and the raid on Fort St. George, Long Island, New York (November 21-23, 1780). Congress promoted Tallmadge to lieutenant colonel in September 1783. Tallmadge was a talented and dedicated dragoon officer, embodying all the traits George Washington looked for in his officers. In November 1778, Washington asked Tallmadge to organize an intelligence service within British-occupied New York City. This service, known as the Culper Spy Ring, provided accurate and frequent intelligence to Washington regarding the disposition and activity of British troops in and around New York City for the remainder of the war. Tallmadge managed the service so well, moreover, that none of the agents were ever convicted of espionage by the British. Tallmadge was also involved in the capture of John André, who served as British General Sir Henry Clinton’s intelligence officer and supervised Benedict Arnold’s treason. Acting on information he had earlier received from Arnold, Tallmadge prevented the return of André to Arnold, after André was captured with the plans for West Point hidden in his boot sock on his way back to New York City. André was remanded into Tallmadge’s custody until the day of his execution. Tallmadge expressed true sympathy for André and was profoundly moved by André’s professional behavior at his hanging. Tallmadge continued to serve in the dragoons and to manage the Culper Ring for the duration of the Revolution. After the war, Tallmadge operated a dry-goods store, B. Tallmadge and Company, speculated in land in Ohio, and served as a congressman for Connecticut from 1801 to 1817. Tallmadge’s management of the Culper Ring provided timely and accurate intelligence to Washington and set a

high standard for future covert intelligence operations. Today, U.S. Army interrogators and counterintelligence agents train in Tallmadge Hall, a classroom complex located on Fort Huachuca, Arizona, home of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. KEVIN SCOT GOULD AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Culper Spy Ring; American Revolution; Arnold, Benedict; Washington, George. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Benjamin Tallmadge, Memoir of Colonel Benjamin Tallmadge (Times Books, 1968); Charles S. Hall, Benjamin Tallmadge: Revolutionary Soldier and Businessman (Columbia University Press, 1943); John Bakeless, Turncoats, Traitors, and Heroes: Espionage in the American Revolution (J.P. Lippincott, 1959); Edmund R. Thompson, ed., Secret New England: Spies of the American Revolution (Provincial Press, 1991).

technology IN FOCUSING the broad aspects of technology, this article is concerned with the practical effects of hard technological innovation, such as devices or gadgets, on organizations and occupations dealing with intelligence and counterintelligence. At the organizational level, there are three ways an espionage organization is affected by technology: integration, diffusion, and technology transfer. Technology integration involves a cultivation of interest in the manufacture and use of technology, leading to organizational progress and efficiency. Technology diffusion involves the spread of technology through an organization, balancing costs and benefits and how intelligence work is restructured. Technology transfer involves the spread of technology between organizations; some technologies, and not others, find their way into usage among all practitioners. Behind all three levels of innovation is the march of progress as significant moments in intelligence history are marked by technological progress.

Early intelligence technology. Technology has affected

almost

every

aspect

of the intelligence

process. Pictorial guides to the history of intelligence and supporting technology have been assembled by authors David Owen and H. Keith Melton. Both of their works contain illustrations of the devices used since the 15th century when polyalphabetic ciphers were first invented. Codes and cipher machines or devices would probably qualify as the intelligence field’s first technology. Innovation with weaponry also characterized the intelligence field’s early history. Although gunpowder existed years before, the invention of cannon in the 14th century led to development of hand-held guns in the 17th century and 20th century innovation with concealed, disguised, silent, and special-purpose firearms. Specialized knives, daggers, crossbows, darts, and instruments of lethality have also been developed in support of covert intelligence operations. A smaller number of unique mining, bombing, and explosive devices

have found their way into sabotage work. The development of photography in the 1820s played an important role in revolutionizing the collection or gathering of intelligence. Microphotography, for example, which involves tiny photographs of messages, or microdots, became a part of intelligence work as early as the 1860s. Miniaturized cameras were available by the 1930s and along with advances in binoculars and optics throughout the 20th century, techniques of visual surveillance and countersurveillance were steadily improved. Lockpicking came into popularity during the mid-19th century, enabling progress in surreptitious entry. Likewise, the inventions of telephone in 1876 and radio transmission in 1901 revolutionized means of communication and facilitated advances in the areas of eavesdropping, wiretapping, audio surveillance, and counterintelligence. Television was invented in 1927, and further added to progress in

The rise of innovation and technology in the 20th century affected all forms of intelligence and counterintelligence, including surveillance, as shown above in an airport security monitoring control room.

the areas of propaganda, counterpropaganda, and video surveillance work

Airborne devices. A significant 20th-century invention was powered flight in 1903, which ushered in a new age of airborne intelligence. For at least 100 years before powered flight, and even after its invention, balloons were used for intelligence-gathering behind enemy lines. By 1942, a wide range of recon-

warfare and human physiology. One of its earliest tasks was determining if the Soviets had an atomic device. The Office of Naval Intelligence retained primacy in the area of earth sciences, and the U.S. Air Force, not the CIA, discovered Soviet atomic particles indicating bomb capability via a weather reconnaissance flight. The U.S. Army also resisted

naissance aircraft were pressed into action, culminating in the development of spy planes in the

1950s. The launching of satellites into space, starting in 1957 with the Soviet Sputnik program, involved significant advances in signals and imagery intelligence. Satellites designed to stay in Earth orbit fora specific payload purpose currently number approximately 2,800, according to the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, and represent at least a dozen nations, a couple of international consortia, and a handful of private companies. A late-20th-century invention, the computer, has permitted intelligence work to gather, process, and analyze large amounts of information. The first computer, the ENIAC, was put together in 1945, and there is some history involving intelligence applications with calculating machines predating the ENIAC. The internet, of course, changed the availability of information in 1973 when it was invented. Supercomputers, powerful microcomputers, digital enhancement, steganography, strong encryption, speech recognition, and data-mining represent some of the more modern technological developments in intelligence and counterintelli-

gence.

Intelligence services and technology. One of the most well-known intelligence organizations involved in technological innovation is the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T)). It, or some version of it, has been an integral part of that agency since the CIA was founded in 1947. The directorate’s early days dealt resistance from other government entities to the idea of centralizing scientific intelligence, yet the directorate has evolved to its current efforts at deploying information technology to ease the burden on intelligence analysts. In the first few years of the DS&T’s existence, it was tasked with appraising the extent of scientific developments in enemy countries. Intelligence deficiencies were apparent in such areas as biological

Twenty-first century technology has made the protection of classified data increasingly difficult to control.

giving up control to the CIA’s directorate of its expertise in weapons systems intelligence. In 1953, a special unit, the Technical Services Staff (TSS) within another CIA directorate, the Directorate of Plans (DDP), was tasked with creating devices and methods such as bugs, recorders, disguised weapons, forged documents, special cameras, poisons, and secret writing techniques. Oriented as it was to behavioral science, the TSS staff also experimented on humans and animals. TSS conducted a program known as MKULTRA in the late 1950s and early 1960s, which experimented with hallucinogenic drugs, mostly LSD, for the purpose of discovering ways to condition people to be immune from interrogation. MKULTRA > cartied out 182 subprojects, some of which implanted electrodes in the brains of several species of animals. ORD carried out projects to turn cats, birds, and insects into mobile bugging devices, and it also did some pioneering work on computer networking and digital enhancement. In 1973, the TSS was moved into DS&T and renamed the Office of Technical Services (OTS). The OTS task was to develop clandestine devices for concealment, recording, communication, surreptitious entry, destruction, and incapacitation. How-

ever, it also became involved in a program known as Operation STARGATE, which studied the use of so-called psychics or those claiming paranormal abilities to remotely scan and mentally retrieve secrets from enemy personnel.

Planes and satellites. In 1954, President Dwight Eisenhower authorized the building of spy planes for the CIA. In 1955, at a secret Nevada test site known as Area 51, the first spy plane was tested, a

Lockheed U-2. It was lightweight and could reach heights of 70,000 feet, far above any fighters and anti-aircraft missiles at the time. Flying out from overseas bases, American U-2 spy planes established imagery of the locations and deployments of Soviet long-range bombers and ICBM sites. The cameras used were special, long-focus devices that enabled extremely detailed images of a swath of ground 125 miles wide directly below the aircraft. In 1960, another type of spy plane was born, the Oxcart A-12, which was used primarily for signals intelligence over China. Project OXCART marked the start of stealth technology, based on certain shapes and surface finishes that minimize radar reflection. U-2 planes

were used once again during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, but were mostly replaced afterward by the speedier Lockheed SR71 Blackbird. In time, a variety of aircraft were developed based on stealth technology, and also over time, spy planes gave way to satellites as the primary means of accomplishing global reconnaissance. CORONA was a 1959 CIA task to launch a photo reconnaissance satellite program. It took four tries, but by mid-year, the first type, called KEYHOLE-1 (KH-1), was successfully put into orbit. The KH-1 satellites used panoramic cameras that could take pictures of areas as wide as one million square miles. They delivered their information. via film-return capsules that were ejected and had to be plucked out of the sky by aircraft or recovered from the ocean. This process, known as “bucket dropping” was slow, as it took time to retrieve the ejected capsules. Improvements in resolution and film capacities of the KEYHOLE series coincided with development of the branch of intelligence work known as photo-interpretation, formalized by the 1960 creation of the National Photographic Interpretation Center that eventually became the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). The KH-1 series only had a resolution of about 40 feet, enough to barely make out golf balls on a green. The KH-2 series had a 25-foot resolution, enough to permit more detail but still requiring extensive interpretation. The KH-7 series, using lower orbits, enabled a resolution of 18 inches. By 1976, the KH-11 enabled

resolutions of 6 inches that could be further enhanced by computers since the imagery was sent via digital transmission. The KH-12 series consisted of low-altitude satellites that began in 1988 with radar and infrared night vision capabilities as well as the ability to spot fine detail. Other satellites, such as those associated with the RHYOLITE program in the mid-1970s, were designed primarily for electronic listening (ELINT), and eventually came under the jurisdiction of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), created in 1961 to coordinate the potential of reconnaissance and listening satellites. The National Security Agency (NSA), established in 1952, had control over all satellites that intercepted signals (SIGINT) and eventually took an interest in voice,,fax, and internet traffic (COMINT) by means of satellite and other intercepts. The NSA’s network of ground and

space listening stations is called ECHELON,

and

the computers associated with them search the traffic for pre-programmed lists of words and phrases. Numerous satellites exist today for many reasons, such as navigation, and many are linked or relayed together. Besides satellites, large-scale eavesdropping systems include ground and sea-based listening stations. In the early 1960s, ground stations started using the technology of over-the-horizon (OTH)

radar, that involved bouncing a signal off the ionosphere and onto a target. At about the same time, the potential for exploiting the moon-bounce phenomenon was explored by a number of agencies. Moon-bounee stations require rather large antennas and amplification of weak signals. Another technique was to drop spear-like devices on enemy ground that could be equipped with sensors of various sorts. Called “javelin tossing,” these devices as well as others of its kind could detect atomic testing as well as ultra-high VHF and UHF telemetry signals, indicating such things as velocity, acceleration, flight path, and configuration of an enemy’s air defense system. If the enemy was inactive, a “ferret mission” would send an object into enemy

space to trigger its defense systems,

or an

electronically generated false signal would trick enemies into seeing ghost aircraft.

Surveillance. Submarines and signals intelligence ships constitute most of the modern methods of accomplishing eavesdropping by stationing themselves close to coastlines. The U.S. Navy’s underwater Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), on the other hand, consists of permanently implanted sensor arrays on the ocean bottom. Surveillance cameras and listening devices have played a large part in intelligence work. Small, concealed cameras were plentiful, the most famous one being the Minox, first developed in Latvia in the late 1930s. As the 20th century progressed, miniature and subminiature cameras were placed in briefcases, purses, clothing, clocks, books, watches, ties, cigarette lighters, matchboxes, and eyeglasses. Varietions of the Minox camera had the advantage of attaching themselves to binoculars and other optical aids. Currently, the world’s smallest color pinhole surveillance camera, the PC-53XP, is less than three-quarters of an inch square. Listening devices are of two types, taps or bugs. A common tapping device is the induction telephone clamp, that makes no physical connection to

the phone, but to the wiring, and is difficult to detect. Bugs come in a variety of shapes and sizes, but generally consist of miniature microphones with or without their own amplifiers, transmitters, or recording devices. Modern bugs use a laser medium or preprogrammed schedules to digitally send intercepted communications. The human element of intelligence (HUMINT) has had a number of devices and gadgets created to support clandestine operators in the field. The intelligence agencies of Soviet bloc countries excelled at assassination devices, such as umbrellas, canes, pens, or jewelry tipped with ricin poison. Other devices shot small pellets impregnated with ricin poison into a target at ranges up to six feet. One

Soviet invention disguised as a cigarette pack could release poisonous hydrocyanic acid gas into the face of a victim. Poisons were one of the means used between 1960 and 1965 in the CIA attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro of Cuba. Western intelligence services tended, however, to use pipe, glove, or pen pistols instead of relying upon poisons.

Personal technology. Numerous modifications of sniper rifles and subcompact handguns have been made by intelligence agencies. Suppressed or silenced weapons did not really come into use until World War II, and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor to the CIA, was widely acclaimed for its accurate and silent Hi-Standard pistol. Silenced Berettas were adopted by some agencies, such as the Israeli Mossad, and most Eastern European intelligence services adopted widely available suppressed Czech semi-automatics. Clandestine operators always need concealments and communications for storing and sending

information as well as receiving orders from their handlers. Almost every object imaginable has been used in intelligence work to conceal messages, from toiletry items to articles of clothing, most commonly shoes, to artificial eyeballs. Hollowed out secret compartments were made in ornaments and chess pieces, and many were booby-trapped to destroy their contents if opened improperly.

Codes. It is perhaps in the field of cryptology that technology has had its greatest impact. For intelligence purposes, the principles of codemaking are not necessarily focused on concealing the message, but disguising the meaning. Steganography, for example, which simply hides a secret message inside a

larger message, is not technically considered a part of cryptology. Cryptography depends on the use of a cipher, which is different from code, despite common usages of codemaker and codebreaker (which technically would be ciphermaker and cipherbreaker). Ciphers substitute letters for letters, and codes substitute words for words. There are two general approaches to creating ciphers, transposition and substitution. Transposition is the rearrangement of letters side-by-side, as in Pig Latin or a crossword anagram. Substitution is the pairing of letters at random. There are many different varieties of transpositions and substitutions. The two approaches can even be combined, mixing symbols in with letters. Any actual method used or developed is called an algorithm, and any plaintext alphabet dictionary for it is called a key. To decrypt ciphers, both algorithm (method) and key (dictionary) are needed. There are two kinds of cryptosystems: symmetric and asymmetric. Symmetric systems use the same key (a secret key) to encrypt and decrypt a message. Asymmetric systems use one key (a public key) to encrypt a message and a different key (a private key) to decrypt it. Asymmetric systems are the basis of most modern computer cryptosystems, at least those which have been diffused among the public. The traditional way of cracking most ciphers is by a technique known as frequency analysis, which consists of looking at the most frequently used letter or symbol and matching it with the most frequently used letters in the spoken alphabet, then guessing the rest. This only works for mono-alphabetic ciphers, however. With poly-alphabetic ciphers, which are used more frequently «in intelligence work, the idea is to create many different, successive mono-alphabetic substitutions, and switch from Cipher A to Cipher B to Cipher C and so on as the message is read. Handheld cipher devices containing inner and outer dials allow the operator to switch from Cipher A to Cipher B and then Cipher F in response to a codeword such as ABF. Systems combining codewords or cipher pads with cipher disks are called nomenclature systems. A basic cipher disk, or scrambler system, consists of a metallic dial with letters on the outside rim and letters on the inside rim. These dials can be overlapped back-to-back, and constructed so that electrical wiring creates the key, with current passing through six, seven, or however many dials are desired. The most famous of these systems was the

German ENIGMA machine. Another commonly used method in intelligence work is known as the one-time pad cipher. This nomenclator technique uses a random series of code letters instead of code

words. Once the message had been successfully sent and received, both parties-destroyed the sheet that acted as the key, and then used the next random series of letters on the next pad of paper. Theoretically, as a one pad cipher is never repeated, it is unbreakable. However, if an enemy were to obtain the pads, messages might be compromised. Computers and information technology have greatly enhanced the effectiveness of intelligence work. In cryptology, for example, one of the first. computer ciphers was called LUCIFER. It was based on a mangling function, that divided each possible scramble into left and right, then re-labeled the original right as left. Sender and receiver only had to agree on one number as the key. The NSA intervened in the transfer of this technology by attempting to limit the number of possible keys in a single number system. The result was a 56-bit (100,000,000,000,000,000 possible keys) solution, which became known as the DES (Data Encryption Standard) standard, and is the current business standard for e-commerce and secure web pages. DES, however, was a symmetric system because one key was used by both parties. A better system would involve what mathematicians call one-way functions—algebraic expressions that have one solution but never the same solution again. The common hash function, which is used with digital signatures and in the security of most Microsoft products, is an example of a one-way function. In 1978, a group of Massachusetts Institute of Technology researchers, using a computer to factor prime numbers, came up with a solution dubbed RSA, named after the initials of their last names (Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leo Adleman). The multiplication of prime numbers produces values so large that it takes computers a long time to factor them down by multiplying each descending number by the next one. With sufficiently large primes, it would take a supercomputer hundreds of years to compute the factorial, and there are no known mathematical shortcuts for factoring. The RSA scheme has been the de facto standard in intelligence work since the 1980s, and RSA-level security is generally considered as anything 128-bit or higher. In 1991, however, a Florida professor, Phil Zimmerman, started giving away a software program

called Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), that was based on

the RSA system, so the technology is out in the wild. Current research and development is centered on improvements in RSA cryptology as well as internet security and data mining software.

As the development of new technology races forward, it will continue to improve intelligence functions in reconnaissance, surveillance, covert op-

erations, and most other tasks. THOMAS R. O’CONNOR, PH.D. NORTH CAROLINA WESLEYAN COLLEGE

SEE ALSO: spy planes; cryptography; satellites; photography; communications; electronic intelligence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Keith H. Melton, The Ultimate Spy (Dorling Kindersley, 2002); John Minnery, CIA Catalog of Clandestine Weapons, Tools, and Gadgets (Barricade Books, 1992); David Owen, Hidden Secrets (Firefly Books, 2002); Julie Peterson and Saba Zamir, Understanding Surveillance Technologies (CRC Press, 2000); Jeffrey Richelson, Wizards of Langley (Westview Press, 2002); Simon Singh, The Codebook (Anchor Books, 2000).

Tenet, George AFTER SEVERAL YEARS of short-tenure directors, George Tenet brought a sense of leadership and stability to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Appointed as the fifth director of Central Intelligence (DCI) during the 1990s, Tenet assumed the office after the withdrawal of Anthony Lake, President Bill Clinton’s former national security adviser and nominee to succeed John Deutch, who faced fierce opposition in the Senate Intelligence Committee. George John Tenet was born on January 5, 1953, in Flushing, New York, the son of Greek immigrants. He grew up working in the family owned diner. Tenet graduated from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in 1976, and from Columbia University’s School of International Affairs in 1978. Although considered a Washington insider, Tenet climbed the government ladder outside the CIA, but earned a reputation as an expert on intelligence matters. He served under both Democrats and Republicans and in the legislative and

bis:

CIA Director George Tenet served under both a Democratic and a Republican administration, an unusua! record of service.

executive branches. Tenet worked as a legislative assistant and then legislative director for Senator John Heinz, 1982-85, before spending several years on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. First, as a staff member, 1985-88, Tenet oversaw arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, producing a Senate report entitled “The Ability of U.S. Intelligence to Monitor the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty.” Then, as staff director, 1988-93, Tenet was responsible for coordinating the committee’s legislative and oversight responsibilities, including an increase in covert action reporting requirements, creation of

a statutory inspector general at the CIA, and introduction of legislation to reorganize U.S. intelligence.

After Clinton’s election, Tenet served on the national security transition team and then took over as special assistant to the president and senior director

for intelligence programs on the National Security Council (NSC), 1993-95. Tenet coordinated presidential directives on intelligence priorities, security policy, counterintelligence effectiveness, and policy on remote-sensing space capabilities as well as interagency covert action.

Tenet finally moved his intelligence career to the CIA on July 3, 1995, when he succeeded William Studeman as deputy director. He served in that capacity until July 11, 1997, but also functioned as acting director from December 16, 1996, after Deutch’s de- | parture. When Lake withdrew his nomination, Clinton nominated Tenet on March 19, 1997. The Senate confirmed him on July 10, and he formally assumed office the following day. He was the second youngest nominee in CIA history, being only one week older than James Schlesinger who took office in January 1973. As DCI, Tenet appointed a mixture of Cold War espionage veterans and former White House and Congressional staffers to fill the leadership ranks of the CIA. He was the first DCI to announce publicly the intelligence community budget, of $26.6 billion in October 1997, and again in 1998 under intense Congressional pressure. Tenet continued to formulate the CIA’s post-Cold War role while dealing with the arrest and intelligence fallout of the Robert Hanssen case in 2001. In the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks and the Iraq War of 2003 when no active weapons of mass destruction were discovered despite prewar CIA reports suggesting otherwise, Tenet came

under intense scrutiny. In April 2004, Tenet testified that it would take “five years” for the United States to achieve the kind of intelligence service the country needed to effectively fight terrorism. In June 2004, Tenet announced he would resign the office of DCI effective July 11, 2004. LAURIE WEST VAN HOOK, J.D., PH.D. U.S, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SEE ALSO: Hanssen, Robert P.; Clinton, William J.; Bush, George W.; Central Intelligence Agency.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Center for the Study of Intelligence, “Directors and Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence” (Central Intelligence Agency, 1998); Central Intelligence

Agency, “George J. Tenet,” www.cia.gov; CNN All Politics, “George Tenet,” www.cnn.com; Rhodri JeffreysJones, Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence (Yale University Press, 2002).

terrorism ACCORDING

TO Field Manual 100-20, the U.S.

Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of—or threatened use of—force or vi-

olence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate

governments

or

societies,

often

to

achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.” As part of a further definition of terrorism, the intimidation the manual refers to is understood to be violence against innocent citizens. World history is replete with more instances of violence toward the innocent than could ever hope to be recorded. Terrorism in recent years has thrived as a weapon of the weak against opponents that are not confronted openly, and has also evolved as an essential prop of totalitarian regimes. Terrorism differs from war in that it exists outside the constraints of the laws of war. Throughout the 20th century, terrorism served as an essential weapon of those unwilling, or unable, to confront a stronger opponent on the battlefield. By a series of violent acts, terrorists hoped to destroy their opponent’s will to fight. For example, the al-Qaeda group seeks, among other things, to force America to abandon its interests in the Middle East by inflicting large casualties on the American people, and in that way to influence public opinion. Such attacks had borne fruit in the past: after Islamic fundamentalists bombed a U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, the United States withdrew from that country. The March 11, 2004 bombings by al Qaeda-related terrorists in Madrid, Spain, helped turn out of office a pro-American government. Politics and religion are major motivating factors for terrorists. Indeed, both intertwine and serve as the inspiration for terrorist movements, re-

moving any restraints terrorists might have when choosing their means or their victims. Throughout the 20th century, communist insurgents and subversives used terror to advance their cause around the world. Also during the 20th century, Islamic insur-

gent groups, unable to succeed against the power of Western nations or Israel, turned to terrorism.

The tools of terrorists. Terrorists have a vast array of methods at their disposal. Conventional terrorist techniques, such as bombings and shootings, remain staples of the terrorists’ arsenal. Firearms and explosives remain readily available throughout the world, and when combined with surprise and overwhelming force at the point of attack, they are still very potent. In addition, the vast amounts of chemicals available for sale in the civilian market may also be converted into instruments of death, such

as Timothy McVeigh’s use of a fertilizer to make a bomb which he used to destroy a federal building in Oklahoma Cit in 1995. New technologies are a threat as well. Nuclear terror may come in the form of nuclear weapons or radiological weapons. Both are destructive; both possess an ability to inflict fear, some experts suggest, in excess of their likely damage. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the loss of control of a nuclear weapon that could be sold on the black market remains a constant fear of intelligence agencies. The mere threat of terrorists releasing radioactive material in a large urban area possesses the potential to terrify large numbers of people. In addition, nuclear power plants are potential terrorist targets both for the damage inflicted in their destruction and the fear raised by the release of radioactive material. Chemical weapons also threaten populations as tools of terror. Cheaper and more easily made than nuclear weapons, chemical agents, such as VX nerve gas, possess terrifying lethality. Given their tendency to disperse in open air, chemical weapons are most lethal in closed areas, such as buildings or tunnels, where limited air circulation slows their con-

centrated dispersal. Chemical agents have actually been used in some terrorist instances, notably by a cult organization, Aum Shinrikyo, which attacked a Japanese subway system with sarin gas in 1995. Improved medical technology also allows terrorists, with the requisite skills, to develop biological weapons. These may include specially engineered germs with increased resistance to antibiotic treatment,

weaponized

germs,

or simply germs

culti-

vated for attack. One menacing example was the anthrax mailed to members of Congress and the media, following in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terror attack. The anthrax attacks highlight

how easily germ agents may be distributed, their lethality, and how terrorists may kill without leaving a calling card. A new reliance in America and throughout the world on the internet and computer technology leaves open the threat of cyberterrorism. These attacks may run the gamut from denial of service attacks to theft. By attacking computer networks, terrorists could potentially disrupt international commerce or create havoc through the destruction of records stored on computers, or take over networks to disseminate false information. Such attacks require only the necessary computer skills, a computer connected to the internet, and the will to use them. Ease of international travel offers terrorists both a highway and also a target. In particular, international air travel has proven a lucrative target, although terrorists have also attacked cruise ships, as in the 1985 attack on the Achille Lauro. In the 1970s, Palestinian terrorists regularly hijacked airplanes to draw attention to their causes. On September 11, 2001, terrorists inaugurated their own “precision revolution” by hijacking airplanes and flying them into American buildings, turning the planes into enormous cruise missiles in a new fusion of hijacking, terror bombing, and suicide attacks. Indeed, a devious mind, not limited by the restraints of morality but propelled by religious fanaticism, may devise all manner of ways to murder innocent and unsuspecting civilians.

Ruling by terror. Entire nations have also ruled through terror, or “remade” their populations by employing large-scale violence. France exploited this development during its Revolution, as many were fed to the guillotine in wave after wave of revolutionary bloodlust. During the 20th century, the Soviet Union ruled through fear, waging brutal campaigns of repression against their own people. Tyrannies structured their entire societies around fear. During his long reign, Soviet Premier Josef Stalin consistently used violence, and the threat of violence, to eliminate his enemies and to cow dissi-

dence within the Soviet Union. During the history of the Soviet state, millions of people were murdered, or sent off to the gulags to be used as slave labor, or killed through famines. Other totalitarian regimes such as communist China and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq substituted fear for legitimacy. The intelligence services of such

regimes also help to foment terrorism around the globe; the Soviet Union’s KGB terrorized its own citizens, and also participated in terrorism and assassinations around the globe.

Terrorism against rule. In the second half of the 20th century, Islamic terrorism began to emerge as a growing threat to the West. Both religious zealotry and a desire to destroy the state of Israel animated these terror groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), sought to remove Israel from the Middle East and replace it with a Palestinian state. Toward that aim, the PLO launched numerous terror attacks on Israel, including one of its most infamous

acts, the Munich Olympics massacre of 1972. The PLO, despite its support for murder, gained international attention and helped to kindle world interest in the plight of Palestinians, many living in refugee camps since Israel’s establishment the late 1940s. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, acts of terrorism increased in frequency and intensity. Several factors contributed to that rise. Most notably, the decay and collapse of the European colonial system, in the years following World War II, unleashed a bewildering array of previously suppressed religious and ethnic tensions around the globe. Terror served as a means to drive the Europeans away, and to defeat ideological, religious, and ethnic opponents. Force multiplier. Terrorism serves as a force multiplier (tactics that exponentially increase the effectiveness of a small force) for weak states, particularly those unburdened by moral restraints. As one example of force muliplication, consider how a very small force of 19 men with limited resources and funding managed to create abject terror around the world on the morning of September 11, 2001. In less widespread instances, terrorism as a force multiplier is employed on the local level. During the 2003 Iraq War, Iraqi forces turned to terror tactics to harass American supply lines and to instill fear in American troops. Unable to win on the battlefield, Iraqi and foreign Islamic-fundamentalist fighters turned to daily “harassment” strikes in an attempt to undermine the U.S. military’ willingness to fight.

Intelligence and terrorism. It is the job of the intelligence services of the free world to anticipate and pre-

vent terrorist attacks and to crush terrorist networks. Those tasks prove exceptionally difficult, considering the diverse array of thugs interested in terrorism. Terror networks are often highly compartmentalized; various cells are not in contact with each other. Dispersed terrorists need only unite briefly, bringing overwhelming force and surprise to the point of attack. When confronting such an elusive foe, intelligence agencies seek to deny terrorists their sanctuaries, their financial support, to kill or capture individual terrorists, and to step inside the decision cycle of terror networks to disrupt future attacks. Cultural boundaries often make such intelligence work very difficult. The United States faces an array of internal and external terrorist threats, each driven by its own ideology, possessed of unique cultural and operational nuances. Twentyfirst century Americans may need a great deal of education and experience before most can understand the mentality of terrorists. After the 9/11 attacks, many Americans asked, “Why would terrorists commit such horrific acts?” But within the Middle East, regardless of whether countries or citizens approved or were horrified by the attacks, few needed to ask why they happened. Even countries faced with less daunting cultural boundaries still have difficulty suppressing terrorism. Britain’s experience dealing with Northern Ireland separatists and Israel’s difficulties with various Palestinian and Islamic terror groups indicate the decades-long terror campaigns are extremely hard

to stop. The United States refocused its intelligence efforts against terrorism after 9/11. The FBI and the CIA as well as inter-agency counterterrorism efforts were restructured to ensure previous intelligence mistakes (such as overlooking alarming evidence) would not be repeated. But it was not until the July 2004 release of the 9/11 Commission report that the level of change needed to counter terrorism in America was truly appreciated. Amid commission and Congressional discussions were such wholesale changes as replacing the nation’s intelligence heirarchy and completely restructuring the CIA. MITCHELL MCNAYLOR OuR LADY OF THE LAKE COLLEGE . SEE ALSO: Federal Bureau of Investigation; counterterrorism; al-Qaeda; War on Terrorism; Homeland Security Department.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002); Yossef Bodansky, The High Cost of Peace: How Washington’s Middle East Policy Left America Vulnerable to Terrorism (Forum, 2002); Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (Oxford University Press, 1990); Stéphane Courtois et al., The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression (Harvard University Press, 1999); James

F. Dunnigan, The Next War Zone: Confronting the Global Threat of Cyber-terrorism (Citadel Press Books, 2002); Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 1998); Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanatacism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (Oxford University Press, 1999); Judith Miller et al., Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War (Touchstone, 2002); Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda, The Age of Terror: America and the World After September 11 (Basic Books, 2001).

Thailand THAILAND’S intelligence and security agencies are the oldest, and among the largest, in Southeast Asia. As in other countries in the region, several government departments and the military control operations. The Ministry of the Interior runs the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), which controls the Department of Central Intelligence, the National Police, and a number of other services. The Royal Thai Army runs an additional network, of which little is known. The only country in Southeast Asia to have never been colonized, Thailand’s long history of independence extends to its intelligence and security services. More recently, Thailand has worked with the United States. After World War II, Thailand began a close diplomatic, economic, and military relationship with the United States that culminated with Thailand helping the U.S. forces in the Vietnam War. The first centralized intelligence agency in Thailand was established with the help of the CIA in the early 1950s, ostensibly to counter the threat from communist insurgents operating in Thailand’s jungles and who were linked to the North Viet-

namese. By the late 1960s the Thai intelligence network was far more elaborate. To fight the guerrillas, and to help with the prosecution of the war in Vietnam,

Thailand developed numerous paramilitary agencies, special forces, and top-secret intelligence programs, In fact, Thailand was crucial for both overt and covert American operations in Indochina for nearly 20 years. Thai air bases were used for bombing missions against Vietnam, and nearly 11,000 Thai soldiers served in combat there. Moreover, Thailand was host to a wide range of covert activities, including communications surveillance, counterinsurgency, and guerrilla operations in neighboring countries. Many of these groups and activities were disbanded by the mid-1970s after the American withdrawal from the region. However, some, such as the Counter-Terrorist Operations Centre (CTOO), the Border Patrol Police (BPP), and Task Force 90 survived. The success of counterinsurgency programs effectively destroyed communist guerrilla networks in Thailand by the late 1980s. Since then, Thailand’s relationship with its neighbors has steadily improved. The elimination of many internal and external threats, coupled with considerable political and legal reform in Thailand during the 1990s, undermined the authority of the armed forces. While the Royal Thai Army maintains a significant presence along the country’s borders, with respect to intelligence and internal security issues it has lost much of its influence. The Royal Thai Army, Navy, and Air Force still maintain special forces designed for various commando operations, but little is known about the structure and function of military intelligence within these services. Into the 21st century, the Thai National Police (TNP) is responsible for both law enforcement and most intelligence operations. A Central Investigation Bureau attached to the TNP coordinates the efforts of the Provincial Police, the Metropolitan Police Bureau, and the BPP. The BPP is likely the best of Thailand’s internal security forces. Essentially a paramilitary unit, the BPP is primarily focused on drug interdiction efforts along the country’s long and relatively open borders. However, it is also responsible for surveillance of ethnic minorities living along Thailand’s troubled frontiers. Some minorities in the north and west are connected to insurgency, and some have ties to extremist Muslim groups in the south. And on all fronts, both national and international crimi-

nal syndicates deal in a wide range of illicit enterprises.

A river market in Thailand exemplifies the labyrinth which Thai intelligence agencies face in locating terrorists and drug smugglers who finance terrorists. The southeast Asian country is one of America’s closest allies in its War on Terrorism.

To counter these threats, the TNP has the Crime Suppression Division, as well as a less welldefined Special Branch, that until very recently was seen more as a secret police. Basic intelligence gathering is also conducted by the Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) and the Thahan Phran, essentially civilian militias acting in remote, rural areas of the country. Recently, intelligence operations have turned toward the international war on terror. With its notoriously lax immigration policies, Thailand has become a significant center of operations for some terrorist organizations, including the al-Qaeda network. Attention is also focused on southern Thailand, where a spate of bombings and attacks on police are linked to the Muslim separatist movement. Groups such as the Council of Muslim People of Pattani (MPRMP) and Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) want the separation from Thailand of the predominantly Muslim southern provinces, and their incorporation into a new Islamic kingdom. The Malaysian government has acted in concert with Thai intelligence against these groups, but fi-

nancial and tactical support from extremists in Malaysia remains a problem. So, too, does the likely connection with international terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, that was behind the 1994 truckbombing of the Israeli embassy in Bangkok. ARNE KISLENKO, PH.D.

RYERSON UNIVERSITY, CANADA

SEE ALSO: War on Terrorism; Vietnam War; Malaysia. BIBLIOGRAPHY. CIA World Fact Book (2002); Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford University Press, 2001); Peter Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (v.24, 2001); Arne Kislenko, “The Vietnam War, Thailand and the U.S.,” Yone Sugita, Jon Thares Davidann, and Richard Jensen, eds., Trans-Pacific Modernity: An American Asia in the Pacific Century (Greenwood Press, 2003); Duncan McCargo, ed., Reforming Thai Politics (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2002).

hension. Trepper was eventually captured by the

Trepper, Leopold BORN IN NEUMARK,

Nazis and “turned.” He died in 1982.

Poland, in 1904, Leopold

Trepper went to work in the Galician mines where he witnessed the incredible hardships of the workers who were kept on slave wages by mine owners. The experience convinced him to join the Communist Party, and in 1925 he organized a massive and illegal strike that resulted in his arrest and imprisonment for eight months.

In 1926, Trepper emigrated to Palestine, where he worked against the British who were then controlling the region. He was expelled after being identified as a communist agent in 1928 and went to France, where he worked for an illegal political organization that was broken up by French intelligence. Trepper escaped to Moscow, where he became an NK VD/GRU (Soviet intelligence) spy. He returned to France in 1939 and became the resident director of all Soviet espionage in Western Europe. In that position, he was dubbed ‘The Grand Chef.” In France, Trepper established the Rote Kapelle (Red Orchestra) underground operations in France, Belgium, Germany, Holland, and

Switzerland. This most effective spy ring was headed by Vasily Maximovich who was an interpreter for a German general. Trepper’s German wife also worked for the German military establishment. Through these sources, Trepper learned Nazi strength and dispositions throughout France, as well as the secret location of internment camps. In Switzerland, Trepper’s main spy ring was led by Alexander Rado (codenamed DORA). The source of most of their important information came from an agent, codenamed LUCY (Rudolf Roessler). In Belgium, his lieutenant was Victor Sukulof, a Latvian and former Red Army officer who used the cover name Edward Kent. Trepper, at the time, used the cover name Jean Gilbert, posing as a Belgian manufacturer of raincoats. Through his high-positioned spies, Trepper learned of Hitler’s Operation BARBAROSSA (the invasion of Russia) and the exact strength of the German armored and infantry forces to be used. Throughout his career as a spy, Trepper was renowned for his creative ability to escape detection. On one occasion, he arrived at the secret location of a radio transmitter at the very moment it was being raided. With super aplomb, he passed himself off as a rabbit vendor and escaped appre-

FRANK R. DURR U.S. ARMY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE Corps, RET.

SEE ALSO: LUCY Ring; Rote Kapelle; Rado, Alexander; Roessler, Rudolf. BIBLIOGRAPHY. David Kahn, The Codebreakers (Macmillan, 1972); Anthony Read and David Fisher, Operation LUCY: The Most Secret Spy Ring of the Second World War (Putnam Publishers, 1981).

Truman, Harry S PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. Roosevelt’s death in office in April 1945 catapulted Vice President Harry Truman to the presidency at one of the most critical moments in U.S. history. He faced the tasks of ending World War II and planning for a difficult postwar conversion. Unfortunately, Roosevelt had isolated Truman, a former senator from Missouri, from any information about war plans, including the development of the atomic bomb, or about postwar national security (and intelligence) organizations. Truman turned for guidance in these matters most often to the Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS) members General George C. Marshall, Admiral William D. Leahy, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, Secretary of War Robert Patterson, and Bureau of the Budget Director Harold D. Smith. Although they agreed on dropping the atomic bomb on Japan to end the war, Truman received divided counsel on how to organize postwar national security. Such advice was complicated by the emerging confrontation with the Soviet Union that would become a Cold War by 1947. Truman (and Budget Director Smith) also had to consider domestic spending and budgetary restraints in planning a postwar military establishment, including the organization of a national intelligence agency. Truman advocated unification of navy, army and an independent air force department into a single department of national defense, but seemed confused about the role of intelligence in this postwar national security establishment.

ligence Group (CIG) under a National Intelligence Authority. CIG was a compromise. It formed a committee of War, Navy, and State Department heads to prepare a daily foreign intelligence summary for the president. Divested of its wartime counterintelligence network in the Western Hemisphere, the FBI had no role in the committee, as Truman forbid CIG to deal with police or internal security matters. CIG had no independent budget, staff, or Congressional authorization, and carried out no secret intelligence operations. The first director of central intelligence (DCI), Sidney Souers, a St. Louis businessman and reserve naval officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence, developed CIG simply to provide the timely foreign intelligence analysis for the president. But the second DCI, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, an ambitious army air force general and the nephew of powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Arthur H. Vandenberg, lobbied for a separate budget for CIG. He wanted to launch secret intelligence operations against the perceived growing communist menace around the world. Creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), under the National Security Act of 1947, formed a national defense establishment that differed little in concept from CIG. It was a foreign intelligence collection organization. However, the CIA had statutory authority, a separate budget, and Truman was suspicious of an “American Gestapo” but approved the creation of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Smith revealed that, during the war, Roosevelt had elicited plans for a postwar intelligence organization, including a blueprint for central intelligence from William Donovan of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a wartime secret intelligence organization. Truman disbanded OSS right after the war, however, claiming that the United States did not want a super spy agency or “American Gestapo.” Meantime, the JCS, Smith, the State Department, and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, competing for leadership in postwar intelligence, urged Truman to consider the creation of a central intelligence agency. Each viewed intelligence through the perspective of its own service, and offered conflicting views about how domestic and foreign intelligence should be coordinated. In response, Truman established, by executive order in 1946, the Central Intel-

the first director, Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, held wider authority to hire and organize a national intelligence agency. Historians disagree about Truman’s role in developing the CIA. Was he a passive observer or a major architect? At best, the president remained ambiguous about expanding the organization into a worldwide spy agency with full counterintelligence, espionage, and_ special-operations capabilities. However, he never objected to steady expansion of the agency as part of his emerging pol-

icy of containing communism around the world. Truman endorsed State Department policy planner George Kennan’s recommendation to contain communism

by increasing covert operations.

Truman supported Secretary of Defense James Forrestal’s use of CIA assets to defeat communists in postwar Italian and French elections. He agreed with Secretary of State George C. Marshall, who developed more covert CIA operations under an Office of Policy Coordination that probably hired many of the OSS veterans back after Truman had discontinued the organization. Truman established

‘Tubman, Harriet

649

the National Security Agency (NSA) for greater communications intelligence and cryptanalysis, following reports that the CIA had failed to warn that the Chinese communists planned to cross the Yalu River and attack U.S. forces in North Korea. Though uncomfortable with secret operations and a central intelligence agency “engaged in strange activities,” Truman supported and promoted such an organization as part of his national security state in order to stop what he saw as the spread of world communism

and growing Soviet power. JEFFREY M. DORWART, PH.D. RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO: Central Intelligence Group; Office of Strategic Services; Central Intelligence Agency; Donovan, William J.; Souers, Sydney W. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Harry S Truman, Memoirs (Double-

day, 1955-56); Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Off the Record: The

Private Papers of Harry S Truman (Harper & Row, 1980); Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford University Press, 1999); Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (University Publications of America, 1981); William R. Corson, The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire (Dial Press, 1977); Harold F. Gosnell, Truman’s Crises: A Political Biography of Harry S Truman (Greenwood Press, 1980).

Tubman, Harriet HARRIET TUBMAN WAS one of 11 children born to slaves Harriet Greene and Benjamin Ross in the early 1820s in Dorchester County, Maryland. In 1844, she married John Tubman, a free black. When Harriet hired a lawyer to trace her mother’s history, she found out that her mother had briefly been free after her owner died but was never told. Tubman fled to freedom by following the North Star to Pennsylvania and soon joined the growing anti-slavery or abolitionist movement. Impressed by the 1831 revolt in Virginia by Nat Turner, she later befriended John Brown, and helped to plan his famous raid on Harper’s Ferry, West Virginia. Tubman became the “guiding light”

Harriet Tubman served as a pioneer of the Underground Railroad and as a spy for the Union in the Civil War.

of the Underground Railroad, bringing black Americans, including her own parents, to the north. The skills that Tubman and other African-American honed for survival and the search for liberty would later prove useful in their espionage work on behalf of the Union. During the Civil War, Tubman joined the Union Army as a cook, then a nurse, and finally an espionage agent. In the Union Army, Tubman organized raiding parties into the Confederacy, including Maryland and Virginia, guiding Union troops and conducting reconnaissance missions. Tubman organized scouting efforts by slaves who had won their freedom and then risked enslavement again as they moved back into Confederate territory. Under Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and his commanders, Tubman directed intelligence operations deep inside the South, monitoring the enemy and sending intelligence reports back to Union forces. She accompanied gunboats up the Combahee River of South Carolina, commanding a mission to destroy railways and bridges and stop supplies from reaching Confederate soldiers. Tubman’s survey of

the terrain proved especially useful and was credited with allowing the Union forces to successfully complete their mission. Unable to get a pension like male veterans of the Civil War, she finally did receive one as the widow of a veteran. During the period of Reconstruction, she moved to New York and opened schools for free blacks from the South. After her death in 1913, she was buried with military honors for her unique contribution to the Union cause. THOMAS EHRLICH REIFER, PH.D.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE

SEE ALSO: American Civil War; women. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Earl Conrad, Harriet Tubman (Associated Publishers, 1943); PR. K. Rose, “The Civil War: Black American Contributions to Union Intelligence,” Studies in Intelligence: A Collection of Articles on the Historical, Operational, Doctrinal, and Theoretical Aspects of Intelligence (Winter 1998-99, Unclassified Edition); Kwame Anthony Appiah and Henry Louis Gates, Jr, eds., Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and African American Experience (BasicCivitas Books, 1999).

Turing, Alan ALAN MATHISON Turing is a seminal figure in the history of cryptography; he made critical contributions to the Allied effort to break the German’s ENIGMA code during World War II. He is also a pioneering figure in the history of computing and was the first to articulate the concept of a universally programmable computer (otherwise known as a Turing machine). Turing was born in London, England, on June 23, 1912, and spent a good part of his childhood abroad. He had difficulty in boarding school, especially with subjects such as history and English, and was criticized by his instructors for being too interested in his own ideas to learn traditional methods of attacking problems. This independence continued throughout his life, causing him to reinvent solutions to issues in theoretical mathematics and computing several times; his creativity paid off, however, as his new solutions were often brilliant and creative.

Turing graduated from Cambridge University in 1934, and in 1935 was elected a fellow of King’s College for his dissertation on probability theory. Then in 1936, he published a paper in which he introduced the concept of an abstract computing device that could move from one state to another according to a set of rules, defined by a finite set of instructions (a “machine table’’), as it read symbols from an infinitely long piece of tape. Mathematician Alonzo Church was also working in the area of computability theory, and the publication of the paper led to Turing becoming Church’s graduate student at Princeton University. After completing his Ph.D., Turing returned to Britain, where he took up full-time residence at the codebreaking headquarters of Bletchley Park upon the declaration of war against the Axis powers on September 3, 1939. Turing used his mathematical skills and knowledge of computers to decipher the codes

the Germans

were

using to communicate

with their submarines. The German encoding device, called an ENIGMA machine, used three sets of interlocking rotors to substitute one letter in a message with another, according to an algorithm that varied with the date. The ENIGMA device made possible 17,576 combinations of the rotors for each letter in the message. Using a primitive computer called COLLOSSUS, Turing was instrumental in breaking the ENIGMA code. This, in turn, led to Allied victory in the Battle for the Atlantic. Turing took charge of “Hut 8” in Bletchley Park following this achievement, and became the resident genius of the operation. In June 1945, the American Jon Von Neumann published his plans for the EDVAC electronic computer, prompting Britain to implement a rival project. Turing was appointed a senior principal scientific officer at the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) for this Automatic Computing Engine (ACE) program. He also took up long-distance running; only an injury prevented him (most likely) from making the British Olympic team. At NPL, he also formulated the idea of what is now known as the Turing test, in which a human being holding a conversation via a teletype is replaced with a computer; if one cannot identify the computer as a computer but is fooled into believing it is actually a person, then we will know that computers have become truly intelligent. Turing left NPL before ACE was completed, joining the faculty

at the University of Manchester, where he worked on the Manchester Automatic Digital Machine (MADAM). He also revisited some mathematical problems that had puzzled him early in his career and accomplished groundbreaking work in the morphology and development of living things that helped lay the foundations for what is now called non-linear systems theory. Turing died on June 7, 1954, most likely from suicide (he ingested potassium cyanide), perhaps brought on by the social stigma associated with homosexuality. Turing was a great mind in the field of computing machines. Even had he not been instrumental in breaking German cryptographic codes during World War I, his concept of the universal programmable computer would have made him famous in intelligence circles. WILLIAM D. CASEBEER, PH.D. U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY

SEE ALSO: World War II; Bletchley Park; ENIGMA. BIBLIOGRAPHY. F. H. Hinsleyand Alan Stripp, Codebreakers (Oxford University Press, 1993); Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma (Simon & Schuster, 1983); www.turing.org.uk; Michael R. Williams, A History of Computing Technology (Prentice Hall, 1985).

Turkey THE FIRST Turkish efforts to establish an intelligence organization began during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. In 1914, Teskilat-i Mahsusa (Special Organization) was established by Enver Pasha. In 1918, at the end of World War I, a new intelligence unit was formed under the name of Karakol Cemiyeti (Guard Society). During the National Liberation War, this organization provided arms to partisan groups fighting against the Allied occupation forces in Turkey who had remained after World War I. When Istanbul (the capital at the time) was occupied on March 16, 1920, its activities came to an end with the arrest of its members. In the 1920s, the Turkish General Staff estab-

lished various intelligence agencies, including Mudafaa-I Milliye (National Defense, nicknamed

Mim Mim). During the National Liberation War, Mim Mim transferred weapons and ammunition to Anatolia, and infiltrated enemy headquarters, for-

eign missions, and enemy collaborators. After the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, intelligence activities were carried out until 1926 by the intelligence unit within the Turkish General Staff. In 1926, Turkey’s independence leader, Ataturk, ordered the establishment of a modern intelligence organization with the same standards as those in more developed countries. Colonel Walter Nicolai, a Polish officer who had guided Germany’s intelligence activities during World War I, was tasked to establish the organization. Milli Emniyet Hizmeti (MAK; National Security Service) was established in 1926 under the command of Field Marshal Fevzi Cakmak, chief of the General Staff. Most of the cadre of MAK had been trained in European countries, and were European-focused. In 1965, the Turkish Grand National Assembly changed the name of the organization to Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (MIT; National Intelligence Organization) and brought the organization under control of an undersecretary subordinate to the prime minister. MIT performs both internal and external intelligence gathering functions: It is authorized to gather intelligence and conduct counterintelligence abroad and to uncover communist, extreme right wing, and separatist (for example, Kurdish and Armenian) groups internally. The organization functions under strict discipline and secrecy. Housing and headquarters offices for personnel, for example, are located in a secret compound in Ankara. Although the MIT chief reports to the prime minister, the organization is believed to have close ties to the military. MIT has allegedly failed to notify the government of past plots and may have actually been involved in military coup attempts. In 1993, a career diplomat, Sonmez Koksal, was named undersecretary in charge of MIT, the first civilian to head the organization. Koksal’s appointment has apparently reduced MIT’s institutional relationship with

the Turkish military. Many Kurds (especially their separatist minority) in Turkey believe that the Turkish security and intelligence agencies began using paramilitary death squads against Kurds as early as 1984. According to the U.S. State Department’s 1995 Human Rights Report on Turkey, “Prominent credible human rights organizations, Kurdish leaders, and local Kurds asserted that the government acquiesces in,

or even carries out, the murders of civilians.” It said, “Human rights groups reported the widespread and credible belief that a counterguerrilla group associated with the security forces had carried out at least some ‘mystery killings.’” In 1996, former prime minister Bulent Ecevit revealed to the Turkish parliament that such a counterguerrilla ‘“‘stay-behind” organization (small paramilitary cells that would take on the Soviets behind enemy lines in the event of a Soviet invasion) had been established by the United States during the Cold War. Working out of the Joint U.S. Military Aid Team headquarters, it was known first as the Tactical Mobilization Group and then the Special Warfare Department. Former Army Chief of Staff General Kennan Evren, who led the 1980 military coup, acknowledged that the Special Warfare Department was involved in clandestine activities, citing the murder of nine left-wing militants at Kizildere in northern Turkey in 1972. The Israeli intelligence organization, Mossad, expanded its base in Turkey with the support and full cooperation from the Turkish government. According to the military cooperation agreement signed by former Turkish Foreign Minister Hekmet Citen during his visit to Israel in 1993, Mossad provided Turkey with plans aiding the closure of its border with Irag, and helped in the arrest of the chairman of the Kurd separatist party (PKK), Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan. MONTGOMERY

MCFATE SAPONE

RAND

CorRPORATION

SEE ALSO: Israel; North Atlantic Treaty Organization. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Stanford Shaw, From Empire to Republic (Cambridge University Press, 2001); CIA World Factbook (2003); Library of Congress, “Turkey: A Country Study” www.loc.gov; Lucy Komisar, “Turkey’s Terrorists,” The Progressive (v.61, 1997); Arabic News, “Continued Cooperation Between Turkish, Israeli Intelligence,”

(2003).

istration from 1977 to 1980, was born December 1, 1923, in Chicago, Illinois. After attending Amherst College for two years, he transferred to the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, where he graduated in 1946. He and future President Carter were in the same class at Annapolis, though at the time they did not know each other well. Turner received a Rhodes Scholarship and earned his Master of Arts degree from Oxford University in 1950. After leaving Oxford, Turner embarked on a successful naval career that included a two-year tenure as president of the U.S. Naval War College and

commander of the U.S. Second Fleet. In 1975, he was promoted to full admiral and made commander in chief of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Southern Flank. Carter named Turner as DCI on February 7, 1977. In his confirmation testimony before the U.S. Senate, Turner promised to conduct intelligence activities in accordance with U.S. law and restore the reputation of the intelligence community in the wake of numerous investigations detailing past abuses. The Senate unanimously confirmed his appointment on February 24. Morale within the CIA was low when Turner became DCI, and his sometimes brusque management style made him unpopular with many within the agency. One of his first actions was to initiate staff cuts spread over two years within the Directorate of Operations (DO). Known within the CIA as the Halloween Massacre, Turner ordered termination notices sent to 212 DO officers on October 31, 1977. Turner defended this seemingly abrupt action by pointing out that those terminated were headquarters bureaucrats, not officers in the field. Turner also had frequent disputes with National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski over which of them would be Carter’s chief intelligence adviser and have greater access to the president. Carter’s Executive Order 12036 of January 24, 1978, strengthened the role of the DCI and gave Turner unprecedented control over budgets for the entire intelligence community, and charged him with assigning intelligence projects to the various agencies and coordinating their activities. While

covert action was at its lowest point in the history

Turner, Stansfield STANSFIELD Turner, director of Central Intelligence (DCI) during President Jimmy Carter’s admin-

of the CIA in the early years of Turner’s tenure, events in Iran and Afghanistan quickly changed the mindset of the DCI and the president. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 25, 1979, Turner convinced Carter to supply arms to

the Afghan mujahideen resistance forces, an operation that continued until the Soviets withdrew dur-

ing President Ronald Reagan’s administration. Turner had a more difficult time convincing Carter to authorize covert action to rescue the American hostages seized by militant Iranian students when they stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979. For several months Carter attempted to free the hostages through negotiations while Turner and Brzezinski planned potential rescue operations. Carter finally approved Operation EAGLE CLAW in April 1979. The operation was a disaster that resulted in the deaths of eight Americans and one Iranian interpreter when a helicopter crashed at a desert rendezvous point—the rescue team never made it to Tehran. It was the worst covert operations defeat

since the Bay of Pigs. Turner’s tenure as DCI ended with Carter’s defeat in the 1980 election. He continued to have a successful career as a lecturer, television commentator, and writer on intelligence, foreign and military affairs, and arms reduction. JENNIFER L. ROGERS History ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED

SEE ALSO: Agency.

Carter, Jimmy; Iran; Central Intelligence

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only (HarperCollins, 1995); Charles Moritz, ed., “Turner, Stansfield,” Current Biography Yearbook (H.W. Wilson, 1979); Stansfield Turner, Terrorism @& Democracy (Houghton Mifflin, 1991).

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country was able to protect itself against any future occupation, while defending itself against domestic

Ukraine UKRAINE HAS fought for autonomy since its early beginnings in the 16th century. After being ruled by Russian Tzar Peter I in 1709 and Empress Catherine II in 1764, Ukraine first gained its independence in 1918 after the overthrow of the tzar a year earlier. The independent state was short-lived. In 1922, the Soviet Red Army occupied the Ukraine and declared it a republic of the Soviet Union. Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin’s attempts to exploit the nationalism of the Ukraine to the Soviet Union’s advantage backfired and eventually contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Partly because Lenin supported a national identity among the people of the Ukraine, they never lost their longing to be an autonomous state. During the entire span of the Soviet Union’s control of the Ukraine, nationalist movements ensured that native social power structures remained intact, while the population showed an outward appearance of loyalty to the Soviet Union. Thus, it could be said that the nation of Ukraine was itself a clandestine operative for its own nationhood within the Soviet structure. Ukraine declared its independence again in July 1990, and re-declared it when the Soviet Union collapsed in August 1991. After these declarations, Ukraine wanted to ensure that the

threats such as terrorism or insurgencies.

The Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, passed several regulatory laws in the years after independence that established the Security Service of Ukraine, Sluzhba Bespeky Ukrayiny (SBU). Among these laws, the Verkhovna Rada passed on September 20, 1991 the regulation, “On Establishment of the National Security Service of Ukraine” which dissolved the State Security Committee of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine (Ukrainian KGB). That was followed quickly by the legislation, “On the Security Service of Ukraine,” which

established the Security Service of Ukraine. The Security Service of Ukraine’s structure is far removed from the KGB and related organizations of the past. The SBU is governed by the rule of law within the Ukraine, not by the will of the current administrator. Four of the laws that govern the SBU’s activities are, “On Operational and Investigative Activity; On the Fight Against Corruption; On Organizational and Legal Principles in the Fight against the Organized Crime; and On State Secrets.” The SBU has also established the National Academy of the SBU to train operations officers in law and language. As of December 2002, the SBU reported that it had 26 offices including its main office in Crimea. The SBU is organized into 14 different departments. The most imporatnt of these include the

655

counterintelligence department; the department for information support and management of operations; the department for national economy counterintelligence protection; the department for national statehood protection and combating terrorism; and the main directorate for combating corruption and organized crime.

Ukraine’s quick and efficient institution of the SBU is a clear sign of its desire to remain an autonomous state. Although Ukraine’s economy is still greatly suffering from state-owned corporations left over from the Soviet Union, and from continuing cleanup from the Chernobyl (nuclear power plant) meltdown, the country is striving to maintain its sovereignty and self-governance by relying on a strong and secure infrastructure that is ruled by law. The SBU has recently received criticism from both domestic and international organizations regarding some of its practices. Allegations have been made that the SBU participated in the murder of a journalist, and ordered Vadim Rabinovich, a Ukrainian Jewish social activist turned Israeli, to leave the Ukraine for five years, without a trial. The SBU has plans to register all Ukrainian internet users to prevent piracy, and it has been alleged that the SBU has been used to influence political elections. ARTHUR H. HOLstT, PH.D. WIDENER UNIVERSITY

SEE ALSO:

Soviet Union; Russia (Post-Soviet).

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Taras Kuzio, Ukrainian Security Policy (Praeger Publishers, 1995); Security Service of Ukraine, www.sbu.gov.ua.

United Kingdom THE IMAGE of the British secret intelligence agent has occupied a prominent place in modern popular culture, fueled by depictions ranging from the debonair, swashbuckling James Bond to the grimly realistic George Smiley. The long and distinguished record of the real British intelligence services usually falls somewhere between: often far more mundane than Bond but sometimes consider-

ably more exciting than anything Smiley ever dreamed of. The first record of British intelligence work involves King Alfred of Wessex, also known as Alfred the Great. In 878 C.E., invading Danes under Guthrum defeated English forces in several battles and occupied the royal court. According to legend, Alfred disguised himself as a wandering minstrel and infiltrated the Danish camp. There he entertained the invaders with his harp and voice, while gaining information that allowed Alfred’s forces to defeat the Danes decisively in the next battle. Harold Godwin, who succeeded Edward the Confessor to the British throne in 1066, also believed in the value of espionage. Faced with a double military threat from the King of Norway and France’s William of Poitiers (later known as William the Conquerer), Godwin sent spies to gather information about both invading armies. He prevailed over the Norwegians but was defeated by the French at the Battle of Hastings. William’s efforts to consolidate his control

over England met with considerable resistance. The leader of this protracted guerrilla campaign against the invaders was Hereward the Wake (i.e, “the alert,” because of his supposed ability to avoid capture by the superior Norman forces), who, like Al fred before him, is said to have spied upon his enemy personally. The first systematic effort at counterespionage in England began in 1434, when Cardinal Beaufort (chief minister for the young Henry VI) established the “King’s Espials,” a system of paid informers who were to report on seditious behaviors among the common folk. However, the program was haphazard and usually produced unreliable results. Domestic intelligence collection was given greater organization by Henry VII, who had a number of agents on the royal payroll, all reporting to him personally. Henry believed in specialization, and some of his agents were officially designated as “spies,” while others were “informers,” others “secret agents.”

Elizabeth

I. England’s

first organized

and still

espionage

group was set up under the reign of Henry’s grand-

daughter, Elizabeth I. Although she did make occasional use of Robert Devereux, the Earl of Essex

for external intelligence matters, Elizabeth’s real spymaster was Francis Walsingham, an antiCatholic zealot who was the first great intelligence

chief in English history. Although Walsingham’s budget for agents was small (and much of that was paia for from his own funds), he was nonetheless able to secure the services of some remarkably effective spies. These included Anthony Standen (who provided detailed information on the Spanish Armada); John Dee (the English mystic who was also Walsingham’s expert on codes and ciphers); and Anthony Munday (a mediocre playwright who was a first-rate agent and interrogator). Walsingham also developed a very successful counterintelligence apparatus, which uncovered numerous assassination plots against the Queen, the most notable of which involved Elizabeth’s cousin, Mary, Queen of Scots.

Oliver Cromwell.

Following Elizabeth’s death in

1603, intelligence matters were given scant attention. Certainly Charles I was not well served by his few spies in the English Civil War. But the man who deposed Charles, Oliver Cromwell, had high respect for the art of espionage. As Lord Protector, Cromwell appointed John Thurloe as secretary of state and head of intelligence. Much of Thurloe’s work involved safeguarding Cromwell from the many plots against his life. But he also developed a network of agents working on the European continent and even in the fledgling colonies in North America. One of Thurloe’s best agents was George Downing, who in his career managed the difficult feat of serving not only the government of Cromwell but also that of Charles II, who returned the monarchy to England after Cromwell’s death. Downing ingratiated himself with his new masters by vigorously pursuing his former employers, even arresting his former commanding officer. In addition to wiping out unregenerate Roundheads at home, Downing set up a sophisticated spy network abroad, especially in Holland, which was England’s principal rival during that period.

American Revolution. British intelligence efforts during the American Revolution were only modestly effective. William Eden (Lord Auckland) had the job of keeping a close eye on American diplomats in Europe seeking political, economic, and military support for their cause. One of Eden’s greatest successes involved his agent Edward Bancroft, who had been born in Massachusetts before deciding to live in the mother country. Bancroft be-

friended American

diplomat Benjamin

Franklin,

who eventually hired him to spy on the British. But Bancroft was a double-agent, and he was really spying on Franklin and his cohorts. Eventually, Bancroft became secretary to Silas Deane, America’s representative in Paris, France. He was thus able to provide his British spymasters with detailed and accurate information about American-French relations for the duration of the conflict. In North America, meanwhile, probably the most successful British intelligence officer was Major John André. He ran several successful agents in the colonies, including Ann Bates, one of the few female agents of the period. André’s greatest success was the “turning” of American General Benedict Arnold, the Revolution’s most infamous traitor. But André’s triumph was short-lived. He was captured by Continental Army soldiers in September 1780 while on a reconnaissance mission. Because he had been unwise enough to wear civilian clothes for the occasion, André was charged with being a spy, tried by a military court, and convicted. General George Washington ordered that André be hanged, possibly in retaliation for the execution of American spy Nathan Hale by the British four years earlier.

French Revolution. A few years later, British attention was focused on the revolution that was sweeping through France. As a monarchy, Britain was automatically opposed to the overthrow and execution of Louis XVI and his queen, Marie Antoinette. It was hoped, in some quarters of the British government, that the French revolution might be aborted and the monarchy restored. Most of this effort fell to William Wickham, the British ambassador to Switzerland, who was more spymaster than diplomat. Wickham was given a generous budget which he used to hire spies, saboteurs, and propagandists aimed against the revolutionary cause. He was ultimately unsuccessful, and the French government pressured the Swiss to expel him from the country. Wickham left but returned to Switzerland in 1799 for a renewed series of espionage activities directed against a new enemy of England: Napoleon Bonaparte.

Napoleonic Wars. Much of the intelligence activity by the British in the struggle against Napoleon involved the Peninsular War in Spain and Portugal. This is because the Duke of Wellington, who com-

Crimean War, and even then improvement occurred slowly. It was only after fighting had broken out and the cost of inadequate intelligence was made clear (through such disasters as the ill-fated Charge of the Light Brigade) that the War Office grudgingly created its Topographical and Statistical

The Tower of London prison, on the River Thames, has held its share of spies through England’s centuries of conflict.

manded the British forces, placed a high value on timely and accurate information about the enemy’s disposition, capabilities, movements, and intentions. Wellington’s intelligence apparatus was run by Colonel Henry Hardinage, who employed a large number of agents, mostly Spaniards, to ferret out information about the French forces. Hardinage is credited with providing crucial information prior to the Battle of Waterloo that allowed Wellington to anticipate the direction of the French attack and subsequently defeat it. Wellington also made use of what he called “exploring officers” to provide tactical intelligence about specific enemy units. The most famous of these agents was Colquhoun Grant, whose ability to provide timely information was equaled by his penchant for the kind of daring exploits that are more common to modern spy fiction. Wellington’s intelligence gathering was also aided by General George Scovell, an expert codebreaker who ran agents to intercept French communications.

The strategic side of intelligence during the Napoleonic wars was conducted mostly by the British Foreign Office, with additional strategic military intelligence gathered by the Army Quartermaster General’s Department. But financial support from the government for these efforts, substantial as long as Napoleon posed a threat to the realm, fell away drastically after the Battle of Waterloo.

Turn of the century. British efforts in strategic intelligence would continue to languish until the

Department (T&S) under the direction of Colonel Thomas Best Jervis. Most of the department’s work during the war was restricted to the creation of maps, and it was not until 1873 that the government showed any real interest in T&S work. That year, it was expanded significantly and its name changed to the Intelligence Branch, to be commanded by General Patrick MacDougall. Nine years later, in 1882, the navy took similar measures and created a Foreign Intelligence Committee—tenamed the Naval Intelligence Department in 1887. As the new century dawned, the world was changing rapidly. New technologies being applied to transportation,

communications,

and weapons

meant that British dominance was being challenged as never before. Changes were in order, and some of these affected the intelligence organizations. In 1904, the Intelligence Department became the Directorate of Military Operations and was given greater responsibilities and resources. Soon thereafter, the Naval Intelligence Department underwent a similar expansion. But even these steps did not satisfy an increasingly concerned government, which worried that the military intelligence organizations were neglecting to investigate political and economic developments abroad that did not have immediate military implications. Consequently, the Secret Service Bureau was created on October 1, 1909. It was divided into a Foreign Section and a Home Section,

although a year later these were separated into autonomous organizations. The Foreign Section was

headed by the colorful Mansfield Cumming. In 1911, Cumming’s section was reconfigured as the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), with the role of providing strategic information to all government departments. The organization’s title was changed to MI-6 in 1920, the name by which it is

still known today. Cumming developed the habit of signing internal correspondence simply with the letter “C,” and ever since then, the heads of the Secret Intelligence Service have been known by that designation. Cumming’s budget was hardly equal to his department’s mission, and so he often relied upon

semi-professional volunteers, usually men from the genteel classes who regarded espionage as patriotic duty combined with a chance for excitement and adventure. Many of these well-meaning amateurs were disasters for the Service, but there were a few

notable successes, including Max Schultz and Sidney Reilly (born Sigmund Georgievich Rosenblum), who would decades later be mythologized in popular culture as “Reilly, Ace of Spies.” Just as the Foreign Section of the Secret Service Bureau became the autonomous MI-6, so did the Home Section also evolve into an independent organization. It came to be called MI-5, also known as the Security Service. Its first head was Vernon Kell, and he was given responsibility for all aspects of counterintelligence in Great Britain. Over the years, MI-5 developed a close working relationship with Special Branch of Scotland Yard, the police unit charged with investigating espionage cases. Special Branch was begun in 1883, in response to a series of terrorist incidents in Britain perpetrated by Fenians (members of a secret Irish organization formed to overthrow British rule). Cooperation between the two security organizations was essential,

since MI-5 has no authority to arrest suspects; in Britain, only police officers have that authority.

World War I. The British began World War I with a major intelligence coup. Only hours after the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, the ship Teleconia was sent into the North Atlantic where it quickly located and cut the German trans-Atlantic telegraph cable. This meant that for communications outside the continent, the Germans would have to rely either on radio signals or on telegraph messages sent by cables owned by other nations, either of which could be intercepted by the British, and were. ML6 had several successes during the war, largely due to the groundwork that had been laid under Cumming’s direction in the years before the conflict began. British spy networks in Holland and Belgium provided ongoing and accurate information on the disposition of the Central Powers’ forces. Other British agents were able to acquire a copy of the German naval codebook, which proved invaluable in locating the “wolfpacks” of German U-boats that roamed the Atlantic. Like Cumming, MI-5’s Kell had been forwardlooking. He was well aware that the Germans were establishing spy networks in Britain. Rather than disrupt them, Kell ordered MI-5 agents to keep

track of the Germans’ movements and associates. As soon as war was declared, MI-5 rolled up the entire spy network at once. The Germans sent other spies, and MI-5 uncovered them as well, notably Karl Lody, the main German spy in Britain. Perhaps the greatest British intelligence triumphs in the Great War came from the Naval Intelligence Department, especially its cryptography section in Room 40 of the Admiralty Building. Under its chief, William “Blinker” Hall, Room 40 broke nearly every code and cipher used by the Central Powers. The section’s most singular achievement came when it deciphered the infamous Zimmermann Telegram, uncovering a German plot that, when revealed to President Woodrow Wilson, helped push the United States into the war. The war produced several British spies who would become well known to the public. Perhaps the most enduring of these was T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), who organized and led Arab tribes against the Ottoman Turks, who were allied with Germany. Just as Lawrence was renowned for his success, another British spy became famous for failure. Edith Cavell was a British nurse assigned to the Red Cross in German-occupied Belgium. In addition to her official duties, she helped smuggle Allied prisoners of war back to friendly lines. It is believed that Cavell and her associates saved more than 200 prisoners from the Germans before she was discovered and executed for espionage in 1915. The British propaganda apparatus turned Cavell into a national heroine, conveniently neglecting to mention that she was acting as a spy and that the Germans were well within their rights to execute her. Following the end of the war in 1918, all the

British intelligence agencies suffered severe cutbacks in budgets and personnel. Since the British government was unwilling to recognize the growing menace posed by Adolf Hitler’s Germany throughout the 1930s, restoration of resources to intelli-

gence was slow and grudging.

World War II. Shortly after war broke out in 1939, the head of MI-6 died and was replaced by Stewart Menzies. He proved an able espionage chief, but he assumed office only weeks after one of the greatest disasters in British intelligence history. The British had established contact with several Germans in The Hague, Holland, who claimed to represent an anti-Hitler resistance. Two high-level MI-6 officers,

R.H. Stevens and Sigismund Best, were sent to meet with them in the town of Venlo. However, the German “traitors” were actually agents of the Nazi SD (the SS Security Service) who captured the British agents and spirited them to Germany, where they were tortured into confessing all manner of “crimes” against the Reich. The Venlo incident was important because it undermined government confidence in MI-6. After the fall of France in June 1940, the British resolved to exploit widespread hatred of the Germans in the occupied countries for purposes of intelligence, sabotage, and propaganda. But instead of giving the job to MI-6, the government decided to create a

Service. Under what was known as the DoubleCross system, some of these spies were turned into double-agents who sent deceptive information back to Germany at the direction of MI-5 spymasters. Arguably the greatest British intelligence successes during the war involved cryptanalysis. Under the direction of mathematician Alan Turing, the Government Code and Cipher School, located at Bletchley Park outside London, achieved stunning successes. Foremost among these was the breaking of the top-secret German ENIGMA code, which gave the British priceless information about German naval movements. The team responsible for producing the ongoing ENIGMA decrypts was

new organization, the Special Operations Executive

codenamed ULTRA,

(SOE). The first chief of SOE, Hugh Dalton, was charged by Prime Minister Winston Churchill to “set Europe ablaze.” As may be gathered from this instruction, SOE was designed to emphasize covert operations over intelligence gathering. Its agents (most of whom were not professional intelligence operatives), in addition to organizing and supplying resistance groups throughout occupied Europe, undertook missions of sabotage, assassination, and psychological warfare. But MI-6, despite its disgrace over Venlo, was not out of the game. Indeed, the agency ran a full slate of operations in occupied Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa—sometimes working in tandem with SOE, sometimes in opposition, and in some cases ignoring the other agency entirely. One notable success by MI-6 was dubbed Operation MINCEMEAT at the time, although it later became known by the title of a popular book about the case, The Man Who Never Was. In 1943, the AL lies were planning an invasion of Italy as the next major stage of the war. MI-6 concluded it would save lives if the Axis could be duped into believing that Greece was to be the next Allied target. A corpse was dropped into the sea off the coast of Spain, wearing a British Major’s uniform and carrying papers that identified him as a member of a general’s staff. Additional planted documents were designed to reveal that the Allies were planning to invade Greece next. The Spanish passed the papers on to the Germans, who took them at face value and began to prepare to defend Greece, leaving Italy vulnerable to Allied attack. MI-5’s record of success against German spies was extraordinary. Every German agent sent into England was speedily identified by the Security

greatest intelligence secrets of the war—a that the Germans never uncovered.

Cold War.

During

and its work was one of the

World

War

secret

I], British and

American intelligence organizations cooperated closely and productively. That relationship continued into the Cold War that followed, although it was hampered by the revelations concerning the Cambridge Five. The term refers to a group of Englishmen who were recruited to the cause of Soviet espionage while still students at Britain’s elite Cambridge University in the 1930s. Four of the spies (Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, Donald Maclean, and Kim Philby) later pretended to disavow their communist affiliations, so that they would be accepted by the postwar British establishment. This allowed them to serve as moles—that is, agents who penetrated a nation’s government or intelligence service over a long period of time, revealing information to that nation’s enemies all the while. Burgess was at various times an agent of ML-6, assistant to the deputy foreign minister, and a functionary in the British Foreign Office. Blunt was an agent of MI-5 and later art adviser to Queen Elizabeth. Maclean held responsible positions in the British Foreign Office, with postings in Paris, Washington, D.C., and Cairo as well as London. Philby gained a high-level position at MI-6. Always convinced a “Fifth Man” was involved with the four spies who were revealed, ML-5 identified John Cairncross as the fifth spy, though Cairncross denied it to his death. Their spying caused immeasurable damage to the Western democracies, and the harm done to the relationship between the British and U.S. intelligence communities was al-

most, but not quite, irreparable. The two countries were able to work together on several operations. One involved the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadeq, who had deposed the shah of Iran, a longtime Western ally. In August 1953, a joint British-U.S. covert operation ousted Mossadeq and brought the shah back into power. The most important joint intelligence effort between the two allies focused on Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, a colonel in the Soviet GRU (military intelligence). While stationed in England in 1961, Penkovsky made contact with British representatives in London and indicated a willingness to provide high-level information about Soviet military affairs. For the next two years, British agents received highly valuable intelligence from Penkovsky which they shared with their American allies, often leading to joint operations. ML6 and MI-5 continue to be the major British intelligence organizations today, along with the Government Communications Headquarters, which specializes in electronic intelligence gathering. There have been occasional charges of abuse (alleged MI-6 assassinations in Northern Ireland, claims of MI-5 eavesdropping on innocent citizens), but the cloak of secrecy continues to surround these organizations and protect them from extensive criticism. In 1991, ML5 took the unprecedented step of announcing publicly the identity of its then-current chief, Stella Rimington. JUSTIN GUSTAINIS, PH.D. STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, PLATTSBURGH

SEE ALSO: Cumming, Mansfield; Kell, Sir Vernon; MI5; ML-6; ENIGMA; Philby, Kim; Maclean, Donald D.; Blunt, Anthony; Cairncross, John; Burgess, Guy; KGB.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Christopher M. Andrew, Her Majesty’s Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (Viking, 1986); Stephen Dorril, MI-6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service (Free Press, 2000); Anthony Masters, The Man Who Was M: The Life of Maxwell Knight (Blackwell, 1984); William Samuel Stephenson, British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940-1945 (Fromm International, 1999); Alan Marshall, Intelligence and Espionage in the Reign of Charles II, 1660-1685 (Cambridge University Press, 1994); Richard Deacon, A History of the British Secret Service (Taplinger, 1970); Bernard Porter, Plots and Paranoia:

A History of Political Espionage in Britain, 1790-1988 (Unwin Hyman, 1989); Philip Davies, The British Secret Services (Transaction, 1996).

United Nations THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) is a magnet for intelligence collection on political, diplomatic, economic, military and crises-management intentions. Agent networks report on UN and UN-member state activities, UN headquarters personnel, national delegations to the UN, and UN agencies operating in other regions. Much information today is open source and readily available on the UN internet homepage. Nonetheless, international diplomacy is a vital concern of the intelligence services responsible for analyzing the intentions of other nations. The UN is a central focus for the resolution of disputes either peacefully or otherwise. Thus, UN-related diplomatic activity is monitored closely. Intelligence services began monitoring the activities of the UN from its very creation. The United States started signals intelligence (SIGINT) monitoring of fellow UN members during the initial deliberations of the organization’s charter in San Francisco in 1945, but it was not the only country to do so. These intercepts involved national delegation communications from San Francisco to their respective embassies in Washington, D.C. The U.S. intercepts were given the codeword MAGIC but were not declassified until 1993. The Soviet intelligence services also were quick to target the new international body through political and diplomatic espionage. The Soviet spy Donald Maclean, working within the British Foreign Service, was frequently involved in UN affairs and international diplomacy. As early as 1945, he argued for the Soviet right of veto in the UN Security Council (UNSC), and for UN membership of Ukraine and Belarus in the UN General Assembly (UNGA), thus giving the Soviet Union three votes versus one in UNGA voting. The Soviets introduced a resolution in 1946 requiring member states to declare the number and location of their armed forces in the territories of other states. Maclean worked in liaison with the U.S. State Department to produce a Western re-

taining positions in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). One of the Soviet Union’s earliest introductions to data-bank technology came

The UN Security Council debates the Cuban Missile Crisis on October 25, 1962.

sponse. Maclean’s point of contact was Alger Hiss, who was later accused of spying for the Soviets but never convicted. Nonetheless, the exchange of military information about British and U.S. overseas deployments fell directly into the hands of the KGB. Maclean was able to report to Moscow that the U.S. had troops in 108 locations including 52,590 in South Korea. The information was particularly valuable in 1950 as the Korean War commenced. The first known American case of espionage linked to the UN was Judith Coplon in 1949. She was a Department of Justice employee arrested carrying documents intended for Valentin Gubitchev, a Soviet citizen and UN employee assigned to planning for the new UN building on the East River in New York City. He was sentenced to 15 years for espionage but was allowed to leave the country. The Soviets maintained tight restrictions on assignments to UN-designated positions until the mid-1950s, fearing that Western materialism would inspire defections. However, as former colonies in Africa and Asia began sending new national delegations to the UN, the KGB realized that UN headquarters could become useful for not only political cultivation and propaganda, but also in support of international espionage operations.

Soviet-sponsored “front” organizations in the East during the 1960s—70s, in coordination with socialist alliances in the third world such as the World Peace Council, were consistently utilized by intelligence operatives to further Soviet influence in these regions and elsewhere. Soviet intelligence also acquired Western nuclear information by ob-

in 1974, when a Soviet official attending a UN meeting in New York was shown The New York Times (NYT) data-bank system. The revelation that significant information in data banks is openly available led the KGB resident in New York to begin using the UN’s data bank to tap into the NYT data bank. The highest-ranking Soviet official to defect to the U.S. was Arkady Shevchenko, UN under-secretary general in 1978, Shevchenko claimed it was easy to distinguish regular diplomats from KGB operatives: KGB officers had more money than diplomats, lavishing it in revealing ways such as buying rounds of drinks for non-Soviets. A diplomat could spend one or two years saving up just enough money to purchase a used car. KGB officers purchased a car soon after their arrival in New York. The 1985 FBI assessment provided to the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee asserted that 25 percent of the Soviets within the UN Secretariat were intelligence officers and others cooperating in the intelligence effort. All Soviets had to respond to KGB requests for assistance. Another 200 UN employees came from the Eastern Bloc and routinely cooperated with the Soviet espionage regime. Meanwhile, there were numerous espionage cases uncovered by the FBI during the 1970s and 1980s. These cases included everything from attempted recruitment of military personnel and technical experts to acquisition of classified documents from the Pentagon library. Finally, UN assignments allowed Soviets the opportunity of travel throughout the United States. Most threatening, though, was the access of Soviets to UN personnel folders, thus giving them insider knowledge of individual histories and personal information. These files were useful for political intelligence analysts seeking knowledge of leadership perceptions and beliefs. It also gave KGB personal information fodder for blackmail or recruitment attempts. The Soviet and East European intelligence services were in disarray at the close of the Cold War. Nonetheless, the protracted crises of the 1990s and the emergence of transnational tetrorism, ethnic faultlines, and enduring regional disputes forced intelligence services of whatever nation to engage actively in the collection of information.

United States THE CRAFT OF intelligence and counterintelligence is not new to the United States, as some would suppose, but goes all the way back to the American Revolution. Indeed, the military battles of the Revolution were the end-product of earlier intelligence wars. The origins of U.S. intelligence services can be traced to the Sons of Liberty, the group formed to oppose England’s 1765 Stamp Act in the American colonies. Here was created a secret

A U.S. intelligence target, the People’s Republic of China is seated in the General Assembly of the UN in 1971.

There is a positive international corollary to intelligence operations in support of UN global operations. The post-Cold War era has brought an unprecedented level of cooperation between intelligence services. Former adversaries now require the sharing of operational intelligence for the deployment of peacekeeping operations (PKOs), humanitarian assistance rescue operations (HUMROs), and INTERPOL’s hunt for war criminals and international fugitives. National intelligence service resources are tasked to support these UN missions in addition to their other duties. The increase in joint and combined multinational peacekeeping operations have brought, particularly, military intelligence services directly into the international UN arena. GAIL H. NELSON, PH.D. ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO:

Coplon, Judith; Maclean,

Donald

D.; at-

taché; diplomacy. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Alfred Maurer, Marion Tunstall, and James Keagle, Intelligence Policy & Process (Westview Press, 1985); Jeffrey Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Westview Press, 1989); Arthur Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990); Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: Inside Story (HarperCollins, 1990); Pavel Sudoplatov, Special Tasks (Little, Brown, 1994); Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge Universi-

ty Press, 1996).

network of resistance and sabotage groups in the fledgling nation that continued as an intelligence network even after the Act’s repeal. Moreover, long before the flowering of the U.S. intelligence community in the 20th century, George Washington served as the original intelligence chief and spymaster of the emerging nation. Washington ran agents, used coded communications and counterintelligence to guard against traitors, engaged in disinformation and psychological warfare directed against British-bought Hessian mercenary soldiers, and employed all varieties of covert operations, including sending agents abroad. Long before the 20th-century language of espionage developed, its practices were in evidence.

Revolutionary espionage. Already as an officer in the British Army before joining the movement for independence, Washington learned the importance of secret intelligence in battle, especially by observing the examples of Native American guides and scouts. After taking command of the Continental Army, Washington set out to create an elaborate spy network “for the purpose of intelligence of the Enemy’s movements and designs,” with military communications coded by aide-de-camp and de facto intelligence officer Alexander Hamilton. The Continental Congress established numerous secret intelligence committees, including the Secret Committee; what became the Committees of (Secret) Correspondence (involved in foreign intelligence affairs and secret missions abroad), chaired by Benjamin Franklin; and the Committee on Spies, charged with the task of purchasing weapons for the revolutionaries abroad. Members of these committees included luminaries such as John Jay (the first Supreme Court Justice), Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and

graduate Major Benjamin Tallmadge, which monitored British troops occupying New York City and sent reports back to the future president through a system of dead drops and couriers. Other Washington spies were not so lucky, such as Tallmadge’s classmate and close friend; Nathan Hale, who on a spying mission behind enemy lines was captured by British forces and executed. As the first U.S. spy to be executed, Hale was honored with a statue at Yale

in 1914, and a copy later was placed at the CIA headquarters’ entrance in Virginia in 1973. This was quite fitting given how many persons in the intelligence community came from Yale and the rest of the Ivy League, in a tradition dating back to the: American Revolution. As Robin Winks has documented in his book Cloak and Gown, the tradition dates back to the American Revolution.

George Washington took personal charge of intelligence matters in the Revolutionary War.

Robert Livingston. Initially, Congress directed foreign agents on operations abroad, though after the passing of the Constitution, President Washington took over such activities, using the Congressional exemption that allowed him to keep secret the spending of the president’s Secret Service or contingency fund. Congress had begun appropriating funds for the president’s discretionary use in 1790, a tradition that has continued until the present. During the Revolution, Washington’s spy networks included the Culper Ring headed by Yale

A new nation’s intelligence. After the conclusion of the Revolutionary War in 1791, Washington ordered his presidential administration to cooperate with a Congressional committee investigating a failed army raid against Native Americans, an event that was cited as a precedent for the Congressional investigations of the intelligence community in the mid-1970s. During this period of continental expansion and displacement of Native American populations, numerous expeditions approved by successive presidential administrations used intelligence as an important component and were often ably assisted by Native American scouts and guides, as in the Lewis and Clark expedition. From the beginning, as in other countries, questions of internal security and related spy scares were bound up with domestic politics. In 1798, the ruling Federalist Party secured passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts (expired or repealed in 1800-02), at a time when the party accused Thomas Jefferson of being a French agent, though this did not prevent his becoming president (1801-09). The acts blurred the distinction between political dissent and sedition, targeting French and Irish immigrants who were part of the political base of Jeffersonian Republicanism, while seeking to curb the freedom of the Republican press by outlawing “false or malicious” writings critical of the government. Soon enough, the spirit of revolutionary republicanism that was unleashed by the American Revolution spread to Europe, leading to the French Revolution and subsequent rise of Napoleon.

Britain moved to stamp out the republican spark in the New World during the War of 1812. Even before war approached, though, President James Madison (1809-17), who had earlier participated as secretary of state in President Jefferson’s covert operations during the Barbary wars to overthrow the pasha of Tripoli, sought to deny England the use of Spanish-ruled Florida as a base in the war by similarly secret means. In a plan that echoes numerous U.S. 20thcentury covert operations and wars, Madison, with

the connivance of a secret Congressional resolution but without really consulting Congress, secretly encouraged rebellions against Spanish authorities to create revolutionary governments that would request U.S. military assistance, while making U.S. actions appear wholly defensive in nature. And, in the War of 1812, General Andrew Jackson’s hiring of pirates foreshadowed later U.S. cooperation with gangsters and organized crime in intelligence operations, as with the CIA-Mafia plots to assassinate Cuban leader Fidel Castro in the 1960s. As early as 1846, there were challenges to the secret executive power that concealed from Congress how the presidential Contingency Fund was being used. In that year, it was revealed that President John Tyler’s (1841-1845) first secretary of state, Daniel Webster, had spent money from the Contingency Fund on domestic propaganda, along with funds from the British Secret Service, to secure passage of the U.S.-U.K. Webster-Ashburton Treaty on border disputes. President James Polk (1845-49) refused to comply with Congressional demands to account for the money, citing earlier precedents for executive secrecy, ostensibly dating back to the fund’s creation in July 1790. Polk, a great enthusiast of covert operations, was especially adroit at secret provocations designed to maneuver his enemies, such as Mexico, to fire the first shot. Polk used such schemes to justify the enactment of his preexisting pans for the conquest of much of the present-day southwest United States, at a cost of well over 10,000 American and many more Mexican lives. The 1846 Mexican-American War inspired citizen challenges such as Henry David Thoreau’s jailing for tax resistance. Thoreau’s position, expressed later in his essay “On Civil Disobedience,”

was a prelude to 20th-century nonviolent, anti-war activism. Polk’s aggressive expansionism, driven by visions of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority and

manifest destiny, had by the end of his term nearly doubled United States territory.

Civil War espionage. The American Civil War saw the proliferation of intelligence networks, though not the emergence of a centralized secret service, as myth supposes, which was actually founded soon thereafter. During the war, President Abraham Lincoln became educated in the world of signals intelligence and codebreaking, making full use of the telegraph office and cipher sector of the War Department for up-to-date information about the conflict in the field, while also approving imagery intelligence operations by founding a balloon corps. The Union drew on the services of one of the world’s first private detective agencies, headed by Allan Pinkerton, and achieved some notable suc-

cesses in the field of counterintelligence by capturing enemy agents. As military intelligence chief for General George McClellan during his march to Richmond, Virginia, in the 1862 Peninsula campaign, Pinkerton exaggerated the estimates of Confederate forces defending the area, as his commander apparently desired. In the face of Lincoln’s urgings to fight on, McClellan instead retreated, erroneously claiming that the forces of his enemy were far superior. In the end, Lincoln was forced to relieve McClellan of his command and Pinkerton soon resigned.

Nascent intelligence services. During the 1880s, a time of overseas imperial expansion, the United States created permanent intelligence agencies, the Military Intelligence Division (MID) and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). During the 1898 Spanish-American War, the U.S. acquired its first overseas territories, including Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines. In the Philippines, counterinsurgency operations resulted in massive numbers of Filipino deaths. And during this same period, the U.S. Secret Service became charged with counterintelligence activities. The decades after the Civil War also saw the flourishing of private intelligence services. In this period of rapid U.S. industrialization and violent class conflict, symbolized by Chicago’s Haymarket (worker rebellion) incident, the Pinkerton Detective Service became synonymous with strikebreaking and union-busting, as during the 1892 conflict at Andrew Carnegie’s Homestead plant in

Pennsylvania, where Pinkerton agents were sent to confront locked-out union workers. This epic battle between capital and labor over the future of the republic erupted into violence, with numerous detectives and workers killed. The National Guard subsequently occupied the town, and some of the unionists were tried for treason at the behest of Carnegie Steel General Counsel Philander Knox, who went on to become attorney general and secretary of state during the era of so-called dollar diplomacy. Then, in the early 20th century, the beginnings of an internal security service that would result in the formation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) evolved following President Theodore Roosevelt’s 1908 creation of a Department of Justice force of special agents, originally called the Bureau of Investigation. While the late 1890s were a watershed in the overseas expansion of U.S. wealth and power, and the formation of an embryonic intelligence community, World War I had an even greater impact. During this period, the United States entered into the top ranks of the great powers, one whose industrial might, financial prowess, and military capability could now decide the fate of continents. Internal security requirements increased and Major Ralph Van Deman, head of the army’s military intelligence division (MID), worked to oversee the work of the American Protective League (APL), created by American businessmen, which sought to quell espionage and domestic dissent, including that of many unionists.

World War I intelligence. Prior to World War I, an upper-class-led, Anglo-American war-preparedness movement, involving volunteer military training and the formation of groups such as the National Security League, played an important role in America’s entry into the conflict. Many of movement’s participants, including “Wild Bill” Donovan, John J. McCloy, Henry Stimson, Charles Bonaparte, and others, were important figures in the evolution of U.S. intelligence. Many in the U.S. war-preparedness movement worked closely in these efforts with their British counterparts. As for President Woodrow Wilson and his aide Colonel House,

they became particularly close with British intelligence figures such as Sir William Wiseman, then trying to rally Americans to the allied cause. British propaganda efforts, related covert operations, and signals intelligence also were key drivers of the U.S.

entry into the war, especially the leakage of the Zimmermann Telegram, which contained information on a German offer of an alliance with Mexico against the United States. America’s entry into the war, and the pursuit of the peace it was hoped would follow, thus led it to establish a host of intelligence services. The official propaganda agency, the Committee for Public Information, Herbert Yardley’s MI-8, Section Eight of the MID, involved in breaking codes and securing communications, and Wilson’s incipient intelligence service, the Inquiry, many of whose members served on the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, at Versailles, were created during. this period.

An explosion of U.S. intelligence efforts. As the end of World War I coincided with a widespread strike wave in 1919 (often by immigrant workers), “patriotic” quasi-official organizations attacking domestic dissent fused their brand of super-patriotism with ethnic and racial chauvinism. Principal groups acting to quell domestic dissent included Attorney General Palmer, the Bureau of Investigation, the ONI, and the APL. Yet apart from the military services and a few voluntary organizations of enthusiasts, foreign-intelligence collection efforts and military alliances abroad ebbed to historic lows, and the informational networks of America’s internationally oriented financial and legal establishment remained. But the growing global crisis of fascism and communism ushered in an explosion of U.S. intelligence efforts of all sorts. Many of the leaders of these efforts came out of the internationalist World War I preparedness movement and went on to create important think tanks, most notably the Council on Foreign Relations. Even before it became apparent to the public that the United States would not be able to remain aloof from the growing global conflagration, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) began aiding America’s European allies and preparing to fight Japan. The appointment of the leader of the World War I preparedness movement, Republican corporate lawyer Colonel Henry Stimson, as FDR’s secretary of war signified the growing bipartisan commitment being developed in the realm of foreign policy. At the same time, FDR was already beginning to rely on another World War I preparedness enthusiast, decorated war veteran and close friend of Stimson, Bill Donovan, for informal

The CIA’s memorial to its World War II predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, showcases a statue of William Donovan and a

book listing each of the 116 men and women who lost their lives in service during the war.

intelligence reports; and it was largely through Donovan’s efforts that the U.S. intelligence community was really born. What turned this growing elite opinion into a national consensus to take action was Japan’s surprise attack of December 7, 1941, at Pearl Harbor, which dramatically revealed the weaknesses of the U.S. intelligence community. If anything demonstrated to national leaders and the public the need for “special intelligence,” it was being caught unaware, at the cost of the destruction of much of the Pacific Fleet. Already that July, FDR had appointed Donovan to head America’s first centralized intelligence agency, the Coordinator of Information, which by June 1942 was transformed, with Donovan still at the helm and with crucial assistance from his

British counterparts in MI-6, into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner of the CIA. The OSS was soon filled with persons from Who’s Who and the Social Register, leading some to call the OSS, “Oh So Social.” The generation that created America’s intelligence empire and led its rise to global hegemony had been born largely in the late 19th century, the period in which U.S. corporate and military power grew exponentially. The leaders of this generation were mostly Eastern establishment corporate professionals such as lawyers and investment bankers, representatives of what sociologist C. Wright Mills called the power elite. After Pearl Harbor, intelligence became a key area of expansion for America’s power elite, as the country harnessed its immense talent, wealth, and industrial capacity to

fight with its Allies against the Axis powers of imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and fascist Italy.

Donovan’s OSS. Donovan quickly set up a Research and Analysis Branch, drawing on the best of the Library of Congress and the U.S. academic community. Also created were the division of Strategic Operations, the Foreign Nationalities Branch, and a Labor Division, engaging in everything from strategic deception to guerrilla warfare. OSS operations are credited with supporting resistance behind enemy lines, groups that served to increase the dispersal of German forces in Europe, and keeping dozens or more of German divisions busy with peripheral issues at a time when they could have been deployed in Russia or France, or moving to meet the invading Allies at Normandy during the D-Day landings. Although Donovan was nominally the coordinator of all intelligence, his title was belied by the host of geographic areas denied to him by his bureaucratic rivals. Latin America was the province of Nelson Rockefeller, while domestic security was largely headed up by the FBI. In the southwest Pacific theater, General Douglas MacArthur and his intelligence chief, Colonel Charles Willoughby, relied on their own U.S.-Australian Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB). Then, of course, there was the all-important signals intelligence data, decoded from intercepts of Japanese communications (codename MAGIC), as well as the German messages decoded by the ULTRA operation that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill eventually

shared with FDR. Not only was such signals-intelligence important in the battles for the Pacific and Atlantic, but

Anglo-American sharing of this information also formed the basis for the U.S..UK agreements in 1943 that created a formal division of labor in this area. While serving as a multiplier of intelligence power, as it were, the cooperation also paved the way for widespread Soviet espionage in the United States, via British participation in the atomicbomb project, as a number of these persons were

secretly spying for the Soviet Union.

The Cold War and U.S. intelligence. Though the United States and the Soviet Union were allied in World War II, rivalry quickly broke out between the two superpowers. The United States sought a world open to trade and investment, while the So-

viets viewed integration into the world economy as ensuring their subordination within a U.S.dominated world system. As the world war ended and the struggle for advantage continued, the United States moved to divide countries such as Korea (with Soviet agreement in 1945) and Germany. America rebuilt its former enemies West Germany and Japan as the industrial workshops of Europe and Asia within U.S.-led military alliances, serving to contain both communist enemies and U.S. allies, while working to ensure the third world remained open to trade and investment. This was seen as necessary to guard against the inter-imperial rivalry and nationalism that had torn apart British hegemony, and led to the disintegration of the global system over which it presided. U.S. officials and members of the intelligence community, in the face of a fiscally conservative Congress unwilling to release funds for these goals, found it convenient to exaggerate the scope of the Soviet threat (relatively easy to do given Soviet leader Josef Stalin’s murderous reign), to secure their larger objectives. Yet the larger drama being played out was the replacement of a British-centered global system with an American hegemony. So, after Britain announced to the United States that it would no longer be able to protect the security of Greece and Turkey, the U.S. administration promulgated the Truman Doctrine, declaring, in effect, that it would take over England’s responsibilities. In so doing, the United States ensured control over Middle Eastern oil, or what the State Department once called “the greatest material prize in world history.” The year 1947 saw the formal creation, with Congressional passage of the National Security Act (NSA), of the CIA, an independent air force, and the National Security Council. As the United States moved to create alliance systems in Europe and rebuild the former Axis powers, the Soviets reacted in a predictable though ominous manner, increasing their totalitarian hold over Eastern Europe. In the year following the passage of the NSA and declaration of the Truman Doctrine, the Soviets shut off Western access to the four-power controlled West Berlin, deep in the heart of the Soviet-controlled territory of what had become East Germany. The Berlin Crisis of 1948, the first of more to come, met.with a brilliantly executed allied response, an airlift operation to the beleaguered city that secured increased support for the formation of the U.S.led North At-

lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, the same year the Soviets exploded an atomic bomb ana the Chinese communists emerged victorious in their civil war. Following soon after these events was the North Korean attack against South Korea in June 1950. Then, following MacArthur’s heroic landing at Inchon and his progress right up to China’s border, massive Chinese troops entered the war on the side of North Korea. While Chinese intervention brought the United States close to considering the use of nuclear weapons, it also provided the opportunity for America to carry out the objectives

mapped out by Secretary of State Dean Acheson and his aide Paul Nitze, including a rise in U.S. military expenditures from some $10 to $50 billion. The emergence of global national-security issues went hand-in-hand with a growing bitterness in domestic politics, as questions of “Who lost China?” brought about a “red scare” that included the search for communist spies at the highest levels of government and within civil society as well, affecting many facets of domestic life. East and West Germany became the site of intelligence wars, with the secret services of both sides seeking to count the troops, tanks, bombers, and missiles being prepared for use in a future war. The United States built-up a global system of alliances to maintain a favorable climate for the global expansion of democracy and capitalism and to protect its geopolitical interests overseas.

The golden age of covert operations. As the Cold War heated up, the CIA’s newly created Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), headed by Frank Wisner and at the time answering to the State Department and the Pentagon, established a sizeable apparatus for covert warfare from Europe to Asia. The OPC carried out airdrops and guerrilla warfare operations behind enemy lines, often relying on former Axis partisans. Due to moles in the British service, the operations were largely a failure. In the third world, it was a different matter. As countries across the globe were freed from colonialism or sought greater freedom of action, independent nationalist movements or those that were communist-inspired were seen as a threat to U.S. economic and politico-military interests. In the face of this challenge, Anglo-American intelligence services responded, as with 1953’s Operation AJAX, involving the overthrow of the nationalist

government in Iran. The CIA’s own clandestine history of the operation begins by noting, “By the end of 1952, it had become clear that the Mossadeq government in Iran was incapable of reaching an oil settlement with interested Western countries,” before going on to list a host of other factors, an indication of the confluence of commercial interests and geopolitical designs which inspired the operation. The next year, the democratically elected and mildly reformist government of Guatemala was overthrown; installed in its place was a military dictatorship closely tied with the country’s oligarchy, which over the decades was responsible for hundreds of thousands of killings and disappearances. There were many more operations, with counterinsurgency efforts in Latin America undergoing a massive boost under President John F. Kennedy’s administration, after the Cuban communist revolution. In Cuba, though, the U.S. quest to remove Cuban revolutionary leader Fidel Castro ended ina humiliating defeat at the Bay of Pigs, which was, as the title of one book put it, A Perfect Failure. Yet the obsession with covert operations and plans to kill Castro continued with Operation MONGOOSE, in conjunction with new plans to invade Cuba in the fall of 1962. When the Soviets put nuclear weapons on the island of Cuba, the activity was captured by U-2 spy plane overflights, triggering one of the most dangerous phases of the Cold War. With the Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, U.S. efforts to invade the island came to an end, but covert operations around the globe did not. During President Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration in the mid-1960s, the U.S. intelligence services provided aid to the groups that overthrew the populist government in Brazil. And, after the fall of the Sukarno regime in Indonesia, long-plotted against by the United States, The New York Times noted, even the State Department’s official history “shows an American effort ...to encourage the Indonesian military’s wholesale effort to wipe out the communist opposition. Generally accepted estimates from historians range from 300,000 to 1 million dead in the killing rampage.” The potential danger of covert efforts was even more starkly revealed in Vietnam, after legendary CIA operative Edward Lansdale helped create a nominally independent government in the South. Yet this South Vietnamese government never had much of a native constituency, thus paving the way

for the deployment of some half-million American troops to Vietnam, and dropping millions of tons of bombs on Indochina. The massive expansion of the Vietnam War, in turn, ultimately led to demonstrations and some violent protests from anti-war activists at home. The late 1960s and early 1970s saw the counterculture generation alarm the American establishment enough that the FBI and CIA became involved in actions that violated the civil rights of American citizens. In addition, President Richard Nixon’s Watergate scandal and other abuses by government power finally helped trigger Congressional investigations and reforms of the intelligence agencies in the 1970s.

Reagan carried out an even more aggressive for-

eign policy than ‘Carter, supporting global proxy wars versus Soviet-installed or revolutionary Islamic regimes such as those in Afghanistan and Iran, as well as against nationalist or communist insurgencies in Asia, Africa, and Central America. Many of the most secret covert operations under Reagan were exposed with the Iran-Contra revelations. Two policies during this period were particularly important, though. During this period the United States provided military and intelligence support (much of it covert) for Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in his invasion and decade-long war against Iran. Additionally, the CIA organized resistance of Islamist militants from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and elsewhere

The sophistication of U.S. intelligence. Along with these cloak-and-dagger operations, there has been an equally, if not more important, growing technological sophistication of U.S. intelligence. In 1952, the U.S. created the National Security Agency (NSA), so secret that it was jokingly referred to as “No Such Agency,” largely to monitor global communications intelligence. And, after the Soviet’s first test of an artificial satellite (Sputnik in 1957) from an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the U.S. followed up the success of its reconnaissance plane, the U-2, with numerous satellite pro-

grams that revealed the much touted missile gap to be dramatically in the Americans’ favor. The success of the American Corona satellite was merely one of the earliest in a massive satellite program that has given the U.S. an astonishing range of capabilities in global reconnaissance and surveillance, making it the premier space power. Yet for all the technical sophistication, the weakness of U.S. intelligence agencies would eventually be revealed. The potential threat of the Iranian Islamic revolution against the shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed to U.S. control of Middle East oil, combined with political pressure from elite groups such as the Committee on the Present Danger, forced President Jimmy Carter’s administration to initiate a massive rearmament program, dramatically continued during Ronald Reagan’s presidency. Carter also made the decision to give massive military aid to the government of El Salvador during its civil war, despite the involvement of the military and intelligence services in mass killings, including Salvadoran government-coordinated death squads, and widespread repression of civilian populations.

to defeat Soviet forces in Afghanistan, including recruitment from the madrassas (religious schools) of Pakistan, whose intelligence services became very close to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Many of these programs, in conjunction with space-based anti-ballistic defenses called Star Wars, arguably helped speed the fall of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and ultimately helped lead to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Yet such support came back to haunt the United States, as many Afghan war veterans, such as Osama bin Laden, reportedly recruited by the head of Saudi Arabia’s intelligence service, were angered by U.S. forces stationed in Saudi Arabia after international forces pushed back Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Bin Laden used the resources garnered during the Afghan conflict to build al-Qaeda, launching widespread attacks on U.S. and Western interests across the globe, including the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. September 11. The September 11 attacks led to new investigations of the intelligence community, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and a new joint CIA-FBI counterterrorism center reporting to the director of Central Intelligence (DCI). In the first decade of the 21st century, U.S. intelligence faced a host of challenges, from the emergence of mid-level powers to the al-Qaeda network. Additionally, there is the whole question of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon proliferation, including in those countries’ President George W. Bush named the “axis of evil”: Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. The U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s marked

only the first “battles” in the War on Terrorism, Bush declared. In response to the need for more acute intelligence to fend off terrorism, Bush signed an authorization allowing for the assassination of what are considered enemy combatants abroad, even if those persons are U.S. citizens. In addition, Bush’s new National Security Doctrine embraced preemption, described as “preventive war” as was the case with the invasion of Iraq in 2003. With the cultural sea change in the U.S. perception of danger

after September 11, there is likely to continue to be a massive expansion of U.S. intelligence capability and growing latitude for aggressive domestic and overseas operations. By the summer of 2004, however, America’s intelligence reforms and effectiveness came under intense scrutiny with the release of the 9/11 Commission findings. The commission, a bipartisan panel which examined the events leading to September 11, found intelligence deficiencies in the US. intelligence community that required immediate attention if the country were to successfully fight terrorism. The commission’s recommendations, ranging from the implementation of a new intelligence leadership hierarchy to restructuring the CIA, were debated in Congressional hearings, but action seemed stalled in the face of an impending presidential election in the fall of 2004. THOMAS EHRLICH REIFER, PH.D. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE

SEE ALSO: Office of Strategic Services; Donovan, William J.; Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Homeland Security Department.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (HarperCollins, 1995); James Bamford, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency (Anchor Books, 2002); William R. Corson, The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire (Dial Press, 1977); Burton Hersh, The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA (Charles Scribners, 1992); Stephen F. Knott, Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency (Oxford University Press, 1996); G.J.A. O’Toole, Honorable Treachery: A History of WS. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action from the Ameri-

can Revolution to the CIA (Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991); Thomas Powers, Intelligence Wars: Secret History from Hitler to al-Qaeda (New York Review of Books, 2002).

USS Liberty IN A TRAGIC incident during the Arab-Israeli SixDay War of 1967, Israeli forces reportedly mistakenly attacked the American intelligence ship Liberty as it steamed in international waters off the Sinai Peninsula. The incident greatly embarrassed both the United States and Israeli governments, and although various investigations determined that the attacks resulted from mistaken identity, efforts to suppress the facts surrounding the episode led to subsequent charges of a cover-up. The Liberty was commissioned by the Maritime Commission in 1945 as the freighter Simmons Victory and saw service in both World War II and the Korean War before being mothballed in 1958. In 1963, the U.S. Navy, in cooperation with the National Security Agency (NSA), started a secret shipboard intelligence-collection program and chose this ship, and several other retired freighters, for conversion into electronic surveillance ships. Outfitted with sophisticated equipment capable of intercepting a wide spectrum of radio, telephone, and microwave transmissions, the re-christened Liberty re-entered service in December 1964 as a “technical research” ship. After sea trials and specialized crew training, the ship arrived at the assigned station off the African coast, patrolling there throughout 1965 and 1966. On May 2, 1967, the Liberty, under Commander William L. McGonagle and carrying a civilian NSA detachment, left Norfolk, Virginia, for another African deployment. Three weeks later, the NSA diverted it to the Middle East, where tensions between Israel and the United Arab Republic (UAR) were escalating toward war. The Liberty arrived in the eastern Mediterranean on June 8, three days after the Israelis opened hostilities against the UAR. A breakdown in navy communications delayed orders directing it away from the war zone, and Liberty began patrolling off the Sinai coast. The Israelis, while responding to false reports of seaside shelling, immediately concluded Liberty was an Egyptian warship. Two flights of Israeli

fighter-bombers soon swept down upon the Liberty, strafing and bombing. Minutes later, three Israeli patrol boats appeared and raked the ship further with cannon fire before torpedoing the starboard bow. As sailors struggled on deck to fight the fire, the Israelis machine-gunned them, as well as their rubber rafts when they tried to evacuate the ship. The assault ended when Israeli commanders positively identified the Liberty as an American ship, but only after 34 crewmembers were killed and another 171 wounded. McGonagle, wounded in the attacks but remaining at his post, rebuffed Israeli offers of assistance and successfully guided the stricken ship . out of the area. The Israeli government quickly apologized to the U.S. government and arranged for reparations, and after a naval court of inquiry confirmed the Israeli account of the incident, President Lyndon Johnson’s administration announced the matter closed. The U.S. Department of Defense remained embarrassed by the Liberty’s discovery near Israeli territory, however, and issued deceptive statements, claiming it had been in the region coordinating the evacuation of Americans from the war zone. To further discourage discussion of the incident, the Defense Department also classified all documentation concerning the Liberty and allegedly attempted to coerce surviving crewmembers into silence. These measures, as well as those taken by the Israelis to downplay the incident, fueled longstanding allegations of a cover-up, especially from embittered survivors who charged that the Israelis had deliberately attacked the Liberty knowing that it was an American ship. However, 13 separate American and Israeli investigations have since reconfirmed the original findings that the attacks were accidental. In June, 1968, U.S. Navy Secretary Paul Ignatius presented McGonagle with the Congressional Medal of Honor for his gallantry in saving the ship. That same month, the Navy decommissioned the Liberty, and two years later scrapped the ship. JAMIE RIFE

HIsTORY ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED SEE ALSO: Israel; Six-Day War; National Agency; collection; signals intelligence.

Security

BIBLIOGRAPHY. A. J. Cristol, The Liberty Incident: The 1967 Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship (Brassey’s

Inc., 2002); James M. Ennes, Jr., Assault on the Liberty:

The True Story of the‘Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship (Ivy Books, 1987); Reverdy S. Fishel, “The Attack on the Liberty: An ‘Accident’?,” Intelligence and Counterintelligence (v.8/3, 1995).

USS Pueblo A SECOND KOREAN War nearly erupted when North Korean forces attacked and seized the U.S. Navy intelligence ship USS Pueblo in January 1968, » while it patrolled in the Sea of Japan. Occurring seven months after the accidental Israeli assault on the USS Liberty, the Pueblo incident further exposed the shortcomings of the U.S. government’s seaborne intelligence program, as well as the U.S. Navy’s continuing failure to protect its intelligence ships from foreign attacks on the high seas. The Pueblo had been built in 1944 as the general-purpose supply ship FP-344 for the Army Transportation Corps, and served through the latter stages of World War II and during the Korean War, before being taken out of service in 1954. In 1966, the U.S. Navy took control of the FP-344 and reactivated it for employment in Operation CLICKBEETLE, a secret naval signals-intelligence program similar to the National Security Agency’s “technical research ship” program, but cheaper and with smallet, less capable ships. The U.S. Navy placed the rechristened Pueblo under Commander Lloyd “Pete” Bucher and ordered him to oversee its refurbishment into an electronics-intelligence (ELINT) ship. Hampered by excessive secrecy, a restricted budget, and bureaucratic apathy, Bucher found his task problematic, but he managed to make the Pueblo seaworthy, albeit with decrepit engines, defective steering, and antiquated communications. Also, the ship was only lightly armed and had no destruct system for either its ELINT equipment or for the classified documents it carried. Despite these deficiencies, the U.S. Navy ordered the Pueblo into service in late 1967 in the Far East, where the United States was becoming increasingly concerned with North Korea’s growing belligerence. On January 16, 1968, the Pueblo arrived off the North Korean coast and began patrolling just outside of that nation’s territorial waters. A week later, on January 23, two heavily

armed North Korean warships and four torpedo boats, along with a pair of MiG fighter-bombers zooming overhead, aggressively challenged the Pueblo as it lay some 15 miles outside Wonsan Harbor. Bucher rebuffed North Korean demands for identification and attempted to escape. The North Koreans responded with cannon- and machine-gun fire, killing one crewman and wounding four. After Bucher’s urgent calls for help to the U.S. Pacific Fleet went unheeded, he surrendered his ship to a North Korean boarding party. The Pueblo’s capture was an intelligence bonanza for the North Koreans, who brutally interrogated and tortured the crew and also recovered the ship’s ELINT equipment and most of its classified documents. Conversely, the incident represented an unmitigated disaster for the U.S. government, which saw its ELINT capabilities in the Far East compromised for years afterward. The capture of a complete KW-11 encryption machine from the Pueblo, combined with information provided by John Walker, allowed the Soviet Union to decrypt an estimated one million top secret messages over the next 16 years. Moreover, the Pueblo’s seizure outraged the American public, and immediate cries for swift retribution against North Korea echoed throughout the country. However, President Lyndon Johnson,

gizing for the Pueblo’s espionage activities. Two hours later, the North Koreans released Bucher, 81 surviving crewmen, and the body of the sailor killed in the attack, but kept the ship. Amid public jubilation, the Pueblo crew members found themselves scrutinized by government authorities who believed that they had performed ignobly throughout the incident. A naval court of inquiry subsequently recommended court martials for Bucher and his intelligence officer, Lieutenant Stephen Harris, and lesser disciplinary actions for their immediate superiors, the ship’s executive officer, and five other crewmen. However, Secretary of the Navy John Chafee rejected disciplinary action against anyone involved in the incident and officially closed the case Despite Chafee’s decision, the navy ostracized the Pueblo’s officers and crewmen and ultimately drove most from the service. In 1990, though, the navy finally yielded to mounting public and Congressional pressure and rehabilitated the Pueblo crew by decorating them as prisoners of war. In 2003, 35 years after the incident, the Pueblo remains anchored in the Taedong River near Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, as a tourist attraction. JAMIE RIFE History ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED

then mired in the war in Vietnam, resisted calls for

military action and determined to pursue diplomatic measures to secure both the ship and crew’s return. Consequently, American officials engaged North Korean representatives in negotiations lasting 11 months. On December 23, 1968, senior American delegate Major General Gilbert Woodward finally signed a North Korean document admitting America’s full responsibility for the incident and apolo-

SEE ALSO: electronic intelligence; Korea, North; Korea, South; Johnson, Lyndon B.; Walker, John. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Mitchell B. Lerner, The Pueblo Incident (University Press of Kansas, 2002); Daniel Gallery, The Pueblo Incident (Doubleday, 1970); Nicholas Evan

Sarantakes, “The Quiet War: Combat Operations Along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, Military History (April 2000).

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