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Covenant Causality in Medieval Thought - Studies in Philosophy, Theology, and Economic Practice
 0860781542

Table of contents :
- Preface

- THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN IDEA

• Necessity and Freedom in Anselm's Conception of God

• Sacrament, Symbol and Causality in Bernard of Clairvaux

• Nature and the Natural in Twelfth-Century Thought

• The Dialectic of Divine Omnipotence

• The Critique on Natural Causality in the Mutakallimun and Nationalism

- THE SOCIAL-ECONOMIC CONTEXT

• The King and the Leaden Coin: The Economic Background of 'Sine qua non' Causality

• Token Coinage and the Administration of Poor Relief during the Late Middle Ages

- CONSEQUENCES IN LATE MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

• John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God Can Undo the Past

• John of Mirecourt (continued)

• Covenant and Causality in Pierre d'Ailly

• Cranmer as a Nominalist - Sed contra

- NOMINALISM AND ASCRIBED VALUE

• Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion - The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion

• Nominalism and Late Medieval Thought: a Bibliographical Essay

• Late Medieval Nominalism Revisited: 1972-1982

- Index

Citation preview

William J. Courtenay

Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought Studies in Philosophy, Theology and Economic Practice

VARIORUM REPRINTS London 1984

r f s r

1

illiam

.

ourt nav .J

British Library CJP data

Copyright

© 1984

Courtenay, William J. Covenant and causality in medieval thought. --(Collected studies series; CS206) 1. Philosophy, Medieval I. Title B721 190'.9'02 ISBN 0-86078-154-2 Variorum Reprints

Published in Great Britain by

Variorum Reprints 20 Pembridge Mews London Wl I 3EQ

Printed in Great Britain by

Paradigm Print Gateshead, Tyne and Wear VARIORUM REPRINT CS206

CONTENTS

.LX-Xl.

Preface. 1'HE DEVELOPMENT OF AN IDEA

1

Necessity and Freedom in Ansehn 's Conception of God

39-64

Die Wirkungsgeschichte Anselms von Canterbury: Akten der ersten lnternationalen Anselm-Tagung, Bad Wimp/en, Septen·iber 1970. Analecta Anselmiana 4.2. Frankfurt/Main, 1975

II

Sacrament, Symbol and Causality in Bernard of Clairvaux

111-122

Bernard of Cloirvaux: Studies Presented to Dorn Jean Leclercq. Cistercian Studies Series, 23. Washington, D. C.: Cistercian Publications, 1973

Ill

Nature and the Natural in Twelfth-Century Thought

1-26

London: Variorum Reprints, 1984

IV

The Dialectic of Divine 01nnipotence London: Variorun1 Reprints, 1984

1-37

VI

V

The Critique on Natural Causality in the MutakaJlimun and Non1inalism

77-94

The Harvard Theological Review 66. Cambridge, Mass., 1973

Tf-lE SOCIAL-ECONOMIC CONTEXT

VI

The King and the Leaden Coin: The Econo1nic Background of 'Sine qua non' Causality

185-209

Traditio XXV/11.

New York, 1972

VII

Token Coinage and the Administration of Poor Relief during the Late Middle Ages The Journal ofInterdisciplinary History 1/1.

275-295

Ca,nbridge, Mass., 1972

CONSEQUENCES IN LATE MEDIEVAL THOUGHT Vllla

John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rirnini on Whether God Can Undo the Past

224-256

Recherches de theologie ancienne er ,necUr!vale XXXIX. Louvain, 1972

Vlllb

John of Mirecourt (continued)

147-174A

Ibid. XL. Louvain. 1973

IX

Covenant and Causality in Pierre d'Ailly Specu!urn XL VI.

Cambridge. Mass., /()7/

94-l 19

..

VII

X

Cranmer as a No1ninalist­ Sed contra

367-380

The Harvard Theological Review 57. C,1mbridge, Mass., 1964

NOMJNALISM AND ASCRIBED VALUE

XI

XII

NominaJism and Late Medieval Religion

26-59

Nominalisn1 and Late Medieval Thought: a Bibliographical Essay

716-734

The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Retlaissance R·efigion. Papers from the University of A1ichigan Conference, ed. Charles Trinkaus with Heiko A. Oberman. Leiden: Brill, 1974

Theological Studies 33. Baltilnore, Md., 1972.

Xlll

Late Medieval Nominalism Revisited: 1972-1982

l59-] 64

Journal of 1he flisrorv of Ideas X LIV. Philadelphia, Pa., 1983

Index

1-8

'fhis volun,e contains,\ t�)tal of 350 pages.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE The articles in this \'.Olume, as in all others in the Collected Studies Series, have not been given a new, continuous pagination. In order to avoid confusion, and to facilitate their use where these same studies have been referred to elsewhere, the original pagination has been maintained wherever possible. Each article has been given a Roman number in order of appearance, as listed in the Contents. This number is repeated on each page and quoted i n the index entries.

PREFACE "' Two interrelated themes are explored in these essays. One is the theme of divine omnipotence and causality, especially the scholastic distinction of absolute and ordained power created to handle the potentially conflicting notions of divine freedom and the reliability of the laws of nature and grace. The second theme is the idea of ascribed value: that some things in this world (both objects and human actions) need not be causally effective on the basis of some inherent "nature" but could operate instead through value ascribed to them in a convenantal or contractual system. Both ideas drew upon the social, legal, and economic validjty of contractual agreements and credit instruments, as they were developed in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. But the theological and philosophical version of these ideas depended less on the legal enforcement of contracts and more on the voluntary, self-binding nature of the relationship of God and man, of God and creation. Initially the ideas that contributed to the conception of covenantal causaJity were worked out by theologians from widely different traditions: Benedictines, Cistercians, Austin Canons, secular priests, and Dominicans. The conceptual framework thus created, however, eventually came to be the special property of Franciscans and authors associated with late medieval nominalism. In origin the essays grew out of an interest in the meaning and wider implications of a theory of sacramental causality based on ascribed value, which in turn led me into monetary theory, social welfare, political thought and a comparative history of the central themes, East and West. All but three were written between the �pring of 1969 and the spring of 1972. Much of that time was spent in the classroom at Madison with students whose interest and questions stimulated so1ne of the ideas and approaches presented here. But the research and writing were facilitated at the beginning and end by grants from The National Endowment for the Humanities (1968-69) and from The Institute for Research in

X

the Humanities at the University of Wisconsin (1971-72), to whom I am especially grateful. The arrangement of essays in this volume is chronological and thematic, but it may be useful to know the ·Order in which they were conceived and written (son1ething the publication date does not always reveal). The paper on Pierre d'Ailly was first (1969); followed by "The King and the Leaden Coin" (1969) for the American Historical Association meeting in New York; "Token Coinage" (1970) for the Renaissance Society meeting in San Francisco; "Nature and the Natural" (1970) at the request of the Medieval Studies Program at Rochester; the Anseln1 paper (1970) for the Anselm Congress at Bad Wimpfen, Germany; and the essay on the Mutakallimun and Nominalism (1970) for the American Historical Association meeting in Boston. Those findings were then applied to the broader problem of divine omnipotence and volition., already touched on in the Anselm paper. That resulted in the articles on Mirecourt and Rimini (1971), BeTnard of Clairvaux (1972). and initiated the research on the dialectic of divine omnipotence that was eventually written as a paper for the conference on omnipotence and future contingents at Ohio State in 1982. The version that is printed here as article lV is a slightly altered and expanded version of the text that will appear in the volume of conference papers to be published by Reidel in Dordrecht, Holland. It is included here because its content provides an important part of one of the central themes of the book. F.inally. in the winter of 1971-72, I \Vas requested to prepare articles on the broader but related theme of Nominalism for Theological Stu.dies and for the Ann Arbor conference on late medieval and Renaissance religion, organized by Charles Trinkaus. Now. more than a decade later, these essays are joined into one sequence spanning the eleventh to sixteenth centuries. l a1n indebted to the original publishers and to Variorum for the opportunity to have them assen1bled here as one collection. Despite occasional overlap and repetition of information originally needed to make each piece independent and self­ sufficient. the combined effect reveals a picture considerably different from traditional accounts. The essays clarify the background and 1neaning of concepts closely associated with late medieval nominalism. concepts •which still today are subject to

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misunderstanding. Perhaps more importantly, they reveal the "antiquity" , the early background of these ideas, the broad range of writers who contributed to their development (particularly Dominicans in the second quarter of the thirteenth century), and the social and economic influence of one of the most fascinatjng conceptual innovations of the high and late Middle Ages. For a period that many historians have described in terms of closing frontiers, hardening class lines, and shrinking intellectual horizons, the wide-spread adoption of convenantal causality in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries points to the ability of men of that age to live secure in a world open to divine power, a world o f future expectation based on concepts of credit and assigned value. WILLIAM J . COURTENAY

Madison, Wisconsin March, 1984

I

NECESSITY AND FREEDOM IN ANSELM'S CONCEPTION OF GOD

In the sixth chapter of book one of Cur deus homo 1, Boso, presenting the critique of the unbeliever against the Christian doctrine of atonement. raises a serious objection to Anselm's initial argumentation. To say that the particular form of the atonement, namely the incarnation and crucifixion of Christ. was the only way thal man could have been redeemed is to place an intolerable limitation on the omnipotence of God. Boso's objection. in a sense. covers any of the 1hen current explanations of Jloncment, including Anselm's. The earlier. dramatic view of atonement, where God rescues man from the power of the devil, suggests to the unbeliever that God is no1 fully omnipotent, for if he were. why did he go to such great lengths and bizarre ploys in order to exercise his power ? In the Ansefmian view. where man is saved from the wrath of God rather tha11 the power of the devil, one is seemingly felt with a God almost powerless in the face of his own connicting motivations, wishing to save man and yet wishing to e xact punishment for the indignities done l.o his honor, a God who in the end chooses a method that is as punishing to lumselt as 10 man. bringing about what t those outside the faith might appear as an t!ven greater indignity, namely the suffering and crucifixion of God. Does not the whole concept of the necessir,r of atonemenL and incarnation, asks Boso, makc a mockery of the omnipotence of God'? If the situation needed rectifying ant.I God chose to do so, why did he not correct it by a simple command. for surely every thing depends on the will of God. his will to punish and his will to save ' ) If God forgives and does not wish LO punish. then he automatically, b y that very c.kc1sion , wills to save man and has removed all barriers to rectitude. Injustice or the lack of righteousness exists not because man's behavior in Adam was absolutely wrong but only because God chooses to view iL in that way, only b�cau�� God feels that his d1gn1ty has been compromised through the breaking of h,s commandment. If God decides to forg,vc and to consider man good, Just. and rtghtt:ous, then man is so, and no further cause need be sought beyond the will of Goel. Supposing rc:demption to be necessary. the simplest and most direct means open to God would have been through a change in or a command of his will alon1: cum so/a 1• 0/w1tate powir!. You Christians, says Boso. summarizing the

!(

S. ANSELMI Opera Omnia, ed. F. S. Schmitt (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1946-1961), JI, 53-55. '" lbui. · 11. 54: "Quapropter si humanum genus. salvare noluit. n1si quo modo dici1is. cum sola votunt 31c potuit. u1 miuus dicam, v1detc quornodo c1us sap1ent1ae rcpugnaus."

position or the unbeliever, contradict yourst'lws by making God powerkss. Does not tht' omnipotent'e or God reign ewrywhcrc J'' The quf divine omnipotence. God cannot do certain things not because they 43

-

entail a logical or inherent contradiction nor because the only necessary definition of God prohibits ascribing such activity to the deity, but rather because God's nature is one and consistent, a nature to which his actions will always confonn. Viewed in this way, Anselm's definition of God is valid because of the consistency of God's nature and actions, a consistency revealed in the Scriptures and in the life of the Church, and reflected in Anselm's definition of God. Whereas the third interpretation would say that we know the nature of God automatically when we hear the term "God." and we know that the divine actions will be in accord with that nature because of the Anselmian categories or the Anselmian definition of God, i n the fourth view, we know the nature of God through Scripture and the life of the Church, and thus we know or trust that God will always act in conformity with that nature. To provide an example, God cannot lie because it is his nature not to lie. If he were to do so, he would not be acting according to his true nature and thus n o longer be God (as we understand him). Here "lying" has a specific meaning a.n d content ai,art fro m what God gives to it by speaking its opposite and therefore making it a lie. Socrates, for example, existed, and to say that Socrates did not exist at one time would be a lie, even if God said it. A fifth interpretation moves a little further toward establishing a norm to which God's actions must conform, a norm that Limits the divine omnipotence. God cannot do those things which would contradict the order he has already established (regardless of whether these actions would also involve a contradic­ tion, violate the definition of God, or reveal a connict in God's nature). God cannot (or at least it is his nature or habit not to), having once established the physical laws of the universe or the moral laws governing human behavior., change those laws. Again. the consistency of God's actions is a necessary corollary of the divine nature, but the consistency here is not necessarily a direct expression of God's true nature but rather a result of the fact that it is part of his nature to act consistently. God. cannot, for instance, reverse the pattern of the sun's motion or make murder and adultery just and meritorious, having once established the physical and moral laws of the universe. I t is important to stress that there is, i n this fifth interpretation, no necessary Link between the nature of God and the ordained order, as there was in the fourth interpretation. God could have established an entirely different order, both physically and morally. One cannot, therefo·re, argue from the nature of the revealed order 10 the nature of God, but only from the natu:re of the revealed order to the inscrutable but presumably benevolent will of God. Similarly, one also cannot argue from the nature of God to the necessity of the revealed order. One can never know for certain the reasons for God's choices; one affirms that they are reasonable and good because they arc experienced as such and because one respects the divine choices and has trust in God. Presumably, the theologian, on the basis of his belief that God always acts wisely, may present probable reasons why the order ordained by God is the best possible order. However, he would never limit the omnipotence of God by calling that order the only possible order. To call it the best is saying nothLng more than that God c.hose to act in a certain way, and that it is part of the definition of God that he would not choose what was not. in his view, the best way for man. So, because o f the definition of Cod, the theologian considers that the way chosen by God was the best way, or rather it ls best because God chose to create that way and thus made it so, 44

Necessity andl freedom in Anselm's conception of God Because o f the human understanding of God, it is believed that God is consistent and trustworthy. and that he will not io the future change his mind or will and ;ilter the physical and moral universe i n which man lives. Finally, a sixth interpretation of Anselm's meaning might conceive that God is ried to some external no.rm of right and truth, a norm not of divine or human creation but one consistent with the natural. human view of justice and truth. For instance, justice. in this view. is a lerm with specific content. a content innately known by every man, so that philosophically the meaning of the term can be explored an' considered. Yet ANSELM. in order to solve the problem of necessity and freedom in God. ,1do1m tlus procedure more readily in Cur deus Jnmo than in Pro.1/ogio11.

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makes himself a debtor to man, on the basis or a promise freety made and freely keptl 1 • The second distinction made by Anselm in order to solve the problem of necessity and freedom in God is the distinction between ability (posse) and will (ve/le)3d. While in earlier works Anselm frequently stated that there were certain things God could not do, he qualifies such statements by indicating that posse presupposes velle. so that power to act without the will to act never results in action. Consequently God may have the power or ability to do· many things which he does not will to do. It is therefore inappropriate LO state that there is anything that God does not have the power to do, and when it is said that God cannot lie, it is me11 dOnl!; 011(1 yet it is nnt right to say tlz(l/ it is impossible for God to make what is past not 10 be past (which would seem to be a direct contradiction to Anselm's position in Proslogion, until one remembers his distinction between the ability to act and the ability to will). For there the necessity of 1101 doing something or the impossibility of

doing it has no effect, but 011.ly the will of God, who. since he himself is trtllh,

1ion1s cogl! caelum volvi, te vero nulla necessitas facit loqui. Sed ubicumque est praecedens necessltas, est et sequens; non au tern ubi sequens, lbi srntim et praecedens." 42) Tbid. (Opera Omnia, 11, 114). 43) Ibid. (Opera Omnia, II, I 22- I 23): "lam diximus qu[a deu.s improprie dicitur aliquid non posse aut necessitate facere. Ornnis quippe necessitas e1 impos.sibilitas eius subiacet voluntati; ilJius autem voluntas nulli subditur necessitaii aut impossibilitatL Nihil enim est necessarium aul lmpossibUe, 11isi quia ipse ita vult: ipsum vero aut velle aut nolle aliquid propter necessitatem aut impossibilitatem alienum est a veritate. Quare quoniam omnia quae vult. et non nisi quae vuit facit: sicut nulla necessitas sive impossib ilitas praecedit eius velle aut n-olle, ita nee eius facere aut non facere. quamvis mu!La vetil immutabiliter et faciat"

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Necessity and freedom in Anselm's conception of God wills that the truth should be always unchangeable, as it is. Similarly, if he unalterably decides to do something .. although ii is necessarily true. e11e11 l;>1>Jore ir is done, that if is going to be done, still he is subject to no necessity of doing it or impossibility of not doing ii. since his will af0ne works in him. for whenever it is said that Cod cannot do something. there is no denial of his power, bitt rarher an indication of his unconquerable might and srrength. For rhis way of speaking simply means rhar no circumstance can make him do what it is said that Jze cannot do 44. In this way Ans.elm arrives back at his earlier solution to the problem of freedom and necessity in God. To attribute to God the power to act in any way, at any time, without restriction is a sufficient defense of the belief in the omni­ p r i g i n o f t h i ngs a n d a s a p r i n c i p l e t h a t makes God i n to a n arra n g e r r a t h e r than a c r e a t o r . I n d e fe n s e o.f t h e r a t i o n a l i n v e s t i g at ion o f n a t u r e a n d n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n a a number o f f o r m u l a t i o n s o r con c e p t u a l t o o l s w e r e worked o u t to s o l v e t h e s e e m i n g �� n f l i_c t b e t w e e n n a t u r a l c a u s a l i t y a n d d i v i n e a c t i o n . _ e f i r s t o f t h e s e was t h e i d e a o f d ou b l e cau s a l i t y , s i m u l tane o u s l y o p e ra t i ng i n t h e same e v e n t . D i s c u s s i o n s

6

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o f n a t u r a l , s e c o n d a ry c au s a l i t y i n no w a y d e t ra c te d fro� There w e r e , t h e u l t i ma t e p o w e r and d i g n i t y o f G o d . i n d e e d , two c a u s e s o f e v e n t s : a n immed i a t e n a t u ra l c a u s e , w h i c h we o b s e r v e , a n d t h e u 1 t i m a t e s u s t a i n i ng c a u s a l i t y of God , w h i c h l i e s b e h i n d t h e n a t u r a l c au s e,. , h i d d e n from o u r e y e s . Furthermore , even t h e most ardent suppor t e r s o f r a t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n s a d m i t t e d t � e p o s s i ­ b i l i t y o f d i r ec t , m i r a c u l o u s a c t i o n a s we l l , a l t h o u g h Th u s , i n a d d i t i o n t o they t e n d e d t o l i m i t i t s e v e r e l y . the o r d e r l y c o u r s e o f n a t u re , w h o s e b e h a v i o r c o u l d b, e understood and pred i c t e d , God c o u l d temporarily suspend some n a t u ra l o p e r a t i o n f o r a p u r p o s e i n k e e p i n g w i t h h i s o v e ra l l , providential design. The concepts of a n o r d e r l y u n i v e r s e a n d t h e p o s s i b i l i ty o f m i r a c l e s were not c o n t r a d i c t o r y , and t h a t r e a l i z a t i o n was n o t a n a c h i e v e m e n t o f t h e t h i r t e e n th c e n t u r y b u t o f C h r i s t i a n thinkers a century earlier. B o t h o f t h e s e i d e a s a r e e n t a i l e d i n t h e famous r e p l y o f A d e l a r d o f Ba t h : For whatever i s , i s I d o n o t d e t r a c t from God , from H i m and becau se o f H i m . But n a t u re is n o t c o n f u s e d a n d w i t h o u t sy s t e m , a n d so fa r a, s h u m a n k n o w l e d g e h a s p r og r e s s e d i t s h o u l d be given a hearing. O n l y when i t f a l l s u t t e r l y should t h e re be recourse to God i.e . , e x p l a i n i ng phenomena t h r ough direct d i v ine 1 9 i n t e rvention .

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B u t s.omeo n e w i l l s a y : " I s i t n o t t h e Creat o r ' s w o r k t h a t m a n i s b o r n f r o m ma n '? " T o which I r e p l y : I d o n o t remove a n y t h i n g f r o m G o d . 2 0

T h e same a p p r o a c h wa s a pp l i e d S c r i p t u r e by A n d r e w o f S t . V i c t o r :

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I f he resort to t h e argum e n t t h a t d i v i n e o m n i po t e n c e c a n d o wha t na t u r, e c a n n o t , e n a b 1 e a man to d i r e c t h i s gaze through t h e heavens and b e y o n d t h e m , w e k n o w t h a t w i t h God n o t h i ng i s i m p o s s i b l e a n d i n n o w i s e g a i n say i t . But he s h o u l d r e a l i z e t h i s : i n e x po u n d i ng S c r :.p t u re , when t h e e v e n t d e s c r i b e d a d m i t s o f n o n a t u r a l e x p l a na t i o n , t h e n a n d o n l y t h e n s h o u l d we h a v e recourse to m i r a c l e s . 2 1

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of

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and s e c o n d a ry T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t ween p r i mary completely not did howev e r , solve the a u s a l i ty , �o n f l i c t o c c a s i o n e d by t h e n a t u ra l , r a t i o na l e x p l a n a t i o n T9 solve t h i s di f f i c u l t y a for" a m i r a c u l o u s e v e n t . d i s t i n c t i o n was m a d e b e t w e e n N a t u re , u n d e r s t o od a s t h e p r o v i d e n t i a l p l a n o f God , c o t e rm i n o u s w i t h h i s w i l l , a n d t h e common c o u r s e o f n a t u r e , u n d e r st.ood a s t h e way things n o r m a l l y , or us u a l l y , o p e ra t e . God n e v e r a c t s agai n s t n a t u r e i n t h e f i r s t s e n s e , s i n c e w h a t h e h a s w i l l e d , h e h a s w i l l e d from a l l e t e r n i ty . B u t God , a s of part i ntervene can plan, providential that occas i o n a l l y i n tl1e comm:on c o u r s e o f n a t u r e to r e v e a l his power and grace. M i r a c l e.s i n t h i s s e n s l;l d o n o t u p s e t t h e o rd e r l i n e s s o f t h e l a rg e r p l a n o f n a t u r e , s i n c e they a r e o n l y o c c a s i o n a l a n d a l wa y s p a r t o f God ' s M i r a c u l o u s i n t e r v e n t i o n s a r e p l a n n e d b y God d e :1 i g n . from e t e r n i ty b u t h i d d en from man ; they do hot r e p r e s e n t M i ra c l e s , t h e r e f o r e , a r- e n o t a n y change i n G o d ' s w i l l . aga i n s t n a t u re o r c o n t r a ry t o n a t u r e i n t h e l a rg e r s e n s e b e c a u s e t h e y s u s p e n d o n l y the o p e r a t i o n o f a p a r t i c u l a r law o f n a t u re a n d o n l y tempora r i l y ; t n e f u l l .f l a n o f na t u r e is c o n s o n a n t w i t h t h e t o t a l w i l l o f G o ct . 2 I n o r d e r to f u r t h e r p r o t e c t t h e o r d e r l y o p e r a t i o n o f t h e physical world w h i l e y e t a c k nowledging t h e full e a r l y t w e l f t h - c e n tury freedom o f d i v i n e omni p o t e n c e , namely theologians distinction, t h i rd a developed T h e s t r u c ture o f the b e t w e e n c a p a c i t y a n d v o l i t i :i n . world in w h i c h we l i v e , t h e ways God h a s c h o s e n to a c t , d i d not exhaust d i v i n e capac i t y , t h e possibi l i t i e s open to G o d . T h a t i d e a , p a r t i a l l y o r d i m ly formu l a t e d b y A n s e l m i n C u r D e u s Homo , was r e f i n e d i n t h e e a r l y twe l f t h c e n tury a n d c o d i f i e d by P e t e r L Qmb a r d i n t h e I t was a n text o f t h e L i b r i gua tu o r sent e n t i a ru m . 2 j idea a t t r a c t i v e e v e n t o t h e more p h i l o s o p h i z i n g o f t h a t W i l l i a m o f C, o n o h e.s 1 a ft e r a t t ac k i ng t h o s e who d i d age. n o t a d e q u a t e l y d i s t ingu i s h b e t w e e n t h o s e things that l i e W i t h i n t h e a b i l i ty o f God ( t h o s e t h i ngs h e c o u l d have done o r t h e o r e t i c a l l y c o u l d do) a n d t h o s e t h i ngs God h a s d o ne , is d o i n g , a n d w i l l d o , s t a te d : " God d oe s n o t d o T o u s e a p e a s. a n t ' s w o r d s , he is able to d o . � V t:? r y t h i n g an d make a c a l f from a t r e e t r u n k ? H a s h e e v e r d o n e i_ t ? •• �� In c o n t r a s t to t h o s e t h e o l o g i a n s who were o v e r l y con ,� er.ned a b o u t p r o t e e t ing di v i n e o m n i p o t e n c e , Wi l l i a m augg e s t s t h a t t o p o s t u l a t e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s o f n a t u re ou t 5 1 de the c o n t e x t o f a r e c o r d e d m i r a c l e ( a l though th e o r e t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e ) is a wa s t e o f t ime . e h t.h!3 fqr d i s t i n c t i o n ;; these of i mp o r t a n c e T d e.ve l o p m e n t o.f m e d i e v a l t h eo l ogy wa.s c ru c i a l . A new

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u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f God a n d nature ha� emerged and w o u l d c o n t i nue to d o m i n a te t h e t h i n k i n g o n t h e s e i s s u e s t h r oughout t h e t h i r te e n th and f o u r t e e n t c e n t u r i e s . T h e o r d e r l i n e s s of, t h e u n i v e r s e was now s een a s t h e r e s u l t o f a n o r d e r God h a d impo s e d , a n o r d i nation b a s e d o n the v o l i t io n a l b u t c o n s i s t e n t p l a n o'f Go, d . E v e n m i r a c l e s w e r e b r o u g h t w i t h i n t h e c o n t r o l o f God ' s o r d a i ned w i l l , w h i c h was i m m u t a b l e a n d e t e r n a l . Outs�d t h e o r d i n a t ion s t o o d t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s God might hav.e c h o s en ; a t t h e h e a r t o f that o r dinat.ion was the c oainio !Jj . l'l1 c o u r s e o f n a t u re w h i c h c o u l d be r e l i e d u p o n , even wh e A s A r n o l d o f B o n n e v a l , a friend temp o r a r i ly d i s t u r b e d . o f B e r n a r d o f C l a i r v a u x a n d a firm b e l i e v e r i n tbe p o s s i b i l ity o f m i r a c l e s , remarke d : " t h e e n t i r e f a b r i c of1 t h e w o r l d c o n t i nues i n i t s l a wf u l a n d o r d e r e d way , harmo n i o u s , a n d w i t h no d re a d p r o s p e c t ofl solid, 2 5 r u i n . 11 T h e V a l i d a t i o n o f t h e N a t u r a l Man The r e s t r u c t u r i ng of v i e ws on p h y s i c a l n a t u r e w a s o n l y p a r t o f t h e n a t u r a l i s m o f t h e t w e l f t h c e n tu r y . E q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t w a s t h e u n d e r s l- a n d i ng o. f hum.a n n a t u l"' e, o f man in n a t u re , and o f W'hat was n a t u r a l to m a n . T·h·e e x p l o r a t ion o f t h e p h y s i c a l u n i v e r s e was i n e v i t a b l y c o n d u c t e d i n c o n s o r t w i t h a n e x p l o r a t i o n o f huma n n a t u P e a n d o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f m a n a n d h i s e n v i r o n me n t . What was nat u ra l , in t h e s e n s e �f b e i n g o r d e r l y a n d c u s t o m a r y , a b o u t t.he p h y s i c a l w o r l d t h e natura l ,a s was o p p o s e d to t h e s u p e r n a t u r a l o r p r e te r n a t u r a l e c h o e d in what was n a t u r a l t o m a n . M i r a c u l ous a n d p r e ­ t e r n a t u r a l e x p l a n a t ions b o t h i n p h y s i c a l n a t u r e a n d i n' human r e l a t i o ns g a v e way to more ra t i o n a l e.x p l a n a t i o n s- , For man h i m se l f , t h e r e was a n i n c r e a s ing a p p r e c i a t ion f o r what was " n a t u ra l " i n human b e h a v i o r apart fr·om g r a c e , a n a p p r e c i a t i o n for t h e b a s i c d r i v e s and d e s i r e �­ o f men, I n s p i t e o f the rel u c t a n c e o f t h e A u g u s t i n i a n t r a d i t io n to r e c o g n i ze much v a l u e i n human l i f e 'a.nd i n s t i tu t i o n s a f t e r the F a l l , a p a r t f r o m g r a c e , t h e r e ;1as s u f f i c i e n t suppo r t i n t h e twe l ft h c e n t u r y f o r a n u p w a �d r e - e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e n a t u r a l man i n a n a t u r a l w o r l d . A t f i r s t g l a n c e i t would seem t h a t there was much in t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d t h e o l o g i c a l h e r i tage o f the: e a r l y M i d d l e A g e s t h a t w o u l d h a v e d i s c o u raged a n y supti o p t i m i s m a n d c o n c e n t r a t i on on the n a t u ra l . B o t h Aug u s ­ t i n ia n i s m a n d t h e N e o p l a t o n i c t r a d i t i on - - the two m o s t

- 13 had impo.rtant p a r t s o f t h a t i n te l l e c t u a l h er i tage The Platonic and something of an anti-natural b i a s . Augu s t i n i a n e p i s t e m o l o g y downgra-ded t h e w o r l d o f sense e x p e r i e n c e 1n ra v o (' of innate ideas t h a t are p e r c e i v e d wi t h i n t h e h u m a n m i nd , a i d e d by d iv i n e i l l u m i na t i o n . t h e s tr e s s o n c o n temp l a t i o n a n d m y s t i c a l Moreove r , a s c e n t was s t r o n g i n t h e s e t r a d i t i o n s , e n c o u r a g i n g man to s e p a r a t e h i m s � l f f r o m m a t t e r and t h e e v i l s o f t h i s world ln o r d e r t o a s c end toward mys t i c a l u n i o n w i t h God , A l though tempered somewhat i n b i s l a t e r or t h e O n e . w r i t i n g s , Augu s t i n e was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e v i e w t h a t sexual d e s i re w a s i n i t s e l f s i n f u l a n d a p u n i s h m e n t for s i n , the b u r d e n o f c o n c u p i s c en c e that had been p l a c ed on man a f t e r the F a l l . What v i rt u e had man a p a r t from What c h a n c e o f s a l v a t i o n a p a r t f r o m the divine grace1 Even the s t at e , t h e g o v e r n i ng predes t i n a t i o n o f God? i n s t; i t u t i o n o f m a n , was a n e c e s s a r y e v i l , a nega t i ve b l e s s i n g . i n s t i tuted by God to c u r b the w o r s t i n s t i n c t s o f man ' s c o r r u p t n a t u r e a f t e r t h e F a l l . T h ere were a s p ec t s of the Neoplatonic and itug u s t i n ian t r a d i t i o n s , h o we v e r , t h a t e n c o u ra g e d a more We have o p t i m i s t i c e v a l u a t i o n o f nature a n d man. cl l ready seen i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f p h y s i c a l n a tu re how that o p t i m i s t i c v i e w was b u i l t i n p a r t on e l em e n t s in t h e Neopla t o n i c w o r l d v i e w , espec i a l l y t h e theme o f a n o r d e r e d h i e ra r c h y o f b e i ngs d i rec t e d u l t i m a t e l y toward tbe good , a s found i n t h e w r i t i ngs of D i o n y s i u s the We s h o u l d P s e u d o - A r e o pa g i t e and John S c -0 t u s E r i g e n a . not forge t t h a t t h e i n v e s t iga t i on o f n a t u r e in the e a r l y twe l fth c.en t u r y was n o t a n t i- r e l i g i o u s o r i rr e l i g i o u s . Rathe r , i t was a n i n q u i ry cond u c t e d w i t h g r e a t p i e t y , based on t h e p r in c i p l e t h a t t o d e t r a c t from t h e p e r ­ f e c t i o n o f c r e a t i o n was t o d e t r a c t f r o m t h e C r e a t o r . God had g i v e n m a n s e n s e s and a mind t h r o u g h w h i c h h e was to i n q u i re i n t o t h e th i n g s that God had c r e a t e d a n d the laws that God had e s t a b l i s h e d for g o v e r n i ng t h e u n i ­ vers e . A n e w e v a l u a t i o n o f n a t u re t h u s was i n e x t r i c a b ly tied up w i t h a n e w e v a lu a t i o n o f m a n . 1 • Mac r o c o sm - M i c r o c o s m : N a t u r e a s Image o f Man

F o r t h e t w e l f t h c e n t u ry , man and na t u r e , man and the c o s mo s , w e re j oi n e d t o g e t h e r t h r o ug h d i r e c t c o n t i n u i t Y • Man no t o n 1 y s tu d i e d n a t u r e ; ma h wa s n a t u re . A t t h e h e a r t o f t h e r e c o g n i t i o n thatma n was p a r t o r n a t u r e l a y L h e r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t man was body , ma t t e r , a s we l l a s s p i r i t . I f N e o p l a t o n i s m tended t o d e m a -

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t e r i a l i z e t h e p r o c e s s o f t h e l" e t u rn o f a l l c r e a t i·ori t o w a r d u n i o n w i t h the O n e , the o p e n i ng c h a p t e r o J G· e n e s i s and the b e l i e f i n t h e r e s u r. _r e c t i ? n sup ? o r t e d t h-� b a s ic goodness o f m a t t e r a n d i t s f i n a l i n c l u s i o n wi thiri the redemptive process. As A lan o f L i l l e , toward t h e end o f t h e c e n t u ry , e x p r e s s e d i t : " I t w a s f i t t i n g th-a� corporeal as well as i n c o rporeal n a t u re shoul1 p a r t i c i p a te in the d i v i ne g o o d ne s s , s h o u l d e n j oy i t anc;t l i v e h a p p i l y . 11 2 6 T h e s t ruc t u r e , t h e s y m m e t r y o f t h e human b o d y , e s t a b l i shed a secood p o i n t o f c o n t ac t , o r cont i n u i t y , Man found i n h i m s e l f t h e same o r d e r o f1 w i th nature. p a r t s to the w h o l e , t h e same p u r p o s e f u l h a r m o n y , t h a t h e found in e x t e r n a l n a t u r e . Man w a s n o t only t h e i mage s De i ; h e was a l s o t h e imago m u n d i . I t was p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the m i n d o f m a n , in r a t i o nal fac u l t y , t h a t h e m o s t c l os e l y resemb l e d o r d e r o f God '· s u n i ve r s e . I t w a s t h a t very u n i t y , c o n t i n u i ty , o r s i m i l a r i t y t h a t p e r m i t ted man t o s t u d)1· T h e laws o f nat u re, , t h e n a t u re t h a t s u r r o u n d e d .h i m . a c c o r d i ng to w h i c h t h e p h y s i c a l w o r l d opera t e d , were p a ra l l e l e d by the l a w o f n a t u re w i t h i n m a n , w r i t t e n upon his h e a r t . The u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f n a t u r a l law in m a n , w i t h i t s fou n d a t i o n i n Roman l a w a n d p a t r i s t i c t h e o l o g y , b ee a n and d e tai led to r e c e i ve a m or e d e f i n i t i ve t r e a t m e n t in t h e t w e l f t h c e n t u ry . T h e symb io t i c r e l a t i on s h i p b e t ween man 3.nd n a t u re e x t e n d e d even i n t o t h e a r e n a o f moral a c t i on , s i n c e fcn:1 many w r i t e r s , e s p e c i a l l l y the P o r r e t a n i ( t he d i s c i p l e.s o f G i l b e r t de l a P o r r ee ) , i t w a s Dame N a t u re who g r a n t:-e.q v i r t u e to m e n . Seen in t h i s way , t h e m o r a l l i fe w a s y e t a n o t h e r i n s t a n c e o f t h e l i f e o f n a t u re , o f t h e u n iv e r s e , A l though t h e theme o f m a n a s a l i t t l e cosmo s , man as m i c r o c o s m , was n o t t r e a t ed in the wr, i ti n g s of the t h e o l o g i a n s of more the e a r l y t w e l fth trad i t i on a l c e n t u r y , such a s those c o n n e c t e d w i t h L a o n o r R h e i m s , nor b y the so-ca l le d Augu s t i n i a n s , s u c h a s Hugh o f S t . V i c t o r , P e t e r Lomba rd , a n d P e t e r o f P o i t i e r s , i t had numerous exponen t s . One o f t h e e a r l i e s t r e f e r e n c e s to t h e c o n c e p t o c c u r s in t h e E lu c i d a r i u m o f H o n o r i u s o f Autun. Wh e n c e came the c o r p o r e a l s u b s t a n c e u s e d i n m a n ' s c re a t i o n ? F r o m t h e f o u r e l e m e n t s , a n d for t h is r e a s o n man is c a l l e d a m i c r o c o s m , t h a t i s , a l e s s e r w o r l d ; for f r o m t h e e a r t h he ·:1.a s h i s flesh, from water h i s b l o o d , from a i r h i s 27 brea th , and f r o m fire h i s w a r m t h .

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I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e re f e re n c e s to man a s m i c r o c o s m rou nd i n W i l l i a m o f C o n c h e s , B e r n a rd S i l v e s t e r , G i l b e r t d e l a P o r r-e e , a n d t h e P o r- r e t a n i , e s p ec i a l l y A lan o f one or the last major theologians of the Lille , V i c t o r i n e s c h o o l , G o d f r e y of S t . V i c t o r , w r o t e a n e n t ire w o rk e n t i t l e d M i c r o c o s m o s . 2 2 . V i a t or in n a t u r a l i b u s : T h e N a t u r a l Man in T h e o l o g y

The n a t u r a l v i r t ue s , n a m e l y t h o s e v ir t u e s t h a t man p o s s e s s e s on t h e b a s is o f h i s c r e a t e d n a t u re a p a r t from The grac e , t o o k on new s t a t u s i n t h e t w e l f t h c e n tury . A u g u s t i n i a n t r a d i t i o n , w h i c h d e f i n e d t r u e v i r tue o n l y in terms o f man r e d eeme d , i n f u s e d by t h e s u p e r n a tu r a l g i f t of gra c e , c o n t i nued t o f i n d s p o k e s m e n w i t h i n m o n a s t i c commu n i t i e s a n d among t h e h e i r s to t h e teac h i ng o f A n s e l m o f L a o n a n d W i l l i a m o f Champea u x : t h e V i c t o r in e s at P a r i s , t h e i nf l u e n t i a l P e te r Lomba rd , a n d P e t e r o f O t h e r t h e o l og i a n s , howe v e r , t o o k a m o r e Poitlers. 29 favorable v i e w o f t h e v i r t u e s exemp l i f i e d i n � n ­ regen era ted p a g a n s , m e n u n r e d e e me d . Man a s o r i g i n a l l y created w a s n o t f u l l y c o r r u p t e d b y t h e F al l , i n s p i t e o f w hat sugges t . The t h e A u g u s t i n i a n h e r i tage m i g h t natural v i rt u e s of t,empe r a n c e , f o r t i t u d e , magnami n i t y , p r u d e n c e , or j u s t i c e were v i r t u e s t h a t p a g a n,s p o s.s e s s e d and through w h i c h e v e n m a n u n r e d eemed c o u l d c o n ­ These struc t i v e l y c o n t r i b u te t o the l i fe a r o u n d h i m . n a t u r a l v i r t u e s m i g h t b e e n h a n c e d through t h e s u p e r ­ n a t u r a l i n f u s i o n o f c h a r i t y when o n e b e c a m e a C h r i s t i a n , b u t they e x i s t e d a s p a r t o f the n a t u r a l s t a t e o f man a n d did n o t requ i r e d i v i n e renewa l i n o r d e r to o p e r a t e for the i m p r o v e m e n t o f soc i e t y . The e l e v a t i o n i n s t a t u s o f the n a t u r a l v i rtues owed much to t h e t e a c h i n g a c t i v i t y of P e t e r A b e l a r d . D u r i ng the 1 1 3 0 s in a number o f works A b e l a r d s c r u t i n i z e d t h e e t h i c a l t e a c h i n g o f t h e p a g a n p h i l o s o p h e r s and d e v e l o p e d the n o t i o n t h a t v i r t u e was a h a b i t o f t h e mind , a c q u i re d by i n d i v i d u a l e f f o r t , w h i c h i n t u r n t r a n s f o r m s t h e human Des p i t e t h e c r i t i c i sms l e v e l e d by W i l l i am o f o u l . 30 � t . T h i e r r y , Thomas o f M o r i g n y , B e r n a rd o f C l a i r v a u x , and e v e n t u a l l y P e t e r L o m b a r d , t h e v i e w s o f A b e l a r d on e t h i c s and v i r t u e were c i r c u l a t e d and g i v e n c o n t i n u e d l i f e b y h i s d i sc i p l e s , p a r t i c u i a r ly by R o l a n d Ban d i n e l l i anct Om nebene o f V e r o n a . 3 1 S i m i l a r v iews o n n a t u r a l v i· r t u e were h e l d by t h e d i s c i p l e s and '' s c h o o l " o f l b e r t d e l a P o r re e , p a r t, i c u l a r l y Simon of T o u r n a i , an o r L i l l e , G o d f r ey o f P o i t i e r s , S te p h en Lang t o n , a n d

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How much of this teaching came Praepositinus. 32 d i re c t l y from G i l b e r t or was b o r rowed d irec t l y o� i nd i r e c t l y from A b e l a rd is h a r d to d e te rm i n e , s i n c e the ex ta n t w r i t i n gs o f G i 1 b e r t i n c 1 u d e v e r y 1 i t t 1 e on th e· Among t�e s u b j e c t o f p o l i t i c a l and m o r a l v i r t u e s . P o r r e t a n i t h e s e n a t u r a l v i r t u e s come t o b e known a s t h e p o l i t i c a l v i rt u e s i n c o n t r a s t to t h e C h r i s t i a n ( •p t h e o l o g i c a l ) v i r t ues o f fai t h , hop e , and love . One s h o u l d n o t gain t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e r e a re t w o s e t tJ o f v i r t u e s , o n e n a t u r a l and t h e o th e r s u p e r n a t u ra l . P o l i t i c a l v i r t u e s b ecome C h r i s t i a n v i r t u e s u n d e r th-e T h e r e i s o n e h a b i t u s o f v i r bu� influence o f grace. w h i c h a t t i m e s is d i r e c ted toward r a t i o n a l m o t i v e s - ­ and at a n d a s s u c h i s c o m p l e t e l y the work o f man o t h e r times , u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e � f g r a c e in t � e i n f u s i o n o f l o v e , o r c h a r i t y , i s d i re c t e d toward God and is m e r i t o r i o u s o f e te r n a l l i fe . T h e r e a p p r a i s a l o f human v i r tue wa s o n l y p a r t o f a more n a t u r a l i s t i c e t h i c a l t h e o r y . Almost universal t o t h e o l o g i a n s o f t h e twe l f t h c e n t u r y , w h e t h e r imbued w i t h A u g u s t i n ia n p e r s l) e c t i v e s o r no t , w a s t h e a t t em p t to e x p l a i n human p s y c h o l o g y i n r a t i o n a l t e r m s , to e x p l,a i n why man f e l t h i m s e l f t o b e t h e a u t ho r of h i s o-wp a c t i o ns , and to g i ve t h o s e ac t i on s v a l u e w i t h r e g a r d to t h e i r m o t i v a t i on o r i n te n t . B o t h A b e la rd and th� P o r r e t a n i s t re s s e d i n te n t i n t h e i r a n a l y s e s o f moral b e ha v i o r . 3 3 M o t i v a t i o n for a c t i o n , t h e i n t e n t i o n to d o g o o d o r e v i l , w a s more impor ta n t t o God than t h e a c t i t s e l f , a l th o u g h c h u r c h a n d s o c i e ty l o o k e d c l o s e l y a t the deeds performed. Good d e e d s done b y a c c i d e h t , Evil without just intention, were morally worthless. d e e d s d o n e u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y w o u l d b e f o r g i v e n , a t l e a s t. b y God i f n o t b y t h e s t a t e , c h u r ch , o r t h e k i n d red. the one injured. Even P e t e r Lomb a r d , who r e f u s ed acknowledge any m e r i t o r i o u s mora l a e: t t h a t wa s n o t r e s. u l t o f t h e indwe l l i ng H o l y S p i r i t i n t h e C h r i s t i a n , a rg u e d that we f e e l o u r s e l v e s to b e t h e a u t h o r o f o,ur own m o r a l a c t i on s b e c a u s e t h e H o l y Sp i r i t , t h e g i f t o f u n c r e a t e d gt>ac e , l i e s w i t h i n u s and i s n o t a f o r c e from outside man, 34 T h e c o n c e r n for t h e n a t u r a l man i n A b e l a rd and t h e, P o r r e t a n i c a n a l s o b e s e e n i n t h e i r a t t i tu d e towa rd th§ ' A g a i n s t t h e A u g u s t i ni a n t e a c h i n g process of salvation. t h a t man c o u l d n e ve r , i n a n d o f h i m s e l f , i ni t i a t e t b e r e t u r n t o God ( a l though o n c e g r a c e were g iven h e c o u ld c o o p e r a t e w i t h i t ) , t h e s e t h e o l o g i a n s took a more For A b e l a rd the d e s i re for t h e h u m a n - c en tered a p p r oa ch . s u p r e m e g o o d a n d t h e human e f f o r t t h a t c re a t e s v i r tue

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i t s mark on t h e s o u l a re c r u c l a l e le m e n t s in a d 1eav�s These v i e ws wer e : • a b i l i t y to e a r n e t e r n a l l i fe . 3 5 m rn k s o e d o u t i.n m o r e j u r i d i c a l d e t a i l b y the P o r r e ta.!1.i. �x pu r i s n a t u r a l i b u s ( o u t o f man ' s p u r e n a t u re a p a r t 1r om g r a c e ) m a n c o u l d c o m p l e t e moral l y g o o d a c t s w h i c h , requ i r e , t h roug.h a d e b t o f m o r a l in t u r n , w o u l d o b l i g a t i o n o n G o d ' s p a r t , t h e d i v i n e g i f t o f g r a c e and , t h r o u g h c o o p e r a t i o n w i th God , t h e u l t i m a t e g i f t o f e t e rnal l i f e . W i t h i n t h i s teach i ng t h e d i g n i ty o f man a l e v e l t h a t a p p a l l e d P e t e r Lomba rd and was r a i s e d to o t h e r t w e l f t h - c e n tury " A u g u s t i n i a n s " . B u t , rega r d l e s s o f o p p o s i t i o n , t h i s t e a c h i ng a t t r a c t e d a w i d e f o l l o w i n g i n s u b s e q u e n t c,en t u r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y a m o n g F ra nc i s c an t, h e o l o g ia n s . 3 6 The d o c t r i n e o f atonement i s a n o th er a r e a o f t w e l f t h - c e n tury t h e o l o g y i n w h i c h one c a n w i t n e s s t h e validation of the natural man. I t was A n s e l m who revived t h e v i e w of t h e e a r l y L a t i n F a t h e r , Tertu l l i a n , that the F a l l o f Man r e s u l t e d n o t i n t h e e n s l a v e m e n t o f man by the D e v i 1 b u t i n t h e b r o k e n p a c t o r c o V e h a n t between mar. a n d G o d , a n a c t o f b e t r a y a l through w h i c h man a f f r o n t e d t b e d i g n i ty and h o n o r o f G o d . 37 Anselm understood the a t onement for that sin an a to n e m e n t through t h e c r uc i fi x i o n o f C h r i s t -- to be a n a c t o f man r e p a y i n g God as mu.ch a s i t was an a c t of Go id , , 1 0 5 : "Seel e t o m n 1 p o t e n s q u o m o tl o e s , s 1' omnia non p o t e s ? A u t s i non p o te s c o r r u m p i nee men t i r :I!

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l s u m , u t q u o d fac t um e s t non f1;1cer e v e· r u m e s s e fa . q u o m o d o p o tes o m n i a ? a fac t u rn , e t p 1 u r a s i mi l i t e r : � !� h aec p o s s e n o n e s t p o t e n t i a , s e d i m p o t e n t i a 7 N a m q u i . a ec p o t e s t , q u o d s ibi non expe d i t e t q u o d non d e b e t quanto magis p o tes t , Quae tanto magis ;o te s t . adv e r s i ta s e t p e r ve r s i t a s p o s s u n t i n i l l um , e t i p s e Q u i ergo s i c p o te s t , non p o t e n t i a m i i1 u s c o n t ra i l l a s . N o n e n i m i d e o d i c i tur p o s s e , pote s t , s e d i m p o t e n t i a . q u i a ipse p o ss i t , sed q u i a s u a i m p o t e n t i a fac i t a l i u d in se p o sse ; s i v-e a l i q u o a l i o g e n e r e l o q u e nd i , s i c u t m u l t a U t cum ponimus ' e sse ' pro ' n o n impro p r i e d i c u n t u r . e s se ' , e t ' fa c e re ' p r o e o q u o d e s t ' non fac e re ' , a u t p r o C f . De c a su d i ab o l i , 1 2 ( Op e r a Omni a , ' n i h i l facere ' . " F o r a n e x t e n s i v e e x a m i n a t i on o f A n s e l m ' s I , 25 3 ) . p o s i t i on see my '' N e c e s s i ty and F r e e d o m i n A n se l m ' s Con c e p t i o n o f G od , '' A n a le9.ta A n s e l m i a n a , 4 . 2 ( 1 97 5 ) , 3 9 -6 4 . ,.. ne-

9 ( PL 178, Abelard, T h e o l ogia c h r i s t i a n a , V 1 32 1 - 1 3 30 ) ; I n t r oduc t i o a d t h e o l og i a m , I I I , 4 - 5 ( P L 1 7 8 , 1 09 1 - 1 1 02 ) . 1 00 ) ;

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::..:.. a__,;0;.:m::.;n:..:...=i.:::a , I I , Ans e 1 m , Cu r De u s h om o , I I , 5 ( ..: Oci:p:...ce r.= I I , 1 0 ( Opera Omni a , .I I , 1 07 ) ; I I , 1 7 ( Opera T l , 1 2 2 - 1 2 6 ) ; " N e c e a a i t y a n d F r e e d om , " p p . 5 3 - 6 0 .

C u r D e u s h o m o , I I , 1 0 ( Opera Omni a , I I , 1 07 ) : Cum e n i m d i c o q u ia ''Ornnis p o t e s t a s s e q u i t u r v o l u n t a t e m . possum l o q u i v e l amb u la r e , s u b au d i t u r : si v o l o . •.• P o s s u m u s i ta q u e d i c e re d e C h r i s t o q u i a p o t u i t men t i r i , si suba u d i tu r : s i v e l l e t . E t q u o n i a m men t i r i n o n p o t u i t nolens nee p o t u i t v e l l e men t i r i , non m i n u s d i c i p o t e s t n e q u i v i s s e men t i r i . S i c i t a q u e p o t u i t e t non p o t u i t meo t i r i . " C f . a l s o c h s . 1 6 ( 11 , 1 20 - 1 2 1 ) and 1 7 ( II , 1 1

12 2 - 1 2 6 ) .

12

C u r D e u s h o m o , I I , 5 ( Opera O m n i a , I I , 1 00 ) : " •N O n en i m h a e c e s t d i c end a n e c e s s i ta s , s ed g r a t i a , q u i a n u l l o c o g e n t e i l la m s u s c e p i t a u t s e rv a t , sed g ra t i s . Nam s i quod h o d i e s p o n t e p r o m i t t i s e r a s te d a t u rum , ead em e r a s v o l u o t a t e d a s , q u a m v i s n e c e s s e s i t te e r a s r � d d ere p r o m .i s s um . s i p o te s t , a u t m e n t i r i : non tamen m i n u. s t i b i d e b e t i l l e p r o i m p e n s o b e n e f i c i o c u i d a s , Quam s i non p r o m i s i s s e s , q u o n i a m t e d e b i t o r e m a n te tern pus d a t i o n i s i l l i f a c e r e n o n es c u n c t a tu s . " " Q u a re � � lto mag is , s i d e u s fac i t b o n u m h o m i n i q u o d i n c ep i t , 1. e e t non dee eat eum a b o n o i n c e p t o d e f i c e re , to tum g!"atiae d e b e m u s i m p u t a r e , q u i a hoc p r o p t e r n o s , non

- 22 p r o p t e r s e n u l l i u s egens inc e p i t . Non e n i m i l l um l a t u i t q u i d h�mo f a c t u r u s e ra t , cum i llum f e c i t , et tamen b o n i t a t e sua i l l u � c r e a n d o s p o n t e se ut p e r f i c e ri e t i n c e p tum bonum q u a s i o b l i ga v i t . Denique deus nihil fac i t nullo necessitate, quia m o ct o cogitur a�t p r o h i b e t u r f a c e r e a li q u i d . ''

13 G l o s sa o r d i n a r i a on Gen . p o te n t ia , non p o t e ra t d e i u s t i t i a . ''

19:

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14

III, 4 ( PL 1 7 8,, I n t r odu c t i o ad t h e o l og i a m , 1 0 92 ) : " P o s s e i t a q u e Deus omnia d i c i t u r , n o n quod omn:es s u s c i p e re p o s s i t a c t i o n e s , s e ct q u o d in o m n i b u s qua81 fieri v e l i t , nihil eius voluntati resistere queat . " ( P 1 7 8 , 1 0 94 ) : " H i n e e s t i l l a P l a t o n i s v e r i s s ima ra t i o , q u� s c i i i c e t p r o b a t D e u m n u l l a t en u s mundum m e l i o re m p o t u i s s e f a c e r-e q u a fec e ri t ; s i c q u i p p e i n T i m a e o s u o a -i ,t : ' D i c e n d u m ' , i nq u i t , ' c u r c o n d i to r fa b r i c a t o r q u e g·e. n i t u r a e omne h o c i n s t i tuendum p u t a v e r i t . O p t i m u s e ra t . Ab o p t i m o p o r r o i n v i d i a longe r e l a g a t a e s t , itaque c o n s e q u e n t e r s u i s i m i l i a c u nc t a , p r o u t c u j u s q u e n a t u ra capax beatitudinis esse potuer i t ; effici voluit ' . " {'PL; 178, 1 09 5 ) : '' P i t e t i t a q u e q u i d q u i d D e us fac i a t ab d i m i t t a t , j u s tam a c r a t i o n a b i l e m c a u s am s u b e s s e , u t s o l a fac i a t a u t d i m i t t a t ; q u a e f i e r i v e l d i m i t t i op� r t e a t atq ue ip sum dec eat . Q u o d s i q u i d q u id fa c i t e um fa c e r-e o,po r t e t , j u s t u m e s t u b i q u e u t f a c i a t q u i d q u i d. fac i t , ae Omne q u i p l:) e s i n e d u b i o q u i d q u i d fac i t f a c e r e d e b e t . quod justum e s t fie r i , i n j u s t um e s t dimi t t i , e t q u isq,ui:'s non fac i t id q u o d r a t i o e x ig i t , a e q u e d e l i n q u i t , ac s.iJ (PL 178, id f a c i a t q u o d r a t i o n i m i n i m e c o nc o r da t . " 1 0 9 6 ) : " Hae i t a q u e r a t i o n e i d s o l u m p o s s e fac ere v i d e u,r D e u s quad fac i t , v e l i l l u d s o l um d i m i t t e re p o s s e qued E x h i s i t;. a q u e tam d e r a t i o ne q u a m al;! dimi t t i t . ... s c r i p t o c o l la t i s , c o n s t a t id s o l um p o s s e f a c e r e D·eum q u od a l iq u a n d o fac i t . 11

1 5 B e r n a rd o f C l a i r v a u x , E p i s t . 1 9 0 ; W i l l iam o f S t . T h i e r r y , D i spu t a t i o ( P L 1 8 0 , 27 0 ) ; Odo o f Our s c a m p s 1 Q u a e s t i o n e s Mag i s t r i O d o n i s S u e s s i on e n s i s , I I , 2 9 8 , iru A n a l e c t a n o v i s sima Spi c i legii S o l e s m e n s i s I I , e d . by I , 1 88 8 ) , 1 1 3 ; Hugh o f S t . B , C a r d . P i tra ( Tu s c u l u m , V i c t o r , De s a c rame n t i s , I , 2 , 2 2 ( P L 1 7 6 , 2 1 4 -2 1 6 ) ; Summa s e n t e n t i a r u m , I , 1 4 ( P L 1 7 6 , 6 8 -7 0 ) ; P e t e r L o m ­ b a rd , S e n t e n t i a e i n I V L i b r i s D i s t i n c t a e , L . I , d i s. t . 4 2 - 4 4 ( '' S p i c i l eg i u m B o n a v e n t u r i a num , '' IV ; O r o t t a fe r r a t a , 1 9 7 1 ) , 294 - 3 0 6 . C f . P·e t e r C o m e s t o r on M a t t h e w 1 9 1 Hisioria S c h o l a s t i c a ( P L 1 98 , 1 5 8 8 ) : " P o t e, s t e n i m Del.ls

- 23 fac e r e , u t c a m e l u s t r a n s e a t p e r fo r a m e n a c u s , n u l l o o b ­ A v arum v e r o , q u i h i e n o m i n e d i v i t i s i n t e l l i g i ­ t a n te , !v ur , p o n e r e i n g l o r i a , s i p o t e s t d e p o t e n t i a , d e j u s t i. II t; i a n o n p o t e s t . 1 6 Aug u. s t i n e , De n a t u r a e t gra t i a , C • 7 , n . 8 ( PL 4 4 , 2 5 0 i CSE L 6 0 , 2 37 ) ; L o m b a r d , S e n t . I ' d i s t . 4 3 ( I ' 303) 1 7 Q u a e s t i o n e s i n e.2_i s to lam_ad_Roma n o s , q . 9 1 ( P L col . 457) : " Q u a e r i t ur a n D e u s p o t u i t fac ere 175, conven i e n t i orem modum r e d e m p t i o n i s ? S i d i c a t u r quod non p o t u i t , v i d e t u r quod p o t e n t i a D e i te r m i num h a b ea t , e t non s i t immensa ; s i d i ca t. u r quod p o tu i t , q u o m o d o i s t e convenien t i s s i mu s e s t ? Solutia : L i c e t i n hoc t e r m i n u m hab e a t , n o n t a m e n s i mp l i c i t e r c o n c e d e n d u m , q u o d t e r m i num V e l l i c e t i s t e modus n o s t rae m i s e r i a e s i t habea t . oonven i e n t i s s i mu s , n o n tamen e s t n e c e s s e , q u od s i t conv e n i e n t i s s i m u s a b s o l u t e . ''

1 8 G o d f r e y o f P o i t i e r s , Summa ( Av r a n c h e s , B i b l , d e 11 D i c o quod d e la v i l l e , Cod . l a t . 1 2 1 , f o l . 1 3 7 r : Quis enim auderet de p o tes t a t e a b s o l u t a p o t u i t e i d a re . p o t. e s t a t e e i u s e t imme n s i t a t e d i s p u t a r e ? Sect n o n p o t u i t d e po te-n t i a c o nd i t 1 o na l 1 , s c i l i c e t ma.nen t i bus d t:: c re t i s , quae i p s e c o ns t i t u i t . 11 I n A . L a n d g r a f , Dogmenge s c h i c h t e d e r F r u h s c h o l a s t i k , I I , 2 ( R egen s b u rg , 1 95 4 ) , p . 1 0 3 . 1 9 W i l l iam o f A u x e r re , Summa A u r e a ( Pa r i s , 1 50 0 ) , fol . 27 v : " A d p ri m o o b j e c tum d i c i lliu s , q u o d Deu s d e poten t i a p u r e c o n s i d e ra t a p o t e s t d a m n a re P e t r u m , e t h a b i t o r e s p e c tu ad p o t e n t i am D e i et p o t e n t i a m P e t r i n a t u r a l e m q u a p o t u i t pee c a re e t non pee c a r e . Sed n o n seq u i t u r : e r g o , p o t e s t d a m na r e P-e t r um , q u i a h o c v e r b u m ' p o t e s t ' i n c o n c l u s i o n e r e s p � c i t m e r i t a . 11 2O W i 1 1 i am o f A u v e r g n e ,

De t r i n i ta t e , c •

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-O m n i a , P a r i s , 1 6 74 ) , p . 1 4 . 21 L e i' p z i· g , U n i v e r s i t� t s b i b l i o t h e k , C od . l a t . 5 7 3 , fol. 223 r : " D i s t i ng u i tamen d e be t , q u o d d u p l e x e s t t e n t i a De i , a b s o l u t a e t o:r d i n a t a . De absoluta potent� i a p o t u i t D e u s e t p o t e s t a d h u c d a re p u r o h o m i n i P o t e s t a t em c o o p e r a t i o n i s . De potestate ordinata non t s t , i d e s t n o n m u t a t-0 o r d i n e r e r u m . Idem enim �� � no e s t p o t e n t i a a b s o l u t a D e i et o r d i n a t a . Sect :� P n t ia o r d i n a t a r e s p i c i t o r d i nem r e b u s a Deo i n d l t u m . 11 c�1 t e d fr om L a n d g ra f , Dog me ng e s c h i c h t e , I I I , 1 ( R e gen s -

- 2 IJ -

burg , 1 95 /J ) , 2 0 7 .

22 For Gue r r i c see P a r i s , B i b l . n ;:i t . l a t . 1 5 603 1 f o l . 1 1 r : 11 P o t e s t a t e a b s o l ut a p o t u i t d a r e , s e d n,.o n p o t. e s t a t e o r d i n at a , q u a e r e s p i c i t o r d i ne m rerum ; " c i t,e-d p. f r o m Landgra f , D ogmenge s c h i c h t e , III, l, 207, A l b e r t us Magnus, S e n t . I , d i s t . 4 2 , a. • 6 ( Opera o m n i. a , e d . A . Borgne t ) , V o l-,- XX V I ( Pa r i s , 1 8 9 3 ) , 3 6 2 - 36 6 ; d i s t . The Summa t b e ologia e , a t t r i b u t e q t- o 4 3 , pp. 377-380. A l b e r t and on w h i ch B o r c h e r t r e l i e d for h i s i n t e r ­ p r e t a t i o n of A l b e r t , i s o f d ou b t f u l a u t hen t i c i ty ; s e e A . S u m m a T h e o l o i a; e Hufnage l , "Zur E c h t h e i t s fr a g e der 1 A l b e r t s d e s Grossen , ' T h e o logische Qu a r t a l s c h r i f t , CXLV ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 8 - 3 9 , Summa H a l e n s i s , P t . I , inq . I , T r . 4 , q . 1 , m . 2 , c . 2 ( Qu a r a c c h i , 1 92 4 ) , I , 2 0 7 : "!amen c o m ­ p a r a n d o a b s o l u t e p o t e n t i a m v o l un ta t i , s i c p o t e n t i a i r:i p l u s e s t quam v o l un ta s ; se. c u nd u m v e ro q u o d i n t e l l i g i tur p o te n t i a o r d i na t a , q u a e q u i de m o r d i n a t i o i n t e l l i g i t u r i n r a t i o n e praeo r d i n a t i o n i s , c o a e q u a n t u r p o te o t i a e t v o l 4�­ tas. D i s t i n g u i t u r ergo p o t e n t i a a b s o l u t a [ a ] p o t e n t i a ordinata. P o t e n t i a a b s o l u t a e s t eorum q u o r u m non es-t d i v ina praeor d i na t i o ; p o t e n t i a v e r o o r d i n a t a est e o r u m q u o r u m e s t d i vi na p r a e o r d i na t i o , h o c e s t eorum q u a e a Deo s u n t p r a e o r d i n a t a s i v e d i s p o s i ta . '' C f . p p . 220-22 2 , 2 2 8 , 2 3 4 -2 3 5 , 23

Pet·er Dam i a n , D e d i v i na omnip o t e n t i a ( PL 1 4 5 , 619) : non inepte p o s sumus d ic e r e q u i a p o t- e s t D eu.s f a c e re , i n i l l a inva r i a b i l i e t c o n s t a n t i s sima s e m p e r. a e t e r n i t a t e s u a , u t q u o d f a c t u m f u e r a t apud h o c t r a n s i r e n o s t r u m , factum n o n s i t , s c i l i c e t ut d i camus : Roma, q u a e a n t i q u i t u s c o n d i t a e s t , po t e s t D e u s age J' e u t c o n d i t a n o n fue r i t . H o c q u o d d i c i mu s : p o t e s t , p r a e se n t i � v i d e l i c e t tempo r i s , c o ng r u e d i c i tur q u a n t u m p e r t i n e t a � immob i l e m Dei o m n i p o ten t. i s a e t e rn i t a t e m ; s e d q u a n tum a d n o s , ubi c o n t i nu a t a mob i l i t a s , e t p e r p e s e s t tra n s i t. u s , . . . . 11 ut d i c e r em u s mos est , p o t ui t con v en i e n t i u s ''P o t u i t s e c u n d um nos , p o t est s e c u n d um se . 11 11

2 IJ Su m ma Ha 1 e n s i s , P t . I , In q • I , T r . 4 , q • 1 , m • U ( I , 228 ) . The Summa H a l e n s i s i d e n t i fi e s pot e n t ia o r d i ­ nata w i t h t o t a l d iv ine p r e o r d i n a t i o n , p o s s i b l y in­ fluenc i ng usage in the second h a l f of t h e t h i r t e e n' t h century . I t a l s o e s t a b l i s h e d a t r e n d b y d e fi n i ng pot e n t i a a b s o l u t a n o t a s t h e r e a l m o f t o t a l p o s s i b i li ty out o f which God ch o s e but spec i f i c a l l y those thing s that h e d i d not choose.

- 25 2 5 A o.u m be r o f au t ho r s d i s t i n g u i s h e d two t y p e s o f rder or two c a tegories within the ordained order. � 1 ready i n t h e m i d - twe l f t h c e n t u r y C l a re m b a l d o f A r r a s argued that w h i l e m i r a c l e s s u s p e n d t h e " c o m m o n c o u r s e o f natu re , '' they a r e n o t " co n tra n a t u ra m , quae e s t v o l u n t a s D e i " ( T r a c t . super l ib r u m G e n e s i s i n N . H a r i n g , L i fe and works of C l a r e m b a l d o f A r ras ( To r o n t o , 1 9 65 ) , p . 2 3 9 . Thomas A q u i nas and P e t e r A u r e o l i d i s t i n g u i s h e d the nat u r a l o r d e r f r om t h e o r d e r o f j u s t i c e , w h i l e Duns sco tus d i s t i n g u i s h e d g e n e r a l d e c r e es from t h o s e th.at app l i ed to p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s . Thomas was we l l aware o f d i s t i n c t i on be tween the g e n e r a l w i l l o f God and t h e the I n question 1 9 , a . 7 , of the p r e s e n t o r d e r o f t h i ng s . f i r s t p a r t o f h i s Summa t h e o l ogiae T h o m a s a f f i rmed t h e unchanging n a t u r e o f t h e d i v ine w i l l d e s p i t e t h e changes in d i v i ne dec r e e s . L a t e r , i n a rt i c l e 6 o f q u e s t i o n 1 05 he c i ted A ug u s t i ne ' s d i s t i n c t i o n b e tween t h e common c o u r s e of na t u r e and t h e h i g h e r l a w of God ( C o n t r a f'au s t u m , c . 26 ) : 11 Deus c o n tra s o l i tum c u rs u m n a t u r a e fac i t ; s e d c o· n t r a s u m m a m l e gem n u l l o m o d o fac i t , q u i a F o r Thomas changes i n God ' s contra s e i p s u m n o n fao i t . 11 ordinances d o n o t r e p r e s e n t changes i n h i s w i l l : " Unde And yet cum p r a e t e r hunc o r d i n em a g i t , n o n m u t a t u r . " Thomas d i d not e m p l o y t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n in h i s ct � s c u s s i on o f d i v i n e p o w e r i n q u e s t i on 2 5 , and P e t e r o f Taran­ tasia ' s a t te m p t was l a r g e l y u n s u c c e s s f u l . A few w r i t e r s made t h i s d i s t i n c t ion in t h e c o n t e x t I n the · o f t h e i r d i s c u s s i ons o f d i v i n e o m n i p o t e n c e . c o u r s e o f a n e x t e n s i v e t r e a t m e n t .g i v e n to a b s o l u t e and ordained p.ower by F r a n-c i s May r onne s , S e n t . I , d i s t s . 4 3 - 1� 4 , q . 6 , h e noted that " po te n t i a o r d i n a t a p o t e s t d u p l i c i t e r ac c i p i : v e l quae a c t u a l i t e r e s t o r d i na t a , v e l quae a p t i t u d i n a l i t e r v e l p o s s i t e s s e o r d i n a t a . Licet eniro Deus non o r d i n a ve r i t q u o d r e v e l e t m i h i h o d i e inc arna t i o n e m , tamen p o s s et o p p o s i tum ordinare de poten t ia a b s o l u t a . Ergo Deus de po t e n t i a a b s o l u t a mu l ta P O te s t quae non p o t e s t de p o t e n t i a o r d i n a t a a c t u a l i t e r ; Sed tamen n i h i l p o t e s t n i s i q u o d p o t e s t de po t e n t i a P ie r r e ordinata v e l a c t u a l i t e r v e l a p t i t u d i na l i t e r . " d ' A i lly m a d e a s i m i l a r d is t i n c t i o n w i t h i n o r d a i ned Powe r ; Sen..t:_ I , q . 1 3 , a . 1 : 11 Sed Deum a l i q u i d p o s s e de P o t � n t i a o r d i n a t a p o t e s t dup l i c i t e r i n te l l i g i . Uno mode s t r i a t e , quod p o t e s t s t a n t e s u a o r d i na t i one q u a a e t e r ­ nal i t e r v o l u i t s e s i c ve l s i c e s s e fac t u r u m , et s i c f��um p o t e s t i l l a q u a e i p s e o r d i nav i t s e f a c t u r u m . .L O � mode po t e s t i n t e l l i g i m� g i s l a r�e , q u o d po t e s t _ _ s t a n � e v e r .1.. tate E t s ic l e g i s s e u s c r 1 p t u rae d 1 v 1 n a e .

- 26 p o s s i b i l e ordinate p o t e s t d i c i i l l u d quod e s t p o s s i b i l e e t n o n o b v i a t a l i c u i veri tat i l e g i s ord inatae v e l s c r i p� ... A l i q u i d es t impos s i b i l e de p o t e n t i a turae sacrae. For �h: e o r d i n a t a p r i m o m o d o et non s e c u n d o mod o . . . . " f u l l text see a r t i c l e XI 4 1 . As u n f o r t u n a t e as i t s e e m s in re t r o s p e ct , i t i. u n d e r s t a n d a b l e why that d is t i n c t i o n b e tween normal o r d er and s p e c i a l order was never f u l l y d e v e l o ped in t h e t h i � ­ teenth century. T h e ab solu. ta / o r d i n a t a d i s t i n c t i o n wa,s, d e s igned t o e s t a b l i s h nec e s s i t y o r con. t i n g e n c y by p r o v i ng i m p os s i bi l i ty or p o s s i b i l i t y . They were l e s s, c o n c e rned with the q u e s t i o n s o f whether God m i g h t ac,t; �, t tamen s i v e l le t , s i c expone e t h i e . V € l hoc non p o t e s t Papa s i n e causa , s e d e x magna e t Deo m a g i s p la c e n te hoc posset. A l i i tamen quam P a p a e c o n t ra iura s in� c a u s a d i s p en s a r e non l i c e t . quod s i p ra e s u m p s e r i t non S e ct e t ex c a·u sa v a l e t d i s p e n sa t i o , v e l r e v oc a t u r . . . . p o t e s t P a pa d i s p e n s a re c u m m o n a c h o , u t p r op r i um h a be.a t . Q u i d e n i m s i t o ta C h r i s t i a n i t a s , v e l e ti a m a l i q u a p a r s i p s i u s e s s e t i n p e r i c u l o , n i s i m o n a c h u s f i e r e t r e x.• lere virtutcm et dicuntur causa ct dicuntur efficerc secundum col\\n1uuc1n modum loquentll propter assistentiam divlnac vl·rtulis. 'Et si tu qu�eras, utn1111 habeanL virtutcm aliquam creatam super increatam, respon.dent,. quod praeter vlrtutem incrcatam est dicere aliquam virlulc111 habere s-acrnmentum, sed extenso nomine virtulis. Si enim vi.rtus dicat aliquam qualitatem vel naturam sive essen­ tlam advenientem sacramento, sicut virtus proprie dicilur, s)c secundum eos non est di· ccndu111, quod habeat virlulem, sed cxtendllt.ir nomen virtutis ad allquam ordlnationem. ut quando a.liquid habct efficacem ordinationem ad aliqu.id, dicilur habere virtutem re­ spectu illius. - Et p911unl hoc exemplluu: rcx statuit, ut qui habeol tale signum, habeant centum marcas. Post istam institutiOnem slgrrum illud non habet aliquam proprietatcm !lbsolutam, quam non lrnberet pl"ius; ad aliquid tamen est ordinatum, ad quod non erat prius. Et qula habct emcaccm ordinationcm, dicitur habere vh-t11t1>n1, ut Iaclat aliquem habei-e centum marcas, et tame.11 nihil plus habet de bonitate nunc. quam prius. . . . Sic di· cunt, cruod sacrarnentu s11nl Lalla slgna a Deo instltuta, ut qui ea susccperit debito modo hal,caL tanlum de gralia vel lrnbeat gratiam a d hunc actwn; ilia, inquam, ordinatio efflcax secunilu111 istos virtns est sacrame.nli, ct raLiono iUius dispouit homioem, ut habeat gratlam, qui.a cflicaciter ordinal ad habcndam ct susclp.lendam graiia.m.' Bonaventure gradually chang1:d from an uridecided position ln the Commentary on the r�urlti lJook of tho Sente11ccs to a more energetic support ot covenantal caus11lity in his Com,nenlary aculutn, episcopus per anulum, sic divisioncs gratiarum diversac sunt lradilac sacrn111cnl"is. ·· - Serl si quis recte. considrret, iste modus non lranscendil ratloncm signi. . . . Simllilcr lll>er est. quoddam signum quo dcsignatur traditio cano11icatus.' 73 A slightly differenl view and an curlier dating of this lrnnsformulio11 has L>e�n suggested by H. V./. Southc:rn, The 1Wakin9 of /he Middle Ages (London 1953).

THE K!NC ANO THF, l,EADE7' COTN

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l o 1250 through lhe restricti()n of inherenL virtue, be it natural or supcrnnlu­ ral. to Lhe markeL value of material ob,jects or to lhe spiritual (orce present wilhiu au ever-decn�asing 11umber of ecclesiaslicnl objects. For Bernard, as for earlier generalions. symbols qua symbols caused the ef[ecL of the action in which lhey were used. For Thomas, symbols qua symbols only declared or • symbolized• an action or t;ft'ect thal was achieved through other causes. The general intellectual shiJt of the early-thirteenth century of which Thomas wa� a proclucL, a shift from a world tlominated !}y tl1e mysterious and mirac­ ulous to a world ordered according lo natural arid divine laws, where most phenoml'.'na could be understood in terms uf cause and effect. made it all Lhc more difficult for Thomas and others like him to understand a causality hascd 011 ;)scribed value and coYcmant. In spite of the inno,,ations in credit in the world of the inei:chanl, I.he general view supported the idea of natural value. r n Thomas, lhc needs of a slrong, apologetic defense of sacramental efficacy, fused wilh earlier, less sophisticated ideas of commercial contract and curn'ncy Yalue (especially as reiliforced by his sludy of Aristotle), caused him lo support firs� the dispositive and then Lhe instrumental theory of sac.­ ramenlal causality. This js why Tho.mas dis111issed the example of the lead denarius }1s nothing more than occasio or per ar,:irlens causality, similar to lhl' causality whir'h Ll1e color of the builder would have with regard Lo Lhe building itself.7• Tn conduslon, lherdon•, iL can I.Ir sl'li(I Lhat sinr q1111 11011 causa1it.y had a rlif(erent meaning for 1nany in the thirteenth century than is uormally unde.r­ stood, a meaning taken from Llic realm of 1·oyal writs and commercial contracts alld applied to tlieology. Sine qua non did not imply ot:casionalism or acciclen1.ul cnusalily !iaYC for those who, like Thomas, failed to see Lhc effect.ive nature of con lrar.t and sign in 1 he commercial world. The conc11pl of covenant or pact stands behind the concept of sine qua non causality in theology, a causality resting on the good faith and recognized wea1th of a human king like St. Louis or, hi the case of the sacraments, 011 Lhe trustworthiness and beneficence of Goel. The [' n /ilersily o( \ VisroHsin ,\1,u/ison

The �trong Arislol�lilll\ character of Thoma�· alt.ack on covcna.nl,)I c�u.sallly is fpl'lhcr reflt'c;t�.cl in Thomas· utilization not onlv of Aristotle ·s distinct ion between per se and per servatio11s rur I'origi,u-. P.t l' 11sage des mereaux . . . (Saint-Omer, x834), also in Memoires de la socieie des antiquaires de la Morinie, IT (1834); Jules Rouyer, "Notes pour servir a l'etude des mereaux," Revue n11mism�tiq11e, XIV (1�49), 3 56-377; Hucher, "Mereaux de plomb," 338- 35o;Jules Rouyer, "Mc!reaux de la Samte Chapelle de Paris,'' Revue n11mismatiqu�. VII (t862), 481-497; idem., "Notes concemant des mereaux et d'autres pieces du m!me genre," ibid., IX (1864), 444-463;

/'

The social and economic signi£icance of these tokens has yet to be

ex2mined. It is this issue, especially as it concerns the origin and function

of charity tokens, that will be the subject of this paper. In particular, I wish to provide some tentative solutions to the following questions: What role did tokens play in the distribution of charity in the late medieval period? Did their use alter current conceptions of the act of charity, either in regard to the one giving or to the one receiving? What role did tokens play in the two most significant changes in the operation of charity in the late Middle Ages-the increasing centraliza­ tion and secularization of charitable institutions, and the attack on begging and vagrancy which presupposed and eventually popularized a distinction between the deserving and the undeserving poor? Finally, what was the impact of such tokens on the European economy? Apart from the tokens used in Ro1nan society (which seem to have had no influence upon the development of medieval tokens), the earliest medieval references to what were termed signt., merelli, marelli, or in French, mereaux, occur in the second half of the twelfth century.8 These tokens had no ascribed value, nor were they passed from one person to another in repeated transactions. They remained in the possession of the persons to whom they were originally given, and each token attested to the fact that the bearer possessed a certain privilege or had already met a required payment. For example, the seal or sign of office, which was carried and displayed by a wine seller to indicate that he had ·official permission to sell wine in the town, was called a token. 9 Similarly, the receipt given to acknowledge that a toll had been paid was also termed a sign or mereau. 10 In no case until the middle of the thirteenth century Forgeais, Collection de plombs (1864; 3rd ser.); Adrien Blanchet nnd Adolphe Dieudonne, Mamie/ de 11umisma1iquefrat1faise (Paris, r930}, III, 511--520. 8 Examples ofmedieval token coinage issued before the middle of the twelfth century have been reported, but they are not well ·documented. For example, siege money, or obsidional money, a form of credit money or substitute currency used in emergencies, has been attributed to the Byzantine ernpeFor Constantine V Kopronymous in 743 and to the Venetian Doge, Domenico Michieli, in t 122. Both of these examples were issues of lc.ither currency which, even if true, may have been pierced with a nail ofpreciou.s n1etal to give them value, as was done later. These pieces were not necessarily tokens ofascribed value. Cf. William Charlton, ''Leather Currency," British Numismatic Joumal �id Pro­ ceedings efthe British Numismatic S()ciety, IIT (r906), J II-328; Paul Einzig. Primitive Money in its Ellmological, Historical and Eco110111ic Aspects (London, 1949). 9 See charters of u67 and n73 from William, Count ofNevers, in Charles DuCange, Clossari11m mediae et in.fimae lati11itatis (Paris, 1845), rv, 364-365. 10 E.g., at Cologne in 1204 (Rouycr, "Notes pour servir 11 J'etu totally in the hands oi his adversaries, Mirecourt wrote a Jong cldcnse, replying to each suspect proposition ln turn, indicating where the exam:iners misquoted or misinterpreted his thought or intention. This apology wru; then sent to an official whose opinion would ultimately carry considerable weight in any inquisito­

ri;:il proceeding, Pastor of ·Serrescuderio, O.F.lVl., Archbishop of Embrun, who was the papal legate in France in 1347 8 • Mirecourt's counterattack was not without effect. A considerable number of the suspect propositicms were dropped and ne,·ru· appeared among the list of condemned propositions. A condemnation did, however, take place in 1347 t11rough the authority of Robert de Bardis 9, chancellor of the University, acting, so it seems. ·with the approval of a majority of the theological faculty. Mirccourt recanted but also authored a :,econd, shorter defense in which he tried to show that even the reduced list of 41 propositions that were finally condemned, some of them new and not to be found among the original 63. could be understood in a Itarmless sem,e. and he examin­ ed each one in turn. !Ylirecourt's defense must have been more successful than historians have led us to believe. His work was not burned nor destroyed ; rather it has survived in a surprisingly large number of manuscripts, scattered all across Europe Jo_ Mire.court's request to J1ave J1is " apo-

Lectura of Mirccourt, which includ€s the positions of Mirecourt and his opponent, John the Korman . 8. Sine� we do not know exactly when l\Iirccourt wrote to Pastor, .it is not clear whether the latter was already papal Legate. nie purpose o,f J\'lireco11rt's maneuver, however, was to enlist in:lucntial support, and the dedication to Pastor, thologians must, hQwever, be solved through a comparison or thu co11tcnt o( thei r writings. Ir · CUP 11, 505, No. 1041. ,\lost of those listed in this $ummons were, like !\utrC'COurt, ,eculars : Hclias de Corso, Guido de Vccli, and Petrus de 1\1ontcrc­ gab. Apart fro.m Henry, thO>"�es in ipso sturlio :Sine liccn tia sedis apostolice spetiati ; tamen tu postmodum opinioncs bujusmodi totaliter desc-

230

Richard and John are mentioned in the same document they are in no way associated ; in fact, the document in question was Clement's solution to the confusion occa:;iom:eginniug poil1t for solving that issue. On a hurried count, I discovered the phrase " sine assertione " or its equivalent as a pre­ cautionary phrase introducing the conclusions in only five of the first thirty-nine ques�ions of b()ok I. Moreover, 1 noted that the only two questions in book IV are not qualified in this manner. 53. Sent. I , q . 39 (E 5-zv, L r2ov, P 155v, R IOI"} : • Primo sciendum quod dupliciter dicitur aliquitl ' ncccssariu.m '. Uno modo simpliciter, quod smnper Iuit necessari um, scmper ,'rit. Alio modo per accidens, quod non sempcr !uit neccssa­ rium, sed est n