Alternative Media and Taiwan’s Socio-Political Transformation, 1970s–1990s [1st ed. 2023] 9789819924769, 9789819924776, 9819924766

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
About the Authors
List of Tables
1 Introduction
Importance and Significance of Research on Alternative Media
Methodology Used for This Research
Organization of the Book
References
2 Alternative Media and the Theoretical Frameworks
Definition and History of Alternative Media
UNESCO’s World Communication Report
Diverse as Alternative Media
Historical Review of Alternative Media Practice
Contemporary Context of Alternative Media
Definition and Practice of Alternative Media in Taiwan
Related Theories to Alternative Media and Society
Civil Society
Public Sphere in Alternative Media
Democracy and Political Transition
McOuail’s Democratic Participant Media Theory
References
3 History of Taiwan’s Political Changes
History of Ethnic and Political Problems in Taiwan
Transition of Taiwan’s Politics and Opposition
Government and Politics in Transition
Political Opposition in the Martial Law Period (1948–1987)
Political Opposition After the Lift of Martial Law (1987–2000)
Political Opposition After 2000
References
4 Media Environment in Taiwan from the 1950s to 2000
Authoritarian Regime and Mass Media
Censorship and Media Control in the Martial Law Period
Taiwanese Society and Media System after the Lift of Martial Law
Media Development and Legal Framework in Taiwan since 1945
Newspapers
Magazines
Radio
Television
The Internet and Online Media
References
5 The Main Alternative Media in the Martial Law Period of Taiwan
Political Background for Opposition in the Martial Law Period
The Birth of Political Opposition Magazine
The Rise and Fall of the Formosa Magazine
Ethnic Orientation of the Political Opposition Magazine in the 1980s
References
6 Alternative Media After the Martial Law from 1987 to the Early 1990s
Shift of Media: Magazine Has Gone, Electronic Media Arrives
Political Background: From 1987 to the Early 1990s
The New Settings for Electronic Media
The First Alternative Electronic Visual Voice
Documentary Films and the Video Activist Group
The Period of Channel Four
References
7 Alternative Media in Taiwan During the 1990s
Definition and Emergence of Alternative Radio
Alternative Radio in the 1990s
Political Background for Burgeoning Alternative Media
The Aims for Establishment
Organization and Types of Alternative Radio Ownership
Call-in Culture Makes Alternative Public Spheres
Mobilization for Social Reform
More Commercial After Legitimization
The Collapse of Station Identity After Legitimization
Guerrilla-Style Underground Radio Still Fought for Alternative Voice
The New Form of Alternative Media After the Late 1990s: Virtual Community
The Emergence of Pluralism, Social Movement Politics, and the Impact of the Internet
Definition of Virtual Community
The Taiwanese Social Movement in the Online Sphere
Case Study: Making an LGBTQ+ Virtual Community as Powerful Alternative Media
References
8 The Main Characteristics of Taiwan’s Alternative Media and the Implications of the Interplay of Alternative Media and SocioPolitical Transformation
The Main Characteristics of Alternative Media in Taiwan
The Main Sociopolitical Functions of Alternative Media in Taiwan
Examining Alternative Media from the “State vs. Civil Society” Perspective
The Consequence of Operation from Alternative Media in Taiwan
Major Thrusts that Alternative Media Served to Cultivate Opposition
The Role of Alternative Media in Political Democratization and Transition
Relationship Between Alternative Media and Democratization in Taiwan
The Alternative Media Operation from the Political Economic View
Comparisons Between Western and Taiwanese Alternative Media
More Political, Fewer Commercial, and Entertainment-oriented
More National Issues, Less Community Issues
Yesterday’s Alternative Media Activists, Today’s Ruling Party Leaders
References
9 Conclusion
References
References
Index

Citation preview

Alternative Media and Taiwan’s Socio-Political Transformation, 1970s–1990s Junhao Hong · Cheng-Nan Hou

Alternative Media and Taiwan’s Socio-Political Transformation, 1970s–1990s

Junhao Hong · Cheng-Nan Hou

Alternative Media and Taiwan’s Socio-Political Transformation, 1970s–1990s

Junhao Hong Department of Communication State University of New York at Buffalo New York, NY, USA

Cheng-Nan Hou Department of Mass Communication I-Shou University Kaohsiung City, Taiwan

ISBN 978-981-99-2476-9 ISBN 978-981-99-2477-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2477-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface

Alternative media refers to nongovernmental or non-mainstream media that are established as a supplement to cater to the needs of various social groups and sociopolitical movements. Even though alternative media may have both positive and negative impacts, in democratic societies, alternative media has been increasingly considered a driving force for social change and an indicator or definer of a civic society. However, this significant progress has been ignored by the world academic community at large. From the 1970s through the 1990s, alternative media had noticeable development in Taiwan and played an important role in its sociopolitical transformation and democratization. The democratization progress in Taiwan from the 1980s through the 1990s eventually made Taiwan a democratic society widely recognized by the world. This book examines how political openness and democratic movement from the 1980s through the 1990s in Taiwan enabled the development of Taiwan’s alternative media, what impact the alternative media in Taiwan had on its sociopolitical transformation, and what implications Taiwan’s case has for other societies in the world, especially for other Asian societies. Since the Nationalist Party (or the Kuomingtang, KMT) retreated to Taiwan from mainland China in 1949 after it was defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and lost power in the second civil war in contemporary China from 1945 to 1949, to 1987, all the media in Taiwan—both the printing media and broadcast media—were totally monopolized, absolutely controlled, and completely owned and managed by the ruling Nationalist Party, the government at the time, and the Nationalist Party commanded military in Taiwan for nearly four decades. During those years, there were very few alternative media in Taiwan, especially those alternative media that were deemed to represent the opposition political parties and challenge the political system and the ruling political party/government at that time. Most of the

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PREFACE

alternative media during this period were treated as illegal and were banned; thus, they had to operate as underground media. Since 1987, after the lift of the “Martial Law” and in light of the gradual openness of the society and political environment in Taiwan, alternative media was legally allowed on the island. Later, most of the alternative media became the organs of the legal opposition political parties and played a vital role both in the development and expansion of the opposition political parties specifically and in Taiwan’s sociopolitical transformation and democratization in general. Consequently, the previous illegal opposition political parties not only became legal political parties in Taiwan, but one of them, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), also defeated the long-time ruling political party, the Nationalist Party, in the 2000 presidential election and became the ruling political party in Taiwan, making the first historic breakthrough in five decades since 1949 when the Nationalist Party retreated to Taiwan. That unprecedented event also marked a historical and political transition of Taiwan, symbolizing that the region has transitioned from an authoritarian society into a democratic society. Following the major change in the political system in Taiwan since 2000, those previously deemed illegal political alternative media in Taiwan were not only legitimized but also became mainstream media. All the media there, regardless of their political tendency and ideological preference, has been allowed to exist and compete with each other in the market. Thus, the nature of alternative media in Taiwan has somewhat changed. Currently, most of the current alternative media in Taiwan are mainly those that either represent the interests of the members of minority groups or are against mainstream sociocultural values. In other words, the political function of alternative media in Taiwan and its impact on sociopolitical transformation and democratization after 2000 is much less significant than it was between the 1980s and 2000. Today, alternative media in Taiwan mainly serves the needs of the cultural, social, political, and ideological diversifications of its society. We hope that this book will be an essential contribution to Chinese studies. First, to date, little research on Taiwan’s alternative media and its impact on sociopolitical transformation and democratization has been conducted. Therefore, this study fills an important gap in Chinese studies in general and in Taiwanese studies in particular. Second, previous research on alternative media and social change has mostly focused on Western countries and reflected Western experiences. Taiwan’s case provides a different perspective and new findings. Finally, this research not only has some broad theoretical implications for alternative media and social change but also has some practical implications for other societies across the world, especially for undemocratic societies. This book relies primarily on first-hand data/materials collected through field research in Taiwan, including library/archive research and in-depth interviews of selected individuals representing alternative media organizations and practitioners, scholars and experts, government officials, social group leaders and activists, and citizens.

PREFACE

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With the fact that Taiwan is an increasingly important society in the world and that alternative media is a very inadequately studied subject and that both topics are now receiving increasing attention from intellectuals and the public as well, this book would raise interest among scholars, researchers, professionals, government analysts, and other people. To date, there is no literature that specializes and homes in Taiwan’s media history and its important role in the island’s sociopolitical transformation and democratization during the critical period between the 1980s and the 2000s, and there are no systematic studies on Taiwan’s alternative media and its unique historical function in the process of democratization. Finally, we would like to express our heartfelt thanks to Ms. Xu Wang, Ms. Nicole Bradley, Ms. Jasmin Yeung, and Ms. Delaney Reh for their meticulous and superior assistance in completing this book project. New York, USA Kaohsiung City, Taiwan

Junhao Hong Cheng-Nan Hou

Contents

1

Introduction Importance and Significance of Research on Alternative Media Methodology Used for This Research Organization of the Book References

1 1 6 11 12

2

Alternative Media and the Theoretical Frameworks Definition and History of Alternative Media UNESCO’s World Communication Report Diverse as Alternative Media Historical Review of Alternative Media Practice Contemporary Context of Alternative Media Definition and Practice of Alternative Media in Taiwan Related Theories to Alternative Media and Society Civil Society Public Sphere in Alternative Media Democracy and Political Transition McOuail’s Democratic Participant Media Theory References

15 15 15 17 22 23 25 26 26 28 32 35 36

3

History of Taiwan’s Political Changes History of Ethnic and Political Problems in Taiwan Transition of Taiwan’s Politics and Opposition Government and Politics in Transition Political Opposition in the Martial Law Period (1948–1987) Political Opposition After the Lift of Martial Law (1987–2000) Political Opposition After 2000 References

39 40 43 43 45 49 52 55

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Media Environment in Taiwan from the 1950s to 2000 Authoritarian Regime and Mass Media Censorship and Media Control in the Martial Law Period Taiwanese Society and Media System after the Lift of Martial Law Media Development and Legal Framework in Taiwan since 1945 Newspapers Magazines Radio Television The Internet and Online Media References

5

The Main Alternative Media in the Martial Law Period of Taiwan Political Background for Opposition in the Martial Law Period The Birth of Political Opposition Magazine The Rise and Fall of the Formosa Magazine Ethnic Orientation of the Political Opposition Magazine in the 1980s References

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Alternative Media After the Martial Law from 1987 to the Early 1990s Shift of Media: Magazine Has Gone, Electronic Media Arrives Political Background: From 1987 to the Early 1990s The New Settings for Electronic Media The First Alternative Electronic Visual Voice Documentary Films and the Video Activist Group The Period of Channel Four References Alternative Media in Taiwan During the 1990s Definition and Emergence of Alternative Radio Alternative Radio in the 1990s Political Background for Burgeoning Alternative Media The Aims for Establishment Organization and Types of Alternative Radio Ownership Call-in Culture Makes Alternative Public Spheres Mobilization for Social Reform More Commercial After Legitimization The Collapse of Station Identity After Legitimization Guerrilla-Style Underground Radio Still Fought for Alternative Voice The New Form of Alternative Media After the Late 1990s: Virtual Community

57 57 60 63 65 65 67 69 70 72 74 79 79 80 84 87 88 91 91 93 94 97 97 101 103 105 105 108 108 109 111 112 114 115 116 117 118

CONTENTS

The Emergence of Pluralism, Social Movement Politics, and the Impact of the Internet Definition of Virtual Community The Taiwanese Social Movement in the Online Sphere Case Study: Making an LGBTQ+ Virtual Community as Powerful Alternative Media References 8

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The Main Characteristics of Taiwan’s Alternative Media and the Implications of the Interplay of Alternative Media and SocioPolitical Transformation The Main Characteristics of Alternative Media in Taiwan The Main Sociopolitical Functions of Alternative Media in Taiwan Examining Alternative Media from the “State vs. Civil Society” Perspective The Consequence of Operation from Alternative Media in Taiwan Major Thrusts that Alternative Media Served to Cultivate Opposition The Role of Alternative Media in Political Democratization and Transition Relationship Between Alternative Media and Democratization in Taiwan The Alternative Media Operation from the Political Economic View Comparisons Between Western and Taiwanese Alternative Media More Political, Fewer Commercial, and Entertainment-oriented More National Issues, Less Community Issues Yesterday’s Alternative Media Activists, Today’s Ruling Party Leaders References Conclusion References

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118 120 121 123 135

139 139 143 144 147 147 148 151 153 155 155 156 157 158 161 169

References

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Index

185

About the Authors

Junhao Hong is Professor in the Department of Communication at State University of New York at Buffalo, USA. He is also Associate in Research of the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, USA. He received his Ph.D. in Communication from University of Texas at Austin, USA. His research interests include media and society, international communication and international politics, and impact of new information/ communication technology and new media. He has authored/edited a dozen of scholarly books and published numerous research articles in various international academic journals. Cheng-Nan Hou is Professor in the Department of Mass Communication, I-Shou University, Taiwan. He received his Ph.D. in Communication from the State University of New York at Buffalo, USA. His research interests include political communication, media and society, gender studies in media, and communication in the era of new media. He has published research articles in various international academic journals.

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List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table Table Table Table Table Table Table

4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 5.1

Table 7.1 Table Table Table Table

7.2 7.3 7.4 8.1

Table 8.2

Environmental protests in Taiwan: 1980–1990 1992 Taiwanese radio’s ownership type and broadcasting capabilities Taiwan television stock shared by the KMT and its ruling government Statistics of newspapers in Taiwan: 1990–2002 Statistics of magazines in Taiwan: 1990–2002 Statistics of radio in Taiwan: 1994–2002 Statistics of cable television in Taiwan: 1993–2002 Cable TV penetration rate Internet penetration rate Banned publication units of opposition political magazines in Taiwan: 1979–1989 The incidents activated by alternative underground radio and taxi drivers: 1990–1993 The ownership of alternative radio and its political relationship Numbers of Taiwanese social movement group websites Development of MOTSS and its characteristics Characteristics of alternative media in Taiwan and their roles in politics Characteristics of the internet and imputed impacts on the civil society

52 59 60 67 68 70 71 72 74 81 109 113 121 127 140 147

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Introduction

Importance and Significance of Research on Alternative Media The mass media does not reveal reality; it masks it. It doesn’t help bring about change; it helps avoid change. It doesn’t encourage democratic participation; it induces passivity, resignation, and selfness. It doesn’t generate creativity; it creates consumers. —Eduardo Galeano (1992).

Hundreds of specialized media address informational needs neglected or poorly served by the mass media. They serve as a partial antidote to the concentrated ownership of the general mass media (Graber, 1997). Traditionally, the mainstream media has tended to speak to and for a homogenous middle demographic. United by their beliefs in the current political, social, and cultural ideas of their day, the audience of mainstream media receive a rather narrow spectrum of thought that reinforces these beliefs (Kessler, 1984). Alternative media offer diverse ways of communication that contrast with the voice of mainstream media. By providing more active and inclusive access to the opinions and emotions of marginalized communities, alternative media serve as a positive force for change. The alternative media—the publications and productions of political, social, cultural, and religious minorities and dissidents—has existed alongside the mainstream media throughout media history. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Hong and C.-N. Hou, Alternative Media and Taiwan’s Socio-Political Transformation, 1970s–1990s, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2477-6_1

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What drives the growth of alternative media? Downing (2001) suggested that when mainstream media fails to represent important aspects of social or political reality, alternative media thrives, and dissident, radical, and minority groups find a voice for themselves. The current study has repeatedly emphasized that alternative media plays a critical role in disseminating the views and opinions of “subaltern counterpublics” (Fraser, 1992) and has the potential to offer more than mere interpretation. Alternative media serves as a significant player in these discursive spaces, enabling dissident, radical, and minority groups to find a voice and challenge the dominant narrative. Alternative media can grant audiences access to the lived experiences of others, and in certain instances, offer these experiences as part of a larger network of sociocultural and sociopolitical projects. As noted by Atton (2002), alternative media can provide empowering accounts of resistance by and for counterpublics, that are created and written by the very individuals they represent. Furthermore, alternative publications prioritize the free exchange of ideas over profits, ultimately emphasizing the importance of intellectual and creative freedom. In the field of alternative media research, UNESCO plays an important role in its meetings and publications. Since the 1970s, UNESCO has commissioned several studies and published 2 monographs about alternative media. While a significant portion of its research focus has been on mass media, the communication program has consistently recognized the existence of various sectors, communities, and minorities that lack access to information and avenues for self-expression through mainstream channels. As a result, it has emphasized the importance of smaller or localized media that can cater to these specific needs and effectively bridge this gap. Postgate et al. (1979) study, which was funded by UNESCO and the Intermediate Technology Development Group in London, has been cited before. Despite its lengthy and confusing title, and unclear terminology, the notion of applying appropriate technology to communications put forth by this issue was significant, and its case studies contributed to the documentation of alternative forms of communication. By drawing examples from both advanced industrialized and developing nations, this study was the first to suggest a shared foundation for alternative communication, which has now become a widely accepted principle in alternative media philosophy. Alternative media have existed on the margins of Western society and other parts of the world since the 1970s. In developing countries, the presence of alternative media has been implicitly acknowledged as a response to the inadequacies of Western mass media systems (Lewis, 1993). However, in the Western world, the emergence of alternative media must be viewed in the context of the increasing commercialization of communication, which replaced the state’s ideological functions (Raboy, 1991). Overall, there exists a multitude of conscious political and social demands made by groups who view alternative communication as an essential tool in their struggle to challenge

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dominant structures and systems and to construct a new social and cultural reality that reflects their needs and aspirations. Alternative media activists and scholars have investigated the intricate nuances of these communication tools and have discovered that they can play a significant role in realizing the democratic project. One example of this is the ability of alternative media to provide a voice to those who are voiceless. By gaining access to media outlets, communities that were previously silenced can break the culture of silence and reclaim their voice (Aufderheide, 1993; Madden, 1992; Rodriguez, 1994a, 1996). Alternative media have the potential to foster empowerment. Social structures of inequality and injustice often leave entire communities feeling disempowered and helpless. However, involvement in alternative media projects has been shown to strengthen people’s sense of self and their confidence in their potential to take action (Lewis, 1987; Protz, 1991; Rodriguez, 1994b). This suggests that alternative media can also connect isolated communities and help to develop networks of individuals and groups who can work together toward collective projects (Jones & Corbella, 1984). Alternative media have the potential to promote conscientization by enabling ordinary citizens to express their own realities using their own language and terms (Colle, 1992; Huesca, 1996; O’Connor, 1990). Unlike the mainstream media, alternative media are not constrained by economic or political pressures, which allows them to maintain an independent stance in collecting, processing, and disseminating information (Downing, 1984; White, 1987). Currently, there exist numerous fertile breeding grounds for alternative media. These include long-standing and ongoing struggles, such as the fight for human, language, and labor rights, resistance by rural communities against urban centers of power, and movements representing the interests of the underprivileged against those of the wealthy and influential. In addition to these, newer social movements—such as those championing feminist and women’s rights, ethnic minorities, environmentalism, LGBTQ+ rights, and peace campaign activism—have also demonstrated their potential for alternative media production (Atton, 2002). The challenges faced by marginalized groups have increased the demand for the use of alternative media, making it more versatile than ever before. Furthermore, the availability of simple and inexpensive technologies has enabled interest and minority groups to publish their own magazines, newsletters, create audio and video content, and build computer-mediated websites on controversial political and social issues. As Silverstone (1999) notes, alternative media “have created new spaces for alternative voices that provide the focus both for specific community interests as well as for the contrary and the subversive” (p. 103). In the field of media studies and in the current era of new media, the transformation of alternative media has become one of the most important issues to explore. Emerging forms of communication invariably give rise to competing visions of utopian promise and apocalyptic change. These debates surrounding the nature of new media challenge fundamental institutions and practices within a

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culture, thus instigating a process of widespread transformation. However, the evolution of media is ultimately shaped less by the logic of technological determinism and more by complex social and cultural negotiations (Jenkins, 1992). In this way, media change can be seen as an ongoing and dynamic process, rather than a sudden or revolutionary upheaval. Media change also causes alternative media to change old forms to new forms. New social movements have utilized computer-mediated communication to develop novel forms of media. Decisions regarding which types of media to use are often influenced not only by considerations of reach and effectiveness, but also by economic and ideological factors (Atton, 2002). Knowledge of alternative media from various countries will help people explain how alternative media affect politics and societies in general. However, previous research on alternative media focuses almost only on the Western and Third World countries; there is no considerable amount of research on East Asian countries. This book is the first comprehensive research object for examining the role of alternative media in Taiwan’s political democratization and transition since the l970s. This study of Taiwan serves as a significant contribution to understanding the pivotal moment when alternative media successfully achieved their goal. The study’s significance lies in its potential to provide insightful findings regarding the critical role of alternative media in fostering democratic development. Additionally, there is a dearth of comprehensive analyses of alternative media in East Asia, underscoring the importance of this research. It is hoped that this study’s results will facilitate a broader evaluation of the methods used and their applicability to other contexts while connecting the findings to fundamental theories that future researchers can build upon. Since the end of China’s civil war in 1949, Taiwan has charted its own unique path of political development, diverging from that of mainland China. In recent years, Taiwan has experienced remarkable economic growth and has made significant strides in political democratization. The country has also been marked by a series of tumultuous events, including military crises, periods of political conflict and repression, economic booms, political stability and democratization, successful political transitions, and the growth of social movements. Before 1987, Taiwan was effectively a one-party state ruled by the Nationalist Party, also known as the Kuomintang (KMT), which held a monopoly on political power in both the government and military. Under martial law, the KMT was the only legal political party in Taiwan, although independent candidates were allowed to run for office in elections at various levels. The media policy was highly restrictive, with the government controlling publishing licenses for newspapers and media outlets. It was almost impossible to obtain a license for radio or television broadcasting. For 38 years, from 1949 to 1987, Taiwan was under martial law, effectively suppressing the media.

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Following the lifting of martial law in 1987, Taiwan entered a new era of mass media development. Lee (2000) noted that democratic change brought about a gradual dismantling of the conflict-ridden ruling regime, the integration of the opposition, and a realignment of media within the power structure. As a result, previously restrictive press laws were lifted or relaxed, and censorship agencies lost their power. In this period (1987–2000), the tolerance of the government for alternative media demonstrated that the government and mainstream media still had control over media content. In fact, some of the causes taken up by alternative media news sources became part of the mainstream of politics (Chun, 2000). Moreover, Taiwan’s political landscape experienced a significant transformation after the 2000 presidential election, when the long-time opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), gained power and became the ruling party. This marked a departure from the hegemonic rule of the Kuomintang (KMT), which had survived the democratic transition relatively unscathed until then. The March 2000 presidential election was the first time that the DPP won the presidency. During the decades, from the one-party totalitarian politics, the lifting of martial law, the open for media management, and finally to the former opposition party owning the presidency, Taiwan has been through various periods of political democratization and transition. Overall, Taiwanese politics underwent several dramatic changes since the 1970s and succeeded in establishing a stable democratic system. This research will mainly examine the role of alternative media in Taiwan’s particular political democratization and transition. The study aims to investigate the factors contributing to the success or failure of project A or B, and subsequently examine the implications for the nature and potential of alternative media. The concept of “impact” is a crucial aspect of this research, and its significance in the study’s working title will be explored in subsequent chapters. These research questions may suggest that the phenomenon of alternative media is not a universal or inevitable complement to mainstream media, but rather a form that emerged out of the historical circumstances of a particular period. Another issue of concern is how alternative media such as the Internet virtual community, cable television, newsmagazine, and alternative radio contribute to democracy differently from mainstream media. Mass media coverage of social protest groups has been criticized for marginalizing groups that challenge the prevailing power structure (Gitlin, 1981; Shoemaker, 1984). In contrast, alternative media tend to provide a more comprehensive and balanced coverage of public reactions to opposition protesters. Unlike the mainstream media, alternative media do not necessarily highlight lawbreaking as newsworthy. Instead of merely criticizing the law violations, alternative media question the actions of law enforcement (Donohue et al., 1987). “How did the alternative media impact attitudes toward a democratic society in Taiwan?” We will try to answer these questions.

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This book explores the evolution of alternative media in Taiwan through the lenses of history, politics, and sociology. It seeks to analyze the impact of alternative media on Taiwan’s political democratization and transition since the 1970s. The degree to which alternative media can contribute to political democratization and transition is contingent on various factors, including the prevailing power structure, media landscape, organizational constraints, media ideology, and individual preferences (Chan, 2002). This study aims to provide a thorough assessment of how these factors intersect and shape the role of alternative media in Taiwan. This book will examine the main sociopolitical developments in Taiwan since 1970s focusing on the alternative media at the time of the formation of civil society in Taiwan. In the study of alternative media in Taiwan, the research task is divided into 5 parts: 1. The development of the idea of alternative media is explored in this work, from its inception to the present day, where it has had to adapt to new economic and political realities and significant shifts in the technological landscape. 2. It explores the nature and content of various alternative media in Taiwan in a diverse set of historical, political, and sociological contexts. 3. It examines how dissident and social movement groups have used alternative media to organize and bring about reform. 4. It aims to explore the dynamic relationship between communication and power, the interplay between media and society, and the multifaceted role of alternative media in promoting political and social dissent in the context of Taiwan’s history. 5. It contrasts the differences in the alternative media in Taiwan and the Western world from the perspectives of nature and content and explores the meaningful findings from theoretical analysis.

Methodology Used for This Research Throughout this study, we will explore the organization, practice, and limitations of various forms of alternative media in the contexts in which they operate. To achieve this goal, we adopt an historical perspective, as suggested by Gibbs and Hamilton (2001), to better understand the interplay between alternative media, communication, and political and social dissent in Taiwanese history. Gibbs and Hamilton (2001) argued that a historical perspective is crucial in the study of alternative media because it allows us to understand the formative influence of historical conditions. This perspective helps us conceptualize individual actions and organizations as active responses to, or elaborations of, much larger social processes.

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To assess the influence of alternative media on Taiwan’s political transitions, this study aims to provide a comprehensive view of the long-term developments within Taiwanese alternative media by utilizing a variety of methods instead of solely focusing on a limited number of short-term independent variables. The methodology employed in this study combines historical analysis, in-depth interviewing, and theoretical critique. John Pauly (1991, p. 1) noted that the qualitative method is trustworthy for serving the goal of presenting an overall picture of long-term phenomena because “research questions are developed in relation to perceived wholes, not to dependent and subject variables”. Given the study’s objectives, a qualitative methodology is deemed more appropriate than a quantitative one. The present study relies primarily on a qualitative research approach, guided by Pauly’s fundamental principles of the qualitative approach, which can be summarized as follows: Research questions are developed in relation to perceived wholes, not independent and subject variables; evidence is open-ended, rather than preselected by particular techniques; analytic procedures are interpretive, not statistical; findings are consciously narrativized, not neutrally “reported”; and knowledge is always assumed to be partial and eliminative, rather than complete and cumulative (1991, p. 1).

The present study employed historical analysis and theoretical criticism as the primary methods of examination, supplemented by personal in-depth interviews. While the qualitative research approach was utilized, the study also incorporated quantitative research findings as supporting materials. The study is unique in its approach as it combines the extensive reading of the material with historical background research while also examining the sociopolitical effects of the alternative media on the government, the opposition, and on the society. Most of the research carried out until now has been focused on either bibliographic inquiry or was limited to narrowly focused analysis of the alternative media’s content. The present study goes far beyond that, and simultaneously examines the content and political implications of the alternative media’s activity. Last, this is a historical longitudinal study that analyzes the role of the alternative media in Taiwan in the 1970s, the 1980s, and throughout the 1990s, thus providing critical overviews of the entire modern history as well as its political impact. In summary, this study utilizes four research methods: bibliographic research, analysis of alternative media content, interviews with alternative media activists, and secondary data analysis. This research adopted a macroscopic approach for the level of analysis, which elucidated the extensive interactions among alternative media, political groups, and individuals that contributed to a series of political transitions in Taiwan. Along with diverse data collected for historical analysis and theoretical criticism, in-depth interviews with representatives from relevant fields were conducted to obtain additional information for the study.

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Primary data research is comprising bibliographic research, media content study, and a series of interviews with individuals active in the alternative media since the 1970s. Of the 2 most extensive collections of Taiwanese opposition publications, the one compiled by the National Library (Taipei City, Taiwan) is in the hands of the Taiwanese government; the other is in the Taiwanese Social Movement Historical Data Center (I-Lan, Taiwan), a privately owned library. They were used as the primary data sources. Bibliographic work at these centers consisted mainly of gathering statistical data on some publications and finding access to them to analyze their content. Both the most well-known and frequently cited alternative publications were examined. The alternative print media’s detailed descriptions offer sufficient data to draw on for the purpose of this study. All the major publications from the period 1970–1986 were the essential subject of the media content research. They all belong to the category of opposition political opinion magazines, and these features included (alpha《夏潮》(a student’s opinion monthly), The Eighties 《八零 betically): China Tide 《美丽岛》(a political opinion 年代》(a political opinion monthly), the Formosa 《前锋》(a political opinion biweekly), Free China 《自由中国 monthly), Forward 《大学》(a student’s opinion monthly), 》(an opinion monthly), the Intellectual 《新潮流》(a political opinion monthly), Outlook 《远望》(a political the Movement 《台湾政论》(a political opinion opinion biweekly), and Taiwan Political Review monthly). Due to the incompleteness of a few of the collections of the above publications, no statistical sampling could be justified, and in some cases, all available issues of a publication became the subject of the analysis. Similarly, the fragmentary nature of the journals’ and magazines’ compilations prevented any systematic content analysis from standing the tests of content or construct validity. Therefore, the study consistently refrained from any pretense of a rigorous content analysis, meeting standard requirements of reliability and validity. Nevertheless, the insights from the cursory content research were sufficient to identify the profiles of publications, their agendas, the debates that they carried, and their political biases. The content study of the alternative media from the 1970s to the late 1980s concentrated on examining the most influential opposition political opinion magazines. Influence was operationalized as a combination of selfidentification, circulation, political visibility, and the extent of participation in the main political debates carried out in the forum of the alternative media. To address the enormous diversity of opposition political opinion magazines, the alternative media content research also encompassed a less systematic examination of numerous other minor alternative campus journals (e.g., the Intellectual and China Tide), especially those that offered insights into alternative media operations. Between 2002 and early 2003, the author conducted interviews with selected individuals from various professions related to the research subject in different parts of Taiwan. Each interview lasted for a minimum of 2 hours. In all instances of interviews being conducted by a designated interviewer, some

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of the texts were not recorded because the interviewees specifically requested that we refrain from taping. The reliability of some of the answers (e.g., statistical data) collected by the designated interviewers had to be checked, and other sources (other interviews or opposition political magazines) were consulted for confirmation of crucial information whenever such opportunities existed. No references are made to the unchecked significant information derived from interviews not conducted by the author. The selection of those individuals to be surveyed was a result of a compromise among 3 main considerations. First, it was to survey as diverse a group of activists as possible. Second, it was to obtain as much information as possible within a limited time, with a limited mobility and finite budgetary resources. Third, academic scholars were interviewed about certain issues in alternative media. Extensive and diverse interviews were implemented. “Diversity” was operationalized as including individuals reflecting various levels of underground involvement in the alternative media and including individuals who were involved in the underground at different periods. Thus, activists from all periods were surveyed, ensuring timeline diversity, especially because the experience of being involved in the alternative media before the lifting of martial law was dramatically different from the post-martial law period. Avoiding any form of skewing of the interviews toward distributors, activists, or editors became a primary concern. Thus, the interviews had to include activists from opposition political magazines, underground radio and broadcasting, and online virtual communities. If possible, it was necessary to survey both the “legal” and “illegal” alternative media—that is, those performing leading functions and those responsible for simple, easily definable tasks, usually performed with a limited time and at a lower risk. Interviews were carried out in a controlled and uniform fashion. Nevertheless, any interpretation of the significance of the interviews should consider the years and the unique circumstances in which they were conducted. Given the whole aspect of the subject matter, the procedure needed to be adjusted to individual respondents, mainly to their openness and time availability, as well as to whether an interview was done in private or was carried out over the phone. All interviews were conducted by the author and were taped and transcribed for analysis; the programs were also recorded if possible. Nevertheless, in all cases the following list of questions was attempted. 1. What was your function within the organization for which you have worked? 2. Could you describe your organization in as much detail as possible: a. history of the media organization (and future plans if it still exists). b. the media working philosophy. c. the extent of its operation. d. the everyday logistical arrangements within the media organization. e. repressive governmental measures suffered by the media organization.

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f. the media’s distribution system. g. audience description and feedback. h. any statistical data on employees, circulation, and distribution. i. means of support. 3. Please provide an assessment of the alternative media’s propaganda activities across Taiwan, with special attention to the contribution made by the media’s organization. 4. Address the constraints and limitations of the media’s possibilities, and versus possibilities and unexplored opportunities. 5. How do you evaluate the sociopolitical function of the alternative media vis-à-vis the state and the government? 6. Please analyze the alternative media’s contribution to the creation of democracy and public sphere in Taiwan, focusing on its extent, forms, and means. As has been stated, all interviews were conducted in as controlled and consistent a fashion as possible. In some cases, however, supplementary questions had to be asked to elicit more information, especially when questions 3 through 6 were addressed. Frequently, an interviewee would volunteer additional information, particularly when it related to the history of the alternative media, or its competitors. Secondary research has been carried out mostly to obtain information on the historical and political developments in Taiwan since the 1970s. Both Chinese and English language sources were used. Information derived from secondary sources is presented mainly in the Historical Review and Literature Review chapters. The vast majority of secondary sources and studies on alternative media in Taiwan fall under 2 methodological categories: bibliographic/statistical data concerning numbers of publications, lengths of their existence, runs, etc.; and descriptive narrowly focused analysis of media content concentrating on the presence, or absence, of selected themes. This study, while drawing from both methodologies, expands on them, allowing broader, potentially more significant conclusions to be advanced. Based on considerable bibliographic work, the content study provides a thorough description of the publications, the political debates in the alternative media, and the independent initiatives, both within the alternative media industry and outside of it. The interviews, on the other hand, offer insights into the philosophical policies, goals, and achievements of the alternative media. Above all, the interviews provide a self-assessment of the alternative media’s political contribution and an evaluation of its general success in reaching designated audiences and bringing about sociopolitical change. The findings from the primary research were then analyzed in view of the secondary data research on the recent history of Taiwan, identifying the degree to

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which the aforementioned activities of the Taiwanese alternative media influenced the nature of specific developments or the course of larger sociopolitical phenomena.

Organization of the Book This book consists of 9 chapters. Chapter 2 provides a literary review and theoretical framework. It defines such concepts as independent civil society and alternative media, focusing on dissident Taiwanese political thought and opposition groups and research on alternative media and independent society. This section also examines relevant academic literature and theories on the sociopolitical environment in which both civil society and the alternative media came into being with special attention given to totalitarianism and censorship as the main determinants of the environment before the lifting of martial law, and the democratic political system after martial law. Finally, the chapter provides a review of the focus and the extent of the research on the alternative media in Taiwan. Chapter 3 offers Taiwan’s political history. By providing a chronological description of major political developments and upheavals, it serves as a reference explaining how the evolution of the alternative media and the corresponding growth of the independent society were derived from and driven by the sociopolitical changes in Taiwan since the 1970s. Chapter 4 offers the media environment in Taiwan. The information contains a description of political development and media system change in Taiwan, and it also offers media development and the legal framework in Taiwan since 1945. The findings are divided into 3 sections. Chapters 5–7 contain this study’s findings in different political periods based solely on the primary data gathered from interviews and the perusal of alternative media as well as opposition political magazines, alternative radio stations, and even the Internet virtual community. Chapter 5 examines the emergence of the first alternative media, zeroing in on specific dissent publications and their contribution to the formation of independent cultural, social, and political activities in the 1970s and 1980s. It also concentrates on the alternative media under martial law, indicating their role in the further solidification of civil society in Taiwan and corresponding changes in Taiwan’s media. Chapter 6 analyzes the alternative media’s activities after martial law in the late 1980s and 1990s concentrating on political and cultural debates for which these media became a forum, and the degree to which development of the alternative media contributed to the expansion of civil society. Chapter 7 examines the noteworthy characteristics of alternative media in Taiwan since the 1990s, even after the opposition party gained power in 2000. The chapter will also predict the future direction of alternative media development and virtual communities used by social movement groups. However,

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there has been limited research on social movement webs (SMWs) outside of Europe and the United States (Calhoun, 1998; Pickerill, 2001; Rheingold, 1995), with much of the discussion being speculative. To contribute to this debate, this chapter will explore micro-level issues by reporting on the findings of web pages launched by social movement groups in Taiwan and unstructured interviews with representatives of these groups. To systematically analyze the potential of the internet to diversify information, we examine SMWs and identify their latest public actions. Chapter 8 discusses the main characteristics of Taiwan’s alternative media and the implications, including examining alternative media from the “state vs. civil society” perspective, the consequence of the operation of alternative media in Taiwan, and comparison between Western and Taiwanese alternative media. Chapter 9 concludes with an analysis of the findings and their implications, followed by an argument for the need to reconsider how we conceptualize alternative media in light of our research on its possible roles in Taiwan. Several abbreviations have been used throughout the book, more for the sake of clarification than for actual brevity. Throughout the book many Chinese names of publications and organizations are used, when an original name is introduced, an English translation is provided. All footnotes and bibliographic material have been given with as much precision and detail as possible.

References Atton, C. (2002). Alternative media. Sage. Aufderheide, P. (1993). Film and video in the cultural struggle of Latin America. Media Development, 40(1). Calhoun, C. (1998). Community without propinquity revisited: Communication technology and the transformation of the urban public sphere. Sociological Inquiry, 68(3), 373–397. Chan, J. M. (2002). Media, democracy and globalization: A comparative perspective. Media Development, 1. Chun, A. (2000). Democracy as hegemony, globalization as indigenization, or the “culture” in Taiwanese national politics. In W. C. Lee (Ed.), Taiwan in perspective. Brill. Colle, R. (1992). A radio for the Mapuches of Chile: From popular education to political awareness. In S. Higgins (Ed.), Ethnic minority media. An international perspective. Sage. Donohue, G., Olien C., & Tichenor, P. (1987, August). A guard dog conception of the mass media. Paper presented to the AEJMC, San Antonio, TX . Downing, J. (1984). Radical media. South End Press. Downing, J. (2001). Radical media: Rebellious communication and social movements. Sage.

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Fraser, N. (1992). Rethinking the public sphere—A contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy. In C. Calhoun (Ed.), Habermas and the public sphere. MIT Press. Galenao, E. (1992). We say no: Chronicles 1963–1991. Norton. Gibbs, P. L., & Hamilton, J. (2001). Alternative media in media history. Media History, 7 (2). Gitlin, T. (1981). The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making and unmaking of the new left. University of California Press. Graber, D. (1997). Mass media and American politics. CQ Press. Huesca, R. (1996). Participation for development in radio: An ethnography of the reporteros populares of Bolivia. Gazette, 57 (1). Jenkins, H. (1992). Strangers no more, we sing: Filking and the social construction of the science fiction fan community. In L. Lewis (Ed.), The adoring audience: Fan culture and popular media. Routledge. Jones, D., & Corbella, J. (1984). leres Jornades sobre Meso-Comunicaci6 a Catalunya. Generalitat de Catalunya Diputaci6 de Barcelona. Kessler, L. (1984). Alternative journalism in American history. Sage. Lee, C. C. (2000). State, capital, and media: The case of Taiwan. In J. Curran & M. J. Park (Eds.), De-westernizing media studies. Routledge. Lewis, P. (1987). Media for people in cities. A study of community media in the urban context. UESCO. Lewis, P. (1993). Alternative media in a contemporary social and theoretical context. In P. Lewis (Ed.), Alternative media: Linking global and local. UNESCO. Madden, K. (1992). Video and cultural identity. The Inuit Broadcasting Corporation experience. In F. Korzenny, S. Ting-Toomey, & E. Schiff (Eds.), Mass media effects across cultures. Sage. O’Connor, A. (1990). The miners’ radio stations in Bolivia: A culture of resistance. Journal of Communication, 40. Pauly, J. (1991, July). A beginner’s guide to doing qualitative research in mass communication. Journalism Monographs, 125. Pickerill, J. (2001). Weaving a green web: Environmental protest and computermediated communication in Britain. In F. Webster (Ed.), Culture and politics in the information age. Routledge. Postgate, R., Lewis, P., & Southwood, W. (1979). Low-cost communication system for educational and development purposes in Third World countries. Intermediate Technology Development Group and UNESCO, Division of Methods, Materials, Structures and Techniques. Protz, M. (1991). Distinguishing between “alternative” and “participatory” models for video production. In N. Thede, & A. Ambrosi (Eds.), Video the changing world. Black Rose Books. Raboy, M. (1991). Communication and the new world order: Strategies for democratization. In N. Thede, & A. Ambrosi (Eds.), Video the changing world. Black Rose Books. Rheingold, H. (1995). Public life in electropolis: Dialog on virtual communities. Retrieved March 2, 2002, from http://www.feedmag.com/95.08dialog/95.08dial ogl.html Rodriguez, C. (1994a). The rise and fall of the popular correspondents’ movement in revolutionary Nicaragua, 1982–1990. Media, Culture & Society, 16(3).

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Rodriguez, C. (1994b). A process of identity-deconstruction: Latin American women producing video stories. In P. Riano (Ed.), Women and grassroots communication: Furthering social change. Sage. Rodriguez, C. (1996). Shedding useless notions of alternative media. Peace Review, 8(1). Shoemaker, P (1984). Media treatment of deviant political groups. Journalism Quarterly, 61(1). Silverstone, R. (1999). Why study the media? Sage. White, R. (1987). Progress toward a new world information and communication order. A third world perspective. Center for the Study of Communication and Culture.

CHAPTER 2

Alternative Media and the Theoretical Frameworks

This chapter focuses on the literature review and theoretical framework of this book, such as civil society, the public sphere, and alternative media, while also addressing features of alternative media and their history. Additionally, the definition and practice of alternative media in Taiwan is analyzed.

Definition and History of Alternative Media UNESCO’s World Communication Report The media encompasses a broad spectrum of communication methods that people utilize to interact with each other, which includes both modern means like press, radio, video, television, and satellite, as well as traditional forms like graphic arts, music, and drama. Regarding new communication research, we might have done well to cite the definitions in UNESCO’s World Communication Report. In part, these read (Lewis, 1993, pp. 12–13; UNESCO, 1989, pp. 195–196). New forms of communication approaches and their corresponding audiences can be broadly categorized into four categories: community media, alternative communication, access to mainstream media, and participation in media management and production. However, in practice, these categories often overlap with each other. In its sociological and geographic sense, “community” refers to the fundamental unit of horizontal social organization. Community media, on the other hand, are media that aim to promote participation from a diverse range of socioeconomic backgrounds, organizations, as well as minority or subcultural © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Hong and C.-N. Hou, Alternative Media and Taiwan’s Socio-Political Transformation, 1970s–1990s, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2477-6_2

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groups within a community. Depending on the context, community media may refer to a geographic or geo-cultural group. Alternative communication refers to communication structures and practices that are created as an alternative to mainstream communication because the latter does not adequately meet the communication needs of certain groups. Access to the mass media refers to how users are able to contribute relatively unfiltered and unrestricted input to mainstream media outlets. The category of participation in media management and production pertains to the practices that enable media users to have a say in the operations of the media. This aspect of participation is a common feature in community media, alternative communication, and, in essence, access to mainstream media. The term “alternative media” brings the question: alternative to what? In general, it refers to media that differs from the mainstream media, which is typically the most widely available media in the area, or the media organized in a conventional way. Therefore, an implicit goal of alternative media is to replace or challenge the dominance of the mainstream media. Lewis (1984) highlighted the role of urban community media in expanding the services of mass media, challenging mass media systems and their implications, offering alternatives to mass media systems, and performing functions that mass media systems cannot fulfill. In UNESCO’s Third Medium-Term Plan (1990–1995), alternative forms of communication were given importance, as they were seen to complement mainstream media. The idea behind this was to address the following concerns: 1. Motive purpose. For instance, the repudiation of profit-driven intentions and affirmation of goals related to human development, cultural preservation, and education, can be observed in various instances (e.g., CIESPAI, 1978). 2. Sources of funding. In various locations, government or local grants may be declined, while in other instances, income from advertising may be refused. 3. Regulatory dispensation. As an illustration, non-mainstream media outlets may be overseen by organizations that differ from the usual authorities, or they may operate independently or on a local scale. 4. Organizational structure. For instance, the media may deliberately adopt an alternative approach in their operations. 5. Professional practices. Being alternative can involve criticizing conventional professional practices, promoting the involvement of volunteers, as well as encouraging the production, participation, and control of media content by ordinary individuals. This can also entail attempting to apply different standards in selecting news stories.

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6. Message content. It may serve as an alternative to what is typically offered or permitted, and an established platform (such as a satellite channel) may be utilized for this objective. 7. Relationship with audience/consumers. The nature of the association can vary, and may pertain to the extent of control exercised by users/ consumers, or to a strategy of enabling audiences/consumers to voice the media’s needs and objectives (Berrigan, 1977). 8. Composition of the audience. The makeup of the media outlet can be non-traditional, with a focus on specific groups such as youth, LGBTQ+ individuals, women, rural communities, and so on. 9. Range of diffusion. The dissemination of the media content can be alternative as well, such as being distributed on a local or national level instead of just regional. 10. Nature of research methodology. The utilization of alternative research methods may generate an image of media production or consumption that meets the criteria for being considered as non-mainstream. The list mentioned above is not complete, but it aims to elaborate the meaning of “alternative”. The boundaries of the concept are indistinct by nature. It involves a temporal dimension that cannot be ignored. What was once considered an underground alternative in the past could become a popular best-seller legally today, and tomorrow it might be acquired by an international conglomerate. Additionally, it’s not simple to use the audience size or the number of medium consumers as a standard for defining the audience, which means that alternative does not always equate to the minority. Small-scale or local is not necessarily a crucial element of “alternative” either. Discussion of so-called “community media” has often been accompanied by confusion. The term “community” does not necessarily refer to a specific location, as it can also include a “community of interest” that extends beyond local areas to include regions, nations, or even continents (Lewis & Booth, 1989). The list highlights the need to reconsider the concept of alternative media because a free-market ideology utilizing contemporary technology (such as cable, video, and satellite) has the potential, at least in theory, to cater to diverse communities, minorities, opposition groups, and social movement groups. Diverse as Alternative Media There is considerable haziness on this subject even among those who are its producers and users. Political opposition groups, civil liberties, human rights movement groups, sexual, environmentalism, gay and lesbian movement groups, and NGOs—in other words those who identify themselves as being engaged in a struggle for a more just and egalitarian world—often have a very vague idea of the word “alternative”, particularly in relation to media.

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What is clear, however, is that the concept can no longer be defined simplistically in oppositional terms that relate, as Senecal (1991) pointed out, to the “dialectic of opposition: large/small media, heavy/light technology, national/ local production, professional/amateur, etc.” (pp. 214–215). Indeed, there are times when alternative communication can be said to occur from within the mainstream. Whether we read such interventions as being resistance, contestation, and an attempt to change from within or simply as a gesture on the part of the mainstream to legitimize itself by seeming more “progressive” is another question. Defining alternative media is a challenging task due to its vast diversity and complexity. Ambrosi (1991) argued that alternative communication is primarily a response to the dominant order and aims to counteract the tendency to diminish the role of the state and to transnationalize economy and culture. Alternative communication is associated with the resurgence of national and cultural identity movements, giving voice to rural populations in the South, and the emergence of new agents of civil society in politics. While alternative communication is not inherently the bearer of social change, it is a central component in many struggles for democratic functioning in societies, both in the North and the South (Ambrosi, 1991). Some problems attach to these areas as well. Alternative groups, who are the main users of alternative media, locate themselves very firmly within broad movements for social change. In some parts of the world, movements for national and cultural identity can be seen as part of the process of social change. Defining alternative media requires addressing the issue of technology. It is no longer accurate to state that alternative forms of communication are based solely on using cheaper technology, as may have been the case previously. With advancements in technology, it is now more feasible and cost-effective to utilize new equipment. However, this does not necessarily equate to the democratization of media creation, which is a crucial goal for alternative media organizations, as noted by Ambrosi (1991). In the modern media age, radio, television, video, audiocassettes, print media, and the Internet are all used by alternative groups as well as by mainstream media. The difference lies not so much in the actual medium as in the issues that alternative media address and the project they see themselves as being engaged in. While mainstream media would, overall, consider certain issues only peripherally, alternative media would take the same issue seriously as being of central concern (Atton, 2002). Through their efforts, alternative media outlets strive to challenge and subvert the dominant position of the mainstream media, which is often viewed as being top-down, one-way, and lacking in opportunities for active audience engagement. Alternative media are part of a much more horizontal process: not only democratization and demystification of the processes of making media, but also being at the very heart of struggles for democracy

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and social change (Atton, 1999). The alternative media’s priorities are unmistakably aligned with those of the general public, in stark contrast to the mainstream media, which can be viewed as primarily serving the interests of the government, even if they occasionally attempt to appeal to the public. Certain other differences between alternatives and the mainstream can help us to move closer to an understanding of the former. The established or mainstream media have a relative permanency about them, as much in terms of politics and content, as in financing which is tied closely to the market. Alternative media forms do not have such stability: it is part of their political or social movement agenda not to subscribe to sources of funding that will compromise their basic principles. However, there are groups that, remaining politically committed to alternative goals, may operate, at least partially, within the confines of the market (Comedia, 1984). Such groups further complicate the question of definitions. Ambivalences aside, there are also certain defining characteristics of alternative media that are important. Such media are largely more accessible to their audience. They often attempt to collapse the distance between media producers and consumers by making communication a two-way process—as much a one of learning from the audience as one of communicating with them (Downing, 1995). This is a political choice, as is the attempt, on the part of such media to democratize and demystify the communication process by making it open to the expression and inclusion of a wide range of views, particularly of the marginalized and repressed sections of society. The process of communication is thus seen as being horizontal and participatory rather than vertical. Generally, groups using alternative media regard the programs they make not as marketable but as tools for political or social change in the struggle for more than just social order. Groups run through the organizational structure of alternative media groups as well, often laying them open to the charge of restrictedness and inefficiency (Downing, 1984). In general, because alternative media forms of communication are trying to convey quite different messages, in quite different ways and often to somewhat different audiences, they also work differently from the mainstream. Organizationally, groups working with or using alternative media are, for the most part, flexible. They attempt to be nonhierarchical, often depending on volunteers because of their limited resources. All these factors make, on the one hand, a kind of flexibility and demystification of certain skills, but on the other hand, for a kind of restrictedness. The flexibility is also because alternative media are not bound by the same kind of regulatory mechanisms that mainstream media must contend with (Herman & Chomsky, 1994). As discussed earlier, the relationship between mainstream and alternative media is often uneasy. Alternative media may depend on the support of mainstream media, while mainstream media may require the information and insights offered by alternative groups. Additionally, the boundaries between mainstream and alternative media are becoming increasingly blurry with the emergence of new communication technologies, leading to changes

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in content, messaging, and audience (Atton, 2002). Therefore, it is crucial to view the media landscape as a constantly evolving entity rather than a static one, with fluid boundaries and relationships between different media forms. In the new media age, with increasing professionalization and specialization within alternative media, the updated accepted lines that defined a simplistic oppositional relationship between alternatives and mainstream are becoming more and increasingly blurred. In the perception of the mainstream, for example, many local, folk, tribal, and community media forms are changed under the banner of alternatives, although they have probably been around much longer than the mainstream to which they are usually considered an alternative. Since advances in technology, the purity and specificity of these alternative forms no longer remain (Downing, 2001). They can be replicated by email lists, captured on film, posted on the website, transported from place to place, or made in a different form or language. There is another issue for alternative media: Does alternative media have to be anti-commercial? The answer is “not necessarily” examining from the perspective of “do or die” (Atton, 1999). For instance, the employment of reprographic technologies and the circulation and distribution of alternative press are affected by the measure of funding available. During the 1960s and 1970s, most alternative press relied heavily on subsidies to survive, making their continuation dependent on ongoing funding (Atton, 1999). According to Comedia (1984), the alternative press could not compete with mainstream media due to its dependence on prefigurative politics to determine its economic and organizational activities. The financing, circulation, or distribution of alternative press cannot compete with mainstream markets as they do not typically attract people through the commercial system. Duncombe (1996) discovered that alternative media tends to self-isolate and take on an economically naive approach. Nonetheless, according to Atton (1999), the alternative press faces recurring financial crises not mainly because of financial strategies but due to the incorporation of economic production into the lives of those involved and the integration of the press into the alternative public sphere. The funding of alternative media remains a common challenge, with many outlets facing financial instability. To address this issue, subscription-based models have become a popular way for alternative media to obtain funding. While this provides some financial security and an opportunity for planning, it is not a complete solution. Alternative media cannot solely rely on subscriptions and subsidies for financial stability. It is also necessary to explore other revenue streams, such as generating profits from commercial products and securing support from advertisers. With a diverse range of funding sources, alternative media outlets can improve their financial sustainability and independence. “In the absence of such funds being forthcoming, a publication can only rely on sales and advertising” (Atton, 1999, p. 59). Comedia (1984) proposed that one potential solution to the financial challenges faced by alternative media is to increase their circulation and appeal to a wider audience, including those in the mainstream. Some alternative media have received

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support from capital markets to become more popular and generate funds, which can strengthen their economic conditions and enable them to produce more alternative media content. However, alternative media outlets cannot rely solely on such subsidies and must find alternative sources of funding. While they may not universally reject such income, it is not feasible to expect it to continue indefinitely. With the development of the World Wide Web, the concept of space and time has been redefined for media participants. The online community has gradually formed with the increasing number of people and their frequency of online activities. The topics discussed in cyberspace are diverse, making it a real community where people can share their common experiences, languages, cultures, and symbols in groups. Furthermore, the cost of media production in cyberspace is typically lower than that of other media technologies. Therefore, many alternative media workers have adopted this approach to develop their content. Alternative media has been influenced by the concept of public service broadcasting, which combines both public and commercial access for their business. As a result, there has been a growing public debate on how the media can reflect a wider range of minority tastes and opinions while remaining responsive to majority demands. The core principle of public service broadcasting is that it should be publicly owned or regulated in a way that serves the public good rather than private gain. Only in this way, it is argued, can broadcasting be prevented from becoming subservient to the commercial forces that make for low quality and cultural uniformity. The ideals of public service broadcasting have been successfully realized in the British system by traditionalists (Curran & Seaton, 1991). The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) competes with ITV (Independent Television Limited) for all viewers in the United Kingdom, but the 2 broadcasting TV systems do compete for the same source of revenue. This has produced a delicate balance of pressures encouraging both creativity and audience responsiveness. The BBC must attract viewers and listeners from the commercial system to justify the license fee. The editorial independence of the BBC is formally recognized by a distinct agreement under a charter, and its operations are primarily funded through the UK license fee. To ensure that the corporation meets its obligations, a group of 12 Governors, comprising individuals with diverse backgrounds in public service, the arts, business, and industry, are appointed by the Crown. According to traditionalists, that is the best broadcasting system in the world consequently (Curran & Seaton, 1991). This is allegedly manifested in a cheap, universally available service that does not discriminate against the poor or against inaccessible areas. High-quality programs for both minorities and the mass audience.

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Historical Review of Alternative Media Practice The contemporary development of “alternative media” should be viewed in the context of the growing commercialization of communication, which was replacing the ideological roles of the state (Lewis, 1993). During earlier centuries, the battle for freedom of the press resulted in the establishment of a sphere where professional journalism was practiced within commercial institutions that were largely free from state intervention. However, in Europe, the introduction of electronic media, starting with radio and later television, followed a different path compared to the telegraph, leading to the implementation of stringent licensing regulations and monopolies in public service broadcasting. These models were replicated with little modification during the colonial era in Third World countries seeking independence. The American free-market model was also exported to nations in the American sphere of influence, such as Latin American countries where commercial broadcasting was seen as part of the American infiltration into the economy. Even Europe felt the impact of American cultural influence. The late 1960s witnessed a swift and extensive response, fueled by a combination of progressive political movements and innovative technology. With the advent of satellite news broadcasting, footage of demonstrations (such as the anti-Vietnam War protests) and the ensuing crackdowns became visible to audiences worldwide. Concurrently, the introduction of portable video recording devices like the portapak had a significant impact on the approaches to community development initiatives in Western democratic nations (Lewis, 1993). During the 1970s, video production was not the sole medium through which communities conveyed their perspectives, despite being the latest and most captivating. Concurrently, community arts, photography, theater, music, and film gained popularity, as did community initiatives relating to healthcare, education, and legal advocacy. The era was characterized by the notion that localism represented a barrier against the influence of large multinational corporations and state bureaucracies (Kessler, 1984). In 1975, community radio underwent national organization in the United States. During the initial phase, a plethora of new and innovative stations emerged, representing the voices of radical cultural and political movements. Nevertheless, as expected, commercial resources and styles ultimately assumed a dominant role, suppressing the original voices and relegating them to the periphery (Lewis, 1984). The experience of community radio in Europe offers an excellent example of an alternative medium’s dual opposition to both public and commercial services. The impetus behind most community radio initiatives in the region, whether in the form of unlicensed broadcasting or pressure group activity to establish legislation recognizing a new broadcasting sector, was the negative experience of mass media endured by various marginalized political and social groups (AMARC, 1991). This was even true in countries such as the United

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Kingdom, which was one of the first to decentralize its radio monopoly. Lewis (1993) suggested that it was precisely the broadcasting professional’s claim to diagnose need, anticipate demand, and influence taste that sparked opposition. In reality, the free market appears insufficient in satisfying the diverse range of communities with different tastes and interests. Meanwhile, public service broadcasting, facing growing competition and reduced public subsidies, as well as privatization and deregulation, may leave some areas of programming vacant, which community radio could take over to its advantage (Atton, 2002). As public service organizations face depleted resources and intensifying battles for television audiences, local radio audiences may be neglected or completely abandoned, and minority groups may no longer have space allocated to them in public service schedules (Postgate et al., 1979). These social groups are often the same ones that commercial broadcasting ignores because they do not appeal to advertisers. In the era of the Internet, people and groups have utilized online communication to establish alternative spaces for themselves in an increasingly centralized and globalized world. Unlike print media and broadcasting systems that provide information directly but only offer indirect communication possibilities, the Internet provides both information and communication channels directly (Atton, 2002). Wood and Smith (2001) introduced the concept of “discursive resistance” in the form of online alternative spaces against the dominant culture. These forms of resistance may not receive widespread support, and they may not even achieve success in a literal sense. However, they succeed in enabling critiques of powerful entities that may otherwise impede or eliminate any form of dialogue. As previously mentioned, it is not a coincidence that Third World societies and Taiwan have faced communication marginalization and criticized Western media for the same reasons. The New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) was formed to address the international issue of unequal news flow and resources. At the local level, alternative media projects aimed to empower marginalized social groups whose voices, needs, and conditions were overlooked by the mainstream media and authorities. Contemporary Context of Alternative Media Alternative media have existed on the fringes of Western society and in other parts of the world since the 1970s, often serving as an implicit acknowledgment of the inadequacy of Western mass media systems in developing countries (Lewis, 1993). The passage of time has reinforced the notion that insufficient or repressive mass media systems tend to spawn alternative media. Additionally, the reactions in Third World nations are similar to those in the North/ West, even though the economic and sociopolitical contexts vary, leading to greater uniformity in the technologies, infrastructures, values, and content of mass media worldwide (Boyd-Barrett, 1977, p. 120).

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According to Lewis (1993, pp. 15–16), there are 3 sorts of “breeding grounds” for contemporary alternative media. First, the contemporary alternative media is formed by new social movements, such as the feminist movement, ethnic minorities, migrants, environmentalists, peace campaigners, gay rights activists, and anti-racist organizations. These movements typically originate outside of parliamentary channels and are frequently disregarded, misrepresented, or marginalized by mass media. Regarding mass media, these groups face a common predicament: whether to spend time and resources attempting to convince mass media to report their cause favorably or to create their own media channels. Second, there are two categories of struggles that make up contemporary alternative media. The first includes new social movements, such as feminists, ethnic minorities, migrants, environmentalists, peace campaigners, gay rights activists, and anti-racist organizations. These movements are typically grassroots in origin and are often ignored, misrepresented, or marginalized by mainstream media. The second category includes ongoing struggles for human rights, language rights, and trade union rights, as well as for rural populations against urban centers of power, and for the poor against the rich and powerful. The issues that fall under the first category have a West/North look because standards of living have risen in wealthier regions of the world, and issues of class have given way to more specific issues. However, some old struggles, such as trade union rights, have re-emerged due to monetarist policies, high unemployment, the decline of traditional industries, and the use of labor-saving new technologies. These struggles must also be included in the first category. Thirdly, newly emerging political demands may utilize alternative media. For example, native peoples in North America or African nations transitioning to multiparty rule may use alternative media. This process has a temporal dynamic, beginning as underground, illegal, or marginalized protest and potentially evolving into recognition within the system, establishment as a separate unity, or the creation of a new nation. These are the sorts of deliberate political and social requests made by groups who see alternative communication as merely another aspect of their imperative to challenge dominant structures and forms and to construct a novel social and cultural actuality for themselves. Alternative media can also be positioned within communication-oriented debates and can be found in other discourses, such as those related to development. In developmental theory, alternative media is part of a concept that views extensive popular participation as essential to eradicating poverty. This contrasts with modernization theories that assume mass media can be used to impose development plans from above and effectively deliver information and secure mass support. In contrast, democratic and grassroots involvement in small-scale media allows people to define their own needs and goals and promote self-development (Nyerere, 1973). Alternative media have also become relevant in the technological aspects of developmental discussions. The idea of appropriate technology includes a

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design principle that aims to meet actual needs instead of creating needs to maximize profits while limiting reliance on supply, maintenance, and training infrastructures that evolved in other advanced industrial situations (Lewis, 1993). When applied to communications, the concept suggests the use of small-scale systems or small, low-cost modules integrated into larger projects. This reasoning aligns with the types of media categorized as alternatives (Postgate et al., 1979). The development of inexpensive electronic communication technology, coupled with the growing globalization of satellite and telecommunications systems, has given rise to the notion of a global village, which represents an ideal of friendly human interaction. McLuhan’s concept of the global village has been used to promote the idea of a global market, and proponents of alternative media have in recent years expanded their argument to a more global level, aligning with those advocating for democratization in communications and calling for a more equitable allocation of resources and opportunities in international communications. This has led to demands for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) and a focus on the issue of transnational cultural homogenization (Roncagliolo, 1991). Looking at this new common ground, the current era is characterized by the concentration, commodification, and shift toward a homogenous global media system in which commercial interests replace public interests, and the citizen is viewed as a consumer (Raboy, 1991). To counteract this trend, it is necessary to develop alternative, usually local media and to critically monitor, intervene, and sometimes use mainstream media (Raboy & Bruck, 1989) within national contexts. This rethinking of the public sphere in civil society aims to promote the development of an international public sphere (Garnham, 1990).

Definition and Practice of Alternative Media in Taiwan The transition of alternative media in Taiwan provides a good sample to study media impact as an interactive process between the political environment and alternative media. The alternative media in Taiwan’s political environment are used as the battlegrounds in the fight to win public opinion support. Since the former ruling party monopolized most mainstream media, the opposition parties and other social movement groups mainly took the form of opposition political opinion magazines before the press ban and of illegal cable television and alternative underground radio stations from the 1980s to 1990s. For instance, the opposition parties, to create and maintain a consensus capable of mobilizing the energies of their members or holding together the detached masses in the 1990s, the opposition parties used underground radio. In the Internet age, the virtual communities have become the other voice of alternative media in Taiwan. We can say that alternative media try to reinforce their

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audience’s values and attitudes. Many people also look to the alternative media to reinforce their own values. The vast array of alternative media, which varies in range, quantity, and diversity, implies that the concept of liberal pluralism is being tested to its limits. Given Taiwan’s political landscape, this book will concentrate on political, resistance, and social movement media to formulate a theory of alternative, dissident, and radical media. The objective is to construct a model that can be used for traditional media like print media and contemporary cultural forms, such as hybrid electronic and computer-mediated communication. The research presented aims to be comprehensive and representative of the alternative media activists discovered in all phases of alternative media transitions in Taiwan.

Related Theories to Alternative Media and Society Civil Society The concept of civil society is derived from the idea of the existence of a space free from state interference wherein individuals might pursue nonstatesanctioned values. “Civil society” must not be misconstrued as a society without the state. In contrast, the very existence of the state with its policies and organization is de facto a precondition for the presence of civil society. Thus, civil society in its modern meaning is set against the state and encompasses various areas of independent activities. It is characterized by the idea of self-organization, which, in turn, puts it distinctly outside the constitutional framework of the state, although not entirely free from it (Linz & Stepan, 1996). The role of civil society is first to define the collective identities of various groups within a population; second, to control the activities and policies of the state in terms of their compliance with the socially constitutive value system; and third, to defend the people, when these values are rejected by the states (Chiou, 1995). In this study, the term civil society refers to the sphere of politics where self-organized groups, movements, and individuals, who are relatively independent of the government, strive to express their values, establish alliances and common interests, and promote their objectives (Kim, 2001). Civil society encompasses a wide range of social movements and civic organizations, including student groups, labor unions, religious organizations, professional associations, and women’s groups, from all social classes. As a normative goal and a type of organization, civil society had immense potential to inspire resistance to authoritarian regimes (Linz & Stepan, 1996). By maintaining their independence from the government, the varied groups of social identity and interests have the potential to not only check the arbitrary actions of those in power but also promote the development of more conscientious citizens who are attuned to the needs of others, more confident in their actions, and more committed to the greater good (Kim, 2001). In

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its optimal form, civil society acts as an intermediary between the individual and the state, capable of resolving conflicts and regulating the behavior of individuals without resorting to public coercion (Schmitter & Karl, 1991). According to Diamond (1994), civil society typically exhibits the following characteristics. Firstly, civil society groups are self-organized and operate in the public realm, with their activities directed toward the common good rather than personal gain. Secondly, civil society is distinct from the state and frequently clashes with it. Thirdly, civil society is separate and independent from political society and is not primarily concerned with acquiring formal power or positions in government. Finally, civil society values and embraces diversity and pluralism. In fact, respect for diversity, partiality, and pluralism is an indispensable characteristic of civil society. In their work, Linz and Stepan (1996, pp. 8–9) drew a contrast between the state, political society, and civil society. According to them, the polity includes 3 arenas: 1. The core organizations that make up the decision-making and enforcement structures of the state; 2. Political society, including political parties and electoral systems that constitute the arena “in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus”; and 3. Civil society, including civil associations and manifold social movements that constitute the arena “where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests”. It is crucial to underscore not only the distinct nature of civil society and political society, but also their interdependence. On one hand, a strong civil society can produce political alternatives and hold the government accountable. At all stages of the democratic process, an active and independent civil society is essential (Kim, 2001). Conversely, political society must fulfill the crucial role of mediating between the state and civil society and facilitating compromise. Political society must be informed, influenced, and regularly invigorated by civil society to build a foundation of core institutions that support democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996). For many years, the Kuomintang (KMT) government in Taiwan was regarded as a “quasi-Leninist” authoritarian regime with centralized leadership and party organs that had deeply infiltrated both the state apparatus and society (Cheng, 1989). Martial law was put into practice by the KMT government from 1947 to 1987. Under this decree, many kinds of political activities were prohibited, and various citizen rights were constrained. However, there is little doubt that the political situation in Taiwan has been changing since the mid-1980s. The major opposition political party—the

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Democratic Progress Party—was established in 1986 and martial law was lifted in 1987. Since then, Taiwan has experienced top-down, regime-controlled, and gradual democratization. The KMT elites chose to initiate democratic reforms while the opposition was relatively weak. The preemptory strategy increased the KMT’s room to manipulate the process and outcome of democratization. Taiwan’s decadelong democratic transition was completed with the country’s first presidential election in 1996, even though this election did not result in power turnover. Finally, the turnover of political ruling power occurred in March 2000, when the opposition party (DPP) won the presidential election. According to Chao and Myers (1998), Taiwan’s democratic development process is unique in 2 ways. First, a ruling party willingly engaged in a top– down, guided democratic process. The KMT tolerated the evolution of an opposition party and the prospect of sharing power or the risk of losing it when it had the power to control society indefinitely. Second, local elections, established in 1950, were institutionalized by the 1960s, and national elections, commencing in the 1970s, were institutionalized by the mid-1990s. Taiwan stands out because, after decades of practicing various degrees of elections, voters did not replace the ruling party with the opposition party. This self-opening of the authoritarian regime was heavily influenced by the presence of strong opposition forces in political and civil society. The opening was not the outcome of prior political compromises or pacts between the regime and the opposition, but it was the unilateral concession by the authoritarian regime pushed by the strong opposition movements. Minkoff (1997) argues that national social movement organizations play a critical role in civil society and the creation of social capital. Minkoff (1997) also suggests that they achieve this by establishing an infrastructure of collective action, fostering the development of mediated collective identities that connect socially excluded members of society, and shaping public discourse and debate. In forming social organizations and practicing the right of association, Taiwanese political and social movements facilitate the accumulation of social capital not only by mediating collective identities but also by facilitating associational democracy. By presenting different interests and values, political and social movements serving as political mediations contribute to public deliberation in resolving differences and cultivating a common vision. Political and social movements in Taiwan not only testify to the visibility of civil society but also cause people to ask what kind of society they aspire to build. Public Sphere in Alternative Media The examination of civil society highlights the significance of groups or associations in promoting associative democracy, which is characterized as a purposeful approach to politics through associations (Cohen & Rogers, 1995).

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Furthermore, the discourse on civil society in relation to the public sphere is linked to deliberative democracy. Jurgen Habermas (1989) coined the term civil society by introducing the concept of the public sphere, which emerged in response to the decline of feudalism and the rise of the nation-state, commerce, and the middle class. The public sphere existed in venues such as “salons” and “coffeehouses”, as well as through mass media such as intellectual journals and newspapers (Habermas, 1989). This concept is crucial for an ideal democratic society because it provides a space for public debate. In other words, the public sphere is a forum in which citizens can engage in discussions about important social and political issues. In an ideal scenario, the public sphere is a platform where citizens engage in discourse on matters of mutual concern and is thus an established domain of communicative interaction. The public sphere is conceptually separate from both the government and the formal economy, serving as a venue for generating and disseminating discourses that can question state power and authority. Habermas (1989) traced the development of the public sphere back to the bourgeois societies of seventeenth and eighteenth century-Europe. According to him, the rise of the public sphere was accompanied by the development of competitive capitalism, which tended to foster liberal democracy. It was a clash between the bureaucratic practices of the absolutist state and the emergent bourgeois class. Habermas defined the public sphere by analyzing the development of bourgeois public spheres in continental Europe from the beginning of the eighteenth century, and he described it as follows: The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent people’s public use of their reason. (Habermas, 1989, p. 27)

As capitalism matured, the public sphere grew to encompass groups beyond the bourgeois class who had been disadvantaged by the free market and state power, seeking regulation of public authority. The Habermasian public sphere was both protected from public authority and accessible to all. Like the market, the cost of entry was lowered by its growth in scale, and social wealth was evenly distributed (Golding, 1994, p. 18). Therefore, all participants had equal power and voices within the public sphere. It operated separately from the private interests of civil society because it followed the rules of rational discourse and was concerned with the public good rather than individual interests. Political views and decisions were based on argument and evidence, rather than the play of power.

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Habermas (1989) contended that the rational politics of the bourgeois public sphere was destroyed by the very same forces that had given rise to it. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the state became so intertwined with society that the sphere became indistinguishable. This led to the structural transformation and ultimate demise of the liberal bourgeois public sphere. Habermas’ discussion of the structural transformation of the public sphere centered on the continuous expansion of the public sphere to include more participants and the development of large-scale social organizations as mediators of individual participation. As the public sphere expanded to include non-bourgeois strata, the conditions for rational discourse were eventually undermined by class struggles, which fragmented the public into competing interest groups. Ultimately, with the advent of mass democracy and the welfare state, the state and society became inextricably intertwined. According to Habermas (1989), the emergence of monopoly capitalism resulted in an unequal distribution of wealth, with ownership concentration in the media and the increasing dominance of advertising and public relations. As a consequence, access to and control over the public sphere became unequal. Advertising and public relations, in particular, epitomized these trends as they facilitated direct control of the flow of public information by private or state interests for manipulation, rather than rational discourse. Consequently, the public sphere transformed into an arena of competition among conflicting interests, with various organizations representing different constituencies emerging to negotiate among themselves and with public officials. This excluded the general population from public discussions and decision-making. In contemporary capitalist societies, the media has increasingly become a tool for promoting a consumer culture and managing public opinion rather than facilitating open public discourse. Consequently, political leaders have adopted sophisticated media techniques to legitimize their programs and manage the masses. As a result, public debates have become increasingly limited. A theoretical foundation for such phenomena could be an alternative public sphere, which posits a network of institutions working in tandem to facilitate independent public discourse on political and social issues, free from the influence of parliamentary powers (Atton, 2002). This network of institutions would necessarily include the media, as they are integral in serving and informing their respective audiences. As such, the alternative public sphere provides a fitting framework for contextualizing the theory of alternative media, given the symbiotic relationship between alternative media and the grassroots movements they support and report on. In fact, the emergence of many alternative media outlets is intrinsically linked to the social and political mobilization of these movements. Comedia (1984) introduced an “alternative ghetto” as a possible research area, but another concept that gained traction is the notion of the alternative public sphere. John Downing (1988) first proposed this idea in his study

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of West German anti-nuclear media, as a culturally embedded social practice (Boyd-Barrett, 1995). Downing (1988) identified an “alternative public realm” of debate within the German anti-nuclear movement, which itself was the source of many alternative media outlets. Instead of Habermas’ historical foundations of coffeehouses, salons, and small-scale bourgeois media, Downing (1988) presented contemporary manifestations of bookstores, bars, coffee shops, restaurants, food stores…, that provide spaces for discussing and debating issues raised by the periodicals of the anti-nuclear movement. Downing (1988, p. 168) discovered an “oppositional political culture” that was “much better nourished in West Germany than in Britain”, this was not just due to the abundance of alternative information circulating, but also because of the crucial element of “the experience of exchange inside a flourishing alternative public realm”. This refers to strong horizontal communication channels, emphasizing activity, movement, and exchange, creating an autonomous space for the free development of experiences, critiques, and alternatives. Atton (2002) pointed out that the ability to express and publish opinions in alternative media differs significantly from that in mass media. Access to the mass media by readers is mainly through letters to the editor, which severely limits readers’ ability to participate. In contrast, alternative media emphasize a democratic, participatory ethos, allowing readers to contribute articles, take part in editorial decision-making, and even become editors themselves. Agger (1990, p. 36) referred to this ethos as “intellectual democracy”, which he considers crucial to reversing the decline in discourse that contributes to the erosion of the dominant public sphere. By providing a platform for activists and readers to express themselves, the alternative media allow members of an alternative public sphere to operate as a public body, as Habermas stated they must, with the freedom to gather, associate, express, and publish their opinions (Habermas, cited in Eley, 1992, p. 289). This is where Nancy Fraser’s (1992) “subaltern counterpublics” come in, creating “parallel discursive arenas” to generate and distribute counter-discourses that define their identities, interests, and needs in opposition to the dominant discourse (p. 123). The concept of a global village has been co-opted to promote the notion of a global market, and the issue of the transnational homogenization of culture has become a point of agreement between supporters of alternative media and those advocating for democratization in communications (Roncagliolo, 1991). According to this new common ground, we are living in an era of concentration, commodification, and the tendency toward a uniform world media system where commercial interests supplant public interests, and citizens are defined solely as consumers (Raboy, 1991). To counteract this, there must be a twofold approach: the development of alternative, often local media, and a critical evaluation and sometimes use of mainstream media (Raboy & Bruck, 1989), either at the national level to redefine the public sphere in civil society, or at the international level to strive for the creation of an international public sphere (Garnham, 1990).

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One of the primary characteristics of electronic communication technologies is their ability to link individuals across space and time. This is possible because of 2 principles related to these characteristics of computer-mediated communication (CMC): interactivity and asynchronicity. These new communities are composed of members who are geographically dispersed, but who share similar interests and preoccupations. CMC can provide a convenient medium for persons whose local communities may not be fulfilling their needs to reach out across geographical boundaries to communicate and share information, ideas, and experiences. Democracy and Political Transition Democracy is a concept that is broad and subject to debate, hence there are various ways to define it. Nonetheless, recent research on democratization demonstrates that there is a significant level of agreement on what constitutes the “procedural minimum” of democracy, this minimalist definition derives from Joseph Schumpeter’s (1947, p. 269) description of democracy as a system, that “enables individuals to acquire the power to make political decisions through a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”. Robert Dahl (1971) developed the concept of polyarchy, which consists of 2 explicit dimensions: opposition (organized competition through regular, fair, and free elections) and participation (the right of almost all adults to vote and run for office). Polyarchy includes not only the right to vote and run for office but also civil liberties such as freedom of expression and publication of dissenting opinions, freedom of association, and alternative sources of information. Therefore, alternative media is regarded as a crucial component in the democratization process. Recent studies on democratization have shown a preference for a procedural or minimalist definition of democracy over a substantive or maximalist one that embraces economic equality and social justice. According to Terry Karl (1990), the latter approach not only struggles to identify actual democratic regimes but also fails to acknowledge significant progress toward democratization in the political realm. This approach also prevents the examination of the hypothetical relationship between competitive political forms and progressive economic outcomes, rendering the definition of democracy meaningless for practical application (see Collier & Levitsky, 1997; Diamond, 1999; Huntington, 1991; Mainwaring, 1992). Identifying non-democratic regimes is also crucial. Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 38) note that an authoritarian regime differs significantly from a totalitarian regime in 4 key dimensions: “pluralism, ideology, leadership, and mobilization”. Authoritarianism can be described as a political system with limited, non-responsible political pluralism, lacking an elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive or intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader

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or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but quite predictable ones (Linz & Stepan, 1996). If a regime has eliminated almost all previous political, economic, and social pluralism, embraces a unified, clear, guiding, and utopian ideology, undertakes extensive and intensive mobilization, and is governed by a leadership with undefined boundaries that poses substantial unpredictability and vulnerability for both elites and non-elites, then it is historically and conceptually valid to characterize it as a regime with strong totalitarian tendencies (Linz & Stepan, 1996). The process of democratic development is often intricate and lengthy. A complete democratic development is seen as a historical process with distinct stages of political liberalization, democratic transition, and democratic consolidation, which overlap empirically but are analytically different. Scholars have made a crucial differentiation between liberalization and democratization. While liberalization aims to loosen restrictions and expand individual and group rights within an authoritarian regime, democratization goes beyond that to include expanded civil and political rights. The causal sequence of democratization can be traced from the decay and disintegration of an old authoritarian regime and the emergence of a new democratic system, through the consolidation of that democratic regime, to its maturity (Shin, 1994). The term political liberalization refers to the process of implementing certain rights that safeguard both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal actions taken by the state (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). Political liberalization primarily involves the acquisition of specific political freedoms by citizens. However, at this stage, the other aspect of democracy—the organization of opposition parties and their contestation with the regime for control of the government—has not yet been fully acknowledged (Kim, 2001). Political liberalization represents a partial opening of an authoritarian system, but it falls short of selecting government leaders through free and fair elections. While political liberalization may not necessarily lead to complete democratization, it is a crucial first step taken by an authoritarian regime toward democracy (Shin, 1994). The process of democratization is generally divided into two stages: democratic transition and consolidation. The democratic transition starts with the emergence of crisis within an authoritarian regime that leads to a certain level of political opening and greater respect for basic civil rights. It concludes with the establishment of an elected government that is chosen through a competitive process, with universal adult franchise and guarantees for the protection of democratic rights and liberties (Mainwaring et al., 1992). On the other hand, democratic consolidation starts with the formation of a democratic government and culminates in the establishment of a consolidated democratic regime. Transitional democracies are different from consolidated democracies because the former operate in an environment where democratic continuity is still uncertain, while in the latter all major political actors consider democratic procedures to be the norm for government renewal (Mainwaring, 1992).

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Recent academic research on democratization has proposed a pathdependent approach that explores the correlation between the method of transition from an authoritarian government and the difficulties and prospects of democratic consolidation. There are numerous approaches to achieving democracy, each with a distinct form of democratic governance. The transition mode is crucial because it produces enduring legacies that influence the post-transition regime and politics. The fundamental consequences of various transition modes can significantly impact a country’s politics (Munck & Leff, 1997). Typologies generally include 2 major categories (Munck & Leff, 1997): “transition from above” paths, in which the holders of power themselves initiate the process of democratization by relaxing their authoritarian control, and “transition from below” paths, in which democratic opposition movements play a major role in challenging authoritarian regimes and establishing the framework for democratization. When the political leadership recognizes that the prevailing socioeconomic and political conditions no longer serve their long-term interests, they are more likely to opt for a “transition from above”. In this scenario, they attempt to preserve their power by transforming authoritarian institutions into democratic ones. In such situations, authoritarian elites can expertly manage and regulate the process of regime evolution. The process of liberalization is initiated by the authoritarian government, and they continue to play a crucial role throughout the transition. This path will be initiated and succeed when: 1. There are new socioeconomic and political demands from below, 2. There is doubt or conflict about regime legitimacy, and 3. There is the chance that powerholders will retain and ratify much of their power via competitive elections (Stepan, 1986). On the other hand, the “transition from below” path to democratization is a result of a societal-led regime change in which oppositional forces gain momentum from the public and have enough power to constrain the state. This path often involves protests by grassroots organizations, large-scale labor strikes, and a widespread loss of support for the government. The ability of civil society to generate and direct social pressures is crucial in this type of democratization. The political organization and capacity of civil society are major determinants of the success of the transition and the post-transition period (Stepan, 1986). Prior to the mid-1990s, Taiwan underwent a transition from a relatively stable and robust authoritarian regime. The regime was not faced with any immediate threats to its continuation and was far superior in strength compared to the opposition forces. The ruling party willingly engaged in a top-down, guided democratic process. The KMT tolerated the evolution of an opposition party and the prospect of sharing power or the risk of losing it when

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it had the power to control society indefinitely (Gold, 1986). It was a topdown, regime-controlled, gradual, protracted, preemptory, elites-dominated, and unilaterally imposed transition. Since the mid-1990s, the Taiwan transition has example of the transition through extrication, which is characterized by mass-ascendancy and compromise. Extensive popular mobilization from below forced the regime elite to make a compromise with the opposition. The regime had tenuous control over the pace of change due to the relative importance of the opposition. The strong opposition pushed the reluctant and recalcitrant ruling regime to pursue democratic reforms, even after the DPP obtained the ruling power. The democratic coalition was the main course for the former authoritarian breakdown and democratic transition. The major momentum for democratic changes almost inevitably came from the “politics of protest” by civil society groups and their coalition with political society. In this period, the Taiwan case was a bottom-up, mass ascendant, fast, and multilaterally compromised democratization (Chao & Myers, 1998). The democratization of Taiwan was largely achieved through the efforts of civil society social movement groups and their coalition with opposition parties. The KMT’s collapse in 2000 was the culmination of sustained and vigorous activism by social movement forces united under strong central organizations. Through effective coordination and mobilization, they mounted successful anti-regime campaigns. The pro-democracy coalition in civil society also formed a solid alliance with the opposition party. The resulting democratic coalition of civil and political society was the most significant and powerful in Taiwan’s history and posed a significant challenge to the authoritarian regime. McOuail’s Democratic Participant Media Theory In the section on theoretical review, McQuail’s (1987) typology of media theory was discussed, particularly his exploration of democratic participant media theory. This theory is one of six “normative media theories” identified by McQuail, with the others being categorized as “authoritarian”, “free press theory”, “social responsibility theory”, “Soviet media theory”, and “development media theory”. McQuail (1987, p. 123) summarizes democratic participant theory in a set of principles: 1. Individuals and minority groups possess the right to access media and receive media services based on their own assessment of necessity. 2. The organization and content of media should not be under the centralized control of political or state bureaucracy. 3. The primary purpose of media should be to serve their audiences, rather than to serve the interests of media organizations, professionals, or clients.

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4. Small-scale, interactive, and participatory media formats are preferable to large-scale, one-way, professionalized media. 5. Certain social demands for mass media cannot be fully addressed through individual consumer choices or through state institutions. 6. The importance of communication is too significant to be entrusted solely to professionals. The theoretical concepts mentioned above will be used to examine and evaluate the practices of alternative media in Taiwan. They will help to demonstrate the ideological and legitimizing function that alternative media has served since its emergence in the 1970s. Through these theories, we can comprehend the vital roles that modern institutions like alternative media have played in the process of political transition and democratization. The succeeding chapter outlines the history and significance of alternative media in Taiwan since the 1970s.

References Agger, B. (1990). The decline of discourse: Reading, writing and resistance in postmodern capitalism. Palmer. AMARC. (1991). The right to communicate: Fourth World Conference of Community Radio Broadcasters. Montreal. Ambrosi, A. (1991). Alternative communication and development alternatives. In N. Thede & A. Ambrosi (eds.), Video the changing world. Black Rose Books. Atton, C. (1999). A re-assessment of the alternative press (p. 21). Culture and Society. Atton, C. (2002). Alternative media. Sage. Berrigan, F. (1977). Access: Some western models of community media. UNESCO. Boyd-Barrett, O. (1977). Media imperialism: Towards an international framework for the analysis of media systems. In J. Curran, M. Gurevitch, & J. Woollacott (eds.), Mass communication and society. The Open University/Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd. Boyd-Barrett, O. (1995). Conceptualizing the “public sphere”. In O. Boyd-Barrett & C. Newbold (eds.), Approaches to media: A reader. Arnold. Chao, L., & Myers, R. (1998). The first Chinese democracy. Johns Hopkins University. Cheng, T. J. (1989, July). Democratizing the quasi-Leninist regime in Taiwan. World Politics. Chiou, C. L. (1995). Democratizing oriental despotism. St. Martins Press. Cohen, J., & Rogers, J. (1995). Associations and democracy. Verso. Collier, D., & Levitsky, S. (1997, April). Democracy with adjectives. World Politics. Comedia, F. (1984). The alternative press: The development of underdevelopment (p. 6). Culture & Society. Curran, J., & Seaton, J. (1991). Power without responsibilities: The press and broadcasting in Britain. Routledge. Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy. Yale University Press. Diamond, L. (1994, July). Toward democratic consolidation. Journal of Democracy. Diamond, L. (1999). Developing democracy. Johns Hopkins University Press. Downing, J. (1984). Radical media. South End Press.

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Downing, J. (1988). The alternative public realm: The organization of the 1980s anti-nuclear press in West Germany and Britain. Media, Culture, and Society, 10. Downing, J. (1995). Alternative media and the Boston Tea Party. In J. Downing, A. Mohammadi, & A. Sreberny-Mohammadi (eds.), Questioning the media: A critical introduction. Sage. Downing, J. (2001). Radical media: Rebellious communication and social movements. Sage. Duncombe, S. (1996). Note from underground: Zines and the politics of underground culture. In S. Berman & J. P. Danky (eds.), Alternative library literature: 1994–1995. McFarland. Eley, G. (1992). Nations, publics and political cultures: Placing Habennas in the Nineteenth Century. In C. Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the public sphere. MIT Press. Fraser, N. (1992). Rethinking the public sphere – A contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy. In C. Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the public sphere. MIT Press. Garnham, N. (1990). Capitalism and communication: Global culture and the economics of information. Sage. Gold, T. B. (1986). State and society in the Taiwan Miracle. ME Sharp. Golding, P. (1994). Capitalism and communication: Global culture and the economics of information. Sage. Habermas, J. (1989). The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society (trans. T. Burger & F. Lawrence). Polity Press. Herman, E., & Chomsky, N. (1994). Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media. Vintage. Huntington, S. (1991). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. University of Oklahoma Press. Karl, T. L. (1990, October). Dilemmas of democratization in Latin America. Comparative Politics, 2. Kessler, L. (1984). Alternative journalism in American history. Sage. Kim, B. (2001). Divergent paths of democratization. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Indiana University. Lewis, P. (1984). Media for people in cities: A study of community media in the urban context. UNESCO, Division of Development of Communication Systems. Lewis, P. (1993). Alternative media in a contemporary social and theoretical context. In P. Lewis (ed.), Alternative media: Linking global and local. UNESCO. Lewis, P. M., & Booth, J. (1989). The invisible medium: Public, commercial and community radio. Macmillan. Linz, J., & Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Mainwaring, S. (1992). Transition to democracy and democratic consolidation. In S. Mainwaring, G. O’Donnell, & S. Valenzuela (eds.), Issues in democratic consolidation. University of Notre Dame Press. Mainwaring, S., O’Donnell, G., & Valenzuela, S. (1992). Introduction. In S. Mainwaring, G. O’Donnell, & S. Valenzuela (eds.), Issues in democratic consolidation. University of Notre Dame Press. McQuail, D. (1987). Mass communication theory: An introduction. Sage.

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Minkoff, D. (1997, March/April). Producing social capital: National social movements and civil society. The American Behavioral Scientists, 40. Munck, G., & Leff, C. (1997, April). Modes of transition and democratization. Comparative Politics. Nyerere, J. K. (1973). Freedom and development. Oxford University Press. O’Donnell, G., & Schmitter, P. (1986). Transition from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusion about uncertain democracies. John Hopkins University Press. Postgate, R., Lewis, P., & Southwood, W. (1979). Low-cost communication system for educational and development purposes in Third World countries. Intermediate Technology Development Group and UNESCO, Division of Methods, Materials, Structures and Techniques. Raboy, M. (1991). Communication and the New World Order: Strategies for Democratization. In N. Thede & A. Ambrosi (eds.), Video the changing world. Montreal: Black Rose Books. Raboy, M., & Bruck, P. (1989). Communication for and against democracy. Black Rose Books. Schmitter, P., & Karl, T. (1991). What democracy is... and is not. Journal of Democracy, 2(3). Schumpeter, J. (1947). Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. New York: Harper. Senecal, M. (1991). The alternative in search of its identity. In N. Thede & A. Ambrosi (eds.), Video the changing world. Black Rose Books. Shin, D. C. (1994, October). On the third wave of democratization. World Politics. Stepan, A. (1986). Paths toward democratization. In G. O’Donnell, P. Schmitter, & L. Whitehead (eds.), Transitions from authoritarian rule. John Hopkins University Press. UNESCO. (1989). World communication report. UNESCO. Wood, F., & Smith, M. (2001). Online communication: Linking technology, identity, and culture. Lawrence Erlbaum Association, Publishers.

CHAPTER 3

History of Taiwan’s Political Changes

To examine the role of media in Taiwan’s political transition and democracy, we have to analyze the major social and political events in Taiwan from the 1940s to 2002, concentrating on the ethnic/political problems, transition of politics, and opposition in Taiwan. Taiwan was generally considered an authoritarian regime by scholars from the 1950s to the mid-1980s since it was under martial law until 1987 and the Kuomintang (KMT) was intent on exerting control over the island’s political and economic affairs. However, there is ongoing debate about the KMT’s motivations (Cheng, 1989; Cheng & Haggard, 1992). Additionally, there was little opportunity for actors who sought to challenge the KMT’s dominant position to participate in politics. During the authoritarian era, the Kuomintang (KMT) utilized traditional authoritarian tactics such as ideological brainwashing, censorship, and persecution of dissidents. However, their triumph was largely due to their ability to garner popular legitimacy. The KMT leadership did not want the Taiwanese people to merely comply passively but sought active involvement and backing from the populace. Through government-sanctioned channels, the ruling party succeeded in involving the public in political matters, thereby hindering the development of civil society in Taiwan (Chun, 2000). Although the Republic of China in Taiwan was known worldwide for its reputation as a “Free China”, there was a dearth of political opposition before 1975. Nevertheless, in the mid-1980s, Taiwan witnessed the emergence of one of the most robust opposition movements in East Asia. This included an electoral faction dominated by the DPP (established in 1986), the Chinese New Party (CNP, founded in 1993), and the People First Party (PFP, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Hong and C.-N. Hou, Alternative Media and Taiwan’s Socio-Political Transformation, 1970s–1990s, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2477-6_3

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founded in 2000 following the presidential election), as well as a wide range of protest movements encompassing political dissidence, social activism, studentled campaigns against ideological indoctrination, and protests by former KMT leaders. These groups all struggled to achieve their unique objectives and goals. Taiwan’s political opposition shares many similarities with other societies, as the social forces that arose during industrialization played a pivotal role in its political evolution. However, Taiwan’s political opposition is also distinct in many ways. Ethnic divisions were far more significant than economic divisions, and the most critical issue in Taiwanese politics has been the unresolved question of Taiwan’s national identity, even though the DPP attained ruling power in 2000.

History of Ethnic and Political Problems in Taiwan A description of the ethnic problems may help the reader understand the controversial political situation and the political background of alternative groups in Taiwan (Jow, 1995). First, the definitions of Taiwanese and mainlanders are provided. Political and ethnic dominance were mutually reinforcing in Taiwan, leading to those outside the favored community being consistently relegated to second-class status. For many Taiwanese, this situation was not sufficient to motivate them to participate in political opposition. They were content with the limited roles allocated to Taiwanese individuals in agriculture, business, and local politics. However, dissidents managed to attract those Taiwanese who could not overlook the overt denial of their constitutional political rights or the constant sense of being at an ethnic disadvantage. Consequently, the opposition’s emphasis on ethnic divisions strengthened the impact of mobilizational authoritarianism, resulting in an opposition movement with minimal class distinctions. As Wang (1990) indicated it: the ethnic division in Taiwan’s politics is more pronounced than the class division because the disparity in the distribution of political power along ethnic lines is more apparent than the power imbalance among different social classes. As a result, this ethnic inequality has become a more accessible basis for political mobilization (p. 45).

Descendants of the Chinese who immigrated to Taiwan in the midseventeenth century constitute Taiwanese as they are today, while Mainlanders refer to those who migrated to Taiwan after World War II or with the KMT in 1949 when the Chinese Communists took power in mainland China (Jow, 1995). There is no difference between the appearances of Taiwanese and mainlanders, but the languages are different (Winckler, 1984). Most Taiwanese speak Taiwanese, while Mainlanders speak Mandarin, which was set as the official language after the KMT took over the island.

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After retreating to Taiwan, the KMT ruled this island by depriving the Taiwanese of power. As Lee (1993, p. 3) described, “Under its rule the local Taiwanese majority (85 percent) have been deprived of their full political rights, while the three million Mainlander minority (15 percent)—those who fled to Taiwan with the KMT in 1949—have dominated, if not monopolized Taiwan’s political power. This Mainlander-Taiwanese division was to develop as a major source of friction in the decade to come”. The conflict between the Mainlanders, who arrived in Taiwan with the KMT government between 1945 and 1949, and the native-born Taiwanese has multiple roots. The Japanese colonial rule lasting fifty years transformed Taiwan’s political, economic, and social structures, resulting in cultural and material disparities between the Taiwanese and the newly arrived Mainlanders. These differences were primarily responsible for the “February 28 Incident”, which further intensified tensions between the two ethnic groups. These conflicts could have been resolved if the KMT had not imposed an ethnic division of labor on the island, which restricted opportunities for the Taiwanese population and undervalued their contributions. However, the KMT Nationalists did impose such a division, and as Marshall Johnson (1992) put it, “Once this correlation of social position and provincial origin was established in practice, ethnicity became part of the sense of the possible and the sense of limits for persons in both groups” (p. 76). “The February 28 Incident” was a watershed in Taiwan’s political development. In the words of one commentator: Seeing their elite and its successors systematically hunted down and murdered by the mainlander traumatized the Taiwanese to the point that the phrase ‘politics is dangerous’ because a watchword etched into their collective unconscious. Political activity became associated with a violent end. (Gold, 1986, p. 52)

This legacy clearly affected the media as well. Discussion of politics that deviated overtly and substantially from the party line became taboo. The incident itself became taboo as a subject of discussion in any context. Despite “the February 28 Incident” and the deprivation of power, the KMT’s suppression of political dissidents, which will be described in the following discussion, kept Taiwanese politically alienated until 1986 when the opposition party DPP was allowed to be established. It was only 40 years later, in the context of liberalization ushered in by President Chiang Ching-kuo, that the media resumed treatment of the tragedy that the Nationalist administration has had to work on ever since to counteract. With the threat of a Chinese Communist attack(ed) on Taiwan, martial law and press ban were imposed to keep the KMT regime in power on the island until 1987. Suspected communists were convinced of conspiracy and were executed without fair trials. Many of the suspected Taiwanese were innocent. Most of them only participated in a left-leaning reading group or only read books about Communism at home. Many magazine editors were accused of

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being anti-government and were put in jail because they asked for democratic reform and were publishing articles to convey democratic ideas. This is why the 1950s was called the “White Terror” period (Jow, 1995, p. 7). Due to the suppression conducted by the KMT government, many innocent victims either were forced into exile to a foreign country or were imprisoned for several decades. They and their friends and families later advocated for Taiwan’s independence from China because independence in their opinion was the only way to get the Taiwanese back into power. Regarding the independence issue, the opponent DPP insisted that advocating for and talking about Taiwanese independence was not a crime. On the other hand, the KMT spread the message through the mainstream media that advocating for Taiwan’s independence did not benefit Taiwan but would bring about social instability. The KMT warned the citizens that mainland China would use armed force against Taiwan if it declared independence, which the DPP saw as threatening to the citizens who favored the idea of Taiwan’s independence. The debate of independence or unification was heated, especially during election campaigns, and sometimes caused supporters of one party to attack supporters of the other party. To some extent, the conflict caused a rise in emigration and capital exodus, stringing out Taiwan’s economy and exacerbating mainland China’s already strained/existing tensions, leading to a situation of uncertainty and instability (Jow, 1995). Martial law, the press ban, the secret police, and socialization through mass media were all parts of the effort by the KMT to keep everything unchanged and unchallenged. “Frozen once and for all were constitutionally guaranteed rights - including freedoms of speech, publication, and assembly” (Lee, 1993, p. 9), as well as a popular election at the Taiwan-wide level. The outbreak of the Chungli Incident (中坜事件) in 1977 was the first time that dissidents tested the power of mass protest. This is one reason why the DPP organized protests and street demonstrations and used other extreme strategies to express its political demands after this incident. The political opposition leaders viewed mobilizing mass rallies as a strategy with significant news value. They believed that such rallies could exert pressure on the KMT to bring about change, and they found it relatively easy to attract attention from mainstream media outlets. For instance, it was effective in getting messages out under the government-controlled media system. However, violence accompanied by outrageous mass behaviors became an easy way to attack the KMT regime after the DPP was established (Jow, 1995). The Chinese New Party ( 新党, CNP), after the split from the KMT in 1993, joined in this attack on the DPP’s opposition activities. To counter the DPP’s radical strategies, the CNP appealed to people on the basis that it opposed violent demonstrations. It asserted that the DPP had brought disorder and instability to society. On the other hand, the KMT leaders justified their suppression of protesters with the excuse of economic cost, and they used mainstream media as their propaganda tools (Berman, 1992).

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Elections for the Taiwan-wide-level officials or legislators had to be held due to the attrition of the older leaders. This opened more opportunities for Taiwanese dissidents to compete fairly with mainlanders. The DPP was organized because of these opportunities and other forces from changes in international affairs (Lee, 1993). In political scientists’ eyes, liberal Taiwanese people were more likely to identify with the DPP, while conservative Taiwanese and conservative mainlanders were more likely to identify with the KMT (Cheng & Haggard, 1992). Most supporters of the CNP and the People First Party (PFP, 亲民党, which was founded in 2000) came from liberal mainlanders, especially the second generation of mainlanders who were no longer guaranteed positions in the top levels of the power structure as their parents had under authoritarian rules (Jow, 1995). Moreover, currently, the most serious challenge to the consolidation of Taiwanese democracy comes from the “crisis of state legitimacy”. This refers to the issue of national identity, which is reflected in the split in Taiwanese public opinion between proponents of independence and those who support reunification with mainland China. During the regime transition, the struggle over democratic reform and the ensuing redistribution of political power from the mainlander to the native Taiwanese became inevitably entangled with an internal contest over Taiwan’s international status and the island’s future political relations with mainland China (Chun, 2000). The danger of internal political polarization and external intervention, inherent in any dispute in a revision of the territorial structure of Taiwan, potentially exists. Eventually, it forced the creation of an independent Taiwan gaining control of Taiwan’s government; there now exists the possibility of explosive confrontation between Beijing and Taipei, especially in President Chen Shui-bian’s (陈水扁) administration since 2000. The future course of political and ethnic problems cannot be separated from the mainland factor. In the worst-case scenario, the possibility that mainland China might resort to coercive action against Taiwan cannot be ruled out. If this occurs, Taiwan’s future democratic development is likely to face severe disruption or to regress. Thus, despite Taiwan’s successful democratic transformation, democratization cannot be completed without a successful resolution of the national identity issue in the future.

Transition of Taiwan’s Politics and Opposition Government and Politics in Transition Politically, Taiwan was de facto a one-party regime before 1987. The KMT monopolized power in the government office and the military. Under martial law, the KMT was the only active legal political party in Taiwan, although it allowed independent candidates to run for few public offices in elections at local levels. After literacy and economic conditions improved, society gradually

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became heterogeneous, and the pressure for political reform grew from people in Taiwan. In 1987, President Chiang Ching-kuo announced the lifting of the Emergency Decree, which had served as the legal foundation for the imposition of martial law in Taiwan. Additionally, it’s worth noting that martial law was lifted in Taiwan following President Chiang Ching-kuo’s declaration. Thereafter, new political parties emerged, and Taiwan moved rapidly toward a full-fledged democracy. In 1997, there were 84 registered parties in Taiwan (GIOa, 1999a), of which only 2, the DPP and the CNP, were able to challenge the KMT in both local and Taiwan-wide elections before 2000. On March 23, 1996, Taiwan held its first-ever direct presidential election, resulting in the election of Lee Teng-hui (李登辉) as the president. Lee Teng-hui, who was the incumbent president and the candidate of the KMT, won with 54 percent of the total votes, defeating the DPP candidate Peng Ming-min (彭明敏). In the 1990s, Taiwan continued a complex and difficult transition from an authoritarian political system dominated by a mainland Chinese elite to a localized democratic system. In the 2000 presidential election, Taiwan made history as voters shifted power from the ruling KMT party to the opposition DPP party for the first time. Since 1949, Taiwan has undergone significant changes. The DPP party was only legalized in 1987, the year in which military rule was lifted. Chen Shui-bian’s ascent to the presidency was one of the most remarkable comebacks in politics. In 2000, Chen, a lawyer from a humble background, was elected as Taiwan’s president, marking a political earthquake as the opposition party took power and ended the KMT’s 50-year hold on power. The repercussions of the 2000 election were widely felt, both within and outside of the KMT party. President-elect Chen Shui-bian’s victory was largely attributed to the internal split within the KMT, and it led to the formation of a new influential party, the People First Party (PFP, 亲民党), under the leadership of James Soong (宋楚瑜) after the election. This marked the end of the era of KMT’s Leninist-style political dominance (Cheng, 1989). As of now, political competition within and among parties has become a defining characteristic of Taiwan’s political landscape. In relation to the issue of unification and independence in Taiwan, until the late 1980s, the KMT government asserted itself as the sole legitimate government of China, encompassing both Taiwan and the mainland. The Chinese communist government also claimed authority over Taiwan, insisting that unification was the only resolution to the conflict between the two sides. However, since the lifting of martial law in 1987, the KMT government has adopted a more pragmatic approach toward mainland China, recognizing the limitations of its “effective rule” to Taiwan and the surrounding islands (Chao & Myers, 1998). Despite increasing trade, tourism, and cultural exchanges between Taiwan and mainland China, the government of mainland China has not abandoned its stance on the use of military force to achieve

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unification. The issue of independence versus unification remains a persistent and unresolved topic of discussion among the Taiwanese people. Political Opposition in the Martial Law Period (1948–1987) In February 1947, Taiwan experienced a widespread uprising against the KMT government, which nearly resulted in the expulsion of the Nationalists from the island. In the subsequent months, numerous politically active Taiwanese elites, including prewar intellectuals and social leaders, were executed, or imprisoned as a part of the reprisals and prolonged period of repression. The political repression continued throughout the 1950s, and it was only in the late 1980s that the last political prisoners were released. The KMT employed a robust program of ideological indoctrination and co-optation mechanisms, as described in the previous section, which discouraged most Taiwanese from challenging the ruling government. (Chu, 1992). From 1947 until the mid-1970s, Taiwan’s political opposition was limited to a few small groups: mainlander intellectuals committed to KMT ideology but disagreed with the KMT’s ruling style (such as Lei Chen, 雷震), independent local politicians (such as Kao Yu-shu, 高玉树 and Wu San-lien, 吴三连), and Taiwanese independence activists living overseas. None of these groups was able to alter Taiwan policy or attract a Taiwan-wide grassroots following. Taiwan was widely regarded as an authoritarian regime from the 1950s to the mid-1980s, due in part to the fact that martial law remained in place until 1987. The KMT was determined to maintain control over the island’s political and economic affairs, although there is still debate over what motivated this. Some argue that the KMT was driven by a simple lust for power, while others believe that it was motivated by a genuine commitment to the historical mission of re-establishing a Nationalist government over all of China. Regardless of the motivation, the interests of Taiwan and its native-born population were subjugated to the KMT’s agenda. Local Taiwanese politicians had no room to challenge the KMT’s dominant position. The KMT employed a range of tools commonly used by authoritarian governments, such as ideological indoctrination, suppression of dissent, and censorship of the media and publications (Chun, 2000). The regime’s legitimacy was consolidated through media control justified by martial law, which served to maintain minority rule by the mainlander population and the selective incorporation of the local-born Taiwanese elite (Cheng & Haggard, 1992). It is a widely accepted belief in political science that economic development often leads to the emergence of social forces that challenge authoritarianism. As the middle class grows, including more educated and white-collar workers, their demands from the government become more complex than just maintaining law and order. They seek participation in political decision-making. However, in Taiwan, some social elites and professionals who would have been expected to support this movement, such as schoolteachers and small business owners, remained loyal to the ruling party. The mobilization of

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authoritarianism proved to be more resilient than many social scientists had anticipated. Nevertheless, by the mid-1970s, a significant number of middleclass Taiwanese were living beyond the influence of the KMT’s mobilizational apparatus. This group included independent professionals, small-scale entrepreneurs dissatisfied with the patronage provided by local factions, and local politicians whose ambitions were thwarted by KMT bureaucrats. These individuals became the core of Taiwan’s political opposition in the 1970s and 1980s. The nascent opposition movement was led by 2 groups of elites: urban professionals (such as lawyers, doctors, and intellectuals) and local politicians. During the 1970s, Taiwan’s economic and political situation began to deteriorate. The decade was marked by a series of international setbacks, and the economy was hit hard by the energy crisis. This was particularly frustrating for Taiwanese who had received education overseas. During the 1970s, as Taiwan’s economy developed, there was a shift in the workforce from agriculture to white-collar jobs and small-to-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in manufacturing. This shift in employment freed workers from the network of corporate organizations established by the KMT to control their participation in activities that supported the system. As prosperity and modernization grew, some economic sectors were left behind, forcing difficult choices. However, the opposition party was slow to gain support from these emerging social groups, partly due to the intimidation caused by decades of political repression. Despite this, elections played a crucial role in preventing the breakdown of the mobilization of authoritarianism. If it were not for their ties to local factions, more workers and farmers who suffered from a decline in their economic position during the recession of the early 1970s and the real estate and stock market booms of the 1980s, might have joined the opposition. As a result, the ruling party was able to maintain the loyalty of these voters through the use of social incentives and patronage by local factions. With increased government revenues due to the prosperity of the time, these factions became even more affluent, providing them with greater resources to build and sustain support networks (Chu, 1994a). In 1975, Kang Ning-hsiang (康宁祥), an opposition activist, published the Taiwan Political Review (台湾政治评论), which was swiftly prohibited by the government. Two years later, Kang and fellow opposition candidate Huang Hsin-chieh (黄信介) flouted KMT regulations and organized a series of rallies across the island. The ruling party was left astounded as non-KMT candidates managed to secure 21 out of 77 seats in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly that year. Following the election, suspicions of electoral fraud led to clashes between voters and police in the city of Chungli, further raising awareness of the growing opposition movement. In 1979, activists opposing the KMT’s rule began referring to themselves as the tangwai (党外, meaning “outside the party”), while embracing liberal Western ideologies. Additionally, as their host countries no longer recognized their Taiwan (ROC) passports, this further solidified their position as being outside the KMT’s sphere of influence.

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The decline in international reputation and legitimacy of the KMT partystate, which had been key factors in their success during the prosperous years, led some members of the emerging middle class to re-evaluate Taiwan’s international and political environment and consider the possibility of reforms (Chu, 1992, p. 34). This caused a small but increasing number of disillusioned lawyers, who had experienced the arbitrariness of Taiwan’s authoritarian legal system, and journalists, who were disgusted by press censorship, to join the opposition. Since its inception, Taiwan’s political opposition has primarily fought its battles in the electoral arena. Elections provided the opposition with an opportunity to showcase its commitment to peaceful reform, gain grassroots support, and outplay the KMT at their own game. In order to achieve this, urban elites joined forces with dissatisfied local politicians, many of whom were genuinely frustrated with the KMT regime. Even though elected officials had minimal impact on Taiwan’s policies, local power, economic privileges, and social status were all at stake during elections, leading to fierce competition among local factions for the spoils of victory. The KMT had learned to exploit this competition by balancing the power of local factions and keeping it limited to the local electoral arena. Faction leaders were well aware of this interference, and many were deeply resentful of it. Some individuals grew increasingly frustrated with the KMT and eventually left the party, taking entire factions with them, and aided in the establishment of the Formosa Magazine (美丽 岛, Meilitao in Chinese). In December of that same year, they organized a rally in Kaohsiung that quickly turned violent. The incident led to the trial of 41 opposition activists, including eight who were tried in a military court. Long sentences were handed down to several individuals involved in the Kaohsiung Incident (1979), such as Huang Hsin-chieh, the magazine’s publisher, and Shih Ming-the (施明德), its editor. Additionally, followers of Yu Teng-fa, the Kaohsiung County faction leader, and Lin Yi-hsiung (林义雄), a Taiwan provincial assembly member, were also incarcerated for their involvement. This Formosa Incident “led Taiwan to lift its decades-old martial law, paving the way for the democratization of Taiwan” (Chang Chun-Hong was interviewed by Central News Agency, December 12, 1999), and “without the Formosa Incident, Taiwan’s opposition movement would have remained fragmented, and the non-KMT camp would not have been able to gather and achieve increasingly greater electoral success in subsequent elections” (Yu Ying-lung, 游盈隆 interviewed by Central News Agency, December 12, 1999). As Wu Nai-jen (吴念真) (1999) said, “this incident was actually a shot in the arm for the opposition, leading to the rise of younger-generation opposition activists” (interviewed by Central News Agency, December 12, 1999). Most importantly, the Formosa Incident “revived Taiwan people’s courage for resistance, which had subsided after the February 28 Incident” (Shih Ming-Teh was interviewed by Central News Agency, December 12, 1999). During the 1970s, the opposition in Taiwan, particularly the tangwai movement, emphasized the need for political reform and ethnic justice,

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demanding the lifting of martial law and the protection of basic human rights. They also demanded an increase in the number of elected positions in the Taiwan-wide government and an end to widespread electoral violations such as vote-buying and fraud (Cheng, 1989). Since 1969, Taiwan had been conducting supplementary elections to fill legislative and National Assembly seats that were originally occupied by incumbents who had fled from mainland China in 1949. The tangwai movement argued that it was time to replace these incumbents with legislators elected in Taiwan, a goal that was eventually achieved in 1992 (Chun, 2000). In the 1980s, the tangwai movement continued to advocate for political reform, and their candidates won an increasing number of electoral positions. In 1986, despite martial law still being in place, the movement formed a political party, the DPP. After President Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law in 1987, several new parties emerged, but none have been able to challenge the DPP’s position as the leading opposition party on the island. From its inception, the tangwai/DPP faction of Taiwan’s political opposition has focused on promoting greater competition, participation, and responsibility in Taiwan’s political system. They aimed to increase the political representation of native Taiwanese to a level that reflected their population share and many believed that this would eventually lead to Taiwan becoming an independent state. Electoral politics was seen as a key means to achieve their objectives, and elections were destined to play a crucial role in Taiwan’s political evolution during this time (Chu, 1992). Opponents of Taiwan’s authoritarian regime utilized various means to challenge it, and electoral politics was one of the major channels they employed. However, for others, protest movements were the favored method for effecting social and political change. According to Taiwanese sociology scholar Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao: By the end of 1989, eighteen social movements had already taken shape … including the consumers movement (1980), the anti-pollution local protest movement (1980), the natural conservation movement (1982), the women’s movement (1982), the aborigines human rights movement (1983), the students’ movement (1986) … the labor movement, the farmers’ movement, the teachers’ rights movement, the handicapped and disadvantaged welfare group protests, and the political victims’ human rights movement [all in 1987]. (Hsiao, 1992, p. 154)

Early protest movements often emerged in response to specific incidents that impacted small and clearly defined communities. However, once the issue that sparked the protest was resolved, these movements typically dissipated (Hsiao, 1992). The electoral opposition’s successes in the 1980s were particularly significant for protest movements, as they provided a favorable environment for their growth and advancement (Chu, 1994a).

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During the martial law period, election and protest movements were bound to play important roles in Taiwan’s political transition; political oppositionists also used the alternative media to advocate their voice in election and movement. In this period, opposition political magazines were the major alternative media for their advocacy (Berman, 1992). Political Opposition After the Lift of Martial Law (1987–2000) The presence of a robust electoral opposition and a diverse array of protest movements are evidence of the growth of civil society in Taiwan. Prior to the 1980s, mobilization under authoritarian rule absorbed emerging social movements and integrated them into Taiwan’s structure. However, after the lifting of martial law by President Chiang in 1987, the fledgling movements that had begun in the 1970s flourished into a fully fledged civil society that the government could not control. Even social forces that were previously under the control of the party-state have gained greater autonomy (Chu, 1994a; Pang, 1992). Since 1989, local factions have been asserting their influence in candidate selection during elections. When their preferred candidates were not nominated, some factions opted to support opposition parties instead (Rigger, 1993). In the early 1990s, the KMT faced severe criticism for nominating an excessive number of “golden oxen” (金牛, jinniu in Chinese)—wealthy candidates who could fund their own campaigns but had few other qualifications. The KMT was unwilling to adopt the DPP’s stance on Taiwan independence, which was a key distinguishing factor for the opposition party. However, this issue alone was not enough to bring the DPP to power, as it was not popular among the general public (Chu, 1992). At one point, the opposition party found a more appealing way to promote the issue—by advocating for Taiwan’s return to the United Nations instead of outright independence. This “Returned to the UN” campaign gained immense popularity. After some debate between reformist and conservative factions within the ruling party, the KMT ultimately supported participation in the UN, with the KMT-led Foreign Ministry leading the charge. As a result, the DPP had no choice but to demonstrate their willingness to cooperate by backing the KMT-led UN campaign (Chun, 2000). To summarize, political reform, ethnic justice, and national identity were core issues that separated the ruling and opposition parties. While the first 2 issues have been resolved through consensus, the third issue remains at a standstill. Consequently, the opposition had to find new issues to attract supporters from the majority party, marking a new stage in Taiwan’s political development that posed significant challenges for both parties. Given the predominant focus on elections in Taiwan, any party aspiring to form a government had to appeal to a diverse range of voters. The DPP, which consisted of a cross-class coalition including white-collar professionals, intellectuals, workers, farmers, small business owners, and local political leaders, encountered difficulties in finding

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common issues to unite their diverse coalition once the fundamental issues of political reform, ethnic justice, and national identity lost their traction (Chu, 1994b). On the other hand, the KMT continued to face discontent on various critical issues, primarily corruption and the misuse of funds in politics. Despite a crackdown on vote-buying led by Justice Minister Ma Ying-jeou, the outcry against it persisted. In early 1994, the Taiwanese government proposed the establishment of a government bureau dedicated to combating corruption. As political reform expanded the legislature’s policymaking role, well-funded interest groups emerged, increasingly concerned about legislative corruption. Corruption also contributed to the substandard quality of public services provided by KMT-controlled local governments (Chiu, 1999). In 1994, the incumbent KMT lost the Taipei City mayoral race, mainly because his administration had hit rock bottom due to the long-delayed and overbudgeted transit system’s failure to open, among other disasters (Chao & Myers, 1998). Additionally, besides the issues of political corruption and government inefficiency, urban Taiwanese encountered economic hardships. The skyrocketing land and housing prices that came with the rapid urbanization and real estate boom of the 1980s threatened the living standards of urban professionals, further fueling their political dissatisfaction (Chiu, 1999). At the same time, there was an increase in demands from various groups for social welfare programs, which forced the KMT to adopt initiatives such as health insurance for farmers and social security for the elderly (Chiu, 1999). The KMT also faced internal discord over the widening wealth gap in Taiwan, which went against the party’s “growth with equality” agenda. The ruling party’s inability to address the island’s severe environmental issues, ensure fairness in the education system without compromising students’ health and creativity, manage Taiwan’s business relations with mainland China, and enhance Taiwan’s international standing all contributed to the public’s discontent (Hsiao, 2000). In the 1990s, both of Taiwan’s major parties struggled to effectively capitalize on the issues that voters considered most important. The political landscape was highly competitive, with candidates from both the KMT and DPP vigorously contesting every election within the political elite. In 1993, the CNP split from the KMT and joined the election campaign. In its first two contests, the 1993 municipal executive elections and the 1994 races for Taipei and Kaohsiung mayor and Taiwan provincial governor, the CNP’s vote share was limited outside its stronghold in the Taipei metropolitan region. The party’s performance improved in the 1995 legislative election, capturing 21 seats with 13 percent of the popular vote. The CNP benefited from the KMT’s factional battles, attracting mainlander voters linked to the conservative non-mainstream faction. In 1996, former non-mainstream KMT members Lin Yang-kang (林洋港) and Hao Po-tsun (郝柏村) challenged the KMT’s presidential candidates. Although technically independent, the Lin-Hao ticket enjoyed the CNP’s support, and it captured 15 percent of the vote share while

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CNP candidates won in other contests. The DPP also faced factionalism, with strained relations between the pragmatic, centrist Formosa faction (美丽岛派) and the more ideological New Movement faction (新潮流派). Following the lifting of martial law, social movements in Taiwan rapidly expanded in number and size to fill the newly opened political space. Tactics such as mass protests and publications became available to them for the first time. According to political science scholar Chu Yu-han (朱云汉), social movements grew in the 1980s because Taiwan could no longer assimilate new social forces into mobilizational authoritarianism. The political opposition had also identified the limits of the regime’s willingness to repress dissent. Despite their similarities, most protest movements did not associate too closely with the electoral opposition. Nonpartisanship remained a goal for many groups, as association with politicians hurt their credibility and too tight a link with opposition ideologies, particularly Taiwan independence, confused their missions and drove away potential supporters. While the DPP’s positions were more favorable to protest movements than those of the ruling party, identifying with the opposition party often led to questions about sincerity and blunted effectiveness (Chu, 1994a; Hsiao, 1992). After the DPP was established, the major alternative media outlets prior to the martial law period, the opposition political magazines disappeared gradually, since they had reached the goal of making alternative media—forming a real opposition political party in Taiwan. In(to) the 1990s, some protest movements won their fight aided by alternative media. Impressive victories have been achieved mainly in the field of environmental activism. In particular, the anti-nuclear movement formed a successful but disorganized coalition of citizens, environmentalists, DPP leaders, and taxi drivers (as shown in Table 3.1). Grassroots activists blanketed the northeastern countryside with anti-nuclear posters, while others staged around-the-clock protests outside the Legislative Yuan. Underground radio stations emerged as important alternative media during this time, and they supported the opposition by alerting taxi drivers to impending votes or legislative actions. At a moment’s notice, hundreds of taxi drivers would converge on the legislature, clogging the streets with their iconic yellow cabs. This action had a large influence on some key politicians’ anti-nuclear platforms. Taiwan’s political opposition can be broadly categorized into 2 strands: the electoral opposition led by the DPP and followed by the CNP, and the protest movements that arise in response to specific issues such as environmental degradation, inflated housing prices, inadequate consumer safeguards, and unfair treatment of the LGBTQ+ community (Hsiao, 2000). Despite the motivation behind these movements, none of the political parties have been able to fully leverage this discontent. This is partly since Taiwan’s political parties prioritize electoral success, making it difficult for them to address new issues effectively (Lii & Wu, 2000). During the mobilizational authoritarianism era, the KMT built a cross-class coalition of farmers,

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Table 3.1 Environmental protests in Taiwan: 1980–1990

Year

Amount

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988* 1989* 1990*

4 10 22 11 25 24 30 29 39 45 48

Source Ho, M. (2000). The state and civil society in the democratic transition: the case of environmental movement in Taiwan. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Appendix iv *Means the data were collected by the author

workers, entrepreneurs, soldiers, and civil servants, without relying on socioeconomic cleavages. As such, the opposition’s most effective organizing tool was ethnicity. However, Taiwan’s progress toward new issues and cleavages has been slow and inconsistent. The key issues being debated were fundamental questions such as national identity, ethnic justice, or the pace of political reform, both major parties were able to maintain their cross-class constituencies. However, once these issues threatened the parties’ internal unity, such as in the case of environmental demands driving a wedge between entrepreneurs and conservationists, the problem became severe. Local faction bosses were offended by anti-corruption drives, while farmers demanded subsidies and tariffs that businesses worried would hurt export markets. Since both the DPP and the KMT relied on all these groups to win elections, the result was not a straightforward shift of support from the majority party to the opposition, but rather a growing threeway party split and an increasingly unpredictable electorate that neither major party could accommodate (Chun, 2000). Political Opposition After 2000 Chen Shui-bian’s win in the 2000 presidential election marked a significant turning point for Taiwan’s politics and society. However, there was a concern that the critical and progressive civil society might fade away after the opposition party took over the government. While civil society often shares the goal of a shift in the ruling party with the opposition political parties, it does not aim to achieve this goal itself. When the opposition party becomes the ruling

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party, civil society holds it to the same standards and expectations (Hsiao, 2000). Before 2000, the KMT maintained strict control over all civic groups in Taiwan, leaving opposition voices to be mainly found within civil society. Since the early days of the tangwai movement, civil society has been slowly growing and developing progressive ideas that run contrary to the KMT’s authoritarian rule. As a result, the line between the opposition party and civil society became blurred, with little distinction between the two (Lii & Wu, 2000). Following the KMT’s rule, the DPP took control of Taiwan and had the potential to attract oppositional leaders and resources from the growing civil society. The DPP is currently the dominant political group, while the previous elite must confront the loss of their privileged status. As the ruling party, the DPP will face pressure to make compromises, which increases the risk of corruption. Consequently, there is a possibility that a void could abruptly appear within Taiwan’s civil society. The reconfiguration of political forces in Taiwan has resulted in the KMT and its affiliated factions, including James Soong’s party defectors, becoming the opposition. These factions were previously sustained by their special privileges and were at the center of “black gold” (the same meaning as “corruption”) politics. The KMT’s sudden loss of power has created a new political landscape with 3 main players: the government, political factions, and civil society. If new civic forces fail to emerge soon, Taiwan’s already limited critical voices may be overwhelmed by a new wave of conservatism. (Lii & Wu, 2000). In essence, what factors contribute to the emergence of progressive social movements, and which groups are likely to lead the charge against conservative forces? The DPP is currently grappling with this issue, as former allies in civil society are now poised to critique the new administration. In the new century, there has been an increased acceptance of social changes, often following the lead of democracy and prosperity. One of the most significant changes has been a call for greater individual freedom and personal expression. Since the opposition party took power, Taiwan has actively worked to improve the protection of human rights. The loosening of government control over the media and changes in politics have created an unprecedented opportunity for diverse voices to be heard in Taiwan. Previously marginalized groups such as women, the disabled, environmentalists, and the LGBTQ+ community have become prominent in public discourse. These groups are now recognized as “minority” or “marginalized” groups, distinguished from the traditional power center, which has been patriarchal in nature. Many social movement groups, such as those focused on environmental protection, women’s rights, human rights, LGBTQ+ rights, labor rights, and welfare advocacy, are closely monitoring the actions of the new administration and will likely continue to provide feedback on reform policies. However, if the government fails to fulfill its promises regarding contentious issues such as the

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Fourth Nuclear Power Plant, the Pingnan Industrial Complex, or the Taiwan pension plan, these groups may also strongly criticize the new administration, just as they did with the KMT in the past (Hsiao, 2000). Alongside the establishment of electoral politics, direct involvement in legislative activities is emerging as a new model of political participation. Social movement groups are learning to monitor the legislative process, shape policies, and hold representatives accountable through the ballot box. This new form of political participation, known as social movement group politics, requires expertise in legal procedures and the ability to influence public opinion. The democratic transition period in Taiwan not only brought about changes in electoral rules and liberalization but also the institutionalization of new means by which organized groups can influence the policy process. As Schmitter and Karl (1991, p. 78) noted, modern democracy offers various channels for the expression of interests and values. Associations and movements are crucial in these processes, as they encourage citizens with conflicting interests to deliberate and resolve their differences. The efforts of Taiwanese social movements in legislative lobbying have laid the foundation for interest group politics in contemporary Taiwan, and the emergence of social movement group politics was a unique historical product of social groups’ efforts, especially in transitory politics. Social movement organizations, such as those advocating for environmental protection, women’s rights, human rights, LGBTQ+ issues, labor, and welfare advocacy, will continue to participate in the policy process and hold the new administration accountable. However, the emergence of social movement group politics as an institutional change did not occur automatically; it had to be innovated and practiced successfully. Any single group or single movement did not achieve this goal. Once the shared strategies invented and adapted by political challengers across issues increasingly became “modular”, they served as a blueprint for political action that could be transported from issue to issue, movement to movement, and adopted by groups of different political orientations (Hsiao, 1998; Lin, 1998). In addition to prioritizing democracy on their political agenda, social movement groups helped to push the coming of the democratic reform by facilitating the rise of social movement and interest group politics, vitalizing civil society, and experimenting with new models of civil participation (Chun, 2000). In the current wave of democratization, it is not unusual to witness turmoil and violence among some transitional political systems. Standing out from its counterparts, however, Taiwan’s democratic transition has thus far been characterized by relative stability and continuity, with no radical fluctuation. Since the end of China’s civil war in 1949, Taiwan has pursued a distinct path of development separate from mainland China. As a society with a government democratically elected by its citizens, Taiwan has cultivated its own unique cultural norms and values. What are the roles of mass and alternative media in the democratic transition? We shall analyze it in detail in the following discussions. Before analyzing the roles, the media play in the process

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in this chapter, we focus on the media policy changes in Taiwan and the significant media development and legal framework in Taiwan. The following discussion will provide us with a clear and thorough background about the emergence of alternative media in Taiwan.

References Berman, D. (1992). Words like colored glass: The role of the press in Taiwan’s democratization process. Westview. Chao, L., & Myers, R. (1998). The first Chinese democracy. Johns Hopkins University. Cheng, T. J. (1989, July). Democratizing the quasi-Leninist regime in Taiwan. World Politics. Cheng, T. J., & Haggard, S. (1992). Political change in Taiwan. Lynne Rienner. Chiu, H. Y. (1999). The basic survey project of Taiwan area’s social change. Academia Sinica. Chu, Y. H. (1992). Crafting democracy in Taiwan. Institute for National Policy Research. Chu, Y. H. (1994a). Social protests and political democratization in Taiwan. In M. Rubenstein (Ed.), The other Taiwan. M. E. Sharpe. Chu, Y. H. (1994b). Electoral competition, social cleavages, and the evolving party system. Paper delivered at a conference sponsored by the Gaston Sigur Center, George Washington University, and the Institute for National Policy Research, Washington, DC, 8–9 April. Chun, A. (2000). Democracy as hegemony, globalization as indigenization, or the “culture” in Taiwanese national politics. In W. C. Lee (Ed.), Taiwan in perspective. Brill. GIO (Government Information Office). (1999a). The Republic of China publication yearbook. GIO. Gold, T. B. (1986). State and society in the Taiwan miracle. ME Sharp. Ho, M. (2000). The state and civil society in the democratic transition: The case of environmental movement in Taiwan. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, National Taiwan University. Hsiao, H. H. (1992). The labor movement in Taiwan: A retrospective and prospective look. In F. Simon, & M. Kau (Eds.), Taiwan: Beyond the economic miracle. M. E. Sharpe. Hsiao, W. (1998). Culture, gender and community in Taiwan’s environmental movement. In A. Kalland, & G. Persoon (Eds.), Environmental movements in Asia. Curzon Press. Hsiao, H. H. (2000, June 26). Time for Taiwanese activists to go global. Taipei Times. Johnson, M. (1992). Classification, power and markets: Waning of the ethnic division of labor. In D. Simon, & M. Kau (Eds.), Taiwan: Beyond the economic miracle. M. E. Sharpe. Jow, M. (1995). Media effects on democratic orientations: A case study in Taiwan. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Lee, C. C. (1993). Sparkling a fire: The press and the ferment of democratic change in Taiwan. Journalism Monographs, 138. Lii, D. T., & Wu, J.M. (2000, April 6). Constructing a new civil society. Taipei Times.

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Lin, W. (1998). The prospect and retrospect of Taiwanese social welfare movements. National Taiwan University Press. Pang, C. K. (1992, June). The changing relationship between the state and society in Taiwan during the 1980s. National Taiwan University Journal of Sociology, 21. Rigger, S. (1993, October). The risk of reform: Factional conflict in Taiwan’s 1989 municipal elections. American Journal of Chinese Studies. Schmitter, P., & Karl, T. (1991). What democracy is … and is not. Journal of Democracy, 2(3). Wang, F. C. (1990, September). Zuqun dongyuan yu Taiwan fandui yundong de zhichi zhuanyi (Ethnic mobilization and the shifting support of Taiwan’s opposition movement’), Zhonhhuo Luntan, 360, 42–52. Winckler, E. A. (1984). Institutionalization and participation on Taiwan: From hard to soft authoritarianism? China Quarterly, 99.

CHAPTER 4

Media Environment in Taiwan from the 1950s to 2000

In this chapter, we will discuss the developments that had the most significance on the media in Taiwan. Changing government political policies vis-à-vis media are examined closely, as are the changes within the media development and legal framework in Taiwan. To examine the changes between Taiwanese politics and alternative media in the following chapters, this chapter provides a framework for studying the relationship between the Taiwanese mass media and political parties, both ruling and opposition, within the context of “democracy”. By exploring this relationship, we aim to uncover insights into the impact of interactions between the mass media and political parties on the state of democracy in Taiwan.

Authoritarian Regime and Mass Media Taiwan’s media prior to the late 1980s were marked by contradictions (Hong, 1999, p. 42). After losing the civil war and being exiled in 1949, the Kuomintang (KMT) established its ruling position in the Republic of China in Taiwan. During the presidencies of Chiang Kai-Shek (1949–1975) and his son, Chiang Chin-Kuo (1975–1988), Taiwan’s political system was considered authoritarian in comparison to other developing countries. At that time, the three primary mass media outlets in Taiwan were broadcast television, newspapers, and radio. Rubin (1993) highlighted that media control can take on 5 different forms: direct state monopoly over the media, control via licensing and self-censorship, emergency regulations and national security laws, pressuring the media, and violence against journalists. All 5 control patterns were visible in Taiwan, which © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Hong and C.-N. Hou, Alternative Media and Taiwan’s Socio-Political Transformation, 1970s–1990s, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2477-6_4

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made the media environment in Taiwan “an anti-communist society—a closed, communist-like media system” (Hong, 1999, p. 42). During the period of early authoritarianism in Taiwan, the mass media was strongly controlled by the KMT. Historically, the KMT government had taken over all industries and businesses under the Japanese colonial economic system at the end of World War II. In 1949, 91% of businesses were governmentowned, and only 9% were privately owned, which represented a phenomenon of state capitalism (Chen et al., 1991). The mass media, which was a crucial mechanism for propaganda, was primarily reorganized and managed by the KMT, the Taiwan Provincial Government, and the Department of Defense. The ruling party employed various tactics to maintain control over the mass media. The methods used by the KMT to exert this control are outlined as follows (see Chen et al., 1991; Lin, 1998; Lo et al., 1994): 1. Regulations that compelled the media to conform to the government’s directives. Through the implementation of the first strategy, the government limited the reach of print media through licensing. The Regulation of Restrictions on Newspaper’s Registration and Pages was enacted to prohibit the registration of new Taiwanese newspapers for 38 years (1949–1987). This regulation not only prevented the creation of new newspapers but also influenced existing newspapers’ views toward the government. As a result, many of the larger existing newspapers refrained from criticizing the government out of fear of losing their licenses. 2. State ownership, entailing direct control over the media. The second strategy involved the complete ownership of the largest radio station, the “Broadcasting Corporation of China” (BCC), by the KMT, which transformed it into a political party-owned station. In December 1992, there were 33 radio broadcasting companies in Taiwan, with 188 stations and 435 transmitters. Of these companies, six were operated by the military, six by KMT government agencies, one (BCC) was directly owned by the KMT party, and 20 were privately owned (Wang, 1993a, 1993b). Although there were 20 private radio broadcasting companies, they were all relatively small and broadcasting capability, and only broadcasted locally (see Table 4.1). 3. By collaborating with reliable private enterprises. The third strategy involved the formation of three major television networks in cooperation with trusted private enterprises. To maintain control over these media outlets, the KMT employed three tactics (see Chen et al., 1991; Lo et al., 1994; Wang, 1993a, 1993b): (a) holding the majority of stocks in the media companies; (b) controlling the board of directors and managing the media through majority stock ownership; and (c) establishing party factions within these media outlets through managerial control to organize party-member media workers and monitor the political attitudes of other workers.

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Table 4.1 1992 Taiwanese radio’s ownership type and broadcasting capabilities Type of ownership

Station number

Transmitters (rate)

Electric capability

Private radio Military radio Government radio KMT-owned (BCC) Total

20 6 6 1

64 (14.7%) 176 (40.4%) 56 (12.9%) 139 (32%)

1.8% 1.3% 3.7% 43.2%

33

435 (100%)

100%

Source Wang C. H. (1993a), Controls in electronic media. In Chi, H., Y. Wang, C., Lin, T., Liu, C., Shu, H., Dran, R., Wong, S., & Lee, G., Disintegrating electronic media (p. 109). Taipei: Hen-Wei Publishing Co

In 1951, the Executive Yuan, Taiwan’s highest level of government administration, established a policy concerning the television industry. The policy stipulated that while the government would establish television stations and facilities, business enterprises would handle their management (Chi et al., 1993; Lin, 1998). For instance, Taiwan Television Enterprise, Ltd. (TTV), the first television station, was established in 1962. In accordance with the control strategies and the Executive Yuan’s fundamental principle, the majority of TTV’s stock was held by the Provincial Government of Taiwan, while the remainder was owned by enterprises deemed “trustworthy partners” of the ruling party (Lin, 1998). Table 4.2 presents detailed information on the stock ownership of the three major television networks that are shared by the KMT party and the ruling government. As it held most of the company’s stocks, the KMT had the legal power to make decisions about the media’s management and board. By controlling members of the board of trustees of a major television network, it was easy to understand the KMT’s influence on this medium. For instance, in the China Television Company (CTV), the president and 2 vice presidents were KMT members, and five out of nine trustees on the board of directors were KMT members (Chiang, 1994; Lin, 1998). With the KMT’s control over the media, it wielded significant influence in making crucial decisions and appointing reliable personnel. Administrative control was another strategy employed by the KMT to exert control over the media. The Broadcasting and Television Law was not enacted until 1976, which meant that the first television station had operated without regulation for over 14 years. During this period, the KMT controlled electronic media by issuing administrative orders and replacing high-ranking managers (Lin, 1998). In 1965, the KMT established its News Faction under the command of the Central Committee, the highest power in the party, and the News Faction had branches within television stations, radio stations, newspapers, and magazines (Chiang, 1994; Lin, 1998; Lo et al., 1994). The party’s

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Table 4.2 Taiwan television stock shared by the KMT and its ruling government

TV company

Years

Share by the KMT

Share by Govt

TTV

1970s 1980s 1992 1970s 1980s 1992 1970s 1980s 1992

48.96% 48.95% 48.95% 50.00% 60.27% 68.23% 49.00% 83.32% 86.45%

51.04% 51.05% 51.05% 50.00% 39.73% 31.77% 51.00% 17.68% 13.55%

CTV

CTS

Source Wang C. H. (1993a). Controls in electronic media. In Chi, H., Y. Wang, C., Lin, T., Liu, C., Shu, H., Dran, R., Wong, S., & Lee, G., Disintegrating electronic media (pp. 89, 94, 98). Taipei: Hen-Wei Publishing Co

News Faction aimed to organize all KMT-member media workers and ensure their loyalty (Lin, 1998). Overall, research on Taiwanese media has focused on the KMT’s state capitalism and its control of the media during Taiwan’s development. According to Wang (1993a), the KMT’s authority relied on “domination”, which was represented by its political, economic, and ideological controls. The mass media served as a major tool for the KMT’s ideological domination. Chiang (1994) observed that the KMT monopolized the media to achieve both commercial and ideological control goals. For political opposition parties and social movement groups, it is difficult to seize part of mainstream media and utilize part of them as a propaganda mechanism.

Censorship and Media Control in the Martial Law Period To categorize the democratic roles of media, Curran (2000) proposed criteria based on the relationship between the political elite, other elites, and the media within a society. Subsequently, 4 ideal types were identified: the first model, as illustrated by contemporary Russia, represents the domination of the economic elite who exert their political influence through their power base in the economy, control of private media, funding of political candidates, and informal channels of access to the state. In the second model, broadly represented by Malaysia, South Korea, and Taiwan before recent democratizations, the leading group is the political elite who exercise their influence on other groups in society through the media system. Corresponding to some Latin American countries, the third ideal type marks an alliance between the political and economic elites who try to win the popular acceptance of their consensus through the media. The fourth model, exemplified by liberal corporatism in

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contemporary Sweden and, until the 1980s, by Britain, is characterized by a system of power-sharing among organized capital, labor, and the state, which heavily influences the discourses in the media. As with many ideal types, the boundaries between these models are sometimes not clearly defined. It is possible for a given country to exhibit traits of more than one type. These ideal types are meant for analytical purposes and are delineated primarily based on modes of media control. It is also important to acknowledge that these ideal types are not fixed and can evolve as power structures change over time. With that in mind, I shall turn to examine the roles played by the media in the process of power transition. In civil society, mass media plays the role of watchdog, providing public information about the government. Policy makers are often responsive to media reports of public issues because they perceive that media coverage of these issues will have an impact on public opinion. In an authoritarian society, government officials also perceive a tremendous influence of mass media on public opinion; however, they often try to prevent mass media from covering public issues, which produces negative effects on their ruling power. By limiting the freedom of mass media, they try to socialize citizens and control public opinion (Cheng, 1988). The KMT effectively controlled the mainstream media. The government monopolized all 3 television channels and most radio stations. A bill of publication law amendments was approved in 1958, empowering the government to enact publishing bans and rescind newspaper licenses. This effectively prevented press ownership from falling into the hands of the KMT challengers. Newspaper owners at that time were forced to side with the KMT to obtain either subsides of survival or were forced to sell their newspaper licenses to government-approved owners (Fang, 1995). Although the United Daily news group (联合报) sided with the conservative wing of the KMT hierarchy and the China Times group (中国时报) leaned toward its liberal faction, they were both nonetheless faithful to the KMT. In exchange for the loyalty of the 2 most profitable private newspaper groups, the KMT bestowed immense political and economic benefits on them. Both the owners of the United Daily and the China Times were recruited into the Standing Committee of the KMT Central Committee, the top positions of the party (Berman, 1992; Rawnsley, 2000). The concentration of power of the mass media in the hands of government, military, and the ruling party for more than 40 years created great imbalance in the presentation of views, especially in underrepresented divergent minority views (Peng, 1994). During authoritarian rule, the media was not allowed to criticize either government policies or political officials. Dissenting information may sometimes slip through an otherwise controlled press. Occasionally, editors run stories that they are unable to foresee their troublesome implications and unintended spin-offs. To counter this, the KMT employed so-called loyal writers and paid them large sums to

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write articles that cast doubt on dissenting ideas and the motives of authors of troublesome stories (Wei, 1985). Police powers were once utilized to harass these newspersons, writers, or professors if they persisted in writing dissenting stories during the “white terror” in the 1950s (Rampal, 1994a). Over the years, hundreds of individuals have been imprisoned or faced the threat of imprisonment. Some have been prohibited from delivering public speeches, while others have been repeatedly ordered by the government to surrender documents, tapes, and other materials utilized by news outlets. These types of interference have had a “chilling effect” on the press, resulting in a climate of self-censorship. In the 1960s, despite the taking-off of Taiwan’s economy, the government continued to show no tolerance toward dissent because it asserted that economic growth and political stability were inseparable (Pang, 1992). Mass media were further used as propaganda tools to socialize people and perform political control. In the press ban period, many journalists remained conditioned by their earlier socialization to report at the will of the KMT. Reporters who attempted to challenge the status quo were, however, constrained by structural factors. Information that aligned with the official view was prioritized with prominent placement, while dissenting views were often relegated to the back pages with limited space or even omitted altogether. This disparity in coverage limited the visibility and impact of dissenting ideas in the media landscape. There was no requirement for balanced reporting in Taiwan. Lee (1993) described the situation of the KMT censors blacking out news. “It was widely known that the KMT’s censors would dutifully make a round of nightly phone calls before deadlines to newspaper editors and publishers with instructions to kill or edit a particular news item it deemed sensitive or embarrassing” (p. 24). After a phone call, stories were either discreetly killed or softened at administrators’ request. Parts or entire sequences of pictures, which were sensitive to the ruling party, could be cut out of television news. Important news appearing in television newscasts at noon would often disappear from the evening news programs. Censorship poses a significant risk as it may impede the free and unrestricted access to factual knowledge and unbiased interpretation, which are essential for making critical decisions. Freedom of expression and information have been regarded as key democratic values. Donnelly and Howard (1988) argued that freedom of expression is of little value if individuals seeking to voice their opinions are barred from publicly or privately owned channels of communication. True freedom of expression cannot exist if one is prohibited from reaching their intended audience, or if those without access to the media are unable to freely express their perspectives. Opposition and minority groups have demanded improved access to print and broadcast media in Taiwan. However, the government owns and controls the channels of communication, and the ruling KMT was reluctant to share power with minorities. The imbalanced report was especially evident during the election campaigns.

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The owners of Taiwan’s mainstream media, who were typically entrenched in established interests, espoused the dominant ideology and were therefore unlikely to question the prevailing state of affairs. Being resource-poor and having little access to the mainstream media, political opposition parties and minority groups had to rely on alternative media, which were usually less susceptible to both financial and technological constraints. Alternative media platforms, including opposition political publications and underground radio channels, have played a pivotal role in challenging and undermining government control over mainstream newspapers and television networks. With the help of mobile VCR cameras and cable television systems, dissident groups have been able to present a “people’s perspective” on events involving conflict in contrast to the reality defined by government-controlled television stations (Berman, 1992; Rawnsley, 2000). As we see, freedom of expression is a key empowerment right, while democracy is essential to guarantee the free flow of information. In addition to government-dominant media, alternative media play a crucial role in achieving democracy by providing individuals opportunities to seek and obtain information in relation to their own interests.

Taiwanese Society and Media System after the Lift of Martial Law Although the government, the military, and the KMT owned the majority of terrestrial television stations and a significant number of radio stations, many of these stations became commercial in nature. As Taiwan began to democratize, the heavy concentration of media resources in the hands of a few became the frequent target of criticism, and the pressure to privatize the 2 government and the 1 ruling-party-owned broadcast television companies mounted. CTV was the first to respond to such calls. Since 1996, the KMT sold 19.7% of its shares, reducing its holding to less than 47 %, and in 1999, CTV made another bold move, releasing 6.7% of its share on the market. CTV’s change in ownership structure, in the face of fierce competition from popular liberal satellite channels such as the Hong Kong-based TVBS, reflected a positive response to calls for decentralization of resources. It also reflected the authorities’ willingness to relax controls on terrestrial television, which they now perceived more as a business than as an instrument for ideological control (Lin, 1998). By the late 1990s, it was becoming obvious that the existing legal framework was no longer adequate for mass media. Difficulties in regulating the industry arose when technological convergence and business integration increasingly blurred the distinctions between the media, telecommunications carriers, and computer systems. With technological standards set by the Telecommunications Law and licensing and content regulation set by the law governing individual media, a need would arise not only for a new law each

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time a new medium appeared but also for a team of experts to decide which law should apply in each individual case (Lee, 1998). To maintain its legitimacy, the mainstream press should fairly represent legitimate voices across the range of views expressed by prominent officials and members of institutional power blocs in the new political landscape (Bennett, 1990). Opposition voices have gained visibility in the official range of debate, although their presentation may still be influenced by the respective press interests and ideologies (Lo et al., 1998; Tao, 1995). As no one had full control over the KMT leadership during the period from 1987 to 1995, the media did not have to conform to a single force (Teng, 1997). Lee Teng-hui, the first locally born president, never concealed his disdain for the Chinese Communist regime’s attempts to bring Taiwan back into its fold. After Lee’s landslide victory, political orthodoxy was redefined, thereby reshaping the media’s scope of “consensus” and “dissent” (Hallin, 1986), particularly on sensitive issues such as ethnic identity and cross-strait relations between mainland China and Taiwan. In 1999, the Freedom Forum ranked Taiwan as a “free” press society with a restriction score of 25 out of 100. In relation to laws and regulations that influence media content, the score was 6 out of 15 for broadcast and 4 out of 15 for print. In relation to economic influences over media content, the score was 4 out of 15 each for broadcast and print media. It had a zero score on repressive action (Sussman, 1999). The major concern among critics of the media was no longer the lack of press freedom but the increasingly confused ethical principles. As Pang (1998) pointed out in a review of press freedom in Taiwan, attacking the mass media became a campaign strategy during elections. Gangsters could physically attack reporters, who could also be fired by media owners unhappy with them. On the other hand, the line between press freedom and the invasion of privacy became increasingly indistinguishable, as were the boundaries separating fair media access, the public’s right to know, and trial by press (Wang, 1998). For example, an already accepted practice among journalists in Taiwan was interviewing criminals after, or even before, their arrest. According to Hong’s observations and predictions (1999, pp. 55–56), Taiwan’s media continued to confront several challenges and issues. While the advancement of the media was linked to the maturation of society as it transitioned to a genuinely “democratic, liberal, mature, and pluralistic society” (“Democracy and press freedom”, 1999), the media did not necessarily need to evolve into a more stable and developed societal institution. The success of establishing a free, autonomous, and socially responsible press in Taiwan’s media development hinges on the media’s effective participation in the social transition and democratization process (Hong, 1999). Besides the mainstream media, alternative media must also assume the responsibility of advocating for and safeguarding democracy in Taiwan. As such, political decision-makers, the public, mainstream media, and alternative media share the responsibility of realizing these objectives.

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Media Development and Legal Framework in Taiwan since 1945 After examining the media policy changes in Taiwan, it is worthwhile to analyze various kinds of media development and legal frameworks to provide the whole background about why alternative media emerge beyond mainstream media in Taiwan. Newspapers After the restoration of Taiwan, the KMT government abolished news censorships and monopolies, and the number of newspapers increased to 28 by early 1947 (Lee, 1973). In 1951, claiming a newsprint shortage, the government froze applications for newspaper licenses and set a ceiling on the number of daily newspapers (Lo et al., 1999). Through the newspaper ban, the government effectively restricted freedom of the press and prevented newspaper ownership from falling into the hands of the opposition (Lee, 1993). This strategy resulted in the government, the KMT, and the armed forces owning 14 of the 31 daily newspapers (Cheng, 1988). Even though the 2 most extensive daily newspapers, the United Daily News, and the China Times , were privately owned, both their proprietors were members of the KMT’s Center Standing Committee. Due to the press ban policy, licenses became a scarce commodity that only the party-state and these two newspapers could afford. Before 1987, the Independent Evening Post (自立晚报) was the only proopposition newspaper in Taiwan. In the name of national unity and security in the face of the communist threat, the press had to manage with limited freedom, and it rarely openly challenged government authority (Lo et al., 1999). The government lifted the freeze on newspaper license applications in 1988, soon after the revocation of martial law. Following the lifting of the newspaper ban, the number of newspapers in Taiwan has increased significantly, from 31 in 1987 to 360 in 1998, out of which 179 are dailies. However, only 40 newspapers enjoy a wide readership (GIO, 1999). The 2 largest newspapers, the United Daily News, and the China Times , immediately doubled their page count from 12 to 24 pages per issue after the ban was lifted (Lay & Schweitzer, 1990). In the early 1990s, the largest dailies had increased their page count to 30–50 pages per issue and often exceeded 50 pages on weekends (Rampal, 1994a). The democratizing movement in Taiwan led to a growing liberalization in news reporting and commentary (Rampal, 1994a; Wei, 1998). In the face of fierce competition—especially from the new pro-opposition party newspapers such as the Capital Morning Paper (首都早报)—those with a pro-government and pro-KMT editorial policy, including the United Daily News and the China Times , began to take a more liberal, neutral stance (Lo, 1994).

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Before 1987, the martial law permitted the government to infringe upon the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. The Publications Law—written in 1930 and revised in 1937, 1952, 1958, and 1973—required the licensing of newspapers. It also gave the government the right to implement postpublication censorship (Parker, 1982, p. 854). Although the government seldom censored the newspapers, it had made clear that certain topics were taboo: calling for Taiwan’s independence, glorifying mainland China and communism, or criticizing the president (Parker, 1982). Since the lifting of martial law, the press acquired a freedom that it never enjoyed before. In 1992, the government amended the Sedition Law to cover only direct advocacy of violence. It legalized the promotion of political independence from mainland China. With most of the controlling measures getting outdated, the Publication Law lost its raison d’etre, causing the government to abolish it in early 1999. The revocation of the Publication Law on January 25, 1999 was a significant step in Taiwan’s progress toward press freedom. The Legislative Yuan (congress) abolished the 70-year-old law, which was a remnant of the pre-martial law period and was occasionally used by the government to limit freedom of the press and freedom of publication through licensing. When restrictions on newspaper licensing and publishing were eased in January 1988, newspapers continued to expand to 32 or even 40 pages per issue, and news coverage became more professional and specialized. However, the growth of the newspaper industry was stunted by the economic slowdown, rising paper costs, high cable TV penetration, and rapid proliferation of the Internet. Advertising revenues, especially from the construction and automobile industries, decreased in 2000. To tackle these obstacles, prominent newspapers formed strategic partnerships with other industries, implemented salary cuts, downsized their workforce, or consolidated editorial operations among affiliated publications. Smaller newspapers had to shut down, while some reduced their page count (GIO, 2002). Additionally, many newspapers adopted an online presence by making their content available on the internet. One intriguing trend in the newspaper industry can be observed in Taiwan’s geography and social diversity. While major daily newspapers in Taipei, such as the China Times , United Daily News, and Liberty Times (自由时报), provide extensive coverage of national issues and aim for more objective reporting, local newspapers based in Kaohsiung reflect a stronger sense of the local identity of people in southern Taiwan. The Kaohsiung press is known for being aggressive and provocative, with a heavy emphasis on political news as well as on the culture, literature, and history of the southern region. Leading Kaohsiung papers, such as the Commons Daily (民众日报) and the Taiwan Times (台湾时报), frequently use expressions unique to the Taiwanese dialect (Table 4.3).

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Table 4.3 Statistics of newspapers in Taiwan: 1990–2002

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Year

Registered number of newspapers

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

211 237 270 274 300 335 362 344 360 433 451 463 474

Source GIO (1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002). The Republic of China publication yearbook. Taipei: GIO

Magazines In Taiwan, during the martial law period, numbers of political magazines were able to operate as centers of organized intelligence for the opposition movement as they were not included in the press ban (Lee, 1993). As a result, magazines became the preferred medium for political dissidents. Liberal Mainlander intellectuals established Free China (自由中国) as a forum to advocate democratic reform in the 1950s, but their attempt to organize an opposition party was unsuccessful. The 1960s were a decade of silence. By the mid-1970s, oppositional magazines revived by indigenous Taiwanese politicians attracted not only urban intellectuals but also a sizable middle-class and grassroots following that sought more equitable power sharing and greater political participation. These magazines, focused on the almost annual elections, were closely associated with the tangwai (opposition) movement. They challenged the official narrative and openly negotiated new rules with the authorities (Berman, 1992). They also educated the public, mobilized support during elections, and fostered a collective oppositional consciousness among its members. By the time the regime decided to crack down on oppositional political magazines, they were already too strong to be eradicated and played a “hide and seek” game with official censors (Lee, 1993). By the mid-1980s, some of these magazines began to succumb to market pressures and published ethically dubious accounts that exposed the secrets of the Chiang family. Despite the famous case of Free China in 1960, when several arrests were made on sedition charges, opposition magazines flourished in the 1980s as democratization began to take shape. However, the regime also bestowed

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vast and arbitrary power on overlapping censorship agencies consisting of the KMT’s Cultural Committee, the Taiwan Garrison Command, and the Government Information Office. In the following decades, hundreds of reporters, writers, and editorialists were detained, interrogated, harassed, or jailed for exceeding the permissible limits (Lee, 1992) (Table 4.4). The government in Taiwan never completely abandoned the abstract goals of democracy and press freedom. However, they argued that these principles should be temporarily set aside in the interest of fighting communism. The opposition forces challenged the government-media clientelist relationship as unconstitutional due to its extralegal character. The significant gap between the government’s rhetoric and actions created a fertile ground for the battle against government censorship and for the revival of civil society (Lee, 1993). For 15 years, opposition magazines coexisted with mainstream press as unlikely allies until the democratic changes deprived them of their raison d’être. Opposition magazines never disappeared—despite arrests, confiscation of issues, and orders to shut down businesses—until the lifting of martial law liberalized the media and took away their market. Currently in Taiwan, the press is allowed to disclose information or provide commentary on the actions of any government official or public figure, if it does not pose an imminent threat to Taiwan’s national security. Taiwan’s magazine industry has witnessed remarkable change and growth, where intense competition has led to the downfall of several long-standing magazines and the rise of a diverse range of new publications. According to Table 4.4 Statistics of magazines in Taiwan: 1990–2002

Year

Registered number of magazines

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

4337 4287 4474 4762 5096 5231 5439 5676 5884 6451 6892 7810 8140

Source GIO (1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002). The Republic of China publication yearbook. Taipei: GIO

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GIO (2002), the number of magazines has surged from about 3400 in 1988 to 8140 in 2002. Publishers employ various strategies to boost their sales, including advertisements, direct marketing, telemarketing, discounts, freebies, and prize draws. Radio Since 1949, the KMT party-state has monopolized a significant portion of radio frequency under the pretext of safeguarding Taiwan’s security (Zheng, 1993, p. 109). Out of the 33 stations, the KMT-controlled BCC alone operated 32% of the total transmitters and 43% of the radio power on the island. Additionally, six military stations held 41% of the transmitters and 52% of the radio power. A larger number of small private stations (20)—owned by associates of the security apparatus, religious groups, and affluent families—had to share the remaining portion (15% of the transmitters and less than 2% of radio power). The government started radio broadcasting and kept it under its control in the initial phase of development. Under martial law, the government closely monitored radio broadcasting and kept the number of radio stations at 33 until 1993. The ruling KMT, the government and the armed forces owned 12 of these stations (Rampal, 1994b). The largest was the KMT-owned BCC, which had 4 island-wide domestic networks, an overseas service, and a mainland China service. In 1993, the government approved additional frequencies for applicants. From then up to 1997, the authorities approved applications for 118 radio frequencies. By mid-1998, the radio broadcasting landscape in Taiwan had undergone significant growth, with the number of radio stations reaching 80, and another 65 stations under construction (GIO, 1999). In the early 1990s, radio broadcasting had become ubiquitous, reaching almost every household in Taiwan, with approximately 18 million receivers (Rampal, 1994b). By mid1998, it was estimated that nearly 99% of Taiwanese homes owned at least one radio, with a majority of 82% owning two or more (Chiu, 1999). The numbers continued to increase, and by December 2002, there were 174 radio stations, with another 32 under construction (GIO, 2002). This growth in radio stations reflected the evolving media landscape in Taiwan during that period. After the government lifted the freeze on new radio licenses, many of these frequencies covered only small-to-medium broadcast ranges, and private community radio stations started to flourish, bringing significant changes to an industry dominated until then by island-wide or metropolitan radio stations. In comparison to their well-established competitors, the new genre of community radio stations paid closer attention to local affairs. At the same time, they also became more global in perspective as many entered into alliances with other radio networks or even cable and satellite TV services to achieve economies of scale (Table 4.5).

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Table 4.5 Statistics of radio in Taiwan: 1994–2002

Year

Registered number of stations

1994 1997 2001 2002

33 73 139 174

Source GIO (1994, 1997, 2001, 2002). The Republic of China publication yearbook. Taipei: GIO

Television Although television arrived in Taiwan 30 years later than radio, the 2 electronic media followed a similar path of development. Television arrived in Taiwan in 1962, when Taiwan Television Enterprise inaugurated its service. TTV completed its island-wide relay system in 1965, and 2 other companies, CTV and CTS, later joined the competition. These 3 companies dominated the Taiwanese television market for more than 3 decades until the authorities released more frequencies to license applicants in 1993. In the late 1990s, Formosa Television (FTV, 民视) and Public Television joined the TV market. Following an 18-year delay, the Public Television Service (PTS) commenced broadcasting on its own channel on July 1, 1998. The concept of publicinterest television was initially suggested in 1980, and the Government Information Office (GIO) established a task force four years later to create public-interest programs to be broadcast on a rotating basis on the three commercial stations. Eventually, PTS secured its own channel. While the government initially provided subsidies to PTS during its first year of operation, the subsidy was intended to decrease gradually in the coming years. Prior to 1993, television served as an effective tool for regime control by avoiding politically sensitive topics and discrediting opposing viewpoints. As a mass medium, it catered to the preferences of predominantly local Taiwanese audiences. However, the party-state, influenced by Chinese nationalism, compelled the 3 stations to eliminate local dialects from their programming in favor of Mandarin (Lee, 1980, p. 157). This suppression of cultural and linguistic diversity became a focal point of unyielding protests in the ensuing decades. The contrast between the cultural objectives proclaimed by the medium and its actual performance was so pronounced that it invited public scrutiny. Both top leaders admonished television stations for failing to fulfill their anticommunist and other cultural goals, emphasizing that television programs should not magnify the “dark side” of society or undermine public morality (Lee, 1992). The government responded to such criticisms by appointing managers who, one after the other, pledged to reduce the amount of violence and indecency in television programming, but their efforts proved futile. Market forces dictated that they confront commercial competition head-on

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(Peng, 1994). Even the most powerful leaders were unable to fully impose their authoritarian will on market forces. In 1993, the government lifted the 22-year ban on new TV stations. The 4th terrestrial TV station, FTV, came into existence in 1997. With strong financial backing from the major opposition party, the DPP and FTV served as a balancing chip in Taiwan’s government-dominated TV broadcast ecology. The last terrestrial television station, Public Television, went on air in 1998 after a long and winding legal process. It was an extension of the two-hour public TV program broadcast daily over the 3 TV channels and the only one that survived on public funding. At the turn of the century, the convergence of telecommunication services and cable television networks became an issue frequently debated in Taiwan. As early as 1979, some entrepreneurs in the plumbing business had started to offer Japanese wrestling programs at street-corner teahouses by using cables to connect their videocassette recorders with the subscriber’s TV sets (Wang, 1984). In its primitive form, cable television offered only 1 or 2 channels. However, over the years, significant growth in channel capacity and penetration occurred despite government efforts to stamp out unlicensed operations. In 1994, when cable television was legalized in Taiwan, about 42% of all TV households subscribed to cable TV services (Liu, 1994). However, this number skyrocketed to almost 80% by 1998 (Lee, 1998), as many cable operators began to offer over 90 channels of information and entertainment programs (Table 4.6). Mergers reduced the number of Taiwan’s cable-system operators from more than 300 in the 1980s to 140 in 1998, with 2 conglomerates, Tung-seng ( 东森) and He-hsin (和信), emerging as the major competitors. By the end of the 1990s, cable-system operators, who were not previously allowed to offer value-added services, had begun experimenting with cable modems. Table 4.6 Statistics of cable television in Taiwan: 1993–2002

Year

Number of cable TV channels

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

30 48 59 69 77 80 87 96 98 99

Source GIO (1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002). The Republic of China publication yearbook. Taipei: GIO

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Table 4.7 Cable TV penetration rate

Year

Rate (%)

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

26.3 45.7 61.8 70.7 75.9 78.5 79.0 80.3 80.6

Source GIO (2002). The Republic of China publication year book. Taipei: GIO

Meanwhile, feuds between program providers and cable-system operators were likely to cause cutthroat competition, as the former turned to direct-tohome (DTH) transmission to ensure outlets for their programs. With an 80% growth in advertising revenue in 1996 itself, it was likely that Taiwan’s cable communications market would remain one of the most lucrative businesses to run. The 2 laws governing electronic media in Taiwan are the Radio and Television Broadcast Law and the Cable Television Law, both stipulating licensing procedures, requirements for company structures, and program and advertising codes. Additionally, related to communication and information media are the Copyright Law, the Consumer Protection Law, and the Telecommunication Law. During the last 20 years, the television industry in Taiwan has confronted unprecedented challenges, including the establishment of a public television system, the legalization of private cable operations, the increased penetration of satellite broadcasting, and the growing popularity of mainland Chinese, Korean, and Japanese drama series. A trial for digital television broadcasts started in June 2000 in the metropolitan areas of northern Taiwan, and by the end of 2002, Taiwan’s 5 over-the-air TV stations were expected to be fully digitized. The advantages of a digital TV environment would be a larger number of channels, a more diverse range of programs, and interactive twoway communication (GIO, 2002), and it would allow the reception of a variety of opinions outside the mainstream culture (Table 4.7). The Internet and Online Media Computer networks did not achieve significant growth in Taiwan until the 1990s, but the speed of growth was comparable to that of many developed countries once started. The International Telecommunication Union, known

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as the ITU (1999), reported that in 1997, Taiwan had an estimated 2.57 million computers, a density of 11.8 computers per 100 people. In January 1999, Network Wizard’s survey estimated that Taiwan’s Internet hosts had increased to 309,523, producing a density of 142.75 per 10,000 people, while the Internet Software Consortium estimated the number of Internet hosts in July 1999 as 424,209, or 191.80 per 10,000 people. Taiwan had a dozen private companies offering Internet access, but the government-owned Chunghwa Telecom (中华电信), the island’s principal domestic and international telecommunications operator, remained the largest ISP, with 1.8 million paid subscribers to another 1.2 million users on school campuses (Baum, 1999). Similar growth has occurred in the number of commercial websites, which increased from 333 in early 1996 to 1951 in mid-1997 (Chen & Chen, 1997). As getting online became both a necessity and a fashionable hobby, the “Net” slashed into the audience, as well as the advertising revenue, of the other media, which themselves had to go online to compete. By 1998, almost all major media in Taiwan had crossed into the network business. Considering that few had made a substantial profit and many still defined it as a service to the audience, it is difficult to predict how this service will play out. Taiwan was rated as “least restrictive” in terms of press freedom in the Press Freedom Survey 2001 by Freedom House, reflecting the freedom of the Internet in Taiwan. The Publications Law, which had previously allowed the Taiwanese government to control publications containing seditious or treasonous material, was abolished in 1999, making Taiwan “one of the freest media environments in Asia” (Freedom House, 2001, p. 36). The regulation of the Internet reflected the sense of public policy and the process of democratization in Taiwan. The Taiwanese government has taken a cautious stance toward the expansion of the Internet since 1995, refraining from imposing censorship. Instead, authorities have maintained that there is no need for further regulation of online activities. This stance has been supported by many experts and specialists who believe that a thriving Internet industry will significantly contribute to the island’s political and economic progress (“Taiwan ponders regulation as cyber”, n.d.). As a result, the Taiwanese government does not censor political dissent content, racial or religious issues on the Internet. However, criminal laws are enforced for activities related to pornography, the sale of illegal pornography, or the solicitation of sexual services. Selling pirated software and illegal materials on the internet is also prohibited. Adult-content websites must display warning signs on their opening pages to remind users (“Taiwan ponders regulation as cyber”, n.d.). The Internet has grown from a small means of communication in the 1990s to a flourishing medium of political advocacy. Unlike most mainstream media,

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Table 4.8 Internet penetration rate

Year

June Dec. June Dec. June Dec. June Dec. June

Rate (%) 1997 1997 1998 1998 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001

6 8 11 15 20 22 25 28 32

Source GIO (2002). The Republic of China publication yearbook. Taipei: GIO

the Internet’s greatest strength lies in its ability to provide equal opportunities for all. As Taiwan’s Internet penetration rate increased (see Table 4.8), it became a powerful interactive tool for political communication. As the cost of computers decreases and Internet access fees become more affordable, it is expected that more individuals will join the Internet community, resulting in a more inclusive representation of the general population. However, the Internet is not a completely egalitarian space; those with more power and resources will likely have a greater influence and presence (Atton, 2002). Nevertheless, opposition parties, social movements, and minority groups have actively utilized the Internet, often through the commodification of identity. The Internet has allowed them to express their views, voice their opinions, and engage in discussions and learning within virtual communities. Newspapers, magazines, radio, and television have long been the primary sources of information and entertainment for people in Taiwan. These media outlets perform vital functions in a free society, but they are also constantly evolving. Technological breakthroughs, economic growth, and political liberalization have been the driving forces behind Taiwan’s media transition during the democratic era. The achievement of these changes, however, was a result of the collaborative efforts between the government and the people of Taiwan. The private sector, characterized by its energy, training, and resourcefulness, has played a crucial role in advancing media quality and productivity, alongside more liberalized government policies.

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Tao, S. P. (1995). The role of the press in the transitional Taiwan: An investigation of the “guard dog” conception of the media. Unpublished [M.A. thesis] University of Minnesota. Teng, S. (1997). Hard-pressed Taiwan’s newspaper battle for readers. Sinorama, August, 6–15. Wang, C. H. (1993a). Controls in electronic media. In H. Y. Chi, C. Wang, T. Lin, C. Liu, H. Shu, R. Dran, S. Wong, & G. Lee (Eds.), Disintegrating electronic media. Hen-Wei Publishing Co. Wang, C.H. (1993b). The control power of broadcasting. In Chen-Se (Eds.), The de-structuring of broadcasting. Chen-Sho. Wang, G. (1984). The fourth channel. Unpublished [Research Paper] in Chinese, the National Science Council, Taipei. Wang, G. (1998). Communication ethics in a changing Chinese society. In C. Christians & M. Traber (Eds.), Communication ethics and universal values. Sage Publications. Wei, C. T. (1985). The process of pursuit for freedom and democracy by the intellectuals in the past thirty years. In Editorial Committee of the China Forum (Ed.), Social change and cultural development in Taiwan. Lien-Ching. Wei, R. (1998). Press development in Taiwan and the changing coverage of the Taiwan-China relationship. In B. T. McIntyre (Ed.), Mass media in the Asia Pacific. Multilingual Matters. Zheng, Z. (ed.). (1993). Deconstructing the broadcast media (in Chinese). Yunchen.

CHAPTER 5

The Main Alternative Media in the Martial Law Period of Taiwan

Between 1947 and 1987, the era of martial law, opposition leaders and a group of idealistic journalists from mainstream media adhered to the standards of their profession and recognized their responsibility to act as a watchdog against government actions. Despite the prohibition of their own publications from printing critical stories, they typically provided the majority of such content for the under-resourced and underfunded tangwai magazines.

Political Background for Opposition in the Martial Law Period Although the mainstream media held their own opinions that differed from the KMT government, they were unable to effectively challenge the ruling political party and its apparatus. In contrast, alternative media, primarily the opposition press, faced fewer restrictions and served a more valuable political purpose beyond reporting news and opinions. These alternative magazines served as a platform for activists who were eager to learn about political participation, competition, and mobilization. As a result, the opposition press played a similar role to that of traditional political parties. They provided the movement with ideological guidance, opportunities for patronage, a means of consolidating interests, and a means of recruiting and training leaders (Rawnsley, 2000). Berman (1992) reviewed this situation and suggested that the opposition press was primarily focused on fulfilling the role of a surrogate political party, rather than just conveying perspectives and opinions:

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By continually pushing—and subsequently expanding—the limits of acceptable behavior, by providing a nonviolent, legal context in which a de facto opposition could develop and mature, opposition magazine organizations made a substantial contribution to the relatively smooth transition to a much more democratic form of government. (p. 172)

In addition, the opposition press played a critical role in establishing and shaping the identities that would ultimately unify the opposition movement, including those representing the poor, working class, and most importantly, the Taiwanese people. The government was unable to comprehend that the opposition movement, through these alternative media, was simply demanding what was guaranteed in the constitution—popular elections and the right to form political parties (Berman, 1992). This principle remains relevant in the context of political opposition in Taiwan. All opposition political movements in Taiwan from the aftermath of the “February 28 Incident” in 1947 to the formation and legalization of the DPP in the late 1980s centered on opposition political magazines. The opposition political magazines played a leading role in the initial efforts to establish a credible alternative to the ruling KMT government.

The Birth of Political Opposition Magazine Despite allowing electoral contests in Taiwan, albeit only at the local level, since 1950, the KMT government effectively ensured non-competitive elections, with competition limited to factions within the party. As previously mentioned, the fate of Taiwanese leaders following the “February 28 Incident” was grim. As a result, organized opposition to the KMT did not exist within Taiwan. Instead, the core of social movements challenging the government was based in foreign countries, such as the United States and Japan, where some leaders had fled during the “White Terror” of the early 1950s, while others had been exiled there. The KMT’s dominance in elections was challenged by several independent candidates who succeeded in gaining support. Critics were permitted to conduct public meetings and express their views on municipal and social issues, as long as their actions did not threaten the party’s control over Taiwan. These activities were tolerated solely because they did not pose a significant threat to the party’s rule and helped project Taiwan’s image as a free and democratic political system to the international community. Involvement in elections also served as a valuable training ground for activists, many of whom later became prominent figures in the opposition movement. Ultimately, a multi-stage revolution took place: Taiwan saw the emergence of a political opposition that gradually gained influence, and the ruling party learned to coexist with it. This evolutionary phase of limited democracy played a crucial role in Taiwan’s democratic advancement

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and consolidation by allowing time for people and elites to learn about democracy through practice and for their cultural values to become supportive of democratic practices. (Chao & Myers, 1998)

From this point of view, the political opposition learned to use powerful and inspirational but short-lived political magazines or journals (see Table 5.1) to consolidate their ideas and mobilization. However, opposition political magazines would refashion themselves under different names after being closed down for exceeding the limits of expression that the regime was willing to tolerate. Old issues of banned publications would be circulated, as well as reprinted and circulated surreptitiously, for years after their demise. Berman (1992) has made significant contributions to our understanding of opposition political magazines in Taiwan and has explained why this specific medium was favored over others. He pointed out that establishing and operating newspapers under KMT regulations was challenging. Newspapers required licensing and were subject to strict guidelines that limited the number of pages that could be printed. On the other hand, magazines faced less stringent regulations. Additionally, magazines required less initial capital, could operate on irregular publishing schedules, and had more resilient circulation management than newspapers. These factors made magazines perfectly suited for undercover production and distribution. The concept of using alternative media was developed during the final years of martial law in Taiwan. With 2695 registered magazines in 1981 relative to population and geographic area, Taiwan was considered the most advanced Table 5.1 Banned publication units of opposition political magazines in Taiwan: 1979–1989 Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986* 1987* 1988* 1989*

Units of publication started

Banned units by the govt

11 7 10 7 6 23 21 20 14 11 6

9 4 6 4 5 19 18 12 6 1 1

Source Fang, C. S. (1995, August). The dissident media in postwar Taiwan: From political magazine to “underground radio”. Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies, 20, p. 185 *means these data were collected by the author, and these materials were from the Library of Taiwanese Social Movement, I-Lan, Taiwan

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region in terms of magazine distribution (Yang, 1988). These magazines were deemed necessary to fulfill any information gaps not covered by newspapers. The alternative media justification goes against both the saturation and fair-market competition justifications. The magazine market was deemed oversaturated according to similar international standards that guided the newspaper quota, which was meant to prevent the issues associated with unrestricted registration. Free China (自由中国, Ziyou Zhongguo), established in November 1949, was the earliest dissident media outlet in Taiwan among opposition political magazines. Under the leadership of its founder, Lei Chan, Free China provided inspiration for the creation of the China Democratic Party (中国民主党) in 1960. In 1949, the magazine was established with financial support from the government and the Ministry of Education, as they aimed to counter communism with liberal ideas. However, by 1956, Free China changed its focus to internal issues and started to criticize corruption, constitutional violations, and the lack of multiparty politics in Taiwan. The editorials then advocated for the establishment of a loyal opposition movement, the China Democratic Party (1959), to push for electoral reform: I hope that everyone who believes in democratic politics will gather to form an opposition party to break the monopoly of the KMT. The rationale for a new party is that it must gain political authority by competing in elections. Our constitution (Article 14) empowers individuals with the freedom to form a party. This new opposition party can be organized immediately, but the law must protect it. (Quoted in Chao & Myers, 1998, p. 55)

Lei’s inspiring words resulted in his expulsion from the KMT in 1955. Following his expulsion, he was placed under surveillance, and his phone calls and letters were monitored. In September 1960, he was arrested and charged with sedition on several counts, including associating with communists, denying the possibility of retaking mainland China, urging the United States to intervene in Taiwan’s internal affairs, promoting divisions between the government and military, supporting communist “United Front” tactics in Taiwan, and advocating the separation of mainlanders and Taiwanese (Berman, 1992). Lei was handed a 10-year prison sentence, and the China Democratic Party was crushed before it could establish itself. Before 1975, Taiwan did not have much political opposition despite being known as “the Free China”. However, it had one of the most dynamic opposition movements in East Asia, including an electoral wing dominated by the DDP and the CNP, as well as various protest movements, ranging from anti-nuclear activists to students fighting against ideological indoctrination on campus. Taiwan’s political opposition shared many similarities with other opposition movements described in this volume. As in other countries, social forces that emerged during industrialization played a significant role in its development compared to economic forces. Furthermore, the question of

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Taiwan’s national identity was a fundamental issue that influenced every aspect of its movement, constraining its ability to respond to economic issues before democratization (Berman, 1992). The Taiwan Political Review (Taiwan zhenglun) was a highly influential political magazine during the pre-reform era, founded in 1975 by Kang Ning-hsiang. The magazine advocated for open and free discussions of any issues concerning the people of Taiwan and demanded increased Taiwanese participation in the island’s political life. It highlighted the political system’s unconstitutional nature and injustices. The magazine aimed to lay the foundation for a substantive political movement and served as a model for political opinion magazines to effect change within the system. Kang’s vision was to establish a political party apparatus that could emerge at an appropriate time, fully formed, to facilitate a smooth transition to a democratic political system (Berman, 1992, p. 183). The Review had reached its peak circulation of 50,000 copies by the 5th issue, with an estimated 2000 subscribers overseas, although these figures may be conservative as it was difficult to determine the exact readership. The journal is credited with coining the term tangwai, which referred to political activists who were not affiliated with the KMT and was a significant development for the opposition movement, providing a sense of unity. Huang Hua (黄华), the most outspoken writer of the Review, lamented the passive attitude of the people toward politics and the KMT, stating that it was a prevalent problem in society. Huang also pointed out that despite the KMT’s mistakes, they were never afraid of losing power or being overthrown violently because the people of Taiwan were too intimidated by them (Huang, 1975). The Review was shut down by the end of 1975, and Huang and his colleagues were imprisoned. In 1975, Kang Ning-hsiang founded the Taiwan Political Review, which was promptly banned by the government. Two years later, Kang and fellow opposition candidate Huang Hsin-chieh organized a series of rallies throughout Taiwan, defying KMT rules. The ruling party was stunned when non-KMT candidates won 21 of 77 seats in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly that year. After the election, voters who suspected fraud clashed with police in the city of Chungli (中坜), drawing even more attention to the growing opposition movement. In 1979, opposition activists, also known as the tangwai, helped launch the Formosa Magazine (Meilitao). In December of that year, they sponsored a rally in Kaohsiung that turned violent. Forty-one opposition activists were tried in connection with the incident, eight of whom faced a military court. Huang Hsin-chieh, the publisher of the magazine, and its editor, Shih Ming-teh, were among those who received long sentences. Shih had just finished serving a 15-year term for another political offence when he attended the December demonstration. He was sentenced to life in prison and was not released until 1990. Other individuals incarcerated for involvement in “the Kaohsiung Incident” (also known as the Formosa Incident) included followers of Yu Teng-fa (余登发), the Kaohsiung County faction boss, and Lin Yi-hsiung, a member of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly.

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Other journals that appeared, from Apollo Magazine (Wenxing ), University Magazine (Ta-Hsueh), and China Tide (Xia Chao), can be classified as intellectual magazines. As an example, there was a socialist publication called China Tide from July 1976 to January 1979 that advocated reunification with mainland China. It criticized the dominance of foreign capital in Taiwan and pushed for social welfare rights for peasants and workers. Another publication, This Generation (这一代, Je Yidai), was organized by former staff of the Taiwan Political Review and renamed Great Virtue after it was suspended. However, the October 1977 issue violated the law and was sentenced to a 1-year shutdown (Berman, 1992).

The Rise and Fall of the Formosa Magazine The late 1970s were characterized by numerous external shocks that had significant internal repercussions. The political opposition found renewed hope in the election of Jimmy Carter as US President and his expressed concern for human rights worldwide. However, the KMT’s determination to maintain power was reinforced by President Carter’s decision to fully normalize relations with the PRC (China) and Taiwan’s renewed economic competition with the mainland to maintain its export market during a global recession that threatened its economic prosperity. Although Taiwan attempted to justify its actions by claiming it had the island’s security at heart, it had little effect. The government responded to changes in the external environment that undermined its legitimacy among its citizens with a muted response and poor management (Gold, 1986). Additionally, the cancellation of the supplementary elections in Taiwan in December 1978 further weakened the government’s legitimacy. The tangwai opposition was close to a historic victory, but only the Formosa faction protested, causing further division within the opposition movement. Despite the United States and the KMT’s response, the emerging democracy movement in China and the success of the Iranian revolution provided the tangwai with renewed hope. President Chiang’s policy of “Taiwanization” allowed for greater ethnic diversity in the political process, leading the Formosa faction to push for greater political participation. Two decades later, leaders like Shih Ming-teh emphasized their concerns for Taiwan’s security following the normalization of US-China relations: In the past, the US, which led the fight against Communism, supported Taiwan wholeheartedly. Nevertheless, this was no longer the case after its decision to consider detente with Beijing. We realized it was time to reconsider Taiwan’s future from our own viewpoint instead of allowing the KMT to be the only decision maker for the island’s destiny. (Shih Ming-teh, quoted in the Taipei Times, 9 December 1999)

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In spite of his popularity and success in the Taoyuan county magistrate election, Hsu Hsin-liang was dismissed from his position by the central government in June 1979 due to his participation in an anti-KMT demonstration in Chiaotou (桥头), which the government claimed had compromised his official position. Undeterred, Hsu rallied his supporters and launched a new political journal called the Formosa on August 16, 1979. Unlike previous publications that had merely called for KMT reform, Formosa was a more radical publication. The Formosa Incident erupted during a demonstration organized by editors of the opposition the Formosa Magazine in December 1979, leading to clashes with the police. The magazine had been in circulation since August of that year, with a readership of around 100,000. While the organizers had intended for the demonstration to be peaceful, violence broke out on both sides. Although the number of casualties was small, the incident became a significant turning point for the Taiwanese opposition movement. In relation to the topic of “identity”, the individuals behind the Formosa Magazine were primarily Taiwanese but also included a small number of mainlanders. Huang Hsin-chieh, the leader of the Formosa group, also led the tangwai, a coalition of individuals running for elections independent of the KMT. In the initial article of the inaugural issue of Formosa, Huang articulated the shared principles of the publication: “This beautiful island, Meili zhi dao, as mentioned in the title of the magazine, is the homeland where we have grown up… Democracy in Taiwan is the greatest gift the 18 million people of Taiwan can offer to the Chinese people” (the Formosa, Vol. 1, 1979, p. 2). The central focus of the Formosa was democracy, and many contributors saw it as compatible with a Chinese identity. It was also a common belief that by blending democracy with Chinese culture, a society closer to an ideal society could be created, surpassing even the United States (the Formosa, Vol. 1, 1979, p. 9). However, within the writers of the Formosa, a minority group believed that the Taiwanese identity was more suitable for democracy than the “Chinese” identity. They argued that the shared experience of immigrating to Taiwan was a symbol of their collective pursuit of freedom and happiness, particularly for the Min-nans, Hakkas, and Aborigines. While mainlanders had the potential to become valuable Taiwanese citizens, they might need to put in more effort to do so (the Formosa, Vol. 1 1979, p. 48 and p. 76, and Vol. 3 1979, pp. 69–76). The Formosa Magazine went beyond and made a controversial move by advocating for Taiwan’s independence and direct popular confrontation with the government. Articles expressed discontent over the government’s arbitrary shutdown of critical journals, regardless of whether they were communist, subversive, or neither. The magazine also demanded a complete overhaul of the National Assembly and criticized the government’s lack of commitment to the democratic vision of the Three Principles of the People (三民主义). The government’s reaction to the Formosa was largely based on its subjective views of the publication. The government was initially astonished by

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the popularity of the journal, but soon became fearful of its influence. The situation escalated when the activists behind the magazine began organizing political meetings across Taiwan, attracting thousands of attendees. The tension culminated in Kaohsiung on December 10, 1979, just before the scheduled Legislative Yuan elections. When the police were called to prevent the gathering, a riot broke out after they seized the Formosa publications and arrested activists who were later subjected to severe beatings while in custody (Chao & Myers, 1998, pp. 57–59). According to Chiou (1995), the Formosa incident was a political institution with party characteristics that posed a significant threat to the authoritarian power of the ruling KMT. As a result, the Nationalist government was not willing to tolerate it. As a result of both internal and external pressures, the government was compelled to conduct public military trials for those involved in the Formosa incident. The island’s media were authorized to report the proceedings and to fully cover the speeches made by defense attorneys. However, due to concerns for their safety, only a few lawyers were willing to represent the defendants. Chen Shui-bian, who became the DPP mayor of Taipei in 1994 and Taiwan’s president in 2000, was among those who took the risk of representing the defendants. Hsu Hsin-liang was found guilty and sentenced to exile in the United States, while seven other Formosa leaders were sentenced to between 12 years and life imprisonment. In their speeches, defense attorneys addressed human rights issues and hinted at the principles of law and democracy (Chao & Myers, 1998). Because the trials were so widely reported in the media, these speeches reached a broad audience. As a result, even though “the KMT managed to win the legal battles”, according to Chiou, “they certainly failed to convince the Taiwanese people and win a moral-political victory”. As a result of media coverage, the Formosa defendants “overnight… became political martyrs whose martyrdom would continue to haunt the KMT regime up to the present day” (Chiou, 1995, p. 94). According to Huang Hsin-chieh, the publisher of the Formosa which had only four issues, the magazine was not published for the sake of the magazine itself, but rather to build their organization and gain supporters. The magazine acted like an unnamed opposition party, and Huang noted the challenges faced by opposition candidates in election campaigns when facing KMT opponents with strong party support. To compete effectively, opposition groups needed their own organization (Berman, 1992). The Formosa Magazine was intended as more than just the official journal of the nonparty movement. Its main purpose, revealed during the trial by Shih Ming-teh, generally considered the most radical of the so-called Kaohsiung Eight, was to “organize a political party without a name” (quoted in Wang, 1988, p. 153). Testimony given by Huang and Shih during the trial offered the clearest public summation by opposition insiders as to the use of the magazine organization to form a de facto political party (Cheng, 1982). According to numerous scholars, the Formosa Incident is considered the first significant celebration of human rights on the island. Prior to this event,

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the authorities had never permitted any public display of dissatisfaction, and the Formosa Magazine rapidly emerged as the focal point for the burgeoning democratic movement. In the autumn of 1979, the opposition movement’s voice grew louder, and it was only logical that they would leverage the occasion of December 10th to voice their concerns about the absence of democracy and human rights in Taiwan (Berman, 1992). As the day approached, the tension escalated due to the increasingly violent attacks by right-wing extremists on the magazine’s offices and the homes of its key staff members.

Ethnic Orientation of the Political Opposition Magazine in the 1980s In the early 1980s, the majority of the leading figures in the Formosa group were imprisoned after the Formosa Incident, leading to a setback for those who opposed the KMT directly. The incident prompted changes on both sides, with various interest groups increasing their opposition to specific policies. Since the 1970s, an increasing number of Taiwanese had been accepted into powerful positions within the KMT, a trend that continued with Taiwanese-born Lee Teng-hui becoming vice-president in 1984. Additionally, more Taiwan-wide election seats in the legislative assemblies were opened up for elections. It wasn’t until the mid-1980s that the tangwai was once again able to organize an opposition with a somewhat common policy. During 1984 and 1985, there was a high number of opposition magazines, 1 of which was titled “the Movement ” (新潮流, Xin Chaoliu). Although its circulation was not as large as the Formosa Magazine, many important opposition politicians were on the editorial board. In 1986, when the tangwai organized the DPP, 1 of the party’s two factions was named after “the Movement ”, while the other was named after “the Formosa” (Rawnsley, 2000). The Movement Magazine presented a fresh perspective on Taiwanese ethnic identity, emphasizing that Taiwan was more closely aligned with the global community than with the Chinese cultural sphere. While democracy remained a crucial topic, the focus shifted toward Taiwanese independence and the plight of Taiwanese as victims of the authoritarian rule imposed by the Mainlanders. In contrast to the Formosa Magazine, the authors of the Movement Magazine tended to view Taiwanese and Chinese identities as distinct and separate. While the Formosa Magazine used the term “Taiwanese” to refer to the entire population of Taiwan, including Min-nans, Hakkas, and aboriginals, the Movement tended to use the term to specifically denote those of Taiwanese ethnic origin. Despite Peng’s call for a “one China - one Taiwan” solution, he viewed the division between Taiwan and China as a solely political one. In his call for a Taiwanese republic for the island’s entire population, Peng emphasized the need for cooperation among all 12 million inhabitants of Taiwan, regardless of their provincial descent, to establish a new government (Peng et al., 1964).

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The ideas presented in the Movement foreshadowed what was to come in the following years. In the mid-1980s, the tangwai improved its organization and established the DPP before the national elections in 1986. President Chiang Ching-kuo did not attempt to suppress the new party and even expedited its legalization. The DPP continued the path laid out by the Movement , emphasizing the term “Taiwanese” in election campaigns, and promoting Taiwanese independence within legal limits (Wang, 1996). From the time that the alternative media secured a visible presence at the beginning of the 1970s until the period preceding the lifting of martial law— which marked the beginning of the transition to democracy—they played significant political roles. The purpose of the opposition political magazine was to form an opposition party, create their own Taiwanese ethnic identity, and further get the seat of the ruling party in several years. With the formation of the DPP in September 1986 and the corresponding liberalization of political activities, opposition political magazines were no longer positioned to play the same leading role. It was hard to print anything more sensational than that which appeared in the mainstream media. Opposition magazines started to lose what marketing strategists define as a unique selling proposition—a distinctive quality unavailable elsewhere—which acts as a selling point that justifies the existence of a particular clientele (Berman, 1992). The opposition magazines were truly, therefore, the victims of their own success in the formation of an opposition party. According to journalist Yen Wen-shuan, “The opposition press’s biggest contribution has been to smash taboo” (quoted in Goldstein, 1985). Opposition political magazines made a significant contribution to the relatively smooth transition to a more democratic form of government by continuously pushing the limits of acceptable behavior and providing a nonviolent and legal context for the development and maturity of a de facto political opposition party. After all, they formed the first opposition party successfully in the late 1980s and beat the ruling KMT party in the 2000 presidential election, but the political democratization and transition also confused the opposition press about their further goals and issues. In the early 1990s, numerous intellectual magazines ceased publication due to various reasons. One of the main reasons was the inability of emerging readers from the younger generation, leading to a loss of energy and vitality.

References Berman, D. (1992). Words like colored glass: The role of the press in Taiwan’s democratization process. Westview. Chao, L., & Myers, R. (1998). The first Chinese democracy. Johns Hopkins University. Cheng, T. F. (1982, 21–27 February). Tang-wai cheng-lun tsa-chih: ho-chu ho-tsung (Opposition political opinion magazines)? China Times Magazine, 10–14. Chiou, C. L. (1995). Democratizing oriental despotism. St. Martins Press.

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Gold, T. B. (1986). State and society in the Taiwan Miracle. ME Sharp. Goldstein, C. (1985, December). Publish at your peril. Far Eastern Economic Review, 26. Huang, H. (1975, October 3). Jianxingren di xinxin (The beliefs of a prisoner whose sentence was commuted). Taiwan Political Review (Taiwan Zenglun). Peng, M.’M., Xie, C., & Wei, T. (1964). Taiwan Renmin Zijiu Xuanyan (“Self-help Declaration of the Taiwanese People”). Retrieved October 11, 2002, from, http:// hion.imec.com.tw/Nbut/0soangieen/declare.htrn Rawnsley, G. D. (2000, October). The media and popular protest in pre-democratic Taiwan. Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 20(4). Wang, F. C. (1996, July). Taiwan Fanduiyundong de Gonshi Dongyuan: Yi-jiu-qi-jiu nian Ba-jiu nian Liang ci Tiaozhan Gaofeng de Bijiao (“Consensus Mobilization of the Political Opposition in Taiwan: Comparing two Waves of Challenges, 1979– 1989”). Taiwanese Political Science Review (in Chinese). Wang, J. W. (1988). Political movements against the state: The transition of Taiwan’s authoritarian rule. Unpublished [Ph.D. dissertation] University of California, Los Angeles. Yang, S. (1988, June). The condition and prospects of the newspaper industry after the lifting of newspaper restrictions, Pao-yeh (Newspaper Industry).

CHAPTER 6

Alternative Media After the Martial Law from 1987 to the Early 1990s

The end of 40 years of martial law in 1987 marked a significant breakthrough in political democratization and media liberalization in Taiwan, which was largely attributed to the persistent efforts of political opposition magazines. The emergence of political parties and social movement groups encouraged reforms in Taiwan’s mass media. The KMT was pressured by the general population and political opposition to consider opening parts of the mass media market by issuing more licenses and releasing more frequencies for electronic media. As a result, alternative media became the new form of advocacy instead of traditional press media. During the 1990s, filmmaking teams, cable television channels, and alternative radio stations owned by opposition parties and social movement groups played a crucial role in advancing political and social movements in Taiwan.

Shift of Media: Magazine Has Gone, Electronic Media Arrives During the late 1980s, the opposition movement divided itself into two factions. One group aimed to overthrow KMT domination through radical street action, while the other sought to undermine the system from within by using legal parliamentary channels. Prior to the lifting of martial law, democratization in Taiwan was a non-linear process, and the boundaries between liberalization and political reform were often ambiguous and hard to discern.

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Despite this, it’s evident that the reform of the media environment was part of the push for full liberalization that began in 1987.1 Improved economic conditions and rising audience expectations have turned Taiwan into a fertile ground for the new media despite the government controls placed on the mainstream media in the early 1990s. The intensifying competition between journals and magazines within the movement during this period led to a decline in their credibility, as various factions vied for attention. To attract readers, many magazines resorted to providing sensational content, which sometimes included baseless “facts” (Chao & Myers, 1998). This financial pressure and commercial competition damaged the reputation of the magazines and, by extension, discredited the tangwai movement they supported. By the mid-1980s, magazines were losing their relevance, while underground videos produced and distributed by opposition members became increasingly popular. The opposition recognized the value of electronic media, and the significance of videos was demonstrated by the “520 incident” in 1990.2 Political liberalization in Taiwan spurred a rapid response from the mainstream media, which was carried along by the evolving political climate and the popular demand for faster and more significant change. Many within the industry questioned why the media couldn’t be immediately liberated after the lifting of martial law. Consequently, a movement arose that pushed for the liberalization of the media before the necessary legislation was in place. In other words, the media took it upon themselves to liberalize instead of waiting for the government’s legal machinery to do so. The push for media liberalization captured the public’s imagination, and the gradual process of liberalization became a prominent political issue. Between 1987 and 1993, cable television channels and call-in radio stations multiplied, even though they were not yet legal. The emergence and popularity of such electronic media demonstrated that people were anticipating and demanding greater diversity in ownership and content, providing them with more choices. 1 Newspapers were not allowed to be published until January 1988 because strict licensing regulations controlled the press through Publication Laws. The GIO recommended the abolition of these laws in 1999, which led to the liberalization of electronic media. However, political reform was necessary before this could happen. Cable television broadcasts were illegal until 1993, and call-in radio stations were not legalized until 1994. Despite the high costs of entry to the market, alternative radio stations continue to broadcast. 2 In May 1988, 5000 farmers from central and southern Taiwan staged a demonstration in Taipei, feeling that their rights had been neglected by the government. Sadly, the protests turned violent, resulting in the arrest of more than 100 protesters. Despite the media’s portrayal of the incident as a “riot”, with images of chaos and violence, the China Times downplayed the protests and buried reports in the back pages to avoid taking sides. However, the China Times failed to live up to its liberal image and instead echoed conservative society’s fear of social and political chaos while being reluctant to criticize the military or police.

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Furthermore, their creation and popularity were perceived as an organized and intentional reaction to the slow pace of change in the mainstream media (Rawnsley, 2000).

Political Background: From 1987 to the Early 1990s Following the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988, Vice President Lee Teng-hui assumed the presidency and attempted to clarify to the public how cooperation with mainlanders since 1949 had benefited the Taiwanese. Under his leadership, the democratization process accelerated, resulting in Taiwan currently being considered one of the most successful democracies in East Asia (Zeuthen, 2001). Although he did not advocate for an independent Taiwan during his presidency, he also refused to unify Taiwan with mainland China under any circumstances. The DPP faced difficulties in coordinating its two factions, which had been mostly imprisoned after the Formosa Incident. The Formosa faction called for a less aggressive policy on the question of Taiwanese independence, leading to a policy that changed frequently in the first half of the 1990s. However, the issue of whether and when Taiwan should declare itself an independent Republic, and whether it should change its name from the Republic of China to the Republic of Taiwan, became less important. The Formosa faction believed that a declaration could wait if Taiwan remained de facto-independent due to the threat from mainland China. The Formosa faction dominated throughout most of the 1990s, but the DPP’s extremely open system for nominating their presidential candidate in the first direct presidential elections in Taiwan in 1996 led to Peng Ming-min becoming the DPP’s presidential candidate. Similar to his stance in 1964, Peng took an uncompromising position on the issue of unification (Zeuthen, 2001). During an opening ceremony for a monument commemorating the “February 28 Incident” in early 1995, Lee Teng-hui, as part of his electoral campaign, apologized for the KMT’s past actions. Later that year, when he was nominated as the KMT presidential candidate, he gave a speech in which he introduced the concept of “New Taiwanese” (新台湾人, Xin Taiwanren) that was meant to encompass the entire population of the island. Lee’s speech emphasized the myth of immigration, which had been previously discussed in the Formosa Magazine articles: The fact that Taiwan is a society of immigrants is widely known. With the exception of the aboriginal people who were the original inhabitants, almost all others came from mainland China during the last dynasties. However, regardless of when they arrived, they were born and raised here, and their hard work and perseverance have contributed to the current prosperity and harmony on this land. It is unnecessary and meaningless to use the time of immigration to define who is Taiwanese. Rather, anyone who acknowledges and loves Taiwan can be considered Taiwanese. We should therefore promote and reinforce this identity

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of the “New Taiwanese”. If we at the same time try to protect our sense of being a people [民族情感, Minzu Qinggan], maintain Chinese culture, and do not forget the ideal of unifying China, we are at the same time Chinese. (Lee, 1999, p. 77)

In his speech, Lee Teng-hui appears to agree with Huang Hsin-chieh’s idea expressed in the Formosa Magazine that Taiwan, with its material and political advancements, could be seen as the “New Central Plains ” (新中 原, Xin Zhongyuan). The success of Taiwan in becoming so advanced was attributed to the diverse inputs that the island had received, which resulted in the development of a “pluralistic culture” (Lee, 1999, p. 78). In 1996, Lee Teng-hui won a resounding victory in the presidential elections. Following the election, the DPP swiftly reverted to its more conciliatory stance, but Peng Ming-min and a small faction maintained a more radical position regarding the issue of Taiwanese independence. As a result, they formed a new political party called the Taiwanese Independence Party (建国党). Regarding the media system, the official media remained governmentowned, government-controlled, subsidized, and censored, while the independent media became privately owned, uncensored, and partly market-oriented. The main political goal of the official political media was to secure political consolidation and to support and legitimize the ruling political party and government. The cooptation of reformist intellectuals partially subverted this goal and allowed the publication of more pluralistic values and criticism (Zeuthen, 2001). On the other hand, the alternative media in Taiwan during this period served as a platform to criticize the existing non-democratic power structures, expose abuses of power, and document human rights violations.3 They also played a crucial role in introducing and solidifying political alternatives. In contrast, the official mainstream media sought to promote regime stability by depoliticizing and demobilizing the public. This involved legitimizing the party-controlled radio and television institutions by presenting them as reliable sources of audience-friendly entertainment and valuable information.4

The New Settings for Electronic Media The legitimacy of Taiwan’s Broadcasting and Television Law has been under scrutiny by a burgeoning civil society movement since the 1990s, leading to the KMT government’s consideration of revising the legislation. Opposition parties have mobilized under the banner of “opposing KMT’s media monopoly”, leading to large-scale anti-KMT protests.5 Consequently, the 3

Interviewed with Lin Bo-Wei, March 1, 2003, Tainan County.

4

Interviewed with Lee Tien-Duo, March 6, 2003, Tainan County.

5

A study by Sun (1994) investigated how the three major television networks in Taiwan reported on the election of the second Taiwanese Congress. The study analyzed the networks’ news coverage of five election-related topics using content analysis and found

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DPP and CNP have become the primary forces opposing the KMT’s statecontrolled electronic media. Through the establishment of a Taiwan-wide cable television association, the DPP was able to gain a political platform through mass media. The CNP had numerous underground radio stations that promoted its political viewpoints. These opposition parties directly challenged the legitimacy of the KMT’s Broadcasting and Television Law by creating new media outlets. The operation of cable television and alternative radio stations by the opposition was not regulated by the Broadcasting and Television Law, and this challenge to the KMT’s media monopoly gained public support. In July 1994, the suppression of around 30 alternative underground radio stations in Taiwan drew widespread attention and support from the general population. This event also made the KMT come to the realization that suppression of alternative radio stations was ineffective and only served to increase their reputation.6 In response to opposition parties’ challenges that were supported by the public, a new Cable Television Law was passed in 1993, putting an end to the long-standing prohibition on Taiwanese pirate cable television operations. Additionally, the KMT government granted freedom to low-powered radio stations with the introduction of “The Regulation of Low-Powered Radio” in 1994. Since 1990, there have been some significant changes in the media environment (Lin C. L., 1998; Lin W. K., 1998):

that the KMT networks utilized channels for political propaganda and assistance during elections. The study concluded that: (1) During election campaigns, there was a significant bias against opposition parties in the news coverage of the three television networks. Conflicts were portrayed in a way that suggested opposition candidates were the instigators; (2) In the analysis of election news, KMT candidates received more opportunities to be interviewed by network journalists. The KMT headquarters was the primary source for updated election analysis in network news, while opposition party candidates and their headquarters were rarely interviewed. (3) Although some social movement groups researched candidates’ political views, the three networks often added the opinions of KMT officials to the research findings. This strategic reporting provided the KMT more chances to promote their political views; (4) When news of the KMT’s attempts to buy votes surfaced during the election, it damaged the party’s reputation. To minimize this damage, the three television networks gave candidates who were believed to be responsible for the vote-buying many opportunities to explain their innocence, balancing the critical news coverage of other media. The networks also attempted to downplay the issue, presenting it as a rumor; (5) KMT slogans from their commercials were included in the three networks’ election news content, reinforcing the audience’s impressions of the party’s advertising. This research highlights the extent to which KMT-controlled television networks acted as partisan tools during election campaigns. 6

Interviewed with Lee Tien-Duo, March 6, 2003, Tainan County.

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1. Collaboration between opposition parties and anti-KMT media monopoly groups. The DPP, the first opposition party, recognized the importance of cooperating with anti-KMT civic groups to bolster its political and societal influence. The party also acknowledged the KMT’s power, which partly stemmed from its dominant media monopoly. As a result, the DPP strategized to collaborate with anti-KMT civic groups to dismantle the KMT’s media monopoly. By challenging the legitimacy of the KMT’s media monopoly, the DPP gained gradual support from the public and various anti-media monopoly groups.7 2. The impact of liberated print media. In 1987, martial law was lifted in Taiwan, which led to a relaxation of press bans on registering new newspapers and limitations on the number of pages per issue. However, electronic media remained under the KMT’s control.8 The newfound openness of the print media resulted in a surge of information, which increased Taiwanese citizens’ demand for the right to access information. The new print media also played a vital role in educating the general population about democracy. As print media controls loosened, there was a growing desire within society to open electronic media as well. 3. The opposition parties operate cable television and alternative radio. The KMT’s control over media was criticized by opposition parties and anti-KMT civic groups, who attempted to dismantle the monopoly by establishing their own mass media outlets to compete with the KMT-controlled system. In the aftermath of martial law, restrictions on print media were lifted, prompting political opposition groups to focus on cable television and radio, which were still subject to license and frequency restrictions in the early 1990s. Many members of the DPP, particularly elected lawmakers, invested in local 7 The Taipei Society (北社), a scholarly society, played a significant role in challenging the KMT’s media monopoly during this period. The society consisted of prominent college professors who regularly published articles criticizing the KMT’s control over the media. One notable member of the Taipei Society was Dr. Rei-Chen Dran (郑瑞城), the former director of the Journalism Department at National Chen-Chi University, who published numerous critical articles on the China Times and Global Magazine (Ten-Hsia Magazine), the two largest newspapers and magazines in Taiwan, focusing on the political party’s influence over the media. 8 In 1987, there were only 30 newspapers available in Taiwan. However, by May 1991, the number of newspapers had drastically increased to 216, with the majority located in the capital city of Taipei, and only 3 tabloids based in the eastern area and offshore islands. According to The ROC Year Book 1991–1992, the newspaper subscription rate in 1991 was 61.7 papers per 100 households, which translates to an average of 16.1 newspapers per 100 persons.

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cable television stations, which were named “Channel Four” or “Democratic Cable Television” (民主电视台). In February 1990, the inaugural Democratic Cable Television station was founded in Taipei County. Within 8 months, by October 15, 1990, the National Association of Taiwan’s Democratic Cable Television had grown to include 24 DPP cable television stations. As of the conclusion of 1993, the quantity of Democratic Cable Television stations had risen to 71, providing service to around 280,000 households (Wong, 1993). The Association’s regulations regarding its structure state that Democratic Cable Television stations may not have non-DPP members as stockholders. This provision serves as a means for the DPP to retain its influence over these stations. One notable feature of the programming on Democratic Cable Television is its production of alternative political news programs, which distinguish it from the television networks controlled by the KMT.9

The First Alternative Electronic Visual Voice Documentary Films and the Video Activist Group For a considerable length of time, Taiwan’s documentary film genre was constrained by the cultural limitations imposed by martial law, making it exceedingly difficult to find works that truly represented the social issues faced by the Taiwanese people. However, with the approach of the end of martial law, the documentary film genre slowly began to exhibit greater flexibility in capturing the reality of Taiwanese society. Videocassette recorders (VCRs) were imported into Taiwan during the mid1980s. Despite the fact that VCRs were beyond the financial means of many, there was a great deal of interest in this emerging technology for entertainment. In the mid-1980s, electronic media supplanted journals, magazines, and, to some extent, newspapers as the primary communication channels for the opposition movement. Various independent and illicit video production companies, such as the Green Team (绿色小组, Luse Xiaozu), the Third Image (第三印象, Disan Yinxiang ), and New Taiwan (新台湾), began to circulate their own electronic renditions of underground publications. From 1986 to 1988, the aforementioned companies created around 50 to 60 videos that covered events such as DPP rallies and election campaigns, street protests,

9 Inspired by the strategies employed by the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party), the Chinese New Party (CNP), which is the second largest opposition party founded in 1993, also endeavored to establish control over its own cable television stations. Witnessing the success of the DPP’s Democratic Cable Television stations in effectively propagating the party’s ideology and expanding its political resources, the CNP recognized the potential of electronic media for garnering public support. As a newly formed party, the CNP was eager to establish its own cable television organization (Lin C. L., 1998; Lin W. K., 1998). However, the CNP’s cable television stations did not achieve the same level of success as those of the DPP.

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parliamentary confrontations, as well as calls for action on specific issues, such as environmentalism. During the 1980s, electronic photography costs had decreased significantly compared to those of film stock, and video technology had advanced to the point of being able to maintain consistent picture quality. With the rise of popular broadcast culture, some artists recognized that by harnessing the power of mass media, they could convey their unique perspectives to the public. In 1986, the Green Team was established and began using portable video cameras to record documentaries from different angles than those presented in official materials, often setting up in public locations such as street corners or areas with large gatherings. When martial law, which had been in place for 40 years, was lifted in 1987, several organizations emerged, using video cameras to capture various social movements. Although only the Green Team persisted for an extended period, the documentaries they produced in the wake of the lifting of martial law have become a crucial resource for scholars studying contemporary Taiwanese society.10 The video movement in Taiwan effectively utilized home cassette distribution, utilizing both mail and street vendors. The Green Team collective, for example, has led the way in this effort by distributing over 100 titles that document the struggles of farmers, students, workers, and environmentalists (according to an interview with the Green Team activist Wang Chi-chang conducted by Chang Pi-hua in 1989). In a recent demonstration against the repressive state television system, they broadcast a low-power pirate TV transmission that featured footage from a large protest where dozens of TVs were thrown at the gates of the Taiwan TV station. Following the lifting of martial law in 1987, alternative media creators in Taiwan collaborated with farmers, workers, and students to promote social and political change. The technological advancements during the economic miracle have enabled video to become a useful tool for organizing and empowering marginalized groups who have been excluded from or exploited by this economic boom. The videos highlighted peaceful demonstrations in which people were determined to exercise their democratic rights and stand up to authority, even in the face of brutal suppression. The camcorder’s quality could not match that of professional television cameras, and some of the images were deliberately blurred by the producers to prevent them from being used as evidence (Liang, 1993). The GIO classified all the programs produced by the Green Team and the Third Image as illegal, making it impossible for them to be sold, rented, or publicly broadcasted. Nonetheless, the videos found their way onto the black market, where they were widely available and became highly sought after (Duan, 1993). The widespread demand for black-market political documentary videos in Taiwan suggested that people were actively seeking out alternative perspectives on political events. This suggests that documentary films can have a positive 10

Interviewed with Lee Tien-Duo, March 6, 2003, Tainan County.

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impact on society. Taiwanese documentary makers have turned videos into powerful tools of protest, from observation to participation. This trend began with the formation of the Green Team in 1986. During that year’s competitive multiparty elections, opposition leaders led supporters to greet returning veteran Hsu Hsin-liang at the CKS International Airport in Taoyuan. A riot broke out, and the mainstream media’s reports were not favorable to the opposition. However, a videotape of the event made by the Green Team, composed of 3 young people using simple home video equipment, changed many people’s minds. They reproduced and released the news video. According to some people, the reason why the opposition performed well in the elections that year was due to the Green Team’s efforts to break the monopoly of the pro-government mainstream media (Teng, 1998). After their initial success, the Green Team continued to produce videos and completed almost 100 films over the course of several years. Their documentaries centered on contentious topics that were typically critical of the government, including protests by farmers, laborers, women, indigenous people, elderly veterans, students, environmentalists, anti-nuclear activists, and the families of victims of the “February 28 incident”. Films such as the documentaries of social movements by the Green Team, particularly in their later period when they focused on the worker’s movement, and Lin Hsin-i’s documentaries, utilized not only technical advancements but also the accumulated experience of the past. The Keelung Transit Strike documentary, for instance, employed an evolutionary narrative comprised entirely of interviews with the workers’ wives and children who narrated their unwavering support for their husbands and fathers. The films showcased the families’ backing and acceptance of the workers’ revolutionary activities, conveying a sense of isolation as well as warmth to the viewers. With the filmmakers clearly taking a sympathetic stance toward the working class, these documentaries on the worker’s movements presented an unmistakably radical political perspective in the portrayal of Taiwanese documentaries. The Green Team deserves recognition as documentary filmmakers with a strong social conscience, particularly in their later works that bear witness to the historical oppression of Taiwanese workers during a period of economic prosperity.11 During that time, most viewers lacked confidence in the political news coverage of the 3 Taiwan-wide television stations, which led to the KMT’s Department of Cultural Affairs producing and distributing a re-edited video containing news footage collected by the television networks later (Ho, 1993). This official account of the incident followed the same storyline broadcasted on television, but it demonstrated that the KMT government had acknowledged the pressure from the movement against the mainstream electronic media and felt compelled to respond.

11

Interviewed with Lee Tien-Duo, March 6, 2003, Tainan County.

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The videos’ popularity declined, and they became ineffective by 1989, marking the end of their peak period of street demonstrations from 1986– 1988. The KMT crackdown on social movement organization and competition from the pirate market caused production companies to close down. However, the most significant factor that limited their activity was the lifting of press restrictions in 1988 (Ho, 1993). Obtaining news from newspapers became cheaper and more convenient, and the industry championed press freedom and liberalization. Once these goals were achieved, the videos became unnecessary, and production ceased. What made the video activist group disappear in the 1990s? Media scholar Chen Kuan-Hsing12 indicated that the main reason is that the former political oppositional party finally owns their satellite television station (Formosa Television, FTV): By 1989, the Green Team had lost its effectiveness and their peak period was from 1986 to 1988, during the height of street demonstrations. During this time, they recorded approximately 1,500 tapes, which are still accessible today, and one individual continues to maintain them. However, the Green Team later shifted their focus to producing quick news episodes, which faced challenges in terms of distribution. In the early 1990s, some members of the group became exhausted. There was a movement towards alternative video production, modeled after the Green Team, which aimed to establish alternative distribution points. The former political opposition party now has its satellite station, but significant capital is needed to sustain it. Some of the critical energy of the Green Team’s work could still be carried forward, but there is currently no space for it.13

The Green Team has recorded a batch of video materials of democratic reforms and social movements in the years before and after Taiwan’s martial law, covering human rights movement, aboriginal movement, student movement, labor movement, farmer movement, and ecological environmental protection movement. The films of the Green Team used the attitude of minority media with “folk” views, to a considerable extent to check and balance the monopoly of the mainstream media on freedom of speech at that time. The process of democratization in Taiwan has left a valuable record. The trajectory of Taiwanese documentary filmmaking has evolved from its early days of being controlled by the ruling class, to a period where it was utilized as a tool to downplay social issues, and now to a new era where a younger generation is utilizing the medium to chronicle their own experiences and establish themselves as the central figures in social history. 12

Chen Kuan-Hsing (陈光兴) was a central figure in the growing network of political activists and cultural studies academics in the Asia-Pacific region. 13 Interviewed with Chen Kuan-Hsing by Geert Lovink in December 20, 1997. Available on http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9803/msg00002.html. Chen is a central figure in the growing network of political activists and cultural studies academics in the Asia-Pacific region.

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The Period of Channel Four14 In Taiwan, cable television emerged illegally for the first time. It started in the 1960s to broadcast pirate video tapes and programs from the 3 major television networks to areas with poor signal reception, such as mountainous regions. Cable TV experienced limited growth over the next two decades, as the KMT attempted to outlaw this medium but did not harshly suppress it.15 In the 1980s, Taiwan’s cable television industry experienced a rapid expansion. The growth was driven by various factors. Firstly, cable TV stations offered foreign programs that were not available on the major networks, which attracted viewers. Secondly, high-quality programs from Japan and Hong Kong flooded into Taiwan during this period, upgrading the tastes of Taiwanese audiences and making them dissatisfied with the existing three networks. These factors stimulated the development of cable TV, particularly in metropolitan areas. After martial law was imposed, the KMT frequently cracked down on cable television. Even after martial law was lifted, the KMT continued to restrict cable television through licensing, despite a shift in the political climate. To counter the ruling party’s restrictions on cable television, the DPP established the “National Association of Taiwanese Democratic Cable Television” to operate a cable television system owned by the opposition party across Taiwan. By the end of 1993, the association had 71 members. The opposition party, CNP, also worked toward liberalizing Taiwanese cable television. CNP Lawmaker, Ms. Chen Cho, negotiated with the KMT majority in Congress for the passage of cable television legislation. The National Association for Cable Communication Development, consisting of 180 local cable television stations, supported Cho’s efforts and became a major civic pressure group for the liberation of cable television. With mounting pressure from opposition parties and the public, the KMT began to ease its restrictions on cable television. In 1993, after a prolonged ban, the Taiwanese Cable Television Law was finally passed. Despite the liberalization of the press after 1987, the ruling political party and government maintained tight control over broadcasting, fearing electoral support would shift to the DPP. The DPP’s application for a radio license was unsuccessful, despite organized protest rallies. As a result, DPP supporters resorted to sabotage as another form of electronic guerrilla warfare (Lee, 1999). The Green Team established an underground television station 14 Prior to the implementation of the Cable TV Law in 1993, Taiwan had only 3 authorized terrestrial TV networks: TTV, CTV, and CTS. Due to this, people commonly referred to cable TV as the “Fourth Channel ” since it was an unofficial and unlawful supplement to the three recognized TV networks. 15 Due to Taiwan’s mountainous topography, common antennas were introduced in 1969 to enhance television reception in remote areas. In 1976, cable operators started to provide illicit services by using VCRs, inexpensive coaxial cables, and rudimentary transmission equipment. As a result, comparable stations emerged across the island, collectively referred to as “Channel Four”.

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in 1990 to counter the pro-government election campaigns regularly aired by the three TV stations. Other groups attempted to disrupt official television broadcasts, and mobile underground television stations joined the movement against KMT control of mass media. Sheila Chin (1997) observed that cable television in Taiwan had its roots in both regular Common Antennas Television (CATV) systems and the activities of cable television pirates and political opposition known as the “Fourth Channel ”. Although unlicensed stations had been in existence since 1969, their programming quality was poor, which resulted in a small viewership. The launch of AsiaSat 1 in April 1990 was a turning point, enabling the delivery of programs illegally by satellite and their subsequent redistribution by cable operators, making it easier for audiences to access a variety of alternative programs. However, the quality of these programs was still questionable, and it is important to resist the temptation to view the “Channel Four” as solely committed to providing a voice for opposition politics. Its popularity was driven by its ability to broadcast material not available on free-to-air stations, such as Japanese TV series, professional wrestling, and pornography—hardly the sort of programs that could be considered transformative (“Cable cat’s cradle”, 1996). Despite occasional crackdowns, the ruling political party and government did not view the rise of cable TV as a significant threat to their power. By 1985, the total number of cable TV viewers on the island had reached 1.2 million, and 40% of Taipei’s population had access to it. However, in 1990, the DPP used microwave technology to launch their first “Democratic Television Station (民主台)”, followed by a loosely organized “democracy network” comprising 21 small and unsophisticated stations that relentlessly attacked the KMT. The agitated Premier Hao Po-tsun (郝柏村) ordered a full-scale crackdown, resulting in only minor clashes and no long-term solutions. The authorities struggled to defend their monopoly on television. Party and government censors found it challenging to locate inexpensive and highly mobile cable transmitters that could be concealed. Additionally, cable subscription rates increased rapidly as they could pick up spillover signals from overseas satellites, including those from Japan, Hong Kong, mainland China, and American broadcasters. Due to pressure from various interest groups, such as the United States, the KMT, and the DPP, the Taiwanese government at the time yielded to the current situation by legalizing all previously unlawful operations in the

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Cable TV Act.16 The Act divided Taiwan into 52 regions, each with 5 multichannel cable systems, which some argued was excessive for a small island. As a result, only a few major industrial conglomerates with ties to foreign interests had the resources to meet the costly infrastructure investment needs and the high demand for domestic and foreign programs (Zheng 1993). Since the shortage of capital and the enactment of the Cable TV Act, most “Channel Four” operators had to give up their management or make small businesses into conglomerates. There was a trend of commercialization in the cable television industry culture after 1993,17 while it also meant that the function of democratization from “Channel Four” faded. Above all, “Channel Four”, even if imperfectly, succeeded in allowing postmartial law politics to access multiple sources and points of view in managing the news in a very short time. “Channel Four” also gave viewers the chance to understand what had not been possible to convey during the period: that other individuals and groups held similar views, many of them dissenting ones.

References "Cable cat’s cradle” (1996, February). Free China Review, 46(2). Chao, L., & Myers, R. (1998). The first Chinese democracy. Johns Hopkins University. Chin, S. (1997). Broadcasting and new media policies in Taiwan. In A. SrebemyMohammadi, D. Winseck, J. McKenna, & O. Boyd-Barrett (Eds.), Media in global context: A reader. Arnold. Duan, C. (1993). The voice from boundary (in Chinese). Dan-Sun. GIO (Government Information Office). (1999). Taiwan’s media in the democratic era. GIO. Ho, C. T. (1993). Alternative media, protest culture, power: The movement form of the Green Team and analysis of its production (in Chinese). Unpublished master thesis, Fu-Jen University. Taipei. Lee, T. H. (1999). Taiwan de Zhuzhang (“Taiwan’s Point of View”). Yuan-Liou. Liang, K. (1993). Anti-mainstream vision movement – Speaking from the 5–20 Incident. In C. Duan (Ed.), The voice from boundary (in Chinese). Dan-Sun. Lin, C. L. (1998). Paths to democracy. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale University. 16 In 1985, the GIO initiated research on the cable TV landscape, and in 1989, began developing a draft law to regulate the unregulated and disorderly market. This was triggered by complaints from American television stations who objected to illegal cable stations broadcasting their programs without authorization or compensation. By 1991, cable TV had reached only 40,000 households. However, just before the enactment of the Cable TV Law in 1993, it had already penetrated nearly half of Taiwan’s households. As such, the Legislative Yuan merely legalized a popular and widespread phenomenon. By 1995, cable television had captured 60–70% of the market share (compared to 23% in Hong Kong and 8% in Japan) (“Cable cat’s cradle” 1996), and by 1999, its market penetration had surged to 80%, the highest in the Asia-Pacific region (GIO 1999, p. 7). 17

Lo et al. (1994) found that entertainment is major part of Taiwan TV and radio programs. The reasons for the entertainment-orient are avoiding politically sensitive material and possible violation of taboos, and generating great profits.

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Lin, W. K. (1998). Political parties and changes in Taiwanese electronic media in the 1990s. A paper presented to AEJMC annual conference. Lo, V. H., Cheng, J. C., & Lee, C. C. (1994). Television news is government news in Taiwan. Asian Journal of Communication, 4(1). Rawnsley, G. D. (2000, October). The media and popular protest in pre-democratic Taiwan. Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 20(4). Sun, S. H. (1994). How the three major television networks report election of the 2nd Taiwanese Congress. In W. Jan (Ed.), Media reform, democracy, and liberty. Forerunner Publishing Co. Teng, S. (1998). Shoot on site: Documenting Taiwan with video. Sinorama, 23–28 July. Wong, S. C. (1993). Taiwanese pirate media. In H. Y. Chi, C. Wang, T. Lin, C. Liu, H. Shu, R. Dran, S. Wong, & G. Lee (Eds.), Disintegrating electronic media. Hen-Wei Publishing Co. Zeuthen, J. (2001). Nation and identity in Taiwan. A paper presented at China’s Challenges at the Tum of the 21st Century Conference, 8–10 June, Helsinki.

CHAPTER 7

Alternative Media in Taiwan During the 1990s

After martial law was lifted in 1987, Taiwan has taken significant steps toward achieving democratic freedoms, particularly in the realm of press freedom. Over the past decade, there has been a rapid development of media. On January 1, 1988, restrictions on the number of newspapers and printings were removed, while in 1990, the broadcasting policy was liberalized, allowing private cable and satellite TV enterprises to operate. The granting of new licenses for AM and FM radio, as well as television, marked the beginning of a new era in the free dissemination of information. Most importantly, the internet experienced remarkable growth during the 1990s, transforming from a small medium of communication to a thriving platform for political advocacy. Since then, 2 main alternative media outlets have emerged in Taiwan: alternative radio and the internet. They represent a new chapter in the history of Taiwan’s political transition and democratization.

Definition and Emergence of Alternative Radio Before delving further into the topic of alternative radio in Taiwan, it is important to first examine the definition of alternative radio and certain aspects of Taiwanese society. This will provide a better understanding of the emergence of alternative radio. To gain a better understanding of the historical context surrounding the emergence of alternative radio, Hollander (1992) identified 4 main factors: the pre-existing Taiwan-wide and regional broadcasting system, broadcasting policies, the impact of social reform movements, and the evolution of communication technology. Furthermore, these factors are closely associated with © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Hong and C.-N. Hou, Alternative Media and Taiwan’s Socio-Political Transformation, 1970s–1990s, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2477-6_7

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groups or individuals who have been marginalized or hold opposing views to the mainstream media. Hollander argued that although the motives differed, the common goal shared by these factors and groups was the drive for decentralization. Decentralization was regarded by cultural and social organizations as a means of fostering citizen engagement in the broadcasting sphere. For ordinary individuals, decentralization represented an opportunity to exercise their right to free expression and gain exposure to diverse viewpoints from a range of social classes (Hollander, 1992). For opposition political parties, decentralization presented a platform to contest government policies. The term “alternative” implies a departure from mainstream practices, and the goals of alternative radio have historically been at odds with those of the mainstream. Hollander (1992) notes that decentralization is a common element, with the goals of alternative radio frequently aligned with antiauthority and anti-imperialism, and opposing the domination of political, cultural, ethnic, and communicative orthodoxies. Additionally, the goals of alternative radio have been closely tied to social reform movements.1 Alternative radio and mainstream radio differ significantly from an organizational perspective. Unlike the hierarchical decision-making approach of mainstream radio, alternative radio tends to prioritize diversity and spontaneity over uniformity, reflecting an anti-bureaucratic ethos. Many alternative radio organizations are self-funded, refuse commercial advertisements, and are geared toward nonprofit objectives. These organizations rely on audience subscriptions and public-interest funding as their primary sources of revenue. Volunteers are the primary workforce for these organizations, and while they may not possess professional media experience, they often exhibit advanced skills in other political domains (Hollander, 1992). As alternative radio is open to all, it tends to be more participatory than traditional radio in terms of program production.2 The emergence of alternative radio in Taiwan was catalyzed by a pivotal moment in the country’s democratic evolution. In 1987, the lifting of martial law and the “Emergency Decree” signaled a new era of political openness.

1 For example, consider the earliest community radio station in the United States, KPFA in Berkeley, California, which aimed to promote “peace, social justice, the labor movement, and the arts” through its programming format (Stebbin, 1968, as cited in Barlow, 1988, p. 85). Radio Donna in Rome and Women’s Airwaves in Britain were founded as direct extensions of the feminist movement, with the goal of raising the profile of women (Jallov, 1992). However, as a general example of what alternative radio seeks to accomplish, it strives to present a range of social values, cultural perspectives, musical styles, and opinions as alternative possibilities. 2 Examples of community radio from Europe (Jakubowicz, 1995) and ethnic minority radio from around the world (Riggins, 1992) illustrate that the line between alternative media and their users is blurred. Users of these media are both receivers and senders, citizens and unpaid staff, participants, and supervisors. Programs and messages are collectively created by the media and their users.

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The following year, the newspaper industry underwent a significant transformation with the opening of new registrations for newspapers and the removal of restrictions on the number of pages per issue. However, the release of broadcasting resources was postponed until the conclusion of 1993. Radio was long viewed as a peripheral medium in Taiwan due to its limited audience. According to an official report, the daily rate of radio listenership was 37.85%, which paled in comparison to the 78.49% daily rate of television viewership (Republic of China, The National Report of Cultural Supply-side Statistics, 1993, pp. 71–72). The KMT maintained control over radio stations, which were either ideological or propagandistic in nature. Furthermore, opposition politicians learned from the experiences of numerous political and social movements that alternative radio was an extremely effective method of organizing their supporters. Through live reports and call-in programs on radio stations, they could draw thousands of people to protests. As a result, opposition parties and politicians invested in establishing alternative radio stations in the 1990s. These stations were used to criticize the politics of the ruling KMT, attract massive audiences, and propagate opposition ideologies. Alternative radio quickly became a crucial tool for opposition parties’ organizational and developmental activities. Prior to broadcasting deregulation, there were 33 stations operating on available frequencies in Taiwan. Of these stations, 20 were privately owned, 12 were government-owned, and 1 was owned by the KMT.3 The governmentowned stations, while publicly labeled, were under the control of the government. Therefore, apart from the private stations, all others were subject to the influence of the KMT. Although there were more private radio stations than government-owned ones, the number of transmitters and output capacity of the private stations were much lower than those of the governmentowned counterparts. The KMT government maintained a dominant position in broadcasting resources, controlling 80% of AM transmitters, 96.2% of FM transmitters, and 98.2% of transmitter output power (Wang, 1993a, 1993b). By owning alternative radio stations, politicians could utilize them as resources to promote their political platforms. The peak of illegal underground radio occurred in 1993 and 1994, with several dozen illegal radio stations competing for airtime in Taiwan (GIO, 1996). After a delay, the government began to release radio frequencies in December 1994, and by January 1996, 67 licenses for community radio stations were issued (GIO, 1997). 3 The main strategy employed by the national apparatus to exercise state authority is through regulations. Prior to 1993, the government-imposed restrictions on the number of broadcasting licenses for reasons related to state security. In addition, regulations were imposed that required a minimum capital of NT$50,000,000 (US$1,666,000) for setting up a radio station, which limited new entrants. The government also controlled the formation of programs, including the types of programs, the duration of advertisements, and their content. Furthermore, the government reserved the right to preview programs and to impose fines on producers, resulting in the suppression of diverse opinions and the achievement of their own goals (Lin, 1995).

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Alternative Radio in the 1990s Political Background for Burgeoning Alternative Media The lifting of Martial Law has created a new class of people with increased purchasing power, demanding a political democracy led by those with such power. This democratization process was essentially a bourgeois democratic form, resulting in societal changes and breaking down of old boundaries. The political transition occurred chaotically, with at least 3000 street demonstrations within a year. Each newspaper had a hidden affiliate with a political party, which they could not officially associate with. After 1987, cultural criticism emerged in the newspaper context, leaving conservatives and even liberals with little to say. As a result, the alternative radio movement began to emerge. After the democratization of politics, there was an increasing demand for the right to access information and communicate freely among the people. They accused the KMT ruling government of dominating all media resources and exerting overwhelming control over broadcasting. In the 1990s, the DPP sought to collaborate with civic anti-KMT groups, such as anti-nuclear and environmentalist groups, to establish new media channels that would strengthen their political and societal influence. As previously mentioned, the DPP established its own cable television association, the “National Association of Taiwan’s Democratic Cable Television (Channel Four)”, which attracted many members from civic anti-KMT groups.4 The initial rise of Taiwanese alternative radio was fueled by the swift expansion of alternative media, largely influenced by civil society. However, opposition parties quickly recognized the potential of tapping into the vast resources of anti-KMT civic groups. Consequently, this new media landscape was soon incorporated into the development strategies of the opposition parties. In 1993, Taiwan terminated its 40-year media monopoly by permitting the introduction of new radio stations. But, faced with rigorous licensing regulations requiring substantial capital and equipment, numerous operators decided against registration. While these unlicensed stations could seek official licenses, their applications remained in waiting. Besides alternative radio, DPP lawmakers also ventured into owning radio stations. Given the limited funds, certain members from anti-KMT civic groups resorted to “renting” airtime from the DPP-owned stations. For instance, the host of the most famous alternative radio program, Shih Ronchi (许荣祺), was an activist in anti-KMT civic groups. Before becoming well-known, Shih paid NT$60,000 per hour to broadcast on a DPP-owned 4 Chen (1992) argued that this problem was partly due to the immaturity of Taiwanese civil society. Although essential components of civil society had developed significantly, Taiwan was still in the “pre-civil society” stage. This meant that Taiwanese society lacked the necessary autonomy to integrate a “societal community”, and emerging civic groups were still large and easily co-opted by opposition parties. .

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alternative radio station called “The Voice of Whole People” (全民之声) in 1992 (“The Independent Daily” April 24, 1994, p. 3). This arrangement meant that anti-KMT civic groups had to compromise on political stances to satisfy DPP radio station owners. The Aims for Establishment Over the past 20 years, despite the people’s desire for greater media competition to foster a more diverse society, the government has remained steadfast in its belief that “illegal” electronic media poses a significant threat to its authority. Consequently, the government has opted to seize essential broadcasting equipment or shut down such operations entirely. Although the populace sought to exercise their newfound political rights to participate in the media, the government did not want to hasten the process. As indicated in Table 7.1, alternative radio stations demonstrated remarkable resilience. Despite having their equipment seized by authorities on one day, they were often back on the airwaves the next day, their desire to be heard impossible to silence. These radio stations were named after their political leanings, such as the Formosan New Voice and the Voice of Taiwan, which were particularly favored among taxi drivers (a demographic traditionally aligned with the DPP) and were instrumental in organizing political activities (refer to Table 7.1). This “incitement”, which occasionally fostered the emergence of a uniquely Taiwanese perspective, entailed censuring the government while elucidating the populace’s grievances (Rawnsley, 2000). A significant portion of Taiwan’s taxi drivers ardently support the island’s underground alternative radio stations. Many of these stations are run by opposition parties or individuals in disagreement with the ruling KMT party. According to research data on alternative radio, these stations have 2 primary objectives: challenging the KMT government’s authority and advocating for the human rights of expression and communication. Chen C. J. (1994), a host at an alternative radio station, cited two reasons for the rise of such stations. The primary reason was to remedy the structural issues in broadcasting caused by the KMT government’s monopoly. The other rationale was Table 7.1 The incidents activated by alternative underground radio and taxi drivers: 1990–1993 Year

Amount of incidents

1990 1991 1992 1993

5 1 3 3

Amount of taxis get involved Over 160 Over 10 Over 110 About 100, there was fighting between taxi drivers and construction workers

Source Hsieh, S. (1994, August 17). China Evening Post, p. 10

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to afford citizens the right to unrestricted access and engagement with the media and to safeguard their freedom of communication. In Chen M.H.’s (1995) interviews with staff from 14 alternative radio stations, it was discovered that the stations’ objectives were directly linked to existing social issues and reflected the needs of ordinary citizens. These objectives included breaking the KMT government’s stranglehold on the broadcasting market, securing freedom of expression, hearing different viewpoints, and advocating for the interests of marginalized groups, such as aboriginal people, women, the elderly, and individuals with disabilities. Additionally, Chang (1995) highlighted the political motivations behind these stations, citing the intense competition between political parties following the political liberalization of 1987. As government-controlled broadcasting media dominated the airwaves, dissidents turned to alternative radio to weaken the government’s power. In Fang’s (1995b) observation, during the early 1990s, all parties concurred that commercial interests played no role in the establishment of alternative radio stations. These stations were exclusively established to promote the ideologies of political dissidents and were not driven by commercial motivations.5 Compared to the history of media worldwide, the issue surrounding Taiwan’s alternative radio is particularly unique in that early underground radio stations in Taiwan often incited direct protests by the people. That is, through the radio, they were able to quickly mobilize and gather people, causing several instances of clashes between the police and civilians, resulting in social unrest. Underground media hosts became social activists, and even political figures, causing the mainstream media to lose its role as a watchdog. This is the biggest concern brought about by alternative radio to society in Taiwan.6

5 Chang (1995), a scholar specializing in media studies, investigated the variations in program content between alternative radio stations (primarily of the “underground” variety) and mainstream radio from the perspectives of localism and pluralism. She discovered that mainstream radio programs were typically dominated by music and leisure content, accounting for 65% of broadcasts, while news programs constituted only 10%. Additionally, programs that addressed public issues, underrepresented communities, and Taiwanese culture were significantly underrepresented, making up less than 1% of broadcasts. In contrast, alternative radio stations allocated 36% of their airtime to political and public issues, 8% to Taiwanese culture, and 8% to underrepresented communities, with music and leisure content constituting only 25% of broadcasts. These differences were deemed significant, leading Chang to conclude that alternative radio stations were more inclined toward public service than mainstream radio. 6

Interviewed with Lee Tien-Duo, March 6, 2003, Tainan County.

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Organization and Types of Alternative Radio Ownership According to research conducted by Chen M. H. (1995), as well as Chen C. J. (1994) and Du (1996), the organization of alternative radio stations was highly adaptable. As the government considered alternative radio to be illegal, these stations could not make long-term plans and needed to remain mobile and adaptable to avoid crackdowns. Furthermore, the research findings indicated that most alternative radio stations did not have segregated task departments, and each staff member had to take on multiple tasks. Financial support from users’ subscriptions and donations from political parties, politicians, and social movement groups was a crucial source of funding. During the anti-KMT movement among opposition parties and civic groups, former DPP member Shih Ron-chi saw an opportunity to utilize radio as a platform for opposition politicians. On November 3, 1993, Shih established the Voice of Taiwan (台湾之声), an alternative radio station aimed at criticizing the corruption and issues of the ruling KMT government. Despite being a small station, the Voice of Taiwan gained widespread attention throughout Taiwan. However, the government viewed the station as a threat to its power, especially during election campaigns, and sought to suppress its broadcasts due to its illegal status. Some scholars believed that the act of suppression was a political struggle, rather than an attempt to enforce legitimacy (The China Times , July 31, 1994, p. 3). Due to the support that the Voice of Taiwan received from many Taiwanese, other similar alternative radio stations emerged between 1994 and 1995. Involvement of opposition politicians in the ownership of political opposition radio stations was also observed. At the end of 1993, there were only 3 alternative radio stations: the Voice of Taiwan, the Voice of Whole People, and the Voice of Southern Taiwan. According to Chen C. J. (1994) and Lin (1995), the number of alternative radio stations in Taiwan had surpassed 30 by November 1994. These stations can be classified into 3 ownership types: Type A, which is directly owned by members of political opposition parties; Type B, which is owned by anti-KMT civic groups or groups collaborating with opposition politicians; and Type C, which is owned by individuals who have no apparent political affiliations but oppose the monopoly of electronic media and therefore provide an alternative radio station. Table 7.2 illustrates that alternative radio stations in Taiwan were owned by 3 types of owners as mentioned earlier. Half of the stations (50%) were directly owned by members of the two major opposition parties—DPP and CNP. The second-largest group of stations (40%) were owned by anti-KMT civic groups or groups cooperating with opposition politicians. The remaining 10% were owned by individuals with no evident political affiliations but opposed the monopoly of electronic media and offered an alternative radio station. These ownership statistics provide a significant insight into the political connections of existing alternative radio stations. Mostly, opposition parties and anti-KMT

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groups, which accounted for 90% of the ownership (combined Type A and B), owned these stations. Apart from ownership, station programming was also used to convey political attitudes. Call-in Culture Makes Alternative Public Spheres Chen C. J. (1994) suggested in this research that the program production processes of alternative radio stations differ from those of mainstream media since they were established by political dissidents who lacked professional background in broadcasting. These characteristics were evident not only in the organization but also in the production processes. One notable instance of this opposition to mainstream media production is the call-in program, which relied heavily on input from both the host and the audience. The rise of Taiwan’s diverse and vocal population contributed to a surge in call-in radio programs, with 25 of the 30-minute programs dedicated to listener comments. These programs provided a platform for listeners to voice their opinions on Taiwan’s development, and even allowed for government officials to visit the studios and address policy questions.7 The topics covered by call-in programs were diverse, ranging from healthcare and traffic laws to broader societal concerns such as security. In addition, according to Chen M. H. (1995), most programs were created in-house by the stations, with only a few being contributed by external sources such as social movement groups. Both Chen M. H. (1995) and Chen C. J. (1994) agreed that program production was a dynamic process. The stations produced interactive programs that emphasized immediacy and anonymity, allowing for two-way communication. The alternative radio stations thus appeared to provide a public sphere where individuals could participate and contribute to the formation of public opinion. Lin (1995) highlighted that the emergence of alternative radio stations with accessible platforms, public participation, and public service orientation has been motivated by people’s concern over public issues and encouraged greater participation in public discussion. These features are also evident in alternative radio stations, which have been embraced by both white- and bluecollar workers. According to Lin (1995), alternative radio has broken down the barriers between different social classes and bridged the gap between the elite and the common people. It may be the closest thing to an ideal public sphere. Constantly applying majority rule without respecting minority rights is one of the reasons behind social conflicts. However, mainstream media can mislead people to see the freedom to dissent as the root cause of conflict. Empirical evidence shows that KMT supporters exhibit high levels of intolerance and are reluctant to extend civil liberties to objectionable groups, while DPP alternative radios tend to protect and encourage minorities to express their views 7

Interviewed with Lee Tien-Duo, March 6, 2003, Tainan County.

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Table 7.2 The ownership of alternative radio and its political relationship Name of station

Ownership

Political relationship

Frequency

Location

Broadcasting for Independence The Green Peace

A

FM 93.0

Northern Taiwan

FM 90.3

Northern Taiwan

Nation of Taiwan

A

FM 90.9

Northern Taiwan

New Thoughts

B

FM 89.9

Northern Taiwan

Taiwan New Tone

A

FM 95.1

Northern Taiwan

The Voice of Basic People The Voice of Central Taiwan The Voice of Dynasty The Voice of Formosa Justice

A

The owner is a former DPP member The owner is a former DPP member; and the programming designed by anti-KMT civic groups The owners are staff of the DPP The owners are CNP members The owners are DPP legislators The owner is a former leader of the DPP The owners are DPP legislators Civic groups

FM 91.9

Northern Taiwan

FM 88.7

Central Taiwan

FM 89.9

Central Taiwan

FM 92.1

Central Taiwan

The Voice of Freedom The Voice of Hakka The Voice of New Party The Voice of Peace The Voice of President The Voice of the Public The Voice of Southern Taiwan The Voice of Taiwan

B

The owners are DPP-supporting civic groups The owners are anti-KMT civic groups Ethnic groups

FM 95.5

Northern Taiwan

FM 91.5

Central Taiwan

FM 93.2

Northern Taiwan

FM 88.3a

Northern Taiwan

FM 95.2a

Southern Taiwan

FM 92.7

Northern Taiwan

FM 88.3a

Southern Taiwan

FM 88.3a

Northern Taiwan

The Voice of Yamsb

B

The owners are the CNP members The owners are anti-KMT civic groups A CNP-supporting group The owner is a DPP member The owner is a DPP legislator The owner is a former DPP member; Programming designed by staff of the DPP local branches The owners are anti-KMT civic groups and staff of the DPP local branch

FM 89.7

Northern Taiwan

B

A C B

C A B B A A A

(continued)

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Table 7.2 (continued) Name of station

The Voice of Whole People

Ownership B A

Political relationship

The owner is a former secretary-in-general of the DPP

Frequency

Location

FM 95.2a FM 98.1

Southern Taiwan Northern Taiwan

Table 7.2 is compiled based on the information from Chen C. J. (1994) and Lin (1995). Total Number: Type A—10; Type B—8; Type C—2. The table displays 20 stations, with 13 located in northern Taiwan, 4 in central Taiwan, and 3 in southern Taiwan. a It is normal that some alternative radio stations share the same frequency even if they are in the same area. The main reason is that these radio stations transmit signals via medium frequencies or low frequencies, which means their coverage is limited. Therefore, they will not interfere with each other. Because they are regarded as “illegal situations”, these alternative radio stations are not able to maintain stable operations since they would be banned by the government at any time. b The Voice of Yam broadcasts programs via different frequencies in different regions across Taiwan. Therefore, these 2 radio stations have the same ownership and same relationship with the same political party as well.

and different opinions. In contrast, CNP alternative radio (“The Voice of the New Party”), with a pro-Chinese unification stance, would attack any advocacy of Taiwan independence or any criticism and speech attacking Taiwan, playing a crucial role in promoting pro-Chinese unification in the 1990s. Jow (1995) posited that if we embrace the views or actions endorsed by the CNP, there would be a negative correlation between DPP alternative radio and political tolerance. Similarly, we can note pronounced intolerance among KMT supporters and significant tolerance among DPP supporters. Mobilization for Social Reform Highlighting the mobilization of alternative media is a crucial point to make. According to Fang’s (1995b) observations, radio stations’ ownership ideologies vary significantly. While mainstream radio stations align with the interests of the KMT government, alternative radio stations challenge the authority of KMT. Additionally, Fang (1995b) pointed out that alternative media has tremendous potential to bring about social change. Chen C. J. (1994) expressed concerns about the impact of combining radio station power and social reform movements. Alternative radio stations played a significant role as centers for social reform movements between 1994 and 1995. These stations utilized their broadcasting platforms to direct public action, specifically among taxi drivers. On February 22, 1994, a significant incident took place when the well-known alternative radio station, “The Voice of Taiwan,” utilized its platform to gather taxi drivers around the Ministry of Finance in protest compulsory third-party car insurance. Over 500 taxis converged at the Ministry of Finance, and in response

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to the radio station’s cue, all the drivers honked their horns simultaneously to express their discontent (Chen C. J., 1994). On April 21, 1994, “the Voice of Taiwan” organized a street protest, rallying hundreds of taxis to surround the KMT headquarters in opposition to the unjust broadcasting policy. Then, in July 1994, as the government targeted “the Voice of Taiwan”, hundreds of taxis rallied around the station in its defense. Many alternative radio stations documented comparable incidents, resulting in tensions between the government and its citizens. The pressure exerted by the already established alternative radio stations, along with the growing desire for freedom of communication, compelled the government to issue radio licenses and revise its media policy. This development prompted Weng (1993) to remark that alternative radio stations have played a positive role in transforming Taiwanese society. As soon as the principal opposition forces signed the agreement to participate politically within the institutional framework created by the authoritarian regime, the alternative radio played significant roles in mobilizing the electorate, operating as the voice of the opposition alliance. In the context of electoral competition, given their confrontational character, these radio stations responded to increased demands for political information, providing accounts of the various activities of the opposition alliance. However, their response was not merely to pass on information, as if it came from somewhere external to the media themselves. In fact, these alternative radio stations actively involved them in the contest, adopting the opposition’s politicalelectoral strategy and broadcasting its positions. During this period, they widely disseminated the messages of the opposition alliance: calls to vote for opposition party candidates as a means of recovering true political citizenship, calls for widespread participation in the various campaign activities of the opposition, and so on. More Commercial After Legitimization Early underground radio was popular among political enthusiasts or individuals precisely because its free and call-in program style was favored by listeners. However, just as in the formation of dissenting media in the past, once the speech market became more open and the interactive hosting model was excessively abused by the media, the market competitiveness of alternative radio weakened. By the end of 1993, the government took significant steps toward reforming broadcasting regulations. They released broadcasting resources and amended “the Broadcasting Law”, eliminating restrictions on the share of broadcasting time allotted to each language and reducing the required capital to NT$1,000,000 (equivalent to approximately US$33,000). These amendments enabled dozens of illegal radio stations to legalize their operations. The government issued over 100 new radio licenses, including 46 regional radio stations that catered to a 30-kilometer radius and 67 community radio stations that served a 5-kilometer radius. Most of the popular alternative stations met

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the requirements and were able to legalize their operations as community radio stations by the end of 1995.8 After the KMT government released broadcasting resources and implemented a deregulation policy in the 1990s, the media landscape in Taiwan underwent significant changes, the community radio stations no longer had the same imperative to combat government domination as their main aim. As a result, community radio stations shifted their focus to other activities. Radio is a versatile medium that can serve political or commercial purposes, but community radio stations prioritize public service while also aiming for financial sustainability (Lin Chun-Fu, Manager of Chia-Kang Radio Station9 2002 interview). Based on Chang Chin-Hua’s investigation (1995), alternative radio stations were more focused on broadcasting programs addressing public issues rather than entertainment issues. However, community radio stations have since undergone significant changes. Legitimization has brought stability, and community radio managers have worked toward consolidating their organizations to maintain their viability in the face of market pressures. They have recognized that their once-dissident medium, which created an uncertain future for the station, could now impact its survival. Legitimization has also led to institutionalization, with all community radio stations following broadcasting regulations and setting up different sections to formalize their operations. As a result, full-time, paid staff and commercial considerations have been introduced. The Collapse of Station Identity After Legitimization The popularity of alternative radio stations can be attributed to the strong sense of identity shared by both the stations and their listeners. This sense of identity encompassed a feeling of belonging, inclusion, and active participation. These stations relied on their listeners’ contributions for financial support, human resources, and the creation of program identities. Listeners acted as both message receivers and senders, sharing a powerful sense of identity with the stations. As a result, listeners shared a powerful sense of identity with the stations, which led them to protest government crackdowns on underground radio stations (Ke, 1998). 8 Community radio stations can be considered a form of alternative radio as they cater to specific communities where the station is based or to which it belongs. The station’s programming focuses on addressing the needs of residents, and it often welcomes community members to participate in its operations. Community radio stations maintain their “public” character and avoid market pressures by relying on audience subscriptions or public funding for financial support. 9 The Chia-Kang Radio Station (正港电台) was established in 1994 solely to support the campaign of independent candidate Hsu Hsiao-Tan (许晓丹) for the legislative assembly in Kaohsiung City, located in southern Taiwan. Following the election, the unused broadcasting equipment sparked an idea in Lin Chun-Fu, one of Hsu Hsiao-Tan’s assistants, to establish a radio station.

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After being legitimized, alternative radio stations, most of which were community-based, gradually became assimilated into the mainstream radio due to government regulations and commercial pressures, according to Ke (1998). As a result, the lines between alternative and mainstream radio were blurred, and the stations lost their distinct identities and the recognition of their users. This loss of identity and recognition caused community radio stations to move away from the alternative radio sphere and become marginalized in the mainstream, making it harder for them to survive in the competitive environment. As demonstrated by the historical experience and growing commercialization of alternative radio, simply releasing more air-wave resources for private use, a policy that was collaboratively implemented by both the ruling and opposition parties in the 1990s, could potentially result in the weakening or complete loss of alternative voices (Fang, 1995a). Guerrilla-Style Underground Radio Still Fought for Alternative Voice The phenomena described above highlight how alternative radio’s growth was rooted in its distinct characteristics. Listeners gravitated towards underground alternative radio stations when they offered unique values and mirrored societal needs and realities. Yet, as many of these underground stations gained legitimacy through government recognition and transformed into community radio stations, government regulations often curtailed their alternative attributes. To remain financially sustainable, community radio stations often shifted toward institutionalization and commercialization, leading to a loss of their unique station identity and support from their listeners. According to Rawnsley (2000), alternative underground radio was never truly legalized. Rather, the government eased regulations on the establishment of new community-based radio stations and solicited applications for licenses to operate on recently opened frequencies. Despite the government’s passage of the New Telecommunications Law in August 1996, which reiterated that alternative radio stations would face prosecution and their operators would be fined or imprisoned, the “pirates of the airwaves” persisted. By the end of 1997, there were approximately 80–90 alternative radio stations that defied the government (Rawnsley, 2000). The alternative underground stations were akin to guerrilla bands, requiring mobility and flexibility to evade government crackdowns. Like “the Voice of Taiwan”, they were primarily focused on their political goal of criticizing the KMT government and advocating for a new ruling party, and their audience consisted mostly of blue-collar workers, particularly taxi drivers. The DPP’s rise to power in 2000 marked the realization of their goal. However, the KMT government attributed their loss of power in part to the influence of alternative underground radio stations (Chen, 2001). The media reform movement has truly entered into an organized operational framework, becoming a prominent category within the collective

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resistance sector. It is not developed by existing media practitioners as the main body or by mobilizing their interests, but rather driven by other forms of resistance that were previously excluded from reasonable use of the media. This phenomenon has made the media reform movement in Taiwan quite different in nature compared to other social movements within the resistance sector for many years. Therefore, if the situation in the resistance sector in the 1990s was a mix of various social movement groups advocating for the expansion of specific civil rights, then the media reform movement is a wave of citizen rights expansion movements with a national character that advocates for freedom of speech and expression and demands fair distribution of media resources.10 Looking back and contrasting with the social scene at that time, this stage of underground radio fully demonstrated the role of alternative media in democratic social movements.

The New Form of Alternative Media After the Late 1990s: Virtual Community The Emergence of Pluralism, Social Movement Politics, and the Impact of the Internet As indicated in a research article by one of the authors of this book (for details of that article, see “Creating the Internet as Alternative Media: A Study of the Role of Gay Virtual Community in Taiwan’s Political Participation”, authored by Cheng-nan Hou and published in Cyber Sociology Online Journal, 網路 社會學通訊, Vol. 50, Nov. 15, 2005, http://www.nhu.edu.tw/~society/e-j/ 50/50-02.htm), Taiwan experienced significant social transformations in the 1990s and beyond. The legislative election led to the replacement of many mainland elected KMT supporters with younger, well-educated representatives born in Taiwan, who aimed to democratize the country. As the decade progressed, societal changes became more widely accepted, often aligning with the ideals of democracy and economic prosperity. Notably, there was a growing demand for greater individual freedoms and self-expression. Following Chen Shui-bian’s (Formosa faction) victory in the 2000 presidential elections, the moderate line of the DPP persisted. He emphasized even more strongly than previous DPP leaders that the party did not seek formal independence for Taiwan if it posed a threat to the safety of its people. Nevertheless, given the rapid political changes in Taiwan, this context is highly pertinent for examining the role of identity politics in shaping visibility. Among the notable social movements that emerged in Taiwan, identity politics played a significant role, with social movement groups leading the charge. The lifting of martial law in 1987 provided some breathing room for activists, while the advent of the internet had a tremendous impact on social movements across the country. Taiwan has made active strides toward 10

Interviewed with Lee Tien-Duo, March 6, 2003, Tainan County.

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promoting human rights since the lifting of martial law. The relaxation of the KMT government’s grip on the media and changes in politics paved the way for a diversity of voices to be heard in Taiwan, as noted by Lee (1998). With the opposition party assuming power after the 2000 presidential election, the primary alternative media of the 1990s—alternative radio—lost its significance, and alternative media activists transitioned into leadership roles within social movement groups.11 The widespread adoption of information and communication technology (ICT), coupled with the ongoing process of globalization, brought about profound social and political changes. On a large scale, the ICT revolution is believed to have ushered in a new economy and a new type of politics. In this new political climate, identity and culture replaced class and material interests as the primary sources of social conflict, as noted by Castells (1998). On a smaller scale, ICT, and the Internet, gave a voice to marginalized groups, enabled their mobilization, expanded the range of collective actions, and contributed to the growth of civil society (Naughton, 2001). As previously mentioned, computer-mediated communication (CMC) is characterized by its anonymity, decentralization, and independence from location. These attributes offer vast opportunities for social movements in the information age. Nonetheless, the true impact of this technology hinges on the particular contexts in which these social movements function. Over time, the internet has evolved from a small-scale mode of communication into a thriving platform for political activism. The availability of alternative media has led to a rise in self-production, enabling former participants to create their own websites or discussion boards independently of one another, often with minimal costs. Alternative media, as part of the public sphere, involve people directly in their production and distribution without the same degree of commodification as mass media. According to John Durham Peters (1993), mass media primarily serve as a means of imaging community, with limited opportunities for active participation. In contrast, alternative media actively encourage participation by offering opportunities for identity and engagement, rather than mere representation (Peters, 1993). As media production becomes more democratized through evolving social practices, traditional structures begin to wane, giving rise to unconventional methods that question the prevailing systems of organization, culture, and politics. This creates alternative paradigms of participation, power, and creativity. Participants evolve from being passive observers to active contributors, endeavoring to reshape the manner in which we perceive ourselves, our actions, and our environments (Cox, 1997). As communication becomes more widespread, the traditional order is revolutionized (Eder, 1993). Williams (1976) emphasized the significance of communication within social networks and its function in reflexive learning procedures: 11

Interviewed with Daiwei Fu (傅大为), June 1, 2002, Taipei City.

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What we call society is not only a network of political and economic arrangements but also a process of learning and communication. Communication begins in the struggle to learn and describe. (p. 11)

Unlike traditional media, the Internet offers a unique power of equality among its users, regardless of differences in race, gender, age, isolation, abilities, or sexuality. It does not rely on a limited spectrum and is an influential interactive platform for political communication. This means that individuals can express their opinions through email, chat, or personal websites, and as the cost of computers and internet access decreases, more people can join the Internet community, making it more representative of society. However, those with more power and resources still have more influence and space online, as the Internet acts as a mirror of society (Atton, 2002). Despite this, minority groups have actively embraced the internet, partly due to the opportunity it provides for the commodification of identity. Nowadays alternative media have opened new avenues for diverse voices, and social movement activists have proven to be a fertile ground for alternative media production. As a result of these struggles, social movement groups have increasingly demanded alternative media, which in turn have become more versatile. Recent low-cost technologies have made it possible for minority groups to create their own computer-mediated websites. These sites serve as the primary alternative media for discussing controversial political and social issues, and they help these groups achieve their goals in social reform movements. Definition of Virtual Community According to Jones (1997), virtual communities are more than just a group of people communicating online. They are based on a sense of belonging and are characterized by 4 qualities that are also applicable to geographically bound communities. These 4 qualities, as outlined by Jones (1997), include: 1. A minimum level of interactivity. 2. A variety of communicators. 3. Common public space. 4. A minimum level of sustained membership. The above features outline virtual communities as channels for significant communication and social engagement among a multitude of individuals. To constitute a virtual community, there must be an exchange of messages between participants. If an individual posts on a website and receives no comments, there can be no virtual community. But, when a post elicits a response from a participant, leading to an exchange of comments, it establishes interactivity among participants. While interaction between 2 individuals

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can create a relationship, a virtual community necessitates the participation of more individuals in the conversation (Hamilton & Gordon, 1999). Virtual communities do not have a physical location, but they still need to be anchored in cyberspace. According to Jones (1997), there are specific platforms where community participants regularly engage in communication. In the early days of computer-mediated communication (CMC), individuals went to BBS (Bulletin Board System) to post, read, and respond to messages. Nowadays, chat rooms serve the same function, but with the added benefit of real-time interaction. Additionally, virtual communities exist for those who have an ongoing relationship with other members. A single visit or interaction is not enough to be considered a member of a virtual community (Wood & Smith, 2001). Rather, membership in a virtual community requires the establishment of relationships that are sustained over time. The Taiwanese Social Movement in the Online Sphere After Taiwan’s shift to a more liberal political environment in 2000 and the proliferation of social movement groups, coupled with its high level of ereadiness, given the ICT revolution, it’s reasonable to expect that numerous groups have capitalized on it. Through an extensive search that involves using the search engine “Google™” to identify relevant web pages and following hyperlinks generated by the initially identified web pages, the number of groups that have launched web pages is presented in Table 7.3. Since there is no reliable estimate of the number of environmental groups in the area, it is unclear whether the number of launched web pages reflects a high or low rate of internet usage. Particularly, Taiwan’s democratization movement and flourishing social activism around the 1990s had a profound enlightening effect on the longoppressed LGBTQ+ community. Many early participants of the LGBTQ+ movement had even been involved in the wave of reform movements at that time. The lifting of martial law, parliamentary reform, and media liberalization Table 7.3 Numbers of Taiwanese social movement group websites Group LGBTQ+ right Environmentalist Women right Aboriginal right Education reform Taiwan independence Labor right Community

Total 29 26 28 29 10 11 12 11

Generate hyperlinks

Discussion board

29 (100%) 26 (100%) 28 (100%) 27 (93%) 8 (80%) 9 (82%) 11 (92%) 9 (82%)

29 (100%) 26 (100%) 28 (100%) 28 (97%) 9 (90%) 8 (73%) 10 (83%) 11 (100%)

Last Retrieved Date: January 11, 2003. Search from http://www.google.com

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all symbolized the end of authoritarian rule, the breakdown of political surveillance, and the burning flame of freedom of speech throughout society. It was no longer taboo to discuss LGBTQ+ topics in the media. Taiwan’s LGBTQ+ movement advanced in sync with the pulse of Taiwan’s reform movement, illustrating that the trajectory of the LGBTQ+ movement cannot be separated from the fluctuations of the political and economic environment. By local standards, social movement groups in Taiwan are relatively resourceful, as evidenced by the well-maintained state of most of their websites. For example, as of the author’s last visit on January 11, 2003, approximately 90% of environmental organizations, 85% of labor organizations, and 90% of LGBTQ+ groups had updated their web pages within the previous 3 months. In addition to the technical difficulties, it is noteworthy that a significant number of groups and organizations have effectively utilized the internet as an information source. According to Table 7.3, all LGBTQ+, environmental, and women’s rights websites, and more than 80% of the other social movement websites, have included hyperlinks to either local or global related organizations. Moreover, when these links are provided, they are generally well-organized and comprehensive. It is disappointing that not all organizations have utilized the Internet’s feature of time–space compression and attempted to connect with a broader audience. Particularly, websites of all social movement groups are solely accessible in Chinese. One possible reason for this is that some of the social movement groups have only aimed their sites at their potential or current members residing in Taiwan. However, this further highlights that social movement groups have not maximized the potential of the Internet as a tool to disseminate information and garner public support beyond geographical barriers. Although there are some drawbacks, many social movement groups have utilized the internet to increase public awareness of their objectives and to promote their positions on controversial issues, as an alternative to traditional media such as newspapers, magazines, and television. The effectiveness of these efforts has varied widely among the groups. Environmental organizations, for example, have used their websites to explain their goals and histories, as well as to detail their sources of funding and the incidents that led to their formation. Similarly, some labor unions have been able to provide rich historical recollections through their websites. In the past, these groups had relied on newsletters and other publications to achieve the same goals, but the internet now offers a powerful new channel for advocacy. In online forums such as BBS, the group gathered by the topic is to a certain extent above the individual, thus creating a sense of group identity. In addition, relative autonomy in management allows users to have more freedom in use and interaction. This is an important reason for the rise of discussion sites such as BBS in the 1990s. This kind of freedom can also be considered the cause of Taiwan’s democratization, and it also clearly demonstrates the

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mobilization energy that can be generated by the ability to create a group identity for democracy. A potential solution to shorten the distance between social movement groups and interested parties and to enhance networking is to establish a forum for direct communication on the Internet. As shown in Table 7.3, more than 70% of each kind of social movement website, including LGBTQ+, environmental, and women’s rights sites, have provided discussion areas for their visitors. However, the quantity and quality of the discussions vary greatly. Discussion areas dedicated to specific issues tend to attract more active and focused debates. While some discussions were filled with insults, many touched on fundamental principles and encouraged public participation in important policy discussions. In the following case study on virtual LGBTQ+ communities, we will delve further into this point. Case Study: Making an LGBTQ+ Virtual Community as Powerful Alternative Media As mentioned earlier, Taiwan politics has undergone significant changes since the advent of the Internet. The power of the Internet to amplify the diversity of public discourse and to convey the perspectives of social movement groups was most evident in instances where these groups were embroiled in contentious public debates. The emergence of the LGBTQ+ movement provided an opportunity for change in the fate of Taiwan’s LGBTQ+ community. LGBTQ+ individuals began to gather and form organizations, and LGBTQ+ clubs appeared on campuses. The groups connected and formed alliances, speaking out against discrimination, and expressing their opinions on public policies. Online communities, such as BBS systems, web forums, and message boards, as well as emerging social media in recent years, not only provide a more diverse way of reading and disseminating information, but also enable more direct and powerful interaction between LGBTQ+ users, creating strong and influential virtual communities. Previously, online acquaintances only knew each other through text-based communication, but through real-life events, they extend their online relationships to offline and build real friendships, making mobilization more solid and even becoming a crucial factor in promoting individual action.12 Virtual community members not only gather for protest activities but also include the Taiwan Pride Parade, which has seen a sharp increase in participants every year since 2003, and even the creation of Asia’s first successful example of legalizing same-sex marriage. These are major achievements of virtual LGBTQ+ communities that are rare in the world. To explore how social movement groups successfully utilized virtual communities as an

12 Interviewed with Yu-Lin Lai, June 16, 2002, Taipei City. Lai was the secretary-general of “Taiwan Tongzhi Hotline Association” (台湾同志咨询热线).

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alternative media, it is essential to conduct a case study on LGBTQ+ virtual communities in Taiwan. These scenarios may occur when the government proposes new legislation, when organizations publish research reports advocating for reform, or when they voice their opposition to actions taken by either the government or private organizations. One notable development among social movement groups on the internet in the 1990s was the emergence of identity politics by LGBTQ+ advocacy groups.13 In comparison to other groups, such as labor, community, Taiwan’s independence, aboriginal, environmental, women’s, and educational reform groups, the LGBTQ+ community was the most underrepresented by mainstream media in Taiwan, yet it was the most effective in mobilizing support through online channels (Chen & Lin, 2001). The end of martial law in Taiwan brought about some freedom for the LGBTQ+ community. As Taiwan’s dismantling of military rule began in the early 1980s, the country’s desire to present itself as a modern democratic society led to attempts at liberalization in various areas, including sexual politics (Patton, 1998). In 1990, the first openly LGBTQ+ group was established in Taiwan, and by the mid-1990s, there was a consistent production of queer novels, films, and magazines. According to Wang (1998), LGBTQ+ activists in Taiwan drew upon a diverse range of same-sex cultural activities and representations with a rich history. Through writing, editing, and publishing, they shared their life stories and conveyed the anger and dissent of the LGBTQ+ community. These writings and publications provided comfort and inspiration to many LGBTQ+ individuals, and through reading these books, the public in Taiwan gained a new understanding and comprehension of the real lives and situations of the LGBTQ+ community. The LGBTQ+ rights movement in Taiwan has made notable advancements since then. In 1996, Taiwanese writer Hsu Yu-sheng (许佑生) and his American partner Gary Harriman held their wedding in a Taipei hotel, attracting 400 attendees and local and foreign media attention. That same year, the first LGBTQ+ church in Taiwan opened and the first LGBTQ+ magazine, G & L Magazine, was launched. In June 2000, Jan Jin-yen (詹景严), an LGBTQ+ movement activist and talk-show host, established the Taiwan Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Association, which became the first LGBTQ+ rights organization to receive official registration. However, there is still a need for better organization and systematization of the efforts made by LGBTQ+ groups to provide more help to those in need. In 2000, Taipei City hosted its first gay festival, during which Mayor Ma In-Chju (马英九) stated that “gays and lesbians should not be given special rights, but they deserve equal rights like other people” (Deutsche Press, 2000). Moreover, President Chen Shui-bian met with LGBTQ+ rights activists from Taiwan and the United States, making 13

This phenomenon continues to persist in published research on gay and lesbian internet use in Taiwan, which indicates that gay and lesbian individuals are among the most enthusiastic users of the internet (McLean & Schubert, 1995; Shaw, 1997).

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him the first Taiwanese president to publicly support the LGBTQ+ rights movement. In the 2001 Legislative Election, 2 independent gay candidates campaigned for equal rights for Taiwan’s LGBTQ+ community who still faced discrimination at work and in school. They also called for legalizing gay marriage, adoption, and equal rights in all aspects of life (Chuang, 2001). Moreover, 40 LGBTQ+ groups in Taiwan recommended 11 parliamentary election candidates who pledged to support LGBTQ+ rights if elected. These groups utilized the Internet and BBS to spread their recommendation news, and the Internet platform significantly increases the possibility of combining virtual and real identities and expands the mobilization power. Virtual community did mark a significant milestone for virtual communication among Taiwanese LGBTQ+ activists in their efforts to be heard by society.14 Like the United States, the women’s movement in Taiwan provided some inspiration for the LGBTQ+ community, despite the considerable cultural differences between the two groups (Wang, 1998). Women in Taiwan, who had long been marginalized and oppressed, launched a concerted effort to demand greater autonomy in their personal and social lives. As a result, in recent years, women have been elected to political positions, fought against abuse, and founded feminist organizations (Chun, 2000). While women have made bold strides in making their voices heard, the LGBTQ+ community has made slower progress, often operating in a more covert manner. In the early 1990s, gay activism was still in its infancy, largely concentrated on Taiwan’s university campuses. Outside of academia, gay activism was more sporadic and less organized, with activities such as the opening of bars or cafes relying on word-of-mouth rather than public announcements (Chen, 1998). In contrast to the United States, the issue of minorities’ access to mass media was not a topic of discussion in Taiwan (Yang, 1998). However, with the advent of the Internet, the LGBTQ+ community found an alternative platform to express their opinions and connect with each other. The Internet has, to some extent, fulfilled what traditional media has failed to do—provide an equal and objective platform for the voices of LGBTQ+ individuals. Through the Internet, the LGBTQ+ community has gained control of presenting their perspectives in the public sphere, without the need for intermediaries like reporters and media organizations (Wakeford, 1997). There are currently over 13,000 Usenet newsgroups in Taiwan dedicated to various segments of society, including more than 400 computer bulletin boards.15 The Internet has the potential to become a tool for freedom and liberation for the LGBTQ+ communities in Taiwan. 14 Interviewed with Yu-Lin Lai (赖钰麟), 16 June, 2002, Taipei City. Lai was the secretary-general of Taiwan Tongzhi Hotline Association (台湾同志咨询热线), one of the main gay rights movement groups in Taiwan. 15 Taiwan 2001 Wanglu Shiyong Diaocha Huodong (“The 2002 Taiwan Internet Use Survey”), http://taiwan.yam.org.tw/survey.

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Scholars have only recently started paying attention to the political activism of Taiwan’s LGBTQ+ community (e.g., Chang, 1998, Ding & Liu, 1998, Gian, 1998, Patton, 1998, and Yang, 1999). However, the issue of homosexuality entered public discourse in the early 1990s with the establishment of Gay Chat at National Taiwan University. This student organization became the first officially registered and recognized gay group on a university campus in Taiwan in March 1993 (Han, 1995). The news of its formation spread quickly through mainstream newspapers and television, inspiring students on other university campuses to follow suit. As of 2002, over 20 others officially registered gay and lesbian student groups had been established on other campuses. In the mid-1990s, new media—the Internet—emerged in Taiwan, and within two to three years, the “gay discussion forums” on the main platform, BBS (Bulletin Board System), became popular on college BBS sites, the Internet, as mentioned earlier, became the most important media for LGBTQ+ community awareness-raising, mobilization of protest actions, and participation in public policies. In academic research, following the development of feminism in Taiwan, more profound and progressive sexual and queer discourses have also taken root and developed in Taiwan. The trend of critical reflection has enabled Taiwan’s LGBTQ+ movement to have a broader reference and has stirred up more powerful movement energy. From 1994 onward, a flourishing queer writing industry emerged, featuring authors who were still attending college or graduate school. Around the same time, National Central University established the first “MOTSS” (Members of the Same Sex) discussion board on a BBS, creating a virtual community for the LGBTQ+ population in Taiwan.16 In March 2002, there were 36 websites of LGBTQ+ rights groups in Taiwan, and 40 gay and lesbian college student clubs offered online discussion boards like MOTSS. From the beginning and continuing today, these student-centered LGBTQ+ organizations give the LGBTQ+ movement in Taiwan a definitively youthful character. As a result, the most popular online destinations for the LGBTQ+ community were university-based BBSs, also known as MOTSS sites (Chen, 1998). This helps explain why the LGBTQ+ movement was so visible, largely through computer-mediated communication. It was a different kind of movement, unlike the street demonstrations of the late 1980s (Li, 1996), and the cultural atmosphere was shaped by commercial structures. MOTSS and other important LGBTQ+ discussion board websites took advantage of this newfound visibility and have become the most widely used virtual community among Chinese-speaking gay and lesbian users to date. The topics covered in MOTSS ranged from the public to the private aspects of queer life in Taiwan. The featured issues varied from broader public concerns to more individual matters of identity (Chen, 1998). 16 This data was collected from the websites: http://tw.yahoo.com and http://www. yam.org.tw, on August 22, 2002.

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The attention given to homosexuality in Taiwan’s media during the 1990s was remarkable even outside of the university setting. Despite persistent homophobia in the discourse on homosexuality and AIDS, there were positive signs of an expanding social and cultural space for the LGBTQ+ community in Taiwan. This was reflected in the tremendous increase in gay-related publications and websites. The explosive growth of the Internet and interuniversity networks created opportunities for BBS chat sites that catered to and were supported by the LGBTQ+ community (Li, 1996). According to Chen (1998) and my observations, the development of MOTSS can be divided into 4 distinct periods, as shown in Table 7.4. Amidst the numerous queer activities in virtual communities, Taiwan had a particular focus on sites that facilitated high levels of interaction. As a result, significant social groups were formed within Taiwan’s emerging queer cultures, which scholars have termed as “online discursive communities” (Berry & Martin, 2000). These communities served as essential tools for LGBTQ+ activists, who utilized message boards to disseminate information about events and provoke discussions.17 Table 7.4 Development of MOTSS and its characteristics Period

Characteristics of this period

Beginning (April 1994–November 1994)

At the outset, 4 BBSs introduced “MOTSS” discussion boards to provide a platform for the LGBTQ+ community. These discussion boards were interlinked, allowing for the exchange of messages among them During this period, the number of MOTSS boards increased and many of them were equipped with the capability to transmit messages to other MOTSS boards MOTSS became more regionally focused and began to address local issues, rather than just serving as a message transfer platform. Each MOTSS board started to develop its own unique characteristics In addition to MOTSS, various specialized discussion boards emerged on BBS, such as Homosexual-Theology, Queer-Writing, Queer-Chat, Queerteacher, Bearlover, Lesbian Paradise, and more

Growing (November 1994–April 1995) Stronger (May 1995–July 1995)

Mature (August 1995–early 2000s)

17 In 1997, a gay college student was featured on a popular TV show in Taiwan, discussing his experience of coming out. This interview was part of a trend of increasing attention to homosexuality in Taiwanese media. However, the controversial aspect of the interview was that the young man’s mother was brought onto the show without her prior knowledge, and he came out to her on national television. The mother became emotional and cried on camera. After the show aired, there was public backlash from the LGBTQ+ community, who felt that the show exploited the queer subject matter for ratings. Within the virtual community, there was also controversy over the son’s disregard for his mother’s feelings and the appropriateness of airing family matters in the public eye. The MOTSS

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The MOTSS community on KKCITY’s BBS18 (telent://bbs.kkcity. com.tw) offers a compelling case study on the topic of virtual communities in CMC, given the community’s extensive self-reflection on the notion of community itself. Nevertheless, this experience of community is not unique to the MOTSS community of KKCITY, as there is ample evidence that virtual communities are not exclusively underground and significant only for a specific marginalized group. The primary focus of interaction on MOTSS of KKCITY is the discussion of various issues relevant to the LGBTQ+ community, making it a significant platform for the dissemination of news and information related to the rights of gay people. The topics of these discussions include political issues, personalities, and research, as well as current news topics such as gay rights, AIDS, and romantic relationships. The case study examines a news story on gay rights that sparked discussions and debates among LGBTQ+ virtual communities. The debates eventually led to visible protests and put pressure on government policymakers. With the concerted effort of LGBTQ+ virtual community members, they achieved their policy change goals after significant struggle and voices of dissent, making it a compelling case for analysis. On May 1, 2002, it was reported by the local media that the Armed Forces Police Command (AFPC) in Taiwan had implemented a ban on homosexuals serving as military police. The AFPC argued that military police were responsible for critical tasks such as guarding military and government installations, enforcing military law, maintaining military discipline, supporting combat troops, and acting as supplementary police. As a result, it was deemed inappropriate for individuals with gender identity disorder (GID) or other “potentially dangerous” elements to serve as military police in the interest of maintaining military discipline and order (Hsu, 2002). The discriminatory policy immediately received backlash from the LGBTQ+ community, as well as human rights organizations across Taiwan. The revelation of this discriminatory practice by a local newspaper prompted gay rights protest demonstrations in Taipei, the capital of Taiwan. Faced with strong protests from all sides, Minister of National Defense Tang Yao-ming (汤燿明) announced a prompt lifting of the ban to avoid criticism for discriminating against gays. The military police also stated that they would revise the rule that excludes homosexual conscripts from serving as guards at the Presidential Office and other vital governmental buildings. However, it is essential for the armed forces to change their attitude toward gay men and women serving in the military to ensure equal and fair treatment (Hsu, 2002). BBS sites were particularly active in sharing their opinions, with many expressing negative sentiments about the event (Chen, 1998; Yang, 1998). 18

MOTSS of KKCITY is widely regarded as the most frequented discussion board for gay men in Taiwan, and is often regarded as a “gay community” due to its membership primarily consisting of Taiwanese gay virtual community members.

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The typical approach to disseminating news is through news summaries. A subscriber will provide a concise summary of a news article, highlighting important details, key individuals involved, and sometimes providing their own commentary. In this case, ANIKE, a computer center administrator, shared the news story about the AFPC’s ban on homosexuals serving as military police by posting a message in MOTSS of KKCITY titled “MILITARY’S BAN ON GAY” (Message 1692). After the news was posted, several responses were received. The discussion then split into 2 directions. One addressed the original question about “the rights of gay men to serve in the military”, while the other became a discussion on “appropriate protests for gay rights”. The first response came from a college student named Boycool, who posted the following: It’s time to revise the rule as it’s no longer appropriate by current standards. The government should show respect for the rights of soldiers regardless of their sexual orientation by revising it. (Message 1700)

In a subsequent message, Gofyy, a leader in the gay rights movement, provided commentary on this issue related to gay rights: Based on Article 20 of the ROC (Taiwan) Constitution, it is the duty of citizens to perform military service as stipulated by law. In Taiwan, all male citizens are required to perform military service upon reaching the age of 18 under the Military Service Law, which includes gay men. In 1994, the defense ministry ceased to classify homosexuality as an illness. Therefore, it is only fitting that gay men, like any other man in Taiwan, have both the duty to perform military service in accordance with the law and the opportunity to serve in the military police, which is regarded as the elite of the armed forces. (Message 1705)

Several other members expressed their frustration and disappointment with regard to this issue. The subscriber Iceman shared his views on how gay men are often stereotyped as gangsters in front of military officers: Regrettably, due to the restriction, homosexual conscripts, as well as gangsters, criminal offenders, drug addicts, and mainland Chinese immigrants, are excluded from serving as military police due to “security concerns”. (Message 1711)

On May 2, 2002, other subscribers contributed their comments to the discussion. One military veteran subscriber, Soldier, provided information to address Iceman’s concerns: The logic presented above is unfounded, as there is no evidence to suggest that homosexuality poses a threat to the military. Moreover, it is important to note that homosexuality and gender identity disorder are distinct issues. On the other hand, instances of sexual harassment of female officers, as well as military

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abuses and scandals involving heterosexuals, are all too common in Taiwan. In fact, some heterosexual officers have even been found guilty of serious offenses such as rape and murder. If the military truly had “security concerns”, why did they not exclude all heterosexual individuals from serving as military police? (Message 1716)

A subscriber by the name of Groan, who was studying law at the time, posed a question: The prohibition on homosexuals clearly violates fundamental human rights, particularly with regards to employment. As stated in Article 15 of the Constitution, “All citizens shall have the right to work and to pursue their careers”, among other rights such as the right to life and property. To uphold and promote these fundamental human rights, President Chen Shui-bian has committed to eliminating all forms of discrimination. To this end, the government has released Taiwan’s first “Human Rights White Paper” to demonstrate its resolve. However, the military’s ban on homosexuals amounts to a direct rebuke of President Chen’s efforts, as members of the LGBTQ+ community are even barred from guarding key government facilities such as the Presidential Office or the President’s residence. Such discriminatory policies can only serve to damage Taiwan’s international reputation. (Message 1728)

Coinciding with the release of the news story by the mass media, a message was circulated online by Yu-Lin Lai, also known as POKI in the virtual world, who serves as the secretary-general of the Taiwan Tongzhi Hotline Association, a prominent group advocating for gay rights. The message called for a protest to be held the following morning and was targeted toward “passionate men”. POKI spread this message by posting it on various social movement websites, utilizing hyperlinks to maximize its reach: We intend to voice our opposition to the defense ministry’s decree that prohibits gay men from serving as military police. It is our belief that homosexuals should be entitled to the same rights as their heterosexual counterparts, and this discriminatory policy exposes the hypocrisy that still exists in our society. We demand that equal employment opportunities be afforded to all, regardless of sexual orientation - including within the military. We plan to march to the defense ministry tomorrow to make our voices heard, and we invite others to join us in this cause. Together, let us stand up for equal rights and justice for all. (Message 1698)

POKI’s message received support from over 25 social movement groups, human rights organizations, gay and lesbian rights groups, and college LGBTQ+ organizations. Additionally, there were 18 replies offering support and seeking information on how to join the planned protest demonstration. In addition to the visible protest, there was also a signature campaign protesting discrimination, which saw over 100 individuals signing their real names or usernames on the MOTSS. Eventually, the protest demonstration took place

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in front of the Ministry of Defense, and their collective efforts resulted in the ban on gays serving as military police being lifted on the same day. How do MOTSS participants establish, negotiate, and maintain their community? As an alternative form of virtual media, MOTSS serves as a public platform for participants to share and discuss issues that are important to them. Drawing on Braddlee’s theory (1993), the MOTSS discussion list fosters diverse communication. Participants often stay subscribed for extended durations, paving the way for the formation of robust relationships and a communal knowledge base. This platform enables subscribers to transcend geographical and informational limitations, granting them access to vital resources and support essential for their personal growth. Essentially, MOTSS functions as an alternative media source that serves as both a community for its subscribers and a resource for the LGBTQ+ community in Taiwan. This case highlights the importance of “online discursive communities” as an alternative media for the LGBTQ+ activists. They utilized message boards as a means of disseminating information about events and issues, creating a “public sphere” for debate about gay rights. Through these virtual communities, members were able to communicate and mobilize to fight for their rights. Their actions were observed not only by the LGBTQ+ community but also by the mainstream media and the wider Taiwanese audience. Based on Lai’s experience, utilizing these online communities as an alternative media source has proven to be an effective strategy for advancing LGBTQ+ rights and liberation movements in Taiwan.19 When it comes to activism, there exists a small yet active community of LGBTQ+ activists in Taiwan since the country’s transition to democracy in 1987. However, it seems that activism lags visibility. According to David Hu,20 a prominent figure in MOTSS, the primary concern for the average Taiwanese gay man is still finding a partner and having fun, rather than activism. The older generation is still heavily closeted, fearing that coming out would jeopardize their career, family, or other important aspects of their life. Overall, most Taiwanese gay men are not enthusiastic about coming out and politics, especially those over 30 years old.21 After participating in several LGBTQ+ rights demonstrations, Lai noted that the most visible members of the rights movement are college students. “It is rare to see white-collar gay men participating in visible movements, but they are also major residents in LGBTQ+ virtual communities”, Lai said.22 As noted earlier, when discussing the impact of internet technology on queer identities, it is often mentioned how the online LGBTQ+ community provides a virtual space for older career gay men (over 30 years old) to express

19

Interviewed with Yu-Lin Lai, June 16, 2002, Taipei City.

20

Interviewed with David Hu, June 7, 2002, Taipei City.

21

Interviewed with Yu-Lin Lai, June 16, 2002, Taipei City.

22

Interviewed with Yu-Lin Lai, June 16, 2002, Taipei City.

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their sexual politics in the face of broader societal homophobia. BH, a 38-yearold gay man who is still closeted and works as a manager in a stock exchange company, shared his experience: In my opinion, “queer politics” implies a very proactive and progressive stance. It requires one to actively participate and vocalize their dissent. However, most career gay men are not inclined towards that. Because of the fear of homophobia, I prefer to remain a net user in the virtual community instead of coming out. This is the queer attitude that most members in our gay virtual community possess.23

BH’s response indicates that his identification with outspoken gay politics is influenced by his experience as a net user, rather than simply celebrating the freedom of cyberspace. Gay identity politics in Taiwan face several challenges, one of which is the family issue. Wang Ping (王苹), secretary-general of the Gender/Sexuality Rights Association, pointed out that while the LGBTQ+ movement has a solid cause, most LGBTQ+ people do not want to be publicly identified due to societal attitudes toward homosexuality. These attitudes stem from Taiwan’s Confucian roots, where traditional views about family structure still prevail. As a result, parents may have difficulty accepting their children’s homosexuality. This makes “coming out” a contentious issue in Taiwan’s LGBTQ+ virtual communities.24 A noteworthy observation from this case is the alliance between LGBTQ+ activists and feminists. Feminists were able to organize under martial law and thus had better resources to lobby for changes in government policy.25 In an interview, Lai noted that “we received significant assistance from feminist and women’s rights groups; they participated in our protest demonstrations”.26 Additionally, alternative media activists employed a strategy of collaboration with mainstream media. Lai emphasized the importance of utilizing mainstream media to gain visibility for their demonstrations, as mainstream media deemed it a major news story.27 This case demonstrates that alternative and mainstream media can work together on social issues, rather than being in opposition to one another. It is currently possible for alternative media 23 Interviewed with BH, August 2, 2002, Taipei, BH is the name his friends call him on the net. 24

Interviewed with Wang Ping, September 4, 2002.

25

The primary aim of the early feminist groups was to provide a platform for lesbians to be heard. These groups also extended their support to underprivileged women who were compelled to engage in prostitution, and showed solidarity with both gay men and sex workers. They urged for the dissemination of information regarding the transmission of AIDS and safe sex to combat the epidemic, rather than stigmatizing those who were affected by it. 26

Interviewed with Yu-Lin Lai, June 16, 2002, Taipei City.

27

Interviewed with Yu-Lin Lai, June 16, 2002, Taipei City.

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activists to navigate their relationship with mainstream media, regardless of their ideological or principled stance on managing alternative media. The primary point of concern in this case study is the development of identities. According to Mantovani (1996), the Internet can act as a platform for experimenting with “possible selves” that may shape one’s offline identity, instead of being used to evade it. This proposition may hold partially true for LGBTQ+ individuals who encounter significant challenges in constructing their offline identities, particularly in Taiwan’s LGBTQ+ virtual communities. Nevertheless, homophobia still exists beyond the bounds of LGBTQ+ cyberspace. In the beginning of alternative radio development, it did play the role of opposition political media and had an influence across Taiwan and on local elections. However, the function declined gradually after Taiwan opened space for television and radio stations in 1993. After the mid-1990s, there were still few underground radio stations that emerged for their political alternative voice, although government and police caught and cracked down on them several times. The alternative radio often offered “call in” programs that welcomed audience participation by phone and focused on criticizing the ruling KMT policies sensationally. In the study of call-in culture in alternative radio, accessibility was a crucial aspect under scrutiny. It served as an indicator to gauge the extent to which the Taiwanese radio audience could partake in discussions of public interest. Results showed that alternative radio provided greater accessibility to its audience compared to mainstream radio. Additionally, the democratization of communication was explored in this research through the development of diverse voices within alternative radio in Taiwan, with a focus on local sources. The study argues that democratization of communication can be achieved through increasing media pluralism.28 Alternative radio was found to have a unique potential for participatory programming that allows the perspectives and opinions of the average person to be heard. One reason for this potential is the lower production and transmission costs of alternative radio, which is often community-based. In Taiwan, the KMT controls most of the electronic media, and during election periods, alternative radio stations gain popularity as people seek a break from official propaganda. While newspapers have become increasingly critical of the ruling party due to the government’s relaxed media control, illegal radio stations remain popular among many Taiwanese. The primary role of alternative radio is to facilitate the transition of Taiwan’s political landscape.29 Consequently, many alternative radio stations disappeared after the DPP, the

28 This argument could be seen from Skogerbo, E. (1988). A democratic perspective on local television. Report No. 2, Department of Media and Communication, University of Oslo. 29

Interviewed with Lee Tien-Duo, March 6 2003, Tainan County.

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former opposition party, won the 2000 presidential election as they lost their sense of purpose now that the DPP had become the ruling party. This study investigates how social movements utilize hyperlinks on internet websites and discussion boards to promote and connect with their communities. It is believed that social movement websites serve as intentional extensions of their organizations and the hyperlinks embedded on these pages serve as strategic tools to spread ideas and acquire resources. Alongside information sharing, the internet is also a powerful tool for extending and strengthening networks. One of its most significant benefits is improving internal communication within social movements. After reviewing the LGBTQ+ virtual community in Taiwan, it becomes evident that social movement webs, such as the LGBTQ+ community, utilize computer-mediated communication to construct their identities and communities online and offline. It is apparent that the LGBTQ+ virtual community is capable of mobilization and functioning similar to that of alternative media. When compared to other media forms, it appears that CMC offers the most promising opportunity for interactive communication among social movement groups. In general, this study supports the notion that the Internet has given power to organizations and expanded the range of collective action. The implementation of the Internet results from negotiations between the technology, strategic choices made by social movement groups, and the sociocultural characteristics of the society. Organizations can benefit from the Internet by saving critical resources such as downloading application forms, sending e-newsletters, and conducting in-depth discussions through emails. However, the digital divide has limited their extensive use of technology, and the Internet has remained a supplement to conventional practices. Technological advancement alone cannot change people’s habits. Despite significant websites launched by most social movement groups such as LGBTQ+, environmental, women’s rights, and aboriginal rights, few poorly maintained social movement pages still exist (such as labor). According to Chen and Lin (2001), a considerable number of individuals still prefer paper versions of newsletters. Additionally, many organizations lack the resources to prevent hacking and support online applications and fee payments. In conclusion, our exploration of online discursive communities and potential identities within the sphere of internet usage in Taiwan underlines the need to reassess our understanding of internet communications. Our findings indicate that what we have observed differs from the phenomenon noted by Berry and Martin (2000) and is not merely an extrapolation of pre-existing offline communities and identities. Rather, it’s an integral part of a lived culture that simultaneously shapes and is shaped by various facets of user experiences. Within the landscape of Taiwan’s digital communal cultures, this is anticipated to grow as a crucial and evolving component in the years to come.

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CHAPTER 8

The Main Characteristics of Taiwan’s Alternative Media and the Implications of the Interplay of Alternative Media and SocioPolitical Transformation

This chapter presents an exploration of the primary attributes, development, and roles of alternative media in Taiwan. It covers a range of topics, such as examining alternative media through the lens of “state versus civil society”, analyzing the impact of alternative media operations in Taiwan, and drawing comparisons between Western and Taiwanese alternative media. The following discussion provides insights into the research questions addressed in this study.

The Main Characteristics of Alternative Media in Taiwan This examination focuses on the development of alternative media in Taiwan, tracing their genealogy since the 1970s (as presented in Table 8.1). The argument put forth is that alternative media in Taiwan, whether in the form of magazines, cable channels, videos, or radio programs, typically faced authoritarian oppression from the authorities once they began to represent the voice of opposition groups, even if their coverage was not solely limited to narrow political party issues. Additionally, it is contended that the failure and disappearance of these alternative media can be better explained by market forces and a lack of coordination among dissident groups, rather than government coercion. This conclusion is drawn from the experiences of domestic dissident media and alternative underground radios. In contrast to the laissez-faire approach, repression is the norm in systems with a centralized power structure, as exemplified by Taiwan during the period of martial law. In totalitarian or authoritarian systems, the state exerts control over all aspects of civil society and imposes strict restrictions on the press © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Hong and C.-N. Hou, Alternative Media and Taiwan’s Socio-Political Transformation, 1970s–1990s, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2477-6_8

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Table 8.1 Characteristics of alternative media in Taiwan and their roles in politics Period/Alternative Media

Characteristics

The Role in Politics

The Martial Law Period (before 1987) The opposition political magazine

Compared to newspapers, magazines were not subject to such strict license regulation. In addition, magazines required less start-up capital, they could function according to irregular publishing schedules, and due to their durability and the ease of managing their circulation, alternative media formats were better suited for underground production and distribution than newspapers Financial pressure and commercial competition forced magazines to provide titillation, and as the credibility of the magazines was suspect, the reputation of the whole tangwai movement that they supported was discredited. Opposition members increasingly produced and distributed videos underground, which became a more widespread practice. The opposition had recognized the usefulness and significance of electronic media, and their protest activities highlighted the importance of such videos

The purpose of the opposition political magazine is to form an opposition party, create their own Taiwanese ethnic identity, and further get the seat of the ruling party from the KMT party in several years

1987–the early 1990s Cable Television VCR Form

The electronic media liberalized themselves, rather than waiting to be liberalized by the government’s legal machinery. Such impulses also captured the popular imagination, and the slow liberalization of the media became itself a prominent political issue

(continued)

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Table 8.1 (continued) Period/Alternative Media

Characteristics

The 1990s Alternative Radio In contrast to the hierarchical decision-making model, alternative radio embraces an anti-bureaucratic ethos, prioritizing diversity and spontaneity over uniformity. Many of these organizations are self-funded and do not accept commercial advertisements, operating with a nonprofit orientation and relying on audience subscriptions and public-interest funding as their main financial support. The primary human resource for alternative radio is volunteers, who may lack professional media experience but often possess expertise in other political fields The 1990s–present ICT is considered to have given a voice to the weak and Social Movement Websites powerless, facilitated their (SMWs) Virtual mobilization, expanded the Communities repertoires of collective action, and contributed to the advancement of civil society Affordable and user-friendly technologies have made it possible for minority groups to create their own computer-mediated websites, serving as a primary alternative media platform for discussing controversial political and social issues and advancing their social movement goals

The Role in Politics From the experiences of many political and social movements, opposition politicians learned that, through the radio station’s update reports and call-in style, which can draw thousands of people to protests; alternative radio was an incredibly efficient way to organize their supporters

SMWs represent purposeful extensions of their organizations, and the hyperlinks provided on these pages represent strategic attempts to disseminate ideas and to accumulate resources. A most important achievement of the Internet is to enhance internal communication and then make collective action in order to make public policy changed

without providing corresponding incentives. Press censorship is enforced, and a repressed press often relies on government subsidies and lacks autonomy, particularly in the political sphere. In such circumstances, mainstream media outlets tend to act as mouthpieces for the ruling elite, promoting the status quo, inhibiting democracy, and silencing dissenting voices. There is little space for alternative media to flourish, and if they do exist, they are often used as propaganda tools for underground democratic movements (Chan, 2002).

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These statements can reveal why political opposition groups often used political “illegal” magazines to advocate their voice for democratization in the martial law period. During the martial law era from 1949 to 1987, most of the alternative media in Taiwan, particularly opposition magazines, adhered to professional norms and saw it as their duty to act as a check on government activities. Some idealistic journalists from the mainstream press, who were often restrained by their editors, contributed critical stories to poorly staffed and poorly financed tangwai magazines, which their own journals were not permitted to publish. The KMT accused political journals such as Formosa, China Tide, and Eighties of threatening Taiwan’s security and exaggerating the social division between Mainlanders and Taiwanese. Nevertheless, the opposition denounced the covert network that intertwined the government, the ruling political party, and the media as unlawful. They perceived it as their duty to spotlight the discrepancy between the government’s avowed commitment to democracy and the stark reality of martial law. Through this, the political opposition aimed to challenge the KMT’s legitimacy and galvanize Taiwan’s populace towards their reformist objectives. The tangwai crafted their own media channels, beginning with journals and eventually expanding to videos and radio shows. These were clandestinely produced and circulated until, after more than three decades of relentless effort, they accomplished their aspirations of political transformation, societal liberalization, and freedom of expression. Prior to the widespread availability of the Internet in the late 1990s, other technologies such as cassette tapes, compact disks, VCDs, telephones, cell phones, satellite, and cable television had already played a significant role in opening Taiwan’s media system and breaking the monopoly of the ruling party (Chan, 1994). This trend continued with the advent of the Internet, which further increased the liberalizing impact due to its global reach, interactive capabilities, and decentralized structure. During the 1990s, state-owned enterprises in Taiwan persistently employed both repression and cooptation to sustain their centralized political dominance. While the mainstream media wasn’t merely an echo of the official narrative, it operated as a subdued, secondary, and reliant entity. Though media proprietors amassed significant wealth via corporate endeavors, their prevailing ideology deterred them from contesting the entrenched power structures. Although mainstream media remained politically subservient, they were able to operate relatively freely in nonpolitical areas. Conversely, those who opposed the authorities’ inducements found economic and political support from those who shared their ideology and established alternative media. However, those who challenged the power structure faced coercion or suppression under the guise of being illegal or underground. These events were documented by alternative media in the early 1990s, most notably by Channel Four and alternative radio. The impact of alternative media during Taiwan’s transition is demonstrated through its role in the 2000 presidential election. The coverage provided by

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alternative media not only supported the opposition party’s advocacy but also symbolized the significant progress of political change in Taiwan. When the opposition party gained power after the election, the leading issues of opposition political media in the 1990s shifted toward social movement issues. As technology continued to advance and the Internet became more accessible, virtual communities replaced traditional media forms and became the primary alternative media source since 2000. While they may have lost their distinct alternative voice, they evolved into a potent catalyst for political mobilization in people’s civic engagement.

The Main Sociopolitical Functions of Alternative Media in Taiwan After examining the practice of alternative media in Taiwan, we find that its function is as a vehicle for launching a political party and serving as a collective organizer. Meanwhile, opposition media performs several other vital functions, some of which are psychological. To be effective in an authoritarian regime, an opposition movement requires alternative media activists to connect with each other and acknowledge their shared commitment. While reading a publication or watching a program that merely confirms one’s existing beliefs may not yield much new information, alternative media can still provide a significant morale boost by presenting forbidden or taboo thoughts as socially acceptable. Seeing one’s private beliefs reflected in alternative media can transform them into validated, shared reality. Similarly, a person who privately disagrees with an authoritarian government needs some sense of social support to maintain a high level of commitment to his belief. Such support also enables the individual to function at an optimum level without the anxieties created by feelings of isolation (Berman, 1992). Whether an alternative media activist feels like an isolated person or like a member of underground movement may mean the difference between retreating into inactivity or devoting precious time and energy to his cause. Among alternative media, alternative radio, virtual community, or political magazine, they can all provide the consensus that rallies like-minded dissidents together and give their constituency a sense of belonging. From a political perspective, alternative media in Taiwan were at the cutting edge of reform by continually pushing back the limits of politically acceptable behavior as defined by the regime.

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Examining Alternative Media from the “State vs. Civil Society” Perspective Nonetheless, in an authoritarian regime, alternative media activists were determined to fight for media diversity and to challenge the legality of the KMT’s media control. This struggle against KMT’s media monopoly in the mass media gave rise to the emergence of Taiwanese civil society (Lin, 1998). The research uncovered the following results: 1. Demands for media and political plurality existed in the history of alternative media in Taiwan. Before the lifting of martial law, a quasi-authoritarian system dominated by a virulently anti-Communist ruling party organized along Leninist lines underwent peaceful reform in large part through an organizational device originally articulated by the use of publications as de facto political parties. In this way, Leninist principles for many years strengthened the KMT regime but also pried it loose from its monopoly on power. Mass media and technology were important contributing factors. Increased literacy and higher educational levels, coupled with alternative media activists, made it difficult to enforce the dictates of the government upon its citizenry. The KMT’s authoritarian rule over Taiwan can be seen as a paradoxical situation where the party-state became a victim of its own success. The economic development brought about autonomous forces that were beyond the KMT’s control. As sociologist Thomas B. Gold noted, the party’s success in leading economic development and social change from an autonomous position created conditions that led to the erosion of its dictatorship (Gold, 1986). Throughout history, activists of alternative media have attempted to establish “illegal media” to defy the laws of Taiwan and break the media monopoly of the KMT. Prior to the termination of martial law, political opposition groups utilized magazines, mainly critical political publications, to counteract the KMT-controlled public opinions. Following the martial law period, electronic media emerged as a new form of alternative media. These oppositional political magazines, cable television, and alternative radio stations challenged the KMT’s strict administrative suppression and punishment. The civic opposition to KMT’s media control had a significant impact during the final 4 decades of martial law (Lee, 1993). The external pressure for reform was strengthened by factions within the KMT, a consequence of the party’s incorporation and cooptation of emerging social forces in the preceding years. When people observe something, they desire originating from alternative media, they naturally aspire to have the same. The emergence of the information age has complicated the debates on civil society, resulting in arguments articulated at 2 levels. According to Webster (2001), significant shifts in power and politics have occurred due to the ICT

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revolution, the globalization of economic activities, and the persistent decrease of authoritarian politics at the macro level. These changes were associated with the decline of the manual working class, expansion of white-collar occupations, evasion of national boundaries, and consequently, a shift in the targets of political contention. New social movements such as environmental preservation, gay and lesbian rights, and alternative religions emerged, replacing labor organizations as the most important political actors in Taiwan. In contrast to politics based on class, the emerging social movements were more focused on cultural and identity issues rather than material interests. As a result, their strategies were more expressive than strategic. In addition, while these movements still aimed to reach local audiences and national governments, they also sought to mobilize global citizens and target transnational and regional governments. These developments brought about changes in the concept of civil society, and some analysts proposed the emergence of a “new politics” (Webster, 2001). One of the ICT revolution’s major impacts on civil society concerned the potential it presented for networking. ICT enthusiasts identified at least 3 processes that have enhanced the social movement group’s external networks. First, not only did the Internet make online publications possible, it also facilitated individual and group communication and discussion. Email is the oldest and easiest form. List-server, use net, chat rooms, and web-based conferencing and chat were other means that allowed one-to-one or manyto-many synchronous or asynchronous modes of communication. By utilizing web pages and online discussion forums, social movement groups no longer had to rely on traditional media sources, which frequently prioritized sensational events, misrepresented their actions, and neglected to provide context for their beliefs and actions. Second, with the new communication technology, civil society groups could clarify their positions and hopefully become more effective in addressing their prospective supporters. The internet offered a cost-effective way of communicating across locations, allowing small social movement groups with limited resources to establish a global network of supporters, and enabling multiple small groups to combine their resources worldwide. This was especially crucial for organizations and causes with geographically dispersed potential members or where addressing the issues at hand necessitated cross-border collaboration. Third, by building global solidarity and pooling resources, small social movement groups could organize massive protests within a country and across the world. 2. The rise of taiwan’s civil society was a result of the opposition to KMT’s media control. The lifting of martial law in Taiwan unleashed the societal energy for mobilization, leading to the formation of various civic groups that demanded

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political and social plurality. This marked the emergence of civil society in the early 1990s. Scholars argue that the KMT considered people as its “subjects” rather than “citizens” under its totalitarian power (Lin, 1998). However, the energized political opposition opened space for a burgeoning civil society. Although suppressed by the KMT’s authoritarian government, the energy of Taiwanese civil society persisted and flourished rapidly after the end of martial law. The growth of Taiwanese civil society is evident in 2 aspects: the rise of civic organizations advocating for various causes, and the use of alternative media and movements by political opposition and civic groups to promote a sense of citizenship among the general population (Chen, 1992). Scholar Lee T.D. further noted that the emergence of Taiwanese civil society spurred the rapid development of cable television and alternative radio, driven by a desire to challenge the KMT’s authoritarian media control that had lasted for 40 years. He indicated: The rapid expansion of cable television and the emergence of alternative radio were indicative of Taiwanese society’s liberation from KMT’s media control after the lifting of martial law. It is worth noting that the driving force behind the development of these new media channels was people’s demands. As KMT’s three television networks were tightly controlled, cable television and alternative radio provided a platform for broadcasting news that could not be aired elsewhere. These new media channels were born out of the burgeoning civil society in Taiwan following its liberalization. (quoted from Lin W. K., 1998)

To integrate the general population into the production and economy model of Taiwanese society, it was recognized that the KMT governed Taiwan as a “political society” and was perceived as a dictatorship and coercive mechanism by the Taiwanese people (Femia, 1987). Consequently, the KMT’s government lacked legitimacy and was not based on the consent of its citizens. The representation of Taiwan’s “political society” in KMT’s media control was nothing more than KMT’s State Capitalism in media monopoly. Furthermore, under KMT’s authoritarianism, Taiwanese people gradually learned that they needed to organize civic power through “associations”, such as various cable television associations (e.g., Channel Four), to resist government controls. As the power struggle intensified between the ruling regime and the emerging civil society, alternative media outlets emerged to cater to the needs of the general public. This dynamic arose from the clash between the state apparatus in power and the growing influence of civil society. In the era of the Internet, the primary effect of information and communication technology (ICT) on civil society has been on the availability and sharing of information. Above all, the Internet has enabled civil society organizations to access a vast array of valuable information worldwide quickly and inexpensively. Individuals who have access to the World Wide Web can readily acquire government documents, valuable databases, and information

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Table 8.2 Characteristics of the internet and imputed impacts on the civil society Characteristics

Favorable impacts

Unfavorable impacts

Connectivity

Access to and sharing of information Alternative to the traditional media and a voice for people Time–space compression Evade censorship

Digital divide Information overflow Mislead by intentional unknown persons

Anonymity

Lack of trust for each other users

pertaining to the operations, programs, and strategies of various organizations. Given the hyperlink function of the Internet, different social movement groups could also “compile indices and guides to one another’s materials without having to maintain multiple archives” (Naughton, 2001, p. 153). Compared with traditional sources, information on the Internet was relatively inexpensive, which contributed to the leveling of playing fields between actors in civil society and those within the government (see Table 8.2). Adapted from Chu, Y., & Tang, T. (2003). The Internet and civil society. A paper presented at the Internet Culture and Society Conference, National Ting-Hua University.

The Consequence of Operation from Alternative Media in Taiwan Major Thrusts that Alternative Media Served to Cultivate Opposition At a more political, sociological, and cultural-specific level, the alternative media in Taiwan went well beyond preaching to the already converted. Their propaganda served to deepen and expand its constituency, even though this practice was by no means entirely premeditated, coherent, or unified. After examining the alternative media in Taiwan, we suggested 4 major thrusts that served to cultivate an opposition base among the electorate, a strategy that contributed to impressive victories in elections (Berman, 1992, pp. 196–197): 1. Playing upon social divisions to create a sense that everyone must belong to 1 of 2 opposing parties. Mainlander versus Taiwanese was only one of the dichotomies in which this face-off was expressed. Others could be described as establishment versus new generation, party insiders versus party outsiders, and wealthy capitalists versus the masses (Ou-yang, 1985). Through these dichotomies, the opposition portrayed itself as the voice of the outsider and the economically disadvantaged. From the perspective of marketing analysis, it was a brilliant strategy. It addressed all potential members

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of its constituency, fueled antagonism, and forced people to choose sides. Such a strategy straddled the political spectrum. 2. Cultivating a credibility gap vis-à-vis both the government and the controlled mainstream media. Unfair elections, unequal administration of justice, lack of political openness and disclosure, and democracy in name but not indeed, these major issues provided ammunition for the offensive. This two-pronged attack against both the government and the government-controlled media served both to reinforce the two-camp mentality and to present the opposition as the only reliable source of news and information. 3. Creating a negative image of the ruling party. Using articles, images, and information, they portrayed government officials as greedy, corrupt, ignorant, and authoritarian. They were criticized for prioritizing the party’s interests over those of the people, maintaining a dictatorship by suppressing fair competition, and not having a true foundation of popular support. Most alternative media were also repeatedly attacked for creating in Taiwan an excessively materialistic society where money is almighty, often with disregard for the best long-term interests of society. Inattention to growing environmental pollution is a case in point. Such a strategy has the potential to harness a wide range of dissatisfaction inherent in the modernization process. 4. Projecting a positive image of the opposition, as the fearless hero of the popular will, identifying themselves with the people. The theme was that the opposition was willing to struggle relentlessly and, if necessary, to sacrifice themselves in the process of realizing the wishes of the people. During the election, the opposition had rich ideological overtones. Compared to the opposition, the ruling KMT’s unexciting Three People’s Principles paled by comparison. The Role of Alternative Media in Political Democratization and Transition After examining Taiwan’s alternative media since the 1970s, it is crucial to acknowledge the significant role they played in political democratization and transition. Taiwan’s economic success, famously known as the “Taiwan Miracle”, has been accompanied by a diverse and populous media market, which could be considered another Taiwanese marvel in the wake of the country’s political and economic development. As Taiwan’s economy continues to grow,

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and alternative media advocates for democratic issues, democratic ideals have become a reality. Consequently, the government and economic transformations have led to a revolutionary shift in Taiwan’s media roles. The media landscape has undergone significant changes in recent years, partly in response to technological advancements, but largely in line with the rapid pace of democratization (Sukosd, 2000). During the process of democratization in Taiwan, characterized by rapid political pluralization, democratization, party formation, and the realization of democratic elections, the alternative media played several important roles. 1. Democratic agenda setting. The alternative media played a crucial role in Taiwan by informing readers, listeners, audiences, and viewers about important social and political issues and guiding their understanding of the political world (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). This was particularly significant because, for 4 decades (1940s–1980s), crucial topics were entirely absent from public discussion. As a result, the alternative media’s role in setting the political agenda was more pronounced and visible than in established democracies, where such topics were regularly covered. By expanding their coverage to include political and social taboo topics, the alternative media contributed to the establishment of an open-ended, democratic, and pluralistic political agenda. This agenda supported opposition forces, as many of the issues covered were favorable to them, such as national independence, democratization, and ending one-party rule, rather than position issues that can be viewed differently by voters (McCombs & Shaw, 1993). Regardless of how committed the ex-martial law leaders professed to be toward change or how publicly they expressed regret for their past actions, voters would not forget their authoritarian history and unyielding stance on many previously unaddressed issues. In general, media freedom played a significant role in delegitimizing the regime following the lifting of media control (Sukosd, 2000). 2. Reconstruction of a democratic political culture. The role played by the alternative media was that of disseminating the values of democratic culture. During the period prior to the transition, the alternative media not only defended the right of expression but also worked to defend other rights that had been violated and spoke out on behalf of values such as political freedom, social justice, and open media that were absent from the ideological framework of the regime. The media thereby played an important role in the reconstruction of a democratic political culture. From this perspective, it becomes clear that one of the alternative media’s most significant political functions during the democratization and transition periods was to promote the fundamental principles of democratic polity and

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acknowledge the advocacy made by alternative media. By serving as substitute channels for the flow of democratic values, political information, and norms of tolerance for differing political views, the alternative media played a vital role in placing various essential reforms on the agenda and acting as forums for political dialogue. Essential for fostering and ultimately institutionalizing political pluralism, these dialogues stood as milestones. The alternative media championed the cause of democracy by advocating for a shift from the dominant KMT and positing democracy as the only credible alternative to the flawed political regime. They offered a tangible and enticing blueprint for transitioning away from authoritarianism, underscoring the adaptability of political stakeholders and societal dynamics in the face of evolving scenarios. In fact, prior to the shocking result of the presidential election in 2000, the alternative media provided the infrastructure for the articulation of viewpoints that included radical criticism of the authoritarian regime. In general, terms, and notwithstanding variations among these media, the criticism emphasized several themes: human rights, political activity, and social equal rights. Abuses and authoritarian actions were condemned in the name of those most directly affected—the victims of repression. It should be noted that these alternative media—especially the opposition political magazines—were able to reach only a restricted audience because most of them were legally proscribed after all. Their problem was that, insofar as these magazines worked within the framework of alternative communications, they were incapable of establishing a presence among the mass public. Instead, their audience was limited to the politically sophisticated sector of society, mainly among the middle- and lowerclass Min-nan Taiwanese people; it was there that their political influence was highly significant. In the end, the alternative media played a critical role in introducing the political programs, alternative political options, and leaders of new parties to the Taiwanese electorate. Alternative media (e.g., opposition political magazines, alternative radio, and social movement websites) were established to convey the messages and statements of parties and other political and social movement groups. Such democratic political culture as coverage of party meetings, rallies, and demonstrations also helped to mobilize the Taiwanese people for participation in the new democracy and to socialize them to embrace democratic and alternative values. 3. The development of civil society, political parties, and a new ruling party. The alternative media facilitated development during this democratization process. In response to gradually decreasing dictatorship and terror, hundreds of dissident and social movement groups emerged onto the political scene in the late 1980s. These groups rapidly acquired legal status and evolved into a network of civil society, which was a prerequisite for the emergence of political society. Among them were the DPP, which initially emerged as

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a dissident group in the 1970s, but subsequently won the first election in the 1998 parliamentary and local election and then became the ruling party in the 2000 presidential election. Other social movement groups that grew included the environmental, women’s rights, human rights, LGBTQ + , and labor and welfare advocacy groups. Alternative media activists played a vital role in advocating for social movements by presenting them in an unbiased and even sympathetic manner. After martial law was lifted, the alternative media began extensively covering their activities and broadcasting their political messages to the public. This not only granted them a public presence and identity, and provided an avenue for individuals to join their cause, but also helped to diversify civic organizations and advance the growth of civil society. Relationship Between Alternative Media and Democratization in Taiwan In Western nations, democracy is deeply embedded in the political culture, and its values and institutions have reached a relatively stable state, forming what is known as “mature democracies”. As a result, various free and independent media systems have emerged organically in these societies. Conversely, democracy is often considered a part of the incomplete modernization project in developing countries. With democratic values and institutions still in the process of formation, democratization can take either an evolutionary or revolutionary path. Regardless of the form that democratic struggles may take, the media landscape is constantly shaping and being shaped by the level of democratization (Chan, 2002). This insight is equally relevant to the relationship between Taiwan’s evolving society and its alternative media. As noted by Jakubowicz (1995), media roles are contingent on the existence of favorable social conditions, but social change can also bring about media actions that influence society. This concept illustrates the mutually reinforcing relationship between democratization and media, akin to the “chicken and egg” dilemma, where social change and media roles are interdependent. The level of democratization in a society defines the mode of media control and its roles, while the media neither operates entirely independently nor obediently under established power. Instead, they can play a critical role in promoting or reversing democratization. Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that alternative media and democratization mutually strengthen one another, as each constitutes a vital aspect of the other. In the case of Taiwan, we find that political democratization made former illegal dissident alternative media, especially cable television and underground radio stations, legalized and that electronic alternative media influenced Taiwanese society very much during the 1990s. As Jakubowicz (1995) observed, social change can prompt media actions that affect society. This phenomenon is evident in the creation of civil society in Taiwan, where political and social movement groups engage in political participation and contestation, and alternative media play a prominent role. Civil society has the potential to dismantle non-democratic regimes and accommodate diverse

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political viewpoints. By focusing on civil society, we can avoid oversimplifying the relationship between the government and society in Taiwan and gain a better understanding of how alternative media emerged during the regime change process, facilitated by political institutions such as elections and party systems. In addition, since democratization requires the institutionalization of competitive electoral and party systems, a civil society perspective does help us better evaluate the degree of transition of a new democracy that alternative media influenced in Taiwan. In general, democratization and civil society make it so that the alternative media can advocate what they think without control and finally reach their goal. When considering the role of mainstream media in Taiwan’s political democratization and transition, we can deduce that they played a part in the liberalization process, but only to a limited extent. Taiwan’s democratization was primarily driven by the elites, with opposition pressure serving as an additional factor. While mainstream media supported democratization, they were unable to shape the political agenda. On the other hand, alternative media gained significant popularity but were not taken seriously until martial law was lifted. Before 1987, the government did not tolerate alternative media attempting to organize a political movement against them. Instead, the political opposition and personalities utilized alternative media as a pioneer for their activities, leading to the government’s often-oppressive responses. Following 1987, mainstream media played a significant role in raising public awareness and comprehension of the shifting political agenda. Furthermore, they allowed formerly illegal opposition media to express their opinions within the confines of legality. From the late 1990s onward, the mainstream media became increasingly critical of the government, embracing its role in ensuring political accountability. When juxtaposed with alternative media, it becomes evident that the mainstream media had a more pronounced impact on solidifying democracy in Taiwan, rather than on its nascent stages of democratization. Certainly, the alternative media had a profound political impact during Taiwan’s transition to democracy. From our discussion, one can infer that media structures are chiefly influenced by the distribution of power since media roles are deeply rooted in, and refined by, the foundational processes of societal formations. Mass media mirrors the viewpoints of prevailing power structures and adjusts to the shifting power dynamics within a society. These adaptations are multifaceted. Media entities mold perceptions of reality based on the ebb and flow of power. Consequently, mechanisms of media oversight and their respective roles may transform as power dynamics undergo realignment. As an illustration, when “hard” authoritarian regimes transition to “soft” authoritarianism amid growing democratization, the state may alter its approach to media control from one of incorporation to cooperation (Chan & Lee, 1991). In Taiwan, the influence of media on the political process became apparent when opposition parties and grassroots groups gained legitimacy to challenge

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the ruling regime’s monopoly in the late 1980s and 1990s. With the advancement of media and cyber technology, new forms of alternative media emerged, reducing the reliance on government and mainstream media and loosening government control. This relaxed control and the growing technology led to an expanded public sphere, which further reinforced Taiwan’s democratization. These factors ultimately led to the first political transition in Taiwanese history. However, this finding maintains that the role of the alternative media in leading change may be derivative, having been determined by society or a segment within it, such as the power elite and voters. Moreover, the process is cyclical; the original impetus for change comes from society, is later disseminated by the media, affects the voters, and is secured by informed, active, and willing participation in the process of change. In the end, an active society influences an active alternative media, which influences society. The alternative media affect change only as long as social conditions and the average people permit them. Social and media changes feed on each other. This concept was essential to understanding the places of opposition political magazines, Channel Four, and alternative radio in the overall role of the alternative media regarding the development of democracy in Taiwan. The Alternative Media Operation from the Political Economic View Under Taiwan’s authoritarian rule, the KMT stood as the singular political authority, exerting dominance over the nation’s media landscape. Within the bounds of state capitalism, the KMT administration maintained tight control over key mass media entities, spanning both print and electronic mediums. Yet, with the termination of martial law, burgeoning Taiwanese civil society factions pressed the KMT for media liberalization. The early 1990s saw the rise of opposition parties, leading two primary parties to join forces in creating new media platforms tailored for significant anti-KMT contingents. Together, the DPP and the CNP launched media endeavors encompassing cable television and pioneering radio stations. These new electronic media outlets became part of the opposition parties’ resources for ideological propaganda and mobilization of popular support (Lin, 1998). Consequently, the KMT’s one-party monopoly was replaced by a media oligarchy of 3 parties. The KMT’s media monopoly in Taiwan was finally broken in the 1990s due to changes in electronic media, which eroded their 40-year hold on the industry. In the cable television and low-powered radio markets, the KMT was unable to “compete” with the 2 opposition parties. However, the KMT retained control of “old” electronic media, such as the 3 television networks and island-wide radio stations, enabling them to maintain their politicaleconomic power (Lin, 1998). This transformation of the Taiwanese media monopoly into a media oligarchy was the result of changes and interactions between electronic media and political parties.

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The state capitalist approach to Taiwanese mass media during the KMT’s 40-year reign was initially applicable. However, it could not fully explain the increasing media ownership by political parties after the dramatic changes in Taiwan’s electronic media in the 1990s. To address these changes, this study suggests the application of political economy theory, which takes a socially critical approach and focuses on the relationship between economic structures and the dynamics of media institutions and ideological content. This theory emphasizes ownership and control structures of the media, considering media institutions as part of the economic system with close links to the political system (Lin, 1998; McQuail, 1994). Political economists, drawing from Marxist theory, posited that the ones who owned the means of production had control over the distribution of economic resources and the allocation of surplus. In the same vein, those who controlled media ownership also held influential positions in the executive and managerial hierarchy of media institutions, enabling them to shape the overall allocation policies. By owning media institutions, owners were able to exercise operational control over them (Murdoch & Golding, 1979). While the alternative media were not the voices of political organizations before 1987, it is clear that they had a more or less organic relationship with parties. Indeed, the main impetus behind the establishment of these alternative media, mainly the opposition political magazines, was political. Politically active groups and leaders took initiative in founding these media, fighting for their existence through legal or underground means, recruiting their leading personnel, and establishing their editorial policies. The alternative media relied on financial contributions from individuals, cooperatives, civic groups, and dissident groups who were actively involved in the democratization movement. These irregular contributions were vital for the survival of these media outlets, as they were unable to sustain themselves through market mechanisms alone. Neither advertising nor circulation revenues were sufficient to cover their costs. In the 1990s, opposition parties in Taiwan were able to challenge the ruling party’s media control by organizing massive civic groups and investing in media ownership. They utilized new electronic media like cable television and alternative radio stations to compete with the KMT’s control of the old electronic media, such as the three television networks and major radio stations. As a result, political control over Taiwanese media was not limited to the KMT government but also included other political institutions and opposition parties. Ownership of both mainstream and alternative media was a strategy employed by both the KMT and opposition parties for media control, as evidenced by the changes in Taiwanese electronic media during this period (Lin, 1998).

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Comparisons Between Western and Taiwanese Alternative Media More Political, Fewer Commercial, and Entertainment-oriented It is clear that different political development and culture make different characteristics of alternative media. In Taiwanese society, most issues that people cared about were politically oriented since the KMT built the ruling regime in Taiwan (Chao & Myers, 1998). Alternative media also focus on more political than other areas of issues. In democratic countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, there exists a wide range of alternative media in various forms, including print and electronic media, with diverse perspectives such as single-person zines, large-scale working-class newspapers, radical community newspapers, magazines of sexual politics, and anarchist media. This demonstrates the liberal principles of pluralism in these countries. The “democratic-participant” model in these countries emphasizes the use of communication media for interaction and communication in small-scale community, interest group, and subculture settings. This model favors horizontal patterns of interaction, where participation and interaction are critical concepts (McQuail, 1994, p. 132). As Atton (2002) suggests, this model is not limited to political and resistance media in Western alternative media but also extends to artistic and literary media (such as video, music, mail art, and creative writing) and newer cultural forms such as hybrid forms of electronic communication (ICT). Even within a single sphere of alternative media, there exists significant variation in terms of style, contributions, and viewpoints. As emphasized in earlier chapters, Taiwanese alternative media possess a more distinct political orientation than their Western counterparts. This distinction stems from the KMT’s regime of state capitalism and media dominance during Taiwan’s developmental phase. Evidently, the KMT’s stronghold was anchored in its comprehensive mastery over political, economic, and ideological domains. To put it succinctly, the KMT exploited its media monopoly to attain both commercial dominance and ideological influence. Due to the fear of being sentenced into jail, most Taiwanese people went into the “spiral of silence” without criticizing the ruling government. Only a few “bold” idealistic persons created their alternative media, most of which were illegal or underground, and advocated their dissident voices for political and social reform. Although the democratization of Taiwan is developing, it is difficult to conclude that Taiwan’s alternative media development has already caught the pace of Western media development. Obviously, we can see that Taiwanese alternative media still focused more on political and social issues and even less on entertainment and commercials in the Internet age.

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More National Issues, Less Community Issues Western countries typically have alternative community media, whereas Taiwanese alternative media tends to have a greater interest in society-wide or political activism of any kind. In the United Kingdom and United States, community media types are sometimes referred to as “native reporting”. This term refers to the work of alternative journalists who work within communities of interest to provide news that is relevant to them and that is presented with their collaboration and support (Atton, 2002). The study demonstrates that most opposition political movements in Taiwan since the retreat by the KMT from the mainland have centered on alternative media. For example, the reasons for the role that opposition political magazines came to play can be traced to both generic and culture-specific sets of phenomena. In 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was established because of the no-party movement that was supported by various magazines. One of these magazines, the Taiwan Political Review, which started in 1975, created a model of a political opinion magazine that aimed to promote change within the political system. The magazine helped establish a political party apparatus that could eventually emerge as a fully formed party when the time was right, effectively paving the way for a smooth transition to a democratic political system (Berman, 1992). As the late former Formosa magazine publisher Huang Hsin-chieh stated during his trial for sedition in 1980, “the purpose of the magazine was not for the magazine’s sake but to develop our organization and to recruit supporters (quoted in Wang, 1988, p. 153)”. Testimony given by Huang and his codefendants during the trial offers the clearest public summation by opposition insiders as to the use of the magazine organization to build a de facto political party. In Taiwan, the fusion of alternative media and civic groups produced a mutually reinforcing impact. Yet, the cable television and alternative radio stations of the opposition parties and civic groups also served as pivotal channels for political propaganda. This led to clashes between the KMT’s media dominance and the dissenting factions, manifesting in media policies and electoral campaigns. Both governing and opposition parties viewed their media platforms as catalysts for party expansion. As a result, political skirmishes spilled over into confrontations between media outlets affiliated with the ruling party and those associated with the opposition, especially during election seasons. Part of the significance of the Taiwan experience to political theory is a case history of a genuine opposition political party with real clout developing outside the arena of the legislature (Berman, 1992), where such organizations have long been believed to typically originate. However, with the coming of Internet technology, we can see that several groups created a web-based network of community reporters in Taiwan, as community interests were

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paid more attention by alternative media participants, especially for social movement groups. Yesterday’s Alternative Media Activists, Today’s Ruling Party Leaders It is the biggest difference between Western and Taiwanese alternative media activists. In Taiwan, the former leaders of opposition political magazines were sentenced by the ruling KMT government but then became main members of the new ruling party after several years of struggle. The alternative media played a significant role in personalizing politics in a positive manner by introducing the public to the new generation of political leaders. These leaders were previously political prisoners but now served as opposition party leaders who were potential new political leaders. The alternative media linked them to parties, programs, policies, statements, and symbols, and bestowed greater authority and responsibility on them. The Formosa (Kaohsiung) Incident was a significant demonstration against the government organized by political opposition groups in the history of Taiwan’s political opposition. The incident led to the arrest and court-martial of 8 opposition activists, who later became known as the “Kaohsiung Eight”, on sedition charges, and the event had a profound impact on the country. The role of opposition political magazines in promoting democratic reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s is widely recognized. Moreover, the incident ignited in-depth conversations about Taiwanese identity, encompassing facets like culture, language, and history. Given its significance in Taiwan’s political evolution, this incident frequently acts as a benchmark to evaluate politicians’ political orientations, determining if they merit commendation or censure for their roles in Taiwan’s move towards democratization (Lin, 2003). With the changing political dynamics, perceptions of many KMT and PFP leaders have shifted from being authoritative to oppressors during the crackdown. On the other hand, those who were once tagged as seditionists are now revered as stalwarts of Taiwan’s democratic movement. The Formosa Incident played a crucial role in the establishment of the DPP in 1986 and was a baptism of fire for its leaders, including President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu, both of whom were former alternative media activists and editors of the opposition political magazine, the Formosa. They were once incarcerated by the ruling KMT government. Along with many other Formosa activists and defense lawyers, they have become prominent political figures in Taiwan. They include incumbent Kaohsiung Mayor Frank Hsieh (谢长廷), Taipei County Magistrate Su Chen-chang (苏贞昌), former Taipei County Magistrate Yu Ching (尤清), DPP’s founding Chairman Chiang Peng-chieh (江鹏坚), and former Prime Minister Chang Chun-hsiung (张俊雄). In the history of Taiwanese alternative media, the political effects of this information are shaped by the interaction between its use by opposition elites and the receptivity of individual citizens who are the target of political messages. While we have surveyed a number of technological, economic, and

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social factors that influenced the impact of the media on political behavior, we conclude that the most decisive determinants of media effects are the strategies and behavior of opposition elites. In non-democratic systems, mass publics retained an appetite for political messages subversive of the regime, but they were unable to act on these messages until authoritarian elites decided, for whatever reason, to relax their strict control of the media and allow them to disseminate alternative opposition views. Compared to the study of Western alternative media, it is important to see that the Taiwanese alternative media activists and opposition elites finally reached their political-oriented goal—to establish a real opposition party and then take the ruling power from KMT government; they fought for their goal although the authoritarian government cracked down on them several times.

References Atton, C. (2002). Alternative media. Sage. Berman, D. (1992). Words like colored glass: The role of the press in Taiwan’s democratization process. Westview. Chan, J. M. (1994). Media internationalization in China: Processes and tensions. Journal of Communication, 44(3), 70–88. Chan, J. M. (2002). Media, democracy and globalization: A comparative perspective. Media Development, 1, 22–35. Chan, J. M., & Lee, C. C. (1991). Mass media and political transition: The Hong Kong press in China’s orbit. Guilford Press. Chao, L., & Myers, R. (1998). The first Chinese democracy. Johns Hopkins University. Chen, C. N. (1992). Civil society sense and Taiwanese political development. YunCheng Publishing Co. Chu, Y W., & Tang, J. (2003). The Internet and civil society. A paper presented at the Internet Culture and Society Conference, National Ting-Hua University. Gold, T. B. (1986). State and society in the Taiwan Miracle. ME Sharp. Femia, J .V. (1987). Gramsci’s political thought. Clarendon Press. Jakubowicz, K. (1995). Media as agents of change. In D. Paletz, K. Jakubowicz & P. Novosel (Eds.), Glasnost and after: Media and change in Central and Eastern Europe. Hampton Press. Lee, C. C. (1993). Sparkling a fire: the press and the ferment of democratic change in Taiwan. Journalism Monographs, 138. Lin, M. C. (2003, March 1). Exhibit arouses political passions. Taipei Times. Lin, W. (1998). The prospect and retrospect of Taiwanese social welfare movements. National Taiwan University Press. Lin, W. K. (1998). Political parties and changes in Taiwanese electronic media in the 1990s. A paper presented to AEJMC annual conference. McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1972). The agenda-setting function of mass media. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 36(2), 176–187.

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McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1993). The evolution of agenda-setting research: Twenty-five years in the marketplace of ideas. Journal of Communication, 43(2), 58–67. McQuail, D. (1994). Mass communication theory: An introduction. Sage. Murdoch G. & Golding P. (1979). Capitalism, communication and class relations. In J. Curran, M. Gurevitch, & J. Woollacott (Eds.), Mass communication and society. Sage. Naughton, J. (2001). Contested space: The internet and global civil society. In M. Glasius (Ed.), Global civil society 2001. Available online at ww.lse.ac.uk/Depts/glo bal/Yearbook/outline.htm Ou-yang, S. (1985). A study of the role and function of non-party-operated political opinion magazines in our country’s political environment [Unpublished master thesis, Chinese Culture University]. Sukosd, M. (2000). Democratic transformation and the mass media in Hungary. In R. Gunther., & A. Mughan (Eds.), Democracy and the media. Cambridge University Press. Wang, J. W. (1988). Political movements against the state: The transition of Taiwan’s authoritarian rule. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California. Webster, F. (2001). A new politics? In F. Webster (Ed.), Culture and politics in the information age. Routledge.

CHAPTER 9

Conclusion

After examining the evolution of alternative media in Taiwan, we have found a particular relationship between alternative media and political development. The KMT, Taiwan’s governing party, enforced martial law in 1947, granting the government stringent authority over newspapers, radio, and television. Although martial law was lifted in 1987, state entities maintained control over the majority of major television channels until the DPP secured victory in the presidential election of 2000. By either directly or indirectly overseeing key newspapers and TV stations, the ruling party was able to manipulate public opinion with great efficacy and severely curb freedom of expression. However, the used-to-be illegal alternative media set a democratic agenda, crystallizing opposition discourse strategies and providing an unrestricted public sphere. The role of alternative media was no less significant once democratization was set in motion (Fang 1995). During the 1980s, a democratic movement swept across Taiwan, with opposition political magazines challenging the government’s control over martial law and media. A variety of political movements, including farmers, workers, environmentalists, and human rights activists, took to the streets to demand legal protection for their rights. In response to these social protests pushing for democratization, the KMT relied on military and police force to suppress them. The protests were depicted by the mainstream media as violent street confrontations, with the government being accused of manipulating public perception. At the same time, opposition political magazines that condemned the government surged in popularity.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Hong and C.-N. Hou, Alternative Media and Taiwan’s Socio-Political Transformation, 1970s–1990s, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2477-6_9

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Starting in 1986, the Green Team, an underground video collective, started documenting social protests and distributing their recordings. Their work provided a new perspective on the opposition movement. From 1987 to 1988, home videos produced by the Green Team and other groups such as the Third Image and New Taiwan documented significant protest events in a social movement that represented a critical turning point in Taiwan’s path toward democratization, culminating in the lifting of martial law. In 1990, the Green Team took their efforts to the next level by setting up an underground television station to counter the pro-government election campaigns typically aired by the 3 major TV stations. Some individuals attempted to interrupt official television transmissions, and clandestine mobile television stations joined the campaign against the KMT’s domination of mass media. By 1991, Taiwan boasted 300 cable TV stations. Interestingly, all operated in a legal gray area due to a government-imposed ban on cables. That same year, the opposition party, DPP, began airing political speeches, coverage of social disturbances, and political discourse on these clandestine channels, which subsequently earned the moniker “Democratic Cable Television”. These channels produced news reports on local events to counter the centralized control of news by the 3 major television stations, marking the beginning of community TV news in Taiwan. However, true community participation in program production was still lacking. It was in 1993 when the government was ultimately compelled to legalize the development of cable TV. In 1994, underground alternative radio stations began to surface and quickly captured widespread interest. These stations established hotlines for listeners to call in, enabling taxi drivers, laborers, homemakers, and others to voice their views on political events and societal issues. The real-time nature of these discussions fostered public engagement and surfaced opinions that mainstream radio stations had consistently suppressed. Yet, these live discussions were not exempt from government oversight. Significantly, underground radio became a vehicle for mass engagement and a nexus of dispute, amplifying public awareness of the intrinsic link between freedom of speech and democracy. In a notable event on August 1, 1994, the KMT government dispatched helicopters and mobilized a 6,000-strong police contingent to shut down all 14 underground radio stations across Taiwan simultaneously. This pre-dawn operation ignited widespread protests and disturbances in Taipei City. Despite the clampdown, some stations swiftly returned to the airwaves, bolstered by considerable financial support from their dedicated audience. This incident underscored the KMT’s continued authoritarian control and its unease with unrestrained expression. Since 1986, proponents of democracy in Taiwan have been persistently fighting against the government’s regulation of the media. Their resistance has taken shape on the periphery of society, through the distribution of underground video tapes, interference with TV broadcasts, the establishment of opposition cable TV, and the use of underground radio broadcasting systems.

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This struggle has been aimed at challenging the KMT’s authoritarian grip on mass media and its repression of free speech. In this way, the electronic media in Taiwan has gradually moved toward democratization, albeit gradually and against significant obstacles. The alternative media of the 1990s, however, had 2 characteristics that set them apart from earlier clandestine efforts. First, alternative outlets in 2 of these media, radio and cable television, succeeded in establishing themselves legally and publicly, implying an abandonment of illegality. Cable television acquired legal status and their right to broadcast by following legal procedures established by the regime. Second, alternative radio stations also emerged through a more evolutionary process by redefining their basic function. Compared to the media in the 1980s, these media were direct outlets and advocates of political opposition parties; meanwhile, they attempted to articulate a multiparty opposition. In general, it can be inferred that the liberalization of television, radio, and print media during the transition period provided diverse activists with unprecedented avenues to reach the masses. However, the democratic consolidation brought about by their style and content of communication appears to depend partly on the decisions and actions of these alternative media activists themselves. As a result, media effects during the transition period may have contributed to a top-down, or elitist, approach to democratization in Taiwan. Following the 2000 presidential election, the primary purpose of alternative media during the 1990s, which was to promote political change, became obsolete after the opposition party came into power. Instead, alternative media shifted their focus to social movement groups, which utilized social media platforms to create communities and construct identities both online and offline. The Internet empowered these organizations and expanded the range of collective actions available to them. The utilization of the Internet emerged from the interplay of technological advancements, strategic decisions taken by social movement organizations, and the sociocultural traits of society. In earlier chapters, we emphasized the symbiotic relationship between social change and the roles of alternative media. The interplay between alternative media and democratization is reciprocal, with each being indispensable to the other’s progression. This research aimed to examine the impact of alternative media on social change in Taiwan. The findings suggest that the media cannot be viewed as solely responsible for bringing about social changes. Instead, they are both influenced by and influence society. Moreover, the study found a strong link between media and democracy, with communication being a vital component of democracy. The higher the diversity of information that circulates transparently between citizens and the government, the greater the likelihood of a functional democracy taking shape. Alternative media change in Taiwan has progressed at varying rates during different development periods. Prior to the late 1990s, when the Internet gained popularity, the transformation of alternative media was primarily evolutionary rather than revolutionary, resulting from intricate social and cultural

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negotiations rather than the influence of technological determinism. Opposition political magazines, cable television, and alternative radio stations filled the gap left by the KMT-controlled mainstream media, providing access to information and news that had been censored or overlooked. The people’s demand for real voice and opposition groups’ political goals were the reason such alternative media existed in Taiwan. In contrast, alternative media did not follow the same “evolutionary” pace after the late 1990s due to the popular use of the Internet. The CMC changed the form of alternative media, making the form of alternative media more versatile than before. By examining the roles of mainstream and alternative media in Taiwan’s political democratization and transition, coupled with case studies from Central and Eastern Europe and other regions (referencing Chan, 2002; Downing, 1996; Paletz et al., 1995; Sparks, 1998), it’s evident that shifts in media roles transpire when the prevailing power structure undergoes significant upheaval and novel sociopolitical paradigms arise. During political transitions, there is environmental uncertainty, which requires strategic interorganizational relations between the power structure and the media to cope with and reduce the uncertainty. Additionally, the alternative media cannot sustain itself without entering transactions and relationships with the new political structure in the changing environment for further resources. To solidify their legitimacy, centers of power need to provide substantial incentives without enforcing excessive limitations. In contrast to alternative media, mainstream media must accede to this pressure by conferring legitimacy to the centers of power. There is one further point that we must not ignore. In the history of Taiwanese alternative media, alternative media activists were always the pioneer of new media production and used them illegally before the government legalized them. The introduction of new forms of communication technology often sparks debates about their potential benefits and risks, leading to questioning of fundamental institutions and practices within a culture. This process of debate and reflection can initiate widespread change, as argued by Jenkins (1998), and is a valid concept to consider. In the examination of media change in Taiwan, it was discovered that popular activities, serving as social forces, were frequently directed against the bias of the electronic mainstream media, particularly the three national television stations, as a means of mobilizing opposition against the government. The DPP and civic groups were particularly active in this respect, with many of their members participating in scholarly discussions about the future of Taiwan’s media. This indicates that media issues themselves have tended to become highly politicized, frequently evolving into political issues. In contrast to alternative media, the initial uses of new technologies were generally conservative compared to mainstream media. The dissemination of new media was frequently sluggish and inconsistent, impeded by political and social considerations. These findings illustrate how the idea of radical media transformation

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can conceal the existence of hybrid alternative media that act as intermediaries between traditional and modern forms. According to the concept of civil society and the public sphere, dissent is inevitable. While making decisions on the various issues of public importance, it is natural to have different opinions. In a democratic system, decisions by consensus and by majority rule are now established facts. In fact, majority domination is contrary to the goals of equal participation in citizen governance and equal rights. If the dissident of a minority is appreciated and well-ventilated, the democratic system will survive its test and grow stronger. However, if minority dissent is not tolerated, the system will decay. Hence, the democratic system is judged by the extent to which the majority tolerates, protects, and even encourages minorities to express their views. Both the government and the population need to allow political differences of opinion and encourage freedom of expression as a whole. Thus, creating alternative media and creating an “alternative public sphere” is an essence of democracy. We posit that the “alternative public sphere” offers a fitting framework to comprehend the generation and dissemination of self-documented experiences, critiques, information, and knowledge through alternative media (Atton, 2002). Within this domain, alternative media can be viewed akin to the “free spaces” outlined by Melucci (1995). These spaces underscore the crucial independence from governmental entities, the state, and other prevailing political institutions and practices. They possess attributes consistent with a public model, functioning as experimental arenas where alternate societal models can be crafted. Bookchin (1986) characterizes free spaces as domains where the sway of power and economic rationale is diminished, allowing for affinity groups to surface as venues where revolutionaries can evolve both personally and as community members. The principles and characteristics of alternative media practices in Taiwan can be explored through these theories, underscoring the significance of autonomy, unity, and introspection in the inventive processes of crafting democratic media. ICT enthusiasts believe that the Internet has the potential to enhance the internal networking of civil society organizations, particularly opposition and social movement groups, when compared to traditional media. Through internet-based discussions, leaders can communicate directly and informally with members at different levels of the organization. This allows individuals to express their opinions, gain a closer understanding of the organization and its causes, develop a sense of identification and solidarity, and take initiative. The ICT revolution has encouraged informal connectivity, horizontal structure, and self-organization, all of which have contributed to the democratization of politics and made organizations more meaningful for individuals. This demonstrates how the internet can facilitate the formation of authentic communities that collaborate to produce alternative media via collective efforts. Mainstream media is still evolving and adjusting its emphasis on objectivity and advocacy to respond to the societal divisions. The democratizing function

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of mainstream media can vary depending on power structure splits, particularly if disagreements arise within the central elites. These conflicts are often reflected in the media, creating the perception that the media are acting as watchdogs and engaging in public debate (Curran, 2000). The media can serve as an emancipatory force and represent critical public opinion when they break from the prevailing power system under the influence of an energized civil society, professionally oriented media staff, and consumer pressure. Independent, aggressive, and critical alternative media are necessary for a wellinformed democracy, and well-developed alternative communication networks are crucial in a well-developed civil society. Additionally, to promote Taiwanese culture and consciousness, alternative media should always be available. Suggestions for future research could include examining the political culture of Taiwan. Taiwanese politics have distinctive features that set them apart from Western politics, and an exploration of political culture may uncover additional factors that have shaped the attitudes and actions of Taiwanese politicians in their pursuit of political and media dominance. For instance, political culture may explain why opposition parties in Taiwan have employed strategies aimed at challenging the KMT’s ownership and control of media. As such, influenced by political culture, opposition parties have pursued democratization and even regime change as goals for their alternative media outlets, a departure from the approaches adopted by Western parties. Secondly, it is crucial to examine the effects of media control by the ruling party and how the mainstream and alternative media contribute to political democratization and transition, either individually or collectively. Alternative media always play a vital role in shaping democracy in a country. While alternative media represent minority interests, mainstream media should also play an active role in promoting democracy by representing public interests. To put it differently, both mainstream and alternative media should take an active role in promoting democracy rather than relying on an already established democratic system to bring about changes in their practices. Thirdly, it is crucial to monitor the current opposition parties and the evolving role of alternative media. The former opposition party, the DPP, has already obtained media resources and ruling power. However, will they relinquish their control of these resources easily? If the public does not contest the media control by opposition parties, as they did with the KMT, will these parties automatically lose their media ownership? Therefore, it is essential to focus on the new media policy of the former opposition, the DPP, and the potential media oligarchy’s impact on Taiwan’s democracy and political development in future research. As the 2000s saw a surge in identity politics linked to multicultural social movements and opposition to political and economic globalization, the examination of alternative media in Taiwan has shifted toward the tangible and situational facets of its practice. The core premise underpinning the “theorization of Taiwanese alternative media” centers on its historical context,

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striving to offer a detailed history and analysis of Taiwanese scholarly contributions. We contend that contemporary alternative media evaluations lean heavily on techno-deterministic notions that are both rooted in and promote prevailing societal and political objectives. Gibbs and Hamilton (2001) concur, recognizing the historical backdrop of alternative media. They emphasize its influential role in counteractive political and social movements, while also acknowledging the limitations set by accessible media resources, cultural expressions, and historical circumstances. Indeed, since entering the 2000s, there have been several new trends in alternative media in Taiwan. They resulted from the new trends in the island’s politics, society, newly emerged societal issues, new advanced communication and information technology, and the transition of mainstream media. Below are the main new trends in Taiwan’s alternative media. First, the alternative media has had a new development during the digital age, which even created a new alternative public sphere in Taiwan, including ones such as independent media and “citizen journalism” or “citizen news”. Since the Internet has emerged in the digital age, while Taiwan’s mainstream media’s role as an endorsement for social reform is being widely criticized, the mainstream media’s democratic communication potential has also been seriously questioned. Therefore, the rapid growth of the Internet has not only revived the discourse in the public sphere but also opened up the socalled self-media and inspired new thinking about how alternative media can be more democratic and increase citizen participation. The development of Internet technology has also allowed citizens to have a broader power of communication and has entered an era in which all citizens can participate in communication through online media. The development of social networks has become increasingly vigorous and has become a channel and tool for the evolution from “individual communication” to “public communication”. The so-called “personal communication” of social networks connects one’s own thoughts with a single object or a specific majority of objects through social websites. Because social networks have the function of textual discussion of texts and audiovisual works, the function of “groups”, this kind of online media creates new forms of alternative media and has become an important channel and tool of the “alternative public sphere”. For example, in recent years, society has often used “independent media” to describe these relatively rebellious “alternative media” in Taiwan, but this statement does not easily highlight the character of “alternative media”. As long as the funds are independent and the operation is independent, it can be called “independent” media, but such media may not be “alternative”. In contrast, it may be close to the dominant power system and copy the mainstream “political” value. “Independent” media may not necessarily stand in the position of the disadvantaged and speak out for the disadvantaged. Even if some media dissent in society, they may only be appendages of certain dissident groups and do not have the subjectivity that alternative media should have. Additionally, as another example, after 2000, citizen news began to appear in Taiwan, and

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independent media channels of “Citizen News” began to appear. This is a stage in the development of Taiwan’s alternative media that deserves attention. These citizen journalists do not use journalism as their “occupation”. Most of them have normal jobs, and some are students, laborers, retirees, housewives, and community volunteers. The content is mostly community and local public issues. Not only does citizen news reach every inch of Taiwan’s land, but local issues have also become the focus of national attention. Citizen reporters pay attention to labor, the environment, agriculture, various social movements and disadvantaged issues. They are also more organized independent media. Even so, they mostly operate horizontally, emphasizing the democratic nature of internal decision-making. Compared to the mainstream media, journalists in these organizations are more independent and less constrained by the organization, and journalists have more room to report. Most of these media are native to the Internet, featuring written text, a large number of pictures or in-depth analysis. Second, an increasing number of minority social movement groups in Taiwan have established their own alternative media, thus not only increasing the number of alternative media on the island but also making the alternative media more powerful and influential. For social movement groups, social movement is a kind of collective resistance and countercontrol against an unreasonable system. Its core process is to highlight the conflicts between values and interests and to show the masses’ collective will against resistance from the actual movement. Since the 1990s, the theory of multiculturalism has emerged around the world, which has provided a new fighting force for vulnerable groups such as gay groups. Minority groups and communities rely on their own propaganda strategies to strive for equal status in social participation, to strive for the protection of group benefits, and to maintain their identity or cultural identity, thereby practicing the concept of social equality of multiple culturalisms. In addition to the development of Internet technology, homosexuals among minority groups have begun to fight for their rights in an organized manner. The LGBTQ movement groups use online technology to gather strength to make people know more about homosexuality, eliminate discrimination, and improve their social status. As far as the gay social movement is concerned, the gay pride parade has become one of the best ways to appeal for media exposure, and it can also become the focus of the mainstream media. The LGBTQ movement groups also attach great importance to the exposure of relevant information in the gay pride parade in multiple kinds of mainstream and alternative media. For example, homosexuals in Chinese society have been facing individual and social struggles since ancient times. Compared with mainstream heterosexual society, homosexuals are still marginalized persons whose interests have been ignored by most people, and their homosexual relationships are not respected. For gay groups who have always regarded themselves as disadvantaged, the practice of achieving actual rights through alternative media and civil society has been regarded as an

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important task. Taiwan’s gay movement groups have also successfully achieved the goal of legal gay marriage, becoming the first and only one in Asia. Third, the alternative media and mainstream media in Taiwan have coexisted with their own boundaries regarding sociopolitical policies and culture. For example, in addition to providing voices of dissent from mainstream society, the current alternative media is also an alternative choice. The larger purpose is to promote social reform, which means that it must promote overall social progress as the goal. Alternative media pay attention to internal democratization in operation. In terms of organization, it is different from mainstream media that emphasize the hierarchy of power structure. It is parallel and equal for all staff members in an organizational relationship, rather than that found in traditional media. Building on the aforementioned analysis, there’s a pressing need to expand our understanding of Taiwan’s alternative media, especially in light of evolving sociopolitical landscape and the burgeoning diversity in its political and societal spheres. Central to this exploration is discerning how alternative media fuel the rise of counter-establishment social movements. While Hamilton (2001) underscores that investigations concentrating on particular publishers, authors, journalists, publications, or institutions can shed light on certain occurrences, they might inadvertently narrow the broader comprehension of media practices and their foundational preconditions. One of the impediments to deepening our insights in this domain is that a substantial chunk of alternative media artifacts remains unpublished—encompassing elements like handbills, placards, circulars, protest banners, and other transitory materials—which often escape archiving or cataloging (Hamilton, 2001). To genuinely grasp the essence of such media forms, it’s imperative that we move beyond conventional methods and carve out innovative research and analytical approaches. Consequently, forthcoming investigations should aim to offer a more holistic view of the present-day alternative media scene.

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Index

A Alternative communication, 2, 15, 16, 18, 24, 150, 166 Alternative media characteristics (Taiwan), 11, 12, 19, 140, 155 concept, 5, 11, 17, 21, 24, 36, 81 consequence of operation (Taiwan), 12 criteria, 17 definition, 15 evolution, 6, 11, 161 historical contributions (Taiwan), vii, 6, 7, 31, 167 historical review, 10 socio-political function (Taiwan), v, vi state vs. civil society (Taiwan), 12 vs. mainstream media, 3, 5, 16, 18, 65, 169 Western vs. Taiwanese, 12, 139, 155, 157 Alternative public sphere, 20, 30, 31, 165, 167 Alternative radio, 5, 11, 91, 92, 95, 105–117, 119, 133, 141, 143, 146, 153, 154, 163, 164 Anti-nuclear media, West German, 31 Anti-nuclear movement, Taiwan, 51 Apollo Magazine, 84. See also Wenxing

B British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 21 Broadcasting and Television Law (Taiwan), 59, 94, 95 Broadcasting Corporation of China (BCC), 58, 59, 69 Bulletin Board System (BBS), 121, 122, 125–127

C Cable Television Law (Taiwan), 72, 95, 101 Cable television (Taiwan), 5, 25, 63, 71, 91, 92, 95–97, 101–103, 142, 146, 153, 154, 163 Call-in culture, 133 Capital Morning Paper, 65 Carter, Jimmy, 84 Chang Chun-hsiung, 157 Channel Four, 97, 101–103, 108, 142, 146, 153. See also Democratic Cable Television Chen, Shui-bian, 43, 44, 52, 86, 118, 124, 130, 157 Chiang, Ching-kuo, 41, 44, 48, 88, 93 Chiang, Kai-Shek, 57 Chiang Peng-chieh, 157 Chiatou Incident, 85

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Hong and C.-N. Hou, Alternative Media and Taiwan’s Socio-Political Transformation, 1970s–1990s, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2477-6

185

186

INDEX

China Democratic Party, 82 China Television Company (CTV), 59, 60, 63, 70, 101 China Tide (magazine), 8, 84, 142. See also Xia Chao China Times , 61, 65, 66, 92, 96, 111 Chinese New Party (CNP), 39, 42–44, 50, 51, 95, 97, 101, 111, 113, 114, 153 Chunghwa Telecom (Taiwan), 73 Chungli Incident (Taiwan), 42 Civil society, 6, 11, 15, 25–29, 31, 34, 35, 39, 49, 52–54, 68, 108, 139, 141, 144–147, 150–152, 165, 166, 168 Common Daily, 66 Computer-mediated communication (CMC), 4, 26, 32, 119, 121, 126, 128, 134, 164 distinctive features, 166 uses, 31 Consumer Law (Taiwan), 72 Copyright Law (Taiwan), 72 D Democratic Cable Television, 97, 101, 108, 162 Democratic participant media theory (McQuail), 35 Democratic Progress Party (DPP), vi, 5, 28, 35, 39–44, 48, 49, 51, 53, 71, 86, 88, 93–97, 101, 102, 108, 109, 111, 113, 114, 118, 133, 150, 156, 157, 162, 166 the Formosa faction, 93 the New Movement faction, 51 Disan Yinxiang , 97 E The Eighties (magazine), 8 the Emergency Decree (Taiwan), 44 F the February 28 Incident, 41, 47 the 520 incident, 92 The Formosa (magazine), 8, 47, 83, 85–87, 93

the Formosa Incident, 47, 83, 85, 86, 87, 93, 157. See also the Kaohsiung Incident Formosa New Voice, 109 Formosa Television (FTV), 70, 71, 100 Forward (magazine), 8 Free China (magazine), 8, 67, 82 G Gay Chat (Taiwan), 126 Gay virtual community, 118, 128, 132. See also LGBTQ+ community Gender/Sexuality Rights Association (Taiwan), 132 This Generation (magazine), 84. See also Great Virtue Government Information Office (GIO), 66, 68–70, 72, 92, 98, 103 Great Virtue, 84 H Hao Po-tsun, 50, 102 He-hsin (cable-system conglomerate), 71 Hsieh, Frank, 157 Hsu Hsin-liang, 85, 86, 99 Hsu Yu-sheng, 124 Huang, Hsin-chieh, 46, 47, 83, 85, 86, 94, 156 Huang, Hua, 83 I Identity cultural, 18, 145, 168 in cyberspace, 132 social, 26 Independent Evening Post , 65 Intellectual (magazine), 8 International Television Union (ITU), 73 J Jian Jin-yen, 124 K Kao, Yu-shu, 45

INDEX

the Kaohsiung Incident, 47, 83. See also the Formosa Incident Keelung Transit Strike (Taiwan), 99 Kuomintang (KMT), v, 4, 5, 27, 28, 34, 35, 39–47, 49–51, 53, 54, 58–61, 63, 65, 69, 80, 81, 83–87, 91, 93–96, 99, 101, 102, 107, 109, 110, 114, 116, 117, 119, 133, 142, 144, 146, 153–157, 161, 162, 166. See also the National Party

L Lee, Teng-hui, 44, 64, 93, 94 Legislative Yuan (congress), 51, 66, 86, 103 Lei Chen, 45 LGBTQ+ community, 51, 53, 121, 123–128, 130, 131, 134 Liberty Times , 66 Lin, Yang-kang, 50 Lin, Yi-hsiung, 47, 83 Luse Xiaozu, 97

M Mainstream media, vi, 1, 2, 5, 15, 16, 18–20, 25, 42, 60, 63, 64, 73, 88, 93, 99, 106, 112, 131, 132, 142, 152, 161, 164, 166–169 criterial studies, 60 vs. alternative media, 3, 5, 16, 18, 64, 165 Ma, Ying-jeou, 50 Members of the Same Sex, 126 MOTSS, 126, 127–129, 131. See also Members of the Same Sex Movement (magazine), 8, 87, 88

N the National Party, v, vi, 4 New Central Plains , 94. See also Xin Zhongyuan New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), 23, 25 Ning-hsiang, Kang, 46, 83

187

O Online discursive community, 127, 131, 134 Outlook (magazine), 8 P Participation, 1, 8, 15, 16, 24, 30, 32, 45, 46, 48, 49, 54, 64, 67, 79, 83–85, 99, 112, 115, 118, 119, 121, 126, 151, 155, 167, 168 and control, 16 principle, 123 Peng, Ming-min, 44, 93, 94 People First Party (PFP), 39, 43, 44, 157 Political democratization and transition (Taiwan), 4–6, 88, 148, 152, 166 Presidential election (Taiwan), vi, 5, 28, 40, 44, 52, 88, 93, 94, 118, 119, 134, 142, 150, 151, 161, 163 Publication Law (Taiwan), 61, 66, 92 Public sphere, 10, 15, 25, 29–31, 112, 131, 165 Public Television Service (PTS), 70 R Radio and Television Broadcast Law (Taiwan), 72 Regulation of Restrictions on Newspaper’s Registration and Pages (1949–1987), 58 S Shih Ming-the, 47 Shih Ron-chi, 108, 111 Social movement webs (SMW), 12, 134, 141 Soong, James, 44, 53 Su Chen-chang, 157 T Ta-Hsueh, 84 Taiwan the authoritarian regime period, 27, 39, 45, 48 censorship and media control, 65, 68

188

INDEX

democracy and political transition, 166 ethnic and political problems, 40 the independent issue, 4, 43 the martial law period, 49, 51, 67, 144 media system, 11, 58, 142 national identity, 40, 43, 83 opposition magazines, 67, 68, 87, 91, 142 political change, 48, 118, 143 political opposition, 40, 45–48, 51, 80, 82, 100, 111, 142, 144, 157 the press ban, 25, 42, 67 social movement group, 6, 11, 12, 35, 54, 91, 119, 121, 122, 145, 157, 168 the tangwai, 46–48, 84, 87, 88, 142 the “White Terror” period, 42 Taiwanese Independent Party, 94 Taiwan Political Review (magazine), 8, 46, 83, 84, 156 Taiwan Television Enterprise (TTV), 59, 60, 70, 101 Taiwan Times , 66 Taiwan Tongzhi Hotline Association, 123, 125, 130 Tang Yao-ming, 128 Telecommunication Act (Taiwan, 1997), 73 Three Principles of the People, 85 Tung-seng (cable-system conglomerate), 71

U Underground radio (Taiwan), 9, 25, 51, 63, 81, 95, 107, 109, 110, 115–118, 139, 162

UNESCO, 2, 15, 16 United Daily, 61, 65, 66 University Magazine, 84. See also Ta-Hsueh V Video activist group (Taiwan) the Green Team, 98, 99, 100, 162. See also Luse Xiaozu New Taiwan, 97, 162 the Third Image, 97, 98, 162. See also Disan Yinxiang Virtual communication, 125 Virtual community, 5, 9, 11, 25, 74, 120, 121, 123, 125–128, 131, 132, 141, 143 Voice of Southern Taiwan, 111, 113 Voice of Taiwan, 109, 111, 113–115, 117 Voice of the New Party, 114 Voice of Whole People, 109, 111, 114 W Wenxing , 84 Wu Nai-jen, 47 Wu San-lien, 45 X Xia Chao, 84 Xin Zhongyuan, 94 Y Yu Ching, 157 Yu Teng-fa, 47, 83 Yu Ying-Lung, 47