Cross-Regional Ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe: Lessons from the Western Balkans and the Baltic States (Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations) 3030999505, 9783030999506

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements
Praise for Cross-Regional Ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe
Contents
About the Author
Acronyms
List of Tables
1 Introduction
Navigating Through Crises: A Cross-Regional Focus and Main Objectives of This Book
Outline and Content of Chapters
Literary Overview: Setting the Conceptual and Analytical Frames
Euroscepticism, Minority Rights, and Identity Politics: The Cases of Croatia and Serbia
Institutional Politics, Party Politics, and Ethnopolitics: The Cases of Estonia and Latvia
Geopolitics, Ethnopolitics, and the EU: The Cases of Latvia and Serbia
Geopolitics, Ethnopolitics, and the EU: The Cases of Estonia and Croatia
Bibliography and Other Sources
2 Literary Overview: Setting the Conceptual and Analytical Frames
Introduction
Transitional Processes and Their Legacies in the Former Yugoslavia and the Baltic States: Why Ethnopolitics Matter
Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Ethnopolitics: Then and Now
The Ethno-Symbolic Approach: The Nation as a Socio-Psychological Phenomenon
Between Triadic and Quadratic Configurations of Ethnopolitics
From the Theory to Practice in Central and Eastern Europe: The 1990s
From the Theory to Practice in Central and Eastern Europe: Contemporary Cases
Nativism, Euroscepticism, and Populism: Conceptual Definitions
Nativism
Euroscepticism
Populism
Radical Versus Extremist Right-Wing Parties
New Actors Enter the Scene: The Necessity to Update and Upgrade
Bibliography and Other Sources
3 Euroscepticism, Minority Rights, and Identity Politics: The Cases of Croatia and Serbia
Introduction
Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe: A Retrospective and Contextual Overview
Euroscepticism in Croatia and Serbia: Main Actors and Primary Areas of Concern
Minority Rights in Croatia and Serbia: Between European Persuasion and Domestic Practice
Croatia
Serbia
Euroscepticism and the Management of Ethnic Relations in Croatia and Serbia
Croatia
Serbia
Geopolitical Concerns and Euroscepticism in Croatia and Serbia
Croatia
Serbia
Gender-related Issues and Euroscepticism in Croatia and Serbia
Croatia
Serbia
The Migration Crisis and Euroscepticism in Croatia and Serbia
Croatia
Serbia
In Lieu of a Conclusion
Bibliography and Other Sources
4 Institutional Politics, Party Politics, and Ethnopolitics: The Cases of Estonia and Latvia
Introduction
Narratives of ‘Alien Rule’, ‘Colonisation’, and ‘Decolonisation’ in Estonia and Latvia: A Conceptual and Contextual Overview
EKRE and NA: Ideological Foundations, Trajectories of Evolution, and Primary Areas of Concern
The Bauska Declaration (2013): Establishing Ideological Pillars
EKRE: Formation and Early Stages
EKRE’s Core Principles: A Populist and Radical Right-Wing Party That Operates in Estonia
NA: Formation Process and Early Stages
The NA’s Core Principles: A National Conservative Party That Operates in Latvia
The Latvian and Estonian Party-Systems: Continuity Versus ‘Situational Adaptability’
A State of Continuity in Latvia
A State of ‘Situational Adaptability’ in Estonia
Oscillating Between the Present and the Past: EKRE and the NA on Nativism and Anti-Immigration
EKRE and the Migration Crisis (2015–2016): Grass-Roots Mobilisation, Anti-Establishment Rhetoric, and Euroscepticism
The Nativism of EKRE: Framing the Present Inside the Context of the Past
The NA and the Migration Crisis (2015–2016): Navigating the Halls of Power
The Nativism of the NA: Framing the Present Inside the Context of the Past
In Lieu of a Conclusion
Bibliography and Other Sources
5 Geopolitics, Ethnopolitics, and the EU: The Cases of Latvia and Serbia
Introduction
The Management of Ethnic Relations in Latvia and Serbia: Constitutional and Legal Arrangements
Contrasting Legacies from the Communist Era
Serbia: A Multilevel Infrastructure
Latvia: A Centralised Legal Framework
The Management of Ethnic Relations in Serbia and Latvia: Between Domestic Ethnopolitics and Regional Geopolitics
Systemic Transformation Versus a Pattern of Continuity
Geopolitics and Ethnopolitics: Readjustment Versus Maintenance
The Engagement of the EU as an External Actor: Enabling Versus Disabling Circumstances
The Management of Ethnic Relations in Latvia and Serbia: The Dimension of Party Politics
Contesting the EU and Minority Rights: A Retrospective Overview
Party Politics, European Politics, and Ethnopolitics: The View from Within the Halls of Power
The Management of Ethnic Relations in Latvia and Serbia: Realities ‘on the Ground’
Geopolitics, Ethnopolitics, and the EU: What the People Think
Ethnopolitics on the Grass-Roots Level: Regional and Sociocultural Dimensions
In Lieu of a Conclusion
Bibliography and Other Sources
6 Geopolitics, Ethnopolitics, and the EU: The Cases of Estonia and Croatia
Introduction
The Sphere of Domestic Politics: Ethnos Versus Demos in Estonia and Croatia (1990s)
Croatia and Estonia as Independent States: Constitutional and Legal Realities
National Survival, Narratives of ‘Self Versus Other’, and Their Political Repercussions
The Interaction Between Domestic and External Actors in the 1990s
States, Ethnic Minorities, External Homelands, and the EU in Estonia and Croatia
Estonia: A More Pragmatic Stance
Systemic Transformation Versus the Persistence of National Survival: The Cases of Croatia and Estonia in the 2000s
Croatia’s Change of Course and Its Significance
Recycling Institutional Legacies from the Yugoslav Era and Cooperating with the EU
Estonia: A Few Steps Forward
Contemporary Estonian Nationalism: The Functions of Restoration and Decolonisation
The Emphasis on National Survival Halts More Substantial Developments in Estonia
Between Breakthroughs and Backslidings (the 2010s)
Estonia: Towards a More Inclusive Version of the Ethnic Democracy Model
The ‘EKRE Phenomenon’ and Its Repercussions on the Management of Ethnic Relations in Estonia
Contesting the State Legislation on Minority Rights in Croatia: Emergence of a Multilevel Nexus
Assessing the Risks: Placing Estonia and Croatia into a Comparative Context
Patterns of Ethnic Relations in Estonia and Croatia: The Sociocultural Dimension
Intercultural Realities and Regional Politics in Croatia: The Case of Istria
Estonia: Soviet Legacies and the Shift Towards Integration
In Lieu of a Conclusion
Bibliography and Other Sources
7 Final Remarks, Conclusions, and Trajectories for Further Research
Intersections Between Regional Geopolitics and Domestic Ethnopolitics
Intersections Among Ethno-Nationalism, Nativism, and (Right-Wing) Populism
Intersections Between Ethno-Nationalism and Euroscepticism
Ethnopolitics ‘On the Ground’: The Sociocultural Dimension
Trajectories for Further Research
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Cross-Regional Ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe Lessons from the Western Balkans and the Baltic States Vassilis Petsinis

Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations

Series Editors Michal Onderco, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands Monika Sus, Center for International Security, Hertie School, Wroclaw, Poland

CEEPIR, the foundational book series of the Central and East European International Studies Association (CEEISA), is an interdisciplinary forum for scholarship that straddles traditional and novel approaches, advancing cutting-edge scholarship in global international relations. The series invites proposals in the spirit of epistemological and methodological pluralism and in a range of traditional and innovative formats: research monographs, edited collections, textbooks and Pivots which aim at succinct and timely scholarly interventions. The editorial focus is twofold: (1) The CEEISA book series retains its long-standing objective to sustain and showcase excellent research in and on Central and Eastern Europe. We are interested in innovative scholarly perspectives on contemporary social and political transformations in the region, in how knowledge is produced about such transformations, and in how Central and Eastern Europe interacts with the wider European and global contexts. We are interested in advancing the scholarly discussion between Central and Eastern Europe and the discipline more broadly. In cooperation with CEEISA, we maintain a subseries of works which received distinction of excellence by the Association (e.g. the best doctoral dissertation, the best paper at the CEEISA convention, the best thematic panel). (2) We seek in particular outstanding empirical work which advances conceptual and methodological innovation in International Relations theory, European Studies and International Political Sociology, particularly when related to Central and Eastern Europe. We welcome novel research techniques and approaches that explore diverse sites and engage diverse challenges of contemporary world politics. As a devoted team dedicated to excellence and timeliness in the editorial and peer review process, we rely on the support of Palgrave Macmillan, and liaise with the Journal of International Relations and Development to develop a platform for scholars who can reinvigorate existing research in global international relations.

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/14885

Vassilis Petsinis

Cross-Regional Ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe Lessons from the Western Balkans and the Baltic States

Vassilis Petsinis Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies University of Tartu Tartu, Estonia

ISSN 2947-7980 ISSN 2947-7999 (electronic) Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations ISBN 978-3-030-99950-6 ISBN 978-3-030-99951-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99951-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Marcus Lindstrom/Getty Images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

This monograph is dedicated in loving memory of my grandfather (1917–2016)

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to cordially thank the following institutions without the help of whom this piece of work would not have been completed successfully. I am highly indebted to the European Commission, the Marie Skłodowska-Curie (MSCA-IF) actions and the Horizon 2020 POPREBEL group-project (‘Populist Rebellion against Modernity in 21st-century Eastern Europe: Neo-traditionalism and Neo-feudalism’, Grant Agreement No. 822682) in particular. I would also like to extend my thanks to the Swedish Institute (Stockholm, Sweden) and the Visby Programme (Visbyprogrammet ) for academic research in the Baltic Sea region. Then, I would like to use this opportunity to thank, in no particular order, the following individuals who provided: valuable first-hand information towards the materialisation of this monograph; assistance towards the coordination of the research activities and the dissemination of the preliminary findings (seminar series, international conferences and other events, and information outlets); their valuable insights and cooperation in co-authoring activities; technical assistance in a number of activities; other kinds of support. In Estonia, my thanks go to: Piret Ehin (Tartu), Andres Kasekamp (Tartu/Toronto), Vello Pettai (Tartu/Flensburg), Stefano Braghiroli (Tartu), Andrey Makarychev (Tartu), Maili Vilson (Tartu), Vladimir Sazonov (Tartu), Holger Mölder (Tallinn), Dmitri Teperik (Tallinn), Piret Hartmann (Narva), Kristina Kallas (Narva), Heidi Mõttus (Tartu), Raili Nugin (Tallinn), Tõnis Saarts (Tallinn), Florian Hartleb (Tallinn),

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Viacheslav Morozov (Tartu), Heiko Pääbo (Tartu), Varje Kuut (Tartu), Laura Tomson (Tartu), Eiki Berg (Tartu), Juhan Kivirähk (Tallinn), Spencer Terry (Tartu), Lena Sologub (Tartu), Anna Beitane (Tartu), Tiina Jaksman (Tartu), and Maarika Traat (Tartu). In Latvia, I would like to thank: Sigita Struberga (Riga), Aleksey Vesyolyi (Riga), M¯artinš ¸ Kapr¯ans (Riga), Iveta Reinholde (Riga), Igors Muravjovs (Riga), Yuri Nikolayenko (Riga), Ieva B¯erzina ¸ (Riga), J¯anis B¯erzinš ¸ (Riga), Ilvija Bruge (Riga), Aija Lulle (Riga), Zaneta Ozolina (Riga), Inga Belausa (Daugavpils), Dmitrijs Olhenovics (Daugavpils), Ir¯ena Saleniece (Daugavpils), Daunis Auers (Riga), Ivars Ijabs (Riga), and Boriss Cilevics (Riga). In Croatia, my thanks go to: Antonija Petriˇcuši´c (Zagreb), Nikola ´ Ivanovi´c (Pakrac), Bishop Jovan Culibrk (Eastern Orthodox Eparchy of Slavonia, Pakrac), Andrea Matoševi´c (Pula), Igor Duda (Pula), Matija Miloš (Rijeka), Aleksa Ðoki´c (Zagreb), Tea Einwalter-Simonovi´c ˇ (Zagreb), Danijel Martinovi´c (Zagreb), Dario Cepo (Zagreb), Ljubomir Miki´c (Vukovar), Ðorde Gardaševi´c (Zagreb), Ana Brakus (Zagreb), Mirjana Galo (Pula), Davor Pinzan (Pula), and the administrative staff at Grad Vukovar (Vukovar). In Serbia, I would like to thank: Zsolt Lazar (Novi Sad), Srd-an Šljuki´c (Novi Sad), Ratko Bubalo (Novi Sad), Ivana Vukaševi´c (Novi Sad), Ivana Raˇci´c (Belgrade), Elvira Kovacs (Belgrade), Dragiša Mijaˇci´c (Belgrade), Jasna Žarkovi´c (Belgrade), Nikola Luni´c (Belgrade), Dragan Šutanovac (Belgrade), Nedim Sejdinovi´c (Novi Sad), Zsolt Szakallas (Novi Sad), Aleksandar Popov (Novi Sad), Ljubiša Despotovi´c (Belgrade/Novi Sad), Renata Eremi´c (Zrenjanin), Tibor Pap (Novi Sad), Nataša Smiljani´c (Belgrade), and the administration, as well as the group of researchers, at the Novosadska Novinarska Škola (Novi Sad). Elsewhere, I would like to extend my thanks to: Jan Kubik (London), Richard Mole (London), Agnieszka Sadecka (Krakow), Tom Rowley (London), Alex Sakalis (London/Corfu), Rosemary Bechler (London), Vera Stojarova (Brno), Matthew Kott (Uppsala), David Smith (Glasgow), Roland Kosti´c (Uppsala), Stefan Wolff (Birmingham), Karl Cordell (Plymouth), Zoltan Vörös (Pecs), Niklas Bernsand (Lund), Barbara Törnquist-Plewa (Lund), Thomas Lunden (Stockholm), Joakim Ekman (Stockholm), Kjetil Duvold (Stockholm), Anu-Mai Köll (Stockholm), Olena Podolian (Stockholm), Julia Malitska (Stockholm), Matthew Feldman (CARR, UK), Natasha Kuhrt (London), Andrej Findor

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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(Bratislava), Olga Gyarfasova (Bratislava), Juraj Marušiak (Bratislava), Yiannis Stavrakakis (Thessaloniki), Giorgos Katsambekis (Loughborough), Claes Levinsson (Uppsala), Vaidas Morkeviˇcius (Kaunas), Liutauras Gudžinskas (Vilnius), Timofey Agarin (Belfast), and Aušra Grabliauskaite˙ (Kaunas).

Praise for Cross-Regional Ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe

“Vassilis Petsinis is to be congratulated for producing an important scholastic work that informs the reader of important political crosscurrents in two important parts of the European continent. In so doing in an eminently readable fashion, he informs the reader of how politics has evolved and continues to evolve in the countries and regions under consideration.” —Karl Cordell, The University of Plymouth, UK “In his highly engaging and empirically rich new book, Petsinis updates earlier scholarly debates on Ethnopolitics—in particular, theoretical works on the triadic and quadratic nexus approaches—to take account of more recent political developments such as Euroscepticism, right-wing populism and nativism. In so doing, he convincingly demonstrates how the ability of domestic politicians to liberalise state policies on ethnic minorities is constrained by the role that domestic ethnopolitics has come to play in regional geopolitics. While Petsinis’ interdisciplinary and comparative research focuses on the Baltic States and Western Balkans, his theoretical insights on inter-ethnic relations will resonate with other societies in Europe and beyond and look set to be of interest to academics and policymakers alike.” —Richard C. M. Mole, Professor of Political Sociology, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK

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PRAISE FOR CROSS-REGIONAL ETHNOPOLITICS IN CENTRAL …

“Vassilis Petsinis offers an original and innovative look at the many dimensions of ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe. His comparison of countries in the Balkans and the Baltics is well-structured and provides interesting insights that integrate ethnopolitics, geopolitics, EU integration, and other relevant fields of study into one coherent inter-sectional analysis.” —Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham, UK

Contents

1

1

Introduction

2

Literary Overview: Setting the Conceptual and Analytical Frames

19

Euroscepticism, Minority Rights, and Identity Politics: The Cases of Croatia and Serbia

49

Institutional Politics, Party Politics, and Ethnopolitics: The Cases of Estonia and Latvia

89

3 4 5 6 7

Geopolitics, Ethnopolitics, and the EU: The Cases of Latvia and Serbia

131

Geopolitics, Ethnopolitics, and the EU: The Cases of Estonia and Croatia

169

Final Remarks, Conclusions, and Trajectories for Further Research

207

Index

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About the Author

Vassilis Petsinis (Ph.D. Birmingham, 2005) is a Senior Research Fellow in Comparative Politics at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies (University of Tartu, Estonia) within the frame of the Horizon 2020 POPREBEL international project. He is a political scientist with an expertise in European Politics and Ethnopolitics. His Marie Skłodowska-Curie (MSCA-IF) individual research project at the University of Tartu (2017–2019) was entitled: ‘Patterns and management of ethnic relations in the Western Balkans and the Baltic States’ (Project ID: 749400-MERWBKBS). He has developed a regional specialization in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. He has conducted research and taught at universities and research institutes in Estonia (Tartu University), Germany (Herder Institut in Marburg), Denmark (Copenhagen University), Sweden (Lund University, Malmö University, Södertörn University, and Uppsala University), Hungary (Collegium Budapest/Institute for Advanced Study), Slovakia (Comenius University in Bratislava), Romania (New Europe College), and Serbia (University of Novi Sad). He holds a Ph.D. in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Birmingham, UK. He is the author of National Identity in Serbia: The Vojvodina and a Multiethnic Community in the Balkans (Bloomsbury and I.B. Tauris Publishing: London, 2020) and various academic publications that cover a range of countries as diverse as Serbia, Croatia, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Greece. xv

Acronyms

AfD ANEL BDZ BM 365 BRICS CLRNM COE CRPC DJB Domovinski Rat DOS DP DS DSS Dveri EIP EKRE ETV EU FCNM FIDESZ GDP GKR

Alternative for Germany (Germany) Independent Greeks (Greece) ‘Justice and Reconciliation’ Party (Serbia) Bandi´c Milan 365—Labour and Solidarity Party (Croatia) Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities (Croatia) Council of Europe Crisis Response and Policy Centre (Serbia) ‘It Was Enough!’ Coalition (Serbia) Homeland War (Croatia) Democratic Opposition of Serbia (Serbia) Homeland Movement (Croatia) Democratic Party (Serbia) Democratic Party of Serbia (Serbia) ‘Gates’ Party (Serbia) Estonian Independence Party (Estonia) Estonian Conservative People’s Party (Estonia) Estonian National Television (Estonia) European Union Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Council of Europe) Hungarian Civic Alliance (Hungary) Gross Domestic Product ‘Honour to Serve Riga!’ Coalition (Latvia)

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ACRONYMS

HCIT ˇ HCSP HDSSB HDZ HKS HNS HSP ICDS ICTY IDS Isamaa JKP JNA KPV LV LDP LFRNM LGBTQI LKS LMP LRA LSV MEP MERWBKBS

MOST Možemo MP MSCA NA Narodna Skupština NATO NDNV NGO NNS NS NSL OSCE Pametno

Humanitarian Centre for Integration and Tolerance (Serbia) Croatian Pure Party of Rights (Croatia) Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja (Croatia) Croatian Democratic Union (Croatia) Croatian Conservative Party (Croatia) Croatian People’s Party—Liberal Democrats (Croatia) Croatian Party of Rights (Croatia) International Centre for Defence and Security (Estonia) International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Istrian Democratic Assembly (Croatia) Pro Patria and Res Publica Union Party (Estonia) New Conservative Party (Latvia) Yugoslav People’s Army (Yugoslavia) ‘Who Owns the State?’ Party (Latvia) Liberal Democratic Party (Serbia) Law on the Freedoms and Rights of National Minorities (State Union of Serbia and Montenegro) Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and Intersex Latvian Russian Union (Latvia) ‘Politics Can Be Different’ Party (Hungary) Latvian Association of Regions Party (Latvia) League of Vojvodina’s Social Democrats (Serbia) Member of the European Parliament ‘Patterns and Management of Ethnic Relations in the Western Balkans and the Baltic States’ (Horizon 2020 Research Project) ‘Bridge’ Party (Croatia) ‘We Can!’ Coalition (Croatia) Member of the Parliament Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (Horizon 2020) National Alliance (Latvia) Serbian National Assembly (Serbia) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Independent Association of Journalists in Vojvodina (Serbia) Non-Governmental Organization Novi Sad School of Journalism (Serbia) People’s Party-Reformists (Croatia) ‘For Latvia from the Heart’ Party (Latvia) Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe The ‘Clever’ Coalition (Croatia)

ACRONYMS

PDD PEGIDA PGS PiS PM POKS POPREBEL

PRM Republika Srpska RI Riigikogu Sabor Saeima Saskana ¸ SDA SDE SDP SDS SDSS SNS SNS SPAS SPO SPS SR SRS SYRIZA TB/LNNK UHRV UN UNHCR VMDK VMRO VMSZ ZES Živi Zid ZZS

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Party for Democratic Action (Serbia) Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident (Germany) ‘Alliance of Primorje and Gorski Kotar’ Party (Croatia) Law and Justice Party (Poland) Prime Minister Movement for the Restoration of the Kingdom of Serbia (Serbia) ‘Populist Rebellion Against Modernity in 21st-century Eastern Europe: Neo-traditionalism and Neo-feudalism’ (Horizon 2020 Research Project) Party of Greater Romania (Romania) Bosnian Serb Republic (Bosnia and Herzegovina) ‘Electoral List for Rijeka/Fiume’ (Croatia) Estonian National Parliament (Estonia) Croatian National Parliament (Croatia) Latvian National Assembly (Latvia) Harmony (Latvia) Party of Democratic Action (Serbia) Social Democrat Party (Estonia) Social Democrat Party (Croatia) Social Democratic Party (Serbia) Serbian Democratic Independent Party (Croatia) Serbian Progressive Party (Serbia) Slovak National Party (Slovakia) Serbian Patriotic Alliance (Serbia) Serbian Renewal Movement (Serbia) Socialist Party of Serbia (Serbia) Socialist Republic (Yugoslavia) Serbian Radical Party (Serbia) Coalition of the Radical Left (Greece) For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Independent Movement (Latvia) Croatian War Veterans Association (Croatia) United Nations United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina (Serbia) Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization Party (Bulgaria) Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina (Serbia) Green Party of Serbia (Serbia) ‘Human Blockade’ Party (Croatia) Union of Greens and Farmers (Latvia)

List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 3.4 Table 3.5 Table 3.6 Table 3.7 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5

The results of the Croatian parliamentary elections (11 September 2016) The results of the Croatian parliamentary elections (5 July 2020) The results of the Serbian parliamentary elections (24 April 2016) The results of the Serbian parliamentary elections (21 June 2020) The results of the Serbian presidential elections (2 April 2017) The ethnic structure of the population in the municipality of Vukovar (2011) The ethnic structure of the population in the Serbian autonomous province of Vojvodina (2011) The results of the Estonian parliamentary elections (1 March 2015) The results of the Estonian parliamentary elections (3 March 2019) The results of the Latvian parliamentary elections (17 September 2011) The results of the Latvian parliamentary elections (4 October 2014) The results of the Latvian parliamentary elections (6 October 2018)

54 54 55 55 56 64 68 96 97 103 104 104

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 5.1 Table 5.2

Table 5.3

Table 5.4 Table 5.5 Table 5.6 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 6.4 Table 6.5 Table 6.6 Table 6.7

The ethnic structure of the population of Latvia on 1 July 2018 (largest affiliations) The results of the elections for the assembly of the Serbian autonomous province of Vojvodina (21 June 2020) Should the assembly of the Serbian autonomous province of Vojvodina comprise a Chamber of National Communities where the major national communities in the province will be equally represented? What kind of relations should ethnic minorities maintain with their external homelands? The ethnic structure of the Daugavpils municipality in Latgale (2017) The results of the elections for the Riga City Council (26–29 August 2020) The ethnic structure of the population of Estonia on 1 January 2020 (largest affiliations) The ethnic structure of Croatia’s population in 1991 The ethnic structure of Croatia’s population in 2001 The ethnic structure of Istria’s population in 2011 (largest affiliations) The ethnic structure of the population of Tallinn on 1 January 2020 (largest affiliations) The results of the eighth electoral district (Croatian parliamentary elections of 2020) The ethnic structure of the population of Ida Virumaa on 1 January 2020 (largest affiliations)

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156 157 158 161 170 174 175 192 195 196 197

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Navigating Through Crises: A Cross-Regional Focus and Main Objectives of This Book The end of the Cold War witnessed the dynamic return of nationalism and the study of ethnopolitics across Central and Eastern Europe (Petsinis, 2019a, p. 379). During the 1990s, a series of governments rushed to securitise the question of ethnic minorities in their states’ interior (e.g. the cases of Slovakia and Romania). Others opted to closely monitor the situation of their ethnic kin in neighbouring states, such as Hungary vis-à-vis the ethnic Hungarian minorities in Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia (Auer, 2000; Szabo, 1994). This saw the gradual emergence of a quadratic nexus that consisted of: ethnic minorities; their external homelands; the (frequently) nationalising states where these minorities reside; and later, the EU’s soft power diplomacy as a fourth (regulatory and normative) pillar (Brubaker, 1995; Bruszt & Stark, 2003; Budryte, 2005; Haughton, 2007; Pettai, 2006; Smith, 2002, 2003). Since the 2000s, the internal balance within this nexus has become subject to several readjustments (Petsinis, 2019a, pp. 379–380). The initial stage (2000–2005) might be dubbed the phase of optimism. Systemic transformation led to the formulation of extensive legislation on minority rights in Serbia and Croatia (Petsinis, 2013; Vasilijevi´c, 2002). Political parties that claim to represent the interests of minority groups shifted from the politics of confrontation towards the politics of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 V. Petsinis, Cross-Regional Ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99951-3_1

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V. PETSINIS

consensus and participated in grand coalition governments with larger, mainstream, partners—notably, the ethnic Hungarian parties in Romania and Slovakia (Craiutu, 1995). Meanwhile, EU membership functioned as a pole of attraction that relaxed the emphasis on national survival and encouraged the improvement of minority rights in Estonia and Latvia) (Mole, 2012; Van Elsuwege, 2004). Further to the southeast, the international community became actively engaged in an endeavour to pacify contentious nexuses that consist of states, ethnic minorities, and their external homelands, as evidenced by the Ohrid Peace Agreement of 2001 in the Republic of Northern Macedonia (Bieber, 2005). The current stage can be dubbed ‘the phase of crisis(-es)’ all over Europe. The economic crisis of 2008–2010 generated a ‘core versus periphery’ cleavage (mainly between the EU ‘south’ and the EU core— primarily, Germany) over austerity cuts and the conditions of the bail-out programmes. On that occasion, increasingly popular political parties of the radical left (e.g. the Coalition of the Radical Left/SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain) contested the bail-out terms and counterproposed anti-models to the strict budgetary commitments endorsed by the proponents of fiscal austerity within the Eurozone—notably, Germany’s former Minister of Finance, Wolfgang Schäuble (Della Porta et al., 2017; Hien & Joerges, 2017). In addition to the radical left, parties of the radical and the extremist right also endeavoured to maximise their political capital by addressing public grievances over these economic reforms prescribed by the European Commission and the European Central Bank (most remarkably, the cases of the Golden Dawn in Greece and, to a secondary extent, Jobbik/Movement for a Better Hungary in Hungary). Of greater relevance to the purposes of this book is the migration crisis that commenced during the second half of 2015 as a result of protracted warfare in Syria and Iraq. In response to the urgent necessity to accommodate the incoming waves of displaced persons, the European Commission issued a directive for the proportional redistribution of refugees within the EU.1 This measure triggered another ‘core versus periphery’ cleavage between the countries of the EU core (Germany and France) and the ‘Visegrad Four’ (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary). Soon, the opposition of certain ‘Visegrad Four’ governments 1 On this issue, see: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_ 5596. Accessed 20 October 2020.

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shifted from disagreements over infrastructural capacities to argumentation embedded in identity politics and cultural essentialism. Prominent statesmen, such as Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán, rushed to accuse the European Commission of ‘irresponsibility’, underlined that ‘Europe and European culture are rooted in Christian values’, and judged that ‘there is no alternative, and we have no option but to defend Hungary’s borders’.2 At the same time, the migration crisis also triggered an ‘inter-periphery’ cleavage between certain South European states (mainly Greece and, to a secondary extent, Italy) and the ‘Visegrad Four’—as some of the latter (e.g. Czech Republic and Slovakia) accused the former of irresponsibility during the scanning process of refugees and other migrants moving northwards (Haughton, 2017; Petsinis, 2016b). According to Ernesto Laclau (1977, p. 175), ‘the emergence of [in this case, right-wing] populism is historically linked to a crisis of the dominant ideological discourse which is in turn part of a more general social crisis’. In contemporary Europe, the new challenges that the migration crisis poses for several societies are indissolubly linked with the political crisis of liberal democracy and (more concretely) multiculturalism as the model for managing inter-group relations and diversity. In the first instance, one might argue that this correlation does not seem highly relevant within the context of Central and East European societies because of the small numbers of refugees and/or other migrants therein (Petsinis, 2019b, p. 215). Nevertheless, what possesses pivotal importance (on this occasion) are neither the causes nor the tangible symptoms of the social/political crisis but the successful endeavour of political actors to convince their target groups that there is a crisis. In Cas Mudde’s words, ‘… there are very few concepts as vague as ‘crisis’. People act politically not so much on the basis of actual facts, but of what they think is the truth. In that sense, crisis is important. ‘When people think that there is an economic or a political crisis they will act accordingly’.3 This brief conceptual discussion of crisis is necessary in order to place into context the socio-psychological campaigns of certain (right-wing) populists, as well as broadly nativist, 2 See these statements by Viktor Orbán at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2015/sep/03/migration-crisis-hungary-pm-victor-orban-europe-response-madness. Accessed 10 October 2020. 3 Cas Mudde, ‘The Five Best Books on Populism,’ interview by Sophie Roell, at: https://fivebooks.com/best-books/cas-mudde-populism/. Accessed 16 October 2020.

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political actors in Central and Eastern Europe. Their objectives include to: (a) convince their target groups that their respective countries also form part of the European migration crisis; (b) highlight the ‘pre-emptive’ character of their engagement over this area of concern. Amid this phase of crises (and with specific regard to ethnopolitics), geopolitical realignments across the Continent and the emergence of Eurosceptic trends within the EU also exert a powerful impact on the state of ethnic relations across Central and Eastern Europe (Petsinis, 2019a, p. 380). In the northeast, Russia has been decisively reassuming its role as an external homeland and has become active in its endeavour to win hearts and minds among the ethnic Russian minorities of Estonia and Latvia via informal channels (Berzina, 2016; Cianetti & Nakai, 2017; Kaprans & Mierina, 2019). Mainstream parties of the centre-right became ‘radicalised’ (e.g. the governing Hungarian Civic Alliance/FIDESZ in Hungary) whereas populist and radical, as well as more extremist, rightwing parties augmented their public appeal—embedding opposition to minority rights and immigration into their agendas, as evidenced in the cases of Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, and Latvia (Braghiroli & Petsinis, 2019; Bustikova, 2019; Kasekamp et al., 2018; Kluknavská & Smolik, 2016; Kovarek et al., 2017). In all of this, EU membership has lost much of its attraction among candidate states in the region (e.g. Serbia). Most recently, the imposition of a state of emergency in response to the outbreak of COVID-19 (2020) has granted certain political actors an opportunity to interlink immigration and allegations over the potential spread of the global pandemic to their nativist agendas. Academic experts have endeavoured to assess how ethno-nationalism can combine with nativism, Euroscepticism, and right-wing populism in an attempt to update the study of ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe (Agarin, 2020; Brubaker, 2017; Krzyzanowski, ˙ 2017; Minkenberg et al., 2021). In addition, a series of academic monographs and edited volumes on the Western Balkans and the Baltic States have recently concentrated (partly or fully) on thematic areas as diverse as: (a) institutional and party politics; (b) ‘Europeanisation’ processes and the emergence of Euroscepticism; (c) nationalism and the management of ethnic relations; (d) the populist and radical right (Auers, 2015; Austers & Bukovskis, 2017; Bukovskis, 2016; Duvold et al., 2019; Džanki´c et al., 2019; Minkenberg, 2015; Stoji´c, 2018). In spite of their academic merit, these treatises retain a primarily regional (either Western Balkan or Baltic) focus and generally do not

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engage into extensive, cross-regional comparisons with other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. This monograph follows the steps of these older research endeavours, but it also fills in some of their gaps through an interdisciplinary approach and a cross-regional study. It positions the interaction among institutional politics, party politics, domestic ethnopolitics, and regional geopolitics inside a comparative context of two European regions where such intersections are of pivotal significance. This book highlights and compares the patterns and specificities of ethnic relations in the Western Balkans and the Baltic States. Particular attention is paid to the country cases of Estonia, Latvia, Croatia, and Serbia. Since the 1990s, a series of developments (e.g. the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by powerful global actors and the unrest in the southeast of Ukraine) have demonstrated that ethnic tensions can generate insecurities and have ramifications throughout Central and Eastern Europe. By comparing different post-communist settings (two post-Yugoslav and two post-Soviet states), this book provides new insights in conflict resolution and the management of ethnic relations in the new and the aspiring EU member states (e.g. Serbia). The choice of country cases in this book is not random. Croatia and Serbia (Chapter 3) share the political legacies of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The diachronic persistence of issues pertaining to ethnic minorities and the importance attached to the management of ethnic relations enhances the common ground between these two country cases. Most recently, the emergence of various brands of Euroscepticism in Croatia and Serbia provides another common denominator which can become interwoven with ethno-nationalism and the management of ethnic relations. Nevertheless, the evolutionary trajectories of Euroscepticism in the two countries seem to diverge with respect to Croatia’s political and socioeconomic realities as an EU member state (since 2013) and Serbia’s opportunity structures as a state which is not a member of the EU and oscillates between the EU and ‘alternative’ global partners such as Russia and, to a secondary extent, China (Petsinis, 2020a, pp. 139–140). Inside the context of Serbia’s non-linear and complex accession process to the EU, it is of particular importance to provide a critical overview of Croatia’s experience throughout the course of its EU membership and highlight any potential implications for Serbia with respect to the management of ethnic relations and its intersections with Eurosceptic sentiment.

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With regard to the Baltic component, Estonia and Latvia (Chapter 4) are two heterogeneous societies where societal cleavages along ethnic lines (the Estonian/Latvian titular majorities and the ethnic Russian minorities) have been intensively politicised on the levels of institutional and party politics (including the persistent and non-negligible appeal of populist and radical right-wing parties). The case of the southernmost Baltic republic, Lithuania, is not covered in this book because: (a) it is a considerably less heterogeneous society and the politicisation of ethnic cleavages has not been of such a pivotal significance as it is the case in the two other Baltic States; (b) the electoral appeal of political parties with an ethno-nationalist, nativist, and/or populist and radical right-wing orientation in Lithuania is rather weak. The pairing of country cases from the Western Balkans and the Baltic States in the chapters that follow is not coincidental either. Starting with the comparative pair of Latvia and Serbia (Chapter 5), a multitude of factors interact and coincide in the management of ethnic relations. These include the largest and politically organised minority groups resident in each state (in Serbia, ethnic Hungarians,4 and in Latvia, ethnic Russians); their external homelands (Russia and Hungary); and both structured and informal EU engagement. Although Latvia is a full-fledged member state of the EU (since 2004) and Serbia is currently not, the management of ethnic relations has been mediated (to varying degrees), by geopolitical concerns in both countries, and this provides a crucial common denominator between the two cases (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 107). Similarly, various factors interact in the management of ethnic relations in the second set of paired states: Estonia and Croatia (Chapter 6). These include the Russian and Serbian ethnic minorities; their external homelands (Russia and Serbia); and the EU. In addition, the management of ethnic relations in Estonia and Croatia has frequently been subject to discourses of ‘otherness’ and cultural reductions. Of particular significance has been the necessity to demarcate and safeguard Estonian and/or Croatian perceptions of ‘Europeanness’ from ‘Eurasian’ or ‘Balkan’ adversaries (Aalto, 2003; Petsinis, 2016a, pp. 230–231). More importantly, little research has compared any of the Western Balkan states with the Baltic republics, enhancing the innovative aspects of this monograph. 4 This monograph is largely centred on Serbia’s most ethnically diverse region, the autonomous province of Vojvodina, where the bulk of the ethnic Hungarian community resides.

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The mind-set behind this cross-regional, Balkan-Baltic comparison is not simply to pinpoint and summarise similarities and differences. Instead, the main objective of this monograph is to offer a significant theoretical contribution. The cross-regional structure contributes empirical material which tests the hypothesis: as the bond between regional geopolitics and domestic ethnopolitics grows stronger, the liberalisation of policies on ethnic minorities within a given state can become less feasible. The ultimate aim is to assess the validity and contemporary relevance of selected theoretical models for the study of ethnopolitics. This is particularly the case with the triadic (Brubaker, 1995; Waterbury, 2021) and quadratic (Pettai, 2006; Smith, 2002, 2003) nexuses which consist of ‘nationalising states’, the ethnic minorities living in these states, the external national homelands of the minorities, and the EU as a fourth, additional, actor. These theoretical models are outlined and discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. Of particular importance to this book is to demonstrate that the interaction among the components of these triadic and quadratic nexuses is not to be perceived as ‘fixed’ or ‘all-pervasive’ but can vary remarkably, according to the idiosyncratic particularities of regional and national contexts. This is equally valid when observing the varying interactions between regional geopolitics and domestic ethnopolitics inside different political and sociocultural environments. This monograph additionally elaborates and underlines these key aspects through reference to fresh empirical material from the Western Balkans and the Baltic States. This endeavour acquires a greater significance when taking into consideration older empirical research in the Western Balkans and the Baltic States that has provided much of the theoretical edifice for the formulation of both the triadic and the quadratic nexuses (e.g. Brubaker, 1995; Pettai, 2006; Smith, 2002, 2003). The cross-regional comparisons between the contemporary ethnopolitical realities in this monograph makes a solid contribution updating and upgrading these theoretical models. The scope of this monograph is interdisciplinary (within the bounds of political science) in that it combines theoretical approaches from political history, political sociology (ethno-nationalism and ethnopolitics), and party politics (e.g. cleavages between mainstream and ethnic minority parties, mainstream parties of the populist and radical right). A combination of theoretical approaches from the field of ethnopolitics and those pertaining to the study of the populist and radical right is both

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feasible and insightful because ethno-nationalism constitutes an ideological component of fundamental significance for populist and radical right-wing parties (Minkenberg, 2017; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2017). Complementary attention is paid to selected approaches from International Relations theory with a focus cast on geopolitical shifts and how these impact the patterns and management of ethnic relations across Central and Eastern Europe (Bilgin, 2003; Lipschutz, 1995; Wendt, 1999). This book aims at relaxing the barriers that exist between academic researchers and policymaking experts working on the Western Balkans and those dealing with the Baltic States. This book: (a) assesses how the Estonian/Latvian and the Croatian/Serbian models for ethnic relations management compare to European standards for the protection of minority rights; (b) highlights patterns of domestic opposition to minority rights; (c) contextualises the role of kin-states vis-à-vis their respective minorities (Hungary vis-à-vis the ethnic Hungarians in Serbia; Russia visà-vis the ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia; Serbia vis-à-vis the ethnic Serbs in Croatia). Two complementary areas of concern comprise: (a) the politicisation of ethnic cleavages at the level of institutional and party politics (the Estonian and Latvian cases, in particular); (b) the ‘new’ identity politics of anti-immigration and the endeavours by ethno-nationalist and nativist political parties to capitalise on them. Lastly, this book illustrates how: (a) in multi-ethnic parts of Serbia (e.g. Vojvodina) and Croatia (e.g. Istria), a trans-ethnic notion of regional identity seems to have withstood ethnic friction and preserved cultural pluralism in local societies; (b) a heritage of peaceful cohabitation can enhance the implementation of state legislation and encourage the adoption of flexible models for ethnic relations management. Another objective is to illustrate why and how existing theoretical models in ethnopolitics need to be updated in the light of recent developments and the increasing impact of new catalysts such as nativist trends, Euroscepticism, and the emergence of the populist and radical right across Central and Eastern Europe (Petsinis, 2020c, pp. 35–38). More systematic cooperation between academic experts in nationalism and academic experts in the populism and the radical right might enable: (a) the former to assess more accurately the degree to which new variables such as Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant trends can reshape ethnopolitics, as both a lived reality and a field of study across Central and Eastern Europe;

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(b) the latter to formulate new interpretative models about how (rightwing) populist and Eurosceptic actors embed their agendas inside the pre-existing political cultures of ethno-nationalism, particularistic identity and memory politics (ibid.). The systemisation of this interdisciplinary cooperation can be beneficial to the study of ethnopolitics, nationalism, and the populist and radical right not solely in the Western Balkans, the Baltic States, or the ‘Visegrad Four’, but all over Europe. Croatia has seen the mobilisation of Eurosceptic, right-wing politicians and extra-institutional actors (e.g. war veteran associations) against the public use of Serb Cyrillic script in Eastern Slavonia (2013–2016). Meanwhile in Estonia, EKRE (the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia/Eesti Konservatiivne Rahverakond), which was accepted as a governmental partner in April 2019,5 contested minority rights and the EU’s quota arrangement for the redistribution of refugees and sought to restrict immigration on the basis of allegedly combatting the spread of COVID19. Contextualising how the management of ethnic relations can intercede with Eurosceptic and nationalist opposition to minority rights is of great importance—considering that not a lot has been written on rising Eurosceptic sentiment in the Western Balkans and the Baltic States. In this light, it is of equal interest to assess whether (and how) shared anxieties over immigration can (or cannot) provide a common ground and bring the national majorities and certain minorities (e.g. ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia) ‘closer’ to each other (Auers & Kasekamp, 2015; Kluknavská & Smolik, 2016). The cross-regional content of this book also has a practical dimension: a comparative approach can help the reader assess the degree to which certain states may learn from the successes and/or shortcomings of others in the field of accommodating ethnic differences. This can contribute new insights and elaborate alternative models for understanding ethnopolitics drawn from the Central and East European multi-ethnic experience. This is of great significance, considering that researchers from Central and Eastern Europe have been mostly employing ‘Western’ theoretical models for the study of ethnopolitics inside their macro-region. This, in

5 The bulk of this monograph was authored prior to the official dissolution of Estonia’s governing coalition (consisting of EKRE, the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union/Isamaa party, and the Centre Party/Eesti Keskerakond as the core partner) on 13 January 2021 and the subsequent formation of a new government consisting of the Reform Party/Reformierakond and the Centre Party.

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turn, will help to illustrate the specificities in the patterns and management of ethnic relations in Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, it will scrutinise essentialist theses over the alleged ‘linear persistence’ of ethno-nationalism therein. This book partly relies on research output (monographs, academic articles, book-chapters, and analytical commentaries) produced during the course of the author’s participation in: (a) the ‘Populist Rebellion against Modernity in twenty-first century Eastern Europe: Neo-traditionalism and Neo-feudalism’ international research project (Horizon 2020, POPREBEL, Grant agreement no.822682); (b) a Marie SkłodowskaCurie (MSCA-IF) individual research project at the University of Tartu (project title: ‘Patterns and management of ethnic relations in the Western Balkans and the Baltic States’ [2017–2019] project code: 749400MERWBKBS); (c) postdoctoral research in various academic institutions across Europe between 2005 and 2016. This monograph also includes material from 47 elite and expert interviews conducted between 2016 and 2019, in Estonia, Latvia, Croatia, and Serbia. The interviewees comprise categories as diverse as: locally based academics and other researchers; politicians and political activists; government officials at all levels of public administration; journalists and other opinion formers; professionals engaged in the NGO sector and think-tanks; and clerics. The questionnaires of the research interviews elicited insights on: the political dimension of ethnic relations (both domestic and external); the development of minority rights legislation and its implementation; and the state of ethnic relations at grass-roots level. Estonian field research was conducted in Tartu and Tallinn in summer and winter 2017 (June and December) as well as in summer 2018 (June). It comprises of a set of interviews conducted during autumn and winter 2016 in Estonia under the auspices of research funding from the Swedish Institute, Stockholm (the Visby Programme/Visbyprogrammet ). The Latvian part of the field research was conducted in Riga and Daugavpils in summer-autumn 2017 (July, August and October) and in spring 2019 (April). The Croatian part of the field research was conducted in Zagreb, Vukovar, and Pakrac in autumn 2018 (November) as well as in Pula and Rijeka in spring 2019 (March). The Serbian part of the field research was conducted in Novi Sad and Belgrade in autumn 2018 (November). In addition to the elite and expert interviews, this monograph has relied on locally available surveys, reports, and opinion polls, articles and other academic works (published and unpublished), party

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documents, legal documents, and other literature on the management of ethnic relations. The insights of this book are of particular interest to: (a) political scientists with an expertise in Comparative Politics, European Politics, Ethnopolitics, Euroscepticism, nationalism, democratisation, populism, and the study of the populist and radical right; (b) sociologists with an interest in research topics such as ethnic conflict and ethnic relations, multiculturalism, migration studies, and political culture. The findings of this monograph are of an equal interest to a wide range of practitioners such as: political analysts and commentators; policy advisors in European and international organisations (e.g. the EU’s External Action Service); think-tanks; journalists; NGOs with a focus on ethnic relations, immigration, and refugee issues; and a regional expertise in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The chapter outline of this book is as follows.

Outline and Content of Chapters Literary Overview: Setting the Conceptual and Analytical Frames This chapter outlines the theoretical and conceptual framework of this book. This includes an analysis of key concepts such as ethno-nationalism, nativism, Euroscepticism, and populism. Particular attention is paid to the enduring relevance of certain theoretical approaches to the study of ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe from the 1990s to the present day. At the same time, the necessity for a more extensive and systematic cooperation between academic experts in ethnopolitics and experts in subject areas such as populism and Euroscepticism is underlined. In this chapter, it is stressed that the main contribution of this book is to situate new trends such as Euroscepticism and nativism into existing theoretical models for the study of ethnopolitics. It also highlights how these can combine with ethno-nationalism. This, in turn, can provide a safe trajectory towards updating and upgrading these theoretical models. Prior to this, a retrospective overview highlights how the management of ethnic relations in the former Yugoslavia and Baltic States has interacted with transitional processes (1990s and 2000s).

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Euroscepticism, Minority Rights, and Identity Politics: The Cases of Croatia and Serbia This chapter highlights patterns of Euroscepticism in Croatia and Serbia with a primary focus on the employment of Euroscepticism by the ruling (nominally centre-right) parties of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Recently, in Croatia, the formation of a nexus has been witnessed, which comprises of actors as diverse as: certain representatives of the ruling HDZ’s ‘right-wing faction’; former HDZ-affiliates and current ‘dissidents’; and the Croatian War Veterans Association/Udruga Hrvatskih Ratnih Veterana (UHRV). Firstly, this nexus has been attempting to revise Croatia’s legal framework on minority rights, especially as far as the political representation of the ethnic Serb minority is concerned. However, their further-reaching objective is to voice discontent with the EU’s external engagement towards the improvement of minority rights legislation between 2000 and 2002. Meanwhile in Serbia, the period since 2008 triggered the dissociation of Eurosceptic narratives from the question of ethnic relations in the interior. Especially, the question of Kosovo has been transformed from one that once pertained to the realm of domestic ethnopolitics into one that pertains to the sphere of foreign policy and regional geopolitics. Moreover, positive neighbourly relations with Hungary, the normalisation of relations with Croatia, and the continuous cooperation between SNS and ethnic Hungarian parties in the established governing structures hint at the absence of a security threat emanating from any of the minorities in Serbia’s most ethnically diverse region, Vojvodina. This chapter highlights that, by contrast to their Croatian counterparts within HDZ, Serbian Eurosceptics within the governing SNS do not generally intertwine their criticism of the EU with the management of minority issues in Serbia. Institutional Politics, Party Politics, and Ethnopolitics: The Cases of Estonia and Latvia This chapter concentrates on party politics in Estonia and Latvia. Particular attention is paid to (right-wing) populist and national conservative parties (Estonia: EKRE; Latvia: The NA) as pivotal actors in the intersection that consists of institutional politics, party politics, and ethnopolitics. This chapter demonstrates that the Latvian party system has provided structural opportunities for the inclusion of the NA as a legitimate partner

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in three consecutive government coalitions with parties of the liberal centre and the centre-right (2011, 2014, and 2019). This facilitated the NA to promote its standpoints on: ‘demographic’ measures with the alleged objective to boost the birth-rate; language issues; educational reform; and the management of immigration and the refugee crisis. Meanwhile, in Estonia, the mainstream political parties excluded EKRE from power until 2019 when it was accepted into a government coalition. This chapter outlines EKRE’s ongoing endeavour to promote its standpoints on the management of ethnic relations within Estonia as well as the securitisation of bilateral relations between Estonia and Russia. Attention is also paid to the intersection between the party’s nativist prerogatives against immigration and its policy principles on domestic ethnopolitics, regional geopolitics, as well as to the area of active policymaking in government (April 2019–January 2021). Geopolitics, Ethnopolitics, and the EU: The Cases of Latvia and Serbia This chapter comprises a comparative study on the patterns of managing ethnic relations in Latvia and Serbia. This comparison demonstrates that as the bond between geopolitics and ethnopolitics grows more powerful, the liberalisation of minority policies becomes less feasible within a given state. In Serbia, a series of systemic transformations have triggered the demarcation of an intersection between domestic ethnopolitics and regional geopolitics. This combined with the endorsement of consensus politics by the largest minority party (the Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina/Vajdasági Magyar Szövetség [VMSZ]) and the impact of exogenous factors—namely, the change of course in Hungary’s neighbourhood policy. Within a longer trajectory, the aggregate of these developments facilitated the EU’s engagement as a fourth actor. By contrast, in Latvia, the convergence between geopolitics and ethnopolitics remains intact; therefore, the opportunity structure towards further liberalising the legal framework on minority rights has been more restricted in comparison with Serbia. This chapter also demonstrates that the intersection between geopolitics and ethnopolitics should not be perceived as ‘fixed’, but instead can be subject to fluctuations and readjustments. This paradigm means that, under certain circumstances, the centrality of domestic ethnopolitics can weaken. The discussion of Serbia clarifies that a readjustment of the intersection between ethnopolitics and geopolitics has shifted the lens of the

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country’s main political actors primarily towards geopolitics. Meanwhile, the discussion of Latvia demonstrates that new variables can enter the fore (‘new’ identity politics based on anti-immigration rhetoric as well as economic anxieties) and can temporarily challenge the primacy of regional geopolitics and domestic ethnopolitics. Geopolitics, Ethnopolitics, and the EU: The Cases of Estonia and Croatia This chapter comprises a comparative study on the patterns of managing ethnic relations in Estonia and Croatia. Along a similar trajectory to the comparison between the Latvian and the Serbian cases, this chapter demonstrates that the relaxation of the bond between geopolitics and ethnopolitics can facilitate the liberalisation of minority policies within a given state. In Croatia, the defeat of HDZ in the parliamentary elections of January 2000 (as well as the gradual normalisation of the bilateral relations with Serbia) generated the circumstances that led to the formulation of a consistent and extensive legislation on minority rights. This also facilitated steady cooperation between EU advisors and Croatian government officials with expertise in minority rights (2000–2002). Meanwhile, in Estonia, the emphasis on national survival and safeguarding the ‘Estonian’ ethno-cultural character of the republic during the early stages of the EU accession process halted more substantial legislative developments on minority rights despite a state of social stability. This chapter also tests the validity of the above-mentioned hypotheses against the background of more recent developments such as: (a) the attempts by Eurosceptic and nationalist actors to revise the legal framework on minority rights in Croatia; (b) the more systematic, albeit informal, use of the Russian language in the public administration sector (since the ‘Bronze Soldier’ crisis of 2007); (c) the state of affairs following the inclusion of EKRE into the previous governing coalition (April 2019January 2021) in Estonia.

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Bibliography and Other Sources Monographs, Edited Volumes, PhD and Masters’ Theses, and Other Books Aalto, P. (2003). Constructing post-Soviet geopolitics in Estonia. Routledge. Auers, D. (2015). Comparative politics and government of the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the 21st century. Palgrave Macmillan. Austers, A., & Bukovskis, K. (2017). Euroscepticism in the Baltic States. Latvian Institute for International Affairs. Berzina, I. (2016). The possibility of societal destabilization in Latvia: Potential national security threats. National Defence Academy of Latvia. Budryte, D. (2005). Taming nationalism? Political community building in the post-Soviet Baltic States. Ashgate. Bukovskis, K. (2016). Euroscepticism in small EU Member States. Latvian Institute for International Affairs. Bustikova, L. (2019). Extreme reactions: Radical right mobilization in Eastern Europe. Cambridge University Press. Della Porta, D., Fernández, J., Kouki, H., & Mosca, L. (2017). Movement parties against austerity. Wiley. Duvold, K., Ekman, J., & Berglund, S. (2019). Political culture in the Baltic States: Between national and European integration. Palgrave Macmillan. Džanki´c, J., Keil, S., & Kmezi´c, M. (2019). The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans: A failure of EU conditionality? Palgrave Macmillan. Hien, J., & Joerges, C. (2017). Ordoliberalism, law and the rule of economics. Bloomsbury. Laclau, E. (1977). Politics and ideology in Marxist theory: Capitalism. NLB Publishing. Lipschutz, D. R. (1995). On security. Columbia University Press. Minkenberg, M. (2017). The radical right in Eastern Europe: Democracy under siege? Springer. Minkenberg, M. (2015). Transforming the transformation? The East European radical right in the political process. Routledge. Mole, R. (2012). The Baltic States from the Soviet Union to the European Union: Identity, discourse and power in the post-communist transition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Routledge. Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press. Stoji´c, M. (2018). Party responses to the EU in the Western Balkans: Transformation, opposition or defiance? Palgrave Macmillan. Van Elsuwege, P. (2004). Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia: Problems of integration at the threshold of the European Union. ECMI Press.

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Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Cambridge University Press.

Academic Articles, Book-Chapters, Working Papers, and Analytical Commentaries Agarin, T. (2020). The (not so) surprising longevity of identity politics: Contemporary challenges of the state-society compact in Central Eastern Europe. East European Politics, 36(2), 147–166. Auer, S. (2000). Nationalism in Central Europe—A chance or a threat for the emerging liberal democratic order? East European Politics and Societies, 14(2), 213–245. Auers, D., & Kasekamp, A. (2015). The impact of radical right parties in the Baltic States. In M. Minkenberg (Ed.), Transforming the transformation: The East European radical right in the political process (pp. 137–153). Routledge. Bieber, F. (2005). Power-sharing after Yugoslavia: Functionality and dysfunctionality of power sharing institutions in post-war Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo. In N. Sid (Ed.), From power sharing to democracy: Post-conflict institutions in ethnically divided societies (pp. 85–103). McGill-Queens University Press. Bilgin, P. (2003). Individual and societal dimensions of security. International Studies Review, 5(2), 203–222. Braghiroli, S., & Petsinis, V. (2019). Between party-systems and identity-politics: The populist and radical right in Estonia and Latvia. European Politics and Society, 20(4), 431–449. Brubaker, R. (1995). National minorities, nationalizing states and external homelands in the new Europe. Daedalus, 124(2), 107–132. Brubaker, R. (2017). Between nationalism and civilizationism: The European populist moment in comparative perspective. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40(8), 1191–1226. Bruszt, L., & Stark, D. (2003). Who counts? Supranational norms and societal needs. East European Politics and Societies, 17 (1), 74–82. Cianetti, L., & Nakai, R. (2017). Critical trust in European institutions: The case of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia. Problems of Post-Communism, 64(5), 276–290. Craiutu, A. (1995). A dilemma of dual identity: The democratic alliance of Hungarians in Romania. East European Constitutional Review, 4(2), 43–49. Haughton, T. (2007). When does the EU make a difference? Conditionality and the accession process in Central and Eastern Europe. Political Studies Review, 5, 233–246. Haughton, T. (2017). Central and Eastern Europe: The sacrifices of solidarity, the discomforts of diversity, and the vexations of vulnerabilities. In D. Dinan,

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N. Nugent, & W. E. Paterson (Eds.), The European Union in crisis (pp. 253– 268). Palgrave Macmillan. Kaprans, M., & Mierina, I. (2019). Minority reconsidered: Towards a typology of Latvia’s Russophone identity. Europe-Asia Studies, 71(1), 24–47. Kasekamp, A., Madison, M., & Wierenga, L. (2018). Discursive opportunities for the Estonian populist radical right in a digital society. Problems of PostCommunism, 66(1), 47–58. Kluknavská, A., & Smolik, J. (2016). We hate them all? Issue adaptation of extreme right parties in Slovakia 1993–2016. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 49(4), 335–344. Kovarek, D., Róna, D., & Hunyadi, B., & Krekó, P. (2017). Scapegoat-based policy-making in Hungary: Qualitative evidence for how Jobbik and its mayors govern municipalities. Intersections, 3(3), 63–87. Krzyzanowski, ˙ M. (2017). Discursive shifts in ethno-nationalist politics: On politicization and mediatization of the “refugee crisis” in Poland. Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, 16(1–2), 76–96. Minkenberg, M., Florian, A., & Vegh, Z. (2021). Depleting democracy? The radical right’s impact on minority politics in Eastern Europe. International Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/019251212097 2883. Accessed 18 November 2020. Pettai, V. (2006). Explaining ethnic politics in the Baltic States: Reviewing the triadic nexus model. Journal of Baltic Studies, 37 (1), 124–136. Petsinis, V. (2013). Croatia’s framework for minority rights: New legal prospects within the context of European integration. Ethnopolitics, 12(4), 352–367. Petsinis, V. (2016a). Ethnic relations, the EU, and geopolitical implications: The cases of Croatia and Estonia. Ethnopolitics, 15(2), 230–244. Petsinis, V. (2016b, January 7). The refugee question in Europe: “South” versus “east”. Open Democracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/author/vas silis-petsinis. Accessed 18 November 2020. Petsinis, V. (2019a). Ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe in a state of flux: Introduction. Ethnopolitics, 18(4), 379–382. Petsinis, V. (2019b). Identity politics and right-wing populism in Estonia: The case of EKRE. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2(2), 211–230. Petsinis, V. (2020a). Converging or diverging patterns of Euroscepticism among political parties in Croatia and Serbia. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 28(2), 139–152. Petsinis, V. (2020b). Geopolitics, ethnopolitics and the EU: The cases of Serbia and Latvia. Ethnopolitics, 19(2), 107–124. Petsinis, V. (2020c). Ethnopolitics across Central and Eastern Europe in a state of flux: Time for updating and upgrading? In A. Makarychev & O. Bogdanova (Eds.), Regionalisms and neighbourhoods at Europe’s Eastern margins: The Baltic—Black Sea Patch-/Networks (pp. 27–40). Springer.

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Rydgren, J. (2017). Radical right-wing parties in Europe: What’s populism got to do with it? Journal of Language and Politics, 16(4), 485–496. Smith, D. (2002). Framing the national question in Central and Eastern Europe: A quadratic nexus? The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 2(1), 3–16. Smith, D. (2003). Minority rights, multiculturalism, and EU-enlargement: The case of Estonia. Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 1, 1–39. Szabo, M. (1994). Nation-state, nationalism and the prospects for democratization in East Central Europe. Journal of Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 27 (4), 377–399. Vasilijevi´c, S. (2002). The legal aspects of the protection of minorities in the process of stabilization and association. In K. Ott (Ed.), Croatian accession to the EU: Institutional challenges (Vol. 2, Chapter 10, pp. 249–272). Institute of Public Finance. Waterbury, M. (2021). Divided nationhood and multiple membership: A framework for assessing kin-state policies and their impact. Ethnopolitics, 20(1), 39–52.

CHAPTER 2

Literary Overview: Setting the Conceptual and Analytical Frames

Introduction One might argue that the study of ethnopolitics interlinks specific territories with groups of people who are bound together by an agglomerate of sociocultural affinities through time (the ethnos/ethnie in classical Greek). This explains the interdisciplinary character of ethnopolitics. This field of study has incorporated theoretical and methodological approaches from modern history, political science, as well as sociology and cultural studies. Theoretical approaches to the study of ethnopolitics and nationalism are equally multifaceted. They can comprise of the diverse ethno-symbolic approach (Connor, 1993; Smith, 2000, 2010; Billig, 1995), approaches to ethnopolitics beyond groups and groupism (Brubaker, 1995, 2002), approaches with a primary stress on socioeconomic modernisation (Gellner, 1983; Greenfeld, 2012), as well as historiographic approaches (Breuilly, 1997; Mann, 1995; Hobsbawm, 1992a, 1992b). Of particular relevance to the purposes of this monograph are the two former approaches because they help place into context more lucidly: (a) the patterns of interaction among entities such as ethnic minorities, their external homelands, and the states where these minorities reside; (b) the symbolism and socio-psychological strategies employed by a wide range of political and social actors (political parties, organisations, and other interest groups) in order to manage issues with ethno-cultural implications. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 V. Petsinis, Cross-Regional Ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99951-3_2

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This monograph integrates a wide range of different literatures, including theoretical approaches to the study of ethnopolitics and ethno-nationalism, geopolitics, European integration and Euroscepticism, populism and the populist and radical right, and postauthoritarian/totalitarian transformation. In the following chapters of this book, the objective of the empirical discussion is to test the validity and relevance of this multidimensional theoretical framework against the political and sociocultural realities in the countries and societies studied. This aim is additionally facilitated by situating this empirical and theoretical debate into three stages in the evolution of ethnopolitics across Central and Eastern Europe: namely, the phases of securitisation (1990s), optimism (2000s), and fluctuation (2010s until present day). One significant contribution of this monograph is to position the functions of new trends such as Euroscepticism and nativism into the existing theoretical models for the study of ethnopolitics and highlight how they can combine with ethno-nationalism. For instance, this monograph introduces and analyses the concept of geopolitical Euroscepticism. It elaborates how ethno-nationalism can interact with Euroscepticism inside the context of geopolitical concerns and insecurities in the Western Balkans and the Baltic States. This aspect acquires a greater significance as part of the broader endeavour to assess how the process of European integration can (or cannot) change political mores and values (at elite and public levels) and the opposition that it faces from a multitude of Eurosceptic political actors. This is equally valid regarding the intersections between ethnonationalism and nativism. As illustrated in the empirical discussion, certain political actors in the country cases studied converge on the belief that membership to state and nation must be defined by ancestry and be coterminous. Such core-beliefs are not exclusively the domain of the populist and radical right but have also been propagated by mainstream political actors along the lines of the necessity to ensure national survival (e.g. the Estonian and Latvian cases). Therefore, one more theoretical contribution of this monograph is to: (a) clarify the longer trajectories behind such deep-seated convictions; (b) assess how they can facilitate, if not legitimise, the formulation of new nativist platforms against a new wave of immigration by the populist and radical right. Empirical discussion hints that this process can become highly subject to the particularities of national (as well as regional and local) settings. This means that one

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cannot speak of a ‘uniform’ and ‘all-pervasive’ pattern but a varied and idiosyncratic one across Central and Eastern Europe. In the following sections, the theoretical and conceptual framework of this book is outlined and discussed in greater detail. This includes an analysis of key concepts such as ethno-nationalism, nativism, Euroscepticism, and populism. Particular attention is paid to the enduring relevance of certain theoretical approaches to the study of ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe from the 1990s until nowadays. However, at the same time, the necessity for more extensive and systematic cooperation between academic experts in ethnopolitics and experts in subject areas such as populism and Euroscepticism is underlined. Prior to this, a retrospective overview that highlights how the management of ethnic relations has interacted with transitional processes in the former Yugoslavia and the Baltic States (1990s and 2000s) is required.

Transitional Processes and Their Legacies in the Former Yugoslavia and the Baltic States: Why Ethnopolitics Matter Of particular importance for this overview is the work by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan and their approaches to the trajectories of democratisation in Latin America, Southern Europe, Central Europe, and Eastern Europe (Linz & Stepan, 1996). From a broader perspective, the authors establish two major categories of non-democratic governance in the contemporary world: authoritarian and totalitarian. According to Linz and Stepan, authoritarian regimes differ from totalitarian with regard to four focal dimensions: pluralism, ideology, leadership, and mobilisation. Along these lines, authoritarian regimes might be defined as: ‘… political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilisation, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones’ (Linz, 1970). By contrast, totalitarianism is defined by the elimination of all sorts of pre-existing political, economic, and social structures (Petsinis, 2019, p. 159). The three key dimensions representative of totalitarian rule are: (a) a concrete, thoroughly-defined and preponderant state ideology; (b)

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intensive and extensive mobilising potential; and (c) a charismatic leadership with boundaries of action which are not clearly defined and a frequently unpredictable behaviour towards elites and non-elites (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Inside the boundaries of this terminological distinction, Hungary throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, as well as Czechoslovakia since the suppression of the Prague Spring (1968), can be classified as authoritarian regimes (Musil, 1995). On the other hand, Bulgaria under Todor Zhivkov’s regime represents an appropriate example of totalitarian rule (Spirova, 2008). Processes of political and socioeconomic transition in Central and Eastern Europe have been conditional, depending upon geopolitical concurrences, political infrastructure, as well as patterns of social stratification inherited from the previous era (Petsinis, 2019, p. 160). One may schematically place into context a set of commonalities among post-communist polities undergoing transition: (a) the establishment of a multiparty system and free elections; (b) a political landscape dominated by reformed socialist and ‘new’ political parties (Agh, 1995); (c) increasing differentiation between elite and grass-roots politics (Baylis, 1994); (d) the establishment of Western-style constitutional courts (McGregor, 1996); (e) large-scale replacement of top administrative cadres with powerful links to the old regime—such as the practice of lustration in Poland (Bernhard, 1996; Petsinis, 2010, p. 304). Many (sometimes most) of these features have been characteristic of transitional processes across post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the diversity among the patterns of governance in the Central and East European states under communism hints that these states were likely to pursue more case-specific trajectories towards transition. Of great interest for the purposes of this book is to briefly place into context how the management of ethnic relations interceded with democratisation (also ‘Europeanisation’) and highlight the enduring legacies of such intersections, up to date, in the former Yugoslavia and the Baltic States. The high degree of ethnic heterogeneity, as well as conflicting claims to self-determination, state sovereignty, and territorial integrity, eventually paved the way to the contested dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia through protracted warfare in 1991–1992 (Cohen, 1993; Lampe, 2001). Slovenia was the only former Yugoslav republic that managed to break away from the crumbling federation with minor damage and (after a series of reforms) become a member state of the EU in 2004. However, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the legacy of

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the recent conflict complicates the consolidation of democratic institutions and divides the leaderships of the Bosnian Serb republic (Republika Srpska) and the Croat-Bosnijak federation up to date. In Serbia and Croatia, the enhancement of the presidential office during the 1990s enabled Slobodan Miloševi´c and Franjo Tud-man to pursue authoritarian patterns of governance. Since the reincorporation of certain territories into the Croatian state between 1995 and 1996 (the former, self-proclaimed, ‘Serb Republic of Krajina’ and Eastern Slavonia), Croatia slowly started the course to democratisation (Petsinis, 2013, pp. 353–355). However, even after the conclusion of the Erdut Agreement (15 January 1996), which paved the way to the administrative reincorporation of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem into the Croatian republic, the management of ethnic relations still interceded with democratisation and the country’s trajectory towards EU structures (ibid.). As early as 1996, the Venice Commission and other sub-bodies operating under the umbrella of the Council of Europe (COE) had been urging Croatia to inaugurate a new Constitutional Law on the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities (Venice Commission, 2002). In April 1999, the COE issued a resolution that called upon the Croatian government to: ‘adopt a constitutional law that would revise the suspended provisions of the 1991 constitutional law,1 taking into account the new realities, by October 1999 at the latest’ (Vasilijevi´c, 2002, p. 257). At the same time, the EU commenced its joint engagement together with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the COE, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for the return of ethnic Serb refugees to their hearths. As part of Croatia’s accession process, these organisations (together with the EU) issued a set of recommendations to the Croatian government. These recommendations underlined the necessity for the quick naturalisation of Serb returnees plus compensation for Serb properties that had been destroyed during war (OSCE, 2005, pp. 5 and 9). The Croatian government under the ruling Croatian Democratic Union/Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (HDZ) pledged that it would 1 Following the victorious outcome of the ‘Operation Storm’ (Operacija Oluja) against the ‘Serb Republic of Krajina’ in August 1995, the Croatian Sabor (national parliament) made use of Article 17 of the Constitution on declaring a state of emergency and froze the implementation of the legislation on national minorities.

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put the recommendations by COE and the other European and international organisations into effect (Petsinis, 2013, p. 354). Nevertheless, actual cooperation between European and Croatian officials was limited, and little progress was observed in the area of legislation for national minorities, as well as the return of ethnic Serb refugees throughout the late 1990s. It was only after the ‘change of guard’ in Croatian politics (2000) when the new Social Democrat Party (SDP) government, and President Stipe Mesi´c, initiated constitutional reform that restricted presidential powers sped up the democratisation process, and lifted the obstacles in the cooperation between Croatia and the EU. This led to the inauguration of the new Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities (CLRNM) on 19 December 20022 (Petsinis, 2012, p. 32). In adjacent Serbia, the interplay of adverse domestic (political instability and the question of Kosovo) and external (the UN embargo and the NATO bombing of 1999) catalysts delayed the transition process until the fall of Slobodan Miloševi´c from power (5 October 2000). However, alongside cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the endeavour to maintain the breakaway former autonomous province of Kosovo inside the administrative bounds of the Serbian republic emerged as a top priority for Serbian policymakers (Noutcheva, 2007, pp. 17–18)—especially following the adoption of Resolution 1244 by the UN Security Council (1999)3 and the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by powerful global actors (e.g. the US in 2008). Meanwhile, throughout 2003 and 2005, Hungary accused the Serbian authorities of indifference to a spate of violent incidents often categorised as ‘ethnic’ that broke out in the autonomous province of Vojvodina which frequently had ethnic Hungarians as targets.4 The aggregate of these combined catalysts complicated Serbia’s accession process to the EU and

2 For a full-text version, see: ‘Ustavni Zakon o Pravima Nacionalnih Manjina’, in Narodne Novine (2000). 3 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244 (including annexes 1 and 2), Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting on June 10th, 1999, Distr. GENERAL, S/RES/1244 (1999). 4 For some preliminary information about the ‘ethnic incidents’ in Vojvodina, see: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/serbia1005/7.htm. Accessed 18 October 2020; https://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/2008/EDOC11528.pdf. Accessed 19 October 2020.

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helped augment the electoral appeal of the Serbian Radical Party/Srpska Radikalna Stranka (SRS)—a party with a fervently nationalistic profile (Petsinis, 2017). Nevertheless, it was also during the same period when the inauguration of the Law on the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities (2002)5 triggered a breakthrough for upgrading Serbia’s legal infrastructure on minority rights which largely consisted in the combination of EU guidelines (e.g. the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities [FCNM], issued by COE in 1994) with selected and ‘recycled’ elements of communist era legislation (Petsinis, 2012, p. 33). By contrast to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the reformation process (glasnost ) that commenced during Mikhail Gorbachev’s tenure in office culminated in the (mostly) negotiated dissolution of the Soviet Union. This was a multifaceted and complex process which considerably varied across the crumbling federation. For the purposes of this book, the focus is cast on the specificities of the transitional process in the Baltic States. Unlike other contested (e.g. Croatia) or negotiated (e.g. Slovakia) acquisitions of independent statehood, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia perceived their independence as the restoration of their interwar statehoods that were suppressed after their annexation to the Soviet Union by Stalin (1940). In 1991, the Lithuanian state automatically granted universal citizenship to all residents irrespective of ethnic affiliation. However, the bulk of post-war settlers in Estonia and Latvia (mostly ethnic Russians) were rendered ‘stateless’ and had to start a complex process of naturalisation (including strict language requirements) in order to obtain the citizenship of the newly-independent republics. This shared restoration aspect has endowed Estonian and Latvian nationalisms with an essence of symbolic ‘decolonisation’ (Agarin, 2016; Hallik, 2002, p. 71; Mole, 2012; Peiker, 2016, pp. 120–123). The removal of any vestiges of the Soviet past and the construction of a firmer continuity between the interwar and contemporary Estonian and Latvian states emerged as a top necessity (Annus, 2020, p. 4). In both Latvia and Estonia, the state institutions have been fashioned in such a way as

5 This legal document was initially issued as a federal law under the auspices of the Serbian-Montenegrin loose state union (established in 2003). Following the result of the Montenegrin independence referendum (21 May 2006), the Law on the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities was incorporated into the legal system of the Serbian republic.

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to mirror the ‘ethnic state of the Latvians/Estonians’—finally restored after its suppression by the Soviets (Budryte, 2005). In Latvia, the necessity to keep parties suspected of pro-Kremlin leanings away from the halls of power (e.g. the nominally centre-left Harmony/Saskana ¸ which is highly popular among ethnic Russian voters) resulted in the formation of cordon sanitaire arrangements that have persisted throughout the span of independent statehood (Saarts, 2011). Meanwhile, in Estonia, Epp Annus contends that: ‘de-colonial ideas were largely displaced by an eco-digital discourse that focused on successes, while overlooking the persisting Soviet heritage’ by the 2010s (Annus, 2020, p. 4). Nevertheless, the underlying necessity to preserve the ‘Estonian’ ethno-cultural physiognomy of state institutions persists and constantly recurs in the discourse and practice of most political parties. In the following chapters of this book, focus is cast upon: (a) how this shared centrality of ethnopolitics is managed in the country cases under study, from a cross-regional and cross-country perspective; (b) how domestic ethnopolitics interact with regional geopolitics as well as the increasing impact of new variables (e.g. nativist trends and Eurosceptic sentiment).

Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Ethnopolitics: Then and Now The Ethno-Symbolic Approach: The Nation as a Socio-Psychological Phenomenon The ethno-symbolic approach largely conceptualises the modern nation as a socio-psychological phenomenon (Petsinis, 2020b, pp. 29–31). According to Anthony D. Smith, the modern nation can be summarised as: ‘a named human population, sharing a historic territory, common myths and historic memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all its members’ (Smith, 1999, p. 11). The ethnos can be defined as: ‘a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an association with a homeland and some degree of solidarity, at least among the elites’ (ibid., p. 13). In this light, the nation is a broader notion than the ethnos in that it addresses larger, more diverse, and primarily political/civic communities. Meanwhile, ethno-nationalism, as an ideological current, largely casts its

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focus on myths of common ancestry and the symbolism built around them—in other words, the essentially socio-psychological components of nationhood (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 29). The ultimate objective of constituent myths of origin is to create an overriding commitment and bond for the group. Such myths aim at forging an imagined continuity of the group through the ages (Anderson, 1983). Roughly speaking, there exist two types of myths of origin: myths that point towards genealogical descent (‘biological continuity’ myths) and myths that cite an ancestry of a cultural-ideological variant. ‘Biological’ myths generate high levels of communal solidarity, since they regard the national community as a network consisting of interrelated kin groups descending from a common ancestor. In this case, imagined blood ties provide the basis for a strictly primordial sense of belonging and identity, such as the currents of Basque ethno-nationalism propagated by intellectuals such as Sabino Arana during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries (Muro, 2005). The other (and perhaps the most common) types of constituent myths of origin are those that emphasise cultural affinity with presumed ancestors (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 29). This involves a spiritual type of kinship, which seeks to trace a ‘historical’ link between the present ideals and aspirations of the group and those of its presumed ancestors. Culturalideological myths of descent stress the persistence of certain types of collective virtue (e.g. ‘heroic spirit’) or other distinctive cultural qualities such as language, religion, and customs through the ages. They also seek to draw a parallel between these old qualities and the present virtues and cultural qualities of the group in question. By locating the present inside the context of the past of a group, constituent myths of origin interpret social changes and collective aspirations in a way that satisfies the drive for meaning, by making up new identities that also seem to be very old. Such core myths persist and are espoused through state rituals, even in states with a pronounced ‘civic’ character like the UK and the US (Mach, 1989, pp. 101–110).6 As far as their mobilising power is concerned, these myths pertain to the non-rational domain of the ‘nation’. Constituent myths of origin endow the nation with a near universality through the employment of selected images and phrases (e.g. home, forefathers, brothers, and 6 An appropriate example of this kind is certain British state rituals (e.g. Remembrance Day).

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mother) that aim at forging a subconscious bond of integrity among its members (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 30). This is of vital importance for mass mobilisation since, as Walker Connor phrases it, ‘people do not voluntarily die for things that are rational’ (Billig, 1995; Connor, 1993, p. 206). Even Marxist-Leninists have taken advantage of the mobilising potential of constituent myths of origin, despite the philosophical incompatibility between nationalism and communism (Connor, 1993, p. 199).7 The academic value of the ethno-symbolic approach is that it seeks to situate the position of constituent myths of origin inside modern nations. This, in turn, helps to contextualise how the political and cultural/sociopsychological components of modern nations may in practice overlap with each other. Between Triadic and Quadratic Configurations of Ethnopolitics Rogers Brubaker has coined the concept of groupism. This notion addresses the tendency to view ethnic groups and identities as bounded, regards them as the leading protagonists of conflicts, and treats them as the key units of social discourse. Ethnic conflict is obviously the conflict between ethnic groups, but these groups should not be perceived as compact entities or ‘collective individuals’. In accordance with Rogers Brubaker (2002, pp. 163–189), group cohesion should be viewed as a continuous process that in some cases may be brought to completion but in others fail. Within this frame of interpretation, the notion of categories is of pivotal significance. For example, ‘Russian’, ‘Ukrainian’, or ‘Bulgarian’ (as ethno-cultural definitions) constitute categories but not groups. In order for these categories to generate a high degree of solidarity among a given number of people, to become external markers, and ultimately, to culminate into group cohesion (or groupness ), a whole process is required. The engineers of this process are certain actors, most commonly organisations, who claim to speak in the name of an ethnic group (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 31). These organisations may range from paramilitary formations and terrorist organisations to political parties, cultural associations,

7 For instance, the Greek Communist partisans during the resistance struggle against the Axis and, later, during the Greek Civil War (1946–1949) had tried to engender proSoviet sentiment among the local population in the territories under their control through frequent allusions to the ‘historical ties between the Greeks and their longstanding allies, the Russians’.

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and other interest groups. Consequently, the strategies employed by these actors in order to achieve groupness differ considerably from each other. They may range from armed operations to political engagement within mainstream structures. The common denominator, however, remains the endeavour to make good use of the historical background and constituent myths of a people, as well as utilise an array of cultural and sociopsychological catalysts in order to cement group cohesion (Brubaker, 2002, pp. 170–173; Petsinis, 2020b, pp. 31–32). Attention should be paid to the cognitive dimension of ethnic conflict. In other words, what is it, specifically, that makes an armed or political conflict an ethnic one? The ‘ethnic’ quality is not intrinsic to ethnic conflict. It is up to organisations and a variety of individuals (e.g. government officials, political activists, journalists, and others) to frame and, ultimately, constitute a conflict as ethnic. Framing an incident as a ‘pogrom’ or a ‘riot’ is not just a matter of external interpretation but an act of definition that can have important consequences (Brubaker et al., 2004, pp. 37 and 47). The more an organisation succeeds in constituting a conflict as ethnic or interpreting a governmental decision as detrimental to the ethnic group that this organisation claims to represent, the more it succeeds in forging cohesion within the group. This success acquires a higher significance if the organisation manages to internationalise its standpoints. Another useful concept, coined by Rogers Brubaker, is the triadic nexus theory (Brubaker, 1995, p. 109; Petsinis, 2020b, p. 32). According to the author, nationalism in multi-ethnic societies is often a dynamic interaction between the ‘nationalising state’, the ethnic minority (or minorities) living in that state, and the minority’s (or the minorities’) external national homeland. A ‘nationalising state’ is one which subtly promotes the culture, language, and political primacy of the titular nation within the state through governing institutions. Each of these actors is not a static entity but a ‘variably configured and continuously contested political field’. The interaction among these actors depends upon the relations and balances within each of them. Within this framework, minorities’ frequent response to the policies of the ‘nationalising state’ is to push for more cultural or territorial autonomy and resist actual or perceived policies of discrimination. The external homeland’s role is to monitor the situation of their co-ethnics in the state in question, protest alleged violations of their rights, and assert the right, even the obligation, to defend their interests (Waterbury, 2021).

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The model of ethnic democracy can provide a trajectory for the nationalisation of political institutions and the public space (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 32). Based on the Israeli precedent, Sammy Smooha defines ethnic democracy as an arrangement which ‘combines a structured ethnic dominance with democratic rights for all’ (Smooha, 2001, p. 8). Ethnic democracy is ‘democracy that contains the institutionalisation of dominance of one ethnic group…the “democratic principle” provides equality between all citizens and members of the society while the “ethnic principle” establishes preference and dominance’ (ibid., pp. 24–25). Therefore, although providing the formal representative institutions of liberal democracy, ethnic democracy tends to restrict the participation of certain minority groups in the political processes. The most representative examples of the ethnic democracy model and its implementation in Central and Eastern Europe are the cases of post-Soviet Estonia and Latvia. Rogers Brubaker’s theoretical matrix became highly topical inside the background of numerous disputes over the collective statuses of ethnic minorities across Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s. In the light of an increasing significance of international institutions/organisations, and supranational processes in Central and Eastern Europe, the prospect of EU membership started functioning as a powerful pole of attraction for most post-communist states. This enhanced the EU’s soft power diplomacy vis-à-vis the candidate states. Soft power refers to the aggregate of the formal (as well as informal) mechanisms that the EU employed in order to promote the candidate states’ compliance with membership conditions (Bruszt & Stark, 2003; Haughton, 2007). This development prompted several academic experts to reformulate Brubaker’s triadic nexus into a quadratic one, in the light of the EU’s eastward enlargement, and add the EU as a fourth actor inside the nexus (Budryte, 2005; Pettai, 2006; Smith, 2002). In David Smith’s words, ‘the role of international organisations should be central to any discussion of post-communist identity politics in Central and Eastern Europe’ (Smith, 2002, p. 9). Slightly amending the terminology used by Brubaker, Smith argues that ‘Europeanisation can thus be regarded as a variably configured and continuously contested political field in which different states, organisations, parties, movements or individual political entrepreneurs vie to impose their own particular political agenda’ (ibid., p. 11). On numerous occasions, the author contends that it was the impact of the EU as a ‘fourth pillar’ that spurred the transition

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from ‘nationalising statehoods’ to multiple ‘integration strategies’ since the year 2000 throughout Central and Eastern Europe (Smith, 2003). From the Theory to Practice in Central and Eastern Europe: The 1990s Empirical evidence from a series of conflicts, during the 1990s, testifies to the validity of Rogers Brubaker’s outlook on ethnicity as a process (Brubaker, 2002). For instance, nowadays, it has become almost customary for academic and non-academic experts to regard the multiple wars of secession within the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s primarily as ethnic conflicts. Nevertheless, this occurrence is linked to the multifaceted institutionalisation of ethnicity (e.g. the peoples [narodi] and ethnic minorities or ‘nationalities’ [narodnosti]) inside a multilevel constitutional arrangement (republics, autonomous provinces, and the self-management [samoupravljanje] units) within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These structural realities gradually facilitated a joint endeavour by a multitude of international and domestic actors (e.g. political leaderships, paramilitary groupings, political activists, opinion formers, and journalists), during the 1990s, to frame these conflicts as primarily ethnic (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 33). With regard to the triadic nexus theory, Yugoslavia’s contested dissolution process of the early and mid-1990s witnessed the endeavour of ambitious new leaderships to re-nationalise state institutions (e.g. Serbia under Slobodan Miloševi´c and Croatia under Franjo Tud-man). This resulted in discriminatory policies vis-à-vis specific minority groups (e.g. ethnic Serbs in Croatia and ethnic Albanians in Serbia) and led their external homelands to protest against perceived violations of collective rights. These developments provided Rogers Brubaker with his primary material for the conceptualisation of the triadic nexus as a theoretical model for the interpretation of ethnic conflict (Brubaker, 1995; Petsinis, 2020b, p. 33). During the same period, the ethnically diverse parts of Romania (namely, Transylvania) witnessed symbolic competition between Romanian and ethnic Hungarian nationalist groupings in the public space (e.g. in urban centres such as Cluj-Napoca) as well as their simultaneous endeavour to generate groupness inside the Romanian majority and the ethnic Hungarian minority. These grass-roots developments, in combination with the occasional interference of Romania’s larger political parties (as well as a string of Hungarian governments in Budapest),

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provided Rogers Brubaker with additional source material, allowing him to substantiate his triadic nexus theory (Brubaker et al., 2008). Lastly, developments such as the gradual heightening of controversy between the Republic of Northern Macedonia and Greece over the cultural heritage of Ancient Macedonia (since the early 1990s) have hinted at the validity of the ethno-symbolic approach with regard to the socio-psychological appeal of constituent myths and symbols as well as their potential intersection with the realm of foreign policy (Danforth, 1997; Petsinis, 2020b, pp. 33–34). From the Theory to Practice in Central and Eastern Europe: Contemporary Cases By contrast, ethnicity never became institutionalised to the same degree within the Soviet Union where it never evolved to such a high, multilevel arrangement comparable to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Therefore, despite any attempts to ‘ethnicise’, for example, the conflict in Donbas (southeast Ukraine), the conflict is still primarily being perceived as being a political one (Kermach, 2017; Kulyk, 2018a; Mitchnik, 2019). Moldova, throughout the post-Soviet era, provides another environment where internal cleavages primarily revolve around favourable and non-favourable dispositions vis-à-vis the Kremlin and/or Euro-Atlantic institutions and not ethnicity per se (Beyer & Wolff, 2016; Sasse, 2009). However precarious it might be to regard the ongoing conflict in southeast Ukraine as an ethnic one, Rogers Brubaker’s triadic nexus theory remains topical in this context. On the one hand, the post-Maidan era saw a coordinated project by several political and non-political actors (e.g. journalists and segments of the intelligentsia) in Russia with the objective to mobilise the anti-Maidan cohorts in southeast Ukraine and elsewhere via the utilisation of symbols associated with the Great Patriotic War and the Soviet anti-Fascist struggle of the 1940s (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 34).8 On the other hand, the post-Maidan realities accelerated the counter-project of the new elites in Kyiv with the aims to:

8 This project consisted in portrayals of the war in southeast Ukraine as a conflict between ‘neo-Fascists’ (the post-Maidan Ukrainian government) and ‘anti-Fascists’ (the Donbas separatists). On this issue, see the relevant excerpts of Vladimir Putin’s Crimean speech (18 March 2014) at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/ 20603. Accessed 20 October 2020.

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(a) ‘de-Sovietise’ the Ukrainian national identity through the excision of any visible vestiges from the Soviet era (e.g. the removal of remaining statues and other monuments); (b) enhance the institutional status of the Ukrainian language in the state administration and bureaucracy (Kulyk, 2016, 2018b). Moreover, in Russia, the period since 2014 has seen the orchestration of a joint political-intellectual project with the objective to legitimise Crimea’s annexation into the Russian Federation. As part of this endeavour, Crimea is portrayed as a territory indissolubly linked with the Russian nation through time via references to the Crimean War (1853–1856) and other major historical events (Petsinis, 2020b, pp. 34–35).9 On this occasion, the intersection among constituent myths of origin, ancestral territories, and contemporary political objectives (as highlighted by the proponents of the ethno-symbolic approach) becomes clear. The same thing can be argued about the enduring relevance of the ethno-symbolic approach with regard to the ‘de-Sovietisation’ process in post-Maidan Ukraine (ibid., p. 35). In spite of their divergent outlooks on ‘groupness’ and groupism, the two theoretical models discussed in this section converge (if only by default) in that they both place into context how the politicisation (or, occasionally, weaponisation) of ethnicity operates as a joint sociopsychological and political process within different environments—hence the persisting relevance and validity of these theoretical approaches with regard to contemporary cases. However, as argued in greater detail later in this chapter, new actors with the ambition to contest the relevance of both interpretative models have entered the fore recently—therefore, there is an urgent need to update and upgrade these approaches.

Nativism, Euroscepticism, and Populism: Conceptual Definitions Nativism If only tentatively, nativism can be defined as a sub-branch of ethnonationalism with a more concrete and pronounced stress on opposition to immigration. Nativism, as a concept, generally holds that primacy must be given to the political rights, the economic needs, and the cultural identity 9 Ibid.

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of the ethnic/native members of a titular nation. The notions of nativism and xenophobia should be clearly demarcated from one another. Xenophobia, in brief, can be summarised as a socio-psychological reaction that revolves around sentiments of apprehension and/or aversion vis-à-vis the influx of groups of people, cultural trends, and manifestations which are perceived as ‘alien’ and/or ‘foreign’ in relation to the main body of a society—including the development of defensive attitudes towards them (Bolaffi et al., 2003; Donald & Rattansi, 1992; Wimmer, 1997). By contrast, nativism can be specified as an essentially political phenomenon. Of particular importance for the purposes of this book is to rely on the conceptualisation of nativism coined by Takis Pappas (2018). In accordance with the author, nativism (as it becomes manifest in contemporary European politics) displays the following intrinsic features: (a) ideologically, political parties endorsing nativist standpoints can be clustered under the broader category of the ‘conservative right’; (b) nativist positions form standard components of ‘right-wing policy packages’; (c) the common denominator among nativist parties across Europe revolves around the overarching prerogative to restrict freedom of movement (therefore, often downplaying those aspects of politics that might fragment the main body of ‘native’ society—e.g. anti-elitism); (d) nativist parties can become very ‘situationally adaptive’ and frequently espouse ‘one-issue agendas’ with respect to their policymaking areas of ultimate concern (e.g. the monopolisation of the German refugee crisis by the Alternative for Germany/AfD between 2014 and 2018) (Pappas, 2018, pp. 151–152). At this point, it is of equal significance to single out the highly essentialist conceptualisations of ‘the nation’ along ethno-cultural and ‘autochthonous’ lines in the discourse employed by nativist political actors throughout Central and Eastern Europe. During the 1990s and 2000s, a series of right-wing parties tended to contest the extent to which minority groups (with a long-standing presence in the territories where they reside) could be regarded as ‘indigenous’. Examples include the cases of the Slovak National Party (SNS) and the Party of Greater Romania (PRM) vis-à-vis the respective ethnic Hungarian minorities of Slovakia and Romania (Bustikova, 2019). Correspondingly, it is of great academic value to detect any changes in these essentialist stances, in the light of the new circumstances brought about by the migration crisis and the anxieties over prospective arrivals of new ‘others’ all over Central and Eastern Europe.

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Euroscepticism Schematically, Euroscepticism is the: ‘outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration’ (Taggart, 1998, pp. 365–366; Petsinis, 2020a, pp. 140–141). Hard Euroscepticism consists of the principled opposition to the EU and may even demand the withdrawal of given states from the EU or object to their prospects of EU membership (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002, p. 4). Soft Euroscepticism does not entail the principled opposition to the EU but centres on policy areas where a divergence between the ‘national interest’ and the EU trajectory is perceived (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008). Left-wing Eurosceptics tend to scrutinise European integration as a project which is embedded in the neoliberal principles of globalised capitalism (Della Porta et al., 2017). Two areas of utmost concern for right-wing Eurosceptics are: (a) varying degrees of opposition to immigration and an insistence on the principle of hard borders (Arzheimer, 2015; Evans & Mellon, 2019); (b) safeguarding national sovereignty from the ‘domination of Brussels’ (Brunazzo & Gilbert, 2017; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008). The opposition of right-wing Eurosceptics to the EU stems from the shared conviction that the nation state must remain the ultimate repository of sovereignty and that this principle should not be contested by any supranational entity. All manifestations of Euroscepticism can be articulated at both the party level and the public (or grass-roots) level—inside and outside the EU. The Euroscepticism of political parties is dependent upon ideology, political and socioeconomic circumstances, and the distinction between domestic and foreign policy (Petsinis, 2020a, p. 141). Therefore, the engagement of Eurosceptic parties can be subject to malleability and/or ‘situational adaptability’. Within this context, Kopecky and Mudde further diversify the dichotomy between hard and soft Euroscepticism. These authors argue that Eurosceptic parties tend to adopt softer stances and do not oppose the idea of European integration per se. However, they object (to varying degrees) to its materialisation. It is the ‘Euroreject’ parties that assume harder stances and oppose both the idea and the materialisation of European integration (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, pp. 302–303). Christopher Flood proposes an analytical classification of party-based Euroscepticism which comprises of the revisionist, reformist, gradualist,

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maximalist, minimalist, and rejectionist categories (Flood, 2002, p. 5). The revisionist category opts for a return to the state of affairs prior to a major EU treaty/decision whereas the reformist desires the modification of one or more existing EU institutions and/or practices. Gradualist Eurosceptics formally endorse the European integration process albeit at a slower pace and with greater care (ibid.). Maximalists are in favour of pushing forward with the existing process as rapidly as is practicable towards higher levels of integration whereas minimalists tend to accept the status quo but resist further integration (ibid.). Lastly, rejectionist parties adamantly oppose participation in the EU or any of its constituent institutions (ibid.). For the purposes of this monograph, and with specific regard to party politics in the country cases under study, primary attention is paid to the category of soft Euroscepticism, as well as to the subcategories of revisionist, reformist, and gradualist Euroscepticism, with a predominantly right-wing orientation. Populism According to Margaret Canovan, a minimal definition of populism in democratic societies is that of ‘an appeal to “the people” against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society. […] They [populist parties or movements] involve some kind of revolt against the established structure of power in the name of the people’ (Canovan, 1999, p. 3). Nevertheless, populism as a political phenomenon has been subject to different theoretical approaches and interpretations. Anchored in the Gramscian and the post-Marxist traditions, Ernesto Laclau, as a representative of the discursive approach to populism, argues that ‘populism is not a fixed constellation but a series of discursive resources which can be put to very different uses’ (Laclau, 2005, p. 176). In this light, ‘…it is possible to call Hitler, Mao, and Perón simultaneously populist. Not because their movements were similar; not because their ideologies expressed the same class interests but because popular interpellations appear in the ideological discourse of all of them, presented in the form of antagonism and not just difference’ (Laclau, 1977, p. 174). In an attempt to set up a bulwark against the monopolisation of this term by specific ideological currents and political actors, Laclau holds that ‘against the idea according to which populism would represent a stable and coherent trend typical of the new radical right, we want to defend

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the idea that it is less of a political family than a dimension of the discursive and normative register adopted by political actors’ (Laclau, 2005, p. 176). Along these lines, political theorists have further elaborated on Laclau’s distinction between active/inclusionary and passive/exclusionary brands of populism (Stavrakakis, 2014; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). Stavrakakis and Katsambekis tend to associate the former with what Antonio Gramsci might describe as dynamic and wide-reaching coalitions with the aim of accommodating a broad range of societal demands (e.g. leftist initiatives such as Greece’s SYRIZA or Spain’s Podemos during the first half of the 2010s). Meanwhile, the latter are associated with radical or more extremist right-wing parties that harbour an overt disdain towards democratic institutions and are predominantly built upon the principle of ethnic/racial purity, such as Greece’s Golden Dawn (Petsinis, 2016, pp. 282–283; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014, pp. 135 and 138). In the other end of the spectrum, the proponents of the ideational approach conceptualise populism as a ‘thin’ ideology with the ambitions to: (a) temporarily fragment the society into two, internally homogeneous and inherently antagonistic to each other, blocks (the people versus the elite); (b) depict politics solely as the expression of the ‘general will’ of the people (Mudde, 2007, 2010; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 8). The main area of divergence between the two aforementioned schools of thought is to be found in their conflicting interpretations of the interrelation(s) between populism and democracy. Chantal Mouffe, Laclau’s long-time collaborator, argues that the active/inclusionary variants of populism not only do not pose a threat to the democratic order but, on the contrary, they can contest the boundaries of liberal democracy in a constructive manner, therefore, leading to more pluralist, radical, and direct forms of democracy (Kingsbury, 2015, p. 6; Mouffe, 2005, p. 30).10 By contrast, proponents of the ideational approach tend to see all variants of populism as intrinsically inimical and potentially detrimental to liberal democracy on the basis of their allegedly uniform rejection of compromise, disregard of institutional legality, and endorsement of raw

10 Chantal Mouffe has repeatedly spoken of the necessity for dynamic and inclusionary versions of left-wing populism, on a worldwide level, as a joint bulwark to neoliberal hegemony and the rise of the populist and radical right. On this issue, see her analytical commentary at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/democraciaabierta/ populist-moment/. Accessed 24 October 2020.

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majoritarianism (Pappas, 2018, p. 150). In addition to this, representatives of the ideational approach have expressed serious doubts over the extent to which there can be a firm distinction drawn between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ populisms.11 Since ethno-nationalism and nativism constitute the core ideological components of populist and radical right-wing parties (Rydgren, 2017), this book prioritises the study of these two thematic areas over populism. A secondary reference is made to the anti-systemic discourses utilised by parties of the populist and radical right (but not exclusively) in the country cases nominated. Radical Versus Extremist Right-Wing Parties At this point, the distinction between parties of the radical and the extremist right needs to be clarified. Attention here is paid to the political origins, evolutionary trajectories, and patterns of (active) political engagement (Petsinis, 2019, pp. 166–167). Parties of the populist and radical right tend to scrutinise constitutional order but, at the same time, strive to promote their political cause(s) principally via the parliamentary and democratic institutions and procedures. Populist and radical right-wing parties may often be by-products of top-level formation processes (socalled ‘cadre’ parties) that have come into being after the: (a) reformation or merger of already existing parties (e.g. the cases of the Finns Party in Finland and EKRE in Estonia); (b) the secession of ‘splinter groups’ from larger parties (e.g. the case of ANEL in Greece). On some occasions, populist and radical right-wing parties have entered the halls of power through their participation in government coalitions (e.g. the Finns Party in Finland, EKRE in Estonia, and ANEL in Greece). Attention here also needs to be paid to one more sub-category of right-wing parties, the national conservatives . The political platforms of such parties maintain the ethno-nationalist and nativist components, as well as occasional pledges to protect ‘naturally ascribed’ gender norms and religious values, but their populist and anti-establishment tones are rather atrophic. A few representative examples are: FIDESZ in Hungary,

11 For instance, Pappas and Aslanidis (2015, p. 12) detected several areas of convergence in the jargon and the symbolism employed by left-wing (SYRIZA) as well as right-wing (the Independent Greeks/ANEL) political actors in the course of the antiausterity protests in Greece between 2010 and 2014, (e.g. the use of ‘Fourth Reich’ imagery, with respect to Germany’s allegedly autocratic role within the EU).

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the Homeland Movement/Domovinski Pokret (DP) in Croatia, the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland, and the National Alliance/Nacion¯ al¯ a Apvien¯ıba (NA) in Latvia. By contrast, parties of the extremist right may actively challenge (or even attempt to temporarily substitute) the operation of state institutions (e.g. the organisation of self-styled ‘patrolling operations’). Such parties have usually come into being as result of processes spearheaded by a grass-roots nucleus often aided by semi-paramilitary groupings, therefore, regularly opting for a more militant engagement. Parties of this sub-group with a non-negligible public appeal have become active across Central and Southeast Europe—notable cases include ‘Our Slovakia’ in Slovakia, Bulgaria’s ‘Ataka’, and Golden Dawn in Greece (Dalakoglou, 2013; Ellinas, 2015; Sygkelos, 2015). The political operation of parties that belong to this sub-category tends to converge along the following premises: preoccupation over regional geopolitics; a strong emphasis on identity and memory politics; activism and the intensive mobilisation of popular bases of support (e.g. against political rivals and/or immigrants). Their anti-democratic inclinations and militant engagement have often resulted in overt clashes between extremist right-wing parties and the state authorities (e.g. the conviction of the party leaderships of Golden Dawn and ‘Our Slovakia’ by the respective Greek and Slovak courts of justice on the basis of criminal charges in October 2020).

New Actors Enter the Scene: The Necessity to Update and Upgrade In all of this, it should be taken into account that new catalysts have entered the scene and can decisively impact the study of ethnopolitics across Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, controversies over immigration have gained increasing significance and may even occasionally overshadow debates over ‘traditional’ cleavages with ethnic implications such as disputes over minority rights (Petsinis, 2020b, pp. 35–38). On numerous occasions, this largely remains a virtual debate in that the physical presence of refugees and other, non-white and non-Christian, migrants in Central and East European societies is rather limited.12 12 For a set of figures and other quantitative data, see: https://www.unhcr.org/ceu/ 11242-statistics-on-refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-central-eastern-europe.html. Accessed 21 October 2020.

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However, this has sufficed for a wide spectrum of mainstream as well as non-mainstream political actors to capitalise on the public apprehension over immigration and augment their popularity. A common denominator among all these endeavours has been the utilisation of the cultural argumentation against the EU’s fixed quotas arrangement for the redistribution of refugees. A series of academic experts on the populist and radical right have highlighted a qualitative difference between the political engagements of populist and radical right-wing parties in Western and Eastern Europe (Allen, 2017; Kende & Kreko, 2019; Minkenberg, 2015; Pytlas, 2016). Whereas, within the former context, the primary emphasis is laid on anti-immigrant rhetoric, within the latter context, ethnic minorities are seen to assume the role of scapegoats. As Lenka Bustikova puts it, ‘in the more ethnically pluralistic societies, (populist and radical rightwing) parties seeking electoral support mobilise against constitutive, larger ethnic groups, with a high degree of politicisation’ (e.g. the cases of Slovakia, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia) (Bustikova, 2018, pp. 566–567). Since the 1990s, this scapegoating has been legitimised through references to the longer historical trajectories and the fears of irredentist tendencies among politicised minority groups (e.g. the case of the VMRO party vis-à-vis the ethnic Turkish community in Bulgaria during the 2000s). The same treatises contend that the establishment of the adequate protection of the rights and freedoms of national minorities as one of the conditions for accepting post-communist states into the EU (established by the COE’s Copenhagen Criteria, 1993) forged a solid bond among minority rights, democratisation, and Europeanisation (Bustikova, 2015, p. 67). In this light, and to a remarkable extent, the populist and radical right in the more ethnically pluralistic societies of Central and Eastern Europe started building their Eurosceptic platforms in the early and mid1990s with varying allegations that the EU ‘imposes’ minority rights from the exterior and weakens national sovereignty. Nevertheless, anti-immigration rhetoric has been acquiring a locus of prominence in the political engagement of the populist and radical right across Central and Eastern Europe, too.13 Some parties within 13 On the Hungarian case and the official position of Jobbik on immigration, see: ‘Immigration increases tensions in Europe’. https://www.jobbik.com/immigration_increa ses_tensions_europe. Accessed 12 October 2020.

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this macro-region have re-appropriated key aspects from the pre-existing political cultures of nationalism in specific countries and embedded them into their agendas on anti-immigration (Petsinis, 2020b, pp. 36–37). For instance, certain members of this party family (e.g. Estonia’s EKRE) tend to interlink the collective memories of ‘colonisation’ under the Soviets (Annus, 2012; Peiker, 2016) with the collective anxieties of becoming ‘colonised’ again by others in the future (e.g. refugees and/or other migrants) (Braghiroli & Petsinis, 2019; Kasekamp et al., 2018). On other occasions, the anti-refugee and anti-immigration rhetoric of the Central and East European populist and radical (also, the more extremist) right even seems to sideline more ‘traditional’ areas of discord in domestic ethnopolitics, as is the case with ‘Our Slovakia’ and its prioritisation of the migration crisis over the ethnic Hungarian question in Slovakia (Harris, 2019; Kluknavská & Smolik, 2016). Moreover, in stark contrast to the 1990s and the 2000s, the appeal of EU membership as an additional fourth actor inside Rogers Brubaker’s triadic nexus theory seems to be eroding while various brands of Euroscepticism are on the rise. For instance, in the Baltic States, populist right-wing, as well as national conservative parties with an increasing appeal and varying shades of (nominally soft) Eurosceptiscism (EKRE and NA) engage in geopolitical Euroscepticism by casting doubts on the extent to which EU membership can upgrade the security status of these states vis-à-vis Russia (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 37). This is frequently coupled with financial protectionism and subsequent calls for the taxation of tax-free foreign capital (EKRE, 2015) as well as the objection to the acquisition of Estonian/Latvian land by foreign nationals. Meanwhile, the sociocultural Euroscepticism of the far right throughout Central and Eastern Europe capitalised not solely on public opposition to the EU’s fixed quotas for refugees but also on fears that the EU promotes the import of ‘alien’ gender norms to these societies—such as EU guidelines ˙ ˙ on LGBTQI rights (Zuk & Zuk, 2020). Even though recent migration waves also constitute an ethno-cultural ‘other’, this variant of otherness is a brand new one and qualitatively distinct from earlier instances of tension between national majorities and ethnic minorities. In addition to this, the constantly fluctuating and nonterritorial scope of the European migration crisis renders the triadic nexus theory rather irrelevant within this particular context. In all this, however, it should be kept in mind that the trajectories towards capitalising on anti-immigration sentiments have been rather idiosyncratic across Europe.

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Anti-immigration parties and groupings tend to embed their narratives primarily into symbols and imageries derived from their own societies’ historical experience. In this light, the cooperation between academic experts in ethnopolitics and academic experts in the populist and radical right needs to become more extensive and systematic. On the one hand, this will enable experts in ethnopolitics to more precisely assess the degree to which new variables such as Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant trends can reshape ethnopolitics, as both a living reality and a field of study across Central and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, this systematic cooperation will enable experts in the populist and radical right to formulate new interpretative models about how (right-wing) populist and Eurosceptic actors across this macro-region embed their agendas inside the pre-existing political cultures of nationalism, particularistic identity, and memory politics. At a first instance, this will require a greater number of empirical, in-depth studies on the operation of specific political actors within specific countries (Petsinis, 2020b, pp. 37–38). Although this monograph and its research insights are anchored in the political experience of Central and Eastern Europe, this interdisciplinary cooperation can be equally beneficial to the study of ethnopolitics, nationalism, and the populist and radical right across Europe as a whole.

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Connor, W. (1993). Ethnonationalism: A quest for understanding. Routledge. Danforth, L. (1997). The Macedonian conflict: Ethnic nationalism in a transnational world. Princeton University Press. Della Porta, D., Fernández, J., Kouki, H., & Mosca, L. (2017). Movement parties against austerity. Wiley. Donald, J., & Rattansi, A. (1992). Race, culture and difference. Sage. Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and nationalism. Cornell University Press. Greenfeld, L. (2012). Nationalism. Wiley. Hobsbawm, E. (1992a). Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme. Cambridge University Press. Hobsbawm, E. (1992b). The invention of tradition. Cambridge University Press. Laclau, E. (2005). On populist reason. Verso Books. Laclau, E. (1977). Politics and ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism. NLB Publishing. Lampe, J. R. (2001). Twice there was a country: Yugoslavia as history. Cambridge University Press. Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe. Johns Hopkins University Press. Mach, Z. (1989). Symbols. Krakow University Press. Minkenberg, M. (2015). Transforming the transformation? The East European radical right in the political process. Routledge. Mole, R. (2012). The Baltic states from the Soviet Union to the European Union: Identity, discourse and power in the post-communist transition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Routledge. Mouffe, C. (2005). On the political. Routledge. Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press. Musil, J. (Ed.). (1995). The end of Czechoslovakia. Central European University Press. Pytlas, B. (2016). Radical right parties in central and Eastern Europe: Mainstream party competition and electoral fortune. Routledge. Smith, A. D. (2010). Nationalism: Theory. Oxford University Press. Smith, A. D. (2000). The nation in history: Historiographical debates about ethnicity and nationalism. Oxford University Press. Smith, A. D. (1999). Myths and memories of the nation. Oxford University Press. Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2008). Opposing Europe? Oxford University Press.

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Academic Articles, Book-Chapters, Working Papers, and Analytical Commentaries Agarin, T. (2016). Extending the concept of ethnocracy: Exploring the debate in the Baltic context. Cosmopolitan Civil Societies, 8(3). https://doi.org/10. 5130/ccs.v8i3.5144. Accessed 25 October 2020. Agh, A. (1995). The experiences of the first democratic parliaments in East Central Europe. Journal of Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 28(2), 203–214. Allen, T. (2017). All in the party family? Comparing far right voters in Western and Post-Communist Europe. Party Politics, 23(3), 274–285. Annus, E. (2020). A Post-Soviet eco-digital nation? Metonymic processes of nation-building and Estonia’s high-tech dreams in the 2010s. East European Politics and Societies and Cultures, 20(10), 1–24. Annus, E. (2012). The problem of Soviet Colonialism in the Baltics. Journal of Baltic Studies, 43(1), 21–45. Arzheimer, K. (2015). The AfD: Finally, a successful right-wing populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany? West European Politics, 38, 535–556. Baylis, T. A. (1994). Plus ca change? Transformation and continuity among East European elites. Journal of Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 27 (3), 315–328. Bernhard, M. (1996). Civil society after the first transition: Dilemmas of postcommunist democratization in Poland and beyond. Journal of Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 29(3), 309–330. Beyer, J., & Wolff, S. (2016). Linkage and leverage effects on Moldova’s Transnistria problem. East European Politics, 32(3), 335–354. Braghiroli, S., & Petsinis, V. (2019). ’Between party-systems and identity-politics: The populist and radical right in Estonia and Latvia’. European Politics and Society, 20(4), 431–449. Brubaker, R. (2002). Ethnicity without groups. European Journal of Sociology, 43(2), 163–189. Brubaker, R. (1995). National minorities, nationalizing states and external homelands in the new Europe. Daedalus, 124(2), 107–132. Brubaker, R., Loveman, M., & Stamatov, P. (2004). Ethnicity as cognition. Theory and Society, 33, 31–64. Brunazzo, M., & Gilbert, M. (2017). Insurgents against Brussels: Euroscepticism and the right-wing populist turn of the Lega Nord since 2013. Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 22(5), 624–641. Bruszt, L., & Stark, D. (2003). Who counts? Supranational norms and societal needs. East European Politics and Societies, 17 (1), 74–82. Bustikova, L. (2018). The radical right in Eastern Europe. In J. Rydgren (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the radical right (pp. 1–22). Oxford University Press.

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Bustikova, L. (2015). The democratization of hostility: Minorities and radical right actors after the fall of communism. In M. Minkenberg (Ed.), Transforming the transformation (pp. 58–79). Routledge. Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy. Political Studies, 47 (1), 2–16. Dalakoglou, D. (2013). From the bottom of the Aegean Sea to golden dawn: Security, xenophobia, and the politics of hate in Greece. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 13(3), 514–522. Ellinas, A. (2015). Neo-Nazism in an established democracy: The persistence of golden dawn in Greece. South European Society and Politics, 20(1), 1–20. Evans, G., & Mellon, G. (2019). Immigration, Euroscepticism, and the rise and fall of UKIP. Party Politics, 25(1), 76–87. Flood, C. (2002, September 2–4). Euroscepticism: A problematic concept. A paper presented at the UACES 32nd Annual Conference, Queen’s University Belfast. Hallik, K. (2002). Nationalizing policies and integration challenges. In M. Lauristin & M. Heidmets (Eds.), The challenge of the Russian minority: Emerging multicultural democracy in Estonia (pp. 65–88). Tartu University Press. Harris, E. (2019). Nation before democracy? Placing the rise of the Slovak extreme right into context. East European Politics, 35(4), 538–557. Haughton, T. (2007). ‘When does the EU make a difference? Conditionality and the accession process in Central and Eastern Europe. Political Studies Review, 5, 233–246. Kasekamp, A., Madison, M., & Wierenga, L. (2018). Discursive opportunities for the Estonian populist radical right in a digital society. Problems of PostCommunism, 66(1), 47–58. Kende, A., & Kreko, P. (2019). Xenophobia, prejudice, and right-wing populism in East-Central Europe. Current Opinion in Behavioural Sciences, 34, 29–33. Kermach, R. (2017). Attitudes of Ukrainians toward Russia and Russians: Dynamics and main trends. In O. Haran & M. Yakovlyev (Eds.), Constructing a political nation: Changes in the attitudes of Ukrainians during the war in the Donbas (pp. 183–200). Stylos Publishing. Kingsbury, D. (2015). Populism as post-politics: Ernesto Laclau, Hegemony, and the limits of democracy. Radical Philosophy Review. https://doi.org/10. 5840/radphilrev201542838. Accessed 17 November 2020. Kluknavská, A., & Smolik, J. (2016). We hate them all? Issue adaptation of extreme right parties in Slovakia 1993–2016. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 49(4), 335–344. Kopecky, P., & Mudde, C. (2002). The two sides of Euroscepticism: Party positions on European integration in East Central Europe. European Union Politics, 3(3), 297–326.

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Kulyk, V. (2018a). Shedding Russianness, recasting Ukrainianness: The postEuromaidan dynamics of ethnonational identifications in Ukraine. Post-Soviet Affairs, 34(2–3), 119–138. Kulyk, V. (2018b). Between the “self” and the “other”: Representations of Ukraine’s Russian-speakers in social media discourse. East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies, 5(2), 65–88. Kulyk, V. (2016). National identity in Ukraine: Impact of Euromaidan and the war. Europe-Asia Studies, 68(4), 588–608. Linz, J. J. (1970). An authoritarian regime: The case of Spain. In E. Allardt & S. Rokkan (Eds.), Mass politics: Studies in political sociology. Free Press. Mann, M. (1995). A political theory of nationalism and its excesses. In P. Sukumar (Ed.), Notions of nationalism (pp. 44–64). Central European University Press. McGregor, J. P. (1996). Constitutional factors in politics in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 29(2), 147–166. Mitchnik, I. (2019). Making Donbas, breaking Donbas: The impact of conflict experience on identity shifts in the east of Ukraine. Ethnopolitics, 18(4), 423– 443. Mudde, C. (2010). The populist radical right: A pathological normalcy. West European Politics, 33(6), 1167–1186. Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2012). Populism and (liberal) democracy: A framework for analysis. In C. Mudde & C. R. Kaltwasser (Eds.), Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or corrective for democracy? (pp. 1–26). Cambridge University Press. Muro, D. (2005). Nationalism and nostalgia: The case of radical Basque nationalism. Nations and Nationalism, 11(4), 571–589. Noutcheva, G. (2007). Fake, partial and imposed compliance: The limits of the EU’s normative power in the Western Balkans. CEPS Working Documents, No. 274. Pappas, T. (2018). How to tell nativists from populists. Journal of Democracy, 29(1), 148–152. Pappas, T. S., & Aslanidis, P. (2015). Greek populism: A political drama in five acts. In H. Kriesi & T. S. Pappas (Eds.), European populism in the shadow of the great recession (pp. 181–196). ECPR Press. Peiker, P. (2016). Estonian nationalism through the postcolonial lens. Journal of Baltic Studies, 47 (1), 113–132. Petsinis, V. (2010). Twenty years after 1989: Moving on from transitology. Contemporary Politics, 16(3), 301–319. Petsinis, V. (2012). Minority legislation in two successor states. Baltic Worlds, 1, 31–35.

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Petsinis, V. (2013). Croatia’s framework for minority rights: New legal prospects within the context of European integration. Ethnopolitics, 12(4), 352–367. Petsinis, V. (2016). Russophilia as a component of national populism in Greece. Critique and Humanism Journal, 46, 281–298. Petsinis, V. (2017, July 11). Competing conservatisms in Serbia and Croatia. Open Democracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/author/vassilis-petsinis. Accessed 24 November 2020. Petsinis, V. (2019). Hijacking the left? The populist and radical right in two post-communist polities. In G. Charalambous & G. Ioannou (Eds.), Left radicalism and populism in Europe. Routledge Studies in Radical History and Politics (pp. 156–180). Routledge. Petsinis, V. (2020a). Converging or diverging patterns of Euroscepticism among political parties in Croatia and Serbia. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 28(2), 139–152. Petsinis, V. (2020b). Ethnopolitics across Central and Eastern Europe in a state of flux: Time for updating and upgrading? In A. Makarychev & O. Bogdanova (Eds.), Regionalisms and neighbourhoods at Europe’s Eastern margins: The Baltic—Black Sea patch- /Networks (pp. 27–40). Springer. Pettai, V. (2006). Explaining ethnic politics in the baltic states: Reviewing the triadic nexus model. Journal of Baltic Studies, 37 (1), 124–136. Rydgren, J. (2017). Radical right-wing parties in Europe: What’s populism got to do with it? Journal of Language and Politics, 16(4), 485–496. Saarts, T. (2011). Comparative party system analysis in Central and Eastern Europe: The case of the Baltic states. Studies of Transition States and Societies, 3(3), 83–104. Sasse, G. (2009). The European neighbourhood policy and conflict management: A comparison of Moldova and the Caucasus. Ethnopolitics, 8(3–4), 369–386. Smith, D. (2003). Minority rights, multiculturalism, and EU-enlargement: The case of Estonia. Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 1, 1–39. Smith, D. (2002). Framing the national question in Central and Eastern Europe: A quadratic nexus? The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 2(1), 3–16. Smooha, S. (2001, October 13). The model of ethnic democracy. ECMI Working Papers. ECMI Press. Spirova, M. (2008). The Bulgarian socialist party: The long road to Europe. Journal of Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 41(4), 481–495. Stavrakakis, Y. (2014). The return of “the people”: Populism and anti-populism in the shadow of the European crisis. Constellations, 21(4), 505–517. Stavrakakis, Y., & Katsambekis, G. (2014). Left-wing populism in the European periphery: The case of SYRIZA. Journal of Political Ideologies, 19(2), 119– 142.

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Sygkelos, Y. (2015). Nationalism versus European integration: The case of ATAKA. East European Quarterly, 43(2–3), 163–188. Taggart, P. (1998). A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems. European Journal of Political Research, 33(3), 363–388. Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2002). The party politics of Euroscepticism in EU member and candidate states. SEI Working Paper. Vasilijevi´c, S. (2002). The legal aspects of the protection of minorities in the process of stabilization and association. In K. Ott (Ed.), Croatian accession to the EU: Institutional challenges, 2 (Chapter 10, pp. 249–272). Institute of Public Finance. Waterbury, M. (2021). Divided nationhood and multiple membership: A framework for assessing Kin-state policies and their impact. Ethnopolitics, 20(1), 39–52. Wimmer, A. (1997). Explaining xenophobia and racism: A critical review of current research approaches. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 20(1), 17–41. ˙ ˙ Zuk, P., & Zuk, P. (2020). Right-wing populism in Poland and anti-vaccine myths on YouTube: Political and cultural threats to public health. Global Public Health, 15(6), 790–804.

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CHAPTER 3

Euroscepticism, Minority Rights, and Identity Politics: The Cases of Croatia and Serbia

Introduction This chapter focuses on the patterns of Euroscepticism among the political parties of Croatia and Serbia. Both states share the political legacies of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The emergence of Euroscepticism appears to provide one more common denominator. Nevertheless, the evolutionary trajectories of Euroscepticism in the two countries seem to diverge with respect to: (a) Croatia’s political and socioeconomic realities as a member state of the EU since 2013; (b) Serbia’s opportunity structures as a state which is not a member of the EU and oscillates between the EU and ‘alternative’ global partners (Russia and China). Eurosceptic agendas have been communicated by certain governments across Central and Eastern Europe such as the, nominally centre-right, FIDESZ-led government in Hungary and the PiS-led government in Poland. The Euroscepticism of these parties has concentrated on a wide range of issues such as the migration crisis and the rule of law controversy with the European Commission. In Hungary, the dominant brand of Euroscepticism seems to be anchored into the ‘alternative’ concept of illiberal democracy, as this has been formulated by Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán and FIDESZ. This chapter places into context the commonalities as well as the differences between the Croatian and Serbian brands of Euroscepticism. The main focus is cast on Euroscepticism as employed by the governing parties of the Croatian Democratic Community/HDZ © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 V. Petsinis, Cross-Regional Ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99951-3_3

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and the Serbian Progressive Party/SNS. Secondary reference is made to the patterns of Euroscepticism among smaller political parties. Primary attention is paid to why and how the management of ethnic relations may interweave with Eurosceptic sentiment in the two country cases. Complementary attention is paid to the intersections between Euroscepticism and the thematic areas of: geopolitics; gender-related issues and rights for sexual minorities (LGBTQI communities); and the ‘new’ identity politics of immigration. Euroscepticism among Croatia’s political parties appears to be multifaceted, with an emphasis on domestic ethnopolitics; gender-related themes; and, to a certain extent, economic anxieties. Meanwhile, the Euroscepticism of Serbian political parties seems to have become ‘singleissue’ with a major stress on geopolitics. Nevertheless, the governing apparatuses of Croatia and Serbia converge on their pragmatic and adaptive employment of Euroscepticism. This demarcates the tactical and ‘situationally adaptive’ adjustments of HDZ and SNS from the more ideological and pervasive dominance of socially conservative agendas among ruling parties of the conservative right in the ‘Visegrad Four’ group of states (e.g. FIDESZ and PiS). The timeframe of this chapter concentrates on Euroscepticism in Croatia and Serbia from the 2000s until nowadays with references to earlier stages where deemed necessary. This chapter is situated inside the framework of a qualitative political analysis and has been organised as a thematic and paired comparison (Tarrow, 2010). A paired comparison can correct generalisations from single case studies and test the validity, or universality, of older conclusions that the researcher has reached. It can operate as an intermediate step between a single case study, which suggests a general relationship, and a multi-case analysis that tests or refines a theory. This chapter has additionally relied on: (a) legal documents concerning minority rights, expert reports, and public surveys; (b) semi-structured interviews with political representatives and government officials, journalists, NGOs, and locally based academic researchers (political scientists, sociologists, and public lawyers) with an expertise in nationalism and Euroscepticism. These interviews were conducted in autumn 2018 and spring 2019. The empirical research is embedded in scholarly, theoretical, and legal literature on: (a) Euroscepticism in Europe and the two country cases; (b) the specificities of minority issues and their management in Croatia and Serbia.

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Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe: A Retrospective and Contextual Overview During the 1990s, several Central and East European states had endorsed the accession process to the EU from ‘eclectic’ angles. Primary attention was paid to foreign investment, free movement, and regional security. Therefore, the external engagement of the EU and the Copenhagen Criteria (1993)1 over areas such as the management of ethnic relations inside the candidate states was frequently met with misunderstandings. Several, usually right-wing, parties started formulating their nascent Euroscepticism along the lines that the EU ‘imposes’ minority rights from the exterior and weakens national sovereignty (e.g. the cases of Slovakia, Latvia, and Estonia) (Bustikova, 2015, 2018; Minkenberg, 2015; Petsinis, 2020b, p. 141; Pytlas, 2016). The outbreak of the migration crisis (2015) generated one ‘centre versus periphery’ cleavage. This consisted in a dispute between the European Commission and the Visegrad Four, later also Italy, over the quotas arrangement of the Commission for the redistribution of refugees within the EU space. In the light of these developments, the brands of Euroscepticism among certain conservative right-wing parties across the Continent have undergone a qualitative transformation: they are no longer focused only on negotiating a compromise over the terms of a state’s membership of the EU. Instead, they harbour ambitions to revise the EU’s configurations, with regard to selected policy areas, and reform its existing institutions and practices from within. In Hungary and Poland, the dominant patterns of Euroscepticism possess ideological underpinnings. Especially in Hungary, Euroscepticism appears to be anchored into PM Orbán’s promotion of illiberal democracy as an ‘alternative’ model with a greater stress on national and Christian values as well as a more centralised and leader-centred pattern of governance (Brubaker, 2017; Palonen, 2018). This outlook is shared by the ruling PiS party in Poland (Kovacs & Scheppele, 2018; Krzyzanowski, ˙ 2017). Both leaderships converge along: (a) their calls for EU’s ‘return’ to fundamental norms and values that have been allegedly forgotten or betrayed; (b) the ambition to juxtapose the Visegrad Four as a geopolitical 1 For further information on this issue, see: Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council (1993, p. 7.A.iii), available online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enl argement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf. Accessed 20 October 2020.

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and sociocultural ‘anti-model’ to the EU centre (Agh, 2016; Bozóki & Heged˝ us, 2018).

Euroscepticism in Croatia and Serbia: Main Actors and Primary Areas of Concern The political scientist Visnja Samardzija argues that the term ‘Eurorealism’ would be more topical than Euroscepticism inside the Croatian context (Butkovi´c & Samardzija, 2009; Petsinis, 2020b, p. 142; Samardzija, 2016, p. 125). This notion consists in the rational calculation of the advantages of EU membership as well as a simultaneous attempt to minimise shortcomings. Euro-realism should not be regarded as a ‘sub-variant’ of Euroscepticism because it places the primary emphasis on the actual benefits of EU membership. With regard to Croatia’s accession process to the EU, the author highlights that major emphasis was placed on economic benefits (foreign investment and the EU Cohesion and Structural Funds), free movement, and regional security (Samardzija, 2016, pp. 135–140). Along comparable lines, Bojana Kocijan and Marko Kukec underline that Croatia’s dependence on the EU’s financial aid has been functioning as a constraint for the emergence of hard Euroscepticism across the left– right spectrum (Arnold et al., 2012, p. 1345; Kocijan & Kukec, 2016, p. 42; Raos, 2016). This hints at the prevalence of rational calculations and the ‘beneficiary member mind-set’ among most affiliates of Croatia’s major parties (Kocijan & Kukec, 2016, p. 56; Maldini & Paukovi´c, 2016). The authors argue that: (a) the dominant version of party-based Euroscepticism in Croatia can be termed as soft, with a stress on subjects of a cultural and/or symbolic nature (immigration and the reluctance to cede part of national sovereignty to Brussels) (Vachudova, 2008); (b) this variant of soft Euroscepticism is mainly propagated by the ‘right-wing faction’ within the ruling HDZ (Kocijan & Kukec, 2016, pp. 45, 51, 53–54 and 57; Petsinis, 2020b, p. 142). Jelena Suboti´c examines the sociocultural origins of party-based and pubic Euroscepticism in Serbia. Suboti´c argues that, since the 1990s, a political culture of self-victimisation has been constructed along the foundations of the EU’s allegedly biased outlooks on Serbia’s interests. This culminated in the portrayal of the EU as an, occasionally adverse, ‘Other’ in a series of domestic, political, as well as academic and clerical, discourses (Perica, 2006; Suboti´c, 2010, pp. 597, 604; 2011, pp. 323 and 326).

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Cooperation with the ICTY and the question of Kosovo’s status acquired centrality (Antoni´c, 2012, pp. 69–70 and 78; Suboti´c, 2011, p. 325). Suboti´c contends that these narratives: (a) were communicated on the political level by hard Eurosceptic parties (e.g. the, nominally centre-right, Democratic Party of Serbia/DSS) along the lines of the argumentation that it is ‘either EU membership or Kosovo’ (Antoni´c, 2012, p. 70; Suboti´c, 2011, pp. 321 and 324); (b) obstructed the accession process and revealed key weaknesses of EU conditionality (e.g. the ‘trade-in’ between cooperation with ICTY and EU membership) (Suboti´c, 2010, p. 612; 2011, pp. 325–326). Complementary studies highlighted the deficient coverage of EU-related topics and the abundance of Eurosceptic standpoints in the Serbian press (Antoni´c, 2012, pp. 73–76; Markovi´cTomi´c, 2016, pp. 13–15). If only at a retrospective glance, the shades of Euroscepticism in Serbia appear to be ‘harder’ in comparison with Croatia, especially as far as the right-wing angle of the party spectrum is concerned. One essential commonality between the Croatian and the Serbian party spectrums is their domination by, nominally, conservative parties of the centre-right. This establishes a common ground with respect to the political principles, the intra-party arrangements, and the policymaking patterns espoused by HDZ and SNS. In the parliamentary elections that were held on 5 July 2020, HDZ won 66 out of 151 seats at the Sabor (national parliament). This is 5 more seats in comparison with the parliamentary elections of 2016 (Tables 3.1 and 3.2).2 In Serbia, following the outcome of the latest parliamentary (2016 and 2020) and the presidential (2017) elections,3 President Aleksandar Vuˇci´c and SNS dominate a continuum that stretches from the boundaries of the liberal centre to the conservative right (Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5).

2 HDZ governs together with the 3 deputies elected on a ‘fixed’ basis by the Serbian Democratic Independent Party/SDSS. However, the current Croatian President, Zoran Milanovi´c was the nominee of the (centre-left) Social Democrat Party/SDP in the presidential elections of December 2019 and January 2020. HDZ had also emerged victorious in the 2016 parliamentary elections although it had to rely on support from smaller coalition partners (namely, the centrist-liberal Croatian People’s Party/HNS) but most of the ministers originated from HDZ. 3 SNS garnered 61.6 per cent (2020) and Aleksandar Vuˇci´c 55.6 per cent of the vote (2017). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 2020 elections were boycotted by the opposition parties that gathered around the ‘Alliance for Serbia’/Savez za Srbiju coalition (Petsinis, 2020c).

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Table 3.1 The results of the Croatian parliamentary elections (11 September 2016)

Parties and electoral coalitions

Percentages and seats at the Sabor

HDZ-led coalition The People’s Coalition (led by SDP) MOST ‘Only Option’ coalition (led by Živi Zid) ’For Prime Minister’ coalition (led by BM 365) IDS-PGS-RI coalition (led by IDS) HDSSB-HKS coalition Independent list

36.27% and 61 seats 33.45% and 54 seats 9.84% and 13 seats 6.16% and 8 seats 4.05% and 2 seats 2.27% and 3 seats 1.24% and 1 seat 0.27% and 1 seat

Source: Izbori 2016—Rezultati (https://www.izbori.hr, accessed 4 May 2021)

Table 3.2 The results of the Croatian parliamentary elections (5 July 2020)

Parties and electoral coalitions

Percentages and seats at the Sabor

HDZ-led coalition ‘Restart’ coalition (led by SDP) DP MOST Možemo Pametno HNS Reformists

37.26% and 66 seats 28.47% and 41 seats 10.89% and 16 seats 7.39% and 8 seats 6.99% and 7 seats 3.98% and 3 seats 1.30% and 1 seat 1.01% and 1 seat

Source: Izbori 2020—Rezultati (https://www.izbori.hr, accessed 4 May 2021)

Both SNS and HDZ appear to converge on their formal endorsement of the European integration process. This left both countries with smaller, usually right-wing, political actors that harbour and promote explicitly rejectionist agendas, such as the Croatian Party of Rights/HSP and the ˇ Croatian Pure Party of Rights/HCSP in Croatia and the parties of SRS

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Table 3.3 The results of the Serbian parliamentary elections (24 April 2016)

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Parties and electoral coalitions

Percentages and seats at the Skupština

SNS-led coalition SPS-led coalition SRS DJB DS DSS-Dveri SDS-LDP-LSV coalition VMSZ-led coalition BDZ (Sandžak) SDA (Sandžak) ZES PDD

48.25% and 131 seats 10.95% and 29 seats 8.10% and 22 seats 6.02% and 16 seats 6.02% and 16 seats 5.04% and 13 seats 5.02% and 13 seats 1.50% and 4 seats 0.86% and 2 seats 0.80% and 2 seats 0.63% and 1 seat 0.43% and 1 seat

Source: Izbori 2016—Rezultati (https://www.stat.gov.rs, accessed 4 May 2021)

Table 3.4 The results of the Serbian parliamentary elections (21 June 2020)

Parties and electoral coalitions

Percentages and seats at the Skupština

SNS-led coalition SPS-led coalition SPAS VMSZ BDZ (Sandžak) PDD SDA (Sandžak)

60.65% and 188 seats 10.38% and 32 seats 3.83% and 11 seats 2.23% and 9 seats 1.00% and 4 seats 0.82% and 3 seats 0.77% and 3 seats

Source: Izbori 2020—Rezultati (https://www.stat.gov.rs, accessed 4 May 2021)

and DSS-Dveri 4 in Serbia. Nevertheless, the (national conservative) DP is the third largest party at the Sabor with 16 deputies after the elections of 2020. The emergence of this party as a potent contender to the right

4 The decision of DSS to form a temporary coalition with the more nationalistic Dveri (‘Gates’), between 2014 and 2016, consolidated the shift of this party further to the right. Following the results of the 2020 parliamentary elections, DSS, Dveri, and SRS are not represented in the national assembly.

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Table 3.5 The results of the Serbian presidential elections (2 April 2017)

Presidential candidates

Votes and percentages

Aleksandar Vuˇci´c Saša Jankovi´c Luka Maksimovi´c Vuk Jeremi´c Vojislav Šešelj Boško Obradovi´c Saša Radulovi´c Milan Stamatovi´c ˇ Nenad Canak Aleksandar Popovi´c Miroslav Parovi´c

2,012,788 votes and 55.06% 597,728 votes and 16.35% 344,498 votes and 9.42% 206,676 votes and 5.65% 163,802 votes and 4.48% 83,523 votes and 2.28% 51,651 votes and 1.41% 42,193 votes and 1.15% 41,070 votes and 1.12% 38,167 votes and 1.04% 11,540 votes and 1.69%

Source: http://arhiva.rik.parlament.gov.rs/english/arhiva-konferenc ije-za-medije-2017.php (accessed 4 May 2021)

of HDZ invigorates the soft Eurosceptic voices in Croatian politics.5 In its electoral manifesto, the DP strikes a stance of reformist Euroscepticism and clarifies that it subscribes for a European Union as ‘a confederal union of sovereign states and not as a supranational, federal, state with the prospects to become unitary’ (DP, 2020a, p. 3). In its political programme, the DP reiterates this position and prescribes that Croatia must develop closer relations with the ‘Visegrad Four’ because of ‘the shared historical experiences, as well as the similar positions and outlooks on the European and global developments with this group of countries’ (DP, 2020b, p. 30). Before proceeding to the thematic discussion of Euroscepticism in Croatia and Serbia, it is necessary to briefly place into context the, political as well as legal, realities of ethnic relations in the two countries since the 2000s. Particular emphasis is put on the interactions between systemic transformation and the external involvement of the EU towards the arrangement of the new legal frameworks on minority rights.

5 The leader of the DP, Miroslav Škoro, used to be a popular singer and television host.

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Minority Rights in Croatia and Serbia: Between European Persuasion and Domestic Practice Croatia Article 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (Narodne Novine, 1990) formally endorsed the equality of members of all national minorities before the law. Nevertheless, the realities ‘on the ground’ were different. Since the declaration of Croatian independence (1991), President Franjo Tud-man initiated a nationalisation process. His government proceeded to purge employees, mostly those with an ethnic Serb background. This affected the administrative bureaucracy, the police, the judiciary, the media, and education. Even as late as July 2000, government statistics demonstrated that only 2.8% of state administration employees belonged to the ethnic Serb minority.6 Furthermore, in 1995, the UN expressed concern about the state authorities’ failure to take action over the propagation of ethnic hatred against Serbs by the media and the press.7 The landscape became fuzzier because of indications that Croatian society had been hugely scarred by the war and that ethnic cleavages were pronounced.8 Consequently, the situation with regard to minority rights remained static until the end of the 1990s (Petsinis, 2012, 2013). The year 2000 saw ground-breaking changes in Croatian politics. The voters’ change of mood resulted in Stipe Mesi´c’s victory in the presidential elections (24 January 2000 and 7 February 2000) and the Social Democrats’ (SDP) victory in the parliamentary elections (3 January 2000). The new government promoted an agenda of alleviation of ethnic cleavages within Croatia and the establishment of better relations with the leaderships of neighbouring states. Most importantly, the new leadership demonstrated great interest in Croatia’s accession to the EU as well as eagerness to comply with the recommendations of EU advisers. A series of bilateral talks were held between EU advisers and representatives of the Croatian government. In the course of these negotiations, the former 6 On this issue, see: The Croatian Government Report on the Implementation of the FCNM to the COE, 1998 (http://www.coe.int, accessed 10 October 2020. 7 On this issue, see: CERD Conclusions on Croatia, 22 September 1995. 8 As late as autumn 2002, opinion polls revealed that a large percentage of Croatian

citizens did not feel secure with the presence of ethnic Serbs in Croatia (Veˇcerniji List, 2002, p. 7).

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outlined to the latter a number of reforms that had to be undertaken in order for Croatia to tread the path of democratisation more effectively. The culmination of the entire process came about with the inauguration of the new Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities /CLRNM (19 December 2002) (Petsinis, 2013, pp. 357– 358).9 A key aspect of this law was the authorisation of national minorities to elect advisory councils on the local and municipal levels of administration as well as their proportional representation in the Sabor (Article 7, Articles 19–20, 24, 25–31, and 32–33) (Toplak & Gardaševi´c, 2017, pp. 265–275).10 The constitutional law is of particular significance for the more ethnically mixed op´cine (municipalities) in that it has encouraged the application of regional mechanisms for the accommodation of the minority communities’ demands. One should add that Croatian legal experts and policymakers made proper use of certain mechanisms for the management of inter-group relations during the communist era and adapted them to the European standards for the protection of minority rights. In greater detail, the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (1981) (Articles 219 and 380) granted minorities the right to participate in representative bodies at all levels of state administration. SR Croatia’s 26 multi-ethnic municipalities were granted extensive autonomy in managing inter-group relations with regard to a variety of areas (education, the public use of minority languages, and public information) (Petsinis, 2013, pp. 360–361). Inside the context of independent Croatia’s legal infrastructure for the management of ethnic relations, these provisions ‘correspond’ to the national minorities’ advisory councils at the local self-government level. However, their powers are more restricted than those of the multi-ethnic op´cine during the communist era. The laws on education and the use of the national minorities’ languages (2001) additionally safeguard the status of minority languages in public information and the system of

9 For a full-text version, see: ‘Ustavni Zakon o Pravima Nacionalnih Manjina’, in Narodne Novine (2000). 10 In every parliamentary election, 8 seats are reserved for the representation of national minorities, the so-called ‘District 12’, at the Sabor on a proportional basis and in accordance with their size (3 seats for the ethnic Serb minority; 1 seat for the ethnic Hungarians, the Italian community, jointly the Czechs and the Slovaks, the Bosnjaks, and the Albanians).

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education.11 Lastly, the joint efforts between the Croatian government and the European as well as international organisations (e.g. EU, COE, and UNHCR) enabled a greater number of ethnic Serb returnees to obtain Croatian citizenship and regain their property.12 A considerable percentage of returnees managed to reclaim their properties or obtain alternative housing. In particular, the period between 2002 and 2003 saw an intensification of the return process of ethnic Serb refugees (Petsinis, 2013, p. 362).13 Nevertheless, this is not to say that the implementation of the constitutional and legal clauses on minority rights has been without shortcomings. One persistent hindrance, since the early 2010s (European Commission, 2010, p. 13; Petsinis, 2012, p. 33), is the reluctance or lack of eagerness, on behalf of certain bodies in the municipal and local administration, to implement certain of the legal provisions (e.g. signposting).14 Furthermore, the quality in the staffing of the national minority councils may vary across Croatia, whereas, on certain occasions, the members of national minorities themselves have not been capable of taking advantage of the positive discrimination measures (Petsinis, 2013, p. 360; Schwellnus, 2009, p. 40).15 There also exists evidence of non-transparent management of the funding earmarked for the national minorities councils on the municipal and local levels whereas the returning process of ethnic Serb refugees has not been without complications (e.g. the case of Vukovar

11 For a full-text version of these legal documents, see: Narodne Novine (2001a),

‘Zakon o Uporabi Jezika i Pisma Nacionalnih Manjina u Republici Hrvatskoj’, no. 51; Narodne Novine (2001b), ‘Zakon o Odgoju i Obrazovanju na Jeziku i Pismu Nacionalnih Manjina’, no. 51. 12 It is estimated that, between 2008 and 2009, a total number of 108,466 ethnic Serb refugees had returned to Croatia while an additional 80,000 remained in Serbia (European Commission, 2009, pp. 14–16). 13 It is estimated that, by that time, approximately 46,068 ethnic Serb refugees had returned to Croatia (CLP, 2005, p. 20). 14 Interview with an advisor in the Department for Human and Minority Rights, Government of Croatia (5 November 2018, Zagreb); Interview with the Deputy Ombudsman at the Advisory Council for National Minorities, Republic of Croatia (6 November 2018, Zagreb). 15 Interview with a legal expert on minority rights at the ‘Centre for Peace’ NGO (9 November 2018, Vukovar); Interview with a member of SDSS (14 November 2018, Pakrac).

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in eastern Slavonia).16 In all of this, as demonstrated in greater detail later in this chapter, the major obstacles to the implementation of the legal prerogatives derive from the frequent and intensive politicisation of minority issues. Serbia In Serbia, during the 1990s, certain provisions on minority rights were included in the Yugoslav Constitution (1992) and the Serbian Constitution (1990). Nevertheless, as long as neither the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, nor Serbia had a separate law on national minorities, the constitutional rights of national minorities were also codified in Serbian (republican) legal statutes (Petsinis, 2020a, pp. 123–125; Korhecz, 1998). As in Croatia, the realities in the area of implementation were different. In Vojvodina, the Serbian government promoted subtle policies with the objective of ‘renationalising’ the province. Since the termination of Vojvodina’s autonomy in 1989, the nationalising dimension manifested through irregularities in the implementation of the provisions on education and the public use of minority languages as well as in alleged cases of discrimination against minorities in employment (Petsinis, 2020a, pp. 125–128). The end of Slobodan Miloševi´c’s rule in 2000 was accompanied by rapid developments in the field of minority legislation. The post-Miloševi´c governing coalition (Serbian Democratic Opposition/DOS; 2000–2003) showed a great interest in recovering the lost ground in Serbia’s path towards the EU and complying to the recommendations by the COE and the European Commission. A number of documents were jointly drafted, by Serbian and European legal experts, and came into force under the umbrella of the Serbian-Montenegrin Constitutional Charter (March 2003). These included the Federal Law for the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities (LRFNM, 27 February 2002).17 This law guaranteed the public use of minority languages in those municipalities where a minority forms at least 15% of the population (Article 11). 16 Interview with an advisor in the Department for Human and Minority Rights, Government of Croatia (5 November 2018, Zagreb); Interview with a legal expert on minority rights at the ‘Centre for Peace’ NGO (9 November 2018, Vukovar). 17 For a full-text version of the law, see ‘Zakon o zaštiti prava i sloboda nacionalnih manjina’ in Službeni List SRJ , broj 11, (Belgrade, 27 February 2002).

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It also provided for education in minority languages, at all levels, in the same municipalities (Article 13). The most notable innovation of this law was the establishment of the National Minorities’ Council at the former Federal Assembly (Articles 18–20). As in Croatia, this is a body tasked with supervising the implementation of the minority legislation. After the dissolution of the Serbian-Montenegrin state union (May 2006), the LRFNM was incorporated into the legal system of the Serbian republic,18 and, since July 2008, the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights came into existence as a full-fledged legal entity. As in Croatia, legal experts on minority rights recycled certain aspects of the communist era legislation and adapted them to the European standards for the protection of minority rights on a more regionalised basis. The Statute on the Autonomy of Vojvodina (14 December 2009)19 provided for: (a) the election of the national minorities’ councils at the assembly of the autonomous province in Novi Sad (Article 40); (b) crossborder cooperation with legal entities based in the external homelands of the ethnic minorities (Articles 75–80); (c) the ban on ethnic discrimination and the propagation of ethnic hatred (Articles 6 and 7, 75–80). Similar provisions were in force as part of the Vojvodinian Constitution (1974) (Articles 4 and 194) and its supplementary legislation but with greater powers (Petsinis, 2012, p. 35). As in Croatia, though, the implementation of these legal provisions has not been without shortcomings. Here, primary attention is paid to the autonomous province of Vojvodina due to its richly diverse ethnocultural demographics and the operation of Serbia’s largest minority party (the Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina/VMSZ). For a start, an obstacle that may frequently occur is the lack of coordination among republican, provincial, and local authorities towards the prompt implementation of the legal framework as well as their weak motivation to do so (ibid., p. 33). Furthermore, the existence of various legal statutes on minority 18 In 2016, the LFRNM was replaced by the ‘Action Plan for the Materialisation of Minority Rights’. This new document maintained all pre-existing guidelines of the LFRNM on the national minorities’ councils, education, political participation, the public use of minority languages, and the prohibition of discrimination. For a full–text version of the Action Plan, see: http://www.puma.vojvodina.gov.rs/dokumenti/Engleski/pravni_ akti/Action%20Plan%20for%20National%20Minorities.PDF. Accessed 29 October 2020. 19 This document was revised in 2014, but the amendments did not impact on the clauses for the rights of national minorities. For the current version of the statute, see: ‘Statut Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine’ in Službeni List AP Vojvodine, br. 20/2014.

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rights may complicate implementation whereas not all national minority councils are equally efficient and well equipped. For instance, the ethnic Hungarian minority council at the assembly of the autonomous province of Vojvodina is the best equipped one and has been receiving funds from state agencies and private donors based in Hungary.20 In addition to this, there have been allegations that powerful ethnic minority parties may attempt to exert political control on the councils tasked with the representation of their communities (most remarkably, the case of VMSZ within the ethnic Hungarian minority).21 In spite of the sporadic recurrence of ‘ethnically-motivated’ incidents of violence,22 the politicisation of ethnic cleavages in Vojvodina and elsewhere in Serbia has been less intense in comparison with Croatia.

Euroscepticism and the Management of Ethnic Relations in Croatia and Serbia Croatia The Law on the Use of the Languages and the Alphabets of National Minorities (2000) guarantees that minority languages and their scripts are to be equal with the Croatian language before the law (Article 1). It endorses their public use in these municipalities and localities where national minorities make up a local percentage of 30% in the areas of: local administration, public information, signposting, and naming of geographic locations (Articles 4, 5, 8, 10, 13, and 18). The CLRNM (2002) additionally safeguards and establishes these rights (Articles 7 and 11).

20 This funding comprises of financial assistance for start-up entrepreneurship, agricultural projects, land purchase, the construction of industrial plants, and tourist entrepreneurship. Some information over this issue was disclosed to the author in the course of his field research in Serbia (Interview with the Vice-Secretary at the Provincial Secretariat for National Minorities, Autonomous Assembly of Vojvodina; 29 November 2018, Novi Sad). 21 Interview with the Director of the Independent Association of Journalists in Vojvodina/NDNV media-NGO (1 December 2018, Novi Sad). 22 For example, following the football match between Serbia and Albania (14 October 2014), physical attacks against ethnic Albanians and their properties (e.g. bakeries) occurred in certain localities of Vojvodina (e.g. Sombor) (Interview with the Director at the ‘Centre for Regionalism’ NGO; 16 November 2018, Novi Sad).

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Inside the context of the HDZ’s process of ‘de-Tud-manizacija 23 ’, the party never vocally objected to the initiatives undertaken by SDP in order to accelerate Croatia’s trajectory to the EU. Instead, when party leader Ivo Sanader succeeded SDP’s Ivica Raˇcan as the Croatian PM (2003), he reiterated HDZ’s commitment to the EU accession process and established continuity in: (a) the steady cooperation between the state authorities and the ICTY (Suboti´c, 2011, p. 319); (b) the maintenance and prompt implementation of the new legal framework on minority rights. One might argue that, during the accession process to the EU, it was marginal parties of the far right, mainly HSP, that objected to the EU’s soft power. These parties attempted to draw a linkage between opposition to the new legal framework on minority rights and hard Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, the period during Tomislav Karamarko’s tenure as the chairman of HDZ (2012–2016) witnessed an intra-party project towards the ‘selective re-appropriation’ of elements from Franjo Tud-man’s legacy as the founding statesman of the independent Croatian republic (Kocijan & Kukec, 2016, p. 52).24 This reinforced the, so-called, ‘right-wing faction’ inside HDZ. This is an intra-party segment characterised by more socially conservative outlooks on policymaking areas such as: minority issues; LGBTQI rights, abortion, and other genderrelated themes; relations between clergy and state; immigration; and the implementation of stricter ‘law and order’ agendas. These policymaking principles may be coupled with the occasional communication of soft Eurosceptic standpoints (Petsinis, 2020b).25 Although complicating the endeavours by Croatian PM and chairman of HDZ, Andrej Plenkovi´c, to shift the official party narrative more firmly towards the centre, the engagement of HDZ’s ‘right-wing faction’ has been of pivotal significance 23 De-Tud-manizacija (‘de-Tud-manisation’) is a term coined by Croatian political scientists. It addresses HDZ’s substantial reformation and dissociation from Franjo Tud-man’s nationalist legacies inside the frame of its transformation into a ‘proper’ party of the centre-right during the 2000s. 24 On this issue, see: https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/karamarko-ni-za-pavelica-ni-zatita-moramo-se-vratiti-tudjmanu-407309. Accessed 19 October 2020. 25 One prominent affiliate of HDZ’s ‘right-wing faction’ was the former member of the European Parliament, Ruža Tomaši´c who was accused of historical revisionism with regard to the Ustaše Axis-collaborationist regime during the Second World War. For more on this issue, see: https://www.portalnovosti.com/croatian-mep-sympathizes-the-fascist-mov ement. Accessed 20 October 2020.

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Table 3.6 The ethnic structure of the population in the municipality of Vukovar (2011)

Affiliations

Numbers

Percentages in the population

Croats Serbs Hungarians Germans Others TOTAL

15,881 9,654 347 58 1,743 27,683

57.37% 34.87% 1.25% 0.21% 6.30% 100%

Source: Stanovništvo prema Narodnosti po Gradovima/Op´cinama, Popis 2011 (https://www.dzs.hr, accessed 4 May 2021)

towards securing the vote of socially conservative target groups (e.g. in Dalmatia and Slavonia) (Petsinis, 2020c). Especially in the municipality of Vukovar and other parts of Slavonia where the ethnic Serb population meets the prescribed 30% threshold, the public use of the Serb Cyrillic script has not been implemented (Table 3.6). In Vukovar, the implementation of the legislation was obstructed, between 2013 and 2016, by the systematic mobilisation of the Croatian War Veterans Association/UHRV.26 During 2018, HDZ’s ‘right-wing faction’ and grass-roots groupings (Narod odluˇcuje/ ‘The people decides’) had been spearheading the proposal for a referendum in order to amend the Constitution (Article 72) and reduce the ‘fixed’ number of the ethnic minorities representatives elected at the Sabor from eight to six (‘Zahtjev za Raspisivanje Državnog Referenduma’, 13 June 2018). Although this multilevel endeavour was not met with success, its immediate objective was to reduce the number of the ethnic Serb parliamentary deputies from three to one. One might argue that this ‘revisionist’ project, as coordinated by extra-institutional and political actors, represents one more example of ‘post-accession non-compliance’.27 However, the political ramifications of these developments bear a higher significance. Opposition to the public use of the Serb Cyrillic script prompted the formation of a nexus which comprised actors as diverse as the UHRV, former HDZ-affiliates (e.g. the

26 On this issue, see: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/vukovar-bilingualismintroduce-faces-violent-resistance. Accessed 10 October 2020. 27 Interview with the Deputy Ombudsman at the Advisory Council for National Minorities, Republic of Croatia (6 November 2018, Zagreb).

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former Minister of Culture, Zlatko Hasanbegovi´c), and local representatives of the HDZ’s ‘right-wing faction’ (e.g. the mayor of Vukovar, Ivan Penava).28,29,30 Especially in Vukovar, this nexus legitimised its active engagement on the basis of the significance of this town as a landmark in the Croatian ‘Homeland War’ (Domovinski Rat ) and symbol of resistance to the Yugoslav People’s Army/JNA in 1991. The formation of this nexus emboldened its components to protest against: (a) certain decisions of the political establishment; (b) any (perceived) external interference to Croatia’s domestic affairs and the sovereignty of the national majority inside their homeland.31 The immediate concern remains to revise Croatia’s legal framework on minority rights. One further-reaching objective of this nexus, though, is to voice its discontent with the external engagement of the EU for the improvement of the legislation on minority rights. This is the case with the EU conditionality between 2000 and 2002, in particular (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 143). The success of the DP in the parliamentary elections of July 2020 hints at the, however antagonistic to HDZ’s ‘right-wing faction’, prospective reinforcement of the nexus that objects to the state legislation on

28 The official position of the municipal authorities in Vukovar is that they are engaged in the improvement of the living standards for the entire population and the prompt implementation of the minority rights legislation (proportional representation at the national minorities councils, education, and public use of minority languages and their scripts) (Interview with a civil servant with a specialisation in minority issues at the municipal administration of Vukovar, 9 November 2018, Vukovar). 29 Ivan Penava departed from HDZ, on 20 May 2020, because of his discontent over: (a) the delays in the investigation of atrocities committed during wartime; (b) financial issues; (c) the alleged assignment of the census of local minorities to representatives of ethnic minority parties (namely, SDSS). For more on this issue, see: https://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/parlamentarni-izbori-2020/vukovarski-gradonacelnik-ivanpenava-izlazi-iz-hdz-a-na-izbore-ide-s-miroslavom-skorom---606060.html. Accessed 29 October 2020. 30 For more on this issue, see: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/interkulturnaskola-vukovar-nezeljeno-dijete/29559596.html; https://euractiv.jutarnji.hr/PiD/obrazo vanje/skola-koja-je-trebala-biti-primjer-integracije-i-dijaloga-nema-ni-jednog-ucenika/796 5822/ and https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/135837; http://hr.n1info.com/ English/NEWS/a337004/Upcoming-protest-in-Vukovar-divides-right-wing-groups.html. Accessed 17 October 2020. 31 Interview with an independent journalist at the FAKTOGRAF fact-checking platform, Zagreb (13 November 2018); Interview with a Professor of Law at the University of Zagreb (13 November 2018).

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minority rights and harbours, soft and reformist, Eurosceptic inclinations. Eurosceptic sentiment interweaves with the management of ethnic relations in the party’s discontent over the pressures from the Venice Commission (COE) and the EU on Croatia (2000–2002) for the adoption of the ‘fixed’ quotas arrangement towards the representation of ethnic minorities at the Sabor (DP, 2020b, p. 32). The DP holds that with the exceptions of Croatia, Slovenia, and Hungary, ‘this model is mostly applied outside of Europe (e.g. Armenia, China, Cyprus, Iran, and India) … Western democracies no longer implement this model’ (ibid.). The party leadership contends that ‘this arrangement has mostly enabled certain individuals and groups to serve their private interests’ (ibid., p. 31). Therefore, the DP calls for the abolition of ‘District 12’ and its replacement by ‘the proportional nomination of ethnic minority candidates in the electoral lists of the political parties via universal (and not ‘special’) ballot in accordance to the Dutch model’ (ibid., p. 32). The decision of Ivan Penava to join forces with Miroslav Škoro after his departure from HDZ (May 2020) is largely to account for the party’s successful performance in the electoral districts of Slavonia (namely, the 4th unit, consisting of the Virovitiˇcko-podravska županija/county and the Osjeˇcko-baranjska županija).32 Serbia During the 1990s, the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia/SPS, as well as the SRS, had repeatedly accused the EU of jeopardising the state’s territorial integrity and sponsoring ‘secessionist’ parties (e.g. the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina/VMDK and, later, VMSZ).33 The party manifesto of SRS still judges that: ‘throughout the past 50 years, the rights of the national majority had been violated, whereas the members of the national minorities had been privileged’ (SRS, 2009, p. 28). However, the SRS-manifesto no longer comprises of any structured

32 The DP elected 3 deputies in the 4th unit. On this issue, see: https://www.sabor.hr/ hr/zastupnici/iv-izborna-jedinica-10-saziv-hrvatskoga-sabora. Accessed 26 October 2020. 33 Declaration of the 3rd congress of the Vojvodinian SPS committee (issued in January 1996) in Socijalistiˇcka Partija Srbije - Pokrajinski Odbor SPSa u Vojvodini, ‘Vojvodina 2000. Korak u novi vek- izveštaj’, Novi Sad, 1996, p. 2.

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attempts to draw links between rejection of the EU and the party’s opposition to clauses of the legislation on minority rights (Petsinis, 2020b, pp. 143–144). The Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council (1999) reaffirmed ‘the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, but it, de facto, paved the way to the enhancement of Kosovo’s governing institutions and the recognition of its independence by powerful global actors. This, in combination with the change of guard in Serbian politics, resulted in: (a) the prioritisation of geopolitical and foreign policy concerns by a sequence of governments in post-Miloševi´c Serbia; (b) the readjustment of the intersection between regional geopolitics and domestic ethnopolitics. Serbian policymakers prioritised areas such as the redefinition of relations with Montenegro, cooperation with ICTY, and relations with Republika Srpska in Bosnia while struggling to maintain Kosovo inside the administrative bounds of the Serbian republic (Noutcheva, 2007, pp. 17–18; Petsinis, 2020b, p. 144). The relaxation of the intersection between ethnopolitics and geopolitics resulted in the dissociation of Eurosceptic narratives from the question of ethnic relations within Serbia. Since 2008, the question of Kosovo has been transformed from one that once pertained to the realm of domestic ethnopolitics into one that pertains to the sphere of foreign policy and regional geopolitics. Moreover, the positive neighbourly relations with Hungary, the normalisation of relations with Croatia,34 and the continuous cooperation between SNS and VMSZ in the established governing structures35 hint at the absence of a security threat emanating from any of the minorities in, Serbia’s most ethnically diverse region, Vojvodina (Table 3.7).36 34 However, the first half of 2016 witnessed a brief attempt, by the Croatian government, to obstruct Serbia’s accession bid to the EU. Croatia accused the Serbian government of not having paid adequate attention to the situation of minority rights for the ethnic Croats in Vojvodina, although the European Commission had not detected any major areas of concern in its progress report for Serbia (2015). For a discussion of this controversy, see: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/05/17/croatias-blocking-ofserbias-eu-integration-another-case-of-bilateral-conditionality-in-the-balkans/. Accessed 20 January 2021. 35 Following the parliamentary elections of 21 June 2020, VMSZ is represented at the national assembly with 9 deputies and grants its support to the government led by SNS. 36 Some affiliates of VMSZ may even juxtapose their consensus approach to the, allegedly, more confrontational attitudes espoused by the political representatives of other

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Table 3.7 The ethnic structure of the population in the Serbian autonomous province of Vojvodina (2011)

Affiliations Serbs Hungarians Slovaks Croats Roma Romanians Montenegrins Bunjevci Ruthenes Yugoslavs Macedonians Ukrainians Muslims Germans Albanians Slovenes Bulgarians Gorani Russians Bosnjaks Vlachs Others Regional affiliation Non-defined Unknown TOTAL

Numbers

Percentages in the population

1,289,635 251,136 50,321 47,033 42,391 25,410 22,141 16,469 13,928 12,176 10,392 4,202 3,360 3,272 2,251 1,815 1,489 1,179 1,173 780 170 6,170 28,567 81,018 14,791 1,931,809

66.76% 13.00% 2.60% 2.43% 2.19% 1.32% 1.15% 0.85% 0.72% 0.63% 0.54% 0.22% 0.17% 0.17% 0.12% 0.09% 0.08% 0.06% 0.06% 0.04% 0.01% 0.35% 1.48% 4.19% 0.77% 100%

Source: Republiˇcki Zavod za Statistiku, Popis 2011 (http://popis2 011.stat.rs/, accessed 4 May 2021)

As an aggregate of these developments, by contrast to their Croatian counterparts within HDZ, Serbian Eurosceptics within SNS generally do not intertwine their criticism of the EU with the management of minority issues in Serbia (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 144). The political programme of SNS subscribes to safeguarding the collective rights and freedoms of ethnic minorities as these are stipulated in the state legislation (education, political representation, public use of minority languages, and cross-border

minority groups (e.g. the ethnic Bosnjaks in the south-western region of Sandžak) (Interview with MP of VMSZ at the Serbian parliament; 30 November 2018, Belgrade).

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links to the external homelands) (SNS, 2011, pp. 44–45). The party programme regards the existence of ethnic minorities as a ‘strength and wealth of Serbia’ and judges that ‘the violation of the constitutional and legal arrangements on the individual and collective rights of ethnic minorities represents a direct threat to the Serbian national interest’ (ibid., p. 43).

Geopolitical Concerns and Euroscepticism in Croatia and Serbia Croatia The enhancement of regional security via the ‘joint’ membership of NATO and the EU functions as one of the strongest arguments in favour of Croatia’s participation in the structures of the EU. This dual membership corresponded to the quest for a solution to Croatia’s security agenda, following the warfare in the 1990s as well as to the unanimous yearning for a ‘return to Europe’. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement for the Western Balkans upgrades Croatia’s geopolitical status as a ‘bridge’ between the EU and the candidate states from the former Yugoslavia (Samardzija, 2016, p. 139). Quantitative research has detected remarkably positive attitudes in favour of the EU’s common defence and security policy as well as the formation of an EU army among most of the political parties and the public (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2015, as cited in ibid.). Therefore, Eurosceptic narratives in Croatia tend not to comprise of a geopolitical component (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 144). Serbia In contrast to Croatia, geopolitics make up the main component of Euroscepticism in Serbia. In its manifesto, the ruling party of SNS subscribes to Serbia’s accession process to the EU as a trajectory which is expected to enhance the country’s democratic institutions, accelerate economic growth, and modernise the state’s infrastructure (SNS, 2011, p. 40). In all of this, the party opts for military neutrality and envisages Serbia’s global role as ‘a bridge between east and west’ which should be open to cooperation with global actors as diverse as the US, China, Japan, and Russia (ibid., p. 41). With regard to relations with Russia, the manifesto of SNS underlines the necessity to promote the Orthodox

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and Slavic, cultural and religious, bonds between the two nations (ibid.). As the former party chairman and Serbian President, Tomislav Nikoli´c stated on a series of occasions: ‘Serbia wants to join the EU because it is an organised family of nations…but, at the same time, we have a close historical and religious connection to the Russian Federation’.37 One might argue that SNS inherited aspects from the programme of the ‘old’ SRS38 on Serbia’s global neutrality and modified them along the lines of conditional endorsement to the EU accession process. One might even draw some, however non-linear and tentative, correlations to the legacies of Yugoslavia’s participation in the non-aligned movement. Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the impact of pragmatic and timely considerations. In addition to political and economic stability, the SNS-led government legitimises the accession process through reference to the existence of a vibrant Serb diaspora in Central and North-western Europe and the ‘remittances factor’ as well as to the export–import ratio between EU and Serbia (Ðuki´c, 2015, p. 35; LSEE Research on South Eastern Europe and SEESOX South East European Studies at Oxford, 2015, p. 9; Petsinis, 2020b, pp. 144–145).39 At the same time, though, Russia is Serbia’s staunchest ally at the UN Security Council with regard to the question of Kosovo. Since 2008, the Serbian government has established a steady cooperation with Gazprom (Suboti´c, 2011, p. 322) and Russia remains a key partner in energy cooperation. The ongoing impact of the economic and migration crises throughout the EU functions, if only subtly, as an additional incentive for Serbian policymakers to prolong Serbia’s geopolitical oscillation between east and west (Vuksanovi´c, 2018). Serbian policymakers may often reflect upon the Croatian precedent and the belief that Croatia did not reap all

37 On this issue, see: https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2016/ 11/tomislav-nikolic-serbia-won-align-east-west-161124105054362.html. Accessed 15 October 2020. 38 SNS represents the evolution of a ‘splinter group’, comprising of former leading cadres such as Aleksandar Vuˇci´c and Tomislav Nikoli´c, who departed from the ‘old’ SRS in 2008. SNS was officially launched on 21 October 2008. 39 Transactions with EU member states amounted to 63.7 per cent of the total external trade between 2017 and 2018. On this issue, see: http://www.stat.gov.rs/en-us/vesti/ 20180928-spoljnotrgovinska-robna-razmena-avgust-2018/?s=1701. Accessed 15 October 2020.

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the economic benefits that it anticipated from membership of the EU.40 The aggregate of these catalysts has resulted in the consolidation of a soft version of Euroscepticism with a predominantly geopolitical profile (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 145).41 This consists in the occasional criticism of the EU’s alleged bias over the collective status of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo (or, secondarily, the relations between Serbia and Republika Srpska in Bosnia) which is frequently coupled with statements of gratitude to Russia (Pavlovi´c, 2015).42 In greater detail, President Aleksandar Vuˇci´c has been reiterating, in a series of interviews to Russian media outlets, that: ‘I feel very comfortable about Vladimir Putin’s words of further support for Serbia’s territorial integrity which is not only an issue of Serbia, it has become an issue for many sovereign states’.43 At the same time, the Serbian President has been issuing charges of ‘double standards’ and ‘hypocrisy’ against powerful EU member states along the lines that: ‘How can Serbia open a Pandora’s Box? Who opened this Pandora’s Box in 2008 having accepted, acknowledged and recognised the unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo? They were doing so, not us!’.44

Gender-related Issues and Euroscepticism in Croatia and Serbia Croatia One landmark event that occurred shortly after Croatia joined the EU was the ban on same-sex marriage in the referendum that was held on 1 December 2013.45 Two-thirds of those who voted granted their assent 40 Interview with a senior researcher at Friedrich Ebert Stiftung-Serbia, Belgrade (30 November 2018). 41 Interview with a political scientist at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad (26 November 2018). 42 Interview with a Former Serbian Minister of National Defence (20 November 2018, Belgrade); Interview with the Director of the NDNV media-NGO (1 December 2018, Novi Sad). 43 On this issue, see: https://www.rt.com/shows/sophieco/440384-vucic-kosovo-ser bia-tensions/. Accessed 17 October 2020. 44 Ibid. 45 On this issue, see: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25172778. Accessed

20 October 2020.

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to the proposal that: ‘the Constitution should be amended to define marriage as the union between a man and a woman’. The petition for a referendum was initiated by grass-roots groupings with an affiliation to the Roman Catholic Church and spearheaded by the NGO U ime obitelji ˇ (‘In the Name of Family’) (Cepo, 2017; Petriˇcuši´c, 2015). In order to comprehend the wider implications of opposition to LGBTQI rights in Croatia, one should take into consideration the pact between Croatia’s religious authorities and the political establishment as also stipulated in the Vatican Contract (Petsinis, 2020b, pp. 145– 146).46 As part of this semi-formal arrangement, HDZ had granted its assent to the constitutional referendum on the same-sex marriage ˇ ban and condones the Church’s opposition to sexual education (Cepo, 47 2017, pp. 17–18). Throughout 2018, the governing party’s ‘right-wing faction’ concentrated their engagement on opposition to the ratification of the Istanbul Convention (2017) and its provisions for LGBTQI rights.48 More recently, the DP equally pledges to ‘respect and safeguard traditional family values’ (DP, 2020a, p. 2) whereas the full party manifesto defines ‘marriage as the union between a man and a woman, as stipulated by the Constitution…this guideline must be respected by the Croatian institutions’ (DP, 2020b, p. 20). In addition to this, the DP firmly objects to the adoption of children by same-sex couples (ibid.). At this point, it should be noted that, as it is the case with regard to minority rights, Croatian right-wing Eurosceptics do not tend to explicitly interlink their criticism of the EU with their standpoints on genderrelated issues. In compliance with the party line to portray Croatia as a ‘Christian and European country’, the ‘right-wing faction’ of HDZ criticises the Istanbul Convention from a predominantly gender-related angle. However, HDZ backbenchers and other minor actors (e.g. the, nominally centre-left, Labour and Solidarity Party/BM 365) may still

46 On this issue, see: https://www.total-croatia-news.com/politics/31604-vatican-pra ises-its-contracts-with-croatia. Accessed 1 November 2020. 47 Interview with an independent journalist at the FAKTOGRAF fact-checking platform, Zagreb (13 November 2018); Interview with a senior analyst at the ‘GONG’ NGO, Zagreb (13 November 2018). 48 On this issue, see: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/anti-istanbul-con vention-protesters-turn-against-croatian-pm-04-13-2018 and https://euobserver.com/bey ond-brussels/135837. Accessed 2 November 2020.

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allude to the external ‘imposition’ of alien ethical norms on the Croatian society and issue calls for the reformation of the EU by means of a return to its ‘original’, ‘European and Christian’, principles and values ˇ (Cepo, 2017; Petsinis, 2020b, p. 145; Zakošek, 2010, pp. 6–10). In this light, one might argue that HDZ’s ‘right-wing faction’ conforms to the widespread endeavour among right-wing political actors throughout Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Poland’s PiS, Estonia’s EKRE, and Latvia’s NA) to portray their pleas for a more socially conservative turn, from the part of the EU, as appeals for a ‘return’ to fundamental norms that have been allegedly forgotten or betrayed (Braghiroli & Petsinis, 2019, p. 7). Serbia Although contemporary Euroscepticism in Serbia primarily consists of a geopolitical component, one should not entirely overlook its sociocultural dimension. In accordance with partly theological and partly political narratives (e.g. the doctrine of Svetosavlje 49 ), Serbian national identity is to be understood not as a modern and individualistic notion but as a predominantly collectivist one. Along these lines, the Serbian nation is conceptualised in terms of an extended kinship, symbolically as well as literally. Therefore, any external influences that may potentially ‘disrupt’ this kinship, such as the EU’s guidelines on the rights of sexual minorities, are viewed through an inimical prism.50 The early 2000s witnessed the mass mobilisation against LGBTQI rights of a nexus which comprised of grass-roots participants as heterogeneous as: nationalist groupings, clerical associations, and organised football supporters. This culminated with the violent disruption of the

49 Svetosavlje is a Serbian interpretation of the Eastern Orthodox doctrine, in accordance with the teachings and religious canons allegedly inherited from the founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Saint Sava (1174–1236). It has been standardised in the works of renowned clerics Justin Popovi´c (1894–1979) and Nikolaj Velimirovi´c (1881–1956). Svetosavlje has been associated with clerical-political trends of a conservative, ethno-nationalist, and anti-Western character in contemporary Serbia (e.g. nationalist organisations such as 1389 and the extremist right-wing grouping Obraz/’Honour’) (Jovanovi´c, 2020, pp. 86–89; Jovanov and Lazar, 2017, pp. 138–140). 50 Interview with Sociologist 1 at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad (26 November 2018).

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first attempted ‘Pride Parade’ in Belgrade on 30 June 2001. Furthermore, during his campaign as the SRS mayoral candidate for Belgrade (2004), Aleksandar Vuˇci´c had pledged to ban ‘Pride Parade’ while castigating the EU for its alleged attempt to export ‘perverse’ gender norms to Serbia (Petsinis, 2017). However, the steady cooperation between EU advisers and a sequence of Serbian governments, including those led by SNS, resulted in the establishment of an extensive legal infrastructure for the protection of minority rights, including LGBTQI rights (European Commission, 2009, pp. 17–19).51 On the institutional level, decisions such as the appointment of, openly gay, Ana Brnabi´c to the post of PM have been interpreted as symbolic gestures towards Brussels with regard to the Serbian government’s standard commitment to the system of values espoused by the EU (Petsinis, 2017). Serbian media-NGOs have monitored the occasional propagation of allegations in domestic tabloids that the EU encourages the promotion of homosexuality (e.g. outlets such as Kurir and Srpski Telegraf ). Nevertheless, this sociocultural aspect is sidelined by the paramount stress of Serbian Euroscepticism on geopolitics and foreign policy issues.52 Therefore, by contrast to HDZ and its ‘right-wing faction’, gender-related issues do not form a significant component of the Eurosceptic narratives propagated by SNS-affiliates and the pro-government tabloids (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 146).

The Migration Crisis and Euroscepticism in Croatia and Serbia Croatia With regard to the latest migration crisis, the HDZ has been scrutinising the long-term viability of the EU quotas for the redistribution of refugees within the EU space. The empirical survey conducted by

51 The latest progress reports, compiled by the European Commission, regard the implementation of the legal clauses on LGBTQI rights in Serbia as ‘satisfactory’ (European Commission, 2019, p. 28; 2020, p.38). 52 Interview with a group of researchers at the Novi Sad School of Journalism (NNS) media-NGO, Novi Sad (28 November 2018); Interview with the Director of the NDNV media-NGO, Novi Sad (1 December 2018).

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Bojana Kocijan and Marko Kukec found out that 52.9% of the HDZaffiliated respondents judged that immigration policy must remain under the jurisdiction of member states. This was the highest percentage among Croatia’s largest parties (Kocijan & Kukec, 2016, p. 53). However, during his tenure as Croatian PM, Zoran Milanovi´c of SDP disapproved of Hungary’s decision to erect a razor-wire fence along its southern borders in autumn 2015 (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 146). Furthermore, by contrast to Hungarian PM Orbán and former Slovak PM Fico, Croatian PM Andrej Plenkovi´c from HDZ, and previously Zoran Milanovi´c, refrained from resorting to the cultural argumentation against the accommodation of refugees and other migrants on Croatian soil. Instead, they concentrated on the limited infrastructural capacities.53 In addition to this, the relevant report by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles/ECRE for Croatia assessed that the conditions at the Croatian accommodation centres for refugees were overall satisfactory (ECRE, 2017, pp. 83–85).54 The aggregate of these observations hints that, unlike the precedents of FIDESZ in Hungary and/or PiS in Poland, no segment within HDZ appears to perceive any interest in the potential ‘weaponisation’ of the party’s scepticism over the EU refugee quotas. This is largely a consequence of Croatia’s more recent entry to the EU and the ensuing benefits. This also seems to be in alignment with Kocijan and Kukec’s key argument that Croatia’s dependence on the EU over financial aid and regional security substantially regulates any propensities to a potential conflict with Brussels from the part of the political establishment (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 146). Meanwhile, conforming to the universal trend among the Euroˇ pean radical and extremist right, HSP, HCSP, and smaller groupings resorted to the bio-politics of anti-immigration by addressing refugees and migrants collectively as ‘potential rapists’.55 To this, one should add the increase in anti-refugee hate messages on YouTube and the Croatian

53 On this issue, see: https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/sep/18/ref ugee-crisis-hungary-builds-border-fence-with-croatia-live-updates#block-55fbea61e4b0c46 d88e0313a. Accessed 2 November 2020. 54 Nevertheless, sporadic incidents of maltreatment of refugees and other migrants were also reported, especially along the Croatian-Bosnian border, between late 2019 and early 2020. For more on this issue, see: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/06/croatia-is-abu sing-migrants-while-the-eu-turns-a-blind-eye/. Accessed 17 October 2020. 55 Interview with a senior analyst at the ‘GONG’ NGO, (13 November 2018, Zagreb).

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web sphere, as a whole, between 2017 and 2018.56 Nevertheless, as result of the high degree of fragmentation and lack of coordination among the Croatian far right, this attempt at mass mobilisation cannot compare to the precedents of Hungary (e.g. Jobbik and the grass-roots grouping of the ‘Hungarian Guard Movement’)57 and Slovakia (the extremist rightwing party of ‘Our Slovakia’)58 between 2015 and 2016. Furthermore, the fact that most refugees and other migrants tend to view Croatia as a transit country (ECRE, 2017) relegates the migration crisis to a secondary area of concern in the agendas of both soft and hard Eurosceptics. With regard to the softer Eurosceptics, the party manifesto of the DP dedicates only a few lines to the refugee question and holds that ‘the management of the latest migration crisis, as well as the protection of borders and citizens from potential threats, must be assigned primarily to the authorities of sovereign states within the EU’ (DP, 2020b, p. 29). Serbia With regard to the refugee crisis, although not a member state of the EU, Serbia received financial assistance from the EU for the management of the migration flows.59 DSS-Dveri and SRS were the two parties that strongly objected to the stay of refugees on Serbian soil. The former party embedded this opposition inside its hard Euroscepticism by issuing statements such as: ‘the culprit for the war in Syria is not Serbia but NATO and the EU, therefore, the most developed member states of the EU

56 Interview with the Deputy Ombudsman at the Council for National Minorities, Government of Croatia, Zagreb (6 November 2018). 57 Regarding public outlooks on migrants in Hungary during 2016, see: http://www. pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/30/hungarians-share-europes-embrace-of-democr atic-principles-but-are-less-tolerant-of-refugees-minorities/. Accessed 2 November 2020. Moreover, instances of physical maltreatment of refugees, by the Hungarian border guard, had been recorded along Hungary’s southern border during the same year (HCIT, Fondacija Ana i Vlade Divac and USAID, 2017, pp. 75–77). 58 Regarding public outlooks on migrants in Slovakia during 2016, see: https://www. euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/study-cautious-slovaks-take-eu-approach-to-ref ugees/. Accessed 4 November 2020. 59 Approximately 80 million euros were allocated by the European Commission and the EU member states to assist Serbia in managing the migration waves between 2015 and 2016. For this figure, see: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/ serbia_en.pdf. Accessed 1 November 2020.

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must accommodate the refugees’.60 The SRS-leader, Vojislav Šešelj, went several steps further and uttered that: ‘following Viktor Orbán’s example, I would erect a barbwire fence and if this was not sufficient, I would set up minefields along the border’.61 To these, one should add that the party leadership of VMSZ, largely conforming to the platform of its senior partner in Hungary (FIDESZ), expressed its discontent to the Narodna Skupština (national assembly) over the concentration of refugees and other migrants in districts with a dense ethnic Hungarian population (e.g. Kanjiža, Horgoš, and the outskirts of Subotica in northern Baˇcka) during late 2015 and early 2016.62 Nevertheless, in a similar vein as their Croatian counterparts, President Vuˇci´c, or previously President Nikoli´c, and other high-rank officials never resorted to anti-migrant rhetoric on a cultural basis in a potential confrontation with Brussels. As in the Croatian case, a primary focus was cast on the insufficient material infrastructure (HCIT, 2017, pp. 33–34).63 Moreover, the period since autumn 2015 saw the efficient coordination and mobilisation of the state administration, including regional and municipal levels, and Serbia’s civic society towards the successful accommodation of the refugee and migrant waves (UNHCR, 2014, pp. 13 and 15; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung-Serbia, 2016, pp. 7–8 and 20–21; European Commission, 2018, pp. 35–36; Petsinis, 2020a,

60 On this issue, see: http://www.dss.rs/dss-protiv-trajnog-naseljavanja-migranata-u-pan

cevo/. Accessed 10 November 2018. 61 For more on this issue, see: http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/2660/izb ori-2017/2679047/seselj-ogradom-ili-minskim-poljem-smanjiti-priliv-migranata.html. Accessed 3 November 2020. 62 Interview with a MP of VMSZ at the Serbian parliament (30 November 2018, Belgrade); Interview with the Director at the ‘Centre for Regionalism’ NGO (16 November 2018, Novi Sad). 63 On this issue, see also: https://visegradpost.com/en/2016/10/03/serbia-closesher-borders-to-migrants/. Accessed 2 November 2020. To this, one should add those occasions on which asylum seekers were pushed from the Hungarian ‘transit zones’ to Serbia between 2016 and 2017. This included asylum seekers who had not initially crossed into Hungary from Serbia (UNHCR et al., 2018, pp. 59–63).

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pp. 228–232).64 In all of this, it should be kept in mind that Serbia’s position as a transit country for most refugees and other migrants mitigated any prospects for the emergence of public discontent.65

In Lieu of a Conclusion Whereas in Croatia Euroscepticism appears to be multifaceted, in Serbia it has become ‘single-issue’. The patterns of party-based Euroscepticism in the two states are subject to Croatia’s political and socioeconomic realities as a member state of the EU and Serbia’s opportunity structures as a state which is not a member of the EU and oscillates between the EU and ‘alternative’ global actors such as Russia and China. Correspondingly, Eurosceptic narratives among Croatia’s political parties may become interwoven with instances of post-accession non-compliance over the implementation of the legislation on minority rights. Meanwhile, the Euroscepticism of Serbian political parties revolves around rational calculations with the objective to safeguard the country’s oscillation between east and west and the persistence of ambiguities over state sovereignty and territorial integrity. This may also involve occasional portrayals of the EU as an adversarial ‘other’. Therefore, the dominant brand of party-based Euroscepticism in Serbia can be categorised as right-wing, conservative, and geopolitical. In all of this, one should not underestimate the impact of sociocultural specificities such as the entrenchment of Eurosceptic narratives into the frame of the Vatican Contract in Croatia. Lastly, controversies over the migration crisis do not constitute a crucial component of Eurosceptic narratives for the governing parties of either state (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 148). The management of ethnic relations in Croatia remains a policymaking area that can become intensively politicised by right-wing political actors. This is particularly valid as far as the legal provisions for the institutional representation and the linguistic rights of the ethnic Serb minority are

64 Interview with the Director and a senior analyst at the Humanitarian Centre for Integration and Tolerance, Novi Sad, 27 November 2018; Interview with two senior analysts at the ‘InTER’ research institute, Belgrade, 23 November 2018). 65 Interview with a political scientist at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad (26 November 2018); Interview with the Director and a senior analyst at the Humanitarian Centre for Integration and Tolerance, Novi Sad (27 November 2018); Interview with two senior analysts at the ‘InTER’ research institute, Belgrade (23 November 2018).

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concerned. During the last decade, a multilevel and heterogeneous nexus which comprises of parliamentary (e.g. the ‘right-wing faction’ of HDZ) as well as extra parliamentary components (e.g. nationalist NGOs and war veterans’ associations) mobilised and actively obstructed the implementation of the state legislation on minority rights (e.g. the case of Vukovar). The direct concern of this nexus is to revise Croatia’s legal framework on minority rights. Nevertheless, although not explicitly interlinking their criticism of the EU with their standpoints on minority rights, a further-reaching objective of the same actors is to communicate their dissatisfaction with the external engagement of the EU for the improvement of minority rights legislation. The most recent emergence of the DP as a national conservative party which interconnects its soft Euroscepticism with the management of ethnic relations hints at a prospective reinforcement of the aforementioned nexus, although in an antagonistic relation to the ‘right-wing faction’ of HDZ. By contrast, the relaxation of the intersection between ethnopolitics and geopolitics resulted in the dissociation of Eurosceptic narratives from the question of ethnic relations in Serbia. Since 2008, the question of Kosovo has been transformed from one that once pertained to the realm of domestic ethnopolitics into one that pertains to the sphere of foreign policy and regional geopolitics. Moreover, the positive neighbourly relations with Hungary and the normalisation of relations with Croatia hint at the absence of a security threat emanating from any of the minorities in, Serbia’s most ethnically diverse region, Vojvodina. As an aggregate of these developments, by contrast to their Croatian counterparts within HDZ, Serbian Eurosceptics within the ruling party of SNS do not intertwine their criticism of the EU with the management of minority issues in Serbia. Nationalist discourses in Croatia and Serbia tend to perceive nationhood from a collectivist angle along the lines of an extended kinship, symbolically as well as literally. In this light, any external influences that may potentially ‘disrupt’ this kinship, such as the EU’s guidelines on the rights of sexual minorities, are viewed through an inimical prism. In Croatia, under the auspices of the Vatican Contract, HDZ’s ‘right-wing faction’, the DP and smaller political, as well as extra parliamentary (e.g. Catholic Church NGOs), actors may allude to the external ‘imposition’ of alien ethical norms on the Croatian society and issue calls for the reformation of the EU via means of return to its ‘original’, ‘European and Christian’, principles and values.

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As it is the case with the opposition to state legislation on minority rights, the aforementioned nexus opts for a soft and reformist variant of Euroscepticism which does not dispute Croatia’s membership of the EU. Meanwhile, in Serbia, certain tabloids may propagate allegations that the EU sponsors the promotion of homosexuality. Nevertheless, this sociocultural aspect is sidelined by the paramount stress of Serbian Euroscepticism on geopolitics and foreign policy issues. By contrast to HDZ and its ‘right-wing faction’, gender-related issues do not form a significant component of the Eurosceptic narratives propagated by SNS-affiliates and the pro-government tabloids. With respect to the migration crisis, no segment within HDZ in Croatia or SNS in Serbia seems to be particularly keen on ‘weaponising’ their discontent over the passage or accommodation of refugees and other migrants in a potential clash with the EU. Since autumn 2015, both governing parties have been centring on infrastructural deficiencies and voiced their mutual discontent over Hungary’s decision to erect a razor-wire fence along its southern borderline. In all of this, one should take into consideration that a common denominator that mitigated any prospects for the emergence of political, as well as public, discontent is the fact that the bulk of migrants tend to see Croatia and Serbia as ‘transit countries’. To this, one should add that Croatia’s dependence on the EU over financial aid and regional security decisively alleviates any propensities for a conflict with Brussels from the part of the political establishment. Overall, the governing apparatuses of Croatia and Serbia converge along their pragmatic and adaptive employment of soft Euroscepticism. This situationally adaptive model demarcates HDZ and SNS from the more homogeneous, ruling parties of the conservative centre-right in the Visegrad Four, such as FIDESZ and PiS (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 148). In the precedents of FIDESZ and PiS, one can observe the more ideological and pervasive dominance of socially conservative agendas which regularly manifested amidst the tensions between the Hungarian/Polish governments and the European Commission over the EU refugee quotas. This friction seems to be amplified by centre-periphery relations and the apparent ambition by the Visegrad Four (Poland, in particular, as the largest partner) to juxtapose a geopolitical and sociocultural ‘anti-model’ to the EU centre. By contrast, in the cases of HDZ and SNS, one can speak of more tactical and internally devolved arrangements which consist in ‘divisions of labour’ between the pro-EU and the more Eurosceptic cohorts (especially in the case of HDZ and its ‘right-wing faction’)

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(ibid.). Studying why and how in countries such as Croatia and Serbia ruling conservatives are adaptive whereas in Poland and Hungary they opt for establishing ‘illiberal democracies’ can provide the most insightful trajectory for further comparative research. As a closing remark, one should keep in mind that in addition to, broadly defined, identity politics and geopolitics, Euroscepticism may combine with economic insecurities in the two countries. This is particularly valid in the case of Croatia,66 a country that was burdened by an economic recession (2009–2015) which was particularly felt in the, ˇ less developed, rural parts of regions such as Slavonia (Cipin & Ilieva, 2017; Samardzija, 2016, p. 135; Szilard, 2014, pp. 87–105; Tica, 2011, pp. 1–19).67 Despite the beneficial contribution of the EU’s Structural Funds to the economy,68 the ‘collateral damage’ of free mobility within the EU space resulted in the emigration of highly qualified personnel out of Croatia and brain drain. Meanwhile, the purchasing power of Croatian citizens remains relatively weak (Samardzija, 2016, p. 135; Tica, 2011, pp. 1–19). The party of Živi Zid/’Human Blockade’, in particular, contended that the EU is structured in accordance with the ‘neo-feudal and neocolonial principle’, rejected the austerity measures during the crisis, and underlined that ‘we do not desire Croatia’s isolation however we would not desire our country to become a colony of foreign interests to the detriment of its citizens’ (Živi Zid, 2015, pp. 65 and 67).69 In spite of

66 In Serbia, the voices of economic Euroscepticism are feebler and mostly cluster under

the umbrella of DSS and, more recently, Dveri. The two parties do not object to the maintenance of bilateral cooperation with individual EU member states (especially Italy, Austria, and Germany) but reject Serbia’s bid to the EU and favour the establishment of closer connections to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) (Stoji´c, 2018, pp. 247–250). 67 Interview with a senior researcher at the ‘Centre for Peace’ NGO, Vukovar (9 November 2018); Interview with a member of SDSS, Pakrac (14 November 2018). 68 10.7 billion euros had been allocated for Croatia between 2014 and 2020 (European Commission, 2016, p. 74). 69 Although eclectically incorporating elements of left-wing Euroscepticism, the party manifesto defines Živi Zid as a non-ideological ‘humanitarian party beyond the left–rightcentre axis’ (Živi Zid, 2015, p. 9), structured in accordance with the prototype of Italy’s Five Star Movement.

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its rising popularity during the second half of 2018,70 Živi Zid suffered a steady decline in public appeal after one of the founding members seceded and set up the ‘Party of Ivan Pernar’ in July 2019. Correspondingly, Živi Zid did not succeed in entering the Sabor in the parliamentary elections of 2020. The long-term failure of Živi Zid was an additional catalyst that paved the way to the success of the (green/leftist) Možemo/’We Can!’ coalition, represented by 7 seats at the Sabor in the latest elections (Table 3.2). By contrast to Živi Zid’s emphatic and almost rejectionist Euroscepticism, Možemo juxtaposes an alternative platform for the refashioning of European integration with a greater emphasis on social cohesion and equality in accordance with what academic experts on left-wing Euroscepticism have termed the doctrine of ‘Euro-alternativism’ (Guerra, 2015; FitzGibbon, 2013).71 The intersection between economic anxieties and Euroscepticism hints at the growing relevance of the economy not solely for anti-austerity initiatives in Southern Europe but also for a new generation of anti-establishment parties in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that were most negatively affected by the economic crisis (e.g. Latvia’s ‘Who Owns the State?’/KPV LV) (Austers, 2016, p. 91; Eurobarometer 2018, p. 2). This underlines the necessity for the more extensive and comparative study of intersections between Euroscepticism and the economy along the eastern part of the Continent.

70 Živi Zid ranked as Croatia’s third most popular party in a series of opinion polls conducted during the second half of 2018. On this issue, see: https://www.tportal.hr/biz nis/clanak/crobarometar-hdz-najjaci-zivi-zid-za-dlaku-ispred-sdp-20181224. Accessed 4 November 2020. 71 For example, Možemo does not object to Croatia’s accession to the Eurozone but holds that this objective should be materialised in a gradualist fashion. According to Možemo, a greater emphasis must be put on the expansion of job opportunities and the upgrading of social welfare and not solely the stabilisation of prices. For more on this issue, see: https://www.mozemo.hr/izborni-program-2020/zeleno-otporno-gos podarstvo-i-dostojanstveni-uvjeti-rada/#monetarna-politika-i-ulazak-u-eurozonu. Accessed 5 November 2020.

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Bibliography and Other Sources Monographs, Edited Volumes, PhD and Masters’ Theses, and Other Books Minkenberg, M. (2015). Transforming the transformation? The East European radical right in the political process. Routledge. Petriˇcuši´c, A. (2015). Religio-politics through Law: Use of legal norms and institutions by the Croatian conservative social movement [MA thesis, Central European University, Budapest]. Petsinis, V. (2020a). National identity in Serbia: The Vojvodina and a multiethnic community in the Balkans. I.B. Tauris and Bloomsbury Publishing. Pytlas, B. (2016). Radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe: Mainstream party competition and electoral fortune. Routledge. Stoji´c, M. (2018). Party responses to the EU in the Western Balkans: Transformation, opposition or defiance? Palgrave Macmillan.

Academic Articles, Book-Chapters, Working Papers, and Analytical Commentaries Agh, A. (2016). Cultural war and reinventing the past in Poland and Hungary. Polish Political Science Yearbook, 45(1), 32–44. Antoni´c, S. (2012). Euroscepticism in Serbia. Serbian Political Thought, 5, 67– 96. Arnold, C., Shapir, E., & de Vries, C. (2012). Parties’ positions on European integration: Issue congruence, ideology or context? West European Politics, 35(6), 1341–1362. Austers, A. (2016). The case of Latvia: Popular Euroscepticism in impasse. In K. Bukovskis (Ed.), Euroscepticism in small EU member-states (pp. 85–107). Latvian Institute for International Affairs. Bozóki, A., & Heged˝ us, D. (2018). An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the European Union. Democratization, 25(7), 1173–1189. Braghiroli, S., & Petsinis, V. (2019). Between party-systems and identity-politics: The populist and radical right in Estonia and Latvia. European Politics and Society, 20(4), 431–449. Brubaker, R. (2017). Between nationalism and civilizationism: The European populist moment in comparative perspective. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40(8), 1191–1226. Bustikova, L. (2018). The radical right in Eastern Europe. In J. Rydgren (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the radical right (pp. 1–22). Oxford University Press. Bustikova, L. (2015). The democratization of hostility: Minorities and radical right actors after the fall of communism. In M. Minkenberg (Ed.), Transforming the transformation (pp. 58–79). Routledge.

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Butkovi´c, H., & Samardzija, V. (2009). Rethinking Euroscepticism: The institutional and policy dimension. In K. Arto & P. Kaniok (Eds.), Euroscepticism and European integration (pp. 195–213). Political Science Research Centre. ˇ Cepo, D. (2017). Breeding ground for croatia’s conservative social movements. In I. Mujanovi´c (Ed.), The democratic potential of emerging social movements in Southeastern Europe (pp. 17–22). Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. ˇ Cipin, I., & Ilieva, N. (2017, November). Coping with demographic decline in Croatia and Bulgaria. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung-Croatia. https://library.fes. de/pdf-files/bueros/kroatien/13814.pdf. Accessed 24 November 2020. Ðuki´c, S. (2015). Serbia’s relations with Russia: An overview of the post-Yugoslav (post-Soviet) era. In J. Mini´c (Ed.), Challenges of Serbia’s foreign policy (collection of papers) (pp. 31–36). Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and European Movement in Serbia. FitzGibbon, J. (2013). Citizens against Europe: Civil society and Eurosceptic protest in Denmark, Ireland and the UK. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(1), 105–121. Guerra, S. (2015). Eurosceptic voices: Beyond party systems, across civil society. In M. Caiani & S. Guerra (Eds.), Euroscepticism, democracy and the media: Communicating Europe, contesting Europe (pp. 21–48). Palgrave Macmillan. Jovanov, D., & Lazar, Ž. (2017). Serbian Orthodoxy between traditional and universal values: Discourse analysis of the journal Orthodoxy. Sociološki Pregled, 51, 135–156. Jovanovi´c, S. (2020). Militant orthodox fringe: Political programs of early 21st century Serbian right-wing organizations. Security Dialogues. https://doi. org/10.47054/SD2010085mj. Accessed 17 November 2020. Kocijan, B., & Kukec, M. (2016). From hard consensus to soft Euroscepticism: Attitudes of Croatian MPs on EU integration. Historical Social Research, 41(4), 38–60. Korhecz, T. (1998). The rights of national minorities in Vojvodina: Legal norms and practice (Unpublished work, pp. 1–23). Kovacs, K., & Scheppele, K. L. (2018). The fragility of an independent judiciary: Lessons from Hungary and Poland—And the European Union. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 51, 189–200. Krzyzanowski, ˙ M. (2017). Discursive shifts in ethno-nationalist politics: On politicization and mediatization of the “refugee crisis” in Poland. Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, 16(1–2), 76–96. Maldini, P., & Paukovi´c, D. (2016). Introduction. In P. Maldini & D. Paukovi´c (Eds.), Croatia and the European Union: Changes and development (pp. 1– 10). Routledge. Noutcheva, G. (2007). Fake, partial and imposed compliance: The limits of the EU’s normative power in the Western Balkans. CEPS Working Documents, No. 274.

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Palonen, E. (2018). Performing the nation: The Janus-faced populist foundations of illiberalism in Hungary. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 26(3), 308–321. Pavlovi´c, S. (2015, March 30). Serbia’s choice: EU membership or eastern promises? Open Democracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europemake-it/srdja-pavlovic/serbia%E2%80%99s-choice-eu-membership-or-easter npromises. Accessed 25 October 2020. Perica, V. (2006). The politics of ambivalence: Europeanization and the Serbian Orthodox Church. In T. A. Byrnes & P. J. Katzenstein (Eds.), Religion in an expanding Europe (pp. 176–203). Cambridge University Press. Petsinis, V. (2012). Minority legislation in two successor states. Baltic Worlds, 1, 31–35. Petsinis, V. (2013). Croatia’s framework for minority rights: New legal prospects within the context of European integration. Ethnopolitics, 12(4), 352–367. Petsinis, V. (2017, June 28). Enter Serbia’s ‘Orbán’? Aleksandar Vuˇci´c and his catch-all politics. Open Democracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/author/ vassilis-petsinis. Accessed 24 November 2020. Petsinis, V. (2020b). Converging or diverging patterns of Euroscepticism among political parties in Croatia and Serbia. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 28(2), 139–152. Petsinis, V. (2020c, July 7). Elections in Croatia: Conservatives retain the parliamentary majority. Open Democracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/ author/vassilis-petsinis. Accessed 20 November 2020. Raos, V. (2016). Transformation of the Croatian party system in the process of EU accession. In P. Maldini & D. Paukovi´c (Eds.), Croatia and the European Union: Changes and development. Routledge. Samardzija, V. (2016). How Eurosceptic is Croatia? In K. Bukovskis (Ed.), Euroscepticism in small EU member-states (pp. 124–143). Latvian Institute for International Affairs. Schwellnus, G. (2009). Anti-discrimination legislation. In R. Bernd (Ed.), Minority rights in Central and Eastern Europe (pp. 32–45). Routledge. Suboti´c, J. (2011). Europe is a state of mind: Identity and Europeanization in the Balkans. International Studies Quarterly, 55, 309–330. Suboti´c, J. (2010). Explaining difficult states: The problems of Europeanization in Serbia. East European Politics and Societies, 24(4), 595–616. Szilard, R. (2014). Regional development in Croatia from the turn of the millennium to EU accession. Regional Statistics, 4(2), 87–105. Tarrow, S. (2010). The strategy of paired comparison: Toward a theory of practice. Comparative Political Studies, 43, 230–259. Tica, J. (2011). Kriza 2008–20XY: Populizam i Puna Zaposlenost kao Sukobljeni Ciljevi. EFZG Working Papers, 5, pp. 1–19. https://hrcak.srce.hr/136805. Accessed 22 November 2020.

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Toplak, J., & Gardaševi´c, D. (2017). Concepts of national and constitutional identity in Croatian Constitutional Law. Review of Central and East European Law. https://doi.org/10.1163/15730352-04204001. Accessed 20 September 2020. Vachudova, M. (2008). Tempered by the EU? Political parties and party systems before and after accession. Journal of European Public Policy, 15(6), 861–879. Vuksanovi´c, V. (2018, July 26). Serbs are not little Russians. The American Interest. https://www.the-american-interest.com. Accessed 25 October 2020. Zakošek, N. (2010). Zauzdani Populizam: Fenomen Milana Bandi´ca. Politiˇcke Analize, 1, 6–10.

Expert Reports, Opinion Polls, Public Surveys, Electoral Results, and Other Statistical Data Centar za Ljudska Prava, CLP. (2005, April). Položaj Nacionalnih Manjina u Republici Hrvatskoj-Zakonodavstvo i Praksa, In T. Erceg (Ed.). European Commission. (2020). Serbia 2020 Progress Report. SWD, 2020. European Commission. (2019). Serbia 2019 Progress Report. SWD, 2019. European Commission. (2018). Serbia 2018 Progress Report. SWD, 2018. European Commission. (2009). Serbia 2009 Progress Report, SEC, 1339. European Commission. (2016). Country Report: Croatia, SWD, 2016. European Commission. (2010). Croatia 2010 Progress Report, SEC, 1326. European Commission. (2009). Croatia 2009 Progress Report, SEC, 1333. European Commission. (2018, Spring). Standard Eurobarometer 89: Latvia. European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE. (2017). Country Report: Croatia (2017 update). Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Serbia. (2016). Studija o Izbeglicama: Srbija 2016. Belgrade. Humanitarian Centre for Integration and Tolerance (HCIT). (2017). Srbija nakon Zatvaranja Balkanske Rute. Novi Sad: HCIT. Humanitarian Centre for Integration and Tolerance (HCIT), Fondacija Ana i Vlade Divac, and USAID. (2017). Koridor Nade (2015–2017). Novi Sad: HCIT. LSEE Research on South Eastern Europe and South East European Studies at Oxford, SEESOX. (2015, March 13). Russia in the Balkans: Conference Report (London School of Economics). Markovi´c-Tomi´c, M. (2016). Mediji i Teme u Vezi Sa Evropskom Integracijom Srbije u Periodu 2002–2016. Belgrade: Government of the Republic of Serbia. UNHCR. (2014, September). Izvestaj sa Istraživanja Javnog Mnenja: Stav Grad-ana Srbije prema Tražiocima Azila. Belgrade: UNHCR and CESID. UNHCR, CRPC, & HCIT. (2018). Between closed borders: Joint agency paper on refugees and migrants in Serbia (2017). Novi Sad: HCIT.

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State, International, Legal, and Party Documents (Electronic and Printed Versions) DP. (2020a). Parlamentarni Izbori 2020: Zašto Što Svoje Volim. Zagreb: Domovinski Pokret. DP. (2020b). Program Delovanja, lipanj 2020. Zagreb: Domovinski Pokret. SNS. (2011). Bela Knjiga Programom Do Promena. Belgrade: SNS. SRS. (2009). Program Srpske Radikalne Stranke. Belgrade: SRS. Živi Zid. (2015). Politiˇcki Program. Zagreb: Živi Zid.

News and Other Informative Sources (Electronic and Printed) Veˇcerniji List, 2002, p. 7: The results of a public survey on the state of interethnic relations in Croatia.

CHAPTER 4

Institutional Politics, Party Politics, and Ethnopolitics: The Cases of Estonia and Latvia

Introduction This chapter explores the intersection between governing institutions and interethnic cleavages and how this shapes party politics in Estonia and Latvia. Specific attention is paid to the populist and radical right-wing party of EKRE (Estonian Conservative People’s Party) in Estonia and the national conservative party of National Alliance (NA) in Latvia. From a broader perspective, this chapter examines how: (a) national conservative, as well as populist and radical right-wing, parties adapt to specific sociocultural settings; (b) political circumstances can provide trajectories towards either the exclusion or inclusion of populist and radical right-wing parties in the governments of certain countries and during certain periods (Braghiroli & Petsinis, 2019, p. 432; Petsinis, 2019a). The primary focus here is cast on identity politics , which can be broadly defined as the ethno-nationalist and nativist prerogatives of the political actors under study. The references to the party-systems of Estonia and Latvia are of a secondary and more ‘instrumental’ importance. The more specific objective here is to examine through a regional (Baltic) angle how parties of these two sub-categories can: (a) selectively appropriate particularistic ethnopolitics from the political cultures of their countries and societies; (b) embed these longer trajectories of ethnopolitics into their narratives on hot-button issues (e.g. immigration and the management of the economy). As stressed in the introduction, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 V. Petsinis, Cross-Regional Ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99951-3_4

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a more systematic cooperation between academic experts in ethnopolitics and academic experts in right-wing populism would enable the latter to formulate new interpretative models about how (right-wing) populist actors anchor their agendas into the pre-existing political cultures of ethno-nationalism. This chapter demonstrates that, since 2011, the Latvian party-system has provided structural opportunities for the inclusion of the NA as a legitimate partner into a sequence of government coalitions. By contrast, Estonia’s mainstream political parties excluded EKRE from the halls of power until 2019, when it was accepted into a government coalition. This divergence also became subject to the different ways that the party-systems of Latvia and Estonia sought to accommodate parties suspected of pro-Russian leanings (Estonia: Centre Party/Eesti Keskerakond; Latvia: Harmony/Saskana). ¸ Whereas the Latvian party-system hints at a state of continuity in its relations with ‘unreliable’ (or ‘undesirable’) parties, a greater flexibility and/or ‘situational adaptability’ can be observed in Estonia. More importantly, this chapter illustrates that the socio-psychological campaigns of EKRE and the NA focusing on the refugee crisis and immigration tend to interlink these two policymaking areas with collective memories of ‘colonisation’ under the Soviets and the collective anxieties of becoming ‘colonised’ again by new groups of migrants. The timeframe of this chapter concentrates on the evolution of institutional and party politics in Estonia and Latvia from 2010 until the present day (with a stress on the period since 2015) and references to earlier stages where deemed necessary. With regard to Estonia, this chapter does not cover the period after the official dissolution of the previous government (formed in April 2019 and consisting of EKRE, the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union/Isamaa party, and the Centre Party as the core partner) on 13 January 2021.1 This chapter has been organised according to the pattern of a paired comparison (Tarrow, 2010). This comparison is anchored in a qualitative

1 This coalition was dissolved on the basis of corruption charges. For further infor-

mation on this issue, see: https://estonianworld.com/security/a-political-crisis-in-est onia-prime-minister-juri-ratas-resigns/?fbclid=IwAR2WqmbF8fJFP458Y9zB1YEWB1He F4M5xbQsCYlzhvH_al4HIkRgBkFXMhM. Accessed 21 January 2021; https://news.err. ee/1608072376/q-a-estonia-s-government-has-resigned-what-happens-next. Accessed 22 January 2021.

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and content analysis (Hermann, 2008; Schreier, 2012) of EKRE’s and the NA’s political programmes and other party documents (e.g. electoral manifestos) as well as official statements and declarations. Additionally, a set of elite and expert interviews with prominent affiliates of EKRE and the NA, as well as locally based political scientists and other academic researchers with a specialisation in the thematic areas of ethnopolitics (right-wing) populism, and Estonian/Latvian party politics (conducted between 2016 and 2018). Quantitative sources such as public surveys and opinion polls have been of complementary importance. In addition to the academic literature, this chapter has also relied on selected articles from the Estonian, Latvian, and international press. Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, this chapter introduces the concepts of ‘alien rule’, ‘colonisation’, and ‘decolonisation’ with a focus on the restoration nationalisms of Estonia and Latvia.

Narratives of ‘Alien Rule’, ‘Colonisation’, and ‘Decolonisation’ in Estonia and Latvia: A Conceptual and Contextual Overview In accordance to Michael Hechter, ‘at the most basic level, alien rule exists whenever one or more culturally distinct groups are governed by individuals of a different cultural group…this encompasses the legally distinct situations of colonialism, foreign occupation and multi-ethnic states composed of some nations whose members consider their rulers to be alien’ (Hechter, 2009, p. 290). Alien rule contains an intrinsic controversy between governance and cultural distinctiveness which started becoming increasingly relevant after the emergence of the norm of national selfdetermination (ibid., pp. 290 and 292). According to the same author, cultural distinctiveness renders the acquisition of legitimacy (by the alien rulers over the ruled) a particularly hard task, especially on those occasions when the subordinate societies are culturally homogeneous (ibid., p. 291). Colonialism has been associated with the alien rule and extraction of material wealth from overseas dominions for the benefit of European powers. Colonisation as a process may also address: ‘the transfer of communities who sought to maintain the allegiance to their own original culture, while seeking a better life in economic, religious, or political terms’ (Young, 2001, p. 20). In this light, there is an equal stress on the

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settlement of certain groups of people in new territories and their rule over the indigenous population. Frantz Fanon elaborates the sociocultural and socio-psychological dynamics of colonisation and places into context how one of its major objectives is to alienate the colonised subject from its past. In accordance to Fanon, a complementary function of colonisation is to: ‘turn its attention into the past of the colonised people and distort it, disfigure it and destroy it…convince the indigenous population that it would save them from darkness’ (Fanon, 2004, p. 149). With specific regard to the Baltic States, there has been a debate among modern historians and social scientists over whether their annexation into the Soviet Union by Stalin (1940) paved the way to colonial rule or whether it only constituted an act of military occupation and, subsequently, political dominance. This ongoing dispute did not obstruct the emergence of academic treatises which tend to equate the historical experience of the Baltic States under the Soviets with colonial rule. In accordance to David Chioni Moore, ‘(imperial) Russia and the successor Soviet Union exercised colonial control over the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Baltics, and Central and Eastern Europe for anywhere between 50 and 200 years’ (Moore, 2001, p. 111). On the Estonian case, Epp Annus sketches out three occasions when military occupation can combine (or not) with colonisation. These are: (a) a temporary military occupation of a territory not accompanied by new settlements or continuing subordination; (b) a military occupation accompanied by exploitation of natural resources but without the significant establishment of settlers’ colonies (e.g. the British rule in India); (c) a military occupation accompanied by the settlement of new inhabitants into the area and the exploitation of local resources, such as the French rule of Algeria (Annus, 2012, p. 31). In spite of the tangible differences with the overseas dominions of Western colonial powers, Annus contends that the case of Estonia under Soviet rule largely matches the third pattern (ibid.).2 In regard to the sociocultural dimension (and along a comparable line to Fanon), Kalev Kukk argues that the Soviet era in Estonia

2 Annus also singles out the following aspects which differentiate Soviet colonisation in

Estonia from the Western colonisation of overseas dominions: (a) Estonia’s legal status as a federated republic within the Soviet Union; (b) the lack of geographic distance between the colonised subject and the colonising agent; (c) the fact that the Estonians and the other two Baltic nations had already attained their national consciousness by the time of the Soviet annexation (Annus 2012, pp. 32–35).

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featured the essential features of colonial rule such as: (a) the liquidation of earlier economic structure; (b) the establishment of a production structure corresponding to alien interests; (c) migration and employment policies directed towards the assimilation of the indigenous population (Kukk, 1991, p. 8). One central actor in Estonia’s post-Soviet nationbuilding is the Soviet era settlers who often came to be depicted en masse (in the domestic ‘decolonisation’ narratives) as ‘the coloniser’ (Peiker, 2016, p. 114; Petsinis, 2019a, p. 216).3 In Latvia, a series of academic treatises have centred on the country’s historical experience during and after Soviet ‘colonial rule’ (Kelertas, 2006; Racevskis, 1998; Vardys, 1964; Veinberg, 2017). As in Estonia, these domestic treatises converge on the centrality of ‘Russification’ as a multifaceted process which resulted in the imposition of Russian political and socioeconomic interests, as well as linguistic and sociocultural trends (Chatterjee, 1995, p. 165). More emphatically, Karl Jirgens judges that: ‘the Baltic States are eminently suited for post-colonial analysis due to their collective stories, which feature roughly one millennium of recurring colonial activity’ (Jirgens, 2006, p. 45). In all of this, a distinctive difference between the treatises studying the historical experiences of the overseas dominions of Western colonial powers and those focusing on Latvia and Estonia consists in that, within the latter contexts, ‘the colonisers were not forced to flee or to recognise the fact that they were colonisers’ (Rudzitis, 2004; Veinberg, 2017, p. 3).4 On the levels of institutional politics and public administration, the overriding necessity to restore the interwar republics and ‘decolonise’ the respective societies functioned as a key catalyst which prompted the implementation of the ethnic democracy model in post-Soviet Estonia and Latvia. The removal of any visible vestiges of the Soviet past and

3 As a long-term consequence of the planned migration project, the Russian-speaking population in Estonia grew from 23,000 people in 1945 to 475,000 in 1991 (Chinn & Kaiser, 1996, p. 97). These Russian-speaking settlers originated from various parts of the Soviet Union. 4 In 1989, ethnic Russians made up 34% of Latvia’s population and amounted to a total figure of 905,000. In comparison with the demographic situation during the pre-war era, the planned migration project undertaken by the Soviets increased the number of ethnic Russians by 4.5 times and the share of the ethnic Russian community in Latvia’s population by 3.5 times. On this data, see: https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/pol icy/society-integration/integration-policy-in-latvia-a-multi-faceted-approach/ethnic-struct ure-and-promotion-of-national-minorities-cultural-identity. Accessed 19 January 2020.

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the construction of a firmer continuity between the interwar and the contemporary Estonian and Latvian statehoods emerged as a paramount necessity as early as 1991. On the level of economic administration, even the neoliberal consensus on privatisation (1990s) came to be viewed as a vehicle to enable the Estonian nation to ‘decolonise’ themselves from communist era planning and reassume full control over the management of the country’s economy (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2009, pp. 9–11; Peiker, 2016, p. 121). In addition to domestic ethnopolitics, within the contexts of post-Soviet Latvia and Estonia, the ethnic democracy model has additionally been legitimised as part of the endeavour to guarantee the continuous survival of the titular nations in the light of Russia’s disproportional leverage as the external homeland for ethnic Russians (Ijabs, 2016, pp. 13–15; Petsinis, 2019a, p. 112). Meanwhile, a simultaneous, ‘bottom-up’ process on the sociocultural level encapsulated the departure from state Socialism not solely as a policy issue of ‘transition’ but as the emergence of a brand new cultural formation which underpinned these political processes—namely, the ‘culture of transition’ (Hladik, 2013; Veinberg, 2017, p. 3). This conceptual overview is necessary in order to efficiently contextualise how the sociopsychological campaigns of EKRE and NA have endeavoured to connect collective memories of the Soviet ‘colonial’ experience with the collective anxieties over a prospective, new ‘colonisation’ of Estonia and Latvia.

EKRE and NA: Ideological Foundations, Trajectories of Evolution, and Primary Areas of Concern The Bauska Declaration (2013): Establishing Ideological Pillars On 28 August 2013, EKRE, NA, and their Lithuanian partners the Nationalists Union (Tautininku˛ Sajunga) signed the Bauska Declaration in the town of Bauska, in southern Latvia (EKRE, 2013).5 This document set up a framework of cooperation among the parties and consolidated their ideology and values inside the context of a ‘Baltic national conservative and populist and radical right-wing international’ (Braghiroli & Petsinis, 2019, p. 434). In the preamble, the co-signatories reject ‘any 5 A full text-version of the Bauska Declaration in English can be found at: http://tau tininkas.blogspot.com.ee/. Accessed 22 March 2020.

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attempt to absorb our independent nation states by any kind of European Super State’ (ibid.). The three partners denunciate the impact of ‘the looming ideas of cultural Marxism, postmodern multiculturalism and destructive liberalism’ across Europe and stress that ‘our honour and love for our homelands will not let us walk the path of cosmopolitanism’. Further along the text, the three signatories call for ‘a new national awakening’ and pledge to convey and spread ‘the positive meaning of nationalism’ through ‘national education and creative culture’ (ibid.). The requirement to repair the damage and reverse the trauma inflicted on the Baltic nations during the Soviet era forms another major component of the Bauska Declaration (Petsinis, 2019a, p. 223). In particular, the document demands ‘compensations for the occupation by the Soviet communist regime and acknowledgement of the occupation (by Russia)’ (ibid.). This is coupled with references to the necessity to prevent ‘any violation of our sovereignty and any external intrusions to our domestic affairs’. In regard to immigration, the Bauska Declaration summarises the co-signatories’ main standpoints in a succinct, yet comprehensive, manner as follows: ‘We see the immigration policies of Western Europe as a warning example. The demographic situation in our countries does not allow any new massive immigration into our lands’ (ibid.). The central standpoints of this document comprise of some of the universal premises shared by several other national conservative, populist, and radical right-wing parties across Europe such as: (a) Euroscepticism and the primacy of the nation state as the ultimate repository of political sovereignty; (b) nativism and anti-immigration; (c) opposition to (perceived) manifestations of ‘cultural Marxism’ as the alleged driving force behind sociological globalisation. However, the ethno-nationalist component of the Bauska Declaration remains firmly subject to the concept of restoration nationalism in the Baltic States and its idiosyncratic particularities. EKRE: Formation and Early Stages EKRE was founded in 2012 as the evolution of a merger between the formerly centre-right/conservative People’s Union of Estonia/Eestimaa

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Table 4.1 The results of the Estonian parliamentary elections (1 March 2015)

Political parties

Percentages and seats at the Riigikogu

Reform Party Centre Party SDE Isamaa Free Party EKRE

27.7% and 30 seats 24.8% and 27 seats 15.2% and 15 seats 13.7% and 14 seats 8.7% and 8 seats 8.1% and 7 seats

Source: Riigikogu Valimised 2015. http://rk2015.vvk.ee/. Accessed 4 May 2021

Rahvaliit 6 and the more nationalistic and Eurosceptic pressure-group Estonian Patriotic Movement/Eesti Rahvuslik Liikumine. In 2011, the remainder of the People’s Union commenced talks with the Estonian Patriotic Movement which also comprised EKRE’s current chairman, Martin Helme. By that time, Mart Helme’s (Martin’s father, EKRE’s founder and long-time chairman between 2013 and 2020) nationalist faction had taken over the People’s Union. In EKRE’s founding declaration (proclaimed in the central Estonian town of Põltsamaa on 24 March 2012), the leadership of the new party vowed to protect the national interest, preserve Estonian traditions, and ‘…offer a viable alternative to the voters who are sick of the forced choice between Andrus Ansip (former leader of the centre-right liberal Reform Party/Reformierakond) and Edgar Savisaar (former leader of the, nominally centrist/centreleft, Centre Party), East and West, left and right’ (Petsinis, 2019a, p. 217).7 The party delivered a satisfactory performance in the 2015 elections garnering 8.1% of the vote and 7 seats at the Riigikogu (Estonia’s national parliament). In the parliamentary elections of March 2019, EKRE increased its percentage to 17.8% and won 19 seats, making it the third largest party (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). EKRE was structured along the lines of an oligarchic party with the decision-making powers vested on the present chairman, Martin Helme, Mart Helme, and their close associates. Early EKRE embedded itself into 6 The People’s Union of Estonia was a partner in the large electoral coalition (the Estonian Coalition Union) during the second legislature (1995–1999) and then again between 2003 and 2007. 7 For this statement, Accessed 10 January 2020.

see:

http://www.delfi.ee/archive/print.php?id=64124549.

4

Table 4.2 The results of the Estonian parliamentary elections (3 March 2019)

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Political parties

Percentages and seats at the Riigikogu

Reform Party Centre Party EKRE Isamaa SDE

28.9% and 34 seats 23.1% and 26 seats 17.8% and 19 seats 11.4% and 12 seats 9.8% and 10 seats

Source: Riigikogu Valimised 2019. https://rk2019.valimised.ee/en/ election-result/election-result.html. Accessed 4 May 2021

the pre-existing structure of the People’s Union and inherited this party’s predominantly rural electorate (ibid., p. 218).8 Although already keen on mobilising its popular bases of support and coordinating various public manifestations (e.g. the torchlight parades for Estonia’s Independence Day on 24 February in Tallinn), EKRE could not boast a longstanding tradition of grass-roots activism during its early stages. Therefore, EKRE largely operated as a ‘cadre’ party that had evolved out of a reformation process of the People’s Union. Estonia’s political circumstances provided the opportunity structure for the emergence of a new populist and radical right-wing party. Until then, the far-right end of the party spectrum was occupied by the Estonian Independence Party/Eesti Iseseisvuspartei (EIP). This party never managed to win more than 0.5% of the vote, as result of its extremist profile and the unrealistic conceptualisation of Estonia as a ‘neo-autarkic geopolitical space’ between the EU and Russia (Ehin, 2002/2003; Mikkel & Kasekamp, 2008; Petsinis, 2019a, p. 218). In addition to inheriting the pre-existing electoral base of the People’s Union, EKRE swiftly filled the political gap which existed as a consequence of Isamaa’s transformation from a vocally nationalist actor with a highly apprehensive outlook on the ethnic Russian minority into a ‘moderately nationalist’ party of the centre-right during the 2010s (Bennich-Björkmann, 2012, pp. 8–9; Sikk, 2006, p. 43).

8 EKRE incorporated the predominantly rural electorate in the southern and western districts who used to vote for the People’s Union of Estonia in the past. In the 2015 elections, EKRE was the third strongest party in the western district of Pärnumaa. On this issue, see: http://rk2015.vvk.ee/voting-results-12.html. Accessed 11 January 2020.

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The participation of the Estonian Patriotic Movement in EKRE infused the party with a youthful element which gradually enhanced its mobilisation potential and projected a more ‘realistic’ variant of Euroscepticism in comparison to the one previously espoused by EIP (Petsinis, 2019a, p. 218). In the longer run, the Estonian Patriotic Movement undertook a principally coordinating role towards: (a) structuring EKRE as a brand new party with a vocally anti-establishment orientation; (b) severing any apparent links to the People’s Union as an ‘old’ party that also formed part of the (‘corrupt’) establishment. In Martin Helme’s words: ‘a sequence of leaderships in the People’s Union had been involved in corruption scandals…the “real” history of EKRE commences in 2012 when the People’s Union merged with the Estonian Patriotic Movement…we called for a decisive break from the corrupt past and demanded that a brand new party with a new name and a new political platform is set up’ (ibid.).9 According to the political scientist Siim Trumm, anti-immigration and Euroscepticism were not of pivotal importance behind the public’s support for EKRE in the parliamentary elections of 2015 (Trumm, 2018, p. 11). Instead, Trumm contends that the party’s anti-establishment rhetoric and social conservatism had been crucial in boosting its popularity in the early stages (ibid., pp. 10–11; Auers & Kasekamp, 2015, p. 146). Nevertheless, as illustrated in greater detail later in this chapter, the elaborate combination of ethno-nationalist and nativist principles in EKRE’s speech and political practice played a decisive part in augmenting the party’s public appeal between 2015 and 2019. EKRE’s Core Principles: A Populist and Radical Right-Wing Party That Operates in Estonia The systemisation of anti-establishment speech makes up one of the most ‘essentially’ populist components in EKRE’s engagement into politics (Petsinis, 2019a, pp. 218–219). In 2012, the party’s ‘Conservative Manifesto’ contended that: ‘the current state of political affairs in Estonia favours the interests of specific segments within the society in a one-sided manner’ and that it is characterised by an ‘excessive, often undemocratic, centralisation of power with no independent vision of development’

9 Interview with the chairman of EKRE (12 October 2016, Tallinn).

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(Konservatiivne Manifest, 2012). EKRE’s leadership also perceives institutions such as the mainstream media as part of the establishment. As Martin Helme remarked in 2016: ‘Estonian state media are always loyal to the government and this provides them with an additional incentive to depict EKRE in a negative light…the accusations of “racism” that they often levy against us mean little to the Estonian people’ (Petsinis, 2019a, p. 219).10 In 2019, the party’s platform for the parliamentary elections reiterated these prerogatives with an additional stress on ‘the right of popular initiative to hold binding referendums’ and ‘direct instruments for making political decisions’ as well as a pledge to ‘restrict the arbitrariness of the bodies of public administration’ (Riigikogu, 2019). Since 2012, EKRE has been entrenching its anti-establishment campaign into: (a) the absence of a long-term consensus in Estonian party politics, as manifested in the fragility of government coalitions during the 2000s and 2010s11 ; (b) the indictments of high profile politicians with corruption charges (e.g. Edgar Savisaar during his tenure as Tallinn mayor between 2007 and 2015).12 As Braghiroli and Petsinis (2019, p. 437) put it, ‘the party-leadership has fashioned EKRE as a “modern” party (of the populist and radical right) that can address and capitalise on a wide array of timely themes such as: (a) instances of inconsistency and political corruption on the behalf of mainstream parties13 ; (b) any possible manifestations of latent Euroscepticism within society; (c) environmental concerns (e.g. opposition to the Rail Baltica project14 )’. Euroscepticism forms another key component of EKRE’s engagement into politics and comprises three dimensions: economic, sociocultural, 10 Ibid. 11 On the

dissolution of the government coalition consisting of the Reform Party, the Social Democrat Party/SDE and Isamaa in November 2016, see: http://news.err.ee/v/news/952dcb2e-bb26-4c32-a87a-0a4f073fec01/governmentfalls-as-social-democrats-and-irl-leave-coalition. Accessed 10 January 2021. 12 On this issue, see: http://news.err.ee/v/politics/2b68a0b6-7636-4070-8389-f97 51d5874a4/savisaar-suspended-from-mayors-office. Accessed 10 January 2021. 13 In accordance to an academic expert on Estonian party politics, EKRE (as soon as it entered the Riigikogu in 2015) operated as ‘the only real opposition party in Estonia at the moment (spring-summer 2016), adopting staunchly anti-systemic speech’ (Interview with a professor in Estonian party politics; 8 June 2016, Tallinn). 14 This is a large, EU-funded, infrastructural project with the aim to connect the Baltic States with Central Europe via railway. About the Rail Baltica project, see: https://www. railbaltica.org/. Accessed 20 February 2021.

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and geopolitical. The party’s economic Euroscepticism is interwoven with financial protectionism and demands: (a) the taxation of tax-free foreign capital (Riigikogu, 2015); (b) restrictions on the sale of land and forests to foreign persons and legal entities (Riigikogu, 2019).15 Meanwhile, EKRE’s sociocultural Euroscepticism revolves around the party’s opposition to the EU’s guidelines for the rights of sexual minorities and to Estonia’s Cohabitation Act of 2016.16 For the purposes of this monograph, primary attention is paid to the geopolitical dimension. One might argue that the embryonic origins of geopolitical Euroscepticism in Estonian society should be traced as early as the 1990s and the accession process to the EU (Petsinis & Wierenga, 2021, p. 6). During that time, a series of public surveys detected that certain segments of the respondents prioritised Estonia’s membership of NATO (on the basis of security concerns vis-à-vis Russia) over the country’s accession to the EU (Aalto, 2003, p. 26; Kuus, 2002, p. 98; Pettai, 2005). The geopolitical component of EKRE’s Euroscepticism appears to have relied on this longer trajectory, concretised it, and updated it in accordance to present circumstances. Correspondingly, EKRE argue that the core states of the EU allegedly underestimate the security threat which Russia represents for the Baltic States. The party has contended that by contrast to (former President) Toomas Hendrik Ilves’ expectations, membership of the EU did not enhance Estonia’s security status vis-à-vis Russia (Eurovalimiste Platvorm, 2014). Moreover, EKRE has expressed its discontent towards Germany’s alleged apathy in the light of Russian aggression and to its ongoing cooperation with Moscow in energy issues (Petsinis & Wierenga, 2021, p. 6). In its platform for the 2019 European parliamentary elections, the party watered down the tone of its geopolitical Euroscepticism, yet it urged the EU to firmly align with NATO’s defence doctrine and not to create ‘unilateral defence structures’ (e.g. the European Security Union) that might weaken the military capacity of the Alliance (Eurovalimiste Platvorm 2019, Point 7). 15 These prerogatives are in accordance with those of the Bauska Declaration where it is decreed that: ‘the independence of our economies is to be just as important as our political independence…we are ready to combat the foreign financial influence in our countries and we see only Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian capital as a basis of our national prosperity’. 16 In its ‘Conservative Programme’ (2015), EKRE vows to uphold ‘Christian family values and the traditional family model which consists of a father, mother, and children’ (‘Perekond’ section).

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EKRE’s prerogatives on citizenship and immigration are structured in such a way as to interlink these two policymaking areas with the necessity to prolong the securitisation of Estonian-Russian relations and the adoption of a stricter law and order approach. Although regarding Estonia’s ethnic Russian minority as an essentially migrant community, EKRE does not object to the naturalisation process of ethnic Russian ‘stateless’ persons (Konservatiivne Program, 2015: ‘Kodanik ja Kodanikuühiskond’ section). However, naturalised individuals must give up any previous nationality and possess solely Estonian citizenship (ibid.; Petsinis, 2019a, pp. 220–221). In regards to immigration, EKRE’s programme specifies that ‘a fixed immigration quota must be set and a thoughtful action plan that ensures the fast integration of immigrants into Estonian society and culture must be implemented’ (Konservatiivne Program, 2015: Kodanik ja Kodanikuühiskond’ section). The linkage between immigration policy and a law and order approach becomes particularly manifest in the following excerpt: ‘the residence permits of foreign nationals involved in hostile activities against Estonia must be repealed…the state can take over repatriation costs to the countries of origin, in cooperation with international organisations, if required’ (ibid.).17 EKRE’s ‘Conservative Programme’ was authored prior to the escalation of the migration crisis since the second half of 2015. This means that these programmatic prerogatives on immigration alone would not suffice for the party to address the complex realities of the new state of affairs across Europe. Consequently, between 2015 and 2019, EKRE: (a) intensified and systematised the mobilisation of its popular bases of support against the impending ‘re-colonisation’ and the threat of ‘Islamisation’; (b) anchored the opposition to the EU’s quota arrangement for the redistribution of refugees more firmly into the colonisation and ‘decolonisation’ narratives of Estonian nationalism, as part of a socio-psychological strategy. NA: Formation Process and Early Stages Along comparable lines to EKRE, the NA evolved between the TB/LNNK (‘For Fatherland and National Independent Movement’) and the ‘All Latviai!) parties. The two partners initially formed

out of the merger Freedom’/‘Latvian for Latvia!’ (Visu a coalition for the

17 The party’s platform for the parliamentary elections of 2019 reiterates the clause ‘to expel foreign citizens involved in activities hostile to the Estonian state’ (Riigikogu, 2019).

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parliamentary elections of 2010, and the official merger was completed on 23 July 2011.18 Established as TB/LNNK in 1997, this party had participated in almost every government coalition since 1995—first as TB and LNNK separately, then also after their fusion into TB/LNNK.19 Throughout the 1990s, TB/LNNK vocally objected to the acceleration of the naturalisation process of (mostly ethnic Russian) ‘stateless’ persons as well as to the external pressures from the High Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE) for the relaxation of citizenship laws—albeit not seriously obstructing Latvia’s accession to the EU (Kelley, 2004, pp. 83–84; Petsinis, 2020, p. 116). At a first glance, the formation process of NA (just as that of EKRE) largely conforms to the prototype of a ‘cadre party’ that came into being after the unification of two pre-existing entities. Nevertheless, by contrast to the locus of the Estonian Patriotic Movement in early EKRE, the ‘All for Latvia!’ component of NA could already boast a long tradition of grass-roots activism.20 According to Auers and Kasekamp (2013, p. 75), ‘All for Latvia!’ ‘ticks all the necessary boxes for a modern radical right populist party. It has followed the rhetorical master frame of the radical right and has a charismatic leader in Raivis Dzintars, the founder and driving force behind “All for Latvia!”’. The participation of ‘All for Latvia!’ inside the NA endowed the new party with a more youthful and dynamic impetus which revitalised the more senior cohort originating from TB/LNNK (ibid.). By contrast to the ultimate fusion of the People’s Union and the Estonian Patriotic Movement into a centralised and vertically structured party in the case of EKRE, TB/LNNK and ‘All for Latvia!’ maintained their organisational autonomy. Consequently, the NA was set up as a horizontally arranged and devolved party, led by two vice-chairmen who represent each of the two constituent entities.21 18 This electoral alliance was prompted by the decision of the (predominantly centrist/centre-right) electoral coalition under the designation of ‘Unity’ not to admit any of the two parties. On this issue, see: https://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/ 29032/. Accessed 28 January 2021. 19 The core component of the party (TB/‘For Fatherland and Freedom’) was formed

on 1 February 1993 and merged with the smaller LNNK/‘Latvian National Independent Movement’ on 21 June 1997. 20 ‘All for Latvia!’ was officially launched on 14 January 2006 but the party traces its early origins back in 2000. On this issue, see: https://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/val odas/history-of-all-for-latvia-visu-latvijai/. Accessed 1 February 2021. 21 Interview with the Secretary General of the NA (13 October 2017, Riga).

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Table 4.3 The results of the Latvian parliamentary elections (17 September 2011)

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Political parties

Percentages and seats at the Saeima

Harmony Reform Party Unity NA ZZS

28.62% 21.01% 19.00% 14.01% 12.33%

and and and and and

31 22 20 14 13

seats seats seats seats seats

Source https://www.cvk.lv/en/elections/saeima-elections/11th-sae ima-elections. Accessed 4 May 2021

Furthermore, along comparable lines to EKRE, the NA gradually built its electoral strongholds in the more ethnically homogeneous (Latvian) constituencies in Vidzeme (the northern part of the country), Zemgale (central-western Latvia), and Riga.22 Conversely, the party has not been a particularly popular option in more ethnically diverse constituencies (e.g. the region of Latgale in the southeast) or in the predominantly Russianspeaking settlements such as the border town of Daugavpils.23 As early as 2011, the NA succeeded in appealing to the more nationalist and socially conservative segments of the Latvian electorate. The same segments did not feel content with the neoliberal measures espoused by the core partner in Latvia’s government coalitions since 2011 (the centre-right Unity24 party) and were attracted by the package of welfare provisions clustered under the NA’s ‘demographic policies’.25 Correspondingly, the NA won 14.01% of the vote (14 seats) in the parliamentary elections of 2011, increased its share of the vote to 16.6% (17 seats) in 2014, but dropped to 11.01% (12 seats) in 2018 (Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5).26

22 Interview with a NA MP at the Latvian Saeima and the European parliament (13 October 2017, Riga); Interview with a professor in Latvian party politics at Latvia University (28 July 2017, Riga). 23 Interview with a NA MP at the Latvian Saeima and the European parliament (13 October 2017, Riga); Interview with the Vice-Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Daugavpils University (23 October 2017, Daugavpils). 24 Since 2018, this party’s official designation is ‘New Unity’ (Jaun¯ a Vienot¯ıba). 25 Interview with a professor in Latvian party politics at Latvia University (28 July

2017, Riga). 26 There have been speculations that the (broadly anti-establishment) ‘Who Owns the State?’/KPV LV party (with its social welfare platform considered ‘antagonistic’ to NA) claimed a considerable chunk of the vote from the latter party in 2018 (Petsinis, 2019b).

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Table 4.4 The results of the Latvian parliamentary elections (4 October 2014)

Political parties

Percentages and seats at the Saeima

Harmony Unity ZZS NA NSL LRA

23.15% and 24 seats 22.01% and 23 seats 19.66% and 21 seats 16.72% and 17 seats 6.90% and 7 seats 6.71% and 8 seats

Source: 12th Saeima Elections. http://sv2014.cvk.lv/index_rez.html? lang=1. Accessed 4 May 2021

Table 4.5 The results of the Latvian parliamentary elections (6 October 2018)

Political parties

Percentages and seats at the Saeima

Harmony KPV LV JKP Development/For! NA ZZS New Unity

19.92% and 23 seats 14.33% and 16 seats 13.59% and 16 seats 12.04% and 13 seats 11.01% and 13 seats 9.91% and 11 seats 6.69% and 8 seats

Source: BALSIS 2018. https://sv2018.cvk.lv/pub/ElectionResults. Accessed 4 May 2021

The NA’s Core Principles: A National Conservative Party That Operates in Latvia Ethno-nationalism forms one of the essential components in NA’s programmatic principles as well as its political practice. In its ‘Extensive Programme for the 13th Saeima (Latvian national assembly)’ in 2018, the party summarises its core political values as follows: ‘…the Latvian nation, language and culture, honour and remembrance of heroes, independence and growth of Latvia’ (NA, 2018a, p. 1). The NA calls for the enhancement of: ‘…spiritual continuation of the Latvian people - strengthening the Latvian language, culture, collective memory and sense of belonging’ (ibid.). Further along the same text, it is clarified that: ‘maintaining the national culture and Latvian language is a crucial priority for the country’s growth and an essential precondition for a cohesive society’ (ibid., p. 110).

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Together with the preservation of Latvian language and culture, the party leadership has set demographic issues as a primary area of concern. NA interlinks ‘demographic issues’ with national survival and firmly embeds this policy area into the party’s ethno-nationalist agenda.27 Consequently, two areas of paramount significance for NA are to: (a) facilitate an increase in the proportion of (ethnic) Latvians in Latvia; (b) boost the birth-rate (NA, 2018a, p. 1; NA, 2018b). The party commits to ‘remove all obstacles to remigration (bureaucratic and practical), thus enabling more people to return and shape their lives in Latvia’ (NA, 2018a, p. 6).28 With regard to the naturalisation process of ‘stateless persons’, throughout 2017, NA systematically contested the Saeima’s proposal for the ‘automatic’ provision of Latvian citizenship to the children born to ‘stateless’ ethnic Russian families (without the necessary assent of one of the two parents).29 Finally, a compromise was reached and the new law (valid from 1 January 2020) grants automatic citizenship to children of non-citizens unless the parents opt for another nationality.30 The NA interlinks the management of ethnic relations inside Latvia with state security and, in a similar fashion as EKRE, insists on upgrading Latvia’s security status vis-à-vis Russia. In order to safeguard state sovereignty (domestically and externally) the NA pledges to: (a) prevent ‘pro-Russian forces’ (namely, the Harmony party) from entering the government (NA, 2018b); (b) upgrade the national defence forces under the auspices of NATO. The party advocates for an increase in military spending; the permanent presence of NATO international troops in Latvia; and the reinstatement of compulsory military service, as well as the more efficient cooperation between civic-military units (e.g. the

27 Interview with the Secretary General of NA (13 October 2017, Riga); Interview with a NA MP at the Latvian Saeima and the European parliament (13 October 2017, Riga). 28 Nevertheless, there also exist allegations that certain NA-affiliates dubbed Latvians who emigrated abroad during the country’s economic recession (2007–2009) ‘deserters who did not want to contribute towards rebuilding Latvia under economic crisis’ (Interview with a professor in Latvian party politics at Latvia University; 28 July 2017, Riga). 29 Interview with a NA MP at the Latvian Saeima and the European parliament (13 October 2017, Riga). 30 For more on this issue, see: https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/latviatakes-important-step-toward-eliminating-child-statelessness. Accessed 1 February 2021.

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Latvian National Guard) and the armed forces (NA, 2018a, pp. 87–90; NA, 2018b; Petsinis & Wierenga, 2021, pp. 7–8). In accordance with the clause of the Bauska Declaration for the promotion of ‘national education and creative culture’, the NA prioritises the dominant status of the Latvian language in the public sector, with a major emphasis on education. In Edv¯ıns Šnore’s words, ‘the Stalin era introduced an additional long-term social pathology to Latvia: the segregated educational system. Since then, ethnic Russians have been opting for Russian-language schools whereas Latvians for Latvian-language ones. This turned out to be detrimental for social integration and cohesion’.31 At this point, attention also needs to be paid to Latvia’s sociocultural specificities and the ways that they shape the ethno-nationalist component of the NA’s rhetoric. As result of the dense concentration of Russian-speakers in the Latvian capital of Riga and the frequent economic transactions with Russia (also, Belarus and Ukraine), adequate command of the Russian language has informally become a prerequisite for business entrepreneurship.32 Therefore, the NA additionally legitimises its project for a unified educational system, with Latvian as the sole language of instruction, as part of the necessity to ‘protect Latvian youth against discrimination in the labour market due to their lack of knowledge of Russian’ (NA, 2018b). Correspondingly, throughout 2017 and 2018, the party championed demands for reform towards the further centralisation of the educational system and the consolidation of the preponderant status of the Latvian language.33 In regard to the media, Raivis Zelt¯ıts assesses that: ‘Russia’s information war (via the Russian state media) does affect identity perceptions among the ethnic Russian community… If you take into consideration the ‘Bronze Soldier’ incidents in Estonia (2007), the Kremlin has been very

31 Interview with a NA MP at the Latvian Saeima and the European parliament (13 October 2017, Riga). 32 Interview with a professor in public administration at Latvia University (10 August 2017, Riga). 33 Finally, a compromise was reached and while the educational reform subscribed to the institutional primacy of the Latvian language, it still acknowledged ‘the right of ethnic minority students to continue study of their language, literature, and cultural subjects in their family language’. On this issue, see: https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/ eurydice/content/national-reforms-school-education-34_en. Accessed 28 January 2021.

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successful in mobilising their support-bases in the Baltic States and elsewhere within the post-Soviet space (e.g. Ukraine)’.34 Consequently, the NA objects to the arrangement of a Russian-language information sector under the auspices of the Latvian national information agency because: ‘…for the proponents of the “Russian World” concept, any media in the Russian language can become subject to infiltration, regardless of their owner or administrator’.35 Instead, the party insists on increasing the finances for a centralised, state-run, media sector broadcasting solely in Latvian as the safest trajectory towards countering Russian ‘information warfare’ (NA, 2018a, pp. 25–26). In a similar vein to EKRE, the NA’s Euroscepticism comprises an economic as well as a geopolitical dimension.36 The party equally combines its Euroscepticism with financial protectionism and assesses that: ‘the situation allowed by the current regulatory enactments, which allows foreigners to have full control over critical objects of Latvia - ports, roads, railways and aviation companies - should be reviewed’ (NA, 2018a, p. 68).37 However, primary attention needs to be paid to geopolitical Euroscepticism. Just as EKRE in Estonia, the NA has been capitalising on the longer trajectory of geopolitical anxieties and the ensuing prioritisation of Latvia’s membership of NATO among a considerable percentage of Latvian citizens (Austers, 2016, p. 102). Therefore, the NA’s affiliates have regularly voiced their scepticism over the extent to which EU 34 Interview with the Secretary General of the NA (13 October 2017, Riga). 35 Interview with a NA MP at the Latvian Saeima and the European parliament (13

October 2017, Riga). 36 The sociocultural strain of NA’s Euroscepticism is feebler in comparison to that of EKRE. However, a certain faction within the party (mainly originating from ‘All for Latvia!’) has advocated for a revival of the so-called Intermarium project as ‘the heart of true Europe’ that can project a joint bulwark ‘not only against Putin’s “neo-Bolshevism” encroaching from Moscow, but also against the neoliberal, multicultural, secular and feminist “neo-Bolshevism” emanating from Brussels’ (Braghiroli and Petsinis, 2019, p. 436). For a more elaborate discussion on this issue, see: https://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/ 05/26/a-far-right-hijack-of-intermarium/. Accessed 1 February 2021. 37 The economic dimension of NA’s nativism is less broad in comparison to that of EKRE and more centred on the activities of foreign entrepreneurs from specific countries. In accordance to Raivis Zelt¯ıts, ‘there are Russian and Chinese citizens who buy apartments and other land property in Latvia (especially in Riga) without being resident in our country…Consequently, Latvians have difficulties buying their homes. In such cases, the national question and economics become interlinked’ (Interview with the Secretary General of NA; 13 October 2017, Riga).

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membership can enhance Latvia’s security status in relation to Russia (Petsinis & Wierenga, 2021, pp. 8–9). With specific regard to energy cooperation between Germany and Russia, the party leadership stated in 2016 that: ‘Germany may not like it, but we have to protect our national interests. It is obvious that this project (Nord Stream II) threatens the security of Latvia and the Baltic States, therefore we must not remain silent about it’.38 Nevertheless, the most distinctive difference between EKRE and the NA is to be detected in the much feebler anti-establishment tones in the rhetoric of the latter party (Petsinis & Wierenga, 2021, pp. 21–22). Although hosting an entity with a long tradition of grass-roots activism (‘All for Latvia!’) under its auspices, the anti-systemic tones in NA’s political engagement has progressively eroded. For instance, although occasionally levying criticism at the media,39 the party’s affiliates have refrained from conceptualising Latvia’s media-sphere as part of the (‘corrupt’) establishment. Moreover, by contrast to EKRE, the NA does not cater for an ‘alternative’ media infrastructure under its wings.40 In regard to European politics, although opposing Euro-federalism and envisaging the EU as a ‘union of sovereign nation states’,41 the party never went as far as to justify the prospective departure of member states from the Union.42 The aggregate of these observations hints at the gradual transformation of the NA into a predominantly national conservative party with an atrophic, anti-systemic disposition (Petsinis & Wierenga, 2021, 38 On this issue, see: https://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/l/en/latvia-has-the-dutyto-save-europe-from-drowning-in-the-swamp-of-political-correctness-national-alliances-opi nion-in-debates-about-annual-report-on-foreign-policy-2016/. Accessed 1 February 2021. 39 On certain occasions, the party leadership criticised the media for allegedly ‘overindulging’ in political correctness with regard to policymaking areas such as immigration. On this issue, see: https://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/l/en/migration-and-politi cal-correctness-in-europe/. Accessed 2 February 2021. 40 Two appropriate examples, in the case of EKRE, are ‘alternative’ news platforms such as the publication Objektiiv (‘Lens’) and the website Uued Uudised (‘New News’). 41 On this issue, see: https://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/l/en/openly-about-nationalsecurity-threats-national-alliances-opinion-on-debates-concerning-the-annual-report-on-for eign-policy-2017/. Accessed 2 February 2021. 42 By contrast, in its platform for the European elections of 2019 (‘Eurovalimiste Platvorm’, 2019), EKRE calls for an EU which is ‘a union of nation states, not a federation!’, where ‘the Member States must be equal!’, and where ‘Member States which have acceded to the EU on the basis of the will of their people must also have the right to leave without hindrance if they so wish’ (Points 1, 4, and 5).

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p. 23). Of pivotal significance for this transformation of the NA has been its continuous participation in three government coalitions: 2011, 2014, and 2019.43 This is indicative of the divergent trajectories via which the Estonian and the Latvian party-systems have sought to accommodate specific parties.

The Latvian and Estonian Party-Systems: Continuity Versus ‘Situational Adaptability’ A State of Continuity in Latvia Barring the (nominally, centre-left) party of Harmony from the government emerged as a top necessity for a multitude of centrist and centreright parties (e.g. the New Conservatives, ‘Development For!’ and Unity—as well as the ‘Farmers and Greens’ agrarian party). Officially launched on 10 February 2010,44 Harmony triggered the apprehension of the predominantly ‘Latvian’ parties on the basis of its: (a) mainly ethnic Russian layers of support; (b) repeated calls for a foreign policy of appeasement vis-à-vis Russia. The latter included signing a ‘Memorandum of Cooperation’ between Harmony and United Russia in 2009.45 Although never put into practice and annulled on 9 October 2017, the mere existence of this document sufficed to intensify anxieties among the party’s rivals. Correspondingly, a cordon sanitaire has been built around Harmony on the basis of the party’s allegedly pro-Kremlin leanings and ensuing unreliability. To this, one should add: (a) the persistent accusations of cronyism and corruption levied against prominent party-affiliates

43 Since January 2019, NA participates in a governing coalition together with three conservative and liberal parties of the centre/ centre-right (New Conservatives, ‘Development/For!’ and New Unity as the core partner) and most deputies from KPV LV. 44 Following a string of negotiations between November 2009 and February 2010, Harmony emerged as a new party from the merger of the (centrist and centre-left, respectively) National Harmony Party, the New Centre, and the Social Democratic Party. 45 The ‘Memorandum’ mainly concentrated on issues of financial management and other areas of ‘functional cooperation’. On this issue, see: https://eng.lsm.lv/article/ politics/politics/saskana-quietly-ditches-putin-party-agreement.a252983/. Accessed 10 January 2021.

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(e.g. the former mayor of Riga, Nils Ušakovs)46 ; (b) the repercussions of the Ukrainian crisis (2014) coupled with suspicions over Russia’s endeavour to destabilise Latvian society via means of cyber-warfare and disinformation campaigns on social media (Berzina, 2016, pp. 7–20; Ozolina, 2016; Petsinis, 2019b). Between 2010 and 2018, Harmony finished as the largest party in a sequence of parliamentary elections (Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5) and has obtained international representation in the Progressive Group of Socialists and Democrats at the European Parliament. Moreover, recent years have witnessed the emergence of a more ‘youthful’ segment inside Harmony’s ranks with the ambition to transform the party from a ‘quasiethnic’ one (focused on the representation of the ethnic Russian minority) into a ‘proper’ Social Democratic party of the European centre-left (with a greater stress on social welfare and egalitarianism).47 Nevertheless, as an aggregate of all aforementioned allegations, it might not be an exaggeration to contend that Harmony has been essentially treated as the ‘outcast’ party inside the Latvian party-system (Braghiroli & Petsinis, 2019, p. 438).48 The overriding commitment to keep Harmony away from power and the ensuing formation of multi-party, heterogeneous, and often fragile governing coalitions has benefited the NA in a very crucial way. In particular, the NA has been granted ample opportunity to actively promote its programmatic principles—especially those pertaining to the policymaking area of ‘demographic issues’ (ibid., p. 439). The party’s interventions in the Saeima have largely revolved around the introduction of additional benefits for large families and the provision of stimuli towards increasing the birth-rate. Moreover, the Ministry of Welfare has been assigned to the NA in a series of governments in the past.49 In greater detail, between 2015 and 2018, the Saeima approved the party’s

46 For more on this issue, see: https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/09/riga-a-new-beg inning/. Accessed 11 January 2021. 47 Interview with one affiliate of the Harmony’s youth organisation (27 July 2017,

Riga). 48 The Social Democrat parties of Estonia and Lithuania have been equally apprehensive vis-à-vis the prospects of systematic cooperation with Harmony (Interview with a professor in Latvian party politics at Latvia University; 28 July 2017, Riga). 49 Interview with a professor in Latvian party politics at Latvia University (28 July 2017, Riga).

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main proposals for parental and dependent child benefits and incorporated them into the state’s legislation (NA, 2018a, p. 43). Furthermore, throughout 2017, the NA’s drive to improve the demographic situation in Latvia played a pivotal part in the adoption of the ‘Diaspora Law’ by the Saeima. This document makes provision for the maintenance and expansion of ties between Latvians abroad and Latvia—including the facilitation of remigration (ibid., pp. 5–6).50 The NA’s uninterrupted and successful spell in government was the most decisive catalyst in alleviating the intensity of the party’s anti-systemic speech through the years. A State of ‘Situational Adaptability’ in Estonia Whereas the Latvian party-system hints at a state of continuity in its relations with ‘unreliable’ (or ‘undesirable’) parties, a higher degree of ‘situational adaptability’ can be detected in the Estonian context since the mid-2010s. This ‘situational adaptability’ appears to have been subject to: (a) the increasing significance of socioeconomic catalysts (namely, the economy and social welfare) in shaping Estonian party politics; (b) the decisive impact of ‘pragmatic’ decision-making (amid persisting fragmentation) at a party leadership level. The former catalyst gradually brought about the thorough incorporation of the Centre Party into the political mainstream. The latter catalyst resulted in EKRE’s inclusion into Estonia’s governing coalition between April 2019 and January 2021. Starting with the Centre Party, officially established in 1991 as the evolution of the early post-Soviet Popular Front of Estonia, its trajectory in Estonian party politics has been comparable to that of Harmony in Latvia. Although its leadership fashioned the Centre Party as a centrist/centre-left51 party instead of a Social Democratic one, a common denominator with Harmony can be detected along the lines of the: (a)

50 On this issue, see: https://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/l/en/openly-about-nationalsecurity-threats-national-alliances-opinion-on-debates-concerning-the-annual-report-on-for eign-policy-2017/. Accessed 12 January 2021. 51 Programmatically, the Centre Party has expressed commitment to extensive provisions

in social welfare. This was a major catalyst that helped attract the less privileged cohorts of voters (e.g. certain categories of pensioners) to the party (Petsinis, 2019b, p. 165). More detailed information regarding the socioeconomic profile of Centre Party’s bases of support can be found in the following public survey: Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies (University of Tartu), ‘Estonian Internet Voting Survey 2015’ (March 2015).

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persisting popularity among Estonia’s ethnic Russian minority52 ; (b) calls for foreign policy appeasement vis-à-vis Russia. In regard to the latter aspect, the signing of a ‘Memorandum of Cooperation’ with United Russia (2004)53 further intensified apprehension across the rest of the party spectrum (in the Reform Party, in particular). By contrast to the strict cordon sanitaire and the firm exclusion of Harmony from the governing structures in Latvia, the Centre Party participated in two short-lived government coalitions during the 2000s (between 2002 and 2003 together with Reform, and between 2005 and 2007 together with Reform and Isamaa). Nevertheless, it was during the mid-2010s when political circumstances paved the way for the decisive consolidation of the Centre Party as one of Estonia’s major and fully legitimate political actors. This development can be understood as the outcome of two combined catalysts: (a) the more emphatic contestation of the neoliberal consensus within the country’s party spectrum; (b) as in the case of Harmony, the gradual emergence of a younger and reformist generation of cadres within the Centre Party (led by the current party chairman and Estonian PM between 2016 and 2021, Jüri Ratas).54 Consequently, November 2016 saw the dissolution of a governing coalition that comprised the Reform Party, SDE, and Isamaa. The driving force behind this development was several disagreements between the Reform Party and SDE over the increase of the taxation rate and the extension of welfare provisions that was proposed by the latter.55

52 This was largely the outcome of Edgar Savisaar’s (Centre Party’s founder) successful networking with influential interest groups within the ethnic Russian community since the 1990’s (Petsinis, 2019a, p. 164). 53 This agreement focused on economic cooperation and other forms of knowledge exchange between the two sides but, as in the case of the memorandum signed between Harmony and United Russia, it was never put into practice. The memorandum was annulled altogether in October 2017. On these issues, see: http://news.err.ee/119629/overview-center-party-s-cooperation-pro tocol-with-putin-s-united-russia and https://news.err.ee/635146/latvia-s-saskana-partyditches-agreement-with-putin-s-united-russia. Accessed 21 November 2020. 54 This new generation of cadres pledged to enhance pluralism and democratic decisionmaking inside the party, after a long string of allegations regarding Savisaar’s intra-party authoritarianism in previous years. 55 Health and social security featured as two major areas of concern among the Estonian public between 2017 and 2018 (European Commission, 2018, p. 2; Kivirähk, 2017).

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At first instance, this helped provide common ground between the prowelfare prerogatives espoused by SDE and the Centre Party. In due time, this culminated in the creation of a new government coalition led by the Centre Party, with the SDE and Isamaa as junior partners. Moving to EKRE, throughout the same period the party maintained its anti-establishment rhetoric against the other parties (including the Centre Party)56 —especially in regards to immigration, institutional corruption, and national defence policy. The party’s sharp anti-systemic tones were the main reason why EKRE was excluded from negotiations for the formation of a new government in November 2016—especially as result of the objections from SDE. Nevertheless, following a string of negotiations after the parliamentary elections of March 2019, EKRE was accepted into a government coalition together with the Centre Party (as the core partner) and Isamaa. This development can be interpreted as an outcome of political pragmatism and its prevalence in the decision-making among the party leaderships involved. Taking into account the persistence of fragmentation in Estonian politics and the formation of fragile government coalitions since the 1990s, the leaderships of Centre Party and EKRE opted to: (a) concentrate on those policymaking areas where a common ground could be detected; (b) temporarily downplay the significance of policymaking areas that posed a source of friction between the two parties (e.g. national defence and the management of ethnic relations within Estonia). The compromise between the two parties was satisfactory for EKRE and its agenda, and the formation of the government coalition was predicated upon agreements on (March 2019): (a) an agreement to temporarily freeze the approval of the Estonian-Russian border treaty of 2005 by the Riigikogu 57 ; (b) a great emphasis on the increase of child and family benefits as well as the provision of incentives for Estonians

56 EKRE’s leadership repeatedly dubbed the Centre Party: ‘the party of pensioners and ethnic Russians’ (Interview with the chairman of EKRE; 12 October 2016, Tallinn). 57 EKRE subscribes to the terms of the Tartu Peace Treaty (1920) which recognised Estonia’s independence and conceded Petseri, Abrene, and certain territories in the vicinity of Narva to the Estonian interwar republic (Anderson, 1988). For more on this issue, see: https://news.err.ee/936832/agreement-in-place-not-to-ratify-bordertreaty-says-ruuben-kaalep. Accessed 3 April 2020.

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who emigrated abroad to return to the country (Jakobson et al., 2020)58 ; (c) a reiteration of the shared objections of the Centre Party and EKRE to the European Commission’s quota arrangement for the redistribution of refugees. Moreover, this compromise temporarily enhanced Jüri Ratas’ status as a ‘rising star’ in Estonian politics and, most importantly, granted EKRE an opportunity to promote its programmatic principles (the ethno-nationalist and nativist ones, in particular) from within the halls of power.

Oscillating Between the Present and the Past: EKRE and the NA on Nativism and Anti-Immigration EKRE and the Migration Crisis (2015–2016): Grass-Roots Mobilisation, Anti-Establishment Rhetoric, and Euroscepticism In accordance with the Commission’s guidelines for the redistribution of refugees within the EU, Estonia had agreed to host 580 relocated persons (September 2016).59 According to the Ministry of the Interior, by March 2018, 206 of them were to be stationed in the country and a refugee assistance centre had been functioning in the locality of Vao (Lääne-Viru county, north-eastern Estonia).60 By that time, the debate on the quotas system had triggered controversies, misunderstandings, as well as a ‘core versus periphery’ cleavage within the EU. This consisted of (mainly) Germany versus the ‘Visegrad Four’ group of states. Although not as vocal as their EU partners from Central Europe, the Estonian government had also voiced certain reservations in regards to the quotas arrangement (Petsinis, 2019a, p. 221).

58 On this issue, see: https://news.err.ee/920943/centre-ekre-isamaa-discuss-social-iss ues-in-coalition-talks. Accessed 4 April 2020. 59 On this issue, see: http://news.err.ee/v/179f0f5d-0a10-459c-b26e-4c714e38ba7b. Accessed 1 February 2021. 60 On this issue, see: https://news.err.ee/689666/estonia-reaches-first-refugee-quota. Accessed 2 February 2021.

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In July 2016, Raivo Küüt had underlined (on the Ministry of Interior’s behalf) that: ‘Estonia prefers case-specific decisions to the automatic redistribution of refugees by quota’.61 More emphatically, the then Estonian PM Taavi Rõivas (Reform Party) judged that: ‘the European Commission has made an error in its calculation and even if Estonia did welcome the refugees, the quota should be much lower’.62 Even SDE voiced its scepticism along the lines that Estonia might not possess the material infrastructure required for the accommodation of the number of refugees specified by the Commission (ibid.). Later, on 12 September 2016, the Centre Party called for a referendum to set a maximum limit on the number of people eligible for asylum in Estonia. This proposal was rejected by the Riigikogu.63 By that time, EKRE had already dictated that: ‘Estonia’s demographic realities do not allow mass immigration from any direction…immigration must remain firmly under the competence of national legislation’ (EKRE, ‘Eurovalimiste Platvorm’, 2014). As early as February 2016, EKRE had intensified and internationalised its engagement via staging countrywide protests against ‘the Islamisation of Europe’ (echoing Germany’s PEGIDA and other grass-roots initiatives across the Continent).64 Particular attention was paid to a wave of sexual assaults in Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2016 and the ensuing ‘necessity to protect Estonian and European women’ (Petsinis & Wierenga, 2021, p. 12). These incidents were interpreted as ‘the shape of things to come’ for the entire Continent if Germany and Brussels kept on insisting on an ‘open border’ approach to Muslim immigration (Petsinis, 2019a, p. 222). Later, in September 2016, the party commenced its campaign for a referendum on the question of Estonia accepting refugees as a whole.65

61 For this statement, see: http://news.err.ee/v/3fc82d69-6f26-4ca7-8989-cf69d4 4b29f6. Accessed 2 February 2021. 62 For this statement, see: http://news.err.ee/v/55ea4612-1abb-4cee-95ef-91e4bc 775df9. Accessed 2 February 2021. 63 On this issue, see: http://news.err.ee/v/179f0f5d-0a10-459c-b26e-4c714e38ba7b.

Accessed 2 February 2021. 64 On this issue, see: http://news.err.ee/v/6614e41a-1fb7-4b87-a205-987d4b1a77d5. Accessed 3 February 2021. 65 EKRE had submitted its (rejected) proposal for a referendum to the Riigikogu on the same date with the Centre Party (12 September 2016). On this issue, see: http:// news.err.ee/v/3f60bd89-68bc-43b3-96a8-bdc3ba15a9e5. Accessed 3 February 2021.

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The essential difference between EKRE and all of the other parties in the Estonian party spectrum is that the party was quick on its feet to: (a) systematically mobilise popular bases of support; (b) successfully embed its campaign against refugee quotas into a broader frame of Euroscepticism and anti-systemic speech on domestic and European politics (Petsinis, 2019a, pp. 222–223). Correspondingly, EKRE held the EU accountable for allegedly forcing its directives on Estonia in such a manner that it violated the will of the majority.66 Meanwhile, the Estonian government itself was being held accountable for ignoring the ‘will of the people’ and ‘lying to the public’.67 At this point, it should be noted that EKRE successfully anchored its campaign over the refugee question into dominant trends of public opinion. As early as June 2015, a public survey commissioned by the Estonian Government Office (and conducted by the TNS Emor agency, Tallinn) observed that 42% of a polled sample objected to the admission of refugees.68 Meanwhile, a joint opinion poll conducted by the Turuuuringute AS agency and Tartu University (November 2015) detected that a mere 39% of the sample harboured no objections to the implementation of the refugees quota in Estonia.69 The survey, carried out by the same agency during the same month, found that 62% of respondents held the opinion that the government cannot be trusted in its management of immigration.70 By the end of 2016, an opinion poll (commissioned by the Estonian Government Office) detected a relatively more positive outlook on the admission of refugees to the country—mostly among younger respondents with a higher level of education and based in Tallinn and Tartu (Voog, 2016, pp. 8–12).71 Nevertheless, a public survey conducted by 66 Interview with the chairman of EKRE (12 October 2016, Tallinn). 67 For these statements, see: http://news.err.ee/v/f58cb255-07ed-4cac-b0f9-e6f65c

a43f83. Accessed 3 February 2021. 68 For these findings, see: http://news.err.ee/v/e4bbce9e-036a-44c2-a4ba-671b01 e4a3a8. Accessed 3 February 2021. 69 For these findings, see: http://news.err.ee/v/26acfd36-f1ab-4d93-9489-ea8b7b 18ddcf. Accessed 4 February 2021. 70 For these findings, see: http://news.err.ee/v/8154884a-a3e1-45b6-bf35-6fc606 b6a387. Accessed 4 February 2021. 71 For these figures, see: https://valitsus.ee/en/news/general-attitude-estonian-reside nts-towards-migration-and-refugees-has-significantly-improved. Accessed 4 February 2021.

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Turu-uuringute AS for the Institute for Society Research in Tallinn (16– 30 January, 2018), hinted at the persistence of apprehensive outlooks, as a majority of respondents agreed that: (a) Estonia should only accept a small number of refugees; (b) it would be a positive development if the refugees who were already based in Estonia left the country.72 The Nativism of EKRE: Framing the Present Inside the Context of the Past As highlighted in the introduction, locating the present (or, occasionally, the future) inside the context of the past is a rather common strategy among ethno-nationalist actors with the objective to interpret historical developments along a linear trajectory and establish ‘historical continuity’ (Connor, 1993; Smith, 2000, pp. 82–83). The very same ethno-nationalist actors (political parties and organisations as well as other interest groups) tend to embed their narratives primarily into symbols and imageries derived from their own societies’ historical experience. In addition to these aspects, Trumm holds, from a more instrumental angle, that parties of the populist and radical right tend to: ‘tap on the “right” type of disillusionment when choosing their public discourse’ (Trumm, 2018, p. 11). As an aggregate of all aforementioned points, EKRE: (a) capitalised on and ‘weaponised’ the migration crisis exactly at a time when it had started generating anxieties among various segments of the population; (b) systematically interlinked the collective memories of ‘colonisation’ under the Soviets with the collective anxieties of becoming ‘colonised’ again by new groups of migrants (Petsinis, 2019a, p. 223). Correspondingly, several statements issued by prominent affiliates of EKRE endeavoured to interconnect different waves of migration through time and emphasised that: ‘…in addition to Islamic immigration from North Africa and the Middle East, we are also very sceptical towards the migration waves from Slavic countries (namely, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine) to Estonia…it might not be an exaggeration to assert that, in 30 years from now, the majority population in Estonia will be Russian-speaking’.73

72 On this issue, see the relevant diagrams at: http://www.inst.ee/uuringud/vaartushi nnangute-uuring-2018. Accessed 5 February 2021. 73 Interview with the chairman of EKRE (12 October 2016, Tallinn).

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In an attempt to bypass allegations that the physical presence of Muslim migrants in Estonia was limited, EKRE’s leadership often endowed its engagement with immigration with a pre-emptive dimension, adding that: ‘Global terrorism poses a security threat for Estonia but this is lower in comparison to Western Europe … the number of Muslim immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa who are based in Estonia is small. However, the refugee quota arrangement, dictated by the EU, can generate perils in the immediate future’.74 Quantitative data demonstrates that EKRE did succeeded in touching a sensitive cord among its target groups. A public survey conducted by Turu-Uuringute AS (22–28 March 2016) discovered a clear link between EKRE’s capitalisation on anti-refugee rhetoric (especially after the Brussels terrorist attacks on 22 March 2016) and the party’s increase in popularity (Petsinis, 2019a, p. 224). Meanwhile, the Erakonnad monitoring service (hosted by TNS Emor AS) equally detected a correlation between EKRE’s capitalisation on anti-refugee speech and an augmentation of its public appeal between autumn 2015 and 2018.75 The period between 2018 and 2021 did not see an increase in refugee numbers in Estonia. Nevertheless, this did not hinder EKRE from promoting its nativist prerogatives from within the governing structures, and elaborately interlinking (when required) the present with the past in its rhetoric. As an early sign, in September 2019, EKRE’s former chairman and Minister of the Interior Mart Helme issued a (rejected) proposal to the Riigikogu and demanded the unilateral revocation of the visa-free regime for Ukrainian citizens along the lines that: ‘…we are facing immigration pressure from the East, especially Ukraine… the people who are coming here are not really Ukrainians, rather they are Russians from Eastern Ukraine or Russified Ukrainians or just Homo Sovieticus ’.76 Nevertheless, it was the state of emergency imposed during the global spread of COVID-19 in spring 2020 that provided EKRE with an ample 74 Ibid. 75 On this issue, see: TNS Emor, ‘Toetused erakondadele’. https://www.erakonnad.

info/reiting.html. Accessed 5 February 2021. 76 For this statement, see: https://estonianworld.com/security/estonias-hard-line-int erior-minister-wants-to-unilaterally-revoke-visa-freedom-to-ukrainians/ and https://news. err.ee/979094/interior-minister-to-launch-inquiry-into-ukrainians-migrating-to-estonia. Accessed 5 February 2021.

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opportunity to reiterate their nativist principles and also to impact on governmental policies. In April 2020, EKRE’s policymakers spearheaded (via the Ministry of the Interior) and achieved the introduction of amendments to the ‘Aliens Act’ and the ‘Obligation to Leave and Prohibition on Entry Act’. The main objective was to ensure that foreign citizens from ‘third’ (non-EU) countries who had lost their jobs after the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis (and the ensuing state of emergency) would leave Estonia as soon as possible.77 One month later, in May 2020, the Ministry of the Interior announced the preparation of a new bill which would disallow university students from ‘third’ (non-EU) countries to study in Estonia during the autumn term of 2020, even if they had the necessary visa or residence permit, due to fears of a resurgence of COVID-19 (Petsinis & Wierenga, 2021, pp. 12–13).78 On the latter occasion, EKRE’s nativist prerogatives combined with the party’s ethnonationalist standpoints and, in particular, their opposition to an increase in English-language courses at Estonian universities at the alleged expense of Estonian-language ones.79 The NA and the Migration Crisis (2015–2016): Navigating the Halls of Power As in the Estonian Riigikogu, as early as spring 2015, all of the parties of the Latvian Saeima expressed their reservations towards the EU’s refugee quotas arrangement. This comprised the parties of the governing coalition as well as Harmony in opposition. In May 2015, PM Laimdota Straujuma from Unity emphasised that: ‘Latvia supports solidarity (within the EU) regarding other measures, such as increased border control, medical aid, and other matters, but is against the quota system’.80 A few months later, in November 2015, the controversy between the Latvian government and the Commission intensified when the latter stressed that Latvia 77 On this issue, see: https://news.err.ee/1072360/foreigners-from-third-countrieswho-lose-their-jobs-must-leave-estonia. Accessed 5 February 2021. 78 This standpoint was reiterated by Martin Helme, on behalf of the Ministry of Interior, on 16 September 2020. 79 On this issue, see: https://news.err.ee/1033587/ekre-wants-new-university-fundingmodel. Accessed 22 November 2020. 80 For this statement, see: http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/legislation/?doc=106 034&output=d&ins_print. Accessed 20 February 2021.

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was obliged to accommodate 531 refugees over the course of two years. In the words of the then Minister of the Interior (Rihards Kozlovskis from Unity): ‘We have committed not to bringing in 531 refugees, but rather to relocating 531 persons…It does not mean that everyone that comes to Latvia will stay here. Some may not qualify for refugee status’.81 As in Estonia, public apprehension over the arrival of refugees saw instances of grass-roots mobilisation and the organisation of public demonstrations. The participants in these events ranged from affiliates of the NA all the way to more militant, anti-immigrant, groupings such as the Fatherland Guards.82 By contrast to EKRE, the NA and its party organisation did not play a pivotal part in public manifestations against the admission of refugees. Instead, the NA sought to promote its standpoints on the migration crisis along the lines of a ‘gradualist’ strategy: from within the halls of power and taking advantage of a shared hesitation to accept quotas across the party spectrum (Braghiroli & Petsinis, 2019, p. 442). Correspondingly, in June 2015 (and echoing the denunciation of the ‘failed Western policies’ on immigration by the Bauska Declaration) the NA’s J¯anis Iesalnieks from the Ministry of Justice remarked: ‘Is this what we want in Latvia? 127,000 immigrants arrived in Sweden in 2014 but meanwhile 115,000 children were born (including immigrant families)’.83 One year later, in 2016, the NA deputies at the Saeima accused the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of inconsistency and submissiveness to the directives of the Commission, following the Ministry’s decision to approve the quota of 776 refugees for Latvia.84 In addition to the allegedly ‘forceful imposition’ of refugee quotas on Latvia (as with their counterparts from EKRE) prominent NA-affiliates: (a) tried to frame their engagement over the migration crisis as a ‘preemptive action’; (b) contended that a majority of the refugees themselves

81 See this statement in: https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/society/interior-ministerwe-agreed-to-relocate-not-admit-531-refugees.a156528/. Accessed 20 February 2021. 82 On this issue, see: https://www.baltictimes.com/anti-refugee_rally_takes_on_latvian_ government_26807166755c21627948b7/. Accessed 20 February 2021. 83 See this statement in: https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/society/refugee-numbersknown-in-a-month-says-pm.a135277/. Accessed 21 February 2021. 84 On this issue, see: https://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/l/en/latvia-has-the-dutyto-save-europe-from-drowning-in-the-swamp-of-political-correctness-national-alliancesopinion-in-debates-about-annual-report-on-foreign-policy-2016/. Accessed 22 February 2021.

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did not intend to stay in the country. As the MEP Edvins Šnore stated in 2017: ‘Latvia is mostly safe from global terrorism because we only have a tiny Muslim community. The larger the Muslim minority, the greater the security risk can be (e.g. the cases of France, Belgium, or Germany)’.85 Furthermore, in accordance to Šnore: ‘the bulk of the refugees that we accepted preferred to move to Scandinavia and/or Germany… the EU cannot “dictate” to refugees that they must be stationed in countries such as Latvia, Estonia, or Slovakia’.86 As with EKRE in Estonia, the NA also harmonised its campaign with dominant trends in Latvia’s public opinion. A countrywide survey conducted by the Norstat agency and UNHCR in August 2016 found out that 55% of the respondents objected to the admission of refugees, with an additional 27.4% of the sample being ‘completely against’.87 One year later, in accordance to the findings of a survey carried out by Eurobarometer, global terrorism and immigration still featured as the two areas of greatest concern for the Latvian public (Eurobarometer 88, 2017, p. 9). Complementary evidence demonstrates that throughout 2017, the residents of communities with a Russian-speaking majority (especially along the eastern border and in Daugavpils), demonstrated comparable levels of negativity over the prospective relocation of refugees.88 Nevertheless, amid this general climate of apprehension, empirical surveys hinted that (as in Estonia) the younger and better-educated segments of the population (e.g. university students) expressed a greater interest in establishing ‘first-hand contacts’ with the refugees accommodated in Latvia (Veinberg, 2017, pp. 11 and 14).

85 Interview with a NA MP at the Latvian Saeima and the European parliament (13 October 2017, Riga). 86 Ibid. 87 Moreover, the campaign undertaken by the Latvian branch of the UNHCR, with

the objective to enlighten the public about the refugee crisis, was dubbed ‘unpatriotic’ by segments of the press. The same outlets also hinted at an ‘impending colonisation’ (Veinberg, 2017, p. 9). On these issues, see: https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/society/ majority-of-latvians-against-taking-in-refugees.a195952/. Accessed 21 February 2021. 88 Interview with the administrator of a local NGO (23 October 2017, Daugavpils).

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The Nativism of the NA: Framing the Present Inside the Context of the Past In a comparable vein to EKRE, the NA’s leadership has been seeking to draw links between the ‘new’ immigration debate in Latvia with the question of the ethnic Russian minority. As early as 2015, the prominent NA-affiliate J¯anis Dombrava stated on Twitter that: ‘Latvia already has the highest level of “other ethnicities” in the EU (inherited from the Soviet era)…therefore further immigration is not possible’.89 From an ideological angle, other NA-affiliates have allegedly detected: ‘…striking similarities in the present and Soviet time pro-migrant propaganda…they also advocated Russification through immigration just like the present welcoming forces do: a sign of progress, much needed labour force, enrichment, strength through diversity, and the like’.90 Correspondingly, the party leadership also targeted its campaign against ‘ultra-liberal’ NGOs and think-tanks (e.g. the think-tank ‘Providus’), castigating their alleged ambition to: ‘…influence Latvian school students and change their attitudes towards immigration and immigrants’ and adding that: ‘immigrant-lovers try to take on the most defenceless part of the society — the children!’ (Petsinis & Wierenga, 2021, p. 15).91 As in Estonia, the period between 2018 and 2021 did not see an increase in the numbers of refugees stationed in the country.92 This was met with a relative relaxation in public alarmism over the migration crisis and instead led to a greater concern about the economic situation (Eurobarometer 89, 2018, p. 2). Nevertheless, in 2018, the NA’s deputies at the Saeima opposed the approval of the UN Global Compact on Migration, arguing that its real intentions were to: ‘facilitate consistent immigration and, whenever possible, ensure that irregular migrants 89 In order to support his claim, Dombrava posted a diagram where he compared Latvia’s ethnic make-up to those of the other member states within the EU. For this statement and the accompanying diagram, see: https://twitter.com/janisdombrava/status/596 252161790627840/photo/1. Accessed 21 February 2021. 90 On this issue, see: https://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/l/en/the-new-pro-migrant-

propaganda-is-just-like-the-old-one/. Accessed 20 February 2021. 91 See this statement in: https://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/l/en/on-the-ultra-liberalngo-caught-in-a-lie-regarding-pro-immigration-project/. Accessed 21 February 2021. 92 It should be added that, even in 2015, the majority (309) of detainees, illegal immigrants, and trespassers in the territory of Latvia originated from Vietnam (Veinberg, 2017, p. 5).

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are granted regular status…gradually stigmatise those who oppose migration’.93 Unlike EKRE in Estonia, the NA’s leadership did not issue any unilateral proposals with the objective to further curb immigration inside the context of the COVID-19 emergency. However, in conformity with the party’s principles on financial protectionism, the NA submitted a recommendation for the exclusion of offshore companies from the list of legitimate recipients of state aid to combat the impact of the pandemic (Petsinis & Wierenga, 2021, p. 15). As the NA’s Rihards Kols stated in May 2020: ‘we cannot use state funds to support dishonest businesses and businessmen who have avoided supporting the country until now, sustaining themselves off offshore systems and tax optimisation’.94

In Lieu of a Conclusion In accordance with the principles of the Bauska Declaration, ethnonationalism and nativism feature prominently in the agendas of EKRE and the NA (both in ideology and in political practice). Ethno-nationalism, in the programmatic documents and official statements of the two parties, is centred on: (a) the dominant status of the Estonian/Latvian languages in the public sector (public administration, education, and the state media); (b) the increase of the (ethnically) Estonian/Latvian birth-rates, remigration, and other ‘demographic issues’; (c) the securitisation of bilateral relations between Estonia/Latvia and Russia and the prioritisation of Estonia’s and/or Latvia’s membership of NATO over the EU. These standpoints have been systematically communicated and promoted by EKRE and the NA on the national (the Estonian Riigikogu and the Latvian Saeima) and the European/international levels (e.g. in the European Parliament). This heavy emphasis on ethno-nationalism is largely to be traced to geopolitical anxieties over Russia’s disproportional leverage as the ‘external homeland’ for the ethnic Russian minorities resident in the two states. In addition, EKRE and the NA have been propagating a

93 On this issue, see: https://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/l/en/intervention-of-aleksa ndrs-kirsteins-mp-from-the-national-alliance-during-the-debate-against-signing-of-the-unglobal-compact-for-migration/. Accessed 22 February 2021. 94 This proposal gained the endorsement of the work-group led by the Finance Minister, J¯anis Reirs from New Unity (6 May 2020). On this issue, see: https://bnn-news.com/offshores-to-be-excluded-from-list-of-state-support-recipientsduring-state-of-emergency-213029. Accessed 22 February 2021.

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brand of (soft) geopolitical Euroscepticism which scrutinises the extent to which EU membership can upgrade the security status of Estonia/Latvia vis-à-vis Russia. In regard to nativism, opposition to the Commission’s quotas scheme for the redistribution of refugees constitutes the main area of contention between EKRE/the NA and the EU. The two parties tend to: (a) interconnect older migration (during the Soviet era) with more recent waves of migration to Estonia and Latvia; (b) forge a solid nexus between their ethno-nationalist principles on national survival and uncompromising nativist standpoints on immigration. Throughout 2020, EKRE (by contrast to NA) was very active in the sponsorship of unilateral proposals for the restriction of immigration from ‘third countries’ to Estonia amid the COVID-19 emergency. The combination of ethnonationalist and nativist principles in the rhetoric of EKRE and the NA aims at constructing a discursive nexus between collective memories of ‘colonisation’ under the Soviets and the fears of becoming ‘colonised’ by new groups of migrants in the near future. Attention also needs to be paid to the specificities of the Latvian/Estonian party-systems and how they have facilitated the engagements of EKRE and the NA over the aforementioned and other policymaking areas. The Latvian party-system hints at a state of continuity in its relations with ‘unreliable’ parties, especially as far as the endeavour to keep Harmony out of government. In addition to the NA’s continuous acceptance in a sequence of governments since 2011, this continuity has granted the party ample opportunity to actively promote its programmatic principles—especially those pertaining to ‘demographic issues’. In the long run, this brought about the ‘de-radicalisation’ of the NA. By contrast to Latvia, a higher degree of fluidity and/or ‘situational adaptability’ can be observed inside the Estonian context, vis-à-vis both the Centre Party and EKRE, since the mid-2010s. By contrast to the NA, EKRE did not demonstrate any intention to soften its anti-systemic tones during its brief stay in power (2019–2021). In accordance to the political sociologist Juhan Kivirähk, the persistence of anti-establishment (also Eurosceptic) underpinnings in EKRE’s rhetoric and active policymaking should be understood along the following lines: ‘The EU’s pressure for the emergence of a multicultural society and exaggerated political correctness have sparked some opposition in Estonia…People who do not trust

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anyone and who want to protest against “the establishment” can always choose EKRE’.95

Bibliography and Other Sources Monographs, Edited Volumes, PhD and Masters’ Theses, and Other Books Aalto, P. (2003). Constructing Post-Soviet geopolitics in Estonia. Routledge. Berzina, I. (2016). The possibility of societal destabilization in Latvia: Potential national security threats. National Defence Academy of Latvia. Chinn, J., & Kaiser, R. (1996). Russians as the new minority: Ethnicity and nationalism in the Soviet successor states. Westview Press. Connor, W. (1993). Ethnonationalism: A quest for understanding. Routledge. Fanon, F. (2004). The wretched of the earth. Grove Press. Kelertas, V. (Ed.). (2006). Baltic post-colonialism: On the boundary of two worlds: Identity, freedom and moral imagination in the Baltics. Rodopi. Kelley, J. (2004). Ethnic politics in Europe: The power of norms and incentives. Princeton University Press. Kukk, K. (1991). On economic and geographical department of Estonia (1945– 1990). Publications of the Estonian Geographical Society VI (Tallinn, Estonian Academy of Sciences). Racevskis, K. (1998). Modernity’s pretenses: Making reality fit reason from Candide to the Gulag. State University of New York Press. Schreier, M. (2012). Qualitative content analysis in practice. Sage. Smith, A. D. (2000). The nation in history: Historiographical debates about ethnicity and nationalism. Oxford University Press. Young, R. (2001). Post-colonialism: A historical introduction. Routledge.

Academic Articles, Book-Chapters, Working Papers, and Analytical Commentaries Anderson, E. (1988). How Narva, Petseri, and Abrene came to be in the RSFSR. Journal of Baltic Studies, 19(3), 197–214. Annus, E. (2012). The problem of Soviet colonialism in the Baltics. Journal of Baltic Studies, 43(1), 21–45.

95 Interview with a political analyst at Turu-uuringute AS (22 June 2018, interview conducted by e-mail).

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Auers, D., & Kasekamp, A. (2013). Comparing right wing populism in Latvia and Estonia. In R. Wodak, M. Khosravinik, & B. Mral (Eds.), Rightwing populism in Europe: Politics and discourse (pp. 235–248). Bloomsbury Publishing. Auers, D., & Kasekamp, A. (2015). The impact of radical right parties in the Baltic states. In M. Minkenberg (Ed.), Transforming the transformation: The East European radical right in the political process (pp. 137–153). Routledge. Austers, A. (2016). The case of Latvia: Popular Euroscepticism in impasse. In K. Bukovskis (Ed.), Euroscepticism in small EU member-States (pp. 85–107). Latvian Institute for International Affairs. Björkman-Bennich, L., & Johansson, K. M. (2012). Explaining moderation in nationalism: Divergent trajectories of national conservative parties in Estonia and Latvia. Comparative European Politics. Online version: https://doi.org/ 10.1057/cep.2011.28. Accessed 20 October 2020. Braghiroli, S., & Petsinis, V. (2019). Between party-systems and identity-politics: The populist and radical right in Estonia and Latvia. European Politics and Society, 20(4), 431–449. Chatterjee, P. (1995). Nationalism as a problem. In B. Aschcroft, G. Griffiths, & H. Tiffin (Eds.), The post-colonial studies reader. Routledge. Ehin, P. (2002/2003). Estonian Euroscepticism: A reflection of domestic politics? East European Constitutional Review, 11/12(4/1), 96–100. Hechter, M. (2009). Alien rule and its discontents. American Behavioral Scientist, 53(3), 289–310. Hermann, M. (2008). Content analysis. In A. Klotz & D. Prakash (Eds.), Qualitative methods in international relations (pp. 151–167). Palgrave Macmillan. Hladik, R. (2013). Post-colonial Europe. A theory’s travelogue: Post-colonial theory in post-socialist space (online version: https://www.post-colonial-europe.eu/ essays/153-atheorys-travelogue-post-colonial-theory-in-post-socialistspace. html. Accessed 10 September 2020. Ijabs, I. (2016). After the referendum: Militant democracy and nation-building in Latvia. East European Politics and Societies, 30(2), 288–314. Jakobson, M., Saarts, T., & Kalev, L. (2020). Radical right across borders? The case of EKRE’s Finnish branch. In T. Kernalegenn & E. Van Haute (Eds.), Political parties abroad: A new arena for party politics (pp. 21–38). Routledge. Jirgens, K. (2006). Fusions of discourse: Post-colonial/postmodern horizons in Baltic culture. In K. Johansson-Cartee (Ed.), Narratives and news framing: Constructing political reality. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Kuus, M. (2002). European integration in identity narratives in Estonia: A quest for security. Journal of Peace Research, 39(1), 91–108.

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Lauristin, M., & Vihalemm, P. (2009). The political agenda during different periods of Estonian transformation: External and internal factors. Journal of Baltic Studies, 40(1), 1–28. Mikkel, E., & Kasekamp, A. (2008). Emerging party-based Euroscepticism in Estonia. In A. Szczerbiak & P. Taggart (Eds.), Opposing Europe? The comparative party politics of Euroscepticism: Case studies and country surveys. Oxford University Press. Moore, D. (2001). Is the post- in post-colonial the post- in Post-Soviet? Toward a global post-colonial critique. Special Topic: Globalizing Literary Studies, 116, 111–128. Ozolina, Z. (2016). Social security: Conceptual framework. In Z. Ozolina (Ed.), Social security: Inclusion-exclusion dilemma: A portrait of the Russian-speaking community in Latvia (pp. 13–28). Zinatne. Peiker, P. (2016). Estonian nationalism through the postcolonial lens. Journal of Baltic Studies, 47 (1), 113–132. Petsinis, V. (2019a). Identity politics and right-wing populism in Estonia: The case of EKRE. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2(2), 211–230. Petsinis, V. (2019b, January 26). As long as it lasts: Latvia’s new coalition Government. Open Democracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/author/vas silis-petsinis. Accessed 24 November 2020. Petsinis, V. (2020). Geopolitics, ethnopolitics and the EU: The cases of Serbia and Latvia. Ethnopolitics, 19(2), 107–124. Pettai, V. (2005). Unfounded worries? Euroscepticism prior to the referendum’s mobilization. In V. Pettai & P. Ehin (Eds.), Deciding on Europe: The EU referendum in Estonia (pp. 41–62). Tartu University Press. Rudz¯ıtis, I. (2004). Latvijas Post-koloni¯al¯as Identit¯ates Probl¯emas. Providus. Online version: https://providus.lv/article/latvijas-post-kolonialas-identi tates-problemas. Accessed 23 October 2020. Sikk, A. (2006). From ‘sexy men’ to ‘socialists gone nuts’: The European Union and Estonian party politics. In P. G. Lewis & Z. Mansfeldova (Eds.), The European Union and party politics in Central Eastern Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. Tarrow, S. (2010). The strategy of paired comparison: Toward a theory of practice. Comparative Political Studies, 43, 230–259. Trumm, S. (2018). The ‘new’ wave of populist right-wing parties in Central and Eastern Europe: Explaining electoral support for the conservative People’s Party of Estonia. Representation, 54(4), 331–347. Vardys, S. (1964). Soviet colonialism in the Baltic states: A note on the nature of modern colonialism. Lithuanian Quarterly Journal of Arts and Sciences, 10(2). Online version: https://www.lituanus.org/1964/64_2_01_V ardys.htm. Accessed 17 November 2020.

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Veinberg, S. (2017). The consequences of colonialism in Latvia during a mass migration period in Europe (2015/2016). Cogent Social Sciences, 3(1). Online version: https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2017.1368110. Accessed 21 September 2020.

Expert Reports, Opinion Polls, Public Surveys, Electoral Results, and Other Statistical Data European Commission. (2017). Standard Eurobarometer 88: Latvia (Spring). European Commission. (2018). Standard Eurobarometer 89: Estonia (Spring). Kivirähk, J. (2017). Public Opinion and National Defence, a public survey conducted by Turu-uuringute AS for the Estonian Ministry of Defence (Spring). Petsinis, V., & Wierenga, L. (2021). Report on radical right populism in Estonia and Latvia (Working Paper no.7). Horizon 2020 POPREBEL. https:// populism-europe.com/poprebel/poprebel-working-papers/. Accessed 4 May 2021. Voog, A. (2016). Arvamusuuring Eesti Elanike Hoiakutest Pagulastesse. Kantar Emor.

State, International, Legal, and Party Documents (Electronic and Printed Versions) EKRE. (2012). Konservatiivne Manifest (Conservative Manifesto). https:// www.ekre.ee/konservatiivne-manifest/. Accessed 22 March 2020. EKRE. (2013). Bauska Deklaratsioon (The Bauska Declaration). https://ekre. ee/bauska-deklaratsioon/. Accessed 22 March 2020. EKRE. (2014). Eurovalimiste Platvorm 2014 (Platform for the 2014 European Elections). https://www.delfi.ee/archive/ekre-eurovalimiste-platvormmeie-eesti-eest-rahvusriikide-euroopa-eest?id=68566351. Accessed 22 March 2020. EKRE. (2015a). Konservatiivne Programm (Conservative Programme). https:// www.ekre.ee/konservatiivne-programm/. Accessed 22 March 2020. EKRE. (2015b). Riigikogu 2015 (Platform for the Estonian Parliamentary Elections of 2015). https://ekre.ee/riigikogu-2015/. Accessed 22 March 2020. EKRE. (2019a). Eurovalimiste Platvorm 2019 (Platform for the 2019 European Elections). https://www.ekre.ee/ekre-programm-2019-aasta-euroopa-parlam endi-valimisteks/. Accessed 22 March 2020. EKRE. (2019b). Riigikogu 2019 (Platform for the Estonian Parliamentary Elections of 2019). https://www.ekre.ee/ekre-programm-riigikogu-valimisteks2019/. Accessed 22 March 2020.

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National Alliance. (2018a). Extensive Programme for the 13th Saeima (Englishlanguage translation). https://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/programma/plasaprogramma/. Accessed 1 April 2020. National Alliance. (2018b). Programme for the 13th Saeima (condensed version) (English-language translation). https://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/ programma/13-saeimas-programma/. Accessed 1 April 2020.

CHAPTER 5

Geopolitics, Ethnopolitics, and the EU: The Cases of Latvia and Serbia

Introduction The prospects of joining the EU have functioned as a pole of attraction for several states in Central and Eastern Europe. One of the conditions for admitting post-communist states into the EU, set out in the Copenhagen Criteria (1993), is the adequate protection of the rights and freedoms of national minorities.1 Nevertheless, the management of ethnic relations becomes interwoven, to varying degrees, with geopolitical configurations and anxieties. Assessing whether and how regional geopolitics can combine with domestic ethnopolitics and the management of ethnic relations remains a timely endeavour that can generate innovative insights. The pairing of the country cases from the Baltic States (Latvia) and the Western Balkans (Serbia) is not random. Various actors interact in the management of ethnic relations in the two cases: the largest and politically organised minority groups (Serbia: ethnic Hungarians,2 Latvia:

1 On this issue, see: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_ process/criteria/index_en.htm. Accessed 7 November 2020. 2 This chapter casts its focus on: (a) Serbia’s most ethnically diverse region, the autonomous province of Vojvodina; (b) the largest and politically organised minority group, the ethnic Hungarians (251,136 or 13% of Vojvodina’s population in 2011).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 V. Petsinis, Cross-Regional Ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99951-3_5

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Table 5.1 The ethnic structure of the population of Latvia on 1 July 2018 (largest affiliations)

Affiliations

Numbers

Armenians Azerbaijanis Belarussians Roma Jews Estonians Russians Latvians Lithuanians Poles Tatars Ukrainians Germans

2,672 2,002 67,086 7,009 8,328 2,136 542,469 1,266,297 25,901 44,004 2,410 50,569 5,207

Source https://www.pmlp.gov.lv/. Accessed 5 May 2021

ethnic Russians); their external homelands (Russia3 and Hungary); and the, structured as well as informal, engagement of the EU. Although Latvia is a full-fledged member state of the EU since 2004 and Serbia is stranded along a complicated and non-linear accession process (Table 5.1),4 the management of ethnic relations has been mediated, to varying degrees, by geopolitical concerns in both countries. This provides a crucial common denominator between the two cases (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 107). The varying intersections between ethnopolitics and geopolitics have been commonplace in ethnically diverse societies across Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. the cases of Estonia, Slovakia, Romania, and Croatia) since the 1990s. This chapter demonstrates that the more powerful the nexus between domestic ethnopolitics and regional geopolitics, the less feasible it becomes to liberalise minority policies within given states. Of particular interest is to illustrate how political processes such as systemic transformation can bring about the relaxation of the nexus that 3 In this chapter, Russia is seen as the state that operates as the ‘external homeland’ of Latvia’s Russian-speakers in the field of foreign policy. By July 2018, 542,469 ethnic Russians were estimated to reside in Latvia (Table 5.1). 4 Serbia formally applied for membership of the EU on 22 December 2009 and the accession negotiations officially commenced on 21 January 2014. For more on this issue, see: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-countryinformation/serbia_en. Accessed 11 November 2020.

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consists of ethnopolitics and geopolitics and facilitate the engagement of the EU as an ‘external actor’ inside certain contexts. This chapter highlights the enduring convergence between regional geopolitics (bilateral relations with Russia) and domestic ethnopolitics (the collective status of the ethnic Russian minority) inside the Latvian context. By contrast, the Serbian government under the Serbian Progressive Party/SNS places a greater emphasis on geopolitical considerations, namely the desire to preserve Serbia’s ‘neutrality’ between east and west, occasionally gravitating towards Russia. Consequently, the centrality of domestic ethnopolitics appears to have lessened in the case of Serbia. Furthermore, this chapter underlines that, in Serbia, systemic transformation triggered the relaxation of the intersection between geopolitics and ethnopolitics and this facilitated the external engagement, formal as well as informal, of the EU on minority rights. By contrast, in Latvia, the convergence between geopolitics and ethnopolitics remains intact, and the opportunity structure towards further liberalising the legal framework on minority rights has been more limited in comparison to Serbia. The lens is cast on the management of ethnic relations in Latvia and Serbia and its evolution from the 2000s until present day with occasional references to the 1990s where deemed necessary. This chapter is situated inside the framework of a political analysis. Nevertheless, background references to the developments in the field of minority legislation in Latvia and Serbia are made when judged appropriate. This chapter has been organised according to the pattern of a thematic and paired comparison (Tarrow, 2010). In addition to the consideration of the realities on the levels of institutional and party politics, attention is paid to the grass-roots dimension and sociocultural specificities with a focus on: (a) the public outlooks on geopolitics, ethnopolitics, and the EU in the two societies; (b) how a heritage of peaceful cohabitation can enhance the implementation of the state legislation and encourage the adoption of flexible models for the management of ethnic relations inside regional settings (e.g. the case of Vojvodina in Serbia). This chapter has also relied on: (a) legal documents concerning minority rights, expert reports, opinion polls, and public surveys; (b) semi-structured interviews with political representatives and activists, government officials at all levels of public administration, NGOs and think-tanks, and locally based academic researchers (political scientists, sociologists, and historians) with an expertise in the thematic areas of

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nationalism, ethnopolitics, and geopolitics (conducted in the two countries between 2017 and 2018). The research embeds this information in scholarly and theoretical literature in the thematic areas of ethnopolitics, geopolitics, and nationalism. Before proceeding to the thematic analysis, this chapter outlines the evolution of the constitutional and legal arrangements for the management of ethnic relations in Latvia and Serbia during the 1990s and 2000s.

The Management of Ethnic Relations in Latvia and Serbia: Constitutional and Legal Arrangements Contrasting Legacies from the Communist Era From a legal standpoint, the divergent ramifications of the institutional heritage from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union become visible in the Latvian and Serbian legislations on minority rights. Especially, since the inauguration of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, the Yugoslav legal framework provided a multilevel infrastructure for the management of ethnic relations on the administrative levels of the federated republics, the autonomous provinces within Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo), and the ‘multi-ethnic municipalities’ (e.g. associations of districts in ethnically diverse areas such as the north-western region of Istria in Croatia or the western parts of SR Macedonia) (Dominim, 1990, pp. 97 and 100; Poulton, 1993, p. 27; Pavlowitch, 1971, pp. 357–358). Throughout the former Yugoslavia, civil servants in the legal service recycled these aspects of the communist era legislation that remain relevant, adapted them to the European standards for the protection of minority rights, and drafted decentralised and regionalised models on the regulation of minority issues since the 2000s (e.g. the cases of Croatia, Serbia, and the Republic of Northern Macedonia). In sharp contrast to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, although it officially acknowledged the collective identities of ‘titular’ groups within its federated republics, the Soviet legal framework for the management of ethnic relations remained highly centralised. This generated a state of social segregation which the independent republic of Latvia, as well as Estonia, inherited after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Agarin, 2016, p. 87; Cheskin, 2016; Ekmanis, 2017; Järve, 2013;

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Mertelsmann, 2003; van Elsuwege, 2008).5 Nevertheless, as it becomes clearer in the following sections, primary attention should be paid to the varying intersections between endogenous (domestic ethnopolitics) and exogenous (regional geopolitics) catalysts and how these shape the state legislations and their implementation inside the Latvian and the Serbian contexts. Serbia: A Multilevel Infrastructure The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (30 September 2006)6 comprises of clauses on the public use of minority languages; the prohibition of discrimination; and the cross-border relations of ethnic minorities with their external homelands (Articles 75-80). The ‘Action Plan for the Materialisation of Minority Rights’, adopted by the Republic of Serbia in 2016, maintained and developed the pre-existing guidelines of the Law on the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities /LFRNM (inaugurated inside the frame of the ‘State Union of Serbia and Montenegro’ in 2003) on the national minorities’ councils, education, political participation, the public use of minority languages, and the prohibition of discrimination.7 In particular, the ‘Action Plan’ preserved the clauses on: (a) the public use of minority languages in those municipalities and localities where an ethnic minority makes up at least 15% of the population (Article 11 of the LFRNM); (b) the education in the minority languages at all levels of schooling in the same municipalities and localities (Article 13 of the LFRNM).8

5 This pattern of ‘parallel lives’ in Latvia and Estonia consisted of two segments: the native populations and the Russian-speakers (especially, those who arrived after the end of the Second World War) who, taking advantage of the institutional status of Russian as the lingua franca inside the Soviet Union, often did not demonstrate great interest in learning the Latvian and Estonian languages. 6 For a full text-version, see: ‘Ustav Republike Srbije’. In Službeni Glasnik Republike Srbije, br. 98/06 (2006). 7 For a full text-version of the ‘Action Plan for the Materialisation of Minority Rights’ (2016), see: http://www.puma.vojvodina.gov.rs/dokumenti/Engleski/pravni_ akti/Action%20Plan%20for%20National%20Minorities.PDF. Accessed 29 October 2020. 8 Even in tiny communities of Vojvodina, such as the locality of Maradik (in the vicinity of Ind-ija, Srem), there were two pupils taught in the Hungarian language in each grade at the local school in 2018. Small minority groups such as the ethnic Czechs of the Banat are fully covered at the elementary level of schooling. Some information over these issues was

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The most noteworthy provision in both the old LFRNM and the ‘Action Plan’ remains the authorisation for the formation of the national minorities’ councils at the Narodna Skupština (Serbian national assembly) in Belgrade as well as the assembly of the autonomous province of Vojvodina in Novi Sad. Both bodies are appointed via separate elections and recognised as a pravno liˇce/’legal entity’. In 2008, a new institution was assigned with the task of supervising and safeguarding the prompt implementation of the legal framework on minority rights and a full-fledged legal entity came into existence: The Ministry of Human and Minority Rights. The Serbian laws on local self-government (2002), the official use of minority languages (amended in 2005), and prohibition of discrimination (2009) also contribute to the arrangement of an articulate framework for the protection of minority rights (Petsinis, 2012, pp. 31–35, 2020b, p. 216). One distinctive feature of the Serbian legal framework on minority rights is its highly devolved infrastructure. The statute on the autonomy of Vojvodina, initially adopted on 14 December 2009 and revised on 22 May 2014, upgrades the status of national minorities to that of national communities (nacionalne zajednice). Articles 6 and 7 reaffirm the multi-ethnic physiognomy and endorse the equality of all ethnic groups living in the autonomous province of Vojvodina. They also provide for the implementation of positive discrimination with the aim of safeguarding minority identities. Article 23 acknowledges the dual dimension of minority rights (individual and collective) whereas Article 26 safeguards the use of minority languages at all levels of education and public information. An institutional provision of major importance is the Council for National Communities at the provincial assembly of Vojvodina (Article 40). These clauses supplement those of the ‘Action Plan’ (2016) with a greater focus on the local management of ethnic relations. Latvia: A Centralised Legal Framework Post-Soviet Latvia has been officially established as the restoration of the interwar Latvian republic and not as a new state (Muižnieks, 2006a; van Elsuwege, 2004; Ziemele, 1998). On 15 October 1991, the Latvian disclosed to the author during his field research in Vojvodina (Interview with the ViceSecretary at the Provincial Secretariat for National Minorities, Autonomous Assembly of Vojvodina; 29 November 2018, Novi Sad).

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parliament decreed the restoration of citizenship to all residents of Latvia who were interwar citizens and their direct descendants.9 Nevertheless, the redefinition of the citizenship status of these residents who did not meet this criterion became entangled into a complicated process. The bulk of settlers who arrived after the Second World War, mostly ethnic Russians, were rendered ‘stateless’ and had to start a complex process of naturalisation to acquire Latvian citizenship. This corresponded to restrictions in their political participation (Salonari, 2007, pp. 323–326; Van Elsuwege, 2004, pp. 21–23). Consequently, by March 1995, 740,000 persons (in their majority Russian-speakers) did not fit any of the standard legal categories: citizen, foreign national, or stateless individual (Muižnieks, 1995, p. 22). In April 1995, a new law was passed and granted stateless persons the equivalent of permanent resident status but not without restrictions in their political participation (Van Elsuwege, 2004, pp. 21–23; Salonari, 2007, pp. 323–326).10 It was not until the national referendum of 1998 that this law was amended and allowed for the children of noncitizens born after independence to obtain citizenship by registration (Muižnieks, 2006a, pp. 15–17).11 Most recently, following another long string of debates at the Saeima (Latvian national assembly), a compromise was reached and the new Law on Citizenship, valid from 1 January 2020, grants automatic citizenship to the children of (mostly Russianspeaking) non-citizens/stateless persons unless the parents opt for another nationality.12 The legal framework on languages establishes the institutional primacy of the Latvian language in public administration and information as well as the educational system. In March 1992, the Law on Languages (1989) was amended and institutionalised the adequate command of 9 On this issue, see: Latvijas Republikas Augst¯ ak¯ as Padomes un Vald¯ıbas Zinot¯ ¸ ajs, No. 43, 1991. 10 For more on this issue, see: http://minelres.lv/count/non_cit-rights_2.htm. Accessed 3 November 2020. 11 In accordance to data from the Commissioner of Human Rights at the Council of Europe, there were about 230,000 ‘non-citizens’ in Latvia on 1 January 2018. For this figure, see: https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/latvia-takes-import ant-step-toward-eliminating-child-statelessness. Accessed 10 November 2020. 12 For additional information on this issue, see: https://www.coe.int/en/web/commis sioner/-/latvia-takes-important-step-toward-eliminating-child-statelessness. Accessed 10 November 2020.

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Latvian language as a basic prerequisite for employment in the government and the economy sectors (Muižnieks, 2006a, p. 18; Salonari, 2007, pp. 329–330). Meanwhile, state-funded higher education was to be provided solely in Latvian whereas a state of segregation between Latvianlanguage and Russian-language schools consolidated in the primary and secondary levels of education (Kamenska & Muižnieks, 1995; Muižnieks, 2006a, pp. 18–19). Following a series of debates between 1998 and 2004, the ’60-40’ principle was agreed upon and specified that public secondary schools were to deliver at least 60% of the instruction in Latvian (Nakai, 2014, pp. 69–70; Zepa et al, 2006, p. 27). Most recently, in March 2018, the Saeima decreed that: ‘…as of 2022/2023, all general subjects in upper-secondary education level will be taught in the state language (Latvian), but ethnic minority students will continue study of their language, literature, and cultural subjects in their family language’.13

The Management of Ethnic Relations in Serbia and Latvia: Between Domestic Ethnopolitics and Regional Geopolitics Systemic Transformation Versus a Pattern of Continuity Ethnopolitics in Serbia and Latvia are subject to the impact of both endogenous and exogenous catalysts (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 110). In Serbia, the most decisive transformation of the political landscape took place during the transition from Slobodan Miloševi´c’s rule. This commenced after the victory of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia/DOS coalition in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 5 October 2000. A secondary and more recent transformation of the Serbian political map consists in the consolidation of President Aleksandar Vuˇci´c and the (nominally centre-right, conservative) SNS (Srpska Napredna Stranka) as preponderant actors, after the presidential elections of 2017 and the parliamentary elections of 2016 and 2020 (Petsinis, 2020c).14 This development signalled an end to the high degree of fragmentation that 13 On this issue, see: https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/content/ national-reforms-school-education-34_en. Accessed 10 November 2020. 14 For further information about the wider context of the latest parliamentary elections (21 June 2020) in Serbia, see: https://www.politico.eu/article/serbian-ruling-party-winsby-landslide-in-europes-first-covid-19-election/. Accessed 10 November 2020.

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persisted across Serbia’s party spectrum after Slobodan Miloševi´c’s fall from power (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 110).15 In order to comprehend more adequately how systemic transformation combined with ethnopolitics in Serbia, some further elaboration and contextual analysis is required. During the 1990s, domestic ethnopolitics intertwined with regional geopolitics and the relations among the actors inside Brubaker’s triadic nexus (Brubaker, 1995, p. 109) remained tense. The aggravation of the situation in Kosovo and the confrontation with the Euro-Atlantic institutions culminated in NATO’s air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro (March–June 1999). Meanwhile in Vojvodina, despite the general absence of violent conflict, there is evidence that the legislation on minority rights was not implemented promptly and that a ‘renationalisation’ project was put under way (Korhecz, 1998; Samardži´c, 1998; United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1996). Political parties vested with the task to represent the political interests of the ethnic Hungarian community (the Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina/VMDK and, since 1996, the Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina/VMSZ16 ) refrained from cooperating with the Serbian democratic opposition and concentrated their efforts on internationalising their grievances in the European forums (e.g. COE and OSCE) aided by a series of governments in Budapest (Arpasy, 1996, pp. 65–66, Petsinis, 2020b, p. 110). As already stressed in the comparative discussion of Croatia and Serbia (Chapter 3), the enhancement of the administrative institutions in Kosovo gradually triggered: (a) a prioritisation of geopolitical and foreign policy concerns by a sequence of governments in post-Miloševi´c Serbia, with the overriding endeavour to maintain Kosovo inside the administrative bounds of the Serbian republic; (b) the readjustment of the nexus that

15 Before the dynamic emergence and consolidation of SNS, the leaderships of parties as diverse as the (centre-right, conservative) DSS, the (centrist, liberal) Democratic Party/DS, and the (royalist, conservative) Serbian Renewal Movement/SPO watered down their programmatic differences, or the inter-personal antipathies of their leaders, in order to set up short-lived coalition governments as a cordon sanitaire against SRS (Serbia’s strongest party in its own right during the 2000s). 16 VMSZ is the evolution of a ‘splinter group’ that departed from VMDK in 1994. This group of dissidents left VMDK because of their discontent with the alleged ‘intraparty authoritarianism’ as well as their more favourable disposition to cooperation with the Serbian democratic opposition (Arpasy, 1996, pp. 40, 43, and 62; VMSZ, 1996, Section III).

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consisted of geopolitics and ethnopolitics. This new state of affairs consolidated after the unilateral recognition of the independence of Kosovo by the US government (17 February 2008). Consequently, the management of ethnic relations within Serbia started forming a distinct area of engagement in relation to regional geopolitics. This development provided the early impetus that led to the arrangement of an extensive and multilevel legal framework on minority rights. On the other hand, Latvia is characterised by a social stability although its party spectrum has been subject to fragmentation (Ikstens, 2013; Melenshevich, 2007; Saarts, 2011). In contrast to Serbia, the political landscape of post-Soviet Latvia has displayed a greater continuity especially in regards to the endeavour to exclude parties suspected of proKremlin leanings from the government structures (Nakai, 2014, pp. 74– 76). One key-feature of the Latvian party system is the tendency of the ethnic Russian community to rally around parties with a civic (the centreleft Saskana/Harmony) ¸ instead of an explicitly ethnic profile, unlike the ethnic Hungarian minorities across the Carpathian basin (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 111). Harmony’s appeal to ethnic Russians, as well as their calls for a foreign policy of appeasement towards Russia, has made their political rivals sceptical over the party’s reliability. Therefore, despite its successful performance in a series of electoral contests, Harmony has been viewed as an outcast party by the predominantly Latvian parties and a cordon sanitaire has been formed around them. These political configurations and alignments are in accordance with: (a) the implementation of the restorationist and ethnic democracy models (Aalto, 2003; Agarin, 2016; Mole, 2012; Smooha, 2001); (b) the stress on the primacy of the Latvian language in the state bureaucracy, education, and the public sector. The provisions of the ’60-40 principle’ in education (1998), the revision of the Law on Citizenship (1998) and, most recently, the inauguration of the new Law on Citizenship (2020) amount to noteworthy steps towards the liberalisation of the legal framework on minority rights. However, as illustrated in greater detail later in this chapter, certain controversies persist with respect to the implementation of the state legislation on language and education. To these, one should add the geopolitical anxieties because of Russia’s disproportional leverage as the external homeland for ethnic Russians (Ijabs, 2016, pp. 13–15). This pattern of continuity in domestic politics has preserved the convergence between geopolitics and ethnopolitics (Petsinis, 2020b, pp. 111–112).

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Geopolitics and Ethnopolitics: Readjustment Versus Maintenance The relaxation of the nexus that consisted of ethnopolitics and geopolitics brought about the readjustment of the interaction between endogenous and exogenous factors in the management of ethnic relations in Serbia. Starting with the former, since 2000, the engagement of Vojvodinian Hungarian parties (namely, VMSZ) has centred on a preference to the politics of consensus over the politics of confrontation. Capitalising on the state of fragmentation in Serbian politics since the fall of Slobodan Miloševi´c and before the consolidation of SNS, VMSZ had been participating in a series of government coalitions with larger Serbian parties on the republican level and at the provincial government of Vojvodina. This pattern of engagement has facilitated VMSZ to promote their standpoints and demands on minority rights from within the halls of power. At the same time, although this document still maintains a great symbolic value, VMSZ appears to place a secondary importance to the tripartite concept of ethno-territorial autonomy as the fundamental premise for the party’s policymaking (Petsinis, 2020a, p. 217, 2020b, p. 112).17 The consolidation of SNS as the dominant actor in Serbian politics did not affect the management of ethnic relations in a negative manner. The political programme of SNS subscribes to safeguarding the collective rights and freedoms of ethnic minorities as these are stipulated in the state legislation (education, political representation, public use of minority languages, and cross-border links to the external homelands) (SNS, 2011, pp. 44–45). More importantly, following the results of the 2016 and the 202018 elections for the Vojvodinian assembly, VMSZ has been cooperating with the provincial SNS committee over a broad range of policymaking areas (Petsinis, 2020a, p. 217) (Table 5.2).19 17 The VMSZ concept of tripartite autonomy comprises of the areas of personal autonomy, territorial autonomy, and local self-administration (VMSZ, 1996; Section IV, Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4). 18 On 21 June 2020, VMSZ garnered 9.29% of the vote (11 out of 120 seats) and currently stands as the third strongest party at the assembly of the autonomous province of Vojvodina (Table 5.2). 19 The party-chairman, István Pásztor, currently serves as president at the executive

council of the provincial assembly. Some first-hand information regarding the steady cooperation between SNS and VMDZ, both at the assembly of the autonomous province of Vojvodina and at the Narodna Skupština, was disclosed to the author in the course of his field research in Vojvodina (Interview with MP of VMSZ at the Serbian parliament; 30 November 2018, Belgrade).

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Table 5.2 The results of the elections for the assembly of the Serbian autonomous province of Vojvodina (21 June 2020)

Parties and electoral coalitions

Percentages and seats at the assembly

SNS-led coalition SPS-led coalition VMSZ LSV-led coalition DSS POKS SRS

61.58% and 76 seats 11.18% and 13 seats 9.29% and 11 seats 5.12% and 6 seats 4.38% and 5 seats 4.21% and 5 seats 3.27% and 4 seats

Source: Electoral Commission of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (2020). http://www.pik.skupstinavojvodine.gov.rs/. Accessed 5 May 2021

Moreover, the party garnered 2.5% of the vote and elected 10 deputies at the Narodna Skupština in the parliamentary elections of June 2020 enhancing the strength of the SNS-led coalition (188 out of 250 seats). Empirical research demonstrates that SNS and President Aleksandar Vuˇci´c have been keen on a tactical and situationally adaptive pattern of policymaking with the objective to maintain a favourable balance with various interest groups (Petsinis, 2017; Vuksanovi´c, 2018). Meanwhile, the role of Hungary as the external homeland for Serbia’s ethnic Hungarians has been readjusted. During the 2000s, the question of minority rights for ethnic Hungarians fomented tensions between Budapest and neighbouring governments (e.g. Hungary’s objections during Romania’s accession process to the EU and its opposition to the Slovak Language Law of 2009). Although the situation of the ethnic kin in the ‘near abroad’ still forms a priority of Hungarian foreign policy, the EU’s apprehension over the state of democratic freedoms (e.g. the rule of law) in Hungary, as well as Viktor Orbán’s principled opposition to certain EU guidelines (e.g. the quotas arrangement for the redistribution of refugees within the EU space), has largely shifted the lens of the Hungarian government’s grievances from the neighbouring states towards Brussels.20 Correspondingly, PM Viktor Orbán was the 20 Politically active individuals among Vojvodina’s ethnic Hungarian community have also hinted at the inter-personal modus vivendi between President Aleksandar Vuˇci´c and PM Viktor Orbán. They underline that István Pásztor functioned as the key-mediator between the two leaders (Interview with MP of VMSZ at the Serbian parliament; 30 November 2018, Belgrade; Interview with the Vice-Secretary at the Provincial Secretariat

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first foreign leader who congratulated the leadership of SNS, on the occasion of the party’s victory in the parliamentary elections of June 2020. Moreover, Hungary remains a fervent advocate of Serbia in its accession process to the EU. The endeavour by the irredentist party of Jobbik/Movement for a Better Hungary,21 to expand its bases of support among Vojvodina’s Hungarians, between 2012 and 2014, was not fruitful (Pogonyi, 2017, pp. 104–105) and was met with by strident opposition from VMSZ. In January 2014, István Pásztor, warned Jobbik, on the occasion of the party’s attempt to open its representation office in Subotica, that: ‘we do not need anyone, not a single one, who comes from Hungary to ignite fire with their irresponsible behaviour, and then go home’ and added that: ‘Vojvodina’s Hungarians have never been and will never become protagonists in either Serbian or Hungarian nationalism’ (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 113).22 To this, one should add that: (a) an estimated 90–95% of ethnic Hungarians from Vojvodina with the right to vote in Hungary voted for FIDESZ in the last Hungarian parliamentary elections (2018)23 ; (b) the (green) ‘Politics Can Be Different’/LMP surpassed Jobbik as the second most popular party among the ethnic Hungarian community in Vojvodina, by the time of the last elections.24

for National Minorities, Autonomous Assembly of Vojvodina; 29 November 2018, Novi Sad). 21 Since 2016 and before the departure of Gábor Vona from its leadership (October 2019), Jobbik officially entered a phase of ‘de-radicalisation’. The new chairman, Péter Jakab, redirected the party’s rhetoric from identity politics inside (the Roma question and the migration crisis) and outside (the ethnic Hungarian minorities in the Carpathian basin) Hungary to the debate on corruption. For a few samples regarding this change of course, see: https://www.jobbik.com/the_shame_is_here_to_stay and https://www.job bik.com/fidesz_is_protecting_murderers. Accessed 11 November 2020. 22 The original statement can be found at: http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Srbija/ 377296/Pastor-Jobiku-Ne-vrsljaj-po-Vojvodini. Accessed 10 November 2020. 23 Interview with MP of VMSZ at the Serbian parliament (30 November 2018, Belgrade). 24 The ‘Hungarian Hope Movement’ was a small, pro-Jobbik, party based in Subotica.

The party was founded in 2009 but was officially disbanded in 2018 without succeeding in gaining popularity among the local ethnic Hungarians. The LMP is also interested in the situation of the ethnic Hungarian communities across the Carpathian basin but its standpoints on this policymaking area are not extensively developed (Interview with MP of VMSZ at the Serbian parliament; 30 November 2018, Belgrade; Interview with the

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By contrast, Russia’s role, as the external homeland for Latvia’s ethnic Russians, has been confrontational. As early as 2000, the Kremlin responded to Latvia’s perceived nationalising project by dubbing the country a ‘frontrunner in the discrimination of the Russian-speaking population’ whereas, in 2003, Dmitry Rogozin went as far as to prescribe economic sanctions and contend that ‘Nazis have come to power in Latvia’ (van Elsuwege, 2004, pp. 1 and 28; Petsinis, 2020b, p. 113). Furthermore, between 2003 and 2004, Russia tried to indirectly complicate Latvia’s accession process to the EU by bringing up the question of minority rights in Latvia at the sessions of the COE and the OSCE (Muižnieks, 2006b, pp. 124–125, 2011). Most recently, Russia has been accused of trying to jeopardise societal security in Latvia by means of information warfare, disinformation campaigns in the social media, and the sponsorship of separatism in the south-eastern region of Latgale (Berzina, 2016, pp. 7–20; Backes & Swab, 2019, p. 41; Kachuyevski, 2017; Ozolina, 2016; Petsinis, 2020b, p. 113).25 One might argue that Russia’s greater geopolitical weight and confrontational tones have not generated more positive developments for the collective status of ethnic Russians in Latvia but, instead, backfired. In contrast to Serbia, the aggregate of endogenous and exogenous catalysts has preserved the nexus between ethnopolitics and geopolitics intact. To the eyes of most political parties at the Saeima and other stakeholders, any attempts at further concessions in the area of minority rights may bring about societal polarisation and pave the path to concessions in the field of inter-state relations with Russia (Cianetti, 2014, pp. 101–102). The language referendum of 2012 was an initiative that polarised the society and highlighted the cleavages regarding the ethnic democracy model and its implementation (Hanovs, 2016; Ijabs, 2016, pp. 10–12).26 Therefore, Latvian remains the only official language in the public administration, Vice-Secretary at the Provincial Secretariat for National Minorities, Autonomous Assembly of Vojvodina; 29 November 2018, Novi Sad). 25 Some information about this issue was disclosed to the author in interviews with two research experts in information warfare at the National Defence Academy of Latvia (7 July 2017, Riga). In all of this, it should be also kept in mind that, locally based, political scientists judge that geostrategic and military analysts may occasionally overstate the extent of Russian information and hybrid warfare in Latvia (Interview with a political scientist at the Latvia University in Riga, 28 July 2017). 26 The result of the referendum was against the motion to recognise Russian as the second state-language (74.8%) but reflected on the ethno-cultural divisions within the

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even in Latgale and other parts of the country with a dense presence of a Russian-speaking population (Petsinis, 2020b, pp. 113–114). The Engagement of the EU as an External Actor: Enabling Versus Disabling Circumstances In Serbia, the clearer demarcation of regional geopolitics from domestic ethnopolitics facilitated the engagement of the EU and its soft power as a fourth actor. In a series of bilateral negotiations with Serbian government representatives, since the early 2000s, the European Commission reiterated to their interlocutors that the rearrangement of the legal framework on minority rights not only would conform to the accession requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria (1993), it would also contribute towards the resolution of outstanding controversies with neighbouring states (e.g. Hungary and Croatia) (Anastasakis, 2008; Petsinis, 2020b, p. 114).27 The provisions of the ‘Action Plan for the Materialisation of Minority Rights’ (2016) and the other legal documents on minority rights are fully consistent with the guidelines of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM, 1995) in regards to: the prohibition of discrimination (Articles 4.1, 5.2 and 6.2 of the FCNM), the public use of minority languages (Article 11.1-2), the operation of media in the minority languages (Article 9.3 of the FCNM), the provision of education for ethnic minorities at all levels (Articles 12.1-2, 13.1, and 14.2 of the FCNM), and the authorisation of minorities to maintain links to legal subjects based in their external homelands (Article 17.1 of the FCNM). In addition to these, the Serbian law on the use of minority languages (2005) is consistent with Articles 8.1 (on education), 9.1 (on the judicial authorities), 10.1-2 (on public administration), 11.1 (on the media), and 14 of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Council of Europe, 1992). On the regional level of Vojvodina, the statute on provincial autonomy recycles and combines selected elements of the communist era legislation with the European standards on minority rights.

society and hinted that the ethnic Russian population did not subscribe to the recognition of Latvian as the only state language. 27 Article 6 of the statute on the autonomy of Vojvodina (2009) officially restored the collective status of the ethnic Croat minority in regards to the areas of education and public information in the Croatian language and its script.

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During Latvia’s accession stage, the EU and its soft power engagement played a decisive part towards the relaxation of the ethnic democracy model and the more effective inclusion of the ethnic Russian minority (Schutze, 2018, pp. 260–274). This was the case with the allowance for the children of non-citizens born after independence to obtain citizenship by registration and, also, with the abolition of the (Latvian) language requirement for deputy candidates (Cianetti, 2014, pp. 97–98; European Commission, 2002, pp. 20, 25, 27, 30–31, 33, 135, and 141; van Elsuwege, 2004, pp. 9–10 and 51). Nevertheless, the persistence of the convergence between ethnopolitics and geopolitics operated as a ‘glass ceiling’ that froze more drastic developments during the post-accession period. Russia’s emergence as a contender to the EU and NATO from the east prompted a string of Latvian governments to place a greater stress on regional security rather than on the domestic management of ethnopolitics (Schutze, 2018, pp. 134–164). Therefore, lesser attention was paid to the liberalisation of minority policies whereas a greater emphasis was laid on perfecting the other aspects of democratisation (e.g. consolidation of the democratic institutions and the rule of law, media freedom, and privatisation of the economy). In contrast to Serbia, the persistent convergence between geopolitics and ethnopolitics in Latvia limited the opportunity structure towards the liberalisation of the legal framework on minority rights and the substantial revision of the ethnic democracy model (Petsinis, 2020b, pp. 114–115). The attention paid towards establishing Latvian as the official language in order to, allegedly, boost integration (e.g. the Latvia National Action Plan, 2004–2006) was often interpreted by interest groups among the ethnic Russian community as an attempt to disguise assimilation into integration (van Elsuwege, 2004, pp. 12–16; Zepa et al, 2006, p. 23). Furthermore, between 2017 and early 2018 and before the compromise of March 2018, Harmony MPs and ethnic Russian interest groups regarded the proposals for Latvia’s educational reform as a subtle endeavour, engineered by the party of National Alliance/NA, with the objective to ‘ostracise’ Russian-language schooling institutions (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 115).28 28 Interviews with: two ethnic Russian journalists and political activists (7 July 2017, Riga); two Professors in Latvian party politics at Latvia University (28 July 2017, Riga); a National Alliance representative at the Latvian Saeima and

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The Management of Ethnic Relations in Latvia and Serbia: The Dimension of Party Politics Contesting the EU and Minority Rights: A Retrospective Overview The 1990s were marked by a convergence between ethnopolitics and geopolitics in Serbia. This convergence was reflected on the ‘antiimperialist’ critique of Euro-Atlantic institutions which was propagated by the ruling party of SPS (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 115). Inside this hegemonic narrative, Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia not only were under threat from the geopolitical machinations of the EU and NATO, they were equally imperilled from the destabilising initiatives of ‘fifth-column’ political organisations in the interior (allegedly VMDK, VMSZ, as well as the regionalist League of Vojvodina’s Social Democrats/LSV) (ibid.). Under the leadership of Vojislav Šešelj, the Serbian Radical Party/SRS adopted this convergence between geopolitics and ethnopolitics and extended it even further in its platform (Baki´c, 2009, pp. 194–203). During the early 1990s, SRS affiliates became directly involved in acts of ethnic violence (e.g. against the ethnic Croat community of Hrtkovci in Srem, May 1992) (Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 1997, pp. 34–35, 1998, pp. 46–47). Vojislav Šešelj and other leading SRS-cadres were charged with the propagation of hate speech against ethnic minorities in Vojvodina and elsewhere in Serbia.29 In its present manifesto, SRS hints at the allegedly ‘privileged’ status of ethnic minorities in Serbia (SRS, 2009, p. 28). However, the party no longer contends that minority rights are ‘externally imposed’ on Serbia by the EU or any other European institution. The SRS manifesto makes no clear references to the EU but stresses that the party prioritises the

the European parliament (13 October 2017, Riga). For further information, see: https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/education/legality-of-latvias-education-reform-tobe-considered-by-constitutional-court.a277041/. Accessed 10 November 2020. 29 Vojislav Šešelj called for the expulsion of ethnic Croats from Vojvodina, with the exception of those Croats who ‘fought with his volunteers and these were not too many’ (Borba, 3 May 1992). During the same period, the SRS-leader is also said to have stated that: ‘Every Hungarian or Slovak who agrees to leave Vojvodina will take a sandwich as a present’ (Interview with MP of VMSZ at the Serbian parliament; 30 November 2018, Belgrade; Interview with the Director at the ‘Centre for Regionalism’ NGO; 16 November 2018, Novi Sad).

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formation of political and military alliances with: ‘…those states that have understanding for Serbia’s national interests…those states that expressed solidarity (to Serbia) during its toughest moments in history’ (SRS, 2009, pp. 28 and 30). Then, it concludes that: ‘…Serbia has no reason to become member of international alliances that favour the interests of certain groups of states at the expense of others’ (ibid., p. 29; Baki´c, 2009, p. 199; Petsinis, 2020b, p. 115). In all of this, it should be kept in mind that SRS is evolving into a marginal actor in Serbian politics, especially after its failure to enter the Narodna Skupština in the parliamentary elections of June 2020; garnering a mere 2.5% of the vote. In regards to smaller (hard Eurosceptic) right-wing actors, DSS also refrains from interconnecting its Euroscepticism with the situation of minority rights in Serbia and has adopted a platform of mostly economic Euroscepticism (Stoji´c, 2018, pp. 247–250). Along comparable lines, the radical right-wing party of Dveri/‘Gates’ makes no reference to the management of ethnic relations in the interior and embeds its opposition to the EU accession process into: (a) discontent with the ‘EU conditionality fatigue’ and allegations that Serbia is being transformed into an economic colony; (b) the memories from the NATO air campaign of 1999 and the conviction that Russia must be the main strategic partner of Serbia in global politics.30 However, in spite of the frequent participation of DSS in a number of governing coalitions during the 2000s, neither DSS nor Dveri is currently represented in the national assembly. In contrast to Serbia, as early as the restoration of independence (1991), the desire for a ‘return to Europe’ by joining the EU emerged as an imperative in Latvia (Austers, 2016, pp. 87–88; Austers & Nikišins, 2017). During the 1990s, the (radical right-wing) party of TB/LNNK urged for the renationalisation of the state, objected to the relaxation of the legal criteria for the naturalisation of the ‘Soviet era colonists’, and even proposed their ‘conditional repatriation’ to Russia (Björkman & Johansson, 2012, pp. 8–9).31 The pressures from the High Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE) for the revision of the Law on the State Language (1998–1999) were interpreted by TN/LNNK as an affront and a sign of negligence,

30 For more on this issue, see: https://dveri.rs/zasto-dveri/program/van-eu-savez-sarusijom/. Accessed 7 November 2020. 31 Interview with a political scientist at the Latvia University in Riga (28 July 2017).

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as well as external interference, to Latvia’s domestic affairs (ibid., p. 8; Jubulis, 2001, pp. 128–129; Kelley, 2004, pp. 83–84). Nevertheless, the party did not harden its outlook on the EU accession process as a whole. Instead, since that early stage, TB/LNNK directed its efforts towards the renegotiation of certain aspects of the EU’s conditionality which, according to the party, clashed with Latvia’s national interest and state sovereignty (Petsinis, 2020b, pp. 115–116). Party Politics, European Politics, and Ethnopolitics: The View from Within the Halls of Power The governing party of SNS formally safeguards the state legislation on minority rights and endorses Serbia’s accession to the EU (SNS, 2011, pp. 40 and 41). In its active policymaking, the SNS-led government assumes a gradualist stance vis-à-vis the accession process to the EU with an overriding emphasis on geopolitics and a concern over Serbia’s relations with the main actors in global politics. This does not comprise of any complementary references to the situation of ethnic relations in the state’s ibid., p. 41). Of great significance for Serbian policymakers is to preserve the country’s oscillation between east and west without, at the same time, annulling or jeopardising Serbia’s candidacy for membership of the EU.32 Taking into consideration its staunch support at the UN Security Council on the question of Kosovo and the ongoing partnership in energy cooperation, Russia has been the favourite ‘alternative’ global actor to the EU for a sequence of Serbian governments after the fall of Miloševi´c (Samorukov, 2020, pp. 21–25).33 Nevertheless, more recently and during the period between the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis and the parliamentary elections of June 2020, China was repeatedly praised for its supply of medical aid.34 This

32 For more on this issue, see: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/13/eu-strategykosovo-serbia-thaci-vucic-russia-china-relationship/. Accessed 8 November 2020. 33 Interview with a Former Serbian Minister of National Defence (20 November 2018, Belgrade). 34 This aid consisted of items such as ventilators, respiratory masks, test kits, and other medical supplies. Chinese state officials and political analysts contested claims of a ‘geopolitically motivated’ opening to Serbia and preferred to highlight the ‘humanitarian dimension’ of China’s assistance for the whole of Europe. For more on this issue, see: https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1185161.shtml. Accessed 9 November 2020.

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country’s popularity among Serbia’s stakeholders (especially within the circles allied to SNS), the pro-government tabloids (e.g. outlets such as Informer, Alo, Srpski Telegraf , and Kurir), and the general public skyrocketed; arguably more than the popularity of Russia35 . Counterevidence36 indicates that, since 2009, the EU has been a more substantial foreign donor for Serbia than China. However, the COVID-19 emergency provided the SNS-led apparatus with one more opportunity to practise its ‘situationally adaptive’ Eurosceptic rhetoric. Party officials accused the EU of not responding adequately to the country’s hardships. These occurrences attest to the clear demarcation between the areas of geopolitics and foreign policy on the one hand, and ethnopolitics on the other, among Serbian policymakers. In Latvia, the fusion between TB/LNNK and the ‘All for Latvia!’ party into the National Alliance/NA in 2011 set a milestone in the history of the country’s populist and radical right (Auers & Kasekamp, 2015, p. 141). At this point, it should be stressed that, throughout the last decade, the core partner in nearly all governing coalitions in Latvia has been the party of Unity which is currently designated as New Unity (‘Jaun¯a Vienot¯ıba’).37 This is a party of the centre-right that accommodates a variety of liberal, as well as conservative, standpoints under its umbrella and which has been displaying a powerful pro-EU disposition. The focus on the NA is due to this party’s consistent propagation of ethno-nationalist, on ‘demographic issues’ and the necessity to safeguard the institutional status of the Latvian language, and soft Eurosceptic prerogatives from within the halls of power. In all of this, it should be kept in mind that the New Unity’s more prominent role in the governing structures has weakened the NA’s more nationalistic tones on domestic policies (e.g. the compromise over the new Law on Citizenship in 2019) and Eurosceptic utterances on the EU (e.g. on the quotas arrangement

35 For more on this issue, see: https://lseideas.medium.com/from-russia-with-love-ser bias-lukewarm-reception-of-russian-aid-and-its-geopolitical-implications-a911b3ec09a7 and https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_serbia_and_coronavirus_propaganda_high_time_for_ a_transactional/. Accessed 11 November 2020. 36 On this issue, see: https://www.rferl.org/a/who-gives-the-most-aid-to-serbia-/306 60859.html. Accessed 12 November 2020. 37 New Unity was officially launched in April 2018 as a long-term evolution of the merger among the New Era Party, the Civic Union, and the Society for Other Politics. The Latvian PM, Arturs Krišj¯anis Karinš, ¸ is a member of New Unity.

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for the redistribution of refugees within the EU space and policymaking issues pertaining to state security). Following the results of the 2018 parliamentary elections, the (centrist-liberal and equally pro-EU) ‘Development/For!’ party additionally functions as a regulatory catalyst which alleviates the more nationalistic and Eurosceptic trends inside Latvia’s governing coalition. Coming back to the NA, from an early point in the party’s programmatic declarations for the 2018 parliamentary elections, it is stressed that: ‘the main threat to the Latvian nation is Russian imperialism…today’s Russia poses a military, informational, and political threat to the Latvian state’ (NA, 2018b, p. 2). The leadership of the NA clarifies that: ‘we primarily view Latvia’s membership of the EU as a geopolitical and security related issue…we do not subscribe to (former President of the European Commission) Mr Juncker’s concept of Euro-federalism because it is seriously flawed’.38 The NA remains adamant in its position that the convergence between geopolitics and ethnopolitics must remain intact, especially considering that the ‘Kremlin’s weaponisation of the Russkiy Mir/“Russian world” concept is visible in Latvia…the contemporary “Russian World” concept is reminiscent of the Völksdeutsche (ethnic German minorities) concept in the days of Nazi Germany’ (Kudors & Pelnens, 2015).39 Consequently, the party programme strikes a stance of geopolitical Euroscepticism and the party leadership expresses their dissatisfaction with regard to: (a) the ongoing cooperation between powerful EU member states, Germany and France, and Russia in energy issues; (b) the potential formation of defence structures ‘parallel’ to NATO on the EU level (e.g. the European Security Union and the European army project) (NA, 2018a, p. 3). Since 2015, the EU refugee quotas arrangement has emerged as an additional point of contention between the NA and the European Commission. The party holds that ‘the EU has been ignoring state sovereignty…we are very critical towards the EU redistribution plan for refugees’ because this, allegedly, ‘consists in a very naïve approach: Bring the refugees to states like Latvia and the problem will be miraculously

38 Interview with the Secretary General of the NA (13 October 2017, Riga). 39 Interview with a NA MP at the Latvian Saeima and the European Parliament (13

October 2017, Riga).

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solved!’.40 More importantly, the NA underlines the preemptive character of its engagement against the admission of Muslim refugees, or other migrants, in Latvia and, in Raivis Zelt¯ıts’ words: ‘If you look at the UK or France, ghettoisation, crime, and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism constitute an explosive blend. Latvia is and will remain safe if it manages to escape the migration waves’.41 In all of this, the party leadership tends to be somewhat less vocal with regard to its grievances about the outlooks of the EU on domestic ethnopolitics, yet stresses that: ‘we are afraid that our Western partners often cannot relate to our trauma inherited from the Soviet era and our concerns over Latvia’s security and state sovereignty (e.g. their relentless pressures for the naturalisation of stateless persons)’.42 Overall, one might argue that the NA has been cultivating a brand of soft Euroscepticism within which geopolitics, ethnopolitics, and the ‘new’ identity politics of immigration constitute a joint nexus (Petsinis & Wierenga, 2021, pp. 22–23). By contrast to the consolidation of a soft (geopolitical) Euroscepticism from within the governing structures in Serbia, the NA’s successful ‘right-wing entryism’ to the halls of power has not triggered a more Eurosceptic turn in Latvia’s foreign policy (Auers & Kasekamp, 2015, pp. 151–152; Kott, 2016). Such a development has also been averted by the ‘regulatory’ engagement of the New Unity and Development/For! Instead, the NA has been mostly successful in: (a) promoting its policies on demographic issues (Auers & Kasekamp, 2015, pp. 142–143); (b) spearheading its proposals for the safeguarding of Latvian language and its institutional dominance.43

40 Interview with a NA MP at the Latvian Saeima and the European Parliament (13 October 2017, Riga). 41 Interview with the Secretary General of the NA (13 October 2017, Riga). 42 Interview with a NA MP at the Latvian Saeima and the European parliament (13

October 2017, Riga). 43 Interviews with: two ethnic Russian journalists and political activists (7 July 2017, Riga); two Professors in Latvian party politics at Latvia University (28 July 2017, Riga); a NA MP at the Latvian Saeima and the European parliament (13 October 2017, Riga).

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The Management of Ethnic Relations in Latvia and Serbia: Realities ‘on the Ground’ Geopolitics, Ethnopolitics, and the EU: What the People Think Moving to the grass-roots dimension, public surveys, conducted between 2001 and 2002, detected very positive inclinations regarding the prospects of Serbia joining the EU as well as an apprehension towards ‘the West’ and the firm rejection of NATO (Lazar & Marinkovi´c, 2001; NNS, 2001; Petsinis, 2020b, p. 118; Puziga´ca & Molnar, 2001, p. 19). These ambivalent observations can be comprehended, on the one hand, on the basis of the desire to end the country’s prolonged isolation and, on the other hand, as a result of NATO’s air campaign and the Western policies towards Serbia during the 1990s.44 The favourable disposition towards the EU accession process persisted until the early 2010s (Kancelarija za Evropske Integracije, 2010, p. 3; Markovi´c-Tomi´c, 2016). Nevertheless, since 2014, there has been observed a steady decline in the favourable attitudes towards the EU accession process and the pro-EU percentages in the public surveys have been fluctuating between 55 and 45% of the samples polled (CESID, 2016, pp. 24–25; Kancelarija za Evropske Integracije, 2014, p. 4; Ministarstvo za Evropske Integracije, 2019, p. 6). The reluctant or negative attitudes towards the EU seem to correlate with the Serbian government’s oscillation between east and west in that they revolve around perceived controversies with the EU policies on Kosovo and other issues in geopolitics. This also comprises of fears that the EU membership may not contribute a lot to the improvement of Serbia’s economic situation (Ministarstvo za Evropske Integracije, 2017, p. 6, 2018, pp. 6 and 25).45 To these, one should add the long-term impact of ‘EU conditionality fatigue’ (Ministarstvo za Evropske Integracije, 2017, p. 9).46 Meanwhile, there is no apparent linkage between unfavourable attitudes towards the EU and the management of ethnic 44 Interview with Sociologists 1 and 2 at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad (26 November 2018). 45 Interview with a political scientist at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad (26 November 2018). 46 Interviews with: Senior Researcher at Friedrich Ebert Stiftung-Serbia (30 November 2018, Belgrade); a team of researchers at the Novi Sad School of Journalism (28 November 2018); the Director at the ‘Centre for Regionalism’ NGO (16 November 2018, Novi Sad).

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relations within Serbia. Moreover, the state of multi-ethnic cohabitation between the Serbian majority and ethnic Hungarians, as well as Croats, in Vojvodina remains positive (CESID, 2016, p. 35).47 By contrast to this alteration between pronounced Europhilia and a mood of apprehension in Serbia, Latvian public attitudes vis-à-vis the EU can be summarised as ‘lukewarm’. In October 2003, a total of 67% approved Latvia’s accession process to the EU in the nationwide referendum (a considerably lower percentage in comparison to Lithuania’s 89.9% and Slovakia’s 92.5%) (Austers, 2016, p. 90). Furthermore, by contrast to the uniform desire to end the country’s isolation in Serbia, positive outlooks on the EU membership appear to have been subject to different expectations among Latvians and ethnic Russians. In the former case, the geopolitical argument and the necessity to enhance Latvia’s leverage vis-à-vis Russia had been of crucial significance (ibid., p. 102). In the latter case, membership of the EU was viewed, by interest groups within the ethnic Russian community, as a trajectory that would help improve the situation of minority rights (ibid., p. 92; Petsinis, 2020b, p. 119).48 The results of more recent opinion polls, conducted in 2016, hint at the prolongation of these lukewarm outlooks with 38.8% of the respondents regarding the EU membership as ‘positive’ and 40% being ‘neutral’ (ibid., p. 91; SKDS, 2016).49 In regards to the Latvian respondents, their lukewarm or apprehensive attitudes vis-à-vis the EU seem to correlate with the soft Euroscepticism propagated by NA along the lines of: (a) insecurities regarding the EU’s capacity to enhance Latvia’s geopolitical

47 One more opinion poll, conducted by the Institute for European Affairs-Belgrade (21–24 March 2018), found out that the majority of the respondents regarded Hungary as one of Serbia’s friendliest neighbours. On this issue, see: http://iea.rs/2018/05/10/ rezultati-istrazivanja-javnog-mnjenja-o-evropskoj-uniji/. Accessed 10 November 2020. 48 This wave of Europhilia eroded as result of the widespread conviction among the ethnic Russian community that the EU’s soft power was not sufficient enough. On this issue, see: Ciannetti and Nakai (2017, p. 276); Interviews with one affiliate of the Harmony’s youth organisation (7 July 2017, Riga) and with two ethnic Russian journalists and political activists (7 July 2017, Riga). 49 In Latgale, the polarisation was more evident with 54% of the sample declaring their belonging to Europe and a percentage of 40.8 denying it (Berzina, 2016, p. 26; FACTUM, 2015). Moreover, 43.1% among the ethnic Russian respondents reiterated their identification with Europe and an additional 84.3 with Latvia (Berzina, 2016, p. 27).

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weight in relation to Russia, especially following the domestic repercussions of the Ukrainian crisis since 2014 (Berzina, 2016, p. 19); (b) suspicions that the EU may ‘use’ Latvia as a destination for the mass relocation of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa (Murašovs et al, 2016, p. 62; Austers, 2016, p. 95; Petsinis, 2020b p. 119).50 In all of this, there is no apparent linkage between Eurosceptic attitudes and opposition to minority rights. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the controversy over the educational reform (2017–2018) additionally worsened the outlooks of ethnic Russians on the EU (Kaprans & Mierina, 2019). Especially, following the outcome of the latest economic recession in Latvia (2009–2011), it is economic Euroscepticism which may occasionally manifest in the society (Austers, 2014, pp. 9–37, 2016, pp. 96–101). Ethnopolitics on the Grass-Roots Level: Regional and Sociocultural Dimensions Although a richly diverse region, which accommodates approximately 25 ethnic communities together with the Serbian majority, Vojvodina has demonstrated its capacity to withstand ethnic conflict. The instances of inter-communal friction during the early 1990s (e.g. the ‘Hrtkovci incidents’ of May 1992) never escalated to the violent excesses that were witnessed in other multi-ethnic parts of the former Yugoslavia (1991– 1995) (Baˇcevi´c et al., 1991, pp 180 and 236; Ili´c & Cveji´c, 1997, pp. 181 and 184–185). The spate of ‘ethnically motivated’ incidents that occurred between 2003 and 2005 did not generate prolonged segmentation on the local level (Gruhonji´c, 2003; Léphaft et al., 2014, pp. 143–154). Nationalist actors based in adjacent countries, most recently Jobbik from Hungary, have not succeeded in acquiring a foothold within any of the ethnic minorities in Vojvodina. A series of opinion polls and public surveys conducted during the 1990s (Baˇcevi´c et al., 1991; Golubovi´c et al., 1995, pp. 159, 219, 248, and 252), the early 2000s (Puziga´ca & Molnar, 2001, pp. 11 and 15–16; Boarov, 2001, Tables 5.3 and 5.4), and more recently (CESID, 2016, p. 35) hint that Vojvodina represents a successful example of intercultural

50 Interview with the administrator of a local NGO (23 October 2017, Daugavpils).

15.5% of the respondents

26.7% of the respondents

45.7% of the respondents

9.1% of the respondents

40.6% of the respondents

47.1% of the respondents

22.2% of the respondents

20.6% of the respondents

Serbs

Croats

Hungarians

Montenegrins

Slovaks

Romanians

Ruthenes

Others

36.5% of the respondents

22.2% of the respondents

23.5% of the respondents

30.4% of the respondents

31.8% of the respondents

39.4% of the respondents

53.3% of the respondents

37.7% of the respondents

Yes, but only as a body which will decide over questions pertaining to the equality of national communities

Source Puziga´ca and Molnar (2001, p. 15) (Polled sample: 1,422 respondents)

Yes, with full-fledged jurisdiction

Affiliations

33.3% of the respondents 23.8% of the respondents

31.4% of the respondents 3.3% of the respondents 2.9% of the respondents 50.0% of the respondents 5.8% of the respondents

No

15.4% of the respondents 16.7% of the respondents 12.0% of the respondents 9.1% of the respondents 23.2% of the respondents 29.4% of the respondents 22.2% of the respondents 19.0% of the respondents

I do not know

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Total (%)

Table 5.3 Should the assembly of the Serbian autonomous province of Vojvodina comprise a Chamber of National Communities where the major national communities in the province will be equally represented?

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Table 5.4 What kind of relations should ethnic minorities maintain with their external homelands? Answers

Percentages among the respondents

All kinds of relations which are of primary concern to them Only cultural relations Cultural relations, but they can also maintain other kinds of relations, provided that they have acquired the previous assent of the government No relations whatsoever Some other suggestions I do not know

39.4% of the respondents 33.5% of the respondents 21.1% of the respondents

2.5% of the respondents 0.9% of the respondents 2.6% of the respondents

Source Puziga´ca and Molnar (2001, p. 11) (Polled sample: 1,422 respondents)

cohabitation (Petsinis, 2020a, pp. 201–203).51 This better integrated and intercultural pattern manifests through the lower impact of territorial segregation and ethnic distance, multilingualism, as well as the high frequency of intermarriage in both urban and rural settlements (Komši´c, 1998, p. 42; Lazar & Marinkovi´c, 2001; Risti´c et al., 2016, pp. 201– 214).52 From a ‘bottom-up’ angle, these sociocultural realities facilitated the formulation of more flexible legal models for the management of ethnic relations in Serbia.53 Meanwhile, in Latvia, empirical research hints at a tripartite configuration of identity which comprises of the grass-roots, the institutional,

51 Nevertheless, there also exist allegations that certain recent arrivals within the Serbian national majority (e.g. ethnic Serb refugees from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia during the 1990s) may ‘occasionally not comprehend the tradition of multi-ethnic cohabitation in the province’ (Interview with the Director of the ‘Centre for Regionalism’ NGO, 16 November 2018, Novi Sad; Interview with MP of VMSZ at the Serbian parliament, 30 November 2018, Belgrade). 52 Interviews with: two sociologists at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad (26 November 2018); the ‘Director of the Centre for Regionalism’ NGO (16 November 2018, Novi Sad). 53 Locally based sociologists contend that the endeavour to counter the reinforcement

of Montenegrin national identity, during the last decade, has emerged as an additional challenge which renders the proponents of Serbian nationalism more ‘introverted’ and less interested in minority issues. This has been the case not only in Vojvodina but all over Serbia (Interview with Sociologist 1 at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad, 26 November 2018).

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Table 5.5 The ethnic structure of the Daugavpils municipality in Latgale (2017) Affiliations

Numbers

Percentages in the population

Russians Latvians Poles Belarussians Ukrainians Others

46,654 inhabitants 17,449 inhabitants 12,970 inhabitants 6,812 inhabitants 1,773 inhabitants 7,651 inhabitants

50.0% 18.7% 13.9% 7.3% 1.9% 8.2%

Source https://www.daugavpils.lv/en/city/daugavpils/residents/. Accessed 5 May 2021

and the party politics levels (Berzina, 2016; Duvold & Berglund, 2019; FACTUM, 2015; Kaprans & Mierina, 2019).54 On the grass-roots level, bilingualism and ethnically mixed marriages remain a regular occurrence in urban and rural settlements whereas ethno-cultural identification is often a matter of individual discretion (Cheskin, 2012, pp. 325–347).55 Especially in Latgale, the persistence of a multi-ethnic regional identity alleviates ethnic cleavages and provides a common substratum for a multitude of ethno-linguistic communities without indications of separatist tendencies (Berzina, 2016, pp. 10–13 and 27; FACTUM, 2015; SKDS, 2016, Table 5.5).56 At a first instance, these sociocultural specificities seem akin to the trans-ethnic cultural substratum which alleviates intercommunal cleavages in Vojvodina. However, in contrast to the Serbian and Vojvodinian precedents, the fragmentation of institutional and party politics along ethno-linguistic lines operates as a catalyst which complicates a consensus on the formulation of more flexible models for the management of ethnic relations.

54 Interviews with: one MP of Harmony (5 July 2017, Riga); one affiliate of the Harmony’s youth organisation (27 July 2017, Riga); two ethnic Russian journalists and political activists (7 July 2017, Riga). 55 Interview with one MP of Harmony (5 July 2017, Riga). 56 Interviews with the administrator of a local NGO (23 October 2017, Daugavpils),

the Vice-Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Daugavpils University (23 October 2017, Daugavpils), and a Professor of History at Daugavpils University (24 October 2017, Daugavpils).

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In Lieu of a Conclusion Latvia and Serbia are two states situated along the northeast and the southeast fringes of the EU periphery. Although the former is a fullfledged member state of the EU since 2004 and the latter remains stranded along the path of a complicated accession process, the management of ethnic relations has been interceded, to varying degrees, with geopolitical concerns in both countries. This provides a crucial common denominator. The comparison between the two cased hints that as the nexus between regional geopolitics and domestic ethnopolitics grows more powerful, liberalisation of minority policies within a given state becomes less feasible. In Serbia, systemic transformation triggered the demarcation of the intersection between domestic ethnopolitics and regional geopolitics. This combined with the endorsement of consensus politics by the largest minority party (VMSZ) and the impact of exogenous factors, the most important of which was the change of course in Hungary’s neighbourhood policy. Within a longer trajectory, the aggregate of these developments facilitated EU’s external engagement as a fourth actor. By contrast, in Latvia, the convergence between geopolitics and ethnopolitics remains intact and the opportunity structure towards further liberalising the legal framework on minority rights has been more restricted in comparison to Serbia. In all of this, one should not overlook Russia’s emergence as a contender to the EU and NATO from the east. This development prompted a series of Latvian governments to place a greater stress on regional security rather than on the management of ethnopolitics in the interior (Petsinis, 2020b, p. 119). Nevertheless, a prospective categorisation of the Latvian case as one more example of ‘post-accession non-compliance’ in Central and Eastern Europe would not be accurate. Recent developments such as the parliamentary compromise over the new Law on Citizenship (2020) and the new legal provisions in upper-secondary education (2018) demonstrate that there is still room for the liberalisation of the framework on minority rights. However, this process is subject to long parliamentary negotiations and considerably slower in comparison to Serbia. The uniqueness of the Serbian case consists in that, despite the uneven trajectory to the EU and the legacies of ethnic strife across the former Yugoslavia, the state authorities succeeded in setting up an extensive and regionalised framework on minority rights. This framework effectively combines European

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prerogatives with recycled elements from the communist era legislation. The latest progress reports, compiled by the European Commission, emphasise the efficient implementation of the legal clauses (European Commission, 2018, pp. 28–30, 2019, pp. 29–30, 2020, pp. 38–40). Vojvodina’s longstanding tradition of harmonious multi-ethnic cohabitation is an additional catalyst which encouraged the elaboration of more flexible models for the accommodation of minority rights. This cross-regional comparison also demonstrates that the intersection between geopolitics and ethnopolitics should not be perceived as ‘fixed’, but it can be subject to fluctuations and readjustments. This means that, under certain circumstances, the centrality of domestic ethnopolitics can weaken. The discussion of Serbia demonstrates that the readjustment of the intersection between ethnopolitics and geopolitics shifted the lens of the country’s main political actors towards geopolitics. Meanwhile, the discussion of Latvia demonstrates that new variables can enter the fore, such as the ‘new’ anti-immigration identity politics compounded by economic anxieties and temporarily challenge the primacy of regional geopolitics and domestic ethnopolitics. With specific regard to the growing significance of the economy and the potential, if only momentary, effacement of ethnopolitics, one should also take into consideration: (a) the temporary success of the (populist) KPV LV party in the parliamentary elections of October 201857 ; (b) the victory of the centrist/centre-left coalition, consisting of (centrist) Development/For! and (centre-left) Progres¯ıvie/’The Progressives’, in the 2020 Riga City Council snap election (26–29 August 2020). On the latter occasion, the victorious coalition claimed 26.14% of the vote and won 18 out of 60 seats at the municipal assembly (six seats ahead of Harmony at the second place) (Table 5.6). Its programmatic standpoints placed primary importance to the resolution of economic issues,

57 KPV LV, renamed into ‘For a Humane Latvia’ in December 2020, jumped to a percentage of 14.25% in the 2018 parliamentary elections making it Latvia’s second largest party after Harmony. The party’s electoral platform comprised of proposals for reversing the detrimental repercussions of the latest recession (2009–2011) on Latvian economy, combatting corruption, and upgrading the system of financial administration. However, as result of an intra-party split in February 2019, KPV LV started suffering from a rapid decline in popularity; polling at around 2.8 and 2.0% in the public surveys conducted between mid-September 2019 and mid-February 2020. By the end of October 2020, the popularity of the party had dropped down to 1%. On this issue, see: https://www.pol itico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/latvia/. Accessed 1 December 2020.

5

Table 5.6 The results of the elections for the Riga City Council (26–29 August 2020)

GEOPOLITICS, ETHNOPOLITICS, AND THE EU …

161

Parties and electoral coalitions

Percentages and seats at the Riga City Council

Development/For! and The Progressives coalition Harmony New Unity NA and LRA coalition GKR LKS JKP

26.14% and 18 seats 16.91% and 12 seats 15.24% and 10 seats 9.64% and 7 seats 7.71% and 5 seats 6.52% and 4 seats 6.39% and 4 seats

Source Riga City Elections, August 2020. https://rd2020.cvk.lv/ pub/en/election-results. Accessed 5 May 2021

such as administrative transparency and social welfare, and its appeal cut across ethnic lines especially among the younger generation of voters. The failure of Harmony to claim the ‘traditional’ first place in Riga’s election and maintain its grip to the ethnic Russian electorate indicated the growing significance of the economy and the popular dissatisfaction with the corruption charges against Harmony’s long-time mayor, Nils Ušakovs.58

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Stoji´c, M. (2018). Party responses to the EU in the Western Balkans: Transformation, opposition or defiance? Palgrave Macmillan. Van Elsuwege, P. (2004). Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia: Problems of integration at the threshold of the European Union. ECMI Press. Van Elsuwege, P. (2008). From Soviet republics to EU member states: A legal and political assessment of the Baltic states’ accession to the EU (2 Vols.). Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Zepa, B., et al. (2006). The aspect of culture in the social inclusion of ethnic minorities: Latvia. ECMI Press. Ziemele, I. (1998). State continuity and nationality in the Baltic states: International and constitutional law issues. A PhD thesis submitted to Wolfson College, Cambridge University.

Academic Articles, Book-Chapters, Working Papers, and Analytical Commentaries Agarin, T. (2016). Extending the concept of ethnocracy: Exploring the debate in the Baltic context. Cosmopolitan Civil Societies, 8(3). Online version: http:// dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i3.5144. Accessed 25 October 2020. Anastasakis, O. (2008). The EU’s political conditionality in the Western Balkans: Towards a more pragmatic approach. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 8(4), 365–377. Auers, D., & Kasekamp, A. (2015). The impact of radical right parties in the Baltic states. In M. Minkenberg (Ed.), Transforming the transformation: The East European radical right in the political process (pp. 137–153). Routledge. Austers, A. (2014). Latvia’s controversial “success story”. In K. Bukovskis (Ed.), The politics of economic sustainability: Baltic and Visegrad responses to the European Economic crisis (pp. 1–24). Latvian Institute for International Affairs. Austers, A. (2016). The case of Latvia: Popular Euroscepticism in impasse. In K. Bukovskis (Ed.), Euroscepticism in small EU member-states (pp. 85–107). Latvian Institute for International Affairs. Austers, A., & Nikišins, ¸ J. (2017). The sociology of Euroscepticism in the Baltic states. In A. Austers & K. Bukovskis (Eds.), Euroscepticism in the Baltic states. Latvian Institute for International Affairs. Backes, O., & Swab, A. (2019). Cognitive warfare: The Russian threat to election integrity in the Baltic states. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. Online version: https://www.belfercen ter.org/publication/cognitive-warfare-russian-threat-election-integrity-balticstates. Accessed 23 September 2020.

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Baki´c, J. (2009). Extreme-right ideology, practice and supporters: Case study of the Serbian Radical Party. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 17 (2), 193–207. Björkman-Bennich, L., & Johansson, K. M. (2012). Explaining moderation in nationalism: Divergent trajectories of national conservative parties in Estonia and Latvia. Comparative European Politics. Online version: https://doi.org/ 10.1057/cep.2011.28. Accessed 20 October 2020. Brubaker, R. (1995). National minorities, nationalizing states and external homelands in the New Europe. Daedalus, 124(2), 107–132. Cheskin, A. (2012). Synthesis and conflict: Russian-speakers’ discursive response to Latvia’s nationalising state. Europe-Asia Studies, 64(2), 325–347. Cianetti, L. (2014). Granting local voting rights to non-citizens in Estonia and Latvia: The conundrum of minority representation in two divided democracies. Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 13(1), 86–112. Cianetti, L., & Nakai, R. (2017). Critical trust in European institutions: The case of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia. Problems of Post-Communism, 64(5), 276–290. Gruhonji´c, D. (2003, October 21). Gde Je Vojvod-anska Tolerancija Išla? Grad-anski List. Hanovs, D. (2016). Can postcolonial theory explain Latvian politics of integration? Reflections on contemporary Latvia as a postcolonial society. Journal of Baltic Studies, 47 (1), 133–153. Ijabs, I. (2016). After the referendum: Militant democracy and nation-building in Latvia. East European Politics and Societies, 30(2), 288–314. Ikstens, J. (2013). Latvia. In J.-M. De Waele, F. Escalona, & M. Vieira (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of social democracy in the European Union (pp. 470– 487). Palgrave Macmillan (Kindle edition). Järve, P. (2013). Soviet nationalities policy and minority protection in the Baltic states: A battle of legacies. In K. Cordell, T. Agarin, & A. Osipov (Eds.), Institutional legacies of communism. Routledge. Kachuyevski, A. (2017). The “Russian world” and the securitization of identity boundaries in Latvia. In A. Makarychev & A. Yatsyk (Eds.), Borders in the Baltic Sea Region: Suturing the ruptures (pp. 227–247). Springer. Kaprans, M., & Mierina, I. (2019). Minority reconsidered: Towards a typology of Latvia’s Russophone identity. Europe-Asia Studies, 71(1), 24–47. Korhecz, T. (1998). The rights of national minorities in Vojvodina: Legal norms and practice (Unpublished work) (pp. 1–23). Novi Sad. Kott, M. (2016). The far right in Latvia: Should we be worried? In Trouble on the far right series. Berlin: De Gruyter Publishing. Online version: https:// doi.org/10.14361/9783839437209-022. Accessed 24 November 2020.

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Kudors, A., & Pelnens, G. (2015). Diverging faces of ‘soft power’ in Latvia between the EU and Russia. In T. Rostoks & A. Spruds (Eds.), The different faces of ‘soft power’: The Baltic states and Eastern neighbourhood between Russia and the EU (pp. 220–242). Latvian Institute for International Affairs. Lazar, Ž., & Marinkovi´c, D. (2001). Regional identity: Vojvodina’s urban public research survey. In Open university Subotica: Essays on regionalization. Agency for Local Democracy. Léphaft, Á., Németh, Á., & Reményi, P. (2014). Ethnic diversity and polarization in Vojvodina. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin, 63(2), 135–157. Muižnieks, N. (1995). The influence of the Baltic popular movements on the process of Soviet disintegration. Europe-Asia Studies, 47 (1), 3–25. Muižnieks, N. (2006a). Government policy and the Russian minority. In N. Muižnieks (Ed.), Latvian-Russian relations: Domestic and international dimensions (pp. 11–21). Latvia University. Muižnieks, N. (2006b). Russian Foreign policy towards “compatriots” in Latvia. In N. Muižnieks (Ed.), Latvian - Russian relations: Domestic and international dimensions (pp. 119–130). Latvia University. Murašovs, V., Ruža, A., Rašˇcevskis, V., & Dombrovskis, V. (2016). Expecting refugees in Latvia: Negative stereotyping. Economics and Business, 29(1), 56– 64. Nakai, R. (2014). The influence of party competition on minority politics: The cases of Latvia and Estonia. Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 13(1), 57–85. Ozolina, Z. (2016). Social security: Conceptual framework. In Z. Ozolina (Ed.), Social security: Inclusion-exclusion dilemma: A portrait of the Russian-speaking community in Latvia (pp. 13–28). Zinatne. Petsinis, V. (2012). Minority legislation in two successor states. Baltic Worlds, 1, 31–35. Petsinis, V. (2017, June 28). Enter Serbia’s ‘Orbán’? Aleksandar Vuˇci´c and his Catch-all Politics. Open Democracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/aut hor/vassilis-petsinis. Accessed 24 November 2020. Petsinis, V. (2020b). Geopolitics, Ethnopolitics and the EU: The cases of Serbia and Latvia. Ethnopolitics, 19(2), 107–124. Petsinis, V. (2020c, June 24). Serbia: Continuity elections amid Covid-19. Open Democracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/author/vassilis-petsinis. Accessed 20 November 2020c. Saarts, T. (2011). ’Comparative party system analysis in Central and Eastern Europe: The case of the Baltic states’. Studies of Transition States and Societies, 3(3), 83–104. Salonari, V. (2007). Regulation of ethnic relations in Post-Soviet countries: The cases of Latvia and Moldova compared. Treatises and Documents, 52, Ljubljana.

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Samorukov, M. (2020). Serbia, Quo Vadis? Belgrade between EU accession and alignment with Russia (Institute for Security Policy (ISP, Vienna) Working Papers). Smooha, S. (2001, October 13). The model of ethnic democracy (ECMI Working Papers). ECMI Press. Tarrow, S. (2010). The strategy of paired comparison: Toward a theory of practice. Comparative Political Studies, 43, 230–259. Vuksanovi´c, V. (2018, July 26). Serbs are not little Russians. The American Interest. https://www.the-american-interest.com. Accessed 25 October 2020.

Expert Reports, Opinion Polls, Public Surveys, Electoral Results, and Other Statistical Data Centre for Free Elections and Democracy, CESID. (2016). Javno Mnenje Srbije: Politiˇcka i Društvena Situacija u Srbiji. CESID. European Commission. (2002). Regular Report on Latvia’s Progress towards Accession (SEC 2002), 1405. European Commission. (2018). Serbia 2018 Progress Report. SWD. European Commission. (2019). Serbia 2019 Progress Report. SWD. European Commission. (2020). Serbia 2020 Progress Report. SWD. FACTUM. (2015). Survey for the needs of the NADL’s research on ‘current security problems in Latvia’. FACTUM Agency. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. (1997). In the name of humanity. HCRS. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. (1998). Minorities in Serbia.HCRS. Kancelarija za Evropske Integracije. (2010). Evropska Orijentacija Grad-ana Srbije: Trendovi (decembar 2010). Government of the Republic of Serbia. Kancelarija za Evropske Integracije. (2014). Evropska Orijentacija Grad-ana Srbije: Trendovi (jun 2014). Government of the Republic of Serbia. Markovi´c-Tomi´c, M. (2016). Mediji i Teme u Vezi Sa Evropskom Integracijom Srbije u Periodu 2002–2016. Government of the Republic of Serbia. Ministarstvo za Evropske Integracije. (2017). Evropska Orijentacija Grad-ana Srbije: Trendovi (decembar 2017). Government of the Republic of Serbia. Ministarstvo za Evropske Integracije. (2018). Evropska Orijentacija Grad-ana Srbije: Trendovi (jul 2018). Government of the Republic of Serbia. Ministarstvo za Evropske Integracije. (2019). Evropska Orijentacija Grad-ana Srbije: Trendovi (decembar 2019). Government of the Republic of Serbia. Petsinis, V., & Wierenga, L. (2021). Report on radical right populism in Estonia and Latvia (Working Paper no. 7). Horizon 2020 POPREBEL. https:// populism-europe.com/poprebel/poprebel-working-papers/. Accessed 4 May 2021.

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Puziga´ca, M., & Molnar, A. (2001). Istraživanje Javnog Mnenja: Autonomija Vojvodine. SCAN. SKDS. (2016). Survey for the needs of the NADL’s research on ‘current security problems in Latvia’. Marketing and Public Opinion Research Centre (SKDS). The Novi Sad School of Journalism, NNS. (2001). Nacionalistiˇcka Vrednosna Orijentacija kao Faktor Otpora prema Autonomiji Vojvodine. NNS. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia: Special Report on Minorities, E/CN.4/1997/8, 25 October 1996.

State, International, Legal, and Party Documents (Electronic and Printed Versions) Council of Europe. (1992). European charter for regional or minority languages (signed on 5 November 1992). Council of Europe. (1995, February 1). Framework convention for the protection of national minorities (European Treaty Series No. 157). National Alliance. (2018a). Extensive programme for the 13th Saeima (Englishlanguage translation). https://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/programma/plasaprogramma/. Accessed 1 April 2020. National Alliance. (2018b). Programme for the 13th Saeima (condensed version) (English-language translation). https://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/ programma/13-saeimas-programma/. Accessed 1 April 2020. SNS. (2011). Bela Knjiga Programom Do Promena. SNS. SRS. (2009). Program Srpske Radikalne Stranke. SRS. VMSZ, Proposal for an Agreement on the Self-Organisation of Hungarians in Vojvodina (The Concept of the Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina), Novi Sad (18 January 1996).

News and Other Informative Sources (Electronic and Printed) Borba, 3 May 1992: A statement by Vojislav Šešelj on the ethnic Croats of Vojvodina.

CHAPTER 6

Geopolitics, Ethnopolitics, and the EU: The Cases of Estonia and Croatia

Introduction As in the previous chapter, the pairing of the cases from the Baltic States (Estonia) and the Western Balkans (Croatia) is not random. A variety of actors interact in the management of ethnic relations in Estonia and Croatia: the ethnic Russian1 and Serbian minorities; Russia and Serbia; and the EU as a fourth, external, actor with a regulatory and normative power. Estonia joined the EU in 2004 whereas Croatia became an EU member state on 1 June 2013. From a retrospective angle, the patterns for managing ethnic relations in Croatia and Estonia are examined inside the context of the EU’s eastward enlargement with an emphasis on the Copenhagen Criteria (1993) and their guidelines for the protection of the rights and freedoms of national minorities. Especially in Croatia, steady cooperation with the ICTY and the formulation of an adequate and extensive legal framework on minority rights formed crucial requirements in the accession trajectory of this country to the EU. The management of ethnic relations in both countries has been subject to essentialist discourses of ‘Otherness’ and cultural reductions. During 1 As in Chapter 5, Russia is seen as the state that operates as the ‘external homeland’ of Estonia’s Russian-speakers in the field of foreign policy. Ethnic Russians make up approximately 24.7% of the total population in Estonia. As in Latvia, the larger Russianspeaking community in Estonia also comprises of smaller ethnic groups (e.g. Belarussians and Ukrainians) (Table 6.1).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 V. Petsinis, Cross-Regional Ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99951-3_6

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Table 6.1 The ethnic structure of the population of Estonia on 1 January 2020 (largest affiliations)

Affiliations

Numbers

Percentages in the population

Estonians Russians Ukrainians Belarussians Finns

909,552 327,802 24,897 11,536 8,297

68.4 24.7 1.9 0.8 0.6

Source https://vana.stat.ee/34267. Accessed 5 May 2021

the 1990s, of particular significance it had been the necessity to demarcate and safeguard Estonian and Croatian perceptions of ‘Europeanness’ from ‘Eurasian’ or ‘Balkan’ adversaries (Petsinis, 2016a, p. 230). Well until nowadays, a wide range of opinion formers, stakeholders, as well as interest groups, in Estonia and Croatia have been visualising the former country as part of the broader Nordic realm and the latter as a ‘continuum’ between the cultural milieus of Central Europe and the Western Mediterranean.2 The timeframe concentrates on the management of ethnic relations in Estonia and Croatia and its evolution from the 2000s to the present day, with selective references to the 1990s as far as the accession process to the EU is concerned. This article is situated inside the framework of a political analysis. Nevertheless, complementary references to the developments in the field of legislation on minority rights in Croatia and Estonia are made where judged appropriate. Along a similar trajectory to the comparison between the Latvian and the Serbian cases, this chapter demonstrates that the relaxation of the nexus between regional geopolitics and domestic ethnopolitics can facilitate the liberalisation of governmental policies on minority rights within a given state. In Croatia, the systemic transformation that commenced in 2000, as well as the gradual normalisation of the bilateral relations with Serbia, generated the circumstances for the formulation of an extensive legislation on minority rights. This facilitated the cooperation between EU advisors and Croatian government officials with an expertise in minority rights between 2000 and 2002. Meanwhile, in Estonia, the enduring emphasis on national survival and safeguarding the

2 Some information regarding the Croatian case was disclosed to the author in the course of his field research in Zagreb (Interview with a senior analyst at the ‘GONG’ NGO, Zagreb, 13 November 2018).

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‘Estonian’ ethno-cultural character of the republic halted more substantial developments in the legislation on minority rights despite a state of social stability in the 2000s. At a later point, this chapter tests the validity of the aforementioned observations inside the context of more recent developments from the 2010s to the present day, such as: (a) the attempts by Eurosceptic and nationalist actors to revise the legal framework on minority rights in Croatia; (b) the more systematic, although informal, use of the Russian language in the public administration sector in Estonia since the ‘Bronze Soldier’ crisis of 2007; (c) the state of affairs following the inclusion of the, populist and radical right-wing, EKRE in a governing coalition (April 2019–January 2021). As in the comparative discussion of Latvia and Serbia, attention is paid to the grass-roots dimension and sociocultural specificities. Of particular interest is to illustrate how a heritage of peaceful cohabitation can enhance the implementation of the state legislation and encourage the adoption of flexible models for the management of inter-group relations inside multi-ethnic regional settings (e.g. the north-western region of Istria in Croatia). This chapter has been organised according to the pattern of a thematic and paired comparison (Tarrow, 2010). It has additionally relied on: (a) legal documents concerning minority rights, expert reports, opinion polls, and public surveys; (b) semi-structured interviews with political representatives and activists, government officials at all levels of public administration, NGOs and think-tanks, and locally based academic researchers (political scientists, sociologists, and public lawyers) with an expertise in the thematic areas of nationalism, ethnopolitics, and geopolitics (conducted in Estonia and Croatia between 2017 and 2019). The research embeds this information in scholarly and theoretical literature in the thematic areas of ethnopolitics, geopolitics, and nationalism. Before proceeding to the thematic analysis, the evolution of the constitutional and legal arrangements for the management of ethnic relations in Estonia and Croatia, during the 1990s and 2000s, needs to be placed into context.

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The Sphere of Domestic Politics: Ethnos Versus Demos in Estonia and Croatia (1990s) Croatia and Estonia as Independent States: Constitutional and Legal Realities The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (1990) and the Constitutional Law on the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities (Narodne Novine, 1991) formally endorsed the rights of national minorities in a number of areas. These included: cultural autonomy and freedom from discrimination, education and public use of their languages, proportional representation in administrative bodies. Nevertheless, the Croatian Law on Citizenship (1991) relied on a double standards approach (Petsinis, 2016a, p. 232; 2013, pp. 354–355). According to this law, the civic status of persons who owned property in Croatia by the declaration of independence (8 October 1991),3 but who belonged to one of the former Yugoslav narodi/‘peoples’ such as Serbs, Bosnjaks, and Slovenes, was to be ‘redefined’ (Minority Rights Group International, 2003, p. 16).4 Meanwhile, post-Soviet Estonia was regarded as the restoration of the interwar Estonian republic and not as a new state (Mole, 2012; Smith, 2001; Thiele, 1999). The Law on Cultural Autonomy (1993) rendered the term ‘national minority’ valid only for ethnically non-Estonian residents with Estonian citizenship. Correspondingly, this term came to legally address small, well-integrated, and ‘loyal’ minorities rather than the large ethnic Russian population (Aidarov & Drechsler, 2011).5 The bulk of the, mostly Russian-speaking, settlers who came after the Second World War were granted a legal status comparable to that of the Gastarbeiter (guest labourers) in Germany. The official explanation given by 3 This law also made individuals of Croat ethnic origin based abroad (e.g. Canada, Australia, and Germany) automatically eligible to acquire Croatian citizenship. Along similar lines, the new legal framework in Estonia entitled individuals of Estonian descent based abroad (e.g. Sweden, Canada, the US) to acquire Estonian citizenship. 4 An English-language version of the Croatian Law on Citizenship (1991) can be found at: https://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/6020. Accessed 4 November 2020. 5 The Estonian Law on Cultural Autonomy (1993) recognises the German, Russian, Swedish, and Jewish national minorities (Section 2). By contrast to the other minority groups, Estonian citizenship was automatically granted only to those ethnic Russians who could certify that they or their families resided in the territory of Estonia before the annexation of the interwar republic to the Soviet Union by Stalin in 1940.

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the authorities of independent Estonia was that the post-war settlers were ‘citizens of an illegally occupying foreign state, the Soviet Union’ (Smith, 2001, p. 75).6 A major feature that qualitatively differentiates the Croatian from the Estonian case is that protracted warfare took a toll on the pattern of ethnic relations in Croatia. The urgency to reincorporate the self-proclaimed ‘Serb Republic of Krajina’ and eastern Slavonia into the Croatian state saw the expulsion of over 200,000 ethnic Serb civilians from the warravaged territories to Serbia between summer and autumn 1995 (Ðurd-ev, 1997, p. 307). This was a turning point that decisively restructured the internal ‘balance of power’ between the Croatian state and the ethnic Serb minority. The situation in regard to the management of ethnic relations would be very different if the Croatian state had to negotiate with a larger, regionally concentrated, and politically mobilised ethnic Serb minority to the present day (Petsinis, 2016a, p. 232) (Tables 6.2 and 6.3).

National Survival, Narratives of ‘Self Versus Other’, and Their Political Repercussions The external dimension of the management of ethnic relations in the two countries became entangled into a nexus that combined Classical Realist understandings of realpolitik (Carr, 1946; Morgenthau, 1948) with essentialist narratives of ‘Self versus Other’ (Bilgin, 2003; Lipschutz, 1995; Wendt, 1999). The prerogative of national survival, understood as ‘the essence of national interest…the protection of physical, political and cultural identity’ (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 12), soon acquired centrality inside both contexts. Both the Croatian and the Estonian governments saw the accession to NATO as a project that would upgrade their security status vis-à-vis the post-Yugoslav geopolitical environment and Russia respectively. Nevertheless, the simultaneous endeavour to join the EU was also seen as a project that would set Croatia and Estonia apart from the Balkan or the post-Soviet ‘Others’ and reinforce the Europeanness of both states. With regard to EU accession, both Croats and Estonians othered themselves from their ‘Balkan’ and ‘Eastern’ adversaries through the frequent employment of contemporary, culturally essentialist,

6 Out of a total of 335,000 ethnic Russians, 210,000 were either without Estonian citizenship or with Russian citizenship by May 1997 (Mole, 2012, p. 155).

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Table 6.2 The ethnic structure of Croatia’s population in 1991

Affiliations

Numbers

Percentages in the population

Albanians Austrians Bosnijaks Bulgarians Croats Czechs Germans Greeks Hungarians Italians Jews Macedonians Montenegrins Muslims Polish Roma Romanians Russians Ruthenes Serbs Slovaks Slovenes Turks Ukrainians Vlachs Yugoslavs Others Regional affiliation Non-determined Unknown Total

12,032 214 – 458 3,736,356 13,086 2,635 281 22,355 21,303 600 6,280 9,724 43,469 679 6,695 810 706 3,253 581,663 5,606 22,376 320 2,494 22 106,041 3,012 45,493 73,376 62,926 4,784,265

0.3 0.0 – 0.0 78.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 12.2 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.2 0.1 0.9 1.5 1.3 100

Source https://www.dzs.hr/default_e.htm. Accessed 5 May 2021

discourses (e.g. Brzezinski, 1998; Huntingdon, 1996) (Kaplinski, 1994, p. 13; Petsinis, 2016a, pp. 232–233).7 7 On this issue, see also the excerpt of a speech by the then Estonian President, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, as cited in Mole (2012, p. 151). On the Croatian case, see the concept of nesting orientalism as discussed by Baki´c-Hayden (1995), Ballinger (2004) and Lindstrom (2008).

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Table 6.3 The ethnic structure of Croatia’s population in 2001

175

Affiliations

Numbers

Percentages in the population

Albanians Austrians Bosnijaks Bulgarians Croats Czechs Germans Greeks Hungarians Italians Jews Macedonians Montenegrins Muslims Polish Roma Romanians Russians Ruthenes Serbs Slovaks Slovenes Turks Ukrainians Vlachs Yugoslavs Others Regional affiliation Non-determined Unknown Total

15,082 247 20,755 331 3,977,171 10,510 2,902 – 16,595 19,636 576 4,270 4,926 – 567 9,463 475 906 2,337 201,631 4,712 13,171 300 1,977 12 – 21,801 9,302 89,130 17,975 4,437,460

0.3 0.01 0.47 0.01 89.6 0.24 0.07 – 0.37 0.4 0.01 0.1 0.1 – 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.02 0.05 4.5 0.11 0.3 0.01 0.04 0 – 0.49 0.2 2.61 0.4 100

Source https://www.dzs.hr/default_e.htm. Accessed 5 May 2021

In spite of the vocal assertion of a European identity and values, the adoption of exclusionist patterns for managing ethnic relations backfired along the paths of the two states to the EU. In the case of Croatia, the Croatian Democratic Union/HDZ government under President Franjo Tud-man never paid serious attention to the criticism and the pressures from the Council of Europe for the inauguration of a new Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities (Petsinis, 2016a, p. 233).

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In Estonia, the European Commission observed that the naturalisation process had been very slow and issued recommendations that would accelerate the integration of non-citizens (Gelazis, 2003, p. 65; Smith, 2001, p. 102; Van Elsuwege, 2004, p. 14).8 Therefore, one might argue that in both states the principle of national survival had gained, to varying degrees, priority over accession to the EU.

The Interaction Between Domestic and External Actors in the 1990s States, Ethnic Minorities, External Homelands, and the EU in Estonia and Croatia Starting with Croatia, during the 1990s, the Croatian government had aimed at the renationalisation of the public space. This manifested through the complication of the naturalisation process for ethnic Serbs, the restriction of political participation, and discrimination in employment (Minority Rights Group International, 2003, p. 16; Petsinis, 2013, pp. 2–4; 2016a, p. 234). The response of the ethnic Serb minority was to become alienated from the Croatian state and ‘boycott’ its institutions, whereas the relations between Serbia and Croatia remained tense. Throughout the 1990s and well after the end of the war, Serbia, as the external homeland, condemned the ‘semi-Fascist’ regime in Zagreb and maintained a hostile stance towards Croatia. Although the two parts signed an Agreement for the Normalisation of the Relations between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (23 August 1996), this did not actively facilitate the return of Croatian Serb refugees or the naturalisation of the ethnic Serb community (Petsinis, 2020, p. 128). Meanwhile, the role of the EU as a ‘fourth pillar’ was not of a decisive significance. Although Franjo Tud-man’s government had formally expressed its commitment for Croatia’s ‘return to Europe’, the reaffirmation of national identity in the interior had acquired precedence over the EU’s soft power with regard to minority rights. Meanwhile, Estonian restoration nationalism was equally orientated towards the renationalisation of the public space (Petsinis, 2016a, p. 234). However, there exist some qualitative differences from the Croatian case. 8 On this issue, see: Commission Opinion on Estonia’s Application for Membership of the European Union, COM (97) 2006 final, pp. 13–15.

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First of all, as in Latvia during the same period, Russia had decided to use its disproportional weight, as an external homeland, in order to protect their co-ethnics in Estonia from alleged discrimination. As early as the period between 1992 and 1993, Boris Yeltsin had denounced Estonia as an ‘apartheid state’ and threatened with economic sanctions if the situation of ethnic Russians did not improve (Mole, 2012, pp. 90 and 92). In addition to this, Russia had refused to sign the border treaty with Estonia largely on the grounds of discontent with its neighbour’s restoration nationalism (Aalto, 2003, p. 32). In all of this, though, the EU’s soft power as a ‘fourth pillar’ temporarily exerted a greater impact on the nexus that consisted of Estonia, the ethnic Russian minority, and Russia. Estonia: A More Pragmatic Stance Despite the paramount stress on national survival, the Estonian government demonstrated some eagerness to comply with the recommendations from the EU the COE, and the OSCE on minority rights. For a start, the new Law on Citizenship (1995) relaxed the criteria for the acquisition of Estonian citizenship. Later, between 1998 and 1999, the coordinated efforts among the Estonian government, the COE, and the OSCE resulted in an amendment to this law with the aim to resolve the problem of stateless children among ethnic Russians (Thiele, 1999, p. 18). Agenda 2000 of the European Commission (1997) confirmed its satisfaction with the cooperation between the Estonian authorities and the European organisations (p. 14). There are a number of explanations that can be given with regard to the varying impact of EU’s engagement in the two states during the second half of the 1990s. In the case of Estonia, the political establishment had managed to strike a balance between realpolitik concerns over security issues, such as membership of NATO, and the state’s ‘return to Europe’. The Estonian political elites had maintained their Europhilia, despite the emergence of public Euroscepticism in response to the EU’s pressures on minority rights (Aalto, 2003, p. 26; Kuus, 2002, p. 98).9 Furthermore, the Estonian political elites had managed to capitalise on an additional factor. This was the internal fragmentation and the relatively 9 By the second half of the 1990s, a growing percentage of Estonians had put higher importance on Estonia’s membership of NATO rather than the accession process to the EU (Aalto, 2003, pp. 145–146; Pettai, 2005, pp. 44–48).

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low intensity of group cohesion within the Russian community (Smith, 1998, pp. 3–18). Although a certain segment among the Russian minority had maintained an orientation towards their external homeland, a large percentage of ethnic Russians declared their allegiance to the Estonian state and endorsed Estonia’s path towards the EU (Arter, 1996, p. 228; Smith, 2001, p. 103). Politically active individuals, opinion formers, and other stakeholders within the ethnic Russian community had regarded EU’s soft power as a guarantee for the improvement of minority rights in Estonia (Kirch et al., 2006, p. 32; Past & Palk, 2005, p. 86).10 This clearly contrasted with the situation in Croatia during the same period. On the one hand, President Tud-man’s espousal of ethnonationalism, in combination with Belgrade’s hostile stance towards Croatia, resulted in high levels of group cohesion and collective introversion among ethnic Serbs. This manifested through the, almost uniform, abstinence from the political processes on the part of the Serb community (Minority Rights Group International, 2003, p. 14; Tatalovi´c, 2001). On the other hand, the Croatian government had misunderstood essential things in regards with the meaning of Europeanness (Petsinis, 2016a, p. 235). Since the 1990s, European identity was being redefined along inclusionary lines. This had brought about a more positive outlook on micro-identities and the further-reaching objective to integrate them into the mainstream societies. In policymaking terms, this manifested through the high emphasis on the protection of minority rights in the Copenhagen Criteria (1993). This was a crucial change that the Estonian political establishment had managed to observe. By contrast, the Croatian elites insisted on an understanding of Europeanness not as an inclusive and multidimensional concept but as a notion defined by binaries such as ‘Western versus Oriental’, ‘Balkan versus European’, etc. Despite the abundance of ‘Self versus Other’ narratives in Estonia, the Estonian government was successful in utilising the low intensity of groupness within the Russian community against Russia’s pressures, as an external homeland, in their negotiations with the EU (Petsinis, 2016a, p. 235). The Estonian leadership underlined to their European interlocutors that they had the full endorsement of the ethnic Russian community in Estonia’s trajectory to the EU. 10 On this issue, see also the results of a countrywide survey carried out by the FOKUS public research agency in November 2003, in: http://www.riigikogu.ee/?rep_id=577301. Accessed 30 November 2020.

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Meanwhile, the Croatian government became entangled into the principal endeavour to safeguard Croatian identity and sovereignty from internal and, potentially, external perils thus rendering their cooperation with the EU highly problematic. The Estonian government’s choice to water down narratives of exclusionism and cultural essentialism was a pragmatic step that reinforced the state’s bargaining potential along the path to the EU.

Systemic Transformation Versus the Persistence of National Survival: The Cases of Croatia and Estonia in the 2000s Croatia’s Change of Course and Its Significance Nevertheless, the 2000s saw ground-breaking developments in Croatia. The ‘change of guard’, following the presidential and parliamentary elections of January and February 2000, also resulted in the rapid and drastic rearrangement of the legislation on minority rights. Between 2000 and 2002, a series of legal texts on minority rights were drafted and approved by the Sabor (national parliament). The whole process culminated with the inauguration of the new Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities /CLRNM (19 December 2002) (Petsinis, 2013, pp. 357–358). While the year 2000 was a breaking point for Croatia, it still did not signify a watershed of some sort for Estonia. Furthermore, in the post-2004 period, the EU’s influence in Estonia was transformed to post-accession dynamics. However, this is not an accidental neglect of the temporal frame on the part of this chapter. The main aim here is to underline the unique significance of Croatia’s ‘change of course’ in the light of a rather fresh conflict and a tense political environment. Moreover, the post-2004 era in Estonia places into context an incidence which is not an Estonian particularity. This is the halt or slowing down of further developments on minority rights legislation after accession to the EU. In some cases, this even resulted in the introduction of rather restrictive measures (e.g. the Slovak Language Law of 2009). By contrast, states such as Serbia and Croatia proved successful in setting up and implementing extensive provisions on minority rights, before actually joining the EU and against the background of tense controversies over questions with ethnic implications (Petsinis, 2016a, p. 236).

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Of particular importance is to stress that the new government demonstrated active interest in Croatia’s accession to the EU as well as willingness to comply with EU advisers’ recommendations. The main aim in this section is to clarify the link that consisted of systemic transformation, the external engagement by the EU, and positive developments in the legislation on minority rights. More importantly, it is of great significance to place into context how the post-Tud-man governments took advantage of Yugoslavia’s political heritage and certain institutional aspects as part of their objective to set up a new framework on minority rights. Then, it is of equal interest to clarify what were the factors that halted more substantial developments in the management of ethnic relations in Estonia during the 2000s. Recycling Institutional Legacies from the Yugoslav Era and Cooperating with the EU The new Croatian government demonstrated its intention to accept the ethnic Serb community as a constituent part of the society on grounds of equality. A crucial factor that facilitated this endeavour was certain aspects of the political heritage from the Yugoslav era. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had strived to establish an ideological, devolved, anti-model to the Soviet ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘over-centralised’ model. This enabled Yugoslav Communists to concede extensive rights to national minorities at local levels of authority (Articles 137–138, 219, and 380 of SR Croatia’s Constitution in Radniˇcke Novine, 1981). Within Croatia’s legal framework, since 2000–2002, the communist era provisions on education, culture, public use of minority languages, cross-border cooperation, and the outlawing of ethnic discrimination roughly ‘correspond’ to Articles 7, 11, and 16 of the CLRNM. Inside this context of systemic transformation, the post-Tud-man government made sufficient use of the institutional legacies inherited from the communist era (Petsinis, 2016a, pp. 236–237). This culminated into the arrangement of an extensive framework for the management of ethnic relations that combined elements from the communist era legislation (e.g. the provisions for the national minorities’ councils in the multi-ethnic municipalities) with European standards. At this point, it is essential to assess the impact of this transformation on the nexus that consisted of Croatia, ethnic Serbs, Serbia, and the EU as a ‘fourth actor’. Croatia’s systemic transformation enjoyed the advantage to coincide with the

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defeat of Slobodan Miloševi´c and his SPS in the Serbian parliamentary and presidential elections (5 October 2000). The new Serbian government equally sought to alleviate tensions with Croatia and provide for an extensive legal framework on the management of ethnic relations (e.g. the Serbian-Montenegrin federal law on national minorities/LFRNM in 2002). The Croatian government’s endorsement of a more inclusionary platform in domestic politics and a reconciliatory outlook on foreign relations enhanced the impact of EU’s soft power diplomacy (ibid., p. 237). During their negotiations with Croatian government representatives, the European Commission underlined to their interlocutors that the civic reintegration of the ethnic Serb community possessed ‘good neighbourhood policy’ underpinnings. Since 2000, the European Commission held a series of bilateral meetings with Croatian as well as Serbian governmental representatives (Petsinis, 2020, pp. 187–190). It stressed to both sides that the resolution of their disputes was a basic condition for joining the EU. This provided the main incentive for the approval of the new legal framework by the Sabor. Croatia’s systemic transformation alleviated tensions in the interior and the exterior, facilitated the engagement of the EU and its soft power, and set the management of ethnic relations on new foundations. Estonia: A Few Steps Forward The 2000s signified a breakthrough in regards with the legislation on minority rights in Croatia. The same thing cannot be said about Estonia, although certain positive steps did take place. Most importantly, the Estonian state, since the year 2000, introduced a new integration strategy. One year earlier, in 1999, a modification to the Law on Citizenship (1995) meant that children born to non-citizen parents after 1992 no longer would have to undergo the full naturalisation process (Pettai, 2006; Smith, 2003). A simple application by the parents would suffice for the child to be granted full-fledged citizenship (Petsinis, 2016a, p. 238). This amendment carried challenging implications for the future, ethnoculturally, ‘Estonian’ character of the state and the foundational discourse of national survival which future governments would be required to address. At that point, however, this did not modify or contest the underlying ius sanguinis principle to a remarkable extent. Moreover, between 2000 and 2003, Estonian civil servants in legal service cooperated with

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legal experts from the Commission and drafted an anti-discrimination law on equality (Poleshchuk, 2003; Van Elsuwege, 2004, p. 25). Nevertheless, these developments did not bring about a decisive acceleration of the naturalisation process. As late as 2004, 12.5% of the Estonian population (172,000 people) had remained stateless (Van Elsuwege, 2004, p. 28). Contemporary Estonian Nationalism: The Functions of Restoration and Decolonisation A crucial aspect that differentiates Estonian from Croatian state building is the fact that the former has sought its legitimacy on the basis of continuity with the interwar Eesti Vabariik (Estonian Republic). It is precisely this restoration aspect that has endowed Estonian nationalism with a dimension of decolonisation (Hallik, 2002, p. 71). The removal of any vestiges of the Soviet past and the construction of a firmer continuity between the interwar and the contemporary Estonian statehood emerged as a top necessity. To consolidate Estonian national identity, the post-Soviet elites had to demarcate their identity from the Soviet/Russian exterior, thus rendering illegitimate the Russian presence in Estonia (Mole, 2012, p. 83). By contrast, this decolonisation aspect was out of context in the Croatian case. Despite the regular denunciation of certain features of the Yugoslav experience (e.g. the allegations over Croatia’s ‘economic exploitation’ which culminated into the ‘Croatian spring’/Hrvatsko prolje´ce of 1967–1972), Croatian state building has generally assumed a more moderate stance vis-à-vis the Yugoslav past (Petsinis, 2016a, p. 238). The decolonisation aspect of Estonian restoration nationalism reflected itself in the choice of the ius sanguinis principle for the management of ethnic relations. As the Estonian Minister for Interethnic Relations, Andra Veidemann, had stated in 1998: ‘the population of Estonian origin is too small for keeping its culture and identity alive if a ius solis approach were adopted’ (Järve & Wellmann, 1999, p. 11). Governmental Programme 2000 of the Estonian republic also clarified that: ‘in the sense of a common cultural space, Estonia is, and will remain, Estonian’ (Petsinis, 2016a, p. 239).

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The Emphasis on National Survival Halts More Substantial Developments in Estonia The paramount stress on national survival alleviated the impact of EU’s soft power and its recommendations for further concessions in the area of minority rights. For instance, in 2001, the concessions of the late 1990s were ‘counterbalanced’ by a new law with the objective to strengthen the status of Estonian as the only working language at the Riigikogu (national parliament) and the local administration (Poleshchuk, 2001). The EU and its legal infrastructure have generally employed a rather soft wording vis-àvis the candidate member states from Central and Eastern Europe. It has usually been through a more informal engagement that the EU sought to ensure the cooperation of these states towards the materialisation of its recommendations (Petsinis, 2013, 2016a, p. 239). On certain occasions, this was met with patterns of non-compliance throughout the region, especially after the 2004 round of EU enlargement (Brosig, 2009). In the Estonian case, the rather minimalist nature of the EU conditionality enabled the Estonian state to ‘reconcile’ the competing demands of a restorationist nation-building ethos, on the one hand, with those of Europeanisation on the other (Smith, 2003). This was indirectly encouraged by an intrinsic condition that the EU set to Estonia and the other member states from the ‘new Europe’: the establishment of a viable and, if only implicitly, unitary state as the ideal endpoint of state consolidation (Copenhagen Criteria, 1993). In all of this, as in Latvia, the role of Russia as the external homeland for the ethnic Russians has not been particularly constructive throughout the span of independent Estonian statehood. This clearly contrasted with the rapprochement between the Serbian and Croatian leaderships during the 2000s. The aggregate of these internal and external catalysts discouraged Estonian policymakers from additional concessions. Furthermore, the ‘Bronze Soldier’ incidents (26–29 April 2007) were a watershed for the management of ethnic relations in Estonia. The decision by the Estonian government to remove the ‘Bronze Soldier’ monument of the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945) from the Tallinn city centre to a military cemetery caused bitterness among the ethnic Russian community. Widespread riots followed (Ehala, 2009; Lagerspetz & Vogt, 2013, pp. 57 and 61–62). These developments ‘on the ground’ were accompanied by the systematic information and cyber warfare, emanating from Russianbased agencies, against Estonia.

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Estonian political scientists, government officials, and political analysts at think-tanks with an expertise in information war tend to agree that the ‘Bronze Soldier’ incidents signified a landmark in Russian cybernetic warfare against Estonia. Political analysts at the International Centre for Defence and Security/ICDS (Tallinn) contend that this was a pre-planned operation, by agents based in Russia, which relied on a manipulation of conflicting, Russian versus Estonian, historical narratives about the Second World War.11 Nevertheless, political scientists at the Tallinn University of Technology also assess that, however alarming, the ‘Bronze Soldier’ incidents were a ‘missed opportunity’ for extremists to augment their support and consolidate their status within the ethnic Russian community in the years to come.12 However, one might also argue that, in the course of the civil unrest, the state-sponsored ‘decolonisation’ project overtly clashed with the persistence of the Great Patriotic War and its symbolism as a sentimental bond that bounds the ethnic Russian community together. In the short term, the aftermath of the ‘Bronze Soldier’ riots saw an increase in the popular preferences among Estonians towards what the political scientist Tõnis Saarts and others define as the introverted ‘national defence’ model of Estonian democracy (Ehala, 2009, p. 153; Peiker, 2016, p. 120; Saarts, 2012). Consequently, throughout the 2000s, Estonia remained the state with the strictest criteria for the naturalisation of ethnic Russians among the Baltic republics (Petsinis, 2016a, p. 239).13

11 Some information about the ‘Bronze Soldier’ troubles and their long-term ramifications was disclosed to the author in the course of his field research in Estonia (Interview with a political scientist at the Tallinn University of Technology, 28 June 2017, Tallinn; Interview with a senior researcher at the ICDS, 4 August 2017, Tallinn; Interview with a policy adviser at the Government Office of Estonia, 1 December 2017, Tallinn). 12 Ibid. 13 The Estonian Law on Citizenship (1995) literally attributed ‘stateless persons’ the

status of foreigners who have to apply for residence and work permits. By contrast, the Latvian Law on Citizenship (1995) granted stateless persons a ‘special’ status (neither citizens, nor foreigners) (Järve & Wellmann, 1999, p. 25).

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Between Breakthroughs and Backslidings (the 2010s) Estonia: Towards a More Inclusive Version of the Ethnic Democracy Model Nevertheless, one might equally argue that, within a longer trajectory, the aftermath of the ‘Bronze Soldier’ unrest was one of the major catalysts that spurred the partial revision of the ethnic democracy model on the institutional level. This process appears to have resulted in the more extensive use of the Russian language in the areas of public information and the administrative bureaucracy. One Russian-language TV channel currently operates under the auspices of the Estonian state television (the ETV Plus channel) whereas the Russian language has been used more extensively in public institutions such as the municipal administration, the police, and the tax authorities. More decisively, on 21 January 2015, the Estonian parliament introduced a new set of amendments to the Law on Citizenship (1995). In accordance with this revision, a stateless child born in Estonia to parents with ‘non-regulated citizenship’, who have lived in Estonia for at least 5 years before the child’s birth, became automatically eligible to obtain citizenship. Correspondingly, the language requirements and the other criteria for the acquisition of Estonian citizenship have become more flexible whereas the naturalisation process of ‘stateless’ people has been accelerating. As result of this acceleration and relaxation of the naturalisation procedures, the total number of ‘stateless persons’ in Estonia had dropped to 79,300 by 2017.14 These structural changes appear to correlate with the relative swing of Estonian party politics towards the ‘left’ and a revision of the neoliberal consensus between 2016 and 2018. This topic requires elaborate and contextual analysis. Since the 1990s, the securitisation of bilateral relations between Estonia and Russia often triggered the simultaneous necessity to project a cordon sanitaire vis-à-vis ‘unreliable’ parties, suspected of pro-Kremlin leanings, in domestic politics. As illustrated in Chapter 4, this was the case with the, nominally centrist/centre-left, Eesti Keskerakond/Centre Party (Saarts, 2015; Sikk, 2015).

14 On these issues, see: http://www.statelessness.eu/blog/fight-voting-rights-statelesspersons-estonia-and-latvia. Accessed 24 November 2020.

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Another distinctive feature of Estonian politics, since the 1990s, is the neoliberal consensus on the privatisation of the economy across the party spectrum. This has been spearheaded by centre-right parties of a conservative, as well as liberal, orientation such as the Reform Party and the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union/Isamaa. Until very recently, neither the Centre Party nor the centre-left SDE actively contested this consensus in spite of their greater programmatic commitment to social welfare. Nevertheless, autumn 2016 witnessed the dissolution of the previous government coalition which consisted of the Reform Party, the conservative Isamaa, and SDE. The driving force behind this development was the disagreements between the Reform Party and SDE over the increase of taxation and the extension of welfare provisions that was proposed by the latter. Consequently, a new coalition government which comprised of the Centre Party, SDE, and Isamaa was formed in November 2016. The shared pro-welfare disposition between the Estonian Social Democrats and the Centre Party provided the main incentive for the acceptance of the latter party as the largest partner in the new coalition, despite persisting allegations over its pro-Kremlin leanings. This aggregate of pragmatic and socioeconomic considerations generated a lower stress on ‘decolonisation’ and the gradual adoption of a more inclusive model of ethnic democracy in Estonian institutional and party politics during the late 2010s. Estonian social scientists have argued that, throughout the 2010s, Estonian policymakers and opinion formers placed a more pronounced stress on elaborating new imageries that visualised Estonia as a successful ‘eco-digital’ nation while downplaying or even suspending the ‘decolonisation’ project (Annus, 2020). The ‘EKRE Phenomenon’ and Its Repercussions on the Management of Ethnic Relations in Estonia Nevertheless, in the latest parliamentary elections (3 March 2019), the party of EKRE garnered 17.8% of the vote and elected 19 deputies at the Riigikogu. This occurrence hints at the salience of questions linked to, broadly defined, identity politics among certain segments of the Estonian electorate. EKRE embodies the essential components of a European populist and radical right-wing party: ethno-nationalism, nativism, antiestablishment rhetoric, and a powerful emphasis on ‘law and order’ policies. After a series of inter-party negotiations, EKRE was included in

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a governing coalition together with the Centre Party and Isamaa (April 2019). With regard to ethno-nationalism, EKRE’s ‘Konservatiivne Programm’ (2015) formally subscribes to the state-sponsored integration strategy for ethnic Russians, with a non-regulated citizen status, who were born in Estonia. However, naturalised individuals must give up any previous nationality and possess only Estonian citizenship (‘Kodanik ja Kodanikuühiskond’ section). The same document contends that ‘the task of education and science must be to preserve the specificity of Estonian culture and national self-awareness’ (‘Haridus ja kultuur’ section). Therefore, EKRE insists on the institutional primacy of the Estonian language in the public educational system from kindergarten to higher education level. Moreover, the party tends to interlink the question of the ethnic Russian minority in Estonia with the areas of foreign policy and bilateral relations with Russia (Petsinis, 2019, pp. 220–221). EKRE insists that Estonia must upgrade its security status vis-à-vis Russia and its leadership: (a) objects to the ratification of the 2005 Estonian-Russian border treaty; (b) demands compensations from Russia for the damage inflicted under Soviet rule, including forced labour and post-war deportations (‘Konservatiivne Programm’, ‘Välis ja julgeolekupoliitika’ section) (Petsinis & Wierenga, 2021, p. 5). In its active policymaking, EKRE, since the time in the opposition, adhered to its prerogative that the highest posts in the state administration must be reserved exclusively for Estonian citizens by birth. This is also prescribed by Article 79 of the Estonian Constitution (Petsinis, 2016b). As soon as the party entered the governing coalition in 2019, EKRE systematically promoted its ethno-nationalist standpoints on policymaking areas such as: (a) the campaign against the ratification of the Estonian-Russian border treaty of 2005 until Russia acknowledges Article 2 of the Tartu Peace Treaty (1920) which recognised the independence of the Estonian interwar republic15 ; (b) the extension of a set of parental benefits with the alleged objective to reverse the demographic impact of a declining birth-rate and persistent emigration16 ; (c) the enhancement of the institutional status of the Estonian language in the public 15 On this issue, see: https://news.err.ee/936832/agreement-in-place-not-to-ratify-bor der-treaty-says-ruuben-kaalep. Accessed 20 November 2020. 16 On this issue, see: https://news.err.ee/920943/centre-ekre-isamaa-discuss-social-iss ues-in-coalition-talks. Accessed 20 November 2020.

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administration and the educational system (Petsinis & Wierenga, 2021, pp. 6–7).17 In all of this, it should be kept in mind that, both in the opposition and in power, EKRE’s leadership put a priority on the active promotion of its nativist prerogatives against immigration. As early as July 2015, the present chairman Martin Helme had dubbed the majority of asylum seekers from the recent conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere ‘illegitimate refugees who are looking for social welfare’ adding that ‘if we came to power, EKRE would deport them’ (Petsinis, 2019, p. 222).18 More recently, as part of the state of emergency declared with the objective to combat the spread of COVID-19, Martin Helme reiterated the Ministry of Interior’s intention to revise the terms of entry and stay for citizens of (non-EU) ‘third countries’ who study and work in Estonia. As Helme stated in September 2020, ‘our goal is to prevent the constant growth of communities from high-risk countries, and this is mainly due to learning mobility…the problem is the growing communities of nations in Estonia, which have a significantly different historical, cultural, and religious background from us’.19 These nativist standpoints have been communicated by EKRE almost interchangeably with the party’s ethno-nationalist principles, both in rhetoric and in political practice. In particular, EKRE’s rhetoric over the refugee crisis and immigration systematically interlinks the collective memories of ‘colonisation’ under the Soviets with the collective anxieties of becoming ‘colonised’ again by others in the immediate future (e.g. refugees and other migrants). Some EKRE affiliates have even speculated that the prospective arrival of new migrants from Africa and the Arab world can exacerbate tensions between them and the Soviet-era migrants as the latter category may see the newcomers as ‘a threat to their special minority status and as job-competitors’ (Petsinis & Wierenga, 2021, p. 11). This socio-psychological strategy helped EKRE increase its public appeal within the electorate and consolidate its status as a potent actor in Estonian politics. 17 On this issue, see: https://news.err.ee/1033587/ekre-wants-new-university-fundingmodel. Accessed 22 November 2020. 18 For this statement, see: http://news.err.ee/v/8728b4fd-d8c5-4c5b-b89e-93a608 f381f0. Accessed 22 November 2020. 19 For this statement, see: https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/estonia-amendsrules-of-entry-stay-for-international-workers-and-students/. Accessed 1 December 2020.

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Consequently, the refugee question has been interweaving in the party’s speech with concerns over the ‘(East) Slavic immigration to Estonia from Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus’ and fears that this may result in ‘a new colonisation and the demographic prevalence of Russianspeakers over Estonians in the next 30 years’ (Petsinis, 2019, p. 223).20 At this point, it should be noted that EKRE’s prominent affiliates generally refrain from resorting to hate speech against ethnic Russians and tend not to ‘Orientalise’ this community on ethno-cultural grounds. Instead, a more political/ideological jargon is used and especially the older generation of Russian-speakers may be depicted as ‘remnants of the Homo Sovieticus (‘Soviet Man’) and its political culture’. Despite the current prioritisation of the nativist prerogatives against immigration by the party leadership, the effective capitalisation on the ethno-cultural cleavages inside the Estonian society still makes up a non-negligible component of EKRE’s engagement into politics. Contesting the State Legislation on Minority Rights in Croatia: Emergence of a Multilevel Nexus As discussed in Chapter 3, the implementation of the constitutional and legal clauses on minority rights in Croatia was not without shortcomings. In addition to the occasional reluctance, by certain bodies in the municipal or local administration, to materialise the legal provisions, the major obstacles to the implementation of the legal prerogatives are to be found in the intensive politicisation of minority issues. The 2010s witnessed the consolidation of an informal and heterogeneous nexus that comprised of partners as diverse as the Croatian War Veterans Association/UHRV, grass-roots groupings, and NGOs with a nationalist orientation, the ‘right-wing faction’ of HDZ, and smaller political actors and activists. This nexus prioritised the revision of Croatia’s legal framework on minority rights. On the level of institutional politics, these political actors endeavoured to reduce the number of the ethnic Serb parliamentary deputies at the Sabor from 3 to 1, although without success, in 2018. On the level of grass-roots activism, the public use of the Serb Cyrillic script in the eastern Slavonian town of Vukovar was obstructed by public protests coordinated by the UHRV between 2013

20 Interview with the chairman of EKRE (12 October 2016, Tallinn).

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and 2016. More recently, the success of the national conservative DP in the parliamentary elections of July 2020 invigorates the political forces that contest the state legislation on minority rights and aspire to ‘renegotiate’ the engagement of the EU for the improvement of minority rights in Croatia (DP, 2020, pp. 31–32). Assessing the Risks: Placing Estonia and Croatia into a Comparative Context Starting with Croatia, the governing party of HDZ draws a considerable chunk of its support from the more socially conservative layers, especially in parts of the country such as Dalmatia and Slavonia, and from the diaspora voters.21 The operation of the ‘right-wing faction’ within the party enhanced the ability of HDZ to attract votes from these target groups. Meanwhile, on the level of intra-party politics, the consolidation of the ‘right-wing faction’ has been complicating the alleged effort by, Croatian PM and chairman of HDZ, Andrej Plenkovi´c to shift the official party narrative more firmly towards the centre. To these one should add the current participation of an ambitious DP to the right of HDZ in the Sabor. One might argue that the aggregate of these developments is likely to readjust, to varying degrees, the intra-party equilibrium between the more liberal and the more conservative factions of HDZ; especially with respect to policymaking areas such as minority rights, migration issues, gender-related themes, and the semi-formal partnership between the Catholic Church and the state. As a preliminary assessment, the prospects for a ‘right-wing turn’ that might complicate, or jeopardise, the state of ethnic relations in the Croatian society do not seem to be particularly feasible. On the one hand, the state of Croatia’s economy and the dependence on the EU’s Structural Funds mitigates the prospects for a large-scale shift towards the right comparable to the Hungarian or Polish precedents. On the other hand, following the results of the latest elections, the composition of the Croatian parliament has become increasingly pluralistic as a wide range

21 In the parliamentary elections of July 2020, HDZ won all 3 seats in ‘District 11’ which has been set up for the votes of Croatian citizens who are resident abroad. On this issue, see: https://vijesti.hrt.hr/631347/izbori-za-sabor-hrvatska-je-odlucila. Accessed 21 November 2020.

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of political parties is represented along the right-centre-left axis.22 This parliamentary pluralism can function as an additional catalyst with the potential to harness any endeavours for a ‘right-wing turn’ in Croatian politics, engineered either by the ‘right-wing faction’ of HDZ or the newcomers of the DP. Moving to Estonia, one can only make broad speculations about the motives and the potential of EKRE to trigger a decisive ‘right-wing shift’ in Estonian politics, either from inside or outside the governing structures. The, however brief, participation of EKRE in the halls of power demonstrated the party’s efficiency in actively promoting its standpoints from within the governing structures. To this, one should add the frequent allegations of passivity and disproportional tolerance to EKRE by, former Estonian PM, Jüri Ratas in the previous governing coalition. Nevertheless, as already highlighted, EKRE appears to prioritise the promotion of nativist principles against immigration with a secondary and complementary stress on its purely ethno-nationalist standpoints. In addition to these, the Centre Party still seems to maintain its grip to Estonia’s ethnic Russian electorate. These observations provide some grounds to speculate that a potential shift towards the right might not seriously impede, at least at an initial stage, the naturalisation process of ‘stateless’ individuals and the implementation of other minority policies in Estonia. Nevertheless, as a preliminary assessment, parliamentary pluralism and the greater reliance on the EU’s financial aid can operate as a combined catalyst with the potential to mitigate a ‘right-wing turn’ in Croatia more effectively than in Estonia.

22 In addition to the ruling HDZ, the (centre-left) SDP, as the largest opposition party,

and the DP, the Sabor currently comprises of the (green-leftist) coalition of Možemo with 7 seats, the (fiscally conservative and soft Eurosceptic) party of MOST/‘Bridge’ with 8 deputies, the (centrist and allied to HDZ) HNS with one seat, the (centrist, liberal) party of Pametno/‘Clever’ with 3 deputies, and the (centrist, liberal) People’s Party-Reformists/NS with one seat.

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Table 6.4 The ethnic structure of Istria’s population in 2011 (largest affiliations)

Affiliation

Numbers

Percentages in the population

Croats Italians Serbs Bosnijaks Albanians Slovenes Roma Montenegrins

142,173 12,543 7,206 6,146 2,393 1,793 858 759

68.33 6.03 3.46 2.90 1.15 0.86 0.41 0.36

Source https://www.istra-istria.hr/hr/opci-podaci/stanovnistvo/. Accessed 5 May 2021

Patterns of Ethnic Relations in Estonia and Croatia: The Sociocultural Dimension Intercultural Realities and Regional Politics in Croatia: The Case of Istria As in the discussion of Vojvodina in Serbia, there is evidence that a longstanding tradition of intercultural cohabitation can facilitate the implementation of institutional and legal norms on the regional and local levels. Intercultural cohabitation presupposes a more ‘integrated’ pattern of interaction between different groups. This more ‘integrated’ pattern manifests through the lower impact of territorial segregation and ethnic distance as well as the higher frequency of intermarriage.23 It is at this point that the case of Istria becomes relevant. This is a peninsula situated in the north-westernmost part of Croatia.24 Although it does not cover a large geographic area, Istria, likewise Vojvodina, is marked by a high degree of ethno-cultural diversity (Banovac & Boneta, 2006, pp. 21–46) (Table 6.4).25 Istria is a space where a trans-ethnic cultural substratum has provided a common ground for distinct group 23 For a theoretical discussion of ‘multiculturalism versus interculturalism’, see the

exposition of the monologic and dialogic ideas of culture in Taylor (1994, pp. 25–74). 24 Historical and geographic Istria also comprises of parts of littoral Slovenia (the settlements of Koper, Izola, Piran, and Portorož) and Italy (the area of Trieste). 25 The largest minority groups in Istria are the ethnic Italians, Slovenes, Serbs, Bosnijaks, Albanians, Hungarians, and the Roma. Despite its small geographic size, Istria produces approximately 33% of the Croatian GDP stemming from the tourist industry.

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identities, as it also becomes manifest through the frequent use of terms such as ‘hybridity’ (‘ibridismo’), ‘mixture’ (‘mescolanza’), and ‘cohabitation’ (‘convivenza’) in Istrian daily discourse (Ballinger, 2004, p. 32).26 As John Ashbrook puts it, the concept of Istrianity ‘has represented an everyday experience […] emphasising cultural similarities and differences, multi-ethnicity, which was embedded in the culture from the distant and recent past, and the idea that Istria and its people were never wholly dependent upon a single cultural or political centre’ (Ashbrook, 2006a, p. 647).27 To these, one should add the enduring significance of shared historical legacies and collective memories among all ethnic groups resident in Istria. These are, for instance, the collective memories associated with the operation of the Communist Partisan movement and the anti-fascist resistance in the peninsula during the Second World War.28 The 1990s saw a powerful emergence of politicised regionalism in Istria. Since its formation in February 1990, the Istrian Democratic Assembly/IDS (Istarski Demokratski Sabor) functioned as the local opposition to the nationalising policies emanating from the HDZ-led government in Zagreb (Ashbrook, 2006b, pp. 7–16). The party leadership defines the IDS as ‘a centre-left party with a humanitarian scope and a stress on regionalism, anti-fascism, and private ownership’.29 The IDS

26 The political scientist Dejan Stjepanovi´c defines the pattern of multi-ethnic cohabitation which is dominant in Istria as ‘pluri-national’ (Stjepanovi´c, 2018, pp. 49–100). 27 One might add the abundance of domestic adaptations of the nesting Orientalism phenomenon in Istria. These narratives tend to juxtapose Istria’s multi-ethnicity and, allegedly, Western Mediterranean historical/cultural identity to Croatia’s more ‘Balkan’ interior (Baskar, 1999, pp. 121–134). 28 During the Second World War, Yugoslav and Italian partisan units collaborated systematically with each other in Istria. The anti-fascist partisan legacy is more vivid in Istria than in other parts of Croatia and this becomes manifest up to date (e.g. the existence of street names and monuments commemorating major participants and events in the armed resistance against the Axis). The symbolism and legacies of the antifascist partisan movement also remain powerful in adjacent Rijeka and other parts of the Primorsko-Goranska region (Interview with a historian at the University of Pula, 11 March 2019, Pula; Interview with a public lawyer at the University of Rijeka, 12 March 2019, Rijeka). 29 Interview with the Head of the Department of Public Relations at IDS, 11 March 2019; Pula. For additional information on the programmatic standpoints of the IDS with regard to regional administration and the management of ethnic relations, see: https:// www.ids-ddi.com/program/amsterdamska-koalicija/. Accessed 1 December 2020.

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emphasised Istria’s multi-ethnic identity and worked towards the alleviation of inter-communal cleavages. It might not be an exaggeration to assert that Istria represented the sole exception of interethnic harmony in Croatia during the turbulent 1990s. The grass-roots concept of Istrian regional identity, as also communicated by the IDS on the political level, withstood the impact of the war and safeguarded peaceful coexistence (Ashbrook, 2006a, p. 647; Ballinger, 2004, p. 32; 2017). In the years to come, efficient and persistent lobbying by the IDS resulted in the legal codification of national minorities’ right to representation in Istria’s local government units (Petsinis, 2013, pp. 358–359).30 For instance, the statute of the Istrian županija (‘county’) stipulates a number of posts in local administration that must be reserved for representatives of the ethnic Italian minority and safeguards the official use of the Italian language in local administration, education, and public information (CLP, 2005, pp. 11 and 16). In contrast to the controversies that persist in certain municipalities of eastern Slavonia, the Serb Cyrillic script is publicly used in institutions of collective importance for the ethnic Serb community (e.g. the building of the Serb national minority council and the Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries in the town of Pula) without disruptions. The IDS remains the most popular party on the level of the Istrian županija to the present day.31 Institutional provisions such as the national minorities’ councils have enhanced the more adequate representation of national minorities in Istria’s municipal and local administration.32 During the 2000s, Istria stood out as a region where coordination among the national minorities’ councils and the local administration had been more consistent in comparison to the Croatian average (CLP, 2005, pp. 19–20). The state of intercultural understanding and peaceful coexistence has provided an 30 During the post-Tud-man era, the IDS softened its regionalist tones towards a series of Croatian governments. However, HDZ remains the party’s arch-rival (Interview with the Head of the Department of Public Relations at IDS, 11 March 2019, Pula; Interview with a historian at the University of Pula, 11 March 2019, Pula). 31 In the parliamentary elections of July 2020, the IDS participated in the ‘Restart’ coalition (together with SDP as the core partner) and garnered 44.53% of the vote, as the first party, in the 8th electoral unit of Istria. HDZ occupied the second spot with 22.51% (Table 6.5). 32 Interview with the Deputy Ombudsman at the Advisory Council for National Minorities, Republic of Croatia (6 November 2018, Zagreb).

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Table 6.5 The ethnic structure of the population of Tallinn on 1 January 2020 (largest affiliations)

Affiliations

Numbers

Estonians Russians Ukrainians Belarussians Finns

228,845 inhabitants 158,588 inhabitants 12,717 inhabitants 6,021 inhabitants 2,998 inhabitants

195

Percentages in the local population 52.29 36.24 3.10 1.37 0.68

Source https://www.stat.ee/. Accessed 5 May 2021

additional incentive towards coordination between the national minorities’ councils. This has encouraged a consensus regarding the joint communication of the national minorities’ demands and issues of major concern to the bodies of municipal and local government (Petsinis, 2013, p. 359). Therefore, Istria still serves as a model for other multi-ethnic parts of Croatia where coordination between the national minorities’ councils and the local administration has not been equally effective (e.g. the cases of western and eastern Slavonia)33 (CPLPA, 2010, pp. 32–33 and 38).34 As in Vojvodina, though, some national minority councils are better equipped, financed, and organised than others (e.g. the council of the ethnic Italian minority).35 In parts of the former Yugoslavia such as Istria and Vojvodina, the longstanding tradition of peaceful cohabitation must always be taken into account as an additional stimulus that facilitates 33 Interview with a legal expert on minority rights at the ‘Centre for Peace’ NGO (9 November 2018, Vukovar); Interview with a member of SDSS (14 November 2018, Pakrac). 34 In all of this, it should be kept in mind that, as in other parts of Croatia, the implementation of the legislation on the collective rights of the Roma minority has not been without complications. Moreover, there is evidence that the tiny Istro-Vlach community, one of the oldest in Istria, has not received adequate financial support towards the preservation of its cultural identity (Interview with a public lawyer at the University of Rijeka, 12 March 2019, Rijeka; Interview with an advisor at the Department for Human and Minority Rights, Government of Croatia, 5 November 2018, Zagreb). 35 In addition to this, the IDS has recently been accused of misusing their political power and employing ‘divide and rule’ policies, as well as nepotism, with the objective to maintain their electoral appeal among the representatives of the most influential minority groups, namely, the ethnic Serbs, Italians, and Bosnijaks. Therefore, it is said that certain flaws in the operation of the national minorities’ councils may not always be reported promptly to the state authorities (Interview with the Director of a local NGO, 6 March 2019, Pula).

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the more consistent execution of the state legislation on the regional and local levels. Estonia: Soviet Legacies and the Shift Towards Integration By contrast to Croatia, there was hardly any legal heritage from the Soviet era that Estonian legal experts could recycle and combine with the European standards on minority rights. Whereas, in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the management of ethnic relations became embedded in a multilevel administrative structure, in the Soviet Union, ethnic identities were granted recognition within a highly centralised arrangement (Roeder, 1991, pp. 203–204; Shafir, 1995, p. 142). In addition to this, the Soviet era in Estonia is said to have brought about the subtle imposition not only of the Russian language, as the lingua franca in the administrative bureaucracy, but also Russian cultural, political, and economic interests (Kreindler, 1988, pp. 11 and 13). The nationalities’ policies during the Soviet era contributed to the heightening of ethnic distance in the public space. By contrast to the intercultural realities in SR Croatia, social stability in Estonia under Soviet rule largely consisted in the model of ethno-linguistic segregation. Residential segmentation along ethno-linguistic lines became a living reality which remains visible up to date in the Greater Tallinn area and the Ida Virumaa county (north-eastern Estonia) where a dense concentration of Russian-speakers is observed (Ruutsoo et al., 2012) (Tables 6.6 and 6.7). If one takes into consideration the grass-roots realities of multiethnic cohabitation in Estonia under Soviet rule, this brings about an apparent paradox. On the one hand, the Soviet-era Russian settlers in Estonia, also Latvia, gradually developed a ‘Baltic Russian’ identity that Table 6.6 The results of the eighth electoral district (Croatian parliamentary elections of 2020)

Parties and electoral coalitions IDS-led coalition (including SDP) HDZ Možemo MOST

Percentages of the total vote 44.53 22.51 8.49 5.82

Source https://www.izbori.hr/sabor2020/rezultati/1/data/mrezul tati.html. Accessed 5 May 2021

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Table 6.7 The ethnic structure of the population of Ida Virumaa on 1 January 2020 (largest affiliations)

Affiliations

Numbers

Russians Estonians Ukrainians Belarussians Finns

98,143 inhabitants 25,375 inhabitants 3,088 inhabitants 2,819 inhabitants 1,208 inhabitants

197

Percentages in the local population 73.1 18.9 2.3 2.1 0.9

Source https://www.stat.ee/. Accessed 5 May 2021

differentiated them from their ethnic kin in Russia. On the other hand, Estonia’s ethnic Russians remained segregated linguistically, residentially, and occupationally within a system that did not treat Baltic Russians as a group with their collective particularities and separate institutional structures (Petsinis, 2016a, pp. 239–240). In accordance to the political scientist Kristina Kallas, the model for the management of ethnic relations in Estonia gradually transformed from an exclusionary (early and mid-1990s) to an integrationist approach, although not free from assimilationist underpinnings, by the 2010s (Kallas, 2016, pp. 24–25). As part of the process, the external engagement by the EU and its sub-bodies, as an agent of both a normative and regulatory power, was of crucial importance. In addition to the acceleration of the naturalisation process, quantitative research demonstrates that the younger generation of ethnic Russians possesses a better command of Estonian language than the older generation. Moreover, their performance in the labour market in terms of incomes and professional attainment does not differ considerably from that of majority Estonians (Integration Monitoring, 2015). More importantly, the levels of trust towards the Estonian state institutions among the younger generation of ethnic Russians are remarkably higher than those encountered among the older generation.36 However, most of them still believe that majority Estonians are better represented in the political participation structures (Kallas & Kivistik, 2015). 36 The older generation of ethnic Russians also tend to derive much of their information about the political developments across the broader post-Soviet space, the Baltic States included, from Russian-based media outlets such as PBK, RTR (RU1 Channel ), and NTV ‘MIR’ (Interview with a senior researcher at ICDS, 4 August 2017, Tallinn; Interview with a policy adviser at the Government Office of Estonia, 1 December 2017, Tallinn).

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In regard to the intersection between generational cleavages and sociocultural integration, political scientists, government officials, and political analysts at Estonian think-tanks converge along their observations that the younger generation of ethnic Russians is generally well-integrated into the society. They also seem to share highly comparable sociocultural patterns with the Estonian majority.37 At the same time, though, sentiments of socioeconomic exclusion among certain segments of the ethnic Russian community can impact negatively on their sense of belonging to the larger society and decrease their trust in the state institutions.38 To this, one should add the existence of highly regionalised (or localised) patterns of identification among ethnic Russians which largely revolve around their native areas of origin (the area of Ida Virumaa and the city of Narva, in particular) (Makarychev & Yatsyk, 2016).39 As recommended in an expert report for the ICDS (Tallinn) thinktank in 2014, ‘…it is high time for Estonian citizenship policy to rid itself of its image of being oriented to ethnic exclusion and being unfriendly to outsiders…to ease the conditions for obtaining Estonian citizenship by simplifying language requirements for older people, giving children born in Estonia citizenship automatically, and so forth’ (Kivirähk, 2014, p. 27). Despite the tangible breakthrough towards a more integrationist direction, it remains equally true that national survival, in Classical Realist terms (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 12), constitutes the stepping stone of domestic policy in Estonia to a greater extent than it does in Croatia.

37 To this, one should add that, as many majority Estonians, a considerable percentage of younger ethnic Russians tend to see their future abroad and are interested in job opportunities elsewhere in the EU or beyond (e.g. Canada, Australia, and the US) (Interview with a policy adviser at the Government Office of Estonia, 1 December 2017, Tallinn; Interview with a policy advisor on social integration at the Estonian Ministry of Culture, 1 November 2016, conducted via Skype). 38 Interview with a political scientist at the Tallinn University of Technology, 28 June 2017, Tallinn; Interview with a senior researcher at ICDS, 4 August 2017, Tallinn. 39 Interview with a policy advisor on social integration at the Estonian Ministry of Culture, 1 November 2016, conducted via Skype; Interview with a senior researcher at ICDS, 4 August 2017, Tallinn. It should be noted that comparable ‘region-centred’ patterns of group identification can be encountered among certain segments of the Serbian majority in Vojvodina who arrived as refugees from the conflicts in Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina during the 1990s (e.g. ethnic Serb refugees from Lika who tend to identify themselves primarily as ‘Liˇcani’/natives of Lika, others from Herzegovina who primarily identify as’Herˇcegovci’/natives of Herzegovina, etc.) (Petsinis, 2020, p. 123).

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To this, one should add the non-negligible salience and appeal of ethnonationalism to certain segments of the Estonian electorate, especially as it manifested in EKRE’s rising popularity from 2016 to the present day.40

In Lieu of a Conclusion Estonia and Croatia are two states situated along the northeast and the southeast fringes of the EU periphery. The redefinition of national identities provided a common denominator between Croatia and Estonia during the 1990s. The institutionalisation of national identities interweaved with securitisation and the safeguarding of state sovereignty inside both contexts. Meanwhile, Estonia and Croatia endorsed accession to the EU as a project that would demarcate them from adversary ‘Others’ in their ‘near abroad’. During the 1990s, Estonia and Croatia saw accession to the EU as a project that would reinforce their Europeanness and mark their ‘return to Europe’. Nevertheless, by that time, European identity was being redefined along inclusionary lines. This entailed a higher emphasis on the affirmation of hybrid/multilevel identities and the necessity to integrate, and not assimilate, minority identities into the mainstream societies. Consequently, the stress on national survival in Estonia and Croatia clashed with the pressures from the EU on minority rights. In all of this, the triadic nexus that consisted of Croatia/Estonia, the ethnic Serb/Russian minorities, and their external homelands remained tense. This obstructed the impact of the EU’s soft power as an additional, ‘fourth actor’, inside the nexus (Petsinis, 2016a, p. 240). During the second half of the 1990s, the Estonian government demonstrated a stronger inclination to cooperate with the EU towards the harmonisation of its legislation on minority rights with the Copenhagen Criteria (1993) and the acquis communitaire. However, it was the systemic transformation in Croatia, since the 2000s, that signified a decisive breakthrough in the arrangement of a new legislation on

40 It should be noted that EKRE’s popularity persisted and surged after the dissolution of the previous governing coalition. In accordance to an opinion poll conducted by the Norstat polling agency (late February-early March 2021), EKRE polled as Estonia’s second most popular party with 19.9%; one spot behind the Reform Party, polling at 34.6% of the sample, and one spot ahead the Centre Party polling at 19.5%. For these figures, see: https://www.err.ee/1608144592/norstati-reitingud-ekre-jatkab-rekord tasemel. Accessed 23 May 2021.

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minority rights. Croatian legal experts proved particularly adept in modifying elements from the communist era legislation and combining them with European standards (e.g. FCNM, 1995). As in the Serbian case (Chapter 5), the significance of this breakthrough consists in that, despite Croatia’s long trajectory to the EU and the mobilising potential of ethnonationalism across the former Yugoslavia, the state authorities, already in the early 2000s, succeeded in setting up an extensive and devolved legal framework on minority rights (Petsinis, 2016a, p. 241). With the exception of the ‘Bronze Soldier’ riots (26–29 April 2007), Estonia has experienced a state of social stability. This enabled the Estonian republic to strengthen its democratic institutions and join the EU in 2004. Social stability is a factor that has generated a commitment to the Estonian state among ethnic Russians; their younger generation, in particular. Although the emphasis on national survival retains its paramount significance for domestic policy in Estonia, the period after the ‘Bronze Soldier’ troubles saw the gradual relaxation of the ethnic democracy model. This became manifest in the amendments to the Law on Citizenship (1995) in January 2015, the facilitation of the bureaucratic procedures for the acquisition of Estonian citizenship (e.g. the introduction of less demanding language tests), the steady decrease in the figures of ‘stateless’ individuals, and the more extensive use of the Russian language in the public administration and the state media. Nevertheless, the period since the mid-2010s has posed new challenges to the state of ethnic relations as ethno-nationalist and Eurosceptic actors have been contesting the legal frameworks on minority rights inside both contexts. At this given moment, the prospects for a ‘right-wing turn’ that might complicate, or even jeopardise, the state of ethnic relations in the Croatian and Estonian societies do not seem to be an issue of imminent concern. Especially in Croatia, the country’s heavy dependence on financial aid from the EU and the enhanced political pluralism at the Sabor seem capable of functioning as a combined catalyst that can harness a ‘right-wing shift’ comparable to the precedents of Hungary or Poland. Meanwhile, in Estonia, the party of EKRE appears to prioritise the nativist (e.g. opposition to the admission of refugees and other migrants from ‘third countries’) and, to a secondary extent, anti-establishment components (e.g. allegations over the existence of a ‘deep state’ in Estonian politics) of its rhetoric over the purely ethno-nationalist prerogatives on the ethnic Russian minority.

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This cross-regional comparison provides additional empirical evidence which demonstrates that the relaxation of the nexus that consists of domestic ethnopolitics and regional geopolitics can facilitate the liberalisation of the models for the management of ethnic relations. In all of this, the varying intersections between institutional politics and sociocultural specificities on the regional and grass-roots levels should also be taken into account. The cases of Istria in Croatia and the autonomous province of Vojvodina in Serbia hint that a heritage of peaceful cohabitation can enhance the implementation of the state legislation and encourage the adoption of flexible models for the management of inter-group relations inside multi-ethnic regional settings. Meanwhile, in these cases where legacies of inter-communal segmentation and the persistence of a tense geopolitical environment combine, the emphasis on national survival can halt or, as illustrated in the discussions of Estonia and Latvia, complicate further progress in the liberalisation of the legal frameworks on minority rights.

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State, International, Legal, and Party Documents (Electronic and Printed Versions) DP. (2020, lipanj). Program Delovanja. Zagreb: Domovinski Pokret. EKRE. (2015). Konservatiivne Programm (Conservative programme). (https:// www.ekre.ee/konservatiivne-programm/. Accessed 22 March 2020.

CHAPTER 7

Final Remarks, Conclusions, and Trajectories for Further Research

This monograph consisted of a cross-regional study and relied on an interdisciplinary approach within political science. Its chief objective is to contribute to the systematic assessment of how ethnopolitics can combine with geopolitical configurations and also with the emergence of more recent trends such as nativism, (right-wing) populism, and Euroscepticism in the countries and societies covered (Estonia and Latvia from the Baltic States; Croatia and Serbia from the Western Balkans). This forms part of the broader endeavour to provide new insights updating and upgrading the study of ethnopolitics—not solely across Central and Eastern Europe—but as a whole. This final chapter summarises and reflects on the main findings of the monograph with a thematic focus on: (a) the intersections between regional geopolitics and domestic ethnopolitics; (b) the intersections among nativism, (right-wing) populism, Euroscepticism, and ethno-nationalism; (c) the sociocultural, ‘bottom up’, dimension of ethnopolitics. In addition to these thematic areas, attention is paid to trajectories for further research, including to those beyond the disciplinary scope of ethnopolitics.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 V. Petsinis, Cross-Regional Ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99951-3_7

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Intersections Between Regional Geopolitics and Domestic Ethnopolitics Starting with the empirical discussion of Croatia and Serbia, the gradual normalisation of relations between the two states since 2000 decisively demarcated the management of ethnic relations in the interior from geopolitical configurations and/or other concerns pertaining to the field of inter-state relations. Consequently, the occasional politicisation of questions related to ethnopolitics is primarily subject to internal catalysts and alignments in domestic politics. This is particularly valid in Croatia where the politicisation of ethnic relations (especially as far as the status of ethnic Serb minority is concerned) has frequently become interwoven with: (a) the endeavour of the ‘right-wing faction’ of the governing HDZ to augment and consolidate its standing inside the party structure; (b) the simultaneous attempt by new political actors (e.g. the national conservative party Homeland Movement/Domovinski pokret [DP]) to contest HDZ’s ‘right-wing faction’ capitalising on ethnic cleavages within society. Inside the Serbian context, this finding is equally valid in regards to the management of ethnic relations in the multi-ethnic province of Vojvodina. This has come about from: (a) the remarkable upgrading of SerbianHungarian relations during the tenures of President Aleksandar Vuˇci´c and PM Viktor Orbán in office; (b) the steady cooperation between the ruling party of SNS and the largest party that represents ethnic Hungarian interests in the assembly and the other bodies of authority in Vojvodina (VMSZ). In the case of Serbia, this monograph demonstrates that the latest alleviation of tensions in the nexus that consists of regional geopolitics and domestic geopolitics was decisively triggered by factors that pertain to political culture as well as ground-breaking developments at the level of European politics. The most noteworthy of them were: (a) a multitude of shared traits with respect to their patterns of personal leadership and governance of the state which facilitated the rapprochement between Aleksandar Vuˇci´c and Viktor Orbán; (b) PM Orbán’s decision to shift the lens of the Hungarian government’s grievances from neighbouring states and minority issues towards the European Commission (e.g. disagreements and controversies over the rule of law in Hungary and the ‘quota arrangement’ for the redistribution of refugees within the EU). Inside both the Croatian and Serbian contexts, the gradual softening of the bond that consists of regional geopolitics and domestic ethnopolitics

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facilitated: (a) the adoption and implementation of new legal frameworks for the management of ethnic relations which also selectively incorporated aspects of communist era legislation on minority rights; (b) the external engagement of the EU as an additional ‘fourth’ pillar in the triadic nexus that consists of ethnic minorities, their external homelands, and the states where these minorities reside. In stark contrast to the cases of Croatia and Serbia, the convergence of regional geopolitics and domestic ethnopolitics remains relevant to the contexts of post-Soviet Estonia and Latvia. As a consequence of this phenomenon, the opportunity structure to further liberalise the legal frameworks on minority rights in the two Baltic cases has been more restricted and complicated in comparison to Croatia and Serbia. In all this, one should not overlook Russia’s emergence as a virulent contender to the EU and NATO from the East, especially during Vladimir Putin’s Presidency. The aggregate of these catalysts prompted a string of Latvian and Estonian governments to prioritise regional security over reforms in the domestic management of ethnopolitics. On the level of party politics, influential parties of the populist and radical (e.g. EKRE in Estonia) as well as the national conservative right (e.g. the NA in Latvia) have been legitimising certain sets of policies along ethno-nationalist lines with an emphasis on national survival. Of paramount significance has been to: (a) safeguard the dominant status of the Estonian/Latvian languages in the public sector (public administration, education, and the state media); (b) encourage the increase of (ethnically) Estonian/Latvian birth-rates, remigration, and other ‘demographic issues’; (c) prolong the securitisation of bilateral relations between Estonia/Latvia and Russia and the prioritisation of Estonia’s and/or Latvia’s membership of NATO over the EU (both in rhetoric and active policymaking). The heavy stress of these political actors on ethnonationalism is largely to be traced to geopolitical anxieties over Russia’s disproportional leverage as an ‘external homeland’ for the ethnic Russian minorities resident in the two states. Moreover, this cross-regional comparison demonstrates that the intersection between geopolitics and ethnopolitics should not be perceived as ‘fixed’, and can become subject to fluctuations and readjustments. This means that under certain circumstances, the centrality of domestic ethnopolitics can weaken. The discussion of Serbia demonstrates that the readjustment of the intersection between ethnopolitics and geopolitics (especially since 2008) shifted the lens of the country’s main political actors primarily towards geopolitics. Meanwhile, the discussion of Latvia

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demonstrates that new variables can enter the scene (e.g. the ‘new’ antiimmigration identity politics, compounded by economic anxieties) and temporarily challenge the primacy of regional geopolitics and domestic ethnopolitics. As a concluding remark, this comparison provides additional empirical evidence which demonstrates that the relaxation of the nexus of domestic ethnopolitics and regional ethnopolitics can remarkably facilitate the liberalisation of legal models for the management of inter-group relations.

Intersections Among Ethno-Nationalism, Nativism, and (Right-Wing) Populism This monograph combined selected approaches from the field of ethnopolitics and others pertaining to the study of the populist and radical right. This is because ethno-nationalism constitutes an ideological component of fundamental significance for populist and radical right-wing parties (Minkenberg, 2017, 2021). Starting with the two cases from the Baltic States, Estonia and Latvia provide two political environments where prominent parties of the populist and radical (as well as the national conservative) right have firmly anchored their nativist standpoints against immigration into the longer trajectories of domestic ethnopolitics. In greater detail, EKRE in Estonia and the NA in Latvia tend to: (a) interconnect older patterns of migration (during the Soviet era) with more recent waves of migration to the two countries; (b) forge a solid nexus between their ethno-nationalist principles on national survival and an uncompromising nativist stance on immigration. The combination of ethno-nationalist and nativist principles in the rhetoric of EKRE and the NA aims at constructing a discursive nexus between collective memories of ‘colonisation’ under the Soviets and the fears of becoming ‘colonised’ by new groups of migrants in the near future. Especially inside the Estonian context, EKRE’s successful anchoring of its nativist standpoints into a longer trajectory of ethnopolitics hints at the persistence of ‘decolonisation’ narratives and their complicated relationship with the recently coined imageries of Estonia as a successful and outgoing ‘eco-digital nation’ (Annus, 2020). Whereas the Latvian party system has enabled the NA to promote its nativist principles as part of a ‘gradualist’ strategy from within the halls of power, EKRE continues to combine its nativist prerogatives with persistent anti-systemic and Eurosceptic rhetoric.

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By contrast to the Estonian and Latvian contexts, no prominent political force in either Croatia or Serbia (including the ‘right-wing factions’ of the ruling parties of HDZ and SNS, respectively) seem to have been particularly keen on politicising their discontent over the passage or accommodation of refugees and other migrants through the territories of the two countries. Instead, since autumn 2015, both the Croatian and Serbian governments focused on infrastructural deficiencies and voiced their mutual discontent over Hungary’s decision to erect a razor-wire fence along the border with both countries (2015–2016). In all this, it should be noted that the bulk of migrants saw Croatia (and especially Serbia) as ‘transit countries’, regulating any prospects for the emergence of public and political discontent. Here, it should be noted that ethno-nationalist discourses in Croatia and Serbia tend to perceive nationhood from a strictly collectivist angle along the lines of an extended kinship (symbolically as well as literally). In this light, it is opposition to the ‘externally imposed’ collective rights for sexual minorities (LGBTQI communities) that can be embedded either in (partly political and partly theological) narratives of ethno-nationalism (e.g. the doctrine of Svetosavlje in Serbia) or semi-formal, partly secular, and partly religious arrangements (e.g. the Vatican Contract in Croatia). Academic experts (Minkenberg, 2017) have hinted that multiculturalism, as understood in Western Europe and North America may not be a particularly welcome notion to a majority of the population in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (including the admission of non-white and non-Christian groups of migrants). Furthermore, a long sequence of domestic conceptualisations of ‘the nation’ along ethno-cultural and ‘autochthonist’ lines hold that membership to state and nation must be defined by ancestry and be conterminous (Bustikova, 2018, 2019). Therefore, one might argue that, if only implicitly, such stances provide a fertile soil for the emergence of staunchly nativist (and, at the same time, appealing) political actors with ambitions to embed their anti-immigration narratives into symbols and imageries derived from their societies’ identity and memory politics. Nevertheless, the study of the Croatian and Serbian cases demonstrates that this tentative correlation does not operate pervasively, let alone ‘automatically’ across the macro-region of Central and Eastern Europe. Instead, whereas EKRE and the NA proved particularly efficient in interlinking the memories of ‘colonisation’ under the Soviets with the (however unsubstantiated) anxieties over a new ‘impending colonisation’, ethno-nationalist and nativist political actors in Croatia and

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Serbia turned out to be more pragmatic and saw little gain in weaponising a migration crisis which has been mostly virtual (or, at least, temporary) for these two societies. The empirical findings of this monograph aim at stimulating a more extensive and systematic cooperation between academic experts in ethnonationalism and academic experts in the populist and radical right. This would enable: (a) the former to more accurately assess the degree to which new variables such as nativism and anti-immigrant trends can reshape ethnopolitics (both as a lived reality and a field of study) across Central and Eastern Europe; (b) the latter to formulate new interpretative models about how (right-wing) populist and/or nativist actors embed their agendas inside the pre-existing political cultures of ethnonationalism, particularistic identity, and memory politics. The systemisation of this interdisciplinary cooperation can be beneficial to the study of ethnopolitics, nativism, and the populist and radical right not solely in the Western Balkans, the Baltic States, or the Visegrad Four, but throughout the whole of Europe. Ultimately, this will lead to a substantial updating and upgrading of existing theoretical models for the study of ethnopolitics. This is a task of urgent necessity, taking into consideration that the bulk of the theoretical literature on ethnopolitics and nationalism dates back to the 1990s and 2000s.

Intersections Between Ethno-Nationalism and Euroscepticism The variants of Euroscepticism encountered in the societies of the Baltic States and the Western Balkans remain an understudied topic in existing academic literature. Inside the political contexts of Estonia and Latvia, the parties of EKRE and the NA have been propagating a brand of (predominantly) geopolitical Euroscepticism which scrutinises the extent to which membership of the EU can upgrade the security status of Estonia and Latvia vis-à-vis Russia. In accordance with this (nominally soft) variant of geopolitical Euroscepticism, the two parties have expressed discontent over Germany’s (and France’s) alleged apathy to Russian aggression and ongoing cooperation with Moscow in energy issues. Moreover, EKRE and the NA have repeatedly urged the EU to firmly align with NATO’s defence doctrine and not to create ‘unilateral defence structures’ (e.g. the European Security Union) that might weaken the military capacity of the Alliance. In addition to geopolitical Euroscepticism, the Commission’s

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quotas plan for the redistribution of refugees makes up an additional area of contention between these two parties and the EU. The latter controversy establishes a communication channel for nativist, ethno-nationalist, and Eurosceptic trends in Estonia and Latvia. Meanwhile, the political landscapes of Croatia and Serbia seem to be remarkably more varied, as far as Euroscepticism is concerned. In Croatia, Eurosceptic sentiment appears to be multifaceted and interwoven with the management of ethnic relations, gender-related themes, and (to a secondary extent) economic insecurities. Throughout the last decade, a multilevel and heterogeneous nexus which comprises parliamentary (e.g. the governing HDZ’s ‘right-wing faction’) as well as extra-parliamentary components (e.g. nationalist NGOs and war veterans’ associations) mobilised and actively obstructed the implementation of state legislation on minority rights (e.g. the case of Vukovar). The direct concern of this nexus is to revise Croatia’s legal framework on minority rights. Nevertheless, although not explicitly interlinking their criticism of the EU with their standpoints on minority rights, an additional objective of these actors is to communicate their dissatisfaction with the external engagement of the EU towards the improvement of minority rights legislation (as observed in the EU conditionality regulations between 2000 and 2002). The recent emergence of the DP as a national conservative party which interconnects its soft Euroscepticism with the management of ethnic relations hints at the prospective reinforcement of the aforementioned nexus, albeit in a manner antagonistic to the ‘right-wing faction’ of HDZ. Furthermore, under the auspices of the Vatican Contract, HDZ’s ‘right-wing faction’, the DP, and smaller political actors (as well as extraparliamentary actors such as Catholic Church NGOs) may allude to the external ‘imposition’ of alien ethical norms on Croatian society and issue calls for the reformation of the EU, demanding a return to its ‘original’ (‘European and Christian’) principles and values. As is the case with the opposition to state legislation on minority rights, the aforementioned nexus usually opts for a soft, reformist variant of Euroscepticism which does not contest Croatia’s place inside the EU. In addition, as previously highlighted, the migration crisis does not occupy a prominent locus in the platforms of ethno-nationalist and nativist actors in Croatia, nor in Serbia, and this includes their prerogatives on Euroscepticism. Croatia’s dependence on the EU for financial aid and regional security decisively alleviates

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any propensities for a prospective conflict with Brussels from the political establishment. By contrast to Croatia, a relaxation of the intersection between ethnopolitics and geopolitics has led to the dissociation of Eurosceptic narratives from the question of ethnic relations in Serbia. Since 2008, the question of Kosovo has been transformed from a matter of domestic ethnopolitics into one of foreign policy and regional geopolitics. Moreover, the positive neighbourly relations with Hungary and the normalisation of relations with Croatia hint at the absence of a security threat emanating from any of the minorities in Serbia’s most ethnically diverse region, Vojvodina. As an aggregate of these developments (and by contrast to their Croatian counterparts within HDZ), Serbian Eurosceptics within the ruling SNS generally do not intertwine their criticism of the EU with the management of minority issues in Serbia. Consequently, the dominant brand of party-based Euroscepticism in Serbia can be categorised as right-wing, conservative, and primarily geopolitical. At this point, attention needs to be paid to the geopolitical components of Euroscepticism in the Baltic States (Estonia and Latvia) and the Western Balkans (Serbia) and how they are qualitatively distinct from each other. From the perspective of International Relations theory, one might argue that the geopolitical Euroscepticism encountered among the policymakers of the governing SNS in Serbia appears to be anchored in the concept of (broadly defined) global multi-polarity. This consists of: (a) a continuous attempt to balance between Western (EU and the US) and ‘alternative’ (Russia and China) partners in global politics and extract as many gains as possible from Serbia’s oscillation between the two poles; (b) a preference for a multipolar international system where global actors such as Russia and China enjoy an invigorated status vis-à-vis the US and the EU. By contrast, the variant of geopolitical Euroscepticism espoused by parties such as EKRE and the NA in the Baltic States largely consists of a preference for global unipolarity. This preference manifests itself in staunchly pro-Atlantic stances and revolves around the preponderant status of the US and NATO in the international system as a bulwark against any security threats emanating from Russia (Chryssogelos, 2021).

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Ethnopolitics ‘On the Ground’: The Sociocultural Dimension Another important objective of this monograph was to relax the communication barriers that exist between academic researchers and policymaking experts working on the Western Balkans and those dealing with the Baltic States. Therefore, it was important to underline the sociocultural aspects of ethnopolitics in the states and societies studied. Before focusing on this aspect, a brief reference to the institutional management of ethnic relations inside these contexts should be made. Starting with the cases of Estonia and Latvia, it would be an exaggeration to categorise them as two more examples of ‘post-accession non-compliance’ in Central and Eastern Europe. Instead, recent developments such as the parliamentary compromise over the new Law on Citizenship (2020) and the new legal provisions in upper-secondary education (2018) demonstrate that there is still room for the liberalisation of the framework on minority rights in Latvia. The same thing can be argued about Estonia, especially in regards to the Law on Citizenship (1995) amendments made in January 2015, the facilitation of the bureaucratic procedures for the acquisition of Estonian citizenship (e.g. the introduction of less demanding language tests), the steady decrease in the figures of ‘stateless’ individuals, and the more extensive use of the Russian language in public administration and the state media. Nevertheless, the entire process inside both contexts has been subject to long parliamentary negotiations and it is considerably slower in comparison to the Croatian and Serbian precedents. The uniqueness of the Croatian and Serbian cases can be evidenced despite uneven trajectories to the EU. In spite of the legacies of ethnic strife across the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the state authorities succeeded in setting up extensive, regionalised, and devolved frameworks on minority rights in the early 2000s. In addition to ground-breaking developments at an institutional and party political level (namely, the systemic transformations of Croatia and Serbia in the 2000s), a set of sociocultural realities provided the ‘bottom-up’ impetus required for this breakthrough in the management of ethnic relations. This monograph demonstrated that: (a) in multi-ethnic parts of Serbia (e.g. Vojvodina) and Croatia (e.g. Istria), a trans-ethnic notion of regional identity seems to have withstood ethnic friction and preserved cultural pluralism in the local societies; (b) a

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heritage of intercultural cohabitation can enhance the implementation of state legislation and encourage the adoption of flexible models for the management of ethnic relations. Intercultural cohabitation presupposes a better integrated pattern of interaction between different groups. This improved pattern of integration manifests itself through the lower impact of territorial segregation and ethnic distance, as well as the higher frequency of intermarriage. In the cases of Vojvodina and Istria, ethnic group cultures seem to exist there as well as a common cultural substratum which becomes manifest in the form of Vojvodinian/Istrian regional identities. These regional identities are one of the main factors in building common denominators. Regional identities establish common human values, developed as significant or even existential by diverse ethnic groups (Petsinis, 2020, pp. 201 and 203; Stjepanovi´c, 2018, pp. 49–100). The part played by similar living conditions, historical links, and mutual reliance, as well as common future perspectives should also be taken into account. However, this is not to argue that Vojvodina and/or Istria are anywhere near as diverse as precedents such as the US ‘melting pot’. By contrast, the ethnic communities in Vojvodina and Istria have preserved a certain degree of integrity, insisting on their own distinctive identities. In Istria, this state of intercultural understanding and peaceful coexistence has provided an additional and significant incentive towards coordination between the national minorities’ councils in the region. In Vojvodina, this longstanding tradition of harmonious, multiethnic cohabitation functioned as an important, ‘bottom-up’ catalyst that encouraged the elaboration of more flexible models for the accommodation of minority rights at national and provincial levels (e.g. the relevant clauses in the statute on the autonomy of Vojvodina, 2009/2014). Coming back to the Baltic States, the southeast region of Latgale in Latvia provides a sociocultural context where the persistence of a multiethnic regional identity alleviates ethnic cleavages and provides a common substratum for a multitude of ethno-linguistic communities without indications of secessionist tendencies. On the grass-roots level, bilingualism and ethnically mixed marriages remain a regular occurrence throughout the region whereas ethno-cultural identification is often a matter of individual discretion. At a first instance, these sociocultural specificities seem rather akin to the bottom-up, trans-ethnic, cultural substratum which alleviates the intensity of inter-communal cleavages in Vojvodina and Istria. However, one needs to pay attention to a tripartite configuration of

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identity across Latvia which comprises grass-roots, institutional, and party level politics. By contrast to the cases of Istria and Vojvodina, the persisting fragmentation of institutional and party politics along ethno-linguistic lines may operate as a catalyst which frequently complicates building a consensus over the formulation of more flexible models for ethnic relations management. Meanwhile, in Estonia, the gradual shift of state policies from exclusion/assimilation to integration resulted in the relaxation of ethnocultural barriers in daily social interaction, especially as far as the younger generation of ethnic Russians is concerned. Nevertheless, the paramount emphasis on national survival may function as a catalyst which preserves ethnic distance at grass-roots level and potentially augments the popular appeal of political actors with a pronounced ethno-nationalist agenda (most recently, EKRE). This is not to contend that things in Vojvodina and Istria are entirely flawless since the intense politicisation of minority issues (Croatia) and instances of insufficient coordination on the regional and local levels (Croatia and Serbia) can complicate the implementation of the legal provisions. However, the study of largely under-researched but socially well-integrated cases such as Vojvodina and Istria makes a solid contribution to the deconstruction of essentialist (yet persisting) theses over the alleged ‘endemic and linear persistence’ of ethno-nationalism and ‘unbridgeable cleavages’ in the multi-ethnic societies of Southeast Europe (Kaplan, 1993).1 This provides plenty of empirical material which can help: (a) the reader assess the degree to which certain states may learn from the successes and/or shortcomings of others in the field of accommodating ethnic differences; (b) set up the rudimentary foundations towards the elaboration of alternative models for understanding ethnopolitics drawn from the Central and East European multi-ethnic experience. This is of great significance, considering that researchers from Central and Eastern Europe have mostly employed Western theoretical models for the study of ethnopolitics inside their macro-region.

1 Maria Todorova (1997) and Milica Baki´c-Hayden (1995) were among the first scholars who systematically contested the re-conceptualisation of Orientalism as ‘Balkanism’ in the work of Robert Kaplan and other authors during the 1990s.

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Trajectories for Further Research The trajectories for future research beyond the findings of this monograph can stretch beyond the disciplinary scope of ethnopolitics. Starting with a purely cross-regional angle, this study provides a substratum for the further expansion of its comparative frame via the inclusion of additional cases from the Visegrad Four group of states; namely Slovakia and Hungary. Both of these countries are currently governed by parties of the (nominally) conservative right and their national parliaments host considerable numbers of ethno-nationalist and nativist parties of the radical and more extreme right (Jobbik and ‘Our Slovakia’, respectively). Moreover, Hungary may be a homogeneous society but the situation of ethnic Hungarian minorities in neighbouring states (including Slovakia) still plays a non-negligible part in shaping foreign policy, despite the current prioritisation of EU-level politics by the FIDESZ-led government. Moving to a more theoretical scope, this monograph demonstrated that the governing apparatuses of Croatia and Serbia converge along their pragmatic and adaptive employment of soft Euroscepticism. By contrast, in precedents set by FIDESZ and/or PiS, one can observe a more ideological and pervasive dominance of socially conservative agendas which regularly manifested amidst tensions between the Hungarian/Polish governments and the European Commission over the EU’s refugee quotas and certain controversies regarding the rule of law. This friction seems to be amplified by centre-periphery relations and the apparent ambition of the Visegrad Four (Poland, in particular, as the largest partner) to juxtapose a geopolitical and sociocultural ‘anti-model’ to the EU centre. However, in the cases of HDZ and SNS, tactical and internally devolved arrangements which consist of ‘divisions of labour’ between the pro-EU and the more Eurosceptic cohorts (especially in the case of HDZ and its right-wing faction) can be observed. Studying why and how countries such as Croatia’s and Serbia’s ruling conservatives are adaptive whereas Poland’s and/or Hungary’s may opt for establishing ‘illiberal democracies’ can provide an insightful trajectory for further comparative research. It would be of great interest to future research to systematically assess the significance of ethnic cleavages, if they can be contested, temporarily effaced, or ultimately transformed by the increasing impact of socioeconomic catalysts (namely, social welfare, transparency, and the economy as a whole). This emerges as a timely and relevant

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research task, especially inside the contexts of Croatia and Latvia— two societies that were recently burdened by economic recession (Croatia: 2009–2015; Latvia: 2009–2011). A noteworthy watershed in the Latvian case was the victory of the centrist/centre-left coalition, consisting of the centrist Att¯ıst¯ıbai/Par!/Development/For! and centreleft Progres¯ıvie/’The Progressives’ parties in the 2020 Riga City Council snap election (26–29 August). The manifesto of the victorious coalition placed primary importance on the resolution of economic issues (such as administrative transparency and social welfare) and its appeal cut across ethnic lines—especially among the younger generation of voters. Taking into consideration that Riga is the political and economic decision-making centre of Latvia, this development clearly hints at: (a) ethno-nationalist actors (e.g. the NA) have not always been successful in attempts to extract political capital out of inter-communal cleavages in multi-ethnic environments; (b) an increased awareness of corruption and non-transparency, irrespective of the minority/majority divide (e.g. the corruption charges against Harmony’s long-time mayor of Riga, Nils Ušakovs). Meanwhile, in Croatia, new and ambitious political actors such as the increasingly popular green/leftist coalition of Možemo juxtapose a platform for: (a) the alleviation of ethnic cleavages and the adequate representation of minority communities in government; (b) a greater stress on social cohesion and equality all over Europe, in accordance with what academic experts on left-wing Euroscepticism have termed the doctrine of ‘Euro-alternativism’ (Guerra, 2015; FitzGibbon, 2013). As in the case of Riga, the growing popularity of Možemo reached a milestone following a landslide victory for the green/leftist coalition’s candidate (Tomislav Tomaševi´c) in the mayoral elections for Zagreb on 30 May 2021.2 In addition to the cases of Latvia and Croatia, the political crisis and dissolution of Estonia’s governing coalition in autumn 2016 equally highlighted an early (yet noteworthy) contestation of the ‘neoliberal consensus’ on the economy that has been in force across the country’s party spectrum since the 1990s.

2 In the second round of the mayoral elections for Croatia’s capital city, Tomislav Tomaševi´c won 199,630 votes (67.3%) whereas his chief-rival, Miroslav Škoro, garnered 106,300 votes (32.7%). On this issue, see: https://rs.n1info.com/region/objavljene-izl azne-ankete-u-najvecim-hrvatskim-gradovima/ (accessed 30 May 2021).

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The aggregate of these observations hints at the growing relevance of the economy not solely for anti-austerity initiatives in Southern Europe (e.g. Greece, Spain, and Portugal) but also for a new generation of political actors in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This acquires a particular weight in the countries and societies that were most negatively affected by the economic crisis—including those that have been either marred by ethnic conflict (e.g. Croatia during the 1990s) or fragmented along persisting, and intensively politicised, inter-communal cleavages (e.g. Latvia). By contrast to the largely ‘virtual’ ramifications of the migration crisis, one might argue that the long-term repercussions of the economic recession in societies such as Latvia and Croatia are very real. During the last decade, both countries have suffered from: the depopulation of rural areas; brain drain and other aspects of outward emigration; the persistence of an urban–rural divide; and the imposition of (not particularly popular) austerity measures for the management of the financial crisis. In multi-ethnic and impoverished regions such as Latgale (Latvia) and/or Slavonia (Croatia), these symptoms of economic stagnation cut across ethnic lines and have impacted equally on ethnic minorities as well as the national majorities. This, in turn, underlines the urgent necessity for a more extensive, systematic, and cross-regional study of how the increasing significance of the economy can reshape ethnic cleavages and regulate their impact across Central and Eastern Europe. In addition to the increasing significance of the economy, new catalysts may become highly relevant and readdress (or temporarily efface) the centrality of ethno-cultural cleavages in multi-ethnic societies. For instance, the ongoing controversy around the COVID-19 crisis and the ways to combat the pandemic has been generating new divisions and fault lines on a global scale. A new state of polarisation between the ‘pro-vax’ and ‘anti-vax’ camps has emerged and become increasingly politicised, and it is likely to persist for as long as the COVID-19 crisis lasts. This monograph briefly touched upon the attempts of certain political actors to capitalise on public anxieties and augment their popularity as early as the outbreak of the pandemic (2020). Therefore, another important trajectory for further research would be to comparatively assess the degree to which new global divisions (such as the one between the ‘pro-vax’ and the ‘anti-vax’ cohorts) can cut across ethno-cultural cleavages and redefine their dynamics inside multi-ethnic environments. This, in turn, can make a solid contribution to the deconstruction of essentialist theses regarding

7

FINAL REMARKS, CONCLUSIONS, AND TRAJECTORIES …

221

the, allegedly, ‘endemic and linear persistence’ of ethno-nationalism and its centrality inside ethnically diverse settings. Moreover, the cross-regional structure of this monograph placed into a comparative context the persisting challenges and various forms of opposition to the European integration process across Central and Eastern Europe. This means that far from the materialisation of the ‘end of history’ expectations regarding the successful consolidation of ‘Europeanisation’ processes in post-Communist polities, Euroscepticism seems to constantly mutate into multiple shapes. This monograph has largely focused on the phenomenon of geopolitical Euroscepticism and clarified how ethno-nationalism can interact with Euroscepticism inside the context of geopolitical calculations and insecurities. Nevertheless, as result of its mutative nature, Euroscepticism may interweave with numerous other themes embraced by ethno-nationalist political actors. For instance, this book also briefly touched upon EKRE’s opposition to the (EU-sponsored) Rail Baltica project along the lines that it is hazardous to the natural environment and Estonia’s rural communities. Taking into consideration recent academic research that has been conducted on environmental populism (Beeson, 2019; Buzogany & Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021), variants such as environmental (or ‘ecological’) Euroscepticism can provide another trajectory for further research on Euroscepticism, populism, and ethnopolitics alike. As a closing remark, if the 1990s were an era of securitisation and the 2000s a period of optimism, the study of ethnopolitics is currently going through a state of flux across Central and Eastern Europe.

Bibliography Annus, E. (2020). A post-Soviet eco-digital nation? Metonymic processes of nation-building and Estonia’s high-tech dreams in the 2010s. East European Politics and Societies and Cultures, 20 (10), (pp. 1–24). Baki´c-Hayden, M. (1995). Nesting orientalisms: The case of former Yugoslavia. Slavic Review, 54 (4), (pp. 917–931). Beeson, M. (2019). Environmental populism: The politics of survival in anthroscene. Palgrave Macmillan. Bustikova, L. (2019). Extreme reactions: Radical right mobilization in Eastern Europe. Cambridge University Press. Bustikova, L. (2018). The radical right in Eastern Europe In J. Rydgren (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the radical right, Oxford University Press, (pp. 1–22).

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Buzogany, A., & Mohamad-Klotzbach, C. (2021). Environmental populism. In M. Oswald (Ed.), The Palgrave handbook of populism (pp. 321–340). Palgrave Macmillan. Chryssogelos, A. (2021). Is there a populist foreign policy? Chatham house research papers, [online]. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/ 2021/03/there-populist-foreign-policy/typology-populist-foreign-policy Accessed 28 May, 2021. FitzGibbon, J. (2013). Citizens against Europe: Civil society and eurosceptic protest in Denmark, Ireland and the UK. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(1), (pp. 105–121). Guerra, S. (2015). Eurosceptic voices: Beyond party systems, across civil society In Euroscepticism, Democracy and the Media: Communicating Europe, Contesting Europe, (edited by M. Caiani and S. Guerra), Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, (pp. 21–48). Kaplan, R. D. (1993). Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through history. Macmillan Publishers. Minkenberg, M. (2017). The radical right in Eastern Europe: Democracy under siege? Springer. Minkenberg, M., Florian, A., and Vegh, Z. (2021). Depleting democracy? The radical right’s impact on minority politics in Eastern Europe. International Political Science Review [online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/019 2512120972883 Accessed 18 November, 2020. Petsinis, V. (2020). National identity in Serbia: The Vojvodina and a multiethnic community in the Balkans. I.B. Tauris and Bloomsbury Publishing. Stjepanovi´c, D. (2018). Multiethnic regionalisms in southeastern Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. Todorova, M. (1997). Imagining the Balkans. Oxford University Press.

Index

Note: The page number followed by ‘n’ represents footnotes. A accession process (to the EU), 5, 13–14, 23–25, 51, 52, 63, 67n34, 69, 70, 82n71, 100, 132n4, 142–144, 148, 149, 153, 154, 170, 173, 176, 177n9, 179, 180, 199 ‘Action Plan for the Materialization of Minority Rights’ (Serbia, 2016), 61n18, 135, 135n7, 145 AfD party (Germany), 34 alien rule, 90–92 ‘All for Latvia!’ party (Latvia), 102, 102n20, 107n36, 108, 150 Alo (tabloid, Serbia), 150 amendments (to governmental and legal documents), 61n, 119, 185, 200, 215 ANEL party (Independent Greeks, Greece), 38, 38n11 Ansip, Andrus, 96 anti-austerity, 38n11, 82, 220

anti-establishment, 38, 82, 98, 99, 104n26, 108, 113, 114, 124, 186, 200 anti-Fascism, 193 anti-Fascist, 32, 32n8, 193, 193n28 anti-immigrant, 8, 40–42, 120, 212 anti-immigration, 8, 40–42, 75, 95, 98, 114, 160, 210, 211 anti-systemic, 38, 99n13, 108, 109, 111, 113, 116, 124, 210 Arana, Sabino, 27 assembly, 55n4, 61, 62, 67n35, 77, 105, 136, 137, 141, 148, 160 assembly (of the Serbian autonomous province of Vojvodina), 61, 62n20, 136, 136n8, 141n17, 143n20, 144n24, 208 austerity, 2, 81, 220 authoritarian, 10, 21–23 ‘autochthonist’ (tendencies and parties), 34, 211 autonomy (of Vojvodina, Serbia), 60, 136, 145, 145n27, 216

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 V. Petsinis, Cross-Regional Ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99951-3

223

224

INDEX

B Baˇcka (Vojvodina, Serbia), 77 Balkan, 6, 170, 173, 193n27 Balkans (Western), 4–10, 69, 131, 169, 207, 212, 214, 215 Baltic (republics), 6, 184 Baltic Russian (identity), 196 Baltic States, 4–11, 25, 41, 92, 93, 95, 99n14, 100, 107, 108, 131, 169, 197n36, 207, 210, 212, 214–216 Bauska Declaration, 94–95, 94n5, 106, 120, 123 Belgrade (Serbia), 10, 68n36, 71n40, 74, 77n62, 78n65, 136, 141n19, 142n20, 143n23, 147n29, 149n33, 153n46, 157n51, 178 bilingualism, 158, 216 birth-rate, 105, 123, 209 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 22 Bosnian Serb republic (Republika Srpska), 23, 67, 71 brain drain, 81, 220 ‘Bronze Soldier’ (crisis of 2007, Estonia), 107, 171, 183, 184, 184n11, 185, 200 Brubaker, Rogers, 1, 4, 28–32, 41, 51, 139 Brussels, 35, 52, 74, 75, 77, 80, 107n36, 115, 118, 142, 214 Bulgaria, 22, 39, 40

C Canovan, Margaret, 36 Centre Party/Eesti Keskerakond party (Estonia), 9n5, 90, 96, 111, 112, 112n51, 113, 113n54, 114, 115, 116n65, 124, 185, 186, 191, 199n40 centre-periphery (relations), 80, 218

centre-right, 4, 53, 63n23, 80, 95–97, 102n18, 103, 109, 109n43, 138, 139n15, 150, 186 China, 5, 49, 66, 69, 78, 149, 149n34, 214 cleavages, 6–8, 32, 39, 144, 158, 189, 194, 198, 216, 217, 219, 220 cleavages (ethnic), 6–8, 57, 62, 158, 208, 216, 218–220 cohabitation, 8, 133, 154, 157, 157n51, 160, 171, 192, 193, 193n26, 195, 196, 201, 216 Cohesion and Structural Funds (EU), 52, 190 colonial rule, 92–93 colonisation, 41, 90–92, 92n2, 94, 101, 117, 121n87, 124, 188, 189, 210, 211 Communism, 22, 28 Communist, 22, 25, 28n7, 58, 61, 93–95, 134, 145, 160, 180, 221 Communist Partisan Movement (Yugoslavia), 193 conflict (ethnic), 11, 28–32, 155, 220 consensus (neoliberal), 94, 112, 185, 186, 219 consensus (politics of), 2, 67n36, 99, 141, 159, 217 conservative (socially), 50, 63, 64, 73, 80, 103 Constitution, 23n1, 57–62, 64, 72, 134, 180, 187 Constitutional Law on the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities (Croatia, 1991), 23, 172 Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities (Croatia; CLRNM, 2000), 24, 58, 62, 175, 179 constitutional rights, 60 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (1990), 57, 172

INDEX

convergence (between ethnopolitics and geopolitics), 38n11, 133, 140, 146, 147, 151, 159, 209 Copenhagen Criteria, 40, 51, 131, 145, 169, 178, 183, 199 cordon sanitaire, 26, 110, 112, 139n15, 140, 185 corruption, 90n1, 98, 99, 110, 113, 143n21, 160n57, 161, 219 Council of Europe (COE), 23, 137n11, 145, 175 Covid-19, 4, 9, 119, 123, 124, 149, 150, 188 Crimea, Crimean, 32n8, 33 crisis (economic), 2, 82, 105n28, 220 crisis (migration), 2–4, 34, 41, 49, 51, 74, 76, 78, 80, 101, 114, 119–121, 123, 143n21, 212, 213, 220 crisis (refugee), 34, 76, 90, 121n87, 188 Croatian Democratic Union (‘rightwing faction’ of HDZ), 52, 63, 63n25, 64, 65, 72–74, 79, 80, 175, 208, 211, 213, 218 Croatian Democratic Union party (HDZ, Croatia), 23, 49, 50, 52, 53, 53n2, 54, 56, 63, 63n23, 64, 65, 65n29, 66, 68, 72–75, 79, 80, 175, 190n21, 191n22, 194n30, 208, 211, 213, 214, 218 Croatian War Veterans Association (UHRV), 64, 189 cross-border cooperation (and links/relations), 61, 68, 135, 141, 180 cross-regional, 1, 5, 7, 26, 160, 201, 209, 218, 220, 221 Czechoslovakia, 22 Czech Republic, 2

225

D Dalmatia (Croatia), 64, 190 Daugavpils (Latvia), 10, 103, 104n23, 121, 121n88, 158 decolonisation, 25, 91, 93, 101, 182, 184, 186, 210 democracy (illiberal ), 49, 51, 81, 218 democracy (liberal), 3, 30, 37 Democratic Opposition of Serbia coalition (DOS), 138 democratisation, 40, 58, 146 demographic (issues and measures), 61, 93n4, 95, 103, 105, 111, 123, 124, 150, 152, 187, 189, 209 depopulation, 220 ‘Development/For!’ party (Latvia), 109, 109n43, 151, 219 disinformation campaigns, 110, 144 Dombrava, J¯anis, 122, 122n89 Domovinski Rat (‘Homeland War’, Croatia), 65 Donbas (Ukraine), 32, 32n8 DP party (Croatia), 39, 55, 56, 56n5, 65, 66, 66n32, 72, 76, 79, 190, 191, 191n22, 208, 213 DSS party (Serbia), 53, 55, 55n4, 81n66, 139n15, 148 Dveri party (Serbia), 55, 55n4, 81n66, 148 Dzintars, Raivis, 102

E eco-digital nation (Estonia), 210 economic anxieties, 50, 82, 160, 210 economic recession, 81, 105n28, 155, 219, 220 economy, 26, 81–82, 89, 94, 111, 138, 146, 160, 160n57, 161, 186, 190, 218–220 educational reform, 107n33, 146, 155

226

INDEX

educational system, 106, 107, 137, 187, 188 Eesti Vabariik (Estonian republic), 182 EKRE (Estonian Conservative People’s Party, Estonia), 9, 9n5, 38–42, 73, 171, 186–189, 189n20, 191, 199, 199n40, 200, 209–212, 214, 217, 221 elections (parliamentary), 53–56, 53n2, 82, 95–104, 110, 113, 138, 142, 143, 148, 149, 151, 160, 179, 181, 186, 190 elections (presidential), 53n3, 57, 138, 179, 181 elite (the), 10, 26, 37 energy (issues and cooperation), 70, 100, 108, 149, 151, 212 Estonian Independence Party (EIP, Estonia), 97 Estonian Patriotic Movement (Estonia), 96, 98, 102 ethnic Albanians, 31, 62n22 ethnic democracy, 30, 93, 94, 140, 144, 146, 185, 186, 200 ethnic discrimination, 61, 180 ethnic friction, 8, 215 ethnic groups, 28, 136, 169n1, 193, 216 ethnic Hungarians, 6, 8, 24, 58n10, 131, 131n2, 142, 143, 143n24, 154 ethnic Italian (minority), 192n25, 194, 195 ethnicity, 31–33 ethnic relations (management of), 4–13, 50, 51, 58, 62, 66, 78, 79, 106, 113, 131–134, 136, 138, 140, 141, 147, 148, 153, 154, 157–159, 169–171, 173, 180–183, 186, 193n29, 196,

197, 201, 208, 209, 213, 215, 216 ethnic Russians, 6–9, 25, 93n4, 94, 97, 101, 102, 105–107, 109, 110, 112, 113n56, 122, 124, 132, 132n3, 137, 140, 144, 154, 155, 169n1, 172n5, 173n6, 177, 178, 183, 184, 187, 189, 197, 197n36, 198, 198n37, 200, 217 ethnic Serbs, 8, 31, 57n8, 71, 176, 178, 180, 195n35 ethno-cultural, 26, 28, 34, 41, 61, 144n26, 158, 171, 181, 189, 192, 211, 216, 217, 220 ethno-nationalism, 4–11, 26, 27, 33, 38, 90, 105, 123, 124, 178, 186, 187, 199, 200, 207, 209–212, 217, 221 ethnopolitics (domestic), 7, 26, 50, 67, 79, 94, 131–133, 135, 138, 139, 145, 152, 159, 160, 170, 201, 207–210, 214 ethnos /ethnie, 26 ethno-symbolic (approach), 26–28, 32, 33 ethno-territorial (autonomy of ethnic Hungarians, Vojvodina), 141 ETV Plus channel (Estonia), 185 EU membership, 2, 4, 30, 51, 52, 124 Eurasian, 6, 170 EU refugee quotas, 75–81, 101, 151, 218 Euro-alternativism, 82, 219 Euro-Atlantic, 32, 139, 147 Euro-federalism, 108, 151 Europe (Central and Eastern), 1, 4–11, 31–33, 49, 51, 73, 92, 131, 159, 183, 207, 211, 212, 215, 217, 220, 221 Europe (Southeast), 5, 39, 217 Europe (Southern), 21, 82, 220

INDEX

European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (COE, 1992), 145 European Commission, 2, 49, 51, 59, 59n12, 60, 67n34, 74, 74n52, 76n59, 77, 80, 81n68, 113n55, 114, 115, 145, 146, 151, 160, 176, 177, 181, 208, 218 European identity, 175, 178, 199 Europeanisation, 4, 22, 30, 40, 183 Europeanness, 6, 170, 173, 178, 199 European Parliament, 63n25, 100, 104n22, 105n27, 106n31, 107n35, 110, 121n85, 124, 147n28, 151n39, 152n40 European Security Union, 100, 151, 212 Euro-realism, 52 Euroscepticism (geopolitical), 41, 100, 108, 124, 151, 212, 214, 221 Euroscepticism (gradualist), 35 Euroscepticism (hard), 35, 52, 53, 63, 76 Euroscepticism (maximalist), 36 Euroscepticism (minimalist), 36 Euroscepticism (party-based), 35, 52, 78 Euroscepticism (public), 177 Euroscepticism (reformist), 35, 56 Euroscepticism (rejectionist), 36, 82 Euroscepticism (revisionist), 35 Euroscepticism (soft), 35, 52, 56, 63, 150, 152, 154, 213, 218 Eurosceptics (left-wing), 35 Eurosceptics (right-wing), 35, 72 external homelands, 1, 2, 6, 124, 132, 135, 199

F Fanon, Frantz, 92

227

fence (along Hungary’s border with Croatia and Serbia), 75, 77, 80, 211 FIDESZ party (Civic Democratic Union, Hungary), 4, 38, 49, 50, 75, 77, 80, 143, 218 financial aid, 52, 75, 80, 191, 200, 213 foreign policy, 32, 35, 67, 74, 79, 80, 109, 112, 132n3, 139, 140, 142, 150, 152, 169n1, 187, 214, 218 ‘fourth actor’ (the EU), 30, 41, 145, 159, 180, 199 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM, Council of Europe), 25, 145 France, 2, 121, 151, 152, 212

G gender, 38, 41, 50, 63, 71, 72, 74, 80, 190, 213 geopolitics (regional), 7, 26, 39, 67, 79, 131–133, 135, 138–140, 145, 159, 160, 170, 201, 207–210, 214 Germany, 2–3, 38n11, 81n66, 100, 108, 114, 115, 121, 151, 172, 172n3, 212 glasnost (Soviet Union), 25 global multi-polarity, 214 global uni-polarity, 214 Golden Dawn party (Greece), 2, 39 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 25 Greater Romania party (PRM, Romania), 34 Great Patriotic War (Soviet Union), 32, 183, 184 Greece, 2–3, 32, 37, 38n11, 220 groupism, 28, 33 groupness , 28–29, 31, 33, 178

228

INDEX

H Harmony party (Saskana, ¸ Latvia), 26, 90, 106, 109n44, 110, 110n47, 112n53, 124, 140, 146, 154n53, 158n54, 160, 160n57, 161, 219 Hasanbegovi´c, Zlatko, 65 ˇ HCSP party (Croatia), 54, 75 Helme, Mart, 96 Helme, Martin, 96, 98, 119n78, 188 homosexuality, 74, 80 Homo Sovieticus , 119, 189 Horizon 2020, 10 Hrtkovci (Vojvodina, Serbia), 147, 155 HSP party (Croatia), 54, 63, 75 Hungary, 1–7, 12, 22, 24, 38, 49, 51, 62, 65–69, 74–81, 76n57, 77n63, 132, 142, 143, 143n21, 145, 154n47, 155, 159, 200, 208, 211, 214, 218

I Ida Virumaa (Estonia), 196, 198 ideational approach (to populism), 37 ideology, 21, 35, 37, 123 Ilves, Toomas Hendrik, 100, 174n7 immigration, 4, 8, 9, 20, 33, 35, 39, 40, 40n13, 50, 52, 63, 75, 89, 90, 95, 101, 108n39, 113, 115, 118, 122, 123, 152, 188, 189, 191, 210 independence, 5, 24–25, 25n5, 57, 67, 71, 95, 98, 100n15, 105, 114n57, 137, 140, 146, 148, 172, 187 information warfare, 107, 144, 144n25 Informer (tabloid, Serbia), 150 interculturalism, 192n23 interdisciplinary, 5, 7–9, 42, 207, 212

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 24, 52–56, 63, 67, 169 International Relations, 214 inter-state relations, 144, 208 interviews, 10, 50, 71, 91, 133, 144n25, 146n28, 152n43, 153n44, 157n52, 158n54, 171 interwar (era and republics), 25, 93, 114n57, 136, 137, 172, 172n5, 182, 187 Islamisation, 101, 115 Istria (Croatia), 134, 171, 192, 192n23, 193, 193n27, 194, 201, 215–217 Istrian Democratic Assembly party (IDS, Croatia), 193, 193n29, 194n30, 195n35 Italy, 3, 51, 81n66, 192n24 ius sanguinis , 181 ius solis , 182

J Jobbik party (Movement for a Better Hungary, Hungary), 2, 40n13, 76, 143, 143n24, 155, 218

K Karamarko, Tomislav, 63 Kols, Rihards, 123 Kosovo, 5, 24, 53, 67, 70, 71, 79, 134, 139, 140, 149, 153, 214 Kozlovskis, Rihards, 120 KPV LV party (Latvia), 82, 104n26, 109n43, 160, 160n57 Kremlin, pro-Kremlin, 26, 32, 107, 110, 140, 144, 151, 185, 186 Kurir (tabloid, Serbia), 74, 150 Küüt, Raivo, 115

INDEX

L Laclau, Ernesto, 3, 36 Latgale (Latvia), 103, 144, 145, 154n49, 158, 216, 220 law and order, 63, 101, 186 Law on Citizenship (Croatia, 1991), 172, 172n4 Law on Citizenship (Estonia, 1995), 177, 181, 184n13, 185, 200, 215 Law on Citizenship (Latvia, 1998 and 2020), 137, 140, 150, 159, 215 Law on Cultural Autonomy (Estonia, 1993), 172, 172n5 Law on Languages (Latvia), 137 Law on the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities (LFRNM, State Union of Serbia and Montenegro), 61n18, 135, 172 legal framework (on minority rights), 56, 63, 65, 79, 133, 134, 136, 137, 140, 145, 146, 159, 169, 171, 189, 200, 201, 209 legislation (on minority rights), 1, 60, 61, 65, 67, 78, 79, 133, 134, 139, 149, 170, 171, 179–181, 189, 190, 199, 200, 209, 213 LGBTQI, 41, 50, 63, 72–74, 74n51, 211 liberalisation (of minority policies), 146, 159 liberalism, 95 Lithuania, Lithuanian, 6, 25, 94, 100n15, 110n48, 154

M Macedonia (Republic of Northern Macedonia), 2, 32, 134 Macedonia (Socialist Republic), 134 Marxism (cultural), 95

229

media, 57, 62n21, 71, 71n42, 74n52, 99, 107, 108, 108n39, 110, 123, 145, 146, 197n36, 209, 215 medical aid, 120, 149 Memorandum of Cooperation (with United Russia), 110, 112 MERWBKBS (Horizon 2020 research project), 10 Mesi´c, Stipe, 24, 57 Middle East, 118, 155, 188 migrants, 3, 39, 75, 75n54, 76, 76n57, 77, 78, 80, 90, 117, 118, 123, 124, 152, 155, 188, 200, 210, 211 Milanovi´c, Zoran, 53n2, 75 Miloševi´c, Slobodan, 23, 24, 31, 60, 138, 139, 141, 149, 181 Ministry of Human and Minority Rights (Serbia), 61, 136 minorities (ethnic), 1, 2, 5–7, 29–31, 40, 41, 61, 64, 66, 68, 69, 135, 141, 145, 147, 155, 176, 209, 220 minorities (ethnic Russian), 4, 6, 209 minorities (sexual), 50, 73, 79, 100, 211 minority issues, 50, 60, 63, 65n28, 68, 79, 134, 157n53, 189, 208, 214, 217 minority languages, 58, 60, 61, 61n18, 62, 65n28, 68, 135, 136, 141, 145, 180 minority policies, 132, 146, 191 minority rights (protection of), 8, 58, 61, 74, 134, 178 mobilisation, 9, 21, 28, 39, 64, 73, 76, 77, 98, 101, 114, 120 Montenegrin, 25n5, 60–61, 157n53, 181 Montenegro, 60, 67, 135, 139 Moscow, 100, 107n36, 212 Mouffe, Chantal, 37, 37n10

230

INDEX

Možemo coalition (Croatia), 82, 82n71, 191n22, 219 Mudde, Cas, 3, 3n3 multiculturalism, 3, 11, 95, 192n23, 211 multi-ethnic, 8–10, 29, 91, 136, 154, 155, 157n51, 158, 160, 171, 193n26, 194–196, 201, 208, 215–217, 219, 220 multi-ethnic municipalities (Yugoslavia), 58, 134, 180 Muslim, 115, 118, 121, 152 myths, 26–29, 32, 33

N NA (National Alliance party, Latvia), 39, 41, 146, 150, 151, 151n38, 152, 152n40, 154, 209–212, 214, 219 narod/narodi (Yugoslavia), 31, 172 Narva (Estonia), 30, 114n57 national communities, 136 national conservative, 38, 41, 55, 79, 89, 94, 95, 105, 109, 190, 208–210, 213 nationalisation, re-nationalisation, 30, 57, 139, 148, 176 nationalising (state), 1, 29 nationalism, 1, 4, 8–10, 25–31, 33–42, 50, 90, 91, 95, 101, 134, 143, 157n53, 171, 176, 177, 182, 212 Nationalists Union party (Lithuania), 94 national minorities’ councils, 59, 135, 136, 180, 194, 195, 195n35, 216 national survival, 2, 105, 124, 170, 173, 176, 177, 179, 181, 183, 198–201, 209, 210, 217

nativism, 4, 11, 20, 33, 34, 38, 95, 108n37, 114, 117, 122–124, 186, 207, 210, 212 NATO, 24, 69, 76, 100, 106, 108, 123, 139, 146–148, 151, 153, 159, 173, 177, 177n9, 209, 212, 214 naturalisation, 23, 25, 101, 102, 105, 137, 148, 152, 176, 181, 182, 184, 185, 191, 197 neighbourhood policy, 159, 181 nesting Orientalism, 174n7, 193n27 New Unity party (Latvia), 104n24, 109n43, 123n94, 150, 150n37 nexus (quadratic), 1 nexus (triadic), 29–32, 41, 139, 209 NGO, 10–11, 50, 59n15, 60n16, 62n21, 71n42, 72, 72n47, 74, 74n52, 77n62, 79, 81n67, 121n58, 122, 133, 147n29, 153n46, 155n50, 157n51, 158n56, 170n2, 171, 189, 195n35, 213 Nikoli´c, Tomislav, 70, 70n38 Nord Stream II, 108 normalisation, 67, 79, 170, 176, 208, 214 North Africa, 118, 155 Novi Sad (Vojvodina, Serbia), 10, 61, 62n20, 66n33, 71n41, 73n50, 74n52, 77n62, 78n64, 136, 136n9, 143n20, 144n24, 147n29, 153n44, 157n51

O occupation, 91, 92, 95 opportunity structure, 5, 49, 78, 97, 133, 146, 159, 209 Orbán, Viktor, 3, 3n2, 49, 77, 142, 142n20, 208

INDEX

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 23, 102, 139, 144, 148, 177 ‘Otherness’, 6, 41, 169 ‘Others’, 34, 173, 199 ‘Our Slovakia’ party (Slovakia), 39, 41, 76, 218 P paired comparison, 50, 90, 133, 171 Pakrac (Croatia), 10, 59n15, 81n67, 195n33 Pappas, Takis, 34 party-system(s), 90, 109–111, 124 PEGIDA (grass-roots organisation, Germany), 115 Penava, Ivan, 65, 65n29 People’s Union of Estonia party (Estonia), 95, 96n6, 97n8 people (the), 36, 37 Pernar, Ivan, 82 PiS party (Poland), 39, 49–51, 73, 75, 80, 218 Plenkovi´c, Andrej, 63, 75, 190 pluralism (cultural), 8, 215 pluralism (political), 21, 200 Podemos party (Spain), 2, 37 Poland, 2, 22, 39, 51, 75, 80, 200, 218 political culture, 8–11, 40–42, 52, 89, 189, 208, 212 political establishment, 65, 72, 75, 80, 177, 178, 214 politicisation, 6–8, 33, 40, 60, 62, 189, 208, 217 Politics Can Be Different party (LMP, Hungary), 143n24 politics (identity and memory politics), 9, 39, 42, 211, 212 politics (identity politics), 3, 8, 30, 50, 81, 89, 143n21, 152, 160, 186, 210

231

politics (institutional politics), 90, 93, 189, 201 politics (party politics), 4–8, 36, 89–91, 99, 99n13, 104n25, 105n28, 110n48, 111, 111n49, 112, 133, 146n28, 147, 149, 152n43, 158, 185, 186, 190, 209, 217 POPREBEL (Horizon 2020 research project), 10 populism, 3, 3n3, 4, 8, 11, 33, 36–38, 37n11, 90, 91, 207, 210, 221 populist and radical right-wing parties, 6, 7, 38–39, 89, 94, 95, 210 post-accession non-compliance, 64, 78, 159, 215 post-Communist, 5, 22, 30, 40, 131 post-Soviet, 5, 30, 32, 93, 94, 107, 112, 136, 140, 172, 173, 182, 197n36, 209 pre-emptive (character), 4, 118, 121 Progressives, The; party (Latvia), 160, 219 Pro Patria and Res Publica Union/Isamaa party (Estonia), 9n5, 90, 97, 112, 113, 186 protectionism (financial), 41, 100, 107, 123 Pula (Istria, Croatia), 10, 193n29, 194, 194n30, 195n35 Putin, Vladimir, 32n8, 71, 209

R Raˇcan, Ivica, 63 Rail Baltica, 99, 99n14 Ratas, Jüri, 113, 114, 191 realpolitik, 173, 177 recycling (institutional legacies), 180 referendum, 25n5, 64, 71, 72, 99, 115, 116, 116n65, 137, 144, 144n26, 154

232

INDEX

Reform Party/Reformierakond (Estonia), 9n5, 96, 99n11, 112, 113, 115, 186, 199n11 refugees, 2, 3, 9, 23, 24, 39–41, 51, 59, 59n12, 74, 75, 75n54, 76, 76n57, 77, 78, 80, 101, 114–117, 120–122, 124, 142, 151, 152, 157n51, 176, 188, 198n39, 200, 208, 211, 213 regional identity, 8, 158, 194, 215, 216 regionalised (legal frameworks on minority rights), 61, 198, 215 regionalism, 62n22, 77n62, 147n29, 153n46, 157n51, 193 remigration, 105, 111, 123 restoration/restorationist (nationalism), 25, 91, 95, 136, 137, 140, 148, 172, 176, 177, 182, 183 Riga City Council (snap election, August 2020), 160, 219 Riga (Latvia), 10, 103, 104n21, 105n27, 106n31, 107n34, 108n37, 110, 110n47, 111n49, 121n85, 144n25, 146n28, 148n30, 151n38, 152n42, 154n48, 158n54, 219 right (conservative), 34, 50, 53, 218 right (extremist/extreme), 2, 38–39, 73n49, 75 right (populist and radical), 4–10, 37n10, 38, 89, 98, 150, 171, 186, 210, 212 right-wing turn, 190, 191, 200 Riigikogu (Estonia), 96, 99n13, 101n17, 114, 115, 116n65, 118, 119, 124, 183, 186 Rijeka (Croatia), 10, 193n28, 195n34 Rogozin, Dmitry, 144 Rõivas, Taavi, 115

Roman Catholic Church, 72, 79, 190, 213 Romania, Romanian, 1, 2, 31, 34, 40, 132, 142 Russian Federation, 33, 70 Russian World, 107, 151 Russification, 93, 122

S Sabor (Croatia), 23n1, 53, 55, 58, 58n10, 64, 66, 82, 179, 181, 189, 190, 191n22, 200 Saeima (Latvia), 104n22, 105, 105n29, 106n31, 107n35, 111, 119, 120, 121n85, 123, 124, 137, 138, 144, 146n28, 151n39, 152n40 Sanader, Ivo, 63 Savisaar, Edgar, 96, 99, 112n52 Schäuble, Wolfgang, 2 SDE party (Estonia), 99n11, 113, 115, 186 SDP party (Croatia), 24, 53n2, 57, 63, 75, 191n22, 194n31 SDSS party (Croatia), 53n2, 59n15, 65n29, 81n67, 195n33 Second World War, 63n25, 135n5, 137, 172, 184, 193, 193n28 securitisation, 101, 123, 185, 199, 209, 221 security, 41, 51, 52, 67, 69, 75, 79, 80, 100, 106, 108, 113n55, 118, 121, 124, 144, 146, 151, 152, 159, 173, 177, 187, 209, 212–214 segregation, 134, 138, 157, 192, 196, 216 separatism, 144 Serb Cyrillic script, 9, 64, 189, 194 Serbian-Montenegrin (state union), 25n5, 60–61, 181

INDEX

Serbian Progressive Party (SNS, Serbia), 50, 53, 53n3, 67, 67n35, 69, 70, 70n38, 74, 79, 80, 133, 138, 139n15, 141, 141n19, 143, 149, 150, 208, 211, 214, 218 Serbian Radical Party (SRS, Serbia), 25, 54, 55n4, 66, 70, 70n38, 74, 76, 77, 139n15, 147, 147n29 ‘Serb Republic of Krajina’, 23, 23n1, 173 Šešelj, Vojislav, 77, 147, 147n29 Škoro, Miroslav, 56n5, 66, 219n2 Skupština (Serbia), 77, 136, 141n19, 142, 148 Slavonia (Croatia, Eastern), 9, 23, 60, 173, 189, 194, 195 Slavonia (Croatia, Western), 195 Slovakia, 1–5, 25, 34, 39–41, 51, 76, 76n58, 121, 132, 154, 218 Slovak National Party (SNS, Slovakia), 34 Slovenia, 22, 66, 192n23 Smith, Anthony David, 26 Smith, David, 30 Smooha, Sammy, 30 Šnore, Edv¯ıns, 106, 121 Socialism, 94 social welfare, 82n71, 104n26, 110, 111, 112n51, 161, 186, 188, 218, 219 sociocultural (realities and specificities), 201 socio-psychological, 3, 26–28, 33, 34, 90, 92, 94, 101, 188 soft power (diplomacy of the EU), 1, 30, 63, 145, 146, 154n48, 176–178, 181, 183, 199 sovereignty, 22, 35, 40, 51, 52, 65, 67, 78, 95, 106, 149, 151, 152, 179, 199 Soviet rule, 92, 187, 196 Soviets, 26, 41, 93n4, 188, 210, 211

233

Soviet Union, 25, 32, 92, 92n2, 93n3, 134, 135n5, 172n4, 173, 196 Spain, 2, 37, 220 Srem (Vojvodina, Serbia), 135n8, 147 Srpski Telegraf (tabloid, Serbia), 74, 150 Stalin, 25, 92, 106, 172n5 ‘stateless’ persons, 101, 137, 152, 184n13, 185 states (kin), 1, 8, 27, 142, 197 statute (on the autonomy of Vojvodina, 2009/2014), 61, 61n19, 136, 145, 145n27, 216 Straujuma, Laimdota, 120 Subotica (Vojvodina, Serbia), 77, 143, 143n24 Svetosavlje (Serbia), 73, 73n49, 211 SYRIZA party (Coalition of the Radical Left, Greece), 2, 37, 38n11

T tabloids, 74, 80, 150 Tallinn (Estonia), 10, 97, 98n9, 99, 99n13, 113n56, 116, 116n66, 117, 118n73, 183, 184, 184n11, 189n20, 196, 197n36, 198, 198n37 Tartu (Estonia), 10, 112n51, 114n57, 117, 187 TB/LNNK party (Latvia), 101, 102, 148–150 territorial integrity, 22, 66, 71, 78 terrorism, 118, 121 theoretical models, 8, 9, 11, 33, 212, 217 third countries, 124, 188, 200 Tomaševi´c, Tomislav, 219, 219n2 totalitarian, totalitarianism, 21 trans-ethnic, 8, 158, 192, 215, 216

234

INDEX

transformation (systemic), 1, 56, 132, 133, 138, 139, 159, 170, 179–181, 199, 215 transition (political and socioeconomic), 22, 35, 94, 138 Transylvania (Romania), 31 Tud-man, Franjo, 23, 31, 57, 63, 63n23, 175, 176, 178, 180 U Ukraine, 5, 32, 32n8, 33, 106, 107, 118, 119, 189 Ukrainian crisis, 110, 155 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 23, 59, 121, 121n87 United Russia party (Russia), 110, 112, 112n53 Unity party (Latvia), 102n18, 103, 109, 120, 150 Ušakovs, Nils, 110, 161, 219 V Vatican Contract, 72, 78, 79, 211, 213 Venice Commission (Council of Europe), 23, 66 Visegrad Four (group of states), 2, 3, 9, 50, 51, 56, 80, 114, 212, 218 VMDK party (Serbia), 66, 139, 139n16, 147 VMRO party (Bulgaria), 40 VMSZ party (Serbia), 61, 62, 66, 67, 67n35, 68n36, 77, 77n62, 139, 139n16, 141, 141n17, 142n20,

143, 143n23, 147, 147n29, 157n51, 159, 208 Vojvodina (Serbian autonomous province of), 6n4, 8, 24, 24n4, 60–62, 62n21, 67n34, 131n2, 133, 134, 135n8, 136, 141n19, 142n20, 144n24, 145n27, 147n29, 157n53, 192, 195, 198n39, 201, 208, 214–217 Vuˇci´c, Aleksandar, 53, 53n3, 70n38, 71, 74, 77, 138, 142, 142n20, 208 Vukovar (Croatia), 10, 59, 60n16, 64, 65, 65n28, 79, 81n67, 189, 195n33, 213 X xenophobia, 34 Y Yeltsin, Boris, 177 Yugoslavia (former), 21, 22, 31, 69, 134, 155, 159, 195, 200, 215 Yugoslavia (Socialist Federal Republic of), 5, 22, 25, 31, 32, 49, 134, 176, 180, 196 Z Zagreb (Croatia), 10, 59n14, 60n16, 64n27, 65n31, 72n47, 75n55, 170n2, 176, 193, 194n32, 195n34, 219 Zelt¯ıts, Raivis, 107 Živi Zid party (Croatia), 81, 81n69, 82, 82n70