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Linkage Politics In The Middle East: Syria Between Domestic And External Conflict, 1961-1970
 0865319456, 9780865319455

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgement
Introduction
Part I. A Theoretical Framework
1. Linkage Politics and Conflict Linkage
2. A Critique of the Quantitative Approach
3. A Proposed Method of Research
Part II. The Case Study
4. Syria: A Linkage Politics State
5. The Separatist Regime, 1961-1963: Connections Between Internal and External Conflicts
6. The Ba'th Regime, 1963-1966: Connections Between Internal and External Conflicts
7. The Neo-Ba'th Regime, 1966-1970: Connections Between Internal and External Conflicts
Conclusions
Index

Citation preview

Linkage Politics in the Middle East

Westview Replica Editions T he concept o f W estview Replica E ditions is a response to the continuing crisis in academ ic a n d inform ational publishing. Library budgets for books have been severely curtailed. Ever larger portions o f general library budgets are being diverted from the purchase o f books an d used for d ata banks, com puters, m icrom edia, a n d other m ethods o f inform ation retrieval. Interlibrary loan structures further reduce the edition sizes required to satisfy the needs o f the scholarly com m unity. Econom ic pressures (particularly inflation a n d high in ­ terest rates) on the university presses and the few private scholarly publishing com panies have severely lim ited the capacity o f the industry to properly serve the academ ic an d research com m unities. As a result, m any m anuscripts dealing w ith im p o rtan t subjects, often representing the highest level o f scholarship, are no longer econom ­ ically viable publishing projects— or, if accepted for publication, are typically subject to lead tim es ranging from one to three years. W estview Replica E ditions are o u r practical solution to the problem . We accept a m anuscript in cam era-ready form , typed according to o u r specifications, an d m ove it im m ediately into the production process. As always, the selection criteria include the im portance o f the subject, the w ork’s contribution to scholarship, an d its insight, originality o f thought, an d excellence o f exposition. T he responsibility for editing an d proofreading lies w ith the au th o r o r sponsoring institution. We prepare chapter headings an d display pages, file for copyright, an d obtain Library o f Congress Cataloging in Publication D ata. A detailed m anual contains sim ple instructions for preparing the final typescript, and ou r editorial staff is always available to answ er questions. T he end result is a book p rinted on acid-free paper a n d b o u n d in sturdy library-quality softcovers. We m anufacture these books our­ selves using equipm ent th a t does not require a lengthy m ake-ready process an d th a t allows us to publish first editions o f 300 to 600 copies an d to reprint even sm aller quantities as needed. T hus, we can produce Replica E ditions quickly an d can keep even very spe­ cialized books in p rin t as long as there is a dem and for them .

About the Book and Author Linkage Politics in the Middle East: Syria Between Domestic and External Conflict, 1961-1970 Y aacov Bar-Sim an-Tov, H ebrew U niversity T raditional studies o f linkage politics tend to assum e th at internal political instability leads a governm ent to divert attention from internal problem s by initiating an external conflict or stressing the pressures o f international problem s. In contrast, quantitative studies typically conclude th a t there is little o r no relationship between internal an d external conflicts. In this case study o f Syria’s internal political instability an d the country’s involvem ent in the A rab-Israeli an d inter-A rab conflicts, Dr. Bar-Sim an-Tov criticizes the use o f exclusively quantitative m ethodology an d suggests an alternative com bined approach, one th at em ploys traditional em pirical m ethods to supply the basis for a w ell-substantiated quantitative analysis. T he quantitative m ethod alone, he argues, can a t best only assist in identifying the degree o f intensity o f the relationship betw een dom estic an d external conflicts; there m u st be recourse to traditional m ethods in order to clarify the causes an d conditions th a t underlie th a t relationship. Dr. Bar-Sim an-Tov is a lecturer in the D epartm ent o f International R elations o f the H ebrew U niversity in Jerusalem , Israel. H e is the au th o r o f The Israeli-E gyptian W ar o f A ttritio n 1969-1970: A Case S tu d y o f L im ite d L ocal W ar an d several articles dealing w ith the M iddle East.

P u b lish e d in c o o p e ra tio n w ith th e H a rry S. T ru m a n R e se a rc h In stitu te , th e H e b re w U n iv e rsity o f Je ru sa le m

Linkage Politics in the Middle East Syria Between Dom estic and External Conflict, 1961-1970 Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov

Westview Press / Boulder, Colorado

To Keren, Itta i a n d Yonatan

A Westview Replica Edition

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Copyright © 1983 by Westview Press, Inc. Published in 1983 in the United States o f America by Westview Press, Inc. 5500 Central Avenue Boulder, Colorado 80301 Frederick A. Praeger, President and Publisher

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov, 1946Linkage politics in the Middle East: Syria between domestic and external conflict, 1961-1970. (A Westview replica edition) 1. Syria—Politics and government. 2. Syria—Foreign relations. DS98.2.B37 1983 956.91 82-21878 ISBN 0-86531-945-6

Printed and bound in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

I. Title.

Contents ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

ix

INTRODUCTION

1

PART ONE: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 1.

LINKAGE POLITICS AND CONFLICT LINKAGE Linkage Politics 9; Conflict Linkage 10

9

2.

A CRITIQUE OF THE QUANTITATIVE APPROACH Data 21; Methodology 25; Theory 29

21

3.

A PROPOSED METHOD OF RESEARCH The State Level 39; The System Level 43; Synthesis of the State and System Levels, Conflict: Towards a Definition 44; Basic Variables of Conflict Linkage 48; Variants of Conflict Linkage 52

37

PART TWO: THE CASE STUDY 4.

SYRIA: A LINKAGE POLITICS STATE The Geo-Political Dimension 62; The National-Ideologi­ cal Dimension 64; The Communal-Demographic Dimen­ sion 66; The Structural-Institutional Dimension 68; The Internal Political Dimension 69; Linkage Politics and Conflict Linkage 70

vu

61

viii 5.

THE SEPARATIST REGIME 1961-1963: CONNECTIONS BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONFLICTS Syria’s Political Regime 79; Types of Internal and External Conflict, Connections between Internal and External Conflicts 84; The Egyptian-Syrian Conflict 85; The Syrian-Israeli Conflict 101; The Arab-Israeli Conflict 106

79

6.

THE BA‘TH REGIME 1963-1966: CONNECTIONS BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONFLICTS Syria’s Political Regime 118; Types of Internal and External Conflict 121; Connections between Internal and External Conflicts, The Egyptian-Syrian Conflict 122; The Syrian-Israeli Conflict 129; The Arab-Israeli Conflict 136

117

7.

THE NEO-BATH REGIME 1966-1970: CONNECTIONS BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONFLICTS Syria’s Political Regime 148; Types of Internal and External Conflict 150; Connections between Internal and External Conflicts 151; The Jadld-Asad Conflict and External Syrian Conflicts 152; Intensification of Internal Conflict and Outbreak of the Six-Day War 157; Epilogue 161

147

CONCLUSIONS

171

INDEX

173

Acknowledgement Among the people who have provided assistance and support for this effort, there are two to whom I owe a particular debt of gratitude. In the earliest and most difficult phase of research, and throughout the entire research period, Professors Alan Dowty of Notre Dame University and Yehoshaphat Harkabi of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem provided a wealth of wise methodologi­ cal and substantive advice on my subject and research direction. I am indebted as well to Professors Jonathan Wilkenfeld of The University of Maryland and Moshe Ma‘oz of The Hebrew University for their valuable suggestions. This study was supported by grants from The Leonard David Institute for International Relations and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, both of The Hebrew University. I am grateful to Professors Nissan Oren and H.Z. Schiffrin and to Dr. Yitzhak Shichor of these institutions. I am also indebted to The Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern Studies of Tel-Aviv University, which kindly permitted me to use their archives. Dafna Allon and Estelle Albeg did yeoman work in translating the book from Hebrew and typing it, and Laurie Fialkoff did an excellent job of condensing and styling this English version. The editing and production of the work was handled by The Truman Institute, under the supervision of their director of publications, Norma Schneider. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the indispensable contribution of my wife Ronit, for without her love, patience and understanding this research would never have been completed.

Introduction The belief that internal and external political conflicts have a reciprocal relationship has been accepted by most of the disciplines concerned with research on wars and conflicts. Social scientists have put forward two main propositions concerning the relationship between internal and external con­ flicts. The first states that growth of an external conflict causes or is connected with a growth or decline of the internal conflict. The second proposition, which treats external conflict as a dependent variable, states that its increase or decrease depends on variations of the internal conflict. A review of the research indicates the existence of two approaches to the phenomenon of linkage: that of the traditionalists and that of the quanti­ tative school. The first approach tends to develop a theory that presents hypotheses on the relationship between the two types of conflict without empirical examination of the hypotheses. The second approach proposes a quantitative, empirical examination of the hypotheses of the traditional school. The division of labor between the research of theorists and empiricists into similar phenomena is not necessarily bad — provided that some sort of operative, theoretical framework can be devised within which a limited num­ ber of relevant variables can be defined and examined empirically. Until now, however, this division of labor has suffered from a basic flaw: quantitative studies on the relationship between the two types of conflict have accepted the hypotheses of the traditional school without making any attempt to identify relevant variables. Quantitative researchers have assumed that an empirical examination either strengthens the theoretical basis of the hypotheses or disproves them entirely. Since their research to date has indicated little or no relationship between internal and external political conflicts, the conclusion has been that traditionalists are wrong in affirming that such a relationship exists —or that if it does exist, it cannot be proven significant when analyzed by quantitative means alone. The present study accepts as a hypothesis the proposition of the traditional school that there is, in fact, a relationship between the two types of conflict. It does not support the view that quantitative examination is the only empiri­ cal method for proving the existence of these relations. Rather, a combination of qualitative (historical) and quantitative analysis should be used. The latter 1

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Linkage Politics in the M iddle East

can assist in identifying the intensity of the relationship between the two types of conflict, while the former helps to clarify its underlying causes and conditions. The aims of this study are as follows: (1) To develop a theoretical framework within which relevant variables can be identified and applied to an examination of the relationship between internal and external political conflicts. Such an examination will be con­ ducted on the two levels of research used in international relations: that of the state and of the international system. (2) To combine qualitative and quantitative empirical analysis in examin­ ing reciprocal relations between external and internal conflicts. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The framework of research proposed in this study is based on James N. Rosenau’s "linkage politics” research, inasmuch as linkage politics is the theoretical foundation for describing various relations between the two types of conflict. This study extends Rosenau’s research by defining two variants of “linkage foreign policy” along with the concepts of “internal political environment linkage,” “linkage groups” and “linkage systems.” Defining the two variants of linkage foreign policy assists in distinguishing the direction given to links between internal and external political conflicts. The first variant identifies constraints of the internal political environment as the dominant variable in the formation of foreign policy. Using this variant, internal conflict is identified as the independent variable and external conflict as the dependent variable. The second variant identifies intervention of one external actor into the internal political environment of another actor by means of domestic linkage groups. With this variant, external conflict is seen as the independent variable affecting the internal conflict. The idea of linkage systems or sub-systems is intended to identify inter­ national systems or sub-systems characterized by their being liable to behavior changes as a result of events in the internal political environment of one of the actors in the system. This concept assists in identifying reciprocal relations between an internal conflict and a system conflict. Apart from developing these linkage ideas, this study seeks to identify four overall dimensions relevant to any discussion of relations between internal and external political conflicts: (1) Internal political structure and its stability. Internal political struc­ ture is the dimension that includes the following variables: type of regime, type of political actors, type of interaction between internal political actors, and distribution of political power in the political structure. (2) Linkage groups. Actors in the internal political environment of a

Introduction

3

given state who serve as connecting links between the internal and external political environments. (3) External political environment. A dimension with several possible configurations: one international actor; a number of international actors; a sub-system; an international system. (4) Types o f internal and external conflicts. The distinctions between various types of internal and external political conflicts. In view of the multiplicity of differences between internal political vari­ ables, types of external environment and types of internal and external conflict, this study takes the view that the most effective method of research is to examine the conflicts of one specific “research state.” Supporting this decision was the fact that research along quantitative lines proved incapable of formulating identical indices for the empirical comparison of different states. The choice of Syria as the research state was based on the following considerations: (1) A majority of historians, sociologists, political scientists and students of international relations who have focused on the Middle East in general and Syria in particular agree that there are close connections between internal and external policy in Syria. These researchers stress the connections between Syria’s internal political instability and her involvement in the inter-Arab conflict, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Superpowers conflict. (2) During the period between dissolution of the Egyptian-Syrian Union (28 September 1961) and Asad’s coming to power (November 1970), Syria was characterized both by a high degree of internal political instability and by intensive involvement in external conflicts within the Arab level (disputes with Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudia, Morocco) and on the Arab-Israeli conflict level (border incidents and the Six-Day War). (3) Findings of researchers of the purely quantitative school, on the other hand, have indicated absolutely no relationship between Syria’s internal and external conflict behavior during this period. The striking difference between the views of the historical and quanti­ tative schools regarding Syria provided the main impetus for her selection as this study’s research state. M ethods o f Empirical Examination Both qualitative and quantitative methods will be used in examining the con­ nections between internal and external political conflicts. Qualitative analysis will concentrate on presenting the different processes connecting the two types of conflict, and the causes for such connections. Qualitative analysis

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Linkage Politics in the M iddle East

will examine events that embody some kind of connection between the two types of conflicts, as for example, contacts between Egypt and the repre­ sentatives of linkage groups in Syria for the purpose of planning a coup or uprising. Qualitative examination of the connections between the two types of con­ flict will be assisted by a simple quantitative analysis of events that distin­ guishes different levels of intensity in the connections between the two types of conflict: e.g., whether an increase in Egyptian verbal attacks on the separ­ atist regime in Syria is bound up with an increase in internal conflict behavior manifestations initiated by linkage groups; or whether an increase in internal conflict manifestations initiated by Nasserite linkage groups is bound up either with an increase in declarations of apprehension regarding Israel or with hostile border incidents. It should be kept in mind, however, that the number of conflict manifestations does not necessarily indicate the intensity of a given conflict. One aggressive speech delivered by ‘Abd an-Nasser of Egypt, for example, may have sufficed to trigger a whole series of internal conflict manifestations in Syria. In presenting a quantitative analysis of the connections between internal and external conflict, the present research makes use of behavior manifestations proposed by the quantitative school such as demonstrations, strikes and bomb plants (internal conflict behavior manifestations), and verbal attacks, border incidents, troop concentrations and mobilizations (external conflict behavior manifestations). Sources o f the Present Research Three main types of sources have been used in this study: documents; previous research on Syria; and newspapers and radio broadcasts. These sources may be detailed as follows: Documents. Two different types of documents have been used. The first consists of three collections of documents published by the American Univer­ sity of Beirut for the years 1963—1965. These papers, entitled Arab Political Documents, consist of a large quantity of non-confldential documents, including declarations and speeches of heads of governments in Syria (mostly heads of the Ba‘th regime, though a small portion deals with the period of the separatist elite), as well as resolutions and declarations of the Ba‘th Party leadership. A second category, of the highest interest, comprises Ba‘th Party docu­ ments that are found today in the Shiloah Institute of Tel Aviv University.1 This collection consists largely of party organs, memos and circulars of Ba‘th Party National and Regional Commands. In spite of their great importance as a primary source, these documents have the serious limitation of being only a partial and, at times, chance sample of all the material circulated during the period under review; moreover, some of them are clearly tendentious. How­ ever, they are of prime importance in reflecting the level of internal political

Introduction

5

activity of the Ba‘th Party. To a lesser degree, they also shed light on various nuances in the internal political conflict in Syria, since when the Ba‘th Party was ruling Syria, its internal struggles were reflected in the internal political environment. Previous research. Most of the research done to date does not cover the entire period reviewed in this study, the years 1961—1970. Stress has been placed mainly on the years 1963—1966, i.e., the period of Ba‘th rule. There has been less emphasis on 1961—1963, the period of separatist rule. The following are outstanding works published so far: that of Itamar Rabinovich, dealing mainly with the internal politics of the B a ^ Party and the interactions between the party and the Syrian Army in the years 1963— 1966;2 that of Donald Betz, which is also concerned with Ba‘th Party internal politics in the years 1963—1966, but which stresses as well the interactions between Syria’s internal and external political environments;3 and that of John Devlin, which covers the history of the Ba‘th Party from its origins until 1966.4 These three studies provide a wealth of information on internal political events in Syria. Several other works also provide plentiful material: George Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States, in particular his chapter on Syria; Eliezer Be’eri, Arm y Officers in Arab Politics and Society ; Moshe Ma‘oz, M odem Syria ; Kamel Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba‘th Socialist Party: History, Ideology and Organization -, Abraham Ben-Tsur, “The Neo-Ba‘th Party of Syria” ; Malcolm Ken, The Arab Cold War; and Nikolas Van Dam, The Struggle fo r Power in Syria.s The present study also makes some use of memoirs by Syrian personalities.6 Press and radio. Syrian, Egyptian and Lebanese press and radio reports of the years 1961—1970 are an important source for the analysis of internal and external conflict, mainly because they provide a copious amount of infor­ mation. The major problem in making use of these reports is the questionable reliability of much of the material transmitted, since state control of the media often resulted in biased information. During most of the period under review, both the Egyptian and Syrian media were used as instruments of war propaganda. The result was a great deal of mendacious or exaggerated infor­ mation on what was happening in the internal political environment of each rival state, in an effort to increase political ferment. Lebanese press and radio broadcasts also have problems of unreliability. In the period under review, the Lebanese press reflected different political orientations and was frequently harnessed to inter-Arab war propaganda in the service of one side or the other. Thus, for example, the newspapers al-Anwär and al-Muharrir represented a Nasserite orientation, taking part in the Syrian-Egyptian conflict mainly by dramatizing events in Syria’s internal political environment. Al-Ahrär, the organ of the National Command of the Ba‘th Party in Beirut, was utilized to help the National Command in its

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Linkage Politics in the M iddle East

struggle against the neo-Ba‘th regime after the coup of 23 February 1966. Three independent newspapers, an-Nahär, al-Hayät and al-Jarïda, are an im­ portant source for the supply of more objective information; they can also serve to some extent as a control for information from other press sources. The present research makes use of three main compilations of Arab radio broadcasts: (1) The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Monitoring Service: Sum­ mary of World Broadcasts, Part IV (Part IV covers Middle Eastern radio Broadcasts), 1961 —1970. (2) U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Daily R eport, Middle East, Africa and West Europe, 1961—1970. (3) Itim Mizrah News Agency. Monitoring Service. Summary of Arab Broadcasts, 1961—1970. These three compilations of radio broadcasts give information as reported by the Arab radio services as well as supplying the pronouncements and state­ ments of Arab policy-makers. Use of all three compilations at the same time both enriches the quantity of events supplied and helps to overcome the problem of unreliability, making it possible to compare the information given. The use of Arab radio broadcasts is especially important for the needs of quantitative research, since these sources provide a much greater quantity of information than do “Western” sources. NOTES 1. Itamar Rabinovich made use of this collection of documents in research for his book, cited below. He also classified and edited the documents as a bibliographical col­ lection: Itamar Rabinovich. Documents o f the B ath Party in Syria (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Shiloah Institute, 1971). A small portion of the documents have appeared in an English translation by Abraham Ben-Tsur, The Syrian Ba'th Party and Israel: Documents from the Internal Party Publications (Arab and Afro-Asian Monograph Series, Center for Arab and Afro-Asian Studies, Givat Haviva, 1968). 2. Itamar Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba th 1963-1966: The Army-Party Symbiosis (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972). 3. Donald Lawrence Betz, Conflict o f Principle and Policy: A Case Study o f the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party in Power in Syria, 8 March 1963 - 23 February 1966 (Univer­ sity of Denver, Ph.D., 1973). 4. John F. Devlin, The B ath Party: A History from the Origins to 1966 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976). 5. George M. Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1971), Vol. 2, pp. 181-388;Eliezer Be’eri, Arm y Officers in Arab Politics and Society (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1969); Moshe Ma‘oz, Modem Syria: Political and Social Changes in the Process o f Creating a National Community (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Reshafim, 1974); Kamel Abu Jaber, The Arab B ath Socialist Party: History, Ideology and Organization (New York: Syracuse Univer­ sity Press, 1966); Abraham Ben-Tsur, “The Neo-Ba‘th Party of Syria,” Journal o f Contemporary History, III (1968), pp. 161-181; Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Nikolas Van Dam, The Struggle fo r Power in Syria (London: Croom Helm, 1979). 6. Munlf ar-Razzaz, The Bitter Experience (Arabic) (Beirut, 1967).

Part I A Theoretical Framework

1 Linkage Politics and Conflict Linkage LINKAGE POLITICS The term “linkage politics” was coined by James N. Rosenau in 1969 in an effort to present a new approach to research on the political behavior of states.1 Rosenau’s declared aims in developing this conception were twofold. First, he wished to connect the two spheres of research that dealt with the political behavior of states —research on national politics and on international politics — by establishing a new conceptual and methodological language that would be acceptable both in political science and in international relations. Second, he wanted to provide a research framework for the systematic testing of connections between national and international political behavior. Rosenau did not set out to prove that there are reciprocal connections between national and international politics; the existence of such connections was so clear in his mind, that there was no need of a new methodology to ensure it scientific recognition.2 Rather, the impetus to develop the linkage conception came about from Rosenau’s belief that scholars in political science and international relations generally ignored each other’s existence.3 Rosenau felt that the total conceptual separation of the two disciplines was not only unjustified but harmful, and was a central factor in the non-development of a general political theory that would be able to cross existing boundaries be­ tween national and international politics.4 In Rosenau’s words, linkage may be defined as “recurrent sequences of behavior that originate on one side of the boundary between the two types of systems and that become linked to phenomena on the other side in the process of unfolding,” or as “any recurrent sequence of behavior that orig­ inates in one system and is reacted to in another.” 5 By this definition, he gives a twofold signification to the linkage concept.6 Primarily, it refers to interaction between the internal and external political environments of the actor in question in the course of shaping foreign or internal policy. The second signification refers to the ways in which interactions between actors in the internal political environment affect those between actors in the inter­ national system, and vice versa —that is, how interactions between the actors in the international system affect the internal political environment of any of the actors involved.

9

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Linkage Politics in the M iddle East

In order to distinguish between the beginning and end of a linkage, Rosenau defines the former as output and the latter as input. Outputs and inputs are defined according to whether they occur in the national or international political system.7 Connections between outputs and inputs create a reciprocal feedback network between national and international political systems, whereby outputs of the national are inputs for the international political system, and vice versa.® What distinguishes linkage politics is the number of possible relationships it sets out to define. In Rosenau’s view, linkage is not limited to the inter­ actions existing between governments in the international system, as described in most international relations studies. Nor is it confined to interactions be­ tween a government and other internal political actors within a given state, as described by most political science works. Linkage, according to Rosenau, can also exist between a government and the internal political actors of another government; in other words, an external government can interact with the parties, interest groups, pressure groups, etc. in a second national political system, without the mediation of the latter system’s government. Moreover, the internal political bodies of two national political systems can interact without the mediation of the governments themselves. In terms of international relations, the internal political bodies in these systems are then filling the roles of transnational actors.9 An important aim of linkage politics is to establish a synthesis between international relations and political science. Without saying so explicitly, Rosenau also seems to believe that the concept of linkage politics can be extended to the two research levels of international relations, that of the state and of the system. On the state level, Rosenau tries to identify formation of a state’s foreign policy as a function of the interactions between internal political actors who are not within the ruling elite of a given state and the government or other internal political actors of another state. On the system level, Rosenau tries to identify how interactions between actors within the internal political environment of a given state and either the government itself or non-governmental internal political actors within other states in the system affect interactions within the international system.

CONFLICT LINKAGE “Conflict linkage” is an extension of linkage politics that focuses on the more limited aspect of the relationship between conflicts in the internal political environment of a given state and those of the international system. We can differentiate among three main approaches that deal with the relation­ ship between internal and external conflict: the socio-psychological; the tra­ ditional; and the quantitative approach. These approaches are examined below in greater detail.

Linkage Politics and C onflict Linkage

11

The Socio-Psychological Approach Many researchers in sociology and psychology have dealt with the connec­ tions between internal and external conflicts. In fact, most of the accepted hypotheses of conflict linkage research are derived from socio-psychological studies dealing either with individuals or various social groups. The present study is particularly indebted to Georg Simmers work, Conflict, and to Lewis Coser’s reformulation of that work.10 The following contentions of Simmel, reformulated by Coser, are particularly relevant to the present research: (1) “Conflict with another group leads to the mobilization of the energies of group members and hence to increased cohesion of the group. Whether increase in centralization accompanies this increase in cohesion depends upon both the character of the conflict and the type of group.” (2) “Social systems lacking social solidarity are likely to disintegrate in the face of outside conflict, although some unity may be despotically enforced.” 11 (3) “Rigidly organized struggle groups may actually search for enemies with the deliberate purpose or the unwitting result of maintaining unity and internal cohesion. Such groups may actually perceive an outside threat although no threat is present. Under conditions yet to be discovered, imaginary threats have the same group-integrating function as real threat. The evocation of an outer enemy or the invention of such an enemy strengthens social cohesion that is threatened from within.” 12 These three basic contentions indicate the connections between internal and external conflicts, the directions they may take and the conditions that determine such directions. It is actually possible to reduce these three pro­ positions to two: (a) an external conflict can intensify or limit an internal conflict in a group; (b) an internal conflict can heighten or reduce the tension of an external conflict. Simmers third contention is a “scapegoat” theory that posits the use of an outer “circle” in order to overcome an internal conflict. As such, it can be considered a subgroup of the second proposition. The scapegoat theory can also posit exploitation of an inner circle, such as an ethnic minority, in order to overcome some other domestic conflict. Such a case would, however, touch on the relationship between two internal conflicts —which is outside the scope of this study.13 Simmel’s basic contentions, as reformulated by Coser, are also accepted in psychology studies. Leonard Berkowitz, for instance, states that threatening situations create social harmony and that external aggression creates cohesion between different sectors of the population.14 Mark A. May argues that war is an important element in uniting any social group; under attack from outside, internal quarrels are pushed into the background. Complex psychological processes, May says, work to limit internal tension and intensify the internal sense of belonging. Outside attack heightens each individual’s sense of in­ security, and the group as a whole realizes that joint defense is the best way to face up to danger.15

12

Linkage Politics in the M iddle East

Common to all these contentions is the belief that conflict between groups can be exploited to create internal solidarity within a given group, and that there is a tendency among certain groups to ultilize external conflict as a means of settling internal problems. A number of researchers have attempted to test these contentions by empirical means. Muzafer Shérif et al. tested a hypothesis similar to Coser’s by observing the behavior of small groups of children taking part in conflict games. The data they compiled tend to strengthen the following hypothesis: “The course of relations between two groups which are in a state of competition and frustration will tend to pro­ duce an increase in group solidarity.” 16 In another piece of research, Sherif determined that increased hostility between groups promotes solidarity and cooperation within the groups, and that leaders or representatives of groups tend to restrain internal criticism by directing accusations at other groups.17 These socio-psychological contentions have also been applied to state and international behavior. The socio-psychological approach holds, in brief, that when a political elite or leadership is in domestic difficulty, it may focus upon a circle of external conflict in order to secure domestic calm. The decision to launch an act of international aggression, for example, may be made in order to increase national patriotic sentiment, in the hope that this will reduce the level of domestic conflict. The Traditional Approach The traditional school in international relations accepts intuitively assump­ tions that are similar to those of the socio-psychology researchers, to the effect that in special circumstances, there is a relationship between internal and external conflict. Traditionalists assume that in circumstances of internal political instability, the political leadership of a state tends to divert the attention of its population to the external political arena, either by initiating an external conflict or stressing the pressures of the external environment. Quincy Wright, for example, argues in his book, A Study o f War, that it is common for states “to indulge in foreign war as a diversion from domestic ills.” 18 In his Encyclopaedia Britannica article on war, Wright raises the ques­ tion whether totalitarian or dictatorial regimes can survive at all without an external scapegoat.19 Democratic, constitutional leaders may also find it useful to stress inter­ national questions in order to divert attention from internal political prob­ lems, writes Barry Farrell.20 Henry Kissinger agrees that such a tendency exists, adding: “If domestic structures are reasonably stable, temptations to use an adventurous foreign policy to achieve domestic cohesion are at a minimum.” 21 Ernst Haas and Allen Whiting similarly assert that a domestic leadership bent on its own survival may find itself pursuing a foreign policy of conflict — or even actual war — in an effort to defend itself against domestic attack. At

Linkage Politics and C onflict Linkage

13

times of extreme internal tensions between rival elites, it is often seen as a useful policy to unite the state against a real or imaginary external threat.22 Geoffrey Blainey studied the connections between civil and international strife in a group of nations during the period of 1815—1939. His finding was that in more than half the cases, a war between nations was preceded by civil strife in one of these nations.23 Frank Denton, researching the still longer period of 1820—1949, put forward a similar proposition.24 Richard Rose* crance, who carried out systematic research on nine international political systems, states: There tends to be a correlation between international instability and the domestic insecurity of elites. This correlation does not hold in all instances. War may occur in the absence of internal instability, internal friction may occur in the absence of war. In many of the chaotic inter­ national patterns of modern items, however, the two factors were associated.25 In summary, a majority of traditional researchers accept the assumption that internal conflict (e.g., instability of ruling eûtes, civil rebellion, civil war) may provide an adequate explanation for the origin of war between nations, although they are careful to qualify this assumption by using such phrases as “in given circumstances,” “at times,” “it may possibly be” and the like. Moreover, this assumption is perceived as one that may be taken for granted without the need for extensive causal explanation. The Quantitative Approach The starting point of researchers of the quantitative school of international relations has generally been to accept the assumptions of the traditional school. Rather than developing new theoretical assumptions concerning the relationship between internal and external political conflicts, the quanti­ tative school has focused upon empirical examination of the traditional school’s hypotheses.26 Rudolf Rummel, Raymond Tanter, Jonathan Wükenfeld, Robert Burrowes and Bertram Spector are among those who have conducted empirical studies,27 the aim of which has been to establish cross-national data banks of conflict behavior and to utilize statistical techniques and computer data to test the amount and frequency of connections between internal and external con­ flict behavior. Unlike researchers who describe conflicts in qualitative terms, Rummel and others use the term “conflict behavior” instead of “conflict” : ...Domestic conflict behavior is conceived as manifestations of internal disorders within a society. These manifestations vary in intensity from strikes and demonstrations to guerrilla wars and revolutions. Similarly, foreign conflict behavior is conceived as manifestations of foreign

14

Linkage Politics in the M iddle East violence engaged in by a nation. These may vary in intensity from protests and accusations to mobilizations and wars.28

By utilizing the terminology of conflict behavior manifestations, the quantitative school aims to avoid both the methodological difficulties involved in constructing causative models of conflict, and the linguistic difficulties of defining just what a conflict is. There are two clear advantages in using the quantitative school’s terminology: (1) It is easy to construct measurable indices of such things as the number of riots, strikes, and demonstrations (internal conflict behavior) and the number of incidents, mobilizations and wars (external conflict behavior). (2) By means of these indices it is possible to avoid constructing indices for complex variables such as stability and inte­ gration, which are connected with conflict in the broader sense of the term, but not susceptible of direct measurement. Until now, statistical research of the quantitative school has confirmed little or no relationship between internal and external conflict behavior. The first researcher to come to this conclusion was Rummel, whose research covered 77 states over the three-year period 1955—1957: “Foreign conflict behavior is generally completely unrelated to domestic behavior.” 29 Re­ searchers of the quantitative school who followed Rummel have used a variety of statistical techniques, have organized their data in a variety of ways, and have introduced additional variables in an attempt —unsuccessful, so far —to disprove Rummel’s findings. Tanter replicated Rummers study for 83 nations, for the years 1958— 1960. His conclusion was that there is only “a small relationship between 1958—1960 domestic and foreign conflict behavior which increases with a time lag.” 30 Substantial correlations between internal and external conflict, especially between collective protest against the government and foreign conflict activities, have been found by Wolf-Dieter Eberwein et al. for 125 nations for the years 1966—1967 31 But these findings do not support the extemalization hypothesis: “The results for 1966—1967 point to a spurious relationship instead of supporting the causality implied by the extemalization hypothesis. We thus agree with Rummel and Tanter as to the causal aspect of the hypothesis, even though our correlations are much higher than theirs.” 32 The most impressive study to date has been that of Leo Hazlewood, who reconsidered the diversion-encapsulation hypothesis developed by traditional scholars in order to discern the reasons for the discrepancy between this hypothesis and the empirical findings of quantitative studies.33 Developing composite measures for 75 countries for the years 1954—1965, Hazlewood defined three types of domestic conflict (mass protest, elite instability and structure war), and three types of foreign conflict (disputes, conflicts and hostilities). Composite measures of domestic conflict for a given year were used jointly to explain each pattem of foreign conflict for the following year. Hazlewood’s conclusion was that: “stronger domestic conflict-foreign conflict

Linkage Politics and C onflict Linkage

15

relationships are present across a large number of states at least at some time points.” However, “although the results are often consistent with the hypo­ theses, they are often quite inconsistent. Accordingly, there is considerable ground for arguing that a range of competing interpretations of these data may be equally plausible.” 34 Wilkenfeld was the first to argue that it is unrealistic to search for gen­ eralizations covering such a large number of countries without first differen­ tiating among them. Accordingly, while using Rummers data, Wilkenfeld differentiated between various types of states and various types of internal and external conflicts, as well as determining specific time lags between internal and external conflicts. Wilkenfeld’s tentative conclusion was that: ...By controlling for type of nation and for specific types of conflict and for specific time lags, there are relationships between the domestic and foreign conflict behavior of nations. The generally small size of the correlation coefficients, however, indicate that we have not ex­ plained a great deal of the variance in foreign conflict on the basis of domestic conflict, and vice versa.35 Additional research by Wilkenfeld together with Dina Zinnes tends to con­ firm a portion of these findings: the degree of conflict between countries was found to afford a possibility of predicting changes in the level of internal conflict behavior, the reliability of the prediction varying with the type and intensity of internal and external conflict (i.e., within and between states), and specific time-lags between the various conflicts and the states they involve.36 In a different study, Hazlewood asks how and why the concept of govern­ ment type (which Wilkenfeld finds useful) affects internal-external relation­ ships.37 Hazlewood explains that a state may respond to internal conflict in three ways: by offering adaptational rewards, suppressing internal conflict through coercion, or externalizing domestic conflict by means of a conflictoriented foreign policy. Hazlewood factor-analyzed ten measures of the government’s capacity to coerce, and obtained two factors. He combined these two factors with a third variable —per capita change in the government’s budget representing the capacity to reward — and correlated the results with Rummel’s three categories (diplomacy, belligerency, war) of foreign conflict. Hazlewood’s study, which covered 74 nations for the years 1958—1960, con­ cluded that “population diversity predicted to societal turmoil and that three measures of systemic stresses... predicted to the dimensions of coercive capacity... and budget growth per capita over time. These governmental re­ sponse variables, especially the relative size and importance of the military then predicted to the three dimensions of foreign conflict behavior.” 38 Kegley et al. continued Hazlewood’s study, asking: “What happens to the domestic-foreign conflict linkage when we take into consideration govern­ ment type as measured by differences in level of military spending?” The 73 countries in this study were divided into three subsets according to levels of

16

Linkage Politics in the M iddle East

military expenditures. Countries comprising the low militarization category showed a very small positive relationship between their domestic and foreign conflict behavior, while those in the medium militarization group manifested virtually no relationship. Only in highly militarized societies did a patterned relationship between civil strife and foreign conflict emerge.3’ Kegley et al. summarized their findings as follows: “We find the two arenas of conflict to be unrelated when standing alone.... When countries are grouped according to their relative efforts to militarize, civil strife is negatively related to (later) foreign conflict in the most militarized societies.” 40 Another group of studies focused on specific geographical locations. Michael Haas reconsidered the extemalization proposition for ten western states (Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Norway, Spain, Switzerland and the United States) for the years 1900—1960, examin­ ing the effects of unemployment, industrialization, suicides, homicides and death due to alcoholism on military expenditures, frequency of wars and war aggressiveness. No significant results were found.41 Wilkenfeld’s further researches, together with Virginia Lee Lussier and Dale Tahtinen, focused on six states in the Middle East (Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) during the years 1949—1967. This study found varying but limited connections between the two types of conflict behavior in each state.42 In yet another study, Wilkenfeld focused on four states in the Middle East directly involved in the Arab-Israel conflict: Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Once again, he found that the effect of domestic conflict behavior on foreign policy is minimal.43 In research on 33 independent African states in the years 1963—1965, however, John N. Collins found close connections between certain types of internal conflict behavior (domestic disorders) and external conflict behavior (formal diplomatic hostility).44 Unlike all previous studies, Burrowes and Spector tried to test for connec­ tions between internal and external conflict behavior in one country alone, Syria, for the years 1961—1967. Their conclusion was the same as that of Rummel and Tanter: there are no connections between internal and external conflict behavior.45 In further research on Syria, Burrowes and Gerald DeMaio drew distinc­ tions between Syria’s involvement in different types of external conflicts. However, this study did not lead to a significant change in Burrowes’ previous findings.46 Kuang-Sheng Liao, on the other hand, has determined that there was a strong relationship between internal mobilization in China during the Cultural Revolution of 1967—1969 and its articulated hostility to foreign countries at that time, as expressed through mass media and mass protest demonstrations.47 In summary, there are two fundamental conclusions of the quantitative school regarding the relationship between the two types of political conflict: (1) positive linkages between internal and external conflict behavior exist for certain groups of states at a given point of time: (2) there is a time-lag factor

Linkage Politics and C onflict Linkage

17

— i.e., positive linkages can be seen between certain types of internal and external conflict behavior after as much as a year or two have passed. How­ ever, both these conclusions point to only a limited, and not particularly sig­ nificant connection between the two types of conflict. NOTES 1. James N. Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1969). 2. James N. Rosenau, “Introduction: Political Science in a Shrinking World,” in Linkage Politics, pp. 8 -1 0 . 3. Ibid., pp. 3 -7 . See also Rosenau, “Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revisited,” in Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, ed. Jonathan Wilkenfeld (New York: McKay Company, 1973), p. 42. 4. Ibid., pp. 29-30. Rosenau also believed that the main obstacle in developing a theory of international relations was the fact that internal causative factors were ignored. See his article “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in Approaches to Com­ parative and International Politics, ed. Barry R. Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern Univer­ sity Press, 1966), pp. 27-92. 5. Rosenau, ‘Toward the Study of National-International Linkages,” in Linkage Politics, p. 45. 6. Rosenau created a double signification for the linkage concept because he did not accept the usual distinction made between political system and political environment in the theoretical terminology of international relations. In this terminology, political environment refers to an ensemble of human and material variables connected with each other within the geographical and national boundaries of a polity, and variables affecting foreign policy formation such as internal political structure, political regime, economic strength and military power. The external political environment is that which is outside the geographical and national boundaries of the polity in question. It can be a neighbor­ ing state, regional sub-system or even the whole international system (i.e., the inter­ national system is identified as one of the external political environments of the polity in question, not all of them). For analytical reasons, Rosenau gives the term political sys­ tem a double meaning: now political system and now political environment. Rosenau is of course aware of the accepted distinction between the two; he argues that his definition overlooks the distinction because it is incorporated into the actual linkage concept. 7. In defining the term linkage, it was in fact possible to distinguish three stages instead of two: the preliminary stage (when the event comes into being); the stage of arrival (crossing the boundary between the national political systems); and the stage of the event’s taking effect on the other political system. 8. Rosenau does not define the boundaries between the political and international system in view of the double signification he attaches to the linkage conception. Karl Deutsch, however, proposes an operative definition of the boundaries between the internal and the external political environments: “Discontinuities in the frequency of transactions and marked discontinuities in the frequency of responses - particularly, therefore, discontinuities in the degree of covariance.” (Karl W. Deutsch, “External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States,” in Approaches to Comparative and Inter­ national Politics, p. 5). 9. For an extensive discussion of transnational relations, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, Massa­ chusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973). 10. Lewis Coser. The Functions o f Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1956); Georg Simmel, Conflict, trans. Kurt H. Wolff (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955). 11. Coser, op. cit., p. 95.

18

Linkage Politics in the M iddle East

12. Ibid., p. 110. 13. George Wada and James C. Davies, “Riots and Rioters,” Western Political Quar­ terly, 10 (1957), pp. 864-874; Gordon W. Allport, The Nature o f Prejudice (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 4 1 -4 2 ,1 4 8 , 342, 350-351. 14. Leonard Berkowitz, Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), pp. 188-190. 15. Mark A. May,A Social Psychology o f War and Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), p. 11. See also pp. 13,16, 53,62. 16. Muzafer Shérif et al.. Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment (Norman, Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), p. 123. 17. Sherif, Group Conflict and Cooperation (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1966), pp. 85,90,112. 18. Quincy Wright, A Study o f War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964, abridged edition), p. 169; see also pp. 114, 240-241, 321,427. 19. Wright, “War,” in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago, 1970, Vol. 23, p. 192. 20. Barry R. Farrell, “Foreign Policies of Open and Closed Political Societies,” in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, p. 185. 21. Henry A. Kissinger, “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy,” Daedalus (Spring, 1966), p. 503. 22. Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, Dynamics o f International Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), p. 62. 23. Geoffrey Blainey, “The Scapegoat Theory of International War,” Historical Studies, XV, 57 (1971), pp. 7 3 -7 4 ; see also Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes o f War (New York: Free Press, 1973), pp. 70-71. On the other hand, Blainey affirms {ibid., p. 248): 'T h e evidence of past wars does not support the scapegoat theory and its assumption that rulers facing internal troubles often started a foreign war in the hope that a victory would promote peace at home.” 24. Frank H. Denton, “Some Regularities in International Conflict: 1820-1949,” Background, 9 (1966), No. 4, pp. 283-296. 25. Richard N. Rosecrance. Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963), pp. 304-305. See also pp. 291-300. 26. Thus, for example, Wilkenfeld writes in his Introduction to Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics: “In no way should the endeavor undertaken in the following pages be considered a quest for a general theory by which we will be able to predict and/ or explain the actions of nations. A theory of domestic and foreign conflict behavior will emerge only in the doubtful eventuality that we are able to isolate and measure properly virtually all variables operating in a given situation.” (p. 2). 27. Rudolf J. Rummel, “Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations,” in Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, pp. 59-106; Raymond Tanter, “Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1958-1960,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 10 (1966), pp. 4 1 -6 4 ; Jonathan Wilkenfeld, “Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations,” Journal o f Peace Research, 1 ( 1968), pp. 5 6 -6 9 ; “ Some Further Findings Regarding the Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations,” Journal o f Peace Research, 2 (1969), pp. 147-156; Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Dina A. Zinnes, “A Linkage Model of Domestic Conflict Behavior,” in Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, pp. 325-356; “An Analysis of Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations,” in Comparative Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, ed. Wolfram F. Hanrieder (New York: McKay, 1971), pp. 167-213; Robert Burrowes and Bertram Spector, “The Strength and Direction of Relationships Between Domestic Conflict and External Con­ flict and Cooperation: Syria, 1961-1967,” in Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, pp. 294-324. 28. Wilkenfeld, “Introduction,” in Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, p. 7.

Linkage Polities and C onflict Linkage

19

29. Rummel, “Dimensions of Conflict Behavior...,” p. 100. 30. Tanter, “Dimensions of Conflict Behavior...,” pp. 6 0-61. 31. Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, Gisela Hübner-Dick, Wolfgang Jagodzinski, Hans Rattinger, Erich Weede, “External and Internal Conflict Behavior Among Nations, 19661967,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 23 (1979), pp. 715-742. 32. Ibid., p. 739. 33. Leo Hazlewood, “Diversion Mechanisms and Encapsulation Processes: The Domestic Conflict-Foreign Conflict Hypothesis Reconsidered,” in Sage International Yearbook o f Foreign Policy Studies, Vol. Ill, ed. Patrick J. McGowan (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975), pp. 213-244. 34. Ibid., pp. 238-240. 35. Wilkenfeld, “Some Further Findings...,” p. 155. Wilkenfeld examined 74 countries in the period 1955 to 1960. 36. Wilkenfeld and Zinnes used Markov’s data in examining the connections be­ tween internal and external conflict behavior. Markov’s interpretation was that the previous level of internal conflict behavior affects the level that follows afterwards, while the external conflict behavior influences these transitions. Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Dina A. Zinnes, “A Linkage Model of Domestic Conflict Behavior,” pp. 325—356. 37. Leo A. Hazlewood, “Externalizing Systemic Stress: International Conflict as Adaptive Behavior,” in C onßct Behavior and Linkage Politics, pp. 148-190. 38. Ibid., p. 186. 39. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Neil R. Richardson, and Günter Richter, “Conflict at Home and Abroad: An Empirical Extension,1"Journal o f Politics, 40 (1978), pp. 742-752. 40. Ibid., p. 752. 41. Michael Haas, “Social Change and National Aggressiveness, 1900-1960,” in Quantitative International Politics, ed. J. David Singer (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 215 -244. 42. Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Virginia Lee Lussier and Dale Tahtinen, “Conflict Inter­ actions in the Middle East, 1949-1967,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution, XVI (1972), p. 150. 43. Wilkenfeld, “A Time-Series Perspective on Conflict Behavior in the Middle East,” in Sage International Yearbook o f Foreign Policy Studies, Vol. III, pp. 177-212. 44. John N. Collins, “Foreign Conflict Behavior and Domestic Disorder in Africa,” in Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, pp. 286-287. The opposite conclusion is reached by Sa’adia Touval in his work on African states. Touval does not use statistical tests: ’Thus, paradoxically, domestic instability was a factor promoting stability in inter­ state relations, whereas relative domestic stability has enabled states to pursue policies which had a de-stabilizing effect on the international scene.” (Sa’adia Touval, “The Sources of Status Quo and Irredentist Policies,” in African Boundary Problems, Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1970, p. 118). 45. Burrowes and Spector, “The Strength and Direction of Relationships...,’’ p. 315. 46. Robert Burrowes and Gerald DeMaio, “Domestic/Extemal Linkages - Syria, 1961 -1 9 6 7 ,” Comparative Political Studies, VII (1975), pp. 495-496 (Table 5). 47. Kuang-Sheng Liao, “Linkage Politics in China: Internal Mobilization and Articu­ lated External Hostility in the Cultural Revolution 1967—1969,” World Politics, XXVIII (1976), pp. 590-610.

2 A Critique of the Quantitative Approach Any attempt to criticize the quantitative approach towards conflict linkage research must first examine the quantitative approach as it applies to inter­ national relations in general. In recent years, this approach to international relations as a whole and to conflict linkage in particular has come under heavy critical attack. Criticism has come mostly from the traditional school, which absolutely rejects the use of quantitative approaches to international relations. Other criticism, however, has come from researchers within the quantitative school itself, who, in light of various studies that have been carried out to date, have suggested improved methods of research. The present study aims to examine the characteristic methodology of the quantitative approach, as well as the quality of data at its disposal, in order to arrive at a theoretical evaluation of this approach as it applies to conflict linkage research. The three areas of data, methodology and theory correspond to the major thrusts of criticism against the quantitative approach. Our own criticism is directed mainly against the way in which political events are used in quantitative research methodology, and on the failure of the quantitative school to develop its own theory of international relations.1 Data The quantitative approach to conflict linkage utilizes what are called “events data” in order to answer such questions as who does what to whom, with whom, and when.3 Edward Azar et al. defined events according to two sig­ nifications, conceptual and operative. An event from the conceptual point of view was defined as “any overt input and/or output of the type, ‘Who does what to whom and/or with whom and when,’ which may have ramifications for the behavior of an international actor or actors.” 3 According to Azar, the operative signification of an event is the same as the conceptual one, with the added stipulation that it be “recorded at least once in any publicly available source.” 4 Major sources available to researchers utilizing the events approach are newspapers, newspaper indexes, chronologies and the like, with events being culled from the news appearing in these sources. There are a number of critical questions concerning the development of criteria for identifying the best sources of news. How can a researcher deter-

21

22

Linkage Politics in the M iddle East

mine that the sources at his disposal do, in fact, provide useful material from which to take the desired events?5 Burrowes, for one, contends that a useful source is one that supplies “good events” —reports that can be relied on, that can be compared and that display “sensitivity.” 6 The question of authenticity (reports that can be relied on) is another very serious one, revolving around the following issues: First, whether the events reported have indeed occurred — they might actually be a fabrication or a plant by government news agencies; second, whether a given source reports the events in their entirety or only in part according to its own criteria; and third, whether various sources differ from each other, both in the kind of news they report and in the number of events they cover.7 In confronting the issue of reliability, Burrowes and Spector suggest utiliz­ ing the largest possible number and variety of sources, in order to ensure the widest coverage of events reported.8 Their proposal is based on the assump­ tion that each source tends both to report on different events and to stress some events differently. Even if a given source is a large “supplier of events” (the best way of testing this is by systematic and empirical comparison of the number of events reported in several different sources),9 the question remains whether it alone can report all the important events in a given state or region. Azar et al. were the first to test the use of different sources by empirically examining and comparing eight different sources covering events in the Middle East.10 Events initiated by Egypt and Israel outside their respective borders in the period from 1955—1958 were classified into different categories of conflict and cooperation. Azar et al. found that there were quantitative dif­ ferences in the coverage of events by different sources in the period in ques­ tion; simply put, different sources did not report the same events. The conclusions of Azar et al. confirm the contentions of Burrowes and Spector that: “Our findings serve as a strong warning against utilization of a single source for area studies, especially if one is directing his attention at the whole spectrum of international behaviors. It is quite apparent from our investigation that reliance on a source might generate strikingly dissimilar conclusions about international behavior.” 11 Burrowes himself followed in the steps of Azar et al. in examining the use of different sources. Among his questions were: Which source supplies the largest quantity of events? What combination of sources supplies the largest quantity of events with a minimum of duplication? Do sources differ from each other “qualitatively” (in terms of classes of events)? Do they differ in exactness of reporting?12 Burrowes examined the reporting of nine different sources on actions initiated by Syria, Jordan, Israel and Egypt over a period of two months each (January and February) in four selected years, 1951, 1952, 1962 and 1967.13 (He intentionally selected two periods of limited conflict as compared to two periods of more extensive conflict.) Burrowes divided events into various categories of cooperation and conflict on dif­ ferent levels, and found that sources differed from each other both in the

Critique o f the Quantitative Approach

23

quantity and quality (type) of events reported.14 In general, his research con­ firmed the findings of Azar et al.: only limited congruence was found between different sources in their reporting of events; while sources whose business was current reporting on events in a given region were the best suppliers of local events, compared with such général sources as the New York Times and the London Times.15 Great variation in the quality and quantity of sources covering different geographic regions or reporting a specific international episode — such as an international crisis — was also found in studies by Gary Hoggard, Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael Hudson, Charles Doran et al., John Sigler and others. Hoggard conducted two extensive source comparisons. In the first study, he examined events in China over a 10-month period as reported in the New York Times Index, the Asian Recorder and Deadline Data, and dis­ covered highly differential reporting of the events.16 In his second study, Hoggard examined the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, using the New York Times Index, Deadline Data, the Asian Recorder, and the Indian White Papers. Attempting to statistically determine the effects of differential source coverage on research findings, he found that: “ ...different sources... yield different levels of international interaction data, and that the reporting of the same events across sources is a small proportion of the total interaction reported. Different sources... tend to provide different research conclusions when analyses of more complex relationships are undertaken.“ 17 Taylor and Hudson compared the primary source of the New York Times Index with four secondary sources for five regions, and with four tertiary sources for seven countries. They found great variation in the quality of reporting on different geographic regions, with the largest discrepancy occur­ ring in news coverage of Africa. Many of the secondary sources proved useful to them in filling in the gaps of primary source reporting of regional issues. They did not find tertiary sources quite as useful.18 Doran et al. tried to determine which type of data source —global or regional —was more reliable in reporting specific regional issues such as politi­ cal instability. Replicating the Feierabend data collection for 11 Caribbean countries, they used the Hispanic American R eport and Spanish language journals instead of Deadline Data and the Yearbooks o f the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Their conclusions were interesting: both the proportional num­ ber of events and factor structures appeared to change significantly when regional sources were used. Regional sources provided a more accurate repre­ sentation of the nature of political instability in the Caribbean states for 1955—1957.19 Sigler arrived at almost the same conclusions when he compared regional coverage of global and regional sources (the New York Times, London Times, Le Monde, Jerusalem Post and al-Ahräm). According to Sigler’s findings, the use of global sources alone is not sufficient in analyzing events between regional actors of the international system.30

24

Linkage Politics in the Middle East

Hazlewood and Gerald West examined the effects of different numbers and types of sources (single, multiple, regional and global) on the pattern and structure of indicators of political conflict in Latin America during the years 1955—1960. In this context, they asked three questions: (1) What are the bivariate relationships between the same indicators in data sets among varying numbers and types of sources? (2) Do these common indicators arrange them­ selves according to comparable underlying structures? (3)-Does the use of a single source rather than multiple sources, or global sources rather than regional sources, produce any counting or content differences which might yield systematically different results when hypothesis-testing is undertaken? Comparing the West data with that of Banks, Rummel and Tanter and Feier­ abend and Feierabend, they tested the relationship between societal frag­ mentation, rapid economic growth and domestic political conflict and arrived at the following conclusions: (1) The use of several global sources does not markedly increase the extent of association with events counted from a single regional source. (2) Considerably different results obtain when one uses a global source rather than a regional source in the generation of events data on domestic political conflict. (3) Diverse data sets of domestic political conflict events produce quite similar factor structures whether drawn from global or regional sources. (4) There are some differences, perhaps appreciable, between patterns and structures of the global source and the regional source-generated data, although the correlations between the patterns and structures are not perfect. These findings suggest that the source coverage problem is unimportant for domestic political conflict in Latin America for the years 1955—1960.21 A number of conclusions can be drawn from these diverse studies: (1) No one source provides comprehensive coverage of all contemporary international events. (2) Regional sources provide a better indication for regional issues than do global sources, especially for a specific issue such as a domestic conflict. Moreover, valid regional research requires regional expertise in judging the accuracy and meaning of regional events.22 (3) Different sources may provide different research conclusions, especially when analyzing highly complex relationships. (4) Even the use of multiple sources (global or regional) does not relieve researchers of the responsibility to carefully examine the reliability and validity of their findings, especially when they involve complex relationships between internal and external political conflicts.23 (5) The validity of an event data set refers to its content validity — the degree to which the events observed are representative of the distribution of behavior.24 Hamid Mowlana has attempted to put forward a paradigm for testing the reliability of sources by identifying all the elements hable to reduce the

Critique o f the Quantitative Approach

25

reliability of a given report of events.25 Mowlana identified a whole gamut of elements that detract from reliability of reportage, including variations of reporting in different countries; differences in reporting resulting from the systems of beliefs, opinions, orientations or political slant of the editors and reporters; difference of emphasis on local, regional or international events; preference for covering certain events as against others (e.g. those involving conflict and violence rather than others); concentration of the paper’s reporters in specific parts of the world; education and qualifications of reporters; pressures for standardization; idiosyncratic and personal traits of reporters and editors; and the nature of censorship in areas where it exists 26 Mowlana’s paradigm offers, more than anything, a confirmation of the dif­ ficulties involved in examining the reliability of sources. Is it really possible to isolate the elements affecting the reliability of a given report so that it can be said with perfect certainty that the reported event actually occurred? The proposed paradigm is a contribution to the problematics of reliability rather than to its solution, since the complexity of the elements introduced out­ strips possible effective examination. Against this paradigm, Charles Hermann provided very useful criteria for event data collection: codes reliability, appli­ cability, comprehension and input clusters.27 Patrick McGowan suggested the use of Bayesian techniques to determine the validity of an event data source.28 The conclusions of these studies are especially important because many researchers, including those specializing in conflict linkage such as Rummel, Tanter and Wflkenfeld, have utilized sources which supply a relatively limited quantity and quality of events — especially for regions such as the Middle East.29 The question of reliability concretizes just how limited the events approach is in research on the political behavior or interaction between states. As long as this question has not been resolved — and it is doubtful whether it can be — it is hard to accept the events approach without great reservation. Methodology A general distinction must be drawn between the different uses of statistical techniques in these researches, first, between statistical techniques that are used to analyze events culled from the press and those utilized in linking the two types of conflict and second, between two methods of analysis: crosssectional and longitudinal. In the former distinction, two different uses of statistical technique can be identified. The first is that of categorizing events —i.e., reducing the number of variables. Rummel, for example, reduces nine variables of domestic conflict behavior (assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, major governmental crises, purges, riots, anti-government demonstrations, revolutions, number of people killed in internal violence) to three general dimensions: unorganized, spontaneous conflict; planned revolution; and clandestine subversion. Like-

26

Linkage Politics in the Middle East

wise, 13 variables of foreign conflict behavior (anti-foreign demonstrations, negative sanctions, protests, severance of diplomatic relations, expulsion or recall of ambassadors, expulsion or recall of lower-ranking officials, threats, military action, troop movements, mobilizations, accusations, number killed in different forms of external conflict, and wars) are reduced to three dimen­ sions: diplomacy, belligerency and war.30 Categorizing events within a limited number of dimensions is done by means of a statistical system known as factor analysis. Use of this technique is based on two assumptions: First, the data for every country are perceived as equal in importance and are thus given equal weight. A number of riots in the United States, for instance, is perceived as equal in importance to the same number of riots in Yemen, and both numbers are given equal weight in the output. Second, all the connections between main variables are seen as linear.31 Under the linear proposition, increases in domestic conflict must be followed by roughly comparable increases in foreign conflict. The possibility of a-linear connections is not considered relevant in this research because of technical difficulties. Besides examining connections between variables within each type of con­ flict behavior, Rummel also utilized factor analysis in examining the connec­ tions between domestic and foreign conflict. However, in this instance, further analysis turned out to be U nsuitable.” 32 Rummel therefore used a second statistical technique, multiple regression, to examine the correlation between variables in the two fields. Multiple regression also failed to confirm the exist­ ence of connections between the two classes of conflict.33 Rummers research, as noted before, was a pioneer effort in the quanti­ tative approach to conflict linkage. As such, it has become the focal point of criticism by researchers both of the traditional school and within the quanti­ tative school. The traditionalists’ criticism focuses mainly on the following points: (1) Use of a statistical approach to international politics. It is not possible to analyze political phenomena with statistics, traditionalists argue. Even if it were possible, only a limited circle of researchers have the proper grasp of statistical methods.34 (2) Rummers research lacks theoretical underpinnings. There are no criteria offered to explain just how he selected his variables.35 (3) The terminology “manifestations of conflict behavior” is likely to be of use only to those who utilize Rummers particular research methods. By focusing on manifestations of conflict behavior, rather than conflict, Rummel totally neglects to consider the causes and substance of a given conflict.36 (4) Rummel’s research does not explain the direction of links between variables.37 (5) Rummel’s basic assumption that different variables have equal weight for all countries is purely a-theoretical, since it ignores the differences in size, culture, economy and regime that exist in different types of nations. Not all

Critique o f the Quantitative Approach

27

events coded in the same conflict category have the same meaning or magni­ tude, even for one country, and events such as domestic conflict are not truly comparable across nations. Even statistical methods such as factor analysis cannot solve this problem by establishing data clusters.38 (6) The affirmation that relationship between the variables is necessarily linear is also basically a-theoretical.39 (7) No criteria are suggested regarding the length of various time units chosen for analyzing data. A number of different time units have been utilized without classification as to the appropriate time unit for examining the relationship between domestic and foreign conflict.40 The most striking conclusion from these criticisms is that the use of a statistical approach in the empirical testing of connections between domestic and foreign conflicts has been done without any proper theoretical orien­ tation. The precedence given to technical constraints involved in statistical testing has pushed aside other methodological constraints. Within the quantitative school, criticism of Rummel and Tanter has focused on their use of “cross-sectional” and macro-quantitative analysis —i.e., comparative analysis of many countries at the same point in time. Burrowes, Wilkenfeld and others are opposed to this approach in view of two main drawbacks. First, it treats all the countries examined on an equal basis, ignor­ ing their differences. Second, cross-sectional analysis focuses on one point in time only, and in so doing ignores behavior changes that may occur over a period of time. Such one-point focusing also makes it impossible to deter­ mine whether a given conflict behavior is either accidental or a one-time event.41 Burrowers has also criticized Rummel and Tanter for using superficial criteria when defining a country for the purposes of their research, in order to ensure the largest possible number of forecasts.43 As another critic, Arthur Kalleberg, argues, “Two objects being compared must be of the same class.” 43 How can one deal with countries like the U.S. and Yemen in the same research without examining the differences between them? In an effort to overcome this difficulty, Wilkenfeld proposed testing the links between domestic and foreign conflicts according to type of country. However, his division of countries into three main categories — personal, centralist and polyarchist — did not produce significant results.44 Moreover, by reducing the number of units examined, Wilkenfeld also adversely affected the results of his research from the statistical point of view.45 While Wilkenfeld’s proposal cannot be dismissed, his typology does not adequately reflect the spectrum of variations among states. His assumption that links between domestic and foreign conflicts are determined by the character of the national polity is an acceptable one. However, acceptance of this assumption neces­ sitates limiting the number of countries under examination. And this would be a striking deviation from the primary intention of the quantitative school, for by reducing generalization the statistical findings would also be adversely

28

Linkage Politics in the Middle East

affected. Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that results of one case study or a small number of case studies can be applied to a larger number of cases.46 Burrowes’ and Wilkenfeld’s solution to the problems of cross-sectional analysis was to use a system known as time-series, or longitudinal analysis. Instead of testing the links between the two types of conflict in many countries at one point in time, this system tests the links in one country or a limited number of countries by use of a time-series over a long period: Longitudinal research can be designed to ascertain the directionality of relationships between variables... one can observe whether trends in postulated independent variables consistently precede those in the hypothesized dependent variable. Results may be computed as timelagged correlations between per capita GNP of year X and fertility of yearX + N.47 In the opinion of its supporters, the advantages of longitudinal analysis are as follows: (1) Since it is limited to one country or a small number of countries, the problem of comparison is considerably reduced. It is possible to avoid the methodological problems involved in such questions as whether a demon­ stration in the U.S. “equals” one in Yemen, since “even over long time periods it is likely that a given characteristic will have the same cultural mean­ ing within a single political system.” 48 On the other hand, longitudinal analysis allows comparison between nations on a regional basis: “Comparative longitudinal studies enable one to test the ‘regionally’ hypothesis, that is, whether variables are intercorrelated differently from one cultural area to another.” 49 (2) Longitudinal analysis makes it possible to reduce the number of cases tested without concern for statistical validity; the time dimension ensures a different kind of validity by examining events over a long period. (3) It is possible to ensure a high degree of accuracy and reliability in the data collected when only one country or a limited number of countries are being researched. Press sources that concentrate on the country or countries under research may be used in addition to more general sources, and in this way the reliability of the data is enlarged from both the quantitative and qualitative points of view.50 (4) By testing correlations between domestic and external conflict over different periods of time, it can be determined whether or not the correlation between internal and external conflict behavior depends on a time dimension, — i.e., whether internal conflict behavior of one kind over a specific time influences external conflict behavior over another period of time, and vice versa. (5) With longitudinal analysis, it is possible to test links between the two types of conflict in two directions,using a time dimension as the intermediary

Critique o f the Quantitative Approach

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between the two types of conflict. In other words, the two types of conflict can serve as either dependent or independent variables.51 Burrowes and Spector made use of this system to test the links between domestic and foreign conflict in Syria for the years 1961—1967. They sought to show the existence of links between the two kinds of conflict by testing gaps in time between them. For this purpose, the two researchers made use of 24 indicators of conflict behavior for 74 periods of four weeks each during the years 1961—1967. The main finding, of this research confirmed the findings of Rummel and Tanter to the effect that there are no links to be found between the two kinds of conflict, even through research utilizing time-series.52 Longitudinal analysis is no doubt better than the cross-sectional analysis used by Rummel and Tanter — but it too presents many difficulties, as Bur­ rowes and Spector themselves point out: “An inspection of the scatter plots of pairs of indicators suggested that, even when log transformed, many of the series of data produced correlations which were highly unstable and the anti­ facts of many ‘zero-entries’ and a few high values.” 53 Zinnes notes another difficulty: “Taking measures for the same country at successive time points raises serious questions about the independence of observations which in turn has implications for the statistical analyses and casts some doubt on the results.” Moreover, Burrowes’ and Spector’s study: “ ...treats the data at the various time points for a given nation as if they were independent, and do not actually examine in a longitudinal sense the changes that occur in a given measure through time. In other words, they do not use the time series properties of the data in the analyses.” 54 In longitudinal analysis, the main difficulty is the choice of criteria for determining the time gaps which may affect the links between the two types of conflict — i.e., criteria according to which it will be possible to determine that a given time gap is linked with one or other type of domestic or external conflict. Andrew Mack, for one, believes that in the absence of theoretical argumentation to clarify the causal connections between the two types of conflict, there is no way of choosing such criteria.55 Theory The central criticism directed against the quantitative approach is that it lacks a theoretical framework to give direction to the hypotheses under empirical examination.56 Quantitative researchers have tended to test hypotheses put forth by the traditional school without ever asking why these hypotheses had not been previously tested. One answer to the question is that traditionalists never had difficulty explaining the links between internal and external politi­ cal conflicts because they always viewed such links as a natural phenomenon that could be taken for granted. Another answer is that traditionalists have always had difficulties in dealing with the conceptual and methodological

30

Linkage Politics in the Middle East

complications of empirically testing conflict linkage. As long as there seemed to be no way to overcome these difficulties, there seemed to be little point in even attempting an empirical examination of their hypotheses. Quantitative researchers have held the opposite point of view: that by empirically testing the hypotheses, it would be possible to arrive at a theoreti­ cal level. Is the use of empirical testing sufficient to establish a theory? And is the quantitative approach the only empirical method for testing hypotheses of conflict4inkage? Rummel, et al. have answered both these questions in the positive: “The test of whether such theory is indeed a theory is whether it can be empirically falsified... The term explanation adds nothing to the term cause... The explanation of phenomena is nothing more than being able to predict or mathematically relate phenomena.” 57 In the face of this conception, it is not surprising that theoretical efforts of the quantitative approach have concentrated solely on identifying good statis­ tical methods, rather than creating a theoretical framework for testing the linkage between internal and external political conflicts. The findings of these studies are therefore not particularly convincing: they amount, in essence, to an examination of the correlations between different events within the two spheres of conflict. It is unfortunate that the quantitative school has concen­ trated on pure empiricism because in so doing, it has evaded substantive questions whose presentation would have led it to a more exact testing of the principles of conflict linkage. Quantitative studies have made no attempt to examine the theoretical nature of links between internal and external conflicts —i.e., to find out why there is or is not linkage, what affects the direction of the links, what accounts for the existence or absence of the links, etc. Cain and Watts have made it clear that without a theoretical framework showing the nature of links be­ tween variables, there is no way of understanding the statistical findings: Without a theoretical framework to provide order and rationale for the large number of variables, we have no way of interpreting the statistical results. Regression and correlation analysis is properly used to estimate parameters for a model only when the structure of that model and the elements which make up the theory are already well specified. This specification of the structure must precede the application of the statis­ tical techniques.58 Brunner, too, argues convincingly that various statistical methods such as cor­ relations or regressions do not point to any theoretical framework in either cross-sectional or longitudinal quantitative analysis.59 The main question the quantitative school should have asked is the one formulated by Warren Phillips: “To what extent can data — even time-series data — be used to identify the basic structure of a theory of international interactions?” 60 Searching for empirical generalizations, as Oran Young points out, “ ...does not offer a rewarding prospect from the point of view of

Critique o f the Quantitative Approach

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theory building... treated as an end in itself and without careful incorporation into one or more theoretical formulations, the identification of empirical regularities does little to facilitate the explanation of interrelationships among variables involved.” 61 Bruce Russett, who himself belonged to the quantitative school, agrees with that argument: “Doing political analysis without theory is like fishing with a bent pin in a laundry tub...” 62 The absence of a theoretical framework is strikingly apparent in the fact that a majority of the different indicators of conflict identified and defined by various quantitative researchers are not at all distinguished from each other theoretically, but are identified and defined on a simple, impressionist basis. There is no attempt to define a conflict according to types or com­ ponents. The question arises: Is it at all possible to understand conflict behavior or the linkage between political conflicts solely by means of quanti­ tative analyses of events and/or “manifestations of conflict behavior”? Except for Rummel, all the researchers utilizing quantitative approaches have ignored this critical question. Rummel admits that manifestations of conflict behavior can actually be expressed by a small number of conflict situations, and that focusing solely on the former can have a detrimental effect on the validity of the conclusions.63 It is not difficult to understand why quantitative researchers have concentrated solely on manifestations of conflict behavior such as wars, demonstrations, strikes, killings and the like: behavior manifestations such as these are seen to be susceptible of measure­ ment, unlike actual conflict situations. Thus, the sole criterion for defining a conflict has been the external behavior of a given state. Although utilization of quantitative behavioral manifestations facilitates empirical research, the question remains whether such manifestations actually reflect the fundamen­ tal nature of the phenomenon under investigation, or merely give some indi­ cation of the phenomenon. Focusing on manifestations of domestic or foreign conflict behavior cannot replace an understanding of the conflict itself. The quantitative approach is useful only if it is linked to the wider context of the political phenomenon under investigation.64 It is impossible, for example, to merely fit every demonstration, riot or coup into a general inventory of demonstrations, riots and coups. Every demonstration or coup is a symptom of a given political situation, and in some cases it is even debatable whether this type of behavior manifestation is an indicator of domestic conflict or political instability. As Joseph Scolnick points out: In many nations they [demonstrations] may be legal and legitimate in both the society’s and the government’s views, as well as extremely common. They may have a regular place in a state’s political process... in some countries they may be neither a sign of genuine instability nor a threat to the government, and so should not have been employed as indicators of violence or instability.65 The question that has to be asked is not only how many demonstrations

32

Linkage Politics in the Middle East

or coups take place, but why they take place, what the conditions are that influence their occurring, and what are the various links connecting these events with different kinds of political conflict. It is also questionable whether all types of domestic and external conflict behavior should even be included in studies of internal-external conflict. Zinnes argues that a significant correlation between certain types of domestic and external conflict behavior does not necessarily prove the relationship between internal and external conflicts. A correlation, for instance, between riots and anti-foreign demonstrations or between governmental crises and the severance of diplomatic relations does not necessarily strengthen the argu­ ment that there is a link between domestic and foreign conflict behavior. The correlation may corroborate the hypothesis — but most certainly does not prove it.66 In order to examine the nature of the relationship between internal and external conflict, a researcher must ask the following questions: Why might there be a connection between the two conflicts? What affects the direction and intensity of the connection? What are the conditions that act as interven­ ing variables for the existence or absence of a linkage?67 Such conditions, which include the internal political structure of a state, its type of regime and political actors, the form of interaction between internal political actors and the distribution of political power in the political structure, the external political environment, and the types of internal and external conflicts existing, may all act as intervening variables that influence the nature and direction of the relationship between the two conflicts. As Scolnick rightly points out, two models are needed — one concerning the effects of domestic conflict on external conflict and one concerning the effects of external conflict on domestic conflict.68 Development of these two models and clarification of the conditions acting as intervening variables for these relationships is crucial to the advancement of research in the field of linkage conflict.69

NOTES 1. For similar critical criteria, see Andrew Mack, “Numbers Are Not Enough,” Com­ parative Politics, 7 (1975), pp. 597-618; Joseph M. Scolnick, “An Appraisal of Studies of the Linkage Between Domestic and International Conflict,” Comparative Political Studies, 6 (1974), pp. 485-509. 2. Edward E. Azar, Richard A. Brody, Charles A. McClelland, International Events Interactions Analysis: Some Research Considerations (A Sage Professional Paper Inter­ national Studies Series, Vol. 1,1972). 3. Edward E. Azar, Stanley H. Cohen, Thomas O. Jukam and James M. McCormick, “The Problem of Source Coverage in the Use of International Events Data,” Inter­ national Studies Quarterly, 16 (1972), p. 373. 4. Ibid., p. 374. 5. Loc. cit. This question is defined as the “problem of source coverage.” 6. Robert Burrowes, “Multiple Time-Series Analysis of National-Level Data,” Com­ parative Political Studies, 2 (1969/70), p. 468.

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7. Apart from the question of reliability, research on the events approach revealed additional difficulties - defined by Burrowes as technical or practical - such as the absence of uniform criteria for collecting, identifying and classifying events accepted by different researchers; some researchers’ reliance on ‘events’ collected by other researchers without examining them themselves; and the difficulty of creating identical measuringrods for different events in different countries and cross-nationally. See Robert Burrowes, “Theory Si, Data No! A Decade of Cross-National Political Research,” World Politics, XXV (1972), pp. 133-141. 8. Burrowes and Spector, “The Strength and Direction of Relationships Between Domestic and External Conflict and Cooperation: Syria 1961-1967,” in Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, ed. Jonathan Wilkenfeld (New York: McKay, 1973), pp. 298-299. 9. Burrowes and Spector were the first to propose such testing. See: “Conflict and Cooperation Within and Among Nations: Enumerative Profiles of Syria, Jordan and the United Arab Republic, January 1965 to May 1967,” presented at the annual meeting of International Studies Association, April 2-4, 1970, apud Azar et al., “The Problem of Source Coverage,” International Studies Quarterly, p. 375. 10. Ibid., pp. 376-387. 11. Ibid., p. 386. 12. Robert Burrowes, “Mirror, Minor on the Wall... A Comparison of Event-Data Sources,” in Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings and Methods, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: John Wiley. 1974), pp. 383-406. 13. The sources were: (1) Cahiers de l ’Orient Contemporain ; (2) Middle East Journal ; (3) New York Times In d ex; (4) New York Times', (5) Times (London); (6) Deadline Data; (7) Facts on File', (8) Kessing’s Contemporary Archives', (9) Asian Recorder. 14. Burrowes, “Minor, Mirror on the Wall...,” pp. 393-397. 15. Ibid., p. 396. 16. Gary D. Hoggard, “Comparison Reporting of New York Times Index, Asian Recorder and Deadline Data - Chinese Interactions January/October, 1962,” mimeo. Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1969. 17. Gary D. Hoggard, “Differential Source Coverage in Foreign Policy Analysis,” in Comparing Foreign Policies, pp. 353-382, n. 371. 18. Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook o f Political and Social Indicators (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 417-423. 19. Charles F. Doran, Robert E. Pendley and George E. Antunes, “A Test of CrossNational Event Reliability,” International Studies Quarterly, 17 (1973), pp. 175-203. 20. John H. Sigler. “Reliability Problems in the Measurement of International Events in the Elite Press,” Applications o f Events Data Analysis: Cases, Issues, and Programs in International Interaction, eds. John H. Sigler, John O. Field, and Murray L. Adelman (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), pp. 9 -2 9 . 21. Leo A. Hazlewood and Gerald T. West, “Bivariate Associations, Factor Struc­ tures and Substantive Impact,” International Studies Quarterly, 18 (1974), pp. 317-337. 22. Robert Burrowes and Bertram Spector, “Conflict and Cooperation Within and Among Nations,” Presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Asso­ ciation, Pittsburg (April 1970). '23. Hoggard, “Differential Source Coverage...,” pp. 357, 371. 24. Patrick J. McGowan, “A Bayesian Approach to the Problem of Events Data Validity,” in Comparing Foreign Policies, pp. 407-433. 25. Hamid Mowlana, “A Paradigm for Source Analysis in Events Data Research: Mass Media and Problems of Validity,” International Interactions, 2 (1975), pp. 33-44. 26. Ibid., p. 36; see also Lloyd Jensen, “Levels of Political Development and InterState Conflict in Southeast Asia,” in Foreign Policy and the Developing Nations, ed. Richard Butwell (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969), pp. 191-208.

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27. Charles F. Hermann, “What is a Foreign Policy Event,” in Comparative Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, ed. Wolfram F. Hanrieder (New York: McKay, 1971), pp. 295-321. 28. See note 24. 29. See also Burrowes, “Theory Si, Data No!...,” p. 133. 30. Rummel, “Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations,” in Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, pp. 59-106. 31. Ibid., p. 76. 32. Ibid., p. 90. Many researchers after Rummel used factor analysis to categorize the variables in each “field” of conflict. 33. Ibid., p. 91. 34. Gordon Hilton, A Review o f the Dimensionality o f Nations Project (London: Sage, 1973), pp. 5 0 -5 2 ; Hedley Bull, “The Case for a Classical Approach,” in Contend­ ing Approaches to International Relations, eds. Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 26; Robert Jervis, “The Costs of Quantitative Study of International Relations,” in Contending Approaches..., pp. 178— 179,206. 35. Hilton op. cit., p. 51 ; Scolnick, “An Appraisal of Studies...,” pp. 496-497. 36. Loc. cit. 37. Jervis, “The Costs of Quantitative Study...,” pp. 212-213. 38. Ted Robert Gurr, “The Neo-Alexandrians: A Review on Data Handbooks in Political Science,” The American Political Science Review, 68 (1974), pp. 250-252. 39. Rummel, “Dimensions of Conflict Behavior...,” p. 76. The only attempt that called for a non-linear connection between the variables was made by Hazlewood. He encountered a situation in which certain levels of mass protest (domestic conflict) are unlikely to be strongly related to foreign conflict, while a more extreme and chronic level of mass protest is a stress to the society which might be diverted to foreign targets: Leo Hazlewood, “Diversion Mechanisms and Encapsulation Processes: The Domestic Conflict - Foreign Conflict Hypothesis Reconsidered,” in Sage International Yearbook o f Foreign Policy Studies, Vol. Ill, ed. Patrick J. McGowan (Beverly Hills: Sage Publi­ cations, 1975), pp. 213-244. 40. Scolnick, “An Appraisal of Studies...,” pp. 495-496. 41. Burrowes, “Multiple Time-Series Analysis...,” p. 468. 42. Loc. cit. Rummel and Tanter defined a country as a sovereign state in existence for at least two years, with a population of at least 800,000. See Rummel, “Dimensions of Conflict Behavior...,” p. 73 and Tanter, “ Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1958-1960,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 10 (1966), p. 43. Gurr and Ruttenberg defined a state as “any national entity or collectivity with a popu­ lation of a million or more in 1962.” This definition also falls short in many respects. Ted Gurr and C. Ruttenberg, The Conditions o f Civil Violence: First Tests o f a Causal Model (Princeton Center of International Studies, Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 19. 43. Arthur L. Kalleberg, “The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of Political Systems,” World Politics, XIX (1966), p. 76, apud Burrowes. “Multiple Time-Series Analysis...,” p. 469. 44. Wilkenfeld, “Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations,” in Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, pp. 107-123. 45. Robert Burrowes and Gerald DeMaio, “Domestic/External Linkages, Syria 19611967,” Comparative Political Studies, 7 (1975), p. 505. 46. Andrew Mack, “Numbers Are Not Enough...,” Comparative Politics, 7 (1975), p. 610. 47. Michael Haas, “Aggregate Analysis,” World Politics, XIX (1966), p. 118. 48. Ibid., p. 117; see also Burrowes, “Multiple Time-Series...,” p. 474.

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49. Haas, “Aggregate Analysis,” p. 117. 50. Burrowes, “Multiple Time-Series...,” p. 474. 51. Andrew Mack, “Numbers Are Not Enough...,” p. 611. 52. Burrowes and Spector, “Strength and Direction of Relations...,” pp. 294-321. 53. Ibid., p. 299. 54. Dina A. Zinnes, Contemporary Research in International Relations: A Perspec­ tive and a Critical Appraisal (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pp. 168-169. 55. Andrew Mack, “Numbers Are Not Enough...,” p. 612. 56. Robert T. Holt and John M. Richardson Jr., “Competing Paradigms in Com­ parative Politics,” in The Methodology o f Comparative Research, eds. Robert T. Holt and John G. Turner (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 68; Burrowes, “Theory Si, Data No!,” pp. 129-132 Mack, op. cit., p. 613; Scolnick, “An Appraisal of Studies,” pp. 499-503. 57. Rummel, “Understanding Factor Analysis,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 11 (1967), p. 453; Hilton, A Review o f the Dimensionality o f Nations Project, p. 59. 58. G. Cain and H. Watts, “ Problems in Making Policy Inference from the Coleman Report,” American Sociological Review (April 1970), p. 229, apud Warren R. Phillips, “The Theoretical Approaches in the Events Data Movement,” International Interactions, 2 (1975), p. 6. 59. R.P. Brunner, “Data Analysis, Proven Analysis and System Change,” Paper prepared for the 66th Annual Meeting APSA, apud Phillips, loc. cit. 60. Phillips, loc. cit. 61. Oran R. Young, “Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor,” World Politics, 21 (1968-69), p. 491. 62. Bruce M. Russett, “The Young Science of International Politics,” World Politics, 22 (1969-70), p. 93. 63. Rummel, “Dimensions of Foreign and Domestic Conflict Behavior: A Review of Empirical Findings,” in Theory and Research on the Causes o f War, eds. Dean G. Pruitt and Richard C. Snyder (Englewood Cliffs. N J.: Prentice Hall, 1969), p. 220. 64. Paul W. Schroeder, “Quantitative Studies in the Balance of Power: An Historian’s Reaction,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 21 (1977), pp. 5 -7 ; “A Final Rejoinder,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 21 (1977), pp. 6 0-63. 65. Scolnick, “An Appraisal of Studies...,” pp. 496-497. 66. Zinnes, Contemporary Research in International Relations..., pp. 166-167. 67. Arthur A. Stein, “Conflict and Cohesion: A Review of the Literature,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 20 (1976), p. 165. 68. Scolnick, “An Appraisal of Studies...,” p. 503. 69. Hazlewood was the first among the quantitative scholars who reconsidered the hypothesis on diversion mechanisms and encapsulation processes in order to clarify the form and nature of linkage between domestic and foreign conflict. But Hazlewood’s study still concentrated on 75 countries and used only statistical methods (Hazlewood, “Diversion Mechanisms and Encapsulation Processes...,” pp. 213-214).

3 A Proposed Method of Research The review of various studies on conflict linkage brings into relief two interest­ ing phenomena: first, the clear distinction between theory and empiricism; and second, the distinction between linkage politics and conflict linkage. The former of these two is the more interesting. What exists in such a case are two separate intellectual efforts concerning research into similar phenom­ ena. The distinction is between attempts to develop a theory without testing it empirically, and attempts at empirical testing of a theory without any effort to develop that theory. There is nothing wrong with this division of labor between theorists and empiricists in research, provided that both follow an operative, theoretical framework that identifies a limited number of vari­ ables, and defines them in such a way that it is possible to examine them empirically.1 The present work, however, holds that the division of labor between theorists and empiricists has been basically faulty, and thus conflict linkage research has been slow to develop. The traditionalists’ propositions on conflict linkage are hardly more than tentative and extremely general. The quantitative school on the other hand, has accepted and tested these propositions without attempting to identify the relevant variables.2 Quantitative efforts have been guided by the assump­ tion that empirical testing would either strengthen the theoretical basis of the traditional propositions or else completely disprove them. Results of these efforts to date, which show at best limited connections between the two types of conflict, are the best proof of the fundamental flaw in quantitative research. The present work accepts as hypotheses the traditionalists’ prop­ ositions that connections do exist between the two types of conflict, but affirms in addition that these hypotheses are not susceptible of empirical proof unless an operative theoretical schema identifying relevant variables is presented. This work also assumes that quantitative examination of the con­ nections between the two types of conflict does not suffice for understanding the phenomenon of conflict linkage — it is also necessary to examine these connections by means of historical, qualitative analysis. The second phenomenon emerging from our review of conflict linkage studies is the absence of any attempt so far to utilize linkage politics in the construction of a theoretical framework for examining the connections be­ tween internal and external political conflicts. Conflict linkage scholars —

37

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Linkage Politics in the Middle East

mainly those of the quantitative school — did not utilize the ideas of linkage politics or a linkage framework for the following reasons: first, because of the vagueness of Rosenau’s linkage ideas; and second, because of the absence of any possibility of testing the linkage framework by quantitative, cross-national analysis, given the difficulty of identifying and quantifying the variables pro­ posed by the linkage framework.3 The present work holds that in order to promote research on linkage politics and conflict linkage, the following two­ fold synthesis must be achieved: • A synthesis between the idea of linkage politics and conflict linkage. We hold that the connections between internal and external conflict are part of a wider whole, which Rosenau called linkage politics, and that it is possible to make use of linkage politics as a source for understanding the relationship between internal and external conflicts. • A synthesis between the theoretical and empirical efforts, mainly by means of presenting an operative theoretical framework that will identify a limited number of variables. These variables will be defined such that they can be tested empirically. Rosenau’s linkage politics ideas were meant to provide a synthesis between the two main levels in international relations research, that of the state and of the system. However, the vagueness of Rosenau’s definitions and the presen­ tation of linkage politics as a framework solely for foreign policy did not produce the desired synthesis. The main problem facing Rosenau, and indeed any student of linkage politics, is to first draw a clear distinction between the two research levels, and second, to locate the meeting-points between the two levels in such a way that it is possible to construct a schema fitting them both together — in other words, to distinguish between linkage politics as a foreign policy theory and as a system theory. The question is when and under what conditions linkage theory reverts from the state to the system level. Linkage theory on the state level focuses on identifying the connections between variables within the internal and external political environments of a given international actor, when the variables within the internal political environment predominate in shaping foreign policy. Linkage theory on the system level is based on the state level, but focuses instead on foreign policy outputs of a given actor that generate interactions between actors either in the international system or a sub-system of the international system. In order to facilitate making this distinction between the two research levels in linkage politics, the present work proposes to distinguish between the following ideas: linkage foreign policy (of which there are two variants); internal linkage environment; linkage system or sub-system; and linkage processes. These terms are briefly defined as follows: Linkage foreign policy. (1) Foreign policy of an international actor, with the constraints of the internal political environment as the main factors affecting foreign policy-making. (2) Foreign policy of an international actor

Proposed M ethod o f Research

39

that is directed towards changing or maintaining the political behavior of another international actor by activating various elements within the internal political environment of the other international actor. Internal linkage environment. Internal political environment which serves as a connecting link between two international actors through the medium of various elements within the environment (e.g., interest groups, competing elites). Internal political elements that serve as connecting links will be ident­ ified as international actors and defined as linkage groups.4 Linkage system or sub-system. An international system or sub-system where the main patterns of interaction (conflict or cooperation) between actors are considerably influenced by the patterns of interaction between various elements of the internal political environment of at least one of the actors.5 Linkage processes. A series of interactions between the internal political actors of a given state and other governments. Using these terms, we shall try to both distinguish between the two re­ search levels of linkage politics, and to bridge the gap between the two levels. THE STATE LEVEL First variant. The first variant of linkage foreign policy somewhat re­ sembles those foreign policy frameworks that view foreign policy outputs as a function of constraints within both the internal and external political environments of a given state. This variant, however, focuses on the pre­ dominance of internal political constraints in the shaping of foreign policy. In­ ternal political constraints are defined as a function of a system of interactions between variables of the internal political environment. These variables con­ sist of the political structure (referring mainly to the type of regime of a given state); internal political actors (the decision-making elite, interest groups and competing elites); relative strength of the different internal political actors; and the nature of interactions between internal political actors. Theoretical support for this variant is provided to a certain extent by Michael Brecher's foreign policy framework, which identifies both internal and external political variables relevant to foreign policy-making. Brecher defines five internal political variables — political structure, interest groups, competing elites, economic capability and military capability.6 According to Brecher, internal political structure is defined as follows: Political structure denotes in part the political institutions and consti­ tutional matrix in which authoritative decisions are made. It refers as well to various traits of the political system which may influence the decision process in foreign policy: the type of political régime (authori­ tarian or consensual); the character of the party system (two party or

40

Linkage Politics in the Middle East multi-party); civil-military relations of control; and the extent of con­ tinuity and stability of the authority structures in the system. It is necessary to assess the influence of these characteristics in the specific issues under analysis.7

Brecher goes on to define three types of political actors: decision-making (ruling) elites, competing elites and interest groups.8 Decisionmaking elites are individuals or groups who have the authority to make décisions in foreign policy. Competing elites, on the other hand, view themselves as candidates to take power in place of the existing decision-making elite. Competing elites stand for a general and/or specific foreign policy alternative. These elites may be other parties (in a competitive, multi-party system) or different segments of the ruling party (in a one-party system). In describing interest groups which can influence foreign policy formation, Brecher utilizes the work of Gabriel Almond, who identified four main kinds of groups: institutional, associational, non-associa tional and anomic.9 Institutional interest groups are identified as the military establishment, bureaucratic organizations and religious institutions. The officer corps and certain sectors of the bureaucratic establishment (foreign office, finance and commerce) are the most important institutional interest groups. Associational interest groups are identified mainly with trade and commerce associations — peasant unions, for example, who have a specific interest in various aspects of foreign policy such as international trade, agricultural sales and cooperative agreements. Non-associational interest groups are identified mainly as family, class and regional groups that aspire to promote specific foreign policy aims through such intermediaries as private citizens, cliques and family heads. The non-associational group also includes members of the mass media and academics who are interested in promoting both specific and general foreign policy aims. Finally, there are anomic eruptions —spontaneous, unorganized interventions in the political system by various population groups in the form of demonstrations, riots, assassinations and the like. Such actions are intended to demonstrate dissatisfaction with existing foreign affairs policy. The importance of interest groups lies mainly in the pressure they can exert on decision-making elite in terms of getting it to act or refrain from acting in various foreign policy situations. Pressures exerted by interest groups are a function of their special interests and of their perceptions (sets of images, beliefs, etc.) regarding the external environment. Although Brecher’s framework identifies internal political actors as main variables, it does not identify what causes these variables to become dominant in foreign policy formation. Brecher’s framework is intended only to present the relevant variables, not the system of interactions between them or their relative importance as compared to other variables. The usefulness of this framework lies mainly in its identification of internal political actors as im­ portant variables in the shaping of foreign policy.

Proposed M ethod o f Research

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The central question thus remains how to identify conditions or circum­ stances under which internal political variables become predominant in foreign policy formation. Identifying these conditions is not a matter of generalizing, of making up an exact, well-tried prescription. The process of foreign policy decision-making is so complex that it is difficult to take each internal and external variable and completely isolate its influence on foreign policy. For each separate foreign policy decision, the influence of internal and external variables has to be examined anew. There is no doubt that the predominance of one or another set of variables can change according to type of decision, different political structure, or different circumstances. The present study proposes the following hypothesis to tentatively identify the conditions under which internal political variables tend to be predominant in foreign policy formation: In circumstances where the ruling elite’s reten­ tion of power depends upon its response to foreign policy demands of either the competing elite or various interest groups, the influence of internal con­ straints becomes predominant in the shaping of foreign policy. These circum­ stances tend to exist in situations where the ratio of political (and sometimes military) strength tends to favor political rivals, or where the basis of public support for the regime is relatively limited. Second variant. The second variant of linkage foreign policy describes an international actor’s foreign policy that is directed towards changing or main­ taining the political behavior of another international actor by means of activating various elements (linkage groups) within the second actor’s internal environment. This variant resembles the models of intervention and external influence developed by George Modelski, Karl Deutsch and others.10 Using this variant, we can identify interactions between three main elements: actor A, who is interested in changing or maintaining the political behavior of actor B; and linkage groups —elements within the internal political environment of B. Linkage groups serve as middle or intermediate links in the interactions be­ tween A and B. In this foreign policy variant, a situation is assumed where A cannot or does not attempt to change or maintain the behavior of B by means of direct, inter-governmental interaction, either because this would not secure desired results, or because A believes that activation of the linkage groups will pro­ duce better results. Use of linkage groups as the catalysts for change in B is really an indirect activation of a system of pressures on B’s ruling elite to get it to respond favorably to A’s demands. Examples of such situations are the activation of the U.S. Jewish “lobby” by the Israeli government in order to secure a favorable change in U.S. government policy vis-à-vis Israel; activation of the French or Italian Communist parties by the UÜ.SJR. in an effort to change French or Italian foreign policy ; or Nasser’s activation of ‘Nasserite’ elements in Jordan, Iraq and Syria in the 1960’s in order to bring about a change in these nations’ policies. Interaction processes in situations such as

42

Linkage Politics in the Middle East

these will be defined as linkage processes: i.e., processes between A and elements in the internal political environment of B that are intended to change the system of interactions between the two actors. The question remains what conditions make possible the existence of a linkage process. The answer, in brief, is that linkage processes hinge upon the set of loyalties of the various linkage groups. In situations where linkage groups have a two-fold loyalty — both to the national system within which they function (actor B) and to another national system (actor A) —the con­ ditions are created for A’s activation of a linkage process. The linkage groups’ actual response depends upon their degree of loyalty to actor A and neces­ sarily, their degree of disloyalty vis-à-vis the ruling elite -of actor B. This, in turn, is a function of the type of loyalty in question —whether it be ethnic, political, ideological, economic, religious, cultural, etc. The greater the dif­ ferences between B’s ruling elite and the linkage groups, the greater the likely attachment between the linkage groups and A — and the readier their re­ sponse to A’s demands.11 Linkage processes can be identified as effective or non-effective. Effective processes bring about interaction between actors A and B in a direction A views as desirable. The degree of effectiveness is a function of both the linkage groups’ degree of responsiveness to the demands of A, and the degree of response by B’s responsible foreign policy-making elements (the ruling elite) to the pressures or demands of the linkage groups. The ruling elite can either respond to the demands of the linkage groups — i.e., agree to a change in foreign policy — or reject these demands and await the development of internal political conflict. Actor B’s degree of response to the linkage groups is mainly a function of the system of interactions (either cooperation or con­ flict) between the ruling elite and the linkage groups; the ratio of political power between them; and the degree of legitimacy of the ruling elite and its foreign policy in the eyes of the general public and/or army. Deutsch believes that in situations where the ruling elite differs with the demands of the linkage groups (demands that have been activated by the external environment — i.e., actor A), the ruling elite can take steps to either cut off or considerably reduce A’s influence. There are several possible courses of action: framing a national policy that forces linkage groups to differentiate between their loyalty to the national system and loyalty to the external environment — such loyalty being branded as contrary to nationalism and national sovereignty; increasing control of the communications media in order to restrict contacts between the linkage groups and actor A; banning the activities of linkage groups insofar as they are identified as political parties, interest groups, etc. — or else subjecting them to a considerable degree of harassment; or creating a new basis of loyalty with which the linkage groups can more easily identify themselves, and which will enable them to weaken their set of loyalties to the external environment.12

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The system of interactions characteristic of this variant of linkage foreign policy can be schematically sketched as follows: Demand for Change or Maintenance of Behavior

THE SYSTEM LEVEL The major aim of the system research level is to identify ways in which inter­ actions between actors in a given international system or sub-system are influ­ enced by interactions between the internal political elements of at least one of the actors (see schema).

The above schema shows an international system in which there are three actors (A, B and C), as well as interest groups and/or competing elites (1 ,2 ) within actor A that have the potential of serving as linkage groups. We will distinguish between two principal situations: one in which internal political actors of actor A do not serve as linkage groups, and the other in which they do.

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Linkage Politics in the Middle East

In the first situation, the basis for interaction between actors in the system is the external political behavior of A — i.e., its foreign policy. A’s behavior towards B and C is basically a function of the system of interactions between its ruling elite, interest groups and/or competing elites. To put it differently, internal political constraints are the predominant variables in the shaping of A’s foreign policy. In the second situation, the basis for interaction between actors in the system is the set of interactions between B and C and the linkage groups within A. Activation of these groups by B and/or C may influence the system of interactions between either/both of them and actor A. In this type of situ­ ation, A may view the interactions between B and/or C and its linkage groups as interference in its internal affairs, and thus the foundation may be laid for a conflict interaction between A and either/both B and/or C. On the other hand, A’s linkage groups may influence it to pursue a path of cooperation with B and/or C. Alternatively, there may be a situation where actor B, through linkage groups connected solely with itself, incites the ruling elite of A into a pattern of either conflict or cooperation with C. A similar situ­ ation can occur, of course, if A’s linkage groups are connected with actor C instead of actor B. SYNTHESIS OF THE STATE AND SYSTEM LEVELS Synthesis of the levels of state and system is based on theoretical efforts to find a point midway between each of the two variants of linkage foreign policy and the system level of linkage. These efforts focus on identifying those internal political variables of one of the actors in a given international system which influence not only that actor’s foreign policy, but also the pattern of interaction between actors in the entire system. A striking example of state and system synthesis is the way in which a system conflict may develop from a local conflict. The Vietnam War, for example, started out as an internal political conflict between South Vietnam’s ruling elite and the Vietcong, a competing elite. State level conflict developed after North Vietnam activated the Vietcong as a linkage group (foreign policy variant #2). This state level conflict eventually broadened into a system level conflict involving both North and South Vietnam, the U.S., U.S.S.R., China, and others. In this instance, the Vietcong is the crucial internal variable that influenced the course of both levels of conflict. CONFLICT: TOWARDS A DEFINITION A definition of the term conflict is the necessary starting point of any dis­ cussion of the connections between internal and external conflicts. The specialized literature (politics, sociology, socio-psychology) is replete with different approaches towards defining and analyzing the term 13 — and dif-

Proposed M ethod o f Research

45

ferent definitions can have varying effects on conflict linkage research. Accordingly, this study will adopt a definition of conflict that is most ap­ propriate to the aims and methods of its research. A useful approach for our purpose is one that sees conflict as a given inter­ active phenomenon. The behaviorist approach to conflict for example (based on Coser, Boulding, North, Zinnes and others), defines social conflict as a given type of interaction between social units.14 The question that naturally arises is what kinds of interaction should be characterized as conflict. Ray­ mond Mack and Richard Snyder respond by presenting five basic conditions: (1) conflict calls for the existence of at least two sides (parties), since inter­ action by definition involves at least two sides; (2) conflict is characterized by the existence of at least two sets of incompatible values and/or interests; (3) conflict behavior is intended to harm the other side, destroy it or rule over it — i.e., one side can achieve its goals only at the expense of the other side; (4) conflict calls for an interaction of acts and counteracts; (5) conflict relations always include attempts to secure control of sources and positions of strength, or to influence behavior in a direction perceived by one side as desirable but opposed by the other side. In other words, conflict is charac­ terized by efforts to secure or utilize power.15 Mack and Snyder point out that in addition to these five basic conditions, a distinction must be made between different types of conflict interaction, different origins of conflicts and different conditions affecting the period of time that a given conflict lasts.16 Internal Political Conflict Mack and Snyder's definition of conflict will be applied in part to the present research. Internal political conflict is defined here as follows: it is both a political situation between actors in a given internal political environment and a specific type of interaction between these actors. Political conflict inter­ action is defined as such only when the actors exhibit conflict behavior (i.e., take action of some kind). A conflict situation, on the other hand, is charac­ terized by absolute opposition of the interests and/or values of the actors, or by a perception of such opposition.17 In this situation (also known as a latent conflict), relations between the actors are characterized by enmity, hostility, opposition or tension — but such feelings are not necessarily trans­ lated into action.18 Internal political conflict, whether manifest or latent, depends upon the existence of the following conditions: (1) at least two political actors; (2) sets of beliefs and/or interests that are incompatible, or else so opposed that the realization of one is possible only at the other’s expense; (3) dissatisfaction on the part of political actors with their own political status, or opposition to their adversaries’ political status, behavior and/or policy on the internal and/ or external political plane. In this last instance, we can distinguish between

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Linkage Politics in the Middle East

two main political situations: general opposition to the existing situation; or opposition to a specific behavior or policy on the internal and/or external political plane.19 Internal political actors who are not within the ruling elite, for example, may be either generally opposed to the elite or opposed to a specific policy of the elite. Alternatively, a ruling elite may be opposed to the political status or specific policy of a competing elite or interest group. A conflict interaction occurs when political actors take action in some way against their opponents. Thus, a competing elite may attempt to secure full or partial control of the political decision-making process, while the ruling elite acts to prevent such a takeover. Political conflict interaction calls for acts and counteracts, which are de­ fined as manifestations o f conflict behavior. There are two major categories of manifestations of conflict behavior: violent and non-violent. Political violence is defined by Robert Gurr as follows: Political violence refers to all collective attacks within a political com­ munity against the political regime, its actors including competing political groups as well as incumbents or its policies.... The concepts subsumes revolution. ...It also includes guerrilla wars, coups d’etat, rebellions and riots. Political violence is in turn subsumed under force, the use or threat of violence by any party or institution to attain ends within or outside the political order.20 It is interesting to note that Gurr identifies political violence here only as acts against either the regime or competing elites, without any reference to acts of violence initiated by the regime.21 The result is that the connection be­ tween political violence and political conflict is not sufficiently clear. Interaction denotes a two-sided set of events. Thus, if there is political violence against the regime, it must of necessity be a response to some act of coercion or violence on the part of the regime. Quantitative and non-quantitative researchers offer a variety of typologies of internal political conflicts, but they tend to be either limited in scope or confined to examples of violence against the regime. Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, for example, offer a simple typology of revolutions that omits even the general political violence defined by Gurr.22 Harry Eckstein offers a more complex typology: spontaneous non-organized violence, con­ flict between elites (coups d’etat), two types of revolutions and wars of liberation.23 The most complex typology is that of Rummel, which in its essential form has served most other quantitative researchers. Rummel’s typology was the first one to define political violence in the broad sense: both against the regime a n d o /the regime (mainly in the form of purges). Rummel identifies three types (dimensions) of what he terms manifes­ tations of violent political conflict behavior: turmoil, revolution and subver­ sion. Turmoil subsumes non-organized, violent conflicts such as anti-govern-

Proposed M ethod o f Research

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ment demonstrations and rioting. Revolution subsumes extremely violent, overt and organized conflicts such as purges and revolutions. Subversion is identified with organized but clandestine violent conflicts, such as guerrilla warfare and assassinations.24 Gurr also distinguishes three main categories of internal political violence: turmoil, conspiration and internal war. Turmoil is defined as political violence, rioting, political clashes and local revolts. Conspiration is identified with organized and extreme political violence with limited public participation, such as organized political assassinations, limited-scale terrorism, minor guerrilla acts, coups d’etat, and uprisings. Finally, internal war is defined as highly-organized political violence with wide public participation that is intended to either overthrow the regime or dismantle the state. This dimen­ sion includes wide-scale terrorism, guerrilla warfare, civil war and revolution.25 It is worth noting once again, that Gurr’s typology does not include acts of political violence on the part of the ruling elite. External Political Conflict External political conflict is defined in the present work as both a conflict situation between international actors and a type of interaction between international actors. The distinction is similar to that of internal political conflicts: in a conflict interaction, actors exhibit specific manifestations of conflict behavior, while in conflict situations they do not. Rummel distinguishes between external conflict situation and external conflict behavior in the following way: [Conflict behavior] is a definite act of a nation with regard to another in a situation of conflict. Such a situation is indicated by the existence of mutually incompatible goals or values between nations and the per­ ception of this incompatibility. While conflict behavior takes place within a conflict situation, the latter may exist without any physical manifestation.26 Conflict between states does not necessarily have to express itself in con­ flict behavior manifestations. Whenever states have opposing interests — or the perception of opposing interests — there is a conflict situation. Wright remarks that conflict relationships can exist between states at all levels and in every form: “Conflict is a particular relationship between states and may exist on all levels and in various degrees. In the broad sense of the term it may be divided into four stages: (1) awareness of inconsistencies (2) rising tensions (3) pressures short of military force to resolve the inconsistencies and (4) military intervention or war to dictate a solution.” 27 A conflict situation (latent conflict) between states is identical to Wright’s first two stages — awareness of inconsistencies, rising tensions — while overt conflict interaction is the same as his two latter stages. Connections between

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Linkage Politics in the Middle East

the first and last two stages can be defined as conflict escalation. Conflict as a type of interaction between international actors may be of different kinds: political, economic, ideological or military. Quantitative research that identifies external political conflict with conflict behavior manifestations is based on Rummel’s typologies of external conflict behavior manifestations. Rummel identified three main dimensions (types) of manifestations — diplomacy, belligerency and war. The dimension of diplo­ matic conflict includes expulsion or recall of ambassadors and/or other diplo­ matic representatives and personnel. Belligerency, which Rummel also defines as “active hostility,” covers the worsening of diplomatic relations, demon­ strations against foreigners, limited military activity and negative sanctions. War subsumes behavior manifestations connected with warlike preparations, the actual act of war, and the results of war. Indices identifying this dimen­ sion are accusations, protests, threats, troop movements, numbers of fatal casualties, and the actual war.28 It is interesting to note that although Rummers typology of external con­ flict behavior manifestations is meant to distinguish between non-violent and violent dimensions on a non-violence-to-violence continuum (diplomacybelligerency—war), at least one violent manifestation (‘lim ited military action”) is included in the second dimension, while several non-violent manifestations (“accusations,” “protests,” “threats,” “troop movements”) are included under the dimension of war. BASIC VARIABLES OF CONFLICT LINKAGE The present study holds that it is not possible to frame an entire series of defined and identified conditions to distinguish various types of connections between internal and external political conflicts. Connections between the two types of conflict are exceedingly complex, and the number of relevant variables is very large indeed. It is impossible to accurately isolate so large a number of relevant variables, each of which may be one of a number of dif­ ferent types. Nevertheless, it is proposed to identify four dimensions (each subsuming a large number of variables) which may be generally relevant for examining the connections between the two types of conflict. The relevant dimensions perceived by this research are as follows: (1) Internal political structure and its stability. A dimension that includes the following variables: type of regime; type of political actors; type of inter­ actions between internal political actors; distribution of political power in the political structure. (2) Linkage groups. The existence or non-existence of linkage groups in the internal political environment. Distinction between different types of linkage groups. (3) External political environment. This dimension has several possible

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configurations: one international actor; a number of international actors; a sub-system or an international system. (4) Types o f internal and external conflicts. The distinctions between various types of internal and external political conflicts. Internal Political Structure and Degree o f Stability The main dimension used in examining connections between the two types of conflict is the type of political structure and its degree of stability. Internal political structure is an extremely broad dimension that includes a number of main variables relevant to our discussion: type of regime; type of political actors; type of interactions between internal political actors; and the distri­ bution of power. Both the qualitative and quantitative schools identify political structure and its stability as the main variables governing connections between internal and external conflicts. Researchers of both schools accept the proposition that the more authoritarian and less stable the state structure, the greater the likelihood that internal political conflicts will be shifted towards the external environment. Wilkenfeld, for example, set out to examine the connections between internal and external conflict in three different types of state — personalist, centralist and polyarchic.29 He identified personalist states as non-centralist dictatorship, centralist states as centralist dictatorships and polyarchic states as Western, economically developed states. Wilkenfeld found that in per­ sonalist states, every kind of internal political conflict (turmoil, revolution, subversion) was correlated with a diplomatic conflict, although there were no connections between internal and external war. His findings for centralist states were that internal war is connected with external war, while turmoil is connected with war, diplomacy and belligerency. In polyarchic states, turmoil was found to be connected with all types of external conflict, but internal war was connected only with the diplomatic dimension —with that connection having a low negative correlation.30 Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend set out to examine similar connections be­ tween types of states, without categorizing specific types of conflict. Their conclusion was that a non-developed, frustrated and politically unstable state tends to adopt aggressive behavior towards the external environment. In contrast, a technologically developed, satisfied and politically stable state tends not to adopt aggressive behavior (with the exception of the Powers: the U.S., U.S.S.R., Great Britain, France and China).31 Non-quantitative researchers also found that differences in structure between both democratic and totalitarian states and developing and developed states can affect connections between internal and external conflicts. Farrell, for example, contends that totalitarian states commonly tend to exploit inter-

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Linkage Politics in the Middle East

national crises by using them to divert attention from internal problems. He adds, however, that policy-makers in democratic states may also tend towards this approach.32 And Rosenau points out that: “The literature on economic and political development, ...is full of references to the ways in which foreign policies of modernizing societies are shaped by their internal needs —by the need of elites for identity and prestige, by the need of charismatic leaders to sustain their charisma, by the need of in-groups to divert attention away from domestic problems and thereby to placate their opposition.” 33 This study holds that the type of political structure and its degree of stability are two distinct variables, and that the proposition that there is a direct connection between type of political structure and its degree of stability is not necessarily accurate. A one-party authoritarian system does not neces­ sarily have a greater tendency to divert internal conflicts to the external environment — an unstable system of competing parties is just as likely to do the same. Moreover, the type of internal political actors varies in different political structures. In a system of competing parties, competing elites may be identified as political parties, while in a one-party authoritarian system they may be political groups within the framework of the single party. The stability of the political structure depends on these types of political actors, certainly, — but it depends even more on interactions between the various political actors of a given state, the rules of the game that govern these interactions, and the ratio of strength between political actors. Interactions between political actors (principally conflict interactions) depend, in turn, on a number of different variables: types of actors; number of actors; their political and organizational strength and degree of cohesive­ ness; types of internal relations between each actor's various components (party, military group, trade union, etc.); actors’ beliefs and interests; and so forth.34 A change in any one of these variables can have a significant effect on the connections between internal and external conflict, even in countries with the same type of regime. For this reason, an examination of the two types of conflict is most likely to be effective when it focuses on either a single country or a limited number of countries that are similar in their inter­ nal political characteristics. Linkage Groups The present research defines linkage groups as a separate dimension, although there is a close connection between linkage groups and the political structure to which they belong. It is important to keep in mind that not every political structure contains linkage groups — but where they do exist, they have im­ portant effects on interactions both among internal political actors and be­ tween these internal actors and the external environment. Linkage groups constitute an intermediate variable between the internal and external political environment — and by extension, between the two

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kinds of conflict. They are identified in various ways: as political parties in a system of competing parties; various political groups within the single party of a totalitarian system; and as interest groups of various kinds, such as ethnic minorities, trade unions, business associations, officers’ corps, religious and cultural organizations, and mass media (local newspapers, for example, which identify with and express the views of foreign factions). The activity of linkage groups also depends on a number of variables: their loyalty to the internal political environment as opposed to the external one; the type of ruling elite and the linkage groups’ interactions with it; their interactions with the external environment; interactions between the internal and external environment and rules of the game governing these interactions; and the ratio of strength between linkage groups and other internal political actors (principally the ruling elite).35 External Environment The external environment is that which is situated outside the physical boundaries of the national system. The external environment can serve as either a dependent or independent variable. As a dependent variable, it is influenced by internal conflicts that have been shifted outside the state. As an independent variable, the external environment is directly responsible for the creation of an internal conflict, its reinforcement or its diminution. The type of external environment affects the conditions making possible the existence, direction and character of these connections. As with internal political structure, the dimension of external environment has a number of important variables. A system or sub-system environment, for example, may be characterized as either homogeneous or heterogeneous in terms of the types of regimes, political cultures and ideologies of its various actors. Alternatively, a given environment may be identified as either stable or unstable, both in terms of how power is distributed among its actors, and whether the prevailing pattern of interaction is one of conflict or cooperation. Yet another characterization is that of flexibility versus rigidity. A flexible environment is one which has frequent changes of internal alliances. Types o f Internal and External Conflicts This study accepts the proposition that different types of conflict lead to different kinds of conflict linkage. Classification of conflicts varies according to different schools of research. Within the quantitative school, for example, researchers utilize “manifestations of conflict behavior” as the main criterion for classification. Such classification, however, overlooks the fact that conflict situations (latent conflicts) are also a form of conflict. Connections between internal and external conflicts exist whenever a latent conflict leads to an actual conflict interaction — as when a ruling elite, conscious of a latent

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internal conflict, launches an act of aggression in the external environment in an effort to prevent the latent conflict from developing further. The present research will classify various types of latent and overt conflicts with the aid of several criteria. One criterion is the dimension of non violence/ violence. It may be possible to determine whether high levels of internal violence correspond with high levels of external violence, arid vice versa; whether low levels of internal and external violence are similarly connected; or whether connections between the two types of conflict are not necessarily on the same level of violence. Two other criteria are the types of participants in a given conflict (various internal and external actors), and the different causes of internal and external conflicts. VARIANTS OF CONFLICT LINKAGE Concepts of linkage politics serve as the theoretical basis for this study’s examination of the connection between internal and external political con* flict (conflict linkage). The additional concepts of linkage foreign policy, internal political environment of linkage, linkage groups and system linkage will also be utilized. This study seeks to examine connections between the two kinds of conflict both on the state level (two variants of linkage foreign policy) and the system level (system linkage). The two variants of linkage foreign policy assist in identifying the direc­ tion of connections between the two types of conflict. The first variant identifies connections of internal political conflict going towards external political conflict (internal political conflict —►external political conflict). More specifically, it identifies internal political constraints as the predominant variables in the shaping of foreign policy, and defines those variables as a function of the system of interactions between internal political actors —i.e., the source of external conflict interactions lies in the conflict interactions between various internal political actors. The second variant identifies con­ nections of external political conflict going towards internal political conflict (external political conflict —►internal political conflict). In this case, inter­ action between internal political actors is a function either of the interactions between international actors or the interactions between some of the internal political actors (identified as linkage groups) and the ruling elites of one or more outside actors. By means of these two variants of linkage foreign policy, it is possible to identify types of connections passing between the two types of conflict: First Variant Internal political conflict —►external political conflict la. Internal political conflict —►external political conflict t lb . Internal political conflict —►external political conflict I

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Second Variant External political conflict —►internal political conflict 2a. External political conflict —►internal political conflict t 2b. External political conflict —►internal political conflict I This simple typology identifies two main groups of connections between internal and external political conflicts. In the first group, internal political conflict is a basic, independent variable affecting external political conflict; in the second group, external political conflict is the basic, independent variable. Each of these connections is described in more detail below. Variant la: Internal Political Conflict —►External Political Conflict t This variant characterizes an external political conflict between actors A and B where the main factor propelling A towards conflict behavior vis-à-vis B is not conflict behavior on the part of B towards A, but a conflict within the internal political environment of A. This variant characterizes various sociopsychological theories that deal with the efforts of ruling elites to divert inter­ nal conflict situations to the external political environment. Variant la is characteristic of the scapegoat theory — use of an external political conflict “circle” in order to overcome internal political conflict, where the ruling elite assumes that such diversion will increase internal solidarity and strengthen its own position. In variant la , the influence of internal political constraints is predominant. Conflict between the ruling elite and its competing elites and/or interest groups is the main factor in shaping foreign policy. External variables are per­ ceived as less relevant in this variant. Use of external political conflict as a diversion characterizes situations in which internal political conflict threatens the status or existence of the ruling elite. The ruling elite’s effectiveness in diverting an internal political conflict depends on its ability to invent an external political conflict when one does not exist, to concretize a latent external political conflict, or to aggravate an existing conflict. In addition, the ruling elite must convince competing elites and interest groups not only that an external conflict exists, but that it repre­ sents a grave danger to the primary interests of the national system. It is un­ questionably more difficult for the ruling elite to canalize internal political conflict when there are no external enemies to be found — inventing such enemies may not be enough, since competing elites and/or interest groups must also be convinced that there are real grounds for the external political conflict.36 Variant lb : Internal Political Conflict —►External Political Conflict I This variant is the opposite of the preceding one. It identifies situations where the ruling elite is either constrained to moderate an external conflict because

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Linkage Politics in the Middle East

the latter is the source of the internal conflict, or where it finds itself utilizing all possible means and resources to repress internal opposition to its status or existence. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty between Russia and Germany in 1917, for example, was connected with Bolshevik leaders’ realization that they could not simultaneously deal with internal upheaval and an external war. Variant 2a. External Political Conflict —►Internal Political Conflict t Two possible situations can be distinguished here. The first is characteristic of models of intervention and/or external influence: an external conflict between two international actors is liable to be canalized by actor A into the internal political environment of actor B. By activating linkage groups in the internal political environment of B, A seeks to change the behavior of B’s ruling elite. Activation of linkage groups in the case of external political con­ flict is liable to lead to internal political conflict, if the linkage groups re­ spond to A’s demands; such conflict is reinforced if B’s ruling elite does not respond to the demands by changing its behavior vis-à-vis A. The second situation occurs when an internal conflict is reinforced as a result of the existence of an external conflict, even though no linkage groups exist. Such a situation occurs when interest groups and/or competing elites are opposed to the existence of a given external conflict and thereby come into conflict with the ruling elite. For example, resistance of U.S. political and non-political circles to the Vietnam War led them into an increasingly intense conflict with U.S. administration circles. Variant 2b: External Political Conflict —+Internal Political Conflict X Two possible situations can also be distinguished here. In the first situation, the ruling elite of actor B is prepared to respond to the demands of the linkage groups concerning a change of policy towards actor A. Response to the linkage groups’ demands assists in diminishing the internal political conflict. The second situation characterizes socio-psychological and traditional hypo­ theses to the effect that external conflicts may be diminished by establishing a united front of internal political actors against the common enemy. This situation is apt to occur when there are no linkage groups, or when linkage groups are not prepared to respond to the demands of actor A. NOTES 1. For a discussion of this subject, see J. David Singer, “Theorists and Empiricists: The Two-Culture Problems in International Politics,” in Analysis o f International Politics, eds. James N. Rosenau, Vincent David and Maurice A. East (New York: Free Press. 1972), pp. 80-95. 2. Hazlewood made the only attempt, see “Diversion Mechanisms and Encapsulation Processes: The Domestic Conflict-Foreign Conflict Hypothesis Reconsidered,” in Sage

Proposed M ethod o f Research

55

International Yearbook o f Foreign Policy Studies, Vol. Ill, ed. Patrick J. McGowan (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975), pp. 213 -244. 3. Even though Wilkenfeld’s collection. Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, was supposed to provide a certain synthesis between “linkage framework” (theory) and empirical testing (quantitative approach), the connection did not clearly emerge. See, for example, Richard H. Van Atta. “Field Theory and National-International Linkage,” in Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, ed. Jonathan Wilkenfeld (New York: McKay Company, 1973), pp. 208-250; Leo A. Hazlewood, “Externalizing Systemic Stress: International Conflict as Adaptive Behavior.” in Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, pp. 148-190. 4. Deutsch identifies internal linkage environment as a linkage sub-system and the various elements within it as linkage groups. Karl Deutsch, “External and Internal Behavior of States,” in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, ed. Barry R. Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 8 -1 2 . 5. Deutsch identifies the linkage system as a national system, not as an international system as defined in the present research. Ibid., pp. 8 -9 . 6. Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System o f Israel (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 1-14. There is no doubt that variables such as economic capability and military capability are predominant in shaping foreign policy, but for the purpose of identifying this specific variant, we have focused mainly on the variables of political structure and internal political actors. 7. Ibid., pp. 8 -9 . 8. Ibid., pp. 9 -1 1 . 9. Gabriel Almond, “Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics,” in The Politics o f Developing Areas, eds. Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman (Prince­ ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 3 -64. 10. George Modelski, “The International Relations of Internal War,” in International Aspects o f Civil Strife, ed. James N. Rosenau (Princeton, N J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 14-44; Deutsch, “External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States,” pp. 8—10; John W. Eley, ‘Toward a Theory of Intervention: The Limitations and Advantages of Transnational Perspective,” International Studies Quarterly, 16 (1972), pp. 245-256; C.R. Mitchell, “Civil Strife and the Involvement of External Parties,” International Studies Quarterly, 14 (1970), pp. 166-194. 11. For various schemas of connections see Alan Dowty, “Foreign Linked Factional­ ism as a Historical Pattern,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 15 (1971), pp. 429-442. 12. Deutsch, “External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States,” pp. 8 -1 0 . 13. For a wide-ranging discussion of the different approaches to conflict analysis and a presentation of the methodological difficulties bound up with the theorization of conflict^ see Raymond W. Mack and Richard C. Snyder, “The Analysis of Social Conflict - Toward an Overview and Synthesis,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 1 (1957), pp. 212-248; Clinton F. Fink, “Some Conceptual Difficulties in the Theory of Social Conflict,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 12 (1968), pp. 412-460; C.R. Mitchell, The S tr u c ^ e o f International Conflict (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 15-70. K . Coser, The Functions o f Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1956); Mack and Snyder, op. cit. ; Kenneth Boulding, “Organization and Conflict,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 2 (1957), pp. 122-134; Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper, 1962); R.C. North, H.E. Koch, Dina A. Zinnes, “The Integrative Function of Conflict,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 4 (1960), pp. 355-374. 15. Mack and Snyder, op. cit., pp. 218-219. 16. Ibid., p. 219. 17. Rudolph J. Rummel, “The Relationship Between National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behavior,” in Quantitative International Politics, ed. J. Davis Singer

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(New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 200; see also Mitchell, The Structure o f International Conflict, pp. 15-25. 18. Jessie Bernard, American Community Behavior: A n Analysis o f Problems Con­ fronting American Communities Today (New York: Dryden Press, 1949), p. 106. Ralf Dahrendorf, Q assand Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 135; Coser, The Functions o f Social Conflict, pp. 3 7 -3 8 , Mack and Snyder, “The Analysis of Social Conflict...,” pp. 218—219; Clinton Fink, “Some Con­ ceptual Difficulties...,” pp. 4 3 0 -4 4 8 ; Mitchell, The Structure o f International Conflict, pp. 17-25. 19. Ralf Dahrendorf, “Toward a Theory of Social Conflict,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 2(1958),pp. 170-183. 20. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 4. 21. Gurr identifies political violence only with violent behavior manifestations against the regime, in order to distinguish them from coercion or violence on the part of the regime, which are defined as the first type of political violence. This definition damages his distinction to some extent, since what is defined as coercion by the regime can be seen by the competing elites as violence on the part of the regime. In other words, political violence is to be identified as including two kinds of violence, that of the regime and that of its opponents. For discussion of this distinction between two types of violence, see Ted Robert Gurr, “A Comparative Study of Civil Strife,” in The History o f Violence in America, eds. Huge Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 573-574. 22. Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework fo r Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 268-284. 23. Harry Eckstein, “On the Etiology of Internal War,” History and Theory, 4 (No. 2,1965), pp. 133-163. 24. Rummel, “Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations,” in Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, pp. 80-81 ; idem., “A Field Theory of Social Action with Application to Conflict Within Nations,” General Systems Yearbook, X (1965), pp. 183-211. 25. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 11. The scale of participation in the violence, the intensity of the violence and its duration are the components of what Gurr calls “magni­ tude of violence.” Ibid., p. 9. 26. Rummel, “The Relationship Between National Attributes...,” p. 200. 27. Quincy Wright, “The Escalation of International Conflict,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 9 (4,1965), pp. 434-435. 28. Rummel, “Dimensions of Conflict Behavior...,” pp. 81-84. 29. Jonathan Wilkenfeld, “Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations,” Journal o f Peace Research, 1 (1968), pp. 56-59. 30. Wilkenfeld, “Some Further Findings Regarding the Domestic and Foreign Con­ flict Behavior of Nations,” Journal o f Peace Research, 2 (1969), pp. 147-156. 31. Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend, “Level of Development and Intervention Behavior,” in Foreign Policy and the Developing Nations, ed. Richard Butwell (Lexington: Univer­ sity of Kentucky Press, 1969), p. 163. 32. Farrell, “Foreign Policies of Open and Gosed Political Societies,” in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, p. 185. 33. Rosenau, “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in Approaches to Com­ parative and International Politics, p. 33. 34. For a comprehensive discussion of the actors’ political characteristics that may affect various types of conflict interactions, see Mack and Snyder, “The Analysis of Social Conflict...,” pp. 231 -237.

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35. For an interesting discussion on degrees of loyalty and components of loyalty of individuals with a double set of loyalties, see Harold Guetzkow, M ulti Loyalties: Theoretical Approaches to a Problem in International Organization (Center for Research on World Political Institutions, Publication No. 4, Princeton University, 1955). 36. The effectiveness of canalizing the internal political conflict thus depends on the type of internal political actors and the type of external political conflict. (In this con­ text see Coser, The Functions o f Conflict..., p. 95.)

Part II The Case Study

4 Syria: A Linkage Politics State “In an area rocked by explosive politics, Syria is a case study o f political instability. ” - Daniel Lerner

Arguments for selecting one research state as the focal point of an examination of the relationship between internal and external political conflicts have been explored in previous chapters. Why was Syria chosen to be the research state? This question, too, has been examined. In brief, Syria presents a fascinating paradox. A majority of scholars involved in research on the Middle East in general and Syria in particular insist upon the existence of close connections between Syrian internal and foreign policies,1 pointing out the relationship between Syria’s internal political instability and her involvement in external conflicts such as the inter-Arab, Arab-Israeli and Superpower conflicts.2 On the other hand, quantitative scholars have concluded that there was absolutely no connection between Syrian internal and external conflicts during the years in question.3 This striking difference in conclusions served as a spur to further research in an attempt to combine historical and quantitative ap­ proaches. The present study accepts the historians’ affirmation as a hypothesis positing the existence of connections between Syria’s internal political instability and her involvement in external conflicts, and will seek to test these connections in the light of linkage politics and conflict linkage concepts. Syria is to be defined as a linkage politics state if her case meets one or more of the following conditions: • Interactions between actors in the Syrian internal political environment are the predominant variable in shaping Syrian foreign policy. • The foreign policy of another international actor aims at maintaining or changing Syria’s political behavior by activating political actors within the Syrian internal political environment. • The principal patterns of interaction (conflict or cooperation) between actors in the Middle East system (inter-Arab, inter-Power or Arab-Israeli) are affected to a considerable degree by interactions between actors in Syria’s internal political environment. • The principal patterns of interaction between actors in the Middle East system affect Syria’s internal political environment to a considerable degree.

61

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Linkage Politics in the Middle East

Historical and sociological studies dealing with Syria do not make use of linkage concepts in the way the present work does. However, in discussing the causes of Syria’s internal political instability, these studies focus on various dimensions that tend to identify Syria as a linkage politics state: geo-political; national-ideological; communal-demographic; structural-institutional; and internal-political. Each of these dimensions will now be discussed in greater detail. THE GEO-POLITICAL DIMENSION This dimension focuses on the proposition that Syria’s unique geo-political position in the Arab world and the Middle East produces a link between her internal politics and those of the outside environment. Patrick Seale, a jour­ nalist, is the main proponent of this proposition. His book, The Struggle fo r Syria, presents the following argument: Syria lies at the centre of these cross-currents: it is as a mirror of rival interests on an international scale that she deserves special attention. Indeed, her internal affairs are almost meaningless unless related to the wider context, first of her Arab neighbours and then of other interested Powers. It is no accident that Syriajshould reflect in her internal politi­ cal structure the rivalries of her neigRBbüfs7..[But] Shemusl not... bé' thought of as the passive victim of other people’s quarrels. At times, indeed, the reverse is the case: discord in Syria is exported to her neigh­ bours and beyond, so that in the search for the causes of some grave international crisis the track sometimes leads to Damascus.4 Seale gives several reasons for his proposition. First is Syria’s strategic position. Second, her “claim to have been both the head and the heart of the Arab national movement since its beginnings at the turn of the century, both the generator of political ideas and the focus of countless dreams and patriotic fantasies.” Third, “a tacit premise underlying the Arab policies of both Egypt and Iraq... that Syria held the key to the struggle for local primacy. Both realised that whoever controlled Syria or enjoyed her special friendship could isolate the other and need bow to no other combination of Arab státes.” And Anally, according to Seale, “Syria is also a particularly good observation post from which to view Great Power policies in the area. As she was the focus of rivalries between Arab states, so she was also the hinge on which the more grandiose set-pieces of diplomacy attempted by both the West and the Soviet Union turned.” 5 Seale’s focus is the reciprocal relationship between Syrian internal politics and the system of inter-Arab and inter-Power relations during the years 1945—1958 — from the beginning of Syria’s independence until her union with Egypt. In linkage politics terms, Seale’s proposition focuses mainly on the system level, i.e., on interactions between Syria’s internal political environ­ ment and the Middle East system, with Egypt and Iraq as the other main

Syria: A Linkage Politics State

63

actors. Seale’s proposition, which defines Syria as a linkage politics state ac­ cording to the last two conditions stated above, may be presented schemati­ cally as follows:

By means of what Seale calls “this two-way traffic in and out of Syria,” Iraq and Egypt maneuvered linkage groups within the internal political environment of Syria in order to maintain or change Syrian policy or in direc­ tions perceived by each of them as desirable.6 Between the competing elites (1 and 2 in the above schema) which served as linkage groups, one can identify the People’s Party, for example, as Iraq-oriented, and the National Party as Egypt-oriented.7 Seale believes, however, that the influence of the inter-Arab or Powers system on Syria’s internal political environment is not always necessarily greater than Syria’s influence on them. He presents Syria’s internal political environment as a significant factor in influencing interactions be­ tween actors in the inter-Arab system, while at the same time regarding interArab and inter-Powers systems as the source of Syria’s internal difficulties. Seale’s geo-political proposition has not gone unchallenged. In his article, “The Tragedy of Syria,” Leonard Binder completely rejects Seale’s arguments. Binder’s view is that the contest between Egypt and Iraq for inter-Arab primacy and the inter-Power struggle in the Middle East, both encompass Syria as well — but this does not mean that Syria has a unique geo-political status: other Arab and non-Arab states have also been involved. Binder does admit that in the power struggle between Iraq and Egypt, Iraq made attempts — countered by Egypt and Saudi Arabia — to secure control of Syria and in the course of such actions, the two sides interacted with elements in Syria’s internal political environment. Binder rejects the notion that Syria has a unique place in the Arab world and in the Middle East, but he does not deny that there is, in fact, a connection between Syria’s internal political environ­ ment and the inter-Arab system. However, it is the national-ideological dimen­ sion, in Binder’s view, that is the real cause of Syria’s “tragedy.” 8

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Linkage Politics in the Middle East

THE NATIONAL-IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION Orientalists and historians tend to see the national-ideological dimension as the main element characterizing Syria, a country where connections between the internal political environment and the inter-Arab system are closer than in any other Arab state.9 The principal variable in this dimension is “national identity” — more precisely, the absence of a sense of Syrian national identity on the part of both a segment of Syria's intellectual elite and a large portion of her population.10 The perception of many Syrians is that there is no ideological legitimization for their existence as a nation separate from the rest of the Arab peoples, or for Syria as an independent state in its present territorial form. Reasons behind this sense of Syrian non-identity are a subject for thorough historical, sociological and anthropological research which the present work does not aspire to. However, a number of scholars have offered various explanations for the phenomenon: (1) The feeling that Syria is the center of Arab nationalism. As Nazim alQudsT put it: “The trouble with the Syrians is that we are never concerned with just our own problems, but with issues affecting all the Arabs.” Ac­ cording to Seale, Syria historically felt that she had a pan-Arab mission to erase the existing national territorial frontiers between Arab states, since these were artificial structures created by the Powers.11 This feeling was per­ petuated by the peace settlements arrived at after the First World War, which fixed Syria’s present boundaries: “Permanent dissatisfaction with the frontiers of Syria, considered unnatural and restrictive, thus contributed to the feeling that the Syrian Republic was an artificial political unit that could not long survive.” 12 (2) The absence of a tradition of state independence, and the lack of inner faith in the capacity of Syria to survive as a political unit.13 For more than a thousand years, from the 8th century rule of the Umayyads until the first half of the 20th century, there was no independent Syria. The absence of state independence made the evolution of a national identity difficult, while encouraging local identities and loyalties — tribal, communal, city, village, etc.14 (3) The existence of communal and religious divisions, especially those between minorities that constitute a majority in their own regions, such as the Alawï and the Druze.15 These divisions have led to the development of ethnic and religious loyalties rather than a central national allegiance. The wide gap between village and town and the rivalry between the urban centers of Damascus and Aleppo has also encouraged local and peripheral loyalties rather than adherence to the center.16 (4) The heritage of French Mandate rule, which exacerbated these existing divisions. Under the Mandate policy of divide and conquer Syria was divided into territorial and administrative sub-divisions, which inhibited the creation of an inclusive national center.17 French policy was indirectly abetted by the

Syria: A Linkage Politics State

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Syrian nationalist leadership at the time of the Mandate, which gave no thought to the task of forming one political community by healing the divisions among the Syrian population.18 The absent sense of Syrian identity is thus the paradoxical outcome of both a strong sense of regionality and localness —which has produced sub-national allegiances —and a sense of supranational mission, which has produced a kind of pan-Arab allegiance. Over the years, these contradictory perceptions found expression in the philosophy of the Ba‘th Party, which played a major role in Syrian politics during the 1950’s and the period under review.19 The supreme ideal of the Ba‘th Party was Arab unity. The first principle laid down in the Ba‘th Party constitution of 1951, stated that: “The Arabs form one nation. This nation has the natural right to live in a single state and to be free to direct its own destiny. The Party of the Arab Ba‘th therefore believes that... The Arab fatherland constitutes an indivisible political and economic unity. Any differences existing among its sons are accidental and unimportant.” 20 In the provisional Syrian Constitution of 1964 —a Ba‘thist Constitution — the same type of supranational feeling is expressed, although there is also a clear affirmation of the Syrian Arab people and the sovereign Syrian state: “The Syrian Region is a sovereign Socialist Democratic Popular Republic and it is a part of the Arab fatherland. The Arab people of Syria are part of the Arab nation, they believe in unity and work towards its achievement.” 21 From its very beginnings, the Ba‘th Party posited Arab unity —with Syria playing a central role—as the ideal solution to the problems of Syrian national identity and dissatisfaction with her territorial boundaries. Such unity would both subsume Syrian nationality within a wider, inclusive Arab entity, and remove the physical borders between states. While originating in ideology, the Arab unity idea also served as a principal means for buttressing the relative power of various political elites within Syria. Ironically, however, “unity” eventually became the focus of internal and external Syrian conflict. The Egyptian-Syrian Union of 1958—1961 is a case in point. At the time, Patrick Seale wrote, “a union with Egypt seemed to the party the means whereby it could triumph over its local rivals and propagate its doctrine to the whole Arab world.” 22 Uniting with Nasser and Egypt turned out to be a mistake, however: Nasser opposed Ba*th predominance not only within the Egyptian-Syrian Union but within Syria as well. Moreover, he refused to recognize the Ba‘th’s ideological primacy regarding the idea of Arab unity. During the union, Syria was given additional reason to doubt her capacity for self-rule while her sense of separate identity was paradoxically strengthened. Differences between Egypt and Syria soon revealed themselves in economic organization, the state of society, and the political atmosphere. Syria, as it turned out, simply could not be ruled like Egypt — and as a result, Syrian bitterness increased to the point of what Avi-Dan calls “the victory of regionalism over Arab nationalism.” 23

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Linkage Politics in the Middle East

During both the period of the Syrian separatist regime which immediately followed the breakup of the Egyptian-Syrian Union (September 1961 to March 1963), and the Ba‘th regime that succeeded it (March 1963 to February 1966), the main problem facing Syria’s ruling elites was to somehow legitimize existence of an independent Syrian political entity while at the same time preserving Syria’s loyalty to the principle of Arab unity. All this took place against a continual background of internal struggle with other political elites. To secure legitimization of an independent Syria, it proved necessary to gain the consent of a factor outside Syria —Nasser. Following the breakup of the union, Syria’s ruling elite found itself turning to Nasser in an attempt to consolidate its own regime. The effort to strengthen Syrian independence while espousing Arab unity was generally doomed to failure, however. Throughout much of the period under review, such efforts characterized Syria’s national-ideological dilemma. THE COMMUNAL-DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSION The communal-demographic dimension comprises two principal variables: communal and religious divisions, and rivalry between Syria’s main urban cen­ ters of Damascus and Aleppo.24 These two variables help to explain the social, economic and political fragmentation that fostered the development of linkage groups in Syria. Communal and Religious Divisions According to a number of scholars,25 Syria’s heterogeneous population is the basic source of her political instability (see table). COMMUNITIES IN SYRIA: ESTIMATE FOR 1964 Community Sunni Moslems Christians (all sects) Alawi Druze Ismailis TOTAL

Absolute Number

Percentage of Total Population

4,032.000 650,000 600,000 170,000 56,000

73 12 11 3 1

5,508,000

100

Source: United States Army, Area Handbook fo r Syria (Washington, 1965), p. 124.

Rivalry has existed for hundreds of years between the majority Sunni

Syria: A Linkage Politics State

67

Moslems and Syria’s large minorities, a rivalry that goes deeper than mere religious differences. As Avi-Dan points out: The institution of religion has to be understood within the ArabMoslem institution, where there is no distinction between the secular and the religious. Hence the (Communities are not only religious frame­ works in a contest on the spiritual plane, but rival social organizations that compete for resources as peoples do. Within the communities, forced to live side by side with each other, a minority complex comes into being as a basic emotional phenomenon, signifying a morbid col­ lective sensibility that perceives every action of the rival community as a challenge or a threat and that fosters group solidarity.26 Syria’s minorities have been able to maintain an autonomous status because they constitute a majority in specific regions — the Alawr in the Lädhiqiyya region, the Druze in the Jabel Druze, the Ismailis in the Salamiya mountains near Hamä and the Kurds and Turcomans in the Mount Taurus passes.27 Inter-communal rivalry and intra-communal allegiance have fostered regionalism and hindered efforts to forge a Syrian national identity. Com­ munal and ethnic divisions have also prevented political organizations and institutions from expanding their services. Under such conditions, there has long been a tendency for external forces to intervene in Syria. Bolstering this tendency is the fact that various groups in Syria have at times sought assist­ ance from other states in their internal struggle with the Syrian ruling elite. The Druze of the Jabel Druze on the Jordanian border, for example, are known for their traditional loyalty to the Hashemite House, and have served several times as linkage groups between Jordan and Syria.28 There is a certain parallel between community origin and political orien­ tation in Syria. The Druze and AlawT minorities, for example, have tended to favor Syrian independence and oppose pan-Arabism and/or union with other Arab countries (especially Egypt) for fear of damage to their own status within Syria. Sunni Moslems, on the other hand, have tended to have unionist aims and be devotees of pan-Arabism.29 Rivalry Between Urban Centers Rivalry between the great urban centers of Damascus (the south) and Aleppo (the north), began as economic and internal political rivalry, but eventually broadened into opposite political orientation as well, with Damascus being oriented toward Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and Aleppo oriented toward Iraq. The two cities have served at different times as linkage groups between Syria’s internal political environment and these outside actors (see diagram). Rivalry between the urban centers became institutionalized when the People’s Party was founded in Aleppo (August 1948) and the National Party was founded in Damascus (August 1947). From the time of its foundation,

68

Linkage Politics in the Middle East Syrian Internal Political Environment

the People’s Party worked for abolition of both the Syrian-Iraqi frontier and customs barriers that hampered trade between Aleppo and Iraq.30 The National Party, in contrast, leaned towards Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This contest for primacy between two urban centers in Syria, as expressed in the formation of two separate urban parties, increased the temptation for Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt to intervene in Syrian internal politics by assisting their own linkage groups; and the two parties themselves appealed more than once to their “adopted” country when their status in Syria’s internal political environment was threatened.31 THE STRUCTURAL-INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION “The Party of the ‘Arab Ba‘th’ is a universal Arab party. It has branches in all the Arab countries —it does not concern itself with regional politics except in relation to the higher interests of the Arab cause.” (Constitution of the Arab Ba‘th Party, 1951, General Principles, Article 1.) The universal, or to be more accurate, inter-Arab character of the Ba‘th Party bears primary responsibility for the creation of structural-institutional linkage in Syria. This linkage is a function of the pan-Arab organizational structure of the party, which has branches in most Arab countries outside of Syria (pre-eminently in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon), and among Arab students in the U.S., Britain and France. The main distinction within the Ba‘th is be­ tween the “National Command,” with its center in Damascus, and “Regional Commands” in each Arab country where there is a branch of the party. The hierarchy of organizational authorities in the party enables the National Command to intervene in regional affairs, thus creating structural/institutional linkage between Syria’s internal political environment and those of other Arab states — a linkage which bypasses the ruling political elites in these countries32 (see diagram). The system of interactions between Syria’s internal political environment and Regional Commands of the Ba‘th was especially striking during the

Syria: A Linkage Politics State

69

period when the Ba*th Party was in power in Syria (from March 1963 to February 1966), when central personalities in the Syrian Regional Command also functioned as central personalities in the National Command. The more closely personal composition of the Syrian National Command coincided with that of the Regional Commands, the closer the connection was between Syria’s internal political environment and other Regional Commands. It is worth noting that the National Command of the party both deter­ mines the party’s general policy and supervises its implementation (by the Regional Commands) in different Arab countries. The National Command is chosen by the National Congress, which represents all the Ba‘th Regional Commands plus personalities from party organizations of lower rank. A Regional Congress chooses members of each Regional Command, but the National Command can take over the power of any Regional Command if the latter is not functioning properly.33 THE INTERNAL POLITICAL DIMENSION In the view of the present research, the internal political dimension is the most important in defining Syria as a political linkage state. The internalpolitical dimension focuses on power struggles between various elites in the Syrian internal political environment as a source of connections between Syria and the external political environment. What is distinctive about Syria’s internal power struggles during the period under review, is that no one political elite, civilian or military, ever managed to become the center for national political identity or gain sufficient political and military power to ensure its continued rule.34 The political reality of this constant struggle had two important effects on the connection between Syria’s internal political environment and the Middle East system: an increas­ ing tendency by linkage groups to appeal to external states in times of internal Syrian political struggles; and exploitation of specific external conflicts in an effort to increase public support for the ruling elite.

70

Linkage Politics in the Middle East

Appealing to external states in order to change the balance of power be­ tween various internal elites was a characteristic feature of internal Syrian politics during both the 1950’s and 1960’s. Political elites which tended to appeal to external states became linkage groups between Syria’s internal political environment and the external environment. What stands out particu­ larly is the struggle for rule between the People’s Party and the National Party in the early 1950’s. In the course of this struggle, the People’s Party tendedlo be helped by Iraq, while the National Party was aided by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In the late 1950’s, the Ba‘th Party became a linkage group between Syria’s internal political environment and Egypt. The Ba‘th ’s need for Nasserist support in its struggle against the Communist Party and other political elites in Syria led it to create special ties with Egypt that eventually . developed into the Syrian-Egyptian Union. After the breakup of the union, three main Nasserite Parties in Syria became prominent linkage groups with Egypt: the United Arab Front, led by Nihäd al-Qäsim; the Arab Nationalist Movement, led by Hânf al-Hindï and Jihâd Dâhï; and the Socialist Unionists, led in particular by Sämi Sufan.35 Strong ideological allegiance to Nasser secured his support for these Nasserite Parties, although Nasser’s support was not sufficient to enable the parties to wrest control from the Ba*th. For a while, the Syrian Communist Party also served as an active linkage group between the Soviet Union and the Syrian political environment. The Syrian Communist Party acted as a linkage group in two main periods: the period close to the Egyptian-Syrian Union, and the era of neo-Ba‘th rule in Syria from the end of 1966 until November 1970.36 Reliance on external power centers brought about considerable external intervention in the internal political environment in Syria. This, in turn, led to increased internal political instability. The constant struggle between political elites also led to the exploitation of external conflict situations as a means of reinforcing political solidarity, in order to ensure continued rule for the ruling political elite. Exploitation of the Arab-Israeli conflict or conflict with the West and forces of “imperialism” was not unusual, given the rules of the game of the political elites and the characteristic anti-Israel, anti-West set of beliefs held by both competing elites and the general Syrian public.37 During the entire period under review, failures and difficulties were cus­ tomarily ascribed to feudalism, capitalism, Europeans, neo-colonialism, imperialism and Zionism. A sense of national identity and internal union was not to be found except in a clear crisis with a foreign power, with Israel, or in an upsurge against “the West.” 38 LINKAGE POLITICS AND CONFLICT LINKAGE Although most studies dealing with Syria do not make use of linkage con­ cepts, the five dimensions described in this chapter may be used to define Syria as a linkage politics state on both the state and system levels.

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The geo-political dimension identifies Syria as a linkage politics state mainly on the system level, by describing interactions between Syria's internal politi­ cal environment and the inter-Arab and Middle East system. The nationalideological dimension focuses on the inter-Arab level. The communal-demo­ graphic dimension focuses on both research levels: on the linkage system level, it identifies connections between interactions among Syrian internal political actors identified with economic centers and actors in the inter-Arab system; and on the state level, it identifies connections between interactions among minority groups such as the Druze and interactions between Syria and other Arab states (mainly Jordan). The structural-institutional dimension defines Syria as a linkage politics state on the state level, through identification of interactions between Ba‘th Party Regional Commands in Syria and Iraq, and between these and the National Command of the Ba‘th Party. Finally, the internal political dimen­ sion focuses on both research levels. On the system level it identifies inter­ actions between political actors in Syria’s internal political environment and actors in the inter-Arab political system (Iraq, Egypt); and on the state level, it identifies connections between interactions among political elites in Syria’s internal political environment and Syria’s interactions with Israel, the West, and other ideological foes. This last system of interactions between internal and external political environments may be expanded to include additional Arab states, as when the Syrian-Israeli conflict expands to include Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and other Arab countries. In such a situation, the linkage level expands from the state to the system level. In defining Syria as a linkage politics state, the relative importance of these different dimensions varies in accordance with the type of actors present in the Syrian internal political environment; the type of actors in the inter-Arab and Middle East system; the system of interactions among actors in the Syrian internal political environment; the system of interactions between Syria and her neighbors; and the system of interactions among actors in the inter-Arab and Middle East system. The geo-political dimension presented by Seale, for example, is vitally important in defining Syria as a linkage politics state in the 1950’s, until its union with Egypt;afterwards, it gradually loses importance. The “decline” of this dimension stems mainly from changes that occurred in the inter-Arab system at the end of the 1950’s. The struggle between Egypt and Iraq for hegemony in the Arab world — mainly hegemony over Syria — came to a close with the creation of the Egyptian-Syrian Union. In the years after breakup of the union, the national-ideological structural-institutional and internal political dimensions began to assume greater importance in defining Syria as a linkage politics state. Breakup of the union inevitably led to conflict between Nasser and the Syrian separatist regime. The conflict with Egypt had a considerable effect on Syria’s internal political environment, since there were many unionists in

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Syria who believed that the idea of union had not failed. The banding of unionists and Nasserites into political parties and interest groups produced an internal political conflict between elites opposed to renewing the union with Egypt and elites seeking to renew it. The rise to power of the Ba‘th Party in March 1963 led to a short-lived breathing space in the conflict between Egypt and Syria. Failurè of the at­ tempt to unify the Ba‘th and Egypt led to a renewal of the Syrian-Egyptian conflict, which increased the importance of the national-ideological and internal political dimensions in defining Syria as a linkage politics state. The existence of solid Nasserite linkage groups in Syria’s internal political environ­ ment was, in fact, the predominant variable defining Syria ás a linkage politics state during the years 1961—1966. Finally, the rise to power of the B ath in Syria and the existence of a Ba'th regime in Iraq (from February to November 1963) increased the importance of the structural-institutional dimension in defining Syria as a linkage politics state, given the interactions between the B ath Regional Commands in Syria and Iraq and between these and the National Command of the Ba‘th in Damascus. Syria may be defined as a conflict linkage state if any one of the following situations exists: • Syrian internal conflict leads to conflict between Syria and any one of her neighbors. • Conflict between Syria and one of her neighbors leads to internal Syrian conflict. • Syrian internal conflict leads to inter-Arab and/or Arab-Israeli system conflict. • Inter-Arab and/or Arab-Israeli system conflict leads to internal Syrian conflict. It is worth noting that dimensions identifying Syria as a linkage politics state also identify her as a conflict linkage state, since these dimensions focus on conflict interactions as the main linkage interactions. The geo-political dimension, for example, identifies connections between the conflict interactions of actors in the inter-Arab and Middle East system and those of Syrian internal actors. The national-ideological dimension identifies connections between the conflict interactions of internal Syrian political actors and those between Syria and Egypt. The communal-demo­ graphic dimension identifies connections between the conflict interactions of internal Syrian political actors identified with economic centers or minorities and those of actors in the inter-Arab system, or those between Syria and other Arab actors (Jordan). The structural-institutional dimension identifies connections between the conflict interactions within the Regional Commands of the Syrian or Iraqi Ba'th and those between Syria and Iraq. Finally, the internal political dimension identifies connections between the conflict inter-

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actions of Syrian internal actors and those of actors in the inter-Arab system, or those between Syria and Israel. Examination of these dimensions brings out four central elements: (1) The existence of a given external conflict, either in a system (interArab, Arab-Israeli, inter-Power) or between states (Syria-Egypt, Syria-Iraq, Syria-Jordan, Syria-Israel). (2) The existence of conflict between actors in Syria’s internal political environment. (3) The existence of linkage groups in Syria’s internal political environ­ ment. (4) A relationship between internal and external conflict that differs ac­ cording to various factors in Syria’s internal and external political environments. In order to examine connections between internal and external Syrian con­ flicts for the years 1961—1970, the present research proposes the use of four groups of variables: internal political structure; linkage groups; external politi­ cal environment; and types of internal and external conflict. Each of these is described below in greater detail. Internal Political Structure Syria’s internal political structure varied during the period under review.39 We can distinguish between three different types of political structure in Syria in the years 1961 —1970: the separatist regime —(28 September 1961 to 8 March 1963); the Ba‘th regime —(8 March 1963 to 22 February 1966); and the neoBa‘th regime —(23 February 1966 to 13 November 1970). These political structures are distinguished by internal political variables relevant to the study of the relationship between Syria’s internal and external conflicts. Variables include the type of regime; type of actor in the internal political environment; type of interaction —conflict or cooperation —among actors; distribution of political power among actors; and accepted rules of the game. The type and relative power of actors in Syria’s internal political environment differ for each type of political structure. During the period of the separatist regime, Syria’s main political actors were the traditional political elites which had ruled her even before the union with Egypt. From March 1963 on, the main political actors were the Ba‘th Party, various Nasserite elites and different elites within the Ba‘th Party. The relationship between internal and external conflicts varies according to which elites are struggling for power in Syria at any given time. Linkage Groups The existence of linkage groups also affects connections between Syria’s internal and external conflicts. Nasserite linkage groups, for example, played a predominant role in the Egyptian-Syrian conflict; although they had no

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particular importance in the Syrian-Jordanian conflict. The influence of the Egyptian-Syrian conflict upon Syria’s internal political environment also varied in accordance with which linkage groups — if any — existed at any given time. External Environment The external environment is that which is outside the borders of the Syrian national system. External environment may function as either a dependent or independent variable. As a dependent variable, it is identified as the factor “receiving” internal conflict. As an independent variable, it'is identified as the factor responsible for either creating or intensifying the internal political conflict. The present study distinguishes between seven external Syrian environ­ ments, four of them dominant bi-lateral: Israel, Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan; and three systemic: inter-Arab, Israel-Arab, and the Powers. As with linkage groups and internal political structure, varying types of external environments have different effects on the relationship between internal and external Syrian conflicts. The possibility of canalizing internal conflict differs, for example, when the external environment is identified with Israel rather than Egypt. In the former situation it was easy to exploit common hostility towards Israel; in the latter situation, canalizing internal conflict was far more difficult, given the great influence of Nasserite ideology in Syria. Similarly, Egypt (as opposed to a country like Iraq) could rely upon both the great influence of Nasserite ideology and Nasserite linkage groups existing in Syria. Types o f Internal and External Conflict Each of Syria’s three political structures between 1961—1970 (separatist, Ba*th and neo-Ba‘th) faced specific internal and external conflicts. The charac­ ter of each conflict was mainly a function of which internal and/or external actors were involved, and what the nature of their demands was. Internal and external conflicts were connected in one of the following ways: internal conflict —*■external conflict, or external conflict —►internal conflict. NOTES 1. Kamel S. Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology and Organization (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1966); Manfred Halpem, The Politics o f Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963); Daniel Lemer, The Passing o f Traditional Society (New York: The Free Press, 1964); Tabitha Petran, Syria (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1972); Gordon H. Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964) ; Eliezer Be’eri, Arm y Officers in Arab Politics and Society (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1969); Avi-Dan, “Elites and Center in Syrian Society" (Hebrew), Hamizrah Hehadash, xviii (1968), pp. 20S-222; Moshe Ma‘oz,

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Modern Syria: Political and Social Changes in the Process o f Creating a National Com­ m unity (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Reshafim, 1974); Patrick Seale, The Struggle fo r Syria: A Study o f Post-War Arab Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). 2. Abraham Ben-Tsur, “The Neo-Ba‘th Party of Syria,” Journal o f Contemporary History, III (1968), pp. 161-181; George M. Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East - The Arab States (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1971), pp. 237-388; A.W. Horton, “Syrian Stability and the Ba‘th,” American Universities Field Staff, Reports Service, Southwest Asia Series n.v. (1) (1965), pp. 1 -1 1 ; A. Hottinger, “Syria: War Psychosis as an Instrument of Government,” Swiss Review o f World Affairs, XVII (1967), pp. 3 -5 ; Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Itamar Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba'th, 1963-1966: The Army-Party Symbiosis (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972); Martin Seymore, “The Dynamics of Power in Syria Since the Break with Egypt,” Middle Eastern Studies VI (1970), pp. 35-47. 3. Robert Burrowes and Bertram Spector, “The Strength and Direction of Relation­ ships between Domestic and External Conflict and Cooperation: Syria 1961—1967,” in Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, ed. Jonathan Wilkenfeld (New York: McKay Company, 1973), pp. 294 -3 2 4 ; Robert Burrowes and Gerald DeMaio, “Domestic/ External Linkages - Syria, 1961-1967,” Comparative Political Studies, 7 (1975), pp. 478-507. 4. Seale, The Struggle fo r Syria..., pp. 1, 3. 5. Seale, op. cit., pp. 2 -3 ; see too Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule..., p. 184; Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967, pp. 2 -6 . 6. Seale, op. cit., p. 3. See similar view in Kerr, op. cit., pp. 4 - 5 ; “Civilian and officers alike also appealed to patrons in various Arab and foreign capitals, thus inter­ nationalizing even those conflicts that were of purely domestic origin and reinforcing the inclination of outsiders to involve themselves in Syrian affairs.” 7. Seale also examines inter-Power connections with the Syrian internal political environment, but it seems these were of less importance than the interactions between Syria’s internal political environment and the inter-Arab system. 8. Leonard Binder, “The Tragedy of Syria,” World Politics, XIV (April 1967). pp. 522-549. 9. Albert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 116-120; Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (London: Oxford University Press. 1970), pp. 317-319; Binder, op. cit., p. 539; Halpem, Politics o f Social Change..., pp. 211-212, 266. 10. Binder, loc. cit. A unique attitude on this question is that of the Parti Populaire Syrien, the party founded by Antün Sä'adeh in 1932. This party espoused the idea of Syria’s separate existence: Syria belongs to the Syrians, a complete, separate people. According to Sa’adeh. the Syrian fatherland is different from Syria in its present form and has wider boundaries: “It has natural boundaries which separate it from other countries, from the Taurus range in the north-west and the Zagros Mountains in the north-east to the Suez Canal. and from the Syrian Sea (the Mediterranean) in the west, including the Island of Cyprus, to the Arch of the Red Sea in the south, and... the Sinai Peninsula and the Gulf of Aqaba and Arabian Desert and the Persian Gulf in the East.” Additional details concerning the Parti Populaire Syrien and its principles can be found in Seale, The Struggle fo r Syria..., pp. 6 5 -7 2 ; Haim Blank, “The Pan-Syrian Movement of Antün Sä'adeh” (Hebrew), Hamizrah Hehadash, V, 1953-54, p. 258; Yamak L. Zuwiyya. The Syrian Social Nationalist Party: A n Ideological Analysis (Cambridge, Mass., 1966). 11. Seale, op. cit., p. 309. 12. Ibid.

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13. Avi-Dan, Elites and Center..., p. 208. 14. hoc. cit. Also see Halpern, The Politics o f Social Change..., pp. 211-212; Ma’oz, Modern Syria..., pp. 18-20; Michael Van Dusen, “Syria: Downfall of a Traditional Elite,” in Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East, ed. Frank Tachau (Cambridge, Mass.: Wiley, 1975), pp. 115-120. 15. Avi-Dan, op. cit., p. 206; Nikolas Van Dam, The Struggle fo r Power in Syria (London: Croom Helm, 1979), pp. 15-30. 16. Avi-Dan, op. cit., pp. 206-207; Lerner. The Passing o f Traditional Society, p. 296 ; Torrey, Syrian Politics and the M ilitary..., p.338. . 17. This is a widely-accepted proposition. Hourani claims that Syria was always a center of Arab nationalism, and that if it had received its independence as an undivided whole, a certain balance might have come into being between Arab and Syrian feelings (as happened in Iraq and Egypt). Syria’s partition into small states by the French left the people without a country to focus on and their nationalism was thus projected outwards; Hourani, Arabic Thought..., 1970, p. 317; Avi-Dan, on the other hand, argues that Syria was split up during the Ottoman era; it was the French who united her (op. cit., p. 208.) 18. Ma‘oz, Modem Syria..., p. 57. 19. See Michel ‘Aflaq, For the B ath, or. On the Road to the Renaissance (Arabic), Beirut, 1959; Bashir Da’üq, The Struggle fo r the Ba'th, fo r Unity, Freedom and Socialism (Arabic), Vol. IV (Beirut 1964) and Vol. V (Beirut 1965); Sylvia Haim, ed., Arab Nationalism: A n Anthology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 2 3 3 241. On the ideology of the Ba’th party also see Sylvia Haim, op. cit., pp. 6 1 -7 2 ; Abu Jaber, The Arab B a th Socialist Party..., pp. 9 7 -138; Yitzhaq Oron, “The Arab Renais­ sance Socialist Party - Its History and Ideology” (Hebrew), Hamizrah Hehadash, IX (1959), pp. 241-263. 20. Sylvia Haim, op. cit., p. 233. 21. Abu Jaber, The Arab B ath Socialist Party..., p. 167. 22. Seale, The Struggle fo r Syria, p. 317. 23. Avi-Dan, Elites and Center in Syrian Society, p. 211. 24. These two variables are proposed by Avi-Dan, op. cit., pp. 206-207. 25. Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958, pp. 2 1 -2 6 ; Oron, “The Arab Renaissance Socialist Party...,” p. 247; Avi-Dan, op. cit., pp. 206-207; Van Dusen, “Syria: Downfall...,” pp. 119-120; Van Dusen, “Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria,” Middle East Journal, 26 (1972), pp. 123-126; Ma’oz, Modem Syria..., pp. 3 3 -42; Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 121-145; Amos Perlmutter, “From Obscurity to Rule - The Syrian Army and the Ba’th Party,” Western Political Quarterly, 22 (1966), pp. 828-829; P.J. Vatikiotis, Conflict in the Middle East (London: George Allen and Unwin. 1971), pp. 81-82. 26. Avi-Dan, op. cit., p. 206. 27. Ma'oz, Modem Syria..., p. 19; Van Dam, The Struggle fo r Power in Syria, pp. 15-30. 28. Patrick Seale relates that in an interview he had with the Druze leader Hasan alAtrash in Beirut on 21 October 1960, Atrash told him that in 1947 he had invited ‘Abdallah to enter the Druze Mountain and rule there. Glubb Pasha (then Commander of the Arab Legion) referred the matter to London and received an unfavorable reply (Seale, The Stmggle fo r Syria, p. 14). Additional contacts occurred between the Druze and Jordan in 1953. After the massacre of the Druze by Syrian President Adib Shishakll, the Druze leaders fled to Jordan. In September 1966 - after an abortive coup —Salim Hätüm fled to Jordan with his men. 29. Be’eri, Arm y Officers..., p. 337; Torrey, Syrian Politics and the M ilitary..., pp. 10- 11.

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30. Seale, The Struggle fo r Syria, p. 30. 31. Ibid., pp. 30-100; Vatikiotis, Conflict in the Middle East, pp. 81-82. 32. A.I. Dawisha, “The Transnational Party in Regional Politics: The Arab Ba‘th Party,” Asian Affairs Journal, 61 (February 1974), pp. 23-31. 33. For a description of the organizational structure of the Ba‘th Party see Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party..., pp. 139-145. See too. Resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the Ba'th Party, 5 to 13 October 1963, op. cit., pp. 157-165. 34. Avi-Dan, Elites and Center..., pp. 209, 215. See too Lerner, The Passing o f Tra­ ditional Society, p. 296. 35. For details concerning the Nasserite parties see Kerr, The Arab Cold War..., pp. 60-61 ; Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba'th..., pp. 5 3 -5 4 ; and the full exposition further on in the present research. 36. Seale, The Struggle fo r Syria, pp. 148-163, 315 -3 2 6 ; Rabinovich, op. cit., pp. 180—207; Ben-Tsur, “The Neo-Ba‘th Party of Syria,” pp. 161—181; Ben-Tsur, Soviet Factors in the Six-Day War (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Hapoalim, 1975) (Hebrew), pp. 26-60, 76-107. 37. Avi-Dan, Elites and Center in Syrian Society, p. 208. 38. Torrey, Syrian Politics and the M ilitary..., p. 388. 39. Burrowes and Spector studied the connections between internal and external conflict for the entire period of 1961 to 1967, without noting the distinction of internal political structure. Burrowes andDeMaio, on the other hand, divided the years in question (1% 1-1967) into two periods according to type of internal political structure: the period of the separatist regime (28 September 1961 to 7 March 1963), and the period of the Ba'th regime, 8 March 1963 to 4 June 1967.

5 The Separatist Regime, 1961-1963: Connections Between Internal and External Conflicts I During the period between the collapse of the Egyptian-Syrian Union and the ; Ba‘th Party’s ascent to power (28 September 1961 — 8 March 1963), Syria was ruled by a separatist regime which bore specific responsibility both for breakup of the union and for re-establishment of an independent Syrian entity. Breakup of the union, however, immediately —and inevitably —led to the development of two interconnected conflicts: an Egyptian-Syrian external conflict, resulting from Egypt’s opposition to dissolution of the union, her refusal to recognize an independent Syrian entity and her desire to do as much harm as possible to the separatist regime; and internal conflict, between those in favor of the breakup and those opposed to it. The Egyptian-Syrian conflict h ad a major influence on the internal political conflict between separatists and a variety of unionist and Nasserite groups opposed to dissolution of the union. Moreover, the Egyptian-Syrian conflict had an important effect on other external conflicts, most notably the SyrianIsraeli bi-lateral and Arab-Israeli system conflicts. The separatist regime utilized both these conflicts in a continuing effort to secure legitimacy for itself in order to remain in power; the separatist strategy for survival was to reduce the intensity of both the Egyptian-Syrian and internal Syrian conflicts by canalizing them towards the environment of the Syrian-Israeli and ArabIsraeli conflicts. Complicating these efforts was the fact that there was no consensus among various separatist elites regarding such essential issues as the type of regime desired, the internal and foreign policy of the state, and the distribution of political and economic rewards among the elites. This absence of consensus translated into a clear potential for internal political conflict, with a resulting temptation for ruling elites to canalize conflict with the competing elites into the external environment.1 /

SYRIA’S POLITICAL REGIME The regime established after the breakup of the Syrian-Egyptian Union was an alliance between the Syrian Army’s new leadership and a very hetero­ geneous coalition of parties and independent politicians who had been active

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in Syria even before the union. Sinçe the alliance was based solely upon com­ mon dissatisfaction with the union and the desire to establish an independent Syrian entity, it inevitably experienced difficulty in holding together. Of necessity, the separatist regime represented a compromise between conflicting interests of the military and civilian elements who took part in dissolving the union. It held the form of a parliamentary or pseudo-parliamentary govern­ ment comprised of numerous political actors with different — sometimes opposite — political and economic orientations. Although civilian elites appeared to be directing the state, the army ruled behind the scenes with the extent of its overt intervention differing according to two variables: inter­ actions among civilian political elites (if these were conflict interactions, the army was more likely to intervene); and interactions among military elites (the same tendency applied when various military elites found themselves in conflict). In order for the regime to survive, it was forced to constantly seek a balance between conflicting interests of its various components, both civilian and military. Given the large number of different elites, their sharply conflicting interests, and the shifting balance of power both among the civilian elites and between themselves and the military elites, it was almost impossible to And a workable balance. In this political scheme, the potential for internal conflict was very high indeed.* * Political actors. The present research classifies actors in Syria’s internal political environment during the separatist regime along two fixed lines of reference: the internal political orientations of the political elites (economic and social); and their external political orientation (separatist or unionist). Along the first line of reference, a distinction can be made between elites in favor of returning to the socio-economic order prevailing in Syria before the union and those in favor of maintaining the socio-economic order created during the union. Along the second line of reference, the distinction is one between elites firmly opposed to renewing the Syrian-Egyptian Union and those dedicated to renewing it either unconditionally or with certain conditions. The separatist alliance encompassed both left and right-wing factions. The right wing included veteran political parties such as the People’s Party and National Party, the Muslim Brethren, and a large group of independent per­ sonalities associated with land-owners and merchants who were representative o f the pre-union socio-economic order. The left wing included the Ba‘th Party,2 the Syrian Communist Party and independent personalities, among whom Khälid al-‘Azm was most eminent. Views of the left were shared by several socio-economic groups — workers, fellahin and students — who had benefited from Nasser’s socialist legislation and whose orientation was thus unionist as well as leftist. Polarized along the other reference line were the Nasserite and unionist

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elites which demanded an immediate renewal of the Egyptian-Syrian Union. Nasserite elites, which consisted of the Arab National Movement, the United Arab Front and the Socialist Unionists (who had left the Ba‘th), demanded immediate and unconditional renewal of the union. The unionist elite —more accurately, the Bïtâr-Aflaq faction of the Ba*th Party — favored establish­ ment of a federal union based on equality between its components and governed by a collective leadership. Military actors. As with the civilian coalition, the separatist officers’ coalition was composed of right and left-wing factions. The right wing, which was connected with the Syrian bourgeoisie, was headed by Hay dar al-Kuzbarf and Faisal Sirri al-Husaini. Abd al-Karim Nahlâwî and Fliz ar-Rifa‘ï headed a moderate left-wing separatist faction.3 Other officers’ groups included a Nasserite faction that was concentrated mainly in army posts in Aleppo and Homs;4 a Ba‘thist group, part of whom were organized in “The Military Com­ mittee” which counted Muhammad ‘Umrän, Saläh Jadld, Hafiz al-Asad and Hamad 'Ubaid among its members;5 a group of non-party, unionist officers headed by Luayy al-AtasT and Fahd ash-Sha‘ir;6 and a group of independent officers — the majority of the Syrian officers’ corps — whose central per­ sonality was General Abd al-Karim Zahr ad-Din,7 the supreme commander of the army who also held the post o f defense minister from the first govern­ ment of Bashir al-Azma. Military elites also organized themselves along the lines of economic-social and separatist-unionist orientation. In terms of economic-social orientation, the Haydar al-Kuzbarî group and part of the independent officers belonged to the right, while the moderate left Nasserite and unionist officers, the Ba‘thists and part of the independent officers could be identified with the left. In terms of separatist-unionist orientation the Kuzbari group, the moderate left of Nahlawf, the Ba‘thist faction that organized the Military Committee, and a large part of the independent officers’ corps headed by Zahr ad-Din, com­ prised the separatist faction. The unionist and Nasserite groups, described above, were those who favored either conditional or unconditional restoration of the Egyptian-Syrian Union. Ruling eûtes, competing elites and interest groups. The distinction be­ tween ruling and competing elites in Syria’s internal civilian political environ­ ment is one between parties that were inside the government coalition and parties that were outside. A third element, civilian interest groups, consisted of economic and social groups — both organized or unorganized —who were concerned with promoting their own interests within the government. Out­ standing among these interest groups were the fellahin, land-owners, workers, merchants and students. In the transition period immediately following breakup of the union, separatist groups became Syria’s ruling elite, while Nasserites became the

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competing elites. This distinction held good throughout the separatist period. After the initial period of transition, the distance widened between ruling and competing elites; the latter also came to include separatist groups that were not made part of various governments set up during the separatist era. Between 1 December 1961, when general elections to the Syrian Parliament were held, and 8 March 1963, the date that marked the end of the separatists’ period of office, four governments, led by the following people, held power: Ma‘ruf ad-Dawâlîbf, 22 December 1961 — 28 March 1962; Bashir al-‘Azma, 16 April 1962 — 22 June 1962; Bashir al-‘Azma, 22 June 1962 —13 Septem­ ber 1962; Khâlid al-‘Azm, 17 September 1962 —8 March 1963. The ruling elite in these governments underwent a gradual transformation from the rightist and staunchly anti-unionist coalition of Ma‘rüf ad-Dawilibi to mixed rightist/leftist governments, with the weight of the left on the rise in successive coalitions. Changes in the composition of the government and its social-economic-political orientation were a function of large-scale army inter­ vention in political life, and conflicts in the civilian political environment. As with the civilian coalition, the officers’ coalition split into factions once the new regime was set up. The independent separatist officers’ group led by Zahr ad-Dfn comprised the army’s ruling elite, with other groups — moderate leftist, Nasserite, unionist and Ba‘thist - acting as competing elites.8 Throughout the separatist regime, the ruling officers’ elite tended to oppose the civilian elite, even to the point of attempting to overthrow it on at least two occasions.9 Linkage groups. Under the separatist regime, Syria had an internal political environment characterized by the existence of various linkage groups. Com­ mon to all these linkage groups was a unionist orientation that caused them to serve, either actively or passively, as connecting links between Syria and Egypt. The main distinction between linkage groups was that between Nasserite and non-Nasserite groups, a division related to their different levels of loyalty to the Egyptian leader. Civilian linkage groups consisted of three Nasserite parties — the Arab Nationalist Movement, the United Arab Front and the Socialist Unionists — whose main concern was renewal of the union without any preconditions. These three parties refused to recognize the existence of a separate Syrian entity and were characterized by their high level of personal allegiance to Nasser. In the course of the separatist regime’s period in office, these three parties served as active linkage groups in the internal conflict with the ruling elites. To a certain extent, the Bftär-Aflaq faction of the Ba‘th Party can also be defined as a linkage group, both in view of its demand that the union be restored under certain conditions and in its taking an active role alongside the Nasserites in their continuing conflict with the separatist regime. The Ba*th

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83

Party did not, however, hold any personal loyalty to Nasser or Egypt; their alliegance was to the idea of Arab unity and to the use of this slogan in gain­ ing power for themselves. As already stated, military linkage groups were divided into Nasserite and non-Nasserite groups. The Nasserite group included officers serving in the Syrian Army and officers who were removed from the army in the course of the separatist regime’s period in office. As with Nasserite civilian elites, the Nasserite army groups demanded immediate and unconditional restoration of the Egyptian-Syrian Union, and held a high degree of personal loyalty to Nasser. Non-Nasserite officers included both the non-party, unionist officers' group of Luayy al-Atàsî and Fahd ash-Sha‘ir and to a certain extent, the moderate left group of NahlâwT. The latter acted most strikingly as a linkage group when it established personal contacts with Nasser at the beginning of 1962, the eve of its attempted coup.10 Connections of the different linkage groups with Egypt can be represented schematically as follows: Renewal of the Union Without Any Preconditions

Under Certain Conditions

The question remains whether the political behavior of linkage groups was guided solely by allegiance to Nasserite and unionist ideology. It is also un­ certain whether ideology alone caused their readiness to be harnessed to a sometimes violent struggle against the regime. In the case of Nasserite groups, there appear to have been additional considerations. Breakup of the union had seriously damaged their status; restoration of the union was perceived as the best way to restore it. It was in the hope of assistance from Egypt that Nasserite groups took on the role of linkage groups. As will be seen later, the Ba‘th Party also embraced a unionist orientation when it realized that this attachment might help them take power and thereafter ensure the party's continued rule.

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TYPES OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONFLICT Internal conflict in Syria during the separatist regime can be classified accord­ ing to the type of internal political actors taking part. Civilian elites, military elites and interest groups were involved in the following types of conflict: • Separatist ruling elites (civilian and military) vs. separatist competing elites (civilian and military). • Separatist ruling elites (civilian and military) vs. Nasserite or unionist com­ peting elites (civilian and military). • Separatist ruling elites vs. economic-social interest groups. The first of these types was concerned both with political and military power and specific economic-social orientation (left vs. right). The second type was a conflict between those elites supporting the existence of a separate Syrian entity and those supporting unconditional restoration of the union (the Nasserites) or restoration under certain conditions (the Bftâr-Aflaq faction). Conflict of the third type, between the separatist ruling elite and interest groups, was basically socio-economic, although it often expanded onto the political level. After the transition period, when the internal conflict was mainly that between factions of the ruling separatist coalition (left-tonight) and competing Nasserite and unionist elites, all three types of conflict charac­ terized Syria’s internal political environment. The main external conflicts during the separatist regime were the EgyptianSyrian and Syrian-Israeli conflicts. The Egyptian-Syrian conflict stemmed from breakup of the union. The Syrian-Israeli conflict focused upon the demilitarized border zones, Israel’s diversion of the Jordan River and Syria’s claim to wider territorial borders on the Sea of Galilee. Under the separatist regime, characteristic conflict behavior in the Syrian-Israeli conflict was violent (mainly border incidents), while characteristic Egyptian-Syrian con­ flict behavior was verbal. In the course of the Egyptian-Syrian conflict, how­ ever, Nasserite linkage groups carried out a number of acts of violence against the ruling separatist elite. CONNECTIONS BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONFLICTS Four basic hypotheses concerning the connections between Syria’s internal and external conflicts may be outlined as follows: (1) Egyptian-Syrian conflict — a rise or reduction in the intensity of this conflict raised or reduced the intensity of internal conflict between Syria’s separatist ruling elites (civilian and/or military) and competing Nasserite elites (civilian and/or military). (t4- Egyptian-Syrian conflict —►11 Syrian internal conflict.) (2) Rise or reduction in intensity of the Egyptian-Syrian conflict had an

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inverse effect on the internal conflict between ruling separatist elites and competing separatist elites. ( H Egyptian-Syrian conflict —►4-t Syrian internal conflict.) (3) Syrian-Israeli conflict — a rise or reduction in intensity of Syria’s various internal conflicts raised or reduced the extent to which the SyrianIsraeli conflict was exploited in an attempt to cool down these conflicts, ( t l internal conflicts —►H Syrian-Israeli conflict.) (4) Similarly, a rise or reduction in the intensity of internal conflict be­ tween separatist ruling elites and competing Nasserite elites raised or reduced the extent to which the Arab-Israeli conflict was exploited. ( 11 internal con­ flict —►t l Arab-Israeli conflict.) The first three hypotheses focus on the state level of research — that is, connections between the Egyptian-Syrian or Syrian-Israeli conflict and Syria’s internal conflict. The fourth hypothesis focuses on the meeting-point of state and system levels of research: internal conflict in Syria, which originated in the Egyptian-Syrian bi-lateral conflict, also served to influence the ArabIsraeli system conflict. The Egyptian-Syrian Conflict and Unionist-Separatist Conflict in Syria Breakup of the Egyptian-Syrian Union and the rise of various Nasserite linkage groups in Syria had a profound effect upon Syria’s internal and external conflicts. In the external environment, Egypt was naturally opposed to the existence of a separate Syrian entity, and tried her best to undermine the separatist regime. Within Syria’s internal environment, conflict existed be­ tween those groups opposed to the breakup (mainly Nasserite elites) and those in favor of it (separatist elites). Connections between these conflicts came into being in two different ways. First, Egypt activated linkage groups for internal conflict activities against the separatist regime, utilizing them as instruments of Egyptian policy in the Egyptian-Syrian conflict. Second, linkage groups attempted to enlist Nasser’s overt support in their own struggle against the separatist regime. These con­ nections may be presented schematically as follows: Escalation of External Conflict Syrian Internal Environment

Egypt

Demands for Internal Conflict Positive Response

Demands Nasserite Linkage Groups

Positive or Negative Response

Separatist Ruling Elites

I Interactions of External Conflict

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Linkage Politics in the Middle East

The Egyptian-Syrian conflict began as a verbal one, with hostile speeches issuing from both Nasser and other heads of the Egyptian regime; and verbal attacks being broadcast by radio (on two major networks, Cairo and Arab Voice) and in the press.11 The conflict became more violent when Egypt activated its linkage groups for conflict activity against the Syrian regime. Internal conflict manifestations of the linkage groups were of three types: (a) revolution — i.e., attempted military coups or uprisings;12 (b) subversion — i.e., activities such as the dis­ tribution of inflammatory proclamations, bomb-throwing and laying of ex­ plosive charges, arson, and attempted political assassination;13 and (c) turmoil — i.e., the attempt to involve various socio-economic interest groups in internal conflict activity against the regime.14 Characteristic behavior mani­ festations of this last type were demonstrations and strikes carried out either by the linkage groups themselves or groups instigated by the linkage groups. Conflict behavior manifestations of the regime against the linkage groups consisted mainly of purges and arrests. Revolutionary activity. The closest and most direct connections between the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and Syria’s internal conflict came about as a result of joint efforts by Nasser, the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut and Nasserite linkage groups to overthrow the Syrian regime by means of a coup or uprising. There were four outstanding occurrences of attempted coups or uprisings where close connections between Egypt and the linkage groups can be clearly demonstrated: the uprising in Aleppo and Lädhiqiyya on 28 September 1961 ; the attempted coup of the Nahlâwf group in March 1962; the attempted Nasserite uprising in April 1962; and the attempted Nasserite-Ba‘thist coup in July 1962. In the very first week after breakup of the Egyptian-Syrian Union (28 September to 5 October 1961), Nasser made an attempt to utilize linkage groups in order to reimpose it. Linkage groups were activated after an attempt at direct military intervention and the political blockade of Syria had produced no results.ls The clearest evidence for the use of linkage groups as a means for reimposing the union can be found in Nasser’s own words in his “Speech to the Arab People,” delivered on 5 October 1961 : ...I made a decision to insure that the Arab unity between Egypt and Syria would not cause a military operation. Accordingly, I halted all military operations which had already begun in support of the masses of the people revolting against the secessionist movement in Syria. Today I declare to all of you that just as I rejected military war as a means of strengthening unity, I now reject civil war as a substitute for it... Today I will not agree that units of the Syrian Army should con­ tinue to lie in wait for the people. Nor will I agree that groups of the people should remain lying in wait for some elements of the Syrian Army.16

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In this speech Nasser admits both to direct contacts between himself and the linkage groups, and the failure of these contacts in producing desired results. More specifically. Nasser was referring to an uprising of commanders in the northern region (Aleppo) and coastal region (Lädhiqiyya), and to Nasserite demonstrations in Damascus, Der(a and Aleppo during the first week of the separatist regime.17 Apart from his own testimony, there is ad­ ditional evidence confirming a relationship between Nasser and the linkage groups. Direct evidence consists of an appeal made to Egypt by the com­ mander of the LSdhiqiyya region on 28 September, urgently requesting aid in saving the uprising from defeat.18 Indirect evidence may be found in com­ muniques of the Syrian Revolutionary Command. Communiques nos. 3 , 6 , 7 and 8, published on 28 September, forbade public demonstrations of sup­ port for the regime, lest these be exploited by “saboteurs and opportunist elements.” 19 In Communique no. 14, the Command called on its forces in Aleppo to counter the uprising, and attacked Egypt for encouraging the uprising.20 Nasser’s main efforts to activate the linkage groups came in two speeches of incitement on 28 September, one on 29 September and one on 2 October,21 and in inflammatory broadcasts on the Arab Voice and Cairo Radio (25 over the former and 10 over the latter). This excerpt from the Arab Voice broadcast of 1 October 1961 gives an indication of the extent of Egypt’s intervention:22 09.27 h.: Call to workers at the Lädhiqiyya oil installations to fight the regime. 10.05 : Call to men of Aleppo to free Syria from her enemies. 11.12 : Greetings to Aleppo in revolt, and encouragement to continue the revolt. 11.21 : Repeat of previous broadcast. 11.24 : Call to Syrian soldiers to join the rebels in Aleppo. 1130 : Greetings to Aleppo and encouragement to continue the revolt. 12.08 : Appeal to all inhabitants of Syria to rise and join the revolt in Aleppo. 15.00 : Call to inhabitants of Syria — mainly the people of Aleppo and Damascus —to revolt. 1630 : Appeal to Palestinians in Syria to resist the separatist movement. 1830 : Support for the revolt in Aleppo and the demonstrations in Damascus. 21.14 : Support for demonstrations in Damascus. The second revolutionary activity of linkage groups was an attempted coup by the Nahläwf group, on 28 March 1962. The Nahlâwî group of moderately left-wing officers had been the dominant group in the army at the time of the Egyptian-Syrian split, and had been the group most responsible

88

Linkage Politics in the Middle East

for breakup of the union. In the course o f time, however, it had suffered a deterioration in its relations with other army separatist groups. Accordingly, the Nahläwf group decided to take total control of Syria by means of a military coup. In order to carry out this plan, it was deemed necessary to seek outside support. Egypt was regarded as the most suitable external source of aid, since Egypt (as opposed to Iraq) was opposed to the ruling separatist regime.23 During the second week of January 1962, a Nahläwf group delegation met with Nasser in Cairo, assuring him that their group was capable of carrying out the coup and restoring the Egyptian-Syrian Union.24 Although the Nahläwf group was not Nasserite, it tried to secure Nasserite legitimization for its coup, and thus served as a linkage group between Nasser and the internal Syrian political environment. Nasser refused to give explicit support to the Nahläwf group, although he offered it a certain amount of verbal encouragement.25 The qualified nature of Nasser’s support is probably due to the fact that the Nahläwf group had taken part in the original breakup of the union and to the fact that a different, Nasserite coup was already in the making.26 The attempt to connect internal political conflict in Syria with the Egyptian-Syrian conflict was maintained, however, even after the coup had been carried out. In justifying its attempted coup, the Nahläwf group made use of Egyptian attacks on the separatist regime; in its communique after the coup, for example, it sought support in Nasser’s speech of 22 February 1962 sharply attacking heads of the regime.27 The most interesting set of contacts between Nasserite linkage groups and Egypt were those that took place during the period from 30 March to 3 April 1962. In this short span of time, there were open and direct links between Nasser and the Nasserite linkage groups, centered around an uprising in Aleppo and Homs, and on linkage groups’ efforts to áctivate the Egyptians when the uprising was on the verge of defeat. The actual uprising was the fruit of joint planning by a coalition of Nasserite-unionist officers and Ba'thists in alliance with Egypt.28 The officers’ coalition was headed by Jäsim ‘Alwän (Nasserite),29 Luayy al-Atäsf and Fahd ash-Sha‘ir (unionists), and Muhammad ‘Umrân and Hamad TJbaid (Ba’thists).30 Their plan had taken shape through contacts maintained with Egypt well before the Nahläwf coup.31 Nasserite officers took action on 30 March when it became clear that there was firm resistance to the Nahläwf coup both from the separatist officers’ group of Zahr ad-Dfn and from various District Commanders, especially the Commander of Homs, Badr al-A‘sar.32 The primary activity of the Nasserite officers was to exploit demonstrations of protest in Aleppo and Homs against the arrest of Syrian President Qudsf and Prime Minister Dawälfbf in an effort to create widespread agitation against the Nahläwf coup. On 31 March, Nasserite elements organized stormy demonstrations in Aleppo, Homs, Lädhi-

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qiyya and Tudmur, which reached their climax in the Homs uprising against the Revolutionary Command in Damascus.33 The second phase of the up­ rising began on 1 April after Nasserite and unionist officers rejected the decisions of the Homs Congress, which had tried to arrange a compromise between the various officers’ groups.34 The officers’ group headed by Alwän, TJmran and TJbaid seized control of Homs and Aleppo, while Atâsf took over Deir az-Zör. Alwän, head of the Nasserite officers, captured the Aleppo Radio station and announced the restoration of the United Arab Republic.35 Connections between the linkage groups and Egypt became far more overt after 1 April. Until that point, Egypt had supported all attempts to overthrow the separatist regime (including the Nahlâwï coup) by means of her com­ munications media - without stressing the role of linkage groups —while at the same time planning and financing the uprisings in Homs and Aleppo.36 On 1 April, when the Nasserite uprising in these cities broke out in earnest, the Egyptian media began giving open support to the linkage groups. At first the media reported widespread unionist demonstrations throughout Syria, and calls over the Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Deir az-Zör radio networks to close ranks and unite.37 On 2 April, when Aleppo Radio (in the hands of the insurgents) began broadcasting news of the restoration of the EgyptianSyrian Union, and denunciation of Damascus Command’s treachery in accepting the compromise offered by the Homs Congress, the Egyptian radio network launched an attack against the separatist officers.38 Conflict between military groups now turned into conflict between the General Command in Damascus and the Nasserite and unionist officers who were demanding immediate restoration of the union with Egypt. The two sides to the conflict represented it as one between secession and union.39 On 3 April, the General Command decided to take firm action to quash the Nasserite-unionist uprising.40 It called on the insurgents to surrender; when the ultimatum was ignored, troops were sent in. At 07.00 hours on 3 April, Aleppo Radio reported that measures to suppress the uprising were under­ way, and that separatists were attempting to bomb the Aleppo Radio station. In this announcement, the linkage groups also appealed openly for Egyptian military assistance. The appeal, repeated twice, included a request for air sup­ port, Egyptian parachutists and commando troops 41 The Aleppo broadcast for assistance was picked up by the Damascus Command, which published a communique ten minutes later: This important document [broadcast] establishes the conspiracy of the mutineers in Aleppo and provides incontestable evidence of the treason the hired agents committed against our Syrian Arab Republic. ...The hired agents and traitors in the northern area felt that the army was assuming control of the situation and tightening the ring around them. They felt that they were doomed and that their end was imminent. So they hastened to ask their masters in Cairo to implement the plan...42

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Linkage Politics in the Middle East

Aleppo Radio, for its part, issued another appeal to Cairo at 07.15 hours, stating that the Aleppo airfield could receive all types of aircraft and that there would be no danger in dropping parachutists.43 At 07.30 hours, Atâsî took command of the Aleppo region and immedi­ ately informed Egypt that his forces were capable o f defending themselves.44 Atâsî was attempting to mediate between the insurgents and the Damascus Command, because he sensed the uprising was about to collapse and wanted unionist elements saved from liquidation. In the talks concerning union held in Cairo a year later, Atâsî argued in Nasser’s presence that it was the linkage groups’ appeals to the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut that led to failure of the uprising. According to Atâsî, this appeal had served as proof o f the connec­ tions between Nasser and the linkage groups, and thus provided sufficient legitimization for Damascus to repress the uprising. Atâsî went on to claim that his success in countermanding the appeal had saved unionist and nationalist elements from being liquidated once the uprising had been put down.45 Egyptian reactions to the linkage groups’ appeals were as interesting as the actual appeals. There were two responses on a high echelon level, one from the Egyptian minister of state and the other from Nasser himself. Minister of State ‘Abd al-Qädir Hätim flatly denied the report from the Damascus General Command that the insurgents had addressed an appeal to the Egyptian ambassador in Beirut.46 On the same day, 3 April, the Office of the President issued an even more interesting response — one that totally ignored the relationship between Egypt and the linkage groups: President ‘Abd an-Nasser had heard with grieved heart the news that was just broadcast about the beginning of air operations by some planes of the Syrian Air Force against the Syrian People and the army in the northern area. ...President Jamal ‘Abd an-Nasser believes this moment that regardless of anything, all national efforts should immediately be directed toward saving Syria from the danger of the painful possibilities which threaten the Syrian people inside their homeland. ...It is of extreme importance that no Syrian forces should stand against other Syrian forces. President Jamal ‘Abd an-Nasser announces his full readiness, if the concerned parties in Damascus, Aleppo and other Syrian popular and military Commands agree, to place himself, his mind and soul in that service of whatever effort may serve Syria...47 Nasser’s communique was similar to his speech of 5 October 1961 in which he expressed reservations about encouraging a civil war to overthrow the separatist regime. Both these pronouncements were made only after linkage groups had failed to achieve their - and Egypt’s — objectives. The difference between Nasser’s two statements is that his later communique of 3 April 1962 attempts to gloss over the fact of Egypt’s overt connections with the linkage groups. The appeal for direct military aid seems to have embarrassed Nasser - most likely because the uprising itself was heading

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toward failure.48 The Syrian General Command, in any event, rejected Egyptian claims of non-intervention. The Command announced on 3 April that calm had been restored throughout Syria and that all army units had remained loyal to the General Command, and went on to reiterate that those who had seized the Aleppo Radio station had been bent upon conspiring with Egypt in order to destroy Syrian national independence.49 Connections between Egypt and the Aleppo insurgents revealed a set of patron-client relations between Nasser and the Nasserite linkage groups — relations that depended on the client’s success both in achieving joint aims and in keeping the connections hidden. It appears as though the linkage groups did not fully comprehend Egypt’s role as patron. Egypt had helped to plan and finance linkage groups’ activities, and had given them propaganda backing in its media, but this was not sufficient to overthrow the separatist regime. It seems virtually certain that the linkage groups relied upon direct Egyptian military intervention, should the need arise. This belief may well have been based on Egyptian promises. The appeal for Egyptian help during the Aleppo-Homs uprising indicates either that the linkage groups believed this to be the case, or else broke the rules of the game in their set of relations with Egypt. If Atäsf’s argument at the 1963 Cairo talks was correct, the set of relations between Nasser and the linkage groups was apparently based on the understanding that the linkage groups must refrain from asking for Egyptian help in any circumstances - precisely because such an appeal would prove Egypt’s direct involvement in Syria’s internal conflict and give the separatist regime legitimate grounds for liquidating the linkage groups. A final attempted coup against the separatist government took place on the night of 28 July 1962; on the following day, the government announced failure o f the coup and the arrests of its conspirators. The attempt had been made by a portion of both Nasserite linkage groups (civilian and military) and unionists (the Bïtâr-‘Aflaq faction and some Ba‘thist officers). Some time later, the regime presented documents and recordings that connected Egypt with linkage groups responsible for the coup via the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut.50 The plan was to overthrow the separatist regime and establish a new civilian government of Nasserites and Ba'thists, to be headed by Salah alBïtâr.51 Leaders of the plot were Yusuf al-Muzahim, minister of state for religious endowments under the union, Muhammad al-Jarrah, head of internal security services under the union, and leaders of the Nasserite and unionist elites, including Abd al-Wahhâb Haumad, Nihäd al-Qäsim, HänT al-Hindf, and Salah al-BItar. To help execute the plan, the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut had seen to the transfer of arms, explosives and money to the linkage groups.52 This attempted coup marked a significant change in the connections be­ tween Nasser and the linkage groups. For the first time, Nasser responded to linkage groups’ demands by openly declaring his support for their attempt to overthrow the regime.53 In his speech to the Legislative Council in Gaza on 26 June, Nasser directly backed the linkage groups’ struggle:

92

Linkage Politics in the Middle East In the past, we said that we were going to ignore whatever is happening in Syria. Today, when we hear about the torture of the Syrian people at the hands of the reactionaries, the imperialist agents... the reply is. No. Today we tell the Syrian people that we are with them —heart, blood and soul. In the past we declared that we had decided to ignore what was taking place in Syria, but today we say, under no circumstances can we disregard what is taking place in Syria. We are with you...54

This change in attitude on the part of Nasser may best be understood against the background of the unsuccessful uprising in April. It seems that Nasser had come to realize that success of the linkage groups was dependent on his own direct support: effective use of internal conflict as an instrument in the Egyptian-Syrian conflict necessitated open and direct exploitation of the internal conflict. Subversive activity. Unlike revolutionary activity, subversive activity by the linkage groups was not aimed at the direct or speedy overthrow of the separatist regime. Rather, it was aimed at undermining and wearing the regime down, so that the public would see that separatist rule was incapable of ensuring peace and stability in Syria. The sole guarantee of internal stability in Syria would be renewal of the Egyptian-Syrian Union, i.e., abolition of the independent Syrian entity. As in the case of revolutionary activity, Egypt maintained a constant flow of verbal attacks and incitement against the Syrian regime. There was also infiltration of Egyptian and Nasserite agents by the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut. Within the internal Syrian environment, there was a proliferation of destabilizing internal conflict manifestations: distribution of inflammatory proclamations, bomb-throwing, and the planting of explosive charges, arson, and attempted assassinations of political leaders. The Egyptian Embassy in Beirut was responsible for planning various types of internal conflict, main­ taining contact with the linkage groups and supplying a constant flow of arms, explosives, manifestos, and money to finance the conflict activities. The link between external and internal political conflict began shortly after Egypt’s failure in the use of the linkage groups as a means of reimposing the union. As early as 3 October, the Lebanese newspaper al-Jarïda reported Egyptian attempts to organize violent gangs for sabotage and terror against the new Syrian regime. During October and November 1961, Syrian authorities succeeded in foiling four Nasserite infiltration attempts from across the Lebanese border.55 Links between the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and subversive activity by linkage groups were especially close — and intense — during the months of July-August 1962 and January-February 1963. In July-August 1962, con­ nections between the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and linkage groups’ subversive activity were so close that Syria submitted a complaint to the Arab League Council. In the course of debate at the Council meeting, held at Shtura,

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Lebanon in August 1962, Syria submitted documents, pictures and recordings of conversations testifying to the links between Egypt and the linkage groups.56 There had, in fact, been a marked escalation of both the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and the linkage groups’ subversive activities against the regime. Indi­ cations of escalation of the Egyptian-Syrian conflict were both qualitative and quantitative. The qualitative indications consisted of Nasser’s open sup­ port of the linkage groups and his promise to aid them in their struggle against the separatist regime.57 Quantitative indications were the increasing number of Egyptian verbal attacks on the Syrian regime: 126 recorded attacks in July and August as opposed to 60 in May and June; 58 in March and April; and 69 in January and February.58 There was also an increase in attempts to infiltrate Nasserite agents from across the Lebanese border: Syrian security forces succeeded in foiling five such attempts during July and August.59 The number of infiltrators was in fact larger than this figure would indicate, since Syrian sources also reported uncovering a large number of Nasserite sabotage cells that had been plotting to instigate subversive acts jointly with external factors.60 Stepped-up controls on the Syrian-Lebanese border and contacts with the Lebanese government in an effort to put a stop to Nasserite infiltrations bore witness to the intensity of these infiltration attempts.61 During July and August, 55 subversive events were recorded, constituting 49 percent of all subversive events in the whole period of the separatist regime.62 This rise was especially marked in comparison with subversive activity in the period from January—June 1962, when there were only three subversive conflict events. The most instructive evidence of the link between the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and subversive activity against the regime may be found in the formal declarations made by heads of the regime during July and August and in the documents annexed to their complaint against Egypt. Much of this evidence focused on connections between the linkage groups and the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut.63 Connections were also close between the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and linkage groups’ subversive activities against the regime of Khâlid al-‘Azm in January-February 1963. There was a significant rise in the number of Egyptian verbal attacks on Syria (186 in January and February1963 as against 52 in September and October 1962, and 54 in November and December 1962). At the same time, there was a significant rise in subversive activity (30 reports of subversive events, compared with six in September and October 1962 and a complete absence of this type of conflict event in November and December). On a number of occasions during January and February 1963, Syrian authorities reported the failure of attempts by Nasserite elements to instigate subversive activity,64 and the capture of large sums of money in­ tended to finance their terror and sabotage activities.65 Syria also stepped up measures to prevent Nasserite infiltration from Lebanon during this period.66

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Activation o f interest groups. Connections between the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and Syria’s internal conflict also involved various socio-economic interest groups in Syria. During the separatist regime, the Egyptian propaganda media worked to incite these elements with a barrage of inflammatory broad­ casts. The Egyptian government also sent agents to infiltrate the ranks of workers, students and fellahin in order to encourage them to strike and demonstrate against the regime. In the case of revolutionary and subversive activity, linkage groups had been the direct bearers of internal conflict activity. In this instance, however, they served as catalysts in activating internal conflict behavior on the part of others. The link between the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and Egypt’s activation of Syrian linkage groups was especially marked during the period of the Dawâlîbï government (22 December — 28 March 1962). Under the Dawâlîbï govern­ ment, changes were announced in socialist legislation enacted during the union. As soon as the Dawâlîbï government’s policy in this respect was made known on 8 January, an Egyptian campaign of incitement increased, with the purpose of activating both the linkage groups and interest groups.67 Egyptian verbal attacks condemned the “reactionary feudal regime” for deal­ ing a blow to the rights secured by workers and fellahin during the union; Nasserite elements succeeded in infiltrating the ranks of workers, students and fellahin. As in the case of subversive activity, Nasserite agents from Lebanon, on the initiative of the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut, assisted the linkage groups with manifestos and money.68 Evidence of the linkage groups’ success is found in Syrian reports noting their role in organizing strikes and demonstrations, especially the students’ and fellahin strikes and demonstrations in Damascus and Aleppo on 13—15 January 1962. During a press conference on 14 January, for example, Dawâlîbï attacked “exploiting elements which try to exploit the good inten­ tions of the workers and students by trying to show these amendments [to the socialist legislation] in the wrong light.” 69 On 15 January, the interior ministry issued the following announcement: We are pleased that our brethren, the university students and workers... have noticed the intriguing and exploiting elements which during the past three days... tried to foment sedition and create confusion in Damascus. It has been established that the majority of these elements consists of men of the Investigation Bureau who were being used by the past regime to implement its plans and aims. They are still continuing in that service. It is to be regretted that the majority of these Investi­ gation Bureau men are not Syrians.... This morning some of these elements tried to carry out... activities directed at causing turmoil and anarchy when they penetrated into the University building, but the students handed them over. The government is firmly decided not to permit the saboteurs to continue their activities, and it will expel those who are not Syrians if they continue their activities.70

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Connections between the stepped-up Egyptian campaign of attacks and the increase in intensity of internal conflict activity initiated by linkage groups are also indicated by quantitative data. In the period between estab­ lishment of the Dawalibf government (22 December) and announcement of its socio-economic policy (8 January), there were two Egyptian verbal attacks on the Dawalibf government, and no reports at all (even by Egyptian media) of internal conflict activity against the regime. In contrast, between 8 January and the end of that month, there were 44 Egyptian verbal attacks71 and 17 internal conflict events: six strikes and 11 demonstrations.72 Connections between the two types of conflict were also marked in the first half of July. The Egyptian propaganda media began to exploit workers’ dissatisfaction with the government’s new decrees concerning workers’ rights, trade union organizations, and the ban on convening a Workers’ Congress,73 while Nasserite elements succeeded in infiltrating a number of factories in Damascus and Aleppo and inciting workers to strike and demonstrate.74 Between 7 and 10 July, six more strikes broke out in other factories in Damascus and Aleppo, in the course of which workers and security forces men were killed and wounded.75 Investigation by Syrian authorities dis­ closed that agitators were paying workers 150 Syrian pounds apiece to encourage them to strike and demonstrate.76 An announcement by the Syrian interior ministry on 10 July stated that authorities had uncovered a plan of the Damascus Workers’ Federation, instigated by Egypt, to incite the workers to strike, demonstrate, sabotage production and provoke violent disturbances.77 In its announcement, the ministry reported on connections between Egypt and the Nasserite linkage groups in activating the interest groups.78 Connections between Syria’s external and internal conflicts were also clearly evident during January and February 1963, when Egypt and its linkage groups focused on inciting students and high school pupils to demon­ strate against the regime. Along with a notable increase in Egyptian verbal attacks on the Syrian regime (162 during January and February, as opposed to 52 in September and October 1962, and 54 in November and December), there was a notable increase in the number of students’ and pupils’ demon­ strations (17 in January and February, compared with three in September and October and seven in November and December). Syrian sources reporting on demonstrations made explicit mention of the part played by Nasserite elements.79 A statement sent by Syrian Prime Minister Khälid al-’Azm on 16 January to all of Syria’s embassies is particularly striking: The Nasserite propaganda has been unusually active lately. It aims at shaking the confidence of Syrian citizens in [the country’s] stability and creating confusion and at dividing the ranks. It also aims at creating doubts in foreign circles about the political and economic future of Syria. The incidents which took place in the Der‘a and Damascus universities were no more than a tempest in a teacup by students who

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Linkage Politics in the Middle East are mainly Jordanians and Palestinians., who are under the illusion that ‘Abd an-Nasser is the leader of Arabism. Some of them were instigated by hireling lackeys.80

Levels o f Conflict Linkage Quantitative data also show a direct connection between the Egyptian-Syrian conflict (as measured by number of verbal attacks) and. internal conflict behavior manifestations — including activation of linkage groups —instigated by linkage groups during the separatist regime. The following table demon­ strates this connection as it applies to each sub-period of the regime. Although these sub-periods were not of equal duration, it is clear that whenever there was a marked increase in the number of verbal attacks on Syria, there was also a marked increase in conflict activity by the linkage groups (e.g., during the transition period, the second ‘Azma government and the ‘Azm govern­ ment); and conversely, whenever there was a marked decrease in Egyptian verbal attacks on Syria, there was also a marked decrease in linkage groups’ conflict activity (e.g., during the DawälibT and Orst 'Azma governments). EGYPTIAN VERBAL ATTACKS ON SYRIA AND INTERNAL CONFLICT MANIFESTATIONS INSTIGATED BY LINKAGE GROUPS

Period

Number of Verbal Attacks

Total Internal Conflict Manifest.

Type of Conflict Manifestation Turmoil

Subversive Activity

Revolutionary Activity

Transition (28.9 to 22.12.61)

260

48

29

18

1

DawälibT Government (22.12.61 to 28.3.62)

102

27

25

1

1

1st ‘Azma Government (16.4 to 22.6.62)

57

4

3

1

_

2nd ‘Azma Government (22.6 to 13.9.62)

159

75

16

58

1

‘Azm Government (17.9.62 to 8.3.63)

272

68

32

36

-

As indicated, connections between the two types of conflict were closest and most intensive during the DawälibT, second ‘Azma and 'Azm govern­ ments. Probable reasons for this were the low level of internal solidarity in the separatist camp during these periods; dissatisfaction and ferment among socio-economic groups due to the abolition of union period socialist legis­ lation (DawälibT period), changes in the trade union laws (2nd 'Azma period),

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and agitation among students, secondary school teachers and pupils (‘Azm government); and direct and massive Egyptian support for the linkage groups’ struggle (2nd ‘Azma and ’Azm governments). Connections between the two types of conflict were less close and less intensive in the transition period — in spite of its nearness to the breakup of the union — because there was a high level of solidarity in the separatist camp, and no real incentive to conflict activity on the part of interest groups, given the government’s balanced economic policy.81 The first ‘Azma govern­ ment also saw a less close and less intensive connection between internal and external conflicts, in large part because the government reenacted part of the socialist legislation that had been abolished by the Dawälibl government. Close and intensive connections between the two types of conflict were thus dependent on the level of solidarity within the separatist camp, the degree of ferment and dissatisfaction in the socio-economic interest groups, and the degree and kind of Egyptian support for the linkage groups. When­ ever solidarity within the separatist camp was low, and both dissatisfaction among socio-economic interest groups and Egyptian support for the linkage groups were high, there was an increased tendency for close connections between the two kinds of conflict, as the following table indicates: CONDITIONS FOR CONNECTIONS BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONFLICTS DURING THE. SEPARATIST REGIME Level of InterestGroups Satisfaction

Egyptian Support for Linkage Groups

Period

Level of Separatist Solidarity

Transition

High

High

Open and Direct

Low

Dawälibl

Low

Low

Hidden and Indirect

High

First ‘Azma

Middling

Middling

Hidden and Indirect

Low

Second ‘Azma

Middling

Low

Open and Direct

High

‘Azm

Middling

Low

Open and Direct

High

Degree of Connection

The Egyptian-Syrian Conflict and Conflict among Syrian Separatist Elites The Egyptian-Syrian conflict had an important influence not only on the conflict between Nasserite groups and the separatist regime, but on a second conflict that existed between the regime and competing separatist elites. In situations where the Egyptian-Syrian conflict was relatively less intense, conflict between Nasserite groups and the regime also tended to become less intense; but conflict between the regime and competing separatist elites

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tended to increase in such situations. The same relationship tended to apply in opposite circumstances — whenever the Egyptian-Syrian conflict heated up, conflict between the regime and competing separatist elites cooled down. The dynamics of the conflict between the ruling and competing separatist elites seems to reflect socio-psychological and traditionalist hypotheses con­ cerning conflict behavior. These hypotheses (as detailed in Chapter 1) hold that conflicting internal actors tend to band together in situations when there is a perceived external (or internal) threat to their interests. In the case of the conflict described here, the joint interest of ruling and competing separatist elites was the preservation of Syrian independence, and opposition to any kind of renewed union with Egypt.82 The relationship between the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and the two kinds of internal conflict may be shown schematically as follows: Decreased Interactions of Conflict Syrian Internal Environment Separatist Competing Elites Egypt

Conflict Nasserite Competing Elites

Conflict

Ï------- “ T



Increase Decrease

Decrease Increase

_ i __

t

Separatist Ruling Elites

Conflict

Increased Interactions of Conflict

Conflict between the ruling and competing separatist elites tended to be more moderate (i.e., less violent) than that between the ruling separatist elite and competing Nasserite elite. There were two main reasons for this. First, the conflict of interests between separatist elites was limited to the shaping of Syrian internal policy, while in the case of separatist and Nasserite elites it concerned the very existence of an independent Syrian entity. Second, com­ peting separatist elites were aware of the relationship between the EgyptianSyrian conflict and Syria’s internal conflicts; they realized that raising the intensity of their conflict would only serve the interests of Egypt and the Nasserites. Quantitative examination of the relationship between the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and that between Nasserites and the separatist regime focused on the number of Egyptian verbal attacks on Syria and the number of internal con­ flict behavior manifestations (of all kinds) instigated by Nasserite linkage groups.83 In the case of the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and that between com­ peting separatist elites, reduced solidarity within the separatist camp is indi-

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cated by the breakdown o f the civilian-military coalition, and by various efforts of competing civilian and military separatist elites to organize conflict activity against the regime. Both the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and conflict between Nasserite groups and the separatist regime began during the transition period (28 September — 22 December 1961). The rise in intensity of these two conflicts was accom­ panied by a rise in the level of solidarity within the heterogeneous, separatist military-civilian coalition. This high level of solidarity had its source in an awareness of the connection between the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and Egyptian efforts to foment internal conflict in Syria in order to sabotage the creation of an independent Syrian entity. The main indications of solidarity at this time were coalition partners’ support for the National Charter, a docu­ ment backed by a wide national consensus; their presentation of a balanced economic program to prevent a possible conflict between either right and leftwing elites or socio-economic interest groups (workers, students, fellahin) and the regime; and the absence of anything more than minimal conflict manifes­ tations within the ranks of the separatist coalition.84 During the Dawälibf regime (22 December 1961 — 28 March 1962), re­ duction in intensity of the Egyptian-Syrian conflict (decrease in the number of verbal attacks from 260 in the transition period to 102) and reduction in internal conflict activities instigated by the linkage groups (27 internal con­ flict manifestations as against 48 in the transition period) was accompanied by a rise in intensity of the internal conflict within the separatist camp. During this period, the rightist ruling elite faced conflicts with the leftist competing elite, the moderate left officers’ group led by Nahlâwï (a conflict that ended with the military coup carried out by Nahlâwï), and with various socio-economic interest groups. Internal conflict manifestations characterizing this period were strikes and demonstrations by the interest groups and parlia­ mentary clashes between rightist and leftist elites.85 During the first ‘Azma government (16 April — 22 June 1962), there was a further lessening of intensity of both the Egyptian-Syrian conflict (the num­ ber of verbal attacks decreasing to 57) and conflict between linkage groups and the regime (only four conflict manifestations). This double reduction was accompanied by a lessening of solidarity within the separatist camp. During this period, internal conflict within the separatist camp broadened consider­ ably. Conflict within the ruling elite, especially between the two Ba‘th fac­ tions — that of Haurânï and Bïtâr-Aflaq, resulted in a splitting up of the Ba‘th. Hauranf’s socialist bloc, which had participated in the government, became a partner to anti-government activity. Three ministers resigned be­ cause they disagreed with the growing unionist orientation of the govern­ ment.86 And last, conflict between the ruling and competing separatist elites expanded in particular to a competing politicians’ group led by Khälid alAzm. Although this conflict was a verbal one, it seriously threatened the existence of the Azma government, since the politicians’ group demanded a

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renewal of parliamentary rule (suspended after the Nahlâwr coup) on a new constitutional basis; a retreat from the government’s unionist policy; and a change in government, on grounds that the ‘Azma government was incapable of closing the ranks and ensuring stability in Syria.87 Activity of the poli­ ticians’ group took the form of numerous meetings (generally in ‘Azm’s home), and publication of circulars and communiques which stated their demands.88 During the second ‘Azma government’s period in office (22 June — 13 Sep­ tember 1962), there was a considerable rise both in the intensity of the Egyptian-Syrian conflict (159 attacks compared with 57 during the first ‘Azma government) and the conflict instigated by linkage'groups (75 internal conflict manifestations compared to four). This rise led to the elimination of internal conflict between the ruling and competing separatist elites. After meeting with the Syrian president and prime minister on 20 August, the politicians’ group decided to stop acting against the government. This meeting took place one day before the Arab League Council met at Shtura to hear the Syrian complaint on Egyptian subversion. On 21 August, the politicians’ group issued a formal announcement stating that they had decided to halt their attacks on the ‘Azma government until after the hearings, adding that their group differed from the government only on internal matters.89 After the Shtura meeting, the group did in fact renew their demands for a change of government; on 1 September they published an announcement calling for the establishment of a new, broad national government.90 On 17 September 1962, the ‘Azm government was set up in reaction to the negative results of the Arab League Council meeting. Following the meeting. President Qudsf and the army party had been convinced of the need to estab­ lish a broad government that would be able to confront Nasserite subversion. The politicians’ group, which included many of the separatist political elites, became the new ruling elite in a separatist national unity government headed by ‘Azm. This government included representatives of both the right wing (the People’s Party, the National Party and the Islamic bloc) and left wing (the group of ‘Azm and Haurânî’s socialist bloc).91 The previous head of government, Bashir al-‘Azma, was appointed deputy prime minister. The army approved the composition of the coalition, although it put forward a list of persons among whom the prime minister was to choose his ministers.92 ‘Azm’s was the first government since the transition period to succeed in bringing together all the political elites that had taken part in breaking up the Egyptian-Syrian Union. Separatist civilian elites came together again in face of the danger to Syria’s political independence from the rise in intensity of the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and of the internal conflict instigated by the Syrian Nasserite elements. However, increased solidarity lasted for only a brief time. During ‘Azm’s period in office, relations deteriorated between leftist and rightist elites — especially between the Muslim Brethren and Haurânï’s socialist bloc - to the point of violent clashes between the two

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sides93 and the resignations of HauriinF’s socialist bloc ministers, the deputy prime minister and three other ministers.94 In the course of internal conflict between the Muslim Brethren and Hauranfs socialist bloc, the Muslim Breth­ ren made contact with Nasserite linkage groups in order to cooperate with them more effectively.95 During the first months of the ‘Azm government, a breakdown of solidarity was paralleled by a slowing down of the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and the conflict instigated by linkage groups (66 verbal attacks and 15 internal conflict manifestations in the months October to December 1962). However, a marked rise in intensity of the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and the conflict instigated by the linkage groups in the months January-February 1963 (186 verbal attacks, and 49 internal conflict manifestations) did not lead to in­ creased solidarity. During the six last months of the ‘Azm government, the separatist coalition faced complete disintegration; the rise in intensity of external and internal conflicts was no longer sufficient to close the ranks. The Syrian-Israeli Conflict At various points during the separatist regime, ruling elites exploited the long­ standing Syrian-Israeli conflict in an effort to damp down internal conflict. There were two basic methods of exploiting the Syrian-Israeli conflict. In some cases, the ruling elite issued proclamations that Israel was threatening military attack and/or was mobilizing troops along the border. In other instances, the Syrian government made use of force, by provoking border incidents with Israel. The Syrian-Israeli conflict was a convenient external “circle” into which Syrian internal conflict could be canalized. There were a number of reasons for this. First, the Syrian-Israeli conflict was given — there was no need to invent it. Second, this conflict was universally judged to be Syria’s most serious conflict; there was no difference of opinion among Syria’s elites regarding enmity with Israel. Third, during the separatist regime there were three real foci of conflict: Israeli vs. Syrian claims to sovereignty over the demilitarized zones; Syrian claims for partial sovereignty over the Sea of Galilee; and Israel’s diversion of the Jordan River.96 These three foci of direct conflict ‘facilitated’ the use of external conflict for the purpose of canalizing internal conflict, since it was always possible to contend that the Israelis had started a border incident or that Syria was preventing Israel from infringing upon her legitimate rights - this latter charge applying in particular to Syrian attacks on the Israeli national water carrier project at the beginning of 1962.97 In order to examine the connections between the two types of conflict, we shall present direct connections between Syria’s internal conflict and the Syrian-Israeli conflict as they were reflected in three specific internal conflict events: the NahlâwF coup (28 March 1962); the Nasserite uprising (1 April 1962); and the teachers’ strike (8 December 1962). We shall also examine

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quantitative connections between the rise in intensity of the internal conflict and increased efforts to exploit the external conflict. The first of these events was the Nahlâwï coup of 28 March 1962, in which the dominant Nahlâwï officers’ group attempted to take sole power of Syria. Shortly after the outbreak of the coup, the Nahlâwï group began to broadcast reports over Damascus Radio of Israeli intentions to attack Syria. This move was taken after it had become clear that the coup was meeting with increasing opposition from competing civilian and military elites — in particular the Zahr ad-Din group, the Nasserite-unionist officers’ group, and the Ba’thists. Six announcements were made on 28 March in the name of the Revolutionary Command (Nahlâwï), calling on the people to maintain a united front in order to actively confront Israeli and imperialist aggression: Announcement No. 1(11.00 hours): The whole army stands in one firm and united rank in its giant stand against Israel and [the] imperialism which supports Israel and provides it with the means of existence and survival. Israel, which is still licking the wounds it sustained in the Ein Gev battle on the shores of [the Sea of Galilee] is attempting to renew the round. The army that crushed Israel’s aggression in lying in wait for treacherous maneuvers and has its finger on the trigger to shoot Israel in the heart many times over. The army’s strength is derived from that of this noble people. The people’s strength is in their unity and consolidation in standing firm against the forces of treachery, treason and imperialism. The army is the support of the people and the people are the support of the army. Announcement No. 2 (11.05 hours): ...Imperialism and its stepdaughter Israel... are watching for oppor­ tunities to strike against the Arab liberation movement and to distort its objectives. Let us all be united in one rank to face the enemy which is lying in wait for us. Let our slogan at this critical time be complete unity and wide consciousness. Announcement No. 3(11.10 hours): Your rallying round your valiant army is proof of the consolidation and unity of the people and brilliant evidence that our beloved Syrian Arab Republic will always be in the vanguard of the liberated Arab caravan and the stronghold of Arabism. Announcement No. 4(11.20 hours): Having, pledged to safeguard the gains of this country and protect its freedom and dignity, the army is fully confident that all citizens realize the dangers lying behind the intrigues of imperialism and its supporters. Above all, the army is confident that the citizens stand united in one rank behind their army and are ready to respond to the call of duty and bear arms if necessary to oppose imperialism and its supporters, should they attempt to exploit this situation to strike against our national cause and expose our independence to danger.

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Announcement No. 5 (12.15 hours): The dangers surrounding us call upon the sons of Arab Syria to close their ranks, united in one heart and ready to meet the call of duty and bear arms if necessary. Announcement No. 6 (no time given): Imperialism and its collaborators are lying in wait for us. Compatriots, we are all called upon to consolidate and close our ranks and to be prepared to bear arms if necessary to defend the country and crush any plots against our homeland.98 Exploitation of the Syrian-Israeli conflict (more precisely, the threat of Israeli aggression) failed to secure power for the Nahläwf group, most likely because its attempts to grasp at the Israeli threat were far too transparent. Rival military groups did not accept their assertions about an imminent threat from Israel, seeing these as an attempt to consolidate the coup. And in fact the Israeli threat was not a reality on 28 March —although shortly before the coup, on 17 March, clashes on the Israel-Syria border had reached a peak with an Israeli foray against Syrian positions at Nukeib. Syrian Army Com­ mander Zahr ad-Dih, who headed the rival separatist military elite, rejected the Nahläwf group’s claims of imminent Israeli aggression in a speech on 30 March.99 Zahr ad-Dfn’s speech contradicting the Nahläwf group’s assertions about the Israeli threat did not, however, deter either himself or the Army Com­ mand in Damascus from making similar use of the Syrian-Israeli conflict for the purpose of quashing the Nasserite rising in Aleppo. When this uprising reached its climax on 1 April, Damascus Radio suddenly began broadcasting military marches, informing the Syrian people of concentrations of Israeli forces on the Syrian border and warning of Israel’s intention to attack Syria in order to take revenge for her defeat on the Sea of Galilee (the foray against Nukeib on 17 March being defined as an Israeli defeat and a striking Syrian victory). Aleppo insurgents were urged in this broadcast to halt their uprising in order to preserve the army’s solidarity and unity, since this was what had ensured Syria’s victory over the Israeli invasion on 17 March. In order to show that the danger was real, Damascus Radio reported the setting up of training camps for Syrian civilians and the distribution of arms to civilians. The Damascus Command even went to the trouble of declaring that it was necessary to join together not only to confront the expected Israeli aggression - the success of which would depend on unity in the ranks of the Syrian Army — but also to liberate Palestine. Seven times during the course of the day, Damascus Radio called on the men of Aleppo and the Syrian people to unite in face of imminent Israeli aggression. Here are a few sample extracts: Appeal to Aleppo, 08.30 hours: Your brothers in the south are in their positions on the firing line with their hands on the trigger to defend the honor of their beloved home-

104

Linkage Politics in the Middle East land, to check aggression. Your patriotism urges you to respond to the call of the homeland, in unity and solidarity with your valiant army, which by unity and solidarity succeeded in routing Israel [at the Sea of Galilee].

10.00 hours: Your army calls on you to stand at its side, to defend its victories to enable the Palestinian people to return to its fatherland. We call on you to close ranks and prepare for the second round, the battle for Palestine, the Arab national battle. Israel perseveres in her aims of expansionist ambition and of realizing her dream “from the Nile to the Euphrates.” Israel is preparing a new, large-scale aggression... 10.45 hours: Israel wants to avenge her defeat [at the Sea of Galilee]. Israel is pre­ paring and waiting for the right moment to rescue her army’s lowered morale. She is concentrating forces and many large formations, armored regiments, in the hope of wiping out the shame that has been stamped upon her. Israel and those who back her will learn that our army and people are strongly and solidly united.100 In this case, too, use of the Syrian-Israeli conflict proved ineffective. Zahr ad-Dln had hoped to use this conflict in order to peacefully suppress the uprising. In the end, however, he was forced to send in troops to forcefully end the coup. The final internal conflict event canalized to the Syrian-Israeli conflict environment was the teachers’ strike of December 1962. On 8 December, Syrian teachers went on a five-day strike throughout the country, demanding shorter working hours. The Azm government viewed this as a political strike organized and instigated by the Nasserites, and attempted to bring it quickly to a close by making use of the Syrian-Israeli conflict.101 This attempt was facilitated by two successive incidents of exchange of fire —on Syrian initia­ tive, according to Israeli sources —on 4 and 7 December, which were followed by a sharp warning from Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion: “If the U.N. does not succeed in stopping the Syrians, Israel will react with all the means and forces at her disposal.” 102 The Azm government and the Syrian media made repeated use of the Syrian-Israeli conflict, mainly the border incidents and the Israeli warning, in order to bring the teachers’ strike quickly to a close. On 9 December, for example, the Syrian prime minister dramatically described “grave dangers facing Syria within and without, and first and foremost the Zionist danger.” 103 The Syrian Council of National Security was convened on the same day to discuss Israeli aggression and the teachers’ strike, which it de­ scribed as a serious blow to the national interest and security of the state.104 On 10 December, two commentaries on Damascus Radio reported the Council’s deliberations,105 on the same day the government put the popular

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defense forces on a state of alert.106 On 12 December, three commentaries on Damascus Radio described the Israeli danger and against this background, the seriousness of the teachers’ strike. The commentator called on teachers to return to work immediately: It is incumbent on the teachers — who well know that we are in an emergency situation — to act in the way their national duty and profes­ sional ethics dictate and not let themselves be led astray by falsified aims... Our people has to realize the seriousness of the situation and the need to mobilize all its military and popular possibilities. ...We are called upon to make sacrifices and greater exertions. ...The teachers have to realize that their strike sabotages the stand of Syria at the front.107 On 12 December the Syrian prime minister announced that his government had taken all the measures at its disposal to repel Israeli aggression.108 On 13 December Damascus Radio reported Ben-Gurion’s grave threats against Syria.109 On the same day, Israeli sources reported movements of Syrian forces in the direction of the Israeli border,110 — and the teachers’ strike ended, precisely on schedule. As in the previous two cases, the attempt made to exploit the Syrian-Israeli conflict had been a failure.111 Connections between the rise in intensity of Syria’s internal conflict and the rise in intensity of the Syrian-Israeli conflict were especially marked during the Dawâlïbf and second ‘Azma governments. During Dawillbl’s period in office, there was a significant intensification of internal conflict. In addition to the conflict between separatist ruling elites and Nasserite com­ peting elites (which had also characterized the transition period) there were three other types of internal conflict: between the rightist ruling elite and competing leftist and separatist elites; between Nahlawf’s moderate left officers’ group and the Dawâlïbf government, due to the former group’s aspirations for power and its opposition to Dawâlïbf’s socio-economic policy; and between Dawälibf’s government and the socio-economic interest groups of workers, students and fellahin. The last two were the major internal con­ flicts expressed mainly in an increasing number of strikes and demonstrations (seven strikes and 17 demonstrations) during the months of January—March, and in contacts made with Egypt by the Nahläwf group in order to carry out its coup against the regime. The rise in intensity of conflict between the regime and its various internal adversaries had a considerable effect on the Syrian-Israeli conflict as well. The latter conflict began to intensify about two weeks after the government took power. On 8 January 1962, the Dawâlïbf regime announced changes in socialist legislation that had been enacted during the union. Abolition of this legislation led to considerable conflict with various socio-economic groups (see p.9 4 ). At about the same time, border incidents with Israel began to occur, and there was a marked increase of government and media reports concerning the threat of Israeli aggression.112

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Linkage Politics in the Middle East

The Dawâlïbf government held office from 22 December — 28 March. Until 8 January, there were no reports of internal or external (i.e., SyrianIsraeli) conflict activity, nor were there any government or media warnings concerning Israeli aggression. Between 8 January —28 March, however, there were seven strikes and 17 demonstrations, and 24 Syrian-Israeli conflict interactions (18 exchanges of fire initiated by Syria, according to Israeli sources, and six instances of Syrian planes invading Israeli air space).113 During this same period, there were also 33 declarations expressing appre­ hension about the possibility of Israel aggression (16 government declarations and 17 press and radio reports). According to Egyptian sources, the Dawâlïbf government was exploiting the Syrian-Israeli conflict in order to cool down internal conflict and forestall an attempt by army officers to overthrow the government. When the Syrians reported Israeli force concentrations along the border on 14 February, for instance,114 Cairo Radio reacted with the assertion that Israel was merely carrying out routine maneuvers.115 When Dawâlïbr again spoke of Israeli concentrations along the border on 21 March and expatiated on Israel’s aggressive intentions,116 Cairo Radio said outright that the Damascus govern­ ment was making use of Israeli aggression in order to strengthen its own position, which had been deteriorating steadily.117 On 23 March, Cairo Radio again asserted that the Syrian regime was harping on the theme of war with Israel in order to exploit the Syrian populace for its own purposes.118 Israeli observers also believed that the Dawâlïbf government had deliberately given order to warm up the frontier during the months it held power, especially in its last days, in order to try and prevent army commanders from carrying out a coup to overthrow it — particularly since Syria had not initiated any firing on Israeli vessels on the Sea of Galilee for the previous two-and-a-half years.119 Similar connections between a rise in intensity of the internal conflict and a rise in intensity of the Syrian-Israeli conflict can be seen from a comparison of the second ‘Azma government’s period in office (22 June — 13 September) with that of the first ‘Azma government (20 April — 22 June). In the latter months, there was a striking increase both in internal conflict behavior manifestations (75 compared to four) and in manifestations of the SyrianIsraeli conflict (15 exchanges of fire as against four,120 10 declarations of apprehensions of Israeli aggression as against the complete absence of any such declarations during the first ‘Azma government).121 The Arab-Israeli Conflict In addition to exploiting the Syrian-Israeli conflict for the purpose of cooling down internal conflict, the separatist regime also made use of the system-wide Arab-Israeli conflict. Exploitation of the Arab-Israeli conflict was more sophisticated than that of the Syrian-Israeli conflict. The starting point for use of the Arab-Israeli conflict was that in order to cool down internal con-

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flict in Syria, it was necessary to reduce the intensity of the Egyptian-Syrian conflict. One way to do this was to expand the Syrian-Israeli conflict into an Arab-Israeli conflict by involving Egypt, or attempting to involve her, in armed conflict with Israel. The separatist regime’s basic strategy was to represent the Syrian-Israeli conflict as a conflict over Israel’s diversion of the Jordan River. Diversion of the water was to be seen not as a purely Syrian problem but as one affecting over-all Arab interests. The regime’s argument was that it was necessary to step up Arab —mainly Egyptian — exertions in the arena of the Arab-Israeli conflict, rather than meddle in internal Syrian affairs through the use of direct or indirect conflict. Utilization of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in brief, was intended to face Egypt with the choice of either reducing the intensity of the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and her intervention in Syria’s internal affairs, or else appearing to betray the Arab cause at the very moment that Syria was displaying her heroic commitment to it, by her struggling against Israeli imperialism. During the entire period of the separatist regime, Syrian heads of govern­ ment and the media made constant efforts to represent the Syrian-Israeli conflict as one cent&ring on the question of diversion of the Jordan waters, — this being an issue of pan-Arab significance. Such a line of argument made it possible for Syria to attack Nasser, who instead of concentrating on the ArabIsraeli dispute was concentrating on dealing blows to other Arab regimes, mainly Syria. Not only was Nasser not preventing the Jordan diversion, the argument went, he was also in effect cooperating with Israel by consenting to the presence of the U.N. Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip and the Straits of Tiran, and by allowing Israel free passage in the Straits.122 Following the Israeli foray against Nukeib on 17 March 1962, heads of the Syrian regime began to accuse Egypt of betraying the Arab cause not only by abusing Syria as reactionary, but also by refusing to supply her with arms purchased during the union, including ammunition, planes and boats — thus harming both the Syrian and Arab war effort.123 The most determined effort to lessen the Egyptian-Syrian conflict (and thereby Syria’s internal conflict) was made by Akram al-Hauränl, who was convinced that there was a Nasserite plan to subvert the Syrian regime. In a communique published on 10 May 1962, Hauräni attacked Nasser for neg­ lecting the problem of Palestine and concentrating instead on sabotage and conspiracy in neighboring Arab countries. Hauräni called upon Nasser to desist from his subversive actions in Syria and other Arab states close to Palestine. If Nasser did not respond to this call, Hauräni continued, he would publish secret details about Nasser’s attitude on the Palestinian question during the period of the union — details, Hauräni said, which would prove Nasser’s “treachery.” 124 Beginning on 13 May, Hauräni began to carry out his threat by publishing a series of articles about Nasser’s treason.12s In retrospect, however, Hauränl’s

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plan seems to have backfired. Far from being daunted by the attack, Nasser answered it with a stinging speech to the Legislative Council in Gaza on 26 June: In order to defend or strengthen himself, Akram al-Haurânï makes statements every day in which he levels accusations. All know who Akram al-Haurânï is and who Jamal ‘Abd an-Nasser is. Naturally, every­ one can tell who is the apostate and who is the pervert... He who says that we should fight before we appraise the situation is a traitor to his country and his people and is gambling with the fate of his country and his people. We must prepare, and not busy ourselves with mere talk and political bargaining and filling people up with illusions.126 The Syrian people, Nasser continued, would not permit a group of “feudalist reactionaries” to destroy the Arab spirit. Nasser had once declared that he would abandon his concern with Syrian affairs — but in the circumstances prevailing in Syria he had now decided that “We are with you!” Quantitative examination of the relationship between Syria’s internal con­ flict and her use of the Arab-Israeli conflict partly confirms a connection between a rise in the intensity of the internal conflict and an increase in the number of Syrian attacks against Egypt for betraying Arab interests in the conflict with Israel. An increase in conflict behavior manifestations against the second Azma government as compared with the first (75 manifestations as compared with four) is paralleled with an increase in the number of Syrian verbal attacks on Egypt (30 as compared with 13). This parallel, however, does nothold for the Azm government (17 Septem­ ber to 8 March 1963), which experienced a slight decline in the number of internal conflict manifestations against the regime (68 as compared with 75 during the second Azma government), even as it increased the number of attacks against Egypt (64 as against 30). Syria’s exploitation of the Arab-Israeli conflict proved ineffective. Rather than reduce the intensity of the Egyptian-Syrian conflict, it served to exacer­ bate it; and it proved equally ineffective in damping down conflict with Nasserite linkage groups. Use of the Arab-Israeli conflict was perceived by both Egypt and the linkage groups as a ruse to widen the legitimacy of the separatist regime, and was thus rejected in its entirety. NOTES 1. Burrowes and DeMaio present two similar propositions concerning the reciprocal relationship between internal and external conflict: (1) A state that has recently either broken away from a union or attained independence tends to have reciprocal connec­ tions between its internal and external conflicts. (2) These reciprocal connections tend to be linked with the state or states from which the first state has broken away or at­ tained its independence. Robert Burrowes and Gerald DeMaio. “Domestic/External Linkages - Syria 1961-1967,” Comparative Political Studies 7 (January 1975), p. 480. 2. In May 1962 the Ba*th split in two, with the Haurânî faction leaving the party and the BItar-‘Aflaq section remaining. Following the split, a regionalist group, the Qutriyyùn,

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also came into being. This group opposed the Bltar-’Aflaq group and supported resto­ ration of the union with Egypt on certain terms. Leaders of the Qutriyyùn included Fä’iz al-Jäsim, Yösuf Zu‘ay y In, Munir al-‘Abdallah, and Ibrâhîm Mäkhus (see Itamar Rabinovich, Syria under the Ba‘th 1963-1966: The Army-Party Symbiosis (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), pp. 4 1 -4 3 . 3. Al-Hayät (Lebanon), 5 April 1962. See too Middle East Record (MER), 1961, p. 4% . Muhammad Hassanein Haikal, editor of the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahràm, related that only four days after breakup of the union it was possible to distinguish between two groups of separatist officers. The first group he called “mercenaries who carry out coups d ’etat for pay, for whoever wants to pay” and “the corrupt group” who put out their hands outside Syria to take money from King Husain and King Saud. In this group he included Haydar al-Kuzbari and Faisal Sirri al-Husainl. The other group Haikal called “a handful of unprincipled, faithless conspirators, whose sole aspiration is power for its own sake.” In this group he included NahlawI and ‘Abd al-Ghanl Dahmän. (Al-Ahräm, 6 and 20 April 1962; see too M ER, 1961, pp. 614-616 Rabinovich, op. cit., p. 18.) 4. Some of the Nasserite officers were “released” from the army immediately after the breakup of the union. In February and March, another 200 Nasserite officers were “released” . Those who remained did not reveal their political tendencies, so that they would be able to keep their places in the army. (.Al-Hayät, S April 1962.) 5. On the organizing of the Military Committee, see Rabinovich, Syria under the Ba'th..., pp. 2 4 -25; «Abraham Ben-Tsur, “The Neo-Ba‘th Party of Syria,” Journal o f Contemporary History 3 (1968), pp. 164-166. 6. Rabinovich, op. cit., pp. 3 0-31. 7. Al-Hayät, 5 April 1962; MER, 1961, p. 495. 8. This distinction was mainly between the predominant group in the army and groups of minor importance. 9. Thus, for example, the NahlawI coup of 28 March 1962 and the uprising of Nasserite, unionist and Ba‘th officers in April 1962. Both of these are described later in this chapter. 10. See preceding note. 11. Verbal attacks is a collective term for incitement, accusations, and vituperation. For the purpose of quantitative examination, the number of Nasser’s verbal attacks was noted, as were the number of editorial and other articles in the press and the number of radio commentaries. Each attack was given the same unit value. 12. The first type of internal conflict is called “revolutionary” by Rummel and “internal war” by Gurr (see Chapter Three). 13. This second type of internal conflict is called “subversion” by Rummel and “conspiracy” by Gurr (see Chapter Three). 14. This third type of internal conflict is called “turmoil” by Rummel and Gurr (see Chapter Three). 15. George H. Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East - The Arab States (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1971), pp. 251-252. 16. Cairo Radio 5 October, Daily Report 6 October 1961. 17. The uprising of army commanders in the northern and coastal districts lasted only a few hours. It failed because opponents of the union’s dissolution were markedly outnumbered by separatist elements in the army, and because Nasser withheld his sup­ port. During that same week there were also 18 Nasserite demonstrations. 18. Al-Ahräm, 30 September 1961; MER, 1961, p. 612. 19. Damascus Radio 28 September, Daily Report, 28 September 1961. 20. Damascus Radio 28 September, Daily Report, 29 September 1961. 21. In his second speech on 28 September and in that of 2 October, Nasser reported

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at length on the uprising of the Syrian people in Damascus and Aleppo and sent them his greetings (Cairo Radio 28 September, 2 October; BBC 30 September, 4 October 1961). 22. These broadcasts were recorded by the Daily Report and the BBC on 3 October 1961. 23. The Nahlâwi group’s appeal to Egypt was almost certainly based as well on the fact that it was necessary to get Nasser’s support, given his p e a t influence in Syria’s internal political environment. His support for the new coup would have ensured the support of Nasserite linkage groups both within the army and outside it. 24. Haikal, âM /trdm, 20 and 27 April 1962. 25. In al-Ahräm of 27 April 1962, Haikal wrote that after Nasser heard what the officers’ delegation had to say, he answered as follows: ’’While it is true that restoration of the union by means of a coup would give us all satisfaction, we must rise above our emotions.” A different version was given by Akram al-Haurânl in an interview in the Syrian paper an-Nasr, on 14 June 1962 {apud Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule..., pp. 260, 287). Haurânï contended that while Nasser encouraged Nahlâwi to carry out the coup, he was preparing at the same time to carry out a Nasserite coup for restoration of the union. Evidence for this may also be found in the statement of Luayy al-Atâsi (one of the leaders of the Nasserite coup of 1 April 1962) at the Union Talks in Cairo concerning the connection between Nasserite-unionist officers and Nahlâwi’s p o u p before the attempted Nahlâwi coup. This connection was broken off, Atâsi said, when it became clear that Nahlâwi ’s aim was not to reunite with Egypt but to take power for him­ self in Syria. (Arab Political Documents, 1963, p. 101.) 26. Haikal,al-Ahräm, 20 April 1%2. 27. Damascus Radio 28 March, Daily Report 28 March 1962; see too Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule..., p. 257. 28. Nasserite officers made this alliance in view of their inferior numerical strength in the army. The alliance was based on common dissatisfaction with the domination of separatist officers. The main aim of the Ba’thists, unionists and Nasserites, was identical - the return to active service of their comrades who had been discharged by the separatist regime - but the Ba’thists were anti-Nasserites and anti-unionists, while the unionist and Nasserite officers demanded immediate restoration of the Egyptian-Syrian Union. Rabinovich, Syria under the B a th ..., pp. 3 0 -3 1 ; Haddad, op. cit., p. 260; Tabitha Petran, Syria (London: Ernest Beim Ltd., 1972), p. 156. 29. ‘Alwân was responsible for subversive activity directed against the separatist regime from Lebanon and within Syria (Haddad, op. cit., p. 260), and also headed the p o u p of discharged Nasserite officers who organized clandestine cells in Aleppo. This p o u p was known as “The Free Officers” (al-Hayât, 5 and 6 April 1962). 30. Ba’thist officers were members of die Military Committee (Rabinovich, Syria under the B a th ..., pp. 30-31). 31. There is considerable evidence of Egypt’s part in planning the coup and of con­ tacts she maintained with the Syrian officers’ coalition. The most important evidence was that given by Jisim ‘Alwân at his trial: Testimony at the 4th Public Session of the Military Tribunal dealing with the 18 July Nasserite revolt. Daily Star (Beirut), 13 Sep­ tember 1963 {apud Petran, Syria, p. 166). In the unity talks in March 1963, Nasser disclaimed all connection with execution of the coup {Arab Political Documents, 1963, pp. 101,104). 32. Al-Hayât, 5 and 6 April 1962. 33. Al-Hayât, 3 April 1962. 34. The Homs Congress was convened on the initiative of Zahr ad-Din on 1 April. The three main poups in the army were represented - the Nahlâwi p o u p , the indepen­ dent officers led by Zahr ad-Din, and the Nasserite-Ba’thist-unionist officers. A compro­ mise reached at the Conpess between these poups was meant to end the crisis, but

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Nasserite officers and their partners withdrew from the agreement when it became clear that their hopes of getting rid of the separatist regime, improving their status in the army and restoring the union with Egypt would not be realized. (Rabinovich, Syria under the Ba'th..., p. 33: Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule..., p. 262;al-Hayät, 5 and 6 April 1962.) 35. Aleppo Radio 2 April, Daily Report 3 April 1962. 36. Petran, Syria, p. 157. 37. Cairo Radio 1 April, Daily Report 2 April 1962. 38. Cairo Radio 2 April, Daily Report 2 April 1962. 39. See, for example, Damascus Radio 2 April, Daily Report 2 April; and Aleppo Radio 3 April. Daily Report 3 April (announcement by Jäsim Alwin). 40. Aleppo Radio 3 April, Daily Report 3 April 1962. 41. Aleppo Radio 3 April, Daily Report 3 April 1962. 42. Damascus Radio 3 April, Aleppo Radio 3 April, Daily Report 3 April 1962. 43. Aleppo Radio 3 April, Daily Report 3 April 1962. 44. Aleppo Radio 3 April, Daily Report 3 April 1962. 45. Arab Political Documents, 1963, pp. 101-104. 46. Cairo Radio 3 April, Daily Report 3 April 1962. 47. Cairo Radio 3 April, Daily Report 3 April 1962. 48. At the talks in Cairo. Nasser denied all connection with the uprising and stressed that he had believed in any event that its prospects of success were poor. This may indicate that Nasser ignored the linkage groups after the attempt to activate them proved a failure. (Arab Politicdl Documents, 1963, p. 101.) 49. Damascus Radio 3 April, Daily Report 4 April 1962. 50. Announcement by the Syrian Minister of the Interior at a news conference, Damascus Radio 29 July, Daily Report 30 July 1962; documents of the Syrian complaint against Egypt at the Arab League Council meeting at Shtura (Damascus Radio 22 August, Daily Report 23 August 1962). 51. Petran. Syria, pp. 158-160; Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule..., p. 269. 52. See note 50 above. 53. Petran, Syria, p. 160, notes that the linkage groups had insisted upon direct and open support from Nasser as a condition for executing the coup. 54. Cairo Radio 26 June, BBC 28 June 1962. In the 22 August document of the Syrian complaint against Egypt submitted to the Arab League Council at Shtura, the Syrians noted that Nasser’s speech had openly pointed to his support in planning the plot against Syria (Damascus Radio 22 August, Daily Report 23 August 1962). 55. On 4 and 27 October, and 1 and 7 November, 1961. 56. The text of the Syrian complaint was made public over Damascus Radio on 22 August, Daily Report 23 August 1962. 57. Nasser’s speeches of incitement and support for the popular uprising in Syria were made on 26 June and 4, 22, and 27 July. 58. Verbal attacks included Nasser’s speeches (three in July and August), the Egyp* tian delegation’s addresses to the Arab League Council meeting at Shtura, radio com­ mentaries over Arab Voice and Cairo Radio, and editorials and feature articles in the Egyptian press, as reported in the three sources for radio broadcasts. 59. On 9 July, 13 Nasserite agents were killed (Israel Radio 9 July, Daily Report 10 July 1962); on 11 July, five more were killed (Amman Radio 22 July, Daily Report 23 July 1962); on 22 July a Nasserite agent was captured (al-Hayät, 22 July 1962);on 1 August, 11 men were captured as they tried to cross the frontier (Arab News Agency 1 August, Daily Report 3 August 1962); on 15 August, another sabotage gang was caught crossing the frontier with large quantities of arms, explosives, money and inflam­ matory pamphlets in their possession (al-Hayät, 16 August 1962).

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60. Nasserite sabotage cells, gangs and networks were uncovered by the authorities on 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 18, 2 1 -2 2 , 24, 29 and 31 July, and on 9, 11, 16, 1 9-20 and 25 August. 61. On 10 July, the Syrian defense minister called on the army to step up controls on the Syrian-Lebanese frontier (Damascus Radio 10 July, Daily Report 10 July 1962). A similar call for alertness was voiced by the interior minister on 12 July (Damascus Radio 12 July, Daily Report 12 July 1962). On 17 July, the Syrian and Lebanese foreign ministers met on Syrian initiative in the Syrian town of Bludan in order to discuss Syria’s request that the Lebanese government step up control on the border (Damascus Radio 17 July, Daily Report 17 July 1962). At the end of August, Syrian authorities actually closed the Lebanese-Syrian border in order to apprehend persons escaping to Lebanon (al-Hayät, 28 August 1962). 62. Most of these events were bomb-throwing incidents. 63. Damascus Radio 29 July, Daily Report 30 July 1962. 64. Al-Jarlda, 5 January 1963; Middle East News Agency 5 January, Daily Report 8 January 1963; announcement by Syrian interior minister, Arab News Agency 12 Janu­ ary, Daily Report 13-14 January 1963 ; announcement by Syrian premier, Arab News Agency 15 January, Daily Report 16 January 1963; al-Jarida, 27 January 1963; announcement by Syrian interior minister, Arab News Agency 2 February, Daily Report 4 February 1963 ; Damascus Radio 4 February, Daily Report 6 February 1963. 65. Al-Ayam (Syria), 18 January 1963. 66. The Syrian-Lebanese border was closed on 22 January in order to prevent infiltration by Nasserite agents (Israel Radio 22 January, Daily Report 23 January 1963); on 5 February, Syrian forces crossed into Lebanese territory on the track of Nasserite agents (Israel Radio 5 February, Daily Report 6 February 1963). 67. Damascus Radio 8 January, Daily Report 9 January 1962. The changes in socialist legislation consisted mainly of the annulment of nationalizations and a change in the agrarian reform law.’ 68. Syrian forces reported capturing some of the Nasserite agents (an-Nasr, 19-21 February 1962; Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule..., p. 254; al-Ayäm 11 March 1962; Daily Report 12 March 1962). 69. Damascus Radio 14 January, Daily Report 15 January 1962. 70. Damascus Radio 15 January, Daily Report 15 January 1962. The attempts at incitement in the University were by non-Syrian Nasserite students. 71. 29 attacks by Cairo Radio and the Arab Voice, and 15 attacks in editorials in the Egyptian press. 72. All reported by the Egyptian media. 73. Arab News Agency 2 July, Daily Report 3 July 1962; Damascus Radio 4 July, Daily Report 5 July 1962. New laws aimed at restricting trade union political activities were put into effect after the government received reports that trade unions and other workers’ organizations were liable to organize disturbances on Nasserite instigation (Pertan, Syria, p. 160). 74. Damascus Radio 5, 7 - 8 ,1 0 July; Daily Report 6, 7—10 July 1962. 75. A workers’ strike began in Aleppo on 7 July. On 9 July, Damascus factory workers joined the strike. In Aleppo, two workers were killed and six workers and security men were wounded. In Damascus one worker was killed and a large number of workers and security men were wounded. (Damascus Radio 7 July, Daily Report 9 July 1962; Arab News Agency 9 July, Daily Report 10 July 1962). 76. Arab News Agency 8 July, Daily Report 9 July 1962. 77. Damascus Radio 10 July, Daily Report 10 July 1962. 78. Damascus Radio 29 July, Daily Report 30 July 1962. 79. Interior minister’s announcement, Arab News Agency 12 January, Daily Report

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13 January 1963; Syrian premier’s announcement, Arab News Agency 13 January, Daily Report 14 January 1963; Syrian interior minister’s announcement, Beirut Radio 14 January, Daily Report 15 January 1963; Syrian premier’s announcement, Damascus Radio 16 January, Daily Report 17 January 1963. 80. Damascus Radio 16 January, Daily Report 17 January 1963. 81. Interesting evidence confirming the less intensive connection may be found in the Lebanese newspaper al-Jarîda of 5 October, just one week after breakup of the union. The reporter had made a journey all over Syria, and he expressed his extreme surprise at the small number of internal conflict manifestations against the new regime. After three-and-a-half years of the union, many more internal conflict manifestations against the new regime could have been expected, he felt. (MER, 1961, p. 490.) 82. The dynamics of this erasure of one conflict by another is called “Catastrophe Theory’’ in mathematics: the more serious or more catastrophic conflict erases the less catastrophic one. See E.C. Zeeman, “Catastrophe Theory,” Scientific American, 234 (1976), pp. 6 5 -8 3 . 83. Although quantitative analysis was not applied to equal periods of time, since different governments were in office for different periods of time, it does serve to indicate the intensity of the types of conflict. 84. We know of two conflict manifestations: that between Bltär and Hauräni con­ cerning the revival of parliamentary rule (Middle East News Agency 9 November, Daily Report 9 November 1961); and the conflict between the right-wing officers’ group and Nahlawl’s moderate left-wing group (Middle East News Agency 25 November, Daily Report 30 November 1961). 85. Hauräni’s party encouraged interest groups to demonstrate and go on strike (Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule..., p. 254; Arab Voice 21 March, Daily Report 21 March 1962). 86. Damascus Radio 22 May, Daily Report 23 May 1962. 87. These demands were presented in a petition to President Qudsi signed by 106 deputies of the lower house (Arab News Agency 9 June, Daily Report 11 June 1962); and cited in a speech by Tsäm al-’Attar in the mosque of Damascus University (Damascus Radio 8 June, Daily Report 9 June 1962). 88. From 31 May, the date when the politicians’ group was constituted, to 22 June, the date when the ‘Azina government fell, the politicians’ group held 8 meetings, presented one petition and published 4 communiques. In a communique on 27 July, Tsâm al-‘Attâr, one of the group’s leaders, demanded a change of government (Arab News Agency 27 July, Daily Report 29 July 1962); on 5 August, ‘Azm called for the signing of a “National Charter” (Arab News Agency 5 August, Daily Report 7 August 1962); on 14 August, ‘Attar called on President Qudsi to dismiss the government and set up a new one worthy of support (Arab News Agency 14 August, Daily Report 15 August 1962) ; and on 18 August the politicians’ group called for the restoration of parliamentary rule and a new government that would be capable of confronting Nasserite plots (Arab News Agency 18 August, Daily Report 21 August 1962). 89. Arab News Agency 21 August, Daily Report 21 August 1962. 90. Arab News Agency 1 September, Daily Report 4 September 1962. 91. The Bitar-'Aflaq faction refused to join the new government, even though it was invited to do so. 92. Although the prime minister also chose persons who were not on the army list, he was forced to bow to the army’s opposition to personalities such as Dawällbl, Leon Zamariya and Rashid Jabri {al-Hayät, 14 March 1963, apud Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule..., p. 289. See too the book by Zahr ad-Dln, Memoirs, pp. 324-325, apud Haddad, op. cit., p. 289). 93. On 13 November 1962 and 1 February 1963 there were violent clashes between

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Haurânî’s people and the Muslim Brethren (London Radio 13 November, Summary o f Broadcasts IS November 1962; London Radio 1 February, Summary o f Broadcasts 3 February 1963). 94. The three ministers of the Socialist bloc resigned for the first time on 8 Decem­ ber, withdrew their resignations (al-Jarïda, 8 December 1962), and resigned again on 26 January (Arab News Agency 27 January, Daily Report 28 January 1963). Deputy Prime Minister ‘Azma resigned on 24 January, followed by Minister of Education and Culture Rashid Barmada on 29 January. On 16 February, two ministers of the Muslim Brethren also resigned (Damascus Radio 16 February, Daily R eport 18 February 1963). 95. Al-Jarida, 15 January 1963; Paris Radio 15 January; Daily Report 16 January 1963. The conflict between HauranI and the Muslim Brethren was actually based on the latter’s cooperation with Nasserites (Arab News Agency 27 January, Daily Report 28 January 1963). 96. For a discussion of the Syrian-Israeli conflict over the demilitarized zones and the diversion of the Jordan waters, see Nissim Bar-Yaacov, The Israeli-Syrian Armistice, Problems o f Implementation, 1949-1966 (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, The Hebrew Univer­ sity, 1967), pp. 144-242; Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 173—224. Yoram Nimrod, Waters o f Contention The Jordan Waters Dispute (Hebrew) (Centre for Afro-Asian Studies, Givat Haviva, 1966). 97. Bar-Yaacov, op. cit., p. 141. 98. Damascus Radio 28 March, Daily Report 28 March 1962. 99. Damascus Radio 30 March, Summary o f Broadcasts 1 April 1962. 100. Damascus Radio 30 March, Summary o f Broadcasts, 1 April 1962. 101. Damascus Radio 8 December, Summary o f Broadcasts 9 December 1962. 102. Davor, 12 December 1962. 103. Damascus Radio 9 December, Summary o f Broadcasts 9 December 1962. 104. Damascus Radio 10 December, Summary o f Broadcasts 10 December 1962. 105. Damascus Radio 10 December, Summary o f Broadcasts 10 December 1962. 106. Damascua Radio 10 December, Summary o f Broadcasts 11 December 1962. 107. Damascus Radio 12 December, Summary o f Broadcasts 13 December 1962. 108. Beirut Radio 12 December, Summary o f Broadcasts 13 December 1962. 109. Damascus Radio 13 December, Summary o f Broadcasts 14 December 1962. 110. Davor, 13 December 1962. Egyptian sources remarking on the Syrian teachers’ strike and the border incidents with Israel described the use made of the Syrian-Israeli conflict as a joint Israeli-Syrian conspiracy aimed at bringing the teachers’ strike quickly to an end. On 12 December, for example, Cairo Radio reported that “The tension on the Israel-Syria border is the fruit of an Israeli stratagem intended to rescue the Syrian regime from the crises threatening its survival. Israel was obliged to cany out a series of aggressive acts against the Syrian people in the attempt to reduce the pressure of the Syrian people on the regime and divert attention from the state of confusion.’’ On 13 December, Cairo Radio repeated its accusation, the Arab Voice also took it up. 111. On 16 December, al-Jarida reported that “The crisis over the teachers would have been liable to cause complications on the highest level had it not been for the frontier incidents with Israel.... Perhaps Syria’s adversaries were right to some extent when they attributed the tension on the Israel-Syria borders to the problems troubling Syria internally.” 112. The Middle East News Agency reported on 31 March 1962 that the Dawallb! government activated officers supporting it for aggression (border incidents) against Israel, in order to prevent officers opposed to the government from acting against it (Daily R eport, 2 April 1962). 113. One incident of exchange of fire on 17 January, 6 incidents in February (on 1, 7, 10, 15, 25, 27 February), 11 incidents of exchange of fire in March (on 2, 7 -8 ,1 2 ,

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15-16, 19, and 4 incidents on 21 March). Invasions of Israel air space by Syrian planes took place on 19 to 20, and on 21 March. Among the 18 incidents of exchange of fire, 4 were directed at Israeli police boats on the Sea of Galilee, 11 on settlements, and the rest on tractors working in the demilitarized zone. 114. Damascus Radio 14 February, Daily Report 15 February 1962; Ha’a retz, 14 February 1962. 115. Cairo Radio 14 February, Daily Report 14 February 1962. 116. Damascus Radio 21 March, Daily Report 22 March 1962. 117. Cairo Radio 22 March, Daily Report 22 March 1962. 118. Cairo Radio 23 March, Daily Report 23 March 1962. 119. Ha'aretz, 5 April 1962. The complaint submitted to the Security Council by Israel on 16 March 1962 (UN S/5091) accused the Syrian government of adopting an aggressive policy against Israel because of pressure in its internal environment and be­ cause it was involved in conflict abroad with other Arab states. See Fred J. Khouri, “Friction and Conflict on the Israeli-Syrian Front,” Middle East Journal, XVII (1963), p. 27. 120. Two incidents of exchange of fire in June (on 21 and 24 June), two in July (on 9 and 11 July), six in August (one on 8, 21; three on 22; one on 30 August), five in September (one on 3,6; and three on 11 September). 121. In this period too, Egyptian sources accused the ‘Azma government of making use of the Syrian-Israeli conflict for the purposes of broadening the regime’s basis of legitimacy. They again accused the Syrian government of initiating a conspiracy together with Israel in order to lessen opposition to the regime. (Cairo Radio 27 June and 13 July, Summary o f Broadcasts 27 June and 16 July 1962.) 122. Note for example what Zahr ad-Din said on Damascus Radio on 6 November, Daily Report 7 November 1961; Damascus Radio commentary 8 November, Daily Report 9 November 1961. 123. Damascus Radio 18 March, Daily Report 19 March 1962; Damascus Radio 20 March, Daily Report 21 March 1962;Dawâllbï Press conference, Damascus Radio 21 March 1962; Damascus Radio 23 March 1962, BBC 26 March 1962. 124. Arab News Agency 10 May, Daily Report 10 May 1962. 125. From 10 May to 20 June, Hauränl published 9 communiques. 126. Cairo Radio 26 June, BBC 28 June 1962.

6 The Ba'th Regime, 1963-1966: Connections Between Internal and External Conflicts Important changes in Syria’s internal and external political environments took place following the revolution of 8 March 1963 that displaced the separatists with a Ba‘th regime. In the internal environment, a new political structure was set up, characterized at first by a multi-party regime and the appearance of new political and military elites. Changes in the external environment included attempts to establish a triple union of Syria, Iraq and Egypt (an attem pt which ultimately failed); changes in the internal political environment of Iraq (Ba‘th Party rule until 18 November 1963, followed by an anti-Ba‘th coup); Egyptian-Iraqi rapprochement and Syrian isolation after the fall of the Ba‘th regime in Iraq; completion of the Israeli national water carrier project in the first half of 1964; and a stream of Arab summit meetings against a backdrop of inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli conflicts. As in the separatist period, the Egyptian-Syrian conflict was linked with Syria’s internal conflict —in this case, a conflict between the Ba'th Party and Nasserite linkage groups. Given the traditional rivalry between Nasser and the Ba‘th Party, it is not surprising that Syria’s internal and external conflicts continued to be linked. During the separatist era, the Egyptian-Syrian conflict had generally been the main influence on the course of Syrian internal conflict. During the Ba‘th regime, however, it was more often internal conflict between the Ba‘th and Nasserites that served to influence the external Egyptian-Syrian conflict. As in the separatist regime, the relationship between the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and Syria’s internal conflict expanded at various times to the SyrianIsraeli and Arab-Israeli conflicts. The Ba‘th regime, like the separatist regime before it, attempted to exploit these latter two conflicts in an effort to limit the intensity of Syria’s internal conflict. The tendency to canalize internal conflict into the external environment was even greater during the Ba'th regime because this regime had an even narrower base of legitimacy than did the separatist regime. There was no dearth of internal conflict during the Ba'th era: conflict existed between various factions of the ruling elite, be­ tween the Ba'th and competing (Nasserite and Separatist) elites, and between the Ba'th and various socio-economic interest groups.

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SYRIA’S POLITICAL REGIME Syria’s regime after the revolution has been identified as a military one, with power deriving from the National Council of the Revolutionary Command, the supreme authority for the state.1 This council had legislative powers and was also the supreme executive body; the preponderantly civilian government, which was the main operational executive authority, was subject to the Revolutionary Council and supervised by it. Officers were in the decisive majority in the Revolutionary Council, although there were some civilian leaders as well.2 Members of the Revolutionary Council, both military and civilian, constituted the majority of the leadership of the coup that had toppled the separatist regime. A constitutional edict of 9 July 1963 defined the principal elements in this pattem for the first time; these elements were seen again in the pro­ visional Constitution of the Ba‘th Party made public in April 1964.3 In the course of the period from March 1963 —February 1966, changes were made in the size and membership of the Revolutionary Council. Official announce­ ments from late 1964 to early 1965 indicated possibilities of enlarging the Council to 100 or 150 members, to be chosen mainly from the professional ranks.4 This pattem of military rule based on a revolutionary council was characteristic of the first stage of the Ba‘th regime, when the main feature of Syria’s political structure was its large number of military and political elites. In the second stage, which began on 22 July 1963, the political structure was changed from multi-party to one-party, and the Revolutionary Council ceased to be the main base of authority in Syria. True, the council still existed, but officers’ rule now rested on various civilian and military appar­ atuses and institutions of the Ba‘th Party: the National Command, the Regional Command, and principally the Military Committee, which became the main ruling bodies through which the army ruled Syria. Political actors. The 8 March revolution brought to power political elites that had been competing elites under the separatist regime - the Ba‘th Party (Brtar-‘Aflaq faction), three Nasserite parties (the Socialist Unionist Move­ ment, the Arab Nationalist Movement, and the United Arab Front) and a large group of independent politicians. Besides these ruling elites, there were three additional parties which acted as the new competing elites: the Socialist bloc of Haurânf, the Muslim Brethren and the Syrian Communist Party. Although these parties were not legally recognized, they played an important role in Syria’s internal political environment.5 Once the Ba‘th Party had succeeded in ousting its Nasserite and independent partners, the predominant political elite became groups within the Ba‘th itself: the traditional civilian leadership, headed by Bîtâr and ‘Aflaq, and the younger elite, headed by leaders of the Qutriyyün (Regional) group — Nür ad-Dîn al-Atâsî, Yusuf Zu‘ayyfn and Ibrâhîm Mäkhus. For a while there was also an active, radical

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leftist group whose members included Hamüd ash-Shufi, Ahmad Abu Salih and Yäsin al-Häfiz. Military actors. Three principal military elites can be distinguished in the new political regime: (1) Progressive Independents, headed by the following officers: Ziyad alHarîrî, Luayy al-Atäsi, Ghassän Haddad and Fahd ash-Sha‘ir. Some of this group had also been prominent in the period of the separatist regime and were known as unionists. This group of officers inclined more towards a Ba‘th Party orientation than did the Nasserite officers. (2) Ba'thists, headed by Muhammad ‘Umrân, Salâh Jadid, Amïn al-Häfiz, Hafiz al-Asad and Hamad TJbaid (members of the Military Committee). (3) Nasserites, headed by Rashid al-Qutainl, Muhammad as-Sufi and Jäsim ‘Alwän. After the Ba‘th Party took sole control, the military groups active in the internal political environment were those that had been basically Ba‘thist. The three most important groups were those of Häfiz, ‘Umrän and Jadid. During this stage, the distinction between purely political and purely military groups became lessrclear, because leaders such as Hafiz, ‘Umrän and Jadid filled both political and military roles. Ruling elites, competing elites and interest groups. As mentioned above, the regime set up after the revolution was based on a broad coalition of political and military elites that had been partners in overthrowing the separatist regime: Nasserite parties, the Ba‘th Party and independent elements. Competing elites were those that had held a share in power under the separ­ atist regime — the most prominent being the Hauränl Socialist bloc and the Muslim Brethren. Ruling political and military elites were represented in two central insti­ tutions of the regime, the Revolutionary Council and the government. During the first stage of the regime, the Revolutionary Council had four represen­ tatives of the independent officers, three BaHh officers and three Nasserites. President of the Revolutionary Council was Luayy al-AtäsI of the independent officers’ group; his deputy was Rashid al-Qutainlof the Nasserite group. Among the ten civilians on the Revolutionary Council were six Ba‘th representatives, three Nasserites and one independent. During the first government established after the revolution, which consisted of twenty members, there were ap­ parently ten Ba‘thists, six Nasserites and four independents.6 Since independent representatives on the Revolutionary Council and in the government were more Ba‘th-oriented than Nasserite, the relation of forces in the new regime tended from the beginning to favor the Ba‘th. The question of representation in the government — and even more so in the Revolutionary Council — became a central factor in the development of

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internal conflict between the Ba‘th and Nasserites, and from there, the devel­ opment of external Egyptian-Syrian conflict. The initial coalition proved weak and unstable from its inception, given the evident political and ideological contradictions between Nasserites and the Ba‘th, independents and the Ba‘th, and between various components of the BaHh Party itself. The only program the coalition could agree on was ending the secession from Egypt; it had no other positive program to offer. Moreover, it soon became apparent that the Ba‘th was not particularly interested in restoring the union - its main concern was acquiring and staying in power. The coalition remained viable for several months only because of external constraints (Egypt), and because none of the' groups within the government had sufficient power to impose its will and exert complete con­ trol over its rivals. The transition from a wide coalition to a one-party Ba‘th regime was effected in two stages. The Ba^th first formed an alliance with independents in order to oust the Nasserites. When this alliance broke up, the Ba‘th proceeded to oust the independents and take sole control of Syria.7 Once the Ba‘th had become the sole party in power, distinctions could be discerned between various elites. The first distinction was between the Ba‘th as ruling elite and all other political parties. The second distinction was between groups within the Ba‘th Party, some of them ruling and the rest competing. During the period of Ba^th rule, there were frequent changes and transfers of Ba‘th politi­ cal and military groups along this continuum of ruling and competing elites. The main struggle for power was concentrated among military leaders of the Ba‘th; political leaders played a minor role and were generally exploited by the former group. Eventually, leaders of the Military Committee were able to consolidate their position in power, thanks to efficient organization and plan­ ning, and to their success in mobilizing support within the army. Under the BaHh regime, interest groups remained the same as in the separatist period (workers, fellahin, students, merchants, landowners and religious figures). Interest groups identified with the separatist regime (mer­ chants, landowners and religious figures) were naturally inclined to oppose the new regime, whose “socialistic” policy damaged their socio-economic standing. Workers and fellahin tended to be supporters of the new regime, but their views carried little weight because they were unorganized and scattered.8 Linkage Groups. Under the Ba‘th regime, active Nasserite linkage groups were the Nasserite officers in the Syrian Army. There were two stages in their activity. Up until the end of April 1963, they were part of the ruling elite, since they had taken part in the revolution. In this role, Nasserite elites worked for an immediate restoration of the Egyptian-Syrian Union and for establishment of an internal “national front” of all the forces that had taken part in the revolution — a front within which they would be ensured equal

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representation with the Ba‘th. During the second stage, after Nasserite officers were expelled from the army, Nasserites became a competing elite whose activities were illegal. From this point on, they acted against the Ba‘th regime with Egyptian assistance. During the Ba‘th era, a significant change was apparent in the relations between Nasser and the linkage groups, as compared with the period of the separatist regime. Nasser openly extended protection to the Syrian groups loyal to him, and declared that relations with the Ba‘th were conditional on these groups being given a full share in the government. In the course of the tripartite union talks between Egypt, Syria and Iraq held in Cairo in the months of March and April 1963, Nasser made this an explicit precondition for any discussion concerning union with Syria. Such patronage became an important element in the reciprocal relationship that developed between Syria’s internal and external conflicts, especially after the BaHh refused to share power with the Nasserites under the conditions agreed to in the Union Talks. TYPES OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONFLICT A number of internal conflicts can be identified according to the type of actor taking part: • Ba‘th Party vs. Nasserites (political and military elites within both groups). • Ba‘th Party (both political and military elites) vs. independents (pre­ ponderantly military elites). • BaHh Party vs. separatist and right-wing interest groups (Haurânî’s Socialist bloc, the Muslim Brethren, merchants, landowners and religious figures). • Internal Ba‘th conflict (civilian faction vs. military faction; military faction vs. military faction; civilian/military faction vs. civilian/military faction). There were also four main external conflicts during the Ba‘th regime: Egyptian-Syrian, Iraqi-Syrian, Syrian-Israeli, and Syria vs. Western ‘imperial­ ism’. The Egyptian-Syrian conflict was a function of both the internal con­ flict between Nasserite linkage groups and the BaHh and the continuing conflict between the Ba*th and Nasser which dated from the Egyptian-Syrian Union. This conflict was mainly a propaganda war waged in the media, but it was not solely verbal; at times, Egypt activated its linkage groups for internal conflict activity against the Ba‘th regime. The Iraqi-Syrian conflict began in November 1963 when the Iraqi Ba‘th Party was ousted in a coup led by ‘Abd as-Salam ‘Aref. Like the Egyptian-Syrian conflict, the Iraqi-Syrian conflict was mainly but not exclusively a propaganda war; Syria at times activated the Iraqi Ba‘th Party for internal conflict activity against the regime of ‘Aref, while Iraq had a role (albeit a minor one) in internal subversive activity against the Syrian Ba‘th regime.

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The Syrian-Israeli conflict during this period focused in the main on completion of the Israeli national water carrier project and Syria’s diversion of the Jordan tributaries. In addition, there were three other active foci of conflict: the question of the demilitarized border areas; Syria’s demand for a wider band of territory bordering the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee; and the activity of Palestinian organizations aided by Syria from January 1965 on. The Syrian-Israeli conflict was both verbal and violent. The conflict with western imperialism, on the other hand, was strictly verbal: Syria regularly denounced American actions in Vietnam, the Congo and the Middle East, and British ‘imperialists’ in Aden. CONNECTIONS BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONFLICTS As with the period of separatist rule, there are four basic hypotheses con­ cerning the relationship between internal and external conflicts during the Ba^h regime: (1) Internal conflict between the Ba*th Party and Nasserite linkage groups was the immediate source of the Egyptian-Syrian conflict. (Internal conflict —* external conflict.) (2) A rise or reduction in the intensity of the Egyptian-Syrian conflict raised or reduced the intensity of internal conflict initiated by Nasserite linkage groups. ( t l external conflict —►internal conflict t l . ) (3) A rise or reduction in the intensity of Syria’s internal conflict raised or reduced the extent to which the Syrian-Israeli conflict was exploited, ( t l internal conflict —►Syrian-Israeli conflict t l . ) (4) Similarly, a rise or reduction in the intensity of Syria’s internal con­ flict raised or reduced the extent to which the Arab-Israeli conflict was ex­ ploited. ( t l internal conflict —►Arab-Israeli conflict t l . ) These hypotheses will now be examined in greater detail. Internal Conflict and the Egyptian-Syrian Conflict As stated above, internal conflict between the Ba‘th Party and Nasserite linkage groups was the immediate source of the Egyptian-Syrian conflict. Internal conflict in the first phase of the regime focused on the distribution of power among political and military components of the coalition. Following the B ath ’s refusal to share power with the Nasserites, open conflict developed between Syria and Egypt. It is true that ideological and political rivalry between Nasser and the Ba*th Party also had a role in promoting the conflict. However, Syrian internal conflict was the immediate cause of the external conflict; Egyptian conflict manifestations appeared only after the outbreak o f conflict between the Ba‘th and Nasserite linkage groups. It is interesting to note that the Ba‘th Party, the Nasserite groups and

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Nasser himself were all aware of the potential connection between Syria’s internal and external conflicts. This is evidenced by the fact that two contrary trends developed in the period directly after the revolution. On the one hand, Nasser and the linkage groups attempted to maneuver the Ba*th into setting up an internal political structure acceptable to them by threaten­ ing to activate either the internal or external Egyptian-Syrian conflict. The BaHh and its partners, on the other hand, attempted to limit this threat —at least until the party could broaden its base of legitimacy both in the army and among the Syrian people. Linkage groups began to exploit the threat of conflict during the first week of the revolution, as soon as it had become clear that there was dis­ agreement between themselves and the Ba‘th concerning composition of the Revolutionary Council and the future of renewed union with Egypt. Between 10—13 March, linkage groups initiated large-scale demonstrations in Damascus demanding immediate restoration of the union.9 Egypt gave wide publicity to the demonstrations — an unsubtle indication of her interest in Syria’s internal affairs.10The demonstrations had their intended effect: on 14 March, Ba‘th leaders announced that they were traveling to Cairo to hold Union Talks with Nasser. » The Union Talks. Tripartite Union Talks between Egypt, Syria and Iraq were held in Cairo in three rounds (14—16 March, 19-20 March, 6—17 April 1963). Throughout the talks, Nasser and the linkage groups followed a policy of implicitly threatening internal conflict in Syria, should the Ba*th refuse to share power with the Nasserites. Such internal conflict would lead in turn to Egyptian intervention on behalf of the linkage groups, and a subsequent increase in the level of internal conflict (internal conflict —*■ external conflict —►internal conflict t ) .11 Nasser, in particular, was aware that the Ba‘th’s willingness to enter into union talks only five days after the revolution did not stem from ideological motives, but from the need to stabilize the new Syrian regime. It was Nasser’s belief that the Ba‘th was in vital need of his support; without it, open internal conflict was likely to break out in Syria. With this in mind, he was determined to exact major concessions for Nasserite groups. During the first round of talks, Nasser put forward his basic demand: formation of an internal political structure in which the Ba*th would not be the predominant partner. He warned that if the Ba‘th refused this condition, or sought to change it, the result would be open conflict between himself and the party. The Egyptian leader reiterated his warning several times;12 at the close of the second round of talks, Ba‘th representatives agreed to set up a “national front,” whose members were to be drawn equally from the Ba‘th and the three Nasserite parties.13 Nasser’s perception of the Ba‘th Party’s need for support seems to have been shared by Ba‘th leaders themselves. Immediately following the revolution,

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the Ba‘th had been forced to choose between two options: an all-out effort to gain sole control of Syria, which would have meant conflict with Nasser and the linkage groups; or avoidance of conflict by agreeing to share power with the Nasserites. The party leadership, headed by Bftar and ‘Aflaq, came to the conclusion that it would not be able to create a solid base of support unless internal conflict could be avoided. Given the special set of connections be­ tween Nasser and the Nasserite parties, the Ba‘th ’s relative weakness in the army (where Nasserite or independent officers held key positions), the Syrian public’s demands for immediate union with Egypt14 and the absence of wide public support for the BaHh, the party’s first priority had to be stabilization of the regime.ls Ba‘th leaders decided on a plan to first gain Nasserite legitimization of the new regime and then gradually take steps to become the dominant group in power. With the aim of ensuring legitimization, the BaHh agreed to set up a coalition with the Nasserites and to take part in Union Talks. As long as the talks went on, Ba*th leaders reasoned, there was a reasonable prospect of both preventing internal and/or external conflict, and entrenching the party’s position during the margin of time thus gained. In the course of the Union Talks, Ba'th representatives and their independent partners tried to limit the possibility of conflict by seeking a pledge from Nasser that he would abstain from activating Syrian or Iraqi linkage groups or interfering on their behalf, and that he would halt the sending of agents into Syria and Iraq.16 Although Nasser refused to disassociate himself from the linkage groups, he stated that it was not his intention to support them automatically in the event of a dispute or rivalry between them and the Ba*th.17 Although Ba*th leaders agreed to the formation of a national front, it seems they had no real intention of carrying out the agreement. Following the second round of talks — after agreement had been reached — the Ba'th launched a series of media attacks on Nasserite linkage groups. An editorial in the party newspaper al-Ba ‘th on 23 March entitled “More Monarchist than the King” accused linkage groups of trying to sabotage the unity effort. (Nasser was the king referred to in the title; linkage groups were the monarchists.) On 25 March, a second editorial warned linkage groups against attempting to do battle with the Ba*th. The Nasserite response to these attacks was to resign from the Bftär government and to organize Nasserite demonstrations in Damascus and Aleppo on 29 and 30 March demanding immediate restoration of the Union.18 Egypt also responded to the Ba'th attack. In an article in al-Ahräm (31 March) entitled “I Protest,” Muhammad Hassanein Haikal sharply criticized the “More Monarchist” article. The main thrust of Haikal’s article — which was broadcast several times on Egyptian radio —was a description of Nasser’s popularity in Egypt: ‘Abd an-Nasser’s assets in Syria are not sentiment or a birthright, but the harvest of a deep and wide popular experience. The Syrian masses

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which elected ‘Abd an-Nasser President, even before he set foot in Syria, had tested him and judged him by his deeds. When the Syrian masses elected him, ‘Abd an-Nasser was the symbol of a struggle supported by the entire Arab nation.19 Haikal’s article marked the beginning of conflict between Egypt and Syria. The purpose of the article had been to incite the Syrian public against the Ba‘th and demonstrate Egypt’s potential for instigating internal Syrian con­ flict activity.20 Both these aims were achieved. Between 1—3 April, Nasserite demonstrations broke out throughout Syria; the Ba‘th had to take Arm measures against them, including imposing curfews and closing Syria’s border with Lebanon. The success of Haikal’s article may also be judged by Bïtâr’s complaint at the opening of the third round of the Union Talks: “What Haikal wrote was broadcast twelve times... with an introduction aimed at inciting the people against the Ba‘th and the Salah Bitär government.’’21 The pro-Nasserite segment of the Lebanese media also joined in the propaganda war. Egyptian and Lebanese media carried extensive coverage of the demonstrations, and published messages of encouragement for the demonstrators and demands for freedom of assembly in Syria.22 Faced with this «clear conflict situation, the Ba‘th decided to increase its efforts to arrive at a settlement with the Nasserites. The Nasserites opposed renewing the Union Talks until their demands for equal representation of the Revolutionary Council were met; Nasser also refused to reconvene the talks, since his position was not to negotiate with the Ba‘th alone.23 A series of discussions was arranged between the Ba‘th and Nasserite groups on 3 and 4 April (three meetings on 3 April and two the following day), in the presence of senior officials of the Revolutionary Council. These discussions led to a new agreement - similar to the previous one —regarding formation of a Syrian national front. Ba‘thists and Nasserites also agreed upon a new delegation to the Union Talks, which would consist of representatives of the Ba‘th and the three Nasserite parties. Muhammad ‘Umran was the only prominent Ba*th leader in the delegation; army Ba‘th officers chose not to come at all. While non-Ba‘th army officers attended the third round of talks, Ba’th officers in Syria began to formulate a plan for a purge of Nasserite elements from the army.24 On 17 April 1963, the Charter of the Triple Union was signed by Egypt, Syria and Iraq. This charter was a conditional document; union between the three countries would not begin to be formalized until after formation of the Syrian national front.25 However, at least one serious obstacle to the national front remained — the question of equal representation. It had not been made explicit whether equal representation referred to representation on the Revolutionary Council, the government and/or the Army Command. More­ over, equal representation could be interpreted in different ways. It could mean a 50-50 split between the Ba‘th and Nasserite groups —i.e., 50 percent representation for the Ba‘th and the remaining 50 percent to be divided up

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among the three Nasserite parties. Alternatively, equal representation might be interpreted as applying to the Ba‘th plus each of the three Nasserite parties - i.e., 25 percent for each group. Yet another possibility was that the independents were also to be counted — in which case each group would receive a 20 percent share in the front. With this vital issue unresolved, the choice between conflict and accom­ modation again confronted the Ba‘th. Once again, Nasser was a crucial element to consider. Nasserites were again holding demonstrations to back their demands for maximum representation, and several Nasserite army units had been moved to Aleppo in an apparent warning to the Ba‘th.26 Under pressure from the Military Committee, the Ba‘th leadership decided that enough con­ cessions had been made and that the Ba‘th was strong enough, at this point, to reject Nasserite demands and risk internal and/or external conflict.27 Forming an alliance with independent officers, the Ba‘th Military Com­ mittee began to seize key army posts. Between 28 April - 2 May, the first purge o f Nasserite officers took place.28 At the same time, a number of Ba‘th officers (including supporters of HauranI) who had been previously removed from the army were restored to service. On the domestic front, Ba‘th leaders took steps to court the main body of Nasserite demonstrators —students and workers —by promising them improved status under the Ba‘th regime.29 Internal conflict was the immediate outcome o f these moves. On 3 May, Nasserite parties formally announced their resignation from the govern­ ment.30 Egyptian radio also renewed its attacks on the Ba‘th regime. The BaHh, for its part, was anxious to camouflage its moves to consolidate power. Accordingly, it announced replacement of the Syrian flag with a flag of the Triple Union (1 May); the forthcoming trial of 22 leaders of the separatist regime and the imposition o f a political ban on 40 others (1—3 May); and a proposed unified educational program for Egypt, Syria and Iraq. None of these measures deceived the Nasserites, who intensified their attacks against the Ba‘th regime.31 Nasserite representatives made sure that the Lebanese press carried full coverage of the internal conflict between themselves and the Ba‘th, with the Ba‘th being cast in the worst possible light.32 On 4 May, Egypt announced postponement of the military talks that had been scheduled for May 12 among the three charter countries. In Egypt’s view, internal Syrian conflict constituted a clear violation of the charter agreement.33 From 4 May 1963, connections between Syria’s internal and external conflicts grew steadily closer. The link between the two reached a climax on 18 July, when Nasserites in Syria - with full Egyptian cooperation - at­ tempted an overthrow of the Ba‘th regime. Until this point, the EgyptianSyrian conflict had been dependent upon events of the internal Syrian conflict, and had developed in two parallel stages. During May, June and the first part of July, the external conflict was verbal and not governmental in nature. The Syrian media, for its part, exhibited restraint in its responses to

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Egyptian attacks; neither Nasser nor Ba*th leaders took a direct role in the conflict.34 Following the attempted coup, however, both Nasser and Ba‘thist leaders played an active role in the external Egyptian-Syrian conflict. The main spurt of internal conflict activity occurred between 18 April — 15 May, when the Ba‘th liquidated Nasserite power bases in the army and the civil administration by means of a second round of purges and arrests. During this short space of time, an unknown number of officers and commanders (estimates vary from 230 to 1,300) were ousted from the army35 and an un­ known number of civilians (between 30 and 300) were ousted from the civil administration.36 Nasserites reacted with riots on 8 May and demonstrations that continued from 8—14 May. Amin al-Hafiz, minister of the interior and deputy military governor, used security forces to break up the riots and announced the suspension of two Nasserite press organs. The Egyptian media, in turn, renewed its verbal attacks on the Ba‘th with the intention of inciting the populace to rise up against the regime. Haikal, for example, published a series of articles in al-Ahräm focusing on the Ba‘th betrayal of unity.37 The BaHh’s stated attachment to unity; its participation in the Union Talks and signing of the Triple Charter - all this, according to the Egyptian media, had been a fraud designed to camouflage the Ba‘th scheme to seize sole control of Syria. In an additional attempt to “uncover the true face of the BaHh,” al-Ahräm began on 21 June to publish the protocols of the Union Talks.38 During the period of 4 May - 18 July, verbal attacks reached a total of 263 (192 radio attacks and 71 newspaper editorials), a figure equalled only in the period immediately preceding breakdown of the separatist regime. A number of the attacks were designed to show that the Ba‘th Party was ex­ tremely limited both in its membership and basis of popular support.39 The Egyptian-Syrian Conflict and Syria's Internal Conflict Compared to the separatist period, connections between Syria’s internal and external conflicts were not particularly strong, except for the attempted coup of 18 July 1963. As in the separatist period, however, there was a certain amount of internal conflict activity orchestrated or aided by Egypt: revolu­ tionary activity aimed at overthrowing the Syrian regime; subversive activity — acts of terror and sabotage on the part of linkage groups —aimed at under­ mining the regime’s stability; and turmoil — activation of interest groups in demonstrations and strikes against the regime. Revolutionary activity. The closest and most direct connections between the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and Syria’s internal conflict came about when Nasser and the Nasserite linkage groups conspired to overthrow the Ba‘th regime on 18 July 1963. This was the only serious coup attempt to take place during the Ba‘th regime.40 After failure of the coup, the Ba‘th arranged a

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complete takeover of the Syrian Army and completely liquidated the remain­ ing Nasserite elements within it. Moreover, there was savage repression fol­ lowing the abortive coup; plotters were executed and Nasserite groups were sharply persecuted.41 As a result, the risk of mounting any subsequent coup was judged to be quite high. Both Nasser and the Nasserites apparently decided that revolutionary activity against the regime was fraught with too many perils.42 The 18 July coup had been attempted after joint preparation by Nasser and the Nasserites that began with intensive verbal attacks on the Ba‘th regime. As already stated, there were 263 Egyptian verbal attacks on the Syrian Ba‘th regime between the beginning of the Egyptian-Syrian verbal conflict and the attempted coup.43 Details of the connection between Nasser and the Nasserites were published by the Ba‘th Party a few weeks after the coup attempt, after plotters had been thoroughly interrogated.44 According to these confessions, Nasser had promised to send the Egyptian Air Force in order to neutralize the 70th Regiment, who the rebels feared would intervene with the uprising 45 After completion of the coup, Nasser planned to come to Damascus to announce the liberation of Syria from Ba‘th rule, and the restoration of the Egyptian-Syrian Union. Failure of the uprising, however, led Nasser to declare on 22 July that he was abandoning the Triple Union.46 In contradiction to the accused men’s evidence, Nasser himself denied all connection with the attempted uprising, although he did voice support for the conspirators. Syrian representative Atâsï had been in Cairo when news of the attempted coup broke on 18 July. Atas! asked Nasser to condemn the uprising; Nasser refused to do so, and later declared that the attempted coup was “the natural outcome of having driven the most devoted nationalists in Syria into the arms of despair.” 47 Subversive activity. As in the period of the separatist regime, subversive activity was aimed at undermining the stability of the regime. Numerous internal subversive conflict manifestations — distribution of inflammatory tracts, bomb-throwing, laying of explosive charges, attempted arson and attempted assassination of political leaders — had their counterpart in con­ tinuing Egyptian verbal attacks on the Ba‘th regime and attempts by the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut to infiltrate Egyptian and Nasserite agents into Syria. In contrast with the separatist regime, however, there was no sig­ nificant connection between internal and external subversive activity during the Ba‘th regime (see table). The absence of any significant connection between the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and internal subversive activity is probably explained by the fact that Syrian authorities had impressive success in preventing the infiltration of sabotage groups from Lebanon. Evidence of this success is provided by

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NUMBER OF EGYPTIAN VERBAL ATTACKS ON SYRIA AND INTERNAL SUBVERSIVE CONFLICT MANIFESTATIONS* Period

Number of Verbal Attacks

Subversive Conflict Manifestations

448 1 165 94 8

5 5 15 6 2

August-October 1963 January-March 1964 M ay-July 1964 June-August 1965 September—November 1965 * Examined for 5 periods of 3 months each.

Lebanese complaints concerning Syrian armed border patrols that on oc­ casion infiltrated into Lebanese territory.48 Activation o f interest groups. An examination of the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and internal conflict manifestations initiated by interest groups against the Ba‘th regime indicates no connection between the two types of conflict. During three main periods of internal conflict activity initiated by interest groups (February 1964, April 1964 and January 1965), there were no Egyptian verbal attacks on Syria. Such attacks were not renewed until after the internal conflict in Hamä at the end of April.49 The absence of connections between the two types of conflicts appears to have been due to changes in the socio-economic environment of Syria fol­ lowing the rise of the Ba‘th. During the separatist era, Egypt had worked with linkage groups to incite workers and fellahin against the regime. The Ba‘th, however, succeeded in neutralizing these groups by putting into effect a policy of nationalizations and agrarian reform.50 During the Ba*th regime, the bearers of socio-economic conflict were interested groups that were hurt by the new economic policy — merchants and landowners — plus religious leaders opposed to the atheist character of the regime. All of these groups, however, tended to be anti-Nasserite; it was the Muslim Brethren, rather than Egypt or Nasserite groups, that served to catalyze them into action. Ba‘th spokesmen did attach some of the blame on Nasserites and the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut for internal conflict events in Homs in February 1964, in Hamä in April 1964 and in Damascus in January 1965. However, the main share of blame was laid on other elements, including the Muslim Brethren, the “bourgeoisie,” feudalists, merchants, and the U.S.51 Internal Conflict and the Syrian-Israeli Conflict From the moment the Ba‘th Party took power, it adopted a militant and activist policy against Israel. With the completion of the Israeli national water

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carrier project in June 1964, the Ba‘th preached immediate war against Israel, contrary to the stand of Egypt and other Arab countries. The Ba‘th also supported Palestinian liberation organizations as soon as they appeared for the first time in 1965, and carried out a provocative border policy. In the case of each of the three main internal conflicts faced by the Ba‘th —the conflict between the Ba‘th and Nasserite and independent competing elites; between the Ba‘th and interest groups; and among various factions .of the Ba‘th Party itself — the Syrian-Israeli conflict was exploited for the purpose of canalizing internal conflict. Ba'th-Nasserite conflict and the Syrian-Israeli conflict. The most critical conflict for the Ba*th was the one between itself and the Nasserites, which lasted from the revolution of March 1963 until final liquidation of the Nasserite position in August. Not by chance, this period of conflict was also marked by a significant number of border incidents with Israel. Ninety out of 169 border incidents between Syria and Israel during the Ba‘th regime (as reported by Israeli sources) occurred during the period of internal conflict between the Ba‘th Party and the Nasserites. Of this total, 70 were instances of fire directed at Israeli settlements or Israeli tractors at work, and 15 were fire directed at fishing or guard boats on the Sea of Galilee .s2 Most of the former variety of incidents were specifically concerned with cultivation of land in the demilitarized zones of Ashmora and Almagor.53 A closer examination of the Ba‘th-Nasserite struggle indicates that there was a close connection between this conflict and the Syrian-Israeli conflict. From the beginning of the internal conflict (9 March) until the end of the Union Talks (17 April), for example, there were 30 border incidents with Israel. This period was also characterized by increasing pressures on the Ba‘th, both from Nasserite groups and from Nasser himself, to set up a political structure inimical to the party. During this period, there were 14 Nasserite demonstrations, the resignation of Nasserite ministers from the government, and two bomb-throwings. Twenty-seven border incidents occurred during the period from the end of the Union Talks until the attempted coup of 18 July. Between 19 May — 19 August, the Syrians also submitted four complaints to the U.N. concerning Israeli cultivation of land in the Ashmora area.54 This period was also charac­ terized by open internal conflict, resulting from the Ba‘th’s refusal to share power with the Nasserites. There was an increase in manifestations of internal conflict behavior: Ba‘th purges of army officers, commanders and civil ser­ vants; the arrest of several hundred opponents of the Ba‘th; and a series of demonstrations that continued without pause from 8 to 14 May. The period from 18 July until the end of August 1963 was the most violent in the course of the Syrian-Israeli conflict under the Ba‘th regime. There were a total of 41 border incidents, and a marked increase both in the number of verbal attacks on Israel (eight attacks by Syrian officials and 19 in

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the media, compared with only seven attacks between March and the end of July) and in the number of statements of apprehension regarding Israeli aggressive intentions against Syria (four such statements by Syrian officials and three in the media, compared with a complete absence of any such announcements between March and the end of July). During this period, the Ba‘th was struggling to stabilize its rule and widen its base of legitimacy fol­ lowing the 18 July coup attempt. The liquidation of Nasserites as a political and military force (purges and arrests continued after failure of the coup), and Nasser’s abandonment of the Charter of the Triple Union had consider­ ably reduced the Ba‘th’s base of legitimacy among the general population. Hence, there was a real need to canalize internal conflict into the external Syrian-Israeli environment. It is interesting to note that the Egyptian media also saw a connection between Syria’s internal conflict and the Syrian-Israeli conflict. Arab Voice Radio on 12 June, for example, commented that: The border incidents between Syria and Israel are an artificial crisis, which is meant to keep the army busy guarding the frontier so that there will not be any repetition of what happened on 8 March, to divert public opinion from the failings of the Ba‘th regime, and to dress up the Ba‘th in a cloak of power and make it appear a force rejecting all compromise.55 After 20 August, there was a long period of calm in both the Ashmora and Almagor areas, which was maintained until June 1964. In the course of nine months between September 1963 and May 1964 — during which time the Ba‘th-Nasserite conflict faded — there were a total of only seven border incidents with Israel.56 A marked rise in the number of border incidents in June and July 1964, however, seems to have been connected with increased Nasserite activity. After the long period of relative calm, there were 33 violent border incidents with Israel in June and July, mostly centering around the Ashmora area.S7 During these months, there was also an increase of Nasserite conflict activity for the first time since 18 July 1963, following the Bïtâr government’s failure to reach a compromise over sharing power with the Nasserites and the conse­ quent renewal of the Egyptian-Syrian verbal conflict.58 The increased Nasserite conflict activity mainly took the form of demonstrations against the regime (15 conflict events from May to July 1964 as opposed to six from January to April 1964). On 18 July 1964, Nasserite parties announced formation of a Syrian “Arab Socialist Union” comprising the three parties, which was aimed at the restoration of the Egyptian-Syrian Union and the overthrow of the Ba‘th regime. The Ba‘th’s reaction was to impose repressive measures against the Nasserites (purges of Nasserite remnants in the army and arrests) as well as strict security measures, including closing of the SyrianLebanese border.59

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Ba‘th interest group conflict and the Syrian-Israeli conflict During the Ba‘th regime, there were three main periods of internal conflict initiated by merchants, landowners and religious leaders: the months of February 1964, April 1964 and January 1965. The connection between this internal conflict and the Syrian-Israeli conflict seems to have been limited. In February 1964, there were four incidents with Israel (compared with one in January and none in March). In April 1964 there were no border incidents, and in January 1965, there were only three border incidents. The most likely explanation for the limited connection between these conflicts is that Syria, at the time, was anxious to avoid over-escalation of the Syrian-Israeli conflict. During the Arab Summit Conference of January 1964, Egypt and other Arab states had opposed Syria’s call for immediate war with Israel, and had made it clear that the Syrians would be on their own if they provoked such a war.60 Rather than continuing to provoke border incidents, Syrian leaders seem to have decided to concentrate on verbal attacks against Israeli imperialism and on declarations of apprehension regarding an Israeli-imperialist conspiracy against the regime, aided and abetted by local Syrian forces of reaction. Such declarations were often linked with internal conflict events initiated by the socio-economic interest groups. Following riots in Homs on 22 February 1964, for example, Nür ad-Dïn al-Atâsï, the minister of interior and deputy military governor, stated that: “A treacherous group tried to prevent the [Ba*th anniversary] celebration by incitement to a strike, an act which is tantamount to treason, especially at the present moment when the Arab nation is consolidating its efforts to prevent the diversion of the Jordan River.” 61 Ba‘th spokesmen repeated similar charges following the Hamä disturbances of April 1964: The incidents inspired by the feudalist reactionary forces in Hamä were only part of a reactionary-imperialist plan to establish a puppet revolu­ tionary regime in Syria to enable imperialism to dominate the Arab region. The Arab masses in Syria, which created the 8 March revolution and fought external imperialist forces as well as domestic reactionary forces, will always remain an impregnable rock on which all reactionaryimperialist attempts will be wrecked.62 And in January 1965, the regime again linked internal conflict activity with a feudalist, reactionary and Zionist-imperialist plot against Syria. The government’s contentions were bolstered when an Israeli espionage network headed by Eli Cohen was uncovered in Damascus, along with an American network headed by the Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy.63 On 26 Janu­ ary the lead article of ath-Thaura linked reactionary attempts to block the nationalization law with revelations concerning the Israeli espionage net­ work.64 On 27 January, Damascus Radio reported that those on trial for

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instigating strikes and trying to block the nationalization law had admitted their connections with external forces (including Israel and the U.S.) for the purpose of overthrowing the regime.65 On the same day, both party news­ papers, al-Ba‘th and ath-Thaura, carried lead articles calling on the Syrian people to defend the revolution from those who were plotting against it, since it had become clear that the plotters were Israeli agents.66 On 28 January, Damascus Radio declared that Israel and the U.S. were linked in a reactionary conspiracy against the regime.67 Media accusations were echoed by Syrian officials. Amin al-Hafiz, for instance, stating that Israeli spies were among those who had instigated strikes.68 Declarations along these lines continued throughout February and March. The table below indicated the rise in number of verbal attacks on Israel and declarations of apprehension concerning Israeli-imperialist plotting during the periods of massive internal conflict events initiated by interest groups and in the months immediately following, compared with the months preceding these events: Months November 1963 —January 1964 February-April 1964 October-December 1964 January-March 1965

Attacks on Israel

Declarations of Apprehension

26 90 35 71

12 31 12 51

Internal Ba‘th conflict and the Syrian-Israeli conflict. Two types of con­ nections can be discerned between the internal Ba‘th conflict and the SyrianIsraeli conflict. First, a competing extremist faction of the Ba‘th sought to exploit the Syrian-Israeli conflict by demanding a policy of immediate war against Israel. Second, the ruling faction of the Ba‘th sought to exploit outside conflict with Israel in an attempt to defuse internal conflict within the party. From the end of 1963, various elements in both the Military Committee and the Ba‘th Regional Command used the Syrian-Israeli conflict as a point of contention against Amin al-Hafiz, the dominant Ba‘th leader, whose support during part o f that period came from members of the Ba‘th National Com­ mand. In at least two instances — after the Arab Summit Conference of January 1964 and after the third Arab Summit in September 1965 —striking use was made of the Syrian-Israeli conflict in the struggle for power among Ba‘th factions. The extreme left faction in the Regional Command, headed by the Regional Command’s Secretary-General HamOd ash-Shüfï, was the first to take advantage of the first summit meeting in an attempt to challenge Hafiz’ leadership. According to Shflfi, the Hafiz delegation to the summit had deviated from the Ba‘th Party position that demanded immediate war with

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Israel over the Israeli national water carrier project.69 An internal communique circulated by the Regional Command on 25 January 1964 called on the Syrian government to go against the summit meeting decisions and immediately declare war on Israel in order to prevent diversion of the Jordan waters, even if this meant Syria’s having to fight alone.70 Internal party differences broke into the open when the Regional Com­ mand published a statement of deep disappointment regarding the decisions of the Arab Summit Conference71 — a statement that ran counter to Hafiz’ expressed satisfaction.72 Debate over Syria’s policy regarding the SyrianIsraeli conflict was further exploited by the Regional, Command when it ousted veteran civilian leader Salâh al-Bftâr from the party on 24 January 1964.73 The Regional Command’s extremism under Shüfi became a real cause of concern to the Military Committee because in Iraq, factional feuding had led to the overthrow of the Ba‘th on 18 November 1963. With the aim of getting Shüfï’s faction out of the government, the Military Committee formed an alliance with Michel ‘Aflaq’s faction. Two party forums were convened in February 1964, an extraordinary National Conference and the 7th National Congress.74 The outcome was establishment of a new Regional Command headed by Hafiz. A majority of the new Regional Command were supporters of the Military Committee; a minority belonged to ’Aflaq’s group, while Shaft’s supporters were entirely excluded. The expulsion of the Shaft group led to the adoption of more realistic decisions regarding Palestine.75 As a result, Syria’s border policy during the period of January to May 1964 was not one o f provocation, despite the fact that there were several internal con­ flict manifestations on the part of interest groups in February and April. Only five border incidents occurred during these months (one in January and four in February). The third Arab Summit Conference, which took place in Casablanca from 13—17 September 1965, was also exploited in a struggle for power between the Regional Command and Military Committee (headed by Salâh Jadfd, Nür ad-Dïn al-Atâsï and Yüsuf Zu’ayyfn) and the National Command (headed by Hafiz and Razzäz). The former accused Hafiz and Razzäz, who had headed the Syrian delegation at the summit, of once more deviating from the party stand on the Palestinian question.76 In an internal communique circulated on 29 September 1965, the National Command contended that it had remained faithful to the party position — i.e., it was in favor of liberating Palestine from Zionist conquest, wiping out the State of Israel, and restoring the Palestinian Arab people to its fatherland. However, the National Command did not view immediate war as a realistic option: ...Taking into account the existence of Israel, its growing economic, political and military strength... our present resources are insufficient for the requirements of a war of liberation. As regards the diversion of the [Jordan] tributaries, the defense of these works was considered

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part of a complete military plan, and all states argued that their present [military] resources do not suffice for them to offer such defense. Every objectively truthful evaluation of the danger and power of Israel will have to concede that there is not one Arab state that could under present conditions face this danger single-handed, let alone liberate Palestine. It was therefore necessary to plan the strengthening of forces up to the point which had been considered the minimum requirement for an Arab victory. Indeed, what is important is not our starting whatever struggle against Israel, but providing for victory in such struggle, remembering our defeat in the first round in 1948....77 The Ba‘th Regional Command replied with an internal communique of its own on 3 November 1965, that characterized postponement of the Palestine liberation struggle as both dangerous and senseless, and likely to ruin the Ba‘th ’s revolutionary image: ...In other words: we are now told that we shall continue with our non­ revolutionary method. Thus we shall definitely lose the confidence of our people and the confidence of the rank and file of the party, unless we return to our principles and start a struggle that will be a real revolu­ tionary experience, be it ever so cruel and costly in casualties. We demand a rectification of the positions taken and to issue de­ claration evaluating the summit conferences, especially the third sum­ mit conference. We also insist that you work out without delay a plan for the liberation of Palestine, in accordance with the congresses of the party.78 Further maneuvering on the part of the Regional Command led to ousting of the Hafiz government on 22 September. A new Syrian government, which remained in power for just three months (22 September—21 December), was formed, with representatives of Jadîd’s leftist faction given the principal posts. Z ufyyln was made prime minister; Ibrâhîm Mäkhus, the deputy prime minister and foreign minister; Hamad TJbaid, the defense minister, ‘Abd alKarim al-Jundi, the minister for agrarian reform; and Muhammad ‘Id ‘Ashâwï, the interior minister.79 The radical left’s takeover of both the Regional Com­ mand and the government led to adoption of a more militant policy towards Israel. In a speech on 12 October 1965, the new prime minister formulated a policy of calling for collective Arab effort in the battle to liberate Palestine.80 This new policy remained in effect even after the neo-Ba‘th (led by Jadîd) took power in February 1966. It did not, however, immediately signal a change in Syria’s cautious border policy. Only one incident was recorded during Zu‘ayym’s short-lived radical left government. On 21 December, a bloodless coup, led by Hafiz and the National Com­ mand, dissolved the Regional Command. Hafiz had made striking use of the Syrian-Israeli conflict in his successful attempt to regain power. Knowing that the Regional Command firmly supported the Syrian Army, Hafiz (together with Bïtâr and Razzäz of the National Command) tried to artificially

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work up tension along the Syrian-Israeli border in order to move troops loyal to the Regional Command out of the way. Interesting testimony to this use of the Syrian-Israeli conflict is a document of the Provisional Regional Com­ mand of 2 March 1966 (written after Jadrd had regained power in the neoBa‘th coup): ...We wish to recall in this connection that General Hafiz had been sup­ ported, prior to the dissolution of the Regional Leadership, by the Joint Arab Command, which telegraphed from Cairo a demand to concentrate all regular Army brigades at a certain section of the border of conquered Palestine and after that to mobilize the reserves, that is, including the reactionary and Nasserist Officers — on the strength of this pretext. The aim had been the conquest of Damascus and a white [bloodless] coup, at the time that our elite party units are tied down facing the enemy. We shall hereafter divulge to you the details of the case, documents, manuscripts, which prove the artificial creation (of a state of emergency) aimed at destroying the party.81 The above document constitutes the most trustworthy evidence of con­ nections between internal BaHh conflict and the government’s provocative border policy. It is difficult to point to any other clear evidence. During the period o f conflict between the Jadrd and Hafiz factions (April—September 1965), for example, there were only four border incidents. The Arab-Israeli Conflict As with the earlier separatist regime, the Ba‘th regime made use of the ArabIsraeli conflict in its endeavors to cool down internal conflict and broaden the regime’s base of legitimacy, both internally and externally. The Ba‘th ’s aim was to moderate both the Egyptian-Syrian conflict and the internal Syrian conflict initiated by Nasser, in addition to extricating itself from political isolation in the Arab world. Its strategy was identical to that of the separatist regime: representing the Syrian-Israeli conflict (centered on the Israeli national water carrier project) as a conflict endangering overall Arab interests, not only those of Syria. Use of the Arab-Israeli conflict was meant to present Egypt with the choice of either moderating the Egyptian-Syrian conflict - i.e., ceasing its interference in Syria’s internal affairs and breaking Syria’s isolation in the Arab world —or appearing to be a traitor to the Arab cause at a time when the Ba‘th was waging a militant struggle against Israeli imperialism. From the end of November 1963, the Ba‘th regime launched fierce attacks against Nasser’s stand on the Jordan River diversion, and broadcast repeated demands for Arab offensive activity against Israel.82 In the course of Decem­ ber, 21 out of a total of 44 Syrian verbal attacks on Egypt centered around Nasser’s alleged neglect of the Palestinian problem. Syrian verbal attacks were prompted by several events. First, the number of Egyptian verbal attacks on Syria had risen sharply (146 in August, 188 in September, 114 in October),

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and their effect on the Syrian public was thought by the Ba‘th to be con­ siderable.83 Second, the separatist parties, acting on the initiative of the Muslim Brethren, were organizing for conflict activity against the regime.84 Third, the fall of the Ba’th regime in Iraq on 18 November increased Syria’s isolation in the Arab world and led to apprehension that the Syrian Ba’th might be headed for the same fate.85 An indication that the Ba’th articles were an embarrassment to Nasser is the fact that an article appeared in the Egyptian weekly R üz al-Yüsuf on 17 December 1963, accusing Syria of trying to entangle Egypt in war against Israel in order to knife her in the back. Egypt was capable of carrying the burden of war with Israel on her own, the newspaper stated, but she would not take action against Israel over diversion of the Jordan until Arab unity was achieved. The Syrians replied with accusations that Egypt was evading her national responsibility on the Palestinian question, and compared Nasser to Marshal Pétain.86 Syria even threatened to carry out a “suicide” action against the Israeli national water carrier project.87 Nasser reacted officially to the Syrian attacks in a speech in Port Said on 23 December. He called for a summit meeting of Arab kings and heads of state, regardless of any disputes and rivalries between them, to deal with the question of Palestine and the Jordan diversion.88 It was clear that the Ba’th had succeeded in facing him with a challenge - Nasser even suspended his verbal attacks on Syria —but the B ath ’s success turned out to be short-lived. With characteristic virtuosity, Nasser turned the tables on the Syrian govern­ ment at the summit meeting by convincing those present both to prepare a long-term plan for solving the Palestinian problem, and to reject Ba’th demands for immediate war with Israel. The conference also decided in favor of diverting the sources of the Jordan and setting up a Joint Command to plan how to defend this diversion against attempts to block it.89 Following the summit, the Ba’th faced the dilemma of either moving against Israel alone (without support from other Arab states) or else accepting decisions of the summit meeting which went absolutely counter to its militant stand. This dilemma sharpened the dispute between the party factions of Hafiz and the National Command and Shufrs Regional Command. Häfiz and the National Command eventually decided to accept the decisions; the Regional Command rejected them. In an internal circular distributed on 25 January 1964, the Regional Command demanded exposure of Nasser’s tactics - i.e., his argument that the Arabs and Egyptians were not ready for war (which ran counter to his oft-stated boast of Egypt’s great military strength), and called for an immediate war with Israel over the Jordan diver­ sion.90 On the initiative of the Regional Command, the Syrian media also attacked other Arab states (in January 1964) for not having committed them­ selves on the Palestinian question. During January, 26 Syrian demands for immediate action against Israel were broadcast over the media. After three months devoid of verbal conflict with Egypt, the Syrians re-

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newed their attacks on Egypt at the end of April (three attacks in April, four in May). Syria accused Egypt of helping to instigate conflict events in Hama instead of concentrating on preventing Israeli diversion of the Jordan. The renewal of Syrian attacks on Egypt was also a reaction to a renewed Egyptian campaign of verbal attacks on the Ba‘th regime (11 in April, 85 in May); an increased sense of political isolation in Syria as a result of the Egyptian-Iraqi agreement for political cooperation reached on 26 May 1964;91 and increased internal conflict activity on the part of the Nasserites.92 The Syrian regime renewed demands for immediate activity against Israel and threatened that Syria would act on her own to prevent the exploitation of the Jordan waters by Israel, since other Arab countries were doing nothing to carry out the summit meeting decisions.93 At this stage, Syrian efforts focused on trying to set up a Palestinian entity, creating a Palestinian army and having Pales­ tinians defined as the vanguard of the struggle for the liberation of Palestine.94 Such actions served as the background to the start of Palestinian sabotage activities against Israel at the beginning of 1965. A second Summit Conference took place in Alexandria in September 1964. This second Summit led to a pause in both the Egyptian-Syrian and Ba‘thNasserite conflicts.95 Syria renewed its verbal attacks on Egypt between May—September 1965 (45 attacks in all, with 28 concentrated in the month of June). At about the same time there was also a considerable increase in Syrian attacks on other Arab countries - Tunisia, Kuwait, Iraq and the oil principalities — for their neglect of Palestine (92 attacks between March— July, compared to the absence of any such attacks between September 1964 — February 1965).96 The Syrians balanced their attacks on the other Arab states by spotlighting “commitments” any had made concerning Palestine (50 such declarations in the period from September 1964 to February 1965). Syria also reported 25 border incidents allegedly initiated by Israel during the month of May (Israel reported two incidents). The renewal of Syrian verbal attacks on other Arab states appears to have been connected with a number of factors. First was the Ba‘th ’s increasing apprehension over its narrow base of legitimacy; the Muslim Brethren’s success in organizing conflict events throughout January clearly indicated the extent of opposition to the BaHh.97 Second was increased apprehension over the widespread renewal of Syrian Nasserite activity in collaboration with Egypt and Iraq: after uncovering Nasserite activity connected with the January disturbances, BaHh heads feared a renewal of activity by Nasserite exiles in Cairo — especially after Nasserite leaders ‘Abd al-Hamfd as-Sarraj and Jäsim ‘Alwän visited Baghdad in June 1965.98 Third was the renewal of Egyptian verbal attacks (40 in June, 34 in July, 20 in August). Fourth was a rise in conflict between the Ba‘th factions of Hafiz and Jadïd, which focused, as in the past, on exploiting the Arab-Israeli conflict for the purposes of deflecting internal conflict. Finally, Syrian fears of being left isolated in conflict with Israel had increased, especially after Israel had exploited conflict incidents

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initiated by Syria by attacking the Syrian diversion works of the Jordan River on 16 March and 13 May. The second attack had proved that Syria was incapable of standing alone against Israel - it was clear, as well, that other Arab states, headed by Egypt, would not provide military intervention to help Syria. Following destruction of its diversion works, the BaHh found itself in an extremely awkward posture. To abandon the diversion works because of incapacity to defend them would damage the militant image the Ba‘th had projected at the Summit Conferences. An easier alternative was to openly call on Egypt for aid, knowing that Egypt was not prepared to go to war over the matter of diversion. In issuing their call, BaHh leaders hoped that an Egyptian refusal would lead to widespread criticism on the part of the general Arab public; their own militant position, on the other hand, would not be damaged in any way. Nasser replied to the Syrian call in a speech to the Palestine National Conference in Cairo on 31 May 1965. He contended that the issue between Egypt and Syria was not military but a question of mistrust, and he hinted that the Syrians were using the Palestinian question in an attempt to deflect attention from 'their own internal problems. Nasser expressed readiness to send planes to Syria on condition that Egyptian air bases be placed on Syrian soil — a condition he knew the Ba‘th would not agree to. Further, Nasser made it clear that Egypt was not prepared to go to war over every little incident between Syria and Israel. Egypt, Nasser declared, would herself determine when to launch the campaign against Israel." In a later speech on 22 July, Nasser contended that the Ba‘th’s militant attitude on the Palestine question and its attacks on Egypt were a function of mistrust between Syria and Egypt on the one hand and internal difficulties of Ba‘th legitimacy in Syria on the other: They have a big complex in this respect. You all know how the B a tis ts were against us. ...What they said about the liberation of Palestine was mere nonsense. Yet what was their goal? They wanted to deceive the Arab people, not knowing that the Arab people are fully aware of their policy of opportunism as well as their attempts at playing with the problem relating to the people’s fate. The Arab people have discovered the truth about the Ba‘thists. They know very well that it is nothing but a Fascist military rule, a minority rule in Syria, and the Syrian people are struggling to rid themselves of it.100 Ba‘th attacks on Egypt for not undertaking its commitments continued with full force in the month of June. Ba‘th leaders went so far as to accuse Nasser of betraying the Yemenite revolution by trying to reach a compromise settlement with Saudi Arabia. Such attacks were no more than a nuisance to Nasser. At a third Summit Conference in Casablanca (9—13 September), he once more succeeded in isolating the Ba‘th and its militant policies, and the Ba‘th was once more denied an opportunity to expand its external

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legitimization. Moreover, following the third Summit (as with the first), internal conflict concerning decisions of the summit again took place among various factions of the Ba‘th. In all, the Ba‘th strategy to exploit the ArabIsraeli conflict ended in complete failure. NOTES 1. Meir Pa‘il, “Patterns of Military Revolutionary Regimes in Iraq and Syria,” Hamizrah Hehadash (Hebrew), 19 (1969), pp. 181-207. 2. The Revolutionary Council was originally meant to be a purely military body composed entirely of officers, but it was later decided to co-opt civilian politicians. See Itamar Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba‘th, 1963-1966: The Army-Party Symbiosis (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), pp. 52 -5 3 . Also see Arab Political Docu­ ments, 1963 (American University of Beirut), Protocols of the Union Talks, 1963, pp. 72-82. 3. Arab Political Documents, 1964. pp. 284—285 ;al-Ba‘th, 27 April 1964. 4. Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba'th..., pp. 5 0 -5 4 , 171-176. Also see Eliezer Be’eri, “Military Coups in the Arab World in the 1960s,” in Society and Regime in the Arab World (Hebrew), ed. Menachem Milson (Jerusalem: Van-Leer, 1977), p. 263. 5. The Muslim Brethren were particularly active in initiating internal conflict against the regime. 6. An-Nahär, 3 April 1963; Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba'th..., pp. 52, 219, 267; Arab Political Documents, 1963, pp. 8 8 -9 0 ; John F. Devlin, The Ba'th Party: A History from the Origins to 1966 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), pp. 238-239. 7. Rabinovich, op. cit., pp. 6 3 -7 4 ; Donald Lawrence Betz, Conflict o f Principle and Policy: A Case Study o f the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party in Power in Syria, 8 March 1963 - 13 February 1966 (University of Denver, PhJX, 1973), pp. 160-164; Devlin, op. cit., pp. 246-251; Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 5 9-60. 8. Moshe Ma‘oz, Modem Syria: Political and Social Changes in the Process o f Creat­ ing a National Community (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Reshafim, 1974), p. 81; Itamar Rabino­ vich, Continuity and Change in the Ba'th Regime in Syria (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Shiloah Institute 1974), p. 2. 9. At the Union Talks in Cairo, representatives of the Ba’th and the independents voiced complaints concerning the role of two Nasserite leaders, YQsuf Muzâhim and Muhammad Jarrah, in initiating or encouraging Nasserite demonstrations. See Protocols of the Union Talks, Arab Political Documents, 1963, pp. 106-107. In a communique published on 19 May, Ba’thists and their independent partners asserted that Nasserite officers led by Rashid al-Qutaini and Muhammad as-Sufi had tried to carry out a coup on 11 March. Ibid., pp. 264-267. 10. According to Haikal, however, publicity was “modest,” in accordance with Nasser’s instructions that newspaper editors should exercise restraint in their coverage of the demonstrations (Haikal, al-Ahram, 15 March 1963). 11. The Protocols of the Union Talks were first published in al-Ahram and broad­ cast by Cairo Radio from 21 June to 21 July 1963. The Egyptian government later pub­ lished the Protocols in a collection edited by Haikal. The Protocols may be found in English translation in Arab Political Documents, 1963, and in BBC broadcasts from 25 June to 20 September 1963. For comment on the Union Talks, see also Kerr, The Arab Cold War, pp. 63-101. For direct evidence of Nasser’s stand, see Arab Political Documents, 1963, pp. 38 -3 9 , and Kerr, pp. 74-75. 12. Arab Political Documents, 1963, pp. 3 8 -3 9 ,1 3 1 , 165;Kerr, op. cit., pp. 74-75. 13. Ibid., p. 165.

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14. Nasserite demonstrations strengthened the hands of those in the Ba‘th who wanted an immediate improvement in relations with Nasser in order to prevent a link between Syria’s internal conflict and the conflict with Nasser (Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba‘th..., p. 55). 15. Ibid., p. 52. 16. These demands were put forward in the first round of the talks by ‘Abd al-Karlm Zuhür and ‘Ali Salih as-Sa‘di (Arab Political Documents, 1963, pp. 84-86), and by Luayy al-Atäsi and Fahd ash-Sha'ir in the second round (ibid., pp. 104-107). 17. Ibid., p. 118. 18. The resignation of the Nasserite ministers was made public for the first time by the Lebanese paper al-Hayät on 29 March 1963. Cairo Radio reported the news on 3 April (BBC 5 April 1963). 19. Al-Ahräm 31 March 1963; Cairo Radio 31 March, Daily Report 1 April 1963. 20. In his speech on 23 July 1963, Nasser said that the aim of the article had been to warn the Ba'th that Egypt could reply to the Ba'th by direct means. 21. Arab Political Documents, 1963, p. 135. 22. Al-Ahräm, 2 April 1963;al-Akhbär (Egypt), 2 April 1963; Cairo Radio 3 April, BBC 5 April 1963, four reports on Arab Voice 3 April, BBC 5 April 1963, three reports; al-Anwär 3 April 1963, BBC 5 April 1963; al-Muharrir 3 April 1963, BBC 5 April 1963. 23. In hisal-Ahräm article of 5 April 1963, Haikal again made it clear that Egypt was not prepared to establish a union with the Ba'th Party but only with the entire Syrian people. 24. Damascus Radio 5 April 1963, BBC 8 April 1963. According to an-Nahär of 5 April 1963, the question of representation on the Revolution Council and in the government was left open until after the Cairo talks. See also, Munlf ar-Razzäz, The Bitter Experience (Arabic) (Beirut, 1967), p. 97. 25. The full text of the Charter of Union is given in Arab Political Documents, 1963, pp. 227 -246. 26. Al-Hayät, 5 April 1963 ; Be’eri. Military Coups in the Arab World..., p. 153; Kerr, The Arab Cold War, p. 107. 27. Razzäz. The Bitter Experience, p. 97; Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba'th..., pp. 5 6 -5 9 ,6 3 -6 4 . 28. In the first wave of purges, 47 Nasserite officers were discharged, including senior officers such as Air Force General Nûr-‘Allàh Ibrahim al-Hajj, Defense Minister Muhammad as-Sûfi and Deputy Chief of Staff Rashid al-Qutainl (al-Hayät 5 May 1963). 29. It seems that the Communist Party, Hauränl’s group and right-wing elements also agreed to support the Ba'th because they saw rule by the Nasserite parties as worse still. Evidence of this can be seen in these elements’ distributing leaflets all over Syria demanding union with Nasser (al-Jarlda, 27 April 1963). 30. See note 18. The resignations were officially announced on 3 April. 31. The Syrian communications media did not report any of these actions. Nasserite representatives also refrained from reporting them (interview with Nihäd al-Qäsim in alMuharrir on 6 May 1963, Daily Report on 7 May 1963). 32. See the communique of Nihäd al-Qäsim on 3 May (Arab News Agency 3 May 1963, Daily Report 3 May 1963), the publication of the letter of resignation of the Communications Minister Jihäd Dähl and Planning Minister Hänl al-Hindl (Middle East News Agency 5 May 1963, Daily Report 6 May 1963) and the interview of Nihäd alQäsim in al-Muharrir 6 May, Daily Report 7 May 1963. 33. Middle East News Agency 4 May 1963, BBC 7 May 1963. 34. With the exception of two verbal attacks by Bitär and ‘Aflaq on the Egyptian media on 16 May. 35. Different sources gave different figures: Arab News Agency 8 May, Daily Report

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9 May 1963: 230 officers; Cairo Radio 8 May, BBC 9 May 1963:110 officers and 1,000 soldiers;al-Akhbär 29 May, Daily Report 29 May 1963: 600 officers. 36. Al-Jarida, 10 May 1963, reported on the ousting of 15 judges and 15 senior offcials; al-Akhbär 29 May, Daily Report 29 May 1963 reported 300 persons. 37. During the period from 10 May to 18 July, Haikal published eight articles that were attacks (on 10, 14,17 May, 7.14, 21 June, 5 and 12 July). 38. In his articles of 5 and 12 July in al-Ahräm, Haikal clarified the reasons behind publication of the Protocols of the Union Talks. Nasser also gave an explanation in his speech of 22 July. 39. See, for example, al-Ahräm, 17, 24 May 1963. 40. During the Ba‘th era, there were other attempts by small Nasserite groups to set off a new coup —e.g., on 24 July and 7 and 28 October 1963. All these attempts were nipped in the bud, and there were no clear connections with Egypt. See George H. Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East - the Arab States (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1971), p. 313; ath-Thaura, 27 January 1964; al-Jarida, 6 February 1964. 41. This was the harshest repression since 1949 in Syria’s history of coups and attempted coups. (Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba’th..., p. 70; Haddad, op. cit., p. 313.) 42. Part of the Nasserites remaining in Syria who were not arrested or who escaped after the failure of the coup chose to give up political activity (Rabinovich, op. cit., p. 72; Haddad, op. cit., p. 313). 43. For the inflammatory effect of Egyptian propaganda and its connection with the attempted coup, see the communiques of Salâh Bitar and the Revolutionary Council of 18 July 1963 (Damascus Radio 18 July, BBC 20 July 1963). See also Razzäz, The Bitter Experience, pp. 109-111. 44. Up until 17 August, the Ba’th Party refrained from officially accusing Egypt of being directly responsible for the attempts, in the hope of avoiding a complete break with Egypt. The first details on the connections between Nasser and the Nasserites were given in al-Ba'th on 14 August 1963. Amin al-Häfiz officially accused Nasser of inter­ vention on 17 August (al-Ba'th, 18 August 1963; Arab Political Documents, 1963, pp. 359-360). 45. This evidence was given by Muhammad Navhan but was contradicted by Rashid al-Qutaini and Jâsim ‘Alwân, who apparently wished to conceal the connection between Nasser and the plotters: Middle East Mirror (MEM), 24 September 1963. For details on the evidence given by the accused see Uso al-Ba’th and ath-Thaura 14 August 1963, BBC 17 August 1963; Damascus Radio 14 August, BBC 17 August 1963 ;MEM, 19 October 1963. 46. Damascus Radio 17 October, Daily Report 18 October 1963 ;MEM, 10 October 1963. 47. Speech on 22 July 1963 (Arab Political Documents, 1963, pp. 331-332). Also see Haikal, al-Ahräm. 26 July 1963. 48. On 23 October, the Lebanese foreign minister sent a note to his Syrian counter­ part protesting that there had been 17 border incidents in the period up until 7 October and seven more between 18 and 20 October (Arab Political Documents, 1963. p. 428). In his answering note, the Syrian foreign minister admitted to a portion of the border incidents and stated that the Syrian government had found it necessary to take measures to ensure internal security (Arab Political Documents, 1963, pp. 429-430). 49. Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba’th..., p. 115, points out that the renewal of Egyptian verbal attacks was connected with developments inside Syria. 50. Ba’th Party leaders believed from the start that the only way to block Egyptian attempts to incite workers and fellahin was to improve the conditions of the interest groups concerned. Ba’th leaders made contact with workers and students as early as the

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end of May 1963 in order to secure their allegiance to the regime. (Rabinovich, op. cit., pp. 67-68.) At the Sixth National Congress of the party in October 1963, Ba‘th leaders explicitly stated that in view of Nasser’s standing and influence among these interest groups, the policy of nationalization must be implemented (Decisions of the Sixth National Congress, pp. 29-32, 58; Rabinovich, op. cit., pp. 72, 91-92). 51. Damascus Radio 22 February, Daily Report 24 February; statement by Hafiz at a new conference (after the events in Hama in April 1964), Damascus Radio 25 April, Daily Report 28 April 1964; ath-Thaura 2 May 1964; Damascus Radio 30 January, Daily Report 4 February 1965. 52. The other five border incidents were 2 episodes of mine-laying, one of kidnap­ ping civilians, one infiltration by a terrorist group and one air incident. 53. See Nissim Bar-Yaacov, The Israeli-Syrian Armistice (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1967), pp. 196-213. 54. A U.N. observers’ investigation did not corroborate these allegations, although two subsequent Israeli complaints concerning Syrian cultivation in the Almagor area were found to be justified. 55. Arab Voice 12 June, Summary o f Broadcasts 13 June 1963. 56. Bar-Yaacov, The Israeli-Syrian Armistice, pp. 198-217. 57. On 12 July, the Israeli radio network quoted Lebanese sources reporting that Syria had initiated the wave of border incidents in order to prevent a worsening of her internal situation {Daily Report, 13 July 1964). 58. After three months without any verbal conflict, in accordance with the decision of the first Arab Sulnmit Conference, a considerable and increasing number of Egyptian attacks took place against the Ba‘th regime - 11 in April, 85 in May and 54 in June. 59. Baghdad Radio, report of 12 July 1964 on the discharge of 100 officers because of their unionist tendencies, BBC 14 July 1964;an-Nahär 15 July 1964. 60. In a speech on 1 July 1964 and in other speeches in the course of 1964 and 1965, Nasser contended that Syria could not defend herself alone. He made it plain that he had called for a Summit Conference in January 1964 because at the conference of Arab chiefs of staff held in Cairo in December 1963, the Syrians had stated that they were not capable of diverting the sources of the Jordan for fear of Israeli attack {Arab Political Documents, 1964, p. 253). 61. Damascus Radio 23 February, Daily Report 24 February 1964. 62. Damascus Radio 15 April, Daily Report 15 April 1964. 63. Damascus Radio announced on 24 January that an Israeli spy network had been uncovered, Daily Report 26 January 1965. On 17 February, Damascus Radio announced that an American spy network had been uncovered in Damascus, Daily Report 18 Febru­ ary 1965. 64. Ath-Thaura 26 January, Daily Report 26 January 1965. 65. Daily R eport, 29 January 1965. 66. Ath-Thaura, al-Ba‘th, Daily Report 27 January 1965. 67. Damascus Radio 28 January, Daily Report 28 January 1965. 68. Damascus Radio 30 January Daily Report 2 February 1965. 69. Hafiz claimed that he had not deviated from the party position. At the summit, he had voted with the majority on an ambiguously worded resolution concerning im­ mediate war against Israel. Shüfi seized on the ambiguity to argue that Hafiz did, in fact, deviate (Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba'th..., p. 102). 70. Regional Command document no. 26, Documents o f the Ba'th Party in Syria (Tel Aviv: Shiloah Institute, 1971). 71. Damascus Radio 17-18 January, BBC 21 January 1964;al-Bath, ath-Thaura, 17 January;ath-Thaura, 18 January 1964,al-Bath, 20 January 1964. 72. At a press conference on 13 January. See Arab Political Documents, 1964, p. 21.

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73. Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba'th..., p. 103. 74. For a discussion of this internal political development, see Rabinovich, op. cit., pp. 104-108. 75. See, for example, the communique of the National Command, 4 March 1964, Arab Political Documents, 1964, p. 70; communique of Amïn al-Hafiz, 8 March 1964, Arab Political Documents, 1964, p. 77. Against the background of the summit decisions, the Syrian Communist Party published a communique on 26 January 1964 attacking the Ba'th Party’s policy on the diversion of the Jordan River (Arab Political Documents, 1964, pp. 14-15). 76. Razzäz, The Bitter Experience, pp. 152-155. 77. National Command document no. 8/4; in Abraham Ben-Tzur, ed., The Syrian Ba'th Party and Israel: Documents from the Internal Party Publications (Arab and AfroAsian Monograph Series, Center for Arab and Afro-Asian Studies, Givat Haviva, 1968), pp. 7 -8 . 78. Regional Command document no. 4, Ben-Tzur, op. cit., p. 10. 79. Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba'th..., pp. 183-184. 80. Damascus Radio 12 October, Daily Report 13 October 1965. 81. Provisional Regional Command, Circular no. 1; 2 March 1966, p. 8, Ben-Tzur, The Syrian Ba'th Party and Israel..., pp. 11-12. 82. The decision to challenge Nasser by making use of the Arab-Israeli conflict was apparently reached at the 6th National Congress held in October 1963. These seems to be a clear link between the party decision to fight against Nasserite propaganda, which had proved its effectiveness in influencing the Syrian population and the Arab world, and the decision to call on Egypt to take action against the danger of the Israeli diversion of the Jordan River. (Documents o f the Ba'th Party, Decisions of the Sixth National Congress, pp. 5 3 -5 4 , 5 7 -5 9 ; Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba'th..., pp. 9 5 -96.) 83. Ba’th fears of Nasserite incitement are expressed in the Sixth Congress Docu­ ments: see Rabinovich, op. cit., pp. 100-101. 84. In spite of Ba'th efforts to improve relations with them, including the lifting of a ban on political activity by separatist leaders (Rabinovich, op. cit., pp. 100-101). 85. See, for example, Hafiz’ speech of 21 November 1963, Arab Political Docu­ ments, 1963, p. 479. The Ba'th Party believed that the coup in Iraq was carried out with the help of Egypt (Communique of 'Aflaq, 26 December 1963, Arab Political Documents, 1963, p. 514). 86. Al-Ba'th, 23 December 1963; Kerr, The Arab C old War, p. 131. 87. Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba'th..., p. 101. 88. Arab Political Documents, 1963, pp. 502-506. 89. These decisions were not included in the summit’s closing statement. Arab Political Documents, 1964, pp. 6 —7. 90. “The Strategic Significance of the Israeli Conspiracy to Divert the River Jordan” - Regional Command document no. 26 (Documents o f the Ba'th Party in Syria). 91. In two internal communiques of 5 and 7 July 1964, the Regional Command charged that the Egyptian-Iraqi agreement was intended to combat the party’s rule in Syria and to destroy the Syrian revolution (Regional Command documents, nos. 35, 37; Documents o f the Ba'th Party in Syria). 92. Fifteen internal conflict events between M ay-July 1964, as opposed to five between January-March 1964. 93. See the communique of Hafiz, Damascus Radio 30 April, Daily Report 30 April 1964; and the communique of ‘Umran, Arab News Agency 1 May, Daily Report 1 May 1964. A “secret” internal communique of the Regional Command of 20 July 1964 again disclosed Nasser’s “base tactics” of initiating the Summit Conference in order to extricate himself from the embarrassment of his inaction regarding Palestine (Regional Command document no. 39\ Documents o f the Ba'th Party in Syria).

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94. From 27 February to 10 April, the Palestinian cause was brought up twenty times by Syrian heads of the regime and the media. On 2 April, the party leadership met to discuss preparation of a plan for a Palestinian “entity” to replace a different plan proposed by Ahmad Shuqairi (Arab News Agency 2 April, Daily Report 3 April 1964). The Ba'th program was published on 21 May (Damascus Radio 21 May, Daily Report 22 May 1964). A Regional Command document, classified as secret, was published on 20 July 1964. This document stated that Syria was presenting a concrete, detailed plan to deal with the Palestinian problem and affirmed the importance of the role to be played by Palestinians themselves in the struggle for liberation (document no. 39; Ibid). 95. On 23 September, contacts were renewed between the Ba‘th and the Nasserites in an attempt to bring the latter into the government (al Jarida, 23 September 1964). On 4 November, fifteen Nasserite leaders - most notably Jäsim ‘Alwän, who had been imprisoned for his part in the attempted coup of 18 July - were released from prison and deported to Egypt through the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut. (Al-Hayät, 4 November 1964.) 96. The attacks centered around the countries* failure to make use of oil resources for the sake of the cause; their failure to carry out decisions of the Summit Conference and rejection of the summit idea as a means of liberating Palestine; and their renewed rejection of Syria’s demand for immediate war with Israel formulated at a meeting of heads of government in Cairo from 26 to 30 May. 97. In the period of January - April 1965, there was a marked increase in the num­ ber of declarations of apprehension by heads of the regime over possible external or internal attempts to overthrow them (67 statements, compared with 12 in the period of September—December 1964). 98. On 7 June, Razzäz accused Egypt of continuing to undermine the Syrian regime. ’Alwän and Sarräj went to Baghdad, he said, in order to help, weave plots against Syria (Beirut Radio 7 June, Daily Report 9 June 1965). 99. Arab Political Documents, 1965, p. 227. 100. Ibid., pp. 272-276.

7

The Neo-Ba'th Regime, 1966-1970: Connections Between Internal and External Conflicts Instability and increasing militancy were the hallmarks of the neo-Ba‘th regime, which toppled the Ba‘th regime on 23 February 1966. The new oneparty government was composed of various radical military and civilian fac­ tions of the old Ba‘th Party. In addition to changes in Syria’s internal environ­ ment during the neo-BaHh regime, there were a number of important shifts in the external environment. The Egyptian-Syrian conflict, for one, was finally resolved, thanks in large part to a growing rift between Egypt and Saudi Arabia that led to the formation of two major Arab blocs (Saudi ArabiaJordan and Egypt-Iraq-Syria). Both the Syrian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli conflicts also intensified during this period. The single most important conflict event of the neo-Ba‘th regime was the Six-Day War, which had profound effects on Syria’s domestic and foreign policies. During the neo-Ba‘th period, internal conflicts generally influenced ex­ ternal ones. Several factors were responsible for this situation. First was the extremely narrow base of the new regime. Although the previous Ba‘th regime had also had a problem of narrow public support, the new regime was further hampered by a narrowing of support within the party itself — especially after veteran members who had been turned out of the party leadership became the focus of active opposition.1 Second, the Alawï charac­ ter of the new regime (Salâh Jadïd and Hafiz al-Asad, the two major neo-Ba‘th figures, were both members of the Alawï sect) exacerbated the existing polarization between both Alawïs and Druzes and the ruling elite and Syria’s Sunni Moslem urban population. Finally, there were a number of internal conflicts within the ruling elite, most significantly between the rival groups of Jadld and Asad. Given its narrow base of public support and ever-present internal conflicts, the neo-Ba‘th leadership was constantly apprehensive about its ability to stay in power. Accordingly, it turned to a radical foreign policy, in hopes that this would deflect internal conflict and lead to a rallying of sup­ port for the new regime. Although the neo-Ba‘th regime remained in power for almost five years, there are two distinct sub-periods. The first sub-period lasted from 23 February 1966 until the Six-Day War of June 1967; the second period, from the close of the war until the coup of Hafiz al-Asad on 13 November 1970.

147

148

Linkage Politics in the Middle East

SYRIA’S POLITICAL REGIME Syria’s political regime after the 23 February coup was based on a coalition of several hundred officers and party functionaries from among the radical military and civilian Ba‘th leadership. This coalition had constituted the competing elite during most of the previous Ba‘th period. Two main groups were represented in the new ruling elite: a group o f young officers from the Alawf and Druze minorities, under the leadership of Jadfd, Hafiz al-Asad, Salim Hätüm and others; and a group of young politicians from the middle class and the small towns, led by Nur ad-Din al-Atasf, Yüsuf Zu‘ayym and Ibrahim Mâkhus. The most striking characteristics of the.new regime were its very narrow base of public support —even narrower than that of the previous regime — and the multiplication of power struggles within the ruling officers’ coalition. The neo-Ba‘th regime was anathema to a large segment of the urban middle-class and to most of the Sunni majority of the population, which resented both the secular nature o f the regime and the fact that Alawis and Druzes were its leaders. Groups that tended to support the regime — urban workers, fellahin and the population of small district towns - carried little weight in public affairs because they were a relatively small, unorganized and scattered segment of the population. Political actors. Besides the radical civilian Ba‘th faction, the following political elites were also active: the Syrian Communist Party; the veteran leadership of the Ba‘th party; HaurlnT’s socialist bloc, also known as the “Arab Socialists” (this group had actually split in two, with one faction going under the leadership of Fatah ‘Alush and the other under Hauränf; Nasserites (known as Socialist Unionists); the Muslim Brethren; and remnants of Syria’s right-wing parties (the National Party and the People’s Party). Military actors. There were four main military groups during the neoBa*th period: (1) The Jadîd group, supported by Chief of Staff Ahmad Suwaidani, Head of Military Intelligence ‘Abd al-Karlm al-Jundf, and Commander of the 70th Regiment, ‘Izzat Jadfd. (2) The Asad group, whose main support came from the Syrian Air Force. (3) The Hätüm group of the Druzes, supported mainly by the Druze group under Hamad ‘Ubaid, who from May 1966 on also tried to gather sup­ port from officers faithful to the National Command. (4) Neutralist officers, who were supporters of Atâsï. Following the 23 February coup, Jadfd backed Atäsf as president, and these officers there­ after tended to support the Jadfd group. Ruling elites, competing elites and interest groups. In addition to the neoBa‘th ruling elite, other elites were given a share of power as part of the Ba‘th’s attempts to broaden its base of legitimacy. These additional political

TheNeo-Ba'th Regime 1966-1970

149

elites were the Communist Party; the “Arab Socialist” faction that had broken away from Haurânî; one of the Nasserite factions; and independent leftists.2 The first government set up by Zu‘ayyïn on 1 March 1966 had 20 ministers, among whom were two Communists, one Nasserite, and one Arab Socialist. In the second government, set up by Zu‘ayyïn in mid-October, there were two Nasserite ministers. Competing elites included the veteran B ath leadership that had been turned out of the party; the Haurânî faction of the “Arab Socialists” (Hauräni himself was exiled in Beirut along with a number of supporters); the Nasserite faction whose most prominent leaders were in exile in Egypt; the Muslim Brethren; and remnants of the National Party and People’s Party. The ruling group within the neo-Ba‘th was that led by Saläh JadTd. Although he never held a central position (his official title was assistant secretary-general of the Regional Command), Jadîd was in fact the strong man of the new regime. Atâsî and Zu‘ayyïn belonged to the Jadîd group, as did Suwaidani, Jundf and Tzzat Jadîd. The main competing group was that of Asad, the minister of defense and commander of the air force, whose main support came from the air force. During the first phase of the neo-Ba‘th regime, these two groups were fairly equal in power. Realizing that neither could easily overcome his rival (and realizing, too, the narrow support for the neo-Ba‘th), Jadîd and Asad were careful not to let their rivalry get out of hand - at times, the two factions even cooperated with one another. A third competing elite within the neo-Ba‘th was Salîm Hätüm’s group, which had played a considerable role in the 23 February coup. This group was shouldered aside by Jadîd, and was denied a share in power.3 In co­ operation with those loyal to the previous B ath leadership, Hätüm’s group attempted to counter the moves made against it by staging a coup in Sep­ tember 1966. Upon failure of the coup, Hätüm fled to Jordan with a num­ ber of his supporters, and the group ceased to be an active political factor in Syria. A further change occurred in the status of interest groups during the neoBaHh regime. The new regime reinforced its hold on workers, fellahin and students, making them the major base of popular support. A group called the Workers’ Armed Leagues prevented resistance to the regime by arresting its opponents. Late in 1966, the Popular Defense Army was established as the umbrella organization for a number of militia-type bodies set up by the regime (the Workers’ Armed Leagues, the Peasants’ Armed Leagues and the Futuwwa para-military youth organization). The task of the Popular Defense Army was to defend the regime against internal subversion and external attack.4 As before, interest groups opposed to the regime were merchants, landowners and religious leaders. This last group represented the most serious opposition to the regime, especially during the conflict events of May 1967.5 In the absence of competing political parties, popular dissatisfaction was

150

Linkage Polities in the Middle East

most often expressed by various interest groups on occasions of religious significance; generally, such opposition took the form of Muslim disapproval of the secular nature of the neo-Ba‘th. During the neo-Ba‘th era, the most prominent religious figure was the former mufti of Syria, Shaykh Hasan Habanka. Linkage groups. Three main linkage groups were active between February 1966 - March 1967: the Nasserites, the Syrian Communist Party and the Druze officers’ group led by Salim Haturn. Nasserites dwindled in importance after relations between the neo-Ba‘th and Nasser dramatically improved; the neo-BaHh eventually succeeded in neutralizing Nasserite activity with Nasser’s unspoken acquiescence. Such improved relations were an important outcome of Nasser’s struggle against Saudi Arabia. In an effort to establish a bloc of “progressive” Arab states to counter the “Islamic Alliance” of King Faisal, Nasser relinquished his earlier stand against the Ba‘th regime. On 4 November 1966, Syria and Egypt signed a joint defense agreement whose aim was to coordinate the military and political activities of both nations. Despite this thaw in relations, however, the neo-BaHh resisted reinstating ousted Nasserite army officers or giving Nasserites anything more than limited representation in the government.6 The neo-Ba‘th also refused to permit Nasserite exiles in Cairo to return to Syria. The Syrian Communist Party became an important linkage group after the neo-Ba‘th made friendly overtures to the Soviet Union in an effort to broaden its external legitimacy.7 The third linkage group, Druze officers led by Hätüm, had their ties with Jordan. Unlike the first two groups, the Hätüm group was pragmatic rather than ideological in nature; it sought Jordanian aid for the purpose of overthrowing the regime. The Hätüm group was granted political asylum in Jordan following the failure o f their coup, and from Jordan they continued to act against the neo-Ba‘th regime.8 TYPES OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONFLICT A number of types o f internal conflict can be identified according to the actors taking part: • Ruling neo-BaHh elite vs. other political elites (the Communist Party, Socialist Unionists and Muslim Brethren). • Ruling neo-Ba^h elite vs. right-wing interest groups (landowners, mer­ chants and religious leaders). • Conflicts within the ruling elite. In addition, there were six main external conflicts during the neo-Ba‘th era: Syria vs. Jordan; Syria vs. Saudi Arabia; Syria vs. Iraq; Syria vs. Israel; Syria vs. The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC); and Syria vs. “western imperialism.” The conflicts with Jordan and Saudi Arabia were a function of Syria’s

TheNeo-Ba‘th Regime 1966-1970

151

radical policy within the inter-Arab system. Both of these conflicts were generally verbal but occasionally violent. Syria accused Jordan and Saudi Arabia of having had a role in both Hätüm’s abortive coup of September 1966 and in the religious riots of May 1967, for example, while Jordan accused the Syrians of attempts at sabotage and subversion in Jordan.9 The conflict with Iraq focused on two issues: division of the Euphrates River waters and the question of which represented the authentic Ba‘th — the Syrian or the Iraqi party.10 The Syrian-Israeli conflict centered, as before, on the demilitarized zones, and on Syria’s support for Palestinian groups active against Israel. This con­ flict was both verbal and violent, comprising border incidents, mine-layings and sabotage by Palestinian organizations, along with verbal attacks by the Syrian media and Israeli warnings to Syria. The Syrian-IPC conflict focused on Syria’s demand for higher royalties from the transit of oil (through com­ pany pipelines) across her territory. Last, the conflict between Syria and western imperalism took the form of verbal attacks on what Syria termed the “imperialist camp.” According to Syria, western imperialists were bent on harming the Syrian and other revolutionary Arab regimes by supporting Israel and reactionary Arab countries. CONNECTIONS BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONFLICTS Throughout the first phase of its rule, the neo-Ba‘th regime pursued an aggres­ sive foreign policy that was designed to deflect internal conflict by rallying support for the regime in the face of external danger. In each instance, the neo-Ba‘th sought a suitable ideological cover for its policy.11 Within the Arab sphere, for example, it stressed the struggle of “progressive revolutionary” regimes against “reactionary” ones. Within the Syrian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli spheres, the regime embarked upon a strategy of initiated aggression, and propounded a people’s war of liberation as an alternative to conventional war against Israel.12 Within the sphere of the Powers, the neo-Ba‘th sought tobe identified with socialist, revolutionary and progressive regimes in the struggle against U5 .-western imperialism and colonialism. The neo-Ba‘th made simultaneous use of all three types of conflict. In nearly all its official pronouncements, the regime stressed the “reactionaryZionist-imperialist” danger to Syria. Verbal attacks were also specifically directed against Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia (“Arab reaction”) and western imperialism. Such declarations were used to create a war psychosis among the Syrian population that was reinforced by the establishment of a Popular Defense Army, the opening of mobilization and training centers and the distribution of arms to loyal citizens of the regime.13 According to Israeli sources, the neo-Ba‘th regime initiated 177 border incidents and aided 75 Palestinian terrorist or sabotage acts between 23 Febru-

Linkage Politics in the Middle East

152

ary 1966-15 May 1967. During the same period, there were 432 declarations of apprehension regarding reactionary, Zionist or imperialist aggression. These data are particularly striking when compared to parallel data for the separatist and Ba‘th regimes, both of which ruled for a longer period of time (see table):

Regime

Separatist: 28.9.617.3.63

Terror Declarations of and Violent Apprehension Sabotage Border Regarding Acts by Incidents Palestinian External with Aggression Israel Organizations

66

Verbal Verbal Attacks Attacks on Arab on Israel “Reaction”

54

28

Verbal Attacks on “Imperialism”

46

Ba‘th: 8.3.63 22.2.66

169

38*

170

179

125

374

Neo-Ba‘th: 23.2.66 15.5.67

177

75

432**

225

533

445

* From 1 January 1965. **In these 432 declarations of apprehension, Israel was mentioned 295 times, the “imperialist” danger 307 times and the danger of Arab “reaction” 215 times.

The following two hypotheses summarize the relationship between Syria’s internal and external conflicts during the first phase of the neo-Ba‘th regime: (1) A rise or reduction in intensity of Syria’s internal conflict raised or reduced the use made of the following external conflicts: Syria vs. Jordan and Saudi Arabia (“Arab reaction”); Syria vs. Israel, and Syria vs. western imperialism. (14 internal conflict —►14 external conflict.) (2) A rise in intensity of Syria’s internal conflict on the eve of the Six-Day War led to the crisis that erupted into the war. ( t internal conflict —►t system conflict.) These two hypotheses will now be examined in greater detail. February 1966 - April 1967: The Jadid-A sad Conflict and External Syrian Conflicts During the first phase of the neo-Ba‘th regime, it was the internal conflict between Jadfd and Asad that had the most important impact on Syria’s ex­ ternal conflicts. The first phase of neo-Ba‘th rule can be divided into five main sub-periods, during which the Jadrd—Asad conflict either increased or decreased in intensity. The table below indicates these sub-periods,14 and shows connections between intensity of the Jadrd-Asad conflict and conflict behavior manifestations associated with Syrian external conflict:

The Neo-Ba'th Regime 1966-1970

153

Intensity of the Jadïd—Asad Conflict

Violent Border Incidents

Terrorism or Sabotage by Palestinian Organizations

Declarations of Apprehension

July-August 1966

Reduced

3

7

33

6 September 22 October 1966

Increased

3

11

93

23 October 9 December 1966

Reduced

20

7

58

10 December 1966 21 February 1967

Increased

45

17

50

22 February — 12 April 1967

Reduced

11

11

29

Period

Highlights of the Jadïd—Asad conflict will be described in more detail so as to further clarify the links between internal and external Syrian conflicts during this period. The Hâtüm coup attem pt. On 6 September 1966, Salim Hâtüm and his followers —aided by Ba‘thists of the previous regime and the Nasserite group of Fahd ash-Sha‘ir — launched an abortive coup against Jadld’s group. The coup attempt failed, largely because air support promised by Defense Minister Asad never materialized. Following the coup attempt, conflict between Jadfd and Asad increased in intensity. Backed by a majority of the army, Jadïd arrested a number of Asad supporters in the air force and had others trans­ ferred. He also arranged for the formation of a new government that ex­ cluded several Asad loyalists who had previously belonged to the ruling elite.15 Repression of the Hâtüm coup and the increased intensity of the JadldAsad conflict led to a rise in the extent to which external conflicts were exploited. Hätüm’s flight to Jordan enabled the neo-Ba‘th to contend that the abortive coup had been a joint conspiracy of Hâtüm, members of the previous regime, and an alliance between Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the forces of imperialism. Syrian heads and the communications media claimed that this internal-external conspiracy was designed to overthrow the neoBa‘th because of its uncompromisingly revolutionary stand against Arab reaction, Zionism and imperialism.16 From 6 September - 22 October, there was a marked rise both in the number of declarations of apprehension regarding reactionary, imperialist and Zionist aggression against the regime (93 such declarations as against 33 in the months of July and August), and in sabotage operations by Palestinian organizations directed against Israel (11 instances of mine-laying and sabotage as against seven in July and August). However, the number of border incidents

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Linkage Politics in the Middle East

was the same (three in each sub-period). Syria’s exploitation of external con­ flicts was facilitated not only by Hätöm’s fleeing to Jordan, but by sharp Israeli warnings against any further terrorist activity.17 Using these supposed external threats, the neo-Ba‘th leadership called on the population to close ranks in support of the regime, and to volunteer for the National Guard. Mobilization centers and training camps were opened to receive the volunteers,18 but by and large, nobody came. Opposition to the regime increased instead, in part because a number of people suspected of loyalty to the previous regime were arrested by the workers’ armed platoons.19 Religious leaders also stepped up their campaign against the neo-Ba’th at this point because of the regime’s collaboration with the Communist Party.20 From 23 October —9 December, the Jadïd-Asad conflict was reduced in intensity, because the two sides had reached an agreement regarding the limited role of Nasserites in the government.21 During this period, there were fewer declarations warning against Zionist aggression and fewer acts of sabotage by terrorist organizations (58 declarations as oppsed to 93 ; seven reports of mine-laying and sabotage as opposed to 11). However, there was a striking increase in the number of border incidents initiated by the Syrians (20 as opposed to three). Renewed internal conflict. The conflict between Asad and Jadfd resumed its intensity during the second week o f December 1966, when interrogation of those arrested after the abortive Hätüm coup revealed Asad’s role in it. Once again, officers and civilians loyal to Asad were dismissed or transferred from their posts, to be replaced by loyal followers of Jadfd. In opposition to Asad’s wishes, cooperation with the Communists was strengthened.22 Asad retaliated in February 1967 with an ultimatum to the Regional Command demanding the expulsion of Communists and four Ba‘th ministers from the government; the removal of ‘Abd al-Karfm al-Jundl from his post as head of Syrian intelligence (according to Asad, Jundf had tried to have him assassin­ ated); the transfer of the commander of the Syrian front; and cessation of the trade union activity of Jundf’s cousin, Khälid al-Jundf.23 The rise in intensity of the Jadfd-Asad conflict was paralleled by a rise in external conflicts, most notably the IPC conflict and the Syrian-Israeli con­ flict. Between 10 December 1 9 6 6 -2 1 February 1967, there were 45 border incidents and 17 cases of mine-laying and sabotage by Palestinian groups (compared to 20 border incidents and seven acts of sabotage in the previous sub-period). Of the 45 border incidents, 38 occurred during the month of January — the highest one-month figure in the six years (1961-1967) sur­ veyed. Most of these border incidents involved Israeli tractors working plots of land within the demilitarized zones that had either not been previously contested, or else had been quiet for a lengthy period of time.24 Although the total number of declarations of apprehension was actually a little lower during this time (50, as opposed to 58 in the previous sub-period),

The Neo-Ba'th Regime 1966-1970

155

the use made of these declarations was striking: there were 33 warnings of Israeli intentions of attacking Syria in January, as opposed to five in Decem­ ber and six in February. Syria also addressed six notes to the Security Council reporting that Israel intended to attack her,25 and began broadcasting announcements concerning Israeli troop concentrations along the border (later repetition of these announcements signalled the crisis preceding the SixDay War) 26 On 15 Januaiy, U.N. Secretary-General U Thant called upon Syria and Israel to convene the Syria-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) to discuss the question of cultivation in the demilitarized zones. The commission met on 25 January; in the course of the session, both sides agreed to refrain from further hostile acts. Within the neo-Ba‘th, this agreement led to contro­ versy. The view of the more radical faction — which eventually prevailed — held that honoring such an agreement would damage Syria’s image as the spearhead of the Palestinian liberation struggle.27 Accordingly, Syria subse­ quently denied having had a part in any agreement.28 At the second MAC session on 29 January, Syria proposed a settlement of the demilitarized zones dispute based on a return to the situation prevailing before the 1949 armistice agreement.29 The effect of this proposal was to torpedo the talks: at the third session on 2 February, the talks reached a deadlock and were never resumed.30 The IPC dispute. During the time of increased internal conflict between Jadfd and Asad, coupled with an increase in intensity of the Syrian-Israeli conflict, the neo-Ba‘th found itself dealing with a second external conflict involving the Iraq Petroleum Company. Syria had begun negotiating with the company in September 1966. At issue was the rate of payment the company was to make in exchange for permission to transport oil through Syrian terri­ tory. Negotiations broke down on 8 December, at which point the Syrian government issued a decree fixing the rate of payment. When the company refused to pay, Syria proceeded to stop the flow of oil within her borders by seizing all company installations.31 The IPC dispute lasted from 8 December — 2 March 1967. During this time, the regime conducted an intensive propaganda campaign against the company. The Syrian position was described as a pioneer struggle to free Arab oil from western imperialism and colonialism, the most glorious struggle since the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the first step towards the liberation of Palestine.32 According to the regime, Syria was facing a new Zionist, imperialist and reactionary threat in her daring to confront imperialist interests in the region. The IPC, Syrian leaders claimed, had played a role in the abortive coup of September 1966. When this coup failed, U JS. imperialists stepped in, using Israel, their main tool in the region, to try and overthrow the Syrian regime.33 The January 1967 border incidents with Israel were depicted in the Syrian media as the start of a new UÜ. imperialist campaign against Syria. Once again, the ruling elite called on the Syrian population to

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rally around the regime; it also took steps, at this time, to organize the Popular Defense Army.34 Syria’s conflict with the IPC was resolved on 2 March — by which point the internal neo-Ba‘th conflict had also subsided.35. Terms of the final agree­ ment were identical to those offered by the IPC at the beginning of the dispute. However, the party newspaper al-Ba‘th claimed “victory in the oil battle,” characterizing the outcome as “an example to. all struggling peoples.” 36 Syrian heads continued to warn of the three-fold danger of imperialist, Zionist and reactionary aggression.37 However, their efforts to rally public support proved a failure. Resistance to the neo-Ba‘th increased during February and March with the distribution of anti-government manifes­ tos and a number of bomb-throwing incidents in Damascus, Aleppo and Hama.38 The regime reacted with a series of arrests aimed at curbing further outbreaks of anti-government violence.39 The JadTd-Asad conflict, in contrast, cooled down once again between 22 February — 12 April. According to Lebanese reports, the two factions agreed to block expansion of the Syrian Communist Party, and to continue to grant Nasserites no more than minimal representation in the government.40 In a parallel development, Syria’s external conflicts also cooled down during this sub-period. Apart from the IPC settlement, there was also a relative slowdown in the Syrian-Israeli conflict: 11 border incidents initiated by Syria between 22 February — 12 April (seven of them on 7 April) and 11 mine­ laying and sabotage events, as opposed to 45 border incidents and 17 sabotage events in the preceding sub-period. The number of declarations of apprehen­ sion also dropped considerably from 50 to 29. The striking exception to the general lessening of tension occurred on 7 April, when a Syrian-Israeli dogfight resulted in the downing of six Syrian planes.41 After 7 April, there were only two additional border incidents preceding the Six-Day War, though mine­ laying and sabotage continued to take place. Quantitative data concerning the link between internal and external Syrian conflicts is bolstered by several statements made during the period of Febru­ ary—April 1967. Salim Häturn, for example, commented in Amman on 13 September that: Boasting about acting on behalf of Palestine is just the style they [the neo-Ba‘th] use in addressing the people in order to deceive them, TTiey want to sow division in the Arab fatherland. They try to stir up trouble in relations with all the Arab states in order to carry out their policy. The ruling clique does not enjoy the trust of the people.42 Similar contentions were heard over Amman Radio throughout the period under review.43 Thus, on 10 May 1966, the Jordanian commentator had this to say about Syrian announcements of Jordanian troop concentrations along the Jordan-Syrian border:

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This official announcement... is a new fabrication, by which the ¡Damascus rulers are trying to camouflage their true condition and the dangers threatening them by diverting attention to an imaginary ex­ ternal danger... The failure of the regime in Damascus to deal with the problems of the Syrian people and to submit any solution to these problems is not sufficient justification for the recourse of the Damascus authorities to such obvious methods of deceiving the people as fabricat­ ing an imaginary battle, through which the regime in Syria is trying to appear as the victim of encroachment or as the false hero who fights everybody on all fronts.44 Referring to the use of the slogan, “people’s war of liberation,” the com­ mentator went on to say: Every Arab citizen, particularly in beloved Syria, fully understands that the launching of the new slogan of the people’s liberation war as a means for the recovery of the usurped territory in Palestine was no more than the launching of a slogan to divert the attention of the Arab nation.45 May 1967: Intensification o f Internal Conflict and Outbreak o f the Six-Day War A central issue in research concerning the Six-Day War is whether there was a connection between Syria’s intensified internal conflict in May 1967 and the crisis events immediately preceding the war. It is this study’s contention that such a connection indeed existed: that the neo-Ba‘th sought to activate the Egyptian-Syrian defense agreement at a point when internal Syrian conflict was threatening to topple the regime. A further contention of this study is that the Soviet Union may have deliberately aided the Syrian regime by warning Egypt of Israeli troop concentrations —thus further pressuring Egypt to activate the agreement. These two contentions are supported by the following data: (1) The internal conflict that developed in Syria between 5 -1 5 May 1967 was the most serious in the history of the neo-Ba‘th regime.46 (2) Repeated declarations of apprehension between February-May 1967 regarding a Zionist-reactionary-imperialist plot against Syria had gone un­ heeded by the general population; government appeals to join the National Guard and Popular Defense Army had met with an apathetic response. Con­ flict events of 7 April had shown the regime that it was unable to fight Israel on its own. Meanwhile, popular resistance to the neo-Ba‘th had increased between February—May, reaching a peak in May. These were all indications that exploitation of the Syrian-Israeli conflict had failed to canalize Syria’s internal conflict. (3) Syria’s internal conflict grew increasingly intense between 5—15 May.

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However, on 15 May — the day Egypt began to activate the defense agree­ ment by moving forces into the Sinai — the conflict abruptly ceased. A few days later, religious leaders who had been organizing the protest against the neo-Ba‘th reversed position, and began mobilizing the population for the upcoming struggle against Israel. (4) Syrian contentions during the week of 9—14 May regarding Israeli troop concentrations were contradicted by U N . observers.. Israeli warnings to Syria at this time were no more threatening than they had previously been; there was no real change in the Syrian-Israeli conflict at this point, despite Syrian warnings of imminent Israeli attack. (5) Soviet warnings to Egypt concerning Israeli troop concentrations came at a time when Syria was attempting to activate the Egyptian-Syrian defense treaty. These data will now be examined in greater detail. “The new Arab m a n On 25 April 1967, the Syrian Army newspaper Jaysh ash-Shab published an article by Ibrâhîm Khaläs (a junior Alawf officer) entitled “The Means of Creating a New Arab Man.” The main thrust of the article was an attack on traditional values. According to Khaläs, the “new Arab man” : believes that God, religion, feudalism, capitalism, and all the values which prevailed in the pre-existing society were no more than mummies in the museums of history... There is only one value: absolute faith in the new man of destiny... who relies only on himself and on his own contribution to humanity.47 Publication of the article touched off a storm in Syria. As Bernard Lewis noted: This was the first time that such ideas had been expressed in print in any of the revolutionary and radical Arab states and the response was immediate and violent. Until this point an apparently cowed population had passively acquiesced in a whole series of radical political and economic changes. The suppression of free speech, the confiscation of property evoked no response — but a denial of God and religion in an officially sponsored journal revealed the limits of aquiescence, the point at which a Moslem people was willing to stand up and be counted.48 On 4 May, Muslim religious leaders (the ‘Ulami’) met in Damascus to discuss steps to be taken against the regime.49 The following day (Friday), Shaykh Habanka, head of the ‘Ulamä’ in Damascus, gave a sermon attacking the regime in the Manjak mosque. A large-scale demonstration followed the sermon: more than 30,000 people (including Christian religious leaders) attended, shouting anti-Ba‘th slogans. Other religious demonstrations were held on the same day in Aleppo, Homs and Hama.50 Violent clashes resulted when security forces attempted to break up these demonstrations; three people were killed.

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On 6 May, Syrian authorities arrested Habanka and 40 other religious figures. The arrests caused a further upsurge of conflict.51 The National Constitutional Front (a combination of bodies opposed to the regime) pub­ lished a call to the Syrian public: The ruling clique has sought to provoke you and draw you into a civil war under the well-known Communist plans. It is persecuting and imprisoning citizens. To cover up its cowardliness and failure over Israel it is creating internal battles in order to complete its present plot to deploy U N . police to defend the border. The National Front is anxious to preserve the people’s forces for zero hour. It however calls upon you to denounce the ideology of the rulers by proclaiming a one-day gen­ eral strike on 6 May.S2 Damascus businesses closed that day; there were also demonstrations in Homs to protest the arrests.53 On 8 May, the strike spread to Aleppo, Horn? and Hama.54 The following day, authorities succeeded in forcing owners in Damascus to open their shops. A decree was also issued that confiscated the property of Shaykh Habanka and 45 Damascus merchants.55 On 10 May, the Lebanese newspaper d-Hayat reported some 3,000 arrests of TJlamä’, merchants and notables who had taken part in the demonstrations and strikes.56 The wave of arrests continued the next day in Damascus, Aleppo and Hama; there was also news of a bomb explosion in Damascus. On the same day, the Mufti of Syria, Shaykh Ahmed Kaftärü (known for his support for the regime), resigned his post under pressure from the ‘Ulamä’. The regime, however, refused to accept his resignation.57 From 12—15 May, arrests of religious leaders and merchants continued, as did confiscations of their property. The final internal conflict events occurred on 15 May, when violent clashes with Syrian authorities at the Aleppo mosque were followed by the arrest of 300 people.58 The 15th of May signaled the start of the crisis that led to the Six-Day War — from that point on, there were no reports of further internal conflict events. On 22 May, the Mufti of Syria and a religious delegation visiting the Syrian-Israeli front proclaimed a Jihäd against imperialism, Zionism and their agents: it was the duty of every man and woman to carry out a war prescribed in the name of God, the Arab people and history.59 Initial government response. Neo-Ba‘th leaders only gradually realized the extent to which the “new Arab man” article had aroused the public. In an initial response to the heightened internal crisis, Syrian authorities on 5 May confiscated the newspaper that had published the article. Khaläs and the editor of Jaysh ash-Sha'b were arrested and six days later sentenced to life imprisonment.60 The Syrian media carried no reports of internal conflict events until the strikes and demonstrations had been going on for three days.61 During this time, the Regional Command was meeting to discuss the situation. The

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eventual decision was to blame the KhalSs article on a Zionist-UJS.-BritishJordanian-Saudi Arabian-Salim Hatflm conspiracy against Syria. The article itself, according to Damascus radio, was actually a plant: The sinful and insidious article in the magazine Jaysh ash-Sha‘b came as a link in the chain of an American-Israeli reactionary conspiracy... Investigation by the authorities has proved that the article and its author were merely tools of the C i A ., which has been-able to infiltrate basely and squalidly and to attain its sinful aims of creating confusion among the ranks of the citizens.62 Government officials voiced similar accusations concerning a U.S.-Israeli conspiracy. Between 7—14 May, 44 declarations of apprehension were made, compared to 10 during the nine days preceding the disturbances. The regime’s initial response, however, did not succeed in quelling internal conflict. Both the ‘Ulamâ’ and the merchant class were aware that the “new Arab man” article had been written by a neo-Ba‘th member with the party’s blessing.63 Despite the government’s declarations of apprehension concerning the threat of external attack, internal protest continued unabated. The Egyptian-Syrian defense agreement. Realizing that its initial response (based on exploitation of the Syrian-Israeli conflict) had not worked, the regime now attempted to make use of the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. More specifically, the regime sought to activate the Egyptian-Syrian defense agree­ ment by showing that a serious external threat to her security existed. Ac­ cording to the French newspapers Le Monde and Le Figaro, the first Syrian appeal to Egypt was made on 8 May.64 Nasser later contradicted this, saying in a speech on 22 May that he had received a note on 13 May informing him of Israeli concentrations of 11—13 regiments on the Syrian border. According to Nasser, Syria also mentioned a specific date — 17 May — for the planned Israeli attack.65 On record are Syrian declarations concerning Israeli warnings to Syria during the week of 9—14 May. Although these warnings were not significantly different from other warnings given by Israel in the past, the Syrian govern­ ment put them in a particularly menacing light.66 On 11 May, Damascus radio reported that the Ba‘th Party had sent a message to all “revolutionary, progressive Arab parties” warning that there were rising indications of an im­ minent Israeli attack.67 On 13 May, the Syrian foreign ministry sent a com­ munique regarding Israeli aggressive intentions to the U.N. Security Council.68 The following day, Syria’s ambassador to the U.N. spoke with Secretary General U Thant.69 An additional message regarding Israeli aggressive inten­ tions was sent to the Security Council on 15 May. On the same day, the Syrian chargé d’affaires in Washington, D.C. charged that the U.S. was en­ couraging Israel in its planned attack.70 Syrian assertions about Israeli troop concentrations were contradicted after a U.N. observers’ team investigated the border. The Egyptian ambassador

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to the U.N. was informed of the observers’ findings on 17 May —by which point Egyptian forces were already massing in the Sinai.71 These findings tend to corroborate the proposition that Syria invoked the Egyptian-Syrian defense agreement as a means to defuse internal conflict, rather than as a result of changes in the external Syrian-Israeli environment. Soviet warnings to Egypt concerning Israeli troop concentrations acted to bolster Syria’s attempt to activate the joint defense agreement. According to Nasser, Egypt received Soviet data by way of an Egyptian parliamentary delegation headed by Anwar as-Sädät that had visited Moscow on 12—13 May.72 Pravda and Izvestiia both carried articles that week concerning the buildup — a typical editorial comment being that “the military buildup on the Syrian-Israeli border shows that Israel remains the center of tension in the Middle East.” 73 It is not totally clear what motivated the Soviet Union to act as it did at this juncture. It is quite possible, however, that the Soviet Union’s major concern was the internal crisis that threatened to topple the pro-Soviet Ba‘th regime; no other explanation of Soviet behavior takes into account the fact that Soviet warnings to Egypt were precisely coordinated with those of Syria.74 The pre-war crisis of May 1967 is a striking example of canalization of internal conflict into the external environment. As soon as Egypt activated the defense agreement by mobilizing troops in the Sinai, the internal Syrian crisis subsided. Ironically, however, the ultimate outcome of such canalization proved far more serious than the Ba‘th had anticipated. Epilogue: Afterm ath o f the War and Asad 's Ascent to Power (1967-1970) The period following the Six-Day War until November 1970 was characterized by tiie continuation of close links between Syrian domestic and foreign politics. During this period, the Jadid-Asad conflict was once again a central feature of the internal Syrian environment. This internal conflict had direct implications on Syrian external policies, especially those concerning Israel and neighboring Arab states. The Syrian public held the neo-Ba‘th responsible both for the crisis leading to the Six-Day War and the loss of the Golan Heights during the war. Among other things, the regime was accused of having withdrawn the army’s best units from the front during the war in order to protect neo-Ba‘th interests in Damascus.75 Serious as these allegations were, however, they did not really endanger the regime. At this point, the neo-Ba‘th held almost complete control of both the army and civilian centers of power; opposition groups had lost their power prior to the war and were no longer considered a threat.76 Far more significant were the war’s effects on internal neo-Ba‘th rivalries. The army command and civilian political leaders blamed each other for Syria’s defeat in the war. The political leadership, headed by Jadïd, YOsuf

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Zu'ayyin and Ibrâhîm Mäkhus, blamed the Syrian army’s poor performance on Asad, the minister of defense and commander of the air force. Asad, in turn, accused the political leadership of having weakened the army through political purges, and having given preference to party interests over those of the army and the nation.77 There were other important differences between the civilian faction led by Jadfd and the military faction headed by Asad. The civilian faction favored party control of the army and nation, and was opposed to the formation of a “progressive front” that would give any power to Nasserites, Haurânîsts, or former Ba‘th leaders. It also proposed a reorganization of Syrian society on the Soviet model, and was prepared to grant the Syrian Communist Party a large share in government affairs. Within the inter-Arab sphere, Jadfd and his associates were actively hostile towards the “reactionary” regimes of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia, as well as towards the more rightist Iraqi Ba‘th regime which had seized power in July 1968. The military faction, on the other hand, opposed any form of party inter­ vention in military affairs. In domestic politics, it advocated a moderately socialist line on economic and social issues and was prepared to cooperate with progressive elements, while limiting the influence of the Communist Party. Asad’s military faction also favored political and military cooperation with Jordan and Iraq — both to end Syria’s isolation in the Arab world (which had deepened following the war), and to help coordinate a future war against Israel. Recovery of the Golan Heights was a vital issue for the military faction and Syria, in its judgement, could not regain her territory without assistance from other Arab countries.78 In general, Asad was in the stronger position. As defense minister and commander of the air force, he wielded considerable personal control over the army: this was a key factor in being able to control the state. Asad’s only major weakness was his limited influence within the neo-BaHh. Such weak­ ness prevented him from taking full control until November 1970. JadTd’s influence, in contrast, rested almost entirely within the party ; in the army, his position had been considerably eroded by the removal or transfer of many of his supporters. Asad’s basic strategy for gaining control was to consolidate control over the army. As noted, he succeeded in removing the bulk o f Jadld’s supporters and replacing them with his own. Among others, Asad replaced Chief of Staff Ahmad Suwaidani with Mustafa Taläs, and removed his personal enemies, ‘Abd al-Karïm al-Jundï and Khâlid al-Jundî from their posts as head of Syrian intelligence and head of the Syrian trade unions.79 Chronology o f the internal conflict. During the period of June 1967 November 1970, there were three crisis points in the JadTd-Asad conflict. The first crisis occurred in September-October 1968 during sessions of the Fourth Regional and Tenth National Congresses. At issue were the questions of

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military cooperation with other Arab states and relations with the Soviet Union and the Syrian Communist Party. Asad's group presented a foreign and domestic program that was rejected by the party. In retaliation, Asad ac­ celerated his consolidation of power over the army by transferring Jadld supporters to other posts. Jadïd, in turn, had the Regional Command pass a resolution that would limit ministerial tenure to two years. Asad countered by taking steps towards a military coup. This power play convinced his rivals to back down; a new government was formed in which Asad retained his position as defense minister, while Zu‘ayyfn and Mâkhus — both Jadld sup­ porters — were excluded. In addition, a joint session of the Regional and National Commands accepted Asad’s demand for a free hand in army appoint­ ments, and empowered him to make contact with Iraqi leaders with the aim of establishing a new Eastern Command.80 The second crisis took place in February—March 1969, following Israel’s raid on two Fath bases in Syria on 24 February and dogfights between Israeli and Syrian jets. Jadfd seized upon these incidents to criticize Asad for the army’s poor performance. Leaflets critical of the army were distributed at the BaHh branch in Ladhiqiyya, which also stripped Asad supporters of their membership. Weapons were distributed among civilian supporters of Jadld in Ladhiqiyya, Homs, Aleppo and Deir az-Z