Domestic Battleground: Canada and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 9780773562066

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgments
Influencing Canada's Middle East Policy: The Domestic Battleground
DOMESTIC ACTORS
The Zionist Lobby and Canada's Palestine Policy 1941–1948
From Passivity to Politics: Canada's Jewish Community and Political Support for Israel
Canadian Corporations and Their Middle East Interests
A Church Divided: A.C. Forrest and the United Church's Middle East Policy
Keeping Score: From the Yom Kippur War to the Palestinian Uprising
THE GOVERNMENTAL STAGE
"Here I Am in the Middle": Lester Pearson and the Origins of Canada's Diplomatic Involvement in the Middle East
Clark and the Jerusalem Embassy Affair: Initiative and Constraint in Canadian Foreign Policy
Foreign Policy Making Towards the Middle East: Parliament, the Media, and the 1982 Lebanon War
Perceptions of the Middle East in the Department of External Affairs and Mulroney's Policy 1984–1988
Collision Course: Joe Clark, Canadian Jews, and the Palestinian Uprising
THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: A CANADIAN ROLE
Canada and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Discussion with Irving Abella and John Sigler
Contributors

Citation preview

The Domestic Battleground

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The Domestic Battleground: Canada and the Arab-Israeli Conflictt Edited by David Taras and David H. Goldberg

McGill-Queen's University Press Kingston, Montreal, London

© McGill-Queen's University Press 1989 ISBN 0-7735-0705-1 Legal deposit second quarter 1989 Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec

Printed in Canada on acid-free paper This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Social Science Federation of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Main entry under title: The Domestic battleground : Canada and the Arab-Israeli conflict Includes index. ISBN 0-7735-0705-1 1. Canada - Foreign relations - Middle East. 2. Middle East - Foreign relations - Canada. 3. Israel - Arab conflicts. I. Taras, David, 1950- II. Goldberg, David Howard FC244.M53D65 1989 327.71056 089-090130-9 F1O29.5.M627D65 1989

Contents

Acknowledgments vii David Taras and David H. Goldberg Influencing Canada's Middle East Policy: The Domestic Battleground 3 DOMESTIC ACTORS

David J. Bercuson The Zionist Lobby and Canada's Palestine Policy 1941-1948 17 David Taras From Passivity to Politics: Canada's Jewish Community and Political Support for Israel 37 Howard Stanislawski Canadian Corporations and Their Middle East Interests 63 David Taras A Church Divided: A.C. Forrest and the United Church's Middle East Policy 86 David H. Goldberg Keeping Score: From the Yom Kippur War to the Palestinian Uprising 102 THE G O V E R N M E N T A L STAGE

Anne Trowell Hillmer "Here I Am in the Middle": Lester Pearson and the Origins of Canada's Diplomatic Involvement in the Middle East 125

contents

George Takach Clark and the Jerusalem Embassy Affair: Initiative and Constraint in Canadian Foreign Policy 144 David Dewitt and John Kirton Foreign Policy Making Towards the Middle East: Parliament, the Media, and the 1982 Lebanon War 167 John Kirton and Peyton Lyon Perceptions of the Middle East in the Department of External Affairs and Mulroney's Policy 1984-1988 186 David H. Goldberg and David Taras Collision Course: Joe Clark, Canadian Jews, and the Palestinian Uprising 207 THE A R A B - I S R A E L I CONFLICT: A CANADIAN ROLE

Canada and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Discussion with Irving Abella and John Sigler 227 Contributors 249

Acknowledgments

This has not been an easy book to edit. Assembling willing contributors who understood the distinction between scholarship and polemic on a subject where it is all too easy to be drawn into the latter has been a long and arduous process. Without the patience and forbearance of our contributors, this book would never have been brought to completion. Our greatest thanks goes to them. David Taras would like to thank Irwin and Sheila Taras for their love and support and for many years of listening to their son's first thoughts on this subject. Daphne Gottlieb Taras gave encouragement and advice and sustained hope when it appeared to fade. Matthew and Joel Taras were not even born when this project was begun. The late John Holmes, David Taras' thesis supervisor at the University of Toronto, was gracious always and gave needed perspective and criticism. David Goldberg would like to thank his wife Sheri for her devotion and understanding. Daughters Adara and Shayna have been a great joy even as they have distracted their father from working on this volume. Dianne Fox at the University of Calgary helped shepherd the manuscript through to completion, and Brian Mussington and Randy Pelletier worked at various stages as researchers. We owe them a debt of thanks. We would also like to thank Philip Cercone at McGill-Queen's University Press for his professionalism and for believing in this project. Marion Magee did a magnificent job of copy-editing, and Joan McGilvray, the co-ordinating editor at McGill-Queen's, was exceedingly helpful and a pleasure to work with. Two anonymous reviewers for the Social Science Federation of Canada helped immeasurably with their criticisms. The Aid to Publications Programme of the Social Science Federation of Canada must be thanked for its generous support.

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The Domestic Battleground

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DAVID TARAS AND DAVID H. G O L D B E R G

Influencing Canada's Middle East Policy: The Domestic Battleground

The Middle East has always been a catalyst for great-power confrontations, vast religious movements, and historic volte-faces. It has always had a magnetic pull, enticing commitments and allegiances from far away. It has been a place of "fear and fury" as well as dreams. The conflict between Israel and the Arabs has been characterized by deep animosities, drastic misperceptions, and failures at compromise and has remained, despite the passage of generations, exceedingly bitter and intractable. While in its essentials it is a struggle between two national movements - Arab and Jewish - the conflict's impact has spread far beyond the Middle East. Because the Middle East lies at a strategic crossroads, the United States and the Soviet Union have both sought spheres of influence and control there. Although direct clashes between the superpowers have been averted, albeit quite narrowly on a few occasions, the possibility of a dangerous confrontation persists. Another factor influencing Middle East events is oil. The economy of practically every country in the world was affected dramatically by the oil price revolution of the 1970s and by the sizeable oil price fluctuations of the 1980s.The international banking system is still adjusting to the huge financial transfers that flowed from these changes. The Arab-Israeli conflict also has religious overtones. As Jerusalem and the Holy Land are central to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, hundreds of millions of people throughout the world feel a special attachment to events in the region. In addition, the existence of Jewish communities and of banks and corporations with important Middle East interests in more than a few countries has affected domestic politics in those nations. The Arab-Israeli conflict is thus one of the major fault lines in world politics and has spawned an extensive transnational network of organizations and communities

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with either passionate or vested interests in its outcome. Canada is among the many countries caught in these cross-currents. The conventional wisdom is that the Middle East is not an area about which Canadians care a great deal. Janice Gross Stein has pointed out that for most of the postwar era Canada had a policy on the Middle East but not in the Middle East.1 Canada took official positions on Middle East issues, but its contacts and presence in the region were limited. Adherents of the conventional wisdom argue that Canada's involvement is diminished first by its geographic distance from the area. While Canada is not, to use Senator Raoul Dandurand's famous description, "a fire-proof house, far from inflammable materials,"2 and unaffected by the Middle East oil market, the threat of terrorism, or the consequences of superpower rivalry in the area, distance is an unmistakable reality. Geographic distance is compounded by cultural distance. The differences in economic standard of living, social life style, religious values, and norms and traditions, including the place of women in society, are profound and, some would argue, unbridgeable. It is also thought that Canada's proximity to the United States, the superpower with the highest stakes and largest presence in the Middle East, has discouraged Canada from launching initiatives of its own. For much of the 1970s and 1980s the Americans have attempted to dissuade other powers from playing a role in the Middle East peace process, preferring to pull the various strings themselves. While Canada's interests and involvement pale when compared with those of the United States, observers often forget that there are small and middle-sized players in addition to large players in the diplomacy game and that Canada's role need not be compared to that of the United States. In support of the conventional wisdom, it is certainly true that public opinion surveys reveal a widespread indifference to Middle East events.3 Indeed, even during periods of war or crisis, most Canadians either register no opinion or support no one side in the Arab-Israeli conflict. While both Israel and the Palestinians can count on strong currents of sympathy among various publics in Canada, public opinion appears tranquil on the surface. This book examines the domestic politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. While much has been written about Canada's diplomacy and particularly its peacekeeping in the Middle East, scholars have largely ignored the ways in which the conflict has affected political life in Canada. Yet Middle East issues never seem to disappear from the public agenda. The Middle East frustrated Lester Pearson, preoccupied Joe Clark, angered Pierre Trudeau, and remains a minefield which Brian Mulroney has attempted to avoid, not always with success. Important ethnic and religious groups, major banks and corporations, charitable institu-

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tions and prominent individuals have been mobilized by events in the Middle East and have been combatants in the domestic battleground of Canada's Middle East policy. Much of their effort is directed at government (both politicians and bureaucrats), yet a great deal of activity has also occurred in educational institutions and churches and through philanthropy. This book also challenges one of the basic assumptions about the foreign policy process in Canada: that the state is relatively free from domestic pressures. The "statist" or state autonomy model, now popular among some students of Canadian foreign policy, holds that decision-makers in Ottawa have been able to maintain autonomy in the making of foreign policy.4 Proponents of this position argue that the state has interests of its own divergent from those of the society that it governs and that government actors have their own traditions, values, and sources of power. With their hands on the helm of state institutions, governmental actors can shape the political environment and control or influence interest group activity. As Kim Richard Nossal has expressed it, "statism assumes that the government has the power to prevail in any conflict between state and society."5 A central theme of this book is that decision-makers are no longer shielded from the pressures and preferences emanating from "civil" society. Our argument is that domestic pressures are now one of a mix of influences that determines Canadian foreign policy. It is important to begin by pointing out differences between the political landscape in Canada and the United States so as to avoid confusing the power of American Middle East lobby groups with their counterparts in Canada. Stephen Krasner has argued that the United States has "a strong society but a weak state,"6 that the American governmental system is relatively open and power is diffused. With competing branches of government, decentralized authority in Congress, and political parties seemingly always in the midst of preparations for an election, interest groups enjoy many opportunities for access and possibly influence over aspects of foreign policy making. Middle East interest groups in the United States are directly involved in the election process through political action committees. Their financial contributions and political support have been critical in the elections of some of the members of Congress. In contrast, Canada can be said to have had a "strong" state and a "weak" society for much of its history. Seymour Lipset suggested that Canadians display a greater deference to authority than Americans and a greater attachment to conservative values.7 Certainly, the Canadian government has played a dominant role in the economy, bringing services to widely scattered and diverse populations. Until the 1960s provincial governments rarely challenged

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Ottawa's authority. The image of a strong state seemed to be especially evident in the making of foreign policy. The traditional dominance of the Department of External Affairs and the constraints of party discipline in the House of Commons insulated decision-makers from the demands of interest groups. Strict limits on the amount that could be spent during an election campaign by individual candidates dampened the ability of interest groups to have an impact during elections. The Canadian public, moreover, was believed to be relatively passive and largely indifferent to foreign policy questions. Our contention is that this description was always overdrawn and that the model is no longer appropriate. Foreign policy analysts now stress the degree to which external relations have become "domesticated." According to this view, changing international conditions in the 1970s and 1980s brought to the forefront issues that were "simultaneously, profoundly, and inseparably domestic and international."8 Agricultural exports, the price and availability of oil, the safety of international shipping and air traffic, environmental questions, trade in services, and the problems of international debt are some of the issues that touch both the international and the domestic spheres. Canadian publics are increasingly affected as the international economy becomes more interdependent. Domestic interest groups have made increasing demands on Ottawa, besieging decision-makers with the importance of their particular claims. What Don Munton has termed the "traditionally closed processes" of Ottawa's foreign policy elite are now under considerable assault.9 Defenders of the statist position argue that the government has responded to increased domestic pressures by imposing new mechanisms of influence and control. John Kirton and Blair Dimock have described how, after considerable experimentation with different modes of consultation and interaction, the Trudeau government decided "to stand apart from its publics' clamour and to lead in creating alliances with those specific segments of society which were educated as to the harsh realities of life abroad."10 The emphasis was on building foreign policy "networks" with "incorporated organizations" or "preferred clients" who could be used as safe sounding boards or conduits for the government's policy.11 This practice has continued under the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney. The government continues to fund organizations, conferences, and research in the hope that the seeds of obligations will bear fruit. An elaborate consultative network allows Ottawa to influence or at least to maintain links to important groups with interests in foreign policy. Under Mulroney, interest group representatives have even been called upon to present the government's case to the media because the government has found that

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third parties are often considered more credible than cabinet ministers or government spokesmen. Some theorists now take a modified statist approach. They argue that the state still wields substantial power but that its actions are constrained by parameters set by public opinion and influential interest groups. Within sharply defined limits the state can exercise wide discretion; beyond these boundaries its capacity to make unilateral decisions is drastically curtailed.12 This is nowhere better illustrated than on Middle East issues. In Canada the Jewish community, corporate actors, Arab groups and their allies, and the United Church became fullfledged foreign policy actors on Middle East issues only during the 1970s and 1980s. On the issues of the Arab economic boycott against Canadians doing business with Israel, the United Nations Crime Conference scheduled for Toronto in 1975, the Jerusalem embassy affair, Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories, and on whether Canada should recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization, lobbying has been intense, sharp, sophisticated, and, at times, tough and threatening. At least on Middle East issues the Canadian state does not stand in splendid isolation from society. While Middle East interest groups are part of Ottawa's "net" in that they have all forged some consultative relationship with the Department of External Affairs and links to parties and parliamentarians, they remain highly independent and powerful. To a significant degree, they have even forged their own relations with the Middle East. The essays collected for this volume give ample evidence of fierce domestic battles that have at times shaped aspects of Canada's foreign policy. Governmental actors are no longer shielded completely from the domestic politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The book is divided into three sections. The first describes some of the domestic actors and the roles they have played in the contest over Canada's Middle East policy. The second examines the decision-making process in Ottawa and the performance of different leaders and institutions. A final section presents a discussion between the historian, Irving Abella, and the political scientist, John Sigler, about the broad contours of Canada's diplomacy in the region, the power of domestic interest groups in the making of policy, and the initiatives that might be taken in the future. The first articles in the opening section are about the Canadian Jewish community. David Bercuson focuses on the role of Zionist interest groups in Canada's historic decision to recognize the state of Israel. Working with recently released historical materials, he concludes that Prime Minister Mackenzie King was largely insensitive to Jewish concerns and decided matters at his own pace and based on interna-

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tional factors. This article supplies evidence that domestic forces were not an important part of foreign policy decision-making in the 1940s. He also debunks the myth of a powerful Jewish lobby able to sway the balance of decision in its direction. David Taras describes the development of pro-Israel beliefs and institutions in Canadian Jewish life. He explains the special place Israel holds in Canadian Jewish society: the spiritual, emotional, and social needs that it serves. His main theme is that the emergence of the state of Israel brought a fundamental transformation in Jewish life in Canada, one that propelled the community from political passivity to intense political action. Despite a formidable commitment of money and prestige, however, he concludes that the Jewish community has had a mixed record of success in Ottawa. While certainly more powerful in the 1970s and 1980s than during the period described by Bercuson, the Jewish community remains an effective but marginal player in the contest over Middle East policy. Howard Stanislawski's article on Canadian corporate behaviour provides a different perspective on the power of domestic lobbies. Although there is much speculation about the role that business interests play in the making of foreign policy, few studies have been undertaken. It is generally assumed that major corporations do not have to lobby extensively on foreign policy issues because their views are automatically taken into consideration when decision-makers calculate what is in the national interest. Stanislawski documents how banks and corporations have waged campaigns to alter foreign policy - at least on Middle East issues - and have shown in the process where their interests lie in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Perhaps the most distinctive contribution of the Stanislawski chapter is the evidence not so much of a corporate-Arab connection, but of the extent to which Canadian corporations were willing to lobby extensively in Ottawa based on what they anticipated Arab demands might be rather than on concrete evidence about how Arab states would react to policy changes. The fourth article in this section is Taras's account of a dispute between the United Church of Canada and the Jewish community. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the two communities became locked in an emotional conflict over their respective positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the Christian churches have lobbied for years on foreign policy issues, little has been written about their actual proposals or influence.13 This article helps to shed some light on largely uncharted terrain. It also illustrates how a foreign policy issue can have an impact on relationships within society and yet not involve the government directly. In this case, the two communities were able to reach an accommodation on the rules that would govern the controversy that

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had arisen between them because of opposing positions on the ArabIsraeli conflict. The last article in the section on societal players is by David Goldberg. He has devised a score card to assess the satisfaction of four domestic constituencies - the Jewish community, Arab organizations, the business community, and the external affairs bureaucracy - with the key decisions made by the Canadian government between 1973 and 1988 on Middle East issues. Goldberg's findings will no doubt be controversial. Even Canadian Arab groups, who were largely passive and unorganized, obtained greater satisfaction than did the Jewish community. Canadian corporations and the foreign policy bureaucracy were also pleased. Although not totally satisfied with every decision, they were not dissatisfied with the outcome of any single event. Goldberg concludes that the "statist" perspective on foreign policy making needs some refinement. While foreign policy bureaucrats have considerable power, they cannot take that power for granted and cannot assume that their positions will be reflected completely in the final decisions and policies that emerge. In reflecting on the articles chosen for this section, the reader may wonder why there is no examination of the lobbying efforts of the Canadian Arab community. The explanation is simply that the editors were unable to entice any scholar who was in a position to write such an article to do so. The Arab community in Canada is a loose amalgam of a number of distinct communities with different histories and patterns of emigration, religious traditions, and attitudes towards politics.14 The large Lebanese Christian community has different views about Israel than do Palestinian groups. Moroccans and Tunisians cannot be lumped together neatly with Syrians or Egyptians. Generational differences and the primacy of economic concerns among new immigrant communities are also important. These factors have all played a role in delaying the emergence of Canadian Arab lobbying in Ottawa, although there has been a discernible increase in the organizational capabilities and political muscle of Arab lobby groups in the 1980s. The late entrance of Canadian Arab groups onto the political stage does not mean that their interests have not been looked after. The embassies of the Arab countries have worked closely with Canadian corporations and churches and have found allies in Parliament and in the foreign policy bureaucracy. The existence of a network of influential pro-Arab interests is well documented in a number of articles in the book. The second section in this volume focuses on the governmental stage. The roles played by Parliament, the Department of External

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Affairs, the media, and makers of foreign policy such as Lester Pearson, Joe Clark, and Brian Mulroney are described in several case studies. Anne Hillmer describes Canada's Middle East diplomacy during the period of Israel's founding. Her perspective differs from that of David Bercuson. While Bercuson concentrates on whether Canadian Zionists were able to influence the final policy outcome, Hillmer describes the struggles among senior politicians and diplomats who were divided over the proper course to follow. According to Hillmer, Pearson played a critical role both within the government and at the United Nations. He was able to put his own stamp on the policy that emerged, even though he was not comfortable with the compromises reached or the legacies that were left to both parties in the conflict. But, for Pearson, a solution that was second best was always better than no solution at all. Joe Clark and the Jerusalem embassy affair is the subject of George Takach's article. He analyses the influences that led Clark to promise that the Canadian embassy in Israel would be moved to Jerusalem and to persist in adhering to this pledge long after it had become politically damaging. Takach argues that although the Jewish community sought the change in policy on Jerusalem, members of the Conservative party and not the Jewish community were the primary catalysts in prompting Clark to make the promise. Clark's idealism, pride, and obstinacy are central elements in the drama. In the end, the weight of corporate pressure, opposition within government departments, and reactions overseas combined to overwhelm Clark. To some degree, Takach's article is a companion to Stanislawski's. Both conclude that business interests, while not always dominant, are major powers in the landscape of Middle East policy-making. This article, together with Hillmer's portrait of Pearson, provides a perspective on political leadership. Takach stresses the constraints that inhibit action and the difficulties awaiting any leader who is unfamiliar with the diplomatic terrain of the Middle East. David Dewitt and John Kirton examine the relationship between the performances of parliamentarians and media coverage during the Lebanon War of 1982. They argue that the perceptions of politicians were blurred by news coverage that was often sensationalized, politically biased, and based overwhelmingly on non-Canadian news sources. Lacking other sources of information on the crisis, parliamentarians were unduly influenced by media reporting. They assert that media images had real political force during the Lebanon War and describe how the media's portrayal of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon changed the views of a sizeable number of members of parliament, especially in the Liberal party caucus. The study provides a warning to politicians and the public that they should not allow the media to

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become their only source of information and advice. Alternate sources such as briefings by scholars or government officials or contact with interest groups should be sought so that political leaders are exposed to a more diverse set of influences. John Kirton and Peyton Lyon examine the role of the Department of External Affairs in shaping Brian Mulroney's Middle East policy. Through a survey and interviews the authors attempted to ascertain whether there is a distinct departmental perspective on the Middle East. The answer is clearly that there is. Officials are less enthusiastic about Israeli policies, more conscious of international forces, largely unsympathetic to domestic lobbies, and committed to enlarging their own sphere of influence and control. According to Kirton and Lyon, External Affairs has been quite successful in gaining the high policy ground during the Mulroney years. Its perspective seems to have become dominant as departmental officials have been slowly able to educate Mulroney and Clark about Middle East realities. Advocates of the statist school will find support for their position in this article, for the department is described as contending successfully with domestic interests, weaving a web of its own over the decision-making process. Canadian responses to the Palestinian intifada in Israel's occupied territories are analysed by David Goldberg and David Taras. The article centres on the making of government policy, particularly the different perspectives that seem to have been taken by Mulroney and Clark. The reactions of the Jewish community to Israel's handling of the uprising, to media coverage, and to Clark's speech condemning Israel's policies are described in some detail. Many questions about the making of policy during this dramatic period nonetheless remain unanswered. The book concludes with a discussion between two acknowledged authorities on Canada's Middle East diplomacy, Irving Abella and John Sigler. The discussion places the groups, institutions, and events described in the book into a broader context and suggests the degree to which continuity has triumphed over change in Canada's Middle East policy. Abella stresses the strong moral commitment that Canada has had to Israel's survival and argues that this should remain a cornerstone of Canada's approach to the region. Sigler emphasizes the disenfranchisement of the Palestinians and the responsibility that he feels Canada has to help to resolve the resulting dilemma. Both scholars agree that the conflict remains explosive and envision a constructive role for countries such as Canada in helping the peace process. In challenging some of the basic assumptions about the foreign policy process and suggesting the degree to which international issues, however distant they may seem, can penetrate and infuse Canadian politics, we hope this volume will add a new dimension to the scholarly

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literature. It will also serve a useful purpose if it awakens the reader to the high stakes that Canadians have in the Middle East conflict and to the importance of the domestic battleground in influencing the policies Canada will pursue. NOTES

1 Janice Gross Stein, "Canadian Foreign Policy in the Middle East after the October War," Social Praxis 4, no. 3-4 (1977): 272. 2 Quoted in C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, vol. 2, 1921-1948, The Mackenzie King Era (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1981), 61. 3 Werner Cohn, "English and French Canadian Public Opinion on Jews and Israel: Some Poll Data," Canadian Ethnic Studies \\, no. 2 (1979): 31-48. 4 Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: Prentice-Hall 1985) and "Analyzing the Domestic Sources of Canada Foreign Policy," International Journal 39 (winter 1983-4). See also, Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1978), and Eric Nordlinger, On The Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1981). 5 Nossal, "Analyzing the Domestic Sources," 8. 6 Krasner, Defending the National Interest, 61. Krasner also argues that the American system fuels greater interest group competition which enhances the power of the state. As societal power is diffused, the state emerges as the arbiter among contending interests. 7 Seymour Martin Lipset, "Revolution and Counterrevolution: The United States and Canada," in Thomas Ford, ed., The Revolutionary Theme in Contemporary America (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky 1965). 8 Denis Stairs, "Public Opinion and External Affairs: Reflections on the Domestication of Canadian Foreign Policy," International Journal 33 (winter 1977-8): 128-49. See also David Dewitt and John Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power (Toronto: John Wiley 1983). 9 "Preface," in Don Munton, ed., Groups and Governments in Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs 1985), viii. 10 John Kirton and Blair Dimock, "Domestic Access to Government in the Canadian Foreign Policy Process 1968-1982," International Journal 39 (winter 1983-4): 80. 11 Ibid., 91-8. 12 Nossal, "Analyzing the Domestic Sources," 16-18, and Stairs, "Public Opinion and External Affairs."

Influencing Canada's Middle East Policy 13 See Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt, eds., Church and State: The Christian Churches and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs 1983). 14 Baha Abu-Laban, An Olive Branch on the Family Tree: The Arabs in Canada (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada 1980).

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PART ONE

Domestic Actors

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DAVID J. BERCUSON

The Zionist Lobby and Canada's Palestine Policy 1941-1948

The Canadian Zionist movement traces its roots back to the late 1890s and was given formal shape in November 1899 with the formation of the Federation of Zionist Societies in Canada, forerunner of the Zionist Organization of Canada (zo c). In 1920 the federation had approached the Canadian government to intercede with Britain on behalf of the Zionist movement to ask that an area on the east bank of the Jordan River be included in what was to become the Palestine Mandate.1 The approach, like that of most Jewish attempts to influence Canadian governments on a variety of issues until late 1938, was quiet, unobtrusive, and deferential. That pattern for Jewish political activity in Canada was already well established; lobbying was to be done through friends at court, Jewish or not, and was to be undertaken in such a way that the Jewish community did not focus attention on itself and thus wear out its welcome in an overwhelmingly Christian country. The approach did not work; the efforts of Canadian Jews to use this method to persuade the Canadian government to change its approach to the Jewish refugees during the 1930s were a tragic failure.2 Zionists took note of that failure, and when confronted by Britain's 1939 white paper on Palestine limiting Jewish immigration, severely curtailing Jewish land purchases, and holding out the promise of an independent, Arab-dominated Palestine, Canadian Zionists made a dramatic change in the way they approached the Canadian government. The outbreak of World War II doomed a generation of European Jews and dramatically altered the dimensions of the Palestine question by linking the fate of the Holocaust survivors to it. Zionists around the world stepped up their drive to open the gates of Palestine to Jewish refugees even before their worst fears about the destruction of European Jewry were confirmed. In Canada the United Zionist Council, a new Zionist umbrella organization, established a public relations com-

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mittee in May 1941 under the chairmanship of Harry Batshaw only one month after its first meeting.3 Batshaw was a Montreal lawyer, educated at McGill and in France, who had been involved for at least a decade in a wide variety of Jewish and Zionist activities as well as in Liberal party politics. One of his first moves was to direct the establishment of the Pro-Palestine Committee which was originally intended to be an organization of Christians and Jews friendly to the Zionist cause who would spread the Zionist message throughout the community and take part in Zionist efforts to lobby the federal government.4 In addition to this committee, a Canadian Palestine Committee (modelled after the American Palestine Committee and the Pro-Palestine Parliamentary Committee of Great Britain) was established to "give expression to the interest, sympathy and moral support of the Canadian people for the Jewish National Home."5 It was to be entirely non-Jewish in membership. ZIONIST LOBBYING DURING THE WAR YEARS

The public relations efforts of 1941 and 1942 were feeble and intermittent - a "modest beginning," Batshaw later reported.6 But as news of the Holocaust leaked out of Europe to Palestine, and from Palestine to Zionists around the world,7 efforts to line up governments and public opinion behind the Zionist cause increased. In May 1942 delegates representing the Jewish Agency, the Yishuv, and the American Zionist Emergency Committee met at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City to reconsider Zionist aims during wartime. Zionist leaders, especially those in Palestine and the United States, concluded that nothing less than full sovereign statehood was necessary if the Jewish national home was to have a future and if it was to serve as a haven from persecution. The Biltmore conference, largely at the behest of David Ben-Gurion and with the assistance of Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, the vigorous and dynamic leader of the Zionist Organization of America, called for the Jewish Agency to have full control over immigration to Palestine and demanded that 'Talestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world."8 Henceforth statehood was the key objective towards which all others were subordinated and from which solutions to other Jewish problems, such as immigration, would flow. Nevertheless, Zionist public relations work in Canada virtually ignored the Biltmore conference declaration, and Canadian Zionists continued to concentrate on the white paper and the humanitarian issues connected to it in order to convince the Canadian government to bring pressure to bear on Britain to drop the policies it advocated. In September 1943 the national council of the United Zionist Council

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convened in special session in Toronto to form a revitalized national public relations committee, still under Batshaw's direction. The Zionist aim was to win increased support from non-Jewish Canadians, including the clergy and "various political parties," for their drive to persuade Britain, through the Canadian government, to abandon the white paper restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine.9 A campaign was initiated to enlist members for the Canadian Palestine Committee (C P C) and to establish committee branches across the country, and in December 1943, Mackenzie King, the prime minister and secretary of state for external affairs, was approached by A.J. Freiman, a prominent Ottawa Jewish leader and an acquaintance of King's, to intervene with the British government to forestall the imposition of the immigration restrictions in Palestine, now scheduled to go into effect in April 1944. Freiman claimed that the Canadian government was "not without responsibility in this matter" and could, because of its membership in the League of Nations, make "appropriate representations" to the United Kingdom government. Freiman's letter was somewhat intimate in tone and clearly intended to appeal to the prime minister's friendship as well as to his supposed sympathetic understanding of Jewish problems.10 King was determined to keep his distance from the Palestine question and sought the advice of the Department of External Affairs before replying. The job of drafting an answer was given to Elizabeth P. MacCallum, a new member of the department and its only bona fide expert on the Middle East. Born in Turkey of missionary parents, she had graduated from Queen's University and had worked towards a doctorate at Columbia University in New York before she was lured away in 1925 to work for the Foreign Policy Association under the direction of James G. McDonald (who later became the first United States ambassador to Israel). During six years of intensive work, MacCallum published a book, The Nationalist Crusade in Syria, and more than twenty papers for the association's information service concentrating on the Middle East. In 1942 she joined the European and Commonwealth Division of External Affairs and specialized in the Middle East because "none of the men were interested."11 She was shy, almost deferential, and precise, and she turned out carefully reasoned documents. At times she seems to have felt it her special duty to debate, in print and behind the closed doors of the department, the points raised by Zionists and their supporters in their briefs and memoranda to the government. Freiman's letter offered the department, and the government, the opportunity to put its views about current British policy on Palestine on the record, and those views were largely based on MacCallum's

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reasoning. She rejected all of Freiman's arguments. In a carefully worded and detailed memorandum MacCallum claimed that "wellinformed Canadian Jews, occupying positions of some responsibility," were uneasy about Zionist policy because it might detrimentally affect the interests of Jews in Palestine and elsewhere. Some of these "nonZionist Jews" considered schemes to mount a mass emigration of European Jews to Palestine "a mistake," coming at the very moment when a reaction against Hitlerism was bound to "bring about a permanent improvement in the status of Jews" in Europe. It would be wrong, she maintained, to encourage the people of eastern Europe and the Balkans to plan for a postwar society without Jews. MacCallum believed that Canadian efforts to encourage Britain to abandon the 1939 white paper would ruin the British effort to force Arabs and Jews to begin "direct consultation" on important policy questions affecting Palestine which was, in her opinion, the whole point of the white paper.12 King's reply to Freiman, based on MacCallum's draft, should have dashed any hopes the Zionists might have had about gaining the prime minister's support. He told Freiman that the white paper was directed not at limiting Jewish immigration but at "creating political conditions which would facilitate peaceful development of the Jewish National Home." Seeking the withdrawal of the white paper would be "to condemn in advance the effort to establish democratic procedures and the principle that both elements of the Palestinian population must be consulted about policies which closely affect their interest." The position of the Jews in Europe could best be secured through a victory of the allied forces over Nazi Germany while the situation of the Jews in Palestine would be best served "by agreement among those whose interests are directly concerned."13 King thus indirectly endorsed the white paper and made it clear that Canada would not, for the moment, intervene in Palestine matters. If Freiman and his followers wanted the government to change its course, they would have to use whatever political leverage was at their disposal to convince King that a significant proportion of Canadian voters were behind them. In the following months the drive for public sympathy was stepped up as the Zionists intensified their efforts to mount a major, sustained, nation-wide drive for support among Jews and non-Jews with a carefully planned, long-term, public campaign. There was little precedent for this type of action among Canadian Jews, and Harry Batshaw felt it necessary to explain the decision to the January 1944 convention of the zoc. Public relations, he told the gathering, was crucial to the attainment of Zionist aims for a "publicly secured" homeland. The Balfour Declaration had been supported by hundreds of political and church

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leaders in Britain when it had been issued, he pointed out, and this support had been carefully cultivated by Zionist leaders in Britain.14 Batshaw's work soon produced dramatic results, with new initiatives across the country to rally Christian support for the cause of the Jewish national home. The two organizations spearheading this work were the Christian Council for Palestine, directed by Henry Janes, a Toronto public relations consultant, and the CPC under Herbert Mowat, a former Anglican minister from Toronto. Janes and Mowat had been hired by the United Zionist Council - which paid their salaries and expenses - and were responsible to the council. Janes proved less than adequate in his role and his organization failed to win widespread support among Christian clergy - its designated target group. His extravagant expense claims also led to dissatisfaction among leaders of the United Zionist Council and, eventually, a parting of the ways by the summer of 1944.15 Mowat, however, was a huge success. He was a tireless worker, an effective speaker, and an enthusiastic, even passionate promoter of the Zionist cause. After a visit to Welland, Ontario, in the spring of 1945, the executive secretary of the local B'nai Brith lodge wrote of him: "Mr Mowat certainly sold the non-Jew the idea of Palestine as the rightful homeland of the Jews. I don't know of anyone who is more qualified to speak at non-Jewish audiences on the Palestine question with such sincerity as Mr Mowat."16 He and his c P c were soon carrying a large share of Zionist public relations work. In early 1944 the United Zionist Council, in conjunction with the CPC, launched a major effort to convince Mackenzie King to place the Palestine question on the agenda of the forthcoming conference of Commonwealth prime ministers and to press the British to lift the white paper restrictions on Jewish immigration. On 27 March 1944, Freiman brought Dr Nahum Goldmann to the East Block for a discussion with King. Goldmann, the Jewish Agency representative in Washington, had stopped off in Ottawa (en route from London to Washington) because he was anxious to speak to King, and Freiman made the arrangements. Goldmann spoke for less than an hour, summarizing the Zionist position on the white paper, and when the two men left, Freiman was convinced that King was "favourably impressed" and would be "kindly disposed" towards that position.17 Three days later King told the House of Commons that he would see to it that the Palestine matter was brought up at the London talks. On 31 March another Zionist delegation met King, this time at the behest of Mowat and the CPC. Mowat was accompanied by Henry Janes and nine members or supporters of the CPC including the leader of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C C F), M.J. Coldwell, a Social Credit member of parliament, J.H. Blackmore, a Liberal member

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of parliament, Arthur Roebuck, and Senator Cairene Wilson. Percy Benough, president of the Trades and Labour Congress, Aron Mosher, president of the Canadian Congress of Labour, and Robert Pennell, president of the Toronto Board of Trade were also part of the delegation. S.J. Zacks, the newly appointed co-chairman of theUZC'spublic relations committee, Batshaw, and two other representatives of the zoc also attended. After a brief introduction by Roebuck, Mowat outlined the aims and purposes of the CPC and claimed that it enjoyed wide support throughout Canada from the press and from organizations such as the National Council of Women. King claimed to be impressed by the delegation's "representative character" and succeeded in convincing them that he "would be helpful" at the forthcoming conference.18 Once King had made his commitment to bring the Palestine question up at the Commonwealth meeting, J.W. Pickersgill, head of the Prime Minister's Office, approached the Department of External Affairs for advice. MacCallum, in response, prepared a long and careful analysis of the background to the 1939 white paper, its impact on the Arabs and Jews, and the likely direction of Britain's Palestine policy after the war. It was the most thorough history and analysis of the Palestine question yet written in the department and it presented a tough-minded assessment of the difficulties Britain would face in the near future. MacCallum also pointed out that Canada, "recognized as a leader among smaller nations," would eventually be called upon to support "the efforts [of both Arabs and Jews] to achieve nationhood and political independence" and would, at the same time, be "expected to speak in defence of Jews who [would] wish to continue making their homes" in Europe and North America. It would be difficult, she believed, for Canada "to fulfill all three of these expectations," but she made no suggestions about future courses of action that Canada might adopt.19 Hume Wrong, in charge of the European and Commonwealth Division and MacCallum's immediate superior, drew the obvious conclusion: "I would myself be loath to see any strong advocacy by the Canadian Government of a particular solution to the Palestine problem. No matter what may be done about the White Paper, Palestine will remain, for a long time, a troubled area ... in which it is most unlikely that Canada will have any very direct human interest."20 Wrong, however, was needlessly worried about Mackenzie King meddling in Palestine affairs. The matter was not on the agenda for the Commonwealth meeting and the official, secret minutes of the conference fail to record any mention of Palestine by King or anyone else.21 The work of lobbying the federal government paralleled and reinforced a broader campaign to rally public opinion against the white

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paper. In the summer of 1944 Dr Carl Hermann Voss, executive director of the American Palestine Committee, spoke to a group of clergy in Montreal who then passed a resolution supporting the Balfour Declaration and demanding "maximum Jewish immigration" to Palestine. Mowat toured the Atlantic region to address service clubs, university faculty, and groups of Christian clergy. In Halifax, Saint John, and Yarmouth he spoke on Palestine and the Jewish refugees on local radio. In western Canada, Zionist representatives addressed receptive audiences in Saskatoon, Edmonton, Calgary, and Vancouver.22 On 4 August, Mowat, Roebuck, and Zacks went back to Ottawa to meet the under-secretary of state, Norman A. Robertson, and Hume Wrong. It was known in Zionist circles that the British government was examining solutions to the Palestine problem and was once again seriously considering partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. Zacks, Mowat, and Roebuck gave Wrong and Robertson a written brief opposing partition which Robertson promised to bring to Mackenzie King's attention, and they tried to find out what Mackenzie King had done at the Commonwealth meeting. Robertson claimed that King had raised the Palestine matter but he refused to disclose details of the discussions.23 After leaving Wrong and Robertson, the delegation met several members of parliament from the major parties to explain their position on partition. Later that day, the MPS - the Reverend Daniel Mclvor for the Liberals, Stanley Knowles for the CCF, and John R. MacNicol for the Conservatives - spoke in the House of Commons along with Roebuck in support of the anti-partition brief. Knowles also questioned King on his role at the Commonwealth meeting. The prime minister replied that the Palestine question had not been on the agenda, but claimed that he had placed it there, though he could not tell the house what had been discussed.24 King's lack of enthusiasm for Palestine matters did not discourage Zacks. Even though he concluded in August 1944 that Britain would not try to solve the Palestine question until the war was over, he still believed the Canadian government could be convinced to help Zionists "force a decision earlier."25 This was wishful thinking: the government was preoccupied with the thousands of tasks necessary for the daily conduct of the war and needed to maintain good relations with Britain. Nevertheless the work of the Zionist public relations machine, carried out by the United Zionist Council and the c p c, was stepped up across the country, with speeches, radio addresses, luncheons, the distribution of literature, and personal approaches to prominent Canadians beseeching them to join the CPC. Well-known political and public figures lent their support to the cause, including F.R. Scott, Chester Martin, Lady Eaton, Senator Salter Hayden, and Senator Adrian

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Hugessen. In Quebec, Aime Geoffrion, a well-known lawyer with important Liberal connections, Emile Vaillancourt, and Jean-Louis Gagnon joined the committee.26 Until late 1944 Zionist public relations work had largely bypassed Quebec, on the assumption that French-Canadian views on Palestine would be biased by deeply rooted anti-Semitic feelings. Batshaw set out to remedy this with the help of David Rome of the Canadian Jewish Congress. They approached Paul Guerin, a journalist with La Presse who also ran a small clipping and public relations bureau, to seek his views on the best way to spread the Zionist message in Quebec. After a number of meetings the three decided to concentrate on a low-key campaign that would include the distribution of press releases to French newspapers and to a select list of Quebecers. At the same time approaches would be made to "leading French Canadian Liberals" to enlist them for membership in the CPC. Batshaw worried about the danger that anti-Semites in Quebec might support Zionist objectives on the basis "that they would like to see even Canadian Jews go to Palestine," and he had little doubt that Zionist public relations work would "meet with greater resistance" in Quebec than Ontario.27 For most of the war Zionist public relations work in Canada concentrated on rallying public opposition to the white paper and attempting to enlist the Canadian government as an ally in that cause. Almost no effort at all was spent countering anti-Zionist propaganda since there was so little. As long as the truce between the British and the Yishuv remained in effect in Palestine, Zionists could emphasize the tremendous efforts made by the Yishuv on behalf of the allied war effort. But when that truce began to break down and attacks on the British started to mount, the United Zionist Council and the CPC faced a difficult problem. Most Canadians were ignorant about, and apathetic towards, the Palestine question, but they were not ignorant or apathetic about Britain, a close ally, ancestral home of many Canadians, and Canada's legal, constitutional, and political "mother" country. The problem first cropped up in the fall of 1944, when two members of the Stern Gang assassinated Lord Moyne, the British minister resident in Cairo. The murderers were captured, tried, and executed. The assassination brought immediate and unfavourable press reaction in a number of Canadian cities and prompted soul searching by some Canadian Zionists. When news of the killing broke, Mowat was about to leave for a speaking tour of western Canada but was urged to remain home by a representative of the Edmonton Zionist Council who told Rabbi Jesse Schwartz, secretary of the zoc, that if he were a Christian he would tell Mowat and the Zionists: "until you set your house in order and root out this gang even if it involves sacrifices of blood, lay off for a

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little while begging for sympathy."28 But even before this message was received, Mowat moved quickly to cover his flank with a press release that denounced the "Sternist terrorist organization" and claimed they could not be a greater barrier to Zionist aims if they "were in the pay of the bitterest enemies of the Jewish National Home."29 Mowat's tour went ahead and, as usual, produced positive results, particularly in Winnipeg where a speech to the local press club brought an immediate improvement in press coverage of Jewish and Zionist news.30 The adverse press reaction to the Moyne killing was thus but a temporary setback. In January and February 1945, many new members were added to the CPC and Sir Ellsworth Flavelle accepted Mowat's invitation to become national chairman, lending a prestigious and wellknown name to the organization.31 Another meeting was arranged between Robertson and Wrong of the Department of External Affairs and a joint C P C - Z O C delegation.32 Meetings between Zionist leaders and government officials usually produced little more than promises that the Canadian government would forward their petitions and position papers to London. The meeting of 24 January 1945 was no exception. But this time Zionist pleas for Canadian representations over Britain's enforcement of the white paper came against the unfolding backdrop of the Jewish catastrophe in Europe. Robertson, the ultimate example of bureaucratic coolness, took an uncharacteristically sympathetic view of the Zionist position. He had little experience with the Palestine question and had considered MacCallum's 1943 views on the white paper "objective and realistic," but after the January 1945 meeting he told King that "the position of the surviving European Jews will be very difficult." Their property had been seized and their livelihoods destroyed, Robertson noted, and if European governments tried to restore Jewish property, taking it away from those who had held it during the war, there might be a recurrence of anti-Semitism. In his view, therefore, "the cause for permitting the largest possible movement of Jewish refugees into Palestine [was] on compassionate grounds alone a very strong one." Despite these apparent personal sympathies, however, he knew just how complicated the Palestine question was, and he "did not think that the Canadian Government would wish to press a particular policy for meeting one specific problem upon the United Kingdom Government."33 His budding sympathy was tempered considerably by his desire not to complicate Anglo-Canadian relations by urging a reluctant Britain to adopt a pro-Zionist position. In the spring of 1945, as Hitler's armies crumbled in Europe and the victorious allies prepared to meet in San Francisco to draw up the United Nations Charter, the United Zionist Council intensified its

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public relations and lobby efforts with a three-pronged campaign aimed at increasing the membership of the CPC, placing the Zionist program before as many members of parliament as possible, and pressing the government to adopt a pro-Zionist stance at San Francisco and at the meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers scheduled to precede it. In the month of April alone, seventy-six legislators from all parties and provinces joined the CPC. New members included Ian Mackenzie, the minister of veterans affairs, and J.G. Gardiner, the minister of agriculture.34 A delegation headed by Sir Ellsworth Flavelle met with Robertson and presented a brief which claimed that Canadian governments had been sympathetic to Zionist aims since 1912 and were bound to support the Balfour Declaration because of Canada's membership in the League of Nations at the time the Palestine Mandate was awarded.35 On 25 April the United Nations Conference opened in San Francisco and Mackenzie King headed the Canadian delegation which also included Gordon Graydon, the Conservative party's house leader (because the party leader, John Bracken, did not yet hold a seat in the house), and M.J. Coldwell, as well as seven alternate delegates, most of whom were members of the Department of External Affairs. Saul Hayes and Sam Bronfman of the Canadian Jewish Congress and Sam Zacks also attended as part of a large gathering of non-governmental delegates representing Jewish organizations from around the world which made up one of the largest groups at the meeting. The Zionists among them were particularly concerned with the question of how the United Nations, as successor to the League of Nations, would dispose of former League mandates and particularly the Palestine Mandate. The deliberations at San Francisco focused on proposals for a United Nations organization that had been drawn up by the great powers at the Dumbarton Oaks conference in October 1944. Those proposals dealt, among many other matters, with trusteeship territories to be administered by the United Nations or assigned to United Nations member countries for administration. If Palestine should come under the administration of the United Nations Trusteeship Council, the policies of that council would obviously be applied to it. The Zionists and Arabs knew this and set out to influence the principles which would guide policy-making in the Trusteeship Council. The Arab delegations did not focus specifically on Palestine but concentrated instead on an effort to force the Trusteeship Council to recognize only the rights of the largest single group in each trusteeship territory. Success would have dealt a serious blow to the legality of the Zionist position in Palestine because the Jews were in a minority there. The Zionists countered with a campaign to have the specific rights of the Jewish

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people in Palestine, as defined by the Balfour Declaration, built in to any future trusteeship decisions on Palestine. In fact, however, they need not have worried about the Arab proposals because Britain, France, and the United States strongly opposed them. The Arabs had no chance of success against these colonial powers which were jealously protecting their own interests and possessions around the globe.36 The Zionist lobby at San Francisco spent considerable time and effort on gaining the support of the Commonwealth countries, Canada among them. Canada was active in several important areas at the San Francisco meeting (the Canadian role has been covered in detail elsewhere),37 but on trusteeship matters Canada, in contrast to New Zealand and South Africa,38 remained in the background and "took no active part in the discussions"39 despite the public relations work of the Zionists over the previous three years. Canada had no colonial dependencies and stood smugly aloof. Once again, the efforts of the Zionists to convince the Canadian government to involve itself in the Palestine question, however obliquely, had failed. CANADIAN ZIONISTS AND THE STRUGGLE OVER PALESTINE

By late 1945 Britain and the United States had begun to search for a political solution to the Palestine question. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and the Morrison-Grady Commission were formed to investigate on, and recommend solutions to, this increasingly complex problem against a backdrop of the attacks by Irgun and the Stern Gang in Palestine and the Haganah's efforts to bring Jewish displaced persons to Palestine in defiance of the white paper. In Canada the United Zionist Council and the CPC re-doubled their efforts to expand the latter's membership, to line up prominent Canadians behind their efforts, and to influence government policy. The job was made more difficult by the open war that raged in Palestine between the British and the underground fighting organizations. Canada had just fought a major war as a staunch ally of Britain and anglophilic feeling ran deep in the country. The press in Canada generally reacted with considerable editorial fury to every new attack on the British in Palestine. Zionists and Jews were castigated by some newspaper editorial writers for their lack of gratitude towards Britain for saving European Jewry from Hitler's gas chambers.40 Zionist leaders perceived a definite rise in public anti-Semitism41 and feared this would adversely affect their efforts to convince Ottawa to be more friendly to the Zionist cause and to put pressure on Britain to allow the displaced persons to enter Palestine legally.

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Those efforts were a total failure. Despite petitions, letters, newspaper advertisements, private meetings, and radio broadcasts from Jews and non-Jews alike, the Canadian government, for the most part, stayed clear of the Palestine question. And when it did get involved, it was for the purpose of helping Britain stem the flow of illegal immigrants to Palestine by trying to block the sale of war surplus Canadian ships to individuals or organizations that were likely to transfer those ships to the Jewish Agency. The Department of External Affairs was highly embarrassed when it learned that ex-Royal Canadian Navy ships were plying the Mediterranean waters under the Panamanian flag, bringing illegal immigrants to Palestine.42 External Affairs and Canada's political leadership had no intention of muddying the waters of Canadian-British relations over Palestine. In the spring of 1947, however, Canada did become directly involved in the Palestine question when it was named a member of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which was charged with investigating the Palestine problem and making recommendations to the General Assembly by the end of August. But that had nothing whatever to do with Zionist lobbying efforts in Canada; rather it was due to the determination of the United States to draft Canada for this special and somewhat hazardous duty. The United States wanted a committee composed of small countries which had relatively weak Jewish communities and which had had nothing to do with Palestine.43 Canada qualified on each score. The irony is that the very neutrality on Palestine which Canada had so scrupulously observed in the past was the major qualification for its sudden plunge into Palestine affairs. Canada's secretary of state for external affairs, Louis St Laurent, had not wanted to get involved in U N S C O P but he, and the Canadian delegation to the United Nations Special General Assembly in New York, were outmanoeuvred by the Americans. Nevertheless, since St Laurent failed to avoid involvement, he and King chose the next best course and named a Supreme Court justice, Ivan C. Rand, to serve on UNSCOP as an independent observer who was not bound by, and who would not bind, the Canadian government.44 On 31 August 1947, UNSCOP issued its report; seven out of eleven members (including Rand) recommended that Palestine be given its independence as quickly as possible and that it be partitioned into a Jewish state and an Arab state tied together by an economic and monetary union to last no less than ten years. Jerusalem and its environs were to become a separate area administered as a United Nations trust territory under a governor appointed by the Trusteeship Council. The recommendation was clear, if somewhat idealistic. Canada, as a member country of the United Nations and one with considerable

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influence in the postwar world, would now finally have to get off the fence and set out a policy on Palestine. This was the signal for an intensification of Zionist lobbying in Canada. The United Zionist Council and the CPC, this time joined by the Canadian Jewish Congress, were quick off the mark and issued public statements congratulating Rand on his contributions to U N S C O P and urging the Canadian government to follow his and UNSCOP'S recommendations.45 These public declarations were buttressed by private meetings with a number of Liberal MPS in which Jewish constituents urged the government to support partition. Rand's role was generally played up, as if to remind Ottawa that it could not ignore the opinions of this respected jurist. Moshe Shertok, the unofficial foreign minister for the Jewish Agency's executive noted, at one point: "This is most satisfactory! We should by all means play up Rand with the Canadians, so as to strengthen their noblesse oblige complex."46 Using this, and other arguments, the Zionist lobby directed what George Ignatieff later remembered as "very strong ... pressure" on the government and particularly on the under-secretary of state, Lester B. Pearson. At one point the defence minister, Brooke Claxton, told Ignatieff, who was a member of the Canadian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in the fall of 1947: "Don't forget George, I don't mind how you vote but... don't forget that I have no Arabs in my constituency and I have I've forgotten how many hundred Jews."47 Strong pressure there undoubtedly was, and the strength of the Jewish vote in a handful of constituencies (two or three in Montreal, two or three in Toronto, one or two in Winnipeg) may have been given some consideration in the government, but Canada did not support partition to curry favour with Jewish voters as a result of Zionist lobbying. Jewish influence in the Liberal party and in the government was strictly limited, as the failure of the campaign to convince the government to allow Jewish refugees into Canada clearly shows; in the fall of 1947 the government had still not completely lowered the barriers.48 Jewish votes, Pickersgill later recalled, could often be taken for granted because the Liberals knew that Jews would not vote for the Conservatives and, although the CCF may have been an alternative for some, the leadership of the Jewish community was integrally tied to Liberal politics.49 It was simply not in the nature of the Canadian political game that David Croll or Sam Bronfman or Lazarus Phillips or Harry Batshaw would abandon the one political organization that gave them an entree, however limited, to government and which obligingly provided a token handful of safe Jewish seats so that Jewish M PS could sit in the House of Commons. The government's decision to support partition was based on "practical and realistic considerations."50

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When the Canadian delegation to the General Assembly departed for New York in mid-September it was given no specific instructions as to what position to take on theUNSCOPrecommendations but was told, instead, to support "any proposals which appear ... likely to bring about a solution to the Palestine problem provided that there [was] reasonable evidence that they can be put into effect." The delegation was reminded that Canada was not bound by Rand's views although it ought to bear in mind that "a distinguished member of the Supreme Court of Canada had arrived at certain conclusions after careful consideration of the issues involved."51 After several weeks of listening to discussion on the matter and sounding out the views of various delegations, particularly those of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, the delegation (with the exception of Elizabeth MacCallum) prepared a draft statement under the leadership of R.G. Riddell. It cautiously supported partition as "the only solution practicable at the moment" and as a basis for further discussion at the United Nations.52 St Laurent, who unlike Claxton had almost no Jewish voters in his constituency, brought the draft to the cabinet which approved it on 14 October and a slightly revised statement was made later that same day.53 The final version, read by J.L. Ilsley, Canada's minister of justice and head of the delegation, in the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, was, if anything, even more hesitant in its support of partition than the Riddell draft.54 Over the next few weeks the Canadian delegation, guided by Lester Pearson, worked hard to find a formula which would reconcile basic differences between the United States and the Soviet Union on plans to implement partition; Pearson contributed significantly to the final draft of the partition plan put before the General Assembly. When the final vote was taken on 29 November, Canada supported partition as "the best of four unattractive and difficult alternatives."55 In a secret report circulated within the Department of External Affairs some weeks later, the reasons behind Canada's actions were clearly outlined. First, there was no "practicable alternative" because the alternative Arab plan of a unitary Arab-controlled state was totally unacceptable to the Jews and the Arab states "at no time indicated" that they would consider any other plan which "offered control of immigration and land regulations to the Jews within a Jewish area." Second, partition was supported by the Soviet Union and thus offered the only possibility of a solution to the Palestine problem which might prevent Soviet intervention in the area. Third, failure to adopt partition might discredit the Jewish Agency and thrust Jewish extremists" into the leadership of the Jewish community in Palestine. This might precipitate civil strife among the Jews that would "place an even more severe

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strain on United Nations-United Kingdom relations." Finally, partition "gave to the Western powers the opportunity to establish an independent, progressive Jewish state ... with close economic and cultural ties with the West generally and in particular with the United States." The Canadian delegation had believed that if the United Nations failed to do anything, it would be thoroughly discredited and that partition was the only plan which was likely to receive the two-thirds support necessary for adoption.56 Because the delegation basically recommended policy to St Laurent, whose views were not challenged in the cabinet, it is clear that considerations far more important and central to Canadian interests than those of the Zionist lobby formed the foundation of Canadian policy in this important decision. Canada did not support partition because of Zionist lobbying or because of the Jewish Agency's condescending use of Ivan Rand's name; it backed partition for reasons of high policy. In this instance official Canadian views and the aspirations of Canadian Zionists were parallel but unconnected. That was not true of many other key decisions made by the Canadian government on Palestine in the months that followed. In March 1948, Senator Warren Austin, the American ambassador to the United Nations, announced that in the face of the violence in Palestine, the United States was temporarily retreating from its support of partition and desired a special session of the United Nations General Assembly to consider placing Palestine under a trusteeship and to impose a ceasefire between Jews and Arabs. The Zionist movement in Canada and elsewhere naturally opposed the suggestion, but Canada supported the calling of a special session in order to see if any alternative to partition existed which could produce a "constructive result," in St Laurent's words.57 Nothing came of this session, but Canada's willingness to consider the abandonment of partition in the event that American-British co-operation on some other plan might be achieved is a clear indication of how little influence Zionist lobbying, or Jewish votes, had on Canadian policy. A similar case arose following the declaration of an independent state of Israel on 15 May 1948. In the months following, Zionist lobbying, through the United Zionist Council and the CPC, concentrated on persuading Ottawa to recognize the new Jewish state and support its admission to the United Nations. All the stops were pulled out in an intense campaign, but no results were obtained for over seven months.58 The Canadian government was unwilling to get too far out of step with the United Kingdom, which refused to recognize Israel,59 for fear that Canada would thereby undermine its potential role of trying to build bridges between the United States and the United Kingdom on

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the Palestine issue.60 By this time Canadian foreign policy had become very much tied up with the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Canadian policy-makers feared that NATO was being endangered by the wide policy divisions which separated Britain and the United States over Palestine. Thus the reconciliation of those two pillars of the Western alliance, always the major cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy, played the dominant role in shaping Canada's Palestine policy in the summer and fall of 1948.61 If Zionist lobbying can be said to have had any effect at all, it was on Canada's extension of de facto recognition of Israel on 24 December 1948. The first public sign that this was in the air came on 22 November when Pearson, in a speech to the First Committee on the United Nations General Assembly, listed "certain facts which must be accepted" if peace was to be restored. The first of these was "the emergence of an independent Jewish state in Palestine."62 This statement led Shertok, now Israel's foreign minister, to believe Canada would support his country's admission to the United Nations as part of the extension of de facto recognition when the matter came before the Security Council in December.63 When the issue came to a vote on 17 December, however, Canada abstained and that action helped defeat the resolution.64 Canada's abstention on the Security Council vote was not a reversal of Canadian policy. It arose because of the particular wording of the admission resolution which appeared to call on the Security Council to enforce the boundaries laid out in the 29 November 1947 partition resolution of the General Assembly. The Canadian government did not accept this interpretation, viewing the 29 November resolution as a recommendation only. Canada wanted to leave the boundary open because it was clear that as far as the Arabs and the Israelis were concerned the November 1947 boundaries were not acceptable. Better then, it was reasoned, to leave the matter for the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission.65 Shertok and other members of the Israeli delegation were surprised and disappointed at Canada's action and urged Canada to offset the impact of the Security Council vote by extending recognition to Israel.66 On 21 December Pearson recommended to cabinet that de facto recognition be granted and cabinet approved; Shertok was informed on 24 December.67 This may have been the one time that the Canadian government acted out of concern for Jewish votes and under the influence of the Zionist lobby because the Jewish community in Canada was certain to be highly vocal in its displeasure that Israel had been barred from United Nations membership partly because of a Canadian abstention.68 The short time between the abstention and the cabinet decision four days - did not allow a full public relations effort to be mobilized,

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however, and if this was a consideration in the minds of cabinet ministers, it was a matter of potential, not actual, pressure. From the beginnings of the campaign by Canadian Zionists to mobilize a broad range of public opinion and to focus the concerns of Canadian Jews on the Palestine question until Canada's de facto recognition of Israel, the Zionists and their allies lobbied the government to take a pro-Zionist course. The presence of that lobby is undeniable, but it is not a priori proof of its effectiveness. In fact, the Zionist lobby had little or no impact whatever on Canada's Palestine and Middle East policy during this period. The Canadian public, for the most part, remained basically apathetic about Palestine to the very end,69 and Canadian public opinion was heavily behind Britain even though Canadians, no less than the British themselves, were often not sure where Britain stood. This public attitude gave the government all the freedom it needed to make its decisions on the basis of how it viewed the conflict in Palestine within the larger context of great power relations and Canadian national interests. Jewish votes and Zionist lobbying had made no difference to Canadian policy. NOTES

This article was first presented as a paper to the Jewish History Conference sponsored by the Ontario Multicultural History Society in 1982. 1 Zachariah Kay, Canada and Palestine: The Politics of Non-Commitment (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press 1978), 56-7. 2 Irving Abella and Harold Troper, None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948 (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys 1982). 3 Israel, Central Zionist Archives (c z A), Zionist Organization of Canada (zoc), minutes and correspondence, file 55-786, minutes of United Zionist Council meeting, 8 April 1941. 4 Ibid., National Council Minutes, 26 May 1941. 5 Canadian Jewish Congress Archives (c j c A), Palestine Collection, "A Proposal for a Canadian Palestine Committee." 6 CZA, Files of the Political Department, file 525-1998, "Summary of Report Delivered by Harry Batshaw K.C.... at the 27th Convention of the Zionist Organization of Canada," January 1944. Hereafter Batshaw report. 7 Zoc minutes and correspondence, file 55-786, Lauterback to Schwartz, 9 December 1942 and 2 February 1943. 8 Zvi Ganin, Truman, American Jewry, and Israel, 1945-1948 (New York: Holmes and Meier 1979), 8. 9 Batshaw report.

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10 National Archives of Canada ( N AC), Department of External Affairs Records (DBA), RG 25, G-I, vol. 1839, file583/2, Freiman to King, 3 December 1943. 11 Interview with Elizabeth P. MacCallum, July 1980. 12 DE A, RG 25, G-I, vol. 1839, file 583/2, "Memorandum for Mr Glazebrook," 17 December 1943. 13 Ibid., King to Freiman, 24 December 1943. 14 Batshaw report. 15 NAC, Zacks Papers, MG 30 0144, vol. i, Zacks to Schwartz, 14 April 1944. 16 Ibid., vol. 3, Carrel to Z^ s, 24 April 1945. 17 CZA, Central Office London Files, file 24-14731, Freiman to Weizmann, 31 March 1944. 18 CZA, Files of the Political Department, file 525-7496, "Report to Members of Public Relations Committee," n.d.; NAC, King Papers, MG 26, 14, vol. 381, file 3971, "Memorandum re Meeting of the Prime Minister with a Delegation of the Canadian Palestine Committee," 7 April 1944. All citations from the King Papers in this article are from series 14. 19 King Papers, vol. 310, file 3308, "Postwar Policy and the 1939 White Paper," n.d. 20 Ibid., "Memorandum for Dr Gibson," 8 May 1944. 21 These minutes are found in King Papers, vol. 322, file 3407. 22 Palestine Collection, Batshaw to "Fellow Zionists," 24 July 1944. 23 CZA, Files of the American Section, New York, file Z5-H23, Batshaw to Goldmann, 7 August 1944. 24 Ibid., confidential memo re "Interview with the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs ... August 4,1944." 25 Zacks Papers, vol. 3, Zacks to ?, 21 August 1944. 26 Palestine Collection, minutes of the United Zionist Council, 12 October 1944. 27 Zacks Papers, vol. i, "Memorandum re Eastern Division's Public Relations," 8 December 1944. 28 Ibid., Wershof to Schwartz, 10 November 1944. 29 Palestine Collection, c P c press release, 11 November 1944. 30 Zacks Papers, vol. 3, Dorfman to Zacks, 22 December 1944. 31 CZA, Files of the American Section, New York, file 75-1123, "Report of Herbert A. Mowat for January and February 1945." 32 Ibid. 33 King Papers, vol. 310, file 3308, Robertson to King, i February 1945. 34 Ibid., "Additions to Canadian Palestine Committee since April i [1945]." 35 Kay, Canada and Palestine, 116-17. 36 Eliahu Elath, Zionism at the UN: A Diary of the First Days (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America 1976), 5-10,14-15.

The Zionist Lobby and Canada's Palestine Policy 1941-8

35

37 John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1945-1957, vol. i (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1979), 245ff.

38 39 40 41 42

Elath, Zionism at the UN, 38-9 and other diary entries. Holmes, Shaping of Peace, 1:254. See, for example, Calgary Herald, 22 July 1946. Zacks Papers, vol. 2, Schwartz to Zacks, 7 April 1947. David J. Bercuson, " 'Illegal' Corvettes: Canadian Blockade Runners to Palestine, 1946-1949," Canadian Jewish Historical Society Journal (fall 1982). 43 DE A, RG 25, 8-3, vol. 2152, "Palestine and the Special Assembly of the United Nations," 22 April 1947. 44 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 2 June 1947. 45 C z A, Files of the American Section, file 75-4871, "Statement Issued by United Zionist Council," 5 September 1947; c j c A, Congress Bulletin (September 1947), 19. 46 C z A, Files of the American Section, New York, file 75-485 11, Gelber to members of the Jewish Agency Executive, 17 September 1947. The quote is from a note pencilled by Shertok on the document. 47 Peter Stursberg, Lester Pearson and the American Dilemma (Toronto: Doubleday 1980), 72. 48 Abella and Troper, None is Too Many, 238-79. 49 Interview with J.W. Pickersgill, July 1980. 50 DE A, RG 25, file A R 35/1, vol. 3, Pearson to Robertson, 30 December 194751 King Papers, vol. 429, file: "1947, Saber to Scythes," draft letter from the prime minister to the secretary of state for external affairs, 10 September 1947; NAC, Privy Council Office Records, RG 2/16, vol. 10, Conclusions of Cabinet Meeting of 11 September 1947. Hereafter Cabinet Conclusions. 52 DEA, Historical Section Files, file 5475-c 0-400, Canadian consulate general, New York, to secretary of state for external affairs, 14 October 194753 Cabinet Conclusions, 14 October 1947. 54 DEA,file5475-0 0-40 c, "Text of a Statement Made on October 14, 1947 in the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine." 55 CJCA, "Statement on Palestine: Rt. Hon. J.L. Ilsley, Canada," 26 November 1947. 56 DEA, RG 25, file A R 35/1, vol. 6, "The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly," 27 December 1947. 57 House of Commons, Debates, 29 April 1948. 58 Zacks Papers, vol. 2, appeal to "Key Members of National Public Relations Committee," 2 June 1948; Globe and Mail, 17 May 1948, 5; Israel

36

59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

David J. Bercuson State Archives (ISA), RG 93.03, file 16, box 69, Comay to Israeli delegation at United Nations, 13 July 1948; DEA, file 5475-c 0-5-40, "Memorandum for the Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs," 2 December 1948. DEA,file47B(S), secretary of state for external affairs to high commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom, 18 May 1948; Cabinet Conclusions, 26 May 1948. Ibid., file 470(5), "Palestine: Recognition of Jewish State: Policy of Commonwealth Governments," 9 September 1948. Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1977), 5*-3R.A. MacKay, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1970), 144. DEA, file 5475-c 11-2-40, Canadian delegation, United Nations, Paris to secretary of state for external affairs, 26 November 1948. ISA, RG 93.03, file 19, box 2414, Comay to Pearson, 18 December 1948. DEA, Statements and Speeches 48/65, "Application of Israel for Membership in the United Nations," text of Riddell speech, 17 December 1948. ISA, RG 93.03, file 19, box 2414, Comay to Pearson, 18 December 1948. Cabinet Conclusions, 21 December 1948. Interview with MacCallum, July 1980. According to one informed observer this was true as late as December 1948. National Archives (Washington), RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 8671^.01/12-3048, Steinhardt to secretary of state, 30 December 1948.

DAVID TARAS

From Passivity to Politics: Canada's Jewish Community and Political Support for Israel

The Jewish community has been the most fully mobilized of any of the domestic groups in Canada concerned with events in the Middle East.1 Canada's Jews, which number approximately 308,000, have a legacy of a deep attachment to Zionism and a highly organized community structure. In launching its impressive campaigns on behalf of Israel, the Jewish community has had to face inner challenges as well as powerful external forces. This article will argue that because of a tradition of political passivity resting mainly on deep fears of anti-Semitism, political involvement has been difficult for Jews. Nonetheless as Canada's Jews responded to historic events, passivity gave way to action. The first sections briefly describe the history of the Jewish community in Canada and the implanting of the Zionist ideal. A central theme is that the community lacked the self-assurance to lobby effectively on political issues. Later sections emphasize that a series of historic shocks - the Holocaust, the emergence of Israel, the Six-Day War of 1967, and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 - brought a deepening of political consciousness and provided an impetus for lobbying activity. Against this background, a political and philanthropic structure took shape. Finally, the emergence and workings of the pro-Israel lobby from the Six-Day War through to the Lebanon War of 1982 will be discussed. The lobby's evolution in terms of organization, tactics, and goals will be the main theme. THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE B E G I N N I N G S OF ZIONISM IN CANADA

Jewish life in Canada began in the earliest years of the French regime. A Jewish presence can be traced in every region of the country and through all the various eras of national development. Canadian Jewry's

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founding can be attributed to Aaron Hart, who rode into Montreal with General Amherst's forces in 1760. Hart was soon followed by others, mostly traders and adventurers attached to the British army or attracted by the beckoning fur trade. By 1768, the first synagogue, the Spanish and Portuguese Congregation, had been established in Montreal. The name given to this congregation reflected the Sephardic origin and tradition of most of the early Jews. In taking their first steps into the mainstream of Canadian life, this small band of Jews encountered considerable suspicion and discrimination. For example, Jews arriving in Canada were often refused entry and occasionally they met with interference in their religious observances.2 Jews were also denied certain positions in society: the most celebrated case involved Ezekiel Hart who was elected to the Legislative Assembly of Lower Canada in 1807 and again in 1808 but was not allowed to take his seat.3 Despite these difficulties, Jews were to participate in many aspects of Canadian life, build their religious congregations, and increase their numbers from less than twenty families in 1825 to almost 200 people by i845.4 The period from 1850 to 1880 was one of steady development and continued immigration, particularly from central Europe. By 1881 the Jewish community in Canada had grown to almost 25OO.5 Although still coming together in terms of structure and organizational life, it was what Joseph Kage has described as "an active, growing body, but as yet not an integrated organism."6 This period of measured development came to an end in 1881, when events in Russia and Eastern Europe altered fundamentally the circumstances of Jewish life throughout the world. The instrument of this change was the "provisional laws" of Czar Alexander HI. These ordinances caused Jews to be systematically evicted from their homes and made them victims of government-inspired pogroms. These conditions, accompanied as they were by the breakdown of societal order, precipitated a mass exodus. According to one reliable estimate, some two and a half million Jews left Eastern Europe between 1882 and iQH-7 Many found their way to Canada, and by 1920, the Canadian Jewish community had grown to almost 125,000 and had been transformed dramatically. Canadian Jewry was now composed predominantly of new immigrants whose characters were formed by the traditional values of the shtetl and Yiddish culture. These new arrivals were for the most part Orthodox in religious outlook and greatly affected by memories of persecution, and while differences existed among Jews from different countries, a strong collective identity was manifest. The products of centuries of rabbinic rule, they brought with them a deeply embedded

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system of values. Education was highly prized, charity was sustained by a network of social institutions, and there was a strong sense of fraternity and mutual obligation. The ideal of menshlichkeit, a code of behaviour based on high-minded conduct and the conviction that one is finally accountable for one's actions, was widely endorsed if not always lived up to. In the Jewish tradition, political activism in the world outside the community was discouraged because of fears of stirring an anti-Semitic backlash. For centuries in Europe, Jewish societies lived on the edge of a precipice, their existence always threatened by hatred and intolerance. Behaviour was conditioned by the belief that "any involvement with the affairs of the gentiles would probably be dangerous."8 Often special intermediaries, frequently non-Jews, were sent to represent Jewish interests before monarchs or with local authorities. In addition, there were some Jews who accepted the conditions under which they lived as divinely ordained. They waited to be "delivered by God" and believed that any initiatives would interfere with the fulfilment of the messianic plan. Although the tradition of passivity was deeply implanted, the advance of secularism, the inroads made by socialist and radical thought, and the Zionist revolution itself did much to break the pattern of the past. As Jews became integrated into Canadian life, there gradually emerged a unique Canadian Jewish identity that was an accommodation between old traditions and new circumstances. A distinct politics, a distinct brand of Zionism, a character and a quality of life different from that in other Jewish communities was soon to blossom. As Saul Hayes once observed, it would be "a mistake of the greatest consequence... to believe that Canadian Jews are merely American Jews with quieter temperaments."9 Indeed, according to Seymour Lipset, important structural differences emerged between the two North American Jewish communities. In the Canadian mosaic there was to be less assimilation and a greater sense of solidarity.10 Zionism, a term coined by Nathan Birenbaum in 1892, is the desire among Jews for national expression, an end to exile, and a renewal of their ancient political sovereignty in Palestine. Its origins can be found in Jewish religious thought, but the emergence of modern European nationalism and the response of the Jewish masses to the various antiSemitic shocks of the nineteenth century were a more immediate catalyst. From the beginning, Zionism was able to capture the imagination and allegiance of significant numbers of Canadian Jews. After the formal inauguration of the Zionist movement in Basle, Switzerland, by Theodore Herzl in 1898, a mass rally was held in Montreal and Zionist

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committees were formed in every Montreal synagogue (except the Reform Temple) and in many congregations across Canada. The Federation of Zionist Societies in Canada, founded in 1899 to unite all Zionist groups under a single banner, showed impressive growth with its membership doubling from 500 in 1899 to 1034 by igoi.11 By 1910 the federation had unveiled a scheme to purchase several thousand dunums of land in the Galilee and was committing considerable resources to aiding Zionist colonization efforts.12 According to Stuart Rosenberg: "In Canada, the Zionist movement was never seriously challenged, either by socialist secularism, or by assimilation-minded religious reform. The largest number of Canadian Jews were ... emphatically Zionist in their folk aspirations."13 One indication of the validity of Rosenberg's observation is that in 1912 Canadian Jewry registered the highest per-capita Zionist contributions in the world.14 The movement received strong support from the Jewish press in Canada which highlighted Zionist activities and dramatized its achievements and challenges. Another crucial factor in the strength of Zionism amongst Canadian Jews was the orientation of the Canadian Jewish Congress (cjc). Founded in 1919, the cjc was to be "the Parliament of Canada's Jews" and the community's principal spokesman on political and external matters. Unlike its American counterpart, Canadian Jewry was integrated into an overall political system with a single organization representing the entire community. From the beginning Zionists were prominent on the cjc executive and the national body reflected Zionist aspirations and imperatives. Canadian Zionism was not, however, a political monolith. Under its canopy, parties of the right, left, and centre charted diverse political courses and adhered to different visions. The Zionist federation, which was renamed the Zionist Organization of Canada (zo c) in 1920, occupied the political centre. As a "general" Zionist organization it was able to attract the largest following, raise the most money, and wield the greatest influence. In 1905, a labour Zionist group, a branch of Poale Zion (Workers of Zion), advocating an egalitarian society and a Jewish workers' state, was founded in Montreal. The Mizrachi, a party which believed that Zionism would lead to religious redemption and the fulfilment of messianic hopes, had its Canadian beginnings in 1911. In later years, the followers of Vladimir Zev Jabotinsky, the charismatic leader of a militant and right-wing brand of Zionism, established their own organization. But while sharp divisions emerged, the avoidance of open conflict has been an enduring characteristic of Canadian Zionism. With many obstacles before them, Zionists realized that disputes had to be kept within the family. The outbreak of the First World War brought virtually all Zionist

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activity in Canada to a halt. Preoccupied by their commitment to the Canadian war effort and cut off from Palestine which was under Turkish control, and from fellow Zionists in Germany and Austria-Hungary, Canadian Zionists ceased activities for the duration of the war. However, in November 1917, when the Balfour Declaration proclaimed that "His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people," Canada's Jews were stirred to a high pitch of excitement and expectation. Rallies were held to celebrate this momentous event in Jewish history. In the atmosphere that prevailed, adherence to Zionism and allegiance to the British empire were seen to be complementary. The popular sentiment was perhaps best expressed by a prominent Montreal rabbi, Mendele de Sola, who had stated some years before that "Palestine is my fatherland, England my motherland."15 The prospects for Zionism changed dramatically for the worse in the years following the First World War. The exhilaration which had swept the Jewish world at the time of the Balfour Declaration turned to disappointment as British policy towards Palestine changed. Although large numbers retained confidence in Britain's ultimate good faith, there was an element of bitterness towards Britain in the attitude of some. Canada's Zionists did, however, make progress on the creation of a greater Jewish presence in Palestine. In 1927 the zoc embarked on what was to be its most ambitious project of the period, the purchase of the Plain of Sharon at a cost of one million dollars. It was also at this time that Zionists were able to co-ordinate their fund-raising activities by merging several different appeals. It may be significant that the outbreaks of violence in Palestine in the 19205 and 19305 came as a surprise to many Zionists. They had not realized the determination and ferocity of Arab opposition. More ominous was the rise to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany. The Nazis' institution of virulent anti-Semitism in Germany and the threat that Hitler posed to the maintenance of the political order throughout Europe came to preoccupy Jews worldwide. Optimism was replaced by alarm and despair. In consequence, as Bernard Figler has described it: "Each problem that arose in Palestine constituted an emergency and necessitated an emergency campaign. Each political setback was a 'crisis' and called for renewed affirmation of faith."16 Although the progress of Zionism and the fate of Europe's Jews were of profound concern to the Canadian community, Jewish leaders were reluctant to lobby the government or to present their concerns to the public. The inhibitions of the past, a lack of self-confidence, and a fear of the tide of anti-Semitism that was sweeping the country in the 19305 reinforced the Jewish community's characteristic low profile on exter-

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nal relations. Political passivity was still the prevailing motif. For example, a cjc leader warned: "I have in mind that we refrain from mass meetings, publicity and noise, because such methods would nullify what we have in mind."17 The judgment of Irving Abella and Harold Troper is that, "their sense of being outsiders in their own home, of being in Canada but not of it, left them uneasy in dealings with government... the general timidity of Jewish leaders, even under pressure from their own rank-and-file, and their obsequiousness in the face of government authority led only to friction within the Jewish community."18 It took a catastrophe to shake the old foundations. T R A N S F O R M A T I O N , 1Q3Q-67

The period from the beginning of the Second World War to the Six-Day War in 1967 brought vast changes and a significant transformation in Jewish life. Because of these epoch-making events, the attitude of Canada's Jews towards involvement in domestic politics was to change dramatically. From the Holocaust to the Creation of Israel The Holocaust, a term which describes and symbolizes the systematic annihilation of six million European Jews at the hands of the Nazis, altered with a "tragic decisiveness" the very foundations of the Jewish world.19 In one transforming disaster an entire way of life, Jewish environments which had survived for a thousand years, and that segment of the diaspora that had most nourished the Zionist idea were all but destroyed. To Canada's Jews, distant bystanders to the horror, the Holocaust marked a low point in their political efficacy and sense of self-worth. Jewish leaders made representations to Prime Minister Mackenzie King and to other high officials protesting the government's restrictive immigration policy and pleading that everything possible be done to help Europe's Jews. However, to the government, which was burdened by an enormous war effort and by strains resulting from a crisis over conscription, this was a minor issue. According to Abella and Troper, European Jews wishing to save their lives by coming to Canada were the victims of deliberate neglect and discrimination. 20 The argument Tan behmade, e however, a r tthtgthe Jewish u m community e n failed t toc do everya n thing that was possible to rescue its fellow Jews and that there was a lack of forceful protest and action. There are several important ways in which the Holocaust was to have an impact on Canadian Jewish life. Most students of the subject agree

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that the Holocaust caused a "profound shudder," one that significantly altered the community's self-image and values. As Gershon Scholem has described it, the victims "died in a way ... that burdened the collective consciousness of the Jews with a shock, a trauma in its deepest strata that no analysis will ever resolve."21 Certainly many Jews could no longer be as complacent about their lives in Canada, and their beliefs in the certainty of evolutionary progress were shaken. Among the reactions within the community were an increased distrust of nonJews, greater fears about security, and a more fervent dedication to Jewish survival. The arrival in Canada of close to 100,000 displaced Jews in the late 19405 strengthened these attitudes. Largely because of the Holocaust, Jews are preoccupied with the question of their survival with an intensity not generally found among Canada's ethnic groups. The shadow cast by the Holocaust was to lengthen with the years. It took a considerable period of time - a period of gestation - before its full impact was felt. For instance, during the 19505 Jewish writers and editors tended to avoid the topic, and there was widespread silence within the community.22 The Montreal poet, A.M. Klein, made the Holocaust a central theme in his work, but he was an exception. It was only later, with the reviewing of the record of Nazi atrocities during the Eichmann trial in 1961-2 and with the threats posed to Israel in June 1967, that the memory of what had occurred moved to a place at the forefront of Canadian Jewish consciousness. By the late 19605 a growing reaction to the Holocaust and a yearning to understand its significance had become apparent. The catastrophe in Europe also brought a vast change in political circumstances. Because of the destruction of European Jewry, Israel and the English-speaking countries became the centres of Jewish life. Canadian Jewry, which had had very little influence in the Jewish world before the war, emerged as an important and powerful community. Many Canadian Jews now felt that they had a responsibility for Jewish destiny. The Struggle for Palestine Following the Second World War the attention of Canada's Jews was focused on the decisive struggle for a Jewish state that was then unfolding. As bitter fighting was to continue between Jews and Arabs well into 1949, Canadian Jewry had to endure a long period of apprehension and uncertainty. However, the community was as fully mobilized to aid the Zionist effort as it had ever been. In May 1946, the zo c made the following appeal: "At this grave hour we ... must not fail to make every sacrifice... An unprecedented need exacts unprecedented

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generosity. Let history not record that when the opportunity presented itself, we lacked the vision to grasp it."23 Similar sentiments were expressed in an editorial in the Canadian Zionist magazine in September 1947: "It is the zero hour for the future destiny of Erez [a Jewish state] as fateful decisions are about to be taken. Whatever strength and influence Canadian Jewry can muster must be brought to play to assure that our minimal demands at least be satisfied... if justice is to be rendered to the victims of Nazi Germany."24 The community intended to wage an intensive lobbying campaign - a decisive break from the pattern of past behaviour. The United Zionist Council (uzc), a new Zionist federation, had been established in 1941, and its public relations committee was now given the responsibility of co-ordinating lobbying activities. Because Canada, through its membership on the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, was in a position to play a role in determining the outcome of the diplomatic struggle, Canadian Zionists wished to ensure a sustained presentation of their views at the highest level. As David Bercuson has shown in his description of Zionist activities during this period, the uzc opened lines of communication to key cabinet ministers and members of parliament and contacted the Canadian delegation at the United Nations.25 In July 1946, for the first time, a Zionist delegation made a submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs. Zionist leaders also met on occasion with the prime minister, Mackenzie King, and with the secretary of state for external affairs, Louis St Laurent. It is doubtful whether these initiatives could have been taken if it had not been for the intervention of the Canadian Palestine Committee (CPC). The CPC, which had been formed in December 1943, was comprised of prominent non-Jewish Canadians who had come together to support the Zionist effort. Influential CPC members included Paul Martin, Stanley Knowles, Senator Arthur Roebuck, Premier T.C. Douglas of Saskatchewan, the painter A.Y. Jackson, the lawyer Frank Scott, and Sir Ellsworth Flavelle. A number of c p c members were strong Christians whose sympathy for Zionism was an outgrowth of their religious beliefs, while others had been moved by the catastrophe that had befallen the Jews in Europe. Bercuson points out that the CPC was to contribute by giving advice, sponsoring pro-Zionist radio broadcasts and publications, and providing Zionist leaders with an entree to the highest levels of government. Perhaps most important, the CPC bestowed social acceptability upon the Zionist cause. It was on fundraising that Canadian Zionists expended their most concerted efforts. In a campaign that was until then unrivalled in Canadian philanthropy, with the probable exception of the Canadian

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Red Cross's "bundles for Britain" operation during the Second World War, $9,186,395 was raised for Israel in 1948-9, just over half the total of $18,188,875 collected from 1940 to 195O.26 Some made a more active and compelling sacrifice. Driven in some cases by moral commitment and in others by the promise of adventure, approximately 300 Canadians served in Israel's ranks during the War of Independence.27 According to one source, Prime Minister David BenGurion had even considered the formation of a separate Canadian unit within the Israel Defence Forces.28 Several Canadians played significant roles in Israel's victory. Perhaps the most exceptional was Montrealborn Dov (Barney) Joseph who served as military governor of the Jewish sector of Jerusalem during the Arab siege of that city in 1947-8. In all, twelve Canadians gave their lives fighting for Israel, one of whom was the famous World War n fighter pilot, Buzz Beurling. While the Jewish community had been moved to what was for it an unprecedented level of political activity, care and circumspection still prevailed. Pro-Israel lobbyists were consensual and accommodative and did not attempt to apply acute pressure. There can be little doubt, however, that Canadian Jewry's display of solidarity, the vital aid that it received from influential allies, and its well-considered approaches combined to have at least some impact on the Canadian government's ultimate decision to recognize the emergent Jewish state in December 1948. The Post-Palestine Generation The creation of Israel had profound implications for the Canadian Jewish community. Indeed, almost immediately, Israel was accorded special status and became a paramount focus of endeavour and concern. The establishment of Israel aroused sentiments far deeper than those of typical religious or ethnic pride. Israel's rebirth had for many diaspora Jews a redemptive and even messianic quality. Israel's importance derived in large part from its ability to respond to several needs in Jewish life. As Solomon Schecter once observed, Zionism's strength was "that it could be all things to all men."29 First of all, Israel provided a much needed common bond to a community increasingly divided by denominational differences. It also gave less observant Jews a means of relating to a Jewish experience. Second, after centuries of being thought of as outsiders in society, lacking a country of their own, Jews viewed Israel as a source of self-esteem. It responded to a deeply felt need to belong, and some also saw it as a sanctuary in the event of renewed religious persecution. A third factor which contributed to the strong attachment of Canadian Jews to Israel was the

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significance that Israel had as a religious symbol for the observant. Israel was the land of Abraham and Isaac as much as it was a modern state. As such, it represented a return to places that were sacred in Judaism, a linking of Jewish festivals to their origins in the Palestinian seasons, and a fulfilment of the Torah's promise of return. Israel's rebirth was a sign of future commandments and revelations, and a harbinger of the messianic age envisioned in the Bible. As well, many Jews viewed Israel as a theological response to the Holocaust: an "unprecedented act of redemption" following an "unprecedented act of destruction."30 Because of these influences, a deep reservoir of sentiment, much of it as yet unharnessed in terms of philanthropic or political expression, had been built up. What had emerged among Canada's Jews was the conviction that what happened to Israel affected them and was important in their lives. From 1949 to 1967 several projects in Israel were initiated by Canadians. In 1952 Canadian Zionists financed the reclamation of a large area in the western part of the Negev desert, in 1956 a Canada Forest was planted at Ein Kerem near Jerusalem, and in 1962 a Canadian village was established.31 A significant step was taken in 1960 when, under the direction of Samuel Bronfman, a group of prominent Jewish businessmen founded the Canada-Israel Development Corporation. With an original capital outlay of $5 million, the corporation's goal was, in Bronfman's words, "attracting investment from the Canadian public ... for industry in Israel basic to Israel's economy."32 In many respects this was an important period in Canadian Jewish life. Jews as a group enjoyed increased prosperity and acceptance and, consequently, enhanced self-confidence. A climate of "normalcy" had set in and the future looked increasingly secure. The Six-Day War: A Watershed There had been little warning in the months previous to May 1967 that Israel was about to be involved in a decisive confrontation. Yet, in a brief period and with dramatic suddenness, the Middle East was thrust into crisis and transforming change. The Six-Day War overturned previous relationships in the Middle East, brought the intensity of conflict to a new and higher level, and deeply affected perceptions in the Jewish and Arab worlds. While some scholars have questioned the seriousness of the dangers that Israel faced in 1967, Michael Brecher reports that the issue was presented in Israel and to the world as "to live or perish."33 Certainly this was the perception of Canada's Jews. Egypt's dismissal of United

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Nations peacekeeping forces, its blockade c the Straits of Tiran, and a large troop build-up on Israel's borders signalled Arab intentions. Reports of overwhelming Arab strength and bellicose threats by Arab leaders led to the belief that a second Holocaust was about to occur. Feelings of shock and fright were widespread in the community. As an editorial in the Canadian Jewish News was to put it: "Apparently no one had to be told: saving Israel was the one supreme purpose facing every Jew."34 Among the community's first responses was the establishment of an emergency committee, the Coordinating Committee for Emergency Aid to Israel. The committee was headed by Phil Givens, a former mayor of Toronto and at that time president of the newly constituted Canadian Zionist Federation (CZF), an umbrella organization for all Zionist groups. As no permanent co-ordinating structure existed, the committee was, in effect, a campaign cabinet which brought together representatives from B'nai Brith (a Jewish fraternal and service organization), the CZF, and the cjc. A division of labour was agreed upon whereby the CZF would be responsible for sending medical supplies and volunteers, while B'nai Brith and the cjc would handle public relations. The campaign on Israel's behalf really began in late May, when rallies were held in various cities. In Montreal, over 15,000 people attended. In Toronto, Rabbi Gunther Plaut told a large gathering that helping Israel in this time of distress was "an action to save civilization."35 Medical supplies were bought and blood banks were set up. When they became aware of reports that the Egyptians had used poison gas during the civil war in Yemen, community representatives purchased thousands of gas masks and readied them for shipment to Israel.36 During the crisis, Samuel Bronfman, the powerful magnate behind the huge Bronfman financial empire, emerged as a dominant figure. In fact, on the day that war broke out, Bronfman, as chairman of the board of governors of the c j c, brought together approximately forty of the wealthiest individuals in the Montreal community and elicited pledges of millions of dollars for Israel. On the very next day, he signed a personal cheque covering the amount that had been pledged.37 With similar vigour, Bronfman was able to influence the pace of the fundraising drive throughout Canada. During the crisis and war of 1967, fundraising was, as it had been in 1947-9, the main channel for the community's participation and activism. Many people reached into savings and sold valuables. A sizeable number of non-Jews also contributed, raising close to $100,000. According to one source, in all, a record $25,383,966 was raised for Israel.38 Canadian Jewry's contributions were amongst the world's highest. In late May, a delegation led by Samuel Bronfman met separately

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with Prime Minister Pearson, the secretary of state for external affairs, Paul Martin, the leader of the opposition, John Diefenbaker, and the leader of the New Democratic party, T.C. Douglas. The Jewish leaders stressed the dilemmas that Israel faced and the deep anxiety that prevailed throughout the Jewish community. But no effort was made at that time to contact other parliamentarians or to carry out a more systematic lobbying effort. Israel's swift victory gave Canada's Jews feelings of exhilaration and a heightened sense of national and spiritual identity. The reunification of Jerusalem brought a new sense of completeness to Jewish life. Further, many of those who had been marginal to the community, or who had seen their Jewishness as a mark of shame, were uplifted by Israel's military accomplishments and by its courageous and self-confident image. Because it brought pride and self-assurance, the 1967 war was a vital catalyst in the political transformation of the Canadian Jewish community. THE POLITICAL WORLD OF CANADIAN ZIONISM

The dynamics and structure of the Canadian Jewish community's organizational efforts on behalf of Israel were and are different from those of other interest groups. The Zionist phenomenon in Canada has features that make it a unique case study. Leadership One of the important changes that took place within the pro-Israel movement during the years following World War II was a transfer of leadership from Zionist officials to those who were involved in fundraising. During the 19503 and 19605 Zionist organizations lost considerable influence. Paradoxically, this loss of potency was attributable at least in part to the establishment of Israel because the Israeli government displaced Zionist organizations from many of the functions that they had hitherto performed. Control over aliyah ("going up," the act of emigrating to Israel), diplomatic negotiations with the Canadian government, and development projects in Israel fell largely if not exclusively to Israeli officials. Moreover, as an expressed purpose of the Zionist organizations is to send their members to live in Israel, their numbers were constantly being depleted. Unlike other groups which could depend on a relatively stable leadership and talent pool, the leadership in Zionist organizations was always changing because the most dedicated and idealistic went to Israel. Another important factor was that most Canadian Jews had concerns other than Israel, while the

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Zionists, as a one-issue organization, were limited in their influence. Battles over territory were commonplace in the 19705 and 19805, and the Zionist organizations inevitably lost ground to the c j c which held sway over much of the community's domestic agenda. As one Zionist official complained recently, "the c j c seems to have a mandate to do everything." The view of a c j c executive was that "Israel had become too important to be left to the Zionists." With the relative decline of the Zionist leadership, men and women whose skills lay primarily in fundraising advanced to the forefront of community affairs. What emerged was a trusteeship of "givers and doers," people with the wealth, influence, and time to be involved in fundraising. As leadership fell to this group, fundraising, already the prime instrument of support for Israel, received even higher priority. The dynamic force behind this takeover was the Bronfman family. In particular, it would be difficult to overstate the role that was played by Samuel Bronfman. Having built Seagrams into a major corporation, he used his considerable wealth to gain political and social influence. Harold Waller has observed that "in his generation, he had no peers in terms of skills, wealth, influence and status."39 Until his death in 1971, Bronfman was at once the pace-setter in contributions, the central figure in virtually every campaign, and the community's principal representative in the worlds of politics and finance. His philanthropy had an important impact both in Canada and in Israel. For example, according to Peter Newman, "in 1948, when Michael Comay, Israel's first ambassador to Canada, found himself operating from temporary quarters in the Chateau Laurier Hotel, Sam immediately bought him a sumptuous official residence." And in 1962, Bronfman donated $1 million to build a new wing for the Israel Museum in Jerusalem.40 By 1971 the Bronfmans were donating approximately $1.5 million a year to the United Jewish Appeal, accounting for almost 15 per cent of total contributions.41 Because of their influence, other wealthy families became involved. As a result fundraising for community projects in Canada and for Israel came under the patronage of the wealthiest segment of the Jewish community. Those who wished to play the game of social advancement and gain prestige in Jewish society had to be active in fundraising. An important factor in the ascendancy of wealthy contributors was the high priority that Israel's leaders gave to fundraising. The fact that world Jewry accounted for over 50 per cent of the long-term capital transfers to Israel from 1949 to 1965 was an important consideration to a country in need of capital.42 With so much at stake, Israel's leaders made extensive efforts to cultivate the Jewish economic elite. Highprestige missions were organized to bring the biggest donors on special

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tours of the country and to have them meet with the leading politicians and officials. Given this reinforcement, the dominance of the fundraising establishment in the Canadian Jewish community was virtually complete by the 19705. Fundraising

Fundraising was organized on its present basis in 1951 when all of the then existing campaigns were amalgamated into the United Jewish Appeal (UJA). In the formula that was then agreed to, approximately half of the funds collected were designated for Israel while the rest went for domestic needs and to Jewish relief overseas. In the late 19605 a separate United Israel Appeal (u i A) was set up under the canopy of the UJA. Depending on what were considered to be the greatest needs at a particular time, the amounts allocated to Israel and to community and other services varied. The selling of State of Israel Bonds also began in Canada in 1951. The depth and degree of volunteerism in the Jewish community is by any standard quite remarkable. During the 19705 and 19805 at almost all times during a typical year, there was at least one fundraising campaign being waged for the u j A at least somewhere in Canada, with the annual campaigns in Montreal and Toronto taking place in the autumn. Across the country up to 7000 volunteers were active during a campaign season. According to a former executive director of the UIA, in 1975 there were 86,922 individual contributions to Israel, a figure that included over half of the heads of households in the Jewish community.43 While this has been a grass-roots effort, reaching into every corner of Jewish society in Canada, it is noteworthy that in one Montreal campaign, for example, the leading 1000 contributors accounted for close to 80 per cent of the donations.44 The UIA has been held accountable under the Canadian Charities Act of 1967 for every dollar that it has collected and spent. According to the provisions of the act, the Department of National Revenue has discretion over "the fields in which... funds could be used in Israel and qualify for charitable or tax deductable status."45 The areas that the department has approved have been helping the aged, aiding educational institutions, contributing to health care, and assisting immigrants to Israel. The Canadian government also specified that a body of Canadian residents in Israel, known as the Israel Residents Distribution Committee, be set up to ensure that the law was being strictly adhered to. In some years during the 19705, Canadian Jewry gave more on percapita basis than any other Jewish community in the world.46 While the goals of fundraising have been widely endorsed within the

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Jewish community, the means have sometimes been controversial, even though the strategies used do not differ from those of many other religious and political organizations. The main point of contention has been that, as Harold Waller has observed, the campaign "is conducted in such a way that great pressure is placed on people to contribute."47 First, soliciting is organized so that the prospective giver is often approached by either a friend or business associate. Under such circumstances it is difficult for many to refuse and coaxing them to give more is particularly effective. Second, it is not unusual for some wealthy individuals to be virtually assessed as to the size of the donation expected by the community. Indeed it can be argued that contributions to the UJA have become a kind of internal income tax, with failure to pay punishable by peer pressure and other sanctions. Third, participation in any aspect of Jewish life - whether in synagogues, fraternal organizations, or recreational activities - often carries with it an obligation to contribute to Israel. Even joining a golf club whose members are predominantly Jewish may bring with it the requirement for a donation. Moreover, throughout the campaign, publicity, shame tactics, community pressure, and the honours and prestige bestowed on the most generous are designed to create a bandwagon. People are urged at every turn "to give until it hurts." According to an official of the State of Israel Bonds, many of the major banks, insurance companies, and large corporations have also donated to the UJA or purchased low-interest-yielding Israel bonds "as tokens of expression." The official noted that in business "one hand washes the other" and that donations or purchases were made to please important clients or associates and "not for love of Israel." Given the involvement of major corporate interests, financial aid to Israel cannot be described as exclusive to the Jewish community. The Canada-Israel Committee During the 19505 and 19605 lobbying efforts on Israel's behalf by the Canadian Jewish community tended to be intermittent, ad hoc, and inconsistent. Although the public relations committee of the z o c was nominally responsible, for most of this period Samuel Bronfman and Saul Hayes of the cjc and Lawrence Freiman of the zoc together conducted almost all major business. They operated without staff or offices in Ottawa and were able to act with considerable independence. By the 19605, however, meetings with government and opposition leaders were regularized in annual "briefings" by a joint zoc-cjc delegation and a pattern of regular consultation with the Israeli embassy had been established.

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As a result of being caught relatively unprepared by the 1967 crisis, the Jewish leadership in Canada decided that a permanent and stronger pro-Israel voice was necessary. In response to this need, the CanadaIsrael Committee (c i c) was established. The c i c was able to be the sole liaison between the Jewish community and Ottawa on all matters concerning Israel, and Israel's advocate before the media and the Canadian public. The CZF, the cjc, and B'nai Brith were the cic's initial sponsors. Each of these organizations contributed to its budget and each had a voice in decisions. This alliance was not always an easy one. In fact, the ci c's work was halted for a brief period in 1971 when the three organizations were unable to agree on a common approach. The watershed in the development of the c i c was the Yom Kippur War of 1973. In the years before that war, the c i c had operated from offices in Montreal staffed by three or four people and had no permanent representation in Ottawa. In the aftermath of the 1973 War, its operations expanded. The c i c became one of the larger foreign policy lobbies in the country, with a permanent presence in Ottawa and a more professional staff. In 1975 it also opened an office in Toronto. The pro-Israel lobby was reorganized in May 1982 when its board of directors was expanded to include representation from the UIA and eight Jewish community councils. The previous arrangement, under which decisions were reached through consensus, gave way to a new scheme which requires the tallying of votes. Because fears of anti-Semitism are so vivid and painful for many in the community, the c i c has had to conduct itself in a different manner from other interest groups. The community has been reluctant to become embroiled in controversy and the pro-Israel lobby has faced the dilemma of how to be a forceful political advocate while avoiding unwanted publicity and attention. Quiet and delicate behind-thescenes diplomacy has thus been the main instrument in the cic's repertoire. Through the years it has carefully constructed a network of friends and allies in Ottawa which is its first line of defence when Israel draws criticism. Especially receptive to the c i c's overtures are politicians and officials who are sympathetic to Israel for religious and humanitarian reasons, who represent ridings with significant numbers of Jewish voters, or who for one reason or another are especially interested in the Jewish perspective on events. A rule of thumb that has guided the c i c's actions is that friendly relations must be maintained with all political parties and that partisanship must be avoided. The c i c never suggests that it can deliver Jewish votes, although it does not discourage this presumption. While cabinet ministers and their opposite numbers on the opposition front bench receive the most attention, there is a good deal of

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lobbing among ordinary backbench members. As is the case with many other lobby groups, the c i c tries to cultivate those who will some day have power. The c i c contacts new M PS soon after they are elected and follows up with periodic visits. It explains Israel's position when a controversy arises, distributes (since the mid-1970s) a magazine entitled the Canadian Middk East Digest, and invites selected M PS to meet Israeli officials or even go on study missions to Israel. Members of parliament also receive invitations to attend the c i c's annual dinner and its yearly study conference. As a former associate national director of the c i c has described the process, "the essence of lobbying is a willingness to speak to strangers and to establish a peg, a link, a basis of communication." The c i c also maintains contact with officials in the Department of External Affairs and other departments that deal in some manner with the Middle East. During the 19705, delegations from the cic met approximately two or three times a year with the secretary of state for external affairs. Officials assigned to the Middle East or United Nations divisions in External Affairs are also contacted frequently. As is the case with most lobbying groups, contact with a politician or an official is sometimes established through a third party. A campaign contributor, a close friend, or a colleague is used as a conduit. In fact, a former national director of the pro-Israel lobby described his job as "using people to get to people" and "putting the right combinations together." He noted with regard to one particular cabinet minister that a close confidant and an executive assistant made sure that the minister "couldn't help but absorb the merits of Israel's case." In all these encounters, the cic tries to appeal to universal and democratic values and avoids making Israel's case appear to be of concern only to Jews. As one high-ranking Zionist official explained: "When we see the government, the Zionist part is soft-pedalled." And another official associated with the pro-Israel lobby was quoted as saying: "When I go to Ottawa, I don't argue for favours, but for what is in the best interest of Canadians."48 THE CATACLYSM OF THE YOM K I P P U R WAR

The Yom Kippur War was a turning point in the political evolution of Canada's Jews. The last constraints against total political activism fell by the wayside. At 2:00 P M Middle East time on 6 October 1973 - on Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish year - the armies of Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israeli-held positions in Sinai and on the Golan Heights. In the weeks that followed the world watched a spectacle of

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furious battle and massive struggle and was itself thrown to the brink of a great-power nuclear confrontation. In the Jewish world, the war struck with the devastation of an earthquake, shaking the foundations of pride and self-confidence that had been built since 1967. When the Arab armies attacked, the morning service for Yom Kippur was in progress in synagogues across Canada. The solemnity of the day was disrupted by the news from the Middle East. In almost every congregation rabbis spoke on the need to identify with Israel during this ordeal, and prayers were offered for those in Israel who were about to go into battle. After the day-long fasting and petitioning of Yom Kippur, the community's leaders began to organize what would be the most intensive campaign ever waged in Canada on behalf of Israel. As the media disseminated accounts of heavy Israeli battlefield casualties, Canadian Jews were troubled by anguished visions. According to Emil Fackenheim, the first days of war had caused "a shudder unlike anything since the Holocaust." A theologian, Norman Lamm, wrote of the "unexpressed fear" felt by some Jews that "the bubble would burst and the inexorable numerical superiority of the Arabs and the underlying anti-Semitism of the Christian West would eventually join forces, rise and take revenge." Rabbi Gunther Plaut told a Toronto rally: '1 could not help but feel that they [the Israelis] like the rest of us had the sinking sense of deja-vu, of historical repetition. Enough, Lord, I cried on Yom Kippur, let there be an end."49 Even though many Jews were still reticent about openly displaying their commitment, rallies and demonstrations provided an opportunity for emotional release and were a convenient and immediate means for expressing solidarity with Israel. Thus, beginning on 7 October and continuing for several days, tens of thousands of Israel's supporters marched and attended rallies in cities from coast to coast. During the week of 15 October "Israel survival rallies" were staged by an estimated 25,000 people in Toronto, Montreal, Winnipeg, and other cities. Dozens of smaller rallies were held at synagogues and Jewish community centres and on college campuses. On 8 October the community's leaders gathered at Toronto's Shaarei Shomayim Synagogue to chart an overall campaign. Among their first acts was the drafting of a resolution calling upon the government to "condemn this infamous and sacrilegious attack" and to prevail upon the Arab states to negotiate a settlement with Israel.50 In the days that followed, the c i c organized an intensive lobbying campaign to present Israel's case. Meetings were held with important cabinet ministers and with the leaders of the opposition parties, there was increased contact with officials in the Department of External Affairs, and a canvassing of MPS was carried out. One opposition politician noted that despite the

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aggressiveness of their campaign, the c I c's representatives appeared to be quite "shaken" and were "very uptight at the time." The Jewish leadership was aware that its ability to lobby effectively depended on the harnessing of pro-Israel feelings among many segments of society. A public relations effort was launched using newspaper advertisements, news conferences, and door-to-door campaigning. The central theme, stressed at every opportunity, was that Israel's right to exist was at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict and that the destruction of the Jewish state was the Arabs' real intention. For instance, in a full-page advertisement which appeared in newspapers across the country, the Jewish lobby drew the following comparison: "All the evidence demonstrates that this was an unprovoked and premeditated attack by Egypt and Syria: that the attack was launched with blasphemous purpose on Yom Kippur, the holiest of Jewish holy days, is reminiscent of the Nazis who frequently executed their extermination raids on Yom Kippur."51 Fundraising, as during other crises, was again the principal means of expressing solidarity with Israel. With preparations for the UIA'S annual fall campaign already under way, little extra planning was needed to meet the challenges presented by the war. As in 1967 many Canadian Jews and non-Jews were stirred to make their greatest contributions to Israel. The campaign broke all previous records, reaching a total of $54 million. Approximately another $50 million was purchased in State of Israel Bonds.52 As a result, Israel received a vital financial transfusion at a time of great economic need. The c i c was unable to achieve its main goal during the war which was to have Canada condemn the Arab attack. Canada wished to maintain a studious neutrality and was under considerable pressure because of an Arab oil embargo imposed on countries that were thought to be friendly to Israel. The pro-Israel lobby, however, elicited significant support for Israel in Parliament and from some segments of the Canadian public. Had such support not been demonstrated, the government could well have concluded, based on external factors, that a pro-Arab stand was more to its future benefit. As it was, Canada adhered to its traditional even-handedness. A D V E R S I T Y A N D P E R S I S T E N C E : T H E 1970S A N D 19808

During the Yom Kippur War, the Jewish community's efforts on behalf of Israel reached a new plateau of mobilization and formalization. Whether this level of commitment could be sustained in the absence of crisis or in more ambivalent circumstances remained to be seen. The first major challenge to face the community in the period after

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the war was the effect in Canada of the Arab economic boycott against Israel. The boycott, which the Arab League had maintained since 1945, became a matter of concern because of the dramatic increase in trade that developed between Canada and the Arab world in the mid-1970s. Canadian banks and corporations that had clients and contracts in Arab countries came under considerable pressure to comply with the boycott, whose provisions stipulated that business could not be conducted with Israel or with corporations or institutions having dealings with Israel. Between 1975 and 1980, the c i c fought the Arab boycott campaign by bringing the issue to the attention of the media and by lobbying for legislation that would make adherence to the boycott illegal. While the issue became a cause celebre for the Jewish community, no attempt was made to affect corporate decisions by bringing pressure from Jewish business interests or by mobilizing a grass-roots protest. The cic was successful in having an anti-boycott law, bill 112, enacted in Ontario in November 1978, but it encountered stiff resistance in Ottawa. Although the issue was presented as a fight against discrimination and as a matter of civil rights, Trudeau and key ministers such as Jean Chretien and Jack Horner were not convinced of the necessity for such a law. In addition, as Howard Stanislawski has shown, an informal alliance of major corporations, high-ranking trade officials, and Arab diplomatic representatives strongly opposed the c i c's efforts.53 Despite supportive statements from the major parties it was apparent by the end of 1980 that legislation was not going to be passed. The cic clearly had lost against more powerful interests in Ottawa. An even greater setback loomed on the horizon: the Jerusalem embassy affair. During the 1979 election, the Conservative leader, Joe Clark, with an eye to winning Jewish votes in several closely contested ridings in Toronto, promised to move the Canadian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a change which Israel had been pressing for among all foreign governments with which it had relations since it gained control of Jerusalem in 1967. The c i c had to some extent triggered the Clark initiative by launching an educational campaign illustrating the centrality of Jerusalem to Jewish life, which was directed at all parties and politicians. But, as George Takach has written, it was a case of a political party attempting to co-opt an interest group rather than vice versa.54 As there was no compelling emergency and Israel was not in danger, the embassy issue did not affect the life of the community at large. Reluctant to squander valuable resources and contacts when Israel's security was not in immediate jeopardy and having to maintain a non-partisan stance during an election, the c i c had little room for

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manoeuvre. The judgment of many is that the c i c's image was damaged by the affair. The media focused unprecedented attention on the Jewish community, and Liberal politicians including Pierre Trudeau were critical of what they saw as the cic's overt salesmanship of Jerusalem. Most importantly, as Alan Rose has written, "the embassy issue ... brought hostility and indifference because public opinion was basically not seized with the issue as one critically significant to Canada."55 In the end, the Clark government, under intense pressure from Arab governments and corporations with interests in the Middle East, backed down on its promise. Israel remained the central focus of identity and concern as Canadian Jews entered the 19805. In a survey of Montreal Jews taken in 1978,47 per cent listed "news of the Middle East" as the current affairs topic in which they were most interested, while only 26 per cent chose "Quebec news" and 20 per cent "Canadian national news."56 Contributions to the u i A, although below the record level of 1973, still indicated an extraordinary measure of devotion. Furthermore, in most circumstances, the vast majority of Canadian Jews strongly supported Israel's policies. The widely held perception was that Israel was threatened by implacable foes who would conduct a second holocaust if given the opportunity. In these circumstances Israel was expected to take a tough political stand and be aggressive in defence and security matters. There was little dissent on policies towards the occupied territories and the Palestinians. Some Jewish leaders also felt that it was inappropriate and presumptuous for distant observers to offer advice or criticism. Others were reluctant to do so because of peer pressure. Cracks in this edifice had begun to appear, however, when Menachem Begin became prime minister of Israel in 1977. The shift in power from the sophisticated socialist elite of the Labour party to the rightwing populism of the Likud changed the tenor of Israel's politics. In particular, Begin's acerbic personality, inflated rhetoric, and grandiose schemes with regard to the West Bank stirred passions and created divisions. President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty also altered in some minds the image of the Arabs as a monolith blindly committed to Israel's destruction. Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 brought these mixed emotions to the surface. Although Canadian Jews supported Israel's aim of ensuring peace on its northern border, many felt that Israel had gone beyond its own security needs by advancing on Beirut. That Israel might be drawn into a quagmire from which it could not easily extricate itself was also feared. Television coverage of Israel's two-month-long seige of Beirut, with its depictions of carnage and innocent suffering, was distressing for many. At the same time, it was widely believed that Israel's actions

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were not being reported fairly and that in some instances Israel had been vilified grossly and maliciously. Many feared that the "demonization" of Israel by the international media would stir the embers of antiSemitism. The c i c was put under considerable strain during the Lebanon War, facing internal problems, a strengthened opposition, and the disaffection of many of its friends. While the Jewish community for the most part maintained a unified front in support of Israel's actions, the cjc violated the spirit of the cic partnership by meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau separately to discuss Israel. Cjc officials felt that because Trudeau had refused to meet with the c i c the onus was on them to present Israel's case. Trudeau strongly opposed Israel's invasion and sanctioned initiatives which left the cic constantly on the defensive during the summer of 1982. For example, soon after the war began, the House of Commons unanimously passed a resolution which called for "an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Israeli military forces from Lebanon" but not for a similar withdrawal by the Syrian army. This was an enormous setback for the c i c. It is ironic that despite the reputed power of the pro-Israel lobby, Canada had refused to condemn the Arab states for the attack that began the Yom Kippur War in 1973 but quickly denounced Israel at the very start of the Lebanon War. In August, both the cabinet and the Liberal party caucus debated whether Canada should officially recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization. Intense pressure from prominent Jewish supporters of the Liberal party and the arguments presented by the c j c helped to forestall such a move. According to some reports, a number of prominent politicians who had previously been among Israel's most avid supporters did not intervene on this occasion. Some may have been deterred from doing so by the prime minister's view, while for others Israel's actions in Lebanon may have triggered a rethinking of their entire perspective. Clearly, there was a "visceral dislike of Begin in Ottawa," and an erosion in support was evident on all sides of the house. Without the constraining force of the usual pro-Israel sentiments, it became possible for the government to fashion a policy that seemed to give greater weight to Arab claims.57 The massacre of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by the Lebanese Christian allies of Israel in September 1982 brought further pain to the Jewish community. Irwin Cotler, the president of the c j c, called for an independent commission of inquiry and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon.58 This provoked an immediate backlash from the hard-line CZF, whose leaders believed that criticism of Israel's policies by Canadian Zionists was inappropriate.59

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For the first time divisions within Israel were being reflected in the public positions of constituent groups of the Canadian Jewish community. Perhaps the Lebanon War's enduring legacy for Canadian Jews is that it left the community with the problem of how to reconcile a devotion to Israel with legitimate criticism of its leaders and policies. This difficulty would remain and sharpen as a result of the Palestinian uprising in 1987-8. CONCLUSION

The pro-Israel lobby differs from other interest groups in Canada because of the special circumstances that surrounded its establishment and its coming of age. The catalysts were a series of historic crises that dramatically transformed the self-image and consciousness of Canada's Jews. Each of these major events - from the Holocaust to the Lebanon War - had a profound effect. Most other interest groups cannot claim the longevity or the high level of commitment that has sustained the efforts of the pro-Israel lobby. Pro-Zionist institutions have endured from the turn of the century and have retained a popular base and grass-roots character. The size of the lobby's fundraising effort is virtually without rival. The most important development has been the Jewish community's transition from passivity to politics. The feelings of wariness and trepidation that characterized the approach to Ottawa in the 19303 and 19403 changed to a robust and confident attitude in the 19705 and 19803, even though the c i c has a mixed record of achievement. It was largely successful in defending Israel's position during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the Lebanon War although it certainly fell short of achieving its goals on these occasions and suffered clear setbacks on the boycott issue and during the Jerusalem embassy affair. While the Jewish community still perceives itself to be vulnerable and is cautious in its actions, the organizations that support Israel are permanent institutions that operate even in the absence of crisis. They are intrinsic to the Canadian Jewish community and to its sense of identity. NOTES

All quotes not footnoted are from interviews conducted between 1976 and 1984. i "Study Shows Population Growth of Jews Hits Zero," Canadian Jewish News, 5 April 1984,15.

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2 Jan Goel, "The Maritimes/' Viewpoints 7 (winter/spring 1973): 13. 3 Stuart Rosenberg, The Jewish Community in Canada, 2 vols. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1970-1), 1:39-40. 4 Ibid., 52; Max Bookman, "Jewish Canada by Numbers," in Eli Gottesman, ed., Canadian Jewish Reference Book and Directory 1963 (Ottawa: Central Rabbinical Seminary of Canada 1963), 105. 5 Rosenberg, The Jewish Community in Canada, 1:103. 6 Joseph Kage, With Faith and Thanksgiving (Montreal: Eagle Publishing 1962), 43. 7 Walter Laqueur, A History of Zionism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1972), 60. 8 Irving Howe, World of Our Fathers (New York: Simon and Schuster 1976), 645. 9 Saul Hayes, "Some Differences between Canadian and U.S. Jewry," Viewpoints i (March 1966): 10. 10 Seymour Lipset, "Canada and the United States: The Cultural Dimension," in Charles Doran and John Sigler, eds., Canada and the United States (Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall 1985), 153. 11 Zachariah Kay, Canada and Palestine: The Politics of Non-Commitment (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press 1978), 18. 12 Bernard Figler, "History of the Zionist Ideal in Canada," in Gottesman, ed., Canadian Jewish Reference Book and Directory 1963, 89. 13 Rosenberg, The Jewish Community in Canada, 2:16. 14 Figler, "Zionist Ideal," 89. 15 Rosenberg, The Jewish Community in Canada, 2:34. 16 Figler, "Zionist Ideal," 89. 17 Irving Abella and Harold Troper, "The Line Must Be Drawn Somewhere: Canada and Jewish Refugees, 1933-39," in William Shaffir, Morton Weinfeld, and Irwin Cotler, eds., The Canadian Jewish Mosaic (Toronto: John Wiley 1981), 60. 18 Irving Abella and Harold Troper, None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948 (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys 1982), 66. 19 Phrase from Simon Herman, Jewish Identity (New York: Herzl Press 1977), 88. 20 Abella and Troper, None Is Too Many. 21 Gershon Scholem, On Jews and Judaism in Crisis (New York: Schocken 1978), 250. 22 Herman, Jewish Identity, 104-5; Paula Hyman, "New Debate on the Holocaust," New "York Times Magazine, 14 September 1980, 65. 23 "A Message to Canadian Jewry," Canadian Zionist, 10 May 1946, i. 24 "Canadian Jewry's Stand," ibid., September 1947, 3. 25 David J. Bercuson, "The Zionist Lobby and Canada's Palestine Policy 1941-1948," in this volume.

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26 "Five Million from Canada," and "H. Grover Gives Financial Report," Canadian Zionist, i February 1950, 5. 27 David J. Bercuson, The Secret Army (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys 1984)28 Ben Dunkelman, Dual Allegiance (Scarborough, Ontario: Macmillan-New American Library 1976), 137-8. 29 Quoted in Samuel Halperin, The Political World of American Zionism (Detroit M i: Wayne State University Press 1961), 279. 30 Irving Greenberg, letters from readers, Commentary 71 (June 1981): 5. 31 Figler, "Zionist Ideal," 102. 32 Shira Herzog Bessin and David Kaufman, eds., Canada-Israel Friendship (Toronto: Canada-Israel Committee 1979), 113. 33 Benjamin Geist, "A Question of Survival/' International Journal 28 (autumn 1973): 630; Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press 1974), 335. 34 "Jewry's Finest Hour," Canadian Jewish News, 23 June 1967, i. 35 "Canadian Jews Contribute $25 Million to Israel," ibid., 9 June 1967, i. 36 Interview with official of United Israel Appeal, Montreal, 21 December 1978. 37 Harold Waller, The Governance of the Jewish Community of Montreal (New York: Centre for Jewish Community Studies, General Learning Press, 1974), 4938 "United Israel Appeal Emergency Campaign," Canadian Zionist (summer 1967): i. 39 Waller, Jewish Community of Montreal, 81. 40 Peter C. Newman, The Bronfman Dynasty (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1978), 48. 41 Waller, Jewish Community of Montreal, 82. 42 Charles Liebman, Pressure Without Sanctions (New Jersey: Associated University Presses 1977), 52-3. 43 Interview with u i A official. 44 Waller, Jewish Community of Montreal, 89. 45 Joel Weiner, "Warm, Human Story Not Shown by Audit but Thousands of Israelis Thank our u i A," Canadian Jewish News, 24 February 1978,5. 46 Bernard Baskin, "Canada," in Morris Fine and Milton Himmelfarb, eds., American Jewish Year Book 1978 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America 1977), 278. 47 Waller, Jewish Community of Montreal, 57. 48 David Birkan, "Czr Top Post Attracts Givens, Milner, Goody," Canadian Jewish News, 14 February 1980,19. 49 Emil Fackenheim, "Canada: Perspectives," in Moshe Davis, ed., The Yom Kippur War (New York: Arno Press 1974), 122-3; Norman Lamm, "United States of America: Perspectives," in Davis, ed., The Yom Kippur War, 51;

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Warren Gerard, "7000 Cheer and Weep at Rally to Support Israel," Toronto Star, 10 October 1973, BI. 50 Gary Levine, "Half Ottawa Jewish Community Joins Enthusiastic Rally on Parliament Hill," Canadian Jewish News, 12 October 1973, i. 51 "An Open Letter to the Canadian People," Vancouver Sun, 13 October 1973, 752 Interview with u i A official. 53 Howard Stanislawski, "Elites, Domestic Interest Groups, and International Interests in the Canadian Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: The Arab Economic Boycott of Canadians and Canadian Companies Doing Business with Israel," doctoral dissertation, Brandeis University, 1981. 54 See George Takach, "Clark and the Jerusalem Embassy Affair: Initiative and Constraint in Canadian Foreign Policy," in this volume. 55 Alan Rose, "Addressing the Federal Governance," 8-9 (mimeo). 56 William Shaffir and Morton Weinfeld, "Canada and the Jews: An Introduction," in Shaffir, Weinfeld, and Cotler, eds., The Canadian Jewish Mosaic, 19. 57 See David Dewitt and John Kir ton, "Canadian and Mideast Realities," International Perspectives (January/February 1984). 58 Erna Paris, "Aftermath: Canada's Jews and the Summer of Lebanon," Quest (April 1983): 32. 59 Ibid., 34; "Azrieli Opposes Criticism by Canadian Zionists," Canadian Jewish News, 19 April 1984,5.

HOWARD STANISLAWSKI

Canadian Corporations and Their Middle East Interests

CORPORATE INTERESTS AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN CANADA

While interest group participation in foreign policy making generally has been discouraged by governmental and bureaucratic elites, corporate involvement often has been viewed in a favourable light. Some analysts have viewed the process of decision as one in which there is close co-operation among governmental elites and corporate interest groups which together work out both the parameters within which decisions can be made and the decisions themselves.1 In particular, the theory of elite accommodation holds that political decisions are made through a process of consultation and bargaining between interest group elites and political-bureaucratic elites, most of whose members share similar social and economic backgrounds and political values.2 On foreign policy issues in general, and on Middle East policy in particular, interventions by Canadian corporations were certainly rare prior to the 19805. Canada's quest for a role in the Middle East, directed as it was towards conciliation and peacekeeping, in no way involved corporate interests. International pressures and moral support for Israel were the key elements in establishing the governmental perspective toward the Middle East. All this changed, however, with the coming to power of Pierre Trudeau. The foreign policy review process of 1968-70 effectively abandoned morality and mediation as the basis for Middle East policy and substituted an overt quest for economic gain. The 1970 white paper, Foreign Policy for Canadians, had no shortage of elaborate formulations about what constituted the national interest. It listed six major themes of national policy - economic growth, sovereignty and independence, peace and security, social justice, quality of life, and a healthy natural environment. The first theme was in fact the

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most important, and it became the overriding factor in the determination of foreign policy options. As the policy document stated: Fostering Economic Growth is primarily a matter of developing the Canadian economy, seeking to ensure its sustained and balanced growth. This theme embraces a wide range of economic, commercial and financial objectives in the foreign field, such as: promotion of exports; management of resources and energies; trade and tariff agreements; loans and investments; currency stabilization and convertibility; improved transportation, communications and technologies generally; manpower and expertise through immigration; tourism.3

With this in mind, the Trudeau government sought to reformulate its Middle East policy so as to assess issues from a fresh perspective. It reduced the attention paid to the traditional political problems posed by the Arab-Israeli conflict and saw as a new priority the broadening of bilateral ties with Arab states, especially with those states which were enriched by increased oil profits after 1973. This constituted a fundamental shift in policy. Canadian corporate interests were now able to claim that their quest for profit coincided with the national interest as enunciated by the government. Even so, overt corporate lobbying on Middle East issues would begin only after a challenge to their interests had been launched. That challenge was faced and met in the controversies over the Arab boycott and Jerusalem embassy issues. THE A R A B ECONOMIC BOYCOTT

The Arab boycott operation had its origins in the earliest decades of Jewish-Arab strife in Palestine under the British Mandate. At the founding of the Arab League in 1944, one of its stated objectives was "to frustrate further Jewish economic development in Palestine by means of a boycott against Zionist produce," and member states undertook to prevent the entry of Jewish-produced goods into their countries. A Central Boycott Office (c B o) was established to co-ordinate this effort, although each Arab League state was responsible for instituting its own boycott operation. After the establishment of the state of Israel in May 1948, the boycott of Jewish goods and services became a boycott of Israeli goods and services. Soon afterward, the direct or primary boycott was extended into one with secondary and tertiary dimensions.4 A primary boycott is a direct boycott of Israel and Israeli goods and services by Arab states, firms, or individuals. Countries such as Canada and the United States essentially are unaffected by and play no role in the primary boycott. The secondary boycott is the attempt by Arab

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governments or institutions to pressure firms in other countries not to deal with Israel or Zionists by making no commercial relations with Israel a condition for trade with Arab states. The tertiary boycott is an attempt to prevent companies in uninvolved third-party states from dealing with firms or with other states that have a relationship with Israel or Zionists. Respecting the terms of this boycott is again a requirement for doing business with Arab governments or clients. A fourth type of boycott, the voluntary boycott (also known as a shadow boycott or chilling effect), has come into being as a logical extension of the secondary and tertiary boycotts. So as not to antagonize present or prospective Arab business partners, firms simply decline to deal with Israel or Zionist-related firms or individuals in any way, even to the point of rejecting attractive and available business opportunities. Under the provisions of the boycott, firms or individuals seeking to engage in business with Arab states or enterprises are asked to provide information about their activities, although sometimes such information may already have been compiled by the c B o or its affiliates. Arab boycott provisions must normally be fulfilled in writing. Documents involved may be as simple as a "negative certificate of origin," stipulating that none of the goods involved in a transaction are of Israeli origin, in whole or in part, or as complex as an entire series of attestations to secondary and tertiary provisions. Controversy has arisen frequently regarding the explicitly anti-Jewish criteria utilized in the boycott's operations. In general, it appears that the terms "Zionist" and '7ew" were used interchangeably until the post-1973 period, although even in later years documentation retained clear anti-Jewish terminology. Even when the term "Jew" is not used in documents, evidence suggests that the term "Zionist" is understood to include all Jews. That this presumption existed was not denied by Sheik Ahmed Zaki al-Yamani, then Saudi oil minister, in a statement in Ottawa in June ig?g.5 After a series of boycott-related incidents in the 19505 and 19605, the United States Congress passed an amendment to the Export Administration Act in 1965, requiring all American exporters to report to the Department of Commerce on the receipt and nature of any Arab boycott-related request. Though the American government stated its firm opposition to boycott stipulations, the act did not prohibit compliance with boycott provisions. In the following decade, United StatesArab trade increased considerably, reaching US$54 billion by 1975 and u s$8.36 billion by 1978.6 A tightening of the reporting requirement in 1975 led to the collection and publication of substantial information about the boycott. For example, in the year beginning i October 1975

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and ending 30 September 1976,3,477 exporters, banks, freight forwarders, insurers, and carriers reported the receipt of 169,710 boycottrelated requests. These involved 97,491 transactions with a total value of us$7-7 billion. Fifteen per cent of these requests were classed as discriminatory on the basis of race or religion.7 In response to these developments, thirteen American states enacted anti-boycott statutes, and two federal statutes were adopted: the Ribicoff Amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and the Export Administration Act of 1977. These prohibited secondary and tertiary boycott clauses, established a compulsory and comprehensive reporting mechanism for all boycott-related requests received by American firms, and denied a wide variety of tax benefits to corporations found to have contravened American anti-boycott law.8 Dire predictions made by major corporations about grave retaliatory measures by Arab states proved groundless.9 For example, Dresser Industries of Dallas, Texas, purchased two full pages in the Wall Street Journal in April 1977 to predict that "500,000 jobs hang in the balance as Congress considers more boycott legislation."10 No such consequences ensued. In fact, United States trade, even with the most militant Arab states, increased after the federal statutes were adopted, and some Arab states even began to change their boycott provisions to avoid contravening the American laws.11 In the United States many major corporations worked with American Jewish organizations to seek a resolution of the boycott problem.12 In Canada, however, with the exception of some initiatives by the banking sector, corporations were generally firmly opposed to anti-boycott action. The lobbying process which they initiated evolved into a multimedia lobbying extravaganza. Indeed, as we shall see, corporations waged a fierce battle to prevent the enactment of such legislation in Canada. JERUSALEM AND THE CANADIAN EMBASSY

A detailed chronicle of the Jerusalem embassy affair can be found elsewhere in this volume.13 However, a general sketch of the issue is important to establish the context for what follows here. From 1922 to 1948 Jerusalem had been the administrative capital of Mandatory Palestine, governed by Great Britain under the authority of the League of Nations. In 1947, when Britain decided to leave Palestine, it returned the mandate to the United Nations, the League's successor in law, and in November 1947 the United Nations adopted a partition plan for Palestine. The plan was a complex seven-segment scheme envisaging a

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three-segment Jewish state, a three-segment Arab state, and an internationalized corpus separatum for Jerusalem. The corpus separatum was to exist for ten years, after which the inhabitants of the city were to determine its future status. While Jewish authorities accepted the plan (although they were deeply pained by the exclusion of Jerusalem from the Jewish state), Arab states and Arab leaders in Palestine rejected the scheme and invaded Palestine in May 1948 in an attempt to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state. In the 1948-9 fighting, Trans-Jordanian Arab Legionnaires sacked the Jewish Quarter of Old Jerusalem, expelled its Jewish inhabitants, and sought to capture the entire city. Israeli resistance succeeded in securing only western sections of Jerusalem, and the 1949 armistice agreement between Trans-Jordan and Israel divided the city between them. Barbed wire cut Jerusalem in two and, contrary to the express provisions of the armistice agreement, Jews were denied access to Jewish holy sites that were in Trans-Jordanian hands. In 1950 Trans-Jordan (which had changed its name to Jordan) annexed eastern Jerusalem and other parts of Mandatory Palestine (now known by a new term, the West Bank). Jordan excluded all Jews and there were widespread desecrations of Jewish holy sites in that country. In late 1949 Israel declared Jerusalem its capital and began to move its governmental offices there from Tel Aviv. Because Western states had not yet given up all formal allegiance to the defunct corpus separatum scheme, most placed their embassies in Tel Aviv. Only Holland kept its embassy in Jerusalem. Canada opened its embassy in Israel in the mid1950s in Tel Aviv, in deference to the internationalization notion and with the expectation that the status of Jerusalem would be resolved in future peace negotiations. It is interesting to note, however, that in the period prior to 1967, all new embassies opened in Israel by African, Asian, and Latin American states were located in Jerusalem. After the 1967 and 1973 wars, a number of Third World states, under Arab and/or Soviet pressure, broke diplomatic relations with Israel and closed their diplomatic missions. Nonetheless, at the time of the controversy in Canada over the site of the Canadian embassy, thirteen embassies were located in Jerusalem, including those of the Netherlands and of Venezuela and Ecuador (both members of the Organization of the PetroleumExporting Countries). The presence of Canada's embassy in Tel Aviv, then, bore no direct relation to Israel's capture and integration of eastern Jerusalem in 1967. The roots of the decision lay in the late 19405 and early 19505. By not moving its embassy to Israel's capital, however, Canada seemed to be conveying the message that it viewed Jerusalem - all of Jerusalem,

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western and eastern segments - as negotiable and subject to removal from Israeli jurisdiction. Although it has refrained from dramatizing the issue, Israel sees this as an affront.14 During his visit to Canada in November 1978, the Israeli prime minister, Menachem Begin, rekindled the embassy issue. Prime Minister Trudeau was adamant in rejecting the proposal that the embassy be moved. Then, in the election campaign of 1979, the Progressive Conservative leader, Joe Clark, announced his commitment to move the embassy to Jerusalem, a commitment he repeated in his first press conference upon assuming power in June 1979. A massive campaign of orchestrated propaganda, punctuated by grave and exaggerated threats of Arab retaliation, led to his retraction of the commitment and capitulation to the wishes of a corporate-Arab-foreign policy elite alliance unprecedented in Canadian history. Clark's Jerusalem policy entangled the embassy question with the Arab boycott issue and established a new context for corporate lobbying on foreign policy. That entanglement and the overt political activities that ensued form a fascinating chapter in the evolution of contemporary foreign policy making. LOBBYING ON THE ARAB BOYCOTT AND JERUSALEM EMBASSY ISSUES

The Canadian experience with the Arab boycott of Israel in the 19703 was characterized by virtually unceasing efforts by federal government officials to stymie the development of any apparatus or law to curtail boycott activities. It should be noted, however, that political leaders found the boycott at the very least offensive and contrary to traditional Canadian values and practices. For many years, despite apparent acquiescence by many Canadians and Canadian companies with the boycott, the Canadian government undertook no response of any kind. Canada pursued a general policy of seeking to maximize all trading opportunities and the boycott was not seen as particularly significant. As part of their normal support role, Canadian government personnel abroad forwarded information to Canadian firms about boycott requirements, and Canadian government publications provided information on how to comply with the boycott.15 Notwithstanding their inaction on the boycott question, Canadian decision-makers had a strong predisposition against the extraterritorial application of foreign law to Canadians engaged in international commerce. This problem had arisen in cases involving American pressure on subsidiaries of American multinational corporations in Canada,

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when these companies were asked to refrain from entering into certain types of transactions with designated foreign states under the terms of the American statute known as the Trading with the Enemy Act. This policy led to a number of conflicts with the Canadian government over the right of Canadian subsidiaries of American corporations to trade with prohibited countries (such as Cuba, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China). In each such instance, Canada firmly upheld the principle of sovereignty and repeatedly advised the United States government that foreign-owned corporations operating in Canada were required to act in accordance with Canadian laws.16 The Arab boycott became a significant issue in the period following the 1973 Yom Kippur War when oil price increases led to a substantial growth in Arab economic power. In April 1975, Herb Gray (who had previously been but was not at that time in the federal cabinet) revealed that the Export Development Corporation (EDC), a federal crown corporation providing both financing and insurance coverage for export transactions, had been giving export insurance coverage to transactions that were in compliance with Arab boycott provisions. On 8 May 1975 Prime Minister Trudeau stated in the House of Commons: "I think it is sufficient to say that this type of practice is alien to everything the government stands for and, indeed, to what in general, Canadian ethics stand for."17 The statement of principle was not, however, translated into policy, despite an intense lobbying campaign against the boycott during the next eighteen months spearheaded by Canadian Jewish organizations. They mobilized support for anti-boycott legislation through a media campaign and sought support from human rights and civil liberties associations, trade unions, and other bodies. They stressed repeatedly that this was a case of outright discrimination based on race and religion. On 6 August 1976 the Globe and Mail carried a front-page banner headline announcing a major government leak: "Pro-Israel lobby exaggerates harm of Arabs' boycott, Ottawa is told. Secret memo gives policy options." The copyrighted story provided details from a secret cabinet memorandum claiming that the boycott "does not appear to discriminate against the Jewish race or religion." The memorandum suggested four possible approaches, but warned that Canada had to act in concert with other countries. Failure to do so could provoke Arab retaliation and seriously endanger Canadian trade and economic activities in the Middle East. The memorandum also suggested that Canadian policy on the boycott must be "consistent with our policy of balance and objectivity toward the Arab-Israel dispute." If anti-Canadian actions were taken by Arab states, the story quoted the memo as claiming, "Canada would stand to lose a multi-million-dollar market

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(product exports amounted to approximately $i63-million in 1975) and an important source of crude oil (approximately 40 per cent of Canada's oil imports were from the Arab world in 1975)." While Canada's 1975 total exports were $33 billion, the memo apparently contended that "the loss of these markets and this source of oil would probably have serious effects on the Canadian economy in the nature of oil shortages and unemployment." The memo noted that Canadian governmental officials knew of only seven cases of boycott clauses inserted into contracts with Canadian firms and that "we are not aware of any cases where contracts have been lost because Canadian exporters have refused to include boycott clauses in contracts."18 The next day, the Globe carried an article providing substantive information contradicting the government memorandum. "Arabs' Israel boycott gets Canadian compliance. Government, airlines, publications observe some terms," by Arnold Bruner, documented a series of incidents involving acceptance of boycott-related conditions by Canadians. Its most significant revelation was probably the practice of the Department of External Affairs authenticating certificates of religious affiliation for Canadians seeking to prove that they were not Jewish in order to obtain visas to Saudi Arabia. In the wake of mounting criticism of the government's policy, an External Affairs spokesman announced on 12 August that instructions were being sent to its embassies that, effective immediately, they would no longer authenticate declarations of religious affiliation. Notwithstanding the government's decision to end such practices "immediately," the administrative guidelines implementing this change were not issued until nine months later.19 In mid-September 1976 the prospect of anti-boycott legislation being enacted in the United States raised concern in Canada. Because the proposed amendments to the Export Administration Act contained provisions which related to actions by American subsidiaries abroad, they would presumably have limited the ability of American-owned corporations in Canada to comply with the Arab boycott. The ironic possibility was therefore developing of Canada making representations to the United States to exempt Canadian resident corporations from an American law for whose purposes Prime Minister Trudeau had already proclaimed support. After continuing controversy in the press, the federal government announced an anti-boycott policy on 21 October 1976, to be implemented not by legislation but by administrative guidelines. This policy, it was stated, would deny government services, support, and facilities to companies for transactions that required adherence to the boycott. Under this policy the government would require all Canadians to

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report to the government on their experiences with boycott requests and would make public the names of firms signing unacceptable clauses.20 While initially attractive to anti-boycott activists, its subsequent haphazard application by the Department of Industry, Trade, and Commerce, the many loopholes that soon became apparent, and a number of ex post facto reinterpretations of the policy that had the effect of widening those loopholes led to a renewed campaign for comprehensive anti-boycott legislation. The January 1977 report of the Commission on Economic Coercion and Discrimination, a citizens' panel composed of distinguished Canadians from all major political parties, once again brought the issue to the forefront. The commission, chaired by Irwin Cotler (a professor of law at McGill University), found that major Canadian banks, corporations, boards of trade, and chambers of commerce continued to comply with the boycott. The report maintained: The issue at this point goes beyond the question of the protection of Canadian sovereignty, the affirmation of free trade and the protection of the civil liberties of our citizens - though this alone would be enough ... What is at stake now is the credibility of our commitments and the integrity of our policies. At some point we must say - the sovereignty of this country is not for sale. In defining our policy on the Arab boycott, we are really making a statement of ourselves as a people.21

Editorials were unanimous in calling on the federal government to enact serious comprehensive anti-boycott legislation.22 On 21 January 1977 the government quietly released the guidelines23 that were being used and thereby revealed that the policy had been watered down considerably. The vast majority of boycott requests continued to be tolerable and no loss of government assistance would result from corporate acceptance of them. In addition, the reporting mechanism clearly called for in the government's policy statement was simply abandoned in the guidelines. Officials of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce would keep track of cases of which they heard, and semi-annual reports of the information at their disposal would be made. Response among Canadian corporations and business communities varied considerably. The banks denied any involvement with the boycott and stated their eagerness to receive detailed and definitive government guidelines. An official of the Royal Bank of Canada stated that the bank had not knowingly "negotiated any letters of credit including terms and conditions commonly referred to as secondary and tertiary boycott provisions" and that the bank "will not nego-

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tiate any letters of credit in the future which might include such terms."24 Other corporate bodies were less inclined to work toward conciliatory solutions. Meanwhile the Arab states seemed to be altering their boycott demands in response to United States legislative pressures. Indeed, in its March 1977 bulletin, the Canadian Export Association informed its members that a large number of Arab states had dropped a requirement for negative certificates of origin - that is, "that the goods being exported are of Canadian origin." Among the Arab states which softened their certification requirements were Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic, and Yemen. Iraq was the only major Arab state which refused to modify its position.25 On 29 March 1977 Paul Beauchemin, president of the Association of Consulting Engineers of Canada, condemned the government's policy as "disastrous" to Canadian consulting engineers and other firms trying to market services and products in the Middle East. He said that the association disagreed "with a potential punishment such as publicly naming" a firm for accepting a contract containing a boycott clause. "The Canadian government does not have the power to pass judgment on the morals of that firm," Beauchemin stated, and he indicated that the association would seek a meeting with the secretary of state for external affairs to "tell him not to mix trade and foreign policy."26 Several weeks later, the Consulting Engineers Association of Ontario publicly dissociated itself from Beauchemin's statement, asking him to refrain from making statements "that are not in the common interests of all its members."27 On 12 May 1977 John MacDonald, president of the Export Development Corporation, revealed in testimony before the House of Commons Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs how the E D c was implementing the government's anti-boycott policy. Under questioning, he indicated that the E D c-insured contracts carried a clause issued by the ED c stating that "if the contract or agreement carries requirements that are contradictory to the policy statement herein appended, [the E D c insurance] policy is null and void." However, he added that in contracts that were directly financed, clauses in ancillary documents might not be seen by the EDC and that, even if they were seen, the inclusion of boycott clauses in an ancillary document would not be viewed as constituting their inclusion in the contract. This provided a loophole which allowed continuation of E D c support to firms complying with boycott provisions.28 In June 1977, while controversy swirled around the federal govern-

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ment's stance, the Canadian Association of Statutory Human Rights Agencies passed two resolutions calling for anti-boycott legislation and, in September 1977, the Canadian Labour Congress did the same. In the midst of all these events, Ontario's premier, William Davis, promised to introduce provincial anti-boycott legislation, should federal inaction continue. After lengthy and careful study, Ontario's antiboycott bill was passed and enacted in November 1978. Extensive consideration had been given to the bill and the views of business groups were actively solicited by the legislative committee which held hearings on the bill. Testimony and documentation were received from Arab groups, Canadian Jewish organizations, the banking community, and concerned citizens.29 The Association of Canadian Financial Corporations, the Credit Granters' Association of Toronto, the London Chamber of Commerce, and the Board of Trade of Metropolitan Toronto all strongly endorsed the bill while expressing some concern about the potential application of business considerations in situations not involving the Arab boycott. Revisions to the bill accommodated these concerns. The Canadian Manufacturers' Association, however, found itself in an uncomfortable position. It believed that adverse economic consequences might flow from the bill, but was "disapproving of boycotts and all the consequent disruption they produce."30 The association did not publicly fight the bill, limiting itself to a brief written submission. Apparently, opposition to the Ontario statute was expressed only privately. In public, only specific criticisms and limited requests for modifications were offered. Government officials made no attempt to obstruct the bill's passage. As a result, the anti-boycott bill was passed with all-party support. It prohibited adherence to the boycott by Ontario-based firms and the furnishing of information relating to boycott requests. A compulsory reporting mechanism which included annual* reports was established. Fines and other punitive measures could be imposed on those who violated the new statute.31 In 1977 and 1978 the federal Liberal government was subjected to continuing pressure on the boycott issue from the media and the Jewish community. This was resisted by some government officials and business groups. While behind-the-scenes business pressures had failed to dissuade the Ontario government from its initiative, on the federal level these pressures were able to combine with bureaucratic and political forces to prevent, or at least forestall, new developments. Nonetheless, a series of damaging revelations led to further controversy. The release by the government of its first and second semi-annual reports on 10 February 1978 (for the period from 31 October 1976 to 31 July 1977) and on 30 May 1978 (for the period from i August 1977 to 31 January 1978)

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illustrated clearly that major deficiencies existed. In particular, the second report caused an immediate uproar, because the government had refused to name a company to which it had temporarily suspended support because of that company's compliance with the boycott. The Globe and Mail identified the company as Canadian Westinghouse Ltd.32 The minister of industry, trade, and commerce, Jack Horner, added fuel to the controversy when he indicated publicly that he would do as little as possible to implement an anti-boycott programme of any consequence. In August 1978, in anticipation of a forthcoming general election, the government announced that it would introduce a bill to establish a compulsory and comprehensive reporting mechanism. While the House of Commons reconvened in October 1978, the bill was introduced only in mid-December and was never brought back for legislative action. During the 1979 election campaign, the Liberal party promised to reintroduce the bill while opposition parties called for the enactment of much stronger legislation along the lines of the American and Ontario statutes. The election of a Progressive Conservative government on 22 May 1979 gave rise to expectations that such legislation would be tabled soon after the opening of the new Parliament. However, the controversy over the proposed move of the Canadian embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem smothered the boycott issue. BELL CANADA AS AN ACTIVIST CORPORATE LOBBY

From March 1978 until late 1979, a major boycott-related issue flared, involving charges that Bell Canada had complied with various discriminatory and restrictive trade provisions of the Arab boycott. The controversy had a significant impact on how the issue was perceived by the Canadian public and on the developing federal and provincial responses to the issue. It illustrated the extent to which Bell had become a major pro-Arab lobbyist in the Canadian political system. On 14 December 1977 the government of Saudi Arabia awarded a contract for the extension and modernization of the Saudi telephone system to a consortium consisting of Bell Canada, Phillips of the Netherlands, and L.M. Ericsson of Sweden. On 25 January 1978 Bell signed a separate five-year contract for $1.1 billion to operate and maintain the kingdom's telephone system, construct certain facilities, and procure specific materials and supplies.33 Bell and Canadian government officials saw the contract as a major success for Canadian export policy. At the time it signed this contract, Bell was about to come before the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (c RTC) seeking approval for the highest increase in telephone

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rates in Bell's history. At these hearings, one of Bell's principal opponents was the National Anti-Poverty Organization (NAPO). Bell indicated that it planned to use profits from the Saudi contract to pay special dividends to its shareholders rather than to offset a rate increase. On 17 March Bell's president, James Thackray, was interviewed on the c B c radio program, "As It Happens." Asked if Bell had signed a boycott agreement, Thackray admitted that Bell had stated that it had no direct business relationship with Israel and he indicated that Bell would refrain from dealing with Israel at least for the five-year duration of the contract. He remarked that Israel did not need "any help from us on how to operate or manage a telephone system."34 When the CRTC hearings began in April, N A P O promptly claimed that Bell's adherence to the boycott was an indication of its lack of morality. Government officials testified that Bell had received federal government assistance for the Saudi contract, including $430 million in E D C insurance coverage.35 The CRTC ruled that the details of the contract should be investigated. Bell appealed the ruling, arguing that the document was confidential and that publicity might jeopardize the $100 million in profits anticipated by Bell over the five-year period.36 Though Bell refused to release the text of the boycott clause it had signed, Herb Gray obtained and released the full text of a "statement of fact" in which Bell had affirmed that it had no business ties with Israel.37 In addition, a prospectus for Bell Canada International employees was discovered, informing all employees eligible for service with the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) in Saudi Arabia that they must provide twelve photocopies of "proof of religion in the form of baptismal or other certificates."38 Later, in January 1979, the Consumers' Association of Canada obtained major sections of the Bell contract from the Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington where it had been deposited in accordance with American law. It soon became apparent that the contract contained several boycott provisions. In June 1979, shortly after being sworn in as Canada's new prime minister, Joe Clark reaffirmed his campaign pledge to move Canada's embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Arab governments and their embassies in Canada reacted immediately and within days a major lobbying campaign was under way. Canadian corporate interests were encouraged to proclaim both publicly and privately that an embassy move would be disastrous for Canadian trade with the Arab Middle East. Bell Canada took an early and leading role in this lobbying effort. On 8 June, Bell officials stated that the proposed embassy move threatened Bell's contract to revamp the Saudi telephone system.

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Exactly how the Saudis would penalize Bell when its contract was already in the third year of a five-year term was not clear; however, David Orr, Bell's director of public relations explained that "the Saudis have deep feelings about the embassy location." Orr argued that "the current uproar is particularly untimely" because the Saudi government had done an additional forecast of its needs and was in the preliminary stages of a plan to add 285,000 phone lines.39 And in response to a letter from a Bell shareholder complaining of Bell's active pro-Arab involvement, Mr Thackray wrote: Up until recently, Canada's position of neutrality in the Middle East conflict has served us well. Canadians have been favourably received throughout the Middle East precisely because we threatened no one and had not attempted to line up with one side or the other. With the announcement of the proposed move to Jerusalem, this has changed. Canada is now seen as contemplating a unilateral change in the status of Jerusalem, a holy city to the Moslems as well as to Christians and Jews. It is we who have threatened to disturb the status quo against the perceived interest of the Arab countries. We shouldn't be surprised by their reaction ... My own view is that our interests will be served best by regaining our former advantageous position of neutrality as quickly as possible.40

On 5 July 1979 the Globe and Mail reported on its front page that a major Bell subsidiary, Northern Telecom, was considering bidding on a contract to supply telephone equipment to the Emirates Telecommunications Corporation, the telephone company of the United Arab Emirates. The contract required the acceptance of the following clause, affirming both fact and intent: "The contractor as a condition precedent to entering this contract declares that he has no commercial or economic relations with Israel and no interests, branches, or agencies in Israel. Further, the contractor declares that he will not engage in import or trading in goods produced in Israel or work for Israel's advancement or matters relating to financial operations or any other dealings." Northern Telecom officials confirmed their interest in the contract, though they were unable as yet to determine how they would deal with the boycott clause.41 Two days later, Bob Scrivener, Northern Telecom's chairman and chief executive officer, was far more outspoken, saying that he was willing to provide a "test case" on the boycott by signing the contract and then going to the Supreme Court of Canada if either the federal or Ontario governments tried to block the bid. 'It's not a question of morality," Scrivener said. "I'm not taking sides on the moral issue. It's like getting caught between two Irishmen - winding up with my nose

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broken." Canadian industry "can blow the Arab market, and many jobs." Scrivener argued that Northern Telecom had spent over five years developing relations with Arab countries, that it soon expected to be doing business worth in excess of $100 million a year with the Arabs, and that "all this will go down the drain ... if contracts with the Arabs are blocked."42 As the controversy over the Jerusalem embassy continued, Bell's lobbying intensified. In October, Bell claimed that it had not been able to negotiate an expansion of its contract with the Saudis although its consortium partners had succeeded in doing so.43 It should be noted, however, that Arab threats against Canada for boycott-related actions had preceded the Jerusalem embassy affair. For example, the Gkbe and Mail published a front-page story on 20 March 1979 entitled 'Irritated by Ontario's pro-Israel law, Saudis curb visas, threaten trade ban." The article said that Saudi Arabia had tightened its visa policy for Canadian businessmen and, in protest against the Ontario anti-boycott bill, was considering not doing business with Canadians. It quoted Omar Bamanie, a counsellor at the Saudi embassy in Ottawa, as saying that the Ontario legislation "is not for the benefit of Canada" and could lead to a loss of millions of dollars worth of contracts for Canadians. He reportedly stated that the Ontario legislation was one of the reasons why Saudi Arabia had begun restricting visas for Canadians in January of that year. The article also quoted an unnamed External Affairs official as agreeing that "the boycott legislation has something to do with what's going on."44 In response to this article and questions arising from it, Mr Homer said that Canada was losing valuable sales in Saudi Arabia because of the Ontario legislation, and he called on businessmen to complain to the Ontario government. The measure, he said, "goes much farther than they intended. That legislation is costing us trade, causing difficulty in the banking fraternity, and has businessmen very concerned." Horner commented that he was not surprised by the Saudi attitude, and while he did not put a figure on the amount of trade allegedly being lost because of Ontario's stand, he insisted that amount was large.45 CORPORATE LOBBYING DURING THE CONSERVATIVE INTERREGNUM

The minority Conservative government of Joe Clark was to govern Canada for only six months. During that time the Conservatives failed to fulfil their commitments on either the Arab boycott or the transfer of the Canadian embassy in Israel. The harsh reaction of the Arab states, opposition by government officials, and intense lobbying by a large

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number of corporate leaders not only doomed the embassy proposal but also led the Conservative government to fear any initiative with regard to the Arab boycott. The success achieved by Arab and Canadian corporate interests in overturning what had been a clear commitment to move the embassy emboldened those interests to threaten equal or even more serious economic or diplomatic consequences if stricter anti-boycott action was undertaken. Three years of promises from Clark and his party to enact legislation were simply abandoned. While reaffirming his commitment to move the embassy to Jerusalem at his 5 June press conference, Prime Minister Clark declined to provide a time-frame for the move. He did say, however, that the secretary of state for external affairs, Flora MacDonald, would work with officials in her department on the details of the move. Arab reaction was immediate and intense. The director of the Arab League office in Ottawa said that all twenty-two Arab countries had agreed to take dramatic action, should the embassy be moved. This would include the severing of diplomatic relations and the curtailment of all existing and planned economic links.46 Arab ambassadors accredited to Canada spoke openly of their goals. "What is needed now," their spokesman said, "is pressure from our governments to stop this silly action before it happens."47 Initial editorial reaction was not supportive of the embassy move. The Toronto Star and the Montreal Star both carried front-page stories quoting unnamed spokesmen in the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce as saying that Canada would lose $1 billion of business, 55,700 jobs, and 250,000 barrels of oil per day.48 "Arabs threaten us with economic war" was the Toronto Sun's front-page headline. It also reported that a departmental spokesman had said that $1.6 billion of imported petroleum would be lost to Canada.49 Corporate manoeuvres, both in the public arena and behind the scenes, intensified the controversy. On 12 June, Canadian Westinghouse claimed that it had been in the final stages of negotiating an $85million generator contract with Libya which would have provided over 200 jobs to Canadians when, according to Westinghouse's president, "the whole affair broke off and the customer has not talked to us since." On the basis of this allegation (shown to be false several weeks later), the Toronto Star carried a front-page banner headline reading "Firm fears huge Arab deal lost." Bell Canada also continued to apply pressure. Its president, Jean de Grandpre, stated that after a meeting with Saudi officials, Bell had complained directly to Clark and the minister of industry, trade and commerce, Robert de Cotret. Reports also surfaced about a $2-million contract that government-owned Air Canada had signed with Saudi Arabian Airlines to provide maintenance services for

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the Saudi airline's L-IOII aircraft. Air Canada acknowledged that it had signed a clause stating that no Israeli national or Israeli company would be involved in the contract.50 Threats of Arab retaliation soon provoked a backlash. For example, a Toronto Star editorial, "Stand up to the Arabs," stated that the "Jerusalem affair" had "overnight changed its character": "It is the job of ambassadors to convey the wishes of their governments to the government of the country to which they are accredited. It is offensive and impermissible to have them engage in a campaign of blackmail - and wage it through the press and other unofficial channels." The editorial called on the government to tell the Arab ambassadors that "Canada would not tolerate any such indecent campaigns of intimidation as we have witnessed, in shock and disbelief, in the past week."51 Other editorials echoed the Star's strong stance. Threats by Arab governments and business interests subsided for several days. It was not long, however, before such action resumed. On 18 June, in Abu Dhabi, the director of the Arab Monetary Fund announced that the fund had decided to boycott all Canadian banks and financial institutions and had told all its affiliates to withdraw their capital from Canada. (In fact, the fund had no money at all in Canada.) In addition, the Islamic Conference of forty-two states called on Canada to reverse its stand or face adverse reaction in its relations with those states.52 Though neither bank spokesmen nor government officials were able to identify what the AMF was or whether it had any financial links to Canada, its announcement set off a wave of panic. In one of the most important developments of the period, the Royal Bank of Canada issued a statement which encouraged a major new alarm. The bank feared "a possible interruption of the flow of capital investment from Arab sources" and observed that "Canadian business might lose access to Middle East markets." The bank admitted, however, that "at this time, the Royal has not experienced withdrawals of deposits by Arab nations."53 In an interview, the bank's president, Rowland Frazee, underlined the seriousness of the situation from his perspective, saying that "we can't afford to jeopardize that business."54 Within two days of the AMF announcement, its insignificance became clear, as did the fact that no other Arab institutions or governments had followed the AMF lead in threatening financial disruption. By this time, though, Canadian banks had already involved themselves in intense and unprecedented lobbying on a foreign policy issue, both publicly and privately. Editorialists and commentators were aroused by the revived business initiatives. The Globe and Mail, the Toronto Sun, and columnists Joan Sutton and Laura Sabia called for strong government opposition to

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Arab blackmail.55 The Toronto Star attacked the Arab campaign for its "unconscionable propaganda coupled with frequently undiplomatic moves by Moslem diplomats in Ottawa": "In this unseemly game, some Canadian business interests have fallen in with the Arab propagandists. It is not that any of them has yet been hurt. The talk is all in terms of 'may' and 'might'... what cannot be tolerated is a brazen effort mounted by the Arab lobby and its allies in Canada to intimidate the new government."56 Financial columnists pointed out the fanciful nature of the threats that had precipitated the panic. Jack Macarthur called the Canadian reaction "a knee-jerk conclusion-jumping mistake about cause and effect," pointing out that Arab money did not have a serious impact on Canadian commerce or stocks.57 Don McGillivray found curious "the extent to which Canadians have joined forces with the Arab countries to increase pressure on their own government." Examining what he saw as the real economic stakes, he discovered that only i per cent of Canada's exports went to the Middle East and that Canada's imports from the area accounted for only 2.5 per cent of total imports. McGillivray criticized Canadian businessmen for wanting to "surrender to the Arab pressure," and he expressed the fear that this approach, rather than saving Canada's business with the Arab world, would instead see it turned into "a permanent hostage, a tethered goat, to be menaced at will."5* On 23 June Prime Minister Clark sought to put the embassy issue on the back-burner. After meeting with the ambassadors of nine Arab states and Israel, he released a statement announcing that the highly respected former Conservative leader, Robert Stanfield, would study the whole spectrum of Canada's relations with the Middle East, including the implications of the embassy move. Stanfield would consult with Arab and Islamic governments, Canada's allies, provincial governments, the business community, and other interested groups in Canada. Stanfield's inquiry would begin in the early autumn, and he would report to the government early in the new year.59 Arab threats continued throughout the summer, though in a more muted manner. On 15 September the Toronto Star reported that Canadian firms were being boycotted by the Arabs despite the Stanfield inquiry and the government's apparent retreat on Jerusalem. Bell Canada, AT c o, De Havilland, Arthur Erickson Associates, Canadair, Litton Systems, and SNC Corporation all expressed concern that the Canadian government's policy was hurting their interests. Executives from these and other corporations reportedly met with Stanfield and urged him to recommend that the Canadian embassy remain in Tel Aviv.60 Less than a week later, on 21 September, a Quebec firm, Comterm,

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signed a $6-million contract with Saudi Arabia for the manufacture of 1000 containers.61 As a consequence of their unprecedented public and private lobbying campaign, business, Arab, and bureaucratic pressures triumphed. On 29 October 1979 Clark reported that he had received an interim report from Stanfield and had accepted the latter's recommendation that "a change in the location of the Canadian Embassy in Israel could be seen as prejudging negotiations among parties in the Middle East, and might in fact work against progress toward a just and lasting peace settlement."62 In late December, the Clark government fell on a motion of nonconfidence. In the general election of February 1980, the Conservative party was soundly defeated, and a Liberal majority government led by Pierre Trudeau returned to power. Just before Trudeau's accession, on 20 February 1980, Stanfield submitted his final report. While Stanfield began by writing "that while Canada has important economic interests in the area, our most fundamental goal there is to contribute to a just and lasting peace," his report was in fact a clear reflection of the policies he believed Canada should pursue to maximize its economic interests. He recommended that Canada not transfer its embassy from Tel Aviv and suggested that anti-boycott legislation need not be pursued. Stanfield proposed that if clear proof of discrimination was found, then some consideration should be given to broadening the powers of the Canadian Human Rights Commission.63 By February 1980 the boycott issue had been in the public eye for almost five years and a matter of serious concern for at least two. It was also linked to the one issue that had set the tone for Clark's brief government. In the end, no federal legislation was enacted to deal with the problem. Although the substantial trade and investment envisaged with the Arab world has not materialized in the 19805, the corporate point of view won the day. CONCLUSION

The Arab boycott and Jerusalem embassy issues are interesting case studies of corporate lobbying on foreign policy issues. In some ways they represent a new chapter in the evolution of corporate lobbying in Canada. In the early periods of activity on Middle East issues, corporations acted with relative caution and even timidity. However, they gradually became more assertive. By the time of the Jerusalem embassy controversy in 1979, an unprecedented public campaign was under way. The Royal Bank of Canada and Bell Canada, among others, leaked exaggerated and frightening tales of potential developments to the

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public. Alliances, both tacit and explicit, were formed between Canadian business interests and Arab governments. Statements from one source bolstered the credibility of statements from the other. The development of these issues exemplifies the importance in Canadian policy-making of all forms of domestic interest groups - including corporate and ethnic ones - and of the alliances which international interests have established with indigenous Canadian interest groups or elites. In the longer term, the particular outcomes of the Arab boycott and Jerusalem embassy struggles may prove less significant than the breakthrough into the foreign-policy-making process that they occasioned for these groups. Canadian corporations that have expanded their markets and gained clients overseas have become significant players on Ottawa's foreign policy stage. In protecting their own interests, they have shaped the national interest. NOTES

1 Robert Presthus, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics (Toronto: Macmillan 1973), 20. 2 Ibid., 11, 60. 3 Foreign Policy for Canadians, 6 vols. (Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services 1970), 1:14. 4 Donald L. Losman, International Economic Sanctions: The Cases of Cuba, Israel, and Rhodesia (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press 1979), 47; Dan S. Chill, The Arab Boycott of Israel: Economic Aggression (New York: Praeger 1976), i; W.H. Nelson and T. Prittie, The Economic War against the Jews (New York: Random House 1977), 103; Nancy Turck, "The Arab Boycott of Israel," Foreign Affairs 55 (April 1977): 474; and Subcommittee on Oversight and Intelligence of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the United States House of Representatives, Report on the Arab Boycott (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office 1976), 20. 5 Transcript, press conference, Sheik Ahmed Zaki al-Yamani, Ottawa, 28 June 1978. 6 Turck, "The Arab Boycott of Israel," 485. 7 Ibid. 8 For provisions of the Ribicoff amendment, see Federal Register, 5 January 1977, i March 1977, and 17 August 1977. For detailed analysis of the Export Administration Act, see Stanley J. Marcuss, "The Arab Boycott Law: The Regulation of International Business Behavior," Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 8, no. 3 (1978): 559-80.

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9 For example, see New York Times, 30 September 1976, and Los Angeles Times, i November 1976. 10 Wall Street Journal, 14 April 1977. 11 See New York Times, 12 June 1978; US News and World Report, 26 June 1978; Newsday, 30 May 1978; New York Times, 12 October 1978; American Banker (April 1978); Houston Business Journal, 29 May 1978. 12 See Henry J. Steiner, "Pressures and Principles - The Politics of the Antiboycott Legislation," Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 8, no. 3 (1978): 550-5. 13 See George Takach, "Clark and the Jerusalem Embassy Affair," in this volume. 14 Even after the visit of Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, to Jerusalem in November 1977, in which he addressed Israel's parliament, met with Israeli leaders in their Jerusalem buildings, and even visited Islamic holy sites in eastern Jerusalem accompanied by Israeli politicians (something which Canadian officials have refused to do), Canada's embassy remained in Tel Aviv. 15 For example, see Canada Commerce 137 (June 1973): 17. 16 As a result of Canadian interventions in all such cases involving Cuba, the United States embargo was not applied in practice with respect to Canadian-based subsidiaries, exemptions from the embargo provisions being provided by the American government in response to Canadian representations on a case-by-case basis. 17 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 8 May 1975,5583. 18 Toronto Globe and Mail, 6 August 1976. 19 Ibid., 7 August 1976; External Affairs Consular Document, file 81-4, consular number 23/77, c s R. 20 Debates, 21 October 1976, 302-3. 21 Report of the Commission on Economic Coercion and Discrimination (Montreal: Commission on Economic Coercion and Discrimination 1977), 10-11. 22 For copies of newspaper editorials following the publication of the commission's report, see Canada and the Arab Boycott: Developments and Proposals (Montreal: Canada-Israel Committee 1977). 23 Directive on International Boycotts, Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, 21 January 1977. 24 Letter from R.G.P. Styles, general manager, Metropolitan Toronto, Royal Bank of Canada, to H. Levy, executive vice-president, B'nai Brith of Canada, 21 January 1977. 25 Canadian Export Association, Export News Bulletin, no. 636 (March 1977): 426 Ottawa Citizen, 30 March 1977.

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27 Globe and Mail, 18 May 1977. 28 Testimony of John MacDonald to House of Commons, Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 43,12 May 1977,5-9. 29 Hearings of the Standing Committee on the Administration of Justice, Legislature of Ontario, 18-28 September 1978, typescript. 30 Canadian Manufacturers' Association, brief to Standing Committee on the Administration of Justice, 8 September 1978. 31 Ontario Legislature, Bill 112,1978, sections 5-11. 32 Globe and Mail, 31 May 1978. These semi-annual reports were released by the federal Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce and the Export Development Corporation. 33 Bell Canada, s-i submission to United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, 23 March 1978, 63. 34 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (c B c), transcript of "As It Happens," 17 March 1978, 3-4. 35 Ottawa Citizen, 15 April 1978. 36 Ibid., 18 April 1978. 37 Office of the Hon. H. Gray, release, [1978]. 38 Bell Canada International, prospectus, 11 August 1977. 39 Globe and Mail, 9 June 1979. 40 Letter from J.C. Thackray, 6 July 1979. 41 Globe and Mail, 5 July 1979. 42 Toronto Star, 7 July 1979. 43 Ottawa Citizen, 8 October 1979. 44 Globe and Mail, 20 March 1979. 45 Ibid., 21 March 1979. 46 Office of the Arab League, Ottawa, press release, 6 June 1979. 47 Toronto Sun, 7 June 1979. 48 Montreal Star and Toronto Star, 7 June 1979. 49 Toronto Sun, 7 June 1979. 50 Toronto Star, 13 June 1979; Ottawa Journal, 12 June 1979. 51 Toronto Star, 12 June 1979. 52 Ottawa Citizen, 19 June 1979. 53 Royal Bank of Canada, statement, 19 June 1979. 54 Globe and Mail, 21 June 1979. 55 Toronto Sun, 21 June 1979; Toronto Star, 20 June 1979; Edmonton Sun, 26 June 1979; Toronto Sun, 26 June 1979. 56 Toronto Star, 23 June 1979. 57 Ibid., 22 June 1979. 58 Montreal Gazette, 22 June 1979. 59 Statement by Joe Clark, 23 June 1979. 60 Toronto Star, 15 September 1979.

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61 La Presse, 22 September 1979. 62 Statement by Joe Clark, 29 October 1979. Also see Debates, 29 October 1979, 694ff. 63 Final Report of the Special Representative of the Government of Canada Respecting the Middle East and North Africa (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 20 February 1980), 18.

DAVID TARAS

A Church Divided: AC. Forrest and the United Church's Middle East Policy

Scholarly writing on Canadian interest groups has focused almost exclusively on the interaction of groups with governments. The degree of access to senior politicians and officials and the amount of influence on government policies have been the preoccupations. Little has been written on inter-group politics in which interest groups struggle and bargain with each other on key issues and attempt to alter the behaviour and positions of rival organizations directly. The government is bypassed as conflicts are fought and sometimes resolved within society. This chapter will describe and analyse one such inter-group conflict. For seven years, from 1967 to 1974, the United Church of Canada and Canada's Jewish community were embroiled in an emotional dispute over their respective positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The issue was important to the self-image of both communities and the conflict between them harmed co-existence between the two groups. This is an example of how a foreign policy issue can reverberate within Canadian society and affect Canadian life. Because the Jewish community has been examined elsewhere in this volume, this article will concentrate on the United Church.1

THE C H U R C H ' S T R A D I T I O N OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT Since its establishment in 1925 as a union of Presbyterian, Methodist, and Congregational churches in Canada, the United Church has had as one of its essential teachings the tenet that faith could be expressed through action and involvement. It has stressed the importance of being "an authentically Christian witness in our country."2 In accordance with this tenet, the United Church has lobbied the federal and provincial governments extensively. During the 19405 and 19505 dele-

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gations were sent frequently to Parliament Hill, and the church organized letter-writing campaigns, speaking tours, and prayer meetings to publicize its concerns on such issues as abortion, capital punishment, and health care. The relationship between leading churchmen and politicians tended to be informal and familiar, but from time to time a great deal of pressure was exerted.3 A more circumspect approach prevailed during the 19605. Nonetheless, the secretary of the church's General Council wrote to the prime minister about every resolution passed by that body.4 In the 19705 lobbying became more sophisticated with a greater emphasis on research and on co-ordinating efforts with other churches. Representatives of the United Church met with federal ministers approximately half a dozen times each year, and occasionally there were meetings with the prime minister. As one observer has described the situation, "politicians and church leaders have known for years that the church is a lobby too and an important one."5 Foreign policy questions have long been a vital concern within the United Church. A church committee on international affairs was in operation even before the Department of External Affairs had its first full-time minister. In his memoirs, the Reverend James Mutchmor claims that the church had a "share in the federal government's decision to have a full-time Minister of External Affairs" and admits trying to influence Mackenzie King to choose St Laurent as that minister.6 The church often has taken strong independent positions: in September 1952 the General Council, the church's highest decision-making body, passed a resolution calling for recognition of the People's Republic of China and in September 1954 the United Church became the first Canadian church to propose an end to nuclear testing. In 1966, the church's moderator, Dr J.R. Hood, protested the American bombing of North Vietnam. In the 19705 and 19805 the church's General Council harshly condemned racial policies in southern Africa and actions taken by dictators in Latin America.

POLITICS AND THEOLOGY: THE UNITED CHURCH AND THE MIDDLE EAST The Middle East dispute, with its complex interweaving of historical and religious claims, competing political rights, and conflicting moral justifications, held a particular fascination for the United Church. The fascination is probably rooted in the significance of the Holy Land and of the Jews in church belief. The prophecy of Israel's return from exile is a major element in the New Testament and the Holy Land is to be the site of the great cataclysms that biblical accounts declare will portend

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the second coming of Christ. Jews are to play an important role in the unfolding of these events. In a survey of United Church ministers conducted by this writer, New Testament theology appeared to be a constraining factor in shaping the political views of some. As a minister in Saskatchewan put it: "My critique of politics is from a theological stance." When asked which side Canada should support in the Arab-Israeli conflict one minister replied: 'Israel - the Bible makes this very clear." Another wrote: "Some relate issues to Biblical prophecy and produce a 'time-line' of events predicted in Scripture... I think God has his purposes but that man has a role to play in working out, discovering, fulfilling the Divine Plan Armageddon or Jerusalem." It is also significant that the church's official organ, the Observer, reacted to Israel's establishment in 1948 by warning the Jews not to promote nationalism at the expense of their religious role. Adherence to theology, however, does not necessarily produce a positive orientation to Zionism. Despite the prominence given to Jews, there are portions of the New Testament that depict Jews in an unfavourable light. And among liberal churchmen who do not interpret the Bible literally, a theological bias favouring the state of Israel is not likely to exist. CONTROVERSY ERUPTS

The United Church of Canada's first encounter with the Jewish community over the Middle East was the Suez Crisis of 1956. The General Council reacted to that crisis by declaring "a just and impartial friendship to all peoples of the Middle East" and support for the Canadian peacekeeping initiative proposed by Lester Pearson at the United Nations.7 The Observer, however, took a more controversial stance. It featured an article by Claris Silcox that was harshly critical of Israel. In attacking what he saw as "the essential injustice of the Zionist demands," Silcox claimed that Israel's establishment had had no historical or moral justification.8 He also believed that the Law of Return, which gives any Jew who emigrates to Israel automatic Israeli citizenship, violated the rights of the Palestinian Arabs. After complaints from the Jewish community, the Observer published a rebuttal by Abraham Feinberg, a prominent Toronto rabbi. Feinberg stressed that the Jews had endured a great deal of suffering and blamed the Arabs for the outbreak of war. He denounced what he called the "Hitler-like dreams of Nasser."9 The church largely ignored the Arab-Israeli conflict in the decade from 1956 to 1967. The General Council made only passing references to

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the Middle East in its pronouncements on international affairs, and the Observer's main focus was on religious and social issues. In the international field the magazine's major concerns were the dangers of the Cold War and the church's missionary work abroad. A turning point in the United Church's involvement came with the dramatic events of the Six-Day War of 1967. In the period leading to the outbreak of war, bellicose threats from Arab leaders, the mobilization of armies throughout the Middle East, and the forging of a pan-Arab military alliance made it seem that Israel was about to face annihilation. Among wide segments of Western public opinion, Israel's survival was a matter of urgent concern. The church made no pronouncement in the weeks of tension that preceded the war. A first response came on the second day of the war, 6 June, when the moderator, Wilfred Lockhart, joined with the president of the Canadian Catholic Conference and the primate of the Anglican Church of Canada in calling for "a just and honourable peace."10 On the next day, United Church ministers in Montreal passed a resolution which commended the Canadian government for "its neutral stand and its wish to participate in any peace keeping action and procedure in the Middle East."11 As the war was short, a more detailed statement was not made until after the fighting had ended. In a telegram to Prime Minister Pearson, church spokesmen again avoided taking an overtly partisan position. The government was urged, however, to press for Israel's immediate withdrawal from the territories that it had seized.12 To the Canadian Jewish community, which had been deeply moved by Israel's successful defence and triumph, the church's neutrality in general, and in particular the absence of a firm declaration of support for Israel's rights, caused concern. Also, the message sent to the prime minister had called for Israel's withdrawal from areas that many Jews now saw as vital to Israel's security and from East Jerusalem which contained the most sacred sites in Judaism. Alarm increased when the Observer launched a campaign of vehement attacks against Israel and Zionism. While the Middle East conflict had not been one of the magazine's major concerns before 1967, after the Six-Day War it became an obsession. In 1967 alone seven out of twelve issues dealt with the Middle East in one fashion or another, and from the June 1967 war to July 1969, twenty-four issues contained articles, editorials, or exchanges of letters on the subject. As the Observer had over 300,000 readers, a circulation making it among the most widely received magazines in Canada at the time, its potential influence worried the Jewish community. The Observer's first response to the Six-Day War came in the August 1967 issue when the editor, Dr A.C. Forrest, wrote in an editorial:

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"informed and objective Christians cannot be 100% for Israel in the Middle East struggle. While Arab threats to destroy Israel must be condemned ... it must also be remembered that the provocations and threats were not all from one side." In the October issue, which was devoted almost entirely to Forrest's impressions of a visit to the Middle East, the editor was more forceful. He attacked Israel for its "intolerable racist policies" and a "ig-year-old record of inhumanity." Israel was accused of territorial aggrandizement at the expense of the Palestinians. Forrest felt that the Palestinian refugees should be allowed to return to their former homes and that Israel should be pressured by the international community to solve the Palestinian problem. To illustrate this argument, the Observer ran photographs depicting fleeing Palestinian refugees and the squalour of the refugee camps. One picture, almost a full page in size, showed a small girl horribly burnt in what the magazine claimed as an Israeli napalm attack. The October issue of the Observer signalled the beginning of a long-term anti-Israel campaign. Israel's supporters were outraged. For example, the Toronto rabbi, W. Gunther Plaut, denounced Forrest's views, arguing that "there was, so Forrest led his readers to believe, something wrong not only with Israel but with the Jewish character."13 Within the Jewish community it was widely assumed that the Observer had acted with the church's approval. Thus Gerson Avner, Israel's ambassador to Canada, characterized the Observer's coverage as "vicious" and asked whether the church was "prepared to have its publication turned ... into an adjunct of the Arab League Propaganda Office."14 A spokesman for B'nai Brith argued that "the church, by its silence, condones these attacks."15 The truth of the matter was that the Observer had an independent position and "was not required to adhere to United Church policies." The editor had wide discretion in deciding both the editorial stance and the subject matter of the magazine. Moreover, while the church encompassed a large and diverse community, its structure of decision-making, like that of most institutions, often allowed a few highly motivated individuals to accumulate considerable power. The General Council was the highest authority within the church and the only body that could determine official policy. It consisted of approximately 500 delegates representing the church's ten conferences and met once every two years. Resolutions proposed by committees which were responsible for specific policy areas were usually approved with little debate. The committees tended to attract a small nucleus of committed people and were largely self-selecting. Although Forrest was considered somewhat of a maverick by a number of high-ranking church officials, he was also widely respected and had considerable influence on several working committees.

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Forrest was apparently sincere in his belief that it was necessary to "stir the conscience of United Church members" and to break what he felt was a Zionist monopoly on information to the Canadian public. By the end of 1968 Forrest had taken his campaign well beyond the confines of the United Church and had contacted Canadian Arab organizations, lobbied politicians, and expressed his views frequently to the media. Forrest had, in the words of one former church moderator, become "obsessed" by the Middle East issue. In 1971 Forrest wrote a book entitled The Unholy Land which brought further controversy and difficulties between the United Church and the Jewish community. In the book, Forrest described Israel as "a racist and aggressive state" that routinely launched brutal attacks against innocent Arab villages. He argued that there was a strong similarity between Israel and South Africa, except that in applying racism the Israelis "made the South African whites look like babes in the wood when it comes to practicing apartheid and keeping another race in its place and misleading the world about it." His most extreme charge was that: "I do not like to refer in any way to Israel's treatment of the Arabs as Nazi but the parallels are so numerous and so similar that Arabs speak of Nazi tactics and practices."16 In Forrest's view the dream of a Jewish state had turned into a nightmare. By the time The Unholy Land appeared, Canada's Jews and the United Church community had ceased "to communicate even on a superficial level."17 A B'nai Brith publication typified Jewish sentiments when it compared Forrest to "a pharaoh... who attempts by nefarious means to besmirch and throttle the Jews."18 Rabbi Plaut charged that "Forrest had ceased to be a critic and had ... become an enemy."19 Forrest was stung by the vehemence of the criticism against him. Charges of anti-Semitism upset him terribly, and he made much of the fact that he had roomed with a Jewish family when he first came to Toronto. Being the centre of controversy also brought considerable stress. At one point a cross was burnt on his lawn. Threats from extremists in the Jewish community caused him to seek police protection on several occasions. Yet the more pronounced the attacks and threats against him, the more determined Forrest became. Before long the entire United Church was to be involved in what had begun as one man's personal crusade. A CHURCH DIVIDED

For the United Church the issue had become critical. Not only was its integrity being questioned, but the controversy threatened to overshadow other church positions and projects. The church now faced the

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dilemma of how to maintain good relations with the Jewish community while allowing freedom of expression. Several prominent church leaders defended Forrest's right to express his views. Perhaps his most influential supporter was Dr Robert McClure, a veteran missionary and the moderator from 1968 to 1971. McClure felt that Canadian Jews had taken an "excessive interest" in Israel and that many suffered "a certain element of paranoia" with regard to the Jewish state.20 Speaking to a Jewish audience that he had been invited to address in Toronto in January 1969, McClure maintained that the Observer's coverage of the Middle East had been essentially accurate and that "it would be unconscionable for the United Church to fire Forrest." According to McClure, the meeting became so hostile that he feared for his life.21 Another prominent churchman who came to Forrest's defence was the Reverend Ernest Howse. Howse, a former moderator, responded to one particular attack on Forrest by writing in the Observer: "Forrest has been consistently cool and mild. He has said nothing that has not been said in stronger terms not only by UN officials but by a long line of objective and competent observers."22 On a different occasion, Howse accused Canada's Jewish leaders of using intimidation and of "emotional bomb-throwing" on the Middle East issue.23 Other allies included almost all members of the Middle East working group of the Toronto Conference's international affairs committee. The committee was a self-selected group that acted as a forum for general discussion of Middle East issues. The pro-Palestinian initiatives that were later to become church policy emanated from this body. Strong opposition to Forrest was also evident within the church. For example, the Reverend Donald Keating resigned from the pulpit in 1971 to protest the Observer's treatment of Israel. Keating denounced the magazine's editor for "lighting candles that stoke the fires that turned to smoke and fire the bodies of six million Jews."24 Another churchman who felt that the Observer had needlessly offended the Jewish community was Dr Bruce McLeod. While McLeod had gone on a churchsponsored fact-finding mission to the Middle East that "prepared him to be critical of both sides," he was cognizant of the sensitivities of the Jewish community. His view, nonetheless, was that Forrest was an "untamed and vigorous voice" and that some of his criticisms of Israel were legitimate. For Forrest to be successful in shaping church policy, however, he had to garner support from members of the Middle East working group and the national Committee on the Church and International Affairs. Members of these groups tended to be sympathetic to his views. The

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most critical factor in the equation was that while most churchmen may have disagreed with Forrest, few were willing to oppose him. THE CONFLICT DEEPENS

In the period from 1970 to the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, Forrest persisted in what the Reverend Alan Davies has described as an "unrelenting editorial crusade against the Jewish state."25 The appearance in the Observer in March 1972 of an article by John Nicholls Booth was for many in the Jewish community a final breaking point. The article, entitled "How Zionists manipulate your news," accused Israel of causing "a trail of global tensions, the longest and blackest record of international censures against any nation, 1,500,000 heartbroken and homeless refugees, and three wars." Booth argued that "the Zionist network" wielded enormous and disproportionate power and that it was disloyal and sinister. His view was that 'Israeli intelligence, through B'nai Brith's A[nti]-D[defamation] L[eague], Zionist organizations, temples, and rabbis, penetrates every part of our nation." He believed, moreover, that anyone who criticized Israel was certain to be labelled an antiSemite and that this was a form of "harassment" used by the AntiDefamation League to intimidate potential critics of Israel. Appearing beside the article were photographs of Franklin Roosevelt, Bertrand Russell, Arnold Toynbee, and Harry Truman and a caption that read: "These famous men were all called anti-Semitic." Gunther Plaut was among those in the Jewish community who challenged the church's right to have its magazine publish such material. He wrote: "The Observer's tendency to depict Zionism as an historical evil has strengthened the heritage of latent and overt antisemitism in many readers. Surely ... such sentiments ought to be firmly out of bounds in a Christian publication."26 Soon after the Booth article appeared, the B'nai Brith sued Forrest. Forrest replied by launching a countersuit. The B'nai Brith responded with another suit, this time against the Observer and the United Church. Forrest had also accelerated his campaign to change the government's Middle East policy. He made frequent trips to Ottawa to speak with parliamentarians and government officials and often worked closely with Canadian Arab groups who may have funded some of his efforts. As many members of parliament were for a variety of reasons predisposed to be sympathetic to Israel, Forrest often got a cool reception. His encounters with John Diefenbaker and Mitchell Sharp were particularly difficult. While at the time no more than five or six MPS seemed to agree with Forrest, one might argue that his campaign was

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more successful in its long-term effects. That an important church leader was so vocal in criticizing Israel may have made it easier or more legitimate for those MPS who had doubts about Israeli policies to become more overtly critical. The evaluation of one former M P was that "to have some influence in the largest Protestant group in the country has to have some value." Forrest's lobbying efforts may have been received with enthusiasm by some officials in the Department of External Affairs. Forrest claimed that he was told by an under-secretary in the department: "We can't be too far ahead of public opinion but we hope you keep on writing." Indeed, one high-ranking officer who felt strongly that the government had been overly responsive to pressures from the Jewish community thought that Forrest's lobbying had helped "to right the balance." The same official reported that the Observer was "one of the pieces of evidence that we used to show that there were other voices" on the Arab-Israeli question. Forrest's efforts were not appreciated by everyone at External Affairs. One former assistant under-secretary, particularly sympathetic to Israel's position, harshly attacked Forrest as "holier than us" and the church for being "united in everything but its principles." He felt that Forrest had judged Israel by a double standard and argued that if he truly wanted peace "he would bear down on the Palestinians" as well. Evidently Forrest's experiences in Ottawa whetted his appetite for politics. His fascination was such that at one point he seriously considered leaving the Observer to run for Parliament. This interest was soon reflected in the Observer which became devoted increasingly to political issues and commentary. In 1972, eight of twelve issues contained at least one item that was overtly political. For example, the January, February, and March issues featured interviews with David Lewis, the leader of the New Democrats, Ontario's premier, William Davis, and the Conservative leader, Robert Stanfield, respectively. Some months earlier an interview with Prime Minister Trudeau was the lead item. Other articles included "Political agnostics and your next candidate," "Why so many voted against Trudeau," "A preacher who ran for Parliament," as well as an article analysing how church members were going to vote in the next federal election. The last article was based on a questionnaire that the Observer had sent to 1656 subscribers. Forrest's agenda apparently included trying to politicize the church as a whole. A principal goal for Forrest was to change the direction of church policy on the Middle East. He wanted to transform the church from an essentially non-partisan bystander to an active lobby on the ArabIsraeli issue. Years of intense planning and politicking were devoted to this end. The showdown took place at the twenty-fifth meeting of the

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General Council in Saskatoon in 1972. Because of the B'nai Brith law suit, and the heightened criticism directed at the church from the Jewish community and elsewhere, the political climate in Saskatoon was emotionally charged. Attacks against Forrest had been widely perceived as an assault on the church as a whole and under the circumstances the natural inclination was to close ranks around Forrest. When Forrest took the podium on the first day, there was a prolonged standing ovation and shouts of "We love you Al!" According to a leading churchman, it was an emotional response "to a member of the United Church family who was being severely attacked." The desire to support Forrest continued during the policy sessions. On the Middle East issue, the report of the Committee on the Church and International Affairs was the focal point for discussion. While the report criticized both sides in the conflict for "pride, selfishness, and prejudice," the principal blame was directed at Israel. Close to a third of the report was devoted to charges made by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights "that grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention committed by Israel... constitute war crimes and an affront to humanity."27 The commission was itself controversial because its membership had been made up for the most part of countries whose foreign policies were decidedly pro-Arab. A resolution placed before the General Council asked that the church challenge a loan of $100 million that was scheduled to be made to Israel by Canada's Export Development Corporation ( E D c). This resolution, which according to one source "was specifically and originally from Al Forrest," also proposed that a delegation be sent to meet the prime minister and that the support of other churches be sought in the campaign to defeat the E D c loan. Another resolution asked the church to donate $25,000 to aid Palestinian refugees. Both resolutions were approved overwhelmingly. As the blocking of the E D c loan would have jeopardized important projects in Israel, the church resolution had the potential to be a significant development in Canadian-Middle East relations. It also showed that the church was prepared to do battle with the Jewish community in the domestic arena. The Middle East dispute was central to the self-esteem and political agenda of both communities. DE-FUSING THE CRISIS

Although the United Church thus formally endorsed an activist role, circumstances intervened to change the course of events. First, in Saskatoon, Drs Bruce McLeod and George Morrison were elected moderator and secretary, respectively, of the General Council. Both were

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committed to seeking a reconciliation with the Jewish community. In his acceptance speech, McLeod stated that bringing about a withdrawal of the court actions would be a priority. To have two major religious communities airing their grievances before the courts amid a clamour of publicity would be damaging to everyone concerned. He was unwilling to have the church subjected to such an ordeal. Second, in September 1972 at the Olympic games in Munich, 11 Israeli athletes were murdered at the hands of a Palestinian extremist group - an action that aroused sympathy for Israel and damaged the Palestinian cause. Church leaders were concerned that given the wave of indignation that had swept the Canadian public after this incident, the campaign to challenge the EDC loan would be counterproductive. McLeod's feelings, as he expressed them at the time, were: "Our hands must reach out instinctively to Jewish brothers ... as we with them condemn the strategy of terror that threatens them still."28 McLeod and Morrison faced the dilemma of how to implement the resolutions passed by the General Council and yet "de-fuse the crisis" with the Jewish community. They decided that while the church would lobby against the EDC loan, it would do so in a less forceful manner than originally contemplated. The church "would not highlight or press the point." After it became apparent the other churches were hesitant to become involved in fighting the EDC loan, the United Church curtailed its own lobbying. In the end, the loan to Israel was allowed to proceed without the noisy protests and widespread opposition that had been envisioned by Forrest and his allies. The issue of the law suits was more difficult to resolve. Both Forrest and the leadership of B'nai Brith were convinced of the correctness of their positions and felt that honour and prestige were at stake. In an attempt to re-establish contact, Morrison invited Alan Rose of the Canadian Jewish Congress to address church leaders at a day-long retreat. The encounter became an occasion for an airing of the grievances that had been stirring on both sides. A second step towards reconciliation was taken when McLeod and Rabbi Plaut agreed that each would arrange for the other to speak to their respective congregations. Bodyguards and police escorts were necessary precautions as both leaders feared the reaction of extremists. In his memoirs, Plaut credited the warmth of his reception at Bloor Street United Church with convincing him that the breach between the communities could be healed.29 In the aftermath of these initiatives McLeod and Morrison were able to begin negotiations with B'nai Brith. From September 1972 to May 1973 the two ministers met at least once a week with B'nai Brith leaders. After many impasses these discussions finally produced an agreement.

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The outcome, however, depended on Forrest withdrawing his countersuit and apologizing for having published the Booth article. Forrest's original position was that he would apologize only if "anybody could show me there was anything incorrect or false in it... I refused to go along with the moderator and secretary of the General Council in coming to any sort of agreement."30 Under enormous pressure from church colleagues, Forrest finally relented. He agreed to drop the legal action and admitted in a carefully worded statement prepared by his legal counsel that he may not have been sensitive enough to the impact the article would have on Jewish memories and fears. Following this admission, McLeod, Morrison, and the B'nai Brith leaders were able to formulate a statement of reconciliation. The statement which was released on 4 May 1973 read in part: We of the United Church deeply regret and disavow the insensitivity and inaccuracies contained in an article by John Nicholls Booth ... We of the B'nai Brith deeply regret and repudiate invective as a form of expression and communication. We recognize and appreciate the interests of Jews everywhere, and of the United Church, for the events in the Middle East and in the survival of Israel... As growing problems and challenges face us ... members of the United Church and of B'nai Brith need to meet one another, share insights, discover differences and communicate ... but communication cannot take place in an atmosphere of ambiguity or doubt regarding the respect of one party for the other.31

McLeod and Morrison could sign the accord only as individuals and not as official representatives of the church. The statement was not legal or binding. It was only an effort to establish a basis for dialogue. The outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 once again stirred deep passions and was to test the understanding. THE STRUGGLE FOR RECONCILIATION

The Yom Kippur War began with a massive surprise attack by Arab armies against Israeli-held positions in Sinai and on the Golan Heights. Israel suffered heavy casualties on the battlefield and lost much of its self-confidence and sense of security. The Arabs, because of their improved military prowess and effective use of oil as a weapon, gained power and prestige. The church's first reaction to the war came on 9 October, just three days after the beginning of hostilities. Dr McLeod joined Archbishop E.W. Scott, the primate of the Anglican Church of Canada, in calling

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upon "Arab and Jewish brothers to condemn the inhumanity of war." They regretted the "mixture of pride and fear" which they saw at the root of the conflict.32 Soon after, the Middle East working group of the Toronto Conference's international affairs committee met to decide what further action should be taken. While the war's developments were being studied by the Middle East working group, the initiative was seized dramatically by churchmen sympathetic to Israel. In an emotional and compelling letter to the Globe and Mail, several prominent United Church clergymen and scholars joined with a number of prominent Catholic leaders in asking their fellow Christians to "affirm Israel as the visible and tangible manifestation of both Jewish survival and security." They argued that Christians had a deep obligation to support Israel when its survival was at stake. As they phrased it, "the possibility of a second Auschwitz is something which no Christian should view with equanimity." The letter admonished what were described as Israel's "Christian enemies," charging that "in much Christian opinion, the [Arab] refugees have unwittingly emerged as a comfort for a troubled conscience, which preferring not to dwell on Christian guilt with regard to Jews, dwells instead on Jewish guilt with regard to Arabs."33 This impassioned defence of Israel evoked an immediate response from those sympathetic to the Arab cause. Professor Lome Kenny and thirteen others associated with the Departments of Islamic and Near Eastern Studies at the University of Toronto replied with their own letter to the Globe. The pro-Israel letter was described as "a surprising apology for Zionism" and as being "rife with prejudice... virulent antiSemitic prejudice against the Arabs."34 In their view Christians could not uphold Israel's rights while ignoring the injustices committed by Israel against the Arabs. They strongly condemned the comparison that had been drawn between the Holocaust and Arab intentions towards Israel as a blatant appeal to emotion. The exchange of letters in the Globe and Mail forced the United Church to clarify its position. The Reverend W. Clarke MacDonald, a spokesman for the Committee on the Church and International Affairs, criticized the letters for helping to "polarize local feeling" and the pro-Israel letter in particular for not dealing with the real issues in the conflict: the inequality that existed between Jews and Arabs in Israel and the need to obtain security and justice for all peoples in the region.35 The Middle East working group also felt the need to react to the issues raised by the war. It wanted to draft a statement that would incorporate two seemingly contradictory aims; to express sympathy for certain Arab objectives and yet keep the newly formed understanding with the Jewish community intact. Despite warnings from a prominent

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Toronto rabbi that the statement was "likely to be offensive" to the Jewish community and criticism from Arab-Canadian leaders that it was too supportive of Israel, the working group issued a statement that called for a settlement that would bring "justice and self-determination" for the Palestinians and yet guarantee the security of Israel. This statement does not seem particularly bold viewed from the perspective of the late 19805. In the early 19705, however, the Palestinian issue was still seen in many quarters in Canada principally as a refugee problem and not as a matter of national rights or sovereignty. The statement was a major departure from the viewpoints and prescriptions that were commonly held. Those in the United Church who favoured a conciliatory approach were largely successful during the war. There was no attempt to lobby MPS, disrupt Canadian-Israeli relations, or become involved in the various demonstrations that were taking place. Lines of communication were kept open to the Jewish community. A new emphasis could also be detected in the Observer. Forrest again came under considerable pressure from church leaders. As one prominent churchman put it: "We were prepared to have Al travel anywhere - Asia, Latin America - as long as he kept away from the Middle East." Although Forrest continued to be forceful, his focus was on Canadian policies rather than on the rights and wrongs of the Middle East dispute. He studiously avoided attacking Israel directly. He did, however, argue for a vigorous church policy and urged that the Canadian Council of Churches be mobilized to lobby in Ottawa on behalf of the Palestinians. Forrest believed that "Mr Trudeau shakes in his boots when the Canadian Council of Churches speaks."36 The Yom Kippur War was Forrest's last major foray on the Arab-Israeli issue. Clearly the balance of opinion within the church had shifted against him. In 1976 Forrest was defeated in a bid to fulfil his longcherished ambition of becoming moderator of the United Church. Apparently few church members wanted to provide an opportunity for further controversy. As one prominent church leader expressed the prevailing viewpoint: "We weren't going to agree with Israel but we weren't going to be fighting with our fellow Canadians." Forrest died of a heart attack in 1978 believing to the end that his pro-Arab campaign had helped to awaken the church to the moral imperatives of the Middle East. CONCLUSION

The United Church's involvement with the Arab-Israeli issue ignited a conflict with the Jewish community that brought pain and unwanted

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attention to both sides. The two communities, conscious of their image and prestige and perhaps also of their vulnerability, could not tolerate a long-term conflict. Little could be gained but quite a bit lost in a prolonged test of strength. In particular, the prospect of a court battle, with its attendant publicity, was a deterrent to both sides. The case of the United Church and the Arab-Israeli conflict shows that a foreign policy concern can deeply affect important groups in Canadian society even while the government remains relatively unaffected. Society, just as much as government, can be the terrain for battles over foreign policy issues.

NOTES

All quotations not footnoted are from interviews conducted by the author or from a survey conducted of over 400 United Church ministers. 1 David Taras, "From Passivity to Politics: Canada's Jewish Community and Political Support for Israel" in this volume. 2 Douglas Hall, 'Introduction," in Graham Scott, ed., More than Survival (Don Mills, Ont.: Canec Publishing and Supply House 1980), 4. 3 The Reverend James Mutchmor, a leading church spokesman during the 19405 and 19505, claims to have been instrumental in forcing the resignation of cabinet ministers including the federal minister of labour in 1941 and in blocking the return of Mitch Hepburn to the leadership of the Ontario Liberal party in 1944. See James Mutchmor, Mutchmor (Toronto: Ryerson 1965). 4 Patricia Clarke and Carla Courtenay, "Has God a Lobby in Ottawa?" Observer, 15 February 1967, 27. 5 Tom Sherwood, "How Your Church Lobbies in Ottawa and How It Could Do the Job Better," ibid. (November 1973): 27. 6 Mutchmor, 172. 7 Reuben Slonim, Family Quarrel (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin 1977), 41. 8 Claris Silcox, "The Crisis in the Middle East," Observer, 15 February 1956,59 Abraham Feinberg, "Christians and Arab-Israeli Peace," ibid. (July 1956): 13-1410 Slonim, Family Quarrel, 4. 11 Gerard Laprise, in Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 8 June 1967, 132312 Ken Windsor, "Religion," in John Saywell, ed., Canadian Annual Review for 1967 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1968), 419.

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13 W. Gunther Plaut, Unfinished Business (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys 1981), 282. 14 Gershon Avner, "Editor Anti-Israel - Israeli/' Observer, 15 November 1967, 215 Slonim, Family Quarrel, 6. 16 A.C. Forrest, The Unholy Land (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1971), 15117 Slonim, Family Quarrel, ii. 18 Ibid., 6. 19 Plaut, Unfinished Business, 253. 20 Munroe Scott, McClure: Years of Challenge (Toronto: Munroe Scott Presentations Ltd 1979), 283. See also Robert McClure, "Forget History Look Ahead," Observer (November 1970). 21 Plaut, Unfinished Business, 283-6; Scott, McClure, 239-40. 22 Ernest Howse, "Was this Editorial Anti-Semitic?" Observer (March 1972): 42. 23 Ernest Howe, "A Rebuttal, Ernest Marshall Howse," Viewpoints 4 (1969): 24. 24 Slonim, Family Quarrel, 8. 25 Alan Davies, "Was this Editorial Anti-Semitic?" Observer (March 1972): 11. 26 Plaut, Unfinished Business, 290. 27 The Fourteenth Report of the Committee on the Church and International Affairs to the Twenty-fifth General Council of the United Church of Canada (Saskatoon 1972), 20. 28 Plaut, Unfinished Business, 291. 29 Ibid., 292. 30 Slonim, Family Quarrel, 10-12. 31 Ibid., appendix A, 165-6. 32 "Canadian Churches Seek Peace." Calgary Herald, 10 October 1973, 61. 33 "Statement of Christian Concern about the Middle East," Toronto Globe and Mail, 19 October 1973, 7. 34 Globe and Mail, 24 October 1973, 7. 35 "United Church Official Urges Justice for All in Mid-East Settlement," Globe and Mail, 30 October 1973, 7. 36 A.C. Forrest, "The Middle East: What's Happening and Why," Observer (November 1973): 13.

DAVID H. GOLDBERG

Keeping Score: From the Yom Kippur War to the Palestinian Uprising

The preceding chapters of this book have introduced some of the players that contend in the domestic battleground of Canada-Middle East relations - the Canadian Jewish community, the domestic Arab community, Canadian corporations with interests in the Middle East, the United Church, the Department of External Affairs, and the media. We have also seen how some of these actors have influenced the making of Canadian foreign policy on specific issues pertinent to the ArabIsraeli conflict. This chapter attempts to synthesize and compare these forces for the purpose of drawing some broad conclusions about the domestic dimensions of the conflict. This exercise is worthwhile for several reasons. First, no complete cross-group comparison has yet been undertaken in the field of Canada-Middle East relations. The traditional approach has been the detailed case study, that is, the analysis of the objectives and behaviour of one organized group usually with respect to one specific issue or event in Canada-Middle East relations. There is, of course, considerable utility in such an approach, primarily in the amount of rich detail that one can accumulate about specific events or time periods, and it has produced several important studies of Canada-Middle East relations.1 However, this approach has its failings. By examining an event or group in isolation, for example, one does not necessarily garner any sense of the larger context within which the government has made its decisions. Is the government's behaviour on a specific issue, and in relation to one particular domestic group, reflective of a broader pattern of behaviour, or is it an anomaly - the reasons for which must be pursued and analysed? Concentration on the efforts of one element of society, without reference to the efforts (or even the existence) of other groups, may also lead to inaccurate assumptions. A second reason for this exercise is to seek evidence of broader

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patterns in the Canada-Middle East relationship, to detect long-term fluctuations in Canada's diplomatic and political support for the Arabs or the Israelis. This means, of course, that a certain basic assumption must be accepted a priori - namely, that there is a correlation between the Canadian government's behaviour with respect to issues pertaining to the Arab-Israeli dispute and the concerns articulated by domestic groups. The cross-group approach will allow the reader to compare both the objectives of each domestic interest group on a particular issue and the actual behaviour adopted by the Canadian government in response to pressure from various concerned parties. Yet a third reason for the comparative approach is to test some of the broader assumptions about the domestic battleground, in particular the belief that the Canadian Jewish community has been able to influence Canadian policy behaviour in a direction favourable to the interests of the state of Israel.2 In this book, David Bercuson, Howard Stanislawski, George Takach, and David Taras all question the validity of this assumption. This comparative exercise permits a more complete testing of whether or not the Canada-Israel Committee (c i c) has been a dominant factor in shaping Canada's Middle East policy over the past fifteen years. METHOD

This chapter compares the objectives, activities, and relative political achievements of several of the actors in the domestic battleground of the Arab-Israeli conflict for the period from the October 1973 war through the early months of the Palestinian uprising of 1987-8. This period was selected primarily because the Yom Kippur War was an important watershed for the Arab-Israeli conflict, for the international politics of the Middle East, and for the alignment of forces within Canada on the Middle East issue. In the area itself, the military gains of the Arab armies early in the war severely weakened the confidence of the Israelis and deeply frightened many of their Jewish and non-Jewish supporters in Canada. The ability of the Egyptian and Syrian armies to penetrate the Israeli "Maginot line" drew attention directly to the occupied territories and to the position of the Palestinian Arabs. Although the Israelis had certainly felt pressures for the return of territory acquired in 1967 and a resolution of the Palestinian question prior to the Yom Kippur War, such pressures intensified considerably following the 1973 war and have been a focus of debate ever since. The Yom Kippur War was also a watershed in the global domain, for the war and various ensuing developments substantially altered the balance of relations that had existed prior to the outbreak of fighting.

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The breakdown of detente between the superpowers and a global energy crisis were direct consequences of the war. Although the international environment survived both the geostrategic and economic crises caused by it, the Yom Kippur War set the tone in many ways for global relations throughout the 19705 and beyond. Canada, despite its greatest efforts to avoid entanglements, was gravely affected by these developments, especially the problems of the new oil economy. Finally, the 1973 war represented a watershed for domestic actors concerned with the Arab-Israeli conflict and Canadian policy towards it. The Canadian Jewish community, for example, was put temporarily on the defensive by the indeterminate results of the war and by the increased focus on the political demands of the Palestinian Arabs. One might therefore have expected that these same factors would boost the confidence and activism of Arab Canadian groups. The international energy crisis caused significant elements of the Canadian business community to begin a re-examination of their traditional lack of interest in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Their incentive lay in substantial growth in Arab markets promised by the energy boom in Saudi Arabia and much of the Persian Gulf region. The makers of Canadian foreign policy, the politicians and the bureaucratic mandarins, also came to be considerably more attentive to the issues arising from the Arab-Israeli conflict. All these developments, especially the world's fascination with the Palestinian question and the "visuals" it afforded, influenced the Canadian media and made it significantly more attentive to an area of the world that it had, with only rare exceptions, ignored. The Lebanon War of 1982 and the Palestinian uprising of 1987-8 were also important watersheds. They were particularly important for the Canadian Jewish community which defended Israel's actions despite its division over whether Israel was pursuing the right policies. The image of Israel as a small democratic state eagerly pursuing negotiations and peace was transformed by its massive invasion of Lebanon and its seemingly repressive policies in the occupied territories. The Canadian business community faced another change in landscape. The oil economy of the 19705 and early 19805, which had made Arab oilproducing states powerful financial and economic actors, waned in importance as scarcity gave way to glut. The period from 1973 to 1988 thus covers a series of changes that make it a rich period for examination. The Canadian domestic actors upon which the analysis is superimposed are the following: the Canadian Jewish community, Arab Canadian groups, Canadian corporations, and the Department of External Affairs and other interested bureaucracies in Ottawa. The media have not been included because while they most certainly affect the course and quality of foreign policy

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decision-making, they did not (and do not) appear to have interests and objectives with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict comparable to those of the other four actors.4 This is not to suggest, however, that the media did not play an often important role, either by supporting or by denying support to domestic groups concerned with the Arab-Israeli dispute. In selecting the policy issues for examination, I was guided by a number of criteria. Obviously, an issue had to involve an aspect of the Arab-Israeli dispute in which the Canadian government had an interest and was thus likely to respond to it. Similarly, an issue had to elicit some response from each of the subject groups, even if that response was a decision not to take action. An issue also had to be important to more than one of the domestic actors, so that it was perceived to involve "benefits" to be won or lost, gained, or denied. In selecting the issues for consideration, I have been sensitive to the dilemma of "chronic" (that is, long-term non-crisis issues of concern) versus "acute" (that is, a crisis in which survival is perceived to be at stake) items on the Canada-Middle East policy agenda.5 However, based on the limited number of Canadian cases available for consideration and the fact that an "acute" situation for one actor or group of actors may not be a crisis for all, I did not stress this dichotomy. Based on these criteria and considerations, the following issues were selected: 1 The October 1973 (Yom Kippur) War 2 The Palestine Liberation Organization (p L o) in Canada 3 The Arab Boycott of Israel 4 The Jerusalem Embassy Affair 5 The Lebanon War of 1982 6 The Palestinian Uprising CRITERIA FOR COMPARISON: AN I N D E X OF SATISFACTION

A final methodological note concerns the basis for comparison among the groups. The problem of "influence" continues to bedevil students of foreign policy behaviour. Given this unresolved (and perhaps irresolvable) dilemma, I have chosen to focus not upon a domestic group's "influence" over Canadian foreign policy per se but rather upon the extent to which governmental behaviour appeared to satisfy each of the domestic groups. The criterion for analysis then becomes the degree to which the objectives, goals, concerns, and preferences of the domestic communities were satisfied with respect to the six Arab-Israeli issues Canada was confronted with during the period between October 1973 and the end of June 1988. The extent of satisfaction is determined by an

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analysis of empirical data (personal interviews, primary and secondary material) as well as by logical inferences. My five-point "index of satisfaction" with the government's foreign policy behaviour ranges from complete dissatisfaction to absolute satisfaction. At one end of the continuum, scoring one, are situations of complete dissatisfaction, in which the government's behaviour is perceived as completely contrary, and perhaps even harmful, to the interests and objectives of the domestic group. The next point on the scale, scoring two, refers to situations of moderate dissatisfaction. The group feels that many of its interests have been disregarded, but either these interests are not of primary importance or the government's response is not considered that harmful. The group can "live with" the government's policy and is willing to conserve its political resources for another day and another issue. The middle point on the continuum, rating a score of three, is indifference; the domestic group is essentially indifferent to the government's actions. The policy outcome is seen to have no apparent impact at all on the group or its principal concerns. Nor does Ottawa's decision appear to satisfy any rival group.6 The next point on the continuum, scoring four, describes a situation of moderate satisfaction. There are elements of policy with which the group and its members have difficulty; some of its preferences may not have been addressed adequately or were given short shrift. The group is essentially satisfied with the government's behaviour, however, and important political advantage has been denied to competing groups. At the other end of the continuum, scoring five, is complete satisfaction. The government's policy reflects fully the policy preferences and objectives articulated by a particular domestic constituency. FINDINGS

Based on these criteria, the scores set out in table i were given to express the relative satisfaction of domestic groups with Canada's policy on the six selected issues. The October 1973 War Overwhelmed with political and economic concerns at home, and with public opinion indifferent to the outcome, the Trudeau government pursued a careful neutrality during the October War. The potentially devastating consequences of the oil embargo imposed by Arab oilproducing states and the dangers of superpower confrontation increased the need for caution.7 At the outset the Jewish community

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TABLE 1 Index of Satisfaction with Government Behaviour Domestic Group Event October 1973 War p L o in Canada Arab boycott Jerusalem embassy Lebanon War Uprising Total

Jewish

Arab

Business Bureaucracy

4 4 1 1 1 1

2 2 5 4 4 4

3 3 5 4 3 3

4 2 4-5 4 4 4

12

21

21

22-23

was dissatisfied with the government's reaction. Most specifically, community leaders were disturbed by the cabinet's refusal to condemn the Egyptian-Syrian attack officially as the casus belli.8 This dissatisfaction was nevertheless tempered by a number of factors. First, although the community was not able to translate an unprecedented national lobbying campaign into a pro-Israel response from the government, it was apparent to most Jewish leaders that there was within Parliament and among foreign policy officials a substantial degree of pro-Israel sentiment, sentiment which could be mobilized against any attempt to water down further Ottawa's limited and measured criticism of the Arab attack. Also, there seemed to be little overt sympathy for the Arab perspective in the cabinet, in Parliament (save for a number of 'loose fish" in the Liberal and the New Democratic caucuses), or in the media (with the exception of Montreal's La Presse).9 Attentive public opinion seemed to be on Israel's side.10 The Canadian Arab community, scoring two, was certainly dissatisfied with the Canadian government's apparent disregard for the Arab position that the Egyptian-Syrian attack of 6 October was precipitated directly by a series of Israeli provocations and indirectly by the continued denial of national self-determination for the Palestinians in the occupied territories. The Canadian Arab community saw the government's non-acceptance of the Arab perspective as a victory for the Jewish lobby. Moderating the Arab community's sense of dissatisfaction, however, was the consistent refusal of the Trudeau government to acquiesce to Jewish and non-Jewish pressure for a strong condemnation of the Egyptian-Syrian attack. Ottawa's willingness to participate in a renewed United Nations Emergency Force in the Sinai desert also

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contributed to the sense that the government was not too pro-Israel. Accepting the role of peacekeeper meant that the government was trying to maintain its neutral credentials. The Canadian business community was given a score of three on the grounds that it was essentially indifferent to the government's conduct during the war. On the one hand, it was satisfied that the government had followed a balanced posture and had resisted the demands of the Jewish community for condemnation of the Arab attack. This response was in step with the business community's traditional proclivity to want Canada to avoid hard and fast positions or involvement in political disputes far from home. The business community was essentially indifferent to the drama in the Middle East because Canada was a net exporter of energy resources and few envisioned the economic revolution that was to result from the actions of the Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC). That there could be enormous potential markets in the Arab world was not yet recognized. Finally, Canadian foreign policy officialdom receives a score of four, meaning that the bureaucracy as a whole was moderately satisfied with the government's policy of straddling the fence between Israel and the Arabs. By resisting the temptation to condemn the Arab attack, the government had avoided entangling itself in a fierce dispute far from the centre of Canada's diplomatic and economic concerns. The government's position left the door open for the development of further diplomatic and economic relations with the Arab world without harming Canada's relations with the state of Israel and its domestic supporters. These developments were in keeping with the perspective of the Department of External Affairs described elsewhere in this book. Overall, then, the Canadian government's behaviour during the October 1973 War was moderately satisfying to both the Canadian Jewish community and to foreign policy officials. At the same time, it was only moderately dissatisfying to Arab Canadians. The business community remained indifferent. The PLO in Canada The Canadian government responded to the possible participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the United Nations Conference on Law Enforcement and Terrorism (the Crime Conference) and the Conference on Housing and International Settlement (Habitat) scheduled, respectively, for Toronto in September 1975 and Vancouver in May 1976, by seeking compromise. It wanted to avoid potential violence in the streets of Toronto as well as painful electoral sanctions by Jewish

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voters. Ottawa requested that the Crime Conference be postponed but would not retreat from hosting the more innocuous Habitat Conference. The Canadian Jewish community was moderately satisfied with the decision. On the one hand, it was extremely satisfied with the postponement-cum-cancellation of the Crime Conference. The community's leaders considered it ludicrous, if not hypocritical, to have PLO representatives participating in a conference on international crime and terrorism and considered it a direct affront to have this spectacle take place in Toronto with its sizeable Jewish population. The Jewish community consequently forged an alliance with various other concerned groups and had maintained considerable pressure on the government. Some of the Jewish community's satisfaction was tempered by the government's refusal to cancel or postpone the Habitat Conference. While the local community in Vancouver was distressed that the PLO would now be in its backyard, Jewish leaders at the national level were prepared to live with the compromise.11 A conference on housing was less provocative and Vancouver more distant from where the majority of Canada's Jews lived. Thus, while having to accept something less than a perfect solution, the Canadian Jewish community was prepared to live with a compromise that would allow the government to handle a delicate diplomatic situation. The Canadian Arab community, conversely, was moderately dissatisfied with the government's behaviour. I've rated their level of satisfaction as two compared to the Jewish community's four. The Canadian Arab community and supporters of the Palestinian movement strongly advocated full PLO participation at both meetings, especially at the Crime Conference. They maintained a high profile through much of the controversy. Representations to both the cabinet and the Department of External Affairs were made by various groups, including the Canadian Arab Federation and the Association Quebec-Palestine. The latter reportedly suggested that the Crime Conference be transferred to Montreal if Toronto proved an inhospitable host.12 George Hajjar of the Canadian Arab Federation suggested that Canada's much-lauded "evenhandedness" on Middle East issues and its support for the United Nations were both at stake.13 This was the Arab community's first serious foray into the Canadian domestic battleground of the ArabIsraeli dispute. It emerged dissatisfied. As during the 1973 war, the Canadian business community was largely indifferent to the government's handling of the PLO issue. Though certainly becoming more sensitive to the potential profits to be gained through enhanced trade with Arab states, Canadian corporations had not yet fully recognized the link between satisfying the political demands of a non-state actor (the PLO) and winning major

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contracts and access to markets in Arab countries. That link would later be made more explicit. The foreign policy bureaucracy in Ottawa was only moderately satisfied with the outcome of the controversy. Its reaction was scored as two. Throughout the debate, foreign policy professionals had quietly voiced concern about the possible harm to Canada's reputation internationally and to the building of relations with the Arab world which was likely to result from a Canadian decision to restrict or deny the admission of PLO members to Canada.14 The cabinet's decision to postpone the Crime Conference but to move ahead with Habitat was perceived by some officials as perhaps wise from the standpoint of domestic politics but a dangerous precedent in the international context.15 The Arab Boycott The Canadian government's response to evidence of corporate and government acquiescence to the Arab economic boycott of Israel and of individuals and businesses in Canada doing business with Israel was one of initial denial and then of moral posturing but little concrete action. On 15 December 1978, the government introduced bill €-32, an act to provide for the reporting of information about boycott requests. After months of inaction and procedural wrangling in the House of Commons, the bill died on the order paper when Parliament was dissolved for a national election on 26 March 1979. Although the issue was the subject of much rhetoric and many promises by all the political parties during the electoral campaign, anti-boycott legislation was never re-introduced by the newly elected Clark government or by the Trudeau government that followed. The Canadian Jewish community was immensely dissatisfied with the lack of effective action on the boycott issue. Feelings of dissatisfaction were such that the score awarded is one. The Canada-Israel Committee helped "break" the boycott story and make it an issue of public concern and debate. Cic lobbyists and influential members of the Canadian Jewish establishment worked diligently with sympathetic members of parliament and launched a media campaign to force the Trudeau government to respond. The c i c lobbied for the introduction of legislation and even got party house leaders to agree to have bill 032 passed through Parliament in an extraordinary one-day consideration, so that it could be enacted before the anticipated dissolution of Parliament. As unanimous consent of the house is required for one-day passage, the bill died a premature death when two MPS refused to give consent. Some Jewish community leaders attributed the bill's demise to duplicity by Pierre Trudeau and influential members of the Liberal

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cabinet.16 A number of Jewish leaders still considered their effort a "moral victory" because the Jewish community was able to force the cabinet to recognize that a problem existed and enforce tighter administrative guidelines with respect to government's own adherence to boycott practices.17 Although moral victories and "fighting the good fight" may be beneficial to the communal soul, the Jewish community came away from the anti-boycott debate with little to show for its considerable efforts. The c i c had staked substantial resources on the passage of bill €-32. The bill's death on the parliamentary order paper was a major defeat for the Canadian Jewish community. The tightening of administrative guidelines was minimal satisfaction in the face of legislative failure. The Canadian Arab community was completely satisfied with the result although it had played a passive role in the boycott debate. Canadian Arab groups were inactive during the controversy and their interactions with politicians and governmental officials infrequent. Nevertheless, in a zero-sum game, a defeat for your opponent is a victory for yourself, however uninvolved you may be in the battle. The government's apparent decision not to use its influence over the two recalcitrant MPS who blocked unanimous consent for passage of bill €-32 and the failure of subsequent governments to re-introduce the bill was (and is) viewed with complete satisfaction by the Canadian Arab community.18 Canadian corporations also registered considerable satisfaction with the outcome. They receive a five on the index. Individual corporations and business groups, including Bell Canada, the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, the Canadian Export Association, the Association of Construction Engineers of Canada, ATCO, Canadian Bechtel, and Canadian Westinghouse, all seemed to take seriously Arab threats (or implied threats) that there would be economic retaliation if anti-boycott legislation was passed. There is evidence that "during the evolution of the Arab boycott issue, business and banking interest groups played a large role in shaping both political and bureaucratic perspectives" against meaningful anti-boycott legislation.19 Members of the Canadian corporate and banking communities developed a large stake in the defeat of anti-boycott legislation. Finally, foreign policy officials were also satisfied with the outcome. Throughout the parliamentary debate, there was considerable concern within the foreign policy bureaucracy that the adoption of strong antiboycott legislation would put in jeopardy existing and potential contacts and trade with Arab oil-producing states. This view, however unfounded it may have been considering the response of Arab states to anti-boycott measures introduced in the United States and in the

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province of Ontario, seemed to be pervasive within the Department of External Affairs and was also expressed strenuously by senior bureaucrats in the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, and by their minister, Jack Horner.20 Senior foreign policy officials talked openly of the need to blunt the influence of the Jewish lobby" in Canada which they viewed as "increasingly strident" in its advocacy of policies that they considered not always consistent with Canada's best interests.21 For all of these reasons, significant elements of the foreign policy bureaucracy felt relief, and satisfaction, when bill €-32 failed to pass. They fought to ensure that subsequent governments would not reintroduce it. The Jerusalem Embassy Affair The Canadian government made two dramatic decisions with respect to the Canadian embassy in Israel in 1979. The first was Prime Minister Joe Clark's announcement, made in June 1979, that his government intended to transfer the Canadian embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (thereby reaffirming the commitment he had made during the spring 1979 election campaign). The second was Clark's decision on 29 October 1979 to accept the interim report of the ambassador-atlarge, Robert L. Stanfield, and to reverse the pledge to move the embassy. The Canadian Jewish community was extremely dissatisfied with this outcome. I have again scored its response as one. Contrary to the contention of some analysts,22 the Jewish community was not unanimously pleased with Clark's original pledge to move the embassy. A majority of Jews no doubt favoured a transfer of the embassy as a further affirmation of Jerusalem as the "eternal capital of the Jewish people." However, many disapproved of the timing of the pledge and of Jerusalem and Israel becoming partisan issues in a federal election campaign. So rancorous were the disputes over strategy within the community that the c i c was reported to be close to collapse over the Clark pledge.23 Some community members were concerned about adverse publicity resulting from the suspicion that the community had enticed Clark with promises of electoral support in return for the embassy promise. The question of who first proposed the move remains a matter of contention. There is evidence to suggest that the initiative came not from the Jewish community but from Clark and a number of his key advisers, some of whom saw the embassy transfer as a moral imperative while others viewed it as an opportunity for the Conservatives to make important gains in key Toronto ridings. As expected, the Clark government's decision to reverse its position

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on the embassy caused serious disappointment in the Jewish community. But, even here, unanimity was absent. Some segments of the community believed that Clark should be made to pay a stiff political price for the reversal, while others argued that the embassy pledge was ill considered as a political gesture and had been harmful to Jewish interests from the outset. Thus Clark should be allowed to extricate himself from the morass.24 In summary then, the entire Jerusalem embassy affair, both Clark's initiative and his reversal, was viewed with disquiet within the Jewish community. The domestic Arab community, by contrast, tended to view the outcome of the Jerusalem affair with moderate satisfaction. Their reaction is scored as four. For obvious reasons, the majority of Canadian Arabs were dissatisfied with the initial Clark pledge and undertook a campaign to reverse it which was of unprecedented scope and organization in Canadian Arab political history. Following Clark's statement of 25 April, the Arab Palestine Association of Canada sent a strongly worded telegram to the Conservative party leader warning that the proposed move would impair Canada's economic relations with the Middle East.25 Similar warnings were expressed by the Arab News in Toronto and Montreal's Arab Journal.26 Not surprisingly, the Canadian Arab community responded with considerable enthusiasm to the establishment of the Stanfield inquiry.27 The government's eventual decision to reverse itself on the proposed embassy transfer was gratifying because it represented a fulfilment of Canadian Arab political objectives and it was at the same time a notable political setback for Israel.28 Equally satisfied with Clark's reversal were corporate and banking interests. Much of the business community was dissatisfied with the original Clark pledge, especially as a large number of corporate executives had become sensitized to Middle East issues during the recent battle over anti-boycott legislation. There is no question that business pressure on Clark was significant. The corporations wanted Canada to remain free of any Middle East entanglements or controversies so as to ensure that economic relations would continue to function smoothly. Clark decided not to accede to these pressures, but his actions soon brought threats from the Arab world. These threats brought many of Canada's major corporations to near panic and led to "a corporate storming" of the Prime Minister's Office and the Departments of External Affairs and Industry, Trade and Commerce.29 The Canadian corporate community heaved a sigh of relief with the appointment of the Stanfield inquiry and the policy reversal of October 1979. From its perspective, the proposed embassy moved had been ill considered and contrary to Canada's (and its own) economic interests.

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The foreign policy bureaucracy also found the decision to reverse the move highly satisfying. Their response is scored as four. From the outset, External Affairs officials were opposed to the planned transfer. Disaffection with the Jerusalem initiative can be understood in a number of ways. Some foreign policy bureaucrats believed the Arab threats and felt that disaster awaited Canada if the pledge was fulfilled. Others, operating from a more clearly anti-Israel posture, argued that Canadian policy toward the Middle East had been intolerably tilted in favour of Israel because of a combination of outdated and biased historical factors and by an overwhelmingly powerful and increasingly strident Canadian Jewish lobby.30 Holders of this perspective believed that the transfer of the embassy would harm Canada's interests in at least two ways: first, by signalling to the Arabs that Canada was no longer unbiased and non-partisan in the Arab-Israeli dispute and second, by strengthening the alleged influence of the Jewish community over Canada's Middle East policy. Still others, including the officer assigned to assist Stanfield, appeared to oppose the embassy transfer because it was "not a just and fair-minded thing to do," would not contribute markedly to the Arab-Israeli peace process, and was simply not in Canada's long-term diplomatic or economic interests.31 The force and influence of bureaucratic opponents to the embassy transfer were countered initially by the prime minister's determination to use the Jerusalem question as a test of his control of the foreign policy apparatus.32 However, Clark's resolve was weakened severely by a combination of factors. The opposition parties skilfully used the issue as evidence of Clark's unworthiness to govern, corporate pressure was unrelenting, and media coverage focused on Clark's apparent ineptitude and on increasingly sensational Arab threats. In the end, the voices opposed to the embassy move were in the majority. The policy pledge was reversed, to the considerable satisfaction of the foreign policy establishment and its de facto allies in the corporate and Canadian Arab communities. The Lebanon War of 1982 The Canadian Jewish community is given a score of one with regard to the policy adopted by Canada during the Lebanon War, indicating "complete dissatisfaction." The Trudeau government strongly condemned Israel's invasion into southern Lebanon and the subsequent siege and bombing of West Beirut33 and supported United Nations resolutions critical of Israel. Indeed, Trudeau was among the first Western leaders to condemn Israel. The position of the c i c was that Canada

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should have demanded the withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign armies including the PLO and the Syrian army and that Israel was justified in going into Lebanon to clear out the terrorists that threatened its northern border. Reinforcing the c i c's frustration was an apparent shift towards a more aggressive concern with Palestinian rights. By the early 19805 some members of the Trudeau cabinet had begun to speak about "the legitimate right of the Palestinians to a homeland within a clearly defined territory/'34 namely, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although the official position as stressed by secretary of state for external affairs, Mark MacGuigan, still distinguished between "homeland" and formal sovereignty and statehood, the Jewish community was disturbed by the apparent erosion of support for Israel's prescription for the occupied territories.35 Fear was expressed that this apparent shift to a more pro-Palestinian position might be given impetus by Israel's actions in Lebanon. Trudeau believed that the stalemate in negotiations over autonomy for the West Bank was almost entirely due to intransigence on the part of Menachem Begin. Trudeau's aggressive condemnation of Israel's actions in Lebanon was an indication that his patience was wearing thin. The sense of unease in the Jewish community was heightened by the government's inability or unwillingness to censure the rhetoric of Theodore Arcand, Canada's ambassador to Lebanon.36 Arcand made a series of pronouncements blaming Israel alone for what was taking place in Lebanon. In contrast to the Canadian Jewish community, Canadian Arab groups were relatively satisfied with the government's position. I've designated a satisfaction level of four. The war stimulated a significant increase in activity on the part of the Arab community. "Palestine Solidarity" movements proliferated in every major Canadian city and on many university campuses. Although reportedly controlled by the Ottawa offices of the Arab League and the Palestine Information Office,37 this new activity represented the climax of a generation of growth in Canadian Arab consciousness. A greater sensitivity to the Arab perspective was evident, and Arab groups were no longer, at least in some quarters, the political outcasts they had once thought themselves to be. With widespread criticism of Israel's behaviour in Lebanon, the political climate and, certainly, the government's position had shifted somewhat in their favour. While falling short of their maximum position - official recognition of the PLO and its Palestinian manifest destiny - the new tilt in the Canadian approach was viewed favourably by most Canadian Arab spokesmen and their supporters.38

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As Abdallah Abdallah of the Palestine Information Office was to put it: 'It is no longer a sin in Canada to talk about the Palestinians and the PLO."39

The foreign policy bureaucracy shared with the Canadian Arab community a sense of moderate satisfaction (score four) with the government's position. A significant number of officials, including many of those in the Middle East Division of the Department of External Affairs, had become convinced that Israel's policies were the single greatest impediment to peace, especially the policy of Jewish settlement in the occupied territories. There had been considerable pressure emanating from the Pearson Building for the Canadian government to adopt its own position on the Arab-Israeli dispute, independent of the United States' traditionally pro-Israel line. As was the case with Canadian Arab groups, the satisfaction of External Affairs officials was tempered by the unwillingness of the Liberal government to "go all the way" and recognize the PLO. The perception of some officials at the time was that having taken so strong a stand against Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the Trudeau government would soon revert back to a more conservative policy.40 Of the domestic groups under examination, the one exhibiting the least noticeable concern over the Canadian government's policy was the business community. It appeared to be indifferent to the entire affair. Obviously, its interests were to have Canada avoid any action that might threaten trade prospects. The low level of Canadian investment in Lebanon, and the cautious reaction of Canada's major Middle East trading partners in the Persian Gulf to the events in Lebanon, seemed to absolve Canadian businessmen of the need for involvement in stark contrast to their high level of involvement in the boycott issue and the Jerusalem embassy affair. It may be that this response is tied to a decline in the economic importance of the Middle East by late 1982. Lower oil prices, a glut of oil in the international market, and continuing instability in the Persian Gulf had made the Middle East less lucrative for Canadian business. The indifference of business during the Lebanon War rates three on the index. The Palestinian Uprising, December igSy-June 1988 The Canadian Jewish community was completely dissatisfied with the government's response to the uprising in the occupied territories and, especially, to Israel's handling of it. Influential elements within the Canadian government strongly condemned Israel for its alleged violation of human rights in attempting to put down the uprising. The secretary of state for external affairs, Joe Clark, even accused Israel, rather than the Arab states or the PLO, of being the major obstacle to

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peace. To the Jewish community, Clark's interpretation represented a drastic misreading of the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and a fundamental assault on the truth. The community had been pleased at first when, in late December 1987, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney contended that Israel had shown "restraint" in its handling of the disturbances. Mulroney also vigorously refuted the notion that Israel's governance in the occupied territories could be compared to the South African system of apartheid. The calming influence of Mulroney's words was soon lost, however, amid harsh criticism of Israel in the media and from all parties in the House of Commons. Then, on 10 March 1988, Mr Clark condemned Israel's handling of the uprising in an address to the c i c.41 He accused Israel of widespread abuses of human rights including the deliberate denial of food to refugee camps and of being the impediment to peace. The speech was interrupted by boos and catcalls and a sizeable part of the audience walked out. The c i c demanded an immediate clarification of the government's position, and Sydney Spivak, the cic's national chairman, hinted that there would be retaliation at the ballot box. The result was that in a subsequent address to the Edmonton Jewish community, Clark changed the tone but not the substance of his remarks.42 Clark reiterated Canada's long-standing support for Israel and blamed both sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict for feeding the cycle of violence. Despite the attempt at rapprochement, the Jewish community was stung by the harshness and vehemence of the government's criticism of Israel. Canadian Arab groups had a much different reaction to the government's position. While they were initially dissatisfied with Mulroney's suggestion that Israel had acted with restraint, they were pleased by Clark's strong criticism of Israel, especially his highlighting of alleged Israeli human rights violations.43 Some felt that criticism of Israel had been "too little, too late," but that Canada was now on the right track.44 Laying the blame primarily on Israel's shoulders was certainly in line with their objectives. External Affairs officials were also gratified by the government's position, scoring four. Clark's speech symbolized to some that the Jewish community's "stranglehold" over Middle East policy was finally broken.45 The pro-Israel orientation of the prime minister and other cabinet "politicians" had finally given way to a more balanced and even-handed approach, whose management now lay principally in the hands of the foreign policy professionals in External Affairs. Indeed, one is tempted to argue that Clark's speech signalled the triumph of the foreign policy bureaucracy in the making of Middle East policy. Political constraints, for the moment at least, had fallen by the wayside. Finally, the business community appeared to be indifferent to both

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the events in the occupied territories and Canada's response to them. The general formula remained to stay as far away as possible from controversy, to become involved only as required, and to reassure Arab clients that Canada's policy was moving in the right direction. CONCLUSIONS

Several conclusions may be drawn from these findings. First, its much touted prestige and power notwithstanding, the Canadian Jewish community has not been particularly "satisfied" with Canada's policy toward the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The evidence for the 1973-88 period suggests a high degree of Jewish community activism on foreign policy issues concerning Israel, but only a mixed record in achieving results. Indeed, of the four groups here examined, the Jewish community had by far the lowest combined score in terms of satisfaction. It received twelve points on the satisfaction index compared to twenty-one for the Canadian Arab community and twentyone for the business community. The foreign policy bureaucracy received a score of twenty-two/twenty-three. Clearly, then, there is no obvious or automatic correlation between activity and satisfaction with the outcome of events, at least for the Jewish community. A second conclusion, a corollary of the first, concerns the level of satisfaction with Ottawa's policy enjoyed by groups having interests antithetical to those articulated by the Jewish community and its supporters. The findings, especially for the cases in the latter part of the period under consideration, suggest a continuing lack of interest in Canada's Middle East policy by corporate and banking interests, as long as that policy does not adversely affect their capacity to do business with the region. The findings also suggest growing satisfaction with Canada's policy direction on the part of the foreign policy bureaucracy. Clearly, the "message" it had been seeking to convey to cabinet was beginning to come through. Nevertheless, the findings indicate that the group most satisfied with Canadian policy towards the Middle East was the Arab Canadians. Although still less than completely satisfied with the hesitance of the government to go "all the way" and recognize the PLO, Canadian Arabs were quite pleased with the anti-Israel tone of many of Canada's formal pronouncements on the Middle East, especially as the 19805 progressed. More broadly, it is clear that despite limitations on pressure group influence in the foreign policy process, there does indeed exist a vibrant domestic dimension to the Arab-Israeli dispute, with clearly defined actors holding clearly defined (and often opposed) positions. The Canadian domestic battleground of the Arab-Israeli conflict is fiercely con-

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tested. The apparent success enjoyed by Arab, pro-Arab, and/or antiIsrael groups during the 1973-88 period and the de facto coalitions these groups appeared to form seem to indicate an evolving pattern in domestic sentiment which favours the Arab perspective and is contrary to the interests of the state of Israel. If maintained, this pattern could conceivably change the basic landscape of the domestic battleground, possibly leading to a more overtly "pro-Arab" Canadian policy posture towards Middle East disputes.

NOTES

1 Howard Adelman, "Clark and the Canadian Embassy in Israel," Middle East Focus 2 (March 1980): 6-18; David Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1985); Zachariah Kay, Canada and Pakstine: The Politics of Non-Commitment (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press 1978); Howard J. Stanislawski, "Elites, Domestic Interest Groups, and International Interests in the Canadian Foreign Policy Decision Making Process: The Arab Economic Boycott of Canadians and Canadian Companies Doing Business with Israel," doctoral dissertation, Brandeis University, 1981; Janice Gross Stein, "Canadian Foreign Policy in the Middle East after the October War," Social Praxis 4, nos. 3-4 (1976-7): 271; George Takach, "Clark and the Jerusalem Embassy Affair: Initiative and Constraint in Canadian Foreign Policy," master's thesis, Carleton University, 1980; David Taras, "Canada and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Study of the Yom Kippur War and the Domestic Political Environment," doctoral dissertation, University of Toronto, 1983. 2 Tareq Ismael, ed., Canadian Arab Politics: Policy and Perspectives (Ottawa: Jerusalem International Publishing House 1984); Tareq Ismael, ed., Canada and the Arab World (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press 1986); Peyton V. Lyon, "Canada's Middle East Tilt," International Perspectives (September-October 1982): 3-5 (reprinted in Ismael, ed., Canadian Arab Politics). 3 See "The Media and the Middle East," special issue of Middk East Focus 9 (winter 1986-7). 4 David Taras and Daphne Gottlieb Taras, "The Canadian Media, Domestic Interest Groups, and Middle East Reporting: The Effects of Structural Bias," International Journal 42 (summer 1987): 536-58. See also David Dewitt and lohn Kirton, "Foreign Policy Making Towards the Middle East: Parliament, the Media, and the 1982 Lebanon War," in this volume. 5 Although logic would dictate that the heated and multilayered quality

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of the Arab-Israeli dispute would make it difficult to find governmental behaviour on any issue on the Canada-Middle East agenda that would elicit a score of "indifference" on the part of one domestic community or the other, evidence suggests that this is indeed possible. When Canada's behaviour either strikes at the geographic periphery of the dispute or is specifically designed to avoid the battles and controversies endemic to the dispute, then indifference can be the result. 7 Taras, "Canada and the Arab-Israeli Conflict." 8 Ibid.; Irwin Cotler, "Canada: Overview," in Moshe Davis, ed., The Yom Kippur War: Israel and the Jewish Peopk (New York: Arno Press/Jerusalem: Institute of Contemporary Jewry 1974), 101-6; Emil Fackenheim, "Canada: Perspectives," in Moshe Davis, ed. The Yom Kippur War, 107-23; interview with Myer Bick, former national director, Canada-Israel Committee, March 1984; interview with Norman May, former national chairman, Canada-Israel Committee, March 1984. 9 Taras, "Canada and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," 248-64. 10 Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, 22 December 1973. 11 May interview, March 1984; interview with Rabbi W. Gunther Plaut, former national chairman, Canada-Israel Committee, February 1984. 12 Stein, "Canadian Foreign Policy after the October War," 285-6; Stanislawski, "The Arab Economic Boycott," 70. 13 Stein, "Canadian Foreign Policy after the October War," 285. 14 Official of the Middle East Division, Department of External Affairs, interview, February 1984. 15 Ibid., former assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, interview, April 1984. 16 Bick interview, March 1984; Plaut interview, February 1984. See also Stanislawski, "The Arab Economic Boycott," 310. 17 W. Gunther Plaut, Unfinished Business: An Autobiography (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys 1981), 272; Plaut interview, February 1984. 18 Interview with A. Abdallah, director, Palestine Information Office, Ottawa, May 1984. 19 Stanislawski, "The Arab Economic Boycott," 409. 20 Bick interview, March 1984; former assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, interview, April 1984; official of the Middle East Division, interview, February 1984. 21 Ibid.; interview with Mitchell Sharp, former secretary of state for external affairs, March 1984. 22 Ismael, ed., Canadian Arab Politics. 23 Bick interview, March 1984; May interview, March 1984; Plaut interview, February 1984; Plaut, Unfinished Business, 274-6. 24 Plaut, Unfinished Business, 276; interview with Frank Dimant, executive vice-president, B'nai Brith Canada, June 1986; May interview, March

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1984; interview with Mark Resnick, former national director, CanadaIsrael Committee, February 1984; interview with Alan Rose, former executive vice-president, Canadian Jewish Congress, March 1984. 25 Takach, "Clark and the Jerusalem Embassy Affair," 50. 26 Ibid. 27 Mr Stanfield adopted a broad mandate for himself. While examining fully the possible advantages and disadvantages to Canadian interests of a transfer of the embassy, he also took it upon himself to examine the range of diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations between Canada and the Middle East and North Africa. Given the region's demographic and political realities, the findings of the report were likely to (and indeed did) favour the interests of the Arab-Canadian community. Stanfield interview, May 1984. See also Final Report of the Special Representative of the Government of Canada Respecting the Middle East and North Africa (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 20 February 1980). 28 Abdallah interview, May 1984. 29 See George Takach, "Clark and the Jerusalem Embassy Affair: Initiative and Constraint in Canadian Foreign Policy," in this volume; official of the Middle East Division, interview, February 1984. 30 For a summary of the External Affairs long-term perspective on the Middle East, see the article by John Kirton and Peyton Lyon in this volume: "Perceptions of the Middle East in the Department of External Affairs and Mulroney's Policy 1984-1988." 31 Official of the Middle East Division, interview, February 1984; Stanfield interview, May 1984. 32 David Cox, "Leadership Change and Innovation in Canadian Foreign Policy: The 1979 Progressive Conservative Government," International Journal 37 (autumn 1982): 555-83. 33 See Canadian Middle-East Digest 6 (September/October 1982). 34 See Paul Noble, "Canada and the Palestinian Question," International Perspectives (September/October 1983). 35 Ibid.; former assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, interview, April 1984; official of the Middle East Division, interview, February 1984. 36 Taras and Taras, "The Canadian Media, Domestic Interest Groups, and Middle East Reporting" and Irving Abella, "Innocent Abroad: The Strange Case of Ambassador Theodore Arcand," Middk East Focus 5 (September 1982): 3-4. 37 Resnick interview, February 1984; Abdallah interview, May 1984. 38 Abdallah interview, May 1984; Peyton V. Lyon, "Canada's Middle East Tilt"; Noble, "Canada and the Palestinian Question." 39 Abdallah interview, May 1984. 40 Official in the Middle East Division, interview, February 1984; former

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assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, interview, April 1984. Department of External Affairs, Statement 88/18,10 March 1988. David Lazarus, "Clark Remarks Please CIC," Canadian Jewish News, 28 April 1988, i, 15. Angela Murphy, "PM Urged to Denounce Killings in Gaza Strip," Toronto Star, 17 January 1988, A2; "Clark Accuses Israelis of Abusing Rights," Toronto Star, 21 January 1988, AI. Ibid. Official in the Middle East Division, interview, February 1984; former assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, interview, April 1984; Stanfield interview, May 1984.

PART TWO

The Governmental Stage

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ANNE TROWELLHILLMER

"Here I Am in the Middk": Lester Pearson and the Origins of Canada's Diplomatic Involvement in the Middk East Canada's diplomatic involvement in the Middle East can be dated from February 1947, when the Department of External Affairs was informed by the British government of its decision to place the future of Palestine before the United Nations.1 Canada took a major role in the negotiations which followed the British announcement, culminating in the recommendation of the General Assembly in November 1947 that the area be partitioned into separate Jewish and Arab states joined in economic union. The under-secretary of state for external affairs, Lester B. Pearson, remembered becoming "emotionally involved in a very special way because we were dealing with the Holy Land - the land of my Sunday School lessons."2 He was sympathetic to the Zionist longing to return to the land of their forefathers and deeply affected by the revelations of the Nazi death camps.3 But Pearson was above all a realist, convinced that broad collective security arrangements were the key to a peaceful future.4 Palestine was a major international problem, and the first great challenge for the United Nations; it was therefore vital for the organization's future that it respond positively and creatively. This was no easy task. There were other reasons for interest and action. By 1947, what had been a divergence of views on Palestine between Great Britain and the United States seemed likely to develop into an open and bitter split. This was all the more dangerous because the Soviet Union, suspected to have "no policy but to fish in these troubled waters," might be quick to take advantage.5 The under-secretary worked hard to harmonize British and American positions, but also to serve Canadian and international purposes by maintaining as great a distance as possible from all the interested parties. Pearson believed that Canada had a special contribution to make: of "all the people in these discussions," he claimed, "we were best able to be objective."6

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The Palestine episode laid the groundwork for Canada's Middle East policies for years to come and was an example - and test - of Canada's postwar commitment to the search for world order. As John Holmes has said: "it was ... the Canadian performance, or more particularly Lester Pearson's performance, over Palestine in 1947 that might be regarded as the beginning of ... Canada's role ... and reputation as a moderate mediatory middle power."7 It was also an early demonstration of Pearson's skill and determination as negotiator, conciliator, and moulder of opinion. CANADA AND UNSCOP

On 28 April 1947, a special session of the United Nations met to constitute a committee of investigation into Palestine. This committee was to play a historic role in determining the Palestine issue. Pearson found himself at the centre of the discussions as the much-praised chairman of the influential First (Political) Committee, which drafted the terms of reference and composition of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). Pearson skilfully managed to steer debate clear of the emotion-charged substance of the problem and focus on two main issues - whether the great powers would be represented on u N s c o P and whether its terms of reference would be broad enough to include the problem of displaced persons in Europe. Such questions were especially relevant because it became clear at a very early stage that the United States planned to nominate Canada for election to the committee. Although Canada was reluctant to serve, considerable pressure was applied by the Americans, and Canada acquiesced. The King government appointed the Supreme Court justice, Ivan C. Rand, as its representative and Leon Mayrand, a senior officer in the Department of External Affairs, as his alternate. In an effort to relieve increasing pressure from domestic lobby groups, the government made it clear that it would neither direct or instruct the Canadian representative, nor be bound by u N s c o p's findings. Rand was on his own.8 During its visit to Palestine in June and July of 1947 U N S C O P was boycotted by the Arab population but managed to have extensive meetings with Jewish representatives. On 31 August the committee released its conclusions, a scant two weeks before the General Assembly was to convene. Among its unanimous recommendations were calls for the termination of the mandate and the granting of independence at the earliest possible date. Three members of UNSCOP put forward a minority plan which advocated the establishment of an independent federal state in Palestine, but a seven-member majority recommended

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partition into an Arab state and a Jewish state and the internationalization of the city of Jerusalem, the three to be linked in economic union. Economic integration was an important aspect of the plan because of the complicated territorial boundaries and because Palestine, which was approximately the size of the state of Vermont, could not be divided into two economically strong and independent areas.9 Rand was among those who endorsed the majority report. He had, indeed, drafted much of it, and his interventions at key moments in the decision-making process had been crucial.10 The second session of the General Assembly was left to consider the merits of UNSCOP'S report. Debate on the Palestine question would normally take place in the First Committee. In the fall of 1947, however, the number and importance of the items to be covered led the secretary-general, Trygve Lie, to suggest that Palestine be considered separately by an ad hoc committee consisting of all 57 United Nations members. The General Assembly agreed, and on 25 September the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question had its opening meeting. The first item on the agenda was the election of a chairman. Pearson was back in Ottawa. During the summer he had closely followed newspaper accounts of UNS COP'S progress and he now hoped to make his, and Canada's, presence felt again. At the end of August Ottawa informed George Ignatieff, a member of the Canadian delegation at the United Nations, that "Pearson would be available for the chairmanship, should a committee on Palestine be constituted."11 Events, however, did not favour Pearson's candidacy. Canada was also seeking one of the seats on the Security Council and after sounding out British and American diplomats, External Affairs was informed that election to the Security Council might be jeopardized by allowing Canadians to run for any other United Nations office.12 A final stumbling-block developed when the prime minister, Mackenzie King, who was planning an extended trip to Europe during October and November, became reluctant to release Pearson from his duties in Ottawa. Pearson's name was withdrawn from consideration. When general debate opened on 26 September, the ad hoc committee had before it UNS COP'S general recommendations, majority and minority reports, and an item submitted by Saudi Arabia and Iraq advocating the termination of the mandate and recognition of Palestine's independence as a unitary state. The first to speak was Arthur Creech Jones, the British secretary of state for the colonies. British policy, he revealed, was neither to endorse nor to criticize the majority and minority reports, but to remain "neutral." Whatever solution was finally adopted, however, he warned that it must include provisions for implementation. Britain would not enforce any policy which was unac-

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ceptable to both Jews and Arabs. The United Kingdom delegate startled the committee by announcing his government's decision to "plan for an early withdrawal of the British forces and of the British administration from Palestine."13 The situation confronting the second session was thus immediately and dramatically different. The assumption until now had been that the mandatory power would remain in Palestine until the situation was resolved and arrangements were completed for a future government. The United States and the Soviet Union had not yet made their views known. Neither had Canada. The instructions to the Canadian delegation had been very broad, authorizing the representative to "give support to any proposals which appear to them likely to bring about a solution to the Palestine problem, provided that there is reasonable evidence that they can be put into effect. It is obvious, however, that nothing will be gained by the adoption of recommendations, no matter how great their merit, which are resisted by either Jews or Arabs unless provision is made to overcome this opposition."14 Ottawa was uncertain about the positions of the United States and Great Britain, and, with the danger that the Palestine issue might develop into a cause for embarrassment in Anglo-American relations, it was decided that Canada should defer its statement until the positions of the major powers were made clear.15 In his initial speech before the ad hoc committee on 11 October, the United States representative, Herschel Johnson, pledged American support for the general UN SCOP recommendations and for the majority plan of partition with economic union. The American statement was generally vague regarding implementation, although it was clear that the United States was not prepared to become directly involved in carrying out the United Nations recommendations. Rather, Johnson contended that the responsibility for administering Palestine during the critical period of transition from mandate to statehood rested with Great Britain.16 Two days later the Soviet Union's representative on the committee, Semen Tsarapkin, outlined his government's position. Many Western observers, including officials of the State Department and of the American and Canadian embassies in Moscow, had assumed that, having expressed its preference for a bi-national state in May 1947, the Soviet Union would support the Arab position on the Palestine question.17 Sensing that a "socialist" Jewish state might become a diplomatic ally, however, the Soviet position had recently changed and Tsarapkin's speech came as something of a surprise. Because of the prevailing tension between Arab and Jew, he said, the minority u N s c o P plan was impracticable. Partition offered more hope of realization.18

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The time had arrived for Canada to place its own views before the committee. J.L. flsley, the minister of justice, headed the Canadian delegation. Pearson, of course, was available, and External Affairs sent R.G. Riddell as principal adviser, along with Leon Mayrand and E.P. MacCallum, the department's highly respected expert on the Middle East.19 It was a strong team. All its members were acquainted with the problem of Palestine; each was committed to a point of view. Legitimate disagreement was inevitable, flsley had profound doubts about the ethical and moral aspects of partition. He was particularly concerned to uphold the principle of self-determination and the commitments made to the Arabs prior to the setting up of the mandate. MacCallum urged that the Canadian government withhold any endorsement of partition until the possibility of an Arab-Jewish agreement was ruled out. "Our first duty here is to use our good offices toward conciliation," she concluded, and "it will become our duty to vote on the report of the Special Committee only as a last resort if conciliation fails."20 MacCallum also questioned whether Canada had any right "to insist on the partition of Palestine against the wishes of practically the whole Arab population and of at least a substantial minority of the Jews." Mayrand's views differed markedly. He believed that acceptance of any report by the two interested parties was clearly an impossibility. The Arabs were bound to be vocal opponents of partition but they should not be taken too seriously. The great majority were not yet committed nationalists and the Arab chiefs could be appeased through financial concessions, especially if these accompanied a clearly declared will to impose a settlement whatever the means necessary. The Jews, for their part, "would be capable of maintaining themselves by force if only the right to use force were conceded to them." Canada, he concluded, might safely adopt the majority report.21 Pearson, for his part, was personally committed to partition. "I have never wavered," he recalled in his memoirs, "in my view that a solution to the problem was impossible without the recognition of a Jewish state in some form in Palestine. To me this was always the core of the matter." Partition "was certainly no ideal solution but it seemed, certainly to me, the best that could possibly be achieved, the only solution that might bring peace and order to Palestine, with some recognition of the just claims of both sides. Provision was made for a Jewish state in Palestine, a 'national home,' something which I felt was a sine qua non of any settlement."22 After a telephone conversation with the under-secretary, still in Ottawa, Riddell drafted the statement on Canada's position. A highly respected officer well acquainted with United Nations issues and with the postwar refugee problem, Riddell's view of the Palestine problem coincided with Pearson's. The draft was sent to the East Block,

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along with a synopsis of the objections put forward by Ilsley and MacCallum. Ottawa evidently did not share their misgivings. Riddell's draft received cabinet approval. Ilsley delivered the text to the ad hoc committee on 14 October. His speech stressed the need for a solution to Palestine's difficulties that was practicable and constitutional. The main task facing the committee was to determine the arrangement that would "best enable two peoples living within the confines of a restricted geographical area to avoid obstructing one another's development and most conduce to their welfare and freedom." Two plans were before the committee, one based on partition, the other on a federal form of government. Federation, however, must be founded on agreement: "the question arises as to whether it is any better to try to maintain unity without consent. There is no evidence in anything we have seen or heard here that both Jews and Arabs will accept accommodation within the framework of a single state." The Canadian delegation had thus been led to accept, somewhat reluctantly, the majority proposals, at least "as a basis of discussion."23 On 17 October fourteen members, including Canada, gave approval in principle to the partition plan.24 Thirteen states declared their opposition, eight calling for the establishment of an independent unitary Arab state in Palestine. The minority UN SCOP plan recommending a federal solution failed to win substantial support.

PEARSON'S INTERVENTION In mid-October Pearson replaced Ilsley as head of the Canadian delegation. It has been claimed, in fact, that Pearson engineered Ilsley's temporary recall to Ottawa.25 Certainly Pearson's arrival in New York signalled the beginning of a different phase of the delegation's work. Although initially tied up with other business, the under-secretary was kept apprised of developments in the ad hoc committee. He occasionally became directly involved, as he did when it appeared that the United States might succeed in preventing a thorough discussion of the procedure for implementing the partition plan. Members of the Canadian delegation were convinced that, if partition was to have a chance of success, it was crucial that details of the plan and its implementation be worked out in advance. Canada endorsed the United States proposal for the establishment of a sub-committee to draw up a partition scheme but, going further, put forward an amendment which would broaden the sub-committee's terms of reference to include the question of administrative responsibility during the phases of implementation.26 General John Hilldring, the alternate American representative on the ad hoc committee, tried to persuade Canada to withdraw the amend-

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ment because it focused on "certain facets" of the Palestinian problem which "should not be over-emphasized." Pearson was adamant, and vigorous American public and private efforts to change his view met with little success.27 The Canadian delegation then learned that the United States, having already made clear its reluctance to become involved in the work of the sub-committee, threatened to refuse membership unless the Canadian amendment was withdrawn.28 The Canadians, however, emphasized their determination "to resist strongly" any attempt by the United States to withdraw. Should the United States pull back, Canada would do likewise.29 Pearson had his way. On 21 October the American draft resolution and the Canadian amendment were approved. Two sub-committees were set up to work out concrete plans for Palestine's future government. Sub-Committee I was composed of delegations which had declared their support for the partition principle, including Canada and the United States. MacCallum, still far from reconciled to the partition principle, continued to raise doubts. Under the terms of the United Nations Charter, she pointed out, the power of the General Assembly was limited to making recommendations. It could not create new states. A United Nations decision to divide Palestine against the wishes of the majority of the population, and to "turn over 65% of the territory to the Jews, who now own only 6% of the land," would constitute an aggression and a violation of the Charter. Under article 51, the Arab states would have the right "to resort to individual or collective self-defence." MacCallum's position was that "if strong desire to settle in another community, to develop its land, and to take over the government of all or part of it, is now recognized by the United Nations as a valid cause for partitioning their country, a precedent will be set whose consequences may be easily foreseen."30 There were questions from other Canadian delegates as well, centring on the problem of implementation and, in particular, on the transition period from mandate to statehood. In Ottawa the department's legal advisers, Max Wershof and Russell Hopkins, had concluded that the General Assembly was ill equipped to deal with the vacuum which would exist when the United Kingdom withdrew. A complicated political operation was being undertaken; someone would have to take responsibility for putting it into effect.31 Mayrand argued, however, that "only partition possesses the character of finality ... the problem is primarily a political one and ... it would be a mistake to entertain too many legal scruples about it." On the question of possible guarantees and compensation to the Arab Palestinians, Mayrand stated: "We do not believe that the Jews could abandon much of what is provided for them in the majority plan. Jewish acceptance of the major-

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ity plan meant a serious curtailment of their previous claim over the whole of Palestine." He believed that financial assistance to the Arabs was the responsibility of the United Nations, not the Jewish people. Because the thousands of Arabs in the Jewish state would be "very seriously hurt in their pride at being ruled by Jews," the United Nations should set up an agency to encourage the orderly transfer of population from one state to another.32 During the remaining discussion in the United Nations, the Canadian delegation assigned its highest priority to determining and assessing the policies of the major powers in order that areas of agreement could be identified and compromise proposals worked out. On 31 October, Herschel Johnson set out a plan for implementation which would eliminate the transition period with its problems and complications: the date of the termination of the mandate would coincide with the date of independence of the two states. To assist in the transfer of power, the Americans suggested that the United Nations might set up a two- or three-man commission headed by a high commissioner. The United States assumed that Britain would provide the administration and resources necessary to carry out the United Nations recommendations - precisely what the British had already stated they would not do. The Americans remained determined to oppose any plan which might commit them to direct intervention in the area. The United States delegation was equally determined to avoid any plan which the Soviet Union could veto and for this purpose sought to prevent responsibility for implementation being assigned to the Security Council. For the same reason the Americans did not want any of the permanent members of the Security Council, which of course included the u s s R, to be represented on their proposed commission.33 The policy of the Soviet Union was aimed primarily at securing the United Kingdom's withdrawal from Palestine at the earliest possible date. Under the Soviet scheme the British mandate was to terminate on i January 1948, although the United Kingdom would be given until 30 April to withdraw. The Soviet Union also proposed a commission to prepare the new states for independence.34 There were thus similarities in the Soviet and American positions, but (as we will see) substantial suspicions and disagreement as well. Once more detailed information on the position of the United States and the Soviet Union was at its disposal, Canada decided to enter actively into the preparation of the partition plan. A statement should be given soon, commented one member of the delegation, in order to give "direction to the discussion and avoid some of the confused thinking which is becoming evident."35 On 2 November the secretary of state for external affairs, Louis St Laurent, was sent an outline of

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American and Soviet views as well as a draft statement which the delegation wished to present to the sub-committee. The minister's approval was tempered with a note of caution: "I would be very careful about how the very serious and obvious difficulties can be overcome. No one else seems to be prepared to subscribe and I am not sure enough about our diagnosis to be ready to do so. If there is to be a Commission," he added, "we should not be so prominently identified with the matter as to be placed in the position of having to serve on such a Commission."36 Those in New York, however, believed there were strong reasons to put caution to one side. Riddell later recalled the "practical and realistic considerations" which motivated the delegation. As a member of the Security Council, Canada could not "possibly escape participating in the decision which was finally taken... it was very much in our interests to do whatever we could to make that decision as widely acceptable as possible, and to prevent the responsibility for putting it into effect being left with ourselves and other secondary States." Partition, Pearson believed, was the only plan which had any chance of adoption; Canada was not being "merely enthusiastic or noble."37 Pearson addressed the sub-committee on 4 November. He argued that if partition was to be successful, the proposal must be constitutionally sound, practicable, and effective. Nothing at all would be preferable to a plan which had little expectation of being put into practice. First, the sub-committee must examine what action the United Nations could take, or cause to be taken, to fill the legal vacuum which would follow the withdrawal of the mandatory power. Second, Pearson warned, "careful consideration should also be given in advance to the steps which could or might be taken by the United Nations should the settlement not work out peaceably in the manner contemplated." Before the delegations adopted a final position, Pearson urged that the partition proposals be carefully scrutinized, particularly with regard to the role that Britain was expected to play until its withdrawal and to the methods employed to maintain law and order in Palestine immediately following that withdrawal.38 That same day Canada joined the United States, the USSR, and Guatemala in a small working group set up to reconcile the various proposals and suggestions. David Horowitz, the Jewish Agency's representative at the ad hoc committee's meetings, has claimed responsibility for Canada's addition to the group: "I knew Lester Pearson's great abilities and influence and felt his membership would be a substantial contribution to success."39 Pearson prospered in such intimate groups, "where arguments can be advanced and withdrawn; points won and lost in a way which simply is not possible when every position taken,

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even tentatively, in the morning becomes a headline in the afternoon." "I am a strong believer in open covenants," as he put it, "but I do not think they should always be openly arrived at."40

" H E R E i AM IN THE M I D D L E " Pearson was now clearly in charge of the delegation and no less clearly the key figure in the making of Canadian policy. Of those with strong views on partition, Ilsley remained in Ottawa, Mayrand was assigned to Sub-Committee I to advise on constitutional and boundary questions, and MacCallum, although accompanying Pearson in the working group, was shunted to one side. Once Pearson became thoroughly immersed in the issue, George Ignatieff recalled, all others had to give way.41 Pearson's views were moderate ones, lying between those of MacCallum on the one hand and Mayrand on the other. Pearson worked with one eye on Ottawa, reassuring his minister (and through him an ever cautious Mackenzie King) that Canadian involvement would not run too deep. This was difficult, because Pearson's reputation as a skilled conciliator was becoming public knowledge. The New York Times, for example, gave front-page credit to his working group diplomacy on 11 November: "The latest draft was a series of compromises that were largely a result of the tireless efforts of Lester B. Pearson."42 Anticipating such praise, Pearson had already told St Laurent that "there may be exaggerated and misleading reports of this effort on our part." The working group and Sub-Committee I were merely attempting to produce the most practicable scheme for implementing a plan based on the partition principle, a principle which had not yet been accepted by the General Assembly. He stressed that if no way of successfully implementing partition could be found, it would be useless to vote for the principle. The delegation would continue to make it clear that if a commission was established, Canada was not available for membership, having already done its part. Pearson advised "that it is of the greatest importance that every possible effort should be made to reach such a solution, because if the United Nations fails, or even falters, in this regard, a further tremendous, almost a fatal blow will be struck at its prestige."43 It was hard work. "Here I am in the middle," Pearson noted, "between an obstinate Russian and a not too skillful American, and it has been about the most exhausting experience of my life."44 It was, however, the British posture that he found most distressing and most difficult to understand. The United Kingdom had asked the United Nations to deal with the Palestine problem, but it now refused to make any contribution to a workable solution. The British had had to face

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difficulties, it was true. The Americans, and others, had been "irresponsible," but it seemed to Pearson that the United Kingdom was leaving itself open to the charge of equal irresponsibility. Surely the British delegation could indicate whether one implementation plan or the other was acceptable without irrevocably committing itself. It had, however, "taken a completely detached attitude, and in private conversation some of their advisers tend to take the line that United Nations efforts are doomed to fail and that [the] United Kingdom is not going to get itself involved in so impracticable a proposition as partition." Pearson thought Britain would be blamed for discrediting the United Nations and frustrating a plan agreed to by the United States and the USSR. 45

Pearson worried that "all the heat" would be turned on the United Kingdom and that the United States might escape "the censure they deserve."46 Throughout the discussion in the working group, he felt the Americans were all too apt to take an unrealistic attitude of easy optimism. There was no evidence of a desire or readiness to lend the material assistance necessary to resolve the practical problems which would inevitably arise during implementation. Pearson informally had suggested to American representatives that their government simply state its willingness to fulfil its responsibilities as a good member of the United Nations, should implementation of partition be followed by violence. They had not been willing to go even this far.47 Pearson's assessment of Soviet policy - "the subject of anxious speculation before it was made known, and of equally anxious and sceptical analysis when it had been announced" - was more equivocal. On the face of it, the Russian stance seemed to be a sincere if groping attempt to find a solution to a troublesome international problem. Tsarapkin was "an agreeable, diligent, conscientious and even flexible colleague."48 Having supported the principle of partition, he appeared genuinely anxious to be accommodating in working out the details. Tsarapkin did have Russian self-interest to promote, but he did so in a direct and generally inoffensive manner. According to Pearson, Tsarapkin was convinced that despite all their protestations the British would remain in Palestine in some guise unless an international authority made sure they took their leave. Pearson continued to press for a compromise solution, eventually putting aside his and his colleagues' qualms about the General Assembly's doubtful legal credentials to exercise sovereignty in Palestine. Canadians, after all, were nothing if not flexible. A Pearson plan won general approval in the working group on 18 November; it called for termination of the mandate and the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory power by i August 1948 and for the establishment of

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independent Arab and Jewish states barely two months later. During the transition period, a United Nations commission would be responsible for the administration and maintenance of law and order in Palestine. Consisting of the representatives of five states, the commission would be appointed by the General Assembly, but act under the guidance of the Security Council.49 "Mr Lester Pearson of Canada," a correspondent wrote in the Manchester Guardian, "has been the creator of ... successive compromises, and this capacity to watch a plan knocked down and then set up another should give him some special sort of status with the United Nations."50 The composition of the proposed commission was still to be determined, and the United States maintained its pressure on Canada to serve. Pearson's views on the matter are unclear - he could certainly think of strong reasons in favour51 - but his minister was adamantly opposed to Canadian participation. If Canada "were to criticize the United Kingdom," St Laurent said on 24 November, "it would create a terrible storm in Canada, as many people... would consider it presumptuous that we should criticize a country which had thirty years' experience in trying to deal with the Palestine problem." In addition, "we were now generally looked upon, rightly or wrongly, as having espoused the Jewish cause. The Arabs would feel that, as members of the Commission, we would be hostile to them." It might further be thought that the members of the commission had a peculiar responsibility to furnish the men and materiel, should armed forces be required in Palestine. The job description for the commission's chairman also fit Pearson only too well, and an effort might be made to conscript him. The secretary of state for external affairs must have been relieved when Pearson telephoned him from New York to report that the delegation had made it clear that Canada would not serve on the proposed commission.52 It might be assumed that, having expended so much time and effort on the partition plan, Canadian support would be a foregone conclusion. In fact, Canada backed partition reluctantly and with many misgivings. Questions about its moral and legal validity and concern about British and Arab attitudes remained; there were doubts about the advisability of supporting a United Nations recommendation which could not be enforced. The decision to vote in favour of the partition plan had, however, been made on 22 November. Light is shed on this decision, which MacCallum claims was made in New York despite continuing doubts in Ottawa,53 in a memorandum written by Riddell for the use of the Canadian delegation. The plan, he contended, however "dangerous and provocative" it might be, "offered the only possibility of avoiding a collapse of order and a settlement by force in Palestine."

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Partition admittedly raised the possibility of disturbances or even war, "but failure to adopt the plan creates an equal if not greater danger, because it will discredit the Jewish Agency, and will play into the hands of Jewish extremists who are said to be prepared to seize the whole of Palestine by force." More broadly, Riddell suggested: "The plan of partition [also] gives to the Western powers the opportunity to establish an independent, progressive Jewish state in the Eastern Mediterranean with close economic and cultural ties with the West generally and in particular with the United States." The Soviet Union was willing to co-operate in the establishment of this state, whose existence might be of very great consequence for the future political development of the Middle East. Finally, partition coupled with an economic plan would force the people of Palestine to take the responsibility for a peaceful future.54 "We were quite aware," Pearson said to the ad hoc committee on behalf of his colleagues in Sub-Committee I, "of the difficulties of the position, the legal difficulties, the moral difficulties, and the physical." The General Assembly was being asked to take a calculated risk. The sub-committee's plan could work, however, "providing we obtain three conditions which I think we are entitled to expect or at least to hope for." The first was Britain's co-operation. Pearson defended the British against American allegations that they had been of little help to the subcommittee. "We like to think in Canada that we know something about the British," he said, and he claimed to have "every confidence" that their support would be forthcoming. Secondly, the partition plan would require the "active backing and support of the permanent members of the Security Council; the great powers which have to accept a special responsibility in this matter." The third condition was the most obvious and difficult of all: the plan must be approved by two-thirds of the Assembly and then "accepted by the people of Palestine and by all members of the United Nations." Toward that end, Pearson gave a pledge of his government's support.55 On 25 November the report of Sub-Committee I came to a vote and received the ad hoc committee's approval; on 29 November the plan won narrow two-thirds acceptance in the General Assembly. A CALCULATED RISK

The partition resolution, so painfully reached, was almost immediately placed in jeopardy. The first of Pearson's conditions for the success of partition was the co-operation of the United Kingdom. When British withdrawal was approved by the Attlee cabinet on 4 December, however, there was little evidence of such an attitude. The date of termina-

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tion of the mandate was unilaterally advanced to 14 May 1948. Until that date Britain was unwilling to share authority in Palestine with the United Nations commission and wanted, for security reasons, to delay the arrival of the commission until i May. Nor would it allow the demarcation of boundaries, the establishment of provisional government councils, and the recruiting of local militia - all preparations essential to the plan - to be carried out.56 It had been blithely assumed in New York that a transfer of authority from Britain to provisional councils would take place rapidly and efficiently, with the commission doing little more than acting as an observer. The commission, apparently, would have to undertake much wider responsibilities in the implementation of partition than was ever intended or believed possible. Pearson was critical of the British attitude. As he told Norman Robertson, the British "often seemed to go out of their way to be uncommunicative about... their timetable ... It would have made matters much simpler also if the United Kingdom had said before, rather than after the close of the Assembly, that they would not permit a United Nations Commission to enter Palestine before the termination of the Mandate." Such examples of "reticence," although not decisive, "created the impression that the United Kingdom Government was deliberately attempting to make it as difficult as possible for the Assembly to answer the question which the United Kingdom itself had placed on the agenda." Pearson had said that partition must receive the active support of the permanent members of the Security Council. Should outbreaks of violence occur in Palestine following the surrender of the mandate, the council alone was empowered to take steps to maintain law and order. By the end of December 1947, however, it had become clear that such powers were not likely to be invoked. Information reached Ottawa that the United States and the United Kingdom, still opposed to involving the USSR directly in Palestinian affairs, were "concerting action" to prevent the subject even being discussed in the council.57 Pearson had also known that there must be co-operation and good will between Arab and Jew in Palestine. He thought that a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly - and thus the force of world opinion - would sway the doubters, abstainers, and opponents, but that was not to be. As MacCallum had predicted, Arab opposition to partition did not melt away. Neighbouring Arab states refused to recognize the will of the United Nations and threatened a military solution. Within Palestine, conflict between the Arab and Jewish communities became more intense. Economic integration and a complicated territorial distribu-

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tion, key features of the partition scheme, quickly seemed hopelessly optimistic goals. As 1947 drew to a close, the American consul general at Jerusalem reported that the United Nations commission was undertaking a virtually "impossible" task. Its members and staff were "generally believed to be in real danger of assassination." As for the British, "their chief desire seems to be to prevent any organized warfare before departure." "Terror is prevalent and normal life (i.e. normal for Palestine) is disappearing." Much worse, he predicted, was to come.58 From January until early May 1948, while the United Nations continued to grapple with the question of Palestine's future, conflict between Arab and Jew intensified as the British withdrawal progressed. On 14 May, one day before the mandate was to end, the Jewish state of Israel was proclaimed and, minutes later, recognized by the Truman administration. Partition had taken place, but in a manner unforeseen six months earlier at the United Nations. War followed between Israel and its Arab neighbours, and in January 1949 an uneasy truce was declared. CONCLUSION Canada's involvement in the Palestine debate in 1947 set the pattern for its Middle East diplomacy. The main participants, MacCallum and Pearson, remained at the centre of events until the mid-1950s. MacCallum continued to provide a departmental core of expertise along with her own brand of independent-minded advice. Pearson, who replaced St Laurent as minister in 1948, gave overall direction, thrust, and purpose to Canada's policy. Indeed, the attitudes and priorities which he brought to bear during the partition debate shaped Canadian diplomacy on the Middle East long after he was gone from the scene. Although the survival of Israel became the cornerstone of Canadian policy, Pearson had established a reputation, for himself and for Canada, as an effective mediator and conciliator on Middle East questions, and he steadfastly tried to maintain and develop that role. Pearson therefore sought as much flexibility and manoeuvrability as possible. It was important that Canada continue to avoid being too closely identified with either Israel or the Arabs. To the chagrin of Jewish interest groups, Canada kept aloof from the denunciations and condemnations which characterized relations between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The factors which limited Canada's freedom of action in 1947 continued to act as constraints. A Cold War atmosphere pervaded virtually all aspects of United Nations affairs. Any situation which might allow the u s s R to capitalize on political instability in the area must be avoided.

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There was, moreover, the ever present Canadian reality, or difficulty, of working within a foreign policy framework in which policies or decisions made elsewhere were often as immediate and important as those made in Ottawa. "When we talk of Canadian foreign policy," Pearson said, "we are not talking of clear-cut, long-range plans and policies under national direction and control. We are certainly not without power to influence our own external policies - and in many matters the influence is of course decisive. But we needn't exaggerate our power, or deceive ourselves about it, by talk of sovereign rights and unrestricted independence."59 As Pearson frankly admitted only a few weeks after partition was accepted by the General Assembly: "I would have liked in this Palestine issue to have taken a strong independent stand for what we thought was the proper and right solution and to have dismissed the British and Americans with 'a plague on both your houses/ '/6° Canada sought thereafter to establish a necessarily discreet distance between its Middle East policies and those of its closest allies - from the United States, which followed a strongly pro-Israel course, and from the United Kingdom, initially cool to Israel and preoccupied with questions of global strategy and oil supplies. Canada's policy in 1947 was a nice mixture of fresh Pearsonian idealism and internationalism and traditional Canadian caution and realism. That internationalism and idealism, of course, were not confined to Pearson alone, and his own sense of realism and caution was acute. "There are dangers in seeking perfection," he said in 1945. "If we insist on perfection we might not get anything. We would merely make the best the enemy of the good."61 Looking back in his memoirs on a long and distinguished career in international affairs, Pearson remembered the Palestine debate as an important moment in the life of his country and that of the United Nations. It had been, in addition, his first great international crisis as under-secretary of state for external affairs. Canada, he assured himself and his readers, had done its part in supporting peaceful international co-operation and conciliation.62 Events, however, had quickly overtaken the partition solution and the Holy Land remained torn by division and hatred between Arab and Jew. NOTES

i Canada, Department of External Affairs ( D E A), file 47 B(S), Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Secretary of State for External Affairs (s s E A), 0146,14 February 1947. See, generally, Anne Trowell Hillmer,

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"Canadian Policy on the Partition of Palestine 1947," unpublished master's thesis, Carleton University, 1981; David J. Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1985). 2 John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis, eds., Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourabk Lester B. Pearson, 3 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1972-5), 2: 213. 3 See, for example, National Archives of Canada (NAC), King Papers, MG 26, J4, vol. 310, file 3308, Pearson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 15 November 1946. 4 DBA, Statements and Speeches 47/1, "Canadian Diplomacy," 11 January 19475 NAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26, N, vol. 63, Pearson to Trygve Lie, 17 May 1948. 6 Ibid., vol. 2, Pearson, "Palestine," 16 May 1949. 7 John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1945-1957, 2 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1979-82), 2: 63 and 69. 8 For details, see Hillmer, "Canadian Policy on Partition," 67-8. 9 United Nations, Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly (Lake Success, New York, 1947). Australia, the eleventh member of the committee signed the UN SCOP report as a whole, without subscribing to either majority or minority plans. 10 See DBA, file 5475-c0-1-40c, Mayrand to SSEA, 220, i September 1947, and 5475- c 0-40 c, R.G. Riddell, "Palestine," 31 January 1948. 11 DE A 5475- c0-40c, Riddell to Ignatieff, 814, 30 August 1947. 12 Ibid., s s E A to High Commission for Canada in Australia, 150, 2 September 1947; High Commission for Canada in Great Britain to SSEA, 1430, 6 September 1947, and Riddell to Hume Wrong, 2340, 8 September 194713 United Nations, Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Summary Records of Meetings, 25 September-25 November 1947 (Lake Success, New York), 4. Hereafter Ad Hoc Committee records. 14 DBA 9770-8-40c, "Statement Approved by Cabinet on 11 September 1947 for the Guidance of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations Second Session," Circular 5140,17 September 1947. 15 DBA 5475-c0-1-40c, Holmes to Pearson, 1412, 3 September 1947. 16 Ad Hoc Committee records, 62-4. 17 United States, Department of state, Foreign Relations of the United States 1947. 5: The Near East and Africa (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office 1971), 1166-8. Hereafter FRUS 1947.

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18 Ad Hoc Committee records, 69-71. 19 See Anne Trowell Hillmer, "Elizabeth Pauline MacCallum," Bout de Papier 3 (summer 1985): 14-15. 20 D E A 5475- c 0-2-40 c, MacCallum, "Palestine," 9 October 1947. 21 Ibid., Mayrand, "Memorandum for the Under-Secretary: Note on the Present Palestine Situation at the United Nations Assembly," 10 October 1947. 22 Munro and Inglis, eds., Mike, 2: 217, 214. 23 The original draft had not included the phrase "as a basis for discussion" which gave the Canadian delegation additional flexibility. It was added at MacCallum's suggestion. 24 DE A 5475-CG-4OC, MacCallum to Reid, 1385,18 October 1947. 25 Interview with MacCallum, 22 February 1977. 26 DBA 5475-CG-4OC, MacCallum to Reid, 1385,18 October 1947. 27 DBA 5475-CD-2-4OC, MacCallum to Reid, 1454, 26 October 1947. 28 DBA 5475-CG-40C, MacCallum to Reid, 1385,18 October 1947. 29 D E A 5475- c 0-2-40 c, C. Drury to acting u s s E A, 1408, 21 October 1947. 30 Ibid., MacCallum, "Palestine: the Partition Issue," n.d. 31 Ibid., M.H. Wershof, "Legal Aspects of Action on Palestine by the United Nations," 17 October 1947, and "Supplementary Memorandum Regarding Legal Aspects of the Palestine Question," 21 October 1947. 32 Ibid., Mayrand, "Necessity of Partition of Palestine" and "Suggestions re Amendments in Majority Plan," 25 October 1947. 33 Gordon Knox to United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations, memorandum, 4 November 1947, in FRUS 1947,5:1234-6. 34 D E A 5475- c 0-2-40 c, "General Proposals of the u s s R on the Structure of Palestine," UN Press Release PM 7177. 35 D E A 5475- c w-4O c, C.M. Drury to acting u s s E A, 1536,3 November 194736 D E A 5475- c 0-2-40 c, St Laurent, minute, on L. Beaudry, "Memorandum for the Minister," 3 November 1947. 37 D E A 47 B(S), Riddell to Robertson, 30 December 1947, and Pearson to A.F.W. Plumptre, 3 April 1948. 38 D E A 5475- c 0-2-40 c, Canadian statement, 4 November 1947. 39 David Horowitz, State in the Making (New York: Knopf 1953), 290. 40 DBA, Statements and Speeches 47/1, L.B. Pearson, "Canadian Diplomacy," 11 January 1947. 41 Interview with MacCallum, 21 February 1977; interview with Ignatieff, 23 March 1977. 42 New York Times, 11 November 1947. 43 D E A 5475-c 0-2-40 c, Pearson to St Laurent, 1599,10 November 1947. 44 Pearson Papers, pre-1958 series, vol. 10, Pearson to V. Massey, 16 November 1947.

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45 DE A 5475-c 0-2-40 c, Pearson to St Laurent, 1692,17 November 1947. 46 United Kingdom, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Records, 37i/ 6i888/ £10748, United Kingdom Delegation to Foreign Office, 3406,16 November 1947. 47 DE A 5475-c 0-2-40c, Pearson to St Laurent, 1692,17 November 1947. 48 DE A 47e(s), Pearson to Holmes, 30 December 1947. 49 DE A 5475-c 0-2-40c, Riddell to E.R. Hopkins, 1710,18 November 1947, and Hopkins to Riddell, 1427,19 November 1947. 50 Quoted in ibid., Robertson to SSE A, 1731,19 November 1947. 51 See ibid., Pearson to St Laurent, 1763, 22 November 1947. 52 Ibid., E. Reid, "Palestine," 24 November 1947; King Papers, Diary, 5 February 1948. 53 Interview with MacCallum, 21 February 1977. 54 DBA 478(5), Riddell, "Palestine," 30 December 1947. 55 D E A 5475-c 0-2-40 c, L.B. Pearson, "Canadian Statement on the Partition Plan for Palestine," 22 November 1947. See also DE A 5475-0 G-I40 c, J.L. Ilsley, "Statement on Palestine," 26 November 1947. 56 United Kingdom, Public Record Office, Cabinet Office Records, 128/10, Cabinet Meeting 93(47), 4 December 1947. 57 DEA 478(5), Pearson to Wrong, 30 December 1947. 58 American Consul General at Jersualem to Secretary of State, 31 December 1947, in FRUS 1947,5:1322-8. 59 "Some Principles of Canadian Foreign Policy," January 1948, in L.B. Pearson, Words and Occasions: An Anthology of Speeches and Articles Selected from His Papers by the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1970), 68. 60 "Canada and the San Francisco Conference," 4 June 1945, in ibid., 71. See also Pearson Papers, vol. 63, Pearson to Trygve Lie, 27 May 1948. 61 Pearson, Words and Occasions, 63-4. 62 Munro and Inglis, eds., Mike, 2: 214.

GEORGE TAKAC H

Clark and the Jerusalem Embassy Affair: Initiative and Constraint in Canadian Foreign Policy

On 25 April 1979, halfway through Canada's 1979 federal election campaign and just minutes before a meeting with the Canada-Israel Committee (cic) at a Toronto hotel, the leader of the Progressive Conservative party, Joe Clark, announced to the press that if elected he would be prepared to transfer the Canadian embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Only a few months before, while on a trip to the Middle East, Clark had refused to make such a commitment, on the grounds that it might adversely affect the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations. On 5 June 1979, at his first press conference as prime minister, Clark reaffirmed the Conservatives' new Middle East policy by indicating that it was definitely the intention of the new government to move the embassy to Jerusalem. Yet on 29 October Clark effectively abandoned this initiative when he announced in the House of Commons that his government no longer intended to move the embassy, at least until such time as a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbours had settled the status of Jerusalem. This chapter explores these two policy reversals within the context of domestic interest group activity, international power politics, and government decision-making. INITIATIVE

The complex and seemingly intractable nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict finds ample expression in Jerusalem, the city which for centuries has been a religious focal point for Jews, Muslims, and Christians.1 Canadian involvement in the Jerusalem issue dates from the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. A Canadian, Ivan Rand, was one of the eleven members of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine which

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recommended within the context of the Arab-Israeli partition plan that Jerusalem be constituted an international city for ten years, at which time its status would be reviewed. Following the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, Israel maintained control over West Jerusalem. This control was recognized in the 1948 Armistice Agreement and on 13 December 1949 Jerusalem was proclaimed Israel's capital. After 1949 Canada called for the internationalization of the holy places rather than of the whole city and, prior to 1967, gave de facto recognition of Jerusalem as a part of Israel by conducting some diplomatic business there, while keeping its embassy in Tel Aviv. The Canadian position changed during the Six-Day War in 1967 when Israel captured the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Old City formerly occupied by Jordan. Until Clark's initiative Canada had not recognized this Israeli annexation and, like most nations, regarded East Jerusalem and the Old City as Israeli-occupied territory. Since 1967, however, it had been a major thrust of Israeli foreign policy to secure international recognition of its annexation of Jerusalem and to have states confirm that recognition by transferring their embassies from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In 1976 the Democratic party in the United States adopted as part of its election platform the position that the American embassy in Israel should be moved to Jerusalem. In 1980, several months after the resolution of the Clark embassy affair, thirteen countries withdrew their embassies from Jerusalem and moved them to Tel Aviv in response to the passage of a bill in the Knesset which established as a basic law - the Israeli equivalent of a constitutional principle - earlier administrative orders declaring Jerusalem the capital of Israel. More recently, in 1984, legislation which would have required the State Department to move its embassy to Jerusalem was introduced into the American Congress and received substantial support in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The issue also arose in the 1984 Democratic primary in New York when both former Vice-President Walter Mondale and Senator Gary Hart promised to move the American embassy if elected president. As well, on i October 1984, two subcommittees of the United States House of Representatives passed a non-binding resolution urging the relocation of the American embassy to Jerusalem. Prime Minister Clark had several options in the wake of his election pledge. He could have ignored his promise, as the American president, Jimmy Carter, had done with regard to his party's pledge in 1976. Alternatively, he could have employed various delaying tactics or diplomatic manoeuvres to postpone, perhaps indefinitely, the implementation of his promise. For example, he might have declared that Canada did not recognize Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem, yet wished to

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locate its embassy in Israel's capital. Clark, however, boldly chose to pursue both de jure recognition of Israeli claims to Jerusalem and a de facto move of the embassy. JERUSALEM AND THE CANADIAN JEWISH COMMUNITY

The idea of moving the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem as a gesture of support for Israel first emerged as a major issue within the Canadian Jewish community during the visit to Canada of Israel's prime minister, Menachem Begin, in November 1978.2 Begin urged the Canada-Israel Committee to take action on a number of issues important to Israel including the Arab boycott, the prevention of recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization ( P L o), and the transfer of the embassy in Israel. The Israeli prime minister was particularly anxious to see the c i c mobilize on the embassy issue because only one month before, in October 1978, Harold Saunders, the United States assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, had allegedly assured East Jerusalem and West Bank Arab officials that as Israel was withdrawing from the Sinai as a result of the Camp David negotiations, so too would it withdraw from other territories captured during the 1967 War. Consequently, Begin was eager to secure Canadian recognition of Israeli authority over Jerusalem. While the leadership of the c i c agreed unanimously with Begin on the justice of the case for moving the embassy and readily committed itself to promoting the move, there was a marked lack of consensus within the Canadian Jewish community with regard to timing and tactics. Some Jewish leaders were extremely reluctant to make the embassy transfer a high priority because they foresaw opposition from Christian leaders who favoured a form of shared jurisdiction of Jerusalem and from Canadian business interests fearful of retaliation from Arab governments. While the Canadian Jewish Congress (cjc) believed that the embassy issue ought to take a back seat to the campaign already under way to secure tough anti-Arab boycott legislation, the Canadian Zionist Federation (CZF) and B'nai Brith unreservedly endorsed the high priority of the embassy question and urged that it be pursued actively by the cic. From these contending approaches, the cic leadership fashioned a compromise whereby it agreed to undertake an educational campaign on Jerusalem aimed at both Jews and Canadians generally. The dissolution of Canada's thirtieth parliament on 22 March 1979 and the ensuing federal election reopened the debate within the Canadian Jewish community as to how to best proceed. The CZF and B'nai Brith pushed for direct political action while the c j c remained reluc-

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tant to make the embassy question a high priority or partisan issue. After much discussion, the cic launched a campaign, focused on Jerusalem and other issues of concern to the Jewish community, to contact all parties and candidates. The c i c's non-partisan efforts notwithstanding, the embassy question very quickly became one of the campaign's most partisan issues. Several prominent Jewish Conservatives who did not hold official leadership positions in Jewish organizations, such as Lew Moses and Rabbi Monson, openly lobbied Ron Atkey and Rob Parker, two Tory candidates in Toronto, for a Conservative commitment on the embassy initiative. At the same time, although he agreed with the merits of the policy, Eddie Goodman, an influential Jewish Conservative (also from Toronto), advised the Conservative party against any public announcement. Most importantly, several Jews on Clark's election team, such as Reva Gerstein and especially the Toronto lawyer, Jeff Lyons, exerted significant influence by virtue of their close personal and professional access to Clark and were crucial in persuading the Tory leader to make his pledge.3 The Canadian Jewish community's involvement with the embassy issue illustrates the degree of fragmentation within this group vis-a-vis certain Middle East questions. Far from being monolithic and undifferentiated, the Jewish community is divided along various religious, political, and organizational lines. While there exists among Canadian Jews an overriding concern about the security of Israel, there is a clear divergence of opinion on the means to achieve this goal. A key observation about the Jewish community's role in the embassy affair relates to the degree to which politicians and policy-makers may act on the basis of what they perceive to be the demands of a particular domestic constituency. It is sometimes the case that an ethnic or other interest group will find action taken on its behalf which was not asked for or which was asked for but in a different manner. Clark's 25 April announcement put the c i c in a difficult position. While it welcomed the initiative, it feared that the domestic circumstances surrounding the promise would not allow a thoughtful discussion of the merits of the embassy issue. Indeed, certain segments of the Jewish community concerned about the political motives underlying the initiative felt that Clark's pledge was less a result of an interest group exercising pressure on a political party than a political party attempting to use an interest group for possible electoral gain. Explaining the Initiative Clark had not met with Begin during the Israeli prime minister's trip to Canada in November 1978. Shortly after Begin's visit, however, individ-

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ual Jews identified with the Conservative party began to make representations to the leader of the opposition and to Conservative party officials and members of parliament, urging them to adopt a policy favouring the embassy transfer. It was also at this time that Atkey became the Tories' expert on the issue. A lawyer and former member of Parliament for St Paul's, a Toronto riding with a significant Jewish population, Atkey had a wealth of experience dealing with matters of concern to the Jewish community. For example, in 1976 he had drafted, with the assistance of Eddie Goodman, Ontario's anti-Arab boycott legislation. Early in January 1979, Atkey prepared a brief on the embassy question for Clark's world tour which was delivered to the Conservative leader en route to Israel. The report was mainly factual in tenor, dealing with the demographic, administrative, and legal aspects of Jerusalem. While it advocated the transfer of the embassy from Tel Aviv, the report did not discuss tactics, timing, or the political ramifications of such a move.4 In Israel, Clark was subjected to different points of view and pressures on the embassy issue. Begin spent half of his meeting with Clark urging the Tory leader to make an immediate commitment in support of moving the embassy. Several Conservative party colleagues who had flown to Tel Aviv to meet Clark, including Atkey, Parker, Lyons, and Irving Gerstein, also urged Clark to incorporate the embassy move into Tory policy but argued that the announcement of an initiative should be delayed until his return to Canada.5 Finally, in an intensive briefing with Edward Lee, Canada's ambassador in Tel Aviv, Clark was advised strongly against moving the embassy. Clark was also given a briefing document on Jerusalem prepared by the Conservative party's research bureau and Douglas Roche, the Conservatives' foreign policy critic, which outlined more than a dozen reasons for not moving the embassy.6 Clark charted a careful course between these approaches both in Israel and at his final press conference of the tour in Amman, Jordan, by maintaining that any decision on the embassy would require further review in Canada and a successful resolution of the EgyptianIsraeli peace process.7 Several months later, however, Clark made his electoral pledge, and after his victory in the 1979 election he reaffirmed his intention to move the embassy to Jerusalem. Any explanation of Clark's embassy initiative must take into account three distinct yet interrelated factors. First, both Clark and his senior advisers considered the transfer of the embassy to be a foreign policy initiative justifiable on historic, moral, and especially legal grounds; they were convinced of the justice of the case for moving the embassy. Second, the electoral dimension must be considered. Whether or not there is a "Jewish vote" in Canadian politics, Clark's election team

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certainly perceived there to be one and believed that it could be induced to support the Conservatives by a promise to move the embassy. The 5 June 1979 statement of the new prime minister introduced a third element - namely, the use of the embassy issue as a vehicle by which the Conservative government could impose itself on the Ottawa civil service which Clark's transition team perceived as strongly Liberal in orientation. The Conservative party, from at least the time of Diefenbaker's government, had taken a consistently sympathetic view toward Israel. Robert Stanfield and members of parliament such as John Fraser and Gordon Fairweather represented mainstream Conservative policy in expressing unequivocal support for the state of Israel. Similarly, throughout his time as leader of the Conservative party, Clark's perception of the Middle East was weighted in favour of Israel. In a speech to the c i c shortly after becoming leader of the opposition, Clark stated that 'Israel's right to exist is simply not open to discussion/' and he implored the Liberal government of the day not to be blackmailed by the politics of oil with respect to the survival of Israel. A month after this speech, the "Delorme" incident during the federal by-election in the Quebec riding of Terrebonne reinforced Clark's pro-Israel sentiments. Roger Delorme, the Conservative candidate, gave a pro-Palestinian speech at an election campaign meeting at which Clark and many other high-ranking Conservative officials were present.8 The fact that Clark did not disown Delorme, as Stanfield had done several years before when Leonard Jones of Moncton made anti-French statements, caused a great stir in the Canadian Jewish community. Several observers have mentioned Clark's desire to make up for the Delorme incident as a factor in his 25 April promise.9 Clark's pro-Israel sympathies, which were based at least in part on his religious background as well as his view of Israel as an island of liberal Western democracy in a sea of autocratic, Soviet-manipulated regimes, were shared by his senior advisers. Bill Neville, Jim Gillies, and Lowell Murray had long been on record as highly sympathetic towards Israel. They believed, as did Clark, that Canada had always supported Israel in rhetoric but seldom with concrete measures of assistance. Finally, Clark's emotional attachment to Israel was strengthened during his trip to the Middle East in January 1979. Clark was greatly impressed by what he saw in Israel. One incident particularly reinforced his pro-Israel outlook. Although he did not comply with Begin's wish to promise a transfer of the embassy, Clark nevertheless was treated graciously in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. By contrast, Jordan's King Hussein made Clark and his entourage wait a lengthy time in Amman before receiving them, ostensibly to protest the fact that Clark

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had assigned three days of his trip for Israel and only a few hours for Jordan. This seemingly minor affair led both Clark and his wife to contrast Arab inhospitality with Israeli friendliness as they disembarked from their plane in Ottawa.10 The embassy transfer was thus viewed by Clark and his team as a measure of unequivocal support for the people and government of Israel.11 There was, of course, a very detailed intellectual argument put forth as to the justice of the transfer. In this regard, Clark and his advisers drew heavily on Atkey's highly legalistic argument that Israel's de facto occupation of East Jerusalem and the Old City since 1967 allowed it to claim jurisdiction over the whole city. Clark believed that moving the embassy would simply confirm Middle East reality; hence the statement in the press release of 25 April 1979 that "this foreign policy initiative is only a recognition of the political, administrative, and legal realities of Jerusalem in 1979." The signing of the Camp David Accords in March 1979 gave further credence to Atkey's argument in the minds of Clark and his advisers; again, Clark's team believed, as stated in the press release, that this event had settled the controversy surrounding Jerusalem and had opened "the way for Canada to take positive initiatives in the Middle East."12 Clark's people had played down the potential negative ramifications of the new policy. It was argued that the Arab world would not be overly upset because, for them, Jerusalem ranked third behind Mecca and Medina as a place of religious significance, while Jews regarded the Holy City as their most sacred religious site. Clark's advisers also dismissed the possibility of domestic repercussions on the grounds that the policy was intended for a very particular constituency and that it would not even be noticed, let alone be of interest, to Canadians other than those of the Jewish faith. The risk factor, as far as Clark's entourage was concerned, was also decreased by the very slow timetable envisaged for the embassy transfer; his advisers considered it at best a fouryear project. Moreover, the embassy transfer was to be only one of several Conservative initiatives in Middle East affairs. In another important departure from traditional policy, Clark planned to move Canada towards eventual recognition of the importance of involving the Palestinians in the Arab-Israeli peace process. This second prong of Conservative Middle East policy, which never got on track because of the controversy over the embassy proposal, was seen by Clark as balancing this first initiative.13 The particular understanding of the Jerusalem situation shared by Clark and his advisers was in many ways simply incorrect. They totally misread the history of Canadian-Israeli relations by arguing that Can-

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ada had always paid lip service to Israel but had contributed very little in the way of tangible assistance. In fact, quite the opposite has been true. Especially since the 1967 war, Canada had toned down its overt support of Israel and stressed "balance" in its statements in international organizations, while increasing its behind-the-scenes support. Most disturbing, however, was the misreading of the Camp David Accords by Clark and his advisers. Far from settling the status of Jerusalem, these accords had only set the stage for deliberations on this and other fundamental issues such as the future of the West Bank and the Palestinian question. Given the critical state of Arab-Israeli negotiations in the spring of 1979, Clark could not have found a more inopportune time to announce a transfer of the embassy. And, indeed, Clark's election team was cautioned about the inadvisability of the proposed embassy transfer by the Conservative research bureau and Douglas Roche. On at least three occasions - in briefs submitted to him during his Middle East tour, before his c i c meeting, and before the leaders' television debate towards the end of the election campaign - Clark was warned about the consequences such a policy would have for Canada's position in the Middle East and for the Conservative party's credibility in foreign affairs. Moreover, Clark was told bluntly that no discernible Canadian interest would be advanced by moving the embassy.14 The deliberations of Clark and his advisers on the question are an example of poor decision-making. They seem to have fallen prey to the small group decision-making phenomenon known as "group think," a socio-psychological condition which can occur when a leader surrounds himself with a coterie of "yes men."15 This increases the flow of favourable information and reduces the possibility that the leader will hear negative opinions. The Clark team viewed the embassy issue from a narrow perspective and limited discussion among themselves to a single course of action. Obvious risks emanating from likely Arab reaction were constantly underestimated and often altogether ignored as Clark's team expressed selective bias in its gathering and processing of information. Internal censorship was exercised against conflicting positions put forward by Roche and the Conservative research bureau. Indeed, during the period between Clark's return from the Middle East in January 1979 and the 25 April announcement, not a single Arab spokesman - either from the Canadian Arab community or the Arab diplomatic corps in Ottawa - was sounded out about the proposed transfer.16 During the election campaign, any discussion of the merits of the embassy issue became increasingly difficult as electoral concerns came to overshadow intellectual ones. One factor in the Conservatives' deci-

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sion to use the embassy issue was a desire to put policy distance between themselves and the Liberal party. Having been accused on many occasions of "me-too-ism," Clark saw in the embassy question an opportunity for the Tories to differentiate themselves from the Liberals. Moreover, Clark's election team knew that it was facing a close contest. Few if any Conservative inroads would be made in Quebec and Ontario thus became fundamental to Clark's election strategy. Winning Toronto's "swing" ridings was critical. Among these were three ridings with substantial Jewish populations: Eglinton-Lawrence and Willowdale, where candidates Parker and Bob Jarvis were the incumbent Conservative members of parliament, and St Paul's, where Atkey, the Conservative candidate in 1979, had been the member of parliament between 1972 and 1974. The Jewish vote was also a factor in Don Valley East. Atkey argued the intellectual merits of the embassy move, while Parker attempted to impress Clark with its vote-gathering potential. Parker had urged his leader to consider making a commitment to the Jewish community on his return from the Middle East in January 1979 and had asked Roche to do the same at the time of a c i c meeting in February 1979-17 During the election he warned that the Liberals, who were experiencing trouble with the Jewish community because of the negative comments on the anti-boycott bill of the minister of industry, trade and commerce, were about to announce their own embassy policy. The decisive pitch was made at a breakfast on 25 April before Clark's meeting with the cic, at which it was decided to announce publicly a Conservative policy favouring the transfer of the embassy.18 Throughout the deliberations on timing, Parker insisted that a positive policy on the embassy would deliver the Jewish vote to the Conservatives. After the election the embassy issue took on added significance. During the transition period, Clark was in Jasper, Alberta, drawing up a cabinet and reading government briefing papers. One document, drafted jointly by the Department of External Affairs and the Privy Council Office, concerned Jerusalem. It warned the prime ministerelect not to proceed with his election promise. This warning went unheeded, partly because Clark intended that the new Conservative government use the embassy issue to impose its will upon what he perceived to be the Liberal-oriented bureaucracy in Ottawa. Acting on the long-held Conservative assumption that Diefenbaker's government had been sabotaged by the lack of co-operation and often questionable loyalty of civil service mandarins, Clark wanted very early in the thirty-first parliament to establish effective political control over the senior personnel in the civil service. Accordingly, in reply to an innocuous question about the embassy promise at his press conference on

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5 June 1979, Clark launched into a lengthy speech about the new relationship he envisioned between cabinet and the bureaucracy: ... And Miss MacDonald will be indicating to officials at External Affairs that we will be expecting from them recommendations fairly directly as to how it can be accomplished and what other policies will be necessary to make that goal realizable. I say that simply to indicate that the position she and other ministers will be taking in relation to matters that have been part of party policy in the election campaign will be to indicate that these questions are now beyond discussion as to their appropriateness and that what we will be seeking from the public service will be indications as to how we accomplish what we have undertaken to do.

The tone of Clark's response was earnest and defiant. Further evidence of the bureaucratic imperative underlying Clark's announcement was his telephone call to a close friend that same evening during which he asked: "Do you think they got the message?" In effect, he hoped to make clear to officials of External Affairs and indeed throughout the federal civil service that they had a new boss.19 CONSTRAINT

Arab Reaction Canada's Arab community and the rest of the Arab world were quick to respond to Clark's election pledge and affirmation of 5 June. Iraq took a very hard line, threatening disruption of economic and diplomatic relations, while the PLO condemned the embassy policy as an "act of aggression." A more moderate approach was taken by the council of Arab ambassadors in Ottawa which met on 6 June in an emergency session to co-ordinate the official Arab response to Clark's initiative. In a rather low-key statement the group's spokesman, the Moroccan ambassador, Nourreddine Hasnaoui, maintained "qu'il n'y aura pas de represailles tant qu'il n'y aura pas du d£menagement de 1'ambassade du Canada a Jerusalem."20 One telling response to Clark's remarks at the press conference came from Egypt's representative in Canada, Hassan Fahmy. Interviewed by the c B c on the morning of 6 June, he stated that on the question of the embassy, Egypt was going to remain firmly in the Arab camp. This was a significant announcement, given that Egypt had begun to be ostracized by the international Arab community after Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem and that ties between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world were broken after the signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.

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On 8 June, at the request of the council of Arab ambassadors, the secretary of state for external affairs, Flora MacDonald, met with the representatives of Morocco, Algeria, Iran, Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Somalia, and Sudan. In the week following this meeting a spokesman for the Arab League Information Office in Ottawa publicly suggested that Canada send a goodwill mission to the Middle East, preferably comprised of government officials of ministerial rank.21 On 16 June the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union called upon Clark to reverse his decision as did the Islamic Conference meeting in Rabat. It was also at this time that a federal-provincial dimension to the embassy issue came to light. The French-Canadian press reported an alleged Arab-Quebec understanding whereby Quebec City would not recognize the federal government's transfer of the embassy to Jerusalem if in turn the Arabs would support Quebec's aspirations for independence. Canadian-Arab relations were further strained by remarks made by Ron Atkey, the new minister of employment and immigration, during an appearance on CTV'S "Question Period" on 17 June. Arguing that "the same sort of threats were made by Arab ambassadors to Ontario business - that all sorts of things would be cut off," and "that Ontario went ahead as a matter of principle and enacted the anti-boycott law and the threats never materialized," Atkey concluded that the "Arabs' bark is worse than their bite" and that "if they want to buy Canadian goods they will." The Arabs interpreted the reference to barking dogs as particularly degrading inasmuch as the dog is considered a lowly creature in Arab culture. In response to Atkey's comments, Yasir Arafat threatened that "our Arab nations must teach the Canadian scoundrels a lesson that would ensure the protection of our dignity, rights and lands." In Ottawa the nine Arab ambassadors met again and their spokesman met once more with MacDonald. Several days later, in an unprecedented series of meetings, Prime Minister Clark received the nine Arab ambassadors as well as the Egyptian and Israeli ambassadors. Then, on 23 June, several hours before his departure for the summit in Tokyo, Clark announced what became known as the Stanfield mission. In addition to the verbal barrage directed at the Conservative government during the summer of 1979, at least three concrete measures were taken by the Arab world against Canada as a result of Clark's embassy initiative. The first was the decision of the Arab Monetary Fund ( A MF) to suspend dealings with Canadian financial institutions. The second was an Iraqi oil embargo imposed against Canada. The third involved the cancellation of several Canadian contracts by Arab buyers. While these Arab sanctions were relatively unimportant in themselves

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(indeed, the A M F decision was entirely symbolic inasmuch as the Fund had ceased to invest in Canada at the end of 1978), their significance was not lost on the foreign policy bureaucracy. Officials of the Departments of Industry, Trade and Commerce and External Affairs argued that each case was a "straw in the wind," that these mini-sanctions were samples of bigger things to come.22 For example, what worried Ottawa officials and Canadian bankers most about the AMF'S action was that Kuwait, and especially Saudi Arabia, were shareholders in the A M F. If these two countries were to follow the AMF'S lead, then Canada would suffer serious economic damage indeed. Canada's vulnerability vis-a-vis the Arabs in terms of oil supply was patently clear. During 1979 Arab crude accounted for 30 per cent of Canadian imports and 14 per cent of total Canadian supply. Substitutability, both in commodity and source of supply, was extremely limited as the crude production of Canada's other major suppliers, especially Venezuela, was completely allocated. Furthermore, Canada would have had little success in attempting to draw on the International Energy Agency for assistance because the embassy affair was solely Canada's doing and other Western nations were not prepared to jeopardize their relations with the Arabs. It was in light of these facts that the minister of energy, Ray Hnatyshyn, ordered the petroleum utilization group of his department's emergency program section to prepare a special study of a potentially severe oil shortage arising from a complete Arab oil embargo. Another source of weakness was the $4.5 billion of Arab investment capital in Canada. While this amount was little more than 4 per cent of the Arabs' u s$ioo-billion global pool at the time, a massive dumping of Canadian currency by Arab holders would have depressed the Canadian dollar by at least three cents, and perhaps by as much as six cents, in relation to the American dollar.23 Finally, the Middle East and North Africa had become an important market for Canadian goods in the preceding decade, especially in manufactures which comprised 97 per cent of all exports to this region at the time. In 1979 Canada sold nearly $800 million in goods and $500 million in services to the Middle East. While this was less than 3 per cent of Canada's total exports, trade officials as well as many businessmen believed the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa were the single most promising market for future Canadian exports. Thus, Canada's economic relationship with the Arab world during the time of the embassy affair was based upon a largely inelastic demand for petroleum and investment capital and a desire to acquire a larger share of the lucrative Arab market. The Arabs could have sold to other buyers the oil they exported to Canada and could have invested

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their petro-wealth outside Canada. Similarly, given the highly competitive nature of the Middle East domestic market for goods and services of the type provided by Canada, the Arabs could obtain elsewhere whatever Canada sold them without great inconvenience. While Canada considered its economic ties with the Arab world very important, the inverse was not true. As one trade official perceived the situation at the time, "the Arabs could cut us off tomorrow both in terms of imports and exports and not so much as feel a tickle in the nose."24 The advantage enjoyed by the Arabs in their economic relationship with Canada was enhanced during the conflict over the embassy by several non-economic factors. Klaus Knorr maintains that "will" contributes to a state's economic power,25 and in this regard the Arabs clearly enjoyed a position superior to Canada because the embassy issue had enormous religious and political significance for them. This is borne out by the display of Arab unity and diplomatic muscle following Clark's 5 June reaffirmation of the policy. There was keen popular solidarity, both within individual Arab nations and among Arab states, in combating what was perceived to be a significant threat to Arab aims. By contrast, the embassy issue was extremely divisive in Canada. Apart from the obvious rift between domestic Jewish and Arab groups and the business community's strong reaction to the Clark initiative, it is telling that even within the Jewish community opinion was divided as to the appropriateness, and especially the timing, of the embassy promise. Moreover, a Gallup poll taken during the summer of 1979, which indicated 15 per cent of the respondents in favour of the transfer of the embassy and 70 per cent opposed, reflected the general lack of support in Canada for the initiative.26 Knorr has also stated that economic power is enhanced by a reputation for being willing to use such power, and the Arabs had already made use of the oil weapon against the United States and other countries during the October War in 1973Most important of all, the Arabs handled the embassy issue with exceptional deftness. To begin with, they were extremely well informed about what was happening in Canada, while the inverse was not at all true. For example, the Saudi Arabia ambassador in Ottawa heard of Atkey's "Arabs' bark is worse than their bite" remarks by shortwave radio from Riyadh within hours after the comment was made and well before the incident was reported by the Canadian wire services. As well, Arab capitals received reports from Ottawa on the embassy issue every two hours during the month of June 1979.27 On the diplomatic front, the Arabs realized very quickly the political advantage that could be gleaned from Clark's embassy promise by making an example of Canada. The threats and blandishments made by some Arab countries,

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however, were tempered by more moderate positions expressed by others. Thus, a division of diplomatic labour was expertly manipulated, allowing the Arabs to make known their intense concern while keeping channels open for negotiation. By contrast, the Clark government, having greatly underestimated the intensity of Arab reaction, was forced into a defensive position. Clark's lack of expertise in foreign affairs, coupled with the Conservative government's inexperience in exercising power, added to the uncertain posture taken by Clark in dealing with the Arabs. The embassy affair was a harsh introduction to the realities of international power politics for which the Tory leader and his new cabinet were clearly ill prepared. Domestic Reaction Spirited negative reaction to the embassy initiative was not confined to the Arab world. Groups such as the United Nations Association of Canada and several university professors opposed the proposed transfer because they felt it would mean a departure for Canada from responsible international citizenship in its Middle East diplomacy. Initial press comment following Clark's 5 June statement was cautious, but by 8 June, with front-page headlines proclaiming "Arabs threaten economic 'war' against Canada" and "Arabs' reply could cost 55,700 jobs," most editorial comment turned against the initiative. Interestingly, when Arab pressure began to make itself felt, some Canadian newspapers, while maintaining that the embassy policy was improper, argued against giving in to Arab blackmail, thereby attempting to transform the embassy issue into one of Canadian sovereignty. Finally, Liberal party reaction was predictably negative during both the election campaign and the ensuing parliament; the leader of the opposition, Pierre Trudeau, was particularly vehement and accused Clark, among other things, of undermining Canadian credibility in the Middle East. The Canadian corporate community was deeply disturbed by the Arab world's reaction to Clark's initiative. Three sectors of Canadian business were particularly anxious to make their opposition known to the Clark government: oil-importing companies, banks and other financial institutions, and manufacturers with export contracts in the Arab world. Besides individual corporations, several trade associations, and especially the Canadian Export Association, were active after 5 June in making the business community's concern known to the government. The business lobby also acted in concert with Arab interests; in a startling meeting, Bell Canada's president, Jean de Grandpre, flew to

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Ottawa from Montreal two days after Clark's press conference to reassure Arab ambassadors not to worry about Clark. Bell Canada was especially concerned because it had a contract to help install a large telecommunications network in Saudi Arabia. The business community's lobbying of the government began with a corporate storming of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce. Every conceivable means, at every possible level, was employed: letters (of which the department received a record 600), telephone calls, telexes, and personal representations by literally scores of businessmen were targeted from the desk level through to the deputy minister's office and the three trade ministers. As well, the business lobby gave considerable attention to several other ministers and departments and the prime minister received numerous personal representations. The most significant meeting took place on 22 June when Clark invited thirteen leading Canadian businessmen to 24 Sussex Drive. It was the next day that Clark announced the appointment of Robert Stanfield as the government's representative to study the embassy move and other Canadian-Middle East questions. The Stanfield Mission Clark's appointment of Robert Stanfield on 23 June 1979 as Canada's special representative and ambassador-at-large was an important development in the embassy affair. The choice of Stanfield is generally credited to MacDonald who, having worked for him while he was leader of the opposition, was probably the only member of the Clark cabinet able to impose such a difficult task upon her former mentor. The choice was a wise one. As a public figure who enjoyed widespread admiration, Stanfield was able to command the respect of those with whom he spoke, and he likewise was assured that the Clark government would consider his recommendations seriously. There was, however, substantial debate among Clark, External Affairs, and MacDonald about Stanfield's terms of reference.28 Clark wanted him to find out how best to implement the embassy transfer and to determine its costs. By contrast, the department saw the mission as a means to dump the policy altogether, while MacDonald hoped Stanfield could provide the government with a breathing space in which it could weigh all the ramifications of the policy. Stanfield's final terms of reference were a mix of the three positions: he was asked to examine ways in which to enhance Canada's bilateral relationships with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, to determine how Canada could contribute to a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East, and

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"to examine ways and means of implementing the Government's policy on Jerusalem in a manner that will be compatible with efforts to achieve such a peace."29 In carrying out his mandate, Stanfield consulted with numerous groups and individuals both interested in and expert on questions relating to Canada-Middle East relations. In speaking with and accepting written and often very detailed briefs from academics, bureaucrats, members of the Arab diplomatic corps in Ottawa, and representatives of the Canadian business and Jewish communities, Stanfield was exposed to all the arguments surrounding the embassy controversy. As well, in the fall of 1979 he visited several Arab countries, Israel, France, the United Kingdom, the Vatican, Italy, Washington, the United Nations in New York, and four provincial capitals. Some observers viewed these protracted consultations as damaging to Clark. By appointing the Stanfield mission, Clark managed to keep the embassy issue prominently on the Canadian political agenda during the summer and autumn of 1979. Indeed, Stanfield's first trip overseas coincided with the opening of Parliament and this had the effect of bringing the embassy issue into the House of Commons where Conservative Middle East policy was subjected to persistent attack by the Liberals. Disgruntled Conservatives believe that the negative publicity induced by this scrutiny reinforced Clark's image of incompetence and thereby contributed to the defeat of the Conservatives in the February 1980 federal election. Conversely, those in the Ottawa foreign policy community who were anxious to improve Canadian-Arab relations considered the Stanfield mission a success. Officials in the Departments of Industry, Trade and Commerce and External Affairs have maintained that Stanfield, both through his consultations in Arab capitals and by means of his interim and final reports, made a major contribution to rebuilding a healthy rapport between Canada and the Arab world. In his interim report, Stanfield approached the embassy question from the perspective that Canada's contribution to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East was more important than Canada's economic interests in the region. Accordingly, because the Camp David Accords had not resulted in a comprehensive peace settlement, especially with regard to the future of Jerusalem, Stanfield recommended against the transfer of the embassy. Given the complex negotiations on Jerusalem and the sharply differing positions of the Israelis and Arabs, he maintained that a transfer of the embassy would have an exceedingly negative impact upon the peace process: "To use effectively whatever influence we may have in the area to encourage moderation and compromise we must retain credibility with both sides as a fair minded

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interlocutor. We could not do this if we were to move our Embassy to Jerusalem." Furthermore, Stanfield opposed moving the embassy because he believed it would: also enhance the concern already exhibited by many in the area that the Camp David process does not serve the interests of a comprehensive settlement because it does not adequately deal with the Palestinian, Jerusalem and other questions. To succeed, negotiations for such a settlement must have wider participation. I do not think that Canada should pursue any course of action which risks making this more difficult or which erodes the credibility of the Camp David Accords by creating the impression that they have strengthened the position of one of the parties on a key issue yet to be addressed in negotiations. Explaining the Reversal

At least a dozen factors must be weighed when considering Clark's decision to postpone indefinitely the embassy transfer. Officials had, at least initially, the least effect on Clark. Clark read the papers prepared by External Affairs and the Privy Council Office on the embassy issue and listened to their briefings, but remained committed to his original course. Indeed the bureaucracy's warnings had the opposite effect because of Clark's perception of External Affairs as a bastion of civil servants sympathetic to the Liberals. In his view this had been borne out by the department's handling of the initial Arab response to his 5 June statement; a senior Clark adviser was particularly startled by how the External Affairs official in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, sent back to Ottawa hysterical cables during the summer of 1979 "that led one to believe that half of Canada's gross national product was about to go down the drain."30 Indeed, Clark's advisers have maintained that External Affairs encouraged Arab reaction by letting it be known that the cabinet was divided over the embassy issue and that pressure exerted upon certain ministers would have a significant effect. In short, Clark believed that his Middle East policy would have worked, had the department spent as much time supporting as criticizing it. There is evidence that soon after 5 June Clark developed somewhat of a siege mentality in that he did not wish to listen to further negative reports on the embassy affair but wanted to hear only about how to deal with the issue. His initial reaction to the negative response in the press was also one of wary scepticism. The front-page headlines trumpeting dangerous Arab retaliation at first served only to harden his resolve and later he refused to acknowledge the "bad press" he was getting by simply not reading any more damaging newspaper reports.31 By con-

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trast, editorial sentiment to the effect that Canada ought to stand up to Arab "blackmail" pleased Clark greatly. Clark's hostile reaction to the criticism of Ottawa's bureaucrats, academics, and the press was certainly due in part to the fact that the embassy issue was his first major policy initiative. Cognizant of the need to look capable and decisive, Clark made a conscious effort to act "prime ministerial" from the moment he was elected. This was particularly true with regard to foreign policy, where Clark was perceived to be far less adept than his predecessor. The cumulative weight of these factors made him resistant to any quick policy reversal on the embassy issue. After trips to the Tokyo Summit and the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka, however, Clark began to give credence to the foreign policy specialists. He came to realize that External Affairs was supportive of his government and his confidence in their advice grew to the point that by the autumn of 1979 Clark was ready to follow their counsel on the embassy issue. One of the important factors which influenced Clark's reconsideration of the embassy initiative was the massive, unyielding, continuing Arab opposition to his policy. The only group to enjoy greater effectiveness was the business community, and this was in large part attributable to the sheer size of its effort. As one Clark adviser has described it: "by massive business lobby on this issue I mean they were coming through the window!"32 Against the Arab groups and the business community, the Canadian Jewish community and the Israeli government stood practically alone in urging Clark to remain firm. Prime Minister Begin telephoned Clark on 7 June to thank him for his initiative; he also said that he expected Clark to follow through on his pledge. Some prominent Canadian Jews publicly warned Clark not to back down in the face of Arab and corporate pressure and these efforts were not without effect, given Clark's emotional attachment to Israel and his deep belief in the justice of the case for moving the embassy. Moreover, Arab and business criticism initially served only to strengthen Clark's pro-Israel position. Indeed, inasmuch as the Arab and business lobbies called for an immediate reversal of the embassy policy, the Stanfield appointment and Clark's disagreement with External Affairs over its terms of reference indicate the degree to which Clark was still intent on transferring the embassy prior to his Tokyo trip. A discussion that Clark had with President Jimmy Carter of the United States at the Tokyo Summit had an impact upon the development of Clark's thinking on the embassy affair. Carter confronted Clark on his Middle East initiative and impressed upon him the negative repercussions it would have on the delicate Camp David peace process. Several other factors then conspired to allow Arab and business reac-

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tion to hit their mark more effectively. Cabinet and the Conservative caucus became increasingly opposed to the embassy initiative. Clark had already resigned himself to receiving little or no support from his party when at the second caucus meeting after the election he took the burden of responsibility for the policy upon himself, denying that Atkey or any other Toronto member of parliament had a part in the decision. By the time Parliament convened on 8 October 1979, Clark clearly was thinking of putting the embassy policy into the deep freeze. The incessant pummelling from opposition members in the House of Commons was difficult to withstand. Clark, a Commons man, took the debate seriously.33 The unexpectedness and urgency with which Stanfield submitted his interim report seems to have provided the final factor in Clark's reversal. It was announced originally by Clark's office that Stanfield would not be heard from until autumn 1980 at the earliest. In September 1979 Stanfield himself did not envisage producing a report until "some time early next year." Indeed, upon Stanfield's return from his first trip abroad in October 1979, Clark's office issued a release stating that an early report was not anticipated. Three days later Stanfield delivered his Interim Report to Clark, stating that "appropriate recommendations regarding the location of the Embassy in Israel seem so clear following the consultations I have already held that I wish to submit them to you." The next day, 29 October, Clark announced in the House of Commons that he no longer intended to proceed with the embassy initiative. CONCLUSION

The conventional view of the embassy affair is that Clark made an electoral promise at the behest of the Jewish community, found the resulting Arab and domestic corporate pressure compelling, and consequently appointed the Stanfield mission in order to abandon the initiative. In fact, the emergence and resolution of the embassy affair were far more complex and problematic. The Canadian Jewish community was divided over the political course to follow on the question and, most importantly, the issue's emergence exemplifies not so much an interest group demanding policy action from a political party as it does a political party using an ethnic group for what was perceived to be possible electoral gain. As for the issue's resolution, the business community did not consider the appointment of Stanfield a victory because Clark did not comply with its demand for an immediate reversal of policy. Furthermore, because Stanfield's terms of reference did not herald explicitly a reversal of Conservative Middle East policy, the

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business community initially viewed its appointment as a setback. Indeed, the conflict over Stanfield's terms of reference, coupled with the fact that Stanfield treated his endeavour as a truly independent mission of inquiry, is further proof that Stanfield was not appointed merely to help the Conservatives jettison the embassy policy. The embassy affair brought into sharp relief several important themes in Canada's Middle East policy. One is the paramountcy of the prime minister in determining the direction of foreign policy. Mackenzie King's anti-Zionist predisposition accounted for the Canadian Jewish community's relative lack of success in influencing policy during his time in office. By contrast, under St Laurent, Diefenbaker, and especially Pearson, Canada's Middle East policy was decidedly favourable towards Israel. Similarly, Clark's pro-Israel sympathies played a role in the embassy affair, first in helping to inspire the initiative and then in impeding the eventual reversal of the decision. Another recurring theme in Canadian-Middle East relations is the role of the Jewish community as a domestic source of policy. While there are cleavages within this ethnic group, its overriding concern with the survival of Israel remains an important factor in the formulation of Middle East policy. This is so for several reasons: the Jewish vote - or, more precisely, the major parties' perception of its existence - the presence in Ottawa of a very expert lobby, and, magnifying the effect of both, the lack of a countervailing Arab electoral or domestic organizational presence. Throughout the postwar period, the community has been effective in delineating the parameters of Canadian discussion on the Middle East while persuading non-Jewish Canadians to question the appropriateness of views critical of Israel. Certain events in the Middle East, however, such as the 1973 war, President Sadat's peace mission to Jerusalem in 1977, and, more recently, Israel's involvement in Lebanon, have tended to diminish the ability of the Jewish community to have an impact upon the Canadian foreign policy process. The effectiveness of the Jewish community in Ottawa has also been tempered by the increase in commercial exchanges between Canada and the Arab world since the early 19703 which has resulted in the increasing influence of the Arab point of view. Stanfield's mission and his two reports stand out as a positive outcome of the embassy affair. Genuinely impressed by the diplomatic role Canada might be able to play in the Middle East, Stanfield argued for a policy of scrupulous evenhandedness. This includes, in Stanfield's estimation, recognition of the Palestinian issue as central to the ArabIsraeli conflict and of the fact that worthwhile negotiations towards a settlement will only occur with Palestinian involvement in the peace process.

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The embassy affair also raises several important questions about the Canadian public policy process generally. It highlights the predicament of a party too long in opposition; namely, a lack of access to information and expertise, a pronounced vulnerability to special interest groups, and, on achieving power, a lack of experience in governing. Many observers, both within and outside of the Conservative party, cite these three factors to explain Clark's mishandling of the embassy issue. Conservatives have maintained that a root cause of their unfortunate experience with the embassy question can be traced to Clark's inability, while in opposition, to gain first-hand insight into the subtleties of world politics. This was, Clark's aides have argued, less a reflection on their leader than on a parliamentary system of government which does not allow members of the opposition to become familiar in any effective way with the issues and intricacies of Canada's external affairs. In this regard two obstacles are particularly noteworthy: first, lack of access to information essential to responsible decision-making and, second, a lack of sustained contact with bureaucrats which would afford both the opposition leader and senior civil servants an opportunity to foster mutual confidence. In retrospect, the Conservatives have taken the lesson from the embassy affair that a two-week whirlwind tour, even one punctuated with briefings by officials, is insufficient to prepare a leader of the opposition for the intricacies and nuances of world politics. It is when a party long in opposition comes to power that its inexperience in world politics and its tendency to adopt potentially dangerous policies really take their toll. Distrustful at first of the foreign policy bureaucracy that seemed so unhelpful to it while in opposition, the new government is likely to adopt a posture of confrontation towards its senior civil servants. By the time the new government comes to grips with the levers of power, major errors are likely to have been made. Had Prime Minister Clark found a means other than the embassy transfer with which to exert his dominance over the bureaucrats, and had the embassy issue arisen several months after his first prime ministerial press conference, conceivably Clark already would have learned enough about initiative and constraint in Canadian foreign policy not to proceed with the electoral pledge. NOTES

Most of the information in this chapter was gathered in confidential interviews during the winter of 1979 and the spring and summer of 1980. Some of the ideas in this chapter were previously expressed in a master of arts

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thesis submitted by the author to the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa. 1 See J. Van Dusen, "Jerusalem, the Occupied Territories, and the Refugees," in M. Khadduri, ed., Major Middk Eastern Problems in International Law (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1972). 2 See H. Adelman, "Clark and the Canadian Embassy in Israel," Middle East Focus 3 (March 1980). 3 Interviews with Conservative party officials and members of the Jewish community. 4 Adelman, "Clark and the Canadian Embassy in Israel." 5 Ibid. 6 Interviews with Conservative party officials. 7 Globe and Mail, 16 January 1979. 8 D. Humphreys, Joe Clark A Portrait (Ottawa: Deneau and Greenberg 1978), 250-1. 9 Interviews with two of Clark's personal friends, members of the Jewish community, and Conservative party officials. 10 Interview with a close friend of Clark. 11 Interviews with Conservative party officials. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Interviews with members of the Conservative party research bureau. 15 See I. Janis and L. Mann, Decision Making (New York: The Free Press 1977)/ arid I. Janis, Victims ofGroupthinkk (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1972). 16 Interviews with Conservative party officials. 17 Interviews with members of the Conservative party research bureau. 18 Interviews with Conservative party officials. 19 Interview with a close friend of Clark. 20 Montreal Le Devoir, 8 June 1979. 21 Interviews with Arab diplomats. 22 Interviews with officials of the Departments of External Affairs and Industry, Trade and Commerce. 23 Financial Post, 30 June 1979. 24 Interview with an official of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce. 25 K. Knorr, The Power of Nations (New York: Basic Books 1975), 83-5. See also K. Knorr and F. Trager, eds., Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1977). 26 Toronto Star, 18 August 1979. 27 Interviews with Arab diplomats.

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Interviews with Conservative party officials. Order-in-Council, P.C. 1979 - 1843. Interview with a Conservative party official. Interviews with Conservative party officials. Interview with a Conservative party official. One interviewee mentioned Clark's self-perception as a staunch parliamentarian as one of the motives behind his adopting the embassy initiative in the first place; that is, that Clark felt it was only proper and just that Canada's embassy be located in the same city as the Knesset, Israel's parliament.

DAVID DEWITT AND JOHN KIRTON

Foreign Policy Making Towards the Middle East: Parliament, the Media, and the 1982 Lebanon War

On 6 June 1982, three days after an assassination attempt on Shlomo Argov, Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdom, Israeli forces crossed their northern border with Lebanon and began what Prime Minister Menachem Begin called the 'Teace for Galilee" operation. Intent on destroying the ability of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to bombard Israel's northern settlements, Begin insisted that Israel's forces would go no further than the 4O-kilometre perimeter necessary to achieve the desired security. However, within days Israeli forces had pushed the PLO out of its southern strongholds and forced it to retreat into Beirut and the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley. Whether by design or merely seizing the opportunity, Begin, following the advice of his minister of defence, Ariel Sharon, announced that Israel's armed forces would be thrown at the p L o in an effort to destroy its "state within a state" and remove it from Lebanon. He did not rule out the possibility of taking Beirut. The Canadian reaction to these Israeli actions was swift and condemnatory. Between 8 June and 5 August Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau sent three strongly worded personal letters to Prime Minister Begin, reportedly expressing clearly and directly the Canadian government's deep concern over the Israeli invasion. He criticized in particular the reluctance of Israel to withdraw its forces until the PLO had been eradicated from Lebanon even though that increased the likelihood that the war would expand to include Syria and other Middle East countries. The House of Commons was equally concerned. From 8 June until its recess on 5 August, 27 Lebanon-related questions were asked by both opposition and government members. Of these, none was proIsrael in tone, 15 were neutral, and 12 were clearly pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel.1 The prime minister, the secretary of state for external affairs, and other cabinet ministers expressed fears in the Commons

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and to the press about high civilian casualties and the possibility of a dramatic escalation of the conflict. The discussion in the house took on added drama when members offered horrible statistics and graphic stories about the heavy toll on civilian life. During the first week in August, two additional and potentially more significant events occurred in foreign policy making circles in Ottawa. On 4 August the caucus of the governing Liberal party met to discuss, among other things, the conflict in Lebanon. The following day, the cabinet issued a directive to the Department of External Affairs to initiate an internal review of Canada's policy towards the Middle East with particular reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict. These two events were not unrelated, for the fundamental aspects of Canada's Mideast policy had almost been overturned at the caucus meeting. Although the intervention of a number of senior cabinet ministers averted a direct clash between caucus sympathies and government policy, the consensus was strong enough to provoke the cabinet directive. A number of decisions about relief to Lebanese civilians and immigration privileges to visitors from Lebanon currently in Canada were also made. What explains this defection within the Liberal party caucus? The most obvious answer - the events and actions that took place in Lebanon in the preceding weeks - provides only a part of the explanation, for these events did not produce a similar independent reaction from the responsible foreign policy actors in Canada - the cabinet and the Department of External Affairs. Canada's political leadership seemed unwilling to alter the direction of previous Middle East policy.2 There was no evident discontent among the public servants responsible both for carrying out the government's policies and for advising it on the complexities of the situation.3 Even in Parliament, the pressures, while stronger, do not appear to have been overly compelling. Since 6 June, members of all three parties had voiced their personal as well as their party's views on the conflict in the Commons. All parties supported Trudeau's criticism of Israel, but none announced any shift away from the all-party consensus on support for Israel and for the peace process envisioned in Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and in the Camp David accords. There was also wide agreement on the need for a Palestinian homeland and on condemnation of Israel's policy on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Discussion was cautious and constrained, however, as many individual MPS felt caught between their long-standing support for Israel and criticism of Israeli actions in Lebanon. In the house what little evocative rhetoric there was came from the same parliamentarians who usually could be counted on to voice their opinions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Those members who had made inflammatory charges about Israeli culpability

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had been vehemently critical of Israel long before the invasion of Lebanon. New critical voices were few and muted. However, it also was evident that the events in Lebanon were causing discomfort for many parliamentarians who had hitherto been staunchly pro-Israel or neutral. These MPS generally refrained from reiterating their support for Israel or trying to explain the unfolding of events to their colleagues.4 What, then, provoked the shift in parliamentary sentiment and the Liberal caucus initiative that followed? Our analysis strongly suggests that the media were the single strongest determinant of the views and actions of MPS. Using a three-wave bilingual questionnaire sent to all parliamentarians sitting during the autumn and winter sessions of 1982-3 and follow-up interviews with parliamentarians and government officials, we assessed the factors which shaped opinions and attitudes concerning international events, including the war in Lebanon. Through a content analysis of the print and broadcast news presented by those media judged to have been most influential by the MPS themselves, we were able to examine the specific message in the media that so affected parliamentarians.5 MPS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS: THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

Given the usual nature of the caucus and cabinet meetings of the first week in August when a significant sector of the Liberal caucus directly challenged the government to change its long-standing policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, and given that the demands had a serious impact on policy-making, the overriding question is obvious: what caused such a challenge and why did it receive a sympathetic and generous hearing? While no formal record of caucus deliberations is available, the events of the preceding weeks had clearly created a receptivity to change. How did this occur? Did MPS have information and expertise different from that available to the secretary of state for external affairs and his department which would prompt such action? Or might the parliamentarians be responding to constituents' demands, something the department would be less sensitive to? What were the sources of information, as well as analysis, available to Canada's elected representatives, and how credible were they in light of the complexities of the Middle East situation? To avoid a biased and selective response to these queries, our questionnaire surveyed five international events or issues of topical concern in 1982 and 1983. Table i presents the MPS' views concerning the most important factors in the formation of their understanding and positions on these international events and foreign policy issues.6 The results are

17O

David Dewitt and John Kirton TABLE 1

Factors for the Formation of Views on Select Foreign Issues/Events (%)

Source Information & facts from media Opinion & analysis from media External Affairs information Constituents' communications Other government departments Public opinion Party policy Personal beliefs Interest groups

Rank I

n i n i n i ii i

n i n i ii i n i n

Issue/Event War in War in War in Lebanon Falklands El Salvador 51 18 12 32 5 5 0 7 0 0 2 2 4 4 11 11 2 0

47 18 11 35 7 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 0 0 11 9 0 5

21 18 5 19 7 9 4 7 0 0 2 2 12 15 25 19 7 2

Acid rain

Disarmament

12 16 5 17 3 2 2 2 12 5 7 2 10 3 12 14 25 9

9 11 2 14 5 4 2 9 4 4 2 5 2 11 54 12 7 15

quite dramatic. Members were heavily dependent on both the factual information and the analysis provided by media for their views about the wars in Lebanon and the Falklands, with their personal beliefs rating a distant third. Party policy and personal beliefs, in addition to the media, were the decisive elements in shaping policy positions on the conflict in El Salvador. Disarmament issues were dominated by personal beliefs, with interest groups, the media, and the party acting as secondary influences. On the acid rain issue a much more diffuse set of sources was important, including interest groups, the media, party policy, personal beliefs, and information provided by government departments other than External Affairs. It is noteworthy that 94 per cent of all respondents received no professional briefings on either general or special foreign policy topics as a normal part of their parliamentary experience. Nine out of ten MPS surveyed who had to go overseas as part of their parliamentary responsibilities reported that they had not received briefings beforehand. Five general conclusions emerge. First, MPS were the captives of the media in acute international crises, especially ones which were distant or involved military conflict. This is not surprising, given the nature of modern war and the ability of the media to provide almost instantane-

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ous images to a global audience. However, it is perhaps a concern that little effort seems to have been made by members to secure additional information from other sources - in particular those, such as government departments, which are supposed to have the relevant expertise, independent sources of information, and substantial analytic capabilities. Second, a more diverse set of informational resources was used in examining issues which are chronic and technologically complex. Both acid rain and disarmament require technical knowledge which can be supplied by specialized interest groups and government departments other than External Affairs. In these two cases personal beliefs also played a very significant role, reflecting the "moral character" of the issues, as did party policy. The media were not unimportant, but neither were they central. Particularly on disarmament it is evident that the media did not set the agenda which the parliamentarians had. Third, views about Central America (specifically the war in El Salvador) were based upon the delivery of information and analysis by the media, but personal beliefs and party policies were key factors. Because this is a geographic area fraught with ideological confrontation and human rights abuses and with implications for Canadian-American relations, the parties had debated the issues and articulated policy positions. The influx of refugees and their accounts of slaughter and abuse seem to have had an impact on the personal beliefs of many members. On this issue, M PS seemed not to be overly dependent on the media for either information or analysis. Fourth, MPS rarely employed the expertise available in the Department of External Affairs or other departments in the formation of their views on foreign issues and events. Nor did they attach great value to public opinion in general or to communications received from their own constituents. This might be interpreted in a number of ways, none of them pleasing to theorists of parliamentary democracy: (a) channels of effective access from the citizenry to their representatives did not exist; (b) foreign affairs were of little concern to the public; (c) M PS were not responsive to the opinions of their constituents; (d) governmental expertise was available only to cabinet, thereby effectively placing backbenchers and opposition alike in the position of being ill prepared to challenge government policy; and (e) MPS, for a host of possible reasons, did not or chose not to take advantage of public service expertise. Finally, in acute crises, interest groups were not perceived as significant factors in the formation of personal views on specific events and issues. This may have been because most interest groups in Canada

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have a quality of permanence which transcends a single event. These groups hope that a crisis, such as the invasion of Lebanon or the escalation in El Salvador, would be viewed in the context of the longterm situation on which they direct a continuous lobbying campaign.7 Given the inordinate influence of the media on those M PS responding to the questionnaire, what sources were used and what was their message? Table 2 provides an overview of the media sources reported by our respondents and the frequency with which they were used. The Toronto Globe and Mail was read regularly by 80 per cent of our respondents, while the Ottawa Citizen was read by 63 per cent and the Toronto Star by 42 per cent. All other domestic daily newspapers were read on a regular basis only by M PS who came from the city or province in which the paper was published. Just as the Globe and Mail was the dominant daily newspaper, so Maclean's was dominant among the weekly news magazines. Ninety per cent of respondents reported reading Maclean's on a regular basis. Its only significant competitor was the American magazine, Time, Other foreign print media were of interest to some M PS, with 32 per cent reading the Economist and 19 per cent reading Newsweek and the New York Times. Somewhat surprisingly, the broadcast media were not the dominant source of media information or analysis. The national evening news broadcasts of c B c - T v and c T v were watched regularly by only 57 per cent and 58 per cent of our respondents, respectively, although almost all reported watching both at least once a week. C B c English radio did slightly better, with 65 per cent reporting almost daily listening. However, c B c's in-depth radio news show, "As It Happens," was listened to by less than half our respondents, with only 8 per cent reporting that they listened more than three evenings per week. Thus, in spite of the general acknowledgment that the media were the primary means of obtaining information and analysis on foreign issues and events, MPS were exposed to only a few sources. The Globe and Mail, Maclean's, c B c national radio and television news broadcasts, and the CTV evening news were the primary outlets. Moreover, contrary to common opinion, American network television and news magazines had a limited following. One caveat should be noted: among M PS who identified foreign policy as an area of special interest, threequarters read, on a regular basis, one or more foreign-based newspapers and/or magazines, especially the New York Times and the Economist. If but a few sources were so instrumental in shaping the views of MPS, how did these same members evaluate their chosen sources for information and opinions? Tables 3 and 4 offer some general data on this. More than one-half of our respondents found that the media did

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TABLE 2

Media Sources Used (%) Read domestic dailies Globe and Mail Toronto Star Ottawa Citizen Le Devoir La Presse Montreal Gazette Toronto Sun Read magazines Maclean's Time Newsweek Economist US News & Wor/d Report Read foreign newspapers Manchester Guardian New York Times The Times (London) Le Monde Other

View/Listen

Daily

3-5 days

1-3 days

Don't read

65 23 42 10 7 11 8

15 19 21 5 5 5 8

16 27 24 10 5 23 24

5 31 13 76 84 61 60

Read

Don't Read

90 53 19 32 10

8 45 77 65 87

Read

Don't Read

8 19 5 27

89 77 97 92 69

1-3 times/ week

Not at all

36 24 23 5 39 24

8 16 71 84 53 10

Every night/ 3-5 times/ week Daily

c B c "National/Journal" CTV "National News" u s television news c B c French radio news c B c "As It Happens" c B c English radio news

18 31 0 7 3 47

39 27 5 3 5 18

not cover foreign events adequately and less than one-half thought that the reporting was accurate. On both points, New Democratic party MPS were less sanguine than either Liberal or Conservative members, although none gave the media a very positive evaluation. The ensuing profile is clear. The media were significant - and in some cases, dominant - sources of information and analysis about foreign

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TABLE 3 Media Coverage of Foreign Events (%) Party Liberal Conservative New Democratic % of all respondents

Very Inadequate Inadequate

Very cornprehensive

Comprehensive

No opinion

11 0 0

33 36 20

6 12 20

44 46 40

6 6 20

3

33

12

44

8

TABLE 4

Media Accuracy on Foreign Policy Issues/Events (%) Very accurate

Accurate

No opinion

Somewhat Inaccurate

Very inaccurate

Liberal Conservative New Democratic

0 3 0

47 46 30

12 15 10

41 33 40

0 3 20

% of all respondents

2

43

13

37

5

Party

events and issues for Canadian members of parliament. Yet these same M PS, relying on a relatively limited number of sources, did not express confidence either in the comprehensiveness or accuracy of media coverage. This obvious discordance between the primary source of information and a lack of confidence in its quality is difficult to explain. Nevertheless, it does show how, in the absence of alternative inputs, the media and their message could have had a powerful effect on the substance of what parliamentarians thought and did. M P S A N D L E B A N O N , 1 1982: THE ROLE OF THE M E D I A

Of those M PS who responded to the survey, 56 per cent of both the Liberals and New Democrats and 80 per cent of the Conservatives ranked "information and facts from the media" as most significant in the formation of their views about the war in Lebanon. Similarly, onethird of both Liberals and New Democrats and just over one-half of Conservatives reported that "opinion and analysis from the media" were most significant (ranked first or second, where multiple rankings were possible). Only "personal beliefs" for the Liberals (44 per cent) and

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"interest group activities" for the New Democrats (22 per cent) and the Conservatives (16 per cent) provided important additional contributions to the development of understanding and points of view in the midst of the crisis-laden situation in Lebanon. Given the evident reliance of so many of the MPS on the media and the pressures that many of these M PS placed on the cabinet for a change in government policy, what message did the Fourth Estate thrust into the foreign policy making process? A content analysis of a sample of the Canadian print and broadcast media offers some evidence about why the challenge in the Liberal caucus developed and why it was partly deflected. The first issue to be considered is the dependence of the Canadian daily newspapers on foreign sources for their reporting of the Lebanon War.8 Are Canadian MPS reading reports, analyses, and opinions of foreign correspondents and journalists, directed by foreign editors and publishers, or by Canadians? Table 5 provides the relevant data on this point. Only 8 per cent of the stories in our sample carried a distinctly Canadian byline or authorship. The remaining 92 per cent had as their source foreign newspapers (10 per cent), foreign-controlled wire services such as Associated Press, United Press International, Reuter, and Agence France-Presse (57 per cent), and a combination of wire services with Canadian rewrite (25 per cent).9 The point here is that an uncritical acceptance of wire service and foreign news reports may introduce a host of problems such as bias and the possible lack of credibility of sources which cannot be verified by the Canadian press. What were the general impressions of the conflict in Lebanon as portrayed by the press during June, July, and early August 1982? In stories which focused upon a specific action or event (fighting, destruction, invasion, retreat, and so on) and in which responsibility for that activity was clearly attributed to one or more actors, 70 per cent received a neutral portrayal by the reporter or wire service, 21 per cent a negative portrayal, and only 9 per cent a positive portrayal. In other words, in 7 out of 10 stories, reporters either refrained from judging the action, or, if assessment occurred, it contained such reasonably valuefree attributions as "complex scenario," "opinion is mixed," "many groups are involved," or "difficult to judge." Fewer than i in 10 stories contained any positive attribution, from the extreme of portraying one party's actions as entirely just and in pursuit of a noble cause to stating that one side deserves sympathy, has been unfairly pursued or harassed, or should be viewed in a favourable light. Finally, about 20 per cent of the stories conveyed a negative portrayal of the actor(s), using such terms as extremely violent, barbaric, or expansionist, or presented events in black and white terms and focused on the black. Forty-nine

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Sources of Foreign News Reports About War in Lebanon in a Sample of English-language Canadian Dailies (1 June to 10 August)1 Original source not noted2

Canadian sources

Foreign sources3

62 53 32

20 17 10

120 194 88

TOTAL

147

%

24.7

47 7.9

67.4

June July August 1-10

402

Total number of sources is greater than total number of stories surveyed due to multiple sources for some stories. Sample of Canadian dailies included every issue of the Toronto Globe and Mail, Toronto Star, and Ottawa Citizen, and two per week from the Halifax Chronick-Herald, Hamilton Spectator, Montreal Gazette, Winnipeg Free Press, London Free Press, Vancouver Sun, and Edmonton Journal. zThis category includes reports attributed to a wire/news service in which Canadian domestic staff have rewritten and amalgamated stories. Usually these reports are non-Canadian in origin, but Canadian Press, for example, may be included. 3

Foreign sources included the following, expressed as a percentage of the total number of 596 sources: Associated Press 18.3%; United Press International 13.8%; Reuter 19.6%; Agence FrancePress 5.5%; New York Times 5.0%, Washington Post .3%, other United States papers 2.9%, and British papers 2.0%.

per cent of all stories attributed responsibility to the Israeli government or army. Of these, 9 per cent were positive, 59 per cent neutral, and 32 per cent negative in presentation. Thirty-four per cent of the stories attributed responsibility to the PLO, and of these 12 per cent were positive, 76 per cent neutral, and 12 per cent negative. Of the remaining stories recorded, 12 per cent attributed responsibility to the Syrians and 9 of these 10 were neutral portrayals. Thus a substantial part of the reporting attempted to present information without imposing either a positive or a negative judgment. However, even here, 42 per cent of such stories dealt with events in which responsibility was attributed to Israel, with 37 per cent attributed to the PLO, and 16 per cent to Syria. In total, Israel received about 50 per cent more attributed coverage than the PLO, and the ratio was roughly the same for the "negative" stories. The higher frequency with which Israel was depicted as bearing responsibility for events, combined with more than double the negative assessment compared with the PLO, could well have caused readers to judge Israel the culprit. Positive portrayal of the responsible party occurred in only 9 per cent

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of all the stories examined. Although Israel received almost half of such stories, little can be inferred from so few cases. Of the 170 stories having a negative portrayal, 77 per cent cited Israel as the party responsible for the event. In other words, 49 per cent of all stories attributed responsibility for events to Israel, and 32 per cent of these stories portrayed Israel in a decidedly negative image.10 It would be difficult to deny the cumulative impact of such stories upon the reader. Nevertheless, it might be that the portrayal of Israel as primarily responsible for the loss of life and destruction in Lebanon as well as the homelessness of so many innocent Lebanese was justified. If this was the case, then MPS not only were receiving accurate accounts of the fighting but also could be certain that those who tried to introduce sanctions against Israel and persuade their colleagues to support fundamental changes in Canada's policy were arguing from a basis of sound factual information. Did reports in the Canadian press, which we have shown to have been decidedly negative towards Israel, present accurate and informed facts and analyses? An examination of the stories in the Canadian press, together with published studies of the quality of reporting on the war in Lebanon, show that flaws existed in the media's depiction of "reality."11 Casualty reports, featuring over 10,000 civilians dead, thousands wounded, and 600,000 to 700,000 refugees in the south, were based on biased sources and ignored alternative and subsequent information which showed these figures to be greatly exaggerated.12 Unqualified graphic descriptions of villages, towns, and cities destroyed or severely damaged, for example the formerly Christian town of Damur, disregarded the prior destruction caused by the Lebanese civil war and thus led readers to believe that Israel was solely responsible. The depiction of Palestinian targets as basically defenceless was often simply wrong and too often presented out of context.13 Allegations of brutal Israeli treatment of prisoners and detainees, notably those made by a Canadian physician working in a PLO-run Red Crescent hospital, were not followed by publicized retractions when shown to be false. Pictures were presented with misleading interpretations that again were not subsequently corrected. The most famous example is that of a baby in bandages supposed severely burned and without arms due to Israel's bombing. Weeks afterward it was learned that neither the amputations nor the bombing had occurred. History was distorted, as reporting gave little attention to the previous Lebanese civil war, the establishment of the PLO "state within a state" in southern Lebanon, and the role of Syrian and foreign mercenary forces. Moreover, the battlefields of eastern Lebanon, where Israeli and Syrian forces fought massive tank and air battles, received relatively little coverage.

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The second source of information and analysis about the war in Lebanon during those hot summer months was the broadcast media. Television news is of particular interest because as a visual medium with an intense and dramatic narrative structure, it can have a profound influence in establishing a dominant message and arousing viewer emotion - at least in the short term. To assess the message of the war in Lebanon that the Canadian broadcast media transmitted to parliamentarians, we analysed the logs, shot lists, and voice transcripts of c B c's "The National" from i June to 31 August 1982.™ An initial indication of the volume of coverage on the Lebanon War which bombarded the Canadian viewer comes from the number of warrelated stories on "The National" each evening. This analysis reveals three periods of particularly acute attention: the first 17 days just before and following the outbreak of the war on 6 June; the 11 days immediately preceding 5 August; and the seven days from 21 to 28 August. Of these three periods, the 11 days prior to 5 August, and especially i to 4 August, were unique in the large number of stories offered on the Lebanon War. In short, by this initial measure, c B c coverage of the war peaked at exactly the moment at which it would have the greatest impact on caucus opinion. This pattern is fully confirmed by an analysis of the percentage of stories on each nightly newscast accounted for by the war in Lebanon. Again, the four days immediately preceding 5 August were the most intense of any four-day period in terms of relative attention devoted to the war. Of the three occasions during the summer of 1982 when the war occupied over 40 per cent of the stories in a newscast, one was eleven days and the other four days prior to the cabinet meeting. A closer examination of the positions occupied by the war stories within each newscast also shows the exceptional character of the eleven days prior to 5 August. During this period the war was the lead story on eight of the eleven available occasions and on five nights provided the first five stories in the newscast. Three of these five nights came in the four days immediately prior to 5 August. Because of the capacity of the television camera and screen to arouse interest and emotion where mere voice or print coverage would not, the number of stories each night with new visual footage on the war is of particular interest. And here again, the eleven-day period is unique on several counts. All the days during the summer in which four or more new visual items on the Lebanese war were included in a newscast fall into that span. Two came in the three days immediately preceding the Liberal cabinet meeting.

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The night before the meeting was the only occasion on which five new film segments on the war were included in "The National." Thus the four days immediately prior to the Liberal cabinet meeting on 5 August saw truly exceptional coverage of the war in Lebanon on the c B c national news.15 There were a record number of stories (5) about the war. They accounted for between 25 and 55 per cent of the entire programme and generally occupied the first five positions in each newscast. Also, they were unusually rich in new visual footage about the war. Hence, not only were parliamentarians who were interested in foreign affairs probably watching "The National" during the few days prior to the 4 August caucus, but in so doing they were receiving saturation coverage and the network's particular view of the war in Lebanon. What was that particular view? Were the Liberal caucus dissidents simply trying to "do something" about the volume of violence which suddenly impinged on their consciousness, that is, were they reacting emotionally to the bombs, bullets, and bodies generated by actions for which Israel, as the more powerful party, was deemed largely responsible? Alternatively, was their response more rational and akin to the interpretations and reactions of diplomatic professionals in the Department of External Affairs, in that it was based on a critical and focused media-presented story of the complex political events unfolding in the Middle East and throughout the global system during those days? The content of c B c's coverage suggests the latter interpretation is the more correct. While there was violence in the CBC'S coverage during the critical eleven-day and four-day periods under discussion, its volume and character were not distinctly different from that shown regularly by the c B c since the outbreak of the war. More important, the actual sequence of c B c stories during the eleven days presented a saga of hopes for a peaceful settlement dashed by Israeli intransigence and emphasized a particular Canadian perspective and responsibility vis-avis the problem. The news stories presented by "The National" (as well as the print media) during this eleven-day period unfolded as follows. On 25 July Yasir Arafat, under Israeli siege in Beirut, said he would recognize all United Nations resolutions on the Middle East and thus, implicitly perhaps, the existence of Israel. Canadian officials were sceptical of this gesture. Three days later the Canadian ambassador in Beirut, Theodore Arcand, speaking the day after an Israeli bomb had destroyed his residence, criticized Israeli actions in Lebanon. In response, the House of Commons unanimously passed a motion praising his courage. The Liberal MP, Marcel Prud'homme, argued that Canada should withdraw its ambassador, but the secretary of state for

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external affairs, Mark MacGuigan, disagreed. On 29 and 30 July, respectively, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution calling for an end to Israel's blockade of Beirut for humanitarian reasons and Arcand announced that he was sheltering 50 Palestinian women and children in the basement of his besieged embassy. On i August, four days before the cabinet meeting, the Security Council passed another resolution demanding a ceasefire to be supervised by United Nations observers, while the Israeli government said it would not begin its final assault on Beirut on that day. On 2 August the Canadian government ordered Mr Arcand out of Beirut for reasons of safety. The Liberal MP, Ian Watson, charged the action was an External Affairs attempt to punish Arcand for his anti-Israeli statements, and the former Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, arrived in Canada to reassure the Canadian Jewish community about Israeli intentions. On 3 August Israel sent its tanks into West Beirut in an attempt either to destroy or to expel the p L o. This was the dramatic high point of Israel's Lebanon campaign. The following day, 4 August, Prime Minister Begin warned the PLO it would leave Beirut one way or another and said Washington would not prevent him from achieving his goal. Washington reacted in a passive manner. In Ottawa, MacGuigan responded only that it was hard to understand how Israel thought it was advancing peace talks while shelling at the same time. To the Liberal MPS watching these sequences on "The National," the message was clear. The hopes for a negotiated settlement aroused by Arafat's earlier remarks and the United Nations resolutions had been suddenly destroyed by the movement of Israeli tanks into West Beirut. The next day they realized that Israeli goals were backed by a de facto American blank cheque. The Canadian role in this drama was also clear. While the most directly involved Canadian official, Theodore Arcand, publicly expressed his outrage at Israel's actions, the executive branch of the Canadian government seemed to be offering Israel its tacit support. It cast doubt on Arafat's sincerity by ordering Arcand out of Beirut, allowed Rabin to visit Canada, and issued only a mild reproach about Israel's final assault on West Beirut. By the night of 4 August, with Washington and Ottawa refusing to condemn Israel's ultimate drive, it was easy for watching M PS to conclude that only they could act against the course established by a Department of External Affairs which was unable or unwilling to move. CONCLUSION

On 4 August 1982 the parliamentary caucus of the Liberal party defected from its deference to the traditional prerogative of the execu-

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tive branch and the Department of External Affairs to decide foreign policy and from the long-established balance between Israel and the Arabs in Canada's diplomatic posture. Why? There is little evidence to suggest these MPS were responding to a host of standard sources, notably diplomatic briefings on events in the region, the policy direction established by their prime minister, public rallies and constituent pressures, party differences, emergent groupings, or sustained discussion within the House of Commons. In contrast, there is considerable evidence that these MPS were moved by the media and its particular portrayal of the Lebanese war. Most M PS indicated that they depended primarily on the media for information and analysis of the war. Their dependence was heavily concentrated on eight, overwhelmingly Canadian, sources. An analysis of the print sources they were reading indicates that 69 per cent of all stories attributed responsibility for events to the Israeli government and army and, of these, 39 per cent portrayed Israel in a negative light and only 6 per cent in a positive light. The moderately anti-Israel direction of the caucus rebellion was fully consistent with the balance portrayed in the press sources they were reading. An analysis of the volume and content of a critical broadcast source the c B c's television news - strengthens the case that the media had a significant role in prompting this policy shift. According to all standard objective measures, the coverage of the war in Lebanon by "The National" reached unique levels of intensity in the eleven-day period and especially the four days before the 5 August cabinet shift. Within that critical period, the dominant story was of a p L o-inspired peace initiative suddenly sabotaged by Israeli and American action. A mute Canadian government stood idly by and even silenced the criticisms of their diplomat closest to the events. The cumulative message presented on "The National" was fully consistent with the actions taken by M PS on 4 August and by cabinet the next day. Given the importance of the media in the foreign policy process in this case, it is important to consider the quality of foreign affairs coverage the media provides. Here the evidence is mostly discouraging. The majority of MPS themselves, despite their acknowledged heavy dependence on the media for foreign affairs information and analysis, think that this coverage is inadequate in comprehensiveness and accuracy. Indeed, an analysis of the print coverage of the war in Lebanon indicates the overwhelmingly non-Canadian origins of most stories, with unattributed "eyewitness" or partisan sources for virtually all the stories portraying Israel in a negative light, and numerous examples of exaggerated, ahistorical, context-free, and simply inaccurate reporting. Only in the rarified, if critical, realm of the publicly owned broad-

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cast media did we find a more balanced portrait. For while the c B c's "The National" seemed to provide a strong, short-term stimulus for parliamentary action, the signal it sent was grounded not in unnecessary violence or sensationalism but in a relatively sophisticated treatment of a complex diplomatic saga. Given these findings, M PS interested in foreign affairs would be well advised to seek sources of information and opinion beyond the media, to cancel their subscriptions and turn off their television sets if they cannot, and to remind the media of their responsibility for good reporting.

NOTES

An earlier draft of this chapter was presented at the Conference on the Media and Foreign Policy, University of Windsor, 27-29 October 1983. The research for this paper forms part of the s s H RC c-supported project on Canada-Middle East relations awarded to Dewitt. In addition, the authors wish to acknowledge the financial assistance of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs Research Programme, the generosity of c B c television's "National News" and "The Journal" in granting access to their facilities and materials, and the research assistance of Keith Krause, Jack Barei, Jason Richler, Julie Leonard, and Patricia Pearson. 1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 8 June-4 August 1982, passim. 2 It is possible that some members were influenced by the positions taken by Prime Minister Trudeau or ministers such as Pierre De Bane. Some confidential sources have suggested that the 4 August debate in caucus was prompted by prior private discussions between the prime minister and a number of his colleagues who, in effect, received a "green light" to challenge the pre-existing consensus. We have not been able to confirm this scenario. Nevertheless, confirmation would still leave unexplained the evident emergence of caucus support for the ensuing defection, especially since neither the prime minister nor his senior cabinet colleagues overtly promoted such a position in caucus. 3 The Canadian ambassador in Lebanon, Theodore Arcand, is a likely exception. 4 Aside from documents such as Hansard, we have no publicly available evidence to support these assertions. However, based on confidential interviews conducted from August 1982 through to March 1983, we believe that we have not misrepresented the case. Most M PS (who were not actively pro- p L o or pro-Arab or not at all involved in these affairs) thought that "no comment" was the best stance. Many pro-Israel MPS,

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while privately sympathetic to Israel, refused to participate in the Canadian foreign policy debate. 5 The reader should be aware of at least two problems encountered in this research. First, as in all survey research exercises, we are at the mercy of those whom we ask to respond. For the purposes of this paper where our focus is on M PS, 63 out of a possible 282 responded to our questionnaire, a response rate of about 22 per cent. Given that cabinet members normally do not respond to mailed questionnaires, the response rate increases to about 25 per cent, which falls in the range generally accepted as statistically adequate: see David Nachmias and Chava Nachmias, Research Methods in the Social Sciences (New York: St Martin's Press 1976), chaps. 6 and 12. We gain additional confidence from the fact that 18 respondents sat on the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, representing 60 per cent of the committee's membership (15 members plus 15 alternates). Furthermore, 67 per cent of all respondents noted that foreign affairs was an area of special concern. Hence, while the survey was sent to all M PS, the resulting sample is weighted in favour of those non-cabinet M PS concerned with events abroad. The second major methodological issue concerns the media. It was impossible to survey all Canadian newspapers, news magazines, and broadcast media. The sampling was determined by our respondents; that is, the Globe and Mail and Mackan's were identified by 80 per cent or more as being read on a daily/weekly basis; similarly, approximately 60 per cent listened to or watched the daily radio and television news of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (c B c). In addition, we examined second- and third-ranked newspapers (Toronto Star and Ottawa Citizen), Time magazine, and some regional papers. Most of the content analysis was based on English-language sources. 6 For a more detailed examination of these data, see David B. Dewitt, "Canadian Parliamentarians and Foreign Policy: Where is the Expertise?" prepared for the Conference on Parliament and Foreign Affairs, Ottawa, 30 April-2 May 1984. 7 David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations (Toronto: John Wiley 1983), chaps. 5, 6,10. 8 All stories concerning the war in Lebanon reported in the Globe and Mail, the Ottawa Citizen, the Toronto Star, and a twice-weekly sampling of those to be found in major regional newspapers were surveyed. Editorials also were examined, as were all stories in Maclean's and Time. These data draw from those sources reported to be read most often by the parliamentarians who responded to our survey.

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9 When newspaper reporting is examined over a four-month period (June through September), the figures change to 60 per cent foreign wire service and 24 per cent Canadian rewrites of wire service materials. 10 This pattern is less pronounced among the news magazines surveyed, where 39 per cent of all stories attributed responsibility to Israel, 21 per cent of all stories portrayed Israel in a negative light, and 16 per cent portrayed it as neutral (that is, of all stories focusing on Israel as the responsible actor, 55 per cent were negative and 4 per cent were positive). 11 While most of these published studies on newspaper and wire service reporting (as well as broadcast sources) deal with the American media, they are directly applicable here because they cover the same sources from which close to 90 per cent of Canadian-printed stories were derived. At time of writing the three most comprehensive studies of reporting on the Lebanese war were Joshua Muravchik, "Misreporting Lebanon," Policy Review 23 (winter 1983): 11-66; Edward Alexander, "The Journalists' War against Israel," Encounter 59 (September-October 1982): 87-97; Mansour Farhang and William Dorman, "The U.S. Press and the War in Lebanon," SAIS Review 3 (winter/spring 1983). For an interesting, albeit somewhat rhetorical, statement, see Martin Peretz, "Lebanon Eyewitness," New Republic, 2 August 1982,15-23. A rather weak attempt by the press to defend itself from criticism is seen in "The Battle Israel Lost," Newsweek, 13 September 1982,58-9. For one reporter's view on reporting the war, see Kenneth R. Timmerman, "How the PLO Terrorized Journalists in Beirut," Commentary 75 (January 1983): 48-50. 12 Early reports on casualties were reputedly based on figures from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), yet the repudiation of early casualty figures by the I C R C itself on 18 June was given only slight coverage. Nor was there an effort to inform readers that the I C R C in Lebanon was connected with the Red Crescent, headed by Dr Fathi Arafat, Yasir Arafat's brother. It worked primarily for the PLO and the Palestinians, often against the policies of the fragmented Lebanese authorities. 13 Palestinian "camps" usually were within urban areas and contained permanent buildings and full social services rather than tents as implied. Furthermore, the placement of P L o headquarters, weapons, and arms caches in schools, hospitals, churches, courtyards, on residential rooftops, and in United Nations refugee offices was well known, yet rarely mentioned. Thus Israeli soldiers were depicted as purposefully inflicting death and destruction upon civilians. Not until much later, after the Beirut siege, did journalists cautiously write about the P L o's use of civilians and their homes as shields.

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14 Unlike the print media, whose results are readily available, a content analysis of the Canadian broadcast media raises formidable problems of access. We were fortunate to obtain complete access to the logs, shot lists, voice transcripts, and voice and video recordings of CBC-TV'S English-language programmes, "The National," "The Journal," and "Sunday Report." Resource constraints and coding difficulties limited our initial focus to a survey of the logs, shot lists, and voice transcripts of "The National" for the period i June to 31 August 1982. CT v refused to grant any access to their materials. Resource constraints dictated the omission of any radio sources. On the importance, methods, and problems of content analysis of television news, see Williams Adams and Fay Schreibman, eds., Television Network News: Issues in Content Research (Washington D c: School of Public and International Affairs, George Washington University, 1978), and Williams Adams, ed., Television Coverage of the Middle East (Norwood N j: Ablex 1981). 15 During the summer of 1982 about 20 per cent of the news items carried on "The National" dealt with the Middle East (22.6 per cent in June, 18.2 per cent in July, and 21.1 per cent in August). During the ii-day period prior to 5 August this rose to 29.6 per cent. During the 4-day period prior to 5 August it was 35.8 per cent. During the summer of 1982,30 per cent of "The National's" news items on the Middle East came from foreign networks (23.8 per cent in June, 28.3 per cent in July, 36.5 per cent in August). During the n-day period and the 4-day period prior to 5 August the figure was about 32 per cent. With one exception, the foreign items came from two American networks: CBS (34 items), and N B C (30 items). Thus in July and August, the c B c relied more on reports from the American networks than from its own reporters in the field. The figures suggest that from 20 July to 18 August, there was no c B c - T v reporter in the Middle East, resulting in a greater dependence on foreign news sources or on scripted items from Toronto. During the three summer months, 33.3 per cent of "The National's" news items on the Middle East originated in Toronto, 3.7 per cent from elsewhere in Canada, 1.8 per cent from the United States, 4.6 per cent from Europe, 25.9 per cent from the Middle East, and 30 per cent from the United States networks. However, during the n-day period prior to 5 August, 76.6 per cent came from Toronto, 13.3 per cent from elsewhere in Canada, and 10 per cent from United States networks, with the 4-day period showing 85.7 per cent, 7.1 per cent, and 7.1 per cent respectively. By this very stringent measure, the critical 11- and 4-day periods show considerable closure of the scope of c B c's coverage, but an intense concentration on the Canadian dimensions of the problem.

JOHN KIRTON AND PEYTON LYON

Perceptions of the Middle East in the Department of External Affairs and Mulroney's Policy 1984-1988 About i per cent of Canada's trade is with the fifteen countries of the Middle East; less than 2 per cent of its aid is targeted to the area; 7.6 per cent of its recent immigrants have come from the Middle East; about 2 per cent of its armed forces participate in Middle East peacekeeping operations; and 6.4 per cent of its diplomats man Canada's ten embassies in the area.1 These figures do not suggest a major Canadian involvement in the Middle East, and yet the region has long been a source of intense interest to Canadian diplomats and scholars. It is generally regarded in Ottawa as the most consistently sensitive item on Canada's foreign policy agenda. In part, this reflects the historic role Canada played in the creation of the state of Israel and later in the containment of the Suez crisis of 1956, which many regard as the apex of Canada's participation in global diplomacy. In part, it stems from the concern that if the world ever stumbles into the final world war, the Arab-Israeli conflict would be a likely flash-point. Finally, the Middle East is of deep concern for the 1.4 per cent of Canada's population which is Jewish and, to a lesser extent, for the smaller number of Arab Canadians. The scholarly debate on the policy of the Canadian government towards the Middle East turns on six points. The first is the balance in Canada's approach; is the policy "tilted" towards Israel, towards the Arabs, or neutral? The second is the direction in which the policy might be shifting: towards Israel, towards the Arabs, or towards the centre. The third point concerns the depth of Canada's interest as displayed in personnel, thought, and initiatives: does it simply follow others, or does it possess a distinctive and substantial approach? This leads to a fourth issue: how greatly are Canada's options limited, and its policy determined, by other nations and international organizations? The fifth question is about the control of Canada's Middle East policy. Does it lie

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with the organs traditionally responsible for foreign policy, notably the prime minister, the cabinet, and the Department of External Affairs ( DE A), or is policy determined largely by societal forces? Finally, if the answer to that question is "societal," are these forces predominantly the Canadian Jewish community, through the Canada-Israel Committee (cic), 2 or do they derive more from a broad pluralistic process including economic interests? The debate tends to resolve itself into two contending schools. One sees Canada's policy as tilted towards Israel. With little tendency to shift, because inter alia, its political leadership caters to the perceived electoral power of the Jewish community.3 The other believes Canadian policy is swayed in either direction by changes in the international realm, especially in the Middle East, and is controlled largely by the foreign policy professionals in DEA. 4 The relationship between the DEA professionals and their political masters is critical to resolving the debate between these two schools. Both the department and the political leadership have their own perspectives, and each is subject to different pressures. In general, the department's view reflects largely the international realities of the Middle East and the wider world. Over four decades it has striven for policies of depth and balance. Canada's elected leaders, ultimately supreme in practice as well as in theory, are naturally more susceptible to domestic pressures and less attuned to the opportunities and threats of the external environment. Knowledge that would allow any more specific analysis of the views of these two groups is fragmentary. The one serious study of the images of the foreign policy elite, conducted in 1976, revealed little about attitudes towards the Middle East except that Israel was perceived to be almost as disruptive in the international system as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and more disruptive than Egypt, China, or the Soviet Union.5 Little is known about Middle East policy-making in Ottawa in the 19805, a decade during which the first majority Progressive Conservative government in more than twenty years came into office and in which the trade element of the former Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce was merged with DEA. What was the impact of the strongly pro-Israel stance of the Diefenbaker years and Joe Clark's short period in office on the government elected in 1984? How much difference did it make that the political leadership's large majority rested less on support from Montreal and Toronto (with their large concentrations of Jewish voters) and more on French Canada with its traditional sympathy for the Arabs6 and on the west with its ties to the oil industry? To answer such questions, and to contribute to an under-

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standing of the more enduring points of dispute about Canada's involvement in the Middle East, we chose two complementary approaches. The first approach - to which the next section of the chapter is devoted - was a questionnaire mailed in 1987 to all former and current D E A officers who have, or have had, responsibility for Canada's relations with the Middle East. The questionnaire and supplementary interviews conducted by one of us (Lyon) sought specific details about their perspectives on the Middle East and Canadian policies. The evidence reveals strong continuity between the views of past and serving D E A officers and a substantial departmental consensus on key questions.7 While there were some interesting differences among various subgroups of officials, we were impressed by the similarity in the views of almost all D E A officers with service in the Middle East or involvement with Middle East affairs either in Ottawa or at the United Nations in New York. Because the department discouraged replies from serving officers, our figures apply mostly to retired senior officers. We are confident, however, that they offer a reasonable indication of the current D E A perspective.8 The next part of the chapter deals with Canada's Middle East policy during the first Mulroney government. The final part, based on interviews conducted by Kirton with individuals who were strategically located within the current executive, probes the Mulroney government's perspectives and practices and describes the relative power of the key actors in the decision-making process with special emphasis on the role and influence of the prime minister and the secretary of state for external affairs. THE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS PERSPECTIVE

Is there "a" D E A perspective on the Middle East? Half our respondents replied negatively, but it is possible that they understood the question to apply to the entirety of the department, including its political leadership. Some observed that D E A members are just like Canadians at large, and hence divided into pro-Israel and pro-Arab camps. Several respondents thought the pro-Israel wing predominated, while others were sure that sympathies within D E A had shifted to the Arabs. One noted that a DEA perspective was difficult to attain because fragments of Canada's relations with the area were handled by different divisions; officers dealing with economic development, trade, or peacekeeping, for example, were more likely to share the outlook of those in the other departments dealing with similar matters. Those who did perceive a distinctive D E A perspective were more

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certain of its existence than its content. Not surprisingly, there was general confidence that they, the experts, were more knowledgeable, sophisticated, balanced, and resistant to pressure groups than either the public or the politicians and officials in the remainder of the government. The department was seen as "less romantic about Israel," less influenced "by the Holocaust factor," and "less inclined to accept the equation between Arab and terrorist." When comparing the department's position to the American stance in the Middle East, these officials saw DEA as less "tilted toward Israel," less "erratic," more "balanced," and far less disposed to impose a settlement by force. Only a handful of respondents stressed the Middle East as a potential flashpoint for general war - perhaps because the point was too obvious to mention - and there were few references to values such as equity, justice, or enhancing trade. Also surprising by their absence, considering that many respondents had served during the Pearson years, were nostalgic references to Canada's historic role in 1948 and 1956. The principal goal of Canada's policy, it would seem, is to maintain, or regain, "balance" in its approach to the region - "against heavy odds," one interjected. The existence of a common DEA perspective on some critical points was, however, demonstrated by the responses to several closed ended questions. When asked to rate prospects that a serious war would erupt in the area, a sizeable majority considered the chances to be at least "5050." What can Canada do to improve the prospects for peace? Precious little it would seem, from the responses (set out in table i) when respondents were asked to weigh, on a scale of i (slight) - 7 (great), "the importance in negotiating a Middle East settlement" of various actors. Considering Canada's exceptional role during the birth of Israel, and again in the Suez crisis, the maintenance of ten diplomatic missions in the area, and Canada's rise in some ways to the rank of "principal power,"9 to be tied in perceived importance with Libya may be somewhat sobering. However, Canada was the only extra-regional power on the list without superpower status, colonial involvement in the region, or a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Its preoccupation with free trade and other serious bilateral issues with the United States makes it more difficult for Canada to use its diplomatic credit in Washington to influence American policies in the Middle East. Nonetheless, it should be recalled that Canada's effectiveness in 1947-8 and 1956 did not derive from its proximity to the area, or even its wealth or military strength, as much as it did from its reputation, its commitment to peace in the area, and its diplomatic finesse. What could Canada do to improve the prospects for peace in the Middle East? There were few suggestions. One respondent urged that

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John Kirton and Peyton Lyon TABLE 1

Relative Importance of Selected Actors in the Negotiation of a Middle East Peace Settlement1 Israel United States Syria Egypt Soviet Union Jordan Palestine Liberation Organization Saudi Arabia United Nations secretariat France United Kingdom United Nations Security Council United Nations General Assembly Lebanon Arab League Libya Canada

7.0 6.3 5.1 5.0 4.9 4.6 4.6 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.2 2.8 2.7 2.5 1.7 1.7

'Scale: 1 (slight) - 7 (great)

we seek an early return to the Security Council and then promote an international conference on the Middle East. Another recommended "a truly balanced policy, and then make much more noise about it. Distance ourselves from the USA ... upgrade our image as honest broker." Five said explicitly that they could think of no feasible action that Canada could take. Peacekeeping has loomed large in Canada's Middle East policy, and there remains a strong willingness to soldier on, but little conviction, it seemed, that peacekeepers now have a major role in the area. A majority of respondents felt that peacekeeping continues to be worth the risk in lives and expense and that it helps the negotiating process. A small number argued the contrary. Most believed that it adds to Canada's influence, albeit modestly, although a sizeable number saw it as imposing limitations on its diplomacy. It "makes us wimpish," one complained. Several others said that the limitations, by obligating us to be objective, were a good thing. Has Canada been balanced in its approach to the contending forces in the Middle East? Not in the eyes of most of our respondents. A majority perceived imbalance, all in favour of Israel, and most of those who did not were ambiguous. For example a highly admired ex-ambas-

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sador wrote that "Canada's position was relatively balanced but clearly in favour of Israel." Another said "for the most part balanced," with occasional "leaning over backwards to favour Israel." A third wrote "reasonably" balanced but "unbalanced at times," and our "actions are often seen as pro-Israeli." The strongest perception of imbalance was expressed by former ambassadors (13 of 15 who responded to this question) and officers who had served in Israel (5 of 6). A few respondents, while saying "unbalanced," noted that Canada's posture is in fact becoming more balanced. In most Arab eyes, the touchstone of balance in the Middle East remains a nation's attitude towards Palestinian claims and the PLO, which is supported by an overwhelming majority of Palestinians. Canada has been inching towards full recognition of the Palestinian right to a homeland and self-determination, but unlike most of its allies and the Vatican, it refuses to accept the P L o as the only legitimate voice of the Palestinians or to permit diplomatic contacts with it at the ambassadorial level or above. At the summit for francophone leaders held in Quebec City in September 1987, Canada was alone among the 41 participating countries in not supporting a resolution calling for selfdetermination for the Palestinian people. (This stand has also attracted critical attention in the United Nations.) As the secretary of state for external affairs, Joe Clark, explained: "Self-determination is a phrase we've had a lot of difficulty with. We think it could be a synonym for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The use of that language could prejudice the results of a conference on the Palestinians."10 Apart from the United States and Israel, no other government shares this apprehension. Ottawa has, however, accepted the almost universally adopted call for a Palestinian "homeland." Our questionnaires reveal a considerable gap between the private views of DBA officials and government policy on this issue. Twenty-three (of 27) agreed that there can be no "meaningful negotiations for a settlement without the participation of the PLO." Seventeen (of 23) favoured increasing Canada's level of diplomatic contact with the PLO; the other six concurred but attached significant conditions, such as the prior recognition of Israel by the PLO. The highest support for Palestinian and PLO claims came from the ex-ambassadors (13 of 15) and those who had served in Israel (6 of 6). A strengthening of measures to counteract the Arab economic boycott against Israel has long been a major objective of the Canadian Jewish community, and all three political parties have in the past promised support. We asked, in part as a test of DEA sympathy for Israel, if these measures "should be made more vigorous." Of the nineteen clear responses, eighteen opposed more rigorous measures.

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To questions about their principal sources of information and analysis on the Middle East, the largest single group by far replied "the media," even though only five considered it to be "objective," even "relatively." Twenty-two said it was not, eighteen specifying that it favoured Israel, and none the Arabs. Four said that the bias in Middle East reporting was greater than anywhere else. The most extreme comment was that the media "purveys Israeli propaganda on a grand scale." More moderate critics attributed the perceived bias to the greater skill of the Israelis in making news easily available. Several respondents complained that almost all of Canada's Middle East news comes through American channels, with a heavy bias towards Israel. The greater objectivity of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (c B c) was praised, but its coverage was criticized as "sporadic." Other sources of information and analysis included Canadian and foreign diplomatic reports, American, British, and Canadian intelligence, Israeli and Arab handouts, academic articles, and service in the Security Council. What events, we asked, "were most important in the formation of your current views on the Middle East"? The six wars that have disfigured the post-1945 history of the Middle East (Israel's War of Independence, the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Six-Day War of 1967, the October War of 1973, the Iran-Iraq War, and Israel's invasion of Lebanon) were cited most often, while several respondents also mentioned the problem of terrorism. Three had been disturbed by the election of Menachem Begin. Another three responses referred to the Holocaust and one to the expulsion from Palestine of most of the Palestinian Arabs. On the more positive side, respondents mentioned the historic visit to Israel by Egypt's President Sadat, Henry Kissinger's diplomatic efforts in the 1973-5 period, and the breakthrough at Camp David. How does living in Israel or the Arab world affect the perceptions of Canadian foreign service officers? Twenty-four (of 29) responded that they had indeed been affected. Only one of the six posted to Israel reported being favourably influenced towards Israel; this impact, he added, had been reversed by subsequent service in Ottawa, where he had occupied a senior post dealing with the Middle East, and by the rise of Begin. The responses from those who had served in Arab countries were less gloomy and generally more flattering to their hosts. One commented: "One has to live there a while to begin to understand the diversity of thought, emotion, desires" and also the effect of "living for two years under the shadow of Israeli military might." Two were moved greatly by the experiences of their wives, one of whom had worked with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and the other at a hospital near Sidon. Service in an Arab capital is likely to augment sympathy for

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the Palestinians. Service in Tel Aviv also appears to engender proPalestinian sympathy, if anything more strongly, and deep pessimism about prospects for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Almost no sympathy was volunteered for Israeli policies and not much more for the Israelis themselves. Service at the United Nations in New York was less likely to change one's views of the Middle East, but one respondent noted that hearing the Arab case, and meeting members of the P L o for the first time, had been "broadening." Another commented on his "sense of futility - as one tends to have regarding Northern Ireland - listening to the same debates over and over again." Former ambassador William Barton has explained why service in New York tended to foster a critical view of Canada's position: "the Canadian government went to great lengths to find reasons for voting against or abstaining on resolutions which ... were justified by the facts ... we were generally identified, along with Costa Rica and the U.S.A. as being the most pro-Israeli delegations in the UN... most of our delegates felt that this was not in the best Canadian interest." Another former ambassador noted how his service in Washington had altered his outlook: "contrary to my expectation," he said, "the State Department people were not proIsraeli." A clue to the development of the D E A perspective was provided by responses to a question about the individuals who have been most influential in shaping it. The following individuals were mentioned by more than one respondent: Lester Pearson (former secretary of state for external affairs, prime minister of Canada), 14 times; Elizabeth MacCallum (External Affairs Arab expert), 10; Michael Shenstone (former head of the Middle East Bureau in External Affairs), 6; John Holmes (former diplomat and scholar), 4; E.L.M. Burns (the Canadian general who commanded the United Nations Emergency Force in Sinai), 4; Robert Elliott (former head of the Middle East Bureau), 3; Robert Stanfield (former Conservative Party leader), 2; and Allan Gotlieb (former undersecretary of state for external affairs and ambassador to Washington), 2. The frequent mention of Pearson and MacCallum is not unexpected; yet they make a curious combination. He treated her, the department's first Arabist, with great respect, but ignored her advice as he swung Canada towards a more pro-Israel position than she wanted. MacCallum had counselled more negotiations between the big powers and greater regard for Arab rights before granting Israel statehood. Pearson won the day but, although DEA continues to admire the skilled diplomacy he displayed at the birth of Israel, and again during the Suez crisis, it is Elizabeth MacCallum's perspective that has come to prevail within her old department.

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In seeking to explain the evolution of D E A'S Middle East perspective, one of the most thoughtful respondents wrote: the greatest single influence ... up to very recently has been our well-merited guilt over our treatment of Jews, both in Canada and would-be immigrants, during the late thirties. Added to this was our shared cultural responsibility for what the Germans did to them. Personally, I still cannot bring myself to talk about Israelis in the same terms as I would use speaking about say, Americans or Europeans in the same context... [this] hangup provides the... psychological climate in which decisions relating to Israel were taken.

Another made a similar point more tersely: "Compassion for the victims of the Holocaust led to the perpetuation of another kind of injustice to the peoples of Palestine. There will be no peace until that injustice is remedied." Compassion for the Jews, however, did not appear to be a compelling motive in post-1945 Ottawa decision-making, and it never became as dominant within D E A as it later did throughout the country. There was, for example, support in D E A for Britain's efforts to limit Jewish emigration to Palestine and little inclination rapidly to extend diplomatic recognition to the new state of Israel. The department's growing concern about the Middle East had less to do with the suffering of the Jews or the Palestinians than with the serious rift over the Middle East developing between Britain and the United States, at the critical moment when Canada was striving mightily to preserve the United Nations and to build the Atlantic alliance. For many in the department, the acceptance of Israel was simply the acceptance of a new reality. Most DE A respondents display resignation rather than anger at the obstacles that, in their view, prevent Canada from implementing the Middle East policies they consider to be most consistent with the interests of Canada and the global community. What are those obstacles? With which other actors must DEA contend in making Canada's foreign policy towards the Middle East? We asked our respondents to weigh, on a scale of one to seven, the influence of eighteen actors and to suggest any we had overlooked. Table 2 gives their responses and compares them with those given in 1975 by about 300 members of the Canadian foreign policy elite to a roughly equivalent question concerning Canadian foreign policy in general. One striking comparison to emerge from the two studies is the relatively low ranking given "pressure groups" by the foreign policy elite in 1975 and the top ranking given by the DEA officials to the Canadian Jewish community in 1987 when the question was confined to Middle East policy. The strong influence attributed to the United States and to Israel is also note-

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TABLE 2

Ranking of Obstacles to Implementation of Policy on Middle East 1987 Mid-East responses (scale of 1-7) Canadian Jewish community Prime minister Department of External Affairs Israel Cabinet United States Media Public opinion Business United Nations Parliament Arab states Department of National Defence Other allies Department of Finance Arab Canadian community Palestine Liberation Organization Provinces

5.85 5.04 5.04 4.92 4.68 4.68 4.24 3.58 2.92 2.85 2.84 2.766 2.58 2.30 1.88 1.80 1.52 1.20

1975 CIIS responses (scale of 1-5) Prime minister Cabinet Secretary of state for external affairs Senior officials Department of Finance Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce Business Parliament Media Public opinion Pressure groups Department of National Defence Provinces Other ministers

3.72 3.35 3.12 3.03 2.77 2.54 2.34 2.25 2.23 2.22 1.96 1.85 1.73 1.72

worthy. Perceptions, of course, do not necessarily correspond to facts. There are, as we have seen elsewhere in this volume, limits to the power of the Canada-Israel Committee. It remains striking, however, that a sizeable number of exceptionally experienced public servants should attribute to the Jewish community such a large share in Canadian decision-making towards the Middle East. External Affairs officials volunteered that the Middle East is the most sensitive issue that they must deal with and also that the c i c is by far the most efficient and effective of the lobbies active in the making of Canadian foreign policy. Asked to support their assessment, the officials noted Canada's continuing tilt towards Israel as illustrated by its refusal to support Palestinian self-determination or to establish contact with the P L o at an ambassadorial level and the fact that Canada's votes at the United Nations on Middle East questions are closer to Israel's than are those of any other member, apart from the United States. They rule out the possibility that this bias is the result of pressure from the United States or any other external actor. While they deny that the c i c dictates policy and readily acknowledge instances of its failures, they adhere to the position that it exerts far more influence than is consistent with what they regard as an effective Middle East policy. And they claim that the c i c's impact on Middle East policy is decidedly greater

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than that of any other lobby on any aspect of Canada's foreign policy. Many respondents to our questionnaire seemed to accept the impact of the c i c as a necessary fact of Canadian life. Several observed that the committee rarely employs threats and that it promotes its pro-Israel position by means that are not only legal but civil. Some of its interventions are even perceived as helpful. A number of respondents, however, expressed anger at the overall consequences of this interaction. A former senior ambassador even described cic tactics as "chantage" and went on: "la communaute juive, etablie dans des circonscriptions electorates strategiques, exerce une influence disproportionn^e ... et intervient regulierement en faveur dlsrael, dont souvent elle fait passer les intents avant ceux du Canada/' DE A always resisted this pressure, he observed, but was often outweighed by a majority of the cabinet. "Governments of recent decades," another respondent commented, "have had no will to take domestic political risks over the Middle East." In contrast, the Arab Canadians are far behind the Jewish Canadians in numbers, wealth, roots in Canadian society, and cohesion. Many, notably among the Lebanese Christians, are indifferent to Palestinian aspirations. Although they have started to organize and lobby in conscious emulation of the c i c, Arab Canadians are still considered to exercise only minor influence in Ottawa. The same is true of their fifteen countries of origin compared to Israel.

CANADA'S MIDDLE EAST POLICY UNDER MULRONEY Do D E A perceptions of the strength of the Canadian Jewish community correspond to the existing situation? To judge by the developments of the Mulroney years, they may be exaggerated. Even during the Trudeau era, changes were made in Canada's position that were unwelcome to the cic. Several decisions by the Begin government were condemned by Ottawa and the promise of anti-boycott legislation remained unfulfilled. Canada broke with Israel and the United States in announcing support for a Palestinian homeland in the West Bank and Gaza. Low-level diplomatic contacts with the PLO were authorized, and a number of its leaders visited Parliament Hill, one to address the Senate committee which investigated Canada's relations with the Middle East in 1984-5. Despite protests from some committee members, notably Senators Grafstein and Nurgitz, the body of the Senate report was remarkably supportive of the P L o's credentials and sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians.11 In addition, Trudeau exchanged angry letters with Prime Minister Begin over Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. During the Trudeau years, seven new missions were opened in Arab capitals.

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However, one of Trudeau's secretaries of state for external affairs commented in an interview that the only pressure on him for greater balance, meaning a shift in favour of the Arabs, had come from the prime minister. The minister had resisted because he had a clear cabinet mandate for the existing policy as well as a healthy respect for the pro-Israel lobby. He also observed that "of course" he knew that the Middle East experts in his department were all "Arabists" - by which he clearly meant "Arab sympathizers" - but he considered them to have been "passive." There is thus disagreement about how far Trudeau was able to affect Canada's pro-Israeli position and about how the steps Canada did take on Middle East issues compare with those of other Western countries, especially with respect to the Palestinians. Similar uncertainty surrounds the policy of the first government of Brian Mulroney, but two points emerge clearly. First, the government began its tenure in 1984 with a strongly pro-Israel bias that brought a sudden halt to the trend of the later Trudeau years and a sharp return, at least in rhetoric, to the pro-Israel sympathies of the Diefenbaker regime. Second, the Mulroney government's position and philosophy subsequently moved, somewhat unevenly, some distance in the direction advocated by the DBA professionals. There are difficulties in determining the degree and durability of this shift. Canada's relations with the Middle East embrace a diverse set of issue-areas: terrorism, arms exports, peacekeeping, the Arab-Israeli peace process, United Nations voting, the Iran-Iraq War, international development, diplomatic representation, and bilateral relations with individual states. Apparent adjustments in Canada's behaviour are often responses to small shifts in the external environment - how a United Nations resolution is worded, for example, or how "like-minded" countries propose to vote. Nonetheless, it can be shown that since the Conservatives came to office in September 1984, Canada has moved a modest distance towards the mainstream Western position on Middle East issues. During its first months the government gave full expression to its pro-Israel sentiments but, bearing in mind the costs of the Jerusalem embassy decision of 1979, resisted Israeli overtures to translate these into new commitments or initiatives. It became more active in 1985. The government agreed to participate in the Sinai-based Multinational Force and Observers ( M F o) which had come into being as a result of the Camp David accords, a step which the Trudeau regime had earlier avoided and which was welcomed by Egypt, Israel, and the United States. Israel's bombing of the PLO headquarters in Tunis in October was harshly condemned by Ottawa, and a more distinctive stand on terrorism was formulated. On most terror-related issues, Canada acted in quick and at times lonely support of the United States and Britain.

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This was particularly apparent in the aftermath of the 1986 United States air strike on Libya. Canada also withdrew its ambassador from Damascus to protest Syria's backing of terrorist activity. Canada's actions, however, were always less extreme than those of the United States and Britain, and it had declined active support of Israeli initiatives. Its own proposals on dealing with terrorist activity were confined to the forum of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the problems of airline and airport security. In 1986 Canada changed its negative vote on a very popular Arab proposal for an international peace conference on the Middle East in the United Nations General Assembly to an abstention, to the great relief of D E A: in previous years Canada had been isolated in opposition with Israel and the United States. Canada's overall pro-Israel tilt in its United Nations voting was thus reduced, and its position approached the mainstream Western position. The c i c, indeed, complained that: "Canada voted against nine of thirty-three resolutions that were inimical to Israel. It abstained on fourteen, and voted for the remaining ten resolutions." Its marginal tilt towards Israel had thus evolved into a marginal tilt against it.12 This assessment, however, ignored the significance of individual votes and also the overall closeness of Canada's voting pattern to that of "like-minded" United Nations members. In 1987, observers, including members of Canada's own United Nations delegation, still ranked Canada as second only to the United States in perceived support for Israel. Another modest shift away from Canada's pro-Israeli position took place in the realm of international development. Canada firmly resisted Israeli proposals, notably for a $ioo-million Canada-Israel science and technology fund. It also turned a cold shoulder to the suggestion of Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres for a Marshall Plan for the Middle East. At the same tune, Canada steadily strengthened and broadened its aid programs with Arab states and peoples. It began new projects with Israel's Camp David partner, Egypt, continued to upgrade the aid eligibility status of Jordan, and sent money to Palestinians in Lebanon. Of particular significance was a new aid package for the Palestinians on the West Bank; this was given directly to the Palestinians, rather than being channelled through the Israeli authorities, as a mild but unmistakable indication of impatience with Israel's treatment of the West Bank Arabs. A similar evolution was apparent in diplomatic relations. The Canadian embassy in Beirut was closed because of the endemic violence in Lebanon, and the one in Abu Dhabi to save money. Far more significant, however, was the opening of a mission in the capital of hard-line Syria

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in 1985. The ambassador was soon recalled to reproach Syria for its support of terrorism but, unlike the United Kingdom, Canada restored its representation after a brief interval. Meanwhile, Israel received a diplomatic rebuff, when Canada refused to accredit its proposed military attache in Ottawa, General Amos Yaron, who had led Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. The Conservative government, it seemed, had become as disenchanted with Israel as its Liberal predecessor. Canada's current role in the overall Arab-Israeli peace process is a minor one. Not surprisingly, the Mulroney government was reluctant to rush into such a complex situation, and there was no likelihood of Canadian initiatives comparable to those taken during the birth of Israel and the subsequent decades. The Conservatives entered office without a Middle East peace plan or even a conception of the peace process beyond the views inherited from the Liberals, conditioned by the general Conservative disposition to stay close to Washington. The government deliberately ducked the opportunity to develop a plan during its 1985 foreign policy review and gave the Middle East little attention in the various policy papers and the parliamentary review. It also avoided a second opportunity when it decided not to react in any detail to the report on relations with the Middle East of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. The most ambiguous Canadian response to a Middle East development was prompted by the revolt which broke out in Gaza and the West Bank in 1987. The Canadian public, like publics everywhere, was shocked by the daily television portrayal of Israeli violence in the suppression of the stone-throwing Palestinian youth, and DE A made vigorous protests through diplomatic channels. In sharp contrast, the prime minister, in a remark indicative of his instinctive approach to Middle East issues, told a c B c interviewer in December 1987 that he considered that the Israelis were handling the situation with "restraint." Subsequently he rejected angrily the suggestion that the Israeli suppression could be compared in any way with that of the South African authorities against their black majority. The dichotomy in the views of DEA and the prime minister was striking and never entirely reconciled, at least in public. Indeed, it was further revealed when Clark addressed the annual meeting of the Canada-Israel Committee in March 1988. Departing dramatically from the usual words of undiluted praise of Israel offered by all political leaders on such occasions, Clark strongly criticized its current measures to restore order, including the manipulation of food supplies.13 Members of the audience replied with loud heckling, a partial walkout, and the singing of the Israeli national anthem. This episode received headline treatment in

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the media. While most of the editorial comment, and 60 per cent of the messages from the public to the government supported Clark's stand, the anger of the Jewish community was intense and prolonged. The prime minister did not publicly repudiate his minister, but by telephone and letters he explained to Canadian Jewish leaders that Clark was speaking only for himself. His office noted that, although it had cleared and muted the Clark speech, the text had not been read by the prime minister. In subsequent weeks Clark took the initiative to speak to Canadian Jewish audiences and stressed repeatedly that Canada's friendship for Israel and its position on the Middle East had not changed and would not change. DEA officials wondered if Clark, by following the dictates of his conscience in the c i c address, had thereby made it more difficult to alter the substance of Canada's policy. As a test of influence on Ottawa decision-making, the outcome of the episode was probably a three-way draw. The government's emergent policy had appeared to take shape with Joe Clark's well-prepared visit to the region, and an ambassadorial speech to the General Assembly, both in 1986. Clark committed Canada to contribute to peace in the region where it could and impressed Middle East governments by repeating, in Israel, Canada's support for a Palestinian homeland within a defined territory,14 the West Bank and Gaza. The General Assembly speech by Canada's ambassador, Stephen Lewis, was the first spelling out of Canada's Middle East policy in that forum for twelve years. It stressed Canada's unilateral initiatives such as its aid package for the West Bank as well as support for West European perspectives on the peace process. Greater depth was also given to Canada's policy by efforts to develop closer relations with important moderates in the Arab world. These augmented Canada's twenty-year links with Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, and the newer relationship with Egypt. The Economic Joint Commission with Saudi Arabia was reactivated, and a new one established with Iraq. In mid-iQSS a call from the United Nations came for Canadian participation in a new peacekeeping force to police the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq. Canada's response was prompt and substantial. There appears to have been no conflict over that decision within the government and the move was endorsed by all parties in Parliament and most editorial opinion. Canada's disposition to support Middle East peacekeeping was fostered by the award of the Nobel peace prize to all United Nations peacekeepers. Many commentators noted that Canada had responded to every such call and supplied more personnel than any other country and that the United Nations peacekeeping function itself had been established on the proposal of Lester Pearson.

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THE CONTRIBUTION OF MULRONEY AND CLARK TO MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Prime Minister Mulroney's instinctive expression of tolerance of Israel's response to the Palestinian revolt was surprising because it ran counter to the apparent trend in his approach towards the Middle East. He had begun his term in office with a very pro-Israeli perspective but, influenced by his officials, had gradually become more conscious of the complexities inherent in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and hence more cautious. He had avoided bold initiatives such as Clark's 1979 attempt to move the Canadian embassy to Jerusalem. Mulroney came to office with little familiarity with foreign affairs, few fixed convictions about them, and little desire to become involved except in relations with the United States and France. His wide connections included leading members of the Jewish Canadian community, but few if any Arab Canadians. Before taking power, he had spoken of Canadian foreign policy focusing on four "friendly" countries - the United states, Britain, France, and Israel. Asked about the absence from that list of any Arab state, he replied that he could easily have added Egypt. The effect of this afterthought was weakened by his repeated references to Israel as an "ally," even after the Arab ambassadors in Ottawa had complained, pointing out that their countries were formally at war with Israel. Mulroney's pro-Israeli views were reinforced by several factors. Among them were the early political support he had received from prominent Jewish Canadians, the pro-Israeli views of leading policy advisers in his office, notably Fred Doucet and Charles McMillan, and his generally pro-American perspective on world affairs. His appointment of Joe Clark as secretary of state for external affairs also seemed to signal a pro-Israeli policy. However, the prime minister's involvement in Middle East issues was sporadic, related to major episodes such as the United States bombing of Libya and the Western response to terrorist acts or forced on him by the high-level visits to Canada which Israel secured within a relatively short time after the Conservatives came to power. Although the prime minister wanted, for both foreign policy and domestic reasons, to see the visiting Israelis, these were not encounters he initiated, not ones which generated profound dialogue or new positions. His goal was merely to say the right things and avoid public mistakes. Over time, however, Mulroney's approach slowly shifted. While his level of knowledge of the Middle East remained insufficient to generate a global view, there were discernible changes in presentation. His briefings for meetings with Israeli visitors and the meetings themselves

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seemed to make him more aware of the immense foreign and domestic sensitivity to any tilt one way or the other in Canada's Middle East policy. As he came to realize that one cannot publicly utter code words to please visiting Israeli guests without suffering political consequences, he moderated his pro-Israeli rhetoric. And increasingly it was briefings by officials, and not his initial pro-Israel impulses, that determined his statements. But, beyond this perception of the costs of taking his strong pro-Israeli views to their logical conclusion, there was no fundamental re-evaluation of the prime minister's basic position. During 1988 his tactical emphasis on caution was reinforced by two developments. The first was Canada's bid for a seat on the United Nations Security Council, which gave added weight to those arguing internally that strongly pro-Israeli statements would hamper the effort to collect the necessary votes from Arab and African countries. The second was the emergence, within the traditionally cohesive Canadian Jewish community, of apparent division between rank and file hardliners and the relatively moderate leadership. The result of the growing divide was reflected in several c i c positions that officials and Mr Clark found uncharacteristic and exasperating. More change is evident in the approach of Joe Clark to Canada's Middle East policy. The Middle East was not his favourite area. Surprisingly, given the Jerusalem embassy initiative of 1979, he came into office as secretary of state for external affairs with a less well developed view of the region and Canada's opportunities there than, for example, he had of the situations in Central America and South Africa. The legacy of his failed initiative on the Canadian embassy, which had been the outgrowth of a genuine sympathy for Israel, was now offset by a desire to show critics he was open-minded and experienced and by the conviction, based on first-hand experience, that the Middle East was a political powder keg. There was also the lesson of Allan MacEachen's visit to Syria in 1983: Clark had watched one of Canada's most experienced and skilled foreign ministers reap, through incautious words, far more criticism at home than credit abroad; MacEachen had suggested that Canada "upgrade its contact" with the P L o and had visited the Syrian side of the Golan Heights.15 Clark's caution was reinforced by his increasingly professional judgment. He saw little scope for a tangible Canadian contribution to the relaxation of tensions in the area. Canada's direct interests, apart from its general concern for regional and global peace, were not great. There had been, in recent years, little action in the international peace process and in any case the United States continued to assert its claim to a dominant role. Clark might have exploited his close relations with the secretary of state, George Shultz, to influence American policies, but he

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chose early on not to "badger" the Americans about the Middle East. It was rarely mentioned in the frequent encounters between Clark and Shultz. Other issues, mostly bilateral ones, provided an ample agenda and, while Canada's position on Palestinian rights was more liberal than the American one, Clark's own views were not sufficiently different from those of Shultz that he wanted to risk precious diplomatic credit in pursuing them. Clark saw little scope for flexibility for Canadian foreign policy in the region and judged that great initiatives and grand gestures were likely to go nowhere. He saw it as one of those areas where, if he could just prevent Canadian foreign policy from blowing up in his face, he would be doing well. Clark's objective has been to run a foreign policy "without eccentricities." Shortly after taking office, at a meeting with all departmental officials at the level of director-general and above, he said that he was aware of suspicions both of his views on foreign policy and of Progressive Conservative stewardship of foreign affairs. He assured his listeners that the embassy issue would not be revived and that the new government would not take any alarming initiatives. He also assured them that he was sufficiently in charge of the government's foreign policy to have his cautious policies prevail. This was reassuring to D E A officials dealing with the Middle East, who quickly got on with the task of acquainting the minister with what the area offered Canada or demanded of it. Given this approach by Mulroney and Clark, the Jewish Canadian community, acting through the Canada-Israel Committee, continued to loom large during the first Mulroney government, even if not quite as large as the response to our survey would indicate. It challenged effectively the conclusions of the Senate report on relations with the Middle East and blocked any further steps to upgrade contacts with the p L o or to support Palestinian self-determination. Canada's voting pattern at the United Nations shifted away from its pro-Israel bias, but was still second only to that of the United States in support of Israel. C i c pressure certainly discouraged any initiatives comparable to Canada's anti-apartheid campaign in southern Africa, or indeed to its Middle East role during the "golden decade" of its postwar diplomacy. On the whole, the cic had become more of a brake impeding a warmer embrace of the DEA perspective than an engine driving Canadian policy. CONCLUSION

The configuration of perspectives within the new Conservative government appeared in 1984 to leave some scope for incremental redirection

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of Canada's Middle East policy. Behind the veil of Prime Minister Mulroney's lack of interest in foreign affairs, and his inclination to leave the Middle East minefield to Joe Clark, lay his instinctive pro-Israeli sentiments and his interest as the leader of a political party in responding to the views of those who would count most in the next election. The DEA professionals remained firmly focused on the international environment, Canada's interests, and the long-term relationship between the two. In between stood the new secretary of state for external affairs, Joe Clark, who as an individual believed that Israel must be defended, as a politician that its supporters in the Canadian Jewish community mattered, and as an ex-prime minister that there were good reasons to listen to what the professionals told him about the Middle East. He was also becoming disenchanted with Israeli attitudes and convinced that Canada would have to be more evenhanded in the Middle East conflict. This study enables us to draw several limited conclusions. One is that a distinctive perspective persists among professional public servants with the duty to guide Canada's diplomacy in the Middle East. While not immune to the popular concern for the suffering of the Jews during the Second World War, and the security of Israel, they have consistently believed that the interests of Canada, and of peace in the region, called for greater recognition of the rights and feelings of the Arabs. Canada's policy has evolved discernibly, if slowly and unevenly, in the direction they favour. While respecting the constitutional pre-eminence of their political masters, and acknowledging the power of a well-organized and determined interest group, they have quietly pressed on. Canada's Middle East policy is still a considerable distance from what most DEA professionals would like, and it is not yet in step with those of almost all of Canada's allies, such as Italy, Britain, and France. But it is more autonomous and balanced than it was a decade ago. NOTES

1 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Policy Planning Secretariat, Canada's Bilateral Relations: Some Key Statistics (various years): figures supplied by the Department of National Defence; and Canada, Department of External Affairs, Canadian Diplomatic Representatives Abroad (1986). 2 The Canada-Israel Committee, established by the major Jewish Canadian organizations, is authorized to speak on Canada-Israel relations for virtually all Jewish Canadians. 3 For an elaboration of this position, see Peyton V. Lyon, "Canada's Middle East Tilt," International Perspectives (September/October 1982).

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4 This approach is illustrated in David B. Dewitt and John Kirton, "Canada and Middle East Realities," International Perspectives (January/February 1984). 5 This is the Canadian International Image Study, whose findings were reported in R.B. Byers, David Ley ton-Brown, and Peyton V. Lyon, "The Canadian International Image Study," International Journal 32 (summer 1977). 6 See, respectively: Peter Dobell, Canada's Search for a New Rote (Toronto: Oxford University Press 1972); David J. Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1985), 137; and Werner Cohn, "English and French Canadian Public Opinion on Jews and Israel: Some Poll Data," Canadian Ethnic Studies, 11, no. 2 (1979), 31-48. 7 Henceforth, when we refer to D E A in this chapter, we mean the members of the Department of External Affairs who possess, or have possessed, responsibility for recommending and implementing Canada's policies towards the Middle East. 8 Our questionnaire was sent to 152 currently serving officers and about 50 retirees. Seven serving officers and 22 retirees responded. The small number of responses from serving officers is attributable to the following telex to all members of the department: 1 Professor Peyton Lyon of Carleton University has circulated questionnaires to Departmental officers seeking their views on a variety of questions related to the Middle East and Canada's policy. 2 Whatever our personal views might be, we are servants of the government and supporters of its policies on the Middle East as on other issues. Accordingly we believe members of Department would be best advised not to respond to questionnaire since results of survey could tend to call into question nature of advice rendered by Department to ministers. Four previous surveys of departmental attitudes on current issues had been tolerated, even encouraged. The different response that this survey evoked indicates the sensitivity of the Middle East in Canadian policy-making. The officials responsible for the directive offered similar explanations for it. These did not refer to Canada's economic or security interests or to any external actor. Rather the first concern expressed was that the Canadian Jewish community would be disturbed by the anticipated results. The second was the impropriety of officials expressing views that might conflict with those of the nation's elected leaders. The 29 returns were qualitatively impressive and consistent with expectations based on about 40 informal interviews over the past decade. We were able to identify 24 of 29 returns. Sixteen were from ex-

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ambassadors, 4 to the United Nations and 3 to Israel; 4 had served as deputy or assistant deputy ministers. Thirteen had served in Arab capitals, Turkey, or Iran; 6 in Israel; 8 in the United Nations; 2 in Ottawa. The average involvement with Middle East affairs was 6V2 years. The seven serving officers who responded despite the departmental edict were not the most critical of policies. The 16 former ambassadors were the most critical. 9 David Dewitt and John Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power (Toronto: John Wiley 1983). 10 Graham Fraser, Bertrand Marcotte, and Patricia Poirier, "Canada Kills Debts of Seven Countries at Quebec Summit/' Toronto Globe and Mail, 3 September 1987, 2. 11 Canada, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on Canada's Relations with the Countries of the Middle East and North Africa (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, June 1985). 12 "Mideast Issues at the 4ist UN General Assembly: Canada's Votes," Canadian Middle East Digest 11 (February 1987), 3. 13 Department of External Affairs, Statement 88/18,10 March 1988. 14 Joe Clark, as cited in "International Canada, April and May 1986," 14 in International Perspectives (July/August 1986). 15 Report on Canada's Relations with the Middle East, 64.

DAVID H. G O L D B E R G AND DAVID T A R A S

Collision Course: Joe Clark, Canadian Jews, and the Pakstinian Uprising

On 9 December 1987, Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip began rioting against Israel's occupation. Beginning with apparent suddenness, the intifada has raged for over a year. More than three hundred Palestinians have been killed, thousands injured, and thousands imprisoned. A boycott of Israeli products, the mass resignation of Arab officials who helped Israel administer the territories, and periodic general strikes have destroyed much of the infrastructure that Israel had erected over a twenty-year period. The cost of occupation which Israel, although not all Israelis, had borne lightly for over twenty years is now being fully paid, a burden of immense psychological and moral as well as economic weight. What David Grossman has called "the yellow wind,"1 the plague of occupation, now casts a pall over Israel's consciousness, over its national character. The uprising has spread to Arabs in East Jerusalem, effectively redividing that ancient city. Arabs within Israel proper have been moved to mass protests and have become "palestinianized." The Arab-Israeli conflict appears to have come full circle, back to its original impetus, a struggle between two national movements over the same small but infinitely precious territory. The heart of the struggle is again between Israel and the Palestinians, with the Arab states, worn by years of conflict and still fearfully watching developments in the Persian Gulf, confined to the sidelines. In Canada the domestic battleground was rife with contention and controversy in response to these events. In fact, the government's reaction to the Palestinian uprising provoked the most dramatic confrontation ever between a secretary of state for external affairs and the Canadian Jewish community. Canadian Arab groups, the Canadian Labour Congress, and the Canadian Council of Churches, among others, all entered the debate over Canada's Middle East policy. The political parties and the government itself seemed divided over the

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proper policy for Canada to pursue. The media's coverage of the uprising became extremely controversial, with Canadian Jews and supporters of Israel claiming (as they had in 1982 during the Lebanon War) that facts were distorted, events lifted out of context, and the media manipulated to present Israeli actions in the worst possible light. This article, written some seven months after the uprising began, chronicles what has taken place in Canada so far: the Mulroney government's first responses to the unrest, the reactions of the Canadian Jewish community and other interested parties, and the changes that have occurred in Canadian public opinion. The controversy surrounding the media's coverage of the uprising will also be discussed. Being in the midst of a continuing drama, our purpose is to pose what we feel are the critical questions. Deeper analysis, distance from events, the historian's ability to probe for detail and context will one day provide a fuller explanation of what took place in the domestic battleground during this crucial period. MULRONEY AND CLARK

The first responses to the Palestinian uprising on the part of the Canadian government stirred confusion and seemed to reflect sharp internal conflict. In a year-end television interview with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (c B c), Prime Minister Brian Mulroney told David Halton that Israel had shown "restraint" in its handling of the uprising. When asked whether the situation in Israel could be compared to the repression in South Africa, Mulroney replied that any such comparison was "false and odious and should never be mentioned in the same breath."2 The prime minister seemed to sympathize with Israel's difficulties and seemed to see the situation from Israel's point of view. Several days later, on 24 December, Marc Brault, an assistant deputy minister in the Department of External Affairs, sent a letter containing a very different message to the Saudi Arabian ambassador. The letter expressed Canada's "profound concern" over Israel's actions in the territories and mentioned that Canada had urged Israel repeatedly to act with restraint.3 Canada's discontent with Israel's handling of the situation was reiterated on several occasions by the secretary of state for external affairs, Joe Clark, in response to questions in the House of Commons. As John Kirton and Peyton Lyon have pointed out, Mulroney and Clark had different views on the Middle East and had come under different influences.4 For Mulroney, whose primary interest was the maintenance of his party's popularity, links to the sizeable and influential Jewish community were important. He obviously wanted to avoid

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taking any position that would offend Jewish voters and financial contributors as he approached an election. Moreover, his view seemed to be that Israel was a democratic and humane society and was among Canada's closest friends. Clark, however, seemed to reflect the sentiments which prevailed within his department, a department sensitive to international pressures and currents of opinion and more open to the Arab perspective on the conflict. These differences have remained evident, although it would appear that Clark was able to secure the principal role in the making of Middle East policy during this period. Clark's position was bolstered by the crescendo of criticism which was directed at Israel in January and February 1988. The argument of its supporters that Israel was acting cautiously and with care to avoid injuries seemed to be refuted by its defence minister's "iron fist" policy, with its heavy-handed show of strength. Israel's policy of beating rioters, imposing mass curfews, and destroying Arab homes, and the rising number of dead and wounded stirred a torrent of unfavourable reaction in Canada. Typical of the sometimes impassioned criticism were remarks by Howard McCurdy, the human rights critic for the New Democratic Party (NDP). McCurdy claimed angrily that "when thousands of people are imprisoned in camps, when even children protesting their oppression as they must fall before lethal ammunition, and when the nations of the world condemn these excesses of the occupying army of Israel, our Prime Minister commends the restraint of the oppressive conqueror."5 Criticism from within the Jewish world was also rife. A particularly vehement attack came from Rabbi Alexander Schindler, the leader of American Reform Judaism, writing to Israel's president, Chaim Herzog: "The indiscriminate beating of Arabs is an offence to the Jewish spirit. It violates every principle of human decency. We plead with you to bring this madness to an end."6 Media commentary was sometimes equally scathing. Keith Spicer, the editorin-chief of the Ottawa Citizen, wrote in his column of 18 February that "the chance we face is an innovative one. It is to shout our horror at Israel's straying into racism and brutality, into blind arrogance and immobilism - and to say this while insisting on our firm attachment to Israel's existence and legitimacy."7 During this period pro-Arab groups mobilized to seize whatever advantages they could. In early January, the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations released a letter criticizing the prime minister's "restraint" statement. The letter had 27 signatures including those of Jack Maybee, a former Canadian ambassador to Egypt, Arthur Blanchette, a former ambassador to Tunisia, and the Conservative member of parliament, Alex Kindy. Led by Kindy, Andrew Witer, and Senator Heath Macquarrie, a rump group within the Conservative

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caucus associated with the Canada-Arab World Parliamentary Association pressed the government to condemn Israel's actions more strongly. Similar groups were active in the Liberal and New Democratic caucuses. Canadian Arab organizations sponsored rallies in Toronto and Montreal, and there was a steady stream of letters to the editor from Arab Canadians. The Ottawa-based Palestine Information Office of the Arab League Information Centre was active in co-ordinating at least some of this activity. On another level, Arab ambassadors met with Clark and other officials to protest the prime minister's "restraint" statement and lobbied for a much tougher Canadian response. In mid-January, Clark called in Israel's ambassador to Ottawa, Israel Gur-Arieh, for what has been described as a tough "dressing down."8 The issues discussed included a claim reported by c B c television news that Israel was withholding food supplies and Israel's announced policy of beating rioters. While Canada did not lodge a formal protest at the time, Clark reportedly had been stern in saying things "that sometimes need to be said between friends."9 Later in the month, the prime minister retreated from his position that Israel was using "restraint." In answering a question about his "restraint" statement before a high school audience in Napanee, Ontario, Mulroney said: "There have been changes on an ongoing basis. The profile is changing. Secretary of State Joe Clark has stated our concern about developments in that area. He said food ought not to be used as a weapon."10 Clearly, the weight of opinion within the government was shifting against Israel. Israel's apparent harsh actions, widespread public criticism and a shifting climate of opinion, and Clark's strong views on the issue were changing the dynamics of Canadian policy-making towards the Middle East. CLARK AND THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The climax came with Clark's address to the annual policy conference of the Canada-Israel Committee (cic) on 10 March 1988. The annual policy conference is the highlight of the cic's year. It is usually an opportunity to renew the lobby's strength and contacts, to rally its troops, and to get the latest messages about Israel's policies through to influential politicians and officials. Over 1,000 parliamentarians, civil servants, and members of the Jewish community attended the c i c dinner on 9 March. Prime Minister Mulroney put in a brief appearance at the reception preceding the dinner, a significant political gesture in the circumstances. The evening's keynote speaker was Israel's ambassador to the United Nations, Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu delivered a stirring defence of Israel's actions in quelling the unrest, arguing that the ultimate blame lay with the Arab states which had refused to

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negotiate with Israel or deal constructively with the Palestinian issue. The impediment to a successful resolution of the conflict, he argued, was the Arabs' unwillingness to accept the right of Israel to live in peace. The conference began the next day with a breakfast address by the NDP leader, Ed Broadbent. Broadbent had come to deliver a tough message. Speaking as a long-time supporter of Israel, he expressed strong disapproval of Israel's actions in the occupied territories, actions that he found morally repugnant. He emphasized, however, that Israel could only be expected to negotiate with those who recognized Israel's right to exist. But he added: "We say the Palestinians have the right to choose their own representatives ... The Palestinians do overwhelmingly seem to want the P[alestine] Liberation] Organization] to be their voice."11 Broadbent characterized the peace mission then being undertaken by the United States secretary of state, George Shultz, as a step in the right direction. Nevertheless he warned his listeners against too great expectations of what impact Canada could have. "We outsiders," he said, "cannot be presumptuous enough to spell out a detailed solution ... But we can encourage a process."12 For many in the audience, Broadbent's harsh criticism of Israel and his endorsement of a role for the PLO were too much. There was some visible anger, but mostly polite and cold displeasure. A lunchtime address by the Liberal leader, John Turner, was greeted quite differently. Turner spoke cautiously, aware that on this issue at least he was walking a thin line. He began by stating that Canada had a long-standing commitment to Israel's security and reiterated his party's formal position that the Palestinians have a right to a "homeland" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Where Turner differed from Broadbent was in his rejection of the PLO as a suitable negotiating partner for Israel. He also managed to side-step the question of Israel's handling of the uprising by dwelling, instead, on the active role that Canada might play as a Middle East peacekeeper and in helping to construct a workable peace plan. Eschewing Broadbent's warning that Canada stay clear of too direct a role, the Liberal leader advocated a more aggressive Canadian involvement in the region. The mood of the conference had changed considerably as a result of Turner's speech. The twenty-minute talk was interrupted by sustained applause and several standing ovations. These were earned, it would appear, less by what Turner said than by what he did not say. The stage was now set for an appearance by Joe Clark, scheduled for the late afternoon. It is critical to note that before Clark's address, many members of the c i c were briefed on, among other issues, the wellpublicized allegations that Israel had prevented food supplies from

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entering the territories. It was pointed out that the CBC now had information refuting its earlier report that Israel was using food supplies as a weapon to quell the unrest. United Nations relief trucks had been stopped and searched for weapons before being allowed to proceed; this had delayed but not prevented the delivery of food supplies. In short, it was suggested that the charges were false and were being used as a ploy to discredit Israel.13 Clark stepped into a highly charged atmosphere. He appeared tense, anticipating, no doubt, that his remarks were likely to provoke a hostile and unpleasant reaction. What seemed to disturb the audience from the outset was Clark's tone. To many, his demeanour was high-handed, pompous, and moralistic; he had come to preach and accuse. The main thrust of Clark's speech was a stinging attack on Israel's record on human rights. According to Clark, violations of human rights were being used by Israel as "deliberate instruments of the so-called 'ironfist' policy, designed to re-establish control by force and by fear."14 The daily violence "tears at our conscience and our hearts as it tests our convictions."15 The litany of abuses included: "The use of live ammunition to restore civilian order, the withholding of food supplies to control and collectively penalize civilian populations, the use of tear gas to intimidate families in their homes, of beatings to maim so as to neutralize youngsters and preempt further demonstrations, have all been witnessed these past months."16 Clark's claim that Israel was deliberately depriving populations in the occupied territories of food was met by boos and cat-calls. As many in the audience had just been briefed on the subject, they believed that Clark was either peddling lies or had his facts wrong. The minister responded to the abusive comments by proclaiming: "I learned long ago that disputing reality won't change reality."17 The meeting was soon disrupted by another claim. Clark described what he viewed as a developing Arab peace camp. As he told the c i c audience: "My discussions with the leaders of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt leave me in no doubt that they genuinely want a just and lasting peace, and to that end are willing to lend their assistance in negotiations."18 His intimation was that Israel was the stumbling-block. To many in the audience this assertion represented a complete about-face in Canadian Middle East policy. A noisy exit by as many as 50 members of an audience numbering approximately 450 began. The accepted logic of most supporters of Israel is that the absolute refusal of all Arab states, except Egypt, to recognize Israel and the PLO'S intractable dedication to a maximalist policy posture are the very foundation of the conflict. To turn the tables - to imply that the Arabs wanted peace and Israel did not - was an outrage for most at the conference.

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Clark also called on the Palestinians to accept Israel and stressed the government's support for a Palestinian "homeland" on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The formula was identical to that suggested earlier in the day by John Turner. Yet, the audience's response to Clark's statement was far more belligerent. Also lost in the commotion overtaking the conference was Clark's suggestion of a government-sponsored dialogue between representatives of the Arab Canadian and the Canadian Jewish communities, to be held under the auspices of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. The meeting seemed about to dissolve in turmoil. After the minister had concluded his remarks, the cic chairman, Sidney Spivak, responded with a harsh rebuttal of Clark's main points.19 In particular, he admonished Clark for making the accusation that food was being systematically denied to occupants of the territories, calling it "a myth that became fact." The c i c chairman also hinted at electoral retaliation: "Israel will have an election ... as will we soon." The comment was greeted by a hearty round of applause. Shocked by what had just taken place, the cic's national executive met in an emergency session. Emerging from its meeting, the c i c demanded that the government issue "a definitive clarification of policy immediately."20 Dorothy Reitman, the president of the Canadian Jewish Congress, called Clark's intimation that Israel was responsible for the continuation of the conflict "grotesque": "It is the refusal of the Arab states to recognize Israel that is the root cause of the conflict ... Mr Clark's inability to perceive the Arab-Israeli conflict within the context of history, rather than relating to isolated incidents, is a serious failure on his part."21 In the wake of Clark's speech a number of theories emerged as to why the minister had been so adamant in confronting the Jewish community directly over Israel's handling of the uprising. One argument is that Clark, having suffered for so long from an image of weakness and indecisiveness, has sought opportunities to display his machismo. Indeed, in the weeks prior to the speech, Clark had taken a number of bold positions: on the American presence in the Canadian Arctic, on the fishing disputes with France off the Newfoundland coast, on economic sanctions against South Africa, and on the activities of Turks and Sikhs in Canada. Later in 1988 he would trade diplomatic expulsions with the Soviet Union over spying activities in Canada with the apparent intent of teaching the Russians a lesson. Perhaps in his own mind the confrontation with the c i c was a chance to settle an old grudge born of the disastrous Jerusalem embassy affair of 1979, in that he was seen by some at that time as having been manipulated by the cic. An old memory, the rankles of the past, could be erased. Another view is that

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this was yet another example of Clark the humbler. He blindly accepted the "facts" presented to him by External Affairs officials who had their own axes to grind against the c i c. He had not fully checked these facts or thought through the ramifications of what he was saying and undoubtedly succeeded in alienating a valuable and influential constituency. Prone to disaster, Clark had, in political terms, fallen on his face again. Still others would argue that Clark's reactions to Israel's handling of the uprising arose from a genuine sense of morality. He was deeply upset by what Israel was doing and felt a responsibility to speak out despite the political consequences. Political and diplomatic objectives may have loomed larger than Clark's personal motivations. Apparently there was concern among Mulroney's advisers that because of the time and energy devoted to negotiating the free trade agreement with the United States, the government was perceived by many people to have a one-dimensional foreign policy. Consequently, Ottawa may have been seeking opportunities to distance itself from the Americans. Strongly criticizing Israel was one way of demonstrating independence without suffering great costs. Another consideration was that Canada was vying for a seat on the United Nations Security Council and needed to curry favour with Arab and Islamic countries. Canada had to prove that its policies were acceptable to those countries lest there be an attempt to block the Canadian candidacy. Others place the decision on the doorstep of officials in the Department of External Affairs. Some officials, it can be argued, had long sought the opportunity to attack what they saw as the government's pro-Israel foreign policy. They were worried about Canada's isolation within the francophone community, in the Commonwealth, and at the United Nations on Middle East issues because of what they saw as Canada's pro-Israel tilt, a tilt brought about to some degree by the c i c's reputed power. This was a much sought after opportunity to trim the c i c's sails. The c i c was seen as a rival in briefing and informing cabinet ministers about the Middle East and as far too influential in the making of Middle East policy. DE A officials thought that Clark's speech would cause dissension and division within the Canadian Jewish community and immobilize the c i c. Another possibility is that Clark used the speech to the c i c to assert his independence from Mulroney and become the key player in Middle East policy-making. There is certainly evidence that Mulroney moved quickly to dissociate himself from Clark's remarks. Reports were leaked to the media, apparently from sources within the Prime Minister's Office ( P M o), that Clark's original draft was even more critical of Israel but that the P MO had intervened to soften Clark's language. The word

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was also put out that some P MO officials were distressed by what had taken place and thought that Clark had made an error in judgment. The prime minister sent a letter to Sidney Spivak which was far more reassuring than Clark's comments had been. While expressing the standard concerns about continued violence in the occupied territories, Mulroney stated: "Canadian policy toward Israel is clear, consistent and unchanged: Israel is our friend. Israel has a right to exist in peace, to be recognized by its neighbors and to be secure. This is an unshakable commitment."22 Whether the old rivalry between Clark and Mulroney had bubbled to the surface over Middle East policy, whether the Tories had not properly co-ordinated their response, or whether there was a broad strategy at work whereby Clark would send out one set of signals and Mulroney another, thus satisfying each of the different constituencies that had to be appealed to, is at this stage difficult to determine. The Mulroney foreign policy has attempted on previous occasions to offer "something for everyone."23 The strategy and motivations behind Clark's speech remain matters of speculation. Following Clark's speech emotions seem to have been reined in. A delegation from the c i c met with the minister to review the situation. While Clark refused to retract any of his statements, the mood was cordial and restrained. The c i c no longer threatened retaliation at the ballot box and there was a sense of "agreeing to disagree." This new cordiality was underscored by an address Clark gave to members of Edmonton's Jewish community on 18 April. While not retreating from his position that Israel was violating human rights, Clark was far less strident. He stated that Canada is "a firm and unyielding friend of Israel," that "Canada will protect, defend and endorse the State of Israel forever."24 The minister also clarified his characterization of Jordan and Saudi Arabia's readiness for peace by observing only that those nations had recently exhibited a "greater openness, a greater willingness to be flexible" than in the past.25 Despite Clark's steadfast adherence to a hard line on Israel's handling of the uprising, the c i c was pleased by the different tone and emphasis of the speech. Robert Willmot, the c i c's executive director, reacted to the speech by saying: 'It's pretty clear the government has made a serious effort to address concerns and has gone a long way towards meeting them."26 Apparently a truce had been reached between Clark and the organized Jewish community. THE MEDIA, PUBLIC OPINION, AND CANADIAN JEWS

Almost every night for months in early 1988, television news reports showed Israeli soldiers firing canisters of tear gas, chasing stone-throw-

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ing children and teenagers, and imposing curfews, and grisly scenes of those who had been severely beaten or shot. The images that flickered across the screen were the reverse of the old image of Israel as a David facing an Arab Goliath. Israel's response to the uprising appeared frenzied and disorganized, brutal and bloody. Newspapers carried the same vivid pictures as did television, with daily descriptions of the outbreaks of violence, the number killed and wounded, and the latest measures taken by Israel to clamp down on the unrest. The media's coverage brought a sharp reaction from the Jewish community. They were condemned for one-sided and superficial reporting, for having been manipulated by the P L o, and for having an obsession with Israel's wrongdoings.27 Perhaps the most scathing criticism was levelled by the historian, Irving Abella, who accused the media of trying "to destroy memory."28 Abella's argument was that most reporters did not mention the historical conditions that led to the unrest: the Arabs' emphatic refusal to deal with or recognize Israel's right to exist, the savagery of anti-Semitism in the Arab world, and the Palestinians' inability to develop "a peace camp" within their ranks. Moreover, the number of Palestinians killed in internecine fighting in Lebanon during the same period was at least equal to the number killed in the occupied territories. Yet, television coverage of fighting between Palestinian factions in Lebanon was virtually non-existent. Public forums on the media's coverage of the uprising were held in the Jewish community, and there were private meetings between Jewish leaders and media managers. Letters to the editor campaigns and efforts to monitor the media's reporting were also launched. For the most part, journalists could not be swayed. Their main defence was that, like it or not, what was being shown was in fact reality. As the CBC'S David Bazay explained to a Jewish audience: "It is patently untrue to say we distort the news. If there are pictures of Israeli soldiers beating Palestinians, it's because that is the reality."29 Toronto Sun reporter/photographer Stuart McCarthy had the same message: "What's happening in Israel is ugly, but the images are factual. What is seen on the nightly news or in pictures is true and I can't apologize for it."30 It was also pointed out that in current news reporting, particularly on television where the average news story is roughly 90 seconds in length and has no more than 150-200 words, there is little room for historical background. The news is, after all, the events of a particular day. The c B c's Middle East correspondent at the time, Don Murray, had a subtler view of the role played by television cameras, as indicated in the following conversation with Peter Mansbridge on CBC'S "Sunday Report" of 31 January 1988.

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M A N S B R I D G E Don, in your report tonight, you used the phrase "daily ritual between the Israelis and the Palestinians." I'm wondering how much a part of that daily ritual are we in the media. M U R R A Y Well, increasingly, I think we in the media are becoming part of the ritual. That's not to say that what has happened, for example in the last two days, isn't a genuine and very bitter confrontation. But in previous days, it was becoming quite remarkable to see five and six television cameras and half a dozen photographers trailing around after an Israeli patrol waiting for something to happen, and in fact willing things to happen because Palestinians would gather and a demonstration would form almost for the cameras. And this has become something that's become more evident in the last two weeks. M A N S B R I D G E Well, I realize and I think we all realize that the confrontation there is serious, but what you say raises the question of would the rioting be going on if we weren't there? MURRAY Well, I think the answer is yes, it would be happening. Now whether it would be happening in as many places in the same manner seven or eight weeks after it started is a question. Certainly today when we were following soldiers around in the Gaza, as soon as people saw us, they began to gather. And it was clear that several of the soldiers were quite upset and indeed angry at our presence, even if it had been cleared ... with the army because they said look, those people down the street, those kids throwing stones, they're doing it because you're with us. M A N S B R I D G E Well, some might say hearing you say that, that the army's right in not letting us in. M U R R A Y Well, I think that the Israelis finally are trying to win the media war themselves... It took them seven weeks to even get around to doing that and organizing themselves for six to seven hundred journalists and camera people here. They seemed to be sleep walking for six weeks. Now that they're getting around to telling their side of the stories, even their soldiers are beginning to get a little upset because they feel that in some cases it's counterproductive. The cameras and the reporters are creating the story themselves. For Canadian Jews the most disturbing episode involving the media was probably the editorials which appeared on 12 March in the Toronto Star and La Presse. Commenting on Joe Clark's address to the c i c, both editorials raised the spectre that Canadian Jews had a dual loyalty. This produced deep anger. La Presse's editorial, written by Guy Cormier, asked: "que les membres en regie du comite Canada-Israel penseront a Israel quand ils votent au Canada? Est-ce qu'on peut avoir deux patries et une double loyaute? II est vrai que les cardinaux de la sainte

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Eglise sont citoyens du Vatican. Mais cette qualite ne les entraine pas a trahir leur patrie charnelle." The Star's editorial stated: "Clark's remarks may have cost his party votes in the next federal election. But his message was a timely one. It was also a necessary reminder to members of the Jewish community in Canada that they are citizens of Canada, not Israel." B'nai Brith, which took the lead within the Jewish community on this issue, held a news conference to denounce the Star's editorial in particular. Ralph Snow, the B'nai Brith president, stated that the "canard" of dual loyalty had been "a common thread of anti-Semitism throughout the years" and that the editorial was "offensive, not only to the Jewish community but to all ethnic minorities in Canada." In a letter to La Presse, B'nai Brith officers Marilyn Wainberg and Ted Greenfield wrote: "Les membres de B'nai Brith Canada se sentent profond£ment cheques par les allusions de M. Cormier a la trahison.' Bien de membres de la Communaute Juive Canadienne ont donne leur vie dans plusieurs guerres pour leur 'patrie charnelle': le Canada."31 The Star was quick to clarify its position. During a meeting with B'nai Brith representatives, the editorial page editor at the time, John Honderich, said that there had never been any intention to question the loyalty of the Jewish community and that the Star would consider opportunities to rectify the situation. Still the charges had opened old wounds. As historian Harold Troper pointed out: "Canadian ethnic groups remain particularly vulnerable to the disloyalty charge. Can one imagine those lobbying against free trade being smeared as disloyal? Would the Star feel it necessary to remind pro-life or pro-choice groups that they are Canadian? Obviously not. Why then is it necessary for ethnic communities to be subject to this form of abuse when exercising their rights as Canadians?"32 One question haunting the Jewish community was whether Israel's actions and the widespread media coverage they had received was changing the attitudes of Canadians towards Israel. A survey conducted after Clark's c i c speech by the Environics Research Group for the Globe and Mail found that 53 per cent of respondents disapproved of Israel's handling of the uprising. Only 23 per cent characterized themselves as pro-Israel as against 14 per cent who described themselves as pro-Arab. A majority of those polled had no preference for either side.33 Another poll, taken by Angus Reid in the wake of Clark's speech and commissioned by Southam News, found that 20 per cent of those sampled blamed Israel alone for the increased tensions, 20 per cent put the onus on the Palestinians, while 24 per cent blamed both sides. Most of those expressing an opinion believed that the media's coverage had been fair and so had Clark's criticism of Israel.34 This would seem to

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suggest that the percentage of those sympathetic to Israel had not changed in any dramatic way. In 1958 only 14 per cent of respondents to a similar question were sympathetic with Israel; in 1969 the figure had risen to 26 per cent; and in 1974 it was 30 per cent.35 Pro-Israel sentiments plummeted to 19 per cent during the 1982 Lebanon War.36 The percentage favouring the Arab cause never exceeded 10 per cent from 1956 to 1974;37 during the Lebanon War, however, 15 per cent described themselves as pro-Arab.38 What has shifted are the positions taken on the Arab-Israeli dispute by several important groups in Canadian society. The Canadian Labour Congress passed a resolution in May 1988 which strongly criticized Israel for "senseless and brutal violence" and called on the FLO to represent the Palestinians at an international conference.39 The Canadian Council of Churches, which represents 16 churches including the Roman Catholic Church and the main Protestant denominations, issued a statement which seemed to take a pro-Arab slant. The PLO was to be brought into the negotiations, Israel was to withdraw from all of the territory occupied in 1967 including East Jerusalem, and a sovereign Palestinian state was to be established. In addition, Israel was rebuked for having inflicted suffering on the Christian Arabs in the occupied territories. One churchman denounced the statement for not mentioning Israel "in any favourable light"40 and Jews were suspicious that the real objective was to transform Israel into a "mini-state" incapable of securing its defence and without its most precious religious shrines and symbols. THE ISSUE OF DISSENT WITHIN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

Since the establishment of Israel forty years ago, support for Israel's well-being has been one of the cornerstones of Canadian Jewish life and criticism of Israeli policy within the community has been rare. While moral dilemmas are not new - the memoirs of Yitzhak Rabin, for instance, describe the harsh moral climate of the War of Independence and the cruel choices that were made - it was the ascendancy of Menachem Begin to Israel's prime ministership in 1977 that opened the gates for wider criticism of Israel among North American Jews.41 Begin's policy of West Bank settlement and Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 aroused considerable anxiety and substantial criticism and disagreement among Canadian Jews. Nonetheless, during times of crisis, the Canadian Jewish leadership has always held firm and presented what appeared to be a united front. This became more difficult with the Palestinian uprising, whose events were a severe shock to Canadian

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Jewish perceptions of Israel. Many Canadian Jews felt that Israeli society was changing and that Israel was now threatened by its own policies. Although the president of the Canadian Jewish Congress claimed that "the support for Israel is as strong as ever within the Jewish community," there was vocal disagreement with Israel's policies from leading Canadian Jews.42 Gunther Plaut, the dean of Canada's Reform rabbinate, advocated an international conference, arguing that "the continuation of the status quo is intolerable for the Arabs ... and the Israelis."43 The president of the World Jewish Congress, Canada's Edgar Bronfman, proposed that Israel withdraw unilaterally from the West Bank and Gaza Strip: 'Israel could just walk out, and say 'we didn't put the Palestinians in the camps, you take care of your Arab brothers/ " Three months' notice could be given. In reality, according to Bronfman, the territories were not essential to Israel's security nor were they part of Eretz Israel. Canadian Friends of Peace Now, a marginal group within the wider Jewish community, called on Israel to pull out of the major Arab population centres as a first step. The position of the critics was that by their silence, the Jews of the diaspora were intervening in Israeli politics - on the wrong side. It was time to help right the political balance within Israel. One effect of Clark's speech and of the Toronto Star and La Presse editorials was to rally the community behind a united front and its established leaders. The three major organizations - B'nai Brith, the Canadian Jewish Congress, and the Canadian Zionist Federation remained staunch defenders of Israel's policies. There was also a significant amount of "cheerleading" from the Israeli embassy. Israeli officials urged the community to hold back on its criticism, arguing that Israel was in a vulnerable situation and that open dissent at this particular time would have a negative effect.45 Frank Dimant, the executive vicepresident of B'nai Brith, went even further, contending: "It is unfair for Canadians to pontificate to Israelis about what they should do. We don't send our children to the frontline and we don't suffer the consequences of a bad decision."46 Alan Rose, Dimant's counterpart at the Canadian Jewish Congress, also took the view that "it is not our job to criticize Israel."47 CONCLUSION

The Canadian government's response to the first months of the Palestinian uprising leaves a number of questions unanswered. One might even ask whether the government has been able to fashion a consistent or even a discernible position. Mulroney and Clark seemed to deliver

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quite different messages or at least chose to emphasize different aspects of the same policy. It may be that the government is a house divided over Middle East issues. Its policy certainly seems mired in contradictions. It proclaims its devotion to Israel's sovereignty and security yet advocates a Palestinian homeland on the West Bank and Gaza Strip and refuses to recognize Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem. The government is also pressing for negotiation but only among parties that recognize each other, a rather meaningless position given the impasse on this very point that has existed for over forty years. The rhetoric promotes initiatives for peace yet Canada has not chosen an activist role comparable to that which it played in the period from 1947 to 1967. The most difficult questions are about the domestic political environment and its influence on the making of foreign policy. The exact roles played by interested parties during the Palestinian uprising are still shrouded in some mystery. On the surface it would appear that the Department of External Affairs is at a high-water mark in its control of Middle East policy. Clark's speech to the c i c can be seen as a clear triumph for the department in the policy-making process. What Clark's personal motivations were in seeking an open conflict with the proIsrael lobby remains an intriguing question. Some will see him as a courageous truth teller while to others he appears prone to error and easily manipulated. The c i c's influence would seem to be at its lowest ebb. It was publicly battered by Clark, pro-Israel sympathies among the Canadian public remain low, and it was unable to counterattack effectively. Of course, the c i c could do little to alter the situation in the Middle East which was the root cause of such widespread Canadian dissatisfaction with Israel. It had to play with the cards it was dealt. Canadian Arab groups, while in the mix of events, seemed to be quite marginal, even though their general position had triumphed to some degree in Ottawa. Of all of the influences on government policy the most persuasive may have been the media's reporting. The power of television, in particular, to communicate not only information but a sense of experience, of being a witness to events, is unquestioned. It may be that media coverage created the stage on which everything else took place; that the media set the agenda. The only certainty is that turbulent times are ahead for the domestic battleground. Each of the major actors will face some internal disagreements and remains on a collision course with other groups. Each is mobilized to lobby effectively, both behind the scenes and in the media. Emotions, as always, remain high. There is little danger in predicting that the battle over Canada's Middle East policy is far from settled.

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1 David Grossman, The Yellow Wind (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux 1988). 2 CBC television transcript, 21 December 1987. 3 "Comments by PM Reflection of Policy, Arab Envoys Told," Toronto Globe and Mail, 24 December 1987, A9. 4 John Kirton and Peyton Lyon, "Perceptions of the Middle East in the Department of External Affairs and Mulroney's Policy, 1984-1988," in this volume. 5 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 19 January 1988. 6 " 'Ugly Beatings' Dismay Diaspora," Montreal Gazette, 30 January 1988, B6.

7 Keith Spicer, "Time to Re-Think Israel's Position," Calgary Herald, 18 February 1988. 8 "Clark Accuses Israelis of Abusing Rights," Toronto Star, 22 January 1988, A5. 9 Ibid. 10 Val Sears, "PM Softens his Support for Israel," Toronto Star, 23 January 1988, AI, A4. 11 Personal transcript recorded by David Goldberg; ibid., 20 March 1988, B512 Ibid. 13 Personal transcript by Goldberg; confidential interviews with conference participants. 14 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements 88/18,10 March 1988, 3. 15 Ibid., 2. 16 Ibid., 3. 17 Personal transcript by Goldberg. 18 Statements 88/18, 4. 19 David Lazarus, "Clark Speech Shocks Jewish Community," Canadian Jewish News, 17 March 1988, i. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 "Mulroney: Canadian Policy Clear, Israel Is Our Friend," Toronto Star, 25 March 1988, A22. 23 David Taras, "Brian Mulroney's Foreign Policy: Something For Everyone," Round Tabk, no. 295 (July 1985): 35-46. 24 "Clark Tells Jewish Leaders of Canadian Commitment," Toronto Globe and Mail, 20 April 1988, AH. 25 David Lazarus, "Clark Remarks Please cic," Canadian Jewish News, 28 April 1988,15.

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26 Ibid. 27 See J.B. Salsberg, "Daily Gaza Performances Fool International Media," Canadian Jewish News, 21 January 1988,11; Ancil Kashetsky, "CIC Official Calls for Accuracy, Depth in Media," Canadian Jewish News, 28 January 1988, 20; W. Gunther Plaut, "What is Behind our Fascination with Israeli Unrest?" Globe and Mail, 19 February 1988, A7; Moura Wolpert, "Dimant Accuses Media of Playing Divisive Game," Canadian Jewish News, 25 February 1988, 27; Ben Rose, "Press Coverage of Riots Unfair, Abileah States," Canadian Jewish News, 10 March 1988,19; Sally Zerker, "Voluminous Coverage Shows Obsessiveness with Israel," Canadian Jewish News, 26 May 1988,12. 28 Address to the Calgary Jewish Community, 28 January 1988. 29 Ancil Kashetsky, "Media Coverage of Gaza Disturbances Attacked," Canadian Jewish News, 4 February 1988, 22. 30 Ibid. 31 B'nai Brith Canada, Institute for International and Governmental Affairs, Comment, special edition (April 1988). 32 Ibid, (spring 1988): 3. 33 Michael Adams and Donna Dasko, "Poll on Israel Finds Policy Unpopular," Globe and Mail, 30 March 1988, AI. 34 Jonathan Manthorpe, "Majority Backs Clark's Line on Israel," Calgary Herald, 2 April 1988, AI. 35 "Middle East Turmoil Hasn't Touched Canadians Much," Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, 20 August 1969; "44 Percent of Americans Sympathize with Israel," Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, 23 February 1974. 36 Baha Abu-Laban, "Arab-Canadians and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," Arab Studies Quarterly, 10 (winter 1988): 119-21. 37 CIPO, 20 August 1969; CIPO, 23 February 1974. 38 Abu-Laban, "Arab-Canadians and the Arab-Israeli Conflict." 39 David Ferman, "CLC Paper Criticizes Israel," Canadian Jewish News, 19 May 1988,12. 40 Janice Arnold, "Churches Hit Out at Israel," ibid., 19 May 1988,16. 41 David Shipler, Arab and Jew: Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land (New York: Penguin 1987), chap. i. 42 " 'Ugly Beatings' Dismay Diaspora," B6. 43 Ibid. 44 Janice Arnold, "Bronfman Sees Autonomous W. Bank, Israel Link," Canadian Jewish News, 5 May 1988, 3. 45 Janice Arnold, "Hold Back on Criticizing," ibid., 4 February 1988, 3. 46 Wolpert, "Dimant Accuses Media of Playing Divisive Game," 27. 47 Sherri Aikenhead et al, "A Community's Torment," Maclean's 101 (4 April 1988), 13-14.

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PART THREE

The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Canadian Role

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IRVING ABELLA AND JOHN SIGLER

Canada and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Discussion with Irving Abella and John Sigler TA R A s What are Canada's interests in the Middle East? How important are these interests in the larger scheme of Canadian foreign policy? A B E L L A As Henry Kissinger put it: "There are interests and there are interests." Over the past decade, Canada's primary interest has been economic - and it seems from all the position papers and statements emerging from the Department of External Affairs that it will remain that way for the foreseeable future. Since the early 19705, the Middle East has been increasingly viewed by foreign policy makers as an area of vast economic opportunity, not only as a source of capital for investment in Canada but, more importantly, as a focus for the export of Canadian goods and services. In an era of rapidly changing, highly competitive patterns of international trade, the importance for Canada of access to and exploitation of the Middle East market assumes increasing importance. A second category of interests arises out of Canada's geographical position and our shared comity of concerns with other nations to whom we are allied, if not by treaty, then by political system. Notwithstanding Canada's oft-repeated resolve to steer an independent course in foreign policy, it will never veer too far from the Western alliance. Given the strategic significance of the Middle East, specifically the Gulf region, to the economies of the West, ensuring geopolitical stability in the region is a major Western concern. These concerns of trade/economics and of alliance are, therefore, vital in the larger scheme of Canada's foreign policy. In the last decade we have witnessed a change in emphasis from allianceoriented policy. This is as true of general global foreign policy as it is of specifically Middle East foreign policy. The result has been a shift

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from what scholars have termed enlightened liberal internationalism to unilateralism. On 22 January 1981, the secretary of state for external affairs formally introduced the concept of bilateralism by saying that the government had decided to concentrate its attention on a select number of countries as a basic instrument of its global foreign policy. The oil states of the Middle East were specifically mentioned by the minister as countries with which bilateral partnerships were desired. The third interest Canada has in the Middle East - and one that is not nearly as important as the other two, but should be - is a moral one. Israel is a democracy, the only one in the area. There are so few democratic nations in the world that we have a moral obligation to support those that exist, especially one whose values - liberty, justice, equality - we share. Obviously this does not mean underwriting all the policies of that government, but it does mean total support if the survival of that democracy is in question. Indeed, it is in our interest to encourage other nations in the area to become more democratic. So far, none have. s r G L E R Your question reflects the main tenet of the realist school national interest as the prime determinant of foreign policy. Certainly in terms of that language of core foreign policy interests, which are the protection of territory and national sovereignty, Canada has not historically considered the Middle East as central. In an age in which our fates are tightly linked to the overriding importance of avoiding global nuclear war, the Middle East is, however, of central importance. Many analysts believe that the greatest risk of nuclear war lies in the danger of a regional conflict escalating to a confrontation between the superpowers themselves which they may not be able to manage. The situation in the Middle East is similar in many ways to that of the Balkans in 1914 where the great powers were forced to war by their failure to manage successfully the confrontation of their client-states. By concentrating all of our defence interests on our commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the defence of the North American continent, we may be ignoring our responsibility to try to reduce tensions in the Middle East and thus lower the risks of another dangerous superpower confrontation in the world's most volatile region. Our geographic position in North America has prevented us from seeing the tight linkages which now exist on our interdependent planet, and there are voices abroad again who argue that we can defend ourselves against the danger by retreating to Fortress North America. The problem is all the more difficult because the United States has assumed, not without controversy, the responsibility for

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managing the Arab-Israeli conflict, and there are many in Europe and in Canada who question whether the American experience in the Middle East to date gives us much confidence in their maturity or wisdom. Irving argues, I think correctly, that Canadian foreign policy in the 'seventies moved away from its previous concern with helping to find a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict to a narrower concern with the economic opportunities for trade and investment, particularly after the oil embargo and rapid price increases of the mid-'seventies transferred vast amounts of wealth to the Middle East oil-producing states. An additional incentive for seeking to diversify our trade and investment toward the Middle East arose from our vulnerability because the preponderance of our trade and investment lay with the United States. Trade with the Middle East in services did become very important for Canadian engineering and construction firms, particularly those based in Quebec. Growth rates of some 300 to 400 per cent in trade with the Middle East occurred in the late 'seventies, but we are still talking about a small segment of Canada's overall trade and investment in which the Pacific Rim now looms much larger as an alternative than the Middle East. The Middle East is no longer seen as the great dynamic growth area because of the world oil glut and greatly reduced Arab expenditures on trade and internal development. It still contains the bulk of the world's known petroleum reserves, however, and with global economic recovery, its share in global production is again likely to increase. That is a prospect for the 19905, however. Irving raises the importance of moral considerations in Canada's concern with the Middle East. That does not figure prominently on the realist agenda for understanding foreign policy interests, but I share that concern. His primary emphasis is on the moral obligation to support Israel as a democratic state, although he recognizes that does not mean support for policies of Israel which we regard as inconsistent with our values. How a state treats its own minorities is a critical element in judging the effectiveness of its democratic practices, and here Israeli practices towards its own Arab minority as well as the Palestinian population in the occupied territories have aroused increasing concern among civil rights organizations in Israel and abroad. Certainly humanitarian and value questions lay at the core of the early Canadian diplomatic role in helping to establish the state of Israel in 1947-8. The plight of the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust and the need for resettlement of that refugee population thrust the Middle East onto the Canadian diplomatic agenda in the immediate postwar period. We failed to realize, however, despite the prescient

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warnings of Elizabeth MacCallum, the Department of External Affairs expert, that our efforts to solve one refugee problem at the expense of the indigenous Palestinian population would involve us in a severe moral dilemma which would poison the politics of the region for a very long time. We were of course committed to making the United Nations work effectively as the major instrument for the protection of international peace and security, yet we saddled it at its birth with a major responsibility for helping to create the postwar world's most persistent trouble-spot. Canadian statesmen and academic analysts are constantly reminding us that it is in the national interest of Canada to be internationalist. This is not because we are do-gooders at heart (the United States secretary of state, Dean Acheson, once called Canada "the stern daughter of the voice of God"), but because our security ultimately depends upon an effectively functioning international community. Canadians have always been concerned about not being lost in Fortress North America or always being the junior partner of the United States. It is in the Canadian national interest to move as broadly as possible on the international stage because we are heavily involved in international trade and have a strong interest in the security of international relationships which can be deeply affected by military disruptions. We erroneously believed for a moment after the 1973 Middle East war and oil boycott that we would come out on top because of our greater energy autonomy and the greater premium put on trade and investment in a politically stable area such as Canada. It was an illusion; the world recession that accompanied the oil price rise cost us more because of the general reduction in international trade that followed. So conflict in such an important strategic area as the Middle East affects Canadian economic security as well as threatening escalation to general war. If we are to promote our trading interests, we must also promote the expectation that we have international institutions and effective diplomacy that will ensure that conflict can be managed without resort to war. The Middle East remains a critical test case. There have been some modest successes in great-power diplomacy, in the use of the United Nations Security Council after the wars of 1967 and 1973, and in international peacekeeping efforts in which Canada has played an important and widely respected role. But the underlying grievances remain, and it will require the efforts of the whole international community to help the Middle East actors escape the tragedies which have engulfed them. T A R A s Has Canada's basic position on the Arab-Israeli conflict been one of continuity or has it altered course as a result of events,

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changing circumstances, or the different attitudes of policy-makers? If so, how has policy changed and when were the decisive turning points? A B E L L A Regarding the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish nation, within secure internationally recognized boundaries, there has been no change in Canada's basic position. However, there has been change over the past two decades on the matter of the Palestinians. Between 1948 and 1967, Canada regarded the Palestinians as a refugee problem. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency was seen as the chief instrument for the resolution of their plight which was viewed as essentially one of compensation and relocation. After the Six-Day War, Canadian policy-makers slowly came to conceive of the Palestinians as a viable, independent political community. Security Council resolution 242, endorsed by Canada, dealt with the Palestinians as refugees. In this regard, the resolution can be said to reflect accurately international perception and parlance of the issue at the time. The perception and the language of the issue was to change from that point forward. By 1974, Canadian views had changed considerably, primarily as a result of the political and economic fallout of the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Canadian policy reformulation seemed to be in step with similar changes in Europe, Africa, and Latin America. In 1974 the secretary of state for external affairs, while reaffirming general support for Security Council resolution 242, stated: 'Any enduring peaceful settlement ... must take account of the legitimate concerns of the Palestinians." From that time forward, Canadian policy consistently called for the fulfilment of the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinians. The Stanfield report of 1980 advocated support of the "Palestinian" right to a "homeland." Subsequently, the secretary of state for external affairs stated that the 'legitimate" rights and concerns of the Palestinians had to be realized. In the fall of 1982, after the Israeli incursion into Lebanon, Pierre De Bane, then minister of state for external affairs, called for Palestinian "self expression within the territorial framework ... and a homeland within a clearly defined territory, the West Bank and Gaza" In the latter formulation the Canadian government, it seems to me, has come perilously close to accepting the political lexicon, if not the agenda, of the Palestinian side of the dispute. The Camp David Accords, to which both Canada and Israel subscribe, calls only for negotiations to recognize the 'legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" and to allow them to "participate in the determination of their own future." It is clear that, to some extent, Canada has pre-

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judged the outcome of these negotiations and has publicly stated what the results of the bargaining should be even before it has begun. The invasion of Lebanon also was a source of tension between the governments of Canada and Israel. Prime Minister Trudeau was amongst the first Western leaders to condemn the invasion and call for unilateral, unconditional Israeli withdrawal. That he did not also call for the withdrawal of the troops of Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization ( P L o) incensed Israeli authorities who were already smarting from a series of letters they had earlier received from the prime minister calling for greater Israeli flexibility. Some Israeli officials felt that the Canadian prime minister had no business interfering in Israel's internal affairs. When Prime Minister Begin said as much in a strong letter of response, according to cabinet sources, Trudeau was angered. It was then that Israeli-Canadian relations hit rock bottom. That is until Joe Clark's provocative speech before the CanadaIsrael Committee in March 1988. His attack on the policies of a friendly government, the state of Israel, for its behaviour in trying to deal with the Palestinian uprising, surprised many - but it should not have. It has been an open secret in Ottawa for years that key officials in the Department of External Affairs have for some time been trying to change the orientation of Canada's Middle East policy - for want of a better description, they have been trying to Europeanize it, so that Canada behaves and votes at international meetings more like the Europeans than the Americans. They want Canada to side more often with the Arab position, to be more vocal in its criticisms of Israel, and to enhance relations with the Muslim world. And, of course, these experts argue that Canada has much to gain from such a shift. After all, they can count. In the United Nations, Israel controls a voting bloc of i; the Muslim nations and their allies have a bloc of anywhere from 40 to 80. And certainly as our foreign policy becomes more trade-oriented, the potential Arab markets for Canadian goods loom large in the eyes of many of our senior officials. Finally, with the achievement of free trade, the primary item on our foreign policy agenda was to win election to the Security Council of the United Nations. Criticizing Israel may have helped us to achieve this goal. Canadian politicians, reacting to public opinion and, for some, their own visceral feelings, have for the most part resisted the advice of this group. But that resistance has now, it seems, weakened. There is an alliance at work between the "pragmatists" in External Affairs, as they call themselves, and some parliamentarians to force a change. With the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories and espe-

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daily the saturation media coverage of it, they sensed a shift in the public's perception of Israel and wished to capitalize on it. They argued that Canadian public opinion is no longer on the side of Israel and that, indeed, the Jewish community itself is split. Now was the perfect moment to act - to make our policy more "even-handed." Joe Clark's speech was a symbolic step in that direction, s i G L E R The emphasis in Canadian policy is on continuity. There have been certain dramatic incidents which have been the subject of much writing and discussion on Canadian foreign policy. There are good stories in these incidents, but I think that if you were to take a historical view, you would have to argue that there has been substantial continuity in Canadian foreign policy on the Middle East since the Second World War. The major deviation from this, of course, was the attempt of the Clark government in 1979 to show closer ties with Israel by the decision to move the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. However, I would argue that on that decision, the followthrough came more from a mistaken wish by a new and inexperienced government to assert authority over the bureaucracy than from the substantive merits of the question. The election campaign of 1979 may have been the original motivation, but, after all, the Americans have made many statements during election campaigns about moving their embassy, but have never followed through. In fact, if you talked to the Arab embassies at the time, they assumed that the Clark promise was similar to the Democratic platform in the United States, simply a pious election wish that wouldn't be acted upon. The difference came when Mr Clark chose to make this a decisive question of showing the mandarins of External Affairs that he was in charge. It was not something that was pressed upon him by the electorate, certainly not even by the Jewish community in this country, and it took on a life of its own. His aides thought that it was a good election device and there is some evidence that Mr Clark himself feels considerable sympathy for Israel. But having said all those things, the real motivation for pressing through so vigorously on it came, I think, on Mr Clark's assertion in the opening week of his government that he was going to show the mandarins that he was in charge, and he happened to choose this issue. He could have chosen another one. Canadian diplomats took a rather dim view of the feasibility or desirability of that particular move and, of course, that's the way things subsequently came out. A second exception to this continuity might be the period since the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and, more particularly, since the Palestinian uprising began in December 1987. The Canadian government, along with the international community generally, has certainly

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sharpened its criticism of Israeli policies, particularly on what is seen as the excessive use of force against a civilian population. TAR AS How would you respond to Irving's point that while it is true that Canada's policy vis-a-vis Israel has had a lot of continuity, our attitude towards the Palestinian question has shifted? S I G L E R No question. That's a good point. Certainly the argument that the Palestinians are a key element in any lasting solution to the problem was not something that Canada emphasized earlier. I think we have to note, in all fairness, that the United States position changed at about the same time. It was, after all, Jimmy Carter who first raised the homeland question, and subsequently the homeland concept became a part of a restatement of Canadian policy. Again, I don't think that the reason was simply to go along with the Americans. I think the same factors that influenced the reorientation of American thinking was becoming clear to Canadian diplomats and to the government as well. Canada's present position on the Palestinians is somewhat different from the American position, and that's because we didn't have to negotiate in 1975, as Mr Kissinger did, a second withdrawal agreement from the Sinai, in which he put in a secret protocol that the United States would not negotiate with or recognize the FLO. The Canadian position has been closer to the European one. The level of contact with the p L o has always been restricted, but Canadian diplomats have dealt with and talked to the P L o, whether in international settings or in Beirut and Tunis. You'll find that that's true for the p L o representative in the diplomatic community here in Ottawa. The level at which people will meet with him is very carefully controlled. He does have regular meetings with lower level officials in the Department of External Affairs. But that corresponds to a Canadian government position that ultimately the Palestinians are going to have to be involved in any resolution of the Middle East question, and we have not quarrelled as much as the Americans have with the idea that the PLO has to be represented. You can see that in various government statements over time. It's in the Stanfield report, probably more than any other Western government document. Even though the Venice meeting of European Community foreign ministers in June 1980 was very strong on the Palestinian question, it was very reserved on the PLO question. In his report, which was the outcome of the earlier Clark decision on the embassy affair, Mr Stanfield suggested, based on his interviews - and he did interview senior PLO officials - that a judgment about the

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p L o's being good or bad was a different question from whether we should acknowledge that most people in the region accepted the fact that the PLO represented the Palestinians. Stanfield made recommendations that really haven't been very effectively acted on. Canada has not wanted to be, it seems to me, out in front of everyone else on this question. But it certainly doesn't want to be last either. A B E L L A Frankly, I think, both the Stanfield Report and the 1985 Report on Canada's relations with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa by the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs are wrongheaded and naive on their approach to the PLO. So long as it publicly and officially calls for the obliteration of a state with which we have close relations, Israel, and for its replacement with a new state - as it does in its charter which has never been amended -1 see no rationale for either recognizing that organization or maintaining relations with it. Many governments throughout the world have recognized the PLO without causing it to moderate its objectives. It still calls for the destruction of the state of Israel, and it still undertakes - or at least underwrites - terrorist activity. No purpose can be served, I think, by enhancing the prestige of Yasir Arafat and the PLO unless we demand - and receive - something in return, that is, a change in its policy. In addition, the Western world, by recognizing the P L o as the official voice of the Palestinians, makes it very difficult for another perhaps more legitimate - and more moderate - voice to emerge in the West Bank and Gaza. God knows it is difficult enough as it is, between PLO assassination squads and the Israeli military government, for such a leadership to step forward. TAR AS Have there been significant differences in the approaches of Canada's major political parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict? A B E L L A There have been no significant differences amongst the parties. All subscribe to the same fundamental approach, though they may differ in tone or nuance. The three major Canadian parties are committed to Israel's right to exist behind secure and recognized borders, and all accept Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 as the starting point for a peace settlement. They also all believe in the need for direct negotiations between the parties to the conflict, though they may differ as to when these face-to-face talks should take place at the beginning or at the end of negotiations. Finally, all accept the need for a Palestinian homeland, the nature of which should be negotiated by the parties involved.

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Historically, the New Democratic Party ( N D P) has been the most supportive of the Israeli cause, largely because of its close relationship to Israel's Labour party, and to the Histadrut, the Israeli trade union movement, but as the Left worldwide has turned away from Israel over the past decade, elements of the NDP have urged a more pro-Arab policy on the party. As well, small groups within the other two parties have also tried to persuade their colleagues to adopt a more pro-Arab line. They have met with little success - so far. S I G L E R The differences within the parties are far more important than any differences between them and that is also true in the United States. You can see this in the amount of support for the Canada-Arab World Parliamentary Group which is broadly based in the three parties. One major exception to what I've said is that the N D P, at least in my view, has been more pro-Israeli. My argument with respect to the Conservatives and the Liberals is that there are more differences within each of those parties than between them. The reason for the NDP position, I suspect, is heavily conditioned, as Irving mentioned, by the shared membership of the NDP with the Israeli Labour party in the Socialist International. There has been a long-term set of contacts at the party level transnationally. The N D P has had a personal knowledge of, and direct access to and contact with, the leaders of the Israeli Labour party. That would certainly not be true of the other two parties. Israeli policies have come under strong criticism from European socialist parties for the repression of the Palestinian uprising, however, and the new debate within the Socialist International on Israeli policies, which are no longer predominantly those of the Labour party since the triumph of the Likud coalition in 1977, has had a clear effect in moving the NDP toward more criticism of Israeli policies and more concern with Palestinian rights. TAR AS Is there a sociology to these internal party divisions? I'm referring particularly to differences in perspective among francophone and anglophone MPS. S I G L E R Quebec opinion certainly stands out in North America for having a more divided view on the Middle East. It is usually represented as being pro-Arab, but that's not really what it is. Except for a brief period after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Quebec opinion remains more favourable to the Israelis than the Arabs. But the proportions are much closer to even than in any other part of the North American public. There is some similarity to opinion among blacks in the United States. I have tried to get people's guesses about

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the reasons for Quebec opinion. One explanation is the shared underdog perspective that comes out in a more Third World orientation in all Quebec francophones. Another explanation, offered largely by the Jewish community, is Quebec's history of anti-Semitism which was particularly evident in the 19305. That's a question for discussion; I think that it's very difficult to probe mental states on these kinds of issues, but you have a whole host of things that are operating. Quebec provincial leaders have expressed views sympathetic to the Palestinians and that may have reinforced these views among the public as a whole. In addition, of course, would be the historical fact that - given the views of the Vatican on the Middle East - this most Catholic part of North America would have received a more nuanced view on the Arab-Israeli conflict. A B E L L A The question is intriguing. It is true, according to all the public opinion polls I have seen, that the majority of French Canadians - like the majority of English Canadians - regard themselves as pro-Israel. Yet, the degree of support is considerably smaller than in the rest of Canada and the number who are more favourable to the Arabs higher. I suspect this arises from a combination of reasons. Since surveys of anti-Semitism in Canada all report that it is still much more dominant in Quebec than elsewhere, obviously antiJewish feeling plays a role. The negative attitudes of the Vatican towards Zionism clearly also have an impact in an overwhelmingly Catholic province. Finally, the hostility of Marxists and other leftwing elements towards Israel may explain why various Quebec unions, journalists, and academics are in the forefront of the antiZionist movement in the province. I think it is a strange amalgam of anti-Semitism, Catholicism, and Marxism that explains this phenomenon in Quebec. T A R A s How influential have domestic interest groups been in bringing Arab-Israeli issues to the attention of officials and parliamentarians and in affecting the foreign policy agenda? s i G L E R The impact of domestic interest groups on Canadian policy has been overwhelming. One senior Arab diplomat recently told me: "Canada does not have a Middle East foreign policy. It has a domestic policy on the Middle East." I would argue that Canadian policy is more influenced by interest group pressure than American policy, in part because Canadian policy is less subject to international pressures and in part because the Canadian Jewish community is more unified and better organized as an interest group. The impact of such

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interest group pressure has been far greater on politicians than officials, and, given the legitimacy of interest group activity in North America, parliamentarians and members of cabinet have been very responsive. The other side of that, in the Canadian case, is the relative impermeability of officialdom in Ottawa as opposed to the United States. I think that Stanislawski and others have clearly documented that it was the politicians and not the bureaucracy who were affected by interest group activity. And that's entirely consistent with everything else we know about how interest groups act in this particular parliamentary system as opposed to some others. Certainly the Canadian Jewish community has been effective. We are told that voting in the General Assembly or the Security Council on Middle East questions has frequently required cabinet approval. I can't imagine another situation where there is such a degree of sensitivity that politicians feel that it is necessary to oversee the bureaucracy on a regular basis - perhaps because they don't trust the bureaucracy to do what is politically wise. The diplomatic establishment often regards these pressures as much less legitimate, particularly when exercised by what may appear to be "blackmail" tactics. The cancellation of the United Nations Crime Conference in Toronto because the PLO had been invited may provide an interesting case study of these pressures and perceptions. Survival-oriented politicians don't like to contend with such pressures very actively, particularly when there is little credible countervailing pressure. The Palestinian uprising may herald a significant shift in these generalizations. First of all, there have been visible differences within the Canadian Jewish community over Israeli policies toward the Palestinians. The Canada-Israel Committee has long taken a position that it does not criticize Israeli policies, which is consistent with its position as an interest group. But Israelis themselves are deeply divided on the right policies to follow and that division is readily translated into the Jewish community in Canada. As in Israel, many in the Canadian Jewish community are wrestling with the agonizing question: "Is the continuing suffering of the Palestinians to be the price of the existence of a Jewish state?" Like the Canadian Jewish community, Canadian political leaders and the general public have been deeply affected by the Palestinian uprising. The government may still be unwilling to move on such key questions as greater contact with the PLO and the two-state solution, but on human rights, there is a strong Canadian consensus, and Mr Clark received substantial public support in his criticism of Israeli practices in his encounter with the Canada-Israel Committee in

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Ottawa on 10 March 1988. The incident was important because it was the first time that a Canadian cabinet minister had gone beyond the ritual endorsements of Israeli policy which had characterized past appearances before the Canada-Israel Committee. A B E L L A Domestic interest groups succeed only when the policies for which they are lobbying are those seen by the government as in the country's best interest. Unlike in the United States, in Canada political lobby groups are not really accepted as part of the system. Nor are they part of our political culture and tradition. They are viewed as an alien - often unwelcome - intrusion on the political scene, and their efforts to influence government officials are seen as suspect and illegitimate. Even the very best and most efficient of these groups are viewed suspiciously and accepted only reluctantly - especially by the Department of External Affairs, which prefers to set policy on its own without the input of private citizens and organizations. It is only recently, I think, with the growing influence of various ethnic communities and the proliferation of consumer, human rights, environment, business, women's and labour groups, that lobbying has become a more accepted part of our political system. Domestic interest groups have played a role in bringing ArabIsraeli issues to the forefront of domestic political debate. This has occurred even as other ethnic groups have become more vocal on foreign policy issues of concern to them. Within the Jewish community, the intense political advocacy reflects a growing assertiveness and comfort within the Canadian political arena. Jews in Canada today feel that political advocacy is not only their right but their obligation as committed citizens. Yet, I think it is absolutely necessary to stress that the fabled Israel lobby in Canada is not as powerful as either it or its enemies think it is. I think John is wrong in his analysis of the strength of the Jewish lobby. Yes, Canadian Jews are relatively well organized and unified, but, unfortunately for them and for John's analysis, they have very little political power. In less than 10 of this country's 295 constituencies is the Jewish vote of any significance. Indeed, save for i or 2 seats in Montreal and Toronto, there is no such thing as a Jewish riding. And so-called Jewish money is hardly a factor in any of the parties and certainly not in the NDP which has usually been the most supportive of the Jewish state. Frankly, I believe it is mischievous to argue that Canada's foreign policy in any area is dictated by a domestic ethnic group. As a multicultural nation, Canada is made up of peoples who have concerns for their countries of origin. This is understandable, and probably beneficial. But no group, and certainly not one as small as Cana-

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