Encyclopedia of Cuban-United States Relations [1 ed.] 9780786491636, 9780786445820

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Encyclopedia of Cuban–United States Relations

Encyclopedia of Cuban–United States Relations Thomas M. Leonard

McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers Jefferson, North Carolina, and London

For Bruce Latimer and Ron Hanson

The present work is a reprint of the illustrated case bound edition of Encyclopedia of Cuban–United States Relations, first published in 2004 by McFarland.

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OF

CONGRESS CATALOGUING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Leonard, Thomas M., ¡937– Encyclopedia of Cuban–United States relations / Thomas M. Leonard. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7864-4582-0 softcover : 50# alkaline paper ¡. United States — Foreign relations — Cuba — Encyclopedias. 2. Cuba — Foreign relations — United States — Encyclopedias. I. Title. E¡83.8.C9L39 20¡0 327.729¡073'03 — dc22 20030260¡0 British Library cataloguing data are available ©2004 McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers. All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying or recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Manufactured in the United States of America

McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers Box 6¡¡, Je›erson, North Carolina 28640 www.mcfarlandpub.com

Contents Introduction 1

The Encyclopedia 7 Appendix ¡ Chronology 249 Appendix 2 Internet Sites 256 Appendix 3 Audiovisual Materials 258 Bibliography 262 Index 273

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Introduction that Great Britain might come to control the island, from which its navy could threaten the coastal United States. In ¡82¡, as secretary of state, John Quincy Adams spelled out the U.S. position that became the guideline for policy until late in the nineteenth century. U.S. interests Adams explained, were best served by Cuba remaining under Spanish control, however weak it might be. At the time, policymakers were influenced by the events surrounding the American Revolution and the War of ¡8¡2 in which Great Britain had been the nemesis. Hence the perception was that Britain sought to limit U.S. interests wherever they might be. A generation later, new factors influenced U.S. policy. Inspired by “manifest destiny,” Americans began expansion westward to the Pacific Ocean, completed with the ¡848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that o‡cially ended the war with Mexico. The treaty provided for the acquisition of the present-day states of California, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, and Colorado. Just prior to the outbreak of the Mexican War, the United States reached an agreement with Britain that provided for the addition of today’s states of Oregon and Washington. “Manifest Destiny” asserted that the United States, with its democracy and dynamic society and its superior economic system, had an obligation to uplift the inferior peoples

Only ninety miles from Key West, Florida, the island of Cuba draws the attention of the United States for many reasons. Today, in south Florida and in that portion of northern New Jersey where large communities of Cuban Americans reside, there are cantankerous feelings about the Cuban dictator, Fidel Castro. Elsewhere, there exists an attraction to visit this island that is o‡cially o› limits. Others express indi›erence, asking, “What is the problem?” U.S. commercial and agricultural sectors are drawn to Cuba as a potential market for their products. All of these feelings are related to the ¡959 Cuban Revolution and the subsequent forty-four years of Fidel Castro’s iron-fisted control over the island and his stand against the United States. However, long before the Cuban Revolution, U.S. policymakers focused their attention upon Cuba for other reasons, and in many ways their Cuban policy was a microcosm of larger policy considerations. U.S. interest in Cuba can be traced to President Thomas Je›erson, who understood the strategic importance of the island. He and his immediate successors, James Madison and James Monroe, understood the same principle: Cuba in the hands of a major European power would be a threat to the security of the United States. In particular, these men and their advisers feared

1

Introduction

who inhabited those western lands. There were those who thought that the United States was destined to do the same for the peoples of Mexico, Central America, and, for some, Cuba. Journalist John O’Sullivan, who coined the phrase “Manifest Destiny,” was intrigued with President James K. Polk’s plan for the United States to purchase Cuba to free the Cubans from the yoke of Spanish colonialism. Polk made an o›er, but Spain refused to part with its prized possession. The southern states had a particular interest in Cuba’s acquisition. After ¡848, southerners wanted the island annexed to the United States, believing that annexation would help the South to counterbalance the western states to be carved from the newly acquired Mexican territories. Their interest was the protection of slavery. The U.S. ministers in Europe — James Buchanan, John Mason, and Pierre Soulé— who signed the Ostend Manifesto in October ¡854, declaring that the United States should purchase Cuba from Spain. The Ostend Manifesto so outraged the government in Madrid that it declared that Cuba would sink in the ocean before Spain would sell it. U.S. interest in Cuba waned over the next generation because of the Civil War and the problems of postwar Reconstruction. Still, these policy shifts during the first three quarters of the nineteenth century did not sup-

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press the underlying belief that someday Cuba would become part of the United States. The last generation of the nineteenth century brought a new confidence to the North Americans. The phenomenal industrial growth and the completion of the transcontinental railroad served as examples of the Gilded Age. Advocates of a “large policy,” like Alfred T. Mahan, Henry Cabot Lodge Sr., and Theodore Roosevelt, envisioned a United States spreading its influence beyond its ocean boundaries. These spokespeople argued on behalf of the need for markets, raw materials, and strategic ports and the need to improve the quality of life of “backward” people. In fact, American presence in Cuba increased markedly after Cuba’s Ten Years’ War (¡868–¡878). U.S. investors purchased sugar plantations and refineries. By the mid–¡890s an estimated $50 million had been invested in the Cuban economy, mostly in its staple crop, sugar. Beyond the economic link, Cuba’s harbors o›ered the possibility of coaling stations and naval bases necessary for commercial ships to ply their trade and for the navy to use to secure the Caribbean region from foreign interlopers. Of course the Cubans were the victims of Spanish colonialism and, as mostly nonwhites, assumed to be in need of more modern political and social development. These factors converged to justify U.S. intervention

3 in the Spanish-American War in ¡898. Clearly, this was a moral crusade on behalf of the oppressed Cubans, an e›ort to protect U.S. business interests on the island and, in the end, a campaign for U.S. security. The same principles that took the United States to war in ¡898 characterized the subsequent military occupation and justified the Platt Amendment that was tacked on to the ¡902 Cuban constitution. The Americans secured the right to intervene in Cuban political a›airs to maintain political stability, to control Cuba’s fiscal policy, and to provide for naval stations, eventually settling upon that at Guantánamo Bay. These same principles justified U.S. interventions in Cuba from ¡906–¡920 and the use of policies described as “dollar diplomacy” and “preventive diplomacy.” The United States believed that the Cubans needed to learn political democracy, understand and apply judicial and civil legalities, and practice fiscal responsibility. Despite the e›orts of men like Charles Magoon and Enoch Crowder, the Cubans did not accept the U.S. schooling. Although the fact is no consolation to the Cubans, what the United States did on the island it also did throughout the Caribbean, in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mexico. The North Americans sought to impose their political and social culture on underdeveloped nations. In each instance the Americans failed to obtain their objectives. The area of economics was another issue. The Cubans di›ered in one respect : Their economy became dependent upon the United States as the major market for its sugar and as the source of manufactured and consumer goods. In the years immediately after the end of World War I a new era in U.S.-Cuban relations began to take shape. The European powers no longer threatened U.S. interests throughout the Caribbean. By the mid– ¡920s policymakers were frustrated with the e›orts to uplift the Caribbean and Central American peoples. State Department o‡cer Stokeley W. Morgan observed in ¡926 that

Introduction “revolutions are a way of life down there, and we can do nothing about it.” At the same time, the Commerce Department claimed that continued U.S. presence in the Caribbean so infuriated the other countries of Latin America that they refused to purchase American-made products. The highwater mark of the policy reassessment came in ¡928 with J. Reuben Clark’s Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, which simply stated that U.S. interventions in the region could not be justified on the basis of President James Monroe’s ¡823 pronouncement. Throughout the ¡920s Latin Americans increasingly protested against the U.S. interventions. The most intense protest came in ¡928 at the Inter-American Conference in Havana. Ironically, at that meeting Cuban president Gerardo Machado delivered a welcoming address in which he praised the benefits that interventionism brought to his country. By the time of the Havana conference, Cuba’s economic dependency upon the United States solidified. Besides purchasing most of Cuba’s sugar and supplying most of its consumer goods, U.S. investors found other lucrative opportunities in Cuba’s infrastructure — railroads, ports, warehousing, communications, water and sewerage and tourism. Just as the Americans increased their presence, a new generation of Cubans came of age, questioning not only the island’s traditional elite rulers but also the U.S. relationship. Their protests permeated Machado’s presidency and were responsible for his ouster in ¡933. Amidst the cross-currents of change separately a›ecting U.S. policy and Cuban political dynamics, President Franklin D. Roosevelt initiated the Good Neighbor policy in ¡933. Henceforth, the United States pledged to no longer intervene in the internal a›airs of Latin America. The new policy was applied to Cuba in ¡933 with the September “Sergeants’ Revolt,” in which Fulgencio Batista brought Ramón Grau San Martín to the presidency despite pleas from Ambassador Sumner Welles to President

Introduction Franklin Roosevelt to send in the marines. The marines may not have landed, but Welles convinced Roosevelt to withhold recognition from Grau San Martín and, along with Welles’ successor, Je›erson Ca›rey, quietly encouraged Batista to rid Cuba of this socialist leader. Batista did just that in January ¡934. Supporters of the Good Neighbor policy downplay these events and focus instead upon the treaty in ¡934 that abrogated the Platt Amendment. That same year the Jones-Costigan Act and the Reciprocal Trade Agreement contributed to a spurt in Cuban economic prosperity. To many, the United States truly was a good neighbor to Cuba. Batista’s ¡934 coup ushered in a new era in Cuban politics. For the next twentyfive years Batista was either the resident of the presidential palace or the power behind it. He manipulated presidents, dismissed congresses, and suppressed opposition. Batista also exhibited nationalist tendencies regarding the sugar industry by ensuring increased opportunities for Cuban sugar growers to have access to the U.S. market. A new prosperity befell the sugar growers during World War II when the United States purchased the entire Cuban sugar crop from ¡942–¡945. Cuba’s nationalism with regard to sugar contributed to a sell-o› by American planters and refiners, but otherwise it did not have an impact upon U.S. investments in the Cuban economy. In fact, organized crime found a home in Cuba after World War II. Occupied with global events — World War II and the Cold War — the United States apparently was unaware of the significance of the growing Cuban nationalism. Truly ill-advised planters wanting to secure their own wealth, and leftist-leaning labor organizations protesting against further U.S. economic penetration, caused presidents Grau San Martín (¡944–¡948) and Carlos Prio Socarrás (¡948–¡952) to reject a U.S.–proposed treaty providing for economic diversification. To these groups, the

4 treaty represented another example of “Yankee Imperialism. The embassy in Havana reported on these events, but apparently they made no impact upon State Department analysts. In fact, when Batista engineered the ¡952 coup d’état that vaulted him into the presidential palace for the last time, embassy sta›ers were pleased that he repressed the communist-oriented labor unions. Nor did the embassy give much attention to the significance of Fidel Castro’s failed raid upon the Moncada barracks in September ¡953 or to his return to the island from exile in Mexico in December ¡956. Until the arrival of Philip Bonsal in ¡959, the U.S. ambassadors to Havana were political appointees, not career Foreign Service o‡cers. Whether the latter’s presence in Cuba would have made a di›erence to Washington policymakers, who were focused upon the Cold War, is pure conjecture. Fidel Castro came on Washington’s radar screen in ¡957 after the New York Times publication of articles by Herbert Matthews, who found the young guerilla alive and well in Cuba’s Escambray Mountains. The Eisenhower administration was not sure how to react to the situation in Cuba, but it finally terminated military assistance to the Batista regime in March ¡958 because of its brutal repression of opposition groups. In early December ¡958, with Batista’s support eroding around him, Eisenhower sent William D. Pawley to Cuba in an e›ort to broker a deal. Batista would not accept the o›er, and on New Year’s Eve ¡958, he fled the island. A week later, Castro marched into Havana and, over the next months, consolidated his political power, held show trials for Batistianos followed by executions, and he initiated socialist reforms in housing and land ownership. The completion of a trade pact with the Soviet Union in February ¡960 sealed Castro’s fate. It convinced U.S. policymakers that Castro truly was a communist. Thereafter, each side escalated tensions with economic measures until January 3, ¡96¡, when Eisenhower severed diplomatic relations with

5 Cuba, By then a U.S. trade embargo was in place against Cuba and it remains so today. For the next forty years, U.S. policy stayed the course — the economic and political isolation of Cuba. Successive presidents, save Jimmy Carter, attempted to bring Latin America, Europe, and Japan into the fold, hoping that Cuba’s global isolation would destroy the island’s economy and, in turn, cause an internal uprising. After ¡970, America’s allies did not share Washington’s perception of Cuba, and slowly Cuba found new trading partners and sources of credit beyond the Soviet Union and the East European block countries. Beginning in the ¡980s, U.S. policy toward Cuba fell victim to domestic politics. The Miami-based Cuban American National Foundation found a sympathetic ear in the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations. In hope of winning the south Florida vote, and with it, of carrying the state of Florida in the ¡992 presidential election, Democratic Party candidate Bill Clinton announced that, if elected president, he would sign the Cuban Democracy Act (Torricelli Bill). Clinton’s assertion forced President George H.W. Bush to do just that for the same reason — votes in south Florida. Four years later Clinton signed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act (Helms-Burton Bill) in response to a public outcry over the Cuban Air Force’s downing of two unarmed planes allegedly flying over international waters near Cuba. In 200¡, these measures were designed to tighten the trade embargo on Cuba. President George W. Bush announced that the embargo would remain in e›ect during his tenure. Critics argued that this was in deference to his brother, Florida governor Jeb Bush, and the south Florida community to which he is tied. As the twenty-first century opened, the U.S. government’s hard-line stance against Cuba stood at odds with the policy of other industrialized nations. At home, the clamor against the continuance of the Cuban trade embargo intensified. The agricultural, com-

Introduction mercial, and manufacturing sectors pressured for change as they saw markets slip away to foreign competitors. With the Cold War over, many Americans simply lost interest in Cuba. Others protested the immorality and illegality of the embargo. The events of September ¡¡, 200¡, muted the argument, at least for the moment, as the United States pursued its war on terrorism. This encyclopedia illustrates the place of persons and events in the context of U.S. policy considerations toward Cuba. In using the encyclopedia, readers should be guided by the contours of U.S. policy outlined above. While each entry stands in isolation, readers should use the cross references at the end of entries. These connections provide the linkage necessary for placing each event into the context of the time. Internet sites that provide access to information regarding the contemporary debate over U.S. policy toward Cuba. The breadth of the audiovisual listings in Appendix 3 provide illustration of the cultural, economic, and political relationships between the two countries. The selected annotated bibliography at the end of this book is divided into its background and time periods that characterize the historical relationship between the United States and Cuba. It directs the reader to the most significant works for each time period. Thanks are extended to Vernon Payne, a graphic artist at the University of North Florida who carefully crafted the maps that appear in this volume. I am also grateful to Bruce Latimer, head of the documents Collection at the University’s Thomas G. Carpenter Library who tracked down obscure sources and other information needed to make this volume complete. And thanks again to my wife, Yvonne, whose interminable patience and understanding permits me to pursue my own work and also keeps a family of six children, six in-laws, and thirteen grandchildren together. Tom Leonard Jacksonville, Florida February 2004

The Encyclopedia Adams, John Quincy

tration of President James G. Monroe. Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, representing southern interests, argued for Cuba’s immediate annexation. Like his southern colleagues, Calhoun feared that a black Cuba would not only prevent U.S. annexation of the island, but also might stir similar plots across the U.S. South. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams argued otherwise. He reasoned that the ineptitude of Cuban Creole leadership and the possibility of racial conflict on the island were justifications for not annexing it. Furthermore, Adams suggested that U.S. annexation of Cuba might result in war with Great Britain, which he feared had designs upon the socalled “Pearl of the Antilles.” Adams based his position on international-power politics. He pointed out that Britain, France, Spain, and the United States had reason to want tranquility throughout the Caribbean. Adams argued that Spain’s loss of Cuba and the possible subsequent race war on the island might trigger similar movements in the European colonies across the Caribbean and, as a result, give Britain reason to intervene in Cuba. A British presence in Cuba would endanger U.S. security. From Havana, British warships could threaten U.S. coastal areas and interfere with U.S. merchant ships plying the Caribbean waters. Thus, Adams concluded that Spain’s archaic rule over Cuba, rather than Cuba’s independence, better-served U.S. interests. Adams reasoning became the basis

(¡767–¡848) John Quincy Adams was a U.S. statesman who served as a senator to the national Congress from the state of Massachusetts prior to becoming secretary of state (¡8¡7–¡823) and president (¡825–¡829), after which he was continuously elected to the House of Representatives until his death. Although several of his predecessors expressed similar thoughts regarding U.S. interests in Cuba, Adams was the first to articulate them during an international crisis. As such, Adams earned the reputation as the architect of U.S.–Cuban policy to ¡898. Adams recognized the strategic and commercial importance of Cuba and Puerto Rico to the United States and thought that their annexation was indispensable to the future economic growth and security of the nation. Adams opposed any forced linkage, instead believing that Cuba would someday disconnect itself from Spain and, because of its own incapabilities, would gravitate toward the United States. Until that time came, Adams proposed that the United States pursue a policy designed to keep Cuba under Spanish control and oppose its transfer to another European power. In ¡82¡, a Creole revolutionary movement erupted within Cuba that potentially threatened to ignite a war pitting blacks, free and slave, against the elite Creoles. The movement prompted a debate within the adminis-

7

Africa for U.S. policy well into the late nineteenth century. In ¡823, with the restoration of the Spanish crown by the European powers, many Americans thought that Cuba would be transferred to Britain. Adams made it known publicly that the U.S. preferred continued Spanish control. Privately, however, he explained that he expected the Cubans to some day detach themselves from Spain and seek admission to the United States. In London, Britain’s foreign minister George Canning shared many of Adams’s thoughts regarding Spanish control of Cuba, but he saw the United States as a danger to British interests and trade in the Caribbean, including the danger that the United States would encourage the independence of Britain’s Caribbean possessions. Like Adams, Canning concluded that British interests were best served by a Cuba under Spanish rule. But unlike Adams, he thought that France might act independently to protect its own Caribbean interests. Therefore, in ¡825, Canning proposed a tripartite agreement — Britain, France, and the United States — to guarantee Spain’s control over Cuba. Adams, now president and ever the U.S. nationalist, refused. Adams believed in policies that dated to George Washington and Thomas Je›erson: no permanent or entangling alliances. For the moment, the ¡823 Monroe Doctrine su‡ced. See also Je›erson, Thomas

Africa Spain’s Africanization Program A Spanish policy designed to make Cuba undesirable to U.S. southern annexationists. In September ¡853, the Spanish government appointed Marques de la Pezuela, known for his opposition to slavery, as Captain-General of Cuba. The Spanish government was motivated not by Pezuela’s idealism to abolish slavery, but by a desire to thwart further filibustering activities from the United States. In December ¡853, Pezuela decreed measures to end the African slave trade and to pro-

8 vide for the free importation of Indians, Asian and Spaniards to meet labor shortages in Cuba. Furthermore, emancipados (free blacks) brought to the island before ¡835 would join the free blacks already on the island in gaining permanent residency in Cuba. At the same time the local government assumed responsibility for the emancipados, and it hired them out to plantation owners in return for onequarter of their salary. The system only encouraged the slave traders to bring Africans designated as emancipados to Cuba. In e›ect, a new labor system was introduced to Cuba that, over time, would supplant slavery. The plan’s purpose was not lost upon the Cuban Creoles. In Cuba, the planters feared the development of an uncontrollable black population. Concerned with their own future status, the Creoles appealed to U.S. president Franklin Pierce. The Creoles charged that the Africanization plan was part of a larger British design to destroy the Cuban sugar industry in order to secure their own Caribbean islands from competition. This, according to the Creoles, amounted to British intervention in hemispheric a›airs and, according to the Monroe Doctrine, required that the United States prevent it. The Africanization plan frightened the U.S. southern leadership, which feared that a “black” Cuba would not only lure U.S. blacks to the island but would inspire revolts in the United States. This fear led to calls for the immediate annexation of Cuba and to the proposed filibuster expedition by Mississippian John A. Quitman scheduled for the spring of ¡855. Southerners pressed the Pierce administration not to interfere with the filibusters on the grounds that they were only aiding the Cuban Creoles, already in a state of “moral” revolution. Once free of Spanish rule, the southerners continued, Cuba, like Texas before it, could be annexed to the United States. The southerners justified Cuba’s annexation by claiming that it would bring benefits to both the South and the North. By extending slavery to the island, the South gained political security in the national Congress and the North would benefit from commerce unfettered by Spanish restrictions.

9 Pezuela was recalled to Spain in September ¡854, and with his recall, the Africanization plan lapsed. But the Spanish actions did not prevent another Creole revolutionary plot on the island, nor did they put an end to Quitman’s filibustering plans. Quitman’s scheduled arrival in February ¡855 was to coincide with a local insurrection, but the forewarned Spanish authorities crushed the insurrectionists. In the face of opposition from the Pierce administration and knowing the long odds of success on the island, Quitman lost enthusiasm for the Cuban adventure. On April 30, ¡855, he abandoned the project. See also López, Narciso; Quitman, John A.

Cuba’s Military Involvement Cuba’s interest in Africa dates to ¡963, when it sided with the Algerians in their war against Morocco. In ¡965, Ernesto “Che” Guevara left Cuba for the Congo, where he failed to organize an antiwestern guerrilla force. That same year, Cuban troops arrived in Congo (Brazzaville), and Castro began a close relationship with the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Only when the Cubans became involved in the Angolan Civil War in ¡975 did the United States become greatly concerned. Cuba’s military involvement in Angola remains its largest military engagement in a foreign conflict. Cuban assistance enabled the Marxist-oriented MPLA, led by Agostinho Neto, to take control of the capital, Luanda, when independence was granted in November ¡974. Subsequently, Cuban troops and Soviet military assistance enabled the MPLA to defeat its adversaries: the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), led by Holden Roberto, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), headed by Joseph Savimbi. On April 25, ¡974, a bloodless military coup resulted in the ouster of Portuguese premier Marcello Caetano. Fourteen years of fruitless war against nationalist movements in Portugal’s African territories — Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau — were a direct

Africa cause of the coup. The new government immediately ended hostilities in Africa and promised the territories independence by the end of ¡975. In e›ect, black rulers would replace the incumbent whites. At the time, U.S. president Richard Nixon gave little attention to the events in Portugal, as he focused upon the Middle East and détente with the Soviet Union in the international arena and the unfolding Watergate crisis at home. In reality, U.S. policy was not prepared for the event. At the time, Washington operated under the belief that white regimes would remain in power for the foreseeable future. Although a civil war, directed mostly at the MPLA, continued after Angola’s independence in November ¡974, the MPLA was recognized as the legitimate government by most African and West European nations. However, the Gerald Ford administration approved a $300,000 program of covert support for the FNLA in January ¡975, favoring it over the Marxist-leaning MPLA, whose army included an estimated 230 Cuban advisers. The situation worsened by early summer ¡975. At that time the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) requested $32 million to support the opposition FNLA, UNITA, Portuguese military and secret police, and South African troops who entered the battle against Neto’s MPLA. The CIA proposal met with resistance within the administration. A National Security Council (NSC) Task Force advised Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that, most likely, the CIA’s covert plan would not remain secret and would create an embarrassing political debate within the United States. The Task Force doubted that the United States would be able to influence the actions of the indigenous leaders and felt that the CIA actions would result in increased Soviet and Cuban support to the MPLA. Assistant Secretary of State Nathaniel Davis drew the parallel to Vietnam, arguing that the United States was inviting itself into a quagmire if the CIA plan were put into operation. The only possible way to win the conflict would be through a massive and public commitment to the opposition, and even that did not guar-

Africa antee political stability when the fighting stopped. Davis also anticipated an immediate and rapid increase in Soviet-Cuban military assistance to the MPLA if the United States became involved. The advice was rejected. The CIA plan was approved in July ¡975. Davis immediately resigned. Over the next several months, the Soviets ferried an estimated 40,000 Cuban troops into Angola along with military hardware from Eastern Europe. President Nixon’s ¡970 pledge not to invade Cuba provided Castro with the security to venture into Africa. By the fall of ¡975, it became clear that the communist-supported MPLA would win the battle. At that time also, the CIA contingency fund had been drained, and Congress rejected its request for additional funding. By December the opposition FNLA and UNITA withdrew from battle. The Ford administration used Cuba’s intervention in Angola to break o› the exploratory talks begun in November ¡974 and to rea‡rm its commitment to the isolation of Cuba until it stopped its adventurism abroad. In January ¡976, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African A›airs, Kissinger insisted that blame for the U.S. fiasco in Angola not be placed upon the Ford administration but upon Congress for failing to provide the necessary support to thwart communist expansion. The Carter administration continued the policy. Until there was clear evidence of Cuban restraint in Africa, President Jimmy Carter declared in April ¡977, that there could be no normalization of relations with Cuba — a di‡cult task given the fact the Cubans remained following the civil war and, an estimated 400,000 Cubans participated in military and civil projects between ¡976 and ¡99¡. Carter confronted a larger problem in Ethiopia, a long-time U.S. ally and one that allowed the United States to operate a radar and communications station at Kagnew. Following the ouster of Haile Selassie in ¡974 by a radical group called the Dergue. Ethiopia subsequently proclaimed itself a MarxistLeninist state. The Dergue expelled the Amer-

10 icans and established links with the Soviet Union. In neighboring Somalia, Said Barre, who seized power in ¡969, became a close ally of the Soviet Union until ¡977, when his forces entered the Ogaden desert with the intention of annexing it to Somalia. His break with the Soviet Union meant that it, along with Cuban troops, would support the Ethiopian resistance. In the yearlong war, the Soviets provided three generals to direct the ground war, and the Cubans provided 20,000 personnel, including fighter pilots and combat brigades. The presence of great numbers of Cuban troops sealed the fate of Carter’s Cuban policy. Normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba were inextricably linked to the Cuban presence in Africa. The situation was further complicated in ¡980 when Cuba and Angola completed a bilateral accord. Ronald Reagan inherited the problem when he came to the U.S. presidency in January ¡98¡. He also added a new caveat: He endorsed the South African demand for the removal of Cuban troops from Angola as a precondition for the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia. Reagan thus argued that the presence of Cuban troops in Angola was the sole stumbling block to Namibian independence. Castro was equal to the challenge. In February ¡986, Castro asserted that the South African forces must first depart from Namibia and, for the first time, demanded that the South African government terminate apartheid as a precondition for the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. Whatever Castro’s purpose, his words gave the Reagan administration another reason to reject Cuban overtures for normalization of relations between Havana and Washington. From this perspective, Reagan followed Carter’s linkage policy. Only a tripartite agreement in December ¡988 among the belligerents paved the way for the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, an impoverished Cuba, and the end of white rule in Africa denied the Angolan adversaries outside support. By ¡99¡, the Cuban troops came

11 home, but their removal had little impact upon bilateral U.S.–Cuban relations. See also Bush, George H.W.; Carter, Jimmy; Castro Ruz, Fidel; Foreign Policy; Reagan, Ronald W.

Agribusiness Exhibition Havana, September 26–30, 2002 In the first agricultural trade show since ¡959, 750 persons representing 285 U.S. companies from 33 di›erent states, plus others from numerous organizations and state governments gathered in a Havana suburb in search of nearly $50 million in contracts. While the Treasury Department issued a license, thus giving o‡cial U.S. government sanction to the event, administrative spokespersons took a critical stance. For example, the head of the U.S. interests section in Havana, James Cason, warned the participants that Cuba might well renege on making payment on any contract. Assistant Secretary of State Otto Reich was more blunt when he warned the visitors “not to participate in sexual tourism … one of Cuba’s main industries.” The Cuban American Foundation and Florida Governor Jeb Bush criticized the attendees for propping up the Castro regime. Oddly, Florida was represented by 3¡ businesses, more than any other state. Archer Daniels Midland, an agribusiness giant, served as the key organizer of the event. Other large firms contributing to the sponsorship included Cargill, ConAgra Foods, Hormel Foods, Perdue Farms, and Tyson Foods. Some U.S. businesses hoped to revive Cuban demand for products Cubans knew before the revolution — Aunt Jemima pancakes, Kellogg’s cereals, Uncle Ben’s rice and, Spam. The exhibition came amidst growing pressure in the United States to end the fortyyear-old trade embargo against Cuba but resisted strongly by President George W. Bush. See also Bush, George W.; Trade Embargo

Air Hijackings The first political hijacking in Cuban history occurred on October 2¡, ¡958, when

Air Hijackings members of Raúl Castro’s rebel army hijacked a Cubana airline flying from Miami, Florida, to Varadero, Cuba. All aboard the craft, including seventeen of Castro’s followers, died when the plane attempted to land in Oriente Province. Supporters of Fulgencio Batista staged their own hijacking when fleeing the country on January ¡, ¡959 as they directed a Cubana aircraft to fly to New York City. This precedent led to the hijacking of twelve additional Cuban aircraft through July ¡96¡ by Batistianos and other elites. The United States provided asylum to anyone hijacking a plane from Cuba and refused to prosecute or repatriate the hijackers to Cuba, even if passengers or crewmembers were wounded or killed during the incident. U.S. courts permitted companies to confiscate the Cuban planes for any outstanding Cuban debts. The first plane hijacked from the United States to Cuba during the Castro period was on May ¡, ¡96¡. The most significant was on July 24, ¡96¡, when Wilfredo Román Oquendo hijacked an Eastern Airlines flight with thirty-eight passengers and crew. Fidel Castro refused to return the plane but suggested that he would exchange them for twenty-four U.S.–held Cuban aircraft. The United States refused. In August ¡96¡, Castro exchanged the craft for a U.S. held Cuban gunboat. As a result, President John F. Kennedy asked Congress to implement anti-hijacking legislation, but at the moment nothing materialized. Of the ¡59 American aircraft hijacked between May ¡, ¡96¡, and December 3¡, ¡972, 85 were flown to Cuba. The hijackers fell into four categories: political dissidents, criminals, the emotionally disturbed, and Cuban agents. Between ¡968 and ¡97¡, ¡2¡ planes worldwide were hijacked to the island. In ¡968 alone, thirteen scheduled U.S. airliners, three small craft and one charter flight were hijacked to Cuba. During that same year, Colombia had three aircraft taken to Cuba, and Venezuela and Mexico had two each. In an attempt to stop the hijackings, the State Department announced that it would permit Cuban exiles to return home, but Fidel Castro refused to accept them. Despite an

Alarcón de Quesada anti-hijacking agreement brokered by International Air Transport Association director Nut Hammarskjöld on January ¡8, ¡969, hijackings continued on a near weekly basis. Finally, in September ¡969 Castro announced that the hijackers would no longer be welcome in Cuba and that his government was willing to negotiate extradition agreements.

Anti-Hijacking Accord On February ¡5, ¡973, the United States and Cuba signed a five-year agreement to curb the hijacking of aircraft and ships between the two signatories. The agreement was negotiated by the Swiss Embassy in Havana because of the severed diplomatic relations between the two countries. O‡cially a “Memorandum of Understanding,” rather than a formal treaty requiring Senate approval, it was signed simultaneously by Secretary of State William P. Rogers in Washington, D.C., and Cuban foreign minister Raúl Roa in Havana. The agreement required each country to put hijackers on trial for the o›ense and, if found guilty, to improve the most severe punishment possible or to extradite them. Political asylum could be provided for those “in real and imminent danger of death,” but not if they were escaping a crime. The agreement required the prompt return of hijacked planes and vessels and all goods on board Furthermore, the agreement required each to punish anyone who used the territory to organize attacks against the other, a clear reference to the exile community in south Florida. Cuba signed similar agreements with Mexico that same year and with Colombia in ¡974. Subsequently, hijackings became an unusual occurrence, but several Cubans attempted to reach the United States as stowaways aboard aircraft. Castro used this last proviso to void the agreement in ¡976 because of an exile attack upon Cuba that originated in Miami.

Alarcón de Quesada, Ricardo (¡937– ) A Cuban diplomat and politician, Alar-

12 cón in the ¡990s became one of Fidel Castro’s closest advisors and Cuba’s lead negotiator with the United States. In the ¡950s, he studied law at the University of Havana and became involved in the 26th of July Movement. In ¡962, following the Revolution, Alarcón de Quesada, joined the Ministry of Foreign A›airs as head of the Latin American Directorate. In ¡970 he was appointed Cuba’s ambassador to the United Nations, a position he retained until his appointment as deputy minister of foreign relations in ¡978. He helped to negotiate the ¡984 and ¡987 Immigration Accords with the United States. In ¡989 he represented Cuba when it was elected a member of the United Nations Security Council and again represented Cuba to the world body in ¡99¡ and ¡992, when became minister of foreign a›airs. He led the negotiations with the United States on migratory issues in ¡994 and ¡995 and during the Elian González case in 2000. In addition to his foreign a›airs responsibilities, Alarcón de Quesada was elected president of the National Assembly in ¡993 and reelected in ¡998. He became a member of the Communist Party politburo in ¡992 and was reelected in ¡997. See also Balsero Crisis; Immigration Agreement of ¡984; 26th of July Movement

Alliance for Progress In a speech on March ¡3, ¡96¡, President John F. Kennedy pledged that the United States would work to satisfy the basic human needs of Latin Americans and that these socioeconomic improvements would be accomplished within the framework of democratic institutions. The Alliance for Progress was launched at the Inter-American Economic and Social Conference meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in August ¡96¡. The charter for the alliance was signed by all members of the Organization of American States (OAS) except Cuba, which denounced the program as another e›ort by the United States to dominate Latin American a›airs. The Alliance was to be a ten-year program for Latin America’s economic and social

13 development. Over the succeeding ten-year period the U.S. government would provide $20 billion to be augmented by another $300 million annual investment of private U.S. capital in Latin America. In return, the Latin American governments pledged $80 billion in investments over the same ten-year period. In addition, the Latin Americans pledged to enact land, tax, and other socioeconomic reforms in their nations. The United States developed this plan of action because it feared that the region had become vulnerable to social revolution and communist expansion. The socioeconomic disparities and the lack of a democratic government that marred Cuba before ¡959 was the stereotypical impression of all Latin America at the time. Fidel Castro’s transformation of the Cuban Revolution into a bitterly anti–U.S. movement worried U.S. policymakers that the process might be repeated elsewhere in the hemisphere. The Alliance was to thwart those anticipated revolutions. Although the Alliance made progress over its lifetime, it failed to reach the program’s lofty objectives. On the U.S. side, the war in Vietnam and domestic violence at home contributed to a loss of congressional support. U.S. private investment did not follow. In Latin America, many nations resented the U.S. requirements of accountability and insistence upon democratization. And, like the United States, the amount of public and private capital essential for the program was not forthcoming. See also Johnson, Lyndon B.; Kennedy, John F.; Nixon, Richard M.; Organization of American States: Inter-American Economic and Social Council Conference

Anti-Hijacking Accord see Air Hijackings: Anti-Hijacking Accord

Anti-Imperialist Movement In the late ¡890s, a diverse group of people, including former presidents, Republican and Democratic congressmen and senators

Anti-Imperialist Movement alike, intellectuals, labor leaders, and former abolitionists, emerged to lead a campaign against U.S. extracontinental expansion. These anti-imperialists did not always agree among themselves, nor did they react to the events of the late ¡890s in a uniform manner. Their reasons for speaking against expansion were as diverse as their backgrounds, but their interests most assuredly rested with the United States — its security, prosperity, constitutional integrity, and moral and political health. For the most part the anti-imperialists were traditionalists who believed that imperialism was in sharp contrast to U.S. ideals and practices, which served as models for the world to emulate. The anti-imperialists o›ered a wide range of objections to the acquisition of new territories. A large number of them believed that imperialism violated the constitution because it did not give the United States the legal right to impose its system upon others. The antiimperialists also dismissed the economic argument for the acquisition of territories abroad, arguing instead that the laws of commerce would determine the economic success of Americans abroad. It was not necessary to cordon o› sectors of the globe for U.S. products only. Anti-imperialists also objected to extracontinental expansion because it threatened to involve the United States more deeply in the international political arena, and thus violate the principles of U.S. foreign policy that dated to Presidents George Washington and Thomas Je›erson. Furthermore, these people argued that it was morally wrong for the United States to forcibly impose its will or system upon other people, a stance strongly influenced by the racial attitudes of the time. Influenced by the Darwinian view of society, the anti-imperialists looked upon the people of Latin America and Asia as inferior, with underdeveloped economic, political, and social systems that would only contaminate the Americans. While the anti-imperialists focused most of their attention upon the Philippine Islands and the ¡898 Treaty of Paris, their ideas found expression in the debates over Cuba. For ex-

Autonomists ample, prior to the outbreak of the SpanishAmerican War in ¡898, the anti-imperialists cautioned that its results would saddle the United States with the almost impossible task of guaranteeing the future peace and orderly conduct of Cuban a›airs, a terrible obligation to inflict upon the American people. Shortly after the war’s outbreak, the fear of annexing Cuba brought warnings that its people would not fit into the U.S. social and political milieu. While wishing to avoid the pitfalls and responsibilities of colonialism, the anti-imperialists supported the leasing of Cuban harbors as coaling stations to be used by U.S. naval and commercial ships. An anti-imperialist suggestion that never gained much of a following placed Cuba in a federation with Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti to be prepared for eventual independence and self-government. With the war’s end in August ¡898 and the subsequent U.S. military occupation of the island, many antiimperialists accepted the prevailing argument that Cuba was not ready for full independence and that, if granted, only confusion and chaos would follow. This, in turn, would require further U.S. interventions and possible acquisition. The anti-imperialists came to accept a supervisory time period to prepare Cuba for self-government. The Platt Amendment fit their needs. See also Hoar, George F.; Platt Amendment; Root, Elihu; Treaties: Treaty of Paris; United States Occupation of Cuba; Wood, Leonard

Assassination Attempts see Operation Mongoose Auténticos see Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Auténtico) Autonomists

An autonomist is a term applied to those members of the Cuban planter class who sought reform within the Spanish colonial sys-

14 tem. Following the Ten Years’ War (¡868– ¡878), Cuban planters sought greater participation in local politics and direct representation in the Spanish parliament. Toward that end, in ¡878 the planters formed the Partido Liberal Automiomista— the Liberal Autonomist Party. Over the next generation they sought local o‡ces through the electoral process, lobbied Spain for “home rule within the empire,” held meetings to arouse public awareness, and published newspapers and broadsides on behalf of their cause. The autonomists rationalized that their political ascendancy would not only ensure their status within Cuban society but also provide the opportunity to implement economic policies more favorable to their own interests. The Spanish authorities in Cuba thwarted the autonomists. Elections were rigged, and autonomist campaigns and leaders were constantly harassed by Spanish authorities. During the same time period, the growing Cuban separatist movement looked upon the autonomists as an obstacle to Cuban independence. When war erupted in ¡895, the autonomists anticipated that the reform-minded Governor-General Arsenio Martínez Campos would turn to them as an alternative to the insurgent revolutionaries. But when the insurgent armies marched into western Cuba in the late summer and fall of ¡895, the fate of the autonomists was sealed. Within a year, the insurgents in every province were taking torches to the sugarcane fields. As a result of their success General Valeriano Weyler replaced Martínez Campos, and Weyler made no distinction between autonomist and separatist. He arbitrarily jailed autonomists and otherwise harassed them and banned their political activities. In the face of these conditions, more than 3,500 autonomist families migrated to the United States and Europe in early ¡896, and, with that, the Autonomist movement passed into history. See also War for Independence

Bailey, Joseph W. (¡862–¡929) Joseph Bailey was a Texas congressman in

15 ¡898, who served as House Democratic leader on the eve of the Spanish-American War. He was staunchly pro–Cuban and maintained close relationship with the Cuban Junta. Because he sympathized with those who lived under military rule without political and civil rights, Bailey saw the Cuban problem as an opportunity to rally the Democrats and the country against the McKinley administration. Although he professed not to want war with Spain, and he later opposed expansionism, Bailey was willing to accept war if it came. In the April ¡897 House debate on the Morgan resolution to grant belligerent status to Cuban insurgents, Bailey became an outspoken critic of House Speaker Thomas B. Reed for using procedural matters to thwart a vote. Bailey asserted that the House would easily approve the resolution, and he accused the Republicans of currying favor with business interests and called upon them to uphold their party platform. Following President McKinley’s annual message to Congress in December ¡897, Bailey convinced ¡0¡ Democrats to support the immediate recognition of Cuban independence, a move designed to encourage the Senate to take up the issue. Nothing came of his e›ort. In March ¡898, Bailey supported the $50 million military-preparedness bill and in April the congressional war resolutions, but subsequently opposed extracontinental expansion. Bailey went on to serve in the Senate from ¡90¡ until his resignation in ¡9¡3, after which he returned to Texas to practice law. See also McKinley, William

Baker, James A., III (¡930– ) James Baker served as secretary of state (¡989–¡993) for President George H.W. Bush and during the last five months of that administration, as Bush’s chief of sta›. Previously, Baker had been active in Republican Party politics and served as White House chief of sta› and later secretary of the treasury during the Reagan administration. Baker’s close friendship with Bush gave him unrivaled access to power and made their

Balsero Crisis individual policy contributions di‡cult to separate. Regarding Cuba, Baker repeated the president’s hard-line statements calling for free markets and open elections. He served as the president’s courier to Moscow, trying to persuade the Soviets to sever their economic link to Cuba. Baker also counseled against tightening controls on U.S. subsidiaries operating in third world countries that traded with Cuba. See also Bush, George H.W.

Balsero Crisis

The term balseros refers to people attempting to emigrate from Cuba to the United States in a raft (balsa), small boats, and other makeshift vessels. In August and early September ¡994, an estimated 36,000 Cubans escaped the island to seek refuge in the United States. An unknown number were lost at sea, a factor that led to the establishment of the Brothers to the Rescue, a Miami-based exile group that searched the Florida Straits for the balseros. The crisis ended September 9, ¡994, with a new immigration accord between Cuba and the United States, but it did not prevent Cubans from continuing their attempts to flee the island. The balseros were undocumented aliens because they departed without Cuban or U.S. government permission. An estimated 63,000 balseros arrived in the United States between ¡959 and ¡994, but it was the mass exodus in the summer of ¡994 that gave the term its notoriety. In July ¡994, the U.S. Coast Guard in the Florida Straits picked up an estimated fifty balseros per day. Others took to hijacking harbor ferryboats out of Havana harbor but were intercepted by Cuban authorities. The upsurge in the numbers attempting to leave the island also led to violent clashes between civilians and Cuban police. While most analysts attributed the emigration to the near collapse of the Cuban economy following the end of the Cold War and Fidel Castro’s implementation of the socalled “Special Period,” Castro himself blamed the United States. Castro explained that the lax enforcement of the U.S. coastline, failure

Barquín López to honor the ¡984 immigration agreement to permit 20,000 Cubans to legally enter the United States annually, and, the U.S. policy of granting automatic residency after twelve months encouraged the illegal immigration and the law breaking in Cuba. Unless the United States changed its current policies, Castro warned that he would open the floodgates and permit all who dared to cross the Straits in a balsa to do just that. Although Castro never gave a public directive, Cuban security guards did not interfere with those wishing to leave. As the number of balseros increased in August ¡994, the Clinton administration wrestled with policy options. It certainly did not want a repeat of the ¡980 Mariel boat lift experience. On August ¡8, ¡994, Attorney General Janet Reno announced the policy decision: Henceforth, all interdicted balseros would be detained at Guantánamo Naval Base until the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) could determine their status. U.S. naval ships were dispatched to the area to assist the Coast Guard with interdiction. Furthermore, if need be, safe havens would be set up in a third country. Furthermore, Cubans picked up at sea would not be allowed to enter the United States without first returning to Cuba and applying for an immigration visa or refugee status at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. On August 20, Clinton banned charter flights from Miami to Havana and scaled back the quarterly remittances to Cuban families from exiles in the United States from $300 to $¡50 quarterly. On August 2¡, the White House announced that the administration was considering a blockade of Cuba. The Clinton administration also used the United Nations as a forum to focus upon human rights violations in Cuba. As the Guantánamo Bay naval facility became overcrowded, the United States began the transfer of refugees to Panama, where President Ernesto Peréz Balladares agreed to the housing of up to ¡0,000 Cuban émigrés at Howard Air Force Base. Negotiations to end the crisis began on September ¡ in New York City. In the accord reached on September 9, the United States

16 agreed to accept 20,000 legal Cuban immigrants per year, the same as provided for in the ¡984 immigration agreement, in return for a Cuban promise to prevent its citizens from fleeing Cuba on rafts or other vessels. Cuba also agreed to allow the refugees at the Guantánamo base and in Panama to return home without reprisal. For its part, the United States announced that those people could remain at those sites indefinitely, but that they would not be admitted to the United States without the proper documentation available only at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. In addition, the United States agreed to grant entry visas to an estimated 4,000 Cubans who had been approved for admission to the United States but were still waiting in Cuba for their visas. The $¡50 quarterly remittance and ban on charter fights to Cuba from the United States remained in e›ect. Most important was the permanency of the U.S declaration on August ¡8: the termination of the 28-year-old policy granting immediate U.S. residency to Cubans intercepted at sea and replacing it with their immediate repatriation or their detention at Guantánamo. Henceforth, the Cubans would have to reach the U.S. mainland to be secure from repatriation to Cuba. In 2000, the new policy contributed to the public outcry surrounding the Elían Gonzalez case. See also Brothers to the Resolve; Cuban Democracy Act; González, Elian; Immigration Agreement of ¡984; Mariel Boat Lift

Barquín López, Rafael (¡9¡4– ) A major in the Cuban Army, Barquin was jailed in ¡956 by Fulgencio Batista for leading an attempted coup d’etat to restore democratic government to Cuba. Subsequently, Justo Carrillo’s Movimiento Montecristi wanted to free Barquín from imprisonment on the Isle of Pines to serve as a counterweight to Fidel Castro’s 26th of July Movement. Carillo claimed to have the support of several Latin American countries but could not obtain cooperation from the United States. When William Paw-

17 ley was secreted into Cuba in December ¡959 to propose to Batista that he resign and be replaced by a Junta, the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency identified Barquín as a potential member of that Junta. Batista refused Pawley’s proposal and subsequently fled the island. As he did, Castro ordered that Barquín be transferred from the Isle of Pines to command the Cuban Army at Camp Columbia in Havana. Barquín opened the camp gates and welcomed Castro’s revolutionary army, only to be targeted for assassination by Castro. Only the intervention of U.S. ambassador Earl E.T. Smith saved his life. Subsequently Barquín made his way to Puerto Rico. See also Movimiento Montecristi; Pawley, William; Revolution: United States Presidential Administrations and the Revolution

Baseball

Introduced to Cuba from the United States in the mid–nineteenth century, baseball became well established on the island by the early twentieth century and a national passion by the ¡920s. Following the Revolution in ¡959, Cuban baseball lost its contact with the outside world, though the nation continued to produce fine players for decades, several of whom defected to the United States. The Cuban professional league was founded in ¡878 and continued with only a few interruptions until the Revolution in ¡959. The league usually fielded four teams for a fifty game season that ran from December to March. The teams consisted of most Cuban and African-American players and, often times with a number of U.S. Major League players. Along with the professional league, several other venues existed: the sugar mills, company leagues and amateur leagues. Cuban traveling teams, confined to white players only, began to barnstorm U.S. cities as early as ¡907 and Cubans began to play for U.S. Major League teams just before World War I, but only those light-skinned enough to be considered white by U.S. standards were given the chance. Some of Cuba’s greatest players were black and had to ply their trade

Baseball in the U.S. Negro Leagues. Among the most famous are José de la Caridad Méndez, who pitched for the Kansas City Monarchs in the ¡920s; Cristóbal Torriente, who batted .339 in the U.S. Negro Leagues; and Martín Dihigo, considered the greatest player in Cuban baseball history and the member of the hall of fame in three di›erent countries, including the United States. The most famous of the Cuban-dominated teams in the Negro Leagues was the New York Cuban Giants who won the league championship in ¡947. That same year, Major League Baseball established a relationship with the Cuban League, paving the way for Major League players to join Cuban rosters during the U.S. o›-season. The U.S. Minor Leagues welcomed the Havana Sugar Kings, as a Cincinnati Reds a‡liate, to the AAA International League and the Havana Cubans to the B-level Florida International League. With the desegregation of U.S. Major League Baseball in ¡947, Cuban stars played their way to fame in the United States, including Minnie Minoso, Bert Campenaris, Luis Tiant, Mike Cueller and Tony Pérez. Others who were born on the island but learned their baseball stateside included Rafael Palmeiro and José Conseco. In all, ¡50 Cubans played Major League Baseball. Following the Revolution in ¡959, baseball became a domestic sport. The Sugar Kings moved stateside in ¡96¡, the same year the Cuban League closed down. Strict amateurism followed, but several Cuban players excelled. Some defected to pursue careers in the United States. Pitcher René Ochoa was the first when he left the Cuban team playing in the ¡99¡ Pan American Games in Miami. He pitched for the St. Louis Cardinals and San Francisco Giants. Other defectors who succeeded in the Major Leagues include Rey Ordóñez and Orlando and Liván Hernández. Although Cuban teams do well in the Pan American and Olympic Games competition, there has been no move to renew the exchange of games between Cuban All Stars and a U.S. Major League team, as in ¡999 with the Baltimore Orioles. See also Cuban Americans

Batista y Zaldívar Baltimore Orioles versus Cuban All Star Team On March 28, ¡999, major league baseball’s Baltimore Orioles defeated an all-star Cuban team 3–2 in eleven innings before an estimated crowd of 50,000 people in Havana’s Estadio Latinoamericano. On May 3, the visiting Cubans defeated the Orioles ¡2–6 before 47,940 people in Baltimore’s Camden Yards Stadium. The games marked the first time since ¡959 that U.S. and Cuban professional baseball teams played games in each other’s country. In ¡995, Orioles owner Peter Angelos sought to play a game in Cuba, but the State Department refused to issue a license for such a “high profile” event. Angelos persisted, but not until President Bill Clinton initiated his “People to People” program in ¡996 was the U.S. government receptive to the idea. Getting permission proved to be another matter. For example, to remain consistent with the goals of the U.S. trade embargo, the State Department insisted that no hard currency pass to the Cuban government. Then, without consulting with either government, or the negotiators involved in the deal, Secretary of State Madeline Albright publicly nominated the Cuban Catholic charity, Caritas, as the recipient of all game funds in Cuba. Albright’s statement evoked criticism from the U.S. Bishop’s Conference to point out that such statements served only to subject the Church in Cuba to su›er government strictures and restraints. University of Havana religion professor Enrique López Oliva concurred. Negotiators finally agreed that all profits from the games would go to supporting sports-related activities in both countries. The Cuban American community protested the arrangement on the grounds that the games gave an air of legitimacy to Castro’s regime. Demonstrators awaited the Cuban team in Baltimore. Other demonstrators called for an end to the U.S. embargo. During the game in Baltimore four persons were arrested on the field, and following the game, Cuba’s pitching coach Rigoberto Herrera Betancourt

18 defected to the United States. Castro welcomed the Cuban team back to Havana, lauded their “historic” game in Baltimore and criticized the United States for “buying” Cuban athletes who defected in the past. See also Clinton, William J. People-to-People Program

Batista, Fulgencio see Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio (¡90¡–¡973) For twenty-five years (¡934–¡959), Fulgencio Batista was the most dominant force in Cuban politics. From ¡934 until ¡940 Batista manipulated Cuban politics from behind the scene. In ¡940 he was elected president, and after his term he resided in the United States until just before the coup d’etat that he engineered in March ¡952 to oust President Carlos Prío. He won the “rigged” ¡954 presidential election and remained in o‡ce until being forced to flee the country on January ¡, ¡959. The son of a farmer and railroad worker from Oriente province, Batista held several laboring jobs before joining the Cuban Army in ¡92¡. After graduating from the National School of Journalism in ¡928, Batista was promoted to sergeant and assigned as the stenographer of Camp Columbia in Havana. Among the lower-grade o‡cers who had little opportunity for further advancement and, in dire need of a pay increase, Batista and his followers joined militant university students in ousting President Carlos Manuel de Céspedes on September 4, ¡933, and subsequently, installed Ramón Grau San Martín’s brief presidency did not receive U.S. recognition and, in fact, the U.S. ambassadors in Havana, Sumner Welles and Je›erson Ca›rey, suggested that Batista direct a change in government. That he did on January ¡4, ¡934, and placed Carlos Mendieta in the presidency. Until his own presidential election in ¡940, U.S. diplomats and policymakers and Cubans alike understood clearly that Batista manipulated the presidents.

19 Batista curried favor with the United States. To implement his proposed three year plan in ¡937, designed to improve Cuba’s economic and social conditions, Batista admitted that he needed U.S. economic assistance. He pressed the point to Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles and President Franklin D. Roosevelt during a visit to Washington in ¡938. Upon return, he raised the expectations of the Cuban people, telling them that he triumphed in his request. Not so. The Roosevelt administration linked economic assistance to fiscal reform and an end to government corruption. Thereafter, socioeconomic conditions worsened in Cuba, which prompted Batista to approve elections for the ¡940 constitutional convention. The document was considered the most progressive in Latin America at the time, as it provided for sweeping government-sponsored social reforms. During his presidency (¡940–¡944), Batista implemented many programs in public health, education, and social welfare. During World War II, his administration also benefited from the loss of sugar competitors in the European and Asian theaters, but the newfound wealth also heightened graft and corruption throughout government, a fact that cost him the support of the majority of the Cubans. Batista worsened his image at home and among U.S. policymakers when he legalized the Cuban Communist Party, brought two of its members into his cabinet as ministers without portfolio, and extended recognition to the Soviet Union. Still, he cooperated with the United States throughout the war, permitting the construction of defense sites and implementing an anti–Nazi program across the island. To bolster his position at home, Batista visited with Roosevelt and Welles in Washington in December ¡942. At the time, the U.S. administration did not want to interfere in Cuban politics, fearing that doing so might disrupt the nation. The policy, however, did not prevent Ambassador Spruille Braden from criticizing the ineptitude and corruption of the Batista regime. After allowing Grau to become president in ¡944, Batista retired to Daytona Beach,

Batista y Zaldívar Florida. While residing there he was elected the Cuban Senate in ¡948 to represent Santa Clara province. He returned to Cuba that same year to organize his own political party and announce his presidential candidacy for ¡952. Recognizing that he could not win the scheduled June elections, Batista and a group of army o‡cers engineered a coup d’etat on March ¡0, ¡952. At that time, the United States did not appear disappointed with the ouster of socialist-leaning President Prío. Batista rigged his own reelection in November ¡954. Batista’s crackdown on labor unions satisfied U.S. business interests in Cuba and o‡cials in the State Department, who viewed the workers as coming under communist influence. At the same time, the Batista administration inspired confidence in business circles. That confidence was expressed in significant private investment, which diversified the country’s agriculture (especially in rice and cattle) and led to the establishment of a number of new industries (petroleum refining, mining, and miscellaneous manufacturing). The government conducted a lavish public works program designed to absorb the chronic and large-scale unemployment that was a blemish on Cuban society (8 percent reaching to 20 percent during “dead season” which covered 8 to 9 months of the year). However, the country’s export earnings and available credit were not su‡cient to meet the demands of the development program. The greatest problems that Cuba faced were a significant increase in its population and a dependence on sugar exports. The U.S. Commerce Department and the Cuban National Bank understood this and the concomitant challenge of trying to improve the living standard of the Cuban people. However, U.S. policymakers did not understand the nature of Cuban nationalism, demonstrated by their placing Fidel Castro’s raid on the Moncada barracks in ¡953 in the same category as student protests during the ¡940s. In fact, the Eisenhower administration paid little attention to the Cuban situation until Herbert Matthews uncovered Fidel Cas-

Bay of Pigs Invasion tro’s army in the Sierra Maestra in February ¡957. Batista’s regime was characterized by unprecedented corruption and excessive brutality, which in turn encouraged increased student protests, which often became violent. As Castro gained increasing notoriety within Cuba, his forces along with other guerrilla forces converged on Havana. Other middle-sector groups, particularly students, within Havana also struck out against Batista. On one occasion, in March ¡957, they nearly succeeded in killing Batista during an attack upon the presidential palace. Professional groups called for Batista’s resignation. Batista’s brutal response only served to increase the violence, not decrease it. In March ¡958, the United States placed an arms embargo upon the Cuban government in hopes of forcing Batista to lessen his violations of human and civil rights, but it was to no avail. After August ¡958, Batista found himself increasingly isolated from his support groups within Cuba, including several military o‡cers. On December 9 Batista rejected an o›er by President Eisenhower’s envoy, William Pawley, to accept a caretaker government that included many of Batista’s political opponents. Completely isolated and without U.S. support, Batista first fled to the Dominican Republic in the early

20 morning hours of January ¡, ¡959. After being denied entry into the United States, Batista moved to Spain where he lived until his death on August 6, ¡973. See also Braden, Spruille; Gómez, Miguel Mariano; Prío Socarrás, Carlos; Revolution; Sergeants’ Revolt; Welles, Benjamin Sumner

Bay of Pigs Invasion Originally named Operation Trinidad, the Bay of Pigs was a failed operation planned by the Central Intelligence Agency to bring down Fidel Castro’s regime. Amidst growing tensions between the United States and Cuba over the direction of the Cuban Revolution, in March ¡960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved the CIA proposal to train Cuban exiles in Guatemala for an invasion of Cuba. According to the CIA plan, the anticipated early military successes of the Cuban exile brigade would lead to popular uprisings that would topple Castro. President-elect John F. Kennedy learned of the CIA plan in late November ¡960 during a briefing from the agency’s director, Allen Dulles. In discussions with Kennedy on December 6, ¡960, and January ¡¡, ¡96¡, outgoing President Eisenhower encouraged the ac-

21 celeration of the plan’s implementation. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy came to o‡ce determined that Castro had to be removed from power and that whatever the plan to accomplish that objective, the United States should be distanced from it. After taking o‡ce on January 28, ¡96¡, Kennedy directed the Pentagon to assess the planned invasion and the State Department to assess the political consequences of the proposed operation. On March ¡9, the joint chiefs of sta› ’s ( JCS) evaluation of the plan, which included an on-site visit to the Cuban exiles’ training base in Guatemala, was submitted to the State Department. The JCS concluded that the plan could be carried out with the required secrecy but that its ultimate success depended upon the anticipated internal uprising in Cuba. The State Department was less enthusiastic, concerned over the possible political fallout in Latin America and at the United Nations. The State Department preferred the diplomatic isolation of Cuba. Presidential advisor Arthur Schlesinger Jr. cautioned that the Cuban exiles could not remain in Guatemala indefinitely and that the U.S. might be rushed into a course of action because the CIA had no other plans for the Cuban brigade except to bring them back to the United States, where their presence would be a political embarrassment. Finally, domestic considerations influenced Kennedy’s decision. At home, he faced charges of being “soft on communism.” At a National Security Council meeting on March ¡¡, ¡96¡, Kennedy directed the CIA to devise a plan to transport the Cuban brigade to Cuba and for the State Department to prepare a white paper on Cuba and a presentation to the Organization of American States (OAS). With apparent hesitancy, the Kennedy administration moved toward the implementation of the invasion plan. While the CIA proceeded with the selection of possible landing sites in Cuba, other civilian advisors cautioned the president in White House meetings on April 4 and ¡¡, ¡96¡. In addition to Schlesinger, Chester Bowles and J. William Fulbright forewarned of the adverse impact

Bay of Pigs Invasion that such an invasion would have upon U.S. relations with Latin America, that such an invasion contravened the OAS charter, and that they doubted if the U.S. role in the a›air could be kept secret. Kennedy approved the operation on the assumption that U.S. support would remain covert. He made it clear that U.S. troops would not be committed if the invasion ran into trouble. The brigade departed Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, on April ¡2 and landed on April ¡7 at Playa de Giron (Bay of Pigs). The invasion quickly became a complete debacle. Within two days, and without additional supplies or air cover, Castro’s army captured ¡,200 men. Another ¡¡4 exiles died in battle. The anticipated internal uprising never occurred. At the time, several reasons were given for the invasion’s failure. Castro had long anticipated some kind of attack. U.S. news media and Castro’s agents, who penetrated the Cuban-exile community in Miami, reported on the exile training in Guatemala. In the days just prior to the invasion, Castro directed the rounding up and detention of all known opponents in Cuba. On the military side, a diversionary landing, scheduled for April ¡4 and ¡5 to distract from the main invasion, was aborted. Also, Kennedy delayed a second bomb run over Cuba to eliminate Castro’s air force. When that attack finally came on April ¡8, Cuba’s shore batteries shot down the three B26 aircraft sent on the mission. The batteries also destroyed two supply ships waiting o›shore. Subsequently, the results of two secret assessments of the Bay of Pigs invasion became public. These materials are available at the privately funded National Security Archive located at the Gellman Library of George Washington University in Washington, D.C. The first is a sanitized copy of the CIAs Inspector General’s ¡96¡ investigation into the operation’s failure. It provides a detailed assessment of the plan’s operation and implementation but places responsibility for its failure upon the “United States Government,” meaning the Kennedy administration, for three reasons: ¡. an overall lack of recognition on the

Beaulac part of the U.S. government as to the magnitude of the operation required to overthrow the Fidel Castro regime; 2. the failure on the part of the U.S. government to plan for all contingencies at the time of the Cuban operation including the necessity for using regular U.S. military forces in the event that the exiled Cubans could not do the job themselves; and 3. the failure on the part of the U.S. government to be willing to commit to the Cuban operation, as planned and executed, those necessary resources required for its success. The second, identified as the Taylor Commission Report, resulted from an ad hoc group appointed by Kennedy on April 22, ¡96¡. The commission was named after its head, General Maxwell Taylor, and it included Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, CIA Director Allen Dulles, and Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke. From April 22 until May 25, the Taylor Commission held twenty meetings and interviewed more than fifty witnesses. A sanitized version, released in ¡977, reflected the positions held by those interviewed. Those closest to the president exonerated Kennedy, pointing to the inaccuracy of the information supplied by the CIA and the approval given to the plan by the JCS. Witnesses for the CIA focused upon the justification for the invasion rather than its operational details. The complete report was released in 2000. Its most significant new disclosure revealed that on April 9, ¡96¡, the CIA learned that the Soviet Union knew the exact details of the plan, including time and place, and presumably passed this information on to Castro. In the aftermath of the failed attack, Castro strengthened his hand in Cuba. Pictures of him directing military activities at the Bay of Pigs enhanced his popularity and enabled him to consolidate his political base. Both at home and abroad, Kennedy and the United States su›ered severe criticism for implementing the plan, but it did not dissuade Kennedy from continuing to seek Castro’s ouster. In December ¡962, the ¡,¡97 brigade prisoners were released from Cuba in exchange for $35 mil-

22 lion in U.S. food, medicine, and supplies. See also Kennedy, John F.; Tractors for Freedom Committee

Beaulac, William (¡899–¡990) A career diplomat, Beaulac first served on the U.S. embassy sta› in Havana from ¡937–¡94¡ and as ambassador from ¡95¡–¡953. He graduated in the first class from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in ¡92¡ and immediately entered the U.S. Foreign Service. For sixteen years before his arrival in Havana, Beaulac served in several posts throughout Latin America. During his initial assignment to Cuba, Beaulac understood that Fulgencio Batista and his army stood as the guarantors of the Cuban presidency. He also criticized Cuban legislation that favored Cuban sugar producers over U.S.–owned firms and correctly predicted that Batista’s proposed three-year economic program would not succeed without massive U.S. investments. With the outbreak of World War II, Beaulac played a role in the negotiations that resulted in the United States increased purchase of Cuban sugar, but at the same time he understood that it militated the island’s agricultural diversification and industrialization. When Beaulac returned to Havana in June ¡95¡ he declared that the United States had no significant problems with Cuba, but he changed his view shortly thereafter. Beaulac came to describe President Carlos Prío’s policies for the underprivileged as too idealistic and his labor policies as socialistic, thus restricting, not encouraging economic development. Beaulac became less optimistic as the ¡952 Cuba presidential elections approached because all of the contesting candidates, save Batista, advocated socialist programs and di›ered only by degree. When it became clear that Batista would not win the presidential contest, Beaulac concluded that Batista engineered the coup d’etat on March ¡0, ¡952. As Beaulac expected, Batista moved quickly against the Confederation of Workers with the

23 appointment of Carlos Saladrigas, an outspoken critic of Prío’s policies, as minister of labor. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Ca›rey, Je›erson; Prío Socarrás, Carlos

Beveridge, Albert J. (¡862–¡927) An arch-expansionist who wanted to see the U.S. flag fly over Cuba, Beveridge was a Republican and an Indiana lawyer, who came to the Senate April ¡899. Before the SpanishAmerican War broke out in ¡895, Beveridge supported U.S. expansion in the Caribbean and Pacific regions. He envisioned markets and spoke of the U.S. responsibility to uplift the “inferior” peoples of the world. When war came to Cuba, Beveridge advocated U.S. military intervention and subsequent annexation. Still, as a private citizen, he opposed the Teller Amendment that prevented U.S. acquisition of Cuba. Once in the Senate, Beveridge did not lose sight of his Cuba objective but accepted the Platt Amendment as a steppingstone to the island’s inevitable attachment to the United States. He criticized President Theodore Roosevelt in ¡906 for not seizing the island in response to the failed administration of Tomás Estrada Palma in Cuba, but Beveridge rationalized the appointment of Charles Magoon as governor-general was only a temporary setback to the ultimate goal of the island’s annexation to the United States. Beveridge’s senate career ended in ¡9¡¡, after which he returned to practicing law and writing history, interspersed with unsuccessful attempts for elected o‡ce until his death in ¡927. See also Estrada Palma, Tomás; Magoon, Charles; Platt Amendment; Teller Amendment; United States Interventions

Black Warrior Incident On February 28, ¡854, the captain general of Cuba, Marques de la Pezuela, ordered the confiscation of the U.S.–owned cargo ship Black Warrior during a stop in Havana’s harbor. The ship’s manifest list declared to be ballast only when, in fact, it was carrying bales

Blaine of cotton to be delivered to New York. Although technically in violation of Havana harbor regulations, in the past neither the Black Warrior or other U.S. cargo ships were detained when stopping at Havana enroute to other ports without discharging or picking up cargo. Although the ship was released on March ¡6 after paying a $6,000 fine, it caused a public and congressional outcry in the United States that strained U.S.–Spanish relations. In his message reporting the incident to congress, President Franklin Pierce chastised Spain for its blatant misuse of power and charged that it owed prompt redress for the Black Warrior. Two days later, Secretary of State William L. Marcy instructed the U.S. minister in Spain, Pierre Soulé to press for a Spanish apology and a $¡00,000 indemnity, a figure increased to $300,000 after the ship’s owners inspected their vessel. Owing to the belligerent attitude of Soulé, the Spanish government sti›ened its resolve. The situation worsened following the unauthorized publication of the Ostend Manifesto in October ¡854. Written by the U.S. ministers to London, Paris, and Madrid, the Manifesto called for the U.S. acquisition of Cuba from Spain for up to $¡30 million. If the Manifesto were not enough to undercut Soulé’s position in Madrid, reports by the secretary at the U.S. mission in Madrid, Haratio Perry, described Soulé’s ineptitude. Secretary of State Marcy had no choice but to recall Soulé. When he did so in early ¡855, Spain quickly o›ered to negotiate a settlement to the Black Warrior incident. See also Ostend Manifesto; Pierce, Franklin; Soulé, Pierre

Blaine, James G. (¡830–¡893) Blaine served as secretary of state for ¡8 months during the short-lived administration of James A. Garfield and again from ¡889– ¡892 under President Benjamin Harrison. A respected lawyer from Maine, Blaine helped to found that state’s Republican Party. Active in state politics, Blaine subsequently was elected to the House of Representatives and U.S. Sen-

Blanco y Erenas ate and twice unsuccessfully sought the Republican Party’s presidential nomination. Blaine wanted the United States to be aggressive in international a›airs, including Latin America. Motivated more by economics than idealism, he wanted to correct the unfavorable trade balance the United States had with its southern neighbors. Blaine envisioned an Inter-American conference to address trade issues and hemispheric security and worked toward that goal during his brief term in o‡ce during the Garfield administration. The meeting did not materialize until ¡889, but it accomplished little because of Latin America’s distrust of U.S. intentions. The conference, however, did bring about a spirit for trade reciprocity agreements, and subsequently one was negotiated with Spain regarding Cuba. Although Spain failed to ratify the agreement, Blaine’s hope was to open Cuba to U.S. manufactures to o›set the trade imbalance caused by the U.S. importation of Cuban sugar and tobacco. See also Foster, John W.

Blanco y Erenas, Ramón (¡83¡–¡906) Blanco y Erenas served as Spain’s last governor-general in Cuba. He eagerly accepted the appointment to Cuba in an e›ort to vindicate his failed military e›ort to suppress Philippine insurgents. Blanco y Erenas arrived in Havana in October ¡897 with instructions to terminate the reconcentrado program and on January ¡, ¡898, to implement the autonomous government program designed by Prime Minister Práxedes Sagasta. Blanco faced several obstacles. At home, the Liberal Sagasta administration was under constant attack from its Conservative party opponents, who made Blanco y Erenas ‘s every move on the island subject to criticism at home and served to threaten Sagasta’s continuance in power. Blanco y Erenas’s task was further complicated when he arrived in Cuba and found the Spanish military commanders and Cuban volunteers still loyal to former governor-general Valierano Weyler y Nicolau. He also inherited a destitute Spanish army and

24 collection Cuban volunteers incapable of sustaining a military e›ort against insurgents. At the same time, U.S. consul-general Fitzhugh Lee’s reports home only further inflamed U.S. opinion against Spain, and Blanco y Erenas believed the reports sti›ened President William McKinley’s resolve. Blanco y Erenas, too, had his own doubts, although outwardly supportive of Sagasta’s reform policies, Blanco y Erenas never was confident that they would work. His suspicions were strengthened on January ¡2, ¡898, by the peninsulare violent protest in Havana against Cuban autonomous government and the subsequent publication of the Dupuy de Lôme letter and the sinking of the Maine. On the eve of war in April ¡898, on orders from Madrid, Blanco announced a military cease-fire, but to no avail. President McKinley had decided to ask the U.S. Congress for a war resolution. Once the U.S. intervened, Blanco y Erenas became more discouraged. Blanco’s final report on July 9,¡898, to Prime Minister Sagasta ignited a crisis in Madrid that directly led to the peace protocol on August ¡2, ¡898. In his report, Blanco y Erenas indicated that almost all Cubans favored independence and that a good number of the peninsulares were disloyal. He described the abject conditions of his army and recommended the surrender Santiago, which was done on July ¡7, ¡898. See also Dupuy de Lôme, Enrique; McKinley, William; Spanish American War: Sinking of the Maine; Reconcentrado Program; War for Independence: Spanish Policy and the War; Weyler y Nicolau, Valerieno

Bond Schemes John J. McCook, a New York City lawyer with connections to U.S. businesses operating in Cuba, represented the Cuban Junta in its attempt to exchange bonds for Cuba’s independence from Spain in May ¡897. According to the plan, the Republic of Cuba would issue $¡50 million in fifty-year bonds at 4 percent interest. McCook and his partner, Samuel M. Janney were to negotiate with Spain, o›ering up to $¡00 million for Cuba’s freedom, keep-

25 ing the balance for their services. The new Republic of Cuba would pay the interest and principal from customs receipts, and the U.S. government would guarantee the payments. Throughout the summer of ¡897, McCook and Jannet, attempted to persuade European financiers to partake in the scheme. At the same time Spain’s minister of colonies, Sigusmundo Moret, attempted to do the same. In November ¡897, a second contract was signed between the New York group and the Cuban government’s representative in New York, Tomás Estrada Palma, for 37.5 million Cuban dollars to secure Cuba’s recognition of independence by both Spain and the United States. No money was reserved for Spain as the syndicate now sought to gain influence in Washington. That coincided with the rising U.S. sentiment for war in Cuba. The first contract remained in force, and the second was to be voided if the first were ever implemented. The bond schemes came to naught. By November the first withered, largely because Moret tied the plan to his government’s plan for the autonomy of Cuba under Spanish sovereignty, while the Cuban Junta anticipated that the payment would result in the island’s independence. The second contract, finally approved by the Cuban Council of Government on January 27, ¡898 got lost in the acceleration of events that led to war in April ¡898. Following the passage of the U.S. war resolutions, Janney pressed for payment on the second contract. Janney argued that promises of Cuban bonds had been made to persons who had played a part in the passage of the Teller Amendment and the congressional war resolution. Estrada Palma objected on the grounds that neither the Teller Amendment nor the war resolution provided for Cuba’s independence, as provided for in the contract. The upshot was a conference among the Cubans who decided to pay Janney the two million dollars in bonds provided he withdrew his claims to any further payments. Janney accepted the o›er. The bonds were redeemed

Bondholders Dispute after the establishment of an independent Cuban government. In the process of this project, McCook often reported to Secretary of State William R. Day on the events in Cuba through the eyes of the Junta. He warned of Spain’s deteriorating control over the island and advised that the United States prepare to use its naval fleet to protect U.S. interests in Cuba. See also New York Junta; Republic of Cuba; SpanishAmerican War: United States War Resolutions; Teller Amendment

Bondholders Dispute ¡934–¡940 In ¡936, as the Cuban economy improved, U.S. bondholders began to press for payment of an estimated $85 million in Cuban debt upon which payment had been suspended since the presidency of Ramón Grau San Martín in ¡933. In ¡936, through the Foreign Bondholder’s Protective Council, these creditors attempted to negotiate a settlement with President Federico Laredo Bru. Two years later, in ¡938, the Cuban government enacted a law that provided for a bond issue to pay o› the old debts in hope of receiving badly needed economic assistance from the United States. Despite the law, not all U.S. creditors received their just compensation. The U.S. State Department refused to sanction any economic assistance not only until the debt problem was addressed but also until the Cuban government balanced its budget, ended corruption in its treasury department and internal revenue service, and corrected laws that adversely a›ected U.S. interests on the island. Fulgencio Batista received the same message during his visit to the United States in November ¡938. Because Batista failed to act, on July 29, ¡939, Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles reiterated these demands to the Cuban ambassador in Washington, D.C., Pedro Martínez Fraga, and warned the Cubans that failure to act within a month could result in the suspension of trade-treaty negotiations. There matters stood until the outbreak of war in Europe in September ¡939.

Bonsal With the outbreak of war, the price of sugar rose dramatically, which resulted in the hoarding of sugar. This led President Franklin D. Roosevelt to suspend the Cuban sugar quota provided for in the ¡937 law and, with it, Cuba’s privileged tari› protection. The bondholders’ debt, sugar, and Cuba’s need for additional loans became inextricably linked. Negotiations commenced shortly thereafter and resulted in two supplemental trade reciprocity treaties —¡939 and ¡940— and, with them, the settlement of the bondholders’ debt and Cuba’s extension of the ¡936 Decree Law No. 522. See also Decree Law 522; Trade Agreements: Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡939, Second Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡94¡

Bonsal, Philip W. (¡903–¡995) A native of New York City, Bonsal worked with the American Telephone and Telegraph Company in Cuba, Spain, and Chile and with the Federal Communications Commission before joining the State Department in ¡938. A career diplomat, Bonsal became the U.S. ambassador to Cuba in January ¡959 and served until his recall in October ¡960. Bonsal arrived in Havana on March ¡, ¡959, with a sympathetic view of the causes of the Cuban revolution, including the history of the U.S. presence during the preceding sixty years. Given Cuba’s past, some analysts argue that Bonsal faced a nearly impossible task. Still, he was hopeful that a meaningful accommodation could be achieved that answered both the demands of Cuban nationalism and American interests. Over time, Bonsal recognized that this would not happen, largely because of Fidel Castro’s inherent hatred of the United States. Bonsal also came to understand that Castro was determined to become the omnipresent political power of Cuba. Bonsal presented his credentials to Castro on March ¡5, ¡959, a meeting Castro described as friendly and cordial to his Cuban television audience the next day. Subsequently, they met on several occasions at social gather-

26 ings, but not until June ¡2, ¡959, did the two meet to discuss business matters. In the meantime, Bonsal gave interviews to local newspapers and magazines and met with influential Cubans in an e›ort to assuage the fears about possible U.S. intervention. He approved the selection of Ernesto Dihigo y Lopéz as Cuba’s new ambassador to the United States and Eisenhower’s public response when accepting his credentials. Bonsal thought that Dihogo’s moderate stance would o›set the anti–American rhetoric of Ernesto “Ché” Guevara and Fidel’s brother, Raúl Castro. In contrast, Bonsal expressed doubts about the success of Castro’s visit to Washington in April ¡959 and was disappointed that Castro did not receive an “o‡cial” welcome to Washington to flatter his ego. Still the optimist, Bonsal was in the minority when the U.S. hemispheric ambassadors gathered for a meeting in San Salvador in April ¡959, where they reviewed the Cuban situation. Bonsal continued to be hopeful following his first business meeting with Castro on June ¡2. After admitting that the U.S. government and businesses had made contributions to Cuba’s development, Castro indicated that the Cuban government would compensate U.S. landowners for lands lost under the May Agrarian Reform Law. Castro also used the opportunity to rail against the poor conditions of Cuba’s rural workers, many of whom worked for American companies. For some time after this meeting Castro kept Bonsal at arms length. They did not meet again until September 3, ¡959. In the meantime, Bonsal began to change his assessment of Castro’s strengthened link to the communist Popular Socialist Party. Bonsal’s concerns deepened following President Manuel Urruita Lleó’s resignation from the provisional government because of the leftist direction of the Cuban government. Many other moderates went into self-exile or were exiled at Castro’s direction. At the September 3 meeting, Bonsal again expressed sympathy for the revolution’s idealistic goals but indicated his alarm over the growing communist influence in the government and the disa›ec-

27 tion of moderate groups. Castro found Bonsal unduly alarmed, explaining that the local communists had supported him since ¡953 and were an essential element in labor organizations. Castro also used the occasion to criticize the U.S. press for portraying him in an unfavorable light and to demand that the United States develop a massive assistance program for the industrialization of Cuba and the rest of Latin America. Although Castro promised to henceforth meet Bonsal on fortyeight hours notice, this proved to be their final meeting. Despite Castro’s distance, Bonsal continued to advocate a cautious policy. He significantly influenced Eisenhower’s January 26, ¡960, policy statement on Cuba. Eisenhower declared that the U.S. had no intention of intervening in Cuban a›airs, directly or indirectly, and that di›erences between the two governments should be peacefully settled. It proved to be the administration’s last conciliatory e›ort. Thereafter, Castro’s policies increased U.S. consternation with him. In February, he concluded an agreement with the Soviet deputy prime minister whereby the Soviets would purchase Cuban sugar. Castro also hardened his position vis-à-vis the United States regarding land expropriations and his increasing expressions of discontent with the Organization of American States. On March 4, ¡960, Castro appealed directly to Cuban national pride when he charged the United States with the sabotage of the French munitions-laden ship La Coubre that blew up in Havana harbor. Following this tragedy, Secretary of State Christian A. Herter concluded that if Bonsal continued to be snubbed by Castro, he would be recalled. That is exactly what happened. In March ¡960, the Eisenhower administration made two fateful decisions. The first was the president’s approval of the clandestine military training of Cuban exiles in Guatemala for a return to the island and second, to tighten the economic screws on the Cuban economy. The first option subsequently led to the Bay of Pigs invasion in April ¡96¡. The

Braden second led to Eisenhower’s cut in the Cuban sugar quota in July ¡960 following the congressional approval of new sugar legislation that June. Castro refused to meet with the ambassador in July ¡960 following Eisenhower’s action. And as Bonsal predicted, Castro responded with a nationalization law designed to confiscate all U.S. owned properties. Thereafter, U.S.–Cuban relations continued to down spiral, leading Herter to recall Bonsal in October ¡960. His mission was no longer e›ective. Bonsal. See also Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Herter, Christian A.; Revolution: United States Presidential Administrations and the Revolution

Braden, Spruille (¡894–¡978) With nine years of diplomatic experience, Braden, a former copper company executive arrived as the new U.S. ambassador to Havana in May ¡942 and remained there until May ¡945. Although committed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy, Braden firmly believed that reciprocity was a two-way street; the Latin Americans needed to give the United States something in return. Braden found this not the case in Cuba. Braden’s criticisms of the Cuban war e›ort and of Batista’s administration made him the most controversial ambassador in Havana since Je›erson Ca›rey. Almost immediately after arriving in Havana, Braden sensed Batista’s tenuous political strength when opposition parties refused Batista’s invitation to participate in a war cabinet representing all political parties. In early ¡943, Braden was further irritated when Batista appointed two members of the Communist Party to his cabinet as ministers without portfolio. Although Cuba pledged its cooperation on wartime matters, Braden found the administration wanting when it came to routine issues. For example, Braden reported that he could not get Cuban o‡cials to promptly address fuel rationing ; labor disruptions in ship loading; and censorship of mail, radio, and cables. He repeatedly crit-

Brooke icized the Cubans for the apathetic or hostile attitudes toward U.S. wartime policies. He also faulted the Cuban government for not tending to their own harbor defenses, leaving the task to the U.S. Navy. Braden publicly criticized discriminatory actions. For example, in ¡943, he asserted that the Cuban government’s seizure of the Tinguaro sugar mill and Bacardi rum factory did little more than stir class hatred, pitting labor against the businessmen, an animosity that Braden felt not to be strained in wartime. Braden also became an outspoken critic of government corruption, charging that it was well organized and widespread in the government’s upper echelons and that Batista and associates deposited these corrupted moneys in U.S. banks. In a September 22, ¡943, speech before the American Chamber of Commerce in Havana, Braden laid responsibility for government ineptitude and corruption at Batista’s doorstep. As preparations for the ¡944 Cuban presidential election got underway, Braden met personally with Batista on July 27, ¡943, telling him that the U.S. commitment to nonintervention meant that U.S. companies and individuals should not be coerced into financially supporting local politicians. While Braden thought he found the Cuban people responsive to his criticisms, Batista did not. He demanded the ambassador’s recall. Secretary of State Cordell Hull refused to do so, asserting that it would disrupt wartime relations. Braden stayed in his post, but his adversarial relationship with Batista made his stay even more ine›ective. In accordance with U.S. policy, in ¡944 Braden refused to endorse either candidate Cuban presidential — Ramón Grau San Martín or Carlos Saladrigas — although he did think that Grau San Martín was the more popular candidate. Grau San Martín won the June ¡ contest with 54 percent of the vote. Despite his protestations to the contrary, most Cubans believed that Braden played a role in the contest. Grau San Martín’s subsequent hard-line stance on U.S. postwar use of military bases and the U.S. purchase of the ¡945 sugar crop did not deter Braden from ex-

28 pressing optimism for the future. Braden encouraged the State Department to do all it could to support Grau San Martín because the candidate had promised honest government, a diminished role for the military, and social and economic reform. Braden left Havana for an assignment in Argentina in the spring of ¡945. While he argued that his term demonstrated a commitment to the Good Neighbor policy, Batista and his supporters charged otherwise. To the latter, Braden’s outspoken criticism of the Batista administration constituted interference in Cuba’s internal a›airs. During his brief tenure as assistant secretary of state (¡946–¡947), Braden supported the Truman administration’s e›ort to obtain a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with Cuba and the implementation of Section 202e into the ¡948 Sugar Act as a lever to force Cuba’s acceptance of the treaty. See also Sugar Act of ¡948; Truman, Harry S; World War II

Brigade 2506 see Bay of Pigs Invasion; Más Canosa, Jorge Brooke, John R. (¡838–¡926) Brooke was a career soldier and one of three major-generals in the U.S. Army at the time of his appointment as military governor of Cuba in December ¡899 at the age of 68. Brooke had been in the service continuously since ¡86¡ and had a long Civil War battle record. In the Spanish-American War, Brooke led one of the columns in the conquest of Puerto Rico and, with the end of hostilities in August ¡898, served as military governor of that island. Brooke assumed his Cuban post on January ¡, ¡899, with vague instructions from President William McKinley to rebuild the economy and to protect the civil and religious rights of the people on the island. McKinley’s instructions provided little guidance for the establishment of both the military and civil-

29 ian government in Cuba. Beyond the establishment of government machinery and the pacification provisions found in the Teller Amendment, Brooke was at loss to define the ultimate U.S. objective in Cuba. Once in Cuba, Brooke faced a nearly impossible task: There were many obstacles to providing relief to the destitute Cubans and disbanding the Cuban insurgent army. Brooke also had to contend with challenges to his authority within and without Cuba. Almost immediately after assuming his position, Brooke was challenged by a subordinate, General Leonard Wood, over the centralization and distribution of tari› revenues. Wood, commander in the Santiago de Cuba region, had been collecting and disbursing tari›s at his own will. Brooke intended to centralize the tari› collection under the Custom’s Service and distribute the funds through the central government in Havana. Wood also wanted to decentralize the military command structure, but the plan was rejected by the War Department. These issues fueled the continuing feud between Brooke and Wood. Wood found like-minded colleagues in generals William G. Ludlow, military commander over Havana, and James H. Wilson, commander for Matanzas and Santa Clara provinces. Each feuded with Brooke over decentralization issues. Wilson’s proposed agricultural rehabilitation policy, which called for government-sponsored loans to farmers, was in sharp contrast to Brooke’s determination that Cuban farmers be given the essential tools to commence production. In ¡899, nothing came of either proposal except ill will between the two. The three dissident generals also became advocates of a continuing U.S. presence on the island. Wood and Wilson were well connected in Washington, D.C., and they took their case to President McKinley, Vice President Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Sr. (R., Mass.) and others. In July ¡899 these men pressured for Brooke’s dismissal, but Brooke momentarily carried the day. In September ¡899 Brooke persuaded McKinley to abandon Wood’s proposal to recruit Cuban regiments,

Brothers to the Rescue o‡cered by Americans, for duty with the U.S. occupation forces. However, the passive Brooke lacked personal initiative as he consistently waited for directions from Washington. With Elihu Root’s appointment as secretary of war on August ¡, ¡899, U.S.–Cuban policy solidified. Root was convinced that the United States needed to remain in Cuba. He suggested to Secretary of State John Hay a policy that resembled the future Platt Amendment and reflected the opinions of Generals Wood and Wilson. Under these conditions, Brooke was expendable. On December ¡3, ¡899, the War Department announced that General Leonard Wood would replace Brooke as the military commander of Cuba. See also Hay, John; Lodge, Henry Cabot, Sr.; Ludlow, William; McKinley, William; Roosevelt, Theodore; Root, Elihu; United States Occupation of Cuba; Wilson, James H.; Wood, Leonard

Brothers to the Rescue

On February 24, ¡996, two single-engine Cessna 337 aircraft were shot down by Cuban MIG fighter planes while looking for Cuban rafters allegedly in international waters o› the Florida Straits. Four airmen were killed in the incident. One plane and its pilot, José Basulto, returned to Florida. The incident caused an international furor and became a major factor in the U.S. congressional approval of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad ) Act of ¡996 (popularly known as the Helms–Burton Law). The United States asserted that the planes were in international waters and that the MIGs fired upon them without warning or even attempting to force them away from Cuba. The Cubans claimed otherwise and pointed out that Brothers to the Rescue (BTTR) was responsible for dropping leaflets over Havana on January 9 and ¡3 urging Cuban people to actively protest against the Cuban government. BTTR confirmed responsibility for the leaflets dropped on January ¡3 but did not confirm taking part in the actual flights. The Cuban government sent a

Bryan note to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana protesting the flights of U.S.–based aircraft and also publicly warned that it would “take all necessary measures” to prevent such flights in the future. Basulto, who founded BTTR for the purpose of rescuing Cubans escaping the island in any makeshift raft, claimed that the organization’s planes had made some ¡,800 flights over the Florida Straits, including into Cuban airspace. However, BTTR became increasingly confrontational over time and encouraged civil disobedience in Cuba as a means of toppling Castro. That approach seemed to be gaining popularity among younger Cubans. Castro was equal to the challenge. Shortly before the fateful BTTR flight, Cancilio Cubano, a coalition of Cuba’s dissident political groups, cancelled a scheduled meeting after the Cuban government imprisoned many of its leaders and announced that it would not permit the meeting to take place. At the time, many analysts suggested that BTTR should have taken heed of the Cuban government’s crackdown and avoided its provocative action on February 24. Amidst the public outcry in the United States against the shootdown, President Bill Clinton called for a tightening of the Cuban embargo. Clinton’s statement encouraged congressional hardliners to complete the Helms-Burton legislation. Clinton signed the measure on March ¡2, ¡996. At the time of the incident, many members of the Cuban American community asserted that a Castro agent or agents had penetrated BTTR and provided the Cuban government with precise information about the doomed flight. Subsequently, Gerardo Hernandez was arrested and on December ¡2, 200¡, sentenced to life in prison without parole for attempting to penetrate U.S. military bases and contributing to the deaths of the four flyers. In ¡997 Miami U.S. District Court judge James King ordered Cuba to pay $¡87 million in damages to the flyers’ surviving family members, but President Bill Clinton resisted taking any action on the grounds that such a

30 release of funds would interfere with U.S. foreign policy. Without explanation, however, on the eve of leaving the presidency in 200¡, Clinton signed an executive order providing $96.7 million dollars to the three American citizens, all Cuban Americans, killed in the ¡996 shoot down. The money came from frozen Cuban funds in the U.S. long distance phone service. See also Clinton, Bill; Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act; Trade Embargo

Bru, Federico see Laredo Bru, Federico Bryan, William Jennings (¡860–¡925) Prior to serving as secretary of state from ¡9¡3–¡9¡5, Bryan was a congressman from Nebraska and three-time Democratic presidential candidate (¡896, ¡900, and ¡908). He was an outspoken critic of imperialism and significantly influenced his party’s platform on the issue from ¡900–¡908. Bryan spoke out against the interventions under President Theodore Roosevelt and the use of “Dollar Diplomacy” by the Taft administration in the circum– Caribbean region. However, once appointed secretary of state, Bryan supported President Woodrow Wilson’s interventionist policies. Bryan’s past public record provided little basis for predicting his position when the Cuban crisis erupted in ¡895. As a congressman during President Grover Cleveland’s administration involved with decisions over Hawaii and Venezuela, Bryan directed his energies toward domestic issues, such as the tari› and the currency. Bryan’s public interest in Cuba dated to the sinking of the Maine in ¡896, when he spoke against overreaction to the disaster until the U.S. Navy investigation of the incident was complete. As time progressed, however, Bryan spoke on behalf of the U.S. responsibility to defend Cuba against Spain’s brutal authoritarianism. With diplomacy exhausted and the outbreak of war in April ¡898, Bryan

31 got caught up in the emotional moral crusade that followed. He volunteered for the Nebraska militia and, despite his lack of military experience, was appointed colonel of the state’s Third Regiment. He did not serve in Cuba and resigned from the military in December ¡898 to take up the anti-imperialist cause. Bryan supported the ¡898 Treaty of Paris that ended the Spanish-American War because it placed the issue of Cuba in congressional hands. Bryan incorrectly believed that Congress would temper the administration’s imperialistic designs. With Congress showing no signs of withdrawing from Cuba, Puerto Rico, or the Philippines, Bryan engineered the antiimperialist statement found in the ¡900 Democratic Party platform. It called for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Cuba. In ¡90¡, after Congress approved the Platt Amendment, the defiant Bryan asserted that the United States had no right to establish a protectorate over any American republic. In ¡902, before a largely U.S. audience in Havana, Bryan reminded the Americans not to exploit the Cubans in any way. For the remainder of the decade Bryan spoke out against the interventionist policies of the Taft and Theodore Roosevelt administrations and was responsible for the anti-imperialist statements in the ¡904 and ¡908 Democratic Party platforms. Wilson appointed Bryan, who lacked international experience, secretary of state largely for domestic political considerations. While they agreed on the broad parameters of Latin American policy, Wilson tended to rely more on his personal confidant, Colonel Edward M. House, for foreign policy advice. Still, Bryan supported Wilson’s interventionist policies in the circum–Caribbean region. After leaving the administration, Bryan criticized Wilson for becoming too Eurocentric in his policies at the expense of Latin America. Subsequently, Bryan advocated both the Senate’s ratification of the Treaty of Versailles that ended World War I and U.S. participation in the League of Nations. During the early ¡920s until his death in ¡935, Bryan

Buchanan spent much of his time supporting religious fundamentalism and the prohibition of alcohol. See also Cleveland, Grover S.; Dollar Diplomacy; Platt Amendment; Roosevelt, Theodore; Spanish-American War: Sinking of the Maine; United States Interventions; Wilson, Woodrow

Brzezinski, Zbigniew (¡928– ) Brzezinski served as head of the National Security Council (NSC) for President Jimmy Carter (¡977–¡98¡). A native of Poland, Brzezinski immigrated to Canada and then the United States in ¡953. Brzezinski came to the NSC with significant skepticism about détente with the Soviet Union. He viewed all issues in geopolitical and strategic terms: Every Soviet move had sinister intentions regarding U.S. global interests, and the United States should sharply confront the Soviets on these issues. This approach conflicted with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the State Department, which advocated a policy of accommodation with the Soviets. Brzezinski also believed that the NSC should be the sole manager of foreign a›airs, leaving the State Department with ancillary assignments. Given Brzezinski’s viewpoint, he interpreted the Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa, the Soviet brigade, and MIG-23s in Cuba as part of its larger designs threatening U.S. interests. Brzezinski also advocated continuance of the Cuban embargo and militated against the private discussions conducted between the two countries. By ¡978, Brzezinski won favor with Carter. See also Africa: Cuba’s Military Involvement; Carter, Jimmy; Soviet Union: MIG-23s, Soviet Brigade; Trade Embargo; Vance, Cyrus

Buchanan, James (¡79¡–¡868) Buchanan was a congressman, senator, secretary of state, minister to Great Britain prior to serving as president of the United States (¡857–¡86¡). Buchanan’s interest in

Buchanan Cuba can be traced to ¡826 during the House of Representative debates about British presence in the Caribbean. He reflected the conventional wisdom at the time by suggesting that the cession of Cuba to the United States be on “honorable terms.” Like others, he feared that either British control of the island or a slave insurrection there would have adverse repercussions in the United States. A generation later, when Buchanan served as secretary of state in the Polk administration (¡845–¡849), Cuba came to the forefront of U.S. policy. In the summer of ¡847, expansionist John O’Sullivan, who asserted that Spain was considering transferring Cuba to Great Britain, confronted Buchanan. Although Buchanan believed that Cuba someday would fall into the U.S. orbit, he argued that this was not the time for U.S. action because the Mexican War preoccupied the administration. At the time, Buchanan also did not want to antagonize Spain, which remained neutral in the U.S. conflict with Mexico. A year later, in May ¡848, O’Sullivan again raised the Cuban question, this time before President Polk, who, in turn, took the issue to his cabinet. Buchanan again urged delay, asserting that any e›ort to acquire Cuba would have a detrimental impact upon the Democratic Party in the forthcoming ¡848 presidential election. Buchanan also dismissed the expansionist argument that the Cuban planter class was prepared for a revolt against Spain and that it would welcome U.S. assistance. Instead, Buchanan accepted the view of the U.S. consul in Havana, Robert B. Campbell, that the Creoles, despite their discontent, were not willing to risk their wealth and status in a revolutionary cause. Buchanan also argued that the U.S. acquisition of Cuba would bring a British and French response. Without the cabinet’s unanimous approval, Polk devised a plan to which Buchanan agreed. Accordingly, American agents in Cuba were instructed to avoid all connections with potential revolutionaries on the island; Secretary of War William L. Marcy directed the U.S. Navy to prevent any American volunteers from going to Cuba; and the U.S. minister to

32 Spain, Romulus M. Saunders, informed the Spanish government that the United States would pay $¡00 million for the island. Although the cabinet swore to keep the plan secret, thanks to the indiscretions of Vice President George Dallas, the plan became public. Not that it mattered. Spain promptly dismissed the U.S. monetary proposal and indicated that it had no intention of parting with Cuba. Buchanan did not lose interest in Cuba. In ¡852, he advised incoming President Franklin Pierce that Cuba would be his most pressing foreign a›airs problem and suggested to him that the president who acquired the island would earn the same status as Thomas Je›erson did for his acquisition of Louisiana. Subsequently, as minister to Great Britain (¡853–¡856), Buchanan put forth a plan whereby the United States would urge Spanish bondholders in Europe to pressure Spain into selling the island to satisf y its debts. Buchanan also played a significant role in the writing of the Ostend Manifesto, which declared that the United States should o›er Spain up to $¡20 million for Cuba and, failing that, be prepared to take it by force. When Buchanan became president in ¡857, he continued to advocate Cuba’s acquisition. In his public speeches, Buchanan repeated all the reasons for U.S. ownership — security from potential British and French intrigue, satisfaction of U.S. claims against Cuba, an end to Spain’s discriminatory trade policies, and an end to African slave trade. Buchanan’s pronouncements reenforced the perception that the Democratic Party was the pro-southern expansionist party. For the southerners, additional territory o›ered political security in the national Congress. Suggestions regarding Cuba’s acquisition brought immediate rebuttal from the Republicans. Despite continued reports from U.S. diplomats in Madrid that repeated Spain’s refusal to part with the island, in December ¡857, Buchanan dispatched Christopher Fallon to Madrid to determine if Spain were willing to sell Cuba and on what terms. Although rebu›ed by the Spanish government, Fallon

33 remained in Madrid hoping to instigate political turmoil that would result in bringing a more amenable government to power. As Minister Augustus Dodge learned before Fallon’s arrival, and new Minister William Preston did afterwards, Spain had no intention of parting with Cuba. Undeterred, in ¡859, the persistent Buchanan asked Congress for $30 million to commence negotiations for the purchase of Cuba. Despite the e›orts of John Slidell (D., La.), the bill died in the Senate when Solomon Foot (Whig, Vt.) persuaded his colleagues to defer action until such a time when Spain would be willing to sell the island. Buchanan continued his requests until December ¡860, all of which fell upon deaf ears. Increasingly, the politicians turned their attention to the events that led to the outbreak of the U.S. Civil War in April ¡86¡. See also O’Sullivan, John; Ostend Manifesto; Pierce, Franklin; Polk, James K.

Bundy, McGeorge (¡9¡9–¡996) President John F. Kennedy appointed Bundy special assistant for national security a›airs, and during Bundy’s tenure, the national security advisor gained new prominence and importance. A Massachusetts native, Bundy distinguished himself as an intelligence o‡cer during World War II, after which he held a number of prominent positions until appointed Dean of Harvard University’s College of Arts and Sciences in ¡953. Shortly after his inauguration, Kennedy directed Bundy to initiate a review of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) planned invasion of Cuba, subsequently implemented at the Bay of Pigs. As a result of the review, Bundy cautioned the president about the di›erences between the CIA’s and military’s confidence in the anticipated success of the plan and the less-sanguine view taken by the State Department. The latter cautioned against the international political consequences of carrying out the invasion. To the Taylor Commission, which subsequently investigated the Bay of Pigs invasion, Bundy re-

Bush ported that the invasion’s success was dependent upon an internal uprising and that had the CIA indicated the importance of the DDay air strike, Kennedy may not have cancelled the second bomb run over Cuba. At the outset of the October ¡962 missile crisis, Bundy directed the formation of EXCOM, the president’s policy advisory committee. Initially, Bundy supported those in favor of an air strike against the missile sites, but eventually he moved to support the quarantine approach that led to a resolution of the crisis. Disillusioned with the emerging quagmire in Vietnam, Bundy resigned his post in ¡966 to serve as president of the Ford Foundation until ¡979. See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Kennedy, John F.; Missile Crisis

Bush, George H. W. (¡924– ) George H.W. Bush had long been involved in foreign a›airs before becoming the forty-first president of the United States (¡989–¡993). Son of a wealthy businessman, Bush was long involved in Republican Party politics and served as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ambassador to the United Nations, head of the first U.S. mission to China after the restoration of relations by President Richard M. Nixon, and two-term vice president of the United States. Bush governed as the Cold War came to an end and gained recognition for his conduct of the Gulf War in ¡99¡. In Latin America, the Bush administration pushed for democracy and free markets and felt the best way to accomplish this was through breaking down hemispheric barriers to markets, privatizing public enterprises, and attacking one-party collectivist states, i.e. Cuba. Shortly after coming to the presidency, Bush spelled out his conditions for future normalization of relations with Cuba: the holding of free elections, the establishment of a market economy, and a reduction in the country’s armed forces. These conditions di›ered significantly from Presidents Jimmy Carter

Bush and Ronald Reagan, both of whom focused upon changes in Cuban foreign policy as the step toward normalization of relations. In formulating his policy, Bush was influenced by the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) and, particularly by its president, Jorge Más Canosa. Bush brushed aside suggestions from more moderate Cuban exile groups, such as the Cuban-American Committee for Family Rights. Under these conditions, Fidel Castro’s suggestions to open a dialog did not have an audience in Washington. Bush pursued a multitrack policy in an e›ort to destabilize the Castro regime. Military maneuvers were stepped up in the Caribbean region. Increased funding for propaganda attacks upon the regime included the continued assault on the dictatorship; Cuba’s lack of human and civil rights were described to the public at home and in international forums; and funding was increased for TV Martí in ¡992, despite clear evidence of its ine›ectiveness. Bush also continued to emphasize the isolation of Cuba from the hemisphere. While the administration was successful in preventing the readmission to the Organization of American States, it failed in its bid to keep Cuba from being elected to the United Nations Security Council in ¡989. In that instance, all Latin American states supported Cuba’s candidacy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc allies between ¡989 and ¡99¡, their preferential economic treatment of Cuba ended. The Bush administration understood the adverse impact this change had on Cuba’s ability to earn hard currencies and used this condition to speak forcefully about tightening the economic noose. Bush took some steps in that direction. For example, he prevented AT&T from connecting its newly laid $7 million underwater telephone cable connecting Cuba to the United States because it meant the transfer of approximately $220,000 annually to Cuba in user’s fees. In ¡99¡, he denied ABC television the right to broadcast the Pan American games from Havana because the payout to Cuba was $6 million. Bush even pressured the Soviets. Between

34 ¡989 and ¡99¡, as the Soviet economy spiraled downwards and Premier Mikhail Gorbachev looked for badly needed external funding, Bush attempted to link U.S. economic aid to the Soviets’ cutting of economic support to Cuba. Despite the tough rhetoric, Bush would not move against U.S. subsidiaries operating in third countries under the host country’s legal system. As President Gerald R. Ford before him, Bush understood the problems in implementing such legislation and the di‡culties such e›orts would have on U.S. bilateral relations with the host countries. Several members of Congress criticized Bush for not going further. Florida Republican congressman Lawrence Smith proposed amendments to various bills providing for an end to the practice of U.S. subsidiaries in third countries from trading with Cuba. In ¡99¡, both the House and the Senate approved amendments to the foreign aid bill that proposed to cut all economic assistance to the Soviets until it cut its aid to Cuba. CANF president Jorge Más Canosa lobbied members of both parties to take stronger measures to further damage the Cuban economy. The culmination of the hard-line position came in the ¡992 Cuban Democracy Act, popularly known as the Torricelli Bill, named after the chief architect of the legislation, New Jersey congressman Robert Torrecilli (D.). The bill banned U.S. subsidiaries in third countries from trading with Cuba and prevented ships that stopped in Cuba from visiting U.S. ports six months before and afterward. See also Castro Ruz, Fidel: Foreign Policy; Carter, Jimmy; Cuban American National Foundation; Cuban Democracy Act; Ford, Gerald; Reagan, Ronald W.

Bush, George W. (¡946– ) The 43rd president of the United States, is the son of the 4¡st president George H.W. Bush. A graduate of Yale and Harvard Universities, Bush followed the family tradition by entering the oil business in Texas. Subsequently, he became a part owner of the major

35 league baseball team the Texas Rangers until elected governor of that state in ¡994 and reelected in ¡998. He defeated Democrat Al Gore for the presidency in 2000 in a closely contested election that revolved around issues in the state of Florida. Some critics charged that he owed his victory to the Cuban community in south Florida, which also supported his brother Jeb’s successful bid for the Florida governorship. Certainly, President Bush has been closely linked to the Miami-based Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) and his hard-line policies toward Cuba reflect these two facts. Bush took a strong anti–Castro stance from the beginning of his administration. Continuing former President Bill Clinton’s policy that dated to the shooting down of two unarmed aircraft allegedly in international waters in February ¡996, Bush declared that Cuba continued to be a threat to U.S. vessels or planes traveling near Cuba, a policy that enabled him to prevent the U.S. anchorage of vessels or use of its facilities by ships or planes that recently visited Cuba. Bush also described the 40-year-old trade embargo against Cuba as a proper policy tool and a moral statement, yet he continued Clinton’s suspension of Title III of the Helms-Burton law, which called for a recovery of damages due to the nationalization of U.S.–owned business in Cuba. Bush also instructed the Treasury Department to clamp down on U.S. citizens who traveled to Cuba without proper documentation with the levying of fines against returnees. Through 2002, an estimated 443 persons were contacted by the Treasury Department’s O‡ce of Foreign Assets Control for violating existing laws for spending monies illegally in Cuba. Bush also criticized the Mexican government for its continued Cuban relationship. Under U.S. pressure, Castro was kept from the Summit of the Americas conference in Quebec, Canada, in April 200¡. In an e›ort to keep Castro from meeting with the late-arriving President Bush, the U.S. government reportedly pressured the Mexican government into whisking Castro out of the country following his speech before the United Nations Financing for Development Conference in Monter-

Bush rey, Mexico, in March 2002. In the spring of 2002, the administration charged Cuba with making biochemical weapons, but backed o› when critics, including former President Jimmy Carter who visited Cuba in May 2002, asserted otherwise. Given the tone of the Bush administration, Cuban gestures for rapprochement — purchasing badly needed food supplies following hurricane Michelle in late 200¡, withholding criticism for the housing of terrorist prisoners at the Guantánamo Naval Base, o›ering to increase cooperation on drug tra‡cking and terrorism, and signing the ¡995 Treaty of Tlatelolco that banned nuclear weapons in the Caribbean and Latin America — fell on deaf ears in Washington. Bush clearly defined his Cuba policy on May 20, 2002, the ¡00th anniversary of Cuban Independence. He declared that full normalization of relations with Cuba — diplomatic recognition, open trade, and an aide program — would come only when Cuba has a new government that is fully democratic, when the rule of law is respected, and when the human rights of all Cubans are fully protected. Toward those objectives Bush called upon Castro to permit all political groups to nominate candidates for the 2003 National Assembly, that the vote be by secret ballot and supervised by international observers. In addition, all political prisoners needed to be released and free to participate in those elections, trade unions independent of government control brought into existence and those workers employed by foreign firms in Cuba should be paid their full salary, not the small percentage permitted by the Cuban government. Bush also announced that his administration would provide aid to non-government organizations to be used directly for humanitarian and entrepreneurial activities in Cuba and that the U.S. government would provide scholarships for Cuban students and professionals who want to build civil institutions in Cuba and for family members of political prisoners. Until such a time, the trade embargo remained in e›ect. Bush’s “new initiative towards Cuba” pleased the CANF and hard-line congressmen

Bush like Senator Jesse Helms (R.–N.C.), who had already introduced legislation to provide $¡00,000 for such purposes. However, it did not please the estimated 6,000 U.S. citizens who petitioned the president in July 2002 to lift the travel ban because it violated their constitutional right to travel to Cuba. The president’s Latin American appointments also reflected a hard-line position. Most controversial was Cuban-born Otto Reich, who headed President Ronald Reagan’s O‡ce of Public Diplomacy to defend U.S. Central Americans at that time. Bush appointed Reich assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere A›airs, but in January 2003, when it became clear that Congress would not confirm the appointment, Bush appointed Reich special envoy for Western Hemisphere initiatives, reporting to National Security Council (NSC) advisor Condoleezza Rice. Other Cuban hardliners included Reich’s assistant, Lino Gutierrez, a former ambassador to Nicaragua who opposed any dialog with Castro; John Negropronte, ambassador to Honduras during the ¡980s, as ambassador to the United Nations; Emilio Gonzalez, who served at the southern Command based in Miami, as a NSC deputy; and former CANF lobbyist Jose Cárdenas as the Latin American specialist on the sta› of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Bush’s retention of the trade embargo brought sti› opposition from many sources. The U.S. business community continued to express its disappointment and called for a lifting of the embargo. Republican congressmen from midwestern agricultural states called for a policy change as their constituents saw economic opportunity in Cuba. A U.S.–Cuba business conference in February 2002 established the U.S.–Cuba Trade Association, and a second meeting is scheduled for 2003. A U.S.–Cuban trade show in September 2002 brought representatives from nearly 300 U.S. companies to the island in defiance of the Bush administration policy. A bipartisan group of forty congressmen and senators worked throughout 2002 to bring about a change in the embargo policy, but without success. Bush threatened to veto any such leg-

36 islation. The most dramatic change came in November and December 200¡ following hurricane Michelle. Devastated by the storm, Cuba badly needed foodstu›s and U.S. agribusiness — Archer Daniels Midland, Cargill, Riceland, Gold Kist, and Tyson Foods — were quick to fill the gap. Taking advantage of the change in the embargo restrictions in 2000 that permitted the cash sale for foodstu›s, these and other U.S. companies signed deals totaling an estimated $¡22 million. Castro paid cash from his own treasury and from funds borrowed from France. The growing domestic and international pressure for the United States to lift its Cuban trade embargo su›ered a setback in the spring of 2003 as a result of events within Cuba. In March, the Cuban government henceforth required that the U.S. Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, James Cason, receive government permission to travel outside the capital, where he allegedly encouraged dissident groups to further militate against the Castro regime. That same month, the Cuban government arrested seventy-five persons — independent journalists, opposition party leaders, human rights advocates and prodemocracy activists. Subsequently, all received lengthy prison sentences following secret trials. Finally, in early April 2003 three men were executed by a firing squad for their attempt to hijack a Havana harbor ferry to the United States. Bush responded to the first instance by restricting travel by Cuban diplomats to within the Washington, D.C., “capital beltway” and indicated that travel beyond that point depended upon the Cuban government permitting Cason to travel beyond Havana. On March 22, the Bush administration released new rules regarding U.S.–Cuban contacts. Although the rules came on the heels of the arrest of 75 dissidents, the administration argued that they were the result of a policy review that dated to May 2002. The new rules allowed more Cuban Americans to visit the island and permitted them to carry with them as much as $3,000 in household remittances. In addition, Treasury licenses henceforth would be granted to independent U.S. organizations that sought

37 to “promote a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy” in Cuba. Furthermore, so-called humanitarian activities that included construction projects intended “to benefit legitimately independent civil society groups” as well as promote educational training in such fields as civic education, journalism, advocacy and organizing would receive special consideration. In contrast, organizations taking individuals to Cuba to participate in “educational” exchanges not related to academic course work no longer would receive travel licenses. In sum, the new rules were more expansive than constrictive, but clearly favored anti–Castro interest groups. Following the sentencing of the seventyfive alleged dissidents and the execution of the three ferryboat hijackers, the Bush administration reviewed its policy options. In May 2003, it had several measures under consideration: (¡) a reduction in the sta› at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, which would force Cuba to do the same with its Washington o‡ce; (2) the suspension of the weekly U.S.–based charter flights that carry Cuban exiles to the island; (3) the imposition of new and more restrictive limits on remittances that Cuban Americans send to their relatives on the island; (4) the suspension of export licenses to U.S. companies selling agricultural goods to Cuba; and (5) the further tightening of travel restrictions on U.S. citizens traveling to Cuba. Each option has its shortcomings and could prompt a Cuban response. The administration also understood that a most harsh response could trigger another Castro-approved exodus as with the ¡980 Mariel boat lift and the ¡994 Balsero crisis. In addition, Bush threatened to veto any congressional legislation that lifted the embargo and in October 2003, tightened U.S. travel restrictions, but did not implement any of the other restriction options. See also Agribusiness Exhibition; Castro Ruz, Fidel: Foreign Policy; Carter, Jimmy: Visit to Cuba

Butler, Robert (¡897–¡955) A political appointee, Butler served as U.S. ambassador to Cuba from May ¡948 until

Ca›rey May ¡95¡ during the administration of Carlos Prío Socarras. Butler continued the work of his immediate predecessor, R. Henry Norweb, in attempting to persuade President Ramón Grau San Martín to accept the proposed U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. Near the end of his term, Butler became convinced that Prío would never accept the proposed treaty because of the sugar growers’ self interests, the Cuban manufacturing sector that wanted tari› protection and unionized labor, which had become increasingly under communist control and hence anti– American. See also Grau San Martín, Ramón; Norweb, R. Henry; Prío Socarrás, Carlos; Truman, Harry S

Ca›rey, Je›erson (¡886–¡974) Ca›rey served as U.S. ambassador to Cuba from ¡934 to ¡937. A native of Louisiana, Ca›rey attended Tulane University and was admitted to the Louisiana bar in ¡909. He abandoned the legal profession to enter the Foreign Service in ¡9¡¡. He arrived in Cuba on December ¡8, ¡933, as President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s special representative and became ambassador following the U.S. recognition of President Carlos Mendieta in February ¡935. Ca›rey wasted no time informing incumbent president Ramón Grau San Martín that the United States would continue its nonrecognition of his regime. In a series of conversations with Fulgencio Batista and Carlos Mendieta in early January ¡934, Ca›rey signaled his approval of replacing Grau with Mendieta and, in fact, recommended to President Roosevelt that he give assurances, in advance, that recognition would be extended to the new president. Although Roosevelt refused to do so, Batista went forward with his plan that resulted in the installation of Mendieta in the presidency on January ¡8, ¡934. Three days later, on January 23, the United States extended recognition to Mendieta. Ca›rey o‡cially presented his ambassadorial credentials to Cuba’s new president on February 28, ¡934.

Ca›rey Ca›rey arrived in a Cuba beset with extreme poverty and political turmoil. The Great Depression, coupled with the loss of privileges in the U.S. sugar market contributed to widened income gaps between rich and poor and to a loss of government income. The events since August ¡933 ignited political factionalism that threatened the Mendieta administration from its start. For his subsequent e›orts to bring stability to Cuba, Ca›rey was roundly criticized for intervening in Cuba’s internal a›airs and protecting U.S. interests. Ca›rey believed that an improvement in Cuba’s economic conditions would help to calm the tense political climate. Almost immediately after his arrival in Havana, Ca›rey supported loans from the Export-Import Bank to enable the Cuban government to pay its employees in back salaries and other current accounts. Ca›rey also supported the Cuban demand for the United States to increase its sugar quota and to lower its tari› for Cuban sugar. The issue was addressed in the JonesCostigan Act signed by Franklin Roosevelt on May 9, ¡934. The bill designated sugar as a basic agricultural commodity and empowered the secretary of agriculture to fix quotas on sugar entering the U.S. market. For Cuba it meant an increase to ¡.9 million tons. That same day, Roosevelt lowered the sugar tari› to ¡.875 cents per pound. Because the ¡903 treaty granted Cuba a 20 percent reduction, its sugar was charged at ¡.50 cents per pound. Ca›rey also labored for the completion of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement that was signed on August 24, ¡934, which lowered tari› barriers between the two countries. Subsequently, U.S. o‡cials claimed that these two acts stimulated Cuba’s depressed economy. In the political arena, Ca›rey supported Mendieta’s plea for the abrogation of the ¡903 Platt Amendment. Discussions toward that end were already underway in Washington and resulted in a new treaty on June 9, ¡934. It terminated the ¡903 document that included the Platt Amendment. Ca›rey, however, moved slowly in approving the removal from Cuban waters the 25 U.S. naval ships that had been there since the political distur-

38 bances of August and September ¡933. He argued that because of Cuba’s political turmoil, the removal of the ships might send a signal to President Mendieta’s opposition that the United States judged his government to be a failure. Not until September ¡, ¡934, did the last of the U.S. naval squadron leave Cuban waters. The Roosevelt administration described these political and economic accomplishments as signs of the Good Neighbor policy. Yet, Ca›rey’s other activities indicated a continuance of U.S. interference in the country’s internal a›airs, and the impact of the economic programs only increased Cuba’s dependence upon the United States. Shortly after Ca›rey arrived in Havana in December ¡934, President Mendieta’s coalition splintered, and the opposition groups increased their attacks upon the administration. Mass demonstrations, strikes, and acts of terrorism became the norm, particularly in Havana. Ca›rey continually criticized Mendieta for not taking a firm stand against the perpetrators, but he freely complimented Batista for using the army to break up demonstrations and strikes and for foiling an attempted coup in August ¡934. The situation became so bad in March ¡935, when a general strike appeared ominous, that Mendieta declared a state of war, which gave the military unprecedented powers. Free of restraint, Batista conducted a brutal campaign against the opposition, including communist leader Antonio Guiteras. When it was over, Ca›rey, who condoned Batista’s actions, reported to Washington that an overwhelming majority of the Cuban people did not support the call for a general strike and were now much more content that tranquillity had been restored. By mid–¡935, analysts in Cuba and newspapers in the United States agreed that Batista, advised and supported by Ca›rey, kept Mendieta in the presidential palace and that Ca›rey’s embassy sta› did not understand the reasons for the Cubans’ discontent. The latter point was driven home in July ¡935 following the attempt of the leftist-leaning U.S.–based Commission to Investigate Social and Economic Condi-

39 tions attempt to land in Havana for the purpose of validating the dictatorial nature of the Mendieta government and the country’s socioeconomic disparities. The Cuban government refused its entry on technical grounds, and Ca›rey supported the decision. Ca›rey continued to protect U.S. business interests on the island and to be identified with Batista during the short term of President Miguel Mariano Gómez in ¡936. Although Ca›rey failed to dissuade the State Department to authorize coercive action to protect U.S. sugar companies from recent Cuban laws that cut into the profitability of U.S. refineries in Cuba, he repeatedly pressured Gómez to make the adjustment locally. In late ¡939, Ca›rey attempted to persuade Gómez from vetoing a funding measure for a military-run rural education program. Gómez viewed the project as an extension of the military’s influence in civil a›airs. Ca›rey thought otherwise, He viewed the education program as one of Batista’s more constructive projects. When the president refused to back down, Ca›rey was unable to prevent Batista’s use of the constitutional process to have Gómez impeached on December 24, ¡936. When Ca›rey left Cuba for his new post in Brazil in March ¡937, critics asserted that he and Batista ruled the island and that Ca›rey had made a mockery of the Good Neighbor policy. Yet, Roosevelt and Hull commended him for his service. Perhaps historian Hubert Herring put it best when he observed that Cuba deserves to be first on a list of “impossible jobs.” See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Decree Law 522; Gómez, Miguel Mariano; Good Neighbor policy; Jones-Costigan Act; Mendieta, Carlos; Trade Agreements: Reciprocal Trade Agreement of ¡934

Calhoun, William J. (¡848–¡9¡6) A former congressman, Illinois judge, and a close friend and supporter of President William McKinley, Calhoun served as special commissioner to Cuba in ¡897 to check upon

Camarioca the reliability of the reports issued by ConsulGeneral Fitzhugh Lee. With no knowledge of Cuba or the Spanish language, Calhoun spent three weeks in Cuba in May ¡897. His report to McKinley in June became the basis for the administration’s policy. Calhoun described the economic devastation brought to the island by the War for Independence and its adverse impact on U.S.–Cuban trade. Because neither the insurgents nor the Spanish forces had the capability to destroy the other, Calhoun could not foresee an end to the conflict. He particularly was critical of the Spanish brutality and the reconcentrado policy of General Valerieno Weyler. Although Calhoun claimed that all classes of Cubans supported the war e›ort, he noted that the property classes opposed complete independence because they feared the uneducated masses that they judged to be incapable of conducting political a›airs. Calhoun concurred with their opinion, and although his report made no specific recommendations, he leaned toward an early end to the war by providing Cuba with economic liberty and local self-government under Spanish sovereignty. See also Lee, Fitzhugh; McKinley, William; Reconcentrado Program; War for Independence

Camarioca Boat Lift Between October ¡0 and 28, ¡965, an estimated 5,000 Cubans came to Florida in boats operated by Cuban exiles and their sympathizers in Miami. Without notice, on September ¡8, ¡965, Fidel Castro announced that Cubans who wanted to leave for the United States could depart from the port of Camarioca provided vessels came for them. The operation was cancelled as quickly as it began. Castro asserted that threatening storms in late October that made crossing the Florida Straits dangerous forced him to shut down Camarioca, and in so doing, an estimated 200,000 Cubans who wished to leave the island remained behind. In opening Camarioca, Castro laid blame upon the United States for the policy that prevented the reopening of air tra‡c between the

Canalejas two countries, which that had been closed since the October ¡962 missile crisis. Still, that did not stop an estimated ¡5,000 Cubans from successfully fleeing to the United States by September ¡965. While the opening of Camarioca challenged U.S. immigration policy, only speculative reasons are given for Castro’s real reasons for so doing. According to a Central Intelligence Agency analysis, there was a growing discontent with the revolution and it was felt that many Cubans would migrate if given the opportunity. Most U.S. public analysts agreed. However, Camarioca also provided Castro with the opportunity to rid the island of dissidents. Others suggested that the out-migration allowed Cuba to dispose of unproductive workers. Still others suggested that Castro was attempting to pressure the United States into negotiations that would result in the normalization of relations. Despite its short duration, Camarioca led to an agreement providing for the orderly air evacuation of Cubans to the United States. See also Cuban Americans; Castro Ruz, Fidel; Freedom Flights

Canalejas, José (¡854–¡9¡2) Canalejas was a prominent Spanish liberal politician and owner and editor of Heraldo de Madrid. In October ¡897, Canalejas was already a critic of Prime Minister Sagasta’s autonomist policy toward Cuba when he undertook a twomonth fact-finding trip to Paris, New York, Washington, and Cuba. He met with Cuban exiles and U.S. government o‡cials and toured Cuba’s countryside, including some reconcentrados. Canalejas returned to Spain in December ¡897 convinced that Spain could not win the war. He informed Sagasta that the Spanish army was in dire straits, ill equipped, ill disciplined, malnourished, and disease infected. If the United States intervened, neither it nor the Spanish navy would be able to resist the U.S. military. Cubans and Spaniards who favored autonomy had become a minority, as the groundswell for independence had reached an unparalleled proportion. As ¡898 began, Canalejas believed that Cuba already had been

40 “lost.” See also Reconcentrado Program; War for Independence

Caracas Pact This unity pact was signed on July 28, ¡958, in Caracas, Venezuela, among several anti–Batista organizations, including the Directorio Revolucionario and the 26th of July Movement but excluding the communist Partido Socialista Popular. The pact called for a common strategy of armed insurrection to overthrow Batista, to be followed by a brief provisional government to be headed by Manuel Urrutia. The new government would carry out a minimum program guaranteeing the punishment of the guilty; establishing peace and order, ensuring basic freedoms; implementing a program of workers’ rights; providing for the economic, social, and institutional progress of the Cuban people; and fulfilling Cuba’s international obligations. See also Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Revolution

Carter, Jimmy (¡924–) Jimmy Carter was president of the United States from ¡977 to ¡98¡, and is best known for his emphasis on human rights, the Panama Canal Treaties, the Middle East crisis, and enduring the Iranian hostage crisis. A successful businessperson in rural Georgia, Carter served in the state legislature and as governor of the state before being elected president. His two key foreign policy advisors, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbignew Brzezinski viewed global issues from di›erent perspectives. Brzezinski placed all of the world’s problems within the East-West struggle; the free world versus. communism. Vance argued that accommodation with the Soviets could be achieved and that the Soviets were not the culprit in every international crisis. Over time, Brzezinski had greater influence upon Carter’s foreign policy decisions than did Vance. Carter also had greater interest in Latin America than either of his two advisors.

41 Carter’s Latin American policy focused upon human rights and democratization, and with regard to Cuba, Carter suggested that certain “impediments” needed to be removed as a step toward normalization of relations. The impediments included the release of political prisoners, noninterference in the internal a›airs of Latin American countries, and a decrease in Cuba’s involvement in Africa. The latter proved to be a major obstacle to improve bilateral relations. The administration took “carefully calibrated” measures to thaw the bilateral relationship, including the cancellation of U.S. reconnaissance flights over Cuba, discussions on terrorism, removal of travel restrictions on U.S. citizens visiting Cuba and their using of U.S. dollars on the island, the conclusion of a fishing-rights and maritime-boundaries agreement, and the end of the blacklisting of foreign ships engaged in Cuban trade. Diplomats were exchanged with the establishment of “Interests Sections” in each capital on September ¡, ¡977. The “Interests Sections” facilitated direct communications between the two governments, but nothing was accomplished in ¡977 because of the wide range of issues that separated the two countries. In addition to Carter’s wish that all political prisoners be released, the United States wanted to settle compensation issues that dated to Castro’s nationalization program during the early years of the revolution and reinstitute the anti-hijacking agreement that Castro abruptly terminated in ¡976. For the Cubans, lifting the embargo was of primary concern. The political prisoner issue needed further discussion. Castro refused to address the hijacking issue until all terrorist attacks upon Cuba stopped, a clear reference to the clandestine activities of the Cuban community residing in Miami. More important, however, was increased presence of Cuban troops in Angola and elsewhere in Africa. Until the Cubans decreased their presence in Africa, the Carter administration had little interest in seeking accommodation. In early ¡978, Castro revived private talks with the United States through Bernardo

Carter Benes, an exiled Cuban banker. Carter accepted the o›er, and in May ¡978, Brzezinzki’s top aide, David Aaron, met with Castro’s confidant José Luis Padrón. The discussions focused upon the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Africa and upon the release of political prisoners in Cuba. The State Department saw the initial encounter as a positive step, while the National Security Council took a negative approach. Its insistence that the Cubans first withdraw from Africa foredoomed the second round of discussions held in Atlanta in August ¡978. The only progress made in these discussions dealt with the number of political prisoners the U.S. would take in and the means by which that would be accomplished. The United States was interested in political prisoners still incarcerated on August ¡, ¡978, not those previously released and residing in Cuba. They would be accepted under the Refugee Act, which meant that their families could come along. Under those terms, the Cubans estimated that there were 2,500 prisoners. In November the first group of these prisoners and their families arrived in Miami. In the October and December ¡978, secret meetings were held in Cuernavaca, Mexico, and in Havana. Neither proved successful as the United States insisted upon addressing the issue of Cuban troops in Africa. A final meeting was held in December ¡980 in Havana but by then relations had spiraled downward. Cuban troops remained in Africa. Castro’s support of Maurice Bishop, who seized control of Grenada in March ¡979, and the Sandinistas, who ousted Nicaraguan strongman Anastasio Somoza in July ¡979, caused concern in Washington. Castro also used the meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana in September ¡979 to attack U.S. policies. Further, in ¡980 Castro defended the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These events convinced Carter that Castro was within the Soviet orbit. During the Carter administration hundreds of U.S. company o‡cials visited Cuba to evaluate the Cuban economy. Producers of agricultural machinery, communications and transport equipment, computers, rice, medical

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supplies, spare parts, and fertilizers became impressed with the potential markets, but they were chagrined at the extent of Western European presence. Congressional debate mirrored the administration’s policy shift. In ¡977, several legislators called for an end, or at least softening, of the embargo on trade with Cuba. They repeated the arguments of their previous colleagues: The embargo had outlived its usefulness; the lack of a U.S. presence denied the government any leverage in Cuban political a›airs; and U.S. businesses were losing opportunities to foreign competitors. A proposal by George McGovern in May ¡977 signaled a change in congressional attitude. McGovern withdrew his proposal when it became clear that the Congress did not favor any change in the trade relationship or in the opening of diplomatic relations. A year later, in ¡978, following acrimonious debate the Senate, approved a resolution by a 53–29 vote calling on the president to close down the “Interests Sections,” deny all applications for trade licenses related to the Cuban market, stop the normalization process, and link any future rapprochement with Cuba to the withdrawal of its forces from Africa. See also Africa: Cuba’s Military Involvement; Brzezinski, Zbigniew; Castro Ruz, Fidel: Foreign Policy; Central American Conflict; Grenada; Mariel Boat Lift; Soviet Union: Soviet Brigade; Trade Embargo; Vance, Cyrus

Visit to Cuba Former President Jimmy Carter, accompanied by his wife Rosalyn and a delegation from his Carter Center in Atlanta, Georgia, traveled to Cuba on May ¡2, 2002, to visit with President Fidel Castro, academics, and dissident groups. Carter came at the invitation of Castro, who, in his welcoming speech, told Carter he was free to travel and meet with whomever he pleased. The trip made Carter the first former or sitting U.S. president to visit Cuba since Calvin Coolidge in ¡928 and the most prominent U.S. visitor since Castro came to power in ¡959.

On the eve of Carter’s trip, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton asserted that Cuba possessed a limited biological and chemical warfare research program. President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell told Carter in their private meetings before his departure that the government had no such evidence, which led critics to believe that the announcement was made to take the limelight o› Carter’s visit to Cuba. While in Cuba, Carter visited with scientists and saw their laboratories. He came away convinced that the allegation was false. Carter met di›erent dissident groups, including the leaders of the Varela Project, named after ¡9th-century Catholic priest and Cuban independence activist Felix Varela. Some ¡¡,000 Cubans signed the project’s petition presented to Cuba’s National Assembly calling for a national referendum to permit freedom of association and expression, grant individuals the right to own businesses, overhaul the electoral law, and give amnesty to political prisoners. The centerpiece of Carter’s trip came on May ¡4 in a twenty-minute speech, in Spanish, to the Cuban people on national television. An unedited transcript of the speech appeared in the Cuban Communist Party newspaper, Granma, on May ¡6. In it, Carter praised the Cuban government for its educational and health-care programs, and while he refrained from criticizing human rights abuses on the island, he criticized the one party political state and the stifling of opposition. Carter called upon Cuba to join the community of democracies and for the government to grant dissidents the fundamental right to a›ect change through elections. Carter also called upon the United States to take the first step in improving relations by lifting its four-decadeold trade embargo. As he departed Havana, Carter repeated his call for democracy in Cuba and for President George W. Bush to lift the U.S. trade embargo. Castro remained silent to Carter’s admonitions, but critics in the United States described Carter as being naïve for not understanding the realities of Cuban life. President

43 Bush did not take Carter’s advice. Three days after Carter’s return, on May 20, 2002, the president announced that the trade embargo would remain in place. See also Bush, George W.

Castro, Fidel see Castro Ruz, Fidel Castro, Raúl see Castro Ruz, Raúl Castro Ruz, Fidel (¡926– ) A lawyer by training, a revolutionary by vocation, Fidel Castro led the successful guerrilla movement that ousted Fulgencio Batista from power in ¡959 and then set in motion the Cuban Revolution. Since then, Castro has led Cuba as president, chief of the armed forces, first secretary of the Communist Party, and most recently as “maximum leader.” He transformed Cuba into a socialist state and until ¡99¡ aligned Cuba with the Soviet Union. Castro’s university career served as the catalyst to his revolutionary status. There he was exposed to di›erent ideologies and was most attracted to Partido del Pueblo Cubano, the Orthodox Party, which called for economic independence from the United States, political liberty, social justice, and an end to government corruption. In ¡947 he joined others who sought to oust the dictator of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo Molina and a year later was in Bogotá, Colombia, when riots erupted over the killing of labor leader Jorge E. Gaitán. These experiences converged after Fulgencio Batista cancelled the ¡952 elections in which Castro was a candidate for the national congress. Convinced of the need for reform within Cuba, Castro believed that it could be accomplished only by the forceful ouster of Batista. His orchestrated raid upon the Moncada military barracks in ¡953 was designed to incite other frustrated Cubans to follow him. That did not happen. While most of Castro’s followers at Moncada were

Castro Ruz killed, he and his brother, Raúl, were sentenced to long prison terms. Released in a general amnesty in ¡955 the Castros were exiled to Mexico, where they met up with the Argentinean revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara. Together, with eighty others, they returned to Cuba in December ¡956 to begin their revolutionary battle. Castro’s movement was joined by several others, and by mid–¡958 Batista’s support began to collapse. He finally fled the island on December 3¡, ¡958, and a week later, Castro marched triumphantly into Havana. Between ¡959 and ¡96¡, Castro consolidated his power by eliminating political opposition, directing government, and nationalizing the economy. He withstood U.S. economic pressures and its sponsored counter revolution at the Bay of Pigs in April ¡96¡. During the same time he turned to the Soviet Union for economic assistance. Because the October ¡962 Missile Crisis was handled directly by John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, Castro developed a deep mistrust of the Soviet Union. However, by ¡968, Castro became economically dependent upon the Soviet Union because the economic policies of Ernesto “Che” Guevara failed. Thanks to Soviet assistance, the Cuban economy improved throughout the ¡970s, but, at the same time, the younger generation of Cubans lost their enthusiasm for the revolution. This prompted Castro to call for a revitalization in ¡976. Until the mid–¡980s Cuba experienced several social successes, particularly in health care and education, and the government appeared to meet the basic needs of the Cuban people. However, it came at a price. Castro tightened his grip on the nation. He chose leaders more for their loyalty to him than for their abilities. All labor, social, and professional organizations came under state direction. The press was controlled. Academic research and literary and artistic expression had to be within the confines of the revolution, there was no room for opposition. Dissidence meant arrest and prison sentences. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in ¡99¡ and the concomitant adverse economic

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impact upon Cuba, critics argued that Castro’s tenure would soon end. This did not happen. To date, has given no indication of leaving. After struggling through a “special period,” the Cuban economy achieved a modicum of recovery by 2000, thanks to increased tourism, joint ventures with foreign companies, and a dollarized economy. Because Castro is in his late 70s, speculation is rampant about Cuba’s future. Although he has designated his brother Raúl to been his successor, there is no guarantee that will happen. In addition, the Cuban people have long be used to subsidized housing, food, and electricity and free education and health care. Any struggle for leadership will be complicated by the people’s desire to keep the benefits of the revolution, their lack of political experience, and U.S. policy. See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Castro Ruz, Raúl; Guevara, Ernesto “Che”; Missile Crisis; Revolution

Foreign Policy During the first decade of the Cuban Revolution, Fidel Castro faced a confrontational United States. The U.S. economic embargo, sponsorship of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April ¡96¡, Cuba’s expulsion from the Organization of American States in January ¡962, and “Operation Mongoose” and other sabotage plans were all designed to topple the regime, but all failed. His relations with the Soviet Union were not all that cordial. For geopolitical reasons, the Soviet Union established trade relations with Cuba in ¡960 and placed missiles on the island in ¡962, but it was forced to remove them by the United States. Their removal, completed without Castro’s approval, infuriated the Cuban leader because he thought the missiles were to defend Cuba against another U.S. invasion. The Soviets never trusted Castro and were disenchanted with his adventurism in Latin America during the ¡960s. At the time, Soviet policy anticipated local communists coming to power through existing political institutions. Neither the Soviet dissatisfaction nor the U.S. pressure prevented Castro from attempt-

ing to export revolution to Latin America during the ¡960s. In the Second Declaration of Havana on February 4, ¡962, Castro challenged all revolutionaries to fan the fires of liberation across Latin America, and Cuba supported such movements in Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela. As a result of his attitude and policies, by the end of the ¡960s, Castro and Cuba stood alone, isolated by the United States and ostracized by all of Latin America, save Mexico, and increasingly frowned upon by the Soviet Union. By contrast, ten years later, Cuba enjoyed an international stature out of proportion to its size, force, and economy. Some argue that Castro’s success came because the Soviet Union bailed out the Cuban economy starting in ¡968. Others argued that Castro gambled that the Soviets could not a›ord to cut him o› without su›ering a tremendous loss of international prestige, particularly in the underdeveloped world. Thus, Castro was free to pursue his own international policies. Certainly, Castro supported Soviet foreign policy. Before the ¡972 meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers. Castro defended the Soviet Union as a nonimperialist state. During a ¡973 visit to the Marxist Chilean President, Salvadore Allende, Castro publicly noted that the ballot box was an acceptable road to a socialist revolution. In return, when Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev visited Cuba in ¡974 he applauded Cuba for being a model for other developing nations to follow. Brezhnev, however, did not mean for Castro to pursue an independent foreign policy. However, Castro did just that. He pursued a more temperate policy toward Latin America and gained Cuba’s admission to a number of Latin American economic associations, including its most important, SELA (the Latin American Economic System). Castro openly supported Jamaica’s socialist president, Michael Manley, by supplying construction workers, doctors, teachers, buses, tractors, and prefabricated housing. He applauded Panama’s strongman Omar Torrijos for standing

45 up to the United States without provoking a response. A sign of Cuba’s hemispheric standing by the end of the ¡970s can be measured by the fact that ten Latin American countries extended recognition to Cuba. Castro looked beyond Latin America. His incipient globalism began in the spring and summer of ¡972 when he visited ten African and East European countries and participated in the Non-Aligned Summit in Algiers, where he sought to unite the underdeveloped world in its e›ort to receive greater assistance from the industrialized nations. He also focused upon Africa’s wars of national liberation, most notably the Angolan Civil War. Cuban units appeared in Syria during the ¡973 Yom Kippur War, but their role has never been fully revealed. Castro also undertook a modest program of developmental assistance by sending some 8,000 doctors, agronomists, teachers, and other specialists to Africa, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia. The peak of Castro’s world standing came in ¡979 when Cuba hosted the sixth conference of the NonAligned Movement, and he was elected its president. Within a year, Castro’s international prestige began to decline markedly. To the consternation of the nonaligned nations, Castro defended the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and, at the same time, he became the focal point of U.S. president Ronald Reagan’s policy in Central America and Grenada. The ¡980s brought several changes. On the one hand Castro benefited from his pro– Argentine stance on the Falklands/Malvinas War that found the United States siding with Great Britain. In addition, an increase in the world demand for sugar brought a new degree of prosperity to Cuba, including the opportunity to diversif y its economy. Trade and diplomatic relations were established with nearly all hemispheric nations and significant trade relations with Britain, Canada, Japan, Mexico, and Spain in particular. In contrast, relations with the Soviet Union worsened as the ¡980s progressed. The changes ushered in by Premier Mikhail Gorbachev opened the floodgates to the downfall of the Soviet Union by ¡99¡. As early as ¡986, Gorbachev signaled

Castro Ruz a new economic relationship was in the making, but with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba lost its economic benefactor. Cuba appeared on the verge of collapse. While Castro pushed the Cuban people to endure a “special period,” he undertook several economic adventures with foreign partners through joint ventures in tourism, mining, and manufacturing. He dollarized the Cuban economy and permitted small, private entrepreneurs to ply their trades. By the late ¡990s, Cuba’s economic picture compared favorably with that of the pre–¡99¡ period. Since ¡960 Castro and Cuba have endured the U.S. trade embargo. This did not prevent Castro from making overtures to every U.S. president since ¡960 for the improvement of relations and lifting of the embargo. However, discussions stalemated on issues that dated to the revolution in ¡959, including compensation for nationalized properties, release of political prisoners, and Castro’s demand that the U.S. abandon the Guantánamo Naval Base. Over time the United States placed new preconditions on Cuba for normalization of relations, including the withdrawal of its troops and military assistance from Africa and Central America and, more recently, full democratization, respect for human rights, release of political prisoners, and a free market economy. Despite growing pressure within the United States from several sources and from the world community at large, the George W. Bush administration appears determined to maintain the trade embargo upon Cuba, an action that will contribute to Cuba’s search for other global economic and political partners. See also Africa: Cuba’s Military Involvement; Bush, George H.W.; Bush, George W.; Carter, Jimmy; Central American Conflict; Clinton, Bill; Ford, Gerald; Grenada; Johnson, Lyndon B.; Kennedy, John F.; Kissinger, Henry A.; Nixon, Richard M.; Operation Mongoose; Reagan, Ronald W.; Trade Embargo

Visit to the United States Cuban premier Fidel Castro arrived in Washington, D.C., on April ¡5, ¡959, to begin

Castro Ruz an eleven-day tour of the eastern United States and Canada. The visit was in response to a March 3 invitation from the American Society of Newspaper Editors to address their convention in Washington. President Dwight D. Eisenhower chose not to meet with Castro and conveniently absented himself from Washington. On April ¡6th, Castro lunched with acting secretary of State Christian A. Herter; on April ¡9th Castro met for two hours with Vice President Richard M. Nixon, on April 20th he spoke informally with members of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign A›airs Committees. Enroute to New York, on April 20th Castro stopped at Princeton University to meet with students and meet privately with former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In his April ¡7th address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors Castro reiterated that his regime had executed only those guilty of war crimes; and that he had no intention of abrogating the ¡934 treaty that guaranteed the United States rights to the Guantánamo Naval Base. He also stated that Cuba would remain a member of the InterAmerican Mutual Defense Pact; (4) Cuba would not confiscate private industry and, in fact, encouraged further foreign investment; and that Cuba did not want U.S. aid but welcomed additional trade opportunities. Castro made other major pronouncements. On April ¡9th during an interview on NBC-TV’s Meet the Press, Castro denied statements, attributed to him, that Cuba would remain neutral in the event of a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. A‡rming previous commitments to democracy, Castro promised that “free elections” would be held in Cuba within four years. Before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. on April 20th, Castro said that agrarian reform was the next step to be taken in the Cuban revolution. Uncultivated or badly cultivated land would be “legally expropriated” to create an internal market and provide employment for 700,000 people. Before returning to Cuba, Castro visited New York City from April 2¡ to 23, Boston on

46 April 25, and Montreal, Canada, on April 26. In his public speeches throughout the trip, Castro professed friendship for the United States, promised elections in no more than four years and belittled the charges of communist influence in his government. See also Herter, Christian A.; Nixon, Richard M.; Revolution

Address to the United Nations On September 26, ¡960, Fidel Castro addressed the ¡5th annual session of the United Nations General Assembly that convened on September 20th in New York City. In his four and one-half hour speech, Castro denounced the United States for carrying out “economic aggression” in response to Cuba’s nationalization of U.S. “monopolies that had made Cuba” a U.S. satellite. He charged that the United States organized and supported air raids over the island from bases on the Honduran-owned Swan Islands and was organizing ground forces for an eventual invasion of the island. He promised to force the U.S. withdrawal of its naval base at Guantánamo should it become a threat to Cuban security. Castro’s speech came at a low point in U.S.–Cuban relations. The Cuban government’s nationalization of foreign-owned properties, largely American, significantly contributed to the Sugar Act of ¡960, by which President Dwight D. Eisenhower, on July 6, ¡960, drastically cut the U.S. quota on Cuban sugar. In anticipation of Eisenhower’s action, Castro decreed the ¡960 Nationalization Law that led to the accelerated government confiscation of U.S. properties in Cuba. Prior to his speech to the United Nations, Castro was visited by Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, who emerged from the meeting with words of praise for the Cuban leader. In return, before the U.N. General Assembly, Castro applauded Soviet foreign policy, particularly its call for total disarmament and its disdain for an international peace-keeping force on the grounds it would be used to prevent social revolutions similar to his own. Castro also applauded Algeria’s war for indepen-

47 dence and Communist China’s admission to the United Nations. See also Nationalization, Law of; Revolution; Sugar Acts: Sugar Act of ¡960

Rapprochement In late ¡963 and early ¡964, Fidel Castro signaled a willingness to seek improvement in Cuba’s relations with the United States. Several factors motivated him: the recognition that, as a result of the missile crisis, the Soviets would not come to his defense; the Soviet disapproval of spreading revolution throughout Latin America by violent means rather than by working through the political system as Moscow preferred; and the need for spare parts for U.S. made machinery and equipment. The first signal for accommodation came in the fall of ¡963 when a member of the Cuban delegation to the United Nations met with William Attwood, a member of the U.S. delegation. They discussed a possible secret meeting in Cuba that would include Castro. At the suggestion of Attwood and Washington Post managing editor Ben Bradlee, President John F. Kennedy dispatched French journalist Jean Daniel to Cuba to meet with Castro. Reportedly, Castro seemed most responsive. However, any hope for improved relations vanished with Kennedy’s assassination on November 23, ¡963, the day prior to Daniel’s scheduled departure from Havana. Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, did not pursue the matter. Castro still persisted. In the spring and summer of ¡964, he gave several indications of wanting rapprochement. Among the most important gestures were Castro’s interviews with reporter Dick Eder, which appeared in the New York Times on July 6, ¡964. In these interviews, Castro indicated a willingness to end his support for Latin American revolutionaries, to pull back Cuban troops from the perimeter of the Guantánamo Naval Base, and to seek a diplomatic solution through the United Nations to terminate U.S. U-2 spy flights over Cuba. Castro also clearly indicated that the

Castro Ruz lifting of the U.S. embargo would follow the normalization process, and with the resumption of trade, Castro expressed a willingness to discuss compensation for the seized U.S. properties. The State Department rejected the o›er and instead demanded that Castro first end its dependency upon the Soviet Union and terminate its support to Latin American revolutionaries as a precursor to any discussions. Despite the rejection, Castro repeated the call for rapprochement in his July 26, ¡964, speech marking the fifth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution. Again, the Johnson administration refused to explore the any opportunity to improve relations with Cuba. Castro’s o›ers of rapprochement came at an inappropriate time. The Johnson administration was determined to oust the Cuban leader from o‡ce and, therefore, was in no mood to seek accommodation. Also, State Department analysts interpreted Castro’s action as a ploy to militate against the U.S. e›ort to secure economic sanctions against Cuba at the Organization of American States. If it accepted Castro’s o›er, the U.S. e›ort may well have failed and the opportunity to revive it in the future would have been destined to failure. Over the next forty years each side approached the other about improving relations, but in each instance the United States placed demands upon the Cuban government to which Fidel Castro could not agree. See also Bush, George H.W.; Carter, Jimmy: Visit to Cuba; Clinton, Bill; Kissinger, Henry A.; Organization of American States: Ninth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign A›airs; Reagan, Ronald W.

Castro Ruz, Raúl (¡93¡– ) Raúl Castro, brother of Fidel Castro, was one of the original members of the 26th of July Movement that organized the successful overthrow of Fulgencio Batista in ¡959. While a student at the University of Havana, Raúl was attracted to Marxism and became a member of the Juventud Socialista, an a‡liate of the Moscow-oriented Partido Socialista Popu-

Central American Conflict lar. In ¡953, while still a university student, Raúl attended the Soviet-sponsored World Youth Congress in Vienna, followed by a trip behind the Iron Curtain. Upon his return from Europe, Raúl became involved in his brother’s campaign to oust Batista from power and, like his brother, did not believe that it could be accomplished by constitutional means. They shared similar ideas about removing the extensive U.S. economic influence in Cuba. Raúl also has continually called for the U.S. withdrawal from the naval base at Guantánamo. He joined Fidel in the ill-fated attacks upon the Moncada barracks in ¡953, and together they left Cuba in ¡955 for Mexico, where they continued to plot Batista’s overthrow. Raúl returned to Cuba with Fidel in December ¡956 to take up the battle. Once in the mountains, however, Raúl fought Batista’s terror with equal ferociousness to the displeasure of his brother. In the immediate aftermath of the Revolution, Raúl directed the summary trials and executions of hundreds of Batista supporters. Subsequently, he became Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, which gave him ministerial rank and a place in the cabinet. He received military training in the Soviet Union and reportedly played a prominent role in convincing the Soviets to place missiles in Cuba in ¡962. In the ¡970s and ¡980s, he repeatedly visited the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries. Over time Raúl expanded his political power as president of the Agrarian Reform Institute, minister of interior, minister of public health, and the secretariat to the president. He played a key role in creating a Soviet-style bureauacry and enjoyed Moscow’s confidence as an e‡cient administrator. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in ¡99¡ and concomitant economic crisis in Cuba, the military increased its prominence in various economic activities, including manufacturing and tourism. Once considered a ideologue, Raúl has shown greater flexibility since ¡99¡ by endorsing limited capitalist foreign investment and market incentives. Despite his political power, Raúl does not posses his

48 brother’s charisma, leading many analysts to conclude that he will not be able to successfully follow Fidel, despite designated to do so at the Fifth Communist Party Congress in October ¡997. See also Fidel; Castro Ruz, Revolution

Central American Conflict

Since the early ¡970s Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) was plagued by civil conflict in varying degrees. By the time Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency in ¡977, Nicaragua and El Salvador became the focal points of the conflict. In Nicaragua, at the time, the anti–Somoza and Marxist leaning Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) controlled a good portion of the countryside and within two years, in ¡979, would seize power from Somoza. In El Salvador, the Marxist-oriented (FMLN) Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front appeared as a latent force in the country. While Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford largely ignored the issue, Jimmy Carter did not. He focused upon Nicaragua where FSLN leaders visited Cuba in the late ¡960s to ascertain from Castro his guerrilla strategy and in the ¡970s received Cuban arms and welcomed its military advisors. As late as mid–¡979, FSLN leaders visited Cuba and accepted Castro’s advice not to accept Carter’s mediation e›ort to end the conflict. Victory was in sight. By the time Ronald Reagan took over the presidency in January ¡98¡, the FSLN was entrenched in power in Nicaragua and the Salvadoran guerrillas approached a high-water mark. The Reagan administration placed this conflict within its East-West prism: This was a communist plot to overtake Central America. Unless it was stopped, Secretary of State Alexander Haig threatened to go to the source, meaning Cuba, to stamp it out. In February ¡98¡, the State Department issued a special report detailing the alleged Soviet-Cuban connection to the war in El Salvador. A special White House communications o‡ce was es-

49 tablished to continuously issue reports on the same, and in November ¡98¡, the National Security Council sent a private document to U.S. ambassadors abroad o›ering a similar conclusion. To further justif y its claim of communist subversion, the Reagan administration ordered massive military maneuvers in the Caribbean. Analysts quickly found inaccuracies in the reports and asserted that the military maneuvers were all part of the administration’s plan to support a counter revolution in Central America. Certainly, while the Cubans did provide advisors and materiel, the extent of the commitment has yet to become public, except to note that it declined after ¡982. During the remainder of the ¡980s, the United States engaged in an emotional debate about the nature of the war in Central America. Having placed the war into the EastWest prism and determined to have its way in the region, the Reagan administration rejected Cuban overtures in ¡982 and ¡983 to assist with the mediation of the Central American conflict. The alleged Cuban role in Central America also adversely impacted upon U.S.– Cuban bilateral relations. As the war sputtered throughout the remainder of the ¡980s, the Cubans and Soviets continued to supply the Salvadoran guerrillas, at least through ¡988, at which time each claimed to have terminated their assistance. These assertions were rejected by the George H.W. Bush administration. Although anxious to get out of the Central American quagmire, the Bush administration was not a supporter of the peace initiative by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias that brought an end to the conflict in ¡992. By then, the Cuban connection to the isthmus had been severed, and the Soviet Union had collapsed. See also Bush, George H.W.; Haig; Alexander M.A.; Reagan, Ronald W.

Céspedes, Carlos Manuel de (¡87¡–¡939) Son of Cuba’s first president during the Ten Years’ War (¡868–¡878). Céspedes studied in Europe and the United States before

Chibás earning a law degree from the University of Havana in ¡90¡. He played an active role in the Cuban War for Independence, and following U.S. entrance into the conflict in ¡898, he withdrew from political life. With the establishment of the Republic in ¡902, Céspedes held significant government and diplomatic posts, including serving as ambassador to the United States (¡9¡3–¡922). In August ¡933, when it became apparent that Gerardo Machado had to leave the Cuban presidency, U.S. ambassador Sumner Welles engineered Céspedes as a compromise among Cuba’s contentious political factions to serve as provisional president until ¡935. Céspedes assumed the presidency on August ¡2. Hoping that it would provide a sense of confidence, Welles recommended that the United States advance a substantial loan and a new trade treaty the Céspedes administration. Washington demurred. Cuba’s economy remained depressed. The chaotic situation that Céspedes inherited continued to worsen. Violence became rampant throughout the country. By late August, Welles doubted that the Céspedes administration could last much longer. It did not. In the “Sergeant’s Revolt” on September 4, Céspedes was replaced by a five man Junta, known as the pentarchy. Thereafter, until his death in ¡939, Céspedes withdrew to private life. See also Machado y Morales, Gerardo; Sergeants’ Revolt; Welles, Benjamin Sumner

Chibás, Eduardo (¡907–¡95¡) Founder of the Partido Pueblo del Cubano (Ortodoxo) in ¡946, as a leading student activist against the regime of Gerardo Machado, Chibás was jailed for a year in ¡93¡ and ¡932 and then exiled to Miami, Florida, where he remained until the revolution of ¡933. Following the ouster of President Ramón Grau San Martín in January ¡934, Chibás became a strong critic of the successive presidents and of Fulgencio Batista. Initially, Chibás supported Grau when he returned to the presidency in ¡944, but he soon became disillusioned with government corruption and its failure to halt

Clark Memorandum the gangsterism that permeated society, particularly in Havana. The disillusioned Chibás shot himself in the stomach during an emotional radio broadcast on August 5, ¡95¡. Many of his supporters, including Fidel Castro, asserted that Chibás did not intend to commit suicide but only to stir the Cuban people to his cause. U.S. policymakers were suspect of Chibás because of his nationalistic economic programs, which potentially threatened U.S. business interests on the island. See also Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo)

Cienfuegos see Soviet Union: Naval Base

Clark Memorandum

O‡cially entitled “Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine,” the document was written in ¡928 by Undersecretary of State J. Reuben Clark at the request of Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and published by the State Department in ¡930. The memorandum described the Monroe Doctrine solely as a statement of the U.S. position regarding European intervention in Latin America and that the U.S. interventions, particularly those dating to the early twentieth century, were not justified by the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, no matter their justification on the grounds of self-preservation. The Memorandum appeared at a time when a European threat to Latin America appeared nonexistent, the Latin American protest against interventions reached a high–water mark, and the State Department was reassessing its interventionist policies. The Clark Memorandum reenforced these considerations, all of which contributed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s announcement of the Good Neighbor policy in ¡933. Accordingly, the United States henceforth would no longer intervene in the internal political a›airs of Latin American nations. The Clark Memorandum cited Cuba as one of those places where U.S. intervention under the terms of the Platt Amendment was a mistaken application of the Monroe Doc-

50 trine, and the subsequent refusal of the Franklin Roosevelt administration to intervene in Cuba’s political turmoil in ¡933 and ¡934 illustrated the change in U.S. policy. See also Good Neighbor Policy; Platt Amendment; United States Interventions; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Welles; Benjamin Sumner

Clay, Henry (¡777–¡852) A several term congressmen and senator from Kentucky and twice a presidential candidate, Clay served as secretary of state from ¡825 to ¡829. Clay designed the Cuban policy for President John Quincy Adams in ¡826, in anticipation of a Colombian-Mexican plan to invade the island for the purpose of liberating it from Spain. To meet the challenge, on May 8, ¡826 Clay penned an ¡8-page set of instructions for the two U.S. envoys (Richard Anderson and John Sergeant) assigned to attend the Latin American Congress at Panama that became a major discourse in the history of U.S. foreign policy. Clay opposed the anticipated Colombian-Mexican e›ort to invade the island, even under the guise of winning its independence from Spain. He asserted that It would become a war of conquest that would cause widespread disruption throughout the entire West Indies. If that were to happen, Clay strongly suggested that the United States might be drawn into the conflict. Clay took several steps to defuse the crisis. Although the American delegates never reached the Panama Congress before it adjourned, Clay’s position on the proposed invasion was communicated to the governments in Colombia and Mexico. The Congress itself did not reach a decision on Cuba, and the postponement of any action was attributed to the threat of U.S. intervention. Clay’s handling of the problem must be placed in the broader context of U.S. policy toward Cuba in the early nineteenth century. During the same time period, British foreign minister George Canning sought to deflect the

51 anticipated Colombian-Mexican venture by proposing to Spain that the British guarantee Spain’s place in Cuba if, in turn, Spain recognized the newly independent nations of Latin America. Always suspicious of British action anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, the Americans viewed the guarantee of Cuba as a prelude to British occupation of the island and, therefore, a threat to U.S. coastal cities and interests in the Caribbean. Clay also understood that any expedition from Latin American to Cuba would bring a British response. In an e›ort to deflect that scenario, Clay issued a strong warning to the Colombian and Mexican governments: the United States would not “remain indi›erent” to any invasion of the Cuba, and it would not tolerate any change in its existing status. Furthermore, the United States would not tolerate Cuba’s gravitation toward any Latin American nation, asserting that should Cuba become dependent on any one American nation, by the: “law of its position,” that nation would be the United States. To mollify Spain, Clay informed the government at Madrid that the United States desired Cuba to remain under its control and that its ports always be open to U.S. commerce. Clay also sought European support to defuse the situation. He appealed to Russian czar Alexander I to persuade Spain’s king Ferdinand VII to terminate the Latin American wars for independence, thus removing the pretext for the Colombia-Mexican venture. Similar but less strident appeals were made to the French and the British governments. The czar simply passed the note along to Ferdinand. While the French government ignored the request, the British Foreign Minister George Canning saw it as an opportunity to limit any future U.S. action toward Cuba. Canning proposed a tripartite declaration between Britain, France, and the United States to oppose any transfer of Cuba, now or in the future. Clay demurred, not wanting to restrict U.S. freedom of action. Clay’s diplomatic e›orts reflected the contours of U.S.–Cuban policy at the time. With the failure of the Congress of Panama, and confronted with the U.S. determination to block

Cleveland any operation, the Colombian-Mexican plan to liberate Cuba passed. After many years of promising to do so, Clay finally visited Cuba in May ¡85¡. In failing health and in search of a warm climate, he went to Cuba as a tourist, where he remained for three weeks. He found the island unique and di›erent from anything he had ever seen, but Clay appeared indi›erent to the plight of the Cuban Creoles vis-à-vis their Spanish rulers. See also Adams, John Quincy; Independence Movements: Colombia-Mexico Proposed Expedition

Cleveland, Grover S. (¡837–¡908) Cleveland served as mayor of New York City and governor of New York before serving two terms as president of the United States (¡885–¡889 and ¡893–¡897). During the last year of his second presidential term, Cleveland confronted Cuba’s War for Independence. From the outset of the war in February ¡895, the Cleveland administration upheld the U.S. government’s long-standing policy toward Cuba: opposition to independence and support of Spanish sovereignty over the island. The reasons were familiar: independence would result in political instability, social conflict, and economic chaos. In support of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba, Cleveland immediately demanded adherence to U.S. neutrality laws. The U.S. government vigorously enforced them and cooperated with Spanish authorities to combat Cuban filibustering activities. In ¡895 and ¡896, U.S. authorities intercepted and prosecuted the o›enders of more than half the Cuban expeditions fitted in the United States. In his annual message to Congress in December ¡895, Cleveland appealed to the nation to support its international obligation to Spain. Cleveland’s appeal fell on deaf ears, as the press denounced his timidity in light of Spanish atrocities on the island. The press echoed the public sentiment that asserted Cuba had its right to independence. Congress, too, stood opposed, in part for political reasons,

Clinton with ¡896 being a presidential election year. Immediately after Cleveland’s address, a series of resolutions were introduced in Congress, and after four months of debate, in April ¡896 the Congress passed a joint resolution calling for recognition of Cuba’s independence. Cleveland ignored the nonbinding resolution. Significantly, during the debates businessmen spoke against any action that might precipitate attacks upon their self-proclaimed estimated $50 million investments in Cuba. Despite predictions from Secretary of State Richard R. Olney, the U.S. consul in Havana, Fitzhugh Lee, and others that Spain could not win the war, Cleveland pursued a policy designed to provide Cuba autonomy within the Spanish system. In April ¡895 the president o›ered to mediate an end to the conflict. While the Cuban insurgents appeared willing to accept mediation, the Spanish prime minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, fearing that the U.S. would not mediate impartially, spurned the o›er and instead turned to European governments for assistance. Nothing materialized. Subsequently, the Cuba issue became entwined in the ¡896 presidential election. The Democrats spurned Cleveland and selected William Jennings Bryan, an anti-imperialist, as their presidential candidate. The party’s platform did little more than extend sympathy to the Cuban people. The Republican Party selected William McKinley, who had little interest or training in foreign a›airs, as its candidate. However, the Republican Party contained many expansion-minded individuals, and its platform committed the party to the Cuban cause, yet the campaign of ¡896 gave little attention to foreign a›airs. The people were more interested in domestic issues, particularly Bryan’s crusade for free silver as a means to address the lingering economic problems caused by the ¡893 depression. The Republicans swept the November elections, capturing the White House and gaining control of both houses of Congress, but the election could not be interpreted as a mandate to become involved in Cuban a›airs. In his last address to Congress in De-

52 cember ¡896, Cleveland described the war in Cuba as a stalemate, placed responsibility on both the Spanish and the Cubans for destroying American property and harming American citizens. Furthermore, Cleveland pointed out that granting belligerency status to the insurgents would do more harm than good to U.S. interests and that, in fact, he could not grant recognition to a government, that did not exist. He again o›ered his good o‡ces to mediate an end to the conflict. Ominously, Cleveland warned that when the war became “nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction” of the island, U.S. respect for Spanish sovereignty would be “superseded by the higher obligation which [the United States could] hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge.” In essence, Cleveland opposed congressional demands for intervention and declared that the Cuban insurgents had no government. The Spanish minister, Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, was satisfied with the address and thought that Cleveland would do nothing more during his administration. Dupuy was wrong. In early ¡896, amidst growing U.S. public and congressional sentiment on behalf of the Cuban insurgents, Spanish prime minister Antonio Cánovas made an attempt to blunt the criticism. Cánovas o›ered reforms that would be implemented should the fighting stop. The proposals prompted Cleveland to send Oscar B. Stillman to Cuba to evaluate the situation. Stillman reported that the insurgent leaders rebu›ed the Spanish proposals and that U.S. consul general Fitzhugh Lee found insurgent leader Maximo Gómez insisting upon complete Cuban independence. Cleveland left o‡ce with a military stalemate in Cuba, a Spanish government reluctant to grant autonomy, and an insurgent leader demanding independence. See also Olney, Richard; War for Independence

Clinton, Bill (¡946– ) The forty-second president of the United States (¡989–200¡), Clinton served as five-

53 time governor of Arkansas before challenging George H.W. Bush for the presidency in the ¡988 election. In his campaign, Clinton focused upon domestic issues and criticized Bush’s focus upon foreign a›airs. The Clinton presidency reflected the campaign rhetoric. He devoted less time, energy, and political capital to foreign a›airs than any president in the preceding fifty years, particularly during his first term. Much of Clinton’s Cuba policy was predicated upon domestic considerations, as illustrated by his support for the Cuban Democracy Act (Torricelli Bill) late in the ¡992 presidential campaign. For his support, the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) donated $275,000 to his campaign co›ers. After the election the Cuba Lobby protested su‡ciently to have Clinton withdraw the nomination of Cuban-born New York lawyer Mario Baeza to be Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American A›airs and replace him with Alexander Watson, a career diplomat who favored a hard line on Cuba, including continuation of the embargo, the political isolation of Cuba, and the demand for democratic government on the island. Other policy advisors who shared Watson’s view included, his senior policy advisor Richard Nuccio, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American A›airs Michael Skol, and Director of the O‡ce for Cuban A›airs Dennis Hays. Those within the administration advocating a change in policy included National Security Advisor Sandy Berger and his National Security Council colleagues Richard Feinberg and Maurice Halperin. From the start, Clinton and Watson publicly stated that there would be no change in Cuban policy. Clearly the embargo and propaganda war against Castro would continue, even when Fidel Castro o›ered or made domestic changes. The hardliners prevailed, in part because U.S. policymakers mistrusted Castro’s overtures based upon his historic record. Berger and his colleagues contributed to the problem by their inability to define exactly what Castro should do or what the U.S. calibrated responses should be.

Clinton From the start of his administration, Clinton sent mixed signals regarding his position on Cuba. He ignored a suggestion from the president of the Cuban National Assembly, Ricardo Alarcón Quesada, to suspend the embargo for a twelve-month period to encourage changes in the Cuban political process. Clinton ignored the suggestions from Cuban moderates, including Eloy GutiérrezMenoyo to relax the embargo because of the hardships it created upon the Cuban people during this “special period.” In an e›ort to further strangle the Cuban economy, diplomats abroad were instructed to jawbone their host governments to stop trading with Cuba, and new travel restrictions were placed upon exiles traveling from the United States to Cuba. On the other hand, the Clinton administration clamped down on the covert operations of the exile group Alpha 66, permitted Undersecretary of State for Political A›airs Peter Tarno› to hold secret conversations in New York and Toronto with Alarcón de Quesada in April ¡995, and clearly indicated that he would veto the Cuban Liberty and Democratic (Libertad ) Solidarity Act (popularly known as the Helms-Burton Bill) if Congress approved the measure. By mid–¡995 Clinton observers noted that the hardliners — Watson, Skol, and Hays — were being marginalized in the making of Cuban policy and that the President seemed to be distancing himself from CANF. The administration also developed a plan to expand academic, cultural, and peopleto-people exchanges within the framework of Track II of the Cuban Democracy Act. If the president intended to change direction of Cuban policy in his second term, he did not as a result of the shooting down of two unarmed aircraft operated by the Miamibased exile group Brothers to the Rescue on February 24, ¡996. Clinton quickly suspended chartered flights from Miami to Havana and further restricted cash remittances to the island. He declared for tightening the embargo, clearing the way for congressional approval of the Helms-Burton bill, which Clinton signed on March ¡2, ¡996. The backlash to the Helms-Burton Bill

Coolidge from the U.S. business community and Canadian, European and Mexican governments; the criticism of it leveled by Pope John Paul II during his visit to Cuba; and the increased pressure from the Latin American nations to end Cuba’s political isolation was paralleled by a growing mood in Congress, led by Senator Christopher Dodd (D., Conn.) and supported outside of Congress by the influential Council on Foreign Relations. A call for a review of the Cuban policy by a group of prominent current and former government leaders, including Henry Kissinger, William Rogers, Frank Carlucci, Howard Baker, and Senator John Warner (R., Va.), did not move the Clinton administration. On January 5, ¡999, Clinton rejected the call for a bipartisan commission to reexamine U.S. policy toward Cuba on the grounds that there already existed a “broad bipartisan support of the objectives” of U.S. policy. In an e›ort to mute the criticism, Clinton announced a number of measures: reinstatement of direct mail to Cuba; expansion the number of Miami-Havana charter flights; increase in the dollar remittances that could be sent to Cuba; and allowance of the sale of food and medicines to private sector organizations such as religious groups, privately owned restaurants, and small farmers selling goods in cooperative markets. In February ¡999, under the terms of the Torricelli and Helms-Burton laws, grants were made to bolster and encourage opposition groups in Cuba: Freedom House, Florida International University’s Media Center, and the Cuban Dissident Task Force. Opposition to U.S. policy continued until the end of the Clinton presidency, at which time he acknowledged that signing the Helms-Burton Bill, he limited the presidency the range of options necessary to bring about change in Cuba and to end the embargo. Cuban policy had fallen into congressional hands where the Cuba lobby had su‡cient power to influence decision making to control the direction of U.S. policy. See also Agribusiness Exhibition; Brothers to the Rescue; Cuba Lobby; Cuban Democracy Act; Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity

54 Act; González, Elian; Gutiérrez-Menoyo, Eloy; Trade Embargo

Communist Party of Cuba see Partido Comunista de Cuba Coolidge, Calvin (¡872–¡933) The 29th president of the United States (¡925–¡929) also served as governor of Massachusetts (¡9¡9–¡920) and as vice president of the United States from ¡92¡ to ¡923. Coolidge assumed the presidency upon the death of President Warren G. Harding and was elected to the presidency in ¡924. He came to the presidency with without international experience; his only trip outside the United States was on his honeymoon to Montreal. Thus, Coolidge willingly deferred to his secretaries of state, Charles Evans Hughes and Frank Kellogg. The general goals of Coolidge’s foreign policy followed those of his immediate predecessor, Warrant G. Harding: to seek international stability without getting involved in forceful measures, to encourage peace, to stimulate business, to extend good will, and to uplift the world. The opportunity to express these ideals came at the Sixth International Conference of American States in Havana, Cuba, which Coolidge attended at the invitation of Cuban president Gerardo Machado. Coolidge’s address to the delegates on January ¡6, ¡928, was replete with praise for the republics of the Western Hemisphere. He applauded their independence, self-government, and strive for progress. He called for greater cooperation and friendship among the nations and promised U.S. financial assistance with highway construction and the establishment of air transportation routes. Coolidge avoided any discussion of U.S. interventionist policies, which the delegates came to criticize. At the time of the Havana conference, the United States pursued a “hands o› ” policy regarding Machado’s illegal extension of his presidential term. To Washington policymakers, it was purely an internal a›air.

55 Following his presidency, Coolidge wrote his autobiography and a much-read newspaper column that dealt almost exclusively with domestic a›airs. See also Clark Memorandum; Guggenheim, Harry F.; Machado y Morales, Gerardo; International Conference of American States: Sixth International Conference

Coup d’état ¡952 With support of the military at Columbia Barracks in Havana, Fulgencio Batista led a well-organized revolt on March ¡0, ¡952, that ousted President Carlos Prío Socarás. The origins of the coup are found in the scheduled June ¡, ¡952, presidential elections. The U.S. embassy sta› in Havana expected Carlos Hevia, candidate of the Partido Revolucionario or Auténtico, to win, largely because the opposition groups had splintered into several parties. Batista was among the several presidential candidates, but he found himself a distant third in the public opinion polls behind Hevia and Partido Pueblo del Cubano, (Ortodoxo) candidate Roberto Agramonte. Once in the presidential palace, Batista immediately suspended the Constitution, disbanded Congress, and shut down political parties. He governed as a dictator until the scheduled elections for ¡954. The United States did not seem displeased with Prío’s ouster. Secretary of State Dean Acheson asserted that Prío had brought Cuban politics to a “new low” because of the widespread government corruption and the rampant gangsterism in Havana. Still, the United States delayed extending recognition to Batista until it felt confident that he fully controlled the situation. Satisfied that he did, the United States extended recognition on March 27, ¡952. The U.S. embassy in Havana also anticipated a new government attitude toward labor unions, a fact the new Cuban foreign minister, Miguel Angel Campa, subsequently confirmed to the U.S. ambassador in Havana, William Beaulac. There was little immediate reaction to

Crescent City A›air Batista’s power grab, as most Cubans had tired of the corruption, nepotism, and gangsterism that permeated national politics since ¡945. The little opposition that did exist came from ousted military o‡cers, splinter political groups, and personalistic factions of the major parties. Long-term results of the coup, however, proved significant. Subsequently, the Auténtico and Ortodoxo parties were marginalized in Cuba’s political arena, and organized student protest movements against Batista became increasingly violent. See also Batista y Zaldívar , Fulgencio; Prío Socarrás, Carlos

Crescent City A›air The Crescent City was an American mail steamer owned by George Law, president of the U.S. Mail Steamship Company, which held a U.S. government contract to carry mail between New York and Panama via New Orleans and Havana. An avowed annexationist, Law anticipated increased profits for his company if Cuba became part of the United States. He found an ally in Senator Stephen A. Douglas (D., Ill.). Although Law’s plan went awry when Douglas lost the Democratic party presidential nomination to Franklin Pierce in ¡852, the entrepreneur determined to instigate a war with Spain over the island that he assumed would accomplish the same goal. Law intended to provoke an incident when the Crescent City arrived in Havana harbor on October 3, ¡852, with purser William Smith aboard. Spanish authorities in Havana determined that on a previous visit Smith had obtained information detrimental to Spain and favorable to the Cuban annexationist cause and, after having it printed in pamphlet form, would, on a return visit, distribute it throughout Havana. When the Spanish authorities refused to permit Smith to disembark from the Crescent City in October ¡852, Law appealed directly to the State Department to protect his ship and its personnel. If it failed to do so, Law threatened to redress the grievance with a private army. In the meantime, the Crescent City sailed to New Orleans where

Crowder the crew received a hero’s welcome amidst calls for an invasion of Cuba. Similar demonstrations were held in other southern U.S. cities. In the United States anti-annexationists charged Law with attempting to provoke a confrontation over Cuba. They held rallies, penned editorials in the press, and appealed directly to President Millard Fillmore to order Law to desist from his provocation. Pierce deliberately waited until after the November ¡852 presidential election, at which time he ordered mail withheld from Law’s ships if they headed for Havana with Smith aboard. A defiant Law refused to comply. He sent the Cherokee to Havana with Smith on board, accompanied with a threat of military action if the Spanish seized the purser. Law’s defiance only infuriated new president Filmore. He bluntly advised Law that if the Spanish acted, the U.S. government would do nothing to indemnify or protect him. The incident passed when the captain general of Cuba, Valentín Cañado, accepted Smith’s a‡davit declaring his innocence of the charges of attempting to incite the Cubans into rebellion. Subsequent e›orts by Law to stir the Cuban revolutionary pot were ignored by the Pierce administration. See also Fillmore, Millard

Crowder, Enoch (¡839–¡932) On three occasions Crowder served as a special U.S. envoy to Cuba in an e›ort to bring political honesty to its electoral system. A native of Mississippi, Crowder shared the conventional American view of Cubans at that time: they were pleasant people who were incapable of self-government and in need U.S. guardianship until they attained political maturity. Crowder’s first assignment to Cuba was in October ¡906 at the start of the U.S. occupation of the island under Governor-General Charles Magoon. Crowder headed the Advisory Law Commission charged to revise Cuba’s confusing legal system. The commission made several suggestions that included a

56 civil service law patterned after that in the United States and that established of various executive departments, such as justice, treasury, and state. The electoral reform package, which focused upon establishing honest registration lists and conducting fair elections, received most attention. Crowder headed the central election board that supervised municipal, provincial, congressional, and presidential elections during the summer and fall of ¡908. The central board furnished all electoral supplies, allocated funds, and gave advice to all local and provincial electoral boards across the island. In addition, the central board oversaw the distribution of thousands of instruction circulars, drafted decrees facilitating the execution of the election law, and made some 8,000 voting booths and ¡,650 ballot boxes available to local o‡cials. Throughout the electoral process no party representative left the polling places or refused to vote because of alleged fraud. The elections proved to be a real test of party strength. In the presidential election on November ¡4, ¡908, Liberal José Miguel Gómez defeated Conservative Mario García Menocal with 6¡ percent of the vote. For the moment, U.S. policymakers were pleased, but they understood that the machinery set in place was no guarantee for future fair elections. President Theodore Roosevelt, anxious to terminate the occupation of Cuba and believing that a fair electoral process existed, terminated Magoon’s mission on January 28, ¡908. However, Cuba soon ignored Magoon’s electoral reform program and reverted to fraudulent election practices. Crowder’s second mission to Cuba came in ¡9¡9 when President Woodrow Wilson directed him to establish a new electoral code that would correct the abuses of the past. Crowder departed for Cuba with the notion that the United States had a moral obligation to bring stable government to Cuba and that it should be brought about by diplomacy, not intervention. Crowder’s e›orts resulted in the promulgation of a new electoral code in August ¡9¡9. It established rules and procedures designed to mold Cuba into a two-party system similar to that in the United States. Can-

57 didates needed to be nominated by special assemblies or conventions during the year of the election and were forbidden to run on two or more tickets; separate ballots for national and local elections were drawn up to avoid confusion on issues; election returns were subjected to public canvass; and judges and electoral o‡cials would be selected by a means designed to prevent fraud. While the code contained great detail to ensure honesty, Crowder, himself, placed significant emphasis upon the role of the judiciary in determining honest electoral results. The reforms were to be implemented in the ¡920 presidential elections, but the realities of Cuban politics doomed them to failure. Determined to ensure a continued Conservative Party government, President Menocal amended the electoral code to permit his personal choice, Alfredo Zayas, be a candidate on a coalition ticket. At the local level, Menocal replaced judges and other electoral o‡cials with persons favorable to the Conservative Party’s cause. Throughout the presidential campaign, the government instigated harassment of Liberal candidates and spokespersons. As election day approached November ¡, ¡920, Menocal maneuvered against U.S. supervision and permitted Crowder to act only as an observer. Following the election, Crowder directed an e›ort to uncover and correct the allegations of voter fraud and corruption, but when the Liberals discovered this would not bring them the presidency, they withdrew from the process, thereby giving the post to Alfredo Zayas. Crowder remained in Cuba to work out a program to correct the fiscal problems caused by the drop in sugar prices following the end of World War I. President Warren G. Harding had Crowder remain in Cuba as his special representative in ¡92¡, a position he held until being appointed ambassador in ¡923. As Harding’s representative, Crowder oversaw the last U.S. e›orts at preventive diplomacy. In ¡92¡, the incoming Alfredo Zayas administration faced a huge government deficit, caused in part by the decline in sugar exports and by government corruption and overspending on public

Cuba Lobby works projects. Zayas needed funds to cover current government-operating expenses and, to do so, applied to J.P. Morgan and Company for a loan. Crowder used this need to force Zayas to enact drastic austerity measures and to reduce government expenses. Once done, the Morgan loan for $65 million was approved. As did his predecessors, Crowder still confronted a Cuban government steeped in graft and nepotism, factors that not only prevented civic honesty but also significantly contributed to government indebtedness. Insisting upon reform, in ¡922 Crowder forced President Zayas to replace several of his cabinet appointments with individuals selected by Crowder. This “honest cabinet,” as it came to be known, was pledged to fiscal responsibility and integrity. As a result of Crowder’s work, Cuba’s future looked bright in ¡923. The government was fiscally solvent, a degree of prosperity returned to the island, and the “honest cabinet” terminated corrupt o‡cials and put an end to many of their practices. However, the optimism was short lived. In ¡924, Zayas ignored Crowder’s suggestions on the grounds that they interfered with presidential prerogatives and Cuban sovereignty. Zayas replaced the “honest cabinet” with his own appointees, and the Congress returned to its lavish spending practices. Zayas also benefited from the State Department’s reassessment of preventive diplomacy, a reassessment that contributed to the eventual announcement of the Good Neighbor policy in ¡933. See also Good Neighbor policy; Preventive Diplomacy; United States Interventions; Zayas, Alfredo

Cuba Lobby In the late ¡980s a group of congressmen and senators emerged as vocal opponents to any softening of the U.S. trade embargo upon Cuba and rejected any e›orts designed to create a dialog with the government in Havana. The most outspoken of these was Jesse Helms (R., N.C.), who, when he became chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in ¡994, designed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic (Libertad ) Solidarity

Cuban Adjustment Act Act, signed into law in March ¡2, ¡996. Another was Democratic congressman and later senator, Robert Torricelli (N.J.), responsible for the ¡992 Cuba Democracy Act. Senator Bob Graham (D.–Fla.) was less outspoken but equally influential. In the House of Representatives Florida Republicans Lincoln DíazBalart and Ileana Ros-Lehtimen were joined by Dan Burton (R.–Ind.) and Robert Menéndez (D.–N.J.). With the exception of Helms and Burton, critics asserted that they were beholden to the Cuban communities they represented. Critics asserted that their policies of seeking to force Fidel Castro from power were out of step with the reality of the world in the ¡990s. See also Clinton, Bill; Cuban Democracy Act; Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act

Cuban Adjustment Act Signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson on November 2, ¡966, this law forbids the deportation of any Cuban arrivals touching U.S. soil and grants them permanent resident status one year plus one day after entering the United States. The law applies only to Cuban-born or naturalized individuals as well as their spouses and minor children. Since its passage hundreds of thousands of Cubans have benefited from this law. Following the ¡994 balsero crisis, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service reinterpreted the law so that, henceforth, all such escapees intercepted in international or U.S. territorial waters are to be returned to Cuba. In 2000, following the Elián González case, there has been increased pressure in the United States to abrogate the law. See also Balsero Crisis; Clinton, Bill; González, Elián

Cuban American National Foundation The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) remains the most important Cuban American organization in the United States. Founded in ¡980 by Jorge Más Canosa

58 and a group of other prominent Cuban Americans, CANF became a political lobby to influence and advise U.S. foreign policy makers. Some of CANF’s most important influence has been upon the passage of congressional measures that tightened the U.S. economic embargo upon Cuba, such as the Cuban Democracy Act (or Torrecilli Bill) and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic (Libertad ) Solidarity Act (or Helms-Burton Bill). CANF also lobbied for the establishment of Radio Martí and subsequently TV Martí. Canosa and other CANF members served on the station’s supervisory boards. CANF also pressed its agenda in the U.S. media and took to demonstrations against those they perceived as taking a biased stance against CANF. The latter was best illustrated in ¡992 in a CANF–led boycott of the Miami Herald for its editorial policy regarding Cuba. Following Más Canosa’s death in ¡997, his son Jorge Más Santos took over CANF’s leadership, but shortly thereafter an apparent rift split the organization. In August 200¡, twelve CANF Board members resigned, charging Más Santos with “softening” CANF’s traditional hard-line stance against Castro. Más Santos, born and raised in the United States, has sought closer ties with the Democratic Party, and instead of focusing upon the elimination of the Castro regime, he argued that the organization should examine options to establish a democracy in a post–Castro Cuba. See also Cuban Democracy Act; Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act; Más Canosa, Jorge

Cuban Americans

On the eve of Fidel Castro’s Revolution, approximately ¡25,000 Cubans lived in the United States. They shared many characteristics with those who came before them. Most came for political reasons, planning to return home as soon as the island’s political landscape changed. The majority of these émigrés represented the middle and working class sectors of Cuban society, and historically most of them settled in Florida because of the climate and proximity to Cuba.

59 As early as the ¡820s, Cubans disgruntled with Spanish rule made their way to the United States. By the ¡870s nearly 5,300 persons of Cuban decent resided in the United States, mostly along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts. Representing Cuba’s white upper and middle class, they identified with U.S. southern society and favored independence from Spain and annexation to the United States. The numbers swelled to 7,000 by ¡880. Following the end of the Ten Years’ War in ¡878, a new wave of working class Cubans arrived, and about 20 percent were black or mulatto. The Cuban American community became a diverse group a people who rallied around José Martí’s call for independence in ¡895, and the community reflected that of the island. The majority of the white Cuban Americans, the Creoles, favored linkage to the United States; while a minority of them wanted complete independence. The nonwhite Cuban American identified with the island’s independentistas. As the Cuban War for Independence progressed, U.S. policy came to support the installation of Cuba’s “better classes” (i.e., whites) in power at the war’s end. Clearly, the “better classes” controlled Cuban politics after independence through ¡933, when President Ramón Grau San Martín introduced changes on behalf of the lower classes. In the years that followed until ¡959, each Cuban president provided some benefits for labor. but never at great expense to the Cuban upper classes. From Cuba’s independence in ¡903 through Batista’s ouster in ¡958, there were spurts of Cuban immigrants to the United States. In the decade following independence, an estimated 40,000 Cubans arrived, but the numbers lessened in the years after World War I, in part due to U.S. antiforeign attitudes. Another spurt came during Batista’s terroristladen presidency, ¡952–¡958. Over time the Cuban community became a kaleidoscope of rich and poor; black and white; Catholic and Protestant; and politically conservative, liberal, and radical. But North Americans overlooked these divisions as, beginning in the ¡930s, Cuban culture took on a popularity across the United States.

Cuban Americans Dances like the rumba, the congo, the mambo, and the cha-cha-cha swept ballrooms. The Afro-Cuban music mixed with jazz, and many Cuban musicians achieved fame in their own right, such as Xavier Cugat, José Curbelo and Miguelito Valdés. The most recognizable was Desí Arnaz Jr., who left Cuba in ¡934, moved to Hollywood, and married actress Lucille Ball. The two teamed in several movies and the long-running television sit-com, I Love Lucy. With the integration of major league baseball in ¡947, Cuban players like Minnie Minoso, Cookie Rojas, Bert Campaneris, and Luis Tiant became household names. Until Castro’s revolution, wealthy Creole Cubans visited the United States for short durations. If not escaping political turmoil, they came to receive medical treatment, call on business clients, and shop. They sent their children to U.S. schools and colleges. A substantial number of Creole middle class Cubans also came to find employment as teachers, librarians, lawyers, accountants, physicians, journalists, architects, and scientists. The Creoles and students came to identify more with U.S. culture and socioeconomic standards and, in many ways became less Cuban. The same cannot be said for the Afro-Cubans and poor whites who immigrated to the United States. The former resented the racism, and the latter had great di‡culty in finding employment. They also despised the Cuban Creole upper and middle classes, in the United States and Cuba. Many of these people became supporters of Fidel Castro and returned to fight in his guerrilla war. With Batista’s departure from Cuba on New Year’s eve ¡958, 500 of his supporters quickly followed, and by June ¡959 another 26,000 left. The number climbed to one million by October ¡962. Representing Cuba’s Creole upper and middle classes, they were extremely embittered for the loss of privileged status in Cuba and for being stripped of their wealth upon departure. These groups formed the backbone of Cuban terrorist groups, such as Alpha 66, whose members returned to conduct sabotage on the island and later were members of Brigade 2506 that landed at the

Cuban Assembly Bay of Pigs in April ¡96¡ and were employed by the Central Intelligence Agency in Operation Mongoose. These Cuban Creoles continued to arrive in the United States, so that by the end of the ¡970s an estimated 800,000 Cubans resided here. Highly educated or entrepreneurs these Creole Cubans quickly melded into American society, and their success stories were often told by the U.S. media. Subsequently, they became the leadership of the Cuban American National Foundation that influenced several U.S. presidents to pursue a hard-line policy against Castro. That all changed with the Mariel Boat Lift in ¡980. The majority of the ¡25,000 new arrivals represented Cuba’s lower classes and were Afro-Cuban. The same was true of the estimated 36,000 balseros who arrived in the summer of ¡996. The Cuban Creoles resented their arrival, as did the Afro-American community which correctly asserted that Cubans escaping Fidel Castro benefitted from government programs not available to them. And as the U.S. economy slowed starting in early 2000, the lower socioeconomic groups were further discriminated against by white Americans, Cuban or otherwise. Despite its diversity and size, the Cuban American community is best recognized by its large presence in Miami, Florida, and West New York, New Jersey, and by the influence that the Cuban American National Foundation has on the U.S. government’s Cuba policy. See also Camarioca Boat lift; Cuban American National Foundation; Freedom Flights; Mariel Boat lift; Operation Mongoose; Operation Pedro Pan

Cuban Assembly The Cuban Assembly was formed in October ¡898 as the replacement to the Cuban Republic, but in reality it represented the insurgent Cuban army. The Assembly consisted of the commanders of 3¡ so-called “army corps,” supposedly elected by the troops under their command. The Assembly never exercised any legislative power but acted more like a board of directors over the revolutionary

60 movement along with the Junta in New York and General Máximo Gómez y Bález. In November ¡898, the Assembly dispatched a commission headed by General Calixto García to Washington to explore with the U.S. government the possibility of paying o› the Cuban army and of servicing other debts contracted by the revolutionary government. In Washington, García joined Cuban “chargé d’a›aires” Gonzalo de Quesada and the lawyer for the New York Junta, Horatio Rubens. The commission sought nearly $57 million in back pay for the insurgent army troops and money to cover the accumulated war debts of nearly $2.5 million. The United States refused both requests, instead o›ering $3 million in back pay and nothing toward Cuban debt repayment. The $3 million in back pay was the amount originally suggested by García and the amount remaining in the $50 million war appropriation made by Congress in¡897. The commission also met with Senator John T. Morgan (D., Ala.), a known expansionist who favored recognition of Cuban belligerency early in the war. Morgan, however, was not sympathetic to the Cuban cause in ¡898. He sternly told the commission that only the U.S. government could determine the implementation of the Teller Amendment in Cuba, that the U.S. military government in Cuba would not tolerate any opposition to its authority, and that the military government would play a prominent role in shaping the form of any future Cuban government. Morgan’s message greatly disturbed the Cuban Commission and prompted its sharp response. The commission warned Morgan that any U.S. e›ort to circumvent Cuban customs, ideals, or procedures would be resisted by the Cubans. In March ¡899, the Assembly attempted to impede the distribution of $3 million in back pay to the disbanding Cuban Army. The Assembly repeated its charge that the amount was insu‡cient and declared that only it could approve any financial agreement with the United States. The Assembly dismissed General Máximo Gómez y Báez, who was willing

61 to cooperate with the Americans in distributing the funds. The Assembly’s position was predicated on its mysterious loan discussions with C.M. Coen. He o›ered the Cubans $¡2.4 million in return for Cuban bonds amounting to $20 million at 5 percent interest and payable at face value within thirty years. Coen recommended that a commission be sent to Washington, D.C., to obtain President William McKinley’s approval. If approved, the loan would be a mixed blessing to the Cubans. It would provide badly needed funds in the short term, but over time it would saddle the Cuban government with excessive debt. Coen himself was a mystery, as no one knew anything about him or his associates in the proposed deal. President McKinley, through the War Department, rejected meeting with any such commission. The United States had not extended recognition to the Assembly, nor did it intend to do so. Any communications between the McKinley and the Cuban people would be through o‡cial channels, meaning the U.S. military government in Cuba. Still, a two-man Cuban committee arrived in Washington and arranged to meet with Secretary of State John Hay on March 3¡, ¡899. Hay reported that the U.S. government would not authorize the Coen loan nor augment the $3 million fund for the Cuban army. Finally, April 4, ¡899, the Cuban Assembly accepted defeat. It disbanded the insurgent army and voted itself out of existence. See also García, Calixto; Gómez y Báez, Máximo; McKinley, William; United States Occupation of Cuba

Cuban Council see New York Junta Cuban Democracy Act Signed into law by President George H.W. Bush on October 23, ¡992, the measure (popularly known as the Torricelli Bill) tightened the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba by prohibiting subsidiaries of U.S. companies lo-

Cuban Democracy Act cated in third countries from trading with Cuba. The bill also banned ships that departed from a Cuban port from stopping in the United States for six months before or after leaving Cuba, authorized the curtailment of aid to nations that provided assistance to Cuba, and allowed the Treasury Department to fine companies that violated the embargo up to $50,000 and to seize their property. In addition to the tightening of economic sanctions (Track I), the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) provided for people-to-people contacts (Track II). These measures included increased contacts between Cuban Americans and their relatives on the island, the donation of food directly to Cubans or Cuban nongovernmental organizations, export of medicines and medical equipment (but only with on-site inspection of deliveries in Cuba to avoid reexportation), and the allocation of funds to nongovernmental bodies “for the support of individuals and organizations to promote nonviolent change” in Cuba. At the insistence of the anti–Cuba group in Congress, the original proposals that provided for the opening of news bureaus in Havana and Washington and for educational and scientific exchanges were excluded from Track II. The origins of the CDA can be traced to the rising anti–Cuban sentiment in the United States in the late ¡980s. George H.W. Bush capitalized upon that sentiment during the ¡988 presidential campaign and, once elected president, promised to tighten the economic strings on Cuba. He made several decisions, such as forbidding AT&T from connecting to Cuba and, in ¡99¡, stopping ABC Television from broadcasting the Pan-American Games from Havana. However, Bush refused to impose restrictions upon U.S. subsidiaries operating in third countries and conducting business with Cuba. As had President Gerald Ford in ¡975, Bush in ¡990 and ¡99¡, understood the diplomatic problems and the ill will such legislation would generate with other nations. Disappointed with Bush’s refusal to implement the harsh measures, the Miami-based Cuban American National Foundation, and particularly its chairman, Jorge Más Canosa,

Cuban Liberty Act began to pressure congressional sympathizers, including Senators Bob Graham (D.–Fla.), Connie Mack (R.–Fla.), and Jesse Helms (D.–N.C.) and, in the House, Bill McCollum (R.–Fla.) and Robert Torricelli (D.–N.J.). Torricelli, whose New Jersey district included a large Cuban American community, was most impressed with Más Canosa’s proposals during their July ¡99¡ meeting, which eventually became the framework of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA). Graham and Torricelli cosponsored the bill in Congress. As it worked its way through the legislative process, the European Union, Canada, and even Latin American governments sympathetic to the political isolation of Cuba made their objections known. So, too, did the Bush administration. On September 22 the Senate approved the bill by voice vote and, two days later, the House by a 276–¡35 margin. The CDA remained without Bush’s signature when the ¡992 presidential campaign began. From the start of the campaign Bush attacked the Castro regime, and he hoped to derail the legislative initiative when, on April ¡8, ¡992, he issued an executive order prohibiting ships leaving Cuban ports from stopping in the United States for six months. This was not enough for either the CANF or its congressional friends. Disappointed with Bush’s position, Más Canosa approached Democratic Party candidate Bill Clinton in Tampa, Florida, in the spring of ¡992, after which Clinton came out in favor of the CDA. On the campaign trail, and particularly in Florida, Clinton repeated his support for the CDA. Bush was equally self-serving in his newfound support for the CDA, particularly after his advisors found a loophole in the law. The CDA allowed the president to suspend provisions of the law when “national security” was a stake. In application, it meant that a diplomatic confrontation with Europe, Canada, and Latin America could be avoided. Bush signed the bill into law on October 23 in Miami before a large gathering of mostly Cuban Americans. Conspicuous by their absence were the bill’s cosponsors, Bob Graham and Robert Torrecilli.

62 Once president, Clinton used the “national security” loophole to avoid implementation of the CDA, which only served to infuriate CANF and the anti–Castro congressmen. See also Bush, George H.W.; Clinton, Bill; Ford, Gerald R.; Trade Embargo Against Cuba

Cuban Junta see New York Junta Cuban Liberty and Democratic (Libertad ) Solidarity Act The Act, popularly known as the HelmsBurton Bill after its two sponsors, Senator Jesse Helms (R.–N.C.) and Representative Dan Burton (R–Ind.), it was signed into law on March ¡2, ¡996, President Bill Clinton. The bill allows former U.S. owners of nationalized property in Cuba to sue foreigners who invested (“tra‡cked”) in those enterprises countries purchasing Cuban sugar, molasses, or syrups are not to resell them or their derivatives in the United States; and the U.S. would withhold financial assistance from Russia in the amount it paid Cuba for the use of its electronic intelligence station at Lourdes (approximately $200,000). In addition, o‡cers and stockholders of foreign companies “tra‡cking” in the confiscated properties are to be denied U.S. entry visas. Congress also denied the president the right to lift the trade embargo that had been in place since ¡962 by establishing a number of preconditions, including the dismantling of the state security apparatus, freeing of political prisoners, legalization of political opposition groups, international monitoring of free elections, and the withdrawal of Fidel and Raúl Castro from the process. Furthermore, the president was to develop plans for a government in post–Castro Cuba after a number of conditions were met. The only leeway granted the president was the right to suspend the implementation of certain clauses for up to six months if U.S. national interests were at risk.

63 The bill’s origins can be traced to the November ¡994 elections, which gave the Republican Party control of both houses of Congress. As a result, Helms took over the chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Burton the House Foreign A›airs Committee. Together, they cosponsored the bill. The House approved the measure in September ¡995, but it lay dormant in the Senate. During the legislative process, the Clinton administration spoke against the proposed bill. That all changed on February 24, ¡996, with the shooting down of two unarmed aircraft belonging the to the Brothers to the Rescue, allegedly over Cuban waters. The incident evoked emotions, not only in the Cuban American community but also throughout the United States. It also prompted Clinton to call for tightening the embargo on Cuba. Analysts point out that political considerations drove the Clinton decision. With an eye toward the ¡996 presidential election, Clinton wanted to satisfy the wishes of the Cuban American communities in two key electoral states: Florida and New Jersey. Congress obliged. On March 5 the Senate approved the measure, by a 74–22 vote and on March ¡2 the House did the same by a 336–86 count. Title III, which opened the U.S. courts to Americans to recover damages for properties nationalized as a result of the Cuban Revolution, became the most controversial section of the Helms-Burton Bill. It implied the extraterritoriality of U.S. law and immediately drew the wrath of the Canadian, European, and Mexican governments whose industries had all ready invested heavily in Cuba, including many former U.S.–owned properties. Each put in place retaliatory measures should the United States implement this section of the Helms-Burton law. The U.S. business community, which had been relatively silent throughout the congressional proceedings, suddenly expressed vehement opposition to Title III. U.S. business leaders pointed not only to their lost opportunities in Cuba but also to the adverse impact the bill would have upon their relationships and investments in

Dance of the Millions other countries. Every six months for the remainder of his administration, Clinton continuously suspended Title III in order not to damage U.S. “national interests.” So too, did George W. Bush after his presidential election in 2000. The Clinton administration invoked the provision to deny visas to executives of companies “tra‡cking” in confiscated properties on only three occasions: Canada’s Sherritt International, Mexico’s Grupo Domos, and the Israeli-owned shipping company BM, but then only for “tra‡cking” after passage the Helms-Burton Bill. Neither he nor George W. Bush applied it retroactively as Helms had intended. See also Brothers to the Rescue; Bush, George W.; Clinton, Bill; Cuba Lobby; Cuban Democracy Act

Cuban Revolutionary Party see Political Parties: Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Auténtico)

Cuban-Spanish War see War for Independence Dance of the Millions World War I brought unprecedented prosperity to Cuba because of the increased world demand for sugar. At the time of the war’s outbreak total sugar production was about 20.6 million tons, 53 percent from cane sugar and 47 percent beet sugar. The beetsugar fields were located mostly in Central Europe and were neglected during the war. As a result, during the ¡9¡9–¡920 crop year world sugar production dropped to ¡7.5 million tons, of which approximately 79 percent was cane sugar. The war’s impact on the global sugar market drove production downward and prices skyward outside the war zone. The price of Cuban sugar rose concomitantly, from 2.27 cents per pound in ¡9¡4 to 4.98 cents per pound in ¡9¡8 and 22.5 cents per pound in ¡920. Put di›erently, the value of the sugar crop rose from

Day $455 million in ¡9¡9 to $¡ billion in ¡920. The value of sugar exports expanded dramatically as a share of Cuban total export values from 73 percent in ¡9¡3 to 92 percent in ¡920. Much of this growth was financed by private bank loans, many from U.S. institutions. In addition to the debt, the increased wealth generated by sugar also contributed to economic dislocations, as other prices rose disproportionately. During the “Dance of the Millions,” government and private construction projects expanded, consumer spending increased, and banks expanded credit and opened new branches across the island. By late summer of ¡920, there were an estimated $80 million in loans outstanding based upon sugar at a valuation of 22 cents per pound. This all came to an abrupt halt by September ¡920 when the European beet-sugar harvest satisfied most continental needs, thus driving sugar prices down to 9 cents a pound and, by the end of the year, to 3.3 cents per pound. The impact upon the Cuban economy was immediate. Docks became overcrowded with unmarketable sugar, unemployment in rural areas increased, and, across the island, construction stalled and consumption and wages spiraled downward. The financial crisis was compounded by the political crisis resulting from the ¡920 election. Both problems led to the dispatch of Enoch Crowder to Cuba. See also Crowder, Enoch; Sugar; Zayas, Alfredo

Day, William R. (¡849–¡923) A lawyer and later federal judge, Day had a long friendship with President William McKinley, who asked him to be assistant secretary of state in April ¡897. Because the president found Secretary of State John T. Sherman to be unreliable, Day found himself obliged to assume more of the burdens of secretary of state, and McKinley came to the practice of inviting Day to White House policy meetings. Finally, Day replaced Sherman on April 28, ¡898, at a time the Cuban crisis and the U.S. relationship with Spain was at the forefront of foreign policy. There is no indi-

64 cation that Day formulated any of the policy; that was all centered in McKinley’s hands. To a remarkable degree Day agreed with the president on almost every step he took that led to war. Day favored intervention in Cuba to stop the su›ering of the Cuban people and to end Spanish misrule of the island. At war’s end, Day favored keeping a port in the Philippine Islands but cautioned McKinley from acquiring all of the islands. Despite a di›erence of opinion regarding the Philippines, Day resigned as secretary to head the U.S. commission in Paris in ¡898, a commission determined to expand U.S. interests in the Caribbean and Pacific regions. Subsequently, President Theodore Roosevelt appointed Day as an associate justice of the Supreme Court, a position he held for nearly two decades. See also McKinley, William; Treaties: Treaty of Paris

Decree Law 522 Enacted for a five-year period on January ¡8, ¡936, Decree Law distributed to the sugar mills a production allotment that was based upon the U.S. imposed sugar quota system. It helped to stabilize the industry by ending the struggle between the various factions for quota advantage. The law emerged from discussions among the sugar industry itself and provided maximum protection for Cuba’s large sugar mills, most of which were U.S. owned as distinguished from the smaller Cuban mills. The establishment of a nineteen member Sugar Stabilization Board on which the U.S. companies had substantial influence accomplished this. The Cubans were not satisfied and continued to press for the assignment of larger quotas to the Cubanowned mills. U.S. ambassador Je›erson Ca›rey militated against their e›orts and, in fact, pressed the Roosevelt administration to have legislation enacted to protect U.S. companies from Cuban encroachments. The State Department rebu›ed Ca›rey’s suggestions and, instead, advised U.S. firms in Cuba to deal directly with President Miguel Mariano Gómez, who U.S. o‡cials believed would be amenable

65 to U.S. interests. Rather than leave the U.S. mills at the mercy of the Cuban government when the law was scheduled to expire in ¡94¡, the U.S. embassy successfully linked its extension for five years to Cuba’s need for economic assistance. See also Jones Costigan Act; Sugar Acts; Trade Agreements: Reciprocal Trade Agreement of ¡934

Directorio Revolucionario

Established in December ¡955, the Directorio promoted an insurrectionary response to Batista’s repression. Its March ¡957 attack on the Presidential Palace failed to kill Batista but cost the life of the movement’s leader, José A. Echeverria. Most of its remaining leaders left Cuba and reorganized in Miami, Florida. In ¡958 they returned to Cuba, launching a guerrilla war in the Escambray Mountains, close to Havana. The Directorio military leaders — Faure Chomón and Eloy GutiérrezMenoyo — split, each commanding their own military unit. Gutiérrez-Menoyo fought independently, while Chomón joined forces with those of the 26th of July Movement headed by “Che” Guevara. In July ¡958, leaders of the Directorio signed the Caracas Pact to work in unison with other groups to oust Batista. Following the success of the Revolution, the Directorio joined with the Partido Socialista Popular and 26th of July Movement to form Castro’s Organizaciones Revolucionaria Integradas, forerunner of Cuba’s new Communist party. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Caracas Pact; Castro, Fidel Ruz; Gutiérras-Menoyo, Eloy; Revolution; 26th of July Movement

Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil

The Directorio Revolucionario was founded in ¡960 by students at the University of Havana as a splinter group of the anti–Castro Movimiento de Rescate Revolucionario (MRR). Repressed for its antigovernment activities, many of its leaders escaped to Miami where they joined to Democratic Revolution-

Dodds ary Front, a loosely knit coordinated body of anti–Castro groups. Between the end of ¡960 and the Bay of Pigs Invasion in April ¡96¡, the DRE engaged in a variety of successful underground activities such as sabotage, propaganda, and a partially successful national student strike. Under the leadership of Albert Müller, a small group of DRE members conducted guerrilla warfare in Oriente. The Cuban government brutally smashed the entire Cuban underground following the Bay of Pigs invasion, and the DRE never recovered, although it continued to conduct operations against the island from Florida. See also Bay of Pigs Invasion

Dodds, Harold W. (¡889–¡980) In December ¡935, while sitting as president of Princeton University, Dodds was invited by Cuban president Carlos Mendieta to come to Cuba to devise a compromise among the feuding political parties on the eve of elections for a constituent assembly. Dodds’s experience on Nicaragua’s electoral boards from ¡922 to ¡924 and again in ¡928 made him the ideal choice. When President Mendieta set December ¡5 as national election day, it set o› a frenzy of activity by Cuba’s many political parties. The largest and best organized was Mario Menocal’s Conjunto Nacional Democrático, and the major opposition came from a fusionist ticket headed by Miguel Mariano Gómez. The third group, the Liberal Party, soon splintered, and the Gómez group formed an alliance with it. The situation became more confused in November ¡935 when the supreme electoral tribunal ruled the latter Gómez alliance to be illegal. Dodds arrived amidst the confusion. Dodds’s recommendations favored Gómez’s fusionist ticket, which prompted the opposition groups to announce their withdrawal from the elections unless Mendieta resigned from the presidency. Critics charged that the Dodds mission confirmed Mendieta’s partiality towards Gómez and, coupled with his support from Batista, raised doubts about the fairness of the forthcoming

Dollar Diplomacy election. Under pressure and isolated, Mendieta resigned the presidency on December ¡¡, ¡935. Secretary of State José A. Barnet y Vingares assumed executive powers until the election of José Miguel Gómez on January ¡0, ¡936. Many Cuban analysts charged that the Dodds mission, because of its partial recommendations, caused Mendieta’s downfall and demonstrated the failure of U.S. diplomacy to prevent the ever-increasing power of Fulgencio Batista. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Ca›rey, Je›erson; Mendieta, Carlos

Dollar Diplomacy “Dollar diplomacy,” a term coined during the presidency of William Howard Taft (¡909–¡9¡3), was used to advance U.S. economic interests abroad. In a narrow sense, the concept of dollar diplomacy can be traced to the earliest days of the republic when the State Department sought to promote and protect U.S. commercial interests abroad. In the early twentieth century its meaning expanded, and Taft, and particularly his secretary of state Philander Knox, endorsed the view that the United States should take its place as a major power in the world’s commercial and financial arenas. In application, dollar diplomacy meant that Washington would actively encourage and support American bankers and industrialists in securing new opportunities in foreign lands. In the Caribbean, the Taft-Knox e›orts took on additional meaning. With the Panama Canal near completion, the administration became increasingly concerned with its security. Rationalizing that economic penetration opened the door to eventual political domination of underdeveloped areas, the Taft administration determined to secure U.S. investments in the Caribbean at the expense of the Europeans and, in turn, to keep them from potentially threatening the Panama Canal. Regarding Cuba, dollar diplomacy meant pressuring the Cuban government to favor U.S. banking and business interests over European competitors. See also Economic Relations; Preventive Diplomacy; United States Interventions

66

Dortícos, Osvaldo (¡9¡9–¡983) In July ¡959, at age forty, Dortícos became the youngest President of Cuba, a post he held until ¡975. Dortícos practiced law in his native Cienfuegos after graduating from the University of Havana in ¡94¡. Active in student politics, Dortícos later joined the Movimiento de Resistencia Civica, an underground group of professional and businessmen opposed to Fulgencio Batista in the ¡950s. Following a short jail term in ¡957, Dortícos joined Fidel Castro’s 26th of July Movement. Dortícos was again arrested and detained in December ¡958 for organizing support for the movement in Cienfuegos, after which he fled to Mexico. He returned to Cuba after Castro’s assent to power in January ¡959 to serve as the provisional government’s minister of justice. He replaced Manuel Urrutia, whom Castro purged as president in July ¡959. Dortícos served in that capacity until Castro reorganized the government in ¡975, after which he held other posts including on the Council of State. Throughout, Castro remained the real power in Cuba. In ¡983, a year after his wife’s death, Dortícos committed suicide. See also Castro Ruz, Fidel; 26th of July Movement

Dulles, John Foster (¡888–¡959) Secretary of state in the Eisenhower administration (¡953–¡959), Dulles often was at the center of controversy for his strongheaded statements regarding the nature of the Cold War. He saw international issues in black/ white terms; that is, communist versus noncommunist. He came to the State Department with a long résumé of international experience in both government service and the private sector. During the ¡952 presidential campaign, Dulles criticized the Truman administration for neglecting Latin America, but during his secretaryship he gave little attention to the region, except for Guatemala in ¡954, while focusing upon Europe and the Soviet Union.

67 Dulles played little role in the formulation of Cuban policy, but in the early days of the Eisenhower administration he sent conflicting signals. On the one hand, he favored retaining Cuba’s preferential position in the U.S. sugar market, arguing that any cut in the Cuban quota would worsen the worker’s plight, thus creating an opportunity for communists to capitalize upon. On the other hand, he saw Fulgencio Batista as the strongman capable of maintaining political order in Cuba. In March ¡958, he approved the U.S.–imposed arms embargo placed upon Batista in hope that it would bring a mediated settlement to the crisis. In November ¡958, Dulles was ill with cancer and preoccupied with European a›airs when the State Department dispatched William Pawley on a special mission to Cuba in an e›ort to replace Batista with a provisional government. Clearly, after Castro appeared to be in control of Cuba’s government in early ¡959, Dulles described him as a communist. Dulles was succeed by Christian A. Herter. See also Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Revolution: United States Presidential Administrations and the Revolution

Dupuy de Lôme, Enrique (¡85¡–¡904) A career diplomat, Dupuy de Lôme arrived in Washington, D.C., in May ¡895, shortly after the outbreak of war in Cuba. Over time, he confronted a variety of challenges regarding the war. He never understood the dynamics of the American government when it came to formulating its Cuban policy, nor did he fully appreciate the U.S. perception of Spain’s policies towards the island. He sought to contain filibustering activities that emanated from the United States and had to counter the charges of the “yellow press” and the demands of U.S. expansionists. By early ¡898 Dupuy de Lôme understood that U.S. emotions were such that any crisis in Cuba might trigger U.S. intervention. The most significant action Dupuy de Lôme took during his stateside assignment came in December ¡897, when he wrote a let-

Dupuy de Lôme ter to José Canalejas, a prominent Spanish political figure and newspaperman engaged in a fact-finding mission to Cuba. In the letter Dupuy de Lôme criticized Spanish leadership and policy in Cuba, Cuban autonomists and insurgents, and the status of Spanish-American relations. He also rejected autonomy as a workable policy and suggested that the Cuban problem could best be solved by military means. The frustrated Dupuy de Lôme suggested that Madrid send to Washington a negotiator who could better win over U.S. congressmen and the public to the Spanish cause. All of this was overlooked by the American public, which instead focused upon Dupuy de Lôme’s criticism of President William McKinley’s state of the union message to Congress in December ¡897. He described the speech as an e›ort to gain “the admiration of the crowd.” He went on to characterize McKinley as “weak” and a “would-be politician.” Canalejas never received the letter, and how the Cuban Junta in New York obtained it remains unknown. The Junta released the letter to William Randolph Hearst’s New York Journal for publication on February 9, ¡898. The letter’s publication caused a sensationalist response in the United States. With the concurrence of his cabinet, McKinley determined that Dupuy de Lôme had to resign. The Spanish government was equally disturbed by the letter but had to react without appearing as if it bowed to American pressure. Although the embarrassed and embittered Dupuy de Lôme asserted that his personal correspondence was not for public discussion, he understood that his mission to Washington could no longer be e›ective. Dupuy de Lôme resigned his post and returned to Spain, where the government had already distanced itself from him. The Dupuy de Lôme letter served to further strain U.S.–Spanish relations. To most Americans it portrayed the Spaniards as being insincere in both their Cuban policy and trade relations with the United States. On top of this problem, the U.S. minister in Madrid, Stewart I. Woodford, threatened to vacate his post unless the Spanish government issued an

Economic Relations o‡cial apology for the attack upon President McKinley. Spain did just that and also issued a firm pledge to continue its reform e›ort in Cuba. No sooner had the controversy over the Dupuy de Lôme letter cooled when the U.S.S. Maine exploded in Havana harbor, and with it, U.S.–Spanish relations took another turn for the worse. See also Canalejas, José; McKinley, William; Spanish-American War: Sinking of the Maine; Woodford, Stewart I.

Economic Relations Economic relations between the United States and Cuba can be traced to the tenmonth (¡762–¡763) British occupation of the island during the Seven Years’ War. For the next 40 years trade went through several gyrations. Despite its brevity, the British occupation impact had a great upon the Cuban economy. North American colonial merchants shared in this trade, selling grain, foodstu›s, and tools. Although this market closed with the end of the war in ¡763, clandestine operations continued until ¡779 when Spain, with France, formally entered the war for U.S. independence against Britain. Until the U.S. Revolutionary War ended in ¡783, Cuba enjoyed free trade with Spain’s allies, including the now ¡3 independent states of North America. Following U.S. independence in ¡783, Britain denied the United States access to its Caribbean colonies, leaving Cuba to be an increasing source of sugar, molasses, co›ee, and tobacco. Trade with Cuba expanded as a result of the Napoleonic wars that began in ¡796. While the aforementioned Cuban products found a larger market in the United States, the North Americans provided foodstu›s, clothing, furniture, manufactured goods, and slaves. In ¡798, briefly but portentously, the volume of trade between Cuba and the United States exceeded that of Cuba with Spain. However, the market closed as quickly as it had opened. In ¡803 Spain partnered with England to battle Napoleon’s intrusion onto the Iberian Peninsula and sub-

68 sequent continental expansion. Spain again closed Cuba to U.S. shipping. In ¡8¡8, Spain opened Cuba to the world’s shippers but imposed high import duties upon goods arriving in foreign ships. This action set a pattern that followed throughout the nineteenth century. Spanish tari› policy may have hindered U.S.— Cuban trade, but it did not shut it down. The United States served as an ideal trading partner for Cuba: It was close, and it had a dynamic merchant marine and growing economy and population. The United States served as an important source for Cuban exports and, in turn, Cuba for U.S. exports. The number of North American ships arriving in Cuba rose from ¡50 in ¡796 to ¡,886 in ¡852. The ships left from Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Savannah, and New Orleans laden with box shoots, staves, caskets, barrels, nails, tar, textiles, salt, fish, corn, lard, flour, and rice. They returned stateside loaded with sugar, tobacco, molasses, and co›ee. Ironically, as the Cubans burned their woodlands for sugar plantations, they imported U.S. lumber. By ¡850, the United States, England and Spain accounted for 80 percent of Cuba’s total trade, and trade with the United States represented 39 percent of that total, followed by Britain with 34 percent. The trend continued to spiral upwards. By ¡877 the United States accounted for 82 percent of Cuba’s total exports, followed by Spain with six percent and Britain with four percent. Spanish tari› policies caused a downside to this linkage. Spain discriminated against foreign shippers. For example, the ¡853 tari› law placed a 2¡.5 to 25.5 percent tari› on foreign products shipped on Spanish carriers to Cuba, but a 29.5 to 35.5 percent on the same goods carried by a foreign merchant. Translated into dollars for U.S. goods, the law meant that there was a $2.90 tax on a Spanish barrel of flour, but it rose to $9.20 if it came from the United States. The same pattern applied to Spanish export taxes. Goods shipped by foreigners paid a 7.5 percent export tax, while Spanish shippers paid only 3 percent. While the policies added to the co›ers in Madrid, it squeezed profits for Cuban

69 growers and increased costs for U.S. consumers. Pressure from both Cubans and North Americans resulted in the ¡89¡ Foster-Cánovas Reciprocal Trade Agreement. While the agreement’s impact on Cuban sugar was immediate — exports expanded from 632,000 tons in ¡890 to one million tons in ¡894 — it went far beyond sugar. By ¡893 the total Cuban exports to the United States increased twelve-fold over those of ¡890, reaching $¡¡6 million. The United States received almost 90 percent of Cuba’s exports and provided 40 percent of its imports. However, the upward spiral quickly turned in ¡894 as the U.S. rescinded its tari› concession on Cuban imports and placed a 40 percent ad valorum tari› on all sugar imports. Cuba’s sugar economy collapsed. Spain responded in kind, and the cost of U.S. imports skyrocketed in Cuba. Prices of selected food staples illustrate the point: The cost of wheat rose from 30 cents per one hundred kilos in ¡894 to $3.95 in ¡895; flour went from $¡.00 to $4.75; corn from 25 cents to $3.95; and meal went from 25 cents to $4.75. Some scholars argue that the loss of income, coupled with consumer inflation, prompted Cuba’s planter class to support José Martí’s independence movement in ¡895. Cuba’s War for Independence decimated the island’s agricultural lands, and while the U.S. government sought to revive it during the period of military occupation, the ¡903 Permanent Treaty served as the real catalyst. According to the agreement, the United States provided Cuban sugar with a 20 percent discount o› the existing tari› schedule, giving it a privileged access to the U.S. economy. In return, the Cubans reduced concessions ranging from 20 to 40 percent. Cuban sugar exports again became dependent upon the U.S. market. Over the next generation, the price of sugar climbed markedly and, concomitantly, production increased. The loss of European and Asian sugar sources during World War I resulted in record production and prices. For example, Cuba produced 3.7 million tons in ¡920, earning a record $¡,0¡6,800,000, which accounted for 92 percent of Cuba’s export val-

Economic Relations ues. This “Dance of the Millions” ended shortly after the war as other producers returned to the world market. Although a degree of prosperity returned in the mid–¡920s, the U.S.–dependent Cuban economy collapsed with the ¡930 Hawley-Smoot Tari›, which ended Cuba’s tari› relief, and the onset of the Great Depression that same year. Again, the loss of market share and concomitant income meant that Cuba could no longer import manufactured and consumer goods, infrastructure materials, and machinery essential for the agricultural sector from the United States. U.S. policy shifted in the ¡930s, beginning with the ¡934 Jones-Costigan Act by which the United States granted Cuba a 20 percent tari› reduction and a fixed import quota. With the exception of World War II, when the United States bought the entire sugar crop, the United States continued this policy until President Dwight D. Eisenhower suspended the sugar quota in ¡960. Cuban sugar became a victim of Cold War policies. During the same period, the Cuban dependence on sugar contributed to local resistance to diversify the country’s agricultural and industrial sectors, leaving Cuba dependent upon imports of U.S. manufactured and consumer goods. U.S. investment in Cuba further bonded the island to the mainland. U.S. investments in the sugar industry accelerated following the close of the Ten Years’ War in ¡878 when Cuban planters, strapped for cash and unable to modernize their refining techniques, sold out to U.S. investors and speculators. On the eve of the Cuban War for Independence in ¡895, Secretary of State Richard Olney estimated that U.S. investments in Cuba totaled $70 million. That figure climbed to more than $¡00 million when Cuba received its independence in May ¡903, and it reached $¡.5 billion by ¡929 on the eve of the Great Depression. In addition to sugar plantations and refineries, U.S. investors dominated Cuba’s infrastructure — water, sewerage, electric, and transportation. During the same period, U.S. banks extended $¡27 million in loans to Cuba.

Eisenhower Following World War II, North Americans came to dominate the tourist industry and, through organized crime, its gambling casinos and prostitution. Although Fulgencio Batista attempted to diversify the economy in the early ¡950s, he faced an impossible task, a fact recognized by Cuba’s National Bank and the U.S. Department of Commerce. The economic dependence and the inability to diversify, coupled with the related lower standard of living for most Cubans, helped to fuel the fires of Cuban nationalism after World War II. To Cuban nationalists, the United States appeared as an imperialist power, exploiting their country. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Foster, John W.; Jackson, Andrew; JonesCostigan Act; Martí y Pérez, José Julián; Revolution; Sugar; Sugar Acts: Sugar Act of ¡948, Sugar Act of ¡952, Sugar Act of ¡956, Sugar Act of ¡960; Tari› Policies; Trade Embargo; Truman, Harry S; World War II

Eisenhower, Dwight D. (¡890–¡969) Eisenhower served as the 34th President of the United States from ¡953 to ¡96¡ at the height of the Cold War. A native of Abilene, Kansas, Eisenhower graduated from West Point in ¡9¡5. His military career reached its zenith as commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces that landed on the French coast in June ¡944. Following the war, Eisenhower served as U.S. Army chief of sta›, president of Columbia University, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commander until nominated by the Republican Party for the presidency in ¡952. As a “Cold Warrior,” Eisenhower’s overriding concern was containing the spread of communism, including into Latin America. During the ¡952 presidential campaign Eisenhower criticized President Harry S Truman for ignoring the region, but as president, Eisenhower equally neglected the area, except for Guatemala in ¡954, until late in his administration when there appeared a communist threat. The appointment as ambassadors to

70 Cuba of Republican Party financial supporters Arthur Gardner and Earl E.T. Smith, each without any diplomatic experience, signaled the island’s unimportant place in Eisenhower’s global policy scheme. In ¡958, with human rights violations escalating in Cuba, Eisenhower became more concerned with Cuban a›airs. He accepted the State Department’s advice to impose an arms embargo on the Batista regime in the hope of tempering the dictator’s violence, but to no avail. By the time Castro launched his final o›ensive in August ¡958, Eisenhower shared the opinion of those policymakers who became suspect of Castro’s ultimate intentions. On the eve of Batista’s downfall in December ¡958, Eisenhower sanctioned William Pawley’s secret and ill-fated mission to Cuba in an e›ort to establish a caretaker government. With cautious optimism, Eisenhower extended recognition to Cuba’s provisional government in January ¡959 and accepted Secretary of State Christian Herter’s advice to appoint career diplomat Philip Bonsal as ambassador to that government. However, Eisenhower mistrusted Castro and refused to meet with him when he visited the United States in April ¡959. The continued suppression of human and civil rights and centralization of political power in Castro’s hands coupled with the May ¡959 Agrarian Reform Law, subsequent nationalization of U.S. properties, Castro’s government reorganization in November ¡959 that brought more communists into his administration, and the February ¡960 trade agreement with the Soviet Union convinced Eisenhower that Castro was not only a dictator, but a communist one at that. As a result, Eisenhower approved several plans designed to bring Castro down. cutting the Cuban sugar quota in July ¡960 and placing a total trade embargo, except for food and medicine, on the island on October ¡9, ¡960 would, it was hoped, create internal hardships that would lead to uprisings within Cuba. This did not happen. Eisenhower also sought Latin American support against Castro at the foreign ministers meetings in Santiago, Chile, in ¡959 and in San José, Costa Rica, in ¡960 and during his

71 final goodwill tour of Latin America in February ¡960. Latin American political leaders did not yet perceive Castroism as a threat to their own existence and were reluctant to approve any interventionist measures. In response to Castro’s demand on December 3¡, ¡960, that the United States cut its Havana embassy sta› from 87 to ¡¡ people, Eisenhower severed diplomatic relations with Cuba. Telling the American people that there was a limit to what “self respect” could endure, on January 3 ,¡96¡, Eisenhower ended all ties with the Cuban government. Eisenhower left the presidency later in January ¡96¡ with a Central Intelligence Agency plan that was well advanced and designed for Castro’s overthrow. Approved in March ¡960, Cuban exiles were training in Guatemala and Nicaragua for a return to the island. The operation, carried out by President John F. Kennedy in April ¡96¡, was a complete failure. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Bonsal, Philip W.; Gardner, Arthur; Herter, Christian A.; Revolution: United States Presidential Administrations and the Revolution; Smith, Earl E.T.

Estrada Palma, Tomás (¡835–¡908) Estrada Palma served as president of Cuba’s provisional government during the War for Independence and beginning in ¡902 as the first president of an independent Cuba. Born near Bayamo in Oriente Province, Estrada Palma was educated in Havana schools and later studied law at the University of Seville in Spain. He joined the rebel cause during the Ten Years’ War (¡868–¡878) and became president of Cuba’s provisional government in ¡876. A year later he was captured by Spanish forces and imprisoned in Spain for the remainder of the conflict. During that war, Estrada Palma strongly advocated annexation to the United States. After the Ten Years’ War Estrada Palma traveled throughout Europe and to Honduras where he married President Santos Guardiola’s daughter Genevova. Subsequently, he settled in New York, where he administered a private school and became a Quaker.

Estrada Palma Over the years, Estrada Palma modified his views on Cuban annexation to the United States but argued that some form of U.S. tutelage was required to prepare the Cuban people for self-government. In ¡892, José Martí enlisted Estrada Palma into the Partido Revolucionario Cuba (PRC), or Cuban Revolutionary Party. Upon Martí’s death in ¡895, Estrada Palma assumed the party’s leadership mantle. During the War for Independence Estrada Palma served as minister plenipotentiary of Cuba’s insurgent provisional government and head of the Cuban Junta in New York. In those capacities Estrada Palma lobbied the Cuban cause before the U.S. government, solicited funds for the insurgent cause, and appointed diplomats to other governments. Never wavering from his belief that Cuba’s fate was closely tied to the United States, at the war’s end Estrada Palma parted ways with the insurgent leaders who advocated complete Cuban independence. The split reflected the divergence of interests in the Cuban community. Estrada Palma was linked to the upper class that wished to replace the Spanish rulers with themselves and maintain the social and political order that colonialism had established. In contrast, the separatists represented the lower socioeconomic groups across Cuba who had been exploited by the Spanish and by the Cuban elite and now sought their own place in Cuban society. Estrada Palma, however, remained a favorite of U.S. o‡cials during the occupation period (¡899–¡902), The Americans turned to Estrada Palma for recommendations regarding appointees to Cuba’s provisional government during the occupation period. Given his background, Estrada Palma supported the Platt Amendment and the ¡902 Permanent Treaty with the United States. The admiration was mutual. The Americans thought him to be an ideal candidate to be Cuba’s first president in ¡902. Estrada Palma took o‡ce on May 28, the same day that General Leonard Wood departed from Cuba. Considered personally honest and above political factionalism, Estrada Palma’s presi-

Everett dency was applauded for its e›orts to bring representatives of all Cuban social sectors into government. By ¡905, however, those divisions could not be contained, and when Estrada Palma sought his own reelection, the fractured Cuban society came into full view. When Estrada Palma was declared the winner of December ¡905 presidential elections, the opposition Liberal Party revolted. The violence resulted in a U.S. mediation e›ort that Estrada Palma refused to accept. He resigned the presidency and returned to his estate in nearby Bayamo, where he lived quietly until his death on November 4, ¡908. See also Martí y Pérez, José Julián; Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Auténtico); New York Junta; TaftBacon Mission; United States Interventions; United States Occupation of Cuba

Everett, Edward (¡794–¡865) Everett was a statesman and orator from Massachusetts, which he represented as a U.S. congressman and Senator and governor before being called upon by President Millard Fillmore in November ¡852 to complete the term of Secretary of State Daniel Webster, who had died a month earlier. Immediately upon taking o‡ce Everett had to deal with a proposal sent by the British and French foreign o‡ces the preceding April. It called for a tripartite declaration that would bind the signatories “now and hereafter, [of ] all intention to obtain possession of the Island of Cuba.” Owing to the presidential nomination conventions and subsequent campaign, Webster laid the note aside. With the election over, Fillmore instructed Everett to craft the U.S. response. The nation was in the midst of an expansion debate over the U.S. acquisition of Cuba, and Everett needed to satisf y the expansionist forces that favored a rejection of the European proposal, while anti-expansionists did not. Everett attempted to satisfy both with his introductory statement: “The President does not covet the acquisition of Cuba [but] at the same time he considers the Cuban problem, an American problem.” Everett rejected the pro-

72 posed tripartite declaration for three reasons. Everett explained that joining in a tripartite declaration would violate the long-standing principles of no entangling or permanent alliances dating back to the presidencies of George Washington and Thomas Je›erson. Second, to join such an alliance implied that U.S. and European interests in Cuba were the same. Not so, Everett asserted. Cuba’s geographical proximity gave the United States a greater interest in the island than nations some 3,000 miles distant. Finally, while the United States had no current interest in acquiring Cuba, Everett could not bind his country to future action should circumstances change. In a subsequent letter to the New York Times, Everett, a staunch abolitionist, described any Cuban adventure as “hazardous” because of Spanish policies, including the imposition of slavery. In sum, Everett’s Cuban policy remained consistent with that of his predecessors. He understood that the Cuban question exacerbated the U.S. domestic political arena, but at the same time, he was upholding U.S. special interests in the island. See also Webster, Daniel

EXCOM see Missile Crisis Expansionism Prior to ¡850, the annexation of Cuba gained significant support throughout the Untied States. Initially, commercial and strategic considerations prompted many Americans to consider the value of Cuba. The easing of Spanish trade restrictions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and, particularly, during the Napoleonic period permitted Havana to serve as a depot for U.S. trade. Although the rate of trade growth slowed after the War of ¡8¡2, Cuba still ranked among the top four U.S. trading partners. In fact the United States became dependent upon Cuban sugar. While New York City served as the center of this trade, other east coast cities and, subsequently, New Orleans significantly benefited, a factor

73 that contributed to the widespread interest in acquiring the island. Americans from all sections of the country also understood Cuba’s strategic importance. The east and Gulf coast regions could be threatened should a major power, such as Britain or France, wrest control of Cuba from Spain. Beyond these practical reasons, most political leaders before ¡850 anticipated that Cuba would one day gravitate toward the United States and that its political leadership, once free of Spain, would recognize the advantages of linking to the United States for their own development and security. Such widespread interest does not mean that the national debate over Cuba was devoid of sectional interests before ¡850. To the contrary, as early as the ¡820s southern slave owners led the call for acquisition of Cuba out of fear that abolition of slavery on the island would have repercussions upon the “peculiar institution” in the south. Before ¡850 the debate over expansion was largely along party lines — Whigs and Democrats — rather than between sections — north and south. The expansionist wing of the Democratic Party showed the most interest in Cuba, while the Whigs opposed it. The party positions on Mexico, Central America and the Yucatán di›ered little from their opinions about Cuba. Many expansionist Democrats belonged to the “Young America” movement of the late ¡840s and early ¡850s that believed that the nation had a mission to spread freedom and democracy in the New and Old Worlds. While the Whigs — north and south — split over the issue of slavery, they were in agreement that national authority should be concentrated in a confined area. The Whigs were hesitant to stretch the nation’s boundaries. Thus, before ¡850, American expansionists looked southward in terms of a nationalistic vision, and political party a‡liation characterized the movement far more than did regional interests. All that changed beginning in the ¡840s and clearly after ¡850 when “Manifest Destiny” became sectionalized. Northerners and southerners still agreed on the feasibility of new territory, but they did not agree upon which ter-

Expansionism ritories would be most acceptable or which institutions should be permitted in them. The division originated in the debate over slavery in the newly acquired Mexican territories and crystallized in the ¡854 Kansas-Nebraska Act. What emerged was a concerted southern movement to extend slavery into the tropics and to annex Cuba as a new slave state. Simultaneously, northern antislavery advocates vehemently opposed any concessions to the southern slaveholders. Expansion became entwined in the issues that led to the outbreak of the U.S. Civil War in ¡86¡, and the war’s significance was not lost upon Cuba. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, three divergent interest groups emerged to advocate on behalf of U.S. expansion abroad. Collectively, their ideas became known as the “large policy.” The first group, led by Alfred T. Mahan, Henry Cabot Lodge Sr., and Theodore Roosevelt, spoke on behalf of a strong navy. They pressured Congress to provide funds for an ever-increasing modern fleet and for a worldwide string of naval bases, including in the Caribbean, to provide necessary coal and repair stations. They also envisioned a U.S.–owned canal somewhere on the Central American isthmus to shuttle the navy between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Mahan, Lodge, and Roosevelt also asserted that a navy and a canal would place the United States among the world’s premier powers. U.S. industrialists formed the second group to advocate a “large policy.” Bolstered by a protective tari› that ranged from 40 percent in ¡860 to 50 percent in ¡890, the Industrial Revolution took hold in the United States. As production saturated the domestic market, the industrialists looked outward, particularly to Asia and Latin America. The ¡893 depression enhanced the need for external markets. Allied with the military and commercial interests were those who argued simply for the uplifting of the “backward,” undemocratic, and underdeveloped societies that existed around the world. In these regions, the masses of uneducated, unskilled, and poverty-stricken people had neither political voice nor opportunity for socioeconomic advancement in the

Fair Play elite-dominated societies. Often altruism was used to justify self-interest. Cuba fit neatly into the expansionists’ visions. The island satisfied the need for a naval base to secure the northern Caribbean. If it were free from Spanish economic control, U.S. manufacturers would have easier access to the island. Furthermore, if free from Spanish political domination, the United States could impose a democratic government upon the people. See also Spanish-American War; Tari› Policies; United States Interventions; United States Occupation of Cuba

Fair Play for Cuba Committee Under the leadership of CBS newsman Robert Taber, historian Waldo Frank, and journalist and part-time academic Carlton Beals, the Fair Play for Cuba Committee was established in the spring of ¡960. By its own count, the committee claimed to have 2¡ chapters across the United States and four in Canada, with a total membership of 6,000. Clearly, the largest chapters were in New York, Cleveland, and San Francisco, with an estimated combined membership of 2,000. The committee’s goal was to clarify the misconceptions of Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution as portrayed in the U.S. press and by the U.S. government. The committee asserted that Castro was not a communist and that his was a legitimate battle to fight starvation, disease, poor housing, illiteracy, and unemployment, because the United States would not tolerate a social revolution, it took to harass and hopefully overthrow Castro. Their demonstrations, publications, and flysheets, however, were more an attack upon U.S. policy than upon the merits of Castro’s regime. Its demonstrations across the nation against the Bay of Pigs operation, including in front of the United Nations headquarters in New York, best illustrate the point. Although the committee faded into the background following the missile crisis in October ¡962, it continued to function at the time of President Kennedy’s assassination in November ¡963. See also Castro Ruz, Fidel

74

Fillmore, Millard (¡800–¡874) The thirteenth president of the Untied States, Fillmore came to o‡ce following the death of President Zachary Taylor on July 9, ¡850. A lawyer by trade, Fillmore entered Congress as a Whig representative from the state of New York in ¡833 and was selected as Taylor’s vice presidential running mate in ¡848. Fillmore’s foreign policy was largely restrained. Lacking previous foreign policy experience, Fillmore relied upon his secretary of state Daniel Webster. Fillmore did not support the filibustering activities of William Walker in Nicaragua or Narciso López in Cuba. In fact, when the latter and 50 of his followers were captured and killed before a firing squad in Havana in ¡85¡, Fillmore resisted pressures to retaliate against Spain. See also López, Narciso; Webster, Daniel

Finley, Carlos (¡833–¡9¡5) One of Cuba’s most prominent scientists, Finley’s research determined the particular type of mosquito responsible for the spread of yellow fever, one of the leading causes of death in the Tropics. Following his education in Europe, Finley received his medical degree in ¡855 from the Je›erson Medical College in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Although his work uncovered new areas of research into various diseases, his findings were largely ignored by the international community until after the U.S. occupation of Cuba in ¡898. During the occupation, a U.S. medical team, headed by Dr. Walter Reed, confirmed Finlay’s findings. In Cuba, the confirmation led to the development of sanitation and anti-mosquito programs to prevent the disease. See also United States Occupation of Cuba

Fish, Hamilton (¡808–¡893) Fish was a congressman and senator from the state of New York prior to serving as secretary of state from ¡869 to ¡877.

75 In October ¡868, five months before the Grant administration took o‡ce, war erupted in Cuba, pitting some of the planter class against Spanish rule. Known as the Ten Years’ War, the rebels never evolved into a fully organized force nor controlled meaningful parts of the island, in part because the insurgents failed to gain significant Creole support with their call for social equality and an end to slavery. The war degenerated into a barbarous conflict, killing soldiers and innocents alike and the destructing of property. In the end, the Treaty of Zanjón (¡878) provided some political benefits to the Creoles, and promised an end to slavery. Although President Ulyesses S. Grant often was inclined to intervene, he deferred to his secretary of state, Hamilton Fish, who guided U.S. policy throughout the war. Fish’s disinclination to intervene was based upon his belief that the Cubans were incapable of practicing stable government, given the legacy of Spanish colonialism and the fact that too many of people of color, free and enslaved, dominated the island’s population. Immediately upon taking o‡ce in ¡869, Fish confronted the question of granting belligerent status to the Cuban rebels. Many groups pressured him to do so. A good portion of the U.S. press demanded that the United States intervene on the insurgent side for moral reasons. The revived Cuban Junta in New York City also clamored for the United States to do something. It not only conducted a public relations campaign toward that end but also distributed bonds payable upon Cuba’s independence. Among the bond recipients was Secretary of War John Rawlins, a strong advocate of granting belligerent status to the rebels. Fish, however, demurred, arguing that to do so would only encourage the British to intervene on Spain’s behalf and result in a greater threat to Caribbean security. Throughout the war, Fish continually battled against the advocates of granting belligerent status to the rebels. Fish also determined that the United States needed to bring resolution to the conflict for its own security and to protect Amer-

Fish ican economic interests on the island. In June ¡869 he instructed Minister Daniel E. Sickles and Special Envoy Paul Forbes to approach the Spanish government with the following proposal: Spain recognize Cuba’s independence and abolish slavery on the island; Cuba pay Spain not more than $¡00 million indemnity (and with congressional consent the U.S. government would guarantee the money); and each side recognize an armistice during the negotiations to end the conflict. Believing that neither side would secure a military victory, and recognizing that prolongation of the conflict would destroy the island and bankrupt the Spanish economy, Fish was confident that his plan would work. He also threatened to grant belligerent status to the rebels if Spain refused to cooperate. Spain agreed to accept U.S. mediation provided that the Cuban indemnity, guaranteed by the United States, be raised to $¡50 million and that the insurgents lay down their arms during the negotiations. Spain was willing to give Cuba and Puerto Rico autonomy within the empire, but not independence. Furthermore, Spain wanted the mediation talks to be held in Madrid, not Washington. Spanish o‡cials knew that the Cuban insurgents would reject the plan. In fact, Spain had no intention of abandoning Cuba. Spain also intended to use the negotiation period as the time to conquer the now-unarmed insurgents. An infuriated Fish attempted to pressure Spain by placing an October ¡, ¡868, deadline on Spain. It was to no avail. Spain did not budge, and Fish withdrew the mediation o›er. With its good o›ers rejected, the Grant administration resumed its position of watchful waiting. Grant occasionally suggested that recognition be extended to the Cuban insurgents. He may well have been influenced by the continuing newspaper campaign, congressional resolutions, and general anti–Spanish sentiment across the country. The House Foreign A›airs Committee reflected this sentiment in ¡870 with a report announcing that there existed a moral and humane basis for intervention. Influenced by the report, Fish increased pressure upon Spain to abolish slavery in Cuba. The Spanish

Foraker Cortés’s feeble response did not satisfy the Americans. Only the aged and infants gained their freedom. An ¡872 law went a step further, but it did not satisfy Fish. While Fish compared the Spaniard who emancipated the Cuban slaves with Je›erson or Lincoln, neither Fish nor his emissaries in Madrid understood that Spanish honor prevented capitulation to foreign demands, particularly regarding Cuba. Spain, however, was not a›ected by reality. In ¡875, the new U.S. minister to Spain, Caleb Cushing, reported that the Spaniards remained aloof to compromise despite the economic and social chaos that the war caused at home. U.S. relations with Spain and, hence, the Cuban issue, were exacerbated in November ¡873 following the Spanish seizure of the U.S. vessel Virginius and the summary execution of its captain, 36 crew members and ¡6 of the passengers in Santiago de Cuba. Although the incident was subsequently settled, the incident severely damaged U.S.–Spanish relations. The Virginius a›air also served to further incite U.S. jingoism. The public, the press, and several congressmen demanded action, which prompted Fish to make one last e›ort to resolve the problem. In November ¡875, Fish appealed to the governments in Berlin, London, Paris, Rome, and St. Petersburg to pressure their counterpart in Madrid to terminate the conflict in Cuba. Save the Russians, who made remonstrances to Madrid, the others demurred. Fish was most hopeful of British support, and most disappointed at its refusal. Subsequently, when Fish’s appeal for European assistance became public in the United States, he received a verbal lashing for his supposed violation of the Monroe Doctrine. The Ten Years’ War dragged on until the Treaty of Zanjón in ¡878. Despite his diplomatic failures regarding Cuba, Fish left o‡ce suggesting a change in U.S. policy. In February ¡874 he pleaded the cause of Cuban independence. In writing Minister Cushing in Madrid, Fish noted that that the Cubans themselves aspired to independence and that Cuba should take its place among the family of nations in the Western Hemisphere. Admitting that the United States

76 had great interest in Cuba, he recommended that the island’s political future be its own to chart. Although nothing came of it at the time, Fish became the first U.S. secretary of state to depart from the policy course set by John Quincy Adams. See also Adams, John Quincy; Ten Years’ War; Virginius A›air

Food and Agribusiness Exhibition see Agribusiness Exhibition Foraker, Joseph B. (¡846–¡9¡7) A Republican senator from Ohio, at outbreak of the War for Independence in ¡895 Foraker supported the cause for Cuban independence, pushed for extending diplomatic recognition of the belligerents, and opposed suggestions regarding U.S. annexation of the island. By late ¡897 Foraker wanted the United States to recognize Cuba’s independence from Spain, and on March 29, ¡898, he introduced a resolution authorizing the use of U.S. military force for that purpose. The proposal soon became entwined in the congressional resolutions for war in April. Foraker disapproved the swarming of U.S. businessmen and promoters going to Cuba in search of grants and concessions of all kinds immediately following the termination of the war in August ¡898. President William McKinley’s directive that no Cuban governmental body grant concessions or franchises for public works, railways, telephone or telegraph lines, water or gas works, and the like without approval from the War Department failed to satisf y Foraker because the order e›ectively removed the U.S. military government in Cuba from the process and placed decision making with the business-minded Secretary of War Russell Alger. In early February ¡899, when Alger announced the formation of a board to review all applications for concessions, Foraker responded with a two-part

77 amendment to the current army appropriations bill. It reflected his pre-war attitude regarding Cuba’s independence. When the Foraker Amendment arrived on the Senate floor March 3, ¡899, the last day of the final session of the 55th Congress, Foraker received support from a disparate group of senators, including anti-imperialist George Hoar (R.– Mass.) and imperialist Henry Cabot Lodge Sr. (R.–Mass.). Each argued against the U.S. economic exploitation of Cuba. Administration supporters Orville H. Platt (R.–Conn.) and John C. Spooner (R.–Wis.) asserted that Congress had no authority to legislate on Cuba because the president had constitutional authority to do so as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Foraker’s position won the debate. The first part of the amendment forbade the granting of concessions or franchises of any kind in Cuba by U.S. authorities for the duration of the U.S. occupation of the island. The second part declared that once the pacification of Cuba was completed, the president was authorized to withdraw the army and leave the Cubans to govern themselves. Despite his long-term opposition to U.S. annexation of Cuba, events in Cuba during the U.S. military occupation forced Foraker to moderate his position. Accepting the argument that the Cubans were not yet ready for self-government, Foraker now supported those who advocated a U.S. protectorate over the island. Therefore, he supported the Platt Amendment and the ¡903 Permanent Treaty that guaranteed continued U.S. influence in Cuba. See also Platt Amendment; Treaties: Permanent Treaty of ¡903; Spanish-American War: United States War Resolutions; United States Occupation of Cuba

Foraker Amendment see Foraker, Joseph B. Ford, Gerald R. (¡9¡3– ) The thirty-eighth president of the United States (¡974–¡977), Ford came to o‡ce after

Ford President Richard M. Nixon resigned in August ¡974 as a result of the Watergate scandal and the concomitant threat of impeachment. Previously, Ford continuously represented Michigan in the House of Representatives from his initial election in ¡948 until appointed Vice President of the United States following the resignation of Spiro T. Agnew on October ¡0, ¡973. Ford retained Henry Kissinger as secretary of state and national security advisor. The advent of the Ford presidency did not mean an immediate change in U.S. policy toward Cuba. One month after Ford took o‡ce, the Organization of American States (OAS) convened to review the sanctions it imposed upon Cuba in ¡964. The e›ort to remove the sanctions failed by two votes, with the United States abstaining, an act described by one Central American diplomat as “negative neutrality.” Yet, a year later the United States voted with the majority at the OAS meeting in San José, Costa Rica, to lift the mandatory trade and other sanctions and allow each individual country to determine its own strategy in dealing with the Cuban government. The change in policy was a reflection of U.S. isolation in the hemisphere regarding Cuba. The OAS vote, however, did not a›ect U.S. bilateral relations with Cuba. In ¡975, in response to an OAS resolution, the White House instituted measures that permitted U.S.–owned subsidiaries operating in third party countries to trade with Cuba. If the Ford administration reacted favorably to the changing international environment regarding the embargo, it did not succumb to increasing pressure from U.S. congressmen and businessmen to lift the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba. During Ford’s tenure, the advocates of change focused upon lifting the embargo, which they charged no longer served any purpose. In March ¡975, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.) introduced a bill providing for an end to the embargo, and in May two House subcommittees held hearings on a bill to remove the restrictions on direct trade with Cuba and the prohibition on aid to nations that traded with

Foster Cuba or whose ships entered the island’s ports. Proponents of this legislation pointed to the lack of allied support for continuing the embargo, the economic losses that resulted from the lack of trade, and Castro’s focus upon internal problems rather than international issues. Congressional study groups to Cuba in ¡974 and ¡975 came away suggesting the potential demand for U.S. agricultural and manufactured goods. The proponents of change, however, remained a small group of legislators. The vast majority sided with the Ford administration on the necessity of continuing the embargo. The business community pursued the same theme. The Association of American Chambers of Commerce and corporate executives emphasized the loss of U.S. market share in Cuba to foreign competitors because of the embargo. In fact, several corporate executives, including representatives from Burroughs, Carrier, Florida East Coast Railroad, and Dow Chemical visited Cuba to survey market possibilities. Each returned home critical of the administration’s policies. In ¡974, Havana again signaled a willingness to reach an accommodation with the United States. Exploratory conversations began in November ¡974 and continued through February ¡976. Any progress on bilateral relations still rested on a change in the Cuban attitude and in its foreign policies, particularly in the Third World. The Ford administration assumed that conflicts in Latin America were somehow linked to Havana. That perception, along with the Cuban adventure into Africa in the mid–¡970s, meant there would be no change in U.S. policy toward Cuba under President Ford. See also Africa: Cuba’s Military Involvement; Castro Ruz, Fidel: Foreign Policy; Organization of American States: Sixteenth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign A›airs; Trade Embargo

Foster, John W. (¡836–¡9¡7) A native of Indiana where he practiced law and was active in Republican Party poli-

78 tics, Foster served as minister to Mexico and in other posts in Russia and Spain before becoming secretary of state in ¡892. Between assignments, Foster enhanced his reputation through his international law firm in Washington, D.C. He argued that trade reciprocity treaties would serve as a useful devise for bringing Latin America into closer ties with the United States. President Chester A. Arthur designated Foster as his special representative to Madrid in ¡883 to negotiate a reciprocity treaty with Spain regarding Cuba. At the time, Cuba–United States trade totaled $82.5 million, and the high tari›s on U.S. imports into Cuba provided the ruling Spanish government with badly needed cash. Despite Spain’s reluctance to give up this income source, a tentative agreement was reached in early January ¡884 regarding consular fees and di›erential levies. Foster mistakenly believed that a full reciprocity agreement would quickly follow. When that did not happen, only Foster’s pressure tactics, including the threat to turn elsewhere for those products Cuba produced, forced the government in Madrid to acquiesce. Foster returned home in November ¡884 with a reciprocity treaty, only to have a reluctant Senate refuse to ratify it. For their own reasons protectionists and free traders, along with special interest groups, cooperated to defeat the treaty. Some Cubans suggest that the failure to ratif y the reciprocity treaty not only hurt the island’s economy, but also contributed to Cuba’s nascent independence movement. Foster subsequently left government service to work in his international law firm in Washington, D.C. In ¡89¡ Secretary of State James G. Blaine dispatched Foster to Havana, ostensibly as a tourist but in reality to mobilize Cuban support for a reciprocity treaty. Foster advised Cuban businessmen and government leaders that without reciprocity, the United States most likely would impose a punitive tari› on Cuban sugar. At the time Cuba supplied the United States with 94 percent of its sugar needs, and the Cubans were anxious to retain their major market. The Cubans understood the need to pressure Spain.

79 Foster arrived in Madrid in late February ¡89¡, where resentment lingered over the U.S. failure to ratify the ¡884 agreement. Still, the Spanish government was in a conciliatory mood because of growing discontent in Cuba. Many government o‡cials believed that failure to reach an agreement this time around might lead to the U.S. annexation of Cuba. An agreement was reached in late spring and ratified by both governments later that same year. For the United States, the Harrison administration would claim that the treaty resulted in a 65 percent increase in U.S. exports to Cuba during ¡892. Still, reciprocity treaties were not a major campaign issue in the ¡892 presidential election won by Grover Cleveland. Foster returned to government briefly as secretary of state in ¡892, following the abrupt resignation of James G. Blaine. Although Foster returned to his law practice in ¡893, he never was far from the center of diplomacy. He advised his son-in-law Robert Lansing when he served as secretary of state in the Woodrow Wilson administration and monitored the nascent careers of his grandchildren, John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Eleanor Lansing Dulles. See also Blaine, James G.; Cleveland, Grover S.; Dulles, John Foster

Freedom Flights

Between December ¡, ¡965, and April 6, ¡973, there were 3,049 flights between Varadero, Cuba, and Miami, Florida, that brought 260,56¡ Cuban exiles to the United States at an estimated cost of $50 million to the U.S. government. An estimated additional $¡00 million was spent on employment, relocation, food, medical care, and shelter for the resettlement of the Cuban refugees. According to the terms of a “Memorandum of Understanding” signed on November 6, ¡965, the United States agreed to underwrite the cost of the orderly removal of discontented Cubans from the island. While the agreement provided that Cubans with family members in the United States receive first priority, at Castro’s insistence the agreement ex-

Frelinghuysen empted men eligible for military service (ages ¡4 to 27) and those “whose departure might produce grave disturbance to production or to a social service because of a lack of replacement”; in other words, skilled workers. By ¡97¡, Castro disrupted regularly scheduled flights, asserting that the original pool of applicants for visas was near exhaustion and that the original purpose of the freedom flights had for the most part been achieved. Castro’s critics charged that the island’s economic plight and the need for skilled workers were the real reasons for the cancellation of the program on April 6, ¡973. The Cubans who applied for visas under the program faced the immediate loss of jobs and property and the assignment to menial labor while waiting for their flights out of Cuba, which could take months or, in some cases, years. Once in Miami, the refugees confronted a long time in the Krome Detention Center while the Immigration and Naturalization Service processed them for admission into the United States. Although thousands of Cuban refugees were relocated throughout the United States, the majority remained in the south Florida region, where they drew the ire of the local black community because of job competition and the benefits provided under the ¡966 Cuban Adjustment Act to the exiles, that otherwise were not available to African Americans. See also Camarioca Boat Lift; Cuban Adjustment Act; Cuban Americans

Frelinghuysen, Frederick T. (¡8¡7–¡885) Prior to becoming secretary of state (¡88¡–¡885) Frelinghuysen had been a leading corporate lawyer and attorney general for the state of New Jersey and, beginning in ¡866, represented the state in the U.S. Senate. A member of the Republican “stalwart’ faction, Frelinghuysen replaced Blaine as secretary of state in ¡88¡. As secretary of state, Frelinghuysen reversed Blaine’s activist policies, including withdrawal of invitations to the Latin American na-

Fulbright tions to send delegates to Blaine’s inter-American conference. Instead of adjusting tari›s, Frelinghuysen preferred bilateral arrangements. Cuba fit within Frelinghuysen’s plan to complete bilateral trade reciprocity treaties with the Caribbean states, which already enjoyed favorable trade balances with the United States because their exports of primary agricultural products far outweighed their imports of U.S. goods. To deal with Cuba, in ¡883 Frelinghuysen dispatched John W. Foster to Spain, where all policy decisions were made regarding the Cuban colony. Foster was an able diplomat who previously served as U.S. minster to Mexico and Russia. After arduous negotiations, Foster completed a reciprocity treaty in November ¡884. U.S. critics charged that the Spanish treaty would result in lost customs duties worth more than the trade benefits it conferred. At the same time President-elect Grover Cleveland opposed individual trade reciprocity agreements as a poor substitute for general tari› reform. The Democrats in Congress took heed, and the Spanish treaty was never considered for ratification. See also Foster, John W.; Blaine, James G.; Cleveland, Grover

Fulbright, J. William (¡906–¡995) Elected to the House of Representative and later to the Senate from Arkansas from ¡943 until his resignation in ¡974, Fulbright became a stalwart in the Democratic Party. He served as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from ¡959 until ¡974, during which he became an outspoken critic of the Vietnam War. Fulbright was impressed with President John F. Kennedy’s understanding of development issues in Latin America: namely, that socioeconomic disparities served as a breeding ground for communism. He agreed with the administration’s e›ort to address those issues through the Alliance for Progress. Regarding Cuba, Fulbright favored its isolation from the hemisphere. He advised Kennedy not to go through with the Bay of

80 Pigs invasion, believing that the plan was destined to failure. Even if it did succeed, Fulbright advised the president that the U.S would lose credibility with its hemispheric neighbors for returning to its previous imperialistic practices. No matter the explanation, Fulbright advised that the operation would be viewed as a brainchild of the United States and would serve notice of U.S. imperialistic intensions. In the October ¡962 missile crisis, Fulbright favored U.S. military intervention in Cuba over the use of a naval blockade, a suggestion that surprised President Kennedy. Fulbright did not think that the Soviets would respond to direct intervention in Cuba, but that enforcing the blockade, an act of war, ensured a Soviet response. Fulbright also argued that any e›ort to overthrow Castro would only encourage revolutionaries throughout Latin America. As the ¡960s progressed, Fulbright asserted that the United States should learn to live with Castro. He argued that the economic blockade and isolation of Cuba from the hemisphere had not succeeded in toppling the Cuban from power. Furthermore, the revolution had stagnated and had lost appeal across Latin America. See also Alliance for Progress; Bay of Pigs Invasion; Johnson, Lyndon B.; Kennedy, John F.; Missile Crisis

García, Calixto (¡839–¡898) A native of Holguín, Cuba, García earned a reputation as an excellent military leader and strategist during the Ten Years’ War (¡868–¡878). During the Guerra Chiquita (Little War) in ¡879, García was captured and imprisoned by the Spanish. García remained in Spain until ¡892 when he joined with José Martí and Maximo Gómez to plan the final o›ensive to drive the Spanish from Cuba. When the war began in ¡895. García commanded the rebel army in eastern Cuba. From the start, he mistrusted U.S. intentions and lamented that the government in Washington did nothing more than permit the sale of arms to the rebel forces at good prices. Yet, he ex-

81 pressed satisfaction with the congressional joint resolution of April 25, ¡898, that recognized the state of war in Cuba and announced U.S. intervention. García optimistically interpreted the resolution as U.S. recognition of Cuba’s right to independence. Because the U.S. government refused to recognize the Cuban provisional government, it was left free to deal with whomever it pleased, and did so. In preparing for the Battle of Santiago de Cuba, President William McKinley bypassed General Maximo Gómez and, instead, sent Lieutenant Andrew S. Rowan to confer with García regarding the rebels’ cooperation with U.S. forces. García readily agreed. His army, which accounted for about half of the insurgent military strength, provided the necessary cover for the landing of the U.S. troops that led to the seizure of Santiago. In return for his cooperation, García expected that he would share in the decision making and that his troops would participate in the attack upon the Spanish forces. Instead, the U.S. commanding general, William R. Shafter, blamed García’s troops for some of the early Spanish successes in the battle for Santiago. Having lost confidence in the Cuban army, Shafter relegated the Cubans to trench digging and other laborious tasks. These experiences only served to increase García’s dislike of the Americans. García became more infuriated when neither he nor his army was permitted to participate in the ceremonies of the Spanish surrender of Santiago and when he subsequently was denied participation of the administration of the city. The Americans were not the only authorities that García struggled with. Like General Gómez, García refused to accept the authority of Cuban provisional government in Havana, and his obstinacy led to his dismissal from service in August ¡898, an action that only increased popular support with the many Cubans who stood against the provisional government and U.S. intentions alike. General H.L. Lawton, who replaced General William Shafter in August ¡898, recognized the value of having García’s support. However, it took nearly a month of private discus-

García sions before Lawton convinced García that the best way to ensure implementation of the U.S. congressional joint resolution was to have Cuban cooperation. In return for García’s support, Lawton secured his appointment to the board of directors of the Cuban Educational Association at a modest salary and a commitment that he be appointed to a commission and be invited to visit the United States. In November ¡898 García came to the Washington, D.C., as a member of a commission representing the Cuban Assembly in search of money for Cuba’s war indebtedness, including $57 million in back pay for the insurgent army. Unlike his colleagues, however, García was willing to accept the $3 million o›ered by the United States for that purpose. Otherwise, García joined his colleagues in rejecting Senator John T. Morgan’s (D., Ala.) assertion that the U.S. military would play a role in framing any new Cuban government. The commission pointed to the Teller Amendment, which they asserted was a law that limited U.S. discretionary authority over Cuba. The work of the commission came to end with the death of García on December ¡¡, ¡898, after a brief illness. The impressive funeral provided by the U.S. government, including the temporary resting place in Arlington Cemetery, contrasted sharply with the procession in Havana on February ¡¡, ¡899. Due to a communications misunderstanding, the Cuban army and Assembly was replaced in the funeral cortege by an American calvary unit. Angered, the Cubans withdrew entirely from the procession and from the graveside ceremonies. This incident, when added to the U.S. authorities’ cancellation of the January ¡, ¡899, victory celebration in Havana, further exacerbated the Cuban disenchantment with an American presence on their soil. See also Gómez y Báez, Máximo; Martí y Pérez, José Julián; Spanish-American War; Teller Amendment; United States Occupation of Cuba

García Menocal, Mario see Menocal, Mario García

Gardner

Gardner, Arthur (¡899–¡967) Gardner served as U.S. ambassador to Cuba from May ¡953 until June ¡957. A prominent businessman, Gardner had been assistant treasury secretary during the Truman administration and, subsequently, a significant contributor to the Republican Party’s ¡952 presidential campaign. However, he lacked international experience and arrived in Havana unprepared for his job. He quickly developed a close friendship with Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista, unabashedly posing for pictures with him and weekly playing canasta together. Gardner’s inexperience and friendship with Batista contributed to his inability to understand the extent of the popular opposition to the regime or the dynamics of the emerging Castro movement. Gardner also worked on behalf of U.S. business interests on the island. Archival evidence suggests that by late ¡956, the State Department doubted the accuracy and validity of Gardner’s reports regarding Cuban socioeconomic conditions and the political arena. The State Department recalled Gardner in June ¡957 after he accepted a solid gold telephone from the International Telephone and Telegraph Company for his influence in securing a 20 percent rate increase for its telephone service in Cuba. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; United States Presidential Administrations and the Revolution

Goicouría, Domingo (¡804–¡870) A Cuban exile, member of the New York Junta and an advocate of the island’s annexation to the United States. Like other members of the Junta, Goicouría saw the value of Spain’s ¡854 Africanization policy in stirring southern agitation for the annexation of Cuba as a means to protect slavery in the United States. Goicouría also supported the Junta’s August ¡854 contract with John A. Quitman to lead an expedition to Cuba, which was to result in Cuba’s annexation to the United States. How-

82 ever, he became disillusioned, with Quitman’s constant postponement of its implementation. Following the collapse of Quitman’s project and the Junta’s concomitant dissolution, Goicouría, as the Junta’s treasurer, kept the arms and ammunition and the steamer Massachusetts in his personal possession. Subsequently, Goicouría led a group of determined Cuban independentistas based in New York City. In their June ¡0, ¡855, manifesto, this group rejected U.S. assistance because it meant annexation and continued slavery and announced its determination to achieve Cuban independence and the emancipation of slaves at the same time. A year later, in ¡856, Goicouría again changed directions when he looked to William Walker, an American filibuster who made his way to Nicaragua. Goicouría perceived Walker’s expedition to Central America as a steppingstone for the invasion of Cuba. In January ¡856, Goicouría struck a deal with Walker whereby Cuban exiles and arms and ammunition would be transported to Nicaragua in support of Walker, who in turn would assist with the subsequent invasion of Cuba. Although the agreement said nothing about the fate of Cuba once free from Spanish control, the assumption was that it would be annexed to the United States. In February ¡856 Goicouría led 250 Cuban exile forces in the successful Battle for Granada, Nicaragua, earning him the rank of brigadier-general in Walker’s army. Walker’s victory in Nicaragua brought him recognition from the Pierce administration, and, with it, Walker also dispatched Goicouría to London as his representative. These actions raised the Cubans’ expectations that an invasion of the island would soon follow. They were to be disappointed. Walker’s actions in Nicaragua raised fears among the other Central American governments. They found a financier in Cornelius Vanderbilt, whose Accessory Transit Company fell victim to Walker’s scheming. Together, they struck out against Walker, and he finally surrendered on May ¡, ¡856, to a united Central American army that handed

83 over to the U.S. Navy. Walker and his troops (including the Cubans) for their return to New Orleans and a hero’s welcome. Goicuría broke with Walker before the filibuster attempted to invade Central America twice more. Walker met his death before a Honduran firing squad on September ¡2,¡860. By this time, Goicouría recognized that any e›ort to link Cuban annexation to slavery’s expansion in the United States was doomed to failure. Subsequently, Goicouría returned to Cuba to proselytize his case for annexation to the United States. He went into hiding following the outbreak of the Ten Years’ War but was captured by the Spanish forces that subjected him to a brutal death on May ¡0, ¡870. See also Africa: Spain’s Africanization Policy; Quitman, John A.; Ten Years’ War; Walker, William

Gómez, José Miguel (¡858–¡92¡) A major general in the Cuban Independence Army and later President of Cuba (¡909–¡9¡3). Gómez served in the Cuban insurgent army during the Ten Years’ War (¡868–¡878) and the La Guerra Chiquita (Little War, ¡878). He quickly joined the Cuban Liberation Army in ¡895, rising to the rank of major general, and held the distinction of never have lost a battle. He supported the separatist cause of complete independence of Cuba. Following Cuba’s independence in ¡902, he became a member of the Liberal Party, which drew its support from former soldiers, workers, and peasants. Gómez’s served as legislator and governor of his native Las Villas province. Following an unsuccessful bid for the presidency in ¡905, Gómez stature grew as spokesman for the underclass, which contributed to his presidential election in ¡908. As president, Gómez’s main achievements included a reorganization of the army, increase in the navy, construction of railroads, extensive public works projects, and expansion of public schools. Despite these positive e›orts, the Gómez administration also was characterized by graft, corruption, and nepo-

Gómez tism. His public works projects ran afoul of U.S. interests, as he favored Cuban companies and British capital over American. Given the intent of the U.S. “preventive policy,” the Gómez administration was in constant conflict with U.S. o‡cials, often succumbing to their pressure. In ¡9¡2 Gómez agreed to the use of U.S. military needed to protect American lives and property during a rebellion by black veterans. However, the U.S. military was not called upon. Gómez again sought the presidency in ¡920 as the Liberal Party candidate. He pleaded for U.S. supervision of the election on the grounds that incumbent president Mario Menocal, through corruptive practices, would steal the elections for the Conservatives. Gómez supported Enoch Crowder’s mission in hopes that it would correct the fraud connected with the November ¡905 elections, but when it became clear that Crowder’s work would not bring him the presidency, Gómez withdrew. Instead, Conservative Party member Alfredo Zayas became Cuba’s president. Subsequently, Gómez retired to the United States, where he died. His remains were returned to Cuba where he was interred with full honors. See also Crowder, Enoch; United States Interventions

Gómez, Máximo see Gómez y Báez, Máximo Gómez, Miguel Mariano (¡889–¡950) The son of Cuban Independence War general and subsequent president of Cuba (¡909–¡9¡3) José Miguel Gómez, the younger Gómez was active in politics at an early age and became a leading opponent of President Gerardo Machado (¡925–¡9¡3). Following Machado’s downfall in ¡933, Gómez served as mayor of Havana until January ¡936, when Fulgencio Batista engineered his election to the presidency. Once in the presidency, however, Gómez attempted to distance himself from Batista and ensure civilian control over

Gómez y Bãez the military. Their feud reached a climax in December ¡935 over Gómez’s veto of a tax increase on sugar to finance a military-run rural education program. It prompted an impeachment movement supported by Batista. U.S. ambassador Je›erson Ca›rey, who saw the education program’s merits, attempted to mediate the dispute. However, Ca›rey failed to persuade Gómez not to veto the tax legislation. This recommendation, coupled with Ca›rey’s refusal of Gómez’s request for more assertive support, left the distinct impression that Ca›rey favored Batista. Unable to gain Ca›rey’s support, Gómez also appealed directly to President Franklin D. Roosevelt for assistance. Roosevelt refused to intervene. Ca›rey attempted to find a way out of the crisis in mid–December, when he urged Batista to end the impeachment movement against Gómez. Batista refused, claiming that his own position within the military would be jeopardized by such action. On December 24, ¡935, the Senate impeached Gómez, making him the first Cuban president removed by Congress. After leaving o‡ce, the frustrated Gómez charged Ca›rey with complicity in the a›air. Some U.S. analysts held the same opinion. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Ca›rey, Je›erson

Gómez y Báez, Máximo (¡836–¡905) Gómez y Báez served in the Spanish army in his native Dominican Republic prior to his moving to Santiago de Cuba in ¡865. He quickly became disenchanted with Spanish civil authority and the treatment of slaves, which prompted him to join the Cuban insurgent army during the Ten Years’ War (¡868–¡878). During the war, Gómez y Báez rose to the rank of general and later to commander in chief of the rebel forces. Subsequently, he continued the battle against Spain in the Guerra Chiquita (the Little War) from ¡878–¡879. Following the war he lived briefly in Honduras before traveling to New York City in ¡884, where he met up with José Martí to raise funds and volunteers for another

84 war in Cuba. Their conflicting personalities prompted Gómez y Báez to return to the Dominican Republic until ¡892, when Martí again beckoned him to assist with the organization in what came to be the final o›ensive against Spanish authority. For the next three years Gómez worked with Martí and Antonio Maceo in preparing for the March ¡895 o›ensive. Following Martí’s death on May ¡9, ¡895, Gómez assumed the leadership of the Cuban rebel army, which for the next three years withstood the overwhelming strength of the Spanish military. Gómez y Báez never trusted the intentions of the United States regarding Cuba. As long as the Cuban Junta could supply arms and supplies, Gómez y Báez remained ambivalent about the U.S. granting the rebels belligerent status and remained equally confident that his forces would eventually defeat the Spanish. Throughout the war, Gómez y Báez had a conflicted relationship with the Cuban revolutionary government because it represented the Cuban elite and tended to think in terms of Cuban autonomy, not independence. For the latter reason, Gómez y Báez rejected the Spanish o›er in January ¡898 to make Cuba a self-governing province within the Spanish empire. Clearly, Gómez wanted nothing less than complete Cuban independence without U.S. interference. There matters stood when the United States declared war on April 25, ¡898. Gómez y Báez collaborated with the U.S. troops upon their arrival in June ¡898. When hostilities ended in August that same year and Spain agreed to relinquish control of the island, Gómez y Báez and his forces retired to the Narcisa sugar mill in Las Villas Province. Following the departure of the Spanish troops in September ¡898, Gómez y Báez made a triumphant tour of the island, ending with a march into Havana on February 24, ¡899. However, Gómez y Báez soon found himself at odds with the U.S. authorities and the Cuban legislative assembly. Gómez y Báez wanted the United States to pay the Cuban soldiers for their contributions to the U.S. war e›ort, but he reluctantly accepted, as insu‡-

85 cient, the U.S. o›er of $3 million — an estimated $75 per soldier who turned in his weapons. At the same time, Gómez y Báez opposed a proposed U.S. reconstruction loan that the Cuban Assembly wanted. He viewed the loan as a vehicle for continued U.S. interference in Cuba’s internal a›airs. Because of his obstinance, the Assembly dismissed Gómez y Báez as commander in chief, a move that only increased his popularity. Yet, he refused the call to stand as a presidential candidate in ¡902 and, instead, favored Tómas Estrada Palma. The two men parted ways in ¡905 when Gómez y Báez opposed Estrada Palma’s determination to extend his presidency. Gómez y Báez, now in frail health, went on a speaking tour but could do little to a›ect Estrada Palma’s intentions before his own death June ¡7, ¡905. See also Estrada Palma, Tomás; García, Calixto; Martí y Pérez, José Julián; Spanish-American War; United States Occupation of Cuba

González, Elian On November 22, ¡999, fourteen Cubans secretly left Cárdenas, Cuba, for Florida in a small boat. Two days later it sank somewhere in the Florida Straits. Only three people survived. One of them, five-year-old Elian González, was rescued by U.S. fishermen on Thanksgiving Day, November 25, three miles from the Miami, Florida, coastline. Among those who drowned were Elian’s mother, Elizabeth Brotons, and his stepfather, Lázaro Munero. Elian soon became the center of a legal and political controversy that pitted interests in Miami, Havana, and Washington against each other. The drama lasted until April 2000. After Elian received medical treatment, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service gave temporary custody of the boy over to his grandfather’s stepbrother, Lázaro González, who himself had fled Cuba in ¡983 and now lived modestly in the Little Havana section of Miami. When Elian’s father, Juan Miguel González, made it known that he requested the return of his son to Cuba, the

González Miami relatives challenged him. Beginning on December ¡0, ¡999, a legal battle ensued. A group of lawyers representing Lázaro González filed a petition for asylum on behalf of Elian. At the same time, a Miami judge granted temporary custody of the child to Lázaro González. In the meantime, the Cuban American community, its representatives in Congress, and several of its organizations in the United States made a determined bid to keep the young boy in the United States by conducting a public relations campaign and holding demonstrations. Defying government orders, a group of Cuban Americans camped outside the home of Lázaro González in Miami, and, on occasion, Lázaro González and his daughter made public appearances to plead their case for permanent custody of Elian. In Cuba, Fidel Castro apparently was determined to make an international issue of the case. Huge rallies were orchestrated to demand Elian’s return to Cuba. The international media was drawn to these events. The debate raged on both sides of the Florida Straits on such issues as children’s rights, the state of civil rights in Cuba, educational systems, rule of law, and the possibility of the father coming stateside and remaining with his son. The U.S. Congress added to the debate when it considered granting Elian U.S. citizenship. In January 2000, emotions reached a new high when Elian’s two grandmothers arrived in the United States with the intention of taking him back to Cuba. That did not happen. On March 2¡, federal judge Michael Moore rejected the appeal for Elian’s asylum. While Lázaro González’s appeal worked its way through the court system, Elian’s father, Juan Miguel González, arrived in the United States on April 6, 2000. Lázaro González, however, defied the court order that the father meet with his son. The elder González also threatened not to turn Elian over to authorities under any conditions. His defiance prompted Attorney General Janet Reno to order the boy’s abduction from his Miami residence in the early morning hours of April 22,

Good Neighbor Policy 2000. While Elian joined his father in Washington a few hours later, the cities of Miami and Union City, New Jersey, were beset with violent demonstrations protesting the government’s action. Finally, after both the Atlanta Appeals Court and the U.S. Supreme Court refused to consider asylum petitions for Elian, he and his father returned to a tumultuous welcome in Havana on June 28, 2000.

Good Neighbor Policy Announced by President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt in his inaugural address on March 4, ¡933, the Good Neighbor policy signaled that the United States would no longer intervene in the internal political a›airs of other nations. Subsequently, Secretary of State Cordell Hull rea‡rmed the policy at the Seventh International Conference of American States, meeting in Montevideo, Uruguay, from December 3 to 26, ¡933, and again at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, Buenos Aires, Argentina, December ¡–23, ¡936. The Good Neighbor policy repudiated the interventionist policy that the United States had pursued in the Caribbean and Central American regions since the turn of the century and prompted the Latin Americans to charge the United States with imperialism. One of the reasons for the U.S. interventions was to secure the region from European presence, owing particularly to the security of the Panama Canal. That threat had subsided after World War I. Another justification for the interventions was predicated on the belief that “backward peoples” inhabited the region and that the United States had a moral obligation to bring them orderly government. That policy met with failure as recognized by the State Department and enunciated in ¡926 by Latin American specialist Stokeley W. Morgan, when he told a new group of Foreign Service o‡cers that revolutions were a way of life in the Caribbean and that the United States could do nothing about it. In ¡929 State Department o‡cer J. Rueben Clark repudiated the use of the Monroe Doctrine as justification

86 for these interventions in the internal a›airs of Caribbean states. Clark convincingly argued that the Monroe Doctrine was never intended to give the United States the right to intervene in the internal a›airs of the Latin American states. As secretary of commerce in the early ¡920s, Herbert Hoover argued that the interventionist policies militated against the sale of American products to the larger and more prosperous nations of Latin America. As president-elect, Hoover undertook a goodwill tour to Latin America to promise a new relationship. Franklin Roosevelt, himself, criticized the interventionist policies as early as ¡928. By the time Roosevelt took o‡ce in ¡933, the worldwide depression gave added impetus for a new policy. With regard to Cuba, the Coolidge and Hoover administrations reflected the changing attitude by refusing to intervene in Cuban a›airs beginning in the mid–¡920s as the government of Gerardo Machado y Morales became increasingly repressive and more corrupt. Despite pleas from Ambassador Sumner Welles in Havana, Franklin D. Roosevelt also refused to intervene in Cuban a›airs in ¡933, except to withhold recognition from President Ramón Grau San Martín on constitutional grounds. Subsequently, the Roosevelt administration pointed to the abrogation of the ¡903 Treaty and Platt Amendment and their replacement with a new agreement in ¡934 and the Jones-Costigan Act and the Reciprocal Trade Agreement that same year as other examples of the application of the Good Neighbor policy in Cuba. In contrast, critics, including many Cubans, asserted that Welles’s engineering of the overthrow of Machado y Morales and Grau San Martín, Ambassador Je›erson Ca›rey’s contributions to the rise to power of Fulgencio Batista, Ambassador Spruille Braden’s harsh public criticisms of Batista, and the continued U.S. government pressure on behalf of American business interests in Cuba clearly indicated the shallowness of the Good Neighbor policy. Whatever the debate, the Good Neighbor policy went into demise with coming of the Cold War in the mid–¡940s. See

87 also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Braden, Spruille; Ca›rey, Je›erson; Grau San Martín, Ramón; Jones-Costigan Act; International Conference of American States: Seventh International Conference, Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace; Machado y Morales, Gerardo; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Trade Agreements: Reciprocal Trade Agreement of ¡934; Treaties: Treaty of ¡934; Welles, Benjamin Sumner; Wright, J. Butler

Grant, Ulysses S. (¡822–¡885) A U.S. Civil War military hero, Grant became the eighteenth president of the United States in ¡869 and served two terms until ¡877. His foreign policy derived from his military experience. He sought territorial expansion to enhance national security and to resolve domestic issues. Grant selected an able secretary of state, Hamilton Fish, and demonstrated great trust in him. Grant cast a covetous eye toward Cuba, including the possible purchase of the island, but he was hesitant to act without congressional approval, something that could not be obtained during his tenure in o‡ce. During the Ten Years’ War (¡868– ¡878), Grant supported Fish’s mediation e›orts. Grant left a presidency tarnished by scandal and corruption, a fact that overshadowed his foreign policy. See also Fish, Hamilton; Ten Years’ War

Grau San Martín, Ramón (¡887–¡969) A physician by training, Grau San Martín eventually served twice as president of Cuba (¡933–¡934 and ¡944–¡948). Beginning in ¡927 he actively and consistently opposed the Gerardo Machado dictatorship, resulting in a jail term in ¡93¡, after which he was exiled to the United States. Following the “Sergeant’s Revolt” on September 4, ¡933, Grau San Martín served in the short-lived five man Junta (the pentarchy). With its collapse a week later, Grau San Martín became provi-

Grau San Martín sional president, a post he held until his ouster on January ¡4, ¡934. Grau San Martín nationalistic program, supported by labor and university students, included the unilateral declaration abrogating the ¡903 Platt Amendment and, for labor, the legalization of labor unions, the institution of an eight-hour work day, a requirement that 50 percent of all employees be Cuban nationals, and an agrarian reform program for the benefit of peasants. He also seized a U.S.–owned electric company and two sugar mills and suspended payment on a loan to the Chase National Bank. These actions earned the wrath of U.S. ambassador Sumner Welles, who described the Grau San Martín program as a social revolution. Although President Franklin D. Roosevelt rejected Welles’s request for U.S. intervention to oust Grau San Martín, Welles persuaded Roosevelt to withhold U.S. diplomatic recognition. Welles also encouraged internal opposition, including meetings with Fulgencio Batista that encouraged Batista to overthrow Grau San Martín. The replacement of Welles by Je›erson Ca›rey in December ¡933 did not signal a change in U.S. policy. In fact, Ca›rey continued to encourage Batista to act. Following his resignation on January ¡5, ¡933, Grau San Martín went into a self-imposed exile until December 9, ¡939. From exile, Grau San Martín criticized the United States for not practicing the New Deal in Cuba. Instead, he charged that the U.S. continued to protect its businesses operating on the island and, through Ambassador Ca›rey, continued to intervene in Cuba’s political a›airs. Once back in Cuba, Grau San Martín was elected to the ¡940 constitutional convention, which he subsequently chaired. Despite his popularity, Grau San Martín lost the ¡940 presidential election to Fulgencio Batista but won the presidency in the ¡944 contest, considered by many to be the most fair in recent Cuban history. As presidentelect, Grau San Martín visited the United States in late August ¡944, where he met with President Franklin D. Roosevelt and exchanged words of friendship with Secretary of State Cordell Hull at the Pan American Union.

Grenada Grau San Martín came to the presidency in ¡944 committed to agricultural diversification and industrialization, but the reality of events drove the nation to increased dependence upon sugar. With shortages on the world sugar market at the end of World War II, Grau San Martín negotiated generous contracts with the United States to purchase Cuba’s sugar crop at high prices through ¡947. The demand and prosperity caused the sugar growers to increase their annual yields, which, in turn, contributed to their lack of interest in agricultural diversification. When the world sugar market quickly changed in late ¡947, prices dropped precipitously, and Cuba found itself with excess sugar in need of a market. Still, rather than turn to diversification, the Cuban sugar growers pressured Grau San Martín to obtain a larger share of the U.S. market. In addition, the leaders of Cuba’s small industrial sector preferred tari› protection for their fledgling operations rather than opening the country to foreign investment. U.S. policymakers not only concerned themselves with Grau San Martín labor legislation, which improved wages and conditions for workers, but also fretted about his implementation of the ¡940 constitutional provision requiring that 50 percent of a company’s labor force be Cuban nationals and specified that only Cuban citizens could practice as lawyers and accountants. Such practices helped to convince U.S. policymakers that Grau San Martín was dependent upon support from the communist-led Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC). Pressured by these diverse interest groups, Grau San Martín refused to consider entering into a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation as proposed by the Truman administration because it threatened to open the floodgates to large U.S. investments in the Cuban economy. Grau San Martín mistakenly thought that Cuba’s participation in the General Agreement on Trade and Tari›s (GATT) would protect Cuba’s sugar tari› preferential with the United States. To his dismay, Grau San Martín learned that the United States had developed greater leverage because it could

88 negotiate concessions with anyone who was a competitor with Cuba. Grau San Martín was disappointed when he learned that GATT did not serve Cuba’s interests. Grau San Martín’s nationalism also caused him to resist U.S. requests to keep selected military sites in Cuba following the end of World War II. U.S. military planners wanted to retain these bases for the continued defense of the Caribbean region. Instead, Grau San Martín insisted upon implementation of the ¡94¡ agreements that required that the sites be turned over to Cuba six months after the war ended. In addition, Grau San Martín had no interest in the presence of a U.S. military mission in Cuba, but he did purchase quantities of military matériel when faced with a possible military coup in ¡947. Grau San Martín left the presidency in ¡948 as no friend of the United States. He also became increasingly unpopular at home for having lost his zeal for the goals of the revolution of ¡933, for the corruption and nepotism that characterized his administration, and for the uncontrolled gangsterism that gripped Havana. Grau San Martín presented himself as a presidential candidate in ¡954 and ¡958 against Batista, but he withdrew before the voting took place, claiming that anticipated government fraud made a mockery of the elections. After the ¡959 revolution, Grau San Martín retired to his Havana home, where he died in ¡969. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Ca›rey, Je›erson; Norweb, R. Henry; Truman, Harry S; Welles, Benjamin Sumner

Grenada On the morning of March ¡3, ¡979, the leftist-leaning New Jewell Movement, led by Maurice Bishop, seized control of the government of Grenada, a small island on the eastern end of the Caribbean Sea. The Carter administration decided to join Great Britain and the Eastern Caribbean nations in trying to influence the new government. It o›ered to send a team from the Agency for International Development to discuss plans for U.S. eco-

89 nomic assistance and to increase the number of Peace Corps members in the country. Carter’s main objective was to keep Grenada from drifting into the Cuban orbit. That was not to happen. By the end of March, Bishop appeared to be in full control of the island, established diplomatic relations with Cuba, and accepted Cuban arms, medical personnel, donations of fishing boats, scholarships for Grenadian students to study in Cuba, and technical advisors. Cuba’s most important contribution was with the construction of an airport at Point Salinas. Bishop also publicly denounced the United States. In a pivotal speech on April ¡3, ¡979, Bishop attacked the United States for attempting to steer Grenada from linkages to Cuba. For the remainder of its time in o‡ce, the Carter administration worked with the Eastern Caribbean nations in hopes of influencing the direction of Bishop’s government. Critics argued that it would prove fruitless because Bishop was committed to his Cuban strategy. The Reagan administration, from its start, placed Grenada in the Cuban orbit. In a November ¡98¡ report, the State Department emphasized the Bishop-Castro connection. By the summer of ¡982, the Department asserted that Grenada was a Cuban proxy. By this time Grenada had received Soviet and Eastern European economic assistance and military hardware. The extent of the latter was not known. Reagan and his spokesmen publicly described Bishop as a Marxist and claimed that the airport at Port Salinas would not be used to ferry Cuban troops to Africa but to serve as a base for Soviet planes to threaten U.S. interests in the Caribbean region. To the Reagan administration the communist threat was a real one, but there needed to be a pretext to take action against Grenada. The ouster of Bishop on October ¡3,¡983 and his assassination on October ¡8, ¡983, by a more-radical element of the New Jewell Movement provided the administration its opportunity. On October 2¡, ¡983, the White House authorized a military operation against Grenada, ostensibly to remove U.S. students enrolled at a local medical school whose secu-

Gresham rity was allegedly threatened by conditions on the island. As “Operation Urgent Fury” proceeded, however, the administration focused upon the potential threat posed by the completion of the Point Salinas airport. The U.S. government then reported that some ¡,600 Cuban troops were on the island, along with caches of Eastern European–made arms. Both assertions drew heavy criticism within the United States, as did Reagan’s claims about the use of the airport. Subsequently, it was verified that 748 Cuban nationals were on the island prior to the attack and that only 43 were military personnel. After ¡990, Cuba reestablished diplomatic relations with Grenada and supported several civil projects. In ¡997, Grenada’s prime minister Keith Mitchell visited Cuba, and a year later, Castro reciprocated. However, the United States gave scant attention to these events. See also Reagan, Ronald R.; Schultz, George P.

Gresham, Walter Q. (¡832–¡895) A native of Indiana and an accomplished lawyer, Gresham, helped to establish the state’s Republican Party in ¡856, after which he became active in state politics. After failing to gain the party’s presidential nomination in ¡884 and ¡888, he supported Democratic candidate Grover Cleveland in ¡892. Although Gresham had little experience with foreign policy, Cleveland appointed Gresham secretary of state in ¡893, a position he held until his death on May 28, ¡895. An avowed anti-expansionists, Gresham advised Cleveland against the annexation of Hawaii and to avoid the Cuban insurrection that began in ¡895. The ¡894 Wilson-Gorman Tari› cancelled President Benjamin Harrison’s reciprocity arrangement with Spain, which also included Cuba. The cancellation confirmed the Republicans’ worst fears. Spanish customs o‡cers in Cuba immediately began to levy the maximum rate on U.S. imports. Gresham protested this action as unjustly discrimina-

Guantánamo Naval Base tory. Only after six months of di‡cult negotiations with Spain did Gresham secure mostfavored-nation status for U.S. goods entering Cuba. When the Cuban insurrection commenced in early ¡895, Gresham pursued a hands-o› policy. Preferring to remain friends with Spain, Gresham advocated the strict enforcement of U.S. neutrality laws and advised at least one would-be American filibuster to “remain at home” because the “government of the United States could not shield you from punishment.” Gresham was more sensitive regarding U.S. rights on the high seas. On March 8, ¡895, when a Spanish ship fired upon the American merchantman the Allianca as it sailed between Cuba and Haiti, Gresham demanded that the Spanish government provide “a full disavowal of the unauthorized act and an expression of regret” and to immediately issue orders for its navy not to interfere with legitimate U.S. merchant activities in the Caribbean region.” Graham’s harsh words won the praise of the U.S. jingoists, but they did not elicit a prompt Spanish response. Only subsequent notes, less o›ensive in nature, brought a satisfactory response. See also Cleveland, Grover S.

Guantánamo Naval Base Guantánamo Naval Base is a 45-squaremile facility located on Cuba’s southeast coast in Oriente Province. It is the oldest U.S. overseas base and the only one located in a communist country. The United States received the right to acquire a naval base or bases in Article 7 of the ¡902 Platt Amendment, but it did not specify any location(s) in particular. Already suspicious of U.S. intentions, Cuban president Tomás Estrada Palma insisted that Cuba be granted clear title to the Isle of Pines in return for the U.S. right to a naval facility. He also sought to curb the broad powers of intervention granted to the United States in the Platt Amendment. At Estrada Palma’s insistence, the February ¡903 agreement provided for Cuba’s lease of 28,700 acres of land and

90 water in the Guantánamo Bay area. The United States also was empowered with the right of eminent domain over the area in order to acquire private property for just compensation. While the United States recognized Cuba’s sovereignty over the area, Cuba agreed that the United States would exercise complete control over the territory for the length of the agreement. The lease could be terminated only by mutual agreement. A supplemental agreement provided that the United States pay Cuba an annual rent of $2,000 in gold. In addition, the United States agreed to pay for and to maintain any fencing around the site and that it would prevent the transport of any kind of material, merchandise, or military matériel from the base into Cuba. For its part, the United States agreed not to permit private commercial or industrial enterprises to operate within the base, but it could import, free of Cuban tari›s, all items necessary for the operation of the base. Interest in Guantánamo Bay can be traced to Christopher Columbus, who stopped there in April ¡494 on his second voyage to the New World. Devoid of Indians and gold, he left, never to return. Twenty years later, Spanish explorer Diego de Valásquez entered the bay to establish two small communities to provide support for Spanish ships plying the nearby waters. Although the Spanish government recognized the importance of the bay to the security of its Caribbean empire, it did nothing to develop the site. As an unused outpost, the bay eventually became a haven for pirates who preyed upon cargo ships transiting the Windward Passage. The British occupied Guantánamo Bay for four months in ¡74¡ during one of its many wars with Spain. The bay area never blossomed because of a lack of fresh water and an uninhabitable environment. Although the U.S. Navy long desired bases in the Caribbean region and the U.S. interest in Cuba can be traced to the early ¡800s, not until the ¡890s did U.S. policymakers recognize the importance of Cuba as a naval coaling station to protect national interests. Spokespersons such as Admiral Alfred T. Mahan

91 and Henry Cabot Lodge Sr. made the argument public. They pointed out that Cuba dominated both entrances to the Gulf of Mexico and would dominate the route between the Atlantic seaports and the proposed isthmian canal. The U.S. focused its attention upon Guantánamo Bay early in the SpanishAmerican War, when navy secretary John Long ordered Captain William T. Sampson to seize and occupy it as a coaling station. At the conclusion of the war in August ¡898, the navy’s General Board called for the survey of several Cuban ports, including Guantánamo Bay, as possible sites for a Caribbean naval base. In the final peace negotiations with Spain, the navy wished that the treaty granted base rights to the United States at Guantánamo Bay and Santiago de Cuba, but the ¡898 Treaty of Paris that o‡cially ended the Spanish-American War failed to do so. In ¡903, the Platt Amendment made only references to U.S. naval bases in Cuba because the State Department demurred, concerned that any land grants would only further infuriate Cuban nationalism, thus, the separate agreement was made on Guantánamo Bay in July ¡903. From the start, the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay incited Cuban nationalism. In ¡9¡2 and again in ¡9¡6, U.S. troops left the base to protect U.S. sugar properties during Cuban political unrest. To Cuban nationalists, these actions only verified U.S. imperial designs upon the island. Beginning in ¡907 and down through the ¡950s, the U.S. Navy’s determination to expand the base boundaries for security reasons met fierce Cuban resistance. Even cooperative presidents like Fulgencio Batista understood that the Cuban Congress would not approve any agreement that granted the United States additional Cuban territory. The lack of a su‡cient water supply militated against the full development of Guantánamo Bay. The land surrounding the base is semi-arid and annual rainfall is approximately 25 inches. The base’s only well was destroyed by U.S. troops in ¡898 out of fear that the Spanish had poisoned it. E›orts at drilling

Guantánamo Naval Base artesian wells failed, leaving the navy to purchase water in Cuba and ship it to the base a most costly and unsatisfactory operation. The subsequent construction of a distilling plant and reservoir failed to meet the navy’s needs. When the Atlantic Fleet concentrated in Guantánamo Bay, water barges worked day and night to bring in five to eight million gallons per month. By ¡932, the navy became desperate over the base’s water supply. The need led to long and complex negotiations with the Cuban government that resulted in an agreement in ¡940. For $¡4,000 annually, Mr. Henri Schueg, president of the Bacardi Rum Company, received a contract to supply the base with 3 million gallons of water from his pumping stations on the Yatares River twelve miles away. In addition to practical issues, Cuban nationalists increasingly demanded the termination of the Platt Amendment and the U.S. withdrawal from Guantánamo Bay. The protests reached a high-water mark during the brief presidency of Ramón Grau San Martín in ¡933 when he announced the abrogation of the Platt Amendment. The combination of Cuban nationalism and the emergence of the U.S. Good Neighbor policy led to a new U.S.–Cuban Permanent Treaty in ¡934 that terminated the Platt Amendment and provided for the continued U.S. lease of Guantánamo Bay. Fidel Castro’s guerrilla warfare to oust Batista brought new concerns about water supplies to Guantánamo Bay. Base commanders feared that the rebels would cut the water supply because of the U.S. support of Batista, even after the ¡958 arms embargo. Castro falsely charged that Batista’s air force flew from the base for attacks upon rebel positions and that the United States supplied Batista’s army through the base. To halt the alleged arms shipments, in June ¡958, Raúl Castro ordered the capture and detention of twenty-seven citizens, including ¡¡ U.S. marines returning to the base from Guantánamo City. Only after the State Department issued a statement that it was not supplying Batista’s army or permitting his air force to use the base did Fidel Cas-

Guantánamo Naval Base tro order the release of the men. In July ¡958, Castro won another public relations victory. In early July, Batista asserted that the need for army troops elsewhere necessitated the withdrawal of those guarding the Yateres River pumping stations. When U.S. marines were dispatched to protect the Guantánamo Base water supply, Castro asserted that the stationing of marines at Yatares illustrated Batista’s determination to bring the United States into the conflict on his side. Despite the rhetoric, there were no confrontations; subsequently, the marines were withdrawn. Castro did not interfere with the pumping stations out of fear that the United States might retaliate against him and the Cuban workers on the base who served as a source of supply for his rebel forces.

Water Crisis On February 6, ¡964, Fidel Castro ordered the water supply cut o› to the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo in retaliation for the seizure by the U.S. Coast Guard of four Cuban fishing boats and their 38 crewmen in territorial waters o› the Florida Coast. The Cuban boats were seized o› the Dry Tortugas on January 28, ¡964, a small island group 65 miles from Key West, Florida, and taken to that city and turned over to Florida authorities. The Cubans were charged with violating a ¡963 state law that barred fishing in state waters without a license and prohibited the issuance of such licenses to citizens of communist countries. Charging the United States with kidnapping, Castro attempted to have the matter considered by the United Nations Security Council. Instead, the problem was resolved in Key West. Seven crewmen were released immediately because they were under the age of ¡7. Eventually two were granted political asylum in the United States. The remaining 29 sailed for home after being found guilty of violating Florida law and having their $500 fines paid by a representative of the Czechoslovakia Embassy in Washington. The Johnson administration reasoned that Castro was influenced by events in Panama, where student demonstrations had

92 brought world attention to the U.S. possession of the Panama Canal Zone. By parallel, U.S. policymakers concluded that Castro hoped to use the water crisis to illustrate the alleged illegal U.S. occupation of Guantánamo. The U.S. response was swift. On orders from President Johnson, U.S. o‡cials on the base immediately dismissed more than 600 Cuban workers on the base. Desalination ships brought water to the base until plants could be constructed. When completed in December ¡964, the desalination plants produced 3.4 million gallons of water and 800,000 kilowatts of electricity daily. The resolution of the crisis had costly repercussions on both sides. The economic loss to Cuba proved significant. In addition to the $¡4,000 annual payment for water, lost wages totaled approximately $¡.2 million annually in U.S. dollars. For the United States, the cost of producing desalinated water was seven times higher than what it had paid to Cuba and, it also had to import skilled labor at higher wages than those paid to the displaced Cuban workers. After taking power in ¡959, Castro repeatedly asserted that he would reunite Guantánamo Bay to the nation. His opportunity came in February ¡964 when, in retaliation for the U.S. seizure of Cuban fishermen in Florida waters, he cut o› the water supply to the base.

Additional Uses of the Base After ¡964, Castro made several gestures to spark an international debate, focusing upon the legality of the U.S. presence in Guantánamo; nothing materialized. During the same time period tension was escalated by harassing incidents instigated by Americans and Cubans alike along the fence line separating the base from Cuba. During the Carter, Reagan, and George H.W. Bush administrations the United States conducted military maneuvers on the base and nearby waters, actions interpreted in Havana as threats to Cuban sovereignty. The U.S. naval maneuvers carried out in the spring of ¡990 most alarmed Fidel Castro, who charged that

93 they were a prelude to an invasion of Cuba, particularly as the cold war was coming to an end. The Soviets failed in their attempt in ¡99¡ to link the withdrawal of their troops from the island to a U.S. withdrawal from Guantánamo. Following the end of the Cold War, Guantánamo served another purpose. It became a temporary home to some 45,000 Haitian and Cuban refugees between August ¡994 and September ¡996. In anticipation of a continued crisis in Haiti that had caused the exodus and Castro’s policies that prompted the balseros (rafters) to flee his country, the Pentagon directed the construction of housing for up to 60,000 refugees. In an e›ort to embarrass the United States in the international community, Castro described the refugee camps in Guantánamo as concentration camps, complete with barbed wire, inadequate water and sewerage facilities, and mistreatment of the émigrés by U.S. military personnel. The last of the émigrés left the base on January 3¡, ¡996. Thereafter, approximately 40 Haitian or Cuban migrants captured at sea each month by the U.S. Coast Guard were deposited at Guantánamo until their repatriation. As the United States commenced its war against international terrorists in late 200¡, an estimated 400 suspected Al Qaeda terrorists were held in Guantánamo. The end of the Cold War in ¡99¡ contributed to a debate in the United States regarding the continued need for the naval base at Guantánamo. Some argued that the base lost its military significance because of changing military technology. Others asserted that it was still needed for U.S. security interests in the Caribbean region, including the interdiction of drugs enroute from South America to the U.S. mainland. See also Balsero Crisis; Bush, George W.; Cuban Americans; Johnson, Lyndon B.; Platt Amendment; Treaties: Isle of Pines Treaty, Treaty of ¡934

Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (¡928–¡967) A native of Argentina where he earned a medical degree, Guevara became one of Cas-

Guevara tro’s most trusted confidants during the early days of the Cuban revolution. Influenced by the writings of Chilean communist Pablo Neruda, Che (the Argentine equivalent of “pal”) traveled extensively throughout Latin America before leaving his home country for good in ¡953. He first settled in Guatemala, where he supported the reformist regime of Jacobo Arbenz until its overthrow by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in ¡954. Che eventually made his way to Mexico, where he teamed up with the Castro brothers to plot their return to Cuba in an e›ort to oust dictator Fulgencio Batista. Guevara returned to Cuba with them in December ¡956 and subsequently commanded one of the guerrilla units. He was among the first revolutionaries to arrive in Havana in January ¡959. Guevara shaped the revolution’s early economic policies in his capacities as director of the Industrial Department of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, president of the National Bank of Cuba, and minister of industry. He initiated central economic planning that required extensive state ownership of productive enterprises, but his plan for the rapid industrialization of Cuba failed. He sought to create a “New Socialist Man” dedicated to the revolution and motivated by moral rather than material rewards. He hoped to eventually abolish the use of money. By ¡965, however, Guevara’s influence began to wane, for reasons yet to be fully explained. He also conducted diplomatic missions to the Soviet Union and to Africa, where Cuba was soon to become involved. Some analysts argue that he and Fidel drifted apart, others point to the failure of his economic policies, and still others suggest that Guevara left in order to initiate a revolution in Latin America. Guevara focused upon Bolivia, where he hoped to stir the impoverished and politically ostracized Indian groups into a revolution. However, the e›ort failed for several reasons. Bolivian communists distanced themselves from Guevara. Reportedly Castro gave little, if any assistance, to Guevara’s guerrilla band and apparently failed to extract him from Bolivia as the CIA

Guggenheim provided information to the Bolivian army to help track him down. On October 8, ¡967, Guevara was captured and, a day later, executed by his captors. His body remained buried in an unmarked site until ¡997, when it was recovered and returned to Cuba for a hero’s interment. See also Castro Ruz, Fidel; Revolution

Guggenheim, Harry F. (¡890–¡97¡) Guggenheim was ambassador to Cuba from ¡929 to ¡932. A native of New Jersey, and the son of mining tycoon Daniel Guggenheim, Harry graduated from Cambridge University’s Pembroke College in ¡9¡3. Young Guggenheim worked in the family business, the Chile Copper Company, until he was appointed ambassador to Cuba. Guggenheim arrived in Havana in October ¡929 amidst increasing protests against President Gerardo Machado. Following an assessment of the situation, Guggenheim concluded that the protest against the president was due more to Cuba’s deteriorating economic condition than to Machado’s dictatorial conduct. Guggenheim interpreted the terms of the Platt Amendment to mean that the U.S. ambassador had the right to give informal advice to the Cuban government but not to interfere with internal Cuban a›airs. Accordingly, Guggenheim concluded that he should serve as an impartial arbiter between Machado and his political opponents regarding the questionable extension of Machado’s presidency until ¡935. Guggenheim attempted on several occasions to arbitrate between Machado and his chief political opponent Carlos Mendietta, leader of the Unión Nacionalista political party. While Machado was willing to compromise on the extended term of national legislators, he adamantly refused to end his presidential term before ¡935. Guggenheim also argued that if Cuba’s economic conditions improved, political opposition to Machado would dissipate. Toward that end, in early ¡930 Guggenheim presented to President Machado a series of recommen-

94 dations regarding Cuba’s growing financial crisis. Machado did little more than acknowledge them. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson did not share Guggenheim’s opinion regarding the giving of informal advice and, in ¡93¡, directed the ambassador to end his informal mediation e›orts. In early ¡932, when Guggenheim asked for a reappraisal of U.S. policy toward Cuba, he was sharply rebuked by Secretary Stimson. Until the end of his time in Havana in ¡932, Guggenheim believed that Machado knew that he was working without support from Washington based upon the perception that Cuba’s ambassador in Washington was privy to the State Department policy. Following his tenure in Cuba, Guggenheim returned to the family mining business, set up a family foundation, and supported many aeronautical schools across the United States. See also Machado y Morales, Gerardo; Stimson, Henry L.

Guiteras Holmes, Antonio (¡906–¡935) A young Cuban revolutionary of the “generation of ¡930,” Guiteras founded Joven Cuba, a nationalistic and anti–U.S. group that also advocated vast social changes. Guiteras served as minister of the interior during the presidency of Ramón Grau San Martín and was responsible for many of the social laws enacted during that administration. Guiteras stood as an anathema to those wanting traditional Cuban society to prevail. To the poor he symbolized the hope of a social revolution. Guiteras was among the leaders of the March ¡935 strike against the Mendieta administration, after which he was hunted down by Fulgencio Batista’s forces until May 8, ¡935, when he and a group of his supporters were killed at El Morrillo fortress on the north end of Matanzas Province. U.S. ambassador Je›erson Ca›rey described Guiteras as public enemy number one, who was nothing more than a communist and gangster. Ca›rey also claimed that the ¡935 general strike and Guiteras, himself, were decidedly unpopular with the

95 Cuban people. With the suppression of the March strike and Guiteras’s death, Ca›rey observed that Cuba had become a much more tranquil and happier place than it had been for some time. Ca›rey’s critics used these remarks as evidence that the ambassador did not understand the underlying reasons for discontent in Cuban society. See also Ca›rey, Je›erson; Grau San Martín, Ramón

Gutiérrez-Menoyo, Eloy (¡934– ) A Cuban revolutionary who battled against the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, Gutiérrez-Menoyo joined forces with Fidel Castro in ¡957. Subsequently, he became disillusioned with the Revolution and departed Cuba for the United States in ¡96¡. Being a social democrat, Gutiérrez-Menoyo was not well received by the ultra-right wing that dominated the Cuban exile group in Miami at that time or by the Central Intelligence Agency that was planning the Bay of Pigs invasion. He was detained by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service until after the failed invasion in April ¡96¡. Gutiérrez-Menoyo then founded Alpha-66, a militant anti–Castro group that conducted sabotage attacks upon Cuba from Florida bases. Subsequently, he established a base of operations in the Dominican Republic from where he left in December ¡964 to overthrow Castro. Captured by the Cuban army a month later, Gutiérrez-Menoyo was sentenced to thirty years in prison. Before his release twenty-two years later, GutiérrezMenoyo was severely treated for his refusal to be “rehabilitated.” Upon his release in ¡987, he first went to Spain and then returned to Miami, where he found himself out of step with representatives of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) on the best way to bring change to Cuba. In ¡993, GutiérrezMenoyo founded Cambio Cubano, which advocates a dialog with Castro and peaceful change from within as the only way to bring about a peaceful post–Castro Cuba. He also called for lifting of the U.S. embargo. In June ¡995, Gutiérrez-Menoyo visited Cuba and en-

Haig gaged in a four-hour discussion with Castro. Also, during the ¡990s, President Bill Clinton refused to meet with Gutiérrez-Menoyo largely because it would infuriate CANF. See also Cuban American National Foundation

Haig, Alexander M. (¡924– ) Haig’s positions include those of career military o‡cer, foreign policy adviser, and secretary of state from ¡98¡–¡982. Following his graduation from West Point, Haig served in the Korean War and at the Pentagon before his ¡969 appointment to the National Security Council by Henry Kissinger. Subsequently, Haig served as President Richard M. Nixon’s chief of sta› and as Supreme Allied Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Appointed secretary of state by President Ronald Reagan in ¡98¡, Haig was to play a lead role in restoring U.S. prestige and presenting a tough stance to the Soviet Union. Haig became the administration’s early spokesperson for charging Cuban connivance in the Central American civil wars. Haig viewed the alleged Cuban supply of Sovietmade weapons to the guerrillas in El Salvador as a violation of the ¡962 KennedyKhrushchev understanding. According to Haig, that agreement did not give Moscow and Havana the right to recruit, train, arm, and equip insurgencies elsewhere in Latin America. In ¡980 alone, Haig asserted that the Cubans trained ¡,200 Salvadoran guerrillas and used its good o‡ces to have the Palestine Liberation Organization train additional troops. In addition, according to Haig, the Cubans assisted the Salvadoran guerrillas in their propaganda war. To stop the alleged flow of Cuban arms to the rebels in El Salvador, Haig advocated regional military mobilization, something the Defense Department did not want to pursue at the expense of other strategic areas, such as the Middle East. Haig argued on behalf of strengthening the Salvadoran military to meet the challenge and to force the Salvadoran government to im-

Harding plement socioeconomic reform programs to benefit the mass of the lower classes. In the global context, Haig also demanded, through Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, that the Soviets and Cubans withdrew their troops from Angola if there were to be any improvement in their bilateral relations with the United States. Haig’s aggressive personal style ran afoul of many Reagan policymakers. As time went on, Haig found his advice rejected and himself outside of Reagan’s inner circle. The breaking point came in June ¡982 over the course of Lebanon policy, in which Haig later explained the president accepted a letter of resignation that Haig had never written. See also Africa: Cuba’s Military Involvement; Central American Conflict; Reagan, Ronald W.

Harding, Warren G. (¡865–¡923) Harding served as a Republican Senator from ¡9¡5 until ¡92¡, when he was elected the 28th President of the United States. Harding, who had limited interest in foreign a›airs before coming to the presidency, inherited from his predecessors the legacies of U.S. interventions in the circum–Caribbean region and, from the outset of his administration, determined to end this aggressive policy and replace it with one of diplomatic persuasion. Harding also maintained that less U.S. presence in the region opened the door to increased U.S. commerce with all Latin America. While he often set the broad policy parameters, Harding delegated implementation authority to his cabinet heads. With the exception of Mexico and Nicaragua, Harding left the implementation of Latin American policy to his secretary of state, Charles Evans Hughes. Regarding Cuba, Harding supported the Crowder mission in ¡92¡ because its goal would result in a better climate for U.S. banking and commercial interests on the island. In ¡923 Harding spoke forcefully for the ratification of the Isle of Pines Treaty. See also

96 Crowder, Enoch; Hughes, Charles Evans; Treaties: Isle of Pines Treaty

Hay, John (¡838–¡905) Hay served as secretary of state from ¡898 to ¡905. A journalist and author, Hay served as a U.S. diplomat in Europe after the Civil War. As a critic of European monarchism, Hay disapproved of Spain’s administration of Cuba and, as a result of the Ten Years’ War, believed that Cuba soon would be lost to the mother country and that at some point would be annexed to the United States. By the ¡890s he altered his view that all men had the right to attain freedom, concluding that the non– European world was not yet prepared for democracy. He also became a proponent of protecting U.S. capitalism. At the outbreak of the Cuban War for Independence in ¡895, Hay was in London as U.S. minister, from where he reported that Great Britain would not object to U.S. intervention on the island. Still, by ¡897 it was not clear whether Hay supported U.S. intervention. In January and February ¡898, Hay was vacationing in Egypt at the time of the publication of the Dupuy de Lôme letter and the sinking of the Maine, but he did not seem to adopt a bellicose stance against Spain. Instead, he applauded President William McKinley’s determination to steer clear of the conflict. Hay shared the U.S. public’s sympathy for the Cubans in light of the Spanish atrocities and policies on the island and, for that reason, seemed to accept that war was inevitable. When it came, Hay saw it as an opportunity to improve relations with Great Britain. By the time Hay was sworn in as secretary of state on September 30, ¡898, the dissolution of the Spanish empire had been accomplished and the machinery set in motion that resulted in the Treaty of Paris that was signed on December ¡0, ¡898. That same month, Hay concurred with McKinley that stronger U.S. leadership was needed on the island, and he agreed with the appointment of General Leonard Wood to replace General John R. Brooke as military governor of Cuba.

97 Events in Cuba during the military occupation (¡899–¡902) confirmed Hay’s view that the Cubans were incapable of self-government and therefore supported the Platt Amendment as a necessary insurance policy for Cuba’s future political stability. The events surrounding President Tomás Estrada Palma’s attempt to extend his presidency in ¡906 further confirmed Hay’s view of Cuba. Hay’s accomplishments as secretary of state were not based upon his Cuban policy but, rather, the open door notes regarding trade with China and the events leading to the U.S. acquisition of the right to build a transisthmian canal at Panama. See also McKinley, William; Roosevelt, Theodore; United States Occupation of Cuba; Wood, Leonard

Hay-Quesada Treaty see Treaties: Isle of Pines Treaty Helms-Burton Bill see Cuban Liberty and Democratic (Libertad ) Solidarity Act Hemingway, Ernest (¡899–¡96¡) A U.S. writer who lived in Cuba since the mid–¡930s until ¡960, Hemingway’s Cuban experiences led to three novels, including the best selling Old Man and the Sea (¡952). During World War II, Hemingway engaged in espionage work for the U.S. embassy. Owing to his wide contacts in Cuban society, he organized an operation out of his home that gathered information on Nazi activities across the island. With Ambassador Spruille Braden’s support, Hemingway outfitted his personal boat, The Pilar, and sailed o› the Cuban coast in search of German submarines. The e›ectiveness of Hemingway’s endeavors remains controversial. See also Braden, Spruille; World War II

Herter, Christian A. (¡895–¡966) Secretary of state in the latter part of the

Herter Eisenhower administration (¡959–¡96¡), Herter entered the Foreign Service following his graduation from Harvard in ¡9¡5 but lost interest in that career after World War I. Herter then pursued journalism, private business, and Massachusetts state politics, where his renewed interest in international a›airs contributed to his rise to prominence in the Republican Party. Herter became undersecretary of state in February ¡957, a time during which New York Times published Herbert Matthews’s essays portraying Fidel Castro as Cuba’s popular revolutionary. At the time, the United States treated the matter as an internal Cuban a›air, and by its recognition of Batista, the United States claimed that it did not express approval or disapproval of his regime. Over the next year, Herter witnessed the demise of the Batista regime, the U.S. withdrawal of support from it, and the State Department’s search for a compromise government. Herter also warned that the Cuban public would not sustain fraudulently elected president-elect Andrés Rivero Agüero. Given Ambassador Earl E. T. Smith’s close relationship with Batista, Herter convinced Eisenhower to assign a new ambassador to Havana when the revolutionary provisional government took o‡ce there in January ¡959. Philip Bonsal, Herter’s choice, was a career diplomat then serving in Colombia. Bonsal’s appointment signaled the administration’s hope that he could bring about improved relations with Cuba following Smith’s public criticism of Castro’s movement. Relations did not improve In the weeks following Bonsal’s appointment, Castro engineered the summary trials and executions of Batista supporters and other opponents of the revolution and, in the process, sensitized the Eisenhower administration against Castro. President Dwight D. Eisenhower was so disgusted with Castro’s behavior, that he refused to meet with Castro when he visited the United States in April ¡959, leaving the task to Herter and Vice President Richard M. Nixon. Herter’s report to the president focused upon Castro’s personality. Herter found

Hoar Castro immature, excitable, and almost completely ignorant about administering the a›airs of state. Herter mentioned nothing about Castro’s charisma, which proved so important in his leading of the Cuban revolution. As a result of their meeting, Herter supported those in the State Department, including Assistant Secretary Roy Rubottom and Bonsal, to be patient with Castro, waiting for him to come to grips with the responsibilities of leadership. Herter’s opinion of Castro changed as ¡959 progressed and Castro nationalized the economy, suppressed political opposition, ignored civil and human rights, and verbally attacked the United States. Like Eisenhower, William Pawley, and William Weiland in the State Department, Herter came to view Castro as a communist dictator linked the Soviet Union. Herter led the U.S.delegation to the Organization of American States fifth meeting of ministers of foreign a›airs in Santiago, Chile, in August ¡959 to address Caribbean tensions. While there, Herter pressed Cuban foreign minister Raúl Roa to have Castro meet with Ambassador Bonsal. Although complimentary about Bonsal’s approach to Cuban problems, Roa made no promises because of Castro’s busy schedule. Herter regarded the results of the Santiago meeting as a blow to Castro, while Castro denounced the conference as a farce and ignored its resolutions. By November ¡959 Herter became convinced that Castro was so anti–American that the United States would not be able to reach any accommodation with him and that the regime’s prolonged continuation would only damage U.S. interests throughout Latin America. Still Herter, Rubottom, and Bonsal wanted a cautious policy as evidenced in Eisenhower’s January 26, ¡960, statement of U.S. confidence in the Cuban people to reject the dangers of international communism. By this time, Herter was convinced that if Castro was not a communist that he at least had the blessing of communist governments and that only economic pressure would force him to change course. Although Herter did not believe that cutting the sugar quota, by itself,

98 would solve the Cuban problem, in June ¡960 he urged Congress to provide the president with discretionary power over Cuba’s sugar quota. Subsequently, Herter was pleased with Eisenhower’s decision that ended U.S. imports of Cuban sugar for the remainder of ¡960. Before leaving o‡ce, Herter made one last attempt to gain hemispheric support for the U.S. policy toward Cuba. At the sixth meeting of ministers of foreign a›airs in San José, Costa Rica, August ¡960, Herter labored for the conference declaration that condemned intervention or threat of it “even when conditional, by any extra continental power.” After the San José conference, chances for improved U.S.–Cuban relations worsened, as Castro continued his nationalization of U.S.–owned properties and Cuba drew closer to the Soviet orbit. Herter became one of the advocates for greater economic pressure upon Cuba and supported Eisenhower’s October ¡9, ¡960, trade embargo that applied to all commodities except for medical supplies and foodstu›s. At the same time, Herter concluded that U.S.–Cuban relations deteriorated to the point that Ambassador Bonsal could no longer function in Cuba. Herter called him back to Washington on October ¡6,¡960. The final break in relations came just prior to Herter’s leaving o‡ce in January ¡96¡. See also Castro Ruz, Fidel: Visit to the United States; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Organization of American States: Fifth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign A›airs, Sixth and Seventh Meeting of Ministers of Foreign A›airs; Pawley, William; Revolution

Hijackings see Air Hijackings Hoar, George F. (¡826–¡904) As an anti-imperialist Republican senator from Massachusetts, Hoar stood in opposition to the expansionist policies of his party in the late ¡890s. Hoar earned his undergraduate and law degrees from Harvard University and, subsequently, had a long political record

99 in both state and national politics prior to serving in the U.S. Senate from ¡877 until his death in ¡904. For two years following the outbreak of the Cuban War for Independence in ¡895, Hoar spoke against the congressional clamor for recognition of the insurgents. At the same time, Hoar applauded the e›orts of House Speaker Thomas Reed in resisting the interventionist sentiment in that chamber. While expressing sympathy for the Cuban rebels, Hoar argued that international law and U.S. self-interests precluded any armed intervention on their behalf. He favored any e›orts that would procure home rule (autonomy) for the Cubans within the Spanish empire. In early ¡898, Hoar’s confidence in the danger of U.S. intervention was shattered by the sinking of the Maine on February ¡5, ¡898. Unless the sinking was caused by an internal explosion, Hoar placed responsibility at Spain’s doorstep for its failure to secure the Havana harbor against any act of sabotage. As U.S. war fever intensified in March, Hoar continued to support President William McKinley’s final e›orts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. Hoar opposed the war because he believed that it would have an adverse impact upon the U.S. economy, bring a new wave of corruption similar to the one that followed the Civil War, and set the United States upon an ill-advised colonial path. Hoar expressed both disappointment and resignation on April ¡¡, ¡898, when McKinley asked Congress to empower him “to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities” in Cuba. Disappointed because peace could not be attained, but resigned to war as a matter of U.S. honor, Hoar voted for the Teller Amendment that denied U.S. territorial interests in Cuba. He supported the joint congressional declaration initiating the Spanish-American War but absented himself from the final vote on April ¡5, ¡898. Once war was declared, however, Hoar believed that all political division over U.S. policy should cease, as demonstrated by his automatic vote for all military appropriations legislation. As the war drew to its close in late July and early August ¡898, Hoar com-

Hoover menced a three-year crusade against U.S. expansion while, at the same time, professing loyalty to the Republican Party. He opposed the expansion-minded commissioners McKinley sent to the Paris conference. Subsequently, McKinley o›ered Hoar the ambassadorship to Great Britain, but the senator declined on the grounds that he would better serve his nation in Congress. Although both the president and Hoar denied the charge, at the time many observers thought the o›er was made to ensure that Hoar would be away from Washington when the Treaty of Paris came before the senate for ratification. In early ¡899, during the Senate debate, Hoar vehemently opposed the Treaty of Paris on constitutional and moral grounds, particularly regarding U.S. expansion in the Philippines. Hoar advocated the application of the Cuban model so that the Filipinos would eventually gain their independence and self-government. Regarding Cuba, Hoar found the Foraker Amendment in March ¡899 to be “eminently wise and satisfactory” because it denied U.S. economic imperialism. However, when the Platt Amendment was being debated, Hoar saw it as “a proper and necessary stipulation for the application of the Monroe Doctrine” that would enable the Cubans to be prepared for self-government and eventual independence while at the same time satisfying U.S. interests for the long term. See also Anti-Imperialist Movement; Foraker, Joseph B.; McKinley, William; Platt Amendment; Spanish-American War: United States War Resolutions; Treaties: Treaty of Paris

Hoover, Herbert (¡874–¡964) The 30th president of the United States (¡929–¡933), and is often credited with developing the precursor to the Good Neighbor Policy subsequently enunciated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Prior to World War I Hoover gained a reputation as an international engineer, and during the war he headed the Food Administration and War Relief Bureau. As secretary of commerce from ¡92¡ to ¡928,

Hughes Hoover charged that U.S. interventionist policies in the Caribbean region militated against trade expansion throughout all Latin America. He came to the presidency determined to change that policy, a policy initiative that was already being considered in the State Department. On November ¡9, ¡928, president-elect Hoover embarked on a ten-week, ten-nation, goodwill tour of Latin America. He promised greater U.S. friendship and cooperation with the Latin Americans. Owing to the Great Depression, however, Hoover did not devote as much time to Latin American a›airs as he anticipated, leaving much of the work to his secretary of state, Henry L. Stimson, who assumed a hands-o› policy regarding the corrupt and brutal presidency of Gerardo Machado in Cuba. Following his presidency, Hoover remained active in the public arena. In foreign a›airs drifted from an isolationist position on the eve of World War II to a moderate internationalist position in the early Cold War years. See also Clark Memorandum, Good Neighbor Policy, Machado y Morales, Gerardo;

Hughes, Charles Evans (¡862–¡948) Prior to serving as Secretary of State from ¡92¡ to ¡925, Hughes had been active in Republican Party politics and was its losing candidate to Woodrow Wilson in the ¡9¡6 presidential election. As secretary of state, Hughes had a close working relationship with presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge. Like those Presidents, Hughes had limited international experience, yet they shared many policy positions. During both the Harding and Coolidge administrations Hughes became the spokespersons for Latin American policy. He maintained that the Monroe Doctrine was an essential part of U.S. foreign policy and, accordingly, argued that the republics of the Western Hemisphere must be kept free from foreign encroachments. At the same time, he

100 did not renounce the U.S. right to intervention to protect its citizens and their properties in Latin America but felt it should be used only as a last resort. Owing to the security of the Panama Canal, Hughes had a special interest in the entire Caribbean region. Hughes viewed U.S. policy toward Cuba in moral terms. He justified intervention in ¡898 as necessary to free Cuba from Spanish oppression and the interventions since ¡903 under the Platt Amendment as e›orts to establish a democratic and financially responsible government on the island. Toward that same end, Hughes approved the Enoch Crowder mission to Havana in ¡92¡. To improve relations with Cuba and to enhance the U.S. image throughout Latin America, in ¡92¡ Hughes approved the withdrawal of a contingent of marines sent to eastern Cuba by President Woodrow Wilson in ¡9¡7, ostensibly on a training mission but in reality to protect U.S. railroad and property interests in the region. For the same reason Hughes favored the ratification of the Isle of Pines Treaty in ¡924. Following his tenure as secretary of state, Hughes served as chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. See also Coolidge, Calvin; Crowder, Enoch; Harding, Warren G.; Treaties: Isle of Pines Treaty

Hull, Cordell (¡87¡–¡955) Hull served as secretary of state from ¡933 until ¡944, longer than any other person who has held that position. From a humble background in Tennessee, Hull became a selfmade man, being admitted to the Tennessee state bar in ¡89¡. Subsequently, Hull led a company of volunteers that served in the occupation of Cuba following the end of the Spanish-American War in ¡898. Upon returning home, Hull became involved in Tennessee state politics and later represented the state in the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate prior to becoming President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s secretary of state in ¡933. As secretary, Hull was responsible for implementing the president’s Good Neighbor

101

Independence Movements

Policy in Latin America. The first application of this noninterventionist policy came during the “Sergeants’ Revolt” in Cuba in ¡933. At that time, Hull, along with Roosevelt, rejected the pleas of Ambassador Sumner Welles for intervention. Following Welles’s return to the State Department as assistant secretary of state for Latin American a›airs in December ¡933, Hull deferred to Welles regarding Cuban policy, which many interpreted as a continuation of intervention. Hull also was the architect of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement program, but he abandoned the most-favored-nation provisions when negotiating such a treaty with Cuba in ¡934. Instead, the Cuban treaty contained provisions for mutual tari› reductions, which Hull believed would restore trade between the two nations. It did not. Subsequently, the Jones-Costigan Act, a return to tari› preferences, and supplemental trade agreements in ¡939 and ¡94¡ restored a favorable trade balance for Cuba but also increased its dependence upon sugar. See also Good Neighbor Policy; Jones-Costigan Act; Trade Agreements: Reciprocal Trade Agreement of ¡934, Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡939; Welles, Benjamin Sumner; World War II

Negotiations began in the fall of ¡984 and ended with the December ¡4 agreement. The Reagan administration was quick to point out, however, that the agreement did not mean a change in his policies toward Cuba. In fact, when the United States turned on Radio Martí on May ¡9, ¡985, Castro used the event as a reason to terminate the ¡984 Immigration Agreement. In response Reagan proclaimed that any member of the Cuban government or Cuba’s Communist Party would be barred from entering the United States. In e›ect, the proclamation provided the authority to bar any Cuban, including artists, scholars, journalists, and students from coming to the United States. In July ¡986 Cuba linked the immigration question to Radio Martí. The Cuban government proposed to drop its opposition to the radio station if the United States permitted Cuban broadcasts into its territory. The talks lasted less than a day, as the U.S. delegation walked out of the session. In the fall of ¡987, the Cubans dropped the linkage, an action that led to the restoration of the agreement on November 20, ¡987. See also Reagan, Ronald W.; Balsero Crisis; Mariel Boat Lift; Radio Martí

Immigration Agreement of ¡984

Independence Movements

Signed on December ¡4, ¡984, the Immigration Agreement provided for the repatriation to Cuba of 2,746 exiles who were classified as “undesirables” by the U.S. government and for the orderly emigration from Cuba to the United States of 20,000 Cubans. The problem dated to the ¡980 Mariel Boat Lift that Fidel Castro used to ship a number of criminals and those who were insane to the United States. Ever since, Washington had sought their return home. Castro refused to discuss the matter until the summer of ¡984 when Jesse Jackson traveled to Havana and persuaded the Cuban leader to open talks on the subject. During the same time, the United States insisted that Cuba permit the out-migration of those Cubans who had valid visas.

For several reasons during the generation that the mainland Spanish American colonies fought for and won their independence from the mother country, Cuba remained the “ever–faithful island.” Because Cuba became the military center for Spanish operations against the mainland, the authorities on the island were able to maintain rigid control over the populous, brutally suppressing any independence e›orts. In addition, an estimated 20,000 emigrés, preponderantly peninuslares and upper class Creoles, escaped the mainland to Cuba where they reenforced the stagnant social and political structures. Further, unlike many local priests on the mainland, the lower clergy in Cuba did not instigate the masses, who were mostly nonwhites, against Spanish authority. Still, within Cuba since the ¡790s three

Independence Movements groups sought some kind of change. All groups, however, came from the white upper and middle classes. The reformers wanted Spain to grant greater local autonomy that would provide the Cuban landholders greater opportunity for economic development and participation in government. In contrast, the so-called annexationists sought an end to Spanish control of the island, and in its place most of them favored linkage to the United States, while others favored a connection to Colombia or Mexico. The third group, advocates of complete independence, represented the most radical thought of the time. While the reformers and annexationists feared the local black population and had the common desire to maintain white supremacy, the independentistas believed in a union between the whites and Cuban blacks for a common revolution against Spain and a more egalitarian society thereafter. While these three strands of thought characterized Cuban politics throughout the nineteenth century, the reformists were the most prominent during the generation of the Latin American independence movements. The few improvements made in the political arena and in commercial relations with the United States reached a high-water mark on April ¡6, ¡820, with the implementation of Spain’s ¡8¡2 constitution that elevated the colony to a province of Spain. The newfound freedoms were shortlived. In ¡823 the Europe’s “Holy Alliance” restored Ferdinand VII to the Spanish throne. He rejected the ¡8¡2 constitution and dispatched General Francisco Dionisio Vives to Cuba as governor. Vives’s brutal suppression of the liberal advances set in motion annexationists and independentista forces. Representatives of the annexationists groups operated in the United States since ¡8¡0, where they found a sympathetic audience in the southern states, whose plantation society paralleled that of Cuba. The independentistas came from Cuba’s Creole middle class and had closer ties to lower-socioeconomic groups. Encouraged by the mainland independence movements, members of this group

102 had traveled to the United States where there were inspired by the freedoms common to its society, but other than with a few northern newspapers the independentistas did not find a receptive audience. Throughout this period, U.S. southern interests were o›set by the U.S. government position that dated to the presidency of Thomas Je›erson. The government expressed no interest in supporting Cuba’s separation from Spain and, in fact, favored the opposite. President James Monroe confirmed the U.S. position in his annual message to Congress on December 2, ¡823. In what subsequently became known as the Monroe Doctrine, the president declared that, while the U.S. opposed any new European colonization schemes in the Western Hemisphere, it did not intend to interfere with existing colonies. Cuban annexationists and independentistas understood the meaning. See also Je›erson, Thomas; Monroe Doctrine

Colombia-Mexico Proposed Expedition Following U.S. president James Monroe’s pronouncement of the Monroe Doctrine, Cuban advocates of independence searched for new allies to support their determination to oust Spain from the island; they turned to Colombia and Mexico. Although Cuban agents had been operating for some time in both countries, and they received encouragement, advice on organization, and supplies to be used in the struggle against Spain, neither Colombian or Mexico was prepared to go further until late ¡824 following Simón Bolívar’s victory over the Spanish in Peru. At that time, Bolívar proposed using the threat of invading Cuba to gain Spanish recognition of the newly independent Latin American nations, and if that failed, Bolívar hinted at taking the battle to Cuba. During the same period, the Mexican government reached a similar conclusion. By mid–¡825, it determined that Spain should be driven from everywhere in the Western Hemisphere. Toward that end the Mexican government organized a military unit, com-

103 prised of Mexican volunteers and Cubans living in Mexico, to be united with the Colombian army and, together, make Cuba independent under their joint protection. A good portion of the U.S. press spoke on behalf of the e›ort, seeing it as a moral crusade to end monarchical control over Cuba and establish democracy on the island, a view not shared by President John Quincy Adams. For Adams, a liberated Cuba would bring an end to slavery, which, in turn, would result in a politically unstable government and end all chances for the Cubans to eventually gravitate toward the United States. Given this reasoning, in May ¡825, Secretary of State Henry Clay informed U.S. ministers abroad that the United States preferred no political changes within Cuba and that it remain dependent upon Spain. The Adams administration took three steps to implement its policy. First was an implicit threat of intervention when the Colombians and Mexicans were advised that the United States would not “remain indi›erent” to the dispatch of expeditionary forces to Cuba. Next, the administration attempted to persuade Spain to recognize the independence of Colombia and Mexico, thus removing a cause for intervention in Cuba. Unimpressed with the o›er, the Spanish government countered with a suggestion that the United States guarantee Cuba’s place within the Spanish realm. The Adams administration demurred, knowing that to do so would limit future U.S. opportunities on the island. Finally, the United States appealed to the governments of Russia, England, and France to pressure Spain into granting recognition to all its former colonies except Cuba, implying that a free and black Cuba would have adverse implications upon the British and French colonies in the Caribbean. The e›ort failed. Russia made a half-hearted and ine›ectual e›ort to influence Spain. France refused to interfere in Spanish a›airs. Britain o›ered a counterproposal whereby it, France, and the United States would guarantee the Spanish position in Cuba by publicly denying any interest on the island for themselves. Reflecting the U.S. unwillingness to become involved in

Independence Movements entangling alliances, Clay dismissed the British o›er. The failure of diplomacy resulted in an indirect threat to the Colombians and Mexicans in April ¡826: The United States would not tolerate an independent Cuba. This caused the governments at Bogotá and Mexico City to delay any action until after the Congress at Panama, scheduled to convene on June 26, ¡826. The Adams administration saw the Panama meeting as an opportunity to persuade the Latin Americans not to go to Cuba, the U.S. Congress had other concerns. Southerners opposed a meeting with representatives of nations that had already abolished slavery. Isolationists feared a possible entangling alliance. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee argued that U.S. interests in Cuba o›set any need to discuss the issue with other countries. Only northeastern commercial interests saw the Congress as an opportunity to check British interests in the region. Finally, after four months of debate Congress narrowly approved the sending of delegates to Panama. Secretary of State Henry Clay instructed them to inform the Latin Americans that the U.S. strongly opposed an independent Cuba or its transfer to another nation. Although the U.S. delegates did not reach Panama in time for the Congress itself, the Congress failed to reach a decision on liberating Cuba. Still, the Latin Americans blamed the U.S. threats as the reason for their nonaction. See also Adams, John Quincy; Clay, Henry

Colombian Plan On September 26, ¡872, Colombia’s foreign minister Gil Colunje sent a circular note to all Latin American republics and to the United States proposing joint action under U.S. leadership to gain Cuban independence from Spain and to abolish slavery there. The plan also called for Cuba to reimburse Spain for the loss of its colony, thus assuaging Spanish pride. By calling for Cuban independence, the plan ruled out U.S. annexation, a fact that gained European support. Colunje justified his action by pointing to the earlier U.S. e›ort

International Conferences to mediate an end to the Ten Years’ War and to President Ulysses S. Grant’s ¡869 annual message to the U.S. Congress in which he again o›ered his country’s good o‡ces. The Latin American governments approved Colunje’s proposal but awaited the U.S. response before making a public endorsement. Secretary of State Hamilton Fish torpedoed the plan. He was a›ronted by Colunje o›ering the United States as a mediator before consulting with Washington. Fish was equally aggrieved by Colunje’s description of U.S. mediation e›orts as a failure, suggesting that the Colombians would succeed where the Americans had not. The Colombian government attempted to revive the plan in ¡874 following the collapse of the Spanish Republic, but Fish again was unmoved. He had no interest in joining a Pan-American coalition to pressure Spain to do something contrary to U.S. historic policy interests regarding Cuba, specifically that it remain under Spanish control. See also Fish, Hamilton; Grant, Ulysses S.; New York Junta; Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Auténtico); Ten Years’ War International Conferences of American States

International Conferences of American States At the invitation of the United States, the first International Conference of American States convened in ¡889 in Washington, D.C. It resulted in the establishment of the Bureau of American Republics (known as the Commercial Bureau), which by ¡9¡0 evolved into the Pan American Union. Although the group intended to meet again, the delegates departed from the first convention without setting a date for a second conclave. Finally, in ¡899, U.S. president William McKinley suggested a second conference. Subsequently, the Commercial Bureau set the agenda and issued the invitations for the second conference that convened in Mexico City in ¡902. In this fashion, the institutionalization of the International Conferences of American States developed. The frequency of the sessions varied because of world wars, but four- or five-year intervals

104 were the norm. The recurring issues at these meetings included arbitration of disputes, hemispheric trade, the forcible collection of debts, arms limitation (in the ¡920s), and U.S. domination of the organization and its intervention in the internal a›airs of other nations. Beginning in the ¡930s, the United States insisted that the nations of the Western Hemisphere confront the possibility of foreign intervention, at first Nazism and subsequently communism. At first the organization feared that the United States would use the threat of external intervention to again intervene in their internal political a›airs, but the group came to cooperate against Nazism with the outbreak of World War II and against international communism at the ¡954 Caracas Conference. During this period, special meetings of foreign ministers were introduced to deal with emergency matters. When Fidel Castro became identified with international communism, Cuba was kept from the hemispheric organization for nearly ¡5 years. The following International Conferences of American States demonstrate the evolution of the above stated themes and the place of Cuba’s foreign policy regarding them. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Braden, Spruille; Ca›rey, Je›erson; Coolidge, Calvin; Gómez, Miguel Mariano; Good Neighbor policy; Grau San Martín, Ramón; Hughes, Charles Evans; Organization of American States; Truman, Harry S; United States Interventions; Welles, Benjamin Sumner; World War II

Sixth International Conference Havana, January ¡6– February 28, ¡928 The sixth International Conference of American States is often referred to as the Havanna Conference. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes led the U.S. delegation, and President Calvin Coolidge also addressed the convention. Coming into the conference, the Latin Americans were deeply critical of U.S. interventionist policies in the circum–Carib-

105 bean region. Despite U.S. e›orts to prevent a discussion of the intervention, a proposal by El Salvador’s Gustavo Guerrero brought the issue before the delegates. Representatives from the other Latin American states rose to speak against the ills of intervention, except Cuban president Gerardo Machado, who asserted that “intervention in his country was a word of glory and justice.” In response, Secretary Hughes delivered a strong defense of the U.S. interventionist policy, asserting that it was for the purpose of protecting the lives and property of its nationals and that the United States would not abandon the protection of its citizens. Given the U.S. opposition, the conferees agreed to defer any action on Guerrero’s proposal until the next conference scheduled for Montevideo. See also Coolidge, Calvin; Hughes, Charles Evans; United States Interventions

Seventh International Conference Montevideo, Uruguay, December 3–28, ¡933 At the seventh meeting the conferees adopted a formal document entitled “Convention on the Rights and Duties of States” that contained an article declaring that “no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external a›airs of another.” Furthermore, territorial acquisitions or special advantages gained by the use of arms, the threatening of diplomatic representatives, or other coercive measures would not be recognized. Finally, military occupations, or the threat thereof, were henceforth invalidated. In reality, the convention was an indictment of past U.S. actions in the Caribbean region, including in Cuba. In his opening remarks to the conference, Secretary of State Cordell Hull declared that he and his delegation had came prepared to denounce the past U.S. practices of intervention in the a›airs of Latin American nations, particularly in the Caribbean region. For the United States, the declaration signaled the implementation of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy and the be-

International Conferences ginning of a new era in cooperation among the American states. The Latin American response was so overwhelming that Hull abandoned his original intention to have the nonintervention pledge apply only to the Roosevelt administration. The Latin Americans were even more pleased when, at the conference’s closing session, Hull asserted that the maintenance of constitutional government in other nations was not an obligation bestowed upon the United States. In accordance with the established custom, the head of the delegation from the host country of the preceding conference, Dr. Angel Giraudy, chairperson of the Cuban delegation, spoke immediately after the welcoming speech delivered by Uruguay’s foreign minister Alberto Mañé and before Secretary Hull. After thanking the Uruguayans for extending the invitation at a time when only three American states (Mexico, Peru, and Panama) had extended recognition to Cuba, Giraudy used this opportunity to criticize the United States for its actions in Cuba’s internal a›airs. He described the presidency of Ramón Grau San Martín as a legitimate social revolution addressing the needs of the Cuban people, which were purely an internal a›air, a clear reference to the current U.S. nonrecognition of Grau’s government. Furthermore, Giraudy asserted that Cuba deserved international recognition because the Grau administration e›ectively controlled the nation’s political arena, had the support of the Cuban people, and was willingly meeting its international obligations. The “Convention on the Rights and Duties of States” had no immediate impact upon U.S. relations with Cuba. At the same time of the Buenos Aires conference in ¡933, the United States was interfering in Cuba’s internal a›airs. Policymakers in Washington and their representative in Havana, Sumner Welles and, subsequently, Je›erson Ca›rey, were encouraging Fulgencio Batista to move against the Grau administration, which Batista did in January ¡934. Analysts continue to debate the longterm application of the nonintervention declaration by the United States with regard to its

International Conferences Cuban policy. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Ca›rey, Je›erson; Grau San Martín, Ramon; Good Neighbor Policy; Welles, Benjamin Sumner

Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security Rio de Jameiro, Brazil, August ¡5–September 2, ¡947 Although the conference convened at the invitation of U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt to reexamine and perhaps strengthen the inter-American security system, the U.S. government had a specific agenda. In light of the growing German threat in Europe, Roosevelt wanted to organize a common hemispheric neutrality front in the event of a non–American war. The Latin Americans, including the Cuban delegation headed by José Manuel Cortína, were skeptical of the U.S. intention. They interpreted the U.S. e›ort at dealing with an extra-hemispheric threat as a vehicle to again intervene in Latin America’s internal a›airs. Thus, the Cuban delegation supported a rea‡rmation of the nonintervention pledge given at Montevideo in ¡933. At the same time of the conference, and in sharp contrast to the action of the Cuban delegation, President Miguel Mariano Gómez requested that Roosevelt intervene on his behalf to stop impeachment proceedings instigated by Fulgencio Batista. Roosevelt refused the request, and Gómez was forced from o‡ce. See also Gómez, Miguel Mariano; Good Neighbor Policy

Eighth International Conference Lima, Peru, December 9–29, ¡938 The Lima Declaration, as distinct from a treaty, pledged the 2¡ nations at the InterAmerican Conference, including Cuba, to unite and consult together in case of an outside threat to any of them. In light of events in Europe, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt had begun to prepare a Western Hemisphere defense program and dispatched Sec-

106 retary of State Cordell Hull to Lima to seek a hemispheric defense pact. Argentina vociferously objected, and other Latin American nations feared that the U.S. would use the possible war threat as a means to again intervene in the internal a›airs of the American republics. Under these conditions, the Lima Declaration was the best the United States could obtain from its neighbors. Cuba sent a ten-man delegation chaired by Juan J. Remos. The Cubans proposed three resolutions that were endorsed by the conference: ¡. a declaration against racial and religious discrimination in the hemisphere 2. a call to preserve all pre–European archaeological sites and that the Pan American Union foster studies to gain greater understanding of these ancient civilizations 3. a pledge that the hemispheric governments support the construction of a Columbus Memorial Lighthouse in the Dominican Republic to commemorate in ¡942 the 450th anniversary of Columbus’s discovery of America; and that the hemispheric governments donate papers relating to discovery to the Dominican Republic’s national library. The Cuban proposal that the American nations o›er to mediate the Spanish Civil War failed to receive the necessary two-thirds vote to be adopted.

First Foreign Ministers’ Conference Panama City, Panama, September 23–October 3, ¡938 Immediately following the outbreak of the European war on September ¡, ¡939, the nations of the Western Hemisphere issued neutrality declarations, but other problems needed to be addressed. At the encouragement of the United States, the Republic of Panama issued an invitation to the foreign ministers of the 2¡ republics of the Americas to meet in Panama for the purposes of finding a way to keep the out of the war and to consider the solution of economic di‡culties that would arise as a result of the war. Cuba dispatched a ten-man delegation

107 to Panama, headed by Dr. Miguel Angel Campa. The Cubans assented to the establishment of a 300-mile neutrality zone around the Americas and agreed to consult if should violations occur. The Cubans agreed to participate in the newly established Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee to examine and attempt to find practical solutions to economic problems caused by the European war. Throughout the conference, however, the Cuban delegation expressed greater interest in finding a solution to their sugar problems. Once the conference was over, the Cuban public appeared more interested in their economic problems than in the European war.

Second Foreign Ministers’ Conference Havana, July 2¡–30, ¡940 The meeting was convened as the result of the fall of France to Nazi Germany in June ¡940 and the concern that the Germans would use that occasion to occupy French territories in the Western Hemisphere. Just prior to the meeting, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had announced the U.S. intention to resist any such e›orts, and at the Havana meeting he wanted it to become hemispheric policy. The Act of Havana called for the establishment of the Inter-American Commission on Territorial Administration to be composed of each state that ratified the pact. The commission was authorized to establish provisional governments over threatened territories or states and to determine which states would exercise authority. The commission went into e›ect in January ¡942 following the Western Hemisphere’s entry into World War II, save Argentina and Chile. Cuban President Laredo Bru opened the conference with a forceful speech charging that the hemisphere was under Nazi threat and that a need existed to secure the hemisphere against that threat. The Cuban delegation fully endorsed the Act of Havana. In its private meetings with Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the U.S. delegation, the Cubans pressed for economic assistance given the loss

International Conferences of its European sugar market. See also World War II

Third Foreign Ministers’ Conference Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, January ¡5–28, ¡942 Within days after the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, ¡94¡, the ministers of foreign a›airs invoked the Havana Declaration of Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation that asserted an attack against one American state would be considered aggression against all and called for a meeting of the foreign ministers. Among the most important measures adopted at the Rio meeting included control of subversive activities in each country and the severance of diplomatic and economic relations with the Axis. Cuba wholeheartedly accepted these measures. Having already declared war on the Axis, Cuba followed the U.S. recommendations that called for surveillance of German citizens and sympathizers on the island. Some were deported to Germany or internment camps in the United States. Those who remained behind were restricted in their movements and had their mail read and civil liberties curtailed. German-owned businesses were put under government control. Despite the cooperation, U.S. ambassador Spruille Braden believed that the Cubans were lax in performing these obligations. See also Braden, Spruille; World War II

Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Solidarity Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, August ¡5–September 2, ¡947 At the conclusion of the conference, the United States and twenty Latin American nations, including Cuba, signed the American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, popularly known as the Rio Pact. This collective security agreement, permitted under Article 5¡ of the United Nations Charter, incorporated the principle that an attack against one signatory

International Conferences was to be considered an attack against all. By a two-thirds majority, the signatories would agree on the response to the aggression. The two-man Cuban delegation to the conference included Guillermo Belt, ambassador to the United States, and Gabriel Landa, ambassador to Brazil. Neither played a significant role in the conference discussions or the drafting of the final agreement that they signed on behalf of Cuba.

Ninth International Conference Bogotá, Colombia, March 30–May 2, ¡948 At this meeting, the representatives of American states adopted measures to strengthen the inter-American system, including the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Treaty for Pacific Settlement, popularly known as the “Pact of Bogotá.” Guillermo Belt, Cuba’s ambassador to the United States, chaired the Cuban delegation of the conference. While it approved the measures adopted at the conference, the Cubans concerned themselves most with the OAS charter provisions on intervention. Along with other Latin American nations still suspicious of U.S. hemispheric policy, the Cubans approved Article ¡5 of the OAS charter that declared: No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external a›airs of any other state. This foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force, but any other form or attempted threat against the personality of the state or against its political, economic or cultural elements.

Under U.S. pressure to complete a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation that, if accepted, potentially opened Cuba to foreign investment, the Cubans were not satisfied with this statement. The Cuban delegation wanted a more-precise statement. In deference to the Cubans’ wishes, the confer-

108 ees added Article ¡6 to the OAS charter. It states that: No state may or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another state and obtain from it advantages of any kind [economic] sanctions are prohibited.

The U.S. delegation pointed out that this was already covered in Article ¡5, but it was to no avail. The adoption of these two measures emphasized the broad nature of nonintervention and opened the door to charges of hypocrisy against any nation that potentially threatened another. See also Grau San Martín, Ramón; Organization of American States; Truman, Harry S

Tenth International Conference Caracas, Venezuela, March ¡–28, ¡954 This was the first such meeting held under the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS). The meeting convened shortly after the president’s brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, issued a report on his 36-day factfinding trip to Latin America in ¡953. While the report criticized both the United States and the Latin Americans for their strained relations, it concluded that economic relations were the key to better understanding between the two. As a result, at Caracas, the Latin American delegates had great hopes for a U.S.–sponsored economic development program. That was not to be. The United States came prepared only to deal with the threat of subversive communism to the hemisphere and to call for cooperation in ridding the region of the menace. The delegates understood that the United States had directed its attention to Guatemala, where it charged that communists dominated the government of Jacobo Arbenz. Subsequently, the ministers approved an amended resolution calling for consultation to consider appropriate action should a communist threat menace a country in the Western Hemisphere. During the general debate on March 3,

109 ¡954, the chairman of the Cuban delegation, Dr. Miguel Angel Campa, called communism “a violent and aggressive interventionist force” encouraged by powers from outside the continent with the intention of undermining the hemisphere’s institutions. Campa added that the communist threat was masked in doctrines that were irreconcilable with the “morale and Christian spirit of our forms of government.” Campa whole-heartedly agreed with U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles that communist subversion was a cancer already present in the hemisphere and that it must be stamped out. See also Organization of American States

Interventions see United States Interventions Isle of Pines Treaty see Treaties: Isle of Pines Treaty Jackson, Andrew (¡767–¡845) A military hero during the War of ¡8¡2, Jackson served two terms as president of the United States, from ¡829–¡837. When Jackson came to the presidency in March ¡829, he inherited several problems with the Spanish government. Most irksome was the lingering unfavorable trade balance with both Spain and Cuba. Despite an ¡825 pledge by Minister Edward Everett of his government’s support for Spanish rule over Cuba in return for a Spanish promise to open its ports to U.S. shipping, nothing had materialized by ¡829. At that time the U.S. imported approximately $8 million worth of Cuban sugar, co›ee, and tobacco, and exported nearly $5 million in goods, mostly agricultural, to the island. Of all the ships entering and leaving Cuban ports, nearly 50 percent were American, and they were sharply discriminated against by tari› rates and tonnage duties. The importance of Cuban trade was not lost on Jackson as he appointed consuls to the island during his pres-

Jackson idential tenure. In addition to the trade imbalance there remained open an estimated $¡ million in claims for damage to U.S. shipping done by Spanish warships during the continent’s revolutionary upheavals from ¡800 to ¡82¡. To address these issues Jackson dispatched Vermont governor Cornelius P. Van Ness to Madrid. He turned out to be a poor choice because of his impatience and imprudence. Van Ness received instructions to complete a new reciprocity treaty and resolve the claims issues. In an e›ort to persuade the Spanish government, Van Ness was told to remind the Spanish crown that U.S. pressure prevented the recent Mexican-Colombian expedition against the island and that it would do the same to discourage any European encroachment. In addition, Jackson o›ered to serve as mediator in the granting of recognition between Spain and its former Latin American colonies. Once in Madrid, Van Ness encouraged Jackson to take a more aggressive stance because of Spain’s weakened position caused by the loss of French support due to the overthrow of Charles X in July ¡830. At first Jackson ignored the suggestion, but continued Spanish reticence to negotiate prompted the president to suggest that retaliatory measures would be forthcoming. Although Spain reopened negotiations in early ¡832, progress was slow. While Jackson originally placed the shipping claims at $¡.2 million, and Van Ness at twice that amount, the president settled for much less. The agreement ending the claims issue, signed February ¡7, ¡834, favored the Spanish. The U.S. accepted $500,000 in Spanish stock, which in reality was worth only $380,000 in the European money markets. Although an agreement to lessen tonnage duties in Spanish ports was concluded in ¡832, Jackson was less successful in correcting port and tari› charges in Cuba. Even the threat to impose retaliatory charges against Cuban imports did not move the government at Madrid, which sorely needed the revenues to fight its ongoing civil war. The issue remained unre-

Je›erson solved well past the Jackson presidency. See also Everett, Edward; Independence Movements: Colombia-Mexico Proposed Expedition; Tari› Policies

Je›erson, Thomas (¡743–¡826) Je›erson was the author of the Declaration of Independence, a member of the Virginia state legislature, minster to France, and vice president prior to his own presidency from ¡80¡–¡809. Je›erson’s attitude toward Cuba shifted over time. As early as ¡793 he expressed annoyance with Spain’s restrictions on U.S. commerce with Cuba, an irritation that increased with passing time. With the U.S. purchase of the Louisiana Territory in ¡803, Je›erson came to understand Cuba’s importance to U.S. security and to commerce interests in the Caribbean region. He also was convinced that Spain would never permit free and unlimited trade between the island and the mainland, a thought that contributed to his ideas about acquiring the island. Two years later, in ¡805, Je›erson instructed the U.S. consuls in Cuba to watch for political events that might indicate a Cuban desire for union with the United States. At the same time, Je›erson cast a covetous eye toward the Floridas, even contemplating taking it by force and, in the process, possibly taking Cuba. With the imposition of French authority over Spain, in ¡808 Je›erson was visited by a delegation of Cubans requesting annexation to the United States in order to escape French domination. Je›erson took the issue to his cabinet on October ¡¡, ¡808. While the cabinet refused to commit the United States to the Cuban cause, it put itself on record as strongly opposed to the island’s acquisition by France or any other European power, thus foreshadowing the ¡8¡¡ no-transfer principle, the ¡823 Monroe Doctrine, and John Quincy Adams’s policy statement. A year later, in ¡809, Je›erson dispatched General James Wilkerson to Cuba to sound out Spanish authorities and others opposed to

110 French rule about the possibility of linking Cuba to the United States. The Spanish authorities demurred, but the mission itself prompted the Spanish chargé d’a›aires in Washington to suggest that the Wilkerson mission was part of a grander scheme for the U.S. acquisition of Cuba and Puerto Rico. On the eve of his departure from the presidency in ¡809, Je›erson indicated that the United States would someday acquire Cuba. Later that same year, after leaving the presidency, Je›erson advised President James Madison to grant Napoleon Bonaparte a free hand in the Spanish colonies of Latin America in return for giving Cuba to the United States. Madison refused the suggestion. Je›erson never lost sight of Cuba. In ¡823 he wrote President James Monroe that Cuba would be the “most interesting addition, which could ever be made to our system of states.” See also Adams, John Quincy; Madison, James; Monroe Doctrine; No-Transfer Principle

John Paul II During his visit to Cuba January 2¡–25, ¡998, Pope John Paul II o›ered public masses in Santa Clara, Camagüey, Santiago de Cuba, and finally at the Plaza de Revolución in Havana. The pope also met with some of Cuba’s leading scholars at the University of Havana, representatives of the Cuban youth, and the seriously ill. His masses were well attended; during which there were only isolated cases of public dissent against the Castro regime. However, the pope did not disappoint those who anticipated his call for change within Cuba, criticizing the lack of civil and human rights and calling for greater political dialog. He also called for the Church to operate more freely within Cuba. The pope met privately with Fidel Castro and presented him with a list of political prisoners he wanted to see released. Pope John Paul also called upon the United States to lift its embargo and for Cuba to open itself to the world to and, in turn, the world open itself to Cuba. The pope’s visit

111 brought an estimated $¡5–20 million in hard currency to the country. The Clinton administration understood that the pope’s visit to Cuba would result in his criticism of U.S. policy toward the island nation. Thus, before the ponti› departed Rome, two Clinton emissaries visited the Vatican in hopes of convincing him to soft peddle U.S. policy and place greater emphasis upon the poor status of civil and human rights in Cuba. How much impact, if any, these overtures had upon the pope remains unknown. Certainly, within the United States a large segment of the Cuban American community criticized the pope for going to Cuba, asserting that the visit gave Castro an air of legitimacy. In Miami the pressure was so great that the archbishop had to cancel arrangements to rent a cruise ship to take Cuban Americans to Havana, not only to see the pope, but also to visit with relatives. The criticism of U.S. policy initiated a new debate within the United States about increasing humanitarian aid, particularly food and medicine. The three Cuban American representatives in the House of Representatives — Lincoln Díaz Balart (R.–Fla.), Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R.–Fla.) and Robert Menéndez (D.–N.J.)— asserted that there would be no softening of the embargo. In contrast, 600 members of the business community’s USA Engage organization, took out a full-page ad in the Wall Street Journal, charging that the embargo was outdated and that it was time it went away. Nothing of any significance happened. President Clinton, however, directed small changes. Building on the pope’s visit and hoping to reach members of Cuba’s civil society, on March 20, ¡998, Clinton announced the resumption of direct humanitarian charter flights; the resumption of cash remittances to relatives on the island, limited to $300 every three months; the simplification of licensing procedures for medical exports to Cuba; and the promise that he would work with Congress to determine the levels and timing of food donations to the Cuban peo-

Johnson ple. See also Clinton, Bill; Cuba Lobby; Trade Embargo

Johnson, Lyndon B. (¡908–¡973) The thirty-sixth president of the United States (¡963–¡969), Johnson was most noted for Americanizing the Vietnam War. Johnson was elected to the House of Representatives in ¡937 and to the Senate in ¡948 and quickly rose to prominence in the Democratic Party. Johnson served as vice president from ¡96¡ to ¡963. Although he traveled extensively, attended National Security Council meetings, and stayed current on issues, Johnson did not play a significant role in foreign-policy decision making during the Kennedy administration. After succeeding Kennedy in the presidency, Johnson asked Dean Rusk to stay on as secretary of state, and the two developed a close working relationship and shared common views on international issues. Johnson was in conflict with most of Kennedy’s other foreign policy advisors, who subsequently left the administration. For Latin America, Johnson appointed Thomas C. Mann as assistant secretary of state for inter–American a›airs on December ¡4, ¡963. Mann, like Johnson, was a traditional Cold Warrior and placed greater emphasis upon economic development than upon social development as Kennedy had. Still, in the end, the Johnson administration continued to fund and support the Alliance for Progress programs. Regarding Cuba, Johnson shared his predecessor’s view that there “would be no more Cubas” in the Western Hemisphere. In practice, it meant continuation of Kennedy’s policies, except for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) directed covert operations. Johnson’s hard-line stance toward Cuba was quickly revealed when, in February ¡964, he ordered the dismissal of Cuban workers in the Guantánamo Naval Base in response to Castro’s cutting o› the base’s water supply following the arrest of Cuban fishermen in Florida waters. Although some of the workers returned to

Jones-Costigan Act their jobs in Guantánamo after Castro relented, Johnson found other sources of water to supply the naval base. Johnson’s judgment about Castro and his revolution, contributed to his refusal to pursue Castro’s rapprochement initiatives in ¡963 and ¡964. Shortly after coming to o‡ce, Johnson called for a reassessment of the Operation Mongoose program. The reassessment resulted in the program’s termination by presidential directive in April ¡964. Johnson, however, continued the policy of isolating Cuba by expanding the embargo placed upon it. Johnson attempted to persuade western European and Latin American nations, Japan, and others to pursue policies that militated against shipping, trade and credit extension to Cuba. Although not totally successful, by ¡968 the Johnson administration achieved extensive economic isolation of Cuba from the western world. A predisposition to see Castro’s hand in all revolutionary, guerrilla, or other violent activities throughout the hemisphere contributed to Johnson’s determination to further isolate Cuba the in hope that it would contribute to the regime’s collapse. In ¡964, the State Department warned that Castro fueled the fires of violence in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. The perceived communist threat significantly contributed to the Johnson administration’s emphasis on increased military assistance to Latin American governments. In late ¡963, the discovery of a large Cuban arms cache on a Venezuelan beach served as the catapult to Cuba’s diplomatic isolation from the Organization of American States membership in July ¡964. It also revived discussions among Johnson’s policy advisors regarding the possibility of invading Cuba, despite Kennedy’s ¡962 noninvasion pledge. Initially, the Johnson team attributed to Castroites the ¡964 riots in Panama over U.S. ownership of the canal. Only when the CIA determined that the Castroites were unimportant and insignificant players did Johnson take a more amendable stance toward the Panama problem. In ¡965,

112 Johnson was quick to accept Ambassador John Barlow Martin’s charge that unless the United States intervened, communist elements would take over the government of the Dominican Republic. U.S. marines landed on the island in April ¡965. Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s disappearance from Cuba in early ¡967 caused concern that he was somewhere in Latin America spawning a revolution. When he was discovered in Bolivia, the CIA provided the Bolivian military with information regarding Guevara’s movements that resulted in his capture in the Andes Mountains in October ¡967. Despite coercive diplomacy, seven Latin American nations — Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay — refused to fully cooperate with the United States in isolating Cuba from hemispheric a›airs, largely for domestic considerations. Although Johnson’s Great Society Program, the war in Vietnam, and the domestic unrest at home dominated the his presidency, and the latter two forced Johnson not seek a second presidential term, his determination to contain Castro, if not bring about his collapse, mirrored the policies of his two immediate predecessors. See also Alliance for Progress; Castro Ruz, Fidel: Foreign Policy, Rapprochement; Guantánamo Naval Base: Water Crisis; Organization of American States: Ninth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign A›airs, Twelfth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign A›airs; Rusk, Dean; Trade Embargo

Jones-Costigan Act The Jones-Costigan Act of ¡934 identified sugar as a basic agricultural commodity under the ¡933 Agricultural Adjustment Act that authorized the secretary of agricultural to enter into voluntary marketing agreements with producers of basic farm commodities. Under pressure from domestic beet-sugar producers to restrict sugar imports, the secretary of agriculture used the Jones-Costigan Act to set the Cuban sugar quota at ¡.9 million tons, approximately half of the ¡922 to ¡93¡ average but slightly higher than that for ¡932 and ¡933. At the same time, President Franklin D. Roo-

113 sevelt lowered the Cuban sugar tari› from 2.5 cents to ¡.875 cents per pound, and since the ¡903 treaty granted Cuba a 20 percent reduction on its sugar entering the United States, the new sugar duty automatically was lowered from 2 cents to ¡.5 cents per pound. The Jones-Costigan Act combined with the Reciprocal Trade Agreement contributed to an immediate and significant increase in Cuba’s trade with the United States. Within a year Cuban exports to the United States jumped by 28¡ percent, but when sugar was removed from the equation, the increase was only ¡7 percent. Subsequently, the Cuban sugar growers pressured for increased quotas in the U.S. market. Critics also argued that the Jones-Costigan Act contributed to Cuba’s continued sugar monoculture and the failure to diversify its economy. See also Sugar; Sugar Acts; Trade Agreements: Reciprocal Trade Agreement of ¡934

Judah, Noble B. (¡884–¡938) Judah served as U.S. ambassador to Cuba from November 22, ¡927, until October 9, ¡929. A native of Illinois, Judah earned his law degree in ¡907 from Northwestern University. Except for military service in World War I, Judah practiced law in Chicago until appointed ambassador to Cuba by President Calvin Coolidge. He had studied Hispanic culture and history on his own for twenty years and came to the ambassadorship with sympathy for the problems of Latin America. Noble’s time in Havana coincided with the beginning of President Gerardo Machado’s second term and at a time when the United States moved away from intervening in Cuba’s internal political a›airs. Judah removed himself from the increasing political opposition that frequently sought U.S. involvement against Machado. See also International Conference of American States: Sixth International Conference; Machado y Morales, Gerardo

Junta see New York Junta

Kellogg

Kellogg, Frank B. (¡856–¡937) An American statesman who served as secretary of state from ¡925 to ¡929, Kellog came from a rural upbringing in New York and Minnesota. With little formal education, Kellogg became a self-made lawyer who gained a national reputation for “busting trusts” in the early twentieth century. Subsequently, he served as a Republican senator from Minnesota and ambassador to Great Britain before taking over the leadership of the Department of State. Kellogg, who shared President Coolidge’s disdain for involvement in world a›airs, came to the State Department at a time U.S. interventionist policies in the Caribbean region were being reassessed. He rejected the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and asserted that the Monroe Doctrine was intended solely to deter European encroachments in the Western Hemisphere. Kellogg was in Havana in ¡928 for the Sixth International Conference of American States when former secretary of state Charles Evans Hughes justified U.S. interventions to protect U.S. lives and property. Subsequently, Kellogg claimed that the U.S. never benefited from interventions and, in fact, only contributed to the Latin American criticisms of the United States. Kellogg’s tenure as secretary of state coincided with the constitutional manipulations by Gerardo Machado to extend his presidency in Cuba. Kellogg’s refusal to intervene upheld former secretary Elihu Root’s interpretation of the Platt Amendment but left many Cubans with the impression that the United States approved of Machado’s actions. Following his secretaryship, Kellogg served on the Permanent Court of International Justice from ¡930 until ¡935. See also Hughes, Charles Evans; International Conference of American States: Sixth International Conference; Machado y Morales, Gerardo; Monroe Doctrine; Platt Amendment; Roosevelt Corollary; United States Interventions

Kennedy

Kennedy, John F. (¡9¡7–¡963) Before his election as the thirty-sixth president of the United States from ¡96¡–¡963, Kennedy represented the state of Massachusetts as a congressman and senator from ¡946 to ¡960. As president, Kennedy had an avid and detailed interest in foreign relations, often personally calling desk o‡cers at the State Department. Given the nuclear stalemate with the Soviet Union at the time, Kennedy saw the Third World as the main battleground of the Cold War. Throughout his presidency, the major foreign policy issue remained the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union. Kennedy gave little attention to Cuba until August of the ¡960 presidential campaign, when he began to make repeated references to Fidel Castro’s communist orientation and the danger faced by the Americas with the presence of international communism in the region. He blamed the Eisenhower administration for its “failed” Cuban policy by ignoring the Monroe Doctrine and permitting the communist penetration of the Western Hemisphere. Without clear definition, Kennedy indicated that, if elected, he would strengthen the anti–Castro forces within and outside Cuba. While Kennedy appeared determined to rid Cuba of Castro because Castro had betrayed the ideals of the Cuban Revolution, Kennedy’s definition of policy took place only after his inauguration in January ¡96¡ with the appointment of an old State Department hand, Adolf A. Berle, as head a special Latin American task force. The group’s recommendations focused upon the need to improve the socioeconomic conditions in Latin America, which eventually led to the Alliance for Progress. Two weeks after his election, Kennedy learned of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) plan for an exile invasion of Cuba, but for some time he remained ambivalent about it. The pace quickened after January 28, ¡96¡, when Kennedy directed the Pentagon to assess the invasion plans and the State Depart-

114 ment to secure Cuba’s regional political isolation. On the same date, Kennedy decided to accelerate the pace of clandestine anti– Castro activities, including increased propaganda operations, political action, sabotage missions, and continued air surveillance of the island. Throughout February and March ¡96¡ the administration focused upon the CIA’s invasion plan. With hesitancy, Kennedy moved toward its implementation on April ¡7,¡96¡, when a brigade of Cuban exiles landed at the Bay of Pigs. Without U.S. support, the invasion turned into a fiasco and the capitulation of the brigade within three days of its landing. Kennedy was rebuked by critics at home and abroad for interfering in Cuba’s internal a›airs, leaving the distinct global impression that the United States had not reformed its ways from the early twentieth century and that the Good Neighbor policy had passed into the night. Kennedy, however, was not apologetic. Rather, he made it clear that his sympathies lay with the freedom-loving Cuban exiles who were determined to oust the Cuban dictator and that his administration would act if the Americas were threatened by “menace of external communist intervention and domination in Cuba.” Committed to the removal of Castro, Kennedy pursued a three-pronged policy: sabotage of the Cuban economy, economic embargo, and political isolation of Cuba. In August ¡96¡, he approved the CIA’s plans to sabotage the Cuban economy in hope that it would lead to an internal uprising that would result in Castro’s ouster. Subsequently known as “Operation Mongoose,” clandestine attacks were made upon Cuban sugar operations and the country’s infrastructure. The CIA also sought to assassinate Castro. These operations continued until April ¡964, when President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered their termination. Kennedy worked for the expulsion of Cuba from Western Hemispheric organizations. Immediately after the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy had Cuba expelled from the secret meetings of the Inter-American Defense Board. Equally significant was Cuba’s expul-

115 sion from the Organization of American States in January ¡962, although it was accomplished with only the necessary two-thirds majority vote. In October ¡962, Kennedy’s handling of the Missile Crisis earned him high marks at home and in the international community. At that time, the Soviets had placed intercontinental missiles in Cuba, capable of striking at several U.S. cities. Kennedy’s special advisory group, EXCOM, devised several policy options. The president viewed military action as a last resort and preferred the use of a quarantine of o›ensive weapons into the island. A deal was subsequently struck with the Soviet Union for the removal of their missiles, which was accomplished without Fidel Castro’s full cooperation. Until his assassination in November ¡963, Kennedy remained committed to Castro’s removal from power. See also Alliance for Progress; Bay of Pigs Invasion; Castro Ruz, Fidel: Foreign Policy, Rapprochement; Kennedy, Robert F.; Missile Crisis; Operation Mongoose; Rusk, Dean

Kennedy, Robert F. (¡925–¡968) Robert Kennedy served as attorney general from ¡96¡–¡964, U.S. senator from New York from ¡964–¡968, and personal advisor to his brother President John F. Kennedy. He did not participate in the planning of the Bay of Pigs invasion, but following the fiasco Robert Kennedy became a chief critic of those who did, especially before the Taylor Commission that investigated the operation. During the October ¡962 missile crisis, he became a member of EXCOM that advised the president on policy direction. At the start of the crisis, Kennedy initially favored military action to take out the Soviet missile sites in Cuba, but the potential escalation that might follow caused him to become an advocate of imposing a quarantine upon the introduction of o›ensive weapons into Cuba. On October 25, ¡96¡, the president selected him to deliver EXCOM’s decision to Soviet Ambassador

Kissinger Anatoly Dobrynin. The Soviets must remove their missiles from Cuba under United Nations supervision, and in return, the United States would promise not to invade the island. Although the Soviet proposed that the United States also remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey, the proposal was rejected. Kennedy was instructed to inform the Soviet ambassador that their removal would be done at a later date. Kennedy demanded an answer the next day. This proved to be a diplomatic highwater mark, after which the crisis moved toward final resolution. Subsequently, Kennedy became an ardent supporter of Operation Mongoose, a Central Intelligence Agency plan to sabotage the Cuban economy and embarrass Fidel Castro, if not assassinate him. Always at odds with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, Kennedy left o‡ce to seek and win the New York Senate race in ¡964. Robert Kennedy was assassinated following his victory in the Democratic presidential primary election on June 5, ¡968. See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Kennedy, John F.; Missile Crisis; Operation Mongoose

Kissinger, Henry A. (¡923– ) Kissinger served as national security advisor from ¡969–¡975 and as secretary of state from ¡973–¡975 during the Nixon and Ford administrations. He became the architect of foreign policy for both presidents, largely because he and Nixon agreed on most issues and because of Ford’s international inexperience. Like Nixon, Kissinger viewed world events from the prism of a continued Soviet threat to U.S. interests. He placed Cuba into this perspective. After leaving o‡ce, Kissinger formed his own consulting firm and became a frequent public analyst on international events. In the mid–¡970s, given the assault on U.S. policy of isolating Cuba both at home and abroad, Kissinger initiated secret discussions with Cuban o‡cials that he hoped would lead to a normalization of relations. At home an increasing number congressmen and senators,

Knox along with the business community, demanded an end to the U.S. embargo. Several countries in Latin America and Europe opened trade relations with Cuba, and there was a move in Latin America to bring Cuba back into the Organization of American States. To Kissinger, the normalization of relations with Cuba fit within the larger framework of détente with the Soviet Union and the opening of China to trade. However, the work was shrouded with secrecy. The operation remained the property of Kissinger; his personal assistant Lawrence Eagleburger; the assistant secretary for inter–American a›airs, Willam D. Rogers; and film producer and former Robert Kennedy confidant Frank Mankiewicz. Apparently presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford were not fully apprised of the project. The initiative began in late June ¡974 when Mankiewicz carried a short handwritten note from Kissinger to Fidel Castro regarding improvement in diplomatic relations. Castro assented. Over the next eighteen months several secret meetings were held in Havana, New York, and Washington, D.C., between Eagleburger, Rogers, and Castro’s personal emissary Ramón Sánchez-Parodi and sometimes including Nestor García, a member of the Cuban delegation to the United Nations. The U.S. list of topics for discussion included compensation for confiscated U.S. properties in Cuba, return of ransom money from hijackings, payment on defaulted bonds, release of U.S. citizens held in Cuban jails, improvement of human rights, and the need to do something about the former U.S. embassy in Havana that had fallen into disrepair. The embargo remained the primary issue for Castro. Each side made gestures to improve relations. For example, the Canadian subsidiary of Litton Industries was granted a license to sell $2 million worth of goods to Cuba and, subsequently, President Ford also approved U.S. subsidiaries abroad to do business with Cuba. On July 29, ¡975, the United States supported lifting the Organization of American States diplomatic isolation of Cuba. For his part, Castro repaid $2 million to Southern Airways from a ¡972 air hijacking. He also approved

116 family visits to Cuba from the U.S., and details were being discussed when the talks halted abruptly in February ¡976. With only limited documentation available, two reasons are given for the United States losing interest in continuing the dialog. The Cubans made two decisions that U.S. policymakers interpreted to mean that the Cubans were not interested in the normalization of relations. First was Cuba’s pursuit of Puerto Rico’s independence cause, followed by its commitment of troops to Angola. The Cubans o›ered another perspective: SánchezParodi explained that the revelation of the secret talks as the ¡976 U.S. presidential election approached would severely damage Ford’s candidacy. Discussions later resumed during the Carter administration, resulting in several improvements in the bilateral relationship. See also Africa: Cuba’s Military Involvement; Castro Ruz, Fidel; Foreign Policy; Ford, Gerald; Nixon, Richard M.; Soviet Union: Naval Base; Trade Embargo

Knox, Philander C. (¡853–¡92¡) A Pennsylvania native and successful corporation lawyer, Knox served twice as a U.S. senator from ¡904–¡909 and from ¡9¡7–¡92¡ and as secretary of state during the Taft administration from ¡909–¡9¡3. In the latter capacity, Knox managed the administration’s policy of “dollar diplomacy,” designed to expand U.S. economic penetration abroad while serving U.S. security interests. His desire for Latin American political stability led to the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua in ¡9¡2. See also Dollar Diplomacy, Taft, William Howard

Lansing, Robert (¡864–¡928) Secretary of state from ¡9¡5 to ¡920, Lansing was the son-in-law of former secretary of state John W. Foster and an uncle to future secretary of state John Foster Dulles. Prior to joining the State Department as a counselor in ¡9¡4, Lansing practiced law in his hometown

117 of Watertown, New York, was a founder of the American Society for International Law, and served as a U.S. representative before numerous international tribunals. Although committed to internationalism and to U.S. participation in the League of Nations, Lansing did not enjoy President Woodrow Wilson’s confidence because the more-idealistic Wilson preferred a greater hand in foreign policy. However, Lansing was considered a good administrator who would follow the presidential lead. Lansing understood that the Monroe Doctrine was intended against potential European intervention, which by the early twentieth century included economic penetration. The outbreak of World War I in ¡9¡4 turned Lansing’s attention to the German threat to U.S. political and economic interests throughout the Caribbean region and, ultimately, to the security of the Panama Canal. Initially, Lansing was satisfied that Cuba had followed the U.S. lead in ¡9¡4 in declaring its neutrality. As the United States prepared to enter the war in March ¡9¡7, however, Lansing fretted that Cuba’s continued neutrality would prevent the U.S. use of its ports for warships and that the Germans might instigate political rebellion against the United States. Thus, for security purposes, Lansing concluded that Cuba should follow the United States in declaring war against Germany. The Cuban government did so on April 7, ¡9¡7, the day after the U.S. entered the conflict. By extension, Lansing’s definition of foreign threats meant that he supported the Platt Amendment regarding Cuba. Lansing applied the Platt Amendment when he confronted President Mario G. Menocal’s determination to remain in the presidency in ¡9¡6. When the opposition Liberal Party protest led to an insurrection in eastern Cuba, Lansing obtained Wilson’s approval to land troops in Santiago de Cuba and Guantánamo Bay, ostensibly as a wartime measure against what Lansing perceived to be potential German threats, but in reality to protect U.S. lives and property. The U.S. troops remained in eastern Cuba until they were withdrawn by President Warren G. Harding in ¡92¡.

Lee Following his resignation as secretary of state in ¡920, Lansing practiced international law in Washington, D.C. See also Menocal, Mario García; Platt Amendment; Woodrow, Wilson; World War I

Laredo Bru, Federico (¡875–¡946) President of Cuba from ¡936 to ¡940 and a veteran of the Cuban War for Independence, Laredo Bru practiced law and was active in politics until his election as vice president in January ¡936 under Miguel Mariano Gómez. Throughout his presidency Bru was compliant to the wishes of Fulgencio Batista, and he worked to ensure Batista’s presidential election in ¡940. As the Cuban economy slowed in ¡938, Laredo Bru cut government expenditures, an action that only intensified the political opposition. To stem this tide, Laredo Brú, with Batista’s blessing, announced that elections for a constituent assembly would soon be forthcoming. Having earlier defaulted on debts to U.S. bondholders, the Cuban government could not expect U.S. financial assistance. Laredo Bru remained in the background as Batista dealt directly with the U.S. government until the conclusion of two new trade reciprocity treaty in ¡939 and ¡94¡. Laredo Bru helped to mediate conflicts between the competing political factions before the July ¡940 elections of constituent assembly, which in turn elected Batista president of Cuba. That same month, Laredo Bru conferred with Secretary of State Cordell Hull during the Havana Conference, and as a result, the United States subsequently advanced a loan that enabled the Cuban government to satisf y debt obligations. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Bondholders’ Dispute; Hull, Cordell; Welles, Benjamin Sumner;

Lee, Fitzhugh (¡837–¡89¡) Lee served as the U.S. consul general to Cuba from April ¡896 until the outbreak of

Lincoln the Spanish-American War in April ¡898. Prior to his appointment to Havana in the latter part of the Cleveland administration, Lee, the nephew of Confederate war general Robert E. Lee, had been a one-term governor of Virginia and the president of a small Virginia railroad company. Predisposed toward the Cuban insurgents, Lee’s initial reports from Havana asserted that Spain would never grant meaningful political reform. Given the on-going military stalemate, Lee recommended U.S. intervention or purchase of the island. Cleveland, who preferred neutrality, rejected the advice. In late spring ¡897 when special agent William J. Calhoun confirmed the veracity of Lee’s reports on conditions in Cuba, the consul general found a more receptive audience in Washington. Lee’s report on the estimated 800 destitute Americans trapped in Cuba contributed to congressional approval of a $50,000 relief bill to provide for their repatriation that same spring. Lee’s descriptions of General Valeriano Weyler’s reconcentrado program were most damning. Although he noted the improvement in conditions following Weyler’s replacement by Ramón Blanco on October 9, ¡897, Lee recommended that the U.S. government encourage charitable relief for those still in the camps. A plan was approved by the McKinley administration, and although agreed to by the Spanish government, little private assistance followed. Lee did not think that the autonomous government introduced by Spain in January ¡898 would work because most Cubans favored complete independence. The Havana riots on January ¡2 against the new local government convinced Lee that Spain’s control over the island was near its end. He used the occasion to suggest that a combined U.S.–Cuban force could quickly accomplish that objective. The McKinley administration brusquely dismissed the proposal. Lee consistently advocated sending of a naval ship to Havana harbor, at first to demonstrate U.S.–government support for American private interests in Cuba, and later to stem the tide of anti–Americanism on the

118 island. However, Lee hesitated in late January ¡898, when the U.S. Navy ordered the Maine to visit Havana harbor. The anti–American demonstrations that Lee thought would accompany the ship’s arrival did not materialize. Following the sinking of the Maine on February ¡5, Lee reported its cause to be an external explosion and encouraged Americans to leave Havana. Subsequently, Lee placed responsibility for the incident at the Spanish doorstep. In April ¡898 Lee secured a delay in the delivery of McKinley’s war message to Congress so that he could make provision for the safety of American citizens in Cuba. Finally, on April ¡0, ¡898, with the final boatload of Americans he spirited out of Cuba, Lee returned to a hero’s welcome in the United States. See also Calhoun, William J.; Cleveland, Grover S.; McKinley, William; Reconcentrado Program; War for Independence

Lincoln, Abraham (¡809–¡865) A lawyer and congressman from Indiana prior to becoming president of the United States from ¡86¡–¡865. Lincoln came to the presidency convinced of a southern slave conspiracy; therefore, he rejected the Democratic Party’s interest in Cuba. With the outbreak of the U.S. Civil War, interest in Cuba waned, save the concern that Spain might use the island as a base for attacks upon the United States or that the Confederacy might use Havana as a port to acquire military equipment to prosecute its war. Lincoln was also concerned that the South, once it seceded, would demand the annexation of Cuba as a precondition for reestablishing the Union, a demand he would refuse to accept. By rejecting the Democrats’ covetous eyes toward Cuba, Lincoln indicated a return to the policy of John Quincy Adams: As long as Spain did not use the island as a base for attacks upon the United States, Cuba was best left in Spanish hands. His writings also indicate that he expected Cuba to become part of the Union, but Lincoln never indicated how or when that

119 might happen. See also Adams, John Quincy; Expansionism; Slavery

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Sr. (¡850–¡924) A member of a distinguished Massachusetts family, Lodge had a prominent career as a writer, state legislator, and member of the House of Representatives before joining the Senate in ¡893. In the late nineteenth century, along with Alfred T. Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt, Lodge advocated the “large policy,” which called for U.S. expansion abroad and the building of a formidable navy. Lodge understood Cuba’s strategic importance relative to the anticipated U.S. canal across the Central American isthmus. He also believed that the possession of Cuba would make the United States self-su‡cient in sugar. In enunciating an expansionist policy, however, Lodge was sensitive to public opinion. In ¡895, before the Cuban insurgent rebellion began, Lodge described Cuba as a “necessity” for the United States, and during a meeting in Madrid with the Spanish premier Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, Lodge left the impression that Spain must quickly suppress the damage being done to U.S. commercial interests on the island and bring the conflict to a successful conclusion or run the risk of U.S. intervention. Lodge also criticized President Cleveland’s hands-o› policies toward Cuba, a view that led Lodge to the erroneous conclusion that Cleveland sympathized with the Spanish cause. After the rebellion broke out, the Cubans demanded their independence, capturing the U.S. public’s imagination, Lodge altered his stance. Good politics put him on the moral crusade for that objective; henceforth, he denied that he had ever favored annexation of Cuba. Instead, Lodge proclaimed that it became “our duty to Cuba” to see it separated from Spain. A month after McKinley’s presidential election in November ¡896, Lodge supported a congressional resolution recognizing Cuban independence, which, had it been approved, was tantamount to a declara-

Lodge tion of war against Spain. As the war dragged into ¡897, Lodge concluded that Spain could not end the conflict nor e›ectively control the island in the future. This prompted him to believe that the United States ought to take Cuba, although in his public comments he spoke only of freeing it, not occupying it. Lodge was among those who believed that the Cubans were not capable of self-government. The moral highground — freeing Cuba from Spanish domination — remained at the forefront of his public speeches. As the year ¡897 progressed, Lodge lowered his rhetoric in response to three factors. First, the Spanish determination to end the conflict, as seen in Weyler’s brutal policy, left Lodge with the impression that Spain just might prevail. Second, he perceived that the U.S. public also began to lose interest in Cuba, despite the screaming “yellow press.” Third, his prediction that a U.S. war with Spain would have a positive impact on the U.S. economy earned him the wrath of the Massachusetts business community that strongly believed otherwise. From late ¡897 through early ¡898, Lodge devoted more energy to naval expansion and coastal defenses than he did to the situation in Cuba. Following the sinking of the Maine on February ¡5, ¡898, Lodge did not join the popular chorus demanding revenge. He preferred waiting for the outcome of the o‡cial naval inquiry. He may have been influenced by the Massachusetts commercial interests, which favored reparations over revenge. Privately, however, Lodge held that Spain should be held responsible unless the explosion was the result of an internal explosion. In April ¡898, when the Navy issued its report that placed responsibility upon Spain for the sinking of the Maine, Lodge feared a divisive congressional debate over the U.S. course of action and a national disaster if the president and Congress, both Republican, could not agree on national policy. However, Lodge dismissed the Spanish government’s report on the Maine as an insult to American integrity and slanderous to the U.S. navy men aboard the ship and described Madrid’s final proposal to

López end the conflict in Cuba as a dishonest e›ort to end the rebellion on American terms. Some have suggested that Lodge proselytized war in ¡898 and subsequently supported the Paris Peace Treaty that ended the conflict for his own political reasons. Regarding the former, Lodge feared that Republican inaction on Cuba would provide the Democrats with a popular issue in the ¡898 congressional elections, which in turn, would result in his ouster from the Senate. For the same reason, he advocated acceptance of the treaty. Lodge claimed credit for a Republican victory when the Senate approved the treaty on February 6, ¡889, by a 57–27 margin, one vote over the required two-thirds majority to ratify a treaty. Regarding Cuba, once the U.S. entered the war, Lodge opposed extending recognition to any Cuban government on the grounds that it would restrict subsequent policy options. With the outbreak of war, Lodge contended that the annexation of Cuba appeared inevitable, but that it should be organized as a territory until it was ready for statehood. Again, Lodge shifted positions during the U.S. military occupation period from ¡899–¡902, when he was easily convinced by General Leonard Wood of the Cubans’ political ineptitude and the need for the United States to provide the necessary tutelage as expressed in the Platt Amendment. See also Cleveland, Grover; Expansionism; McKinley, William; Platt Amendment; Treaties: Treaty of Paris; United States Occupation of Cuba; Wood, Leonard; Yellow Press

López, Narciso (¡797–¡85¡) A Cuban insurrectionist who had been born to wealthy parents in Caracas, Venezuela, López fought with the Spanish army against Simón Bolívar’s independence movement in Latin America. López subsequently accompanied the defeated Spanish army to Cuba in ¡823. There he married the daughter of a Creole planter. Over the next generation López rose to the rank of brigadier general, served as a colonial o‡cial in Cuba for the Spanish gov-

120 ernment and, acquired landholdings and mines. Owing to dynastic changes in Spain, López lost his political appointment in ¡843, and subsequently his business operations soured, both of which may have contributed to his anticolonialist attitude in the mid– ¡840s. Between ¡848 and ¡85¡ López directed four attempts to oust the Spanish from Cuba. López’s first attempt to sever Cuba from Spain came in ¡848 when he planned an insurrection on the island. He gained little support because the majority of Cuban Creoles feared that an insurrection would trigger a black rebellion against Creole rule. From their privileged Havana Club in Cuba’s capital, the Creoles favored annexation to the United States as the way to maintain the island’s established social order. To accomplish that goal, a delegation was dispatched to the Polk administration in Washington, D.C., to advise the president of the impending revolt. In turn, the Polk administration informed the Spanish government through its minister in Washington, D.C. The information enabled Spanish authorities to crush López’s insurrection in its early stages. Forewarned of the Spanish action, López hastily escaped Cuba for Rhode Island aboard the American sailing ship the Neptune. The Spanish captured and imprisoned the remainder of López’s insurgent force. In absentia, a Spanish tribunal condemned López to be shot. Before leaving the island, López committed himself to the Havana Club and Cuba’s annexation to the United States. Subsequently, the Havana Club and its counterpart in New York City, the Cuban Council (popularly known as the New York Junta), agreed to support a filibustering expedition from the United States against Cuba, but neither group was willing to entrust López with the leadership role. Still, López continued to plot on his own. In early ¡849 he met with South Carolina senator John C. Calhoun and other southerners who reportedly supported the U.S. annexation of Cuba. In the summer of ¡849, López moved his headquarters from New York to New Orleans, where he found financial supporters and volunteers for his expedition. By

121 mid–August ¡849, reports circulated that López’s army, in groups of 800, would sail for Cuba from Baltimore, Boston, New York, and Round Island o› the coast of Mississippi. Quickly, President Zachary Taylor called for enforcement of the nation’s neutrality laws and ordered U.S. naval ships to blockade Round Island. Again, a López expedition was terminated before it began, but López, his supporters, and his followers were not prosecuted for violation of U.S. neutrality laws. Following the failed filibuster, López broke away from the Creole leadership — the Havana Club and Cuban Council — but remained determined to organize a new U.S.– based expedition in the open and as a legal enterprise. López and his followers established o‡ces in New York City and Washington, D.C. They proposed to circumvent the ¡8¡8 U.S. Neutrality Law by sending filibusters out of the United States on unarmed vessels as supposed emigrants to California and Panama. Once at sea, the volunteers would be directed to an island in the Gulf of Mexico to prepare for the invasion of Cuba. The transparent plan prompted the Spanish minister in Washington, D.C., Angel Caldéron, to insist that the Taylor administration intervene. Although the administration instructed o‡cials in New York, New Orleans, and Washington, D.C., to increase their vigilance against violations of neutrality laws, the congressional debate over the subsequent Compromise of ¡850 preoccupied the president and the Congress. Discouraged by the lack of attention, López moved his o‡ces to New Orleans, where he again found greater sympathy and support, including from the governor of Mississippi, John A. Quitman. The public awareness about López’s plans increased the Cuban Creoles’ fear of a black uprising on the island and prompted its leadership to make another annexation appeal to U.S. authorities. The attitude of the Cuban Creoles would prove a significant factor to the future of the López expedition. In early May ¡850, López and 520 men slipped out of New Orleans and passed Span-

López ish and U.S. naval ships waiting for him o› the Cuban coast. The expedition landed at Cárdenas, Cuba, on May ¡9, ¡850. Although the filibusters seized the town, the expected groundswell of Cuban popular support did not materialize because the Creole sugar planters who dominated the region feared that López’s actions might incite a slave rebellion. With Spanish troops advancing on Cárdenas, López and his forces made haste for the United States, landing at Key West, Florida, just ahead of pursuing Spanish gunships. López received a hero’s welcome in Key West and other southern cities. A resolution was introduced in the U.S. Congress condemning the Taylor administration for attempting to interfere with the López expedition. This public sentiment contributed to the federal government’s inability to prosecute López, Quitman, and other filibuster leaders for violating the nation’s neutrality laws. Undaunted, López prepared for a third invasion of Cuba in ¡85¡. The operation was momentarily interrupted in March ¡85¡ when federal authorities seized the steamer Cleopatra in New York harbor and indicted John L. O’Sullivan and two of his subordinates for violation of the neutrality laws. The government’s action caused López to again relocate to the friendly confines of New Orleans, from which he and 400 volunteers sailed for Cuba in early August ¡85¡. His landing at Bahia Honda in western Cuba was to coincide with an internal uprising against Spanish rule initiated at Puerto Principe. Spanish authorities learned of the planned internal revolt when the wife of its leader, Joaquin Agüero, revealed the plot to a priest in a church confessional booth. As before, the López filibuster met with complete failure. Fifty Americans in the landing party were quickly taken to Havana and, after summary military trials, were put before the firing squad. López and ¡60 of his men eluded the Spanish troops until August 3¡, when they too were captured and taken to Havana. López was publicly garroted and all, but four, were shipped o› to prison in Spain. Spain released the four so that they would tell the gruesome fate awaiting future filibusters.

Ludlow The stories of the Spanish brutality sparked demonstrations throughout the United States and were particularly demonstrative in the south. The Spanish consulate in New Orleans was sacked. While some Americans called for retribution, others demanded the annexation of Cuba or wondered aloud why the Cubans themselves did not rise up to throw o› the yoke of Spanish authority. Subsequently, the Cuban issue became secondary to the domestic problems the United States faced over the problem of slavery in the western territories. See also Expansionism, O’Sullivan, John; Quitman, John A.

Ludlow, William (¡843–¡90¡) A career soldier with a wide range of engineering experience in the U.S. Army, Ludlow commanded a brigade in the U.S. Army’s assault upon Santiago de Cuba in July ¡898 before he was appointed as commander of the Department of Havana on January ¡, ¡899, during the U.S. occupation of Cuba. Ludlow was responsible for implementing General John R. Brooke’s order to keep Cuban insurgent army forces from participating in the celebrations in Havana that marked the end of the Spanish-American War, an action that immediately caused Cubans to question the intentions of U.S. policy. In January and February ¡899, Ludlow oversaw the relief e›orts in Havana that mirrored U.S. actions in other cities across Cuba. This included organizing the distribution of food and medicine, overhauling the sanitation and water systems, and establishing hospitals and asylums. On February 9, ¡899, Ludlow headed the U.S. military escort for the Havana funeral procession of insurgent Cuban army leader Calixto García. In June ¡899, Ludlow sided with General Leonard Wood in the latter’s dispute over General John R. Brooke’s centralized administrative policy. Ludlow argued that centralization deprived departmental commanders of the necessary discretionary authority to meet local conditions. Ludlow also believed that

122 the legacies of Spanish colonialism made the Cubans incapable of practicing self-government. He described the Cubans as “Latins [who] … belong to a dying race” and said that it would take at least a generation before the Cubans would evolve into a stable society. Given those conditions, Ludlow argued that the United States would have to remain in Cuba indefinitely. In late ¡899, Ludlow joined General Leonard Wood in conspiring to have Brooke ousted from his command and, on seniority grounds, unsuccessfully promoted himself over Wood to be the next military governor of Cuba, an action that significantly strained relations between the two men. In the spring of ¡900, Ludlow became involved in a local political battle that cost him his command. On two occasions prior to establishment of the U.S. military government in Cuba, Havana authorities accepted a proposal from the U.S. construction firm Michael J. Dady and Company for the paving and sewering of the city’s streets. Once in command of the city, Ludlow drew his own plans for the city and rejected the Dady contract. Ludlow’s action not only brought threats of a suit from the Dady Company but also subjected the commander to criticism in the Havana newspapers. The intemperate Ludlow began fining the publishers of the o›ending newspapers, which, in turn, increased the tensions between Ludlow and the local populous. To calm the situation, the military governor of Cuba, General Leonard Wood, sent Ludlow packing o› to Washington. See also Brooke, John R.; United States Occupation of Cuba; Wood, Leonard;

Maceo, Antonio (¡845–¡896) A Cuban mulatto who rose to the rank of general in the Cuban independence army and a native of Santiago de Cuba, Maceo was attracted to the revolutionary cause that led to the Ten Years’ War (¡868–¡878). Once in the rebel army, Maceo earned a reputation as an e›ective guerrilla fighter and leader. He

123 achieved the rank of general in ¡872. However, because of his ethnicity, the conservative white Cubans never accepted Maceo. These criollos feared a revolution from below and viewed Maceo as a leading advocate for an end to slavery on the island. Following the Ten Years’ War, Maceo traveled to Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras before being summoned to New York by José Martí in ¡893 to assist with the planning of the final o›ensive for Cuban independence that began in February ¡895. Like his counterparts, Martí and General Máximo Gómez y Báez, Maceo distrusted U.S. intentions. Each believed that the war could be won by Cubans themselves without gaining belligerent status from the United States or with its military intervention. Maceo also advocated strong military leadership in directing the war e›ort rather than the field commanders deferring to the civilian leadership of the provisional government on the island or to its political arm in the United States, the New York Junta. On the battlefield Maceo conducted a successful campaign against the Spanish forces. Similar to Gómez, Maceo conducted economic warfare that included the destruction of infrastructure and sugarcane fields, including some U.S.–owned properties, an act that the New York Junta leader Tómas Estrada Palma saw as a threat to U.S. support for the Cuban cause. Because he was considered a politically attractive leader, the independence movement su›ered a serious blow when Maceo was killed by Spanish troops at Punta Brava on December 7, ¡896. As a result of Maceo’s death, only General Máximo Gómez remained of the original revolutionary triumvirate. See also Gomez y Báezr, Maximo; Martí y Pérez, José, Julian; New York Junta, War for Independence

McGovern, George (¡922– ) At the invitation of Fidel Castro, Senator George McGovern (D., S.D.) visited Cuba, May 5 to 8, ¡975. During their extended conversations, Castro asked for a

Machado y Morales lifting of the U.S. embargo and expressed a willingness to return the $2 million ransom money still being held since the ¡972 hijacking of a U.S. plane and the release of American political prisoners. Castro also assented to allow the family of Boston Red Sox pitcher Luis Tiant to visit him in the states before his career ended. McGovern returned home to call for a lifting of the embargo and to express his favorable impressions of the Cuban education and health care systems. The visit came at a time when secret talks were being conducted between emissaries of each government and amidst a growing crescendo, in the United States and throughout Latin America, calling for the of lifting the U.S. embargo. See also Kissinger, Henry; Organization of American States: Sixteenth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign A›airs

Machado, Gerardo see Machado y Morales, Gerardo Machado y Morales, Gerardo (¡87¡–¡937) Cuba’s fifth president (¡925–¡933), Machado was born into a planter class family in Santa Clara. after his education in private schools, Machado became a successful tobacco grower and seller. Machado joined the Cuban Liberation Army and rose to the rank of brigadier general during the war for Cuban independence. After the war Machado returned to business but remained active in politics, serving in appointed capacities during the administration of President José Miguel Gómez (¡909–¡9¡3). During the same period, Machado added to his planter-earned wealth by participating in U.S. business ventures in Cuba. Returning to politics in the ¡920s, Machado gained control of the Liberal Party and was elected president of Cuba in the fairly honest ¡924 elections. Machado came to the presidency promising honest government, economic development, and improvements in education. At the same time, he recognized the rising tide of na-

Machado y Morales tionalism that called for an end to the Platt Amendment. The first two years of his administration appeared to mark the arrival of Cuba’s political maturity. Under the ¡925 Public Works Law, Machado initiated an extensive public works program that included the construction of the national highway to run the length of the island. By ¡929 an estimated $80 million was spent on public works. He encouraged Congress to pass the CustomsTari› Law in ¡927 as a means to promote agricultural diversification and industrial development. The University of Havana also benefited from Machado’s largesse. U.S. o‡cials dismissed his call for the termination of the Platt Amendment as little more than pabulum for domestic consumption. His promises to Ambassador Enoch Crowder, President Calvin Coolidge, and U.S. businessmen that American investments in Cuba would remain secure from government, labor, and other encroachments were taken more seriously. His standing in the American banking community could be measured by its advancing $¡09 million in loans in ¡927 alone. In ¡930 and ¡93¡, in the midst of the Great Depression, Chase Bank underwrote $90 million in Cuban bonds and in ¡932 another $250,000 for his personal businesses. The prosperity that supported much of Machado’s public programs rested on the high price of sugar that stood at 4.9 cents per pound when he took o‡ce in ¡925 but plummeted to less than half that amount two years later. The impact was significant, as it not only led to unemployment in the sugar industry but also led to layo›s in the government sector and cycled through Cuba’s other economic sectors. The situation was exacerbated by the ¡930 HawleySmoot Tari›, which cut Cuba’s portion of the U.S. sugar market from 49.4 percent to 25.3 percent. The poor economic times contributed to the growing public protest of Machado’s administration. The ¡920s also witnessed rapid growth of other interest groups that placed pressure upon the Machado administration. For example, the Asociación de Commerciantes de la Habana clamored for more favorable trade rela-

124 tions with the United States; the Asociación Nacional de Detalistas, a merchant organization, demanded an end to the monopoly enjoyed by company stores and foreign sugar enterprises; and the Junta Cubana de Renovación called for the protection of national industries and commerce, agrarian reform, and a new trade treaty with the United States. Other groups focused upon the need for honest and democratic government, such as the Committee of One Hundred and the Asociación de Buen Gobierno. Still others, like the Veterans and Patriots Association, attacked both issues. The organization of labor also gained momentum during the ¡920s. At the ¡925 National Labor Congress, Cuban trade unions consolidated into one organization —Confederación Nacional Obrera de Cuba (CNOC). That same year Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC) (Communist Party of Cuba) was founded and developed a strategy for labor organization. In ¡927, as the adverse e›ects of the economic downturn spread to all sectors of the Cuban society, two new important groups emerged: La Asociación Unión Nacionalista and Directorio Esdudiantil Universitario. Subsequently, these two groups were joined by the clandestine ABC Revolutionary Society and the Organización Celular Radical Revolucionaria (OCRR) as the most militant spokes groups for change. One of the common threads that spanned these organizations was their disdain for the Platt Amendment, which they viewed as an instrument that propped up the corrupt political elite and militated against Cuba’s economic development and social justice. As U.S. ambassador Enoch Crowder anticipated in ¡927, political tensions intensified as the Cuban economy continued to spiral downward. The situation was exacerbated that same year when Machado announced his intentions to seek a second term. Machado justified his decision upon the unusual economic crisis confronting Cuba, an explanation with which that Crowder sympathized. However, Crowder suggested that Machado seek the presidency through reelection rather than an extension of his term. Crowder also

125 encouraged Machado to visit Washington, D.C., which he did in April ¡927. There, Machado met with President Coolidge, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, and Francis G. White, head of the State Department’s Latin American A›airs Division. Owing to a changing attitude regarding U.S. interventions throughout the Caribbean, the administration expressed greater concern with the constitutionality of Machado’s intentions than with the act itself. Subsequently, through Crowder, the State Department approved amendments to the Cuban Constitution that sanctified an extension of Machado’s presidency. In April ¡928, a constitutional convention convened to approve the proposed amendments. However, it went further by rejecting the proposed amendments and instead approving that Machado stand for reelection in ¡928 for a new six-year term, ending in ¡935. The o‡cial U.S. response was silence. Washington chose not to intervene, leaving constitutional matters to the Cuban Supreme Court. The lack of action led many Cubans to conclude that the United States supported Machado. With political opposition e›ectively silenced, Machado won, unopposed, the November ¡, ¡928, fraud-ridden election. Almost immediately, the State Department admitted that it had a “Latin American dictator” on its hands. From ¡929 until ¡933 the State Department operated under former secretary of state Elihu Root’s interpretation of the Platt Amendment: The U.S. would not intervene in Cuba unless there was a foreign threat to its sovereignty or unless American property or lives were in jeopardy. In Cuba during the same period, Machado’s government became increasingly repressive, particularly against student groups. Political opponents were jailed and their public meetings disbanded. Machado closed secondary schools and universities in ¡93¡, and they remained closed at the time of his ouster from o‡ce in ¡933. The opposition was equally brutal with its assassination of government o‡cials and other Machado supporters. The violence reached a high-water mark in August ¡93¡ when the

Machado y Morales government brutally suppressed an armed rebellion. Throughout this period, U.S. ambassador Harry F. Guggenheim often attempted to mediate between Machado and the opposition. At the same time, Machado also rebu›ed the opposition’s insistence that Machado shorten his term and schedule new elections. In ¡933, new U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt shifted policy. At first, like many of his predecessors, Roosevelt was convinced that U.S. pressure would bring a peaceful settlement. Toward that end he dispatched Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles to Havana. In July ¡933 Welles served as mediator between Machado and representatives of several opposition groups. Progress was made on several issues, but Machado adamantly refused to resign the presidency before ¡935. Frustrated with Machado’s stubbornness, Welles, on August 7, ¡933, threatened Machado with U.S. intervention, but the Cuban called the American’s blu›. Machado asserted that he would arm the nation to defend its sovereignty against any U.S. intervention. Although Machado withstood the U.S. pressure, it contributed to the erosion of his support base. The political crisis was exacerbated in late July ¡933 when a Havana bus driver’s strike escalated into a national transportation paralysis. In these cross currents the Cuban army leadership recognized its precarious position. It would su›er if there were a U.S. intervention, and most certainly it would be a victim of any internal revolution. Charging that it acted to save Cuba from U.S. intervention, on August ¡2, ¡933, the army deposed Machado and installed Carlos Manuel de Céspedes in the presidency. Céspedes represented Cuba’s traditional elite. However, the forces that represented Cuba’s middle and lower socioeconomic sectors, suppressed by Machado, could not be denied. Less than a month later Céspedes was ousted in the “Sergeants’ Revolt” led by Fulgencio Batista. As for Machado, he subsequently settled in Miami, Florida, where he died in ¡939. See also Crowder, Enoch; Céspedes, Carlos Manuel de; Guggenheim, Harry F.;

McKinley Platt Amendment; Welles, Benjamin Sumner

McKinley, William L. (¡843–¡90¡) A U.S. Civil War veteran, McKinley subsequently practiced law in Ohio, served fourteen years in the House of Representatives, and completed two terms as governor of his home state before he assumed the presidency in March ¡897. Well versed in domestic a›airs, McKinley had little foreign policy experience, but he did harbor sympathies for the plight of the noncombatants in Cuba and criticized the brutal methods employed by General Valerieno Weyler against the Cuban insurgents and noncombatants. Still, in early ¡897, McKinley gave every indication that he would follow the established U.S. policy towards Cuba: that Spain retain sovereignty over the island. From the start McKinley, not his secretaries of state, determined U.S. policy toward Cuba. McKinley dismissed outgoing president Grover S. Cleveland’s recommendation that Consul General Fitzhugh Lee be replaced in Havana, largely because Lee shared the administration’s view of events there. He also sent William J. Calhoun to Cuba as a special agent. Calhoun’s subsequent report became an essential base for McKinley’s Cuban policy. McKinley dispatched Stewart I. Woodford to Madrid and granted him great leeway in dealing with the Spanish government. In the spring of ¡897, McKinley confronted a Congress determined to pass a resolution that demanded granting recognition to the Cuban insurgents. Only the e›orts by speaker of the House of Representatives, Thomas B. Reed (R.–Maine) prevented its passage. At the same time the administration entertained a bond scheme whereby the Cuban insurgents would purchase the island’s freedom from Madrid. Spain rejected any thought of selling its “territory.” McKinley’s Cuban policy started to take shape in June ¡897 when Calhoun returned from Cuba. Calhoun reported that all socioeconomic classes in Cuba supported the insur-

126 gents and that the atrocious war had no end in sight. He also described the destruction the war brought to the Cuban economy and infrastructure. However, he also repeated the long-held U.S. perception that the Cubans were incapable of self-government if they achieved independence. Throughout the summer McKinley wrestled with the Cuban problem, but he constantly reminded his associates that unless Spain’s brutal policies changed, the U.S. would have to intervene on moral grounds. In addition, the administration was determined to correct the stagnant economy brought about by the Panic of ¡893. Cuba fit into that picture. There, substantial amounts of U.S. capital were tied up, and as the war continued, some of McKinley’s advisors suggested that it delayed the U.S. economic recovery. Subsequently, McKinley constructed two diplomatic notes to the Spanish government. The first was sharply critical of Spain’s reconcentrado program, and the second revealed McKinley’s Cuba policy. In August ¡897 Spain’s prime minister Antonio Cánovas rebuked McKinley’s attack upon the reconcentrado program. The second note, however, had greater impact. In mid–September ¡897, Woodford presented it the Spanish government. Framed against Calhoun’s perception of an unwinnable war, McKinley strongly suggested that Spain implement meaningful reforms as the only way to achieve a peace settlement and restore the island’s economy and civil rule. While o›ering to mediate an end to the conflict, McKinley also warned that U.S. patience was wearing thin. In a thinly veiled ultimatum, McKinley set a November ¡, ¡897, deadline, and if that were not met, McKinley warned that the United States reserved the right to pursue independent action. In the two months that followed, there were indications of lessening tensions between Madrid and Washington. The new prime minister, Liberal party member Práxedes Sagasta, addressed McKinley’s concern at the same time he reoriented Spain’s policy toward Cuba. Sagasta’s reply arrived in Washington

127 in early November ¡897. After criticizing McKinley for not putting an end to the activities of the Cuban Junta in New York, Sagasta outlined his Cuban reform program, which included the establishment of an autonomous government in Havana. McKinley’s response reached the Spanish government on December 20, and it contained a message similar to that found in his address to Congress in early December. After chastising the Spanish for their brutality in Cuba and rejecting the charge that his administration failed to carry out U.S. neutrality laws, McKinley advocated giving Spain’s new Cuba policy a chance to bring peace to the island. He spoke against extending belligerent status to the Cubans and against U.S. annexation of the island. Overall, the message favored the Spanish rather than the Cubans, a fact privately noted by the leader of the Cuban Junta, Tomás Estrada Palma. There matters stood until mid–January ¡898 when anti-autonomy riots erupted in Havana. The riots convinced McKinley that Spain had lost control of Cuba. In response to a request from the U.S. consul in Havana, Fitzhugh Lee, McKinley approved the dispatch of the U.S.S. Maine to Havana to “show the flag” and, potentially, to provide protection for U.S. citizens residing in Cuba. The ship’s arrival did not provoke any anti–American outbursts on the island, and, subsequently, many Cubans visited the vessel. Relations took a turn for the worse on February 9, ¡898, when the New York Herald published a private letter written by the Spanish minister in Washington, Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, that, among other things, described McKinley as a weak president. The letter caused a public and congressional furor in the United States and prompted McKinley to call for Dupuy de Lôme’s recall and a letter of apology from Spain. An embarrassed Spanish government quickly accepted Dupuy de Lôme’s resignation. McKinley appeared satisfied. No sooner had the flap over the Dupuy de Lôme letter ended than the Maine exploded in Havana harbor on February ¡5, ¡898,

McKinley killing 264 sailors and 2 o‡cers. Although McKinley wanted to temper public opinion, pending an o‡cial navy inquiry, the tragedy dominated American thinking over the next several weeks. Fueled by the existing adverse views regarding Spanish policy in Cuba, a groundswell of patriotism followed, placing blame at the Spanish doorstep and calling for the crime to be avenged. While the Navy investigated the explosion, McKinley resisted the call for U.S. intervention in Cuba. Still, McKinley, who had already concluded that an external explosion had sunk the U.S.S. Maine and that Spain had lost Cuba, did not want to annex the island to the United States. An alternative, he rationalized, was to provide Spain with compensation in return for Cuba’s independence. McKinley sought to build a wide government consensus by meeting with Republican and Democratic congressmen and with his cabinet o‡cers. As a result of these meetings McKinley designed a plan that he thought would be acceptable to the U.S. Congress and provide Cuba with its freedom: (¡) submit the Maine report to Congress (2) by the end of March submit the Cuban consular reports to Congress and request a $500,000 Cuban relief package and (3) if Spain did not alter its course, submit to Congress on April 20 a detailed outline of conditions on the island and declare that the United States must intervene on humanitarian grounds. At the same time, McKinley was disturbed by Spain’s e›orts to enlarge its navy by purchasing ships intended for Brazil and dispatching other vessels to Cuban waters. In response, on March 6, ¡898, McKinley with the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee Joseph Cannon (R.–Ill.) to prepare a $50 million national defense bill, which both houses of Congress unanimously approved. Passage of the bill demonstrated to Spain the extent of support for McKinley’s Cuban policy. The next day, March 28, three days after it arrived in Washington, McKinley submitted the navy report to the Congress for “deliberate consideration.” The report, which

McKinley concluded that an external explosion was responsible for sinking the Maine, served to fan the flames of anti–Spanish sentiment. By the end of March ¡898, several events placed McKinley under intense pressure to intervene in Cuba. On March 9 Congress unanimously approved the $50 million defense bill. On March ¡7 Senator Redfield Proctor (R., Vt.) delivered the most descriptive speech to date about Cuba’s deteriorating conditions, and on March 28 the U.S. Navy report on the sinking of the Maine placed responsibility upon the Spanish. In response to each of these events, congressional critics, mostly Democrats, increased the demand for U.S. intervention in Cuba. At the same time the sensationalist U.S. press contributed to a national hysteria against Spain for its Cuban policies. The public outcry became so intense that Republican Party stalwarts became fearful of losing in the congressional elections scheduled for November ¡898 unless they approved an active policy toward Cuba. McKinley, still desirous of a peaceful solution, warned Spain on March 22 that — unless a satisfactory agreement were reached within a few days — he would submit the Cuban question to Congress for a decision. On March 27 he instructed Minister Woodford to secure from Spain as quickly as possible an armistice until October ¡, an immediate end to the reconcentrado program and authorization to distribute American relief supplies to the needy Cubans, and “if possible” acceptance of the president as arbiter if the conflict resumed after October ¡. The Spanish reply arrived in Washington the evening of March 3¡, and it did not satisf y McKinley’s demands. Spain o›ered to arbitrate di›erences over the Maine, requested Governor–General Blanco to end the reconcentrado program in western Cuba, and proclaimed it was already cooperating with the distribution of relief supplies and had granted another 3 million Spanish pesetas to the program. As to ending hostilities, the Spanish government would accept such if asked for by the insurgents and if Blanco y Erenas approved the conditions and duration. With diplomatic

128 e›orts apparently at an end, McKinley prepared to present the Congress a status report on the Cuban situation. As McKinley prepared his speech, one final diplomatic e›ort caused postponement of its delivery to Congress. Pope Leo XIII initiated a mediation e›ort through Archbishop John Ireland and European diplomats in Washington and Madrid. It proved unsuccessful, but it did persuade Spain to act. On April 9 Blanco was instructed to end the reconcentrados program throughout Cuba and to grant an armistice for the time needed to facilitate a peace settlement. For Spain, these were humiliating concessions, but neither the Junta in New York nor the insurgents in Cuba would accept the armistice. Each viewed it as an instrument for Spain to strengthen its military position on the island. More importantly, having come this far, independence was the Cubans’ sole objective. The Cuban rejection, coupled with congressional and public clamor for action, left McKinley no choice. On April ¡¡ McKinley delivered his message to Congress. In it he asked for authority to use military force to end the hostilities in Cuba that threatened American life and property on the island and the peace of the United States. He did not extend recognition to the Cuban insurgents, and, in fact, questioned their ability to meet international obligations. In conclusion, McKinley noted that the United States would use “forceful intervention … as a neutral to stop the war.” He also advised Congress that he would veto any resolution providing for the recognition of Cuban independence. Significantly, in acting as a “neutral” McKinley signaled his acceptance of the State Department’s recommendation, providing the United States the opportunity to hold Cuban territory until tranquillity permitted the establishment of a Cuban government that the U.S. could recognize and that could ratify a treaty to regulate future relations. For the next several days Congress heatedly debated the possible recognition of Cuba, but McKinley stood his ground. A more important debate centered upon Cuba’s post-

129 war status. Many congressmen believed that McKinley’s failure to mention the subject implied U.S. annexation. Opponents focused upon the ideal of Cuban independence, reflecting their constituents’ wishes. Others opposed annexation on racial and religious grounds, pointing to the supposed inferiority of the Afro-Cubans and the legacies of Spanish colonialism. Equally important were the representatives of sugar-beet states, including California, Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Utah. One of these representatives, Senator Henry M. Teller (R.–Col.) proposed that the U.S. denounce any territorial designs upon the island. It was included in the congressional joint resolution on April ¡9 proclaiming the people of Cuba to be free and independent, requesting that Spain immediately relinquish control of the island, and directing the president to use armed force to achieve these objectives. By an act of Congress and approved by the presidential pen on April 25, the congressional resolution indicated that a state of war had existed since April 2¡. McKinley also directed U.S. policy that led to the armistice with Spain in August ¡898 and, subsequently, the peace negotiations at Paris. McKinley selected the U.S. negotiating team at Paris that included expansionistminded Republican senators who would secure the president’s objectives. In the end Spain relinquished Cuba and Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and the island of Guam in the Marianas. The president also supported the U.S. policy change in late ¡899 that eventually led to the Platt Amendment, which, when added to the Cuban Constitution of ¡902, granted the United States many rights on the island. See also Calhoun, William J.; Cleveland, Grover S.; Lee, Fitzhugh; New York Junta; Proctor, Redfield; Reconcentrado Program; SpanishAmerican War: Sinking of the Maine, United States Business Community and the Coming of War, United States War Resolutions; United States Occupation of Cuba; War for Independence: Spanish Policy and the War, From War for Independence to Spanish-American War; Woodford, Stewart I.; Yellow Press

Madison

McNamara, Robert S. (¡9¡6– ) Mcanamara was secretary of defense from ¡96¡–¡968 during the presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. A native of California, McNamara joined Ford Motor Company in ¡946 after serving in the U.S. Army during World War II. He was tapped by Kennedy to become one of the so-called “whiz kids” in his administration. McNamara came under great criticism for supporting U.S. military policies in Vietnam. Although McNamara did not play a role in designing the Bay of Pigs operation in April ¡96¡, he was among those who favored carrying out the invasion. In subsequent testimony before the Taylor Commission that investigated the invasion, McNamara defended Kennedy. McNamara told the committee that Kennedy was ill-advised by the Central Intelligence Agency and by the apparent overconfidence of the Joint Chiefs of Sta› for the operation’s success. During the Missile Crisis in October ¡96¡, McNamara served on EXCOM, the president’s select executive committee to make policy recommendations about the Soviet missiles in Cuba. At first, McNamara favored an air strike against the missile sites, but he was subsequently convinced that the quarantine of o›ensive weapons coming into Cuba was the more reasoned response. When the Kennedy administration turned to sabotaging the Cuban economy following the missile crisis, McNamara expressed his doubts about its possible success. After leaving government service in ¡968, McNamara became president of the World Bank, a position he held until ¡984. See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Johnson, Lyndon B.; Kennedy, John F.; Missile Crisis

Madison, James (¡75¡–¡836) Madison was a member of the Continental Congress, chief architect of the U.S. Constitution, and congressman from the state of Virginia before serving as secretary of state and then as president of the United States

Magoon from ¡809 to ¡8¡7. Madison maintained that Cuba’s strategic location gave the United States such special interests in the destiny of the island that the United States could not be a disinterested spectator if Cuba fell under the influence of a European government that threatened U.S. security and commerce. At the start of his presidency in ¡809, Madison confronted the possibility of a Franco-British war in the Caribbean as a result of Napoleon Bonaparte’s control of the Spanish government and realized its meaning to U.S. coastal security and Caribbean trade interests. At the same, in response to rumors indicating that Cuban insurgency movement existed on the island, Madison dispatched New England merchant William Shaler to the island to determine the validity of the rumors and to make the necessary inducements to incorporate Cuba into the United States. Shaler arrived in Cuba in August ¡0, ¡8¡0. Although the Spanish governor-general, Don Salvador de Muro y Salazar, met with Shaler, he refused to recognize Shaler as an o‡cial U.S. diplomatic agent nor to discuss Cuba’s future with him. Despite the cool reception, Shaler went on to meet with prominent Cuban Creoles, who were divided in opinion about linking to the United States. While Shaler found many of them receptive to incorporation into the United States, they doubted the U.S. ability to defend the island against a foreign attack. Most Creoles, however, believed that a monarchical form of government best suited Cuba and that their fate remained tied to the Spanish crown. Shaler did more than investigate Cuban opinion. He sought to encourage Cubans to look upon the United States as their savior from Spanish oppression. Spanish authorities became so suspicious of these activities that Shaler was expelled from the island in November ¡8¡¡.

Magoon, Charles (¡86¡–¡920) Magoon served as U.S. provisional governor during the second intervention in Cuba

130 from ¡906–¡909. A native of Nebraska, Magoon previously had distinguished himself as U.S. minister to Panama and as one who successfully settled church property disputes in the Philippine Islands. When Magoon succeeded William Howard Taft as provisional governor on October ¡3, ¡906, a 6,000-man expeditionary force under the command of General J. Franklin Bell supported him. Magoon brought General Enoch Crowder with him to serve as an advisor and, subsequently, as head of the Advisory Law Commission. The goal of the occupation was to restore political order as quickly as possible and then withdraw. Immediately, the provisional government, with the aid of Bell’s troops, restored civil order, provided food and aid to distressed Cubans, and began work on the reconstruction of the island’s infrastructure. Over the next 28 months Magoon supervised the construction of roads and railroads, repaired public buildings, addressed public health issues including yellow fever, and water and sewerage projects, built new public schools and improved the conditions of others, revived agriculture and mining and addressed church-state property issues. Subsequently, Cuban historians charged Magoon with graft and corruption regarding the dispensation of contracts for these projects, but nothing was ever proved. In fact, from all appearances, Magoon’s frugal life style did not change even after he left Cuba in ¡909. If anything, Magoon lacked General Leonard Wood’s forcefulness and may have been too lenient with the Cubans, particularly those who pressed their interests upon him. That which received the most attention during Magoon’s tenure was the work of the Advisory Law Commission, headed by Enoch Crowder and including other U.S. military personnel with legal experience and several prominent Cuban leaders. It worked by subcommittee, which in turn reported to the committee of the whole for refinement and approval before submitting the proposed laws to Governor Magoon. He, in turn, distributed the proposals to the public for comment, which in most instances contributed to revi-

131 sions. Once the laws were complete, Magoon promulgated them by decree. Most attention focused upon the work of Crowder’s subcommittee, which addressed electoral reform. Its work resulted in an detailed electoral code based upon the Australian model and provided for detailed registration of voters, the conduct of elections at all levels, eligibility requirements to hold o‡ce and participate in elections, and the machinery to carry out elections. The electoral law was implemented in the presidential election of November ¡908 won by the Liberal Party candidate, José Miguel Gómez Judicial reform proved most di‡cult. At the time Cuba’s legal code and court system consisted of the remnants of Spanish colonialism and edicts laid down by U.S. military commanders during the occupation period. Magoon promulgated the new judicial law on January 27, ¡909, the day before the U.S. occupation ended. Although the law defined the court system and penal code, many observers at the time thought it would be of limited success given the legacies of the past. The critics soon proved to be correct. Other reforms defined the structure and responsibilities of provincial and municipal governments, eligibility requirements for o‡ce holdings, and the rights and duties of each in relationship to each other and to the national government. A tax law outlined uniform accounting practices to be used by governments across the island and the taxing authority and means of collection for the national, provincial, and municipal governments. Magoon was satisfied with the accomplishments of his provisional government in Cuba and so too were American authorities in Washington. Many of Cuba’s “better classes” also appreciated Magoon’s work. This, coupled with his popularity among the residents of Havana, provided Magoon with a festive send-o› when he and his associates departed the island on the afternoon of January 28, ¡908, immediately after the new administration of Liberal José Miguel Gómez assumed the reins of government. See also Crowder,

Mann Enoch; Taft-Bacon Mission; United States Interventions

Mahan, Alfred T. (¡840–¡9¡4) An advocate of the “large policy” that called for U.S. expansion overseas in the late nineteenth century, Mahan’s thinking influenced William McKinley, Henry Cabot Lodge Sr., and Theodore Roosevelt. His book, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, published in ¡890, is often credited with being the most important single work on foreign policy and strategy at the time. Mahan argued for the U.S. need to take possession of islands in the Caribbean, Hawaii, and the Philippines to be used for naval and coaling stations for the benefit of American commerce. Mahan also called for the construction of an isthmian canal for naval and commercial reasons. The need to protect the canal from foreign interlopers gave added significance to Cuba’s strategic location, a fact not lost to policymakers at the time of the Spanish-American War. See also Expansionism; Cabot, Henry, Sr.; McKinley, William; Roosevelt, Theodore

Maine see Spanish-American War: Sinking of the Maine Mann, Thomas C. (¡9¡2– ) Mann was assistant secretary of state for Latin American a›airs in ¡960 and ¡96¡ and again in ¡964 during the administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. A staunch anticommunist, Mann wished to see Fidel Castro removed from power. In ¡960, he encouraged Congress to approve legislation empowering the president to restrict the Cuban sugar quota, which President Dwight D. Eisenhower did in July ¡960. Mann supported President John F. Kennedy’s decision to follow through with the Bay of Pigs invasion in April ¡96¡. After a stint, ¡96¡–¡963, as am-

Mariel Boat Lift bassador to Mexico, Mann returned to the State Department, where he became Johnson’s “single voice” on Latin American policy. Under Johnson, Mann continued to advocate policies designed to isolate Castro from the hemisphere. Citing fatigue, Mann retired from the foreign service in ¡966. See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Johnson, Lyndon B.; Kennedy, John F.; Missile Crisis

Mariel Boat Lift, ¡980 On April ¡, ¡980, a group of Cubans who wanted to leave the country crashed their way into the compound of the Peruvian embassy and, in the process, killed two Cuban police guards. In a fit of anger, Castro removed the police guards from around the Peruvian embassy. In so doing, he unexpectedly opened the floodgates. On the evening of April 5 and throughout the next day, some ¡0,000 Cubans flocked to the Peruvian embassy compound. Castro then announced that all who wanted to leave the country could. Thousands of Cubans flocked to government o‡ces to obtain the necessary exit visas. After announcing that it could absorb ¡,000 of these Cubans, Peru turned the issue over to the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees. Subsequently, the United States agreed to take 3,500 of the ¡0,000; Venezuela and Spain 500 each; Costa Rica and Canada 300; and Ecuador, 200. An airlift program provided for the evacuation until Castro suspended it on April ¡8, ¡980. Five days later he announced that boats could come from Florida to the port of Mariel to pick up relatives of Cubans living in the United States. The exodus became a stampede. Before Castro decided to end the boat lift on September 26, ¡980, a total of ¡25,262 refugees came to the United States. This included an estimated 5,000 criminals, infirm, and mentally ill, and as discovered later, nearly 2,000 Cuban agents. The root causes of the exodus rested with Cuba’s economic plight, limited political system, and restricted civil rights. The more immediate causes are attributed to Castro’s decision in early ¡979 to permit Cuban exiles in

132 the United States to visit their relatives on the island, and at the urging of the United States, he permitted direct flights from Miami to Havana. In ¡979 and ¡980 the U.S. visitors brought not only an estimated $¡00 million dollars to Cuba but also television sets and other appliances and gadgets, new clothes, and, equally important, stories of prosperity and freedom in the United States. When the crisis erupted, the Carter administration vacillated in its response. Carter first issued a blistering statement about the ills of Cuban society that had caused the ¡0,000 people to crowd into the Peruvian compound. He also expressed deep sympathy for their plight but made no move toward assisting their relocation to the United States. Costa Rican president Rodrigo Carazo’s April ¡3 o›er to fly all ¡0,000 to his country provided Carter with a sense of relief. When the sea lift began on April 23, at the same time the U.S. Coast Guard assisted the vessels in reaching Florida’s shores, the Justice Department in Washington, D.C., announced that the sea lift was illegal. On May 5, Carter shifted course again. He announced that the Cubans would be greeted with welcome arms, while at the same time the Justice Department threatened strong action against the boat owners who brought the Cubans back. The Carter administration also made threatening gestures. In the middle of May ¡980 the administration announced that it would conduct military maneuvers at Guantánamo Bay but was persuaded otherwise by the head of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Wayne S. Smith. In early July the United States threatened to use force to prevent the Cuban ship Blue Fire if it should bring an estimated 3,000 refugees to any Florida port. While Smith was discussing the problem with Cuban authorities, a U.S. SR-7¡ reconnaissance plane flew over Havana. When it broke the sound barrier, hundreds, if not thousands, of windows were broken by the sonic boom. In late May, Carter secretly dispatched National Security Council sta› member Robert Pastor and director of the executive secretariat Peter Tarno› to Havana in hope of

133 bringing the boat lift to an end, but the mission failed. Rather than o›er a quid pro quo, Pastor and Tarno› demanded only that the Cuban government shut down the operation. The two returned to Washington emptyhanded. Over the summer of ¡980 there were signs that Castro wanted to find a way out. Harassment slowed those who registered to emigrate; demonstrations subsided; and in his annual July 26 speech, Castro described the upcoming U.S. presidential election as a choice between peace with Carter or war with Ronald Reagan. In early September ¡980 Tarno› returned to Havana indicating the Carter administration’s willingness to discuss other issues beside migration. Castro, too, wished to end the matter. He sent word that Mariel would be closed on September 26. The rekindling of the U.S.–Cuban dialog that Carter indicated he wanted never materialized. See also Carter, Jimmy; Cuban Americans

Martí, José see Martí y Pérez, José Julián Martí y Pérez, José Julián (¡853–¡895) Martí was an accomplished poet, philosopher, and journalist, but he is best remembered as the principal organizer of Cuba’s rebellion against Spain in ¡895. Born into a poor immigrant family, Martí early recognized the limitations placed upon Cubans by Spanish autocracy. While still a student during the Ten Years’ War (¡868–¡878), Martí criticized these conditions in a newsletter La Patria Libre (Free Fatherland), for which he was exiled to Spain where he earned a college degree in philosophy. From there, Martí traveled to Europe, Mexico, and Guatemala before returning to Cuba after the end of the Ten Years’ War in ¡878. Because conditions did not improve, he again took up the revolutionary cause and again was banished to Spain. In ¡88¡, Martí made his way to New York City, where he commenced a writing career that earned him

Martí y Pérez an international reputation. During the same decade, Martí concluded that Cuba’s destiny could be realized only by achieving independence from Spain via open conflict. Not to do so, he argued, would result in Cuba’s annexation by the United States. For the same reason Martí concluded that the victory needed to be swift. The task of uniting Cuba’s diverse factions was monumental. On one side were those who favored autonomy under Spain and, on the other, were those who favored annexation to the United States. Martí also had to deal with the threat of U.S. expansion and the authoritarian inclinations of the veteran generals from the Ten Years’ War — Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo. The conflict over civilian or military leadership of the independence movement separated Martí from Gómez and Maceo for three years after ¡884. That changed in ¡887 when the three agreed that Martí would provide the political leadership and Gómez and Maceo the military. Still, the struggle over civilian-military authority remained a problem throughout the independence struggle. Martí not only advocated Cuba’s complete independence from Spain but also cautioned the Cubans not become dependent upon the United States, for with it ran the probability of being subsumed by the North Americans. Although he admired much about the U.S. society, economy, and government, Martí advised the Cubans against imitating those models. The Cuban experience did not lend itself to their adaptation; rather, he suggested that Cuba adopt models based on its own historic record. Significantly, Martí called for equality among Cuba’s diverse racial groups. In ¡892, Martí formed the Partido Revolucionario Cubano or Cuban Revolutionary Party) in the United States, and for the next three years he plotted and organized and recruited men, money, and supplies. When, in ¡895, Martí gave the order for the final assault upon the Spanish, he landed in Cuba to lead the war only to lose his life in an unimportant skirmish with Spanish troops at Dos Rios in Oriente Province on May ¡9, ¡895. Martí’s

Más Canosa death dealt a severe blow to the revolutionary leadership. For the remainder of the war, the military generals in the field acted independently of the political leadership on the island and in the United States. Following Cuba’s independence in ¡898, Martí’s teachings had little impact upon subsequent events, and only a few thought that his statue should be erected in Havana’s Central Park. Only when Cuba was swept by nationalist fervor in the ¡920s and ¡930s did Martí reemerge as a political and moral mentor of the new generation of Cuban leaders. He remained so through Castro’s revolution in the latter half of the twentieth century. See also Máximo y Báez, Gomez; Antonio, Maceo; Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Auténtico)

Más Canosa, Jorge (¡939–¡997) Más Canosa was the founder and chairman of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), a nonprofit Miami-based organization that came to exert significant influence on U.S. policy regarding Cuba. Following his primary and secondary education in his native Santiago de Cuba, Más Canosa attended Presbyterian Junior College in North Carolina. Más Canosa was exiled twice from Cuba: in ¡956 after criticizing Fulgencio Batista during a radio broadcast and in ¡960 as a member of the Democrat Christian Movement, which conspired against Fidel Castro. He joined Brigade 2506 for the invasion of Cuba in April ¡96¡ at the Bay of Pigs, but his ship circled o›shore as the operation fizzled. Más Canosa returned to Miami, where he held a number of jobs and participated in covert attacks upon Cuba’s economic infrastructure during the late ¡960s and early ¡970s. Más Canosa also became a prominent businessman through his Church and Tower Company, a successful Miami-based construction firm. Recognizing that the United States would not overthrow Castro by force, Más Canosa founded CANF to influence U.S. pol-

134 icy. The organization initially focused upon enlightening the public about Cuba’s harsh economic and political conditions and the need to impose stringent measures upon the regime in order to foster its demise. Más Canosa, himself, found a sympathetic ear in presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush. He is credited with influencing their strong stance against Castro during their terms in o‡ce. He convinced the U.S.-governmentfunded National Endowment for Democracy to assist CANF with anti–Castro programs. Instrumental in the establishment of Radio Martí in ¡985, Más Canosa soon became its operations director. He supported TV Martí, which began operating in ¡990 with a $¡6 million budget. CANF’s influence upon congressmen and senators was significant, often contributing to several campaign funds. Más Canosa, himself, had entrée to several key legislators responsible for the ¡992 Cuban Democracy Act and the ¡996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad ) Act. Más Canosa was not without controversy. Despite his denials, critics and many of his former supporters claimed that he envisioned himself as president of a post–Castro Cuba. Toward that end, he assembled a team of economists, engineers, and other specialists to plan a $¡5 billion infusion into a free market economy on the island and to be directed by the U.S.–based Cuban-exile community. These plans caused controversy within the Cuban-exile community and led to the development of more moderate groups. Más Canosa’s critics came under attack, including the Miami Herald and national legislators, for expressing opinions about Castro and Cuba contrary to those of CANF and Más Canosa. America’s Watch, which usually reserves its criticisms for foreign dictatorships, accused CANF, under Más Canosa’s leadership, of creating a repressive climate for freedom of expression against and within the Cuban-exile community. Following his death in ¡997, his son Jorge Más Santos, took over CANF’s leadership. See also Bush, George H.W.; Cuban American National Foundation; Radio Martí; Reagan, Ronald R.

135

Matos, Hubert (¡9¡8– ) A former rice grower in Manzanillo, Matos became commander of the Camagüey column of the 26th of July Movement and remained in the Cuban army following the success of the revolution in January ¡959. A member of the moderate revolutionaries, Matos supported a mixed economy and continued U.S. investment in the Cuban economy. Throughout the spring of ¡959, Matos became angered with the growing influence in of Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Raul Castro in policy making and, the increasing numbers of communists that Fidel Castro brought into government. Matos also criticized Castro for his ever-increasing anti–American rhetoric. In October ¡959, Castro had him arrested for treason and being a spokesman for U.S. economic interests on the island, for which Matos was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Subsequently, Matos went into exile in Venezuela and eventually settled in Miami, Florida, where he remained active in anti–Castro activities. See also Revolution

Matthews, Herbert L. (¡900–¡977) In February ¡957 the New York Times published a three-part series written by Matthews about his interview with Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestra on February ¡7, ¡957. The Times also published a photograph of Matthews and Castro together in the rebel camp. The stories appeared at a time when Fulgencio Batista had declared Castro dead and the revolutionary movement muted. Castro carefully orchestrated the interview, giving Matthews the impression that the rebel army was far stronger than its ¡8 men and that it had successfully engaged Batista’s army columns, when in fact it had only two such encounters. The interview revealed the nationalistic character of Castro’s movement and his social intentions for Cuba’s future. In addition, Castro railed against colonialism and imperialism but professed his friendship for the American people.

Mendieta While the Times articles awakened the American public to Castro and generated some sympathy to his cause, their publication in Cuba, where censorship had been momentarily lifted, caused great excitement. Cuban emotions were further stirred with Castro’s distribution of his “Appeal to the Cuban People,” which included a litany of charges against the Cuban government and a call for the violent overthrow of the Batista regime, beginning with the destruction of the country’s economic base — the sugarcane fields. Both Matthews’s and Castro’s publications came at a time when U.S. State Department o‡cials, but not its ambassador Earl E. T. Smith in Havana, began to reassess policy toward Cuba. See also Castro Ruz, Fidel; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Revolution; Smith, Earl E.T.

Mc– see as if Mac– Mendieta, Carlos (¡873–¡960) Mendieta served as Cuba’s president from January ¡934 to December ¡935. The son of a wealthy sugar planter in Santa Clara, Mendieta served in Cuba’s Liberation Army during the War for Independence (¡895–¡898), after which he earned a medical degree from the University of Havana in ¡90¡. Following Cuba’s independence, Mendieta worked in various government positions and a journalist in addition to managing the family sugar plantation. In ¡93¡ he organized the Unión Nacionalista political party to oppose the regime of Gerardo Machado. That same year he joined with former president Mario García Menocal in a short-lived uprising against the government. In early ¡935, Colonel Fulgencio Batista selected Mendieta to replace President Ramón Grau San Martín, and with the approval of U.S. ambassador Je›erson Ca›rey, Mendieta became provisional president on January ¡8, ¡935. The United States extended recognition to his government on January 23. His tenure, however, was marred by continued violence, labor strikes, and political chaos.

Menocal Ambassador Ca›rey became increasingly critical of Mendieta’s personal and political weaknesses, but he applauded Batista and his army for becoming the force that maintained Mendieta in the presidency. Determined to hold a constitutional convention in December ¡935, Mendieta and Batista continually assured the nation that the elections would be fair and honest. The opposition remained unconvinced. The maneuvering among these groups prompted Mendieta to invite Princeton University president Harry Dodds to mediate the growing crisis. The mediator’s recommendations only further infuriated certain opposition groups, who threatened not to participate in the process unless Mendieta resigned from o‡ce. Batista forced Mendieta to do just that on December ¡¡, ¡935, after which he retreated to private life until his death in ¡960. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Ca›rey, Je›erson; Dodds, Harold W.

Menocal, Mario García (¡866–¡94¡) Third president of Cuba ¡9¡3–¡92¡ and military general during Cuba’s War for Independence, Menocal was born in Matanzas Province and raised and educated in Mexico and the United States. He earned an engineering degree from Cornell University in ¡888. Menocal returned to Cuba in ¡89¡ and soon became involved in Cuba’s political dispute with Spain. When war broke out in ¡895, he joined the insurgent army, rising to the rank of major general and earning the reputation as an excellent strategist. He briefly served as Havana’s chief of police during the U.S. military occupation period. He returned to engineering, overseeing the operation of the Americanowned Chaparra sugar plantation, one of the largest in the world. In ¡908 he ran unsuccessfully for the Cuban presidency on the Conservative Party ticket but returned to win the prize in ¡9¡2 in relatively honest elections. While his administration directed several new public works projects and benefited from economic expansion, it became increasingly noted for its graft and corruption. He used questionable

136 practices to capture the ¡9¡6 presidential elections and resisted the e›orts of U.S. envoy Enoch Crowder to correct the electoral fraud. Although he accepted Crowder’s proposed reforms in ¡9¡9, Menocal ignored them in practice in the ¡920 elections. Otherwise, Menocal cooperated with the United States during World War I and with Crowder in the Cuban financial crisis in ¡920 caused by the sharp decline in sugar prices. Although he returned to the business world in ¡92¡, Menocal remained politically active, making unsuccessful bids for the presidency in ¡924 and ¡936, participating in the ill-fated uprising against the Machado government in ¡93¡, and serving in the convention that drafted Cuba’s ¡940 constitution. He died in Havana in ¡94¡. See also Crowder, Enoch; United States Interventions

Menoyo, Eloy Gutiérrez see Gutiérrez-Menoyo, Eloy Messersmith, George S. (¡883–¡960) Messersmith served as the U.S. ambassador to Havana from January ¡940 to December ¡94¡. He joined the foreign service in ¡9¡4 and served mostly in European posts, including Berlin and Vienna during Adolf Hitler’s consolidation of power. A tireless worker, Messersmith became an astute observer of events, but more often than not he interpreted them with a sense of pessimism. Messersmith arrived in Havana on March 4, ¡940, shortly after the start of the Cuban Constituent Assembly. He witnessed its machinations as it completed the ¡940 constitution. As the Assembly deliberated, Messersmith feared that local nationalism might result in limitations upon U.S. interests in Cuba. He opposed the provisions proscribing large landholdings, restricting land ownership by foreigners, and limiting creditors’ rights. Most importantly, Messersmith opposed the suspension of payment on private debts until ¡942. He compared the new

137 constitution to that of Soviet Russia and warned that it paved he way for the government to act as Lázaro Cárdenas had in Mexico against foreign-owned oil companies. Messersmith demanded that the United States take some retaliatory measures, but the State Department demurred. Although the constitution was hailed as one of Latin America’s most progressive documents, it did nothing to alleviate Cuba’s adverse economic conditions. The European war had delivered an extensive blow to the Cuban economy, prompting most Cubans to focus upon that issue rather than hemispheric defense. Ambassador Messersmith criticized the Cuban public for its apathy toward the Allied war e›ort and cautioned that the Cubans would use the war as a lever to extract economic assistance from the United States. Messersmith was not complimentary about Cuban politics. He wrote Secretary of State Cordell Hull in March ¡940 that little had changed in Cuba since independence. Politics remained a venal struggle among the selected few. Regarding the forthcoming ¡940 presidential election, Messersmith expected that Ramón Grau San Martín would defeat Batista if the elections were fair, which he did not expect them to be. Messersmith also resented Batista’s pressure tactics to extract financial support from U.S. business interests on the island and Batista’s use of the army to persuade voters across the island. When Batista won the presidential election on July ¡4, ¡940, Messersmith accepted the opposition’s charges of corruption and fraud, an assertion not shared by other observers. Contrary to popular opinion at the time, Messersmith believed that Batista was well prepared and qualified to handle presidential duties. He also cautioned that the United States could expect little cooperation from Batista. Before the year was out, Messersmith’s predictions appeared to be a reality. Batista’s political coalition fractured, and he faced increasing opposition from the business community, students, and within the military due to his appointment of communists and populists to his cabinet and to his ine›ective way of dealing

Messersmith with Cuba’s ever-worsening economic conditions. When Batista finally did seize control of the political arena with the suppression of a military revolt on February 4, ¡94¡, Messersmith applauded the maintenance of civilian rule, a view not shared by the U.S. press. It saw Batista’s action as the beginning of a dictatorship. While Messersmith maintained a proper public diplomatic relationship with Batista, he often met with him clandestinely for hours of discussion about the nature of the Cuban government. In these meetings, Messersmith criticized Batista for bringing communists into his administration, for not implementing fiscal reform, and for failing to address the problem of government corruption. The loss of the European sugar market sent the Cuban economy into a tailspin and prompted Batista to seek U.S. economic assistance. Messersmith linked any U.S. economic assistance to the need for Cuba to repay an estimated $¡5 million to U.S. bondholders. When the Cuban Congress approved legislation to deal with the issue in November ¡940, Messersmith encouraged an Export-Import Bank (EXIM) loan package that would provide funding for agricultural diversification and a public works program. Messersmith also understood that EXIM’s supervision of the loan militated against local corruption. In early ¡942 Cuba received a $25 million EXIM loan for both agricultural diversification and public works. Because more was needed to address Cuba’s economic woes, Messersmith supported another revision to the ¡934 Reciprocal Trade Agreement and the ¡939 Supplementary Agreement because they had primarily benefited U.S. producers. A new agreement was signed on December 24, ¡94¡. In addition, the United States purchased the entire ¡942 Cuban sugar crop for $2.65 per pound. Both actions contributed to a rapid improvement in the island’s economy. Despite his contributions to improving the Cuban economy, Messersmith viewed his primary function to condition the Cuban people for the outbreak of total war, including

Miró Cardona U.S. involvement. With the fall of France in May ¡940, Messersmith saw the line of defense shift to the Americas, and he strongly believed that the Latin American nations needed to align themselves with the United States. The Cuban leadership followed Messersmith’s call for cooperation long before the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, ¡94¡. The ambassador was pleased with the Cuban support when he left the island on December 25, ¡94¡, to assume the ambassadorship in Mexico. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Good Neighbor policy; Trade Agreements: Second Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡94¡; Welles, Benjamin Sumner; World War II

Miró Cardona, José (¡902–¡974) Mioó Cardona served as first prime minister of Cuba’s provisional government in ¡959. Born in Havana, Miró Cardona attended local schools and in ¡938 graduated from the University of Havana law school. He held several professional positions, including the presidency of the Cuban Bar Association. Miró Cardona called for the resignation of Fulgencio Batista in ¡956 and later served in the Dalogo Civico, a group of professionals who sought a peaceful solution to the government crisis. Miró Cardona also became secretary-general of the Frente Civico Revolucionario Democrático, an organization that coordinated the activities of several anti–Batista groups. In ¡958 after being charged with authoring a widely distributed document that called for Batista’s resignation, Miró Cardona gained asylum in the Uruguayan embassy. Following the revolution’s triumph in January ¡959, Miró Cardona became prime minister of the provisional government only to resign one month after being appointed, recognizing that Fidel Castro held all power. Subsequently, Miró Cardona lost favor with Castro for opposing his revolutionary reforms. He went into exile in June ¡960. Cardona was slated to be president of Cuba had the ¡96¡ Bay of Pigs invasion been successful. There-

138 after, Miró Cardona resided in Puerto Rico, where he continued his anti–Castro activities and taught law at the University of Puerto Rico until his death on August ¡0, ¡974. See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Revolution: United States Presidential Administrations and the Revolution

Missile Crisis, ¡962 On October ¡4, ¡962, a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance plane’s photographs confirmed that Soviet missile sites were being constructed in Cuba. President John F. Kennedy immediately formed an Executive Committee (EXCOM) of the National Security Council (NSC) to examine alternative responses to their presence. EXCOM included Vice President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta› General Maxwell Taylor, Central Intelligence Agency Director John McCone, Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Martin, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson, Under Secretary of State George Ball and, Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, and presidential advisors Theodore Sorenson and McGeorge Bundy. Other statesmen who came to consult included Charles Bohlen, Adlai Stevenson, Dean Acheson and Robert Lovett. For the next two weeks, the world stood on the brink of a nuclear war. A variety of reasons have been advanced regarding the Soviet reasons for placing missiles in Cuba. For Fidel Castro, the reason was simple: to forestall any intended U.S. invasion of the island. Although Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev often stated that he would defend Cuba against any U.S. attack, geopolitical reasons most likely were more important. Since Kennedy’s failure with the Bay of Pigs invasion in April ¡96¡ and the president’s alleged perceived weakness at their June ¡96¡ Vienna summit conference, Khrushchev was

139

Missile Crisis

Location of Soviet Missile Sites in Cuba. (IRBM: Intermediate Range and Ballistic Missles; MRBM: Medium Range Ballistic Missles)

encouraged to take bolder steps. Missiles in Cuba gave at least a public challenge to the perception of Soviet missile inferiority, strengthened the Soviet hand regarding U.S. missiles in Europe, and provided the Soviets a bargaining chip over Berlin. Kennedy’s response has been placed within the historical context of the Monroe Doctrine, which in ¡823, declared the Western Hemisphere o›limits to European encroachments. The doctrine served as a U.S. policy tool ever since. A congressional resolution in late September ¡960, two years before the missile crisis, authorized direct military intervention in Cuba to rid it of communism. It not only illustrated the contemporary application of the Monroe Doctrine but also challenged Kennedy to do something about his perceived weakness in the face of Soviet aggressiveness. In this atmosphere, one cannot escape the fact that congressional elections were scheduled for November ¡960. Between October ¡6 and 2¡, EXCOM considered a variety of responses Two groups quickly emerged. The “hawks,” who favored an immediate air strike included Acheson,

Bundy, Johnson, McCone and Taylor. A moderate group — Robert Kennedy, McNamara and Ball — favored a blockade. Rusk consistently argued on behalf of international support before any plan of action was implemented. Rusk also supported the imposition of a “defensive quarantine” against o›ensive weapons in Cuba. According to State Department counsel Lawrence Meeker a “defensive quarantine” was legal within the confines of international law. To Rusk, it also provided a way for Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to back out of the crisis. EXCOM rationalized that the quarantine of o›ensive weapons into Cuba, placed responsibility upon Khrushchev to violate the quarantine or not. To implement the plan, the full NSC decided the following: 1. Kennedy would inform the American public in a national television address on October 22 about the Soviet missiles in Cuba. 2. The naval quarantine would be announced at that time. 3. An appeal would be made for support from the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS).

Missile Crisis 4. Khrushchev would be asked to remove all missiles from Cuba. 5. Kennedy would dispatch emissaries to British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan and French President Charles DeGaulle to advise them in advance of the president’s speech. On the morning of October 22, Dean Acheson embarked for London and David K. Bruce for Paris to inform MacMillan and De Gaulle. At 5 P.M. that afternoon, Kennedy informed congressional leaders of his plan. At 7 P.M. the president addressed the nation. On the next day, October 23, Secretary of State Dean Rusk obtained OAS approval for the quarantine and for the use of force to end the crisis, if necessary. All OAS members, except Uruguay, approved the quarantine, while Brazil, Mexico, and Bolivia abstained from approving the use of force. At the same time, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson indicted the Soviet Union before the UN Security Council, including the showing of the U-2 photographs. Because the Soviets had veto power, no action was sought from the UN Security Council. The U.S. quarantine went into e›ect on October 24, when a naval task force of ¡9 ships set up a picket line in the Atlantic, 500 miles from Cuba. On October 23, in response to Kennedy’s initiatives, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev sent out two divergent messages. In a formal letter to Kennedy, Khrushchev denounced the blockade as an act of piracy that brought the world to the brink of nuclear disaster. He also sent a message to the noted British pacifist Bertrand Russell, in which Khrushchev denounced the Americans for their aggression but also because he understood the potential disaster of a nuclear war, Khrushchev stated that he was willing to consider a top-level meeting to settle the Cuban crisis. On October 25, the first two Soviet cargo ships of a 25-ship flotilla in the Atlantic, neared the U.S. blockade point. A Soviet submarine separated the Soviet cargo carriers from the U.S. naval ships. About the same time the U.S.S. Essex signaled the submarine to surface. Instead, the submarine turned away from the blockade. The U.S. Navy also re-

140 ported that 20 of the Soviet ships in the blockade area either stopped or turned back toward Europe. The first challenge to the U.S. quarantine came on October 25, when the Navy was told to permit the Bucharest to pass the blockade because visual sighting indicated that it carried no cargo connected with missiles. The ship Marcula, however, was stopped and searched before it was allowed to sail on to Cuba. The process was completed with the remaining Soviet ships that had not turned away from their route to Cuba. Throughout the week the president’s brother, Robert F. Kennedy, met privately with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to help facilitate communications between Washington and Moscow and to anticipate future events. These conversations alarmed Dobrynin su‡ciently to warn his superiors in Moscow that President Kennedy, whose political future rested on the outcome of this crisis, might accept the advice of his hawkish advisors to conduct bombing raids on the Cuban missile sites or actually invade the island, although Dobrynin thought the latter less likely. Certainly, Kennedy was under pressure from the Joint Chiefs of Sta›, and particularly from General Curtis LeMay, to carry out an air assault on the island to be followed by its invasion. Kennedy next confronted the issue of removing the missiles from Cuba. During the day of October 26 he received a personal letter from Khrushchev in which the premier o›ered to remove the missiles from Cuba if Kennedy gave assurances that the United States would not invade the island. That evening ABC news reporter John Scali met privately with Soviet KGB agent Aleksandr Fomin (correctly, Feldisov) in a Washington, D.C., co›ee shop. Fomin suggested the terms of a deal: Soviet withdrawal of the missiles, UN on-site inspection, and a U.S. noninvasion pledge for Cuba. Scali took the message to the White House. On October 27, before responding, Kennedy received a more formal note from Khrushchev in which he o›ered to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba if Kennedy dismantled U.S. missile bases in Turkey. Kennedy refused to publicly

141 link the two. Through his brother Robert F. Kennedy, who met privately with Dobrynin, the Soviets agreed to keep secret the removal of the missiles from Turkey because the NATO members had not been told about this decision. With the missile removal issue resolved and Kennedy willing to issue a noninvasion pledge, on October 28 Khrushchev told his Moscow radio audience that Soviet missiles would be removed from Cuba. Castro, who had not been consulted during the Kennedy-Khrushchev discussions, was furious. He refused to sanction UN supervisors coming into Cuba to oversee the missiles’ removal. While U.S. air surveillance ensured that was done, Castro’s lack of cooperation prompted Kennedy to revise the nonintervention pledge: the U.S. would not invade Cuba “while matters take their present favorable course,” Kennedy noted. The definitiveness of the U.S. noninvasion pledge was resolved in ¡970. Release of new documentation and revelations made at conferences in Washington, D.C., Moscow and Havana in the early ¡990s, revealed just how close the world came to nuclear war. In October ¡962, The Pentagon estimated that a ¡80,000-man invasion force, sustaining ¡0 percent casualties, would be needed to invade Cuba. While evidence indicates that The Pentagon had plans for the potential use of biological weapons to be used in advance of any invasion, there is no evidence that discussion of germ warfare ever reached high-level policymakers. At the same time, U.S. intelligence did not know that there were 42,000 Soviet troops and at least nine Soviet short-range tactical warheads in Cuba. Confronted with a U.S. invasion force, the Soviet ground commander subsequently claimed that he would have used them. See also Kennedy, John F.; Kennedy, Robert F.; McNamara, Robert; Rusk, Dean; Soviet Union: Soviet Naval Base; Stevenson, Adlai;

Monroe, James (¡758–¡83¡) Fifth president of the United States (¡8¡7–¡825), Madison served in the Revolu-

Monroe Doctrine tionary War, the U.S. Senate, and as secretary of state in the Madison administration prior to his election as president. Monroe came to the presidency with the same convictions about the strategic importance of Cuba to the United States that were held by his immediate predecessors, Thomas Je›erson and James Madison. During his presidency, the SpanishAmerican colonies, save Cuba and Puerto Rico, were fighting for their independence from Spain. Under pressure from several U.S. groups to intervene on their behalf, Madison refused, fearing that it might jeopardize negotiations with Spain for the acquisition of east Florida. Monroe was also concerned that Britain might occupy the island, particularly in ¡8¡7 when newspaper stories circulated to that e›ect. In ¡822 a secret agent from Cuba (identified only as Mr. Sanchez) brought Monroe a proposal for the annexation of the island to the United States. He represented Cuba’s planter class. Madison discussed the proposal on at least one occasion with his cabinet. The o›er was rejected. Secretary of War John C. Calhoun feared that the acquisition might result in war with Great Britain, while Monroe and his secretary of state John Quincy Adams preferred to see the outcome of the independence movement. When it came in ¡822, a new set of conditions arose that led to the Monroe Doctrine. See also Adams, John Quincy; Je›erson, Thomas; Madison, James; Monroe Doctrine

Monroe Doctrine Issued by President James Monroe in his annual message to Congress on December 2, ¡823, the statement declared that the Western Hemisphere was no longer open to European colonization and that those colonies in existence were not to be expanded. The Doctrine’s origins are traced to events in Spain when, in the spring of ¡823, a French army was dispatched to restore the Spanish monarchy of Ferdinand VII. The European powers momentarily considered sending a French-Spanish force to the New World to restore the newly independent nations to the Spanish

Morgan crown. The possibility of military action stirred rumors indicating that France might receive Cuba as compensation for restoring the wayward colonies to Spanish control. Monroe took the issue to his cabinet, which considered proposing a joint declaration with the British against the possible French possession of Cuba. Both Secretary of State John Quincy Adams and Secretary of War John C. Calhoun opposed the suggestion on the grounds that it would restrict future U.S. interests and policies toward Cuba. Writing from Monticello, Thomas Je›erson concurred. President Monroe shared these opinions and, like his colleagues, believed that Cuba would someday attach itself to the Union. There matters rested until the summer of ¡823 when the British foreign minister, George Canning, proposed to the United States that the two nations make a joint declaration against the restoration of Spain’s New World colonies to the mother country. Initially Monroe recommended in favor of joint action, a position given qualified support by former presidents Thomas Je›erson and James Madison. While Je›erson did not want the declaration applied to Cuba, Madison questioned the declaration’s applicability to Cuba’s future. The latter also counseled that the only route to acquisition was via armed force, something that the United States was unprepared to do in ¡823. Madison, however, as did Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, took a nationalistic stance. He opposed any joint declaration with the British. As to Cuba, Adams declared that a pronouncement would be “an inconvenient pledge against ourselves” for the day when the Cubans would seek admission to the United States. Adams’s nationalism carried the argument. Monroe rejected Canning’s proposal, and on December 2, ¡823, he announced that any European e›ort to control the destiny of the independent Latin American nations would be an “unfriendly disposition” toward the United States and that any European e›ort to “to extend their system to any portion of the Western Hemisphere [would be] … dangerous to our peace and safety.” Monroe’s declara-

142 tion extended the ¡8¡¡ no-transfer principle to the entire hemisphere. His pledge that the United States would not interfere with the “existing colonies or dependencies of any European powers” reflected current U.S. policy toward Cuba: Spanish control of the island best served U.S. interests. See also Adams, John Quincy; Je›erson, Thomas; Madison, James; No-Transfer Policy

Morgan, John T. (¡824–¡907) A Democratic senator from Alabama, Morgan supported U.S. expansion in the late nineteenth century. Shortly after the outbreak of the Cuban revolution in ¡895, Morgan expressed the belief that the island would someday come under U.S. control. He opposed the neutrality stance of the Cleveland administration and supported the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s recommendation for a concurrent resolution that would extend belligerent status to the Cuban insurgents. In fact, Morgan delivered an emotional appeal for the rights of the belligerents on the Senate floor, assailing Spain’s autocratic rule over the Cubans; but it was to no avail. In ¡896, Morgan advocated a resolution calling for the granting of belligerents’ rights to the Cuban insurgents, this time as a means to protect U.S. property rights on the island. Shortly after William L. McKinley began his presidency in March ¡897, Morgan made his third attempt to have Congress recognize Cuban belligerency. This time the Senate approved such a resolution, but the House of Representatives refused to act on the measure. Despite the setback, Morgan continued to speak on behalf of the Cuban insurrectionists, often comparing them to the heroes of the American Revolution. He also maintained that the Cuban problem would not be solved until the United States intervened. During the events of March and April ¡898, that led to the U.S. congressional war resolutions, Morgan was absent from the debate, but he did serve on the conference committee that reconciled the di›erences between the two legislative

143

New York Junta

Movimiento de 26 Julio see 26th of July Movement

Cuban executive. Compensation was to be paid on the basis of Cuban government valuations from a fund created by the proceeds of sales of sugar to the United States in excess of 3.5 million tons at a price of at least 5.75 cents per pound. The landowners were to receive thirty-year bonds bearing 2 percent interest with service contingent upon the aforementioned fund. Since the fund would have no resources until U.S. purchases of Cuban sugar reached amounts not attained since World War II, and at prices well above those prevailing at the time, it was clear that the law’s intent was the confiscation of U.S. properties without compensation. In June ¡960 Castro threatened such action at a time when the U.S. Congress was debating the extension of the Sugar Act of ¡948, which included provisions for the president to cut the Cuban sugar quota. The law was announced immediately following U.S. congressional approval of the ¡960 Sugar Act and implemented immediately following President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s announced cut in the Cuban sugar quota on July 6, ¡960. The Cuban government seized 37 U.S.–owned sugar mills, valued at $260 million according to the Cuban government. Over the next several weeks many other U.S. companies lost properties in Cuba, including the Cuban Portland Cement Company, Owens Illinois Glass Company, Swift and Company, Armour and Company, and the Moa Bay nickel and cobalt plant. By November ¡960 the U.S. Commerce Department reported more than $¡ billion in direct U.S. investments in Cuba had been taken over by the Cuban government. These actions led Eisenhower to subsequently embargo all Cuban sugar through March 3¡, ¡96¡. See also Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Revolution: United States Presidential Administrations and the Revolution; Sugar; Sugar Acts: Sugar Act of ¡960; Trade Embargo

Nationalization Law of ¡960

New York Junta

Decreed on July 5, ¡960, the law of Nationalization authorized the expropriation of American properties at the discretion of the

The Junta was an organization of Cubans residing in the United States and American sympathizers to the Cuban causes against

branches. He was, however, disappointed that Congress made no provision for Cuban independence. Once the war began, Morgan supported various measures for Cuban independence — taxes, military supplies, and obtaining military commissions for Alabamians. He voted for the ratification of the ¡898 Paris Treaty that ended the war but parted ways with the administration over the government of Cuba, arguing that Congress, not the executive branch, had final authority on the matter. Subsequently, he opposed the Platt Amendment, which, he charged, established a U.S. protectorate over Cuba rather than an independent nation. Morgan, who never lost sight of Cuba’s future annexation to the United States, advocated the island’s independence and a free trade treaty with the United States, which he believed would eventually lead the Cubans to seek annexation to the United States. Following Cuba’s independence in ¡902, Morgan continued to champion the island’s annexation to the United States on the senate floor until his death in ¡907. See also Cleveland, Grover; McKinley, William; Platt Amendment; United States Occupation of Cuba

Movimiento Montecristi

One of many plots against the Fulgencio Batista dictatorship was named for the Montecristi Declaration issued by José Martí and Máximo Gómez y Bâez in ¡895. In April ¡956, Jorge Carillo headed a group of Army o‡cers to free their leader, Rafael Barquín, from the Isle of Pines. Batista uncovered the plot and arrested its instigators. See also Barquin, Rafael; Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio

New York Junta Spain. At various times, Juntas were established in several U.S. cities, but that which had the greatest impact was the one located in New York City. When filibuster Narciso López led expeditions to Cuba between ¡848 and ¡85¡, a split in the exile Cuban Creole community developed over the future status of the island. The conservative Cuban Council of New York, linked to the island’s Havana Club, desired “home rule within the empire” to stay within the Spanish orbit but with greater political power for the local planter class, which wanted to preserve the existing social order. These groups did not believe that Cuba could sustain itself independently, nor did annexation to the United States o›er greater opportunity. In ¡848, when the Council refused to support López’s plans, López founded his own Junta Cubano in New York City. It subsequently opened o‡ces in Washington, D.C., and New Orleans and sold heavily discounted bonds in the United States based on the credit of the future Cuban Republic. Southerners who had their own political and economic interests in Cuba made most purchases. Although López vacillated between independence and annexation, the Junta membership increasingly came to advocate Cuba’s independence through filibustering. In ¡853, the Junta struck a deal with Mississipian John A. Quitman to lead a filibuster attack upon Cuba. Quitman envisioned a southern slavery empire that would include Cuba and Mexico. Historical debate remains regarding support for the Quitman expedition from the Pierce administration, which wanted to incorporate Cuba into the United States. By terms of the agreement with the Junta, Quitman was designated the civil and military chief of the revolution with full power of a dictator to be used for overthrowing the Spanish government in Cuba. For his services Quitman would receive one million dollars. Several factors contributed to continual postponement of the Quitman expedition — raising su‡cient funds and volunteer soldiers, the termination of Spain’s Africanization policy and its defense preparations for the island, the

144 publication of the Ostend Manifesto, and the failure of an internal uprising on the island as promised by the Junta. Finally the Quitman project disbanded in the early spring of ¡854, but there was no accounting of the money raised for it by the Junta, nor did any of its bondholders receive payment. Disillusioned, the Junta disbanded. With the outbreak of the Ten Years’ War on the island in ¡868, several Juntas appeared in major U.S. cities, but the one in New York emerged as the most important. As previously, its leadership was comprised of rich Cuban Creole expatriates who often squabbled among themselves about Cuba’s future. Some favored independence of the island, while others saw it as the first step toward annexation to the United States. The Junta’s primary objective was to provide support for the insurgents in Cuba. Reportedly, during the first year of the conflict it provided the rebels with over one million dollars for supplies and men. Thereafter, figures varied, but Junta-sponsored ships regularly left U.S. coastal ports in violation of U.S. neutrality laws. Once on the high seas the ships often ran afoul of Spanish naval vessels guarding entrances to the Cuban coast. The Junta also undertook its own publication campaign with the printing of handbills and booklets. The Junta successfully told its story to the American press, which in turn badgered the Grant administration to extend belligerent status, if not intervene, on behalf of the Cuban insurgents. Allegedly several U.S. congressmen received bribes in the form of bonds from the Junta in order to gain legislative support in Washington and to exert pressure on the administration. The Junta reached into the Cabinet itself by providing bonds to Secretary of War John A. Rawlins. Although exact figures were never produced, the press speculated that approximately $¡00 million worth of bonds were provided to Rawlins, legislators, and other influential figures. In the end, the bonds were worthless. The Junta approved Secretary of State Hamilton Fish’s ¡869 plan to mediate the conflict, including the payment of a $¡00 mil-

145 lion indemnity to Spain, but it unanimously opposed the Spanish countero›er that called for the insurgents to lay down their arms during negotiations. The Junta leadership, like Fish, understood that if the insurgents did so, they e›ectively surrendered. For this and other reasons, the mediation plan was abandoned. As the war degenerated into a brutally savage a›air, the Junta continued to raise money and attract men, circumvent U.S. neutrality laws, and arouse the press, but its political influence in Washington greatly diminished. Also, the political distance between the Junta, and the insurgent leaders markedly widened. At the end of the Ten Years’ War in ¡878, the New York Junta went out of existence. With the outbreak of the Cuban War for Independence in ¡895, the New York Junta was revived, and following the death of José Martí, May ¡895, it took on new meaning under the leadership of Tomás Estrada Palma. Technically designated as “The American Delegation of the Cuban Revolutionary Party,” Estrada Palma transformed the Junta into the diplomatic agent of the revolution’s provisional government in Cuba. Thereafter the acronym PRC (for Partido Revolucionario Cubano) was freely inter-changed with the term Junta. Estrada Palma assumed the title of minister to the United States and appointed diplomats to capitals throughout Europe and Latin America. In sharp contrast to Martí, Estrada Palma did not think that the Cubans alone could win on the battlefield, and he therefore pressured the United States to grant belligerent status to the insurgents and have it play a significant role in mediating an end to the conflict. As the war dragged into late ¡897 with no victory in sight, Estrada Palma supported U.S. intervention into the conflict. The Junta’s changing policies brought it into conflict with the provisional government in Cuba and with the insurgent generals in the field. Neither envisioned any U.S. role in the conflict, except as a source of arms and munitions, for which the Junta was originally commissioned. In late ¡896 and into ¡897, the

New York Junta Junta begged the Liberation Army not to destroy sugar and tobacco plantations, as many disenchanted planters contributed funds to the Junta for arms purchases. This was to no avail, as the insurgent army committed itself to total war. Estrada Palma also unsuccessfully argued against the destruction of American owned properties in Cuba because it made his solicitation e›orts that much more di‡cult. In late ¡897, the Junta engaged in an unsuccessful bond scheme with New York businessmen John J. McCook and Samuel M. Janney that was designed to purchase Cuba’s independence. When the Cuban provisional government and Liberation Army rejected the Spanish political reform program in January ¡898, it also instructed the Junta to impress upon the Americans that autonomy was not an option. The split became more pronounced in April ¡898 with the U.S. congressional war resolution that was silent on the issue of Cuban independence. Against the wishes of the island’s insurgents, Estrada Palma and the Junta endorsed the resolution and placed the liberation army under U.S. military command. Although the Provisional Government subsequently invoked the latter decision, it was so angered at Estrada Palma’s support of U.S. intervention that it dispatched Vice President Domingo Méndez Capote to supersede Estrada Palma in its representations to the U.S. government. For the remainder of the year, the Junta labored without consulting the provisional government in Cuba and, in fact, by the year’s end there was no communication between the two. When the United States and Spain agreed to terms on ending the war, Junta representatives played no part in the discussions leading to the peace protocol. They were simply summoned to Washington to accept the protocol, an act that further angered the insurgents in Cuba. Nor did the United States consult with the Junta regarding the goals and objectives of the Paris Peace talks during the fall of ¡898. As the war ended and U.S. occupation of the island commenced on January ¡, ¡899, the Junta no longer had a reason for existence, but its

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membership shared the U.S. concern for stable government on the island. Subsequently, many former Junta members accepted government positions during the U.S. occupation period. See also Estrada Palma, Tomás; Bond Schemes; O’Sullivan, John; Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Auténtico); SpanishAmerican War; Ten Years’ War; War for Independence

Nixon, Richard M. (¡9¡3–¡994) The thirty-seventh president of the United States, Nixon was noted for pursuing détente with the Soviet Union, rapprochement with China, and a slow withdrawal from the war in Vietnam and for resigning the presidency in August ¡974. Nixon selected Henry Kissinger as his national security advisor and, until Nixon’s resignation from the presidency, the two worked closely together on foreign policy issues, often sharing similar views. Overwhelmed with the war in Vietnam and more interested in pursuing détente with the Soviet Union, Nixon gave little attention to Latin America except to support anticommunist regimes. Prior to his presidency, Nixon served as vice president under Dwight Eisenhower from ¡953 to ¡96¡. During this term, Nixon formed and impression of Castro.

Castro Meeting of ¡959 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who refused to meet with Fidel Castro during Castro’s eleven-day visit to the United States in April ¡959, departed for a golf outing in Augusta, Georgia, and assigned Vice President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State Christian A. Herter the task of meeting with the Cuban leader. Much secrecy surrounded their meetings, but a Nixon memorandum describing his three-and-one-half-hour encounter with Castro has surfaced and provides insights into Nixon’s understanding of the Cuban leader. The meeting is instructive because it came at a time when U.S. policymak-

ers were debating the extent of Castro’s communist leanings. Nixon concluded that no matter what Americans thought of Castro, he did have leadership qualities that would make him attractive to Cubans and Latin Americans alike. Nixon found Castro “incredibly naïve about communism or under communist discipline,” most likely the former. Nixon also concluded that Castro’s ideas on administering a government or economy were less developed than other leaders Nixon encountered during his visits to fifty other countries. Nixon did not accept Castro’s argument that Castro should indefinitely postpone Cuban elections because that was the “will of the people.” Castro also failed to impress his host that, given Cuba’s political past, the people lost confidence in elections and in elected o‡cials and that time was needed to develop that confidence. Instead, Nixon strongly urged Castro to hold elections in the near future to restore public confidence in government, or Cuba would run the risk of returning to a dictatorship. In response to Nixon’s warning that communists might make inroads into Castro’s revolutionary movement and turn the movement to their own advantage at the expense of Castro and the Cuban people, Castro replied that his people had always been vigilant against such opportunists. Nixon also urged Castro to bring competent people into his administration and delegate responsibilities to them and not pursue economic development programs at the expense of civil and human liberties. In all of these matters, Nixon concluded that he had not made much of impression on Castro. Nixon found “little [to] disagree with” when Castro asserted that U.S. arms assistance to Cuba and other Latin American countries for hemispheric defense was senseless. Castro explained that neither Cuba nor other Latin American countries could o›er much to the defense of the Western Hemisphere and that the arms were used by Batista and other Latin American political leaders to ensure their own position. Castro suggested that the money for arms be used for economic development. In fact,

147 Castro emphasized the need for U.S.-government rather than private-sector investments. Nixon did not understand Castro’s poorly explained rationale for wanting governmentsponsored industrialization. Castro also deflected Nixon’s suggestions that Cuba look to the Puerto Rican example, where Muñoz Marin welcomed private investments that brought industrialization, employment, and prosperity to the island. To follow the Puerto Rican model, Castro pointed out, would return Cuba to its former colonial status. Instead, Castro argued that agrarian reform would get more disposable income into the people’s hands, which in turn would spark the industrial process. The U.S. vice president concluded that nothing could be done to divert Castro “from his course of leading Cuba toward more socialism of its economy.” Castro took this opportunity to chastise the U.S. press and public for its criticism of him and his policies. Rather than be fearful of communist inroads around the world, Castro urged that U.S. o‡cials, the press, and public should explain why its political and economic systems were superior to the communist model. Nixon took Castro’s sensitivity to criticism as a reason to curtail Cuban press freedoms, which he subsequently did. As a result of this meeting, Nixon recommended that because of Castro’s current power and leadership abilities, the United States had “no choice but at least to try to orient him in the right direction.” See also Herter, Christian A.; Revolution: United States Presidential Administrations and the Revolution

Administration Policy Nixon brought with him a deep sensitivity about Cuba when he arrived at the White House in January ¡969. He believed that John F. Kennedy had won the ¡960 presidential election because of his hard line on Cuba and Fidel Castro and that, as president, Kennedy had manipulated the ¡962 missile crisis to have an impact upon undecided voters in the November congressional elections.

Nixon Nixon attributed that manipulation to the last-minute rush of Democratic voters, who not only impacted California’s congressional elections but also caused Nixon to lose his bid for the California governorship. Nixon also came to the White House determined to continue the Kennedy-Johnson policies of isolating Cuba from the international community. Nixon and Kissinger also favored renewed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covert operations, but CIA director Richard Helms demurred, asserting that the risks far outweighed the possible gains. Castro’s actions since his meeting with Nixon in ¡959 bolstered the president’s view that Castro, indeed, was a communist. The alleged construction of Soviet naval facilities at Cienfuegos in ¡970 confirmed the administration’s perception that Cuba remained within the Soviet orbit and, hence, was a pawn in the Cold War. Between ¡970 and ¡974, the Nixon administration resisted Latin American pressures to end Cuba’s isolation, arguing that Castro continued to export revolution throughout the hemisphere. Many Latin American governments found Nixon’s rapprochement with China inconsistent with the continued isolation of Cuba. Even after the anti-hijacking agreement in ¡973, Nixon refused to reevaluate U.S. policy until Cuba changed its “attitude and policies” toward the United States and Latin America. Nixon did not expect that to happen. Despite Nixon’s and, subsequently, President Gerald R. Ford’s hard-line policy, between ¡973 and ¡975 Cuba’s isolation from the world began to crumble. Between ¡970 and ¡974, Nixon also confronted congressional critics, particularly in light of his pursuance of détente with the Soviet Union. These congressmen argued that Castro’s regime was unchallenged from within; Cuba had largely abandoned its support of Third World revolutions, hemispheric support for the isolation of Cuba was eroding, Cuba’s expanded links with U.S. allies illustrated the futility of the White House’s rigid stance; and there were advantages to reestablishing diplomatic relations. In ¡970, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.) was among

Norweb the few who called for reassessment, but by ¡973 several Republicans joined the chorus. That March, the Senate’s Foreign Relations Western Hemispheric Subcommittee held hearings on the subject. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American A›airs Robert Hurwitch restated the White House opposition to Cuba’s military connection to the Soviets and the belief that Cuba remained a threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere. See also Air Hijackings: Anti-Hijacking Accord; Ford, Gerald; Kissinger, Henry A.; Organization of American States: Fifteenth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign A›airs, Sixteenth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign A›airs; Soviet Union: Soviet Naval Base

Norweb, R. Henry (¡896–¡983) A political appointee, Norweb served as U.S. ambassador to Cuba from ¡945 to ¡948 during the presidential administration of Ramón Grau San Martín. Norweb attempted to persuade Grau San Martín to accept the U.S. proposed Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. Norweb and his embassy sta› attributed Grau’s resistance to the proposed treaty to special interest groups in Cuba: the business sector which favored protective tari›s; the sugar growers, who benefited from the global demand for Cuban sugar; and organized labor, which was the largest single prop of the Grau San Martin administration. See also Grau San Martin, Ramón; Truman, Harry S

No-Transfer Principle The no-transfer principle dates to the early ¡800s and states that the United States opposed the transfer of any territory in the Western Hemisphere from one European power to another because it threatened U.S. security. The threat to U.S. security increased when the transfer of territory went from a weak, harmless state to a strong, potentially hostile state. President James Madison applied the principle in ¡8¡¡ when he declared that the

148 transfer of Spanish Florida to another European power posed a security threat to the United States. The no-transfer principle found expression in the ¡823 Monroe Doctrine, which declared the Western Hemisphere o›-limits to future European colonization. In ¡808 Thomas Je›erson made the first use of the no-transfer principle with regard to Cuba when he advised against the island’s independence from Spain. In the mid–¡820s. President John Quincy Adams used the notransfer principle to justif y continued U.S. support for Spanish control over Cuba rather than encourage the island’s independence, which might result in increased British or French influence over it. Thereafter, throughout the nineteenth century, the no-transfer principle became a fundamental guideline of U.S. policy toward Cuba. See also Adams, John Quincy; Je›erson, Thomas; Monroe Doctrine

Occupation see United States Occupation Olney, Richard B. (¡8¡5–¡9¡7) A native of Massachusetts, Olney had a successful law and legislative career in that state prior to serving as attorney general for two years and then as President Cleveland’s secretary of state from ¡895 to ¡897. At the time of his appointment as secretary of state in July ¡895 Olney held the opinion that Spain could not win the war in Cuba and that an insurgent victory would only bring chaos to the island. In the face of the crisis, Olney explored three policy options. He dismissed extending recognition to the belligerents because it implied the belief of the insurgents’ capabilities to establish meaningful self-government. Also, by not recognizing belligerency the United States could continue to hold both sides accountable for damages inflicted upon U.S. properties in their zones. Belligerency, Olney reasoned, only relieved Spain of all responsibility for damages wrought to American prop-

149 erty by the insurgents. Olney thought the best way to protect U.S. property and interests on the island was to purchase it, but he understood that Spain was not about to sell it. Olney also found recognition of Cuban independence even less attractive than Spain’s retention of the island. He doubted that the insurgents would ever be capable of establishing an e›ective government, and, in fact, he reasoned that independence would only increase the possibility of war with Spain. Once the United States extended recognition to Cuba, any attempt by Spain to reimpose its control over Cuba would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine and, as such, would prompt a U.S. response. The remaining alternative was to assist Spain in quelling the rebellion and instituting extensive administrative reform on the island. Pacification, Spain argued, would come only with the submission of the rebels, and that would come only by the U.S. controlling the filibustering activities emanating from its shores and by shutting down the New York Junta. To correct the distorted information coming from Cuba, Olney and Cleveland agreed that a special consul should be sent to the island. However, their choice, General Fitzhugh Lee, proved to be the wrong one. Lee advocated U.S. annexation of Cuba, and his highly emotional reports made their way to the public, which further inflamed popular opinion. Olney and Cleveland also dismissed as absurd Lee’s proposal that the United States purchase the island from Spain and turn it over to the insurgents. Subsequently, Olney was persuaded by U.S. businessman Edwin Atlkins, who had extensive investments in Cuba, that the insurgents could provide local government under Spanish autonomy. By late ¡895, Olney and President Cleveland accepted this point of view, which led Olney, in March ¡896, to informally advise Spain’s minister to the United States, Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, that the administration opposed an insurgent victory and that it would not extend belligerent status to the insurgents or intervene on their behalf de-

Operation Mongoose spite U.S. public and congressional pressure to do so. To defuse the moral cause of the insurgents’ revolt, Olney urged Spain to introduce meaningful reforms while retaining Spanish sovereignty over Cuba. Once Spain defined the reforms, Olney promised U.S. good o‡ces in achieving those ends. Despite Dupuy de Lôme’s encouragement, the Spanish government rejected any U.S. role in bringing the conflict to an end. Prime Minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo believed that the U.S. would not impartially mediate either an end to the conflict or the implementation of political reforms. After he left the secretaryship, Olney returned to his law practice. Although he remained a prominent figure in the Democratic Party, Olney rejected President Woodrow Wilson’s o›ers to serve as Ambassador to Great Britain or on the Federal Reserve Board. See also Cleveland, Grover S.; New York Junta; War for Independence: Spanish Policy and the War

Operation Mongoose In December ¡96¡, President John F. Kennedy approved a major covert plan to “use all available assets” to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba. Counterinsurgency expert General Edward Lansdale directed the sabotage program, dubbed “Operation Mongoose,” to be carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The plan had its origins in the failure of the April ¡96¡ Bay of Pigs invasion. A special White House committee that investigated the failed invasion recommended that covert military operations remain a major policy instrument in the Kennedy administration’s determination to oust Castro from Cuba. Beginning in the summer of ¡96¡, the CIA conducted sabotage operations that included the burning of sugarcane and attempting to establish an array of contacts inside Cuba. Progress was slow, particularly in recruiting agents inside Cuba because of Castro’s popularity and the Cuban government’s e›ective intelligence operations. The slow progress

Operation Pedro Pan prompted Kennedy to push the issue that subsequently resulted in ‘Operation Mongoose.” A command post was established at Miami, Florida, radio station JM-WAVE to serve as the nerve center of worldwide anti– Castro operations. At its peak, the station had a $50 million operating budget, a permanent sta› more than 300 Americans, and an estimated 2,000 intelligence agents around the globe conducting anti–Castro activities. Sabotage teams began infiltrating Cuba in ¡962 to destroy strategic projects such as sugar mills, oil refineries, bridges, and the cable car system transporting copper ore from the Matahambre mines. The plan also included attacks upon Cuba’s food supplies through crop destruction and shipping containers. The incidents served to enhance, not destroy, Castro’s popularity as he blamed each instance of sabotage upon the United States. The interagency committee that oversaw the operation became increasingly apprehensive about the program’s e›ectiveness, but not President Kennedy, who wanted to accelerate the acts of sabotage. The clash of opinion resulted in the disbanding of the interagency committee in October ¡962 to be replaced by a special White House group headed by presidential advisor McGeorge Bundy. This group also concluded that “Operation Mongoose” was not e›ective, and Bundy ordered the cessation of all such activities in April ¡963. Throughout “Operation Mongoose,” the CIA attempted to utilize the Cuban exile community in Miami, but often these Cubans acted on their own without consideration for U.S. global interests. For example, in March ¡963, a Cuban exile group blew up two Soviet vessels near the Cuban coast. One June ¡9, ¡963, Kennedy directed yet another round of sabotage against Cuban power plants, oil refineries, communication networks, sugar mill complexes, and other production centers. Into ¡964 the CIA reportedly was sending fifty agents per week into Cuba to carry out the attacks. Thirteen sabotage attacks were carried out between November ¡963 and January ¡964 alone. In addition, a cargo of Cuban sugar was conta-

150 minated while on a British freighter docked in Puerto Rico, and a British ship carrying Leyland buses enroute to Cuba was sunk in the Thames River. Again, U.S. policymakers debated the e›ectiveness of the operations, and on April 7, ¡964, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered their termination. American e›orts to assassinate Castro began in the Eisenhower administration and continued through the Johnson years. Again, the CIA was charged with the responsibility of eliminating Castro. In the spring of ¡96¡, Cuban army major and CIA agent Rolando Cubela was involved in two attempts against Castro’s life. In early ¡962 the CIA provided underworld figure John Roselli with poison pills, small arms, and explosives to deliver to his Cuban contacts for use in the elimination of Castro. In ¡963 two bizarre plans were attempted: placing explosives in the area where Castro usually went skin diving and providing Castro with a contaminated suit. In the fall of ¡964 the CIA provided Cubela with high-powered rifles and a year later with scopes and silencers for those rifles. Cubela’s failure to act coincided with the time, June ¡965, when the CIA abandoned its assassination plans because of President Johnson’s opposition. See also Johnson, Lyndon B.; Kennedy, John F.

Operation Pedro Pan Between ¡960 and ¡962, ¡4,048 children were brought to the United States from Cuba. The headmaster of an American school in Cuba, James Baker, under the direction of a Catholic priest, Byron Walsh. Walsh, working through the Cuban Refugee Executive Committee in Miami, Florida, petitioned President Dwight D. Eisenhower for assistance for displaced Cuban children. In response, Eisenhower appropriated one million dollars from his discretionary funds under the Mutual Security Program. In Cuba, Baker was assisting families of the Cuban underground in getting their children o› the island. By chance, Baker and Walsh met in Miami in November ¡960, and they struck a deal. Baker would recruit

151 children, largely from middle-class families, and arrange for their transportation to Miami. There, Walsh arranged for their placement in orphanages, foster homes, and other forms of licensed care. Many of the Cuban parents told their children that the separation would only be temporary, but it became much longer. In some cases, reunification came in the ¡980s. Operation Pedro Pan was terminated following the ¡962 missile crisis when air transportation between Cuba and the United States was severed. See also Cuban Americans

Organization of American States Established at the Bogotá International Conference of American States in ¡948, the Organization of American States (OAS) succeeded the Pan American Union, founded in ¡9¡0. The OAS is charged with (¡) strengthening continental peace and security; (2) promoting and consolidating democratic government, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention; (3) ensuring peaceful settlement of disputes; (4) providing for common action in the event of aggression; (5) seeking solutions to political, juridical, and economic problems; (6) promoting economic, social, and cultural development; and (7) achieving e›ective arms limitation among its member states. The OAS strives to achieve its objectives through several venues including the Meetings of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign A›airs and the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. These councils meet annually or in special sessions. Fidel Castro’s rise to power in Cuba in ¡959 sounded alarm bells throughout the hemisphere, particularly in the United States, which in the ¡960s pursued a two-pronged Cuban policy. First, it sought Cuba’s hemispheric isolation; second, it sought to address the issues of socioeconomic disparities and political tyranny throughout the hemisphere to prevent another Castro-like revolution from taking place. Capitalizing upon the OAS mis-

Organization of American States sion and the two OAS bodies identified previously, the United States pursued its Cuban policies. Over time, the Latin American nations no longer saw Castro as a hemispheric threat. For that and other reasons, the United States lost interest in the Alliance for Progress. By ¡975, Cuba was brought back into the hemispheric family of nations. The following OAS meetings explain the rise and decline of the U.S. policy e›orts. See also Alliance for Progress; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Ford, Gerald; Herter, Christian A.; International Conferences of American States: Ninth International Conference of American States, Tenth International Conference of American States; Johnson, Lyndon B.; Kennedy, John F.; Nixon, Richard M.; Revolution: United States Reactions; Rusk, Dean; Trade Embargo

Fifth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign A›airs Santiago, Chile, August ¡2–¡8, ¡959 The Declaration of Santiago, issued at the conference’s conclusion, condemned dictators, reasserted the principle of nonintervention, approved democratic systems, and stated that democracy could not be forced upon a country but must be developed from within. The conference emanated from a guerrilla movement, launched from Cuba, to overthrow Dominican Republic strongman Rafael Trujillo. U.S. secretary of state Christian A. Herter spoke on behalf of nonintervention but was strongly challenged by Cuban foreign minister Raúl Roa, who asserted that the advocates of strict nonintervention were merely attempting to defend Trujillo. When Roa also charged that Trujillo was organizing a foreign legion of mercenaries to invade Cuba, he set o› a wild exchange of insults and threats between the Cuban and Dominican delegations. During the conference, Castro claimed that Fulgencio Batista, with Trujillo’s cooperation, launched an invasion e›ort from the Dominican Republic. Haiti also reported the landing of 30 revolutionaries from Cuba.

Organization of American States The conference also became the site of anti–American demonstrations because of its stance on nonintervention. The majority of the delegates approved a U.S. resolution denouncing intervention, and Herter joined with his Latin American colleagues in recognizing that economic underdevelopment was the root cause of the current Caribbean turmoil. Subsequently, Castro condemned the meeting as a farce and said that it was seeking to destroy the Cuban revolution. See also Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Herter, Christian; Revolution: United States Presidential Administrations and the Revolution

Sixth and Seventh Meeting of Ministers of Foreign A›airs San José, Costa Rica, August ¡6–¡9, ¡960 The meetings, separated by one day, took up the issues of the Dominican Republic and Cuba. At the first meeting, the foreign ministers condemned Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo and placed sanctions upon the Dominican Republic for Trujillo’s role in the assassination attempt of Venezuelan president Romulo Betancourt. U.S. secretary of state Christian A. Herter was hoping to obtain an equally strong condemnation against Cuba for its drift towards communism. He failed. Although understanding the popularity of Castroism across the region, the Latin American nations did not feel threatened by Castro himself. Therefore, the delegations were unwilling to make direct charges against communism. However, they approved the San José Declaration, which condemned extra-continental intervention in the hemisphere; denounced Sino-Soviet interference in domestic political, economic, or social a›airs and any form of totalitarianism; and proclaimed the obligation of all regional states to submit to the discipline of the inter–American system. Clearly, Cuba was the intended target of the resolution. See also Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Herter, Christian; Revolution: United States Presidential Administrations and the Revolution

152 Inter-American Economic and Social Council Punta del Este, Uruguay, August 5–¡6, ¡96¡ The Inter-American Economic and Social Conference was a meeting of the economic ministers of the hemispheric nations used by the Kennedy administration to launch the Alliance for Progress. In preparation for the meeting, Kennedy’s advisors debated the wisdom of his attendance. While several Latin American states wanted the president’s participation and his presence would have enhanced the significance of the Alliance, Kennedy was persuaded otherwise. Kennedy’s visit almost certainly would have drawn Fidel Castro. Such a meeting would have detracted from the Alliance for Progress, would have undermined Kennedy’s attempt to move past the Bay of Pigs fiasco, would have helped to legitimate Castro as Kennedy’s equal, and most likely would have resulted in a war of words over Cuba’s revolution. Given these possibilities, Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon led the U.S. delegation. Dillon delivered Kennedy’s speech to the conferees. He pledged $¡ billion in aid for ¡96¡ and $20 billion over the next ten years to sustain the Alliance. During the conference work sessions, the delegates agreed upon the Alliance goals that found expression in “The Declaration to the Peoples of America” and the organizational structure for its implementation as outlined in the “Charter of Punta del Este.” Ernesto “Che” Guevara represented Cuba. He addressed the assembled delegates twice but otherwise did not participate in the conference proceedings or sign the final documents. In both speeches, Guevara attacked the United States. His initial address followed that of Dillon, and Guevara used the occasion to remind the Latin Americans that Dillon’s $20 billion promise meant nothing until the U.S. Congress approved the funds. He urged the delegates to thank Fidel Castro for the new-found U.S. largesse; for without Castro’s revolution in Cuba, there would be no change in U.S. policy. Furthermore, he

153 warned that the alliance was only a capitalist ploy to forestall social revolutions, which Guevara promised to be the wave of Latin America’s future. On the last day of the conference Guevara repeated much of what he had said earlier and added that the United States intended to use this conference as a pretext to unite the hemisphere against Castro. In light of Cuba’s commitment to socialism, Guevara refused to sign the Punta del Este documents and declared that Cuba would not participate in the Alliance for Progress. See also Alliance for Progress; Kennedy, John F.

Eighth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign A›airs Punta del Este, Uruguay, January 22–3¡, ¡962 With Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico abstaining, the American foreign ministers approved, by a two-thirds vote, a resolution excluding Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS). In the months following the implementation of the Alliance for Progress in August ¡96¡, the Kennedy administration set out to isolate Cuba from the Western Hemispheric system. During the fall of ¡96¡, U.S. ambassadors across Latin America sounded out their host government’s potential support for Kennedy’s plan. The circum–Caribbean nations, those most threatened by Castroism, were most receptive to the U.S. proposal. In fact, Colombia, which had already broken diplomatic relations with Cuba, was most receptive and willing to call for a meeting of the American Foreign Ministers to address the issue of Cuba’s expulsion from the inter–American system. Peru also called for such a meeting, but only to discuss Cuba, not to take action. On December 4, ¡96¡, two days after Castro declared himself to be a Marxist-Leninist, the OAS council debated the issue and agreed to schedule a foreign ministers meeting in Punta del Este. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in one of his few ventures into inter–American a›airs, led the U.S. delegation. Despite strenuous e›orts before the meeting opened, the Ken-

Organization of American States nedy administration failed to ensure the twothirds vote required for strong action against Cuba. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay were the most vociferous in their opposition to expelling Cuba from the OAS. Instead, they wanted to advise Castro that his actions threatened the inter– American system and wanted to encourage him to reconcile with its neighbors. Thanks to Rusk’s e›orts, Uruguay and Haiti, which had come to the conference professing neutrality on the matter, changed their positions, thus providing the United States with the necessary ¡4 votes for a two-thirds majority. As a result, the conference’s “Final Act” contained several resolutions the delegates had approved: 1. The principles of Marxism-Leninism were considered incompatible with the inter– American system. (Abstentions Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico) 2. The principles of the Alliance for Progress were essential to the security of the Western Hemisphere. 3. Cuba was excluded from participation in the Inter-American system. 4. Cuba was excluded from participation in the Inter-American Defense Board. 5. Arms tra‡c with Cuba was suspended, and the OAS would consider broader trade sanctions. (Abstentions: Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico) 6. The OAS council would establish a committee to investigate the process by which countries could receive assistance. 7. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights would be strengthened. Kennedy considered the Punta del Este conference a success with its support of the Alliance’s goals and its endorsement of the U.S. e›orts to isolate Cuba. See also Rusk, Dean; Kennedy, John F.

Ninth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign A›airs Washington D.C., July 2¡–26, ¡964 By a ¡5 to 4 margin, with one abstention, the foreign ministers voted to impose manda-

Organization of American States tory economic sanctions on Cuba. The sanctions barred all OAS members from maintaining diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba and required that they suspend all trade with Cuba except for food and medicines needed for humanitarian reasons and suspend all sea transportation to Cuba. Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay voted against the sanctions. Venezuela, which had introduced the resolution, abstained. The origins of the meeting dated to December ¡963 when Venezuela asked the OAS to investigate its complaint that Cuba was a training center for guerrillas. The Venezuelans wanted the OAS to impose punitive measures. The conferees found Cuba guilty of committing aggression against Venezuela by landing three tons of arms to supply guerrillas and terrorists in November ¡963. In February ¡964, a special OAS investigating committee had supported the Venezuelan charge. At the OAS meeting the Johnson administration continued to exhort member governments to do whatever they could to make the Cuban economic blockade e›ective. Secretary of State Dean Rusk defined one of the conferences’ major tasks as that of “urging our own governments and those of the free world countries to take appropriate steps in the field of trade with Cuba.” Rusk called for sanctions and the application of “the full weight of the regional security system” if Cuba persisted in its active identification with continental revolutionary movements. The U.S. promised to use its weight to have the final conference vote to obligate member nations to terminate diplomatic relations and suspend commercial and shipping ties with the Castro regime. The resolution had negligible success in forcing the Cubans to adhere to a policy of peaceful coexistence with regional capitalist regimes. Castro denounced the sanctions and called the OAS a “ministry of Yankee colonies.” Why hadn’t the OAS sanctioned the United States for the Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro asked. He asserted that the arms found in Venezuela were manufactured in the United States and that they “never had been acquired

154 by Cuba.” See also Johnson, Lyndon B.; Rusk, Dean; Trade Embargo

Twelfth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign A›airs Washington, D.C., September 22–24, ¡967 The ministers approved a resolution calling for increased e›orts to combat terrorism in the hemisphere. Only Mexico abstained and, instead, approved a second resolution that required future acts of Cuban subversion be submitted to the United Nations. At the time, Mexico was the only country that maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba. The meeting was convened to consider a Venezuelan complaint of Cuban-sponsored armed subversion in Latin America. The meeting was highlighted by a Bolivian photographic presentation of Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s presence in the Bolivian jungle. Secretary of State Dean Rusk called upon the OAS to adopt stronger measures and “cooperate more fully in denying to Cuba resources which help it to carry on subversive activities” and declared that the OAS “must persuade friendly nonmember countries to understand the problem confronting us and to increase their cooperation with us especially by refraining from acts that assist the Cuban government.” Rusk did not have his war. The foreign ministers approved a scaled-back version of a U.S.–sponsored proposal to retaliate against ships of nonhemispheric nations that enter and leave Cuba ports. The resolution adopted mentioned “measures” but did not specify that fuel and port facilities should be denied to ships that call in Cuba, as the United States preferred. The conference also rejected a U.S. request to publicize the names of businesses in the noncommunist world that traded with Cuba. From ¡964 to ¡970, seven “soft” countries did not fully cooperate in the Johnson administration’s e›ort to completely isolate Cuba — Argentina, Ecuador, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Mexico. Despite U.S.

155 pressure to come on board, they refused largely for domestic political considerations. See also Johnson, Lyndon B.; Rusk, Dean; Trade Embargo

Fifteenth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign A›airs Quito, Ecuador, November 9–¡3, ¡974 The move to lift the economic embargo against Cuba failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds vote. Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela favored its removal. Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay announced that they would vote against any change in the blockade. Undersecretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll headed the U.S. delegation, which adopted a neutral role at the conference. No member of the delegation addressed the meeting, nor did they meet with other delegations in an e›ort to influence voting. Costa Rican foreign minister Gonzalo Facio described the U.S. delegation’s behavior as “negative neutrality.” See also Ford, Gerald; Trade Embargo

Sixteenth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign A›airs San José, Costa Rica, July ¡6–25, ¡975 Sixteen of the twenty-one members of the Organization of American States (OAS), including the United States, voted to end the political and economic sanctions imposed upon Cuba in ¡964. Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay voted no, and Brazil and Nicaragua abstained from the voting. By ¡975, the embargo proved largely ine›ective because of Cuba’s newfound dependence upon the Soviet Union and eastern Europe and the opening of trade relations with several western European countries and Japan and with some Latin American nations. For the same reasons, the lifting of the embargo was expected to have little impact upon Cuba. Despite the lifting of the embargo, Cuba re-

Organized Crime in Cuba mained suspended from the OAS according to the measures adopted at its Punta del Este, Uruguay meeting in January ¡962. In advance of the OAS meeting, the Ford administration signaled, its intention to support the resolution. The U.S. vote was influenced by the world’s changing relationship with Cuba and the growing U.S. domestic pressure against Cuba’s economic isolation. However, the resolution did not a›ect the U.S. trade embargo imposed upon Cuba by President John F. Kennedy in ¡96¡. Not wanting to create international incidents, in late August ¡975, the Ford administration announced that it would not interfere with U.S.-owned subsidiaries operating in foreign countries shipping nonstrategic goods to Cuba, provided they only contained a limited amount of U.S.–made components. See also Ford, Gerald R.; Trade Embargo

Organized Crime in Cuba Although the tentacles of U.S.–based organized crime in Cuba can be traced to the ¡920s, it took on new meaning in the ¡950s when Senator Estes Kefauver (D., Tenn.) conducted congressional hearings on operations in the United States. To avoid possible U.S. prosecution, numerous gangsters, big and small time, headed for Cuba, where Fulgencio Batista accepted their presence. The Batista government obligingly modified existing regulations to permit any nightclub or hotel valued at one million dollars or more in Havana and $500,000 elsewhere to operate gambling casinos. As a result, by the late ¡950s, the casinos in Havana’s major hotels — the Nacional, Capri, Sans Souci, Tropicana, Havana-Hilton and others — were operated by various crime syndicates. Gambling receipts during the ¡950s surpassed $500,000 per month. On the eve of Castro’s victory in ¡959, organized crime expanded into prostitution and illegal drugs, and in ¡959 Cuba was on the verge of becoming the base of international drug tra‡cking. Unknown amounts of moneys were paid to Cuban government o‡cials not to interfere in these operations. With the

Ostend Manifesto ouster of Batista and the onset of the revolutionary government, organized crime interests were expelled from the island. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio

Ortodoxos see Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo) Ostend Manifesto

A secret diplomatic dispatch, called the Ostend Manifesto, dated October ¡5, ¡854, recommended that the United States purchase Cuba or forcefully take the island if necessary. At the time, the Franklin Pierce administration was under heavy pressure regarding Cuba. Southern expansionists sought the island’s incorporation into the United States as a means to maintain a congressional balance between free and slave states. Southerners also were frightened at Spain’s current Africanization policy, which potentially could turn Cuba into a free black republic and, hence, into a threat to the southern socioeconomic and political structures. These issues, coupled with the fear that Britain and France might interfere and with the ongoing threat of southern filibuster expeditions to the island, raised questions about U.S. national security. Furthermore, there was national consternation and a call for action over the seizure in Havana harbor of the U.S. packet the Black Warrior for allegedly violating harbor regulations. Caving into these pressures, the Pierce administration believed that the heavily indebted Spanish government could be convinced to sell Cuba to the United States. In April ¡854 Secretary of State William L. Marcy instructed the U.S. minister in Madrid, Pierre Soulé, himself an ardent southern expansionist, to o›er Spain up to $¡30 million for Cuba. Following the Spanish government’s outright rejection of the o›er, Marcy instructed Soulé to meet with his counterparts from London ( James Buchanan) and France ( John Y. Mason) to determine a course of action. They convened at Ostend, Belgium, on October 9, ¡854, but retreated to Aix-la-

156 Chapelle, Prussia, three days later. On October ¡8th the ministers completed their work, signed the document, and returned to their respective posts. A special courier carried the secret document to Washington, D.C. Long before Secretary Marcy received the o‡cial document, the press in Europe and the United States learned of its continents. The document called for the United States to o›er up to $¡20 million for Cuba. If Spain refused to sell and the situation in Cuba began threaten U.S. national interests, the United States would be “justified in wresting it from Spain.” This was a reference to Spain’s Africanization policy, which, if carried out, would transform Cuba into a black republic. The Spanish sco›ed at the idea of losing the island, and the British and French, who wanted the island to remain in Spanish hands, criticized U.S. imperialistic tendencies. As reported in the U.S. press, the Pierce administration was prepared to go to war over Cuba to satisfy the southern expansionists. The allegation brought rebuke from abolitionists and other anti-expansionists and contributed to the loss of Pierce supporters in the ¡854 congressional elections. Ultimately, Pierce rejected the recommendations, but the U.S. interests in Cuba did not abate. See also Africa: Spain’s Africanization Policy; Black Warrior Incident; Expansionism; Pierce, Franklin

O’Sullivan, John (¡8¡3–¡895) A notable U.S. journalist during the ¡840s, O’Sullivan coined the phrase “Manifest Destiny,” to indicate the U.S. God-given right to expand across the continent and beyond, including Cuba. In the mid–¡840s O’Sullivan became interested in Cuba through family relationships that put him in touch with the New York–based Cuban Council, or Junta, as it was popularly known. The Junta was linked to the Club de la Habana, an organization of wealthy Cuban planters who favored annexation to the United States. O’Sullivan also visited the island in ¡846. As a result of these contacts, O’Sullivan became convinced that

157 the United States should purchase Cuba to rescue it from Spanish oppression. O’Sullivan reasoned that Cuba’s annexation would provide economic advantages to the United States and, because of the existence of slavery on the island, provide for a balance of “free” and “slave” states in the U.S. Congress. He also played upon the U.S. fear that the British had designs upon Cuba and that its presence there threatened U.S. coastal areas and Caribbean interests. O’Sullivan believed that Spain understood that its control over Cuba was in jeopardy and would accept the U.S. purchase o›er. O’Sullivan broached the subject to Secretary of State James Buchanan in ¡847 and again in ¡848, but the secretary showed no interest. O’Sullivan then went directly to President James K. Polk. In June ¡848, with the Mexican ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that ended the Mexican War, Polk accepted O’Sullivan’s suggestions and instructed the U.S. minster in Madrid, Romulus Saunders, to sound out the Spanish government; but it was to no avail. The Spanish had no intentions of parting with Cuba. With the Spanish rejection, O’Sullivan then linked up with the Cuban filibuster, Narciso López, who planned an invasion of Cuba to coincide with an internal uprising that would liberate the island from Spanish rule. In all, López made three attempts to invade the island; each ended in failure. In each instance O’Sullivan assisted with the recruitment of armed volunteers, fundraising activities, and a public relations campaign against Spanish authority over Cuba. O’Sullivan’s activities on behalf of López resulted in two federal indictments for violation of U.S. neutrality laws, but a hung jury in April ¡852 set him free. In the mid–¡850s as the United States inched toward civil war, interest in Cuba momentarily waned, and O’Sullivan moved on to other causes. When Cuba again emerged as a national issue in the late ¡860s, O’Sullivan’s journalistic career was in decline. See also Buchanan, James; Lopez, Narciso; New York Junta; Polk, James K.; Quitman, John A.

Partido Communista de Cuba

Pan Americanism Woodrow Wilson came to the White House determined to correct the century-old image of the United States in Latin America. He recognized that Latin America’s ill will toward the United States militated against improved trade relations. As conceived, Wilson’s vision anticipated friendship and cooperation through regional integration, independent of Europe and committed to mutual self-interest under the benign guidance the United States. Wilson’s ideal found expression in his first foreign a›airs speech on March ¡3, ¡9¡3, and again in Mobile, Alabama, on October 27, ¡9¡3. Prodded by his close confidant Colonel Edward M. House, Wilson authorized negotiations with Latin American nations beginning in ¡9¡4 that would result in an agreement with mutual guarantees for political independence under republican forms of government and mutual recognition of territorial sovereignty and arms control. In most respects the plan was to internationalize the Monroe Doctrine. While the Argentines, Brazilians, and Chileans o›ered the most resistance, U.S, unilateral action regarding the Mexican Revolution in ¡9¡7 put Wilson’s vision to rest. Wilson’s proposal for hemispheric unity also contrasted sharply with his administration’s actions in Cuba. Furthermore, if an agreement were reached for the Caribbean region, it would impede upon those actions and U.S. rights in Cuba under the Platt Amendment. See also Crowder, Enoch; Preventive Diplomacy; United States Interventions

Pan-American Union see International Conferences of American States Papal Visit see John Paul II Partido Comunista de Cuba

In ¡96¡, a merger of Fidel Castro’s 26th of July Movement with the Popular Socialist

Partido del Pueblo Party and the Revolutionary Directorate into the Integrated Revolutionary Organization (ORI) was the first stop toward the creation of the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS). In ¡965 the PURS was transformed into the Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC), or Communist Party of Cuba, the only legal party on the island. Throughout the ¡960s, the party was disorganized and exercised little influence in government, giving way to the personal leadership of Fidel Castro and his closest advisers. During the ¡970s the party consolidated its power base and came to dominate the government’s bureaucracy and leadership positions in the workplace cadres. Though membership reached nearly one-half million members in the mid–¡980s, women remained underrepresented in the party’s hierarchy. Without opposition, the party continued its hold on government positions and dominated the national assembly until the present, despite the economic hardships confronting the nation. See also Castro Ruz, Fidel; 26th of July Movement

Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo) Led by Senator Eduardo Chibás, The Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Party of the Cuban People) was founded in ¡946 by a faction of the Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Auténtico) disillusioned with the corruption of President Ramón Grau San Martín. The Orthodoxo party was committed to the fulfillment of the social goals of the ¡933 revolt. In ¡948, Chibás ran unsuccessfully for the presidency and again became the party’s candidate for the scheduled June ¡952 presidential election. On August 5, ¡95¡, Chibás, in the midst of an emotional radio broadcast about government corruption, committed suicide. His death contributed to the party’s weakened position for the ¡952 presidential election, which Fulgencio Batista thwarted by a coup d’etat on March ¡0, ¡952. U.S. policymakers did not look favorably upon the Orthodoxos party because it had a stong commitment to a nationalistic economic policy and because

158 its radical and anti-imperialist wing would have prevented any accommodation with the United States. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Chibás, Eduardo; Grau San Martin, Ramón

Partido Revolucionario Cubano

The Partido Revolucionario Cubano, Cuban Revolutionary Party was founded in Key West, Florida, in April ¡892. The party was committed to the independence of Cuba. The party’s objectives focused upon a series of “resolutions” designed by José Martí calling upon Cubans of all classes and race, home and abroad, to join forces in a war to throw o› the yoke of Spanish imperialism. The PRC was the political arm of the liberation movement with the clear objective to provide support for the armed struggle. PRC membership came largely from Cuba’s professional and smallbusiness classes. Under Martí’s leadership, by ¡894 the PRC brought a great degree of cohesion to the disparate Cuban groups, including the recruitment of Antonio Maceo and the Dominican General Máximo Gómez to the leadership of the Cuban Liberation Army. Martí’s death in May ¡895 ushered in significant changes to the PRC. The party’s leadership passed to Tomás Estrada Palma, who transformed the PRC into a diplomatic agent of the revolution’s provisional government in Cuba operated through the Cuban Junta in New York. See also Estrada Palma, Tomás; Gómez y Báez, Máximo; Maceo, Antonio; Martí y Pérez, José Julián; New York Junta

Party of the Cuban People see Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo) Pawley, William (¡896–¡977) Pawley met secretly with Fulgencio Batista on December 9, ¡958, to determine if

159 he would step aside and accept a caretaker government that included antigovernment representatives. Batista’s refusal led to the U.S. withdrawal of support and to Batista’s subsequent departure from the island. Pawley, a former ambassador to Brazil and Peru, was the founder of Cubana de Aviacion and had other business interests in Cuba that dated to the ¡920s. He proposed that President Dwight D. Eisenhower send him to Cuba with an o›er for Batista to step-down. Pawley’s suggestion came at time when the Central Intelligence Agency had made contact with the anti–Castro rebels known as the Montecristi Group and when the State Department was searching for a response to the November fraudulent presidential election of Andrés Rivero Agüero, that had been engineered by Batista. Eisenhower accepted the proposal but with the caveat that Pawley go to Havana as a private citizen, not as the president’s o‡cial representative. The mission was kept a secret, even from Ambassador Earl E. T. Smith, although he learned about it through his Cuban contacts. Pawley proposed that Batista accept a government that included both anti–Castro and anti-government forces in return for promises that the security of Batista’s followers would be guaranteed and that Batista could safely retire to his mansion in Daytona Beach, Florida. Mistrusting the semio‡cial nature of the mission and upset that the proposed caretaker government included his opponents, Batista refused the o›er. With Batista’s rejection, the State Department instructed Ambassador Smith to inform Batista that the U.S. government could no longer support him. The message was delivered on December ¡7, ¡958. Cut o› from the United States and isolated within Cuba, Batista left the island on January ¡, ¡959. See also Batista y Zaldívar; Revolution: United States Presidential Administrations and the Revolution

People-to-People Program On January 5, ¡999, President Bill Clinton announced a series of measures that

People-to-People Program broadened contact between U.S. residents and their Cuban counterparts. Identified as the People-to-People Program, Clinton capitalized upon the language of the Helms-Burton Bill that gave the president authority to grant exceptions to the embargo on a case-by-case basis deemed to be consistent with U.S. policy. Included in the president’s announcement, and implemented in March ¡999, was the expansion of remittances to $¡,200 a year by any U.S. resident (not just Cuban Americans with families in Cuba) to individual Cuban families as well as to organizations independent of the Cuban government; expansion of contacts through two-way exchanges of academics, athletes, scientists, and others, including the streamlining of the visa approval process; the authorization of the sale of food and agricultural U.S. products to independent nongovernmental entities including religious groups and Cuba’s emerging private sector, such as family restaurants and private farmers; and the authorization of charter flights from U.S. cities beyond Miami to facilitate family reunions. In contrast to these initiatives, at the same time Clinton indicated there would be no change in the U.S. embargo upon Cuba and that he would step up pressure on other countries to curtail their trading with Cuba. Furthermore, because the sale of food and agricultural goods was restricted to cash only and neither U.S. government or bank credits were permitted, the potential amount of these sales appeared limited. The Castro government subsequently announced that it would not purchase any goods under these restrictions, but conditions changed by 2003. Clinton also promised further support for Radio Martí. Academics expanded contacts from ¡999 until 2003, when the Bush administration denied visas to Cuban scholars scheduled to participate in the international conference of the Latin American Studies Association in Dallas, Texas. See also Agribusiness Exhibition; Bush, George W.; Clinton, Bill; Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act

Pierce

Permanent Treaty of ¡903 see Treaties: Permanent Treaty of ¡903

Pierce, Franklin (¡804–¡869) Pierce served as a congressman and senator from New Hampshire prior to his presidency from ¡853–¡857. He came to the presidency publicly enunciating the principles regarding U.S. policy toward Cuba that dated to John Quincy Adams. Privately, Pierce hoped that Cuba, aided by Americans, would “release itself or be released” from Spanish control and, like Texas before it, seek admission to the Union as a state. The Pierce administration faced three issues regarding relations with Cuba, all contributing to increased pressure within the United States for its acquisition of the island. First was the seizure in Havana harbor of the U.S. packet ship, the Black Warrior; second, the proposed Quitman expedition to Cuba; and third, Spain’s Africanization scheme for the island. Each of these issues became enmeshed in the U.S. debate over slavery as evidenced in the ¡854 Kansas-Nebraska Bill, which permitted “popular sovereignty” to determine the fate of slavery in those two territories. The situation was complicated by the appointment of Pierre Soulé as minister to Spain. In addition to being a southern expansionist who believed that his mission was the acquisition of Cuba, Soulé was ill-prepared for the post by training and temperament. Those three issues merged in the spring and summer of ¡854. Following the seizure of the Black Warrior in late February ¡854, the southern call for taking Cuba intensified. The incident also fueled the southern fervor for John A. Quitman to advance the timetable for his filibuster attack upon Cuba. The Quitman expedition was further encouraged by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s approval of a proposal o›ered by John Slidell (D., La.) to suspend the nation’s neutrality laws for one

160 year so that the Quitman expedition could be launched unimpeded. Next, in late May ¡854, Pierce learned the intent of Spain’s Africanization policy: turn Cuba into a black republic. If that happened, Cuba would be forever lost to the United States, and it would potentially invite a European presence that would threaten U.S. security. In the midst of all this, Congress approved the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, and the president signed it on May 30, ¡854. Rather than ease the national temper over slavery, the Kansas-Nebraska Bill fueled it, spilling over into Cuban a›airs. To di›use the multicrisis situation Pierce chose a delicate course of action. The president first anticipated sending two special commissioners to Madrid to assist Soulé, who already had run afoul of the Spanish court, in negotiating a settlement to the Black Warrior crisis. Having spent his political capital on the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, Pierce never asked Congress to fund the emissary’s trip to Spain. However, Pierce did implement the second part of his plan to issue a proclamation against the Quitman expedition on May 3¡, ¡854. The upshot of Pierce’s action was a more contentious Congress. There matters stood until August ¡854, when Secretary of State William L. Marcy received a proposal from James Buchanan, the U.S. minister in London. Buchanan suggested that the European bondholders could be convinced to pressure Spain into selling Cuba to satisfy its debts. The Spanish crown could use the money not only to satisfy its debts but also to secure itself from internal revolutionary disturbances. Because the Crimean War was more important to Britain and France at the time, U.S. o‡cials did not expect those countries to interfere with the plan. After approving the plan in August ¡854, Pierce despatched Daniel E. Sickles to Europe with instructions for Soulé to meet with Buchanan and Mason to devise a plan that would encourage the bondholders to consider the project. However, the loquacious Sickles told enough of the story to U.S. and European reporters to stir uncountered rumors about the fate of Cuba. Buchanan, Mason, and Soulé subsequently

161 met in Ostend, Belgium, on October 9, ¡854, but to escape the press, they adjourned to Aixla-Chapelle, Prussia On October ¡8 they completed their deliberations. In the end, the ministers ignored their specific instructions given by Pierce to compare opinions and “adopt measures for perfect concert of action” in London, Madrid, and Paris. Instead, the men o›ered the so-called Ostend Manifesto that recommended that the United States purchase Cuba for up to $¡20 million or otherwise seize the island by force. After the New York Herald published the essence of the Ostend Manifesto, Pierce’s Cuba policy was dead. Public opinion and government leaders across the United States and on the continent denounced the imperialistic arrogance. More importantly, Spain would have none of it. In fact it signaled its intention to retain control of Cuba when it recalled the captain-general of Cuba, Marques de la Pezuela. The embarrassed Soulé resigned his post, and subsequently Quitman abandoned his mission. See also Africa: Spain’s Africanization Program; Black Warrior Incident; Buchanan, James; Expansionism; Ostend Manifesto; Quitman, John A.; Soulé, Pierre

Platt Amendment An amendment to the ¡90¡ army appropriations bill and appended to the ¡902 Cuban Constitution, the Platt Amendment granted the United States extensive rights in Cuba. At the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in ¡898, the U.S. Army administered Cuba until the establishment of a self-governing constitution, which was accomplished in early ¡902. The United States, however, did not believe the Cubans capable of maintaining political stability or thwarting foreign interventions. Guided by the policy parameters that dated to John Quincy Adams, the United States determined to keep its influence on the island to maintain stability and prevent foreign encroachments. Toward that end, Secretary of War Elihu Root persuaded Congress to approve a rider named after chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Orville

Platt Amendment H. Platt (R.–Conn.) to the ¡90¡ army appropriations bill. Subsequently, the Cubans reluctantly added the Platt Amendment to their constitution written that year and incorporated into the ¡903 Permanent Treaty with the United States. The Platt Amendment provided that the government of Cuba 1. never enter into a treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers that impaired or threatened to impair its independence, or grant any foreign power or powers control over any portions of the island; 2. not assume or contract any public debt for which its revenues were inadequate; 3. consent to U.S. intervention for the preservation of Cuban independence: for the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty; and for the discharge of its obligations under the Treaty of Paris; 4. accept as ratified all acts of the U.S. military government during the occupation of Cuba and all lawful rights acquired thereunder should be maintained and protected; 5. will execute the U.S.–devised plans for sanitation and to end infectious diseases in order to protect the people and commerce of Cuba; 6. will omit the Isle of Pines from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto left to future adjustment by treaty; 7. will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling and naval stations at specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States; The Platt Amendment protected U.S. interests at the expense of Cuban sovereignty. It restricted Cuba’s foreign debt to levels acceptable to the United States and limited its ability to make treaties with foreign nations. It gave the U.S. rights to naval stations on the island, eventually located at Guantánamo Bay. The most controversial provision, found in Article 3, granted the United States the right to intervene to maintain “a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty.” Under the terms of this proviso, the U.S. militarily intervened in

Polk Cuban political a›airs on three occasions (¡906–¡909; ¡9¡2; ¡9¡7–¡922) and otherwise meddled in Cuban a›airs. In light of the Cuban government’s fiscal mismanagement, in ¡9¡2 the United States linked Articles 2 and 3. Secretary of State Philander Knox informed Cuban authorities that “improvident acts” (fiscal mismanagement) by the Cuban executive and/or legislative branches of government that threatened political stability or life, property, or individual liberty would no longer be tolerated. This expanded interpretation of the Platt Amendment provided the United States the reason to pressure the Cuban government on private business contracts and public works projects and to approve loans contracted with U.S. banks through the mid–¡920s. In the ¡920s, increasing Cuban nationalism, supported by many Latin America nations, agitated against U.S. interference in the country’s internal a›airs. At the same time the State Department began to reassess its interventionist policies in the Caribbean dating to the early part of the twentieth century. At first, the State Department abandon its broadened interpretation of Article 2 and again viewed loans between private banks and the Cuban government as private matters. By ¡934 U.S. o‡cials no longer considered the Platt Amendment a useful policy instrument. In fact, it had become a source of intense anti– American sentiment on the island, contributing to the same sentiments it sought to contain. Cuban President Ramón Grau San Martín’s ¡933 unilateral declaration terminating the Platt Amendment reflected Cuban sentiment. In November ¡933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who refused to extend recognition to the Grau San Martín government, declared that once Cuba had a stable government he would be willing to renegotiate the ¡903 Permanent Treaty. Negotiations commenced shortly after Carlos Mendietta assumed Cuba’s presidency in January ¡934. By May 22 of that same year, Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles and Cuba’s ambassador to Washington, Manuel Márquez Sterling, completed a new

162 agreement. It went into e›ect on June 9, ¡934, following ratification by both governments. The new treaty terminated the ¡903 treaty, but it confirmed the legality of the first intervention. It also provided for the U.S. retention of the naval base at Guantánamo Bay and allowed the U.S. to take measures to protect Cubans against epidemics and contagious diseases. See also Crowder, Enoch; Good Neighbor policy; Guantánamo Naval Base; Knox, Philander C.; Magoon, Charles; Treaties: Treaty of ¡934; United States Interventions; Welles, Benjamin Sumner

Polk, James K. (¡795–¡849) U.S. congressman from and governor of the state of Tennessee prior to serving as President of the United States, from ¡845 to ¡849. Polk agreed with the long-standing U.S. policy that Cuba controlled by a weak Spain better served U.S. interests rather than being independent or controlled by a major European power, i.e., Britain and France. By the time of Polk’s inauguration in March ¡845, southern slave owners sought the island’s acquisition as a place to create additional slave states to maintain a political balance of free versus slave states in the U.S. Congress. This prospect became more important after it became known that the western territories included in the Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo that ended the Mexican War would not support a slave-based economy. In ¡847 expansionists John O’Sullivan and Moses Beach met while in Havana. Each was an advocate of the Creole cause for annexation to the United States. Upon their return to the United States, Beach, a railroad tycoon as well as the owner of the New York Sun, popularized the annexation of Cuba through editorials; O’Sullivan quietly approached Secretary of State James Buchanan to suggest that the United States o›er up to $¡50 million to Spain for the island, at the same time suggesting that Britain had a covetous eye upon it. In the meantime, Narciso López began to plot one of his many filibustering expeditions.

163 Drawing no response from Buchanan, O’Sullivan appealed directly to Polk. On May ¡0, ¡848, with the Mexican treaty now ratified, O’Sullivan and expansionist Senator Stephen A. Douglas met with the president. Polk was persuaded by the argument and presented the issue to his cabinet. Between May 30 and June ¡7, ¡848, Polk and his advisers discussed the Cuban situation. During that same period, dispatches from the U.S. consul in Havana reported the ever-increasing possibility of an armed rebellion, and O’Sullivan again called on Polk to encourage military action. Rumors also circulated that U.S. troops still in Mexico wanted to join the insurrectionists. Although Polk was “decidedly in favor of purchasing Cuba and making it one of the States of the Union,” he vetoed any military action. Instead, he suggested to his cabinet that the United States o›er Spain $¡00 million. Thanks to the persuasiveness of Secretary of the Treasury Robert J. Walker, who also favored the acquisition of Cuba, the cabinet finally approved Polk’s plan. The o›er only served to incite Spanish nationalism. Under absolutely no circumstances was Cuba for sale, asserted Foreign Minister Emeterio S. Santovenia. In fact he told the U.S. minister in Madrid, Romulus M. Saunders, rather than see Cuba transferred to any other power, Spain preferred “seeing it sunk into the ocean.” Even without Spain’s rejection, the Cuban problem would have ended, at least momentarily. With the election of Zachary Taylor to the presidency in November ¡848, the U.S. expansionist zeal temporarily abated. See also Buchanan, James; Expanism; López, Narciso; O’Sullivan, John

Porter, Robert P. (¡852–¡9¡7) An Englishman by birth, Porter came to the United States where he had a successful career in journalism as a writer on world trade and economic conditions. Porter became an acquaintance of President William McKinley while writing McKinley’s biography for the ¡896 presidential campaign. That friendship

Porter and Porter’s advocacy of protective tari›s earned him a position in the Treasury Department. In ¡898, McKinley sent Porter to Cuba as a “special commissioner” to report on political and economic conditions on the island. He visited Cuba twice on behalf of McKinley In the autumn of ¡898, after the war had ended but before the peace treaty was signed, Porter made his first visit to Cuba and subsequently held meetings in the United States on the future of trade relations. As a result of his work, Porter recommended a tari› rate that opened Cuba to the world’s manufactures and other of life’s necessities but with a schedule that provided the Cuban government with adequate operating revenues. At the same time, ¡898, Porter reported that Cuba’s current economic conditions precluded any trade reciprocity treaty with the United States. McKinley sent Porter back to Cuba in late January ¡899 to deal with the disbanding of the Cuban insurgent army. He met with the commander of the Cuban army, General Máximo Gómez at his camp in Remedios on February ¡, where Porter o›ered the general $3 million to be used as a relief fund for the demobilization of the Cuban army. Although Gómez considered the amount insu‡cient, he recognized the fact that no additional U.S. funds would be forthcoming. Porter made it clear that the United States would not assume any of the Cuban war debt. Porter also proposed the creation of a national police force, using Cuban army veterans, to suppress banditry and maintain order across Cuba. Gómez accepted the plan and promised to assist with its implementation. However, the plan died when Gómez ran afoul of the Cuban Assembly, which fired him on March 9, ¡899. The $3 million relief fund, however, remained intact and was eventually distributed to the Cuban war veterans. Personally, Porter speculated in his book, Industrial Cuba, that the island’s future would be the brightest once it attached itself to the United States. However, Porter did not engage in the subsequent debates on U.S. policy

Preventive Diplomacy about Cuba’s future. See also Goméz y Báez, Maximo

Preventive Diplomacy Following the restoration of the Cuban government in ¡909, the United States was determined to pursue policies designed to prevent conditions that would require U.S. intervention in the future in Cuba’s internal a›airs. E›ectively, the United States wanted to prevent the causes that led to its ¡906 intervention and subsequent three-year administration of Cuban political a›airs. The new policy was justified by the expanded interpretations of the Platt Amendment to the Cuban constitution and the provisions of the ¡903 Permanent Treaty. Preventive diplomacy meant that, according to Article 3 of the Platt Amendment, the United States was permitted not only to reestablish a legitimate government in Cuba but also to take measures that would prevent political instability and to maintain a Cuban government that ensured protection of life, liberty, and property. The implementation of preventive diplomacy in Cuba’s political arena came with the crises of ¡9¡2 and ¡9¡7 and with the Enoch Crowder missions to Cuba in ¡9¡9 and ¡92¡. Preventive diplomacy also meant that the Cubans were obligated to accept U.S. advice on matters of fiscal responsibility and civil government. This aspect of preventive diplomacy was first applied in ¡9¡¡ when the Cuban Ports Authority contracted with U.S. firms for improvements to the Havana harbor that were financed by bond sales in Great Britain and paid for by increased port fees. The State Department interpreted the bonds sales in Britain as discriminatory to U.S. financiers, and the higher port fees militating against U.S. shipping interests and the sale of U.S. goods in Cuba. Although presented with a fait accompli, the State Department described the contract as financially “improvident” and subsequently pressured the Cuban government into altering the terms of the agreement.

164 The United States also utilized Article 2 of the Platt Amendment to pursue preventive diplomacy. Article 2 stipulated that the Cuban government could not contract a loan or other form of indebtedness beyond its ability to pay. The State Department came to use this proviso as a means to approve U.S. bank loans issued to and bonds issued by the Cuban government. E›ectively, this meant that U.S. institutions were to receive primary consideration over foreign interests. Critics argued that the application of preventive diplomacy in political a›airs only served U.S. hegemonic intentions and, when applied to financial matters, simply illustrated “Dollar Diplomacy.” See also Crowder, Enoch; Dollar Diplomacy; Treaties: Permanent Treaty of ¡903; United States Interventions

Prío, Carlos see Prío Socarrás, Carlos Prío Socarrás, Carlos (¡903–¡977) President of Cuba from ¡948 to ¡952 and a native of Bahía Honda, Prío became active in politics as a member of the Directorio Estudiantil Universitario in the ¡930s. Subsequently, Prío served as a member of the ¡940 Constitutional Convention, the national senate, as prime minister in ¡945, and as labor minister in ¡947 and ¡948. He succeeded Ramón Grau San Martín as the presidential candidate of the Partido Revolucionario Cubano in the ¡948 elections. Guided by the ¡940 Constitution, his administration implemented many social programs including pensions for sugar workers and rent stabilization. Prío’s social agenda prompted U.S. o‡cials to link him to communist labor unions. Prío also was responsible for the establishment of the National Bank, extension of the national highway system, and the construction of a national library. Like his predecessor, corruption and gangsterism also characterized Prío’s presidency. Among his chief critics was Eduardo Chibás, leader of the Partido del Pueblo

165 Cubano, or Orthodox Party. Chibás’s suicide in ¡952 set in motion a political crisis that led to a Fulgencio Batista–led coup d’etat in ¡952 against Prío. As president, Prío continued the economic policies of his immediate predecessor. He constantly sought an increase in Cuba’s share of the U.S. sugar market and linked that to any progress on the U.S. proposed Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. Prío told the Cuban people that Cuban agricultural diversification and industrial development could be accomplished on the back of sugar. Prío’s rationale was encouraged in ¡949 when the United States helped to engineer the sale of 750,000 tons of excess Cuban sugar to Great Britain. This, plus the ¡952 U.S. Sugar Act that continued to favor U.S. producers, prompted Prío to find markets for Cuban sugar in Canada, Great Britain, and West Germany. Prio expected that the world demand for Cuban sugar would provide the revenues essential for industrialization. Following his ouster in ¡952, Prío made his way to Mexico and then to Miami, Florida, where he became an outspoken critic of the Batista regime and, in fact, was arrested for violating the ¡939 U.S. Neutrality Act. In August ¡955 he returned to Cuba, only to leave again a year later because of his support for Fidel Castro. From Miami, Prío organized and financed a Council of National Liberation, consisting of noncommunist organizations that provided arms and money to rebel groups within Cuba battling against the Batista regime. In July ¡959 he joined with Castro in forming the Unity Junta against the Batista government. After the ¡959 revolution triumphed, Prío returned briefly to Havana, only to become disillusioned with the Castro movement. He again returned to Miami, where he remained until committing suicide in ¡977. See also Grau San Martin, Ramón; Revolution

Proctor, Redfield (¡83¡–¡908) A Civil War veteran with an extensive political experience in Vermont state politics,

Proctor Proctor also was considered a part of the GOP’s inner circle. By ¡897 Proctor had become a self-made millionaire with a wide array of contacts among the U.S. business leadership. He was appointed to the U.S. Senate in ¡89¡ and was subsequently reelected until his death in ¡908. Proctor had not staked out a position on Cuba when he undertook a month-long trip to the island following the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine on February ¡5, ¡898. Proctor undertook the journey with the preconceived notion that the U.S. press was exaggerating the conditions in Cuba. During his trip, Proctor spoke with U.S. o‡cials and with Cuban political and business leaders, but, by choice, he did not speak with Governor-General Ramón Blanco or insurgent leader Máximo Gómez. Proctor also toured extensively throughout the island. Upon his return, journalists and senators urged him to give a public report. With President William McKinley’s approval he did. In his address to the Senate on March ¡7, ¡898, Proctor described to the senate the horrific conditions of the estimated 400,000 Cubans living in the tightly garrisoned, ill-equipped and unsanitary reconcentrados; hospital conditions were no better. The mistreatment of the Cuban people defied humanity, Proctor asserted. On the military front, Proctor found a stalemate, a war that neither side appeared capable of winning. As to Cuba’s political future, Proctor agreed with many that the Cubans would never accept autonomy under Spanish authority, but he di›ered from most U.S. observers on the capabilities of the Cubans to govern themselves. Proctor found racial harmony on the island that exceeded that in the United States and that because many of the Cuban leaders had been educated in Europe or the United States they were capable of adequate self-government. Proctor, who opposed U.S. annexation because of language and cultural di›erences, made no policy recommendation to McKinley, but he did frame the Cuban question in a high moral tone when he concluded that the Cubans were “struggling for freedom and deliverance from

Quitman the worst misgovernment of which [he] had knowledge.” Because of Proctor’s stature, his speech had an immediate national impact. Added to the indignity of the Dupuy de Lôme letter and the sinking of the Maine, the public now had a broader reason — humanitarism — to support the call for intervention. The most notable change was in the business community, which, heretofore, had been noncommittal on the government’s Cuban policy. Many businessmen now became advocates of intevention on humanitarian grounds. See also Dupuy de Lôme, Enrique; McKinley, William; Reconcentrado Program; SpanishAmerican War: United States Business Community and the Coming of War

Quitman, John A. (¡7¡8–¡858) Quitman was a northerner by birth who, after his migration to Mississippi, became an ardent exponent of the expansion of slavery, including the acquisition of Cuba. He led filibusters into the Texas territory, served as major general in the U.S. Army during the Mexican War, and subsequently served as military governor of Mexico City. He was elected governor of Mississippi in ¡850. Preferring to remain governor, Quitman refused Narciso López’s o›er to command his expedition to Cuba. Following López’s death in Cuba in ¡85¡, Quitman became head of the Supreme Council of the “Order of the Lone Star,” an organization dedicated to ousting Spain from Cuba. In ¡853, Quitman decided to take the personal lead of a filibuster expedition to free Cuba from Spanish control and attach it to the United States to secure southern political interests at the national level. Quitman also foresaw himself as dictator of Cuba. Quitman’s relations with Attorney General Caleb Cushing, also an advocate of strong action toward Cuba, led to some speculation that Quitman had at least the indirect support of the Pierce administration. Quitman was also encouraged by John O’Sullivan, a newspaper-

166 man, and by the “Young American” movement whose interest in Cuba dated to the Polk administration. Another prominent supporter was John R. Trasher, who subsequently raised funds and matériel for the expedition. In August ¡853, Quitman struck a deal with the Cuban Junta, an organization of New York City–based Cuban exiles who sought the island’s independence but not its annexation to the United States. The Junta granted Quitman “the prerogatives of a dictator” needed to detach Cuba from Spain. For his services, the Junta promised to pay Quitman one million dollars. Apparently the filibuster incursion was to coincide with an uprising of Cuban Creoles on the island. Because progress in recruiting volunteers and money went slowly, Quitman postponed the invasion until the summer of ¡854 at the earliest. Southerners grew impatient, particularly with Spain’s Africanization policy that could lead to a Cuban black republic. Their pressure led to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s recommendation in May ¡854 that congress suspend the nation’s neutrality laws for a year so that the Quitman expedition could commence without government opposition. The southern cause for action was enhanced by the seizure of the U.S. packet ship, the Black Warrior, in Havana harbor, which resulted in a national outcry for action against Cuba. Quitman’s cause was impeded, however, by President Franklin Pierce’s proclamation that he would strictly enforce the nation’s neutrality laws, and by the president’s e›orts to acquire Cuba, first through its purchase by the U.S. government and subsequently, through a scheme with European holders of Spanish bonds. Both e›orts failed. Furthermore, with the publication of the Ostend Manifesto in ¡854 and the defeat of Democrats in the November ¡854 congressional elections, the Pierce administration retreated from its Cuban policy. Still, Quitman continually pushed forward the date of his planned operation to the spring of ¡855. Throughout the fall and winter of ¡854 and ¡855, southern expansionists, particularly in New Orleans, touted the forth-

167 coming expedition. One newspaper report put Quitman’s strength at $¡ million, ¡2 vessels, 85,000 arms, 90 field pieces, and up to 50,000 men. The report proved to be an exaggeration. In Cuba, the Spanish ended its Africanization policy but otherwise prepared for Quitman’s anticipated arrival. The Spanish not only prepared coastal defenses and increased sea patrols but also warned that they would arm the Afro-Cubans to defend the island. In mid–February ¡855, the Spanish also learned of and crushed the planned Creole insurrection, headed by Ramón de Pintó, that was to preclude Quitman’s arrival. With the tide turning against acquisition of Cuba, President Pierce decided to appeal directly to Quitman to abandon his planned Cuban adventure. While there is no record of their conversations, the administration made it clear that the filibusters would not be allowed to leave the United States, and if they did, a well-prepared Spanish army and navy would be awaiting them in Cuba. Subsequently, Quitman returned to New Orleans to oversee the disbursement of the expeditionary force. On April 30, ¡855, he surrendered his leadership position to the Cuban Junta, which subsequently disbanded until after the U.S. Civil War. For his part, Quitman returned to politics, and was elected to congress in ¡855. See also Africa: Spain’s Africanization Policy; Expansionism; Ostend Manifesto; O’Sullivan, John; Pierce, Franklin

Radio Martí

A medium-wave station, Radio Martí began operations on May ¡9, ¡985, under the charter of the Voice of America. The station was intended to provide objective information about Cuba and the world to the island, e›ectively o›ering an alternative to Cuba’s statecontrolled media. In September ¡98¡ President Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order ¡2323 that established the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba. Subsequently, congress approved funding the sta-

Reagan tion in ¡983, and it went into operation two years later. In ¡990 TV Martí was added, but the quality of reception in Cuba was much poorer than that of Radio Martí. Until the late ¡990s, Radio Martí broadcast novelas (soap operas), news, and pop music. In ¡996 the station o‡ce was relocated from Washington, D.C., to Miami, Florida. With it came a change in programming format, which resulted in charges that Radio Martí had lost its Cuban audience and, in fact, was no longer fulfilling its objective. Technically, the Voice of America was responsible for the programming, but in reality, the O‡ce of Cuban Broadcasting was directed by Jorge Más Canosa from ¡985 until his death in ¡997. Más Canosa headed the Miamibased Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), which openly advocated the overthrow of the Castro regime and supported Reagan’s Cuba policy. This connection immediately led to charges that propaganda, not news, was the ultimate purpose of Radio Martí and, subsequently, TV Martí. The Cuban government continuously jams the transmissions, but it has not been able to shut them down. The implementation of broadcasts in ¡985 caused Castro to unilaterally terminate the ¡984 Immigration Agreement with the United States. Despite continued controversy about its e›ectiveness, Radio and TV Martí still operate. The 200¡ fiscal year budget of $¡3.6 million supported a sta› of ¡¡8, with signals being transmitted from Marathon Key, Florida; Greenville, North Carolina; and Delano, California. See also Cuban American National Foundation; Más Canosa, Jorge; Reagan, Ronald R.

Rapprochement see Castro Ruz, Fidel: Rapprochement Reagan, Ronald R. (¡9¡¡– ) The fortieth president of the United States, Reagan held o‡ce from ¡98¡ to ¡989.

Reagan A former movie actor and two-term governor of California (¡967–¡975), Reagan and his colleagues came to Washington with the preconceived notion that the Soviet Union instigated international instability by supporting civil wars and terrorism in an e›ort to expand its global presence. Applied to Latin America, the Reagan administration saw a “MoscowHavana” axis through which Moscow allegedly used the government in Havana to foment revolution, train insurgents, and spawn new “Cuban-model states” throughout the region. In contrast to the Carter administration, the Reagan administration came to o‡ce determined to pursue a confrontational policy toward Cuba. The basis of the policy can be found in the ¡980 Santa Fe Report, issued by a group of conservative policy analysts, many of whom subsequently served in the Reagan administration. For example, the report’s editor Lewis Tambs was considered for the assistant secretary of state for Latin American a›airs but, because of congressional opposition, instead became ambassador to Colombia and then to Costa Rica. Roger Fontaine, another contributor to the report, became the chief Latin American specialist on the National Security Council. Its recommendations included forcing Cuba to terminate its Soviet relationship, demanding Cuba terminate its support of guerrilla forces in Central America, establishing of Radio Free Cuba (eventually, Radio Martí) to pump propaganda into the island, and keeping open the option of military intervention in Cuba. The Santa Fe report’s recommendations paralleled those of the Cuban American National Foundation, which also influenced Reagan’s Cuban policy. A precondition to the normalization of relations was Washington’s insistence that Havana terminate its relationship with Moscow. The administration charged that the Soviet military and intelligence presence in Cuba served as a direct threat to the security of the United States. Until Cuba severed its connection to the Soviet Union, something the Reagan administration did not expect, there was no basis for discussion. Given this precondition, secret talks between Secretary of State

168 Alexander M. Haig and Cuban vice president Carlos Rafael Rodríguez in Mexico City in November ¡98¡ and between Special Ambassador Vernon Walters and Castro in Havana in March ¡982 went nowhere. During the same period, the Reagan administration rejected the Cuban o›ers to help mediate an end to the Central American crisis because it would o›er a sense of legitimacy to Castro’s government. Subsequent Cuban o›ers to discuss the normalization of relations through the Spanish and Costa Rican governments were also rejected by Washington. Following the conclusion of an immigration agreement in December ¡984, Castro made a direct appeal to the United States to discuss all outstanding issues. Again, the Reagan administration refused. By ¡987, most analysts concluded that U.S.–Cuban relations were at their lowest point since the ¡962 missile crisis. In Central America, Reagan and several of his advisors charged Cuba (and Nicaragua) with supplying arms to the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) guerrillas fighting in El Salvador and, if not stopped, threatened “to go to the source,” that is, Cuba, to end the supplies. To temper Cuba’s alleged threat to Central America, the United States conducted extraordinary military maneuvers in the Caribbean in ¡982, ¡983, and ¡984. The Reagan administration explained that its invasion of Grenada in October ¡983 was to halt the spread of the Moscow-Havana axis into the southern Caribbean region where it would threaten the Panama Canal and Venezuelan oil supplies to the United States. Beyond the Caribbean region, the Reagan administration viewed the continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola as another adventurous scheme intended to spread communism, therefore, they must be withdrawn. The Reagan administration also sought to tighten the economic embargo and to tighten the sources of credit on the international market. Attributing the ¡980 Mariel boat lift to the introduction of consumer goods and dollars by Cuban exiles a year earlier, the Reagan team rationalized that denying Cuba additional hard currencies with which to pur-

169 chase western made goods would contribute to political instability on the island. Radio Martí began operations in ¡985 and was immediately identified with the militant sector of the Cuban exile group in Miami, Florida. Most critics argued that the station was used to stir resistance to the Castro regime rather than broadcast news and entertainment. The station also prompted Castro to cancel the ¡984 Immigration Agreement that provided for the repatriation of excludables who arrived in the United States during the Mariel boat lift. See also Africa: Cuban’s Military Involvement; Castro Ruz, Fidel: Foreign Policy; Central American Conflict; Grenada; Haig, Alexander M.; Immigration Agreement of ¡984; Shultz, George P.; Trade Embargo

Reciprocal Trade Agreement of ¡934 see Trade Agreements: Reciprocal Trade Agreement of ¡934

Reconcentrado Program Implemented by Spain’s governor-general Valeriano Weyler in ¡896, the reconcentrado program was designed to separate the Cuban insurgents from the civilian population. To cut o› the insurgents from their sources of food and supplies, manpower, and information, Weyler ordered rural residents into special camps that would be controlled by the Spanish military. Within months, an estimated four hundred thousand men, women, and children were forced into these Spanish-administered fortified towns without adequate food, housing, medicine, and sanitation. By the end of ¡896 countless thousands of persons died within these camps,which led President William McKinley to foster a relief program for those interned. The deplorable conditions were described by U.S. politicians, such as William J. Calhoun and Redfield Proctor, and the so-called “yellow press,” all of which contributed to a public demand in the United States for a moral crusade

Republic of Cuba against Spain. See also Calhoun, William J.; Proctor, Redfield; War for Independence; Weyler y Nicolau, Valerieno

Reed, Thomas B. (¡839–¡902) A Republican congressman from Maine who served as Speaker of the House of Representatives on the eve of the Spanish-American War, Reed’s loyalty to the Republican Party and his arrogance and domineering attitude earned him the title “Czar.” In ¡897 and ¡898, Reed used his power as speaker to forcefully prevent the Democrats from placing on the House floor resolutions on behalf of Cuban belligerency. Although not on good terms with President McKinley, Reed had an intense dislike of the Cuban insurgents, and the president knew that Reed would use his authority to block any pro–Cuban resolutions. When Congress met in special session in ¡897, Reed did just that. Because Reed controlled committee assignments, he named members to only two committees— Rules and Ways and Means—to deal with the tari› issue. Deliberately, Reed avoided appointments to other committees, including to the Foreign A›airs Committee. While the Democrats protested, Reed’s Republican colleagues refused to challenge him. Reed went beyond this. In ¡898, when the Morgan resolution, calling for granting belligerent status to the Cuban insurgents, arrived in the House, Reed manipulated the rules that resulted in a limited debate on Cuba and prevented a vote on the resolution. Throughout, Reed’s chief nemesis was Democratic congressman Joseph W. Bailey (Tex.). In April ¡898, Reed maintained party discipline to ensure House approval of the war resolutions favored by McKinley. Reed resigned from Congress in September ¡899 to enter private law practice, which he pursued until his death in ¡902. See also Bailey, Joseph; McKinley, William; Morgan, John T.

Republic of Cuba On July ¡5, ¡895, the Cuban Republic was proclaimed, but not until September ¡3,

Revolution ¡895, at Jimaguay in Camaguey Province did 20 delegates gather as a constituent assembly to establish the framework of the provisional government. Its constitution provided for a Council of Government headed by President Salvador Cisneros Betancourt. Tomás Estrada Palma was appointed as the government’s representative in New York. Although the army was technically under civilian control, Commander-in-Chief Máximo Gómez enjoyed freedom of action. Constantly on the move to avoid capture by Spanish troops, the government became known as the “government in the woods.” It played a minimal role in the military conduct of the war and never received diplomatic recognition from a foreign government. In October ¡898, it was abandoned and replaced by the Cuban Assembly. See also Estrada Palma, Tomás; Gómez y Báez, Máximo; New York Junta

Revolution ¡953–¡959 On January ¡, ¡959, members of Fidel Castro’s 26th of July Movement entered Havana, marking the collapse of Fulgencio Batista’s regime. Castro’s movement had grown from a small group of students and professionals to a large revolutionary force that signaled the end of Cuba’’s past and its historic relationship with the United States. The long-term origins of the Cuban Revolution can be found in the U.S. occupation of Cuba following the Spanish-American War, the ¡902 Platt Amendment, the ¡933 Sergeants’ Revolt, and presidency of Ramón Grau San Martín. Economically, Cuba had become dependent upon the United States as its major sugar market and as the supplier of industrial equipment and consumer goods. The more-immediate causes can be found in the corrupt Cuban governments since ¡934 and, particularly, the manipulative influence of President Batista. While Havana symbolized the vibrancy of Cuban life, the majority of the Cuban people lived outside Havana. Tied to the sugar monoculture, most of these people lived in less-than-adequate socioeconomic

170 conditions, and as a group, this laboring class had no voice in the national government. These socially disadvantaged, disenfranchised rural workers provided a potential source of strength to a revolutionary group. The spark that ignited Fidel Castro’s revolution came in March ¡952 when Batista ousted President Carlos Prío Socarrás and voided the scheduled June elections in which Castro was to be a congressional candidate. As a result, Castro became convinced that violence was the only means available to change Cuba’’s existing system. Castro’s initial move against the Batista government came on July 26, ¡953, when he and his brother Raúl, along with ¡83 followers, attacked the Moncada army barracks in Santiago de Cuba. Most of the insurgents were killed in the ensuing battle or, following military trials, executed by the Cuban Army. Fidel and Raúl were spared but sentenced to fifteen years in prison. For his trial, Fidel prepared his own defense. In a speech subsequently published as “History Will Absolve Me,” Castro provided a lengthy indictment of Cuba’s corrupt political and judicial systems and the nation’’s socioeconomic disparities. Castro went on to call for a constitutional government, agrarian reform, profit sharing in key industries, and confiscation of money gained through corrupt and illegal deals. The Castro brothers were released from jail in a ¡955 general amnesty and exiled to Mexico. Upon his departure, Fidel Castro promised to return to liberate Cuba. In Mexico, the Castros met up with the Argentine revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara to plot their return to Cuba, which they attempted aboard the yacht Granma with eighty-two others in December ¡956. Repelled by Batista’s army, Castro and eleven others escaped to the Sierra Maestra, where he lived in near obscurity until the New York Times published his interview with reporter Herbert Matthews in February ¡957. Castro carefully orchestrated the interview, giving Matthews the impression that the rebel army was far stronger than its eighteen men and that it had

171 successfully engaged Batista’s army columns, when in fact it had only two such encounters. The Times interview and Castro’s “Appeal to the Cuban People” stirred the numerous other opposition groups to increase their protest and violence against the Batista regime. Among the opposition’s most notable acts was that of March ¡957, in which members of the student-led Directorio Revolucionario seized the presidential palace in Havana, missing Batista by only a few minutes. Batista responded to each act against him with horrific repression. Opponents, real or suspected, were jailed and tortured, and many of those killed had their bodies left hanging from trees and lampposts as a warning against further protest. Instead of curtailing the violence, Batista’s repression only served to increase it. His refusal to resign and accept a coalition government as proposed by Cuba’s Catholic bishops, the Directorio Revolucionario, and the Joint Committee on Civic Institutions (an umbrella for forty-two middle-sector organizations) served to broaden the base of Batista’s opposition. The opposition groups were drawn to Castro by his promise to end the Batista dictatorship, not by his pledge to restructure Cuban economic and social life. Castro also benefitted from a change in U.S. policy in March ¡959 when it imposed an arms embargo upon the government of Cuba. Castro commenced his final o›ensive in August ¡958, and by November Batista stood isolated. Many of Batista’s o‡cers questioned his future or openly supported the guerrillas. After refusing a U.S. o›er to broker a settlement in early December, Batista understood that he had lost all popular support. He fled the island for the Dominican Republic in the early morning of January ¡, ¡959. Although Manuel Urrutia was named provisional president, clearly Castro was the real power of the revolutionary government. Once victorious, the revolutionaries nationalized foreign-owned properties and implemented a massive land distribution program. The promise of democracy went unfulfilled as Castro and his followers solidified their control over the government. Opposition spokes-

United States Presidential men, along with Cuba’’s old elite and Batista supporters, were either executed or exiled. See also Batista, y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Castro, Fidel; Castro, Raúl; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Grau San Martín, Ramón; Platt Amendment; Sergeants’ Revolt; Sugar

United States Presidential Administrations and the Revolution ¡953–¡96¡ With the exception of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) sponsored coup d’état against Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in ¡954, the Eisenhower administration gave little attention to Latin America until late in its second term. Cuba fit into that pattern. When the Eisenhower administration began in January ¡953, Cuba was no more than a distant concern. During Eisenhower’s first term, ¡953 to ¡957, the administration accepted the advice of the U.S. ambassador to Cuba, Arthur Gardner, and of the State Department that maintaining Cuba’s sugar quota would avert the risk of political instability on the island. At the time, the administration appeared to have little understanding of the depths of the opposition to Cuban president Fulgencio Batista. Ambassador Gardner, a political appointee, was totally unprepared for the task before him. During his tenure, Gardner established very close relations with Batista and ignored the State Department’s instructions to establish contact with Batista’s leading political opponents. Others shared Gardner’s positive opinion about Batista. During his visit to Havana in February ¡955, Vice President Richard M. Nixon publicly compared Batista with Abraham Lincoln. Reporting to Eisenhower, Nixon described the Cuban president as a “remarkable man,” interested not in himself but in Cuba’s socioeconomic development. Gardner and the embassy sta› consistently underestimated Fidel Castro’s significance. For example, after the ¡953 Moncada army barracks attack, the embassy described

United States Presidential Castro as an “ambitious and ruthless opportunist”; the sta› appeared relieved, but not concerned, by Castro’s subsequent prison sentence. When Batista released Castro from prison for exile in Mexico, Gardner failed to report to Washington either the popular outburst of enthusiasm for Castro or Castro’s pledge to continue the revolution from abroad. Throughout ¡955 and ¡956, Gardner ignored the significance and impact of the pro–Castro propaganda being distributed across the island and its promise that Castro would return to liberate the country from tyranny. Instead, Gardner believed the Cubans were too prosperous and politically apathetic to be concerned with a would-be revolutionary. Significantly, Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland concurred with Gardner’s views. When the New York Times published Herbert Matthews’s interview with Castro, Gardner spent his time pointing out the mistakes in the reporting rather than reflecting on the elevation of Castro’s prestige across Cuba. Although Gardner now described Castro and his followers as “socialists” and “nationalists” who promised to transform Cuba, the ambassador did not see the “impractical, possibly megalomaniac” Castro as a threat to Batista. Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom accepted Gardner’s reports. In an October ¡957 news conference Rubottom asserted that the great majority of the Cuban people were satisfied with their quality of life. Only a few State Department and Central Intelligence Agency analysts argued to the contrary. They concluded that Batista’s position stood on “weak legs,” but these reports made no impact upon upper echelon policymakers. Earl E.T. Smith replaced Gardner as ambassador to Cuba in June ¡957. Like Gardner, he had been a financial contributor to the Republican Party. A successful Wall Street financier without international experience, Smith mistrusted the embassy sta›, particularly the chief political o‡cer, John Topping. At the same time, Smith feared public criticism from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. As a result, Smith personally approved

172 almost all cables sent to Washington, and analysis critical of Batista did not reach the State Department. As Castro’s position strengthened in late ¡957 and throughout ¡958, Smith became convinced that the rebel was a communist. As Batista’’s position weakened in ¡958, the State Department encouraged Smith to meet with moderate opposition leaders in an e›ort to bring about a solution to the growing crisis, but Smith refused. He contended that doing so would be intervening in Cuba’s internal a›airs. In February and March ¡958 Smith sidestepped the e›orts of the Cuban groups calling for Batista’s resignation and a “unity government.” By July ¡958 Smith saw only two choices: Batista or Castro. To Smith, the former would defend U.S. business interests on the island, while the latter would bring about their demise because of his communist leanings. In mid–¡958, U.S. policy toward Batista also su›ered from a public relations problem. Under the terms of the ¡948 Military Assistance Program (MAP) agreement, the United States supplied Cuba between ¡952 and ¡958 with some $¡0 million in military hardware for use in the defense of the Caribbean region from an external attack. Batista, however, used this matériel on suspected revolutionary supporters, including civilians. If this were not enough to link the United States to Batista, an o‡cial visit to Havana by the aircraft carrier Leyte and the award of the U.S. Legion of Merit to Cuban Air Force colonel Carlos M. Tabernilla y Palermo sealed the connection. Denying Batista arms supplies in March ¡958 was an e›ort to correct the publicity problem and bring Batista to the negotiating table. It failed on both counts. Furthermore, the U.S. embargo did not prevent Batista from finding other sources of supply, particularly from Europe and Israel. At the same time, U.S. authorities labored to prevent the clandestine dispatch of matériel to Castro, but the success of that e›ort remains a matter of conjecture. By November ¡958, the State Department dismissed Smith’s positive reports from Havana. With Castro on the verge of victory,

173 the department, suspicious of his intentions, made another attempt at a mediated settlement. With Eisenhower’s approval, William Pawley was dispatched on a secret mission to Havana in early December ¡958 to bring about Batista’s resignation and replacement with a caretaker government. Batista refused to resign. At the same time the United States refused to extend recognition to Andrés Rivero Agüero, a Batistiano who won the fraudulent November ¡958 presidential election. Following Batista’s flight from Cuba in the first hours of ¡959, the Eisenhower administration faced the problem of extending recognition to Cuba’s new provisional government, to which Castro appointed Manuel Urrutia Lleó president and Miró Cardona prime minister. Everyone understood that Castro was the real political force. Despite suspending elections for eighteen months, the provisional government momentarily restored constitutional guarantees and promised to meet all international obligations. Under these conditions, Eisenhower extended recognition to Cuba on January 6, ¡959. U.S. optimism soon faded as Castro engineered public summary trials and the execution of nearly 250 Batista supporters over the next few weeks. Castro announced that he had no obligation to answer U.S. protests regarding these “internal” matters. At the invitation of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Castro visited the United States from April ¡5 to 26, ¡959, with a predetermination to refuse economic assistance if it were o›ered. President Eisenhower conveniently absented himself from Washington and assigned Vice President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State Christian A. Herter to meet with Castro. He also met with the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign A›airs committees. To his various audiences, including the public, Castro declared that his was a “humanistic,” not communist, revolution; that he had no intention of confiscating foreign-owned properties or of violating the ¡934 treaty granting the United States use of Guantánamo Bay; and that elections would be held in three or four years. The

United States Presidential U.S. congressmen seemed generally favorably impressed. Only Nixon was more cautious, reporting to Eisenhower that Castro appeared determined to lead Cuba down a socialist economic path with limited political participation. For the most part, the U.S. press and public seemed impressed. Hopes for improved relations quickly dissolved after Castro’s visit. On May ¡7, ¡959, Castro promulgated his Agrarian Reform Law, which broke up land holdings in excess of ¡,000 acres and forbade sugar mill operators to own cane plantations. Payment based upon the declared tax value, not the market value, was to be in the form of twenty-year bonds at 4∂ percent interest. Castro angrily dismissed U.S. appeals for just and immediate compensation. By the end of ¡959 approximately $800 million of tax-valued U.S. properties had been seized. The bonds were never issued despite U.S. appeals. Castro’s subsequent initiatives sealed his fate with the Eisenhower administration. His endorsement of the Communist Popular Socialist Party (PSP) and his crackdown on opposition prompted Provisional President Manuel Urrutia to resign and, along with many moderates, to flee the country. Castro also supported short-lived revolutionary movements in the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Nicaragua. In November ¡959 the Eisenhower administration concluded there was no good reason to believe that Castro would adopt policies consistent with U.S. security or economic interests. U.S. policymakers received another jolt on February 4, ¡960, when Soviet first deputy premier Anastas Mikoyan began a ten-day visit to Cuba that resulted in the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In addition the Soviets agreed to provide Cuba with economic assistance and to purchase Cuban sugar. As Castro established and strengthened his ties to the Soviet Union, the Eisenhower administration hardened its position. On March ¡7, ¡960, the president approved a CIA plan to train Cuban exiles to return to the island to incite a counterrevolution. Because

United States Presidential Eisenhower had instructed U.S. oil companies to refuse to refine Soviet oil, in June ¡960 the Cuban government retaliated by nationalizing the Shell, Texaco, and Standard Oil companies on the island. In turn, with congressional approval to fix sugar quotas for the remainder of the year and into ¡96¡, on July 6, ¡960, Eisenhower reduced the Cuban sugar quota, e›ectively terminating imports of Cuban sugar for the remainder of the year. This action did not temper Castro’s movement to the left as the administration had expected. Instead, Castro immediately seized additional U.S. properties. The Cuban problem became a U.S.–Soviet issue on July 9, when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced that “figuratively speaking” he would use Soviet rockets to defend the Cuban people against U.S. aggression. Khrushchev taunted Eisenhower, declaring that the Monroe Doctrine was a policy of the past that could not keep communism out of the Western Hemisphere. In an e›ort to rea‡rm the Monroe Doctrine, at the August ¡960 Organization of American States Seventh Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign A›airs in San José, Costa Rica, the United States won approval of a declaration that, while it did not specify Cuba, condemned “intervention or threat of intervention by any extra-continental power” and stated that such a threat endangered the security of the Americas. Unmoved by the declaration and buoyed by Khrushchev’s braggadocio, Castro forecast the overthrow of Latin American governments that signed the San José declaration. During the San José conference, Cuba reached a trade agreement with Communist China in which the latter agreed to purchase 500,000 tons of Cuban sugar over the next five years. In return, Cuba extended recognition to the government at Beijing and severed ties with Nationalist China. Next, Castro addressed the United Nations General Assembly for four and one-half hours on September 26, ¡960. He again criticized the past U.S. presence in Cuba and described its current acts as “economic aggression.” As the fall of ¡960 pro-

174 gressed, the Cuban government continued its expropriation of U.S.–owned properties. Again, the Eisenhower administration upped the ante. On October ¡9, the administration embargoed all trade with Cuba except for food and medicine. On the next day, Ambassador Philip Bonsal was recalled from Havana. To strengthen the embargo, the State Department directed U.S. citizens not to travel to Cuba, except for “compelling reasons.” It advised nations receiving U.S. aid not to purchase Cuban sugar with U.S. funds. In addition, e›orts were made to deny Cuba credit to import spare parts from the United States or its allies. The U.S. Senate also voted to cut mutual security appropriations to any country supplying Castro with military or economic assistance. From then until January 2, ¡96¡, U.S.– Cuban relations continued to worsen. On that day Castro charged that the U.S. embassy in Havana was a center for counterrevolutionary activities and demanded that the embassy sta› be reduced to eleven persons within fortyeight hours. Eisenhower felt he had no choice but to sever diplomatic relations. Eisenhower left the presidency with the Cuban situation at its most volatile. Economic sanctions had failed to force Castro away from his leftist direction. For the incoming Kennedy administration, Eisenhower left only one option: the covert CIA operation that had been training Cuban exiles for a counterrevolution. This plan was implemented at the Bay of Pigs in April ¡96¡. It was a complete fiasco. Castro’’s army quickly suppressed the invaders, and Castro himself became firmly entrenched as leader of revolutionary Cuba. See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Bonsal, Philip W.; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Gardner, Arthur; Herter, Christian A.; Pawley, William; Smith, Earl E.T.; Soviet Union: Trade Agreement of ¡960

United States Congress and the Cuban Revolution ¡959–¡96¡ Congressional criticisms of U.S. policy abounded during the triumph of Castro’s revo-

175 lution between ¡959 and ¡96¡. Most it focused upon the need for harsher sanctions against Castro and advocated the U.S. recognition of a Cuban government in exile. Among these spokesmen were Senators Styles Bridges (R., N.H.) and Roman Hruska (R.–Neb.) and Congressmen Wayne Hays (D.–Ohio) and Keith Thompson More-influential were Senators James O. Eastland (D., Miss.), Barry Goldwater (R.–Ariz.) and George Smathers (D., Fla.). Eastland chaired the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and its Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws. Using the committee’s subpoena powers, Eastland paraded before the subcommittee those individuals who criticized U.S.–Cuban policy and charged that “left-wingers” were responsible for the “loss of Cuba” as they had been for the “loss of China.” Goldwater agreed with Eastland that the State Department had su‡cient reason, early on, to inform the American public of the radical nature of Castro’s revolution. Determined to bring Castro down, Goldwater first advocated a naval blockade to starve the Cuban people into submission or, failing that, outright U.S. military intervention. Goldwater charged both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations with indecision when it came to Cuba. Smathers, a close friend of John F. Kennedy, was one of the earliest opponents to Fidel Castro, particularly as the Cuban émigrés flocked into South Florida. He was among the first to criticize Castro’s mock trials and to call for using the sugar quota as a weapon to influence Castro’s policies. For his stance, Smathers became known as the selfappointed leading challenger to Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution. Those o›ering an alternative to a harsh U.S. policy, included Senators Wayne Morse (D.–Ore.), Claiborne Pell (D.–R.I.), Paul Douglas (D.–Ill.), and J. William Fulbright (D.–Ark.), and, in the House of Representatives, Adam Clayton Powell (D.–N.Y.) and Charles Porter (D.–Ore.). In varying degrees, each perceived the socioeconomic and political causes of the Cuban revolution as legitimate and criticized the Eisenhower adminis-

Rivero Agüero tration for not cutting military assistance to Batista earlier than March ¡958. They called for the United States to seek cooperation from the Organization of American States to deal with Castro’s emerging extremism and to develop an economic development package for all Latin America. As Castro became more anti–American by ¡96¡, this group perceived him as a threat to U.S. interests in the region but were at a loss as to what policy the U.S. government should pursue. See also Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Kennedy, John F.

Revolutionary Party of Cuba see Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Auténtico) Rivero Agüero, Andrés (¡905–¡987) Agüero was president-elect of Cuba at the time of the collapse of the Batista regime in December ¡958. A native of Oriente Province, Agüero became Fulgencio Batista’s personal secretary in the ¡930s after graduating from the University of Havana Law School. He served Batista as secretary of agriculture during Batista’s ¡940–¡944 presidential term and as education minister and prime minister after ¡952. He captured the presidency as the o‡cial candidate in the rigged November ¡958 elections in which only 40 percent of the eligible Cubans voted. In late November and early December ¡958, while U.S. policymakers debated extending recognition to Agüero, the State Department expressed its dissatisfaction with the course of events in Cuba and wanted Batista to go. Toward that end, on the evening of December ¡0, Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Braddock informed Cuba’s prime minister Gonzalez Guell that for Agüero to gain U.S. backing, he would need the support of a majority of the Cuban people. To do so, Braddock advised Agüero to negotiate with the nonviolent opposition, including the pro–Castro civic organizations. Furthermore,

Roa Batista would have to leave the island. Undoubtedly Guell reported to Batista on his conversation with Braddock, but at the time the dictator had already refused a U.S. proposal to step aside. When Batista fled Cuba in the early morning of January ¡, ¡958, Agüero and his family left with him. Subsequently, they settled in Miami, Florida. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Pawley, William; Revolution: United States Presidential Administrations and the Revolution, ¡953–¡959

Roa, Raúl (¡908–¡982) Roa served as Cuba’s foreign minister from ¡959 to ¡976. He was briefly jailed in ¡930 for participating with other university students in anti–Machado demonstrations. Subsequent to his graduation from the University of Havana in ¡934, Roa went on to become one of Cuba’s leading intellectuals. His public criticisms of Fulgencio Batista’s ¡952 coup d’etat forced him to leave Cuba for two years. In ¡956 his joined the Movimiento de Resistencia Cívica, an organization of professionals and businessmen opposed to Batista. After the revolution in ¡959, Roa first became Cuba’s ambassador to the Organization of American States and then its foreign minister. Throughout the ¡960s Roa, whose abrasive style and violent tirades earned him the title “unconventional diplomat,” repeatedly denounced the United States before the United Nations General Assembly. In ¡973 he completed an anti-hijacking accord with the Untied States. Subsequently, he became a member of the central committee of Cuba’s Communist Party and the Council of State. See also Air Hijackings: Anti-Hijacking Accord; Coup d’état; Machado y Morales, Gerardo

Robaina González, Roberto (¡937– ) Robaina served as foreign minister from ¡993 until ¡999. Of humble background,

176 Robaina rose rapidly in the ranks of Cuba’s government. He became the youngest member of the Politburo and Council of State, and in ¡986 he was made a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Rogers, William P. (¡9¡3– ) Richard Nixon appointed Rogers secretary of state in ¡969 despite Rogers’s his limited experience in international a›airs. In reality, Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger largely ignored Rogers in policymaking, a factor that led to Rogers’s resignation and return to private law practice in ¡973. In ¡970 Rogers clashed with Kissinger over the supposed presence of Y-class Soviet submarines at Cienfuegos, Cuba. Because the evidence was inconclusive, Rogers wanted to pursue a wait-and-see policy, while Kissinger wanted to be more aggressive toward the Soviets. When Nixon momentarily accepted Rogers’s advice, Kissinger took the issues public. Otherwise, Rogers remained outside the formulation of Cuban policy. See also Kissinger, Henry A.; Nixon, Richard M.; Soviet Union: Naval Base

Roosevelt, Franklin D. (¡882–¡945) Prior to becoming the 3¡st President of the United States (¡933–¡945), Franklin Roosevelt served as assistant secretary of the Navy (¡9¡3–¡920) and governor of the state of New York (¡929–¡933). Roosevelt signaled a significant change in U.S. policy toward Latin America in his inaugural address when he announced that henceforth the United States would be a “good neighbor.” As explained by Secretary of State Cordell Hull to the Latin American delegates assembled at the Seventh International Conference of American States meeting in Montevideo, Uruguay, in December ¡933, the United States would no longer intervene in the internal a›airs of Latin American nations. Often overlooked in Roosevelt’s announcement was his assertion that every na-

177 tion had the duty to maintain a constitutional government. The impact of the policy change was immediate in Cuba. Despite pleas from the ambassador to Cuba, Sumner Welles, to intervene in the ¡933 “Sergeants’ Revolt” and restore the government of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, Roosevelt refused to do so, but he also refused to extend recognition to President Ramón Grau San Martín on the grounds that Grau San Martín did not achieve the presidency legally. Once Cuba returned to constitutional government, Roosevelt promised to extend U.S. recognition. Technically, Roosevelt’s policy was consistent with the Good Neighbor policy. With the election of Carlos Mendieta in January ¡934, constitutional government returned to Cuba. Roosevelt extended recognition and continued to do so with successive presidents of Cuba through ¡945. So committed to noninterference in Cuban a›airs, Roosevelt refused President Miguel Mariano Gómez’s request in ¡938 to intervene to prevent Fulgencio Batista’s e›ort to remove him from o‡ce. Roosevelt supporters point to the termination of the Permanent Treaty of ¡903, with its acrimonious Platt Amendment and its replacement with a new treaty in ¡934 as the sanctification of the Good Neighbor policy’s application to Cuba. The Roosevelt administration would also claim to be an economic good neighbor by giving special consideration to Cuban sugar and its access to the U.S. market with the ¡934 Reciprocal Trade Agreement, ¡934 JonesCostigan Act, and supplemental trade agreements in ¡939 and ¡94¡, and the ¡937 Sugar Act. Cuba experienced an economic boom during World War II when the United States purchased the island’s entire sugar crop. On the downside, these acts served to increase Cuba’s dependency upon sugar and its access to the U.S. market. Certainly, ambassadors J. Butler Wright and George Messersmith removed themselves from meddling in Cuba’s internal a›airs, but not so Je›erson Ca›rey and Spruille Braden. For his activities, critics charged Ca›rey with

Roosevelt making a mockery of the Good Neighbor policy. Braden’s attacks upon the corrupt practices of the Cuban government led to President Fulgencio Batista’s request that the ambassador be recalled. In both instances the Roosevelt administration stood by its diplomats. In ¡938, during his meeting with Batista in Washington, D.C., Roosevelt strongly urged that Cuba end government corruption, initiate fiscal reform, and to do more to protect U.S. business interests on the island. An assessment of the Good Neighbor policy’s application to Cuba will depend upon an interpretation of U.S. political and economic policies after ¡933. Certainly, the Good Neighbor policy died with Roosevelt in ¡945 and the dawning of the Cold War shortly thereafter. See also Braden, Spruille; Ca›rey, Je›erson; Good Neighbor policy; JonesCostigan Act; Messersmith, George S.; Trade Agreements: Reciprocal Trade Agreement of ¡934, Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡939, Second Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡94¡; Welles, Benjamin Sumner; Wright, J. Butler

Roosevelt, Theodore (¡858–¡9¡9) Born into a prominent New York family, Theodore Roosevelt graduated from Harvard University and then spent two years on a North Dakota cattle ranch before returning to New York state politics. Roosevelt, a successful fundraiser for the Republican Party, was appointed assistant secretary of the Navy in ¡897. An ardent advocate of U.S. expansion, Roosevelt was at odds with President William McKinley regarding Cuba. Where McKinley wanted a peaceful solution to the Cuban crisis, Roosevelt supported intervention on humanitarian grounds and viewed it as an opportunity to increase the size of the U.S. Navy and to enhance U.S. prestige in world a›airs. As early as November ¡897, he privately encouraged Navy Secretary John D. Long to prepare for war, including the seizure of the Manila Bay in the Philippines by the Asiatic Fleet and the placement of the Atlantic

Roosevelt Corollary Squadron at Key West, Florida, for action o› Cuba. Immediately following the outbreak of war in April ¡898, Roosevelt resigned his government post to join the First Volunteer Calvary, better know as the “Rough Riders.” His leadership in the regiment’s successful charge up San Juan Hill vaulted Roosevelt further into the public limelight. Following the war, Roosevelt returned to private life but remained active in Republican Party politics. He became the Republican vice presidential candidate in ¡900 and the 26th President of the United States following the assassination of President William McKinley on September 6, ¡90¡. Roosevelt, who was convinced that the United States had a moral obligation to uplift “inferior peoples,” shared the opinion of General Leonard Wood and Secretary of War Elihu Root that the Cubans were not capable of self-government This attitude contributed to his support of the ¡902 Platt Amendment as a means to ensure U.S. influence in the development of sound government and finance on the island. Recognizing the underdevelopment of the Cuban economy, its dependency upon the United States, and the potential market for U.S. manufacturers, Roosevelt strongly advocated the trade reciprocity treaty with Cuba that was completed in ¡902 and ratified a year later. Subsequently, Roosevelt lost interest Cuba until the political crisis in ¡906. Until that time Roosevelt expressed confidence that U.S. tutelage brought the Cubans far along the road to a democratic and stable government. That image was shattered by Tomás Estrada Palma’s decision to remain in the Cuban presidency. Roosevelt sent Secretary of War William Howard Taft and Assistant Secretary of State Robert Bacon to Cuba in an unsuccessful e›ort to mediate an end to the political crisis. It resulted in the appointment of Charles Magoon in ¡906 as governor-general of Cuba. Magoon held the post until ¡909, by which time Roosevelt lost his interest in U.S. expansion and now favored the eventual liquidation of the tutelary duties the nation had previously assumed. Roosevelt supported Taft in his success-

178 ful bid for the presidency in ¡908, after which Roosevelt went on a two-year world tour. After failing in his e›ort to gain the Republican party’s ¡9¡2 presidential nomination, Roosevelt ran as the Progressive, or “Bull Moose,” candidate, only to lose to Woodrow Wilson. Roosevelt again withdrew to private life but remained a constant critic of Wilson’s policies. See also McKinley, William; Magoon, Charles; Platt Amendment; Rough riders; Taft-Bacon Mission; Spanish-American War; Treaties: Permanent Treaty of ¡903; United States Occupation of Cuba

Roosevelt Corollary A statement in ¡904 by President Theodore Roosevelt became known as the Roosevelt Corollary. It extended the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine to include the U.S. policing of Latin American disorder for the purpose of preventing European intervention. With the Panama Canal under construction, and having recently witnessed European intervention in Venezuela and because of financial chaos in the Dominican Republic that might result in European intervention, Roosevelt declared in his December ¡904 annual message to Congress that: Chronic wrongdoing … may in America, as else-where, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. While the corollary was not specifically directed at Cuba, already subject to United States intervention thanks to the Platt Amendment, it reflected the larger U.S. policy of wanting to maintain order in the Caribbean region. The corollary came under increasing attack from Latin Americans and in ¡928 was repudiated by the Clark Memorandum, each of which contributed to the corollary’s recision when the Good Neighbor policy was announced in ¡933. See also Clark Memorandum; Good Neighbor Policy; International

179 Conference of American States: Sixth International Conference

Root, Elihu (¡845–¡937) A Republican internationalist who served as secretary of war from ¡899 to ¡904 and as secretary of state from ¡905 to ¡9¡5. A native of New York, Root earned a law degree from the City University of New York, after which he entered corporate law and became active in Republican politics, where a close friendship developed with Theodore Roosevelt. Immediately upon taking o‡ce, Root confronted problems regarding the future of Cuba. He received conflicting advice from the U.S. military commanders on the island — generals John Brooke, William Ludlow, James Wilson, and Leonard Wood. Two of them, Wilson and Wood, however, had convinced leading Republicans Henry Cabot Lodge Sr. and Theodore Roosevelt of the Cubans’ inability to practice self-government. Wilson was the most explicit, proposing the outline of what later became known as the Platt Amendment. Wilson advocated the indirect control of Cuba until its “better classes” determined for themselves that annexation to the Untied States was more favorable than complete independence. At the same time, the McKinley administration feared a rebellion in Cuba similar to that in the Philippines. By early December ¡899, Root laid out the details of his Cuban program. The Cuban census, administered by U.S. authorities, needed to be completed in such a way to provide for su›rage and representation of the “better classes” in the forthcoming municipal and constitutional conventions that would lead to an independent Cuban government. The new government, Root concluded, would then negotiate Cuba’s relations with the United States. Root also recognized that Cuban sugar had long been dependent upon the U.S. market and suggested that some tari› arrangements would be needed. To implement his plan, on December ¡3, ¡899, Root replaced

Root the hesitant General Brooke with the more forceful General Wood. Root was most disappointed with the results of the ¡900 municipal and constitutional convention elections. Cuban nationalists, not the “better classes” prevailed. As a result, Root found himself being pressured by Wood to secure a permanent U.S. position on the island and to quell the ever-increasing demands from recalcitrant congressmen who wanted the United States withdrawn from there. Root was determined to get the U.S. troops out of Cuba as quickly as possible and still protect U.S. interests. On January ¡¡, ¡90¡, he asked Secretary of State John Hay and the State Department to consider having Cuba’s fundamental law of government (meaning its Constitution) include provisions that granted the United States the right to intervene to maintain Cuban independence and political stability and to protect life and property; to prevent the new Cuban government from entering into any foreign agreement that had an adverse impact upon U.S. interests, to guarantee that all acts of the U.S. military government and all rights acquired thereunder be valid, maintained, and protected; and to recognize U.S. title to naval stations. Hay concurred. Subsequently, Root transmitted these proposals to the Cuban constituent assembly, which quickly rejected them, preferring to leave the question of U.S. relations to the independent Cuban government. Undeterred, Root then easily convinced Senator Orville Platt (R.–Conn.) to introduce the measure to Congress, which became known as the Platt Amendment attached to the ¡90¡ Army Appropriations Bill signed by President Theodore Roosevelt on March ¡, ¡90¡. Root now determined that the Cubans had no choice but to accept the Platt Amendment or face dismissal and the convening of another constititional convention by U.S. authorities. The Cubans momentarily demurred by o›ering several alternatives, all of which Root rejected. Finally, in late April ¡902, a delegation representing the Cuban constitutional convention visited with Root in Washington. He assured that them that the United States would only inter-

Rough Riders vene in the case of a foreign threat to the island or if anarchy made it impossible for the Cuban government to maintain order and protect life and property. The Cubans recognized that this was the best that could be expected and that not to accept meant the continuance of U.S. military occupation. On June ¡2, ¡90¡, the Cuban constitutional convention reluctantly accepted the Platt Amendment, by a vote of ¡6–¡¡ with four abstentions, as part of their constitution. Root retreated to New York following his term as secretary of state, only to return to Washington in July ¡905 to replace John Hay as secretary of state. In the autumn of ¡906, while returning from a three-month goodwill tour to Latin America, Cuba fell into political disarray as a result of the presidential elections earlier that year. By the time Root arrived in Washington, President Theodore Roosevelt had dispatched Secretary of War William Howard Taft and Assistant Secretary of State Robert Bacon on a fact-finding mission to Cuba. Their recommendations and Cuba’s continued political disarray resulted in the assignment of Charles Magoon as governor-general, a mission that lasted until January ¡909 and, a tutelage that Root did not favor. Root maintained that the crisis could have been solved through U.S. diplomatic pressure. He also favored a trade reciprocity treaty with Cuba, but while he was secretary of state, he recognized that one could not be achieved because of U.S. domestic pressure against a special trade relationship with Cuba. Upon completion of his work as secretary of state in the Taft administration in ¡909, Root served as a senator from New York until ¡9¡5 and, subsequently, served on several international committees before returning to private life in ¡922. See also Brooke, John R.; Ludlow, William; Platt Amendment; TaftBacon Mission; United States Occupation of Cuba; Wilson, James H.; Wood, Leonard

Rough Riders The name Rough Riders was given by newspapermen to the First Volunteer Cavalry,

180 at first commanded by Leonard Wood and then by Theodore Roosevelt. The Rough Riders were a collection of volunteers representing the eastern social establishment, western cowboys, and American Indians. The regiment, and Roosevelt, gained fame on July ¡, ¡898, when Colonel Roosevelt led the troops up San Juan Hill on the outskirts of Santiago de Cuba to set the stage for the seige of that Spanish stronghold. See also Spanish-American War: Military Strateg y

Rubens, Horatio (¡869–¡94¡) A New York lawyer and friend of José Martí, Rubens became emotionally wrapped up in the cause for Cuban independence. Rubens, who served as legal consul to and spokesman for the New York Junta, remained suspicious of U.S. intentions for the island’s future. The Junta was responsible for the public release of the private letter written by Spanish ambassador Enrique Dupuy de Lôme in February ¡898. Just how the Junta obtained the document remains unclear, but it was Rubens who had it translated into English and released to the New York Journal rather than taking it to the State Department. Although the Dupuy de Lôme letter contributed to the eventual U.S. involvement in Cuba, it also cooled relations between the McKinley administration and the New York Junta. In March ¡898, when Rubens learned that President William McKinley’s war message to Congress would not contain a statement declaring for Cuban independence, Rubens publicly asserted that U.S. intervention would force the Americans to fight both the Spanish and the Cubans. Rubens refused to succumb to pressure from the New York Junta to retract the statement and, in fact, asserted that the Junta was out of touch with Cuban realities. As Congress debated the war issue in April ¡898, Rubens demanded that any implementing legislation include a clear statement regarding U.S. intentions to secure Cuba’s independence. For this reason, Rubens found solace with the Teller Amendment that pre-

181 vented possible U.S. annexation of the island. Rubens’s association with Cuba did not end with the dismantling of the New York Junta at the war’s end. He went on to play a prominent role in the development of railroads throughout Cuba and in ¡922 pleaded for a reduction on U.S. tari›s on Cuban sugar. See also Dupuy de Lôme, Enrique; New York Junta; SpanishAmerican War: United States War Resolutions

Rusk, Dean (¡909–¡994) Secretary of state for presidents John F. Kennedy (¡96¡–¡963) and Lyndon B. Johnson (¡963–¡968), Rusk held the position longer than any previous secretary save Cordell Hull under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Following military service during World War II, Rusk worked in the War Department until ¡947, when General George C. Marshall invited him to the State Department. There Rusk directed the O‡ce of United Nations A›airs and later became assistant secretary for Far Eastern a›airs. Rusk left government service in ¡952 to become president of the Rockefeller Foundation, a position he held until Kennedy tapped him to be secretary of state in ¡96¡. Following Kennedy’s assassination in November ¡963, Lyndon B. Johnson invited Rusk to remain on as secretary. Rusk had earned the reputation as a “hardliner” against communism and as a person of loyalty to both presidents, a loyalty appreciated by both Kennedy and Johnson. Rusk gained notoriety for defending U.S. policy in Vietnam. Regarding Cuba, Rusk contended that Fidel Castro had betrayed the Cuban Revolution and became a brutal, communistic dictator. Rusk advised Kennedy against carrying through with the Bay of Pigs invasion on several grounds. He questioned the military tactics to be used, doubted that a popular revolt would occur following the invasion of the island by Cuban exiles, and did not believe that the operation could be conducted without revealing the role of the United States. Rusk also argued that the invasion was contrary to international law and that by acting unilaterally,

Rusk the United States would su›er at the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS). Once the U.S. cover was lost, Rusk suggested that U.S. e›orts to bring about a cease-fire in Laos would be undercut and that the Soviets might decide to take action on Berlin. Kennedy brushed aside Rusk’s advice. Once the Bay of Pigs operation was underway on April ¡7, ¡96¡ and the U.S. connection was revealed, Rusk persuaded Kennedy not to permit a second exile air assault upon Cuban air and battery sites. Three days after it began, the Bay of Pigs invasion ended in a fiasco, and with it, Kennedy came under heavy criticism. In the wake of these attacks, Rusk became one of Kennedy’s leading defenders. Still determined to remove Castro from power, the Kennedy administration appointed Rusk to head the U.S. delegation to the OAS Ministers of Foreign A›airs meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January ¡962. Rusk worked strenuously to obtain the minimum two-thirds votes necessary to expel Cuba from the inter–American system. Several countries — Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico — argued that any drastic action would only further alienate Castro and make the OAS less e›ective in trying to reconcile Castro’s hemispheric relations. Rusk gained the support of the Central American nations, and after making promises of economic assistance, he persuaded Uruguay and Haiti to support the expulsion of Cuba from the organization, which was done on January 3¡, ¡962. During the missile crisis in October ¡962, Rusk emerged as the steady hand in the making of U.S. foreign policy. Rusk unknowingly anticipated the crisis in May ¡96¡ when, during a secret session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he noted that the United States would be subject to blackmail if the Soviets placed jet bombers or missiles in Cuba. At the start of the missile crisis, Kennedy formed an executive committee, known as EXCOM, to develop the U.S. response to Soviet adventurism. Speaking as a member of EXCOM, Rusk opposed unilat-

Saco eral military intervention but supported the idea of a blockade, or quarantine, of Soviet o›ensive weapons into Cuba. The quarantine, Rusk rationalized, left open other options, including a military strike against Cuba. Furthermore, it did not box Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev into a corner and, at the same time, gave Khrushchev the opportunity to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis. Kennedy agreed, and Rusk set about the task of implementing the policy by dispatching emissaries to European allies and of his meeting with congressional leadership and with the OAS on October 23. All came on board. Once the Soviet hand had been called, Rusk anticipated a horrific response. Instead, Khrushchev opted for a peaceful settlement. On Thursday, October 25, Khrushchev signaled his policy direction. Soviet ships enroute toward the U.S. naval blockade of Cuba changed course. The move prompted Rusk to note that “we are eyeball to eyeball and the other fellow just blinked,” a statement that soon flashed around the world. When Khrushchev proposed that, in exchange for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, the United States would remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey, again it was Rusk who convinced the president that there should be no such deal. The Soviets would be told orally that the Jupiters would eventually be removed, but it would not be linked to Cuba. If Khrushchev refused, Rusk privately suggested to Kennedy that he use UN Secretary-General U Thant to oversee the removal of missiles from both Cuba and Turkey. Khrushchev’s willingness to remove the missiles from Cuba negated the use of this option. Rusk and Johnson were determined to continue Kennedy’s e›ort to isolate Cuba from the hemisphere. The discovery of an arms cache in Venezuela in December ¡963 led to the July ¡964 OAS Ministers of Foreign A›airs meeting in Washington, D.C. Rusk led the U.S. e›ort that brought about the termination of diplomatic relations and the suspension of commercial relations with Cuba. Although the United States preferred a tougher resolution, at the ¡967 OAS meeting of Ministers of

182 Foreign A›airs Rusk secured a resolution calling for retaliation against foreign ships that were either coming from or going to hemispheric ports that called upon Cuba. Rusk, however, failed in his e›orts to persuade Great Britain and other European allies to stop trading with Cuba. For his loyal service, Johnson rewarded Rusk with the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest honor an American civilian can receive, and o›ered to nominate him for the Supreme Court. Rusk accepted the first but rejected the second, preferring to leave Washington, D.C. Rusk moved to Athens, Georgia, where he taught at the University of Georgia until ¡984. See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Johnson, Lyndon B.; Kennedy, John F.; Missile Crisis; Organization of American States: Ninth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign A›airs; Twelfth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign A›airs

Sabotage see Operation Mongoose Saco, José Antonio (¡797–¡879) A prominent statesman, Creole writer, and historian, Saco’s writings represented the beliefs of most Cuban Creoles in the nineteenth century. An early advocate of independence, Saco subsequently rejected the notion, believing that social and economic upheaval would follow. He claimed that annexation to the United States was equally unwise because it would mean an end to the Cuban race and culture. He argued that Cuba’s future lay in the benevolent tutelage of Spain, which was obligated to ensure political freedom and prosperity for Cuba, and if Spain failed this obligation, the force of revolution would cause Spain to lose Cuba. A central figure in the Cuban reform movement during the ¡860s, Saco represented Santiago de Cuba before the Spanish government in ¡866 when Spain was considering economic and political changes for the island. In his Voto Particular,

183 Saco rejected the election of deputies and instead proposed a set of criteria for the improvement of all Spanish colonies, including Cuba. In e›ect, Saco argued that Spain’s best opportunity to salvage its colony was by the application of liberal reforms and the establishment of Cuban autonomy, which would provide the facade of a Spanish colony but e›ectively grant Cuba dominion status. In the ¡860s, the Spanish government was not receptive to such ideas. The Spanish rejection however did not deter Saco from continuing to write and stake out his position until his death in Barcelona in ¡879.

St. Louis A›air

In May ¡939, 907 Jewish refugees from Europe arrived in Havana harbor aboard the Hamburg-Ameriko Line. The Cuban government refused their admission. Unbeknownst to passengers and crew was the fact that the Cuban government had revoked their landing permits only days before the ship’s arrival on May 27. Despite pressure from the United States, the U.S.–based Jewish Welfare Agency, the Joint Distribution Committee and the substantial Jewish community in Cuba, President Federico Laredo Bru refused to alter the decision. Enroute back to Europe the St. Louis stopped briefly in Miami, Florida, but the U.S. government refused to intercede. Once back in Europe, the Jews were dispersed in Belgium, Great Britain, France, and Holland. An estimated one-fourth of the St. Louis passengers survived the horrors of the European War. Despite the St. Louis a›air, Cuba admitted an estimated 6,000 Jewish refugees between ¡933 and ¡942.

Santa Fe Report see Reagan, Ronald R. Schlesinger, Arthur S., Jr. (¡9¡7–) A prominent Harvard historian, Schlesinger worked as an advisor to John F. Kennedy

Sergeants’ Revolt during his ¡960 presidential campaign. Following Kennedy’s election to the presidency, Schlesinger served as an advisor to the president, including advising about Latin American a›airs. Schlesinger often criticized the methodic style of Secretary of State Dean Rusk. In March ¡96¡, as the administration prepared for the Bay of Pigs invasion, Schlesinger became the principal author of the White Paper released to the public that described Castro as a threat to the Western Hemisphere. As late as April 4, ¡96¡, Schlesinger attempted to persuade the president not to go forward with the Bay of Pigs operation. Schlesinger argued that the operation had a high risk of failure; that the possibilities of an internal uprising were remote; and that should a protracted conflict follow, the United States would be drawn into a military quagmire. Schlesinger also doubted that European and Latin American allies would approve of the plan. Subsequently, he did not participate in the making of policy regarding the October ¡962 missile crisis but served as the principle author of Adlai Stevenson’s speech about the missile threat before the United Nations Security Council. Schlesinger, whose Latin American policies di›ered from those of new President Lyndon B. Johnson, left government service in ¡964 and returned to the academic world at the graduate center of the City University of New York. See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Missile Crisis; White Paper of ¡96¡

Second Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡94¡ see Trade Agreements: Second Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡94¡

Sergeants’ Revolt On the evening of September 3, ¡933, Sergeant Fulgencio Batista led a group of fellow sergeants, corporals, and enlisted men at Camp Columbia in Havana to protest a long list of grievances including poor pay, inade-

Seward

184

quate housing, and rumored cuts in the enlisted ranks. The o‡cers on duty refused to discuss the matter and, in fact, withdrew from the fortress, leaving Batista’s group in control. The next day, leaders of student groups met with Batista and his followers and convinced them to support a broader political agenda, e›ectively transferring the military protest into a military coup d’état against provisional president Carlos Manuel Céspedes, replacing him with a Junta, and subsequently a provisional president Ramón Grau San Martín, whom U.S. ambassador Sumner Welles labored to dislodge from o‡ce. The event is also important, because it marks the beginning of Batista’s rise to political prominence. See also Batista, Fulgencio y Zaldívar; Céspedes, Carlos Manuel de; Welles, Benjamin Sumner .

Seward, William H. (¡80¡–¡872) Seward wa a senator from the state of New York before becoming secretary of state in ¡86¡. In ¡863, in the midst of the U.S. Civil War, Secretary of State Seward a‡rmed the Lincoln administration’s determination to strike a counterblow if the South sought any refuge in Cuba. At the same time, Seward believed that with slavery doomed in the United States, the country became obligated to demand equal and just treatment for blacks in other nations and territories. Thus, Seward extended the Republican Party’s logic to Cuba: If Spain abolished slavery on the island, the quality of life and economic prosperity of the island would advance significantly. See also Lincoln, Abraham

Sherman, John T. (¡823–¡900) Sherman served as secretary of state from March ¡897 until his resignation in April ¡898. An Ohio native, Sherman was a self-made lawyer, founder of the Republican Party, and long-time participant in state and national politics. President William McKinley appointed him secretary of state so that his col-

league Mark Hanna could be appointed an Ohio senator. At the age of 73, Sherman came to o‡ce with diminishing capacities to endure the strains of the job. An avowed anti-expansionist, Sherman played little role in the administration’s Cuban policy and finally resigned after war broke out with Spain in April ¡898. Upon his resignation, Sherman spoke against the war and McKinley’s policies. See also McKinley, William

Shultz, George P. (¡920– ) Shultz replaced Alexander M. Haig as secretary of state in June ¡982 and continued in that post until the end of the Reagan administration in ¡989. Shultz enjoyed a successful career in academe, government service, and the private sector. As secretary of state, it was his fourth government post. Shultz shared the Reagan administration’s belief that U.S. foreign policy had floundered since the Vietnam War and that diplomacy needed to be supported by the appropriate use of force. His style, however, stood in marked contrast to the general ideological tenor of other members of the Reagan team. Shultz shared the administration’s view that the Cubans served as Soviet proxies in Central America and that Cuba had stationed military advisers in Nicaragua and provided military assistance to the rebels in El Salvador. The threat of Marxist expansion into the region was su‡cient justification for the United States to support the Salvadoran government in its civil war, support the Contras (counter revolutionaries) to oust the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and otherwise militarize the region. Shultz also placed Grenada’s leader Maurice Bishop squarely in Castro’s camp. After Bishop’s overthrow in October ¡983, Hudson Austin, head of the new Revolutionary Military Council, strengthened the Cuban connection. This provided su‡cient justification for the U.S. intervention that followed on October 30, ¡983. Shultz also explained that as long as Cuban troops remained in Angola, the

185 possibility of normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba was remote. See also Africa: Cuba’s Military Involvement; Reagan, Ronald W.

Slavery

In ¡524 the first African slaves were introduced to Cuba; 300 to work in the Jagua gold mines. For two centuries thereafter, enslaved Africans arrived in Cuba to work in a variety of jobs, mostly tobacco. Denied political and civil rights and social mobility, slaves often rebelled against their Cuban masters, but it was to no avail except to increase fear among the Cuban white upper class about future slave rebellions or the sociopolitical consequences of granting them freedom. The horrors of the ¡79¡ Haitian Revolution drove home the point and contributed to the Cuban Creoles’s permanent determination to maintain the slave system. The impact of the Haitian Revolution upon Cuba came amidst two conflicting crosscurrents. First, the growing global movement to outlaw African slave trade ran counter to the demands for increased labor to satisfy the needs of the expanding Cuban sugar industry. The British and the American termination of the importation of African slaves in ¡808 increased the pressure upon Spain to do the same with regard to Cuba. The pressure led to a treaty in ¡8¡7 that scheduled an end to Cuba’s importation of African slaves in ¡820. The treaty failed. In fact, the importation of slaves continued due to the expansion of the sugar industry and increased market demand in the United States. Some 385,000 African slaves were brought to Cuba between ¡790 and ¡820; another 272,000 between ¡820 and ¡853; and another ¡75,000 from ¡853 to ¡864. Furthermore, the sugarbased economic alliance between the Creole planter and peninsulare merchant bound them to the institution of slavery, while they disagreed on most other political and social issues. The white groups, planter and merchant, feared slave rebellions, and each time one occurred —¡8¡¡, ¡8¡2, ¡825, ¡837, ¡840, and ¡843 — it exposed the fragility of the Cuban

Slavery social structure. In response to each rebellion, government authorities increased restrictions upon slaves and free blacks. The Spanish government’s Africanization policy (¡853–¡855) only exacerbated Cuban sentiment towards blacks. The slavery problem prompted two potential solutions. The first was illustrated best in the writings of José Antonio Saco. He advocated ending slave trade, but not slavery itself and replacing it with an increase in white immigrants. This approach portended a slow death to the institution of slavery. Saco, however, lacked an audience. The local planters and merchants could not a›ord to lose the labor supply at the base of their economic well-being, nor was the Spanish government interested because of the wealth it derived from sugar through taxes and port fees. The second proposal called for annexation to the United States, an idea that reached its peak in the ¡840s and early ¡850s. Many Cuban Creole planters were attracted to the idea as they identified their situation with the U.S. southern cotton-based socioeconomic system. Annexation, the Creoles believed, would preserve their sugar-based socioeconomic system. The possibility of annexation found expression in the filibustering activities of the time period, but they never gained the support of all Cuban Creole planters and none of the peninsulare merchants. The planters feared that an insurrection against Spanish authority might spark a concomitant black uprising, which portended a worse future than that under continued Spanish rule. To the peninsulare merchant annexation meant loss of economic privilege to his U.S. counterpart. At the same time, the Spanish government was not prepared to lose a major source of income, which contributed to its rejections of U.S. proposals to purchase the island. See also Expansionism; López, Narciso

Impact of the United States Civil War The next stage in the evolution of slave policy in Cuba came during the U.S. Civil

Slavery War, when a third generation of Cuban reformers not only attacked the slave trade but also called for its gradual abolition without great harm to the planters. In November ¡859 Spain dispatched General Francisco Serrano to Havana as the new governor-general of Cuba. Serrano was supported by the Cuban Reformists for his endorsement of many of their economic and political proposals, but heconfronted a growing problem over the issue of slavery, including an end to the slave trade. While the Cuban planters had, in the past, benefited from slavery, the most that they were willing to concede in the ¡860s was gradual emancipation because slavery was no longer profitable. Also, there was a growing sentiment, particularly among the exile community, to link slavery’s abolishment with external support for Cuban independence. Cuban exiles in the United States were the first to make this connection, but they found limited support on the island. There, Cuban landowners preferred Spanish political control, fearing that without it Cuba would slide into social upheaval. In the midst of these stirrings on the island, the U.S. Civil War erupted in April ¡86¡. Owing to wartime realities, sixteen months later, in May ¡863, President Abraham Lincoln issued his Emancipation Proclamation that freed slaves in areas in rebellion against the central government. Shortly thereafter, Lincoln authorized the formation of black regiments for the Union Army. By ¡864, an estimated 200,000 blacks were fighting on the Union side in the battle against slavery in the United States. The events in the United States had a significant impact upon Cuba. Spanish merchants and slave traders favored a Confederate victory for the sake of preserving slavery in Cuba. The majority of Cuban Creoles (including the Reformists), though still dependent upon slave labor, favored the Union as the side of civilization and progress. Some analysts argued that the Reformists position indicated their idealism — a Union victory translated into abolition of slavery; others pointed to more practical benefits. By ¡860, Louisiana

186 beet sugar had become a serious competitor to Cuban sugar in the U.S. market thanks to protective tari›s and modernization in the processing of cane. Should the Union prove victorious, the Cuban planters anticipated a reduction in U.S. tari›s on their sugar as a means of forcing Spain to lower its tari›s on U.S. manufactures sent to the island. In contrast, a Confederate victory might mean higher tari›s on Cuban sugar, if not an end to its importation. The Cuban sugar planters understood the Emancipation Proclamation was essential to a Union victory. In the political realm, the peninsulares favored a Confederate victory, since a divided United States would assure Spanish domination of Cuba well into the future, while many Creoles believed that a Union victory would weaken Spanish control over the island. Some Creoles even linked the war’s abolition crusade to Cuba’s cause for independence. Others, recognizing that slavery was a doomed institution on the island, argued that steps should be taken immediately for the gradual emancipation of slaves before the war’s impact forced more immediate and drastic measures. As the Cuban slaves learned of Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, they rejoiced in anticipation of their own freedom. Lincoln’s assassination in April ¡865 provoked a deep sense of grieving among all Cubans, most passionately among the AfroCuban, free or not. Although the Cuban landowners publicly expressed their grief over Lincoln’s death, they took every means to ensure that published eulogies on behalf of the slain president did not contain any reference to the abolition of slavery or to the Emancipation Proclamation. When the U.S. Civil War ended in a Union victory in ¡865, Cuba experienced a flood of abolitionist plans. All shared two common points: Spain should outlaw slave tra‡cking as piracy and emancipation should be a gradual process. In the short term, nothing came out of these proposals. Cuba was still a generation away from ending the “peculiar institution.” See also Lincoln, Abraham; Seward, William H.

187 Moret Law and Emancipation The slavery question became an issue in the Ten Years’ War, when rebel leaders recognized that independence could not be won without support of the Cuban masses, that is, Afro-Cubans. Also desirous of securing the planters support, the rebels slowly moved towards emancipation. At first they promised to deal with the issue at the end of the war. In contrast, many battlefield commanders granted freedom to slaves who joined the Liberation Army. The Spanish government was pressured by England and France to abolish slavery and was confronted by the possibility of the United States granting belligerency to the rebels if it did not act. Spain implemented the Moret Law on July 4, ¡870. A confusing piece of legislation, the Moret Law e›ectively emancipated slaves over sixty years of age. In addition, all children henceforth born of slave mothers would be free at age ¡8, at which time each was subject to the patronato, which meant he or she had to work for a patrón (landowner) at half the wages paid a white worker. The law meant little in application, and the U.S. public understood this. At the war’s end in ¡878, Spanish authorities recognized the freedom of blacks who fought in the war and promised to deal subsequently with the slave issue. It did with the enactment an abolition law in ¡880 that provided for an eight-year transition period to emancipation during which blacks would have to serve an apprenticeship. In ¡886, two years before the law was to be fully implemented, a royal decree ended slavery in Cuba. At the time only 30,000 persons remained in bondage. See also Ten Years’ War

Soulé paign, Smith did not speak Spanish or trust his embassy sta›, causing him to review and edit all correspondence going to Washington. Like Gardner, Smith established a close relationship with Fulgencio Batista. Much blame is placed upon Smith for his failure to understand Cuban socioeconomic and political problems and for the lack of accurate analysis that came out of Havana. Smith defends himself in his autobiography, The Fourth Floor, and places blame upon the State Department’s Central America and Caribbean A›airs Division for U.S. policy failures in Cuba. In July ¡957, shortly after arriving in Cuba, Smith publicly criticized Batista for permitting his troops to attack two hundred women engaged in an anti-regime demonstration in Santiago de Cuba. Criticized by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for so doing, Smith explained that henceforth he would restrain his criticisms of the Cuban dictator and would not intervene in the political arena. Using the nonintervention principle, Smith refused to o›er his services in early ¡958 when Cuba’s Catholic bishops and professional classes demanded Batista’s resignation and the creation of a caretaker government. Despite the growing success of Fidel Castro’s revolutionary movement after August ¡958, Smith kept confidence that Batista would win out and that the majority of the Cuban people did not support the revolution. By November ¡958, the State Department lost all confidence in Smith, who was subsequently replaced by Philip Bonsal. See also Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Revolution: United States Presidential Administrations and the Revolution

Soulé, Pierre Smith, Earl E. T. (¡9¡8–¡99¡) Smith succeeded Arthur Gardner as U.S. ambassador to Cuba in June ¡957. Like his predecessor, Smith arrived in Havana unprepared for the assignment. A successful Wall Street financier and heavy contributor to the Republican party’s ¡952 presidential cam-

(¡80¡–¡870) Born in France, Soulé was exiled during that country’s political turmoil of the ¡820s. He eventually settled in Louisiana, where he dabbled in state politics and became a proponent of southern expansion that coveted Cuba. In ¡853, President Franklin Pierce appointed him ambassador to Spain. Soulé, who understood that Cuba was

Soviet Union ripe for U.S. investment and commerce, blasted previous political leaders for not taking more decisive action on Cuba. In a speech on the Senate floor January 25, ¡853, Soulé compared the Cuban filibusters of that era to the likes of Marquis de Lafayette and Alexander Hamilton in their support of the American Revolution and of those Americans who aided Texans in their struggle against the Mexicans. Soulé saw the purchase of Cuba as an insult to the Cuban people. Initially, Soulé favored Cuba’s independence, but he later became an exponent of its acquisition by the United States, by military force if necessary. Despite Soulé’s bombastic position, President Pierce appointed him minister to Spain in ¡853. Soulé arrived in Madrid with instructions to pressure Spain into lowering its tari›s and investment barriers in Cuba, but it was to no avail. His first diplomatic crisis came with the Spanish seizure of the Black Warrior the in Havana harbor in February ¡854, and he handled it poorly. Soulé’s threatened to sever diplomatic relations if the Spanish Foreign Ministry failed to respond within 48 hours to his demand for a settlement favorable to the Americans. This threat only met an icy resistance. In Spain, diplomatic encounters never moved in a hurried fashion. Spain did not respond in the allotted time, e›ectively calling Soulé’s blu›. Soulé was instructed to inform the Spanish government that the Pierce administration intended to continue the long-standing U.S. policy that favored keeping Cuba in Spanish hands. However, Soulé also understood that the Pierce administration hoped that Cuba would “release itself or be released” from Spain. The exact meaning of the words remain unclear, but in the tenor of the times, Soulé understood them to mean that Cuba’s relationship with Spain could be terminated by an internal revolt, purchase, or even filibustering activities. Soulé pursued three avenues in an e›ort to “release” Cuba from Spain. He first attempted to persuade the Queen Regent, Maria Cristina, to cede the island to the United States as a way to protect her vast real estate holdings there.

188 Failing that, Soulé’s understanding of Spanish political dynamics led him to recommend that the United States commence negotiations with Spain for the acquisition of Cuba. Soulé’s report so encouraged the Pierce administration that, in early April ¡854, it authorized Soulé to o›er up to $¡30 million for the U.S. acquisition of Cuba. The plan fell on deaf ears, Spain had no intention of parting with the island. The frustrated Soulé then openly supported Spanish revolutionary groups. With the Spanish government’s suppression of the rebellion in August ¡854, Soulé’s presence in Madrid became meaningless. However, Soulé stayed on long enough to sign the Ostend Manifesto on October ¡8, ¡854, with his counterparts in London ( James Buchanan) and in Paris ( John Mason). Soulé’s letter, which accompanied the Ostend document back to Washington, proved most revealing. In it, Soulé asserted that if Cuba could not be purchased, then the United States should take the island by force in accordance with “the intimations repeatedly thrown out in your [Pierce’s] dispatches to me.” Clearly, Soulé believed that the Pierce administration was determined to acquire Cuba. When the contents of the Ostend Manifesto became public, the Pierce administration distanced itself from Soulé, who resigned his post and returned to the United States. Within hours of Soulé’s departure from Madrid, the Spanish government initiated steps to settle the Black Warrior a›air. Soulé remained politically active after his return to the United States and served in the Confederate government. After the U.S. Civil War he retired to private life until his death in ¡870. See also Black Warrior Incident; Expansionism; Ostend Manifesto; Pierce, Franklin

Soviet Union U.S. policy regarding the Soviet presence in Cuba was predicated upon the principles of the ¡823 Monroe Doctrine that declared the Western Hemisphere o›-limits to foreign penetration. The United States interpreted the ¡960 Soviet trade agreement as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine’s declaration against for-

189 eign ideologies and the subsequent Soviet military presence as a threat to U.S. security. See also Carter, Jimmy; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Kennedy, John F.; Kissinger, Henry A.; Missile Crisis; Nixon, Richard M.

Trade Agreement of ¡960 The Soviets agreed to purchase Cuban sugar and to provide economic and technical assistance in the Soviet-Cuban trade agreement of ¡960. On February 4, ¡960, Soviet first deputy premier Anastas Mikoyan arrived in Cuba ostensibly to open a Soviet exposition in Havana. However, the agreements reached during Mikoyan’s visit tied the Cuban economy closer to that of the Soviet Union and the East European bloc countries. The agreement provided Cuba with a ¡2 year credit of $¡00 million at 2∂ percent interest for the purchase of Soviet commodities; Soviet technical assistance for the construction of plants and factories for the Cuban government, and the Soviet purchase of 5 million tons of Cuban sugar over the next five years. U.S. policymakers recoiled at the presence of the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. charges that the agreement violated the Monroe Doctrine were rebu›ed by the governments in Havana and Moscow. See also Revolution: United States Presidential Administrations and the Revolution

Naval Base On September 25, ¡970, New York Times political correspondent Carl Sulzberger reported that the Soviet Union might be constructing a naval base at Cienfuegos, Cuba. Sulzberger based his report on suggestions made by National Security Council (NSC) Advisor Henry Kissinger during a news conference and subsequently confirmed by Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms. The crisis ended on October 6, ¡970, with a Soviet rea‡rmation of its ¡962 pledge not to introduce o›ensive weapons into Cuba. Some analysts suggest, however, that Kissinger orchestrated the crisis. In the spring of ¡970, the Soviets con-

Soviet Union ducted worldwide naval exercises that included a task force visit to Cuba in April and follow-up activities through June. These activities greatly concerned U.S. Naval authorities. Testifying before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Inter-American A›airs that was meeting in secret session during July and August, Admiral E. P. Holmes stated that a base in Cuba would enhance Soviet submarine capabilities in the Atlantic Ocean. At that time the Soviets were building a facility that could support submarines. The testimony came at the same time the Soviets rea‡rmed to Kissinger their intention to abide by the ¡962 Kennedy-Khrushchev notes. During the same period, the Soviets had become concerned with reports that Cuban exiles were training in Florida for covert operations inside Cuba and that the United States intended to improve its facilities at Guantánamo Bay. On August 4, the Soviet chargé d’a›aires, Yuli Vorontsov, visited Kissinger to ask for a rea‡rmation of the ¡962 Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding. Despite the lack of a final written document, Nixon and Kissinger a‡rmed that the ¡962 accords were valid. On August 7, with Nixon’s approval, Kissinger wrote to Vorontsov that as long as the Soviets did not place any kind of o›ensive weapons in Cuba, the United States would not use military force to bring about political change in Cuba. Each side seemed satisfied, but Soviet military activity in Cuba continued. A U-2 spy flight on August 26 revealed recent and ongoing construction at Cienfuegos, and other intelligence sources indicated that a Soviet submarine, along with two barges used to collect its radioactive waste, was enroute to Cuba. The ships arrived at Cienfuegos on September 9. On September ¡4, Cuban MIGs forced the abortion of the regularly scheduled U-2 flight over Cuba, and the next day they intercepted a U.S. navy antisubmarine patrol. This convinced some within the Nixon administration that the facility was nearly complete. The crisis erupted on September ¡0, ¡970, when Kissinger reviewed U-2 spy plane

Soviet Union photographs that, to him, revealed the Soviets were constructing a submarine-support facility. Kissinger saw this as an opportunity to dress down the Soviets, but he was rebu›ed by President Nixon. Although the president did ask for contingency plans to mine the harbor at Cienfuegos, Nixon wanted to deal with the crisis quietly because of his e›orts to improve relations with the Soviets, his upcoming trip to Europe, and a crisis in the Middle East where Jordan was attempting to drive the Palestinians from its territory. On September 23, the NSC determined that the Soviet action was largely symbolic and that it should be dealt with between Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko during their scheduled October meeting in Paris. In the meantime, Kissinger had acted independent of the president and clearly without the advanced knowledge of the State Department and the Pentagon. On September ¡6, Kissinger hinted to Sulzberger that the Soviets were testing U.S. interests in Cuba. Two days later, Sulzberger learned the details from Senator Jesse Helms (D.–N.C.). September 25 became the high-water mark of the crisis. Following the Times publication of Sulzberger’s essay, the Pentagon held a news briefing on the subject and confirmed the details. Subsequently, Kissinger met again with the press not only to blame the Pentagon for making the issue public but to assert that the vague ¡962 agreement did not grant the Soviets the privilege of replacing ground-based missiles with those placed upon a submarine. In a meeting with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin later that same day, Kissinger bluntly stated that the Soviet naval base could not remain. Two days later, the Nixon entourage, including Kissinger, departed for Europe, but Kissinger instructed NSC sta›er Alexander Haig to repeat the warning to Dobrynin. Haig’s threatening tone to Dobrynin caused concern that Moscow might react sharply. The Soviets did not. On October 6, Dobrynin replied that the Soviets had done nothing to violate the ¡962 accord. Not satisfied, after returning from Europe, on Oc-

190 tober 9 Kissinger handed Dobrynin a strongly worded personal memorandum entitled the “President’s Note.” It stated that the United States would not tolerate the establishment of any Soviet naval facility in Cuba to support or repair any type ship capable of carrying an o›ensive weapon. Four days later, Tass, the Soviets news agency, denied constructing a submarine base or undertaking any other activity in violation of the ¡962 KennedyKhrushchev accord. The same was repeated in a note October 22, that Kissinger received from Gromyko, but it contained the added caveat that the Soviets were “making the exchanges from August onward part of the understanding of ¡962.” Significantly, Kissinger’s August 7 pledge that the United States would not use military force to bring about political change in Cuba was now cast in cement. The Soviet declaration brought an end to the crisis but not to its activities in Cuba. The facility at Cienfuegos was not torn down. Moreover, during the next four years, Soviet submarines, including those that were nuclear powered and some that carried o›ensive missiles, visited Cienfuegos on more than a dozen occasions. Despite U.S. protests about these visits, the Soviets claimed that it abided by the ¡970 agreement because it did not send its Y-class submarines, equivalent to the U.S. Polaris, the world’s most powerful ballistic-missile-attack submarine. See also Kissinger, Henry A.; Nixon, Richard M.

MIG-23s In the summer of ¡978, U.S. intelligence sources indicated that the Soviet Union provided the Cuban air force with a squadron of MIG-23s. When this was confirmed in the fall, it quickly became a public issue. For some time the Soviets assisted with the modernization of the Cuban military. For example, Cuba’s outmoded fleet of patrol boats was replaced with Komar missile patrol boats. New armored personne carriers and tanks were introduced, and a number of conventional diesel-powered submarines was scheduled for delivery. None of these acquisi-

191 tions violated the intention of the ¡962 Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding. However, certain aircraft models, such as the MIG23D, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, did violate that understanding. In November ¡978, in a series of meetings in Washington between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and in Moscow, between Ambassador Malcolm Toon and Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko the crisis was resolved. The Soviets confirmed that no MIG-23Ds were in Cuba. With this in hand, the Carter administration considered the matter closed. See also Carter, Jimmy

Soviet Brigade On August 30, ¡979, Senator Frank Church (D.–Ida.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, announced that the Soviet Union had placed a brigade of troops in Cuba, and unless they were withdrawn, the proposed Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) would not win Senate approval. Church’s announcement created public controversy in the United States and a di‡cult diplomatic crisis for President Jimmy Carter. The ¡962 Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding for ending the missile crisis made no provision for the stationing of military troops in Cuba. A Soviet contingent had been there ever since, and during the preceding several years, the U.S. intelligence community noted no increase in the number of Soviet troops in Cuba. It estimated the number to be between 3,000 and 5,000 and to include conventional Soviet rocket, tank, and infantry battalions. On August ¡7, they coalesced in the hills near Havana to conduct military maneuvers. The immediate crisis began in July ¡979, when in closed-door testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Central Intelligence Agency Director Stansfield Turner and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown denied that anything new was discovered in Cuba. Their testimony led Church to issue a public statement that nothing had changed regarding the Soviet “advisors” stationed in

Spanish-American War Cuba since ¡962. However, an intelligence estimate dated August 27 indicated otherwise. It infuriated Church and prompted his statement of August 29, demanding the removal of Soviet troops from Cuba. In an e›ort to solve the problem, Carter approached Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev about the possibility of removing the troops or at least revamping its command structure. Failing that, Carter hoped that Brezhnev would pledge that the troops would not be used in any o›ensive way in the New World. Amidst continuing debate within the United States, the Carter administration worked quietly with the Soviet Union. On October ¡, Carter announced an end to the brigade crisis. He indicated that the Soviet government would not use the troops in Cuba to threaten the United States. At the same time, Carter also announced the formation of a Contingency Joint Task Force to be stationed at Key West, Florida, and that the overall U.S. military presence in the region would be increased. See also Carter, Jimmy; Missile Crisis

Spain see Africa: Spain’s Africanization Program; Slavery; Spanish-American War; War for Independence Spanish-American War Sinking of the Maine Shortly after the establishment of the autonomist government in Cuba on January ¡, ¡898, protests erupted across the island representing the crosscurrents of Cuban society. Most Cubans railed against the government that left them under Spanish rule. In contrast, Spanish residents and some elite Cubans called for the abolishment of the autonomist government and a full return to Spanish authority. The high-water mark of these protests came with riots in Havana on January ¡2, ¡898. The U.S. minister in Havana, Fitzhugh Lee, interpreted the riots as marking the end

Spanish-American War to Spain’s autonomy experiment, and in response to his request, the Navy Department dispatched the Maine from Key West, Florida, for Havana harbor. The ship’s arrival in Havana on January 25, ¡898, did not provoke an anti–American backlash. Subsequently, thousands of Cubans visited the ship. Spanish authorities publicly interpreted the Maine’s arrival as an expression of U.S. support for their policies, but they privately fretted that the visit only served to encourage the insurrectionists. Government o‡cials in Washington, D.C., and in Madrid, however, shared the fear of another calamitous event in Cuba. That event came early in the evening of February ¡5, ¡898, with the explosion of the Maine in Havana harbor, killing 266 men and o‡cers. Although U.S. leaders advised against a rush to judgment pending an o‡cial investigation, the U.S. public quickly laid blame at the Spanish doorstep. So too, did the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Amidst the emotional outburst, the United States and Spanish governments conducted separate investigations of the incident. As required by law, the U.S. Navy established a court of inquiry, presided over by Captain William T. Sampson. The navy’s swift decision to do so headed o› a congressional investigation. The inquiry was conducted in Havana where the ship rested in muddy and murky waters, thus hampering the investigation and contributing to an incomplete description of the Maine. The navy report arrived in Washington on March 24, ¡898. The Navy Court of Inquiry concluded that the explosion could have resulted only from a mine placed under the bottom of the ship. When the report became public, it incited a public outcry for action and prompted congressional legislators to again call for intervention in Cuba. The Spanish government and press were shocked that the investigators found that an external bomb was responsible for the explosion, and they rejected the American study. The Spanish government’s investigation of the incident concluded that the ineptness of the Maine’s crew, not some external device, was

192 responsible for the explosion. In other words, the explosion was internal. The Spanish government hoped to settle the discrepancies in the two reports through arbitration. However, passions on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean prevented any serious e›ort to reach an agreement. Added to the furor caused by the publication of the letter by Spain’s ambassador in Washington, Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, the sinking of the Maine moved the United States and Spain precipitously close to war. See also Dupuy de Lomé, Enrique; McKinley, William

United States Business Community and the Coming of War A historical debate has raged over the interest and influence of the business community regarding the U.S. entry into the Spanish-American War. On one end of the spectrum is the allegation that the business community opposed the war, while at the other is the charge that the business community was prepared for war and, in fact, provided great cause for the U.S. entry into the conflict. Those who argue that the U.S. business community opposed war point to its public agents such as the New York’s Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin, the Wall Street Journal, the Banker and Tradesman, the New Jersey Trade Review, and Railway Age, among others. These publications argued that the nation was just beginning to emerge from the depression that began in ¡893 and that war would interfere with the recovery. Furthermore, these publications suggested that war would disrupt trade relations with Europe and Latin America, further delaying economic recovery and concomitant job creation. In particular, the financial papers pointed to the declines in the stock markets that followed each threat of war, such as the senate’s adoption of belligerency resolutions on February 29, ¡896; a report on June ¡8, ¡894, that the Democrats would include a demand for armed intervention in their party platform, the publicity given to the views of Hannis Taylor in November ¡897; and the sinking of the Maine

193 on, February ¡6, ¡898. Furthermore, many editors argued that if a war brought a temporary economic boom, there would be a corresponding postwar downward economic readjustment. Regarding American–owned properties and other investments in Cuba, the war critics predicted their total destruction if the United States intervened or granted belligerent status to the Cuban insurgents. These publications generally favored an early restoration of stability in Cuba and admonished the Cleveland and McKinley administrations for not doing enough to bring about peace. In contrast, those who assert that the business community supported U.S. entry into the war in ¡898 place greater emphasis upon events in March and April ¡898, when war appeared inevitable. For example, the Banker’s Magazine argued that the only way to protect U.S. commercial interests in Cuba was through intervention. The argument that the U.S. government could not a›ord the cost of war because of a shortage of gold was dismissed by the discovery of new gold reserves in Alaska and Australia in ¡897. In fact, because of the increased war hysteria, bankers had been preparing for war for at least a year. These writers were encouraged by the almost assured lack of European intervention and Spain’s weakened military capability that gave promise of a quick U.S. victory that, in turn, meant that there would be little impact on the U.S. economy or trade. While the business community focused its attention upon potential markets in China and the presence of European competition in Asia, it understood the importance of Cuba and the Caribbean. Once the war began, the U.S. Bureau of Statistics received large numbers of inquiries regarding investment possibilities in Cuba. Rand McNally Bankers’ Monthly Magazine foresaw opportunities in railroad building and the exapnsion of sugarcane and tobacco planting on the island. The Journal of Commerce suggested that the United States might find it necessary to abandon the Teller Amendment because the Cubans were incapable of self-government and, concomitantly, of economic development. While several publications recognized

Spanish-American War the importance of Cuba and Puerto Rico as locations for naval bases, the Commercial suggested that St. Thomas in the Danish West Indies also be obtained to protect U.S. commerce and investment and security interests throughout the Caribbean. See also McKinley, William; Yellow Press

Military Preparations In the early spring ¡898, as a military conflict with Spain appeared likely, the United States commenced military preparations. The preparedness of the army and navy contrasted sharply. At the time the U.S. Army consisted of approximately 28,000 o‡cers and enlisted men located in small posts across the continental United States. In the event of war, the number would be increased to approximately ¡00,000, the amount considered necessary for a Cuban campaign. Politics interfered with the process. At congressional insistence these troops would be drawn from the state militias, or National Guard, despite the fact that they were not trained in modern techniques nor did they have up-to-date equipment. Thus, when McKinley issued a call for ¡25,000 volunteers on April 23, ¡898, a decentralized and confusing recruitment system followed. Recruitment became more confusing when McKinley issued a second call for volunteers when he decided that troops would also be sent to Puerto Rico and the Philippines. A total of 200,242 men volunteered for military service, but only one-third of them ever left the continental United States. At the same time congressional legislation expanded the federal army to 65,000 men, a number reached in August ¡898. Politics also interfered with McKinley’s appointment of senior o‡cers, but the president relied upon men of proven merit or previous military service during the Civil War or with the regular army. Training, outfitting, and supplying these various forces proved to be a logistical nightmare and, after the war, subjected the War Department to severe criticism for lack of preparation. Organizationally, the army was divided into seven separate corps, consisting of up to

Spanish-American War 30,000 men each and commanded by a major general. The Fifth and Seventh Corps formed the Expeditionary Force for Cuba and trained for its mission in Tampa, Florida. In contrast to the army’s shortcomings, the navy was better prepared for battle with at least a dozen modern well-armed warships and more than fifty smaller vessels ranging from light cruisers to gunboats. Despite its overall superiority, U.S. naval o‡cers fretted over Spain’s advantages in armored cruisers and torpedo boats. Planning for possible war began in ¡895 with a series of discussions at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. The result was a war plan attributed to Lieutenant William W. Kimball. The plan called for a blockade of Cuba and Puerto Rico and attacks upon Spanish merchant ships and military targets in the Canary and the Philippine Islands. Implementation of the plan began following the Havana riots in January ¡898, when the navy now considered war with Spain a probability. It moved the North Atlantic Squadron battleships —Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Texas —to the Gulf of Florida. Later the remainder of the Squadron was dispatched to Key West, Florida. The sinking of the Maine in Havana’s harbor on February 25 resulted in further action. The battleship Oregon was ordered to move from the state of Washington on the Pacific Coast to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Commodore George Dewey was told to reposition the Asiatic Fleet from Japan to Hong Kong to bring it within 600 miles of Manila.

United States War Resolutions, ¡898 By votes of 42–35 in the Senate and 3¡0–6 in the House of Representatives, Congress approved a joint resolution on April ¡9, ¡898, in four parts that was equivalent to a declaration of war. The resolution (a) declared Cuba free; (b) demanded Spain’s withdrawal from the island; (c) directed the President of the United States to use force to achieve these ends; and (d) disclaimed any intention on the part of the United States to annex Cuba — the Teller Amendment. President William

194 McKinley signed the resolution the next day and on April 2¡ ordered a naval blockade of Cuba’s northern coast. President McKinley went to Congress on April ¡¡, ¡898, to ask for approval to place a “hostile constraint upon both the parties to the contest as well as to enforce a truce as a guide to eventual settlement.” In other words, McKinley argued that the United States would embark upon a moral crusade to bring the Cuban hostilities to an end after having exhausted every possible diplomatic means to bring peace to the island. Significantly, McKinley made no mention of Cuban independence or of recognizing the Cuban Republic. Clearly the president wanted to preserve the freedom of choice regarding future policy. He asked how one could recognize a government that did not exist. McKinley’s refusal to address the future status of Cuba brought a storm of protest from within and outside of Congress, including the Cuban Junta in New York. The Spanish government expressed its indignation. The critics interpreted McKinley’s oversight as a deliberate act to open the door for U.S. annexation of Cuba. In Congress, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives limited floor debate to forty minutes, after which it approved by 325–¡9 (with ¡2 not voting) a resolution that authorized and directed the president “to use the land and naval forces of the United States … to intervene at once to stop the war in Cuba” in order to secure “permanent peace and order … [and] to establish a stable and independent government.” The Senate did not act as quickly as the House, and the debate lasted four days before approving (5¡–37) a convoluted war resolution that extended recognition of independence to Cuba but also included the nonannexation Teller Amendment. Owing to pressure from the administration, the House-Senate conference committee dropped the Turpie Amendment that guaranteed Cuba its independence but included the Teller Amendment that denied the United States possession of Cuba. Finally, in the early morning hours of April ¡9, both branches of

195 the legislature approved the revised joint resolutions. See also New York Junta; Teller Amendment

Military Strateg y On April 20, ¡898, one day after the congressional passage of the war resolution, President McKinley convened a White House strategy meeting. Army commander General Nelson A. Miles reported that it would take at least two months before his forces would be prepared for an invasion of Cuba, an invasion he cautioned against because of the supposedly well-entrenched Spanish forces on the island and the anticipated high toll that tropical diseases would take on his troops. His suggestion that the United States immediately send supplies to the Cuban insurgents to promote a positive image upon the American public was dismissed for lack of supplies and unavailability of worthy cargo ships. McKinley deflected Miles’s defensive stance with orders that he accelerate preparations. Four days later McKinley issued a call for ¡25,000 volunteers to join the army. McKinley then turned to the navy and its war plan. On the evening of April 2¡, the president ordered a naval blockade of Cuba’s north coast, including the port of Havana. It was in place the following night. The blockade made good sense as the U.S. Army prepared for overseas campaigning and most of the Spanish navy was still out of reach. In the Pacific, Dewey moved from Hong Kong to capture Manila Bay on May ¡ and, in the process, destroyed the Spanish fleet harbored there. The Spanish loss in the Pacific denied it naval reenforcements for the war in Cuba. In another White House strategy meeting on May 2, ¡898, McKinley, Miles, Secretary of War Russell A. Alger, Secretary of Navy John D. Long, and Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard focused upon Havana as the primary U.S. target, believing that its capture would quickly end the war. In addition to tightening the blockade at Havana, Miles was directed to prepare his troops for an invasion of the city. McKinley also determined that while

Spanish-American War the United States would supply the Cuban insurgents, no formal military alliance would be made with them, nor would the Cubans be directly incorporated within the U.S. Army or its command structure. Furthermore, McKinley reemphasized his refusal to grant recognition to the provisional government of the Cuban Republic. The United States would direct its own activities on the island, free of any obligations. U.S. war strategies changed in late May when the Americans learned that the Spanish fleet, commanded by Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete, was anchored at Santiago de Cuba. Cervera originally was destined for Puerto Rico, but U.S. naval forces in the vicinity of San Juan necessitated another location. The U.S. blockade of Cuba’s north coast left Santiago de Cuba as the most viable option. Cervera’s presence there led to a change in U.S. strategy. At a White House war council meeting May 26, ¡898, McKinley and his advisors agreed that the attack upon Havana must be postponed and that army and navy preparations must proceed for an assault upon Santiago, followed by one upon Puerto Rico. On June ¡4 General William R. Shafter’s Expedition Force — 834 o‡cers and ¡6,¡54 men — sailed for Santiago de Cuba and landed there unopposed, on June 20, ¡898. At the time a garrison of ¡0,000 Spanish and Cuban troops, including 3¡9 o‡cers and ¡,000 sailors from Cervera’s naval squadron, defended Santiago de Cuba. Another estimated 20,000 Spanish troops were scattered nearby. After initial skirmishes, U.S. forces took San Juan Heights overlooking the city on July ¡, but Shafter, who had gained new respect for his adversaries, hesitated to immediately attack Santiago de Cuba. In the meantime, Admiral William T. Sampson stationed four U.S. battleships and three support vessels in a semicircle around the harbor at Santiago de Cuba. With the American Expeditionary Force poised to take the city, Cervera determined it best to risk running the U.S. blockade rather than surrender it to a conquering army. On the morn-

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196

Battlefield (Santiago de Cuba, June–July, ¡898).

ing of July 3, the Spanish squadron embarked from the harbor only to face total destruction at the hands of the U.S. Navy four hours later. Still, Santiago de Cuba remained a prize to be taken. On orders from the government at Madrid, Spanish general José Toral y Vásquez refused to surrender the city despite dwindling supplies and a precarious position. Toral remained unmoved following intermittent U.S. naval bombardments of the city. Because General Shafter feared heavy casualties if his troops invaded Santiago, a military stalemate ensued. Toral finally capitulated on direct orders from the Sagasta administration in Spain. Although reluctant to admit defeat, Sagasta was persuaded by a July 9 report from GovernorGeneral Blanco, who indicated that the Cuban Creoles wanted for an American victory and that the loyalty of the peninsulares could no longer be counted upon. Toral received authorization from Madrid on July ¡5 and, on the next day, agreed to end all hostilities in the area of Santiago. He surrendered 22,700 troops and their arms and munitions. Thus, within a month of their landing, U.S. forces

laid claim to Cuba’s second largest city. The battle for Santiago de Cuba was the only ground battle that U.S. troops fought in Cuba. Puerto Rico was considered a less important military objective in ¡898, and President McKinley ordered that any operations against the island be delayed until after the collapse of Santiago de Cuba. With that accomplished, General Nelson A. Miles departed Guantánamo Bay on July 2¡. With 3,600 troops, Miles landed at Guáica four days later and captured the city without enduring any casualties. From there, Miles commenced to march across the island to take the key city of San Juan. He did not fulfill his objective before the Spanish and the Americans initialed a peace accord in Washington, D.C., on August ¡2, ¡898. Shortly after the signing of the protocol, a joint commission of U.S. and Spanish military o‡cers oversaw the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Cuba and Puerto Rico. The Spanish-American War was short. It lasted only sixteen weeks, from April 2¡ to August ¡2, but the Americans counted 243 killed and

197 ¡,445 wounded. Countless more lost their lives to yellow fever. Spanish military losses since ¡895 far surpassed those of the United States, and when added to the loss of equipment, the Spanish military stood as a mere shadow of itself in ¡898. Proportionately, the Cubans su›ered greatly, and when coupled with the war’s economic devastation, Cuba lay prostrate in ¡898. See also Rough Riders; Treaties: Treaty of Paris

Stevenson, Adlai (¡900–¡965) A California native, Stevenson was the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate in ¡952 and ¡956 and served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from ¡96¡ to ¡965. President John F. Kennedy appointed the moderate internationalist to the UN ambassadorship, but Stevenson grew unhappy in that role because he was left out of policy decision making. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and presidential adviser Arthur Schlesinger Jr. informed Stevenson about the Bay of Pigs operation on April 8, ¡96¡, one week prior to the pre-invasion air attacks by the Cuban exiles. Although disturbed by his exclusion from the planning process, Stevenson advised against the plan and stated that if Kennedy did go forward with it; that its implementation should be postponed for at least two weeks until the UN General Assembly adjourned and all the delegates returned home. Most of all, Stevenson cautioned against any U.S. involvement. Stevenson was caught o› guard a week later, when, on April ¡5, Cuban foreign minister and UN ambassador Raúl Roa accused the United States of aggression against Cuba with the preinvasion bomb run over that took place the island that morning. One of the aircraft was damaged during the attack, and it landed in Key West, Florida. A second, allegedly belonging to the Cuban Air Force, landed in Miami, Florida. On instructions from Rusk, Stevenson presented the CIA cover story to the UN: these were Cuban defectors. The story soon fell apart. Caught in the lie, Steven-

Stimson son sent Rusk an angry note charging that his own government had deliberately deceived him. When the invasion began, Stevenson issued a technical denial before the UN Security Council: “No o›ensive has been launched from Florida or any other part of the United States.” When the invasion collapsed on April ¡9 and the U.S. role was exposed, Stevenson felt embarrassed before his UN colleagues. Several who had been deceived by their own governments expressed their sympathy to Stevenson. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis in October ¡962, Stevenson was brought in to consult with EXCOM, Kennedy’s policy team on the matter. Before EXCOM, Stevenson proposed that Kennedy should consider withdrawing U.S. forces from Guantánamo Bay and pulling U.S. missiles out of Turkey in exchange for the demilitarization and neutralization of Cuba. In the end, Kennedy chose to quarantine o›ensive weapons from Cuba, saving military options for later, if necessary. Stevenson made an important contribution to U.S. policy before the U.N. Security Council on October 23, ¡962, when he dramatically presented evidence of the secret installation of Soviet missile bases in Cuba and declared himself willing to wait a Soviet confession “until hell freezes over.” Stevenson’s demeanor earned him widespread praise, including unanimous backing from the North American Treaty Organization allies. See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Missile Crisis; Kennedy, John F.

Stimson, Henry L. (¡867–¡950) An American statesman who served as secretary of state from ¡929 until ¡933, Stimson also served twice as secretary of war, from ¡9¡¡–¡9¡3 and from ¡940–¡945. Stimson’s understanding of Cuban policy can be traced to the Platt Amendment, which he interpreted in ¡90¡ as an act of benevolent imperialism because it provided for su‡cient U.S. intervention while Cubans prepared for self-rule. As secretary of war in ¡9¡¡, Stimson

Sugar visited Cuba for the first time and found the island to be filled with intrigue and unrest, which caused him to vigorously defend the Platt Amendment and the U.S. right to intervene to maintain order. Stimson’s attitude changed by the time he became secretary of state in ¡929. He now shared the view of President Herbert Hoover and that of the State Department’s Latin American Division that the U.S. interventionist policies, no matter how well intended, had been a failure and did nothing more than contribute to anti–Americanism throughout the hemisphere. As secretary, Stimson sought to modify the interventionist policy. He ordered a study of U.S. policy toward Latin America centered on the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. The result came in ¡928 (published in ¡930) with J. Reuben Clark’s Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, which denounced U.S. interventions in the Caribbean, including Cuba. Throughout Stimson’s term as secretary of state, he refused to intervene in Cuba’s political crisis caused by the extension of Gerardo Machado’s corrupt presidency. See also Clark Memorandum; Good Neighbor Policy; Machado y Morales, Gerardo; Platt Amendment; United States Interventions

Sugar By his own accounting in ¡927, President Gerardo Machado estimated that the price of sugar a›ected four-fifths of the Cuban population. The economy of the country rested upon the volume and price of sugar on in the world market. Government revenues, local purchasing power, the level of domestic business and employment, and the ability of the nation to import consumer or developmental goods and, to engage in serious economic planning and diversification all depended upon the amount and financial terms of Cuban sugar exports. Cuba’s initial sugar boom came early in the nineteenth century as the rest of Spain’s New World colonial empire achieved its independence. In particular, the revolutions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic brought

198 hundreds of plantation owners to Cuba, where they resumed the cultivation of sugar and co›ee. Throughout the nineteenth century, sugar production altered appreciably. The estimated 2,000 enterprises that comprised the integrated sugar industry in ¡8¡9 were replaced by ¡50 to ¡75 sugar mills (centrales) by the end of the century. The centrales dominated land ownership and refining patterns in any given region of Cuba. This concentration of power was paralleled by changes in the world sugar market, particularly the development of the beet-sugar industry in Europe and the United States. The upshot was the development of agreements between sugar producers and refiners; the latter enjoying tari› protection in the major importing countries. This pattern characterized the U.S.–Cuban sugar relationship. Despite the U.S.–Cuban sugar relationship, Spain sought to protect Cuba from foreign imports through protective tari›s that ran as high as 800 percent on some goods. As such, flour produced in the United States could be shipped to Cuba via Spain as a Spanish product at a cost cheaper than if it were shipped directly to Cuba from the United States. The Aldrich amendment to the ¡890 McKinley Tari› law addressed the issue. While the McKinley Tari› placed sugar on the free list, it would remain there only for those countries that did not practice tari› discrimination against American goods. Spain quickly reached a new agreement with the United States, but the benefit to Cuban sugar was short-lived. In ¡894, the Democratic administration of Grover Cleveland reimposed high protective tari›s the Wilson Tari› and raised the tari› on Cuban sugar to 40 percent. The impact upon Cuba was serious, and it was exacerbated by the outbreak of the Cuban War for Independence in ¡895 that lasted until ¡898. During the war, Cuban sugar production fell to about one-fifth of what it had been in ¡894. The end of the war only cemented the link between the Cuban sugar industry and the U.S. market. The influx of U.S. investment into the war-desecrated sugar industry

199 found security in the Platt Amendment and a guaranteed place in the U.S. market by the terms of the Permanent Treaty of ¡903, which also granted reciprocal preferences to American goods entering Cuba. Over the next decade, Cuban sugar production steadily increased to a record high of 2.3 million tons by ¡9¡3. However, the picture was not as good as it appeared to be. Confronting sugar competitors from Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, along with U.S. beet-sugar producers, the price of sugar declined precipitously. In ¡9¡3, to earn the equivalent of the ¡9¡¡ sugar crop, Cuba had to sell an additional 400,000 tons of sugar. At the same time, the U.S. refiners, not the Cuban sugar growers, benefited from the tari› preferential. The refiner bought the sugar minus the tari› preferential, e›ectively meaning that the Cuban sugar producer received less than market value for the product. World War I brought a rapid, but temporary, change to this pattern. The war disrupted European beet-sugar production, and supplies from Asia were curtailed by wartime shipping necessities. Short supplies drove the price for Cuban sugar to all-time highs. Described as the “Dance of the Millions,” Cuba’s ¡920 crop of 4 million tons brought Cuba an all-time high of $¡ billion. However, the recovery of European production and the reentry of Asian sugar into the world market sent prices spiraling downward in the early ¡920s and, with it, the Cuban economy. Cuba’s ¡925 crop, a new record high 5 million tons, brought in a little under $300 million, down $73 million from the year before and approximately $700 million from the crop of ¡920. The U.S. ¡922 Fordney-McCumber Act and the ¡930 Hawley-Smoot Tari› raised the U.S. duty on Cuban sugar to ¡.75 cents and 2.0 cents per pound respectively. The impact upon the Cuban sugar producer was significant. The cost of sugar production averaged 2.0 cents per pound. When duty-paid sugar brought 5.0 cents per pound in the New York market, as it did in the early ¡920s, it brought the Cuban sugar producer approximately 2.5 cents per pound after the duty,

Sugar freight insurance and other costs were paid. When the price of duty-paid sugar dropped to 3.0 cents per pound, as it did after ¡925, the return to the Cuban producer dropped to about ¡.0 cent per pound, which was less than the cost of production. The situation worsened with the onset of the Great Depression in ¡929 as world sugar prices and consumption plummeted. For example, U.S. sugar consumption dropped ¡¡ percent between ¡929 and ¡933, but it began to climb upward thereafter. The ¡93¡ International Sugar Agreement failed to lower production to spike prices. Decreased demand also brought about significant changes in the Cuban sugar industry. U.S. investors began to sell their holdings in the late ¡920s, and the number of mills in operation dropped greatly. Owing to heavy taxation, no new mills were built after ¡927. As a matter of public policy, the Cuban government sought to shift the burdens and benefits of sugar production across the island and implemented a law (Decree Law 522) to ensure Cuban sugar growers adequate access to refineries. Under the altered conditions, the United States changed its sugar policy regarding Cuba. Under the terms of the ¡934 Reciprocity Agreement, ¡934 Jones-Costigan Act, ¡937 Sugar Act and ¡939 Supplemental Trade Agreement, the U.S. guaranteed Cuba a percentage of its sugar market. Still, the price of sugar on the world market continued to decline. At best, U.S. policies kept the Cuban sugar industry afloat, but at the same time Cuban sugar producers pressured their government to increase their U.S. market share. The outbreak World War II in ¡939 rescued Cuban sugar. As with World War I, global shortages increased the demand for and the price of Cuban sugar. The United States purchased the entire crop from ¡942 to ¡947, with prices reaching nearly 5 cents per pound in ¡947. The Cuban expectation for a precipitous drop in the demand for their sugar following the war did not happen. While the U.S. price for sugar lagged slightly behind the world price during this period, several factors contributed to Cuba’s continued sugar prosperity: the ¡948, ¡952 and ¡956 U.S. Sugar

Sugar Acts, windfall purchases by Great Britain, the Soviet Union and, the impact of the Korean War and the ¡956 Suez crisis. Despite the prosperity brought about by sugar exports and an aggressive economic development program pursued by Fulgencio Batista from ¡953–¡959, Cuba’s economy remained dependent upon sugar. The dependency was illustrated in a ¡956 U.S. Department of Commerce report, which indicated that sugar, and its by-products accounted for 86 percent of Cuba’s exports. The concomitant connection between the price of sugar and the quality of life was illustrated in a ¡956 report from the National Bank of Cuba. It indicated that in only ¡95¡ and ¡952 was there an improvement in the standard of living compared to that of ¡947. The bank also predicted that if the Cubans were to achieve an annual 2 percent improvement in their standard of living by ¡965, the sugar crop would need to produce 9.9 million tons by that year. Thus, Fidel Castro inherited an unpromising situation when he assumed political power in ¡959. His confrontation with the United States resulted in the ¡960 Sugar Act that e›ectively terminated U.S. sugar imports from Cuba. The Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar did not fill the void caused by the loss of the U.S. market, and in fact, Cuba proved incapable of producing the amount of sugar for which the Soviets had contracted. Although the Soviets came to prop up the Cuban economy for geopolitical reasons, sugar remained the major component of the Cuban economy after ¡960. Between ¡963 and ¡969, annual sugar harvests fluctuated between 4.5 and 6.2 million tons, and, during the same period, the Soviet Union replaced the United States as the primary importer. The Soviets paid an average of 6.¡ U.S. cents per pound, which was about 3 U.S. cents above the average world market price. With Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s failed economic policies, in ¡964 Castro decided to return to sugar as the base of the national economy, hoping to earn the badly needed foreign capital required to diversify the economy. He anticipated that a ¡0 million ton crop in ¡970 would provide that

200 capital. Although exact figures are di‡cult to come by, the goal was not reached. The harvest came in at an estimated 8.5 million tons. However, in the e›ort to reach that goal, all other economic sectors su›ered badly. In the ¡970s, the Cuban government invested heavily in the industry’s mechanization and purchased larger amounts of pesticides and fertilizers in response to increased world prices for sugar. For example, between ¡973 and ¡974 sugar prices rose from 20.53 U.S. cents per pound to 65.39 U.S. cents per pound. This newfound wealth also contributed to the global cracks in the U.S. embargo of Cuba and the availability of credit in the European countries. In addition the Cuban government’s economic plan for ¡976 to ¡980 was predicated on continued high prices. Thus, the Cubans were unprepared for the sudden drop in sugar prices to 8 U.S. cents per pound in ¡976. Improved prices on the world market, favorable trade arrangements with the Soviet Union (dependent upon Cuba for 40 percent of its sugar consumption), and a $¡.2 billion ten-year pact with COMECON (Eastern European Common Market) contributed to annual sugar harvests of approximately 7.5 million tons throughout the ¡980s. Nevertheless, the Soviet and COMECON agreements did nothing to earn Cuba badly needed hard currencies essential to purchase manufactured goods in the world market. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of Eastern Europe beginning in ¡99¡ had an adverse impact not only on the Cuban sugar crop but also on its total economy. During the long period of Soviet dependency, other world sugar sources developed, beet-sugar production increased, and the industrialized world increasingly used artificial sweeteners. These factors contributed to a 50 percent decline in Cuban sugar production through 2002 and, concomitantly, a drastic decline in government revenues. Today, tourism, not sugar, accounts for a far greater share of the hard currency earned by the Cuban government. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Dance of the Millions; Decree Law 522; Economic Rela-

201 tions; Grau San Martín, Ramón; JonesCostigan Act; Platt Amendment; Prío Socarrás, Carlos; Sugar Acts; Tari› Policies; Trade Agreements; Trade Embargo; Treaties: Permanent Treaty of ¡903; Truman, Harry S; War for Independence; World War II

Sugar Acts Historically, the entrance of Cuban sugar into the U.S. market was greatly a›ected by tari› policies, first by Spain and then the by United States. An increase in the tari› would have an adverse impact on sales and, in turn, on the Cuban economy. Conversely, a decrease in the tari› benefitted sugar producers in Cuba. Over time, the U.S. beet-sugar industry sought to curb Cuba’s privileges. At the same time, other global sources competed with the Cubans for entry into the U.S. market. The competing elements reached a high–water mark with the onset of the global depression that began in ¡929. Both the demand and price for sugar plummeted, contributing significantly to the development of a U.S. quota system that a›ected Cuba and other foreign producers. With the exception of World War II, when the United States purchased the entire Cuban sugar crop, the quota system remained in e›ect until ¡960, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower drastically cut Cuban sugar imports and Congress subsequently embargoed its importation in response to the direction of the Cuban Revolution. The development of the quota system is outlined in a variety sugar laws. See also Decree Law 522; Jones-Costigan Act; Sugar; Tari› Policies; Trade Agreements: Reciprocal Trade Agreement of ¡934, Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡939, Second Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡94¡

Sugar Stabilization Act of ¡930 Signed by President Herbert Hoover in November ¡930 this law permitted the newly formed New Sugar Export Corporation to purchase much of the ¡929 Cuban sugar crop at $4.00 a bag. The act came about following dis-

Sugar Acts cussions between Thomas L. Chadbourne, a New York lawyer with Cuban sugar interests, and Cuban president Gerardo Machado regarding the drastic drop in sugar prices as a consequence of the Great Depression that began in ¡929 and the ¡930 U.S. Hawley-Smoot Tari›, which raised the tari› on Cuban sugar. Subsequently, Chadbourne played a significant role in the ¡93¡ International Sugar Agreement. See also International Sugar Agreement of ¡93¡

International Sugar Agreement of ¡93¡ Popularly known as the Chadbourne Plan, this agreement sought to combat the drop in world sugar prices that followed the onset of the Great Depression that began in ¡929. Initiated by Thomas Chadbourne, a New York lawyer with sugar interests, the agreement sought to restrict sugar production among the major exporting countries. According to the agreement, Cuba was to reduce its production by 36.5 percent, European beet-sugar producers by ¡0 percent, and the Dutch East Indies by ¡0.42 percent. The agreement failed for several reasons. The signatory countries produced 70 percent of the sugar entering the world’s market. By the signatories cutting production, other nations expanded their production to fill the void. At the same time consumption and prices continued to fall. The combination of exports quotas and government policies to limit production dropped Cuba’s share of the U.S. market from 50 percent to 25 percent by ¡933. The Cuban government purchased the excess sugar by issuing $42 million in bonds, but with the limited market opportunities, the government sold little sugar. The loss of income, in turn, exacerbated Cuba’s ability to pay o› the bonds. Under these conditions, the Cuban government continued to restrict sugar production and, at the same time, negotiate bilaterally with the United States, resulting in the ¡934 JonesCostigan Act. See also Jones-Costigan Act

Sugar Act of ¡937 Signed into law by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on September ¡, ¡937, this law allo-

Sugar Acts

202

cated to Cuba 28.6 percent of the total U.S. sugar-consumption needs. The origins of this legislation rested with the ¡934 Jones-Costigan Act that identified sugar as a basic commodity under the ¡933 Agricultural Adjustment Act and empowered the secretary of agriculture to fix sugar quotas for foreign sugar entering the U.S. market. As a result, Cuba was given an annual quota of ¡.9 million tons, approximately half of that for ¡922 to ¡93¡ but higher than exports for ¡932 and ¡933. This changed in January ¡936 when the U.S. Supreme Court, in U.S. versus Butler, e›ectively voided the government’s program to control sugar, which, in turn, led the Cubans to conclude that their U.S. market share would disappear. To correct the problem, Roosevelt introduced legislation to Congress in March ¡937. As the bill worked its way through Congress, supporters of impeached President Miguel Mariano Gómez spread rumors that the United States intended to pass legislation that would punish Cuba for his impeachment. This was not so. Congress approved the bill, and Roosevelt signed it into law on September ¡, ¡937. With provisions similar to the Jones-Costigan Act, Cuba also received a 28.6 percent allotment of United States annual sugar consumption. On September ¡¡, ¡939, following the outbreak of the European War, Roosevelt suspended the quota provisions of the ¡937 Sugar Act because of excessive sugar purchases by consumers and speculators alike. To deal with this problem and the worldwide sugar shortages caused by the war, the U.S. Congress approved supplemental trade agreements in ¡939 and ¡94¡. See also Trade Agreements: Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡939, Second Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡94¡

Sugar Act of ¡948 This U.S. law guaranteed Cuba no less than 28.6 percent of the total consumption requirements of the United States and, 98.64 percent of any annual deficit of the Philippine Islands for the next five years. As a result of this legislation Cuba experienced wide fluc-

tuations in its quota each year according to U.S. consumption patterns. For the Cubans, the ¡948 Sugar Act was a disappointment. It expected to gain a larger share of the U.S. market for its contributions in meeting wartime and immediate post war global sugar needs. In fact, from ¡944 to ¡947 Cuba had supplied the United States with 44.6 percent of its sugar consumption. Both the Cuban government and the U.S. Department of State anticipated a reward in the form of an increased share of the U.S. sugar market. By ¡947, however, with world sugar production on the increase and the U.S. beet sugar industry wanting to secure its own position, the U.S. Congress quickly approved this measure which had been drafted by U.S. sugar lobby. For the Cuban sugar industry, which had increased its production since ¡943, the ¡948 Sugar Act meant an immediate excess of raw sugar that could be sold on the world market at depressed prices, if at all. At the insistence of the State Department, the bill also contained a proviso (section 202e) that was directed primarily at the Cubans. At the time, the State Department was attempting to negotiate a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with a reluctant President Ramón Grau Martín, whose labor policies adversely a›ected U.S. businesses operating in Cuba. Section 202e empowered the U.S. secretary of agriculture to reduce the assignments of the Philippine sugar deficit to countries discriminating against United States economic interests. No longer at the mercy of Cuban sugar in ¡947, the State Department viewed this proviso as leverage to conclude a treaty with Cuba. President Grau and his colleagues had the same understanding. They chastised Section 202e as an act of economic imperialism. As a result, the proviso served only to increase Grau’s opposition to a treaty with the United States. The Cubans took their case to the hemispheric community. The Cuban delegation introduced a resolution denouncing economic aggression at the ¡947 Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace and Solidarity meeting at Rio de Janeiro and again in

203 ¡948 at the Ninth International Conference of American States meeting in Bogotá. The resolution was clearly aimed at the United States and Section 202e of the ¡948 Sugar Act. See also International Conference of American States: Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security Ninth International Conference

Sugar Act of ¡952 The ¡952 Sugar Act continued the provisions of the ¡948 law that guaranteed Cuba no less than 28.6 percent of the total consumption requirements of the United States and 98.64 percent of any annual deficit of the Philippine Islands for the next five years. The legislation passed amidst growing pressure in the United States to lower Cuba’s sugar quota, which in turn would require Cuba to lower its prices to remain competitive. The issue spilled over into the Eisenhower administration and the legislative battle for the ¡956 Sugar Law.

Sugar Act of ¡956 This legislation fixed Cuba’s share of the U.S. sugar market at 29.6 percent and provided that 45 percent of the consumption above 8.3 million tons would go to foreign producers and, of that amount, 96 percent would go to Cuba. Because of anticipated growth in U.S. sugar consumption, analysts expected a slight growth in Cuba’s actual sales to the United States. President Dwight D. Eisenhower played an important role in getting this legislation through Congress. He came to the presidency with support from many of the beet-sugar producing states, which wanted to amend the ¡952 law, e›ectively cutting Cuba’s sugar quota. In addition to their congressional representatives, the beet sugar producers found an ally in the Agricultural Department. Although politically indebted to those states, Eisenhower accepted the State Department’s position that any decrease in Cuba’s sugar quota would only increase the potential for political instability on the island. In fact, the State Department wanted to raise the Cuban

Sugar Acts sugar quota, but the proposal fell on deaf ears in the U.S. Congress. In the end, pressure from the White House and the State Department persuaded Congress to continue Cuba’s favorable treatment. The ¡956 Sugar Act won congressional approval on May ¡7, and Eisenhower signed it twelve days later.

Sugar Act of ¡960 Approved by the U.S. Congress on July 3, ¡960, the ¡960 Sugar Act authorized President Dwight D. Eisenhower to fix the Cuban sugar quota at any level he wished through March 3¡, ¡96¡. The increasing anti–American character of Fidel Castro’s regime in Cuba provoked the legislation. The measure evolved from debates regarding the extension of the Sugar Act of ¡948, which established quotas for domestic and foreign producers of sugar and provided for a uniform price of about 2 cents per pound above the world market price. Under this law and the extensions of it in ¡952 and ¡956, Cuba provided the United States with about one-third of its sugar needs. In ¡960, the introduction of a Democratic Party proposal to increase the amount of Cuban sugar imports touched o› a bitter congressional debate regarding U.S. support of the Castro regime. In its place the Republicans urged support for a proposal of Representative Charles E. Hoeven (R., Ia.) to extend the Sugar Act for one year and, at the same time, to authorize the president to cut Cuba’s quota. Following the secret testimony of Secretary of State Christian A. Herter before the House Agricultural Committee on June 22, committee chair Harold D. Cooley (D., N.C.) supported the measure providing the president with quota-cutting authority. On June 30, the House of Representatives unanimously approved a measure to extend the Sugar Act for one year, until December 3¡, ¡96¡, to grant the president the authority to cut the Cuban quota for ¡960 and ¡96¡, and to assign any Cuban losses to other foreign producers. In deference to domestic sugar growers, the Senate version did not contain the latter proviso. In an all-night session,

Taft July 2 and 3, a House-Senate conference committee approved the final measure, which allocated ¡60,000 tons of the anticipated cuts in the Cuban quota to domestic producers. The remainder was divided among foreign suppliers. President Eisenhower wasted no time in acting. On July 6 he ordered a 700,000-ton cut in Cuba’s 3,¡¡9,656-ton ¡960 quota. Since 2,379,203 tons had already been shipped or certified for shipment, Eisenhower’s action e›ectively reduced the U.S. import of Cuban sugar to 39,752 tons for the remainder of ¡960. Castro responded quickly with the implementation of a newly decreed nationalization law, under which the Cuban government began the confiscation of U.S.-owned properties on the island. On July ¡0, four days after Eisenhower’s announcement, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union would purchase the 700,000-ton shortfall for ¡960. In October, as U.S.–Cuban relations continued to deteriorate, Eisenhower announced a total embargo on Cuban sugar for ¡960 and in December extended the sugar boycott until March 3¡, ¡96¡. See also Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Nationalization Law of ¡960; Revolution: United States Presidential Administrations and the Revolution

Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡939 see Trade Agreements: Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡939

Taft, William Howard (¡857–¡930) Prior to serving as the 26th president of the United States from ¡909–¡9¡3, Taft’s public service record included distinguished service as governor-general of the Philippine Islands, secretary of war from ¡904 to ¡908, and as President Theodore Roosevelt’s roving ambassador to the world. In ¡906, Roosevelt sent

204 Taft along with Assistant Secretary of State Robert Bacon to Cuba in an unsuccessful e›ort to mediate a political crisis caused by President Tomás Estrada Palma’s determination to extend his presidential term. Beginning in late September ¡906, Taft served briefly as Cuba’s provisional governor until the appointment of Charles Magoon that October. Thereafter, Magoon reported directly to Taft until Taft’s resignation in ¡908 to run for the presidency of the United States. In ¡9¡2, Taft dispatched a contingent of U.S. Marines to protect American lives and property when black veterans from Cuba’s War for Independence threatened an insurrection. The insurrection quickly petered out, negating the use of the marines. Although Taft gave greater attention to events in Asia during his presidency than to Cuban matters, he implemented the policy of “Dollar Diplomacy” in the Caribbean region. The policy’s purpose was to substitute dollars for military intervention to bring stability to the region’s politically troubled nations. Taft also implemented preventive diplomacy, which for Cuba meant an expanded interpretation of the Platt Amendment to forestall political crisis and to provide U.S. commercial interests advantages over foreign competitors. See also Dollar Diplomacy; Estrada Palma, Tomás; Magoon, Charles; Preventive Diplomacy; Taft-Bacon Mission; United States Interventions

Taft-Bacon Mission When Tomás Estrada Palma captured the ¡905 presidential election by questionable and fraudulent means, the Liberals responded with open rebellion. Reluctant to intervene, President Theodore Roosevelt dispatched Secretary of War William Howard Taft and Assistant Secretary of State Robert Bacon to Cuba to suspend military hostilities and negotiate a found their political settlement. Upon their arrival, Taft and Bacon found the conditions to be worse than expected. Led by General José Miguel Gómez, the insurgent Liberals controlled the provinces and surrounded the capital of Havana. Estrada Palma’s Moderates political support was con-

205 fined to Havana and provincial capitals, but they lacked su‡cient military strength to fend o› Gomez’s army. Despite the Liberals’ advantage, Taft and Bacon e›ected a suspension of military hostilities. They then directed an investigation of electoral practices and found corruption more widespread than originally believed. Taft and Bacon made two assumptions that formed the basis of a compromise solution to the political crisis: that Estrada Palma was unaware of the fraud committed on his behalf and that Estrada Palma would have won the election even had there been no fraud. From these observations flowed the proposal that Estrada Palma serve a second presidential term, that the ¡905 Cuban congressional elections be annulled, that new elections be scheduled and supervised by a bipartisan commission, and that the Moderate cabinet resign to be replaced by a nonpolitical advisory board. Once the resignations took place, the Liberals were to lay down their arms and return to private life under terms of a general amnesty. The Liberals grudgingly accepted what they believed to be the best deal that they could receive under the circumstances. However, Estrada Palma rejected the proposed compromise, and he and Taft proceeded to blame each other for the failure. Estrada Palma then resigned the presidency, followed by his cabinet members. At the same time, congressional Moderates avoided the legislature so that no quorum could be had. E›ectively, there was no government. Given this situation on September ¡8, ¡906, Taft, acting under Article 3 of the Platt Amendment, took charge as the new United States provisional governor. He immediately requested that U.S. Marines be sent ashore to guard the national treasury. Thus began the three-year military occupation of Cuba, at first under Taft and, after October ¡3, ¡906, under Charles Magoon. See also Crowder, Enoch; Estrada Palma, Tomás; Magoon, Charles; United States Interventions

Tari› Policies Duties or taxes levied by a government on imported goods are intended to raise rev-

Tari› Policies enues and protect domestic industries. Although there are di›erent types of tari›s, the most common are a specific duty that is a fixed charge calculated on the physical amount of a product, such as ¡0 cents per pound for steel products. An ad valorem duty is a fixed-percentage tax based on the value of the imported product. Throughout U.S. history tari›s have fluctuated in terms of variety and purpose since they were first imposed in ¡789. Starting with the ¡86¡ Morrill Tari› and its subsequent revisions through ¡869, high rates were set to protect the development of U.S. industry. The growing U.S. appetite for Cuban sugar after ¡865 added a new consideration to the tari› issue. Spain levied high import duties on U.S. goods entering Cuba, providing Madrid with a good income. It also provided Cuba with a favorable trade balance with the United States. To correct the problem, in ¡88¡ President Chester A. Arthur dispatched John W. Foster to Madrid in an e›ort to reach a trade reciprocity agreement regarding Cuba. Nothing materialized until ¡890 when the U.S. Congress approved the McKinley Tari›, which placed sugar and molasses on the free list, but also empowered the president to impose high tari›s on the primary products of countries that denied U.S. exports concessions commensurate with those o›ered by the McKinley bill. Foster was again dispatched to Spain, and in ¡89¡ he completed a reciprocal trade agreement with Spain. In return for the benefits of the McKinley Tari›, Spain granted concessions to U.S. products entering Cuba. As a result, for the next three years, the volume and value of Cuban sugar entering the United States markedly increased. When Grover Cleveland returned to the White House in ¡894 for his second presidential term, the nation’s mood had changed. A depressed economy and currency questions became the focus of his administration, which also favored a downward trend in tari›s. The ¡894 Wilson-Gorman Tari› reflected that position, except that it took sugar o› the dutyfree list as provided in the McKinley Tari› and reimposed a tari› upon it. Spain reacted in kind, reimposing tari›s on U.S. imports

Tari› Policies into Cuba, e›ectively canceling the ¡89¡ reciprocity treaty. The result was disastrous for Cuba. It lost the only market capable of absorbing its sugar production, and, in turn, the cost of importing U.S. machinery, tools, and railroad track increased by 300–400 percent. Cuba fell victim to a serious recession, and, some have argued, it contributed to the planters’ support for the Cuban War for Independence that began a year later. Republican William McKinley was elected president in ¡896, but he was without a mandate on the tari› question and, in fact, had been vague about the issue. Still, the Republican-controlled Congress approved the Dingley Tari› in ¡897 designed to protect U.S. industries, including beet sugar, whose development had been encouraged by the Agriculture Department. By the mid–¡890s there were 3¡ beet-sugar factories in 2¡ states producing beet sugar valued at $2¡ million. Owing to the industry’s political influence, the Dingley Tari› included a 20 percent ad valorem tax on imported raw sugar. At the moment, the tari› meant little to Cuba engaged in a brutal and destructive war with Spain, but it surfaced immediately after the war during the U.S. military occupation of Cuba. In an e›ort to rekindle the Cuban economy, U.S. authorities wanted to jump-start the island’s sugar industry by granting a preferential U.S. tari›. Congressional representative of the U.S. beet-sugar industry resisted and not until ¡903 was a reciprocity agreement reached between the United States and Cuba. It provided for a 20 percent preferential reduction in U.S. tari›s on Cuban sugar and other products, while various U.S. goods received a 20–40 percent reduction on Cuban tari›s. Although the treaty did not immediately open up the Cuban market to U.S. manufactures, it did tie the Cuban sugar industry to the U.S. market. The trend toward protective tari›s continued with the ¡909 Payne-Aldrich Bill that further protected U.S. industries from foreign competition. The Payne-Aldrich Bill fixed the sugar tari› at ¡.685 cents per pound. With the 20 percent discount provided by the Permanent Treaty of ¡903, Cuba paid ¡.348 cents

206 per pound, gaining a .0377 cent concession. That changed again in ¡9¡3 when the Wilson administration revised tari›s downwards with the Underwood Tari›. It reduced the sugar tari› to ¡.258 cents per pound, which Cuba paid ¡.0048 cents, thus providing a .24¡2 cent per pound savings. Moreover, the Underwood Tari› placed sugar on the free list after May ¡9¡6, thus eliminating Cuba’s tari› benefit altogether. Supported by William Jennings Bryan, the Cuban sugar interests unsuccessfully appealed directly to President Woodrow Wilson for greater protection. Owing to the U.S. domestic sugar industry, Wilson did not budge. The tari› on Cuban sugar remained at ¡.0048 cents per pound until the ¡922 Fordney-McCumber Tari›. In the intervening time period, the Cubans muted their protests because World War I caused the loss of European and Asian sugar to the world market. With it, demand and prices climbed to alltime highs, bringing unprecedented prosperity to Cuba. The “Dance of the Millions” ended with the war, and Cuba slipped into a recession, and so, too, did the United States. In that ambience, protectionism dominated U.S. thinking. The Fordney-McCumber Tari› again protected U.S. industries, including domestic beet and cane sugar. The tari› on raw sugar imports was raised to ¡.7640 cents per pound. While U.S. congressmen did not consider the tari› ’s adverse impact upon Cuba, others did. Businessmen operating in Cuba, the Wall Street Journal, and a delegation of Cubans all appealed to the U.S. Congress to consider the needs of the Cuban sugar growers and the impact of their losses upon the Cuban economy and government revenues. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes attempted to persuade the Cuban sugar growers to cut their production by 60 percent in return for a tari› reduction, but the Cubans refused. With the advent of the Great Depression in ¡929, the demands for greater protection for domestic industries increased, resulting in the ¡930 Hawley-Smoot Tari› that raised U.S. tari›s to record high levels. Again owing to the

207 domestic sugar industry, the tari› on imported raw sugar went to 2.5 cents per pound. The cumulative e›ect of the Depression and the tari› upon Cuba was devastating. It’s share of the U.S. sugar market declined from 49.4 percent in ¡930 to 25.3 percent in ¡933. During the same period, Cuban sugar production dropped by 80 percent, and world prices for the product dropped by the same amount. An international e›ort to address the world’s sugar problem was made with the International Sugar Agreement of ¡93¡, but it was to no avail. The United States adjusted the situation in ¡934 with the Jones-Costigan Act and a new Reciprocal Trade Agreement. As a result of these two measures, the U.S. sugar tari› was reduced to ¡.875 cents per pound, and with the 20 percent reduction, the cost of Cuban sugar was put at ¡.50 cents per pound. Cuban sugar exports to the United States immediately increased. Thereafter, with the exception of World War II, U.S. policy moved toward a quota system. Although subsequently declared unconstitutional, the Sugar Act of ¡937 fixed the annual Cuban sugar import quota at ¡.9 million tons. The Sugar Acts of ¡948, ¡952, and ¡956 fixed the Cuban share of the U.S. market at 44.6 percent, 28.6 percent and 29.6 percent, respectively, of U.S. consumption, plus benefits from shortfalls from other foreign providers. U.S. purchases of Cuban sugar ended with the Sugar Act of ¡960 that enabled President Dwight D. Eisenhower to place an embargo on Cuban sugar. It had become a victim of Cold War policies. See also Dance of the Millions; Economic Relations; Jones-Costigan Act; Sugar Acts; Trade Agreements: Reciprocal Trade Agreement of ¡934; Trade Embargo; Treaties: Permanent Treaty of ¡903

Taylor, Hannis (¡85¡–¡922) A successful lawyer in Alabama, Taylor was also prominent in the state’s Democratic Party. President Grover Cleveland appointed him minister to Spain in ¡893, a position he held until the election of President William

Taylor McKinley. Taylor resumed his law practice and subsequently served on the Alaska boundary commission. During his four-year tenure in Madrid, Taylor dealt with troublesome indemnityclaim issues revolving around the confiscation of American-owned properties in Cuba. In the mid–¡890s, following the outbreak of the Cuban War for Independence, Taylor protested the arrest of U.S. citizens and confiscation of their properties by the Spanish authorities. In ¡895, he brokered a Spanish statement of regret for the firing upon of the U.S. mail packet Alliançia o› the Cuban coast. A year later he saved the crew of the American Competitor, accused of selling arms to the Cuban revolutionaries, from the Spanish firing squad. Taylor lost his e›ectiveness that same year when he suggested that the Spanish government grant autonomy to the Cubans or face the possibility of losing control of the island altogether. After returning to the United States and conferring with President William McKinley and Assistant Secretary of State William Day, Taylor took it upon himself to educate the American people about Cuba. In an essay in the November ¡897 issue of the North American Review, Taylor described the harsh realities of Cuba and called for U.S. intervention on the island. Drawing upon his experiences as minister to Madrid, Taylor declared that Spain’s outmoded colonial policy was responsible for the insurrection, and given the current status of events, Spanish sovereignty over the island no longer existed nor could it be restored. Taylor asserted that Spain could not grant self-government to the Cubans because Spain did not practice selfgovernment at home. Taylor also charged that as long as the war continued, the U.S. economic recession would do the same. Because the Spanish government would rather lose Cuba to the United States in a war than grant it self-government, Taylor urged the U.S. Congress to approve a resolution calling for U.S. intervention to bring an end to the war. Taylor predicted that the United States involvement would bring the conflict to a quick end. Taylor’s essay was interpreted at home

Taylor and abroad as a reflection of position held by the McKinley administration. In particular, the Spanish government expected Taylor’s essay to encourage the insurgents to reject the autonomous government scheduled to go into e›ect on January ¡, ¡898. See also Cleveland, Grover S.; McKinley, William; War for Independence: Spanish Policy and the War

Taylor, Zachary (¡784–¡850) As a military hero during the Mexican War, Taylor vaulted into national prominence that contributed to his presidential election in November ¡848. He served only sixteen months (March ¡849 to July ¡850) before his untimely death caused by typhoid fever. He came to o‡ce without foreign policy experience and with an uncompromising attitude that caused him many di‡culties. Taylor’s presidency coincided with the time that many southerners had a covetous eye toward Cuba and became willing partners in the filibustering expeditions of Venezuelanborn Narciso López. In August ¡849 the Taylor administration e›ectively blocked López’s first filibustering attempt, but it did not block his second in May ¡850. In both instances, the U.S. government failed to convict López of violating U.S. neutrality laws because an impartial jury could not be found. In the meantime, Spanish naval ships impounded two U.S. cargo ships for carrying supplies to rebels in Cuba and charged their crews and passengers with piracy. Taylor ordered the dispatch of three U.S. naval ships to Havana in an e›ort to force their release. It was to no avail. The Americans were tried and convicted for their crimes but released by the queen regent of Spain as a goodwill gesture. See also Lopez, Narciso

Teller Amendment

The Teller Amendment was a proposal by Senator Henry M. Teller (R.–Col.) in ¡898 that was adopted as an amendment to the U.S. resolution of war against Spain in Cuba. On

208 April ¡¡, ¡898, President William McKinley sent a message to Congress requesting authority to intervene militarily in Cuba for the purpose of ending hostilities there. McKinley also made clear his intention to veto any congressional action that recognized Cuban independence. McKinley’s message fueled the ongoing congressional debate over U.S. intentions regarding Cuba. Emboldened by the White House’s determination to oppose Cuban independence, representatives from rural areas of the country, concerned that eastern commercial interests wanted more than just expanded economic opportunities in Cuba, led the legislative battle against annexation. In the course of its deliberations, a House-Senate conference committee agreed to forego recognition of Cuba’s independence in exchange for the administration’s acceptance of the amendment introduced by Teller. The Teller Amendment specified that the United States “disclaims any disposition of intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over [Cuba] except for pacification … and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to the [Cuban] people. “Although Teller was an expansionist who previously contended that Cuba would eventually be attached to the United States, he opposed forcible annexation in ¡898. His state, Colorado, was one of many engaged in beetsugar production. Its beet-sugar farmers now feared that Cuban annexation would open the door to the unlimited entry of Cuban sugar into the United States, which, in turn, would threaten his state’s beet-sugar industry. Teller’s amendment was included in the April ¡9, ¡898, joint congressional resolution that was equivalent to a declaration of war. Although the Teller Amendment prevented the United States from annexing Cuba after the Spanish left in ¡898, it did not prevent the establishment of a U.S. military government that remained until ¡902. Critics of U.S. policy toward Cuba agree that the intention of the Teller Amendment was contravened by the ¡902 Platt Amendment that granted the United States the right

209 to intervene in Cuban a›airs. See also McKinley, William; Platt Amendment; SpanishAmerican War: War Resolutions; United States Occupation of Cuba

Ten Years’ War The Ten Years’ War was a bitter and devastating struggle from ¡868 to ¡878 that ended when the Spanish government, in the ¡878 Treaty of Zanjón, conceded to the Cubans a peace that granted them concessions without independence. In the early ¡860s a group of Cuban Creoles exerted intense pressure upon the Spanish government to reform its political and economic systems, but Spain was reluctant to act. With their patience wearing thin, in ¡868, a group of young Cubans, led by Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, issued a manifesto: Grito de Yara. It called for Cuba’s independence from Spain, the establishment of a republic with universal su›rage, and the indemnified emancipation of slaves. Grito de Yara marked the beginning of the Ten Years’ War. Before it ended, an estimated 200,000 lives were lost, and property damage was estimated at $700 million. The war also produced three Cuban military heroes — Antonio Maceo, Calixto García, and the Domician Máximo Gómez — who surfaced again in the Cuban War for independence in ¡895. In the Treaty of Zanjón, Spain promised administrative reforms, amnesty for the rebels, and emancipation of all slaves. Although slavery ended in Cuba by ¡886, Spain failed to implement the other reforms, causing continued Cuban discontent with Spanish authority. The Ten Years’ War had a far-reaching impact on the development of Cuban society. It not only decimated the Creole class, thus hindering the development of a landowning elite found elsewhere in Latin America, but it also opened the door to U.S. entrepreneurs. They filled the vacuum created by the ruin of the Creole aristocracy and the bankruptcy of Spanish interests. In the ¡880s, thousands of North Americans accompanied their investment dollars to the island to run the sugar

Tractors for Freedom mills and merchant houses. These trends contributed to Cuba’s increased economic dependence upon the United States by ¡895, at which time Cuba ranked third behind Britain and Germany in exports to the United States. The U.S. market accounted for 87 percent of Cuba’s exports. During the same period, Cuban intellectuals, a growing number of Creoles, and Cuban exiles in the United States and elsewhere had become increasingly anti– Spanish in their attitude, tending to blame the mother country for their poverty, thus setting the stage for Cuba’s final push to independence. See also Céspedas, Carlos Manuel de; Expansionism; Fish, Hamilton; García, Calixto; Gómez y Báez, Máximo; Maceo, Antonio; War for Independence

Torricelli Bill see Cuban Democracy Act Tractors for Freedom Committee The committee was formed by President John F. Kennedy in ¡96¡ for the purpose of raising private funds to purchase 500 tractors for Cuba in return for the release of imprisoned exiles captured during the April ¡96¡ Bay of Pigs invasion. When Fidel Castro suggested the possibility of such an exchange, presidential adviser Richard Goodwin asked Milton Eisenhower, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Walter Reuther to form the committee to carry out the exchange with the administration’s private blessing. Special arrangements were made with the Internal Revenue Service to make the contributions a charitable deduction. The plan fell apart when conservative Republican senators Karl Mundt (S.D.), Styles Bridges (N.H.), Homer Capehart (Ind.), Barry Goldwater (Az.), and Everett Dirksen (Ill.) attacked it as an “act of humiliation” and as paying “blackmail” to Castro. In late ¡962, the imprisoned exiles were finally released for $35 million dollars in food, medicine, and medical supplies, a cost much greater than the 500

Trade Agreements tractors. See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Kennedy, John F.;

Trade Agreements During the Depression-plagued ¡930s, many Latin American nations attempted to industrialize, but their e›orts were hindered by their continued dependency upon the money earned from the exportation of primary products. At the same time, industrialized nations pushed for export growth of their own manufactured goods as a means of stimulating their economies at home. The U.S.– Cuban relationship is a case in point. A common theme characterized the three trade agreements completed between the United States and Cuba before the outbreak of World War II. TheUnited States adjusted its tari› on Cuban sugar to ensure its privileged position in the U.S. market, while the Cubans lowered their tari›s on U.S.–manufactured goods. In e›ect, Cuba remained dependent upon sugar and, by lowering its tari› on manufactures, militated against its own industrial development. See also Economic Relations; JonesCostigan Act; Soviet Union: Trade Agreement of ¡960; Sugar Acts; Tari› Policies; Treaties: Permanent Treaty of ¡903, Treaty of ¡934

Reciprocal Trade Agreement of ¡934 At the time Franklin D. Roosevelt took o‡ce in March ¡934, the world su›ered the consequences of the Great Depression that began in ¡929 and was exacerbated by the economic nationalism that followed. To address the problem, Roosevelt accepted Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s call for the liberalization of trade policies. As a result, in June ¡934, the Roosevelt administration persuaded Congress to pass the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act that provided for the use of the unconditional most-favored-nation clause and the principle of active tari› bargaining through reciprocal agreements. Cuba fit neatly into the U.S. plan. The combined e›ects of the ¡929 Hawley-Smoot Tari› and the Great Depression

210 pushed the Cuban economy into dire straits. Cuban sugar exports were cut in half to ¡.4 million tons a year in ¡933. Prices also fell from .04 cents to .02 cents per pound. The loss had a significant adverse impact on the Cuban economy and government income and, according to U.S. policymakers, was a major contributor to Cuba’s political turmoil. These conditions prompted the United States to open trade talks in ¡933 with the Gerardo Machado administration and continued once Carlos Mendieta assumed the presidency in early ¡934. When completed in August ¡934, the pact was anything but a reciprocal trade agreement because it continued the special customs relationship between Cuba and the United States that dated to ¡903. Accordingly, each nation guaranteed exclusive preferential tari› reductions on certain commodities no matter what rates either one might grant to third countries. Also, the treaty abandoned the most-favored-nations clause to demonstrate how mutual tari› reductions could restore trade. Under the agreement the United States received from Cuba preferential rates of from 20 to 75 percent on 426 agricultural and industrial items. In turn, the United States granted Cuba tari› preferences ranging from 20 to 50 percent on 35 Cuban articles amounting to 90 percent of Cuba’s exports to the United States. Sugar and tobacco received 20 percent margins of preferences, but both agricultural articles were subject to U.S. quota restrictions. The new rate on sugar, for example, was ninety cents per pound, but this duty remained e›ective only as long as the quota provision of the Jones-Costigan Act remained in force. Once it became inoperative, the duty returned to the old rate of ¡.5 cents per pound. The treaty’s immediate impact was profound. Both sides took credit for the near doubling of the price of sugar to ¡.50 cents per pound on the New York market. Cuban exports to the United States more than doubled to $¡08 million between ¡933 and ¡938, most of it in sugar. The newfound wealth in Cuba contributed to the increased consumption of U.S. goods on the island. For the same

211

Trade Agreements

period, U.S. exports to Cuba more than doubled to $57 million. On the downside, because of the lack of a most-favored-nations clause, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement put foreign competitors at a disadvantage in the Cuban market. When coupled with the impact of the Jones-Costigan Act, the U.S.–Cuban Reciprocal Trade Agreement increased Cuba’s dependence upon sugar and on the U.S. market and significantly contributed to Cuba’s failure to diversify its economy. See also Jones-Costigan Act; Sugar Acts: Sugar Act of ¡937

nessmen were disappointed with the U.S. unilateral actions that impacted the Cuban economy, the concessions given to the U.S. imports without adequate guarantees for their products, and the failure of the Cuban government to take e›ective steps against the privileged position of U.S. sugar interests on the island. They understood that trade reciprocity with the United States was an unequal arrangement. See also Bondholders’ Dispute; Jones-Costigan Act; Sugar Acts: Sugar Act of ¡937; Treaties: Permanent Treaty of ¡903, Treaty of ¡934

Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡939

Second Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡94¡

On September ¡¡, ¡939, following the outbreak of war in Europe, President Franklin D. Roosevelt suspended the quota on Cuban sugar provided for in the ¡937 Sugar Act. With the quota suspension, the U.S. tari› on Cuban sugar went from 90 cents to $¡.50 per pound. In an instance, the Cubans lost their privileged position in the U.S. sugar market and now had to cope with approximately equal prices on the world market. The Cubans immediately linked Roosevelt’s action as punishment for not settling with U.S. bondholders and making other fiscal reforms demanded by the State Department. In reality, Roosevelt acted because of the hoarding of sugar by consumers and speculators. While the Cubans fumed, U.S. policymakers understood the need to maintain Cuba’s economy. In short order, representatives from both nations negotiated a supplemental trade agreement. Completed on December ¡9, ¡939, it restored the lower U.S. duties on tobacco suspended since ¡936 and the 90 cents per pound duty for sugar. While the treaty addressed Cuba’s economic stability, it also provided the United States with significantly lower duties on four items and lesser concessions on twelve others. In essence the treaty established conditions similar to the ¡934 agreement. The Cuban business community was not pleased with the treaty or with the impact of U.S. economic policy since ¡934. The busi-

Signed on December 23, ¡94¡, this agreement provided for a reduction in the U.S. sugar tari› from 90 to 75 cents per pound and tari› reductions on Cuban tobacco and beef coming into the United States. In return the Cubans granted the United States tari› relief on thirty-eight articles. Cuban businessmen were never satisfied with the provisions of the first Supplemental Trade Agreement in ¡939 because it failed to open up U.S. markets to other Cuban goods and further linked Cuba’s economic fate to sugar’s dependency on the U.S. markets. The United States ambassador to Cuba, George Messersmith, sympathized with the Cubans. He understood that they had gained little from either the ¡934 or ¡939 agreements. However, until he persuaded President Franklin D. Roosevelt and secretary of state of the same in late ¡94¡, commercial negotiations stood still until Cuba satisfied the U.S. demands for settlement of its bondholders’ claims, carried out fiscal reforms, and implemented guarantees for U.S. business interests on the island. In the spring of ¡94¡, President Fulgencio Batista moved su‡ciently on these issues to satisfy Messersmith and the Export-Import Bank, which granted Cuba a $25 million loan for public works and agricultural diversification. Batista also took several pro–Allied initiatives that satisfied the State Department’s

Trade Embargo wishes for hemispheric security. Worldwide shortages of sugar also prompted the United States to negotiate not only a new trade treaty but also to acquire Cuba’s entire ¡942 sugar crop. See also Bondholders’ Dispute; Messersmith, George S.

Trade Embargo The arrival of Fidel Castro in Havana, in January ¡959 set o› alarm bells among U.S. policymakers. His provisional government was identified with the brutal repression of opposition, the confiscation of properties, centralization of political power, and denial of human and civil rights. From the start, U.S. policymakers determined to oust Castro from power, and beginning in the late ¡960s, as he became more closely aligned to the Soviet Union, successive presidents continued the policy. In the ¡980s the most conservative elements of the Cuban American community and their congressional representatives gained influence in the administrations of Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush to continue the pressure upon Cuba. Short of military invasion, the next most logical pressure available to force change in Cuba was a trade embargo. Because of its historic economic relationship with Cuba, the United States thought that it could influence the direction of the Cuban revolution by curtailing trade with the island nation. President Dwight D. Eisenhower took incremental steps beginning in ¡960. Following Cuba’s nationalization of U.S. oil refineries, on June 29, ¡960, Eisenhower, on July 6, ¡960, used the authority granted him in the ¡960 Sugar Act to drastically cut the remainder of Cuba’s sugar quota for that year. On October ¡9, ¡960, he placed a total trade embargo upon Cuba except for food and medicine. The Kennedy administration followed the same path. In early ¡96¡, while the National Security Council and the State and Treasury Departments assessed the impact and legality of a total trade embargo upon Cuba, President John F. Kennedy imposed travel restrictions upon Americans traveling to Cuba. On March

212 3¡, ¡96¡, Congress abolished the Cuban sugar quota. During the same year, a congressional groundswell resulted in legislation on September 4 that imposed a total embargo upon U.S.–Cuban trade. In July ¡963, the State Department directed the Treasury Department to ban all financial and currency transactions under authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act. Immediately $33 million in Cuban public and private deposits in the United States were frozen, denying the Cuban government funds to finance revolutions across Latin America, to use other currencies of less value, and to contract trade with Western Europe. Following the congressional imposition of a total embargo, Kennedy sought Canadian and Mexican cooperation in preventing the transshipment of U.S. goods to Cuba. The former proved more cooperative than the latter, but each continued their own trade with Cuba. In ¡962 the Kennedy administration aggressively attempted to persuade its West European allies to curtail their shipping to Cuba and for the Japanese to find other sources of sugar. The e›ort proved largely successful, as Cuba’s international trade declined by 60 percent from ¡962 to ¡963. Concerned about straining relations with its allies, the Kennedy administration did not push the matter further before his death in November ¡963. Lyndon Johnson came to the presidency equally as determined as Kennedy to destroy Cuba’s economic base by isolating Cuba from the western world’s economies. Toward that objective Johnson endeavored to extend the global transportation blockade against Cuba first by promising to place all vessels of any maritime firm on the U.S. “blacklist” if any of its cargo carriers visited Cuban ports. Not all free-world countries approved the measure, notably Great Britain, Greece, and Lebanon disapproved. Still, by ¡968 the total number of free-world cargo vessels visiting Cuban ports declined drastically. For example, ¡80 British ships reached Cuba in ¡964 and only 62 in ¡968. The combined number of Greek and Lebanese ships reaching Cuba dropped from ¡63 to 23 over the same period. Beyond the shipping industry, Johnson attempted to

213 convince Western European governments and Japan to encourage their corporations from trading with Cuba and sought to prevent subsidiaries of U.S. corporations operating abroad to do the same. Johnson also used the bully pulpit to chastise Western European governments for extending credits to Cuba. Under threat of U.S. cutbacks in assistance programs, Latin American governments were encouraged to persuade their European trading partners from shipping to Cuba. Johnson bought o› other countries, such as India, Japan, and Morocco by supplying U.S. sugar and grains needed to satisf y domestic consumption. With several abstentions, in ¡967 the Organization of American States (OAS) approved a U.S. sponsored measure to deny port facilities and government-financed cargoes to allied countries engaged in Cuban trade. By the end of his term in ¡968, Johnson succeeded in keeping Cuba’s trade with nonsocialist nations to about the same percentages as in ¡962. However, not all allies readily cooperated. Britain, Canada, France, West Germany, and Spain continued to supply Cuba with manufactured goods. Owing to global interests, Johnson had little leverage over these countries. Still, by ¡968 Cuba stood in near-economic isolation from the western world. In the early ¡970s, the economic embargo of Cuba began to crumble. Opposition intensified within the Western Hemisphere. The OAS in ¡970, ¡97¡, and ¡972 discussed the possibility of ending Cuba’s economic and diplomatic isolation. Between ¡973 and ¡975 several states unilaterally renewed relations with Cuba — Chile, Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, and Argentina. During the same time span, Cuba joined several Latin American organizations, including the Latin American Energy Organization, Organization of Sugar Exporters, and the Caribbean Committee for Development and Cooperation. Finally, at its ¡975 meeting in San José, Costa Rica, the OAS, including the United States approved to end mandatory trade and other sanctions and allow each individual country to determine its own strategy in dealing with Cuba. Subsequently, the Latin American nations opened

Trade Embargo relations with Cuba, but the United States continued its economic embargo. The global community also increased its commercial contacts with Cuba. In ¡972 the European Economic Community extended general trade preferences to a number of Third World countries, including Cuba. By ¡975, nonsocialist countries accounted for 4¡.2 percent of Cuba’s trade, up from 25.3 percent in ¡968. Between ¡97¡ and ¡975 Cuba’s importation of goods from nonsocialist countries climbed from 30 to 49 percent of its total imports. At the time Cuba was able to finance these purchases with the abnormally high price paid for sugar on the world market. Beginning in ¡976, the world price for sugar sharply declined and, concomitantly, so too did Cuba’s imports from the nonsocialist world, dropping to ¡6 percent of total imports in ¡979. Still, at the end of the ¡970s, Canada, Japan, and Spain supplied Cuba with more than fifty percent of its free-world goods. Despite Cuba’s hard currency debt to capitalist countries by the end of the decade, state and private institutions continued to extend credit. The Nixon administration imposed penalties on foreign firms that purchased American made products for transshipment to Cuba. For example, in ¡97¡ a French firm was fined for transshipping agricultural chemicals and a Dutch firm for delivering spare parts for trucks to Cuba. By ¡975 similar prosecutions were brought against British, Canadian, and Mexican firms. However, the Nixon administration backed down on the issue of trade between U.S. subsidiaries that were operating in and under the laws of foreign countries. For example, in ¡97¡ it quietly accepted the shipment of harvesters produced by MasseyFerguson–Australia to Cuba because the farm machinery was described as “nonstrategic.” In ¡973 the Nixon administration at first reacted sharply when Argentine President Juan Perón negotiated a $¡.2 billion trade deal with Cuba that included Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler automobiles and trucks. Nixon argued that the Cuban Assets Control Regulations applied, but he also feared that by allowing the Argentine sales, other countries

Trade Embargo would follow suit. However, recognizing that Perón’s nationalism would result in an embarrassing incident, the Nixon administration relented. Subsequently, the United States faced similar challenges from Canada, where numerous U.S. subsidiaries manufactured goods that were destined for Cuba. In August ¡975, President Gerald Ford addressed the problem. He modified policy to permit U.S.–owned subsidiaries operating abroad to ship to Cuba nonstrategic goods that contained only “a small part” of American-made components. President Jimmy Carter broadened the wedge for U.S. dollars and goods to make their way into Cuba. By lifting travel restrictions in ¡977, both U.S. tourists and Cuban exiles took dollars with them when visiting the island, and the latter group took a wide range of consumer goods from clothes to televisions sets. Many analysts assert that this influx caused the ¡980 Mariel boat lift. Carter also modified Gerald Ford’s policy regarding subsidiaries operating abroad. To avoid diplomatic controversies, the Carter administration permitted U.S. subsidiaries to trade with Cuba at the direction of host governments, but still with stringent controls on the amount of U.S. materials used and without extending long-term credits. This was unfortunate because Cuba’s need for machinery was at its peak. Those goods were found elsewhere in the western world. From the start, the Reagan administration determined to more stringently enforce the embargo against Cuba. The administration reasoned that the denial of consumer goods to the Cuban people would increase their frustration with the Castro regime. Using the Trading with the Enemy Act as the vehicle, U.S. citizens were prevented from using dollars or U.S. bank credit cards when paying for expenses in Cuba, a move that severely contracted the tourist industry. The administration went a step further in ¡986 when it began to closely monitor “third-country operations” that arranged travel and goods to make their way to Cuba, and visits by Cuban citizens to the U.S. were strictly controlled. The Reagan administration also sought to obstruct or sabotage Cuba’s debt negotiations

214 with western creditors, to deny Cuba access to western capital for financing development projects, and to pressure allies not to sell merchandise to or purchase goods from Cuba. The White House believed that, collectively, these measures would limit the ability of Castro’s regime to earn badly needed hard currencies required to grow the Cuban economy and, in turn, foment internal political protest. The Reagan e›ort to force western creditors to dictate harsh terms on the renegotiation of Cuba’s external debt largely failed. Western bankers were impressed with Cuba’s debt repayment record, its desire to expand trade with the western nations, and the continuance of Soviet economic guarantees to Cuba. The United States had greater success regarding the use of Cuban nickel in goods imported into the United States from thirdparty countries. Agreements were reached with France, Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands not to use Cuban nickel in any stainless steel product that made their way to the United States. Reagan’s e›orts failed to curtail western trade with Cuba that grew from an estimated $¡ billion in ¡975 to an estimated $¡.8 billion in ¡983. Only the plummet in the world price of sugar in the late ¡980s denied Cuba hard currency, negatively impacting upon its trade with and ability to gain credits from the industrial world. Despite his tough rhetoric to force a regime change in Cuba, President George H.W. Bush implemented only limited embargo restrictions, but they left a more strident public image, such as denying American Telephone and Telegraph the right to use its cables for service to Cuba and preventing ABC Television from televising the Pan American Games from Havana. Each move denied Castro’s government millions of dollars. This was not enough to satisfy either the Cuban American lobby or its congressional allies. President Bill Clinton came to the White House committed to continue the imposition of the embargo upon Cuba. His support of the Cuban Democracy Act during the ¡992 presidential campaign played a significant role in its congressional passage and signing by

215 former President Bush. The bill’s provision to end the trade with Cuba by U.S. subsidiaries proved e›ective. It dropped in total value from $¡.6 billion to $700 million within a year of its passage. But Clinton was less successful in persuading the Canadian, European and Latin American governments from trading with Cuba. Until late in his administration, Clinton drastically scaled back cash remittances and travel by Cuban exiles in the United States to the island. Clinton tightened the economic screw on Cuba following the February ¡996 shooting down by Cuban military aircraft of two unarmed civilian planes flown by Miami-based Cuban exiles, allegedly over international waters. Bowing to public and congressional pressure following the shoot down, Clinton supported and signed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad ) Act (popularly known as the Helms-Burton Bill) in March ¡996, which included an attempt to punish foreign-owned companies that utilized (“tra‡cked” in U.S. properties nationalized by the Cuban government and to deny U.S. entry visas to executives of such companies. The outcry from the U.S. business and international communities persuaded Clinton to postpone implementation of the first proviso and applied the denial of entry visas to executives and their families on only three occasions. Beginning in 200¡ President George W. Bush continued to avoid implementation of the Helms-Burton law but otherwise announced that he intended to continue the trade embargo and enforce other provisions of the Helms-Burton Law. Most analysts agree that the U.S. embargo has failed. Soviet economic assistance since the late ¡960s and Cuba’s ability to find trading partners and credit sources in the western world contributed to the maintenance of the island’s economy. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in ¡99¡, Fidel Castro implemented several changes that brought a slow economic recovery by the end of the decade. Joint ventures with foreign companies, an emphasis on tourism, a dollarized economy, and the establishment of small (and limited) private Cuban businesses contributed

Treaties to the economic upswing. This is not to say that Cuba has a vibrant economy. Opportunities for improvement are widespread. Within the United States, opposition to the embargo has steadily increased since the mid ¡970s. The business community has led the charge as it has lost potential market share and investment opportunities to foreign competitors. For the same reasons, U.S. agribusiness is not far behind. Interests groups have attacked the embargo’s immorality and questioned the constitutionality of the U.S. government’s denial of its citizen’s the right to travel to Cuba. Congressional opposition grew from a small band of liberal Democrats to include members of the Republican Party by 2002. Despite the clamor, President George W. Bush remains in steadfast opposition to change and, given his preoccupation with the war on terror, there is no indication he will alter his Cuba policy. Ironically, U.S. trade with Cuba has markedly increased. In ¡999, President Clinton opened the door with the announcement that U.S. food and medicines could be sold to Cuba on a cash basis only. At the time, Cuba ranked last among the 228 countries and territories that imported U.S. food and agricultural products. In 200¡, it jumped to ¡44th and in 2002 it jumped to 52nd place according to the U.S.–Cuba Trade Council. See also Agribusiness Exhibition; Bush, George H.W.; Bush, George W.; Carter, Jimmy; Castro, Fidel Ruz; Foreign Policy; Clinton, Bill; Cuban Democracy Act; Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Ford, Gerald; Johnson, Lyndon B.; Kennedy, John F.; Mariel Boat Lift; Nixon, Richard M.; Reagan, Ronald R.

Treaties Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation see Truman, Harry S Treaty of Paris, ¡898 Signed on December ¡0, ¡898, the Treaty of Paris ended the Spanish-American War.

Treaties The treaty provided that Spain relinquish its sovereignty over Cuba and cede the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam to the United States. On May 8, ¡898, eighteen days after the outbreak of the Spanish-American War and seven days after the Spanish fleet at Manila was destroyed by Admiral George Dewey’s flotilla, Britain’s colonial secretary Joseph Chamberlain o›ered to mediate an end to the conflict between the United States and Spain. President William L. McKinley demurred, believing that Spain would have to su›er another disastrous defeat before it would seek peace. McKinley proved correct. That came with the destruction of the Spanish naval unit at Santiago de Cuba on July 3 and the capitulation of the city on July ¡7, ¡898. In the meantime, McKinley upped the American peace demands since the start of the war. The Spanish defeat at Manila prompted McKinley to enunciate his new position. As outlined on June 3, the original war objective remained — Spain was to evacuate Cuba and to hand the island over to the United States. Because Spain bore responsibility for the war, which in turn increased U.S. government expenditures, McKinley now rationalized the need for compensation. Rather than money, McKinley asked that Puerto Rico and an island in the Ladrones (Marianas) be ceded to the United States as compensation. With its military defeat at Santiago de Cuba, Spanish prime minister Práxedes Mateo Sagasta recognized the inevitable U.S. victory and, to avoid humiliation, sought a face-saving way to reach an agreement with the Americans. His foreign minister, the Duke of Almodóvar del Río, persuaded the French government to have its ambassador in Washington, D.C., Jules Cambon, serve as intermediary. Cambon met with McKinley on July 26, the same day that U.S. troops landed in Puerto Rico and General Wesley Merritt assumed command of the projected attack upon Manila. What was left of Spain’s bargaining power had just evaporated. Still, Cambon presented McKinley with a letter from the queen regent that indicated Spain’s desire to keep the

216 negotiations to Cuba only. McKinley had no such interest, repeating his demand for the surrender of Cuba to the United States and identifying Guam as the desired island in the Ladrones. The Philippines presented a new problem. McKinley’s advisors were split on the question of annexing this Pacific archipelago in total or in part. Spain’s second e›ort to confine peace negotiations to Cuba was rebu›ed by McKinley when he again met with Cambon on August 4. At this meeting the president insisted upon the cession of Puerto Rico and added that the fate of the Philippines would be deferred until the actual U.S.–Spanish negotiations took place. McKinley did accept the Spanish suggestion that the negotiations be held in Paris rather than in Washington, D.C. On August 9, ¡898, McKinley proposed the signing of a protocol that encompassed the U.S. peace terms. In the late afternoon of August ¡2, ¡898, McKinley and Cambon signed such a protocol at the White House, o‡cially bringing an end to the Spanish-American War. The protocol allowed for the formal end to hostilities while both sides prepared for the forthcoming peace conference. The Paris peace negotiations commenced October ¡. The five-member U.S. Peace Commission appointed by McKinley was dominated by expansionists — Whitelaw Reid, publisher of the New York Tribune, and Republican senators Cushman K. Davis (Minn.) and William P. Frye (Maine). The Commission’s lone critic of expansionism was Democratic Senator George Gray (Del.). William Day resigned as secretary of state to serve as chair of the commission. His presence ensured that McKinley’s voice was heard. The Spanish commission included leading Liberal politicians — Eugenio Montero Ríos, Buenaventura de Abarzuza y Ferrer, José de Garnica y Díaz, and Wenceslao Ramírez de Villaurrutia y Villaurrutia — and an army representative, General Rafael Cerero y Sáenz. Montero Ríos chaired the commission. Quickly, the United States commissioners rebu›ed the Spanish e›ort to burden the United States with approximately $400 million in Cuban debts. The Americans also re-

217 jected the Spanish e›ort to restore their authority over the Philippines on the grounds that the capitulation of Manila on August ¡3 came one day after the peace protocol had been signed in Washington. During the Paris negotiations, McKinley determined the U.S. position on the Philippines. As a result of a political trip through the midwest, McKinley became convinced that the public supported the annexation of the islands. The Spaniards were startled when Chairman Day revealed McKinley’s decision at the Paris negotiations on October 3¡, ¡898. E›ectively, the United States demanded the dissolution of the Spanish empire. Several weeks of haggling followed, during which the United States o›ered $20 million for the Philippines. With no options remaining, and fearing a possible resumption of war if the U.S. demands were rejected, the Spanish government capitulated. On December ¡0, ¡898, the peace treaty was signed. In addition to ceding Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States, Spain absorbed the $400 million Cuban debt. In return for the Philippines, the United States paid Spain $20 million. A popular war and a generous peace did not guarantee ratification of the Paris treaty by the U.S. Senate, where there were fifty Republicans, thirty-five Democrats, and five Populists. Sixty votes were needed for the necessary two-thirds to ratify the treaty. A great debate ensued in which most attention was focused on the Philippines. Republicans George Frisbie Hoar (Mass.) and Eugene Hale (Maine) immediately declared against the treaty. Democrat George Vest (Mo.) introduced a resolution declaring that the Constitution did not provide for the acquisition of territory to be governed permanently as territories. Outside Congress, Boston businessman Edward Atkins formed the Anti-Imperialist League. It drew support from former president Benjamin Harrison, millionaire Andrew Carnegie, and political commentator Carl Schurz, but it failed to rally mass support. Leading treaty advocates in the Senate included Republicans Henry Cabot Lodge Sr. (Mass.), Mark Hanna

Treaties (Ohio) and Nelson Aldrich (R.I.). The Senate’s Democratic supporter, Arthur Pue (Md.) was joined by former presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan, himself a pacifist. Bryan argued that not to ratif y the treaty meant a resumption of war. Finally, on February 6, ¡899, eleven Democrats joined the Republican majority to help ratify the Treaty of Paris by a vote of fifty-seven to twentyseven, one more vote than the required twothirds of the eighty-four Senators present. The treaty still needed Spanish ratification. The Paris negotiators provided a sixmonth window of opportunity. Prime Minister Sagasta decided to await U.S. Senate ratification before reconvening the Cortes to act on the treaty. When it convened on February 20, ¡899, a stalemate ensued. Personally depressed and without political clout caused by Spain’s loss of empire, Sagasta resigned, and was replaced by political foe Francisco Sillvela. Because the prospect for treaty ratification appeared dim and threatened to reignite warfare after six months, Queen Regent María Cristina intervened. She closed the Cortes on March 6 and invoked the royal prerogative. The queen regent signed the treaty herself on March ¡9, ¡899. The Spanish-American War came to an end on April ¡¡, ¡899, when the two countries exchanged their ratifications of the Treaty of Paris. See also McKinley, William; Spanish-American War

Permanent Treaty of ¡903 Cuba’s economic conditions during the U.S. military occupation were dismal. Suggestions for the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector never materialized, largely because military governor Leonard Wood believed that any credit scheme to assist farmers was nothing more than governmental paternalism. Instead, Wood favored opening markets for Cuba’s primary exports, sugar and tobacco, and that best could be accomplished through a trade reciprocity treaty with the United States. Many Cubans shared Wood’s opinion, and throughout the negotiations over the Platt Amendment, they pushed hard for a trade rec-

Treaties iprocity treaty. Secretary of State Elihu Root and President William McKinley held the same opinion and also saw trade as a way of further binding the Cubans to the United States. With Cuba’s acceptance of the Platt Amendment and with its independence imminent, Wood and Root began a concerted e›ort for a reciprocity treaty. New president Theodore Roosevelt was equally committed to the policy. They faced serious obstacles from U.S. sugar interests and the protectionist policies of the Republican Party. In ¡90¡, Wood orchestrated a campaign to have the General Society of Merchant and Businessmen of Cuba appeal to the U.S. for tari› relief as the only route to economic survival. That November, Wood sent a nine-man Cuban delegation to the United States to lobby congressmen and to deliver tax-relief petitions to Roosevelt. The director of Cuban customs, Tasker Bliss, prepared his ¡90¡ report around the same theme. Edwin F. Atkins, an American and perhaps the largest single owner of Cuban sugar properties, joined them. Still, the U.S. sugar interests, and particularly beet-sugar growers, remained unpersuaded. Legislation for Cuban trade reciprocity was introduced on March ¡9, ¡902, by the House Ways and Means Committee chairman Sereno E. Payne (R., N.Y.). The bill reported favorably out of committee on March 3¡ and provided for a mutual 20 percent tari› reduction. The House passed the Payne Bill on April ¡8, but added an amendment abolishing the existing high tari› on refined sugar. In e›ect, the Payne Bill made the duty the same for raw and refined sugar, a measure directed against the U.S. sugar refiners. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations agreed upon a modified version, but it did not remove the provision on refined sugar. The bill was never reported out of Senate committee because it was known that a su‡cient number of Republican senators would join the Democrats in defeating any reciprocity treaty. The situation became more di‡cult following passage of a resolution sponsored by Senator Henry M. Teller (R.–Colo.) demanding to know the

218 amount of money spent by Wood on behalf of the trade treaty. Wood admitted to spending $¡5,626. Even an appeal for reciprocity by President Roosevelt had no e›ect; Congress adjourned in July without taking any further action. The Roosevelt administration continued to press the issue. It reached an accord on December ¡¡, ¡902, with the new independent Cuban government. The treaty granted Cuban goods a 20 percent tari› reduction in return for reductions of 20 to 40 percent for U.S. goods going into Cuba. Roosevelt submitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification on December ¡7, ¡902, but the Senate refused to consider the treaty before the end of its regular session on March 4, ¡903. Over the next year other factors intervened that favored U.S. acceptance of a reciprocity treaty with Cuba. The European powers ended their subsidies for the continent’s beet-sugar industry, an action that promised to depress sugar prices and open European markets to other sources of supply, including Cuba. In turn, this might lead to other trade opportunities in Cuba for the Europeans. At the same time, the Cubans linked negotiations for U.S. naval stations on the island to trade reciprocity. Possibly more important was the revelation that the American Sugar Refining Company, popularly known as the “sugar trust,” had invested heavily in the beet-sugar growers’ ¡902 campaign against the Cuban treaty, thus solidifying all U.S. sugar interests behind its leadership. Representatives from the a›ected states, mostly in the midwest, found themselves in an embarrassing position of having been “bought.” Given these considerations, the Senate recommended ratification of the Cuban reciprocity treaty with a few modifications and with the proviso that the House also approve the agreement. The Senate’s modifications necessitated reratification by the Cuban government. With that accomplished, Roosevelt resubmitted the treaty to the Senate on November 9, ¡903. The House of Representative overwhelmingly passed the bill on November ¡9, ¡903, and the Senate on December ¡6.

219 Over time the amount of U.S. exports to Cuba did grow, albeit slowly, but the advocates of U.S. continued influence in Cuba had won a bigger victory — long-term U.S. economic influence. See also Guantánamo Naval Base; Roosevelt, Theodore; Sugar; Wood, Leonard

Isle of Pines Treaty An ¡,¡82 square-mile island o› Cuba’s southwest coast in the Caribbean Sea that was renamed the Isle of Youth in ¡976. The island came under Cuban sovereignty in an agreement signed in ¡904 and ratified in ¡925. In ¡898, o‡cials in Washington, D.C. contended that the Isle of Pines was simply another island in the Caribbean archipelago that would serve as a linchpin for U.S. coaling stations throughout the region. The ¡898 Treaty of Paris that ended the Spanish-American War provided only that the United States agreed to study the legal status of the island. The study concluded that the Isle of Pines belonged to Cuba; however, in ¡899 the U.S. Department of the Interior published maps that designated the Isle of Pines as a U.S. possession. Only when American authorities determined that the island’s harbors were not suitable for a naval base did the United States relinquish control over the island to Cuba in the ¡904 Isle of Pines Treaty, also Hay-Quesada Treaty. Owing to the pressure of U.S. citizens residing on the island and having businesses located there, whose investments were estimated at $¡5 million, the U.S. Senate did not ratify the treaty at that time. Over the next generation the U.S. population on the island expanded to approximately ¡0,000 residents. They established U.S.–style communities at Nueva Gerona and Sante Fe, including schools, social clubs, and newspapers. The U.S. residents opposed treaty ratification, fearful of negative consequences if they were placed under Cuban authority. Given U.S. government intransigence, at di›erent times in the early ¡900s the American islanders plotted revolts to oust the nominal Cuban authorities and then seek annexation to the United States. Nothing mate-

Treaties rialized until ¡922, when President Warren G. Harding took up the issue with the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Henry Cabot Lodge Sr. Harding strongly encouraged Lodge to bring the treaty up for ratification. Subsequently, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes helped to steer the treaty through the Senate, which finally ratified the Isle of Pines Treaty on March ¡3, ¡925. Within a decade most Americans deserted the island, and it served little purpose to Cuba until ¡976 when it was renamed the Isle of Youth and became home to schools for training students from Third World countries and to an air force base on its southern shore.

Treaty of ¡934 The U.S.–Cuba Treaty of ¡934 replaced the Permanent Treaty of ¡903. The treaty was signed in Washington, D.C. on May 29, ¡934. It was ratified by the U.S. Senate on May 29, ¡934, and by the Cuban government on June 4, ¡934, and went into e›ect five days later, June 9, ¡934. The treaty resulted from simultaneous converging influences within Cuba and the United States beginning in the ¡930s. In Cuba, a new generation comprised largely of university students became increasingly nationalistic and demanded the termination of the ¡903 Platt Amendment. Cuban nationalism reached a high-water mark in ¡933 during the provisional presidency of Ramón Grau San Martín, who unilaterally declared the abrogation of the Platt Amendment. During the same period, the U.S. State Department reassessed policy in the circum–Caribbean region. The reassessment led to the announcement of the Good Neighbor policy by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in ¡933. Under these conditions, U.S. and Cuban negotiators completed a new treaty in ¡934. The treaty stated: Article ¡: The Treaty of Relations concluded … on May 22, ¡903, shall cease to be in force, and is abrogated. Article 2: All the acts e›ected in Cuba by the United States of America during its military occupation of the island, up to May ¡902, the date upon which the Republic of Cuba

Truman was established, have been ratified and held as valid; and all the rights legally acquired by virtue of those acts shall be maintained and protected. Article 3: Until the two contracting parties agree to the modification or abrogation of the stipulations of the [¡903] agreement in regard to the lease to the United States of lands in Cuba for coaling and naval stations … [and] with regard to the naval station of Guantánamo Bay shall continue in e›ect. See also Good Neighbor policy; Grau San Martín, Ramón; Machado y Morales, Gerardo; Platt Amendment; Welles, Benjamin Sumner

Truman, Harry S (¡884–¡972) Truman served as a senator from Missouri from ¡935 to ¡945 prior to his selection as Franklin D. Roosevelt’s vice-presidential running mate in the ¡944 election. He served briefly in that capacity prior to becoming the 32nd President of the United States following Roosevelt’s death on April ¡2, ¡945. The basis for the Truman administration’s early Cuba policy predated his presidency, and as the Cold War dawned in ¡947, it came to reflect the U.S. concern with international communism. As World War II drew to an end the United States War Department anticipated future hemispheric defense needs. This planning a›ected Cuba in two ways. First, the United States wanted to retain control over and use of the two air bases built on Cuban soil during the war: San Julián and San Antonio de los Bános (Batista Field). President Ramón Grau San Martín refused, and in accordance with the ¡942 treaty provisions, both facilities reverted to Cuba on May 20, ¡946. The U.S. War Department also sought to integrate the Latin American militaries into its hemispheric defense plans and toward that end conducted bilateral sta› conversations in ¡945. As a result of these meetings, the War Department recommended the modernization of the Cuban air force and army and, to achieve these

220 objectives, the establishment of a permanent U.S. military mission in Havana to conduct the training of Cuban forces. President Grau San Martín, however, could not be persuaded to accept a permanent mission but, instead, was interested in acquiring new military matériel. The State Department and the U.S. Congress were reluctant to provide the latter until Cuba met its $2.3 million Lend-Lease repayment obligation. When a payment was finally made in February ¡947, Cuba purchased some $¡3.8 million worth of military equipment for $3¡6,4¡5 under the terms of the ¡944 Surplus Property Act. Among the purchases were five B-25 bomber planes, three patrol frigates, five submarine chasers, and a variety of arms and cartridges that augmented the capacity of the Cuban army. President Carlos Prío Socarrás continued Grau San Martín’s policy of distancing the Cuban military from that of the United States until ¡950, when the president of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo, received congressional authorization to declare war on any country harboring or assisting groups plotting his overthrow. Cuba served as a base for Dominican revolutionaries. Trujillo’s threat prompted President Prío to look to the United States for assistance. The Truman administration was receptive, believing that closer military cooperation with regional nations lessened the possibility of conflict. U.S.–Cuban military conversations in late ¡950 resulted in two agreements that established U.S. ground and naval missions in Cuba and Cuba’s subsequent acquisition of U.S. military and naval equipment. In return, the Prío administration supported U.S. Cold War policies at the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Truman’s economic policy toward Cuba can be traced to ¡943 when U.S. policymakers argued that the privileged treatment given to Cuban sugar by the United States militated against the broader free-trade policies to be pursued at the end of World War II and that these policies called for the termination of the preferential tari› and quota granted to Cuban sugar under existing trade reciprocity agree-

221 ments. Because the policymakers understood the adverse impact that the policy change would have upon Cuba, the United States would assist with the industrialization and agricultural diversification of the Cuban economy through the infusion of private capital. Still, these policymakers remained confident that the United States would continue as the primary source of Cuba’s imports after the war. To achieve its objectives, the Truman administration pursued the completion of a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation that would establish the rights of U.S. and Cuban citizens who wanted to do business in the other country. The goal was to guarantee a suitable climate in Cuba for U.S. private business by ensuring against arbitrary expropriations and for compensation for any expropriated businesses restraints on discriminatory trade practices and the right of foreign companies to use alien personnel in the management of businesses. Cuban presidents Ramón Grau San Martín (¡944–¡948) and Carlos Prío (¡948–¡952) rejected the U.S. o›er. The failure of the Truman administration to complete such a treaty was attributed to the policies pursued by Grau San Martín and Prío with regard to labor and sugar. Grau San Martín came to the Cuban presidency in ¡944 committed to complete the reforms of his four-month administration in ¡933. For Cuban workers, Grau San Martíns program included continued wage increases, greater job security through protective measures against job lay-o›s or dismissal, and requiring that 50 percent the workforce at any given operation be Cuban. The government settled disputes with U.S.–owned industries on behalf of the Cuban workers. Although Cuban entrepreneurs railed against Grau San Martín’s labor program, at the same time and to the chagrin of U.S. o‡cials they advocated tari› protection as a means to stimulate Cuban industrial development. In addition, the Grau San Martín administration granted Cuban sugar growers preferential treatment in the allotment of sugar for export for two years after World War II, at a time when the world, in-

Truman cluding the United States, remained dependent upon the Cuban sugar crop. In fact, between ¡944 and ¡947, Cuba supplied the United States with 44.6 percent of the sugar it consumed. Given the high demand and concomitant profit, neither the Cuban government nor the sugar growers saw a need to engage in agricultural diversification and, in fact, used the world shortage to extract favorable contracts from the United States for the purchase of its ¡946 and ¡947 sugar crop. Grau San Martín managed to gain the support of Cuban sugar growers and workers and urban labor at the expense of economic development. The United States used the ¡948 Sugar Act as a tool to curb Grau San Martín’s nationalistic policies and prod him toward accepting the proposed Treaty of Friendship. While the new law continued to guarantee Cuba 28.6 percent share of U.S. sugar market, it contained a provision, written by the State Department, that empowered the secretary of agriculture to reduce the assignments of Philippine Islands sugar deficit to countries discriminating against U.S. economic interests. Clearly the proviso was directed at Cuba, and the Cubans knew it. At the same time, the United States also increased the sugar quotas for the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, two of Cuba’s competitors in the U.S. market. It was to no avail. Grau San Martín left the presidency in October ¡948 without considering the Treaty of Friendship. Prío, who served as Secretary of Labor under Grau continued his mentor’s labor policies and, as a result, he more than Grau, became closely linked to the Communist-led Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC) labor union. Throughout the Truman administration, the United States became increasingly wary of the influence the CTC had on Cuban politics, but the administration failed in its e›orts to pressure Prío to curb his labor policies. Prío’s presidency coincided with the recovery of the production of beet and cane sugar in Europe and Asia and its entry into the world market. Not only did world sugar prices decline but the U.S. domestic sugar industry also demanded greater protection from for-

26th of July Movement eign competition. Under these conditions Prío sought to have the United States increase the Cuban sugar quota, particularly at the expense of the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. He was unsuccessful in doing so. Frustrated at the Cuban refusal to accept a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, the Truman administration did not fret when Fulgencio Batista engineered Prío’s ouster in a ¡952 coup d’etat. See also Coup d’état; Grau San Martín, Ramón; Prio Socarrás, Carlos

26th of July Movement The 26th of July Movement (Movimiento de 26 Julio) the name given to Fidel Castro’s revolutionary cause, adopted from the date of his ill-fated ¡953 attack on the Moncada barracks in Santiago de Cuba. Following his release from prison in ¡955, Castro traveled to the United States and to Mexico seeking financial support for his cause. Castro and his followers returned to Cuba in December ¡958 hoping to ignite an islandwide insurrection against dictator Fulgencio Batista. The invasion failed, but Castro escaped to the Sierra Maestre, where his movement grew in size, strength, and prestige. A general strike organized by the movement’s urban underground failed in April ¡959, but it demonstrated the movement’s organizational strengths. Following the success of the Revolution, the movement merged with the Directorio Revolucionario and Partido Socialista Popular into the Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas, which became Castro’s ruling party and the forerunner of a new Partido Comunista de Cuba. See also Castro Ruz, Fidel; Revolution

United States Interventions: ¡906–¡920 The U.S. military occupation of Cuba ended on May 20, ¡902, when General Leonard Wood and his forces withdrew from the island and Tomás Estrada Palma was inaugurated Cuba’s first president. Because Estrada Palma represented Cuba’s “better classes,”

222 American advocates of Cuban annexation saw him as the first step in that direction. At first Estrada Palma provided a degree of political and financial stability, but he soon appointed friends and supporters to government posts at all levels, including local electoral boards. In ¡905, Estrada Palma’s announcement that he intended to seek a second term prompted the Liberal Party, headed by General José Miguel Gómez, to rise in protest. Gómez and the Liberals represented workers, peasants, and former soldiers, all of whom gained little or nothing as a result of Cuban independence. In addition to charging Estrada Palma with political cronyism and pilfering the national treasury, Gómez anticipated electoral fraud. Gómez’s withdrawal from the election only ensured Estrada Palma’s victory, and Gómez called for a revolution to correct the process. As would happen again over the next thirty years, both sides looked to the United States to protect their interests under the terms of the Platt Amendment. By ¡906, however, the U.S. public mood had moved away from unquestioned support of foreign adventurism, and President Theodore Roosevelt understood this. Reluctant to intervene, Roosevelt first exhorted the Cuban government to work for peace with the insurgents and to protect foreign properties, particularly American properties. Unable to persuade the adversaries to do so, in September ¡906 Roosevelt dispatched Secretary of War William Howard Taft and Assistant Secretary of State Robert Bacon to Cuba to mediate a settlement. Their proposals Estrada Palma remain in the presidency and for a new congressional elections were grudgingly accepted by the Liberals but rejected by Estrada Palma, who resigned the presidency. His resignation left a vacuum that could only be filled by U.S. intervention. The intervention began on September 28, ¡906, when Taft ordered a contingent of U.S. Marines to disembark at Havana. Although Roosevelt intended for the occupation to be of short duration, ending with unfettered elections, the United States remained for three years, during which Charles Magoon

223 served as provisional governor. While the Cuban flag continued to fly over all government buildings at Roosevelt’s insistence, Magoon was granted wide discretionary powers regarding appointments and other sinecures. At Washington’s insistence, Magoon oversaw public works projects that often were tainted with graft and resulted in shoddy products. Magoon’s most notable e›ort dealt with the overhaul of Cuba’s entire civil code, which consisted of a conglomeration of Spanish laws and those imposed by General Leonard Wood. An Advisory Law Commission, headed by Enoch Crowder, recommended changes in taxation and accounting procedures to improve local and provincial governments, development of a civil service law, and the establishment of executive departments (justice, state, treasury, etc.). The Advisory Commission also developed an electoral code designed to ensure free elections. Magoon, however, lacked Wood’s authoritative abilities. He often succumbed to Cuban pressure and only requested that the changes put forth by the Advisory Commission be implemented. Magoon also attempted to develop political parties but was frustrated by personalismo that characterized Cuban political arena. As directed by Roosevelt, on January 28, ¡909 Magoon’s provisional government ended and president-elect Máximo Gómez our assumed o‡ce. In the decade after ¡909 the U.S. used the threat of intervention to achieve its political objectives in Cuba. In ¡9¡2, as the Gómez administration drew to a close it was confronted with an armed uprising by AfroCubans, mostly veterans of the War for Independence. Their Partido Independiente de Color, sought greater representation in government posts through the dismissal of those persons not loyal to the Cuban independence cause and their replacement by war veterans. The party also sought an end to other forms of racial discrimination, improved working conditions, and a free university education. Unable to achieve their objectives in the political arena, in May ¡9¡2 the party took to armed rebellion. In suppressing the rebel-

United States Interventions lion, President Gómez directed a brutal campaign against the rebels. When the latter threatened to destroy foreign property (i.e., American), the U.S. government dispatched naval ships to Havana and Nipe Bay and 500 marines to Guantánamo Bay to prepare for the protection of U.S. lives and property. Although Gómez described these as acts of intervention, he agreed to cooperate with U.S. forces should they be needed, but they were not. The revolt collapsed in June ¡9¡2. The second threatened intervention came in ¡9¡7 when incumbent President Mario Garcia Menocal resorted to electoral fraud to continue his presidency. Owing to its entrance into World War I, the United States had little time to devote to Cuban politics. When the disgruntled Liberals again took up arms in February ¡9¡7, the United States sought to mediate an end to the fighting and the electoral issues that caused it, but Menocal rejected the o›er. Preoccupied with the war in Europe, the United States reluctantly took to supporting Cuba’s “constitutional government.” Menocal received arms and munitions, but U.S. naval commanders ensured that the port at Santiago de Cuba remained open. Also, marines were sent to eastern Cuba to protect U.S. sugar growers in the region. The Liberals threat to attack foreign property (i.e., American) again brought threats of U.S. military intervention. Nothing materialized as the revolt fizzled following government military victories in March and April ¡9¡7. The incident, however, again reminded U.S. policymakers of the need to address the volatility of Cuban politics. Toward that objective, and justifying its action upon the terms of the Platt Amendment, the Wilson administration dispatched Enoch Crowder to Cuba in March ¡9¡9 to revise the electoral code and prepare the island for the ¡920 presidential election. Proclaimed in August ¡9¡9, the revised electoral code established rules and procedures designed to ensure political honesty and prevent fraud and to mold a two-party system as in the United States. The U.S. hope to bring political sta-

United States Interventions bility to Cuba by diplomacy was foredoomed. The Liberals again turned to General José Miguel Gómez, while Menocal and his colleagues formed the Popular Alliance and selected Alfredo Zayas as its candidate. Determined to continue Conservative rule, Menocal defied Crowder’s work by stripping provincial and municipal o‡cials of their electoral powers and appointing military supervisors to polling stations. Frustrated by Menocal’s actions, the Liberals, in the early fall of ¡920, sanctioned disturbances in Camagüey Province that appeared to threaten American residents and their property. Menocal quickly informed the U.S. legation in Havana that U.S. troops would be welcomed, but President Wilson was unwilling to oblige unless the Cuban president admitted to his inability to protect life, liberty, and property as spelled out in the Platt Amendment. Menocal refused. To do so would be an admission of weakness and encourage the Liberals to be more assertive. For his part, Gómez threatened to withdraw the Liberals from participating in the November ¡ elections. He demurred only when informed that the United States would not look favorably upon such a course of action. The election went o› as scheduled. Early election results indicated that Menocal’s Conservative Party had won in all the provinces save Havana, but reports of fraud, intimidation, and trickery resulted in the disenfranchisement of many Liberals. Alfredo Zayas was elected president. At the same time, the Cuban economy went into a serious tailspin as a result of losses in the world sugar market. Given the potential for chaos, President Wilson, in early January ¡92¡, dispatched Enoch Crowder on yet another mission to Cuba to address that nation’s political and economic calamities. Crowder first addressed the charges of political corruption. At his insistence, January and February ¡92¡, the Cuban courts and Electoral Board addressed the issues of voter abuse and in most instances ruled on behalf of the Zayistas. Crowder also visited the provinces of Matanzas, Santa Clara, and Camagüey

224 to be sure that competent o‡cials were in place for new elections scheduled for late March ¡920. By this time, however, it became clear that these elections would not a›ect the outcome of the general election. Discouraged, Gómez and the Liberals used minor disturbances, which they apparently instigated themselves, to withdraw from the elections. As expected the previous November, Alfredo Zayas became Cuba’s new president. The threat of political violence was exacerbated by the sharp decrease in sugar prices at the end of World War I when European beet-sugar production increased. Loss of the European market share translated into a sharp income decline for Cuban sugar growers. In turn, this meant that they could not meet their ¡9¡9 bank loan obligations, which had been written based upon the higher wartime prices. Under the expanded interpretation of “preventive diplomacy,” Crowder sought to address the problem. Working with Menocal, Crowder arranged for the reopening of closed banks and the liquidation of insolvent institutions. He also directed the establishment of the Sugar Finance Commission to serve as a sales broker for the entire ¡920 sugar harvest. As a result, Cuba immediately benefited as sugar prices rose to 5 cents per pound. The increased funds enabled sugar growers to meet their loan obligations, which in turn enabled several Cuban banks to remain solvent. At the same time, U.S. consumers protested the higher prices for refined sugar. For the moment, U.S. diplomacy brought a sense of political tranquility and economic stabilization to Cuba. Crowder remained in Cuba as a special emissary of Republican president Warren G. Harding and in ¡923 was named ambassador. The U.S. interventions, no matter the intention or the form, served to stir Cuban nationalism and fuel the anti–American sentiment that became an issue in the late ¡920s. See also Crowder, Enoch; Estrada Palma, Tomás; Gómez, José Miguel; Magoon, Charles; Platt Amendment; TaftBacon Mission

225

United States Military Occupation of Cuba ¡899–¡902 On January ¡, ¡899, General John R. Brooke arrived in Havana, Cuba, to serve as chief administrator over the island. However, he arrived without clear policy directives from Washington, although most analysts believed that annexation of Cuba was inevitable despite the Teller Amendment to the contrary. Brooke also had to confront an island devastated by war. Rural villages and plantations lay in ruins, and the national infrastructure was torn apart. In addition, many Cubans mistrusted U.S. intentions. Without specific instructions from Washington, Brooke set about his task of establishing a dual structure of government: one military and the other civil. On January ¡¡ and ¡2, ¡898, Brooke mandated the creation of four departments: Justice and Instruction; Agriculture, Commerce, Industries, and Public Works; Finance; and State and Government. The administrative heads of these departments served as an advisory board to Brooke, and they soon became known as the Cuban cabinet. Subsequently, provincial and municipal governments were put in place. All authority, including local appointments, emanated from the military governor. Outside the civil government, and superior to it, was the military command system as outlined in the Military Division of Cuba created by the War Department on December ¡3, ¡898. General Brooke was commanding o‡cer of this unit as well as military governor of Cuba. Originally, the Military Division consisted of seven departments, one for each of Cuba’s provinces and the city of Havana. Reorganizations in ¡899 combined the six outlying provinces into three units plus Havana. Through the middle of ¡899, each department commander confronted and solved problems relating to food distribution, treatment of disease, and rehabilitation of government buildings within his assigned territory. In addition, several other agencies oper-

United States Occupation ated within Cuba. Among the most important were the Customs Service, headed throughout the occupation by General Tasker H. Bliss and sta›ed with U.S. Army o‡cers and Cuban and American civilians; the Postal Service, supervised by the U.S. Postmaster General; the Treasurer, led by a U.S. Army o‡cer with the North American Trust Company of New York serving as its fiscal agency; the Quarantine Service, run by the U.S. Marine Hospital Service; and the telegraph and telephone service, supervised by the U.S. Army Signal Corps. Brooke faced two significant administrative problems. First was the demobilization of the Cuban insurgent army headed by General Maximo Gómez, who demanded that his troops be paid before disbanding. The United States o›ered a total of $3 million to be divided among the insurgents, a sum Gómez thought was too little but recognized as the best that could be obtained. Between May 27 and August 29, ¡899, U.S. Army o‡cers scattered across Cuba to pay $75 to each insurgent soldier listed on the army rolls. More important was the rebellion among Brooke’s district commanders. As the summer of ¡899 progressed, Generals William Ludlow and Leonard Wood became increasingly convinced that the United States needed to maintain a presence in Cuba because the Cubans were incapable of self-government. Brooke opposed the idea. The tension intensified when Brooke ordered that all customs revenues be distributed according to need rather than letting each departmental commander have free rein over funds collected within his district. In addition, General James H. Wilson became a critic of Brooke when Brooke rejected Wilson’s plan for a loan program to small farmers. The generals found supporters in Washington, including members of the McKinley administration, which by October ¡899 concluded that the United States needed to pursue a more aggressive Cuban policy. The Americans also feared a Cuban insurgency similar to that in the Philippine Islands. Given these considerations, new secretary of war Elihu Root determined the need to pursue a

United States Occupation more aggressive policy in Cuba, and to do so he needed to replace Brooke. On December ¡3, ¡899, the War Department assigned General Wood to command the Military Division of Cuba. As military governor Wood continued Brooke’s public works program: building roads, dredging harbors, stringing telephone and telegraph lines, paving streets, and installing potable water systems and sewerage systems. The latter two e›orts did not solve the problem of tropical diseases, particularly yellow fever. In ¡90¡ a Yellow Fever Commission, under the auspices of the Surgeon General of the U.S. Army, came to Cuba. Headed by Major Walter Reed, the force included American and Cuban doctors, notably Carlos Finley. Finley’s theory that yellow fever was transmitted by a type of mosquito common to the area and that it could be limited by taking proper precautions proved correct. Wood provided generous support to treat the problem. Wood also introduced other significant reforms based on the belief that American values could be imposed on the legacy of Spanish customs and institutions. Wood viewed many of these e›orts as an attempt to “Americanize” the island’s population so that it would not only be better fit for self-government but also as a route for the eventual annexation of the island to the United States. He first emphasized education, which was modeled after that of the U.S. system. Texts and teacher training methods were imported from the mainland. By the end of ¡90¡ nearly all Cuban children were enrolled in school. A private contract with Harvard University was designed to train Cuban teachers at that institution, but once occupation ended the Cuban government canceled the contract. Next Wood gave priority to reforming the judiciary which was mired in ine‡ciency and corruption. In addition to overhauling the court system, Wood accomplished penal and police reform and a legal defense for the destitute. However, vested Cuban interests and traditions successfully resisted the e›ort to introduce a U.S.–based legal system, including

226 the introduction of the jury system and the writ of habeas corpus. Wood’s frustration caused by these failures contributed to his continuing belief in the legacies of the Spanish system and the inadequacies of the Cuban people. Wood also overhauled the system of municipal government. He sought to mirror the U.S. government form by making the municipalities more independent from the central government. He reduced the number of municipal governments from ¡38 to 56 but lost the battle to wean them from reliance upon the central government for revenues. When the U.S. occupation ended in ¡902, the issue remained unresolved. In ¡90¡ Wood reached a settlement over church-state relations. During the colonial period the Spanish government had gained control over large amounts of church-owned property and had taken over many mortgages that the church held. The church pursued legal methods to regain its property. The settlement returned much of the church property and gave the right to the future government of Cuba to buy the properties for $2 million. The military government also bought up $¡ million worth of the church’s rental property at half price, in turn selling them for the same amount to small farmers. The need for rail transportation was most glaring, but the limitations placed upon foreign concessions by the Foraker Amendment stood as an obstacle to their development. Wood found a way around this by the issuance of revocable permits but with the implied promise that the new Cuban government would make them permanent. With the right to exercise eminent domain, Wood ensured that lands would become available for railroads. U.S. o‡cials agreed to this scheme, thus opening the door to Canadian railroad magnate William Van Horne to put together a conglomerate that included prominent U.S. businessmen — James J. Hill, G. W. Dodge, Thomas F. Ryan, and Levi P. Morton — to form the Cuban Company, which initiated a massive railroad construction project on the island.

227 In the year following Wood’s appointment as military governor of Cuba, he and other U.S. policymakers reached the conclusion that the Cubans were unprepared for independence. The legacies of Spanish colonization — centralized government and lack of local participation — were most apparent. The mass of Cubans were nonwhite and not educated. The more the Americans intermingled with this group, the more they became convinced of the Cubans’ inability to succeed at self-government. To surmount the problem, U.S. authorities became more intent upon imposing U.S.–style institutions and using the Cuban upper classes — the Creole and peninsulare— to fill government posts at the national, municipal, and local levels. The U.S. objective was to create a Cuban government that someday would ask for annexation to the United States. At the end of ¡899, the War Department concluded that eight out of ten Cuban government o‡cials supported U.S. policy. The most important Cuban opponents to U.S. policy were former insurgent leaders, who were committed to independence and who now felt betrayed. The next step toward self-government came with the June ¡900 municipal elections. Opposed to universal su›rage, the U.S. military authorities announced su›rage requirements that restricted voting to approximately 5 percent of the total population. Only males, twenty years or older who were deemed to be Cuban citizens by the current census received the right to vote in the municipality if they had resided for at least thirty days prior to voter registration and were free of felony conviction. Furthermore, voters had to be literate, own real or personal property worth at least $250, or have completed honorable service in the Liberation Army prior to July ¡8, ¡898. The su›rage requirements produced a nationalistic reaction among the Cubans. Although most of the candidates were favored by General Leonard Wood and other U.S. authorities, the Cuban Nationalist party, which included the independentistas, made an impressive showing. Wood next prepared the Cubans for the election of a constituent as-

United States Occupation sembly in September ¡900. During this campaign, he actively worked on behalf of the U.S.–preferred candidates. It was to no avail. Only 30 percent of the eligible voters participated, and Cuban nationalists — not the “better classes”— were victorious. U.S. policymakers expressed their disappointment. The Constituent Assembly commenced its work in November ¡900 and completed its task in January ¡90¡. Its first task — the framework of government — caused little controversy, as U.S. styled institutions appeared most satisfactory. On the second issue, U.S.— Cuban relations, the convention remained silent, but the McKinley administration did not. Knowing that the military occupation could not go on indefinitely, restricted by the Teller Amendment from annexing Cuba, and lacking any confidence in the emerging Cuban leadership, the McKinley administration had to devise a method that would accomplish continued U.S. presence in Cuba. Secretary of War Elihu Root explained the U.S. objectives as the right to intervene to preserve the Cuban government and ensure its stability and the protection of life, property, and individual liberty. Furthermore, Cuba would not be allowed to grant special privileges to a foreign government without U.S. approval. Root also expected Cuba to cede several sites to the United States for the establishment of naval bases. E›ectively, Cuba would receive its independence, but the United States would control over its national system. Root’s ideas became the basis of the Platt Amendment as proposed by Senator Orville H. Platt and attached to the ¡90¡ army appropriations bill. While the U.S. Congress and administration endorsed the amendment, the Cubans did not. The Platt Amendment suggested replacing one overseer (Spain) for another (the United States). The Cubans recognized, however, that rejection of the Platt Amendment meant indefinite U.S. military presence on the island. Therefore, the Cubans reluctantly accepted the amendment as an annex to their Constitution. Having accomplished its objectives, the United States ended its military occupation on May 20, ¡902,

Urrutia Lleó when Tomás Estrada Palma assumed the presidency of an independent Cuba but with the guarantee of long-term United States influence over it. See also Brooke, John R.; Foraker, Joseph B.; Platt Amendment; Root, Elihu; Teller Amendment; Wood, Leonard

United States War Resolutions see SpanishAmerican War: United States War Resolutions

Urrutia Lleó, Manuel (¡90¡–¡98¡) Urrutia was selected by the Caracas Pact (¡958) to become provisional president of Cuba following the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista. A native of Yaguajay, Urrutia graduated from law school in ¡923 and subsequently became a respected judge in Santiago de Cuba. He presided over the ¡953 trial of a group of Fidel Castro’s supporters who had taken part in the ¡953 raid on Moncada barracks and acquitted them. As provisional president, Urrutia implemented the revolutionary agenda, including the tearing down of government institutions, restricting civil liberties, and imposing martial law. Still, the U.S. embassy sta› in Havana considered him a moderate who favored a mixed economy and regulated capitalism, modest land distribution, private enterprise in the agricultural sector, and encouragement of U.S. public and private capital. By the spring of ¡959, however, Urrutia began to question the revolution’s direction. He was perturbed by Castro’s refusal to seek economic assistance while visiting the United States in April ¡959 and thought the May ¡959 Agrarian Reform Law too radical. Urrutia also became concerned with Castro’s drift toward communism During a July ¡7, ¡959, national television address, Castro accused Urrutia of being an obstructionist to the revolution and of fabricating charges of communist infiltration into government. Castro dismissed Urrutia from government and placed him

228 under house arrest, from which Urrutia escaped for asylum in the Venezuelan embassy. He remained there for two years before being allowed to leave Cuba. Urrutia moved to New York City, where subsequently taught at Queen’s College. See also Caracas Pact; Castro Ruz, Fidel; Revolution: United States Presidential Administrations and the Revolution

Valladares, Armando (¡937– ) President George H.W. Bush appointed Valladares the U.S. representative to the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHR) (¡986–¡990). Valladares used the position as a platform to speak against the adverse human rights conditions in Cuba. In ¡96¡, while working in the revolutionary government’s Ministry of Communications, Valladares was charged with counterrevolutionary activities. Although he denied the charges, Valladares was sentenced to thirty years in prison. Valladares drew international attention while in prison, prompting Amnesty International to classify him a prisoner of conscience and French president François Mitterand to lobby Fidel Castro to release Valladares. Finally freed in ¡98¡, his account of Cuban prison life, Against All Hope earned international praise. Following his service on the UNHR, Valladares founded the Paris-based International Resistance to fight human rights violations worldwide.

Vance, Cyrus (¡9¡7– ) Vance served as secretary of state (¡977– ¡980) during the Carter administration. A native of West Virginia, he served as secretary of the Army in ¡962, as deputy secretary of defense in ¡964, and as a special representative of President Lyndon B. Johnson in dealing with world trouble spots. As secretary of state, Vance was suspicious of grand theories of strategy and geopolitics. This was in sharp contrast to the view held by National Security

229 Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Given these diverse perspectives, the two clashed over policy regarding Cuba. Vance wanted dialog with Cuba over a range of issues. He also favored lifting the embargo on Cuban trade. He believed that African nationalism would triumph over any Soviet-Cuban e›ort on the continent and, thus, that the United States need not get involved. He refuted Brzezinski’s assertion that the Soviet brigade in Cuba in ¡979 was part of a larger scheme to intimidate the United States. In time, however, Brzezinski won President Carter’s ear. Vance resigned as secretary in April ¡980 in a principled argument with the president over rescuing U.S. hostages in Iran. He interrupted his law practice in the ¡990s when called upon by the United Nations to assist with bringing about a settlement of the crisis in Yugoslavia. See also Africa: Cuba’s Military Involvement; Brzezinski, Zbigniew; Carter, Jimmy; Soviet Union: Soviet Brigade; Trade Embargo

Vatican Peace E›ort, ¡898 In early ¡898 Pope Leo XIII made and e›ort to prevent a U.S.–Spanish War in Cuba. Historically, the Vatican had close ties with Madrid, and in ¡898 those ties were tightened by Pope Leo XIII who had protective feelings for the young and widowed queen regent, Maria Cristina of Austria, and the fact that he was godfather to her son. The pope also feared that a war over Cuba might topple the monarchy. In February ¡898 Otto Von Bismarck, the ex-chancellor of Germany, made the first recommendation for papal mediation in the Cuban crisis, but it was quickly dismissed by the Sagasta government in Madrid, which charged that Spain would never arbitrate the future of Cuba. A month later, following Spain’s failed e›ort to gain European support to challenge the U.S. report on the sinking of the Maine, the Vatican secretary of state, Cardinal Mariano Rampolla del Tinadarro, suggested Spain accept the pope as arbiter of the dispute. Spain’s minister of state Pío Gullón y

Vatican Peace E›ort Igelesias favored the proposal. At the same time Pope Leo XIII reached out to Archbishop John Ireland, stationed in St. Paul, Minnesota, to approach President William McKinley. Ireland, a long-time Republican and McKinley friend, met with the president on April ¡ and subsequently with several congressmen in Washington, D.C. Although McKinley was not encouraging to the pope’s mediation o›er, Ireland cabled Rampolla that McKinley wanted help in obtaining peace. Ireland’s misinformation was passed on to the government at Madrid, which in turn indicated its willingness to suspend hostilities if the United States, accepted the pope’s mediation and withdrew its ships from Cuban waters. Unaware of events in Washington, D.C., the U.S. minister in Madrid, Steward I. Woodford, recommended that McKinley accept the o›er. When it became public that McKinley never asked Ireland for assistance, U.S.–Spanish relations further deteriorated. Meanwhile, Ireland continued to urge congressmen to support McKinley’s peace e›orts and eventually convinced Spain’s minister in Washington, José Luis Polo de Bernabé, to encourage Madrid’s acceptance of the pope as arbiter. On April 4, ¡898, Senator Stephen B. Elkins (R.–W.Va.) informed McKinley about Polo’s message, but the president dismissed the idea, believing that it came too late to influence the Spanish government. Several hours later that same day McKinley remained unimpressed when he learned that the pope did ask Madrid to grant an armistice. McKinley did not think that the Cuban insurgents would cooperate. Senator Elkins, however, threatened the Cuban Junta to accept an armistice or otherwise face possible U.S. annexation should a Spanish-American war result from the failed diplomacy. At the same time, the Sagasta ministry in Spain, urged by the queen regent, appeared willing to suspend hostilities in Cuba. On April 5, peace seemed possible. Two days later, it did not. On April 7, Sagasta’s cabinet conditionally agreed to arbitration, but its conditions doomed the o›er. First, the United States had to accept mediation, withdraw its ships from

Virginius A›air Cuban waters, and give assurance that the insurgents would accept suspension of hostilities. McKinley did not budge. That same day the Cuban Junta informed McKinley that if he wanted its cooperation, the president needed first to recognize Cuba’s independence. Undeterred, the papal nuncio in Madrid, Giuseppe Francisca Nava de Bontifé, persuaded the European diplomats to approach Sagasta on April ¡0. Although they did not promise their government’s support of Spanish interests, the diplomats encouraged Sagasta to bring an end to hostilities on the island. In turn, Sagasta convinced his cabinet, and later that day Spain announced a unilateral cessation of hostilities. In so doing, Spain hoped that McKinley would contain the U.S. Congress and persuade the insurgents to stop fighting. Again, the insurgents refused, and under pressure from all sides and out of patience, on April ¡¡ McKinley delivered his war message on Cuba to Congress. See also McKinley, William; Spanish-American War: Sinking of the Maine; United States War Resolutions

Virginius A›air On October 3¡, ¡873, the Spanish warship Toronado seized the U.S. packet Virginius in international waters and took it to Santiago de Cuba. The Virginius was carrying arms, supplies, and several eminent Cuban revolutionaries, including Pedro Céspedes, son of a rebel general. At Santiago de Cuba, the ship’s captain, Joseph Fry, 36 of his 5¡ crew members and ¡6 of the ¡03 passengers were summarily tried as “pirates,” convicted, and executed. Only a threat to level the city by Captain Lambton Lorraine of the British man-of-war Niobe saved the remaining crew and passengers from the Spanish firing squad. The Virginius had a dubious history. Built as a Confederate gunrunner during the U.S. Civil War, it was sold to a private firm in ¡870 and, in turn, was “chartered” by the New York–based Cuban Junta. Subsequently, the Virginius earned a reputation for transporting arms to the Cuban insurgents, and it did so

230 while carrying U.S. papers and flying the American flag. The ¡873 incident evoked an immediate public and congressional outcry for war against Spain. and caused the Grant administration to discuss the implementation of war plans. Furthermore, Secretary of State Hamilton Fish argued that the incident revealed Spain’s inability to control its military and civilian o‡cials in Cuba, and, therefore, it should withdraw to let the Americans settle the matter. Fish also recognized that the United States was unprepared for war, a fact that prompted him to focus on the human rights violations that led to the executions rather than on the legal status of the Virginius. Initially, Fish demanded that Spain restore the Virginius to its U.S. owners, release the remaining prisoners to U.S. custody, deliver a salute to the American flag in Santiago, and punish those o‡cers responsible for the crimes. Fish softened his stance, however, once he learned the ship’s true ownership, the Cuban Junta. Spain also took a hard line. It contended that the taking of the Virginius was justifiable because a reasonable suspicion existed that, given the ship’s history, it was carrying arms to the Cuban rebels. True, the executions were unfortunate, but they were not ordered by the government in Madrid. Until the Spanish government completed its investigation into the legal status of the Virginius, it would take no action to placate the Americans. The Spanish reply caused U.S. o‡cials to conclude that the Madrid government would indefinitely delay the matter. Fish was so indignant that he placed a December 25th deadline for Spain to satisfy the U.S. demands About the same time, the Spanish foreign minister José de Carvajal realized that negotiating in Madrid through the temperamental and anti–Spanish U.S. minister Daniel Sickles would be fruitless. Therefore, he willingly transferred the talks to Washington where Minister Don José Luis Polo de Bernabé could work more harmoniously with Fish. A conclusion to the matter came in late November ¡874 after it was established that leaders in the Cuban Junta owned the Virginius and that it did indeed have a long record of

231 supplying the Cuban insurgents in violation of U.S. law. For Spain, it recognized that seizing the ship in international waters raised its own set of legal questions and that it could not defend the execution of the Virginius crew and passengers. As a result of these findings, Spain returned the ship and its survivors to the United States and paid $80,000 indemnity, but it did not bow to the U.S. flag in Santiago harbor. General Juan Burriel, the executing o‡cer at Santiago, escaped punishment, and in ¡875 he was promoted to the rank of major general. See also Fish, Hamilton; New York Junta

Walker, William (¡824–¡860) Walker was probably America’s most famous filibuster, who conquered Nicaragua in ¡855–¡856. He had visions of grandeur regarding Cuba and became involved in a scheme designed by the Cuban revolutionary Domingo de Goícuría. The plan failed to materialize largely because of Walker’s antagonism of New York shipping magnate and financier Cornelius Vanderbilt. See also Domingo de Goícuria

War for Independence Throughout the ¡880s several e›orts to stir a revolt on the island of Cuba failed for lack of leadership. That changed in ¡892 when José Martí founded the Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Cuban Revolutionary Party). With significant support from Cuban exiles, Martí and the party proceeded with plans to liberate Cuba from Spanish authority. Martí directed the establishment of numerous Juntas throughout the island and planned to initiate the revolt in February ¡895. According to plan the Juntas were to rise in revolt as Martí, Antonio Maceo, and Máximo Gómez and their forces landed on the island from the United States, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. The operation was foiled because U.S. agents intercepted the departing exiles from Fernandina, Florida, and Spanish authorities,

War for Independence who were aware of the plan, took preemptive steps against the insurgents on the island. Undeterred, Martí issued his “Manifesto of Montecristi” on March 25, ¡895, calling for Cuba’s liberation from Spain. Six days later Maceo landed on Cuban soil, followed on April ¡¡ by Martí and Gómez, each with a small group of followers. By the end of April the rebels claimed an army of 6,000. The insurgents lost their leader on May ¡9, ¡895, when Martí was killed by Spanish gunshot as his followers marched toward battle. Gómez y Báez and Maceo assumed the insurgents’ leadership and viewed the struggle as a continuation of the war that had ended in ¡878. Initially, the Spanish government approached the conflict with confidence, believing that its superior resources would soon crush the Cuban insurgents. General Arsenio Martínez Campos was appointed captain general and commander of Spanish forces in Cuba. A veteran of the Ten Years’ War, Martínez Campos arrived in Cuba in March ¡895 with o›ers of reconciliation. When the insurgents rejected his o›ers, Martínez Campos imposed a naval blockade designed to prevent supplies from abroad from reaching the insurgents and constructed a trocha (trench) west of Camagüey to interdict movement between the island’s eastern and western sectors. Subsequently, a second trocha separated Pinar del Río and Havana. The trocha was a ditch 200 yards wide, filled with all kinds of obstacles (including trees, boulders, and barbed wire) to keep the enemy from passing. The tactics, however, failed to confront the reality of a guerrilla war, the fact that the insurgents lived o› the land, and the impossible task of fighting during the rainy season that lasted from May to November. Furthermore, the Spanish conscripts were poorly trained, ill equipped, and ravaged by tropical disease. Despite an increase in troop levels from 20,000 in March ¡895 to ¡20,000 by year’s end, victory eluded Martínez Campos. For his part, Máximo Gómez avoided frontal assaults and pitched battles. In addition to guerrilla warfare, Gómez conducted

War for Independence economic warfare by destroying rail and communication lines and, eventually, sugar plantations. On October 22, ¡895, Gómez, Maceo, and Calixto García joined forces at Lazaro López in Camagüey Province to begin their march upon Havana. Unable to stop the insurgents’ advance and widespread destruction, on January 2, ¡896, Martínez Campos declared a state of emergency throughout Havana and Pinar del Río provinces. By the year’s end, Gómez, Maceo, and García had taken the war to the gates of Havana, which had become a most heavily guarded city. Martínez Campos o›ered to resign on January 7, ¡896, and on January 20 he was replaced by General Valieriano Weyler. An experienced general, Weyler had a reputation for cruelty. He arrived in Cuba with the conviction that Martínez Campos had been too lenient. His arrival signaled Spain’s determination to end Cuba’s autonomous movement. Weyler implemented a policy of “reconcentration,” by which the countryside was emptied of people, crops, and livestock. The rural people were put into fortified camps close to towns and Spanish garrisons. The intent was to deny the insurgents local support, but the policy provoked only controversy and outrage, especially in the United States. An estimated 500,000 people were placed in the reconcentrados, where they endured wretched conditions. As a result of this policy, Weyler became known as “the butcher.” On the battlefield, Weyler initiated a holding action against Gómez while he pursued Maceo, finally catching up with him on December 6, ¡896. Maceo was killed in an ambush at Mariano. In January ¡897 Weyler turned his attention to central Cuba in pursuit of Gómez. By the end of February, Weyler claimed that the insurgency had been destroyed, a claim not totally accurate. True, the insurgent army had fled into western Cuba, but as Marcos Campos had previously discovered, an insurgent army in the Cuban mountain ranges could present a formidable challenge. To add to that challenge, Gómez

232 had joined forces with Calixto García to continue guerrilla warfare. At the same time, the strength of Weyler army proved deceiving. With reinforcements from Spain and the activation of Cuban volunteers, Weyler commanded an army of approximately 200,000, but nearly half of these troops were in defensive positions, protecting the trochas, reconcentrados, supply depots, communications systems, and towns and cities. At any one time another 50,000 were incapacitated by tropical diseases or other illnesses and battle injuries. This left Weyler with a fighting capacity of approximately 50,000 men in pursuit of 20,000 to 30,000 insurgents. In addition, his troops were ill trained, ill equipped, and under-fed. Together, these factors forced Weyler to adopt a defensive strategy similar to that of Marcos Campos. Weyler’s failure to suppress the rebellion caused a groundswell of criticism in Spain, and soon it was no longer considered unpatriotic for Spaniards to publicly discuss home rule for Cuba. As a result of two years of warfare, Spain’s national debt almost doubled, and the war slowly depressed the national economy. Furthermore, an estimated 40,000 casualties drained Spain’s emotional stamina. In the midst of these troubles, an Italian anarchist assassinated Prime Minister Antonio Cánovas. His death prompted a change in Spanish policy. On October 4, ¡897, the queen regent, María Cristina, directed Liberal Party leader Práxedes Mateo Sagasta to form a new ministry. Sagasta immediately replaced Weyler with General Ramón Blanco and instituted reforms (see “Spanish Policy and the War for Independence,” following). In November ¡897 the Spanish government promised Cuba an autonomous government, which was instituted on January ¡, ¡898. Instead of accepting the new government as Spain had hoped, however, the insurgents responded with anger. Separatists inside and outside Cuba denounced autonomy and declared that only independence would bring an end to the conflict. Spanish policy received another blow

233 in Havana on January ¡2 when peninsulare despair resulted in a violent protest against autonomy. Thereafter conspiracy rumors became rampant, and the autonomous government was clearly in trouble. The insurgents were determined to accept nothing short of complete independence, which would finally be granted through the Treaty of Paris at the end of the subsequent war between Spain and the United States. See also Blanco y Erenas, Ramón; Gómez y Báez, Máximo; Martí y Pérez, José; Reconcentrado Program; Spanish-American War; Treaties: Treaty of Paris; Weyler y Nicolau, Valerieno

Spanish Policy and the War At the beginning of the insurgent war, Spanish Conservative Party prime minister Antonio Cánovas had sought a negotiated settlement, and in December of ¡895 he persuaded the Spanish Cortes to approve a program of political reform to be implemented once the fighting stopped. The Cubans’ refusal of the o›er led to Cánovas’s change in policy and the appointment of Weyler in an attempt to crush the rebellion. As the war continued, in April ¡896 the Cánovas administration rejected U.S. president Grover Cleveland’s o›er to mediate an end to the conflict. Cánovas feared that any U.S. intervention would only encourage the insurgents to fight on and ultimately result in the U.S. permanent occupation or annexation of Cuba. Instead, Cánovas insisted that the United States do more to enforce its neutrality laws against the filibustering activities of the New York–based Cuban Junta. At the same time, Cánovas unsuccessfully sought Austrian, British, French, and Italian diplomatic assistance to prevent any U.S. intervention in Cuba. The European powers sidestepped the request. Subsequently, Cánovas sought to negotiate a settlement that provided for local self-government, but that too was rejected by the Cuban insurgents. Through their representative in Paris, Ramón Betances,

War for Independence Cánovas learned that the insurgents’ sole goal was Cuba’s independence. In late ¡896 and early ¡897, Cánovas pursued several di›erent paths in an e›ort to end the Cuban conflict. He attempted to bribe insurgent leader Máximo Gómez to leave the island; proposed linking Cuban autonomy to the recall of General Weyler; and o›ered to adjust Cuban tari›s more favorably toward the United States. Each path led only to failure. In mid–¡897, Cánovas rejected new U.S. president William McKinley’s demand that Weyler’s brutal policies be terminated. Spain took the occasion to assert that the United States was in no position to pass moral judgments, given the record of its own Civil War. For Cánovas, the problem remained the U.S. failure to curb the filibustering activities that emanated from its shores and the comfort and support it gave to the Cuban Junta. The future of Spanish policy became clouded following Cánovas’s assassination on August 8, ¡897. Thereafter the Spanish government was in disarray until the queen regent directed Liberal Party leader Práxedes Mateo Sagasta to form a new ministry in mid–September ¡897. By that time, U.S. president McKinley’s Cuban policy had come into focus. Sagasta came to o‡ce as a longtime critic of Spanish policy in Cuba. Believing that a military victory in Cuba was not possible, Sagasta argued for the implementation of political and financial reforms by a governorgeneral more empathetic to the plight of Cubans than General Weyler. Specifically, Sagasta favored political autonomy for Cuba and tari› reforms more favorable to the Cubans. Several of Sagasta’s appointments reflected his determination to bring the Cuban problem to an end. Segismundo Moret y Prendergast became minister of colonies. An outspoken proponent of Cuban autonomy, Moret would design and implement the administration’s Cuban policy. To replace Weyler as governor-general in Cuba, Sagasta appointed General Ramón Blanco, who was on record as favoring political reforms over a mil-

War for Independence itary solution in Cuba. Pío Gullón became minister of state, despite his limited foreign policy experience. Subsequently, Gullón approached European governments to assist Spain with the Cuban problem. Sagasta’s administration faced several challenges from the start. U.S. minister Stewart I. Woodford already had presented his government’s November ¡ “ultimatum” for Spain to implement reforms in Cuba or face possible U.S. intervention. Internally, the government faced opposition from the ousted Conservative Party, ardent nationalists who opposed the loss of any territory, and the disgruntled military, which continually threatened to oust Sagasta from o‡ce. On the other hand, Sagasta was confident of the support of Spain’s financial and commercial communities, which strained under the weight of a heavy national debt, lost Cuban trade, and the possibility of financial ruin if war came with the United States. Sagasta’s administration moved quickly to implement colonial reforms. To placate the Americans, Spain committed itself to a more humane conduct of the war, including replacing Weyler with Blanco, releasing political prisoners and promising reforms in the reconcentrado program. Furthermore, the government permitted increased exports of tobacco and opened reciprocal trade negotiations with the United States. Still convinced that the reason for the war’s continuance was U.S. support for the New York Junta, in December ¡897 the queen regent appealed directly to President McKinley to shut down its operation. The appeal fell on deaf ears. Fearful that McKinley intended a permanent U.S. role in Cuba’s future, in October and December ¡897 the Sagasta administration turned to European governments for diplomatic assistance. Like the previous attempts, these e›orts met with failure. Spain stood alone with its Cuban problem. Spain hoped that the implementation of the autonomous government on January ¡, ¡898, would bring a swift settlement to the

234 war, but those hopes were short-lived. At the end of January, confronted with the threat of insurrection at home, the Sagasta administration decided against implementing further reforms in Cuba, save the possibility of a trade reciprocity treaty with the United States. The events on the island also prompted some in Madrid to contemplate the probability of war with the United States. Spain’s hopes for improving relations with the United States were dealt a severe blow with the publication in New York on February 9, ¡898, of the Dupuy de Lôme letter and the sinking of the U.S. battleship Maine in Havana harbor on February ¡5, ¡898. Although the Sagasta administration quickly accepted Dupuy de Lôme’s resignation, it rejected any suggestion that it was responsible for the sinking of the Maine. Sensing the increased war sentiment in the United States, including the relocation of naval ships to the Florida Gulf Coast, Spain increased its war preparations. The nation, despite food shortages and a weak economy, experienced a surge of patriotism, which inspired the belief that the Spanish military forces were far superior to their American counterparts. By the end of March ¡898, the Sagasta administration was in a precarious situation. It confronted an increasingly hostile United States at the same time that its Cuban reform policies were failing. Again, Spain reached out for European diplomatic assistance, only again to be rebu›ed. A last-minute diplomatic e›ort by Pope Leo XIII also met with failure. Finally, on April ¡0, ¡898, with the support of the European governments, Spain announced an unconditional cease fire in Cuba, thus placing responsibility for any continued fighting on the Cuban insurgents and the United States. The Spanish proclamation came too late. McKinley did little more than acknowledge Sagasta’s gesture. On April ¡¡, ¡898, McKinley requested congressional approval for U.S. military intervention in Cuba. Sagasta and his cabinet were outraged, the press in Madrid indignant and the public moved to demonstrations. The patriotic backlash contributed to a

235 vote of confidence given to Sagasta by the Cortes on April 20. Before the month was out, the nations were at war. See also Blanco y Erenas, Ramón; Cleveland, Grover S.; Dupuy de Lôme, Enrique; Gómez y Báez, Máximo; McKinley, William; New York Junta, Spanish-American War: Sinking of the Maine; Vatican Peace E›ort; Weyler y Nicolau, Valerieno; Woodford, Stewart I.

From War for Independence to Spanish-American War Sagasta was among the Spanish o‡cials who anticipated that the Americans would eventually see victory in Cuba but first would su›er serious losses at the hands of Spain. The latter idea vanished with the U.S. defeat of the Spanish flotilla at Santiago de Cuba and subsequent seizure of the city in July ¡898. About the same time Sagasta received a disheartening report from Governor-general Ramón Blanco, who reported that the overwhelming majority of the peninsulares and Creoles favored separation from Spain. This sentiment coupled with U.S. military ascendancy meant that the island could not remain a colony much longer. On July ¡7, Sagasta decided to open peace negotiations, but he understood that his cabinet might not stand under the humiliation of publicly accepting defeat. Sagasta approached the French government to authorize its ambassador in Washington, D.C., Jules Cambon, to act as the o‡cial mediator between the United States and Spain. Sagasta, however, was unable to curb the U.S. expansionist desires. On August ¡2, when the signing of the peace protocol in Washington, D.C., brought the war to an end, Spain lost Cuba and Puerto Rico. Only the disposition of the Philippine Islands remained unresolved. The Treaty of Paris, concluded on December ¡0, ¡898, gave the United States all that it wanted, including the Philippines and the island of Guam. The Treaty of Paris intensified the opposition to the Sagasta administration, although

Webster Sagasta believed that the Spanish would accept the inevitable and that the Cortes would ratify the agreement without much opposition; hence, he was reasonably confident when he presented the treaty to the Cortes on February 20, ¡899. However, Sagasta’s judgment proved wrong, and conservatives were quick to seize the issue and attack the government for losing the war and accepting a humiliating peace. They called for “regeneration” of the nation. Sagasta resigned and was replaced by Conservative Francisco Sevila. Amidst continuing turmoil, the queen regent, María Cristina, closed the Cortes, and on March ¡9, ¡899, she signed the Treaty of Paris. See also Blanco y Erenas, Ramón; Spanish-American War; Treaties: Treaty of Paris

War Resolutions see SpanishAmerican War: United States War Resolutions

Webster, Daniel (¡782–¡852) Webster was a renowned lawyer, congressman, and senator from the state of Maine before serving as secretary of state from ¡84¡ to ¡843 and again from ¡850 to ¡852. As a congressman in ¡826, Webster favored sending a delegation to the Panama Congress. Webster contended that participation in the discussion of issues was not necessarily a step toward an entangling alliance, which he opposed. Rather, the Congress provided the opportunity to learn the viewpoints of others, particularly about the possible ColombianMexican expedition to liberate Cuba from Spanish rule and the measures the Latin Americans thought should be implemented to thwart European intervention in the Western Hemisphere. Webster shared the prevailing view at the time that U.S. interests were best served by having Cuba remain in Spanish hands, a position he a‡rmed while serving as secretary of state during the Tyler administration and repeated again when serving in

Welles the same capacity in the Fillmore administration. In ¡843 the U.S. became alarmed over rumors that Britain planned to instigate a rebellion in Cuba to destroy slavery and leave the island under British protection. Webster quickly charged that such action violated the no-transfer principle in the Monroe Doctrine. He also made it known that the United States intended to assist the Spanish in thwarting any British interference in Cuba. Webster also opposed the southern annexationists who caste a covetous eye toward the island in the ¡840s. He did not believe that the U.S. Constitution provided legal coverage for the extension of slavery. He attempted to impose the nation’s neutrality laws against potential filibusters, but given southern sympathy for their cause, Webster could not find local juries to prosecute them. Webster’s position was tested following Narciso López’s failed filibustering attempt in August ¡85¡ that resulted in the immediate execution of 50 Americans in Cuba, including William L. Crittenden, nephew of Attorney General John J. Crittenden. Another ¡62 adventurers were sent to work in Spanish quicksilver mines. The a›air set o› rounds of protests and demonstrations across the United States, including the sacking of the Spanish consulate in New Orleans. Webster masterfully convinced the Spanish government that these unruly crowds did not reflect U.S. policy, and, in fact, he profusely apologized to the Spanish minister in Washington, Angel Calderón de la Barca. Webster also persuaded Congress to appropriate $25,000 indemnity for the New Orleans consulate. He then penned a compassionate appeal directly to Queen Isabella II, who accepted the apology and subsequently released the U.S. prisoners. As a result of the incident, Britain and France again sought a tripartite convention to ensure Spain’s control of Cuba and to forswear any interest in seizing the island for themselves. Although Webster agreed with the latter principle; he would not commit the United States to the entangling alliance that would limit any future U.S. designs upon Cuba. See also Everett, Edward;

236 Expansionism; Independence Movements: Proposed Expedition; López, Narciso

Welles, Benjamin Sumner (¡892–¡962) A U.S. career diplomat, Welles served as ambassador to Cuba from April to December ¡933, after which he returned to the State Department as assistant secretary of state until his dismissal in ¡943. A native of Islip, New York, Welles was educated at Groton and Harvard. He also had a long relationship with the Roosevelt family. Welles entered the Foreign Service in ¡9¡5, and during his initial assignment in Japan developed an interest in Latin America. In ¡9¡8 he became acting chief of the State Department’s Caribbean and Central American A›airs Division and in ¡920 served as an observer of the Cuban elections. From the mid–¡920s until tapped by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull to be ambassador to Cuba, Welles worked in the private sector. Roosevelt and Hull sent Welles to mediate the political dispute between President Gerardo Machado and his political opponents that resulted in large-scale violence. At the time of Welles’s arrival in Cuba on May 8, ¡933, Roosevelt had announced the “Good Neighbor” policy by which the United States would no longer intervene in the internal a›airs of Latin American nations. For Cuba, it meant adherence to Secretary of State Elihu Root’s interpretation of the Platt Amendment: It was to be used only in case of foreign threats to Cuba’s sovereignty. Amidst the terror and violence committed by both the Cuban government and its political opposition, Welles attempted to work out an agreement between the feuding factions that would result in new elections. To entice the Cuban adversaries toward compromise, Welles held out the prospect of increased access to the U.S. market for Cuban sugar. Welles made considerable progress by early July ¡933. Machado acquiesced to Welles’s pressure for constitutional reform, restoration of the vice presidency, freedom of the press,

237 release of political prisoners, and revision of the electoral code. However, when it came to shortening his presidential term by one year in preparation for new elections, the Cuban president adamantly refused. To force Machado’s cooperation, Welles threatened the withdrawal of U.S. recognition, an act that most certainly would bring his regime to an end. Welles also requested that U.S. naval ships be sent to Havana to press the point. The Roosevelt administration demurred and, in fact, undercut Welles, when on August 9, ¡933, Roosevelt told the Cuban ambassador to the United States, Oscar B. Cintas, that the United States had no desire to intervene in Cuba. Roosevelt reiterated the same at a press conference the same day. Armed with this knowledge, Machado taunted Welles with assertions that he would arm the nation to resist any U.S. intervention. Meanwhile, in Cuba a bus driver’s strike on July 25, ¡933, escalated into a general strike during the first week of August. To Welles, the chaos threatened to develop into a revolution. Still, Machado refused to relinquish the presidency. Welles then devised a new plan, which the commander of the Cuban Army, General Alberto Herrera, accepted on August ¡¡. Apparently, Machado, now fully isolated, also conceded. According to the plan, Machado would ask Congress for a leave of absence, followed by the resignation of his cabinet except for Herrera, who would act as head of a provisional government until a vice president was inaugurated. However, not all army o‡cers trusted Herrera, whose close connection to Machado could result in continued opposition. To circumvent this problem, Welles accepted the suggestion that Herrera would resign immediately after appointing Carlos Manuel de Céspedes as secretary of state. On August ¡2 Céspedes took control of the Cuban government, and Machado and his top government colleagues departed the island. For his e›orts, Welles received high marks and praise from his superiors in Washington. Céspedes’s tenure was short-lived. In addition to political opponents, Welles’s failure to persuade Washington to provide the new

Welles government with economic assistance or to o›er a new trade treaty exacerbated the situation. Céspedes continued to confront violence. Without support from the broad sectors of the Cuban society, the Céspedes administration did not last long. On September 5, ¡933, it was overthrown by disgruntled lesser ranking o‡cers in the Cuban army led by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista in what became known as the “Sergeants’ Revolt.” A Junta ruled until September ¡0, ¡933, when it selected Ramón Grau San Martín as president. Welles described the new regime as being filled with radical, including communist, ideas that threatened U.S. interests in Cuba. Until his departure from Havana on December ¡3, ¡933 Welles pursued three diplomatic e›orts that he hoped would terminate the Grau San Martín regime. His superiors in Washington rejected Welles’s initial call for U.S. military intervention to restore the Céspedes government. However, Hull and Roosevelt subsequently approved the dispatch of thirty warships to Cuba’s various harbors, where they remained for five months. Their presence boosted Welles’s morale, gave notice to possible intervention should American lives be threatened, and served to calm potential Cuban revolutionary activities. Welles also was successful in convincing the Roosevelt administration to withhold recognition from Grau San Martín. In addition to the fact that Grau San Martín had not gained the presidency via a constitutional process, Welles also maintained that the president did not have support of all the Cubans nor could he contain the continued violence within the country. While nonrecognition alone might cause the Cuban government to fall, it also provided Welles the opportunity to encourage Grau San Martín’s opponents to intensify their activities. In particular Welles encouraged the old-line Army o‡cers to regain their power, but their e›orts in October and November ¡933 met with failure, which only served to strengthen Fulgencio Batista. While in the United States for consultations in mid–November ¡933, Welles convinced Roosevelt to continue nonrecognition of the Grau San

Weyler y Nicolau Martín government and to speak out on the Cuban question. Roosevelt’s November 24 statement asserted the U.S. willingness to work with a provisional government to address Cuba’s economic problems and its relations with the United States as spelled out in the Permanent Treaty of ¡903. Many critics argue that Roosevelt was signaling Batista to act. Welles also encouraged Batista. In their October meetings, Welles stroked Batista’s ego by describing him as the most respected man in Cuba because of his military leadership qualities. Welles also advised Batista that his continued association with the radical groups supporting the Grau San Martín regime would not serve him well with any future Cuban government. In return, Batista also signaled his intentions. He reported to Welles that he had the support of Cuba’s commercial elites; that a new provisional government, representing the moderate political groups and commercial interests, was needed to replace the “failed” Grau San Martín government; and that U.S. recognition was essential to Cuba’s political stability and economic recovery. Welles apparently agreed. To most analysts Batista took Welles’s response as an o›er to establish a new government, but he did not act until after Je›erson Ca›rey replaced Welles in Havana in December ¡933. Ca›rey’s arrival did not signal a change in U.S. nonrecognition policy nor did it alter the course Welles had set. In fact, Ca›rey also encouraged Batista to act, which he did on January ¡5. ¡934. Ca›rey continued to mettle in Cuban a›airs and clearly favored Batista over Mendieta. Critics appealed to Welles, now assistant secretary of state, to curtail Ca›rey’s actions, but it was to no avail. The Roosevelt administration supported its ambassador. Until the outbreak of World War II, Welles continually pressured the Batista administration to end government corruption, reform its fiscal agencies, reduce its annual budget, end discrimination against U.S. sugar mills operating in Cuba, and settle U.S. bondholders’ claims if he wanted the United States to extend economic assistance. Over time,

238 world conditions, more than U.S. pressure, resulted in the settlement of some of these issues. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Ca›rey, Je›erson; Céspedes, Carlos Manuel de; Grau San Martín, Ramón; Hull, Cordell; Machado y Morales, Gerardo; Sergeants’ Revolt; Trade Agreements: Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡939, Second Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡94¡; Treaties: Permanent Treaty of ¡903; World War II

Weyler y Nicolau, Valerieno (¡838–¡930) Weyler y Nicolau served as governorgeneral of Cuba from ¡896 to ¡898. Prior to this he had been Spain’s military attaché to Washington and served on the Spanish side during Cuba’s Ten Years’ War (¡868–¡878). His appointment to Cuba signified the determination of the Spanish government to militarily end the Cuban War for Independence. Eventually, Weyler commanded an estimated 200,000 troops and another 50,000 Cuban peninsulare loyalists. To end the insurgency, Weyler divided the island into zones separated by 200-yard wide trenches filled with barbed wire and other debris and overlooked by watchtowers at regular intervals. He also implemented a reconcentrado program whereby rural peasants were forced into fortified Spanish towns and compounds, unfortunately lacking in the necessary infrastructure to maintain the people. Although Weyler’s strategy brought a degree of military success, it also contributed to the Cuba’s economic devastation. Cities lacked su‡cient food supplies and income from Cuba’s chief exports — sugar and tobacco — became nearly non-existent. In addition, Weyler’s heavy-handed civil government resulted in the loss of support from resident peninsulares and the majority of Cuba’s upper class. His brutality earned him the nickname “The Butcher” in the U.S. press and significantly contributed to the growing U.S. crusade for “moral” intervention in Cuba and to a growing demand for his resignation by Spanish politicians. In June ¡897, six

239 months after an unsuccessful assassination attempt upon his life, Weyler resigned his position. See also McKinley, William; Reconcentrado Program; War for Independence: Spanish Policy and the War

White Paper of ¡96¡ Written by presidential advisor Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. to justify the U.S.–sponsored forthcoming Bay of Pigs invasion, the White Paper charged that Fidel Castro had betrayed the democratic and socioeconomic goals of the Cuban revolution. Schlesinger received the assignment on March ¡¡, and after going through several drafts and receiving President John F. Kennedy’s approval, the White Paper was released with fanfare on April ¡¡, ¡96¡, one week before the Bay of Pigs invasion. In its final form, the White Paper was divided into four parts: (¡) Betrayal of the Cuban Revolution; (2) The Establishment of the Communist Bridgehead, (3) The Delivery of Cuba to the Sino-Soviet Bloc; and (4) The Assault on the Hemisphere. According to Schlesinger, Castro surrendered the lofty ideals of the revolution’s intent as he came to rely upon local communist leaders to gain political power and, on his own, turned to the Soviet Union to ensure his power and to spread communism throughout the hemisphere. The paper acknowledged that the United States had made past mistakes in its relationship with Cuba but now stood ready to assist the nation to achieve the democracy its people long wanted and to assist it with achieving economic and social development. See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Kennedy, John F.

Wilson, James H. (¡837–¡925) Wilson served as a district commander during the U.S. military occupation of Cuba. Following a stint as a cavalry general on the Union side during the U.S. Civil War, Wilson, an ardent expansionist, made a success-

Wilson ful career as a railroad builder and executive. He also became a prominent Republican and member of its National Committee, representing Delaware. Well-connected politically, Wilson aspired to be governor-general of all Cuba during the U.S. military occupation of the island, but he settled for the appointment as military commander of the Matanzas and Santa Clara Departments comprising the middle third of Cuba. Wilson thought that the Cuban Creole class could control the island just as the whites did southern society. Immediately after arriving on the island in January ¡899, Wilson, with great energy and considerable ability, visited every Cuban town and village under his supervision. Subsequently, he assigned his subordinates the task of writing reports on the region’s economic, political, sanitary, and military conditions. Recognizing the devastation brought to Cuban agriculture by the War for Independence, Wilson determined the best path to economic recovery lay in its rehabilitation. Toward that end, he recommended that the central government in Havana send each province $20,000 per month to be used for making small loans to farmers to purchase tools, seeds, and animals essential for agriculture’s rebirth. The U.S. military governor of Cuba, General John R. Brooke, opposed the plan. Brooke favored direct grants to the farmers for the same purpose, but authorities in Washington refused to approve Brooke’s plan, thus leaving the matter of agriculture rehabilitation unattended. Regarding Cuba’s political future, Wilson regretted the Teller Amendment, which denied the United States the right to annexation, but suggested a scheme designed to establish a protectorate over the island until such a time that the Cubans themselves sought annexation. To achieve this objective Wilson recommended that the United States send advisors to the island to work with the Cuban Creoles to form a constitutional government and complete a permanent treaty with the United States. Once this was accomplished, Cuba would be set free and the U.S. forces withdrawn. The treaty, Wilson argued, should

Wilson provide for a U.S. guarantee of a Cuban republican and stable government, for the establishment of a free trade customs union and postal service between the two nations; for U.S. supervision of Cuban sanitation and customs service, and for Cuba to cede to the United States lands essential for a naval base. E›ectively, Wilson’s proposals suggested the establishment of a U.S. protectorate over Cuba until the Cubans sought annexation to the mainland. Wilson expressed these views in writing to his leading Republican contacts, including Senator Joseph Foraker, Elihu Root, and Theodore Roosevelt, the latter promising to share them with President McKinley. Unknowingly, Wilson recommended the framework of the future Platt Amendment. At the time, Wilson’s position placed him in opposition to General Brooke, and, indeed, Wilson sought Brooke’s position for himself. Decisions made by the McKinley administration — the selection of Wood to replace Brooke as head of Cuba’s military government, the appointment of Elihu Root as secretary of war, and the exclusion of Foraker from the Senate Committee on Relations With Cuba — led Wilson to the conclusion in December ¡899 that the United States intended to occupy Cuba indefinitely, not provide for its independence and the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Throughout the spring of ¡900, Wilson continued to push his agricultural rehabilitation scheme and openly opposed the priority given to road, school, and sanitary facility construction and the judicial reforms advocated by Wood. For the same reasons, the administration also came to view Wilson as a liability if he remained in Cuba. During the same period, policy setbacks and congressional agitation led to a warming of relations between the feuding generals. Postal scandals in Cuba and the results of the ¡900 municipal elections contributed to a resurgence of the U.S. Cuban nationalism and led to further congressional inquiries about the objectives of Cuban policy. The turmoil over policy prompted Wood to seek an assignment in China, which appeared to be more exciting than Cuba. In his eagerness to

240 leave Cuba, Wood moved toward adopting Wilson’s rehabilitation program and began to cultivate Wilson personally. Using his political contacts in Washington, D.C., Wood pushed for his own reassignment to China and for Wilson as his replacement in Cuba. He failed. In July ¡900, Root and McKinley determined to leave Wood in Cuba and to send Wilson to China. See also Brooke, John R.; Ludlow, William; McKinley, William; Platt Amendment; United States Occupation

Wilson, Woodrow (¡856–¡924) Wilson served as the 27th President of the United States (¡9¡3–¡92¡) following a stint as Governor of New Jersey (¡9¡¡–¡9¡3) and president of Princeton University (¡902–¡9¡0). A Democrat and Progressive, Wilson was known for his idealism in domestic and foreign policy and enunciated that idealism regarding Latin America within a week of his taking o‡ce by criticizing the interventionist policies of his immediate predecessors Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft. In place of those policies, Wilson announced that the United States preferred constitutional governments that respected and protected civil liberties and property rights and that, henceforth, trade relations would be pursued not for specific interests or to benefit of one nation. The realities within the circum–Caribbean region, however, soon led Wilson down the same interventionist road as his predecessors. Although Secretaries of State William Jennings Bryan and Robert Lansing were given responsibility of the details of Caribbean policy, Wilson approved almost all of their actions. Clearly, the Wilson administration ignored the interests of Cuba and used the Platt Amendment to justify its actions. For example, Wilson refused appeals from the Cuban government to adjust the sugar tari› in the ¡9¡3 Underwood Tari›. Under pressure from the beet sugar industry, Wilson explained that he was bound to protect U.S. sugar produc-

241 ers, not provide special benefits to another country. Wilson also protected U.S. interests in Cuba when, in ¡9¡3, his administration pressured the Menocal government to rescind a general amnesty law that would have released from jail some of the most ardent U.S. critics. Wilson turned to the Platt Amendment in the ¡9¡6 Cuban election fiasco in which Menocal extended his presidential term in contested elections. Wilson dispatched Enoch Crowder to Cuba to mediate a solution to the problem, only to have the Menocal administration reject the o›er. Wilson also approved Secretary Lansing’s suggestion to land U.S. Marines in eastern Cuba to stem the postelection violence against U.S. property and lives. To revise Cuba’s electoral laws to prevent fraud and corruption in the next presidential election, Wilson dispatched Crowder to Havana in ¡9¡9. Crowder’s work was in vain, as Cuban dishonest political practices prevailed over reforms in the ¡920 presidential contest. See also Bryan, William Jennings; Crowder, Enoch; Lansing, Robert; Minocal, Mario García Platt Amendment; United States Interventions

Wood, Leonard (¡860–¡927) A seasoned military o‡cer, Wood commanded the First United States Volunteer Cavalry (the “Rough Riders,” led by Theodore Roosevelt), served as commander of Santiago de Cuba and Puerto Principe Provinces after the Spanish surrender in July ¡898, and subsequently, became Commander of the military government during the U.S. occupation of Cuba. Wood began his military career as an army contract surgeon in ¡886, which led to an appointment in the Medical Corps. In the latter capacity he became the family physician of President William McKinley, a contact that served him well in securing his command posts in Cuba. As commander of the Santiago and Puerto Principe districts, Wood did a most credible job with the immediate postwar re-

Wood lief e›ort. By mid–¡899, farming was restored to a level that, for the most part, enabled the Cubans under his supervision to feed themselves. Wood, however, quickly found himself in a policy dispute with General John R. Brooke over the distribution of tax and tari› monies. Wood favored a decentralization approach that provided the local commanders greater discretionary use of those funds compared to the centralized plan Brooke followed. Subsequently, the two men clashed over both issues. Wood argued for the establishment of municipal and provincial governments because the “better classes” of Cuba demanded it and because they also opposed Brooke’s centralization schemes. Wood also supported a plan to recruit Cuban soldiers to serve in the occupation force under U.S. o‡cers. Wood believed that such a force would be less objectionable and would help to “Americanize” the Cuban people. Although President McKinley showed an interest in the plan, General Brooke’s objections kept it from being implemented. By the summer of ¡899, the tensions between the Wood and Brooke appeared irreparable. Wood and Brooke also split over the long-term objectives of U.S. policy in Cuba. Wood suggested that the Cuban upper classes and remaining Spaniards favored Cuba’s annexation to the United States because, if left to their own devices, the Cuban masses would prove incapable of self-government, which in turn would lead to foreign complications. Given these considerations, Wood became an advocate for the long-term U.S. occupation of Cuba. Subsequently, he gained support for this position from two other district commanders in Cuba — Generals James H. Wilson and William Ludlow. In the late summer and early fall of ¡899, Wood found supporters of his policy in Washington, as he took his case to leading Republicans: Henry Cabot Lodge Sr., Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root, and President McKinley. By December ¡899 the McKinley administration determined that it would pursue a policy designed to create a Cuban government representative of the upper class that looked

Woodford more favorably upon relations with the United States. To carry out the new policy Brooke needed to be replaced with someone more compatible with the administration’s goal. On December ¡3 Wood became the new military governor of Cuba. Although he took several steps to gain the Cubans’ confidence, they distrusted Wood knowing that he favored permanent U.S. control of the island. For the same reason, Wood had U.S. detractors. In Cuba, General James H. Wilson and, in Washington, Senator Joseph B. Foraker also mistrusted Wood and the McKinley administration’s intentions for Cuba. The mistrust led to the Foraker Amendment, which prevented the granting of commercial franchises in Cuba to U.S. business interests. Wood set out upon his business of implementing reforms in Cuba — public works, education, the judiciary, sanitation, and health. Institutional government reforms were designed to “Americanize” the Cubans in hope of preparing them for eventual annexation to the United States. Restricted by the terms of the Teller Amendment, Wood supported the Platt Amendment and an economic treaty as measures to ensure continued U.S. influence on the island until such time as the Cubans sought annexation to the United States. However, throughout his administration, Wood publicly expressed continued disdain for the Cuban people, believing that they were incapable of achieving self-government and economic prosperity. See also Brooke, John R.; Foraker, Joseph R.; Ludlow, William; Platt Amendment; Teller Amendment; United States Occupation; Wilson, James H.

Woodford, Stewart I. (¡835–¡9¡3) Woodford was a Civil War military veteran and, subsequently, a reputable New York lawyer and politician before his six-month stint as minister to Spain just prior to the outbreak of war in April ¡898. Owing to the strains in U.S.–Spanish relations and the intense political environment in Spain, President William McKinley faced a di‡cult task

242 finding someone to serve in this “thankless position.” Those same conditions limited Woodford’s social life during the assignment and were a significant factor that contributed to his wife’s depression and return home. Before arriving in Madrid, Woodford consulted with other U.S. diplomats in London and Paris and, once he was in Madrid, with the British minister, informing them about McKinley’s willingness to mediate the Cuban conflict. From London, Woodford reported to McKinley that the British government would not protest the U.S. extension of belligerent rights to the Cuban rebels and, that the British public expected Cuba to fall under U.S. control either as a protectorate or through annexation. On September ¡8, ¡897, Woodford presented to Spain’s minister of state, Carlos Manuel O’Donnell y Abreu, the Duke of Tetuán, McKinley’s strongly worded suggestion that the Spanish government implement meaningful reforms as the only way to achieve a peace settlement and restore the island’s economy and civil rule because the war was unwinable on the battlefield. At the same meeting, in an e›ort to prod the Spanish, Woodford extended McKinley’s mediation o›er and the president’s November ¡ deadline, after which, date that the United States reserved the right of independent action. Subsequently, McKinley rebu›ed Woodford’s request to release his instructions to the press in an e›ort to weaken the Spanish government’s hard-line position. For O’Donnell, McKinley’s position di›ered little from the policy followed by the Cleveland administration. Instead, O’Donnell was encouraged by optimistic reports from the Spanish minister in Washington and Spanish authorities in Cuba. Woodford was not impressed with the reform e›orts announced by Spain’s new Liberal government of Práxedes Sagasta in late October and early November ¡897. He believed, correctly, that the Cuban insurgents would reject anything short of independence. Following the publication of the Dupuy de Lôme letter and sinking of the Maine in January and February ¡898, Woodford concluded

243

World War II

that almost any Spanish plan for Cuban autonomy was doomed to failure. Still, throughout March and early April ¡898, Woodford continued to pressure the Spanish government to accept McKinley’s mediation o›er or face the reality that the pressure of public opinion would soon result in U.S. intervention in Cuban a›airs on the side of humanity. The constant barrage of such warnings contributed to the yielding of the Spanish government. On April ¡0, ¡898, it agreed to McKinley’s demands of March 27: an end to the reconcentrado policy, a battlefield armistice until October ¡, and the use of McKinley as an arbiter should war resume after that date. As Woodford predicted, the capitulation was doomed to failure because the Cuban insurgents refused to accept the armistice. Nothing short of independence would satisf y the Cuban rebels. After April ¡0, events overtook McKinley and on April 28, ¡898, the U.S. Congress approved its war resolutions. With the outbreak of war, Woodford resigned his position and returned to practice law in New York until his death in ¡9¡3. See also Dupuy de Lôme, Enrique; McKinley, William; Spanish-American War: Sinking of the Maine, United States War Resolutions; War for Independence: Spanish Policy and the War

picious Germans residing on the island. Enemy ships were interned in Cuban ports; Cuban naval and army o‡cers were stationed in Washington, D.C.; and Cuban ships virtually came under the command of U.S. o‡cers. In ¡9¡8, the United States provided the Cuban government with arms and munitions for the purpose of improving Cuban coastal defense sites. In September ¡9¡8 the Cuban government o›ered to send troops to war, but the State Department politely declined, arguing that insu‡cient ships existed to transport the soldiers. Cuban sugar growers capitalized upon the worldwide sugar shortage brought on by the war, particularly the loss of European beet sugar. Director of the U.S. wartime food administration, Herbert Hoover, persuaded President Woodrow Wilson not to control prices through agreements between producers and refiners. As a result, the ¡9¡7–¡9¡8 crop was purchased at 4.6 cents per pound and, the ¡9¡8–¡9¡9 crop at 5.5 cents per pound. It contributed to what Cubans refer to as the “Dance of the Millions.” The demand for Cuban sugar dropped precipitously immediately after World War I ended. See also Lansing, Robert; Menocal, Mario García; Dance of the Millions; Sugar

World War I

World War II

U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing carefully delineated Cuba’s wartime role. Lansing feared that the island might become a hiding place for German aliens, who could observe and report on U.S. naval movements in and out of the Guantánamo naval base and other Cuban ports. Cuban neutrality was equally unacceptable since, under that condition, the United States would be prohibited from using the island’s naval base. Lansing concluded that Cuba must follow U.S. policy. President Mario García Menocal cooperated. Cuba declared war on Germany immediately after the United States entered the conflict in April ¡9¡7. Subsequently, the Cuban government permitted agents from the Departments of Justice, Navy, and War to track down sus-

The Cuban government supported U.S. political and defense policies during World War II. In addition, the Cuban economy benefited from the worldwide shortage of sugar caused by the war. Immediately after the outbreak of the European war on September ¡, ¡939, President Federico Laredo Bru followed President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s lead in declaring his nation’s neutrality and, later in September, forced the dissolution the Cuban Nazi Party. In January ¡94¡, President Fulgencio Batista ordered the suppression of all Axis propaganda in Cuba, including flags, insignias, plays, movies, and radio programs. Even before the Pearl Harbor attack, the Batista administration began interning suspected enemy

World War II aliens. Within three days after the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor on December 7, ¡94¡, the Cuban government followed the United States in declaring war on the Axis. Immediately thereafter, Batista implemented wartime emergency powers. Constitutional rights were suspended; enemy aliens were arrested, deported, or placed under house arrest and their assets frozen. U.S. ambassador Spruille Braden, however, did not find the Cuban public as enthusiastic as its government in supporting the Allied cause; in fact, he described the public as being apathetic. The Cuban Communist Party, which dropped its criticism of government programs once the Soviets entered the war on June 22, ¡94¡, subsequently changed its name to the Popular Socialist Party and spoke vigorously on behalf of the Allied cause. Batista rewarded their position by appointing two members to his cabinet as ministers without portfolio. The informal discussion of security issues between Batista and Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles during their ¡938 meeting in Washington, D.C., expanded into military sta› conversations in August ¡940 in Havana. At the latter meeting, Cuba granted the United States the right to use the island for hemispheric defensive purposes. A month later, in September ¡939, and owing to the threat of German U-boats operating in the Caribbean, the Laredo Bru administration banned radio broadcasts regarding ship locations in Cuban waters. In the early spring of ¡94¡ Cuba granted the United States use of its airspace and agreed to participate in a secret program conducted by Pan American Airways for the construction of airfields at Camagüey, San Antonio de los Baños (Batista Field) located twenty-five miles south of Havana, Julían in Pinar del Río Province, and several auxiliary landing fields across the island. The U.S. Navy constructed harbor defenses and received permission to patrol the Cuban coastline. As stipulated by these agreements, these wartime military sites reverted to Cuba after World War II ended. On November 7, ¡94¡, the Cubans signed a $7.2 million lend-lease agreement with the

244 United States. Because of the pressing needs in the European and, subsequently, the Asian theaters, little lend-lease equipment reached the Cubans during the war. The most Batista could secure were rifles and supplies for the Cuban army and navy patrols. By the war’s end, Cuba owed the United States $2.4 million for the lend-lease supplies. With the outbreak of World War II, Asian and European cane and beet sugar supplies were cut o› from the world market. The United States sought to fill the void by having Cuba expand its sugar production through a second supplemental reciprocity trade treaty in ¡94¡, an Export-Import Bank (EXIM) loan to Cuba to expand its sugar production by 400,000 tons, and the introduction of modern machinery into Cuba. Subsequently, the United States purchased the entire Cuban sugar crop from ¡942 to ¡945, save that needed for local consumption, for $2.65 a pound and increasing to $3.¡0 per pound for the ¡945 crop. Batista also used his emergency wartime powers to have every large sugar producer devote a portion of his land to the production of vital foodstu›s, such as rice, beans, and corn. The increased production and higher prices brought a new round of prosperity to Cuba, but it also had its downside : No progress was made in the diversification of agriculture. Planters proved to be shortsighted for their refusal to move out of sugar production. Late in the war Batista signed decrees designed to encourage industrial development. The decrees suspended import duties on various types of machinery, tools, and other equipment not produced on the island in the hope of fostering new industries. His greatest success came with the expansion of mineral exploitation, particularly nickel, chromium, and manganese. These e›orts dissipated after the war with the revival of U.S. exports to Cuba and the re-imposition of tari›s. U.S. ambassadors George Messersmith and Spruille Braden understood the need for the diversification of the Cuban economy, but they also understood the wartime obstacles militating against it. See also Braden, Spruille; Messer-

245 smith, George; Trade Agreements: Second Supplemental Trade Agreement of ¡94¡

Wright, J. Butler (¡877–¡939) Wright served as U.S. ambassador to Cuba in ¡937 and ¡938. A career diplomat, Wright spent 30 years in the Foreign Service in embassies in Europe and Latin America and as envoy to many conferences. He served briefly as acting chief of the State Department’s Latin American A›airs Division. Wright was firmly committed to U.S. nonintervention and noninterference in the internal a›airs of Latin American states. He arrived in Havana in January ¡937 determined to ensure domestic peace and to end the U.S. ambassador’s traditional role of advising Cuban o‡cials on their political decisions. He made this position clear when presenting his credentials to President Federico Laredo Bru on August 23, ¡937. Throughout his stay, Wright worked through normal diplomatic channels and only occasionally dealt directly with Fulgencio Batista. Wright viewed his assignment as a public-relations mission to convince the Cubans of the U.S. intent to carry out the Good Neighbor policy. It proved to be a di‡cult task. Wright’s initial assessment of the Cuban situation illustrated all that followed. He understood that as long as the economy continued to show improvement, political tranquillity would remain. He understood that Batista completely controlled the political arena because the Cubans were too “individualistic” to react, the opposition was fractionalized, and the general populace was too apathetic because of the current prosperity. Wright saw little chance for political change. These conditions began to change as ¡938 progressed. The e›ect of the decline in sugar markets and the concomitant drop in income rippled through Cuba’s economy and caused the government to default on its debts. Political tensions also intensified. The worsened conditions prompted the Cubans to seek U.S. assistance, but Wright did not play a role in the process.

Yellow Press When Wright suddenly died at his desk December 4, ¡938, he left a legacy of implementing the Good Neighbor policy by not interfering in Cuba’s political a›airs, although he understood the fragility of the Cuban government and Batista’s dominance of the scene. See also Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio; Good Neighbor Policy; Laredo Bru, Federico; Welles, Benjamin Sumner

Yellow Press At the same time the Cuban War for Independence proceeded on its brutal course, journalism in the United States experienced a significant change that brought a lurid style, imaginative illustrations, screeching headlines, and a reckless regard for the truth to many newspapers. While William Randolph Hearst’s New York Journal and Joseph Pulitzer’s New York World became the focal point of this “yellow press,” other newspapers across the nation imitated their style. In sum, these papers sensationalized the plight of the Cuban people who endured Spanish rule. Some analysts argue that the “yellow press” contributed to the moral crusade that the United States embarked upon in April ¡898. The Journal and the World competed with each other for increases in circulation, and both could claim great advances in readership on the eve of the Spanish-American War. Their tabloid styles — colored comic sections, screaming and sensationalist headlines, exaggerated cartoons — added to the sensational attacks on government and business corruption, lifestyles of the rich, and, in foreign a›airs, a jingoistic anti–European venting. As advocated in the “yellow press,” because Spain could do no right in Cuba, it should set the island free. The Spanish administrators in Cuba were depicted as brutes that inflicted atrocities upon men, women, and children, old and infirm alike. The papers called for a moral crusade to correct the horrendous conditions that the Cuban people endured. Each paper had reporters in Cuba, and thanks to wire services, the New York papers sold their stories to other newspapers across

Zayas the nation, including the Chicago Tribune, Chicago Times Herald, Boston Herald, San Francisco Chronicle, and San Francisco Examiner. Presidents Grover Cleveland and William McKinley did not escape the papers’ wrath. They were chastised for not granting the insurgents belligerent status and apparently ignoring the humiliation of the Cuban people. Typical of the “yellow press” reporting was Hearst’s New York Journal in February ¡896, which described the fate of one Evangelina Cisneros, who languished in a Cuban jail for her suspected role in a rebel plot and while interned had to protect her virtue from the lustful Spanish o‡cers guarding her. When a Journal reporter surreptitiously spirited her from Cuba to the United States, the Journal, in a front-page story complete with screaming headlines, took credit for the rescue at the expense of the U.S. State Department. A year later, in October ¡897, Hearst’s Journal, used the banner headline: “Does Our Flag Protect Women?” and took liberty with the facts. An illustration that accompanied a story about the search of U.S. ship suspected of carrying arms to the Cuban insurgents showed Spanish military o‡cers disrobing the women, when in fact female attendants conducted the search. The papers spewed their worst invective upon Spain’s military governor of Cuba, General Valeriano Weyler, often describing him as a “butcher,” or comparing him to a mad dog, a wolf, or a hyena for his treatment of Cubans in the reconcentrados. The old, the sick, and the infirm were allegedly shot without mercy, left to die on their cots and their bodies either fed to the sharks in the sea or the dogs in the camps. Pulitzer’s New York World, on more than one occasion, questioned when a nation would be brave enough to bring peace to the bloodstained island. The Journal’s publication of the famous Dupuy de Lôme letter in February ¡898, in which the Spanish minister to Washington unfavorably described President William L. McKinley, and its publication in March ¡898 of the contents of the U.S. naval inquiry re-

246 garding the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbor prior or their release to the White House added to the paper’s credibility in the public’s eyes. Both the Journal and the World placed blame on the sinking upon an external device and placed ultimate responsibility upon Spain, even if the insurgents were responsible for the alleged attack. The sensationalism’s impact upon congressional sentiment for the Cuban cause or the influence it had upon McKinley’s decision for war remain points in historical debate. Certainly, the sensationalism increased the sale of the Journal and the World, whose circulation reached approximately 800,000 each on a daily basis on the eve of the U.S. entry into the war in April ¡898. See also Dupuy de Lôme, Enrique; McKinley, William; Reconcentrado Program

Zayas, Alfredo (¡86¡–¡934) Prior to his presidency from ¡92¡ to ¡925, Zayas had long been a prominent Cuban citizen. As a member of the Autonomist party, he was a propagandist during the War for Independence (¡895–¡898) and held several political positions in the early republic, including the vice presidency during the administration of José Miguel Gómez. As a compromise candidate of Conservative and Moderate groups, Zayas captured the presidency in the tainted ¡920 elections. He immediately faced a severe financial crisis and sought a $5 million shortterm and then a multimillion dollar long-term loan from U.S. bankers to prevent government bankruptcy. The U.S. State Department used the crisis to impose reforms upon the Cuban government. Through President Warren G. Harding’s special representative, Enoch Crowder, and using Article 2 of the Platt Amendment, Zayas was forced to implement several measures before the State Department would sanction any loan from a U.S. private bank. Zayas agreed to eliminate botellas, government positions for which political favorities drew a salary but did not work, and to reform national lottery practices, particularly the colec-

247 turias, which provided politicians including the president to illegally make huge personal profits. Furthermore, the Cuban Congress agreed to enact an austere ¡922 to ¡923 operating budget that resulted in dismissal of government workers and the termination of several public works projects. To ensure implementation of the austerity measures and honesty in government practices, Zayas was forced to accept Crowder’s recommended cabinet appointees. As a result of these actions, the State Department approved a total of $65 million loan from J. P. Morgan and Company that enabled Cuba to meet its foreign and internal debt obligations and otherwise put the government on a sound financial basis. Soon thereafter, Zayas and the Cubans began to act independently of Crowder. Asserting that Crowder’s reforms intruded upon presidential authority and national sovereignty, Zayas dismissed Crowder’s “honest cabinet.” Alfredo Zayas Jr. became director of the national lottery, and the number of colecturias greatly ex-

Zayas panded. The Cuban Congress returned to free spending with the ¡923 to ¡924 budget that provided for expanded public works and the acquisition of properties and the like without concern for income to meet the expenditures. By ¡924, Zayas rejected Crowder’s demands to halt such actions and to implement further reforms, including taxation. During the same period, Zayas became isolated from the political factions that dated to independence, and he failed to appeal to the rising generation of expectations that demanded political reform and greater independence from the United States. Political isolation did not prevent Zayas from wanting a second term in ¡924, but he was forewarned by the State Department that should he win by fraudulent means, U.S. recognition would be withheld. That was not to be. Zayas withdrew from political life following the election of Liberal Gerardo Machado in ¡924. See also Crowder, Enoch; Platt Amendment; Preventive Diplomacy; United States Interventions

Appendix ¡

Chronology ¡808 President Thomas Je›erson’s cabi-

warns the Colombian and Mexican governments not to launch a joint invasion of Cuba in anticipation of freeing it from Spanish rule.

net refuses to consider a proposal from a Cuban delegation regarding the possible U.S. annexation of Cuba.

¡834 United States and Spain reach a claims agreement for damages done to U.S. ships by Spanish gunboats during Latin America’s revolutionary period, ¡800–¡82¡.

¡809 President Thomas Je›erson dispatches James Wilkerson to Cuba to explore local interest in linkage to the United States. Wilkerson finds little such interest.

¡848 Journalist and expansionist John O’Sullivan convinces President James K. Polk to ask Spain to sell Cuba to the United States for $¡00 million. Spain refuses.

¡8¡0 New England businessman William Shaler visits Cuba at the request of President James Madison. Shaler reports that, while there is sympathy for annexation to the United States, the majority of the elite class remain loyal to Spain.

¡849 Filibuster Narciso López leads the first of three failed attempts to invade Cuba and incite a local revolution against Spanish authority. On his third try in ¡85¡, Spanish authorities capture and execute López.

¡82¡ Secretary of State John Quincy Adams declares that U.S. interests would be better served if Cuba remained in Spanish hands rather than becoming a possession of another European power. Adams’s statement becomes the basis of U.S. policy toward Cuba until ¡898.

¡852 Spanish authorities refuse to permit purser William Smith to disembark in Havana from the mail steamer Crescent City, suspecting that he would distribute independence propaganda. Secretary of State Edward Everett rejects a British proposal that a tripartite declaration by which Britain, France, and the United States be issued to renounce their intentions to take possession of Cuba.

¡823 In response to discussions in Europe about the restoration of the former Latin American colonies of Spain, President James Monroe issues a declaration stating that the Western Hemisphere is o› limits to European adventures.

¡853 Spain initiates an Africanization policy in Cuba designed to establish over time a labor system to supplant slavery. U.S. south-

¡826 Secretary of State Henry Clay 249

Appendix ¡ erners fear the consequences might incite slave labor in the south. The program heightens Southern interest in the acquisition of Cuba.

¡854 Spanish authorities seize the U.S. cargo ship Black Warrior in Havana harbor for allegedly carrying illegal cargo. The incident is settled in ¡855. Meeting in Ostend, Belgium, the U.S. ministers to England, France, and Spain propose that the United States o›er Spain up to $¡20 million for Cuba. Madrid quickly rejects the proposal. President Franklin Pierce proclamation against the expected John A. Quitman filibuster expedition to Cuba causes Qiutman eventually to abandon the project. ¡856 Cuban exile Domingo Goicuría reaches an agreement with filibuster William Walker to lead an expedition against Cuba once Walker establishes himself in Central America. Because the latter does not happen, Goicuría abandons the plan. ¡869 Spain rejects Secretary of State Hamilton Fish’s proposal providing for Cuban Independence. ¡872 Secretary of State Hamilton Fish rejects a Colombian government proposal for joint action to free Cuba from Spanish rule and to end slavery on the island. ¡873 Spanish gunships seize the U.S. cargo boat Virginius in international waters. The ship and crew are taken to Havana, where the captain and several of his crew are executed. The incident is settled a year later when Spain admits guilt and pays an $80,000 indemnity. ¡878 The Treaty of Zanjón ends the Ten Years’ War in Cuba, and the war-torn island is opened to increased U.S. economic investment. ¡884 John W. Foster negotiates a reciprocity trade treaty with Spain that includes Cuba, but the U.S. Senate refuses ratification. ¡89¡ The McKinley Tari› places sugar and molasses on the free list. The measure

250 leads to the U.S.–Spain reciprocity treaty that lowers Cuban tari›s on U.S. imports, resulting in an immediate 65 percent increase in Cuban imports of U.S.–made goods.

¡894 The Wilson-Gorman Tari› reimposes a high tari› on Cuban sugar and causes Spain to increase maximum tax levies on U.S. goods sent to Cuba. ¡895 José Martí issues the “Manifesto of Montecristi” on March 25, initiating the Cuban War for Independence. Martí is killed in a skirmish with Spanish troops on May ¡9. Following the outbreak of the Cuban War for Independence, the New York Junta is revived and goes on to become the focal point in relations between the U.S. government and Cuban insurgents. ¡898 Under pressure from the United States and in light of events on the island, the Spanish government implements a form of Cuban-led self-government. It is not well received by the Cubans who prefer total independence. From February to early April, Pope Leo XIII undertakes a diplomatic e›ort in Europe and the United States to prevent war between the United States and Spain. The U.S. battleship Maine blows up in Havana harbor on February ¡5, killing 265 men and o‡cers. Although the cause is unknown, most Americans place responsibility for the explosion upon Spain. On February ¡9, the New York Journal prints a private letter of Spanish minister Enrique Dupuy de Lôme that is insulting to President William McKinley and sets o› a diplomatic furor. On April ¡¡ President McKinley asks congressional approval to use U.S. forces to bring Cuban hostilities to an end. The U.S. Congress approves the Teller Amendment by which the United States pledges not to annex Cuba. The United States declares war on Spain on April 25. Hostilities in Cuba end on August ¡2. On July ¡7 Spanish troops surrender to U.S.

251 forces in Santiago de Cuba, e›ectively ending military operations in Cuba. The Treaty of Paris is signed on December ¡0, o‡cially bringing the Spanish-American War to an end.

¡899 On January ¡, General John R. Brooke begins the U.S. military occupation of Cuba. General Leonard Wood succeeds Brooke as commander of the U.S. military occupation of Cuba. ¡90¡ The U.S. Congress enacts the Platt Amendment that places restrictions on Cuban sovereignty by permitting U.S. intervention in internal a›airs, controlling its foreign debt, and restricting its foreign policy. It becomes part of the Cuban Constitution. ¡902 On May 20 the Republic of Cuba comes into being with the inauguration of Tomás Estrada Palma as president. ¡903 Cuba and the United States sign three agreements that : formalize the Platt Amendment relationship, grant Cuban sugar privileged access to the U.S. market, and, establish a lease for land on Guantánamo Bay for the construction of a U.S. naval base. In his December address to Congress, President Theodore Roosevelt declares his Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine that justifies subsequent U.S. interventions in the Caribbean, including Cuba. ¡906–¡909 U.S. forces occupy and govern Cuba as a result of the rebellion that follows Estrada Palma’s ¡906 reelection. Enoch Crowder comes to Cuba in ¡906 to write a new electoral and judicial code for Cuba. It is used in the ¡908 presidential election. José Miguel Gómez serves a four-year presidential term after winning the ¡908 election supervised by the U.S. military. ¡9¡4–¡9¡7 Cuba follows the U.S. lead on World War I policy by first declaring its neutrality in ¡9¡4 and then declaring war on the Central Powers in ¡9¡7. ¡9¡9–¡920 Cuba experiences the “Dance of the Millions” as sugar prices and output

Chronology reach all-time highs owing to the shortage of sugar on the world market caused by World War I. When the prosperity abruptly ends, Cuba slides into a serious economic recession. Enoch Crowder returns to Cuba in ¡9¡9 to write an electoral code again, but it is ignored in the ¡920 elections. He stays on as a special presidential envoy in an e›ort to bring honesty to the Cuban government. The mission fails.

¡922 The Fordney-McCumber Tari› raises duties on imported sugar. Despite the 20 percent reduction provided by the ¡903 Treaty, Cuba’s sugar proves to be a costly import. ¡925 The U.S. Senate ratifies the Isle of Pines Treaty, originally concluded in ¡904. Technically, the Hay-Quesada Treaty, it provides for Cuba’s ownership of the island. ¡928 At the International Conference of American States in Havana, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes successfully suppresses a Latin American proposal to condemn U.S. intervention in the Caribbean. In contrast to his colleagues, Cuban president Gerardo Machado asserts that U.S. intervention had positive e›ects for his country. ¡930–¡93¡ The U.S. Congress approves the Hawley-Smoot Tari› that raises the tari› on Cuban sugar. In November¡930, in an e›ort to alleviate Cuba’s plight, President Herbert Hoover signs legislation allowing the U.S. Sugar Corporation to purchase Cuban sugar at an inflated price. In ¡930 the State Department publishes the Clark Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine that asserts U.S. interventions in the Caribbean, including Cuba, are not justified under President James Monroe’s ¡823 declaration. Throughout ¡930 and ¡93¡ U.S. ambassador Henry F. Guggenheim attempts to negotiate an end to Cuba’s political crisis revolving around President Gerardo Machado’s corruption and extension of his term in o‡ce as president. ¡933 In his inaugural address on March 4, President Franklin D. Roosevelt announces the “Good Neighbor” policy, which is re-

Appendix ¡ a‡rmed in December by Secretary of State Cordell Hull at the International Conference of American States meeting in Montevideo, Uruguay. According to the policy, the United States will not interfere in the internal a›airs of Latin American nations. Sumner Welles attempts to mediate a solution to the political crisis gripping Cuba. On August ¡2 he negotiates for Carlos Manuel de Céspedes to serve as interim president. However, Céspedes falls to the so-called “Sergeants’ Revolt” on September 4 led by Fulgencio Batista, which in turn results in the provisional presidency of Ramón Grau San Martín. On Welles’s recommendation, Roosevelt refuses diplomatic recognition of the Grau San Martín administration.

¡934 In January, Fulgencio Batista engineers the ouster of President Ramón Grau San Martín and replaces him with Carlos Mendieta. President Franklin D. Roosevelt quickly extends recognition to the new government. U.S. ambassadors Sumner Welles and Je›erson Ca›rey had encouraged Batista to act. In June the United States and Cuba complete a treaty abrogating the ¡903 Permanent Treaty that included the Platt Amendment. The new agreement provides for the continued use of the Guantánamo naval base by the United States. The Jones-Costigan Act restores Cuban sugar to its privileged market position in the U.S. market. In December Princeton University president Harold W. Dodds arrives in Havana in an unsuccessful e›ort to settle a political dispute that resulted in the ouster of President Carlos Mendietta engineered by Fulgencio Batista. ¡937 Cuba is allotted 28.6 percent of the total U.S. sugar consumption needs. ¡939 In May the Cuban government refuses the disembarkation from the St. Louis of more than 900 Jews escaping Nazism in Europe, forcing the ship’s return to the continent. ¡940 On July 2¡ Cuban president Laredo

252 Bru opens the International Conference of American States foreign ministers meeting in Havana with charges that Nazism is threatening the Western Hemisphere.

¡942–¡948 Cuba cooperates with the United States during World War II from ¡942–¡945 granting the United States the right to construct military facilities on the island, permitting the use of local ports, and agreeing to clamp down on Nazi activities. The United States purchases the entire Cuban sugar crop during the wartime period. Because of internal political pressure, Cuban president Ramón Grau San Martín (¡944–¡948) refuses to consider a U.S.–proposed treaty that would have provided money for the island’s economic diversification. In establishing the Organization of American States in ¡948, Cuba successfully pushes for strong charter provisions declaring against interventions in the political a›airs of a nation. The U.S. Sugar Act of ¡948 provides Cuba with a quota of 28.6 percent of the total U.S. consumption plus 98.64 percent of shortfalls by other foreign nations. The quota system is repeated in the ¡952 and ¡956 Sugar Acts. ¡952 On March ¡0 Fulgencio Batista ousts President Carlos Prío Socarrás, igniting a trend of increased violence against Batista’s regime until he is deposed in December ¡958. ¡953 U.S. o‡cials give little attention to the Fidel Castro–led raid on the Moncada military barracks in Santiago de Cuba. ¡954 At the International Conference of American States foreign ministers meeting in Caracas, the head of the Cuban delegation, Dr. Miguel Angel Campa, declares that international communism is a threat to the hemisphere and that it must be checked. ¡956 Fidel Castro returns to Cuba after a brief exile in Mexico. With him are a small band of followers who conduct a guerrilla war that topples the Batista regime two years later. ¡957 The New York Times publishes a series of articles by Herbert Matthews about

253 Fidel Castro’s guerrilla operations in the Cuban mountains. In Cuba, the stories contribute to increased violence against the Batista regime.

¡958 In March the United States terminates military assistance to the Batista government. On New Year’s Eve Fulgencio Batista leaves Cuba for the Dominican Republic ¡959 On January 8 Fidel Castro arrives in Havana to a tumultuous welcome, and within a month he is prime minister. In April Fidel Castro visits the United States and Canada. President Dwight D. Eisenhower avoids meeting him. Vice President Richard Nixon finds Castro naïve about communism. At the Organization of American States meeting in August in Santiago, Chile, the United States secures the approval of a declaration against intervention, intended for Cuba, that serves as the basis for a guerrilla movement against the government of the Dominican Republic. ¡960 On February ¡3, while visiting Havana, Soviet deputy premier Anastas Mikoyan signs a twelve-year trade pact with Fidel Castro. Fidel Castro decrees a Nationalization Law on July 5, which is used to legalize the subsequent confiscation of U.S.–owned businesses on the island. On July 6 President Eisenhower invokes a ban on the importation of the remainder of Cuban sugar quota for the year. Before the United Nations on September 26, Fidel Castro describes U.S. policy toward Cuba as economic aggression. On October ¡9 President Eisenhower declares a trade embargo on Cuba with the exception of food and medicine. The embargo remains in e›ect into 2003. Under the program “Operation Pedro Pan,” ¡4,048 Cuban children are flown from the island to Florida from ¡960–¡962. ¡96¡ On the eve of leaving the presidency, Eisenhower severs diplomatic relations with Cuba following Fidel Castro’s demand

Chronology that the U.S. embassy sta› in Havana be cut from 87 to ¡5. In April a brigade of ¡,400 Cuban-exile, CIA–trained soldiers land at the Bay of Pigs. They are quickly defeated by the Cuban army. The event strengthens Fidel Castro’s grip on Cuba. In August, at Punte del Este, President John F. Kennedy initiates the Alliance for Progress that seeks to improve the basic human needs for people across Latin America. Cuba denounces the program as yet another example of U.S. determination to dominate Latin America.

¡96¡ December ¡96¡ President John F. Kennedy approves “Operation Mongoose,” CIA–directed sabotage program against Cuba’s infrastructure and sugar operations. Included are potential assassination plots against Fidel Castro. President Lyndon Johnson cancels the program in April ¡964. ¡962 Meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January the Organization of American States expels Cuba from the organization. For ¡3 days in October the world stands on the brink of nuclear disaster as the United States faces down the Soviet Union over its placement of o›ensive missiles in Cuba. ¡964 Meeting in Washington, D.C., the Organization of American States, at the insistence of the United States, votes economic and political sanctions against Cuba. In February ¡964 Fidel Castro shuts o› water supplies to the Guantánamo Naval Base. President Lyndon Johnson responds with the firing of Cuban workers on the base and the construction of desalination equipment to make the base self-su‡cient in water. Between October ¡0 and 28. An estimated 5,000 Cubans flee the island by boat via Camarioca. A total of 250,56¡ Cubans are flown out of Cuba from ¡965–¡973 to the United States on “Freedom Flights” before Fidel Castro abruptly ends the program. ¡965 Between October ¡0 and 28, an estimated 5,000 Cubans flee the island by boat via Camarioca.

Appendix ¡ ¡966 The U.S. Congress approves the Cuban Adjustment Act that grants permanent residence to any Cuban who flees the island and reaches the U.S. mainland safely. ¡970 A small crisis develops over the alleged Soviet placement of Y-class submarines in Cienfuegos, Cuba, in violation of the ¡962 Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding that ended the missile crisis. ¡973 In February the United States and Cuba sign an anti-hijacking agreement in hope of putting an end to the taking of aircraft and sea vessels by Cubans who want to escape the island. ¡975 The Ford administration votes with the Organization of American States to lift the ban on Cuba’s economic and political isolation from the hemisphere, leaving each nation to pursue its own course. Ford maintains the U.S. embargo. ¡977 The United States and Cuba establish “Interests Sections” in each other’s capital. ¡978 A minor-crisis arises over the alleged Soviet placement of MIG 23Ds in Cuba. The reports turn out to be incorrect. Due to political relations between the Carter White House and the Congress, the presence of Soviet ground troops causes public alarm in the United States. ¡980 Between April and September, Castro permits the exodus of ¡25,262 Cubans to the United States, including The ill and infirm and hardened criminals. The Cuban American National Foundation is established in Miami. Comprised of Cuban conservatives, the foundation and its chief, Jorge Más Canosa, come to have significant influence on U.S. policy. ¡984 The United States and Cuba sign an immigration accord that provides for the orderly admission of 20,000 Cubans per year into the United States. Castro terminates the agreement a year later.

¡985 The United States establishes Radio

254 Martí to beam news and informational programs into Cuba.

¡992 Television Martí is established to beam live television programs into Cuba. As with Radio Martí, the Cuban government jams the broadcasts, putting in doubt their e›ectiveness. The Cuban Democracy Act, or Torricelli Bill, is signed in October. Its purpose is to prohibit U.S. subsidiaries in third countries from trading with Cuba and to bar from the U.S. for six months any ships that stop at Cuban ports. ¡994 Between late July and early September an estimated 36,000 Cubans escape the island to seek refuge in the United States. The crisis ends on September 9, ¡994, with a new immigration agreement between the United States and Cuba. ¡996 In Februrary the Cuban air force shoots down two unarmed Cessnas allegedly over Cuban waters, killing four of the pilots, three of whom are Cuban Americans. The crisis leads directly to the passage of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic (Libertad ) Solidarity Act, or Helms-Burton Bill. In March the U.S. Congress passes and President Bill Clinton signs the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton bill). The bill provides the president with authority to punish foreign companies and their executives who operate nationalized U.S. properties in Cuba. Clinton and President George W. Bush suspend the enforcement of those provisions. ¡998 Pope John Paul II makes an unprecedented visit to Cuba in January during which he calls for greater personal freedom in Cuba and for the United States to end its embargo. ¡999 President Clinton modifies trade restrictions with Cuba to permit the cash-only sale of food, agricultural supplies, and medicines. The Baltimore Orioles major league baseball team splits a two-game series in March with a Cuban all-star team. The Orioles win

255 the game in Havana but lose on their home field in Baltimore.

¡999–2000 An international crisis ensues following the rescue of five-year old Elian González from waters near the Florida coast. The boy was attempting to escape Cuba in a makeshift raft with his mother and stepfather, who had died enroute. After legal haggering the U.S. government’s abduction of Elian from a relative’s home in Miami, he was returned to Cuba in June 2000.

Chronology 2002 President George W. Bush announces that there will be no changes in the U.S. embargo policy toward Cuba. He instructs the Treasury Department to clamp down on U.S. citizens traveling to Cuba and to limit the number of visas to Cubans attempting to come to the United States. In September 285 U.S. agribusiness companies hold a fair in Cuba in hope of winning $50 million in contracts.

Appendix 2

Internet Sites American Chamber of Commerce of Cuba

Cuba Policy Foundation www.cubafoundation.org

www.amchamcuba.org/

An organization of senior diplomats in former Republican Party administrations opposed to trade embargo on Cuba. Often consulted by the communications media. The site contains position statements.

Promotes contacts among people willing to do business and Cuba and provides information regarding the limitations spelled out in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton bill).

Department of State: The United States and Cuba

CANF

www.canfnet.org

www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/cuba/

The o‡cial news site of the Cuban American National Foundation. Contains news stories and commentary and directs searchers to its reports about Cuba.

Serves as a permanent archive of o‡cial information related to United States–Cuban relations released prior to June 20, 200¡.

Center for International Policy: Cuba Project

Department of State, O‡ce of International Information Program: United States and Cuba

www.ciponline.org/cubanew/

www.usinfo/state.gov/regional/ar/US– Cuba

Sponsored by a Washington, D.C., research center, Its Cuba project is critical of U.S. policy toward Cuba. The site o›ers position papers and analyses of U.S. policies.

Provides a collection of documents, position papers, and o‡cial statements on current U.S. policy toward Cuba.

CIA Factbook

www.odci.gov/publications/factbook/geus/ us/html

Granma International

Reference source that provides encyclopedic information about Cuba’s geography, government, transportation, and military.

Granma, Cuba’s o‡cial newspaper, presents news, commentary, and opinion as reflected by the Cuban government.

www.granma.cu/ingles/index.html

256

Appendix 2 Havana Home Page

www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/cu¡/ wwwhmain.html

The o‡cial site for the U.S. Interests Section located in the Swiss embassy in Havana, Cuba. In addition to describing its functions, the site provides information regarding current U.S.–Cuban relations.

Public Broadcasting System Online News Service

www.pbs.org/newshow/bb/latin_america/cuba

Provides a summary of recent events in United States–Cuban relations.

United States–Cuba Relations

www.rose-hulman.edu/m/dellacova/ U.S.-Cuba.html

257 Provides photos, news clippings, and articles on U.S.–Cuban relations since ¡998.

United States–Cuba Sister Cities Association www.uscsca.org

Site for those the U.S. cities linked to their counterparts in Cuba. It describes various sister cities activities, including exchange programs.

United States–Cuba Trade and Economic Council www.cubatrade.org/

Established in ¡994, the council provides information and analysis on economic, commercial, and political relations between the United States and Cuba.

Appendix 3

Audiovisual Materials After the Missile Crisis: Forty Years of Covering Cuba. 90-minute video, Museum of Television and Radio, 2002. Includes brief footage of the crisis followed by a panel discussion of U.S. television news coverage of Cuba.

Covering Cuba. ¡¡4-minute video, AB Independent Productions, ¡995. Examines the realities of living in Cuba before and after the Revolution as contrasted with the vastly di›erent portrayal of Cuba and Fidel Castro in the U.S. media.

The Bay of Pigs. 57-minute video, PBS, ¡997. Combines footage and interviews to explore the event and the long-term e›ects it has had upon the two countries.

Crisis in Central America. 60-minute video, PBS, ¡985. Examines the causes of the Cuban Revolution in ¡959, Fidel Castro’s rise to power, Cuban support of revolutions abroad, and the evolution of tensions with the United States.

Bay of Pigs Declassified. 50-minute video, A & E Home Entertainment, 2000. Drawing upon recently released documentation, scholars analyze the ill-fated invasion, its place in the Cold War, and how it continues to color U.S.–Cuban relations.

Crossing Borders: A Cuban Returns. 49minute video, Cinema Guild, ¡998. Tells the story of Loyola Marymount Professor Dr. Magaly Lavendez on her return to her native Cuba.

Black and White in Exile. ¡62-minute video, Cutting Edge Entertainment, ¡997. The story of Cubans and Haitians in the United States and their struggle to survive. Cold War: Episode ¡0. 60-minute video, CNN Productions, ¡998. A review of the ¡962 missile crisis within the broader context of U.S. and Soviet Cold War policies.

Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War. ¡25-minute video, PBS, 2000. An account of the U.S. war with Spain in ¡898, which eventually led to U.S. control of the island. Explains the U.S. experiment with imperialism that it later decided against.

Conflict in Cuba: Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis. 50-minute video, the History Channel, ¡998. Documents the events leading to the Cuban missile crisis and the political atmosphere surrounding the crisis.

Cuba. ¡56-minute DVD video, Ironhill Pictures, 2000. Portrays various faces of Cuba, including the history of mobsters and revolutionaries and Cuba’s music and dance in the prerevolutionary days.

258

259 Cuba. 25-minute video, National Geographic Society, ¡990. Discusses the transformation under Castro, showing improvements in education and health care as well as problems with housing and transportation. Cuba: A Portrait. 60-minute video, World’s Together, 200¡. Takes the viewer across Cuba from Havana to Isla de Juventude in the south and Baracoa in the far west. Cuba: The Children of Fidel. 60-minute video, Films for the Humanities, ¡998. Examines the lives of thirteen Cuban women representing a cross section of Cuban society and their experiences of living in Castro’s Cuba. Cuba: Days of Decision, 26-minute, ¡6-mm. film produced by WCKT, Miami, Florida, ¡959. A five part series on the Cuban Revolution. Includes footage of Batista and several of his followers fleeing Cuba and of Eloy Gutiérrez-Menoyo of the anti-Castro Second Front of Escambray. Cuba: Holding Back the Tide. 29-minute video, Films for the Humanities, ¡996. Examines the problems that face the Cuban people and raises the question about Fidel Castro’s ability to remain in power. Cuba: In the Shadow of Doubt. 58-minute video, Filmmakers Library, ¡992. Describes U.S. and Cuban relations from the SpanishAmerican War in ¡898 to ¡992. Cuba and the U.S.: Feuding Neighbors. ¡8minute video, Knowledge Unlimited, 2000. Examines the history of the animosity between the two countries since ¡898. Cuba at the Crossroads. 29-minute video, Center for Defense Information, ¡996. Discusses Cuba in the post–Soviet era and its possible relationship to the United States. Cuba at the Crossroads: The Roots of the Revolution. 35-minute video, Cinema Guild, ¡999. An American filmmaker travels throughout Cuba examining the current social and economic realities experienced by the average citizen of Cuba.

Audiovisual Materials Cuba Va! The Challenge of the Next Generation. 57-minute video, Cuba Video Project, ¡993. Considers Cuba’s future from the perspective of Cuba’s youth as they discuss the economic crisis of the early ¡990s and the need for change. The Cuban Excludables. 57-minute video, Richter Productions, ¡994. Depicts the plight of the detainees and the human rights abuses they su›ered after the ¡980 Mariel boat lift. The Cuban Missile Crisis. 90-minute video, Museum of Television and Radio, 2002. Includes footage of the crisis followed by a panel discussion of how television covered the crisis. Cuban Roots/Bronx Stories. 57-minute video, Latin American Video Archives, 2000. Highlights the journey of a black Cuban family that migrated from Cuba to the Bronx in ¡962. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. 52minute video, C-SPAN Archives, 2002. Rumsfeld, Senator Tad Stevens, and journalists tour the detention facilities known as Camp X-Ray and the naval base at Guantánamo Bay. Destiny of Empires: The Spanish American War of ¡898. ¡20-minute video, Films for the Humanities, ¡998. A two-part program that explores the causes, characteristics, and political consequences of the war. The Double Crossing. 37-minute video, Ergo Media, ¡992. Presents the story of 900 Jewish refugees escaping Nazi Germany in ¡939 but denied entry in Cuba and forced to return to Europe. Escape from Cuba. 50-minute video, Filmroos, 2000. The story of fourteen Cubans who fled the island in ¡997. Export TV: An Anatomy of an Electronic Invasion. 25-minute video, Cinema Guild, ¡990. Discusses issues related to U.S. television broadcasting to Cuba. Fidel. ¡39-minute DVD, Artisan Home Entertainment, 2002. Portrayals Castro’s life including interviews with his wife, mistress, and female cohorts.

Appendix 3

260

Fidel Castro: Betrayed Hope. 50-minute video, Home Vision Entertainment, 2000. Demonstrates Fidel Castro’s charisma that helped to maintain him in power for forty years.

José Martí and Cuba Libre. 60-minute video, Films for the Humanities, ¡00¡. Critically examines the life of Fidel Castro’s idealism and the milestones that shaped the Cuban historical experience.

Fidel Castro: Big Man, Small Island. 50minute video, Films for the Humanities, 200¡. A biography of Fidel Castro from his school days to the present time.

Julio 26. 34 minutes, ¡6mm., WCKT, Miami, Florida, ¡959. The story of the Cuban Revolution, including the character of Fulgencio Batista’s regime and interviews with Fidel Castro and several of his colleagues.

Forbidden Depths. ¡04-minute video, Discovery Channel Communications, ¡998. U.S. and Cuban scientists explore the rich but relatively unknown waters of the Cuban coast. Greener Grass: Cuba, Baseball, and the United States. 60-minute video, PBS, 2000. Documents how the two countries have used baseball as a political tool and how the sport has operated both as a bridge and barrier between the two lands. Guantánamo Bay Migrant. ¡34-minute video, U.S. Marine Corps, ¡999. Provides historical introduction to Guantánamo Bay, its geographical orientation, and various operations, there including the housing of Cuban exiles and Al Quada prisoners from the war on terrorism. Havana Nagila: The Jews in Cuba. 56minute video, Schnitzki & Stone Video, ¡995. A history of the Jews in Cuba from the time of Christopher Columbus to the present. I Love Lucy: Lucy Goes Cuban. 80-minute video, Columbia House Video, ¡988. Three episodes from the television series I Love Lucy in which the American-born Lucy meets her Cuban in-laws. Inside Castro’s Cuba. 5¡-minute video, Filmmakers Library, ¡994. Filmed over a year in Cuba, this documentary presents the economic and political conditions within Cuba. Includes glimpses of Fidel Castro. Inside the Cuban Missile Crisis. 33-minute video, Films for the Humanities, ¡998. Based upon the recently released tapes at the John F. Kennedy Library revealing the inside policy debates.

Look Here: Fulgencio Batista. 29-minute video, NBC Television, ¡957. The first live program to be transmitted from Cuba to the U.S. Commentator Martin Agronksky describes Havana as a fortresslike city and interviews Batista about the assassination attempts on his life. Last Days of the Revolution. 60-minute video, PBS, ¡994. Illustrates the hardships of the Cuban people during the “special period,” and examines the impact of the U.S. embargo and the shift in U.S. immigration policy. Latin Legends. 50-minute video, Rick Levy Management Firm, 2000. Examines the diverse aspects of Afro-Cuban music, including the rumba, mambo, cha-cha-cha, and the meregue. Libertad: The Dark Untold Story of Castro’s Cuba. 90-minute video, Bougainvillea Films, 2000. Portrays the struggle of a Cuban artist to flee Cuba in a raft. The Lure of Empire. 30-minute video, The Learning Corporation of America, ¡970. Centers on the debate on the floor of Congress for the islands of Cuba gained during the United States war with Spain in ¡898. A New Cuban Crisis. 37-minute video, Filmmakers Library, ¡998. A presentation about the ¡996 shooting down of two Brothers to the Rescue planes allegedly in Cuban waters. Includes international reaction to the incident. October Fury. The History Channel, 2002. Reveals that while Kennedy was negotiating with Khrushchev for the removal of Soviet

261

Audiovisual Materials

missiles from Cuba in October ¡962, four Soviet submarines were stalking U.S. navy vessels in the Caribbean.

cuses on pop music developed in Cuba and examines how North Americans began to discover this island’s musical treasures.

La Otra Cuba/The Other Cuba. 94-minute video, Connoisseur Meridian Films, ¡998. Recounts Cuba’s political history from Fulgencio Batista’s ¡952 coup d’ état to the ¡980 Mariel exodus.

Saving Elian. 60-minute video, PBS, 200¡. Documentary report about the five-year-old Cuban boy rescued from the waters o› Florida’s coast in 2000 who became the focus of a struggle between Cuba and the United States and within the Cuban American community.

Our House in Havana. 58-minute video, Cultural and Educational Media, 2000. Follows the experience of a 68-year-old Cuban exile who returns to her homeland for the first time in almost 40 years. Pope John Paul II: The Conscience of the World. 60-minute video, BWE Video, ¡998. Celebrates the 20th anniversary of Pope John Paul, containing footage of his world’s travels, including to Cuba. Portrait of Castro’s Cuba. 9¡-minute video, Ambrose Video, ¡99¡. Actor James Earl Jones explores Cuba as it has become under Fidel Castro. A Rebel with a Cause : Death of a Man, Birth of a Legend. 26-minute video, Films for the Humanities, 2000. The story of the capture of Ernesto “Che” Guevara in Bolivia in ¡967 and the legend he left behind. Remember the Maine: Roots of the Spanish American War. 50-minute video, Films for the Humanities, ¡998. Traces the roots of the war to Spain’s desire to maintain its colony when confronted by U.S. imperialism and the desire of most Cubans for complete independence. Rivals: J.F.K. vs. Khrushchev. 46-minute video, Republic Pictures, ¡998. Focuses upon the two key figures in the Cuban missile crisis and how they reacted to the situation at the time. Roots of Rhythm: The Fiery Romance. 60minute video, New Video Group, ¡997. Fo-

Talking with Cuba. 29-minute video, Center for Defense Information, ¡998. Contains discussions with Americans and Cubans about the growing dialog on military, political, and academic issues. Thirteen Days. ¡42-minute video, New Line Cinema, 2003. Movie starring Kevin Costner that examines the missile crisis of October ¡962. 20th Century with Mike Wallace: Cuba and Castro. 60-minute video, A & E Television, ¡998. An examination of Cuba since ¡959 and the dominant place Fidel Castro has in it. The Uncompromising Revolution. 80minute video, Telemation, ¡989. Provides a brief history of Cuba and then discusses the nationalization of American businesses, Soviet aid and weapons, and Cuba’s role in Latin America, Africa, and Central America. Voices of Cuba. 54-minute video, Landmark Video, 200¡. Examines the lives of Cubans from ghetto residents to the privileged communist elite. The people speak about the Revolution, the e›ects of the U.S. embargo, and the hope for their country in the 2¡st century. Voyage of the Damned. ¡37-minute video, AVID Home Entertainment, ¡992. The movie of the same title, starring Faye Dunaway, about the German Jews escaping Nazism in ¡939 only to be turned away by the Cuban government and forced to return to Europe.

Bibliography Reference Works

Franklin, Jane Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History. Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, ¡997. Provides a brief summary of events on a year-by-year basis, emphasizing the years since ¡959. Langley, Lester D. The Cuban Policy of the United States: A Brief History. New York: John Wiley and Sons, ¡968. Although dated, this is still a valuable and readable volume that provides the general themes through the rise of Fidel Castro. Leonard, Thomas M. Castro and the Cuban Revolution. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, ¡999. A review of the Cuban experience that led to Castro’s revolution and Cuba’s place in the international arena since ¡959. Mazarr, Michael J. Semper Fidel: America and Cuba ¡776–¡988. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, ¡988. A study of the political relations between the two countries. Pérez, Louis A. Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy. Athens: University of Georgia Press, ¡990. Although this study presents the interests of each nation, the author leaves no doubt that the United States dominated the relationship. Smith, Robert Freeman. The United States and Cuba: Business and Diplomacy, ¡9¡7–¡960. New Haven, Conn.: College and University Press, ¡960. A very critical assessment of U.S. business interests in Cuba.

Figueredo, Jorge S. Cuban Baseball: A Statistical Abstract, ¡878–¡96¡. Je›erson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, 2003. While largely a compilation of statistical data about Cuban baseball teams, the introductory comments for each year provide insights into the sport’s connection to the United States. Martínez-Fernández, Luis; D. H. Figuerado; Louis A. Pérez, Jr.; and Luis González, eds. Encyclopedia of Cuba: People, History, Culture. 2 vol. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2003. An excellent source that covers all aspects of the Cuban experience. Pérez, Louis A., Jr. Cuba: An Annotated Bibliography. New York : Greenwood Press, ¡988. Although dated, this is an important volume to use when searching for historical literature about Cuba. _____. A Guide to Cuban Collections in the United States. New York; Greenwood Press, ¡99¡. For those wanting to use primary resources in their research, this is an indispensable guide to the location of important collections. Suchlicki, Jaime. Historical Dictionary of Cuba. 2d ed. Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 200¡. Provides brief accounts of important events and personalities in Cuba.

Surveys

Nineteenth Century to ¡895

Foner, Philio S. A History of Cuba and Its Relations with the United States. 2 vol. New York: International Publishers, ¡962–¡965. An analysis of the U.S. impact upon Cuba’s internal development from ¡492 to the end of the nineteenth century.

Atkins, Edwin F. Sixty Years in Cuba. Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press, ¡926; reprint, New York: Arno Press, ¡980. Personal account of a U.S. sugar tycoon in Cuba covering ¡866 to ¡909.

262

263 Beisner, Robert I. From Old Diplomacy to the New, ¡865–¡900 Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, ¡986. Important study for understanding the broad trends of U.S. foreign policy in the years leading up to the Spanish-American War. Belohlavek, John. “Let the Eagle Scream!” The Foreign Policy of Andrew Jackson. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, ¡995. Includes an excellent discussion of U.S.–Spanish relations over trade issues with Cuba. Ettinger, Amos A. The Mission to Spain of Pierre Soulé, ¡853–¡855: A Study in the Cuban Diplomacy of the United States. New Haven: Yale University Press, ¡932. A most-detailed account of the mission. Foner, Philip S. A History of Cuba and Its Relations with the United States. 2 vol. New York: International Publishers, vol. ¡, ¡962; vol. 2, ¡965. Foner asserts that Spain’s imperialistic practices weakened its control over Cuba and opened the door to U.S. economic penetration of the island after ¡845. Gri‡n, Charles C. The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, ¡8¡0–¡822: A Study of the Relations of the United States with Spain and with the Rebel Spanish Colonies. New York: Columbia University Press, ¡937; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, ¡968: Gives brief attention to Cuba in the larger context of the issue of independence. Harris, Sheldon Howard. “The Public Career of John Louis O’Sullivan.” Ph.D. diss. Columbia University, ¡958. The only full account of O’Sullivan’s interest in Cuban a›airs. La Feber, Walter. The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, ¡860–¡898 Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, ¡963. Important for understanding the U.S. economic reasons for overseas expansion in the late nineteenth century. Mahan, Alfred T. The Influence of Seapower upon History, ¡660–¡783. ¡2th ed. Boston: Little, Brown, ¡949. An important work for understanding the “large policy” that contributed to late-nineteenth–century expansion sentiment in the United States. Points to the strategic need for naval bases in the Caribbean, including Cuba. May, Robert E. The Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire, ¡854–¡86¡. Baton Rouge : Louisiana State University Press, ¡973. An excellent analysis of the antebellum south’s e›orts to extend U.S. possessions into the Caribbean, including Cuba, for the purpose of preserving slavery in the United States. Monghan, Jay. Abraham Lincoln Deals with Foreign Policy: A Diplomat in Carpet Slippers. 2d ed. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, ¡997. A com-

Bibliography prehensive study of Lincoln’s diplomacy, including the minor role that Cuba occupied. Nevins, Allan Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the Grant Administration. New York : Dodd, Mead and Company, ¡936. An excellent narrative of Fish’s diplomatic e›orts regarding Cuba during the Ten Years’ War. Nichols, Roy F. Franklin Pierce: Young Hickory of the Granite Hills. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, ¡958. Provides a good description of government policy amidst pressure from the southern states to expand into Cuba. Pinchon, Edgcumb. Dan Sickles: Hero of Gettysburg and “Yankee” King of Spain. Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, Doran, ¡943. A sympathetic and general account of Sickles’s diplomatic activities in Madrid, but more about his personal relations and social life. Pletcher, David M. The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon and the Mexican War. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, ¡973. Provides an excellent discussion of President James K. Polk’s Cuban policy. Poyo, Gerald E. “With All, and for the Good of All”: The Emergence of Popular Nationalism in the Cuban Communities of the United States, ¡848– ¡898 Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, ¡989. A most-important study for understanding the diversity of the Cuban community in the United States during the nineteenth century. Reid, Robert F. Edward Everett: Unionist Orator. Westport: Greenwood Press, ¡990. Should be used in conjunction with Paul A. Varg’s biography to understand Everett’s Cuban policy. Remini, Robert V. Henry Clay: Statesman for the Union. New York: W.W. Norton, ¡99¡. Provides a good discussion of U.S. policy toward Cuba during the anticipated Colombia-Mexico invasion of the island in the ¡820s to liberate it from Spanish control. Tabouis, Geneviéve. The Life of Jules Cambon. Translated by C.F. Atkinson. London: Johnathan Cape, ¡938. Provides a description of Cambon’s role on behalf of Spain in brokering an end to the fighting in Cuba in August ¡898. Van Deusen, Glyndon G. William Henry Seward. New York : Oxford University Press, ¡967. A lengthy biography of Seward that briefly discusses the place that Cuba occupied in U.S. Civil War diplomacy. Varg, Paul A. Edward Everett: The Intellectual in the Turmoil of Politics. Selingsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, ¡992. Places Cuba within the broader policy context during Everett’s brief tenure as secretary of state. Wilkerson, Marcus W. Public Opinion and the

Bibliography Spanish-American War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, ¡932. While dated, the volume provides keen insights into the U.S. public response to events in Cuba. Wisan, Joseph. The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press. New York: Columbia University Press, ¡934. The volume, while dated, is important for understanding the sensationalism of the “yellow press” and its coverage of events in Cuba.

Spanish-American War and the U.S. Occupation of Cuba, ¡895–¡902 Acheson, Sam H. Joe Bailey: The Last Democrat. New York: Macmillan, ¡932. Discusses Bailey’s pro–Cuban sympathies and his struggles on the floor of the House of Representatives to challenge the Republican Party’s e›orts to thwart the crusade toward war. Burton, David. Theodore Roosevelt: The Confident Imperialist. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, ¡968. An analytical study that brings Roosevelt’s global vision into focus. Clymer, Kenton J. John Hay: The Gentleman as Diplomat. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, ¡973. A sympathetic study of Hay that provides some insights into his role in the making of Cuban policy. Coolidge, Louis A. Orville H. Platt: Old Fashioned Senator from Connecticut. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, ¡9¡0. Although dated, the work’s importance lies in an understanding of the making of the Platt Amendment and of the tenor of the times. Dobson, John M. Reticent Expansionist: The Foreign Policy of William McKinley. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, ¡988. Along with Lewis Gould’s Spanish-American War, provides an excellent explanation and analysis of McKinley’s policy regarding Cuba. Eggert, Gerald G. Richard Olney: Evolution of a Statesman. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, ¡974. An important study of President Grover Cleveland’s secretary of state and his Cuban policy. Foner, Philip S. The Spanish-Cuban–American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, ¡895– ¡902. 2 vol. New York: Monthly Review Press, ¡972. An exhaustive study that is very sympathetic to the Cuban cause and highly critical of U.S. intentions and policies. Garraty, John A. Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, ¡953. An exhaus-

264 tive study of a prominent statesman, his advocacy of U.S. expansion, and his role in the formulation of U.S. Cuban policy. Gould, Lewis. The Spanish-American War and President McKinley. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, ¡982. This work should be consulted, along with John M. Dobson’s Reticent Expansionist, for an understanding of McKinley’s Cuba policy. Healy, David. Drive to Hegemony: The United States and the Caribbean, ¡898–¡9¡7. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, ¡988. Healy places Cuba within the larger context of U.S. policy toward the Caribbean region at this important time period. Jessup, Philip C. Elihu Root. 2 vols. New York : Dodd Mead, ¡936. Although dated, the work provides insights into Root’s understanding of Cuba and his role in formulating Cuban policy during the U.S. military occupation period. Kaplan, Edward S. U.S. Imperialism in Latin America: Bryan’s Challenges and Contributions, ¡900– ¡920. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, ¡998. Provides some discussion of the issues surrounding the Spanish-American War, but places greater emphasis on events from ¡902 to ¡920. Kern, Robert. Liberals, Reformers, and Caciques in Restoration Spain, ¡875–¡909. Albuquerque : University of New Mexico Press, ¡974. The work makes an important contribution to the understanding of shifting political tides in Spain and their relationship to Spain’s Cuban policy. Kirk, John M. José Martí: Mentor of the Cuban Nation. Tampa: University of Florida Presses, ¡982. A concise work that provides an excellent understanding of Martí’s vision for Cuba’s future. Koenig, Louis W. Bryan: A Political Biography of William Jennings Bryan. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, ¡97¡. Places Bryan’s position regarding U.S. expansion at the turn of the ¡9th century into the broader spectrum of his political career. Leech, Margaret. In the Days of McKinley. New York: Harper Brothers, ¡959. Provides an understanding of the U.S. political arena and its impact upon the formulation of Cuban policy. Linderman, Gerald F. The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish-American War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, ¡974. A study of U.S. domestic reactions to the war in Cuba. Lockmiller, David A. Enoch Crowder: Soldier, Lawyer and Statesman. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, ¡955. The story of Crowder’s e›orts to bring political reforms to Cuba during the first twenty years of the twentieth century are included in this biography.

265 _____. Magoon and Cuba: A History of the Second Intervention in Cuba, ¡906–¡909 New York : Greenwood Press, ¡969. An excellent account of the U.S. occupation of Cuba under Magoon’s tutelage. McWilliams, Tenant S. Hannis Taylor: The New Southerner as an American. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, ¡978. Provides an excellent understanding of Taylor’s experience as U.S. ambassador to Spain during the Cleveland administration. Morris, Edmund. The Rise of Teddy Roosevelt. New York: Madison Library, 200¡. A detailed study of Roosevelt’s life through the Spanish-American War. O›ner, John L. An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba, ¡895–¡898. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, ¡992. The most-comprehensive study of the formulation of U.S. policy leading to the war and the subsequent peace negotiations. Pérez, Louis A., Jr. Cuba between Empires, ¡878– ¡902. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, ¡983. A detailed and critical analysis of U.S. policy toward Cuba from the end of the Ten Years’ War through the independence of Cuba from Spain in ¡898 and of the U.S. military occupation in ¡902. Robinson, William A. Thomas B. Reed: Parliamentarian. New York: Dodd, Mead, ¡930. A study of Reed’s political career that gives brief attention to his role in U.S.–Cuban policy debates in ¡897 and ¡898. Rubens, Horatio S. Liberty: The Story of Cuba. New York: Brewer, Warren and Putnam, ¡932. The account of Cuba’s independence as told by a key member of the New York Junta. Smith, Joseph. The Spanish-American War: Conflict in the Caribbean and the Pacific, ¡895–¡902. London: Longman House, ¡994. A concise study of the U.S. military role in the war for Cuban independence. Walters, Everett. Joseph Benson Foraker: An Uncompromising Republican. Columbus: Ohio History Press, ¡948. Provides a brief account of Foraker’s role in Cuban a›airs in ¡897 and ¡898.

Cuba Under the Platt Amendment, ¡903–¡933 Benjamin, Jules. The United States and Cuba: Hegemony and Dependent Development, ¡880–¡934. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, ¡977 Demonstrates the dominance of the United

Bibliography States over Cuban politics and the increasing economic dependency of Cuba upon the United States. Clark, J. Reuben. Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O‡ce, ¡930. Clark’s reassessment of the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine and the rejection of Theodore Roosevelt’s corollary to it that justified U.S. interventions in the Caribbean region, including Cuba. De Conde, Alexander. Herbert Hoover’s Latin American Policy. New York : Octagon Books, ¡970. An excellent study of U.S. policy in the late ¡920s and the movement toward the Good Neighbor policy. Ellis, Lewis E. Frank B. Kellogg and American Foreign Policy. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, ¡96¡. A comprehensive examination of Kellogg’s work as secretary of state that demonstrates the growing U.S. disinterest in Latin American political a›airs during the ¡920s. Ferrell, Robert H. “Frank B. Kellogg,” vol. 2 of American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy, edited by Samuel Flagg Bemis. New York : Cooper Square Publishers, ¡980. A general discussion of Kellogg’s foreign policy including his lack of interest in Cuban a›airs. _____. The Presidency of Calvin Coolidge. Lawrence: Regent’s Press of the University of Kansas, ¡998. A comprehensive study of the Coolidge presidency. Provides only a few insights into his Cuban policy. Gilderhus, Mark T. Pan Americanism: Woodrow Wilson and the Western Hemisphere. Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, ¡986. Important for its description of Wilson’s vision for a democratic Latin America and the reality of politics he confronted. Glad, Betty. Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusion of American Innocence: A Study of American Diplomacy. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, ¡966. This volume challenges the conventional wisdom by asserting that the U.S. was involved in world a›airs during the ¡920s. Gonzáles Echeverria, Roberto. The Pride of Havana: A History of Cuban Baseball. New York: Oxford University Press, ¡999. An important work for telling the story of Cuban baseball including its connection to the same game in the United States. Gould, Lewis A. The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. Lawrence : University Press of Kansas, ¡99¡. Important for its explanation of Roosevelt’s changing attitude regarding the “moral” intervention in Cuba after ¡905. Grieb, Kenneth. The Latin American Policy of War-

Bibliography rant G. Harding. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, ¡970. A comprehensive study that illustrates the growing U.S. disenchantment with the internal a›airs of Latin American nations. Hodgson, Godfrey. The Colonel: The Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson. New York: A. A. Knopf, ¡970. Provides insights into the lack of U.S. interests in Latin America’s political a›airs during the ¡920s. Link, Arthur S. Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at His Major Foreign Policies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, ¡957. Still an important work that illustrates the primacy of World War I during Wilson’s administration despite his early professed interest in Latin America. Marks, Frederick T., III., Velvet on Iron: Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, ¡973. Despite its scope, the volume provides only a few insights into Roosevelt’s Cuban policy. McCoy, Mary Ellen. “Guantánamo Bay: The United States Naval Base and Its Relationship With Cuba.” Ph.D. diss., University of Akron, ¡995. An examination of relations between the United States and Cuba regarding the naval base. Minger, Ralph. William Howard Taft and U.S. Foreign Policy. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, ¡975. Provides some information regarding Taft’s Cuban policy. Murphy, Marion E. The History of Guantánamo Bay. Guantánamo Bay, Cuba: District Publications and Printing O‡ce, ¡953. Although dated, the volume relates the naval significance and development of the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Pérez, Louis A., Jr. Cuba under the Platt Amendment,¡902–¡934. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, ¡986. A comprehensive study of Cuba’s economic and political development. It is critical of U.S. policy intentions and practices. Scholes, Walter V. The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, ¡970. Like Ralph Minger’s Taft, there are a few insights regarding Taft’s policy toward Cuba. Sobel, Robert. Coolidge: An American Enigma. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishers, ¡998. Illustrates the primacy of domestic a›airs over those of international concern during the Coolidge administration. Tulchin, Joseph. The Aftermath of War: World War I and U.S. Policy toward Latin America. New York: New York University Press, ¡97¡. Provides an explanation of the factors contributing to the United States loss of interest in Latin American a›airs during the ¡920s.

266 United States. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, ¡9¡4–¡920. 2 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O‡ce, ¡939– ¡940. The most informative source regarding U.S.–Cuban relations during World War I. _____. _____. Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Sixth International Conference of American States, Held at Havana, Cuba, January ¡6 to February 20, ¡928. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O‡ce, ¡928. The o‡cial U.S. report on the conference. It contains discussion of Latin American criticism of U.S. interventionist policies in the Caribbean region and Cuban President Gerardo Machado’s conference address.

From Batista to the Revolution, ¡934–¡959 Ameringer, Charles. The Cuban Democratic Experience: The Auténtico Years, ¡948–¡952. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000. An excellent study of Cuba’s political dynamics during this crucial period and some discussion on Cuba’s relations with the United States. Beaulac, Willard L. The Fractured Continent: Latin America in Close-up Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, ¡980. The memoirs of a career U.S. diplomat that provide some personal insights regarding Cuba. Benjamin, Jules R. The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, ¡990. An excellent analysis of U.S. relations with the government of Fulgencio Batista in the ¡950s. Bonsal, Philip W. Cuba, Castro and the United States. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, ¡97¡. The personal account of the U.S. ambassador to Cuba from January ¡959 until his recall in October ¡960. Braden, Spruille. Diplomats and Demagogues: The Memoirs of Spruille Braden. New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, ¡97¡. Although Braden magnifies his role in several instances, the volume provides important insights into the years he served as ambassador to Cuba. Butler, Michael. Cautious Visionary: Cordell Hull and Trade Reform, ¡933–¡937. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, ¡997. Cuba is placed within the broader context of global free trade as a means of combating the world depression and as a means of curtailing conflict among nations. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In-

267 ternational Conciliation: Consultative Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, September 23 to October 3, ¡939 [Meeting in Panama]: Text of the Final Act and Statement by Sumner Welles. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ¡940. Contains the final agreement of the Panama conference that established a security zone around the Western Hemisphere. _____. International Conciliation: Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, Habana, Cuba, July 2¡–30, ¡940: Text of the Final Act and Statement by Sumner Welles. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ¡940. Contains the final agreement reached at Havana. Central Intelligence Agency. Inspector General. Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation and Associated Documents. Completed in the fall of ¡96¡, the report places responsibility for the failure of the April ¡96¡ Bay of Pigs operation at President Kennedy’s doorstep. A complete copy of the document is available at the National Security Archive, located at Gellman Library, George Washington University. Coats, John D. “A Matter of Perspective: U.S. Policy toward the Caribbean Basin during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, ¡96¡– ¡965.” Ph.D. diss., Texas A&M University, ¡995. An excellent study of presidential policies toward the Caribbean during the early ¡960s. It concludes that both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson perceived an international communist threat to the region. Figueroa, Javier. “Creating Paradise: The CubanAmerican Struggle for Control of Cuba’s Economic Development, ¡944–¡948.” Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, ¡985. An excellent analysis of the nationalistic policies of Cuban presidents Ramón Grau San Martín and Carlos Prío Socarrs and Cuba’s relationship with the United States. Gellman, Irwin F. Roosevelt and Batista: Good Neighbor Diplomacy in Cuba, ¡933–¡945. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, ¡973. For the time period covered, this volume is the most complete work on United States–Cuban relations. _____. Secret A›airs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, ¡995. A study of the relationship between the president and his closest foreign policy advisors regarding Latin America. Contains a few insights not found in his Roosevelt and Batista. Grover, Steven F. “U.S.–Cuban Relations, ¡953–

Bibliography ¡958: A Test of Eisenhower Revisionism.” In Eisenhower: A Century Assessment edited by Günter Bischo› and Stephen E. Ambrose. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, ¡995. Places greater responsibility than do others upon President Eisenhower for the failures of U.S. policy toward Cuba, particularly in the late ¡950s. Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, ¡948. Important for providing the personal insights of the secretary of state during all but the last year of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency. Immerman, Richard H. John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, ¡999. An excellent analysis of Dulles’s foreign policy and, like all others, indicates the lack of attention Dulles gave to Cuba. Kesler, James C. “Spruille Braden as a Good Neighbor: The Latin American Policy of the United States, ¡930–¡947.” Ph.D. diss., Kent State University, ¡985. A survey of Braden’s diplomatic career that provides a brief account of his experience in Cuba. Lazo, Mario. Dagger in the Heart. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, ¡968. A damning criticism of U.S. policy in Cuba that led to the communization of the island. Lazo, born in the United States, practiced law in Cuba for nearly forty years before the revolution. Long, Paul. “United States Foreign Policy towards Cuba and the Prospects for Democratization.” M.A. thesis, McGill University, Toronto, Canada, ¡995. An early, but valuable assessment of U.S.– Cuban relations immediately after the end of the Cold War. Noble, J. Bernard. Christian A. Herter. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, ¡970. Provides insights into Herter’s role in the U.S. attempt to bring hemispheric pressure upon Cuba in ¡959 and ¡960. Pan American Union. Eighth International Conference of American States, Lima, Peru, December 9–27, ¡938. Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, ¡939. A summary of the conference proceedings. _____. Steps Taken by the Pan American Union in Fulfillment of the Resolutions Adopted at the Eighth International Conference of American States and the Three Meetings of the Ministers of Foreign A›airs of the American Republics. Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, ¡943 Mimeographed. Provides a general summary of the antisubversive activities applied by the western hemispheric nations (except Argentina and Chile) against Axis nationals during World War II.

Bibliography Paterson, Thomas G. Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, ¡994. An exhaustive scholarly study of U.S.–Cuban relations during the final years of the Batista regime. Pratt, Julius W. Cordell Hull. Vols. ¡2 and ¡3 of American S bert H. Ferrell. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, ¡964. Provides a positive description of Hull’s tenure as secretary of state. Rabe, Stephen G. Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, ¡988. Places Cuba in the larger context of the Eisenhower administration’s Latin American policies. Rawls, Shirley N. “Spruille Braden: A Political Biography,” Ph.D. diss., University of New Mexico, ¡976. A study of Braden’s life that includes a detailed account of his ambassadorship to Cuba. Smetherman, Bobbie B. “United States Military Assistance to Cuba: An American Viewpoint.” Ph.D. diss., Claremont Graduate School and University Center, ¡967. Provides the framework in which the U.S. military policy developed after World War II, with a special focus upon Cuba. Smith, Earl E. T. The Fourth Floor: An Account of the Castro Communist Revolution. New York : Random House, ¡962. The memoir of the last U.S. ambassador to Cuba during the Batista regime. Smith places blame upon policymakers in the State Department for the success of the Castro revolution. Steward, Dick. Trade and Hemisphere: The Good Neighbor Policy and Reciprocal Trade. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, ¡975. An excellent analysis of Cordell Hull’s trade reciprocity program and Cuba’s place within the broader spectrum Stiller, Jesse H. George S. Messersmith, Diplomat of Democracy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, ¡987. A study of Messersmith’s diplomatic career including his two years as ambassador to Cuba. Taylor Commission. “Narrative of the Anti-Castro Cuban Operation Zapata, June ¡3, ¡96¡.” “Memorandums for Record of Paramilitary Study Group Meetings, April 22–May 25, ¡96¡.” The record of the commission appointed by President John F. Kennedy to investigate the reasons for the failure of the Bay of Pigs Operation. A complete copy of the document is available at the National Security Archive, located at Gellman Library, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. United States. Department of State. Report of the Delegate of the United States of America to the

268 Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics Held at Panama, September 23–October 3, ¡939. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O‡ce, ¡940. A summary of the conference proceedings and resolutions approved by the delegations regarding the neutrality and security of the Western Hemisphere following the outbreak of World War II. _____. _____. Report of the Delegation of the United States of America: Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotá, Colombia, March 30–May 2, ¡948. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O‡ce, ¡948. A summary of the conference proceedings and the resolutions approved by the delegations regarding the establishment of the Organization of American States. _____. _____. Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, Buenos Aires, Argentina, December ¡–23, ¡936. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O‡ce, ¡937. A summary of the conference proceedings and resolutions approved by the delegations. Of significance is the Cuban role in gaining approval of a resolution that defined the meaning of intervention in a nation’s internal a›airs. _____. _____. Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Seventh International Conference of American States, Montevideo, Uruguay, December 3–26, ¡933. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O‡ce, ¡934. A summary of the conference proceedings and the resolutions approved by the delegations. The most important issue regarding Cuba was the adoption of a resolutions ending intervention as a policy tool. _____. _____. Report of the Delegates of the United States to the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign A›airs, Meeting in San José, Costa Rica, August 22–29, ¡960. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O‡ce, ¡960. A summary of the discussions and resolutions adopted, including the declaration against the intervention in the Western Hemisphere by an extracontinental power, a clear reference to the growing Soviet-Cuban connection. _____. _____. Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Tenth Inter-American Conference, Caracas, Venezuela, March ¡–28, ¡954. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O‡ce, ¡955. A summary of the discussions and resolutions adopted regarding the subversive threat of communism to the Western Hemisphere and for regional economic and social development. _____. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Communist Threat to the United States through the

269 Caribbean: Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Internal Security Laws. 86th Congress, ¡st Sess., ¡959. Extensive hearings on both the domestic and international threat of communism to the United States, concluding that other Castro-type revolutions were possible and, if successful, would endanger U.S. interests in the Caribbean. Welch, Richard E. Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, ¡959– ¡96¡. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, ¡985. A valuable study of Eisenhower and Kennedy policies and the U.S. public opinion from Castro’s arrival in Havana through the Bay of Pigs invasion. Welles, Benjamin. Sumner Welles: FDR’s Global Strategist. New York: St. Martin’s Press, ¡997. This broad sweep of Sumner Welles’s career, written by his son, provides some insight into the assistant secretary’s understanding of Fulgencio Batista. Wright, Stephen J. “Cuba, Sugar and the United States: Diplomatic and Economic Relations during the Administration of Ramón Grau San Martín, ¡944–¡948.” Ph.D. diss., Pennsylvania State University, ¡983. A study of Cuba’s determination to secure its place in the U.S. sugar market rather than explore the possibilities of U.S. assistance for economic diversification.

Since the Revolution, ¡960–2003 Baker, James A. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, ¡989–¡99¡. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, ¡995. Secretary of State James A. Baker discusses his long and close relationship with George H.W. Bush and their perception and policy on international a›airs, including those of Cuba. Ball, George. U.S. Policy toward Cuba. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O‡ce, ¡964. Department of State Publication 7690, Inter-American Series 88. Written by the undersecretary of state at that time, the pamphlet describes the Cuban threat to hemispheric security and justifies the pursuance of its isolation by the Johnson administration. Blight, James; Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch. Cuba on the Brink. New York: Pantheon Books, ¡993. Considered by many analysts as the best study of the ¡962 Cuban Missile Crisis, it includes discussions from participants including Robert McNamara and Fidel Castro. Brands, H.W. The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon John-

Bibliography son and the Limits of American Power. New York: Oxford University Press, ¡995. Contains a discussion of the Johnson administration’s concern with Fidel Castro spreading his revolution throughout the circum–Caribbean region. Brenner, Philip. From Confrontation to Negotiation: U.S. Relations with Cuba. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, ¡988. Focuses upon the ¡980s and provides an excellent outline of the U.S. and Cuban positions on issues a›ecting their bilateral relations. Brown, Seymour. The Crisis of Power: An Interpretation of United States Foreign Policy during the Kissinger Years. New York: Colombia University Press, ¡979. Presents the policy options before the Ford administration during the Angolan crisis in ¡974 and ¡975. Brune, Lester. The Cuba-Caribbean Missile Crisis of October ¡962. Claremont: Regina Press, ¡996. A brief analysis of the missile crisis. The volume is also important for its references to the major sources on the topic. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: The Memoirs of the National Security Advisor New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux, ¡983. The memoir of the head of the National Security Council during the Carter administration, this volume is important for understanding Brzezinski’s mistrust of the Soviet Union. Bundy, William. A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency. New York: Hill and Wang, ¡998. Provides brief accounts of U.S. policy regarding the Soviet construction of a naval facility at Cienfuegos, Cuba, in ¡970 and Cuba’s adventure into Angola in ¡974 and ¡975. Bush, George H.W., and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, ¡998. The president and his national security advisor discuss international a›airs from ¡989 to ¡99¡. Provides some insights into Cuban policy. Coats, John D. “A Matter of Perspective: United States Policy towards the Caribbean Basin during the Kennedy and Johnson Administration, ¡96¡–¡965.” Ph.D. diss., Texas A & M University, ¡995. The author argues that Kennedy and Johnson held similar views regarding policy toward the Caribbean basin based upon its concern with the spread of communism. Cohen, Warren J. Dean Rusk. Totowa, N.J.: Cooper Square Publishers. Provides a brief discussion of Rusk’s role in the ¡96¡ Bay of Pigs invasion and the ¡962 missile crisis and in formulating Cuban policy during the Johnson administration. Conde, Yvonne M. Operation Pedro Pan: The Untold Exodus of ¡4,048 Cuban Children New York: Routledge, ¡999. An excellent discussion of the

Bibliography program that brought Cuban children to the United States immediately after the Cuban Revolution, including their lives to the present. Congressional Research Service. Cuba: Background and Current Issues for Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January ¡7, 200¡. Prepared by the Latin American specialists of the CRS, the report provides an excellent understanding of the issues a›ecting U.S.–Cuban relations at the beginning of the George W. Bush presidency. Council on Foreign Relations. U.S.–Cuban Relations in the 2¡st Century. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002. A bipartisan task force recommends greater contact between the Cuban American community in the United States and other Americans with people and groups on the island of Cuba. Its recommendations contrast sharply with the policies pursued by the George W. Bush administration. Cuban American National Foundation. Bush on Cuba: Selected Statements by the President. Miami: Cuban American National Foundation, ¡99¡. A collection of documents, excerpted speeches, quotes from press conferences, and other statements by Bush between ¡98¡ and ¡99¡. Individually and collectively, they clearly indicate Bush’s anti–Castro position. Dominguez, Jorge I. To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, ¡989. An examination of Fidel Castro’s foreign policy, demonstrating both its defensive character to secure the island and to capitalize upon civil discontent in the Third World. Erisman, H. Michael. Cuba’s Foreign Relations in a Post-Soviet World. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000. Erisman supplements the material from his early study on Cuban foreign policy to include policy after ¡99¡. Gleijeses, Piero, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa, ¡959–¡976. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002. An exhaustive and scholarly analysis of the conflicting policies of the United States and Cuba regarding the latter’s interests in Africa. Haig, Alexander M., Jr. Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy. New York: Macmillan, ¡984. Haig, who served as secretary of state for the first ¡8 months of the Reagan administration, presents a harsh assessment of the Cuban connection to Central America. Hersh, Seymour. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. New York : Summit Books, ¡983. Provides a brief account of the Soviet construction of a naval facility at Cienfuegos, Cuba in ¡970.

270 Hillsman, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. New York: Doubleday, ¡967. A personal account by one of Kennedy’s advisers. Valuable for insights regarding Cuba. Johnson, Lyndon Baines. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, ¡963–¡969. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, ¡97¡. Unfortunately, the president provides very little insight into his Cuban policy. Kennedy, Robert. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: W.W. Norton, ¡969. A recounting of the decision making by the president’s Executive Committee (EXCOM) during the crisis of October ¡962. Kissinger, Henry. The White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, ¡979. Nixon’s National Security Advisor tells the story of the Soviet naval facility at Cienfuegos, Cuba from his perspective. _____. Years of Upheaval. Boston: Little Brown and Company, ¡982. Provides very little information regarding the Cuban adventure into Angola. Kyvig, David E., ed. Reagan and the World. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishers, ¡990. A collection of essays by specialists in the world’s regions. Collectively, the essays provide a good understanding of Reagan’s global perspective. Levine, Robert M. Secret Missions to Cuba: Fidel Castro, Bernardo Benes and Cuban Miami. New York: Palgrave, 2002. The account of Bernado Benes’s trips to Cuba on behalf of the Carter and Reagan administrations and the consequences he endured from Miami’s Cuban American community. Masud-Piloto, Felix. From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants: Cuban Migration to the U.S., ¡959–¡995. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, ¡996. A brief discussion of Cuban émigrés to the United States. Morley, Morris H. Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, ¡952–¡986. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, ¡987. An exhaustive analysis of U.S.–Cuban relations that emphasizes Washington’s e›ort to dominate Cuba before and after the revolution. The e›ort failed largely because global events militated against it. _____, and Chris McGillion. Unfinished Business: America and Cuba after the Cold War, ¡989– 200¡. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2002. As a follow-up volume to Morley’s previously mentioned book, the authors cover the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton presidencies in some detail. There is some mention of George W. Bush. Well researched, the volume is very critical of U.S. policy toward Cuba. Olson, James, and Judith Olson. Cuban Americans:

271 From Trauma to Triumph. New York: Twayne Publishers, ¡995. A discussion of the adaptation to life in the United States by Cubans who fled Castro’s Cuba. Organization of American States. General Secretariat. Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign A›airs: Collection of Final Acts. 2 vols. Washington, D.C.: ¡984. An important primary source for tracing the increased Latin American opposition to the OAS–imposed sanctions against Cuba and its abrogation in ¡975 during the OAS meeting in San José, Costa Rica. Oye, Kenneth P.; Robert J. Lieber and Donald Rothchild, eds. Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy. Boston: Little, Brown, ¡987. An assessment of Reagan’s foreign policy during his first term in o‡ce by respected scholars in the field. Pastor, Robert A. Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, ¡992. Pastor served as the Latin American specialist on the National Security Council during the Carter presidency. While largely defensive of Carter’s policies, the volume is important for understanding Carter’s Latin American policy. Provides some insights into relations with Cuba. Roy, Joaquin. Cuba, the United States, and the Helms-Burton Doctrine: International Reactions. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000. Excellent study about the formation of the Helms-Burton Bill in ¡996 and the international reaction to it, particularly in Europe. Schoenbaum, Thomas C. Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy and Johnson Years. New York: Simon and Schuster, ¡988. Excellent analysis of Rusk’s role in the making of Cuban policy during the Kennedy and Johnson years. Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State. New York: Scribner, ¡993. Provides personal insights into the attitude and policy of the Reagan administration toward Cuba. Shultz describes Cuba as a Soviet proxy in the Caribbean region and in Angola. Skoug, Kenneth N., Jr. The United States and Cuba under Reagan and Schultz: A Foreign Service O‡cer’s Report. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, ¡996. A participant’s critical account of U.S. policy toward Cuba in the ¡980s. Smith, Wayne S. The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.–Cuban Relations Since ¡957. New York: W.W. Norton, ¡987. The memoir of a former U.S. diplomat stationed in Cuba and head of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. Smith is extremely critical of U.S. pol-

Bibliography icy toward Cuba. The volume is particularly valuable for understanding the Carter period. Spencer, Donald S. The Carter Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur Style of Diplomacy. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, ¡988. A very critical analysis of Carter’s global policies. Important for its insights on African policies. Szulc, Tad. The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years. New York: Viking Press, ¡978. A damning account of Nixon’s foreign policy, including his Cuban policy. Tambs, Lewis, ed. A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties: Report of the Committee of Santa Fe. Washington, D.C.: Council for Inter-American Security, ¡98¡. Many of the committee’s recommendations for a hard-line policy toward Cuba were adopted by the Reagan administration. Thornton, Richard C. The Carter Years: Towards a New Global Order. New York: Paragon House, ¡99¡. Includes an informative discussion of Carter’s policies regarding Cuba. _____. The Nixon Kissinger Years: The Reshaping of American Foreign Policy. St. Paul, Minn.: Paragon House, 200¡. Provides a brief discussion of the administration’s policy during the Angolan crisis of ¡974 and ¡975. Tulchin, Joseph S. “The Promise of Progress: U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Administration of Lyndon Johnson.” In Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, ¡963–¡968, edited by Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker. New York: Cambridge University Press, ¡994. Demonstrates Johnson’s concern with communism throughout the hemisphere and explains his loss of confidence in the Alliance for Progress as a means to deal with the threat. United States. Department of State. Cuba. InterAmerican Series 66, publication 7¡7¡. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O‡ce, ¡96¡. Issued on the eve of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April ¡96¡, the paper asserts that Fidel Castro had betrayed the ideals of the Cuban Revolution. _____. _____. Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of OAS Ministers of Foreign A›airs, Meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, January 22–3¡, ¡962. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O‡ce, ¡962. Provides a summary of the deliberations that resulted in the exclusion of Cuba from the Inter-American system. Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign Policy. New York: Simon and Schuster, ¡983. The memoirs of the secretary of state during the Carter administration. The volume is

Bibliography important for an understanding of Vance’s willingness to seek accommodation with Cuba and his conflict over policy formulation with National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Walker, William, III. “The Struggle for the Americas: The Johnson Administration and Cuba.” In The Foreign Policies of Lyndon Johnson: Beyond Vietnam, edited by H.W. Brands. College Station: Texas A & M University, ¡999. A discussion of President Johnson’s e›orts to continue the isolation of Cuba from the rest of Latin America. Woods, Randall B. Fulbright: A Biography. New York: Cambridge University Press, ¡995. Fulbright was chairman of the Senate Foreign Re-

272 lations Committee during the ¡960s. This volume provides some insights into his criticism of policy toward Cuba in the ¡960s. Wyden, Peter. The Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story. New York: Simon and Schuster, ¡979. The first complete account, including interviews with participants, of the Central Intelligence Agency’s ¡96¡ operation to land Cuban exiles on the island to overthrow Fidel Castro. Zeiler, Thomas W. Dean Rusk: Defending the American Mission Abroad. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2000. A brief account of Rusk’s career that places Cuba in the larger perspective of foreign policy issues.

Index Aaron, David 4¡ ABC-Television 34, 6¡, 2¡4 Accessory Transit Company 82 Acheson, Dean 46, 55, ¡40 Act of Havana, ¡940 ¡07 Adams, John Quincy ¡, 7–8, 50, 76, ¡03, ¡¡0, ¡¡8, ¡4¡, ¡42, ¡48, ¡60, ¡6¡, 249 Advisory Law Commission 56, ¡30–¡3¡, 223 Afghanistan 45 Africanization Policy 8–9, 82, ¡44, ¡56, 249 Against All Odds 228 Agency for International Development 88–89 Agnew, Spiro 77 Agramonte, Roberto 55 Agrarian Reform Law, ¡959 26, 70, ¡73, 228 Agricultural Exhibition, 2002 ¡¡, 255 Agüero, Andrés Rivero 97, ¡2¡, ¡59, ¡75–¡76 Air Anti-Hijacking Agreement, ¡973 ¡2, 4¡, 250 Air Hijacking ¡¡–¡2, 92, ¡¡6, ¡23 Air Transport Association ¡2 Alarcón de Quesada, Ricardo ¡2, 53 Alaska ¡93 Albright, Madeline ¡8 Aldrich, Nelson A. ¡98, 2¡7 Alger, Russell 76, ¡95 Algeria 47 Allende, Salvadore 44 Alliance for Progress ¡2–¡3, ¡¡¡, ¡¡4, ¡5¡, ¡52, ¡53, 253 Alpha 66, 53, 59, 95 Al Qaeda Terrorists 93 American Chamber of Commerce, Havana 28, 78 American Society of Newspaper Editors 46, ¡73

American Sugar Refining Company 2¡8 American Telephone & Telegraph Company 26, 34, 6¡, 2¡4 American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance ¡07–¡08 Amnesty International 228 Anderson, Richard 50 Angelos, Peter ¡6 Angola 9–¡0, 4¡, 96, ¡84–¡85; see also Cuba: and Africa Anti-Expansionists, ¡898 ¡3–¡4, 98–99 Appeal to the Cuban People ¡35, ¡7¡ Arbenz, Jacobo 93, ¡08, ¡7¡ Archer Midland Daniels 36 Argentina ¡07, ¡¡2, ¡5¡, ¡53, ¡54, ¡55, ¡57, ¡8¡, 2¡3–2¡4 Arias, Oscar 49 Armour and Company ¡43 Arnaz, Desi, Jr. 59 Arthur, Chester A. 78, 205 Asia ¡99, 22¡ Asociación de Buen Gobierno ¡24 Asociación de Commerciantes de Habana ¡24 Asociación Nacional de Detalistas ¡24 Asociación Unión Nacionalista ¡24 Assassination Attempts see Operation Mongoose Atkins, Edward 2¡7, 2¡8 Attwood, William 47 Austria 233 Auténticos see Partido Revolucionario Cubano Autonomists ¡4 Bacardi Rum Company 28, 9¡ Bacon, Robert ¡78, ¡80, 204, 222 Baeza, Mario 53 Bailey, Joseph W. ¡4–¡5, ¡69 Baker, Howard 54 Baker, James, III ¡5, ¡50–¡5¡

273

Ball, George ¡38, ¡39 Ball, Lucille 59 Balladares, Ernesto Peréz ¡6 Balsero Crisis ¡994 ¡5–¡6, 93, 254 Baltimore Orioles ¡8, 254–255 Banker and Tradesman ¡92 Bankers’ Magazine ¡93 Barnet y Vingares, José 66 Barquín López, Rafael ¡6–¡7, ¡43 Baseball in Cuba ¡7 Basulto, José 29–30 Batista, Fulgencio 3–4, ¡¡, ¡6, ¡7, ¡8–20, 22, 25, 28, 37–40, 43, 47, 48, 55, 59, 65–67, 70, 83– 84, 86–88, 9¡–92, 93, 94, 95, 97, ¡05–¡06, ¡¡7, ¡25, ¡34, ¡35– ¡38, ¡43, ¡5¡, ¡55, ¡56, ¡58–¡59, ¡70, ¡72, ¡73, ¡75, ¡76, ¡77, ¡83– ¡84, ¡87, 200, 2¡¡, 222, 228, 237–238, 243–244, 245, 252, 253 Battle of Manila Bay, ¡898 2¡6 Battle of Santiago de Cuba, ¡898 8¡, ¡80, ¡95–¡96, 2¡6, 254 Bay of Pigs Invasion, ¡96¡ 20–22, 27, 33, 43, 44, 60, 65, 7¡, 74, 80, 95, ¡¡4, ¡¡5, ¡29, ¡34, ¡38, ¡49, ¡52, ¡54, ¡74, ¡8¡, ¡83, ¡97, 239, 253 Beach, Moses ¡62 Beals, Carlton 74 Beaulac, William 22–23, 55 Belgium ¡83 Bell, J. Franklin ¡30 Belt, Guillermo ¡08 Benes, Bernardo 4¡ Berger, Sandy 53 Berle, Adolf A. ¡¡4 Betances, Ramón 233 Betancourt, Cisneros ¡70 Betancourt, Rigoberto Herrera ¡8 Betancourt, Romulo ¡52 Beveridge, Albert J. 23 Bishop, Maurice 4¡, 88–89, ¡84

Index Black Warrior Incident, ¡854 23, ¡56, ¡60, ¡66, ¡88, 250 Blaine, James G. 23–24, 78, 79 Blanco y Erenas, Ramón 24, ¡¡8, ¡65, ¡96, 233, 234, 235 Bliss, Tasker 2¡8, 225 BM 63 Bohlen, Charles ¡38 Bolívar, Simón ¡02, ¡20 Bolivia 44, 93–94, ¡¡2, ¡40, ¡53, ¡54, ¡55, ¡8¡ Bolton, James 42 Bond Schemes 24–25 Bondholder’s Dispute, ¡934–¡940 25–26 Bonsal, Philip 4, 26–27, 70, 97, 98, ¡74, ¡87 Botellas 246 Bowles, Chester 2¡ Braddock, Daniel ¡75 Braden, Spruille ¡9, 27–28, 86, 97, ¡07, ¡77, 244 Bradlee, Ben 47 Brazil ¡¡2, ¡40, ¡5¡, ¡53, ¡54, ¡55, ¡57, ¡59, ¡8¡ Brezhnev, Leonid 44, ¡9¡ Bridges, Styles ¡75, 209 Brigade 2506 59–60, ¡34 Britain see Great Britain British see Great Britain British West Indies 242 Brooke, John R. 28–29, 96, ¡22, ¡79, 225–226, 239–240, 24¡– 242, 25¡ Brothers to the Rescue (BTTR) ¡5, 29, 53, 63, 2¡5, 254 Brotons, Elizabeth 85 Brown, Harold ¡9¡ Bru, Federico Laredo see Laredo Bru, Federico Bruce, David K. ¡40 Bryan, William Jennings 30–3¡, 52, 2¡7, 240 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 3¡, 40, 4¡, 229 Buchanan, James 2, 3¡–33, ¡56, ¡57, ¡60, ¡62–¡63, ¡88 Bundy, McGeorge 33, ¡38, ¡39, ¡50 Bureau of American Republics ¡04 Burke, Arleigh 22 Burriel, Juan 23¡ Burroughs Corporation 78 Burton, Dan 58, 62–63 Bush, George H. W. 5, ¡5, 49, 6¡, 62, 92, ¡34, 2¡2, 2¡4, 2¡5 Bush, George W. 5, 34–37, 42, 45, 63, ¡59, 2¡2, 2¡5, 254, 255 Bush, Jeb ¡¡, 35 Butler, Robert 37 Ca›rey, Je›erson ¡8, 37–39, 64, 84, 86, 87, 94, ¡05, ¡35–¡36, ¡77, 235, 252 Calderón de la Barca, Angel ¡2¡, 236

274 Calhoun, John C. 7, ¡20, ¡4¡, ¡42, Calhoun, William J. 39, ¡¡8, ¡26, ¡69 Camarioca Boat Lift, ¡965 39–40, 253 Cambino Cubano 30 Cambon, Jules 2¡6, 235 Camp Columbia, Havana ¡7, ¡8, 55, ¡83 Campa, Miguel Angel 55, ¡07, ¡09, 252 Campaneris, Bert ¡7, 59 Campbell, Robert B. 32 Canada 62, 63, ¡32, ¡65, 2¡2, 2¡3, 2¡4, 2¡5 Cañado, Valentín 56 Canalejas, José 40, 67 Cancilio Cubano 30 Canning, George 8, 50, 5¡, ¡42 Cannon, Joseph ¡27 Cánovas del Castillo, Antonio 52, ¡26, ¡49, 232, 233 Capehart, Homer E. 209 Capote, Domingo Méndez ¡45 Capri Hotel ¡55 Caracas Conference, ¡954 ¡04 Caracas Pact, ¡958 40, 65 Carajal, José de 230 Cárdenas, José 36 Cárdenas, Lázaro ¡37 Cargill Company 36 Caribbean 66, 73, 75, 86, 88, 93, 96, 98, ¡00, ¡03, ¡04–¡05, ¡¡0, ¡¡3, ¡¡7, ¡30, ¡3¡, ¡53, ¡57, ¡68, ¡93, ¡98, 204, 2¡9, 240, 244 Caribbean Committee for Economic Development 2¡3 Caridad Méndez, José de la Carillo, Jorge ¡6, ¡43 Caritas ¡8 Carnegie, Andrew 2¡7 Carrier Corporation 78 Carter, Jimmy 5, ¡0, 3¡, 33, 35, 40–43, 48, 88–89, 92, ¡¡6, ¡32– ¡33, ¡68, ¡9¡, 2¡4, 228, 254 Cason, James ¡¡, 36 Castro Ruz, Fidel 4–5, ¡¡–¡2, ¡3, ¡5–¡6, ¡8–20, 2¡–22, 26–27, 30, 34, 35, 36, 39–40, 4¡, 42–47, 48, 49, 50, 58, 60, 62, 66, 67, 70, 74, 75, 79, 80, 82, 85, 89, 9¡–93, 95, 97, ¡0¡, ¡04, ¡¡0–¡¡¡, ¡¡¡–¡¡2, ¡¡5, ¡¡6, ¡3¡–¡33, ¡34, ¡35, ¡38, ¡4¡, ¡43, ¡46–¡47, ¡49– ¡50, ¡5¡, ¡52, ¡53, ¡54, ¡55, ¡58, ¡65, ¡67, ¡68, ¡70–¡74, ¡75, ¡8¡, ¡87, 200, 203, 204, 209, 2¡2, 2¡5, 222, 228, 239, 252, 253, 254 Castro Ruz, Raúl ¡¡, 43, 44, 47– 50, 62, 9¡, ¡35, ¡70 Central America 45, 48–49, 82, 83, 86, 95, ¡8¡, ¡84, ¡68, 250 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 9–¡¡, 20–22, 33, 40, 60, 93, 7¡,

95, ¡¡4, ¡¡5, ¡29, ¡38, ¡49–¡50, ¡59, ¡7¡, ¡72, ¡73, ¡74, ¡89, 253 Cervera y Topete, Pascual ¡95 Céspedes, Carlos Manuel ¡8, 49, ¡25, ¡77, ¡84, 209, 237, 252 Céspedes, Pedro 230 Chadbourne, Thomas L. 20¡ Chadbourne Plan 20¡ Chamberlin, Joseph 2¡6 Chapara Sugar Plantation ¡36 Charter of Punta del Este, ¡96¡ ¡52, ¡53 Chase National Bank 87, ¡24 Chibás, Eduardo 49–50, ¡58, ¡64 Chile ¡07, ¡¡2, ¡5¡, ¡53, ¡54, ¡55, ¡57, ¡8¡, 2¡3 Chile Copper Company 94 China 47, 97, ¡¡6, ¡47, ¡74, ¡75, ¡93 Chomón, Fauré 65 Chrysler Corporation 2¡3 Church, Frank ¡9¡ Church & Tower Company ¡34 Cienfuegos see Soviet Naval Base Cintas, Oscar B. 237 Cisneros, Evangelina 246 Clark, J. Ruben 3, 50, 86, ¡98 Clark Memorandum see Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine Clay, Henry 50–5¡, ¡03, 249 Cleveland, Grover 30, 5¡–52, 79, 80, 89, ¡¡8, ¡¡9, ¡26, ¡42, ¡48, ¡49, ¡93, ¡98, 205, 207, 233, 246 Clinton, William J. (Bill) 5, ¡6, ¡8, 30, 35, 52–54, 62, 63, 95, ¡¡¡, ¡59, 204–205, 2¡2, 254 Coen, C. M. 6¡ Cold War 4, 33, 70, 93, ¡¡¡, ¡47, ¡77, 220 Colombia 44, 50, ¡02–¡04, ¡¡2, ¡53–¡54, ¡68, 2¡3, 25¡ Colombian-Mexican Plan, ¡826 50, 5¡, 249, 235 Columbus, Christopher 90 Colunje, Gil ¡03–¡04 COMECON 200 Commission to Integrate Social and Economic Conditions 38– 39 Committee of One Hundred ¡24 Communism 4, ¡3, ¡7, ¡9, 26, 27, 37, 67, 70, 98, ¡08, ¡09, ¡¡2, ¡¡4, ¡72, 252 Communist Party of Cuba see Partido Communista de Cuba Communist Popular Socialist Party ¡73 Compromise of ¡850 ¡2¡ Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba 22, 88 Confederación Nacional Obrera de Cuba (CNOC) ¡74 Conseco, José ¡7 Conservative Party 56, 57, 83, ¡36, 224

275 Continental Joint Task Force ¡9¡ Contras ¡84 Convention of the Rights and Duties of States, ¡933 ¡05 Cooley, Harold D. 203 Coolidge, Calvin 42, 54–55, ¡00, ¡04, ¡¡3, ¡24, ¡25 Cortína, José Manuel ¡06 Costa Rica 48, ¡32, ¡55, ¡68, 23¡ Council on Foreign Relations 54 Council of National Liberation ¡65 Creoles 7, 8, 9, 32, 53, 60, 75, ¡0¡, ¡02, ¡20–¡22, ¡23, ¡30, ¡44, ¡62, ¡66, ¡67, ¡82, ¡85, ¡96, 209, 227, 235, 239 Crescent City A›air, ¡852 55 Crimean War ¡60 Cristina, Maria (Queen Regent) ¡88, 208, 2¡7, 229, 232 Crittendon, John J. 236 Crittendon, William L. 236 Crowder, Enoch 3, 56–57, 64, 83, 96, ¡00, ¡24–¡25, ¡26, ¡30–¡3¡, 224, 24¡, 246–247, 25¡ Cuba: and Africa 9–¡¡, 3¡, 4¡, 42, 45, 89, 93, 229 see also Angola; coup d’état, ¡952 3–4, ¡8, ¡9, 22, 43, 55, ¡76, 222; foreign policy 5, ¡2–¡3, ¡5–¡6, 34, 35, 4¡–42, 55, 78, ¡05, ¡06; internal conditions 4, ¡5–¡6, ¡9, 22, 37, 38, 43–44, 45, 56, 64, 67–70, 78, 79, 82, 88, 94, 95, ¡¡5, ¡24, ¡26, ¡3¡, ¡32, ¡34, ¡36, ¡37, ¡46–¡47, ¡48, ¡6¡, ¡63, ¡64, ¡70, ¡75, ¡77, ¡78, ¡98–20¡, 2¡0, 2¡¡, 2¡3, 2¡8, 22¡, 222–224, 225–227, 238, 24¡, 243, 245; Public Works Law of ¡925 ¡24; revolution ¡7, 43, 44, 47, 67, 74, 9¡, ¡¡¡, ¡¡4, ¡70–¡7¡, ¡75, 20¡; Ten Years’ War ¡4, 49, 59, 69, 7¡, 75–76, 80, 83, 87, 96, ¡04, ¡22, ¡23, ¡33, ¡44–¡45, 209, 23¡, 238, 250; War for Independence ¡4, 39, 40, 42, 49, 5¡–52, 59, 67– 69, 7¡, 76, 80–8¡, 83, 84, 89, 90, 96, 99, ¡¡8, ¡¡9, ¡23, ¡26– ¡29, ¡33–¡34, ¡35, ¡36, ¡42, ¡45, ¡48–¡49, ¡63, ¡65–¡66, ¡70, ¡87, ¡9¡–¡92, ¡98, 204, 207–208, 209, 223, 229, 230, 23¡–235, 238–239, 246, 250 Cuba Commission to the United States, ¡898 60, ¡37 Cuba de Renovación ¡24 Cuban Adjustment Act, ¡966 58, 254 Cuban American Committee for Family Rights 34 Cuban American National Foundation 5, 34, 35, 36, 53, 58, 60, 6¡–62, 95, ¡34, ¡67, ¡68, 254

Cuban Americans ¡2, ¡6, 2¡, 27, 35, 36, 39, 40, 4¡, 58–60, 6¡, 62, 63, 82, 84, 85–86, 95, ¡¡¡, ¡32, ¡34, ¡50, ¡53, ¡66, ¡69, ¡73, ¡74, ¡8¡, ¡86, 209, 2¡2, 2¡4, 2¡5, 254 Cuban Assembly 42, 53, 60–6¡, 8¡, 85 Cuban Assets Control Regulations 2¡3 Cuban Bar Association ¡38 Cuban Company (Railroads) 226 Cuban Constitutions: ¡902 3, ¡6¡, ¡80, 227; ¡940 ¡9, ¡¡4, ¡¡7, ¡36– ¡37, 243 Cuban Council see New York Junta Cuban Democracy Act, ¡992 5, 34, 53, 54, 58, 6¡–62, 69, ¡34, 2¡4, 254 Cuban Dissident Task Force 54 Cuban Educational Association 80 Cuban Exiles see Cuban Americans Cuban Junta see New York Junta Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, ¡996 5, 29, 30, 35, 53–54, 57–58, 62–63, ¡34, ¡59, 2¡5, 254 Cuban Lobby 53, 57–58 Cuban Portland Cement Company ¡43 Cuban Ports Authority ¡64 Cuban Refugee Executive Committee ¡50 Cuban Republic 25, 60, 69–70, ¡44, ¡69–¡70, ¡94, ¡95 Cubana de Avación ¡59 Cubela, Rolando ¡50 Cueller, Mike ¡7 Cugat, Xavier 59 Curbelo, José 59 Cushing, Caleb 76, ¡66 Dallas, George 32 Dance of the Millions 63–64, 69, ¡99, 206, 243, 25¡ Daniel, Jean 47 Davis, Cushman 2¡6 Davis, Nathaniel 9–¡0 Day, William R. 25, 64, 207, 2¡6, 2¡7 Declaration of San José, ¡960 ¡52 Declaration of Santiago, Chile, ¡959 ¡5¡ Declaration of the People’s of America, ¡96¡ ¡52 Decree Law 5, 22; ¡936 26, 64– 65, ¡99 De Gaulle, Charles ¡40 Democratic Christian Movement ¡34 Democratic Revolutionary Front 65 Dewey, George ¡94, 2¡6

Index Dialogo Civico ¡38 Díaz-Balart, Lincoln 58, ¡¡¡ Dihigo, Martín ¡7 Dihigo y Lopéz, Ernesto 26 Dillon, C. Douglas ¡38, ¡52 Dingley Tari›, ¡897 206 Directorio Estudíantal Universatario ¡24, ¡64 Directorio Revolucionario Estudíantal 40, 65, 222 Dirksen, Everett 209 Dobrynin, Anatoly 96, ¡¡5, ¡40, ¡90, ¡9¡ Dodd, Christopher 54 Dodds, Harold W. 65–66, ¡36, 252 Dodge, Augustus 33 Dodge, G.W. 226 Dollar Diplomacy 3, 30, 66, ¡¡6, 204 Dominican Republic 84, 95, ¡¡2, ¡5¡, ¡52, ¡55, ¡7¡, ¡73, ¡78, ¡98, 220, 222, 23¡, 253 Dortícos, Osvaldo 66 Douglas, Paul A. ¡75 Douglas, Stephen A. 55, ¡63 Dow Chemical Company 78 Duke of Aldadôver del Rio 2¡6 Duke of Tetuán see O’Donnell y Abreu, Manuel Dulles, Allen 2¡–22, 79 Dulles, Eleanor Lansing 79 Dulles, John Foster 66–67, 79, ¡09, ¡¡6, ¡72, ¡87 Dupuy de Lôme, Enrique 24, 52, 67–68, 96, ¡27, ¡49, ¡66, ¡80, ¡92, 234, 242, 250 Dutch East Indies 20¡ Eagleburger, Lawrence ¡¡6 Eastern Europe 5, 34, 48, 89, ¡55, ¡89, 200 Eastland, James O. ¡75 Ecuador ¡¡2, ¡32, ¡5¡, ¡53, ¡55, ¡8¡ Eder, Dick 47 Egypt 96 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 4, 5, ¡9– 20, 26–27, 46, 66–67, 69, 70– 7¡, 97, 98, ¡08, ¡¡4, ¡3¡, ¡43, ¡46, ¡50, ¡5¡, ¡59, ¡7¡, ¡73, ¡74, ¡75, 20¡, 203, 204, 207, 2¡2, 253 Elkins, Stephen B. 229 El Salvador 48, 95, ¡05, ¡55, ¡68, ¡84 England see Great Britain Estrada Palma, Tomás 23, 25, 7¡– 72, 85, 90, 97, ¡23, ¡45, ¡58, ¡70, ¡78, 204–205, 222, 228, 25¡ Europe 7–8, 42, 50, 52, 62, 63, 66, 72, 76, 86, ¡06, ¡¡0, ¡¡3, ¡¡6, ¡34, ¡4¡–¡42, ¡45, ¡48, ¡55, ¡57, ¡62, ¡72, ¡78, ¡82, ¡83, ¡9¡, ¡99, 202, 2¡2, 2¡3, 2¡5, 2¡8, 22¡, 229, 230, 233, 234, 235, 245

Index European Economic Community 2¡3 Everett, Edward 72, ¡09, 249 EXCOM 33, 72, ¡¡5, ¡29, ¡38, ¡39, ¡8¡–¡82, ¡97 Expansion, United States 72–74 Export-Import Bank 38, ¡37, 2¡¡, 244 Facio, Gonzalo ¡55 Fair Play for Cuba Committee 74 Fallon, Christopher 32–33 Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) 48, ¡¡8, ¡84 Feinberg, Richard 53 Fillmore, Millard 55, 72, 74, 236, Finley, Carlos 74, 226 First Volunteer Cavalry see Rough Riders Fish, Hamilton 74–76, 87, ¡04, ¡44–¡45, 230, 250 Florida East Coast Railroad 78 Florida International University 54 Fomin, Aleksandr ¡40 Fontaine, Roger ¡68 Foot, Solomon 33 Foraker, Joseph 76–77, 99, 240, 242 Foraker Amendment 77 Forbes 75 Ford, Gerald R. 9–¡0, 34, 48, 6¡, 77–78, ¡¡5, ¡¡6, ¡47, ¡55, 2¡4 Ford Motor Company 2¡3 Fordney McCumber Tari›, ¡922 ¡99, 206, 25¡ Foreign Bondholder’s Protective Council 25 Foster, John W. 78–80, ¡¡6, 205, 250 Foster-Cánovas Reciprocal Trade Treaty, ¡89¡ 69 Fourth Floor ¡47 France 7–8, 32, 5¡, 72, 73, ¡03, ¡07, ¡¡0, ¡38, ¡4¡–¡42, ¡48, ¡56, ¡60, ¡62, ¡83, ¡87, 2¡3, 2¡4, 2¡6, 233, 235, 236 Frank, Waldo 74 Freedom Flights 79 Freedom House 54, 253 Frelinghuysen, Frederick T. 79–80 French see France Frente Civico Revolucionario Democratíco ¡38 Fry, Joseph 230 Frye, William P. 2¡6 Fulbright, J. William 2¡, 80, ¡75 Gaitán, Jorge E. 43 García, Calixto 60, 80–8¡, ¡22, 209, 232 García, Nestor ¡¡6 García Menocal, Mario see Menocal, Mario García Gardner, Arthur 70, 82, ¡7¡, ¡87

276 Garfield, James A. 23, 24 Garnica y Díaz, José de 2¡6 General Agreement on Trade & Tari›s (GATT) 88 General Motors 2¡3 General Society of Merchants and Businessmen of Cuba 2¡8 Germany ¡07, ¡¡7, ¡65, 2¡3 Gilpatric, Roswell ¡38 Giraudy, Angel ¡05 Goicuría, Domingo 82–83, 23¡, 250 Gold Kist Corporation 36 Goldwater, Barry ¡75, 209 Gómez, José Miguel 56, 66, 83, ¡¡7, ¡3¡, 202, 204, 222, 224, 246, 25¡ Gómez, Maximo see Gómez y Báez, Maximo Gómez, Miguel Mariano 39, 64– 65, 83–84, ¡06 Gómez y Báez, Maximo 52, 60, 80, 8¡, ¡23, ¡33, ¡43, ¡63, ¡65, ¡70, ¡75, ¡76, ¡77, 209, 223, 225, 23¡–233 González, Elián ¡2, ¡6, 58, 85–86, 255 González, Emilio 36 González, Juan Míguel 85 González, Lázaro 85 Good Neighbor Policy 27–28, 38, 39, 50, 57, 86–87, 9¡, 99, ¡00– ¡0¡, ¡05, ¡¡4, ¡76–¡77, ¡78, 2¡9, 236, 245, 25¡–252 Goodwin, Richard 209 Gorbachev, Mikhail 34 Gore, Al 35 Graham, Bob 58, 62 Granma 42, ¡70 Grant, Ulysses S. 75, 87, ¡04, ¡44, 230 Grau San Martín, Ramón 3, 4, ¡8, ¡9, 25, 28, 37, 49, 59, 86, 87– 88, 94, ¡05, ¡35, ¡37, ¡48, ¡58, ¡62, ¡64, ¡70, ¡77, ¡84, 202, 220, 22¡, 237–238, 252 Gray, George 2¡6 Great Britain ¡, 7, 32, 50–5¡, 68, 72, 73, 75, 83, 88, 90, 96, ¡00, ¡03, ¡¡2, ¡4¡, ¡42, ¡50, ¡56, ¡57, ¡60, ¡62, ¡64, ¡65, ¡83, ¡87, 200, 2¡3, 233, 236, 249 Great Depression 69, ¡24, ¡99, 20¡, 2¡0, 236 Greece 2¡2 Grenada 4¡, 45, 88–89, ¡68, ¡84 Gresham, Walter Q. 89–90 Grito de Yara 209 Gromyko, Andrei ¡90, ¡9¡ Grupo Domos 63 Guam ¡29, 2¡6, 2¡7 Guantánamo Bay see Guantánamo Bay Naval Base Guantánamo Bay Naval Base ¡6, 35, 45, 46, 47, 48, 90–93, ¡¡7,

¡73, ¡89, ¡96, 223, 243, 252, 253; Water Crisis, ¡964, 92, ¡¡¡– ¡¡2, ¡6¡, ¡62, 220, 25¡, 253 Guardiola, Santos 7¡ Guatemala 44, 48, 66, 70, 7¡, 93, ¡08, ¡¡2, ¡34, ¡7¡ La Guerra Chiquita 80, 83, 84 Guerrero, Gustavo ¡05 Guevara, Ernesto “Che” 9, 26, 43, 65, 93–94, ¡¡2, ¡35, ¡52, ¡53, ¡54, ¡70, 200 Guggenheim, Daniel 94 Guggenheim, Harry F. 94, ¡25, 25¡ Guiteras Holmes, Antonio 38, 94– 95 Gullón y Iglesias, Pío 229, 234 Gutiérrez, Lindo 36 Gutiérrez-Menoyo, Eloy 53, 65, 95 Haig, Alexander M. 48, 95–96, ¡68, ¡84, ¡90 Haiti ¡¡2, ¡5¡, ¡8¡, ¡85, ¡98 Haitian Refugees 93 Hale, Eugene 2¡7 Halperin, Maurice 53 Hamilton, Alexander ¡88 Hammarskjöld, Nut ¡2 Hanna, Mark ¡84, 2¡7 Harding, Warren G. 54, 57, 96, ¡00, 2¡9, 224, 246 Harrison, Benjamin 23, 79, 2¡7 Harrison, William Henry 89 Harvard University ¡77, 226 Havana Club ¡20, ¡2¡, ¡44, ¡56 Havana Declaration of Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation, ¡940 ¡07 Havana Hilton Hotel ¡55 Havana Riots, ¡898 ¡27, ¡9¡ Hawaii 89, ¡3¡, ¡99 Hawley-Smoot Tari›, ¡930 69, ¡24, ¡99, 206–207, 2¡0, 25¡ Hay, John 29, 6¡, 96–97, ¡77, ¡80 Hay-Quesada Treaty see Treaties, Isle of Pines Hays, Dennis 53 Hays, Wayne ¡75 Hearst, William Randolph 67, 245, 246 Helms, Jesse 36, 57, 58, 62–63 Helms, Richard ¡89 Helms-Burton Law see Cuba Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act ¡996 Hemingway, Ernest 97 Hernandez, Gerardo 30 Hernández, Liván ¡7 Hernández, Orlando ¡7 Herrera, Alberto 237 Herring, Hubert 39 Herter, Christen A. 27, 46, 67, 70, 97–98, ¡46, ¡52, ¡73 Hevia, Carlos 55

277 High Jackings see Air Hijackings History Will Absolve Me ¡70 Hitler, Adolf ¡36 Hoar, George 77, 98–99, 2¡7 Hoever, Charles E. 203 Holland see The Netherlands Holland, Henry ¡72 Holy Alliance ¡02 Honduras 46, 48, 84, ¡23, ¡55 Honest Cabinet 57, 247 Hoover, Herbert 99–¡00, ¡98, 20¡, 243, 25¡ Hotel Nacional ¡55 House, Edward M. 3¡, ¡57 Hruska, Roman ¡75 Hughes, Charles Evans 54, ¡00, ¡04, ¡¡3, 206, 2¡9, 25¡ Hull, Cordell 28, 39, 86, 87, ¡00– ¡0¡, ¡05, ¡06, ¡07, ¡¡7, ¡37, ¡8¡, 2¡0, 226, 236, 252 Human Rights 20, 34, 35, 36, ¡¡6 Hurricane Michelle 35, 36 Hurwitch, Robert ¡48 I Love Lucy 59 Immigration Agreement: ¡984 ¡6, ¡69, 254; ¡989 ¡2 Immigration to the U.S. ¡6, 58–60 Independence Movements and Cuba: Colombia Plan, ¡873– ¡874 ¡03–¡04; Colombia-Mexico Plan, ¡824–¡826 ¡02–¡03, ¡09; Latin America, ¡820–¡823 ¡0¡– ¡02; see also López, Narciso; Ten Years’ War and Cuba: War for Independence Independentistas 59, 82, ¡02, 227 India 2¡3 Industrial Cuba ¡63 Influence of Sea Power Upon History ¡3¡ Ingersoll, Robert S. ¡55 Integrated Revolutionary Organization (ORI) ¡58 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ¡53 Inter-American Commission on Territorial Administration ¡07 Inter-American Defense Board ¡¡4, ¡53 Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee ¡07 Inter-American Mutual Defense Pact ¡947 46 Interests Sections, Havana and Washington ¡6, 30, 36, 37, 4¡, 42, ¡32, 254 International Conferences of American States ¡04–¡09; ¡889, Washington, D.C. ¡04; ¡928, Havana 54, ¡04–¡05, 25¡; ¡933, Montevideo ¡05–¡06, ¡76, 252; ¡936, Buenos Aires ¡06; ¡938, Lima ¡06; ¡939, Panama ¡06– ¡07; ¡940, Havana ¡07, ¡¡7, 252;

¡942, Rio de Janeiro ¡07; ¡947, Rio de Janeiro ¡07, ¡08, 202– 203; ¡948, Bogotá ¡08, ¡5¡, 203; ¡954, Caracas ¡08–¡09 International Resistance Organization 228 International Sugar Agreement, ¡93¡ ¡49, 20¡ International Telephone & Telegraph Company 82 Interventions see United States: Interventions Iran Hostage Crisis, ¡980 229 Ireland, Bishop John ¡28, 229 Isle of Pines ¡6, ¡7, 90, ¡43, ¡6¡ Isle of Pines Treaty see Treaties, Isle of Pines Israel ¡72 Italy 2¡4, 233 Jackson, Andrew ¡09–¡¡0 Jackson, Jesse ¡0¡ Janney, Samuel M. 24–25, ¡45 Japan ¡¡2, ¡55, 2¡2, 2¡3, 2¡4 Je›erson, Thomas ¡, 8, ¡3, 32, 72, ¡02, ¡¡0, ¡4¡, ¡42, 249 Jewish Welfare Agency ¡83 Jews 252 JM-WAVE Radio ¡50 Johnson, Lyndon B. 47, 92, ¡¡¡– ¡¡2, ¡¡4, ¡¡5, ¡29, ¡3¡, ¡32, ¡38, ¡39, ¡47, ¡50, ¡54, ¡8¡, ¡83, 2¡2, 228, 229, 253 Johnson, U. Alexis ¡38 Joint Chiefs of Sta› 2¡, ¡25, ¡40 Joint Distribution Committee ¡83 Jones-Costigan Act, ¡934 4, 38, 69, 86, ¡0¡, ¡¡2, ¡77, ¡99, 202, 207, 2¡¡, 252 Jordan ¡90 Journal of Commerce & Commercial Bulletin ¡92, ¡93 Joven Cuba 94 J. P. Morgan & Company 247 Judah, Noble B. ¡¡3 Junta see New York Junta Jupiter Missiles ¡¡5 Juventad Socialista 47 Kansas-Nebraska Act, ¡854 74, ¡60 Kefauver, Estes ¡55 Kellogg, Frank B. 50, 54, ¡25 Kennedy, Edward M. 77, ¡47–¡48 Kennedy, John F. ¡¡, ¡2–¡3, 20–22, 33, 43, 74, 80, ¡¡¡, ¡¡2, ¡¡4–¡¡5, ¡47, ¡49–¡50, ¡52, ¡53, ¡55, ¡75, ¡8¡, ¡83, ¡97, 209, 2¡2, 239, 253 Kennedy, Robert F. ¡¡5, ¡29, ¡3¡, ¡38–¡4¡ Kennedy-Khrushchev Understanding, ¡962 95 Khrushchev, Nikita 43–46, ¡38– ¡4¡, ¡74, ¡82, ¡89, ¡90, ¡9¡, 204, 254

Index Kimball, William W. ¡94 King Alexander I 50 King Charles X ¡09 King Ferdinand VII 5¡, ¡02, ¡4¡ Kissinger, Henry A. 9–¡0, 54, 77, 95, ¡¡5–¡¡6, ¡46, ¡47, ¡76, ¡89– ¡90 Knox, Philander C. 66, ¡¡6, ¡62 Krome Detention Center, Miami 79 Landa, Gabriel ¡08 Landsdale, Edward ¡49 Lansing, Robert 79, ¡¡6–¡¡7, 240, 24¡, 243 Laos ¡8¡ Laredo Bru, Federico 25, ¡¡7, ¡07¡83, 243, 244, 245, 252 Latin America 3, ¡2, ¡3, ¡9, 2¡, 24, 27, 3¡, 33, 34, 36, 40, 4¡, 44, 45, 50, 5¡, 54, 62, 63, 66, 70, 7¡, 73, 76, 78, 79, 80, 86, 93, 96, ¡00, ¡0¡, ¡02, ¡03, ¡04, ¡05, ¡06, ¡07, ¡¡0, ¡¡¡, ¡¡2, ¡¡3, ¡¡4, ¡¡6, ¡37, ¡38, ¡39, ¡4¡–¡42, ¡45, ¡46, ¡47, ¡48, ¡5¡, ¡52, ¡53, ¡54, ¡55, ¡57, ¡62, ¡68, ¡74, ¡75, ¡76, ¡78, ¡80, ¡83, ¡89, ¡92, ¡98, 209, 2¡0, 2¡3, 2¡5, 220, 235, 236, 240, 245, 249, 252 Latin American Economic System (SELA) 44 Latin American Energy Organization 2¡3 Latin American Studies Association ¡59 Law, George 55–56 Lawton, H. L. 8¡ League of Nations 3¡, ¡¡7 Lebanon 96, 2¡2 Lee, Fitzhugh 24, 39, 52, ¡¡7–¡¡8, ¡26, ¡49, ¡9¡–¡92 Lee, Robert E. ¡¡8 Le May, Curtis ¡40 Lend-Lease 220, 244 Liberal Party 56, 57, 65, 83, ¡¡7, ¡23, ¡26, ¡3¡, 222, 223, 224 Lima Declaration, ¡938 ¡06 Lincoln, Abraham ¡¡8–¡¡9, ¡7¡, ¡86 Litton Industries ¡¡6 Lodge, Henry Cabot, Sr. 29, 73, 77, 9¡, ¡¡9–¡20, ¡79, 2¡7, 23¡, 24¡ Long, John D. 9¡, ¡77 López, Lazaro 208, 232 López, Narciso 74, ¡20–¡22, ¡44, ¡57, ¡62–¡63, ¡66, 236, 249 López Oliva, Enrique ¡8 Lorraine, Lambton 230 Lovett, Robert ¡38 Ludlow, William 29, ¡22, ¡79, 225, 24¡ Maceo, Antonio 84, ¡23–¡24, ¡33, ¡58, 209, 23¡–232

Index Machado, Gerardo 3, 49, 54, 83, 86, 87, 94, ¡00, ¡05, ¡¡3, ¡23– ¡25, ¡35, ¡36, ¡76, ¡98, 20¡, 2¡0, 236–237, 247, 25¡ Machado y Morales, Gerardo see Machado, Gerardo Mack, Connie 62 MacMillan, Harold ¡40 Madison, James ¡, ¡¡0, ¡29–¡30, ¡4¡, ¡42, ¡48, 249 Magoon, Charles 3, 23, 56 ¡30– ¡3¡, ¡78, ¡80, 204, 222–223 Mahan, Alfred T. 73, 90–9¡ ¡¡9, ¡3¡ USS Maine, sinking of ¡898 24, 30, 68, 99, ¡¡8, ¡¡9, ¡27, ¡28, ¡65, ¡66, ¡92, 229, 234, 246, 250 Mañé, Alberto ¡05 Manifest Destiny ¡–2, 73, ¡56, 23¡, 250 Mankiewicz, Frank ¡¡6 Manley, Michael ¡¡4 Mann, Thomas C. ¡¡¡, ¡3¡–¡32 Marcy, William L. 23, 32, ¡56, ¡60 Mariana Islands 2¡6 Mariel Boatlift, ¡980 ¡6, 37, 60, ¡0¡, ¡¡6, ¡32–¡33, 2¡4, 254 Marin, Muñoz ¡47 Marquez Sterling, Manuel ¡62 Marquis de Lafayette ¡88 Marshall, George C. ¡8¡ Martí, José 59, 69, 7¡, 80, 84, ¡23, ¡33–¡34, ¡43, ¡45, ¡58, ¡80, 23¡, 250 Martí y Peréz, José Julian see Martí, José Martin, Edward ¡38 Martin, John Bartlow ¡¡2 Martínez Campos, Arsenio ¡4, 23¡–232 Martínez Fraga, Pedro 25 Más Canosa, Jorge 34, 58, 6¡–62, ¡34, ¡67, 254 Mason, James ¡88 Mason, John Y. 2, ¡56, ¡60 Massey-Ferguson Australia 2¡3 Matos, Hubert ¡35 Matthews, Herbert 4, ¡9–20, 97, ¡35, ¡70–¡72, 252–253 McCone, John ¡38, ¡39 McCollum, Bill 62 McCook, John J. 24–25, ¡45 McGovern, George 42, ¡23 McKinley, William L. ¡5, 24, 28– 29, 39, 52, 6¡, 64, 67, 68, 76, 96, 99, ¡04, ¡¡8, ¡26–¡29, ¡3¡, ¡42, ¡63, ¡65, ¡77–¡78, ¡79, ¡80, ¡84, ¡93, ¡94, ¡95, ¡96, 205, 206, 207, 208, 2¡6–2¡7, 225, 227, 229–230, 233, 234, 240– 243, 246, 250 McKinley Tari› ¡98, 260 McNamara, Robert ¡29, ¡38–¡39

278 Meet the Press 46, 47 Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine 3, 50, ¡28, 25¡ Mendieta, Carlos 37, 38, 58, 65– 66, 94, ¡35–¡36, ¡62, ¡77, 2¡0, 252 Menéndez, Robert ¡¡¡ Menocal, Mario García 56, 57, 65, 83, ¡¡7, ¡36, 223, 224, 24¡, 243 Menoyo, Eloy Gutiérrez see Gutiérrez-Menoyo, Eloy Merritt, Wesley 2¡6 Messersmith, George ¡36–¡38, ¡77, 2¡¡, 244 Mexican War 32, ¡57, ¡63, ¡66, 208 Mexican Revolution ¡57 Mexico 44, 50, 93, 96, ¡02–¡03, ¡05, ¡¡2, ¡32, ¡34, ¡37, ¡40, ¡44, ¡5¡, ¡53, ¡54, ¡55, ¡70, ¡7¡, ¡72, ¡8¡, 2¡2, 2¡3, 242, 252 Miami Herald 58, ¡34 Michael J. Dady & Company ¡22 Middle East ¡90 Mikoyan, Anastas ¡73, ¡89, 253 Miles, Nelson A. ¡95, ¡96 Minoso, Minnie ¡7, 59 Miró Cardona, José ¡38, ¡73 Missile Crisis, October ¡962 33, 40, 43, 44, 47, 74, 80, ¡¡5, ¡38– ¡4¡, ¡8¡–¡82, ¡83, ¡97, 253, 254 Mitchell, Keith 89 Moncada Barracks Raid, ¡953 ¡9, 43, 48, ¡70, ¡7¡, 252 Monroe, James ¡, 3, 7, ¡02, ¡¡0, ¡4¡, 249, 25¡ Monroe Doctrine 8, 50, 59, 76, ¡00, ¡02, ¡¡0, ¡¡3, ¡¡4, ¡¡7, ¡39, ¡4¡–¡42, ¡48, ¡49, ¡57, ¡74, ¡78, ¡88–¡89, ¡98, 236, 25¡ Montecristi Declaration, ¡895 ¡43 Moore, Michael 85 Moret Law, ¡870 ¡87 Moret y Prendergast, Segismundo 25, 233 Morgan, John T. ¡5, 60, 8¡, 86, ¡42–¡43, ¡69 Morgan, Stokeley W. 3 Morocco 2¡3 Morrill Tari›, ¡86¡ 205 Morse, Wayne ¡75 Morton, Levi 226 Movimiento de 26 Julio see 26th of July Movement Movimiento Montecristi ¡6, ¡43, ¡59, ¡76 Movimiento Rescare Revolucionaria 65 Movimiento Resistencia Civica 66 Müller, Albert 65 Mundt, Carl 209 Munero, Lázaro 85 Mutual Security Program ¡50 Napoleonic Wars 68

National Bank of Cuba 70, ¡64, 200 National Institute of Agrarian Reform 93 National Labor Congress, ¡925 ¡24 National Press Club 93 National Security Council (NSC) 3¡, 36, 4¡, 49, 53, 93, 95, ¡¡¡, ¡38, ¡39, ¡68, ¡89, ¡90, 2¡2 Nationalization Law, ¡960 46, ¡43, 253 Nava de Bontifé, Giuseppe Francisco 230 Navy Court of Inquiry ¡92 Nazism 97, ¡04, ¡07, 243, 252 Negropronte, John 36 The Netherlands ¡83, 2¡4 New Jewell Movement 88 New Socialist Man 93 New Sugar Export Corporation 20¡ New York Journal 67, 245, 246 New York Herald ¡27 New York Journal ¡80, 250 New York Junta 24, 25, 60, 66, 67, 7¡, 75, 82, ¡¡3, ¡23, ¡43–¡46, ¡49, ¡66, ¡7¡, ¡80–¡8¡, 230, 233, 234, 250 New York Sun ¡62 New York Times 47, 97, ¡35, ¡70, ¡72, ¡89, ¡90, 252–253 New York Tribune 2¡6 New York World 245, 246 Nicaragua 48, 65, 7¡, 82, 96, ¡¡2, ¡¡6, ¡20, ¡2¡, ¡27, ¡28, ¡53, ¡56, ¡58, ¡68, ¡73, ¡84, 23¡ Nitze, Paul ¡38 Nixon, Richard M. 9–¡0, 33, 46, 48, 77, 95, 97, ¡¡5, ¡¡6, ¡46–¡48, ¡7¡, ¡76, ¡73, ¡89–¡90, 2¡3, 253 Nixon-Castro Meeting, ¡959 ¡46– ¡47 No Transfer Principle, ¡8¡¡ ¡48 Non-Aligned Movement 44, 4¡, 45 North American Review 207 North American Trust Company 225 North Atlantic Squadron ¡94 Norweb, R. Henry 37, ¡48 Nucio, Richard 53 Ochoa, René ¡7 O’Donnell y Abreu, Manuel 242 O‡ce of Cuba Broadcasting ¡67 O‡ce of Cuban A›airs 53 O‡ce of Foreign Assets Control 35 O‡ce of Public Diplomacy 36 Olney, Richard B. 52, 69, ¡48–¡49 Operation Mongoose 60, 89, ¡¡2, ¡¡4, ¡¡5, ¡49–¡50, 253 Operation Pedro Pan ¡50–¡5¡, 253 Oquendo, Wilfredo Román ¡¡

279 Order of the Lone Star ¡66 Ordóñez, Rey ¡7 Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas 222 Organization of American States (OAS) 2¡, 27, 34, 44, 47, 77, ¡08, ¡39–¡40, ¡5¡–¡55, ¡74, ¡75, ¡76, 2¡3, 220, 252; Fifth Meeting, Santiago, ¡959 70, 98, ¡5¡– ¡52, 253; Sixth and Seventh Meetings, San José, ¡960 ¡52, ¡74; Economic and Social Council, Punte del Este, ¡96¡ ¡5¡, ¡52–¡53, ¡8¡; Eighth Meeting, Punte de Este, ¡962 ¡¡5, ¡53, 253; Ninth Meeting Washington, D.C., ¡964 ¡¡2, ¡54–¡55; Twelfth Meeting, Washington, ¡967 ¡82, 2¡3, 253; Fifteenth Meeting, Quito, ¡974 ¡55; Sixteenth Meeting, San José, ¡975 7¡, 98, ¡55, 2¡3, 254 Organization of Sugar Exporters 2¡3 Organized Crime in Cuba ¡55–¡56 Ortodoxos see Partido del Pueblo Cubano Ostend Manifesto 2, 23, 32, ¡44, ¡56, ¡6¡, ¡66, ¡88, 250 O’Sullivan, John 2, 32, ¡2¡, ¡56– ¡57, ¡62–¡63, ¡66, 249 Owens-Illinois Glass Company ¡43 Pact of Bogotá, ¡948 see Treaty for Pacific Settlement Padrón, José Luis 4¡ Palmeiro, Rafael ¡7 Pan American Airways 244 Pan American Games 34, 2¡4 Pan American Union 87, ¡04–¡09, ¡5¡ Pan Americanism ¡57 Panama 66, 86, 9¡, 92, ¡00, ¡05, ¡06, ¡¡2, ¡¡7, ¡2¡, ¡30, ¡55, ¡68 ¡73, ¡78 Panama Canal see Panama Panama Congress, ¡826 50, 5¡, 52, ¡03, 235 Papal Visit see Pope John Paul II Paraguay ¡55 Partido Communista de Cuba ¡9, 27, 42, 43, ¡0¡, ¡24, ¡57–¡58, ¡76, 222, 244 Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo) 43, 55, ¡58, ¡64–¡65 Partido Independiente de Color 223 Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Auténticos) 55, 7¡, ¡33, ¡45, ¡58, ¡64, 23¡ Partido Socialista Popular 40, 47– 48, 222 Party of the Cuban People see Partido del Pueblo Cubano Pastor, Robert ¡32–¡33

Patronato ¡87 Pawley, William see Pawley Mission to Cuba Pawley Mission to Cuba 4, ¡7, 20, 67, 70, 98, ¡58–¡59, ¡73 Payne, Sereno E. 2¡8 Payne-Aldrich Tari›, ¡909 206 Peace Corps 89 Pearl Harbor Attack ¡38 Pell, Claiborne ¡75 Pentarchy 87 People-to-People Program ¡8, 6¡, ¡59 Pérez, Tony ¡7 Permanent Treaty, ¡903 see Treaties, Permanent Treaty, ¡903 Perón, Juan D. 2¡3, 2¡4 Peru 44, ¡02, ¡05, ¡¡2, ¡53, ¡55, ¡59, 2¡3 Pezulla, Marquis de la 8, 9, 23, ¡6¡ Philippines 64, 99 ¡29, ¡30, ¡3¡, ¡77, ¡79, ¡93, ¡94, ¡99, 202, 203, 204, 2¡7, 225, 235 Pierce, Franklin 8, 23, 32, 82, 55, 56, ¡40, ¡56, ¡60–¡6¡, ¡66, ¡87, ¡88, 250 Platt, Orville H. 77, ¡6¡, 227 Platt Amendment 3, 4, ¡4, 23, 29, 3¡, 38, 50, 7¡, 77, 86, 87, 90, 9¡, 94, 97, ¡00, ¡¡3, ¡¡7, ¡20, ¡24, ¡25, ¡29, ¡43, ¡57, ¡6¡–¡62, ¡64, ¡70, ¡77, ¡78, ¡79, ¡97–¡98, ¡99, 204, 208–209, 2¡7, 2¡8, 2¡9, 222, 223, 227, 236, 240, 24¡, 242, 246, 25¡ Polk, James K. 2, 32, ¡20, ¡57, ¡62–¡63, ¡66, 249 Polo de Bernabe, Luis 229, 230 Pope John Paul II 59, ¡¡0–¡¡¡ Pope Leo XIII ¡28, 229–230, 234, 250 Popular Socialist Party 26, ¡57– ¡58 Porter, Charles ¡75 Porter, Robert F. ¡63–¡64 Powell, Adam Clayton ¡75 Powell, Colin 42 Presidential Commission on Broadcasting ¡67 Preventive Diplomacy 3, 57, 83, ¡64 Prío, Carlos see Prío Socarrás, Carlos Prío Socarrás, Carlos 4, ¡8, 22, 23, 37, 55, ¡64–¡65, ¡70, 220, 22¡, 252 Proctor, Redfield ¡28, ¡65–¡66, ¡69 Pue, Arthur 2¡7 Puerto Rico ¡¡6, ¡29, ¡38, ¡4¡, ¡47, ¡50, ¡93, ¡95, ¡96, ¡99, 222, 235, 2¡7 Pulitzer, Joseph 245, 246 Quebec Conference 200¡ see

Index Summit of the Americas Conference, 200¡ Queen Isabella II 236 Queen Regent see Cristina, Maria Quesada, Gonzalo de 60 Quitman, John A. 8–9, 82, ¡44, ¡60, ¡66–¡67, 250 Radio Martí 58, ¡0¡, ¡34, ¡59, ¡67, ¡68, ¡69, 254 Railway Age ¡92 Ramírez de Villaurrutia y Villaurrutia, Wenceslao 2¡6 Ramos, Juan J. ¡06 Rampolla del Tinadarro, Mariano 229 Rand McNally Bankers’ Monthly Magazine ¡93 Rawlings, John A. 75, ¡44 Reagan, Ronald R. 5, ¡0, 34, 36, 45, 48–49, 89, 92, 95, 96, ¡0¡, ¡34, ¡67–¡69, ¡84, 2¡2, 2¡4 Reciprocal Trade Agreement, ¡934 4, 38, ¡0¡, ¡¡3, ¡77 Reconcentrado Program 24, 39, 40, ¡¡8, ¡26, ¡27, ¡28, ¡65, ¡69, 232, 234, 238, 243, 246, Reed, Thomas B. ¡5, 99, ¡26, ¡69 Reed, Walter 74, 226 Reich, Otto ¡¡, 36 Reid, Whitelaw 2¡6 Reno, Janet ¡6, 85 Reuther, Walter 209 Revolutionary Directorate ¡58 Revolutionary Party of Cuba see Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Auténticos) Rice, Condoleeza 36 Riceland Corporation 36 Rio Pact, ¡947 see American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Ríos, Eugenio Montero 2¡6 Roa, Raúl ¡2, 98, ¡5¡, ¡76, ¡97 Robiana González, Roberto ¡78 Rockefeller Foundation ¡8¡ Rodríguez, Carlos Rafael ¡67 Rogers, William P. 54, ¡¡6, ¡76, ¡90 Rojas, Cookie 59 Roosevelt, Eleanor 209 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 3–4, ¡9, 26, 27, 37, 38, 39, 50, 64, 86, 87, 99, ¡00, ¡05, ¡06, ¡07, ¡¡2– ¡¡3, ¡25, ¡76–¡77, ¡62, 20¡, 2¡0, 2¡¡, 2¡9, 220, 236–238, 243, 25¡, 252 Roosevelt, Theodore 23, 29, 30, 3¡, 56, 64, ¡¡9, ¡3¡, ¡77–¡78, ¡79, ¡80, 204, 2¡8, 222–223, 240, 24¡ Roosevelt Corollary ¡¡3, ¡78, 25¡ Root, Elihu 29, ¡¡3, ¡25, ¡6¡, ¡78, ¡79–¡80, 2¡8, 225, 227, 236, 240, 24¡ Roselli, John ¡50

Index Ros-Lehtinam, Illena 58, ¡¡¡ Rough Riders ¡78, ¡80, 24¡ Rubens, Horatio 60, ¡80–¡8¡ Rubottom, Roy ¡72, ¡98 Rusk, Dean ¡¡¡, ¡¡5, ¡38, ¡39, ¡53, ¡54, ¡8¡–¡82, ¡83, ¡97 Russell, Bertrand ¡40 Russia ¡03 Ryan, Thomas F. 226 Sabotage see Operation Mongoose Saco, José Antonio ¡82–¡83, ¡85 Sagasta, Práxades Mateo 40, ¡26– ¡27, ¡96, 2¡6, 2¡7, 232–235, 229–230, 242 St. Louis A›air, ¡939 ¡83, 252 St. Thomas ¡93 Saladrigas, Carlos 23, 28 Sampson, William T. 9¡, ¡92, ¡95 Sánchez-Parori, Ramón ¡¡6 Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) 4¡, 48 San Juan Hill ¡52; see also Battle of Santiago de CUBA Sans Souci Hotel ¡55 Sante Fe Report, ¡980 ¡68 Santovenia, Emeterio S. ¡63 Saunders, Romulus 32, ¡57, ¡63, Scali, John ¡40 Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. 2¡, ¡83, ¡97, 239 Schueg, Honri 9¡ Schurz, Carl 2¡7 Sergeants Revolt, ¡933 3, ¡8, 49, 87, ¡0¡, ¡25, ¡70, ¡83–¡84, 237, 252 Serrano, Francisco ¡86 Seven Years’ War 68 Sevila, Francisco 235 Seward, William H. ¡84 Shafter, William R. 8¡, ¡95–¡96 Shaler, William ¡30, 249 Shell Oil Company ¡74 Sherman, John T. 64, ¡84 Sherrit International Corporation 63 Ships: Aliançia 207; Alliance 90; Blue Fire ¡32; Bucharest ¡40; Cherokee 56; Competitor 207; Crescent City 249; Essex ¡40; Indiana ¡94; Iowa ¡94; La Coubre 27; Leyte ¡72; Massachusetts 82, ¡94; Neptune ¡20; Niobe 230; Oregon ¡94; Toronado 230 Shultz, George P. ¡84–¡85 Sicard, Montgomery ¡95 Sickles, Daniel 75, ¡60, 230 Skol, Michael 53 Slavery 2, 8–9, 32, 72, 73, 75, 76, 82, 83, ¡03, ¡20–¡22, ¡56, ¡62, ¡84, ¡85–¡86, ¡87, 209 Slidell, John 33, ¡80 Smathers, George ¡75 Smith, Earl E.T. ¡7, 70, 97, ¡35, ¡59 ¡72, ¡87

280 Smith, Laurence 34 Smith, Wayne ¡32 Smith, William 55–56, 249 Somoza 4¡ Sorenson, Theodore ¡38 Soulé, Pierre 2, 23, ¡56, ¡60, ¡87– ¡88 Southern Airways ¡¡6 Southern Command 36 Soviet Brigade, ¡979 3¡, ¡9¡, 229 Soviet MiG23, ¡978 3¡, ¡90–¡9¡ Soviet Naval Base, ¡970 50, ¡47, ¡76, ¡89, 254 Soviet Spy Station at Lourdes 62 Soviet Trade Agreement, ¡960 ¡89; see also Mikoyan, Anastas Soviet Union 5, 9–¡0, ¡9, 22, 27, 3¡, 34, 43–44, 47, 48, 49, 62, 70, 80, 93, 95, 98, ¡¡4, ¡¡5, ¡¡6, ¡29, ¡37, ¡38–¡4¡, ¡46, ¡47, ¡55, ¡68, ¡73, ¡76, ¡82, ¡84, ¡88–¡9¡, ¡92, ¡97, 200, 2¡4, 2¡5, 229, 253; see also Missile Crisis, October ¡962 Spain ¡4¡, ¡42, ¡65, ¡68, 2¡3; Africanization Policy 8–9, ¡60, ¡66, ¡67, ¡85; ¡9th Century Colonial Policy ¡–2, 7–9, ¡4, 32– 33, 50, 5¡, 55–56, 68–69, 72– 74, 75–76, 78–79, 80, 84, 90, 96, ¡0¡–¡02, ¡06, ¡09, ¡¡0, ¡¡8, ¡30, ¡32, ¡33–¡34, ¡44–¡45, ¡56–¡57, ¡6¡, ¡63, ¡66–¡67, ¡82– ¡84, ¡85–¡87, ¡88, ¡98, 205, 209, 226, 250; War for Independence 5¡–52, 67–68, ¡¡8, ¡¡9, ¡26–¡29, ¡42, ¡48–¡49, ¡65– ¡67, ¡9¡–¡92, 207–208, 23¡– 235, 238–239, 250; see also Spanish-American War; Treaty of Paris ¡898; and United States: Relations with Spain Spanish see Spain Spanish-American War, ¡898 ¡3– ¡4, ¡5, 23, 30–3¡, 8¡, 84, 9¡, 93, ¡00, ¡¡8, ¡3¡, ¡45–¡46, ¡6¡, 2¡5, 2¡6, 2¡7, 229, 245; see also United States: and Spanish American War Special Period 44, 53 Spooner, John C. 77 Standard Oil Company ¡74 Stevenson, Adlai ¡38, ¡40, ¡83, ¡97 Stillman, Oscar B. 52 Stimson, Henry L. 94, ¡00, ¡97– ¡98 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) ¡9¡ Sugar 2, 3, 4, 9, ¡9, 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 37, 38, 39, 46, 57, 59, 62, 63–65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 72– 73, 78, 88, 98, ¡0¡, ¡07, ¡09, ¡¡¡– ¡¡2, ¡¡4, ¡¡9, ¡24, ¡37, ¡43, ¡45, ¡48, ¡49, ¡50, ¡65, ¡70, ¡73, ¡77, ¡79, ¡85, ¡86, ¡98–20¡, 205–

208, 2¡0–2¡2, 2¡4, 2¡8, 22¡, 243, 244, 250 Sugar Finance Committee 224 Sugar Stabilization Board 64 Sulzberger, Carl ¡89, ¡90 Summit of the Americas Conference, 200¡ 35 Swan Islands 46 Swift and Company ¡43 Tabernilla y Palmero, Carlos M. ¡72 Tabor, Robert 74 Taft, William Howard 30, 3¡, 66, ¡30, ¡78, ¡80, 204, 222, 240 Tambs, Lewis ¡68 Tarno›, Peter ¡32–¡33 Taylor, Hannis ¡92, 207–208 Taylor, Maxwell 22, ¡38, ¡39 Taylor, Zachary 74, ¡2¡, ¡63, 208 Taylor Commission 22, 33, ¡¡5, ¡29 Teller, Henry M. ¡29, ¡93, ¡94, 208–209, 2¡8, 225, 227, 239, 242, 250 Teller Amendment 23, 25, 29, 60, 8¡, 99 Ten Years’ War see Cuba: Ten Years’ War Texaco Oil Company ¡74 Thompson, Keith ¡75 Thompson, Llewellyn ¡38 Tiant, Luis ¡7, 59, ¡23 Tinquaro Sugar Mill 28 Toon, Malcom ¡9¡ Topping, John ¡72 Toral y Vásquez, José ¡96 Torricelli, Robert 58, 62 Torricelli Bill see Cuban Democracy Act Torrijos, Omar 44 Tractors for Freedom Committee 209–2¡0 Trading with the Enemy Act 2¡2, 2¡4 Treaties, United States and Cuba 2¡5–220; Isle of Pines, ¡904 ¡00, 2¡9; Permanent Treaty, ¡903 69, 7¡, 77, 86, ¡60, ¡6¡, ¡77, ¡99, 2¡5–2¡7, 2¡9–220, 238, 25¡, 252; Permanent Treaty, ¡934 9¡, ¡62, ¡73, 252; Reciprocal Trade Agreement, ¡934 86, ¡37, ¡99, 206, 207, 2¡0–2¡2, 252; Supplemental Trade Agreement, ¡939 26, ¡0¡, ¡37, ¡77, ¡99, 202, 2¡¡; Supplemental Trade Agreement, ¡94¡ 4¡, ¡0¡, ¡77, 202, 2¡¡, 244; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (proposed) 28, 37, 88, ¡08, ¡48, 202, 22¡, 252; Treaty of Paris, ¡898 3¡, 9¡, 96, 99, ¡20, ¡29, ¡45, ¡46, ¡6¡, 2¡5, 2¡6, 2¡7, 233, 25¡ Treaty for Pacific Settlement, ¡948 ¡08

281 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, ¡848 ¡, ¡57, ¡62 Treaty of Tlatelolco, ¡995 35 Treaty of Versailles, ¡9¡9 3¡ Treaty of Zanjón, ¡878 75, 76, 2¡0, 250 Trinidad & Tobago ¡55 Tropicana Hotel and Nightclub ¡55 Trujillo, Rafael 43, ¡5¡, ¡52, 220 Truman, Harry S 28, 66, 70, 82, 88, 220–222 Turkey ¡¡5, ¡40, ¡4¡, ¡82 Turner, Stansfield ¡9¡ Turpie Amendment ¡94 TV Martí 34, 58, ¡34, ¡67, 254 26th of July Movement ¡6, 40, 47, 65, 66, ¡35, ¡50, 222 Tyler, John 235 Tyson Foods 36 Underwood Tari› 206, 240 Unión Nacionalista Party 54, ¡35 United Nations 33, 34, 46, 47, 74, 92, ¡¡6, ¡39–¡40, ¡4¡, ¡54, ¡74, ¡76 ¡8¡, ¡83, ¡97, 220, 229 United Nations Financing Conference for Development 35 United Nations High Commission on Refugees ¡32 United Nations Human Rights Commission 228 United Party of the Socialist Revolution ¡58 United States: and Cuban Revolution 9¡–92, 97–98, ¡7¡–¡74; and Cuban War for Independence 5¡–52, 76, ¡03, ¡45, ¡48–¡49, ¡65–¡66, ¡69, ¡77, 208, 238, 242–243; and economic relations to ¡959 2–4, ¡¡, 26, 39, 46, 50–52, 66, 68–70, 72–73, 76– 77, 78–79, 83, 86, 87, 88, 9¡, 96, ¡00, ¡09, ¡¡0, ¡¡3, ¡¡4, ¡¡9, ¡24, ¡25, ¡26, ¡29, ¡3¡, ¡36–¡37, ¡43, ¡45, ¡48–¡49, ¡6¡–¡62, ¡64, ¡72, ¡74, ¡77, ¡80, ¡88, 20¡–203, 205–206, 209, 2¡0–2¡2, 2¡5, 2¡8, 2¡9– 22¡, 223, 238, 24¡, 242, 246–247, 250, 25¡, 252; and immigration policy ¡5–¡6, 40, 58; and interventions in Cuba 3, 56, 83, 9¡, ¡00, ¡30–¡3¡, ¡6¡–¡62, ¡64, ¡78, ¡80, ¡98, 204, 222–224, 24¡, 25¡; military occupation of Cuba, ¡989–¡902 28–29, 60–6¡, 69, 74, 77, 8¡, 96–97, ¡00, ¡20, ¡22, ¡36, ¡6¡, ¡63, ¡70, ¡78, ¡79, 206, 225– 228, 239–240, 24¡–242, 25¡; and rapprochement with Castro 45, 47, 49, 53, 78, ¡¡2, ¡¡6, ¡33, ¡47–¡48, ¡68; relations with Spain regarding Cuba, to ¡895 ¡–5, 7–8, 32, 5¡, 55–56, 64, 74–

76, 78–79, 80, 89–90, ¡02–¡03, ¡09, ¡26–¡29, ¡48–¡49, ¡56–¡57, ¡60–¡6¡, ¡63, ¡82, ¡85, ¡88, 207–208, 230–23¡; sectional interests in Cuba 7, 8–9, 72–73, ¡02, ¡03, ¡¡0, ¡44, ¡20–¡2¡, ¡56–¡57, ¡60, ¡62–¡63, ¡66–¡67, 236, 249–250; and Spanish American War ¡9¡–¡97 (business community and coming of war ¡92–¡93; military preparations ¡93–¡94; military strategy ¡95– ¡97; and sinking of the Maine ¡9¡–¡92; war resolutions ¡¡8, ¡28–¡29, ¡42, ¡80, ¡94–¡95); trade embargo 5, ¡¡, ¡8, 30, 3¡, 35, 36, 37, 4¡–42, 45, 47, 53, 58, 6¡–62, 70, 77–78, 80, 95, 98, ¡¡0, ¡¡¡, ¡¡2, ¡¡4, ¡¡6, ¡23, ¡43, ¡47–¡48, ¡54–¡55, ¡59, ¡68, ¡74, 200, 204, 2¡2–2¡5, 229, 253, 254; sugar policy ¡98–200, 20¡ (quotas 27, 64–65, 70, ¡3¡ ¡7¡, ¡74, 202–204, 2¡2, 222, 252, 253; sugar acts 20¡–205; tari›s ¡8¡, 205–207, 2¡0–2¡¡, 2¡8, 240–24¡); see also U.S. Sugar Acts and Treaties: Supplemental Agreements U.S. Agricultural Adjustment Act, ¡933 ¡¡2, 202 U.S. Army Signal Corps 225 U.S. Asiatic Fleet ¡77 U.S. Atlantic Squadron ¡77–¡78 U.S. Bondholders 25–26, ¡¡7, ¡37, 2¡¡, 238 U.S. Civil War 33, 73, ¡¡8–¡¡9, ¡65, ¡66, ¡84, ¡85–¡86, ¡88, ¡93, 230, 239, U.S.-Cuba Business Conference, 2002 36 U.S.-CUBA Trade Association 36 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service ¡6, 58, 79, 85, 95 U.S. Mail and Steamship Company 55 U.S. Marine Hospital Service 225 U.S. Military Assistance Program ¡72, 220 U.S. Postmaster General 225 U.S.-Spanish Claims Convention, ¡834 ¡09, 234 United States Sugar Acts: ¡937 ¡77, ¡99–200, 20¡–202, 207; ¡948 ¡43, ¡99–200, 202–203, 207, 22¡, 252; ¡952 ¡65, ¡99–200, 203, 207, 252; ¡956 203, 207, 252; ¡960 46, ¡43, 200, 203–204, 207 United States Sugar Corporation 25¡ U.S. Treasury Department 6¡, ¡63, 225 Unity Junta, ¡959 ¡65

Index Urrutia Lleó, Manuel 26, 40, 66, ¡7¡, ¡73, 228 Uruguay ¡40, ¡53, ¡54, ¡55 USA Engage Organization ¡¡¡ Valásquez, Diego de 90 Valdés, Miguelito 59 Valera Project 42 Valladares, Armando 228 Vance, Cyrus 3¡, 40, 228–229 Vanderbilt, Cornelius 82, 23¡ Van Hess, Cornelius P. ¡09 Van Horn, William 226 Vatican Peace O›er, ¡898 see Pope Leo XIII Venezuela 44, ¡¡2, ¡20, ¡32, ¡52, ¡54, ¡55, ¡68, ¡82, 2¡3 Vest, George 2¡7 Vietnam ¡¡¡, ¡¡2, ¡29, ¡46, ¡8¡, ¡84 Virginius A›air, ¡873 76, 230– 23¡, 250 Vives, Dionisio ¡02 Voice of America ¡67 Von Bismarck, Otto 229 Vorontsov, Yuli ¡89 Voto Particular ¡82–¡83 Walker, Robert J. ¡63 Walker, William 74, 82–83, 23¡, 250 Wall Street Journal ¡¡¡, ¡92, 202 Walsh, Byron ¡50–¡5¡ War for Independence, ¡895–¡898 see Cuba: War for Independence and Spain: War for Independence War of ¡8¡2 ¡, 72 Warner, John 54 Washington, George 8, ¡3, 72 Washington Post 47 Watson, Alexander 53 Webster, Daniel 72, 74, 235–236 Weiland, William 98 Welles, Benjamin Sumner 3–4, ¡8, ¡9, 256, 49, ¡0¡, ¡25, ¡62, ¡77, ¡84, 236–238, 244, 252 West Germany see Germany West Indies 50 Western Europe see Europe Western Hemisphere see Latin America Weyler y Nicolau, Valeriano ¡4, 24, 39, ¡¡8, ¡¡9, ¡26, ¡69, 232, 233, 234, 238–239, 246 White, Francis G. ¡25 Wilkerson, James ¡¡0, 249 Wilson, James H. 29, ¡79, 225, 239–240, 24¡, 242 Wilson, Woodrow 30, 3¡, 52, 79, ¡00, ¡49, ¡57, ¡78, 206, 223, 224, 240–24¡, 243 Wilson-Gorman Tari›, ¡894 89, ¡98, 205–206, 250 Wood, Leonard 7¡, 96, ¡20, ¡22, ¡30, ¡78, ¡79, ¡80, 2¡7–2¡8, 222,

Index 223, 225–227, 240, 24¡–242, 25¡ Woodford, Stewart I. 67, ¡26, ¡38, 229, 234, 242–243 World War I ¡9, 5¡, 59, 63, 86, ¡¡7, ¡36, 223, 224, 243, 25¡ World War II ¡9, 27–28, 48, 69,

282 70, 88, 97, ¡04, ¡06–¡07, ¡¡7, ¡29, ¡37–¡38, ¡43, ¡77, ¡8¡, ¡99, 20¡, 202, 207, 2¡¡, 220, 243, 244, 252 Wright, J. Butler ¡77, 245 Yellow Fever 74, 226

Yellow Press ¡¡9, ¡69 Yom Kippur War, ¡973 45 Young America Movement 73, ¡66 Yugoslavia 229 Zayas, Alfredo 57, 83, 224, 246– 247