Deterritorialised Identity and Transborder Movement in South Asia [1st ed.] 978-981-13-2777-3, 978-981-13-2778-0

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xi
The State, Transborder Movements, and Deterritorialised Identity in South Asia (Nasir Uddin)....Pages 1-16
Front Matter ....Pages 17-17
Borders, Citizenship and the Subaltern in South Asia (Nergis Canefe)....Pages 19-36
Citizenship and Membership: Placing Refugees in India (Nasreen Chowdhory)....Pages 37-54
Culture of Migration: State-Society Relations and Transborder Mobility in Northern Sri Lanka (Eva Gerharz)....Pages 55-70
Front Matter ....Pages 71-71
The State, Vulnerability, and Transborder Movements: The Rohingya People in Myanmar and Bangladesh (Nasir Uddin)....Pages 73-90
Nation-State and Its Production of Statelessness: A Study of Chin Refugees (Meghna Kajla)....Pages 91-109
Front Matter ....Pages 111-111
“Ecologic” Border and Deterritorialisation (Biswajit Mohanty)....Pages 113-131
Nepal-India Open Border: A Rationale of Regulation (B. K. Upendra Bahadur)....Pages 133-151
Front Matter ....Pages 153-153
Involuntary Migration in the Border Belt of Indian Punjab (Jagrup Singh Sekhon, Sunayana Sharma)....Pages 155-176
Migration Matters: Estimation and Analysis of Migration from Bangladesh to India (Abhishek Nath, Vivek Vishal)....Pages 177-203
Life on the Edge: Forced Migration and Ethnic Encounter in the Bay of Bengal (Debojyoti Das)....Pages 205-220
Conclusion: Transborder Mobility and the Challenges of the South Asian States (Nasreen Chowdhory)....Pages 221-226
Back Matter ....Pages 227-228

Citation preview

Nasir Uddin · Nasreen Chowdhory Editors

Deterritorialised Identity and Transborder Movement in South Asia

Deterritorialised Identity and Transborder Movement in South Asia

Nasir Uddin  •  Nasreen Chowdhory Editors

Deterritorialised Identity and Transborder Movement in South Asia

Editors Nasir Uddin Department of Anthropology University of Chittagong Chittagong, Bangladesh

Nasreen Chowdhory Department of Political Science University of Delhi Delhi, India

ISBN 978-981-13-2777-3    ISBN 978-981-13-2778-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2778-0 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018962673 © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Acknowledgement

We, both Nasir Uddin and Nasreen Chowdhory as editors, are indebted to many people who have extended their hands of cooperation on various capacities in the making of the book starting from 2016. This book is an outcome of a collective effort of many fellows, friends and scholars who contributed enormously both professionally and personally. The idea of transborder movement in connection with territoriality and identity came in our discussions time and again which translated into a concept note for an open call for papers. We received overwhelming response, but we could not make room for all considering thematic, regional and contextual reconsideration. However, the process of writing this volume was very inspiring which gave us space to make many new friendships and renew many old relations. Let us begin by giving a vote of thanks to all the contributors of this book for their incredible patience, congenial synergy and commendable professional commitments for being with us all the way despite repeated editorial pressure in the form of numerous queries. The book would have not seen the light of the day without all contributors’ sincere efforts throughout the journey. Particularly, we are deeply grateful to Nergis Canafe and Eva Gerharz. They are required to be mentioned because Nergis wrote a chapter for the book just after going through a major surgery and Eva wrote during her advanced stage of pregnancy time only due to their friendship with us. We should convey special thanks to Meherun Ahmed of the Asian University for Women (AUW) who has always been with us right from the planning of the idea of “transborder movements and the states in South Asia” in 2016. Nasir would like to acknowledge his recently late teacher and mentor Prof. Dr. H K S Arefeen who had always been a great source of inspiration for his all academic endeavour and quality publications. Nasir also remains grateful to his ex-students and present colleagues Mr. Md Faruk Hossain, Mr. S M Sadal Al Sajib and Mohammad Kazim Nur Sohad, faculties of Anthropology at the University of Chittagong, for their lively discussions and critical engagement in the idea of “deterrritorialised identity” and transborder mobility in the process of its making. Nasir expresses his gratitude to Prof. Indajit Kundu, Prof. S M Monirul Hassan, and Dr. Nazmul Islam Khan of the Department of Sociology, and Prof. Alak Paul of the Department of Geography at the University of Chittagong for their illuminating v

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Acknowledgement

discussions over the issue of transborder mobilities and constructive consultation on various aspects of the idea of deterritorialised identity. Nasir all time remains grateful to his eldest brother journalist Mohammad Ali Zinnat who always encourages him in his all sorts of academic and research activities. Finally, Nasir owes his debt to his family members for their constant support behind working on this project for a long time. Nasir dedicates this book to his partner Ms. Farzana Ahmed. Nasreen would like to acknowledge Calcutta Research Group, and especially Prof. Ranabir Samaddar, Dr. Paula Banerjee and Dr. Anita Sengupta for being kind and supportive. Nasreen remains grateful to Prof. Veena Kukreja, Prof. Navnita C Behera, Prof. Ujjwal Kumar Singh, Prof. N. Sukumar, Prof. Rekha Saxena and Prof. Madhulika Bannerjee at the Department of Political Science, University of Delhi. With friends, family needs to be acknowledged. Nasreen remains forever grateful to her parents who always encouraged to write and engage with issues that touched human beings. Since her days as scholar at Jawaharlal Nehru University and later at McGill University, her parents Azharul Islam Chowdhury and Nuron Nessa Chowdhury supported her academic endeavours on refugee studies. She owes a deep sense of gratitude to her sisters Parveen Chowdhury and Junied A Chowdhury for keeping her grounded, with love and support. A special mention needs to be made of the youngest member of her family Amaan Chowdhury for being critical of her work and yet always proud to be part of the process. His love, wit and support constitute an integral part of academic endeavours. To Adlul Islam, Nasreen expresses her gratitude for being ever supportive at every step and pushing her to complete another task. In any academic work, research scholars remains an integral part and hence thanks to Sabur Ali M, Saba Ishaq, Jyoti Bharti, Dhivya Sivaramane, Kashyap and, last but not least, Namreeta Kumari for engaging in lively discussion, debates and all the help. Nasreen dedicates this book to her parents and Prof. Kalim Bahadur. We, both Nasir and Nasreen, express our gratitude to Mrs Shinjini Chatterjee and Priya Vyas of Springer who have been very much supportive all the way from the submission of book proposal to sending it to production. We would also like to thank Ms. Hemalatha Jeyaraman for greatly taking care of the entire production of the book.

Contents

1 The State, Transborder Movements, and Deterritorialised Identity in South Asia  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������   1 Nasir Uddin Part I Transborder Mobility, Borders, and Citizenship Dilemmas 2 Borders, Citizenship and the Subaltern in South Asia ��������������������������  19 Nergis Canefe 3 Citizenship and Membership: Placing Refugees in India  ��������������������  37 Nasreen Chowdhory 4 Culture of Migration: State-Society Relations and Transborder Mobility in Northern Sri Lanka ��������������������������������  55 Eva Gerharz Part II Everyday State and Statelessness 5 The State, Vulnerability, and Transborder Movements: The Rohingya People in Myanmar and Bangladesh  ����������������������������  73 Nasir Uddin 6 Nation-State and Its Production of Statelessness: A Study of Chin Refugees ������������������������������������������������������������������������  91 Meghna Kajla Part III The Making and (Un)Making of Borders 7 “Ecologic” Border and Deterritorialisation  ������������������������������������������ 113 Biswajit Mohanty 8 Nepal-India Open Border: A Rationale of Regulation �������������������������� 133 B. K. Upendra Bahadur

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Contents

Part IV Migration in South Asia 9 Involuntary Migration in the Border Belt of Indian Punjab ���������������� 155 Jagrup Singh Sekhon and Sunayana Sharma 10 Migration Matters: Estimation and Analysis of Migration from Bangladesh to India �������������������������������������������������� 177 Abhishek Nath and Vivek Vishal 11 Life on the Edge: Forced Migration and Ethnic Encounter in the Bay of Bengal ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 205 Debojyoti Das 12 Conclusion: Transborder Mobility and the Challenges of the South Asian States �������������������������������������������������������������������������� 221 Nasreen Chowdhory Index  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 227

Contributors

Nergis Canefe  Department of Politics, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada Nasreen Chowdhory  Department of Political Science, University of Delhi, Delhi, India Debojyoti Das  Faculty of Arts, Bristol University, Bristol, UK Eva Gerharz  Department of Social and Cultural Sciences, University of Applied Sciences, Fulda, Germany Meghna Kajla  Department of Political Science, University of Delhi, Delhi, India Biswajit Mohanty  Deshbandhu College, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India Jagrup  Singh  Sekhon  Department of Political Science, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, Punjab, India Sunayana Sharma  Department of Political Science, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, Punjab, India Abhishek Nath  Department of Political Science, University of Delhi, Delhi, India Nasir Uddin  Department of Anthropology, University of Chittagong, Chittagong, Bangladesh B. K. Upendra Bahadur  Department of International Relations and Diplomacy, Mid-Western University, Surkhet, Nepal Vivek Vishal  Freelance Researcher, Delhi, India

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Abbreviations

AI AD BM BBS BP BGB CHT CGB CODEC HRW IGNOAPS IGN-WPS IGN-DPS ISGA JTLBC LTTE MSF NGO POK P-TOMS PTA RAB RTI SSB TRO TGTE UNHCR UN

Amnesty International Archaeology Department Bangladesh Military Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics Bangladesh Police Border Guard Bangladesh Chittagong Hill Tracts Coast Guard of Bangladesh Community Development Centre Human Rights Watch Indira Gandhi National Old Age Scheme Indira Gandhi National Widow Pension Scheme Indira Gandhi National Pension Scheme Interim Self-Governing Authority Joint Technical Level Boundary Committee Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Medicins sans Frontiers Non-governmental organisations Pakistan-occupied Kashmir Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure Prevention of Terrorism Act Rapid Action Battalion Right to Information Sashastra Seema Bal Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee United Nations

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Chapter 1

The State, Transborder Movements, and Deterritorialised Identity in South Asia Nasir Uddin

Abstract  The state, border and people’s mobility have an intimate but a complex relation in globalised world because the states’ roles become catalysts in making people mobile across borders. The states produce borders as much as borders reproduce the states in terms of territoriality, while “deterritorialisation” features the contemporary globalised world. Therefore, transborder movement, that  denotes mobility of people across borders, has become an inescapable part of modern state system as “the notion of intensification of globalization,” as borders both separate and connect states. Borders are dynamic and dyadic in the interface of state and non-state actors involved in border making and in its operations. The transborder movement becomes a complex web when the states deal with the mobility as an issue of national/regional security, legal/illegal trades, growing militancy, terrorisation of regions and the questions of citizenship. The chapter discusses growing trends of transborder mobility in this region since South Asian states could be ideal cases to understand such dynamic and dialectical relations between transborder movements and the states. It unfolds that transborder movement is also deeply entangled with the retaining, regaining and transforming identity in deterritorialised global landscape. Therefore, the nexus between transborder movements and deterritorialised identity demands serious academic attentions and the deep analysis with empirically grounded and contextually rooted cases. This chapter intends to focus the ways how borders and transborder movements are dealt with from strategic and diplomatic points of view in South Asian states; how borders become spaces for people to move from one state to another in search of a better fortune (economic migrants), escaping persecution (refugees) and finding a disaster-free living place (climate migrants); how the states in South Asia address transborder movements at both policy level and practical fields; how borders are used for illegal trades and informal economy in South Asian states; how refugee issues, illegal migrations, citizenship issues and camp/stranded people are dealt with in South Asian states as consequences of transborder movement; and how the notions of territoriality of statehood become blurred due to the increasing N. Uddin (*) Department of Anthropology, University of Chittagong, Chittagong, Bangladesh e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 N. Uddin, N. Chowdhory (eds.), Deterritorialised Identity and Transborder Movement in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2778-0_1

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transborder movements in South Asia. Its lens also flashes out on the dynamics of identity in the interface of territoriality, deterritoriality and mobility of people across borders particularly in South Asia. Keywords  (Trans)Border · State · Mobility · Identity · Deterritoriality · South Asia

Introduction The state, border and peoples’ mobility have an intimate but a complex relation in globalised world because the states’ roles become catalysts in making people mobile across borders. The states produce borders as much as borders reproduce the states in terms of territoriality, while “deterritorialisation” (see Appadurai 1990; Robertson 1992; Hannerz 1996; Tomlinson 1999; Seyhan 2001) features the contemporary globalised world. Therefore, transborder movement, what denotes the mobility of people across borders, has become an inescapable part of modern state system as “the notion of intensification of globalization” (Hernàndez Marti 2006) as borders both separate and connect the states. Generally, border is understood as a form of demarcation, but it opens up the flow of people, goods and the ideas of legality and illegality (see Agnew 2008; Newman 2003; Jackson 1987). Therefore, borders are dynamic and dyadic in the interface of state and non-state actors involved in border making and operations. While the states are understandable, the non-state actors, for instance, accelerating transborder mobility are environmental disasters, mounting river-bank erosions, periodic flood, cyclone and devastating earthquake (for instance, Nepal and Pakistan earthquakes), which render people “climate migrants” (see Hirsch 2016). As the transborder movement becomes a complex web when the states deal with movement as an issue of national/regional security, legal/illegal trades, growing militancy, terrorisation of regions, it also raises questions of citizenship (see Newman 2003; Jackson 1987). Though border is called the “zone of limited statehood” (Scott 2010), and a “fabricated truth” (Van Houtum 2011), the states are present in the borders with unlimited forces, finance and policies to control and patrol transborder movement (see Vila 2003) as “technical landscapes of control and surveillance” (Passi 2009). The states in South Asia could be ideal cases to understand such dynamic and dialectical relations between transborder movements and the states. Particularly, due to mounting pace of transborder movements, borders between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, India and Bangladesh, Bangladesh and Myanmar, India and China, India and Nepal and Sri Lanka and India frequently feature tensions of potential security threats, intermittent border killings, loaded military deployment, space of illegal migrations, channels of informal trade, movements of militants, influx of refugees, boundary (un)making through border fencing, hub of terrorist groups, movements of climate migrants and the area of strategic interests. The  transborder movement is also deeply entangled with retaining, regaining and transforming identity in deterritorialised global landscape. Therefore, the nexus between transborder movement and deterritorialised identity

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demands serious academic attentions and the deep analysis with empirically grounded and contextually rooted cases. This volume is, as such, a scholarly attempt to address this unaddressed impact of globalisation. This chapter intends to focus the ways how borders and transborder movements are dealt with from strategic and diplomatic point of view in South Asian states; how borders become spaces for people to move from one state to another in search of a better fortune (economic migrants), escaping persecution (refugees) and finding a disaster-free living place (climate migrants); how the states in South Asia address transborder movements at both policy level and practical fields; how borders are used for illegal trades and informal economy in South Asian states; how refugee issues, illegal migrations, citizenship issues and camp/stranded people are dealt with in South Asian states as consequences of transborder movement; and how the notions of territoriality of statehood become blurred due to the increasing transborder movements in South Asia. Its lens also flashes out on the dynamics of identity in the interface of territoriality, deterritoriality and mobility of people across borders particularly in South Asia.

The States in South Asia When Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal said, “South Asia is a more recent construction – only about five decades old” (2004: 03), they mean “regional formation of South Asia”, but every state in South Asia has its distinctive history ranging from precolonial through colonial to the postcolonial period. However, Michael Mann attempts to understand South Asia “geographically and politically” (2015: 01) since politics and geography could give distinct features to the understanding of South Asian states. When it comes to the questions of states in South Asia, we would take it up as a political one. The countries of South Asia – alphabetically Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka – are externally identical but internally diverse. “South Asia is a distinct region for its history of colonisation and decolonisation, diversity of cultural landscape, variety of languages used, composition of multi-ethnic settings, uniqueness of festivals, spiritualities of rituals and the dynamics of socio-political entity. There is notable homogeneity as well as remarkable heterogeneity between and among the people of South Asian societies” (Uddin 2012: i). Since state boundaries, not in the sense of physical territoriality, are breaking down globally, the countries of South Asia are getting closely linked to the global flows of people, goods and ideas that have created space for growing overseas human contacts and hence rapid cultural exchange. Therefore, “societies in South Asia have been suffering for decades from the dialectics between colonial domination and post-colonial negotiation, traditional beliefs and leaning to modernity, religious orthodoxies and notions of secularism, conventional cultural settings and post-modern ideologies. The tensions between old and new, tradition and modern, internal values and external influence, local wisdom and global doctrine make the societies in South Asian countries dynamic in its social

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organisations and cultural practices” (Uddin 2012: ii). Over the decades for having its distinct regional features, South Asian societies and countries have drawn attention of scholars across disciplines from all over the world for doing research on history, society, culture, religion, ecology, politics and economics. Researches undertaken by scholars from within and beyond the region have produced distinctive scholarship on South Asia which indeed contributed to make it more diverse, complex and interesting. However, political atmosphere in South Asian states has gradually turned into complex, multidimensional and party and power centred during the last couple of decades (see Kumaraswamy and Copland 2009; Mann 2015). In terms of political stability, democratisation, people’s empowerment and state-­ society relations, South Asian states during the postcolonial periods underwent serious turmoil, ups and down and the formation of new social and political classes other than the expected process of nation-building and state formation. Amita Sastri wrote, “Five decades after the colonial rule, the states of South Asia are still faced problems related to democratic governance, social identity, development and welfare, and territorial security. The establishment of participatory political and economic processes in the last half century has led to the mobilisation of new social groups with different values from those who came to power in the early post-­ independence period. This has risen serious issues of state legitimacy and governance on the one hand, and the questioning of popular identities on the other” (2001: 01). However, during the last half century, South Asian states have also come up with tremendous economic accomplishments which have redrawn the global attention. But, “conflict in a variety of guises has been an important variable in the economic development of all the states that make up South Asia. Sharing a common political heritage as former possessions, outposts or allies of the British Empire, the formation and development of South Asian states have been marked by numerous wars, rebellions and attempted secessions” (Webb and Wijeweera 2015: 02). Several movements, what states term as “separatist movements”, have marked the internal and external conflicts within and between the South Asian states. Matthew J. Webb wrote, “Violent separatism has been the bane of South Asia since independence from British colonial rule: India has confronted numerous separatist movements in Kashmir and Punjab in its west to the states of Nagaland, Mizoram, Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh in its north-east. Pakistan continues to battle Baloch separatists while its north-west frontier regions and the province of Sindh also contain separatist elements. Bangladesh was created by its secession from modern-day Pakistan and today confronts a violent separatist movement in its Chittagong Hill Tract region. The Madheshi people of Nepal persist in their demands for political independence and, finally, Sri Lanka is recovering from decades of civil war with the feared Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)” (2015: 150). Recent trend, we have alarmingly observed, of mounting religious intolerance which is considered as the “hangover of partition” (Bose and Jalal 2004) being taken place in 1947 has contributed significantly to the escalating political instability and the sense of social insecurity in South Asian states. Particularly, anti-Muslim sentiments in India and anti-Hindu sentiments in Bangladesh have recently been marked with prominent

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significance in the contemporary political history of South Asia. Besides, ­Anglo-­American invasion in Afghanistan under the pretext of “war on terrorism” and killing people in the name of counterinsurgency has intensified an anti-western sentiment in South Asia which triggered violent Islamist militancy where Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan are at the focal points (see Kumaraswamy and Copland 2009). All these dynamics features the turmoil political reality in South Asian states and accelerates transborder movements in this region during the last couple of decades.

Transborder Movements in South Asia Transborder movement indicates people’s mobility across the borders taking border as a “territorial space of the state”. Historically, people move from one place to another mainly in search of “better life”, what is academically interpreted as “economic migrations” (see Brettell and Hollifield 2014). “In hunting and gathering society people moved from one place to another in search of food. During the horticulture and agriculture episode of history, people’s mobility was limited since they used to invest domestic labour force in horticulture and agriculture practices. In fact, during the agriculture epoch of history, agrarian mode of production demanded wage-labourers that brought people from outside accelerating people’s mobility” (Uddin, this volume). During that time, people used to move for gaining livelihood which could be considered as “economic migrants” (see Brettell and Hollifield 2014). In fact, gaining economic fortune motivated people to move from one place to another, and until recently it was the governing reason behind all sorts of translocal and transborder migrations (see Taran et al. 2009). The entire Europe and its human geography constitute of several early migrations particularly the Germanic peoples, the Turks, the slaves and others what Anna Triandafyllidou calls Circular Migration Between Europe and Its Neighbourhood (see, for detail, Triandafyllidou 2013). About 60 million European migrants colonised America, Australia, Oceania, the northern half of Asia and the parts of Africa from the sixteenth century until the mid-twentieth century. The Great Atlantic Migration which is considered as the largest migration in history took place from Europe to North America between 1870 and 1914, the first major wave of which began in the 1840s with mass movements from Ireland and Germany (see, for details, Nugent 1992). Following the industrialisation started from 1780 in England and Western Europe, people from rural area migrated to urban centres in search of job which is also a kind of searching “economic fortune”. Following the First World War, transborder mobility increased significantly since people were moving from one country to another as migration turned into a common phenomenon. However, “following decolonisation in Southern Africa, South-­east Asian countries, South Asia, and Latin America, in the process of nation-building and state-formation, the question of identity came up as a central point of conflict and contestation in the context of national majority and ethnic minority divide” (Uddin, this volume). In South Asia,

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the first and major transborder movement took place just the aftermath of “partition” in 1947 when hundreds of thousands of Muslims moved from India to Pakistan and hundreds of thousands of Hindus did the same from Pakistan to India (see, for details, Pandey 2004; Khan 2007; White-­Spunner 2017). However, during the last half century, the pattern, trends, reasoning and desires of transborder movement have been drastically transformed in this region. In most cases, since central state is somehow formed by the national majority, ethnic minority people, in the sense of the people of cultural, religious and racial differences, were dealt with an authoritarian notion of statehood resulting conflict, insurgency and rivalry. Then the state appeared with its all exploitative machineries and oppressive policies to create an extreme vulnerable condition that forced the people of cultural, religious, ethnic and racial differences to cross the border in order to flee persecution. State’s role in dealing with such issues in most cases becomes the questions of serious human rights violation which have created a state of insecurity, space of vulnerability and a threat of an indefinite uncertainty (see, for details, Webb 2015). For example, Indian state’s roles in Kashmir and Punjab, as well as in Nagaland, Mizoram, Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh; Pakistan’s state roles in Balochistan and Sindh; Bangladesh’s state’s roles in the Chittagong Hill Tract region; Nepal’s state’s roles in dealing with the Madheshi people and Maoist movement; and Sri Lanka’s states roles in dealing with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). All these symptoms triggered transborder movements in South Asia. Therefore, transborder movement at present is not essentially motivated only by economic aspiration and the articulation of better fortune anymore, but fleeing persecution, escaping extreme vulnerability and leaving aside the uncertainty of life, people move from one state to another that features the transborder movements in South Asia.

Territoriality and Deterritorialised Identity While territoriality marks the spatial feature of the state, deterritoriality denotes the notion of globalised world. Therefore, in the mounting trend of globalisation is making the territorial feature of the states obscured. It is mainly because deterritorialisation is one of the fundamental notions of globalisation since the idea of globalisation discards the territorial sense, not in terms of physical border, of the state. Hernandez Marti wrote, “The development and extension of the processes of mediatization, migration and commodification which characterise globalized modernity produce a considerable intensification of deterritorialization, understood as a proliferation of translocalized cultural experiences” (Hernàndez Marti 2006). While acknowledging many others, five leading scholars have brought the idea of deterritorialisation in academia, public discussions and political spheres: Arjun Appadurai (1997), Roland Robertson (1992), Hannerz (1996), John Tomlinson (1999) and Azade Seyhan (2001). Appadurai talked about deterritorialisation as a form of how individual and groups try to expand their practice of modernity through the junction

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of mediatisation with the movement of people (1997). Seyhan argues that escalating increase of operation of globalisation gradually decreases the sense of territoriality of the state and thereby the globalised world on principle a deterritorialised world (2001). While Appadurai and Seyhan have talked about globalisation, Robertson has used the term “glocalisation”; Shalini Randeria also used the term (see Randeria 2007) and argued that “deterritorialization and reterritorialization constitute both sides of the same coin of cultural globalization” (1992). Robertson further argues that deterritorialisation process brings an individual beyond the territory but annexes with another territory and hence deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation are supplementary. Tomlison emphasises on the mediatisation which is instrumental behind the process of deterritorialisation and particularly brings in the dynamic experience of everyday cultural experience of contemporary globalised world (1999). Hannerz (1996) talks about the “transnational connections”, and he argues that increasing transnational connection is gradually fading the territoriality of the state which is making people a deterritorialised ones. Having considered different theoretical discussions, it could be synthesised in a way that deterritorialisation is a spatial idea that denotes the mobility of people across state territory as part of globalisation process through mediatisation, transnational connection and everyday cultural practices. However, when it comes to the issue of “deterritorialised identity”, it particularly means that identity has no spatial territory and geographic particularity as it moves with the mobility of people across borders. Therefore, people move from one state to another which could be termed as “bodily shipment” and “physical dislocation” (see Uddin [forthcoming] 2019), to escape persecution, vulnerability, state’s atrocity and everyday forms of discrimination, but identity goes along with. Therefore, Chin in India is identified as Chin people, Tamil in India is still Tamil, Rohingyas in Bangladesh is still Rohingyas, Mohajer in Pakistan is still Mohajer, and Pakhtun in Afghanistan is still Pakhtun. It means that identity has no territory, and hence the nonterritorialised characteristic makes it “deterritorialised identity”. Consequently, transborder movement is deeply connected with such deterritorialised identity.

Transborder Mobility, Borders and Citizenship Dilemmas Transborder movements generate a dilemma of citizenship because citizenship confirms recognition and legitimacy of residency. When people move from one place to other, they tend to anchor their position in the place of migration through legal recognition and legitimacy, and citizenship is the gateway what Hannah Arendt calls, “citizenship is the right to have rights” (1994). Nergis Canefe in Chap. 2 discusses the relations between border and citizenship in South Asia. She argues that borders consist of an overlapping and changeable set of boundaries with different and often contradictory functions, histories, meanings and roles. Furthermore, not only that they are the outcome of “bordering processes” with social, economic and political underpinnings, but they have to be permanently aligned, reproduced and justified while maintaining the simulacrum of fixity and stability. Their lived

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experience and the limits of their containment function are best observed in the way they define, undefined and redefine citizenship and belonging. In her discussion, she posits that shifting the emphasis from borders to relational geographies is the first step towards undoing the pre-existing “containment thinking” that historically framed debates on citizenship. Whereas a certain degree of legal-political verity is required when addressing issues of sovereignty, the spaces of class, identity, ethnicity and in general alterity transcend the border. This is not a matter of transforming “thick borders” into “thin borders” with a magical sleight of hand, but an invitation to expand the horizon of our understanding to an intertwined network of critical practices. Examining power practices within the bordering process itself and underlining the relational geographies demarcated by different types of boundaries illustrates why transborder activities could not be addressed only with reference to the geopolitical dimensions of the border. She also argues that the relevance and importance of postcolonial theory is to the study of not just migration and mobility but border maintenance and surveillance. Specifically, she suggests three possible interventions in this regard: stretching the boundaries of the spaces that encompass the postcolonial, paying closer attention to the spatial connections forged between seemingly disparate places through migration and transborder activities and challenging hierarchical notions of identity and/or place in terms of effected populations’ citizenship status. Citizenship is understood in academic and political sphere with various connotations based on the various experiences across the world. In Chap. 3, Nasreen Chowdhory argues that citizenship as a concept has transcended to include from individual to group rights, which has been articulated as claims. The membership has expanded to include various dimensions including culture, legal and group, which essentially stretched “limits of democratic practices” (Offe 1998) and institutions (Turner 2005). But, the issue of alienage has remained unresolved especially in context to idea of universal citizenship. It questions the manner in which such boundaries are constructed, on the basis of presumed “bounded citizenship”. Chowdhory argues that the issue of alienage challenges citizenship on two levels, one, boundary or threshold citizenship, and two, internal question related to the universal idea of citizenship. The concept of citizenship has been stretched to accommodate some of the basic developments and need of human existence, but it has remained individual focused, while the rights of aliens and migrants have remained in the periphery. She continues that Sassen (2000) and Soysal (2000) discuss the issue of postnational citizenship from different perspectives. As she discusses, Sassen argues postnational citizenship is more broad-based than the concept of denationalised citizenship, as state remains the point of interest, citizenry rights evolve outside the state, while denationalised is when citizenship rights remain within the domains of the state. While the debate appears to be dominated by the concept of denationalised and postnational, it subsumes citizenship as universal rights by virtue. In this chapter, Chowdhory delves into a more agent-driven, political membership of inhabitants, especially those who are more rooted in materiality of the camp. The task of the chapter is twofold: first, she argues that camp for refugees is no longer exceptional and it is active political space for refugees to engage

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with ideas of belonging, and second, it is a place to assert claims of citizenship. Drawing from citizenship discourse, the chapter engages with the literature to assert that the right-based analysis has attempted to engage with non-citizens and India is no exception to the rule. State-society relation is imperative behind transborder movement since it works as one of the leading motivations. Eva Gerharz in Chap. 4 argues that transborder migration from northern Sri Lanka does not only have a long history reaching back to colonial times but mounted high as ethnic relations became more tense. During the war between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), transborder migration became a viable option at least for the more affluent members of society. This resulted into the formation of strong transnational social ties, which were eventually facilitated by the Tamil Tigers, but which also offered new opportunities for imagining one’s own future as well as the future of the region once the conflict had been solved. Even though Sri Lanka’s (post-) conflict situation has ushered in a new area which is marked by the absence of warfare, tensions and ambiguous relationships vis-à-vis the state continue. Based on this observation, Gerharz argues that the conflict and conflict-induced migration have produced specific conditions under which mobility continues to be among the major means to achieve individual aspirations and better future. She further shows the ways how this dynamic impinges on the local society, how it influences prospects for (re) development and what the implications for sustainable peace might be.

Everyday State and Statelessness In contemporary academia, the state is not always considered as a structurally organised centralised bureaucratic system, but the local level state affects state agents, and state machineries also represent the central state. In Chap. 5, Nasir Uddin discusses about the plight of stateless people, not recognised as nationals by any state, albeit state in various forms regulates their everyday life committing severe injustice and various inequalities by producing illegibility in state structure. In fact, notion of modern nation-state has produced the concept of statelessness and non-citizens though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) confirms that “everyone has the right to a nationality”. Since the state of statelessness confirms people belonging to no state, they cannot claim any rights from states, which do not endorse the International Refugee Convention (1951), the Convention related to Status of Stateless People (1954) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). Therefore, the life of a stateless people that include non-­ citizens, refugees or asylum seekers can easily become subject to injustice, inequality, discrimination and illegibility and is even subject to death. The treatment of stateless people as illegal human bodies is as life as animals what Agamben (1998) termed “bare life”, as it does not exist “before the law”. He examines this premise with the case of Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh beneath the intricate relations of the state, vulnerability and transborder movements.

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The Rohingya people became stateless soon after Myanmar in 1982 enacted its citizenship law which conferred to 135 nationals as its citizens excluding Rohingyas. Since then many Rohingya people migrated to Bangladesh. The Rohingyas in Bangladesh enjoy the status of both as officially registered Rohingyas who live in official refugee camps under the control of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) are refugees, while the rest who are not officially registered and live either in makeshift camps or in others of locality are illegal migrants. The Rohingyas have become either refugees or illegal migrants due mainly to their state of statelessness as they do not belong to any state. In the framework of modern nation-state, the Rohingyas are non-existent human being as they are in nowhere in the legal framework of both  Bangladesh and Myanmar. However, the Rohingya people experience persecution, atrocities and everyday forms of discrimination committed by the state despite their stateless identity. With empirically informed analysis, Uddin explains how the vulnerability is (re)produced in the life of refugees due to their statelessness when transborder movement has become the general features of twenty-first century state system in the name of “global society”. In many cases, it is found that the state itself renders some people stateless. Meghna Kajla with the case of Chin refugees in India discusses that the South Asian states do not have proper conventions, laws for refugees, immigrants or stateless people. The borders of the states and their institutions are not strict in not accepting immigrants; rather the borders are more or less known to be porous in the region due to its sharing of boundaries with each other. It is the neighbouring countries where stateless people seek asylum by entering through illegal ways or accepting them as asylum seekers. It is once the people have entered the asylum-seeking state, and then their rights or laws specifically exist for them, if at all they do like finding place in camps or sites constructed for refugees. However, refugees stay in a country for a longer time until the situation of their origin country comes back to normal and accepts them as citizens. This leads to a question that Hannah Arendt addresses of either repatriation or naturalisation, if any of these processes is accepted by states of either origin or state of asylum for the moment. The larger question is how these states will comply with giving citizenship. It may again declare the same people as non-citizens or aliens and create them stateless, and this creates the vicious cycle of statelessness in South Asian states. The people living as stateless remain in camps for years, and their situation never improves in the interplay of state and citizens. There are many counter-arguments of cosmopolitan citizenship or democratisation of borders (Balibar 2010), on the other hand a radical argument of eating others’ share (Ranciere 2004). How then does one address the complicated situation of refugees like Chin living in India in camps, rented rooms and apartments with UNHCR identity? The people still need certain rights and laws for existence rather than living as stateless or no representation. Kajla argues that it is in this regard that the nation-state has authority in the creation of stateless people (Arendt 1994) and also in the contemporary times the only authority of acceptance.

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The Making and (Un)Making of Borders Border has long been an issue of serious academic interest, and it still continues with renewed interests among the scholars across discipline. Biswajit Mohanty attempts to reframe the idea of border bringing in the ecological dimension. He discusses that the Westphalian perspective conceptualises border as eternal truth of modernity. The sovereign by constructing boundary provides identities to the citizens inhabiting it. In contrast to this model, the “Empire Logic of border” privileges “edges”: that is, the existence of transitional zones between regions. There is an internal differentiation of places and population with a fuzzy understanding among people of beginning and an end of place and demarcations. Both the approaches define the border as a relationship of the sovereign with people, territory and control over subjects’ movement. The border formation is a complex process that does not always involve sovereign. People themselves construct boundaries around them and within selves. In this connection he asks the following questions: what constitutes border? How does border as a concept enters the imagination of people? How people in their everyday life understand border? How border as a sense of place becomes part of intersubjective imagination and longing? Do we carry border within us? If so how? Mohanty initiates to answer these questions by reconceptualising border. He conceptualises “ecologic” border (bhitamati in vernacular language) as a lived rather than a constructed place dominated by power relations that involves a complex interaction of social and environmental milieu of material and cultural life. It, through the lived experience of the Munda tribe of Kalinganagar, further argues that border is not always a political artifice constructed to segregate, classify and control people, rather it is a social fact of life embedded within selves and collective memory of a community. The “memorate knowledge”  – an assortment of social and symbolic goods – associated with the ecologic border embeds affective memories to place and the environment surrounding it. Increasing industrialisation after the initialisation of the process of globalisation in this area structurally ruptured the organic link of self with environment by displacing the community from its everyday borderland. The tribes got deterritorialised from the embedded place, at times through voluntary movement and other times by forceful eviction, into a new “culturescape” where the erstwhile labouring population became part of the footloose labour and became part of the “lower class sector” of the new political economy evolving here. While the idea of border is strongly connected with the controlling, checking and imposing various rules and regulation, the practice of open border still exists in South Asia. With the case of open borders between Nepal and India, Upendra Bahadur BK attempts to address couple of questions: How has an open border between Nepal and India been beneficial to the people of the two countries? What are the challenges and issues posed by a practice of an open border in terms of

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national security? The objectives include an analysis on interconnectedness of people beyond the geographical territory and the exploration of outstanding issues created by an open border following the security threats. The statements made by the experts and leaders having a substantive knowledge on open border will be used as the primary source of information along with unstructured interviews of purposively selected respondent. Talking on the geostrategic location, Nepal is surrounded by India to the West, East and the South except the North. Bahadur argues that a practice of an open border between the countries has been remaining since the time immemorial. People from two countries take benefit from an open border in terms of employment opportunities and free mobility without any legal restrictions. Sociocultural integration between the people of two countries seems in intact right from the beginning. Despite the fact, the illegal factors such as smugglers, terrorists and criminals have been posing challenges to the open border taking benefits of the natural openness of the border. The trafficking in girls and women, the mobility of fake Indian currency and explosive substances have challenged to the existing security system. The infiltration of illegal elements is really detrimental to the national security and integrity of the country. Bahadur suggests that in the age of globalisation, the borders cannot be sealed off but can be regulated through mutual and shared liabilities to inject fresh momentum on natural flow and inflow of people from one country to another practically.

Migration in South Asia Before and after decolonisation, migration took place on a regular basis between and among the South Asian states. However, migration in South Asia essentially and largely demotes the migration within the sub-continent. Given the facts, Jagrup Singh Sekhon and Sunayana Sharma focus on involuntary migrations of the people living in the border belt of Indian Punjab since partition of the sub-continent in 1947. These people not only became structural victims of the partition but also the machinations of both neighbours. Though more than 70 years have passed since the division of Indian sub-continent and India and Pakistan becoming independent entities, the baggage of past weighs heavy on both states. The post-partition bitterness between India and Pakistan, wars at regular intervals and warlike situation on the border and criminal neglect of the development process in the border belt by the successive governments at the centre and state forced the citizens to continuously move out of their native places not only for the safety and security of their family members but also for their very survival. Boundary clashes, terrorist activities, smuggling, etc. are some of the other sources of conflict in the border area, creating continuously insecurity and uncertainty that are detrimental to their normal survival. They argue that time and again the state and national governments ordered its residents living on the international borders to vacate their villages. Sometimes these orders come as a bolt from the blue for the border residents (who are mainly marginal and small and middle peasants) in peak season of paddy or wheat

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harvesting. It not only creates panic in the area but forces lakhs of residents to move to the safer places leaving behind their houses. In addition to these are the floods in Ravi and Sutlej rivers which criss-cross border villages also bring untold miseries to the people and force them to migrate from their homes at regular intervals. Involuntary migrations have become part and parcel of their lives. Following the formation of two separate states, India and Pakistan, in 1947 and independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the large number of Bangladeshi nationals migrated in India. Abhishek Nath and Vivek Vishal have discussed that the estimation of numbers of Bangladeshi nationals living in India has been a contested arena because of the continuity of the process started right early since the partition and the mostly illegal nature of migration. And calculation of immigrant community-wise is virtually impossible because of the various similarities among masses across the borders. Around 5000 km-long natural porous border has provided an easy passage to the local population across the borders while presents a monumental challenge to state to protect the borders from transgressors and enforce it on the border population. So, the numbers have also not remained neutral, and it has been used by state and other actors to decide and interpret in a manner suitable to their arguments. Indian state has always found the illegal migration of Bangladeshi nationals to Indian soil as a major contentious issue involving economy, culture, security and politics. On the other hand, Bangladesh denies any such migration at all. It has led to the serious implications on the life and livelihood of millions of masses and forced people to become pawns in the callous hands of two states. They are of opinion that historical process of voluntary migration in this region has been countered by the cartographical innovation by the colonial masters to meet the demands of competing nations. That has resulted in serious limitations on the livelihood possibilities of the people across borders. They, on the one hand, try to provide an analysis of the dynamics of migration from Bangladesh to India and estimate the migration flow through some authentic data with a projection for the near future, on the other hand. The effort has been made to find out and define the pattern of migration through the qualitative analysis of data. Field study has also been undertaken to validate the quantitative findings. Statistical test has been performed to test the data and also to provide the future projection. It will help states to take policy decision and mitigate the sufferings of millions of masses crossing border illegally in search of their livelihood. South Asia is also widely known for its multi-ethnic mosaic. Therefore, many ethnic groups currently living in South Asian states migrated from Southeast Asian states. Given the facts of trans-regional migration, Debojyoti Das with the case of the Rakhines, a migrant ethnic group in South and Southeast Asia, addresses some of the key questions relevant to academic debates on borders, migration and community identity construction in the littoral Bay of Bengal in the twentieth century. Maritime historian Michael Pearson opines that the history of the Bengal Delta, like other littoral regions, should be studied in light of the broader trade and mercantile as well as migration flows that connected the region with the hinterland covering present-day Northeast India, Burma and China. They are part of the “connected histories” of the Bay of Bengal littoral rim. Das fits this premise in the case of the

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Rakhines of Bangladesh, an ethnic minority who have been historically forced to migrate due to political, social and environmental vulnerability in Myanmar and Bangladesh. They migrated from the Arakan valley of present-day Myanmar in the early eighteenth centuries and settled in Chittagong, Khulna and Barisal division of Bengal via the sea route and Sandweep island. They have maintained their distinct identity as a religious, linguistic and ethnic group. Sectarian violence, burning of Pagodas and ethnic conflict with the dominant Bengali community in Bangladesh, however, have forced the Rakhines to migrate back to their homeland in Myanmar and Chittagong Hill Tracts. Das answers to the following questions: What does motivate ethnic minorities to migrate in the Indian Ocean littoral region? What are the roles of state practices and policies in the process?

Conclusion The state has recently turned into very powerful political institutions, what Karl Marx termed “institutions for exploitation” (see Wetherly 2005), yet the widespread cry for democracy should strengthen people’s power and the empowerment of constitutional institutions to check and balance the both. But, over-politicisation of social and constitutional institutions in South Asian states has gradually weakened the democratic culture and the tremendous potentials of building a “pluralistic society”. Therefore, the states themselves become intolerants towards the people of cultural, ethnic, religious and racial difference that constitute a distinctive identity of those people, which accentuates transborder movements over the last couple of decades in South Asian states. This recent trend of intolerance has been intensified by the internal faults and flaws the South Asian states inherited in the process of nation-building and state formation during the postcolonial period in the line of majoritarian framework and nationalist notions of statehood (also see Bose and Jalal 2004; Webb and Wijeweera 2015; Kumaraswamy and Copland 2009; Pandey 2004; Khan 2007; White-Spunner 2017). Therefore, the state gradually became authoritarians leaving out the aptitudes of being peoples’ republic and the state for the people. Given the facts and discussions in the body of the chapter, it is clearly evident that the states are principally responsible for creating some conditionalities within the state territory which forced the people of ethnic, religious and racial difference, as well as the people of lower class and ordinary category unlike political elites and establishments, to cross the border. Every state in South Asia has been going through more or less the similar experience, and hence we find refugees, illegal migrants, camp people, stranded nationals, asylum seekers and forcibly displaced people whose “host state and home state” (Uddin 2018) are different. These categories of people are the production of transborder movements within and among the South Asian states. Unfortunately, the number of these categories of people is growing across the South Asian states in the age of liberal democracy and neo-­ liberal state system.

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Bibliography Agamben, Giorgia. (1998). Homo Sacer: Sovereign power and bare life (D.  Heller-Roazen, Trans.). Stanford: Stanford University Press. Agnew, J.  (2008). Borders on the mind: Re-framing border thinking. Ethics & Global Politics, 1(4), 175–191. Appadurai, A. (1997). Modernity at large: Cultural dimensions in globalization. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Appadurai, A. (1990). Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy. Theory, Culture, Society, 7, 295–310. Arendt, H. (1994). The origins of totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Books. Balibar, E. (2010). At the borders of citizenship: A democracy in translation? European Journal of Social Theory,13(3), 315–322. Bose, S., & Jalal, A. (2004). Modern South Asia: History, culture and political economy. London/ New York: Routledge. Brettell, C., & Hollifield, J. (Eds.). (2014). Migration theory crossing across discipline. London/ New York: Routledge. Hannerz, U. (1996). Transnational connections: Culture, people, places. London/New York: Routledge. Hernàndez Marti, G. (2006). The Deterritorialization of cultural heritage in a globalized modernity. Transfer: Journal of Contemporary Culture, November, 91–106. Hirsch, R. (2016). Climate migrants: On the move in a warming world. Washington, DC: Twienty First Century Book. Jackson, J.  B. (1987). “The word itself” in Discovering the Vernacular Landscape, 13. https:// sfaiph304.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/jbjackson_vernacular.pdf. Accessed on 7 June 2018. Khan, Y. (2007). The great partition: The making of India and Pakistan. New Heaven: Yale University Press. Kumaraswamy, P.  R., & Copland, I. (Eds.). (2009). South Asia: The spectre of terrorism. New Delhi: Routledge. Mann, M. (2015). South Asia’s modern history: Thematic perspective. London/New York: Routledge. Newman, D. (2003). On borders and power: A theoretical framework. Journal of Borderlands Studies,18(1), 13–25. Nugent, W. (1992). Crossing: The great transatlantic migration, 1870–1914. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Offe, C. (1998). Homogeneity and constitutional democracy: Coping with identity conflicts through group rights. Journal of Political Philosophy, 6(2), 113–141. Pandey, G. (2004). Remembering partition: Violence, nationalism and history in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Passi, A. (2009). Bounded spaces in a ‘borderless world’: Border studies, power and the anatomy of territory. Journal of Power, 2(9), 213–234. Ranciere, J.  (2004). “Who is the subject off the rights of man?” The south. Asian Quaterly, 103(2/3), 297–310. Randeria, S. (2007). The State of globalization legal plurality, overlapping sovereignties and ambiguous alliances between civil society and the cunning state in India. Theory, Culture and Globalization, 24(01), 1–33. Robertson, R. (1992). Globalization: Social theory and global culture. London: Sage. Sassen, S. (2000). New frontiers facing urban sociology at the Millenium. British Journal of Sociology, 51(1), 143–159. Scott, J. (2010). The art of not being governed: An acharchist history of upland Southeast Asia. New Heaven: Yale University Press. Seyhan, A. (2001). Writing outside the nation. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.

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Shastri, A. (2001). The post-colonial states in South Asia: Decmocracy, identity, develoment, and security. In A. Shastri & J. Wilson (Eds.), The post-colonial states in South Asia: Decmocracy, identity, develoment, and security (pp. 1–13). London/New York: Routledge. Soysal, Y.  N. (2000). Citizenship and identity in post war Europe. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 23(1), 1–15. Taran, P., et al. (2009). Economic migration, social cohesion and development: Towards an integrated approach. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Tomlinson, J. (1999). Globalization and culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Triandafyllidou, A. (2013). Circular migration between Europe and its neighbourhood: Choice or necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Turner, J. C. (2005). Explaining the nature of power: A three- process theory. European Journal of Social Psychology, 35(1), 1–22. Uddin, N. (2012). Introduction: Anthropology in South Asia. Man in India, 91(01), i–iv. Uddin, N. (2018). The state matters: The Rohingyas in home state and host state. An Unpublished Research monograph. Uddin, N. (2019 [Forthcoming]). The Rohingyas: A case of “Subhuman”. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Van Houtum, H. (2011). The mask of the border. In D. Wastl-Walter (Ed.), The Ashgate research companion to border studies (pp. 49–61). Farnham: Ashgate. Vila, P. (Ed.). (2003). Ethnography of border. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Webb, M. J. (2015). Greed, Grievance and Violent Separatism in South Asia. In M. J. Webb & A. Wijeweera (Eds.), The political economy of conflict in South Asia (pp. 149–170). New York: Palgrave McMillan. Webb, M., & Wijeweera, A. (2015). Introduction. In M. J. Webb & A. Wijeweera (Eds.), The political economy of conflict in South Asia (pp. 1–11). New York: Palgrave McMillan Press. Wetherly, P. (2005). Marxism and the state: An analytical approach. New York: Palgrave McMillan. White-Spunner, B. (2017). Partition: The story of Indian independence and the creation of Pakistan in 1947. Simon & Schuster.

Part I

Transborder Mobility, Borders, and Citizenship Dilemmas

Chapter 2

Borders, Citizenship and the Subaltern in South Asia Nergis Canefe

Abstract This chapter will argue that borders consist of an overlapping and changeable set of boundaries with different and often contradictory functions, histories, meanings and roles. Furthermore, not only that they are the outcome of ‘bordering processes’ with social, economic and political underpinnings, they have to be permanently aligned, reproduced and justified while maintaining the simulacrum of fixity and stability. In Van Houtum’s words, borders are a ‘fabricated truth’ (Van Houtum, The mask of the border. In: Wastl-Walter D (ed). The Ashgate research companion to border studies. Ashgate, Farnham, 2011: 49). Their lived experience and the limits of their containment function are best observed in the way they define, undefined and redefine citizenship and belonging. In the following pages, I will posit that shifting our emphasis from borders to relational geographies is the first step towards undoing the pre-existing ‘containment thinking’ that historically framed debates on citizenship. Whereas a certain degree of legal-political verity is required when addressing issues of sovereignty, the spaces of class, identity, ethnicity and in general alterity transcend the border. This is not a matter of transforming ‘thick borders’ into ‘thin borders’ with a magical sleight of hand but an invitation to expand the horizon of our understanding to an intertwined network of critical practices. Examining power practices within the bordering process itself and underlining the relational geographies demarcated by different types of boundaries illustrate why transborder activities could not be addressed only with reference to the geopolitical dimensions of the border. In this commentary, I will also argue for the relevance and importance of post-colonial theory to the study of not just migration and mobility but border maintenance and surveillance. Specifically, I suggest three possible interventions in this regard: stretching the boundaries of the spaces that encompass the post-colonial state, paying closer attention to the spatial connections forged between seemingly disparate places through migration and transborder activities and challenging hierarchical notions of identity and/or place in terms of effected populations’ citizenship status.

N. Canefe (*) Department of Politics, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 N. Uddin, N. Chowdhory (eds.), Deterritorialised Identity and Transborder Movement in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2778-0_2

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Keywords  Post-colonialism · State · Subaltern · South Asia · Citizenship · Borders

Introduction This article argues that borders consist of an overlapping and changeable set of boundaries with different and often contradictory functions, histories, meanings and roles (Diener and Hagen 2012). Furthermore, not only that they are the outcome of ‘bordering processes’ with social, economical and political underpinnings, they have to be permanently aligned, reproduced and justified while maintaining the simulacrum of fixity and stability. In Van Houtum’s words, borders are a ‘fabricated truth’ (Van Houtum 2011: 49). Their lived experience and the limits of their containment function are best observed in the way they define, undefined and redefine citizenship and belonging. The specific context within which I tackle this debate is practices of citizenship in South Asia and, in particular, the Indian subcontinent. In the following pages, I thus posit that shifting our emphasis from borders to relational geographies in South Asia is the first step towards undoing the pre-­existing ‘containment thinking’ that historically framed debates on citizenship. Although a certain degree of legal-political verity is required when addressing issues of sovereignty, we could take encouragement from the fact that spaces of class, identity, ethnicity and in general alterity readily transcend the border (Chibber 2013). Furthermore, this is not simply a matter of transforming ‘thick borders’ into ‘thin borders’ but an invitation to expand the horizon of our understanding in terms of critical practices that could override bordering of citizenship and rights (Kostakopoulou 2006). In turn, examining power within the bordering process itself and vis-à-vis underlining relational geographies marked by different types of boundaries illustrate why transborder activities could not be addressed with reference to the geopolitical dimensions of the border and its adjacent formulation of national citizenship alone, hence the relevance and importance of hybridisation of post-colonial theory and studies of the subaltern not just for analysing migration and mobility in the South Asian context but also for understanding the dynamics of border maintenance and socio-political surveillance vis-à-vis post-colonial citizenship regimes. Here, I suggest three possible interventions in this regard: stretching the boundaries of spaces and histories that mark the post-colonial state, paying closer attention to the spatial connections forged between seemingly disparate places through migration and transborder activities in the region and in particular the special position of the dispossessed as potent new political actors and challenging hierarchical notions of identity and/or place reproduced by the post-colonial state in terms of vulnerable populations’ citizenship status. In so doing, we could also revisit the seeming puzzle of how and why studying citizenship and border regimes in the Global South, and in particular South Asia, might affect the reconceptualisation of key categories in these areas. Instead of a universal grammar of citizenship, supposedly only modified by ‘exotic’ empirical variations, this essay proposes a form of theorisation that is attentive to historical

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difference as a fundamental constituent of global border regimes and not as a context of creating exceptionalities. Here, what is at stake is politics of theory, which in its Eurocentric mould tends to foreclose multiple concepts of belonging and alternative understandings of political community beyond Europe and the West. As an alternative, a genuine concern with the relationship between place, knowledge and power in South Asia—a key insight inherited from the post-colonial critique in general—would render new practices of theorising in citizenship and border studies possible.

Borders, Bordering and Post-colonial Citizenship At the beginning of Provincializing Europe, Dipesh Chakrabarty explains that the Europe he seeks to provincialise or decentre is an ‘imaginary figure’, and it is largely sustained by ‘clichés and shorthand forms’ (Chakrabarty 2000).1 One could argue that political discourses on citizenship continue to be shaped by these very forms. Among such clichés a certain idea of borders plays a crucial epistemic role. Both the theory and politics of citizenship have taken for granted that national citizenship is the normal relation of belonging. In this sense, the state signifies the homogeneous legal scheme that articulates social conflict and integration as well as access to ‘real’ citizenship in terms of rights and claims making.2 This equation has radical repercussions for the post-colonial world and, in particular, the Indian subcontinent. While access to citizenship is declining as a standard relation between the individual and rights bearing status in the West and elsewhere, the heterogeneity of relations of belonging that has characterised and still characterises colonial and post-colonial societies paradoxically seems to be inadequately theorised concerning the history and present of global border regimes with reference to South Asia. Here, I will attempt to outline a theory of post-colonial citizenship that pays attention to this inner heterogeneity and draws attention to the ambiguities, conflicts and antagonism crisscrossing border regimes in South Asia despite the stubborn insistence on citizenship being perceived as a boundary project. Sure enough, 1  Dipesh Chakrabarty’s influential Provincializing Europe addresses the mythical figure of Europe taken to be the original site of modernity. This imaginary Europe is also built into the social sciences along with the notion of secular time and absolute [national] sovereignty. Chakrabarty then proposes that every transition to capitalism is a case of translation as well. The book remains as one of the cornerstones of the post-colonial critique of modernity. 2  In their article ‘Marxism and Postcolonial Theory: What is Left of the Debate’, Subir Sinha and Rashmi Varma (2017) argue that a critical glance at the long history of engagements between Marxism and post-colonial theory reveals that the relationship has been both collaborative and antagonistic. The authors argue that these exchanges have been productive and have underscored the importance of the category of class across the board. Debates on citizenship in the South Asian context, especially those provided by subaltern studies, are often marked by the criticism that they avoid the class component. Here, I make an attempt to open up the concept of class in terms of degrees of dispossession and invisibility in order to bring in a systemic new dimension to the concept of post-colonial citizenship.

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c­ ritical theorisations within citizenship studies on the condition of migrants and refugees celebrate the nomadic dimension of the contemporary migrant/refugee figure and assign her the potential to disrupt hegemonic practices of state-centric citizenship. However, such enthusiastic accounts fail to exercise the required sense of caution in conceptualising the fragile and unstable condition of the migrant/refugee/ stateless subjects, otherwise known as the dispossessed, of border regimes. These celebratory accounts hesitate to distinguish between various experiences of mobility, hybridity, citizenship and lack of it thereof. The differentiation between different lived experiences of citizenship has already been well marked by Aihwa Ong’s critique of the ‘unified moralism attached to subaltern subjects [that] now also clings to diasporan ones, who are invariably assumed to be members of oppressed classes and therefore constitutionally opposed to capitalism and state power’ (Ong 2008: 13). In the same spirit, my analysis of post-colonial citizenship underlines how class, race, ethno-religious identity and lack of legal status frame experiences of mobility and render easy exaltations of post-colonial hybridity impossible. For instance, practices of post-colonial mobility in the South Asian context have produced highly differentiated and unequal hybridities and, consequently, asymmetrical experiences of citizenship. The good news is that post-colonial hybridity can be employed to reconstitute the rigid boundaries of national citizenship dictated by the European project of border maintenance (Biggs 1999). Interstate borders are indeed superbly constructed artefacts, their physicality being only secondary to the ideological and political functions they perform. Borders can be classified according to the purposes they serve and how they serve them. In South Asia, the dominant socio-political and economical processes that have led to the fencing off of chunks of territory and people from one another make borders almost a residual phenomena rather than serving any essential purpose. In this sense, a border is not a fixed entity that must be overcome, and its evolving construction could only be understood in a contextual manner. The prime example for this phenomenon in a regional context is the cluster of borders that separate India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Burma. Considering territorial spaces as ‘dwellings’ rather than constricted national spaces could then allow us to entertain the possibility of political responsibility for pursuit of a ‘decent life’ as extending beyond the borders of any particular state. Otherwise, borders become increasingly redundant, and being constrained by them restricts thinking about alternative political, social and economic possibilities. This situation is further complicated by the fact that borders are also projects of vested interest, reflecting an unambiguous claim of sovereignty that ends/begins at a border. In this context, migration, citizenship and borders nexus in the South Asian context allows us to engender terms and concepts that move beyond traditional migration studies by building on post-colonial analyses and by drawing on a diverse set of long-standing engagements with cross-border movements. Specifically, strategies such as counter-mapping, redefining borders as spectacles, critical analysis of the politics of border protection, externalisation and differential inclusion/exclusion are essential steps towards developing a robust theory of postcolonial citizenship (Harley 1989). This is in direct contrast to the traditional

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oppositional model of how national identities are formed. Indeed, theoretical reliance on ‘othering’ in both citizenship and border studies have chronically led to the unfortunate conclusion that territorial social formations are at the root of all identities (Wastl-Walter 2011; Wilson and Donnan 2012). The boundaries between them have been viewed as defined by opposing and exclusionary identities that pre-exist the coming of the borders. Henceforth, nation-states have been readily assimilated to a notion of social boundaries, and borders become signposts for expressive and distinctive identities protected within set parameters (Taylor and Flint 2007; Buchanan and Moore 2008). The border then becomes an absolute necessity for marking and protecting identities.3 This type of understanding marks borders as serving a number of vital socio-­ political and economical purposes, all of which have real political and hence policy dimensions. Borders help clearly demarcate institutional and public goods belonging to a nation. Borders are also necessary to define who is eligible and who is not to share in the benefits of the national wealth (Mann 1984). Accordingly, absent territorial restrictions on eligibility and cross-border movements of people would undermine the contractual obligations underpinning the autonomous role of the state as the benefactor of the [national] society. From the provision of public goods to the protection of private property, borders endow classes, communities, political elites and the citizenship contract as a whole. Then, there is the idea of ‘the exception’ (Ausnahmezustand) in relation to border control. Associated most closely with the conservative argument of Carl Schmitt about the suspension of law to protect the essence of the state at the border as well as the radical argument of Giorgio Agamben to the effect that the sovereignty of the state puts the very life of people it is supposed to protect in doubt, borders are yet again declared absolutely central to the definition of the state (Schmitt 1985; Agamben 2005). They allow the decisions to be made in terms of who is inside and who is outside by establishing an essential opposition between the ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ or insiders and outsiders (Canefe 1998). This idiom of exceptionality has recently become extremely popular in state parlance in the so-called Global War on Terror, as a result of which the exception has become the rule. In ever more novel ways, borders continue to constitute key elements for the maintenance of a territorialised political imagination. Even if borders are deemed as arbitrary, contingent or even perverse, it is hard to find a single international boundary in South Asia that has not been inspired by the example and practices of an originally European project of colonial statehood (Nine 2008). In this regard, borders are historically contingent. The imposition and subsequent breakup of European empires outside of Europe into state-like units overshadowed local initiatives concerning the spread of a model of territorial statehood, leading to the model of a state-centred political economy and the association of governance with territorial citizenship (Bose and Jalal 2002; Crowley 2005). As a 3  In direct contrast, the Israel-Palestine ‘border runner’ Michel Warschawski says that ‘The border is not merely a place of separation where differences are asserted; it can also be a place of exchange and enrichment where pluralist identities can flourish. One can have encounters there that cannot take place elsewhere’.

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political ideal, the imagination of territorial statehood rests on imitation and diffusion of established models of governance that define what is in and what is to be kept outside. As such, borders present us with a solid script for the dissemination and consolidation of a global nation-state system. The model of statehood they aspire to rests upon the imposition of sharp lines of demarcation between one state unit, the imagined nation-state and its neighbours (Mann 1984). And yet, it is only with the rise of Europe to global predominance that an idealised version of the European territorial state became the global archetype and hence the crowning of the borders as the defining feature of legitimate statehood. Part of the political tragedy of contemporary South Asia lies in the attempted reconciliation of this European blueprint of territorial state with its sharp borders and ethnic and religious identities in the region that do not lend themselves to it. The shifting parameters of scholarly debate on South Asian historiography, with the unfolding of the process of decolonisation and post-coloniality always at the back of our minds, need to be placed before a broader audience and contextualised further in order to break this hold. Whether characterised as optimistically fanciful or pejoratively stereotypical, the inability and the unwillingness to understand or comprehend, far less explain, the enormous complexities of South Asia remain a hurdle not just for the scholarship on the region but for the debates at large on citizenship, belonging and dispossession. Lurking behind bordering everywhere is that pristine ideal of nationalism embodied by the territorial nation-state, requiring the reinvention of the nation through the mobilisation of populations in and out of borders, and so it has been the case across the Indian subcontinent (Paasi 2005; Newman 2003, 2006; Popescu 2012). Meanwhile, borders provide the essential focus for a collective sense of global uncertainty, although this is even more pronounced in the post-colonial world. By remaining in perpetual question, state borders and one’s containment within them or exclusion from them provide a regular source of political anxiety. The everyday nationalism in which borders are implicated as edifices of certainty/uncertainty is not a local project, either. Its effects often shape the discourse in distant centres and among the scattered diasporas of the dispelled populations who could not be housed within these territorial boundaries. In this sense, state borders are qualitatively different in their capacity in terms of both determining other boundaries and overriding or rewriting historical legacies. They all have a specific historical and geographical origin, and yet, they presume absolute authority as if they existed from time immemorial. Varying in their incidence and precise significance, state borders in South Asia are neither unequivocal nor definite delimitations. Giving borders a deep-seated and layered historical genealogy is a discursive and politically charged exercise. The India-Pakistan border as a line in the sand is a perfect example of the construction of border and human interactions across it as a liminal space, in particular regarding the first and second Kashmir wars (1948 and 1965, respectively), the Bangladesh liberation war (1971) and the Kargil war (1999).4 Whether implicated in wars or  For a superb discussion of the border in the context of India-Pakistan, see two films directed by J.P. Dutta: the high-profile, multiple award-winning war film Border (1997) and his subsequent feature Refugee (2000), which was widely described as ‘a human story’. 4

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not, borders are primarily zones of encounter. Although they are sometimes referred to as a type of ‘non-place’ in which the rules of everyday life are suspended, they host very particular rules of another kind: surveillance. The complexity of border management owes its essence both to excessively laudatory practices of national security and to the invariable convalescence of the inside and outside of boundaries coupled with relative competencies with which state authorities strive to fulfil presumed functions of screening, identifying and ousting ‘dangerous persons’ through containment and deportation (Agnew 2008). All of these characteristics are readily observable in the Indian subcontinent as much as elsewhere. And yet, there is an added element that marks the region as worthy of special consideration as well. The type of exploration I purport here concerning borders and citizenship in South Asia amounts to a practice of geographies at the margins as well as what I will call ‘relational geographies’. This approach offers a unique opportunity to link the literature on borders and margins with the regional complexities of post-colonial citizenship in South Asia (Cons and Sanya 2013). Developing an optic for thinking about both external and internal borders that are at once relational and comparative is essential in order to come to terms with the unique aspects of post-colonial citizenship in a region marked with multiple and at times shifting borders and margins (Näsström 2004; Roy and Gates 2017). It is a place where the articulation of politically potent spaces such as borders is at once suggestive and questionable, as already observed in the workings of the post-colonial politics of nation, state and belonging. While the autonomous and self-referential citizen of the European nation-state is seen as the normative blueprint in the mainstream identification of citizenship, the post-colonial scale such as the South Asian one requires an ‘expanding’ or ‘extending’ of this mould to engender a sense of responsibility and obligation to others through engagement with both local and regional communities who may or may not share the same citizenship or status due to histories of partition, forced displacement and large-scale movements of dispossession (Neocleous 2003; Walters 2006). In the post-colonial context, the assumption of the normatively superior national citizen must be probed to the point of ultimately made redundant. Examining borders and bordering in relation to citizenship practices in the region is a strategy to be employed precisely to this end.

Historical Origins, Heritages and Lineages Post-colonialism emerged primarily as a consequence of the work of diasporic scholars from the Middle East and South Asia, and, for the most part, it refers back to those locations and their once-imperial interlocutors (Europe and the West). Similarly, decoloniality emerged from the work of scholars from South America and, for the most part, refers back to those locations and their once-imperial interlocutors—again, primarily to Europe although addressing a much longer time frame and to the United States. Then there is the third strand of critique spearheaded by scholarship on Africa and in particular through the analysis of the post-colonial

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situation in former French colonies. In terms of a time frame, whereas post-colonialism refers mainly to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, decoloniality starts with the earlier European incursions upon the lands came to be known as the Americas from the fifteenth century onwards. Despite this difference, both postcolonial and decolonial arguments challenge the insularity of historical narratives and historiographical traditions marking Europe as a success story. They suggest the necessity of considering the emergence of the modern world in tandem with the broader histories of colonialism, imperialism, domination, expropriation, usurpation and enslavement. A second point of conversion among all three strands is that the question of production of knowledge from a global and historicised perspective is central to both post-colonial and decolonial critiques. However, the interrogation of the Orient/Occident divide has long lost its novelty, particularly in terms of developing an adequate understanding of contemporary forms of post-coloniality, including post-colonial citizenship. Instead, we witness another kind of epistemological crisis but this time within post-colonial thought itself: are there no others to the post-­colonial subject, post-colonial citizen and, of course, the post-colonial state? Going back to the method of post-colonial critique, by interrupting the assumed temporal trajectory movement of modernity, we instead become privy to the inner logic of this particular European/Western staging of the unfolding of modernity. By bearing witness to different pasts that are not included in this main narrative, one is able to initiate new dialogues about those pasts and thus potentially call into being new histories. From those new histories could then spring new presents and new futures (Bhabha 1994; Laclau 2000). Furthermore, the project of epistemic decolonisation necessary to undo the damage wrought by both modernity/coloniality and idealisations of post-colonial nationhood hinge upon our acknowledgement of the sources and geopolitical locations of particular truth claims related to these paradigms while at the same time affirming the validity and significance of ‘residual’ modes and practices of knowledge that have been denied space by the dominance of these particular forms. In this context, a careful consideration of what geopolitics enables us to know and how it is to be known is key. Indeed, critical post-colonial epistemology has to be geographically informed and alive in its historicity (Mignolo 2007: 469). In the specific case of this essay, for a decolonial epistemic shift to enable histories of alterity to become visible in the context of post-colonial citizenship, one has to unmask the promise of post-colonial aftermath of pristine nationhood protected by perfect borders. Vis-à-vis the post-colonial state in South Asia, the post-colonial citizen has to affirm a sense of independent self-required articulation of the new citizens’ difference from both European and surrounding regional cultures. Hence, we witness a long history of overreliance of the post-colonial states on borders and their maintenance using the stark terms of nativist nationalism. Yet there is very little reflection on how those other cultures such as the ones making the hub of South Asia constitute an integral part of the very grounds of post-colonial self-realisation. The modernity that post-coloniality takes as the context for its own being is deeply imbricated in the structures of regional fragmentation initiated by the very European colonial domination. As such, rereading modernity/coloniality and post-coloniality with a

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consciousness of the continual existence and reproduction of a residue, the subaltern citizen and masses of the dispossessed, forces us to examine the emergence of the category of border-bound post-coloniality in the first place. Just as colonisation invented the colonised, the post-colonial condition fabricated the post-colonial, national citizen and its own others. In doing so, it continued to disrupt social patterns, gender relations and self-understandings of the communities and societies divided through bordered exercises of national sovereignty. Here lies the inner logic of ‘post-colonial difference’. The post-colonial state-system, like the ones preceding it, attempts to organise the world into homogeneous, separable nations arranged through categorical forms of belonging, a process that erases the stateless, the dispossessed and the displaced from most areas of social, economic and political life. This is its weakest point.

Movements, Reversals and Erosions Among the many suggestions and proposals that have been made on how to manage the borders in South Asia, one could trace the emergence of a certain conceptual cluster: soft and open borders. In relation to the [national] borders undergoing a tremendous change in the last three decades, the concept of security has evolved in such a way that the roles played by borders led to the development of a new kind of strategic calculus. The historical perspective on how borders evolved in South Asia, what kind of movements have been taking place in the post-colonial era and how these two kinds of development shaped the citizenship contracts in the region are essential components of this puzzle. At this point, however, a caveat is needed. Post-­ colonial theory traces how the colonial past animates the present, whereas current changes in border regimes have a future-conditional component concerning the self-­ image of post-colonial states. Hence, reconceptualising citizenship in the context of changing bordering practices, the very category of the post-colonial condition would need to be reframed so as to include more than the effects of historical signification. In particular, the implications of migrants’, refugees’ and stateless people’s transnational and intrastate existence require us to consider a form of transborder citizenship. Transborder citizens live their lives across the borders of two or more nation-states, participating in the normative regimes as well as legal and institutional systems of multiple states. The development of transborder citizenship thus takes us beyond the standard legal definitions of citizenship into a zone of living according to plural systems of laws, customs and politics. The politics and claims making of transborder citizens confront us with the task of assessing an important deficit of coupling citizenship with borders. In this context, if we were to think of the border not as a demarcation line but as a frontier, its political meaning and potential become much more visible. Not just transborder existences but unofficial and ‘illegal’ cross-border movements of ­people continue to reproduce life worlds, leading to new political constellations in the postcolonial geography of South Asia. The silent encroachment of the Indian/

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Bangladeshi frontier, Pakistani/Afghani frontier, Burmese/Bangladeshi frontier and Sri Lankan/Chinese frontier, to name a few, is marked by a prolonged denial of the regularity of such crossings. In favour of the advancement of existing power configurations that profoundly questions the legitimacy of transborder lives and people without status, the control over people’s mobility continues to be the quintessence of post-colonial state building and maintenance. At the end of the day, however, as the articles in this volume amply illustrate, the analysis of processes attached to these everyday occurrences of fluidity and movement at borders illustrates quite clearly how peoples of South Asia, notwithstanding the political, structural and technological interventions delimiting and moulding their world, progressively challenge conventional notions of political and economic power. By doing so, they simultaneously introduce new notions of where politics is to be found and what constitutes belonging in the post-colonial world. Furthermore, contrary to dominant wisdom, emerging regulatory authorities across the borders are directly involved in different scales of political decision-­ making—particularly in the domain of cross-border surveillance and permit issuance. They are not just agents of the state, but they are the embodiment of the state in a particular form along the frontiers of the territorial boundaries of the post-­ colonial nation. Such processes can eventually introduce a reconfiguration of post-­ colonial statehood that combines different and apparently contradictory legal orders and political cultures, while giving rise to new forms of meaning and action concerning citizenship and membership albeit inadvertently. These practices of the biopolitics of citizenship and governmentality—as exemplified by various forms of surveillance including immigration documentation, employment permits, investigation of birth certificates, tax forms, drivers’ licences, bank accounts, denial of medical insurance, car insurance, random detentions and deportations—enclose, penetrate, define, limit and frustrate the lives of undocumented millions across the region who live by and crossover borders for safety, work and livelihood. Based on extensive qualitative information and personal narratives, it is safe to propose that abjectivity and illegality constraining daily life could often immobilise their victims and yet in other ways could also motivate them to engage politically to resist the dire conditions of their lives and the calcification of the border as an absolute. This is a potent moment of encounter between the citizens of post-colonial states with post-colonial states themselves. Hence, it forces us to open up the idiom of post-coloniality above and beyond the debate on historical vestiges of the post-colonial state. The present of post-coloniality is creating its own contradictions, erosions and encampments. In contemporary South Asia, displacement and mobility are intertwined in such a way that the notion of displacement offers a powerful lens to understand common aspects of the post-colonial state across the region. Displacement is both an empirical and a conceptual category that may be used to describe the movement of peoples across geographies, as well as unsettling established analytical vocabularies attending to citizenship. Forced migration studies as a field have long sought to ­problematise borders, and yet it has rarely done so with particular emphasis on postcoloniality and post-colonial citizenship. The focus on displacement in South Asia,

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in contrast, necessitates the discussion to include post-coloniality. The prefix postcolonial has a longer provenance than the global one, as it retains the double meaning of ‘post’ as signalling both a coming after and a continuation. Similarly, post-colonial states exclude even as they embrace and produce new forms of internal and external marginality. As such, the special significance of Spivak’s ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ as an inaugurating moment of post-colonial studies in North America back in the 1980s is never lost. In effect, it has continuing implications for those working in the field of forced migration studies. Scholars interested in challenging the logics of colonialism and deploying incommensurability as a critical tool could not confine their vision to the borders of the territorial state. People’s sense of living under colonial projects and with colonial legacies is not limited to the impact of European empires alone. Convergences and tensions that mark the relationship between colonial and post-colonial models of governance and statehood invites us to interrogate subalternity above and beyond the traditional definition of post-colonial citizenship, pushing the borders of its applicability. Inclusion of a school of historiography dedicated to the non-elite histories of the Indian subcontinent may well have become the expression of a depoliticised appropriation of radical thought, yet the travels of the subaltern as a critical concept have been far and wide, bringing us into demystification of post-colonial citizenship itself (Krishna 1994; Delanty 2007). Here, I would like to posit that we now witness an erosion of not just post-­ colonial citizenship but also a redefinition of the subaltern in the context of borders and cross-border movement of peoples (Pandey 2008). Drawing inspiration from Antonio Gramsci’s writings on The Southern Question in Italy adapting the military term ‘subaltern’ to describe uneven national development, subaltern studies emerged as a project for rewriting the history of South Asia outside the bounds of colonialist, elite nationalist and Marxist frameworks. The subaltern studies scholars sought to bring attention to peasant insurrections that had remained invisible in dominant as well as much of leftist historiography. Instead, they offered to develop alternative models of history and politics attuned to the agency of subordinated social groups. Spivak’s critical engagement with the subaltern studies project brought the work of the collective to the attention first of post-colonial scholars and soon thereafter to scholars and activists on a global scale (Dirlik 1994). Just as post-colonial and then subaltern studies emerged against the backdrop of anticolonial struggles and the era of decolonisation, forced migration studies emerged out of the political struggles of the late 1960s and early 1970s associated with mass dispossession of populations across borders in the same region, this time by the post-colonial states themselves (Desai and Nair 2005). While the category of the subaltern marks an intellectual project that challenges and disrupts the logics of colonialism in order to question Eurocentric constructions of self, nation-state and subjectivity, it has largely been consumed within the matrix of national citizenship. This poses ontological and epistemological problems for the discussion on chronically dispossessed and displaced peoples across national ­borders. Within the juridical exercises of post-colonial state power that deploys and constrains sovereignty as justification for state criminality, imposed displacements,

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volatile borders and coerced exiles confuse and obliterate the critical logic of post-­ colonial studies. In contradistinction, critical reflections on borders and bordering practices seem to hold the promise of rearticulating and reframing questions of place, space, movement and belonging (Escobar 2004). While post-colonial studies in its various forms, subaltern and otherwise, have flourished in the North American academy, it has been less successful at engaging some of the more obvious ‘local’ issues of novel vestiges of coloniality in its surroundings than it has in engaging with history (Desai and Nair 2005). Despite some notable exceptions, relatively little has been said about whether and how the emergence of post-colonial states and governance strategies might fit within the post-­ colonial frame (Samaddar 2017). The incomplete dialogue between post-colonial and contemporary historical perspectives is in part a result of the false periodisation of the ‘post’ in post-colonial, leading to the misleading suggestion that colonialism is ever-present in the same form (McClintock 1992; Shohat 1992). The desire to sign on to a theoretical project that relegates contemporary dilemmas to the past or to fit into models developed as a response to the colonisation of the Indian subcontinent, Africa and Latin America is overwhelming (Dussel 1995, 2000). However, the results are not satisfactory concerning contemporary forms of state governance. The resonance between the categories ‘subaltern’ and ‘post-colonial citizen’ is a matter of urgent convergence and new meaning production, as the relationship between these two categories goes well beyond the question of how to relate two autonomously developing intellectual traditions to each other (Pandey 2008). There are fundamental issues that each of these two key terms orient and frame our investigation about the post-colonial condition. Both concepts name problems of transition, power and relationality. Bringing together the subaltern and the post-colonial citizen could thus take us into the domain of the ‘subaltern citizen’, which in turn is essential for understanding the relationship between borders, dispossession and citizenship in the context of the contemporary phase of the post-colonial condition.

Post-colonial Citizenship Unbound: The New Subaltern While we seek to bring the subaltern into the field of operations of the post-colonial state, the conjunction of subalternity with citizenship is suggestive of claims that are not commensurable with the dominant terms of liberal citizenship. For instance, genealogies of the concept of ‘internal colonialism’ constitute an important entry point for theorising subalternity above and beyond the liberal citizenship. It is not just a form of uneven development within the space of the nation but the category of the ‘internal’ threatens to destabilise the very notion of citizenship as a safe haven of rights and protections. Similarly, the necessary condition of subalternity presents fundamental problems when applied to understanding citizenship precisely because it challenges the presumption of the overarching state authority. Finally, dispossession leads us to the realm of limitation or absence of statutory rights, in other words, the borders. In this last instance, reimagining the temporality of the post-colonial

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state requires us to connect with its spatiality. Indeed, the complex mapping of the controversy around the rights of non-citizens in the post-colonial state is a multifaceted process that involves confronting head on the fact that the logics of governance often lead to contradictory and even incommensurable results. This incommensurability proves central to the dialogue between subalternity and post-colonial citizenship, since it is this very notion of incommensurability that lies at the heart of Spivak’s field-defining essay ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ (Spivak 1988a, 1999; Sunder Rajan 2010). While many scholars in ethnic, indigenous and post-colonial studies have been troubled by the notion that marginalised subjects cannot ‘speak’, here the focus should rather be on the inability of the ordinary citizenry to ‘hear’ voices across from marginalised positions and locations. This would be a salutary shift of analysis from a focus on the conditions of a failed subaltern agency to the production of the conditions of a dominant discourse of citizenship and belonging. The issue is not total relegation of [subaltern] subjects to silence, absence and nonrecognition. Rather, political, legal and socio-cultural forms of partial and distorted reception, the kind that fails to acknowledge the source of the message and fed by the incommensurability that derives from established power dynamics, are what we should pay closer attention to. In effect the modern state [including the post-colonial state] is more than willing to ‘listen in’ on the subaltern through surveillance, biometrics, profiling and reified and fluid forms of border control (Spivak 1988b). Established legal regimes across South Asia also dictate speaking one’s difference within a legislated format to engage with the state. As such, the two parties in question, that of the subaltern, the non-citizen, the stateless, etc., and the post-colonial state, are not equally situated. This aforementioned incommensurability marks the kind of difference yet to be acknowledged and voices though heard but not listened to. Furthermore, the subaltern of the contemporary post-colonial state can fall victim not only to a structural lack of hearing but also to forms of substantive and purposeful mishearing. The rendering commensurable of incommensurability is often done through the identification and recognition of difference only to translate it into a language commensurable with the very state that is structured on the disenfranchisement of fundamental claims of discontent. This political act of consummate translation of difference and dissidence could only be addressed in the larger context of political theory, social theory and ethics as these are applied to the post-­ colonial condition. Revealing the fragility of the sovereign legitimacy of the post-colonial state, subaltern classes with or without citizenship and status refuse to act as political subjects to be contained within its borders. While aware of the risks of substantialising difference as such, we nevertheless must provide a much more variegated narrative of rootedness and belonging that is not locked into citizenship status determined by bordered legal protection regimes. Using the category of the subaltern as a lever for revealing power relations that cluster around different experiences of rights, place and movement, the borderless pursuit of interrogating belonging would push post-colonial scholars to appreciate the saliency of the ­colonial and post-colonial continuum that often mutates into forms of post-colonial nativism and populism in the contemporary era. I thus call for a future-oriented

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articulation of post-colonial identities in South Asia in the name of a new society that would leave behind the European heritage of bordered citizenship as the sole harbinger of rights once and for all. Reinforcing the centrality of questions of time and place to the subaltern articulation of the post-colonial state in South Asia, we must again turn to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s conception of ‘heterotemporality’, a temporal plurality of coterminous cultures. A heterotemporal picture of post-colonial citizenship could harbour multiple positionalities—indigenous and settler, imperialist and subjugated, dominant and subaltern, legal and non-legal, within and at the border. In the spirit of Anita Desai’s call for a located critique to trace the shifting meanings that belonging has had in colonial, post-colonial and neocolonial contexts, the marginalised subaltern provides a vocabulary for capturing the relationships between post-colonial national subjects and its others.5 Instead of simply reading this absence as a displaced sign of post-colonial violence, we could choose to recentre the post-colonial presence as a counterforce to the rising tides of neocolonialism sustained by post-­ colonial states themselves. The heterotemporal copresence of citizen and non-­ citizen actors in the post-colonial registries of belonging is best observed in the disruptive, haunting spectre of the dispossessed, precarious, stateless and sans-­ papiers communities lurking in the shadows of the contemporary post-colonial imaginary of nationhood (Saldanha 2008). If one of the most important tenets of the subaltern approach is the signification of that which the dominant discourse cannot appropriate completely, the dispossessed are the new breed of the subaltern subject with an engrained otherness that resists containment. This radical incommensurability of the subaltern, combined with the recalcitrant presence of dispossession, is situated inside the discourse of power in post-colonial states across South Asia and not outside of it. The new subaltern classes force the post-colonial state to speak in tongues (Prakash 2000), trying to define and redefine its borders with moral and legal failure. Contemporary South Asian collective existence hinges upon this very tension. In conclusion, why the subaltern studies approach can be productive in developing a grounded critique of post-colonial citizenship and where that approach meets its limit are best examined by looking at the post-colonial state’s perpetual failure to contain which cannot be contained. There is more than enough subaltern experience within displaced and dispossessed communities—including statelessness, denial of access to rights, abject poverty and continued political disenfranchisement—but there are also already spaces within those communities where alternative forms of survival and political agency alter the original framework signifying the subaltern. 5  In the ‘The Museum of Final Journeys’, which is the opening novella of Anita Desai’s collection of short fiction, The Artist of Disappearance (2011), the story is about an enigmatic art collection left in a state of ruin and dereliction in an unnamed province of post-colonial India. Yet behind the literary representation of ruins lies a profound meditation on the ethical role of the writer in transmitting the past as a situated critique of the present. As such, Desai addresses the potential of literary works to take care of the past, bring it into the present and preserve it from forgetting and destruction. Desai’s imagery of ruins provides a suggestive exploration of the ethics of post-colonial writing as a form of cultural transmission.

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While marked by exclusions, hierarchies and ambivalences, borders and borderlands in particular are places where a different kind of subaltern might already be emerging. The proximity of the subaltern to the dissident and to the outcast creates new possibilities in terms of politics of citizenship and rights. Displacing the question of whether the subaltern can speak with new projects that acknowledge the coexistence of ongoing colonial legacies, entrenched material inequities and new forms of cultural and political resistance is thus both timely and necessary.

Conclusion As should be apparent from the preceding arguments, both post-colonialism and dispossession are discussions that should be understood within the broader politics of knowledge production, and they emerged out of political developments not just contesting the colonial world order established by European empires but also what comes afterwards in the contemporary era of the post-colonial state (Amin 1985). One of the key issues agitating post-colonial scholars, especially those working on borders, states and citizenship in South Asia, concerns the deep imbrications of the development of modernity and statecraft within the post-colonial framework and the more contemporary realities of colonialism/post-colonialism. The post-colonial matrix of power represents the inextricable combination of the discourse of modernity (progress, development, growth) and the logic of coloniality (poverty, misery, inequality), the latter linked to both contemporary global inequalities and the historical basis of their emergence. Post-coloniality not only redivides the world according to a particular logic of segregation and hierarchy. It also creates specific understandings of power that enable the disappearance of the subaltern and the dispossessed from both theoretical and political considerations. Here we must underline the importance of the relationship between coalitions of resistance and coalitions of understanding, exemplified by the relationship between hierarchies of oppression and politics of knowledge production. The post-colonial critique’s influence within the academy (and further afield) has been as extensive as it has been diverse. The demonstration of how the idea of the universal within European thought is based on the elision of its own particularity, and how this claim is sustained through the exercise of sustenance of material power in the world exposes the ways in which relations of power underpin both knowledge and the possibilities of its production (Zizek 2004; Mignolo 2000a, b). The disruption of standard narratives that reinforce particular conceptualisations of power in the name of a broad humanitarian ethos, including the myth of citizenship, in turn provides resources for the construction of other narratives. Post-colonial citizenship is one such narrative. The necessity of rearticulating understandings of modernity through processes of colonisation and enslavement and the modernity/coloniality paradigm casts a long shadow over post-colonial epistemologies. Post-colonialism and decoloniality are made necessary as a consequence of the depredations of colonialism (Mignolo 2007). Methodologically speaking, they offer

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more than simple opposition. They embody, in the words of María Lugones, the possibility of a new geopolitics of knowledge (Lugones 2011: 742). And yet, at least thus far, the border studies and citizenship nexus heralded different news: the individuated form of post-colonial citizenship has as its correlate the radical absence of both national and regional others embodied by the displaced and the dispossessed and a concurrent denial of the idea of geopolitical relationality (Agnew 2003). We already know that to work with ‘a self-contained version of the West…is to ignore its production by the imperialist project’ (Spivak 1988a: 289). But we still need to listen, hear and learn about the detrimental consequences of a self-contained version of the post-colonial world and, in particular, the post-colonial state and its citizens. This is the very point of deficit and silence where traditions of post-colonialism and decolonial thinking and critique and their radical potential in unsettling and reconstituting standard processes of knowledge production must be reengaged, this time against the very post-colonial state and its construct of citizenship as a boundary project. And it holds considerable power over past and ongoing discussions on citizenship, borders and belonging across South Asia.

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Chapter 3

Citizenship and Membership: Placing Refugees in India Nasreen Chowdhory

Abstract  Citizenship as a concept has transcended to include from individual to group rights, which has been articulated as claims. Similarly,  membership, has expanded to include various dimensions such as culture, legal and group, that stretched the ‘limits of democratic practices’ (Offe C, J Polit Philos 6(2):113– 141, 1998) and institutions (Turner 2001). But, the issue of alienage has remained unresolved especially in the context to the idea of universal citizenship. It questions, the manner in which such boundaries are constructed on the basis of presumed ‘bounded citizenship’. The issue of alienage challenges citizenship on two levels: one, boundary or threshold citizenship and, two, internal question related to the universal idea of citizenship.  Interestingly,  the concept of citizenship has been stretched to accommodate some of the basic developments yet, it has remained individual focused, and the rights of aliens and migrants have remained in the periphery. Sassen S (Br J Sociol 51(1):143–159, 2000) and Soysal Y N (Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994) discuss the issue of postnational citizenship from different perspectives. Sassen argues that postnational citizenship is more broad-based than the concept of denationalised citizenship, as state remains the point of interest, and citizenry rights evolve outside the state, while in denationalised citizenship rights remain within the domains of the state. The task of the chapter is twofold: first, to argue that camp for refugees is no longer exceptional, rather, it is an active political space for refugees to engage with ideas of belonging, and second, it is a place to assert claims of citizenship. Drawing from citizenship discourse, the paper assert that the right-­ based analysis has attempted to engage with noncitizens, and India is no exception to the rule. Keywords  Citizenship · Membership · Refugees · Rights · Camp · India

N. Chowdhory (*) Department of Political Science, University of Delhi, Delhi, India © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 N. Uddin, N. Chowdhory (eds.), Deterritorialised Identity and Transborder Movement in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2778-0_3

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Introduction Citizenship is determined by a kind of “juridical relationship” between the state, territory, and the people residing within the geographical area. Citizenship as a concept has transcended to include individual to group rights, which are often articulated as claims. Similarly,  membership  too, has expanded to include various dimensions including culture, legal and group, which essentially stretched ‘limits of democratic practices’ (Offe 1998) and institutions (Turner 2001). But the issue of alienage has remained unresolved especially in context to the idea of universal citizenship. It questions the manner in which such boundaries are constructed, and on the basis of presumed ‘bounded citizenship’. The issue of alienage challenges citizenship on two levels: firstly, boundary or threshold citizenship and, secondly, the internal question related to the universal idea of citizenship. The finality of citizenship rights is based on a certain degree of membership within the territorial bounds of statehood (Chowdhory 2018). Turner (1990, 189-217) argues that citizenship is not a mere extension of rights brought about by the exchange of the cultural and collective rights of a territorial cultural minority in pursuit of a homogenous nation-­ state; rather, citizenship rights have evolved and become more inclusive.Camps constitute the centrality in the chapter and the manner in which refugees appear to be staking claims while challenging the prevalent norms of the state and questioning the idea of ‘bare life’. The chapter examines the question of rights and perhaps claims of citizenship of those who are considered noncitizens/aliens or refugees in camps. One of the most comprehensive literatures on camp was published  in Forced Migration Review by Barbara Harrell-Bond (1998) that discussed the understanding of camps in forced migration and refugee policy. Harrell-Bond examines the importance of camps in both Global North and South that pointed towards the sustained importance of camp as a space for refugees in receiving assistance and protection yet intended to be a transient space with potential of being problematic, especially if it meant that the continued refugee presence in camps were likely to be ‘eating’ into the resources of citizens. While camps assumed a relatively apolitical space, deprived refugees of opportunities, access to resources also failed to facilitate doing things, right for them. Camp, therefore came into being to temporarily house refugees for a short period of time, while other mechanisms were being worked out. But in reality, such was not the case. Camps assumed a space in forced migration study as an important analytical tool to understand how their existence, become an exception. The chapter interrogates the political membership of inhabitants, especially those who are more rooted in materiality of the camp. This is not to suggest that camp space neutralises form of hierarchies of inclusion and questions of membership; instead it allows inhabitants to negotiate and contest varied notions of belongings through their everyday engagement with the state to seek entitlements for themselves. The chapter engages with the citizenship literature to assert that the right-based analysis has attempted to engage with noncitizens. Furthermore, a case of rights of

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noncitizens like the refugees can be made in light of the theoretical framework. The chapter argues that camp for refugees is no longer exceptional; it is a political space, where refugees tend to engage with ideas of belonging1, and second, it is a place to assert claims of citizenship.

Contextualising the Idea of Camps There are various elements that constitute a standard view of a ‘camp’; these are, effectively, tented cities, supplied wholly from the outside. Richard Black (1998) examines the nuances of camps, an innocuous place, a temporary/transient/place for refugees, leading to encampment of people who had to flee home due to conditions leading to refugee-hood. Edith Bowles (1998) in her article on the Thai-Burma border used the word ‘camp’ to describe both ‘small, open settlements where the refugee communities have been able to maintain a village atmosphere’ and larger, ‘more crowded camps’ where they were ‘more dependent on assistance’. It is the latter that can be distinguished rather than be regarded as ‘settlements’ or even ‘villages’ by their size, density, dependence on external aid and the level of control exercised over inhabitants by national or international authorities. Each of these features of the ‘camp’ has been cited in different reports as the main element that makes ‘encampment’ a bad idea for refugees. But these classic elements of camps are not the only aspects of settlement policy that are problematic. With so many nomenclatures of camps available, it is imperative to make a distinction as to why it is essential to engage with camps. Scholars mentioned above seem to agree on the importance of camps and links between camps, forced migration and rights. In a most unassuming language, scholars agree that the efficacy of camps as a space remains significant; but, over a period of time, camps have dominated the discussion in forced migration as a place to house refugee. Interestingly, political situations in Africa, Middle East and Asia have created the largest refugee camps, be it the exodus of Indo-Chinese or the aftermath of Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. Though camps emerged as a mechanism to assist and protect those in need in the host state, United  Nations  High  Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assisted model aimed to provide assistance to refugee, such as independent social services, infrastructure and migration (Loescher 2001), wherein refugee camps became the primary means of administering sanctuary in Global South. States, readily accepted the encampment strategies, as it conserved scarce resources for their own citizens yet, these forms of segregation helped contain security threats, in some instances. Arguably, camp encompasses territory providing safe haven to refugees which is a segregated space, cut off from the mainland politics and needs of society. On r­ efugee 1  ‘Belonging’ is normally determined on the basis of citizenship rights within a territorially demarcated state. The literature on ‘belonging’ tends to view rights attached to a particular territory and identity (cultural) derived as a result of this. I will draw from the literature on citizenship to understand claims of belonging.

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management, even though inequality exists between the Global North and South, specially on burden sharing (Suhrke 1998) camps have been used as an intermediary mechanism to contain humanitarian crisis from reaching the Global North (Shachnove 1993). Camps remain a problematic area in forced migration studies primarily because of its sway on the discipline and policies that tend to impact various refugees. While in Agamben’s (1998) work on the zone of indistinction emerges quite clearly where the state of exception is, it is the suspension of law that has become the norm. Refugees are those who inhabit terrains, denied access to law, resources, rights – where lives exist in a state of limbo. To borrow from Agamben’s state of exception, the ‘bare life’ and zone of indistinction are refugees deprived of rights, etc., yet the very nature of exception has transformed the abnormal into normal. Refugee subject in camps has become a new normality in everyday existence, where the state subjects its existence from being an abnormal to normal. Interestingly, the relation between refugees and camp is a close one, as one draws legitimacy from the other. Often terms such as ‘human refuse’ (Bauman 2004), ‘pariahs’ (Varikas 2007) and ‘urban outcasts’ (Wacquant 2007) are associated with refugees, who are presumed to be unwanted people contributing towards instability, and a burden to the resource-­ strapped society. ‘If all this continues … camps will no longer be used just to keep vulnerable refugees alive, but rather to park and guard all kinds of undesirable populations’ (Agier 2011: 3). Thus, camp represents the embodiment of refugees, where denial of rights, status and entitlements is the norm. Camp, therefore, can be understood as a space inhabited by illegal/aliens/refugees, etc., and those who lives on the margin, an abnormality that assumes normal existence based on their location of stay. It is in this context that camps represent a new normality to ‘bare life’ wherein the sovereign has suspended its legitimacy. Homi Bhabha (2008: 39) writes, ‘the stateless’, ‘migrant workers, minorities, asylum seekers, [and] refugees’ who ‘represent emergent, undocumented lifeworlds that break through the formal language of “protection” and “status” because’, quoting Balibar, ‘they are neither insiders [n]or outsiders, or (for many of us).… insiders officially considered outsiders’. This captures the essence of migrants and refugee population around the world today. Chakrabarty (2012) suggests that today there are more detention centres around Europe than before, which is the result of state failures connected to a whole series of factors: economic, political, demographic and environmental, i.e. ‘globalization of capital and the pressures of demography in poorer countries brought about by the unevenness of postcolonial development’. Notwithstanding the cause, the reality appears that indeed there are more camps/detentions dotted in Europe and outside. The encampment of refugees is the new reality, especially keeping in mind the meagre resources. A slight point of departure is the African refugee camps where people are perceived to assume certain ‘legal consciousness’, i.e. by developing a special relationship to legal rules, spontaneously claiming for justice or equity and refusing to live in a ‘state of exception’, where they would be deprived of any legal rights (Holzer 2013). In this instance such possibility becomes less, as opportunities to negotiate with the state

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become minimal  and the refugee subject as an agent gets enmeshed into camp ­formation. Thus, camp and refugees have now become the new normal in a much skewed world, with exception becoming the everyday norm of society. Formations such as camps emerge and are closely related to this logic as they are temporary solutions to stop individuals and populations from floating around. In this context camps are often conceived as states of exception, states of transition with little or no social and political rights (employment, property, education) existing. The camp constitutes a space removed from the social, economic and political life and human condition, i.e. what Agamben calls ‘bare life’, to their mere biological condition (Chowdhory 2016a). In some ways, South Asian experiences have been very diverse, and there is a concern that dominant analytical models or approaches may not be very effective in application or reflect the Euro-American contexts. Scholarships either on or emerging from South Asia have begun to engage with the state of exception as a framework (e.g. Das and Poole 2004). Vajpeyi (2007) in particular directly addresses these ideas, which avoids the simplistic criticism of the Eurocentric nature of Agamben’s ideas by bringing his work in dialogue with South Asian categories of sociality and community. When legal techniques facilitate this process, it may seem ironic that the nation-state itself produces illegality to make the legal as seen in debates on illegal immigration (De Genova 2002; Samaddar 1999).

Making Citizens: A View from Within The question is: should refugees be accommodated within the paradigm of citizenship rights? Or should they be accommodated at all within this framework? Marshall’s (1950: 15) theory stipulates a mechanism to make ‘state the servant of individual needs’. It carries a suggestion that the people of the modern state advances citizenship by actively subjecting the state to their needs and demands. However, in order to make any state/government work, individuals have to be politically active. And in demanding the material benefits, which are essence of the economic and social rights described by Marshall, the individual, as citizen of a participatory state, is economically passive. Citizenship rights are accessible to nationals only, and the basis of entitlement to rights is nationality, not necessarily residence. The basic thrust of the citizenship model is to dissociate nationality from citizenship (Bouamama referenced in Silverman 1992: 139). And, a corollary to this is that a person’s ‘natural’ entitlements to rights are deemed to rest within his/her own country of origin, i.e. nationality. Although citizenship right is subsumed under nationality issues, the state has absolute jurisdiction. In the case of refugees, they strive for a lesser rung of the hierarchy, and enjoy some basic rights only. The equation is reversed for refugee or noncitizen category as they lack nationality of the host state, and enjoy those rights stipulated under the international refugee law. Therefore, ascertaining the refugee question through the lens of citizenship is important.

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Benhabib (2004) stands at the middle path on the debates2 of ‘radical universalist’ which tackles about open border and civic republican perspective of ‘thick conception of citizenship’. Benhabib asserts that very little attention has been given to citizenship as a sociological category and as a social practice, and articulate a complex network of privileges, duties and obligations. She argues that citizenship as an institution as well as practice can be disaggregated into three major components: collective identity, privileges of political membership, and social rights and claims. She argues against the theory of citizenship based on the premise of ‘democratic society as a closed and self-sufficient entity’ and declares that the ‘right of exit remains a fundamental right’ along with fundamental human right to admittance (at least), but not necessarily to membership. Therefore, the right to exit is meaningless without the right to admittance, so she demands that a liberal democratic polity must treat the other and stranger in accordance with the internationally recognised norms of human respect and dignity. Benhabib advocates for a voluntarily self-­ incurred obligation on the part of countries through the treatise, as the norms. She argues further that the cosmopolitan norms and popular sovereignty reinforce each other. Furthermore, the spread of cosmopolitical norms aims to protect the human being as a citizen of global civil society regardless of the national citizenship. Therefore, the emergence of global civil society is quite complementary to republican federalism and constitutes the only viable response to the contemporary crisis of sovereignty. Arguably, the noncitizens consist of those who have been denied legality within the ambit of the law of the state; but, they too can pose a challenge. The mere presence of a large number of refugees, migrants and aliens on the soils of a particular state could be perceived as a potential threat to the security and withering away of resources. This line of argument tends to lead to a false notion of refugees being a security threat per se to host society. Rather than viewing them as binary and pitting citizens against the noncitizens, if one was to see them as continuum, then the story would have a different ending. The camps are areas demarcated by the state to house refugees/migrants/aliens in nature of transit camps, can also become a permanent state of exception. While the state remains the focal point to all kinds of rights given to citizenship, it cannot be denied that the mobile people/migrants challenge this norm by their mere prolonged presence and question boundary being a marker of rights. Scholars (such as Balibar 1998: 724; cf. Reed-Danahay and Bretell 2008) reveal that there are ‘routine manifestations of citizenship as both participatory and local in character’. Nira Yuval-Davis (2006) asserts the distinction between ‘belonging as an emotional sense of home and what she calls “the politics of belonging”’. While the discussion tends to move away from emphasising the primacy of the state as supreme authority of rights to those who by the process of claiming making practices assert identity and rights are beyond the nation-state. The everyday practice of citizenship and membership shapes the nomenclature of rights of those who have been dispossessed of their land, of their dignity and of official status. 2  Debate around this conflict has two dominant approaches: ‘radical universalist’ which talks for open border and civic republican perspective of ‘thick conception of citizenship’.

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Rights and Citizenship: The Case of India The changing patterns of population movement and dynamics of citizenship laws affect and reflect the abilities of states in South Asia to consolidate power in postcolonial context  (Chowdhory 2018). Citizenship rules are important boundaries to determine inclusion and exclusion both at the level of individual and of community. Identities of such people are transformed because of their legal position within the state structure. Increasingly national identities are tied to the legal position by virtue of citizenship laws. The postcolonial states in South Asia inherited not only its colonial heritage of the state and institutions but also certain categories of people. These groups of people were Biharis3 in Bangladesh (from East Pakistan to formation of a new state of Bangladesh in 1971), the Chakmas in Arunachal Pradesh (India) and the Estate Tamils4 from southern India into Ceylon, which was later called Sri Lanka. The Chakma were part of the 13 ethnic communities displaced as a result of the creation of the Kaptai Dam in East Pakistan in the mid-1960s. Thousands of

 The Biharis in Bangladesh were part of the West Pakistan’s legacy which was never incorporated within the folds of new created democratic state of Bangladesh. Most of the non-Bengalis were part of nonindependence movement in East Pakistan, and upon creation of the new state of Bangladesh, they were termed as traitors, hence denied any official status or recognition. Since they were sympathisers of Pakistani nationalism and opposed Bengali nationalism, they were de facto stateless in Bangladesh. They continued to live in camps waiting to be repatriated. They are still stranded in camps in the outskirts of Dhaka, at Mirpur and Mohammadpur and more than 20,000 refugees live at densities of ten people or more to a tent. The camp contains a large number of widows and infants. Short-term problems in the camps are not only food and health issues, but they also include some basic amenities like water, sanitation, security, etc. In the event of being repatriated to the state of origin, there seems little possibility that receiving polity would reinstate full citizenship rights. 4  The Estate Tamils were brought to the central part of the island of Sri Lanka by the British starting in 1834 to work on coffee and, later, tea plantations (Valentine 1996, 75). As labourers on the tea estate, they occupied the lowest socio-economic stratum of Sri Lanka’s society, earning lower wages than those in the other sectors of the economy of the island and suffering poorer literacy rates and poorer health and housing compared to the rest of the population (Sahadevan 1995). They are different from the other Tamil population from India who inhabit the north and east of the island. Under the constitutional reforms of 1928, the Estate Tamils were given the right to vote (Weiner 1993, 1153), but since independence in 1948, both the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan Tamils view the Estate Tamils as an opportunist group of ‘unwanted migrants who should return home’ (Weiner 1993, 1159). After independence, the Estate Tamils claimed citizenship under the new Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948. This proved to be a difficult task as most of the Estate Tamil families, who had returned to India to marry and consequently had children, did not have the requisite documents. Furthermore, no official registration of birth existed until 1897 (Peiris 1974, 153). The Ceylon Citizenship Act was soon followed by the Indian and Pakistani Residents Acts of 1949, which seem less draconian than the 1948 legislation in that they provided for a 7- or 10-year period of ‘uninterrupted residence’ in Sri Lanka as a qualification for citizenship. This further disenfranchised the Estate Tamil workers who periodically returned to Tamil Nadu and had no documents to prove 7 or 10 years of ‘uninterrupted residence’. In addition to the residential qualification, applicants needed an assured income that was beyond the reach of the majority of Estate Tamils (Sahadevan 1995, 128). This led to both the disenfranchisement and the denial of citizenship for over 95% of the Estate workers, that is, for over 1 million people Weiner (1993, 1154). 3

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Chakma families fled the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHTs) and entered Arunachal Pradesh and Tripura in 1964. Initially, these displaced people were settled in various camps in Arunachal Pradesh in 1966–1968. Government provided financial and food rations to these refugees. In September 1992, the Union Minister of State for Home stated in a letter to a local member of the Parliament that ‘refugees who came to India between 1964–1971 were eligible for the grant of citizenship’. But, Supreme Court of India gave a ruling that the Chakmas were not entitled to citizenship under Section 6A of the Citizenship Act of 1955, which contains certain special provisions with regard to persons of Indian origin who came to Assam before 1966. These categories of people were disenfranchised and stateless as they continued to remain so for a long time. And the states in these countries failed to incorporate them within the new state apparatus. Most of these people were later denied any political, social rights accorded within the constitutional framework. The Bihari in Bangladesh, Estate Tamils in Sri Lanka (earlier disfranchised were later accorded political recognition) and Chakmas in Arunachal Pradesh continued to exist within the framework of statehood. Walzer (2008) discusses the moral obligations to refugees and how moral dimensions of refugees set them apart from immigrants and others. Walzer defines refugees as people whose moral claims ‘cannot be met by yielding territory or exporting wealth but only taking people in’ (Walzer 2008: 163). The ethical considerations of admission of refugees have been the reference point for philosophers such as Carens (1992) and Nyers (2006) who have stressed on the moral obligations of state vis-à-­ vis refugees. According to Loescher, ‘the majority of refugees are not offered permanent asylum or opportunity to integrate into local communities by most Third World governments. Rather, they are kept separate…’ (1993: 9). The argument of providing hospitality remains an important issue in the postcolonial states. Ideally, the liberal democracies have the obligation to host refugees; however, a similar line of argument has been quite prevalent in the Global South as well. Unlike in the other democracies, refugees in South Asia do not have clear legal status (Chimni 1994). India’s reasons of not signing the 1951 Refugee Convention have much to do with the following: first, the Eurocentric bias of the convention; second, it emphasises on the individual nature of refugee problems which overlooks the unique national imagination and fluid conception of citizenship5; it might even ideologically betray the ‘idea of India’ (Austin, 143–148). Third, the convention overlooks the mixed flow of refugees which has been the experiences of South Asian states. India has long faced mixed migration,6 particularly across its eastern land and sea frontiers 5  The existence of multiple nationalities in one country has tempered the citizen-alien dichotomy, making it easier for refugees to find shelter in India. That inclusivity was exemplified by the former Foreign Secretary and National Security Adviser the late J.N. Dixit’s response to Lhotshampa refugees staying in India instead of returning to Nepal: ‘Mother India will take care of them’. (M. P. Lama, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Address at the UNHCR Seminar on Refugee Protection: New Challenges) (June 19, 2006). 6  Mixed migration flows include refugees, asylum seekers, economic and environmental migrants, victims of trafficking and others. Their reasons for migrating may range from a single or many ‘push’ or ‘pull’ factors or a combination of them. Push factors include targeted persecution, gener-

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(UNHCR 2011). And finally, India strongly feels that ‘burden sharing provisions’ should be part of the convention. Interestingly, the 1971 refugee crisis wherein UNHCR contributed between 120  million and 183  million US dollars (Myard 2010), India was forced to ask its citizens to pay a special tax to tide over the crisis (Ganguly and Miliate 2015). Notwithstanding the reasons of non-accession to the Refugee Convention, refugees experience a certain degree of vulnerability in the absence of laws. The refugee status is determined by the law of the host country, i.e. in India the Foreigners’ Act of 1940 can be applied (Chimni 1994: 379).7 The Union Legislature (Parliament) has sole jurisdiction over the subject of citizenship, naturalisation and aliens. India has not passed any refugee-specific legislation to regulate the entry and status of refugees, rather, it handles the influx of refugees at the political and administrative levels. As a result, refugees are treated under the law applicable to aliens.8 Refugee determination process is much more centralised and viewed through the prism of national security. The definition of refugee is based on clarity and understanding of ‘one who is outside the country of nationality (or even habitual residence) due to one of the five conditions, i.e. well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of religion, race, nationality or membership of a political or social group’.9 In case of India, the decision of refugee determination is not based on either individual or group, rather it is viewed as bilateral issue between the country of origin and asylum. Most of these ‘refugees’ are viewed as foreigners, and UNHCR has the task of granting them assistance and protection. Interestingly, though these refugees or foreigners lack official/legal status in India, they appear to have some of their rights protected by the Constitution of India. There are some articles stipulated within the constitution which are equally applicable to refugees (Article 14, right to equality; Article 21, right to personal life and liberty; and Article 25, the freedom to practise and propagate one’s own religion of the constitution are guaranteed to citizens and noncitizens alike). The Indian Supreme Court has also taken the view that the rights of foreigners are not to be limited to Article 21, i.e. ‘protection of life and personal liberty – no persons shall be deprived of his life or alised or disparate incidents of violence, real or perceived threats and environmental degradation. Pull factors include economic opportunities, political freedoms and educational opportunities. Migrants in a mixed flow may travel by air, land, sea or a combination of them. Refugees and migrants often utilise the same means of transportation, which are often illegal, and travel together (See generally UNHCR, Mixed Migration, available at http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/mixed-migration.html). 7  Although the word ‘aliens’ is nowhere defined, it appears in the Constitution of India (Art. 22 part 3 and Entry 17, List I, Schedule 7) in Section 83 of the Indian Civil Procedure Code and in section ‘Making Citizens: A View from Within’ (2) (b) of the Indian Citizenship Act of 1955, as well as some other statutes. Several acts are of relevance to the regulation of aliens in India including the Foreigners’ Act of 1946; the Registration Act, 1939; Passport (Entry into India) Acts, 1967; etc. 8  Khudiram Chakma had approached the Supreme Court when his life was threatened within the state of Arunachal Pradesh. The Supreme Court observed that ‘the fundamental right of the foreigner is confined to Article 21 for life and liberty and does not include the right to reside and settle in this country as mentioned in Article 19 (1) (e) which is applicable only to citizens of this country. 9  See Art. 1(A) (2) of the 1951 Convention on Refugees.

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personal liberty except by procedure established by law’ (Saxena 1986). Moreover, the Constitution of India entails the essential provisions to safeguard and protect (in spirit) the principle of non-refoulement. Article 21 of the constitution requires that the state shall not expel or return a refugee ‘in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion’.10 Refugees in India do not have any official legal status to determine their rights and duties. Given the lack of any special treatment, refugees are neither pushed back nor denied access. Also given the geographical proximity between neighbours and porous borders in the region, countries are often left with little option but to adopt relevant measures necessary to accept and ‘protect’ refugees and provide assistance. The Tamils from Sri Lanka sought refuge in mid-1980s and the Tibetans in the 1950s. Interestingly, most refugees in India have been residing in camps. And the paradoxical understanding of camp is viewed to be the state of exception. The Sri Lankan  Tamil refugees in Tamil Nadu have a curious story. According to the Department of Rehabilitation, Government of Tamil Nadu, 115 camps are there in Tamil Nadu. These refugees had entered India as a result of ongoing conflict in Sri Lanka. The Tamil refugees entered India in phases; during the first phase, 134,053 (Kumar 1989) Tamil refugees sought asylum in Tamil Nadu. In the second phase, 122,00011 Tamils entered India. Most of the Tamil refugees were housed in various government-managed camps in Tamil Nadu. The registered refugees were allowed to reside in camps, and the ‘unregistered’ Tamil refugees resided with relations and friends in Tamil Nadu. Nearly 115,680 refugees reside in camps in Tamil Nadu. The third wave of refugee flow began in 1995 in which 20,196 Sri Lankan Tamils fled Sri Lanka.12 The number of non-camp refugees is not accurate because not all of them have registered – the actual number could vary between 35,000 and 45,000.13 In relation to assistance provided to refugees, the families were divided into different camps located in different districts in Tamil Nadu, and each family receives a settling-in allowance from the Government of Tamil Nadu, some basic cooking utensils, etc., as assistance. Often, the allowances consist of food items (rice, oil, salt, dal, dry chillies and dry fish on some occasions), clothing items (during festivals) and, in some cases, cash. Despite the abovementioned lack of rights, refugees in these camps have somewhat adapted themselves to the state assistance provided in forms of daily ration, financial assistance, etc. Refugee treatment varies in India: first, on the nature of the  Article 33 paragraph (1) of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.  Government of Tamil Nadu, Finance Department, Policy Note: Demand No 42, Miscellaneous 1996–97 (Madras 1996). 12  It is imperative to note that most of these Sri Lankan refugees entering India were much poorer compared to those who sought refuge in the West. Some of these refugees who had relatives in India avoided being registered and never lived in camps. The Tamils who lived in camps were mostly registered refugees. 13  Department of Rehabilitation, Government of Tamil Nadu. 10 11

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reception provided to refugee groups; second, on the methods adopted to manage refugee camps, some of which were relatively under the control of the provincial government, while others were directly controlled by the central government; and third, on the degree of the ethnic affinity between the host population and the refugee communities (Chowdhory 2016b). The states in South Asia region have no formal policies towards refugees; neither do they have any official repatriation policy. Refugees in India fall under the law of the land without any special rights or status. Since India has no official policies or determination processes, refugees are subjected to the arbitrary behaviour of state processes and officials (Chowdhory 2007). The conception of exceptionality draws strength from those residing within that defies being passive bodies and transforms it to be a politicised space, staking claims, as citizen. Much of the literature on citizenship draws its source or legitimacy from state and stateness. And citizenship can be understood as a category that the state bestows but has the ability to be inclusive and transcend to include from individual to group rights, often, articulated as claims/claim-making. The conception of state membership primarily nationality-based creates a sense of bounded community, where the centrality and foci is the state. Though the primacy of the nation-state remains supreme, globalisation and multiculturalism assert that the state borders have become less consequential; hence, state-based understanding of membership is fading out. Some have argued nation-states are now forced to recognise rights which are much more broad-based due to globalisation (Sassen 1996). Sassen (2000) and Soysal (1994) discuss the issue of postnational citizenship from different perspectives. Sassen argues postnational citizenship is more broad-based than the concept of denationalised citizenship, as state remains the point of interest, citizenry rights evolve outside the state, while denationalised citizenship is when citizenship rights remain within the domains of the state. While the debate appears to be dominated by the concept of denationalised and postnational, it subsumes citizenship as universal rights by virtue. The concept of bordered identities, De Genova (2002) argued, appreciate how exclusions, as realised through technologies of exclusion such as border policing and enforcement, also perform inclusionary work. The nature of ‘inclusionary work’ is inseparable to the processes of migrant illegalisation and the subordination of migrant labour. Thus, through the process of juxtaposing the scene of exclusion to the ‘obscene of inclusion’, the conventional notions of ‘belonging’ and membership can be viewed which allow us to see not only the ‘necropolitical extremities’ of regulatory regimes of border policing but also the biopolitical regularities that they produce – above all, the ‘irregularity’ of ‘irregular’ migration. Citizenship is a tool used to exclude those who seek to participate and who need recognition within the statist framework. Though existing at the fringes of the state, refugees/immigrants/stateless need to be recognised. I contend that refugees can make claims on the basis of their denationalised identity. Bosniak (2000), Sassen (1994, 1999), Soysal (1994) and Benhabib (2004) make claims that the ‘national state’ tends to interpret rights based on nationality, and that, presently, there is a need to assert rights beyond nationality. The politics of belonging in most countries

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is based on membership criteria that determine the nature of the rights of each ­individual within a demarcated geographical territory. India, too, determines citizenship based on nationality. In other words, to be considered an Indian, a person has to be born to Indian parentage or be a blood relation. The rules of admission for citizenship are determined at birth, i.e. jus soli, and domicile principle, that is, jus domicile. Membership and citizenship are legal statuses provided to individuals that reside within the territorial boundaries of the state. Refugees and aliens are marginalised categories outside the domain of citizenship in the asylum state. The refugees perceive a sense of ‘belonging’ to the host country and the host population as a result of shared ethnicity and culture and by virtue of their deterritorialised identities (Chowdhory 2018). But, at the same time, the perception of the asylum state that refugees imply ‘temporary’ status or ‘uprootedness’ is a disadvantage to the interests of the refugees. Moreover, the assertion that refugees are ‘uprooted’ and ‘alien’ in regards to identity describes the precarious status of refugees in the asylum state. Therefore, the noncitizens, like citizens, can make claims to belonging, as there exists a correlation between the identities of people residing within a territory and the sense of belonging they derive from it. People residing in a territorially demarcated area tend to derive their identity based on their sense of belonging to that territory. The sense of belonging in turn depends on a perceived sense of attachment to a certain land and a resulting identity. Soguk (1999: 293) asserts refugees or ‘moving people’ tend to ‘transgress political or cultural borders’ and seek to ‘reaffirm’ the proposed boundaries of belonging. But statist assert that refugees claims on belonging remain outside the ensemble of rights, and prioritise against according similar rights to the noncitizens. In a general sense, the capacity of individuals to move into or away from a state effectively challenges the capacity of the state to control the ‘status of the border’. In a practical sense, migration empowers those who move as they challenge the government’s ability to impose ‘difference’ by patrolling the ‘dynamics of bodies’ in the border which are seen as ‘moving bodies’ represent a cluster of people in search of transcontinental rights. But states determine the characteristics of belonging within a geographically demarcated territory and provide rights to those who are legally entitled to belong. Moreover, membership rights can be extended by the state to those wanting to conform to certain state practices, which denotes certain  kind of exclusion, as opposed to belonging within the domain of state by virtue of being born within the statehood structure. Membership can also be extended to a particular community as part of the existing sense of belonging, but it still remains exclusive. Bosak (2003) argues two issues are different as one ‘advocates principles of inclusion (when citizenship is associated with rights, while the other denotes exclusion, when membership is associated with community)’. Soysal (1994: 159) contends that there appears to be two elements of citizenship, rights and identities. She observes, ‘in the postwar era these two elements are decoupled. Rights increasingly assume universality, legal uniformity, and abstractness, and are defined at global level. Identities in contrast express certain particularity when conceived of as a territorially bounded. As an identity, national citizenship – as it is promoted, reinvented, reified by states and other social actors – still prevails’. I agree with Bosak’s analysis that membership

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within community can be denied if one does not politically belong to the state. In other words, belonging to a group based on identity markers can be difficult. On one level, members may belong to a particular group but will be denied political rights; hence such belonging remains confined within the framework of social membership only. Yuval-Davis (1999) views citizenship as multilayered construct where each layer (local ethnic, national, cross, etc.) can interact but remains as collective. Therefore, citizenship issue should be seen beyond the bounds of the nation-state and can be seen as a slippery concept (Hassmann and Walton Roberts 2015). While asserting that claim-making and denial of such claims have its root in the state-centric policies and rights in South Asia, often this is reflected in strategies of preferential treatment to a few refugee communities. Also the relation between territory, membership, rights and geography is quite a complex web. Despite the idea of citizenship being contentious and political, the question of accommodating refugees within the paradigm of citizenship rights has puzzled many scholars. Citizenship is a political activity wherein an individual seeks to acquire political identity, rights and status, especially when the individual has crossed an international border. State attempts to bestow this privilege on members thereby either including or excluding the person from a political community. The question become complex when border crossers seek this privilege on the basis of deterritorialised identities and membership within a community. In the citizenship literature, scholars have debated on the significance of membership and the ability to accommodate the changes that globalisation has brought to the world. The membership issue within citizenship literature is predominantly based on legal and formal acceptance of members within the state. States tend to determine membership based on nationality. The globalised literature tends to be optimistic on the reach of the state in determining nationalised-based rights, as the role of the state is decreasing. However, the traditional approach to citizenship is limited to a ‘formal national membership’, which tends to prioritise the rights of members over those of non-members. While the concept of citizenship rights has expanded from an approach that is based on the individual to one that may include group-based demands, the trajectory of the change nonetheless overlooks the need to include the category of noncitizens. It has failed to acknowledge the rights of the stateless and non-nationals, aliens and refugees (Sassen 1999). Bosniak (2000) concurs that previous theories of citizenship overlooks the immigrant ‘alien’ context of citizenship.14 Soysal (2000) argues that ‘decoupling in citizenship between rights and identity’ is necessary to understand claims beyond nationality. Identity-based claims tend to be more particularistic in nature. Brubaker (1998: 132) argues that it is impossible to ‘decouple’ the rights and the identity aspects of citizenship. For Brubaker, rights and identity are interconnected within citizenship, while the politics of citizenship is about nationhood that fashions and shapes the distinctive kinds of political social membership. Another school of thought focuses on the decreasing role of the state due to globalisation. But the state on the other hand will negate such claim and suggest that the universal norms of citizenship can be challenged, and typically a noncitizen represent 14

 I am grateful to Linda Bosniak for proposing the problem of alienage.

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the justifiable exception to this norm (Bosniak 2017). Often noncitizens are reduced to ‘bare life’ in quest to have citizenship rights which focus on territory and statedetermined rights. The noncitizens in liberal democracies may experience rights as citizens but will not conform to the rights, duties and responsibilities of citizens. The prominent feature is the idea of border and how the state appears to play a constitutive role and territorialisation of rights with the structure of statehood. Yet, noncitizens are the ramification and product of state borders and attempts to make claim on the basis of their deterritorialised identities. Refugees in camps are often reduced to bare life as a result of lack of political and social rights. In the words of Arendt (2003: 150), people are reduced to rightless, as they belong ‘to no internationally recognisable community whatever’ and thus outside ‘of mankind as a whole’. However, in the discussion below, it is evident that despite the Indian state not being a signatory to the Refugee Convention, it has adopted certain principles of admission perhaps to address some of the core concerns of refugee families. Moreover, issue of agency appears to be also emerging in the camps of Tamil Nadu where the Tamils of Sri Lanka are housed. Some of the welfare schemes provided to refugee families in Tamil Nadu indicate that the state took cognizance of the needs of refugee population and accorded assistance. The government of Tamil Nadu has adopted various social welfare schemes to provide pension to older people, along with making educational funds to girl children in camps. Under the Social Welfare, the Indira Gandhi National Old Age Scheme (IGNOAPS), Indira Gandhi National Widow Pension Scheme (IGN-WPS) and Indira Gandhi National Pension Scheme (IGN-DPS) have been adopted that revised from 65 to 60 years of age. In accordance to the revised norms prescribed by the Government of India under IGOPS, IGN-WPS and IGN-DPS, those 60 and above belonging to a household below the poverty line shall be eligible, and second, under IGN-WPS, 40–59 years of age and belonging to a household below the poverty line would be eligible. The disability pension scheme would be applicable to those belonging to 18–59  years of age and belonging to a household below the poverty line  (Chowdhory 2016b). The everyday lives of older refugees in Tamil Nadu demonstrate that through intermittent governmental action, the refugees have attempted to transform their existence. The camp sites have been transformed into political space, where policies of government impact these changes. The social scheme such as pension for older refugees that was previously unheard by most refugees, in a minimalist sense was provided to refugees, and with active intervention from the refugee families. Though these refugees have been provided assistance and protection, their rights seem non-existent. Residing in camps effectively cuts refugees from the ‘common world’. This kind of exclusion is problematic as it is occurring in the state of suspension where the law exists only for refugees and transgressors. The formal exclusion of refugees ceases their identities in India. The nature of assistance provided by the Government of India via the Tamil Nadu government seems to be telling another story. Agamben terms this as inclusive exclusion, i.e. a form on abandonment of the state. But, refugees do not just exist as passive bodies; rather, they make claims in raising their voices vis-à-vis state discrimination and in cases of untimely assistance, etc. As in the case of Sri Lankan

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Tamils in India, more so for them, some of these social benefits address the core concerns of humanitarian needs but cannot be presumed to be the norm. Interestingly, Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in camps contest the idea of exceptionality, views it as politicised space; that creates opportunities to engage with the state, thereby making it possible to go beyond exceptionality and more rights. Camprefugees use the spatial space of camps as an arena wherein a sense of belonging allow refugees to a social and political terrain where rights and entitlement and obligations are re-shaped, activated by everyday interactions. The journey from marginality to recognition is a very minor step in the case of Tamil refugees, an inadvertent fall out of the socio-economic welfare policies of the government, which broke the age-old norms of family tradition, thereby paving way to transform the camp and voices from within.The Indian state does not accord similar benefits to other refugees and often is treated in an ad hoc manner, leaving it to the whims of the administrative decisions of officials to assist and manage refugees. Given the focus of the South Asian state is to contain and refuse entry to refugees and migrants who have crossed or  overstay in camps (as segregated from the city), refugees chooses to make claims to certain rights. In some instances, the Sri Lankan Tamils and Tibetan refugees have been enjoying certain modicum of privileges as opposed to Afghan and other refugees. However, such yardsticks of uneven rights do not augur well for the future, as the Indian state refuses to assign any specific standard of rights and privileges to all refugees. Instead, the state has chosen to look the other way and accord rights on a case-by-case basis. In the case of Tamils from Sri Lanka, in the state of Tamil Nadu, refugees have been residing for nearly two generations. They have received education and earn modest forms of livelihood have expressed their desire to be allowed to work in India. Furthermore, the young refugees have expressed their desire to have a certain modicum of rights within India that would facilitate their mobility outside Tamil Nadu. Some of these refugees are young advocates, doctors and professionals who despite being specialized feel inadequate and would like to join the work force. But, it remains to be seen how the government of India would address these demands as expressed by the Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka (Chowdhory 2016b). 

Conclusion The chapter examined the idea of citizenship and membership among refugees and noncitizens in India. Through a theoretical lens, the chapter argued that despite the statist dominance over the citizenship literature, noncitizens too, by their very existence, can seek to make claims of belonging in countries of asylum by virtue of being members of the community. While citizenship does have an intimate relationship with the state, it is a divided concept (Bosniak 2006: 5). And the idea that citizenship is a divided concept evokes possibility of rights of noncitizens, as it may not be incommensurable to question of rights of aliens and noncitizens. In India, refugee rights appear to be non-existent on paper, yet in practices, interesting

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claim-making seems to be occurring, as in the case of the Sri Lankan Tamils in Tamil Nadu. Elsewhere, I have argued that communities especially refugee communities can make claims on the basis of their idea of belonging and their deterritorialised identities in South Asia (Chowdhory 2018). The South Asia scenario stands out quite unique in this case as refugees by virtue of their deterritorialised identity seek to decouple their notion of belonging and rights. And shared ethnicity and identities make refugee communities vulnerable to make right-based claims in India.

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Sassen, S. (2000). New frontiers facing urban sociology at the Millennium. British Journal of Sociology, 51(1), 143–159. Saxena, J. (1986). Legal status of refugees: The Indian position. Indian Journal of International Law, 26, 501–515. Sigano, N. (2014). Campzenship: reimagining the camp as a social and political space. Citizenship Studies, 19(1), 1–15. Silverman, M. (1992). Deconstructing the nation: Immigration, racism and citizenship in modern France. London: Routledge. Soguk, N. (1999). States and strangers: Refugees and displacements of statecraft. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Soysal, Y. N. (1994). Limits of citizenship: Migrants and posnationalist membership in Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Soysal, Y.  N. (2000). Citizenship and identity in post war Europe. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 23(1), 1–15. Suhrke, A. (1998). Burden-sharing during refugee emergencies: The logic of collective versus national action. Journal of Refugee Studies, 11(4), 395–415. Turner, B. (1990). Outline of a theory of citizenship. Sociology, 24, 89–217. Turner, B. (2001). Outline of a cultural theory of citizenship. In N. Stevenson (Ed.), Culture and Citizenship (pp. 11–33). London: Sage. Turner, J. C. (2005). Explaining the nature of power: A three-process theory. European Journal of Social Psychology, 35(1), 1–22. UNHCR. (2011). UNHCR global appeal 2011 update: India. Retrieved May 28, 2018, from www. unhcr.org: http://www.unhcr.org/4cd96e919.pdf Vajpeyi, A. (2007). Prolegomena to the study of people and places in modern India. New Delhi: WISCOMP. Valentine, D. (1996). Chapters in the anthropology of violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Varikas, E. (2007). The outcasts of the world: Images of the pariah. Paris: Stock. Wacquant, L. (2007). Urban outcasts: A comparative sociology of advanced marginality. Cambridge: Polity Press. Wagner, S.  M. (1993). Political asylum, immigration and citizenship in federal republic of Germany. New Political Science, 24–25, 59–73. Walzer, M. (2008). On promoting democracy. Ethics & International Affairs, 22(4), 351–355. Weiner, M. (1993, August 21). Rejected Peoples and Unwanted Migrants in South Asia. Economic & Political Weekly, 28(34), 1737–1746. Yuval-Davis, N. (2006). Belonging and the politics of belonging. Patterns of Prejudice, 40(3), 197–214.

Chapter 4

Culture of Migration: State-Society Relations and Transborder Mobility in Northern Sri Lanka Eva Gerharz

Abstract  Transborder migration from northern Sri Lanka does not only have a long history reaching back to colonial times but mounted high as ethnic relations became more tense. During the war between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), transborder migration became a viable option at least for the more affluent members of society. This resulted into the formation of strong transnational social ties, which were eventually facilitated by the Tamil Tigers but which also offered new opportunities for imagining one’s own future as well as the future of the region once the conflict had been put to a halt. Even though Sri Lanka’s (post-)conflict situation has ushered in a new area which is marked by the absence of warfare, tensions and ambiguous relationships vis-à-vis the state continue. Based on this observation, this chapter will argue that the conflict and conflict-induced migration have produced specific conditions under which mobility continues to be among the major means to achieve individual aspirations and better future. It will further show how this dynamic impinges on the local society, how it influences prospects for (re-)development and what the implications for sustainable peace might be. Keywords  Migration · Transborder · Mobility · State-society · Sri Lanka

Introduction On February 22, 2018, the Australian Government announced the Sri Lankan Tamil Shantaruban would be deported back to Sri Lanka. Shantaruban had come to Australia by boat in 2012 claiming he fled Sri Lanka fearing repercussions from the national government for his involvement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the separatist group that fought against the Sri Lankan Army for almost

E. Gerharz (*) Department of Social and Cultural Sciences, University of Applied Sciences, Fulda, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 N. Uddin, N. Chowdhory (eds.), Deterritorialised Identity and Transborder Movement in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2778-0_4

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three decades until they were finally defeated in May 2009. Shantaruban had been an active and senior member of the LTTE, working as a boatbuilder for their naval wing, the Sea Tigers.1 As The Guardian continues to report in an article dated February 12, 2018, despite the Sri Lankan Government’s victory over the separatist movement and the subsequent pacification of the formally war-raged island, serious concerns have been raised by the UN and other organisations over the deportation of Tamil migrants back to Sri Lanka. Returning migrants with links to the LTTE in particular are potential targets for the security forces, and there have been widespread reports of mistreatment and torture in Sri Lankan prisons (The Guardian, February 20, 2018).2 Although the fear of being detained and tortured by security forces in Sri Lanka may have urged some Tamils, especially those who had been involved in separatist activities, to consider migration as an exit option even after the end of the war, the reasons for continuing emigration, especially from the mainly Tamil areas of Sri Lanka, are much more complex. Like in many parts of the world, emigration has become a viable strategy to meet and realise individual and collective aspirations for a better future. In places with long histories of emigration and established diasporic communities in the global north, as is the case for Sri Lankan Tamils, images of a better life elsewhere are widespread. In Sri Lanka, these aspirations for a better future elsewhere are deeply entrenched in a specific historical context, one which is characterised not just by the omnipresent fear of the resurgence of terrorist activities but one which reflects complicated relationships between state(-ness) and society. This chapter proposes to understand migration from Sri Lanka, particularly from the Tamil majority-populated north, as a process which is characterised by a certain continuity, even as the reasons for migration and the patterns of movement have changed repeatedly over time. This continuity is marked by an institutionalisation, i.e. the manifestation of certain values and expectations or, in the sense of Berger and Luckmann (2007 [1966]), concepts and mental representations which become habituated in reciprocal societal relationships. As a result, people’s conceptions and beliefs of what reality is, and consequently, how their lives could be formed and organised, become embedded in the institutional fabric of society. Thus, migration becomes an expectation which feeds into individual aspirations, especially of young people. The constitution of transnational fields or social spaces which have been consolidated in the era of globalisation contributes to this pattern, because they enable emigrants to still be present in the social lives of remaining local people (see Smith 1999; for Sri Lanka, Gerharz 2014). To describe and theorise this phenomenon, Kandel and Massey (2002) have introduced the notion of a ‘culture of migration’.

 https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/feb/21/tamil-asylum-seeker-to-be-deportedafter-un-committee-withdraws-torture-concerns 2  https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/06/torture-sri-lanka-many-times-i-wouldlose-consciousness/; http://imadr.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Written-Statement_ HRC-21st-session_Human-Rights-Abuses-in-Sri-Lankan-Prison-2012.pdf 1

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This chapter  seeks to investigate the nexus between the Sri Lankan state and migratory movements of Tamils from the northern part of the island by tracing the various ways in which continuous migratory movements have influenced the state and vice versa. By providing a broad sketch of recent historical developments, we assume that migration is a pattern which cannot be attributed to purely economic or political reasons alone and that in fact such differentiations are irrelevant. Rather, it is continuity and the resulting institutionalisation which are decisive. As a consequence, migration becomes a habitualised practice which is reproduced through the formation of transnational social spaces. The chapter  will show that over time, migration has been reinforced by the nation-state’s exclusionary policies and their ‘offspring’, for example, the continuing outbreaks of anti-minority violence or systematic discrimination through laws and policies. In the current post-war situation, oppression by state organs, e.g. security forces and the military, reinforces large-­ scale emigration. Interestingly, the formation and consolidation of transnational social spaces involving Tamils were largely driven originally by the LTTE in order to support and strengthen its state-building project. Thanks to its efforts to mediate community formation processes in the receiving countries, the organisation could make use of the so-called diaspora Tamils to help with the building up of institutions. As more recent developments show, this process continues despite the absence of LTTE activities within Sri Lanka itself. After some opening conceptual remarks and a glimpse into the history of Jaffna, this chapter details three different forms in which state(-ness) has shaped migration. Firstly, it examines the postcolonial state, which actively promoted the exclusion of ethnic minorities under an ultranationalist ideology. Quite clearly, exclusionist policies and outbreaks of violence triggered waves of migration in different periods. The second part deals with the experiments with stateness on behalf of the LTTE, which managed to establish a de facto state in the areas under its control during the period of armed conflict. As will be shown in the analysis, this experience was marked by a remigration on a more or less temporary basis during the ceasefire between 2002 and 2006  – a period in which an absence of fighting and, at least initially, a willingness to negotiate a sustainable peace offered new avenues for reconstruction and development. The third form in which state-migration relations gain yet another aspect is the ways in which an enduring militarisation in the post-­ war period shapes individual and collective prospects for a better future. Based on an analysis of the long history of emigration from northern Sri Lanka, this chapter concludes by asking whether it would be appropriate to speak of a ‘culture of migration’ that provides a basis for continuing migratory movements and if reconciliation efforts might potentially include attempts to alter such trends. The material for this chapter is based on an extensive literature review as well as primary data which was collected during extensive fieldwork in 2002 and 2004.

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Colonialism and State Formation When the island known as Ceylon was granted independence in 1948, it was considered a promising case of successful development. Economic development had reached new highs with the plantation sector flourishing, and politically the newly independent state was considered to be ‘developed’, with a political class representing the interests of its citizens as well as stable institutions. However, various scholars have argued that colonial interventions had already initiated the formation of ethnic divides. In line with postcolonial thinking, Rajasingham-Senanayake points out that ethno-religious imaginations were gradually constructed by means of colonial census measures on the island, which had been previously known as a place of multi-cultural and hybrid diversity (Rajasingham-Senanayake 1999). Like cases elsewhere, the fixing of identity categories on the basis of ‘race’ and later ‘ethnicity’ was an integral part of the British administration. At the same time, the formation of government polity was prone to processes of ethnicisation. These perspectives concerning ethnic and racial differences were then formalised, as shown by Nissan and Stirrat (1990) who deal with how legal and political procedures during colonialism were shaped by the belief that cultural and social differences were biological facts. Additionally, colonial administrators tried to institute customary practices into the country’s legal system. This codification reified ethnic groups and the differences between them. The racial composition of society, as seen by the colonisers, led to the formation of political institutions on the basis of communal representation. Through the formalisation of cultural differences, pre-existing heterogeneities were given an established form within the colonial society. Although the Donoughmore Constitution in 1931 granted universal suffrage with officially strict ethnicity blindness, the continued existence of the Legislative Council of Ceylon, founded in 1833 and constituted on the basis of ethnicity (Sabaratnam 2001: 127), in fact further consolidated ethnic divides (Wickramasinghe 2006: 166). This was because policymakers believed that representation on a communal basis was detrimental to political progress and stability and that the new constitution could destroy the already existent ethnic communalism. As a result, political decisions were increasingly negotiated on an ethnic basis, because the existing minority-majority relations between the Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors and other ethnic groups gave rise to fears about the consolidation of power hierarchies within Sri Lankan state and society. Tamil politicians in particular adopted a position based primarily on racial and cultural differences. Having become a minority party in the state councils, Tamil politicians started to promote a form of federalism in order to counter the influence of the numerically dominant ethnic group, the Sinhalese. Such attempts to counter communalism, however, backfired. Instead, group relations became a matter of ‘ethnic perceptions’ (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 2007: 320). The relationship between Tamils and the state became increasingly problematic as the Sinhala Buddhist politicians consolidated their power during the decolonisation process (Wickramasinghe 2006: 143).

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State-formation processes were accompanied by a comprehensive transformation of the island’s economy. The consolidation and expansion of the tea plantation sector coincided with an improvement of communication structures between the centrally located up-country and the coast, especially in the Western Province. Here, the city of Colombo developed into the economic and political centre of Ceylon and offered new opportunities for emerging elites who benefitted from the growing influence of capitalism and market orientation (see Jayawardena 2003). For other regions such as the mainly Tamil-inhabited Jaffna peninsula in the very north, however, these processes brought with them an increasing marginalisation. Jaffna had been among the first colonial trading settlements established by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century. Close to India and with rich fishery resources, the peninsula was also attractive for strategic reasons. Nevertheless, it remained closer to Southern India than to the island’s mainland, where early colonisation efforts had hardly permeated beyond the coastal areas.

Migration from Jaffna: A Historical Perspective Although Sri Lankan refugee movements, especially those between the 1980s and 2000s, suggest that migration is a relatively recent phenomenon and connected with the conflict, and thus represents an ideal case of forced migration, the Jaffna peninsula in particular reflects a long history of out-migration. These movements of people actually began during colonial times, when political and economic changes triggered large-scale societal transformations. The relative detachment of Jaffna from the mainland was reinforced by subsequent colonisers, i.e. the Dutch (1640–1796) and from the late eighteenth century onwards the British. However, what had previously evolved due to strategic and economic advantage increasingly turned into a disadvantage because the peninsula remained excluded from the comprehensive transformations taking place in Ceylon due to the development of the tea plantation sector in the South. Only in the mid-­ nineteenth century were Tamils in Jaffna encouraged to engage more in the commercial economy due to the introduction of an export duty under the Colebrooke reforms. This step, along with the construction of a railway line connecting Jaffna with the mainland (Thiranagama 2012), had large-scale effects. The fact that missionary activities had triggered the development of a ‘public’ with the construction of the Jaffna library, the establishment of reading rooms and an evolving newspaper business also affected people’s attitudes towards education and solidified it as the prerequisite for finding alternatives to agricultural production (Hellmann-­ Rajanayagam 1990). This transformation in the importance of education was aggravated by competition in the quality of education provided by Christian and Hindu institutions. While Christian missionaries vied with each other with their English-­ medium and Western-style educational facilities, they were increasingly countered by a local activism inspired by Hindu Saivanism. This new school of thought, promoted by A. Navalar, was thought of as a counter-model to Christianity and spread

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mainly through English-medium schools (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1989). High-­ caste-­dominated Jaffna thus became a pioneer in promoting the Tamil language and Tamil culture in the late nineteenth century and was highly recognised in the Tamil-­ inhabited areas on the Indian subcontinent (Wickramasinghe 2006: 255). This intellectual advancement was accompanied by the emergence of Tamil political elites, who increasingly sought representation of Tamil concerns at a political level on the island. This political participation also benefitted from intensifying translocal interconnectedness, particularly with Tamil populations in the commercial centres in the South, above all in Colombo, where Tamils congregated in enclaves and which were considered at the time to be good neighbourhoods by the more diverse Sinhalese population (Tambiah 1986: 105). Intensifying translocal interconnectivities were mainly the result of the increase in migratory movements from Jaffna. The increase in production for national and international markets and rising population density during the nineteenth century in Jaffna urged Tamils to look for other sources of income, which were rumoured to be found in the South as well as in other parts of the colonial empire. Thanks to the well-organised access to English-medium education on the peninsula, Tamils were sought after for positions in the administrative system and education institutions of colonial Britain. Tamils were also qualified to take up positions in local or regional commerce and banking due to the language of non-European trade being mainly Tamil. As a result, Tamils migrated to Singapore, Malaysia and India to work in colonial administration as well as the plantation sector (Arasaratnam 1998: 307; Spencer 2003: 16). Thus, the colonial period was marked by a labour emigration from Jaffna to different parts of the British Empire. This movement continued to contribute to the formation of boundaries on the island along ethnic lines, which severely intensified after independence.

The Nationalist State: From Educational to Forced Migration For the Sinhalese population in Colombo and other parts of the South, Tamil minorities were suspect. In Colombo, they lived a frugal life as they were obliged to send any extra monies they made back home. Social inequality and ethnic difference become intermingled in Colombo’s public spaces: Sinhalese elites and the upper-­ middle class lived alongside Tamils in their own white-collar ghetto residences, but the majority of the Sinhalese population remained in slums. This divided experience reinforced stereotypes concerning the better jobs secured by Tamils, whereas poorer Tamils remained invisible because they remained in the rural areas of the north and east. These public images were further fed by the impression that the high-caste Tamils followed stricter notions of ‘purity’ and ‘pollution’ than those of Sinhala caste relations (Daniel 1992). When Ceylon became independent in 1948, a number of measures were undertaken to exclude Tamils from decision-making (Arasaratnam 1998: 298). With the widespread impression that Tamils were privileged over the Sinhala majority, some

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felt that affirmative action would enhance the latter’s ability to compete (Fernando 1999: 81). Interestingly, democracy played an ambivalent role. Although it offered Tamil politicians the chance to secure recognition of minority rights and to accommodate minorities within the state hierarchy, Sinhala nationalists attempted to institutionalise a Buddhist prototype of democracy (Wickramasinghe 2006: 157). Subsequently, it was nationalist propaganda and policy promises which helped Sinhalese politicians to secure power. S.W.R.D.  Bandaranaike and his Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) managed to win the 1956 elections by using nationalist rhetoric based on communalism. His exclusivist political programme culminated in the Sinhala-Only Act, which made Sinhala the only official language, leaving Tamils excluded. Seen as a necessary corrective of historical injustices by some scholars, others claim that the move was one of the main reasons for continuing divides in the sphere of ethnic relations (Hettige 1999: 305). As a result, better-off Tamils and Sinhalese increasingly considered migration to Great Britain, the United States and other English-speaking countries as a viable alternative (Amarasingham 2015: 70). Many of these migrants, who belonged to the Westernised upper-middle class and placed importance on better educational opportunities, made plans to migrate on a temporary basis because they still had family and properties back home (Daniel and Thangaraj 1995: 243). Emigration for education, however, intensified when the government changed the university admission system in 1971  – a move designed to benefit Sinhala students but one which was interpreted as an assault on the Tamil minority, who considered it an attempt to reduce the number of Tamil students entering popular faculties such as medicine and engineering (Wilson 2000). This phase of emigration, spurred on by the changes to university admissions, was subsequently characterised by longer-term perspectives, as the situation back home continued to worsen. A new constitution which reduced minority rights and symbolically institutionalised Sinhala hegemony by renaming Ceylon Sri Lanka was enacted in 1972. The Tamil political leadership reacted to these initiatives by promoting its own nationalist programme. In the north, various militant groups formed during the 1970s, whose activities were directed against the state but also against the established Tamil political leadership, which was criticised for its high-caste background and for having distanced itself further from the people. The LTTE was one of these groups, and it gradually emerged as the most powerful. While migration took place on a rather low scale during the 1970s, the imposition of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) made life more insecure, especially for young people. The events that shook the island in 1983 marked a major turning point (Daniel and Thangaraj 1995: 242). On the 23rd of the so-called Black July, an ambush on a military convoy in Jaffna, which killed 13 soldiers, triggered a massive outbreak of violence in Colombo against Tamils, their shops and houses. It is estimated that up to 2000 people, mostly Tamils, lost their lives, 100,000 were forced into refugee camps, and around 30 000 became unemployed due to the destruction of work sites (Amarasingham 2015: 33). Gradually developing into a full-fledged war, the conflict between the Tamil militant factions and the Sri Lankan military made life increasingly insecure for people living in the north-east. As the LTTE in

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particular started to forcibly conscribe young people, practically all male members of the Tamil society became potential terrorist suspects in the eyes of the government (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005). A general loss of trust in the capability and willingness of the state to protect the Tamil population was thus combined with the constant fear of being detained and tortured by the most visible representative of the state, the security forces. Following these traumatic experiences, emigration rose significantly. Black July also marked the beginning of the war between the Sri Lankan military and Tamil militant groups, mainly the LTTE, initially concentrated in the northern part of the country, and people decided to leave Sri Lanka in increasing numbers. This, in turn with changing immigration conditions in the receiving countries, brought with it changes in migration patterns. Increasingly, whole families arrived in the asylum-­ granting countries, and they became more diversified in terms of social class. Poorer families could often not afford to send more than one member abroad. In light of tightening restrictions for foreign students in the UK, for example, migrants often had to apply for asylum (Daniel and Thangaraj 1995: 243). Apart from the classical, English-speaking destinations, other European countries such as France, Germany, Norway and Switzerland became more attractive due to their special provisions for asylum seekers (Cheran 2001: 12). This latter generation of migrants was more politicised than those before. Having experienced state repression and various forms of humiliation, they continue to worry about the families they had to leave back home. During the decade of the 1990s, estimates of Tamil migrants ranged from 400,000 to 600,000, with a high male-to-female ratio and a large share originating from Jaffna (Gerharz 2014: 47).

 iaspora Formation, the LTTE and Experiments D with Stateness Diasporisation, in the sense of community formation processes (see Brubaker 2005), developed hand in hand with the establishment of infrastructure catering to the needs of the migrants: shops and small businesses, community centres, schools, cinemas, print media, TV channels and religious institutions. While such institutions helped Tamils living abroad feel ‘at home’, they were also instrumentalised by the militant groups back in Sri Lanka. Quite early, the LTTE understood that diasporic communities possess lots of potential for supporting its nationalist cause as well as its warfare. From the 1970s, the organisation had developed a transnational support structure to mobilise the resources necessary for combat. The network it created attempted to encompass all spheres of everyday life. Their strategy was to explicitly capitalise on the collective experience of the Tamils and their emotional attachment to their homeland. While the diasporic communities were essential for the financial support of the LTTE, they also provided a source of ideological backing. Conferences, public demonstrations and marches not only served as fundraising opportunities but informed members in the host countries and raised awareness.

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After 1987, after an Indian Peacekeeping Force had calamitously intervened on the request of the Tamil side following a major assault on Jaffna but gradually wrecked havoc, the LTTE emerged as the dominant Tamil group. The LTTE established its first de facto government which although emphasising some social issues remained a totalitarian regime exercising tight control over the population. It introduced a tax system, re-established law and order and infiltrated local organisations, administrative institutions, public committees and schools. It controlled the local press and established its own television system. The Sri Lankan Government reacted with a strict embargo, forcing the population into survival mode under a shadow economy, one which in turn was sustained with the help of remittances sent from sympathising migrants living abroad. During my fieldwork, many conversation partners stressed that without this money from abroad, they would have never been able to survive those difficult times. Due to the absence of official money remittance systems, the LTTE was clearly involved in this informal economy which was dependent on transnational transfers.

Diaspora and the LTTE State-Building Project From the late 1970s, the diasporic communities served as a pool for the recruitment of political experts who could help the LTTE establish its de facto state. One outstanding figure was Anton Balasingham, who had emigrated to Great Britain in the early 1970s and whose interest in left-wing politics attracted him to the LTTE’s representation in London. From the 1980s onwards, he acted as the LTTE’s chief politician and spokesperson, i.e. responsible for political matters, while the head of the organisation, V. Prabhakaran, was in charge of the military part. In the 1990s, when Balasingham moved to Sri Lanka together with his wife, Adele, both of them were involved in helping steer the overall political orientation of the LTTE. Adele was particularly active in supporting female cadres in the setting up of their gender policy. Anton became well-known for his role as an advisor in negotiations, including the peace negotiations after the Ceasefire Agreement, signed between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE in 2002. Many Tamils living abroad took the ceasefire as the necessary change they needed to return to Sri Lanka. These ‘voluntary returnees’ mostly came on a temporary basis, i.e. to visit relatives and friends, to look after the properties they had left behind or to have more touristic ambitions. With the absence of fighting, the A9 road, the ‘highway’ connecting the northern peninsula of Jaffna with the mainland, was finally reopened after being closed for about 12  years. For the first time in decades, people could move more or less freely. Nevertheless, the journey was further complicated by checkpoints set up by both the army and the LTTE on the border of what would become known during this time as the de facto state created by the LTTE. The ceasefire had assigned clearly demarcated territories to both parties, with the LTTE responsible for the so-called Vanni area located in the south of Jaffna and some pockets in the east. The headquarters of the LTTE’s ‘governing

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institutions’ were set up in Kilinochchi, a small trading town on the A9 road, which became known as the capitol of ‘Tamil Eelam’. Many of the visiting Tamils travelled straight to Jaffna, formally home to about 90 per cent of the Tamil population, where they were received by relatives or friends. Others stayed in one of the new hotels or guesthouses which had started popping up, initially without much connection to the local population. Besides these primarily leisure visits, some Tamils from abroad decided to engage themselves locally in various ways in reconstruction and development. My research (Gerharz 2014) reveals that certain professionals, such as medical doctors, committed their leisure time to providing training for local staff or volunteering in hospitals. Most of them were recruited by corresponding NGOs, such as Mediciens sans Frontiers, or through networks formed by Tamil doctors. Others supported schools in Jaffna through alumni associations, which, due to the large number of former students who emigrated, had become transnational organisations with branches in various countries. These alumni associations played an important role in funding the reconstruction of school buildings, 90 per cent of which had been either fully or partly destroyed during the conflict. Moreover, they provided support in funding various school projects such as sports equipment or IT facilities. Young Tamils in particular were recruited by local welfare organisations to help with providing social care in orphanages or the production of orthopaedic limbs for victims of land mines. With its well-organised transnational network, the LTTE managed to reach out to potential volunteers more effectively than other organisations. During my fieldwork in early 2014, the building of institutions in the LTTE capital Kilinochchi was in full swing: The peace talks and subsequently the interest of international organisations in negotiating access to the areas controlled by them had changed the image of the LTTE from that of terrorist organisation into an important local political partner. This in turn reinforced for the LTTE the need to establish capable and efficient institutions. Tamils from abroad were particularly useful in achieving this aim. Those with management skills, for example, were recruited to support the institution-­ building process. Others helped to set up and implement an IT strategy and to write policy papers. The engagement of diaspora Tamils within the LTTE-controlled territories also extended to educational institutions. The IT Institute Vanni Tech, for example, an initiative of Tamil IT experts from Silicon Valley, was established in Kilinochchi to provide vocational training for young Tamils. The idea was to enable local young people to contribute to the development and reconstruction of war-torn areas but also to update the local IT industry to standards prevalent in other parts of the world. Tamils from abroad were also helpful in the social service sector. The LTTE-friendly Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) had established its own transnational network parallel to those LTTE structures and used this network not just for fundraising but also for recruiting volunteers for its various activities. Having a sort of monopoly over development and relief work in the LTTE-controlled areas, TRO was not only the largest but a professionally operating organisation within those areas. Depending solely on donations and receiving no support from the Sri Lankan Government during the war due to its image as a terrorist-supporting organisation,

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TRO quite successfully remodelled its image and its funding strategy during the ceasefire. Tamils from abroad were quite helpful in this regard. The interviews I conducted with various people involved in the organisation confirmed that diaspora Tamils were expected to contribute by writing funding proposals which were then submitted to potential donors from the so-called international development community. They were particularly sought after because of their good English skills but also due to their professional experience in finance and project development. These skills also made diaspora Tamils well suited to represent the organisation in meetings with representatives of donor organisations and countries. Thanks to some insights into the international community scene, I observed that such representational skills are generally well appreciated, as it is much easier to negotiate with someone who is used to ‘Western’ professional business contexts. In that sense, the volunteers from abroad contributed to the professionalisation of the TRO and enhanced its image as a legitimate and capable local development partner. This legitimation was further strengthened in early 2005 following the tsunami that devastated LTTE-controlled areas in the north and east and the international donor community sought to deliver humanitarian aid quickly and efficiently. TRO became a very important channel to deliver this aid, thanks also to the organisational support of (temporary) returning migrants. What is striking about the ceasefire period is that the LTTE and organisations close to them managed to engage returning migrants and use their skills in the service of its state-building project. Although they continue to be the subject of academic debate and politically highly problematic (see Gerharz 2017), the LTTE can be said to have made serious attempts to legitimise itself as a state-like actor by forming working relations with the so-called international community. Interestingly, diaspora Tamils provided a substantial contribution towards this end. In this case, then, transnational networks created by long-established transborder migration were not caused, stipulated or mediated by the (LTTE) state, but rather actors seeking to build the state utilised resources made available through migration. The LTTE’s state-building strategy thus depended on the availability of humans with migratory backgrounds, because it was they who had the abilities and capabilities to form links with representatives of the global giving (developmental) hierarchy. This project, however, did not last long. Already in 2005, the peace process had deteriorated badly, and in the end, war returned with renewed force.

The Militarised State: Reconciliation as a Way Forward? As early as 2003, signs appeared that the negotiated peace was more fragile than hoped by many observers, including the so-called international community. In April, the LTTE pulled out of the peace negotiations. In October, the organisation submitted its proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA), proposing to set up an autonomous administrative authority in the north and east. The ISGA also proposed that international economic assistance should be transferred to them

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directly, bypassing the central government  – a move which was interpreted as a provocative move towards separatism by the Sri Lankan Government (Uyangoda 2005: 345). With the subsequent change to the Sri Lankan Government in April 2004, which brought Mahinda Rajapaksa into the prime minister’s office with the support of ultranationalist parties, the approach of the former government was gradually reversed. While officially pursuing post-conflict reconstruction, both sides had already started to prepare for another war. With the post-tsunami reconstruction, another major conflict over financial resources further deteriorated relations in the peace process. Although the government and the LTTE had signed the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS)3 after months of complicated negotiations, the deal was blocked by the Sri Lankan Supreme Court a few months later. Parallel to these internal developments, the tide turned also internationally. In May 2006, the European Union decided to ban the LTTE by adding it to the list of terrorist organisations. More and more governments turned against the organisation, which had initially received such positive and encouraging responses in its efforts to be accepted as an equal negotiation and development partner. An important factor in this change of attitude was a Human Rights Watch report issued in 2006 which accused the LTTE of starting to collecting funds for a new conflict in 2005. The report describes in detail how the LTTE used Hindu temples in Western countries for acquiring funds and for exerting pressure on Tamils. In late 2005, it further states that extortion and intimidation of individuals for funding ‘the final war’ intensified. Apart from putting pressure directly on individuals and families in the receiving countries, the collectors also threatened that families back in Sri Lanka would face abduction or other kinds of threats (Human Rights Watch 2006: 30). In addition, Tamils visiting Sri Lanka during this time were often asked for money at LTTE checkpoints, with threats that non-payment would result in them not being able to leave the country. The LTTE and organisations associated with them did not consider these practices extortion, but fundraising, which they saw as legitimate practices to gather support for their project. Again, the organisation counted on the readiness of Tamils living abroad to support the nationalist cause either by personal commitment or by force. In May 2009, however, the war finally came to an end. The Sri Lankan Army gradually managed to bring the territory in the north and east under its control, with the LTTE capital Kilinochchi falling in early January 2009. Pursuing the LTTE as it withdrew towards the Mullaitivu east from Kilinochchi, the army encircled the resident Tamil civilian population and the LTTE in a so-called no fire zone which gradually became smaller and smaller. A fierce battle was fought with a high number of civilian casualties and wounded. According to estimations, as many as 40,000 people lost their lives in 5 months of fighting. Massive violations of human rights and humanitarian laws were committed on both sides (Weiss 2011; International Crisis Group 2010). On May 17, 2009, the international representative effectively announced its surrender. During the next 24 hours, the bodies of several high-­ranking 3  P-TOMS was an aid-sharing deal through which the government and the LTTE would jointly distribute aid in LTTE-controlled areas.

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LTTE cadres, including its leader, V. Prabhakaran, were found. Over 280,000 civilians were escorted out from the last no fire zone, a small strip of sandy beach located in the very north-east, and immediately detained in camps. Due to the months of siege warfare, most of them were in terrible physical and mental condition yet were compelled to continue to suffer from a lack of food, water and sanitation in the military-run camps. Relief organisations got only very limited access to the detainees, who were suspected as being potential LTTE supporters and were not allowed to leave the camps without permission. One year later, 80,000 people still remained in the camps, and about 10,000 were detained as LTTE-suspected supporters, with their rights frequently violated (Human Rights Watch 2010: 3). Since the end of the war, the Sri Lankan Army has expanded its presence in the north, exercising tight control over civilian movement and political activities. During the last months of the war, many Tamils living in Western countries were involved in protests and demonstrations. Although some international organisations and governments could be persuaded that impartial investigations into alleged war crimes were necessary, the Sri Lankan Government did not come under much international pressure.4 With many institutions and structures in Sri Lanka lacking the ability to function effectively, the international supporters of the LTTE decided to pursue a new strategy. From mid-2009 onwards, supporters from different countries discussed the viability of setting up a new transnational structure called the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE). The TGTE consists of elected and appointed representatives from more than 20 countries worldwide (Amarasingham 2015: 149). The idea behind the TGTE is to unite Tamils living in different parts of the world and provide a platform for articulating their position in negotiations with the ‘Sinhala nation’. Moreover, it seeks to establish direct links with foreign governments and international organisations to lobby on behalf of political representation for Tamils and to regain the right to self-determination. The TGTE is strongly involved in pressing for an investigation of war crimes and transitional justice efforts.5 The transnational architecture of the TGTE places the engagement of Tamil migrants at the center when it comes to efforts to continue to represent Tamil interests vis-à-vis the Sri Lankan state. Transnational social spaces thus are meant to provide a substitute in the absence of political spaces for such representation in Sri Lanka itself. Another significant dimension of the post-war situation concerns the continuing migration from northern Sri Lanka. Up until at least 2013, the number of migrations from Sri Lanka to Australia increased steadily (Chattoraj 2015: 41). The military’s efforts to screen the entire Tamil population in order to eradicate all forms of activity associated with LTTE and other forms of Tamil resistance have urged many Tamils to migrate, despite the end of the war – a fact largely ignored by foreign governments who label post-war migration as being purely economic. Although the socioeconomic position plays an important role, the political dimension should not be ignored. In truth, it does not make much sense to label recent migratory movements  The OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka was set up in Geneva in 2014.  http://www.tgte-us.org/newshead.asp

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as being either one or the other. Reasons for considering migration as an option to pursue a better life are manifold. Continuing insecurity is potentially as much a driving factor as economic concerns. Bowden and Binns’ analysis of the conditions for young people in post-war Jaffna, for example, reveals that in late 2014, Jaffna had the third highest rate of youth unemployment in Sri Lanka (Bowden and Binns 2016: 204). Due to the large number of displacements during the war, the resettlement process increases pressure on a fragile job market, and the continuing presence of the military, who still occupy large tracts of land, further complicates the redevelopment of the agriculture-based sector. In a similar vein, the fisheries sector is affected by the military presence but also by the increasing number of trawlers from India and Southern Sri Lanka operating in Jaffna’s maritime reserves. Limited access to good-quality education in the north urges young people especially to migrate in order to attend universities. Indeed, even during my fieldwork in 2004, I came across attempts to design education services in Jaffna in such a way that they make it easier for students to apply for admission to universities abroad, for example, by providing internationally accepted degrees. But here too the diaspora plays a role. Funding for school reconstruction which comes from the transnational networks of alumni associations prioritises enhancing skills in fields which are of use in the international job market. For example, in the area of IT, English language skills are an explicit focus because they increase students’ chances to migrate. In addition, it is a common trope that young people in Jaffna are now dependent on remittances from abroad and that the visits of relatives from other countries who bring all kinds of gifts contribute to their aspirations to find a more comfortable life elsewhere. Increased access to the Internet also reinforces the exposure to ‘other worlds’ and shapes young people’s aspirations. The knowledge of how an ‘other’ life might be sees young people calling into question existing cultural and social norms... (sonst das gleiche), which in their home communities are still highly determined by clearly defined hierarchies in terms of caste and generational differences. Seeing these norms increasingly as restrictions, young people in particular feel that migration would offer them more freedom and the chance to live their lives more independently (Bowden and Binns 2016: 215). The same desire to leave is thus reproduced during the post-war period although under different conditions.

Conclusion This chapter has shown that transborder migration from northern Sri Lanka does not only have a long history reaching back to colonial times but indeed has peaked with rising ethnic tensions. During the war between the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, transborder migration became a viable option, initially for the more affluent members of society and later also for members of the lower castes. This resulted in the formation of strong transnational social ties, which were eventually facilitated by the LTTE, but which also offered new opportunities for imagining one’s own future, as well as the future of Sri Lanka’s Tamil region

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once the conflict had been resolved. Even though Sri Lanka’s (post-)conflict situation has ushered in a new era marked by the absence of warfare, tensions and ambiguous relationships vis-à-vis the state continue. Based on this observation, this chapter has argued that conflict and conflict-induced migration have produced specific conditions under which mobility continues to be among the major means to achieve individual aspirations. It has also been shown how this dynamic changes the local society and how it influences prospects for (re-)development. At the same time, recent debates concerning migration on a global scale suggest that the achievement of individual aspirations, stemming from a socialisation in cultures of migration actually impeding options to migrate, especially from countries where there are immediate threats, is not as obvious as those in countries where there exist clearly marked conflict situations. Further research is required to gain a better understanding on how restrictions stemming from the high-level insecurity shape individual migration aspirations but also how local social changes in a broader sense and political participation are shaped by the restrictions imposed on individual’s lives hindering them to realise a better life abroad.

References Amarasingham, A. (2015). Pain, pride, and politics. Sri Lankan Tamil activism in Canada. Athens: University of Georgia Press. Arasaratnam, S. (1998). Nationalism in Sri Lanka and the Tamils. In M. Roberts (Ed.), Sri Lanka: Collective identities revisited (Vol. II, pp.  295–313). Colombo: Marga Institute (Sri Lanka Centre for Development Studies). Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (2007 [1966]). Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit: Eine Theorie der Wissenssoziologie. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag. Bowden, G., & Binns, T. (2016). Youth employment and post-war development in Jaffna, northern Sri Lanka. Conflict, Security & Development, 16(3), 197–218. Brubaker, R. (2005). The ‘Diaspora’ diaspora. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28(1), 1–19. Chattoraj, Diotima. (2015). Ambivalent attachments: Shifting notions of home among displaced Sri Lankan Tamils. Bochum: PhD Dissertation. Cheran, R. (2001). The sixth genre: Memory, history and the tamil diaspora imagination (Marge monograph series on ethnic reconciliation, No. 7). Colombo: Marga Institute. Daniel, V. (1992). Three dispositions towards the past: One Sinhala, two Tamil. Colombo: Studies in Society and Culture/Sri Lanka Past and Present. Daniel, V., & Thangaraj, Y. (1995). Forms, formation and transformations of the Tamil refugee. In e. V. Daniel & J. C. Knudsen (Eds.), Mistrusting refugees (pp. 245–256). California: University of California Press. Fernando, L. (1999). Ethnic conflict and the state in Sri Lanka: A possible solution?. In S. Gamage & I. B. Watson (Eds.), Conflict and community in contemporary Sri Lanka. “Pearl of the East” or the “Island of Tears”? (pp. 77–88). New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London: Sage. Gerharz, E. (2014). The politics of reconstruction and development in Sri Lanka: Transnational commitments to social change. London: Routledge. Gerharz, E. (2017). Towards ‘good life’: The emergence of an indigenous development vision in the CHT. In N. Uddin (Ed.), Life in peace and conflict: Indigeneity and state in the Chittagong Hill tracts (pp. 135–163). Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan. Hellmann-Rajanayagam, D. (1989). Arumuga Navalar: Religious reformer or national leader of Eelam. Indian Economic and Social History Review, 26(2), 235–257.

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Hellmann-Rajanayagam, D. (1990). The politics of the Tamil past. In J. Spencer (Ed.), Sri Lanka: History and the roots of conflict (pp. 107–122). London/New York: Routledge. Hellmann-Rajanayagam, D. (2007). Von Jaffna nach Kilinochchi: Wandel des politischen Bewusstseins der Tamilen in Sri Lanka. Würzburg: Ergon Verlag. Hettige, S.  T. (1999). Economic liberalisation, social class and ethnicity: Emerging trends and conflicts. In S. Gamage & I. B. Watson (Eds.), Conflict and community in contemporary Sri Lanka: ‘Pearl of the East’ or the ‘Island of Tears’? (Studies on contemporary South Asia no. 3, pp. 299–323). New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London: SAGE. Human Rights Watch. (2006). Funding the “final war”: LTTE intimidation and extortion in the Tamil diaspora. New York: Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch. (2010). Legal limbo: The uncertain fate of detained LTTE suspects in Sri Lanka. New York: Human Rights Watch. International Crisis Group. (2010). The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora after the LTTE (Asia report 186). Brussels: International Crisis Group. Jayawardena, K. (2003). Nobodies to somebodies: The rise of the colonial bourgeoisie in Sri Lanka. Colombo: Social Scientists Association. Kandel, W., & Massey, D. S. (2002). The culture of Mexican migration: A theoretical and empirical analysis. Social Forces, 80(3), 981–1004. Nadarajah, S., & Sriskandarajah, D. (2005). Liberation struggle or terrorism? The politics of naming the LTTE. Third World Quarterly, 26(1), 87–100. Nissan, E., & Stirrat, R. L. (1990). The generation of communal identities. In J. Spencer (Ed.), Sri Lanka: History and the roots of conflict (pp. 19–44). London/New York: Routledge. Rajasingham-Senanayake, D. (1999). Democracy and the problem of representation: The making of bi-polar ethnic identity in post/colonial Sri Lanka. In J. Pfaff-Czarnecka, D. Rajasingham-­ Senanayake, A. Nandy, & E. T. Gomez (Eds.), Ethnic futures: The state and identity politics in Asia (pp. 99–134). New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London: SAGE Publications. Sabaratnam, L. (2001). Ethnic attachments in Sri Lanka: Social change and cultural continuity. New York: Palgrave. Smith, L. T. (1999). Decolonizing methodologies: Research and indigenous peoples. London: Zed Books. Spencer, J. (2003). A nation ‘living in different places’: Notes on the impossible work of purification in postcolonial Sri Lanka. Contributions to Indian Sociology, 37(1–2), 1–23. Tambiah, S. J. (1986). Sri Lanka: Ethnic fratricide and the dismantling of democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Thiranagama, S. (2012). ‘A railway to the moon’: The post-histories of a Sri Lankan railway line. Modern Asian Studies, 46(1), 221–248. Uyangoda, J. (2005). Ethnic conflict, the state and the Tsunami disaster in Sri Lanka. Inter-Asian Cultural Studies, 6(3), 341–352. Weiss, G. (2011). The cage. The fight for Sri Lanka and the last days of the Tamil tigers. London: Bodley Head. Wickramasinghe, N. (2006). Sri Lanka in the modern age. A history of contested identities. Colombo: Vijitha Yapa. Wilson, J. J. (2000). Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism. Its origins and development in the 19th and 20th century. New Delhi: Penguin Books.

Part II

Everyday State and Statelessness

Chapter 5

The State, Vulnerability, and Transborder Movements: The Rohingya People in Myanmar and Bangladesh Nasir Uddin

Abstract  This chapter is about the plight of “stateless” people, not recognised as nationals by any state, albeit the state in various forms regulates their everyday life committing severe injustice and practicing various inequalities by producing illegibility in state structure. In fact, the structure of modern nation-state has produced the concept of statelessness and non-citizens though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) confirms that “everyone has the right to a nationality.” Since the state of statelessness confirms people belonging to no state, they cannot claim any rights from states  though the International Refugee Convention (1951), the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless People (1954) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)  confirm the rights of even non-­ citizens. Nonetheless, the lives of stateless people that include non-citizens, refugees or asylum seekers can easily become subject to injustice, inequality, discrimination and illegibility and is even subject to death. The treatment of stateless people as “illegal” human bodies is as what  George Agamben termed “bare life”; a life is “bare” because it does not exist “before the law”. This chapter examines such a group of stateless people known as the Rohingya living in Myanmand and Bangladesh beneath the intricate relations of migration, statelessness and vulnerability. The Rohingya people became stateless soon after Myanmar in 1982 enacted its Citizenship Law which conferred to 135 nationals as its citizens excluding  the Rohingya. Since then many Rohingya people migrated to Bangladesh  in large scale though the influx started from 1978. The Rohingya people in Bangladesh are now under “biometric” database officially termed as “forcibly displaced Myanmar nationals” but not even refugees due mainly to their state of statelessness as they do not belong to any state. In the framework of modern nation-state, the Rohingya people are non-existent human beings as they are in nowhere in the

N. Uddin (*) Department of Anthropology, University of Chittagong, Chittagong, Bangladesh e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 N. Uddin, N. Chowdhory (eds.), Deterritorialised Identity and Transborder Movement in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2778-0_5

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legal framework of both Bangladesh and Myanmar. However, the Rohingya people experience persecution, atrocities and everyday forms of discrimination committed by the state despite  their stateless identity. With empirically informed analysis, this chapter explains how the vulnerability is (re)produced in the lives of refugees due to their statelessness when transborder movement has become the general features of twenty-first-century state system in the name of “global society.” Keywords  Transborder · Rohingya · Myanmar · Bangladesh · Statelessness · Vulnerability

Introduction It was August 26, the Borma military [Burmese military] and kichu moiggar poa [some Rakhine Buddhist youths] came to our village and started random killing, raping and burning house after houses. My wife and I were at home with my son of 10 and daughter of 13 years old. We locked our main door of the house, gathered together in fear at a corner of a room, and silently reciting ‘Allah, Allah.’ Suddenly, a group of military personnel broke the door and entered our house. They caught me and put me on gun point. Seven or eight of them did gang-rape my wife and my teenage daughter. My son was crying and one of the soldiers shot him suddenly not to ‘disturb’ them. I couldn’t do anything but crying and lamenting. My daughter died afterward due to excessive bleeding since I couldn’t bring her to doctor. The following night, I was meeting with some other Rohingya co-villagers to plan how to flee to Bangladesh. When I came back, I saw my house burning and my wife was burnt alive as she was asleep. Standing still, I watched my whole house turning into ashes. In fact, my whole life became ashes in two days.

Shamshul Alam (47),1 a Rohingya who recently crossed the border to flee brutal military crackdown in Myanmar’s Rakhine state beginning on August 25, 2017, explained to me how the Rohingya life was so vulnerable in Rakhine state. He continued, “My story is not a solitary one, but hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas did go through more or less the similar experience following the recent campaign in Borma2 [Myanmar]. Rohingyas are living in Borma [Rakhine] bacha-morar majhamajhi [on the frontier line of life and death]”. In response to my question on the comparative experience between Bangladesh and Myanmar in terms of vulnerability, Mr. Alam continued: We are no longer under life-threat in Bangladesh, and here the degree of safety is better than Borma. Besides, we feel and enjoy here some sorts of human dignity. However, the remaining conditions are more or less the same; for instance, food inscarcity, inadequate medical facility, no education for children, lesser than poor living conditions, no proper sanitation, insufficient water supply, and the threat of women and child trafficking.

1  I have used the age of every informants throughout so that it helps understand the gravity and intensity of the fact and event used in an attempt to substantiate the argument of this chapter. 2  The Rohingyas whom I met always term Myanmar as Borma. Therefore, I have been using Borma when I quote them, but Myanmar in my discussion and analysis since it is an official name.

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Mr. Alam’s narrative unfolds some critical propositions which are conducive to understand the triplicate relations of the state, vulnerability and transborder movement. It clearly shows that the state creates vulnerable conditions within the state territory which triggers transborder movement. Why the Rohingya people have crossed the border into Bangladesh is due to the extreme vulnerability created by the state which disregards “the vulnerable theory” of Martha Fineman. Fineman (2008) emphasises on the role of state to reduce the vulnerability and ensure the equity for the people. She strongly stands for the state to take up the issue of vulnerability to redress for ensuring social justice for all in the society. According to her theory, “vulnerability is inherent to the human condition, and that governments therefore have a responsibility to respond affirmatively to that vulnerability by ensuring that all people have equal access to the societal institutions that distribute resources. The theory thus provides an alternative basis for defining the role of government and a justification for expansive social welfare policies” (Cited in Kohn 2014: 03). Alam’s experience is a clear departure from theoretical proposition by Fineman. In the case of Rohingya, the state of Myanmar has produced and reproduced conditions in Rakhine state making the Rohingyas extreme vulnerable which compels them to flee to Bangladesh. I would rather bring in the idea of “State Crime” (2004) framed by Penney Green and Tony Ward to understand the roles of the state in the generation of vulnerability because both argued that “state crime” is deviant or illegal activities perpetrated by the state to implement its policy and achieve its goal even violating human rights (see Green and Ward 2004). Judith Butler’s idea of “Precarious Life” (2004) is also befitting for a better understanding of the Rohingyas’ vulnerabilities. Butler conceptualised “precarious life” explaining that “[such life] …considers the political implications of those normative conceptions of the human that produce, through an exclusionary process, a host of ‘unlivable lives’ whose legal and political status is suspended” (2004: XV). Mr. Alam’s experience of life is indeed more than “precarious life” since here their legal and political live are not only suspended, but they are considered worthy of extinction as what Isabell Lorey calls “the state of insecurity” (2015). Lorey has further clarified the “precarious life” in the form of the state of insecurity explaining that “Precarization means more than…more than the lack of security…By way of insecurity and danger it embraces the whole of existence, the body, modes of subjectivation. It is threat and coercion, … Precarization means living with the unforeseeable, with contingency (2015:01). Therefore, what the Rohingyas have been experiencing in Rakhine state is more than a “precarious life”. If we deeply analyse, we find that Mr. Alam’s narrative confirms a couple of interconnected premises: Firstly, Myanmar has created an extreme unliveable condition as what I have called “atrocious living conditions” in elsewhere (Uddin [forthcoming] 2019) that has pushed them to the state of vulnerability. It means Rohingya vulnerability is basically state-created because Myanmar state is deliberately implementing a policy of “ethnic cleaning” in an attempt to clean Rakhine state by driving them out of the region. Secondly, this narrative shows the ways the Myanmar security forces and Buddhist fundamentalists treated Rohingyas, as what is reflected in the narratives of Mr. Alam, as if their lives are worthy of extinction which denotes an extreme form of vulnerability. Finally,

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this narrative unfolds another reality that transborder movement is not always determined by the people themselves but the state-created conditionalities which bring the lives of people vulnerable to death. This chapter, apart from the nexus between the state and vulnerability, argues that transborder movement in twenty-first century is not always determined by the people themselves, but the state itself becomes instrumental to create vulnerable conditions to drive them out of the country. With the empirically informed analysis, this chapter examines the triplicate relations of the state, vulnerability and the transborder movement with the case of Rohingya in Bangladesh and Myanmar. Theoretically this chapter argues that the modern structure of state makes some people stateless as it still controls and regulates their everyday life, as what Michel Foucault (1976) calls “governmentality” and Elizabeth Povinelli (2016) calls “Geontologies.”3 With the empirically4 informed analysis, this chapter argues that non-recognition as citizens by the state renders people stateless, which make them “an object of subjective treatment” (see Uddin [forthcoming] 2019) amidst committing severe injustice, acute discrimination and the serious violation of human rights compelling them to cross the transborder. This chapter with the case of Rohingyas discusses how the roles of the state are contributory to the production of vulnerability which accelerates transborder movement. Finally, it sheds light on two central arguments that (1) the state creates extreme vulnerability for the people which triggered transborder movement as a “life-saving strategy” and (2) the state in various forms confirms vulnerable condition even though they are transborder migrants.

Rohingyas: Identity and the Genesis of Crisis Before further discussions on the Rohingya vulnerability, this section provides a comprehensive idea about the Rohingya people with a brief historical note. The Rohingya is an ethnolinguistic and religious minority who have long been the residents (currently about 400–500 thousand) of Myanmar and now a large in number (about 1.3 million) live in Cox’s Bazar, south-eastern district of Bangladesh. They became 3  By the theory of “Geontologies”, Elizabeth Povinelli talks about the mechanism of power that makes distinction between “lives” and “non-lives” where non-lives are dealt with differently unlike the “lives” are treated. The Rohingyas are apparently “non-lives” and therefore dealt with accordingly from the statist perspective. See, for details, Povinelli (2016). 4  The paper is based on ethnographic fieldwork undertaken for over two years intermittantly between 2001 and 2018  in different phases in two villages, namely, Vasan Para (pseudonym) located in Teknaf and Pasan Para (pseudonym) located in Ukhia of Cox’s Bazar the southwestern part of Bangladesh. This empirical experience has been supplemented by my close observation as a local resident of Cox’s Bazar for more than two decades and a half of the flow of Rohingya migrations, the process of their temporary settlements, the attempts of permanent social integration and the roles of state and non-state actors in dealing with the Rohingya peoples in the south-eastern part of Bangladesh. The data used here are comprehensive and descriptive in nature which render the methodology of the research qualitative and ethnographic.

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stateless soon after Myanmar in 1982 enacted its Citizenship Law, which conferred citizenship to 135 nationals excluding the Rohingya. Since then many Rohingyas started migrating to Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia and Middle Eastern countries to flee persecution (see Hossain 2014) though the major Rohingya influx to Bangladesh started in 1978. In 2007, the Rohingyas drew global media attention, yet at minimal level, and attracted the concerns of rights organisation as a “new boat people”5 because hundreds of Rohingyas died in the sea in their journey towards Thailand and Malaysia. But, in 2017, the Rohingyas heavily captured the attention of international community, leading global media outlets and rights organisations due to the massive influx (725 thousands) in Bangladesh. The Rohingyas are regarded as both registered refugees6 and unregistered illegal migrants7 in Bangladesh before making a biometric data-base in 2017–2018. The Rohingyas have become either refugees or illegal migrants due mainly to their lack of citizenship and the state of statelessness as they do not belong to any state (Ahmed, ed. 2014; Uddin 2015). In Myanmar, the Rohingyas are often identified as “illegal Bengali migrants”, whilst in Bangladesh they are “illegal Burmese migrants.” Bangladesh Government has recently prepared their biometric database terming them as “forcibly displaced Myanmar nationals.” In the framework of modern nation-state, the Rohingyas are non-existent human beings as they are nowhere in the legal and structural framework of either Bangladesh or Myanmar (Uddin 2012a, b, 2015). Therefore, the Rohingyas experience persecution, atrocities and everyday forms of discrimination committed by the state despite their stateless people. In fact, the Rohingyas were denied all sorts of rights in Myanmar because “citizenship is considered as the rights of have rights” (see Arendt 1994; Kesby 2012) though citizenship is a very “slippery concept” (See for details, HowardHassmann, & Walton-­Roberts 2015). The Rohingya started migrating to the south-eastern part of Bangladesh in the late 1970s, but big in number came in the early 1990s. The first influx took place in 1978 when about 200,000 fled to Bangladesh (Elahi 1987: 231). “It is said that oppression, discrimination, violence and forced labour practices by the Myanmar authorities triggered an exodus of more than 250 thousand Rohingya Muslims to cross the border between 1991 and 1992. Since then the flow of this migration to the Bangladesh territory continued which contributed to shape a big figure living as ‘refugees’ in this country” (Uddin 2010). Over the years, approximately 230 thousand refugees have been reportedly repatriated to Myanmar under the supervision of the UNHCR. However, most of them along with new cluster of Rohingyas again returned to Bangladesh in many illegal ways and started living as unregistered Rohingyas in various localities of Teknaf and Ukhia. The numbers of such returnee

5  Lewa, Chris. 2008. “Asia’s New Boat People”. Available at http://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/ files/FMRdownloads/en/burma/lewa.pdf (accessed on January 02, 2018). 6  Those who are officially registered and live in official camps under the supervision of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are “Rohingya refugees”. 7  The rest who are not officially registered and live either in makeshift camps or in other localities are known as “illegal migrants”.

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Rohingyas are estimated about 250 thousand.8 Now, just 32 thousand Rohingyas are officially registered who are recognised as refugees by the Bangladesh Government and live in two official camps—Kutupalong of Ukhia and Nayapara of Teknaf— under the supervision of the UNHCR. Among the unregistered Rohingyas, about 40 thousand live in a makeshift camp in Ukhia called Taal and about 30 thousand live in a makeshift camp in Teknaf called Leda. The rest of Rohingyas sporadically live in different localities of Teknaf and Ukhia who constitute about 350–400 thousand before the recent influx took place. Besides, many Rohingyas are believed to have socially integrated in the society building either affinal relations or professional contacts9 (see, for details, Uddin 2012a, b). Many, particularly who came three decades ago, now hold Bangladeshi passports and own National Identity Card (NID) and have integrated into the local society. Many have migrated to Gulf countries with Bangladeshi passports as international labour migrants (Jain and Oommen 2016; Siddiqui 2016). In a recent remark, the Minister of the Ministry of Expatriate Welfare informed that there are 250 thousand Rohingyas live in the Middle Eastern countries with Bangladeshi passport.10 The recent influx following the August 25, 2017 is estimated that more than  725  thousand Rohingyas crossed the border. Bangladesh Government has recently prepared a biometric database of around 1.4 million Rohingyas as part of repatriation process, whilst still many have remained undocumented. Excluding expatriates, now approximately 1.3 million Rohingyas live in Bangladesh. Whilst the previously registered Rohingyas who live in the UNHCR camps are provided with foods, shelter, limited scale health and education, albeit insufficient, the large number of unregistered Rohingyas who live in different villages and roadsides in the south-eastern region of Bangladesh lead a very miserable life (Uddin 2012a, b, 2015). In fact, “these unregistered Rohingyas have been struggling to survive in and around the South-eastern part of Bangladesh, Teknaf and Ukhia, two sub-districts of Cox’s Bazar for years. It is reported that unregistered Rohingyas are largely unemployed, vulnerable to ill health and subject to labour-exploitation…” (Uddin 2012a, b: 87). Newly arrived Rohingyas live in 34 temporarily built refugee

8  This is indeed an approximate estimate of the number of unregistered refuges since there is no official record of them. But, the actual number of unregistered Rohingya refugees is many more than what is estimated since the flow of migration is still continued. 9  Professional contact means a kind of contact with the corrupted official to get Bangladeshi passport in exchange of bribery, working contact with the local people by selling the cheap labour and moving to big cities like Chittagong and Dhaka to work as construction workers, rickshaw pullers, venders and day labourers. Through these processes, some Rohingyas are gradually integrating in the Bangladeshi society. 10  Muntaha, Sadia. 2018. “Expatriate minister: 250,000 Rohingyas went abroad with Bangladeshi passports”. Available at https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2018/04/28/expatriate-minister-250000-rohingyas-went-abroad-bangladeshi-passports/ (accessed on June 02, 2018).

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camps including Kutupalong, Balukhali and Tangkhali, who are also receiving food ration, primary healthcare, water supply, shelter and daily essentials though inadequate in comparison with what they need. Many western countries, UN bodies, and international NGOs are supporting the Rohingya people, but are reluctants in the process of their dignified and safe return to Myanmar. In Bangladesh, the national media, local human rights organisations, NGOs and the representative of the civil society do not speak up for the rights of Rohingya at a significant level when Bangladesh is making attempt to repatriate them without ensuring their life safety and social security. Furthermore, the local people are not ready to host the Rohingyas anymore because they think that Rohingya presence is crucial for their various social problems (see Uddin 2012a, b; Uddin [forthcoming] 2019). Besides, both Ukhia and Teknaf of Cox’s Bazar are resource-poor areas and also overcrowded, and therefore very likely about 1.3 million Rohingyas have created an additional burden on the local resources, job markets and social spaces. As a result, the state institutions—civil administration, law enforcing agencies, local government bodies and bureaucrats—treat them as “illegal migrants, unwelcome outsiders and socially disordered settlers” (Uddin [forthcoming] 2019)  though the security forces seemed sympathetic to the recently arrived Rohingyas becuse of their horrible expereicne of “genocide.”  However, the situation of Rohingya people in Bangladesh is still critical, and majority of Rohingyas do not have a minimum standard of life and do not enjoy minimum rights as human beings. This is largely, not only, because they are stateless people and have no citizenship conferred by any state. In Myanmar, Rohingyas are deprived of their social, economic, civil, political and basic human rights because the state treats them as if they are lesser than human being as what I call “subhuman” (Uddin [forthcoming] 2019) due to their ethnic, religious and racial difference. In Bangladesh, they are not well received because Bangladesh is already an overpopulated country, and south-eastern part of Bangladesh is resource-poor area. Besides, Bangladesh, what it quite often claims, is not one of the signatory states of the UN Refugee Convention 1951 and hence does not feel obliged to host the Rohingyas as refugees. Apart from them, the critical experience of dealing with the Rohingyas who crossed the border in 1978, 1991/1992, 2012, 2016 and 2017 has also discouraged Bangladesh to be cordial and sympathetic to them. Given the scenario, the Rohingyas are in an acute vulnerable stage in Bangladesh and Myanmar which has been created by the state particularly Myanmar.

The State Accelerates “Transborder Movement” Historically people move from one place to another mainly in search of “better life” as what is academically interpreted as economic migrations (see Dalton 2008). In hunting and gathering society, people’s mobility was regulated in search of food through hunting and gathering. During horticulture episode of history,

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people’s mobility was limited since they used to invest domestic labour force in horticulture. During the agriculture epoch of history, agrarian mode of production demanded wage labourers, though not at large as capitalist mode of production requires, that brought people from outside accelerating people’s mobility. However, during the age of capitalist mode of production which demanded huge labour forces, people started moving from small city to big one and country sites to metropolitan urban centres for gaining livelihood which could also be considered as “economic migrants” (Dalton 2008). In fact, gaining economic fortune motivated people to move from one place to another, and until recently it was one of the governing reasons behind all sorts of translocal and transborder migrations (see Taran 2011). The entire Europe and its human geography constitutes of several early migrations particularly the Germanic peoples, the Turks, the slaves and others as what Anna Triandafyllidou calls “circular migration between Europe and its neighborhood” (see, for details, Triandafyllidou 2013). Sixty million European migrants colonised America, Australia, Oceania, the northern half of Asia and the parts of Africa from the sixteenth century to twentieth century. “The Great Atlantic Migration” which is considered as the largest migration in the history of transborder migration took place from Europe to North America between 1870 and 1914, the first major wave of which began in the 1840s with mass movements from Ireland and Germany (see, for details, Nugent 1995). Following the industrialisation started from 1780  in England and Western Europe, people from rural area migrated to urban centres in search of job which is also a kind of searching “economic fortune.” Following the First World War, transborder mobility increased since people were moving from one country to another as migration turned into a common phenomenon. However, following decolonisation in Southern Africa, Southeast Asian countries, South Asia and Latin America, in the process of nationbuilding and state formation, the question of identity came up as a central point of conflict and contestation in the context of national majority and ethnic minority divide. In most cases, since central state is somehow formed by the national majority, ethnic minority, also the people of cultural, religious, linguistic and racial difference, were dealt with an authoritarian notion of statehood resulting in conflict, insurgency and rivalry (see, for details, Uddin 2018b). Then the state appeared with its all exploitative machineries and oppressive policies to create an extreme vulnerable condition that forces the people of cultural, religious, ethnic and racial differences to cross the border in order to flee persecution. Therefore, transborder movement is not essentially motivated by economic aspiration only and the articulation of better fortune anymore, but the fleeing persecution and escaping extreme vulnerability in the countries of origin. This premise is evidentially found in South Asian states (see, for details, Banerjee et  al. 2016). The Rohingya people in Bangladesh is an ideal case to understand the triplicate relations of the state, vulnerability and transborder movement. I have recorded hundreds of personal narratives of terrible and horrific experience of recent atrocities committed by the Myanmar security forces, ethnic extremists and Buddhist fundamentalists (see Uddin 2018a) which combinedly formed a

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force to create an extreme vulnerable condition enough for the Rohingyas to become transborder migrants in Bangladesh. I recorded a personal narrative of Mr. Maruf on October 12, 2018 at Kutupalong Camp, Block-B, Ukhia, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, what unfolds the degree of vulnerability he experienced in Rakhine state of Myanmar. His tone: My name is Maruf (45). I had two sons and three daughters. My wife was pregnant and expecting another issue in the following four months. I used to live in Gartali area of Moungdaw township. My children were still little in age, and two of them were supposed to go to school but couldn’t. Rohingya children had once an opportunity to go to Madrasha, but now is no more because Borma [Myanmar] government has curtailed this opportunity in many areas. I had a small grocery shop on a roadside close by my resident. I came to know that Borma military [Myanmar Security force] and kichu moigg [some Rakhine Buddhists] together started killing people mercilessly, slaughtering Rohingyas one after another, burning houses randomly, raping women and girls forcedly, and looting valuables in nearby Rohingya villages. Many Rohingyas rushed to our villages who lost their families and everything what they had as they explained to me. The frightened villagers were planning to leave Maungdaw and flee to Bangladesh. My wife and I also decided to join them in the following night. I was a bit hesitant because I had a small shop, a piece of cultivable land and a medium semi-brick-built house. I earned and established these assets with a lot of hardship and it was really difficult for me to leave everything. But, my wife convinced me that if I were alive, I could earn it again, but if my live didn’t exist what would I do with this property. Considering the safety of my family, I decided to leave the following night. But, the next day morning before we did wake up, Borma military and some moigga attacked our villages and started burning houses after houses. Many Rohingyas were burnt alive while sleeping in the morning. Many were able to escape with their lives but saw their dearest ones burning alive. I had the similar experience because I somehow escaped myself and save my pregnant wife, but my two sons and three daughters were asleep and hence bunt with my house. I tried to get in the burning house to save my sons and daughters, but a military soldier did hit me with the gun-handle and I became senseless. I didn’t know anything then what happened the next. When I woke up, I saw that my neighbours were carrying me with a group of other Rohingyas who were marching towards Bangladesh border. My pregnant wife was walking beside me. Finally, we could cross the border and came in Bangladesh. Why have our lives become hell over night? What’s our fault? They dealt with us as if we are not human beings!

Mr. Maruf’s experience illustrates an acute state of vulnerability as what Agamben calls “the state of exception” (1998) and Butler terms as “precarious life” (2004) existing in Rakhine state of Myanmar. Maruf’s personal narrative reveals mainly three important points: Firstly, it is basically the state which produces the state of vulnerability within its state territory as part of state’s policy to deal with the people of cultural, religious, ethnic and racial differences like the Rohingyas in Myanmar. Secondly, the state along with other forces creates an “atrocious living condition” (Uddin [forthcoming] 2019) as what Green and Ward (2004) said “state crime”, which compels the target people to leave the country as what academics phrase as “transborder movement”. Thirdly, such transborder movement is not essentially motivated by the premise in search of “economic fortune” and “better off life”, but for saving their lives from persecution.

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The State Produces Vulnerability The state at present has become to many extents more authoritarian and exploitative. Karl Marx long ago said that the state is a tool of exploitation and it protects the interests of the elite and ruling classes of the society (see Wetherly 2005). All classic notions of state indeed serve the interests of the ruling class of the society in the age of capitalism, and hence it excludes people including “the rights of others” (see Benhabib 2004) in order to prioritise profit. Myanmar as a state also serves the interests of military establishment, civilian elites, ruling class of the society and political class of the country (see Ibrahim 2016). Therefore, it deals with the people of cultural difference like Kachin, Chin, Shan and Rohingyas in a way as if they are unwelcoming intruders. Particularly, Myanmar state deals with the Rohingyas living in Rakhine state inhumanly by producing extreme forms of vulnerability. Though the state’s oppressive role in dealing with the Rohingyas started a couple of decades ago, the campaign launched in 2017 was so extreme that the United Nations termed it as “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing” and many international rights bodies including Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International (AI), renown genocide scholars (Zarni and Cowley 2014; Green et  al. 2015; Ibrahim 2016; Wade 2017), and acclaim media outlets (including CNN, BCC, The New York Time, the Independent, Al Jazeera) called it “genocide” (see Uddin 2018a). During my fieldwork I have recorded many horrific narratives which clearly unfold that an extreme form of vulnerable condition was created by the state in Myanmar which compelled them to cross the border. I recorded a personal narrative of a traumatised woman named Ms. Fatema Begum (27) on September 24, 2018 at a roadside temporary tent, Teknaf, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. Her tone: I have lost my everything and have nothing to say. I got married when I was 17 years old. My husband was a businessman and used to sell household goods in Maungdaw Bazar. His earning was good enough to run our family of six members. I had three sons and one daughter. Of three, one was still at breast-feeding age. We had our own wood-made two storied house in Koillarbah area of Northern Maungdaw. We were living with tension and constant insecurity because time and again kichu Moiggar Foa [some Rakhine youths] and Borma military used to visit our house under the pretext of searching illegal arms and Rohingya militants. Every time, we had to pay big amount of money to convinc them. This was the way how we were living in Maungdaw. But, this time Borma military came in August 30, 2017, listened to none and nothing, and started ransacking the household goods and available essentials at home. They vandalised the entire house. They picked me up and taken to a bed room. My all children were crying. My husband was trying to snatched me away from them and he attempted couple of times. Suddenly one of the soldiers shot him on his head and he fell down on the ground and died on the spot. I was so shocked to see dying my husband in front of me. Then, four of them did gang-rape me in front of my children. I was severely bleeding and soon after I lost my sense. When my sense came back, I was lying down on the yard and saw my kids crying around me. I also saw that my house turned into ashes as they burnt the house and my husband was burnt inside the house. At night with many other Rohingays, I with my four children also joined the march towards the border of Bangladesh. On the way, Borma military suddenly started random firing and many of our co-walkers were killed on the spot. I saw that my two sons also laying down on the street as bullets hit their body. The living ones started running and I also did so leaving my two sons’

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dead bodies on the street. Finally, we could enable to cross the border and now in Bangladesh. I don’t have any idea what I will do with my two children; where I will go; how I will survive; and where the destination of our lives is. I see dark in everywhere of my life.

Fatema’s experience unfolds brutal face of the state which does not only create extreme vulnerable conditions but also forces the people to make a choice between “definite death”, which is called “collective violence” (see Brass 1997), and moving out of the country. Since people tend to be alive, they choose to leave the country and cross the border which accelerates transborder movement. Fatema’s narrative tells two significant aspects of the nexus between vulnerability and transborder movement. Firstly, the state has become so powerful, which could do and undo anything when it comes to the question of the people of religious, ethnic and racial difference like Rohingyas in Myanmar whom are thought of the worthy of ­extinction. Secondly, transborder movements are gradually increasing across the world as the state itself is no more container of the people’s civil, social and political rights (see Taylor 1994) as Taylor claims the state is a container of economic, social and political issue that a state deals with. Rather it makes people’s lives so vulnerable that people feel self-pressure to cross the boundary like Rohingyas are crossing the boundary and take refuge in Bangladesh.

The State Reproduces Vulnerability Whilst Mr. Alam was explaining his dreadful experience of Myanmar state’s atrocities, he was also talking about the state of Rohingya situation in Bangladesh. Noticeably, his experience as a new arrival and the same of other Rohingyas who came in 1978, 1991/1992 and 2012 are not the same. Newly arrived Rohingyas are relatively well received, provided with shelter and supported with food supply, primary healthcare and everyday essentials, though inadequate, due to international supports and pressure (see Uddin 2018a). But, those Rohingyas who came in earlier in Bangladesh (particularly in 1978, 1991/1992 and 2012) and got settled down in different makeshift camps, temporary shelters, roadside plastic tents and in yards of local people have long been going through another forms of vulnerability. In most cases, the state agents and state institutions are instrumental in the production of vulnerability in the lives of Rohingyas in Bangladesh. When we talk about “the state”, it generally represents the central state, but the recent trend in anthropology to the study of the state is a bit different. Rather than focusing on the bureaucratically organised and structurally centralised one, anthropologists pay attention to the local state in its local manifestation and its operation at the local-societal representation. Though the idea of “local state” emerged sporadically in various researches (Ferguson 1994; Gupta 1995), the seminal compilation of Veena Das and Debora Poole (2004 [ed.]) first brought more meticulously the idea of the state at the local-­ societal framework presenting couple of empirical cases on how the state lives on the margin away off the centre (see Das and Poole 2004: 05). Talal Asad with a

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polemic analysis substantiated the idea of state on the margin (see Asad 2004). Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta with empirically grounded analysis presented “everyday practices of bureaucrats and their representation of the state” (2006: 277). James Ferguson has taken it on further with a case study in African explaining that the “expansion of bureaucratic state power, then does not necessarily mean that ‘the masses’ can be centrally coordinated or ordered around more efficiently; it only means that more power relations are referred through stat channels” (1994: 263). One of the leading contributors of the scholarship on “local state”11 is Akhil Gupta who with a case of India presents “the analysis of the everyday practices of local bureaucracies (See, Gupta 2012) and the discursive construction of the state in public culture” (1995: 376). In fact, the ranges of administrative practices at the local level could be meaningful symptoms to understand the state in people’s everyday life as what now is widely known as “local state” (see Uddin and Gerharz 2017). I wrote in elsewhere that I consider the “local state” in three dimensions: (a) the law enforcing agencies as the classic representation of the central state, (b) the “local people” that represents the dominant notions of “stateness” and (3) the civil administration and local bureaucracy reflected as the “local state” in south-eastern Bangladesh (see Uddin [forthcoming] 2019). Here I will present the roles of law enforcing agencies in the form of “local states” as the classic representation of the central state. We will see how the local state is reproducing vulnerability in the lives of Rohingya people in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Police (BP), the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), the Bangladesh Military (BM), the Bangladesh Ansar VDB and the Coast Guard of Bangladesh (CGB) are the law enforcing agencies that constitute the classic and formal representation of the state. How these formal state agents treat Rohingyas in south-eastern part of Bangladesh could unfold the dynamics of dealing in both “home state and host state” (Uddin 2018b). “Since migrated Rohingyas are stateless people and living in Bangladesh as unregistered, undocumented and illegal ‘objects’, they face often detention, arbitrary arrests and frequent torture by the law enforcing agencies what unfold their relations with the state” (Uddin 2015; Uddin [forthcoming] 2019). Bangladesh Police and the BGB often raid Pasan Para in Ukhia and Vasan Para in Teknaf where I have been doing fieldwork for years in search of “unlawful objects”. The police intermittently raid Taal in Ukhia and Leda in Teknaf for discovering drugs, arms and criminals, “because Rohingya camps have always been represented as the place of various forms of critical activities including drug business, arm trade, prostitutes-suppliers, militants producer, and the hub of thieves and robbers” (see Uddin [forthcoming] 2019). Many Chittagong-based dailies and Dhaka-based

11  See also Das, V.; Poole, D. (eds.) 2004. Anthropology in the Margins of the State. New Delhi: Oxford University Press; Gupta, A. 1995. Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics and the Imagined State. American Ethnologist 22(2):375–402; Gupta, Akhi. 2012. Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence and Poverty in India. Durham: Duke University Press; Sharma, Aradhana and Gupta, Akhil (eds.). 2006. The Anthropology of the State: A Reader. USA, UK and Australia: Blackwell Publishing.

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printing and electronics media regularly publish news on Yaba12 trade, border smuggling, illegal arms trading, various kinds of social crimes and militant activities where Rohingyas and Rohingya camps are said to have directly involved (see Uddin 2015; Uddin [forthcoming] 2019). Media presentation and public perception indeed justify the raid of law enforcing agencies in Rohingya settlements. However, such raids to some extent cause serious human rights violation which remains unpublished in local and national dailies. I have recorded many of such raid cases during my long-year fieldwork in Ukhia and Teknaf. Mr. Akber Ahmed (49) of Pasan Para in Ukhia explained to me an experience of police raid in his house in 2015. A sub-inspector with six armed-police constables raided my house at dawn while I with my wife, two daughters and three sons were sleeping. They were shouting standing in the yard and calling by my name “Akber, Oi Akber! Wake up! Open the door”. I opened the door and saw them standing along with a few local Bengalis. Before telling anything, a police constable started beating me holding my hair. Three others joined him in beating and shouting that I did steal Mojaffar’s house, my neighbour, last night and steal all necessary household items. The items include, as they were telling, a mobile phone, a colour TV, a small laptop, gold jewelleries of neckless and bracelet, wrist watches, costly sharees and other clothes, shoes, and cash money of 40 thousand BDT. I was trying to convince them that I coudn’t do that as I was asleep at home. They didn’t ready to hear anything and kept saying, ‘chomer mar boro gola’ meaning ‘a thief sounds loud!’ My sons and daughters came forward to rescue me from the aggressive constables, but accompanied Bengalis joined the team to beat them up along with me. At one point of beating, the police sub-inspector stopped them and started telling that since I had stolen the laptop, jewelleries and other necessary valuable goods, I would have to bring all back in 24 hours. I was seriously wounded, and also my three sons, but I was still trying to tell them that since I didn’t steal, how could I bring them back. The sub-inspector didn’t want to listen to anything and warned me of doing what he said. Otherwise I would be put in jail in connection with the stealing Mojaffor’s house. I couldn’t bring the goods and valuable stolen items back, and I was put in jail day after. I was in Jail for three months. My whole family suffered much from food, and everyday essentials during my absence, but no one came up to stand beside us. I stayed in the jail for three months without doing any crime. Since then, I became known in the locality as a thief and my children are facing social stigma for my imprisonment in connection with stealing. I didn’t have any one to complain and any forum to seek justice because we are illegal migrants in Bangladesh. We are not recognised by any state; neither Bangladesh, not Myanmar. What’s our wrong? We were vulnerable in Myanmar in one form, but we are having the experience of vulnerabilities in another in Bangladesh. Rohingya people are indeed not manush [human beings].

Akber’s narrative shows the glimpse of how the Rohingyas are dealt with in Bangladesh, particularly the ways how the law enforcing agencies, the classic representation of the state, produces different forms of vulnerable conditions for Rohingyas in Bangladesh. Therefore, when we talk about the “refugee rights”, it makes no sense to some extent because refugee rights are sometimes indeed myths (see Larking 2014) and Akber’s experience unfolds the reality of the myth. Two very important and fundamental issues come up from Akber’s narrative. Firstly, the Rohingyas are treated arbitrarily as they have no space for lodging complaint with  Yaba is a kind of tablets which are used to increase human sexuality. Myanmar is the largest Yaba-producing country in the world, and as a borderland Teknaf and Ukhia are popularly known as Yaba trading zones.

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any office and seeking justice from any authority due to their vulnerable social and political positioning as they lack any legally recognised status in Bangladesh. Secondly, if any stealing and robbery case comes up or any crime and offence takes place in Ukhia and Teknaf nearby Rohingya settlement, Rohingyas are at first place accused of being the perpetrators as they are looked upon as illegal migrants and socially disorder people and thereby easy to victimise. This is how the local state reproduces another form of vulnerable conditions for the Rohingyas as they are treated inhumanly as if they are “rejected people” (Weiner 1993), “bare life” (Agamben 1998), “non-life” (Povinelli 2016) and “subhuman” (Uddin [forthcoming] 2019); they do not exist before the law. Akber’s statement also unfolds that the state, whether it is central state or local states, creates vulnerability for the people who are already in the state of extreme vulnerable position. In that sense, vulnerability is self-productive since the state of vulnerably pushes people to further ­vulnerable position where the Rohingyas are currently living in. The state is the main player where it is immaterial whether it is “home state or host state” (Uddin 2018b).

Vulnerability Is Reproduced as the “Local State” Matters In Bangladesh local governments are entitled and empowered to settle local disputes, plan, monitor and implement local-level development initiatives and deal with local issues as the representative of the central government. It is indeed another formal local representation of the central state because it reflects and implements the state’s policy and hence could be considered as the “local state” (see Gupta 1995). In Bangladesh: the local government consists of City Corporations, Zila Parishad (district council), Pawrashova (city), Upazila Parishad (sub-district council), and Union Parishad (union council), which are the local organs of the central government. Since Teknaf is a Pawrashova and Ukhia is an Upazila, Rohingya living in Teknaf needs to deal with Ward Commissioners and Ward Officials whilst those who live in Ukhia need to deal with Union Parishad Chairman, Members and Union Parishad Officials (see, for details, Uddin [forthcoming] 2019).

The Rohingyas who live in Teknaf and Ukhia Upazila have no formal relations with the local states except two levels of engagement as what I have written elsewhere in details (see Uddin [forthcoming] 2019). Firstly, in order to handle the case of elopement, the Rohingyas often need to go to Union Parishad in Ukhia and Ward Office in Teknaf to attend a meeting called by the elected Chairman or Commissioners of the Parishad. Secondly, Rohingyas need to go to Union Parishad in Ukhia and Ward Office in Teknaf to deal with the land dispute because they temporarily build shelters/house on the lands which belong to the government as what is locally called “Khash land”. The punishments are also very unorthodox like “in the forms of physical assaults, penalty of giving money, gifting a caw or dozens of hens and holding ears in front of all. Sometimes, ten-slappings by the opponents in front of all on the spot was also given as verdicts in the meeting” (see, for details, Uddin

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[forthcoming] 2019). During my fieldwork I attended and observed many such meeting of dispute settlement in both Pasan Para and Vasan Para where the Rohingyas were given stern punishment though in most cases they did not commit any crime and offence. But, they had to accept the decision made by the “local states”. I have recorded many cases of dispute settlement meeting and am presenting one here. Farid Uddin (54) is a Rohingya who came in Bangladesh in 1991 and got settled down in Vasan Para. Farid Uddin explained to me about a local dispute settlement case in the local union Parishad office. Mr. Sirajul Islam, a Union Parishad Chairman of a Union in Teknaf Upazila, called a meeting at his office in 2014 at the request of Harun-Ar-Rashid, a local Bengali. I was summoned to attend the meeting. Many other local Bengalis were present there. A school teacher was also present there. Some local political leaders also attended meeting. My daughter, Khushbu (19), and her husband, Karim (27) were there. I was surprised to see my daughter there because Khushbu was missing six days ago and I came to know that she eloped with Karim and they got married. But I didn’t find them anywhere in Teknaf. I was rather happy to see my daughter. Mr. Harun complained to Mr. Sirajul Islam against me and my daughter because, as per his complain, my daughter and I deliberately flattered and deluded his son Karim to marry Khushbu. Therefore, he was emotionally blackmailed to marry my daughter. Now, Harun wants his son back and demands my daughter should go back home. Sirajul Islam was asking my opinion. I tried to convince Mr. Sirajul Islam and others present there that both matured boy and girl had consciously decided to marry each other and done so accordingly. They had stayed six days together as husband and wife.How could I bring my daughter back? It should be fair injustice to my daughter and to my family. It would destroy my daughter’s life and her future and bring social stigma to my family. I had still couple of daughters and their future would be at risk too. I tried to convince the people present there with all my logics, my emotions, my requests, and my earnest appeal. But, all went in vain. Finally, Sirajul Islam gave a decision that it was still not too late and Khushbu should go back home and Karim would not meet her again in future. And the decision was final as I didn’t have anything to do. I came back home with my daughter who was crying as if her heart was bleeding. At that night, my daughter committed suicide with the scarf hanging with celling fan at her room. I had nothing to do but just to accept the writing of fate because we are Rohingyas.We have none to complain, nowhere to go and no forum to seek justice. This is a life we lead in Bangladesh.

Farid Uddin’s narrative tells many issues which are crucial to understand the way how the “local state” deals with the Rohingyas. The Rohingyas are quite often victimised under various pretexts one of which is reflected in this case. Two important issues have come up from this narrative: Firstly, the local state always works in favour of the majority, whilst the minority are less prioritised. However, in case of non-citizens and refugees who are neither majorities, nor minorities, the local state behaves blindly because it does not care about whether it is justice or injustice, right or wrong and fair or unfair. It just takes arbitrary decision in favour of the locals. Therefore, here Mr. Farid Uddin was not listened to properly, and his arguments were not considered at all. Rather, the decision was given as one-sided verdict. “Eloping her daughter in the name of romance, staying with her for six days as husband, and returning her back to home with an arbitration headed by the local state” is simply an example of another form of vulnerability. The local state treats the people having an acute vulnerability in a way, knowing their vulnerable condition so that they cannot but accept the decision given. Through this way, the victims

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are further victimised, and vulnerable people are further put in vulnerable conditions where the local state does a preferential treatment. In this case, Harun-Ar-­ Rashid is a local Bengali, but Mr. Farid Uddin is a Rohingya who is a non-citizen and stateless person. Therefore, the decision was given keeping in mind that Farid Uddin would have nothing to do but to accept it so that he would become further victimised. Secondly, the stateless people have to accept all sorts of impositions regardless of right or wrong and fair or unfair because of their lack of citizenship in the land. Therefore, Mr. Farid Uddin had to accept the decision of the meeting and the unexpected untimely death of his daughter where the representative of central state takes clear position against vulnerable one. It reveals that the state is r­ eproducing vulnerabilities and which in turn is being exacerbated with the presence of everyday state such as functioning of “local” state processes.

Conclusion Having presented some compelling narratives of some Rohingya people who have been experiencing persecution, ethnic cleaning, genocide, homicide and an acute form of vulnerability in Myanmar for more than four decades, along with various forms of discrimination and vulnerability in Bangladesh, this chapter tends to establish four basic potential propositions. Firstly, the state has always been instrumental in the reproduction of vulnerability as what Green and Ward (2004) said “state crime” is for the people who are unwelcoming in the national space due to their religious, ethnic and racial difference. Secondly, the state-created vulnerability forces people to make a choice between “leaving the country by crossing border” and “receiving definite death”. Since people tend to be alive, they ultimately prefer to crossing border as a strategy of life-saving which indeed accelerates transborder movement. In that sense, the state promotes transborder movement. Thirdly, vulnerability is a particular form of people’s marginalised positioning which renders them further vulnerable because extreme vulnerability holds nothing to resist, none to complain and no space to seek justice. Rohingyas’ lives in Bangladesh clearly present that vulnerability is self-productive because the local state deals with the Rohingyas as if they are “bare life” (Agamben 1998), “non-life” (Povinelli 2016), “rejected people” (Weiner 1993) and “subhuman” (Uddin [forthcoming] 2019). Finally, this chapter unfolds the triplicate nexus of the state, vulnerability and transborder movement because the relations between and among them are “causes” and “consequential” where the state is the key player. The position of Rohingyas in both home state (Myanmar) and host state (Bangladesh) proves this relation with the vivid and lived experience of the Rohingyas, who are considered as “the most persecuted ethnic group in the world”.

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Bibliography Agamben, G. (1998). Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life (D.  Heller-Roazen, Trans.). Stanford: Stanford University Press. Ahmed, A. (Ed.). (2014). The plight of the stateless Rohingyas. Dhaka: University Press Limited. Arendt, H. (1994). The origins of totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Books. Asad, T. (2004). Where are the margins of the state? In V. Das & D. Poole (Eds.), Anthropology in the margins of the state (pp. 279–288). New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Banerjee, P., Anasua, C., & Atig, G. (Eds.). (2016). The state of being stateless: An account of South Asia. New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan. Benhabib, S. (2004). The rights of others: Aliens, residents and citizens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brass, P. R. (1997). Theft of an idol: Text and context in the representation of collective violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Butler, J. (2004). The precarious life: The power of mourning and violence. London/New York: VERSO. Dalton, D. (2008). Economic migrants: People on the move. London: PawPrints. Das, V., & Poole, D. (Eds.). (2004). Anthropology in the margins of the state. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Elahi, K. M. (1987). The Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh: Historical perspectives and consequences. In J. Rogge (Ed.), Refugees: A third world dilemma. USA: Rowman & Littlefield. Ferguson, J. (1994). The anti-politics machine: “Development”, depoliticization and bureaucratic power in lesotho. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Fineman, M. (2008). The vulnerable subject: Anchoring equality in the human condition. Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, 2(1), 1–23. Foucault, M. (1976). The history of sexuality (Vol. 1). Boston: Vantage Books. Green, P., & Ward, T. (2004). State crime: Governments, violence and corruption. London: Pluto Press. Green, P., MacManus, T., & de la Cour Venning, A. (2015). Countdown annihilation: Genocide in Myanmar. London: International State Crime Initiative. Gupta, A. (1995). Blurred boundaries: The discourse of corruption, the culture of politics and the imagined state. American Ethnologist, 22(2), 375–402. Gupta, A. (2012). Red tape: Bureaucracy, structural violence and poverty in India. Durham: Duke University Press. Hossain, D. (2014). Tracing the plight of the Rohingyas. In I. Ahmed (Ed.), The plight of the stateless Rohingyas (pp. 09–35). Dhaka: University Press Limited. Howard-Hassmann, & Walton-Roberts. (2015). The human rights to citizenship: A slippery concept. Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press. Ibrahim, A. (2016). The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar’s hidden genocide. London: Hurts Publication. Jain, P., & Oommen, G. (Eds.). (2016). South Asian migration to gulf countries: History, policies and development. New York: Routledge. Kesby, A. (2012). The rights to have rights: Citizenships, humanity and international law. Oxford: The Oxford University Press. Kohn, N. (2014). Vulnerability theory and the roles of government. Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, 26(1), 01–27. Larking, E. (2014). Refugees and the myth of human rights: Life outside the pale of the law. London/New York: Routledge. Lorey, I. (2015). State of insecurity: Government of the precarious (A. Derieg, Trans.). London/ New York: VERSO. Nugent, W. (1995). Crossings: The great transatlantic migrations (pp. 1870–1914). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

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Povinelli, E. (2016). Geontologies: A requiem to late liberalism. Durham: Duke University Press. Sharma, A., & Gupta, A. (Eds.). (2006). The anthropology of the state: A reader. USA, UK and Australia: Blackwell Publishing. Siddiqui, T. (2016). International labour migrations and remittances. In A.  Riaz & M.  Rahman (Eds.), Routledge handbook of contemporary Bangladesh. London/New York: Routledge. Taran, P. (2011). Globalization, migration and labour: Imperatives for a rights based policy. Journal of Globalization Studies, 2(1), 58–77. Taylor, P. J. (1994). The state as container: Territoriality in the modern world-system. Progress in Human Geography, 18(2), 151–162. Triandafyllidou, A. (2013). Circular migration between Europe and its neighbourhood: Choice or necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Uddin, N. (2010). Treatment of unwelcome guests: A case of Rohingya refugee in Bangladesh. The paper presented at an international conference on Political Economy of South Asian Migrants organized by South Asian Regional Formation Research Society held on November 24–26, the University of Delhi, India. Uddin, N. (2012a). Of hosting and hurting: Crises in co-existence with Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. In N. Uddin (Ed.), To host or to hurt: Counter narratives on Rohingya refugee issue in Bangladesh (pp.  83–98). Dhaka: Institute for Culture and Development Research (ICDR). Uddin, N. (Ed.). (2012b). To host or to hurt: Counter narratives on Rohingya refugee issue in Bangladesh. Dhaka: Institute for Culture and Development Research (ICDR). Uddin, N. (2015). The state of statelessness people: A case of the Rohingya refugess in Bangladesh. In Howard-Hassmann & Walton-Roberts (Eds.), The human rights to citizenship: A slippery concept (pp. 62–77). Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press. Uddin, N. (2018a). Life in everyday death: A case of Rohingyas. In Berkeley centre for global religion. Washington, DC: Georgetown University. Uddin, N. (2018b). The state matters: The Rohingyas in home state and host state. An unpublished research monography. Uddin, N. (2019 [Forthcoming]). The Rohingyas: A case of “Subhuman”. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Uddin, N., & Gerharz, E. (2017). The many faces of the state: Living in peace and conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh. Society and Conflict, 2(1). in press. Wade, F. (2017). Myanmar’s enemy within: Buddhist violence and the making of a muslim ‘other’. London: ZED Books. Weiner, M. (1993). Rejected peoples and unwanted migrants in South Asia. Economic and Political Weekly, 18(34), 1737–1746. Wetherly, P. (2005). Marxism and the state: An analytical approach. New York: Palgrave McMillan. Zarni, M., & Cowley, A. (2014). Slow-burning genocide of Myanmar’s Rohingyas. Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, 23(30), 683–754.

Chapter 6

Nation-State and Its Production of Statelessness: A Study of Chin Refugees Meghna Kajla

Abstract  The South Asian states do not have proper conventions and laws for refugees, immigrants or stateless people. The borders of the states and their institutions are not strict in not accepting immigrants; rather the borders are more or less known to be porous in the region due to its sharing of boundaries with each other. It is in the neighbouring countries where stateless people seek asylum by entering through illegal ways or accepting them as asylum seekers. Once refugees or outsiders enter the asylum state then the laws and rights convene according to its constitution or international conventions signed by the asylum state. It is at the convenience of asylum state; whether it prefers to build camps or construct sites for refugees for their stay. However, refugees stay in a country for a longer time until the situation of their origin country comes back to normal and accepts them as citizens. This leads to a question that Hannah Arendt addresses of either repatriation or naturalisation. If any of these processes is accepted by states of either origin or state of asylum for the moment then the larger question still remains, how these states will comply with giving citizenship. It may again declare the same people as non-citizens or aliens and create them stateless, and perpetuates a vicious cycle of statelessness in South Asian states. The people living as stateless remain in camps for years and their situation never improves in the interplay of state and citizens. There are many counter  arguments of cosmopolitan citizenship or democratisation of borders (Balibar), on the other hand a radical argument of eating others’ share (Ranciere). How then does one address the complicated situation of refugees like Chin living in India in camps, rented rooms and apartments with UNHCR identity? The refugees require certain rights and laws for existence rather than living as stateless or without any representation. It is in this regard that the nation-state is the authority in creation of stateless people (Arendt) and in contemporary times the only authority to accept them as citizens. Keywords  Citizenship · Chins · Myanmar · Rights · Border · State

M. Kajla (*) Department of Political Science, University of Delhi, Delhi, India © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 N. Uddin, N. Chowdhory (eds.), Deterritorialised Identity and Transborder Movement in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2778-0_6

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Introduction Statelessness is an opposite extreme status in relation to citizenship that rests on the bundle of rights, and other identities like migrants, refugees and asylum seekers can be conditionally made stateless. Migrants and refugees have some minimal rights as individuals that states may designate according to its laws on refugees and other signed international conventions. However, stateless people have a unique interrelational dynamics with state and society; they become stateless as will be elaborated in the case of Chin refugee. The Mizoram society accepts Chins as brother from the same lineage and makes ‘other’ with Myanmar nationality and on the record with Indian state: their non-existence. Hereto, the analyses of statelessness in South Asia, specifically in the governance of postcolonial state, determine in terms of acceptance or rejection a person as citizen or non-citizen. A man1 as a citizen/a political man/a subject to ask for rights is redundant in the situations of de jure and de facto statelessness. The central argument of this chapter is to critically unravel the subject ‘man’ as ‘stateless’ in relation to nation-state. To take a step further, since the creation of viciousness of statelessness is a derived trajectory of a nation-state, then it is under its sphere to address its complexities. Extending the argument, state is the only legitimate authority to give certain rights pertaining to ‘rights of a man’. But when the states declare certain sections of its minorities as stateless, they enter the neighbouring country for refuge and shelter. It is then as Benhabib argues the responsibility of the state-giving asylum to give them their rights (2004: 12). She goes a step further in stating that the ‘rights of a man’ should be universal. However, when these rights are attached to a man irrespective of his status, then these will exist within the purview of a nation-state (Arendt 2017: 293). It is within this dynamic of interplay within and among nation-states that the questions of stateless people arise that need to be addressed by its institutions. It develops an argument to bring in the idea of ‘rights of a man’ within the discourse of nation-state. The chapter is divided into four sections, first, the conceptual notion of statelessness in South Asia and its relationship with the nation-state, second, debate on the legitimacy of nation-state to address rights of a man as stateless, third, Chin refugees and their inadequacy in terms of rights in India, and fourth, conclusion.

1  Man in the chapter is often used to denote both men and women; it is taken from Arendt and her repetitive use of the word ‘man’ signifying a political being. She borrows it from Aristotle to differentiate political being from other beings as species in biological terms. See pp. 182 paragraph 2 in ‘The Public and the Private Realm’. Baehr, Peter. 2002. The Public and The Private Realm. In The Portable Hannah Arendt, ed. 182–230. Ontario: Penguin Books Ltd. Pg. 182–184. In this very section, author discusses the private and public realm that further clarifies her stance on the inclusion of both men and women in the discussion.

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Statelessness as a Political Category The politico-status of a citizen enables one to enjoy three broad categories of rights,2 and when it comes to the category of statelessness, a citizen loses his/her status as an equal citizen to access or seek his bundle of rights.3 This situation often arises due to non-affiliation to a nationality or a political community in relation with nation-state.4 The category of statelessness is vulnerable not because of the definition given by UNHCR ‘a person who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law or one who loses his nationality’5 but more so because of its precarious nature by not being able to achieve representation as a citizen in any polity. This categorically means that there is no political community one may belong to, and no community is ready to give him representation of being a human being.6 It is an epistemological political debate on the inability for an individual to seek rights. However, deprivation of human life is not understood with regard to statelessness (Parekh 2014), rather the principle lead for the arguments in the chapter is about an individual/citizen belonging to a nationality or a political community. In other words, it directs that a subject must find some political community that can give him representation or seek space for the ‘right to return’ in one’s own state. The role a state plays in either accepting outsiders as aliens or economic migrants or by giving citizens the right to return is fundamental at its disposal. But for stateless, states give up selected citizens (mostly the ethnic, racial and religious minorities) and make claim on their belongingness to a country.7 The theoretical distinction on de jure and de facto statelessness,8 pertinent for the debate in the chapter is de facto: people who are unable to access their rights of nationality or are unwilling to access 2  Marshall, T H. 1950. Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays. New  York: Cambridge University Press. 3  UNHCR report states that the impact of statelessness is widely on the enjoyment of rights. http:// www.unhcr.org/stateless-people.html. 4  The idea that now there exists no supreme political community other than a nation-state has been brought out by Hannah Arendt. Ibid. Pg. 293. 5  See http://www.unhcr.org/stateless-people.html. 6  Human being here is referred to a citizen following from the debate of man through Arendt’s framework on how a human being is a social and political animal. 7  De jure and de facto statelessness are the two categories, but a political subject is created to mere subject and encounter similar kinds of economic, social and political problems. See Canafe, Nergis. 2018. Statelessness as Permanent State: Challenges to Human Security Paradigm. Conflict Transformation and Security: 1–14. And for difference made by Arendt where she finds de facto situation more precarious, see Parekh, Serena. 2014. Beyond the Ethics of Admission: Stateless People, Refugee Camps and Moral Obligation. Philosophy and Social Criticism (Sage Publications) 40, no. 7: 645–663. See UNHCR charter for their understanding on statelessness. See http://www. unhcr.org/stateless-people.html. 8  The de facto and de jure statelessness are different due to their process of making stateless; otherwise their conditions or end result is stateless. De jure statelessness is when a person is not considered as national of any state. De facto statelessness exists when a person is unable to provide with valid legal documents for accessibility of nationality but poses a formal nationality. See http:// www.unhcr.org/stateless-people.html.

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because of precedential violence or their ‘right to return’ is challenged and cannot due to notorious declarations made by the state of non-recognition as citizen.9 It is these people who depend entirely on fate of life but in return are in the hands of state. The Burmese ethnic Chins living in India since 1988 as opaque objects due to persistence of ethnic violence against racial and religious minorities by military government and in other words by the state of Burma10 are reluctant to return due to the violence aggravated against them, and their citizenship still remains to be challenged. Their right to return and identification of nationality are lost at once; claims cannot be made for rights either in Burma or India. Statelessness is distinct from the other floating categories, between stateless and citizen; rather they can be termed as outsiders with some legal status, like refugees, asylum seekers, immigrants, migrants, etc. But an ardent critique of their existence and vulnerability is that they are stateless in making (Manchanda 1997). So, the group of outsiders are categorised and considered differently, and the rising seriousness in statelessness is to be analysed distinctively with strong theoretical foundations. Belton argues stateless non-citizens and liberal political theory have either overlooked this category or could not differentiate from immigrants, refugees or migrants (Belton 2011). Minimally they are arranged for, by the state or non-state organisations in makeshift sites, camps, and registered refugees do get some economic benefit from UNHCR11 and at least belong to some nationality formally and can seek ‘right to return’. However, their security, food, shelter and residence provided by international organisations on humanitarian basis cannot be undermined with the immoral and criminal acts within the camps.12 The debate on stateless is deep-seated in rise of modernity that led to the formation of nation-states. It can also be located in the context of South Asia with historical, political and social distinctness of the region. Outlining the trajectory of creation of states in the west (Gellner 1983), the postcolonial societies have a disparate trajectory in creation of nations and in managing their ethnic and multicultural minorities specifically in the case of Northeast India (Piang 2013), and the major problem is failure of nation-building (Ghosh 2016; Chowdhory 2013).

9  See http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/Citizenship%20Law.htm. The major changes brought by the Burmese government against the ethnic and racial minorities of the nation. 10  https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/01/27/we-are-forgotten-people/chin-people-burma-unsafeburma-unprotected-india. Pg. 21. 11   India treats refugees and immigrants differently through enforcing various laws. See Bhattacharjee, Saurabh. 2008. India Needs a Refugee Law. Economic and Political Weekly: 71–75. 12  See Dunn, Elizabeth Cullen and Jason Cons. 2014. Aleatory Sovereignty and The Rule of Sensitive Spaces. Antipode 46, no. 1: 92–109.

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Context of South Asia and Creation of Borders Locating statelessness in the context of South Asia, the political history of region articulates its distinctness from statelessness, as critically substantiated category used in west and by UNHCR. There are major causal reasons that have differentiated the context of stateless in south Asia; failure of nation-building, inter-ethnic conflict, open or virtually open borders, intra-regional and extra-regional military intervention among others (Ghosh 2016). Among these the major factor is failure in nation-­building, which has been explicit in most of the states. The nature of postcolonial state-formation in South Asia was to accommodate ethnically divided society (Chowdhory 2013). This has created most of the ethnic affiliations on the borders and borderlands that appear to be inhabited by groups sharing culture, religion or ethnicity and kinship in the case of Chins with Mizos. The geographical formation of South Asia as explained through its historical past shows that the boundaries were constructed by not looking at the social and cultural belonging but merely through political agenda. A significant reason behind the existence of instability in the region is the demarcation of international border between Burma and India with the British administrative boundaries that are today seen as various states (Piang 2013). The political history of the hill region, which was not under British rule but was later annexed for economic purpose, has led to the creation of international borders with minorities on both the sides. Burma, after its independence in 1948, and the death of Aung San fell into the hands of military rule. In 1962, military junta ran Burma with an official military coup by demolishing the democratic structure till today, with Aung San Suu Kyi as non-active democratic leader.13 This led to protests of 1988 against the military rule; most of the ethnic minorities supporters of pro-­ democracy faced military-directed violence and today are counted as refugees and stateless in various South Asian and Southeast Asian countries.14 Even after Aung San Suu Kyi was elected as the first democratic leader and called as state counsellor, which is a post equivalent to prime minister, she did not address the right to return to stateless or changing the horrendous 1982 citizenship law; rather ethnic violence has worsened.15 In this context, Jalal rightly argues most of the South Asian nations who fell to military junta have not regained democracy due to the inherent nature of postcolonial state (Jalal 1995). Scholars working on statelessness in India have a peculiar understanding on the topic; Singh’s idea of statelessness derives from the domain of social rights and its relationship with the state after designation of official citizenship (Singh 2010). In his ethnographical study on Chakmas of Tripura and Assam, and till today, they are  Egreteau, Renaud. 2017. A Political History of Myanmar. In Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. LII no. 39: 27–29. 14  Banerjee, Paula. 2016. Permanent Exceptions to Citizens: The Stateless in South Asia, ed. Nasreen Chowdhory. International journal of Migration and Border Studies (Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.) 2: 119–131. 15  Chin Refugees’ Indian Dilemma. 2014. https://www.asiasentinel.com/society/chin-refugeesindian-dilemma/ (accessed June 11, 2018). 13

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unable to assimilate in the society and encounter problems with their day-to-day functioning (Singh 2010). These complications are more to do with social rights assured after citizenship, which is a problem that any minority in a country may face. This is the major fallout of citizenship in a welfare state which is unable to provide and look after its citizens.16 Similarly, Ghosh in his work on stateless people brings a narrative from the basic necessity enclosure of shelter and life of migrants. He argues that rather than asking for legal rights and being recognised as migrant group, that government uses for its vote bank politics, it is better for migrants to live a minimal and uninterrupted life as much as possible (Ghosh 2016). To argue, when stateless people enter, the first institution they encounter are national borders of a state and its security personnel. It is right from borders that outsiders come under the purview of nation-states due to its universal existence. Statelessness outlined in the context of Chin in the last section brings a narrative of their invisibility for the Indian government, Burma does not recognise them as citizens and UNHCR has been unable to provide humanitarian aid and assistance. The inability of responsibility taken by the states in the case of Chin has brought them out as a politically created category by a state for its fulfilment of the agenda of majority consensus and homogenous nation-building. This seeks to eliminate ethnic, racial and religious minorities through violence initially and procedurally legally at last declaring them non-citizens. As Banerjee argues in postcolonial countries, statelessness arises due to decolonisation and persecution of minorities as a result of the state’s majoritarian bias (Banerjee 2016). Borrowing from Arendt the concept of stateless, where a human being (Zoe) can exist in a political community and without political affiliation, he is just any other animal species (Bios) (Baehr 2002). Political philosophers Aristotle, Arendt and others have interpreted man as a political animal and without it ‘the world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of human being’ (Arendt 2017). The primary task is to argue that when a man becomes stateless, he is like any other animal, losing his affiliation from the humanity. It may be argued a man returns back to the Hobbesian human nature, where human is a beast and faces enormous security threat and could be argued that one can only survive in ‘food chain’, always vulnerable.17 It is this very reason that locates the debate on stateless within the domain of nation-states in a perceptive manner.

Statelessness and Its Relation with the Nation-State Nation-states have its constituent features and use its sovereignty and authority in regulating its territory, governance, rule of law and citizens. When nation-states conception is embedded in the debate on stateless, it gives a debate of inclusion and  See Fraser on the limitations of social rights comprising within citizenship in Fraser, Nancy and Gordon, Linda. 1994. Civil Citizenship against Social Citizenship?. In The Condition of Citizenship, ed. Bart Van Steenbergen, 90–107. London: Sage Publications. 17  See Hobbes, Thomas. 1998. Of the First and Second Natural Law, and of Contract. In Leviathan, ed. G.C. A Gaskin, 86–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 16

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exclusion of membership into a political community (Arendt 2017). In other words, it also exercises the idea of boundary with regard to citizenship and rights. This is significant and noted in the arguments initiated by Benhabib on the role of nation-­ state in transcending boundaries metaphysically and not in material sense.18 Where exclusion is regarded in terms of outsiders, foreigners, migrants, refugees or simply who are not its citizens. Moreover, this exclusion takes place vis-à-vis territory or a defined national boundary of a state. The territory or the geographical boundary of a nation-state is a defined area for rule and governance and violence.19 This political boundary of a given state can fail to include all members of the nation, or it can include all, can exclude foreigner or can include both at once (Gellner 1983). It elaborates on the power a territory or boundary has in a nation for the purposes of governmentalisation by the state. Mann explains, ‘nation-states are not in general decline’; he gives the significance of nation-state even when some scholars understand nation-states breaking (Mann 1993). It is this boundary that stands rigid in terms of creating outsiders on the basis of nationality and porous while accepting migrants or refugees. The authority of states with respect to its boundaries is the reason of creating citizens, and stateless. Locating the pertinent effect of borders in South Asia, Banerjee argues that for the most part territorial reorganisation in South Asia is the significant reason for creation of statelessness (2016). So, a territory is physical demarcation of land and political demarcation of rights. The states adamantly exercise its sovereignty on the laws relating to citizenship or other nationality laws (Belton 2011). It is within this context that the state makes laws in regard to citizenship and makes most of the time ethnic minorities (Rohingyas, Chins, Karens, etc.) as stateless by creating a citizen an outsider, refugee, migrant or alien. Stateless people are not external outsiders seeking admittance but internal outsiders seeking political inclusion (Belton 2011). However, a stateless man according to law does not exist in the territory and sovereignty of a nation-state and neither is recognised by any other organisation20 because one is to be necessarily recognised by its state. But when one is pushed outside of a territory, then there needs to exist some rights that could extend on moral and political basis to the stateless. This will further be argued in the section on debate of rights. In case of stateless people, the states do not take any responsibility in their creation nor accommodation. A man by birth (jus soli) or by affiliation (jus sanguinis) comes to have a nationality or citizenship of a nation-state. All those excluded under the unreasonable law would be created stateless and then non-recognised. This being cannot

 The argument is for porous borders and not diminishing in physical sense. See Introduction pp. 4–5 and section on crisis of territoriality in Benhabib, Seyla. 2004. The Rights of others Aliens, Residents, and Citizens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 19  See Gellner, Ernest. 2006. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell for arguments on Weberian state’s agency that has rights for legitimate violence. 20  See Weinman, Michael D. 2007. Arendt and the Legitimate Expectation for Hospitality and Membership Today. Moral Philosophy and Politics: 1–23. Where he shows that UNHCR has no accurate number and only says approximately. 18

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remain outside a nation-state, be it stateless, refugees, migrant and immigrant, and its existence in the nation-state holds the central perspective to the arguments in the section on rights. Why would the state hold central perspective for migrants?  The first major impact of state on a migrant life starts when one crosses an international border, and as Bauböck states, ‘that the most important boundaries that structure migration are clearly political borders’ (Bauböck 2012). By this he does not mean that there is no other border like social, economic and cultural. It also means entering in one state or nation is the most critical kind of border one crosses. The experience of immigration that a refugee or a migrant has is first and foremost with the state and its institutions in terms of international border or its institution. In case of transborder migration, it is the border of a state with whom the migrant interacts and later with the community where one seeks for social reproduction. The crucial analyses of the nation-state as it grounds rule of law that stands significant for the migrants. Extending further on the kinds of laws and ambiguousness of the boundaries, Balibar argues borders and boundaries are ambiguous that showcases the complete lawless status of the nation-states while addressing the foreigners or outsiders, migrants and refugees (Balibar 2010). It is this lawlessness with the borders and does not mean only in literal sense borderlands where refugees reside but also borders where law ends and a state of nature comes into existence. It is regarded that the interplay of dynamics with the state remains important (Stephen 2012).

Legitimacy of Nation-State Nation-states have to look after the stateless, foremost for their creation by changing laws of citizenship and pushing people out,21 and it’s the only existence for a political man.22 As Weinman argues ‘if it is one’s membership in a nation that grants one “the right to have rights” then for all persons whose national status is in question or for whom diplomatic protection is not offered for either legal or practical reasons, then the whole regime of international conventions becomes a normative desideratum but not a legally binding fact’ (Weinman 2017). When creation of stateless in South Asia is distinct due to colonial past beset in its creation and so will be its solutions while addressing the complications. Rather than adhering to international law and its conventions, scholars argue that states have to address the situation of stateless. The historical fact about solution of refugees taken by India in case of Chakmas and Sri Lankan Tamils has brought their admission to their countries of

 This is specific to the case of Burma 1982 changes in citizenship laws. http://www.ibiblio.org/ obl/docs/Citizenship%20Law.htm. 22  The larger argument by that man by nature is a political animal and needs a political community for survival, and it is based on membership of nationality. 21

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origin through successful bilateral ties.23 As Irene Khan argues in the case of Tibetan refugees, India did not take the help of UNHCR until 1969 through the Red Cross Society and handled the cauldron through its negotiation policy between the states.24 Moreover, the United Nations was not interested in looking after the refugees in Asia (Khan 2004). There are four various reasons that I understand significant and critical while addressing the issue of statelessness in South Asia through nation-state perspective. Among the four,  two are normative reasons for holding state as the pivotal role-­ playing agency and others are historical and political factors: (1) success of addressing refugee problems through bilateral policies (Khan 2004); (2) international law does not address the global South (Canafe 2018); (3) moral principle of holding the state responsible in accommodating its citizens and outsiders (Benhabib 2004); and (4) there is no other political community as strong as nation-states after their origin (Arendt 2017). The arguments on the ineffectiveness of the international law and refugee convention are buried deep in its sociocultural demography. The international law does not apply to the context of South Asia (Canafe 2018). Scholars working on refugee, migrants and stateless people have focused on the idea of strong support from the nation-states in the South Asian region to address these critical issues.25 Limitedly the South Asian states and specifically India are not signatories to the 1951 Convention relating to rights of refugees and neither the 1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless persons and the 1961 Convention on reduction of statelessness. India through its policy of non-refoulement has addressed various cases of refuges and on basis of Article 14 (Equality before Law) and other fundamental rights in the Indian constitution26 that guarantees rights to foreigners. The supreme court of India has announced its judgements in favour of refugees and asylum seekers more on the humanitarian grounds rather than on the separate category of refugees or stateless (Bhattacharjee 2008). Singh argues that human rights has tried to address to concerns of the refugees but the lapse on the states in its inability in holding states accountable for their action (Singh 2018). Even after this reductionist argument solely on humanitarian grounds, the loophole still remains that India did not engage with the problems of refugees or migrants through law  Chowdhory, Nasreen. 2013. Marginalisation and Exclusion: Politics of Non-Citizen Rights in Post-colonial South Asia.” Refugee Watch A South Asian Journal on Forced Migration (Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group) 42: 1–16. 24  Khan, Irene. 2004. Protecting the Rights of Refugees . In Peace Studies An Introduction to The Concept, Scope and Themes, ed. Ranabir Samaddar, 190–205. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 25  Bose, Tapan K. 1997. Introduction. In States, Citizens and Outsiders: The Uprooted People of South Asia, eds. Tapan K. Bose and Rita Manchanda. Kathmandu: Union Press Pvt. Ltd., 1997. And Manchanda, Rita. ‘No where people: Burmese Refugees in India’. In States, Citizens and Outsiders: The Uprooted People of South Asia, eds. Tapan K.  Bose and Rita Manchanda Kathmandu: Union Press Pvt. Ltd., 1997. And Singh, Deepak K. 2010. Statelessness in South Asia: The Chakmas between Bangladesh and India. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 26  See https://www.india.gov.in/sites/upload_files/npi/files/coi_part_full.pdf for the Constitution of India. 23

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(Bhattacharjee 2008). However, the debate on stateless has a complexity of legal, political and moral sensitivities that are addressed through the debate on rights.

Debate on ‘Rights to Have Rights’ The compartmentalisation of debate on rights as initiated by Arendt (2017) on stateless in an ethical and political proclivity and later by Benhabib (2004) on the questions of outsiders in a normative and theoretical underpinning of morality, and forms two different theoretical debates on rights of refugees. ‘Right to have rights’ and ‘rights of others’ are intertwined for the debate on stateless in the chapter. The stateless people fall out of the humanity or existence once they lose citizenship, due to which they find no political organisation where they could seek rights. The argument is to seek certain basic rights that could provide for survival, and they are driven from legitimacy and obligation of the nation-state. Hannah Arendt initiated the first debate on basic ‘rights of a man’, in the context of statelessness where a man loses the right to be a man and ‘right to have rights’ has become the premise of seeking rights for refugees, migrants, etc.27 Adhering to Arendt’s central concern about nation-state, which can take away rights and the only authority to guarantee rights  is the key idea of the chapter. Within the perplexity of nation-state, there should be some autonomy for inclusion through basic rights of membership (Benhabib 2004). The argument developed in this section basis on conceptualising rights for stateless and their existence guaranteed by nation-state. It develops on the debate that Benhabib extends from the ‘right to have rights’ to the ‘rights of others’ by unfolding the constraints existed for Arendt in acknowledging nation-states.28 The challenge is to locate this debate of rights in the context of South Asia, as its origin in terms of nation-state formation is different than the west. The premise of Arendt’s argument on the ‘right to have rights’ finds many meaning within literature on rights: the rights of man were just abstraction but real rights exist of ‘the rights of citizens’ (Ranciere 2004), and it may be interpreted as first ‘right’ within ‘right to have rights’ belongs to humanity and the second finds a place in political community (Benhabib 2004). Arendt states ‘we became aware of the existence of a “right to have rights” (and that means to live in the framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions and a right to belong to some kind of organised community), only when millions of people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global political situation’ (2017: 388). It finds a place in loss of humanity and political community and its viciousness in its loss. The new political situation is the existence of nation-states in the world, and there was no other form of political organisation that existed for human beings. After awareness of the role nation-states create in statelessness, Arendt explains that rights of a man should exist within the nation-state but should be inalienable or cannot be proved redundant by any political organisation (2017: 383). 27 28

 Ibid.  Ibid.

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Although, Arendt differentiates between the human rights and rights of a citizen, to which she considers that the first are guaranteed by humanity or through the idea of political being or automatically a human is born.29 And, rights of citizens are national rights that exist in a nation-state.30 Both these rights existed within the nation-states and her larger concern with the idea that the world has become one by having nation-states largely everywhere and so a political being could not exist outside of a political community. One has to seek for rights in a political community or political organisation that gives recognition. However, according to Benhabib, Arendt’s limitations are explicit with regard to the idea of multiplicity or heterogeneous societies as her analyses were largely based in Europe (Benhabib 2004: 63), having analysed the idea of right to have rights in relation with actions and speech that she borrows from Aristotle, which makes a human being political31 and brings the ‘political’32 central to the debate while seeking for minimal rights. The primary concern for Arendt is of political man and his existence within the nation-state where one can seek ‘rights to have rights’. Benhabib argues that Arendt’s circular position in the political domain can be philosophically and politically challenged and may bring out the ‘rights of man’ out of the categorical nation-state debate,33 although Benhabib does not argue that nation-states do not exist but rather takes a normative stand (rights of others) and jurisgenerative politics (democratic iterations) to dodge viciousness of nation-state as the sole authority in denying rights to outsiders (2004: 177). She extends the debate on the ‘right to have rights’ to the ‘rights of other’, which gives a space for inclusion to the outsider with some kind of membership (Benhabib 2004: 50).

‘Rights of Others’ in South Asia Benhabib derives the ‘right of others’ by exploring Kantian notion of cosmopolitan right and the republican sovereign, wedlock of two ideas from Kant and Arendt into an argument for the inclusion of outsider into nation-states.34 This makes borders  The creations and engagement with the society is political Ibid 184. And Ibid 293.  Arendt prefers this argument in the creation of a Jewish nation. Ibid. Pg. 295. 31  See Baehr, Peter. 2002. The Public and The Private Realm. In The Portable Hannah Arendt, ed. Peter Baehr, 182–230. Ontario: Penguin Books. And Arendt, Hannah. 2017. The Decline of the Nation-state and the End of the Rights of Man. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, by Hannah Arendt, 349–396. St Ives: Penguin Classics. 32  Arendt borrows political not only in the sense of existence of a human being in a state rather from the man engagements with environment, activities in the material sense. Ibid. Pg. 182–184. 33  Ibid. 34  Benhabib borrows from Arendt and also departs with the idea of democratic iterations. My focus: ‘I want to suggest that the experiment of the modern nation-state could be analysed in different terms: the formulation of the democratic people with its unique history and culture can be seen as an ongoing process of transformation and reflexive experiment with collective identity in a process of democratic iteration’. Ibid. Pg. 64. 29 30

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porous for outsiders to enter and seek a temporary shelter. Benhabib borrows the notion of cosmopolitan right from Kant in order to transcend political borders, ‘that concerns world as one polis is furthered by such multiple overlapping allegiances which are sustained across communities of language, ethnicity, religion and nationality’ (Benhabib 2004: 175). She initiates the cosmopolitan rights as an alternative to disaggregated citizenship as it finds contradictions with democratic citizenship (Benhabib 2004: 171). The existence of cosmopolitan right would not give rights automatically to outsiders but the presence of sovereign with democratic citizenship that could act as responsible institution and can initiate active political engagement.35 This idea she derives from democratic iterations—specifically means, active engagement of the democratic people in law formation and needs to adopt policies in sync with cosmopolitan right.36 This could guarantee outsiders some space and membership on the basis of moral right of cosmopolitanism and accountability of nation-state. Benhabib states ‘the treatment of aliens, foreigners and others in our midst is our crucial test case for the moral conscience as well as political reflexivity of liberal democracies’ (2004: 178). However, the arguments developed above could bring a conceptual development in the debate on rights of stateless persons within the conception of nation-state. With bringing the central position of nation-­ state in protecting and guaranteeing rights based on national and human rights, and transcending those rights on the basis of moral imperative to the outsiders along with the democratic principles may lead to develop an argument for stateless. This debate, when locating in India, needs cue from the idea of democratic principle and the multicultural nation having ethnic affiliations on its borders. Benhabib argues ‘the contradiction between human rights and sovereignty needs to be reconceptualised as the inherently conflictual aspects of reflexive collective-identity formation in complex, and increasingly multicultural and multinational democracies’ (2004: 65). This could be an argument that can lead us to locate right of others in the South Asian context as the states are inherently multicultural and follow a different tangent from the west. Chowdhory’s argument could be borrowed while justifying Benhabib framework in the context of South Asia, although she argues from the two groups, Chakmas and Sri Lankan Tamils, for rights of inclusion (Chowdhory 2013). Her perspective follows from idea of identity and belonging from the territory that can further legitimise for status, rights and entitlements of minorities in the state of asylum and in her case India.37 Chowdhory argues that these rights should extend to non-citizens categories too; She states, ‘As defined by states, such rights and entitlements do not include those who are “outsiders” who have chosen to flee from state atrocities (Chowdhory 2013). A similar claim could be made in the case of Chins living in Mizoram and Delhi who have no basic rights from both the state and the federal government, and UNHCR is not allowed to reach out to Mizoram.38 The  Ibid. Pg. 175.  Ibid. Pg. 179. 37  The idea is clearly denoted with the context of South Asia though the claims from the centricstate perspective. 38  See Human Rights Watch report https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/01/27/we-are-forgotten-people/chin-people-burma-unsafe-burma-unprotected-india. 35 36

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claims for the inclusion of outsiders could find space in India for a temporary membership and accessing basic rights. And this can involve the claims, as Bauböck states that instead of deriving utopian deterritorialised democracy, one should consider stable territorial polities responding to migration (Bauböck 2012). This gives a central perspective to the debate of nation-states being the only authority for giving and guaranteeing rights, along with the perspective of certain rights to be granted by the state of asylum in terms of membership to the outsiders. The argument further can be analysed in the context of human rights as having certain basic rights enclosed in a nation’s constitution. Singh argues that in the case of India with the treatment of refugees in regard to human rights, the treatment has been on ad hoc basis and depends on case-by-case (Singh 2018). But the critical notion still exists that Arendt argues when a man loses his nationality, there is no other organisation able to enforce human rights (Arendt 2017: 294). Moreover the central argument of the chapter is on the idea of rights and not merely giving humanitarian aid and assistance, which UNHCR has been providing and in most of the instances the refugees stay in those camps for longer than expected. As Parekh argues, ‘Despite over 50 years of changes in international law and human rights conventions around stateless people and refugees, their rights  – both legal and human – remain fundamentally precarious outside the nation-state’ (Parekh 2014). This is a bargain of rights not to the extreme of arguing that states would lose their sovereignty but it is a zone where nation-states continue to govern and at the same time the ‘rights of man’ are attached to him. It is this right to be a man in the world that needs to be critically addressed while involving the arguments of basic rights that need to be guaranteed by a nation-state. The notion of taking away rights completely is in the circumference of the nation-state and also giving those rights. However, this paradoxical nature of nation-state that can give rights and also the only legitimate institution to take them away finds a space where certain basic rights of man can be addressed in these powers of the state with giving temporary membership.

Chins and Their Historical Analyses The historical narratives of evolution of Chins have diverse evolution theories like Cave origin theory, Chin Hills origin theory and Israeli origin theory, but it is clear that they share ancestral lineage with ‘Zo’ tribe (Thangtungnung 2015). The Zo tribe includes other subtribes Chins, Mizos, Zomi and Kuki having known to be settled in the hill region of South Asia and Southeast Asian region not before 1200 AD.39 They have been living in the region with having common language, religion, cultural practices and descent particularly in regard to Chins and Mizos (Thangtungnung 2015; Basavapatna 2012; McConnachie 2018). The significant political history of the region is the colonial era and postcolonial era that has marked the larger othering between the tribes due to formation of nation-states of Burma 39

 Ibid. Pg. 39.

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and India. It has led to the consequent ethnic problems in both the nations with the tribes being divided due to the making of boundaries based on governance rather than ethnic and other cultural affiliations (Piang 2013). The major breakdown of the hill region into division of ethnic communities and later leading to formation of distinct nation-state is due to the colonial rule, as Piang brings in the analyses that the hill people were never under any British rule until the British annexed the region for tea plantation and later setting up various administrative boundaries that could be easily managed, and it is these very administrative boundaries that led to postcolonial state for governance and formation of districts (Piang 2013). However, the larger impact of the colonial rule is seen in the region with the formation of boundaries irrespective of ethnic and cultural affiliations. It was noted that the Mizo Union later known as the Mizo National Front has requested with a formal letter to the constituent assembly stating ‘territorial unity and integrity of the whole Mizo population’.40 However, their demands were never fulfilled and the communities found themselves in minority within their homeland after Burma and India international border was drawn. It is in this background that postcolonial state has played a significant role in the present ethnic violence inflicted by the state of Burma. The impact of political history of Burma has led large number of ethnic communities to migrate to the bordering states, which commonly have culturally significant belonging. The inability of the transition of Burma from the military rule in the 1960s to today’s democratisation fully has led to massive-scale violence against the pro-democracy demands and specifically Chins.41 The impact of military violence against the protests of 1988 for pro-democracy demands has forced large number of Chins to migrate to Mizoram and other Southeast Asian countries. The Mizoram people to whom Chins find associations of culture, religion and culture near about 70,000 to 1,00,0000 Chins are living.42 The impact of military rule is still prominent; even after the massive pushbacks initiated by Mizo’s in terms of creating Chins as outsiders, they continue to live in Mizoram. The coming up of first democratic elected leader in Burma has not compelled the Chins to return; rather they continue to live in India as they claim that it is still not safe to return.43 The 2010 democratic elections have not impacted Chins in terms of their return to Burma as they still state that the ‘condition back home has not changed much and all those who returned were killed’.44

 See Piang, L. L. Khan. 2013. Ethnic Mobilisation for Decolonisation: Colonial Legacy (the case of the Zo people in Northeast India). Asian Ethnicity Vol. 14 No. 3: 342–363. Pg. 344 elaborates the concern on bringing the Zo tribe together into one territorial space. 41  Human Rights Watch report https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/01/27/we-are-forgotten-people/ chin-people-burma-unsafe-burma-unprotected-india 42  Ibid. Pg. 43  h t t p s : / / w w w. b u s i n e s s - s t a n d a r d . c o m / a r t i c l e / b e y o n d - b u s i n e s s / d e l h i - s - l i t t l e burma-113111400885_1.html. 44  https://www.asiasentinel.com/society/chin-refugees-indian-dilemma/. 40

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Chins as Stateless The Chins are in a peculiar state in India having ‘no identity’ and in specific with the chapter no political community for representation. In other words, they are non-­ citizens, having no nationality and no nation to claim their citizenship. It is in this context Chin Burmese people are considered stateless because they are not given any status by the government of India or UNHCR and neither citizenship/the right to return by the state of Burma. Accordingly, they do not have the morality and legality to seek rights from any political community. It is these people for whom the states do not want to carry responsibility and leave no space for existence other than illegal. Manchanda calls the stateless people in making (Manchanda 1997), and Nair describes them as unacknowledged people or rather as stateless (Nair 1997). In the literature they are counted as stateless people due to their survival, social reproduction and the unavailability of rights. On elaborating about their legal condition in India, Nair states that there are three categories of refugees out of which the Chin belongs to the third category, that is, ‘Refugees who entered India and have been assimilated into communities. Their presence is not acknowledged by either Indian government or the UNHCR’ (Nair 1997). Chins are the largest population of this category of refugees in India; approximately 40,000 settled in Mizoram and Delhi (Nair 1997; Manchanda 1997). Although there is no accuracy about their exact numbers, as the Human Rights Watch counts them from 70,000 to 1,00,000,45 it is not to be argued that they do not exist in the knowledge of the government; rather the government prefers accepting the refugees or stateless without giving any legal status to them.46 People after crossing borders seek admittance to the society that can assist in one’s survival with some ethnic commonalities. With Chin, many argue that they have more in common with Mizoram than with Burma or India and also trace a kinship lineage with Mizos.47 The history of Mizos and their residence in Chin Hills dates from the fifteenth to eighteenth century before they settled in the northeastern region of India, Bangladesh and Burma (Basavapatna 2012). The interplay of the society and state in case of Chin is complex in many ways: as they have been ­attending threats from social structure due to its multi-ethnic nature and the state institutions like police, state government, etc.48 The Mizoram society has accepted Chins as their economic migrants, brothers and refugees, but there have been various movements initiated by the MNF (Mizo National Front) of claiming Chins as  Human Rights Watch report https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/01/27/we-are-forgotten-people/ chin-people-burma-unsafe-burma-unprotected-india 46  Ibid. 47  See Bhaumik, Subir, and Bhattacharya, Jayanta. 2005. Autonomy of Northeast: The hills of Tripura and Mizoram. In The Politics of Autonomy Indian Experiences, ed. Ranabir Samaddar: Sage Publications: New Delhi. For its multi-ethnic nature and history. 48  Ibid. 45

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outsiders (Basavapatna 2012). The Chins with time have started to demand for social rights and look for job opportunities, education and health, and this has created tensions within Mizos.49 This can be argued when most of the migrants take the share of other communities residing in a territory. The insecurities have led Mizos to be conscious of their rights and demanded that the outsiders should go back. Many a time, the Mizoram police and its other institutions have forcefully pushed them back to Burma without consideration of the instable situations in Burma. The home ministry has regarded them as the ‘illegal migrants in search of gainful employment’.50 The society has mixed claims with Chins, and the state has only interfered when the civil society has demanded; otherwise the state has been invisibly watching the illegal methods of living. A study shows aghast situations of Chin women working in Delhi as maids to the Korean families, servers in a wedding or festivals, etc. They are harassed by the local people and especially men to which they cannot even complain as all these survival work can only be conducted with the help of contractors (Jops et al. 2016). These are the very many conditions a stateless individual may find ways of survival either through illegal means or with some sort of demeaning conditions. There have been series of sexual harassment cases due to which protests were seen on the streets of Delhi to provide some safety measures.51 Some Chins who could travel till Delhi have been given refugee identity card by UNHCR and not to the ones staying in Mizoram, so 90% of them will not be able to register. On the contrary UNHCR card does not ensures safety, here is an example of Chin Burmese refugee, who was registered with the UNHCR but was still tortured and arrested to be called as CNF activist.52 Under these conditions the UNHCR has not been able to defend in terms of granting certain rights to the refugees rather is seen as non-existing. There are various arguments about whether the UNHCR can go to Mizoram or work with other civil society groups (Nair 1997). In these conditions they are neither receiving the humanitarian aid nor care, which most of the refugees in India are provided. However, as elaborated in the section on the debate of rights, it could be argued that if certain ‘rights of a man’ are extended to an outsider in a nation-state, then it can address the precarious situation of stateless people. While addressing stateless, they should not be seen as subjects of care rather kept at par with other political beings or member of a nation-state with extending temporary rights of admission.

 Ibid.  Ibid. 51  ‘A constant state of fear’: Chin Refugee Women and Children in New Delhi. 2014. https://www. opendemocracy.net/rosalinn-zahau-rachel-fleming/%E2%80%9C-constant-state-of-fear%E2%80%9D-chinrefugee-women-and-children-in-new-delhi. 52  Ibid. Pg. 214. 49 50

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Conclusion The chapter argues that nation-states remain the legitimate authority in guaranteeing and protecting ‘rights of a man’, and they may be outsiders, foreigners, migrants and specifically stateless. The gradual procedure of loss of rights is also due to changes initiated by the state with changes in citizenship laws specific to Chin Burmese ethnic minorities. It is this viciousness of nation-states, brought out with analyses specific to South Asian region and how international law and its agencies cannot at par taken as an alternative institution for claims to the ‘rights of a man’. The debate engaged in the section of rights highlights the presence of available alternatives in the literature for stateless people. However, congruence of morality in relation with refugees from the humanitarian concern and politics with the empirical solutions derived from the nation-state. This deliberate intervention could address the situation of statelessness not entirely on humanitarian ontology but with the basic rights that a man could exercise due to his political being. The Chins categorically are not addressed by states, and UNHCR could find some ground on the idea of ‘rights of a man’ that can be morally guaranteed due to humanity and once addressed could seek rights from a state. The idea is not to create a stateless into refuges, as this would provide beneficial for aid but to include the stateless man in a nation-state with political membership.

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McConnachie, K. (2018). Boundaries and belonging in the indo-Myanmar borderlands: Chin refugees in Mizoram. Journal of Refugee Studies, 31, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fey012 Accessed May 2018. Nair, R. (1997). Refugee protection in South Asia. In T.  Bose & R.  Manchanda (Eds.), States, citizens and outsiders: The uprooted people of South Asia. Kathmandu: Union Press Pvt Ltd. Parekh, S.. (2014). Beyond the ethics of admission: Stateless people, refugee camps and moral obligation. Philosophy and Social Criticism (Sage Publications), 40(7), 645–663. doi: https:// doi.org/10.1177/0191453713498254. Accessed May 2018. Piang, L. L. K. (2013). Ethnic mobilisation for decolonisation: Colonial legacy (the case of the zo people in Northeast India). Asian Ethnicity, 14(3), 342–363. https://doi.org/10.1080/15631369 .2012.688670. Accessed June 11, 2018. Ranciere, J. (2004). Who is the subject of the rights of man? The South Asian Quaterly, 103(2/3), 297–310. Singh, D. K. (2010). Statelessness in South Asia: The Chakmas between Bangladesh and India. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Singh, U.  K. (Ed.). (2018). The ‘inside-outside’ body National Human Rights Commission of India. Economic and Political Weekly, LIII(5), 33–39. Stephen, L. (2012). Conceptualising transborder communities. In M.  R. Rosenblum & D.  J. Tichenor (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of the politics of international migration (pp. 456–477). New York: Oxford University Press. Thangtungnung, H. (2015). Ethnic history and identity of the zo tribes in north East India. Journal of North East India Studies, 5(1), 39–50. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2012). Self-study module on statelessness. http://www.unhcr.org/stateless-people.html. Accessed May 2018. Weinman, M. D. (2017). Arendt and the legitimate expectation for hospitality and membership today. Moral Philosophy and Politics, 5(1), 1–23.

Part III

The Making and (Un)Making of Borders

Chapter 7

“Ecologic” Border and Deterritorialisation Biswajit Mohanty

Abstract  The border represents the transitional zone of demarcation where places and nations begin and end. Prominence of the eternal truth coexists with the fuzziness of cultures and nature. Border studies have not taken into account the ecological content of the border that enables the fuzziness to give its content. This chapter attempts to reframe the idea of border by bringing in the ecological dimension and critiques both the Westphalian Border perspective and Empire Logic of Border. The border formation is a complex process that does not always involve sovereign. People themselves construct boundaries around them and within selves. In this connection, border is conceptualised as “ecologic” border (bhitamati in vernacular language) as a lived, rather than a constructed place dominated by power relations, that involves a complex interaction of social and environmental milieu of material and cultural life. Examining the lived experiences of the Munda tribe of Kalinganagar, the chapter further argues that border is not always a political artifice constructed to segregate, classify and control people, rather it is a social fact of life embedded within selves and collective memory of a community. The “memorate knowledge”  – an assortment of social and symbolic goods  – associated with the ecologic border embeds affective memories to place and the environment surrounding it. Increasing industrialisation after the initialisation of the process of globalisation has structurally ruptured the organic link of self with environment by displacing the community from its everyday borderlands. The tribes got deterritorialised from the embedded place, at times through voluntary movement and other times by forceful eviction, into a new “culturescape” where the erstwhile labouring population became part of the footloose labour and of the “lower class sector” of the new political economy evolving here. Keywords  Borders · Ecology · State · Boundaries · Sovereignty

B. Mohanty (*) Deshbandhu College, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 N. Uddin, N. Chowdhory (eds.), Deterritorialised Identity and Transborder Movement in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2778-0_7

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Introduction The borders1 come to us in various forms with its own affordances and imageries. The border signifies spatial representation of power relationship. The border evokes the image of a way of organising and managing a political community or groups and effectively breaking the “flow”. It is a metaphor for violence, conflicts and contestation over spatial occupation. In it the boundaries are more often than not, imposed to exclude, separate and segregate people(s). Drawing border is a political artefact or “rational-instrumental” process that divides peoples and also impose “new” national identities over local population (Sahlins 1989). It is argued that border is inevitable and self-evident fact which is an outcome of “cross-pressure” terms whose constituents are “force” and “functions” (Agnew 2008: 04). Mostly violence ridden, the political process of demarcations is arbitrary, laden with manipulation of mastering the space, that is, “to control any and all territories claimed equally, no matter how far they may stretch from local, regional, or even national power centers”(Tagliacozzo 2015: 04). Borders have history, and its formation is complex, jagged or uneven. It constructs hierarchised, harshly restricted and forbidden places along structured identities, imposed and/or denied citizenship. In its constructivist incarnation, boundaries are conceived as social constructions that signify meanings beyond their existence. The meaning of borders is produced through “discourses” and “practices” (Agnew 2008: 177). In this formulation, function of borders is to produce social relations, collective memories and collective identities, where “identities are represented in terms of a difference between Us and the Other (Paasi 1998: 81). In other words, there is the presupposition that boundary construction involves symbolic codes of distinction that creates the code of “us” and “them”. The self-evident and the constructivist argument of border formation engenders the cause and effect issue whether the bordering practice is the outcome of community formation or institutional bordering creates political community within its territory, that differentiates between “us” and “them” subsequent to its formation. Newman argues that the bordering practice as a process precedes the community formation, when he states that the Westphalian state system imposed borders to maintain order and state’s territorial sovereignty of the countries. He states further, “the process of territorial ordering was imposed upon the political landscape by the power elites of the time, just as it was implemented during the era of decolonisation, and just as it is today by those groups which determine the values and codes which enable some to be members, while others have to remain outside” (Newman 2003: 15). On the contrary, Jackson argues that community formation precedes the boundary when he states the function of border is “less to define a region and establish an effective relationship with the outside world than to protect something within it” (Jackson 1987: P14). Though he is not explicit in stating the idea that community 1  Though there is a conceptual difference between border and boundary, I am using border and boundary synonymously here.

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precedes boundary, the phrase “protecting something within it” draws inference that the community already formed protects itself socially as well as politically through boundary construction. In this sense, social precedes political and becomes political through various means. The social is internalised first to become political later. The social does not stand apart from the surrounding environment. The environment also constructs the social and becomes part of it and vice versa. It is this social-­ ecological boundary that I am explaining below through the concept of “ecologic” border, or in vernacular language, it is called bhitamati. The merger of social and ecological could be discerned at a deeper level and with its complexity when dwelling and territory formation are also taken into the analytical framework. In simple terms, dwelling through its materiality of existence differentiates, on the one hand, place from the space and on the other, builds a relation with the surrounding environment through place-making activity where people interact with the surrounding environment in a meaningful manner. The subjective feeling of individual becomes the intersubjective shared feeling of the community through its constant interaction and the merger of social with ecological landscapes, thus creating the ecologic border. It is about the reciprocity of place and locality, of people and location embedded within members of the community. The cultural practice and the formation of institutions become integral part of the ecologic border. The paper argues that border formation cannot always be positioned within the sovereign domain. The borders can be grasped through an alternative conception or formulation. ‘Ecologic’ border (bhitamati in vernacular language) is one such formulation, which is lived, rather than politically constructed, that involves a complex interaction of social and local environment its material and cultural life. The article through the narratives of lived experience of the Munda tribe of Kalinganagar in Odisha argues that the border is not always a political artifice constructed to segregate, classify and control people; rather it is a social fact of life embedded within selves and collective memory of a community. The “memorate knowledge”  – an assortment of social and symbolic things  – associated with the ecologic border embeds affective memories to place and the environment surrounding it. The process of globalisation initiated in this place by the state ruptured the organic link of border with environment by displacing the community from its traditional political-­ economic sphere. It deterritorialised people, who at times voluntarily and other times forcefully had to move out into a different “culturescape” where the erstwhile “labouring” population were brought into the domain of labour market of the new political economy evolving here.

From the Border to Vernacular Border The border is about construction and classification; and the latter begin with groupings and distinctions wherein  borders become recognisable “when one or more distinctions are perceived and/or imposed”(Green 2012: 577). In this sense, borders

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are political constructs whose essence is to separate “self” from the “other”. It is the bordering process that has universal significance than border per se because as a practice, it has inherent inclusionary and exclusionary tendency (Newman 2003). The construction of national boundary is the best example that can be cited here which follows the logic of “national order of things”. Bordering is about territory and territoriality as well. Though territory can be an analytic category conceptualised in its own terms, nevertheless it has been conflated with border, which is a product of the sovereign’s action and simultaneously produces the sovereign state (Elden 2010). Both Gottmann (1973) and Sack (1986) believe that territory and sovereignty of the state are connected through legal jurisdiction over the specific place. For Gottman, “the link between territory and sovereignty are reinforced by the technological tools available to the governments for the display of authority over the vast geographical area” (Gottmann 1973: 03). In this sense, territory is tied to state authority or “national-state territory” where the territory is conceptualised “as a capability with embedded logic of power and claim-­ making” (Sassen 2013: 23). It also presupposes control of the state through territorial authority over the vast geographical stretches of land, air and water, along citizens within its jurisdiction and relation with other states and subjects. We are within, what the title of the Agnew’s article suggests, “the territorial trap” (Agnew 1994), or what Gidden calls “border power container” (quoted in Elden 2010: 800). In this context, we can state that the border making is the formal institutionalisation of a region which is perched in the relationship of power and rule (Sack 1986: 19). The top down approach of bordering practices has been critiqued by various scholars. The border is defined now in its heteronomic form with multiplicity of meanings (Sohn 2015). The heteronomic understanding of border signifies that the border “does not exist in itself and of itself” (Sohn 2015: 05). There are multiple sets of agencies that create borders: modify and transform the national border and everyday life by creating borders around them. Thus, we have “variations of border in space and time” (Brambilla 2014, quoted in Sohn 2015: 05). Newman flags this issue and argues that though border studies have focused on social and political construction of nation, homeland and territory but they hardly have focused on the smaller areas or locale within the national boundaries where the borders are created and practiced (Newman 2003. 130). The critical geographers, political scientists and sociologists have attempted to understand the notion of the border in various ways. While sociologists “deborder” territory (Sassen 2013), the political theorists analyse territory as a category in itself (Elden 2010) and the critical geographers use importance on affective relationship rather than power relationship (Brighenti 2010). The visible territory in terms of hard fact is not the only way that border is construed. There are different ways that the borders can be comprehended. There may be other subterranean affective relations that may be an important part of the border formation. Brighenti, for example, argues that boundary is the “effect of the material inscription of social relationships which are immaterial, or better, affective…” and exists…. “at the point of convergence, prolongation and tension between the material and immaterial, spaces and relationships, between

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extensions (movements) and intensions (affections and passions)” (Brighenti 2010: 223 quoted in Sassen 2013: 25–26). Perkins provides an interesting dimension to border. For him, the bordering practices are not just revealed at the national border rather they pervade, away from the operational sphere of the border across society, in everyday administrative practices of the state. The legal practices are labeled as “vernacularisation of border”. (Jones and Johnson 2014; Perkins et al. 2014). Four discernible changes can be noticed in the nature of vernacularised border practices, according to Perkins. The first change is that borders are found everywhere. This points to the direction about presence of the borders at other localities away from the national borders. The second change is the polysemic meaning of border where border means different things to different communities and works differently for varied groups. The third change is the changing location of the border, away from the “edges of a nation-state to” the study of border at diverse socio-spatial and geographical scales, ranging from the local and the municipal to the global, regional and supra-state… (Kolossove 2012 quoted in Perkins et al. 2014: 19). The fourth change in the nature of the border is the development of mechanism that controls the mobility rather than the territory. Here, what I am proposing is an alternative conception of the border, which is neither vernacularisation nor a bottom up approach to the border. I am conceptualising the vernacular border or what I term the “ecologic” border or bhitamati. Vernacularisation of border means accomplishing bordering practices in various localities – passport offices, police stations, offices and other public spaces – through surveillance systems. In contrast to the coercive practice, vernacular border is an affective bonding of social and environment embedded within the community and individual self. The vernacular border is not politically constructed but is a social fact of life and embedded within. Though it has the characteristics of controlling the mobility of inhabitants, it is not necessarily a physically coercive practice. It has an emotive and affective content. The emotive and affective appeal comes from the relation of surrounding environment with the social and spatial. It is in this sense border is called ecologic. Border is lived rather than constructed. The affective relationship, as I have argued below, is an offshoot of the unruptured interaction of the social with the natural and of community and individual where the role of environment is discernibly more important in the formation and existence of border that Brighenti, Sassen and Perkins miss.

Environment and Border The border theorist and border studies have conceptualised border as a controlled and a controller relationship. If territory formation is an important aspect of border, then there are many ways that the territory can be formed. One way of territory formation is coercive and arbitrary drawing of line over a place. It is a political construct which is imposed over the citizens of the country by the sovereign for

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segregation and mobility control of citizens and non-citizens. The other way of territory formation can be a self-imposed constraint which is an outcome of an internalised belongingness to the place where individuals or communities belong to. What is the nature of this border? How is it formed? Why is it not political? What role does the ecology play in the formation of border? One of the aspects of boundary is that it generates a frame where place stands in distinction from abstract space; i.e. it assists people to differentiate, qualify and demarcate place from the abstract space. The border creates levels of places where identification of a person with place moves from “micro to macro or macro to micro”. Boundary engenders a sense of place (Sun-young 2003: 64). Whether boundary generates sense of place or sense of place generates boundary remains a problematic issue. Nevertheless, I would argue that making sense of place is instrumental in the formation of a territory and is a naturalised place-making activity of the community within a locality and given environment. The everyday routine activities in engagement with the nature create a sense of place and subsequently territory which becomes a “way of seeing, a way of framing and imagining the environment as well as the organisms....it is [a] relational meaning” (Brighenti 2007: 69). Scant attention has been paid in the border studies to the natural, social and relational aspect of the border and crucial role of the environment in shaping and formation of the border. Environment in the border theorisation is treated as a descriptive variable to explain the ways of managing, governing and causal effect on porosity and fragmentary nature of border. Take, for instance, Wiley-Blackwell companion (2012) and Ashgate companion (2011) to border studies. Both companions carry only four articles on environment and border. The papers in Ashgate companion discuss the preservation and governance of nature and natural resources on and around borderland areas (Fall 2011; Ferreira 2011) and the complex issues involving the delimiting the maritime boundaries that makes border permeable (Schofield 2011). Similarly, in the Willey-Blackwell companion published a year after, one can find only a single entry on the environment and border. In this essay, Cunningham examines the causal role in shaping up of a porous boundary which has a “ripple effect” on fencing processes and mobility and immobility of human and animal species across the boundary (Cunningham 2012). The border studies, in other words, have not examined the constitutive aspect of environment and border. The idea of constitutive conception of environment and border view is in clear contrast to the idea that place is discursively constructed which is embroiled within structural power relationship. The construction of place is carried out by mobile people who are constantly moving in a globalised world. People invent and reinvent the place (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). Contrary to this post-modern perspective, I would agree with Arjun Appadurai’s formulation that the boundary produced during everyday algorithmic activity of communities is not within the purview of “national order of things”. It is because the boundary that is formed due to the proximity of people to nature, belongingness and attachment to place cannot be organised by the nation-state. This is the ecologic border which is a lived space where the relations of a community as well as individual with its environment are intrinsic to individual and

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remain as a fact of life, many a time constant longing. Within this living space, an affective relationship develops and is embedded within the selves that forms the boundary. Unless forced by some strong extraneous compulsions from moving out of the boundary, the individuals find themselves perched animatedly and securely within it. It has its own characteristics and does not “meet the needs for spatial and social standardisation pre-requisite for the modern subject-citizens” (Appadurai 2003: 338). The ecologic border in this context provides an alternative way of looking at the border and offers resistance to the national order and bordering processes.

Ecologic Border: Place and Environment Human being is a geographical agent (Lucas 1914: 478), who unveils the face of the earth, which is a “genius loci, the harmonious joining of people and place” (Sauer 1960: 390). Places are meaningful locations. This meaning is attached through the development of sense of place, i.e. by means of the “subjective and emotional attachment people have to place” (Cresswell 2004: 07). Many expositions have been made on the issue of people’s subjective and emotive attachment to place and the processes of and factors for development of such attachment. There are two perspectives on the nature of the connection. The first is the topophilic approach based on the phenomenological perspective developed by Heidegger (1993). For Heidegger, human beings relation to space is linked through dwelling. Dwelling brings the essence into things and human beings. Dwelling is the essence of space, which endows essence to people, and engenders attachment to place “essentially”. As Heidegger states, “Man’s relation to locales, and through locales to spaces, inheres in dwelling. The relationship between man and space is none other than dwelling, thought essentially” (Heidegger 1993: 259). This perspective was further expanded by Yi-Fu Tuan, Relph, and Cresswell. According to Tuan, “topophilia”, i.e. “affective bond between place and people” or idea of place as “field of care”, is a part of human perception and experience. For him, the place is a “product of “pause”, and as a chance of attachment, it exists at many scales” (Tuan 1974). Similarly, for Relph, place is also “the very everyday mundane fact of our life” where we enact our lives (Relhp 1976: 41). It has a deeper significance for human beings. There exists a “deep” relationship of the place and human beings without which human existence is not possible. Human relationship has no significance without having a sense of the place (Relhp 1976: 41) which is a point that Martin Heidegger’s notion of Desien captures. It is the very essence of existence – the way human exists in the world. The place is, therefore, “a pre-­scientific fact of life” – based on the way we experience the place (Cresswell 2004: 23). Relph goes a step further to argue that place determines our experience rather than the opposite. It becomes “the profound centers of human existence… [an] association seems to constitute a vital source of both individual and cultural identity and security, a point of departure from which we orient ourselves in the world” (Relhp 1976: 42). The only way humans can be humans is to be “in place”.

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Ontological priority is given to the “human immersion in place”. It generates a sense of place, a subjective feeling about the place: a place of attachment and rootedness (Relhp 1976). It provided a sense of control within a limited space and becomes “a metaphor for place in general” (Cresswell 2004: 24). Thus, the place is fundamental and determines our experience. It gives us essence. The essence makes the place a place and human beings as human beings. There are some issues regarding the approach. Firstly, one can have a sense of place without having a notion of boundary attached to it. Secondly, the essence of person can come from any source, not just by being in a place. What is so vital about the place where essence is generated and gets transferred into the individuals in general and communities in particular? Thirdly, it is silent on the role of individual and environment in relation to place. The attachment to place is not automatic rather human being’s interaction with the nature and environment engenders a sense of belonging to the place. The question that the process through which belongingness develops and translates into individual and community is not answered by the topohilists. The biophilic perspective provides an alternative path of emotional connection of human beings and environment to place. Biophilia, “a psychological affinity for life”, as a concept was developed by Erich Fromm, to explain the relationship between nature and human beings (Byrne 2010: 01). According to Fromm the “existential dichotomy” propels human beings to be “at one” with the nature. It was EO Wilson who popularised this idea and defined biophilia as the “innately emotional affiliation of human beings to other living organisms” (Wilson 1993: 31 quoted in Gunderson 2014: 187). It meant that there is an innate human tendency to affiliate himself/herself with biophysical environment in different ways from “attraction to aversion, from awe to indifference, from peacefulness to fear-driven anxiety” (Wilson 1993: 31 quoted in Gunderson 2014: 187). He argues that human beings from the stage of infancy are attracted to living things. This approach was adopted by James Gibson who provided insight about perception that organism and human beings are not different and that organism can be perceived as a whole in its surrounding environment. Perception is set up by “virtue of the perceiver’s immersion in his or her environment” (Ingold 2000: 03). Ingold imbibes the idea and carries it further and argues that world consists of being of many kinds, both human and non-human. Human beings become “organism-­ persons” by being a part of this manifold kind. “Therefore, relations among human and non-human, which we are accustomed to calling ‘social’, are but a sub-set of ecological relations” (Ingold 2000: 05). Taking the case of the hunter-gatherer society, he argues that one needs to dissolve nature and reason, freedom and necessity dichotomy. The dissolution would then enable people to develop their histories by continuously involving themselves with human and non-human constituents of their environment and therefore by “engaging with these manifold constituents that the world comes to be known by its own inhabitants” (Ingold 2000: 10). The engagement comes, according to Ingold, through dwelling and building.

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Both the perspectives agree on the fact that in the course of dwelling that the sense of place is generated but how exactly the transfer takes place is not answered. The sense and essence of place are experienced both individually and communally by virtue of being within social dwelling. Social dwelling is not devoid of rather is situated within the surrounding environment and landscapes (Ingold 2000). Place is a natural setting for social relation to develop within a natural set-up  – a locale (Agnew 1987). The topophilic perspective fails to explain the interactive process of human and non-human world. The argument of topophilists that the human and non-human world interact through the process of dwelling is untenable for the simple reason that the natural cannot axiomatically be subsumed under the spatial and social. This would annul the influence of the natural environment on the social and spatial. The biophilic perspective provides a vital clue in establishing the connection. The environment is not just a nature but a lived space with plentiful life experiences. Human beings are not outside it nor are they restrained by it. It is within them. It becomes an extension of the selves. Person and environment are imbricated with networks of material and social relations with its own existence, rhythms and plans. People touch it; they move it, act on it, build it and destroy it at the same time; and in the process both the environment and human beings get transformed. It is an “intertwining of the flesh of the body and the flesh of the world…we are touched by this fleshly material world of landscape and in turn touch it. In the process we transform ourselves” (Tilley and Cameron-Daum 2017: 06). If the environment and human beings are constitutive of each other, then emotion takes an important place in building this relationship. For emotions do not operate through social relations but “primarily” in ecological relations (Milton 2002: 04). It is a relation between “ecological self” and “interpersonal self”. This interaction which develops within the given environment provides the case for personhood: of ourselves and of others as persons. This personhood provides “relational epistemology”, that is “responsive relatedness”, where the human and non-human beings in our living environment are “actively related to us, we are actively engage with them”. The relational epistemology thus forms the basis of all existing culture where natural objects are understood in personal terms (Milton 2002: 48). Given that we cannot avoid engaging with natural processes and given that such processes impact on our survival and livelihood, it is not surprising that people in many societies perceive personhood in the earth, the wind, the sun, the rain, the nature, the plant and animals as a whole. It is through the process of personification of nature and natural things that connection between us and the outer world is established, thus making the interaction the interpersonal interaction. The emotional attachment develops through the personification of nature and natural things. The relationship is reciprocal as well as unconditional (Milton 2002). Self is extended and deepened within the ecological setting and vice versa. The biophilic perspective by emphasising on the naturalness of relationship like topophilia falls into the essentialist mode. It homogenises the relationship. There are heterogeneous relationships in the natural world. Everybody does not directly connect to the nature. Some are part of nature, some abandon nature and to some

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nature intimidates. Some persons cannot adapt to the hilly terrain and the others do. In this situation how the relationship can be established? Hodder provides an answer for established the relationship wherein the body is a thing among things “entangled” in the materiality of the world (Hodder 2012). It is a “dialectic of dependence and dependency between human and things” (Hodder 2012: 05). According to Hodder, environment was the first thing with which human species got entangled. There are internal adjustments and adaptation where everything is adapted. “Rather than elements of a system being ‘selected for’ in different ‘environments’ there is just one overall whole moving along as a mass, unhinged, unfettered, unconstrained by external limits. There is just a heterogeneous entanglement”. “Humans are drawn into these TT dependencies because of the TH and HT relationships, and indeed it is difficult to isolate a sphere of TT relationships in which humans are not involved” (Hodder 2012: 03).2 Hodder further states, “The entanglement juggernaut is held together by cross-cutting dependencies between stones, rivers, humans, made things, ideas, institutions and so on”(Hodder 2012: 07). Places and their meaning are discursively constructed (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). But every place has an essence embedded in it. It is a part of the locality and local community activity in ordinary people’s algorithmic life, where situated members are dynamically engaged with environment and place. The dynamic engagement, a fact of life within the given locality, produces emotional attachment to place and links place, environment and people. It is in the process of interaction that a locality, territory and border are formed which are embedded within the self and community. A structure of feeling about place, environment and things co-produces territories and boundaries. Dwelling in this ecologic border has a referential function. Each thing has a proper place in the world and thus is implicated with each other making the place a “coherent whole” (Gray 2003: 223). Dwelling produces deep memories of surrounding things along with their “essence” that enables inhabitants to feel contended: being “at home”, a secured place and embodiment of memories. The deep memories are not about the present but also about a shared past where relationships and connectedness with environment and people are shaped or consciously and unconsciously developed and nurtured. It is rooted and embedded. Location, visuality, sense of community and value involved in establishing an attachment to the place together form the ecologic border. It gives rootedness to individuals and communities and builds self-imposed boundaries for them and controls the mobility of people. The nature of ecologic boundary thus differs qualitatively from the politically constructed border in the sense that it is a “habitat for and of human collective” that is embedded in and entangled with the nature. The communities that inhabit the space can be labelled as “communities of places – geographically bounded community”, a community held together by “spirit of the place” and environment 2  TT stands for thing and thing, TH stands for thing and human and HT is human and thing dependent relationship.

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(McIntosh 2010: 19). Within the ecologic border, people are embedded in relationship with nature where the body, place and environment “fold into and co-construct each other through a series of practices and relations”. The body is both “in and of the world” (Wylie 2007: 148 and 144). It is, one may label as, a primordial and organic connection. It is a being-in-environment to paraphrase Merleau-Ponty.

 cologic Border as Bhitamati and the Processes E of Deterritorialisation The ecologic border or bhitamati has a sense of place where boundary and territory are thinly connected. The connection is plain. Bhitamati is a vernacular word in Odisha stands as a synonym of ecologic border. It is a word not new in the Odia vocabulary. Take, for example, the older generation of my family, or any family in a traditional village set-up would evoke it for holding back individual members of family from moving away to distant urban areas in search of employment. My grandmother or mother would constantly stir up this emotive word whenever there was a talk in our family to shift to the nearby town which is situated merely 3 kilometres away from my native place. Our relatives would appeal to father’s intention of moving away from the place of birth. The sense of territory stretched from the beginning of the village, where the village deity is established, to the cremation ground situated at the end of the village. Ecologic border thus has an emotive connotation attached to it with situational meanings: “who would look after the field which sustains us and would sustain the future generation”, “you have an organic connection with the place”, “you have grown up here with friends and relatives” and “how can you abandon the beauty and pure environment for an artificial and plastic city”. This shared internalised feeling creates a sense of boundary to restrict mobility: an initial connection that could be established between bhitamati and territory. But to establish a deeper connection with the border, one needs to explore the notion of territoriality that is created through the natural and social environment along with a sense of place, community feeling and its socio-political contents attached to that environment by the members of a community. The deeper connection with the border was evident when I was conducting my fieldwork in Kalinganagar in Odisha. The persons that I quote below were my informants. Kalinganagar is a product of politics of peripherality and globalisation process. Kalinganagar was carved out of the two blocks – Danagadi and Sukinda – in Jajpur district on 1 August 1992. The reasons for establishing the industrial town here were easy availability of raw materials required for steel and iron industries from Sukinda as well as Keonjhar mining area, availability of water from the Brahmani that is flowing at a distance of 5 km from it, the national highway connecting this area to Paradip Port and, finally, tribes inhabiting this area who could be easily dispensed with because of their presence in the margins. But to the contrary perception, the tribes put up a valiant fight against the TATA company that has

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d­ isplaced the maximum number of tribes from their villages. Twelve tribal lives were sacrificed. In the course of their struggle, two diametrically opposite kinds of boundary with distinct meaning could be visible. For the state, boundary meant confinement of people within their village – controlling people and their mobility, creating border beyond which they were restricted to venture. The police would arrest if the movement activists cross the border of the village. The surveillance system was very much in operation, where the police and industry hired henchman would abduct, kill and kidnap people if they cross the village boundary. In this sense the statist nature of boundary confirmed to “national order of things”. But for the inhabitants, the boundary was not restricted to the administrative boundary of their village. It extended beyond their confined area of dwelling. In its extended form, it went beyond to include the natural environment, landscape surrounding the village on which they have been dependent for livelihood. The ecologic border is not about spatialised power relationship of controlling people or controlling mobility. It is about socially and culturally situated people who were and are engaged in place-making activity thereby creating locality and territory. They create locality that expands beyond the occupied land. There are sites of memory that are scattered across the landscapes – sacred groves, temples, architecture, water sources, ponds, etc. – that circumscribe the individual and communities within its fold when “borders…are important sites where the link between collective memory and territory, community and place… is established” (Zhurzhenko 2011: 73 and 74). The tribal villages and hamlets are scattered around the small hills of Badasuli, Sunajhari and Gobarghati. Both oral and formal histories confirm that the Sukinda king who was the proprietor of this land had come from Bihar and settled here. The tribes were brought by the king and later some migrated into this area. The tribes have migrated from Ranchi, Singhbhum, Mayurbhanj and Keonjhar. The majority of tribes are Mundas. The tribes had remained relatively isolated from the influence of the non-tribes or in tribal lingo odiyas. The relative isolation was due to a self-­ imposed buffer of not interfering with the other ways of life. The buffer is crossed when the two communities meet at the market place to exchange the produce. The market meant not only a place where the trade, interaction and communication of many different communities take place but also synonymous for establishing and renewing relationship: a place not for nurturing exploitative relations and exchange but of initiating connection with the outside world. There are other tribes who inhabit this area. The social boundaries are drawn on the basis of commensality among different tribes. Similar kin can take part in death rituals and marriages. There cannot be inter-tribe marriages. A Tiria cannot marry Banaras, and Jamudas cannot marry Angarais. The method of burial of family members and preservation of ancestors also differ among the tribes. For instance, the Mundas keep big size stones behind their houses where their ancestors are buried; the other tribes like Ganda erect a small stone at the burial place. Santhals bury the dead body after covering with clean clothes. They put no stones behind their houses. Burial ritual is a community affair though worshiping the ancestors is a private matter. The community affair is marked by commensality. Commensality

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has different meaning for different occasions. Commensality of cooked food during death ritual is about community members seeking blessing from the ancestors, who are living with them and protecting them. Commensality during child birth or marriage is to bless the child and couples. Tribal life is deeply connected with nature. Nature is a source of sustenance for the people. The land, forest and the surrounding landscape with the help of hard labour of the tribe is a source for sustenance for generations. “‘A portion of territory the eye can comprehend in a single view’ does not correctly describe the relationship between the human being and his or her surroundings. The assumption is that the viewer is somehow outside or separate from the territory he or she surveys. Viewers are as much a part of landscape as the boulder they stand on” (Silko 1986: 884). The surrounding thus defines their identity as a tribe and/or as individual members. The forests, trees, flowers, fruits and brooks are animated with life and spirits. They are worshipped and propitiated to prevent any harm occurring to the people. The most important tree that is worshipped is sal (Shorea robusta) tree. It is considered as the god of the jungle. For the Mundas the sal flower signifies interpersonal and interrelation among human beings, birds and animals. Rabindra Jarika,3 the president of the movement against displacement, the inhabitant of Chandia village, narrates the story of a Budha Raja4 who went to war leaving his beloved wife companionless. He was aware about his wife’s apprehensions. He plucked the sal flower and handed the tender flowers to his beloved. He stated that it personifies himself. So long as this flower remains fresh, he would be alive. Every morning the wife would wake up and watch the flower. Finally, after a long wait, her husband came back home and they lived happily ever after. Another story that connects human, tree and birds was narrated by Birendra Hembrum,5 a priest in Hatimunda village. In old days there were only two people inhabiting the world. They wanted to worship the ancestors and called it baparab. For this purpose, they required sala flower. They did not know how it did look like. They went to sleep in desperation as there was no one to help them. A bird named Gangar Salu brought the flower. From then on, the sala flower is used to worship the ancestors. After the ritual the flowers would be distributed among all the villagers. There are boundaries among communities. But they are not unconnected. They are relational and co-existing with each other. Social life is guided by kinship relation that creates boundaries but affectivity develops because of close proximity of existence. Close proximity creates “extended heartholds” (Wilson 1993: 34) where duty and service are rendered to individuals. There are friendship and trustworthiness among the members of the communities. People render recognition and services to others. There is no extreme competition as it is incompatible with a way of life that does not glide on but rather ride with the environment.  Interview at Chandia on 22 June 2008.  The tribes do not have a concept of a king. They call their ruler as Budha Raja meaning a king who is old, is wise and has knowledge about the nature. 5  Interview at Hatimunda on 16 June 2008. 3 4

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Locality, familiarity, intimacy and deference are the building blocks of broad-­ based social relationship. Flexible social relations and friendship constitute the base of intercommunity relations. In everyday social transaction, there is an obligation to reciprocate. Respect for members, norms, age-old rituals and practices enables social relationships to sustain for long. There is a propensity to share within unequal relations. Sharing performs vital economic and social functions that help people during scarcity or uncertainty. It performs the role of social capital. The expected return may be “immediate” or “delayed”. Dabur Kalundia explained. Any poor people even if possess no land can never starve in the village. His children and wife can survive if the person is critically ill. If you are working in the factory as daily wagers and fall ill then you do not get wage. After two three days the family would be starving. His wife and children would also face hardship. If he is in a village then he would not have to worry. Women and children can live with the support of other members of the community. People help each other during the time of need. From the birth to the death the poor villagers are taken care of by the community.

Fundamentals of tribal existence are based on being connected to the land and caring of and for land. Their custodianship is reflected in their ritual practices and kinship organisations. There are different rituals associated with agricultural cycles. But the practice of rituals varies among tribes. Herkarsa is a ritual to initiate the process of ploughing and sowing. Mage Parab is celebrated for reaping to commence. All participants of life are connected by a shared oral history that helps them transmit knowledge and information to enable the community to survive against the onslaught of the world outside. Stories and oral narrations became the medium of retention of knowledge. Land and human become “co-dependent”. They take care of each other. There is inequality but is not socially created, rather it is an individual’s unwillingness to labour. There is egalitarianism in practice when it comes to invest labour on a piece of land. Land of any kind becomes the object of labour and becomes the source of their individual identity. Labouring on a piece of land and possessing it are the only way to achieve equality of status within the community and among communities. Land becomes the source of freedom and sources of individuality. It is through the interaction of land that they become part of the nature. Dabur Kalundia, a resident of Chandia village, an important leader of the anti-displacement, explained: A poor man if possesses at least a homestead land can survive without much difficulty. He keeps chicken. He tends goats that he sells in the market and earns cash. In addition, he gets help from the villagers by procuring some pulses and rice. The poor man stitches leaves, make plates and sell it in the weekly haat (local market). Some even work on other’s fields and grow seasonal vegetables and sell them. They have freedom. He does not have to listen to the labour contractor’s abusive language nor is under the threat of eviction from the factory if he does not work according to the whims and fancies of order of the clerks, contractors, middleman and babus. They can clear a patch of the forest land and cultivate it. In this way tribes are free. They enjoy being left free. We are matira manisha. We are sons of soil, belong to the place.

The spatial context relates not only to the materiality of home but also to dwelling – patches of hamlets, a small scrap of land adjoining the house, arterial village

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roads, cremation ground, fields, wells and ponds, hills, brooks, daily meeting places near small water bodies, holes, shrubs the birth of a child in the corner of a house, a stone or tree for recluse inscribes memory acts as a magnet that attracts individuals. Even the animals and insects become part of that memory. All create a sense of place for them and affective bond. People remember their experiences of place through these objects. The individual’s life world and place fuse at these spots thereby create an affective bond. This is what Wilson calls “memorate knowledge”, “knowledge derived from individual experience and unmodified by socially shared or transmitted knowledge” (Wilson 1988: 30). The shared memorate knowledge is internalised individually or communally. Generational dependence and entanglement with nature and things, association and custodianship of land and environment that gives essence to people, affective social relationship and immersion of people in the place characterise the ecologic border. Living in the ecologic border is living, what in vernacular language called, within bhitamati. It is an essence for and of human existence. It is a “deep association with and consciousness of the places”. This association constitutes “a vital source of both individual and cultural identity and security”, a point of departure from which we orient ourselves in the world (Relhp 1976: 42). It means embeddedness of self in place and place in self: the border is embedded within. It embodies deep memories of being “at home”, a subjective belongingness to place and locality. Leaving bhitamati means crossing the ecologic border, that is, being “out of place”. Ecologic border or bhitamati is about a defined boundary which is built upon “milieus beyond the immediate place” (Wise 2000: 297). It is both close and open. It is closed by social relations but open in terms dwelling within natural environment and place-making that includes “multiple acts of remembering and imagining which inform each other in complex ways” (Basso 1996: 05). The ecologic border thus is about an affective feeling about a place: feeling at home, that is, the “feeling of the presence of the significant others” (Wise 2000: 299). Those significant others would include not only the ecology but all small things entangled within it. Feeling home could means carrying significant others within the self. The tribes who have been residing here were declared encroachers and their possession of land illegal with the construction of industries in Kalinganagar. Dabur Kalundia6 laments: Land is our maati maa (mother earth). It provides us with daily needs. Take for example, a man has one son. The son leaves the old parents. What would the old parents do? If they have a piece of land, even if the son leaves them they can always go for share cropping. The land could also act as a security for the future because the son, who may be due to some unforeseen circumstances, could not find work in the factory or meet with an accident, which is happening regularly here, can come back and live comfortably with the piece of land at his disposal. He would always feel free, and at home as he would not work under anyone’s close supervision in the factory nor depend on anyone for salary. Now that we are being evicted from land because of the land acquisition we are in fact being dislocated from bhitamati.

 Interview at Chandia on 12 June 2008.

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Dislocation from the bhitamati and eviction from their land made them devoid of their essence; they got disembodied from the place. They lost their identity. They became migrants, internally displaced, that involved movements “in mind and body, within and between spaces of varying scales that are identified as home” (Ruby 2006: 38). They got deterritorialised. Thus, ‘dislocating us from our bhitamati’ has a meaning for the tribal life. It means uprooted from a habitat that is a “subtle and surreptitious form of expropriation” (Chakravarti and Dhar 2009: 09). It is “a more totalizing form of expropriation of space of living and at other times appears surreptitiously disrupt and dismantle the space of living. The term dislocation in this sense not only includes the ‘involuntary resettlement’; it also includes within its ambit various forms of ‘disruption of everyday life’ in political, economic and cultural sense” (Chakravarti and Dhar 2009: 10). Dislocation, thus, is about getting expropriated from a place or getting deterritorialised. The tribes have been deterritorialised who have been displaced from their bhitamati are now living in tin sheds constructed by the TATA company. They have become footloose labourers, moving from factories to factories to places to places. The common property resources land and natural environment that they were dependent upon were taken over by the government. The market place that was a place of connectedness is now being replaced by exploitative relationship. A new consumer culture is developing here. A roughly egalitarian social relation is being supplanted with unequal relationship. The umbilical cord with the nature has also been dislocated. The embedded border is crossed. Affectivity is replaced by self-interested individuals thus commencing individuation process in Kalinganagar.

Conclusion To sum up, the essay taking environment into account distinguishes the border formation, nature and practice at the locality and bordering at the national level. The ecologic border as discussed above differs in form and in substance from the national border. Environment becomes an integrated part of the border formation process, which is embedded within human beings. In contrast to the border where the institution of state plays an important part in organising citizens through legal texts, the ecologic border may embark on a process of “othering” and organising members, but the process is transgressed through sharing of spaces, developing trust among members of the same and other communities. Friendship, commensality and trust organise individuals and community within the border. The ecologic border is “not present yet it is not absent”, though “imperceptible” but “mentally powerful” (van Houtum 2011: 49). The ecologic borders and territories are internalised through “memorate knowledge”. There are deep memories of surrounding things along with their “essence” that enables inhabitants to feel contended: being “at home”, a secured place for embodied of memories. The deep memories are not about the present but also about a shared past where relationships and connectedness with

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environment and people are shaped or consciously and unconsciously developed and nurtured. It is rooted and embedded (Mohanty 2016). The globalising forces deterritorialised the tribes by forcefully evicting them from the bhitamati or ecologic border that they had internalised from time immemorial and compelled them to be part of the exploitative political-economic landscape.

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Chapter 8

Nepal-India Open Border: A Rationale of Regulation B. K. Upendra Bahadur

Abstract  The chapter attempts to address the research questions: How has an open border between Nepal and India been beneficial to the people of the two countries? What are the challenges and issues posed by a practice of an open border in terms of national security? The objectives include an analysis on interconnectedness of people beyond the geographical territory and the exploration of outstanding issues created by an open border following security threats. The statements made by the experts and leaders having a substantive knowledge on open border will be used as the primary source of information along with unstructured interviews of purposively selected respondent. Talking on the geostrategic location, Nepal is surrounded by India to the West, East and the South except the North. The chapter argues that a practice of an open border between the countries has been remaining since the time immemorial. People from two countries take benefit from an open border in terms of employment opportunities and free mobility without any legal restrictions. Sociocultural integration between the people of two countries seems in intact right from the beginning. Despite the fact, the illegal factors such as smugglers, terrorists and criminals have been posing challenges to the open border taking benefits of the natural openness of the border. The trafficking in girls and women, the mobility of fake Indian currency and explosive substances have challenged to the existing security system. The infiltration of illegal elements is really detrimental to the national security and integrity of the country. In the age of globalisation, the borders cannot be sealed off but can be regulated through mutual and shared liabilities to inject fresh momentum on natural flow and inflow of people from one country to another practically. Keywords  Nepal · India · Borders · Territory · State · Trafficking

B. K. Upendra Bahadur (*) Department of International Relations and Diplomacy, Mid-Western University, Surkhet, Nepal © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 N. Uddin, N. Chowdhory (eds.), Deterritorialised Identity and Transborder Movement in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2778-0_8

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Introduction An open border allows free movement of people between countries with sometimes limited or no restrictions. It does not mean that all matters are overlooked in the name of freedom of movement. In a practice of an open border regime, the borders are not controlled unlike the sharing of militarised borders like the one between North Korea and South Korea. Looking at the past, many states had open international borders. It was possible due to the long-term continuation of free movement of people from one country to another and a lack of any legal restrictions. There are a number of countries in the globe which share common open borders. Excluding the case of Nepal, Sweden and Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway share open borders under the Nordic Passport Union arrangement permitting their citizens unrestricted freedom of movement in both countries without any need for identity documents. Bolivia, Peru, Colombia and Ecuador are also the examples of sharing open borders under the arrangement. The freedom of transborder movements of the citizens meets the need of interdependence. Nepal was recognised before the boundaries were fully established internationally. The ancient history of China and India has mentioned about Nepal. Nepal-India boundary is as old as the history owned by the two countries. Nepal and India enjoy very ancient social, cultural, economic and religious ties. The boundary demarcation and delimitation between Nepal and India had taken place after the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814–1816. Nepal is situated between China and India geographically. It lies to the North of Tibet, the autonomous region of China, and to the East, West and South of India. Nepal-China boundary is vividly shown by its length that is 1415  km. Nepal-India boundary which runs along with three sides of Nepal is only 1850 km.1 It is concerned with the mountainous portions of the boundary that lie in the Sikkim State Darjeeling District of West Bengal State in the East. The rest of the boundary runs along with the plains in the South and along with Mahakali River in the West. Such geostrategic location and age-old sociocultural closeness are instrumental to the open border between the two countries of South Asia. There are main 22 trade and transit points along the Nepal-India border for free movements of goods and services. A plethora of arguments for and against the open border are in discussion and debate over the years. According to Guardian (2011), ‘Open borders advocates emphasise on the free migration as an effective way of reduction of poverty.’2 The migrants moved to developed countries from developing countries can earn higher wages. They send remittances to their relatives and family members in the home country. Resorting to the human rights perspectives, free migration is a compliment on the Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that reads as follows: (1) ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the 1   Vidya Bir Singh Kansakar. 2001. ‘Nepal-India Open Border: Nature, Pattern and Social Implications,’ in Ramakant and BC Upreti (eds.) India and Nepal: Aspects of Interdependent Relations. p. 4, New Delhi: Kalinga Publications. 2  World without borders makes economic sense, The Guardian, 2011 (Accessed on 10 February 2018).

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borders of each state.’ (2) ‘Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.’3 Arguments against the open border seem that controlled borders encourage and enhance responsible policies pertaining to the population and birth rates for countries. Open borders are threats to the security and human safety. The large-scale migration across the border is instrumental to the demographic shifts that change a country’s political structures in favour of the new demography and existing people in the country. The open borders lead to the infrastructures deficit in the country. ‘Push and pull factors’ are largely responsible for in and out going migration in the world. In order to cater to the employment opportunities, people cross borders. The present world is supposed to be the world of globalisation. The moving wind of globalisation has made the states borderless and is warning them to bear the mutual and shared responsibilities in terms of trade, security and public safety. In addition to the geographical proximity, Nepal and India enjoy a long-lasting situation of sociocultural closeness between the people of the two countries. Compared to the arguments for and against open borders, the interconnectedness and interdependence among the states and the people are need of an hour. Open borders can be regulated but cannot be closed and sealed off. I have attempted to develop insights based on contending perspectives. The author of Borderless World, Kenichi Ohmae, argues: Globalization is emerging as a fact and it is impossible to deny it in the age of interdependent and interconnectedness. It has already happened. The state and non-state actors are moving into a new global state. The new world is of radical nature and is taking shape from the ashes of nation- based economic world existed yesterday. The act on a global state leads to the success leveraging the new drivers of economic power and growth.4

Globalisation is a process of integration. The transborder movements of capital, production activities, information and technology function at large. The national barriers and policies do not work and vanish in a global sate. A sense of restriction and controlling the freedom of mobility is dysfunctional in the age of globally shrunk world. Contrary to the statement, the treaty of Westphalia of 1648 is a vivid evidence of sovereignty of the state. States are omnipotent in all affairs of their concerns and do not allow aliens and foreigners to intervene/interference in the internal matters. The borderless world shaped in the backstopping of globalisations has weakened the Westphalian order and posed threats to security considerations and territorial integrity. The borderless world is only buzzed and the states are predominant to take decisions. The evidences as well as incidences from a borderless world to the world of borders are re-emerging in the world. State borders are expressions of multidimensional power. Colas (2007) attempts to make a clear difference between the territoriality of empires and the national states: Empires thrive on fluctuation of the territories whereas National states are only survived within tightly demarcated borders. Empires rule diverse people through the provisions of separate jurisdiction whereas sovereign states claim to unify the populations under a single  United Nations. (1948). Universal Declarations of Human Rights. p. 28, New York: UN House.  The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Inter-linked Economy-Management Lessons in the New Logic of Global Economy. Hong Kong: Collins Business. 3 4

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national jurisdiction. Empires mainly seek to control people whereas national states aim to control the territories.5

Borders are political constructions that demarcate distinct and separate jurisdiction. In the regards, Kukathas opines: Crossing a border is not supposed to take one beyond the reach of the authority of any other jurisdictions. It means coming under the authority of one another. The entrance of jurisdiction blends of liabilities and rights. A border is open to the extent that people are able to enter the jurisdiction. It defines freedom to act therein.6

This chapter basically illustrated based on my research7 the problems and potentials of keeping open border with the case of Nepal-India open border.

Open Border and Benefits: A Discourse The concept of an open border between Nepal and India was begun in the nineteenth century after the delimitation of Nepal-India boundary in 1816 and the restoration of Naya Muluk to Nepal in 1860.8 Furthermore, the general perception argues that Nepal-India open border has always allowed unrestricted movements of people across the international boundary. During the colonial times, the British rulers in India were impressed by Nepal by seeing the fighting skills of Gurkhas. They wanted to recruit them into the army. Nepal was seen as a market for finished goods and services from India. The achievements of these objectives made the rulers keep the border open for transborder movements for people and goods. It led to an idea of open border. Practically the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950 signed between Nepal and India institutionalised a concept of open border. Nepal’s immediate neighbour India got independence in 1947, and Independent India continued the linkages and relations keeping a practice of open border in intact. A big reason for India to keep the border was the emergence of assertive China. The Himalayas falling on the North of Nepal have been realised as the  A Coals. 2007. Empire. p. 62, Cambridge: Polity Press.  Chandra Kukathas. 2012. ‘Why Open Borders?’ p.  652, ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 19, no.4 (2012):649–675, KU Leuven: Center for Ethics. 7  The chapter is based on the content analysis of the sources available on a theme. It includes the collection and analysis of the secondary sources of information. Sources of a study include the books and reports published. The articles published in national and international journals have been used. The authentic publications made by the institutions relating to the governments, commissions and offices have been used. Articles, writings and descriptions available on the Internet sources have been also used. The provisions added to the treaties and declarations have been well used to corroborate the context. 8  Naya Muluk was annexed into British India after the Anglo-Nepal war in 1815. It was later returned the Raja of Nepal in 1860 in the recognition of military cooperation of Nepal to quell the military revolt of Lucknow in 1857. See C.U.  Aitchison. 1983. A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, Vol. 14, pp. 63–72. Delhi: Mittal Publications. 5 6

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northern barrier that guards India. In the absence of the well-defined natural barrier between Nepal and India, Indian policymakers came to view the Himalayas as a natural barrier between Nepal and India. This sort of thought was incorporated by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in a speech in a parliament in 1950. It includes: And regardless of our feeling about Nepal, we were interested in our own country’s security, in our own countries borders. Now we have had from immemorial times, a magnificent frontier that is to say, the Himalayas. It is now quite so difficult as it is used to be, still it is difficult, very difficult. Now so far as the Himalayas are concerned, they lie on the other side of Nepal, mostly not on this side. Therefore, the principal barrier to India lies on the other side of Nepal and we are not going to tolerate any person coming over that barrier. Therefore, as much we appreciate the independence of Nepal and we cannot risk {Our} own security to anything going wrong in Nepal which permits either that barrier to be crossed or otherwise weakens our frontier.9

The open border regime between Nepal and India has fostered cordial and friendly relations between them. The free movements and flows of people over the years have eased in the dissemination of ideas, cultures and settlement of people in each other’s territory. The religious places and institutions existing in the two countries have been playing a vital role in terms of inculcation of social and cultural relations. The places of religious importance like Pashupatinath, Lumbini, Janakpur and Muktinath in Nepal and Kashi, Gaya and Haridwar in India are visited by people from both countries. The matrimonial alliances between the royal dynasties of Nepal and their Indian counterparts had further fostered the ties historically. People to people contacts and their matrimonial relations have also praised the ties to the sky. Some instances were around the ties that both the queens of King Tribhuvan belonged to the royal families of India. The former Crown Princess Himani Rajya Laxmi Devi Shah also belongs to the royal family of Sikar, Rajasthan. Likewise, the first cousin of Mohan Shamsher Rana, the formerly prime minister of Nepal, is married to Karan Singh, the son of Maharaja, Hari Singh, of Kashmir. These alliances constitute the social, cultural and political significance in indeed. Marriages are not only limited to the royal families. Common people also marry across the border. Speaking frankly, cross-border marital ties confer advantages on the legal right to property and a chance of getting dual citizenship.10 The open border conduces to the economic implications for two countries. The mentionable aspect is an income accorded to Nepal in the form of salaries, remittances and pensions from the Gurkhas recruited into Indian army. The tripartite agreement signed between Nepal, India and the United Kingdom made Nepal allow the recruitment of Gurkhas in Indian army because it faced the burden of rehabilitating 200,000 solders discharged from the British India army at the end of

9  ‘Speech of the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in Parliament on the International Situation and the Policy of the Government of India in relation thereto, New Delhi, 6 December 1950,’ in Avtar Singh Bhasin (ed.), Nepal-India Relations Documents 1947 – June 2005. (2005). New Delhi: Geetika Publishers. 10  Ram Prasad Rajbahak. 1992. Nepal-India Open Border: A Bond of Shared Aspiration. p.  30, New Delhi: Lancer Publishers.

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World War II.11 The then Rana rulers feared that the trained but unemployed armies might pose a threat to their rule. From Indian point of view, the recruitment of Gurkhas was a foreign policy tool to enhance the goodwill with the people of Nepal. Besides, the community people engaged in agricultural pursuits take benefit of the sale and purchase of agriculture products and livestock from the markets located on either side of the border. The urbanisation of plain area has open up ample opportunities for inhabitants of the border regions. People from both countries have a tendency to cross the border and work in each other’s country at large. Nepal is the largest market for India. India has an interest in accessing Nepal’s growing consuming market. A couple of Indian merchants and entrepreneurs have invested in Nepal heavily. Nepal offers them cheap labour and tax breaks for setting up joint ventures. There are over 265 approved Indian joint ventures in Nepal. Most of these investments are in the telecom, food processing, tourism, cosmetics and pharmaceutical sectors. The range of 1–1.5 million Nepali citizens seems to have been working in various cities of India. The popular notion that there are 5 to 6 million Nepalis in India is myth created and nurtured by the Indian government. The majorities of Nepali-­ speaking or Nepali-looking people are Indian nationals from the North-East or Sikkim Darjeeling area. On the other side, there are about 1 million Indian nationals in Nepal. There are another 2 million Indians who got Nepali nationality in the past. Most of them are Dalits and Muslim labourers from UP and Bihar, and the smaller elites are either Marwari/Kayastha/Rajasthani businessmen who control Nepali economy.12 Two narratives derived from Indian and Nepali citizens are of utmost important to narrate on to what extent the utility of open border is for sustenance of livelihoods and opportunities. ‘We cross border conveniently as there is a practice of openness for freedom of movement from one to another country. Many Indian agricultural workers come to Nepal to search agricultural works in the firms and field. I am a resident of Basti, India and have been staying in Kapilbastu, Nepal involving in the farming endeavors. A number of Indian workers are in the district as the labourers. We back to the native place after earning.’13 ‘I am a local farmer and have been trading sugarcane in Rupaidiha and Baharaich over the 10 years. I export my product in the mentioned markets since I get reasonable price compared to the local markets in my locality. The open border has eased the movements of goods from border area of Nepal to the border area of India and vice versa. We do not have obstacles in transaction.’14  ‘Memorandum of Agreement on Recruitment of Gorkha Troops, 7 November 1947,’ in S.D. Muni, Nepal and India: A Changing Relationship. 1992, pp. 180–182, New Delhi: Konark Publishers. 12  Accessed from https://www.quora.com/How-many-Nepali-people-work-in-India-How-manyIndians-work-in-Nepal on 11 February 2018 13  An interview with Chinku Pasi remaining in Kapilbastu District as an agricultural worker in the farms. He has come to the district from Basti, India. I interviewed with him on 15 February 2018. 14  An interview administered on 15 February 2018 with Kamal Joshi who is a local sugarcane grower residing in Bhurigaun, Bardiya, Nepal. 11

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Trade, Transit and Investment Nepal and India relations are founded on the age-old history, culture, tradition and religions. These relations are comprehensive, close and multidimensional and are arranged in political, social, economic, cultural and religious engagements with each other. The two countries established diplomatic relations on 17 June 1947 to boost the historic connections. Nepal desires to foster cordial and friendly relations with the neighbouring country. The longstanding position of Nepal reveals not allow its territory to be misused by any elements inimical to India and also expects same reciprocity and assurance from India. The open border between the countries remains as unique feature of Nepal-India relations. Frontier without restriction has greatly facilitated the free movements of people to each other’s territory and has enhanced interactions. A matter of utmost importance to Nepal is the partnership with India in the fields of trade and transit. India is Nepal’s largest trading partner and has provided transit facility to Nepal for the third country trade. The public and private sectors of India have invested in Nepal. The trade statistics reveal a phenomenal increase in the volume of bi-lateral trade over the years between the countries. However, Nepal has been escalating a trade deficit with India. The two countries have concluded bi-lateral Treaty of Transit, Treaty of Trade and the Agreement of Cooperation to Control Unauthorized Trade. Status of trade between Nepal and India

Import Export Balance

FY 2012/2013 397,957,920 51,788,460 −346,169,460

FY 2013/2014 482,345,300 59,458,375 −422,886,925

FY 2014/2015 500,044,484 55,859,253 −444,185,231

FY 2015/2016 487,597,307 39,695,134 −444,185,231

Source: Government of Nepal, Ministry of Commerce (2017)

Open Border and Disadvantages: A Review It is doubtlessly accepted that an open border remains as a strong facilitator to boost bilateral relations. Open borders are the gateway to the friendly ties and closeness. Notwithstanding the benefits, the security concerns constrain an open border. The inclusion of territorial disputes and encroachments, the transgression of border by insurgents and terrorists, the spilling over of domestic unrest across the border and cross-border illegal activities are lessons to regulate the open borders.

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Territorial Disputes and Encroachments The turbulent Himalayan rivers are very powerful and shift the courses constantly. These rivers keep changing their courses every a few years, thereby submerging older land and throwing up newer territory. As the Thalweg principle15 is applicable to delineation of boundaries along water bodies, the position of international boundary keeps changing along with the changing courses of the rivers. The submergence, destruction and removal of the border pillars and encroachment into no man’s land by people from either side add to the problems. Twenty-six districts in Nepal share borders with India. Only the four districts named Mahottari, Dhanusha and Dadeldhura are free from encroachment. Nepalese estimation reveals that there are as many as 54 spots covering an area of approximately 60,000 hectares encroached. Among them, the ones relating to Kalapani (37,840 ha), Susta (14,860 ha), Mechi (1600 ha), Tanakpur (222 ha) and Pashupatinagar are claimed.16 Both Nepal and India are members of United Nations organisations. The territorial integrity of the sovereign state is a base of a national interest. The incidences and cases of encroachment of the Nepali territory are yet to be settled officially. Nepali political parties basically communist forces wield flags and slogans focusing a trend of intrusion of the Nepalese land. The marches and rallies are organised across the country to galvanise citizens against the move heading to the encroachment.

Transborder Movement of Terrorists, Insurgents and Criminals The open border is a door to transborder movements for the people of two countries. Taking benefits of the cross-border mobility, the terrorists and insurgents penetrate through the open border. Some examples are crystal clear. Abdul Karim Tunda, one of India’s most wanted top 20 Lashkat-e-Tiaba terrorists, was arrested on 16 August 2013. Yasin Bhatkal, co-founder of the Indian Mujahideen, a militant group banned in India, and one of India’s most wanted terrorists was arrested by Nepali police near India’s border on 28 August 2013. The terrorists caught were handed over to India officially.17 Based on the chronicles, Sikh and Kashmiri terrorists had sneaked into India and via Nepal in the 1980s as the border between India and Pakistan were fenced. In later years, many north-east Indian insurgent groups named United Liberation Front of Assam, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland and Kamtapur Liberation Organisation also misused the open border. These insurgent  Thalweg means the principle of defining a border between two states separated by a watercourse as lying along the Thalweg. 16  Kishan Sharma. 2068BS{2011 AD}. Nepal Rastriyata: Chunauti ra Rakshako Sawal{Nepal’s Nationality: Challenges and the Issue of Protection}. p. 54, Kathmandu: Swonam Sathiharu. 17  Buddhi Narayan Shrestha. ‘Nepal-India Open Border: Challenges to Peace and Security,’ a paper presented at a national seminar organised by Institute of Foreign Affairs and funded by Fried Rich Ebert Stiftung, 7 July 2017 Kathmandu. p. 5. 15

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groups are reported to have shifted their base to Nepal after being chased out of Bhutan in 2003. It has also been reported that they are increasing sneaking into Nepalese territory and forging links with Maoists. The aim is to engage in the supply of arms and ammunitions to various insurgent groups operating in north-east India.18 In recent years, it has been reported that many terrorists involved in numerous bomb blasts in the country have sneaked through the porous and poorly guarded NepalIndia border. From Nepal, Maoists repeatedly escaped into India during the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. The districts of East and West Champaran and Sirohi of Bihar were particularly frequented by Maoists. The objective was to seek medical aid and shelter. The trend of Maoists rebels escaping into India has been stopped since Maoists have joined the mainstream of Nepalese politics. In addition, many hardcore criminals pursued by Indian security forces escape into Nepal resorting to open border. They are there used to set up smuggling gangs and criminal syndicates to carry out smuggling of gold, drugs, fake currency, arms and explosives. It is reported that Dawood Ibrahim visited Kathmandu several times and utilised his connections with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, Nepalese politicians, business houses and criminal underworld for large-scale hawala transactions.19 Likewise, the criminal groups working in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh use Nepal as a place to mastermind the crimes like car theft, kidnappings, and extortions and so on. Petty criminals cross over to the other side to keep away from the Indian police and security forces, too.20 Madrasas are mushrooming along the Nepal and India border. It is one of the concerns for Indian security agencies. It is reported that about 1900 madrasas are being thrived along the border. There are 1100 madrasas in India and 800  in Nepal.21 Along with madrasas, many Islamic non-governmental organisations have reached in the majority Muslim areas in the Terai region. It is claimed that these NGOs are reportedly funded by unregulated money of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya and other Muslim countries. Most of the madrasas and NGOs work to the cause of social and educational needs of the local people and waves of Bangladeshi migrants settling along the border areas. However, it is suspected that some are engaged in anti-Indian activities under the influence of ISI.22 Indian security establishment posits that ISI uses Nepali territory as a base to bake anti-Indian sentiments in Nepal since the 1990s. It is reported that the ISI has been able to establish a wide logistical network in Nepal to help the agents. Agents are encouraged to enter India to perform subversive activities. Investigations into the hijacking of Indian airlines plane IC814 logically prove an ISI’s involvement in 18  ULFA and KLO Making Base in Indo-Nepal Border, 29 November 2004, at http://news.indiainfo. com/20o4/11/29/2911 ulfa.html (Accessed 16 October 2017). 19  ‘The Kathmandu Nexus,’ India Today. 12 June 2000, New Delhi. 20  Nepal’s troubled Tarai Region, Asia Report No. 36, International Crisis Group, 9 July 2007, p. 24. 21  ‘1900 Madrasas are mushrooming along Indo-Nepal Border: SSB Chief,’ at http://www.india. defence.com/reports- 1600 (Accessed 20 September 2017). 22  ‘The Kathmandu Nexus,’ India Today, 12 June 2000, New Delhi.

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the episode in indeed.23 Intelligence reports also opine that the ISI has been funding many madrasas along the border to use them as a platform to provoke anti-Indian sentiments. In the past, there have been reports accusing ISI of involving in pumping fake currency notes into India to constrain its economy. The arrests of persons have proved evidences and clues into how many Nepal-based criminal syndicates are used by ISI to smuggle fake currency through the Nepal-India open border.24 Nevertheless, it is not permitted by the Government of Nepal. The fact is that the territory is being misused by external agencies. According the Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, the US Department of the State published it in 2003 and attempts to substantiate the undesirable situation of the open border. It says: Limited government finances, weak border controls and poor security infrastructures have made Nepal a convenient logistic and transit point for some outside militants and international terrorist. The country also possesses a number of relatively soft targets that make it a potentially attractive site for terrorists operations. Security remains weak at many public facilities, including the Tribhuvan International Airport in Kathmandu.25

Cross-Border Illegal Activities Along the Nepal-India border, the illegal activities like smuggling of essential items and fake Indian currency, gun-running and the trafficking of girls and women are rampant. Smuggling of essential items from Nepal to India takes place because of the varied tariff rates prevailing in the both countries. The problem is created by Nepal’s decision to import these goods far in its access of requirement. A portion of these goods are diverted to Indian consumption centres even before entering Nepal practically. Moreover, a number of other items are smuggled including marijuana and hashish, different types of herbs, vegetable ghee and cardamom, as well as goods from third countries. Conversely, urea, sugar, industrial explosives and gutkha are smuggled from India to Nepal.26 Looking at the circumstances, Nepal-India border has become a route for smuggling of arms and ammunitions as well. The arms ranging from sophisticated AK47s and 56s to country-made weapons are smuggled across the border through

 ISI Activities on Indo-Nepal Border, Press Release, Ministry of Home Affairs, February 18, 2003, at http://pib/nic.in/archives/ireleng/lyr2003/rfeb2003/18022003/r1802200314.html (Accessed 7 August 2017). 24  Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2001. ‘Border Management,’ Reports of the Group of Ministers on National Security. pp.  60–61, New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. 25  ‘South Asia Overview,’ Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, p. 14 at http://www.state.gov/s/crt/ rls/2003/c1253htm (Accessed 25 June 2017). 26  Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Ministry of Finance, Annual Report 2005–2006, Government of India, pp.  30–31, at http://www.dri.nic.in/DRI/ANNUal. Annual_Report_2005–06.pdf. (Accessed 10 September 2017). 23

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the districts of Pilibhit, Lakhimpur Kheri and Bahraich.27 Insurgencies and emergence of criminal gangs create demand for these weapons in the states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Various Indian insurgent groups, Maoists, various criminal syndicates and individual couriers are actively involved in the mentioned arms smuggling. The police also seized 4  kg of low-grade uranium in Supaul. It is suspected that uranium was being smuggled from Meghalaya to Nepal.28 Another illegal activity posing a challenge to the law enforcement agencies is the trafficking of women and children from Nepal. Hundreds of children and women are being trafficked from Nepal to India for commercial exploitation.29 According to the estimates, approximately 200,000 Nepali women are in Indian brothels. Nearly 7,000 Nepali girls are sold in India every year. The trafficking takes place along the border districts of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. A voluntary organisation has mapped 1,268 unmanned routes along the Nepal-India border that facilitate human trafficking.30 Nepal and India have signed agreements and instituted regular interactions between the concerned officials for prevention of smuggling and illegal activities. The multiplicity of the routes along the border, the ready-made markets on the both sides and the relatively thin presence of law enforcement agencies on the ground makes the task of countering these illegal activities difficult. The state governments do not seem to have sensitised on the enormous problems faced. State police forces like the Bihar military police and special auxiliary police of Bihar and the provincial constabulary in Uttar Pradesh are neither well-trained nor properly motivated to take on criminals and insurgents. In addition to this, the quality of intelligence gathering and information sharing about the movements of insurgents and terrorists is appalling. The inadequate coordination between different securities agencies like the state police forces, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence and the border-­ guarding forces also makes the regulation of open border difficult. Nepal is no exception to the appalling situation.

A Politics of a Demand for Closing the Open Border An open border remains adverse to the peace and security in the territories of the concerned countries. The adverse consequences of an open border have led demand to closure from time to time. British Indian army recruited Gurkha soldiers to guard the northern-eastern frontiers. Nepal migration was basically followed by Nepalese to the north-east. The tendency not to view the Nepalese migration favourably led to the demand from the north-east for closing the border first. The settlers mentioned  See Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Reports of 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006.  ‘Uranium seized along Indo-Nepal Border, six arrested,’ Indo-Asian New Service, Patna, 19 February 2008. 29  ‘Trafficking of Girls Go Unabated,’ The Times of India, Patna, 19 October 2002. 30  ‘Eyes Wide Open for Flesh Trade,’ The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 20 February 2008. 27 28

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above worked as labourers in the coal mines, oil refineries and tea plantation and also as dairy farmers and kitchen helpers. There was a harmony between the Nepalese migrants and the locals till the late 1970s after the ‘son of soil movement’ swept Assam and adjoining states. The locals had expressed resentment on the presence of Nepali foreigners and had demanded their excommunication from the territories of the Indian states. The agitation against the Nepali population was geared up first in Assam, and then it started spreading to other states. The violence against Nepali was witnessed in Manipur in 1980. Meghalaya soon followed suit. The target against Nepali settlers was begun in Shillong, Jowai and other parts of Meghalaya from 1986 to 1987. People were chased. The other states of India like Mizoram and Nagaland did not remain as an exception to the exclusion and expulsion of Nepali people.31 With the pace of time, the situation of misuse of open border by criminals, terrorists and smugglers sparked a debate and discussion towards closing the border. The ISI’s increasing use of Nepalese territory to hatch anti-Indian sentiments and activities furthered a discourse.32 Advocates of this discourse opine that the security considerations cannot be compromised. The international crime and cross-border terrorism are supposed as the fundamental concerns of security considerations. The open border is a hindrance in tracking the threats aforesaid. Following the case of Nepal, the debate on closing the border is as strong as in India. The fear of inundation of Indian migrants through the open border is held on top of the pyramid. Nepal also shares border with the two mostly populated states of India like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The fear has been compounded with the fact mentioned. These states also suffer from intense population pressure on agricultural land and provide adequate employment opportunities – factors that invariably force people to migrate in quest of land and economic opportunities. Many Nepalese people resent on Indian domination of their economy. People in Nepal do accuse that Indians are taking benefits of the developments instead of reinvesting in their country.33 Prior to 1990  in Nepal, the monarchy suffered from a continuous fear of dissemination of democratic idea and culture from India. The monarchs were fed up with democracy and multiparty system in the country. The political parties in the country, especially, Nepal congress had special relations with its counterpart in India. India had covertly support the cause of democracy in Nepal. These fears forced the successive government in Nepal to put checks on the Indian migrants in the form of stringent rules regarding work permits and citizenship.34 Then the  Lopita Nath. 2006. ‘Migration, Insecurity and Identity: The Nepali Dairymen in India’s northeast,’ Asian Ethnicity. 7(2), 2006, p. 144. 32   ‘Closing of Indo-Nepal Border,’ Lok Sabha Debates, at http://meaindia.nic.in/ parliament/1s/2000/03/questn2083.htm (Accessed 13 October 2017). 33  N.N. Jha. 1995. ‘Minorities Immigrate Refugee Issues in the Context of India-Nepal Relations,’ in Kalam Bahadur and Mahendra P. Lama (eds.), New Perspectives on India-Nepal Relations. p. 7, New Delhi: Har Anad Publications. 34  The then His Majesty the Government of Nepal passed an order making the possession of a citizenship certificate mandatory to the teachers of Indian origin working in Nepal. Many Indian teachers did not possess the citizenship certificates and were affected by the order. The restrictions were imposed upon foreigners including Indians on buying immovable properties in 1958. A 31

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government was compelled to study the effects of migration in Nepal. The National Commission on Population was set up under Dr. Harka Gurung to pursue the study on the selected theme in the 1980s. The report submitted in 1983 revealed that: The open border between India and Nepal seems to have been one of the main contributory factors to the increasing magnitude of international migration. The illegal trade associated with free movement of people across the border has been a matter of grave concern for both countries. It is, therefore, necessary to regulate the movement of people along the border between India and Nepal.35 The commission was highly discoursed and debated inwardly and outwardly. The commission had recommended the imposition of restriction on free movement of people, the introduction of work permits and granting of citizenship to the persons of Indian origin.

Bilateral Efforts to Settle Challenges Bilateral efforts are considered to be the base to facilitate border management. In the connection with this, Nepal and India decided to incept an institutionalised system of interactions in 1994 through the meetings of the home secretaries and the Joint Working Group on Border Management.36 The bilateral initiation has been useful in terms of sensitising their respective security concerns and formulating strategies for better management of border. The concerned officials on behalf of Nepal and India have been coordinating and collaborating to regulate the border regime for peace and security. Some of the decisions taken on the introduction of passport verification of passengers travelling by an air between the two countries; sharing of intelligence on movement of Maoists, political activists, insurgents, criminals and smugglers along the border; finalisation of extradition treaty and agreement on mutual legal assistance on criminal matters; settlement of border disputes and the development of infrastructures in the border areas are noteworthy.37 Before the independence of India in 1947, Indo-Nepal joint boundary team used to inspect the boundary every year to check for any encroachment, ill-defined boundary and missing or displaced boundary pillars. After the independence, the practice of joint inspection of a boundary was abandoned leading to many

system of work permits was introduced on Indians wishing to work in Nepal in 1987. However, it was not implemented by the Nepali Government. See S.D.  Muni. 1992. India and Nepal: A Changing Relationship. p. 49, New Delhi: Konark Publishers. 35  The commission was outspoken on the regulation of Nepal-India open border being sincere on the issue of immigration. See National Population Commission 1983. Internal and International Migration in Nepal: Summary and Recommendations. p.  58, Kathmandu: The National Commission on Population. 36  ‘Bihar Village up in arms against Nepali Maoist,’ CNN-IBN, New Delhi, 23 January 2008. 37  ‘Extradition Treaty with Nepal,’ Lok Sabha Debate. 3 March 2005, at http://mea.gov.in/ parliament/is/2005/03/021s3.htm. (Accessed 19 September 2017).

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boundary disputes.38 The Joint Technical Level Boundary Committee (JTLBC) was established in 1981 with a view to resolve the disputes and to complete the demarcation of the border. The then Prime Minister I.K. Gujral paid an official visit to Nepal in 1997. The JTLBC constituted an expert level joint group to examine the relevant facts relating to the demarcation of the boundary alignment in the western sector including the Kalapani area to propose further measures in this regards if need be. It seemed to have reiterated in Nepal-India joint press statement on 3 August 2003. The committee was supposed to complete its field work by 2001 to 2002 and final preparation of strip maps by the end of 2003.39 In spite of the lapse of more than three decades by JTLBC, no remarkable changes have taken place on demarcation of the boundary. The territorial disputes Kalapani, Susta and Mechi are yet to be resolved. The officials of the both countries had agreed to resolve the Kalapani and Susta dispute on the ground of the documents and evidences in possession of both governments.40 No doubt the institutionalised interactions and engagements have provided ample opportunities to manage the border regime between the countries. The infrequent meetings coupled with the absence of diplomatic rigor among the officials have hampered to speedy solutions to the burning problems. It is said that the Boundary Committee has failed to complete its task. The inadequate political will and weak coordination between the expert team are partly responsible for the delay in solving disputes along the border of two countries. The factors mentioned ahead have contributed to the shortcomings of bilateral efforts. It is claimed that threat perceptions emanating from Nepal are considered low. It makes the government unworried regarding the border. The episode of hijacking of Indian aircraft and the increasing activities of ISI in Nepal and its spillover effect to India had made the Nepali policymakers sincere to pay attention to the Indo-Nepal open border. The domestic politics of Nepal started bogging down into political crisis especially after 1996. The governments were preoccupied on internal problems and paid a little attention to the problems arising out in the border. From its side, Nepal has established armed police camps in 18 districts of Nepal sharing border with India. There is no deployment of armed forces to the hilly districts of Nepal confessing border with India, i.e., Illam, Taplejung, Panchthar, Dadeldhura, Baitadi and Darchula. The two plain districts of Nepal named Chitwan and Dang are also deprived of deployment of security forces to manage border.41 In  ‘Closing Indo-Nepal Border,’ Lok Sabha Debates, at http://meaindia.nic.in/parliament/1s/2000/03/ questn2083.htm (Accessed 21 September 2017). 39  Vidya Bir Singh Kansakar. 2001. Nepal-India Open Border: Prospects, Problems and Challenges, at http://www.nepaldemocracy.org/documents/treaties_agreements/nep_india_open_border.htm (Accessed 12 October 2017). 40  Joint Press Statement, at http/mea.gov.in/parliament/rs/2000/08/august17q2695.htm (Accessed 12 October 2017). 41  Kishan Sharma (ed,). 2011. ‘Kati Michyo baisathhi warsama Bharatle Nepali Bhumi?{How much India has encroached Nepali territory during 62 years?},’ Nepalko Rastriyata: Chunauti and rakshako sawal{Nepal’s Nationality: A Challenge and the Issue of Safeguarding}. p.  55, Kathmandu: Swonam ra sathiharu. 38

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order to save the open border from the misuse of undesirable elements, the deployment of security forces is common. The force called Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) was deployed in 2001 as a border-guarding force along the Indo-Nepal border. The areas of deployment were accompanied by the lead intelligence agency.42 The force was primarily deployed to the areas to prevent Maoist insurgency spilling over into Indian Territory.43 To prevent any transgression of border, SSB has divided the entire border into three segments: security sensitive, under observation and normal. The forces are deployed in accordance with the division. The check-posts have been constructed every 4  km for security sensitive areas. One check-post has been constructed every 6  km for areas under observation. The check-posts have been constructed every 15 km for normal areas.44 In addition to the task aforesaid, SSB is also endowed with the responsibility of scrutinising smuggling as well as trafficking in people, arms and drugs. The entire stretch of the border is manned by 314 SSB outposts. To enhance the border-guarding ability, the central government has sanctioned the raising of additional 20 SSB Battalions and has provided a grant of Rs. 444 crore for its modernisation.45 The deployment of SSB has gradually changed a profile of border security. The previous indifference to the security has been ended in the name of open border. Today one can witness an increased presence of paramilitary forces maintaining stricter vigil in the border areas. The completely open border is getting an image of regulated border to some extent with security forces undertaking random checks. Notwithstanding the improvements, the actions of security forces have turned in harassing innocent people for whom the open border is a way of life. Although the annual report of Home Ministry46 contends that the instances of smuggling and transgression of territory by terrorists have been reduced and the security situation along the border has been improved, there are also reports that SSB personnel are indulging in corruptible practices like abetment in smuggling and create legal problems in the areas of deployment.47

 123rd Report on Sashastra Seema Bal Bill 2006, at http://rajyasabha.nic.in/book2/reports/home_ aff/123rdreport.htm (Accessed 10 October 2017). 43  Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2006–2007, Government of India, 2007, p. 27. 44  Buddhi Narayan Shrestha, Guarding Indo-Nepal Border, 28 October 2006, at http://bordernepal. wordpress.com/tag/uncategorized/page/2 (Accessed 8 October 2017). 45  123rd Report on Sashastra Seema Bal Bill 2006, at http://rajyasabha.nic.in/book2/reports/home_ aff/123rdreport.htm (Accessed 10 October 2017). Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2006–2007, Government of India, 2007, p. 27. 46  Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2002–2003, Government of India, 2003. 47  ‘SSB creating law and order problem: IG,’ The Times of India, 9 September 2002. 42

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Development of Infrastructures: A Need of an Hour The Nepal-India border is compounded by the poor level of infrastructures along its entire length that creates difficulty in guarding and managing. The density and rail networks are very sparse along the Nepal-India border areas. The bad road connectivity and the flow of a large number of rivers in these areas make the region inaccessible to the security forces. Along the major transit points, the existing roads are narrow and in a dilapidated condition. Traffic is also not streamlines and cars, trucks and bullock carts jostle for space. The problem is worse along roads where the volume of traffic is higher like in Raxaul in Bihar and in Sunauli in Uttar Pradesh. Cross-border rail connectivity is also poor between Nepal and India. At present, there is only one rail link between Janakpur in Nepal and Jainagar in Bihar. As far as the concerns of check-posts are concerned, the infrastructure seems to be on the verge of collapse. There are a few warehousing facilities, no state-of-the-­ art x-ray machines exist for nonintrusive inspections and testing laboratories are located far away in major cities. Besides, the paucity of space makes inspection of incoming traffic extremely difficult and time-consuming. Different windows exist for obtaining clearances, and these are manned by very few officials.48 Moreover, Chhoti Bhansar is unauthorised Nepali substation which collects custom duties from goods coming from India. Even motor vehicles stolen from India pass through it. As there are no corresponding check-posts on the Indian side, it becomes difficult to begin actions against such criminals.49 The realisation of improvement of infrastructures within and across the border has begun. The Government of India has initiated the Border Area Development Program which is a centrally funded scheme aimed at fulfilling the infrastructural and security gaps in the border areas. It includes the construction of community halls, primary health centres, schools and other needy structures. Roads along the borders are important for strategic requirements and the utility of people residing in the border areas. The finds are for the construction of 702 km road along the border through seven districts of Bihar.50 The four integrated check-posts at Sunauli, Raxaul, Jogbani and Nepalgunj are leading to the cross-border connectivity. The huge trade volume passes through the cross-border points. The implementation of scheme is to equip the points strategically.51 The ICPs would house all regulatory agencies like immigration, customs and security. The modern facilities like state-of-the-art, dedicated passenger  C. Raja Mohan, ‘No entry on an open border,’ The Hindu, New Delhi, 24 December 2003.  ‘Protocol to Article VI of Treaty of Transit between the Government of India and His Majesty’s Government of Nepal,’ 6 December 1991, in Avtar Singh Bhasin (ed.), Nepal-India Relations, Documents 1947 to June 2005, Vol. 3, 2005, p. 2553, New Delhi: Geetika Publishers. 50  Center Grants Rs. 700 crore to Curb Moist Menace, at http://www.dna.india.com. (Accessed 9 October 2017). 51  First Meeting of Project Steering Committee for the Development of Integrated Check-Posts at Indo-Nepal Border, Press Release, Government of India, 23 July 2007, at http://www.south-asia. com/embassy-india/press_release_2007/259press -release.htm (Accessed 20 October 2017). 48 49

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and cargo terminals comprising adequate customs and immigration counters, x-ray scanners, passenger amenities, adequate parking areas, warehousing, bank and financial services would be enhanced.52 Furthermore, the Government of India is envisioning the development of new cross-border rail and road networks. The feasibility study has further the five cross-border rail links between the countries.53 The work is under the way in the course of development of link roads to connect the east-west highway in the Terai region of Nepal as well as to implement a pipeline to channelise oil supplies between Raxaul and Amlekhgunj.54 The progress in building the border infrastructures has been moving ahead gradually. The Government of Nepal is also paying an attention on the peace and security of the border through well-equipped infrastructures. It has also adhered to the integrated check-posts. Social and civil awareness activities on pertinent issues of the international border are being rehearsed and carried out. A significant policy shift is seen in the Government of India that it has reoriented most of its development aid programs to fund along the border areas. The investments are conducive to the development of nationalist feeling in the border population, the economic advancement of the population and prosperity in overall aspects in indeed.55

Conclusion Nepal and India are geographically, culturally and religiously shared counties taking care of the age-old relations. The state to state and the people to people relations are instrumental to the depiction of closeness. The citizens of both countries do not have a compulsion of having a passport to travel to Nepal and India. The transborder movement of people is simply followed by simple inquiries for security matters. Otherwise, people are not restricted from their mobility. Looking at the massive benefits of people at present, many Nepali people go to India for employment opportunities, and likewise many Indian agricultural labourers come to Nepal for their livelihoods. The border between Nepal and India is open for centuries. It is going on traditionally and culturally. The open border system between the countries seems to be a unique and model in the world. An age-old reciprocity among the border inhabitants of Nepal and India has contributed to keep the border open naturally. It has connected with the social, cultural and economic mobility of the people in terms  Development of Integrated Check-Posts at the International Borders, at http://www.mha.nic.in/ pdfs (Accessed 11 October 2017). 53  ‘New Rail Line between India-Nepal and Bhutan,’ Loksabha Debates, 7 March 2007, at http:// meaindia.nic.in/parliament (Accessed 25 September 2017). 54  Shyam Saran, ‘Connectivity as India’s Neighborhood Policy’ a speech delivered at India Council of World Affairs, 6 September 2006. 55  ‘Involvement of People in Border Management is Must: SSB Chief,’ Times of India, New Delhi, 30 March 2003. 52

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of harnessing opportunities. Intermittently, the border has been misused by unwanted elements. It has affected the peace and security of the inhabitants of both frontiers. The illegal cross-border activities have remained curses to the human rights to live and to perform business. Open borders are composed of opportunities and challenges. The advantages of open border are the convenience in movements across the international border without any hassle, the facilities of quick responses during hazard, natural calamities and social activities. On the other hand, there are many challenges of the open border regime to maintain peace and security and protection of human rights on the frontiers of both countries. Some of the challenges are human trafficking, cross-border terrorism and criminal activities, trafficking of narcotic drugs, smuggling of goods and machinery, illegal transaction of small guns and gun powder, transborder theft and robbery through the open border. Security considerations are instrumental to the regulation of an open border in Nepal. The issue of immigration is also a headache for Nepal. Some argue in Nepal that the open border should be closed and the security threats can be kept at bay. It is an untimely and dogmatic view that hampers to the trend of interdependence and interconnectedness in the changed world. The globalisation has spelled out a vision of borderless world in which the capital, finance, production activities and the technology cut across national boundaries. The joint undertakings and collaborations have occupied a proven space in the affairs of mutual concerns among the state and non-state actors. Yes, there are long-standing issues between Nepal and India on regulation of border and land encroachment. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries and their mechanisms have attempted to settle the issues to consolidate Nepal-India relations. Nepal and India are immediate and close neighbours, and the controversy in the course of ties is a detrimental to healthy relations. An argument to close the open border consists of prejudice and biasness to fulfil the vested interests. It does not attempt to understand the natural connection of people and the countries. No doubt the misuse of our open border is a threat to the security and national interests of Nepal and India. The penetration of antielements and fake currency through the open border poses challenges to the both countries. The regulation of border regime is needed to foster transborder movements of people as usual and institutionalises the level of efforts for peace and security. The security reason demands the regulation of Nepal-India international border. It can be implemented phase wise. The regulation of border is a boon to restriction of terrorists, controlling smugglers, checking criminals, obstructing human traffickers, stopping narcotic holders and vigilance to smuggler of fake Indian currency notes. There must not be any delay genuine passengers to cross border. Visa system should not be introduced following the age-old friendship ranging from the g­ overnments to the people of two countries. The ID card system has been implemented on the air route since 1 October 2000 after the hijacking of Indian aircraft flown from Kathmandu. It is imperative for the introduction of ID card system in the surface route in the perspective of Islamic State (IS) terrorist activities in Bangladesh and Pakistan.

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Bibliography Aitchison, C. U. (1983). A collection of treaties, engagements and sanads relating to India and neighbouring countries (Vol. 14, pp. 63–72). New Delhi: Mittal Publications. Bahadur, K., & Lama, M. P. (Eds.). (1995). New perspectives on India-Nepal relations. New Delhi: Har Anad Publications. Bhasin, A. S. (Ed.). (2005). Nepal-India relations, documents 1947 to June 2005 (Vol. 3). New Delhi: Geetika Publishers. Coals, A. (2007). Empire (p. 62). Cambridge: Polity Press. Government of Nepal, Ministry of Commerce. (2017). A Glimpse of Nepal’s Foreign Trade. Lalitpur: Trade and Export Promotion Center. Ministry of Home Affairs. (2003). Annual Report 2002–2003, Government of India. Ministry of Home Affairs. (2007). Annual Report 2006–2007, Government of India. Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. (2001). Border management. Reports of the group of ministers on national security. New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. Muni, S. D. (1992). India and Nepal: A changing relationship. New Delhi: Konark Publishers. Nath, L. (2006). Migration, insecurity and identity: The Nepali dairymen in India’s northeast. Asian Ethnicity, 7(2), 2006. National Population Commission. (1983). Internal and international migration in Nepal: Summary and recommendations. Kathmandu: The National Commission on Population. Nepal’s troubled Tarai Region, Asia Report No. 36, International Crisis Group, 9 July 2007 Ohmae, K. (1999). The borderless world: Power and strategy in the inter-linked economy-­ management lessons in the new logic of global economy. Hong Kong: Collins Business. Rajbahak, R. P. (1992). Nepal-India open border: A bond of shared aspiration. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers. Ramakant, & Upreti, B.  C. (Eds.). India and Nepal: Aspects of interdependent relations. New Delhi: Kalinga Publications. Sharma, K. (Ed.). 2068BS{2011 AD}. Nepal Rastriyata: Chunauti ra Rakshako Sawal{Nepal’s Nationality: challenges and the issue of protection}. Kathmandu: Swonam Sathiharu. United Nations. (1948). Universal declarations of human rights. New York: UN House.

Part IV

Migration in South Asia

Chapter 9

Involuntary Migration in the Border Belt of Indian Punjab Jagrup Singh Sekhon and Sunayana Sharma

Abstract  This chapter focuses on involuntary migrations of the people living in the border belt of Indian Punjab since partition of the subcontinent in 1947. These people not only became structural victims of the partition but also the machinations of both neighbours. Although more than 70 years have passed since the division of Indian subcontinent and India and Pakistan becoming independent entities, the baggage of the past weighs heavy on both states. The post-partition bitterness between India and Pakistan, wars at regular intervals and warlike situation on the border and criminal neglect of the development process in the border belt by the successive governments at the centre and state forced the citizens to continuously move out of their native places not only for the safety and security of their family members but also for their very survival. Boundary clashes, terrorist activities, smuggling, etc. are some of the other sources of conflict in the border area creating continuous insecurity and uncertainty that is detrimental to their normal survival. Time and again the state and national governments ordered its residents living on the international borders to vacate their villages. Sometimes these orders come as a bolt from the blue for the border residents (who are mainly marginal and small and middle peasants) in peak season of paddy or wheat harvesting. It not only creates panic in the area but forces lakhs of residents to move to the safer places leaving behind their houses. In addition to these, the floods in Ravi and Sutlej rivers which criss-cross border villages also bring untold miseries to the people and force them to migrate from their homes at regular intervals. Involuntary migrations have become part and parcel of their lives. The chapter is divided into four sections. Section I introduces the theoretical explanations of involuntary migration and its history. Section II provides a brief overview of the border belt in Punjab and discusses the history of involuntary migration in the border area. Section III examines the impact of migration on the lives of the affected people, and Section IV sums up the study. Keywords  Involuntary migration · State · Borders · Partition refugees · Development · Punjab J. S. Sekhon (*) · S. Sharma Department of Political Science, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, Punjab, India © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 N. Uddin, N. Chowdhory (eds.), Deterritorialised Identity and Transborder Movement in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2778-0_9

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Introduction Human migration is a physical movement by humans from one place to another. It had started from the early stage of mankind and has continued to the modern times in both voluntary and involuntary forms. Migration is a demographic process that has played a vital role in the changing of populations of many countries around the world. Migration literature has been developed since the mid-twentieth century; scholars have focused on its causes and its relative effects on the places of origin and destination (Sanez and Ayala 2008: 156). Today, human migration occurs because of the complexity of human life and fast-changing socio-economic conditions, influencing its causes, consequences and typology. Adam Smith remarked that “Off all the luggage, man is the most difficult to transport” (Smith 1904: 75). Therefore, migration is often unpredictable and difficult to understand as it is associated with large and rather sudden changes. It is closely linked with economic fluctuations and important national events and probably occupies more attention than any other topic in demography (Dubey 1981: 150). The perceived variations between places are the root cause of migration, and it can therefore be argued that as long as physical and resource variations are realized by man, there will be residential movement. So, migration is not just a creator of diversity: it is also a response to diversity itself or, at least, to individuals’ perception of that diversity (White and Woods 1980: 42). Migration has many types based on time, space, volume, cause, etc. It may be voluntary-involuntary, external-internal, permanent-temporary, etc. Migration according to distance travelled can be classified as international and internal, whereas migration on the basis of time period can be defined as short-term migration, long-term migration, temporary migration and permanent migration. Another base of migration is environment of origin and destination, which include rural-­ rural migration, rural-urban migration, urban-urban migration and urban-rural migration, etc. (White and Woods 1980: 18). Voluntary migration is that migration in which a person has its own choice to move, whereas causes of involuntary migration can be wars, political, terror or ecological disasters. Hence, it is categorized as expulsion or refugee movement (Ficsher 1997: 50). Usually, migration movement is seen to be international; however, in present times internal migration holds equal significance. Due to respective reasons, both internal and external migration takes place in voluntary and involuntary form. However, the presence of violence and human rights violation make the issue of involuntary migration more apprehensive and jittery. Therefore, in the light of it, this chapter mainly focuses on the nature of involuntary migration in North-Western part of India (Punjab). The chapter is divided into four sections. Section I introduces the theoretical explanations of involuntary migration and its history. Section II provides a brief overview of the border belt in Punjab and discusses the history of involuntary migration in the border area. Section III examines the impact of migration on the lives of the affected people, and Section IV sums up the study.

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Methodology A total of 25 border villages were selected from 4 border districts, namely, Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Tarn Taran and Ferozepur, for comprehensive study during 2009–2010. Two open-ended interview schedules were prepared: one for collecting information about the village as a whole and the changes that have taken place since 1947 and the second one aimed at drawing profile of the peasants/farmers having land across the fence as well as the problems faced by them in the cultivation of the land. This study was conducted under the project “Problems of Border Area Framers in Punjab: An Empirical Study” sanctioned by the Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi, in 2009. The term border village is used here for those villages which are located on zero line, i.e. the international border between India and Pakistan in Punjab. The distinct features of migration have been discussed under the following sections. An Overview of Population Growth Rates of Punjab, Gurdaspur, Amritsar Tarn Taran and Ferozepur Districts and the Studied Villagers (as per Census Reports) Migrations during partition of the country in 1947 Migration due to war with China Migration due to wars with Pakistan Migration due to floods in Rivers (Ravi and Satluj) Migration due to terrorist violence in the state The extent of migrations is divided into three categories for methodological convenience. The first refers to total migrations, i.e. migration of the total population from the village. The second category includes some migrations which mean migrations of 30–50% of families from the village. The third category of migrations was a few which means migrations of a few dozen families from the villages in the border belt. The village has been taken as a unit to explain in the study. Table 9.1 shows the population of Punjab state, Gurdaspur district and the studied villages in Gurdaspur district from 1971 to 2001. The base year, i.e.1971, was taken because the state was reorganized in 1966 and many villages of Gurdaspur and Ferozepur districts went to Himachal Pradesh and Haryana, respectively. The data shows that the growth rate of Gurdaspur district (1971–2001) was less than the overall growth rate of population in Punjab. Two villages, i.e. Hasanpur and Wazirpur, were not inhabited at present place in 1971. Originally, both these villages were located across the Ravi, and its residents had moved from there to various villages in and around Gurdaspur city. Only a few of families of these villages got settled in present villages (known by the name of their old villages) as the Government of India provided them land to construct houses. The population growth of the remaining three villages, i.e. Bamial, Kamalpur and Ghania Ke Bet, is much lower than the overall population growth in the Gurdaspur district. Table 9.2 shows the population growth in Punjab, Amritsar district and the studied villages from 1971 to 2001. The population growth of Amritsar district is

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Table 9.1  Gurdaspur district (population patterns) Name Punjab state

1971 13,551,060

1981 1991 2001 Growth 1971–2001 16,788,915 20,281,969 24,358,999 +10,807,939 79.75% Gurdaspur district 1,229,249 1,513,435 1,756,732 2,104,011 +874,762 71.16% Bamial 2528 2860 3313 3609 +1081 42.76% Hassanpur Not inhabited 95 109 202 +107 112.6% (1971–2001) Wazirpur Not inhabited 65 76 508 +443 (681.53%) Kamalpur 243 286 216 205 −38 −15.63% Ghania Ke Bet 485 647 545 585 +100 20.61%

Source: Government of Punjab, Population Statistics of Punjab 1971–2001

Table 9.2  Amritsar district (population patterns) Name Punjab state

1971 1981 1991 2001 Growth 1971–2001 13,551,060 16,788,915 20,281,969 24,358,999 +10,807,939 79.75% Amritsar district 1,835,500 2,188,490 2,504,560 3,096,071 +1,260,577 68.67% Bhindi Aulakh Kalan 748 866 826 1038 +290 38.77% Kakkar 2339 648 2802 3267 +928 39.67% Odhar 632 766 988 1226 +597 93.98% Rorawala 1145 1400 1661 1751 +606 52.92% Dhanoa Kalan 1270 859 1563 1642 +372 29.29% Daoke 826 555 1231 1356 +530 64.16% Mohawa 1654 2241 2668 2993 +1339 80.95% Source: Government of Punjab, Population Statistics of Punjab 1971–2011

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Table 9.3  Tarn Taran districta (population patterns) Name Punjab state

1971 1981 1991 2001 Growth 1971–2001 13,551,060 16,788,915 20,281,969 24,358,999 +10,807,939 79.75% District 1,835,500 2,188,490 2,504,560 3,096,077 +1,260,577 68.67% Wan 3087 3253 3183 3333 +246 7.96% Khalra 3835 4539 4585 5556 +1721 44.87% Narli 3338 3681 4162 4381 +1043 31.24% Dal 3249 3553 3377 3507 +258 7.94% Rajoki 4270 4866 5148 5158 +888 20.79% China Bidhi Chand 1972 2246 2221 2412 +440 22.31% Naushera Dhala 2523 3003 3545 3748 +1225 48.55%

Source: Government of Punjab, Population Statistics of Punjab 1971–2011 Tarn Tarana – a subdivisional headquarter of Amritsar district was made district in 2006 by the Congress government in Punjab

11.08 percent less than the overall growth of population in Punjab. The data reveals that except two villages, i.e. Odhar and Mohawa, the growth of population in the studied villages is much lower than the overall growth of population in Amritsar district. Table 9.3 explains the population growth in the studied border villages in Tarn Taran district. It was much lower than overall growth rate of population in Amritsar district. The growth rate of population in Wan (7.96%) and Dal (7.96%) villages shows the intensity of migrations in the border villages of this district. Table 9.4 explains the growth rate of population in Punjab, Ferozepur district and studied villages in the border belt of Ferozepur district. The data shows that there was negative growth of population in Ferozepur district from 1971 to 2001. It is to mention here that two villages, i.e. Dona Tellu Mal and Mohar Jasmer, were not inhabited till 1961. The former, i.e. Dona Tellu Mal, remained on paper because of its location near Satluj river and the later went to Pakistan in 1947 and was returned to India in 1962. The reason of abnormal growth of population (1971–2001) in some of the studied villages was the allotment of government land to the landless people of Ferozepur district. There are thousand acres of land belonging to the central and state governments in the border belt of Punjab.

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Table 9.4  Ferozepur district (population patterns) Name Punjab state

1971 1981 1991 2001 Growth 1971–2001 13,551,060 16,788,915 20,281,969 24,358,999 +10,807,939 79.75% Ferozepur district 1,905,833 1,307,804 1,607,807 1,746,107 −159,726 −8.38% Hazara Singh Wala 1180 1660 2245 2627 +1447 122.62% Dona Telu Mal 56 5 131 259 +203 362.5% Mohar Jamsher 283 711 884 629 +346 122.26% Hasta Kalan 2473 3153 4725 5820 +3347 135.34% Raja Rai 148 190 195 269 +121 81.75% Behak Khas 2228 2703 3209 3828 +1600 71.81% Source: Government of Punjab, Population Statistics of Punjab 1971–2011

Involuntary Migration Migration is mainly of two types voluntary and involuntary. Free choice of migrants is involved in voluntary migration, but involuntary migration includes rational choice of migrants sensing a threat to their life if they do not migrate. Powerful force of society or a political entity or a natural calamity drives the individuals or group of individuals to migrate. But sometimes socio-economic system compells individuals to move from one place to another (Ishtaq 1997: 167). The United Nations International Organisation on Migration in its World Migration Report 2000 defines the types of migration as, “Voluntary migrants include people who move abroad for employment, study, family reunification, or other personal factors. Forced migrants leave their countries to escape persecution, conflict, repression, natural and human-made disasters, ecological degradation, or other situations that endanger their lives, freedom or livelihood” (IOM 2000). Involuntary or forced migration is a darker side of migration, which is the relocation of people against their wishes (Bailey 2010: 5). The nature of involuntary migration is complex and wide-ranging. Forced migration involves coercion, including threats to life or livelihood. These threats are either from natural causes (floods, volcanoes, landslides, earthquakes, etc.) or manmade (global warming, industrial accidents, wars, deforestation and chemical or nuclear disasters) (UNESCO 2018). The other examples of forced migrations are deportations of criminals, political dissidents, minority groups and forced labour (Grolier 1999: 99).

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(in Millions)

Migration or movement of people according to Indian census is determined by birth and last place of residence. A person is figured as a migrant if he or she was born at a place other than the place of enumeration. In India, as per Census 2001, about 307 million persons have been reported under migration by place of birth. Out of them about 259 million (84.2%) migrated from one part of the state to another, i.e. from one village or town to another village or town. Forty-two million (2%) people migrated to India from outside the country. The data on migration by last residence in India as per Census 2001 shows that the total number of migrants has been 314 million. Out of these migrants by last residence, 268 million (85%) has been intrastate migrants, those who migrated from one area of the state to another. Forty-one million (13%) were interstate migrants and 5.1 million (1.6%) migrated from outside of the country (Census of India 2001). “Migration is not new in India, historical accounts show that people have moved in the search of work, in response to environmental shocks and stresses, to escape religious persecution and political conflicts. Now improved communication system, transportation, new economic opportunities have increased the mobility of people” (Deshingkar and Akter 2009: 1). Since 1961, birthplaces are being classified into urban and rural. The length of stay in the present residence was also collected for the first time in 1961. Since 1971, information on previous other residences had also been collected. Prior to this, migration was analysed purely on place of birth, which ignore the certain aspects of migration like, its nature, either internal or international. In 1981, causes of migration were canvassed for the first time (Majumdar 2010: 275) (Fig. 9.1). In India, severe famine, drought and gradual decay of traditional occupation are the factors of involuntary mobility of the population (Barik 1994: 7). It has been observed that rural-urban migration has not been a dominant feature in India. During the 1990s the process of migration was significantly accelerated. This acceleration was prominent in rural-rural and urban to urban streams (Chaurasia and Gulati 2008: 103–104). The 1991 census records 27.4% population as migrants, which indicates considerable decline from 30.6% in 1971 and 31.2% in 1981, and this

31 30 29 28 27 26 25

Number of Migrants

1971 30.6

1981 30.4

1991 27.4

2001 29.9

Fig. 9.1  Migration in India (1971–-2001). (Source: Government of Punjab, Population Statistics of Punjab 1971–2011

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decline was recorded both in male and female migration. But 1992–1993 and 1999– 2000 National Sample Surveys show increase in migration rate from 24.75 to 26.6%, including of both sexes (Srivastava 2008: 112–113). This trend continued in 2011 with 29.9% people migrating (Census of India 2001). Voluntary or involuntary migration leads to deterritorialization of the people which ultimately affects the socio-economic and cultural patterns in the home as well as host states. At the individual level, people face mental as well as physical challenges while coping with the new atmosphere, whereas when they move in large number (intra- or interstates), they have to deal with the issues of basic amenities, work, language, culture, traditions, etc. This problem becomes more adverse if the migrants are farmers and peasants, as for them their land is a source of income and occupation, and leaving behind their land alienates them to profound levels. Such temporary deterritorialization is common on the India-Pakistan borders and has become cause of distress and suffering for the residents of the border villages, majority of whom tend to belong to the farming community. Complex and hostile relations between India and Pakistan resulting into cross-border shelling force these people to move in and out as and when required based on the inimical and antagonistic borders. In light of this background, the chapter makes a humble attempt to examine the problems of residents (particularly farmers) on the border villages of Indian Punjab, who have been the victim of involuntary migration.

Border Areas of Punjab This part of the chapter focuses on description of the border areas of Punjab. The involuntary migration or deterritorialization is not new to the state as Punjab has been pathway to most of the invaders from the east including the Achaemenids, Macedonians/Greeks, Scythians, Turks and the Mongols. The present-day deterritorialization is also quite the same like that of ancient migration where scrawny foreign policy and foreign attacks became the reason for people to migrate. However, after independence from the British in 1947 and partition of the country into two sovereign nations, i.e. India and Pakistan, the involuntary migration in the border villages of Indian Punjab has been a continuous process. The creation of unnatural border between India and Pakistan in 1947 was marred in bloodshed and violence, and people of both sides had gone through trauma during partition which resulted into communal riots and mass-scale migrations of the Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan Punjab to Indian Punjab and Muslims from Indian Punjab to Pakistani Punjab. An estimated half million people were killed in communal riots, and about 13 million were reported to have been displaced from their native homes during partition of the country (Datta 2002: 13). Though more than 70 years have passed since India’s independence and separation of Pakistan from it, still the baggage of history weighs heavy on both states (Kaur 2010a, b: 4–5). The border between India and Pakistan remained hostile, and both countries fought three major wars and faced

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many warlike situations on the border; also the floods in Ravi and Sutlej rivers which criss-cross border villages also brought untold miseries to the people and forced them to migrate from their homes at regular intervals. It is to mention here that a large number of villages of districts Gurdaspur and Ferozepur are located across the rivers Ravi and Sutlej, respectively (Sekhon 2013). The canal water dispute, boundary clashes, smuggling, etc. were some of the other sources of tension between India and Pakistan (Rao 1986, ix). These wars and conflicts adversely affected the lives of the residents of border villages and have been creating the atmosphere of insecurity and uncertainty for their survival. Consequently, they had to leave their native places time and again. Majority of the residents of the border villages are middle- and lower-level peasants and are totally dependent primarily on agriculture for their substance.

About Border Belt Punjab is among the 17 border states of India in north-west and shares international border with Pakistan along 4 districts, Amritsar, Tarn Taran, Gurdaspur and Ferozepur. In all 1838 villages and 10 towns are at the international border, which account for 2.5 million in population (two million in rural areas and half million urban population). Punjab has a total border length of 553 km. The border of Punjab is paradoxically one of the most guarded areas by army and the most neglected by the administration (Kaur 2010a, b: 3). Earlier, Amritsar was a big centre of trade, culture, religion and politics. Ferozepur was centre of education, divisional headquarter of Northern Railways and trade route for neighbouring countries. It was expected that these regions might flourish in every sphere, but the reality has been something different (Sekhon 2014: 237). The border belt has not been uniform in its development. The capacity utilization of the resources has been minimal, and the successive governments have not built the infrastructure the way it should have been. In spite of numerous union and state government schemes, the intended beneficiaries are yet to get the benefits out of these schemes. In a decision by the centre and state government in 1998, the border belt of Punjab was extended internally from 9 to 16 km from the Radcliffe Line. By this even more population and area came under the purview of the border region and hence was entitled to all the benefits and subsidies of the government. As a result the real deprived border belt population became more deprived as the scant government schemes were cornered by the affluent villages, and the former remained destitute. Till 1965, like other borders of the country, this border was guarded by state armed police force, but on December 1, 1965, the Border Security Force (BSF) was raised, and thereafter border is being manned by the BSF. The villages along the border give an impression of the state which has still to get its house in order. They present a bleak picture of development on all counts including primary education, health, power and other utility services. At Mohar Jamsher village in Fazilka block of Ferozepur district, the only access to the village is from an iron gate, and it is surrounded by Pakistan on all three sides.

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Table 9.5  Overview of border belt District Gurdaspur Ferozepur Amritsar Tarn Taran Total

Block 7 6 2 3 18

Villages (percentages) 733 (39.9) 628 (34.1) 286 (15.6) 191 (10.4) 1838 (100)

Villages on zero line (percentages) 64 (22.9) 61 (21.9) 38(13.6) 116(41.6) 279 (100)

Source: Official information collected from the Office of District Revenue Officers of respective districts

Table 9.5 shows the district-wise number of villages falling in the border belt as per the revenue record of the state government of Punjab. The Gurdaspur district has the largest number of such villages followed by Ferozepur district. However, there are many villages which just exist on paper. These villages are called Be-cherag (without light), which means that no one lives over there. The natives had left the villages long back and got settled somewhere else. The distance of zero line from these villages is less than half to 3 or 4 km. The fencing of barbed wire that was erected in the late 1980s and early 1990s to check the infiltration of terrorists and supply of weapons adversely affected the farmers of these villages. The largest number of affected villages falls in Tarn Taran district followed by Gurdaspur. Excluding the Be-cherag villages, the actual number of villages on border is 212 (Sekhon 2009).

Migration During Partition of the Country (1947) One of the despairing effects of the partition of the country was that it was regionally confined to North India and particularly Punjab, where majority of the migration, killings and violence took place. Although it is a fact that Muslims migrated from all over the country but there number remained very low as compared to the migration from the Punjab (Table 9.6). However, the division of Punjab paved its way in the initial violent activities and mass killings that took place even before partition. The post provincial election of 1946 resulted into accelerated clashes between Hindu and Sikhs on one side and Muslims on the other. This led to passing of resolution, by the Indian National Congress on April 8, 1947, demanding division of Punjab. When the country was divided, major setback was faced by the state of Punjab which was divided on the basis of communal lines into two parts – East Punjab and West Punjab. Even the Britishers were already aware that such communal divide will lead to massive violence as Sir Malcolm Darling opined that “Nowhere is communal feeling so dangerous and so complicated as in Punjab” (Darling 1949: XII). Fifteen million persons left their native places and moved either to India or to Pakistan. “The largest single flow within South Asia and perhaps the largest international flow in world history took place in 1947 after the partition of India …when the massacre ended, some put the death toll as high as half a million….” (Weiner 2003: 269).

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Table 9.6  Migration in 1947 (partition of the country) Sr. no. 1. 2. 3. 4. Total

Nature of migration All migrated Some migrated Few migrated No migration

Gurdaspur 1 3 1 – 5

Amritsar – 3 4 – 7

Tarn Taran – 4 3 – 7

Ferozepur 2 3 1 – 6

Total 3 13 9 – 25

Source: Field work

Migration of Muslim Population at the Time of Partition The partition of the country along ostensible religious lines into India, Pakistan and what eventually became Bangladesh resulted in one of the largest and most rapid migrations in human history (Bharadwaj et  al. 2008: 11). It was estimated that nearly 21 lakhs of Muslim refugees had moved into the West Punjab since August 1947 and that during the same period, 20 lakhs of non-Muslims had left for the East Punjab. The non-Muslim population of the West Punjab, according to the 1941 census, was 38 lakhs, and the Muslim population in the East Punjab was about 53 lakhs. The balance to be moved, therefore, was 32 lakh Muslims and 18 lakh non-­ Muslims. Railway trains and a fleet of transport planes, civilian aircraft and motor trucks were mobilized to speed up evacuation. By November 6, 1947, nearly 29 thousand refugees had flown in both directions. About 673 refugee trains were run between August 27 and November 6, 1947, and they were responsible for the movement of over 2,300,000 refugees inside India and across the border. Of these 1,362,000 were non-Muslims and 939,000 Muslims (Rai 1986: 109). With 50.4% of Muslim population before partition, the district Gurdaspur saw highest Muslim migration during partition. In fact initially in the partition plan, the district was included in the Muslim-majority districts that were to move to Pakistan. However, later the Boundary Commission altered the idea, and the district was kept in the Indian boundaries. The Muslim population moved from the four villages of district Gurdaspur. According to the respondents, there were 40–50 Muslim families each in the village Bamial and village Kamalpur. All these families migrated to Pakistan at the time of partition in 1947. Wazirpur village was one of the biggest villages with Muslim majority, and all the Muslim families from the village migrated to the newly formed Muslim-dominated Pakistan. In the similar manner, 40–50 Muslim families migrated from the village Hasanpur, whereas complete migration was seen from the village Ghania Ke Bet which remained under the control of Pakistan for 15 years. In 1962, it came under the control of India. Similarly majority of villages in district of Amritsar had Muslim population which migrated to Pakistan at the time of partition. As per our survey, all the villages of district Amritsar saw migration during the 1947 phase. These villages include Bhindi Aulakh Kalan, Kakkar, Odhar, Rorawala, Dhanoa Kalan, Daoke and Mahawa. However, majority of the Muslims migrated in this district from the village Odhar. The Muslim Choudharies were the owners of one Patti (p’qI) (part or area of

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population in a village) in one of the villages. A massive violence took place which resulted in the murder of six Muslim Chhimbas by non-Muslims. Along with the outlet of Muslim population, there was inlet of Hindu, Sikh and Christians. Seventy Mazhbi Sikh and Christian families came in and settled in the village Kakkar, and they were given lands of the Muslim residents who left India for Pakistan. The Muslim population also migrated from the village Dal which is now part of the district Tarn Taran. Majority of the population of this village belonged to Muslims prior to partition. Four Mazhbi Sikh families also migrated to this village from Pakistan at that time from the district. The village Wan Tara Singh of Tarn Taran was under the district Lahore before 1947 and came to the Indian side after the partition. Forty to 45 Muslim families moved to Pakistan from the village Khalra in the district Tarn Taran. Majority of them included landless farmers. Similarly, half of the population in the village Naushera Dhalla was Muslim and migrated to Pakistan during the 1947 period. Majority of villages of Tarn Taran were under the district Lahore before 1947. In case of district Ferozepur, there was complete and partial migration in the studied villages. Mohar Jamsher and Raja Rai villages came under the control of Pakistan, and the rest of the villages saw migration of the Muslim families. A significant incident (regarding 1947 partition) in the district Ferozepur was that the Radcliffe Line divided the village Raja Rai in two parts. Its one part went on to the Pakistan and another remained in India. There were many Muslim families in the village Hazara Singh Wala of district Ferozepur. These families belonged to blacksmith caste and migrated to Pakistan in 1947. Same was the case of villages Behak Khas and Dona Telu Mal. During shift of the Muslim population, violence also took place in the village Hasta Kalan where on the other hand the village Mohar Jamsher remained under the control of Pakistan till 1961 (Table 9.7). On September 8, 1962, Chinese troops crossed at point on the McMahon Line and later on October 20 launched a massive attack on Indian Territory. The international boundary in the region under the dispute was the McMohan Line which runs along the watershed of Tangal or Thagla Bridge (Varma 1999: 66). This war did not have much impact on the Indo-Pak border. However, due to proximity of Pakistan and China, there was fear in the mind of villagers on the border area with regard to sudden call for forced migration. Acknowledging such apprehensions, the Government of India deployed army in some villages due to security concerns.

Table 9.7  Migration in 1962 (Indo-China War) Sr. no. 1. 2. 3. 4. Total

Nature of migration All migrated Some migrated Few migrated No migration

Source: Field work

Gurdaspur – – – 5 5

Amritsar 1 – – 6 7

Tarn Taran – – – 7 7

Ferozepur – – – 6 6

Total 1 0 0 24 25

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Table 9.8  Migration in 1965 (Indo-Pak War) Sr. no. 1. 2. 3. 4. Total

Nature of migration All migrated Some migrated Few migrated No migration

Gurdaspur 5 – – – 5

Amritsar 7 – – – 7

Tarn Taran 5 2 – – 7

Ferozepur 5 1 – – 6

Total 22 3 0 – 25

Source: Field work

The only village which directly got affected during the 1962 war was village Kakkar of district Amritsar. India again faced war with Pakistan in 1965. Table 9.8 shows that the residents of the majority of the border villages (80%) migrated during this war. The residents of all the sampled villages of district Gurdaspur shifted with their livestocks to their respective relatives. They migrated temporarily for about 2–6 months. The residents of village Ghania Ke Bet shifted to other nearby villages and towns such as Dharmakot, Dera Baba Nanak, Kalanaur and Beas Mand. Some of the residents did not come back to this village and began to live at their respective places of migration permanently. The Government of India allotted six to eight marlas plots to the residents of Kamalpur after the 1965 war in the village Kakkar which exists outside Dhusi Band near Ravi River. The residents of all the villages of district Amritsar also shifted temporarily for 2–4 months. They also migrated to their relatives with livestocks. The Tarn Taran which is another border district could not remain unaffected from the war and residents of five out of seven villages migrated during this period. These villages include Narli, Rajoke, Khalra, Dal and Wan Tara Singh. During this war, the India army advanced towards the territory of Pakistan from the side of Khalra. On the contrary, the Pakistani army forces moved into the territory of India from the side of Khemkarn. The armed forces of India reached up to the Ichhogil canal in the territory of Pakistan. The villages which came under the Pakistani occupation in 1965 war (Kamalpur, Mohar Jasmer, Wazid pur, Hasan Pur) witnessed migrants as they came under the gamut of safety from the Indian Army. However, no village remained unaffected during this time of violence. The Indian forces occupied the Pakistani villages such as Sarga Mirga, Pothavke, Rampur, Ghavindi and Jaman from this side. A total of four villages of district Ferozepur, i.e. Hasta Kalan, Hazara Sing Wala, Dona Telu Mall and Behak, witnessed complete migration. The village Mohar Jamsher was recaptured by the Pakistan during 1965 war and remained under the control of Pakistan till 1967. It is mentioned earlier that at the time of partition, this village remained with Pakistan till 1961. The residents of this village migrated to other Indian villages such as Mahar Mohar Khiva and Mohar Save. The Pakistani army moved beyond the river Satluj and captured this area. The agricultural land of this village went to Pakistan and was cultivated by the Pakistanis for around 2 years. All the houses and household things were looted by the forces and people of Pakistan.

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Table 9.9  Migration in 1971 (Indo-Pak War) Sr. no. 1. 2. 3. 4. Total

Nature of migration All migrated Some migrated Few migrated No migration

Gurdaspur 5 – – – 5

Amritsar 7 – – – 7

Tarn Taran 7 – – – 7

Ferozepur 6 – – – 6

Total 25 0 0 0 25

Source: Field work (In the 1971 war, the following villages came under Pakistani control: China Bidhi Chand, Naushera Dhala, Narli, Waan Tara Singh, etc.)

Table 9.9 shows that the population of border villages completely migrated due to the 1971 India-Pakistan war (on the issue of Bangladesh). Residents of all the studied villages (five) of district Gurdaspur migrated along with their livestocks to their respective relatives from 20  days to 1.5  years. The Indian Army advanced toward the territory of Pakistan from the side of villages Hasanpur, Wazirpur and Kamalpur, and certain villages such as Nanoket and Shakargarh came under their control. Wheat crop was auctioned by the Indian Army among the residents of nearby Indian villages who harvested and sold it. The residents of village Ghania Ke Bet migrated for 2.5 years during this period. Later on, some of the families went to the newly allotted place which came to be known as New Ghania. In the same manner, people from seven studied villages of district Amritsar migrated to their relatives for the period of 2–3  months. The Pakistani army advanced to the territory of India, and village Moolakot was captured by them. This village is very near to the village Odhar. The Pakistani army looted the village Odhar completely. Almost all the houses were demolished and looted by the Pakistani forces. During this period, the Pakistani army remained in the village Odhar for 8  months. Some of the villages of this district were bombarded like Mohawa, Kakkar and Bhindi Aulakh killing one person each in the villages of Bhindi Aulakh and Mohawa. Villagers from all the studied villages (seven) of district Tarn Taran migrated to the safer place along with the livestocks to their respective relatives for 4–6 months as the Pakistani forces advanced towards India from the side of this district. The villages Naushera Dhalla, Rajoke, Khalra, Chhina Bidhi Chand and Dall were captured and looted completely by the Pakistani people and army. The standing wheat crop of village Narli was also harvested by the Pakistani army. They even took away the standing trees with them while retreating back after many months. In case of the villages of district Ferozepur, the whole population migrated from their respective village during this period. The residents of these villages migrated for 5–6  months along with their livestocks and essential household things. The Pakistani army came inside the territory of India from the side of the district Ferozepur and captured some villages such as Mohar Jamsher and Raja Rai. The Pakistani army men plundered these villages completely. The Pakistan forces dropped bombs in Border Observing Post (BOP) in the village Raja Rai. A BSF inspector, named Ram Kishan Wadhwa, died along with a few farmers in this attack.

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Table 9.10  Migration in 1999 (Kargil War) Sr. no. 1. 2. 3. 4. Total

Nature of migration All migrated Some migrated Few migrated No migration

Gurdaspur 1 – – 4 5

Amritsar 5 – – 2 7

Tarn Taran 7 – – – 7

Ferozepur 1 – – 5 6

Total 12 0 0 13 25

Source: Field work

During this period, the mines were also implanted in the cultivable land of this village, and the farmers suffered a huge loss of livestocks. A total of 20 bombs were dropped in the village Hazara Singh Wala by the Pakistani army. All the villagers migrated for 1.5  year along with their livestocks to nearby villages. Such mass migration created chaos not only for the migrants but also to the places where these border villagers migrate. The migrants not only have to look out for shelter but also have to face shortage of food, fodder, medicine, etc., which becomes major issue for the displaced citizens (Table 9.10). India faced a war with Pakistan from the side of Jammu and Kashmir border in 1999. This created tension on the Indo-Pak border in Punjab as well. The residents of border villages shifted to safer places during this period. The most affected district in terms of migration was Tarn Taran and its seven studied villages. Like previous war situations, in 1999 also the villagers of these villages shifted to their relatives from 1 to 2 months, besides some elders who lived there to look after the houses and household things. Similarly, the residents of the villages of district Amritsar, i.e. Dhanoa Kalan, Roranwala Kalan, Odhar, Dhariwal and Kakkar, moved to their relatives for about more than 1  month with their livestocks. The border districts Gurdaspur and Ferozepur were not much affected as residents of only one village of each district migrated. The terrorist attack on Indian Parliament in December 2001 created a warlike situation on Indo-Pak border. The Parliament was in session at the time of the attack. The government took a serious view of the incident and declared war against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. The army was deployed on the border, and both countries came at the verge of war. The deployment of army on the border was for more than 1.5 year. Mines were implanted in the fields of the farmers. The farmers living in the farm houses (deras) in the border villages were asked to shift to safer places. The farmers were not allowed to harvest their standing wheat crop, and their fields remained uncultivated for another 1 year. They were given compensation at the rate of 11,000 per acre of their damaged wheat crop and 5500 each for the next 2 crops (Sekhon 2011). Table 9.11 shows the extent of migrations in the studied villages in the border belt. The district-wise analysis of the migration shows that there was complete migration in the villages of Tarn Taran district. It was followed by Ferozepur district. There were total migrations in the four villages of the district, namely, Dona Telu Mall, Hazara Singh Wala, Hasta Kalan and Raja Rai. There were a few migrations

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Table 9.11  Migrations due to terrorists’ attack on Indian Parliament in 2001 Sr. no 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Nature of migration All migrated Some migrated Few migrated No migration Total

Gurdaspur 1 – 3 1 5

Amritsar 3 3 1 – 7

Tarn Taran 7 – – – 7

Ferozepur 4 – 2 – 6

Total 15 3 6 1 25

Source: Field work

in the remaining two villages in the district. Total migration was also seen in three villages, i.e. Bhindi Aulakh, Dhanoa and Odhar, in Amritsar district and one village of Ghania Ke Bet in district Gurdaspur. The intensity of migrations due to the attack on Parliament was the least in Gurdaspur district with villages like Kamlapur and Ghalari where no migration was seen. The duration of migrations of the people due to this conflict was 4–6 months. The forced migration is not restricted to major wars, but sometimes the conflicts including heavy shelling and cross-border fire also take severe forms leading to migration from the villages which come under the radar of Pakistani posts. In 2016 India-Pakistan skirmishes increased due to the surgical strikes which were conducted by Indian Army in the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) region in the month of September. These acrimonious circumstances led to cross retaliation in the form of shelling from Pakistan, and as a result of this retribution, involuntary migration particularly in the villages of Amritsar and Tarn Taran districts was seen. These villages included Naushera Dhalla (Tarn Taran) where the security forces and administration forced the people to move out of their houses in September–October 2016 at the time when their paddy harvest was standing ready in the field. Similarly the villages Narali and Khalra of Tarn Taran district also faced forced migration of its people during surgical strikes in POK in 2016, whereas major involuntary migration due to their proximity to the border was witnessed in Amritsar district from the villages Odhar and Rorawala, in the year 2016 during India-Pak clashes. The migrations caused by various developments on the border since partition of the country in 1947 had contributed to the disruptions not only in the normal living conditions of the people in the border villages but also the existing socio-economic relations of these villages. In most of the cases, the places of destinations of migrant families were their relatives living in the villages away from any direct consequences of war and warlike situation and floods in the rivers on the border. In some cases, a few residents have constructed their houses in nearby towns. Such migrants look after their agricultural farms from such places. Most of the villages in Gurdaspur and Ferozepur districts are across rivers Ravi and Satluj, respectively. Floods in these rivers are common feature every year. There are number of seasonal rivulets as well; the access is possible only through pontoon bridges built and guarded by the BSF in normal times and army in war times. It is only after the construction of Ranjit Sagar (Thein) Dam in 2001 that the furry of floods came under some control. It was as only 10–12 years ago that bridges were

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Table 9.12  Migration in 1988 (floods) Sr. no. 1. 2. 3. 4. Total

Nature of migration All migrated Some migrated Few migrated No migration

Gurdaspur 5 – – – 5

Amritsar 1 – – 6 7

Tarn Taran – – – 7 7

Ferozepur 6 – – – 6

Total 12 0 0 13 25

Ferozepur – – – 6 6

Total 0 0 6 19 25

Source: Field work Table 9.13  Migration due to terrorism in Punjab (1978–1993) Sr. no. 1. 2. 3. 4. Total

Nature of migration All migrated Some migrated Few migrated No migration

Gurdaspur – – – 5 5

Amritsar – – 3 4 7

Tarn Taran – – 3 4 7

Source: Field work

constructed to link villages with the district headquarters especially when they tend to get cut-off from the mainland during the rainy season. The residents of the villages of border districts, that is, Gurdaspur, Amritsar and Ferozepur, migrated time and again temporarily due to frequent floods and sudden change in the course of rivers Ravi and Satluj. Table 9.12 shows that the residents of a total 12 villages of these districts migrated entirely and temporarily during the floods in rivers Ravi and Satluj. It is important to mention here that the residents of village Hasanpur and Wazirpur of district Gurdaspur migrated completely and for three times, i.e. in 1942, 1951 and 1967, due to sudden change in the course of river Ravi during floods. These villages were originally 3 km far from their present location towards the Pakistan and river Ravi. They moved 1  km each time to the side of Indian Territory (Sekhon 2011). Terrorism brought untold miseries to the people of Punjab. With killing of more than 30,000 people, there was large-scale involuntary migration from Punjab to not only neighbouring states but also to foreign countries (Sekhon 1999). However, most of the border villages remained safe during the terrorism in Punjab due to the presence of BSF and Indian Army in these areas. The migration from these villages during this period was of the same pattern as from the other non-border villages. It is quite interesting to note that many keen observers of the situation in Punjab failed to understand the gravity of the problem of migration during the 1980s and early 1990s. Thousands of families shifted to safer places during the heydays of terrorist violence in Punjab (Sekhon 2014) (Table 9.13). Most terrorism-affected areas in case of border belt were the districts of Tarn Taran and Amritsar. The situation was not alarming in the rest of border area because of security forces were already stationed there and majority of migration was specifically by various castes of Hindu religion (Sekhon 2013). The border villages

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of districts Gurdaspur and Ferozepur remained unaffected from this problem. A few of the Hindu and Khatri families from the border villages of districts Amritsar and Tarn Taran migrated during this period. These Hindu/Khatri families migrated from the villages of Dhanoa Kalan, Kakkar and Mohawa of district Amritsar and villages Wan Tara Singh and Khalra of district Tarn Taran. These families migrated from these villages to cities or town and settled there permanently. On the other hand, as many as 20 boys from the village Kakkar and 10–15 from Mahawa village joined various terrorist groups from the district Amritsar, and later they were killed by the forces. In the district Tarn Taran, villages like Narli saw severe tension with killing of five to six innocent Hindu villagers by the terrorists including a young girl and her mother. This made more than one dozen Hindu families to migrate from the area. On the other hand, a few boys of the village who joined terrorist groups were killed in encounters with the security forces. The village Khalra of the district also became victim of terrorist violence with killing of 10–12 Hindu boys. However, while illustrating about the innocent killings, the villagers also accused the police force for human rights violation in the area as well. The terrorist violence in the state (1978–1992) brought untold miseries to the people of the border belt when the Government of India decided to fence the border to check the infiltration of terrorists and the supply of deadly weapons from Pakistan. Though the fence helped to contain terrorism in Punjab, but it brought about fundamental changes in crop patterns, timings for cultivation and other agricultural operations along with several restrictions imposed on the movement of farmers across the fence. One of the unfortunate things is the fact that for many, their arable land lies on the other side of the fence. After fencing during the time of war or natural calamity, farmers were promised compensations. However, the needy and deserving farmers do not receive their due share of having their land on the other side of the fence. During the field study, farmers alleged the government for not paying them compensation, stating that the fencing on their land is temporary; however, it has been more than two decades, but there has been no shift in the fencing (Sekhon 2011). Overall the compensation paid to the border villages is unsubstantial and inconsistent. Even the farmers who managed to get compensation informed that they received it only from 1997 to 2007 and that too just 2500/− per acre for three times for their land across fence. Presently they are not receiving any compensation. A common problem stated by the famers from almost all the border districts was that only few gates are opened for them to enter into their farms outside the fence and they have to take special pass and permission to till their land. There is time limit for them to work on the farm where the official time is from morning 9:00 am to evening 5:00 pm, but they are only given time from morning 10:00 am to 3:00 pm in the afternoon as per a farmer from the border village of Dona Telu Mal (district Ferozepur). Within the given stipulated time, they have to pass through the gates and all the security checks, and come back undergoing the strict military surveillance once again and this process is very time consuming. Until very recently women were not allowed to go to the other side of the fence. Another farmer from the village Dhanoa Kalan (district Amritsar) stated that half of his land lies beyond the

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fence, and it takes around 2.5 h to go through the security checking and reach the farm. He also accused the BSF forces of misbehaving with their women and not letting them in the farm even in extreme case of informing about some relative’s death. There is a fall in food grains produced both in quality and quantity. During the personal interviews, the farmers described the harshness of the situation where they are not only time bound to move to their field but are not allowed to enter beyond the fence during fog, rain and water overflow. They are not allowed to grow their crops more than 2.5  ft high. Very often the land lying beyond the fence is attacked by the wild animals like pigs and jackals and also by cows, buffalos and goats from Pakistan. The cost of the agricultural labour is very high as no labourer is ready to work on their lands and they are allowed to enter only for 4 h. Some of the villages near the river Ravi in district Ferozepur are victims of not only the border area but also the floods that come in the region. There is no government facility available in order to face these floods; rather the villagers from Dona Telu Mal described about their self-help system to overcome floods. The farmers of the village have bought boats in order to go to their farms during the rainy season. The cost of big boat brought by 15–20 families is around 270,000/−, whereas two small boats cost them 75,000/−. This additional cost is bearded by the farmers alone, and the government has provided no help in it. Similarly, the village Ghania Ke Bet (Gurdaspur district) in particular has destitute infrastructure and most deprived level development as till 1961 it was under the control of Pakistan, and since 1980 there is no light at night in the village. The time for electricity is 9:00 am to 3:00 pm. In such scenario the survival becomes almost impossible. The farmers living in the border areas have to face another setback by the banks which do not provide them loans based on their lands, and on the other hand, no one is ready to buy their land either. Therefore, the farmers of the border area are in very dismal and miserable conditions. On the other hand, some of the villagers also described how extending the border belt has further thrown them into the graves of under development. According to some of the farmers in the Gurdaspur district, some of the rich farmers have permanently migrated to the other secured places, and they come to border areas only to avail the benefits and receive their due of funds and compensation.

Conclusion The process of deterritorialization on the borders has completely dismantled the livelihood and social structures of the people living in the affected villages. The violence on the Line of Control and Line of Actual Control causes mass migration within the nation. This migration can vary from 1 week to more than 120–180 days during proxy-warlike situations and even to 1–2 years during war period. Since most of the residents of the border villages in the state of Punjab are farmers, therefore, they have to leave their farms and animals behind which directly affect their income and occupation. The successive governments both at the centre and state have been

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mainly concerned with the security of the border, and the development of the area has been their last priority. Though numerous schemes for the betterment of the border area were announced from time to time both by the union and the state governments, the end result has been somewhat insubstantial in the case of the studied villages. The residents of border villages were deliberately deprived of any succour extending the border belt, and the benefits of such schemes were appropriated by the people living in towns or villages away from the border but technically part of border belt. The genuine claimants and their legitimate claims have been largely neglected. The government should work on shifting the focus of the farmer from purely cropping to bee farming, dairy business and other sideline occupations in order to sustain during the time of crisis and also in order to reduce their dependence on the agriculture which has become difficult as an occupation in the wake of fencing on the cultivable land. Since the farmers living on the border areas have to go through a complex and time-taking procedure of security checks, therefore, some latest biometric system linked to their identity can solve their problem. As it becomes quite difficult for the migrants to stay for more than few days at their relatives place, therefore, another step which can ease the involuntary migrants of the border area during the time of war or warlike situation is building of migrant camps facilitated with food, medicine and place for livestock. Although government has built some shelters for the migrants, they severely lack the basic human necessities. One of the positive conclusions that comes out of the study is that theft has stopped after the fencing earlier during the time of involuntary migrations as Pakistani rangers and thieves looted their houses and cattle. Similarly due to presence of army during the time of terrorism, very few incidents of violence and riots were reported in the border villages. However, that does not reduce the amount of torture and harassment the border villages have to face at the hands of security forces. The involuntary migration in the border belt has created inimical, dissatisfied and deterritorialized identities as the people living in the border areas feel victimized because of the intimidating situations between India and Pakistan on one side, and on the other side, they feel immolated and discriminated at the hands of their own people and government. This has caused distrust, annoyance and resentment among the sufferers. They feel cheated by their own government and traumatized by their own army’s strict stance along with natural disasters (in the form of floods). Hence, this temporary deterritorialization of the border residents of the Punjab has made it difficult for them to maintain a steady sense of local and national identity. It has also alienated them from their ancestral occupation of farming as most of the young generation finds it difficult to sustain on the same; hence, they are either changing occupation or migrating out of the country. The onus of providing development, security and the implementation of various schemes under Border Area Development Board (BADB) lies heavily on the government and on the political will to reach these groups and bring these into the mainstream of development. However, for the government to take note and bring these people into the planning process, data on frequently moving migrants needs to be captured. As of now, neither the NSSO nor the census has captured this population. As such this group remains vulnerable, invisible and outside the planning process.

9  Involuntary Migration in the Border Belt of Indian Punjab

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In order to address migration, there is a need to look at ground level situation in the border belt and all other policies that contribute the marginalization of people there. The decision to migrate for survival, as is evident from the findings, is a result of hostility between the two sovereign nations that pushed people out to seek safety in new areas.

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Ishtaq, A. (1997). Exit, voice and citizen. In T. Hummar, G. Brochmann, K. Thomas, T. Faist, & G. Malmberg (Eds.), International migration, immobility & development – Multidisciplinary perspectives. New York: Oxford/Berg. Kaur, H. (2010a). Baptism by fire, survival by grit: Life in the border belt of Punjab. Working Paper Series No. 3, Centre for the Study of Social Exclusion and Inclusive Policy. Amritsar: GNDU Press. Kaur, H. (2010b). Study of exclusion in the border belt of Punjab. Research Report-2, Centre for the Study of Social Exclusion and Inclusive Policy. Amritsar: GNDU Press. Majumdar, P. K. (2010). Fundamentals of demography. Jaipur: Rawat Publications. Mitra, H. N. (Ed.). (1947). Indian annual register (Vol. I). Calcutta: The Annual Register Office. Narang, S. (2010, December 11). Understanding the status of climate change and refugees. Mainstream, XLVIII(51) Parveen, S. (2005). Changing face and challenges of urbanization  – A case study of UP. New Delhi: Concept Publishing House. Puri, H.  K., et  al. (1999). Terrorism in Punjab: Understanding grassroots reality. New Delhi: HAR-ANAND Publications Pvt. Ltd. Rai, M. S. A. (Ed.). (1986). Studies in migration: Internal and international migration in India. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers. Raj, H. (1993). Population studies (fundamentals of demography). Delhi: Surjeet Publications. Sanez, R., & Ayala, M. I. (2008). Migration. In W. A. Darity Jr. (Ed.), International encyclopaedia of social sciences (Vol. 5, 2nd ed.). New York: Thomas Gale. Sekhon, J.  S. (1999). Migration due to terrorist violence in Punjab: A case study of a village. Punjab Journal of Politics, XXIII(2), 89–102. Sekhon, J. S. (2009). Personal interview with Rattan Singh Randhawa. Sekhon, J. S. (2011). Problems of border area farmers in Punjab: An empirical study. Unpublished ICSSR Project Report. Department of Political Science, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar. Sekhon, J. S. (2013, September). The cutting edge: Experience of living in border areas. Man and Development, XXXV(3), 57–70. Sekhon, J.  S. (2014). Farmers at the border belt of Punjab: Fencing and forced deprivation. In P. S. Judge (Ed.), Mapping social exclusion in India: Caste, religion and borderlands. Delhi: Cambridge University Press. Smith, A. (1904). An inquiry into the nature and causes of wealth of nations, edited with an introduction, notes, marginal summary and an enlarged index by Edwin Cannan (Vol. 1). London: Methuen. Smith, A. O. (2006). Disasters and forced migration in the 21st century, June 11, 2006. Accessed from: http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Oliver-Smith/. Accessed on 12 March 2018. Srivastava, R.  S. (2008). India: Internal migration links with poverty and development. In B. Mckinley (Ed.), Migration, development & poverty reduction in Asia. New Delhi: Academic Foundation. UNESCO. (2018). “Migrant/migration”, learning to live together. http://www.unesco.org/most/ migration/glossary_migrants.htm. Accessed on 11 March, 2018. UNHCR. (2017). Global trends: Forced displacement in 2016. Geneva: The UN Refugee Agency. United Nations. (2006). International migration report 2002. In A. M. Messina & G. Lahav (Eds.), The migration reader- exploring politics and policies. New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited. United Nations. (2017, December). Population facts”, No. 2017/5, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division. Varma, S. N. (1999). Foreign policy dynamics, Moscow and India’s international conflict. New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publication. Vombatkere, S.  G. (2009, November 14). Managing disasters and displacements. Mainstream, XLVII(48). Weiner, M. (2003). Migration. In V.  Das (Ed.), The Oxford India companion to sociology and social anthropology. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. White, P., & Woods, R. (1980). The geographical impact of migration. London: Longman Group Limited.

Chapter 10

Migration Matters: Estimation and Analysis of Migration from Bangladesh to India Abhishek Nath and Vivek Vishal

Abstract  Estimations of the numbers of Bangladeshi nationals living in India have been a contested arena, both because of the continuity of the process—which started early after Partition—and because of the mostly illegal nature of the migration. Also, the determination of the immigrants’ original communities is virtually impossible because of the similarities among the masses of people across the borders. The around 5000-km-long porous natural border between India and Bangladesh has provided easy passage to local populations, while presenting a monumental challenge to the two states to protect the borders from transgressors and enforce regulations on the border population. So the interpretation of the numbers has not been neutral; the numbers have been interpreted in a manner suitable to their arguments both by these two states and by other actors. The Indian state regards the illegal migration of Bangladeshi nationals to Indian soil as a major contentious issue involving the economy, culture, security, and politics. On the other hand, Bangladesh denies any such migration at all. This difference has had serious implications for the lives and livelihoods of millions of people, forcing them to become pawns in the callous hands of the two states. The historical process of voluntary migration in this region has been opposed by cartographical innovations originated by the colonial masters of these states to meet the demands of competing nations. This has resulted in serious limitations on the livelihood possibilities of the people across borders. This chapter attempts to provide an analysis of the dynamics of migration from Bangladesh to India and to estimate the migration flow through the provision of some authentic quantitative data, obtained from the sources available in public doamin; a projection for the near future is also provided. An effort has also been made to define the pattern of migration through the qualitative analysis of secondary public sourced infomation and surveyed data. A field study was undertaken to validate the quantitative findings. Statistical tests were performed to test the validity of the data and to provide future projections. These findings, we trust, will help the two

A. Nath (*) Department of Political Science, University of Delhi, Delhi, India V. Vishal Freelance Researcher, Delhi, India © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 N. Uddin, N. Chowdhory (eds.), Deterritorialised Identity and Transborder Movement in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2778-0_10

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states to take policy decisions and mitigate the sufferings of the millions of people who cross the border illegally in search of a better livelihood. Keywords  Migration · Bangladesh · India · Livelihood · Borders · State

Introduction The estimation of numbers of Bangladeshi nationals living in India has been a contested arena, both because of the continuity of the process—which started early after Partition in 1947—and because of the mostly illegal nature of the migration. Also, the determination of the immigrants’ original communities is virtually impossible because of the ethnic similarities among the masses of people across the borders. The around 5000-km-long porous natural border between India and Bangladesh has provided an easy passage to local populations, while presenting a monumental challenge to the two states to protect the borders from transgressors and enforce regulations on the border population. Moreover, the interpretation of the numbers has not been neutral; the numbers have been interpreted in a manner suitable to their arguments by these two states and by other actors, such as political parties and religious fundamentalists. The Indian state regards the illegal migration of Bangladeshi nationals to Indian soil as a major contentious issue involving the economy, culture, security and politics. Their presence in huge numbers has been regarded as an extra burden on already scarce resources and as competition for job opportunities with locals who depend on manual labor. In the state of Assam, the increasing presence of Bangladeshi nationals has been perceived as a threat to the state’s cultural identity that has created fissures in society based on language and religion. The Indian state, which regards illegal migration as a threat to its territorial integrity, identifies illegal migrants as infiltrators and regards them as susceptible to antisocial and anti-­national activities. Moreover, some political groups also claim that the growing numerical strength of illegal Bangladeshi nationals in some regions of Assam and in a few Assembly Constituencies of Delhi has become a deciding factor in election outcomes. Overall, the presence of Bangladeshi nationals on Indian soil has galvanized politics in multiple ways. However, Bangladesh denies any such migration at all. This difference has had serious implications for the lives and livelihoods of millions of people, forcing them to become pawns in the callous hands of the two states. Estimations of the number of immigrants from Bangladesh living in Assam have been even more challenging and contentious than estimations in other areas and this migration has created more fissures in the society because of the different religion and culture of these immigrants. Commenting on the growing number of the Muslim population in Assam, Myron Wiener (1983) asserts that while the populations of Hindus and Muslims both showed a significant growth rate, the Muslims’ decadal growth rate in the post-independence period was much higher than that of the Hindus. The increasing trend of migration continued even after the birth of the new Republic of Bangladesh in 1971. Assam’s population grew nearly sixfold from 1901

10  Migration Matters: Estimation and Analysis of Migration from Bangladesh to India Table 10.1 Decadal population growth rate (%) in Assam and India

1901–1911 1911–1921 1921–1931 1931–1941 1941–1951 1951–1961 1961–1971 1971–1981

Assam 16.8 20.2 20.1 20.5 20.1 35.0 35.2 36.3

179 India 5.7 −0.3 11.0 14.2 13.3 21.6 24.8 24.7

to 1981. Had Assam’s population increased at the same rate as that in the rest of India from 1901 to 1981, her population would now be 9.5  million rather than 19.9 million, a difference of 10.4 million. Such a difference could only be accounted for by net immigration.1 The decadal population growth rate (%) in Assam and India is presented in Table 10.1.2 Borooah (2013) notes the limitation of the method used by Weiner (1983) in calculating the number of immigrants through changes in the populations on a national and provincial basis, as the different communities have shown different growth rates according to their sociocultural lineages. Borooah (2013) asserts that the number has been misunderstood and the analysis of the Muslim population in a decade-wise manner shows no significant change in the demographic composition of Assam. It is only because all the Muslims, even those who had settled in Assam before the independence of India, are labeled as illegal foreigners (post March 1971) that their number has been inflated. This inflation also serves the purposes of right wing understanding.3 But everyone accepts that there is migration and that it is mostly illegal, so it is undocumented and impossible to quantify. In a recent judgment, the session court magistrate in Delhi stated the number of illegal immigrants as 30 Million as the official data.4 Against this background, this chapter attempts to determine the dynamics of migration from Bangladesh to India. The quantum of migration, its causes, and its effect on the migrating people are the concerns of this chapter. The chapter finds that

1   Weiner, Myron. (1983, June). “The Political Demography of Assam’s Anti-Immigrants Movement”. Population and Development Review 9:2. p. 282. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1973053 (Accessed on 30 April 2018). Also see Baral, Lok Raj. (1990). Regional Migration, Ethnicity and Security: The South Asian Case, New Delhi: Sterling Pub. (P) Ltd. p. 22. 2  Ibid, p. 283 3  Borooah, Vani Kant. (2013, Jan 26). “The Killing Fields of Assam”. EPW. Vol. XLVIII, no 4, pp. 43–53. 4  “Court Pulls Up Govt. for Illegal Stay of Bangladesh Nationals” (2012, Jan 25), The Hindu. p. 4. Also see, “Court Criticizes Inaction against Illegal Bangladeshi Migration” (2012, Aug 10), The Hindu. p. 4.

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the migration from Bangladesh to India has been a historical process that is continuing until today, but the creation of new states in the region has complicated the process. The historical process of the movement of people in the Indian subcontinent has been further assisted by distorted development that has exacerbated the hardship and reduced the livelihood possibilities of millions of people. This development has led to the migration of people across the border, even illegally, to meet their livelihood needs. The dominant discourse of states contests the identity of the immigrants, which results in the denial of their rights. The question of legal and illegal migration further results in immigrants being declared stateless as their only defining identity. The need is not to make them pawns in the callous hands of the state—either of India or Bangladesh. There is a need to develop a social and political institutional mechanism to come to terms with such a persistent human problem. In this chapter, based on the data of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), we attempt to estimate the migration flow (both legal and illegal) from Bangladesh to India and also to provide a projection for the near future. An effort has been made to determine the pattern of migration through the quantitative analysis of data. The quantitative explanation of data was further tested through a purposive interview survey among Bangladeshi migrants in Delhi conducted during the years 2012– 2013. The number of illegal migrants detained/deported by Delhi police was also obtained by filing a right to information (RTI) application.

Population Characteristics of Bangladesh Bangladesh is the most densely populated country in South Asia. In 2018, its population, according to the World Population Review (2018), is about 166.37 million, with a population density of 1115 people per km2, with a growth rate of 1.03%.5 Percentage gender differences (male minus female) in Bangladesh at the national, urban, and rural levels for different age groups are presented in Tables 10.2, 10.3 and 10.4 and Figs.  10.1, 10.2, and 10.3. The percentage gender difference was derived from the Gender Statistics of Bangladesh 20126 (the original data Table has been rearranged for our purposes). Tables 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4 show that the percentage gender difference (male minus female) during the decade 2001 to 20107 in Bangladesh at national, urban,  http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/bangladesh-population/ (accessed on 2 May 2018).  Gender Statistics of Bangladesh  2012. (2013, June), Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Planning Division, Ministry of Planning, Govt. of the People of Bangladesh. pp. 8–10.) (http:// www.bbs.gov.bd/WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/Health_Demo/Gender_Statistics.pdf. Accessed on 10–12–15. Also see SVRS 2010. (2011, Oct). Dhaka: BBS. pp. 30–34. 7  The data taken for the period 2001–2010 is still relevant as the data represents the situation of a decade and is indicative of a specific trend for the middle age population. The addition of subsequent years would just verify the projection table outcome. Trends will remain the same. We used this the decadal Table 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3 to identify the hidden trend, which is very clear from this period as well. 5 6

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Table 10.2  Percentage gender population differences (male minus female); national Age group (years) 00–04 05–09 10–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 75–79 80+

2001 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.4 −2.5 −2.1 −0.6 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 –

2002 0.1 −0.1 0.6 0.9 −2 −2.1 −0.8 −0.1 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2

2003 0.4 0 0.3 0.5 −1.8 −1.8 −1 0 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1

2004 0.4 0 0.3 0.5 −1.8 −1.8 −1 0 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1

2005 0 0.2 0.9 0.8 −1.8 −1.6 −1.1 −0.2 0.7 1.3 −0.1 0.3 0.2 0 0.1 0.1

2006 0 0.2 0.9 0.9 −1.8 −1.7 −1.2 −0.2 0.7 1.3 −0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.1

2007 0.29 0.27 0.76 0.94 −1.4 −1.69 −1.25 −0.42 0.33 1.21 −0.04 0.39 0.15 0.23 0.19 −0.1

2008 0.44 0.34 0.78 1.02 −1.16 −0.97 −1.47 −0.48 0.05 1.1 −0.31 0.39 −0.13 0.26 0.13 0.08

2009 0.07 0.34 0.65 1.23 −1.73 −1.46 −1.1 −0.59 0.19 1.43 −0.09 0.44 0.3 0.07 0.06 0.08

2010 0.44 0.24 0.74 1.32 −1.58 −1.36 −1.24 −0.62 0.15 0.96 −0.04 0.54 0.22 0.1 0.06 0.07

2009 0.63 0.36 0.45 −0.05 −2.92 −1.81 −0.69 −0.21 0.7 1.61 0.44 0.9 0.42 0.05 0.09 0.08

2010 0.33 0.27 0.53 0.17 −2.32 −1.76 −1.02 −0.33 0.59 1.19 0.86 1.18 0.27 0.02 0.05 0.02

Table 10.3  Percentage gender population difference (male minus female); urban Age group (years) 00–04 05–09 10–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 75–79 80+

2001 −0.7 −0.6 −0.6 −0.7 −1.6 −0.9 0.2 0.8 1.4 1.2 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 −0.7

2002 0 0 −0.4 −0.5 −2.7 −2.4 −0.5 −0.2 1.8 1.8 1.3 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1

2003 0.4 −0.5 −0.4 −0.6 −1.9 −2.4 −0.8 0.3 1.5 1.5 1.2 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0

2004 0.6 −0.5 −0.4 −0.6 −1.9 −2.4 −0.8 0.3 1.5 1.5 1.2 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0

2005 0.1 0.5 0.2 −0.4 −2.4 −1.9 −1.1 0.3 1 1.8 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1

2006 0.1 0.6 0.3 −0.3 −2.4 −2 −1.1 0.2 1 1.7 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1

2007 0.49 0.4 0.12 −0.19 −2.26 −1.96 −1 −0.16 0.96 1.71 0.43 0.8 0.36 0.22 0.21 −0.15

2008 0.76 −0.45 −0.15 0.28 −1.18 −0.5 −1.83 0.28 0.04 1.66 −0.18 1.31 0.28 −0.02 0.03 −0.22

and rural levels for different age groups is unexpected, as it is positive for the age group 0–19 years and that above 39 years, but negative for the middle age group (20–39 years). The trend is consistent during the decade 2001 to 2010, with occasional variations. It can be inferred from the Tables and Figures that among the early and late age groups the percentage of males is greater than that of females, while in

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Table 10.4  Percentage gender population difference (male minus female); rural Age group (years) 00–04 05–09 10–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80+

2001 0.6 1 1.2 0.6 −2.9 −2.5 −1 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 1

2002 0 −0.1 0.9 1.1 −1.8 −2 −0.7 0 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1

2003 0.3 0 0.4 1 −1.8 −1.6 −1.1 −0.1 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1

2004 0.3 0 0.4 1 −1.8 −1.6 −1.1 −0.1 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1

2005 0 0.1 1.1 1.3 −1.5 −1.5 −1.1 −0.2 0.6 1.2 −0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0

2006 0 0.1 1.1 1.3 −1.6 −1.5 −1.1 −0.3 0.5 1.2 −0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0

2007 0.22 0.22 0.97 1.31 −1.12 −1.59 −1.33 −0.5 0.13 1.05 −0.18 0.26 0.08 0.24 0.19 −0.09 0.14

2008 0.3 0.66 1.15 1.36 −1.17 −1.16 −1.35 −0.78 0.05 0.88 −0.37 0.04 −0.29 0.37 0.17 0.2 −0.09

2009 0.68 0.33 0.72 1.47 −1.34 −1.33 −1.23 −0.72 0.02 0.92 −0.26 0.29 0.26 0.07 0.05 0.07 0

2010 0.47 0.23 0.83 1.72 −1.34 −1.21 −1.32 −0.73 −0.01 0.88 −0.35 0.32 0.21 0.12 0.07 0.08 0

2 D 1.5 i 1 f f 0.5 e 0 r -0.5 e -1 n c -1.5 e -2

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

(

2009

% -2.5

2010

) -3

Age Groups

Fig. 10.1  Age group-wise percentage gender differences (male minus female) in Bangladesh (National)

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3 D 2 i f 1 f e 0 r e -1 n c e -2 ( %

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

-3

)

2010 -4

Age Groups

Fig. 10.2  Age group-wise percentage gender differences (male minus female) in Bangladesh (urban)

2 2001

D 1 i f 0 f e r -1 e n -2 c e

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

(

2009

% -3

) 2010 -4

Age Groups

Fig. 10.3  Age group-wise percentage gender differences (male minus female) in Bangladesh (rural)

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the middle age group (20–39  years) the percentage of males is less than that of females. The range of this negative difference is 0–2.5%. The difference is higher in the age groups of 20–24 years and 25–29 years than that in the 30- to 34-year and 35- to 39-year groups. This means that in Bangladesh for the middle age group (20–39 years) there are more females than males. Therefore, the question arises as to why is there a substantial difference in the male and female population percentage only in the middle age (20- to 39-year) group, because the death rates remain higher in the early age group (0–5 years) and the older age group (Above 50). One of the important features of the 20- to 39-year age group is their socioeconomic activity. These people are the breadwinners and take quick and strategic decisions for moving from place to place in search of jobs and livelihood opportunities. Hence, it is prudent to propose that the compositional changes in population seen in Tables 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4 and Figs. 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3 would have happened due to the movement of males from their places of residence.8 However, this proposed reason is not able to explain the differences in percentages for the middle age group (20–39) at the national, urban, and also rural levels. The differences suggest that the said movement of males in the middle age group (20–39 years) away from their native place occurs whether their origin is rural or urban. Thus, the negative percentage gender difference in the middle age group (20- to 39-year) population can only be supported logically by a movement not only from one place to other within the country but by movement outside of Bangladesh also. The movement outside of Bangladesh is more prominent for males than for females as the female percentages are stable in all age groups and also in different years. This interpretation appears to be well supported by the work of Farid et al. (2011). Farid’s work indicates that the migration of the male population outnumbers that of the female population. We drew the same conclusion by making a logical proposition based upon the data points shown in Tables 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4 and corresponding Figs. 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3. Namely, the people who have migrated are mostly males in the middle age category (20–39  years). The specific feature of this movement of people is that it includes both those who have migrated temporarily and those who have migrated permanently, as the percentage gender difference is gradually restored to positive in the later age groups after the middle age (20- to 39-year)group. If we assume that the male population is equal to female population for the middle age group (20–39 years), which is definitely not the case, as the sex ratio (male to female out of 100) of Bangladesh is more than 100 from 1991 to 2010 (Population Census National Report, 2001; Labour Force Survey, 2002–2003; Report on SVRS-­ 2007 and Report on sample vital registration system-2010, cited in Gender Statistics  This conclusion is based on the analogy of the percentage population sex ratio. The sex ratio is positive in the early age and late age populations, indicating more males than females. But in the middle age category the sex ratio is reversed for all the locations; i.e., national, urban, and rural. Logically this can only happen if there is a sudden large surge of the male population of middle age leaving the country.

8

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of Bangladesh 2010 published in October 2011 by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division, Ministry of Planning, ISBN 984-508-982-5, p. 11).9 The percentage difference of males to females in age groups later than the middle age group (above 39 years) is not negative, whereas the high negative percentage difference in the middle age years should have reduced the male population of the late age group in later years. The percentage difference of the male-to-female population for late age group people (above 39 years) is positive in successive years; this can only happen if the net movement of people out of the country is reduced by people who have been temporary emigrants and return to their country at the end of their life. At the same time, those males who have decided to settle permanently in the country to which they have immigrated will have migrated with the females in their family. To estimate a figure for the people who would have migrated from Bangladesh, we examined demographic changes in the middle age groups, i.e., 20–24, 25–29, 30–34, 35–39, and successive age groups, i.e., 35–39, and 40–44 years for 2001 to 2010. The reasoning is that, in successive years, the population of middle and successive age groups will depend upon the people who remained in Bangladesh, people who would have migrated, and people who would then have migrated back to the country. On the basis of this logic, if we subtract from the sum of the % gender population difference of the age groups, 20–24, 24–29, 30–34 and 34–39 of a year, the sum of the % gender population difference of the age groups 25–29, 30–34 and 35-39 of the next year, the resulted value would give an idea about migration flow during a year.  Based on the above formula, using the data  presented in the table 10.2, it can be estimated that if 4.9%, 5%, 4.6%, 4.6%, 4.7%, 4.9%, 4.76%, 4.08%, 4.88%, and 4.8% of males would have migrated from the years 2001 to 2010, respectively, then 2.8% (4.9–2.1%), 3% (5–2%), 2.6% (4.6–2%), 2.4% (4.6–2.2%), 2.3% (4.7–2.4%), 1.87% (4.9–3.03%), 1.89% (4.76–2.87%), 1.12% (4.08–2.9%), 1.81% (4.88–3.07%), and 1.73% (4.8–3.07%) of people would return to Bangladesh. Thus an average of 4.72% of the total population migrated every year, out of which 2.15% would migrate back every year. On a percentage basis about 46% of people migrated back, while around 54% migrated permanently. To arrive at a real blended population,a percentage value  of the total population of Bangladesh who would have migrated in a year, average of the % diffrence shown in the table 10.2 for the middle age group(20 to 39 years) for each year from 2001 to 2010. On this basis the percentages of the population that would have migrated from Bangladesh each year from 2001 to 2010 are 1.22%, 1.25%, 1.1%, 1.15%, 1.17%, 1.22%, 1.19%, 1.02%, 1.22%, and 1.2%, respectively, of the total population of Bangladesh. The absolute numbers of people who migrated from Bangladesh, based upon the above percentages, calculated using the total population of Bangladesh from the 9  Gender Statistics of Bangladesh 2010. (2011, Oct). Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, (Dhaka: Planning Division, Ministry of Planning, Govt. of the People of Bangladesh. p.  11). (http://www.bbs.gov.bd/WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/SubjectMatterDataIndex/statisticsbook.pdf. Accessed on 10–12–15. Also see SVRS 2010, Dhaka: BBS, 2011.

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Table 10.5  Estimation of migrated population Total population (million) Year 2001 131.1 2002 132.9 2003 134.8 2004 136.7 2005 138.6 2006 140.6 2007 142.6 2008 144.7 2009 146.7 2010 148.6 Average 139.73

Estimated migrated population (million) 1.61 1.67 1.56 1.58 1.63 1.73 1.6 1.48 1.79 1.79 1.64***

Officially migrated population (million) 0.19 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.39 0.84 0.88 0.48 0.4 0.42

Unofficially migrated population (million) 1.42 1.44 1.3 1.3 1.38 1.35 0.77 0.61 1.32 1.4 1.22***

Estimated unofficial daily migration (numbers) 4400 4552 4248 4307 4462 4719 4372 4044 4904 4886 4489

***1% level of significance

years 2001 to 2010, are presented in Table 10.5. The official data on the total population that migrated from Bangladesh was obtained from the Report on Sample Vital Registration System, 2007, BBS, and the numbers who migrated in the years 2001, 2004, 2006, and 2007 were obtained from the Bangladesh Economic review, 2009, and data published by the International Labour Organization country office of Bangladesh (2014). It was found that the numbers of people calculated and those reported were different. The difference between the estimated migration each year and the official data on migration for that year is designated as the unofficially migrated population. From Table 10.5, it can be seen that the average estimated number of people who migrated from Bangladesh every year is 1.64 million. However, the official record shows that 0.42 million of the population migrated every year; thus, the remaining 1.22 million people would have emigrated from Bangladesh unofficially. It can also be observed that the official migration during 2001 to 2010 increased from 0.19 million to 0.4 million, while the unofficial migration decreased from 1.42 million to 0.61 million until 2008 and then increased to 1.4 million in 2009 and 2010. These numbers are reflected in Table  10.5 and Fig.  10.4. The exponential trend line is increasing for both total migration and official migration, but is decreasing for unofficial migration. Table 10.5 also shows that, per day on average, about 4489 people cross the Bangladesh border unofficially. If we calculate the sum of the population who would have emigrated from Bangladesh in the 34 years since 1976, it would be around 55.76 million (1.64 × 34 years). Since Bangladesh is surrounded by India and Myanmar the possible destinations for such unofficial migration can only be to these two countries. Because of the ethnic dissimilarity and the military regime in Myanmar, that country may not be a choice for Bangladeshi migration. Historically, East Bengalis had been migrating to

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2 1.8 1.6

1.61

1.4

1.42 1.44

1.2 Number (in Mn)

1.67

1.56 1.58 1.3 1.3

1.63

1.79 1.79

1.73 1.6

1.38 1.35

1.48 1.32

1.4

0.8 0.6

0.61

0.4 0.2

0.39

Absolute (legal) in Millions Absolute (illegal) in Millions

1 0.84 0.88 0.77

Absolute (Total) In Millions

Expon. (Absolute (Total) In Millions) 0.48

0.4

0.26 0.28 0.26 0.19 0.23

Expon. (Absolute (legal) in Millions) Expon. (Absolute (illegal) in Millions)

0 2001200220032004200520062007200820092010 Years

Fig. 10.4  Line diagram showing migrated population

India for their livelihood so the most compelling destination for these people to migrate unofficially is India. Therefore, it is beyond doubt that India is the only destination for this whole unofficial migration. From the Table 10.5 data, we can also calculate that 41.48 million (1.22 × 34) Bangladeshi people have migrated unofficially to India since 1976. Out of these 41.48  million, 54% settled permanently in India. Hence, every year 0.65  million people choose to settle in India permanently; in this way in the last 34 years a total of 22.10 million (0.65 × 34) illegal Bangladeshi nationals have settled permanently in India.

Statistical Tests for Equality of Means To validate the results obtained for the migrated populations (estimated, officially, and unofficially) the paired t-test was performed separately for the estimated migrated population and unofficially migrated population with the officially migrated population. The hypotheses were: Null Hypotheses 1. Estimated migrated population mean – officially migrated population mean = 0. and

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2. Estimated unofficially migrated population mean – officially migrated population mean = 0. Alternative Hypotheses 1. Estimated migrated population mean − officially migrated population mean ≠ 0. 2. Estimated unofficially migrated population mean − officially migrated population mean ≠ 0. The t-stat values for the tests are presented in Table 10.6. t-test: paired two sample for means Estimated Particulars migration Mean 1.644 Variance 0.010 Observations 10 Pearson −0.27 Correlation Degree of 9 freedom t-stat 13.21*** P(T