Climate and Social Justice: The Political Economy of Urban Resilience and Mercantilism (Urban Sustainability) 981996623X, 9789819966233

Table of contents :
About This Book
Contents
Prologue
About the Authors
1 On Capitalism, Cities, and Culture in the Colonial Era
1.1 Introduction
1.2 On Marx and Colonialism
1.3 Colonialism and the Political Economic Landscape
1.4 The Role of Cultural Tools for Power
1.5 The Relationship Between Colonial Cities and the Empire
References
2 The Economic Landscape of Cities and Climate Change
2.1 Introduction
2.2 From Industrialisation to the Service Industry
2.3 Cities and Climate Change
2.3.1 Climate Change and the Urban Economy
2.4 The Need for Revised Models
2.5 Conclusion
References
3 Urban Consumerism and Colonial Structures of Mercantilism
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Coastal Cities and Colonialism
3.3 Military, Trade, and Mercantilism
3.4 Ports as Nodes of Diversity
3.5 Post-colonialism and Economic Injustice
3.6 Conclusion
References
4 Crafting and Transforming Colonial Empires and Landscapes
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Re-defining Hierarchies of Power
4.3 Introducing the Geopolitical Culture of Mass Consumption
4.4 Cementing Cultural Homogeneity in Colonial Empires
4.5 The Economic Tragedy of Cultural Loss, as Reported Two Centuries Later
References
5 Redefining Climate Policy and Economic Resilience in the Consuming World
5.1 Introduction
5.2 On Cities and Political Leadership for Climate Change Mitigation
5.3 Consumerism and Climate Change
5.4 Climate Change Financing
5.4.1 The Unsustainability of Climate Change Debt Financing
5.5 Climate Change Emissions Trading Mechanisms
5.6 Smart Contracts Through the Blockchain
5.7 A Proposed Alternative Model
5.7.1 Regional Decarbonisation
5.7.2 Reframing Emissions Trading Schemes
5.7.3 Smart Contracts
5.7.4 Blockchain
5.7.5 Artificial Intelligence
5.8 Conclusion
References
6 Climate and Social Justice in the Political Landscape of Urban Resilience and Mercantilism: A Concluding Note
6.1 A Concluding Note
6.2 Further Discussions for Future Research
6.3 A Summary
References
Index

Citation preview

Urban Sustainability

Zaheer Allam Ali Cheshmehzangi David S. Jones

Climate and Social Justice The Political Economy of Urban Resilience and Mercantilism

Urban Sustainability Editor-in-Chief Ali Cheshmehzangi , Qingdao City University, Qingdao, Shandong, China

The Urban Sustainability Book Series is a valuable resource for sustainability and urban-related education and research. It offers an inter-disciplinary platform covering all four areas of practice, policy, education, research, and their nexus. The publications in this series are related to critical areas of sustainability, urban studies, planning, and urban geography. This book series aims to put together cutting-edge research findings linked to the overarching field of urban sustainability. The scope and nature of the topic are broad and interdisciplinary and bring together various associated disciplines from sustainable development, environmental sciences, urbanism, etc. With many advanced research findings in the field, there is a need to put together various discussions and contributions on specific sustainability fields, covering a good range of topics on sustainable development, sustainable urbanism, and urban sustainability. Despite the broad range of issues, we note the importance of practical and policyoriented directions, extending the literature and directions and pathways towards achieving urban sustainability. The series will appeal to urbanists, geographers, planners, engineers, architects, governmental authorities, policymakers, researchers of all levels, and to all of those interested in a wide-ranging overview of urban sustainability and its associated fields. The series includes monographs and edited volumes, covering a range of topics under the urban sustainability topic, which can also be used for teaching materials.

Zaheer Allam · Ali Cheshmehzangi · David S. Jones

Climate and Social Justice The Political Economy of Urban Resilience and Mercantilism

Zaheer Allam Curtin University Moka, Mauritius

Ali Cheshmehzangi Qingdao City University Qingdao, Shandong, China

David S. Jones Cities and Research Institute Griffith University Nathan, QLD, Australia

ISSN 2731-6483 ISSN 2731-6491 (electronic) Urban Sustainability ISBN 978-981-99-6623-3 ISBN 978-981-99-6624-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6624-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Paper in this product is recyclable.

We collectively dedicate this book to all those diligent and selfless climate and social justice activists around the globe.

About This Book

Climate and Social Justice offers a fresh perspective on the historical, economic, and cultural foundations of capitalism, cities, and climate change. By exploring the intersection of urbanization, consumerism, and colonialism, the book sheds new light on the origins and development of the economic system that has shaped our world today. What sets this book apart is its unique approach, which challenges conventional wisdom and offers new insights into the complex relationships between culture, politics, and economics. The book is intended for readers interested in the history and evolution of capitalism and its impact on society, as well as those interested in climate change and urbanization. The content level is accessible for general readers, yet sophisticated enough to appeal to scholars and researchers. The two most important features of the book are its fresh perspective on the history of mercantilism and its examination of the economic landscape of cities and climate change. By reading this book, readers will gain a deeper understanding of the complex relationships between urbanization, colonialism, and economic policies and their impact on contemporary society.

vii

Contents

1 On Capitalism, Cities, and Culture in the Colonial Era . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 On Marx and Colonialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Colonialism and the Political Economic Landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 The Role of Cultural Tools for Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 The Relationship Between Colonial Cities and the Empire . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 1 5 8 11 13 20

2 The Economic Landscape of Cities and Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 From Industrialisation to the Service Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Cities and Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 Climate Change and the Urban Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 The Need for Revised Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25 25 28 30 32 34 37 37

3 Urban Consumerism and Colonial Structures of Mercantilism . . . . . . 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Coastal Cities and Colonialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Military, Trade, and Mercantilism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Ports as Nodes of Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Post-colonialism and Economic Injustice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43 43 45 48 50 53 56 56

4 Crafting and Transforming Colonial Empires and Landscapes . . . . . 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Re-defining Hierarchies of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Introducing the Geopolitical Culture of Mass Consumption . . . . . . .

61 61 63 65

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4.4 Cementing Cultural Homogeneity in Colonial Empires . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 The Economic Tragedy of Cultural Loss, as Reported Two Centuries Later . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Redefining Climate Policy and Economic Resilience in the Consuming World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 On Cities and Political Leadership for Climate Change Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Consumerism and Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Climate Change Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1 The Unsustainability of Climate Change Debt Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Climate Change Emissions Trading Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 Smart Contracts Through the Blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 A Proposed Alternative Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7.1 Regional Decarbonisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7.2 Reframing Emissions Trading Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7.3 Smart Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7.4 Blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7.5 Artificial Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Climate and Social Justice in the Political Landscape of Urban Resilience and Mercantilism: A Concluding Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 A Concluding Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Further Discussions for Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 A Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

68 70 73 77 77 79 81 83 84 87 89 91 92 93 94 94 95 96 96 103 103 106 108 109

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Prologue

There is a tendency in the public debate on climate change to present the use and development of green technologies as a miracle solution or panacea. We often forget one aspect: it is crucial to ensure that their development goes hand in hand with social justice. “The realization that it is not just global warming that we are dealing with, but global warming in an unequal and unjust world, has yet to sink in”. Without equality and equity—in other words, without peace and security—we cannot effectively fight climate change. —Thiagarajan Jayaraman, Indian Academic who focuses on climate change and climate justice research, Interviewed by Shiraz Sidhva, at: The UNESCO Courier, Many Voices, One World (Available at: https://en.unesco.org/courier/2019-3/climateand-social-justice)

The nexus between social justice and climate change should be embedded in our actions to achieve sustainable development. Developing human capabilities and capacities is incredibly important in achieving best practices to combat climate change impacts on our natural habitats and human settlements. Social inequity, inequalities, and injustice must be considered more carefully than following the by-default top-down decision-making processes. Hence, social justice needs to be part of the equation in how green transformations and transitions could occur, how sustainability can be truly achieved, and how we can learn from one another in attaining human-centric social infrastructures. Climate action and climate justice must develop side-by-side and hand-in-hand in support of developing and promoting better climate-related policies, guidelines, and action plans. It has been proven that regardless of the many advanced technologies, equality and social justice remain prominently important in developing climate action plans. Reversing some of the trends of recent decades may seem impossible, but bringing people back to the core of taking action against climate change impacts

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remains the backbone of achieving sustainable development. Thus, it is evident that in almost all Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), people are the central point of making and achieving the actual change. To ensure social equity and social justice, we ought to bring people back as the cure to what could occur now and in the future. Only in this way, we may be able to reverse some of the recent development trends and make a difference. To address the above overarching issues, this book offers a fresh perspective on the historical, economic, and cultural foundations of capitalism, cities, and climate change. By exploring the intersection of urbanization, consumerism, and colonialism, the book sheds new light on the origins and development of the economic system that has shaped our world today. What sets this book apart is its unique approach, which challenges conventional wisdom and offers new insights into the complex relationships between culture, politics, and economics. The book is intended for readers interested in the history and evolution of capitalism and its impact on society, as well as those interested in climate change and urbanization. The content level is accessible for general readers yet sophisticated enough to appeal to scholars and researchers. The two most important features of the book are its fresh perspective on the history of mercantilism and its examination of the economic landscape of cities and climate change. This book will give readers a deeper understanding of the complex relationships between urbanization, colonialism, and economic policies and their impact on contemporary society. April–June 2023

Zaheer Allam Ali Cheshmehzangi David S. Jones

Acknowledgements We collectively acknowledge our external collaborators and support teams. Ali Cheshmehzangi acknowledges the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT), the Japanese Government, and Hiroshima University, Japan.

About the Authors

Zaheer Allam holds a Ph.D. in Humanities, a Master of Arts (Res), an MBA, and a Bachelor of Applied Science in Architectural Science from universities in Australia and the UK. Based in Mauritius, he is the chairperson of the National Youth Environment Council (NYEC) and a board member of the Mauritius Renewable Energy Agency (MARENA) and works on a number of projects on the thematic of Smart Cities and on strategies dwelling in the increasing role of technology in Culture and the Society. Zaheer is also the African representative of the International Society of Biourbanism (ISB), a member of the Advisory Circle of the International Federation of Landscape Architects (IFLA), and a member of a number of other international bodies. An honorary fellow at Deakin University (Australia), he holds a number of awards and commendations, including an elevation, by the President of Mauritius, to the rank of Officer of the Order of the Star and Key of the Indian Ocean, the highest distinct order of merit in Mauritius. He is the author of over 115 peer-reviewed publications and author of 8 books on the subject of Smart, Sustainable, and Future Cities. Ali Cheshmehzangi is the world’s top 2% field leader, recognized by Stanford University. He is an urbanist and an urban designer by profession and by heart. He studies cities and city transitions, sustainable urbanism, and integrated urban design strategies. He has recently taken a senior leadership and management role at Qingdao City University (QCU). He is the professor of Urban Planning, the director of the Center for Innovation in Teaching, Learning, and Research, and the advisor to the department’s international communications at QCU. Over 11 years at his previous institute, Ali was a full professor in Architecture and Urban Design, the head of the Department of Architecture and Built Environment, the founding director of the Urban Innovation Lab, the director of Center for Sustainable Energy Technologies, the interim head of Research Group for Sustainable Built Environment, and the director of Digital Design Lab. He was a visiting professor and now a research associate of the Network for Education and Research on Peace and Sustainability (NERPS), Hiroshima University, Japan. So far, Ali has published over 300 journal papers, articles, conference papers, book chapters, and reports. His other 15 books are xiii

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titled Smart-Eco Cities in China: Trends and City Profiles 2016 (2016), Designing Cooler Cities (2017), the award-winning Eco-development in China (2018), Sustainable Urban Development in the Age of Climate Change (2019), Identity of Cities and City of Identities (2020), the double award-winning The City in Need (2020), Urban Memory in City Transitions (2021), Sustainable Urbanism in China (2021), China’s Sustainability Transitions (2021), Urban Health, Sustainability, and Peace in the Day the World Stopped (2021), Green Infrastructure in Chinese Cities (2022), ICT, Cities, and Reaching Positive Peace (2022), China’s City Cluster Development in the Race to Carbon Neutrality (2022), Mapping Urban Regeneration (2023), and Climate Change and Cooling Cities (2023). Ali is globally known for his research on “urban sustainability”. David S. Jones is a professor (Research) at the Indigenous Studies Research Centre at Monash University, an adjunct professor in the Faculty of Art and Design at the University of Canberra, an adjunct associate professor at the Cities Research Institute at Griffith University, and was the foundation professor of Planning and Landscape Architecture at Deakin University, before more recently oversighting strategic planning and urban design for the Wadawurrung Traditional Owners Aboriginal Corporation. With academic and professional qualifications, he has taught, researched, and published extensively across urban planning, landscape architecture, cultural heritage, and Indigenous Knowledge Systems in the past 35 years. He has coauthored the Victoria Square/Tarntanyangga Regeneration Project (2017); authored the Adelaide Park Lands and Squares Cultural Landscape Assessment Study (2007); co-authored Learning Country in Landscape Architecture Indigenous Knowledge Systems, Respect and Appreciation (2021); co-authored North Gardens Indigenous Sculpture Landscape Master Plan (2019), Geelong’s Changing Landscape (2019), and Re-casting Terra Nullius Blindness (2017); and co-authored chapters in the Routledge Handbook to Landscape and Food (2018), The Handbook of Contemporary Indigenous Architecture (2018), Routledge Handbook on Historic Urban Landscapes of the Asia-Pacific (2020), and Routledge Handbook of Cultural Landscapes in the Asia-Pacific (2022).

Chapter 1

On Capitalism, Cities, and Culture in the Colonial Era

Abstract The need for increasing the number of financial resources to sustain local economies has forged new international political-economic landscapes. Redefining in the same vein, the colonial dynasty that re-distributed pre-colonialisation wealth has benefited mainly European countries, leaving others impoverished and economically raped. This rise of capitalism fuelled a thirst for power that led to inhumane, unfair, and unjust strategies by colonial empires and their corporate entities, leaving conquered countries in a state of profound social and economic fragmentation. Further to this, colonialists imposed foreign influences—such as religion/s, culture/ s, and language—to these places to help aid their political (and assimilation) ambitions. Their objective through these tools was economic/cultural/racial assimilation and control, believing that such enabled cohesive communication and the easier establishment of new hierarchies of power. To this end, colonial powers established new cities to maintain nodes of power and (re)structured local and regional economy of regions. Keywords Architecture · Cities · Colonialism · Corporatism · Mercantilism · Capitalism · Slavery · Political economy

1.1 Introduction Colonialism is arguably the most prominent historical happening in recent times, whose impacts have had far reaching consequences upon the modern world. Depending on the side of the ‘fence’ that one sits, colonialism fuels contemporary debates of negative and positive narratives and values and histories. But its role clearly influenced major social, economic, environmental and political shifts and value-dimensions, well beyond historical/contemporary geographical boundaries, is not disputed. As is described in this book, a majority of countries and economies that, in one way or the other were under colonial rule have seen their government structures, cultural heritage and languages and education systems, amongst many others, heavily influenced by their colonial masters; also known as ‘colonialists’, which

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 Z. Allam et al., Climate and Social Justice, Urban Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6624-0_1

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1 On Capitalism, Cities, and Culture in the Colonial Era

seems to be a more acceptable English term.1 Often the colonized were First Nations People’s2 or peoples who had generationally been ‘colonised’ by pre-1700s act of internal cultural empire building activities linked to comparable military, economic and trade imperatives as commonplace in many areas of Africa, India and Asia. It is noted that at the height of the colonial era, most of the world’s economies were being controlled by a handful of countries.3 The latter had both the military, financial and economic power to subdue others that were still finding their footings (Findlay & O’Rourke, 2007). In particular, they were controlled by the British, the Spanish, the French and the Dutch empires amongst others. These empires, and their corporate entities (e.g. the (British) East India Company (1600–1874); the Australian Agricultural Company (1824–), the Verenigde Nederlandsche Geoctroyeerde Oostindische Compagnie (United East India Company) (1602–1799); the Royal African Company (formerly Company of Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa) (1660–1752) (Conn et al., 2023); the Emden Company or officially the Royal Prussian Asiatic Company in Emden to Canton and China (Königlich Preußische Asiatische Compagnie in Emden nach Canton und China) (1752–1765); the French East India Company (Compagnie française pour le commerce des Indes orientales) (1664–1794); the British South Africa Company (the successor to the Cecil Rhodes’ Central Search Association and the Exploring Company Ltd) (1889– 1965); the Ostend Company or officially the General Company Established in the Austrian Netherlands for Commerce and Navigation in the Indies (Compagnie générale établie dans les Pays-Bas Autrichiens pour le Commerce et la Navigation aux Indes) (1722–1731); the Company of One Hundred Associates (Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France) (1627–1663)); were in constant competition for the control of as many countries as possible, to allow them to amass more spatial and (financial/ botanical) economic resources, increase their military, maritime and commercial control base, rid their country of undesirable humans or to entertain a human trade system, and also increase the source of raw materials to service their home country’s industrialisation. Control of colonies also gave these empires ready markets for surplus goods that were produced as well as other economic benefits that they sought to accrue. The appetite for more power and control drove these empires and their corporate entities to continue tirelessly in their pursuit of new protectorates, fiefdoms and colonies. For example, by the time colonial era came to an end, the British Empire, which is taunted as one of the greatest global colonial system of the time, had direct control of near-all of the world countries; with the exception of only 22 of them (Lloyd, 1996). 1 Or, Colon in French; Kolonist in German; Kolonist in Dutch; 殖民者 in Chinese; kolonict in Russian; Colono in Portuguese; Colona/Colono in Spanish; Colona/Colono in Italian; 入植者in Japanese; being the languages of the main actors in these colonisation ventures. 2 For the purpose of this book, we use the term ‘First Nations People’ to describe the Indigenous Peoples of a landscape that exist pre-European colonisation. 3 Please note that the term ‘countries’ is used in a generic context as the authors recognise that colonisers re-wrote and re-mapped landscapes in their eyes and to suite their economic/military efficiencies, thereby erasing/amalgamating/changing long-held pre-colonialisation ‘country’ boundaries.

1.1 Introduction

3

The British Empire had an 88% world dominance rate with over 171 countries under its Crown and its government. The French Empire, which was the second-most dominant colonial force, controlling colonies that extended to over 1,289,814,078 ha and a population of more than 110 million people (Kiprop, 2019), also had its eyes on numerous countries. In Africa, they governed over 20 countries, especially those on the northern and western parts of the continent, and also several in central Africa. Conquering these colonies was the subject of colonisation excitement and was captured and romanticized in acclaimed popular writings. But the processes that the colonisers used to gain control of these countries is what leaves little to be desired. From an economic growth and development point of view, one may find some accrued benefits of colonization, but, on a larger scale, there is much to condemn (Fieldhouse, 1983; O’Brien, 1988; Tharoor, 2017). When examining India, Tharoor (2017) has written: Company official John Sullivan observed in the 1840s: The little court disappears—the capital decays—trade languishes—the capital decays—the people are impoverished—the Englishman flourishes, and acts like a sponge, drawing up riches from the banks of the Ganges, and squeezing them down upon the banks of the Thames.

Disguised was the unnecessary force imposed by the military, biological/medical and economic conscious and unconscious acts of cruelty and inhumane policies that were subjected upon colonies and their citizens. On this, there is an increasing library of literature from varying geographical contexts and discipline perspectives documenting the massive killings and atrocities that most countries experienced as these newfound colonies were forced to surrender their resources, disintegrate generations of self-rule and governance regimes and to change long-held systems of culture and humanity (Bloxham & Moses, 2010; Finaldi, 2019; Thomas, 2019). Such actions also appear to have a negative consequence upon climate change (Cheshmehzangi & Dawodu, 2019a, 2019b) wherein it is now reported that, due to the massive number of people that the merciless European colonizers killed -amounting to approximately 56 million people in America in 1600 AD, and the landscapes that were effectively defoliated, there was a notable drop in global temperatures by approximately 0.15°c (Blom, 2019; Pruitt, 2019). The fascinating research in support of such a claim highlights that the massive human killings left most parts of the globe untended and long held management regimes disintegrated; hence, the global surface was overgrown by all types of vegetation (e.g., in Australia, see: Gammage, 2011; Jones, 1969). This vegetation has been concluded as soaking up massive amounts of carbon dioxide (Milman, 2019), thus causing the cooling effect (Cheshmehzangi & Butters, 2017; Cheshmehzangi & Dawodu, 2020). Despite causing so much human and animal pain and suffering, these colonialists also strategically applied power-relational approaches to befriend locals. Especially prevalent in Africa, India and South-East Asia was the tactical manipulation of local leaders enabling their retention of power under surrogate ‘protectorates’ thereby establishing new hierarchies of powers (Bala, 2016; O’Femi, 2016). Such also enabled the permeation of a colonial religion to local peoples as a controlling philosophy, as it has often been argued, religion is an opium of masses.

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This meant that after accepting the new religion, the colonialists would slowly introduce their own laws and rules as people would be hesitant to question, as the role of religion and power were intricately linked at this time (Miller, 2011). Therefore, as epitomized in the motto of the British Empire the agenda ‘For God and the Empire’ placed ‘God’ first. Locals rapidly accepted this new form of worship and were deceitfully controlled. In addition to religion, the colonialists imposed their own education system, more so to ensure the locals adopted the foreigners’ language. Thus, supposedly improving internal-colony communication but indirectly the control of knowledge (Abrokwaa, 2018). Surprisingly, instead of the colonialists, of which few learnt the local dialects, it was the colonisers who forced the locals to learn new languages (Monteh, 2018). This tactic of introducing religion and language allowed colonialists to penetrate far and deep into their newly controlled or aspirationally controlled territories, and before long, they had gained control not only of the locals but also of entire regions (Nunn, 2010). These conscious and unconscious strategically and deceitfully policies promulgated major cultural and hierarchical changes enabling easy seizure of resources and the general populace. For those who opposed their rule, religion or ways of life, became the victims of atrocities (e.g. in Australia see: Clark, 1995; Perkins & Langton, 2008). This was a practice that further allowed colonialists to ensure civil obedience and control. As they penetrated inland and established their ‘own ways’ upon new territories, colonialists often established new cities (or reinvented pre-colonisation key marketplaces) that served as their control points. With such outposts, especially as river and or sea-ports, they could better control the flow of resources and products in and out towards their colonial homeland. These new centres of control, and later the tentacles of railway systems, aided in the control and exploitation of resources and wealth (Vego, 2003). Most cities, which were predominantly located on coastal strips also allowed colonialists to militarily and economically link their controlling oversights with other colonies they controlled, and also with traders from far and beyond, who offered market places for the colonialist’s products, and who also supplied new products that were in demand in the home countries of the colonialists (Lee & Lee, 1998). On this, as much as these cities set the pace for these colonized countries to experience some level of modernity (or ‘civilization’), especially in terms of infrastructural development and increased economic activities, such cities were visibly skewed in favour of the military and or economic interests and societal and or religious values of the colonialists. In fact, even though mainstream governance colonialism was disintegrated, it has been argued that such places aided economic and social inequality that still persist today the modern world (Angeles, 2007). Additionally, such cities are now more often subject to indiscriminate subtle international corporate, banking, communication systems, economic ‘colonialism’. As will be discussed in the next section, the economic and political establishments and practices that the colonialists adhered to set the motion for the rise of social classes and unbalanced regional growth (Acemo˘glu & Robinson, 2019) amongst other forms of inequalities.

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1.2 On Marx and Colonialism Karl Marx’s ideas have often been used by political leaders in search of power and to create political landscapes that allow dictatorship regimes. Despite this, one should be wary of quickly completely discrediting his ideas as his critique of capitalism leads to interesting avenues for evaluating our past societal models and even our current ones. In particular, Marx’s ideas on how the rich, whom he commonly referred to as the ‘bourgeoisie’, treated the poor or the working class (the proletariat), and continued to do so. According to Marx, the rich were the owners of ‘capital’, which when placed in the context of this book could refer to ownership of land, buildings, transportation means, and power which the colonialists yielded and enjoined in pomp and pride, while the proletariat equates to labour. Marx views the relationship between these two groups as one crowded by insincerity as the bourgeoisie was seen to take advantage of the proletariat by paying them meagre wages, and making them work for unjust hours while keeping all the profit. In his text, ‘Communist Manifesto’, Marx argues that the capitalists vest their success on both the working class and the earth’s raw materials (Marx & Engels, 1848). As Marx and Engels stated in political pamphlet text: “A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of communism” and ends by stating, “The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen of all countries, unite.” Therefore, to maximize their earnings and even yield more power, Marx argues that the bourgeoisie social group is seen to pressure workers to their physical and mental limits so as to exploit as much output from them as possible (Hollander, 2008). Further, the bourgeoisie also sought to maximize the exploitation of raw materials of the earth to meet the ever-increasing demand. These imperatives were executed with little regard for humanity or sustainability (Mattick, 2012). Despite this negative overtone, Marx viewed capitalists as the ones who ensured that the world’s systems ran smoothly, and were devoid of such negatives like hunger, diseases and housing amongst others (Moller et al., 2003). Their emphasis on increased production led to massive innovation, technological advancements and improvements in different sectors (Evangelista, 2017). But, while pushing for their demands to be met, this capitalism led to massive issues including increased pollution, social conflicts, widening of the economic gap (especially the one that exists between the rich and the poor), over exploitation of the world’s resources, increases in waste generation and climate changes amongst many other challenges (Butters et al., 2020; Cheshmehzangi & Butters, 2015; Cheshmehzangi et al., 2021; GarcíaOlivares & Solé, 2015; Kotz, 2009; Newell, 2011). According to Marx’s analysis, the aspirations of the capitalists, at a greater breath only lead to undermining their own source of wealth and power—the earth and the workers (Elliott, 1978; Marx, 1973). These descriptions mirror the operations, thinking and philosophy of colonialism, demonstrating a clear link and comparison between bourgeoisie-driven capitalism and the act and processes of colonialism. As noted in the previous section, colonialists thrived on exploitation of resources, especially those that were in high demand in their home countries. They also thrived

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on the exploitation of available (or imported slave) labour. It has been seen that in most cases, they preferred to employ the services of slaves whom they would treat as commodities devoid of life, as mere tools and goods. This ownership regime enabled them to pay them nothing, feed them on poor diets and expose them to myriads of social evils (Makambe, 1994). While implementing this policy, capitalists still expected slaves to maximize their productivity. In instances where slavery was not applicable, they forced workers or penal convicts to work for extremely cheap wages and very poor working conditions. For example, in Mauritius in 1834, through what was called ‘The Great Experiment’ (UNESCO, 2006), the colonialists were seen to advance their capitalists interest by engaging workers into an indentured labour system that was advertised as allowing them to earn a ‘free’ labour pass to the new colony. Between 1834 and 1920, almost half a million indentured labourers arrived from India at Aapravasi Ghat to work in the sugar plantations of Mauritius, or to be transferred to Réunion Island, Australia, southern and eastern Africa or the Caribbean. This exemplar depicts the heights the colonialists, and their colonial empire government regimes, were willing indulge in to ensure that they maximized their profitability at the expense of the workers. Further, this form of recruitment ‘experiment’, majorly practiced by British colonialists, became attractive to other nonBritish colonialists, all craving to increase their productivity at the expense of free labour (Northrup, 1995). The use of capitalism is credited for massive wealth generation and redistributions away from monarchies, whom, from historical traditions were not obliged to work, but demanded to be regularly supplied with the best of the land, goods and a royalty cut in taxes. Marx voiced against such establishments since they, since time immemorial have been used to negate and stifle democracy. He therefore envisaged that socialism would see the workers justly compensated for their handiwork. The same trend of having a clique of people claiming to be ‘ordained by the gods’ led to a sense of superiority in colonialisms exploitation, dispossession, massacre, persecution and robbery of First Nations People’s. According to monarchs, the profits and gains they quietly obtained from these capitalistic approaches was largely due to their ingenuity in oversighting and controlling the governance structures that supported and enabled capitalism and colonialism, thereby demonstrating subtle political and economic mastery (Lu, 2018). But according to Marx, this was outright theft. Marx correctly argued that colonialists only used their political and economic powers to exploit, enslave and take away the livelihood and resources of imported/enslaved labour to the detriment of local communities and negated reinvesting this gain into local communities less in the governance and physical infrastructure to perpetuate continued human and resource exploitation to their advantage. Despite the birth and spread of capitalism, especially when Marx was alive (1818– 1883), he was confident that in the fullness of time, capitalism would eventually be replaced by socialism. In Das Kapital (1867–1894) Marx observed that capitalism is unstable, and that it usually varies according to periodical crisis. Further, that capitalism is interestingly controlled by the market and its imperative is service the profits of corporations that managed to assert their tangible or intangible political

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powers over others (Marx & Engels, 1848). On this, Marx argued that when the proletariat got tired or angry with the bourgeoisie, they would overthrow them through social or economic revolutions. Such echoes the preceding French Revolution that took place between 1789 and 1799, leading to the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte to the detriment of the monarchy and French royalty. However, this Revolution was not a single event but a series of radical societal and political change developments. True to this prophecy, this was the fate of many colonial empires and their respective new ‘colonies’, ‘protectorates’ or ‘territories’. When these governance entities got tired or frustrated with the torture, killings, enslavement and over-exploitation of their resources, they waged war on the colonialists. For example, the rebellion of miners at Eureka Stockade in Ballarat, Australia, in 1854, in response to mineral licence exploitation and a cruel miliary oversight and policing regime at this goldfield, is a key event in the development of Australia’s representational structures and attitudes towards democracy and egalitarianism. Another example is the ‘American Revolutionary War’ (1775–1783), also known as the ‘Revolutionary War’ or the ‘American War of Independence’, that was the military conflict in which American Patriot defeated the British, establishing and securing the independence of the United States. Preceding on-ground anger, capitalists often fought between themselves or versus their European-based governance systems and their taxation or foreign policies as one colonial power tried to outwit the other in the control of as many colonies as possible (Schlesinger, 1917; Sharman, 2019). Such conflicts were fueled by greed by different empires and colonial corporate entities to maximise their control of trading routes and trading hubs as possible. Importantly, from their perspective, was to control tracts of landscapes under the guise of ‘colonies’ that were endowed with different kinds of natural and human resources that factories and industries in their home countries urgently demanded. As will be expounded in the succeeding section, the greatest struggle that the colonial powers was challenged by was revolts instigated their major colonies—especially in the Australian colonies (both by new settlers as well as by First Nations People’s), the American colonies (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia), the Indian subcontinent, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa (Dutch Cape Colony and the Boer Republics) both or separately by new settlers as well as by First Nations People’s, and also in China and Indonesia. To the locals, their struggles or acts and statements of political unrest arguing for self-rule and freedom. In contrast, the colonialists fought to retain their control of both human capital and resources (Lezra, 2014) seeking to continue with their lucrative lifestyles and profitability from increased production.

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1.3 Colonialism and the Political Economic Landscape Marx’s writing on imperialism and colonialism leads the reader to a profound understanding of how these two historical ‘governance’ structures impacted on geopolitical economic landscapes of the 1800s and much of the 1900s. According to Marx, the ultimate consequences of imperialism and colonialism was evidenced in the economic gap that existed between the rich and the poor. Such led to the exploitative and oppressive nature of imperial/monarchial powers over the control of corporate governance legal structures (that thereupon legitimized colonial corporate entities), resources, commerce, navigation routes and means of production (Elster, 1977). Such were acquired at the expense of the local populace that were demoted to mere labourers with no say on how the economic processes were being driven and being implemented. Marx’s narrative on how imperial/monarchial powers conducted their business perfectly mirrors and explains colonial (both official and corporate entity) structures and their values. Thus colonial empires, as noted above, supported and enabled the over-exploitation of the resources of countries (Sathyamurthy, 1997). Unfortunately, such imperatives were for the selfish purpose of benefiting only a handful ‘elite’ countries and or corporate entities, especially those of European decent where colonialism was the order of the day. One pointer to this exploitative system is the way colonialists forced the local people to extract valuable raw materials from their own soil, and which was later channeled to industries located in home countries of the colonialists. Later, after processing, the refined goods were exported back to the colonies at substantially high prices and the local residents (whether First Nations People’s, native inhabitants or newly arrived settlers) were forced to consume them. Therefore to ensure that the colonies only consumed these goods, most colonialists established a very exploitative circuitous trading mechanism—‘mercantilism’—which made it nearly impossible for goods by other empires to entire into colonies controlled by their imperial/colonial rivals (Thomas, 2007). ‘Mercantilism’ is an economic policy that sought to maximise exportations and minimize importations for an economy. This policy promoted imperialism, colonialism, high taxation regimes, and tariffs and subsidies on the movement of goods to achieve this goal. Strategically the policy, often called ‘Mercantilist theory’, was and is designed to reduce any current account deficits or to realise a current account surplus. The theory promotes government control and regulation of a country’s economy to enable nationalistic power growth and or stabilisation to the detriment of competing country’s and their governance entities. Thus high tariffs on manufactured goods characteristics mercantilist policy and theory. This theory predominated in economic and political policy in parts of Europe and some areas of Africa from the 1700s–2000s supporting the early-1970s policy of ‘Proto-industrialization’ that promoted regional development in partnership with commercial agriculture to service major or niche market places (e.g. the European Union/Common Market).

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Several economic commentators argue that argue that ‘Mercantilism’ is commonplace today in economies of industrializing countries under the guise of economic interventionism. Such capitalistic practices made colonialists very rich and powerful while their host colonies reeled in poverty and in a myriad of social challenges (Morgan, 2000; Wallerstein, 1980). Today, such practices are hard to fathom, do not make sense, and is against much of current government market place activities and policy ethos and morals, although there are questionable corporate entities activities that verge into this realm today. On colonialism, Marx warned that this trend would eventually spark social and economic revolution as the proletariat tried to force their way to the ‘dinner table’ of economic progress that was only enjoyed by a few capitalists. In his view of colonialism, Marx, and his counterpart Engels, argued that the capitalistic nature of the colonialists fuelled their quest to conquer more colonies. They further argued that surplus products from colonial industrial engagements needed to be sold at an attractive profit. But the success of this would only occur if the market for such would be one of their colonies. Such a practice would eventually lead to constant upheavals between different empires and true to Marx warning, making capitalism unstable (Young, 2016). The unfair economic rationale of capitalistic approaches toward colonies made colonial empires very rich and powerful. Thus colonialist entrepreneurs, colonial corporate entities, and quietly military detachments and outposts, were willing to employ any available force to protect not only the colonies, but their economic activities and profits/lifestyles (Wisker, 2007). Indeed, it has been argued that each colonial empire had strategically in place profound and complex military structures, or endorsed private corporate entity military forces (like in the East India Company), that were targeted towards protecting the empire’s interests from both external and internal confrontations. Indeed, such confrontations are widely recorded. For instance, recognizing the pivotal town location of the Straits Settlement Colony of Singapore, the British took control of it and exploited both its trade entrepôts as well as its maritime gateway position economically and militarily (Ting, 2019). Thereupon successive empires sought to seize control of this key entrepôt from the British before the Japanese succeeded temporally in 1940 during World War II (Leyden & Raffles, 1821). In America, fierce battles had been waged as different empires including the British, Spanish, French and Mexican (1846–1848), wanted to exploit the larger economic wealth that characterised the American landscape, especially in terms of immense raw materials, the prospect of gold, and agricultural potentiality (Stuchtey, 2011). On the African continent, there were a number of colonial wars with the most notable one being the two Boer Wars (1880–1881, 1899–1902) (The ‘First Boer War’ (Eerste Vryheidsoorlog, literally meaning ‘First Freedom War’), and the Second Boer War (Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, literally meaning ‘Second Freedom War’), between the British and the Boers (Afrikaner who were of the Dutch descent) fighting to control the rich gold fields of central South Africa, the self-determinism of the South Africa Republic and Orange Free State, and its prosperous coastal agricultural landscapes.

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In the latter War the British lost over 28,000 lives and the Boers only 4000. Despite this most the civilians were also badly affected with over 26,000 dying from various reasons like diseases and bodily harm that were common in the concentrations camps not to mention the little talked about extensive death toll amongst the First Nations People’s including Zulu’s who were indirectly drawn into this War (Palmer, 1999). The evidence of such wars are clearly visible in most port cities, which were predominantly used as military bases as well as trading routes. Unlike today where capitalists engage in trade wars, the ancient colonial empires engaged in real battles that involved a massive shedding of blood and extensive destruction of properties (O’Rourke & Taylor, 2007). The animosity between different empires (internally and externally) was always fierce. As reported in many historical records, these battles and incidents involved the massive employment of armies whom are said to have been drawn majorly from poor backgrounds, mercenaries or corporate armies, or front slaves. Hence, empires were ready to sacrifice a large part of their armies in battlefields, knowing they could easily replenish their ranks. Marx’s view of colonialism and imperialism as pursuing selfish economic agendas, one can conclude that colonialism was an unfair and inhumane period in human history in all its forms. Thus, in part, the current mainstream focus upon statues internationally as representational symbols of greed and human pain. One thread of this outrage is the argument that economic power to sustain colonialism was fueled by the ill-humanity of sweat, blood and the resources of the locals who were left with nothing to show for it. This narrative holds that hidden behind colonialism’s and imperialism’s economic growth and power across the globe was the huge loss of human life, the period and continued sustained serious physical and psychological harm and scars during this epoch (e.g. ‘The Stolen Generation’ in Australia) to the detriment of human respect and freedom (Fanon, 1963). During this epoch, many, especially the youthful and the strong were taken into far lands in forms of slaves and were traded like commodities, as evidenced in the genealogical legacies in the United Kingdom and the United States of America today. All this occurred so that colonialists could sustain their profiteering activities. Even when colonialists engaged in battles that did not directly involve locals, it was the local that substantially suffered the most as a majority were forced to join the armies and fight, their properties and landscapes were destroyed or razed, and their livelihoods disrupted all together (Perkins & Langton, 2008; Thomas, 1975; Yong, 2005). Additionally, the individually and collective actions and inactions of colonialists have had far reaching effects upon the psyche of many new Countries and their citizens today. Such despondency is rooted in the extent that its influences are expected to still be noticeable, be subtle, and told about in the next centuries. Thus, the topic of reconciliation is topical in countries like Australia, New Zealand and Canada, today. But that’s not to say that post-independent countries have not mimicked or carried forth analogous political and or economic tactics against their own peoples or ethnically/ religious minorities, drawing upon the lessons learnt from the European-colonialism period, to achieve their newfound nationalist identity and territorial empowerment aspirations.

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One commonality with Marx’s ideas is the form of governance structures that colonialism established that align to capitalism. As Marx warns, even if those governance structures sometimes seem to be working successfully, they have far-reaching negative impacts upon humans and the landscape’s wellbeing than simply upon goods and commodity production statistics. Consequently, the economic development approach that colonialism established—that of individualism—as explored in the next section, has resulted in the creation of a society characterised by only a few rich people who are surrounded by a multitude of poor and needy people.

1.4 The Role of Cultural Tools for Power The power dynamics between colonial empires and the established hierarchies of power in colonies is the subject of increasing academic and social attention. Core to many of these investigations is the atrocities that occurred under the guise of one or more European empire-endorsed colonial policies. These policies are increasingly being questioned but the recipients and the genealogical ancestors of the oppressed in terms of ‘How did they agree to all these?’ and ‘Why did it take nearly a century for it to collapse?’ and ‘Why has it taken so long for the consequences of these policies to come into the public arena?’. Bulhan’s (2015) research into the social and cultural tools used by colonialism evidences the successful way that colonialist’s designed their ascension to power to the detriment of and covert application over the local residents. In some instances, the intentions of some foreigners were far from simply colonization. For example, the first British arrivals in the prospective eastern seaboard American colonies land were there with the specific mission of exploration (Syrett, 1998). The eastern seaboard was endowed with numerous attributes including woods and multiple food sustenance resources in form of wild animals and diverse plants that attracted these Britons to settle. But, conflicts with the locals about resource access ensued and the British used their battle experience and military equipment power to subdue the locals, eventually conquering the eastern seaboard lands as their own. The equivalent occurred in Singapore, where under Sir Stamford Raffles, the British arrived initially not to conquer the island but after realizing its economic potential, Raffles sought to craft avenues to overthrow the local Sultanate leader who ruled the island enabling its establishment as a key trading hub of the maritime gateway to Southeast Asia from Asia and into the Indian Ocean waters and vice versa (Cangi, 1993). In some instances colonialists arrived as innocent religious missionaries, explorers or traders. Hus, there were initially not perceived as a threat to the locals despite bringing alienating cultural influences (Barnes, 2009). While the locals perceived these visitors as innocent, the colonialists were observed as being stealthfully methodical in the way they approached a local community and their perceptions of colonymaking. Their tactics tended to be first, not employing any violence, but after they gain entry and a foothold, they would strategically reveal their true intentions

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(Bulhan, 2015). With religion, they first convinced locals that their traditional religious worships were inappropriate and rudimental, and that they ought to embrace and accept the new religious order that the colonizers introduced (Mbalisi et al., 2015; Urubshurow, 2009). Once this was achieved, from a psychological and organizational perspective, the locals lost their self-worth and independence and looked towards the new visitors to guide them what to do as they saw them as part of the divine interventions (Mignolo, 2003). Social alienation therefore started with the colonizers trying to convince locals that they were higher in the natural order of civilization; thus, slowly introducing the concept of cultural dominance and racism. To justify their course, the colonials used their economic expertise initiation developmental projects that the locals perceived were for their betterment, but deep down, the colonizers were laying the physical and governance foundations for their control of the place and landscape Such projects gave them the opportunity to strategically occupy or control key resources or strategic areas enabling them easy unfettered access to raw materials to fuel their industries back home. Also, by controlling land, they gained the impetus to control the people, whom, after losing their through new governance and legal regimes and mechanisms had little to hold onto. Aside from religion, the colonialists sought to introduce systems of formal education. Education was a strong tool that enabled colonists to aid the spread their new religious beliefs while at the same time demonizing traditional forms of worship. Schools were also instrumental in introducing the teaching of a uniform colonial language that allowed the colonizers to achieve a number of things (Khalifa et al., 2018; Sweeting & Vickers, 2007). First, standardization of language controlled communication engagements delimiting the plethora of local dialects. Schools in different colonies, irrespective of the local dialects and the same empire, resulted in a standardization of technology pedagogies, languages, explanations of governance structures, and a dispossession of specific-landscape language sovereignty. Education also allowed colonialist’s to introduce and advance their cultures in the colonies, and with this, they were able invoke and nurture demand for some of their own products produced in their home countries. By so doing, they were seeking to expand the market base for their industries. This re-positioned their profitability as they therefore enticed local labour to work in their trade activities in exchange for these foreign manufactured products. Such strategies progressively recharted the locals to neglect their own trade systems in favour of new colonial ones, resulting in the denigration and belittlement of local identities and cultures giving the colonizers even more control over local trade and cultural systems (Austin, 2010). As with education, the colonizers challenged local governance structures, and sought to impose their own structures leading to a significant wearing down of generational rigid tradition social units and governance structures. While seeking to change these generation intangible heritage structures and patterns, the pride and identity of the locals, the colonialist pursued control and changed through religion, education and occupation, thereby also influencing the architectural designs/traditions of locals (Pwiti & Ndoro, 1999). Before the arrival of colonizers, local groups had their own unique architectural designs and stylistic traditions that manifested their and echoed identity, culture, governance and worship

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amongst other things (Markman, 1984). Colonization resulted in the erosion of traditional practices as many locals sought to align and or mimic the styles colonialist’s introduced (Vongvilay et al., 2015). In particular, key new architectural style exemplars were applied in places of worship that aligned with new religious beliefs. These replaced older traditional architectural style exemplars also changing the internal spatial religious activities and the physical symbolism of a religious place. For example, in many African countries and in their religious traditions, places of worship were not attended by certain social demographic cohorts like children and women, but new colonial designs and new systems of worship, all the people congregated in a single room. Thus, traditional designs that depicted particular system of authority were changed to accommodate new governance structures, where even today, most independent countries, still possess many of these colonial identity-making structures like parliament buildings, courts of law, state houses for presidents amongst many others which repeat judiciary and political representations of a colonial era. The same new representations are embodied in post-colonial cities and trading centres that characterized most of the world’s burgeoning urban centres. With these new architectural orders, as discussed in the next chapter, one could easily identity which colonial power dominated a certain country or colony by simply observing how the traditional urban areas of the country were structured and visually expressed.

1.5 The Relationship Between Colonial Cities and the Empire Colonialists cemented their rule through the physical establishment of new cities and their internal patterns, hierarchies and infrastructure systems. These cities were predominantly located near coastal strips, or on major navigable river junctions, due to the need for port activities. These new cities facilitated their maritime (and military and defensive control) activities, but more importantly facilitated the smooth movement of both raw materials and finished goods to and from their home countries. Strategically port cities were selected for colonial imperatives that strategically controlled and developed their goal of colonial commerce. Such port cities were also instrumental in the enabling colonial empires to defend themselves against opposing colonies. This agenda was important as most colonial and pre-colonial wars or military incidents heavily relied upon maritime prowess, especially in the transportation of militaries, weapons and other essential infrastructure including food and medical supplies to service, sustain and underpin a war. Therefore, establishing one or more strategic contact points was seen as part of colonial agendas to ensure that their empires could manage and oversight governance of their colonies and efficiently respond when called upon or threatened.

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Colonial-devised port cities contrasted in totality to existing cities that were mainly located inland. The latter had historically been established to service and enforce agricultural structures that sustained traditional communities. Port cities were also characterized by their colonial-influenced infrastructural development. The majority were well planned, drawing upon European precedents and new theories, and were established to facilitate the numerous new activities that they were purposedly intended to fulfill (Mitter, 1986). Therefore, due to security concerns and the defensive roles that these cities served, these new port cities were often embodied in or included fortresses around or immediately adjacent to the city to ensure safety from external incursions (Home, 2007). Such fortresses included fortified perimeter walls and protected harbours that allowed safe loading and off-loading of raw materials sourced further inland. In addition to their security infrastructure, other notable built-form infrastructure included new religious and public buildings, and rail transportation infrastructure. This infrastructure was critical in supporting the commercial and economic activities that most colonialists engaged in. But, importantly the construction and development of such infrastructure, especially transportation networks, were in their fruition due to the lack of experienced craftsmanship and proper tools. This was due, notwithstanding, to the availability of resources, both locally and from the colonial home, resulted in these port cities being carefully envisaged and planned to hosted more activities and people than traditional inland towns (Hein, 2014). In contrast, inland cities, whose roles were only historically limited to the exchange of agricultural products and servicing required only basic infrastructure and city design configurations to facilitate these activities. Port cities served as the primary point of governance for colonialists. They primarily enabled efficient tracking and control of different economic activities, especially maritime activities that were taking place inland and also in the seas. Secondly, they enabled quality monitoring of navigation communication occurring in the regional seas and river systems. They thus effectively managed and controlled the movement of raw materials and humans (slaves) from different parts of the colony/ ies to the port’s warehouses and safe houses where these ‘commodities’ were temporary housed before being dispatched into different colonies/regions where they were in high demand. Similarly, goods and people coming into the colony from elsewhere were enveloped into this colonial-controlled economic market regime before being dispatched or consumed in the city, or dispatched to European cities/ports. Such ports therefore became the instrumental platform for the exploitation of resources and inhumane treatment of people of these new colonies. As discussed later, these new cities, besides their extensive infrastructural developments and architectural symbols were also established to embody colonial dominance, especially on economic and social fronts. It is therefore very evident that foreign architectural styles were assimilated into the existing cultural identities of cities/colonies with the main purpose being that of supporting newly established hierarchies of power. The splendor and sheer size of some of these new architectural buildings, in contrast to local architectural expressions, were meant to symbolize power and authority that the colonialists yielded, while others were symbols of military strength and prowess (Kennedy, 1988; O’Flanagan, 2008; Vego, 2003).

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While the epoch of (European) colonialism is behind us, we have inherited the legacy of their colonial-inspired cities. While many have been subject to functional and role reinventions and changes, nomenclature changes, most of these cities have experienced substantial but fragmented transformations, especially in infrastructural development, population increases and in the regeneration of some of the pre-independence infrastructure (Dwarakish & Salim, 2015). One such city example is the Swahili (Kiswahili) town of Mombasa in Kenya, which was under the Portuguese rule (1500–1585) who erected the Fort Jesus (Forte Jesus de Mombaça) (where the name further supports its association with religion) that served as defense control point (Horton & Middleton, 2000; Meier, 2016). The fortified structure is now a designated UNESCO World Heritage site and a major tourist attraction (UNESCO, 2011). In the same town, the colonialists used the port as the gateway that linked European and East African countries. A second is the city of Singapore where colonialists developed its footprint from a fishing settlement in 1819 to a reputable port city that controlled and linked the Straits of Malacca and Singapore Strait to Europe, China and India and to other trading routes that existed in those days. Even though locals in the pre-1820s may have lived a more peaceful life prior to the arrival of colonialists, their contributions are only hailed from a geopolitical and economic standpoint; and most definitely not from a humanistic one. Other city examples include the city of Cape Coast (Oguaa) in modern Ghana, Sydney and Melbourne in Australia, and in North America including Halifax (Nova Scotia), Newport (Rhode Island), New Amsterdam/New York, Philadelphia and Charleston (South Carolina) amongst others (McCusker & Menard, 1991). Despite the cultural, social, political and economic exploitations that were manifested in these colonial era port cities, in the post-colonialism era, such cities have played significant roles in the establishment of democracy and the development of more stable economic landscapes. Through them, other inland cities have managed to grow and spread in size and breadth. In particular, port cities have remained as key entities in facilitating the movement and trading of goods and people (Munim & Schramm, 2018; Stiglitz, 2003). Therefore, economies in which such port cities are located have grown and flourished. While supporting their internal city and national economies, these cities are home to numerous urban dwellers and accommodate numerous strategic functions, including post-independence centres of education, health, and hospitality for their new nations (Tan, 2007; Ziafati Bafarasat et al., 2023). Therefore, though their roles in the colonial era cannot be forgotten, these port cities remain critical today.

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Examples of Cities and Colonialism

MICA Building, formerly known as MITA Building or the Old Hill Street Police Station. This vibrant building can be easily recognized for its 927 of windows painted in colourful bright colors. (Photo credit: Free to use under the Unsplash License)

A street view in Trinidad, Cuba. (Photo credit: Free to use under the Unsplash License)

1.5 The Relationship Between Colonial Cities and the Empire

Examples of Cities and Colonialism

A regenerated colonial street in Cartagena, Colombia. (Photo credit: Free to use under the Unsplash License)

Egyptians coming together at the corniche in Alexandria. (Photo credit: Free to use under the Unsplash License)

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Examples of Cities and Capitalism

Frankfurt’s modern skyline of its main finance and business centre. (Photo credit: Free to use under the Unsplash License)

Consumerism in American City. (Photo credit: Free to use under the Unsplash License)

1.5 The Relationship Between Colonial Cities and the Empire

Examples of Cities and Consumerism

Shoppers in a busy street in New York, the US. (Photo credit: Free to use under the Unsplash License)

Shibuya, Tokyo, at night. (Photo credit: Free to use under the Unsplash License)

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Fanon, F. (1963). The wretched of the Earth. Grove Press. Fieldhouse, D. K. (1983). Colonialism 1870–1945: An introduction. Macmillan. Finaldi, G. (2019). Fascism, violence, and Italian colonialism. The Journal of Holocaust Research, 33, 22–42. Findlay, R., & O’Rourke, K. H. (2007). Power and plenty: Trade, war, and world economy in the Second Millennium. Princeton University Press. Gammage, B. (2011). The biggest estate on earth: How aborigines made Australia. Allen & Unwin. García-Olivares, A., & Solé, J. (2015). End of growth and the structural instability of capitalism— From capitalism to a symbiotic economy. Futures, 68, 31–43. Hein, C. (2014). Port cities and urban wealth: Between global networks and local transformations. International Journal of Global Environmental Issues, 13, 339. Hollander, S. (2008). The economic of Karl Marx: Analysis and application. Cambridge University Press. Home, R. K. (2007). Town planning and garden cities in the British colonial empire 190–1940. Planning Perspectives, 5, 23–37. Horton, M., & Middleton, J. (2000). The Awahili: The social landscape of a mercantile society. Blackwell. Jones, R. (1969). Fire-stick farming. In Australian natural history, 224–228. Kennedy, P. (1988). The rise and fall of the great powers. Vintage. Khalifa, M. A., Khalil, D., Marsh, T. E. J., & Halloran, C. (2018). Toward an Indigenous, decolonizing school leadership: A literature review. Educational Administration, Quarterly, 1–44. Kiprop, V. (2019). Former French colonies. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/former-french-col onies.html (3rd August 2019). Kotz, D. M. (2009). The financial and economic crisis of 2008: A systemic crisis of neoliberal capitalism. Review of Radical Polical Economics, 41, 305–317. Lee, R., & Lee, W. R. (1998). The socio-economic and demographic characteristics of port cities: A typology for comparative analysis? Urban History, 25, 147–172. Lezra, E. (2014). The colonial art of demonizing others: A global perspective. Routledge. Leyden, J., & Raffles, T. S. (1821). Malay annals. A. & R. Spottiswoode. Lloyd, T. O. (1996). The British empire 1558–1995. Oxford University Press. Lu, H. (2018). Bourgeois comfort under proletarian dictatorship: Home life of Chinese capitalists before the cultural revolution. Journal of Social History, 52, 74–100. Makambe, E. P. (1994). The exploitation and abuse of African labour in the colonial economy of Zimbabwe, 1903–1930: Lopsided struggle between labour and capital. Transafrican Journal of History, 23, 81–104. Markman, S. D. (1984). Architecture and urbanisation in colonial Chiapas, Mexico. The American Philosophical Society. Marx, K (1867–1894), Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Oekonomie [Capital: A critique of political economy]. Verlag von Otto Meisner. Marx, K. (1973). Grundrisse. Harmondsworth. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1848). Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei (S. Moore, Trans.). [Manifesto of the Communist Party]. The Communist League. Mattick, P. (2012). Marxism, last refuge of the bourgeoisie? M. E. Sharpe Inc. Mbalisi, C. N., Obiakor, N. J., & Okeke, C. A. (2015). Colonialism: Nexus for myriad religious contentions in post-colonial Igboland (an historical overview). Journal of Religion and Human Relations, 7. McCusker, J. J., & Menard, R. R. (1991). The economy of British America 1607–1789. University of North Carolina Press. Meier, P. (2016). Swahili port cities: The architecture of elsewhere. Indiana University Press. Mignolo, W. (2003). The darker side of the Renaissance: Literacy, territoriality, and colonization. The University of Michigan Press.

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Miller, R. (2011). The international law of colonialism: A comparative analysis. Lewis & Clark Law Review, 1–106. Milman, O. (2019). European colonization of Americas killed so many it cooled Earth’s climate. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/jan/31/european-colonizat ion-of-americas-helped-cause-climate-change (29th July 2019). Mitter, P. (1986). The early British port cities in India: Their planning and architecture circa 1640– 1757. Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, 45, 95–114. Moller, S., Huber, E., Bradley, D., Stephens, J. D., & Nielsen, F. (2003). Determinants of relative poverty in advanced capitalist democracies. American Sociological Review, 68, 1–30. Monteh, R. N. (2018). Colonial education system in Africa: The German experience in Cameroon 184–1916. Sociology Study, 8, 220–231. Morgan, K. (2000). Slavery, Atlantic trade and the British economy, 1660–1800. Cambridge University Press. Munim, Z. H., & Schramm, H.-J. (2018). The impacts of port infrastructure and logistics performance on economic growth: The mediating role of seaborne trade. Journal of Shipping and Trade, 3, 1–19. Newell, P. (2011). The elephant in the room: Capitalism and global environmental change. Global Environmental Change-Human and Policy Dimensions —Global Environmental Change, 21, 4–6. Northrup, D. (1995). Indentured labor in the age of imperialism, 1834–1922. University of Cambridge Press. Nunn, N. (2010). Religious conversion in colonial Africa. American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 100. O’Brien, P. K. (1988). The costs and benefits of British imperialism, 1846–1914. Past and Present, 120, 163–200. O’Femi, A. (2016). Marauders in the tropics. PAGE Publishing Inc. O’Flanagan, P. (2008). Port cities of Atlantic Iberia, c. 1500–1900. Ashgate Publishing Limited. O’Rourke, K. H., & Taylor, A. M. (2007). Democracy and protectionalism. In T. J. Hatton, K. H. O’Rourke, & A. M. Taylor (Eds.), The new comparative economic history: Essays in honor of Jeffrey G. Williamson. MIT Press. Palmer, A. M. (1999). The boer war casualty roll 1899–1902. Military Minded. Perkins, R., & Langton, M. (Eds.). (2008). The first Australians: An illustrated history. The Miegunyah Press of the Melbourne University Publishing Ltd. Pruitt, S. (2019) How colonization’s death toll may have affected Earth’s climate. https://www.his tory.com/news/climate-change-study-colonization-death-farming-collapse (1st August 2019). Pwiti, G., & Ndoro, W. (1999). The legacy of colonialism: Perceptions of the cultural heritage in southern Africa, with special reference to Zimbabwe. The African Archaeological Review, 16, 143–153. Sathyamurthy, T. V. (1997). Marxism and imperialism. Economic and Political Weekly, 32, 3119– 3123. Schlesinger, A. M. (1917). The colonial merchants and the American revolution, 1763–1776. Columbia University. Sharman, J. C. (2019). Empires of the weak: The real story of European expansion and the creation of the new world order. Princeton University Press. Stiglitz, J. E. (2003). Globalization and growth in emerging markets and the new economy. Journal of Policy Modeling, 25, 505–524. Stuchtey, B. (2011). Colonialism and imperialism, 1450–1950. http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/backgr ounds/colonialism-and-imperialism (1st August 2019). Sweeting, A., & Vickers, E. (2007). Language and the history of colonial education: The case of Hong Kong. Cambridge University Press, 41, 1–40. Syrett, D. (1998). The royal navy in European waters during the American revolutionary war. University of South Carolina.

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Tan, T.-Y. (2007). Port cities and hinterlands: A comparative study of Singapore and Calcutta. Political Geography, 26, 851–865. Tharoor, S. (2017). An era of darkness the British empire in India. Republished as: Inglorious empire: what the British did to India. Aleph (India) and C. Hurst & Co. Thomas, B. (2007). Encyclopedia of western colonialism since 1450, Vol. 1. Thomson Gale. Thomas, M. (2019). Colonial violence: European empires and the use of force. International Affairs, 95, 472–473. Thomas, R. (1975). Military recruitment in the Gold Coast during the first world war. Cahiers D’études Africaines, 57, 57–83. Ting, K. (2019). Singapore 1819: A living legacy. Talisman Publishing Pte Limited. UNESCO. (2006). Aapravasi Ghat. See: https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1227/. Accessed April 2, 2023. UNESCO. (2011). Fort Jesus, Mombasa. Available at: https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1295/. Accessed April 2, 2023. Urubshurow, V. K. (2009). Introducing world religions. Journal of Buddhist Ethics Online Books: State College, PA. Vego, M. N. (2003). Naval strategy and operations in narrow seas (2nd ed.). Frank Cass Publishers. Vongvilay, X., Shin, J.-E., Kang, Y.-H., Kim, E.-D., & Choi, J. (2015). The influence of French colonial rule on Lao architecture with a focus on residential buildings. Journal of Asian Architecture and Building Engineering, 14, 279–286. Wallerstein, I. (1980). Mercantilism and the consolidation of the European world-economy 1600– 1750. University of California Press. Wisker, G. (2007). Key concepts in postcolonial literature. Palgrave MacMillan. Yong, T. T. (2005). The garrison state: Military, government and society in colonial Punjab. Sage Publications India. Young, R. J. C. (2016). Marx on colonialism and imperialism. In Postcolonialism: An historical introduction (pp. 101–112). John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Ziafati Bafarasat, A., Cheshmehzangi, A., & Ankowska, A. (2023). A set of 99 healthy city indicators for application in urban planning and design. Sustainable Development, 3, 1–12.

Chapter 2

The Economic Landscape of Cities and Climate Change

Abstract This introductory chapter surveys how climate change, accelerated by an urban demographic boom and rapid urbanisation, impacts people’s livelihoods and places stress upon existing urban and economic ecosystems. This stress is fuelled by an unsustainable lifestyle characterised by industrialisation and consumerism that impacts the shifting geopolitical and economic landscapes at various scales. The impacts of climate change on vital urban infrastructures and the urban economy are explored with those challenges. As part of this survey, cities are now having to respond to climate change and mitigation tools. Still, the financing of these policies and actions is complex due to their colonial legacy and unjust political and economic landscapes where countries polluting the less are facing the most impacts and transformative challenges. Faced by this, alternative economic models have been called for. Keywords Cities · Climate change · Urban economics · Sustainability · Development · Paradigm shift

2.1 Introduction The role of colonial-invented cities in any given economy cannot be underestimated today. This is because, in most countries, these cities are seen as the engines of major economic growth and upon which national development is dependent. Interestingly, their contribution to economic growth is not limited to domestic economies but has been seen to have resounding impacts even on regional and international scales. It is argued that cities overall contribute over 85% to the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and with the unprecedented rates of urbanisation, these figures are expected to continue rising (Gouldson et al., 2015). This contribution is dependent upon factors including economies of scale, agglomeration, and localization characterised by qualities like robust and efficient infrastructural developments that are by far more pronounced in cities in contrast to rural areas (Gill & Goh, 2010). These are also made possible by the availability of extensive connectivity through communication networks, internet and technology, power/energy, and financial services. They have also been hailed for their potential to attract intellectual talent and highly skilled © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 Z. Allam et al., Climate and Social Justice, Urban Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6624-0_2

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human capital that helps improve productivity and the quality of services and goods that are offered in cities (UN Habitat, 2011). For instance, it has been observed that the majority of industries, financial institutions, retail businesses, major hospitals, advanced education centres and tourist attraction centres, and hospitality services, for each nation are mostly found in cities. This partly explains why the world is experiencing unprecedented rates of urbanisation and population increase in urban areas, and particularly in the so-called ‘under-developed’ and ‘developing’ economies/ nations (UN Habitat, 2015). Duranton (2014) credits this to the ‘pull factor’ that is associated with advanced innovativeness in cities that allows them to produce advanced and mature products that, in turn, attract more people. With an increasing population, the demand for goods and services increases, thus, prompting economic growth as more resources are pumped into the cities to offset the demand. Despite contributing significantly to the economic welfare of a country, cities are seen to also play a major role in exacerbating the impacts and the consequences of climate change. In particular, during the industrialization era, when cities around the world were competing in growth and development, there was a disinterest in the impacts that industries and development strategies had upon the environment (Martinez, 2005; Mgbemene et al., 2016). For this reason, most of the economic policies that were put in place emphasised growth, infrastructure development, job creation, and improvements in the economic welfare of people, without considering how such policies would eventually impact the city’s environment and sustainability in the long term (International Federation for Housing & Planning, 2016). Therefore, with the dawn of the technological era, most cities were already grappling with the negative impacts of climate change (Cheshmehzangi & Dawodu, 2019a, 2019b), misbelieving that technological advancement was a blessing in disguise due to its ability to help in mitigation measures (Condon et al., 2009; Mi et al., 2019). Additionally, many cities will confirm that they have been attempting to shift their policies to address technologically enabled strategies that would allow them to maintain their economic growth while attempting to reduce climate change impacts (Rezai et al., 2018). The backdrop of such spirited policy shift efforts is the realization of the positive correlation between the roles of cities and climate change. A report by the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that cities directly contribute over 67% of global Greenhouse Gases (GHG), and that by 2030 this contribution is expected to have increased to over 74% (Makido et al., 2012; United Nations, 2017). These policy shifts are perceived to be tied to urban population increases and increasing demands for energy and the supply of other basic resources. Gouldson et al. (2015), in ‘Accelerating Low-Carbon Development in the World’s Cities’, have predicted similar GHG figures of 67–76%, and attribute these statistics to increased activities in cities in investing in and constructing infrastructure development, housing, manufacturing and activities that have the potential to increase GHG emissions and contributing to unbeneficial land use changes. These statistics are also affirmed in the United Nation’s deliberations in their 73rd Session of the General Assembly (2018–2019), which expressed major concern about

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the effects of population increases in cities that are prompting unsustainable environmental practices. These practices include increasing production of urban solid residues and increased consumption of unclean energy (Butters et al., 2020; Cheshmehzangi & Butters, 2015), all of which contribute to over 70% of global CO2 emissions. While directly contributing to emissions, the urban sprawl (and deceptive city boundary map manipulations/changes) is leading to reductions in land reserves being another contributor to the negative impacts of climate change. Between 2000 and 2030, it has been projected that changes in city boundaries will increase from 56% to over 310% (Colenbrander et al., 2018). This will result in land being notionally reserved as ‘urban buffers’ in an attempt to curb the impacts of climate change that would otherwise be converted to urbanized zones. These negative patterns are prompting increased incidences of increased global temperatures, erratic changes in weather patterns, increased incidents of flooding, a loss of vegetation communities and biodiversity, etc. (IPCC, 1997). There is, therefore, a global call for change in our economic models towards ones that curb the impacts of climate change (Allam, 2012, 2018; Allam & Jones, 2018, 2019b). Numerous international conventions, spearheaded by organisations, including the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC), demonstrated the international voice for action toward mitigation strategies (IRENA, 2018c). Two results of these conventions are agreements for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Cheshmehzangi & Dawodu, 2019d)—a collection of seventeen interlinked objectives designed to serve as “a shared blueprint for peace and prosperity for people and the planet, now and into the future”—adopted in 2015, and the New Urban Agenda (NUA)—“a concise, action-oriented, forward-looking, and universal framework of actions for housing and sustainable urban development”—adopted in 2016, that both seek a paradigm shift in economic models to reduce unsustainable practices that are spurred by economic growth and increasing consumer demands (United Nations, 2015a, 2016a). On this topic, numerous urban city strategies have been proposed and implemented that have managed to shift their respective economic fortunes for the better. Amongst these strategies include the adoption of built environment compaction policies, increased physical connectivity infrastructure, quality co-ordination of neighbourhood design and planning to accommodate more people, and the provision of increased accessibility enabling increased optimization of resource usage (Alfredsson et al., 2018; To et al., 2018). Other positive strategies include the adoption of spatial planning that emphasises the optimization of spaces and investment in infrastructure that mitigates climate change (Allam, 2017; Allam & Jones, 2019a; Allam & Newman, 2018; Lanfranchi et al., 2018). Also, as is now applied in the European Union (EU), the introduction of emission mitigation measures, including the use of Emission Trading Licences that seek to encourage low emissions and financial resources to support areas that are in dire need of mitigation investments. However, the demand for new economic models is not necessarily attainable in the immediate short term. This is due to the substantial resource requirements and human behavioural pattern changes that are required, which necessitate paradigm shifts. Such changes involve substantial challenges for policy makers and the general

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populace to adjust to these paradigm shifts. It is clear, however, that policy shifts, like the adoption of renewable energy and smart city technologies, are expected to prompt new ‘normals’ and initiate new forms of economic growth. But these require a concerted effort between all players. While the long-term shift to a more sustainable future is well underway, we need to ponder how to accelerate investment in sustainability in the immediate short and medium terms to aid new economic models that are both equitable and resilient. This book underlines this need and expands on how this can be achieved.

2.2 From Industrialisation to the Service Industry Cities have come a long way since the Industrial Age (c. 1760 to 1840), and their roles in economic growth and development are becoming more pronounced and distinct. Before industrialization began, there was little that could be characterised by cities because most were simply nodes where people congregated for varying reasons (Wallis et al., 2018). In particular, most of these cities were located near or within major agricultural landscapes and therefore characterised by humans who were employed on farms, traded farm produce, or constructed and sold farm inputs like machineries. Significantly, due to the use of such technologies like machines and food supply; furthering access to different types of food and lead to an increase in population (O’Connor, 2004). In such places, the affluent occupy niche urban pockets, while those whom they employ occupy less developed and less attractive parts of the cities. With an increased variety of food choices, at reasonable prices, people started to engage in other economic activities, thereby attracting more people who sought out alternate employment opportunities in cities. Most of the trade exchanges, job opportunities and services were available in cities while other regions outside the cities reeled in poverty and conspicuous under-development (Hatti & Rauhut, 2017). The Industrial Age that began in the late nineteenth century witnessed cities become more vibrant and livelier as most of the industries were located in these cities. These cities became centres for various forms of economic activities, and cities attracted people who migrated from different corners of countries in search for new job and other economic opportunities. This Age witnessed a substantial investment in infrastructure, especially in transportation and financial institutions, that increased connectivity accentuating of all dimensions of accessibility (Peterson, 2008). With revenues from industrial products increasing, the morphology of cities began to change as people sought to build more liveable and permanent structures and neighbourhoods commensurate to their social standing and well-being. In particular, industries attracted settlements around them, progressively transforming them into manufacturing cities. Unfortunately, during this Age, pollutant emissions from these industries and from the surrounding households were not monitored as little was known about the negative consequences of such industries on the environment, and even less on human health. Therefore, with the exponential numerical increase in industries, and their reliance upon fossil fuel energy sources to service industries,

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transportation modes, and households, the problems of climate change started to be firmly entrenched in cities. Even before these negative effects and impacts became evident, they had already reached alarming levels (Abas Kalair et al., 2015; Covert et al., 2016). As the Industrial Age opened doors for more economic opportunities and activities, people slowly started to shift from industrial nodes to service-oriented urban areas. This shift was prompted by both increasing urban populations and disposable incomes that encouraged people to seek out a higher quality of lifestyles not characterised by noise, smoke, and other purported pollutions emanating from industries. Therefore, as cities shifted towards a concentration on service industries, manufacturing cities were slowly being disserted many disconnected from main cities. The only areas that substantially maintained traditional activities and connections were port cities, and this is due more to their uniqueness and importance as linkages entrepôts between different trading hubs (Merk, 2013). Similarly, their role and significance in handling cargos and their tourism attractiveness have allowed them to weather the challenges of being neglected in favour of modern cities. But these port cities, which initially served as trading hubs, administrative headquarters and other roles, historically lost some of these key roles, especially administrative and financial, to newly established cities built further on coastal strips (Kostopoulou, 2013). Some of the reasons for such trends are the emergence of new, flexible, and quicker transportation modes, new financial trends and the rise of more service industries like art and culture, tourism, health and education, and hospitality sectors that do not rely solely on manufacturing industries. Even though cities are increasingly seeking to operate with less polluting activities, their sheer size in terms of geographical boundaries, and the massive population they host, have led to challenges of significant proportions of which the most significant one is climate change (Cheshmehzangi et al., 2021; Papalexiou et al., 2018; Ziafati Bafarasat et al., 2023). The reason for this change is evidenced in their increasing demand for power, housing, manufactured products, robust infrastructure development, waste collection and the increasing need for spaces, etc. To satisfy each of these demands, substantial amounts of resources are being invested in and injected, while an almost equal measure of emissions, especially those in the form of greenhouse gases (GHG) that are released into the environment. In the same vein, even as mitigation measures are being contemplated, the financial burden of such measures is only eased by revenues borne from economic activities that mostly contribute to climate change. In addition, urban dweller’s behavioural attributes and values, despite being far from polluting industries, have been argued to contribute significantly to climate change. It is said that as their disposable income continues to increase, their consumption behaviour also changes, they demand more manufactured goods, electronics, polluting automobiles, etc., which collectively adds to the agencies of climate change. For example, when electronics, lighting, and heating devices are in use, especially in cities with high populations, these activities contribute significantly to the increase in global temperatures, which have been found to have far-reaching consequences to both humans, biodiversity, and the built environments.

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Cities have always been designed in a such way that their outputs have a direct or indirect contribution to furthering the negative impacts of climate change (Lang, 2018; Ochola, 2018; Perea-Moreno et al., 2018). This city’s evolution has occurred regardless of the various stages of developmental phases that humanity has endured. It is only recently, in the late twentieth century, that we have been cognizant of the impacts of climate change that have prompted cities to consider reform changes. This truth is further expounded in the succeeding section.

2.3 Cities and Climate Change As noted above, the primary challenges of cities today are of high rates of urbanisation, which are accelerated by the continuing exponential demographic boom that is projected to continue from the current 54% to over 70% in 2050 relative to that of rural areas (United Nations, 2016b). Due to this boom and the affinity of populations preferring to live in cities, the morphology of cities is in a state of constant change, with infrastructural development and changes in the built environment being one of the pointers to this pattern. In addition, the increasing demand for different services, on a positive front, contributes to the vibrancy of the economy but unfortunately proportionally contributes to climate change (Cheshmehzangi & Dawodu, 2019c). In particular, one of the most demanded services that have had far-reaching impacts upon the environment is that of energy linked to electricity generation involving its distribution, consumption and transportation. Historically there has been an over-reliance on non-renewable sources, namely fossil fuels, which contribute significantly to the generation of different kinds of GHG. Surprisingly, even in the twenty-first century, when technological advancements in the energy sector are much advanced, and the possibility of cities being powered by renewable energy (RE) is real, there is still an emphasis on non-renewable energy production despite negative rhetoric that they are more profitable in the long term (IRENA & CPI, 2018). On this, it has been found that even oil-rich countries, like those in the Persian Gulf Region, have the potential to produce substantial energy from solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind, but due to the perceived cost implications, most of these countries still choose to concentrate upon fossil fuel powered energy generation plants (IEA, 2018b; IRENA, 2018a). However, declining technical costs for renewable energy production and conversation are starting to question the economic viability of fossil fuels (Lee & Callaway, 2018; Owusu et al., 2018; Peimani, 2018). A recent report by International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) entitled Renewable Energy Market Analysis: GCC 2019 (IRENA, 2019) showcases that countries like Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia have great potential to shift their production to either PV or wind resources, but their investments in these sectors are still very low. This report indicates that the highest share of renewable energies in total electricity capacity in the entire Persian Gulf Region is a high of 2% in the United Arab Emirates, which the average of the same in the entire region is only

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0.6% (IRENA, 2019). The Persian Gulf Region is discussed here because it has the highest consumption of energy per person, as documented by Alnaser and Alnaser (2011). In other regions, like Asia, the shift to renewable energies has been hailed as remarkable, but another report by IRENA on energy consumption in the Persian Gulf Region highlights that the high urbanisation rate and unprecedented population growth coupled with an impressive growth trajectory, still render a heavy dependence upon non-renewable sources (IRENA, 2018b). With this backdrop, it is valid to argue that the journey toward renewable energies is still long. Unfortunately, this means that the energy sector will continue contributing significantly negatively to climate change, at least in the short to medium term, where the primary reason is the lack of economic models sustaining investments in renewable energies. Another aspect that renders cities as major contributors to climate change is their underlying built environments. Such environments, in partnership with their entire construction industries is believed to contribute over 39% of emissions to climate change (Abergel et al., 2018). It is projected that in the next 40 years, the number of new constructions globally will increase to a whopping 230 billion m2 and this will be at the expense of the environment. Such high contributions relate to the fact that this sector heavily relies upon non-renewable energies in almost all aspects but has also witnessed significant extractions of resources from the environment, mostly applied in unsustainable ways. For these reasons, there have been calls for the adoption of green building methods that would facilitate emission reductions. But such methods are still contested because they are not deemed to be applicable or cost-effective in varying geographical regions. Thus there have been concerted efforts to create and introduce financial packages like green bonds—a fixed-income instrument designed to support specific climate-related or environmental projects— to help fast-track the adoption of green technologies in the construction industry. As noted in the 2018 version of the Global Status Report (IEA, 2018a, 2018b) by the International Energy Agency (IEA), which documents the status and trends of key indicators for energy use, emissions, technologies, policies, and investments, a number of countries, especially those where large construction activities are taking place like the United States, European and Asian countries amongst others have positively embraced these bonds (IEA, 2018a). Recognising these patterns, large metropolitan areas significantly contribute to emissions, and like other parts of any country, they are all grappling with climate change impacts, especially in terms of fluctuating weather patterns. It is well documented that cities, especially those in the coastal strips, are experiencing increased incidences of inland flooding, coastal erosion, powerful cyclones, hurricanes, unpredictable extreme heat and colds, etc., which points to changes in weather patterns (Allam, 2017; Allam & Jones, 2019b; Dhunny et al., 2019). Such incidents are evidence of the impact upon the built environment, the biodiversity, and on human health that has resulted in the loss of human life. The impacts of climate change, especially in cities that host the majority of the global population and major global investments, have attracted the attention of numerous, reputable organisations from all spheres. All these entities are in agreement that climate change has been the most pressing risk to cities in the last millennia.

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At the forefront of this drive is the United Nations through its different sections, including United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), amongst others, which, over the past decades, have held high-level meetings and passed resounding proposals and agreements geared toward the mitigation and adaptability to climate change. Others include the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40) cities, which is a network of global megacities that are in unison in addressing the challenges of climate change. These have been seen to speed up innovative efforts towards curbing the impacts of climate change. It is believed that by so doing, such efforts can help spur urban liveability dimensions, improve urban resiliency and promote urban economies, as is further discussed in the succeeding section below.

2.3.1 Climate Change and the Urban Economy The impacts of climate change on urban infrastructure are a matter of increasing concern to urban, local, and even regional governmental structures, who are additionally concerned as the negative impacts upon their local and regional economies. Indeed, as noted above, these urban infrastructures are what make cities more superior to rural areas, especially due to their economic potential. These infrastructural developments are partly what differentiates developed, developing and under-developed countries. Therefore, the threat to infrastructure is taken seriously, especially since these hinder the economic growth of regions, and slow down transactions; more so in ports or transportation sectors (IPCC, 1997; OECD, 2014). It is reported that in any given country, infrastructural development is at risk of contributing negatively to climate change. These contributors include the education and health sectors, and the commonly-known pollution-prone sectors of energy, water supply networks, transportation, and communication. The main challenge upon these contributors and sectors, besides their physical destruction/deterioration or the increased demands upon the capital and time enveloped in these investments. Thus, any disruption upon them equates to substantial financial constraints and losses. Similarly, these contributors and sectors are directly interlinked. Any mishap on one or more can have a spiral or collateral effect on others, eventually translating to momentous negative economic impacts. In a report by UN Habitat (2018), it is clear that damages caused by climate change in cities amount to over USD $100 billion each year and much more, in unquantifiable terms, for human and biodiversity loss and its resulting disruption. Additionally, the report highlighted that cities built along coastal strips and low-lying lands are particularly negatively affected as they are vulnerable to the impacts on their infrastructure arising from weather-related causes like flooding, hurricanes, and strong winds. For example, it is reported that in Puerto Rico, due to different climatic instigated challenges, more than 4600 people lost their lives in 2017, with over USD $125 billion worth of properties and infrastructure being destroyed (Levitt & Kommenda, 2018).

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In New Orleans, Hurricane Katrina in 2005 is projected to have caused massive havoc on the regional urban infrastructure, especially roads, bridges, power distribution lines, and telecommunication networks, etc. The financial implication of this hurricane is projected to have surpassed USD $180 billion, and when the amount used to restore the infrastructure is accounted for, the city is projected to have lost over USD $250 billion (Anon, 2020; Hooper, 2003; National Museum of Australia, 2013; Schmidthaler & Reichl, 2016). Besides this loss, substantial infrastructure was destroyed, especially those related to power generation and distribution which have yet to recover to date. In Italy, extreme snowing in 2003 and 2013 caused an extended major blackout in Italian Dolomites, leaving over 200,000 people without power for hours. Four years later, in 2017, a blackout from the same problem was even worse with over 400,000 households having to endure this traumatizing occurrence for at least three days. In some Asian countries like India, in contrast, they experienced a serious heat wave in 2015 that left at least 2500 people dead and a trail of massive destruction on northern and central India‘s urban infrastructure (Choudary, 2022; Rao et al., 2023). In 2009, Melbourne, in Australia, experienced one of its worst years with extreme heat waves resulting in more than 450,000 ha being burnt, the loss of one million wild and domesticated animals, the destruction of 3500 buildings including more than 2000 houses, and major consequential impacts on urban infrastructure, especially telecommunication infrastructure and water supply networks (McEvoy et al., 2012). From the above examples, there is general academic, practitioner and government policy-maker consensus that the impacts of climate change on urban infrastructure cannot be overlooked, especially in any urban development planning activities. In addition to taking extra precautions while planning new infrastructural developments, the need to put in place sound mitigation plans and formulate resiliency and adaptability policies to climate change is essential in strategic planning processes. By addressing this conclusion, construction, design and planning activities have the potential to boost local economies and promote the economies of other regions. In addition, this places a policy responsibility upon local governments, national governments, and other stakeholders to reserve funding and other resource support to incorporate climate resiliency and adaptability measures in advance of their necessity, thereby helping the emphasis upon the adoption of sustainable friendly best practices. The issue of funding towards this goal is critical, especially in least developed and smaller economies that have far less capacity to finance infrastructural investments capable of withstanding the long-term impacts of climate change (Deloitte, 2013; UNCTAD, 2018; United Nations, 2015b). In the past, financial allocations and provisions for urban mitigation projects in these economies have often been unfair, inadequate and poorly managed, resulting in the negative exposure of these infrastructures, and their economies to the wrath of climate change (Arimah, 2017; Barns et al., 2016). On this, trends to underfund projects are seen as unwarranted since these economies are usually on the frontline of climate change, and they take a

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substantial amount of time, resources, and support to at least recover when a climateinstigated incident strikes (Gurara et al., 2017a, 2017b). Further, insufficient funds also mean that such economies will continue to struggle in realising economic development because most of this infrastructure in instrumented as mitigation tools and being critical pillar for economic development and growth. Despite the obvious challenge of capacity to finance a complete and coherent project, a dearth of financial capability is often hampered despite the goodwill of development partners and the private sector. This argument is pegged on the understanding that most developing, low income and small economies are often characterised by wastage, corruption, embezzlement and misplaced priorities when it comes to public funds (Alter et al., 2017; Arezki et al., 2017). This may, in some instances, be unfairly stereotyped, but these historical patterns make financing projects an expensive and unattractive investment, especially when financial support is sourced from the private sector or from foreign development partners. Consequently, the quality of work undertaken with such low resource availability is often substandard and compromised, thus, warranting short-term to long-term high maintenance costs (Shami & Majid, 2014). In these instances, many of these economies are often less motivated to adopt modern projects seeking to remain with conventional (unsustainable) infrastructures, especially in the power and transport sectors (Cohen, 2006; Guneralp et al., 2017; Hove et al., 2013). Unfortunately, in developed and advanced economies, such projects often have fallen short when it comes to mitigating climate change. Therefore the small and developing economies that insist on investing in them do it at the expense of resilience, economic growth and sustainability. These threads are discussed in the next section, and also in Chap. 3, wherein such countries are left with huge financial burdens with little to show for the investment and international cooperation.

2.4 The Need for Revised Models In order to finance mitigation plans for climate change, lesser-developed countries, often less strong economically, have often been found to turn towards loans—both internal and external—that ultimately weaken their economies. Such loans, especially externally-sourced ones, are sometimes advanced at very stringent terms thereupon stifling the potential for such economies to reduce the development gap between them and their developed counterparts (Plumer & Popovich, 2018). However, this development gap is not always exacerbated by the actions of less developed economies, but mostly by the unfair and unjust economic landscape that exists concerning climate change financing. To put this in perspective, it has been observed that most developed and advanced countries have enjoyed the economic rewards of industrialization for the better part of the twentieth century (World Bank, 2015). Unfortunately, such economic rewards have come at the expense of sustainability because it has been during this period that massive negative contributions to climate change have taken place. For

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developed economies, riding on the euphoric wave of industrialization, parts of their society have now attained a comfortable lifestyle that they are unwilling to change or alter, negating their decisions to help safeguard communities living in other geographic areas that have fallen prey to the negative consequences of climate change, accelerated by the same developed countries. The inequality of this situation takes different dimensions, the most compelling of which are twofold. The first is, having already reached a developmental peak, the aforementioned economies perceive that they are comfortable to safely shift to modern economic practices that are more inclusive and mindful of emerging economies especially in regard to their contribution to climate change (Gurara et al., 2017a, 2017b). Such shifts would entail practices like increasing their consumption of renewable energies, and optimal use of resources like the availability of spaces, water, and construction materials, amongst many others. Similarly, these economies have to reduce their waste generation at the same time as emphasizing best practices in waste management (OECD, 2019). The second factor that points to the unfairness in the conventional economic model is the financing mechanism adopted to help in climate change mitigation projects. In this regard, it has been observed that those economies with massive industries and high potential to generate emissions are unfairly charged compared to the less polluting economies (Heindl, 2017). In principle, there ought to be equity in financing climate change mitigation programs. That is, those polluting more should also pay more (as further elaborated in Chap. 4). Unfortunately, this has historically not been the case. Hence, the less developed and emerging economies have to seek alternative financing mechanisms to mitigate and achieve adaptability to climate change, yet, such financing should be done by those who expose these economies to the wrath of climate change. Notwithstanding these two factors, it should not be lost that geopolitics plays a critical role, especially in the issue of climate change. A pointer to this is the failure of some advanced economies, like the United States, to honour the Paris Agreement on emissions reduction despite being amongst the top emitters (Leggett, 2019), despite the onslaught of exponential climate change incidents like Hurricane Katrina, the increasing instability and trails of destruction in ‘Hurricane Alley’ (an area of warm water in the Atlantic Ocean stretching from the west coast of northern Africa to the east coast of Central America and Gulf Coast of the southern United States) and ‘Tornado Alley’ (a loosely defined location of the central United States and Canada where tornadoes are most frequent), major bushfires in California/Nevada/Oregon and in the Pacific and Sierra Nevada Ranges, etc. The Paris Agreement, often referred to as the Paris Accords or the Paris Climate Accords, is an international treaty on climate change. Adopted in 2015, the Agreement covers climate change mitigation, adaptation, and finance (UNCC, 2023a). It has been argued that economic competition between different economies coupled with politics is the main driver for such trends. This raises the issue of morality and ethics, especially tied to political economies concerning climate change.

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In some quarters, it has been seen as prudent by competitive economies to be aggressive and unyielding in support of capitalism (Mason, 2011), while in others, such landscapes are characterized by humanistic approaches that promote the concept of liveability and equity (Barry et al., 2013). The call by those advocating for competitiveness, though attractive to the developed economies, has far reaching impacts on poverty reduction, environmental sustainability and the economic development of other regions. With this approach, poor economies would continue to wallow in their challenges while rich economies would continue to dominate; thus, furthering the economic divide. Ironically the poor:rich analogy also mirrors the colonised:colonial historical power structures. Unfortunately, for less developed economies, they are forced to turn to these same developed economies for financial and technical support in their bid to invest in mitigating and adaptable infrastructures (Were, 2018). Interestingly, low income and developing countries are also pressured to seek financial support to meet their climate change obligations, even though they contribute less to climate change. On the same, when it comes to decision-making and policy formulation on this theme, the decisions are mostly made by those in developed economies. Additionally, in most cases, the aftermath of such decisions is to discourage the lessdeveloped, negate their capacity to invest in economically rewarding frontiers so as to decrease their economic competitiveness. This then means that these economies continue to remain under the whims of the developed economies; in a form of nonphysical territorial colonialism driven by economic colonialism, continuing an unfair and vicious historical circle of the geopolitical mess. With respect to those advocating for humanistic approaches, several forwardlooking steps have been made toward the same. In particular, through the United Nations Frameworks Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (UNCC, 2023b), there have been reputable agreements and proposals that have been put forward that would see some levels of equity achieved (Tanner & Allouche, 2011). The most notable achievement in this regard is the formulation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations, 2023) and the New Urban Agenda (NUA) (Habitat III, 2023) that explicitly outlines what ought to be done to achieve liveability, resiliency, adaptability, sustainability, and equity. By adopting these frameworks, the political landscape can be tallied with environmental dimensions leading to more inclusive discussions for the betterment of all economies. Indeed, in the whole global debate about climate change, the underlying factor that needs to be acknowledged is the preservation of humanity and promotion of a global society that is grounded on the concepts of fairness and justice. Though such may seem unattainable in economic competitive terms, the proposals in the SDGs and NUA help to set the ground for numerous other ways of achieving inclusivity and allowing less developed and emerging economies to pursue strategies that would help them foster their economic growth and development.

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2.5 Conclusion This chapter introduced the increasing challenges facing cities due to the impacts of climate change and their contributions to its cause or addressment. As there are need for change in the processes of design and planning in the form and implementation of policies and frameworks by international organisations and regulatory bodies (and private sectors), their implementation remains a challenge as it is perceived that a transition to more sustainable models may disrupt ongoing economic models, and thus cause a shift in the geopolitical landscape. Within such lies a subtly of colonialism. Revised models looking at tackling the issue of climate change are thus required that can offer a smoother transition that does not impact current modes of lifestyle.

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United Nations. (2015b) Addis Ababa action agenda of the third international conference on financing for development (Addis Ababa Action Agenda). In Third international conference on financing for development. United Nations. United Nations. (2016a). The new urban agenda. Available at: https://habitat3.org/the-new-urbanagenda/. Accessed April 2, 2023. United Nations. (2016b). The world’s cities in 2016. Data Booklet. United Nations. (2017). Urban environment related mitigation benefits and cobenefits of policies, practices and actions for enhancing mitigation ambition and options for supporting their implementation. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations. (2023). Sustainable development goals: The 17 goals. Available at: https://sdgs. un.org/goals. Accessed April 2, 2023. United Nations Climate Change (UNCC). (2023a). The Paris agreement. What is the Paris agreement? Available at: https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement. Accessed April 2, 2023. United Nations Climate Change (UNCC). (2023b), What is the United Nations framework convention on climate change? Available at: https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/what-is-the-uni ted-nations-framework-convention-on-climate-change. Accessed 2 April 2, 2023. Wallis, P., Colson, J., & Chilosi, D. (2018). Structural change and economic growth in the British economy before the industrial revolution, 1500–1800. The Journal of Economic History, 78, 862–903. Were, A. (2018). Debt trap? Chinese loans and Africa’s development options. South African Institute of International Affairs Policy Insights, 66, 1–13. Ziafati Bafarasat, A., Cheshmehzangi, A., & Ankowska, A. (2023). A set of 99 healthy city indicators for application in urban planning and design. Sustainable Development, 3, 1–12.

Chapter 3

Urban Consumerism and Colonial Structures of Mercantilism

Abstract Coastal Cities have played a pivotal role in shaping empires since time immemorial. Ports served as their anchors for warfare and defence of economies. While prominent now, as witnesses to the last centuries, such cities reaffirmed themselves in colonial history and also highlighted the importance of these port cities in national security and as pillars of national economic prosperity. However, as the role of ports is now less associated with warfare and defence, being seen as contributing essentially to economies at local, regional, and global scales, their focus remains the same: being a node for power and control. This chapter explores this phenomenon while mapping the changes and decline in the nature of port cities. The survey includes consideration of regional economic policies and evaluates their role in facilitating trade while negatively impacting low-income coastal economies. Keywords Ports · Colonialism · Economics · Mercantilism · Warfare · Trade

3.1 Introduction Today coastal ports are known to play a significant role in shaping global economies. Historically, their roles differed and were accentuated on military purposes for the conquest of power. Findlay and O’Rourke (2007) argue that ports were used as core connection points for maritime traders and also for naval warfare. Their narrative asserts that ports served as access points where imports and exports from and into different destinations were collected and processed. However, besides traders, there were other groups more inclined toward the desire for conquest and power (Liberman, 1996). This led to the seizing of new territories, exploitation of foreign resources, and a more pronounced leadership at both regional and global levels. This conquest and contest for power led to the shaping of the morphology of port cities and their hinterlands. Indeed, naval military bases were strategically based on or near ports since these were the obvious routes through which potential threats or otherwise would come from. Through these ports, especially during the period of colonialism, ill-appropriated treasures and slaves from submissive and subdued territories were transported to different destinations where they could be traded or © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 Z. Allam et al., Climate and Social Justice, Urban Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6624-0_3

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used for the purposes of further conquests. Glaser (2017) supports that, historically, most military bases, especially those in port cities were set up for imperial purposes including for the control of distant resources and for power-strategising with other empires. For this reason, colonists, such as the British, were able to construct naval bases in almost every part of the global shorelines (Vego, 2003). Despite the value attributed to naval bases, during and at near the end of colonialism, including the Second World War years, the role of ports witnessed a transition from being points of naval military to points of extensive commerce and trade (Loyen et al., 2003). This can be attributed to the increased global attributions of peace, and to the setting up of organisations like the League of Nations (1920–1946), United Nations (1945–), and the European Union (1993–) (Grieco et al., 2019). Most countries have since been able to take self-determination and self-rule, hence, foreign militaries respect the rule of the land. Secondly, due to advancement in technologies, as noted by Glaser (2017), some of the purposes of having naval bases in or near ports have been rendered almost obsolete and can be considered as being a liability. For example, the advancement of alternative transport and communication methods that are much faster, more efficient, and cost effective, has seen numerous military operations and activities shift to these alternatives. Glaser (2017) argues that the ability of countries to use sophisticated weapons that can be launched from remote locations, and also their ability to access almost every part of the globe in real-time has seen most foreign military port bases rendered obsolete. This fact is also strengthened by the decline of external security threats, with the eminent ones being deterred using alternative approaches rather than military confrontations. The Center for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) (CPNI, 2019) further notes that modern security threats are majorly internal and emanate from terrorism, trafficking and cybercrimes, which transcend across the globe, and do not require an established physical foreign military base to address. These technologies have also made the ‘global village’ adage a reality. Since most ports take pride in advanced development and valued infrastructure due to their previous uses, hosting numerous economic activities resulted from globalisation (Munim & Schramm, 2018). For this reason, port cities are known to provide substantial revenue to local economies (Dwarakish & Salim, 2015). For instance, in a global context, in 2017, the number of goods exported/imported worldwide from ports amounted to 10.7 billion tons, which was a 1.5 billion increase from what was reported in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2018a). According to a UNCTAD (2018a) report on global economic statistics of 2018, the Asia region exported over 4.4 billion tons of goods and imported over 6.5 billion tons in 2017 across all Asian seaports. These statistics are significant to the global and local economies, especially noting that the global export and import economy in the same period reported above was USD$17.7 trillion and the global GDP grew by 3.1%, thereby evidencing the contribution of ports that were and are known to handle most of the global merchandise trade. As the world’s demographics changes has been quietly nurturing a burgeoning middle class, equating to an increasing consumer market, the value of ports in various remote locations has attracted the interest of global superpowers in persistently seeking access to these ports. The economic potential of these interests is significant,

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attracting long-term trade agreements and market monopolies (Dunn, 2015). Further, the world has witnessed spirited efforts aimed at drafting policies and deals that are seen to unfairly benefit global superpowers, consumer markets and or trade blocks (Stiglitz, 2003). While these arrangements are hailed by many as showcase exemplars, they often do not always cater to local economies’ best interests (Corrales-Leal et al., 2007). Against this backdrop, the succeeding sections will delve deeper into showcasing how ports were strategically positioned and used to support not only the objectives of colonialism, but also how they allowed different forms of trade, allowing mercantilism to thrive. Included is a discussion about how, after the development of a port, military power was used to tangibly and or intangibly forcibly subject countries to only trade with selected empires, how the competing empires were not ready to trade with each other except under strict conditions that did not support any form of free trade, or balance trade. The third section is dedicated to discussing how ports were not only used for trade but also served as nodes of diversity and cultural exchange. This chapter underlines the significant contribution of ports in the eco-political spectrum, and that through guided policies, targeted at addressing trade imbalance between different regions, they can help spur the economic growth of low-income and developing economies.

3.2 Coastal Cities and Colonialism Kashef (2016) postulates that the living standards in Europe at the time of colonialism (c. 1780–1850) were very low, despite the region baring the tag of being a superpower. Hence, European health wellbeing was, at the time, far more developed than most other regions of the world. It is reported that the provision of certain resources like food, water, shelter, and healthcare was still rudimentary, and people opted to move to other parts of the globe in search of such resources (Lee & Lawton, 2002). It is worth noting that during this period, the ‘liveability’ status as we know it today was different, as the numerical parameters and databases used to measure the concepts of liveability in the modern world were absent then. Employment opportunities were scarce, and due to the lack of extensive markets for locally produced goods, that were enabled by industrialization during that period, the imperial rulers of the day could not afford or ‘turned a blind eye’ to providing services worthy of enabling and or supporting high liveability of their citizens, or even decent living conditions of quality food, water, shelter, and healthcare (Farr, 2003). Farr (2003) explains that this problem was also compounded by the increasing demand for raw materials for industries as well as increasing labour demand. This pattern subsequently accelerated rural–urban migrations (Butters et al., 2020; Cheshmehzangi, 2016; Zhang et al., 2023). Interestingly, this also influenced agricultural and mining policies and shifts in their productivity biases as the demand for raw materials became more specialized (O’Flanagan, 2008). The disruption of new industries also had a toll upon the environment in terms of noise, air and water pollution, especially noting that the technologies

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of that era were not aligned with sustainable outcomes (Cheshmehzangi & Dawodu, 2019a, 2019b; Cheshmehzangi et al., 2021; Kirby, 2013), thus further leading to low liveability levels of urban areas, or peri-urban areas (Cheshmehzangi, 2020) in the instance where factories were made to rely on agricultural sectors (Thomas, 1985). While the industrialization led to the increase of the manufacturing sector and subsequently leading economic growth from the increase in trade, Bayly (2003) explains that there was a heavy financial burden as a consequence upon locals in the form of imposed taxes. The latter was because governments, and colonial empires, were in dire need of financial resources to support both their industrial ambitions underpinned by their colonial resource catchments, and to increase their military activities to protect such interests. Kennedy (1988) argues that this also meant the nurturing and establishment of new colonies as well as increased military protection imperatives in addition to the already established colonies from attacks initiated by competing empires or by rebellious local groups. During the colonial era, Europe boasted of its established ports and respective vast naval fleets, that were used as the key conduits of people and goods transportation of both people and goods (Mahan, 1890). In contrast, Syrett (1998) contends that despite these extensive naval fleets, that most sea vessels of the time were always crowded, with people living on meagre supplies of resources (such as food, water and medical supply resulting in scurvy being commonplace). However, this did not stop the colonial determination to explore new places to feed the gears of home country industrializations ([The] Colonial Period, 2012). Lee and Lawton (2002) attribute this agenda as their drive to seek opportunities far from home due to rising populations in their European home cities, from seasonal and cyclical unemployment due to the availability of forced labor, and from the use of unskilled and casual labour to support their industrialization processes and productions. The latter resulted in ensuring low wages that locals could compete with. This phenomenon led to the development of an influential transportation system for people (and slaves) and the movement of goods to and from countries where they were abundant to in-between trade markets and industries. Findlay and O’Rourke (2007) highlight how the establishment of overseas military centres, through ports, allowed colonial empires to enjoy strategic locations where the respective empire could control trade and power in neighbouring regions without confrontation from their peers. For instance, Thomas (2007) addresses how the Portuguese empire, which was seen to be largely maritime, seldom attempted territorial colonization beyond key ports and their immediate hinterlands (e.g., Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, Goa, Moluccas) and this spared them from confrontations, unlike other empires. Such ports also served as centres for the collection of treasures and slaves forcibly taken from First Nations People’s lands. Interestingly, colonial empires rarely traded between each other, and in most cases, they avoided crossing paths, notably because they were always in competition (Alison, 1843). Nevertheless, they comfortably traded with empires from other regions like China and the Middle East. These empires provided lucrative businesses for slaves and treasures like ivory that were in high demand in countries like China and other Asian countries of the time (Mahan, 1890; O’Flanagan, 2008). Collins (2008) shares

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how thousands of African slaves were traded to Asia, especially between 800 and 1900 AD, which he estimated to equate to approximately 12.5 million men, women, and children slaves, with some 10.7 million being sent to North America during the Atlantic Slave Trade period (c. 1526–1867). In return, the European empires would buy or trade items like silk, ceramics, carpets, gold, spices, dyes, timber, drugs and medicines, and different foodstuffs from those trading partners. The competition between empires for new colonies and trade routes exacerbated their confrontations. Thus when one empire managed to set up a port in a foreign land, it was highly guarded and protected as it was seen as a vital infrastructure that was essential to sustain the economic activities of the empire as well as keeping away any other competitor from setting up comparable establishments. O’Rourke and Taylor (2007) posit that allowing competition would not only endanger trade, but the entire economy of that city, or country and could even impact upon a regional level. This approach reverberated in the political and cultural establishment that the empires were known to infuse whenever they conquered a place (Eltis, 2000). Unfortunately, such trends equated to the pillage and looting of foreign lands and cultures occupied by First Nations People’s who more often never ceded their sovereignty of states and empires, not wanting to readily give up on their respective historiography, culture, identity, and resources. Sharman (2019) contends that colonial empires succeeded in their endeavours as most First Nations People’s were not accustomed to technology-equipped wars, unlike the West that had much experience from their previous confrontations between themselves and those from outside Europe. The establishment of power coupled with trading prowess also allowed them, in some cases, to establish ports with the support of local communities as colonial empires knew how to nurture a demand for their foreign goods and products traded in these new ports, while at the same time, they used the same infrastructure to channel local resources for trading in foreign lands (Arnold, 2005; Webster et al., 2018). Interestingly, it is evident that even though the military was a strong component of colonial port establishment and existence, their primary activity was very much oriented toward trade facilitation and protection (Sharman, 2019). Nevertheless, the militarization of these establishments, as explained by Findlay and O’Rourke (2007), was justified by the behaviour of colonialists, especially in regard to slaves and the practice of imposed taxes. This demanded increased protection from both local rebellions and invasions from other competing empires; a trend that was common in those days. For instance, Wisker (2007) shares how the British Empire was ready to fight to protect the Singapore island port. A key reason for this concern was its strategic location for trade with China, being a lead driver in the provision of consumer goods, as well as a relay for their home industries. It was also viewed as a critical control point. By protecting this port, Lloyd (1996) highlights that the British colony was able to conquer most of what was then known as the Burmese coastline enabling its increasing its trading in South East Asia.

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3.3 Military, Trade, and Mercantilism The role of ports in the geopolitical economy is well documented, and there is evidence regarding the economic contribution of ports through trade in the colonial period, especially during the period between the mid-seventeenth century and early ´ 2016; nineteenth century (1650–1780) (Findlay & O’Rourke, 2007; Gin & Tuân, Morgan, 2000; Tracy, 1991). Either trading between foreign countries, or through ports falling in the same empire. Tracy (1991) explains that European ports, like Venice, Genoa, Lisbon, Antwerp, Amsterdam, and London, served as the communication nodes between different countries and routes, playing significant roles in the geopolitical economy. Tracey explains that through them, there arose different forms of empires that were mostly driven by merchants and their trading prowess, which was dominated by mercantilism ideologies. Thus, where military interventions were not necessary, the pursuit of profit-dominated activities in most ports was exhibited by merchants cherishing trading goods and items sourced from different locations. Schlesinger (1917) argues that the mercantile trends of the day were enough to ensure the prosperity of a port and the imperial authority without the need for violence or military forces by armies. Findlay and O’Rourke (2007) argue that while the force was somehow necessary to maintain order, force was applied to acquire markets and the force submission on parties or communities that showed some resistance or opposition to mercantilism. For businesses, fair trade was all that was required, with little or no use for military power, but when required, it was solely to protect this relationship. Most of the renowned traders are said to have come from Asia (mostly China) and Europe (mostly from Britain, Portugal, The Netherlands, and Spain, amongst other European countries), which were said to benefit from their experience in seas and the availability of fleets of sea vessels that allowed them to import and export commodities in large volumes (Findlay & O’Rourke, 2007). Mueller (2012) expresses that the demand for foreign goods in different regions was insatiable, such that, those who controlled the ports yielded unqualified political power and influence and controlled the port economy and that of the surrounding regions. Morgan (2000) explains that this is why most ports were under the command(s) of powerful empires who preferred businesses with foreigners and those within their jurisdiction, but not with rival empires. For this reason, Thomas (2007) highlights that most empires had devised harsh laws that focused on protecting their trading systems and ensuring market control and monopolies, but often, such laws were constantly violated by colonial merchants in greed for larger profits or with the aim to capture power through underhand practices. Thomas explains that most trades and commerce in ports were controlled in a system theorized as mercantilism. This system provided that colonies, or subordinates to an empire, were to engage in a closed trading system where they could freely trade with each other as well as with the main empire and were also supposed to consume any surplus products that the empire would produce, but were not to engage in any way with competing empires or colonies (Magnusson, 2015).

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When an empire and its colonies produced surplus products in demand in competing empires, the main empire would trade such products with competing empires, but for precious metals. Metals enriched the mercantilist empire at the expense of its colonies (Wallerstein, 1980). To ensure that the colonies did not defy the unofficial protocol arrangements, the empires in control were forced to use naval power to subdue them and also to prevent competing empires from sneaking their products into such colonies (Mueller, 2012). With such business arrangements, though contested, trade had, at best ambiguous consequences for colonised territories and their people. Even though with market monopolies and monopsony dependency relationships, port cities and their immediate hinterlands prospered through in narrowly economic terms. They became the centres of migration, both of colonists and of other countries looking at capitalising on new markets (e.g., Chinese labour). Their economies thrived based on servicing newly established governments and military occupiers. However, even though there was economic growth, there were contestations as to the liveability standards of colonial ports and regions due to the noted widespread poverty evident by slums and poor living conditions of many in the colonies. Those practices building on economic pillars have been heavily guarded, as is comprehensively depicted above, and interestingly, it is seen that today, this protectionism is still present, though through indirect forces. This is demonstrated in the form of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) that, in most cases, were drafted to be beneficial to allied countries and less to those who were not members. Though RTAs are different in their composition and ideologies, such as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), and others are different in that they do not include colonial powers, being mainly Europeans. On the other hand, the European Union is different by excluding (many) poorer countries. In previous colonial times, RTAs focused on providing expanded and secure trade markets to the member countries, while at the same time, allowing them to capitalize on their potential through specializations as noted by Robinson and Thierfelder (1999). A case in point is the European Union, which has transformed over the years and now partners countries that enjoy free movement of labor, capital and services but also have a single currency that makes this trading block very strong (Fernandez & Portes, 1998). Other such include North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that was signed in 1992 (Bonderenko, 2019) and many others, where it is said that countries globally strive to be members of more than one such RTA, noting their importance. Venables (2003) explains that countries are motivated to be members of more than one RTA due to many factors, including ensuring that the local economy benefits from a country’s comparative advantage. According to Venables (2003), integration between countries with unequal economic growth, and by extension unequal incomes, only benefits those that have stronger economies. Thus the need for more arrangements than simply RTAs depends upon the region and objectives the country intends to achieve. In the contemporary context, the role of ports and the trade they host, though different from the colonial days, helps in underlining their importance in local and regional economies. Despite that new modes of transport like air and rail transport are being used extensively, and the world has revised its mercantilism ideologies,

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ports remain true to their value in allowing connectivity and movement of goods (Findlay & O’Rourke, 2007). This pattern is commonplace, though in several countries, local independent administrations have withdrawn from great port cities to inland locations. For instance, Lagos to Abuja in Nigeria, Dar es Salaam to Dodoma in Tanzania, Abidjan to Yamoussoukro in Côte d’Ivoire (Christopher, 1985), Yangon to Naypyidaw in Myanmar, Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia amongst many others. Indeed, with the increase in RTAs, which seem to be softer forms of mercantilism, ports have become popular in terms of commerce and trade, as a majority of goods (both raw materials and in finished form) are shipped to diverse locations from these ports. Munim and Schramm (2018) explain that ports are no longer just limited to cargo handling but are now at the fore in hosting logistics services, tourism, and hospitality industry and are home to a sizeable global population. All these combined make ports and the cities therein special contributors to the economies and economic growth. Jansen et al. (2018) showcase that ports all over the world have enabled governments to reduce their backlog in unemployment, allowing for numerous subsidiary and complementary businesses to flourish, and helped other forms of transport, thereby allowing economies of hinterlands, including those in distant rural areas to open and improve. This is facilitated by the improvement of infrastructures of those areas that are extended to link with the port city infrastructures that allow for free and smooth movement of goods between these distinctive areas. With such a significant contribution of ports to the economy, it has been observed that, like in the colonial days, most countries are not ready to loosen their grip on the control of their ports, though, to some extent, some essential functions like administrative services are and have been relocated to inland capitals. We can witness this playing out in Indonesia with their prospective national capital of Nusantara at present, as it occurred with amalgamations of colonies in Australia with Canberra and the United States with Washington DC. This is in contrast to the colonial period when the use of military power and arms protected ports. Countries embarked on formulating policies that best fit their economic as well as protection needs as the political circumstances warranted it at the time. As they do this, some, however, perceive some of these policies (Hass & Dollar, 2017) as ruthless and uncompromising.

3.4 Ports as Nodes of Diversity The direct contributions of ports to the global economy go beyond the physical trading of goods, as it supports a myriad of other sectors that have a significant influence on the economy of both local, regional, and global economies. Amongst many other things, they are said to facilitate economic growth from both the dry lands and the lucrative blue economy that is gaining traction with technological improvement. Findlay and O’Rourke (2007) posit that since ancient and colonial times, ports have served as the link between different regions, and this quality has allowed them to experience an influx of people as much as of goods, and with time, they became the melting point of cultures and religion.

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Dickey (2012) highlights the case of Marseille, a port city that evolved in 600 BC, how it has been a host to people from different parts of the region, and how it has earnt its reputation of being one of the most metropolitan cities in Western Europe. In addition to this port city, Lee and Lee (1998) argue that until the mid-twentieth century, port cities accounted for more than 40% of the world’s largest cities, and more so those in European and Asian countries. Today, as noted by von Glasow et al. (2013), 67% of megacities are port cities; exhibiting a predominant coastal influence in terms of culture and power upon inland cities. The main reason for this, amongst many others, is the influence of ports in regional trade and their expansive infrastructural developments that attract large investments and increased populations through the opportunities such infrastructure brings, such as job and business opportunities. This example amplifies that a majority of port cities, especially during the colonial era, were known to be more diverse than hinterland cities, and such diversities brought forth numerous economic benefits. Tan (2007) advances that the perception of ports being nodes and hubs for both social and economic networks allowed them to develop much faster than their surrounding hinterlands, both in terms of infrastructural development and population diversity and increase. Indeed, Basu (1985) explains that it is through ports that a majority of hinterlands have been able to experience cultural, ideological, economic and political changes, and for that reason, a majority of development projects carried inland are, in most cases, duplicated in port cities. Dwarakish and Salim (2015) observe that while sea transportation is deemed as the cheapest and safest mode of transport, it attracted industries that tended to import and export bulky and a large number of products. They argue that most of these industries are located within the coastal belt, and those far from the ports are linked by extensive and well-established transport networks. Findlay and O’Rourke (2007) explain that for a majority of industries that existed during the colonial period, raw materials were sourced from countries far away. The OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) has documented that efficiently working ports have, from time immemorial allowed massive economic spill-overs into their hinterlands, allowing for healthy economic growth (Merk, 2013a). The interlinkage of ports and their hinterlands has long been facilitated by a minimal separation between port cities and their hinterlands and fewer obstacles to the repatriation of profits, whether made by Western multi-nationals or by locals. With such economic benefits, hinterlands are able to address some of the issues like adequate urban infrastructures and looming poverty levels. Another factor that made ports primary to their hinterlands was that goods from other countries were traded with the advent migrants, who were found in ethnic ‘quarters’ scattered in cities, such as ‘Chinatowns’. Interestingly, most of these ‘quarters’ were located in port cities. The presence of migrants from different parts of the world has always allowed for a wide mix of innovation and experiences congregating in one area, with the resulting benefits being an increase in maritime service clusters, industrial development within the ports and their hinterlands, and portrelated waterfront developments as is described in the OECD report (Merk, 2013a). Loockx (2018) credits the presence of diverse migrants from different parts of the globe for their role in providing markets for goods and services brought via the ports

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and also for their role in helping market those products to people beyond the ports. Loockx (2018) argues that the interaction between sailors, migrant workers, and local working groups provided a melting-pot cultural environment for the advancement of micro as well as macro economies especially capitalizing on waterfront cultures. Van de Laar (2016) has debunked the notion that most migrant quarters were centres for social vile credited them with the positive transformation and economic growth that has been experienced in port cities like Bremen in Germany/Prussia, Liverpool in the UK, Marseille in France and Rotterdam in The Netherlands. He attributed the presence of migrants to the infrastructural development and ultimate growth that these four cities experienced during the nineteenth century. Even today, interestingly, the diversity and mixture of culture have given rise to new forms of economic dimensions, not only in the port cities, but even in their hinterlands that benefitted from the influx of migrants who relocated further as the roles of port cities diversified and development occurred in those new areas (Kostopoulou, 2013). Today, most port cities pride themselves upon their distinct creative cultural industries that support the rich diversity and cultural dimensions intrinsic to those places. A case in point is Shanghai, in China, a megacity that hosts over 24 million people that boasts its brand as a ‘City of Design’ by UNESCO (2017). Shanghai yields most of its pride from its cosmopolitan characteristic that nurtures a rich cultural diversity, which in turn promotes its creativity, especially in designing industrial products like jewellery that is demanded globally (UNESCO, 2017). From this industry, 7.4% of the local Shanghian’s find employment in different creative and culturerelated institutions and agencies. For example, there are over 4,000 design-related agencies and institutions, 283 art institutions and 239 art and cultural community centres, over 100 museums and 25 libraries, and 743 archive institutions in Shanghai (UNESCO, 2017). Most of these institutions are housed in regenerated warehouses and buildings that were abandoned as part of the port transformation and regeneration changes. Similar fortunes can be witnessed in the port city of Nantes, in France, in the regeneration of many of the dilapidated shipbuilding infrastructure that now supports one of the largest cultural and creativity industry concentrations in France, which Mansfield (2017) reports were able to attract e48.8 million in 2016. The city of Bilbao, in Portugal, which now hosts a Guggenheim Museum, was going through an analogous uncontrolled immigrant unemployment decline amongst other social and economic challenges. However, the construction of the Museum has given the city a competitive edge, an impetus around which to coalesce, itself as a global tourism destination of choice (Plaza & Haarich, 2013). We have witnessed similar transformations in the old port cities of Baltimore and Liverpool. These examples demonstrate how port cities have facilitated through time creative and cultural industries that have helped in the growth of the cities.

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3.5 Post-colonialism and Economic Injustice As we celebrate the remarkable transformations that different eras, like the industrialization and the technological revolution eras, brought to the world, we also should be cognizant of the negatives that may have quietly accompanied such periods and the impacts they brought about. In this regard, it is worth taking stock of colonialism; one of the world’s remarkable societal transformative occurrences that brought some positives and a sizeable number of negatives. On a positive note, it has been argued that colonialism reshaped the world’s political sphere and subsequently enriched colonial empires. As Austin (2010) explains, most world governance structures are, in one way or the other, influenced by the colonial powers that were in control, especially during the twentieth century, and we live their legacies today. Gilley (2017) argues that the goods associated with colonialism only count when one reads the conventional narratives of the economic value of colonialism from the standpoint of the dominant colonialists and their richly endowed economies. However, when the same is considered from the colonies’ point of view, there is little to be desired about the humanity of the colonialism era. To the colonies, most of the challenges, pains, and hurts humans, animals, waters, and landscapes experienced and still experience can be traced back to exploitations during the colonial period. Bulhan (2015) argues that colonialism perpetuated all those negatives to enrich themselves and their empires, and for self-aggrandizement without care for what locals were going through. Such self-interest prompted them to treat locals as mere labourers and sometimes as commodities that could be sold at a price wherein over 12 million men, women, and children were sold in different parts of the world as slaves and suffered transportation and dispossession of their heritage, identity, and culture (Lewis, 2019). Those who were left behind were displaced from their homes and channeled to ‘concentration’ or work camps to incur different types of atrocities and pains in the name of colonialism labour exploitation. The resources from their lands were hauled away to ports, to industries located in home countries of colonial empires far overseas, and the reconstructed finished products were imported back where the local economic structures—designed and controlled by the respective empire—were made to purchase the goods at exorbitant prices thus impoverishing the local economy even more. This is particularly unfair and serious as nearly half a century later, those former colonies are still struggling economically, and this is majorly credited to the actions of colonialism and colonialists. In today’s era of ‘Post-colonialism’, there are numerous calls from different quarters calling for remediation or reconciliation, especially to provide compensation for the numerous atrocities that colonies endured and or the return and recompensed for cultural treasures that were pillaged to serve as keynotes in European and North America Museums and places of cultural virtue. There is a legacy of Egyptian, Greek, and Indian souvenired items that have been prominent in the media over the last 10 years that have been ‘stolen’ from these countries. Collste (2016) highlights two case studies; that of the Herero tribe, a Bantu ethnic group from Namibia, and that of Kikuyu, a Bantu ethnic group native to Central

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Kenya, and their respective quests for remediation after the numerous losses they have incurred and how their attempts have incurred a very long tortuous journey for them. From a humane perspective, these two cases affirm that the call for remediation is justifiable and understandable. But despite that being true, there have been no noticeable hints in a larger geopolitical context that this will ever happen on a larger scale. The Herero’s and the Kikuyu’s exemplars stand as precedence in this matter. Still, remediation needs to be enlarged to everyone who, in one way, was affected by the heinous actions of colonialists. As another topical example, four First Nations People’s (Australian Aboriginal) spears taken by Lieutenant James Cook in 1770 from Kamay (Botany Bay) from the Gweagal People, of which 40 were originally taken but have since disintegrated, are to be repatriated back to the Country of the La Perouse Aboriginal community in 2023. Trinity College Cambridge, now the custodian of the spears in the United Kingdom, has agreed to permanently return the four spears (National Museum Australia, 2023) to the La Perouse Aboriginal community. Despite the deafness of former colonial empires to (re)consider their actions during the colonial period and to offer forms of remediation, there have been little successes to this end, even though organisations like the United Nations have dedicated clusters on decolonization. Even ICOMOS is negligent in this arena by celebrating and writing citation statements of significance narratives celebrating the processes of colonialism without an equitable narrative of alternate stories of the place (Liddle, 2013; Lowenthal, 1996; Meskell, 2018). Indeed, as Collste (2016) highlights of the Herero and of the Kikuyu in their quests for remediation after the numerous losses they incurred, there seems to be changing tactics and rationale narrative re-writings by these colonial groups. It is recorded that during struggles for independence in different parts of the world, colonialists would capture and kill those presumed to be the ring leaders of those dissident groups. After killing them, the colonialists would sometimes carry some of their body parts, like as described in the case of Herero’s where nine heads were taken to Germany in pretense for experiment purposes. A similar case highlighted by Wagner (2018) evidences how colonialists paraded the skulls of their victims as though they were trophies or souvenirs. In other cases, some valuable artefacts, like in the case of Benin, were ‘stolen’ and later exhibited in colonial museums (Klesmith, 2014). In the case of the Herero, the skulls of the nine members were distributed to universities and museums where they were being exhibited. Likewise, the artefacts from Benin were being displayed in Museums in Paris. Additionally, arguments of repatriation are equally being played out by First Nations Peoples within their own new nations by virtue of the colonials who stole items for their private collections and or such ended up inside pre-Australian Commonwealth established museums and archives. For example, Museum Victoria holds the remains of some 79 Wadawurrung People, of which four remains were reclaimed, repatriated, and re-buried in Wadawurrung Country in 2013. On this, the approach by former colonies is to pressure the colonialists to return stolen goods, human remains and artefacts especially remains of the dead that was wrongly acquired. Highlighting and requesting the repatriation of ‘stolen’ goods, as advanced by Dokolo (2018), is a classic case of how the fight toward remediation

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has been taken to the front doors of former colonialists on the basis of social and moral reasons than economic motivations. This struggle possesses a plethora of hierarchies of power and policy complications as former colonialists hold the ‘keys’ to institutions and membership of reputable organisations that advise on colonial remediation. For example, even though the United Nations, one of the most reputable organisations globally, acknowledges and sides with those calling for decolonization, its membership in the powerful positions that reserve the rights to vote on different issues is crowded by former colonial empires’ representatives (Heathwood, 2017). The vote on The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007 is a classic example of this power hierarchy wherein 144 member states voted in favour of the Declaration, and four states voted against (i.e., Canada, United States, Australia, and New Zealand), and 11 abstained. The UK voted in favour in 2007 but speaking on behalf of the UK government, the UK Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Karen Pierce, emphasized that the Declaration was non-legally binding and did not propose to have any retroactive application on historical episodes. National minority groups and other ethnic groups within the territory of the United Kingdom and its overseas territories did not fall within the scope of the indigenous peoples to which the Declaration applied in part to allegedly prevent the formal appeal of Canadian decisions to UK courts (The Wayback Machine, 2014). Australia changed its mind and in 2009 (The Wayback Machine, 2017) endorsed the Declaration, and Canada followed in 2021 (Aiello, 2021) following the passage of their United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act 2021 (Canada, 2021). With such hierarchical composition and complexities, former colonies cannot expect much support. Hence, their struggle is far from being won, even though the recent case of Mauritius regarding the Chagos Archipelagos (Boffey, 2023; Wintour, 2022) may have opened doors for a strong precedence. The actions of the former colonialists in such high-level organisations are well documented by Pearson (2017), who profiled how a number of them (i.e., France, Great Britain, and Belgium) ganged up to defend colonialism. Pearson explains how delegations from these countries argued that in the post-colonialism era, the populations in these former empires were suffering more than those who were under their control. This form of contradiction and hypocrisy only points to the fact that the colonialists are nowhere near being committed to making right for their actions during colonialism. The argument that their people are worse than those in their former colonies is evidenced by their Gross domestic products (GDPs), demonstrating a wide gap of inequality with their former colonies (McCusker, 1999). Unfortunately, looking at this argument from a wider perspective, one can deduce that such were just being made to justify their current non-sustainable actions supported by a nonequitable economic model (Cox, 2014). Colonialism arguments in defense notwithstanding, the push for remediation and re-structuring of political structures in such high-level organizations needs to be fasttracked to ensure economic justice is served in all parts of the globe. Similarly, noting that most colonial empires amassed wealth from their different colonies, emphasis should also be put on the redistribution of wealth even to those poor economies.

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However, the issue of how to provide economic remediation, as distinct from artefact and remains repatriations, as a redistribution of wealth while showing no major disruption to world economies is a subject that will be key in addressing this issue. This Chapter offers some perspectives on this dilemma.

3.6 Conclusion This chapter underlines how ports transitioned from tools of military power, as used in the colonial era, to tools for enhancing trade and commerce. While this transition witnessed a decrease in military activities in most ports, the emergence of mercantilism was observed as the new form of power. While this is accentuated by Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), which are seen to support the economic growth of certain regions, it is perceived that such RTAs are inequitable in nature to developing and less developed countries. Beyond the influx of capital raised through the advent of port infrastructures that brought about employment opportunities, port cities are celebrated for being the melting pots of culture/cultural exchange which can advantageously characterise the economic dimensions of a port town then and now and provide new ways, beyond economics, to rejuvenate port cities today.

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Chapter 4

Crafting and Transforming Colonial Empires and Landscapes

Abstract As opposed to Western countries, the architectural landscape of postcolonial countries hosted a rich cultural diversity. The advent of colonialism aided in first confining its population to the rule of one singular entity; that of a colonial empire. Secondly, it established a hierarchy of power that negated traditional religious, tribal, and community power structures that influenced and underpinned cultural identities. Further, the establishment of a standardized colonial religion and language reinforced in control of local cultures and the acceleration of colonial principles and laws. Post-colonialism witnessed a global landscape of near-uniformity of urban planning, driven mainly by the need for cars, energy, and resources that conformed to and supported capitalist systems. Keywords Architecture · Culture · Heritage · Religion · Language · Modernism · Capitalism

4.1 Introduction There is much that can be said of colonialism and its impacts on different colonies and the local communities that lived therein, including the pains and struggle that victims of colonialism experienced in their clamor for freedom and self-worth. As explained by Fieldhouse (1983), with the arrival of colonialists in a landscape, they cunningly imposed their own rules and way of life, forcing the locals to follow suit. They also wantonly took resources from those colonies without regard to the plight of the locals exporting these resources back to their home countries to fuel and stimulate the growth of their economies. This practice was furthered through forced (indentured/slave) labour, where in some instances, their relocation to other geographies continued their servitude as economic labour commodities. Thomas (2019) explains how most of the locals lost their lives through starvation, physical injuries, controllable diseases, and poor working conditions to name a few. It is reported that colonialists failed to give proper self-worth to the locals, where cases of rape, physical abuse, and different types of torture were rampant, all justified by

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colonialism’s premises that colonial masters could own slaves and could do with them as they deemed fit. In addition to the histories of pain and struggles experienced by the humanity of these local communities, colonialism changed the urban and architectural landscape and fabric of former colonies. Findlay and O’Rourke (2007) credit colonialism for establishing and constructing most of the underpinning infrastructure works in colonial territories that were physically absent at the time. Colonialists designed and established towns, and the associated infrastructures like railways and roads, and were also responsible for the management of the built environments of such cities. While these activities had far-reaching (reputedly) positive impacts upon these cities, especially by opening up their hinterlands to trade and facilitating the movement of people and goods, establishing facilities like hospitals and schools, such initiatives are perceived by many as creations to service the agendas of colonialists. Fieldhouse (1983) argues that most local communities were content with their lifestyles, offering alternative practices in education, medicine, leadership and communication, which did not require colonial assistance. Despite this, colonialists are said to have introduced and established hierarchies of power and enforced these structures and their cultural dimensions, especially through the use of religion and language. Colonialists, within these structures, demonized local religions and languages with the intent of disrupting local lifestyles, which aided their easy manipulation and control of local residents. Colonialists gained the advantage of control in these areas by introducing and forcing uniformity in religion, beliefs, language, and culture. Through these tangible and intangible agendas, colonialists were able to establish their reign, as the agendas served as justification instruments for domination, as documented by Gascoigne (2008). In the majority of instances, colonialists introduced their foreign and cultural practices by fashioning themselves as evangelical missionaries with ‘good intentions’ to liberate locals from what they perceived as ‘ignorance’ (Chinoda, 2010). These transformative religious agendas served as tools to strengthen their imperial dominance. For example, missionaries have been accused of carrying the bible in one hand, and a gun in the other (Nderitu, 2018). Similarly, it said while they piously introduced their own education systems, the graduands were used to advance their foreign agendas, especially in assimilating selected cultural practices. Where the efforts by missionaries to advance their agendas were opposed, the missionaries and government officials reverted to the use of force to ensure that their intended objectives of enculturation were achieved. Introducing and spreading a uniform culture to locals was aimed at negating local cultures and identity making it easy to control and rule. As documented by Clarke et al. (1983), it was successfully achieved as most local cultures, religious beliefs, education systems, administrative practices, and cultural designs were subsumed to conform to those of colonial empires. In terms of religious cultures, colonialists labelled most local cultures as archaic, retrogressive, and occultist, enabling their prohibition. This demonization led to many local religions being abandoned, or shifting ‘underground’, in favour of imported colonial-conformist religions. Even under post-colonialism, it is evident that most communities in different former

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colonies still pursue colonial-conformist religious practices. These practices were carried forth into the design and construction of religious structural buildings, religious materials, religious paraphernalia, and methods of worship. On the educational front, before colonialism, most communities in former colonies taught education practices underpinned by the necessities of survival tactics (Mosweunyane, 2013). Such traditional education strategies were imparted through observation, story-telling, learning-by-doing, and other form of artistic practices. Colonialists, in contrast, introduced formal hierarchical education systems and built numerous educational institutions, which were continued to be pursued even after the abolition of slavery and colonialism. The same trends are evident in administration systems where colonial approaches, especially in politics, substituted traditional practices, the use of national constitutions, administrative regimes, etc. While there were positive innovations and initiatives in areas including education, medicine, administration, etc., the hidden dark shadows still linger behind these institutions and regimes. For example, in pre-colonialism times, there was little evidence of racism, religious strife, social disintegration, and political confrontation, as evident in the current era. Olusoga (2015) argues that the roots of racism, especially associated with Europeans, can be traced back to the Atlantic Slave Trade, from approximately 1526 to 1867, and also during the colonialism era. Before colonialism, there was extensive evidence of peaceful co-existence between different First Nations People’s communities, where people pursued their respective religious convictions without interference(s) from other groups, and the administrative responsibilities that serviced and institutionalised these generational and traditional protocols. Today, especially in the global south, there are increased cases of tribalism, racism, religious strives, political upheavals, and social disintegration that all can be traced back to colonial practices and teaching (Morrock, 1973). For instance, there is no disputing that new political boundaries that were introduced by colonialists have caused extensive negative consequences around the world. Even the rampant economic inequalities in urban areas are all a result of colonial practices that encouraged such political and map-making divisions.

4.2 Re-defining Hierarchies of Power Colonial strategies for securing power were not only limited to introducing respective foreign languages and cultures, but they were also represented through increased incidences where colonists fueled disharmonies and tensions between different cultural groups. In particular, the British colonialism regime, which, according to Laycock (2013), reigned over 90% of the world at their imperial peak is understood to have perfected this hierarchical strategy, especially through their direct and or indirect policies of ‘divide and rule’. Khapoya (1998) argues that the British favoured this strategy because it allowed them to create and institutionalize ethnic groupings, by installing tokenistic chiefs who governed the locals on their behalf, weakening any form of

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local ties and traditional governance hierarchies. Ali and et al. (2015) explain that by allowing ethnic rivalries to thrive, colonialism ensured that there could be no construction of a shared national identity as each group would be pulling for their own selfish agendas. In some cases, this included collaborating with colonial masters to defeat an ethnic group or groups that sought to oppose these new colonial regimes and their rules. With numerically small ethnic groups to deal with, it became possible for colonialists to decimate a sizeable number of cultures, disintegrating their own languages, identities, and histories and dispossessing them from their Country and, thus, their spiritual home. On this, Nunn (2010) argues that in most former colonies, the most predominant cultures are those influenced by foreign colonial practices, and traditional ones that still exist to date are seen as backward and retrogressive. The abandonment of original cultures, as noted by Wiener (2013), is still present even in today’s age of post-colonialism, especially with respect to religious structures, familial configurations, and political regimes. Having succeeded in establishing the ‘divide and rule’ policy, a thread was to create local administrative units headed by local chiefs that were accountable and reportable to the newly established hierarchies of power created by the colonialists. Those policy threads were based upon racial biases that propagated stereotypes with the local First Nations People’s required to submit to colonial masters. A classic exemplar is what transpired in India, where Pakistan was hacked out of India, perpetuating Hindu-Muslim religious antagonism (Shoup, 2018). Despite the euphoria of independence, this antagonism escalated, requiring the intervention of their former colonial master to quell what they themselves started, and unfortunately, continues today (Tharoor, 2017). Ray (2018) explains how various colonial masters forced the erosion of African culture, especially by introducing racial and geographical boundaries that saw the emergence of a culture of violence that necessitated regular interventions of centralized forms of power by past colonial masters and or their international surrogates of the League of Nations (1920–1946) and the United Nations (1945–). According to Arowolo (2010), such violence has its origins in the new creation of hierarchies of power that contradicted generational practices and protocols in different cultures. These old ‘countries’ or ‘nations’ or ‘clans’ had their own long-held generational systems of culture and power, that lacked hierarchical reporting systems. The resistance to adhere to new hierarchies caused the colonialists to devise ways of breaking the long-held cultural hurdles that strengthened the resistance. Kasongo (2010) argues that this strategy was to ‘bring civilization’ to the colonies, which in reality, the apparition of ‘civilization’ was meant to overshadow traditional cultures with foreign ones for the sole purpose of a power play. Another strategy that became apparent and ultimately very successful, in Britishcreated colonies, was the introduction of the British education system that institutionalized English as a tool to control the First Nations People or locals. Sweeting and Vickers (2007) verify that imposing grasp of the English language was coupled with economic gains for those who absorbed fluency in the language affording those advantages in better positions and wages. This strategic re-positioning by locals, as evidenced by Salamone (2010), resulted in locals who yearned to win colonialist favours often abandoning most of their traditional cultural beliefs. Through teaching

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a colonial language, Roche (2019) contends that those charged with their new-found responsibilities did their best in demonizing local languages whilst framing their adopted foreign language as being superior to that of local languages and dialects. Those who understood this acculturalization process attracted more respect and honour from their colonial masters. When such rhetoric settled in the mind of the colonized, the colonialists went forth systematically, forbidding the use of native languages in public settings (Heller & McElhinny, 2017). Surprisingly, even in the twenty-first century, this norm is still subtly alive as most of the public functions and administrative protocols in former colonies are addressed in the former colonial language (irrespective of how many different colonial masters a colony endured, often resulting in multiple colonial languages) particularly English, since the British had dominated a large majority of the colonization arena. With the acquisition of a foreign language, becoming a gateway towards achieving economic and leadership favours (Tupas, 2019), a substantial number of First Nations People’s or locals embraced this language by sending their children to colonial schools. Shakib (2011) argues that only basic knowledge was taught, and that those who graduated from these language-controlled educational institutions enabled acculturated locals to be elevated into leadership positions as chiefs or equivalent or hierarchical supporting officials still having to rely upon the knowledge and or directions of colonialists. This is despite the fact that some of the directives were for the abolition of established cultural and traditional practices, including the demise of traditional religious convictions. On this, to ensure that there were no religious voids, the colonialists also presented and ‘sold’ their own religion as being the superior alternative to the First Nations People’s or locals’ versions. Through religion, colonialists continued to impose and dictate protocols on certain issues, including family configurations and the need to reference those in authority. Unfortunately, unbeknownst to the First Nations People or locals, such was not introduced in good faith. By the time they came to this realization, the majority of colonial practices were deeply entrenched in the minds of First Nations People or locals. Thus, trying to regain self-rule and self-worth became a struggle waged both internally and externally within the newly created regimes and structures of the colonial power. The forceful and incessant dominating combination of foreign education and religions wore out traditionally-established cultures, eventually leading to their own downfall and giving way to the rules and whims of colonialists.

4.3 Introducing the Geopolitical Culture of Mass Consumption The introduction of language, religion, and new social and political hierarchies were not the only foreign cultural elements or policies introduced by colonialists. During their conquest endeavours, partly fueled by the colonists searching for prospective goods and products to trade with their home countries and trading partners,

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the colonists prompted the birth and rise of modern consumerism. In particular, as narrated by Lewis (1998), the increase of manufactured products, perpetuated by the industrial revolution and the availability of raw materials sourced from colonies, enabled the demand for such goods to be increased. While term ‘consumerism’— being a social and economic order that encourages the acquisition of goods and services in an ever-increasing amount—is often stereotyped with the contemporary mass production culture of China, resulting in the first centralized form of intensive trade between and across regions that were indirectly designed under colonization. Findlay and O’Rourke (2007) argue that each of the colonies—irrespective of their size—was viewed as a ‘centre of purchasing power’, and these were driven by either local production or the importation of raw materials. In the colonial empire, such ‘centres’ were influenced and totally dependent upon the availability of one or more finished products. Carson (2017) shares that the buying behaviour of ‘commoners’ fueled consumerism, or what was then seen as the consumer revolution. Or, to write it another way, the buying habits of both commoners and the rising colonial gentry fuelled the consumer revolution, creating even stronger ties with Britain by means of a shared community of taste and ideas (CUNY, 2023). The increased demand for certain types of products, especially raw materials, led to monocultures and forms of production that redesigned the viewpoint of First Nations People’s or locals on how they perceived the worth of their land, geographic position, and their influence over a much larger system, extending well beyond their lands. Due to the introduction of colonialism, most locals practiced subsistence (i.e., mixed farming on small scales (Ferris, 2009)), colonialism changed all this by first transferring or re-configuring most First Nations People’s or locals into labour or production or ‘concentration’ camps—an internment centre for political prisoners or forced labour workforces and members of national or minority groups who are confined for reasons of state security, exploitation, or punishment, usually by executive decree or military order—and their farms were turned to large scale monocultures (or agro-industrial factories) with most of the crops being in demand both locally and outside of colonies. Such practices threatened the generational food security of First Nations People’s or locals as they did not have enough land or time to cultivate food crops for their own consumption. On the same, as most First Nations People’s or locals were forced to work in colonial masters’ farms, there was insufficient time to pay attention to their own farms (Eller, 2016). This meant they had to rely upon their colonial masters for basic supplies, including food, rendering them to their submission referenced to foreign cultures. Weir (2013) elaborates that colonialists ensured that locals did not have the opportunity to acquire suitable tools to help themselves cultivate their own familial and or generational plots of land delimiting and resulting in the decline of the productivity of local agricultural landscapes, let alone their communities, becoming a matter of great difficulty for them to participate in and access. While these local acculturalization and impoverishment strategies continued, colonialists continued to reap maximum profits from the agricultural landscapes they had established in their colonies. Acemo˘glu and Robinson (2017) paint a ‘picture’ of colonial empires representing glory and prosperity, but, at the expense of local

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economies and cultures. Indeed, the efforts, sweat, and blood of locals are what led to the enrichment of those faraway lands, with the amount of wealth and economic growth derived from the colony being something that the former colonies will never have achieved in their lifetime. Even years after colonialism came to an end, most former colonies remained underdeveloped. This conclusion is evident despite there still being dominant sources of raw materials for foreign industries in former colonial powers, and also the high demand of consumers for manufactured products from those countries (Ocheni & Nwankwo, 2012). This can be partly credited to colonial enculturation, where even to date, most of these colonial-imposed cultural practices still resonate and retain their archetypal strength. From education models, to economic models, there are only a few changes that most former colonial economies have initiated to transform their economies. The impoverishment of the colonies was also instigated by trends of working blindly towards an abstract goal of gaining power and money; concepts that were alien to the traditional cultures of First Nations People’s or locals. Unfortunately, the rewards for such efforts were enjoyed only by the colonialists who had the means to export mass cultivated products to markets in high demand. Locally, where the First Nations People’s or locals could trade such products, there were many restrictive laws. As noted by O’Femi (2016), First Nations People’s or locals were not allowed by their colonial masters to engage in long-distance trade, or conduct barter trade that generationally underpinned trade for most First Nations People’s or locals. It was additionally prohibitive to First Nations People’s or locals because the concept of using money as a medium of exchange was, at times, a foreign borne idea, and many First Nations People’s or local communities did not have a formal currency of their own, nor any knowledge of how to use money. Again, the type of products such as tea, coffee, sugar, pepper, and others that colonialists were exporting in large quantities were new to First Nations People’s or locals, and their consumption locally was very ¯ 1996). Also, as noted above, mass production of such limited (Ahmed & Apharoja, products required massive tracts of land, of which most First Nations People’s or locals had no prerogative to own. Indeed, this entire notion of engaging in monoculture and exporting products to foreign lands was an affair of colonialists and the rich, and it could not at any cost– benefit First Nations People’s or locals. Any attempt to copy what the colonialists were doing was a detour and a façade to disengage from traditional First Nations People’s or local cultural practices, resulting in the disintegration of their social bonds. As has been argued in this chapter, enculturalism and societal assimilation were the key tools that colonialists used to strategically manage to disintegrate generational or long-held historical and cultural protocols of natives so as to advance their strategy of the divide, conquer and rule. As argued by Meredith (2014), the colonialists achieved these objectives, while managing to grow their own economies, creating new markets, and becoming even richer and more powerful by exploiting the resources and human power of their colonies. More still, such colonies were left wallowing in poverty, and even in today’s age of post-colonialism, they still maintain some ties with their former empires, as they have not managed to find their

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own economic footing. They are still trading their products to their former colonial master and their colonial networks. Unfortunately, the market policies, prices, rules and regulations and other frameworks are majorly set by the same former colonial oppressors. Thus, the shackles of colonialism continue in a different guise perpetuating their entrapment within neo-colonialism.

4.4 Cementing Cultural Homogeneity in Colonial Empires As discussed in the previous sections, the cultural landscapes in different colonies were heavily re-structured, transformed, re-configured, and physically and economically impacted by the emergence of colonialism. This led to a myriad of losses, deteriorations, or dispossessions, including language, religious practice, arts, music, agricultural practices, designs, building and construction practices, etc. The practices and violence that were introduced by colonialists upon local communities had, and still have far-reaching impacts on their cultural heritage and are seen as the greatest impediments to cultural recovery despite the concerted and increased efforts in different quarters to save some of those (Lowenthal, 1996; Meskell, 2018). As an exemplar, Hemenway (2020) has documented the dispossession and removal of Indians from the United States, which were later enacted in the Indian Removal Act of 1830 (Drexler, 2019). The Indian Removal Act was signed into law by President Andrew Jackson on May 28, 1830, authorizing the President to grant unsettled lands west of the Mississippi in exchange for Indian lands within existing state borders. This Act led to the dispossession of First Nations People’s, American Indian tribes, from their generational lands possessing long-held rich cultural heritage and cultural identity in the form of sacred sites and ancestral burial sites, etc. A few tribes went peacefully, but many resisted this relocation policy. This legislated policy led to the systematic loss of native Languages that were slowly replaced by the English language, the native language of the United States colonizer. Similar scenarios occurred across North America, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, and many British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, German, Belgian, and Italian former colonies. While recently, monies are increasingly being expended on studying, mapping, and narrating such historical events and, where possible, help in restoring or saving First Nations People’s or local’s cultural heritage that is on the verge of being lost, the influence of colonialism still weighs heavily, negating positive results. Thus, the essence of First Nations People’s or local tangible and/or intangible living cultural heritage, like Language, faces unprecedented challenges from foreign cultural heritage regimes and Languages. For instance, in most former colonies, like those under British rule, modes of education mandatorily empowered the English language. Here, the knowledge that most Schools advocate for boarding additionally meant that children, who had not fully grasped the basics of their native language, were alienated from their families and communities, depriving them of both learning and daily communication in their native tongue. The equivalent occurred in religion, literature, teachings, and practices of Western

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(colonial) religions, all of which narrated that the religious practices of First Nations People’s or local were archaic and backward. While studies in different academic branches, like humanities, social sciences, geography, and others, have shown that culture is not static but is evolutionary, they all acknowledge that introducing a foreign culture can be disruptive and lead to the decimation of cultural identities. As explained above, the decimation of First Nations People’s or local cultures came about partly as practices such as education indoctrination prompted the First Nations People’s or locals to neglect their own practices and adopt the coloniser’s foreign culture and curriculums. Nagle (2019) has argued that such neglect points to how the financial allocations to ‘save’ threatened cultures, like First Nations People’s or local Languages, have not borne any tangible results. The dominance of a colonial language, in particular English, is seen to continue to subdue First Nations People’s or local languages or dialects. Nagle’s argument is further evidenced because the opportunity to use alternate Languages is already occupied by and controlled by the English Language. Attempts to alternate or dual Language arrangements are bullied and discouraged. Dalal (2011) argues that even local governments, despite being seen to provide some reluctant support to ensure full-fledged efforts, struggled support the restoration of disappearing living cultural heritages. This conclusion is demonstrated in the machinations of institutions like museums, libraries, and other cultural institutions that are mandated to preserve/conserve.1 Some of these threatened cultural heritages—more often physical artefacts—are seen to favour existing and former colonial cultures, and in some instances. As explained by Thorpe and Galassi (2014), some native cultures have been ‘claimed’ by foreign cultures, their institutions, and their protocols. For instance, Kikoi, the traditional man’s wraparound worn on the Swahili coast of East Africa, especially Kenya, mostly culturally-related to the Maasai People, was almost registered as a trademark by a UK company which was exploiting loopholes in the international laws related to cultural heritage (Maulik, 2012). The proliferation and influence of colonial cultural practices upon their former colonies during and in their post-colonialism phase are evident everywhere. On this, even in this current era, there are reports highlighting the analogous resemblance of architectural elements in colonies and cultural dimensions in remote communities. One such cultural dimension is using a similar foreign language and pursuing similar foreign education systems. Cultural Survival (2018), a non-profit group based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States, which is dedicated to defending the human rights of Indigenous peoples (Cultural Survival, 2023), concludes that such trends, especially with remote communities, are influenced by the negative experiences they have had with colonialists, and that such negative experiences are still rampant after many years of colonialism and supposed independence. Such experiences, like 1

In this book, we are conscious of the international readership audience, and thus our use of the terms ‘preservation/preserve’ and ‘conservation/conserve’, and adopt the definitions used in the Australia ICOMOS’s The Burra Charter: The Australia ICOMOS Charter for Places of Cultural Significance (2013), wherein: “Preservation means maintaining a place in its existing state and retarding deterioration” and “Conservation means all the processes of looking after a place so as to retain its cultural significance”.

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the destruction of their landscape environments and habitats through activities like mining, logging, and agro-industrial activities and other have prompted members of those communities to learn and pursue the contemporary education systems so they can use the same to fight for their rights (Jones, 2022). Another reason is the contribution to the resemblance of culture in different communities is the accessibility that different communities have with each other, and the way they have copied each other’s cultural practices including in design, dress, fashion, etc. (Hansen, 2015) and in religious pursuits. The same is true in the health sector where certain practices, like seeking professional medical services, are seen to be conventionally accepted across the cultural divides, though some traces of traditional cultural practices that are unique to different cultural groups still remain. But a majority of communities reside within the colonial norms and constructs. The revelation of cultural resemblances in different communities from different geographical locations demonstrates and supports the notion that colonialism, to a large extent, has led to cultural homogeneity globally. In part, this can be credited to colonial cultural practices like the use of advanced tools in agriculture, building and construction, health, and education, which allowed them to increase productivity both in quality and quantity. While such practices are admired by locals, and different communities drawn from different colonies, they have found it easy and comfortable to copy what their colonial masters were doing, hence many resemblances. The same can be attributed to the wanton transfer of people from their original communities to others during the slave trade era and once colonialism ended, as people from a given community could have settled in different parts of the globe, hence adapting their cultural practices to assimilate to a new cultural geography. The colonial era left an indelible mark upon our (living) cultural (heritage) landscapes, and there is no way of reversing the influence it has had thereafter, but there are means to ensure that efforts are geared towards the preservation or conservation of what is left.

4.5 The Economic Tragedy of Cultural Loss, as Reported Two Centuries Later As discussed in the last section, this loss of cultural heritage and identity leads to global cultural homogeneity. While many argue that this may be good as it leads to a uniform world system, there are many critics of this outcome; most of these critics reside in the social sciences and from First Nations People’s. The latter has raised issues, including the potential of this homogeneity to suppress the free interaction of groups of people, especially those with conflicting viewpoints, to force them to accept what is advanced by a heterogeneous society. On this, proponents of cultural homogeneity are accused of forcing people with divergent cultural practices to accept the norms and prescripts of the wider (dominant) society without regard to the views of minority groups. For example, in societies dominated by particular religious beliefs, it is perceived as a deviance to uphold contradicting ideas to

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what most people pursue and believe. It then becomes difficult for such minority groups to freely practice their worship without facing ridicule, violence, or discrimination. Social scientists also view cultural homogeneity as a tool to politicize and pervert the dominant culture. In such political-rich and or religious-rich societies, it becomes difficult for individuals to demonstrate their own voice, as they have to behave in a conditioned manner deemed correct in accordance with the requirements and expectations of the dominant culture. Stolyarov (2011) corroborates this narrative, adding that cultural homogeneity has the capacity to produce outcomes like anti-intellectualism, brutishness, bigotry, and crudity which, in essence, deny critical thinking, and anyone who is seen to be trying and thinking beyond what is prescribed in respect to certain cultural traits are opposed and brutally silenced. Such echoes Orwell’s (1949) dystopian warnings in Nineteen Eighty-Four. There are many other negatives of cultural homogeneity. However, most have not received the attention or inquiry they require until recently when it has become increasingly apparent that the archetypal characteristic of colonialism have and are having causation effects on local, regional, national, and global economies. As argued by Bove and Elia (2016), cultural heterogeneity has proven to have positive impacts on economic growth and development, while on the other hand, homogeneity is reported to be negatively influencing the economic and social fabrics of communities, countries, and/or corporations. Similarly, Estaban and Ray (2011) assert that when cultural diversity is curtailed and trampled upon, a situation where such issues like social cohesion, social integration and interpersonal trust wavers, it ultimately leads to negative economic growth and development. In addition, as noted above, where cases of cultural homogeneity persist, they are seen to hinder creativity and innovation, as people are forced to think in a particular way, which does not support insightful and positive economic and human wellbeing growth (Antlej et al., 2013; City of Greater Geelong, 2017; Westbury, 2015). For example, Ager and Brückner (2013) demonstrate that in places where cultural homogeneity has taken root, the production of goods and services is reduced. This may spark social tensions as people scramble for scarce resources. The role of culture in the modern economy, especially its contribution in areas like job creation and the growth of the global economy, are strong arguments to reject efforts to enable and facilitate homogenous global cultures. To put this into perspective, Ernst & Young (2015) conclude that the cultural industry contributes over USD $250 billion a year to the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), creating over 29.5 million jobs globally thereby allowing cultural diversities to thrive. Such economic statistics are commonplace around the world, where countries adopt culture-nurturing policies that allow for communities to narrate and or exploit their living cultural heritage, including the use of digital tools to conserve/preserve and showcase their cultures. Where such cultural policies occur, they are empowering and nurturing communities to devise innovative and novel ways of crafting more cultural products, including arts and music, that are finding new audiences globally arena, especially with the availability of platforms like social media and online streaming (Digital

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Culture, 2019; King et al., 2016; Psomadaki et al., 2018). Adelaide’s WOMADelaide, for example, offers a regular international stage for the exposition of culturerich music in Australia (WOMADelaide, 2021). In addition, there is evidence of increased activities in the tourism sector (Pietro et al., 2018; Richards, 2018) where travellers are seeking exciting cultural products—cultural tourism and eco-tourism— and people are receptive to travel from far and wide to satisfy their quests for unique cultural experiences (Richards, 2018). Understanding cultural diversity’s value was not prevalent in colonial times. Thus, little or no effort was undertaken to preserve or conserve cultures or cultural products for potential economic gains (Australia ICOMOS, 2013). On this, it is estimated that the cultural realm in Africa alone lost over 90% of its tangible cultural products like artefacts during the colonial period. Surprisingly, Kalmoy (2018) reports that over 500,000 of those artefacts are being displayed in museums in Western countries and calls to repatriate such artefacts are now increasingly being heeded. In addition to artefacts, the amount of cultural heritage loss in relation to intangible cultural heritage, including Language, religious products and cultural built environment pieces, etc., during colonialism is immense, and has had and continues to have far-reaching impacts on the economies of former colonies. Thus, many formerly colonial empires have to continue to exploit within their own economies the cultural heritage of former colonized countries, denying both the economic benefits and the cultural standing of such artefacts on the local, regional, national, and international stages. According to Digital Culture (2019), the European Union‘s (EU) cultural and creative industry contributed approximately 5.3% or e509 billion in 2018 to the EU’s total GDP, and employed over 12 million people within the EU. Thus, coloniallyappropriated artefacts are contributing to positive gains in the economies of Britain, Belgium, Dutch, Spain, Portugal, France, Germany, Austria, and Italy, as examples, and not to the respective colonial economies. It is, therefore, an economic tragedy that befell former colonies that a significant portion of their cultural artefacts and legacies were lost, appropriated, or wantonly destroyed. Unlike their counterparts in Western countries who have reaped large economic gains and international prestige standings to their cultural sector from most of these artefacts that have been stolen, appropriated, or ‘loaned’, their former colonies have little to exhibit and narrate from their rich and long-standing cultural sector. Ernst & Young (2015) have concluded that in Latin America and Africa, where most former colonies are domiciled and ranked at positions four and five, respectively, in terms of their respective cultural sector contribution to their GDP, observing that they had very rich cultural heritage legacies before the advent of colonialism. For example, the music industry continues to be a top earner and contributor to the GDP of most developed economies. Still, it is often observed that a large portion of contemporary popular music in the global north borrows from Asian, African, and First Nations People’s music. Paul Simon’s Graceland (1986) (also see: Denselow, 2012) is a blatant example of this derivation. These examples evidence the past and continuing cultural loss that former colonies incurred and continue to incur that negatively impacts upon both their contemporary economies and their modern urban fabric (Butters et al., 2020; Cheshmehzangi &

References

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Butters, 2015). If the reverse recompense occurred, then such former colonies would earn almost equivalent to what the former colonists are earning from exploiting them by exhibiting, researching/studying, and retaining artefacts and remains that have been stolen, appropriated, and ‘loaned’ from their former colonies.

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Denselow, R. (2012). Paul Simon’s Graceland: The acclaim and the outrage—As the 25th anniversary celebrations build for the groundbreaking album, Robin Denselow recalls the huge controversy it caused, The Guardian, April 20. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/music/ 2012/apr/19/paul-simon-graceland-acclaim-outrage. Accessed April 2, 2023. Digital Culture (2019). Modernising cultural and creative industry within the EU. Available at: https://www.digitalmeetsculture.net/article/modernising-cultural-and-creative-indust ries-within-the-eu/. Accessed January 10, 2020. Drexler, K (2019). Library of congress: Indian removal act: Primary documents in American history. Available at: https://guides.loc.gov/indian-removal-act. Accessed April 2, 2023. Eller, J. D. (2016). Cultural anthropology: Global forces, local lives. Taylor & Francis. Estaban, J., & Ray, D. (2011). Linking conflict to inequality and polarization. The American Economic, 101(4), pp. 1345–74. Available from: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/ aer.101.4.1345 EY. (2015). Cultural times: The first global map of culture and creative industries. EYGM Limited. Ferris, N. (2009). The archaeology of native-lived colonialism: Challenging history in the Great Lakes. University of Arizona Press. Fieldhouse, D. K. (1983). Colonialism 1870–1945: An introduction. Macmillan. Findlay, R., & O’Rourke, K. H. (2007). Power and plenty: Trade, war, and world economy in the Second Millennium. Princeton University Press. Gascoigne, J. (2008). Introduction: Religion and empire, an historiographical perspective. 32, 159– 178. Hansen, K. T. (2015). Colonialism and imperialism. Available at: https://fashion-history.loveto know.com/fashion-history-eras/colonialism-imperialism. Accessed February 18, 2020. Heller, M., & McElhinny, B. (2017). Language, capitalism, colonialism: Toward a critical history. University of Toronto Press, Higher Education Division. Hemenway, E. (2020). Native nations face the loss of land and traditions. Available at: https://www. nps.gov/articles/negotiating-identity.htm. Accessed February 18, 2020. Jones, D. S. (2022). Exploring place in the Australian landscape: In the country of the white cockatoo. Palgrave Macmillan. Kalmoy, A. D. (2018). Decolonizing African art: Colonial heritage and European museums’ Gordian knot. Available at: https://thenewturkey.org/decolonizing-african-art-colonial-heritageand-european-museums-gordian-knot. Accessed February 20, 2020. Kasongo, A. (2010). Impact of globalization on traditional African religion and cultural conflict. Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, 2, 309–322. Khapoya, V. B. (1998). The African experience: An introduction. Prentice Hall. King, L., Stark, J. F., & Cooke, P. (2016). Experiencing the digital world: The cultural value of digital engagement with heritage. Heritage & Society, 9, 76–101. Laycock, S. (2013). All the countries we’ve ever invaded and the few we never got round to. The History Press. Lewis, P. (1998). In buying we trust; the foundation of U.S. Consumerism was laid in the 18th century. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/30/arts/in-buying-we-trust-the-founda tion-of-us-consumerism-was-laid-in-the-18th-century.html. Accessed February 17, 2020. Lowenthal, D (1996). The heritage crusade and the spoils of history. Penguin Group. Maulik, S. (2012). Skirting the issue: How international law fails to protect traditional cultural marks from IP theft. Chicago Journal of International Law, 13, 239–263. Meredith, M. (2014). The fortunes of Africa: A 5000-year history of wealth, greed and endeavour. Simon and Schuster. Meskell, L. (2018). A future in ruins: UNESCO, world heritage, and the dream of peace. Oxford University Press. Morrock, R. (1973). Heritage of strife: The effects of colonialist “divide and rule” strategy upon the colonized peoples. Science & Society, 37, 129–151. Mosweunyane, D. (2013). The African educational evolution: From traditional training to formal education. Higher Education Studies, 3, 50–59.

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Chapter 5

Redefining Climate Policy and Economic Resilience in the Consuming World

Abstract Faced with the impacts of climate change and its resulting consequences on both societal liveability standards and economic drawbacks, cities and countries are re-evaluating policies regarding urban sustainability. This is reflected in global policy documents such as the Sustainable Development Goal 11 and the New Urban Agenda by the United Nations. Coupled with national strategies, there is a noticeable interest in mitigation strategies toward protecting vital urban infrastructure while safeguarding the integrity, efficiency, and performance of the urban economy. Cities and countries with low financial capabilities, such as low-income economies and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), cannot afford expensive mitigation measures deemed essential to their survival. Faced with this need, they often fall prey to unsustainable, unethical, and dangerous financing mechanisms supporting debt structures that are principally tabled to secure the power of vital infrastructure or their strategic locations on the global map. This chapter explores this conundrum and advances the need for revised financing mechanisms in the wake of climate change. A revised Emissions Trading System (ETS) model is proposed to achieve regional decarbonisation through the use of Smart Contracts in the Blockchain. Keywords Debt · Sustainability · Cities · Climate change · Low income economies · Small Island developing states (SIDS) · Infrastructure financing

5.1 Introduction The world is increasingly experiencing the unprecedented impacts of climate change. Impacts including: extreme weather conditions; impacts upon vital infrastructures in different parts of the globe; loss of lives; the emergence of new types of diseases; and, many other cases. When those impacts are compounded, climate change is seen as one of the greatest menaces to the global economy (Cheshmehzangi & Dawodu, 2019a, 2019b; Cheshmehzangi et al., 2021). Hughes and Sarzynski (2015) observe that its impacts are not only dire on Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and developing/ low-income economies, but also upon developed and economically stable economies (United Nations, 2023a). Historical record evidence the increasing prevalence of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 Z. Allam et al., Climate and Social Justice, Urban Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6624-0_5

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incidents including severe hurricanes, intense heat waves, and massive flooding events amongst such climate-related issues, have impacted regions, including Europe, North America, South America, Australia, Asia, and the Middle East. Supposedly these are regions that host countries with advanced economies with the capabilities to finance advanced infrastructural development able to withstand the impacts of climate change, but their capacities have been sorely tested in the last 10 years. Such impacts, including incidents of prolonged droughts and climate-disrupted agricultural productivity, have been rampant in low-income countries. Therefore, the call for stringent mitigation measures are well informed and is increasingly playing out in the deliberations of the United Nations and its Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (United Nations, 2023b). Fortunately, there have been spirited and concerted efforts towards such calls, as demonstrated by the introduction of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), more so the SDG 11 and the New Urban Agenda (United Nations, 2016a), policy documents by the United Nations aimed at building sustainable communities. Those are also supported by an array of organisations like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (United Nations, 2023c), Landscope Mauritius (2023) that have come up with resourceful and uncompromising agreements (e.g., The Kyoto Protocol (United Nations, 2023d), The Bali Road Map (United Nations, 2023e), Paris Agreement (United Nations, 2023f), and Katowice Climate Package (United Nations, 2023g), etc.) (UNFCCC, 2018). The implementation of these policies calls for, amongst other things, the development of mitigation infrastructures. But, unfortunately, to most economies, especially for SIDS and low-income countries, such demands are, in most cases, unaffordable. Nevertheless, the significance of such infrastructure prompts countries with less financial capacities to turn to alternative financing mechanisms, which in most cases entails incurring high levels of debt or long-term debt arrangements for which some countries do not have the potential to honour, and in some instances, such have resulted to the risk of bargaining strategic infrastructures. An example, Sri Lanka’s Hambantota International Port was taken over by China for a period of 99 years until their loan advanced to Sri Lanka was recovered (Abi-Habib, 2018); in Djibouti, whose Port of Doraleh Container Terminal is at risk of being placed into receivership by its financer (EXIM Bank) (Senators, 2018); in Zambia which is losing its main power generating company called ZESCO; (Laterza & Mususa, 2018); and also in Pakistan whose Gwadar Port is also in queue of being taken over (Aamir, 2017) as all these economies are seen to be on the verge of defaulting upon their loan repayment agreements. Many of these financiers have been accused of drafting their financing packages in such a way that they look attractive at face value, but in contrast, actually aggravate debt problems that some countries are currently facing. According to Gurara et al. (2017), the debt options to fund sustainable projects, though instrumental to slowing down the impacts of climate change, have far-reaching negative impacts on the liveability dimensions of the urban fabric that, in turn, impact upon the economic status of the country. This is because most resources and efforts are directed toward

5.2 On Cities and Political Leadership for Climate Change Mitigation

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financing debts at the expense of improving sectors that would otherwise promote and foster economic growth. As observed by PWC (2016), most climate change-related mitigation infrastructure is capital intensive and takes considerable longer timelines to complete. Therefore, such financing package measures cannot be relied upon to improve the economy in the short to medium term. Similarly, most of these financing packages have no direct economic bearing, placing a responsibility upon repayment arrangements being sourced from other sectors that are usually constrained, and in most cases performing below their capacity. Flynn et al. (2018) conclude that such debts are also entangled in financial impropriety, that some are exaggerated, that some of the monies go into the pockets of politicians and their operatives, and in most cases, parties that do not wish the debt conundrum to be resolved. Such situations amplify the debt burdens that most low-income economies face prompting financiers to hedge their loans on vital assets (Tyson, 2018). In these situations, economies with insufficient assets, are confronted with securing enough mitigation infrastructure that can never be achieved. There are systems that have been proposed to ensure that there are alternate forms of capital raising in the form of tax credits. One such form is Emissions Trading Systems (ETS). But ETSs have very limited applicability due to their contextual and technological structures. However, there may be avenues to revise the structure of ETS systems to ensure that more intensive capital can be secured to support alternate options over traditional debt financing mechanisms that can often be inadequate tools. In light of these, this chapter considers an alternate financing structure that can address urban sustainability while ensuring the survival of local communities.

5.2 On Cities and Political Leadership for Climate Change Mitigation Cities around the world have grown exponentially. Cities are now home to over 54% of the current world’s population of 7.8 billion people, and this number is projected to continue to increase to approximately 68% of the world’s 9.9 billion people by 2050 (Population Reference Bureau, 2018). Numerically, cities are also growing in numbers due to urbanisation (World Bank, 2010). The United Nations projects that these numbers will increase to 43 megacities and over 660 big cities by 2030 from a current figure of 31 megacities and 520 big cities (United Nations, 2017b). Villa (2017) explains that these patterns compound urban sprawl, expand extensive transportation networks, and appropriate agricultural lands, forest land, and other reserved spaces by residential and human settlement areas. Unprecedented urban growth is evidenced as having a direct correlation with national GDP, where it has been concluded as playing a pivotal role in the economic growth of countries. According to Frick and Rodriguez-Pose (2018), cities that host

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businesses and industries can provide numerous job opportunities and contribute significantly to government tax revenues. These numerous developments, in the forms of infrastructure, housing and business environments, also attract FDIs and foreign and local tourism and large institutions; all contributing to economic growth. However, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), International Energy Agency (IEA) (IEA, 2018a, 2018b), and REN21 (2018) all argue that in the course of improving the economy through various sectors and businesses, cities have contributed substantially in aggravating the impacts of climate change. From the use of fossil fuels in energy production, in automobiles, and in industries, fossil fuels contribute greatly to the increase in the number of emissions that have resulted in farreaching impacts on cities and their hinterlands. In addition, trends, including changes in land use, especially where forest reserves and agricultural lands are converted into built environments, have exacerbated issues like flooding, increases in surface runoffs increases in temperatures, and declines in air quality, all contributing negatively to climate change. Such negatives pose risks to the livelihood of urban dwellers, these businesses, and ultimately the urban economy. These challenges warrant the need for urgent mitigation measures to be adopted and implemented to reverse or at least slow down these impacts. Unfortunately, those mitigation measures are often limited in their form as they are often proposed and framed in countries with financial structures and capabilities unable to implement them. On this, Chandler et al. (2002) explain that the interests and obligation of developed and developing countries are not possible. Most of the international obligations on climate change, especially those related to reductions in emissions as dictated in the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 2007), fall upon developed countries that contribute most of the emissions. Developing countries’ obligations are different since they contribute little or no emissions through mitigation structures that require them to comply. It can be argued that such alternate financing can ensure that a city positions itself for economic resilience by promoting liveability in cities contributing to the economic growth of a national economy. Nevertheless, such decisions that seek financial support, are often motivated by selfish agendas by politicians who are interested in short-term political gains whilst disregarding the long-term consequences of such actions. To them, such actions are only meant for political mileage, which they yearn to gain in their short-lived political mandates. Additionally, they bear no liability for their political decisions even when they might plunge their city or country into perennial indebtedness. Okolo and Raymond (2014) explain that many leaders use most of the finances advanced in their economics for projects, rather than contributing to kickbacks, or allowing their cronies to benefit from such finances, or by using such projects as their own campaign tools. Such blatant disregard for the plight of their country’s or city’s society and the economy at large by such politicians is warranted by a lack of stringent policy frameworks in most of these economies that would otherwise guide how such financing ought to be used and who would be in charge to oversee that they are prudently utilized.

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5.3 Consumerism and Climate Change The aforementioned policy frameworks, proposals, and agreements by different international bodies targeting climate change have the potential to stimulate positive results. Despite the attractiveness of these efforts, their adoption and implementation have been relatively slow, especially by the leading economies that perceive these policies as having the potential to impact their economic outputs negatively. If every nation wholeheartedly commits and strives towards its actualization, it would not take long to see a reversal of trends on the menace of climate change. A case in point is the United States (US), which withdrew its commitment to the Paris Agreement despite being among the leading emitters and contributors to climate change (Leggett, 2019). The reasons cited by the US for this extreme decision was that the Agreement would derail its own economic activities in steel and cement manufacturing, its building industries and other manufacturing frontiers that serve as one of the pillars of their economic backbone (Rucker & Johnson, 2017). IRENA et al. (2018) document that in different economies, their commitment was to reduce their reliance upon non-renewable energy supplies by only small margins ranging from 15 to 40% by 2030. IRENA et al. (2018) record that despite these countries agreeing that their emission-polluting actions are partly to blame for climate change, they still prioritise the protection of their present economic positions more than how other economies is in the future when the impacts of climate change will be unbearable. The trait of NIMB-ism (‘Not In My Backyard’) is valid here. Ivanova et al. (2015) explain that the actions of these leading economies, on committing to climate change, are not wholly to be blamed upon them. In their argument, they narrate that global consumerism trends are partly to blame because they prompt insatiable demands for different products that lead economies to strive to produce, thereby meeting their increasing supply chains. Further, Henderson et al. (2018) assert that the same leading economies are in fierce competition to address this increasing demand so they can strengthen their economies even further. Thus, any attempt to disrupt the operations of their industries to accommodate sustainable practices, like the use of alternative energy from renewable sources, are little encouraged by governments (Cheshmehzangi & Dawodu, 2020; Cheshmehzangi & Tang, 2022). Thereby, most of these economies do not want to incur the cost of investing in new infrastructures, engage in research and development (R&D), and bear other unforeseeable associated costs. The rigidity portrayed by these economies, however, is not a new phenomenon. It can be traced back to the colonialism period, when former empires engaged in practices that subtly stimulated insatiable consumerism trends. During that period, little was known about climate change, and likewise, due to the small scale of their industrial activities, there was little perceived impact on the environment. Today, this perspective holds a different story as most economies are following in the footsteps of colonialists in their past economic activities, in their competition for consumer markets, in their industrial investments and in their reliance upon scarce and endangered resources, that individually and collectively result in colonial and or corporate

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self-enrichment, thereby exacerbating the consequences of climate change. Sharman (2019), for example, narrates that these patterns continue despite the fact that they were dependent upon unsustainable manufacturing models that had no regard for the plight of locals who experienced all sorts of inhumane actions like slavery, very low wage or no wages at all, and high prices for finished goods, etc. At the same time, these manufacturing models were then, due to the availability of resources and raw materials, from different parts of the globe, and the vast markets that sustained the demand for the new products (Clarke et al., 1994). Our contemporary era presents correlating issues of resource scarcity, sustainability policies, and product cost demands. Therefore, without a paradigm shift in our conventional manufacturing models, the postcolonialist-imperialist model cannot hold its continued primacy, and its influence on climate change can shift. The carefree and unsustainability nature of the past territorial colonial system was highly criticized by Marx, especially for its relationship between workers and their employers (Marx & Engels, 2018). Marx has explained that empires practiced capitalism, where the tangible and intangible rewards from colonies were channelled back into the empires’ home countries with little compensation for their colonies and locals (Mattick, 2012). For this reason, Marx advocated for a more equitable system, where each economy can share in the outcomes of the production process. Nevertheless, despite the cessation of colonialism, decades later, it is evident that these former colonies are still tied to former European empires as their livelihood and economic growth depend upon them as they wish to engage in global markets, with the European market being the most potent for a majority of these former European empires (Austin, 2010; Frankema, 2015). This over-dependency on former colonialists denies the now independent countries to establish new markets and also to establish new and innovative ways of production that reverberates within the global call for sustainability. Gale (2006), observes that this over-dependency provides former empires the latitude to continue with their unsustainable practices despite them having the financial capabilities to invest in more sustainable practices and trades. This over-dependency, especially in the governance structures of colonialists, has yielded what McCarthy (2019) terms authoritarian and populist leadership that mirrors perfectly how their colonial ancestral policies were shaped. These forms of governance have been problematic in adhering to calls for climate change mitigation, more so if the geopolitics and economic interests of all leaders and governments, irrespective of their size, are not being considered. The challenge of continuing to rely upon colonialist practices and footsteps drives the battle for climate change mitigation into a paradox. Therefore, it is perceived that if former colonies demand harsher actions on climate change, they are treading a self-defeating path as they are not equitably accessed global markets that are still predominantly controlled in one way or the other by the former empires. On the other hand, if they show a blind eye to the issues of climate change, so as to benefit from the wider global market, they are the ones that suffer most from the impacts of climate change. Therefore, unless we devise ways of overcoming dependencies upon markets related to those economies, former colonies, often low-income and developing economies, who continue to reel in climate change-instigated problems

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and continue to experience financial burdens in investing in climate change mitigation programs. The issue of climate change financing is further discussed in the next section.

5.4 Climate Change Financing As the impacts of climate change are increasingly being felt, they prompt actions from different quarters giving rise to numerous financing mechanisms aimed at ensuring the survival of cities and economies. This is particularly important to SIDS and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (United Nations, 2023h; UNCTAD, 2023) as they are the most vulnerable. The financial resources targeted for these endeavours are sourced either from the public coffers, from the private sector in the form of loans or Public– Private Partnerships (PPP), and other sources like donors, and financial institutions especially from developed countries that have the capacity and potential to finance such projects. Likewise, such mechanisms are instigated by numerous agencies, from governments, financial institutions, organisations and international bodies that promote and support the agenda of environmental sustainability and the need for equity in combating climate change (Kellett & Peters, 2014). Institutions such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have been at the forefront, through its numerous conventions, in advocating the establishment of alternate financing mechanisms, and through them, mechanisms including the Green Climate Fund (GCF) (Green Climate Fund, 2023) that was established in 2010 at COP 16 (Green Climate Fund, 2010, 2015), the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) (UNFCCC, 2019c) (Global Environment Facility, 2023a), the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) (Global Environment Facility, 2023b), and the Adaptation Fund (AF) (Adaption Fund, 2023). According to the United Nations Committee for Development Policy, by 2016, the SCCF fund, which had reached approximately USD$4 billion, had managed to assist 49 most vulnerable LDCs establish over 140 programs and projects established to finance viable projects and programs that would facilitate climate change adaptation programs in the LDCs (UNFCCC, 2019a). Other funds include the Africa Climate Change Fund (ACCF) (Kleymeyer, 2017) (African Development Bank Group, 2023) and the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Fund (GEEREF) (GEEREF, 2023), amongst many others. Despite their intended and far-reaching impacts, these financial mechanisms have been observed as being used as tools by developed countries to further their agendas on trade and income generation, while accentuating their own manufacturing processes thereby contributing to climate change. These actions are being untaken at the expense of low-income economies that are silenced by being the recipients of funds to finance their own specific infrastructures that are often highly needed, especially cities. Plumer and Popovich (2018) have observed that developing countries continue to sustain activities geared towards accentuating the impacts of climate

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change. Some countries, like the US, have remained neutral in honouring the obligations and deadlines embodied in the Paris Agreement that requires commitments to reducing the US’s national emissions by 26–28% by 2025 (Leggett, 2019). Faced with criticisms regarding its applicability, these funds have been contested as being limited. Linnér and Klein (2017) argue that uncertainties crowd such funds, have convoluted management structures, and have no capacity to respond fully to climate risks. Thus a country needs to seek more than one source for such funds to finance concrete and sizeable infrastructural developments actually to address one or more of their climate change impacts. Table 5.1 summarises these and many other financing mechanisms available to help build resilience, promoting programs that ensure low emissions and assisting vulnerable economies in adapting and coping with the impacts of climate change.

5.4.1 The Unsustainability of Climate Change Debt Financing The actions by some developed countries in continuing emission levels beyond the agreed Paris Agreement deadlines are having far-reaching consequences on lowincome economies. In particular, some developed countries are apprehensive about investing in infrastructure that would allow them to achieve environmental resilience that would otherwise reduce their emissions and promote adaptation measures that would allow them to withstand and cope with the impacts of climate change. The demand for climate change mitigation programs arises from the actions of developed economies to continue their emissions of harmful environmental gases and profit from these activities while disregarding the impacts such emissions may have on other countries. For this reason, a majority of countries are forced to turn to financial assistance from alternative sources, which, very often leads to incurring debts, some which are exceedingly hefty for these economies to finance without compromising other vital sectors. Were (2018) argues that such trends have resulted in most of these economies falling prey to some advantage-taking financiers who capitalize on the vulnerability of these, by even risking some of their vital assets and strategic national infrastructures. In this regard, Spratt and Griffith-Jones (2013) conclude that financing of green infrastructure in low-income economies is a highrisk investment. Their conclusions are that returns from these loan investments make it difficult for developing economies to secure long-term financing, unless under very strict and stringent rules. In this case, most external financiers opt for shortterm financial support proposals that are not always effective since the investment demands embodied in the majority of climate change mitigation measures can only be satisfied when long-term financing is secured. To avoid such pitfalls, most low-income economies have turned their attention to seeking financial assistance from institutions that specialise in green infrastructure and climate change mitigation financing. Zimmerman, et al. (2019) observe that this

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Table 5.1 Survey of notable green funds for climate resilience Type/fund name

Cities/ countries

Development status

Repayment

Developed/ low income/ SIDS

Partly repayable

Green Climate Fund (2015)

79 countries as Low income/ of 2017 SIDS

No

UNFCCC (2019c)

Low income and SIDS

No

Technical UNFCCC (2019a), issues, Igoe (2016) politics and limited funding

Least developed countries fund

51 countries by Low income 2017 and SIDS

No

Lack of funds

Global Environmental Facility (2019); United Nations Committees for Development Policy

Africa climate change fund

African countries

No

Limited resources Slow distribution rate

African Development Bank Group (2017)

Global energy efficiency and renewable fund (GEEREF)

All developing All countries developing countries

No

Funds only available in form of equity

GEEREF (2023)

Green funds Special climate change fund Adaptation fund

Low income

Noted issues

Ref.

Congo Central Africa basin forest Region fund

Low income

No

Limited time span

ODI (2019)

47 developing countries across Africa, Asia and Latin America

Low income/ developing

No

Limited to forest activities

Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (2019)

Pilot Global: Piloted Low income/ program for in two regions SIDS climate resilience (PPCR)

No

Only 28 countries covered so far

Bank (2019)

Forest carbon partnership facility

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form of financing has gained popularity in recent years because there is increased knowledge that most green infrastructure projects require substantive financing for upfront activities, project implementation, and maintenance. According to the World Economic Forum (2013), between 2010 and 2011, loans in green investment in renewable energy-related projects increased by over 17%, reaching a record high of USD $257 billion, an increase of over 93% of what was invested in the same sector in 2004. Recognising this exponential growth, The World Bank (2018) in December 2018, committed a further USD $100 billion to double its climate change-related financing funds to USD $200 billion, including the priority financing of projects from low-income countries until 2025. The African Development Bank (2019) additionally has witnessed numerical increases in applications for green funding, and its spending on new investments in this sector will rise to over 40% by 2020 as opposed to the 26% increase witnessed between 2011 and 2014. Financial institutions, like banks, foreign governments and similar, have also been at the fore in advancing financial packages in the form of loans targeting green infrastructure investments. The OECD (2014b) has noted that such institutions are popular in many developing economies and have been observed to mix tangible and intangible returns in their financing agendas. From these financings, for example, some economies have grown and expanded. At the same time, a considerable number have suffered from the loans, even having to forfeit ownership of assets to lenders so as to service loans, and also to ensure the completion of specific projects. According to Ehlers (2014), most of the financial institutions operating in this mode structure their loans seeking to attract high-interest returns because most of these projects have long break-even horizons. As Schmidt-Traub and Sachs (2015) explain, the nature in which this financing is advanced to these developing countries opens doors for the improper use of funds within the spheres of corruption, fraud, and the diversion of resources from the targeted project to other unplanned ones leading to unnecessary delays in the implementation of the core project/s (Ehlers, 2014). In such cases, the lenders are the ones benefiting since they require repayment after the agreed loan period lapses, irrespective of money used or misused, the justification for the repayment can become untenable resulting in loan default. The exploitative character of such lenders is thereupon revealed in the manner they handle loan forfeiture, with some developing countries being forced to surrender the running and management of key sectors like ports, energy resources, transportation networks or venues, and communication systems to these institutions until they are able to recover their loans (Were, 2018). With the recent increases in loan default occurring, to the detriment of positive climate change mitigation measures and projects, there have been a parallel number of calls for the redefinition of climate change mitigation instruments to provide fairer loan conditions for poorer countries. In particular, there have been calls to have systems, like the emission tradable systems (ETSs), reformed to override the underlying legal complexities, governance and institutional barriers to enhance monitoring and enforcement (van Zeben, 2016). Similarly, Heindl (2017) argues that issues like costs involved in securing the mitigation instruments should be standardized to ensure fairness.

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5.5 Climate Change Emissions Trading Mechanisms The issues of fairness in climate change financing mechanisms noted above have been subject to an ongoing debate. This has resulted in the establishment of numerous instruments geared towards that outcome. These instruments have been categorized into various groups, with the most common group being market-based and non-market-based instruments (Beder, 2013). Market-based instruments include measures like taxation systems that can help in reducing demand for certain products due to increased prices, thereby reducing negative activities in manufacturing sectors and ultimately resulting in less emissions. Other instruments include varying the liability rules, deposit-refund arrangements, and the removal of perverse incentives that ensure that no subsidies are advanced for environmentally harmful practices or products, including ETS, amongst other measures. The non-market-based instruments include varying the command-and-control regulations that conventionally entail setting standards for companies or economies to observe, reporting requirements, active technology supports, and the removal of green tech financial barriers, amongst other measures (Görlach, 2013). Of the many instruments, the one that deserves heightened credit is the Emissions Trading System (ETS) which can be re-articulated as a tax system for polluters where the money raised is then distributed to less polluting industries or economies (UNFCCC, 2019b). This instrument was proposed in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol (1997), allows countries that have emission units to spare—emissions permitted them but not “used”—to sell this excess capacity to countries that are over their targets (United Nations Climate Change, 2023a, 2023b). Thus, a new commodity was created in the form of emission reductions or removals. This instrument, as noted by UNFCCC (2007), can be implemented as a clean development mechanism, through joint implementation or through emission trading, and these avenues allow vulnerable regions to implement sustainable developments. Similarly, under this instrument, which is also an environmental policy tool, the developed countries cannot continue to produce emissions without limits since they have to adhere to set limits, and through it, low-income economies that have low emission potentials attract opportunities to trade their unused units. The funds they receive from such trades are directed toward projects that ensure they become resilient and can adapt to the impacts of climate change. The OECD (2019) has highlighted that this instrument can enable both the developed and less developed economies to improve their economic efficiencies, especially in regard to the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG). Despite its critical role in financing climate change mitigation infrastructure, ETS’s have been seen to be limited to European Union (EU) countries, and have mostly been adopted by industries. Hence, prompting criticism that ETS’s are ‘greenwashing tools’. To explain’greenwashing’, as reported by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) (Armour, 2021a, 2021b), the Responsible Investment Association Australasia (RIAA) revealed that 86% of Australians expected that their superannuation or other investments be invested responsibly and ethically. ASIC is

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an independent commission of the Australian Government, tasked as the national corporate regulator, and its role is to regulate companies and financial services and enforce laws to protect Australian consumers, investors, and creditors. These investors, as reported by RIAA, were not only motivated by their personal values but also, increasingly, by financial returns—62% of Australians surveyed believe ethical or responsible super funds perform better in the long term (up from only 29% in 2017). To meet this demand, managed funds and superannuation funds were responding by offering investment products focused on environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) considerations. But, the misrepresentation of such products in the eyes of ASIC poses a threat to a fair and efficient financial system due to the potential for these new funds to over-represent the extent to which their practices are environmentally friendly, sustainable, or ethical otherwise called in the market as “greenwashing”. ASIC’s concerns echo a growing global unease about the risks of greenwashing of financial products—partly driven by a lack of clarity about labelling or a single generally accepted taxonomy in this area. Mason (2011) concludes that by securing ETS’s, most industries have been able to exploit consumers of their products and services in ‘selling’ pretence that their extra costs are warranted to enable them to achieve a reduction in carbon emissions. These schemes reputedly also enable easy access for fraudsters to engage in carbon credit crimes activities thereupon seeking to sell their profits to companies that want to be seen as caring for the environment. Amran et al. (2016) argue that companies with questionable environmental reputations have been found to engage in ETS for rebranding purposes or to attract the attention of external stakeholders concerned about environmental and sustainability performances. Tang and Demeritt (2017) demonstrate that the mandatory requirement in the UK that each company must report and disclose their GHG emissions and account for their contributions has increased cases of fraudulent arrangements and insincerity about emissions, thereupon watering down the positive merits that ETS’s can bring. Another criticism about ETS’s is the unstandardized pricing systems. Heindl (2017) has reported that transaction costs—especially those relating to the administration of the schemes—are not consistent with economic sectors but are seen to be beneficial only to companies with high economies of scale. In such cases, smaller companies, with high potential to pollute can be tempted to falsify their emission reports or engage in fraudulent activities and engage in ‘greenwashing’ activities. Therefore, as warned by ASIC, ‘greenwashing’ activities can be counterproductive to global efforts to encourage the adoption of environmentally sensitive programs. Central to these valid criticisms is that they deny low-income economies the much-needed finances to allow them to attain resiliency and become adaptable to the consequences of climate change that would otherwise genuinely lead to a reduction of global GHG emissions. Another limitation to ETS today is its slow adoption rate, as shown in Table 5.2. In view of the current global challenges, ETS’s have merit for reconsideration and can even be redesigned and expanded at a much wider scale to maximize its potential. As Xia et al. (2018) have argued, ETS’s can be integrated with the latest technologies, such as Blockchain and Smart Contracts, which would reduce some

5.6 Smart Contracts Through the Blockchain Table 5.2 Countries with ETS and their populations

89

Country with ETS

Population

European Union countries

514 million

Switzerland

8 million

Tokyo and Saitama

20 million

South Korea

49 million

Kazakhstan

18 million

Australia

23 million

New Zealand

4 million

bureaucracy, fraudulent activities, lack of transparency and also legal complexities. The next section introduces the concept of Smart Contracts and how this coupling could actualise the adoption of ETS to a much wider audience.

5.6 Smart Contracts Through the Blockchain Smart Contracts can be defined as computer protocols that focus on enhancing digital verification, enforcement and the recording of contracts. Or, smart contracts are code written into a Blockchain that executes the terms of an agreement or contract from outside the chain that automates the actions that would otherwise be completed by the parties in the agreement, thereby removing the need for both parties to conventionally trust each other. A Blockchain is a distributed ledger with growing lists of records (blocks) that are securely linked together via cryptographic hashes. For Smart Contracts, once set conditions for that contract are met, these contracts are set to self-execute and distribute the transactions to the contracting parties. Iansiti and Lakhani (2017) argue that smart contracts are self-executing contracts that perpetuate the power of Blockchain technologies to facilitate the execution of a contract in a faster, secure, transparent, and credible manner, thereby helping the parties involve avoid unnecessary costs and involvement of external forces. For this reason, smart contracts are considered to be far superior to traditional contracts in all aspects, especially in credibility, security, transparency, traceability, irreversibility, distributable, and immutability as enabled by Blockchain technologies (Lauslahti et al., 2017). Sadiku et al. (2018) argue that smart contracts are both conditional in nature and also self-sufficient. They observe that through traditional contracts parties involved have to cater for extra costs like legal fees and monies paid to a third party to verify and enforce the contracts. However, with smart contracts, such issues are addressed during the coding of the smart contract program, and the self-executing character of these contracts cements this notion. Macrinici et al. (2018) have written that while the initial costs of establishing a smart contract platform and setting up the entire system may appear expensive, in the long-run they prove to be more cost-effective networks. The high initial set-up

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cost involved in programming and ICT expert engagements to oversee smooth applications of the programs, as explained by Szabo (1997), are due to the newness of this technology. But with time, besides the ultimate benefits, these costs are also expected to reduce and stabilize. Smart contract attractiveness is amplified by diminishing human interactions and increasing overall efficiencies in the entire process. Similarly, despite the overhead costs and resources that it enables parties to save, it increases the security of the entire transaction process. Giancaspro (2017) explains that the self-execution quality is intentionally programmed to allow for reduced human errors, and duplicity and foster speed at which transactions are processed, encouraging frictionless platforms (Mik, 2017). The applicability of smart contracts has had attractive growth in financial institutions, real estate businesses, management practices, and insurance company activities (Bodó et al., 2018). Smart contracts are thereby seen as the best solution for the challenges facing Emission Trading Systems due to their effectiveness and reliance. In particular, smart contracts increasing acceptance of adoption in the above sectors, have allowed for financial prudency; a factor that is known to constantly discourage the applicability of ETS’s (Xia et al., 2018; Zhou & Li, 2019). As reported by various authors (Gronwald & Ketterer, 2015; Jaraite & Kažukauskas, 2012; JaraiteKažukauske & Kažukauskas, 2014; Zhou & Li, 2019), issues relating to transaction costs in the actualization of ETS are said to be real and a hindrance to their implementation, despite their inclusion in 2007 in the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 2007). Heindl (2017) argues that a majority of regulated polluters blame high transaction costs for apprehensiveness in complying with ETS regulations, especially due to the irregular nature of administrative costs across different regions. Oktian et al. (2019) demonstrate how payments in the subscription-based model of ETS always end up higher due to high transaction costs being paid to banks that act as trusted third parties between contracting parties. Those challenges prompted Oktian et al. (2019) to argue that such issues could be easily solved by the decentralization of payments through the use of Blockchain technologies and, more specifically, through the use of smart contracts. However, the application of Smart Contracts to ETS systems will undoubtedly experience some hurdles because there are no known direct working mechanisms to promote its applicability. Nevertheless, this technology can ride on the power of Artificial Intelligence (AI) that has gained traction and acceptability in different sectors (Allam & Dhunny, 2019; Allam & Jones, 2019; Allam & Newman, 2018). The integration of these two technologies can be expected to greatly enhance the efficiency of smart contracts in the ETS since large volumes of transactions that are synonymous with ETS can be managed safely, efficiently, accurately, and anonymously. Marwala and Xing (2018) suggest that the further integration of smart contracts in AI promises a secure way of delivering bug-free smart contracts that normally only occurs at the coding stage. In addition to strengthening the security characteristics of contracts, the use of these technologies together allows for unlimited possibilities in ETS markets. Salah et al. (2018) hail the capabilities that each of these technologies possesses, arguing that using both would not only allow for security and reduced transaction costs but also increase intelligent decision-making capabilities that would benefit the

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implementation of the ETS and, ultimately, environmental sustainability efforts to take shape.

5.7 A Proposed Alternative Model The model below, as depicted in Fig. 5.1, sets forth an alternative to conventional capital raising for the financing of climate change infrastructure, as debt financing has normally been seen as unveiling problems in the long term. This model is proposed to be run on a revised ETS platform making use of Smart Contracts, Blockchain, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) to ultimately achieve regional decarbonisation. The model is further discussed in the section below. From the above discussion, there is a global understanding to combat climate change. This is better affirmed when one considers that over 170 countries, of their own volition, committed to the Paris Agreement (or Paris Accords or the Paris Climate Accords) on the first day the Agreement was signed on 22 April 2016 (United Nations Climate Change, 2023c), including the US under the Obama administration. Going forward, the Trump administration experienced internal and external Fig. 5.1 A proposed model for regional credit-based system for climate change mitigation financing

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backlashes for announcing that it would cease all participation in the Agreement (McGrath, 2020); a step that the Biden administration rescinded on January 20, 2021 (Mai, 2021). Trump’s withdrawal increased the carbon price for other countries while reducing its own carbon price (Guy, 2017; Leggett, 2019). In theory, such global unison is admirable, since it bolsters some confidence that almost the whole world is concerned about the causes and impacts of climate change. Nevertheless, in practice, it has been established that low-income and SIDS have been suffering far more from the impacts of climate change and have been facing major challenges in infrastructure establishment to honour UNFCCC convention agreements, the Paris Agreement, and others like the Kyoto Protocol. The primary issue they are experiencing is their low economic, technical, and intellectual capabilities to fund, construct and comprehend their plights, and thus they have been substantially unable to contribute very little to the issue and at a sufficient pace (African Development Bank Group, 2017). Where they have consciously sought to set up infrastructures with the capacity to mitigate the aforementioned impacts of climate change, the only stable source of funds for low-income economies is from financiers who, in most cases, advance monies in the form of loans. As discussed above, such financing is more often unfair, unjust, irrational, and mostly unsustainable, especially noting that the developed economies still continue to pollute despite being party to international conventions, pledged to safeguard the environment. The finances they contribute to facilitating mitigation programmes in the global south are given in piecemeal portions, and in the form of loans, thus, plunging these low-income economies deeper into financial problems (Plumer & Popovich, 2018). A new financing model that promotes equity and economic resilience is thus required. The model proposed above offers one solution, including the potential to provide an alternative to conventional debt financing, especially as it promotes the advent of taxing polluters and advocating for building capacity for climate change mitigation. Such measures would ensure true compliance with agreements, as well as availing more financial resources to low-income and SIDS to finance their projects. The following sections engage in the specific dimensions of the proposed model.

5.7.1 Regional Decarbonisation One area that has been observed to prompt non-compliance with the UNFCCC Conventions, and has been addressed comprehensively in the SDGs and the New Urban Agenda (NUA) policy document, is decarbonisation processes (United Nations, 2016a). As the global population increases, demand in various sectors will be seen to climb, and this will prompt industries and manufacturing companies to adjust their operations. In the course of these shifts, an over-reliance on unsustainable energy production, transportation, and agricultural practices has increased, especially in developed regions (Görlach, 2013). But it should not be forgotten that the agenda that mitigation of the impacts of climate change cannot be achieved when some

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regions continue manufacturing products using methods that catalyses carbon emissions. Unfortunately, the emitting regions continue benefiting from the sale of such products even in regions that emit less, and it becomes even more unjust that these regions are encouraged to contribute towards mitigation measures despite their low emission capacities. With the new taxation system proposed in the model, polluting regions are proposed to subsidise those well non-polluting regions operating under pollution thresholds. This, as explained by Mason (2011), would prompt an increase in price for the non-compliant products thereby making them less desirable to consumers. As proposed in the model, this price pliability should be aligned in real-time and computed against an economy’s set targets to ensure that they pay compensation commensurate to their emissions. This approach is expected to encourage further reductions in the demand for unsustainable energy while encouraging the adoption of alternative forms of energy that are friendly to the climate. The proposed taxation system would also discourage less polluting regions from mimicking their developed counterparts, enticing them to select sustainable paths as advocated in the SDGs and the NUA documents. Such regions would also benefit from extra financial support from new taxation mechanisms allowing them to continue to strengthen their resilience and adaptation, as encouraged by Spratt and Ashford (2011). The proposed model then allows for building capital while discouraging the further exploitation of natural resources resulting in the generation of emissions. The next sections demonstrate how this can be achieved.

5.7.2 Reframing Emissions Trading Schemes ETS has been observed as among the most efficient mechanisms that have been adopted to encourage sustainable trends as well as ensure that low-income economies are supported financially. This is true despite the score of issues that have been identified that crowd this system. With the strategies proposed in the above new model, issues like greenwashing emerging from the use of ETS by fraudulent companies could be checked, as the taxation system would ensure that they pay for their disclosed emissions. Additionally, established reporting systems could better identify unethical practices occurring in obtaining ETC credits. The proposed model is also expected to help reframe the presently predominately Europe-only popular ETS embraced in all global regions, including in low-income regions that have been reluctant to adopt it. This reformation should include and consider the pricing strategy, which Heindl (2017) explains, is unstandardized, thus favouring economies of scale representing developed regions. As argued in this model, the reframing of ETS and also emphasized by Xia et al. (2018), should entail integrating a scheme with the latest technologies like Blockchain, Smart Contracts, and Artificial intelligence (AI). By doing this, it is expected that issues like fraud, insincere reporting of emissions, lack of trust, speed of executing contracts, and the reduction of bureaucracies that have been hindering

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the uptake of this scheme, are eliminated. Similarly, such technologies could help transparency, especially in issues like taxation, like the proposed model. Such a model would allow parties to better appreciate the need for climate change mitigation and understand their need to contribute to financing regions impacted by climate change.

5.7.3 Smart Contracts In the course of reviewing the literature above, it has been concluded that one of the most prominent and promising technologies that can assist strengthen the objectives of ETS’s is the adopting of Smart contracts. Before the advent of digital technologies, the reliance on traditional contracts prompted numerous challenges and often discouraged potential polluters from adopting the ETS scheme. With Smart contracts, issues like substantial amounts of paperwork by contracting parties are eliminated. As evidenced by Romano and Schmid (2017), Smart contract increase confidence, reduce overhead costs, enhance trust and make the entire transaction process seamless and frictionless. With Smart contracts, the notion of industries, and economies enjoying economies of scale benefiting more from ETS’s is decoded as this technology reduces complexities and time-consuming engagements that have been shown to discourage small companies and less developed regions from opting for ETS’s. We acknowledge that ETS’s are susceptible to being influenced by hackers and cyber criminals, who sell these credits to unsuspecting companies and industries at even higher prices. Further, those legally trading ETS’s have been found to be overcharging, especially pegging their claims on administration costs (Heindl, 2017). But by adopting Smart contracts, first, issues regarding security are solved, since the contracts are stored digitally in the form of Blocks and cannot be changed once they are digitally signed, and therefore cannot be stolen (Karamitsos et al., 2018). Secondly, it is possible to set standard pricing for an ETS depending upon agreed terms and conditions, and once these terms and conditions are met, the Smart contract self-executes and distributes the transaction anonymously to all the contracting parties in real-time (Kim & Laskowski, 2018). This process thereby ensures that ambiguities surrounding ETS’s are eliminated. By integrating Smart contracts with ETS’s and other financing mechanisms, as shown in the model above, climate change mitigation programs can be actualised in an efficient and satisfying way.

5.7.4 Blockchain The Smart contracts proposed above are actualised since they operationally rely upon Blockchain platforms that have been shown to be very reliable. As noted above, Blockchain technology allows information, such as Smart contracts to be stored digitally, in the form of distributable transactions, also known as ‘blocks’.

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With Blockchain technologies, as more transactions (contracts) are created, they autonomously join the previously created ones and ultimately form a Blockchain. Once these blocks are deemed completed and are agreed upon, they cannot be modified (Swan, 2015). An analogous system operates in Australia’s land title regime established in 1858 (a system now used in New Zealand, England, Wales, Ireland, Malaysia, Singapore, Iran, Canada, and Madagascar) called the ‘Torrens Title System’ that works on three principles: (i) the land titles register accurately and completely reflects the current ownership and interests of a parcel of land. Because the register contains this information, it means ownership and other interests do not have to be proved by title deeds. There are certain exceptions, including unregistered easements or tenancies and rights acquired by adverse possession; (ii) title to land or an interest in land is obtained through registration; and, (iii) a government guarantee provides for compensation to a person who suffers the loss of land or a registered interest (Victoria, 2023). Blockchain technology is attractive for Smart contracts, as it helps ensure ETS’s transactions are successful, and are universally accepted. From this understanding of Blockchain, the most emphasised quality, which has been missing in ETS’s, is that of trust and transparency. Another issue that derails the applicability of ETS in various geographies and jurisdictions is the issue of unstandardized protocols often caused by different pricing strategies and trading systems. But, as explained in the case of Smart contracts, the ability of this technology to allow transactions to be stored and distributed digitally, can help standardize those issues, especially since it is possible for different parties to monitor those digital transactions (Kosba et al., 2016). More specifically, since Blockchain technology allows for both convention and digital currencies (cryptocurrency) of which, the latter is said to be secure and uniform across the globe. The latter currencies use high cryptography that ensures their verifiability and are not subject to strict regulations imposed in different regions by financial and government institutions, like in the case of hard currencies (Iansiti & Lakhani, 2017). The value of such currencies does not fluctuate with respect to regions. Thus, parties from different regions can transact without the troubles of exchange rates, amongst other issues.

5.7.5 Artificial Intelligence In addition to Blockchain technologies and smart contracts, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has been evidenced to be of invaluable significance in ensuring financial mechanisms targeting climate change mitigation that are actualized in a fair, just, and sustainable manner. This is important because the issue of transparency, trust and speed of executing ETS transactions are seen as paramount in acceptance of this financing mechanism. AI in particular, as explained by Salah et al. (2018), has the potential to allow the intelligent management and processing of data compiled from ETS’s transactions in a faster manner and any emerging patterns can be noticed easily.

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One area that AI comes in handy is the issue pertaining to the taxation proposed in the new model. In particular, as the model proposes a taxation regime that would cause an increase in prices of ETS’s in certain regions, deemed to be polluting more, and also a reduction on the same in areas that are polluting less, thereby making a proposal to be efficiently initiated by AI functions and actioned by Smart contracts. With AI, as noted by Nguyen (2018), it is possible for the buyers to intelligently search and negotiate ETS’s with terms and conditions that best fit the region and that can allow for maximum benefits. Such a trend could allow more polluters to participate in sustainable practices as they do not have to worry about being overpriced for the ETS’s. Also, buying from the predictive quality of AI allows different stakeholders involved in entire climate change mitigation programs and ecosystems to make informed decisions, including those that promote decarbonization, capacity building, and adaptable economies and cities. Therefore, a combination of these advanced technologies is bound to actualize the potential of ETS’s and promote further acceptability of this mechanism.

5.8 Conclusion Developing countries, often made to secure strong economic stances based upon their reliance on unsustainable industries that contribute to climate change, are commonly seen in providing debt financing mechanisms to low-income countries and Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Both are on the front line of climate change impacts and do not have the financial capabilities to fund the vital infrastructure required for their social and economic survival. Debt financing, however, can be an unhealthy instrument in some instances and can be seen as unfair when it originates from countries profiting from environmental crimes (Cheshmehzangi, 2021; Ziafati Bafarasat et al., 2023). This chapter proposes a new model riding on the Emissions Trading Systems (ETS) that infuses the use of Smart Contracts, Blockchain, and Artificial Intelligence (AI). It is argued that this refined model may allow for regional decarbonisation through the use of technologies from the refined model to impose tax credits commensurate of both emissions and climate urgency.

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Chapter 6

Climate and Social Justice in the Political Landscape of Urban Resilience and Mercantilism: A Concluding Note

Abstract This chapter offers a concluding note on the issue of how landscapes of economic inequality have been pursued, since industrialization and colonialism, allowing and supporting colonial empires. Nowadays, the leading climate change polluters are expected to further their economic agendas without regard to their former colonies that were left in dysfunctional economic states underpinned by poverty and post-colonialism despair. A change in policy is argued to remediate the historical unfairness and unjust economic legacy of colonialism. This legacy has been negatively accentuated by the wake of climate change, where capital raising is required for mitigation measures. The coupling of technology like the Blockchain, and models such as the Emissions Trading System (ETS), is believed to be the potential to address this issue. Keyword Climate change · Social justice · Colonialism · Economic resilience · Emissions trading system (ETS) · Climate policy

6.1 A Concluding Note The contributing role of cities in accentuating the effects of climate change is indisputable. Additionally, there is increasing literature evidencing the unsustainable historical models upon which urban life has been made to thrive (Cheshmehzangi et al., 2021; Cheshmehzangi, 2021a, 2021b). While the latter models pursue capitalistic agendas and disregard their impacts upon environments and societies, most were perceived to be successful in many outcomes and variables. Nevertheless, as the economic, political, and social activities of cities increased, new challenges arose, disrupting the way our societies operated. For example, urban population increases presented multiple challenges that included increasing demands upon housing, increases in resource consumption, increases in waste generation and attempts to manage waste, increases in unemployment, and transportation challenges to name a few. Because our urban populations will continue to increase, and by 2050 it has been projected that the number of urban dwellers will increase from the current 54% of the total global population to approximately 68% (United Nations, 2018). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 Z. Allam et al., Climate and Social Justice, Urban Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6624-0_6

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This statistical pattern signals that the challenges, as mentioned earlier, will continue unless our existing urban models are revised to accommodate foreseeable changes. The convergent point of most urban challenges is that they ultimately contribute significantly to climate change (Butters et al., 2020; Cheshmehzangi & Dawodu, 2019a, 2019b; Ziafati Bafarasat et al., 2023). Therefore, each challenge requires enhanced attention if we are to address its consequences in the urban realm. While there has been an increase in calls globally to adopt more sustainable and equitable models to help reverse or at least slow down, negative urban contributions to climate change, this has been particularly challenging due to a number of issues. Firstly, many of these calls have been contested and sometimes ignored by economies that have long relied upon pollution-extensive industries to amass wealth and strengthen their economic catchments. Proposed mitigation measures, like the Paris Agreement that emphasizes a reduction of emission to facilitate lowering global temperatures by 2 °C, are perceived as a policy that curtails their economic activities and thus profits (United Nations Climate Change, 2023). Others interpret climate change mitigation strategies as policies that slow down or impede their geo-political influence at local, regional, national, and international levels. But, despite the need to listen and take note of what these climate change mitigation strategies propose, the only alternative strategy going forward is the pursuit of existing models using technologies that enable the continuance of industrial activities as ‘business as usual’ but with some level of reduced emissions to water down or address global pressures and voices for action. While such developed economies can easily afford to shift to more sustainable models, like sea/wind/solar/water renewable energies that have been proven as the most potent alternatives to fossil fuels, they have little gathering mainstream governance or industry acceptance. These developed country governments and industries are equally well placed to effectively implement the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Cheshmehzangi & Dawodu, 2019c; United Nations, 2023) since a majority of these governments and industries have the financial and technological capacities to do so. In the race to cement more vital economic standings, it is indisputable that ports have always played significant roles in local, regional, national, and international contexts. During the Industrial Revolution (c. 1760–1840), their significance was even pronounced as they served as the nodes that linked different regions and trading routes. They facilitated the smooth movement of raw materials, servicing goods, and traders from regions of low demand to those where demand was high. In contrast, most Western authors point to three major characteristics of industrialization as being economic growth, a more efficient division of labour, and a growth spurt in technological innovation, and make little mention of the implications of colonialism, port cities, and what transpired in the colonies that enabled the transition to new manufacturing processes in Britain, continental Europe, and in the United States. It is evident that the majority of global economic growth and development during the Industrial Revolution was underpinned by port cities, whether in colonies (e.g., Calcutta (Kolkata), Bombay (Mumbai), Cape Town, Singapore, Jakarta, etc.) or in home countries (e.g., Amsterdam, Liverpool, Boston, Bremen, Lisbon, Barcelona, etc.), as these port cities both experienced major infrastructural developments,

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improved and accelerated changes in human living standards and increased economic activities. Additionally, within this era, no mention or quality appraisal has yet been made of the loss of animals, avifauna, and biodiversity systems and vegetation communities (Flannery, 2018; Gammage, 2011), and the consequential impacts that occurred to our global climates due to colonialism (from c. 1500 to the mid-nineteenth century) equivalent to and paralleled what occurred in Europe’s Little Ice Age (Blom, 2019)— an increasingly recognised climate ‘interval’ that occurred from the early fourteenth century through to mid-nineteenth century, during major colonial expansions in the Americas, Asia, Africa, and Australasia, when mountain glaciers expanded at several locations, including the European Alps, New Zealand, Alaska, and the southern Andes, and mean annual temperatures across the Northern Hemisphere declined by 0.6 °C relative to the average temperature between 1000 and 2000 CE (Hessayon & Taylor, 2023; Lancaster, 2019). It is evident that ports offered unique and new products sourced from countries afar and were able to reach out to different regions to source similar or new products, e.g., different types of spices, other slave labour catchments, etc. Ports also made it possible for the hinterlands of countries to experience some allied positive and negative economic growth due to infrastructural developments like the tentacles of transportation networks; railways were built from the ports to different parts inland to facilitate the transportation of raw materials. For example, while many would argue that the Indian rail network was and in highly instrumental then and today in facilitating trade movement (Burgess & Donaldson, 2017; Hurd & Kerr, 2012), the French and Belgian pursuit of a rail system in the Congo very much hid the damaging human consequences (Daughton, 2021); the latter of which had analogous consequences to the North American Plains Indians (Vong, 2019; Yelengi, 2000). Rail construction and its alignments garnered the coalescing of products, their easy transmission, the formation of sub-city-trading-nodes at station intersections, and colonial eco-cultural tourism activities (Kennedy, 2022), that individually and collectively result in the hinterlands of ports experiencing collateral positive economic impacts. However, as explained in this monograph, the most significant contribution of ports in such economies was their facilitation of consumerism (Burke, 2012; Staniforth, 2003). Whereby goods produced in one region could be consumed in different parts, thus increasing market bases under the mastery of a dominant government/s and/or corporation/s. However, due to their questionable colonial histories, developed economies often in this position promoted trading and, subsequently, the establishment of pollutionextensive industries that impacted remote regions. Corporate mineral extraction, transportation, and pre-conversion activities prior to port shippage continue this pattern of consumer colonialism today, of which the tangible and intangible economic returns back to the locals remain disproportionate to the product price at the shipping arrival point and stockholder returns.

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6.2 Further Discussions for Future Research As we have discussed, supported by the cited literature, colonialists significantly benefited from ports by exporting valuable raw materials from colonies to industries in the colonial homelands, making them very productive and profitable. The ease of obtaining these raw materials, which have been shown to have been acquired by force aided by cheap or slave labour stimulated increased industrial activities. Before the First Nations People’s or locals knew it, the impacts of such upon their cultural legacy and environmental sustainability had reached critical levels. The most intriguing truth about the impact of such cultural legacy and environmental pollution is that it extended even into regions that hosted little or no industrial activities. For this reason, the search for alternative and more sustainable economic models that have the potential to sustain environmentally responsible or culturally-attuned lifestyles already established in developed economies ought to be promoted. As we have argued, these policy and operational shifts would not disrupt the nature of economies and could entail the exponential adoption of renewable energy sources to power manufacturing industries, leading to lowered emissions. In addition, it accelerates the adoption of the green economy where practices like construction, transportation, and production of different products endeavor to maximize sustainable alternatives. In an environment where the stability of global economies is prioritized, adopting alternative urban development models is particularly important to developing and least-developed economies that need accessibility to global markets but face the negative impacts of climate change. Unfortunately, most latter economies have limited means to finance climate change mitigation projects that would otherwise shield their strategic and vital infrastructures from deterioration, loss, and disruption. Such strategic and vital infrastructures support their economies and ambitions for more critical roles in regional policies. Therefore, as much as developed countries are reluctant to heed calls requiring them to lower their emissions, it is acknowledged that economies in the global south are at the greatest risk from their actions or inactions on climate change. Their historical and antecedal focus influences this reluctance to adopt a more equitable model upon sustaining their economic dominance in world markets. Such also translates into their political standing and influence in large, important regulatory organisations. To counter this economic landscape and to strengthen their infrastructural capacity, most low-income economies and developing economies are now entrapped in massive debts—ironically beholden to (many past colonial masters of now) developed economies, of which some are on the verge of defaulting. In contrast, others have already forfeited some of their strategic public assets to lenders. Such sorry realities, ceteris paribus, are accelerated by the need for urban leaders to shelter cities from the consequences of climate change. The unfortunate reality about debt is that lenders have been observed to propose stringent requirements that borrowers must meet. Such include high-interest rates and securities, mostly entailing the inclusion of strategic public infrastructural assets to serve as loan guarantees. Such requirements render infrastructural development

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projects extremely expensive for implementation, neglecting other sectors of their economies. Thus, while alternative financing models that support more sustainable outcomes are available, they still need to gain mainstream corporate and or governance acceptance as they are seen to be too disruptive to the livelihood of local communities and regional markets, negatively impacting immediate economies. Such models include PPP (Public Private Partnership) models, which is an essential and very effective financing mechanism. However, in some of the least developed and developing economies, PPP has been used to propagate negative consequences, including corruption, rent-seeking behaviours, and overpricing of projects that, to some extent, yield negative results. Surprisingly, in contrast, this PPP mechanism has been very instrumental in supporting economies in developed countries. Despite these shortfalls with current economic and climate change mitigation financing models, there is consensus on the urgency to address climate change headon. Irrespective of any given economy’s economic development and performance, they all rely upon how well their cities are performing, including in liveability variables. However, when the negative impacts of climate change cast their shadows across cities, those negative impacts and incidents translate into significant disruptions in trading flows and systems, which in turn has far-reaching impacts on the performance of economies, and thereupon disrupting the liveability variables and status of the city compromising sustainability efforts. Such intricate and interdependent issues relating to climate change provide relatively few options to global leadership, city managers, and other stakeholders. Accumulated costs, both in terms of financial and property loss and impacts on people and biodiversity, are monumental and more often given a wide berth by decisionmakers. Because of this, increasing financial budgets are being channeled to invest in mitigation programs with an aim to make cities more resilient and adaptable so that when disaster strikes, they would be well prepared and demand much less additional finance to remediate its impacts in the urban realm. In this century, going forward, the world is advantaged to have the power of technologies at its disposal, and these, as discussed in this book, provide new ways of looking at the intersecting dimensions of economics and climate. Such will have increasing importance in the shaping of solutions promoting resilience and adaptability. Technological tools can optimise the numerous ways and strategies cities can consider or be made to adopt to address climate change effectively while respecting the low economic capacities of developing and least developing nations. One interesting strategy that has been tried in several countries, especially those in Europe, is that of the Emissions Trading Systems (ETS). ETS provides avenues for economies and governments to raise capital to finance climate change mitigation programs. The proceeds from ETS have been taunted as one of the financial programs that can be implemented to finance mitigation plans. ETS, with other financial sources, offers opportunities for economies to move away from the current notion of climate change debt financing that has proven disastrous for the long-term liveability of local communities in developing and least developing nations. However, ETS has remained mainly a European initiative program, and its applicability to developing

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and least-developed countries is struggling to take flight, leaving those countries with a dearth of choices for unsustainable and exploitive financing models. Going forward, noting that the proceeds from ETS have been limited due to a myriad of challenges associated with this system, especially those tied to nonuniform platforms, procedures, and guidelines in various jurisdictions, these can be streamlined through the adoption of modern technologies, including the use of Smart contracts. As discussed in Chap. 3, Smart contracts through Blockchain technologies provide reputable avenues to further explore ETS models. The positive attributes of Smart contracts (including self-execution, safety, uniformity, transparency, traceability, and irreversibility) can ensure that some of the hurdles experienced in the current ETS models are overcome. This could allow for an increase in capital raising for the financing of climate change mitigation projects. The use of Smart contracts could also help in reducing legal and transaction costs and the need for third parties to execute the contracts, thus rendering ETS trading smoother and more attractive. Streamlining these processes would not only mean a reduction in costs. However, it would also encourage many economies and organisations to join the ‘band wagon’, which will be a plus in the global fight against climate change. In conclusion, one needs to propose short-term and transitional measures that can be seen to tap into existing models without being branded as disruptive to current economic processes. The adoption of streamlined ETS models opens avenues for short-term measures, as ETSs allow polluting countries to continue with their activities, with a transitional plan in place in a controlled manner, as ETSs allow them to compensate (at a very high cost) for the amount they emit beyond their set limits. Continuing this thread, this provides lesser polluting economies to economically benefit from the sale of their unused credits. The proceeds, as noted above, can then be used to finance climate change mitigation strategies when needed. In addition to offering a short-term solution to the problem, ETSs may also allow economies to transition to more sustainable practices, including using renewable energy and adopting green practices. Further, in the long run, this will be seen to allow the redistribution of wealth that polluting countries have inequitably amassed since the epoch of industrialization and colonialism.

6.3 A Summary This book ends with debates on the importance of social justice in developing climate change action plans. Throughout the book, we discussed issues related to consumerism, products and manufacturing, global trade, etc. In particular, we see the nexus between climate and social justice to be important in offering a fresh perspective on the historical, economic, and cultural foundations of capitalism, cities, and climate change. By exploring the intersection of urbanization, consumerism, and colonialism, the book provided new light on the origins and development of the economic system that has shaped our world today. What sets this book apart is its unique approach, which challenges conventional wisdom and offers new insights

References

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into the complex relationships between culture, politics, and economics (Cheshmehzangi & Butters, 2015). We hope this book is of interest to various stakeholders and readers interested in the history and evolution of capitalism and its impact on society, as well as those interested in climate change and urbanization. We note that the two most important features of the book are its fresh perspective on ‘the history of mercantilism’ and ‘its examination of the economic landscape of cities and climate change’. We hope it has offered a deeper understanding of the complex relationships between urbanization, colonialism, and economic policies and their impact on contemporary society. The content of this book also explores avenues that have the potential to address both climate and social justice, especially for those in ports, developing economies, and less developed economies. It explores ways and avenues to allow these economies to escape the traps of debts and insecure loans that the economies have been struggling with for a long. To this end, this book explores an emerging and topical issue and calls for practical approaches far from conceptual and impractically implementable policies which will further divide climate and policy. Thus, social justice could be embedded at the heart of decision-making processes for climate change action plans. Bringing people back alone is not sufficient, and we hope people are considered as main stakeholders to ensure equity, equality, and justice are sustained and promoted.

References Blom, P. (2019). Nature’s mutiny: How the little ice age transformed the west and shaped the present. WW Norton & Co. Burgess, R., & Donaldson, D. (2017). Railroads and the demise of famine in Colonial India. Economics. London School of Economics and Political Science, 1–45. Available at: https://www.lse.ac.uk/economics/Assets/Documents/personal-pages/robin-burgess/rai lroads-and-the-demise-of-famine.pdf. Accessed April 2, 2023. Burke, T. (2012). Unexpected subversions: Modern colonialism, globalization, and commodity culture. In The Oxford handbook of the history of consumption (pp. 467–484). Oxford University Press. Butters, C., Cheshmehzangi, A., & Sassi, P. (2020). Cities, energy and climate: Seven reasons to question the dense high-rise city. Journal of Green Building, 15(3), 197–214. Cheshmehzangi, A. (2021a). From “The city in need” to “The city we need”. In Urban health, sustainability, and peace in the day the world stopped (pp. 177–185). Springer. Cheshmehzangi, A. (2021b). Signifying the correlation between urban health, sustainability, and positive peace. In Urban health, sustainability, and peace in the day the world stopped (pp. 9–38). Springer. Cheshmehzangi, A., & Butters, C. (2015). Refining the complex urban: The study of urban residential typologies for reduced future energy and climate impacts. In Proceedings of the 8th conference of the international forum on urbanism, Incheon, South Korea. Cheshmehzangi, A., & Dawodu, A. (2019a). Introduction: Climate change and cities—perspectives, planning, and people. In Sustainable urban development in the age of climate change: People: The cure or curse (pp. 1–22). Springer. Cheshmehzangi, A., & Dawodu, A. (2019b). Case study reviews: People, perspective and planning. In Sustainable urban development in the age of climate change: People: The cure or curse (pp. 69–131). Springer.

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Cheshmehzangi, A., & Dawodu, A. (2019c). Sustainable urban development in the age of climate change: People: The cure or curse. Palgrave McMillan. Cheshmehzangi, A., Dawodu, A., & Sharifi, A. (2021). Sustainable urbanism in China. Routledge. Daughton, J. P. (2021). In the forest of no joy: The Congo-océan railroad and the tragedy of French colonialism. WW Norton & Co. Flannery, T. (2018). Europe: A natural history. The Text Publishing Company. Gammage, B. (2011). The biggest estate on earth: How aborigines made Australia. Allen & Unwin. Hessayon, A., & Taylor, D. (2023). The original climate crisis—How the little ice age devastated early modern Europe. The Conversation, March 8. Available at: https://theconversation.com/ the-original-climate-crisis-how-the-little-ice-age-devastated-early-modern-europe-178187. Accessed April 2, 2023. Hurd, J. II., & Kerr, I. J. (2012). India’s railway history: A research handbook. Brill—Handbook of Oriental Studies, Section 2 South Asia, Vol. 27. Kennedy, D. (2022). The magic mountains: Hill stations and the British Raj. University of California Press. Lancaster, J. (2019). How the little ice age changed history: Starting in the fourteenth century, cooling temperatures disrupted our economic and social structures—and may have given rise to the modern world. The New Yorker, April 1. Available at: https://www.newyorker.com/mag azine/2019/04/01/how-the-little-ice-age-changed-history. Accessed April 2, 2023. Staniforth, M. (2003). Capitalism, colonialism, and consumerism. In Material culture and consumer society. The Plenum series in underwater archaeology (pp. 33–45). Springer. United Nations (2018). 68% of the World population projected to live in urban areas by 2050, says UN. Available from: https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/2018revision-of-world-urbanization-prospects.html#:~:text=68%25%20of%20the%20world%20p opulation%20projected%20to%20live,is%20expected%20to%20increase%20to%2068%25% 20by%202050 United Nations. (2023). Sustainable development goals: The 17 goals. Available at: https://sdgs. un.org/goals. Accessed April 2, 2023. United Nations Climate Change. (2023). The Paris agreement: What is the Paris agreement. United Nations, New York. Available at: https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement. Accessed April 2, 2023. Vong, S. (2019). The impact of the transcontinental railroad on native Americans. National Museum of American History: Behring Centre, June 3. Available at: https://americanhistory.si.edu/blo g/TRR. Accessed April 2, 2023. Yelengi, N. (2000). Labor policies and household economic strategies among the railway workers in Katanga, Belgian Congo, 1928–1960, Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell’Istituto italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente, 55(4), 463–487. Ziafati Bafarasat, A., Cheshmehzangi, A., & Ankowska, A. (2023). A set of 99 healthy city indicatrors for application in urban planning and design. Sustainable Development, 3, 1–12.

Index

A Action-oriented, 27 Africa Climate Change Fund (ACCF), 83 African Development Bank Group, 83, 85, 92 African slaves, 47 Alaska, 105 American colonies, 7, 11 Amsterdam, 15, 48, 104 Anti-intellectualism, 71 Architecture, 12–14, 61, 62, 69 Artificial Intelligence, 90, 91, 93, 95, 96 Asia, 2, 3, 11, 31, 44, 47, 48, 78, 85, 105 Atlantic Slave Trade, 47, 63 Australia, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 15, 33, 50, 54, 55, 68, 69, 72, 78, 89, 95

B Bali Road Map, 78 Barcelona, 104 Belgium, 55, 72 Bilbao, 52 Biodiversity, 27, 29, 31, 32, 105, 107 Blockchain, 77, 88–91, 93–96, 103, 108 Bombay, 104 Boston, 104 Brasilia, 50 Bremen, 52, 104 British Empire, 2–4, 47 Brutishness, 71

C C40, 32 Canada, 7, 10, 35, 55, 95

Canberra, 50 Cape Town, 104 Capitalism, 1, 5, 6, 9, 11, 36, 82, 108, 109 Caribbean, 6 Central Africa, 3, 85 Chagos Archipelagos, 55 Charleston, 15 China, 2, 7, 15, 46–48, 52, 66, 78 Chinatowns, 51 Climate change mitigation, 35, 79, 82–84, 86, 87, 91, 92, 94–96, 104, 106–108 Climate policy, 33, 109 Coastal cities, 43, 45 Colonial history, 43, 105 Colonial religion, 3, 61 Colonial remediation, 55 Colonised:colonial, 36 Colonization, 3, 11, 13, 46, 65, 66 Commoners, 66 Congo Basin Forest Fund, 85 Continental Europe, 104 Conventional, 34, 35, 53, 82, 91, 92, 108 Corporate mineral extraction, 105 Côte d’Ivoire, 50 Credit colonialism, 62 Cultural exchange, 45, 56 Cultural heritage, 1, 68–72 Cultural legacy, 106

D Das Kapital, 6 Debt, 77–79, 84, 91, 92, 96, 106, 107, 109 Decolonization, 54, 55 Delaware, 7 Democracy, 6, 7, 15

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 Z. Allam et al., Climate and Social Justice, Urban Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6624-0

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112 Digital culture, 71, 72 Drugs, 47 Dutch Empire, 2

E Economic exploitations, 15 Economic resilience, 80, 92 Egalitarianism, 7 Emissions Trading System, 77, 79, 87, 96, 103, 107 Entrepôt, 9 Entrepreneurs, 9 ETS transactions, 95 European, 1–3, 7, 8, 10, 14, 15, 31, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51, 53, 63, 82, 105, 107 European empires, 11, 47, 82 European Union, 8, 27, 44, 49, 72, 87, 89

F Fashion, 70 Financial services, 25, 88 Financing, 25, 34, 35, 77–80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 91, 92, 94–96, 107, 108 First Boer War, 9 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, 85 France, 2, 52, 55, 72

G Geopolitical, 8, 15, 25, 36, 37, 48, 54, 65 Georgia, 7 Germany, 52, 54, 72 Global colonial system, 2 Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Fund (GEEREF), 83, 85 Global Environmental Facility, 85 Global pressure, 104 Global Status Report, 31 Goa, 46 Goldfield, 7 Green Climate Fund, 83, 85 Green economy, 106 Greenhouse gases, 26, 29, 87 Gross domestic products, 25, 55, 71 Gulf Coast, 35

H Health, 15, 29, 32, 45, 70 Heritage, 12, 15, 53, 70 Homogeneity, 68, 70, 71 Human capital, 7, 26

Index Human health, 28, 31 Human life, 10, 31 Human wellbeing, 71 Hurricane, 31–33, 35, 78

I Ice Age, 105 India, 2, 3, 6, 9, 15, 33, 64, 68 Indian rail network, 105 Indonesia, 7, 50 Industrial age, 28, 29 Industrialization, 26, 28, 34, 35, 45, 46, 53, 103, 104, 108 Industrial Revolution, 66, 104 Infrastructure systems, 13 Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC), 27, 32, 78 International Energy Agency (IEA), 26, 30, 31, 80 International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), 27, 30, 31, 80, 81 Interventionism, 9 Iran, 95 Italy, 33, 72

J Jakarta, 104 Job creation, 26, 71 Jurisdictions, 48, 95, 108

K Katowice Climate Package, 78 Kazakhstan, 89 Kuwait, 30 Kyoto Protocol, 78, 80, 87, 90, 92

L Labour commodities, 61 Labour demand, 45 Latin America, 72, 85 Lisbon, 48, 104 Liveability, 32, 36, 45, 46, 49, 77, 78, 80, 107 Low-Carbon Development, 26

M Manufacturing industries, 29, 106 Maritime, 2, 9, 11, 13, 14, 43, 46, 51 Marseille, 51, 52

Index Marx, 5–11, 82 Maryland, 7 Massachusetts, 7, 69 Mauritius, 6, 55, 78 Mean annual temperature, 105 Mercantilism, 8, 9, 45, 48–50, 56, 109 Mercantilist empire, 49 Mercantilist theory, 8 Mercenaries, 10 Military, 2–4, 7, 9–11, 13, 14, 43–50, 56, 66 Mitigation, 25–27, 29, 32–34, 77–80, 86, 92, 93, 103, 104, 107 Mixed farming, 66 Moluccas, 46 Mozambique, 46 Myanmar, 50

N Napoleon Bonaparte, 7 Native, 8, 53, 65, 67–69 Netherlands, The, 2, 48, 52 New Jersey, 7 New Urban Agenda, 27, 36, 77, 78, 92 New York, 7, 15 New Zealand, 7, 10, 55, 68, 89, 95, 105 Non-renewable sources, 30, 31 North America, 15, 47, 53, 68, 78 North Carolina, 7 Nusantara, 50

O ODI, 85 Oman, 30 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 32, 35, 51, 86, 87

P Pakistan, 64, 78 Paris Agreement, 35, 78, 81, 84, 91, 92, 104 Paris Climate Accords, 35, 91 Pennsylvania, 7 Peri-urban, 46 Persian Gulf, 30, 31 Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), 85 Portugal, 48, 52, 72 Post-colonialism, 15, 53, 55, 61, 62, 64, 67, 69, 103 Pre-colonialisation, 1, 2 Pre-conversion, 105

113 Profitability, 6, 7, 12 Proto-industrialization, 8 Prussia, 52 Public Private Partnership, 107

R Reframing Emissions Trading Schemes, 93 Regime, 3, 5–8, 12, 14, 63–65, 68, 95, 96 Regional decarbonisation, 77, 91, 92, 96 Regional economy, 1, 32, 49 Regional Trade Agreements, 49, 56 REN21, 80 Renewable energy, 28, 30, 31, 35, 81, 86, 104, 106, 108 Resiliency, 32, 33, 36, 88 Resilient, 28, 87, 107 Réunion Island, 6 Rival empires, 48

S São Tomé and Príncipe, 46 Saudi Arabia, 30 Singapore, 9, 11, 15, 47, 95, 104 Slavery, 6, 63, 82 Small Island Developing States (SIDS), 77, 78, 83, 85, 92, 96 Smart Contracts, 77, 88–91, 93–96, 108 Social evils, 6 South Africa, 2, 7, 9, 68 South America, 78 South Carolina, 7, 15 Southern Andes, 105 South Korea, 89 Stolen Generation, The, 10 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 27, 36, 77, 78, 92, 93, 104 Switzerland, 89

T Telecommunication networks, 33 Tokyo & Saitama, 89 Trade, 2, 3, 9, 10, 12, 28, 43–51, 56, 62, 65–67, 70, 82, 83, 87, 105, 108 Tribal, 61

U United Arab Emirates, 30 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 32

114 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 32, 36, 78, 80, 83, 85, 87, 90, 92 United States, 7, 10, 31, 35, 50, 55, 68, 69, 81, 104 Urban population, 26, 29, 103 Urban resilience, 103 V Vegetation communities, 27, 105 Virginia, 7

Index Vulnerable economies, 84

W Wadawurrung, 54 Washington DC, 50 Waste generation, 5, 35, 103 WOMADelaide, 72 World Bank, 34, 79, 86 World Economic Forum, 86 Worship, 4, 12, 13, 63, 71