Bridging the Cyprus Divide: Reflections of an Accidental Peacebuilder [1st ed. 2023] 3031297571, 9783031297571

Table of contents :
Preface
Acknowledgments
Introduction: Fundamental Questions
Contents
Abbreviations
1 Cyprus, a Special Case
Introduction: An Identity-Based Ethnic Conflict at Its Best
Cyprus as an Independent State
Nature of Peace
Peace Can Be Taught
Variable Meaning
Challenges Involved in Peacebuilding29
General Theoretical or Conceptual Foundations: Multi-track Diplomacy33
Informal Approaches34
Civil Society Context
The Special Case of Cyprus
Historical Context41
Principal Players
Greek Cypriot Leaders
Turkish Cypriot Leaders
Conclusion66
Notes
2 Rethinking the “Cyprus Problem”
Introduction
The Fallacies of the Cyprus Problem4
Change the Game10
Intractable Conflict11
Dealing with the Past12
Citizen Participation and Bicommunal Movement15
History of Civil Society Peacebuilding Movement in Cyprus19
Oslo Group I and II
The Oslo Report25
Post-Oslo Group Success
Post-Oslo Group Resistance
Afterthoughts on the Way Out
Conclusion
Notes
3 “On-the-Ground” Perspective: Cyprus Is a Perfect Example of a Negotiation Culture Inherent in Lengthy Peace Processes
Introduction to Bicommunal Civil Society Programs1
Cypriots from Both Sides of the Divide Weigh In
A Bicommunal Look Across the Divide
Conclusion
Notes
4 Greek Cypriot Vassiliou and Turkish Cypriot Akinci Bridge the Cyprus Divide
Introduction
Conclusion
Notes
5 Reflections and Conclusion
Notes
Index

Citation preview

Bridging the Cyprus Divide Reflections of an Accidental Peacebuilder

A. Marco Turk

Bridging the Cyprus Divide

A. Marco Turk

Bridging the Cyprus Divide Reflections of an Accidental Peacebuilder

A. Marco Turk Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution Caruso School of Law Pepperdine University Malibu, CA, USA Negotiation, Conflict Resolution & Peacebuilding Program California State University Dominguez Hills Carson, CA, USA

ISBN 978-3-031-29757-1 ISBN 978-3-031-29758-8 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29758-8

(eBook)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Melisa Hasan This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To Kathryn

Preface

It was 2:45 in the afternoon on June 4, 2019, as the British Airways flight lifted off the Larnaca Airport tarmac. My wife, Kathryn, and I were leaving the Mediterranean island of Cyprus for the last time after an almost 22-year period of numerous repeat visits. These had been to participate in the effort to reunify Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, divided since the Turkish invasion there in 1974. This book recounts my accidental journey as an American academic who became involved initially in international conflict resolution there. The experience had been intended for the short term of only nine months, beginning in the fall of 1997. This soon became an engagement eventually lasting for a total of 23 months, followed by several additional return visits over the ensuing years, continuing even today. It is written from my perspective as an academic activist previously inexperienced in actual “on-the-ground” international peace and conflict resolution efforts. This resulted in my being able to develop abilities to recruit, design, lead, and engage others in what were considered important peacebuilding workshops on and off the island. The long exposure to another

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way of living caused me to reflect on what occurs in the real world of attempting to resolve violent conflict in other circumstances. My extended interaction with Cypriot civil society was mainly at the grassroots level, rather than being confined to the customary fulfillment of numerous assignments related to writing and teaching from the elite platform of the traditional academic. A new world opened for me. During that time, I became a familiar figure in both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities—in part helped by my unusual surname. It seemed “something” to be an American Fulbright Senior Scholar and mediation practitioner in Cyprus with the surname Turk. Hopefully, this book will offer some valuable insights from the ground concerning an important opportunity that was presented to me. One that perhaps may provide learning and understanding regarding a difficult area of peacebuilding: The importance of what is referred to as civil society (“community of citizens linked by common interests and collective activity”) in such perilous situations. While the preparation of the book has been academic in nature, rather than strictly a text or a treatise, it is a monograph. As such, it covers an absorbing phase in what has become known as the Cyprus Problem, one of the world’s longest-running ethnic disputes, symbolized by conflicted Nicosia, the Cypriot city that is the last divided capital in the world . The book seeks to consider, discuss, and inform on a critical topic within the purview of the area of peace studies: International identity-based ethnic conflict and dispute resolution. I became involved in the problem around the time the island was starting on its perilous way to European Union (EU) accession. This path would fundamentally transform the dynamics of the situation and eventually lead to the proposal of a United Nations (UN) comprehensive settlement plan in 2004 to be known as the five-version Annan Plan. Notwithstanding approval by the Turkish Cypriots, the attempt at reconciliation of the two communities was rejected by the Greek Cypriots in a referendum process that year. In this regard, hopefully, the book provides an unusual glimpse into efforts to address the Cyprus issue from an “onthe-ground” perspective. I understand from others, this endeavor may be the first personal narrative of someone involved in conflict resolution in Cyprus on the level of civil society (rather than an official diplomat in the true sense), coming to the dispute directly from the classroom as a

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novice. The reality check presented by these real-life experiences proved to be far more extensive than simply “eye-opening.” Transitioning from the relative calm of the classroom to activities on the ground among civil society in “real time” truly was a culture shock. The journey provided the challenge of discovering whether a resolution to this historical conflict can finally become a realistic political goal. Or is it one eclipsed by the need for a non-political solution, which at least may succeed in convincing people on both sides (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike) to throw off the yoke of history and instead live together peacefully in the future for their joint benefit. My entire life is an example of serendipity, beginning with my premature birth requiring I spend time in an incubator before being released from the hospital; 54 years later fortuitously marrying Kathryn; and 60 years (from birth) changing careers for the seventh and final time. Even in the womb, it seems I could not wait to engage the world. The ensuing journey unveiled here fits my persona perfectly. As a 60-year-old lawyer, I had made a life-changing career decision to retire from a profession where I had begun to feel as if I were required to “do battle” daily in a family law specialty, following my earlier concentration in other fields, especially entertainment law, with hands-on experience in conflict resolution on a regular basis. Because of my legal background which required being contentious on more occasions than I would have liked, I did not consider myself a “peaceful” person. Academia seemed a better fit for my propensities. However, in my wildest dreams, I could not anticipate my unexpected future in the peacebuilding field that contained its own battleground, albeit disguised. So, in 1995, I was able to leave one uncomfortable occupation for another that was unfamiliar and soon to be transformative. The next 26 years would prove to be an amazing ride from which I have never looked back. It all began with a newspaper advertisement in the Los Angeles Times searching to fill a new one-year nonrenewable undergraduate “student-recommended” faculty teaching position in entertainment law. The campus was the University of California-Irvine (UCI), commencing with the fall quarter of that year. This provided me with the camouflaged “start over” opportunity.

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Based on my earlier extensive entertainment industry experience (talent agent, lawyer, and film producer), four excellent letters of recommendation, detailed written application, and supporting materials for ten new courses I was required to design and submit for the proposed teaching assignments, I was selected for the position. This was preceded by only one interview (via telephone, yet) with the acting dean of undergraduate studies. It seemed unbelievable! Either no one else applied or I completely “snowed” him with my application efforts. Without other information, I chose to believe the latter. Because there was no program in entertainment law at UCI, the administrative dilemma was where to place me. Somehow, I landed in the Criminology, Law & Society department just because of the word “law” in the position title. At the end of my nonrenewable one-year contract, unexpected substantial student support fortuitously secured another year for me. I returned for the 1996–1997 academic term, unknowingly choosing the detour sign directing me to the road labeled accidental peacebuilder. During the second year of my academic position, my extracurricular background in conflict resolution caused the dean of the School of Social Ecology, within which the department was located, to request I collaborate with one of its research psychologists, Dr. Robert Beck. The assignment was to design a program to deal with youth offender violence in the family. This was to be established in coordination with the local superior court system. Working together, he and I designed a program (Family Peacemakers). Unfortunately, after completing the project, we discovered it would not be successful in attracting outside funding. As luck would have it, one day in 1996, I received a mass mailer postcard from the US Fulbright Commission (a state department affiliate that, among other things, provides fellowship grants for individually designed study/research projects by selected senior scholars, to be performed outside the US) soliciting applications. Unbelievably, the only category where my professional background would fit was conflict resolution in Cyprus, a country about which I knew nothing…even its location. Based on my prior extensive legal and conflict resolution experience (certified community and trial/appellate court-qualified mediator) always searching for new challenges, I decided to try my luck again. I “reached

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for the stars” completely ignoring the odds against any realistic chance of success in being a recipient of a Fulbright award. The Fulbright program provides applicants with the opportunity to confer with existing scholars active in the subject field, and locations. As a result, I conferred with a then-current scholar in Cyprus. When he heard my idea was to bring to Cyprus comparative information on the American legal system, he just laughed! So, I searched for a new topic following his suggestions based on my prior experience. That is how I decided to pursue a proposal adapting the Family Peacemakers Program to cases of domestic violence in Cyprus. I had discovered there was a great need for dispute resolution services regarding this subject in both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. Fortunately, my UCI unexpected course load introduced me to the subject of domestic violence. Subsequently, after numerous back-and-forth discussions with the Fulbright Commission representatives in Washington DC, early one morning in December 1996, I received the good news telephone call from the commission. I would receive the award as a 1997 Fulbright Senior Scholar in Cyprus! This was along with the updated news I would have to accept it for nine months rather than just the minimum four per my application. I am always ready to jump at an opportunity when it arises, probably dating back to my premature birth. So, I immediately accepted the offered award without consulting Kathryn first. Fortunately, when I explained to her later what was happening, she graciously agreed to leave her fabulous job as a well-respected executive producer of television commercials and join me in this adventure. At the time of my original Fulbright application, I did not realize my protestations of not having Greek or Turkish heritage would later cause considerable interest in my background throughout my entire award period. This phenomenon continues to this day. Upon arriving in Cyprus initially, I understood one of the reasons for receiving the award appeared to have been the American Ambassador to Cyprus (and Chairman of the Cyprus Fulbright Commission [CFC]), Kenneth Brill. He thought it would be interesting to have an American Fulbright senior scholar with the surname Turk working in the peacebuilding effort. On numerous

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occasions, during various future interesting discussions, this later proved to be true. Appearance-wise, I can pass for either Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot, so there were no problems fitting in. However, on occasion, it was necessary to show either my US passport or California driver’s license to prove I was neither. On the other hand, Kathryn has a heritage of Dutch and Irish ancestors, so she stood out as not being from the island. This made an interesting combination for those who tried to ascertain our origin. Welcome to Cyprus was the loudspeaker announcement that came from the stewardess as our Cyprus Airways plane, from London to Larnaca, landed at approximately 4:10 p.m. Cyprus time on Friday, August 29, 1997. As with the folk tale, The Three Princes of Serendip,1 when one sets out to see what life is like outside the “castle,” the opportunity is there to accidentally discover good things. Serendipity continued to guide our lives. The excursion had begun by chance, subsequently providing me with the most gratifying aspect of my entire professional career, continuing so today. In addition to advancing a personal consideration of the applicable theoretical and empirical aspects of any possible solution to the Cyprus Problem based on my involvement, this is the story of that incredible journey. Malibu, CA, USA

A. Marco Turk

Note 1. https://theteknologist.wordpress.com/2017/01/12/the-three-princes-of-ser endip-fairy-tale/.

Acknowledgments

First, I express my gratitude to Dr. Anca Pusca, Executive Editor, International Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, for her immediate and positive reception to the idea of this book, and for her continued efforts to see it published. In addition, I thank Redhu Ruthroyoni and Saranya Siva, Project Coordinators Books Production, Palgrave Macmillan, for their patience and invaluable assistance in working with me during the publication process. Special recognition goes to former Republic of Cyprus (RoC) President, George Vassiliou (1988–1993); and, to former Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) President, Mustafa Akinci (2015–2020), for their friendship and willingness to candidly express their respective opinions concerning the current tenuity of the Cyprus Problem. Life works in strange ways. My appreciation goes to friends Acis Montanios, preeminent Greek Cypriot Eastern Mediterranean maritime lawyer; Achilleas Demetriades, prominent Greek Cypriot human rights lawyer; and, Dr. Joseph S. Joseph, formerly the ambassador from the Republic to Greece (and Jean Monnet Professor of International Relations and European Affairs, University of Cyprus).

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Interestingly, I met Acis Montanios at the first bicommunal meeting of lawyers and judges I attended as a stranger in the Buffer Zone 1 shortly after my arrival in Cyprus in 1997. Upon entering the large room, I sat down in the last available chair, which happened to be next to him. I barely got settled in before he unceremoniously poked me in my ribs while observing the obvious organizational confusion at the podium. I will always remember his responding to my startled reaction, immediately pointing to the presentation area, telling me (suddenly without prior introduction) that I should “tell them how to do it” because I was “the American in the room!” To this day, I still marvel at how fortuitously I ended up as his seat mate. Since then, Acis has been a friend, an enthusiastic participant in my programs, and a cheerleader for my efforts. He and his wife, Aleca, have made a determined effort to see Kathryn and I have been able to enjoy the best of what Cyprus and surrounding areas have to offer, all the way to Venice, Italy where they were married. Fortuitously, also as new friends, Achilleas Demetriades and I together discovered the only bicommunal village (Pyla) on the island one day when we decided to drive there to see how the residents live. It was an “eye-opener” as the mixed group of elderly male card players in the café invited us to join them for coffee. Interestingly, this was a “first” for both of us. Dr. Joseph S. Joseph was kind enough to write the prologue to my earlier book dealing with the Cyprus Problem. He and his wife, Eleni, have befriended and hosted Kathryn and me on numerous occasions throughout the years even though we remain unable to find our way to their house, notwithstanding it is located only on the outskirts of Nicosia! My gratitude also goes to friend Dr. George (Georgios) A. Serghides, Judge at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), formerly President of the Family Court of Nicosia (Cyprus). I originally met him when he enrolled in and attended the mediation training program I designed and taught at the Cyprus Fulbright Centre in Nicosia (CFC), during the early days of my time in Cyprus. This facility is of historical importance because of its location in the Buffer Zone (consisting of approximately 200–300 yards in width of the unpopulated area separating the two communities, stretching across the island, originally

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serving as the hub for bicommunal meetings). Judge Serghides has been a great supporter of the idea of enacting in Cyprus legislation concerning family mediation, which eventually became a reality in 2019. Additionally, my appreciation is extended to the following friends: Canan Oztoprak (former Turkish Cypriot Minister of Education) who, in 1996, commencing what was to become our long friendship, sight unseen, graciously offered in advance to submit the required letter of invitation on my behalf as part of the Fulbright application process. From the beginning of the bicommunal movement, she has been deeply involved as a peace activist well known to both sides. In the body of the book, she has evaluated the overall participation by Cypriots from both sides; Katie Clerides (former member of the Parliament of the Republic and daughter of former President of the Republic, Glafcos Clerides, 1993–2003), weighs in at a point in the book providing important personal observations; Emine Colak (friend and former Turkish Cypriot Foreign Minister) who steered me in an appropriate direction, providing critical background information for this book; and, to Marina Christofides, a post-Fulbright colleague and friend, who has labored almost singlehandedly in the trenches of Cypriot civil society to organize and maintain the spirt of the third-party UniteCyprusNow movement alive, traversing the divide between individual rights and the modern state. I am indebted to the former Cyprus Fulbright Commission Executive Director, Daniel Hadjittofi, and those of his staff who were always supportive and available to assist when needed, especially Anna Argyrou. In the process, Daniel became a friend and enthusiastic believer in what I was attempting to accomplish. If he had his way, I feel certain Kathryn and I would have remained in Cyprus indefinitely. I must acknowledge the special value of collaboration with my former colleague Dr. Robert Beck at University of California-Irvine. I was privileged to work with him in designing the Family Peacemakers Program, which proved invaluable as the foundation for my Fulbright application, award, and experience. I am fortunate to have received strong support from the following regarding my Fulbright application process, which proved to be the “seed” of success that bloomed thereafter: Former Southwestern Law

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Dean Lee Taylor; former American Arbitration Association Western Regional Director Rocco Scanza; US District Judge George Schiavelli (ret.); and Dr. Henry Pontell , former chair of the UCI Department of Criminology, Law & Society (who welcomed and mentored me as I entered academia full time in 1995), all providing the required letters of recommendation to secure my award. My continuing appreciation to Dr. Cecile Lindsay, former Vice Provost for Academic Affairs and Dean of Graduate Studies at California State University Long Beach and earlier at the Dominguez Hills campus, (ret.); and Dr. Munashe Furusa, former Vice Chancellor, Africa University, and earlier Dean of the College of Arts and Humanities, California State University Dominguez Hills (dec.). Each of these colleagues and friends on different occasions arranged substantial post-Fulbright funding for two of my return visits to Cyprus (one each) and religiously provided continual support of my efforts to make a difference on the island. In addition to the above, I have listed in alphabetical order (without intending to differentiate the value of their respective friendship and assistance) the following friends and colleagues who provided me with collaboration, recommendations, contacts, suggestions, and significant interview information for this book. Many of these continue to trudge throughout the cluttered fields of the bicommunal movement seeking a positive light at the end of the tunnel: Yiota Afxentiou, Dervish Baha, Dr. Scott Bollens, Dr. John Dombrink, Katie and Panicos Economidou, Turkish Cypriot Supreme Court Judge Gonul Eronen (ret.), Yucem Eronen, Andros and Iris Karayiannis, Melisa Kasap, Dr. Richard Leo, Niki Mavrokordatou, Buket Ozatay, Demetra Kyriakou-Payiata, Professor Peter Robinson (former Director, Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution, Pepperdine University Caruso School of Law), Dr. Maria Simpson, and my “on-the-ground” Fulbright award collaborator, Dr. John Ungerleider. Also, not to be forgotten are all the welcoming Cypriots on both sides of the Green Line who consistently went out of their way to provide instant friendship and assistance in an obvious effort to be helpful. Historically, Cyprus is known for its hospitality that was regularly extended by all these people. Over the almost quarter-century during which Kathryn and I have made numerous trips to the island

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having a reputation for a “big heart,” this has been demonstrated repeatedly. Also, I am grateful to former US Ambassador to Cyprus, Kenneth Brill, and his wife, Mary, for their friendship, support, and efforts to include us in Embassy events, and for inviting us to accompany them on a fabulous trip to Egypt during our time on the island. I can thank my deceased parents for the surname Turk. My mother was born in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century, my father in Austria at the end of the nineteenth, and later they met in California where I was born. Last, but certainly not the least, my love and appreciation go to my wife and best friend, Kathryn, who has been a major part of my life and this journey. It is to her that I dedicate this book. Without Kathryn, I would not have made the trip to or managed the Cyprus experience. In addition, as my initial editor, her suggestions regarding what you will read herein continue to be invaluable. A. Marco Turk

Note 1. This is the demilitarized area (which I refer to as “no man’s land”) between the two communities patrolled by the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), sometimes also referred to as the “Green Line,” established in 1964 to keep the two populations apart to avoid possible explosive altercations.

Introduction: Fundamental Questions

Historically, in many respects, the United Nations (UN) has failed in its efforts to achieve and maintain peace in various critical areas of the world. Not the least of which is the small but critical island of Cyprus located in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea with its historically conflicted main Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. In 1960, this small island situated at the “Gateway to the Mediterranean Sea,” that makes it strategically important in that area of the world, suddenly became the newly recognized Republic of Cyprus after it succeeded in breaking free from England. Henceforth, it became an independent country and a member of the United Nations. Because of its strategic location (40 miles or 65 km south of Turkey, 60 miles or 100 km west of Syria, and 480 miles or 770 km southeast of mainland Greece), Cyprus (along with Israel as one of two “salient territorial crises” in the area) is in effect the “pathway” to the Mediterranean. My goal in this monograph is not to suggest detailed changes in the historical relationship between the now internationally recognized Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus (“republic”) and the still unrecognized internationally (except by Turkey) Turkish Republic of Northern

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Introduction: Fundamental Questions

Cyprus (“northern Cyprus”) its minority competitor on the Island. The intention here is to propose modifications in the way we think about how these two “republics” may be one and consider ways they might coexist peacefully in the future to avoid a recurrence of the bloody war of 1972 initiated and encouraged by Turkey. Notwithstanding the use of the “Greek” or “Turkish” labels, people of the island are neither Greek nor Turkish by heritage, but simply Cypriot with either Greek or Turkish unique, inherited sense of family identity. Just ask them, on either side. So, I begin by posing the simple question: Why, after over sixty years, should Cypriots of both communities continue to struggle whether to reunite or have the unrestricted freedom to go their separate ways? A seemingly uncomplicated question but one which has to this day been difficult to answer historically. This brings us to the not-so-simple question yet one that has demanded an easy answer: Should the two communities reunite as one state, or will each do better by going their separate ways? There are arguments from both sides of the division between the two major communities that propose or oppose each choice, but always without an acceptable solution. Hopefully, this effort can provide a clearer understanding of the distinction between the arguments pro and con supporting the diverging or opposite views. ***

Contents

1

Cyprus, a Special Case

2

Rethinking the “Cyprus Problem”

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3

“On-the-Ground” Perspective: Cyprus Is a Perfect Example of a Negotiation Culture Inherent in Lengthy Peace Processes

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Greek Cypriot Vassiliou and Turkish Cypriot Akinci Bridge the Cyprus Divide

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4 5

Reflections and Conclusion

Index

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Abbreviations

5-plus one AHDR HOME FOR COOPERATION ANNAN PLAN BBF BORDER BOTTOM-UP BSA BUFFER ZONE CFC CIVIL SOCIETY COUP d’état

UN Secretary-General convened informal meeting to determine viability of solution to the Cyprus Problem Unique community organization located in heart of Nicosia Unsuccessful attempt by UN to resolve the Cyprus Problem Bizonal, Bicommunal Federal solution to the Cyprus Problem Dividing line between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities Phrase referring to attempt by ordinary citizens at the ground level to influence government British Sovereign Base Areas retained by England on Cyprus The “no-man’s unoccupied land area” separating the two communities US Cyprus Fulbright Commission in Nicosia General reference to citizens Sudden, violent, and unlawful seizure of a government

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Abbreviations

CRANSMONTANA CYPRUS PROBLEM (CYPROB) DEJURE PARTITION DEMOCRATIVE RESTORATIVE JUSTICE DISY ECtHR ENOSIS EU GC GRASSROOTS GREEN LINE/BUFFER ZONE GUTERRES MFA MISSING

MOTHER COUNTRY MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY NATO NGO NORTH ON-THEGROUND OSLO GROUP PEACEBUILDING PRIO

Municipality in Switzerland where representatives from both communities met most recently The official reference to the dispute between the two communities Division by claim of right General civic engagement movement to narrow distance between a state and its citizens Greek Cypriot Democratic Rally Party European Court of Human Rights Desired union between Greek Cypriots and Greece European Union Greek Cypriots Another word for “on the ground” Official dividing line between the two communities UNSG Antonio Guterres Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs Refers to Cypriots who went missing and were never accounted for because of the 1974 Turkish invasion of the island A country in relation to its colonies Conceptual process of international peacemaking as a “living system” North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Governmental Organization North Cyprus under Turkish Cypriot control Unofficial efforts to influence government Bicommunal members organized to develop peacemaking strategies for citizens Aims to resolve injustice in nonviolent ways and transform deadly conflict Peace Research Institute Oslo (Norway)

Abbreviations

RESTORATIVE JUSTICE SBA SECURITY COUNCIL SETTLERS SG SOUTH TAXIM TC TOP-DOWN TRACKS TRNC TURKISH LIRA UK UN UNESCO UNFICYP UNSG US USAID WALLED CITY WILD CARD

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Examines harmful impact of crime, determines how to repair damage, and holds perpetrators accountable British Sovereign Base Areas UN unit primarily responsible for maintenance of international peace and security Refugees from Turkey who settle in Cyprus UN Secretary-General Greek Cypriot community Desired union between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey Turkish Cypriots Exercise of authority from the top to lower levels of society Various courses of action Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Currency of Turkey and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations Force in Cyprus UN Secretary-General United States US Agency for International Development Separating a city from outside influence by walls Causes uncertainty because it is unknown how the person or thing will behave or react

1 Cyprus, a Special Case

Introduction: An Identity-Based Ethnic Conflict at Its Best The ethnic dispute is between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot major communities on the island of Cyprus (the Cyprus Problem), dating from the Ottoman period when that empire attempted to convert the population of this small area of land surrounded by water to Islam. It is an identity-based conflict because it threatens the essential needs and very survival of a people.1 There the two communities have been “locked in deep conflict [and need to] take each other’s perspective and then cooperate in designing ways to create new futures that will serve the needs and vitality of each of them individually and collectively”.2 In 1878, notwithstanding the preference of the Greek Cypriot majority for alliance with Greece (enosis), the Ottoman rulers in Turkey ceded Cyprus to Great Britain, which subsequently annexed it in 1914, thus intensifying the communal conflict. The self-interest of the British

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. M. Turk, Bridging the Cyprus Divide, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29758-8_1

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for control ultimately transformed what had been a colonial dispute to one of ethnicity between the two Cypriot communities, forever and beyond imagination irrevocably changing the dynamics of its political dimensions. Despite relatively peaceful grassroots coexistence, initially religious differences (Orthodox Greek Cypriot Christians and Turkish Cypriot Muslims) managed to perpetuate the division between the two communities. This increased under the Greek Orthodox Church’s enosis. The nationalist tendency of Turkish Cypriots countered this by supporting British rule. Spurred on by Ottoman influence, Turkish Cypriots sought a separate identity or taksim through connection with Turkey causing ethnic conflict between the two communities and their separate claims of nationalism directly motivated by their “mother” countries, Greece and Turkey. The British appeasement of the Turkish Cypriot minority that followed further damaged the interethnic relations and resulted in the politicization of the existing power structure between the two racerelated communities. While Turkish Cypriots were supportive of the British, Greek Cypriots traveled in the opposite direction revolting against the English further widening the division between the two communities. Subsequently, the intensified Greek Cypriot nationalist efforts to achieve enosis caused Turkish Cypriots to change course and demand partition of the island, seeking taxsim supported by both Turkey and the United Kingdom (UK). This raised the stakes internationally. Further deterioration of the relationship between the two communities was caused by the British use of Turkish Cypriots as auxiliary police to control the Greek nationalists. Greek-Turkish ethnic clashes resulted in rioting causing the deaths of innocent civilians. Although Turkey initiated the ethnic riots, this was made worse by the British ignoring these events as they hoped to force compromise from Greek Cypriots. The original conflict manifested itself as one between the British Crown and the people of this small island (1.17 million population and 3572 square miles in landmass) in the Eastern Mediterranean known as the crossroads to Europe and Africa. The basis for the dispute concerned the population’s demand for self-determination. Yet, the

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historical dispute was one going well beyond the boundaries of the island because of subsequent involvement of the so-called “guarantor powers” under the Zürich and London Agreements (Turkey, Greece, and the UK) dealing with independence for the island. Additionally, the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and (unofficially) the United States (US), were responsible for a constitution drafted and agreed to, together with two additional treaties (Alliance and Guarantee), then executed in Zurich on February 11, 1959. These agreements provide the only bastion against formal partition of the island between the two Cypriot communities and led to the proclamation of Cyprus as an independent state on August 16, 1960, as the Republic of Cyprus (“the republic”). It has been questionable whether the Cypriots signed these agreements “voluntarily,” because it appears they were caught “between a rock and a hard place” to accept what the British had engineered. It was either this arrangement or nothing. Not much of a freely negotiated arrangement. This has served to complicate the resulting history in ways never contemplated.3 Talks were initiated between the Turkish and Greek governments leading to the Zurich Agreement of 1959. Subsequently, this was agreed to in London between the five parties involved (Turkey, Greece, UK, Dr. Küçük on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots, and Archbishop Makarios on behalf of the Greek Cypriots). This resulted in the republic’s constitution of 1960, and the conclusion of the Treaties of Guarantee, Alliance, and Establishment. When the five-party Treaties were signed, the UK transferred sovereignty to the two communities on the island as a unit. Thus, the republic was born as an “independent partnership state.” Historically, there have been rumblings ever since that Cypriots of both communities felt “trapped” and signed only because the alternative was a “nonstarter.” It has seemed as if the entire process got off on the wrong foot. Cypriots on both sides of the divide continue to suffer. Each community, respectively, has been responsible for ethnic cleansing of the other between 1963 and 1974. First, the victims were Turkish Cypriots in the formative days of the republic, and later Greek Cypriots when in 1974 Turkey sent thousands of troops to occupy approximately 37% of the island. This action ultimately resulted in the

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unilateral creation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) by the Turkish Cypriots in 1983, today still recognized internationally only by Turkey. There can be no other conclusion than this is an intractable dispute (i.e., hard to control or deal with) after 49 years following the 1974 war with Turkey. It continues to prove ripe for intervention by Track III (initiatives promoted and carried out by civil society organizations not associated with government) at the grassroots level. It appears the last viable chance to accomplish this was eliminated with the unexpected Greek Cypriot vote to defeat the referendum for approval of the UN Annan Plan (V) on April 24, 2004, notwithstanding the “surprise” concurrent approval by Turkish Cypriot voters.

Cyprus as an Independent State In 1960, the British withdrew from most of the island in the process of granting independence to the newly formed republic. Only two sovereign bases (SBA) in vastly different locations of the island were retained by the former under an ownership interest arrangement. No equal sharing of power between the two communities occurred. The Greek Cypriot majority continued to chase enosis with Greece and the Turkish Cypriot minority followed by seeking taksim with Turkey. The resulting demands by each community brought international attention to the conflict that would thereafter become known forever as the Cyprus Problem. James Ker-Lindsay, a prominent scholar regarding this protracted (over 50-year) international dispute, has referred to it as the archetype or leading example of a seemingly intractable ethnic conflict.4 The 1963 Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Christmas ethnic clashes gave Turkey an excuse to threaten invasion of the island to protect Turkish Cypriot interests. This eventuality would result in substantial population shifts causing the two ethnic communities to gravitate to their respective territorial enclaves (Greek and Turkish, respectively). Consequently, this created a de facto partition of the island . And it set the stage for both communities to invite UN mediation that resulted in the 1964 stationing of its peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) on the island. The idea was that this would encourage a peaceful resolution

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while postponing an ultimate confrontation between the two disputing communities. The hoped-for cooperation did not last. The 1967 mainland military coup in Greece renewed the Greek Cypriot desire for enosis, setting the stage for the new Greek regime in Athens to plot the subsequent 1974 coup in Cyprus to overturn its then president (Archbishop) Makarios III. Their plan was to take control of the island. However, through the ultimate failure of this attempt, Makarios narrowly escaped death by the Greek-led National Guard, fleeing to the city of Paphos located on the southwestern side. There a helicopter transported him to the British Sovereign Base area of Akrotiri located next to the city of Limassol in the southern part of the isle. Once there, Makarios made it to London. Several days later, he addressed the UN Security Council, which accepted him as the legal president of the Republic. Turkey pounced on this extremely complex development as an excuse to send troops to invade north Cyprus, using the justification that this was a “peace operation to restore order.” In the process, Turkish troops indiscriminately murdered innocent civilians, something that remains fresh in the minds of Greek Cypriots. Makarios eventually returned to Cyprus and resumed power. Notwithstanding the restoration of political order, as proof of the real intent behind the invasion, Turkish troops even today continue to occupy approximately one-third of the northern part of the island. In addition to the casualties on both sides, approximately 40% of the Greek Cypriot population was forced to flee their homes in the northern areas occupied by Turkish troops, causing those Cypriots to become involuntary refugees on their own island. This resulted in Greek Cypriots fleeing from the north to the south, and Turkish Cypriots moving from the south to the north of the island.5 With between 35,000 and 40,000 of its troops, Turkey continues to occupy approximately 37% of the island, ignoring repeated UN attempts to require the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus to guarantee the island’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The most recent major attempts to peacefully resolve the Cyprus conflict were the five versions of the plan proposed by then UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Kofi Annan (Annan I-V) between October 2002 and March 2004. Those

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efforts were rejected in the April 2004 referendum voting on the island (Turkish Cypriots voting 65% Yes, but Greek Cypriots voting 75% No) causing a major failure to accomplish the purpose of the plan. Irrespective of what many would like to think, the status of the conflict now is nothing more than a bicommunal acknowledgment of what only can be described as a ceasefire between the two sides. At any moment without warning, this could evaporate quickly should the UN decide to remove its troops. This is something it regularly threatens in view of the entrenched positions taken by the two sides since 1963. The only effect is the increased disregard of the threat that has come to be considered nothing more than “crying wolf ” that continues to have just the opposite effect. This atmosphere has been created by those perennially sitting at the negotiation table intentionally or otherwise adopting an “elephant in the room approach” (i.e., everyone knows about the problem but no one in the space wants to acknowledge or discuss it ). This continues to avoid having to deal with the increasing enormity of the dangerous and unpleasant situation. Not unexpectedly this has resulted from the respective traditional no-win positions asserted by each side: On the one hand, the TRNC (Turkish Cypriots) says there will be no settlement until they are recognized internationally as an equal but separate state; while on the other, Greek Cypriots insist Turkish Cypriots will be protected only as an established minority in a Greek Cypriot state. The focus and aim of this short work are to provide a subjective learning experience through examination of the nature of peacebuilding at the grassroots level and its theoretical or conceptual foundations as applied to the special case of Cyprus; and explain how this situation can apply in other ways. For example What does the term civil society (i.e., relying on nongovernmental organizations and activities) really mean, and is this the same in different contexts; could the term also be considered uncivil as demonstrated by the 2004 defeat of the UN Annan Plan for resolution of the conflict; is civil society a reference to an unequivocally positive space and thus treated normatively rather than analytically; and, is the activity of civil society always a force for positive change, or a state of being better left as is?

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As the virtual stalemate between the opposing elements of traditional elite diplomacy regarding reunification persists, the history in the race for each side to place blame on the other dictates a fresh slant. Applying John Braithwaite’s theory of democratized restorative justice to Track III (community-based diplomacy that some would place even higher as “Track II”), what I have referred to as the Seven Keys to Peacebuilding may provide the solution. These are: (a) empowerment to participate; (b) recognition of opposing points of view; (c) trust to disclose the past; (d) truth expressed without reservation or rehashing what has come before; (e) forgiveness without forgetting; (f ) collaboration to produce solutions; and (g) reconciliation for future peace.6 The traditional thinking that dealing with emotions and separating these from the problem when in conflict, to ignore positions and focus on their respective interests, does not always work with cases of intractable conflict such as the Cyprus Problem. This is especially true where mediation has not been attempted or worse, failed. Success must depend on transforming the conflict into something more peaceful and cooperative, living without war or violence while the disputing parties continue to disagree, and the opportunity for resolution once again presents itself for consideration in the absence of interference from outside third parties. This will require each disputing formally constituted political group to take control of its own destiny. In a clearly satirical vein, it has been suggested the two Cypriot leaders at any given time might have a better chance of success in arriving at an acceptable permanent solution if they were to meet in the revered far northern coastal TRNC village of Kyrenia. This would be in clear view of the historically prominent castles of St. Hilarion and Buffavento, where the leaders might discover their coming together so far away had solved the problem. The unspoken joke is, by then, any other attempt to unite the island would have become outdated by the passage of time.7 Is this a valid conclusion? Is a new creative approach possible? The answer would seem to be yes, but only if we seek to accomplish this from the bottom-up level through use of intercommunal grassroots dialogue workshop groups that will follow the example set by the civil society Oslo Group sponsored by the US Embassy (Nicosia 1998), discussed below. The different priorities of the two communities may make it possible

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for each to achieve their respective goals without harming the other. However, this would require the abandonment of the historic attempt to demonstrate who is solely to blame for the past, while looking for ways to come together for the future benefit of each community. This will depend heavily on bicommunal grassroots efforts (from both sides) because any successful solution must begin with them together. Failing this, any idea Turkish Cypriots will instead accept minority status in a centralized Greek Cypriot state has been affirmatively answered repeatedly and increasingly in the negative, with mounting determination as the years have passed. This leaves a de jure (by right) partition of Cyprus as the solution,8 reinforcing the joint effort of Turkey and the TRNC to divide the island. On September 20, 1960, the republic was admitted as a member of the UN, and on April 4, 1990, it applied for membership in the EU. After the UN Annan Plan V had been defeated in the joint community referendum vote on April 24, 2004, Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash stubbornly refused to join the EU together with the republic. In retaliation, the EU abandoned its insistence on a bizonal, bicommunal federal solution reunifying Cyprus as a prior condition to the admission of the republic. With the island divided and militarized, the Greek Cypriots joined the EU alone on May 1, 2004, without anyone considering the details of what had occurred. Although this represented the consistent history of efforts at reunification to that point, the irony is the failure of the UN referendum to pass in 2004 was due to the recalcitrance of the republic. The EU reliance on the outcome of the UN efforts to design a solution proved to be misplaced. The preconception that the republic would be more amenable to a settlement based on the Annan Plan proved to be totally without justification. This created one of history’s great miscalculations, in all probability relinquishing the opportunity to “checkmate” any further attempts by the republic to resist reunification. The issue of the Cyprus conflict is multi-actor and multi-level because of the various participants at various stages (both domestically and internationally), all seeking to control the destiny of the dispute between parties unrelated to the onlookers. We know what caused the failure to pass the UN referendum (Greek Cypriot 2004 political opposition), but

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the critical question for history remains what possessed the EU to naively determine its accession process would act as a catalyst to force a solution to this long-running historical conflict with only the admission of the Greek Cypriot portion of the island? 9 Without exception, the prevailing feeling is the EU “blew it.” The only remaining inquiry is why, which to this date has not been satisfactorily answered. The impact of these failures on Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, respectively, considering the fears, perceptions, and expectations of each of the two communities regarding these developments, appears to be: (a) dogged refusal to change on the part of the Greek side; and (b) a gradual increase in strength and bargaining position of the Turkish community with the passage of time. Therefore, the reality of achieving a satisfactory solution becomes increasingly diminished with the arrival of each new day. What are the theoretical and empirical aspects of any solution, especially applying the concept of curiosity, i.e., (1) “a strong desire to know or learn; and (2) having an interest in a person, thing, or experience that leads to making an inquiry.”10 The concept of curiosity in this case means mutually realizing and respecting that each side has their own version to tell, irrespective of the forum. This translates to the necessity of each hearing and understanding the story from the other point of view, to discern the intentions motivating the respective actions as a precondition to successfully reaching a satisfactory resolution. The attempt to navigate this process requires empowering both sides to interact with the other to encourage mutual expression of their respective interests and underlying needs. In the case of the Cyprus Problem this is a long winding road with no visible end in sight, irrespective of the numerous prior attempts. While various theories abound and attempts at practical solutions have been plentiful, the end continues to remain elusive. The continued political self-interest on either side has reinforced the message of the Green Line. Initially, on December 30, 1963, a general of the republic,11 using a green pen to designate the separation of the island after the first intercommunal conflict, has been credited with this designation. Today, it remains and gradually has been extended over the years across the entire island some three hundred kilometers, dividing the two communities, still patrolled by the UN. The term Green Line

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is preferred rather than “border” because the latter is anathema to the Greek Cypriots who insist unrealistically there is no such thing because they control the entire island. It is necessary to question whether (a) a resolution to the Cyprus Problem is any longer a realistic political goal , or (b) has it been eclipsed by the need for a non-political solution, which at least may succeed in convincing people on both sides to live together peacefully for their joint benefit, without more? Have these continual failures caused the entire island to forfeit any capability of, or effectiveness in, attracting outside assistance to fully resolve this long-running conflict? So far, acceptance of the community-based (bottom-up) approach has not been endorsed by the political elites of either side. It has been suggested the history of unsuccessful negotiation of ethno-national conflicts (“nation” defined in terms of ethnicity emphasizing various political issues from the point of view of a particular national or cultural subgroup) demonstrates the need for further analysis. This relates to how pre-negotiation efforts12 can assist in achieving the respective goals of the parties at the bargaining table that hopefully follow. As such, this process becomes a mandatory pre-requisite to a successful outcome.13 In the case of the Cyprus Problem, it is necessary to determine the need to analyze how such pre-negotiation efforts could assist in achieving success. There is an indication the pre-negotiation process from 2003 to 2004 was deficient because its sole purpose was to enable the two respective leaders to achieve specific benefits and was not determined by the parties’ perceived need to reach an agreement. At this point in history, reunification remains in the hands of the politicians and not grassroots interests, irrespective of the side. The rules of the game need to be changed from the top-down approach of the elites to the bottom-up grassroots seeking transformation of the conflict as the best alternative to a negotiated settlement (BATNA). This new and perhaps last effort must be pursued from the perspective of personal, relational, structural, and cultural goals. Such an innovative approach to what has been sometimes referred to as the “graveyard of diplomats’ failed dreams”14 will require a major shift from the historical adversarial to a new collaborative future way of looking at the problem. One of the major roadblocks, among others, will be Turkish Cypriots who live on 37% of

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the island but constitute only 20% of its population, and their fear this could seal their minority social status adversely affects economic opportunities because of their inability to compensate Greek Cypriot owners for unreturned land confiscated in 1974. Additionally, there is the dilemma posed by citizenship rights claimed for the huge number of settlers/immigrants from mainland Turkey who have been regularly shipped by the latter to the island to cement its control through providing economic benefit in exchange for their votes, such as was the case in the 2020 presidential election where Tatar received the benefit of such shenanigans on the part of Turkey to engineer his “shocking victory” over Akinci.15 Further complicating matters is the Greek Cypriot insistence on returning to the way things were versus the Turkish Cypriot interest in a legitimate two-state situation. The haze from the past needs to be lifted to disclose a brighter vision for the future, without attempting the impossible of undoing the history of the conflict. People on both sides should understand the story of the dispute cannot be undone and any change will not be immediate. Also, Turkey must realize eventually it has more to lose than gain from not supporting such a solution. So, the conflict seems open-ended. Unlike other world conflicts, the Cyprus Problem incessantly has been a thorn in the side of peacebuilding efforts there for over 60 years with no end in sight. This is the situation notwithstanding the continued efforts over that period to attempt an acceptable resolution. The inception of the problem with the 1974 Turkish invasion of the island became a festering raw and painful place in the attempt to achieve peaceful relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. This cancer formed instantly with the establishment of the republic in 1960 and has continued to fester well beyond the pseudo-division in 1974 separating the two communities. Notwithstanding the questionable Turkish Cypriot application for EU membership, the attempted resolution of the Cyprus conflict, Turkey’s similar EU application, and the several failures to create a joint positive atmosphere to encourage such a settlement, all have gone nowhere. Final reflections will need to consider mistaken beliefs, missed opportunities, and lessons learned. This in turn will depend on what, if anything,

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might be done to resurrect the possibility of a satisfactory solution. In the absence of this, what next? Applying the analogy of a locking mechanism, will Cyprus ever hear the welcome sound of release? There needs to be a specific piece with incisions designed for this function. It appears there is no realistic hope of ever locating the one that will answer one of Europe’s longest and most contested political questions. After over 60 years of searching for the proverbial needle in the haystack, this piece remains hidden. In the end, the voices of people at the ground level on both sides of the conflict must be taken into consideration, hopefully discovering themselves in the process of its attempted resolution. During this effort they can16,17 be learning while sometimes failing in their own respective ways, but always remaining undeterred from their determination to succeed in attaining what has been the elusive dream of humanity from the beginning of time. This was emphasized by the tearful parting of two Cypriot women (one Greek and the other Turkish) meeting each other at the elevator upon preparing to leave the first Oslo Group meeting hotel (see Chapter 2), for what was then thought to be the final time, in July 1998. When I asked them why they were crying, they informed me neither one had met someone from “the other side” before they formed their bond in Oslo. Now leaving, they feared they would never see each other again! In the case of Cyprus, without successfully encouraging both communities to finally come together, this dream could prove to be unattainable. A quotation attributed to Margaret Mead is particularly apropos here: Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.

Hopefully, those committed to achieving peace in Cyprus through reunification will keep this in mind and seek to overcome their difficulties as they continue their efforts.

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Nature of Peace The goal is to prevent the outbreak, escalation, continuation, and recurrence of violence, which can occur before, during, or after initial disputes, as well as following the resolution of differences. This effort commonly is referred to as peacebuilding because it involves changes in attitudes, behaviors, norms, and is a long-term and collaborative process that is not defined by deadlines.18 Irrespective of the actual structure, the process is an ongoing effort to create and advance a lack of conflict followed by reconciliation requiring the participation of everyone involved irrespective of life experience. While perhaps only a “pipedream,” the goal is to embrace the richness of humanity in general to achieve a politics of compassion that can produce reconciliation, mutual respect, and equal dignity.19 This concept is different from peacemaking (entering into agreements resulting in conflict transformation) or peacekeeping (moving from conflict to adoption of conditions for lasting peace). “Peace” traditionally is used almost in a cavalier way, referring to “a neutral situation where the resolution of conflicts occurs without violence, encouraging collaboration. This is the result when everyone involved has the power to participate in shaping political decisions and the government is accountable to the people.”20 Unfortunately, given human propensities and the structure, operation and current goals of “government” on the island it would seem there will be an indeterminable wait for such universal participation by those on the ground in Cyprus.

Peace Can Be Taught As a start, for example, Toril Rokseth is Director of Education at the Nobel Peace Center, Norway, where she leads a team of four educators. They instruct young people that “peace is more than the absence of war.” The Center is the official showcase for the Nobel Peace Prize. It has been reported more than 10,000 children aged between 6 and 19 visit the Center to participate in ten programs each year21 Interestingly, annually

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the Nobel Peace Prize is awarded in Oslo, Norway, while the other Nobel prizes are presented in Stockholm, Sweden. Peace also can be something more than the absence of war, and conditions such as these may also destroy it: (a) poverty, (b) racism, (c) environmental disasters, or the (d) absence of democracy and human rights. So, should we not work to correct these adverse conditions? Is all discussion about peace positive? What about the negative aspects of peace? The distinction between negative and positive peace is important22 : Negative rests on the absence of war or armed conflict, and positive focuses on pre-requisites and criteria for sustainable peace, e.g., respect for universal human rights that are not synonymous with legal rights. The art of peace is considered a skill acquired by practicing the critical concept of societal friendship and harmony, face-to-face, and “talk about it.” 23 The answer we seek responds to the underlying question: How do we transcend the cycles of violence that bewitch our human community while still living in them?24 This statement is indicative of the historical approach taken when speaking about peace, i.e., the reference most often considers war and violence in first position and peace “bringing up the rear.” It is as if war and violence have more political “sex appeal” than peace, and therefore the former receives more historical emphasis and notoriety, while the latter remains a story rarely told. When asked to define “peace,” most people will respond with “this means the absence of war.” Unfortunately, this has proven to be a generalized response without substance. A prime example of this misleading conclusion is the special case of the long-running ceasefire condition that is the Cyprus Problem. No rational, clear-thinking person would with a straight face argue this ceasefire is an example of “peace,” yet some no doubt would disagree. Ironically, during the Kosovo War (1998–1999), there were Greek Cypriot (heavily pro-Greek Orthodox Church) protests in Nicosia where attacks against the American Embassy by young Greek Cypriot students throwing eggs and tomatoes were orchestrated by adults who brought them to that location to protest. This was in response to the US supporting the Albanians (mostly Muslims) for humanitarian reasons in that conflict.25 An interesting activity on the part of Greek Cypriots

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who traditionally have eagerly accepted the sponsorship by the Cyprus Fulbright Commission (CFC) sending their children to the Seeds of Peace camp in the US to educate them in how to live peaceably with each other! This was to prevent, and a perfect example of how not to transcend but rather encourage and participate in, the cycles of violence that bewitch our human-populated community, while still living in them. In Kosovo, destroying a mosque or a church became a way of putting an end to a community’s identity.26

Variable Meaning The element of using dialogue to transform conflict into cooperation has been considered “magic.”27 If we master the communication skills needed to conduct discourse successfully, it has been demonstrated how this discipline can make us more effective negotiators, “strengthen relationships, resolve problems, and achieve shared objectives.” An extension of this approach acknowledges there are multiple modes of peace providing a better understanding of its variations and building blocks, across different regions. This has established the need for more interdisciplinary work in the field of international relations and peace and conflict studies.28

Challenges Involved in Peacebuilding29 While there are many hazards on the road to successful peacebuilding, chief among these is intractability (generally described as without end in sight, destructive, and unusually resistant to resolution) and spoiling (usually the attempt by groups to actively hinder, undermine, or prevent settlement of a conflict through a peace process designed to achieve certain positive objectives), both of which appear to be “partners in crime.” The case of Cyprus is a prime example of the adverse effects of the inability of conflicting parties to move forward positively, and how spoiling negatively affects the peace process.30

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Therefore, it becomes critical to (1) ascertain the nature of actions considered to be examples of spoiling in this context, (2) determining who are the parties seeking to enhance their specific bargaining positions in this way; and (3) whether such negotiations are part of the established process or outside it through unilateral measures blocked by intractability. The first of what I consider to be the two real opportunities to have solved the Cyprus Problem appeared in 1992–1993 when the UN Security Council became involved. The occasion was the first time in the history of the intercommunal talks the UN had inserted itself and took a stand in favor of one of the parties to the discussions. During the process, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali finally sided with the Greek Cypriots (at the time George Vassiliou was their president) because of TRNC leader Rauf Denktash’s intractability. This was in response to Denktash accusing the Secretary General of overstepping his “mission of good offices” during the negotiations, and for having attempted to impose an inequitable settlement.31 Consequently, the distinction between spoiling from legitimate political actions aimed at bolstering an actor’s bargaining position as part of normal politics has become blurred, as has the traditional give-andtake bargaining process as opposed to intractability. According to Beyond Intractability,32 destructive conflict is the biggest threat to human wellbeing on the planet. It is bigger than climate change, for example, because we cannot solve climate change until we solve the conflict around it.

General Theoretical or Conceptual Foundations: Multi-track Diplomacy33 This revolutionary concept expanded on the original distinction made by Joseph Montville in 1982, between the action in two “tracks” resolution of conflict (official/governmental action referred to as Track I and unofficial/nongovernmental referred to as Track II). Former US Ambassador, John McDonald, and Dr. Louise Diamond enlarged the two tracks to five in 1989. Later, in 1991, they expanded the five tracks into nine, and christened them multi-track diplomacy. Their Institute

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for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) was founded in 1992. The nine tracks they proposed are in this order: (a) government; (b) professional conflict resolution; (c) business; (d) private citizen; (e) research, training, and education; (f ) activism; (g) religious; (h) funding; and (i) public opinion/communication. The McDonald-Diamond underlying principle is when functioning together these produce a “synergy to approaching conflict…that will last.” The foundation for the application of the systems approach is based on three main categories of peacebuilding: (a) political; (b) economic and institutional; and (c) social peacebuilding. One model cannot be applied to every conflict because each is individualized.

Informal Approaches34 An example of informal peacebuilding as opposed to the formal negotiating table is demonstrated by the African country, Rwanda. It questions the application of Western liberal peace models at the grassroots level and seeks alternative or informal peacebuilding approaches using the case study of the Rwandan post-genocide dramatic reconstructions. The prototype uses participatory theater techniques extracted from the applied theater field and argues for the employment of these for peacebuilding at the grassroots level. The attempt is made for a safe, aesthetic space, created by the theater as critical to peacebuilding activities. While unfamiliar to many in the conflict resolution discipline, from my personal perspective based on many years toiling in the thorny fields dealing with disputes, I am intrigued by the idea of exploring the possible benefits of following the Rwandan approach in making a fresh attempt to rein in the Cyprus Problem.

Civil Society Context What does the term “civil society” mean? Among other suggested descriptions, civil society has been referred to as: (1) a normative concept, and (2) a necessary condition precedent to democratic functioning with

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uncertain consequences.35 It features a forum for struggles between a variety of democratic and anti-democratic efforts presenting the positions of the state as a repository of power on the one hand and anti-democratic forces on the other. It is a necessary precondition for democracy to function where the politics of affirmation and contestation play out, with uncertain outcomes. Is it the same in different contexts? This consists of the network of groups and communities that fill the gap between the individual and the state. A civil society independent of the state is critical to the function of a successful democracy, and its absence or decline can be the cause of the fall of such an otherwise healthy system.36 This underscores its critical nature, yet there are places throughout the world where people either are: (a) not aware of the concept; (b) do not practice it; or (c) are prevented from doing so. Instances when actions of civil society could be considered “uncivil ” (e.g., defeat of the 2004 Annan Plan) are those where the concept is referred to as under-theorized because it sometimes is used to describe such a community holding different values from those of the author.37 Does “civil society” refer to unequivocally positive space treated normatively not analytically as in a state of mind, versus a state of physical being better left “as is”? “Normatively” refers to establishing a norm or standard rather than stating facts, and “analytically” means using analysis or logical reasoning as opposed to state of mind. Finally, there are those who might elect to define this as a state of being that is an overall physical condition, concluding this definition is better left alone, while at the same time promoting tolerance and establishing a “culture of peace among citizens.” This is because it directly involves the local community.38 Taking a dialectical approach (logical discussion of ideas and opinions through opposing forces) the function of Track III diplomacy, sometimes overlooked, or discounted by both Track I (political) and II (organizational), is also referred to as “people to people diplomacy” as promoted by the International Organization for Peacebuilding (InterPeace). This is practiced at the grassroots level where its value lies in the inherent ability to create a better “understanding of the other,” civil society becomes unbridled as a key element of peacebuilding. As such, it is normative as opposed to analytical.39

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Civil society, while not always a force for positive change, has been acknowledged as the third sector of government (political, organizational, and the grassroots). This new concept is based on the thinking that such a people-to-people diplomacy is not necessarily good because there is an inherent dark side to the concept, preventing it from equating to democracy or to an originally conceived civic society.40 This leads us to a series of dilemmas. The new concept of civil society consists of the formal and informal institutions, bodies, and activities, which have been voluntarily established and consist of three arenas of societal action: (1) nongovernmental; (2) public interest; and (3) purpose-driven, not necessarily democratic. These do not perform coercive government tasks or have established autonomous governance procedures. The state should expect civil society to provide: (a) ideas and solutions; (b) public discussion; (c) civic engagement; (d) social capital; and (e) volunteer action. In a normative sense (standard or norm as opposed to common or frequent), civil society has a political , not a moral dimension, whereas its analytical or logical aspects are centered on the elemental parts of the whole. A civic society will: (1) define society from the citizen point of view; (2) encompass all three arenas of collective societal action; and (3) accord a political role to civil society.

The Special Case of Cyprus Key Question: In the case of this conflict, lasting over 60 years and so far, seemingly one of the most unsolvable in history, what would occur if attempts to describe and explain the story of the dispute were preceded by: (a) efforts to understand the people on both sides; (b) consider their interests, feelings, and underlying needs; (c) before responding to its conflicting narratives? 1. Listening t o what Cypriots have to say on both sides of the Green Line discloses why so far conflict resolution has not succeeded on the island. For years there has been a diminishing effort to promote serious public discussion regarding future strategic options

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concerning reunification of the island, thereby silencing any meaningful attempt to convert destructive into constructive conflict. 2. While strategic thinking cannot reclaim the past, it can encourage a positive outlook for the future. What is the strategic thinking of each (Greek and Turkish) respective party? New possibilities continue to arise where these two contesting groups maintain a program of collective strategic thinking internally. 3. Third-party involvement of the constructive kind can positively encourage strategic engagement . What is the strategic thinking of outside parties here, such as Turkey, Greece, UK, and the US? 4. Caveat: Strategic engagement is not a cure-all for the failure of conflict resolution. Notwithstanding this, it is important to keep the channels of communication open so future opportunities to continue the peacebuilding story going in a positive direction are possible. This will help to make sure everyone in attendance gets an opportunity to express themselves fully.

Historical Context41 Glafcos Clerides, when president of the republic,42 in addressing the Seton Hall School of Diplomacy, succinctly set forth the essence of the Cyprus Problem.43 His remarks emphasized what was faced by those who were attempting to deal with the tricky situation. Events had made the solving of what should have been a “simple problem” arduous because British colonialism and Turkey’s expansionist interests exacerbated it. Cypriot self-determination would result in an informal partition of the island between the two communities, supported by Turkish foreign policy. This was enhanced by the fact the constitution of the new republic prevented the amendment of this complicated document without the consent of the three guarantors (Britain, Greece, and Turkey) that resulted in fighting between the two communities. The 1974 invasion by Turkey and the resultant exchange of populations, and its engagement in importing Turks (“settlers”) from its mainland to alter the demographic composition of the island, created a result that made solution of the Cyprus Problem increasingly impossible.

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The presence of Turkish forces on the island created the necessity for the republic to form its own army (National Guard) and an alliance with Greece. The military units from both sides faced each other across the Green Line placing the UN peacekeeping force in the middle. The roadblock established by Denktash insisting on partition and the creation of two sovereign states before coming to the negotiating table seemed insurmountable, making any solution depend on what would be his highly unusual way of thinking. Both communities joining the EU together would pacify the anxieties of each side. This was because the republic had the premonition that Turkey’s intention was of one day occupying the entire island, while the fear of the TRNC was caused by the republic one day succeeding in making Turkish Cypriots “second class citizens” as the island’s minority. It was hoped the newly found collaboration between Greece and Turkey concerning the devastating earthquakes in Turkey followed by those in Greece during the summer of 1999, where each country went to aid the other, could forge a new relationship that would provide the basis for resolving the Cyprus Problem. But this was not to be. The strong feeling in several segments of the international peacebuilding community was the 2004 attempt to accept Annan Plan (V) had been the most active and last effort at what has become a losing campaign to secure peace in Cyprus. The accumulation of these increasingly unsuccessful efforts continued to become worse with each failed attempt. What at first had seemed like a victory in 1960 throwing off the shackles of British control was shortlived, and over the ensuing years appeared to continually lose more steam and any chance of getting the “ball over the goal line.” As of this writing, the UN actions continue to have centered around the effort of the republic to unite with Greece while attempting to achieve a settlement of the conflict between the two communities, each claiming sovereignty to its respective percentage of the island. The first elections to take place after the accession of Cyprus to the EU and the failed UN referendum in 2004, were in 2008. Dimitris Christofias of the Progressive Party of Working People—AKEL, the communist party of Cyprus, became the president of the republic after defeating incumbent Tassos Papadopoulos and another candidate. In 2008, Christofias commenced talks with then Turkish Cypriot leader

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Mehmet Ali Talat on the reunification of Cyprus as a bizonal, bicommunal state, but these efforts did not materialize into anything of significance. Renewed efforts between the Greek and Turkish sides during the 2014 Cyprus negotiations between the leaders of the two communities also failed to produce anything positive. The recurring question is why this conflict has created such a “tough skin” impervious to all attempts at peace? The answer appears to be (except for George Vassiliou, Glafcos Clerides and later Mustafa Akinci ) the historic self-interest of many politicians on either side have been pre-occupied with remaining in power by satisfying the ethnic emotionalism of their respective electorates. History proved dependable, and this did not bode well for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s subsequent numerous entreaties to Akinci and then republic president Nicos Anastasiades, “to do their utmost to reach a settlement,” repeatedly asserting “the prospect of a solution in Cyprus is within their reach.” Although it now appears Anastasiades and Akinci were much more aligned than at first appeared, the question remains whether they could have changed the historical intransigence and convinced their respective communities to join them before Akinci’s term of office expired in 2020. The second of what appears to have been the two best opportunities to resolve the dispute vanished with Akinci’s “shocking” defeat by Tatar in the October 2020 TRNC presidential election. While Anastasiades and Akinci seemed open to compromise unlike their respective predecessors (except Vassiliou and Clerides), the landscape had changed. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) upheld entitlements for Greek Cypriots who lost property in the North, to the detriment of Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks who currently were their occupants, potentially resulting in a disastrous economic impact to the latter. Additionally, Turkish Cypriots have become painfully aware soon they could be outnumbered by the immigrants from Turkey, and their descendants, who arrived following Turkey’s 1974 invasion. On the other hand, without agreeing on the outcome, it appears most Greek Cypriots have come to believe reluctantly that a de facto partition would be permanent and the best solution, although there has been no unanimity as to what this would look like.44

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UN-motivated current efforts to address the historical problem continually seeming to be a repetition of the past failures only dressed in new clothes, appear to be surfacing once again albeit in a noncommittal way.45 The Cyprus Problem seems to resonate constantly throughout the island of Aphrodite. It hovers like a dark cloud across this not such a large place with considerable impact in the Eastern Mediterranean. Confrontation is in the air no matter where one travels in the area. What seems irreconcilable does not disappoint in the reality of the situation. The separation between the two communities has been laid at the feet of the Greek Cypriots who were originally thought to be interested primarily in enosis rather than independence from the British. Talks sponsored by the UN to end the historical division of the island last took place in November 2019, when UNSG Antonio Guterres made comments that were designed to achieve a lasting settlement based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality. At the time it was felt that this would be the end of peace talks with the two community leaders. Hovering over this “one more attempt” was the fact Akinci’s numerous efforts to strike a deal with Anastasiades were hindered by the opposition resistance from within the TRNC seeking closer ties with Turkey.46 Since the EU decided in 1997 to accept the republic’s application for full membership as a (legally) unified state at the Luxembourg summit, the Cyprus Problem has moved to the forefront of conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has been said the underlying issue is not reunification but of security as seen from each side of the Buffer Zone (“no man’s land” area) dividing the two communities across the island . Hovering over reunification is a “fictitious aim, when in fact each side needs to look at what would best serve the respective needs of each community, without interference from Turkey.” Not unlike “rubbing salt into an open festering wound,” it bears repeating, on May 1, 2004, when the EU unilaterally admitted the republic to its membership, there was no provision for the TRNC ,47 thereby shutting the door to future admission in its face. In 2003, following a campaign of massive protests, Denktash surprisingly opened the Green Line checkpoints, which up until then had remained sealed to all Cypriots and highly restricted concerning foreigners. Thousands of Cypriots from both communities flooded into

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the opposite parts of the island from where they lived, some seeing the other side for the first time in their lives, calmly waiting in line for a chance to pass over. Many Greek Cypriots went to their former family homes even though now occupied by Turkish Cypriots, to visit and retrieve lost personal belongings. They were surprised their requests were granted by the occupants. This unusual act of humanity was something covered internationally because of its significance. However, once the “make-nice” feeling had passed, again there remained a void unfulfilled, and a wonderful opportunity for a humanitarian reconciliation had been wasted, never to be recovered. The Cyprus Problem still dominates the political life of the island. The continual hostile rhetoric between the two sides intimidates foreigners so they avoid discussions on this issue, if possible. Both parties to the conflict have deep feelings about the situation so outsiders have learned to shy away from involvement unless necessary, such as peacebuilders attempting to search for ways to bridge the divide. The main obstacles for a solution seem to be the: (a) property issue, (b) bizonal structure, and (c) Turkish mainland “settlers” (immigrants) overpopulating the northern part of the island . After the Turkish invasion, the administration in the North expropriated the properties of fleeing Greek Cypriot refugees, either providing this land to Turkish Cypriot refugees returning from the South or to settlers from Turkey. In the landmark Loizides case, Greek Cypriots sought to reclaim their properties in the North. These efforts were reaffirmed by the ECtHR ruling against Turkey as the occupying power, ordering the properties be returned to their rightful Greek Cypriot owners. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots have made no such efforts to recover their properties located in the South.48 Their property for the most part was left unattended. This speaks volumes regarding the potential for future conflict regarding the property issue because of the disparity in the level of interest (and values) in recovering this lost asset. Turkish Cypriots have sought their own federal state that would be on an equal footing with the one controlled by Greek Cypriots. Notwithstanding this, the latter has determined the island to be united with their being the majority and the other community as the minority.49 At this

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point, there does not appear to be any solution on the horizon, because this alternative represents pure anathema to Turkish Cypriots. The poor economy in the North has encouraged many of its citizens to leave the island. As mentioned above, they have been replaced by others coming from Turkey, causing problems that intensify the conflict. These create difficulties such as intermarriage and the possibility those refugees may eventually exceed the number of nonrefugee Turkish Cypriots on the island. The republic has demanded these “settlers” be returned to Turkey, but the TRNC is not willing to accept mass deportation that will further diminish their population importance on the island. At the present rate, this is not something Turkey will agree to. As a postscript to the conflict, while the republic’s parliament continues to hold the required 24 of its total 80 seats for Turkish Cypriots, there do not seem to be any takers. Cyprus Mail newspaper columnist Christos Panayiotides has asserted the ten most critical issues for resolving the Cyprus Problem are: (1) security, (2) political equality, (3) rotating presidency between the two communities, (4) independence for each, (5) undersea wealth of Cyprus, (6) “tight” vs. “loose” federation, (7) risks over deadlocks, (8) education, (9) compensation for war losses, and (10) securing a safe transition.50 He has emphasized: “Cyprus’ priority is the solution of the Cyprus problem because that way it can ensure in the best possible way and the least of sacrifices another 60 years of life in this difficult region of the world would require. He urges that “both communities ought to work for peace”.51 The original concept of EU membership for the two populations through accession being helpful in solving the Cyprus Problem, proved to be a dream. The effect of the several defeated attempts at reunification has been further isolation and economic hardship on the Turkish Cypriots, proving to be an additional boon to the political and financial aspirations of the Greek Cypriots. While unspoken and usually not considered important, a major contributing factor is the youth population. They fail to have any genuine experience living together with the “other side” following the 1974 invasion. Consequently, their potential interest and participation in the peace movement are either not strong, or, in many instances, of no interest.

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Principal Players The selected collection of individuals on both sides who have led their respective communities since independence from Great Britain in 1960 constitutes an interesting array of personalities and capabilities. These have contributed in various degrees to the political growth as well as division of the island and failure to achieve resolution of the Cyprus Problem, as follows:

Greek Cypriot Leaders Archbishop Makarios III (Mikhail Khristodolou Mouskos, 1913–1977) 52 : Archbishop and primate of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. In his joint role as a politician pursued enosis with Greece during the postwar British occupation, and later served as the first elected president of the newly independently recognized republic (1960–1977) with a Turkish Cypriot vice president, without term limits. Subsequently, the office of the president became subject to a two-term limit. The coup d’état of July 15, 1974, led by Nicos Sampson, forced Makarios to leave the island until his return (December 1974) to regain control of the government that lasted until the date of his death on August 3, 1977. Nikos Sampson (1934–2001) 53 : Greek Cypriot journalist and militant nationalist was de facto president of the republic for eight days after the 1974 coup d’état that led directly to the Turkish invasion precursing the island’s division into two hostile separate communities. Turkish forces landed in Cyprus on July 20, 1974, and three days later Sampson resigned in favor of Glafcos Clerides, as acting president in the absence of Makarios. Spyros Kyprianou (1932–2002)54 : Greek Cypriot nationalist leader and politician succeeded Makarios as president in 1977. He served as the country’s first foreign minister (1960–1972), appointed president when Makarios died in office (August 3, 1977), and later won his own elections in 1978 and 1983. From 1979 to 1988, Kyprianou negotiated on several occasions with veteran Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, but reunification talks between the two sides failed. Notwithstanding having some

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success in revitalizing the Cypriot economy, he failed to be reelected in 1988. George Vassiliou (1931–)55 : Travelling widely during his five years as president (1988–1993), Vassiliou motivated international interest in support of resolution of the Cyprus Problem. His commitment to a settlement highlighted the stubbornness of Denktash. Vassiliou’s goal of a reunited island was on a successful track when Clerides challenged him for reelection. Vassiliou, admittedly overconfident as to reelection for a second term, decided to abandon the traditional practice of financially providing for Cypriot students studying abroad to fly home to vote. In what was considered a “shocking defeat,” he lost by only approximately 400 votes, derailing his progress toward reunification, and perhaps permanently ending the opportunity for the ultimate solution to the Cyprus Problem. Glafcos Clerides (1919–2013)56 : He had sought to broker a peaceful solution to the partition of Cyprus into Greek and Turkish zones in his roles as a chief negotiator (1974–1976) prior to his election as president. During the 1959 peace talks in London, he assisted Makarios and then was named Makarios’s first minister of justice. Clerides was elected speaker of parliament in 1960, and he held the position of acting president when Makarios was temporarily ousted by the military coup in 1974. He campaigned for the presidency three times (1978, 1983, and 1988) before winning office (1993–2003). He established good relations with Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash (who he knew from their early years as Cypriot lawyers) but was unable to achieve a settlement and eventual reunification. In his second term as president, Clerides established the groundwork for the eventual entrance into the EU of the republic in 2004. Tassos Papadopoulos (1934–2008)57 : He participated in the negotiations leading to independence of Cyprus in 1960. Afterward he became minister of the interior—the youngest member of the cabinet—and he remained prominent in the island’s politics for four decades. For years he was a political ally of Clerides who became his mentor but broke with him in the mid-1970s. Papadopoulos was elected president in 2003, defeating Clerides and eight other candidates to win outright with 51.5% of the vote. Although he had purported to be in favor of a

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unified Cyprus, in 2004 he changed course and urged Greek Cypriots to vote against the UN-backed reunification plan with Turkish Cyprus, which in all probability proved to be the death knell for reunification. In February 2008, Papadopoulos lost his reelection bid and was succeeded by Demitris Christofias. Demitris Christofias (1947–2019)58 : He became the first communist president of the republic, whose troubled tenure was marked by near financial ruin that led to an international rescue, uproar over a deadly Iranian munitions blast and failure to end the country’s ethnic division. Considered a “thin-skinned” politician who continually sought popularity and the respect that eluded him, he was the only president of the republic not to seek reelection (2008–2013). Nicos Anastasiades (1946–)59 : He was president of the republic (2013– 2023) until succeeded by Nikos Christoulides, earlier having served for six terms, commencing in 1981, in the Cypriot parliament. Although pro-settlement, he received one of the largest vote percentages (57.4%) in years. Subsequently, he supported the Annan Plan for reunification, drawing some opposition even from within his own party. He renewed reunification talks with the TRNC in 2015. His cordial relationship with his TRNC counterpart, Mustafa Akinci, offered hope that an agreement might be reached, and talks continued and off until July 2017, when the two were unable to agree on issues of power sharing and on security arrangements for the TRNC. During his second term as president, Anastasiades engaged in efforts with Akinci to restart formal negotiations, although heightened international tensions over maritime natural gas claims took precedence. Nikos Christoulides (1973–) having run as an independent candidate, was elected in February 2023 as the youngest (age 49) president in the history of the republic. Previously, he served as the republic’s minister of foreign affairs (2018–2022). Reportedly, he was backed by groups hostile to talks on reunification of the island.

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Turkish Cypriot Leaders Dr. Fazil Kuchuk (1906–1984)60 : Following an agreement between Turkish and Greek Foreign ministers at Zurich, Dr. Kucuk represented the Turkish Cypriots at a conference held in London, and after two days signed an agreement reached in the name of his people. According to its founding principles, the president of the republic was to be a Greek Cypriot and the vice-president a Turkish Cypriot. Since the Turkish Cypriots saw him as a “savior without any rival,” he was elected as the first vice-president of Cyprus on December 3, 1959, handing over his vice-presidency to Rauf R. Denktash on February 18, 1973, and until his death, continued the struggle through his newspaper. Rauf R. Denktash (1924–2012)61 : He battled throughout his career for a two-state solution to the sectarian division on the island of Cyprus and thus for international recognition of the self-proclaimed (1983) Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), of which he served as the de facto head of state (under various titles) from February 1976 until he retired in April 2005. Although only Turkey recognized the TRNC, Denktash steadfastly refused international calls for reunification of the divided island. Mehmet Ali Talat (1952–)62 : Although he always had a strong commitment to a settlement, Mehmet Ali Talat had the bad fortune when he was Turkish Cypriot president (2005–2010) to have to deal with two RoC presidents (Papadopoulos and Christofias) who did not share his commitment. Dr. Dervis Eroglu (1938–)63 : Long-time (17 years) as TRNC prime minister and TRNC president later (2010–2015). Physician and politician. In 1976, Ero˘glu entered politics with his election as a member of the TRNC parliament, representing the National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi; UBP). He held the office of prime minister three times (1985–1993, 1996–2004, 2009–2010) before being elected president in 2010. He had campaigned on a platform that included sovereignty of the Greek and Turkish states in Cyprus rather than the reunification that his predecessor, Mehmet Ali Talat, had pursued. In the 2015 election the politician Mustafa Akinci easily defeated him.

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Mustafa Akinci (1947–)64 : At the age of 28, he was the first elected mayor of the Nicosia Turkish Municipality and served for an uninterrupted term of 14 years from 1976 to 1990. During his mayorship, he collaborated with the then Nicosia Greek Cypriot mayor (Lalos Demetriades) on the implementation of the award-winning Nicosia Sewerage Project and the Nicosia Master Plan. Additionally, in 2003 Akinci and his Greek Cypriot counterpart were awarded the prestigious Europa nostra Medal of Honour in recognition of their consistent and successful efforts for Nicosia and its citizens during particularly difficult times, and for the preservation of the historical and architectural environment of the “Walled City.” Akinci played a leading role in the establishment of the Union of Turkish Cypriot Municipalities and became its first president. From 1993 to 2009, he was a member of the Turkish Cypriot parliament. Between 1999 and 2001, he undertook the role of deputy prime minister and minister of tourism. Akinci was elected as the TRNC president by taking 60.5% of the votes in the second round of the presidential elections held on April 2, 2015. He stood alone in pursuing a determined effort to make reunification under a federal system a reality but was unable to move beyond the reach of outside forces determined to demonstrate a settlement was not achievable. Without party affiliation, he was considered independent. In the 2020 TRNC Covid-19 delayed presidential election, Akinci, was unexpectedly defeated by Ersin Tatar in a surprise result.65 Unfortunately, Turkish President Erdogan’s efforts to undermine Akinci succeeded. Ersin Tatar (1960–): He was elected as the current president of the TRNC (2020–). Prior to that, he became the prime minister following the collapse of the coalition government of Tufan Erhürman in May 2019 and served until his own election as president succeeding Akinci in the 2020 runoff, second round. Tatar is also the head of the National Unity Party (UBP) and served as its leader prior to his election as president.

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Conclusion66 Approximately 25 UN special envoys and six UNSGs have been involved in efforts to resolve the Cyprus Problem over a period of a half-century. Along with a list of other concerns, there has been and remains a division in both communities concerning when and how to deal with ownership of resources. And not to be forgotten is the ever-present issue of security for each in the face of an unresolvable protracted disagreement involving majority versus minority rights and obligations. Per Katie Clerides,67 party political expediency in Cyprus as elsewhere unfortunately often impacts negatively on political decisions taken at a specific point in time. When her father founded the Greek Cypriot political party DISY, he allowed even people who had been in favor of the July 15, 1974, coup to join so they would not be “left out in the cold” and cause political unrest. While DISY originally was perceived by the Turkish Cypriots as a nationalistic party, their subsequent contacts with it and the party’s stand in favor of the Annan Plan in 2004, caused a more favorable impression in their eyes.68 This was a clear positive portent for a future reunification. The questions remain as to how, when, and if that might occur.

Notes 1. Conflicts based “in people’s psychology, culture, basic values, shared history, and beliefs [that] threaten people’s basic needs and very survival. These issues tend to be more abstract, ambiguous and intangible.” https://www.beyondintractability.org. 2. Rothman, J. (republished 2014). Preface. In J. Rothman (Ed.), From Identity-Based Conflict to Identity-Based Cooperation: The ARIA Approach in Theory and Practice. New York: Springer. 3. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/what-happened-in-1959---1960.en.mfa. 4. https://lse.academia.edu. 5. Countryatudies.us/cyprus; U.S. Library of Congress. 6. Turk, A.M. (2006). Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue: The Time Is Right for Track III Diplomacy as the Best Approach for Successful Negotiation of This Ethnic Conflict. Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.,

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7.

8.

9.

10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21.

Vol. 28, p. 205. Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol28/ iss2/1. Turk, A.M. (2007). Rethinking the Cyprus Problem: Are FrameBreaking Changes Still Possible Through Application of Intractable Conflict Intervention Approaches to This Hurting Stalemate. Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev., Vol. 29, p. 463. Available at: http://digitalco mmons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol29/iss3/2. International Journal of Managerial Studies and Research (IJMSR) Volume 4, Issue 7, July 2016, pp. 1–12 ISSN 2349–0330 (Print) and ISSN 2349-0349 (Online) and http://dx.doi.org/10.20431/2349-0349. 0407001, www.arcjournals.org ©ARC. Turk, A.M. (2009). The Negotiation Culture of Lengthy Peace Processes: Cyprus as an Example of Spoiling That Prevents a Final Solution. Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev., Vol. 31, p. 327. Available at: http:// digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol31/iss3/1. https://andersonuniversity.edu/sites/default/files/student-success/import ance-of-being-curious.pdf. Green Line—Nicosia | Cyprus Island (https://www.cyprusisland.net/att ractions/green-line-nicosia). Schiff, A. (2011, Dec 1). The Critical Role of Prenegotiations in Etho-national Conflicts. Israel Studies Review, Vol. 26, No. 2, 24 pp. https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/berghahn-books/the-critical-roleof-prenegotiations-in-ethno-national-conflicts-TDetUppBJz. https://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/15/pre-negotiations-a-necessary-pre-req uisite-for-success-in-diplomatic-negotiations/. https://lse.academia.edu/JamesKerLindsay. https://cyprus-mail.com/2021/06/10/shocking-interference-by-turkeysin-north-election-report/. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/determination-key-determines-our-des tination-ms-jemi-sudhakar. https://www.ucg.org/the-good-news/world-peace-the-impossible-dream. https://www.international-alert.org/what-we-do/what-is-peacebuilding. Porter, E. (2007). Peacebuilding: Women in International Perspective, Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics (p. 192). New York. Definition of Peace: www.international-alert.org/what-we-do/what-ispeace. Can peace be taught?—UNESCO: https://en.unesco.org/courier/20181/chto-takoe-mir-i-mozhno-li-emu-nauchit.

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22. Negative and Positive Peace: https://engagingpeace.com/?p=2799. 23. John W. McDonald, U.S. Ambassador (ret.) and emeritus senior advisor at George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (S-CAR), prior to his death in May 2019. 24. Lederach, J.P. (2005). The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace (1st Edition, p. 5). New York: Oxford University Press. 25. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-23129474. 26. Wheeler, 2000: 265. 27. Yankelovich, D. (1999). The Magic of Dialogue: Transforming Conflict into Cooperation. New York: Simon and Schuster. 28. The Palgrave International Handbook of Peace Studies: A Cultural Perspective. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 29. Newman, E., and Richmond, O. (Eds.). (2006). Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing SPOILERS During Conflict Resolution. New York: United Nations University. See, also, Peace Building and Spoilers: www. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14678800600590728. 30. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/nejo.12007. 31. Bolukbasi, S. (July 1995). Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 460–482 (p. 460). 32. https://beyondintractability.org/educationtraining/teaching-materials; https://vimeo.com/356988793. 33. McDonald, John W. Multi-Track Diplomacy. Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: September 20. 34. https://www.bing.com/search?q=informal+approaches+to+peacebuil ding&cvid=a11fdd4653064a18861858087dcd8620&FORM=ANA B01&PC=SMTS; see also https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/inf ormal-peacebuilding-initiatives-in-africa. 35. https://globalsocialtheory.org/concepts/civil-society/. 36. https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-society. 37. Glasius, M. (2010). Uncivil Society. In H.K. Anheier and S. Toepler (Eds.), International Encyclopedia of Civil Society. New York, NY: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-93996-4_6. 38. International Journal of Managerial Studies and Research (IJMSR), Vol. 4, No. 7, July 2016, pp. 1–12, ISSN 2349-0330 (Print) & ISSN

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40.

41. 42.

43.

44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

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2349-0349 (Online); http://dx.doi.org/10.20431/2349-0349.0407001; https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=establishing+ a+%E2%80%9Cculture+of+peace+among+citizens.%E2%80%9D+ This+is+because+it+directly+involves+the+local+community. https:// www.interpeace.org/2017/10/strategy-inclusive-peacebuilding/#:~:text= Track%201%3A%20Political%20elites%20and%20decision-makers% 20both%20at,Local%20communities%20and%20individuals%20w ithin%20the%20broader%20population. http://www.strachwitz.info/resources/BGSS+A+1222.pdf; https://www. bing.com/search?q=Is+Civil+Society+%E2%80%9CNormative+or+Ana lytical%E2%80%9D&cvid=bcb667a960514c7cbd11334b43883cb7& FORM=ANAB01&PC=SMTS. July 23, 2012. www.maecenata.eu MAECENATA INSTITUT the New Concept of Civil Society July 23, 2012, Market State Civil Society CITIZEN. 2nd Berlin Summer School in Social Sciences Civil Society—Normative and Analytical Dimensions Dr. Rupert Graf Strachwitz Montag, July 12 AN DER HUMBOLDT-UNIVERSITÄT ZU BERLIN M. http://www.strachwitz.info/resources/BGSS+A+1222.pdf. Cristou, G. (2004). The European Union and Enlargement. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Acting president of Cyprus (1974), during the period Makarios was in exile off the island following the attempted Greek-sponsored coup to remove him from office. Clerides, G. (Summer/Fall 2000). Addressing the Future Impediments to the Solution of the Cyprus Problem. Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, pp. 15–19: https://www.shu.edu/diplomacy/ upload/clerides-2.pdf. Search Results for “Cyprus 1960 Settlement”—POLITICO (https:// www.politico.eu/?s=Cyprus+1960+Settlement). https://cyprus-mail.com/2021/02/23/un-committed-to-cyprus-and-itspeople-guterres-says/. https://www.nordeatrade.com/dk/explore-new-market/cyprus/politicalcontext. Cyprus: Case Study—A Failure of Ethno-national Understanding (Albert F. Reiterer). https://cyprus-mail.com/2020/08/06/turkish-cypriot-property-claimsin-republic-the-other-side-of-the-same-coin/. https://www.nordeatrade.com/dk/explore-new-market/cyprus/politicalcontext.

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50. Panayiotides, C. Cyprus Mail, Jan. 20, 2020. https://cyprus-mail.com/ 2020/01/12/the-10-critical-issues-for-resolving-the-cyprus-problem/. 51. House Speaker Demetris Syllouris. https://cyprus-mail.com/2020/10/01/ cyprus-ready-to-defend-itself-speaker-says-during-parade/. 52. https://www.nordeatrade.com/dk/explore-new-market/cyprus/politicalcontext. 53. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nikos-Sampson. 54. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Spyros-Kyprianou. 55. George Vassiliou https://cyprus-mail.com/2016/12/20/players-georgevassiliou. 56. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Glafcos-Clerides. 57. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Tassos-Papadopoulos. 58. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/23/obituaries/dimitris-christofias-isdead.html. 59. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nicos-Anastasiades. 60. www.whatson-northcyprus.com/history/kucuk_biography.htm. 61. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Rauf-Denktash. 62. https://cyprus-mail.com/tag/mehmet-ali-talat. 63. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Dervis-Eroglu. 64. http://www.mustafaakinci.com/mustafa-akinci-timeline/?lang=en. 65. In 2003, Ingemar Lindahl (later Sweden’s first resident ambassador to Cyprus) compared Akinci to other Turkish Cypriot politicians as “gentler, more cautious, with a long perspective.” Notes From the Graveyard of Diplomats: Cyprus 2002–2004. Heterotopia Publications (Nicosia: 2019). 66. THE DIVIDED ISLAND | Cyprus Mail (https://cyprus-mail.com/thedivided-island/). 67. Daughter of Glafcos Clerides (dec’d.) and former member of the RoC parliament. 68. Conversation with Katie Clerides.

2 Rethinking the “Cyprus Problem”

Introduction International organizations such as Interpeace 1 aim to prevent violence and build lasting peace through efforts that reconcile divided societies. Imposed solutions often fail to succeed due to an inability to understand the underlying conflicting views from the grassroots level extending up to those at the highest level of decision-making. From the inner depths of conflict, disputants often fail to see how they relate to those on the “other side,” rather than emphasizing what may divide them at first blush. In such instances, the goal of groups such as Interpeace is to bring all sides together to foster forgiveness, achieve reconciliation and accomplish reunification through the identification of elements that can unify them to work together for the good of all concerned. From the birth of Cyprus as an independent nation in 1960 (composed mainly of two ethnic groups, Greek and Turkish), numerous attempts have been made to accomplish this goal. The 1974 invasion of Cyprus by Turkey netted the latter approximately thirty-seven percent of territory in the island’s northern part (the “occupied area” now © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. M. Turk, Bridging the Cyprus Divide, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29758-8_2

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controlled by the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). One can find a physical manifestation of current conditions in the portion separating the two communities demarcated as the Green Line/Buffer Zone. There, visitors can see barbed wire framing a collection of various uninhabited homes, and the large UN-commandeered Ledra Palace Hotel for its headquarters on the island. The once glamorous hotel located in Nicosia, confirms the drastic results of the Turkish invasion. Each attempt at settlement has been billed by the UN as a “critical phase” of a “final push” to reach a historic deal to reunify the island, accompanied by continual threats to move on and cease funding the presence of peacekeeping troops if the then current effort is unsuccessful. Almost like “clockwork,” the numerous attempts to resolve Europe’s “longest-running frozen conflict” have failed consistently and the “cash register” reflecting the amount of money invested by the UN in its “money-losing” peacekeeping venture on the island continues to rise since its establishment in 1964. Now in its 58th year, the annual budget for 2022–2023 is reported to be $54,327,300.2 Reportedly, as early as 2007, a UN poll found a majority backing in both communities for a federal settlement. There are those who believe the failure to resolve the Cyprus Problem is directly attributable to starting at the wrong place. A variety of issues seem to be on the table. Skeptics say to be effective the process should have begun with Turkey, the invader, not Cyprus, the victim. The underlying concept is Desmond Tutu’s proclamation: My humanity is bound up in yours, for we can only be human together.3

The Fallacies of the Cyprus Problem4 Following over half a century of failed negotiations to reach a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus Problem, the last of these took place in Crans-Montana, Switzerland, during June–July 2017. The most recent attempt to start the official process yet again was in April 2021, a repeat failure to even get going in the first place. No one should have expected this last effort to succeed when earlier attempts had not. It seems these

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negotiations were doomed to fail for the following reasons, which have been referred to as the fallacies of the so-called Cyprus “problem” : 1. Fallacy: The key is to solve the Cyprus Problem. However, the real motive is the expansionist policy of Turkey advanced through pressure on not just the republic but also on Greece, the EU, and extending to the West in general. 2. Fallacy: Turkey is in favor of a solution. Not so. Turkey has no intention of contributing to solving the “problem,” but rather pursues its best interests in maintaining its foothold in what has been referred to as the “crossroads” between Europe and the Middle East. Instead, Turkey considers its place in the global and regional politics of the area to be hampered on the world stage because of the strategic location of Cyprus. This is exacerbated by the recent issue of energy resources discovered in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the prospect of their exploitation. 3. Fallacy: Protecting the rights of Turkish Cypriots is Turkey’s primary concern. False. Turkey is interested in protecting its rights and not necessarily those of the Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, because the Turkish Cypriots are so dependent on Turkey, they have no ability to negotiate directly with the republic. The shadow of Turkey is ever present.5 There may be the possibility of “life after death” regarding resolution even in the most Intractable of conflicts such as the Cyprus Problem.6 a. Rather than “pack up and go home” when negotiations become intractable, either by the conflict becoming “frozen” or premature abandonment of the initial effort, the more effective action is to “switch gears” and search for opportunities to continue through “communicative approaches” that are compatible with attaining success and avoiding failure. This is where radical disagreement enters the picture. b. Radical disagreement is not given its due, but rather dismissed without the benefit of learning from the mistakes. This result arises from the reflexive conclusion the disagreement is superficial and does

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not merit further consideration that would be unproductive. Radical disagreements in intractable conflicts render traditional conflict resolution approaches prematurely. c. The alternative is to approach the situation through conflict engagement , where the parties listen to what each has to say, engage in collective strategic thinking , leading to the promotion of a calculated exchange across and between the conflicting parties. When necessary and appropriate, applicable third parties may become involved. (1) In the case of Cyprus and its ever-present intractability, it is crucial for the parties to continue seeking the road to resolution possibilities, especially when things appear darkest. What occurs when conflicting discourses of intractable conflict collide with each other? How effective are third-party efforts to provide aid? Conflicting parties usually are much further apart than was first anticipated, and radical disagreements provide proof of intense and enduring political conflict. (2) The underlying argument is that civil society initiatives are crucial for peacemaking and peacebuilding in Cyprus.7 (3) The positive peaceful future of the island may depend on the conflicting parties being able to take radical disagreement seriously, understand it, and discover ways to adapt appropriately. (4) A joint declaration between both sides of the conflict was issued on November 2, 2014, covering in more detail the following: (i) Continuation of the status quo was unacceptable. (ii) Structured negotiations in a results-oriented manner were contemplated. (iii) All unresolved core issues were on the table to be discussed interdependently. (iv) A bicommunal, bizonal, federation with political equality was the goal. (v) Nothing would be agreed upon unless everything was accepted. (vi) The respective leaders were the only people who could finalize any resulting agreement.

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(vii) Any arbitration process was to be excluded. The leaders affirmed that a “settlement would have a positive impact on the entire region, while first and foremost benefiting Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, respecting democratic principles, human rights, and fundamental freedoms, as well as each other’s distinct identity, integrity, and ensuring their common future in a united Cyprus within the European Union.”8 Civil society’s goal is to allow ordinary citizens to interact directly, including their expressions of apology and forgiveness, “humanizing” each other through acknowledgment of their respective points of view. The lesson for peacebuilding seems clear: Relying on the elite approach of Tracks I or II to diplomacy from the top down is no longer sufficient. All stakeholders should be considered, working from the ground up through civil society. This provides individuals at the grassroots level with the opportunity to clearly establish what must be done to “make things right.” The result can be more than simply a society with a greater voice from its citizens, but by taking such a truly positive step there will be a movement toward securing an improved peaceful world. There is a practice referred to as “restorative justice.”9 Its goal is to: (a) “build up communities through developing strong relationships,” (b) focusing on “empathy – understanding the ‘other’” and (c) “challenges the divisive rhetoric we often see elsewhere, where difference is seen as a thing to be feared.” Communities are not considered as an excluding concept, but as a series of overlapping, shifting groupings. This is a safe area where “fragmentation into cliques around sexuality, gender, class, race and religion is reduced.” Dialogue that leads to understanding focuses on solutions rather than obstacles and is utilized to handle conflict in a positive rather than negative manner. It emphasizes strong “democratic involvement” and is: (1) all about “empathy, (2) participation and self-government”, (3) “how I want you to treat me, and (4) how I should treat you.” It takes the approach “emphasizing a passive nature of the relationship between the individual and the state.” The purpose is to demonstrate our current way of identifying and determining “solutions to problems, has not

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served social justice because it undermines democracy and encourages dependency.” “Self-management and self-government are important skills that should be explicitly fostered in democratic societies. This means rethinking the roles of government and professional organizations that too often speak for communities.” Ultimately, restorative practice “helps to connect the individual to their community, at a local and national level. This allows the individual to understand the patterns of society and therefore the importance of engagement with it.” My experiences with Cypriots from all levels of civil society on both sides of the Green Line indicate there is a viable argument for the emphasis on Track III (civilian diplomacy) efforts as the next step in the attempt to achieve a positive peaceful reunification of Cyprus. History demonstrates elite diplomacy has failed. The consensus is that had it not been for a last-minute “hail-Mary” change of mind by Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos urging a “no” vote, the results from the Oslo Group (below) indicate Track III diplomacy from the bottom-up possibly might have made a difference in achieving a positive outcome in the bicommunal referendum voting on April 24, 2004. An impartial comparison of the in-depth results from the two lengthy Oslo Group meetings with the content of Annan Plan I-V clearly supports this conclusion. The defeat of the referendum seems to indicate a movement toward partition.

Change the Game10 Those at the grassroots level on both sides need to “change the game” through conflict transformation from the bottom-up. The best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) is the way forward given the current state of the stalled negotiation process, pursuing personal, relational, structural, and cultural goals. This will require a “decided shift from an adversarial to a collaborative game,” an approach that appears to be historical anathema to Cypriots on both sides. People in both communities need to understand the history of the conflict cannot be undone. Due to the current atmosphere on the island, the

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dwindling support from outsiders, and the security issue existing for both because of the continued presence of Turkish troops in the North supporting a TRNC government for which Turkey provides substantial funding, the prospect for a settlement does not appear encouraging. Exacerbating this are leaders (except Akinci, and Vassilios as well as Clerides before him) who may “carry the baggage of their respective predecessors” and thus cannot realistically suddenly change embedded positions and expect their communities to follow a change in course without adverse results. Adding to the problem, among other things, are: (a) Turkey’s internal problems, (b) its efforts to gain a foothold on the stage internationally, and (c) the fact real parties in interest politically are the presidents of Turkey and the republic. Except for Akinci, whoever sits in the chair as TRNC leader appears to be the “odd person out” simply there by accident as the puppet of Erdogan. Further complicating things, the problem is the fact the support for reunification within the Turkish Cypriot community seems to have dwindled since the failed referendum vote.

Intractable Conflict11 It is perilous to ignore intractable conflicts that are hard to control or with which to deal. Separating disputing parties from the problem and focusing on interests instead of positions, for mutual gain and recognizing the applicable commonalities, as one of the basic foundational elements of effective dispute resolution, has had limited success regarding a solution to the Cyprus Problem. It has been a common conclusion that the problem is intractable because the mediation process has failed. The dispute needs to be transformed before this process can be restarted and realistically have a chance to accomplish peaceful negotiations for reunification. For this to occur, outside intervenors will need to step back and allow the people on both sides to take charge of their dispute themselves to control their own destiny. This can be accomplished through applying a constructive conflict resolution process using storytelling and dialogue groups to bring the disputing parties together. In my approach

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to conflict resolution training of Cypriots in both communities, I have found this to work miraculously. When first undertaking my work in Cyprus, I was surprised to find the actual formal “mediation process” of resolving disputes apparently had not yet reached the island. Later, I came to understand my background in this area was the key motivation for the decision of the CFC to approve my award. After over 60 years, the plethora of efforts to resolve this long-running conflict has nothing to show for itself other than a more entrenched de jure partition. Does this raise the question of to what extent are there those who feel this current situation may have been meant to be (intentionally or otherwise) left as is after all, given the entangled history of the island? Greek Cypriots historically feel Cyprus is a “Greek island” because of their majority ethnic population. There appears not to be any resolution of the Greek Cypriots’ feeling of superiority versus the Turkish Cypriots’ assertion they should have equal decision-making power. Unfortunately, there appears to be dwindling enthusiasm for a bizonal, bicommunal federation even on the Greek Cypriot side. This is because the direction of the peacebuilding winds seems to be blowing in favor of the known status quo. Sad but true, even if Akinci had been reelected in October 2020, in view of the greatly changed world situation, there are those convinced no one would care about the Cyprus Problem any longer, anyway.

Dealing with the Past12 The case of the “missing,”13 during the 1960s–1970s, those ethnically cleansed in the past whose bodies were buried in mass graves located throughout the island (far more Greek Cypriots than Turkish Cypriots) underscores the effect of a program of compulsory disappearances. This is exacerbated by the seeming paralysis of opposing parties to move beyond the point where they are stalled because of a fundamental disagreement regarding the tragedy of the missing and the necessary steps to be taken. The catastrophe of the missing began in 1974 and continues today as on-and-off negotiations drag on. This has been the case notwithstanding

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continued attempts by the UN to accelerate the exhumation and identification efforts apparently initially backed by the political will of the parties during the 2000s. Further, it was necessary to take into consideration the contradictions of the traditional justice system such as (1) “truth versus justice, (2) proper burial versus responsibility, and (3) acknowledgment versus accountability.” In question was “mutual trust, cooperation, and collaboration; and, on the other hand…the ambiguities of redress, responsibility and [again] accountability.” The process was considered the “most effective example of reconciliation owing to the depoliticization of the issue and the success of the exhumation and identification processes, whereas another perspective may criticize its over-technical approach lacking in accountability.” Relatives of the missing also were subjected to human rights violations both during the inter-communal violence and following 1974. Families of the missing were forcibly moved to other parts of the island and, among other things, subjected to sexual violence, not the least of which was sexual harassment and rape, never acknowledged by the politicians on both sides of the Green Line. While the TRNC is not recognized by the republic, the fact Turkey acknowledged the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) enables that body to consider the claims of the relatives of the missing as well as the actions of those officials involved.14

Citizen Participation and Bicommunal Movement15 Citizen participation may be defined as a process in which ordinary citizens take part on a voluntary or obligatory basis, acting alone or as part of a group of others, for the purpose of influencing a decision involving their community. An example of a typology based on citizen involvement is the classic model developed by Arnstein (1969).16 She proposed a “ladder of participation” with these eight levels corresponding to increasing degrees of citizens’ power in decision-making choices from lowest to highest: (a) manipulation; (b) therapy; (c) informing; (d) consultation; (e) placation; (f ) partnership; (g) delegated power; and

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(h) citizen control. While truly the most desirable and technically accurate, unfortunately true “citizen control” is almost impossible to achieve. Otherwise, participation would not be a seemingly “empty ritual,” but instead possess the real power needed to affect the outcome of the process capable of providing a more equitable and peaceful bicommunal result. Working with people on both sides of the Green Line for close to a quarter-century, I can vouch for the truth of this dilemma. In the case of citizen participation, it does not mean some sort of technical interpretation involving civil society. Many efforts to prevent the true evaluation of a project from the actual point of view of those who will have to live with it, are misrepresented as “citizen participation.” Historically, this is an exaggerated misconception when employing the term “civil society.” The only way actual citizen participation comes to fruition is when the involved community truly has a say on the same level and in cooperation with the elites in government. Unfortunately, control has not been an easy thing to wrest from the hands of those occupying the seats of government and transfer it in favor of true citizen participation, not just engagement.17 Rather than the pro-reunification enthusiasts on both sides of the Green Line succeeding in steering their leaders and Erdogan in the direction of a serious movement on course for a concerted effort toward reunification, the dance of Cypriot history continues to turn endlessly. Where, or even if, it will stop nobody knows. This is because the rhythm hasn’t slowed down for the last 60 years since Cypriot independence from Britain. We need to maximize possibilities for growth and commitment from grassroots factions, usually downplayed. Groups such as women in leadership supporting the peace process are examples of the “it’s about time” mentality determined to alter the Cypriot identity. This will cast off what in the past has been accepted as a customary political division in a concentrated attempt to substantially revise the thinking of society in this area.18 It will depend on a change in Cypriot society’s perception of women in politics and serious interest in making such a proposal work. The key words are “serious interest.” Given the history of the Cyprus Problem any illusion of achieving this appears to be just that unless a fresh look is taken. This would require acknowledging now is the time

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to ensure women are at the forefront of the effort to resolve the conflict, filling the vacuum left by others who have failed (male and female) as of now. Any objective observer would recognize the obvious benefits of doing so, as well as the anticipated resistance waiting in the wings. It is interesting to note (according to the Feb. 13, 2023, edition of the Cyprus Mail ) even those who opposed the republic’s newly elected president, Nikos Christodoulides, will be heard from and consulted. In addition, he pledged that his cabinet will be composed 50/50 of men and women. This is a very interesting expression of intention since historically Cypriot officialdom has been heavily male-oriented.

History of Civil Society Peacebuilding Movement in Cyprus19 The purpose of this movement was to reconcile the two communities in a way conducive to arriving at a peaceful and prosperous society together. This was attempted through the design and application of a series of bicommunal meetings, workshops, and training enabling those from both sides to make contact and work together in the manner of a common vision. In the initial stages, the possibility of achieving this goal seemed like an almost impossible task. Formation of the Nicosia Master Plan was one of the first groups formed to kick off the program. This consisted of a team of architects, city planners, sociologists, and economists that became instrumental in building a common vision for the divided city of Nicosia. Following this, bicommunal meetings were organized by the British Friends of Cyprus Committee from London with journalists, educators, politicians, public servants, and architects from both communities invited to participate. While the strong peace activities had their heyday during the period 1980–2014,20 the group known as Movement for an Independent and Federal Cyprus did not hold a founding meeting until September 23– 24, 1989, that took place in the old Nicosia Ledra Palace Hotel in the Buffer Zone, covered by the press. Attending were 25 Turkish Cypriots and 36 Greek Cypriots. The goal was to consider how rapprochement and more contacts between the two communities could be accomplished. This was

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followed by a second meeting on January 20–21, 1990, where the participants approved a set of basic views and principles later published as a leaflet in Greek, Turkish, and English.21 The views and basic principles ascribed to it were: a. There is concern about the future. b. The respective shares of common responsibilities were acknowledged. c. Both the violence and the separatist ideologies of the past must be rejected. d. Federation is the common future. e. The mobilization of citizens is imperative. The basic concept employed in establishing the foundation for the bicommunal movement was working to find a way to understand, develop, and nurture peaceful relations between those on each side of the Green Line who historically had been taught to consider each other as their enemies. For the most part, bicommunal participants were ordinary citizens who had the opportunity to interact directly, including their expressions of apology and forgiveness, humanizing each other through acknowledgment and respect for their varied points of view. This demonstrated the ability of Cypriot civil society to engage in democratized restorative justice (based on the concept of rehabilitation, rather than criminal punishment of the offender, through reconciliation with the victim and public at large). It was agreed peace and reunification are too precious to leave to the negotiators.22

Oslo Group I and II Citizen participation was put to the test by an unanticipated event taking center stage in the early years of the movement. During the last six months of 1998, my potential as an “accidental peacebuilder” was considerably challenged. Once on the island initially, well into the process of getting acclimated in all ways including working with a women’s shelter involved with cases of domestic violence, the specified description of my Fulbright award, I was contacted by Greek Cypriot

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activist Katie Economidou. She was one of the initial Greek Cypriot civil society leaders of the bicommunal peacebuilding movement, and coincidentally an upstairs neighbor in the apartment complex where we were living at the time. She asked for my help because the activities of the peacebuilding movement seemed to be withering away. I said I had no experience in what she was asking, and my background was in areas other than peacebuilding, but I would discuss this with Daniel Hadjittofi, the executive director of the CFC. He informed me that I should agree because this was exactly the type of activity for which I had been selected to receive the award! Even though this was not specified in my application, he said the CFC had to consider my intent as I had specified, to get me there. However, I had been selected because of my legal background, conflict resolution experience, and my work as an academic. Assisting with the peacebuilding movement was the type of thing they envisaged me doing. My immediate next thought was: Whoa there, this is not what I signed on for! I had been told when applying there would be no onsite instruction or supervision as a “Fulbrighter” because this was just the way the program worked. I would have to create and pursue my own activities. When I finally made sure my brain had received the message correctly and I understood the magnitude of what had just occurred, my next immediate thought was what do I do now? Fortunately, all my years and practice in mediation gave me a “kickstart.” It appeared there had not been any actual “hands-on” mediation training programs in Cyprus. So, I started there and began making contacts that eventually resulted in attracting many people from both sides of the Green Line to attend the training sessions, alternatively (one side and then immediately the next) on a regular basis. Ultimately, the number exceeded 500 participants. My work was so widely followed that, even though I was supposed to enjoy the country and surrounding areas along with the work, I ended up working seven days a week. This was to the consternation of Kathryn who had to go on various Embassy outings on the island, and even to Paris to visit her traveling cousin, without me. Going with the flow of these changes in fortune, my “fingers crossed” dealing with the uncertainty and apprehension concerning a major diversion I was about to undertake, with much trepidation I moved

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in this new direction. Ultimately, it would keep me with Kathryn in Cyprus for a total of 23 months, with what can be described only as “quasi-diplomatic standing,” well beyond the term of my original award. Interestingly, I was offered the opportunity to extend the initial ninemonth award two additional times (which I did) for whatever time I requested. Theoretically, I could have selected the second request for a period way beyond the 23 months involved at that time. However, because of Kathryn’s gravely ill father in California, we needed to return home. She suggested I stay, and she would return home without me because I was successfully involved with my program activities. However, I declined because I did not feel comfortable going in that direction since she had made a significant career change in coming with me in the first instance. Working in the Fulbright program continued to introduce us to an amazing variety of people and events on both sides of the divided island. In addition, the array of pseudo-diplomatic interactions with which I became involved extended from border crossing incidents (the last and most serious being the evening immediately prior to the week of our leaving the island to return home in 1999) to the business community, bicommunal leaders, law enforcement, judiciary, and politicians on both sides of the division. The highlight came as I worked with a group of 52 bicommunal Cypriots selected by me, ultimately whom I would name the Oslo Group. This was in recognition of their subsequent initial summer 1998 meeting in Oslo, Norway, under the auspices of the CFC23 in collaboration with the Norway Fulbright Commission, Norwegian Foreign Ministry, and Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), between June 29 and July 5, 1998. The breakdown of the group consisted of 26 Greek Cypriots and 26 Turkish Cypriots who would participate in conflict intervention skills training in Oslo. This was necessitated because, at that time, the political situation in Cyprus prevented members of the two communities from openly meeting together on the island. As discussed below, the unexpected follow-up gathering in Oslo occurred in December of that year. The effort started off on shaky ground and continued in that manner until completed. While there appeared to be no problem recruiting

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Greek Cypriots, the TRNC authorities adamantly discouraged participation in this bicommunal event. Their attempts at interference included, among other actions, threatening the Turkish Cypriot participants and their family members with loss of employment in the government jobs they held. Additionally, because the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots had to leave from their respective airports and fly by separate airlines, including travel restrictions imposed on the latter, there were some difficult instances. Attempts were made to physically prevent TRNC members from boarding the Turkish Airlines plane in Cyprus that would transport them to Istanbul for their connecting flight to Oslo. The Greek Cypriots were able to go directly from Nicosia to a designated foreign country and then to Oslo. Upon arriving in Norway, I discovered only the Greek Cypriots had made it to the PRIO-arranged reserved hotel. This was disturbing because all 52 Cypriots were supposed to have arrived and been checked in at the hotel designation where they would stay together while engaging in the week’s activities. This made the initial contact with each other the night before the conference was to begin critical. Underscoring the importance of this was the fact most of those attending from one community did not know those from the other. No one at the hotel seemed to have information concerning the current location of the Turkish Cypriots. They should have arrived several hours before, as had the Greek Cypriots, to all meet up before the next day’s events commenced. Upon further checking it appeared the Turkish Cypriots had never made it to the hotel from the airport immigration lockup. So, the PRIO representative and I left the hotel to arrange transportation for all of them from the lockup area at the airport to the hotel. All 26 Turkish Cypriots were there patiently waiting to be released. No one from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry had contacted them. We arranged for their release, they went through passport control, and then to the hotel. However, because of the extremely late hour, their Greek Cypriot welcoming committee had already gone to bed. Later, I discovered the Turkish Cypriots had experienced an earlier situation where the American ambassador to Turkey had fortuitously appeared at the airport in Istanbul to make sure they made it through to their connecting plane to Oslo without incident. This was necessary because those flying

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with Turkish Cypriot passports were doing so without internationally recognized documents. Nevertheless, I had received a telephone call around 11:00 p.m. the night before our departure for Norway, from a specially assigned diplomat from the US State Department asking for the names of all the Cypriot participants. The Cypriots had requested anonymity regarding their attendance at the conference to avoid any possible harassment (of themselves or their families) by their respective communities on the island. I had promised their names would not be publicized so I did not want to jeopardize their privacy by providing the information to any governmental agency. I immediately checked with the chief of mission at the American embassy in Nicosia who said I could use my own judgment. So, I withheld the names, preventing interference from the elite level of diplomacy with my “bottom-up” strategies. The next day, I discovered we were missing some Turkish Cypriots from the general meeting session. It turned out that our government representative there had clandestinely arranged to have them join with another program in session off-site where more Turkish Cypriots were needed. After an inordinate amount of time, the missing Turkish Cypriots from our group retuned with their apologetic explanation that they had been taken away against their will for a separate meeting with other Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members of an unrelated program. Three days of conflict resolution skills training were followed by two days of group deliberations, then brainstorming grassroots group suggestions for a possible bicommunal, bizonal federal solution to the Cyprus Problem. The list of six general topics out of a possible 30, selected for immediate consideration and subsequent subcommittee development by the group, were: (1) Bicommunal Movement ; (2) Structure of Government; (3) Security; (4) Human Rights; (5) Social Issues; and (6) Economic Issues. The election of a bicommunal steering committee to work in the interim between July and December planning for the return trip by the group to Oslo in December 1998 was accomplished. The six bicommunal subcommittees subsequently met with me once a month at a restaurant located just outside the small village of Pyla, in the Pergamos neighborhood on the site of one of the British Sovereign

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Base Areas. This was close to a Turkish Cypriot checkpoint permitting only crossing by them and limited passage (person and time). The meetings were able to take place because of the sympathetic English owners of the local restaurant with whom I became friendly, and thus was able to make the financial arrangements for the regular meetings at their establishment. The incredibly fortuitous and successful border crossings by the Turkish Cypriots to meet with their Greek Cypriots counterparts on such a regular basis proved to be miraculous in that somehow the Turkish Cypriots were able to avoid hostile interaction with their checkpoint police in that outlying area. Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriots crossing over were careful not to bring anything incriminating with them (in either direction) when making their way across. During that approximate six-month interim, the members exchanged ideas and suggestions for each subcommittee’s presentation to be made during the return trip scheduled for the coming December. There the full group would thereafter concentrate on attempting to arrive at a detailed final conclusionary statement of their entire two-session work with ultimate overall suggestions. The evaluation process at the end of the July meeting made it clear the initial intensive three-day conflict intervention skills portion did have a positive effect on the subsequent outcome of the culminating efforts of the first group meeting in Oslo. Then and thereafter, the work product of the Oslo Group was in no way intended to be exclusive, preemptive, or the only approach to the subject matter. This simply was a combination of the attempt by people at the grassroots level of civil society to express, from the ground up, their own collective personal intentions, based on underlying interests, needs, and commitment, to influence the elites, working from the top down, to positively effect improvement in the relations between the two communities. Upon conclusion of the subsequent December 1998 five-day second workshop in Oslo, the members of this bicommunal group prepared and issued a detailed declaration concerning what they felt ultimately had been achieved. They disclosed they had come together at the invitation of the CFC and were hosted by it, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and PRIO. However, they made it clear they were acting solely in their individual capacities to fulfill the need for this meeting because of

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the difficulties at the time faced by people from both sides of the Green Line being prevented from getting together on the island. They disclosed that the two-part event running from July to December had provided opportunities for them to: (a) learn and practice communication skills to be employed later in the exchange of views regarding a possible solution to the Cyprus Problem, and (b) consider the future of the bicommunal movement on the island. (c) In relation to the Cyprus dispute, the group emphasized the importance of working toward the establishment of a democratic, bicommunal, bizonal Federal Republic in which: (d) human rights would be recognized and implemented; (e) the security needs of both communities would be safeguarded; and (f ) encouraging application for membership in the European Union as the “Federal Republic of Cyprus,” would be sought at the earliest date possible. The group indicated their anxiety over what they saw as a deterioration of the peace efforts and an escalation of tension on the island. The members expressed their belief in, and support for resumption of bicommunal contacts that would help play an important part in creating a conducive climate for cooperation and understanding between the two communities. They concluded this could provide the basis for a fair, just, and lasting peace in Cyprus. The necessity of later reconvening the group for further discussion of the issues relating to coexistence and developmental activities was recognized. The hope was expressed that such discussions would promote better understanding in both communities and facilitate an expedited solution to the long-standing historical conflict. It became more convincing at each stage of the process, if the people of this island could be left alone to work together as Cypriots without interference from outside interests, they might find the solution to the problem that for so long had been elusive. As a result, perhaps finally a lasting peace could be achieved in Cyprus. The fact the members of the Oslo Group were willing to meet and work together as committed private citizens at the ground level to make suggestions for a solution to be recommended to others in the “elite” class at the top; and, they did succeed in doing so, is far more important than what they recommended. Nevertheless, it is informative to see what they accomplished in the process at the level of Track III diplomacy. This is especially significant when comparing their

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success with the historical failures of the elite Track I diplomats traditionally supported by the average citizens, and unofficial traditional local organizations of Track II.24

The Oslo Report25 This 46-page document is a collection of the outcomes of the group’s extensive deliberations regarding the foregoing specified six individual papers, each addressing the issues established for the final meeting in Oslo in December 1998. These cover a veritable medley of topics, and with each passing year, I am more amazed at what these dedicated citizens created and agreed to. Truly a testament to what Cypriots from both sides can accomplish when given the chance, putting to shame those at the top of the ladder who have yet to realistically face the issues, but rather choose to turn their backs on what has been provided to them from the grassroots. This report would seem to be a precursor to the Annan Plan (I-V) because the Oslo Group was one of two notable bicommunal citizen units (the other being the Harvard Study Group) to “generate a set of creative conflict resolution ideas, providing directions for interethnic rapprochement and a broad rudimentary framework for the settlement of the Cyprus problem” (see, Anastasiou, Harry. The Broken Olive Branch: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and the Quest for Peace in Cyprus: Vol. One, The Impasse of Ethnonationalism. Syracuse University Press, 2008).

Post-Oslo Group Success While peace theoreticians have run the gamut discussing the numerous potential tracks beyond I (including variations), Track III diplomacy (committed people to people at the grassroots level) generally has not risen to an accepted importance ascribed to Track I, or even Track II, as it should have long ago. However, the concept of Track III is crucial because it is based on (1) an understanding of the “other,” (2) promoting tolerance for different points of view, and (3) supporting a culture of

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non-violence among citizens on opposite sides.26 As demonstrated by the diverse members of the Oslo Group, the critical element regarding this track is its potential effectiveness at the level where personal interaction can be decisive and magnified several times over with “hands-on” determination to take charge of one’s life and assist others with whom they are in contact to do the same.

Post-Oslo Group Resistance Following the completion of their work, the members of the Oslo Group contacted Cypriot government officials, the press, and others on both sides of the Green Line, who they thought might like to know the results. However, for three years until the early part of 2002, the group and their report appeared to be ignored (even by the American Embassy in Nicosia). This drastically changed when the Greek Cypriot press subsequently surfaced with coverage alleging, among other charges, that what the Oslo Group did was “shocking,” criticizing its members as being “hand-picked by the Americans ... betraying the pain” caused by Turkey’s invasion of the island and describing their work as a “pointless psychological effort” to deal with a “geopolitical problem.” The Turkish Cypriot members were singled out for threats. These reactions indicate the depth of the impact the work of the group ultimately had on both sides of the Buffer Zone. During the extended time I was providing a detailed 40-hour mediation training program alternately in each community on a regular basis throughout my time on the island, I had periodic meetings with Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, attempting to get him to agree to bicommunal mediator training for his people. Although he continually refused to allow this to happen, he obviously understood the value of these efforts because he said he didn’t want to get Turkish Cypriot hopes up by allowing them to participate in something they could not later pursue. He would repeatedly suggest that I conduct training only in the North and solely for Turkish Cypriots. I discovered my being “the American,” was no joke: There, the feeling was this personified the truth: We would

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be able to effectively work to solve their problem …until we no longer could. Perhaps this explained the fact I was for the most part ignored singularly crossing through the Ledra Place main checkpoint at all hours of the night on my numerous trips by foot or in our automobile, to and from meetings on both sides. This was encouraged by the attitude of the Turkish Cypriot checkpoint police, one of whom I encountered regularly. He responded to my inquiry regarding this by smiling, reaching into his shirt pocket and producing a small, spiral notepad, flipping to a special page, and proudly pointing there saying in broken English: “Marco Turk, Kathryn Turk, diplomats!” In addition, I recall the inquiry from one of my new friends as to whether I was concerned that someone could take a well-placed shot at me in the night darkness. Notwithstanding the sober thought this suddenly engendered (and still does), I was too committed to my mission to let it interrupt my work. I regularly reflect on that time in my life shaking my head at the memory, “fools rush in where angels fear to tread.”27 In addition to the several mediation training programs I designed and conducted for Cypriots from both sides of the Green Line in Cyprus, Norway, Israel, and the US from 1997 to 1999, I was able to arrange with the UN to provide funding for the establishment of two community mediation centers ($100,000.00 per center for one in each of the two communities) at about the same time in 1999, to become effective following my departure from the island. The Greek Cypriot center was formed first and officially registered as the Cyprus Mediation Association in 2000 (but I understand it has not been as active as the one in the North). The Turkish Cypriot center (Turkish Cypriot Mediation Association) was created thereafter and soon became active in performing mediation sessions that continue today. While there is no official mediation organization in the North, a mediation bill did get as far as the discussion stage in parliament there, and for which the mediation association, the bar, and others in the North have given positive written opinions. But then it was also left to lapse. This legislation is required for EU harmonization—and it is understood this also is something Turkey wants the Turkish Cypriots to implement, but it has not reached that point yet. In the interim, the association is investigating what they can

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do “semi-formally” or with their own set of rules. However, it is facing difficulties because of no formal accreditation.

Afterthoughts on the Way Out What we thought would be our last day in the North was highlighted by a realization that, after all, the Greek Cypriot checkpoint police really were much more than “window dressing.” Against my better judgment, on that final Sunday of our 23-month stay in Cyprus, as we passed through the checkpoint to attend a Turkish Cypriot wedding in the North, that Kathryn was determined to enjoy, this message struck home. Just as we reached the Greek Cypriot checkpoint before we crossed into the North, one of my Greek Cypriot checkpoint police friends pulled me aside with a cautionary warning. Unbeknownst to us, a huge Greek Cypriot national celebration protesting Turkey’s invasion had been planned for that checkpoint going north that day. Even though I had been permitted to go and come as I pleased over the almost two years of our stay in Cyprus, he wanted me to be aware of this major event. protesting Turkey’s 1974 invasion. The checkpoint would close earlier than usual that evening and remain shuttered for several days, likely preventing our returning to the South in time to make our approaching scheduled return flight to California some days later. Fortunately, for one of the few times in our marriage, I was able to, with some difficulty, convince Kathryn to listen to the caution relayed to me. Subsequent events proved me correct, the validity of which she acknowledged.

Conclusion Although formed first, the Greek Cypriot Mediation Center found it relatively difficult to be accepted by the community to perform as planned, and hard to attract a following. This even though subsequently succeeding in providing a small number of training sessions to various organizations and interested groups. Principal members of the center

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became active in writing newspaper articles intended to attract mediation training participants, but with uncertain results. In 2009, the two centers were jointly awarded a grant by European Economic Area (EEA) to produce a 16-hour training kit for mediators. The legislation for mediation in civil matters in the republic ultimately became effective in December 2012, as the Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil Matters Law 159 (I)/12) and covers commercial and civil disputes. It is applied to all civil disputes pending before a Cypriot court, irrespective of whether the parties are nationals of Cyprus, EU member State nationals, or non-EU State nationals. Following the effective date of the new legislation, selected members of the Greek Cypriot center were asked by the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCCI) to prepare a 40-hour mediation training course that, under the new law, would allow successful participants to register as mediators with the Ministry of Justice and thereafter practice as mediators. According to the law, lawyers could act as mediators once having successfully completed the training. From 2013 to 2016, reportedly approximately 400 lawyers were trained under the program. Greek Cypriot Judge George (Georgios) A. Serghides, now a Judge at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), who, as President of the Family Court in Nicosia, had been a great supporter of the idea of enacting in Cyprus legislation concerning family mediation, was gratified to see such a law become reality in 2019. The provisions of that Law are applicable to family disputes and every mediation relating thereto in the republic.28 Based on my years of experience in the field, I have come to realize that generally politicians (and many judges) proceed from an elitist “top-down” approach. The critical contribution of supportive public officials such as Judge Serghides is they look at this arena as providing the opportunity for disputants essentially to come to an agreement that will survive the current conflict. This is advocated by conflict resolution theorists through the application of what is referred to as the so-called principled negotiation. While mostly prevalent in North America, it is based on the following: (a) interest-based approach to negotiation that focuses primarily on management and resolution of conflict; (b) using an integrative approach to finding a mutually shared outcome (i.e., “Getting

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to Yes”); and (c) more popular among academics and mediators than in business and politics where it is criticized as a “negotiation panacea” used mainly by idealistic academics “who don’t understand the challenges posed in the real world,” i.e., synonymous with the more popular phrase “Win–Win.” The current trend in questioning the concept is: “How can we best achieve principled negotiation in many different contexts?”29 Unfortunately, business, and political interests for the most part are not motivated to pursue such an idealistic approach, but rather prefer going at it from business and politically oriented direct frontal talking points, i.e., “no beating around the bush” attempting to reach “yes” and a “win–win” situation. In addition, members of the association, formerly in key positions in the republic school system, managed to train a considerable number of teachers and students in mediation theory and techniques, and how to design mediation programs in a few Greek Cypriot schools. Subsequent teaching assignment changes may have led to a decline in the pursuit of the initiative. Also, as mentioned above, the association, in collaboration with the Nicosia Municipality, created a Mediation Centre for the people of the municipality. Even though extended efforts were made to see the Centre succeed, apparently there was little expression of interest by the community and few or no cases were mediated. Unfortunately, although it would have been more satisfying to see a greater reception and more extensive adoption of the practice of mediation on the island, the years since have disclosed a much stronger embracement of the conflict resolution approach in Cypriot society than what might have been expected when first introduced. The experience and utilization of the skills introduced began a positive Cypriot society move in the right direction. It must be left to the future for those on both sides of the Green Line to determine to what extent, if any, an impact may have been made by the effort.

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Notes 1. International Organization for Peacebuilding. See Appendix A. 25. 2. UN Funding A/RES/74/913. 3. See interview with Archbishop Tutu at: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=hOaSbGD7Was and recent online conversation (Peter Phillips, host) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jAWpV2JN3vk&fea ture=youtu.be. 4. Kouskouvelis, I. The Fallacies of the “Cyprus Problem.” E.-International Relations. 5. See, also: The Fallacies of the Cyprus “Problem” (e-ir.info). 6. Ramsbotham, O. (2017). When Conflict Resolution Fails—An Alternative to Negotiation and Dialogue: Engaging Radical Disagreement in Intractable Conflicts. Polity. 7. https://www.academia.edu/31076437/CIVIL_SOCIETY_ACTIVE_ DIALOGUE_NETWORKS_IN_CYPRUS_PEACE-ING_IT_TOG ETHER_AT_THE_GRASSROOTS?email_work_card=view-paper. 8. https://cyprus-mail.com/2014/02/11/joint-declaration-final-version-asagreed-between-the-two-leaders/. 9. https://restorativejustice.org.uk/blog/strengthening-democracy-throughrestorative-practice-%E2%80%93-empathy-power-and-sense-self. 10. Turk, A.M. (2007). Rethinking the Cyprus Problem: Are FrameBreaking Changes Still Possible through Application of Intractable Conflict Intervention Approaches to This Hurting Stalemate. Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev., Vol. 29, p. 463. Available at: http://digitalco mmons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol29/iss3/2. 11. Turk, A.M. (2009). The Negotiation Culture of Lengthy Peace Processes: Cyprus as an Example of Spoiling That Prevents a Final Solution. Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev., Vol. 31, p. 327. Available at: http:// digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol31/iss3/1. 12. https://enforceddisappearances.dealingwiththepast.org/cyprus/. 13. Id. 14. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/questions_answers_eng.pdf. 15. https://www.citizenlab.co/blog/civic-engagement/what-is-the-differencebetween-citizen-engagement-and-participation. 16. https://lithgow-schmidt.dk/sherry-arnstein/ladder-of-citizen-participa tion_en.pdf.

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17. Crisis, State and Peace: Europe at the Cyprus ‘Border’. Cyprus Review, Vol. 26, No. 1, Guest edited by B. Karatsioli | Barbara Karatsioli— Academia.edu, pp. 147–166. 18. https://blogs.un.org/blog/2021/06/30/women-in-leadership-is-essentialfor-cyprus-peace-building-process/. 19. http://bitquake.co/info.pdf. 20. https://myislandcyprus.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-first-bi-communalmovement-for.html#:~:text=the%20first%20bi-communal%20move ment%20for%20an%20independent%20and,the%20participation% 20of%2025%20T/Cs%20and%2036%20G/Cs. 21. myislandcyprus: THE FIRST BI-COMMUNAL MOVEMENT FOR AN INDEPENDENT AND FEDERAL CYPRUS. 22. The Fulbright Program is the US government’s most prestigious international educational exchange program designed to promote “mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries around the world. It includes a number of different exchange programs for students, academics and professionals in order to conduct a variety of different educational activities. The central objective of the Cyprus Fulbright Commission continues to be “promotion of mutual understanding and respect between the peoples of the United States of America and Cyprus by developing better cooperation and communication between the two countries through educational, academic, professional and cultural exchange.” In Cyprus, the program is administered by the commission which administers a program serving the “academic, educational and professional communities of Cyprus and the United States, through the exchange of scholars, educators and students…based on priority needs and mutual benefit and is designed to be responsive to the needs of the communities involved…serving… a goal of fostering the long-term support of institutions and individuals for a program emphasizing cooperation and understanding that will lead to true bi-nationalism.” 23. https://cyprus.com/listing/cyprus-fulbright-commission. 24. Holbrooke was …the last great freewheeling diplomat of the American Century… with his turbocharged zeal and laughable lack of self-awareness, earned fervent admirers and fevered enemies, including a few longstanding colleagues who fell passionately and paradoxically into both camps. Isaacson, Walter. New York Times, Book Review, May 19, 2019. Richard Holbrooke, the Last Great Freewheeling Diplomat.

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25. Turk A.M. (2006). Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue: The Time Is Right for Track III Diplomacy as the Best Approach for Successful Negotiation of This Ethnic Conflict. Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev., Vol. 28, No. 205, pp. 228–243. Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol28/iss2/1; and FINAL REPORT OF THE CYPRUS FULBRIGHT COMMISSION’S OSLO II BICOMMUNAL PEACEBUILDING WORKSHOP TO CONSIDER RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE FOLLOWING AS THEY CONCERN A POSSIBLE FEDERAL SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM: BICOMMUNAL MOVEMENT, STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS, SOCIAL ISSUES, SECURITY ISSUES, ECONOMIC ISSUES, Norway, Dec. 11, 1998 (hereinafter OSLO II FINAL REPORT) (on file with the author and also with various individuals including members of the Oslo Group, the Cyprus Fulbright Commission, officials from both communities, and the press). 26. International Journal of Managerial Studies and Research (IJMSR) Volume 4, Issue 7, July 2016. 27. Pope, Alexander. An Essay on Criticism (1711). 28. The Law on Mediation in Family Disputes of 2019 [Law 62(1)/2019]). 29. https://www.negotiations.com/definition/principled-negotiation/.

3 “On-the-Ground” Perspective: Cyprus Is a Perfect Example of a Negotiation Culture Inherent in Lengthy Peace Processes

Introduction to Bicommunal Civil Society Programs1 The years 1980–1997 saw the area separating the two communities on the island permitting only limited access to each other until the subsequent general opening of crossing points in 2003. It was during this initial period the peacebuilding movement planted its roots through a series of bicommunal meetings, workshops, and training that allowed people on both sides to interact on a limited basis to pursue their respective efforts toward reconciliation. Participating in regular meetings and attending events abroad proved to be popular opportunities. The question remains whether this civil society movement ultimately “acquired

Organizations not associated with government. Usually that is referred to as the third sector of society, populated by ordinary citizens at the ground level of social interaction. A. Marco Turk, The Negotiation of Lengthy Peace Processes: Cyprus as an Example of Spoiling that Prevents a Final Solution, 31 LOY. LA. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. (2009).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. M. Turk, Bridging the Cyprus Divide, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29758-8_3

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the capacity and the constituency that could establish it as a legitimate interlocutor within an expanded peace process.”2 Mustafa Akinci (as former mayor of the Turkish Cypriot-controlled north portion of the divided capital city of Nicosia) and Lelos Demetriades (as former mayor of the Greek Cypriot-controlled south portion), with their respective teams of experts from both communities joined forces in 1978 to complete a joint sewage system (known as the Nicosia Master Plan), to create a common vision for the divided city of Nicosia. This was an amazing demonstration of the outstanding possibilities in bicommunal cooperation for the best interests of their respective home communities. In London (1980), a series of bicommunal professional meetings was organized by the British Friends of Cyprus Committee attracting Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This was followed by other opportunities such as the 1984 Interactive Problem-solving Workshop organized by Harvard University Professor Herbert Kelman, and the 1985 Operation Locksmith Workshop conducted by Yale University Professor Leonard Doob. From 1988 to 1993, Dr. Ron Fisher from the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, contributed to the organization of a series of Problem-solving Workshops in Ottawa, London, and Nicosia designed to build trust between Cypriots applying ideas from the growing academic field of conflict resolution. In 1992, Dr. Louise Diamond (Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy) collaborated with Professor Diana Chigas (Conflict Management Group) when they arrived in Cyprus to organize two Conflict Resolution Workshops. In 1994, this collaboration led to the establishment of the Cyprus Consortium, supported by the CFC and US Agency for International Development (USAID). From 1994 to 1997, the Consortium provided a series of Training for Trainers and worked to create a group of local instructors for different bicommunal groups related to specific issues. These activities employed an approach referred to as “Interactive Management” that was applied by Fulbright Senior Scholar, Dr. Benjamin Broome, to help Greek and Turkish Cypriots develop strategies for their peacebuilding efforts. These culminated in a Cyprus Peace Bazaar event where 241 promising bicommunal projects were displayed, out of which fifteen were selected as having the most potential to

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advance the needs of both communities and the bicommunal movement. Another key development was a series of approximately twenty-five mediation training workshops offered to various groups by me, in some cases along with another Fulbright Senior Scholar, Dr. John Ungerleider. These utilized exercises, role playing, and discussion to help Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots acquire mediation skills and techniques that could be applied at home, work, or in community settings. A unique outcome of this effort was my organization and facilitation of the Oslo Group, as fully discussed in Chapter Two of this book. The various training and workshops equipped people from the two communities with the necessary skills and tools that led to the establishment of bicommunal groups that began to meet regularly, in effect becoming the actual seeds of the by-then advanced civil society peacebuilding movement in Cyprus. The areas emphasized were those of mediation, peacebuilding, and the development of a Track III civil society component to interact with the elites of Track I as well as Track II. However, in December 1997, a “change of heart” by the Turkish Cypriot administration prevented Turkish Cypriots from continuing to cross freely through the Buffer Zone. The purpose of this peacebuilding effort was to enable Cypriots from both sides of the Green Line to meet in the neutral Buffer Zone at the Fulbright Center located there just for this purpose and under these circumstances. This change of heart required major adjustments to continue joint meeting opportunities requiring the movement to adapt to the new atmosphere. Between 1998 and 2003, civil society peacebuilding efforts began to concentrate outside the Buffer Zone, extending beyond mediation and reconciliation topics, to activities of common concern for both communities. These initiatives had a bicommunal component with parallel, collaborative, and joint results. During this period, a multitude of civil society organizations in Cyprus made use of the support offered by the USAID/UNOPS Bicommunal Development Program to work in different relevant fields. Among a variety of initiatives, cultural heritage, environment, and public health received the most interest during this period.3 Cultural heritage initiatives focused on restoring and preserving architectural artifacts on the island such as the traditional quarters of Old

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Nicosia, the Venetian Walls surrounding the heart of the city, the Monastery of Apostolos Andreas, and the Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque. Environmental initiatives were deemed vital for the preservation of fragile ecosystems across the island, including important work with local fauna (sea turtles, snakes, groin vultures, Cyprus donkeys, and mouflons) as well as reforestation, clearing refuse events on beaches across the island to restore their conditions, and biodiversity awareness campaigns. During this period, public health initiatives were also implemented to eradicate diseases and pests, to inform the public on disease prevention issues, and to introduce new medical techniques in Cyprus. Efforts continued to bring people from both sides together to overcome the restrictions of the past. Following my initial arrival on the island in 1998, unexpectedly I learned about the bicommunal village of Pyla in the Larnaca District of the republic.4 The village boasts the establishment of a Friendship House there. Because of the location, these were accessible to both communities, which demonstrated that a level of bicommunal contact was still possible for people from both sides to work together. At the same time, bicommunal public events also organized in Pergamos Park in Pyla ushered in the beginning of a new era of contact and dialogue across the Green Line. The goal of the civil society peacebuilding movement during this formative period was the identification of and addressing the most urgent needs in Cypriot society in areas such as capacity development, knowledge, innovation, and social good. In 2002, the emerging civil society peacebuilding movement had its first major public outreach opportunity with the creation and execution of a Common Vision document created by 86 Turkish Cypriot NGOs, calling on the leaders of the two communities to arrive at a settlement and outlining suggested criteria for a solution. The most crucial event for the evolution of the movement was presented in 2003, when crossing points between the two communities were opened. This made it possible to contact those from the “other side” and work together enabling the creation of additional joint projects and the establishment of various intercommunal networks and thematic groups. At the same time, through various additional programs, the emerging civil society sector continued growing with support from the EU and USAID. Collaborating on common projects proved to be the road

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available to both communities to discover ways to form relationships leading to cooperation regarding issues of common concern. Civil society peacebuilding efforts expanded in areas such as art, culture, education, youth, and social inclusion (emphasizing human rights and respect for diversity). When the republic joined the EU in May 2004, the body of law promulgated by that organization was suspended in the Turkish Cypriot community because only the Greek Cypriot-controlled part of Cyprus had been admitted. When negotiations for a settlement were resumed in 2008, thirteen working groups and technical committees were created to pave the way to fully fledged negotiations. The participants in the committees organized included civil society leaders and technical experts who had so far been involved in the peacebuilding movement. At the same time, civil society organizations were gradually becoming more important to the democratic deficit apparent in the formal peace process. This highlighted the need to provide specialized services to the two communities in various areas, emphasizing the benefits of economic cooperation between the republic and North Cyprus populations. Civil society in Cyprus was contributing to the creation of a multicultural existence and working to dissolve the divisions between the island’s two communities, strengthening the relationship between the public and the respective leaders. Various programs were made available to support the civil society peacebuilding movement. Another significant achievement was the establishment of the “Ledra Palace Buffer Zone Peace It Together” network, which connected the efforts of peacebuilding and reconciliation NGOs in Cyprus. Participants were encouraged to support science and technology to advance the cause of peacebuilding. The goal was to succeed in building a peaceful, multicultural, prosperous society on the island. The peacebuilding approach to society was one that was specific as well as innovative methodologically at the Track II level. This introduced and demonstrated the relevance of relations and concepts concerning the issue of security and what comes next in the case of Cyprus. A working relationship between the various Tracks of peacebuilding was advocated emphasizing the critical role the grassroots play in the civil society quest for sustainable peace. Publishing

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important documentation in Greek, Turkish, and English was advocated, as was the inclusion of Turkish Cypriots in other bicommunal relationships to overcome the effect of “peace fatigue” so far created by the ineffectiveness of the efforts (or lack thereof ) at the Track I level.5 Sadly, the real culprits responsible for the continuation of the division between the two communities appear to be the international peacebuilding actors who have muddied the waters regarding the issue of official recognition of the Turkish Cypriot North Cyprus. They have interfered with the implementation of effective bottom-up peacebuilding activities through efforts of ethno-nationalists who attempt to prevent cooperation between the two communities. The official approach of siding with one community or the other in the conflict, refusing to understand and act on what is the reality of the situation from a neutral point of view, is destructive rather than constructive in a post-conflict region such as Cyprus,6 especially when the island’s conflict remains so ruinous.7 The future of the island rests in the hands of the grassroots on either side of the Green Line. They are not those who have historically practiced an adversarial approach still followed to date, rather than seeking collaboration with each other. So, those “on the ground” are the ones who could drastically change the game through a transformation of the conflict by converting their relationship from adversarial to collaborative. This would be asking the Greek Cypriots to abandon their intention of retaining a majority control over the minority Turkish Cypriots who live on more land than would be expected based on their population percentage of the island with just one-fifth of the total population,8 to elevate Turkish Cypriots to joint control and equal status. Based on the history of the island, while certainly democratically appropriate, it would seem too much (and unrealistic) to ask Greek Cypriots to relinquish this claim. Therein lies the rub.9 Engaging in this process, we need to keep in mind, unlike the case with many other conflicts of this nature, the historically advanced Cypriot civil society participation was a good indication of the bicommunal interest that continues to underlie this age-old problem. A difficulty magnified as those on the ground endeavor, albeit with some irregularity, to persuade those at the top to modify their traditional

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locked-in elitist approach, attempting to convince them to consider the wishes of those “on the ground.” From extensive personal involvement and numerous in-depth discussions with Cypriots on both sides of the Green Line over the last quarter-century, I have observed the complicated situation known as the Cyprus Problem. In that arena and from that point of view, an attempt is made here to present as much as possible an observationally neutral analysis for consideration of this seemingly perpetual struggle.

Cypriots from Both Sides of the Divide Weigh In I have found Cypriots to be part of an elite bicommunal system that has become the underlying problem agitated by severe territorialized attitudes, requiring more necessity of mediation supporting various power centers and social as well as economic interests. At all turns, events have worked against reconciliation. In addition to threats arising from competion for foreign interests, internal strife has exacerbated demands for change. Passage of time in division reinforces separation concepts of the “other.” This is further reinforced by education systems, and political rhetoric, as well as limited interaction socially, economically, or politically. An inherent outcome brings varying levels of treatment of peacebuilders as “naive fools” at best, “traitors” to their ethnic identity at worst.10 The Greek Cypriots consider Turkey to be the problem, claiming this feeling has nothing to do with Turkish Cypriots, per se. Their rationale is that, if only it remained between the two communities, the problem would have been solved long ago. Greek Cypriots blame the international community for exacerbating the situation because, to satisfy Turkey, they have been absent. The reason for this attitude is that other countries have geopolitically vested interests in the outcome presented by the “problem.” The conflict has been going on for so long and perpetuated by too many outside interests, including the discovery of natural resources, so encouraging accepting there is no way to solve the problem on either side of the Green Line seems to be the “solution.” It is called

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the “heads-in-the-sand” approach that may seem to work until there is a crisis, when it no longer can. When searching for more concrete answers and suggestions regarding a “final solution,” various observations are made by both sides of the divide. Considering the following examples of such diverse opinions should provide a further demonstration of an attempt to find a solution that is itself in serious need of problem-solving assistance: 1. Although local parties on both sides may now really be more interested in resolving the “problem,” there is a feeling that outside interests have diminished this for their own benefit. Mediation attempts have been unsuccessful because the specific mediators were only interested in pleasing their “masters,” the sources who hired them. Each side claims the “other” has never been interested in a resolution. Cypriot civil society was never organized to play its philosophical role because all interests were self-serving and appear to remain so polarized. 2. Historically, it appears that Greek Cypriots have functioned as if Turkish Cypriots did not exist and were not part of the international community. Over the last few years given the difficulties between the two communities, there has been a decided indication by Greek Cypriots that they are inclined to go it alone in the future, without any concern for the Turkish Cypriots, if there ever was any. Nonetheless, peace-seeking Greek Cypriots were disappointed that Akinci lost his bid for re-election because they felt he was the one Turkish Cypriot politician who worked hard for reunification. 3. Actions by most Greek Cypriot leaders have perpetuated the problem because they are not interested in sharing and would prefer to close the “border” to Turkish Cypriots. This appeared to be a “game over” attitude demonstrated by the current policy of closing the Green Line due to the Covid-19 pandemic. It has forced Turkish Cypriot shops to close because of a lack of tourism. Greek Cypriots feel it is important to help Turkish Cypriots regarding this problem as everyday people, but not on a political level . Unfortunately, too many unsuccessful bicommunal efforts have been spent attempting to collaborate with professionals at Track I level rather than people

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in the grassroots category of Track III where it would be time better spent. 4. All the most significant bicommunal programs were those conducted by the Cyprus Fulbright Commission, especially its Oslo Group whose contribution was an important part of subsequently promoting the design of the Annan Plan. Other prominent efforts were youth groups such as Seeds of Peace; Peace Players (using sport to build a global youth movement for peace and equity); Women’s groups; and Cyprus Link (EU supported). Where are efforts such as these now? It’s as if bicommunal interest in the hard work that is the meat of peacebuilding has waned. 5. In addition, there were “think-tank” groups that also worked on position papers as did the Oslo Group, academics, management groups, doctors working on patients’ rights, UK/UN assisted meetings between lawyers comparing how law developed on each side after the division, and regular political party meetings in the Ledra Palace (UN headquarters) assisted by the Slovak Embassy. In addition, there has been the ADHR/Home for Cooperation (critical development providing physical space) plus work of the association on the teaching of history, and similar groups). The Home established encouraging intercommunal cooperation for the benefit of each community. Where are these supporters now? 6. The 52-member Oslo Group (26 from each community) who were selected and organized by me with Fulbright, American Embassy, and PRIO financial support was an important example of those from civil society who accepted the special opportunity to come together (perhaps for the first time in their lives) to help and then created a blueprint for both communities peacefully living together, a truly civil society activity. This was rather refreshing than just taking away what they came for separately in the first place, which was the normal expectation. It was personified by the subsequent arrival of the Annan Plan and efforts to achieve its adoption. In addition, the Oslo Group provided the opportunity for professional, business and community leaders from both sides to interact with each other beneficially on a regular basis.

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7. Earlier Fulbright—sponsored leadership team programs (Ronald Fisher, Louise Diamond, Diana Chigas, and Ben Broome, for example) were useful because they laid the theoretical foundation for acceptance of the Oslo Group to subsequently teach application of the skills and techniques of peacebuilding.11 8. Years later, the Home for Cooperation12 was opened and continues to operate successfully today. It is a unique intercommunal meeting point with a community center and café facilities that attract diverse groups of people from both sides of the Green Line. 9. Bicommunal-oriented teachers worked to bring conflict resolution education into the schools in both communities by teaching other young teachers how to accomplish this with their students. Their work has continued. 10. Business community efforts concentrated on the work of the chambers of commerce in both communities (especially Turkish Cypriots) integrating young professionals on both sides, and providing opportunities to interact. However, the continuing challenge has been how to create a collective singular vision, while at the same time welcoming diverse pursuits in promoting individuals, so as not to override those in the category of “community interests.” All of these were too “Nicosia-oriented,” at the expense of those in the outlying areas negatively affecting the growth of future political action. If community involvement had been promoted in the areas of the island beyond Nicosia, the feeling is that Tatar would not have defeated Akinci. This is because being Nicosia-oriented provided what was considered a “self-aggrandizing elitist atmosphere,” more than one that was truly “community-oriented” and inclusive of rural communities. 11. The continuation of the “problem” affects current daily life and future generations on the island, but both communities appear resigned to the idea that it cannot be solved. On the one hand, there appears to be a feeling that Turkish Cypriot elites have thrived after 1974, so they do not want to alienate those from Turkey. On the other, Turkish Cypriots do not feel secure that they will acquire the same rights as Greek Cypriots, and Greek Cypriots feel Turkey will find ways to eject them (Greek Cypriots) from the island.

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12. Turkish Cypriots are in limbo (some say it feels like permanently), excluded from the international community due to non-recognition. And their dependence on Turkey is of concern due to the instability there, along with pressure being imposed to restrict human rights standards and increase Islamic rules in daily life. The use of the low-valued Turkish Lira is also a major problem—isolation creates obstacles to free trade and tourism, increasing economic dependence on Turkey, which then uses this leverage on its politicians to impose its will on the Turkish Cypriot community. 13. Since even before the 1960 independence there have been waves of migration from Cyprus creating a large diaspora. Deterioration of conditions for the Turkish Cypriots create a fear among that community that this will bring on a new wave of young either migrating or just remaining in other EU countries where they go to study, which they can now do with an EU passport. Hovering over all of this is the fear that Erdogan might try to “Islamize” Turkish Cypriots. A solution could have changed this because then especially young Cypriots might have been more inclined to remain on the island creating a safety bulwark. 14. Strangely there seems to be an unspoken concern created by an elite segment of bicommunal society on both sides of the Green Line that benefits from the advantages of this unresolved situation and might be inclined to collaborate with Turkey to maintain their wealth and power. Benefits from Turkey are enabling even to those who might not like it if it means getting more “Turkified.” 15. Turkish Cypriots feel that a reasonable match in the degree of solution suggestions has been missing. Denktash used to be their problem, now it is Greek Cypriots! There is a feeling that, if in 2004, the Annan Plan had passed, the uncertain situation could have been dealt with and overcome, or Turkish Cypriots at least would have been able to get better terms. Leaders have too much self-interest. There appears to be seeming opposition from Greek Cypriots because they have not had to do this before and are of the opinion they can resist this if they get together. 16. Greek Cypriots have much more to put them in a “comfort zone” despite division. Benefits from the status quo are high again for the

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governing elite. But a slowly growing movement in favor of a solution for reunification is visible—although it still needs to reach a critical mass, if possible. A substantial proportion of Greek Cypriot youth seem apathetic to the division—not part of their daily lives and certainly not harboring any painful memories—unlike the older generation. The separation (“border”) and how members of each community deal with this problem getting around having to show passports, and restrictions on intercommunal commerce are difficult. This façade does not disclose the honest whole truth regarding the difficult realities each side faces (i.e., how “settlers” from Turkey taint the realities so any analysis would be presented from “up-in-theclouds” obstructing a true view). Exacerbated by the threads running through all of this are the current politicians (except for Akinci) who are interested only in their own careers and fortunes without caring for the people they represent. Most of those politicians on each side continue to foment misinformation and promote dislike of those from the other community, rather than being concerned with their human condition. How the political interests are constructed to support this result are not readily disclosed. The purpose of CFC was to demolish the imaginary wall between the two communities on the island, but this effort has not been able to remove the psychological wall. There is a feeling that the Oslo Group has lost its initial effectiveness with the passage of time, due to waning interest and other inducements. Bicommunal groups have been the successful face of humanity on the island—meeting and talking when relations were totally polarized—a situation that the political leaderships wanted to perpetuate so that they could have full control. These groups are always seen as a threat to maintaining a united front on the “national cause.” They are an example of “throwing out a fishing line but not really interested in catching any fish.” There is only the appearance of government encouragement of bicommunal activity. There is a suspicion that the authorities have even used spies (allegedly even among Oslo Group members). There is a feeling that time has passed for these activities to succeed. Those

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meetings were a success in themselves, but that was then, and this is now. They were more social at that time. The Oslo Group did not fail, it became dated. It had relevance, importance, and purpose at the time. However, because all those formed relationships between involved members of the two communities are still maintained today, this is what made the group a success. In 2004, the island was close to a solution, but Papadopoulos made sure Greek Cypriots would not accept the plan. Annan III was rejected by the politicians within four hours of its announcement because Turkey did not like it and Papadopoulos was intent on defeating the plan, so the result in effect would be two separate communities. Notwithstanding EU accession by Turkish Cypriots could help find a solution there has been no movement in this direction.13 Turkish Cypriots feel “totally shattered” by the failure of the Annan Plan. They have not recovered from this—and with every day and negative development, it springs to mind repeatedly what a huge opportunity was missed. Turkish Cypriots would have been so many years further ahead in progress on building the reunified whole, a demilitarized bizonal, bicommunal federation. This would not have been perfect but would have been something to work on to take them forward. The republic was not a poor country to benefit from the EU— they believed being part of an international bigger whole would give them leverage against Turkey and get them a better deal. Denktash missed an opportunity to prevent Greek Cypriots’ accession to the EU without Turkish Cypriots because he failed to pay attention to what was going on. Greek Cypriots wanted to keep Turkey out of the EU, but Turkey did not bite. They have had their own share of corruption and political disappointment issues. Everyone already knows and accepts as normal a certain amount of corruption because they want this concept for their own advantage. Peacebuilders have used this to benefit both sides.14 Perhaps if there is sufficient backlash in Greek Cypriot public opinion and criticism of their leadership, it will create a wave of

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reaction, part of which will include a demand for progress in negotiations. While a critical mass of response would be wonderful, it will not happen. A less formal approach such as a loose federation will be the alternative. But the high number of vested interests and the deep apathy of the younger generation who overall have it “made in the shade” as they are, makes one pessimistic that there will be a major change in thinking in the southern part of the island. The lack of interest by Greek Cypriots, as well as Turkish Cypriots, is a major obstacle. Memories, especially of Greek Cypriots born after 1974, are not a deterrent. They see only money from the sale of properties and harbor no emotional ties to property in the North. 26. This applies mostly to Turkish Cypriots negatively because, as an example, the EU could have introduced health and safety regulations for the island to help all Cypriots. There was no provision of funding to Turkish Cypriots on the same basis as Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots were always at a disadvantage because of having to apply for passports to travel back and forth within the island across the Green Line. Both communities lost in the end because of increased costs in the North, regarding construction created by nonconforming use, that will complicate any future utilization of those properties. All this serves to reinforce the impression that the North is just a province of Turkey and therefore non-recognizable as “Cypriots” in the true sense of the term. 27. Insistence by Greek Cypriots on inclusion only of Turkish Cypriot NGOs in resolution negotiations, rather than Turkish Cypriot leaders, because of incessant fear the latter will be considered to have achieved “recognition” of the North, continues to be motivated by an abhorrent thought to Greek Cypriots. This has been the most destructive policy possible in terms of its impact on reconciliation between the communities. It has been, and still is, counterproductive for a side whose biggest fear is “Turkization” of the North. 28. Greek Cypriots have “thrown the Turkish Cypriots into the arms of Turkey” by making sure they are isolated and avoided by everyone else including Greek Cypriots themselves. They have demoted and degraded perceptions of the standing of Turkish Cypriots and now, no surprise, Anastasiades was saying he has no confidence that he

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can persuade his people of the political equality of Turkish Cypriots! The tragedy is that this is a sine qua non of the solution. The policy has eliminated the possibility of a culture of cooperation and collaboration whereby at least pending a final solution there might be commercial interaction and cooperation on issues such as environmental, social, and cultural dialogue between the two communities with the goal of getting the young to see each other as part of their daily lives. As indicated earlier, “recognition” of Turkish Cypriots is a problem constantly hovering over negotiations lest Greek Cypriots inadvertently do something to acknowledge the legitimacy of Turkish Cypriots. This discourages any interest on the part of the latter in working together for the benefit of both communities. The other disastrous impact is that for those Turkish Cypriots who strive for reconciliation and reunification, they have little to reply when asked why they are so insistent when the Greek Cypriots so blatantly look down on them. The Cyprus Fulbright Commission (CFC) always accepted the need to work to include Turkish Cypriots only in their personal capacities to avoid the issue of recognition. This has created consequences of distrust between the two sides. Tatar’s election victory was accomplished by Turkish mainlanders (“settlers”) in effect imported by Turkey from the beginning intended to control the North. Now, this is materially affecting any chance for reunification in the future. This has created a type of “theater of the absurd” to mask the true intent of Turkey to continue to treat the North as a portion of its own. Because of the nonrecognition of Turkish Cypriots, they have become like the “middle of a sandwich” between the two slices represented by Turkey and Cyprus. Truth be told, history has shown that breaking down psychological barriers between the two communities is harder to accomplish than physical ones. The real problem is that even for human betterment reasons, civil society interaction cannot replace more formal intercourse if we are to make progress toward a solution. It can only support but not encourage or replace what exists because of history. Turkish Cypriot civil society will be active and enthusiastic to collaborate in preparation for reunification, but it is equally sensitive about this aspect. International

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recognition and EU membership do not automatically mean that the republic civil society operates in a more democratic environment than that of the Turkish Cypriots. If UN forces are withdrawn people on both sides will have to deal with each other and remove what in effect amounts to “borders.” Children need to be educated to understand each other and the situation. Increased efforts need to be made to bring people on both sides together through the utilization of online opportunities so they can appreciate each other (even as to their selfish motives). While not desired, Turkey must be accepted as a party to the solution of the problem and entitled to a proportional division of the natural resources to be mined. Any pretense of a true “civil society” is nothing more than a façade because the elites of each side are in control and not interested in what their respective people want, need, or should have. In this respect, they are not dissimilar to other populations worldwide. This move has created a major gap in the improved interaction between civil society on each side. The multi-generational involvement was particularly constructive and has not been replaced by any other since. There are those in Cyprus who place foremost importance on the interest and support of the international community for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem. This is especially true concerning a superpower like the US. When this engagement (especially through the presence and activities sponsored by the CFC) ceased, it was taken as a sign that the “foreigners” have also given up on Cypriots ever achieving a resolution, at all levels. Especially for the Turkish Cypriots and particularly in the pre-EU period, the CFC was the only channel for them to interact with Greek Cypriots, and international interested parties. The hard-won overwhelming success of the CFC was undone by some of the employees of the US Embassy in Nicosia in an effort to secure change of employment benefits for themselves. This was by their assisting the embassy to supplant CFC and its primary access to USAID funding that would then go to the embassy instead. While this attempt failed, those actions derailed the CFC mission, irreparably damaging its credibility and causing its failure to survive. This ended the historical success of CFC in regularly getting people on both sides together. It was a goal

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the former CFC executive director, Daniel Hadjittofi, had labored tirelessly for over a quarter-century to successfully accomplish, only to see it cut short by this unexpected interference. This served to abruptly eliminate the best chance for Cypriot civil society success in the effort to accomplish reunification between the two communities. If CFC could have continued as initially intended, this might have been possible. But no longer. The future possibility of reunification will depend on both communities transcending the conflict through the employment of a more integrated approach. The Turkish Cypriot elite may be willing to do this at some point, but otherwise, the disastrous effects of this decision will continue. It seems that “tomorrow never comes” for Turkish Cypriots. Most foreign ministries are “chicken” to intermingle, creating the derogatory impression these communities have the “plague.” As one long-time Turkish Cypriot activist and former TRNC cabinet minister, who is also a friend, noted, it is like “I (GC) will take a picture with you (TC) but not for anyone else to see!” The same thing is prevalent in all other relations between the two communities, especially at an international level. Even having a cup of coffee together is in effect considered to be “recognition” because Turkish Cypriots are considered “second class citizens.” There must be a method of engagement between the two sides on a more equal footing—and this is only possible if there also is increased even-handed treatment by international elements. So long as the rest of the world falls in line and adheres strongly to these policies favoring Greek Cypriots, things will not improve positively. This is not a demand for recognition of a breakaway state—but an acceptance and respect for the political equality of a partner community of Cyprus. This must be done now, not postponed until “after” a solution. Otherwise, it becomes the “chicken-and-egg game.” Cypriots cannot get to a solution eventually if they can’t deal with this obstacle now. A feeling exists in some quarters that Akinci’s defeat portends abandonment of the reunification talks.15 However, this may not necessarily be the case because the international status of the republic is one of a consociationalism democracy. This translates to the two Cypriot ethnicities (Greek and Turkish) having agreed on another power-sharing arrangement like that which only survived until 1964. Following the

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events of that year, Turkish Cypriots were driven into enclaves that enabled major changes in the political power structure between the two communities on the island. The following intervention by Turkey in 1974 signaled an end to the aspirations of the Greek nationalists to unite the island with Greece. Conversely, the invading Turkish military establishment securely settled into various bases located in the northern part of the island. The year 1983 brought the declaration of independence of what became known as the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) by its leader Rauf Denktash who sought to sow the seeds for equality with Greek Cypriots in future negotiations between the two communities. This was prevented from occurring because of alternative lifestyles adopted by Turkish Cypriots in the areas of gambling and exacerbated by new construction on properties formerly owned by Greek Cypriots that were confiscated by subsequent Turkish Cypriot administrations. The proliferation of alternative higher education institutions in the North, not accepted by the international community, has seriously served to make the already deteriorating situation worse. After Turkey lost patience with Akinci’s independence and decided it wanted to deal with someone else as Turkish Cypriot president, so eventually they could better control the entire island, it realized he had to be replaced. Thus, Akinci’s reelection was critical and his loss so disappointing for the long term. Hoping for another five-year term, he was intent on helping to establish a federation, which did not happen. As a leader he had established himself as the last best hope for a united island. A resolute and honest leader, willing to stand up for Turkish Cypriot independence, and unwavering in his support for reunification, made him an exceptional president for the Turkish Cypriots, but a problem for Turkey. The word in the community indicated there were various corrupt aspects of the Tatar campaign (including buying of votes) plus encouraging support for Tatar from immigrants from Turkey (“settlers”) who were controlled by Ankara; all denied by the Turkish Embassy in the North.16 Notwithstanding the outcome of the election, it appears a majority of the true Turkish Cypriots remain committed to a federal solution, albeit the efforts by Erdogan and Tatar to the contrary using the “settlers” from Turkey to “upset the applecart.”

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History has shown Tatar to be a right-wing nationalist and not a great supporter of reunification—but more importantly he is now totally under the orders of Ankara. So, even though he is making hard-line statements, that is only because Ankara is doing so. And, that could change overnight when Turkey needs to make a strategic readjustment in its foreign policy as it is affected by the Cyprus Problem. Although Akinci was the Turkish Cypriot leader for over five years he could not achieve anything major—admittedly not his fault. The deciding factor is not so much Turkish Cypriot leadership as it is that of the Greek Cypriots. Akinci could “not dance alone.” Akinci’s loss was a great shock to those who pursue reunification. Now, Anastasiades’ successor, Nikos Christodoulides, reportedly a hardliner not in favor of reunification, may need to find a way to avoid dealing with an ineffective Tatar and work directly with Turkey. The jury is still out on that one since Christodoulides is a relative newcomer and its youngest president in the history of the republic. Akinci was for Cypriots as a unified country, reunification all the way. The irony of the election result: Akinci is a true Cypriot while Tatar is an agent of Ankara. Both feel “Cyprus” but with a different heart. Now the wrong “heart” is beating for the future. If Akinci had been reelected, unlike Tatar, his performance to that point was an indication he would have agreed to continue from where they left off at Crans-Montana. However, whether he could have successfully done so would have depended on (a) Anastasiades agreeing to cooperate, and (b) Turkey agreeing that this was okay. There is the view that these are major obstacles that could not be surmounted by Akinci, to be honest. Unfortunately, this is sad. ProAkinci supporters were extremely disappointed that he did not win, as they thought he would with the additional support from the CTP party. Politically things are grim and deteriorating. Once Akinci had become the obvious disfavored and his opponent hardliner the favored of Ankara, the result was inevitable—allegedly there was serious election “engineering” imported—everything from cash bribes to “opening” Varosha— Akinci didn’t stand a chance. But if the difference was only about 4% after all this intervention, that shows how strong the “losing” view is. So, here Turkish Cypriots are with a leader that is repeating what he is told from the “mother” country, namely that the federation is “dead and

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buried”—and “they’re moving on,” but the reality is “they have nowhere to move on to” within international law and present accepted parameters. As one disappointed Turkish Cypriot said, “I am not a fan of the blame game, but (used deliberately!) when we are quizzed to show proof that the Greek Cypriot leadership is sincere about a solution to share Cyprus with the Turkish Cypriots, we find none - and this has helped us to get where we are…The ‘Cyprob’ has been going on for decades and probably will continue to do so - this is something we are used to. The more dangerous development is to have in place a leadership that takes orders and imports policies that could see us becoming less democratic, less secular and less human rights based. The 2020 election was not fair since votes were gained via the money that was handed out by Turkey, and these are not conspiracy theories, but reports from people who received the money directly or indirectly, related to voting, from the Tatar campaign.” For example, it was alleged that a substantial number of Turkish Cypriots received money to pay off their electricity bills and other debts, and suddenly assistance was provided to people receiving government support. So, all these were to gain votes in an undemocratic and unethical way. Someone was even caught taking a confirmation picture to prove the vote they were submitting. All these are enough facts, not only accusations, to render the elections faux. Nevertheless, since the situation in Northern Cyprus is very faux and Turkish Cypriots can’t say much or do anything, or get authorities to objectively check and balance, it just gets “swept under the carpet.” There is a bigger picture being painted. The northern part of Cyprus now will be closer to Turkey and will be more religious. Moreover, there are mainland Turks now buying houses from Cypriots and moving there. Nevertheless, while there is some disagreement, it seems that the majority of Turkish Cypriots are still pro for a federation solution but the “settlers” with Turkish help carried the vote. The feeling is that the “settlers” who had not voted in the first round were mobilized for the second, and that cost Akinci the election. There are those Turkish Cypriots still optimistic because they are among a group who never lose hope. They feel Tatar, a graduate economist of the University of Cambridge with international experience

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at high-level positions, is realistic and embraces the citizens of North Cyprus irrespective of their political views; a uniting leader who has a humanistic mindset. This line of reasoning recognizes and appreciates the support Turkish Cypriots receive from Turkey to exist, the only country recognizing North Cyprus. Having good relations and harmony with Turkey is extremely important for the people of North Cyprus who feel this way, and they are very aware of this reality. The feeling from Tatar supporters is that he will maintain this in the right and diplomatic manner. The future is full of surprises for those who believe in miracles, especially when empathy is expressed. There are those who feel Tatar believes in justice and hopes to inspire his people, going together with Turkey, allegedly the only country protecting Turkish Cypriot rights with “true love and respect at any cost.” Only time will tell. In losing, Akinci cited “disinformation” from Turkey during the campaign, as the majority of Turkish Cypriots “on the ground” appear to prefer a federation.17 It seems clear the losers were those Turkish Cypriots who want to assert their true rather than nominal independence from Turkey’s authoritarianism. Turkey’s enforcement of strict obedience by Turkish Cypriots at the expense of personal freedom is furthered by the increased arrival of mainland Turks (derogatorily referred to as “settlers”), causing many natural born Turkish Cypriots to leave the island to prevent further dilution of their ethnicity. Such an exodus has the effect of abandoning their portion of the island to the growing flow of immigrants from the mainland.18 The question remains as to how all this will affect the reunification process, if any. The only alternatives seem to be: (1) an outright partition with a state in the North and a state in the South (questionably whether acceptable to the EU); (2) the North annexed by Turkey, creating an official border with the republic; or (3) a very loose federation or confederation. A respectable portion of the reunification supporters on both sides of the Green Line seem willing to accept this last option as a temporary compromise hoping for an acceptable permanent future resolution. Of concern, there remain those who have conceded defeat and consider this attitude as “blowing in the wind.” The general feeling is Turkey had long desired someone other than Akinci to be the TRNC president so the eventual result would be

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Turkey’s ability to expand its control to the entire island. This made Akinci’s reelection a critical strategic issue for both sides. His defeat by Tatar brings the Turkish Cypriots ever closer to Turkey making them more religious because of the increasing number of mainland Turks purchasing real estate in the North and immigrating there, further diminishing the true Turkish Cypriot population. Bottom line: Considering the above expressions indicates that all exits lead to a destination unfavorable to reconciliation, with the highway signs clearly warning there is no chance to make it work.

A Bicommunal Look Across the Divide Here we see two experienced points of view, one from an activist on each side of the Green Line: Canan Oztoprak is a Turkish Cypriot peace activist and former member of the cabinet of Mehmet Ali Talat when he was the Turkish Cypriot president. She is well known to both sides, deeply involved from the beginning of the bicommunal movement. She has evaluated the overall participation by Cypriots from both sides of the Green Line, in the following manner19 : Overall, these bicommunal activities have made a positive contribution to the peace process in Cyprus. Participants have indicated satisfaction with the opportunities provided. Unfortunately, these events have received extraordinarily little coverage as bicommunal events, especially from the Turkish Cypriot press. While such activities have attracted a large group of bicommunal followers on both sides of the Green Line, to keep the process growing, more participants were necessary from the grassroots level. In this connection, the main problem was lack of appropriate activities for people from both communities to discover each other through attendance and participation. Unfortunately, the mass media on both sides, especially in the Turkish Cypriot community, have given extraordinarily little coverage to these events. Key to success always required official support for lifting the ban on bicommunal events.

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Katie Clerides is a Greek Cypriot peace activist, former member of the Parliament of the republic and one of the pioneers encouraging her political party (DISY) to develop a better understanding of the Turkish Cypriot community.20 The experience of Clerides in the bicommunal movement indicates, while peace may be taught as an art, the “building blocks or necessary qualities to reach peaceful solutions” through mediation skills and techniques, demonstrate there is a major problem in achieving success. This is because only “self-selected open minded” people who have been through this experience, rather than the public, were “responsive to these efforts, making it extremely difficult to convey the experiences to a wider audience.” Notwithstanding using the media and public panel discussions, unfortunately, a major problem was created by the presence of the US Fulbright Commission and its efforts to further the bicommunal movement. Participants were perceived as being “stooges of the Americans” and who were a “select few who could speak English and did not represent society generally.” Because Clerides’ father was a former president of the republic and negotiated EU accession and the Annan Plan, she was able to convince DISY to organize a “Bureau of Bi-Communal Relations” to begin a program initiating contacts with Turkish Cypriot political parties on a “one to one basis,” meeting on the island alternatively in party offices in the south and north portions, respectively. Over time, these efforts changed the negative image of DISY in the eyes of the Turkish Cypriots as being a nationalistic party and instead legitimized having contact with the other side so visits to the North were not considered “unpatriotic.” This was no easy task because DISY had been branded historically as the party contributing to the invasion of 1974.21 Unfortunately, according to Clerides, citizen participation in Cyprus has not been able to “influence public opinion and change the generally accepted narrative and the enemy image of the other side.” She feels this is due to: (a) lack of “guidance from the top down,” instead believing the other side is responsible “for all the problems in the Cyprus dispute;” (b) the “historical baggage of anti-Turkish feeling carried by the Greek side…still lamenting the fall of Constantinople in 1453, not to mention the exchange of populations in 1923;” and, (c) Greek Cypriots generally have an “extremely negative view of Turkey.”

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Greek Cypriots historically feel Cyprus is a “Greek island” because of its majority ethnic population. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots are of the opinion they should be considered as having “joint decision-making” powers. Unfortunately, there appears to be “no dynamic behind the idea of a bizonal, bicommunal federation on the Greek Cypriot side.” This is because the “present status quo seems preferable to most [Greek Cypriots since] it is known. The unknown which calls for change is scary [and] few are willing to question or give up.” Clerides feels that even if Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci had been reelected in October 2020, “given the troubled world situation,” would anyone “bother with the Cyprus issue anymore?” In the area of apology and forgiveness, Clerides has decided to make her personal feelings felt by others, especially on the Turkish Cypriot side. Learning Turkish is her way of saying to Turkish Cypriots: “I respect you. In my eyes you are as Cypriot as I, and I am sorry for the wrongs which my side has done to you in the past. I accept you as partners in Cyprus and we should make decisions together.” Though she has “never stated this publicly,” Clerides “thinks somehow many Turkish Cypriots implicitly understand this and that makes [her] happy.”

Conclusion Although not listed as one of the ten more dangerous world conflicts (such as Kashmir, India, and Pakistan, Jerusalem [the Middle East’s oldest unresolved conflict], Lebanon, Central African Republic (the world’s most neglected conflict), so far lasting over sixty years the Cyprus Problem categorized as only a ceasefire remains one of the most enduring, which could erupt into violence at any point without warning. The irony is that only the republic’s portion of the island is an active member of the EU and UN, resulting from the exclusion of the TRNC’s portion (in both cases caused by its refusal to participate with the republic regarding the EU, and by formal exclusion concerning the UN). In 1996, the republic arranged to purchase six hundred S-300 missiles from Russia for the purpose of self-defense. Turkey denied the right of self-defense of Cyprus to the republic and threatened it with war if it kept the missiles because Turkey feared they would be positioned with it

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as the target. The result was the republic reluctantly donated the missiles to Greece, which kept them in storage in Crete, subsequently putting them into service through NATO to train the US, Greek, British, and even non-NATO countries like Israel.22 The history of the Cyprus Problem is one replete with failures of negotiation and rejection of suggested outcomes for close to half-a-century. The latest portion of that time (The Annan Plan) was designed to attract support for aspects of the 2004 subsequently failed UN referendum to adopt the proposal in its entirety. This was credited to a new usage of regional and transnational “linkage politics,”23 meant to overcome the deadlock that had kept Cypriot leaders coming back to the negotiating table for the previous two decades. However, the stain of prior failures has continued to contaminate the repeated efforts rather than achieve approval. In fact, the landscape for a resurrection of negotiations has also been a field populated by a lack of success. The only significant outcome has been the inordinate number of additional unsuccessful attempts.24 Under the continual good offices of the UNSG, the numerous unsuccessful efforts to resolve the Cyprus Problem have continued. Nevertheless, they have failed to achieve an acceptable permanent solution and reunification of the island where the two communities must live together. Each rejection has been underlined by UN threats to discontinue the so-far accumulation of wasted efforts should there be no settlement. Notwithstanding the realities, the gap between the two sides continues to widen. Should the goal of achieving a satisfactory solution not be realized, the hope is for at least a detente permitting the two sides to “enjoy a more peaceful and prosperous coexistence.”25 Currently, even that reduced expectancy has failed to make headway.

Notes 1. Mahallae, The Story of the Civil Society Peace-Building Movement in Cyprus. http://bitquake.co/info.pdf. 2. The Cypriot Civil Society Movement—JSTOR. https://www.jstor.org.

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3. https://www.jstor.org (see, also: https://www.google.com/search?q= Number+of+civil+society+peacebuilding+organizatkions+in+Cyprus+ 1998-2003&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS966US966&oq=Number+of+civil+ society+peacebuilding+organizatkions+in+Cyprus+1998-2003&aqs=chr ome..69i57.39011j1j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#ip=1). 4. One of only four villages located within the UN Buffer Zone, the other three being Athienou, Troulloi, and Deneia, in the republic. Pyla sits just outside a Turkish Cypriot checkpoint crossing. 5. https://www.academia.edu/31076437/CIVIL_SOCIETY_ACTIVE_ DIALOGUE_NETWORKS_IN_CYPRUS_PEACE-ING_IT_TOG ETHER_AT_THE_GRASSROOTS?email_work_card=view-paper. 6. Kanol, B. (2013). Journal of Conflictology, 4 (2), 39–47. https://www.aca demia.edu/6196698/Roadblocks_to_Peacebuilding. 7. Cyprus: Why One of the World’s Most Intractable Conflicts Continues—The New York Times (nytimes.com). https://www.nytimes. com/2016/11/08/world/europe/cyprus-reunification-talks.html. 8. https://www.WorldAtlas.com. 9. https://www.aa.com.tr. 10. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4149594. 11. One bicommunal member who has been involved in these activities since 1993 observed what the various outside facilitators brought to the island over the years, concerning their respective goals. It was gratifying to hear that my presence made a difference in the bicommunal movement because it was felt that I left something behind for Cypriots to follow and use. 12. Officially opened in 2011, the Home for Cooperation was established by the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research. As a unique community centre located in the middle of the UN Buffer Zone, in Nicosia. It connects both communities, facilitates sations for people to get together and know each other in Nicosia. Tay the Home for Cooperation has become a landmark building in Nicosia, acting as a bridge-builder between separated communities, memories and visions through its physical presence and its peacebuilding programs benefiting from the transformative pond culture. 13. https://www.files.ethz.ch›isn›brief_11. 14. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oj18cya_gvw. 15. http://ahval.co/en-97464. 16. TCC Press Review 2 Oct 2020—CDF Press Review (cydialogue.org). http://press.cydialogue.org/2020/10/02/tcc-press-review-2-oct-2020/.

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17. https://myislandcyprus.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-first-bi-communalmovement-for.html#:~:text=the%20first%20bi-communal%20move ment%20for%20an%20independent%20and,the%20participation% 20of%2025%20T/Cs%20and%2036%20G/Cs. 18. https://www.politico.eu/article/turkish-cypriots-fear-recep-tayyip-erd ogan-pious… 19. Canan Oztoprak presented this paper to an international conference at the University of California, Irvine, in the summer of 2000. https://www.academia.edu/25032091/The_Bicommunal_Experience_ THE_EXPERIENCE_OF_BI-COMMUNAL_CONTACTS_THR OUGH_THE_EYES_OF_A_TURKISH_CYPRIOT_FACTS_AND_ FICTIONS_Canan_Oztoprak. In addition, she is the initial person responsible for my selection as a Fulbright Senior Scholar for Cyprus. This is because, “sight unseen,” she initially volunteered to write the required initial letter of invitation to accompany my application for the award. We have been close friends and collaborators ever since. 20. Clerides established the Bi-communal Relations Bureau within her party at a time when all official relations between the two parts of the island had been entirely suspended. To this date, she is committed to efforts to achieve reconciliation and accomplish a bi-communal solution to the historical conflict between the two communities. In addition, she is the daughter of Glafkos Clerides, the fourth duly elected president of the Republic of Cyprus and served in its Parliament at the same time. 21. The Turkish invasion led to the complete partition of the island and resulted in … Glafcos Clerides founded the Democratic Rally (DISY). 22. The unresolved Cyprus problem—Le petit jurist. (See also, History and the Cyprus Problem. http://www.jstor.com/stable/41891040, where the problem of the historical Cyprus conflict is discussed, demonstrating its virtual insolubility is due to the presence of two ethnoreligious communities saturated with two respective nationalist ideologies pursuing mutually exclusive goals respectively, similar to those in Greece and Turkey demonstrating the causes of these ideologies have encouraged development of the roots of the entire problem, to be found in such historical developments as the Hellenization of Cyprus, the subsequent Byzantinization of Greek Cypriot culture, the transformation of Cyprus into a bicommunal society, and the introduction and consequences of Westernization.)

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23. Transnational linkages, political dynamics, and the migrationdevelopment nexus: Towards a political settlements approach— ScienceDirect: institutions embedded in power relationships between competing groups defined in class, racial, ethnic, religious and gender terms. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S00167185 20301032. 24. Impediments to the Solution of the Cyprus Problem. https://www.e-ir. info/2019/06/17/a-rock-and-a-hard-place-attempts-at-resolving-the-cyp riot-problem/. 25. The need for realism: Solving the Cyprus problem through linkage politics (brookings.edu). https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-need-forrealism-solving-the-cyprus-problem-through-linkage-politics/.

4 Greek Cypriot Vassiliou and Turkish Cypriot Akinci Bridge the Cyprus Divide

Introduction Looking back to the respective presidential administrations of Greek Cypriots Glafcos Clerides and George Vassiliou, respectively, and Turkish Cypriot Mustafa Akinci, a careful consideration of who they were as resolute public servants albeit on different sides of the Green Line, leads to the conclusion that clearly Cyprus and its people of whatever persuasion are the worse for the absence of these dedicated public servants from the current debate. Through their generosity, while Anastasiades still remained in office, I had the opportunity to discuss with Vassiliou and Akinci, each separately, their respective thoughts on the current political situation in Cyprus regarding the way forward. George Vassiliou. I met Vassiliou through the courtesy of his daughter, Sophia, while I was conducting the Unite Cyprus Now facilitation training in Nicosia during the summer of 2019. Sophia was one of the bright lights who attended the program. Vassiliou was kind enough to spend an appreciable amount of time with me during a meeting in his office, sharing information concerning his presidency and his thoughts regarding the Cyprus Problem since he left office in 1993.1 I learned © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. M. Turk, Bridging the Cyprus Divide, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29758-8_4

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about his political history and what he attempted to and did accomplish as president of the republic. Unfortunately, his term of office expired on March 1, 1993, leaving him with more on his unfinished agenda that could have had substantial influence concerning how the Cyprus Problem would be managed. Interestingly, he faced the same difficulties then that Cypriots continue to experience today. There were those at the time who believed either a solution was not desired or the one they preferred was not possible. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots led by Rauf Denktash (sometimes characterized as the “puppet of Turkey”)2 were blamed for this failure, causing the diminution of the image of Cyprus in the international community. Vassiliou was clear concerning what he thinks the most effective approach will be to achieve a successful future settlement agreement between the two communities (and what it might look like) now; or, if this cannot be accomplished, what the future of the island will be in terms of the continuing conflict. Losing the effort for reelection in 1993 by only four hundred votes did not bother Vassiliou, except for the fact he missed the opportunity to find a solution to achieve the reunification of the island. His efforts created an international positive response from the UN, USA, and other superpowers. Tragically, his defeat had caused Cyprus to lose the opportunity to continue the momentum for reunification, still not been restored so far. In addition, this gave Turkey the opportunity to escape from the then-existing impasse and gain valuable time to pursue its intention to continue the partial occupation of the island. This allowed enough time to pass eliminating the previous advantageous position secured by Vassiliou that might have resulted in the ultimate reunification. Instead, abandonment of all efforts to see the peace talks succeed occurred after he left office. While the opposition repeatedly claimed they wanted a functional solution, they failed to disclose what that might be and pursued the status quo, i.e., a de facto partition.3 The sad outcome was a failure to reach agreement that could only lead to Turkey’s becoming the “absolute, uncontrollable ruler of the North,” creating the future possibility they would also become “partners in the South.”4 He thinks the most effective approach will be to achieve a successful future settlement agreement between the two communities now; or, if

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this cannot be accomplished, seriously consider what the future of the island will be in terms of the continuing conflict. Vassiliou was interviewed by the press concerning his thoughts regarding the possibility for a Bicommunal Bizonal Federation (BBF). He believes that President Anastasiades must: (a) make it clear he supports federation; (b) be firm in his support of the Gutierres framework (UN sponsored proposal for settlement); (c) be convincing about political equality between the two communities; (d) understand there is no “good or bad settlement,” only the best one possible; (e) emphasize since Greece wants to improve relations with Turkey, it will be hard for Turkey to not also show goodwill toward Cyprus; (f ) see to it that Cyprus works to improve its as well as Greece’s relations with Turkey; (g) eliminate alliances in the region with countries who seek to cause deterioration of relations with Turkey, which wants to have a part in what is happening in the Eastern Mediterranean; (h) acknowledge the previous attempts by Cyprus to isolate Turkey were a mistake, requiring correction; and (i) understand, given the importance the EU places on its relationship with Turkey, how anyone can think the EU would consider sanctions against it, or an agreement that would create two separate states on the small island. Vassiliou feels that, if the current efforts to resolve the Cyprus conflict fail, it would be the “end of the road for the problem and the cost would be huge,” leading to the withdrawal of the UNFICYP.5 Furthermore, he stressed the more powerful side would control the Buffer Zone, causing loss of territory and installation of lengthy borders, in addition to the inability to ensure the security of the dividing line. He is certain that only a settlement can provide security, and encourage international investments, and the longer the delay, the more detrimental the postponement. Vassiliou has always felt that the status quo cannot be expected to continue, so Cypriots must try in any way possible to restart the negotiations. They cannot be satisfied with merely the rejection by the EU of the positions that Tatar has taken and must convince the international community that Cypriots are seriously aiming to achieve a fruitful solution. He does not want to accept the fact that the conflict will continue because he knows that “this will be the end of Cyprus.”

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As to how to put the talks back on track given the intransigence between the growing demand by Tatar for a separate state, and Greek Cypriot opposition to a two-state division, Vassiliou noted that the Greek Cypriots have already stated very clearly that Tatar’s suggestion for two separate states is unacceptable. He was definite that “there is no point of keeping on discussing that. We must therefore convince Mr. Tatar and Turkey that we honestly believe in the need of political equality which will ensure the success of a BBF.” Vassiliou said that had he been reelected in 1993, the Cyprus Problem would have been solved then and Cyprus would now be an example for the entire world. He went on to say that “unfortunately, this has been a dream that had not been realized then and will only be achieved if we arrive, after a period of serious negotiations, at an agreed solution.” Vassiliou was certain that “President Anastasiades needs to dispel the doubts that exist about his commitment to a BBF and be ready to go a step further.” According to Vassiliou, “political equality is an absolute necessity to achieve a solution of the Cyprus Problem. It would be achieved only if we can convince the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey that we sincerely believe in political equality to secure the support of the international community in our efforts in this direction.” I asked him what he anticipated would have been the outcome of the 2021 meeting in Geneva with the UN Secretary General had it been successful. He was definite in stating that, “if the Geneva meeting were successful then it would have provided the basis for the start of serious negotiations for addressing the various problems ahead of us and achieving a commonly accepted solution.” Vassiliou’s general feeling is that there exists a comfort in the status quo doing a real disservice to any possible successful attempt to solve the Cyprus Problem, and that we must realize that “the status quo is not acceptable and cannot remain forever. This is the illusion of many people who believe that things can stay forever as they are. Mr. Guterres has clearly stated that the status quo is neither acceptable nor feasible.” In response to my question as to how to motivate action to instill the reality of potential adverse consequences in the event of failure to reach a settlement, Vassiliou, directly replied:

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The only way to motivate action to instill reality is to explain the dangers and the negative effects on every one of a non-solution. Personally, I tried to convey this message to everybody. Many understand the dangers, but the truth is that the government has not done anything to explain the risks of a non-solution and convincingly state that we really want a solution. Let us hope that they will do so.

Following the end of Vassiliou’s term in 1993, sadly there has been an inability on the part of the republic (for whatever reason) to pursue successfully a “vision for the future,” that would avert partition and reunify the island. Mustafa Akinci. I met Akinci in the late fall of 1997 or early in 1998 at a private social event at his home where his wife, Meral, was hosting a bicommunal group with which I was working. During the evening, Akinci and I found our way into an adjacent sitting room, where he initiated a conversation that eventually led to the question regarding what I, as a newcomer to the island, saw as the eventual outcome of efforts to bring together both sides of the Cyprus Problem. I responded with the following analogy: It is like the releasing of a lock, first one needs to locate the key that will fit when inserted; then, when turned, it needs to cause the ‘click’ to open the mechanism. My view is everyone has been searching unsuccessfully for the right key to the lock that has been the Cyprus Problem. When, and if, this occurs and you hear the lock ‘click open,’ the problem will have been solved. However, now, I am not aware that anyone has the right key to accomplish this.

He thought for a moment, then sadly nodded in acknowledgment. When I asked Akinci what he thought would be the most effective approach to take to achieve a successful future settlement agreement between the two communities (and what it might look like); or, if this cannot be accomplished, what was his feeling concerning the future of the island in terms of the continuing conflict, he said:

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The only way to achieve a peaceful solution to any kind of disagreement is the use of diplomacy. In other words, negotiations. It could be questioned why for so many years negotiations proved unsuccessful, and even the Turkish government and our current leadership started to say that fifty years of negotiating federation did not prove to be successful and therefore the federation option should be abandoned. To suggest that federation has been negotiated for fifty years is not a true statement; since for many years the two sides only pretended to negotiate a federation when they were aiming for outcomes other than federation. In other words, one side was trying to achieve confederation in the name of federation, whereas the other side was trying to reach a kind of unitary state again in the name of federation. I would say the genuine negotiations to achieve federation are limited to the few years (between the Greek Cypriot Christofias and the Turkish Cypriot Talat administrations 20052013, respectively; and, during my presidency between 2015-2017 up to Crans Montana).

Akinci was definite that: It is very well known that Turkish Cypriots will not agree to two things: (1) first, they will not accept minority status in a Greek Cypriot administered unitary state, and (2) second, they will not become a province of Turkey. Despite the difficulties, the only achievable and mutually acceptable formula still seems to be BBF with political equality. Mr. Tatar’s and the Turkish government’s so-called ‘new policy’ for two separate independent states for Cyprus obviously is not going to be accepted either by the Greek Cypriot side or by the international community. This policy is very well known and is not new. It has been pursued by the late Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash for a long time without any result. Insistence on this will accelerate the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community.

On the other hand, Akinci went on to explain that during the period that federation was genuinely negotiated, a huge body of work has been accumulated which can be utilized if there exists political will and determination for a comprehensive settlement. For this to happen there should be a structured negotiation process with a reasonable time frame that will aim to reach a strategic agreement. If all the interested parties do not show this political will and determination… the fifty-year

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running status-quo will continue and only help to consolidate the division of the island and further dependency of Northern Cyprus on Turkey. With the passage of time demographic changes of the Turkish Cypriot community will continue to increase, becoming more obvious day-by-day demonstrating that Northern Cyprus has already started to be treated as a ‘province of Turkey’ more openly, without giving the name to it.

So how can we get the talks back on track given the intransigence between the growing demand by Tatar for a separate state, and Greek Cypriot opposition to a two-state division? According to Akinci, the right track for the talks was defined by the UNSG Guterres and confirmed by the two sides lastly in Berlin on 25 November 2019 during my presidency. What should have been done was to take the negotiations from there to proceed with the aim of reaching a settlement with a result-oriented and time-framed final set of structured talks. During the period of non-negotiations after the failure of Crans Montana, I took the initiative and openly asked Mr. Anastasiades to sign together the Guterres framework as a strategic agreement; but Mr. Anastasiades questioned the existence of the Guterres framework dated 30 June 2017.

He continued, According to Mr. Anastasiades, there was another framework dated 4 July, until 25 November 2019, which was the date of our meeting together with Secretary General Guterres in Berlin, and this disagreement relating to the framework continued. In Berlin, the Secretary General clarified that there was only one Guterres framework and that was the one dated 30 June 2017. Besides this, in Berlin, the commitment to BBF was also revived and political equality with the notion of effective participation was confirmed in the statement of the Secretary General as he declared that ‘both leaders reaffirmed their commitment and determination to achieve a settlement based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality as set out in the relevant Security Council resolutions, including OP4 of UN Security Council Resolution 716 (1991).’

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He went on to say: Confirmation of this principle was so important for us as we had witnessed Mr. Anastasiades’ reluctance to accept the political equality of the Turkish Cypriots in a federation with all its elements at Crans Montana and afterwards. Therefore, in Berlin, the existing necessary elements for a possible federal solution were put in order once again and the political atmosphere for a fresh start was prepared with the hope that this time was going to be different as envisaged also in the Secretary General’s statement. Unfortunately, however, this time Turkey and Turkish Cypriot leadership took a position that was completely outside of the UN parameters, demanding two independent sovereign separate states.

On the other hand, Akinci said it was unfortunate that, the reluctance of the Greek Cypriot leadership in accepting the political equality of Turkish Cypriots with all its elements seems to be continuing. As a result, with these positions of the two sides, there will not be any ground for Anastasiades and Tatar to restart negotiations for a mutually acceptable solution.

I asked Akinci, had he been reelected, where did he think the then current Geneva talks would stand and what resolution might have been reached? He replied that had he continued to speak and act on behalf of Turkish Cypriots, he would have taken the talks from Berlin to proceed and insistently keep pressuring for a last set of structured negotiations to reach the BBF settlement for the good of all sides. He would have used the Geneva and future 5plus unofficial meetings to keep all stakeholders at the same understanding to support constructively planning of such a last phase negotiation aiming to reach a strategic agreement. But, for a solution, besides the inevitable support of our respective communities, we would also need the assistance and support of guarantor countries namely Turkey, Greece, and the UK as well as the UN and EU.

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As to where any solution now stands, Akinci said that, because there are completely different visions and positions of both sides’ leaderships, unfortunately nothing positive can be expected towards reaching a mutually acceptable federal solution. Therefore, there is a need to create new dynamics in both communities. Political parties, trade unions and the NGO’s that are committed to a peaceful mutually acceptable federal solution in Cyprus should work within their own communities as well as join their forces to work together. After all these years the experience that I have clearly tells me that unless the two communities themselves decide genuinely to change the status quo, no one from the outside is going to move in that direction to help solve the Cyprus problem.

Akinci believes that all Cypriots, mainly Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots and all the other communities of Cyprus, small and large, deserve a better life. A life where all the younger generations will not go through what we have experienced during all these years. I believe that they deserve a modern democratic secular European way of life. I strongly believe that this could only happen within the context of a BBF with political equality since that is the only formula which can be mutually acceptable and be supported by the international community.

Akinci emphasized that, while he has worked for this kind of a solution in Cyprus since my mayorship, unfortunately, I was unable to see the outcome of this endeavor. However, none-the-less certain achievements for the benefit of all inhabitants have been accomplished. Again, it is true that precious time has been lost without a solution. Nevertheless, it is achieving the goal by consolidating separation. Even today after so many disappointments, I do still believe that we should not lose our remaining hopes and motivation no matter how weak they may seem over time.

At a press conference following a meeting between Turkish and Turkish Cypriot officials early in July 2020, from which unfortunately he had been excluded without credible explanation, Akinci suggested Turkey’s proposed re-opening of Varosha was to influence the thenupcoming fall Turkish Cypriot presidential election. He insisted the

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correct approach was to support UN-backed efforts to re-open the “ghost town.” Since the apparent basis for Turkey’s proposed re-opening was lack of progress in finding a solution to the Cyprus Problem, Akinci cautioned that all aspects of the proposed opening must be an international issue. He referred to the proposal as a “shame for our democracy” and “interference in our elections.”6 Having made it clear that Turkish Cypriots do not accept a minority status and Greek Cypriots the majority, he also has insisted that the former is not subordinate to the “rulers in Turkey.” At the heart of Akinci’s campaign for reelection had been creating a distance from Turkey. Does a realistic hope remain to finally “unlock” one of Europe’s most contested political questions? Prior to his 2020 defeat for reelection, Akinci’s response to me consistently had been he has not heard the lock click open yet! With his defeat, no one may ever hear that click. It is interesting that both Vassiliou and Akinci were only permitted by their respective communities to serve one term each. It is not lost on observers of the conflict that “what might have been” had they both made it to their respective second terms; or, certainly if even one had been able to do so, this could have vastly changed the outcome of the Cyprus Problem. The Turkish Cypriots see Tatar as a leader repeating and executing orders from the “mother” country (and the only one internationally supporting them). He represents the opinion that federation is “dead and buried,” and it is now time to “move on.” But when and where? The reality is Turkish Cypriots have nowhere else to do this within international law and presently accepted parameters. On the other hand, when there is a demand for proof of good intentions by Turkish Cypriots, time will tell. Hopefully, Greek Cypriot leadership is sincere concerning an equitable future solution resulting in a fair way to share the island with Turkish Cypriots. However, as of now, a “blank wall” stands in the way. This realization has helped lead the parties to the present dilemma. Notwithstanding conflicting reports and its actions to the contrary, there are those operating under the premise that Turkey wants an agreedupon deal. But its interest does not appear to have changed appreciably. It has been an assumption that Greek Cypriots have always and still appear to want a BBF. There seems to be nothing current to indicate

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the contrary. Word has it after Anastasiades received recent results from checking behind the scenes and polling indicated to him that he would never be able to sell a two-state solution to his constituents, that concept is no longer on the table. So, he is now trying to advance the conclusion Turkey is not pushing for a two-state solution, because in the end, they know it will not be possible to achieve this over the strong opposition of the international community. A cause for optimism is the latest opinion polls showing there has been a shift. The wish for a federal Cyprus has been registered by a clear majority of 66.5% among Greek Cypriots and 63.6% among Turkish Cypriots. People on both sides of the Green Line do not want to think the status quo is a viable alternative nor do they want two separate states. This leaves only a BBF. A “shocking” disclosure was made in a report from a team of civil society representatives, lawyers, and researchers who had outlined “blatant interference by a team from Turkish Intelligence Agency MIT” to engineer the defeat of Akinci in the election and cause problems for him as well as members of his family and colleagues. The idea was to get him to withdraw his candidacy immediately in favor of “Turkey’s survival,” exemplified by Tatar. This was a clear reflection of the feeling that Akinci’s positions did not “align with those of Turkey.” Erdogan’s interference is taking hold, further lifting the curtain exposing the TRNC “puppet” administration of Tatar, unmasking Erdogan as the “puppeteer.” The next chapter is anyone’s guess.7

Conclusion Although now out of office, Akinci has remained a fierce proponent of reunification, warning of the dire consequences in the event of the pursuit of a two-state solution. It is, for this reason, so much space in this book discusses his place in the history of the Cyprus Problem. Unlike Tatar and other Turkish Cypriot leaders of the past, Akinci’s impact has not been that of just “another” Turkish Cypriot leader. It is a key element in the future of reunification, which is the only event capable of finally putting an end to the conflict. In addition, while not all agree with him

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on everything, he is an honest politician. Based on my conversations with Akinci following his defeat, I have a distinct impression that fortunately he is not “going away” any time soon. This was evident as late as November 2020, when he posted this on social media regarding his then-recent gallbladder operation: The wounds of the operation are small and will heal quickly. But the wounds of democracy due to the operations performed in our community are deep and recovery will be difficult and time consuming. If the Turkish Cypriot people uphold their will by rejecting any intervention, regardless of the cost, they will be able to progress towards achieving a true democracy.8

Yes, it has proved to be a long and complicated road, but if the end is possible the attainment of the rewards will be substantial. This conclusion demonstrates why it is the historical time for Greek Cypriots to create a level playing field and begin treating Turkish Cypriots in the same manner Greek Cypriots would like themselves treated, neither community as subservient to the other. The Greek Cypriot parliamentary election results (May 2021) indicated there may be a positive change in the political wind brewing with increasing storm velocity, even as earlier attempts have failed. The winners were those candidates and parties that emphasized the need for change through positive action rather than continuing to carry the historical burden resulting from knee-jerk negativity. There are appreciable portions of the population on both sides of the Green Line who have long since paved the way for this positive change in Cypriot thinking. Hopefully, this will continue and increase.9 However, unfortunately at this time, there is no reason to get overly excited about this possibility. Earlier in 2015, Hubert Faustmann noted a caveat I believe still is as true today as it was then: As long as a Cyprus Problem exits, there will be actors who will try to do something about it – or at least pay lip service to such attempts. But the likelihood of reunification decreases with every failed attempt and the passing of time. The Taiwanisation of the North with recognition by… states remain[s]

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…the most likely scenario. It is difficult to see how the division will not become formalised one way or another 20, 40 or 100 years from now. The Cyprus Problem in its current form has been with us for almost 40 years. It can easily last another 40 years and longer if it comes to that.10

At least for the time being, the most accurate observation demands an understanding there will be no solution until an agreement on all the open points raised so far. It remains true this will require an honest attempt by Turkey to throw off the cloak of deception, abandoning what can only be its surreptitious campaign to eventually control all of Cyprus. It has been said: “Mustafa Akinci was an honorable politician, a federalist, a true Cypriot patriot who was not a pawn of Turkey, a politician committed – in the literal sense – to solving the Cyprus problem. It was a rare circumstance and one that Anastasiades destroyed. We were incredibly unfortunate that in 2015 we did not have a Clerides or a Vassiliou as president face-to-face with Akinci.”11 Yes, timing is everything in life, especially in Cyprus. The unanswered question remains: Had Akinci been reelected and continued to govern as he had, what would have been the outcome in the event Turkey decided to withhold all future necessary financial assistance? Without speculating, the answer must be left as one “for the ages.”

Notes 1. Vassiliou, G. (2010). From the President’s Office: A Journey Towards Reconciliation in a Divided Cyprus. London: I.B. Taurus & Co. Ltd. 2. https://www.quora.com/profile/Memo-Kosemen. 3. https://kalypsonicolaidis.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/secondbestNicolaidis.pdf. 4. https://www.interpeace.org›uploads›2011/06. 5. https://cyprus-mail.com/2021/04/04/president-urged-to-commit-to-fed eral-solution/. 6. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/7/tensions-simmer-over-nor thern-cyprus-plan-to-reopen-varosha.

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7. ‘Shocking’ interference by Turkey in north election—report | Cyprus Mail (cyprus-mail.com). https://cyprus-mail.com/2021/06/10/ shocking-interference-by-turkeys-in-north-election-report/. 8. https://cyprus-mail.com/2020/11/09/akinci-undergoes-gallbladder-sur gery/. 9. Christofides, M. (2016). The Traitors’ Club: A Memoir (1st Edition, page 35). Nicosia: Self-published. Marina Christofides, is an active Greek Cypriot member of the bicommunal movement. She has written of the situation in Cyprus, especially calling attention to the fact her Kyrenia family home in the north, until his death, was forcibly occupied by Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish Cypriot community supported by Turkey, the invading regime. In her youth, Marina observed firsthand the 1974 brutal division of the island, ever since hoping to see a reunited Cyprus through passage of the 2004 Annan Plan, only to be disappointed by the negative outcome. To visit the other side, she is still required to pass through the major checkpoint of the Buffer Zone that divides the two sides, proving her identity to enter the heavily militarized unofficial regime recognized only by Turkey. 10. Faustmann, H. (2015). Hydrocarbons Can Fuel a Settlement. In James Ker-Lindsay (Ed.), Resolving Cyprus: New Approaches to Conflict Resolution (p. 81). I.B. Taurus. 11. https://cyprus-mail.com/2021/01/24/cyprus-a-victim-of-democratic-def icit/.

5 Reflections and Conclusion

The vision allegedly pursued by the republic is to achieve a solution that would convert the island into a bizonal, bicommunal federation with a “single sovereignty, single citizenship and single international personality, with political equality as set out in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.”1 This initial vision favoring the republic and its Greek Cypriot majority has not been realized and in fact appears to have been abandoned. With the passage of time, this approach has been continually resisted by the Turkish Cypriot minority which is getting stronger as the conflict continues ever-present. Realization of the vision would require a “guarantee” of the unity of the island state, its “institutions, society and the economy and must be in line with the European acquis and fully respect the principles on which the EU is based.” This means a “free and reunited Cyprus, a common homeland of Greek-Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriots, Armenians, Maronites and Latins (Roman Catholics), a model of peaceful coexistence and prosperity of all its citizens and a pillar of stability, peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean.”2 The underlying defect in this lofty proclamation is that Greek Cypriots may now desire that there be two separate communities existing equally on the island under Greek © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. M. Turk, Bridging the Cyprus Divide, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29758-8_5

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Cypriot control, while Turkish Cypriots have a vison that provides for their separate community governed by their own leaders. Cyprus must be “democratic, fair, functional, and viable. It must also be compatible with the laws and principles of the EU, the UN Convention on Human Rights, and UN resolutions. Cyprus must remain an independent, united State with sovereignty and territorial integrity.”3 According to the republic, this translates to “under Greek Cypriot control,” which is anathema to Turkish Cypriots and an idea that becomes more objectionable to them as the continued separation of the two communities becomes increasingly possible. Turning to an overview of the salient aspects of the process Greek Cypriot president Christofias and the then new Turkish Cypriot leader Talat had unfruitful meetings until July 1, 2012, when Cyprus took over the presidency of the Council of the EU. Throughout the Christofias presidency, the Turkish Cypriot side refused to enter settlement talks despite assurances from Christofias that there was no impediment. On February 11, 2014, the first official meeting between Greek Cypriot Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot Eroglu took place under the auspices of the UN, which set the framework for the new negotiation process and reaffirmed the basic principles of the desired solution. The launch of a new process of substantive negotiations renewed international interest, creating fresh positive resolve regarding the problem. This was followed by three years of negotiations that appeared to lead to progress. As a result, in June 2017, SG Guterres convened a Conference on Cyprus in Crans-Montana, Switzerland. The Conference was attended by the republic, the Turkish Cypriot side with its new leader (since 2015) Akinci, the representatives of the three guarantor powers Greece, Turkey, and the UK, with the EU as an observer. The Conference came to a standstill due to Turkey’s intransigent insistence on the permanent presence of Turkish military troops in Cyprus and on maintaining its invasive rights, which continues to this day. Despite this negative development, the republic appeared to remain steadfastly committed to reaching a solution to the Cyprus Problem through talks under the auspices of the UN. Despite the nonconstructive attitude of Turkey, Guterres appointed Jane Holl Lute as Special Adviser to resume the negotiation process. Successive rounds

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of contacts led to the meeting of Guterres with the leaders of the two communities in Berlin on November 25, 2019, during which the leaders once again reaffirmed their commitment to reach a solution based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality, as defined in the relevant resolutions of the UN. On April 27–29, 2021, Guterres convened the informal “5 + UN” meeting for Cyprus in Geneva, with the aim to achieve a breakthrough for the resumption of a process of negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus Problem. Unfortunately, the refusal of Turkey and of the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community to reaffirm their commitment to the agreed basis of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality as defined in UN resolutions, their insistence on the equal status of the “two-states” as a precondition for the resumption of negotiations, and their rejection of the Guterres proposal for the appointment of a special envoy, brought the effort to a deadlock. In addition, Turkey proceeded with the creation of a new fait accompli in its occupied areas of Cyprus, announcing on July 23, 2021, further illegal actions in one of those areas, Varosha, in violation of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. These actions were condemned by the Security Council which issued a Presidential Declaration on July 23, 2021, calling for the immediate reversal of all illegal actions and full respect of the relevant UN resolutions including the transfer of Varosha to the UN administration. These latest provocative actions by Turkey inevitably impacted the efforts of Guterres and the international community to create a conducive environment for the resumption of meaningful negotiations. As a result, to date, no such negotiations have resumed. Nor does any such activity appear on the horizon. What has “risen from the ashes” of the Cyprus Problem is an inadvertent demonstration by the two communities in their own respective ways that they can get along separately on the same island. This bodes well for a peaceful future between the two sides so long as the bicommunal community movement has a reasonable opportunity to wrest control from the politicians traditionally at the top who historically for the most part (with the notable exceptions of George Vassiliou, Glafcos Clerides, and Mustafa Akinci) led from the top down rather than from the bottom up. Restoring control to those

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on the ground by providing the reins of government to them as “of, by and for the people” they will serve and represent, can change the game before that opportunity is lost once-and-for-all. Otherwise, the Cyprus Problem will continue until it runs out of steam…if and whenever that may occur. So far, with the distinctive exception of Vassiliou, Clerides, and Akinci, elites on both sides of the Green Line who have been in control of the “peace process” historically have indicated a tenacity to hold on to their power indefinitely because that is their “bread and butter.” In such a case, the island’s future will continue to rest in the hands of those self-serving politicians who seek to sustain the areas of their personal and financial comfort. Reunification talks after over half-a-century have remained suspended since July 2017. Attempts by the UN to achieve that goal have not been successful. The talks have fallen victim to the realities of such a delay exacerbated by the inability of the conflicting parties to make the required adjustments to the original forced founding agreement after all these years. Consequently, the illusive “butterfly” of the desired bizonal, bicommunal federal solution for the island has remained elusive and may no longer be achievable. The interests of the US in this conflict have been transferred to its other goals in the Eastern Mediterranean such as security and energy concerns dictating that closer relations with the republic have replaced those earlier ambitions. Upon his election in 2015, Akinci made it clear his priority was to conclude a final agreement with Anastasiades as soon as possible. The latter confirmed his interest. However, notwithstanding the early amicable relationship between the two leaders, things began to sour and their regular schedule of meetings in August and September 2016 led nowhere. Problems between Akinci and Erdogan after Akinci reiterated his campaign position that the status of the relationship between Turkey and Turkish Cyprus should change. “It should be a relationship of brothers/sisters, not a relationship of a motherland and her child,” he had said. This provoked an unhappy response from Erdogan, leading the Turkish press to question the future of Turkey’s support for the negotiations.4

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Subsequently, a new, more conservative Turkish Cypriot coalition government was formed that did not include representatives from Akinci’s party or parties from the previous alliance. Serious differences on a number of core issues prevented an actual agreement resulting from those sessions. In November 2016, in Mont Pelerin, Switzerland, to further address the more difficult issue of territory and to move to an agreement on holding a five-party conference on security guarantees. Nothing was settled. The talks reconvened on November 20 and 21, 2016, but no agreement could be reached because the Turkish Cypriots insisted on a date for a five-party conference and insisted that both territory and security be included in those talks. The Greek Cypriots refused to agree to set a date for the five-party conference, causing an end to this series of talks. In order to preserve the momentum achieved at that point or see the end of the talks, both leaders met on December 1, 2016, following a dinner hosted by UN Special Adviser on Cyprus Espen Barth Eide. They agreed to meet as necessary in December 2016 and early January 2017, to try to come together and resolve the existing disagreements regarding most issues at additional meetings. Efforts at staging successful subsequent meetings failed. On June 28, 2017, and thereafter for a short time efforts to conclude successful talks once again failed. Over the July 1–2 weekend, Guterres said he would return to Crans-Montana if the proposals generated positive movement in the negotiations. Following the defeat of several subsequent attempts at reconciliation, the suggestion of a two-state solution was raised. Akinci apparently did not embrace this approach, and the Greek Cypriots rejected it outright, arguing that it did not fall within the agreed framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation. Subsequent US and UN attempts to break the deadlock failed. The hopes and fears embedded in the more than half-a-century life of the ongoing territorial dispute that can be referred to as a major thorn in the side of the UN, have proven to be unrealistic. The conclusion is inescapable that it is even more important now to find another Turkish Cypriot Mustafa Akinci, and Greek Cypriots George Vassiliou and Glafcos Clerides…but where, how and when? The potential for a “new polity that transcends old, tired, and dysfunctional conflict lines, the states it depends upon

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and the elite level peace process that has [un]intentionally sustained it,”5 may have been lost for good. At least for the time being, the most accurate observation demands an understanding that there will be no solution until there is an agreement on all the open points discussed. It remains true this will require Turkey’s honest attempt to throw off the cloak of deception, abandoning its surreptitious campaign to eventually control all of Cyprus. Additionally, it bears repeating this depends on a change in course for Cypriots on both sides of the Green Line wholeheartedly understanding, as Hicks cautions, dignity and respect are not the same thing. All Cypriots deserve “dignity as a birthright,” while respect comes from recognition, they “must treat others as if they matter, as if they are worthy of care and attention.” 6 There is a need for each community to humanize the other and respect the points of view of each, providing a positive example of democratized restorative justice, working from the ground up, no longer from the top down. This is the key to a positive peaceful reunification. There still is an underlying lack of trust on both sides of the Green Line. This will require that the republic accepts Turkey’s offer to open its sea and airports to the republic in exchange for reciprocal treatment of Turkish Cypriots.7 The question is how to transform the conflict into one where the parties can live side-by-side peacefully for as long as they continue to disagree. This will help to establish stability in the region. Additionally, they must work to convert the culture of conflict into one of peace, starting from “scratch.” Because two equal communities will not be possible presently, there must be an effort to achieve a de jure partition of Cyprus equal to the two individual commonalities to look to their respective goals.8 The people on both sides of the Green Line must take solution of the problem into their own hands to survive through the achievement of an acceptable long-term solution.9 So, there you have it, the “needle in the haystack” of the Cyprus Problem: There must be an acceptance of the principle that the dignity of each is a birthright, while both sides need to treat the other as if they matter. Carefully examining the history of the Cyprus Problem, directly contradicts this principle. Until there is a “wake up call” in this category, without question there can be no means of solving the problem.10 And

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no solution continues with amazing regularity to permeate UN ineffective efforts to prove otherwise. Even after all these years, it remains as true as it was in 1977: No [p]resident has proposed a different [detailed] framework [to a bizonal, bicommunal federation], but not a single [p]resident was able or willing to solve the Cyprus problem …[through] a bizonal federation, with the status quo becoming embedded as a substitute of the comprehensive settlement.11

While so far, the “bottom-up” approach has been ignored or not generated sufficient interest to make an impact, those at the top on both sides of the Green Line need to start paying attention to those at the bottom whom they claim to be governing. Most working in the field will confirm that the most effective improvements will come from the ground up rather than the historically unsuccessful top-down way of thinking. This advances the Oslo Group and its history to the top rung of the discussion. Such a change in emphasis would checkmate the historic manipulation by politicians at the top who continue to insist on using the time-worn traditional approach that whoever ends up in office obviously knows better than the people on the ground concerning what is best for the latter.12 More time is spent by most candidates attempting to pedal their “wares” rather than searching for ways to hear and respond appropriately to what those on the ground are seeking to convey, convincing those on either side of the Green Line that, at the end of the day, a joint decision by the two communities concerning the future of the Cyprus Problem is in the best interests of both. It has been said that, had the Annan Plan been accepted early on, “thousands” on both sides could have eventually made it back to their own original homes. Sadly, now, this is not going to happen because that possibility has long since passed.13 It is possible for the parties on both sides to live side-by-side peacefully while they continue to disagree but only if they can work in unison to help stabilize the region. This will require the withdrawal of all those who have so far been involved in the mismanagement of the conflict, in

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favor of the grassroots on both sides. Failing to accomplish this successfully will leave the future offspring on both sides to inherit the problem, more likely leading to a partition at best. Changing course will require “bottom-up” control of the island’s future through effective collaboration by both sides on key critical issues materially affecting the future of both. In the absence of this being successfully accomplished, at some point de jure partition of the island will be the result.14 Reunification of the island is in the hands of the grassroots on both sides. Their goal must be to change the game through intensive bottom-up conflict transformation. A collaborative rather than a continued adversarial approach must be attempted, while at the same time avoiding the historical “traditional rut” that has lurked behind all prior failed attempts to bring the two communities together. This is no mean task given the conflict between the sought-after extensive rights of citizenship for the substantial number of settlers from Turkey versus the emphasis by Greek Cypriots on individual rights. This poses a serious conflict between the past advocated by Greek Cypriots and the future represented by a twostate solution. The result is a “dual personality” for the island because the form of that requires an understanding that the history of the conflict is “here to stay.” That will require movement by leadership in Turkey to take actions that demonstrate that it is aware that it has more to lose than gain by not conceding on key points necessary to make a solution successful. This is further complicated by UN studies showing that an overwhelming majority of people on both sides still avoid contact with the other community. What will be required is the simple but nevertheless complicated act of adopting humanization on both sides. Even then, the serious remaining question is whether it is now too late to accomplish this because the horse has left the barn long ago.15 As far back as 2007, pre-eminent chronicler of the Cyprus Problem, Professor Zenon Stavrinides, aptly prognosticated the deterioration of any realistic chances for resolution of the conflict.16 He cautioned that the Greek Cypriots had reached a point of no return where they must decide regarding:

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adoption of a strong economy supporting a high … standard of living for Greek Cypriots, and the empty rhetoric about ‘struggle’ and ‘justice’; or else negotiating the creation of a bizonal, bicommunal federal republic with their long-standing Turkish Cypriot neighbours, and sharing …the powers and responsibilities of the new republic, as well as benefits of a flourishing economy. If the latter course… the great challenge for Greek Cypriots is to make friends not just with the Turkish Cypriots, but also with the Turkish people beyond the northern coast of the island. However, there is no reason to think that the Turkish side will be softer and more accommodating to a realist Greek Cypriot president than it was to a realist Vassiliou or a moderate Clerides.

However, Stavrinides was realistic in acknowledging that by then the Turkish Cypriot community will have developed to a point of political and economic strength far greater than had been the case regarding earlier efforts to resolve the Cyprus Problem. This was notwithstanding the efforts by Papadopoulos to control the negotiations so the Greek side “could get more advantages for a lower price.” In the event of any appreciable improvement on the part of Turkish Cypriots that might cause the Greek Cypriots to “get very worried and agree to a confederal union in which only Varosha will be returned to them but not the newly developed Morphou,”17 Stavrinides reasoned: The double optimum model for the achievement of a negotiated outcome requires that in any successful negotiation the two sides need to create a package involving the exchange of assets which both of them individually…simultaneously judge to leave them on balance better than their respective default situations.

Unfortunately, history has undeniably “called in the cards” on the fallacy of that kind of reasoning when applied to the resolution of the Cyprus Problem. This brings us to the point of attempting to find a successful means of cracking the acquired historical design of the Cyprus Problem. The wild card in all of this is the interest of Russia in the extensive relationship it maintains with Cyprus’ economic ties, with Russian investment on the island constituting as much as 25% of all bank deposits and a

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third of all foreign investments in the early 2010s, and the island seen as a major offshore tax haven for wealthy Russians and oligarchs. The recent about-face of the republic in the negotiations for a settlement has been attributed to the suspicion that Putin “pulled the plug” on the most recent settlement efforts because he wants access to the Eastern Mediterranean through Cyprus.18 Recently, the news to the international community announced by UNSG Guterres indicated there would yet be another six-month extension, hoping to save the deal that is no deal, not even after almost 63 years from the date the republic achieved its independence. So far there are no takers! At this point, it bears taking a quick look in the rearview mirror reflecting a selection of some of the critical events in the convoluted history of the Cyprus Problem following its establishment as a member of nations19 : 2004 May—Cyprus is one of 10 new states to join the EU but does so as a divided island. 2004 December—Turkey agrees to extend its EU customs union agreement to 10 new member states, including Cyprus. The Turkish prime minister says this does not amount to a formal recognition of Cyprus. 2007 January–March—Greek and Turkish Cypriots demolish barriers dividing the old city of Nicosia. The moves are seen as paving the way for another official crossing point on what used to be a key commercial thoroughfare. 2008 April—Symbolic Ledra Street crossing between the Turkish and Greek sectors of Nicosia reopened for the first time since 1964. 2011 September—Cyprus begins exploratory drilling for oil and gas, prompting a diplomatic row with Turkey, which responds by sending an oil vessel to waters off northern Cyprus. 2012 Turkey’s Turkish Petroleum Corporation begins drilling for oil and gas onshore in Northern Cyprus despite protests from the Cypriot government that the action is illegal.

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2012 June—Cyprus appeals to European Union for financial assistance to shore up its banks, which are heavily exposed to the stumbling Greek economy. 2013 March—President Anastasiades secures e10bn bank bailout from the European Union and IMF. Laiki Bank, the country’s second biggest, is wound down and deposit-holders with more than e100,000 will face big losses. 2014 October—Cyprus suspends peace talks with Turkish Cypriots in protest of what it calls efforts by Turkey to prevent it from exploring gas fields south of the island. The EU and US express concern over the tension. 2015 February—At talks with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, President Anastasiades agrees to let the Russian navy have access to Cypriot ports. 2015 May—Government and Turkish Cypriot negotiators resume talks on reunification, which ended inconclusively in July 2017. 2018 November—First new buffer-zone crossings are opened in eight years at Deryneia in the east and Lefke in the west. 2020 October—Erdogan’s favorite anti-reunification nationalist Ersin Tatar wins narrow victory in Turkish Cypriot presidential election. 2021 September—After a meeting with UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and Greek Cypriot President Anastasiades in New York, Tatar says talks on the future of Cyprus will not start unless they take into consideration “the sovereign equality and international status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.” 2023 To date both sides are at a standstill. The conclusionary irony in the storied conflicted history of the republic is further astounding when one considers the unintended coup de grace inflicted peremptorily upon the republic in 1960 when coming into being. The birth of the country was facilitated by international agreements that were accomplished in the absence of any consent or approval from the people of Cyprus themselves. It was foisted on them by others through a series of treaties concerning which Cypriots had no say and without any referendum being held.

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Thus, Cypriots were chained to a series of treaties dealing with limitations concerning independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the new republic without first having their say! This included the insult of unknowingly being required to allow foreign powers to station military forces on the island, leaving its people exposed to interference in their domestic affairs from outside interests.20 In the end, the rocky “beginning” proved to be an open sore that resisted healing and still festers today. Real or otherwise, time is running out on this “accident of history,” or it may already be the case. Even the positive hopes spurred by the recent election of yet another Greek Cypriot president earlier this year will have no bearing until he actually “shows his cards.” If the UN ultimately makes good on its repeated threat to leave before a full settlement is finally reached, “all bets are off!”

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8. 9. 10.

11. 12.

https://mfa.gov.cy›efforts-to-resolve-the-cyprus-question. Our vision for a reunified Cyprus—MFA. https://mfa.gov.cy/efforts-to-resolve-the-cyprus-question.html. https://issuu.com/norwichuniversityoc/docs/pawc_journal_2022_f inal_single_page. https://www.un.org›sites›files›documents›g.... By choosing dignity as a way of life, we open the way to greater peace within ourselves and to a safer and more humane world. https://drdonn ahicks.com https://www.mfa.gov.tr/new-initiative-by-turkey-on-cyprus.en.mfa. Id. Vol. 29, Summer 2007, No. 3. Id. Vol. 31, Summer 2009, No. 3. Guterres Green-Lights Unficyp Extension, Is Concerned Over Varosha | Cyprus Mail (cyprus-mail.com). https://cyprus-mail.com/2021/07/09/ guterres-green-lights-unficyp-extension-is-concerned-over-varosha/. Drousiotis, M. (2015). The Cyprus Crisis and the Cold War. Alfadi Books. See, Marco Turk, A. (2006, Spring). Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue: The Time Is Right for Track III Diplomacy as the Best

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13.

14.

15.

16.

17. 18.

19. 20.

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Approach for Successful Negotiation of this Ethnic Conflict. Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review, 28(2). See, Marco Turk, A. (2006). Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue: The Time Is Right for Track III Diplomacy as the Best Approach for Successful Negotiation of This Ethnic Conflict. Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev, 28(205). Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol28/ iss2/1. See, Marco Turk, A. (2007, Summer). Rethinking the Cyprus Problem: Are Frame-Breaking Changes Still Possible Through Application of Intractable Conflict Intervention Approaches to this “Hurting Stalemate”? Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review, 29 (3). See, Marco Turk, A. (2009, Summer). The Negotiation Culture of Lengthy Peace Processes: Cyprus as an Example of Spoiling that Prevents a Final Solution. Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review, 31(3). The Underlying Assumptions, Structure and Prospects of the Negotiating Process for a Cyprus Settlement | Zenon Stavrinides— Academia.edu (2007). https://www.academia.edu/36939305/THE_ UNDERLYING_ASSUMPTIONS_STRUCTURE_AND_PROSPE CTS_OF_THE_NEGOTIATING_PROCESS_FOR_A_CYPRUS_ SETTLEMENT?email_work_card=view-paper Interpeace Peacebuilding in Practice, Paper No. 5. https://sputniknews.com/20211208/putin-russia-supports-viable-settle ment-of-cyprus-problem-within-framework-of-international-law-109 1354817.html. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17219505. Joseph, J. S. (2013). The Cyprus Problem: An Overview, Prologue to A. Marco Turk, Visions in Conflict—Peacebuilding in Cyprus: A View from the Ground . Brian C. Alston, Publisher.

Index

A

Akinci, Meral 11, 97, 100, 110 Akinci, Mustafa 22, 23, 28–30, 35, 43, 44, 66, 72, 74, 76, 81–86, 88, 93, 98–105, 108–111 Anastasiades, Nicos 22, 23, 28, 78, 83, 95, 103, 108, 110, 117 Annan Plan 4, 6, 8, 18, 21, 28, 31, 73, 75, 77, 87, 89, 106, 113 Annan Plan I-V 42, 55 April 2004 referendum 6

Bizonal, bicommunal federation 23, 44, 77, 109, 111 Bottom-up approach 10, 113 British Friends of Cyprus Committee 66 British Friends of Cyprus Committee (London) 47 British use of Turkish Cypriots 2 Broome, Dr. Benjamin 66, 74 Buffer Zone 23, 38, 47, 56, 67, 90, 95, 106 Bureau of Bi-Communal Relations (DISY) 31, 87

B

Best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) 10, 42 Bicommunal movement 48, 52, 54, 67, 86, 87, 90, 106 Bizonal, bicommunal federal solution 110

C

Change the game 42, 70, 110, 114 Chigas, Prof. Diana 66, 74 Christmas ethnic clashes 4 Christofias, Dimitris 21, 28, 29, 108

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. M. Turk, Bridging the Cyprus Divide, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29758-8

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122

Index

Civil society 4, 6, 7, 17–19, 40–42, 46, 48, 49, 53, 65, 67–70, 72, 73, 79–81, 103 Clerides, Glafcos 20, 22, 26, 27, 34, 35, 43, 87, 88, 91, 93, 109–111 Clerides, Katie 31, 35, 87 Community-based solution 7 Conflict engagement 40 Conflict Management Group Consortium 66 Crans-Montana 38, 83, 108, 111 Crossroads to Europe 2 Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 39 Cyprus, A Special Case 6 Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCCI) 59 Cyprus consortium 66 Cyprus Fulbright Commission (CFC) 15, 44, 49, 50, 53, 66, 73, 76, 79–81 Cyprus Peace Bazaar 66 Cyprus Problem 1, 4, 7, 9–11, 16, 17, 20, 21, 23–27, 31, 38, 39, 43, 44, 46, 52, 54, 61, 71, 80, 83, 88, 89, 93, 94, 96, 97, 102, 103, 108–110, 112, 113, 116

D

De facto partition 4, 22, 94 Demetriades, Lelos 30, 66 Democratized restorative justice 7, 48, 112 Denktash, Rauf 8, 16, 21, 23, 26, 27, 29, 56, 75, 77, 82, 94, 106 Diamond, Dr. Louise 16, 17, 66, 74

Doob, Prof. Leonard 66

E

Enosis 1, 2, 4, 5, 23, 26 Erdogan, Recep 30, 43, 46, 75, 82, 103, 110, 117 Eroglu, Dr. Dervis 29, 108 Ethnicity 2, 10, 85 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 22, 24, 45, 59 European Union (EU) 3, 8, 9, 11, 21, 23, 25, 27, 39, 54, 57, 59, 68, 69, 73, 75, 77, 78, 80, 85, 87, 88, 95, 107, 108, 116, 117

F

Fallacies of Cyprus Problem 39, 61 Fisher, Dr. Ron 66, 74 “5+UN” 109

G

Great Britain 1, 26 Greece 1967 Mainland Military Coup 5 Greek Cypriot 1–6, 8–11, 14, 16, 22–26, 28–31, 42, 44, 47–53, 56–60, 67, 70–72, 74–84, 87, 88, 91, 93, 96, 99, 102–104, 106–108, 111, 114, 115, 117 Greek Cypriot Mediation Centre 58 Greek National Guard 2, 82 Green Line 9, 19, 21, 23, 38, 42, 45, 46, 48, 49, 54, 57, 60, 67, 68, 70–72, 74, 75, 78, 85, 86, 93, 103, 104, 110, 112, 113 Guarantor powers 3, 108

Index

Guarantors 20 Guterres, Antonio 23, 108, 109, 111, 116, 117

123

Lute, Jane Holl 108

M H

Historical context 20 Home for Cooperation 73, 74

I

Identity-based conflict 1 Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) 17, 66 Interactive Management 66 InterPeace 18, 37 Intractable conflict 7, 40, 43 Intractable dispute 4 Islam 1

Macdonald, Ambassador John W. 16, 33, 51 Makarios III, Archbishop 5, 26 Margaret Mead 12 Mont Pelerin 111 “Mother” countries 2 Multi-track diplomacy 16, 33 Muslims 14

N

National Guard 5, 21 NATO 89 Nature of Peace 13 Nicosia Master Plan 30, 47, 66 Nobel Peace Center, Oslo 13

J

James Ker-Lindsay 4

O

Kelman, Prof. Herbert 66 Ki-Moon, Ban 22 Kosovo War 14 Kuchuk, Dr. Fazil 29 Kyprianou, Spyros 26

Obstacles to a solution 24 Operation Locksmith Workshop 66 Oslo Group 7, 12, 42, 50, 53–56, 67, 73, 74, 76, 77, 113 Oslo Group I and II 48 Oslo Report 55 Ottoman period 1 Oztoprak, Canan 86, 91

L

P

“Ledra Palace Buffer Zone Peace It Together” 69 Listening 19, 40, 58 Loizedes (Titina Loizidou v. Turkey) 24

Papadopoulos, Tasos 21, 27–29, 42, 77 Partition 2, 3, 8, 20, 21, 27, 42, 44, 85, 91, 97, 112, 114 Peacebuilding challenges 15

K

124

Index

Peace Can be Taught 13 Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) 50, 51, 53, 73 Principled negotiation 59, 60 Pyla Village 68

R

Radical disagreement 39, 40 Republic of Cyprus (RoC) 3, 29, 35, 91 Restorative justice 41 Reunification 7, 8, 10, 12, 20, 22, 23, 25–31, 37, 42, 43, 46, 48, 72, 76, 79, 81–83, 85, 89, 94, 103, 110, 112, 114, 117

S

Sampson, Nikos 26 Serghides, Judge George (Georgios) 59 Settlers/Immigrants 11, 20, 22, 24, 25, 76, 79, 82, 84, 85, 114 Seven Keys to Peacebuilding 7 Strategic engagement 20 Strategic thinking 20, 40

T

Taksim 2, 4 Talat, Mehmet Ali 22, 29, 86, 108 Tatar, Ersin 11, 22, 30, 74, 79, 82–86, 95, 96, 99, 102, 103, 117 The missing 44, 45, 52 Third-Party Involvement 20 Tracks I-III 16, 17, 55 Trainers for Trainers 66

Treaties of Guarantee 3 Turkey 1–5, 8, 11, 20–25, 29, 38, 39, 43, 45, 51, 57, 58, 71, 74–80, 82–86, 88, 91, 94, 95, 101–103, 105, 106, 108–110, 112, 114, 116, 117 Turkish 1974 Invasion 20, 22, 37, 58 Turkish Cypriot 1–6, 8–11, 21, 22, 24–27, 29–31, 35, 39, 43, 44, 47, 50–53, 56–58, 66–72, 74, 75, 77–88, 90, 93, 94, 96, 100–104, 106–109, 111, 112, 115–117 Turkish Cypriot Mediation Centre 57 Turkish Intelligence Agency (MIT) 103 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) 4, 6–8, 16, 21–23, 25, 28–30, 38, 43, 45, 51, 81, 82, 85, 88, 103, 117 “Turkization” 78 Tutu, Desmond 38

U

UNFICYP 4, 95 Ungerleider, Dr. John 67 Unite Cyprus Now 93 United Kingdom (UK) 2, 3, 20, 73, 108 United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) 5, 23, 31, 89, 116 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 66–68, 80 UN Secretary General 96 US State Department 52

Index

V

Vassiliou, Sophia 93

Varosha 83, 101, 109 Vassiliou, George 16, 22, 27, 93–97, 102, 105, 109–111

Z

Zurich and London Treaties 3

125