Decolonization of Kazakhstan 9819952069, 9789819952069

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
About This Book
Contents
About the Author
1 Preface
2 Delayed Decolonization
2.1 Minefield, or Decolonization
2.2 Edward Said’s Revolution in Orientalism and Nomadism
2.3 Colonization of Kazakhstan: Stages, Forms, Specifics
2.4 Post-colonial Theory and the Process of Decolonization
2.5 Post-imperial Syndrome and the Process of Decolonization
2.6 Post-colonial Syndrome and Collective Memory
2.7 Cultural Dominance: Yesterday and Today
2.8 Conclusion
References
3 Nomads: Experience of Reconstruction
3.1 Identity and Decolonization of Consciousness
3.2 Decolonization of History, or the Voice of the Other
3.3 Reboot: Decolonization and Literature
3.4 Nomadism and Sedentism: Deconstruction
3.5 Bai: Exploiter or Defender of the Interests of the People?
3.6 Hierarchy vs Network, or Nomadism of the Twenty-First Century
3.7 Destruction of the Network, Power, Society, Earth
3.8 Conclusion
References
4 The Other Side of the Myth
4.1 Liberation from Myths: How the Kazakhs Were “Taught” Agriculture
4.2 Poor Nomad: Myth and Truth
4.3 Unrecognized Court of Biys and Stereotypes About It
4.4 Slandered Barymta
4.5 The “Oppressed” Kazakh Woman: A Different Look
4.6 The Origin of the Russian Cossacks
4.7 Who Raised the Industry in Kazakhstan and for Whom Was It Raised?
4.8 Who Were Cities in Kazakhstan Built for and Who For?
4.9 Destroyed Virgin Land
4.10 “Golden Age” of the USSR, or Comes with Ice Cream
4.11 Conclusion
References
5 Overcoming the Consequences of Colonization
5.1 Collective Trauma
5.2 Asharshylyk of the 1920s–1930s, or They Came Out of the Famine
5.3 Broken by Starvation, or the Consequences of Asharshylyk
5.4 The Guillotine of Political Repression, or the Headless People
5.5 Political Repressions, or the Steppe—the Territory of Captivity
5.6 Consequences of Mass Political Repressions
5.7 Voice of the Other and Public Consensus
5.8 Conclusion
References
6 Conclusion
Index

Citation preview

Decolonization of Kazakhstan Ainash Mustoyapova

Decolonization of Kazakhstan

Ainash Mustoyapova

Decolonization of Kazakhstan

Ainash Mustoyapova Karaganda Buketov University Karaganda, Kazakhstan

ISBN 978-981-99-5206-9 ISBN 978-981-99-5207-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5207-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the many scholars who have made efforts to study the methods of colonization, its impact and consequences, which helped me to better understand what was happening to my country. My gratitude is addressed to Kazakh scientists who, during the Soviet period and during the period of independence, tried to form an alternative view of the history of Kazakhstan, who made their way to the truth in the conditions of partially closed archives, censorship, and taboo topics. My special thanks to those who helped me pave the way to the reader— the translator of the book into English Aliya Temirova as well as the editors of the Palgrave Macmillan publishing house, who made this book as easy to read as possible.

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About This Book

The given book suggests the issues relevant for modern Kazakhstan, related to the process of decolonization, which, after the country’s independence restoration, was, in fact, postponed. This circumstance led to a number of negative consequences in politics, economics, education, social structure, and affected the law enforcement practice state. The unreflected consequences of colonization and totalitarianism largely determine the current state of the country. The issues of identity are paid special attention in the book, an important component of which is nomadism. The author considers the circumstances and intentions of the Kazakhs’ colonialists that distorted and transformed its identity. The book deconstructs colonial myths about the Kazakhs, designed to promote the dominant role of the colonizer, to justify the colonization and forced sedentarization of nomads. The author views two periods of Kazakhstan colonization—the tsarist and Soviet periods. The latter was exacerbated by totalitarianism, which led the political terror use, total censorship, and punitive actions in the ongoing colonization of Kazakhstan. The relevance of the book is due not only to the need to explore the ways and methods of Kazakhstan colonization as well as the current dependent position on Russia, which claims a dominant role in the politics and economy of Kazakhstan. This circumstance reveals the question of the colonization consequences and the need to overcome its consequences. That is what this book is about. vii

Contents

1

Preface Glossary

1 5

2

Delayed Decolonization 2.1 Minefield, or Decolonization 2.2 Edward Said’s Revolution in Orientalism and Nomadism 2.3 Colonization of Kazakhstan: Stages, Forms, Specifics 2.4 Post-colonial Theory and the Process of Decolonization 2.5 Post-imperial Syndrome and the Process of Decolonization 2.6 Post-colonial Syndrome and Collective Memory 2.7 Cultural Dominance: Yesterday and Today 2.8 Conclusion Glossary References

7 7

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Nomads: Experience of Reconstruction 3.1 Identity and Decolonization of Consciousness 3.2 Decolonization of History, or the Voice of the Other 3.3 Reboot: Decolonization and Literature 3.4 Nomadism and Sedentism: Deconstruction 3.5 Bai: Exploiter or Defender of the Interests of the People?

12 17 31 36 41 47 61 62 65 67 67 75 81 89 96

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3.6

Hierarchy vs Network, or Nomadism of the Twenty-First Century 3.7 Destruction of the Network, Power, Society, Earth 3.8 Conclusion Glossary References 4

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101 113 125 125 128

The Other Side of the Myth 4.1 Liberation from Myths: How the Kazakhs Were “Taught” Agriculture 4.2 Poor Nomad: Myth and Truth 4.3 Unrecognized Court of Biys and Stereotypes About It 4.4 Slandered Barymta 4.5 The “Oppressed” Kazakh Woman: A Different Look 4.6 The Origin of the Russian Cossacks 4.7 Who Raised the Industry in Kazakhstan and for Whom Was It Raised? 4.8 Who Were Cities in Kazakhstan Built for and Who For? 4.9 Destroyed Virgin Land 4.10 “Golden Age” of the USSR, or Comes with Ice Cream 4.11 Conclusion Glossary References

131

Overcoming the Consequences of Colonization 5.1 Collective Trauma 5.2 Asharshylyk of the 1920s–1930s, or They Came Out of the Famine 5.3 Broken by Starvation, or the Consequences of Asharshylyk 5.4 The Guillotine of Political Repression, or the Headless People 5.5 Political Repressions, or the Steppe—the Territory of Captivity 5.6 Consequences of Mass Political Repressions 5.7 Voice of the Other and Public Consensus 5.8 Conclusion Glossary References

231 231

133 141 151 161 172 182 191 201 206 212 220 220 224

245 258 261 266 271 276 281 282 285

CONTENTS

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Conclusion Glossary

Index

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About the Author

Ainash Mustoyapova is Candidate of Philological Sciences, Associate Professor, and is the author of more than 60 scientific and educational publications (Kazakhstan, Great Britain, Poland, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia) and more than 150 journalistic articles. Major works include the monograph The Irish Novels of Maria Edgeworth (2006), textbooks The Japanese Novel of the Second Half of the Twentieth Century (2009), Actual Problems of Modern Literary Studies (Interdisciplinary Theories and Critical Approaches) (2021), The Modernist Novel (2022), Famine of 1931–1933 in Central Kazakhstan: Collection of Archival Documents and Memoirs (2023), Leaders of the Nation (2023).

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CHAPTER 1

Preface

The process of decolonization began when the world colonial system fall in the middle of the twentieth century. This process in countries that emerged from colonial dependence took place in different ways, with different intensity, on different scales, and this had a direct impact on the further development of a certain country. Thus, for example, a number of African countries did not go through the process of decolonization, and they became victims of either neo-colonization, or their own corrupt regimes, or national conflicts. The second parade of sovereignties took place in the 1990s after the collapse of the USSR. Some countries, focusing on already successfully tested mechanisms, had partially or completely carried out the process of decolonization and desovietization; others have tried to do without it. Almost 30 years on, the results of both the first and second choices can be observed. The process of decolonization did not develop in Kazakhstan, and the initiatives of public organizations (Zheltoksan, Nevada-Semipalatinsk) to decolonize a number of phenomena in the life of society were leveled. Since the Soviet nomenklatura remained in power in Kazakhstan, the issues of decolonization, desovietization, and lustration disappeared from public discourse. Instead the country’s colonial past thorough study and overcoming its consequences, state bodies proposed programs designed to fill the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Mustoyapova, Decolonization of Kazakhstan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5207-6_1

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spiritual and intellectual thought. This is the state program “Cultural Heritage” (2004), which involved modern national culture study, folklore, traditions and customs of the Kazakhs, archaeological research, the reconstruction of historical and cultural monuments, etc. The program is essential, but it never became the basis for people’s tragic experience rethinking, its transformation under the influence of colonization and the totalitarian past. The problem of the negative consequences of colonization and, consequently, their overcoming was not raised. Another state program “Spiritual Awakening” (2017), aimed at modernizing public consciousness, had turned into shallow declarations. This was evidenced by the societal faults which have been recently activated after Russia started Soviet ideologies restoration, propaganda of the so-called “Russian world” and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The society is split, and the demarcation line runs on the issue of Kazakhstani citizens’ attitude to Russian policy. The historical events of Kazakhstan recent history demonstrate that the lack of appreciation of country’s colonial and totalitarian past country leads to a repetition of that tragic experience. The execution of oil workers in Zhanaozen (2011), executions and torture in the days of Kantar (2022) are totalitarian practices adopted by the authorities. Suppression, repression, and punitive methods of talking to the people are rooted from the colonial and Soviet past. These are the visible consequences of delayed decolonization. Until the tragic events of the twentieth century are evaluated, recognize their consequences and try to get rid of them, colonial and totalitarian practices will continue. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has highlighted a number of issues associated with Russian imperial mindset and the expansionist intentions of the Russian government. The war also revealed that there are those in Kazakhstan who would welcome Russia’s aggression against Kazakhstan, who would be glad to restore the USSR and re-colonize Kazakhstan. The above mentioned again raised and actualized the issues of national identity, the tasks and goals of post-colonial nationalism, and the building of a single civil nation. History forces to return to decolonization necessity and unlearned lessons. Decolonization is the creation of new meanings; it is the development of ways, methods, and actions aimed at ensuring that Kazakhstan becomes a truly independent country. We are still gripped by the colonial past. The

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necessary period of the decolonization process must be gone between the colonization period and the real independence of the country. We have not yet completed this path, and therefore it is too early to talk about post-colonial Kazakhstan. We will enter the post-colonial period only by having worked through the colonial past, the problems, and the traumas associated with it; when we begin to overcome the consequences of colonialism and to be reborn; when we find clear signs of our political and economic independence. The history of the twentieth century should be returned to, because many of our problems and even the current state of the country largely originate from those times. How can the consequences of the tragedies and trials Kazakhs befell be overcome? We need to understand what exactly we have lost, to determine the ways to overcome the consequences of colonization and the ultimate goal that should be achieved. For example, taking into account the tragic events of the twentieth century, the issues of demography (response to losses incurred), health (response to malnutrition of several generations of children), ecology (response to nuclear explosions, destroyed water bodies, industrial emissions), strong education, all-round development become especially relevant. New generations (a response to the loss of the educated stratum nation), a powerful development of the language (a response to its discrimination and a sharp narrowing of the scope of its application), and more. Many narratives about nomads still sin with Eurocentrism and sedentary centrism. However, this is perplexing: despite the fact that Western scientists have largely abandoned the Eurocentric view of the East and are trying to overcome settled centrism in relation to and in the assessment of nomads, some part of the population of Kazakhstan is still captive to stereotypes of a century and a half centuries ago, distorted interpretations, including soviet historical school. A new overlook at one’s own past is necessary in order to see oneself not as an object of history, but as its subject—an actor who is responsible for what happened to him. This is a direct way of liberation from the victim complex, who is looking for the causes of adversity in someone else and, as a result, does not take responsibility for finding a way out of the prolonged historical crisis in which the people found themselves. It is vital to understand the injuries causes and the nature of their consequences, without which it is impossible to overcome them. Yes, a tragedy has happened to us (colonization, totalitarianism), but we survived and must make up for what was lost, do what our ancestors

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did not have time to overcome, overcome obstacles that they could not overcome. The role of the victim is also dangerous because it gives rise to the infantilism of the nation, forms a psychological readiness to accept the will of a stronger one, to obey him. The victim complex prepares the nation for the role of the victim. And most importantly, infantilism leads to the expectation that someone will take responsibility instead of us, someone will solve our problems, protect us from threats. The West has been gaining experience of critical thinking for centuries, passing through the fires of the Inquisition, censorship, doubt, nihilism, atheism, undermining dogmas, false authorities, and pseudo-values. In art, it was the avant-garde, sometimes outrageous and scandalous, but it prepared Europeans for the acceptance of modernism as a new way of thinking and seeing the world. Then there were a number of -isms (existentialism, deconstructivism, poststructuralism, etc.), which led to the emergence of a number of critical approaches. And, as a result, today the West is less susceptible to propaganda, less dependent on dogmas and authorities (in science, politics, culture). This gives a chance for the West to go forward, to be at the forefront, largely because it is open to alternatives. The critical approach allows undermining the most subversive action and overthrowing everything that does not stand up to criticism. The undermining of imposed dogmas, stereotypes, myths, values, and ideologies is a means of resetting for post-colonial and post-totalitarian countries. It is dogma that is afraid of a critical approach that undermines its dominance, which does not allow for alternative judgments, and also because dogma is in its essence unchanged, introduced through coercion and lives only thanks to its uncritical acceptance. Is there another way possible, without debunking false myths, exposing Soviet ideologemes, and declassifying archives? Is it possible to do without public discussions and breaking stereotypes and just wait until a couple of generations change, and the next ones will acquire new thinking on their own? Probably you can. But we have not succeeded. For 30 years, the miracle of approaching a new way of thinking and seeing the world has not happened. And today it has become obvious that the old dogmas have not gone away, have not died, and the thinking of many people has not been modernized, despite the presence of the Internet and access to alternative sources. Moreover, these people aggressively defend and reproduce the old ideological clichés based on the lies of the totalitarian ideology,

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promoting chauvinism, hostility, isolation from the world, prohibitions, non-admission of criticism and alternative opinions, etc. In short, public discussion is indispensable. Decolonial thinking and decolonial sensibility are to be developed. The consequence of coloniality should not be passed on to the next generation and this must be taken into consideration. Unquestionably, it is impossible to cover all the issues related to the process of decolonization, to answer all the pressing questions in one book. However, the book allows us to look at many realities of ours from a post-colonial point of view. This work is of practical importance. The topics covered make it possible to understand how much of our selfesteem and worldview is permeated with colonial thinking and colonial stereotypes, due to the colonial and totalitarian past. Awareness is only the first step, which should be followed by building a new policy, economy, educational, social, informational, and cultural spheres.

Glossary Kantar (lit. January) peaceful rallies in a number of cities of Kazakhstan demanding a change in kleptocratic power, social policy, etc., ending with the execution of peaceful protesters and bystanders, cars on the streets of cities, followed by torture of eight thousand people and trials of participants in the rallies. Nevada-Semipalatinsk is an anti-nuclear movement that arose in February 1989, whose task was to stop nuclear tests and close the test sites on Kazakh soil. The appeal of the movement was supported and signed by 2 million citizens of Kazakhstan. Zhanaozen (lit. new river) the name of the city in the western region of Kazakhstan, where mass strikes of oil workers took place during 2011, culminating in provocation on Independence Day and the shooting of workers, subsequent torture, murder and trials of strike participants. Zheltoksan (lit. December) is a public association of participants in the December events of 1986, when student youth and university teachers took to the central square of Alma-Ata to protest against the appointment of a protege of the Kremlin as the head of the Kazakh Republic, discrimination against Kazakhs, the Kazakh language and culture. The rally was crushed by the army, students were beaten with sapper shovels, taken out of the city and thrown into the winter steppe, then courts followed, and expulsions from universities.

CHAPTER 2

Delayed Decolonization

This chapter presents an urgent problem for Kazakhstan, which is delayed decolonization. Understanding nineteenth–twentieth century’s events, i.e. the colonial period while state independence restoration, was selective in Kazakhstan, or even completely hushed up. The exception is individual publications of scientists concerning the revision of some events of the recent historical past, the trauma issue, the state of the Kazakh language. This chapter attempts to define the colonization process of Kazakhstan why it is important to go through it, without which the country’s true independence is problematic.

2.1

Minefield, or Decolonization

It is striking that in a country that emerged from colonization, the issues and decolonization mechanisms did not become the subject of a wide scientific discussion in sociology, political science, cultural studies, psychology, history, literature, etc. As a result, the possible results of such discussions did not become part of the political processes, the basis for the methods development for overcoming the negative consequences of colonization and totalitarianism by Kazakhstan.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Mustoyapova, Decolonization of Kazakhstan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5207-6_2

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The events taking place today, namely the aggression of Russia against Ukraine, the political, economic, informational, and ideological dependence of Kazakhstan on Russia, as well as the threats emanating from it, actualize the issue of rethinking the negative phenomena of our country’s recent historical past. Speaking of the necessity to rethink, or rather, expand the view of the past, the process of forming a single civil nation in Kazakhstan should be remembered the importance markers of which are a common history and values. This does not mean that some canonical version of history should be accepted. However, the Soviet historical science tendentious point of view should be abandoned, determined by historical circumstances and ideological expediency. This will enable us to see the opposing side of the events and form an objective, as far as possible, the idea of colonization, its methods, and its consequences. It is not only about events but also about understanding, a balanced assessment of goals, motives, and methods of colonization. The goal is not an accusation, not a confrontation, not a search for the guilty, but the desire to see the fullness of the picture, its different aspects. It is equally important to understand the consequences of colonization, otherwise the origins of a number of current problems cannot be found and, therefore, solved. Finally, an honest look at our own past will bring us closer to understanding and accepting the complex, contradictory, sometimes our history’s repulsive past. The hushing up of certain tragic events only contributes to the confrontation of society. As long as some continue to perceive history in the Soviet interpretation, others feel the contradiction between the official truncated version of history and collective memory, and still others silently experience collective trauma, we will live in different dimensions within the borders of one country. As a result, current values, ideas about the future, conditioned by a differently understood past, will be different for citizens of one country. Potential conflicts that are splitting our society today are hidden here. It is this circumstance that should prompt us to rethink our common history. Our past cannot be changed, but we can change our attitude towards it. Therefore, we should make an effort to see a fuller and therefore more objective picture of the colonial period, otherwise completely different views of the past and, as a result, the present will continue to divide us and become a cause of conflict. A kind of umbrella concept for the process of rethinking the past and building the future should be decolonization, which includes a

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large number of different aspects, from the interpretation of historical events, and their consequences to the awareness of the mechanisms of national identity transformation. This process is equally relevant both for countries that have undergone colonization in the past, and for former metropolises. Since the post-colonial theory has not been properly applied in Kazakhstan, the following questions arise in society: Did Kazakhstan automatically enter the post-colonial period after the restoration of independence? Did the country’s post-colonial period lead to the process of decolonization? To find the answers to these questions, one must understand the relationship and difference between colonialism/colonialism, decolonization, and post-colonialism. Colonialism as a subordinate form of existence of the country does not disappear with the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, with the acquisition of political independence by the former colony. It continues to manifest itself at different levels, including culture, socio-economic relations, foreign policy ties, and, most importantly, thinking. Colonial thinking is more extended and stable over time compared to the country’s colonial status, which de jure ends at a certain point in history. Moreover, coloniality as a concept also includes a global component, the manifestation of which we find in the relations between developed countries and states of the so-called third world after the destruction of the world colonial system. This gives grounds for the colonial nature of any political and economic dominance. It is colonialism as an institutional phenomenon that has been and continues to be an enslavement instrument, under the guise and rhetoric of modernization, justifying any economic, political, and other (including military) influences designed to overcome the alleged backwardness, “barbarism”, “traditionalism” of the third world countries. Thus, coloniality as a phenomenon of thinking, power relations is a long-term, arbitrarily long consequence of colonialism. Post-colonialism is not just a historical stage, chronologically necessarily following the end of the colonial period in the country’s history. Post-colonialism is the result of certain processes that mature, are prepared, and carried out within the framework of colony existence. It can be a liberation struggle or processes in the minds of people, cultural phenomena, rethinking national history, and the desire to overcome colonial dependence. In fact, it was the desire of the Kazakhs to get out of colonial oppression was found in Alash Orda activities and in the liberation uprising of 1916. Otherwise, post-colonialism becomes the result of

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a successful process of overcoming the consequences of colonization on the way to gaining a real political independence of the country. Mention should be made that after the February Revolution, the October Revolution of 1917, and the Russian Civil War, Kazakhstan entered a pseudo-post-colonial period. The Soviet government declared the thesis that it had put an end to imperialism and brought freedom to the enslaved peoples. This led to the conclusion that there was no need for decolonization and overcoming the consequences of the colonization of the tsarist period. As history has shown, Soviet power inherited from tsarism not only the colonized territories but also the relationship of the colonizer and the colonized. The real preservation of colonial administration, coupled with totalitarian methods, led to a tightening of colonial policy, and manifested itself in the destruction of the traditional way of life and management of the Kazakhs, in the loss of national identity, in a distorted interpretation of national history due to ideological demands, in the deplorable state of the Kazakh language and much more. The second attempt to decolonize and enter the post-colonial period appeared in Kazakhstan with the collapse of the Soviet Union. We can say that on the eve of it, processes were ripening in Kazakhstan that testify to the desire of the people to free themselves from colonial existence, which manifested itself in attempts to restore national history, preserve national culture, and defend territorial integrity. However, with the restoration of Independence in 1991, the process of decolonization was not started. One of the reasons for this is the preservation of power by the former party nomenklatura, which does not want to subject the events of the Soviet period of history to reassessment. In a word, the transition of Kazakhstan into the post-colonial reality did not take place, and this fact is becoming more and more obvious in the light of Russia’s persistent desire to maintain its political dominance and the inability and unwillingness of the Kazakh authorities to pursue a policy independent of the former metropolis. The entry into the period of post-colonialism and the post-colonialism associated with it can be considered as a form of existence, indicating the beginning of a new historical stage in the country. However, the formal restoration of political independence does not at all guarantee a fundamental liberation from colonialism and its consequences until the post-colonial state and colonial thinking are overcome, i.e. due to

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the colonial past and still dependent on colonial ideological attitudes, stereotypes, and assessments. Overcoming the consequences of colonialism is possible in the process of decolonization, which gives a fundamentally different impetus aimed at eradicating the negative impact of colonization, including ideology, politics, economics, culture, value systems, and national identity. Hence, the decolonial choice acquires special importance as a setting for the emancipation and decolonization of thinking. In its first meaning, decolonization is the process of gaining independence by countries, dominions, and protectorates that were in colonial dependence. This is a historical fact, measurable in a specific period of time and expressed in the date of restoration of the sovereignty of the country, territory. In the second sense, decolonization is a time-consuming process of liberation from the consequences of colonialism as a multifaceted phenomenon. It is the process of decolonization that makes it possible to problematize ideas, stereotypes, complexes caused by colonization. With the completion of colonization, colonialism as a form of existence of the state, coloniality as an institutional category does not suddenly disappear, it manifests itself in the mentality, self-identity, interpretation of historical events, collective memory, culture, language, etc. Overcoming the negative consequences of colonization is the goal of decolonization. The condition of decolonization is the conscious choice of a person, society, nation, or country. This is a choice in favor of the decolonization of consciousness, which is a method of thinking, as well as an intention to enter a new internal state, acquiring a changed scale of measures, assessments, and views on the phenomena of colonization. The subject of understanding of decolonial thought is not so much the facts of the past colonial experience as those visible and often invisible traces that it leaves and which we do not even think about, do not consider them as a consequence of colonial attitudes, attitudes, stereotypes, complexes. Decolonization as a process covers domestic and foreign policy, power and social sphere, economy and education, and culture and psychology. The inhibition of this process becomes the reason for the conservation, stagnation of many phenomena of life, and determines the continuing influence on the life of the society of the colonial past, colonial ideology, and its tools. The process of decolonization in Kazakhstan is avoided by all means, as if it is to step into a minefield. But the minefield should be neutralized

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so as not to be afraid that the mines will explode under our feet or under the feet of the next generations, who are unaware of their existence and the reasons for their origin.

2.2 Edward Said’s Revolution in Orientalism and Nomadism The revolution carried out by Edward Said in his book “Orientalism” contributed to the emergence of a new field of post-colonial studies and offered tools for consciousness decolonization implementation, liberation from Western-imposed preconceived notions and false stereotypes about the East. Orientalism as a system of ideas about the East, based on a tendentious interpretation and assessment of the philosophy, history, lifestyle, traditions, values of the Eastern people, has become a way not only to legitimize imperial conquests, but also to simplify the management of colonies. Since the relationship between the West and the East developed as a relationship of power, domination, on the one hand, and subordination, dependence, on the other hand, the culture and history of the East were considered from the point of view of power relations. The colonized people were perceived within the framework of stereotypes that made the colonies and their cultures more accessible to imperial understanding and, most importantly, justified their colonization (Said 1978). E. Said proposed a discourse for understanding the system by which European civilization could manage the colonized the East politically, sociologically, ideologically, and also by military means. Orientalism as a system of knowledge is an idea that has its own history and tradition of thinking, imagery, and its own vocabulary. Europeans who wrote or read about the East formed a European idea of the East. The formation, preservation, and transmission for a long time of false ideas, and stereotypes about the East in the academic environment, fiction, cinema, and foreign policy institutions were provided by theory and practice, designed to consolidate the idea of the backwardness of the East. At the same time, peculiar filters sorted out and discarded what did not fit into the framework of an understandable, easy-to-use idea of the East. Such a “convenient” East was reflected and fixed in the minds of Europeans, employees of the colonial administration, was presented in fiction and scientific texts. Writers and poets, “experts” and “specialists” in the

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East have constructed a complex of “Eastern” ideas that explain Eastern traditions, philosophy, psychology, adapting their interpretation to their own goals. Orientalism as a system of knowledge for a long time remained a kind of justification for the European-Atlantic power over the East, since this “knowledge” was dominated by a system of principles imbued with ideas of European superiority, racism, dogmatic and stereotypical views regarding the “Oriental man”. All subsequent knowledge about the East, according to E. Said, was limited to the already entrenched stereotype of the East. In addition, Orientalism was an important part of the collective mindset in which Europeans defined themselves as opposed to nonEuropeans. The East acted as an image of the Other and helped Europe (the West), on the basis of the principle of contrast, to determine its own image, character and identity. E. Said argues that the main component of European culture is the idea of European identity, based on the conviction of the superiority of Europeans over non-European peoples and cultures. This feeling of superiority became the basis that determined the system of colonial administration, as well as historical, economic and other theories. Orientalism became the basis for the development of a number of sociological descriptions, psychological analysis, evaluative categories, stereotypes, which in many ways became an instrument of control and manipulation. It should be emphasized that Orientalism was the result of an external view, a view from the outside. The Orientalist, be it a scientist or a politician, spoke instead of the East, appropriated its voice, described it, and explained it in a language understandable to the Westerner. This language is a coded system that contains many ways to express and show an object. Since the essence of relations between the West and the East was based on the ratio of the strong to the weak, this was reflected in the corresponding vocabulary, rhetoric, semantics, assessments, epithets, and comparisons. Ultimately, Orientalism became a kind of expression of the intellectual power of the West over the East. The work of E. Said acquires special significance for peoples who have freed themselves from colonial dependence, it demonstrates the importance of liberation from the stereotypes and dogmas imposed on them, generated by the manipulative mechanisms of political and cultural domination.

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The discourse proposed by Edward Said provides post-colonial studies with methodological tools that allow us to determine the mechanisms through which a false narrative about a nomadic civilization was created. Just as in the case of Orientalism, the assessment and attitude towards nomads was based on the concept of Eurocentricity, aggravated by the principle of settledness. The ideas of farmers about nomads were superficial, if not fundamentally erroneous. They were determined by the sedentary’s own ideas about the world, society, culture, values, customs, and finally, about time and space. Through the sedentary/nomadism dichotomy, the sedentary world positioned itself and defined its identity. This identity was built on a priori acceptance of the correctness, “normality” of a settled way of life, management, culture, and, on the contrary, the deviation from the norm of everything that was associated with a nomadic civilization. Stereotypical ideas about nomads, conditioned by the view from the outside, were subjected to transformation over time. So, for example, in the Middle Ages, a nomad was assessed as wild, and unbridled, he caused fear, and anxiety and posed a threat that had come from him for centuries. The nomadic world was presented as alien, unfamiliar, dangerous, possessing military power and almost mystical power. Thus, in the Middle Ages, an archetype of some dark force arose, bringing destruction and death. This archetype was based on the emotion of fear, and rejection, which influenced the ideas of the settled about nomads, their assessments and behavior in relation to the world of nomads. This archetype in its negative semantics gave rise to myths about nomads, indicating ignorance, and misunderstanding of the sedentary world of the world of nomads. It should be noted that not only many representatives of the settled world, but even the current descendants of nomads, still remain in captivity of some myths about nomads, relayed from century to century. Undoubtedly, in the Middle Ages, for the settled world, the achievements of the nomads were of interest, associated exclusively with military tactics, weapons, paraphernalia, orienteering skills, equestrian culture. At the same time, the nomad was presented as an image of the Other, in relation to which there was an appraisal. At that time, the assessment was due to power relations or the threat that came from the nomad. The military dominance of nomads in the mature Middle Ages was most directly reflected in stereotypical ideas about an incomprehensible and frightening nomadic world, in which the rich culture of nomads (music, poetry,

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applied arts, philosophy, social relations, moral imperatives) almost did not find reflection, because it did not fit into the picture of the nomadic world that the farmers imagined. After the decline of the nomadic civilization by the end of the eighteenth century, and especially during the colonization of the Steppe in the nineteenth century, the image of the nomad was subjected to correction by tsarist Russia. The old image of a disturbing, frightening nomad was inconvenient; moreover, it interfered with the colonialist’s goals. A different image was needed, which would allow us not to be afraid of him, not to get lost in front of the incomprehensible nomadic world, but to look at him condescendingly, patronizingly, contemptuously. In other words, it was necessary to change the attitude towards the nomad, and the direct path to this lay through a change in the interpretation of his image and a wide retransmission of new ideas about him, his way of life, history, traditions, values. Relations between the sedentary (represented by Tsarist Russia) and nomadic (represented by Kazakhia) worlds were considered in the antonymic paradigm: civilized/wild, developed/backward, progressive/ patriarchal, we/they. Here, evaluation became decisive, which dictated a certain hierarchy. This hierarchy implied comparison not from a neutral position familiar/unknown, familiar/unusual, understandable/ mysterious, but from the position of evaluation: better/worse, right/ wrong, friend/foe, norm/deviation from it. The body of texts (ethnographic descriptions, narratives, reports, reports), decrees, instructions of the colonial administration, as well as the ongoing colonial policy determined the nature and format of interaction with the nomadic world, formed and disseminated a vulgar opinion about it through judgments expressed about it, certain sanctioned views about him, his tendentious description. The representatives of the sedentary world adopted the basic distinction between sedentism and nomadism as the starting point for their theories about the nomadic world, political and economic calculations in relation to the Steppe, its people, culture, methods of management, customs, and even further destiny. This starting point made it impossible for a settled person to truly see and understand the culture, worldview, way of life, traditions, and legal system of the nomad, so strikingly different from his own.

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Moreover, an objective image and perception of a nomadic civilization could convince the nomads that they have much more humane traditions, effective methods of managing due to the environment, a fairer court, democratic norms of a nomadic society, greater human rights and freedoms, as well as a deep original worldview. All of the above, undoubtedly, would destroy the attitude taken as a basis for the nomadic world as more backward, requiring correction and management. Unquestionably, music, poetry, applied arts, philosophy, crafts, the system of law, and the traditions of nomads were of interest and studied, but the works of ethnographers, travelers, notes of individual officers of the colonial troops and officials of the colonial administration did not fit into the framework of widespread stereotypical ideas about nomads. And therefore they could damage the theory that justified colonization and the colonizer’s view of what is right for the people being colonized. Therefore, assessments that destroy the accepted politically convenient interpretation of the nomadic world were subjected to censorship and were not recommended for distribution. In addition, in order to effectively manage the colonized lands, settled settled-centric stereotypes about the backwardness of the nomads, their way of life, methods of managing, and traditions began to be instilled into the nomads themselves and used for the purpose of manipulation. The consequences of this suggestion were not only reflected in the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized, but also led to altered selfesteem, a distortion of the identity of the latter. Thus, the connection and contacts between the settled and nomadic worlds continued to be determined by power relations, the dominance of one over the other. And this circumstance determined and for a long time preserved the idea of the settled world about nomads, limited by the framework of stereotypes and myths. Only refusal to consider the issue from the standpoint of dominance, the principle of one or another centricity, opposition and evaluation will allow us to get rid of the tendentious view and see a true and more complete image of the world of nomads. This is what ethnographers and travelers in the nineteenth—early twentieth centuries tried to accomplish in their works, and already in recent decades, a look at the nomads from the inside was offered in the works of Kazakh researchers: N.E. Masanov (Masanov 1995), Zh.O. Artykbaev (Artykbaev 2005), V. Tuleshov (Tuleshov 2006, 2008), A.A. Kodar (Kodar 2009) and others.

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The liberation of Kazakhs from dogmas, tendentious assessments of the period of colonization, imposed stereotypes about themselves, their identity, is fundamentally important both for adequate self-esteem and in order to stop looking at oneself from the outside, not to perceive oneself through the eyes of another. The strength and durability of stereotypes about nomads in the mass consciousness is due to long and large-scale cultural retransmission, in which significant labor, funds, and intellectual efforts were invested. The influence of the past is significant in strength, scale, and duration. Incorrect interpretations of the past, which were called to the Kazakhs, at least over the last century, still have consequences, not only deforming the consciousness of an individual and the people as a whole, but also depriving him of adequate self-esteem, the ability to understand himself, realize his identity, see his place in history.

2.3

Colonization of Kazakhstan: Stages, Forms, Specifics

In order to understand if there is a need for a process of overcoming anything (and decolonization is, first of all, overcoming the negative consequences of colonization), one should see the content, forms, mechanisms of functioning, and consequences of the phenomenon itself. Undoubtedly, the process of colonization of Kazakhstan, along with the typical features of the colonization of any other country, had its own specifics, which was due to a number of historical, social, economic, and other circumstances. Typical features of the colonization of Kazakhstan are the following. First, that it was conditioned by the West/East dichotomy, which predetermined the hierarchy of relations between the colonizer and the colonized. This dichotomy found expression in the emphatically evaluative opposition civilized/wild, advanced/backward, right/wrong, reasonable/meaningless, modern/patriarchal, own/alien, and the subsequent discrimination of Kazakhs and Kazakh culture. E.B. Bekmakhanov writes: “A lot of interesting things have been preserved in the official correspondence, depicting the attitude of the tsarist colonizers towards the Kazakhs. In one of the reports of a prominent official to the Orenburg military governor—Count P. Sukhtelen—it is said: ‘I am not lured by the hyperbolic desires of philanthropists to arrange for the Kyrgyz (Kazakhs.—A.M.), enlighten them and elevate

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them to the level occupied by European peoples’” (Bekmakhanov 1947: 31). A similar assessment of the Kazakhs and Asians in general, based on racism, the policy of discrimination against the Kazakhs continued throughout the Soviet period. Moreover, today Russia is pursuing the same policy towards the inhabitants of its current colonies, as well as immigrants from Central Asian countries working in the Russian Federation. Secondly, the purpose of colonization was to extract economic benefits, appropriation of land, as well as a political influence throughout Central Asia. E.B. Bekmakhanov notes that official correspondence does not always give an objective idea of the true goals of Russian colonial policy, but “it often contains secret documents that depict the true nature of the tsarist colonial policy. The capture of Kazakh lands by Count Nesselrode explains in his report to Nikolay I as follows: they roam” (Bekmakhanov 1947: 30). From the moment the Russian fortresses were founded on the border with the Steppe, there was a constant advance inland and the seizure of land. The goal of the resettlement policy pursued already in the USSR until the 1960s (development of virgin lands) was also the seizure of territory. Thirdly, the colonization of Kazakhstan was accompanied by uprisings and the national liberation struggle of the Kazakhs. In 1783–1797, an uprising broke out in the west under the leadership of Syrym Datula (1753–1802) because of the prohibition by the tsarist government of the cattle breeder to cross the Ural River to their ancestral lands, and also because of conflicts with the Ural Cossack army, who claimed for the Kazakh lands. In 1822–1830, a rebellion took place under the leadership of Zholaman Tlenshiuly, biy of the Tabyn clan, on whose lands the Russians built their fortresses (the Novoiletskaya line). Representatives of other clans joined his struggle, the number of rebels reached 4500 people. In 1824–1825, an uprising broke out under the leadership of the Khan of the Middle Zhuz Gubaydulla (1770–1856), who began to negotiate with China to recognize his authority. In 1826–1838, sultan Kaip-Gali Yessimuly (1789–1857) led another uprising, the participants of which then joined the uprising of 1836– 1838 led by Isatay Taymanuly (1791–1838) and Makhambet Utemisuly (1803–1846). The rebels fought not only with the policies pursued by the

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colonial administration but also with the sultans and beys who supported the king. In 1824–1836, in the center and north of modern Kazakhstan, the national liberation struggle was organized by Sultan Sarzhan Kasimuly (year of birth unknown—1836); the rebels put forward a demand for the elimination of Russian fortresses and military fortifications on the territory of the Steppe. After the assassination of Sarzhan Kasimuly, the fight for independence was led by his younger brother, the last Kazakh khan raised on a koshma by the clans of the Middle Zhuz, Kenesary (1802–1847), who led the liberation struggle for 10 years, from 1837 to 1847. Local uprisings took place in 1853–1857 under the leadership of Iset Kotibarula (1807–1888), in 1856–1858—under the leadership of Zhankhozha Nurmukhameduly (1874–1860). The rebels opposed the subjugation of the colonial administration and fought for independence. In 1870, in response to the “Temporary regulation on the management of the Turgay, Ural, Akmola and Semipalatinsk regions” of 1868, which introduced a new system of administrative division, the Adayev uprising broke out on the Mangyshlak peninsula led by Dosan Tazhiuly (1829–1876). Following the uprising of the Kazakhs of the Ural and Turgai regions. In response to the call of the Kazakhs for rear work on the fronts of the First World War, an uprising of 1916 broke out, which was of an anti-colonial nature. The activities of the Alash-Orda party, which united the educated part of the Kazakh elite, should be attributed to the anti-colonial movements. More than 300 large and small uprisings and rebellions were raised in Kazakhstan in the period from 1928 to 1932 in response to the expropriation of livestock, forced sedentarization, and collectivization. The uprisings were suppressed by army formations and the creation of manmade famine in the places of the uprisings. As a result, the Kazakhs lost half of their numbers, more than 1 million Kazakhs were forced to migrate to neighboring countries. The last anti-colonial uprising in its content took place shortly before the collapse of the USSR—in 1986. The reason for the performance of student youth was the appointment of the head of one of the Russian regions to the role of the first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. The protest was aimed at the ongoing colonial policy, infringement of the rights of Kazakhs, discrimination of the language

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and, more broadly, Kazakh culture. Like other uprisings, Zheltoksan was brutally suppressed. Let us turn to the specific features of the colonization of Kazakhstan. First of all, it should be noted that in our case, the colonizing country and the colonized country belonged to different civilizational types—settled and nomadic. In the history of mankind, most often colonization took place in relation to one settled country by another settled state. In the case of Kazakhstan, which at the time of the tsarist stage of colonization remained mostly a nomadic country, colonization acquired additional specific features. The sedentary/nomadism dichotomy was expressed not only in the difference between the forms of management and the management system, but also in a significant difference in the worldview, social and economic structure, culture, legal system, and partly in moral imperatives. This circumstance predetermined one of the components of the conflict and determined the policy of violent transformation of nomadic culture with the aim of imposing a settled way of life, laws, and values declared by the more developed, simply “civilized” as opposed to the supposedly backward norms of (semi) nomadic society. It should be noted that a number of Russian (tsarist) ethnographers and travelers made attempts to more fully explore and objectively assess the way of nomads’ life, but they could not break the widespread convenient clichés and false stereotypes about nomads. The stamps, which were fixed in the nineteenth century, continued to be actively exploited in the Soviet period. The forcible sedentarization of nomads, carried out by the Soviet government at the cost of destroying almost half of the number of Kazakhs, is one of the cruelest results of colonization, which had tragic and large-scale consequences. Another sign was that the mother country, Russia, was itself a backward agrarian state and technologically dependent on advanced European countries. The era of modernity and the modernization associated with it took place in Russia almost simultaneously with its colonies, where, of course, on a smaller scale, but production developed, foreign capital was represented. The development of capitalist relations also developed almost simultaneously under the influence of Europeans, who actively entered the Russian market in the last third of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century. Settlers from Russia to Kazakhstan were not at a higher level of culture than the Kazakhs, in order to at least

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serve as an example to follow, they were illiterate, extremely poor, and abused alcohol. The next specific feature of the colonization of Kazakhstan (as well as a number of other territories colonized by Russia) is that Russia and Kazakhstan were in direct territorial neighborhood. The penetration into the Steppe was carried out in two stages. The first is the construction of fortresses, outposts, redoubts along the borders of the Steppe, which gradually moved deeper and deeper into the Steppe. This is the so-called Cossack colonization (mid. eighteenth century–1870s). The Cossack army received from the Russian government the lands taken from the Kazakh clans by ousting them. The Ural Cossack army received water meadows on the left side of the Ural River. The Siberian Cossack army received 5 million acres of desyatina, including the so-called “ten-verst strip”. The second stage included the resettlement of a significant number of landless Russian peasants from the inner provinces of Russia to the lands taken from the Kazakhs. This is the so-called peasant colonization (late 1860s—before the fall of tsarist Russia). It should be noted that with the fall of the Russian monarchy, the process of mass migration to Kazakhstan did not stop. On the contrary, during the Soviet period they grew and consisted of several waves. The settlers of the last third of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were mostly yesterday’s serfs who fled from landlessness and the famine that periodically repeats in Russia. At the end of the 1860s, several families were resettled, but already in the early 1870s, noticeable spontaneous peasant colonization of the northern and western regions began, accompanied by the squatting of the lands of nomads. The unauthorized resettlement of peasants after the permission of the main administration of Western Siberia began in the 1860s, several years after the abolition of serfdom. For example, according to the “Provisional Rules on Peasant Resettlements in Semirechye” (1868), in addition to 30 acres of land for each male person, settlers received benefits in the form of exemption from all types of taxes for 15 years. After the famine and cholera in Russia in 1881, which led to the threat of peasant riots, by the end of that year, the government adopted “Temporary rules for resettlement of rural inhabitants in the Kyrgyz (Kazakh.—A.M.) steppes”. Settlers were given 45 acres of Kazakh land per person and provided with various benefits.

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In 1886, the “Regulations on the management of the Turkestan General Government” was adopted, according to which the settlers were provided with 10 acres of land for each male soul and exemption from taxes for 5 years. In the 1880s, resettlement plots were created, and significant benefits began to be provided to the settlers: writing off previous arrears, issuing money for setting up a farm, 100 trees for building a house, funds for the purchase of agricultural implements and livestock. In order to streamline the process of spontaneous peasant resettlement in Kazakhstan, which is gaining momentum, the tsarist government adopts in 1889 a special Regulation “On the voluntary resettlement of rural inhabitants and petty bourgeois to state lands and on the procedure for classifying persons, the designated estates, who moved in the past.” Resettlement required permission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but this requirement was ignored and unauthorized resettlement continued, mainly to the Semirechensk, Akmola, and Semipalatinsk regions. A new impetus to mass resettlement was given by the famine that broke out in Russia in 1891–1892. A significant number of immigrants occurred in the 1880–1890s. “Already in 1890, about 70 thousand peasants arrived in Kazakhstan from Samara, Astrakhan, Poltava, Voronezh, Chernigov, Penza, Tobolsk and other provinces …” (Kapekova 2006: 96). It should be noted that in addition to the peasants from Russia, in the 1880s Dungans and Uighurs were resettled to Kazakhstan from China (Kuldzha Territory), who were provided with 20 thousand acres of land on the right bank of the Chu River. 60 villages were formed, each household received from the tsarist government a loan of 6 rubles 17 kopecks and tax exemption for 10 years. Kazakhs and Kyrgyz (here real Kyrgyz are meant, who inhabit Kyrgyzstan and partly reside in the territory of Kazakhstan.—A.M.), from whom this land was taken away, did not receive anything for it (Pankratova et al. 2011: 430–431). A new stage of mass resettlement was associated with the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Part of the highway was supposed to pass through the territory of the Akmola region, where 2,241,503 acres of land were taken from the Kazakhs to provide it to 160,000 resettled peasants. By 1897, the Russian population in the Akmola region was already 33%. In the Turgai region, by 1897, the number of Slavs was already 7.71% of the total population. In the Ural region (western Kazakhstan), where

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the Slavic ethnos was represented by the Cossack army before the mass resettlement, 5480 peasant families moved in the period 1867–1897 (Nursultan 2007). Mass migration went, first of all, to the northern, western, and southeastern regions of Kazakhstan, the richest lands suitable for agriculture. “According to the data of the First General Census of the Russian Empire in 1897, in Kazakhstan (on its territory close to modern) there were 4147.7 thousand people, of which Kazakhs accounted for 3392.7 thousand, i.e. up to 81.7%, Russians—454.4 thousand—10.9%, Ukrainians—79.5 thousand—1.9%, Tatars over 55.9 thousand—1.4%, Uighurs over 55.8 thousand—1.4%, more than 29.5 thousand Uzbeks— 0.7%, etc.” (Nursultan 2007: 157). In 20 years, this picture will change dramatically. At first, the tsarist government made attempts to restrain the unregulated flow of peasant settlers, but after the adoption of the Stolypin agrarian reform in 1906, the resettlement process began to be organized and large-scale. To demonstrate, in 1909 the number of migrants amounted to 87,711 males, an increase of 350% compared to the same figures in 1906. Only in one Semirechensk region by 1913, out of 4 million 100 thousand acres of land suitable for arable farming, 2 million 674 thousand acres were given to the resettlement fund. To this should be added the lands seized by the settlers without permission, outside the resettlement fund (Abdurakhmanov 2014). In terms of regions, as of 1910, the number of Kazakhs was: Akmola region—36.6% (in 1897—61.1%); Semipalatinsk—73% (in 1897— 87.9%); Syrdarya—62.3% (in 1897—84.4%); Semirechenskaya—60.5% (in 1897—80.4%); Turgai—58.7% (in 1897—90.6%); Ural—56.9% (in 1897—71.3%). During the first 6 years of the implementation of the Stolypin reform (1907–1911), over 17 million acres of land were seized from the nomads, and by 1917 this figure amounted to more than 45 million acres of land (Bekmakhanova 1986). To this should be added the lands that were taken from the Kazakhs before 1907. By a decree of the Provisional Government in June 1917, the implementation of the Stolypin reform was terminated. Not a small interest is how the ratio of the autochthonous population and migrants has changed over the past 30 years.

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From 1885 to 1900, 645 thousand people moved to the Akmola region. During this period, the number of Russian peasants increased 15 times. In the western regions of Kazakhstan, from 1897 to 1917, there was also a change in the numerical ratio of Kazakhs and immigrants. The share of Kazakhs in the Inner Horde decreased from 96.5% to 84.3%; in Mangyshlak uyezd—from 93.0% to 82.7%. In the Ural region, by 1917, the Kazakhs left only 25.3%, and in the Kustanai district of the Turgai region—35.3% of the total population. A significant number of migrants fell to the west of Kazakhstan. In 1917, the number of Russians and Ukrainians amounted to 495.8 thousand people and 210.4 thousand people, respectively. In the Ural region, Russians and Ukrainians accounted for 44.4% of the total population, and in the Turgai region, these two ethnic groups accounted for 37.6% of the population (Pankratova et al. 2011: 157–158). In Zhetysu, in the period from 1897 to 1914, the number of Kazakhs increased by only 1.07% (from 515,001 to 550,976 people), while Russians and Ukrainians—by 2.5 times (from 71,958 to 189,988 people), Uighurs—by 1.4 times (from 4425 to 7148 people), Tatars—1.5 times (from 6907 to 10,413 people). If the proportion of Kazakhs over the indicated period decreased from 77.5% to 67.5%, then the percentage of the Russian and Ukrainian population increased from 10.83% to 22.1%; the growth of the Uighur population was from 8.4% to 9.58%; Tatars—from 1.04% to 1.27% (Bekmakhanov 1947: 98). Thus, in the period 1897–1916, 1301.4 thousand people moved to Kazakhstan from Russia and Ukraine. The number of Russians in Kazakhstan by 1917 increased to 1.099.8 thousand people, i.e. 2.4 times since 1897, and their share reached 18.4%. The number of Ukrainians during this period amounted to 653.5 thousand people, i.e. increased by 8.3 times, reaching 11% of the total population of Kazakhstan. Together, these two ethnic groups amounted to more than 1753.7 thousand people, or slightly less than a third of the total population of Kazakhstan population (Pankratova et al. 2011: 158). Apart from Russians and Ukrainians, Germans, Belarusians, Tatars, Estonians, and others moved to Kazakhstan. For example, by 1914, the Germans, who began to actively move to Kazakhstan in 1897, numbered over 63 thousand people. New waves of mass migration to Kazakhstan will take place against the background of the death of half of the number of Kazakhs during

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the Asharshylyk period, i.e. genocide of the indigenous population. In the 1930s, the dispossessed peoples were resettled in Kazakhstan, in the 1940s—deported peoples, in the 1950s the development of virgin lands will begin, which will provoke a new boom in resettlement in Kazakhstan. This will also change the proportion of Kazakhs and migrants in favor of the latter. The implementation of such mass migrations was impossible for most empires. For example, Britain or France were separated from the countries they colonized by a huge distance (Europe and Asia) or were located on different continents. This did not allow populating to the colonized territories of Africa and Asia with a significant number of immigrants from the metropolis and carrying out large-scale assimilation. The metropolises were represented in the colonies by the colonial administration, military units and an insignificant number of merchants, businessmen, priests, and other persons compared to the local population. The exceptions were the territories of Australia and North America, which were settled by immigrants from Europe, not only by residents of the named metropolitan areas. Thus, the territorial proximity of Russia and Kazakhstan made it possible to implement a policy of resettlement of a significant number of immigrants from the metropolis to the colonized territories. The settlers contributed to the colonial policy, they deprived the nomads of their most fertile lands and, if necessary, defended the colonial administration. In the case of India, for example, it was not possible for Britain to do the same. The British colonizers, with rare exceptions, left India after serving in the colonial administration, while in Kazakhstan the resettled population remained for permanent residence. This is how the land was seized, which was the main means of production for the nomadic clans inhabiting it. This circumstance not only did not take long to affect the decline in the well-being of local residents but also provoked conflicts between them and the settlers. Gradually, a myth was formed about supposedly “empty lands” (in fact, they were forcibly taken away from the local population), which can and should be populated. This myth ruled out the very question of where, at the expense of whom and in what way this land began to belong to the state treasury, the Cossacks, and the peasant settlers. Another myth spread the idea that the migrant peasants would civilize the Kazakhs and teach them a supposedly more efficient form of management—agriculture. Thus, the colonialists in Kazakhstan were represented not only by a small colonial administration and their families but also by a

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large number of immigrants from the metropolis, who massively, actively, and in a short time populated the colonized lands. The mass migration of peoples to Kazakhstan occurred in waves (from several tens of thousands to a million) over the course of a century: after the abolition of serfdom in 1861; in the 1880s–1890s after the famine in Russia; at the beginning of the twentieth century in the framework of the Stolypin reform; during the period of dispossession; for serving a sentence in the Gulag system; deportation of peoples in the 1930s–1940s; evacuation during World War II; during the development of virgin lands in the 1950s–1960s. The mass settlement of Kazakhstan, along with the reduction of the local population during the 1916 uprising, the Russian civil war, the resistance movement to Soviet power, Asharshylyk, the forced emigration of nomads, led to a significant decrease in the percentage of Kazakhs in the population of the republic. In 1926, the share of Kazakhs in Kazakhstan was 57.1%. According to the census in 1939, i.e. after two large-scale famines and the Great Terror, the share of Kazakhs in the republic was 37.8%. This factor played a fundamental role in Moscow’s choice of the economic, cultural, and personnel policy pursued in the republic, and also determined the difference in the scale of the consequences of colonization compared to other republics of the USSR, where the local population was the vast majority. The population census of 1959 showed that Kazakhs already made up 30% of the population of the republic. The share of Kazakhs in the total population of the republic grew slowly: 1970— 32.5%, 1979—36.0%, 1989—39.7%. In the years of independence, after the emigration of part of the population to Russia, Ukraine, Israel, Germany, the Baltic countries, and others, as well as due to the return of Kazakhs to the country from abroad, the indicator in question showed an increase. During the years of independence of Kazakhstan, the following dynamics of the number of Kazakhs in the country is observed: 1999— 53.4%, 2009—63.1%, 2021—70.4%. Thus, the indicator of 1897 (81.7%) has not yet been reached. Colonization usually does not break, does not destroy traditional forms and directions of management, especially in the agricultural sector, on the contrary, its volumes increase for export to the metropolis (at the same time, processing factories can be opened, mining industry, etc. can be developed). In Kazakhstan, the idea was imposed on the expediency of a

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wide transition of nomads to agriculture. During the period of colonization, the system of nomadic (transhumant) animal husbandry was broken, which was and could be the only most effective one precisely in the arid zone. At the turn of the nineteenth–twentieth centuries, only a small part, and in the 1930s the main part of the nomads lost the opportunity to earn a living in the usual way, which led to the impoverishment of a huge mass of the population, which previously had food thanks to animal husbandry, produced clothing, household items, housing, while selling the surplus of its economic activity. Thus, colonization led to the destruction of the traditional efficient form of agriculture, the economic indicators of which were not achieved during the entire subsequent Soviet period and have not been achieved to this day. Imperial colonization was not only continued but its consequences were exacerbated by the totalitarianism of the USSR period, namely the aggressive, overwhelming ideology, disenfranchisement, and punitive measures to bring the population to accept Soviet power. Speaking about the beginning of the Soviet period, one should mention the narrative promoted by the Bolsheviks about the supposedly already carried out decolonization. Its essence is contradictory: on the one hand, Soviet propaganda propagated the idea that the communists had already decolonized national minorities (the right of nations to selfdetermination), on the other hand, the Soviet government established a much crueler and more aggressive regime of colonial oppression. It, among other things, was an encroachment on national traditions, lifestyle, culture, history, and language. That is, an attempt was added to economic and political colonization to change the mentality of an entire people, to distort its identity, to change its self-esteem. The communists justified this policy by their intention to create a type of so-called Soviet man. To achieve the success of this event, the communists had to stop any attempts to defend their national identity, national interests on the part of representatives of the national republics. It was for this purpose that the modernly educated, democratically minded Kazakh national elite, formed at the end of the nineteenth century—the first quarter of the twentieth century, was gradually ousted and then persecuted, whose representatives insisted on decolonization and proposed mechanisms for its successful implementation. In order to disarm the national elite and deprive them of arguments in favor of the need for decolonization, the Soviet government announced

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that it had already carried out the liberation of the peoples, in connection with which this issue was removed from the agenda. Soviet propaganda replaced the anti-colonial appeals of the Alashordans and their sympathizers with supposedly anti-Bolshevik slogans, which opened the way for their persecution as opponents of Soviet power. By this method, the Soviet authorities deprived the representatives of the national elites of the opportunity and the right to update the anti-colonial discourse. This substitution, the ban on the retransmission of decolonial ideas, and the upholding of national interests makes it possible to equate tsarist colonialism and Bolshevism. The essentially close policy of the tsarist and Soviet authorities towards the national republics laid bare their common colonial character. Moreover, the accusation of the Kazakh national elite of anti-Bolshevism was supplemented, burdened with a new accusation—of Kazakh nationalism. Nationalism as a phenomenon was given exclusively negative semantics. The accusation of the Kazakhs, seeking to preserve their culture, history, language, territory, in “Kazakh nationalism” was used against them until the end of Soviet power. This allowed the communists not only to stop all talk about the colonial orientation of Bolshevism/communism, but also to destroy attempts at national self-determination. It was for this purpose that nationalism was declared reprehensible and unacceptable, although in essence it was expressed in the desire to preserve national culture, history, traditions, language, values, and religion. The persistent desire of the Kazakh national elite to carry out decolonization and gain the right to national self-determination led to large-scale political repression. Definitely, political terror affected the entire country, but in Kazakhstan it was those who expressed and promoted the ideas of national identity and defended the interests of the people against the Bolsheviks’ encroachments on the wealth, culture, lifestyle, and thinking of Kazakh nomads that were destroyed. Not only the leaders of AlashOrda were destroyed, but almost the entire educated layer of the nation. This circumstance significantly accelerated the process of further colonization and cultural assimilation of the Kazakhs. In addition, the destruction of the former national elite allowed the communists to clear the way for the formation of a new local elite, which was used to promote the policies of the Soviet government. Thus, the Kazakhs found themselves at the next stage of colonization, aggravated and toughened by total ideological domination and repressive policies.

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The destruction of the national elite opened the way not only to further colonization of the land (expansion to supposedly “empty” territories, mining, the nuclear Semipalatinsk test site, virgin lands, etc.), but also to the implementation of forced cultural assimilation, which was ensured by the ongoing resettlement of the population from different parts of the USSR. It should be noted that it also affected representatives of other ethnic groups, resettled, and deported to Kazakhstan. If, for instance, in the colonized countries, cultural assimilation (often voluntary) was subjected to people from local elites in order to use them for effective management of the local population, then in Kazakhstan during the Soviet period, assimilation was of a violent and massive nature. This found expression in a change in the national mentality, the way of life of people, the eradication of a number of national traditions, later— the distortion of history, the rapid reduction in the use of the Kazakh language, and the like. All these processes took place under the sign of modernization, which, in the execution of the Soviet government, a priori meant Russification. In other words, a monstrous experiment was undertaken—an attempt at total Russification of the Kazakhs, erasing their cultural code. Soviet modernization in the case of the Kazakhs meant the people’s rejection of their history, national identity, culture, language. The Khrushchev thaw (mid-1950s–mid-1960s), which led in other republics of the Soviet Union to a softening or curtailment of open Russification, in Kazakhstan, on the contrary, was expressed in the massive closure of Kazakh schools and the rapid Russification not only of Kazakhs, but also those living in the republic of representatives of other ethnic groups. As a reaction to these processes in the late Soviet period, the works of writers appeared, in whose work the anti-colonial discourse finds expression: I. Esenberlin, A Kekilbaev, S. Elubay, O. Bokeev, D. Isabekov, Sh. Murtaza, and others. Their works are an artistic appeal to the hushed facts of history and to the folklore tradition, the image of the philosophy of life and the tragic life of a former nomad, the coverage of the problem of Russification and the loss of national roots, the transformation of the way of life of the Kazakhs and their survival under Soviet rule, a reflection of the process of the disappearance of the aul and the growth environmental threats. Therefore, the natural questions start to arise: when does the actual post-colonial period begin in Kazakhstan? And why did the restoration of the Independence of Kazakhstan not lead to the beginning of the process

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of decolonization? In fact, anti-colonial processes emerged and matured already in the late Soviet period and continued into the 1990s. Signs of decolonization are manifested not just in legal rehabilitation, but in the return of the creative heritage of poets and writers repressed in the 1930s. Decolonial phenomena were essentially Zheltoksan (an uprising of Kazakh youth against the appointee from Moscow in December 1986) and the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement aimed at closing the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site. They developed under the sign of criticism of the colonial policy of the USSR and the demands for its termination. However, the listed movements did not receive a logical development and were not further formalized programmatically. The former Soviet nomenclature, which held power in its hands, took the Zheltoksan and Nevada-Semipalatinsk movements under its wing, and gradually both phenomena were deprived of their critical intensity and problematization of decolonial discourse. Thus, the problems of decolonization did not become the subject of reflection in politics, science, and culture and, as a result, were not reflected in political, economic, and other decisions. Hence the consequence—an ideological vacuum, the closedness of a number of topics and periods in the history of the twentieth century, limited access to archives, the unresolved issue of the rehabilitation of the Kazakh language, the colonial consciousness of a part of the population, the conservation of the “Sovietness” of the former Komsomol-party elite, and more. The former Soviet nomenklatura repeated what the Bolshevik propaganda had already done once, announcing the right of nations to self-determination and, thereby, supposedly carrying out the decolonization of the peoples colonized by tsarism. Now people from the Soviet nomenklatura have decided that the restoration of Independence automatically removes all the acute questions and problems of the previous period and allows history to start from scratch. Thus, the two stages of colonization, through which Kazakhstan passed with great losses, were left without proper understanding, evaluation, and attempts to overcome their tragic consequences. This was not long in affecting the position of modern Kazakhstan, where true independence has been supplanted by the symbiosis of the so-called internal colonization and neocolonization. That is, the colonization of the people by the already local “elite” (in fact, people from the Komsomol-party nomenclature), on the one hand, and neo-colonization

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by a number of powers and the Russian Federation, which finds expression in varying degrees of economic, political, ideological, information dependence.

2.4 Post-colonial Theory and the Process of Decolonization It is noteworthy that the post-colonial theory began to develop actively almost a third of a century after the destruction of the colonial system of the world. Moreover, in a number of countries, certain phenomena of post-coloniality and decolonial discourse were presented during the period of ongoing colonization and actively continued after the liberation of these countries from colonial dependence. Sometimes this process was sporadic, intuitive, subjective, emotionally overloaded, and accompanied by extremes in assessments, the discussion itself was presented mainly in journalistic works, political essays, fiction, and individual theoretical works (William Dubois, Leopold Senghor, Franz Fanon, Leroy Jones/Amiri Baraka, and others), in manifestos, declarations of political organizations and cultural associations (Pan-Africanism, Pau Brasil Organization for the development and protection of the black community, and others), as well as in original theories (Negritude theory, Rastafarianism, and others). This circumstance is largely due to the fact that at first, the postcolonial theory did not have the necessary scientific methodology and terminology. Post-colonial studies became possible with the spread of postmodernism as an ideological concept. Under the influence of the post-structuralism of Michel Foucault, the deconstructivism of Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and others, post-colonial studies acquired analytical tools and terminological apparatus, which made it possible to study the processes of decolonization on the basis of different geographical regions. Deconstruction, among other things, has armed researchers with methods for analyzing an ideologically saturated text, allowing them to reveal its essence and ultimate goal, determine the mechanisms for constructing narratives, see the broad context and hidden subtext, and discover its social, historical, political, and ideological conditioning. The subject of the study of post-colonial theory, the development of which was given by the work of E. Said “Orientalism” (Said 1978), is the legacy of the theory and practice of colonialism and imperialism. One of the tasks of post-colonial theory was the destruction of the binary oppositions West-East, civilized/barbarian. Instead, post-colonial

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studies considered phenomena traditionally opposed to each other from the point of view of their self-sufficiency, the presence of their inherent original features outside the evaluative categories of right/wrong, worse/ better, etc. This attitude led to a more objective view of phenomena that were previously evaluated from the position of power, hierarchy, tendentiousness, and political “expediency”. Within the framework of post-colonial theory as a critical approach, scientific, methodological tools were developed that armed scientists with research methods defined the subject of research, and outlined a range of issues, the problematization of which made it possible to significantly advance research. Thus, post-colonial studies acquired the conceptual approach they needed and allowed them to take their place in the academic environment. Today, post-colonial theory is represented in various fields of knowledge: philology, history, sociology, psychology, political science, economic geography, ecology, etc. Moreover, post-colonial studies have expanded significantly in recent decades, and their methodology is successfully used not only in studies of classical colonialism but also in the so-called internal colonization, as well as in conducting ethnic studies, studying the life of diasporas and diaspora culture, cross-cultural phenomena, etc. In addition to scientific value, post-colonial studies acquire special practical significance for the process of decolonization, which includes not only the disembodiment of (post)colonial consciousness, but also aims to overcome the negative consequences of colonization in the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres. In addition to those already mentioned, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Homi Bhabha, Stuart Hall, Toni Morrison, and Robert Young should be mentioned among the researchers who not only had a huge impact on post-colonial theory, but also presented samples of research that received wide recognition. A special place in this series is occupied by G.Ch. Spivak is the author of a number of works on post-colonialism, and a specialist in post-structuralist literary theory. G.Ch. Spivak worked with students and faculty at a number of the world’s leading universities and became convinced of the power of stereotypes, which were subject to both residents of the former metropolises and people from countries that were once in colonial dependence. G.Ch. Spivak (Spivak 1985) states the steady and continuing success of the imperialist project in the production and dissemination of inherently colonial ideas. This is because they are still

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present in some form or another in cultural artifacts: texts, TV programs, films, paintings, etc. G.Ch. Spivak has worked with children in Indian schools for many decades. She explained this, at first glance, unforgivable waste of time and energy of an authoritative and busy scientist the fact that she wanted to demonstrate to teachers (often victims of colonial rhetoric) how to form a generation free from colonial stereotypes. As long as teachers are subject to colonial stereotypes, it is difficult to set a goal to raise a new generation with a decolonized mindset. Until there is a decolonization of thought, we unwittingly prolong the life of colonialism, its practices, and its influence on our lives. In order to get rid of the mental colonial heritage, one should understand how it was formed, what it was based on, what it was directed at, and how it influenced the minds. As Franz Fanon noted in his essay “Black Skin, White Masks” (Fanon 1986), the colonizers did not stop at colonizing the people. They tried to change his national values, culture, and way of life by instilling the idea of their wrongness, second-rateness, and unsuitability, and instead they imposed their values, and their culture, thereby destroying the past history of the whole nation, its identity, its originality, its value. Stuart Hall (Hall 1989) points out that it is one thing when in the dominant discourse a person, society, or nation are positioned as “others”, different from the norm, and quite another thing when this “knowledge” is imposed on the subject, forcing him to see, to feel, to perceive oneself as “other”, “foreign”. Thus, not only external, but also internal, psychological, and mental domination over the colonized was carried out. Thus, a special blasphemy consisted in this imposed, forced alienation of a person from himself, his inner “I”. Undoubtedly, this internal alienation, the attitude to one’s nature as “other”, wrong, caused great harm to the identity, self-esteem of a person, community, and people. It is precisely this aggressive suggestion, the imposition of a tendentious, biased assessment of the colonizer on the colonized, that determines the “long trail” of colonization. The economic and political consequences are eradicated more quickly, and the mental consequences are much more permanent. Therefore, even the restoration of the country’s independence is not a guarantee of the completion of colonization or a successful exit from the state of colonization and the period of postcolonialism. Change, as an important component of the decolonization process, begins in the minds, and only then is it reflected in the ongoing politics, economy, social sphere, and culture.

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False stereotypes have become tools of “suppression, reshaping and subjugation” (Said 1978). That is why these tools should be given increased attention. This will make it possible to determine what exactly they tried to eradicate in the colonized people, what was subjected to change, and distortion, and what was re-designed and imposed on them. Understanding this will be a step towards liberation from what was instilled by the colonialist, and gaining, returning what was destroyed as an important component of national identity. Identity is not something once and for all established. It takes shape over the centuries for a people or throughout a lifetime for an individual; it is subject to transformation under the influence of historical events, ideological propaganda, censorship, and the like. This means that it can be broken, changed, or constructed by an external force. Leaving without understanding and evaluation what was actively, by all the forces of propaganda inspired the Kazakhs during the period of colonization, we, as a people, run the risk of further reinforcing these false stereotypes. Instead of preserving the ideas about ourselves that have been imposed on us, we must cleanse the national identity of what in it was conditioned by the view and assessment from the outside, artificially constructed and imposed on us. Without debunking these colonial myths, through which they tried to distort our own self-image and impose low self-esteem on us, we risk passing on all these propaganda lies to the next generations. And then all these colonial myths will be finally fixed in the identity of the nation, continuing their destructive impact. The task of post-colonial studies is not to present accounts and reproach, but to establish a dialogue, a step towards abandoning the previous tendentious approaches and overcoming the polarization in the relationship between the former colonizer and the former colonized. Not only the deconstruction of narratives associated with the previously colonized country must be carried out, but also the deconstruction of narratives relating to the former mother country (previously perceived biased, exclusively in a complementary vein, whose artificial elevation was achieved by downgrading the colonized). In other words, deconstruction allows you to clear everything superficial, politically engaged in relations between East and West, and in our case, also in the interaction of the nomadic and sedentary worlds. Thus, post-colonial studies become the basis for the decolonization of consciousness not only of residents and immigrants from former colonies, but also for the population of former empires.

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In this respect, post-colonial studies can be seen as anti-colonial. One of the ultimate goals of decolonization is the establishment of equal relations between the former colonizer and the colonized. The path to this lies through the liberation from the mythology that was formed, maintained, and spread from positions of power, in order to justify colonization, i.e. served the political goals and expansionist intentions of the empire. And if today the former empire positions itself as having abandoned its former aggressive aspirations, and declares equal allied relations, then, following the logic, it should also abandon the former colonial rhetoric, the purpose of which is political dominance, the seizure of territories, economic expansion, and ideological influence. As for Kazakhstan, the process of decolonization of consciousness here began from below. This applies to Zheltoksan (the youth uprising of 1986), and the restoration of the previously discriminated Kazakh language, and the increase in the number of Kazakh schools, and heated disputes in social networks that turn into “post-colonial battles”. National history, culture, language, literature, identity, Soviet heritage, understanding Soviet propaganda clichés and false stereotypes, including about nomadism, became the subject of discussion for a wide audience. At the same time, it can be stated that the official authorities of Kazakhstan, and partly the academic circles, prefer to distance themselves from this issue, tacitly resisting its spread, avoiding issues of ideology, assessing a number of events in the history of the twentieth century (this is also expressed in the lack of access to some archives). Attention is drawn to the fact that the government refrains from steps and decisions in foreign and domestic policy that are directly related to the process of decolonization and aimed at overcoming the negative consequences of the colonization of the country. One of the reasons for this distancing, as we see it, is that the process of decolonization will objectively affect the problem of de-Sovietization, and for the current government, which is the successor and heir to Soviet power, this is fraught with questions about its own nature, its inner essence, its goals. and tasks. Another reason lies in the unpreparedness and inability of the authorities to build processes of interaction with Russia on new, equal terms. However, as the development experience of the past two decades shows, delayed decolonization only exacerbates the problems, further enslaving the country.

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2.5 Post-imperial Syndrome and the Process of Decolonization It is mistakenly assumed that the process of decolonization concerns only countries that have emerged from colonial dependence. To no lesser extent, it also applies to the former metropolises, once colonial powers. The further development of a colonized country in the past depends not only on its own desire to decolonize or remain more or less dependent, but also to a large extent on the desire of the former metropolis to maintain its political and economic influence on previously dependent countries or, on the contrary, its readiness to build relationships on a fundamentally new foundation. Therefore, the second aspect of post-colonial discourse acquires particular relevance—the process of decolonization in the former metropolis. In a number of countries that carried out colonial conquests in the past, this process has passed or is still going on. It is not only a matter of overcoming and minimizing the negative consequences of the colonial expansion carried out in the past. A significant factor is the decolonization of the imperial mindset of the citizens of a former colonial power. The success of this project depends on the further development of the former empire, its acquisition of new meanings and ideas, new values and goals, and new positioning of itself in the post-colonial world. After the fall of the world colonial system, not only the colonies focused on the revival of statehood and national identity, but also the former metropolises faced the need to position themselves in a new way, which predetermined in some way a humanitarian crisis, overcoming which was often difficult and contradictory. According to Edward Said (Said 1978), power relations constitute the identity of the subject, “inscribed” in it. The thinking of the inhabitants of the metropolis was largely determined by the imperial status, and the mentality of the imperial nation evolved depending on the ongoing imperial policy, which, of course, could not but be reflected in the transformation of national identity and ethical values. The empire saw itself as a reflection of the colony, and positioned itself through an underestimation of the colonized people. Thus, the inhabitants of the metropolis perceived themselves as the highest (in comparison with the colonized peoples) nation, and this belief was based on “convenient” stereotypes, replicated by the forces of propaganda, through the system of education and science. One way or another, imperialism forms an identity and,

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given the fact that it is often built on false, politically motivated messages, it does harm, distorting the original nature and national essence of the people. The loss of the colonies and the associated need to build a new political and economic reality required the inhabitants of the metropolises to adjust their self-esteem, to look at themselves not against the background, not in comparison with the colonized peoples. This position without a priori superiority gave rise to anxiety and confusion. The collapse of the former ideological foundation required finding, and acquiring new meanings, and new (or former, pre-imperial) components of national identity. Residents of the metropolis are more or less susceptible to the postimperial syndrome. It is caused not only by the loss of the former guidelines but also by the inability/unwillingness to acquire a new (nonimperial) status, to become self-sufficient and recognize the equality of the Other. The post-imperial syndrome has been experienced by many former colonial powers facing a crisis of national identity. For example, the collapse of the British Empire hit hard on the national identity of the British. The decadent moods of the British saved the pride of their nation, which contributed to the victory over fascism. The search for oneself and one’s position in the new historical circumstances was reflected in the definition and opposition of the definitions of “Britishness” and “Englishness” among the British. In an effort to restore their identity, which has undergone changes under the influence of “imperiality”, the British turned their gaze inward. Hence the actualization of the concept of “Englishness” as opposed to “Britishness”, as well as the increased interest in national roots, folklore motifs (Tolkien), the history of the pre-imperial period, and Victorian England in the 1950s and 1960s. This interest was due to the desire to restore the behavioral, mental, and moral pattern of a typical Englishman (not the British Imperial), to free the national identity from the layers of imperialism. France experienced a similar period in the 1960s and 1970s after the Algerian Revolution. French humanitarians—historians, philosophers, sociologists, psychologists—realized that they should take an active part in the formation of new ideologies, strengthening the common identity of the ethnic groups inhabiting the country. Hence the criticism of Eurocentrism (J. Derrida) and limited, tendentious Orientalism, which became

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the basis for the destruction of former ideological clichés and stereotypes and, as a result, the creation and acquisition of new meanings. In the case of Japan, a significant factor in social, political, and mental transformations was not only the defeat in the Pacific War, but also the collapse of its imperial ambitions. The mental transformation, albeit carried out under pressure from the USA, was significant and showed the world a new strong Japan. Correlation, and interdependence of the process of decolonization in the former colonies and mother countries had a positive effect on both sides, allowing you to create new forms of interaction, and build partnerships on a fundamentally new basis. This helped to avoid or minimize potential conflicts, and to carry out the process of overcoming a shared negative past based on dominance and dependence. The process of decolonization in this case went far beyond political separation (secession), the destruction of pre-existing economic and other ties. An important role was played, first of all, by cultural and humanitarian projects aimed at rehabilitation and restoration of national identities. Most of the former empires that went through the process of decolonization took place in a new capacity. Without touching on the issue of further relations with the countries they once colonized, attention should be focused on internal processes, on the construction of a new identity of the former imperials, more precisely, its liberation from the imperial component. It was this renewed vision of themselves and their place in the world that allowed them to abandon revanchist sentiments and successfully develop in new historical conditions. The West has largely overcome the extremes of Eurocentrism and the fallacy of Orientalism. Of course, this does not mean the complete erasure of the oppositions own/alien or the image of the Other and does not cancel the fact of the mimicry of the imperialist project, which takes the form of neo-colonialism, economic expansion, cultural dominance, environmental exploitation, and the like. But one thing is certain: the decolonization of the former imperialist powers, their overcoming of the post-imperial syndrome has changed the world for the better, contributing to the growth of humanism, the expansion of human rights, and the overcoming of racial discrimination. Each of the countries that were part of the Russian Empire and/or the Soviet Union in the past follows its own complex and sometimes dramatic path, finding itself in a new post-colonial reality. It is impossible not to notice that neither Russia, as a former metropolis, nor the governments of

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some now independent states, demonstrate readiness for an active process of decolonization that affects a whole range of relations. We are witnessing attempts at revenge, on the one hand, and silence and avoidance of post-colonial issues, on the other hand. Hence the contradictory, ambiguous, hybrid forms of interaction with a multitude of political, economic, and social problems that follow. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine exposed this problem and demonstrated that even at first glance, the progressively thinking part of Russians is subject to the imperial syndrome. The sooner the process of decolonization begins, the more interdependent and interconnected it is, the more all parties will benefit and the more reliable will be the basis for further mutually beneficial relations. To illustrate, in Kazakhstan, at different levels of thinking (mental, linguistic, political, cultural), one can still observe the dominance of the former colonial and Soviet stereotypes and the principle of “Russiancentrism”. Of course, this is, first of all, a problem for Kazakhstan, or rather, a question for the establishment that determines domestic policy. However, the desire of the Russian Federation to keep the former colonies under its political and economic influence, in its information space also plays an important role. Is it possible to say that in Russia the importance of the decolonization process for itself finds understanding and broad support? Has it mastered the experience of other colonial empires in the past? Is there a process of turning “inward”, a search for internal reserves and the potential of the people, the restoration of national identity? Is there a self-sufficient Russia outside of the status of “elder brother” that it has appropriated to itself, in other words, is there a “selfhood” in it? irrelevant to something or someone? After all, like the West, which defined itself through the East, Russia positioned itself in a flattering comparison with the numerous “outskirts”. It should be noted that the post-colonial discourse, widely represented in the Western academic environment, in Russian science is reflected in the works of only a small number of researchers and has known boundaries, possibly due to an ambiguous and partly painful attitude to the issue of Russia’s imperial past. The problem is not in the absence of the methodology of post-colonial theory but in the unwillingness to apply it to one’s own historical past and present to one’s own subjectivity and identity. Considering the past from the standpoint of post-colonial theory touches on sore points and reveals the far-favorable role of Russia in the

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history of the peoples it once colonized. The problem is complicated by the fact that in today’s Russia, there is a so-called internal colonization, signs of which are found in the policy pursued in relation to a number of subjects of the federation. Can these reasons be sufficient grounds to avoid post-colonial discourse? After all, it is scientists who are able to put an end to the past relationship between the colonizer and the colonized and create a new basis for further partnerships. An unbiased examination of the recent past, overcoming barriers in the application of post-colonial (post-imperial) discourse will not only reveal the internal potential of the nation for further development but also stop explosive discussions, imperial rhetoric, expansionist sentiments that do little to promote the peaceful coexistence of peoples. The process of colonization had a negative impact not only on the identity of the colonized peoples but also on the Russian people. By the period of the formation of Russia as a colonial power, the process of folding a single Russian nation was not completed (unlike, for example, the British or Japanese), which played a significant role in the sharp breakdown of identity and its distortion due to the transition from the recent serf existence to imperial status, from dependence on European culture to attempts to impose their own cultural dominance. The questions of the formation of Russian identity are of particular interest; its formation in the era of Peter I and Catherine I; its demolition, due to the intellectual and mental dependence of the Russian nobility on Europe; ideological confrontation between Westerners and Slavophiles; the abolition of serfdom as a false decolonization experience; new enslavement by forced collectivization and more. To understand the process of folding and transformation of Russian identity, significant material is provided, for example, by the book by M.N. Virolainen “Historical Metamorphoses of Russian Literature” (Virolainen 2016). It should be understood that the issues of decolonization are more than scientific discourse. In this regard, it is appropriate to talk about the responsibility of scientists who should contribute to the decolonization of the consciousness of their nations and the creation of new meaning-forming values. The inhibition of these processes contributes to the successful revival of imperial rhetoric, opens the way for imperial propaganda (in the case of the Russian Federation), and determines the ongoing colonial project (in the case of Kazakhstan). The military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine is the result of an ongoing

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imperial project, Russia’s postponed decolonization process, the unwillingness of its intellectual elite to raise a whole layer of problems related to Russia’s imperial past, and the current moral state of the nation.

2.6

Post-colonial Syndrome and Collective Memory

The post-colonial syndrome is expressed in the dependence of thinking on the views and assessments implanted by imperial propaganda, in the preservation of an inferiority complex (of a person, people, country, national culture, etc.), as well as in positioning oneself as a victim. Getting rid of this syndrome is possible only through decolonization of thinking, reassessment of oneself and one’s place in the world. On this path, it is important to understand how the post-colonial syndrome was formed and on what it is based. In this regard, one of the significant aspects is the phenomenon of memory. The confrontation between the canonized, official history, and collective memory, the discrepancy between different versions of the historical past makes us turn to its re-comprehension through distancing from the previously generally recognized, permissible/permitted interpretations of the events of recent history. What is collective memory and why does it become such an important element in opposition to official history? Collective memory is a symbolic reconstruction, a representation of one’s past by society. It is expressed in value orientations, behavioral norms, and cultural preferences, as well as in psychological complexes and pain points. The main function of collective memory is the formation and maintenance of individual and group identity. According to M. Halbwachs (Halbvaks 2005), positioning oneself as a community cannot do without knowledge of one’s own past. P. Nora writes about the regularity in the process of decolonization of the appeal to the collective memory of the people who emerged from the yoke of the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century. Ideological decolonization is expressed in the appeal of the liberated peoples to the collective memory to restore their own history, destroyed or distorted in their favor by the dominant regime (Nora 2005). The break with the past, which has to be restored through historical reconstruction, may be due not only to false interpretations of historical events dictated by political expediency but also to the abuse of memory. Paul Ricoeur considers the following types of abuse: delayed memory

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(forgetting); memory as an object of manipulation; improperly oriented memory (managed) (Ricoeur 2004). Memory abuse can be expressed in an emphasis, increased attention on some events of the past, and at the same time on silence, obscuring others. And then we are talking about the abuse of forgetfulness. We find the facts of redundancy, for example, in the increased attention to the events of the revolution, civil war, World War II, and, on the contrary, the facts of insufficient memory—in the concealment of the uprising of 1916, armed resistance to Soviet power at the turn of the 1920–1930s, Asharshylyk. The problem of default, the fragility of memory is transferred to the problem of the fragility of identity and the associated inadequate assessment of the present, incorrect planning of the future. Forgetting events can be provided by a compulsion to repeat, and memorize events and their interpretations, which prevents independent awareness of tragic events and what caused the injury. Thus, the repetition of what has been imposed, assimilated, and learned is forgetting, ousting from memory what should have been hushed up and not mentioned. Assimilated ideologically acceptable interpretation of historical events is passed down from generation to generation and becomes the official version of history. It constitutes a canon, in accordance with which each member of society “remembers” (memorized) and reconstructs and interprets all other events of his life and the life of society. In fact, his memory, knowledge, and interpretations do not correlate with memories, not with the real past of the community, but only with a given, sanctioned model of the past. Memory manipulation is a powerful tool for manipulating public consciousness. Official history reinforces and ensures the existence of imposed memory—a memory that has been taught through the forced memorization of events, historical figures, and interpretation of facts. Facts and events are selected in a certain way. Those of them that can strike at the ruling regime are carefully ignored and erased from memory. So, for the Kazakhs, the October Revolution, the Civil War, and the Second World War (called the Patriotic War) were important milestones in the history of the twentieth century. However, such events that are directly related to the Kazakhs, such as the uprising of 1916, the Kazakh autonomy Alash proclaimed in 1917 and existed for more than two years, hundreds of centers of resistance of the sarbaz to collectivization, expropriation of livestock, were hushed up. Other events were subjected to distortion and were called upon to

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develop a firm rejection of the opponents of Soviet power. So, the sarbaz were called “bands of Basmachi”, and the figures of Alash-Orda were called Japanese spies. The functioning of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site and the development of virgin lands were interpreted as a blessing, while the negative consequences of these experiments were hushed up. Asharshylyk of the early 1920s and early 1930s was not mentioned at all. In addition to the history taught, cinematography, memorial ceremonies, parades, and monuments serve to reinforce the imposed memory, designed not to resurrect the memory, but to consolidate the acquired knowledge and interpretations. This was how the legitimization of knowledge about national history was carried out, and the historical memory was introduced, which was recognized to be fundamental for a common Soviet identity. P. Ricoeur calls it memory-habit—a memory that is activated, cultivated, trained, and formed (Ricoeur 2004). The failure of the official version of Soviet history or the crisis of the legitimization of knowledge was due to the fact that the past of one of the subjects of the union (Russia) was proposed as a common history, which had little correlation with the history of others, as well as the presence of gaps between sanctioned history and collective memory. Retained memory refers to the memory of events artificially subjected to forgetting. Forgetting strategies can be varied: silence, shift in emphasis, attention to certain figures and distraction from others, distortion of the true goals and consequences of the event, etc. For example, the emergence of a large number of orphanages was explained by the events of the civil and World War II, while in Kazakhstan they were the result of an artificially created famine in the early 1920s and 1930s; an event that was objectively considered the colonization of Kazakhstan by tsarist Russia, after the Second World War began to be called “voluntary accession” to Russia (certainly with the stable epithet “voluntary”)—such substitutions and displacements lead to a distortion of historical events, their premises, consequences, assessments, and, ultimately transform collective memory and identity. M. Halbwachs describes the “retarded memory” syndrome: major historical events that severely traumatize consciousness are subject to relative oblivion or repression of the traumatic experience from the memory for about fifteen years (Halbvaks 2005). This phenomenon can take place in the case of such historical events as collectivization and forced sedentarization, Asharshylyk and the bitter truth about the Second World War, which the witnesses refrained from talking about. The difficulty of

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addressing delayed traumatic memories is associated with a painful need to reevaluate past events, life (of a person, communities) and identity, to experience a state of conflict between one’s own knowledge of events and what was officially voiced. In the case of repression of traumatic experience, memory management also takes place. The rejection of truthful stories about the tragic past in a totalitarian system can be caused not only by psychological rejection, but also by the fear of punishment for voicing what was excluded from the official version of history. In an effort to clean up history, not only material evidence was confiscated, but people who were ready to voice the truth of memory were also destroyed. The purpose of the intimidation, the threat of punishment for relaying true memories, was to deprive the “others” of the right to vote, a monopoly on memory and history. One of the reasons for the political repression of the 1930s that targeted the educated national elites was to silence them forever. One of the tasks of manipulation or the so-called instrumentalization of memory—erasure of traces. P. Ricoeur touches on the issue of amnesty, forgiveness, which is raised where there is a place for condemnation, accusation, and punishment (Ricoeur 2004). Retarded memory leads to a shift in the boundary between forgetfulness and amnesty towards amnesia. The undermining of controlled amnesia and, as a result, an identity crisis, actualizes many issues and makes it possible to re-read and appropriate the past. Retained memory is incorrect or traumatic forgetting that is indicative of an injured or diseased memory. Scholars often use Freudian psychoanalysis to understand how collective trauma works and how to avoid it. Paul Ricoeur writes: “The first lesson of psychoanalysis is this: trauma continues to exist, even if it is incomprehensible, inaccessible. In its place, phenomena of substitution arise, symptoms that in many ways mask the return of the repressed, which must be deciphered in the joint work of patient and analyst. The second lesson is that, under specific circumstances, entire pieces of the past that were considered forgotten and lost can return” (Ricoeur 2004: 615). In order to understand its depressive or disturbing state, or simply stop hiding it from itself, society must focus on the origins of the disease, and its syndromes. To recover it, sometimes it is enough to accept one’s past, not constructed, but real, with all its defeats, mistakes, losses, and traumas. Society (and man) is either in decline, depression, or melancholy,

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or through the work of remembrance it is cleansed and makes room for the new. The distortion of memory, its incorrect operation, and manipulation of it give rise to a gap in identity. Reinterpretation of history, expansion of the field of vision makes it possible to detect gaps in identity, determine the mechanisms of its distortion and, as a result, restore the field of identity. The next important point is the concept of the duty of memory, which includes a duty towards those who preceded us, or who experienced tragic events. We not only inherit them (land, history, traditions, etc.), but also have a duty towards them in repaying their memory, understanding their feat, mistakes, strength, weakness, and victims. It is important to understand that we are talking about others, not about us. And the sacrifices were made by them, not by us. Having assumed the right of their voice, it is important to refrain from the abuse of memory, not to fall into extreme idealization or accusations. It is necessary to have the wisdom and courage to see the objective historical context, to recognize the idea that in our past there were heroes and traitors who resisted and resigned, died of hunger, and migrated. Our task is to accept everything, without exception, without censorship, in order to avoid further memory manipulation. At the same time, it is important not to fall into the trap of the victim, not to see yourself in the position of the victim. We can talk a lot about the traumatic nature of the colonial and totalitarian experience, about the other side of Soviet modernization—physical and mental violence, destruction, which gave rise to severe historical trauma. But trauma is something that should be got rid of, and not nurtured, not nurtured in yourself. And here it is appropriate to say about the significance of the reinterpretation of history, the discovery of new, previously hushed-up events, facts, and evidence. We already know that our ancestors were not silent victims of colonialism and totalitarianism; yes, they lost the fight, but they resisted and defended their historical right to choose their way of life, values, traditions, history, and culture. They responded to the challenge of their time, were defeated, but saved the land and their descendants. And we must not remain victims of their defeat. It does not lessen our sorrow, but it reconciles us with our past and gives us strength. A new, fuller, and broader awareness of the events of the first half of the twentieth century brings many facts of the country’s history closer to the stories of our families. In this way, the

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gap between collective memory and history is reduced, and places where identity gaps pass are exposed. Liberation from the post-colonial syndrome is a way not to remain a victim of the colonial past, it is a way to overcome its consequences on a mental level. In this regard, we should mention the concept of postcolonial sensitivity, which consists of the ability to identify and respond to manifestations of dependent, colonial thinking, self-flagellation, lack of faith in historical consistency, and self-sufficiency (examples: “It’s a pity that we were a colony of Russia, not Great Britain”, “We need external management”, “How good it was in the USSR”, “For the implementation of reforms, Saakashvili must be called”, “Russia will not allow us; she will not let us go”, “We have no leaders”, “We have the wrong people” “We’re better off with Russia than China”. The carriers of such thinking, in search of a role model and a criterion for success, cite not the modern advanced countries, but the backward USSR and imperial Russia. This appeal to the colonial past as an example of a better, dignified life, in spite of the facts of totalitarian violence, dependence, and discrimination, is an example of colonial thinking. Only by freeing yourself from the postcolonial syndrome and colonial thinking, you can improve your health and clear the mental “place” for accepting the new. The listed abuses of memory are of particular relevance because the practice of manipulating memory and controlled oblivion continues to be used already in the recent history of Kazakhstan. For the purpose of an implied amnesty, a number of tragic events are surrounded by oblivion (Zheltoksan, Shanyrak, Zhana-Ozen, Kantar); the wrong orientation of memory is called upon to consolidate new historical “milestones” supported by propaganda; the ongoing reconfiguration creates new “fathers of the nation” and “elite” (street names, etc.); the displacement of memory implements the consolidation of sanctioned interpretations of ongoing events, etc. It is important that the right to vote, the right to remember, their version of what is happening are not deprived of others, other than official historians, narrators, and propagandists. Here it is appropriate to recall the following point. M. Halbwachs argued that there are as many collective memories as there are groups of people (communities). Probably, in Kazakhstan, not only the collective memory of the Kazakhs is in conflict with the sanctioned history of the twentieth century. Have we heard the voices of the dispossessed and resettled, the voices of the deported peoples? This is necessary to free them from the traumatic experience of deportation and restore their distorted

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identity. The collective memory of representatives of ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan is an integral part of the history of our country in the twentieth century.

2.7

Cultural Dominance: Yesterday and Today

Determining the dominant presence of imperial culture that suppresses national culture, demonstrating the structure and mechanisms of cultural dominance has become one of the important components of post-colonial discourse. The problem of cultural dominance and the cultural dependence associated with it was considered in the works of F. Fanon, E. Said, G.Ch. Spivak, N. Chomsky, A. Gramsci, S. Hall, and others. By colonizing peoples and justifying the cultural dominance of the colonizer over the colonized, empires emphasized the progressive and modernizing role of colonization. Any colonized people was perceived by the “mother country” within the framework of stereotypes that allowed the colonists to place themselves culturally higher and, thereby, justify their so-called “civilizing mission”, and in fact justify their aggressive aspirations, the purpose of which was nothing more than economic and political bondage. In order to be able to place themselves on a higher stage of development, the colonialists needed to inspire the colonized people with the idea of their backwardness. At the same time, the colonizer was little familiar with the culture of the colonized people, however, the imposed culture was a priori assessed as more developed. Without a doubt, a certain part of Russian culture (literature, painting, music, etc.), which received an impulse for development in the nineteenth century under the influence of European culture, was at a higher stage of development than Kazakh. However, with regard to the general culture of the people (broad education, traditions, moral values, social behavior, behavioral norms, worldview, etc.), then it is not necessary to talk about the undoubted advantage of Russians during the period of colonization. For example, according to the census of the Russian Empire in 1897, the number of literate people was 21.1%. This figure fluctuated depending on the region, and most higher rates were in cities. Most of the people remained illiterate. So, for example, the percentage of illiterate recruits in the most developed part of the empire—the so-called European Russia—was

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68.66% in 1887. It should be recalled that the Kazakhs dealt with representatives of the colonial administration and migrant peasants, who did not have a high level of culture. In a letter dated October 7, 1904, student Khalel Dosmukhamedov, a future member of the People’s Council of the Alash government, wrote about the migrant peasants who were given Kazakh lands: “They are being distributed to peasants, new cultural troopers of our people. Cultural trade unions (…) it is scary to say that this word is about the peasants who are now settled in our steppe in order to ‘cultivate’ it. They cultivate it by spreading tobacco, vodka, deceit, theft, debauchery and poverty…” (Movement Alash 2011: 119–120). It was problematic to talk about the introduction of Kazakhs to high culture through contact with Russian settlers. Under these conditions, the suppression, displacement, and discrimination of the culture of the Kazakhs and the imposition of a culture alien to them were carried out. Traditions, language, music, poetry, applied arts, social relations, legal system, way of life, and ways of managing the Kazakhs were declared inferior, backward, in need of correction, or even eradication. Against this background, Russian culture was offered as a model. In Kazakhstan, cultural dominance was carried out in several stages. During the period of tsarist colonization, a number of Kazakh traditions, customs, ethical values, and the system of law were gradually being forced out, the Christianization of Kazakhs was encouraged through the provision of land and through the education system in Russian schools. The possibility of Kazakhs being baptized was seen as a means of bringing them into submission. In a letter classified as “Secret” dated August 20, 1864, the military governor of the Region of Siberian Kazakhs and the Governor-General of Western Siberia speaks of the possibility of planting Christianity among the Kazakhs. We read: “Your Highness, dated May 15 of this year, under No. 101, suggested that I deliver an opinion on the conversion of the Kyrgyz (Kazakhs.—A.M.) to Orthodoxy . The insufficiency of the Russian population among the Kyrgyz did not give them the opportunity to become well acquainted with the life of the Russians; however, the Orthodox population in the steppe is increasing every year, especially along the trade routes, and there is no doubt that the civilization of the Kyrgyz goes in parallel with the increase in the Russian population.

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The Kyrgyz in the general mass, although they are considered Mohammedans, but religious concepts are slightly developed among them, especially in the northern part of the steppe. In the southern half, i.e. on the other side of the river Ishim and in the Karkaraly district, fanatical Islamism is more developed, and for the first time it will not be safe for both missionaries and public order to openly preach the Christian religion there. Some of these Kyrgyz, but mostly from a poor state, living in the service of the Cossacks, by their own conviction, convert to Orthodoxy. However, here, too, I consider the main obstacle to the spread of Orthodoxy to be the Kyrgyz class, more educated and wealthier, brought up mostly by Tatar mullahs in the rules of the Mohammedan confession. For these reasons, the open preaching of Christianity can be successful and should not arouse fanatical opposition on the part of the Horde between the Kyrgyz, wandering near Russian settlements and on the lands of the Cossacks, i.e. within a distance of 10 versts from the line, if it involves extreme caution, but no less than that, it is necessary first to take administrative preparatory measures for the conversion of the Kyrgyz to Christianity, such as: providing them with some land or other benefits, as well as financial assistance to the newly baptized. Lieutenant General [Signature illegible]” (State archive of the Omsk region). Already at the end of the nineteenth century, the colonial administration began to pursue a policy of Russification, the purpose of which was to assimilate the Kazakhs and representatives of other Asian peoples living in Kazakhstan, depriving them of their national identity. In November 1898, the Turkestan Governor-General issued an order according to which the Russian language was immediately introduced into the office work of local native public administrations by replacing the position of volost clerks exclusively with Russians. Translators, police officers, watchmen, employees of county and regional institutions, and volost governors were replaced in a similar way. To occupy the positions of a volost manager, city and village foremen and their assistants, and a people’s judge, it was necessary to graduate from a Russian-native school (Pankratova et al. 2011). Then, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the colonial administration prevented the opening of printing houses, and the growth of the publication of books and newspapers in the Kazakh language. The total circulation of Kazakh books in the period from the beginning of active colonization (the last third of the nineteenth century) to 1917 exceeded 2 million copies. These are 508 titles of books on folklore, fiction, history,

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law, medicine, veterinary medicine, technology, religious and spiritual literature, textbooks, dictionaries, and reference books. By 1917, about 200 works by Kazakh writers were published, including translated books. The tsarist government was wary of the process of book printing, which was gaining momentum in the Steppe, and put up obstacles. For example, if in 1914 in the Kazakh language, 4 works were published with a circulation of 191,500 copies, then in 1915 26 works could be published only in the amount of 85,850 copies, that is, the total circulation was halved, while the number of created works increased by 8 times (Razdykova 2010). Many books in the Kazakh language were not censored. School textbooks were often among them. Books for Muslim schools were subjected to strict censorship by the tsarist authorities. All Muslim literature imported from abroad, as well as printed in Russia, fell into the St. Petersburg Censorship Committee. The censorship committee took measures to counter the Kazakh enlighteners, in whose actions the tsarist authorities saw the desire to consolidate the Kazakhs through the press and literature, as opposed to all-Russian tasks and interests. As a result, supervision of the book trade was established in Kazakhstan. Such prohibitive measures led the Kazakhs to hide uncensored books and hectographed brochures in the Kazakh language. In response, tsarist officials practiced searches in the homes of educated Kazakhs and mullahs in order to seize books. The political system, ideology, and culture are interdependent, especially in the conditions of an empire or a totalitarian system. During the Soviet period, the system of cultural dominance was marked by modernization and the creation of a kind of Soviet culture. By “Soviet culture” was meant Russian culture. Thus, the tsarist colonial policy was continued, aimed at the cultural assimilation of the Kazakhs. Russian culture (language, literature, cinema, music, behavioral norms, traditions, etc.) dominated, and this dominance was supported by the means of ideology, science, the education system, and cinema. However, drastic measures were taken first. The practice of seizing books has acquired grandiose proportions. The Soviet government set out to destroy the cultural heritage of the Kazakhs. Everything that was written in Arabic was subjected to burning. The size of the seizure was measured not even by the number of books or banned authors, but by poods. In 1921, the literary and publishing department of the Glavpolitprosvet began work in Kazakhstan. N.K. Krupskaya signed instructions

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for the removal of counter-revolutionary literature from repositories and libraries. The consequences of this step for Kazakhstan were devastating because the works of Kazakh classics Dauletkerei, Kurmangazy, Suyunbai, and others were prohibited. Azimbay Gali writes that the Bolsheviks launched a real bibliocide. Throughout Kazakhstan, censors worked “on the eradication of enemy literature”. In the report of Chief Inspector Pavlov, it is noted that in just 5 months of 1923, 41,000 copies of Kazakh-language literature were confiscated from libraries and depositories in Kazakhstan (Gali 2002). In 1927, many works of art by modern Kazakh writers were confiscated, as well as musical notations of “500 songs of the Kazakh people” by A. Zatayevich, who recorded more than 2300 works of Kazakh musical folklore that have come down from ancient times and the Middle Ages, as well as works by modern Kazakh composers. The policy of devaluing Kazakh culture as feudal and contrary to Soviet ideology continued. Under the sign of modernity, everything traditional was crossed out as patriarchal, obsolete. Emphasized contempt for dombra, kobyz, genres of Kazakh poetry, yurt, and the like were intended to turn Kazakhs away from adherence to their culture, and to make them ashamed of their cultural heritage. Following this, everything Kazakh was subjected to criticism and sarcasm, a derogatory assessment. This practice continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its echoes are still heard today. At the same time, Russian folk musical instruments, sarafan, vodka, etc., strangely did not fall under the definition of patriarchal, contrary to the tasks of modernization. Another direction of establishing cultural dominance is the destruction of the Kazakh language. The Arabic graphics used by the Kazakhs allowed them to read any Turkic-language publications, incl. and published abroad, which was considered politically harmful by the Soviet authorities. And in 1929, a sharp translation of the Kazakh script from Arabic to Latin was carried out. This made it possible to tear the Kazakhs away from the huge spiritual heritage of many centuries, recorded in books with Arabic script. Educated Kazakhs began to copy the surviving and newly created books from the Arabic script into the Latin script so that the next generations could read them. However, this did not save the situation for two reasons. Firstly, on July 9, 1937, the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Kazakhstan “On the seizure of Alashordyn and nationalist literature” was sent under the stamp of top

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secret to the local censorship authorities. In other words, almost everything that was written over more than a third of the twentieth century by the educated elite of Kazakhstan should have been seized. As part of the next resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Kazakhstan “On the Seizure of Hostile Literature” dated May 28, 1938, books began to be withdrawn from libraries, book depositories, and the trading network, the authors of which fell under the millstone of political repression and were recognized as “enemies of the people”. The works of art and textbooks written by the Alashordans were mostly confiscated during arrests, searches, confiscation of property, and then disappeared. Secondly, in the 1930s, the carriers of moral norms, knowledge, history, and customs of the Kazakhs (biy, shezhireshi, zhyrshi, akyns) were expelled, executed, disappeared, all those who could restore the destroyed fund of knowledge. For the same reason, almost the entire Kazakh intelligentsia, who had a higher education, spoke several languages (Western and Eastern), and was able to write books, create textbooks, and translate, was subjected to repressions and executions. Thirdly, 10 years after the change of the Arabic script to the Latin alphabet, in 1939 the Kazakh language was translated into Cyrillic. As a result of two similar reforms of Kazakh writing within one decade, the Kazakhs were artificially cut off from the literary heritage that had previously been accumulated by the people, as well as from the literature created by modern writers in Arabic and Latin. Mass seizures of books occurred continuously in the Soviet Union until the 1950s. In 1950–1951, 97 thousand books were withdrawn from libraries in Kazakhstan. There was nothing more to destroy. Only Soviet literature, predominantly Russian, remained. In schools, Kazakh children studied Russian classics, since Kazakh classics were destroyed or banned. A similar situation developed in the history of the Kazakhs. It was rewritten, distorted, and interpreted through the prism of Soviet ideology and only in connection with Russia and its “civilizing” mission. The Kazakhs partly preserved their history thanks to tribal memory, the history of Kazakh clans. Each Kazakh knew the history of his family, and this knowledge was in conflict with the officially recognized Soviet version of Kazakh history. Clearly, the desire of the Soviet authorities to destroy Kazakh culture met with resistance. P. Chatterjee considers the response in the form of defending one’s cultural field, inner life as anti-colonial nationalism,

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designed to protect national independence in the spiritual sphere (Chatterjee 2002). Having lost their political independence, the Kazakhs sought to preserve their spiritual independence. During the entire Soviet period in the history of Kazakhstan, all political persecution, repression, repression, and executions took place under the sign of the fight against Kazakh nationalism. The definition of “nationalism” has acquired an exclusively negative meaning. All Alashordans were executed for their adherence to the ideas of preserving their territory, language, culture, and traditional form of management—nomadic cattle breeding. Here are some examples to illustrate. The poet M. Zhumabaev tried to create a literary association of Kazakh writers. The Bolsheviks considered this intention a manifestation of nationalism and subjected the poet to harassment and then exile. He was shot in 1938. The poet M. Dulatov opposed the reform of the Arabic alphabet, believing that this measure would lead to the loss of their native language, and the alienation of the people from their own history. In 1928 he was arrested on charges of nationalism, after a while he was exiled for 10 years to the Solovetsky camp, where he died in 1935. Alikhan Bukeikhanov, who acted as the main ideologist of the national liberation struggle against Tsarist Russia and the policy of Russification in the Steppe region, sought political self-determination for his people. Under Soviet rule, he was accused of nationalism and shot in 1937. The Soviet Kazakh writer S. Seifullin, who called in 1923 to return to the Kazakhs their name instead of the imposed “Kyrgyz”, “KyrgyzKaisaki”, was considered a nationalist. At one of the interrogations in 1929, in response to the accusation of nationalism, he answered, setting out the essence of his nationalism: “We want our fatherland to belong to us”. He was arrested in 1937 on charges of bourgeois nationalism and shot in 1938. After the Second World War, Kazakh historians and professional writers tried to restore the true history of the Kazakhs, but these attempts were severely suppressed. So, for example, in 1848, E. Bekmakhanov’s monograph “Kazakhstan in the 20 s and 40 s of the XIX century” was published, in which the author tried to give an objective interpretation of the historical role of Khan Kenesary, under whose leadership the liberation struggle was waged in 1837–1847 years. Article in the central newspaper “Pravda” in “bourgeois nationalism”. The scientist was sentenced to 25 years in prison (released in 1954, the year after Stalin’s death).

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Next, an ideological campaign began to combat “bourgeois nationalism” and “political mistakes” in the coverage of Kazakh history, literary criticism, and folklore. The risk of persecution threatened nationally oriented figures. Social scientists, biologists, physicians, geologists, musicians, and writers were persecuted and expelled from higher educational institutions and scientific institutions. Among them, Doctor of Geological and Mineralogical Sciences K. Satpaev, composer and musicologist A. Zhubanov, Doctor of Philology and poet Kh. Zhumaliev, Head of the Department of Pre-Revolutionary History of Kazakhstan Institute, Institute of HA&E of the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR as well as B. Suleimenov and others. Those who were put on trial were judged exponentially, accompanying the campaign with devastating articles in the central press, discussion, and condemnation at meetings of labor collectives. Terrifying terms of imprisonment—25 years of exile in camps—should have turned people away from even thinking about national revival. In the 1960s, the writer I. Yesenberlin was persecuted for his historical novels. In his novel “Nomads” and other books, Soviet ideologists and literary critics saw “propaganda of nationalism”. The writer tried only to preserve history for the Kazakhs, at least in artistic form. The mental breakdown occurred after Asharshylyk in the 1930s, when about a million Kazakhs were forced to migrate, and the number of Kazakhs was halved. The survivors, broken by hunger, struck by the cruelty of reprisals, and the readiness of the Soviet government to destroy any number of people in order to achieve their goals, simply fell silent, and abandoned attempts to rebel. The task of the survivors remained the same—to save, and raise children, so that the people would not disappear from the face of the earth. The adoption of the Russian language and culture became a matter of survival, and later, in the second half of the twentieth century, it became the only means of social success, higher education, and work in the field of science, education, medicine, and industry. Gradually, the position of the Kazakh language became more and more critical. Its active displacement began with the directive promotion of the Russian. In 1938, the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On the compulsory study of the Russian language in the schools of the national republics”. In 1955, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR “On exemption from the

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compulsory study of the Kazakh language in Russian schools” was issued. In 1957, a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR “On the mandatory study of the native language by Kazakh students studying in schools where teaching is conducted in Russian” was issued. However, for all the remaining years of the existence of the USSR, the teaching of the Kazakh language in schools with the Russian language of instruction has not established. In the 1950s–1960s, an active policy of cultural assimilation of the Kazakhs began to be pursued. This was reflected in the rapid reduction in the number of schools with Kazakh language of instruction. Thus, in the period from 1950–1970s, out of 3891 Kazakh schools, only 2577 remained. Sometimes these were small schools in rural areas, which were enlarged by creating boarding schools. But the very fact that for Kazakhs getting an education in their native language was associated with the need to live away from home, in a boarding school, speaks of additional obstacles. In the same two decades, the number of Russian schools increased by 1.5 thousand. It should be noted that the vast majority of Kazakh schools were located in rural areas. It was difficult to get an education in the Kazakh language in the city. In large cities (Alma-Ata, Karaganda) there were only two schools with the Kazakh language of instruction. In a number of cities, there were no Kazakh schools at all. In addition, artificial barriers were created for those who did not speak Russian. Many spheres of professional activity remained inaccessible to them (with the exception of rural labor). In the 1960s, Russian became the language of science and higher education. Parents who wanted to give their children a higher education and contribute to their success in life were forced to send their children to Russian schools. This led to the fact that if in 1958 the number of Kazakh children studying in their native language was 75%, then in the year of the collapse of the USSR this figure was only 34.4%. Russian was the only language used by the Soviet army. Nurseries and kindergartens functioned only with the Russian language of communication. Several generations of Kazakh children grew up on Russian fairy tales, Russian history and literature. Translations of foreign literature into national languages could be carried out only from Russian translation, which did not allow the formation of a national school of translation. This problem is still relevant. In the 1970s–1980s, the scope of the Kazakh language was significantly reduced. Office work was completely carried out on it, over 90%

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of book production and more than 70% of television programs were published in Russian. It should be noted that Russia is still pursuing a policy of forced cultural assimilation in relation to the subjects of the federation. Discrimination of the Kazakh language at the state level has led to discrimination of people on the basis of language and at the household level. In the cities, conversations in the Kazakh language in public places were suppressed, and people could be dropped off public transport due to their use of the Kazakh language. Kazakh music and musical instruments, the Kazakh language and culture, the large number of children of Kazakh families and traditions were subjected to ostracism, ridicule, and contempt. With this baggage, the Kazakhs approached their independence, restored in 1991, and the necessary process of decolonization. The problem of cultural independence, liberation from the dominant culture of the former metropolis is relevant in the post-colonial period. The revival of national culture becomes a challenge to the legacy of colonialism. The restoration of the independence of many former colonies led to a revision of the culture (primarily literature) that helped preserve colonialism, instill its ideology, and promote foreign value orientations in the life of society and culture. Parallel to this work, there was a process of revival of the national culture, which sometimes experienced a period of rapid growth, which was a reaction to its artificial containment and suppression during the period of colonization. The revival of national culture work was done immediately after the restoration of independence, for example, by some African countries, which was reflected in the concept of Afrocentrism. The Cultural Revolution of the peoples of the Caribbean introduced Rastafarian culture to the world. Today we are seeing a growing interest in nomadic culture that has preserved its authenticity (hunting with a golden eagle, kokpar, etc.). The revival of the cultures of previously colonized peoples has enriched world culture and opened up new facets and original phenomena. The increase in the degree of pronounced commitment to one’s culture does not occur all of a sudden. As a rule, these processes are pushed by external circumstances and are a reaction to suppression. For the restrained, silenced, assimilated phenomena and phenomena of culture, there are two ways—revival or oblivion. “Post-colonial battles”, disputes about national culture, traditions, and language that arise in Kazakhstan again and again, are the result, on the one hand, of the

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colonial thinking of a part of society, accustomed to being ashamed (experience of alienation) and accustomed to considering Kazakh culture as backward, secondary, not worthy of preservation, and, on the other hand, the lack of a program of real cultural revival and development after the restoration of the country’s independence. Such a program was vital, given the fact that we had to not only overcome the cultural and linguistic dependence and partial assimilation that had already taken place, which led to some conservation of our own culture, but also resist the expansion of many other cultures after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The Kazakhs will certainly go through all stages of the restoration of national culture, despite attempts to prevent this, slowing down this process. This will be done because the preservation of culture and language is one of the most effective means of preserving the nation and cultural identity. If the river is held back by a dam for a long time, then, breaking free, it will flow in a powerful stream, seething, foaming, sweeping away small obstacles, and dragging along the path, until it enters its natural course and carries its waters calmly and measuredly. Understanding the objectivity of this phenomenon will set many supporters of the former USSR with its dominant Russian culture to a restrained attitude towards the ongoing process of the Kazakh cultural revival. This process will be relevant as long as the culture, having reached the position of a straightened spring, will remain in a natural, legitimate, not forcibly compressed state. It is permissible to consider two types of cultural dominance: (1) during the period of colonization, cultural imperialism as the practice of forcibly promoting the culture of one society to another, whose culture, in turn, is discriminated against, disqualified; (2) in the post-colonial period, cultural hegemony is promoted through “soft power” through the consumption of goods, cultural products, information technology, etc. The named types are different in the form of expression, but the same in content or ultimate goal. The first type of cultural dominance has already led to the complete or partial disappearance of a number of national cultures in the world, the second continues to have a dominant effect, endangering the cultural diversity of the world, and destroying the national cultural heritage. The cultural influence that we observe today, depending on the attitude of the subject of influence towards it, may be a threat or a means of replenishing the baggage of one’s own national culture. For example, in the middle of the twentieth century, Japan, as a “receiving” culture,

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reliance on its own national identity made it possible to create original content: modern in form and national in content. This approach allowed the Japanese, on the one hand, to create new spheres, subtypes, genres of culture, “Japanizing” what they adopted from the West, offering the world a Japanese cultural product and, on the other hand, to protect, preserve their cultural space, allowing foreign cultural presence only to known limits. Developed countries are also at risk of the dominance of a foreign culture. As a rule, such risks are not ignored. We are talking, for example, about the export of American culture and values that undermine the value of European cultures and languages. It would seem that France, which for centuries has been the trendsetter of cultural fashion in language, literature, painting, music, and architecture, is far from the threat of being under anyone’s cultural influence. However, post-war France was dominated by an attractive American ideology with its cult of consumerism. It soon became apparent to the French that the USA had taken over not only their markets for consumption but also their minds. American culture instilled a taste for its language, music, lifestyle, a form of relationships in personal life and family, behavioral standards, and moral values. France began to actively resist American cultural expansion. Hence, in the 1960s, in order to protect the national cinematography, literature, language, and music, programs were developed in France, in the implementation of which everyone was involved: from officials and creative people to spectators/readers. This bore fruit in the 1970s and 1980s, when the boom of French cinema and variety art was observed not only in France but also far beyond its borders. On television and leading radio stations, quotas were introduced for broadcasting American (and more broadly, Anglo-Saxon) products. According to European intellectuals, Hollywood films posed a threat to European traditions, the European way of life, and European cultural identity. In the 1990s, the European Union, within the framework of “the Television Without Borders” project, initiated the introduction of screen time quotas for film and television production in the countries of united Europe. The right of veto in protecting the television and film industry from foreign production was enshrined in the EU Constitution. The Europeans did not limit themselves to protection and quotas. Huge financial resources were invested in the development of various

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programs for the development of culture, and the practice of protectionism in cultural policy was expressed in the support of artists, creative associations and organizations. In the twenty-first century, the preservation and intensive development of national culture has become not only a matter of cultural and ideological sovereignty but also of economic attractiveness. This is not just about the profits from movie rentals, but about the so-called “cultural” economy or creative industry, which commodifies individual creative expression, ideas, and artistic talent, and creates jobs through the use of products of intellectual labor. Purposeful construction of the cultural image of cities, and recognizable places through the efforts of designers, artists, architects, and sculptors has given rise to a new direction—location marketing. Cultural strategies allow the creation of new cultural attractions, attract investment in the “cultural” industry, and create conditions for making a profit at the expense of objects that are unique in the eyes of tourists and citizens resting in public places. In the context of globalization and standardization, it is the cultural national heritage or original works of contemporary art that can attract tourists to the country. The easiest way to achieve an attractive distinction is to use the national component. These are not only unique landscapes, and historical cultural heritage, but also modern cultural artifacts containing the original national filling. We are witnessing a change in the industrial age of information. The extraction of minerals and the production of material resources is giving way to an economy of ideas and creative resources. Originality, diversity, novelty, and national color are in demand. The “cultural” or creative industries are represented by architecture and design, film and television, crafts and crafts, performing and visual arts, music and publishing, and a variety of software-based products. The absence in the country of its own “cultural” strategy and investments in the “cultural” industry guarantees dependence on the culture, ideas, and innovations of other countries. Passive consumption of a foreign culture will lead to the loss of cultural independence, marginalization, and extinction of one’s own culture. From being a victim of cultural imperialism, the countries of the third world run the risk of moving into the position of a voluntary or involuntary object of the aggressive influence of cultural hegemony. As it can be seen, the state is required not only to protect the national culture but also to actively support the development and promotion of

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the domestic “cultural” industry. The original national culture, valuable in itself as a historical heritage, contains a powerful potential for the development of a creative economy in the country and can produce an economic effect. In the post-colonial period, as a rule, the inertia of the influence of the dominant culture of the former metropolis persists for some time. The excessive reverence for a foreign culture that has been instilled for many years and, as a result, its uncritical and unreasoning acceptance, while at the same time belittling one’s own culture, threaten in the post-colonial period already voluntary cultural and informational colonization. Until now, we are faced with such depressing facts as the recognition of our own achievements only after they are highly appreciated by foreigners. We ourselves do not seem to believe that we are able to give world culture something unique and truly valuable. One can passively and omnivorously absorb foreign culture, or you can integrate into current global trends and offer your own cultural product based on national identity and even exoticism. The current dependence of Kazakhstan on foreign technologies is objective, but by assimilating and using them, we can find our niche in the production of final “cultural” products. If efforts are directed in this direction, success will certainly be, because each culture is unique and capable of giving the world something new. The undoubted advantage of the creative economy is that individual creative people are its engine, and individual creativity is a historical tradition, a feature of Kazakh culture, and the inclination of the Kazakhs. The next plus is that the Kazakhs, as the heirs of the last nomadic civilization, are able to reveal to the world, mostly settled, what was hushed up, remained undisclosed or distorted in the depiction of nomads from Eurocentric and/or settled-centric positions. And, finally, the fusion of ethnic cultures in Kazakhstan can give an unexpected result, motivate some kind of cross-cultural experiment. Certainly, it is unreasonable to practice prohibitions on foreign music, literature, cinema, etc. as in the totalitarian system time. But restrictions on TV and radio in a volume that does not pose a threat to national identity are reasonable and appropriate, and in our case, necessary, given the fact that our own culture was suppressed relatively recently and is still being revived. Will it survive another blow of cultural expansion? At the same time, the excessive presence of Russian culture, which has dominated over the past hundred years, remains on television and in the book market.

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A foreign culture does not carry risks if the society has a strong cultural foundation, creative forces that form ethical guidelines, and aesthetic values. And then any cultural fashions and trends are nothing more than diversity and passion, and not the only example to follow. But in conditions when the roots of one’s own culture are lost or the national culture has been suppressed for a long time, the consumption of someone else’s is a guarantee of maintaining the former cultural hegemony or falling into a new cultural (mental, ideological) dependence. As for the benefit of intercultural communication, then it should be understood that in this case we are talking about interaction, i.e. contact of at least two cultures, two sides. If one of the parties does not have culture (as a sum of cultural norms and forms, as an identity), then there is no interaction, no communication between A and B, but the dissolution of one side into the other, i.e. cultural assimilation. This is exactly what threatened many colonial countries, and the risk of which should be eliminated by going through the process of decolonization. The second generation of children is already growing in independent Kazakhstan, the entire industries have not been created for them: children’s literature, cartoons, children’s songs, computer games and much more. What can be said about the identity of young people and children who grow up on examples of foreign cultures? In the information field, in the book market of Kazakhstan, Russia still dominates, I relay my own hysterical narratives, imperial rhetoric, and propaganda clichés. We have emerged from the state of colonization, the entire period during which there was a danger of losing our national culture. It is criminal and suicidal now to dissolve into foreign cultures. A dynamically developing national culture is evidence of the nation’s creative energy, competitiveness, innovation, spiritual freedom, and rich creative potential. In this regard, the Kazakhs are still waiting for a long and much-needed road of returning to themselves, reviving their culture, restoring their identity.

2.8

Conclusion

In this chapter, the problem of decolonization of Kazakhstan in the framework of post-colonial studies was examined, also the connection between the process of colonization of Kazakhstan and the global practice and methods of colonization was determined. Finally, the specific features of

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the colonization of Kazakhstan, due to the lifestyle and values of the nomads, territorial proximity to the colonizing country, etc. were identified. In addition, the chapter substantiates the problem’s current relevance and the decolonization process in Kazakhstan implementation needs. The success of this process is based on the transformation of both colonial and imperial thinking inherent in different groups of citizens of Kazakhstan.

Glossary Akyn is a poet-improviser. Alash Orda (1917–1920) a party created in 1917 by educated, progressive-minded Kazakhs who dreamed of a democratic path for the development of Kazakhstan, aiming to achieve autonomy and end the colonial policy. Asharshylyk (lit. famine) an artificially created famine of 1921–1923 under the conditions of war communism and a famine of 1931–1933, which occurred as a result of the expropriation of livestock, collectivization, the forcible sedentarization of Kazakhs, and the suppression of armed resistance to the policy of Soviet power. Aul is a traditional rural-type settlement, a community of close relatives, a camp among the Turkic peoples. Basmachi (from Turkic basmak—to raid, to attack) a term filled with negative semantics was used by Soviet ideologists and historians to refer to the rebels of the Muslim peoples of Central Asia who opposed the establishment of Soviet power. Biy (lit. to know, to rule) is an authoritative person, a judge, and an expert on Kazakh society, its structure, the system of customary law, traditions, and the history of the people. Desyatina 1.09 hectares. Dombra is a Kazakh stringed musical instrument. Enemies of the people convicts under Article 58 for anti-Soviet activities. Glavpolitprosvet the main political and educational committee of the People’s Commissariat of Education. GULAG Main Directorate of Correctional Labor Camps, a division of the USSR People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Institute of HA&E of the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.

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Khan the title of the monarch, ruler, sovereign person among the Turkic peoples. Kobyz is an ancient Kazakh stringed bowed musical instrument. Kyrgyz Kirghiz, Kyrgyz-Kaisaks, Horde, and foreigners are ethnonyms that were used to call the Kazakhs in the Russian Empire instead of using their real name. Middle Zhuz (zhuz—union, hundred) conditionally Kazakhs consist of three zhuzes, each of which is a confederation of kindred clans. The term “zhuz” was introduced in the eighteenth century. This tripartite structure is based on the traditional composition of the Turkic army from the center, left and right wings. Native local, indigenous; the Russians called the locals “natives”. Nevada-Semipalatinsk is an anti-nuclear movement that arose in February 1989, whose task was to stop nuclear tests and close the test sites on Kazakh soil. The appeal of the movement was supported and signed by 2 million citizens of Kazakhstan. Pood a Russian measure of weight equal to 16.4 kilograms. Raise on a koshma the ceremony of raising to the title of khan, which consisted in raising the newly elected khan sitting on a white felt mat (koshma). Koshma was raised by representatives of clans, batyrs. Sarbaz is a soldier, warrior, and fighter. Shanyrak the events of July 2006, when the authorities decided to demolish the houses of the residents of the Shanyrak and Bakai settlements in order to release expensive land near Almaty. Residents of the villages organized self-defense, trying to prevent the demolition of the house by bulldozers. The clashes ended tragically, four participants received prison terms ranging from 14 to 18 years, and twenty people received suspended sentences. The villages were saved. Shezhireshi chronicler, specialist in the genealogy of the Kazakhs. Sultan the title of nobility from among the descendants of Shyngyskhan, who could claim to be the head of tribal associations or participate in the struggle for the title of khan. Surfdom the norm adopted in Russia in 1861 forbidding peasants to leave the land, hereditary subordination, belonging of the peasants to the landowner. Ten-verst strip Kazakhs were forbidden to settle and use pastures in the territory adjacent to the borderline of Russian fortresses. This territory was 10 versts along the entire line towards the Kazakh lands. One verst is equal to 1.06 kilometers.

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The Alashordyns an educated national elite, united in the Alash-Orda party and declared in 1917 the autonomy of the Kazakh republic under the name Alash. The Bolsheviks the radical wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party, carried out a coup in October 1917. The Novoiletskaya line a line of outposts along the Ilek River, associated with the advance of the Russians deep into the western part of the Kazakh Steppe in 1810–1822. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks the highest party body (1918–1952). The Solovetsky camp (Solovki) is a labor camp for the isolation, detention and re-education of especially dangerous political and criminal criminals, located on the Solovetsky Islands and functioning in the 1920s–1930s. The Stolypin agrarian reform a set of measures to reform Russian agriculture, within the framework of which Russian peasants were given the right to leave the community, and the issue of lack of land was solved by providing them with land plots in Kazakhstan and Siberia. Western region of Kazakhstan includes Tugai, Ural regions, the inner horde, Mangyshlak region. Yurt a portable frame dwelling with felt covering among nomads. Zheltoksan (lit. December) is a public association of participants in the December events of 1986 when student youth and university teachers took to the central square of Alma-Ata to protest against the appointment of a protege of the Kremlin as the head of the Kazakh Republic, discrimination against Kazakhs, the Kazakh language and culture. The rally was crushed by the army, students were beaten with sapper shovels, taken out of the city, and thrown into the winter steppe, then courts followed, and expulsions from universities. Zhetysu (lit. Seven rivers) the southeast of Kazakhstan with seven large rivers, the territory from north to south is 900 km, from west to east 800 km. Zhyrshi is a chronicler, a specialist in the genealogy of the Kazakhs.

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References Abdurakhmanov, N.A. (2014). Negative aspects of agrarian reforms in Kazakhstan during the Stolypin reform and their consequences for the Kazakh population. Bulletin of the Kazakh National Pedagogical University named after Abai. Series “Historical and socio-political sciences”, No. 2 (41), 39–44. Artykbaev, Zh.O. (2005). Nomads of Eurasia (in the kaleidoscope of centuries and millennia). St. Petersburg: Major. Bekmakhanov, E.B. (1947). Kazakhstan in the 20–40s of the XIX century. AlmaAta: Kazakh United State Publishing House. Bekmakhanova, N.E. (1986). The multinational population of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the era of capitalism (60s of the XIX century–1917). M.: Nauka. Chatterjee, P. (2002). Imaginary communities: who imagines them? Nations and nationalism. M.: Praxis, 283–296. Hall, S. (1989). Cultural identity and diaspora. In J. Rutherford (Ed.), Identity: community, difference. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 222–237. Fanon, F. (1986). Black skin, white masks. Pluto Press. Gali, A. (2002). Positives, negatives and objectives of Soviet rule in Kazakhstan (based on the political biographies of its leaders). https://zonakz.net/2002/ 06/13/pozitivy-negativy-i-obektivy-sovets/ Halbvaks, M. (2005). Collective and historical memory. Emergency ration. No. 2–3, 8–27. Kapekova, G.A. (2006). Economic traditions and ethnostructure of the population of the Semirechensk region. Reports of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Social Sciences. No. 5, 96–102. Kodar, A.A. (2009). Tengrianism in the light of Deleuze-Gwatari nomadology. New studies of Tuva. No. 4, 82–90. Masanov, N.E. (1995). The nomadic civilization of the Kazakhs: the foundations of the life of the nomadic society. Almaty: Sotsinvest. M.: Horizont. Movement Alash. (2011). Collection of materials of trials of Alash people. In 3 vols. Vol. 1: Documents, interrogations and answers. Simultaneous translations. court materials. confiscated letters. Almaty: El-shezhire. Nora, P. (2005). World celebration of memory. Emergency ration. No. 2. Nursultan, M.U. 2007. Population dynamics and changes in the ethnic and class composition of the population of Western Kazakhstan in the late XIX–early XX centuries. Reports of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Social Sciences, No. 3, 155–161. Pankratova, A.M., Abdykalykov, M.A., Vyatkin, M.P., Druzhinin, N.M., Kuchkin, A.P., Zutis, Ya.Ya., Bernshtam, A.N., Grekov, B.D., Maruglan, A.Kh. (2011). History of the Kazakh SSR from ancient times to the present day (reprint of 1943). Almaty. Razdykova, G.M. (2010). History of Muslim education in Kazakhstan: textbook. Pavlodar: Kereku.

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Ricoeur, P. (2004). Memory. Story. Oblivion. M.: Publishing house of humanitarian literature, (French philosophy of the twentieth century). Said, W. Edward. (1978). Orientalism. New York: Pantheon Book. Spivak, G.Ch. (1985). Three women’s texts and a critique of imperialism. Critical inquiry. Vol. 12. № 1 (Autumn, 1985): “Race”, Writing and Difference. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, 243–261. State archive of the Omsk region, f. 3, on. 4, d. 5668, ll. 5– 6. https://drevlit.ru/docs/central_asia/XVIII/1760-1780/Kazach_rus_17_ 18/321-340/337.php Tuleshov, V. (2006). Principles of the Kazakh national ideology in the XXI century. Zona.kz, May 15. https://zonakz.net/2006/05/15/principy-kazaxs koj-nacionalnoj-ide/ Tuleshov, V. (2008). Humanistic logic of postmodernism. Or how the era of Europe began in Kazakhstan. IAC (Information and Analytical Center of Moscow State University), September 29. https://ia-centr.ru/experts/iatsmgu/humanisticheskaya-logika-postmodernizma-ili-kak-nachalas-epokha-evr opy-v-kazakhstane/ Virolainen, M.N. (2016). Historical metamorphoses of Russian literature. St. Petersburg: Palmyra.

CHAPTER 3

Nomads: Experience of Reconstruction

This chapter focuses on the ways the colonialist formed a tendentious idea of the nomads and the colonial administration gradually seized and exercised its power. This process was expressed in the destruction of the former system of social and economic relations, in demoralization and impact on the consciousness of the colonized by changing value orientations, in distorting the history of the people and their self-esteem, in marking the territory and trying to erase the original Kazakh toponymic names.

3.1

Identity and Decolonization of Consciousness

The concept of identity was considered by Franz Fanon as an object of special and heightened attention for post-colonial society, because the colonialists not only seized territory and resources, but also tried to change the national code, values, and culture of the people being colonized. In return, with the aim of successful colonization and bringing it to submission, they imposed alien values, ideas, tendentious assessments on the colonized and forced to look at themselves and their own past through the eyes of a conqueror, a representative of an alien culture. This factor is doubly significant in a totalitarian super-ideologized system.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Mustoyapova, Decolonization of Kazakhstan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5207-6_3

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Identity is not something complete, which finds expression in the sum of unchanging attributes. It is a time-consuming process, conditioned by external circumstances, but measured by internal changes. Over the centuries of development, some basic qualities (national code) are formed in the people, on which new components of its identity are superimposed. It has its origins, history, and transformation caused by a number of reasons. We cannot designate a specific starting point for the formation of national identity or name a certain period in the history of the people when they had their “most correct”, primordial identity in order to return to it in search of their true self. The identity of any nation changes gradually under the influence of historical events, contacts with other peoples, the development of science and technology, and so on. This process, sometimes slowly and imperceptibly, sometimes quickly and clearly, occurs from generation to generation. But the following aspect remains fundamental: the identity of the people changes, whether the transformation occurs naturally, on the basis of and in conjunction with the national code, traditions, or is imposed by external forces, domination, accompanied by the destruction of the identity of the people that has been formed for centuries. The first case is an objective historical process; in the second—the demolition of the psychology of the people occurs, a violent negative impact on its traditions, moral values, way of life, and collective trauma is inflicted. The identity of the Kazakhs was subjected to violent transformation during almost a century and a half of colonization, and gradually it gained strength and acquired an increasingly large-scale character. And in this regard, the following questions are of particular importance: were the colonialists able to completely destroy the identity of the people that had taken place before them? What traditions and values were eradicated? What exactly was forcibly imposed? The answers to these questions will allow us to restore our partly destroyed identity and prevent the final consolidation of the false ideas about ourselves imposed on us, values and ideas that are alien to us. The reconstruction of social phenomena, methods of influence, subordination by the dominant regime, and the deconstruction of inspired ideologemes and stereotypes is a method to stop their destructive impact on the identity of the Kazakhs. No matter how much we turn to history, we cannot become the same as our ancestors were before colonization, since colonization has already left its mark on our identity. But another thing is that we can partly free

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ourselves from elements, ideas, interpretations, and assessments imposed from outside and distorting national identity. The difference between what we Kazakhs were a century or two ago and what we have become will allow us to understand how, why and under the influence of what the identity of the Kazakhs changed. This concept of “difference” makes it possible to rethink the identity of the Kazakhs and trace the changes taking place in it. In the identity of the Kazakhs, one can single out the basis—(1) the nomadic component, as well as (2) changes due to the imperial-colonial presence, (3) the Soviet totalitarian presence, (4) the current, relatively speaking, post-colonial presence. According to Stuart Hall, when defining an identity that has undergone a violent transformation, it should be considered in the direction of two vectors: (1) similarity and continuity; (2) differences and gaps. He writes: “The one gives us some grounding in, some continuity with, the past. The second reminds us that what we share is precisely the experience of a profound discontinuity: the peoples dragged into slavery, transportation, colonization, migration…” (Hall 1989: 227). More will be said about the nomadic component below, but now we focus on the components of identity imposed from the position of power. The main goal of changing the identity of the people and their subsequent assimilation is the successful implementation of the colonization of the population, which is perceived as mentally, religiously, and culturally alien to the colonizers. The colonial administration did not aim to take into account the peculiarities of the culture, lifestyle, and methods of managing, traditions, and customary law of the semi-nomadic people, whose livelihoods were invaded. To teach colonial officials to understand the world they did not know seemed too complicated, long, and costly. The colonialists took a simpler and more radical path: everything “native” was rejected as “wrong, backward, barbaric”, and on this basis was subject to eradication. In order to introduce their “correct, advanced, civilized” colonialists, first of all, they had to destroy the existing social structure: power, laws, traditions, values, and more. The imperial period of colonization affected four generations of Kazakhs, each of which experienced another stage of violent transformation of identity. For a rather limited period of time, these generations became more and more different from each other in priorities, values, and behavioral norms.

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The stage-by-stage change of the elite (the abolition of the khan’s power; the ousting of the sultans from power in tribal associations, the restriction of the power and rights of biys; and, finally, the admission to the power of those representatives of the local population who accepted the “rules of the game” imposed by the colonialist) allowed the colonial administration to seize power functions. The overthrow of local authorities was achieved by depriving them of control levers and decisionmaking mechanisms. Then the Kazakhs were instilled that colonial power should stand over them, since they were not able to govern their country themselves. The constant (every 15–20 years) change in the administrative structure, contrary to the traditional settlement of clans, destroyed the established economic and social ties. The territory was fragmented, which narrowed the nomadic area of the clans, subgenuses, and auls living there. At the same time, the renaming of territories was carried out: the names were changed from generic names to the names of subgenera, then to geographical names, then simply numbering was used. By this method, they sought to erase the memory of the clans about the territories belonging to them on the basis of collective ownership. The reduction of the norms of customary law led to the imposition of alien morality, the depreciation of the word (perjury), the practice of bribery, and the system of influence (exiles, prisons). Along with biys recognized by the people, those who now could simply buy a position and demanded signs of respect began to appear. So there was a substitution of personal authority, honesty by the power of money, and proximity to the colonial power. This led to a negative transformation of the moral values of the people, who used to be threatened by the violation of the norms of the community with rejection from the family, exile, and now a basis has been created for avoiding responsibility through money, and providing personal services. The introduction of the institute of prison and exile to Siberia, alien to the Kazakhs, led to a powerful mental breakdown. Firstly, traditionally, the Kazakhs did not deprive a person of freedom, using other measures of influence. Secondly, among the Kazakhs, those who violated the norms of the hostel, who stained themselves and the honor of the family were subjected to rejection, expulsion from society; now the authorities called criminals and punished those who, in the eyes of the Kazakhs, were not such—these are people who defend the interests of the people and rebel against injustice and oppression by the colonial administration. These

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circumstances led to the split of the Kazakh society, previously living according to common morality: what was considered criminal, unacceptable, and immoral for the people, such was the case for biys, batyrs, and bais. Under the new system, the principle of justice was violated, the criminal could escape punishment if he served the colonial authorities or had money to bribe the colonial judge. The people were demoralized, leaving without punishment the one who robbed the people, gave false evidence, and ruined the villages. The use of Tatar mullahs to bring the Kazakhs into obedience, on the one hand, shook the faith, and on the other hand, made adherence to Islam a means of resisting Russification. The policy of mass resettlement of the inhabitants of the metropolis, the expropriation of land from the Kazakhs, their displacement into territories poor in pastures and water led to the separation of clans from the land of their ancestors, depriving them of the feeling of being the owner of their land. At the same time, clans were fixed in a specific territory with a ban on leaving it without the permission of the colonial authorities, i.e. the principle of entrenchment was introduced.Due to the seizure of land from the Kazakhs for the settlers, clashes began for pastures between clans that had not previously crossed the borders of other people’s pastures. Moreover, if earlier controversial issues were resolved by the inter-tribal council of biys, now it was necessary to apply with a petition and resort to the patronage of the colonial administration. So, the main issue— the land—was in charge of the colonizer, finally making the Kazakhs dependent. The Soviet period affected the next three generations of Kazakhs. The Soviet totalitarian component further distorted the identity of the Kazakhs. This was a consequence of the fact that the Bolsheviks used more stringent measures to subdue the Kazakhs. In fact, it was about the threat of not only physical, but also mental destruction of the people. Forced sedentarization led to a radical change in the way of life and methods of managing the Kazakhs, depriving them of their traditional source of livelihood. No less destructive was the “sedentarization of consciousness”, the massive instillation into the Kazakhs of the ideas of the sedentary about the backwardness, savagery, barbarism of the nomads. This external one-sided view and tendentious assessment was inspired by the nomad, contributing to his alienation from himself, his culture,

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history, and were aimed at ensuring that yesterday’s nomads gratefully accepted the “modernization” that the Bolsheviks carried. Experience has shown that under the guise of “modernization” through criminal, inhumane, barbaric measures, totalitarian norms of law and social structure were introduced. Asharshylyk, who in the early 1930s reduced the number of Kazakhs by almost half, broke the resistance of the people to totalitarian power alien to them, morality, way of life, injustice (in cases where the former Kazakh jumped on a horse with the battle call “Attan!”, the current Kazakh obeyed and was silent for the sake of the physical preservation of the people). The devaluation of human life left a heavy imprint on people (in the Steppe, domestic murder was a rare occurrence, the death penalty was almost never practiced, and blood feud was replaced by the kun almost three centuries before Soviet power with the set of laws Zheti Zhargy). In the 1920s and 1930s, orphanages appeared and gradually became the norm—a phenomenon alien to the mentality of traditional Kazakh society. Aggressive intervention in the spheres of private, family life, and education destroyed the centuries-old Kazakh traditions and customs. The destruction of the national elite in the person of its educated part, the bearers of morality (biy) and historical memory (shezhireshi), religious figures, and wealthy people who were responsible for people (bai), led to the fact that the people were left without moral authorities, national leaders, those who could speak in his defense. The execution or exile of the national elite, the seizure of books, and the change of the alphabet twice in a short period (in 1929 and 1939) interrupted the continuity in the transfer of knowledge, created the basis for the distortion of historical facts and their biased interpretation, which also formed the wrong attitude of the people to their own past and culture. The implementation of a new cardinal change of elites, which became possible through the physical destruction of the former, changed the ideological and moral guidelines of the people. Censorship and the threat of reprisals taught them to be silent, to hide the truth, to be afraid of denunciation, to doubt what was said, which for the Kazakhs, with their trust in the word, the significant place of the word in culture and behavioral code, was akin to an ailment affecting the entire body. Propaganda has taught the Kazakhs for decades that dreaming and talking about the revival of the national (history, language, culture) is reprehensible, immoral, and criminal.

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The continued practice of renaming was of an ideological nature, linking the territory, settlements with Soviet history, and communist leaders in order to fix in the minds of the people the idea that the land belongs to the Soviet government, and therefore it is free to dispose of it at its discretion. The policy of mass resettlement, which is acquiring colossal proportions (kulaks, political prisoners, deported peoples, virgin lands), has led to the fact that the Kazakhs on their land were a minority. The demographic situation had a negative impact on the position of the Kazakh language and culture: a decrease in the circulation of newspapers and books in the Kazakh language, a rapid reduction in Kazakh schools; the use of the Russian language in public places, the economy, office work, education, medicine, and science. All this became the key to the success of the Russification policy and forced cultural assimilation, which affected not only the Kazakhs, but also representatives of other nationalities of Kazakhstan. The power of the empire in many colonies was enforced by military force, bribery, and the training of native officials in the administration. But the obedience of the people could be achieved only by instilling in them an inferiority complex. Only the methodical eradication of those who did not agree to admit their backwardness and second-rateness, who did not undergo the required processing of consciousness, as well as the real (and demonstrated during the period of Asharshylyk) the threat of annihilation of the entire people, allowed the Soviet authorities to instill, inculcate an ideology alien to the Kazakhs, values, and way of life. Thus, for seven generations, methodically, relentlessly, with an increase in the scale and degree of intensity, the transformation of the identity of the people was carried out through a change, distortion of its values, ideological guidelines, morality, lifestyle, history, language, and culture. Gradually, everything Kazakh was squeezed out of the Kazakh. At first, not so noticeable, and then more and more strikingly, each new generation differed from the previous one. The national code of the people was preserved only thanks to morality, the strength of traditions, customs of upbringing, and ideas of honor—everything that a person got an idea about in the family. An important marker of the violent transformation of the identity of the people is the differences between the Kazakhs of Kazakhstan and the Kazakhs living in Mongolia and China (for the period of the

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1990s, before the active policy of China’s assimilation in East Turkestan— Xinjiang). In China and Mongolia, the Kazakhs were not subjected to such radical ideological influence and cultural assimilation, and therefore retained those features that were characteristic of the Kazakhs until the 1930s, that is, before active Soviet ideological influence. At the same time, common features allow us to talk about the original components of the Kazakh identity. Another marker is the similarities in the identity of the Kazakhs and representatives of other ethnic groups of Kazakhstan, due to the common historical experience of existence and survival in a totalitarian state. In addition, in the case of a number of ethnic groups in Kazakhstan, one should talk about their common traumatic experience of forced resettlement/deportation, enslavement, and deprivation of part of civil rights (with the exception of settlers of the early twentieth century and virgin lands). The presence in our identity of a common, carrying a positive beginning, having a positive potential, and bringing us closer to each other, should become the basis for the formation of a single nation civil. The actualization of the identity issue is not a reason to turn to the past, it is a look at the present self. With the restoration of the independence of Kazakhstan, the process of colonization of the consciousness of new generations of Kazakhs did not stop, including through attempts to form the identity of modern Kazakhs on the basis of Soviet identity. False stereotypes not only live on, but continue to be implanted through the old rhetoric. Moreover, there are new objects for distortion, misinterpretation, and deliberate belittling through ridicule under the same “sauce” of backwardness, archaism, and patriarchy. Speaking about the current post-colonial presence in the identity of the Kazakhs, it should be said about the planting in society of repulsive, unacceptable norms of morality and behavior, which is carried out through corruption, nepotism, as well as the lack of proper punishment for those who violate the laws. We are witnessing an attempt to form a new “elite” (on the basis of the Soviet one), which absolutely does not meet the moral and intellectual requirements, which cannot but affect the general moral character of the people. The implementation by the authorities of the principles of internal colonization of the people, which is complicated by the threatening neocolonization of the country (political, economic, informational), deals a powerful blow to the spirit, and self-esteem of the people. In the same row—the continuation of the Soviet practice of restricting freedom

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of speech, repressive methods of law enforcement agencies aimed at achieving obedience, the passivity of the people to the detriment of its development, the revival of dignity, inner strength, and creativity. A new blow to the moral health of the nation is the widespread, pervasive spread of corruption. Conservation of spheres of use of the Kazakh language, obstacles in the study of the real and uncut history of the country of the colonial and totalitarian periods hinder the process of liberation from their negative consequences, and therefore, fix the signs, assessments, ideologemes imposed on it in the identity of the Kazakhs. All of the above affects the consolidation of the low self-esteem of the people (shame for the events taking place, for the country), which cannot but have a devastating effect on the identity, which has already been subjected to external violent influence. The younger generation is instilled with the idea that corruption, theft, groveling, and the desire for the show are the national traits of the Kazakhs. The success of such suggestion, the persistence of these negative manifestations threatens to leave its ugly mark on the identity of the Kazakhs and contribute to rejection from their nation (the choice of emigration by young people is one of the manifestations of this).

3.2

Decolonization of History, or the Voice of the Other

History is written by the victors, and history becomes a tool used to substantiate, justify the occupation of the territory, colonization, imposed ideology, and the pursued imperial policy. The colonialists rewrote history, developing a version of historical events that was convenient for them and fixing it as a canon with all the might of the ideological apparatus. The construction of history for the colonized people was considered by the colonialists to be their prerogative; in a totalitarian society, this function was appropriated by ideologues. For more than a century, Kazakh history has been presented from the point of view of Russia and the place of Kazakhstan in the history of Russia. But this is precisely the history of Russia (with a tendentious view of the Kazakh nomads), but not the history of Kazakhstan. The Kazakhs were deprived of the opportunity to have their own history. Soviet historical science, subject to ideological dogma, sinned with falsifications. Any attempt at an objective and scientifically reasoned consideration of historical events was persecuted and punished. Those who deviated from the

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canonized version of Soviet history were threatened not only with the label “nationalist”, a ban on scientific work, but also with condemnation under the notorious Article 58 for counter-revolutionary activities. In other words, the people were deprived of the right to vote, the right to broadcast their own knowledge of their history. The problem of the voice of the Other is one of the key issues in post-colonial theory. The West at one time deprived the East of its voice and spoke for it, on its behalf, i.e. appropriated the voice of someone who allegedly, as the colonialists convinced themselves, could not describe himself. In our case, the nation could speak through the mouths of the bearers of historical memory (biy, shezhireshi, educated Alashordians), but they were repressed in the 1930s, often deprived not only of their voice, freedom, but also of life. So, the Soviet government, having appropriated the voice of the Other, created for us, instead of us, for us a permissible, the only permitted version of our historical past. The imperials of the period of tsarism were not capable, and the Soviet ideologists and propagandists did not want to hear the voice of the Other, because it would break the picture of the world familiar to them, would destroy the idea of their own cultural and moral superiority that they did not question, and would also reveal previously hushed up facts representing the colonizer in a negative light. The reason for the one-sided coverage of the events of the twentieth century lies in the suppression of objective facts that dominated the historical discourse, and in today’s Kazakhstan, in the evasion of an objective assessment of more than 100 years of Kazakhstan’s history. Evasion is expressed in the creation of another, replacing history, shifting the emphasis to the distant past or the present. This principle of exclusion, evasion allows one to avoid uncomfortable, painful topics, to get by with clichés and clichés instead of serious research and open scientific discussions. This device has the same purpose: by default, to deprive the Other of his own voice. This explains the lack of access to many archives of the twentieth century. Rethinking and creating a more complete picture of what happened is possible only by including the voice of the Other, the opposite side, the opponent: the loser, the colonized, the deported, the emigrant, etc. This is the only way to avoid marginalization, suppression, or appropriation of the voice of the Other. Edward Said believes that the Eastern Renaissance began when the East found its voice (the turn of the 19th–twentieth centuries). It was

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then that Eastern texts from Sanskrit, Avestan, and Arabic began to be translated. The West heard the voice of the East, began to be imbued with its centuries-old philosophy, marvel at the diversity and richness of its culture. It was a hitherto unknown East, not stereotyped, not limited by the framework of the Western idea of it, and, as it turned out, far from the prevailing view of it in the West. The existing hegemony of European ideas regarding the East, the usual idea of the superiority of Europe over Eastern “backwardness” for a long time did not allow the idea that the East could have a different idea of the relationship between the West and the East, a different assessment of the colonialist and the results of his activities. Many former colonies, having restored their independence, did not allow themselves the frivolity of leaving the colonial past without evaluation, without reflection, and without work on its consequences. They understood that otherwise the colonial past would continue to exert its pernicious influence on the public consciousness, self-esteem of previously colonized peoples for many decades to come, and retain the existing racial antagonism. In the 1970s and 1980s, young scholars in the United States and Great Britain (often from former colonies) criticized the accepted interpretation of many historical events and were able to make a breakthrough not only in their approach to history, but also in its teaching. They actually created new scientific schools and areas of research, such as post-colonial, ethnic, and diaspora studies. In many areas of humanitarian and social knowledge, new scientific theories began to appear and new critical approaches were used. It was a long struggle of scientists from the former colonies for the right to have their own voice, their own point of view, different from the point of view of the “white” person and free from the Eurocentric position. One should not consider these processes in the West proceeded to go smoothly, quickly, and without conflict. Many interpretations of history, different from those traditionally accepted and customary, met with resistance not only from the general public, but also from the academic community. However, these difficulties and confrontation were overcome through dialogue, scientific discussions, popularization of new ideas, interpretations, and a new vision of different sides of long-known events. For example, in England, instead of glorifying the greatness of the British Empire, they began to talk about the evil that it brought to the colonized

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peoples; consciousness and public opinion were formed in favor of antiimperial views. The example of the United States is no less significant: there are almost no white spots left in the history of the colonization of Native Americans and in the history of slavery. These studies and new interpretations are reflected in literature, cinema, social relations, behavioral norms, and politically correct language communication. Another aspect of the problem of the decolonization of history includes two directions of research: (1) how does the continued practice of imperial rhetoric affect the imagination, behavior, self-positioning of those who still preach the imperial ideology; (2) what happens to the worldview and how the identity of the one who leaves the position of imperial dominance and its components (racism, chauvinism, etc.) changes. This is the subject of a separate scientific study by sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, and psychologists. It is important to understand that any collective critical project, which is a discussion about the recent historical past, is also a kind of social practice, a national dialogue aimed at finding national consensus and, therefore, prospects for the future. Our attitude to the events of recent history characterizes us, our readiness to admit again or, on the contrary, the determination not to allow a repetition of the tragic past. Finally, the acceptance of one’s history, with all its defeats and mistakes, is an indicator of the maturity of a nation. Many countries have had a difficult experience of an objective assessment of their own negative past, and this is evidence of their willingness to be honest with themselves, not to hide behind ideological clichés and false stereotypes, not to avoid admitting their own mistakes, guilt, and injuries. We will not cite the already textbook example of Germany, which took a far from easy step and reassessed the events of 1933–1945. Let us turn to France, which could accept a satisfactory interpretation of what was happening during the Second World War, where it acted as the victim of the occupation. However, after a while, the French returned to the events of the occupation period in order to overcome the silence associated with it, the repression of memory, to comprehend and evaluate what happened without cuts. Paul Ricoeur in his book “Memory, History, Forgetting” (Ricoeur 2004) mentions Henri Rousseau, who made a significant contribution to the history of the “Vichy syndrome”, and also helped his compatriots to move on to the “work of memory”. In addition to the history of the Vichy regime, another (parallel) history was proposed, the memory

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of the occupation, the restoration of its so-called “residual action”, that which remained outside the official version. This is a difficult topic for the French, but they mastered it. The “return of the repressed”, consigned to oblivion and default, was carried out. It has not gone away and remained in the memory of people, in their mental confusion, hidden pain or a sense of shame. This work made it possible to identify the gaps between official history and people’s real knowledge of past events. What and what facts have been superseded by the prevailing myth of the Resistance? Henri Rousseau undertook a “new exploit of a weak point”, which made it possible to demystify the ideology of the Resistance, as well as highlight, focus on another aspect—anti-Semitism. Previously, the gaze was focused on one side of the war—the occupation of France by Germany, and this view overlooked another fact—the extermination of the Jews in France. The “obsession” with certain events is selective and always results in the mainstream narratives narrowing the field of vision and excluding what is disturbing and can damage the country’s reputation. Thus, France dotted the “I”, just as it did in the case of the assessment of the St. Bartholomew’s Night, the events of which were a stumbling block for a long time and served as a pretext for confrontation between the French; as she did later, rethinking the war in Algiers. The nation passed the negative events of its own past through itself, accepted and subjected it to moral judgment. Moral historical responsibility, recognition of mistakes, understanding of the consequences, and memory of the tragedy contributed to the unity of the nation, creating the basis for a common past and, therefore, a common future. In our national history, too many events have been hushed up and ousted from memory, too many “blank” spots remain. Our recent past is disturbing, attracting more and more attention, and this is happening precisely because it continues to define our present. It is difficult to move forward, having an unreflected historical experience, especially such a complex and ambiguous one as the Kazakhs had not only in the history of the last century, but also in the recent history of the period of Independence. Until now, the events of December 1986 remain under the cover of secrecy—the uprising of Kazakh youth against the appointee from Moscow and the implementation of colonial policy, including the cultural assimilation of the Kazakhs; July 2006—the demolition by bulldozers in the villages of Shanyrak and Bakai of the houses of Kazakhs, who, due to the lack of work in the countryside, were forced to move closer to

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the city; December 2011—the execution of oil workers in the city of Zhanaozen; January 2022—execution and torture of peaceful protesters in different cities of Kazakhstan. The tradition of the Soviet period to hide the truth about events, to replace it with “convenient” fiction continues to be practiced by the current government. In assessing the past of the country, they often proceed from the position of their current development, modern values, ideals, and moral imperatives. The point is to give the past a moral assessment. This act becomes a unifying ethical principle for the citizens of the country, the basis for the further development of national values, which serve as the foundation of national unity. Today, the citizens of Kazakhstan are people of different nationalities who have a common past, albeit not very long in terms of history. But on average, already 3–4 generations of representatives of different ethnic groups live in Kazakhstan. Given these prerequisites, we still have not constituted a single civil nation. The first step to this is to “speak out”, to accept your past. The line of demarcation separating different social groups does not run between ethnic groups, but between ideologies and ideas. The defense of Soviet totalitarianism on the part of even an insignificant part of the population allows us to think that there are still people who consider concentration camps, trials of troikas, political persecution, censorship, dictatorship of party nomenklatura, and repressive measures of influence to be acceptable and possible. A single civil nation (people of different ethnicity) is based on the basis: a single language, history, and values. It is noteworthy that these are the very phenomena that cause controversy in our society and become the basis for confrontation. The resolution of differences in these matters will give us the desired national unity and, as a result, will allow us to develop the country together. What does one history mean? We are talking not only about the fact of having a common historical past, but also about our current attitude to significant events of the past, about the coincidence of assessments and attitudes towards them (approval, pride, regret, condemnation, grief). History should be based on scientifically reasoned facts, without distortions and ideological clichés, and the attitude towards it should be based on an assessment from the point of view of universal human values and morality. Such a reading of history will not be the reason for the disagreements and divisions that we regret to see in our society today. In parallel, we have different, sometimes diametrically opposed interpretations of the

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past, as if we are on different sides of the conflict, we live in different countries, we are striving for a different future. This is evidence of the presence of different, sometimes diametrically opposed, values preached in our society. One of the ways to overcome the rift is to return what has been repressed from history, to hear the voice of the Other. The interpretations of the facts of history by the colonialists and the ideologists of totalitarianism are well-known, it remains to see history through the eyes of the other side.

3.3

Reboot: Decolonization and Literature

Fiction holds a special place in decolonization process, since it forms the public consciousness, value orientations, and identity. Literature has been and remains a powerful means of propaganda, especially at turning points in history. The use of literature as an ideological weapon is confirmed by the censorship practiced throughout the Soviet period, the cleansing of libraries, the destruction of books and personal archives of Kazakh authors in the period of 1920s–1930s. Repressions, as known, affected almost all Kazakh poets and writers twentieth century first half. On the scorched literary field of Soviet power, it was easier to nurture and promote those authors who propagandized, disseminated, and consolidated the Soviet ideology. Unwanted authors were persecuted, and those writers permitted to be read received titles, editions, awards, and wide recognition. In the last half of the century, a significant phenomenon in world literature has been the revision of a large body of texts, the authors of which were imperial and/or militaristic views spokesmen. New critical approaches have enabled post-colonial critics to take a fresh look at the work of those writers who would, wittingly or unwittingly, contributed to the formation, dissemination, and consolidation of stereotypes in the West regarding colonized peoples. Thus, G. Ch. Spivak states: “It should not be possible to read nineteenth-century British literature without remembering that imperialism, understood as England’s social mission, was a crucial part of the cultural representation of England to the English. The role of literature in the production of cultural representation should not be ignored. These two obvious ‘facts’ continue to be disregarded in the reading of

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nineteenth century British literature. This itself attests to the continuing success of the imperialist project, displaced and dispersed into more modern forms” (Spivak 1985: 243). Thus, the literature and cinema of the colonial era, especially the Soviet period, must be reworked and re-analyzed. It is unavoidable to notice that some texts continue to have a pernicious effect on new generations of Kazakhs, forming in them complexes or an unjustifiably pious attitude towards the colonialists, a one-sided perception of the Soviet era. To do this, researchers and, more broadly, readers need to develop decolonial sensitivity, i.e. the ability to see manifestations of the colonial presentation of facts in various phenomena of art, life, and ideology. For many, this sensibility was the result of a critical eye, and it developed long before exposure to post-colonial theory. The literature of the Soviet period, in addition to direct ideological impact, may contain hidden messages, for example, inspire an excessively and unreasonably complimentary attitude towards the “big brother”— Russia, inspiring the idea that Kazakhstan should see its future only in it, depend on it, be guided by her decisions, strive for a closer union with her. In the West, the established canon of authoritative authors has already been reassessed and a number of classics have new interpretations have taken their place. L. Montrose noted: “As the problem of ideology has become an acceptable and even a central topic of critical discourse in the American academy, so the emphases in sociocultural analysis have shifted from unity, reciprocity, and consent to difference, domination, and resistance. It is precisely this shift of emphasis from canonicity and consensus to diversity and contestation that, during the past decade, has been the focus of the national debate about the direction of the humanities…” (Montrose 2017: 821). In Kazakhstan, the process of the Soviet period literature rethinking is formed in two ways: (1) the return of the names and creative heritage of Kazakh writers and poets repressed by the Soviet authorities in the 1920– 1930s and rehabilitated in the late 1980s: M. Dulatov, Zh. Aimautov, M. Zhumabaev, and others; (2) a study of the literary struggle of the 1920s– 1930s, as a result of which nationally oriented writers were forced out of the literary field, which made it possible to “clear” the place for the singers of the Soviet system.

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The content side of the works of recognized authors who served the Soviet regime is writers, which could not but affect their identity, selfpositioning, values, and attitude towards Russian and their culture. The content side of the works of recognized authors who served the Soviet regime is still beyond the scope of extensive research in terms of the presence of a colonial component in them. Rare examples of studies that question the established interpretations of individual classics cause rejection by a part of society that is not ready to question the authority of the classic and rethink the facts of literature, and also face the silence of philologists who refrain from complex discussions. In addition, studies on the rethinking of the works of Russian classics are not presented in Kazakhstan, whose works testify to the presence of openly imperial views in them. This work is important, given that at least three generations of Kazakhs grew up on the Russian classics, which could not but affect their identity, self-positioning, values, and attitude towards Russian and their culture. A critical assessment of the imperialism of the Russian classics can be found among Estonian (M.Yu. Lotman), Russian researchers, but Kazakhstani philologists still cannot venture it. Another phenomenon deserves attention. Given the fact that literature is an effective means of forming and promoting a particular ideology or moral values, as well as the fact that in 1991 Kazakhstan entered a new period of its historical development, one should expect a literary boom. The new era, the country’s exit from totalitarianism, the beginning, as expected, of the post-colonial period required the creation of new plots and characters, the birth and promotion of new meanings, the rethinking of the tragic past, the formation of new values, etc. However, this did not happen, although writers write novels, poets compose poems, and books published. But a fundamentally new, post-colonial, literature as an integral phenomenon was not born. This is a logical consequence of the fact that the authorities did not change the ideological paradigm, did not criticize the totalitarian period and its consequences. In Kazakhstan, during the period of restoration of independence, a stable set of value imperatives and moral and ethical norms was not formed in opposition to the totalitarian Soviet ideology. The authorities were preoccupied with enrichment through the privatization of national wealth, corruption flourished, lawlessness reigned, the corruption of courts, and the repressive orientation of law enforcement agencies remained. This led to the fact that the authorities were not interested in the development of literature that would broadcast and promote moral

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values, speak about the fate of a person in a difficult transitional historical period, and critically depict Soviet or current reality. Certainly, this circumstance did not stop the authors, and they wrote books, but it was not possible to live by literary work. For thirty years, a national book network, publishing houses (and not printing houses), a school of literary criticism, a school of literary translation, etc., have not been created in the country; the Soviet practice of placing state orders for authors who create tendentious works will continue. Until recently, there were almost no works of domestic authors on the shelves of bookstores, with the exception of a few Kazakh classics. In the second half of the twentieth century, many national literatures went through a difficult path of ideological reloading. This process has always been driven by the search for new ways of developing literature under the influence of historical circumstances, changing moral values, and further humanization of society. After the defeat in World War II, West German literature began with an awareness of everything that had happened to the nation since 1933. The main questions facing the writers were as follows: how to revive the nation, how to carry out the process of demilitarization and denazification? Writers saw their role in helping the people to rediscover themselves, to form new values that would allow them to live in peace with other countries. The literature created by the Nazis was criticized (the concept of “Kahlschlagliteratur”—“clear-cutting literature” appeared), and in 1947 a congress of German writers was held, at which issues of the further development of national literature were decided. In the same year, the “Group-47” was created, which became a kind of creative workshop for many aspiring West German writers who helped the Germans find themselves in a new reality, and who later gained fame far beyond Germany. Did Kazakh writers and authorities raise the issue of the tasks facing Kazakh literature, the importance of the formation of new values in the period of post-colonization and post-totalitarianism? Has the tragic experience of the twentieth century been subjected to artistic comprehension? Unfortunately, no. Post-war Japan found itself in a state of ideological emptiness: militaristic literature was banned, and many venerable writers left literature in the 1930s, not wanting to serve Japanese militarism. After the war, Japanese writers were in a state of confusion and uncertainty: what to write about, how to form the ethical values of the Japanese, who had lost

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their usual ideological guidelines. However, already a few months after the end of the war, literary magazines resumed their activities. During 1946 alone, more than 60 new literary and literary-culturological journals appeared on the market. In early 1947, the Japanese Peng Club resumed its activities. In order to attract young talented authors to literature, the largest “thick” magazines have established awards for novice writers. This policy contributed to the popularization of literary activity among young people. It should be noted that in Japanese literature of the second half of the twentieth century there is almost no author worthy of attention who has not been awarded and supported by one or another literary prize in his time. Already 10–15 years after the revival of the literary process, a number of Japanese authors gained world fame (Y. Kawabata, Y. Mishima, K. Abe and others), and in 1968 Japan already had its first Nobel laureate in literature. As we remember, in our country in the 1990s “thick” magazines barely survived, bookstores closed, literary prizes were discussed only 15– 20 years later, and none of them became permanent. The authorities did not think about the importance of forming new values in a new historical period, about liberation from the Soviet ideology, the consequences of colonization and totalitarianism, which caused severe mental trauma to the people. In addition to the mentioned examples of a complete ideological reboot of literature, serious changes took place in the literatures of countries that regained their independence after a period of colonization. First of all, texts created by imperial authors were subjected to reassessment. The continued influence of imperial (or, on the other hand, colonial) psychology on people’s consciousness after independence caused concern to writers of many former colonies. It was they who did everything possible for the peoples to gain a sense of their own dignity, pride in their culture, and so on. In the former English colonies, for example, in the Caribbean, the previously dominant and taught as the main English literature began to be supplanted by local literatures. In the United States, such processes have found expression in the revival of previously ignored traditions of African-American and Native American storytelling. The history of Kazakh literature in the twentieth century was difficult, sometimes tragic. The authors of the first Kazakh novels, playwrights, and poets were repressed in the 1930s and, as a result, their works were banned, published books were removed from libraries and destroyed, manuscripts were confiscated. The folk epic and other folklore works were

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subjected to a purge; tragic was the fate of their carriers. In this way, the literary tradition and the connection between the generations of Kazakh writers were artificially interrupted. Under these conditions, the Kazakh literature of the second half of the twentieth century had to be created virtually from scratch. Instead of the national literary tradition, the tradition of Russian literature was offered as a model, and socialist realism was the only acceptable artistic method. Young Kazakh writers of the sixties felt both the alienation of the model and the limiting framework of socialist realism. They saw and perceived the world differently, and therefore they were looking for other forms of displaying life. The problem was that the Soviet reality left almost no place for the image of the Kazakh world, there was no place for Kazakh history, traditions, spirituality, philosophy of nomads. The rise of Kazakh prose took place in the 1960s and 1970s, when national literatures in the USSR began to overcome the oppression of socialist realism and its canons. After several decades of forced silence (1930–1950), she found her own unique voice. The stamps of socialist realism were overcome in the formulation of problems, the choice of language means, and the type of hero—the builder of communism. The transfer of attention from the eventfulness and labor exploits of the Soviet man to the inner world of the heroes determined the modernist beginning of the Kazakh prose of those years. This found expression in the rejection of the author’s word and the transfer of the word to the hero (internal monologue, stream of consciousness), from which the ideologically correct language of Soviet slogans was not required. The narration in the first person fully corresponded to the national tradition of zhyrshi, akyn, who not only portrayed, but also evaluated and interpreted the events. What became important was not so much the event as the thought; not an explanation, but a multi-valued symbol; not propaganda, but the image of a moral example. After the supremacy of socialist realism with its active, unthinking heroes, the Kazakh writers’ use of tolgau techniques made it possible to focus on the person, his thoughts, doubts, and feelings. It was important for Kazakh literature to give the floor to people after decades of destruction, forced silence, and deprivation of their own voice. The depiction of internal conflict gave particular tension to the works of Kazakh authors. It made it possible to adequately depict the state of the Kazakh in the conditions of Soviet reality, the values and way

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of life imposed on him. The hero is alien to modernity, where everything Kazakh—way of life, traditions, language, culture—was considered an anachronism. He did not find a place in the city, where under the guise of “Soviet modernization” cultural assimilation was carried out, where spiritual values were replaced by ideology. The search for national forms of artistry led to an appeal to folklore, parables, and legends, which made it possible to create a second plan of narration—a spiritual one. The parable gave the character the opportunity to reveal and understand himself through an appeal to the centuries-old wisdom of the people. The traditional method of tolgau—the image of two time layers—made it possible to see the present in comparison with bygone times, events, and characters. Through parallel layers of narrative, the conflict of the old and the new was allegorically portrayed: national tradition and Soviet modernity, city and village, man and nature, ideology, and universal values. Folklore material here is not a tribute to tradition, but a way to go beyond the event level to a timeless, extra-spatial level. This is a lyricalepic perception of life, the existence of a person in the traditions of zhyrau. Understanding the cyclicity of time and the constancy of eternal unshakable values gave hope that history and society would return to the right path. Thus, Kazakh literature overcame Soviet reality, which was perceived as only a small part of the long history of the Kazakhs. It is important for the people to preserve themselves, not to lose themselves and their values—something that is timeless, eternal, and not subject to Soviet ideology. Therefore, in relation to the Kazakh works of the 1970–1980s, we can talk about the prerequisites and the first examples of post-colonial literature. This is the work of the following poets and writers: M. Shakhanov, A. Alimzhanov, M. Magauin, S. Elubay, A. Kekilbaev, A. Nurpeisov and others. In the same row are the historical novels of I. Yesenberlin about the heroes of the past, their moral values and struggle for independence. Thus, the writers of the 1960s–1980s took upon themselves the task of preserving the national history, traditions, language, morality, and coped with it with honor. In the context of the closure of Kazakh schools, the reduction of the spheres of use of the Kazakh language, the ongoing forced cultural assimilation, the loss of national identity, Kazakh fiction became the saving bridge that allowed the Kazakhs not to dissolve in a foreign culture, to preserve the language and a sense of national pride until the collapse of the USSR in 1991.

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Only at the turn of the 1980s–1990s, when modern Kazakh literature was formed, did the time come for “returned literature”. Then the commonality of motives, artistic originality, expressiveness of linguistic means, the moral problems of modern literature, and the works of repressed writers and poets became obvious and amazed, as if they had not been artificially separated, and their connection had not been severed for many decades. After the restoration of the country’s independence, post-colonial literature did not become a trend (however, like no other literature). Unwritten stories, unexpressed thoughts, and unappreciated past continue to be silent. But right now, the artistic understanding of the recent past—through literature and cinema—is especially relevant. The dramatic present provides rich material for literature. We need moral and ecological literature with the formulation of moral and ethical problems for the revival of lost moral values in totalitarian and authoritarian periods. Speaking about the need to revise the works of the Soviet period, it should be remembered that the works of socialist realism consolidated the language norm, including through the creation of a replacement language, substituting concepts (voluntary accession, basmachi, etc.), endowing words with negative semantics previously unusual for them (biy, bai, nomad, aul, clan). These language stamps should be worked out, and the words should be freed from “sticky” epithets and tendentious semantics imposed on them. Will we dare to take a fresh look at our literary heritage of the twentieth century? Sooner or later, we will have to re-read a lot, rethink anew in order to understand whether the authors were the conductors of imperial and totalitarian ideologies, and of what was written during the colonial period was aimed at forming a flawed colonial consciousness, at consolidating a distorted identity. There is another issue. During the Soviet period, translations of works of world literature only from the Russian language were strongly recommended and practiced. This is a kind of cultural dependency. Statements that the Russian language opened the door to world culture for the Soviet republics, in fact, means that world literature was let in only through the Russian door, and it was presented through the prism of the Russian view and assessment. This was the reason for the choice for translation of both authors and national literatures (in a lesser part—oriental ones). In Kazakhstan, the practice of translating world literature into Kazakh through Russian translations is still preserved. Another nonsense: the translation

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of Kazakh literature into other languages continues to be carried out through interlinear translators who do not speak Kazakh. A national translation school has not yet been established. In 2018, the next congress of Kazakh writers was held, after which a broad national discussion on the development of literature again did not follow. What was the point in inviting writers from abroad, when our own literature is in decline and it would be necessary to discuss ways of developing and rebooting national literature? Financing translations is not the development of literature, but its promotion, and not caused by demand, but only by the desire that foreign readers read our literature. The vicious practice of ordering generously paid image articles about Kazakhstan and holding expensive PR events, alas, has been transferred to literature. Will it help her develop? Exactly as much as EXPO-2017 and laudatory articles in foreign media helped the development of “green energy” and the country as a whole. That is, no way. Only when our literature is in demand by a domestic reader can it claim the interest of a foreign readership. One of the shortest ways to popularize literature is film adaptation, it is this that can motivate an appeal to the original source or to other works of the same author. Instead of translating selected works of our authors into six UN languages, they should have been filmed. They could get a second wind. “The era of emptiness”—this is how our spiritual life of the last third of the century can be defined. Should we be surprised at the current state of minds, the ongoing demoralization of society, the triumphant spirit of money-grubbing and consumption, the normalization of corruption and criminal consciousness. The country, which entered a qualitatively new period of its historical development—independence—turned out to be spiritually devastated, and this situation has not changed for almost a third of a century. Have we encountered something hitherto unseen? Not at all. Many countries in the twentieth century faced the need for a spiritual revival, a clear definition of the moral foundations for further existence. They have gone this way. Literature has played an important role in this.

3.4

Nomadism and Sedentism: Deconstruction

In the case of the Kazakh post-colonial discourse, it should be remembered that the colonizer and the colonized belonged to different civilizational types—nomadic and settled. This circumstance determined the

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perception of the Steppe not only within the framework of Orientalism, which created a “convenient” image of the East from the position of Eurocentrism, but also the idea of the nomadic world in vulgar stereotypes generated by settled centrism. Both civilizational (A. Toinbee, O. Spengler) and formational (K. Marx, V. Struve) approaches sin with this, as pointed out by L. Gumilyov, N. Masanov, Zh. Artykbaev and others. The question of the civilizations types and cultures is still open in science, debatable, and deserves a separate discussion. We are also interested in the stereotype about the superiority of a settled civilization over a nomadic one. Let us turn to deconstruction, which will allow us to consider some phenomenon outside the previous hierarchies, the definition of right/wrong, best/worst. In addition, the rejection of any kind of centrism and the use of a comparative approach make it possible to get rid of stereotypes and suddenly discover that the philosophy of nomads, their existence in the world, and value orientations have become for the settled the future they are approaching. This paradox is explained by the fact that the settled world remained captive to its own stereotypes about the world of nomads. What the nomads mastered and carried through the centuries, as it turned out, was the goal for the settled people and a long way to it through searches and mistakes. Comparison of various phenomena of the nomadic and sedentary worlds from the point of view of the nomad (the very voice of the Other) gives an unusual and probably uncomfortable for the settled perspective, revealing that much in the settled world in the perception of the nomads seemed wild, unreasonable, unfair. Moreover, the comparison sometimes gives reason to doubt that the settled civilizational path was unambiguously the best, that the settled world owes its civilizational breakthroughs to the impact of the nomadic world on it, and also to see that the long path of development of the settled world leads it to many worldview landmarks of the nomadic civilization. Even a superficial comparison of the two worlds—nomadic and sedentary—demonstrates some difference in the perception of the world, which means that they form different values and development paths. It is not about what is worse or better, what is right or wrong, or what is the norm or deviation from it. It is about what distinguished these worlds and what caused these differences. Let us consider a few illustrative examples.

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The environment predetermines the ways of human adaptation to it, forming a way of life that is most suitable for given conditions, identifying the most optimal forms of labor activity, depending on the resource potential of the habitat. And therefore it is natural that the environment ultimately determines the way of life, traditions, the originality of the mentality of the people, the norms of community life, and even the path of civilizational development. The physical space, the body largely determines the thinking of a person. Cognitivists argue that the structure of thought can be shaped by bodily experience, that the functioning of our mind can only be explained in terms of evolutionary adaptation based on biology. Our minds are able to transfer lessons from one environment to another with the help of a cognitive schema. Many of our concepts can be explained as arising from the basic patterns that our bodily experience gives us. In the 1980s, the question was raised about the conditionality of the mentality and being of a person or people by biological factors. The theory of “embodied cognition” offers theoretical models for the study of cognition, based on the relationship between the human body and the experience of its interaction with the environment. Thus, the opinion is expressed that human thinking is largely shaped by bodily experience, and the functioning of the human mind is explained by the theory of evolutionary adaptation. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (Lakoff and Johnson 2004) argue that much of a person’s thinking is shaped by image schemas derived from their bodily experience. They note that this tendency is inherent in all thinking, because the human mind is clothed in a material form. Thought is in captivity of its physical bodily location, and therefore thinking is essentially spatial, it acquires physical guidelines. Fear of the forces of nature forced the settled first to worship them, deify them, and then predetermined the desire of man to conquer, conquer and curb the natural world. This led to the opposition of man to nature, the predatory, consumer attitude of man towards it, which led to the merciless exploitation of nature, the violation of the ecological balance. The settled man saw himself as the crown of nature (hierarchy again). The nomad accepted nature without fear, entering into it, mastering more and more new spaces. He was driven by a desire to get to know the environment better, and therefore did not try to conquer it as something hostile, but sought harmony with it, his place in it. He obeyed her and

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accepted her laws, which allowed him to survive and receive everything necessary for life without harming nature. For the nomad, the goal was not to conquer, not to gain the upper hand, but to integrate harmoniously into the environment. Violence against nature was alien to the nomad, who saw himself as part of it, one among other living beings. Thoughts about how to own nature, the nomad could not have arisen. The difference in attitude to the surrounding world and positioning oneself in it—the opposition of a settled person or as part of a whole for a nomad—determined the principle of closeness/openness to a new, different, different from one’s own: culture, lifestyle, values, traditions, and religion. Contrasting oneself with the rest of the world, striving for mastery, appropriation of land formed the tradition of the settled world to define boundaries, erect fences between one’s own and another’s (courtyard, village, feudal land, city, state). Due to the development of forms of economic activity, nomads and settled people developed a different attitude towards land as the main means of production. The nomads did not fence off the territory, while they knew perfectly well where the lands of another kind, people, confederation of tribes end and begin. The creation of barriers, fences seemed absurd to the nomads, because they understood that the earth is given to all living beings, like sky, air, and water. Moreover, artificial barriers disturbed the natural landscape and blocked the paths of animal migrations. And most importantly, the nomads understood that no borders, fences, fortress walls, boundaries could be more reliable than a word, an agreement, or an intention to coexist peacefully. Such a view of the nomads on the world is determined by the environment and bodily experience. The panorama in the Steppe is unobstructed, the horizons are boundless, and the nomad needs to see far, to know that there is a perspective. His gaze is not used to resting on obstacles. The nomads erased the boundaries for the settled. The desire to move, to receive new information, and the willingness to learn something different will come to settled peoples later, and trade will become the engine first, then navigation, i.e. nomadism on the seas, on the world. And this will largely change the mentality of a settled person. Appeal to the world, movement across a large space predetermined the interest and readiness of the nomads to meet the new, the unknown. His expectations of discoveries, something unusual, were always justified, and the nomad invariably received new impressions, new experience, and

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learned with interest something different from his usual one. This was one of the important components of the mentality of the nomads. The nomads’ perception of the world without borders, in its integrity, their movement across the vast territory of Eurasia, the knowledge of how large and diverse the surrounding world is, led to their openness to everything new, and unknown. Faced with a new country, a new people, the nomads were looking for something in common that could potentially become the basis for cooperation, networking (by the way, if the settled people sold goods, then the nomads sold services). Just as the nomads adapted to nature, they adapted to any new conditions, incl. social, and built into them. A nomad, traveling, saw a lot, and he was distinguished by his knowledge of the world outside his country, breadth of views, and ability to analyze and compare. At the same time, the nomads did not adopt and borrow so much from other peoples for the reason that not every experience or invention of the settled people was suitable for nomadic life, but the new information certainly expanded the horizons of consciousness. Visiting different countries, getting to know different peoples taught the nomads to calmly, as a norm, accept the diversity of the world, which led to tolerance for others and the ability to see the rational in other people’s traditions, lifestyle, and religion. For sedentary people who have been living in the same territory for centuries, surrounded by one ethnic group, everything new, and unfamiliar violated the usual picture of the world, brought confusion, and anxiety, was perceived with caution, hostility and, as a result, caused rejection, a desire to protect themselves, protect themselves. In habitually shielding himself from the rest of the world, the sedentary seeks the boundaries between his own and that of others, i.e. in perception and evaluation, he relies on differences, proceeds from the discovered difference. This explains the focus of the settled on their own, on the unconditional priority of their own (protection, isolation) and rejection, belittling the other, the alien, the unfamiliar. Therefore, the settled are more intolerant of manifestations of otherness in any of its forms: traditions, appearance, language, religion. The sedentary way of life, the inability to imagine how many-sided the world outside of his settlement, led to the limited views of the sedentary, his closeness, and rejection of the other. The mental closeness and intolerance of the sedentary to the other in their implementation, for example, conquests, colonization became the

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reason for the forcible imposition of their own: language, way of life, laws, culture, religion. The inability, unwillingness to see and accept the rational in someone else’s way of life and traditions was masked by a categorical statement about the superiority of one’s own culture. Conquering nature, and then—entire nations, the settled ones acted in the same way— breaking, adjusting to themselves, striving to dominate, not being able, ready to see alternatives, unable to foresee the destructive consequences of their actions. For many centuries nomads carried out conquests, but the fundamental difference between these conquests was that they did not impose their way of life, culture, customs, or language. Yes, in the Middle Ages outside the Steppe they spoke Kypchak, i.e. Turkic language, but it was taught by merchants, ambassadors, and travelers, because this language guaranteed the ability to be understood, negotiate, trade, and communicate over a vast territory from Europe to China. At the same time, the nomads remaining on the new land mastered the language of the host country, married local women, and their descendants assimilated after 3–4 generations (cultural and mental pluralism was a consequence of the openness, tolerance, and ability to harmoniously integrate into the new environment characteristic of nomads). In the controlled territories, nomads introduced laws that made it possible to regulate international relations, equally beneficial to all parties. The settled ones appropriated part of the world for themselves (the more, the better); nomads perceived the whole world as a whole (it does not need to be appropriated, it is enough to be harmoniously present in it). The settled adjusted the world for themselves; the nomads introduced unifying norms of relations between peoples and acted as a link between them. Thus, the settled during the conquest carried out the seizure, appropriation of the territory (and marked the boundaries of the conquered) and sought to create their usual “norm” (linguistic, religious). And the nomads established control in order to create an extensive network of international relations, and trade routes while maintaining the specifics of the network links—countries with their traditional production, conditioned by the environment and natural resources. This diversity was beneficial for trade, circulation of ideas, and inventions. The nomads were interested in exchanges and establishing logistical routes, because, firstly, caravans, passing through the vast territories of the nomads, brought

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profit, revived their cities, and secondly, the nomads, who were accustomed to overcome large spaces and knew how to navigate in any area, provided goods transportation and road safety services. Nomads have integrated into a single geopolitical, multicultural, informational, macroeconomic space of the territory of Eurasia—Europe, China, India, the Middle East, and, of course, the Steppe. Being mobile, the nomads forced the world to open its borders, to move, to let the new into their world. And this was reflected in the development of many peoples. The history of many countries in the West and Asia would have been different, the pace of building national states and their development would have proceeded much more slowly if it were not for the nomads. Today it is obvious that the nomads accelerated the pace of development of many peoples and the processes of nationbuilding, forced the settled world to establish international cooperation, contributed to the development of military affairs (weapons, paraphernalia, concepts of military honor, intelligence), contributed to cultural borrowing and the influence of different cultures on each other. Even the principle “from the contrary”, “in spite of” played a certain role in the centralization of settled states. It was after the Huns of Attila that the world began to move: the Roman Empire was destroyed by the Germanic tribes, and the migration of peoples began. After the last powerful wave of the nomads of Shyngyskhan, both in Europe and in China, a cultural renaissance, a national revival, began, which resulted in the centralization of power, and in Europe also the formation of national languages with their subsequent victory over Latin. Undoubtedly, all these changes were the result of incoming historical challenges, which was presented in the face of nomads. The update took place on the basis of new information brought by the nomads. Given the circumstances, the listed processes of revival had, so to speak, an “antinomadic” component. Nomads made the world more open, erasing the boundaries, but preserving the uniqueness and originality of different cultures. Acting as a link between countries, societies, mentalities, nomads created a system of common cultural values, gave impetus, set the pace and direction for the development of settled peoples, created international communications, and relayed information from cultural centers distant from each other. There is no need to talk about the exclusively negative contribution of nomads to the history of the world, although many sedentary states resorted to the services of nomads precisely for waging wars, in the

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struggle for new territories, religion, and political influence. But let us remember that not in the Middle Ages, but in the New Age, sedentary peoples who call themselves civilized planted their “peace” much more bloodily, landing on new continents and conquering new colonies. This was carried out under the sign of modernity, the reverse side of which was colonialism. Today the world has become nomadic in spirit, in its inner essence— open to the new, mobile, receptive to the different. The settled world in its development comes to what constituted the principles of nomads, on which their competitive potential was traditionally built: respect for nature and awareness of being part of it, mobility, tolerance, religious tolerance, inviolability of international treaties, overcoming the boundaries of the world and the movement of information through them, services, technologies, etc.

3.5 Bai: Exploiter or Defender of the Interests of the People? A dubious attempt to explain the socio-economic structure of the nomads through the formational approach led to an erroneous, vulgar idea of the nomads’ class relations. In order to justify the class struggle and hence the need for a revolution in Kazakhstan, the Bolsheviks had to discover the class conflict. They created a distorted idea of the bai, extrapolating to him the characteristics of a Russian landowner—the owner of the land and peasants. K. Marx did not create a complete theory of socio-economic formations. He considered different variants of formations, for example: (1) Asian, ancient, feudal, capitalist, or (2) Asian, ancient, and German (according to the mode of production). These reflections and sketches by K. Marx became the basis for Soviet historians (V.V. Struve and others) to define five formations in accordance with the dominant production relations and forms of ownership: primitive communal, slaveholding, feudal, capitalist, and communist. The formational approach was defeated when trying to find slave and feudal formations in the nomadic world. Feudalism presupposes an estateclass social structure and economic coercion on the part of the owners of private ownership of the means of production.

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However, the theorists of Marxism-Leninism, using the formational model for propaganda and ideological purposes, unreasonably gave it the properties of universality, absoluteness, and completeness. In addition, serfdom was seen as a constituent element of the interpretation of feudalism adopted in the USSR. The formational theory was subjected to fair criticism, since it did not assume the multivariance of the ways of development of all mankind. Feudalism should be regarded as a phenomenon characteristic of Western European development, or, more broadly, of a significant part of the settled world, and not at all as an obligatory stage in the world-historical process. The absence in a traditional nomadic society of landowners (feudal lords) characteristic of a feudal society and, consequently, people dependent on them, explains the absence of exploitation and class antagonism. Despite the obvious contradictions, the Bolsheviks armed themselves with a formational approach, defining the nomadic society as feudal, and fitting “evidence” under it, including the interpretation of the bai as a feudal lord and exploiter, and the nomadic pastoralists as exploited. Such an interpretation of socio-economic relations in a nomadic society allowed the communists to bring them under the class struggle and present their own actions as the liberation of the people from the power of the exploiters. The theory of “nomadic feudalism”, which was based on the principle of feudal ownership of pastures and the thesis of serfdom of ordinary pastoralists, also looked like a frank stretch. Although it is obvious that nomadism was a nomadic variant of socio-economic development, and the patterns of settled societies could not be applied here. The fundamental factor is that the Kazakhs did not have private ownership of the main means of production—land. It was in the collective ownership of the clan. Each village had its own summer and winter pastures. Therefore, there was no dependence of the nomad on the bai— a wealthy cattle owner. The aul as a nomadic community (a form of social relations, a subject of economic activity) consisted of close relatives and consisted of an average of 8–10 families with a total of 40–50 people (3–4 generations). The territory of the clan, i.e. the land, reservoirs, and forests used by the auls remained his indivisible, inalienable property. N. Alimbay in the article “The nomadic community of Kazakhs: problems of ethno-sociological reconstruction” writes: “…it was the community that had the monopoly right of the subject of ownership to the tribal territory… It follows from the foregoing that the relations

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of communal ownership of land consisted of several interdependent and interdependent levels: relations of use, the subject of which were large undivided families and systems of management and regulation of land relations. Summarizing the above, it can be concluded that such a ‘segmented’ way of realizing land ownership relations in the form of use relations, in essence, is one of the effective economic factors (at the same time methods) for the rational exploitation of habitat resources, on the one hand, and on the other hand, ensuring the corporate unity of the community as a society…” (Alimbay 2009: 322). Collective ownership of the land provided any member of the clan, even in the event of its complete ruin, the possibility of a sufficiently quick and, most importantly, guaranteed restoration of prosperity. The guarantee was based on his full right to count on a certain part of the clan’s territory for nomadism. An individual person used the land (vegetation), water bodies, but did not own them individually. This applied to a wealthy cattle owner, and a person of average income, and the poor (by the nomads’ standard). Collective ownership of the land was the basis of the economic freedom of an individual nomad and his descendants, and strengthened his connection with the clan. Conversely, private ownership of land in a feudal sedentary society became the cause of the cruel exploitation of farmers, their lack of freedom, and economic dependence on the owner of the land. Why was there no class antagonism in a nomadic society? Bais and biys were not just natives of the people. They headed the genus or subgenus, i.e. their relatives who had a common ancestor in the seventh generation, which is considered by the Kazakhs to be a close relationship. Bais were responsible for the well-being of the clan, its reputation. Their duty was to provide conditions under which all members of the clan would be protected and financially secure. These considerations guided the beys and biys in the fair distribution of pastures. The material wellbeing of all members of the (sub)genus was beneficial: strong, numerous rich auls, which means a strong, numerous, rich clan. A poor aul in the clan or an impoverished member of the clan, who became a zhatak became an occasion for ridicule of the bai of this clan. The Uzun-kulak could spread across the Steppe the dubious glory of the bai, who does not (if necessary) provide assistance in paying kalym or issuing a dowry, organizing an as or asar, supporting victims of jute, etc. Also, the bai and the clan headed by him could be publicly criticized by aityskers at any

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event: fair, toy, as, if they did not provide assistance to their impoverished relatives. At the beginning of the twentieth century, it was the beys who financed the publication of newspapers and the publication of books, paid for the education and maintenance of talented children in gymnasiums and universities, supported the initiatives of the Alashordans (including paying deposits and paying fines for them), i.e. stood up for the interests of the people, their education. The resettlement policy deprived the nomads of their ancestral lands: rich pastures, and reservoirs. “As a result, the impoverishment of the Kazakhs, the appearance of dzhatats, poor Baigus, the humiliation of the common people, enmity between the Kazakhs for pastures,—A.D. Azerbaev.—The Kazakhs, occupying the positions established by the colonial administration, became addicted to bribery, slander… New time exhibited new heroes: volosts, clerks, translators, alypsatars” (Azerbaev 2019: 13). The consequences of colonial policy became especially noticeable at the end of the nineteenth century. Newly rich people appear—the nouveau riche, who made a fortune thanks to the development of trade and the expansion of money-usurious operations. Among the Kazakhs began to appear rich merchants, usurers from among yesterday’s interpreters, guides, and intermediaries between the Kazakhs and the colonial administration. These were the rich of the new formation. They broke away from the family, strove for personal success. Appearing poor Kazakhs, deprived of their pastures as a result of the resettlement policy, were hired to serve as herders and were exploited in the same way as the zhataks working for the Cossacks. These nouveaux riches, who preached new “values” and adopted norms of behavior alien to the Kazakhs, were rather the exception (minority) than the rule in a society that, for the most part, continued to lead a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle. The definition of “buy” did not suit the newly minted rich, since their essence did not imply the whole palette of meanings invested in this concept. That is why the communists faced the problem of fomenting the class struggle. The Kazakh nomad did not see and could not see the class enemy and exploiter in his relative bai, who cared about the interests of the members of the clan. The negative connotation of the word “bay” appears in the late 1920s—early 1930s in the conditions of the growing struggle of the Bolsheviks with the prosperous and wealthy Kazakhs in the Steppe.

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This negative semantics (“kulak-bai element”, “feudal-bai remnants”) was actively supported throughout the Soviet period by the forces of journalism, literature, cinema, and, thanks to this, still retains its stability. During the establishment of Soviet power, the communists tried to split the Kazakh society, pushing, as they saw it, class antagonists—rich and poor. Relations between Russian landlords and peasants, formed over a long period of serfdom, they extrapolated to relations between beys, biys and ordinary Kazakh nomads. However, the nomadic Kazakh society is far from a sedentary society, which, moreover, was serfdom in the recent past. In addition, the number of settled sharua and the proletariat was small compared to the bulk of the Kazakhs, who maintained a nomadic and semi-nomadic lifestyle with its characteristic specific features, social and economic relations, traditions, and norms of behavior. The nomadic community continued to maintain the traditional structure, where bai and biy were not exploiters, but leaders who were responsible for the well-being of relatives (clan, subclan, villages). They jointly owned pastures, jointly coped with difficulties or increased their prosperity, i.e. carried out general socio-economic activities in all its manifestations. The overwhelming number of Kazakhs, in whom the Soviet government hoped to find supporters, opposed the expropriation, because the cattle lost not only the bai, but the entire aul, clan. It was cattle that members of the clan could count on in case of need. Thanks to this cattle, the bai paid for the education of the children of the clan, the work of teachers, etc. During the years of Asharshylyk, the Kazakhs migrated to China and Mongolia also by clan or auls, led by their bai and biys, who led the people, taking responsibility for their future. The Bolsheviks never managed to convince the Kazakhs that the bai was a class enemy, because for the Kazakhs, bai and biy were close relatives; not just more wealthy people, but older ones who have obligations to their relatives. They were in charge of economic and economic affairs, migrations, litigation, observance of customs, marriage and marriage of young people, sending them to study, aces, etc. Bai, biy was a close relative for a Kazakh. Could there be class animosity here? The communists, realizing the futility of their attempts to push the members of one branched family together, simply physically destroyed the beys and biys, i.e. decapitated the birth. Some of the bais migrated with their auls outside the USSR, others were exiled to Siberia, and others were repressed.

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During the repressions of the late 1930s, even the elderly (70–80 years old) were executed. They were bearers of the memory and values of the people, experts in a different type of social structure and social relations. Having physically destroyed the bais, the Bolsheviks excluded the possibility of passing on to the next generations the traditional Kazakh values and norms of behavior, the tradition of social responsibility of wealthy people for their relatives. Bais could no longer serve as their own example, demonstrating a way of life and social relations that was different from the essence of the Russian landowner. After that, the Bolsheviks began to entrench the image of an exploiter in the mass consciousness, written off from the Russian landowner and his relations with the peasants. Such an image of Bai was created in Soviet literature and cinema. A different (objective) image of the bais could not be passed by the censors. Thus, the class antagonism of the settled was extrapolated to the nomadic society.

3.6

Hierarchy vs Network, or Nomadism of the Twenty-First Century

The sedentary world has existed for many centuries and partly continues to exist according to the principle of hierarchy, denoting the top and bottom of society, endowed with power and subordinate, noble and rootless, rich and poor. The principle of hierarchy determined the nature of social, economic relations, as well as the forms of functioning of power. The history of the settled world is the history of overcoming the hierarchy built by it (popular uprisings, revolutions, religious wars). The forms of expression of the principle of hierarchy are different: social structure, private ownership of the means of production, property stratification, legal system, religion, education, community norms, etiquette, and the like. The aforementioned secured the privileged position of some and the subordinate position of others. Building and substantiating the hierarchy in a sedentary society originates in mythology. For example, ancient Greek mythology tells about the hierarchy of the gods, as well as about the heroes from whom the ancient Greek aristocratic families and Roman patricians originate. In the Middle Ages, an aristocratic title was received from the king for merit, and not necessarily for feats of arms. This is how the vertical was created, classes and estates were built into it. An important point: privileges (title

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and land) were inherited. True, there was always a risk of losing them, for example, during the formation of a centralized, absolutist state. The selection for positions was carried out from among the privileged class, which significantly narrowed the choice of applicants, and also limited the opportunities for the vast majority of the population. Often this was not a selection of the best, but those who inherited the title of nobility from a once heroic ancestor, or who were ready to submit to the will of the king. The extremes of hierarchy find expression in the slavery that existed in the sedentary world. The forms of management and the need for labor created all the prerequisites for one person to exploit another person. Slavery threatened not only prisoners of war. In ancient Rome, the patricians believed that the plebeians should be treated as second-class people. When the opportunity to plunder the provinces disappeared and the influx of slaves ceased, a law was practiced in the Roman Republic, according to which a plebeian, unable to pay off his debts, was obliged to sell himself and his family into slavery in payment of the debt. A man has become a slave. Later there is a rethinking of religion. Man from the creation of God turns into his slave. Why? To justify the chosenness of some, their right to the throne (the king is God’s chosen), and the low, subordinate origin of others. The servant of God was to become the servant of God’s chosen one. So, the settled peoples had states, kings and dynasties, strong power, and social hierarchy. The rulers began to be considered the vicegerents of God on earth (later philosophers had to prove the principle of equality of all people). What was the dominant class in a sedentary society? The aristocracy is, first of all, a person of noble birth (having a long pedigree), in the history of whose family there were famous knights, and defenders of the crown. In the Middle Ages, for service and exploits, they were endowed with exclusive rights, including property rights. These rights became hereditary, and thus, in short, the European aristocracy was formed. The inheritance of a noble family did not yet become a guarantee of aristocracy; the reputation of an ancestor known for his nobility had to be maintained. That means not only blood, but also personal qualities (the presence of an aristocratic spirit) became an important marker. The formation of the aristocracy contributed to the consolidation of private ownership of land and strengthened the social hierarchy. The opposite of the aristocracy in the sedentary world is the so-called mob, commoners. These two layers became more and more distant from each other in

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terms of culture, education, and language used. Only in the process of the formation of a number of European nations did national languages occupy a dominant place, displacing Latin as the language of science and literature, and became a unifying factor. In a nomadic society, it is not necessary to talk about the opposition of a certain aristocracy and ordinary people, first of all, because both are representatives of one kind (biy, bai, herdsman, shepherd, artisan), leading a genealogy from a common ancestor. In a nomadic society, there was no division into social tops/bottoms, aristocrats, or commoners with a pedigree/without it. Firstly, because all Kazakhs have an ancestry, and this could not become a kind of distinguishing feature. Secondly, the category “ar ici” (lit. “man of honor”, i.e. aristocrat) was replenished from the bowels of the people, at the expense of any member of the society with outstanding qualities of a commander, batyr, judge, akyn, and musician, etc. The tradition of building a hierarchy and determining the dominant force determined the goal of the class struggle. The settled world held power over people through coercion, fear, and submission. The desire to strengthen this position in the mass consciousness led to the use by the dominant class of the practice of persecuting dissent. A significant part of the history of Europe is a chronicle of religious intolerance, which led to wars, revolutions, reformation, St. Bartholomew’s nights, the burning of “witches”, and the persecution of dissidents. After the terrible consequences of religious hostility and the struggle against dissent, European thinkers started talking about religious tolerance (it took even longer to get to freedom of speech). So, in a nomadic society, the principles of democracy and equality of people, their rights and freedoms, reflected in folk traditions, were formed in parallel with the formation of a way of life and management in extreme conditions of a survival environment. And among the settled, the same principles developed in the mental constructions and the educational activities of thinkers, philosophers after the bitter experience of prohibitions, the persecution of dissent, the “dark” Middle Ages, the extremes of absolutism, and a rigid social hierarchy were developed. Nomads did not encroach on the thoughts, faith of a person, they only demanded compliance with laws designed to ensure the conditions for the peaceful coexistence of a clan, tribe, confederation of tribes, countries. The steppe did not know religious wars and racism. The nomads did

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not have slavery. The principle of freedom of speech was not only implemented, but was also enshrined in the tradition of public speaking: Dat, aitys. The ideas of the French Revolution “Liberty, Equality and Fraternity” were embodied in a nomadic society long before it was formalized by European enlighteners. The hierarchy of the sedentary world was also based on private ownership of the means of production, primarily land. This led to the dependence of the peasants on the land-owning feudal lord and, as a result, to the emergence of a form of slavery—serfdom, which existed, for example, in England until the fourteenth century, in Germany and France until the end of the eighteenth century, in Russia until 1861, in the southern In the United States, slavery existed until the end of the Civil War of 1861–1865. Economic dependence asserted the power of the ruling circles and contributed to the consolidation of the overwhelming, repressive functions of the state (M. Foucault, L. Altusser, J. Agamben, and others). The sedentary world created such norms of social structure, which it then had to correct throughout the history of its existence. The best thinkers struggled with the problem of a just social order, from century to century changing the minds of people, softening the role of the state, and helping to overcome inequality between people. In a nomadic society, the principles people’s equality, their rights, and freedoms were formed under the influence of lifestyle and forms of management in extreme environmental conditions. And in the sedentary—through theory, in the ideas of philosophers and after the bitter experience of religious prohibitions, the “dark” Middle Ages, the persecution of dissent, censorship, the inquisition, the extremes of absolutism, racism. In contrast to the sedentary world, nomadism is not a hierarchy, but a Network, where there is no center and periphery, top and bottom, dominant and subordinate, where each element, the node of the network is equally significant, and the plurality of connections ensures the branching and effective functioning of the network. Nomads perceived the world as integral, connected, i.e. a structure similar to a single organism or network. I will provide two explanations for the structure of a nomadic society. The first allows you to see the traditional idea of the nomads about the social structure. In figurative form, it was transmitted by biys (Suleimanov 2013). The second one uses the actor-network theory of B. Latour

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(Latour 1996) and the concept of the rhizome by J. Deleuze, F. Guattari (Deleuze and Guattari 2005). The structure of a nomadic society is based not on a rigid hierarchy, but on the principle of interconnectedness and interdependence, when one cannot exist without the other. This is reflected in the figurative comparison of society with the body system: kara suyek (black bone), ak suyek (white bone), kan (blood), mi or bi (brain). The use of anatomical terminology is explained by the excellent knowledge of the anatomy of a living organism by nomadic pastoralists. The term kara suyek does not mean at all “black bone” as a synonym for niello, but as standing bones, i.e. the skeleton of the whole organism. Kara suyek included the main, most numerous labor and at the same time, if necessary, the military part of society. Any cattle breeder became a warrior: a scout, a guide, a foreman, a centurion, a thousand’s manager. Many famous batyrs and generals come from here. The term ak suyek (white bone) referred to the bones of the skull. This figurative concept denoted that part of society that performed a unifying function for the optimal functioning of the body, and also played a spiritual role. Ak suyek consisted of two branches. These are tore—direct descendants of Genghis Khan, from among whom khans and sultans were elected, called to deal with state affairs, thus performing the functions of managing the whole organism. The second branch ak suyek is kozha, the descendants of Arab missionaries who brought Islam to the Steppe. In turn, kara suyek (black bone) consisted of several components: the meat that grows on the bones is families, children; the main part of the skeleton, the spinal column, is relatives, on whose help a person relies; hands are batyrs, called to hold weapons and protect the earth from enemies; legs are herdsmen, shepherds. Thus, kara suyek is a people. The link between kara suyek and ak suyek was the best representatives of the former. This estate received the designation “mi” or “bi” (brain), i.e. what filled the skull determined its content, and hence the forms, principles, values, the mode of existence of the entire organism controlled by the head. Representatives of this estate were called biys, who were actually the heads of clans or tribal formations. Thus, in the presence of a khan, sultans, the main content of politics, economics, and social relations was determined by the biys of clans and tribal associations. It was the biys who could support this or that khan, the people stood behind them. Therefore, the khan depended in his decisions on the support of the biys. This ensured that the Khan’s decision would not run counter to the interests of

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the clans. Within the limits of the clan subject to him, the biy, most often, concentrated judicial, administrative and, if necessary, military power in his hands. It was the biys who acted as bearers of traditions, personified law and justice, were the voice of the people, conveying to the khan the will and decision of the family. Biys were called upon to establish fair laws, and khans—to implement and ensure their strict implementation by all members of society. The concept of kan means not only “blood”, but also “genes”, “breed”. In addition, kan also means “khan”, i.e. ruler. This coincidence of concepts is not accidental, since the Kazakhs believed that the khan should play a role in the life of society, similar to the role of the circulatory system of a living organism. Khan had to make sure that family, political, economic, and cultural ties between the Kazakh clans functioned as continuously as the circulatory system circulating in the body. At the same time, not every descendant of Genghis Khan became a khan, but only a worthy one, elected by the decision of biys, ru-aksakals, and batyrs of tribal associations. This way, gender equality was ensured. The triad of zhuzes originally meant not seniority at all (senior, middle, junior), but the left, right wings, and the center of the traditional building of the nomad army. Each clan gave the people the best representatives: biys, batyrs, akyns, etc. Aristocracy was an indicator not so much of noble origin (which everyone had), but of personal dignity, i.e. it was the aristocrat of the spirit that was considered an aristocrat. In the Steppe, a high origin did not guarantee respect or did not save one from contempt if a person acted dishonestly (they migrated from the khans and abandoned the biys). In order to gain and maintain authority and power, the ruler, the biy, had to show absolute devotion to the society he leads every day, selfless service to it, demonstrate complete impartiality and objectivity in resolving disputes that arise between fellow tribesmen. Only by showing the qualities of ar ici (a man of honor), a person could claim the right to lead the people. Such a person should have a sense of honor and conscience, brought up from childhood. These qualities will not allow a person to encroach on someone else’s property. And then the basis of order and legality is not fear of inevitable punishment, but meaningful adherence to the social contract, respect for other people’s work and property, and, most importantly, the absence of any thought to violate the ban. What was important was the inner attitude of a person to observe his honor, not to allow a low deed even in his thoughts.

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Any tribal community considered its main wealth to be people of honor, conscience, and dignity. Such people are incorruptible and serve society not out of fear, fearing justice (dat), but out of conscience, honor (ar). Only noble individuals, guided by the principles of honor, conscience, dignity, and fidelity to the word, could dispose of power, the distribution of pastures. Thus, khans, sultans, biys of clans, and herdsmenwarriors were interconnected. There were traditions developed over the centuries that regulated these relations and, if necessary, prevented an excessive concentration of power in one hand (Suleimanov 2013). The actor-network theory of Bruno Latour allows us to see the nomadic society in a new way, its essence. Network theory, which rejects the hierarchy of top/bottom, far/near, and large/small scales, proposes to consider the world as a network, united by numerous connections and nodes. The network principle demonstrates the advantages of the social structure of nomads and explains the expediency of choosing connection and multiplicity instead of a hierarchical vertical and separation. B. Latour notes that “A network notion implies a deeply different social theory: it has no a priori order relation; it is not tied to the axiological myth of a top and of a bottom of society” (Latour 1996: 371). Network communication among the nomads was expressed in the presence of not only the temporal vertical of the genealogy—deepening into the past and striving for the future, but also a horizontal level, in breadth in different directions in the present tense: ata-zhurt—paternal relatives (representatives from the first to the seventh generation from common ancestor), nagashy (relatives on the mother’s side), ulken-nagashy (relatives on the maternal side of the father), kudalar (matchmakers, acquired relatives). Moreover, a kind of social network expanded through the traditions of amanat, tamyr, which also multiplied the nodes of the network. The presence of an ancestry and a glorious ancestor did not form a privileged class in a nomadic society, because all nomads had a pedigree stretching for several centuries. The nomads understood that a person would be loyal to those people among whom he grew up and formed. The custom of the Steppe to exchange children between the leaders of clans and tribes guaranteed peace and support. The so-called dynastic marriages have been practiced for centuries by nomads at different levels: interstate, confederate, and tribal.. Such marriages significantly expanded the network, united its new

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elements, and multiplied the knots of connections. As B. Latour notes, “Strength does not come from concentration, purity, and unity, but from dissemination, heterogeneity and the careful plaiting of weak ties” (Latour 1996: 370). The spread of network nodes was also facilitated by the nomads’ ban on marriages between people who had a common ancestor up to the seventh generation. The knowledge of the seven ancestors made it possible to keep inseparable the nearest nodes of the network, which diverged further in many directions. Marriage to a member of another genus or subgenus bound the nation not as an imaginary community (Anderson 2016), but through numerous economic, political, mental, and moral ties and obligations, as well as common descendants. Since the presence of a pedigree did not guarantee privileges for nomads in view of the presence of a long pedigree among all members of society, success could only be achieved thanks to personal qualities. The absence of a fixed social hierarchy allowed the nomads to select the best, the strongest, regardless of their origin and social status. Those who had intelligence, courage, strength, experience, authority, and charisma became leaders. Difficult living conditions did not allow taking risks and trusting a weak leader who defended the interests of a separate clan or confederation of clans. This principle contributed to the constant renewal of the elite based on the personal qualities of a person (in Europe, the elite remained largely unchanged since the time of the Crusades or was updated after the bourgeois revolutions). Due to the development of different forms of economic activity, the settled and nomads developed a different attitude towards the land as the main means of production. Social, economic, and political problems associated with land ownership, as well as excessive property stratification, were not characteristic of a nomadic society. The land was collectively owned and belonged to the clan, tribal association. This contributed to the economic independence of each individual nomad, aul, (sub)genus and excluded exploitation, and significant material inequality. The overwhelming majority of nomads were middle-class people (an aul of 3–4 households had hundreds of sheep and a herd of horses, which provided food, clothing, and yurts). With a smaller number of livestock, nomadic (transhumant) pastoralism did not make economic feasibility. If the nomads continued to roam, driving cattle either to winter or summer pastures, then they had a fairly large number of cattle. The opportunities for enrichment of the nomad were limited only by the size of the available pastures. Each clan collectively owned a certain territory.

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Representatives of the family either got rich or went bankrupt together. The strength of the clan was provided not only by the number of people, but also by their well-being (the presence of a sufficient number of horses, weapons, etc.). Therefore, the heads of clans were interested in ensuring that there were no poor auls in the clan. In the case of jute, the victims were replenished by the forces of the clan, or given a sufficient number of livestock for further effective farming. (Europe has been moving towards understanding the importance of a large middle class, the need to protect the interests of small and medium-sized producers, and the demonopolization of the system of material production for a long time). The presence of a fundamental and cementing “middle class” society without the poor and beggars is the norm for a nomadic society. If a person grew rich, then he grew rich only together with his aul, clan (hence the tradition of the Kazakhs in various forms to support their relatives financially, so that they would not be separated by material inequality). A strong system of family ties (belonging to the same genus, i.e. from a common ancestor), the common ownership of ancestral land excluded the class division of society. Biy, bai were relatives of the middle peasant, an ordinary nomad. They lived in common problems, joys, celebrated toi, or aces together. They spoke the same language, adhered to common moral principles. The absence of class antagonism in the Steppe made it more difficult for the Bolsheviks to fight against the bais: firstly, it meant turning people against close relatives, and secondly, the expropriation of cattle from the bais deprived the entire genus headed by him of this cattle. The formation of a monarchy, the establishment of absolutism in the social structure of the nomads were excluded due to the existing system of checks and balances, the distribution of power, and the inalienable human right to freedom. Therefore, the nomadic world did not fit into the framework of civilizational or formational approaches based on the stages of development of the state and the principle of private ownership of the means of production. Social responsibility and the principles of civil society occupied a key place in the nomadic society. The authority of a bai, biy of one kind or another was built, among other things, on their ability to resolve issues related to the life of the family (raising orphans, caring for widows, helping with jute, etc.), as well as observing laws and moral standards by family members. There were no orphanages, orphanages in the Steppe. The strength of the clan was in the ability to work together to solve all emerging problems.

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The concept of a network removes many of the parameters of the hierarchical principle inherent in the sedentary world: dominance/ subordination, importance/minority, primacy/second-rateness, center/ periphery, and one’s own/them. The network replaces vertical connections with horizontal ones. These connections are always present, they just can be more or less intense, long, extended, wide. The network has no boundaries, inside or outside; the only question is the availability of connections between network elements. The person was inside the network. He was connected with the clans of his father, mother, and wife, through the marriages of his children and grandchildren—with other clans. This network is constantly expanding. With each new generation, it is enriched with new elements and connections. Thus, a nation was formed among the Kazakhs—a community not imaginary, but united by blood ties, a common culture, way of life and management, a system of law and common moral imperatives and norms of behavior for a khan, bey, ordinary nomad. Such a social structure was reflected in the worldview of the nomad, who perceived the world as one, permeated with many connections. The function of establishing links was performed by the nomads: by themselves making up the network, they expanded it, uniting the world. It’s just that in this case, not auls and clans, but countries and parts of the continent became elements. The idea of the world (human societies or nature) as a single organism is characteristic of the worldview of the nomad. The concept of the rhizome by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari should also be mentioned (Deleuze and Guattari 2005). Some theses in it raise doubts, but a number of observations undoubtedly explain the specifics of the worldview and existence of nomads in the world. The rhizome, in contrast to the principle of hierarchy (vertical, subordination) and the actor-network theory (multidirectionality and multiplicity of connections and nodes), includes an important component—movement: “Make rhizomes, not roots, never plant! Don’t sow, grow offshoots! Don’t be one or multiple, be multiplicities! Run lines, never plot a point! Speed turns the point into a line! Be quick, even when standing still!!… A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo” (Deleuze and Guattari 2005: 24–25). Movement, high mobility are an important sign of the nomad’s worldview and a condition for the life of a nomadic society. The mobility of the nomads was due to the habitat, the need to provide livestock with

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fodder in the arid zone. This circumstance predetermined the special attitude of nomads to space, time, nature, and for a long time ensured their competitive potential. The network in some way, like the hierarchy, can become a dictating factor and require obedience to common rules. This is a dictate, but not a dictate of a leader in defending his power, but a dictate of society in the name of preserving himself. Violation of laws and moral norms is punished by nomads not by prison, but by exile: a node, an element of a network, deprived of all connections, becomes nothing. However, a rhizome, unlike a network, assumes the principle of autonomy of nodes— a non-meaningful gap. And this corresponds to a number of fundamental principles of a nomadic society. A nomad or a separate clan who disagrees with the majority has the right to leave, the ability to move (this is not a prescribed step in the hierarchy, not a localized node in the network, but the principle of a rhizome). The departed clan does not fall out of the network, but continues to exist/grow/move at any new point. That is how, by separating part of the clans, in 1465 the Kazakh Khanate arose. Another example is the waves of nomads who left the Steppe for centuries in search of new pastures and also to avoid power struggles. Their movement made it possible to maintain nodes and expand the network. J. Deleuze argues that there are no points in the rhizome, but there are lines, and each element of the network has its own path. Moreover, the movement undermines/destroys the hierarchy, if one suddenly begins to appear in the network (the right to leave, meritocracy), and preserves the essential characteristics of the nomadic world. J. Deleuze and F. Guattari write: “The nomad has a territory; he follows customary paths; he goes from one point to another; he is not ignorant of points (water points, dwelling points, assembly points, etc.). However, the question is what in nomad life is a principle and what is only a consequence. To begin with, although the points determine paths, they are strictly subordinated to the paths they determine, the reverse of what happens with the sedentary. The water point is reached only in order to be left behind; every point is a relay and exists only as a relay. A path is always between two points, but the in-between has taken on all the consistency and enjoys both an autonomy and a direction of its own. The life of the nomad is the intermezzo” (Deleuze and Guattari 2005: 380).

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It is important to keep moving even in a limited space. Movement and speed allow you to master time and space. The chronotope (interrelation of temporal and spatial relations), which the settled world began to operate only in the twentieth century, has long determined the worldview of nomads, based on an understanding of the interdependence of time and space. The hierarchical “first”, “beginning”, “reference point” is completely swept aside by the idea of nomads that there is no beginning or end, and time is cyclical and space has no center. Hence, for example, the cyclic calendar of nomads. The nomads realized that to settle means to stop the movement, i.e. break the connection between time and space, lose control over them. Settling would lead to the appropriation of land, the transformation of space for themselves, an aggressive impact on nature, the destruction of ties with the world, and the alienation of people. The sedentary world developed in fits and starts: from one level to another, from one social revolution to another, from one formation to another. And the nomadic world developed, keeping unchanged that which guaranteed the rights and freedoms of the nomad, preserved its harmonious existence with the world. The conservatism of the nomads (which the sedentary people call backwardness, archaic) was explained not by their unwillingness to develop, but by the fact that they already had the optimal version of the social structure, system of law, social equality, and freedoms, harmony with nature worked out over the centuries. Did the settled world have a better alternative? Representatives of the settled world, initially borrowing from the nomads only what served the war and contributed to the conquests, missed the main thing—the philosophy of the nomads, because due to their closeness, narrowness, a false sense of superiority and prevailing stereotypes, they were not able to recognize what was the essence of the nomadic world. At the turn of the twentieth–twenty-first centuries, the era of mental nomads, neonomads, has come, who have adopted the values of nomads: the vision of the unity of the world without borders, mobility, tolerance, information content, openness to the unknown, new contacts and knowledge about the world, respect for nature, inalienable rights and freedoms man, etc. The sedentary world, having forced the nomads to settle down, itself moved along their path, adopting and defending the values of the nomadic world and acquiring the mentality of a nomad.

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Did Cain, who killed his brother, realize that his future is a long way, invariably bringing him closer to Abel?

3.7

Destruction of the Network, Power, Society, Earth

The presence of Russian fortresses, outposts, and redoubts on the border of the Steppe did not yet mean the colonization of Kazakhstan. The tsarist government was faced with the task of gaining power over the Kazakhs. The specifics of the social organization of Kazakh society, the limited power of khans and sultans led to certain difficulties in establishing the power of the imperial administration. The absence of a strong central government, on the one hand, was the reason that the Kazakhs could not act under the leadership of one of the khans as a single force against the colonialist, and on the other hand, complicated the task of spreading the power of tsarist Russia. Even an agreement with the khan and the sultans of one horde or part of the Kazakh clans was not enough, because the sultans of other clans pursued their own policies. That is why the process of seizing political power over the Steppe took more than half a century. An important circumstance was that the social structure of the nomads was a horizontal network, each link of which was autonomous, selfsufficient, and did not depend on the power of the khan. Each clan itself solved problems with land, litigation, assistance to those in need, etc. However, if it is necessary to solve a large-scale problem, these elements of the network nodes, i.e. clans and hordes should unite and strengthen the network, not allowing it to be broken and destroyed. So, for example, the Kazakhs were able to unite after a long confrontation with the Dzhungars, and defended their independence in the eighteenth century. At that time, outstanding historical figures were found who united the Kazakhs—batyrs, biys, sultans, khans. By the 1820s, the khan’s power in the Steppe was weak, between the descendants of Genghis Khan, i.e. khans of the hordes and sultans of tribal associations, there was no unity. Fatigue had an effect after almost a hundred years of war with the Dzungars (1643–1755). It was during the war between the Kazakhs and the Dzungars that Russia began to build its fortresses on the border with the Steppe. As a result, the Dzungar Khanate, also a nomadic state, ceased to exist, and the Kazakhs emerged from the war weakened. The era of batyrs is in the past. The strength of the passionary push of the eighteenth century was waning.

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Despite the weakness of the khan’s power, formally it continued to exist, and this circumstance did not allow the Russian government to pursue an independent policy. The direct seizure of the territory was risky, because it would immediately raise the Kazakhs to the liberation struggle. Another problem was that the territory was huge, and for the most part represented by dry steppes, which were difficult to pass. It was even more difficult to control them. In a word, the tsarist government chose the path of gradually narrowing the levers of power of the Kazakh elite. The weakness of the khans, the traditional independence of the clans from their will (with the exception of cases of war or inter-tribal litigation), as well as the distrust of most of them on the part of the people because of the loyalty of the khans to royal politics, made it possible to abolish their real power. Appointed by the Russian tsar, and not elected according to the tradition of the nomads, the khans received no protection. Among the Kazakhs, the heads of the clans chose the khan and raised him on a white felt mat. In addition, part of the Genghisides began to oppose Russian colonization. For example, the descendants of Ablai Khan—his middle son Kasym (1746–1836) with his sons Sarzhan (year of birth unknown— 1836) and Kenesary (1802–1847)—rebelled against the abolition of the khan’s power in the Middle Zhuz and fought for the restoration of the Kazakh Khanate. Thus, the tsarist government preferred to carry out creeping colonization or gradual seizure of power. We started with the abolition of the khan’s power, which did not directly affect the power of the sultans in the hordes and, at first glance, gave them more power. The abolition of the khan’s power was carried out by means of the “Charter on the Siberian Kyrgyz” of July 22, 1822 (Charter on the Siberian Kyrgyz 1830), according to which power was transferred to sultans and biys loyal to tsarism. The “Charter on the Orenburg Kyrgyz” of 1924 actually abolished the khan’s power in the Younger Zhuz. In the Junior Zhuz. Khan Shergazy, ruling until that time, received a lifetime monthly salary. Power here was concentrated in the hands of three sultans, who were subordinate to the Orenburg governor. Their rates were located at the serfs and fortifications of the Cossack villages. With them were Cossack detachments that protected them from the angry people and followed the decisions that were not supposed to go against the tsarist policy.

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Thus, part of the sultans bowed to the colonialists. Others began the liberation struggle, raising the Kazakh clans subject to them. The appointed sultans and some tribal leaders now depended entirely on the colonial administration, and not on the trust of the people in them. Consequently, they did not serve the people, but the colonial administration. Their task was to persuade the people to obedience. However, the acceptance of royal power by the people did not happen. Not being dependent on the sultans, the Kazakhs made decisions within their clans, in accordance with their own interests. The abolition of the khan’s power and the betrayal of a number of sultans have not yet changed their habitual life activity. The biys remained at the head of the clans. For the people, the biy of the clan was the authority, he made all the important decisions. E. Bekmakhanov notes: “The dominant social group, which, in contrast to the sultans, grew directly from the depths of the nomadic community, were tribal foremen – biys… Only representatives of the so-called ‘black bone’ could be biys, Chingizids could not be elected biys, although they participated in the analysis of court cases” (Bekmakhanov 1947: 74). Thus, traditionally, the Kazakhs did not allow the Genghisides to get full power over the people. The powers of the biys were wide. Within the limits of the clans subject to them, the biys had judicial, administrative, and military power. “Biy, being an important link in the khanate’s management system, thus combined at least four qualities: a military leader, an administrative person, a judge and a representative of the steppe aristocracy. The biys are the heirs of the distant past, which is why they so organically mastered all the functions of management” (Useinova 2014: 20–21). The abolition of the khan’s power only led to the fact that the Kazakh clans of all three zhuzes could not unite in the struggle for independence, as was the case during the war with the Dzungars. However, in the Middle and Younger zhuz, the sultans raised uprisings. For example, the resistance movement of Kenesary Khan, raised on a felt mat by the clans of the Middle Zhuz, lasted 10 years (1837–1947) until his assassination. Thus, the tsarist administration, having abolished the power of the khans, did not achieve the desired goals—obtaining political power in the Steppe. The real power over numerous clans was in the hands of the biys. There was a horizontal connection between the clans, which counted on economic and other assistance from each other. In fact, it was a civil

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society, not independent of anyone, which owned the land on the basis of the right of collective ownership. The colonial authorities sought to destroy this network, to deprive the biys of the power that they had and made the people independent of any supreme authority. Instead of the former horizontal social relations, the colonial authorities tried to build their usual vertical ties and integrate into it. To do this, it was necessary to subjugate the biys of the clans, which was problematic, since the biys became authoritative people, devoted to the people. It remained to replace them with more loyal ones and offer privileges for this loyalty. The land became the object of temptation. Sultans and biys were allowed to own kystau and zhailau on the right of private property. The hereditary right to land and property, which was protected by the state, was fixed. Sultans and biys were appointed by senior sultans and volost governors. Received the title of hereditary nobility. They were exempt from taxes. Judicial functions were assigned to the sultans and biys. E. Bekmakhanov notes: “Senior sultans in the Middle Juz and sultan-rulers in the Younger Juz were actually appointed by the government; the socalled elections of new officials were under the unlimited control of the tsarist administration” (Bekmakhanov 1947: 119). Elections of volost governors and aul foremen turned into a struggle for privileges, for pastures. This confrontation within the clans was kindled and used by representatives of the royal power. Bribery and bribes were used. The one who was defeated in the elections and his auls were pushed back to the worst lands. The winner provided his community with the best pastures (Pankratova et al. 2011). E. Bekmakhanov summarizes: “Thus, the process of the final registration of feudal ownership of land takes place” (Bekmakhanov 1947: 78). Thus, the private ownership of land, introduced by tsarism, instead of the former, collective property, undermined the former distribution of land among clans. This redistribution took sharp forms also because the Kazakhs, whose lands were given to the Cossacks and the first settlers, crowded out the clans located deep in the Steppe. Now, the well-being of biys and volost rulers, based on land ownership, completely depended on the location of the colonial administration, which led the elections. Volostyn and biys ensured the obedience of the clans subject to them.

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There were undoubtedly exceptions. There were still real biys, chosen due to their spotless reputation. But the very authority of the institute of beating was shaken. Following this, the demolition of the old traditional values began to occur. Not immediately, not suddenly, but this process slowly poisoned society from the inside. It should be noted that the new ethical norms still did not take root in Kazakh society and survived until the Soviet period. Another way to break the social network is to break the previous economic and other relations between clans. This was carried out through the multiple administrative-territorial division of Kazakhstan. This measure made it possible, when redistributing the territory, to withdraw a significant part of it in favor of the state treasury, the Cossacks, immigrants, for sale under private dachas. In addition, constant reforms (every 15–20 years) were designed to destroy the memory and knowledge of the Kazakhs about their ancestral territory. This was never done, the Kazakhs still know which clans each lands belong to. According to the “Charter on the Siberian Kyrgyz”, they were divided into districts, which were organized gradually from 1824 to 1854. The borders passed through the ancestral lands of the Middle Zhuz. According to the Charter of the Orenburg Kyrgyz, the territory of the Younger Zhuz was divided into three parts along the borders of the clans living there. After 4 years, these tribal territories were renamed the Western, Middle, and Eastern parts. In the Younger Zhuz, a major new administrative reform was carried out in 1831. All camps adjacent to the border line were divided into 32 sections— distances. At the head of these distances were the sultans and foremen appointed by the Russian government. This reform in the border regions destroyed the last remnants of the independence of the Western Kazakhs (Bekmakhanov 1947). In 1856, the Alatau Special District was opened on the territory of Semirechye. The districts were subordinate to the governor-general or the border commission and the line of fortifications and fortresses. N. Bekmakhanov writes: “In the Region of the Siberian Kazakhs and the Semipalatinsk region, there was a district and volost management system headed by senior and volost sultans. The region of the Orenburg Kazakhs was ruled through units and distances, at the head of which were placed sultans-rulers and station chiefs, subordinated to the Orenburg Border Commission under the Orenburg Governor-Generalship. In 1844, the Orenburg Border Commission was replaced by the Orenburg

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Regional Administration. In 1854, the Semipalatinsk region was created, which was ruled by military district chiefs. Semirechye was subordinate to the West Siberian Governor-General. The region of the middle and lower reaches of the river. The Syr Darya was under the command of the commander of the Syr Darya line of fortifications” (Bekmakhanova 1986: 67). The territory of southern Kazakhstan became part of the Turkestan Governor-General in accordance with the “Decree on the Establishment of the Turkestan Governor General” of July 11, 1867 and the “Temporary Regulations on the Administration of the Semirechensk and Syrdarya Regions” of 1867. Cossack settlements were governed by the “Regulations on the Semirechensk Cossack Host” (Bekmakhanova 1986). In October 1868, a “Decree on the transformation of the management of the Kyrgyz (Kazakhs. – A.M.) of the Orenburg and Siberian departments” was issued. In the same year, the “Temporary regulation on management in the Ural, Turgai, Akmola and Semipalatinsk regions” was adopted. According to these documents, the Ural and Turgai regions became part of the Orenburg Governor-General, and Akmola and Semipalatinsk—in the West Siberian Governor-General. The region was headed by a military governor, who was the commander of the troops in the regions. It is important to note that in Kazakhstan, throughout the history of colonization, the power of the colonial administration was carried out by military forces, and there could be no talk of any “voluntary annexation of Kazakhstan to Russia”. This myth was born in the Soviet period in order to remove any suspicions about the continuation of the colonization of Kazakhstan already in the Soviet period. The Cossacks and settlers had the obligation and the right to have weapons in case of an uprising of the Kazakhs. Kazakhs were forbidden to have weapons. The military governors had special military departments that commanded the regular troops and the Cossacks. They were governed in accordance with the “Regulations on military administration in the regions of the Orenburg and West Siberian districts”, “Regulations on military administration in the Urals, Turgai, Akmola and Semipalatinsk regions”. The administrative division prescribed a ban on crossing the borders of the districts without special permission from the authorities. It was an attempt at enslavement following the example of Russian peasants. The main purpose of this ban was to separate the Kazakhs from their

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ancestral lands and centuries-old ties with neighboring clans. In addition, the existing tribal land relations became more and more confusing. Along with the administrative division, the “Temporary Provisions” increasingly reduced the scope of use of the Kazakh biy court; more and more questions, problems, and litigations could only be resolved by turning to the colonial administration. The “Temporary Provisions” of the 1860s mentioned above deprived the local aristocracy of privileges. The next stage of colonization has come—to take all power into the hands of the colonial administration. It should be noted that the regions were governed under the Provisional Regulations of 1867–1868, which ended their probationary period, but they were never legally approved. Those. they have effectively become null and void. On March 25, 1891, the “Regulations on the management of Akmola, Semipalatinsk, Semirechensk, Ural and Turgai regions” were adopted. A year later, the Steppe General Government was created, which included Akmola, Semipalatinsk, and Semirechensk regions. Probably, it was necessary to carry out more than one administrativeterritorial reform to join the Kazakh territories to the borders with them to Russian administrative units. The events of the early twentieth century prevented this process from being extended. The administrative division was continued during the Soviet period. The next step is an attempt to erase the memory of who owned the land, which has now been appropriated by the tsar’s treasury, the Cossacks, the settlers, and the volosts partially loyal to the tsar. One of the ways to work with memory is toponymy. Changing the names of a place is a symbolic appropriation of space. A.I. Miller notes: “Russification of the imperial era has traditionally been viewed as violent, carried out by the central government in relation to the outskirts, but in reality it is much more complex in its content. Russification was one of the side effects of the Cossack and peasant colonization Changes in toponymy, the construction of monuments or churches, a kind of symbolic Russification . On many former outskirts of the empire, the results of various processes of assimilation and acculturation, as well as the policy of population and the symbolic appropriation of space, carried out in the Romanov Empire, and then in the USSR, pose a serious problem for the new nationalizing states” (Miller 2006: 75–77).

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Toponymy and its transformation (especially during the period of colonization) has long been the subject of scientific research and, I think, today it has been carried out in all regions of the country without exception. Thus, similar studies were carried out by historians in different districts of the Karaganda region. For example, based on the results of work in the archives, a remarkable publication was published, including maps, a description of the place, the presence of water sources, the name of the family living there, an indication of the kystau and its owner as of 1833–1868 (i.e. before renaming), and also materials on land use as of 1905, listing all auls-kystau (by the name of the owner) of the volosts of the Karkaralinsky district of the Semipalatinsk province (according to the administrative division of 1927), indicating the tracts, the number of farms, etc. (Zhakin 2013; Arshabekov et al. 2006). Since the nineteenth century, the colonial authorities had attached a great importance to the destruction of the tribal structure of the Kazakh society. They understood that unity, cohesion, the existing practice of mutual assistance, and social ties of the clan(s) is a strength, a guarantee of the unity of the people. The colonial administration sought to destroy this historically ramified horizontal network of kinship, economic, political, and social ties. Let us consider one of the mechanisms for the destruction of this unity of the nation. Districts and volosts, as is known, were originally formed in accordance with the territories of the traditional residence of the clans. Within each tribal territory, biy courts functioned (including for the consideration of inter-tribal disputes), a scheme for the fair distribution of pastures, reservoirs, and nomadic routes was worked out, and there was also an effective system of mutual assistance during periods of jute, etc. With the introduction of the Karkaraly outer district in 1824, among others, the Karakesek volost was formed in the territories inhabited by clans that were part of the Karakesek clan association (other volosts also bore names by the name of the clan: Jagalbaylinskaya, Turtkulskaya, Kulyuk-Karzhasskaya, Karaulskaya, Tarakta, Tolengutovskaya, etc.). After 20 years, the Karakesek volost was divided into several volosts according to the names of the clans and subgenera included in it: KarsonKernei, Alteke-Sarymovskaya, Koyanshi-Tagai, Dadan-Tobyktinskaya, etc. The next step in 1869 was the further fragmentation of these volosts: into Carson, Kerney, Sarymov, etc.

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The administrative division was accompanied by decrees to fix people in a certain territory, i.e. a ban was introduced to cross the borders of volosts for childbirth, which means that pre-existing social, economic, logistical, and other ties were violated: assistance, joint consideration of litigations if necessary. Now the clans were not supposed to interact with each other, jointly solving problems, but were obliged to apply to the colonial administration, to the county courts. However, these names did not suit the colonial authorities, because they contained an indication of the belonging of these lands to one or another clan. Finally by 1878, the volosts were renamed according to the name of the area, mountains, rivers, etc., where the family lived: Sarymovskaya was renamed Tokraunskaya; Koyanshi-Tagai—to Kzyltau; Karsonskaya— to Mointa, Kerneiskaya—to Akchatauskaya; Dadan-Tobyktinskaya— to Zapadno-Balkhashskaya and Kotan-Bulakskaya, Tolengutovskaya—to Chubartauskaya, etc. Thus, specific territories “lost” their generic names. This practice of renaming, not related to the name of the clan, was introduced in all volosts. It is appropriate to point out the fact that the colonial power was not at all embarrassed by such frequent renaming and innovations in territorial division. Moreover, each new division cut, disrupted the established economic ties, established nomadic routes, fixed wells, and pastures. Each new division was accompanied by disputes, conflicts between the clans inhabiting this territory. These disputes could only be resolved by the colonial authorities. Thus, the Kazakhs were now forced to turn to the Russian authorities with questions that were previously resolved by the biys. The previously close ties between the clans gradually weakened. Unity and network connections became more and more unsteady. Horizontal connections have been replaced by vertical, hierarchical ones. In this vertical, most positions, decision-making levels were occupied by the colonial administration. The consequences of the administrative division and the loss of the former interdependence and cohesion of the clans affected the economic, social, and other aspects of the life of the people, and also (along with other reasons) played a negative role during the uprising of 1916, the period of the civil war, the resistance of the 20–30 s of the twentieth century.

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The return of the original toponymic names is one of the directions of the decolonization process accepted in the world. Each without exception mountain, hill, spurs of mountains, gorge, tract, log, ravine, river, stream, lake, forest, grave, well, caravan routes, lone tree, noticeable large stone, etc. had a name among the Kazakhs. Moreover, they became the natural boundaries of ancestral lands, individual kystaus, landmarks, signs, etc. The toponyms reflected the characteristics of the area and, thus, they became a hint, a notch for memory. Ancient mining is reflected in the toponymy of Central Kazakhstan: Zhezdy—a river rich in copper, Zhezkazgan—a copper mine, Kazansyngan—a place where a boiler exploded during the smelting of ore, Kalayykazgan—a tin mine, Kengey—a place rich in ores, Kengir—a river of treasures, Kenkorytkan— a place for smelting ore, Korgasyntau—a lead mountain, Ustanynzhaly—a ridge of blacksmiths, Temirshitau—a mountain of blacksmiths. The remains of ancient mining operations were well-known to the Kazakhs and were fixed in the toponymic names Temir, Altyn, Kazgan, Zhez, and Altynsu river. It was in the footsteps of these names that geological parties followed in the nineteenth–twentieth centuries. The territories were named based on the characteristics of the soil, the dominant feature of which served to form a toponym: fodder, solonchak, wormwood, etc. These are not just names, but also instructions, instructions for the proper use of land for grazing: Zhusan-dala—Wormwood steppe, Ermentau—Wormwood Mountains, Maykara-sai—Wormwood Log. Epithets in toponyms reflected the assessment, the attitude of the people to certain places. So, the word “kara” means not only “black”, but also mountains, and in toponyms it is equivalent to the words “big, great, powerful, strong”: Karatau (Black Mountain), Karkara (Snowy Hilly Mountains), Kara Ertis (Bolshoi River Yertys), Juancara (Massive Mountains), Naizakara (Spear Mountain), Egizkara (Twin Mountains), etc. The group of toponyms originated from the names of clans (during the half of the nineteenth century they were preserved in the names of volosts and districts), the names of tribal aksakals. Thus, any part of the Kazakh land is the historical territory of a specific clan and taip, and toponyms and hydronyms of localities are associated with the history of the ethnic group inhabiting them, as evidenced by legends, myths, historical chronicles, zhyrs, shezhire, etc. In the cycle of

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legends shezhire, as presented by M. Zh. Kopeev, the events of finding (settlement of clans) the tribal territory are reflected. Some versions of the shezhire contain descriptions of a large number of well-known toponymic names. These toponyms are preserved in primary sources and archives. For example, the toponym Irtysh is recorded in the Orkhon-Yenisei cuneiform inscriptions of the sixth–seventh centuries. This means that this hydronym existed already in the fourth–fifth centuries BC. M. Kashgari mentions the Ertis River in the “Dictionary of Turkic Dialects” (XI century), not to mention the works of the orientalist V.V. Barthold, Arab historian Al Gardizi and others. In addition, toponyms reflected the color characteristics of the Steppe, mountains, rivers, lakes: sary (yellow), ala (variegated), kara (black), kok (blue), konyr (brown), kyzyl (red), etc. Or a characteristic of the properties of water (Tuzköl—Salt Lake; Itishpes—The dog will not drink, i.e. the water is so salty; Sasykköl—Rotten Lake), the presence of fish (Balyktyköl—fish lake, Shortanköl—Pike Lake), features of tributaries (Zhalanashköl—Naked Lake), etc. Again, as we see, there are practical tips and instructions. As time shows, the history of toponyms acquires important significance in the context of upholding the territorial integrity of the country. Is this why the colonialists were in a hurry to erase the former toponyms from the memory of the people? Isn’t that why today they oppose the return of original toponyms? What toponymic names did the settlers give instead of the previously existing ones? Consider, for example, the regions of the Irtysh region, inhabited by Kazakh clans and having Kazakh names. There are names of toponyms, which are a translation from Kazakh into Russian, as well as toponyms, which reflected a characteristic feature of the area. But few such cases have been recorded. It should be noted that it was considered worthy to perpetuate on our land at the cost of destroying the former original Kazakh names. Thus, resettlement villages in the Irtysh region were given names in honor of Christian holidays; in honor of the capture of Lvov by Russian troops on August 21, 1914; in honor of the Steppe Governor-General Nadarov; in honor of the daughter of General Borisov; in honor of the provincial head of resettlement Miloradov; in honor of the county resettlement chief Zaborovsky (and 3 more villages in honor of his 3 daughters); by the names of members of the royal family; by the name

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of a Cossack officer; by the name of the first settler; by the name of the owner of the first mill in the resettlement village; by the name of the resident who built a rural school in the village; by the name of the village, city, province, where the settlers came from (Akishev et al. 2008). To claim that in the eighteenth–nineteenth centuries someone could be the first to set foot on the earth (and therefore allegedly had the right to call it whatever they like), on the territory of which BC. lived great nomadic tribes-peoples, tribes-confederates, flooding the entire mainland in waves to the West and East, to the North and South; to call oneself a “first settler” on the land, on the territory of which Turkic kaganates, great empires, uluses existed and their descendants continue to live, means to become like a child who believes that the world began its existence with his coming into life. Therefore, it is absurd to try to instill the idea of the reasonableness of preserving alien, and even more so, openly ideological names given to territories obtained through the forced expulsion of an indigenous people from this land. During the Soviet period, the Bolsheviks numbered the Kazakh auls. Then there were names associated with the Soviet ideology, the names of revolutionaries, leaders of the Communist Party, party congresses, etc. Today in Kazakhstan there is an acute problem of returning the original Kazakh toponyms. Public initiatives to eradicate street names associated with Soviet revolutionary figures are met with objections from supporters of the USSR. The demands of the Kazakhs to change the names of the cities of Pavlodar (named after Paul, the youngest son of Emperor Alexander II) and Petropavlovsk (named after the Christian apostles Peter and Paul) provoke a reaction of the Russian population with imperial views, who consider themselves the defenders of the metropolis and, probably, hope for reunification with Russia. “Generations, times, formations will change, but the earth will remain and names will remain with it that characterize precisely its properties, its character, its nature, its peculiarity, its space” (Zhakin 2013). It is important to return the names of the area according to its characteristics, and it is the objective names that are not connected with ideology, politics, or conjuncture. Thus, an attempt was made to replace the horizontal social ties of the nomads with a multi-stage hierarchy of a settled society. However, for another century, horizontal ties between clans remained, the system of mutual assistance worked, and the court of biys functioned. It was only

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in the 1930s that the Kazakhs were completely subjugated to the power vertical after the artificially created Asharshylyk, which almost halved the number of people.

3.8

Conclusion

This chapter highlights some issues related to the existence of nomads: lifestyle, social structure, and national identity. Particular attention is paid to the methods of influencing the thinking of nomads and the destruction of their identity, lifestyle, social ties, and land ownership. In addition, the chapter discusses some examples that allow you to get an idea of the difference between nomads and sedentary people: social structure (vertical and horizontal), attitudes towards the environment and land, other religions, and everything else, etc.

Glossary Aitys is a poetic competition of two improvisers on a particular topical topic to the accompaniment of folk stringed instruments. Aitysker is a participant of aitys, i.e. a poetic competition between two poets-improvisers on a current topic. Aksakal (lit. aksakal—white-bearded) the elder of the clan, family, honorary, respected person. Akyn is a poet-improviser. Alypsatar (lit. took, sold) a horse dealer, dealer. Amanat (entrusted for storage, reliability) here: transfer of an heir to another house, family as a guarantee of friendship. Amanat became a link between houses, auls, and clans. Article 58 of the Criminal Code criminal liability for counterrevolutionary activities (1922–1961). As feast, which was given a year after the death of a person. Asar is one of the types of mutual assistance in Kazakh society, which consists in the gratuitous performance of any great work that is beyond the strength of one person or family, for example, building a house, building a canal for irrigation, etc. Asharshylyk (lit. famine) an artificially created famine of 1921–1923 under the conditions of war communism and a famine of 1931–1933,

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which occurred as a result of the expropriation of livestock, collectivization, the forcible sedentarization of Kazakhs, and the suppression of armed resistance to the policy of Soviet power. Attan! (lit. on horses!) an alarm signal, a warning about an enemy attack. Aul is a traditional rural-type settlement, a community of close relatives, a camp among the Turkic peoples. Bai is a wealthy, socially responsible person who headed a clan or subgenus. Baigus poor man. Basmachi (from Turkic basmak—to raid, to attack) a term filled with negative semantics was used by Soviet ideologists and historians to refer to the rebels of the Muslim peoples of Central Asia who opposed the establishment of Soviet power. Batyr the title that the Kazakhs gave to a person for his military merits. Biy (lit. to know, to rule) is an authoritative person, a judge, an expert on Kazakh society, its structure, the system of customary law, traditions, and the history of the people. The Bolsheviks the radical wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party, carried out a coup in October 1917. Dat (“I came for justice”) is a tradition and the right of any person to appeal to the khan with a claim, a complaint, a demand for justice. Jute is a mass death of livestock due to the inability to get pasture during pasture icing or heavy snowfall. Kalym is material property, most often in the form of cattle, which is presented by the groom’s side to the father, the family of the betrothed bride. Most often, kalym formed the basis or compensated for part of the dowry that the bride received (yurt, utensils, livestock, jewelry, clothes). Khan the title of the monarch, ruler, sovereign person among the Turkic peoples. Kozha representatives of the clergy, descendants of the Arab missionaries of Islam. Kozha is not included in the Kazakh ansestry. Kun is a fine for injuring or killing a person. For the murder of a person, the death penalty was supposed, but under certain conditions, the payment of a fine was also practiced, after which the victims refused to take revenge.

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Kyrgyz Kirghiz, Kyrgyz-Kaisaks, Horde, and foreigners are ethnonyms that were used to call the Kazakhs in the Russian Empire instead of using their real name. Kystau winter pastures. Ru-aksakal (lit. ru – clan, aksakal – white-bearded) the elder of the clan, family, honorary, respected person. Sharua impoverished pastoralists who were employed by wealthy pastoralists. The Sharua retained their nomadic way of life, their freedom, in case of injustice they could migrate, for the offense, they could steal the cattle of the offender. Tamyr (lit. vein, artery) enslave, closest friend, faithful support in trouble. The era of batyrs the eighteenth century, when the war with the Dzungars revealed hundreds of batyrs among the people who liberated the land from the invaders. The returned literature is a term used to refer to the works of authors banned during the Soviet period, many of whom were repressed and shot in the 1930s. Tolgau a philosophical and didactic genre in folklore and individual creativity. Tore are the descendants of Jochi, the eldest son of Shyngyskhan. Tore are not included in the Kazakh clans. Toy a feast, a holiday, a treat on a joyful occasion, for example, a wedding, the birth of a child, etc. Uzun-kulak (lit. long ear) news that was passed by word of mouth, from aul to aul. Voluntary accession of Kazakhstan into Russia is a narrative designed to promote the idea of the supposedly voluntary incorporation of Kazakhstan into Russia and introduced into consumption after the Second World War. Zhailau summer pastures. Zhatak (lit. to lie, i.e. not to roam) impoverished representatives of the Kazakh nomadic society, who did not have enough livestock to roam, and therefore were forced to settle. They were engaged in agriculture, hiring as workers for sedentary people. The concept of zhatak emphasizes not only the material standard of living, but also the loss of the way of life of one’s people, separation from the people and their traditions, worldview. If the zhatak succeeded in improving his situation,

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he either bought cattle and returned to the nomad camp, or settled permanently, cultivating the land or engaging in trade. Yurt a portable frame dwelling with felt covering among nomads. Zhyrshi is a chronicler, a specialist in the genealogy of the Kazakhs. Zhyrau a poet, a singer of poetic works. “Zheti zhargy” (lit. Seven regulations) is a code of customary laws developed in the Kazakh Khanate in the seventeenth century and officially adopted at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Zhuz (zhuz—union, hundred) conditionally Kazakhs consist of three zhuzes, each of which is a confederation of kindred clans. The term “zhuz” was introduced in the eighteenth century. This tripartite structure is based on the traditional composition of the Turkic army from the center, left and right wings.

References Akishev, A., Insebaev, T.A., Azerbaev, A.D., Dauenov, E.N., Smetova, A.T. (2008). Essays on the colonization of the Pavlodar Irtysh region by Tsarist Russia. Pavlodar: Publishing house “KEREKU”. Alimbay, N. (2009). The nomadic community of the Kazakhs: problems of ethno-sociological reconstruction. Izvestiya RGPU im. A. I. Herzen. No. 96, 317–325. Anderson, B. (2016). Imagined communities. Reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism. M. Kuchkovo field. Arshabekov, T.T., Zhakin, M.S., Zhumabekov, J.A. (2006). Map of toponyms of the Karaganda region: Aktogay, Karkaraly. Kagandy: Publishing house ARKO. Azerbaev, A.D. (2019). About the Kazakh identity in the XIX–beginning of the XX years. Kazakhs in the Eurasian space: History, culture and socio-cultural processes: A collection of scientific papers. Omsk: Publishing house of Omsk state university. Bekmakhanov, E.B. (1947) Kazakhstan in the 20–40s of the XIX century. AlmaAta: Kazakh United State Publishing House. Bekmakhanova, N.E. (1986). Multinational population of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the era of capitalism (60s of the XIX century–1917). M.: Nauka. Charter on the Siberian Kyrgyz (1830). Complete collection of laws of the Russian Empire since 1649. The first meeting (1649–1825). T. 38 (1822– 1823). Printed in the printing house of the II Department of His Own Imperial Majesty’s Chancellery. No. 29.127, 417–433. https://nlr.ru/e-res/ law_r/content.html

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Deleuze G., Guattari F. (2005). A thousand plateaus. Capitalism and schizophrenia/translation and foreword by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press. Hall, S. (1989). Cultural identity and diaspora. In J. Rutherford (Ed.), Identity: Community, difference. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 222–237. Lakoff, J., Johnson, M. (2004). Metaphors we live by. M.: Editorial URSS. Latour, B. (1996). On actor-network theory: A few clarifications. Soziale Welt, 47. Jahrg. No. 4. Miller, A.I. (2006). Romanov Empire and nationalism: Essays on the methodology of historical research. M.: New Literary Review. Montrose, L. (2017). New historicisms. Rivkin J., Ryan M. Literary Theory: An anthology. Third Edition. John Wiley & Sons, 810–836. Pankratova, A.M., Abdykalykov, M.A., Vyatkin, M.P., Druzhinin, N.M., Kuchkin, A.P., Zutis, Ya.Ya., Bernshtam, A.N., Grekov, B.D., Maruglan, A.Kh. (2011). History of the Kazakh SSR from ancient times to the present day (reprint of 1943). Almaty. Spivak, G.Ch. (1985). Three women’s texts and a critique of imperialism. Critical inquiry. Vol. 12. No. 1 (Autumn, 1985): “Race”, writing and difference. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 243–261. Suleimanov, M.Kh. (2013). Maiky-bi, the doctrine of “Zhasau-isi” and the origins of Chingizism: The history of the peoples of Turan in the legends of the Kazakh biys. Almaty: Service-Press. Ricoeur, P. (2004). Memory. Story. Oblivion. M.: Publishing house of humanitarian literature, (French philosophy of the twentieth century). Useinova, K.R. (2014). To the question of the meaning of the concept “Biy”. KazNU Bulletin. Law series. No. 2 (70), 20–23. Zhakin, M.S. (2013). Toponymy of the Shet’s district. Karagandy: Publishing house “Glasir”.

CHAPTER 4

The Other Side of the Myth

Travelers of the nineteenth century very superficially assessed things they observed in the Steppe. This is quite understandable, as in order to know people’s life, one should live with them, in their environment for a long time. Otherwise, everything observed turns into only travel notes. Representatives of the tsarist administration, pursuing their goals, described the life of the nomads in a biased and biased way. In this regard, one important point should be emphasized: the position of a supposedly more civilized person did not enable either to see, understand, or, even more so, to recognize in some way a more just and humane way of life, as the colonizers believed, a “wild nomad”. Hence, the many hastily cobbledtogether myths were readily picked up and diligently replicated by the settlers and then inspired by the Kazakhs themselves. These myths flattered the vanity of the settlers, making them consider themselves higher, more civilized. Since the process of decolonization did not begin in Kazakhstan, moreover, in the scientific community, the topic of colonization did not become the subject of a wide discussion, we have an incomplete idea of what means and methods the colonization of Kazakhstan was carried out, the identity of the nomads was distorted, and the cultural assimilation of the Kazakhs took place. Meanwhile, it was during this period that many false myths about the Kazakhs and the civilizing role of tsarist colonialism were created and spread. Such myths and the stereotypes formed on their © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Mustoyapova, Decolonization of Kazakhstan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5207-6_4

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basis are methods and forms of manifestation of imperial violence aimed at destroying the identity of the colonized people. Myths about the nomadic world in general and the Kazakhs in particular continued to be exploited and maintained throughout the entire Soviet period, serving as a rationale for the need for violent sedentarization of the Kazakhs. The deconstruction of colonial (and settled-centric) myths will make it possible to understand how the process of colonization took place, how justified the prevailing stereotypes about nomads are and how they influenced the identity of the Kazakhs. This issue is fundamentally important, since the tendentiousness and one-sidedness of assessments continue to work to support the old odious colonial myths, designed to form an inferiority complex for some and fuel a sense of superiority for others. Until now, the opinion has been voiced that colonization brought Kazakhstan only benefit, modernization, and industrial development. The promotion of this point of view becomes a kind of preventive measure aimed at preventing a detailed consideration of the essence of the colonial policy of tsarism and the USSR and also prevents the formation of a different view of the history of the Kazakhs during the period of colonization. Moreover, a complimentary assessment of the colonial period is intended to form among the Kazakhs a sense of gratitude towards the “civilizers”. The relevance of debunking colonial myths is also caused by the current claims of Russia on the territory of Kazakhstan and its excessive presence in the politics of Kazakhstan. Some representatives of the older generation, as well as some government officials, are captivated by colonial myths, which affects their readiness for rapprochement with Russia, contrary to the interests of Kazakhstan. Until now, those who call themselves descendants of the Ural and Semirechye Cossacks see themselves as defenders of the Russian world on the land of Kazakhstan and cherish the hope of reunification with Russia. Along with colonial myths, myths about happy life in the USSR are circulating and promoted by Russian propaganda, the purpose of which is the unhealthy idea of restoring this totalitarian state. This chapter discusses some of these myths associated with the colonization of Kazakhstan during the period of tsarism and the USSR.

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4.1 Liberation from Myths: How the Kazakhs Were “Taught” Agriculture One of the widespread myths says that the colonizers taught the Kazakhs how to cultivate the land. Introduction to agriculture was considered by the colonial authorities as a way and method of introducing nomads to civilization. Considering serfdom as the norm, having failed for centuries to solve the problem of crop failures and famine in Russia, the colonialists believed that they could bring the light of civilization and prosperity to the Steppe. This civilization, according to the colonialists, was to come along with the agricultural culture, and therefore the introduction of agriculture became a key point in the spread of colonization and the main argument in the decision to bring the nomads to settling. The “Charter on the Siberian Kyrgyz” of 1822 speaks of the Cossacks, who are tasked with introducing nomadic pastoralists to the cultivation of the land: § 181. Russian assessors in orders and Cossacks who make up guards should set the first example in cultivating land and economic institutions. § 182. On the lands allotted to them, they should try to start arable farming and, if possible, horticulture, beekeeping, etc. § 183. They must use all diligence, then the Sultans, Elders and other Kyrgyzes were convinced of the benefits of such institutions, provide them with all the means and help with the necessary advice. (Charter on the Siberian Kyrgyz 1830: 426)

Let us try to figure out whether the Russians could teach the Kazakhs how to farm and how this process actually happened. Let us consider two interconnected myths: (1) the nomads did not know agriculture and only roamed with their herds and herds; (2) Russian farmers taught the Kazakhs how to cultivate the land. Contrary to popular belief, Kazakhs, along with cattle breeding, were engaged in agriculture as an additional type of economic activity. In rich and medium-sized farms, agriculture was of an auxiliary nature, and most of the crop was sold. Kazakh agriculture differed from European, and its characteristic feature was the irrigation system of agriculture. In the Kazakh language, there are terms for all grain crops and their varieties, agricultural operations, inventory, and hydraulic structures. This (along with other factors) indicates that agriculture was not borrowed by the Kazakhs from the Russians.

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At the beginning of the nineteenth century (almost a century before the appearance of Russian settlers), S.B. Bronevsky wrote: “Although the Kyrgyz are not at all familiar with arable farming and eat the most important meat, milk and cheese, but some, convinced of the benefits of this occupation, produce it … at the foot of the Narym mountains, I saw quite significant arable land, skillfully grooves from mountain springs, and although the soil of the earth is silty-stony, but due to the moisture communicated by the water, millet is fairly born …Near the river Nurva, near the rivers Turgaev and Lake Kurgaldzhika, there is also to some extent arable farming; they count the reeds by the lakes, blast the earth and sow millet, which is very prolific, and different from that which grows in Russia. The Kyrgyz of the Great Horde, nomadic in the tracts of the Seven Rivers, Lake Balkhash, along the Ili River… are diligently engaged in agriculture, they produce millet, wheat and barley also through flooding…” (Bronevsky 2005: 38–39). Thus, having listed the centers of agriculture in the east, in the center, and in the south of Kazakhstan, S.B. Bronevsky draws unexpected conclusions: “Without surprise, however, one cannot look at the strange ways of their work, and at the persistence to adopt something better. Ignorance and prejudice, to the extreme regret, will for a long time replace the successes of arable farming, which provides more reliable food and binds to a settled life” (Bronevsky 2005: 39). I leave without comment on his assessment of the people, whom he did not know, and his a priori opinion that one should certainly “attach” to a settled life. More than half a century later, S.B. Bronevsky is echoed by the West Siberian Governor-General N.G. Kaznakov (from a report of 1875): “Cautious settlement within the steppe itself, still not yet allowed, of a settled Russian population, however nomads without hesitation, frequent communication between Russians and Kyrgyz not only on the border line, but in places of permanent Kyrgyz wintering, a clear daily an example of a more comfortable life… – represents, it seems to me, a set of the only means that can soften the morals and raise the level of well-being of a semi-savage people…” (Most obedient report of the Governor-General of Western Siberia 1875: 19–20). It should be noted that the nomads quite successfully ensured their existence for centuries despite the fact that they traditionally did not eat bread, and for this reason alone, it was arable farming that could not ensure their existence and convince them of the undoubted “benefit of this occupation”. At the same time, the report of N.G. Kaznakov says:

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“Cattle breeding is the most profitable branch of rural industry. The abundance of pasture places, equipped with convenient watering places and rich food in saline areas, contribute to the successful breeding of all kinds of livestock everywhere, which, freely breeding, does not require at the same time special care on the part of the owners, because in the southern part of Western Siberia, the runoff is content with pasture all year round from under the snow and does not require warm shelters during the winter. In addition, cattle breeding is more profitable than arable farming, because the raw products obtained from it find demand in the markets of European Russia, which, in turn, sell them abroad” (Most obedient report of the Governor-General of Western Siberia 1875: 2). The testimony of a military officer A. Maksheev about how in 1851 the Russian settlers could not provide themselves with bread is noteworthy: “Four-year experiments of grain farming on the Syr have sufficiently clarified the question that occupies the highest authorities: can the Aral fortification in its present position have hope of securing its food by local means, through the development of Russian or Kyrgyz arable farming… On the Syr-Darya, almost all places suitable for arable farming are occupied by the Kyrgyz and constitute the only source of their food, so they give up their arable land very reluctantly and, at the same time, they probably lose some conviction in the justice and disinterested care of the Russians about their well-being. In addition, Russian arable farming on the Syr cannot be as successful as the Kyrgyz, and not so much because of the ignorance of the local conditions by the newcomers, but because of the inconsistency of these conditions with their habits and character. The Syr-Darya Kyrgyz … for a meager piece of bread is ready for the most difficult work. For several poods of barley or millet, he makes a ditch for a considerable length, often suitable for only one year, then he sows a piece of land in several square sazhens and works day and night near this piece… The Russian will not be content with what the Kyrgyz … He needs not a few square sazhens, but a whole field, and meanwhile he will not work so hard and with such self-sacrifice as the Kyrgyz. This means that its arable land cannot be as well processed and give such a harvest as the Kyrgyz one. Until now, the settlers, making, on the orders of their superiors, unsuccessful experiments in arable farming, lived at the expense of the treasury, and if they secure their existence over time with their own means, then, of course, not by agriculture, and therefore it cannot be expected that the Aral fortification could ever feed on one Russian arable

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farming on Syr. As for the Kyrgyz arable farming, the fortification can use it in two ways: by hiring the Kyrgyz to cultivate arable land and by buying bread from them” (Maksheev 1896: 142–143). A. Maksheev concludes: “The three-year attempt of Russian arable farming in the Kyrgyz steppe failed and does not give hope for success in the future … In the vicinity of the fortification, the Kyrgyz sow grain only on Kitai-Kul, but this area is forty miles from the fortification, bread will be born on it with the help of increased watering, to which the Russian settlers are incapable…” (Maksheev 1896: 144). The issue is not only in climatic conditions but also in the unwillingness and unwillingness of Russian settlers to work hard on the land. A. Mashkeev compares Kazakh arable lands and Russian hayfields: “During my stay in Raim, I managed to make… two trips to the surroundings: the first on June 27… to the Ak-gerik valley, to inspect Kyrgyz arable lands; and the second on July 9 to Talbugut and along the coastal SyrDarya embankment, to inspect the so-called fortification hayfields (i.e., the Cossacks). The impressions of these trips were completely different. In the Ak-gerik valley we found really vast fields, covered with almost ripening grain, while on the banks of the Syr there was not a single patch of land with pure meadow grass, without an admixture of reeds. Near Syr, only in some places there were dry places with small reeds, along with some kind of grass, and for the most part we had to wade on horseback through the water, sometimes up to the belly of a horse, among reeds two horse riders high” (Maksheev 1896: 47). So, the Russian fortification could not provide itself even with hayfields. In connection with the phrase of S.B. Bronevsky about arable farming, “giving a more faithful subsistence”, let us consider how arable farming “truely” fed the Russian peasantry. An important indicator is productivity. In Russia, productivity was measured in “sama”. If three grains are harvested from each sown grain, then the yield is “sam-3”, i.e. the farmer harvests about three times as much as he has sown. The yield in the central zone of Russia was sam3, sam-4, and remained unchanged for a long time. V.G. Rastyannikov, I.V. Deryugin write: “So, the average annual growth rate of grain yield, expressed in sam-so much, for the period 1801–1861 is in accordance with the trend of its annual dynamics, calculated by Alb. L. Weinstein, 0.04%. This indicator coincides with the value calculated by the authors of this work for the period 1795–1867” (Rastyannikov and Deryugina 2009: 5; 52).

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The Russian peasantry was also threatened by a crop failure. “Undergrowing”, which led to famine, happened quite often in Russia. Only during the nineteenth century famine in Russia happened in 1813, 1833, 1839, 1844, 1872, 1891–1892, and 1897–1898. Between 1891 and 1892, 30 million people were starving in Russia; in 1897–1898—27 million people. At the beginning of the twentieth century (1901–1902, 1905–1908, 1911–1912), famine gripped dozens of Russian provinces. Often the cause of famine was drought. Shouldn’t the Russian peasants have borrowed the methods used by the Kazakhs in the arid zones and the drought-resistant varieties of wheat that were grown in the Steppe? Let us return to Kazakhstan. Arriving in the Steppe, the Cossacks were in no hurry to introduce the local population to the culture of Russian arable farming. Moreover, they themselves did not want to do it. V. Ostafiev writes: “Indeed, all the efforts of the administration to make the Cossack a military man and a farmer were unsuccessful, even a huge land allotment of more than 40–50 acres per capita… wonderful natural conditions did not make the Cossack a farmer-owner” (Ostafyev 2006). Moreover, as N.M. Yadrintsev noted in 1882: “In general, following the example of the Kyrgyz and Kalmyks and in accordance with the local conditions of climate and steppes, the West Siberian and especially the Altai population became more pastoral than agricultural, acquired, through the udder from Kyrgyz and Kalmyks, large herds of horses and herds of cattle, even for the most part led a semi-nomadic lifestyle, constantly moving from one place of settlement to another. In agriculture itself, the Russians adopted some of the techniques of the indigenous Asians” (Yadrintsev 1882: 32–33). The main goal of the subsequent resettlement of the Russian peasantry in Kazakhstan was arable farming. The settlers raised virgin lands and sowed mainly wheat. For a long time, authors who wrote about agriculture in Kazakhstan argued that European arable farming is more advanced than Kazakh. However, the famous Russian agronomist A.A. Kaufman, who was directly involved in the resettlement economy in the Turgai region, saw an advantage only in the use of factory iron plows by the Russians, which the Kazakhs did not have at that time. A.A. Kaufman pointed out that the settlers rapaciously used the natural fertility of the virgin lands. So, the peasants plowed the virgin land for 3–4 years, while it gave a good harvest, then they abandoned the plowed land and moved to a new plot. So, using the fertile virgin lands, squeezing all the juice out of it, with a minimum of effort, the Russian settlers quickly left the

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areas allocated to them and moved further deep into the steppes. After such “managing” there were huge wastelands overgrown with weeds. That is why the settlers opposed the allocation of permanent allotments to them, explaining their desire to resettle again either by the lack of forest, or by the lack of water resources, but in fact, trying to grab a new piece of virgin land. Russian peasants began to switch to more complex farming methods (three-field and fallow) only at the beginning of the twentieth century when there was almost no “free” land left. It was more difficult for those settlers who ended up in South Kazakhstan, because they required the skills of irrigated agriculture unfamiliar to Russian peasants. Only after a long time did they manage to establish their economy on the basis of rainfed agriculture and melon growing. Some Russian peasants adopted from the Kazakhs simple methods of watering by flooding. And how did the Kazakhs do agriculture? Let us return to S. Bronevsky’s remark about “strange ways of their work”. The arid climate, semi-deserts allowed only irrigated agriculture. The Kazakhs knew both the most primitive forms of field irrigation (melt water—sualma-egin; irrigation by building dams—godey; hand scoop— atpa) and complex ones (water distribution from main canals—togan; chigir irrigation of various types—shygyr). The Kazakhs created complex hydraulic structures. For example, the Karabur canal was laid over rough terrain, included a tunnel and several aqueducts through canals, logs, and ravines. In the Chimkent district in 1890, there were 239 canals and ditches, with a total length of more than 3000 miles. There were also original irrigation systems. In Balkhash, for example, they dug large pits near rivers, in which water accumulated, then discharged through canals. In the Syr Darya, a method of lake irrigation was known—koltaban, in which sowing was carried out along the bottom of drying lakes. The Cossacks also irrigated the fields by simple flooding. A.A. Kaufman admitted that in the local natural and climatic conditions one can only engage in Kazakh agriculture, and this is possible subject to the application of huge labor costs. To the question that the Russians taught the Kazakhs how to farm, A.A. Kaufman in 1896 points out: “As for the development of agriculture among the Kyrgyz itself, the majority of local figures see its cause in the influence of Russian settlers who have poured into the region over the past 15 years; ‘under the influence of Russian culture, Mr. Polferov says, especially since the time Russian settlers settled in the Turgai steppes, the agricultural industry began to

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noticeably develop among the nomads’. But this dominant view is hardly justified by the facts. As mentioned, by the way, by the same author, the beginning of agriculture among the Turgai Kyrgyz dates back to the end of the eighteenth century, and in the southern districts of the region, agriculture, mainly irrigated, developed and is developing, as far as local conditions allow, regardless of any Russian influence… Attributing the development of agriculture among the Kyrgyz to the influence of the settlement of Russian settlers among them is already incorrect chronologically: as mentioned above, the area of Kyrgyz crops from 1875 to 1882, hence before the formation of Russian agricultural settlements in the region, i.e. increased by more than two and a half times; on the other hand, the idea of such an influence of Russian settlements is also refuted by volost figures: the largest size of Kyrgyz plowing reaches both Kustanai and Aktobe districts, in such volosts where there are no Russian settlements at all or almost at all…” (Kaufman 1896: 95–96). He also notes: “Certainly, it would be very useful for the Kyrgyz to have good examples and examples before their eyes, but unfortunately I must say that those Russian settlers who still appeared in the region, thanks to the highly predatory nature of their economy, could to serve the Kyrgyz only as very bad examples and models” (Kaufman 1896: 186). What was the efficiency of Kazakh arable farming? Let me give as an example the famous Akbidai wheat (there were also dwarf kozhebidai and branched besbasbidai), which was grown in an arid climate on the Tokyrauyn River in the Northern Balkhash region. The Akbidai wheat variety is drought-resistant, not afraid of diseases, grows on saline soils, and does not crumble from the wind. In early March, snow melting began in the Balkhash region. From the banks of the Balkhash, following the receding snow, nomadic auls went north. Togans (big canal), covered with silt, were cleaned by the Kazakhs, standing waist-deep in water. Each aul had its own togan. The arable land was flooded with water and plowed after 2–3 days. Sowing of varieties akbidai, kozhebidai, kyzylbidai, and karakaltyk was completed by May 20. A month later, they watered, in turn visiting the arable land, since the auls went further north. At the end of June, the water in the river disappeared, and ditches had to be deepened, which were fed by the waters of the underground Tokyrauyn. In 1863, according to M. Krasovsky, 180 farmers sowed 310 poods of wheat in the Dadan-Tobykta volost. There were 5 water mills. To irrigate 130 versts of arable land, 100 head togans were built, each 3–12 versts

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long. The total length of togans was 500 versts, and with their help an area of 700 acres of land was irrigated (Krasovsky 1868). Difficulties were associated not only with the applied labor but also with the working conditions: it was necessary to break through the dense riverside thickets (tugai) from tala, shingil, and other shrubs. In summer, midges and mosquitoes annoyed. In rainy years, the motley-winged midge killed livestock and people. Death came from a tumor in the nasopharynx. And now the most important thing is productivity. Harvest of 1903: winter rye—sam-5, spring rye—sam-12, spring wheat—sam-26, oats—sam-10, millet—sam-40, potatoes—sam-10. The year 1904 was considered poor due to low water: spring rye— sam-3.7, spring wheat—sam-5.8, oats—sam-5.3, potatoes—sam-8.3. In 1916, the head of the resettlement area testified that up to a million poods of bread were collected by the Kazakhs in the Torkyrauyn valley. Academician D.N. Pryanishnikov (1865–1948) reported the following about the Kounrad (Tokyraun) varieties: one hundred grains of French wheat weigh 4.55 grams, East Indian—3.8 grams, American—3.2 grams, Russian—2.85 grams. And 100 grains of Kounrad wheat Akbidai weigh 6.2 grams and Kozhebidai—4.5 grams. Akbiday gives from 7 to 25 shoots in a bush, the number of grains in an ear is from 52 to 120, the average yield from a sifted pood is 50–60 poods. Kozhebidai wheat produces 30– 55 shoots (there are individual bushes with 75 shoots, grains in an ear— from 32 to 60, the average yield per hectare is 60–70 pounds). That is, the yield of Akbidai is sam-50 and sam-60. Fantastic compared to Russian sam-3 and sam-4. But this was not the best indicator of Akbidai. On Tokyrauyn, a harvest of 50 poods per tithe (5 poods were sown) was considered average (sam-10). Akbidai’s record was set by Begetai Rustemov, having received 89 poods of grain from 1 pood of seeds (sam-89) (Popov 1976, 2008). Alikhan Bukeihan in “Materials on Kyrgyz land use”, collected by an expedition to explore the Steppe regions (1896–1903), noted the traditional places of development of Kazakh agriculture. He points out that the regions of the greatest development of Kazakh agriculture covered the course of the Syr-Darya, Ili, Chu, Talas rivers, and the Karatau mountains with numerous watercourses suitable for sai-brook irrigated agriculture, the interfluve of the Zhanadarya and Kuvandarya, the river valleys of the Black Irtysh, near Lake Zaisan on plain, on the western and northern

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slopes of Tarbagatai, in the basin of the rivers Turgai, Irgiz, Or, Ural, Khobda, and Emba (Bokeyhan 2016). E.B. Bekmakhanov indicates the main reason for the transition of the Kazakhs to agriculture: “By the 20–30s of the nineteenth century, a significant part of the Kazakhs, who lived both near the border line and in the depths of the steppe, began to switch to agriculture. This was mainly due to the onset of a crisis in the pastoral economy, caused by the same land shortage. In the 20–30s of the nineteenth century, the tsarist authorities, together with the Kazakh nobility, seized the best pastures. The Kazakhs, having lost their winter camps and summer camps, were forced to switch to arable farming…”. The official Artemiev, who visited the Orenburg Territory, wrote: “After cattle breeding, the most important industry in the steppe is agriculture, which is noticeably rapidly developing due to an increase in population and a lack of land for cattle breeding” (Bekmakhanov 1947: 56). “On the comparative distribution of agriculture in other districts of the Middle Zhuz, Idarov wrote: ‘According to the degree of development of arable farming, one can list the districts in the following order: Kokchetav, Kokpekta, Ayaguz, Karkaraly, Akmola, Bayan-Aul’” (Bekmakhanov 1947: 58). The listed territories are precisely those that were filled with Cossacks and peasant settlers. That is, the Kazakhs were deprived of their pastures and were forced to engage in agriculture, which gave many times less profit than cattle breeding.

4.2

Poor Nomad: Myth and Truth

Throughout the nineteenth century, representatives of the colonial administration talked about the need to develop arable farming in the Steppe, allegedly “providing more reliable food” and to “ensure the existence of nomads”, most of the “reformers” strangely did not notice the fact that the Kazakhs provided themselves with cattle breeding in a way that was inaccessible settled peasants in feudal and post-serf Russia. To no lesser extent, such wealth was inaccessible to industrial workers in industrialized England. But the colonialists continued to spread the myth that sedentism and agriculture would bring the nomads allegedly inaccessible material well-being and provide them with a piece of bread that the steppe people traditionally did not eat. The Kazakhs ate mainly meat and dairy products.

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Why did the myth of the poverty of nomads continue to exist during the Soviet period and was supported by the Bolsheviks? Because he allowed to “explain” the plight of the Kazakhs, in which they found themselves in the 1930s, after Asharshylyk organized by the Bolsheviks. In the 1930s, dispossessed people began to arrive in the Steppe (sometimes for the presence of only 2–3 cows), and in the late 1930s and 1940s—deported people. When they first saw the Kazakhs, the Kazakhs were poor, ruined, had no livestock, no land, lived in yurts covered with old, leaky felt mats. The new arrivals were told about poor nomads (who used to live as robbers), to whom the Soviet government gave protection and well-being. Is it so? How did the nomadic Kazakhs live before the forced sedentarization carried out by the Bolsheviks, and before the “civilizing” impact of the tsarist colonization? The cattle was the main treasure of the Steppe. Kazakhs from cattle breeding received almost everything necessary for life. They fully provided themselves not only with a variety of meat and dairy products but also with clothes, shoes, felt mats for yurts, carpets, soap, and much more. The pastoralists received income from the sale of livestock, skins, wool, skins, furs, and butter. Surplus sales were carried out on an industrial scale. A.I. Levshin points out that “in 1786 and 1787, 500,000 sheep were exchanged from them (Kazakhs.—A.M.) annually to Orenburg and the same number in other places of our border. Consequently, up to 1,000,000 sheep a year entered Russia in total. The number of horses received on the Orenburg and Siberian lines, together in other years reached 50,000… According to this information, they could trade up to 2,000,000 sheep and about 100,000 horses annually” (Levshin 1832: 225–226). A.I. Levshin notes that “In addition, they sell: Goat down is about 4,000 pounds. Horse skins 15.000. Sheepskin 100.000. Raw hare skins 10.000. Lamb fat 10,000 poods” (Levshin 1832: 234–235). E.B. Bekmakhanov writes that according to Levshin, “in the 1920s, XIX century, only from Siberian Kazakhs alone, Russian merchants annually bought 3 million sheep, 150 thousand horses and up to 100 thousand bulls in the amount of up to 8 million silver rubles. Along with this, thousands more camels, thousands of tons of leather, sheepskins, lambskins, felt mats, carpets and other goods were bought” (Bekmakhanov 1947: 64). The Kazakhs brought in so many livestock that in the areas bordering the Steppe, leather processing industries that received raw materials from

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the Steppe rapidly grew. In 1837, as follows from the report of the Orenburg military governor for 1836 and 1837, 59 tanneries operated in the Orenburg province (Bekmakhanov 1947: 66). E.B. Bekmakhanov notes that “in trade with the Kazakh steppe, the features of colonial trade clearly appeared with its non-equivalence of exchange, which, however, was masked by the exchange nature of trade. Russian merchants, exchanging cheap industrial products for valuable raw materials, made huge profits… Krasovsky gives a vivid example: Kyrgyz (Kazakh.—A.M.) paid 1 rub silver per arshin, a wooden dish was sold for a ram, i.e. for 1 ruble. …The colonial nature of trade was also manifested in the fact that goods of the lowest quality were sold to the Kazakh steppe” (Bekmakhanov 1947: 67). Major General S.M. Bronevsky in 1830 wrote that “In the Middle Horde there are very rich Kyrgyz; for example, in the Carpyt region, Bey Sapak has up to 10 t. (thousands.—A.M.) of horses, many camels and cattle; when he wanders from one place to another, he embraces more than 150 camels with his estate, and about 100 workers tend his herds. The horses of the Sapak factory are distinguished by their great growth, kindness and articles” (Bronevsky 2005: 42–43). There was no economic point in roaming if the Kazakh did not have enough livestock. How many livestock justified transhumance? Here is the minimum required for nomadism: “To maintain a year-round nomadic lifestyle, a certain limit of livestock was needed, this is about 100–150 sheep or 25 horses, 15–20 camels… Poor households did not have the opportunity to conduct a purely cattle breeding economy, for example, due to the lack of a sufficient number of camels and horses as pack animals, as well as due to the insufficient number of sheep—the main livestock species among Kazakh nomads, nomadism lost its meaning” (Orynbaeva 2015). Those, the established mass of Kazakhs, who continued to roam until the 1930s, had at least this limit. Wealthy farms numbered several hundred or thousands of heads of various types of livestock. Y.P. Gaverdovsky, E.K. Meisndorf, and A.I. Levshin noted that the Kazakhs considered farming a sign of extreme poverty. This observation was confirmed by the fact that those who were left without livestock and could not roam turned to arable farming or hiring the linear Cossacks. Among them were those who lost their pastures as a result of the resettlement policy and the selection of their ancestral lands.

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Fox hunting (on average, each yurt sold 100 skins annually) was an additional source of income for the Kazakhs, wild horses—kulans (the skin went to Tashkent for sabs, bags, shoes), argali, marmots, corsacs, foxes, wolves, whose skins in large quantities were supplied to the exchange yards at the lines, fairs, bought up by merchants arriving in the Steppe. The Kazakhs had the opportunity to constantly and without additional costs to renew fur and woolen clothes, leather shoes, and felt mats for yurts. Steppe trade grew rapidly. If in 1862 Russia’s trade turnover in the Central Asian markets was 6.6 million rubles, then in 1896 this figure rose to 70.2 million rubles (Pankratova et al. 2011: 442). Demand from Russian merchants led to an increase in the production of products from livestock products: dressing of sheep, horse, and goat skins was carried out, felt mats and lassoes were made, and goat down was bought up in large volumes by Orenburg merchants. After the abolition of serfdom in Russia (1861), when factories and plants began to be built in Russia itself with the help of foreigners, Russian merchants and industrialists began to establish enterprises in the Steppe for the primary processing of livestock products: wool washing, lard, candle, sheepskin, intestinal, oil-pressing, glue-making, and tanneries. Due to pasture cattle breeding, there were so many agricultural raw materials that the number of large and small industries for processing livestock products was growing rapidly. So, for example, at the end of the nineteenth century, 126 oil plants functioned in the Akmola region, and 65 in the Semipalatinsk region. Fixed capital invested in production in the amount of 600–1500 rubles paid off in one season. In the two named regions at the beginning of the twentieth century, there were 162 tanneries producing products worth 1116 thousand rubles. Sheepskin and fur coat production developed: Akmola region—88 establishments and Semipalatinsk region—13 (Bekmakhanova 1986: 197–198). “How large the livestock productivity of the Kyrgyz (Kazakh.—A.M.) Steppe outskirts in terms of sales of livestock products, both to the Siberian markets and to the markets of the European mainland, is clearly shown by the data of the veterinary supervision of the Akmola region for 1897. The number of exports of slaughter meat and in general all animal products during 1897 followed along the Siberian railway and by water to Tyumen: fresh meat of cattle 337,589 poods, lamb and goat 99,180 poods, pork 735 poods, lard 78,000 poods, intestines 565,042 poods, legs of cattle 202 poods, giblets 8,211 poods, undressed horse hides

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239,942 pieces, cowhide 201,077, camel 13,077, sheepskin and goat 2.389,805, sheep wool 121,339 pounds, camel wool 15,894 pounds, goat 841 pounds, factory 5,525 pounds, mazura 100 pounds, horse hair 31,570 pounds, horns 940 pounds” (Guide to the Great Siberian Railway 1902: 184). The oil production of only Petropavlovsk supplied oil to St. Petersburg, Moscow, Riga, Revel, Odessa, Samara, and Vladivostok. From the end of the nineteenth century, oil from Petropavlovsk was sent to England, France, Germany, and Denmark. In one year, 1900, the following were exported from Petropavlovsk: beef—903,744 pounds, horse meat— 167,988 pieces, lamb—98,341 pounds, sheepskin—764,613 pieces, pork—10,556 pounds, goats—280,024 pieces, corned beef—52,730 pounds, intestines—500,000 pieces, dry leather—183,442 pieces, and butter—55,715 pounds. Until 1914, Petropavlovsk retained leadership among the cities of Western Siberia and Kazakhstan in terms of oil supplies abroad. In large volumes, livestock products were sent through the ports of Libau and Revel to Vienna (sheepskin), Paris, and Boston (goat). Through Odessa—fur products to Turkey. Through Samara, guts were exported to Berlin and Hamburg (Zaibert et al. 1997). In the 1870s– 1880s, livestock products processing plants began to work and increase in the Semirechensk region. Russian merchants of various guilds made capital in the Steppe as quickly as if they were sitting on a gold mine. It has already been said about the “efficiency” of agriculture planted in the Steppe and the ability of the Cossacks and settlers to grow bread in the arid zone. As for the efficiency of cattle breeding, for those who lived in the Steppe, this issue was not in doubt. “In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Siberian Cossacks developed a certain economic system—they found it more profitable to engage in cattle breeding and conduct petty barter with nomads who came on the line than to start arable farming on their farm” (Shevchenko 1993). A. Maksheev, traveling in the Steppe in the early 50s of the nineteenth century, noted: “General Obruchev’s idea of arranging Russian agricultural settlements in the steppe turned out to be untenable … General Obruchev’s mistake was not in the arrangement of settlements, but in the fact that he would certainly I wanted to give them an agricultural character, and as a result, forced the settlers willy-nilly to spend labor and time on fruitless cultivation of the land and distracted them from other activities” (Maksheev 1896: 145). Also: “In 1850, in order to avoid losses from

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an ulcer, the Orenburg settlers sent their cattle to the summer migrations of the Kyrgyz … The settlers of the Ural and Orenburg fortifications and the Karabutak fort are engaged in hunting and especially hunting for wild boars. The boar provided meat allowance not only for the settlers, but partly also for the garrisons of the fortifications… Petty trade gives them good profits, and from farmers they naturally tend to turn little by little into small industrialists, merchants, and townspeople” (Maksheev 1896: 146). The Cossacks grew rich in the Steppe thanks not to agriculture but to cattle breeding. In the economic activity of the Cossacks, cattle breeding prevailed, and the methods of herd keeping were borrowed from the Kazakhs as the most effective. In addition, the methods of harvesting local fuels, the use of adobe bricks for buildings, etc. were adopted. Senior officials started herds, hiring Kazakhs as herdsmen. The junior ranks were hunted by robbery (stealing herds from the Kazakhs), especially in turbulent years. For comparison, consider how workers lived in developed industrial England and the peasants of post-serf Russia in the same nineteenth century. On this topic, both scientific and fiction literature is presented in sufficient quantity. Let’s take a look at a few examples. In the works of B. Disraeli “Two Nations”, C. Dickens “Oliver Twist”, and many others tell about the life of factory workers and miners, about urban slums and workhouses, and about the exploitation of female and child labor. According to the biographies of famous Englishmen, we know about the bleak and almost beggarly existence of even the middle class, the horrors of living and studying in private schools (the fate of the Bronte sisters, etc.), high mortality, etc. By the middle of the nineteenth century, England had become a country of cities and workers’ settlements, where more than 50% of the population of England lived. An industrialized country, an imperial power, England could not cope with poverty. Against the background of the rapid enrichment of the bourgeoisie, the impoverishment of the bulk of the British grew. I.R. Chikalova in her article gives the following description of the life of workers in Manchester in 1851: “Workers employed in cotton factories get up at 5 o’clock in the morning, work in the factory from 6 to 8 o’clock, then… drink liquid tea or coffee with a small amount of bread… and work again until 12 o’clock, when they have an hour’s lunch break, usually consisting of boiled potatoes for those who receive the lowest

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wages… Those who receive the highest wages add meat to this – at least, three times a week. At the end of dinner, they work again in the factory until 7 pm or later, then they drink tea again, often with an admixture of alcohol and a small amount of bread. And some eat potatoes or oatmeal a second time in the evening… The population that eats in this way lives in a crowded mass in houses separated by narrow, unpaved, contaminated streets, in an atmosphere saturated with smoke and evaporation of a large manufacturing city. And in the workshops they work for 12 hours a day in a relaxing, heated atmosphere, often saturated with dust from cotton, with unclean air from constant breathing or from other causes… The workers neglect the household, they do not know home comfort…, premises dirty, uncomfortable, unventilated, damp…” (Chikalova 2006: 504). Also: “In the famous seaport of Liverpool, famous throughout the world for its size and wealth, ‘from 35 to 40 thousand people live below the soil level – in cellars that have no flow at all…’” (Chikalova 2006: 504). Only at the beginning of the twentieth century in the USA, England, Germany, and France, bread was gradually replaced by meat and dairy products that became available to the majority of the population, i.e. those that the nomads traditionally consumed. In the factories of England in 1820–1840, the working day lasted 12– 13 hours (the same for men, women, and children), plus 1 hour for lunch, and 30 minutes for breakfast and dinner; practiced widespread use of low-paid female, adolescent, and even child labor (often up to 70% of all employed). The law of 1867 reduced the working day for children aged 13–18 to 10.5 hours, on Saturday—7.5 hours. Later, the English worker worked 12 hours, then the time was reduced to 10 hours, and only in 1880 was the demand for an 8-hour working day put forward. In England in the middle of the nineteenth century, there were about 3 million people who lived in poverty or had no income. V.A. Andrianova and G.V. Rokin write about the life of paupers in the Victorian era: “England in the second half of the nineteenth century hid a significant part of the population in its dirty back streets and dark quarters… A variety of habitats could become living quarters here: dilapidated houses, residential basements, old dilapidated cottages… During floods, the lower floors were flooded to the top. For a long time the smell did not disappear due to the lack of ventilation… The streets here are dirty and narrow. The most disgusting sight was the presence of garbage and animal remains in the yards. The number of people living in each room of the slum building

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exceeded any norms… The inhabitants of the house slept all together – it was easier to keep warm, and there were no beds. There was no furniture… The statistics cited by Dioneo in his work show that only 2.8% of the poorest families were in good health… All family members could walk in the same clothes. The clothes looked terrifying: rags, patches of cloth or burlap, and bare feet. Lice, ticks and various kinds of infections were transmitted to everyone who put on a thing. In addition, there was no material such as linen and wool. Instead of them – cotton fabrics that could not warm … Poverty forces people to earn a living in different ways: women prostitute, men steal. The children of such a society are a burden to their unfortunate parents. From early childhood, they have to survive in a cruel world of debauchery, unsanitary conditions, cold and hunger” (Andrianova and Rokina 2017: 9–10). Between 1800 and 1870, about 10 million British and Irish people emigrated from England. Let us turn to Russia. Many Russian classics L. Tolstoy, A. Blok, and others, foreigners traveling or living in Russia, for example, A.N. Engelhardt (Engelgardt 1999). The condition of the people remained the subject of heated debate for many decades. Let us turn to the work of V. Bezgin “Peasant everyday life” about the life of the Russian peasantry at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries: “The composition of peasant food was determined by the natural nature of its economy, purchased dishes were rare. It was distinguished by its simplicity, it was also called rough, as it required a minimum of time to prepare. The huge amount of housework left the cook no time to cook pickles and everyday food was monotonous. Only on holidays, when the hostess had enough time, did other dishes appear on the table… In the Oryol province, the daily food of both rich and poor peasants was ‘brew’ (shchi) or soup. On fast days, these dishes were seasoned with lard or ‘zatoloka’ (internal pork fat), on fast days—with hemp oil. During the Petrovsky Post, the Oryol peasants ate ‘mura’ or tyurya from bread, water and butter. Festive food was distinguished by the fact that it was better seasoned, the same ‘brew’ was prepared with meat, porridge with milk, and on the most solemn days they fried potatoes with meat. On big temple holidays, the peasants cooked jelly, jelly from the legs and offal. Meat was not a permanent component of the peasant diet. According to the observations of N. Brzhevsky, the food of the peasants, in quantitative and qualitative terms, did not satisfy the basic needs of the body. ‘Milk, cow’s butter, cottage cheese, meat’, he wrote, ‘all products rich

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in protein substances appear on the peasant table in exceptional cases— at weddings, on patronal holidays. Chronic malnutrition is a common occurrence in a peasant family’” (Bezgin 2004: 122). Wheat bread was another rarity on the peasant table. V. Bezgin cites the data of the ‘Statistical Sketch of the Economic Situation of the Peasants of the Oryol and Tula Provinces’ (1902) “M. Kashkarov noted that ‘wheat flour is never found in the everyday life of a peasant, except in the gifts brought from the city, in the form of rolls’… From cereals eaten in the Tambov province, millet was the most common. Kulesh porridge was cooked from it, when lard was added to the porridge. Lenten cabbage soup was seasoned with vegetable oil, while lean cabbage soup was whitened with milk or sour cream. The main vegetables eaten here were cabbage and potatoes. Carrots, beets and other root crops were grown in the village before the revolution. Cucumbers appeared in the gardens of Tambov peasants only in Soviet times. Even later, in the 1930s, tomatoes began to be grown in vegetable gardens… The peasants had water as their daily drink, and kvass was prepared in the summer. At the end of the 19th century, tea drinking was not widespread in the villages of the Chernozem Territory” (Bezgin 2004: 122–123). M.O. Menshikov wrote in his 1909 article “Youth and the Army”: “I draw the reader’s attention to a very remarkable article by Colonel Prince Bagration in No. 11 of the Bulletin of the Russian Cavalry. “Every year the Russian army”, says the prince, “becomes more and more ill and physically unable… Of the three guys, it’s hard to choose one who is quite fit for service… Frail youth threatens to overwhelm military hospitals. Poor food in the countryside, wandering life on wages, early marriages, requiring increased labor in almost adolescence—these are the causes of physical exhaustion …The foundations of the family were shaken, the youth reached out to the factories. Today, a guy from the age of 14 and earlier no longer knows his family; he leads a nomadic life in flophouses and taverns near factories. Healthy offspring cannot be expected from poorly fed and poorly working, malnourished and overdrinking men” (Menshikov 1991: 108–109). V. Bezgin gives a description of a peasant hut: “Reporters of the Ethnographic Bureau described the interior of the houses of poor and prosperous families as follows: ‘The situation of a poor peasant’s family is a cramped dilapidated shack instead of a house, and a barn in which there is only one cow and three or four sheep. There is no bathhouse, barn or barn. A wealthy person always has a new spacious hut, several

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warm barns, in which 2–3 horses, three or four cows, two or three calves, two dozen sheep, pigs and chickens are placed. There is a bathhouse and a barn… Russian peasants were very unpretentious in household use. An outsider, first of all, was struck by the asceticism of the interior decoration. Peasant hut of the late XIX century not much different from the rural dwelling of the previous century. Most of the room was occupied by a stove, which served both for heating and for cooking. In many families, they replaced the bath. Most of the peasant huts were heated “in a black way”… Other furniture was practically absent. Not all families had benches and stools. They usually slept on stoves in winter, and on tents in summer. To make it not so hard, they laid straw, which was covered with sackcloth… Straw served as a universal floor covering in a peasant’s hut. Family members sent their natural needs to it, and, as it got dirty, they periodically changed it… Constant housework and in the field practically did not leave the peasant women time to maintain cleanliness in their homes. At best, rubbish was swept out of the hut once a day. The floors in the houses were washed no more than 2–3 times a year, usually for the patronal feast, Easter and Christmas’” (Bezgin 2004: 125–126). Unable to feed their own people, the colonialists decided that they could raise the welfare of the Kazakhs, who not only provided themselves with everything they needed but also supplied the surplus for sale; who wore woolen things, dressed in furs and leather; who ate meat and dairy products, which in developed Europe was a sign of prosperity. The point is not at all in agriculture, the effectiveness of which was not achieved in Russia itself and never reached the European indicators. The true goal of the rhetoric about ensuring the well-being of the Kazakhs is to attach them to a small piece of land with the subsequent seizure of all the territories of the Kazakh clans into the state treasury. In addition, it was the enslavement of the Kazakhs that would allow the tsarist administration to complete the colonization of the Steppe. In the report of N.G. Kaznakov we find: “Since the Kyrgyz (Kazakhs.—A. M.) took Russian citizenship, the successes they have made in citizenship are negligible… as long as the Kyrgyz will lonely make huge orbits of their wanderings in the desert spaces of the steppes, far from the Russian population, they will remain loyal subjects only in name and will be listed as Russians only according to censuses. The Cossacks adjacent to them along the line, due to their small number, did not bring any tangible benefit to the Russification of the Kyrgyz, but they themselves learned the Kyrgyz dialect without exception and adopted some, however, harmless habits of the

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nomadic people” (The Most Submissive Report of the Governor-General of Western Siberia 1875: 19). In 1911, in the St. Petersburg newspaper “In the World of Islam”, A. Bukeikhanov wrote about the “Steppe Regulation” of 1868: “This law… was designed in a private way in the St. Petersburg offices and received approval not only without the consent of this, who until then considered himself the sovereign their lands, people, but also without prior hearing of their representatives. Having made the entire Kazakh people landless, this law predetermined the fate of the Kazakh cattle-breeding economy, and at the same time put the very existence of several million of our relatives at stake” (Bukeikhanov 1911: 1). A. Bukeikhanov warned against the hasty transition of nomadic auls to settled life and warned that the Kazakhs should not assign a certain number of acres to their household, because all other lands would become state property. The more land was taken in favor of the settlers and the Cossacks, the more impoverished nomads appeared. The Kazakhs who settled down and engaged in arable farming never achieved prosperity equal to that of pastoralists. Raiymzhan Marsekov in his 1912 article “How can a Kazakh remain the owner of his land?” writes: “If we look at the last 15–20 years, we see that the Kazakhs have lost a lot of their lands, and they have lost the best lands and pastures, and they themselves are increasingly closing in on inconveniences and waste lands” (Marsekov 2014: 112). What gave the colonial authorities the settlement of the Kazakhs? The “liberation” of ancestral lands, taken away to the state fund, made it possible later to allocate it to settlers, sell it to Russian landlords, and give it away as a reward for faithful service to the tsar. The selection of pastures from the Kazakhs is the deprivation of their means of production, since land and livestock are a guarantee of wealth and independence in the Steppe from colonial power.

4.3 Unrecognized Court of Biys and Stereotypes About It The widespread stereotype about a corrupt, unfair, and cruel biy-exploiter is based on the assessment and interpretation of the biy court, which became widespread in the Soviet period thanks to historians with their desire to discover “feudal exploitation” and “patriarchal-feudal remnants”

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in the institution of Kazakh customary law (Stalin’s formula). A superficial idea of the court of biys was also a feature of colonial officials, who considered the court of biys from the point of using it as a means of promoting colonial policy. In recent decades, many scientific works have been published, dissertations have been defended, giving a more complete and truthful idea of the customary law of the Kazakhs and the functioning of the biy court. However, despite the fact that many distortions have been removed and the ideological conditionality of the assessments had been substantiated, the sediment (false stereotype) remains. The “Charter on the management of foreigners” of 1822 officially initiated the process of studying Kazakh customary law with the aim of gradually replacing it and introducing Russian legal proceedings: “§ 68. All nomadic and wandering foreigners, as mentioned above, are governed according to their own steppe laws and customs. As these laws and customs in each tribe have some and often important difference from others, moreover, being preserved to this day through some oral traditions, they can be confused and indefinite; then for these reasons, it is left to the Administration from the most honorable people to collect complete and detailed information about these laws, to consider them in the Provinces in special Provisional Committees, to soften everything wild and cruel, to cancel what is inconsistent with other regulations…” (Charter on the management of foreigners of 1822 1830: 398). In the dissertation “Essays on the history of the state and law of the Kazakhs in the XVIII and the first half of the XIX century” (1948) S.L. Fuchs gave a detailed assessment of the sources on which the idea of the colonial authorities about the trial of biys was based. These sources were introduced into scientific circulation at the end of the nineteenth century and for a long time remained without proper critical evaluation. S.L. Fuchs notes that until the middle of the nineteenth century, no special legal literature on Kazakh law existed. Available in the 1860s, legal literature was only memos, more or less systematized collections of customary law, and the authors often compiled previously written. Another method is the publication of the collected scattered material for study. For example, L.F. Balluzek published materials on customary law collected by Sultan Seydalin, and P.E. Makovetsky published material on customary law collected by the district chiefs of the Semipalatinsk region (Fuchs 2008: 99).

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G. Gaverdovsky, K. Shukuraliev, A.T. Putintsev, A.I. Levshin (1832), L.I. d’Andre, later—L.F. Balluzek, G. Zagryazhsky, P.E. Makovetsky, N.I. Grodekov, A. I. Dobrosmyslov, M.I. Bronevsky, A.K. Gaines, and others wrote about the court of biys. Definitely, the works of these authors are of value, mainly because they were created during the existence of the described phenomenon. However, the presented data needs critical verification (detection of inconsistencies, misinterpretations, distortions), given the fact that much remained superficially understood due to the ignorance of the language by the “collectors”, their short stay in the Steppe, as well as the tasks set—to discover arguments in favor of replacement of the traditional biy court with Russian legal proceedings. Representatives of the scientific and geographical community of Russia and colonial officials collected considerable empirical material, but it could only become the basis for further scientific analysis. The tasks of practical politics, the colonial approach completely ruled out obtaining any scientific results in the study of Kazakh legal proceedings, since the main goal was to create a guide for officials of the tsarist administration, which is often indicated by the named authors. At the beginning of the twentieth century, L. Slovokhotov and A.I. Myakutin in their writings note the “official character” of the works of their predecessors, their “complete helpfulness of thought”, and mutual repetitions. Thus, the customary law of the Kazakhs not only was not studied and understood, but its essence, the conditionality of the way of life of the people, moral norms, and traditions of nomads, remained outside the scope of research. N.A. Kozlov in his article “Customary Law of the Kyrgyz”, published in 1822, wrote: “In the minds of people, the title of biy belongs to those few who were noted for impeccable honesty, with a natural mind, who combine deep knowledge in the indigenous customs of the people. Biy is a living chronicle of the people, a lawyer or legislator” (Useinova 2014: 22). Sh. Valikhanov wrote: “Elevation to the rank of biy was not conditioned by the Kyrgyz by any formal choice on the part of the people and approval by the ruling power of the people; only deep knowledge of judicial customs, combined with oratory, gave the Kyrgyz this honorary title. In order to acquire the name of biy, it was necessary for the Kyrgyz to show his legal knowledge and his oratorical ability to the people more than once. The rumor about such people quickly spread throughout the steppe, and their name became known to everyone. Thus, the title of biy

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was, as it were, a patent for judicial and advocacy practice”. Also: “The law of tribal life, according to which members of one clan were considered, as it were, members of the same family, was the reason that a biy-of-kindred in the process of his relative with a member of another clan could only be a lawyer for his relative, but not his judge”, “The court of biys was carried out verbally, publicly, and in all cases allowed advocacy. He was in such respect among the people that he did not require and still does not require any disciplinary measures” (Valikhanov 1985). Evidence of the effectiveness of the judicial system is the lack of prevalence of crimes in the Steppe: from theft and deceit to violence and murder. Major General S.M. Bronevsky in 1830 wrote about the Kazakhs: “They are simple-hearted and kind to infinity to their fellows: there is no thing that they would not share, and there is no service that they would not render, they are hospitable to the full extent; to feed them does not mean to oblige them, but to fulfill their duty… Russians and any foreigners are welcomed: a yurt, food and a sure guarantee for personal safety are openly offered… suicidal tendencies are not noticeable: homicide is rare, and then in a movement of anger” (Bronevsky 2005: 51–52). Reforms in the middle of the nineteenth century begin to destroy the biy court, introducing Russian legal proceedings instead, and already in the last third of the century, the traditional Kazakh court underwent significant changes and in the vast majority of it represented the Russian (colonial) version of the “biy court”. According to the law “On the extension of the General Laws of the Empire to the Siberian Kyrgyz” dated May 19, 1954, the title of biy could only be granted to sultans, aul foremen who had served for at least 6 years, as well as persons who had awards or performed any positions approved by the government (On the extension of the General Laws of the Empire to the Siberian Kyrgyz 1866). At the same time, the candidate elected by the society had to be approved by the district order. Thus, instead of a real choice of a biy from among the fair people, respected by the people, the colonial authorities actually appointed pseudo-biys from among those who were loyal to the colonial administration, served the tsar, and not the people. The appointment of judges, widely introduced in the middle of the nineteenth century by the colonial authorities and aimed at destroying the traditional steppe law, became the reason for the emergence of bribery because the appointed judges no longer depended on the opinion and

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choice of the people, but on the attitude of the authorities who loved bribes. Krasovsky noted about the biys: “…some remained the former righteous advisers of the people, others, seeing a bad example from above, went crazy: thus, in the once beautifully organized people’s court, the bribe finally found a place for itself” (Bekmakhanov 1947). Thus began the degradation of the steppe law. Honest biys shied away from such shameful service. They turned out to be forced out by those who were elected according to the Russian method through bribery and an agreement with the Russian administration, which was beneficial to have conductors of tsarist policy obedient to their will. D.V. Vasiliev cites the testimonies of tsarist officials about the transformation that took place with the court of biys. So, second lieutenant of Kazakh origin S. Babagaliyev notes how the appearance of the biy changed: “if before noble Kazakhs became biys, who were the closest relatives of the rulers and cared not only about the prosperity of their kind, but also about peaceful relations with their neighbors, then with the introduction of the election procedure by the Russians judges from the people’s environment ‘these exemplary biys are replaced for the most part by people who are not always trustworthy’” (Vasiliev 2017: 11). Another official N.F. Petrovsky noted that “by the draft Regulations of 1867, the arbitration and informal nature of the court of biys was actually emasculated, and it itself turned into a regulated state institution unnatural for the Kazakhs” (Vasiliev 2017: 8). At the beginning of the twentieth century, a graduate of the medical faculty of Tomsk University (1890), eastern (1895), and law (1897) faculties of St. differed from what was called the court of biys in the second half of the nineteenth century and which functioned as an appendage of the colonial administration. Sultangazin noted that “in the pre-colonial period, the court of biys was not such an undisguised tool of lawlessness, extortion and unlimited arbitrariness. Then the biys were not, as in the second half of the nineteenth century, officials who crawled into this position through bribery and dark machinations in systematically rigged elections” (Mazhitova 2014: 90). Lawyer R. Marsekov noted that the legal norms introduced by the colonial authorities opened the way for lawlessness, bureaucracy, violations of human rights, and injustice. Noting the fact that the pre-colonial court can no longer meet the requirements of the changed life, R. Marsekov writes: “…the mass of biys does not know the existing legal customs, most of which have outlived their time and nothing new has

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been created to replace them… on what then do they base their decisions? On nothing, in other words, they create their own law at will” (Marsekov 2014: 82). At the beginning of the twentieth century, two future Alashorinians defended their diplomas at the Faculty of Law of St. Petersburg University: Aidarkhan Turdybaev (1902) and Zhakyp Akbaev (1905). They showed the mechanism of Kazakh customary law in the field of marriage and family relations and proved its effectiveness and expediency in a nomadic/semi-nomadic society. Later, in their publications, they pointed to the deplorable state and degradation of the once-fair Kazakh court. Cases considered according to Russian production accumulated by the thousands. State Councilor Lyubimov reported in 1845: “The sultansrulers, foremen told me that while correspondence was going on in this way on some matter, it would be possible, according to their Kyrgyz customs, to solve 20 cases… In general, their desire is that all sorts of cases in the Horde (except, of course, important criminal cases) were allowed to be decided by them according to their own customs (as it was before, before the publication of the Regulations), and not according to the now established procedure, which entails an investigation, long correspondence, procrastination of cases. Some outgoing papers from the sultans-rulers can be from 1500 to 3000 – and where is this? – in the steppe, in the Horde, where everything, apparently, should go, in accordance with the life and needs of the Kyrgyz” (Bekmakhanov 1947: 121). In a word, the colonial administration broke the former effective system of law and instead created an ugly, extremely unjust system, which became synonymous with complete lawlessness. The Kazakhs did not understand the Russian language, red tape in court proceedings, and depended on interpreters who pursued their own selfish interests. Egregious cases of deceit, perjury, and bribing judges have become common practice. This is also why the Kazakhs continued to turn to real biys until the 20s of the twentieth century, which, despite the reforms and the introduced colonial system of justice, still survived. The Cossacks and settlers who live nearby and do business with the Kazakhs resort to the court of the biys. The court of biys—quick, public, fair, the purpose of which was not so much punishment as reconciliation of the parties—was popular. Litigation was resolved without red tape, to the satisfaction of both parties and, importantly, without the use of such punitive measures as prison or hard

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labor (the point is not that biys could not consider major crimes intended as punishment for exile or prison, but that Kazakh court a priori did not practice such types of punishment). Biys (judges, experts, and interpreters of the steppe law, bearers of the moral code of the people) became exclusively respected people who enjoyed the trust of people. Anyone who would take it into his head to abuse his position and make biased decisions risked losing not only his name and reputation but also those who could turn to him for a solution to the dispute. An indispensable condition in the choice of a judge, as a rule, was the trust of both parties acting in the lawsuit. The same unconditional trust was also a condition for the implementation of the judge’s decision. People, as a rule, tried to choose a well-known and respected judge among the people, especially when a conflict arose between representatives of different clans. Thus, the right to choose a judge was realized, and such a system, of course, increased the personal responsibility of the biys for the justice and validity of the decision. One of the guarantees of a fair decision was the publicity of the court. Litigation was considered during the days of kurultai, congresses of clans, and large fairs, which allowed interested parties and witnesses to be present. And, importantly, the trial took place with a confluence of a large number of people. The people judged the justice of this or that decision, the wisdom and honesty of the biys. Literally, every decision of the judge became a brick in building his reputation, which no one would risk. The Russian (more broadly, European) and Soviet judicial systems had a pronounced punitive orientation, where the main goal was punishment. And the nomadic legal proceedings (customary law of the Kazakhs) are aimed primarily at the eradication of crime. The punishment of those who violated the laws was largely humanized, i.e. did not contain an infringement on his primordial rights to life, freedom, and human dignity. In addition, the forms of punishment and influence were aimed at compensating for the damage caused and gave the offender a chance for correction and rehabilitation. Incorruptibility of the biy, justice as the essence of court decisions, publicity, accessibility, publicity, competitiveness of the parties, the right to defense, the system of proving and substantiating a court decision, case law, non-punitive orientation of the court, mediation mechanism (the court’s focus on achieving and establishing civil peace), humanism, the proportionality of punishment, the strengthening of morality and

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morality, the regulation of the norms of nomadic society—all this characterized the court of biys. The effectiveness of the court of biys and the recognition of its decisions were provided by the system of education and moral standards. The biys did not just judge, but spread the morality and rules of the community, which encouraged them to refrain from reprehensible acts. The simplicity and efficiency of steppe legal proceedings are evidence of its perfection and refinement, and not primitiveness or unviability. The colonial authorities did not even notice this, which was a typical mistake of Orientalism, Eurocentrism, and settled centrism. As for the “wild and cruel” court, we should mention the fact that instead of the Kazakh legal proceedings, a system was introduced that was based on falsification in the selection of judges (it is difficult to use the word “Biy”, because it is from a different legal system) and their bribery, who practiced corporal punishment, sending a person to exile, prison, or hard labor—this is what the Kazakhs saw as truly wild and cruel. Where did this come from? Here are some strokes to the picture of legal proceedings in Russia in the nineteenth century. “The judicial system that existed in the Russian Empire until the mid-1960s. XIX century, until the introduction of the judicial reform in 1864, was cumbersome and chaotic…” (Tomsinov 2016: 3). Exploring the process of legal proceedings in criminal cases in the first half of the nineteenth century, N.N. Efremova notes that there was no defense, the process itself was archaic and aimed at prosecution, and was also accompanied by such vices as bribery and unjust judges. Formal evaluation of evidence dominated (Arkhipov et al. 2019). Why was the oral trial in the biy court embarrassing, which was presented as a sign of backwardness? This practice also existed in Russia: “…in the cities of the Russian Empire, there were verbal courts for civil cases and commercial verbal courts. Verbal courts were established on the basis of the ‘Charter of the Deanery or the Policeman’, issued on April 8, 1782… the verbal court was supposed to: 1. ‘Verbally analyze civil cases at the verbal request’, not touch upon written requests and criminal cases” (Tomsinov 2016: 13). Colonial officials criticized the Sharia court functioning in the south of Kazakhstan, seeking to eradicate it. Meanwhile, at the same time, an ecclesiastical court existed in Russia. R.A. Abubekerov notes: “…the system of formal evidence, absentee proceedings, arbitrariness in determining the degree of guilt and imposing penalties made the church court extremely

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ineffective. One of the leading experts in church law is a professor of Moscow University N.K. Sokolov, who stated that the church court that existed at that time, ‘demoralizing the administration, developing in it arbitrariness and inclination to act at its own discretion, almost completely kills the court, turning it into a humble tool to cover up administrative arbitrariness’” (Abubekerov 2017: 42). The reform of the church court was supposed to “replace written proceedings with oral proceedings, with public hearings of the court, and abolish the practice of using formal evidence”. The backwardness, archaism, and shortcomings of the Russian judicial system demanded reforms. They were carried out for almost half a century but did not achieve the desired modernization. R. Reduto writes about the system of criminal and correctional punishments existing in Russia in the nineteenth century: “The Code of 1845 underwent three editions – 1857, 1866 and 1885, two (the last) of which significantly modified some fundamental institutions. The characteristic features of the Code can also include the mechanical borrowing of certain provisions from foreign codes and the extreme lack of development of terms. Even stronger than all these shortcomings, in the second half of the XIX century. The archaism of the Code was felt. It was not updated even after the introduction of partial amendments in 1866. Criminal penalties included the death penalty, exile to hard labor, to a settlement in Siberia, in the Transcaucasus… As for correctional punishments, the Code divided all criminals into two main categories: those released and not exempted from corporal punishment… The main types of punishments for exiles, the following: whips, rods, chaining to a cart, an increase in the term of work, transfer from the category of reformers to the category of probationers, transfer from a settlement to hard labor” (Raduto 2009: 64–66). During the reign of Alexander II, a reform of the judiciary and legal proceedings was developed (1864), which was to be implemented in 1866–1899. The reform assumed a change in the principles and procedures of Russian legal proceedings, namely, it was proposed to make the court public, open and oral, with an adversarial process in which the parties received equal rights to provide and refute evidence, the court became the same for all classes. It should be noted that it was these characteristics that long before the Russian reform were characteristic of the court of biys, but this did not save it from destruction.

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One of the developers of the Judicial Charters of 1864 S.I. Zarudny wrote in his autobiographical notes: “If on February 19, 1861, by the will of the Autocrat of the All-Russian, the liberation of the peasants with land had not taken place, then in no case would the Judicial Charters be approved on November 20, 1864. Under serfdom, in essence, there was no need for a fair trial. The real judges were then only the landowners; they were dominated by a supreme arbitrary court. The landowners could not resist him; but power over the majority of the population was concentrated in their hands. The peasants dealt with the landlords by lynching. After February 19, even our highest dignitaries realized that there was an urgent need for a quick and fair trial” (Dzhanshiev 1891: 42). On April 17, 1863, the law “On some changes in the current system of criminal and correctional punishments” was issued, which introduced the following provisions: especially severe corporal punishments were abolished; punishment with rods was replaced by imprisonment; the imposition of stigma and stamp marks on the body was canceled; corporal punishment for women was abolished; hard labor in mines and fortresses for women was replaced by work in factories; clergymen, clerics of nonChristian confessions, teachers of public schools, persons with a certificate of graduation from county schools, as well as persons of the peasant class holding public elected positions were exempted from any corporal punishment in general (On some changes in the current system of criminal and correctional punishments 1866). Reforms in Russia were difficult, slow, and uneven. By the twentieth century, Russia still did not have an effective judiciary, and it remained punitive, inhumane, and corrupt. The question involuntarily arises: who are the reformers? Unable to reform their own judicial system, even relying on European models, the colonialists set about changing (eliminating) the court of biys that was effective at that time. The content of the above law on the abolition of corporal punishment gives an idea of the punishments practiced before 1863 in Russia, in comparison with which the Kazakh customary law system looks not only more humane but also more effective in terms of crime prevention. The proof of this is the absence of theft in the Steppe, extremely rare cases of murders, etc. As for Soviet punitive justice with its courts of troikas, repressions, executions by list, Vyshinsky, etc., it is difficult for anyone to compare (compete) with him in savagery and cruelty (crime).

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In the works of the Soviet period, criticism of the biy court was continued in the spirit of the Marxist–Leninist theory, according to which the biy court appeared as “backward”, “patriarchal”, was a “class hostile” “feudal relic”. At the same time, the properties of the “court of biys” of the colonial period were often criticized. The authors, seeking to give an objective assessment of the court of biys, were accused of class blindness, praising patriarchal-feudal relations, and other ideological crimes. Even the aforementioned dissertation by S.L. Fuks of 1948, generally consistent with the Soviet ideology and the ideas of Marxism–Leninism–Stalinism, was classified for many years, because it contained separate theses of a complimentary nature about traditional Kazakh legal proceedings.

4.4

Slandered Barymta

Distorted, fundamentally erroneous idea of barymte as a robbery became widespread in the first half of the nineteenth century. In the “Charter on the Siberian Kyrgyz” of 1822, several paragraphs are devoted to the barymta: § 62. According to this Order is obliged: …0.3) Use all means to immediately eradicate the unrest common to the Kyrgyz, namely: robberies, baranty, and disobedience to the authorities. (Charter on the Siberian Kyrgyz 1830: 420) § 206. Only the following shall be regarded as criminal cases against the Kyrgyz: 1) high treason; 2) Murders; 3) Robbery and sheep; 4) Explicit disobedience to established authority. (Charter on the Siberian Kyrgyz 1830: 427) § 287. To announce that henceforth the ram will be revered as robbery, and for it, as well as for murder, the perpetrators will be relentlessly pursued and soon punished. (Charter on the Siberian Kyrgyz 1830: 431)

How could it happen that barymta, carefully regulated by the institution of law, began to be called theft, raid, robbery, and became equated with murder? How did the semantics of barymta change to the exact opposite? To answer these questions, it is necessary to understand what the barymta was from the point of view of the ordinary rights of the Kazakhs. Barymta (“belonging to me”; “what is mine”) is one of the most universal institutions and important links in the entire system of Kazakh

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customary law. The law clearly regulated the institution of barymta, prevented arbitrariness, and turned it into a way to protect law and order. Sh. Valikhanov designates barymta as an institution of law that existed from time immemorial among nomadic pastoral peoples. Barymta was reflected in the laws of Khan Tauke as an already established procedural institution. Good reasons were required for the implementation of barymta. Everyone who studied/described the customary law of the Kazakhs in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries wrote about the possibility of resorting to it only if there was a claim: A.I. Tevkelev, Ya.P. Gaverdovsky, K. Shukuraliev, A.I. Levshin, S.B. Bronevsky, Sh. Valikhanov, A.K. Gaines, N.I. Grodekov, and others. S.B. Bronevsky (1787–1858), an ardent conductor of colonial policy who served from 1808 to 1837 and who took part in the suppression of Kazakh uprisings and sought privileges for the Siberian Cossacks, we already find a mention of barymta with negative semantics: “He is a virtuous man, he never got mixed up in rams and lives peacefully because of that”, “…no one takes someone else’s place, otherwise a fight and a ram will certainly follow” [2; 43–45]. At the same time, he perfectly understands that barymta is not a crime, and his words contradict the following observations: the most courageous from 100 to 500 people, armed, go to the auls of the volost where they should make an attack”, “Baranta is revered by daring; those distinguished by successful raids are glorified as heroes in folk songs” (Bronevsky 2005: 49–50). S.B. Bronevsky notes that “All measures are being taken by the Government to destroy the baranta, and the law, depicted in the Charter of the Siberian Kyrgyz, commanding that the baranta is a criminal offense, will very soon destroy this harmful habit” (Bronevsky 2005: 50). He probably put a lot of effort into this, since the barymtachi were a threat to the Cossacks, they did not allow the latter to rob the villages. Why did the colonialists take up arms against barymta so much and want to destroy it? The fact is that barymta was a punishment for a crime or injustice, a person who violated social norms was forced to pay with cattle. These cattle was received by the affected party. The amount of the “fine” was determined by the elders or the court of biys. Barymta performed a number of functions, being: (1) a way to protect the right of the victim to compensation for the damage caused; (2) debt collection method; (3) the type of extrajudicial reprisal against the guilty, evading the court, as well as in the case when one cannot count on

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the help of the court (impossibility or refusal of biys in justice, delay in the case); (4) a means of coercing the defendant to appear in court to consider the lawsuit, incl. by influencing those persons who are obliged to contribute to this (biy clan, aksakals, aul of the defendant); (5) taking influence on the defendant in order to force him to comply with the court’s verdict (in case of delay or refusal to execute the decision made by the court); (6) the type of punishment (murderer) allowed until the moment when the crime becomes the subject of a trial; (7) a measure aimed at ending hostility and preventing further revenge. Barymta is defined as a method of forcing the guilty person to trial by M. Tefkelev in “Report to the Collegium of Foreign Affairs” (1732): “…and in order to force the offender to seek trial himself, the whole family of the offended person makes a reprisal over the uluses and takes him away from he has enough livestock to force him to seek court” (Tefkelev 1936: 212). Without a doubt, customary law has undergone changes due to changing life, the task of maintaining peace and harmony in society. Thus, for example, the introduction of kun (payment for blood, i.e. murder) was introduced into the “Zhety zhargy” in order to reduce and eradicate blood feud, which could lead to many years of inter-clan war and extermination of each other by nomads. This transition from blood feud to kun was not easy, because the Kazakhs considered it unfair to pay for spilled blood (human life) with “milk”, that is, cattle (cf.: English proverb: “If you don’t want to get hit by a spear, buy it”). However, the biys were consistent in applying the fine, realizing that kun and barymta seemed to be the optimal substitute for blood feuds, although the latter continued to be practiced for a long time, individual cases were observed until the end of the nineteenth century. The unit of the fine was cattle, which is important for understanding the practice of barymta. In addition to the kun, there was ayip—the most common type of punishment, which is a fine that is a multiple of the number 9, so it was often called “togyz”. In addition, biys contributed to the transition from barymta to litigation. The rejection of barymta as an immediate pre-trial punishment for the death of a relative (“to wash the blood”) was encouraged by the court of biys. So, if the relatives of the murdered did not resort to barymta and immediately turned to the court of the biys, then when determining the size of the kun, the biy added cattle to it as compensation and encouragement for refraining from immediate revenge. In addition, “togyz”

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was also appointed as a “payment for yurts”, i.e. for the fact that the injured party refrained from ruining the village under the influence of anger caused by the murder of a loved one. Instead of destroying the aul, a symbolic ceremony was held, in which the relatives of the murdered person came to the defendant’s aul and hit the yurts with weapons. The killer’s relatives with a request not to destroy their homes paid “togyz”. These types of compensation in addition to the main fine for murder— kun—encouraged refraining from barymta and attacks on the guilty aul, which could result in new casualties. Barymta as an immediate act of retribution for the murder of a kinsman was treated with understanding, given the desire to take revenge while the slain was not yet interred. However, after the implementation of barymta, the murder case should be considered in the court of biys (compare: in medieval England, revenge for the murder was allowed only until the corpse of the murdered was buried; in Georgia in the Middle Ages, the looting of the killer’s household was allowed until the official intervention in the case of the authorities). It becomes obvious that barymta contributed to the eradication of the tradition of blood feuds. Barymta, being an institution of law, was regulated, and its implementation required compliance with certain procedures. It was carried out as a legal seizure by the decision of biys or aksakals, which distinguished it from robbery. A.I. Levshin, who left records of the Zheti Zhargy (Seven Rules) code of customary law, noted that barymta was carried out “only by the verdict of judges or elders” and together “with relatives or their closest neighbors”. Moreover, barymta was accompanied by an advance announcement on the basis on which it was carried out, i.e. stated the reason for the claim. Presenting the grounds for barymta is one of the mandatory conditions for its implementation. The biy of the injured party sent messengers to the biy or aksakals of the defendant’s clan with a proposal for a peaceful settlement of the dispute, and only in case of refusing to proceed with the trial or evading the answer did he agree to barymta. The legality and openness of the act of capturing livestock are also ensured by the announcement of the ongoing barymta to neighboring villages or villages that meet on the way, as well as a repeated announcement after the barymta had been carried out and a report to the biys and aksakals. Sh. Valikhanov pointed out that it was necessary to notify those from whom the cattle was stolen within three days, for which a barymta was made. This was achieved by preventing robberies under the

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guise of barymta and distinguishing barymtachs from cattle thieves. The barimtachs knew that they were on the side of the law, and it must be enforced, otherwise lawlessness and rampant crime would come to the Steppe. Even if the family expelled the criminal, this did not exempt him from the need to pay for the crime of his relative, i.e. compensate for the damage they had caused. Many authors emphasize that barymta was a last resort, provided that the guilty party was unable or unwilling to peacefully resolve the dispute. In the notes collected by L. Balluzek, it is noted that the Kazakh, only “having been everywhere, with everyone who can have the slightest influence on the thief and, seeing some unwillingness to contribute, and others a real impossibility to help”, uses barymta. Having tried all attempts to negotiate peacefully, turning to everyone who can act as an intermediary (biy, aksakals, sultan), the victim has every right to horse steal. The number of cattle stolen by barymtachs was also determined by the court of biys. The driven cattle was counted, and the biy or aksakals made sure that its number was commensurate with the claim and was returned if excedeed. The presentation of the stolen cattle was also important in the case when the barymta was carried out with the aim of forcing the defendant to trial. The cattle was with the injured party until the verdict was passed on the lawsuit, after which part remained on account of compensation for damage and part was returned. There has always been livestock to return, because they barked in excess, so that the defendant has the motivation to participate in the court and return at least part of the cattle taken by the injured party. Sometimes, in order to bring the defendant to court, the cattle was not driven away from him (he could go far with the aul to the Steppe or hide), but from authoritative representatives of his family or neighboring auls—his relatives. In this case, about a quarter of the cattle from the total amount of the claim was driven away. The desired goal of this is to force the biys of the clan or relatives to influence the criminal and force him to answer before the law. After the defendant appeared before the court, the cattle, stolen as a kind of pledge, were returned. This measure was, as a rule, effective, and made it possible to do without forcibly bringing the perpetrator to court. The voluntary, albeit forced, decision to participate in the trial also presupposed the submission of the defendant to the court’s decision. The (sub)genus of the perpetrator turned out to be interested in the fact that

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the case was considered in the court of the biys, and the injured party had no reason and right to steal their cattle. The protection of criminals could threaten with enmity between the clans, and therefore the custom did not allow the practice of leaving or removing the criminal from responsibility to gain a foothold. As you can see, the implementation of the barymta was based on the principle of collective (clan) responsibility, and the consequences of the barymta affected the entire village. Each member of the nomadic society was obliged to think not so much about his own, personal success, and well-being, but about the general, which was important for the family. This found expression in the imperative: “Do not be the son of your father, be the son of your people”. Since the family was responsible for the actions of their relatives among nomads, they did not ask themselves the question of who personally committed the crime. They were interested in the question: what kind of criminal? This knowledge was enough to carry out retribution. Inside the clan, they themselves sorted out and established who offended the neighbors. S.L. Fuchs compares barymta with the legal practice of other peoples: in ancient Rome, the creditor, saying “certa et solemnia verba”, declared that the seizure of property he made was not robbery, but legal seizure as a method of recovery; in the monument of Irish law “Senchus mor”, it is said about the capture of cows after the murder of a woman, which forced the defendant to trial; The “barbaric truths” of the Franks and Germans reflect a more developed form of legal seizure, which required the consent of the court (the term “strud”, i.e. robbery, was called among the Franks the seizure of the debtor’s property by the court); in Russkaya Pravda, the term “robbery” denoted the punishment of a robber sanctioned by the authorities, while “plunder” was carried out by the victim and his relatives; in Swedish law at the end of the twelfth century, “robbery” was the collection from the property of the debtor in favor of the creditor, carried out by the hundred-community; in Ukraine in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. “grabuvannyam” was called the customary legal seizure of the property of the guilty or debtor. The scientist concludes: “The Kazakh barymta developed in the same direction as the ‘robbery’ among the Slavs, Swedes and Franks” (Fuchs 2008: 430). Also: “However, perhaps, nowhere, except in the monuments of ancient Irish law, the institution we are considering is not described with such thoroughness as ‘barymta’ in the monuments of Kazakh law” (Fuchs 2008: 424).

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Customary law did not allow replacing barymta with theft and robbery, since it distinguished it from the latter by its essence, goals, basis and methods of implementation. Thus, barymta was an effective means of complying with laws and achieving justice in a nomadic way of life, when the participants in the lawsuit were at a remote distance from each other. Its effectiveness is proven by the fact that crimes in the Steppe were rare, blood feuds were reduced, and biy courts achieved peace and harmony between clans. During the period of colonization of Kazakhstan and in the process of reducing the norms of customary law, the interpretation of barymta underwent a transformation in an unusual way, and its essence was radically distorted. At the first stages of the struggle for the colonial subjugation of the Kazakh Steppe, the Russian government did not reject the barymta, considering it as a “reprisal”. In the presence of barymts, they saw an excellent reason for the legalization of armed violence and the robbery of the Kazakh population, the so-called “military searches”, “border baranty”, which became the means of the colonial policy of tsarism. Barymta—“reprisal” was widely practiced by the royal administration in the second half of the eighteenth century. Decrees of the Foreign Affairs Board of 1749, 1760, 1776, 1779, and 1783, it is recommended “that in order to restore calm at the borders” to combat raids, “theft”, and other “insolence” on the part of the Kazakhs, one should “perform reprisals, i.e. capture people and livestock”, proceed to “baranta”, “ram this means the capture or detention of people, as well as horses and cattle. This is how the substitution and distortion of the concept of “barymta” begins. S.L. Fuchs notes that “Tsarism in the eighteenth century widely used barymta for robbing and ruining the Kazakhs, for punitive expeditions against them, which were carried out under the guise of ‘retaliatory rams’” (Fuchs 2008: 462). He explains: “Having thus turned barymta into a ‘represal’, the tsarist government found the legal formula needed to implement the policy of colonial robbery and violence against the Kazakh people. ‘Border sheep’, ‘military searches’ became the source of the greatest disasters for the Kazakh people, the source of its economic ruin and physical destruction, especially under such governors as A.R. Davydov, who believed that ‘the best way to deal with the Kazakhs is to cut them’” (Fuchs 2008: 452). Far from always complying even with the plans of the government and without benefit to it, exacerbating the resistance of the Kazakhs, the

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“border baranta” was often used only to enable the border authorities to rob. S.L. Fuchs refers to the words of the Orenburg military governor Bakhmetev, who was forced to admit that barymta “allowed to make fortunes”. It can be seen from a note by Timkovsky dated May 29, 1821, at what cost under him these fortunes were compiled: “The devastating rams, or in the true sense of the word, the incredible robberies carried out in the Lesser Horde under the leadership of Major General Bakhmetev, led the Kyrgyz people to a disastrous state” (Fuchs 2008: 452). Thus, through the efforts of the colonialists, barymta went beyond the law and opened the way for any plunder. The colonialists began to call both barymta and raids for the purpose of robbery the same name barymta, having carried out the substitution of concepts. In 1806, Alexander I banned “external barymta”. However, the robbery of livestock and the capture of people continued to be widely practiced during military operations and punitive expeditions against the rebellious Kazakhs, the line administration for a long time was reluctant to give up the opportunity to improve their affairs at the expense of the Kazakhs. The attitude towards barymta changed depending on the tasks and methods of the colonial policy of a certain period. The Kazakhs carried out barymta against the Cossacks, returning the stolen cattle and punishing for the inflicted insults. The tsarist administration, realizing that this could turn into a protracted anti-colonial war, decided to put an end to the robberies of the linear Cossacks, and began to fight… with barymta in general, criminalizing it. The rejection of the “border baranta” made it possible for the tsarist government to ban the barymta as a whole, in all its forms and manifestations. It was a preventive step before the first serious steps towards the transformation of Kazakhstan into a colony of the Russian Empire. The “Charter on the Siberian Kyrgyz” of 1822 classifies “robbery and sheep” as one of those crimes that “relative to the Kyrgyz” (not the Cossacks) are considered criminal, and therefore are withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Kazakh biy court and transferred to the jurisdiction of the royal courts. Since that time, barymta has been considered as a criminally punishable act, identified with robbery and considered by a military court. However, bringing to a military court took place in cases where barymta affected the interests of the Russian population or the direct interests of the tsarist administration. Bringing to criminal

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liability for barymta, which did not directly affect government interests, was practically almost impossible. Barymta continued to be used by the Kazakhs against the newly minted bais and corrupt “biys”, which forced the latter to fight against the preservation of the institution of barymta. The practice of distinguishing between legal (justified) and illegal barymta is being introduced. In addition, the functions and methods of barymta (stealing livestock from relatives in order to force the perpetrator to trial) are being reduced. So, the Biy Congress of 1865 decides: “If someone, wanting to repay a debt from someone, steals cattle from an innocent (not due to him Kyrgyz), then he pays protors, losses and a fine” (paragraph 7). This way, the principle of collective responsibility and the measure of influence on those who evade responsibility for a crime are destroyed. Paragraph 9 read: “He who steals cattle with a sheep is judged like a thief” (Fuchs 2008: 444). Under the influence of this new content, the true meaning of barymta begins to blur, distort, and be replaced. During the period of demoralization of society under the influence of colonization and the destruction of the traditional biy court (second half of the nineteenth century), when the decisions of the “biys” elected according to Russian laws increasingly became unfair, the Kazakhs resorted to barymta as a way to get even with those who managed to resolve the lawsuit behind the scenes, taking advantage of bribery, proximity to the colonial administration. In this way, the steppes punished the beys or took revenge for the prejudiced decision of the biy, taking away what, in fairness and the laws of the Steppe, they considered their own. No doubt, the newly minted bais preferred to interpret barymta solely as a robbery. Bais and biys of the new formation, who came to power through cooperation with the colonial administration and bribery, escaped from the people behind the back of the Russian military court. They knew that according to the customary law of the Kazakhs they could be punished by barymta, and therefore fought against it. The preservation of barymta in its true spirit became a threat to a new layer of owners with their dubious morality. Only barymta, which allowed the Kazakhs to defend justice and their rights, was an obstacle to the permissiveness of the nouveaux riches. Their fear of the barymta was used by tsarism in order to force them to support the policy of colonization

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aimed at eliminating the remnants of the political and administrative independence of the Kazakhs, and hence the court of biys and the institute of the barymta. In addition, the barymta used by the Kazakhs was aimed at compensating for the damage caused by the Cossacks and settlers. The latter, for obvious reasons, did not want to recognize the right of the nomads to retribution, and therefore, quite consciously and with benefit for themselves, they interpreted barymta as a robbery. With the established practice of Russian legal proceedings, which in most cases protected the rights of the Cossacks or settlers, the barymta for the Kazakhs remained almost the only measure against the injustice done to them. In the legal consciousness of the Kazakhs, barymta, which for centuries had served as a way to fight against any injustice and violation of moral norms, retained its true essence and became more and more in demand, especially against the backdrop of suppression by the Cossacks, the Russian court, part of the corrupt bais and biys. Regardless of the barymta, the cattle theft spreading in the Steppe was the result of the breakdown/undermining of the social and political life of the Kazakhs under the influence of the colonial policy of tsarism and the demoralization of part of the elite of the Kazakh society. Therefore it is permissible to assume that almost any cattle rustling had a reason and a pretext—infringement of rights, ruin of auls, selection of pastures, and many others. In this sense, it seems more appropriate to the thesis that the willful cattle rustling in the Steppe was closer in nature to barymta, rather than vice versa. The memorandum of the Minister of War to the Committee of Ministers (July 30, 1867) states that “the prosecution of sheep by criminal procedure, as experience has shown, does not stop this kind of cases”. “An attempt by the tsarist government to destroy the barymta in the nineteenth century, when the barymta ceased to serve as a suitable instrument of colonial policy, was not crowned with success. The tsarist administration was forced to repeatedly admit its powerlessness to fight the widespread barymta” (Fuchs 2008: 462). Also: “At the same time, the government clearly signed the recognition of the bankruptcy of the criminal prosecution of Barymta by the royal court” (Fuchs 2008: 456). Having found out that the criminal prosecution of barymtachi would not stop the barymta, the tsarist government took measures to regulate the process of considering conflicts. Thus, a congress of representatives of the parties was created to reconcile them on the basis of Kazakh

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customary law. The colonial administration actually takes the path of legalizing internal “private” barymta. With more frequent cases of corrupt judges making unfair decisions, barymta becomes a way of forcing the defendant to re-examine the case, respected and recognized by the biy people. It was possible to appeal only once, a secondary appeal with the use of barimta entailed a fine. The use of barymta as a means of the appeal came into practice, probably in the second half of the nineteenth century (when a means of combating unfair decisions of judges was required), as the former Kazakh court did not widely practice appeal (Ibragimov 2006). Despite the measures taken against barymta, even during the period of strengthening the colonial administration and the court at the end of the nineteenth century, it continued to be used widely and everywhere. At the same time, the Kazakhs did not resort to the Russian court, but resolved disputes in the biy court. S.L. Fuchs cites information about the Turgai court, explaining why the Kazakhs avoided the Russian court: “…not a single self-respecting Kazakh would go to witness this case, the investigation would drag on for years until the disputed cattle died, and therefore the victims were no less than the guilty themselves sought to hide the facts of barymta from the Russian administration, which could inappropriately cruelly, from the point of view of customary law, punish the guilty, equating them to robbers, but would deprive the victims of material compensation provided to them by proceedings in the court of biys or at counter-barymta” (Fuchs 2008: 455–456). The tsarist administration preferred to see in barymta the “natural” inclination of the Kazakhs to robbery and predation. However, any record of the customary law of the Kazakhs at the end of the nineteenth century states the vitality of the barymta institution and fixes it as a way to achieve justice. This is what the Kazakh was deprived of in the repressive and corrupt Russian court. Barymta, as a means of achieving justice, compensating for losses and punishing the guilty, existed until the final establishment of Soviet power (in the early 1930s, after the expropriation and dispossession, the Kazakhs no longer had Asharshylyk cattle) and was destroyed along with the court of biys and the biys themselves (political repressions of 1930 the years). During the totalitarian period (with its judicial system), barymta was endowed with exclusively negative semantics, and it was in this interpretation that it was entrenched in the mass consciousness as another false stereotype about nomads.

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4.5 The “Oppressed” Kazakh Woman: A Different Look European and Russian travelers who observed the traditional nomadic and semi-nomadic life in the Steppe in the nineteenth century often wrote about the position of a Kazakh woman, her “slave” labor, and her dependence on a man. At the same time, the authors noted an amazing, in their opinion, for an Eastern woman involvement in the life of society, the opportunity to participate on an equal basis in sports with men on an equal basis (horses, wrestling, archery), aitys, folk holidays, games, etc. It should be noted that the stereotypical approach to the East in general is still prevailing in the mass consciousness. Speaking of it, they mean some kind of generalized East, with supposedly inherent typological features. At the same time, it is obvious to many that the Middle East and China are different East, and Southeast Asia and Japan are different Asia. Kazakhstan, which is the East, Asia, nevertheless, was something different, different from its neighbors already by virtue of its nomadic lifestyle. This key circumstance became decisive for the formation of a different social structure, attitudes towards power, freedoms, special traditions, norms of behavior, moral imperatives, etc. Consequently, the position of a nomad cannot be considered within the framework of the stereotype “oriental woman”. In present times, a considerable number of scientific and popular science works have been created that make it possible to understand various aspects of the world of nomads in their conditionality by way of life, way of managing, and established traditions. Many phenomena and norms of nomadic life that do not fit in the head of a settled person have a rational explanation and, moreover, contain obvious expediency and effectiveness in certain historical conditions. From the height of our time, we cannot disagree with the conclusion that the life and life of a Kazakh woman was difficult, associated with hard physical labor and the restriction of a number of her rights. However, a more objective assessment of the “enslaved” position of a Kazakh woman is possible if we consider it in comparison with the position of women in other countries and societies of the same historical period. Was the oppression of women, so to speak, a commonplace, or, against the background of the position of women in other societies, did the Kazakh woman really appear to be especially disadvantaged and oppressed?

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Let us turn to the nineteenth century, when active colonization of Kazakhstan was carried out and an opinion was formed about the oppressed Kazakh woman. Let us make a comparison with the position of women in the sedentary society of the same period. Not considering the position of a woman in agrarian Russia, moreover, she was freed from serfdom only in 1861. Let us turn to greater contrast to the most industrialized country in the world of the nineteenth century—England. The contrast will allow the most convex demonstration of the features of the described phenomenon. Without a doubt, in any society, women from wealthy families are protected from exhausting work, they have privileges, and therefore the most massively represented type, level, and way of life should be considered. The work of a Kazakh woman included a variety of types of work: spinning wool, felting felt, processing and dyeing leather and felt, embroidery, sewing clothes, blankets, making interior elements of the yurt, washing, soap making, cooking, milking livestock, churning butter, making irimshik, kurt, kymys, preparation of smoked, dried and other meat products, etc. In addition, the migration actually fell on the shoulders of the woman: packing household items, bedding, utensils, clothes, disassembling, and assembling the yurt. All this was the usual work of most Kazakh women. In the countryside, the Englishwoman also performed hard physical work: taking care of cows, pigs, and poultry, gardening, growing flax, cooking, baking bread, processing milk into butter and cheese, preserving meat, fruits, and cabbage, cooking dinner, and washing clothes. The industrial development of England has led to the presence of a significant number of people living in cities and working in industrial facilities. Among them, a large proportion were women. What was the labor of a number of industrial city workers in England? I.R. Chikalova writes: “Among factory workers in Great Britain in 1839, there were 57.7% of women… Women, using as a draft force for transporting coal in mines, were harnessed like horses to trolleys. The exploitation of women’s labor has become a real disaster, not only in this, but also in other countries of Europe. The physician and sociologist Willerns wrote in 1847: ‘One must see how every morning they come to the city and every evening they return back… They get up at four in the morning, walk several kilometers, dragging their children with them, and

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in the evening they again make the same path after 12–13 hours of work in appalling conditions’” (Chikalova 2002). Not only women but also girls worked in the mines. After an accident in 1838 that killed 26 children (11 girls aged 8–16 and 15 boys aged 9–12), the Coal Mines Act of 1842 was passed, which prohibited women and boys under 10 years of age. From that time on, English women and girls could only work on the surface, sorting coal. R.R. Vyaselev gives the following figures: “By 1868, in the textile industry in England, 55.5% of all workers were women over 13 years old, and together with teenagers, 75% of the total mass of workers. As of 1874, women accounted for 61% of the total number of all workers (1,005,685 people)… The harm caused by factory work to women’s health was reflected not only on women themselves, but also on the future generation of citizens of England. Often dead and weak children were born, both due to illnesses and due to insufficient nutrition and employment at work” (Vyaselev 2013: 31). Obviously, the work of English women in factories, plants, and mines was a terrible form of exploitation. At the same time, the majority lived in far from comfortable conditions, crowded, and did not have the opportunity to breathe fresh air and eat fully. Against this background, the life of a Kazakh woman will seem quite easy. She was burdened with housework, but did not work at night and did not engage in exhausting monotonous work; at the same time, fresh air, meat and milk nutrition, natural woolen, fur clothes, and leather shoes were available to her (hassle and silk were bought in Central Asian markets). Pregnant factory workers worked as usual, sometimes giving birth right at the machine, and sought to return to work as soon as possible. In 1890, the German Emperor Wilhelm II proposed to convene a conference on labor protection. In addition to Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria–Hungary, Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal took part in it. As a solution, it was recommended to limit the working day of women to 11 hours, to provide them with a month’s post-natal leave, and it was also recognized as unacceptable for women and children to work on Sundays and at night (Chikalova 2002). In 1891, a law was passed in England requiring women not to work for 2 weeks after giving birth, but few workers could afford this unpaid leave, and therefore the law was poorly enforced. In England, despite the presence of hospitals, childbirth at home was considered safer, not threatening infection. However, this precaution did

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not save women in childbirth from puerperal fever. In the 1880s, it was discovered that this disease was the result of non-sterile instruments and microbes on the hands of doctors who did not wash their hands before the next appointment with the patient. Kazakh women gave birth in a yurt. If the aul was on the way, the camp stopped, yurts were set up and preparations for childbirth began. For forty days after giving birth, a woman was protected, not allowing her not only to work, but also not to leave the yurt in order to avoid a cold, and they also tried to limit her social circle to those who did not wash their hands before the next appointment with the patient. Since the Kazakhs traditionally lived in the same village with their parents and close relatives of the spouse, the Kazakh woman could count on the help of her mother-in-law, sister-in-law, and other relatives of her husband in doing the necessary household chores and caring for the child. A woman in labor was nursed because her health is a guarantee of a healthy and numerous offspring, which was the main value for the nomads. An easier and better-paid job for a woman in England was considered domestic service. In the 1870s, it employed 1.5 million women. A middle-class English girl was taught reading, embroidery, music, and traditional crafts. In the nineteenth century, the British believed that physical activity was inappropriate, harmful, and even in some ways immodest for a Victorian woman. It should be noted that Victorian morality and manners were quite strict and even harsh towards women. It was not supposed to have and express one’s opinion, it was recommended to hide true feelings. The code of conduct and speech taboos are written and rife with prohibitions. “First, in the understanding of the Victorians, femininity implied the economic and intellectual dependence of a woman on a man. Secondly, it was believed that sacrifice and helpfulness should determine the behavior of women” (Nesterova 2004). Representatives of the middle class refrained from hard physical labor in factories and in the field, but their financial and legal situation was rather difficult. Many women had no income and were forced to work due to the lack of the opportunity to get married. The high mortality of men, as well as their active emigration to other countries and British colonies, led to the fact that in 1851 the number of women in England exceeded the number of men by half a million. Unable to marry, a woman had to find work to support herself. Being educated, as a job, they could count on the available place for them as a governess or companion, which was often associated with working conditions that degraded their human

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dignity. Even the fate of talented women was deplorable (Bronte sisters). Opportunity to have a job, i.e. livelihood, has become one of the reasons women fight for the right to education, opening the way to work that is not associated with hard physical labor and health risks. An alternative existed in the form of leaving for the British colonies—“exporting women in bulk” to marry there. The Society for the Emigration of Women from the Middle Class, established in 1862, organized the movement of girls to Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa. For a Kazakh woman of average income, the question of hiring into the service did not arise at all. Even in the case of non-marriage, she remained in her native village, surrounded by her relatives: her father and brothers. They were responsible for her and had to take care of her safety and food. Yes, Kazakh women in the nineteenth century, with rare exceptions, did not receive a school education (they could learn to read the aul mullah) for lack of schools. However, English school education was associated with pressure on the child, not always favorable for health living conditions in a boarding house. In addition, the father of a Kazakh woman would not let her live in a boarding house. Relatives were responsible for the safety of her daughter, her behavior, and her upbringing. A Kazakh girl in her home was considered a guest who had to go to another family, and therefore, before marriage, she was spoiled, and her special position was emphasized. There was no question of excessive physical exertion, but at the same time, she was taught to run a household, do all the work associated with a nomadic life, as well as spin, live, embroider, etc. Obviously, she rode horseback, if she had the ability, she played one or another musical instrument, knew traditions and etiquette, and knew how to keep up the conversation. As a rule, girls did not graze livestock and were engaged in work that was not associated with heavy physical exertion. Young ladies were prepared for family life, obedience to her husband, but this did not negate their self-will, courage, and sometimes audacity in communicating with young people. It must be remembered that traditionally among the nomads women were warlike, in conditions of war they could fight together with men. In the conditions of a nomadic life, she needed to be strong, strongwilled, confident, able to fend for herself. Until adolescence, girls grew up and played with the boys, and therefore sometimes they were not inferior to them in dexterity, accuracy, speed, ingenuity, and riding skills. Kazakh women, along with men, took part in competitions: horse racing, shooting, and even wrestling. Women participated in aitys and

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often defeated men. Neither the stereotypical “Oriental woman” nor the nineteenth-century Englishwoman could compete with men. Sports (archery, tennis, badminton) for English middle-class women became available only at the end of the nineteenth century. Horseback riding could afford only the representatives of the wealthy strata of society. Recall that the mentioned middle class (lawyers, engineers, teachers, military, priests, doctors, merchants, journalists, etc.) in 1837 was approximately 15% of the population, and by the beginning of the twentieth century—25%. As for inequality, in both sedentary and nomadic societies, women in the nineteenth century were equally infringed on property rights. In England the property of the wife was placed at the disposal of the husband; she had rights only to personal belongings. The woman lost the rights to the property that she brought as a dowry, even in the event of a divorce. The husband was legally entitled to full control over any income received by his wife. Only after the adoption of the “Law on the Property of Married Women” in 1884 did the Englishwoman receive the right to own property and dispose of it at her own discretion. Although not having legally secured property rights, the Kazakh woman was in charge of the household, and her husband was in charge of livestock. The woman participated in making important decisions about expenses, helping relatives, neighbors, etc. Of course, wealthy wives living in a separate village owned their own herds, flocks, and other wealth. Let us consider three more phenomena related to women: widowhood/divorce, prostitution, and polygamy. Divorce in England was a rare case because of its high cost. He even received permission for separation from the church court, the spouses formally remained married, and therefore could not remarry. In the event of a wife’s infidelity, the husband demanded financial compensation from the lover, as if estimating the cost of his wife. After the divorce of spouses, children in most cases were given to their fathers. A woman who cheated on her husband was deprived of access to her young children. A man, even in the event of treason, retained the right to children. In 1839, after the adoption of the “Child Custody Act”, the mother received the right to custody of children up to 7 years old and only on condition of her impeccable reputation. Since 1873, the court could decide with which parent to leave the children, and the updated Guardianship Act of 1886 allowed children to be given to a former spouse who did not commit adultery.

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Divorce did not exist among nomads. In exceptional cases, a woman could return to her family. Some traditions of the Kazakhs should be viewed through the prism of the fact that they were formed in a nomadic society. In this regard, it is impossible not to mention the law of amengerstvo (levirate) that existed in Kazakh society—this is a tradition adopted in the Steppe, according to which a widowed woman, after a year after the death of her husband, had to marry her late husband’s brother or one of his relatives. The purpose pursued by this law was that the children of the deceased remained in the ata-zhurt (kind of the father). The question of the implementation of the law of amengers was discussed by the aksakals of the clan and blood relatives. Since the widow had the last word, the decision was made taking into account the interests of the woman in order to avoid her refusal. If she made the decision to leave the family, then she left alone, leaving children and property. If she decided to marry a person from a different clan, then he paid money for her and took her away without children. One of the main goals was achieved—the children grew up in the father’s family, among their relatives. Having been widowed, a woman could publicly announce her complete refusal to remarry. Her decision was made, while she and her children remained in the family of the deceased spouse, under the protection and guardianship of his relatives. Women rarely shied away from following the law of levirate, because in a nomadic lifestyle, it is difficult to manage a household without an adult male and guarantee full protection and care for children. There was always a question about their material support because even the presence of livestock did not save them from the threat of starvation (the loss of livestock, theft, etc. could happen). This custom brought up in men an understanding of their responsibility not only for their own family but also for the family of a brother, relative, all the children of the village, clan. This custom explains why the Kazakhs had neither street children nor orphanages, shelters and almshouses for the elderly, or workhouses. To better understand the significance of the validity of the levirate, consider how the fate of the widow developed in nineteenth-century England. Let’s take the middle level—the local nobility. If a woman did not give birth to sons (only daughters), then this threatened that the widow with her daughters could remain on the street, because the right to a family estate passed through the male line. Only those widows who initially had their own fortune remained secure. In the event of the death

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of a spouse, the woman had to resolve all economic problems on her own. At best, she was entitled to a widow’s share, stipulated in the marriage contract or by will. A widow from the category of the poor survived as best she could. In nineteenth century England, prostitution, the so-called “white slavery”, took on a large scale. The spread of syphilis in English cities, ports, and the army became a serious threat. “Necessity and cold forced people to earn money in any way, sometimes far from legal. Excessive exploitation, lowering the standard of living – all this led a person to moral and physical degradation. The scale of the problem was great: a significant number of residents of English cities were below the poverty line” (Andrianova and Rokina 2017: 8). They tried to fight prostitution with the “Contagious Diseases Acts” of 1864, 1866, and 1869. Prostitution did not exist in the Steppe. An important remark should be made here: rape was equated with murder, for which the death penalty was due. The law emphasized the special treatment of women and ensured their protection. A criminal could be saved from punishment either by marrying a raped girl with the payment of the bride price for her, or by paying a kun for killing a person. In a nomadic society, polygamy was quite common. Often the reason for introducing a second wife into the house was the illness of the first wife or the absence of a son-heir. For wealthy people, having two or three wives was an indicator of social success. At the same time, an elderly voluptuous man who married young girls was condemned and ridiculed. In nineteenth century England there were facts of bigamy and even bigamy. The reason for this was most often the complexity, duration, and high cost of processing a divorce. The practice of selling their wives by the British is also connected with this circumstance. It took several years and a considerable amount of money to obtain a parliamentary decision to dissolve a marriage. Divorce was beyond the means of the poor, and they used the tradition of selling their wife at the market square. This procedure was performed by mutual consent of the spouses and became a kind of way to end the marriage. The wife’s sale took place in the form of an auction in a public place, such as a local market or a hotel. The husband brought his wife for sale on a symbolic leash-ribbon. It often happened that the buyer was known in advance, and the woman actually married him immediately. The law persecuted this tradition, but for many decades it continued to exist. The last time a wife was sold in England was in 1913.

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The position of women in England inspired them to fight for their rights. Family law was reformed with the Marriage and Divorce Act of 1857, which allowed a woman to initiate a divorce. There was no similar women’s movement in the Steppe. It is probably acceptable to say that the position of women that existed was optimal in that historical period and in the conditions of a nomadic lifestyle. It was not possible for a woman to run a nomadic economy on her own. The facts of the real or fictitious sale of an English wife are reminiscent of another myth built about nomads. It became widespread during the Soviet period, when the Bolsheviks fought against the “remnants of the past” and eradicated all the customs of the Kazakhs. The myth says “Cossacks sold their daughters for bride price”. Probably, in serf-owning Russia, and then in the impoverished Union that survived several large-scale famines, the tradition of gifting the bride’s family during matchmaking, as well as the dowry given to the daughter who was getting married, could not have developed. Otherwise, the interpreters would have understood the essence of the kalym, its, so to speak, functional purpose. Critics of the kalym traditionally saw it as the price for a bride. Is it so? Kalym was not at all (as was sometimes misinterpreted) reimbursement for the fact that the parents raised and raised the bride. In gratitude for this, the Kazakhs have a separate gift presented to the mother of the bride—ana suti (for mother’s milk). In addition, there were many other gifts and offerings designed to thank the bride’s relatives, her aul, family, and even her deceased ancestors. Kalym actually became the basis of the dowry (the Kazakh name of the dowry—dunie—is translated as life, peace, property, wealth). Like many figurative expressions of the Kazakh language, the word “dunie” is multifaceted, and implies not just material wealth, but what will become the basis of a young family’s life. The material basis that will allow them in the first years of their life together to avoid many everyday and material problems that can overshadow their relationship. The size of the dowry did not always depend on the size of the bride price, because sometimes the dowry was more significant than the cattle received from the groom as bride price. The bride’s dowry included an otau (young yurt) with everything necessary: carpets, tekemets, chests, bedding, dishes, etc. The bride’s side, taking care of her daughter, tries to provide her with everything necessary, not relying on generosity, an idea of the comfort of that family which the daughter is going to join.

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A couple of words should be added about saukele. This is not just a bride’s headdress. Often, the saukele was a kind of investment: precious and semi-precious stones, gold and silver coins and jewelry were sewn onto it. The bride took this capital to the groom’s house and kept it for her daughter. As you can see, the dowry allegedly paid for the bride was safely returned to the groom in the form of a separate, equipped with everything necessary for housing. Could this be about selling your daughter? No. By giving away their daughters, the Kazakhs acquired new relatives, a new link in social and family ties, potential support in times of trouble, during the jute period, during migrations, etc. Any custom, always conditioned by the way of life and fulfilling a practical task, must eventually disappear as unnecessary or be transformed into other forms that are more in line with modernity or more optimally solve problems. But if a custom, always aimed at solving certain social problems, is simply destroyed without replacing it with other ways of solving the problem, this is always a breakdown, a break, a gap, which is reflected on a number of levels (mental, value, communicative, etc.). The Decree “On the Marriage Law of the Kyrgyz” dated January 17, 1921, abolished the norms of customary law, incl. levirate. The Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of the KASSR “On the punishability of polygamy” of November 9, 1921, determined the penalties. Thus, persons guilty of polygamy were punished by imprisonment in a house of deprivation of liberty for a term of up to one year, incl. and a woman, if she had knowingly voluntarily married a man having a wife. However, the ban on the exercise of levirate and the decree on marriage law did not provide a solution to the problem: what to do and how to survive for widows with children? And there are examples that the custom continued to function illegally. Widows, of course, remained in the family of the deceased husband and father of the children (there was no tradition to return wives/widows to their relatives). And already in the 30s, after the Holodomor, the very way of life of the nomads was destroyed. Then and later, in the 1940s, there were so many widows that there was no longer any talk of their “device”. Here the consequences of the violent breaking of the custom should be discussed. If it disappeared gradually, under the influence of another, more advanced culture or, in general, the development of life and society, then instead, norms would be developed that would solve those problems that the levirate was intended to solve. There was no transformation

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of custom. The custom was banned, the social problem remained and dissolved in the general impoverished life, the difficulties of the entire Soviet population. There was another consequence—it was a breakdown of the mentality of men who traditionally were responsible for the women and children of the clan. This consequence, of course, should be considered in the general breakdown of the former way of life of the people, and, moreover, at least a whole generation of Kazakhs grew up without fathers (some of them were brought up in orphanages). Therefore, some important component of the behavioral code was erased, although the women did their best to preserve it and pass it on to their growing sons. However, the absence of the daily example of the fathers before our eyes had sad consequences. This was reflected in the loss by men of the ability to see themselves on the scale of the family (not only connections but also duty, a sense of responsibility). Gradually, the man ceased to be responsible for the children of his kind, for the family. At the turn of the 1990s and 2000s, there was a boom in divorces, and sometimes a man was not responsible for his ex-wife and children. Taking into consideration the above-mentioned life of a nineteenthcentury Kazakh woman, with all its complexity, appears in a slightly different light, which makes it possible to doubt the stereotypical idea of life and infringement, the “slave position” of a woman in a nomadic society.

4.6

The Origin of the Russian Cossacks

Who are they, free Russian Cossacks? Is it free, is it Russian, are they Cossacks? Linear Cossacks in Siberia began to be established during Omsk and Zhelezinskaya fortresses construction (1716). Yalutorovsk, Ishim, Tyumen, and Krasnoslobodsk peasants were sent to the New Line (the territory of the Kazakh Steppe) and recorded as Cossacks. According to Major General S.V. Kinderman in Siberia, there were 7702 registered Cossacks. “500 people of which were sent to work during the construction of the Ishim line, with their weapons, gunpowder and lead, and received only a soldier’s dacha of provisions. They were replaced only in 1754; they went bankrupt” (Potanin 1867: 30). Discharge Cossacks served unpaid, “from the earth and from the grass”, that is, for land.

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A.I. Semyonov points out: “The discharged Cossacks were assigned to the New Line from the Yalutorovo, Ishim, Tyumen and Krasnoslobodsky peasants… Without the knowledge of the headmen and foremen, they could not leave their houses, and in case of illegal absence, upon finding, they were punished with a whip…” (Semenov 2010: 27). This is a pathetic parody of the real Cossacks, the true essence of which is freedom and daring, and here the peasants were forcibly (discharged) appointed to the Cossacks, as if the spirit of freedom can be endowed, attributed to him or forced to be mentally free with slave psychology. Serf methods (illegal absences, punishment with a whip) do not form the Cossacks. In 1755, there were 3081 regular and irregular troops on the Irtysh line. Most of them were so-called discharge or “black” Cossacks—peasants or townspeople, mobilized for temporary service for the construction and protection of the military line. In 1758, due to the temporary aggravation of Russian-Chinese relations, 2000 Don and Yaik Cossacks, one dragoon regiment and folk teams of Bashkirs and Meshcheryaks, 500 people for each line, were sent to the Siberian line. Don and Yaik Cossacks were replaced every 2 years. Bashkirs and Meshcheryaks were replaced after 1 year. However, since 1763, business trips of the Don and Yaik Cossacks were canceled, and since then the number of Cossacks had been replenished by enrolling “different ranks of people” into its composition. In 1770, 150 exiled Cossacks were sent to the line, participating in the movement against the Polish gentry. In 1762, according to the order of the Senate, the retired lower military ranks began to settle on the Siberian line, and in 1766—artisans. Captured Poles and petty criminals were also enrolled. Later on, one problem arose—the lack of women. One of the ways to solve it was the forcible capture of women from the recalcitrant Kazakh villages, who opposed the presence of Russian fortresses in the Steppe. Another method was associated with the transfer to the line of criminals exiled to Siberia. In 1759, the Senate decided to “settle exiled women suitable for marriage on the Siberian lines”. Thus, in 1759, a batch of 90 wells was sent to the Irtysh line, of which 77 (aged 19–40) were found suitable for married life. It was a chance for them to avoid hard labor for their crimes: 24 of them were exiled for sodomy, 10 for infanticide, 1 for patricide, and the rest for other major crimes (landowner’s house arson, etc.). Some of these women were taken by single officers “in

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the service”, others were married by Cossacks, soldiers, and other linear residents (Semenov 2010: 29). In 1797, a decree according to which the children of the Cossacks were to be recruited into the Cossack service was issued. This decree (serf in spirit) became the basis for the creation of the Cossack estate. Any man suitable for military service could enter the Cossacks, but he did not have the right to leave the estate. The military reform of 1798 formed an irregular army (11 Kalmyk companies, 1 Teptyar cavalry regiment). The structure of the army consisted of 17 Bashkir, 5 Mishar (Meshcheryak), 1 Kalmyk, and 7 Cossack (2 Ural and 5 Orenburg) cantons. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, 44 families of Don Cossacks, baptized Kalmyks, were moved to the line, and the exiled Poles were enlisted as soldiers. “Regulations on the Siberian Line Cossack Host” (1807) and “New Regulations” (1846) indicated that “one who enters the Cossack estate remains in it forever with his offspring”. This decree applied to ordinary Cossacks, officers of Cossack origin and their children, translators, and interpreters who graduated from the Omsk Asian School (Akishev et al. 2008). The formation of the Siberian Cossacks took place through its natural and mechanical growth. The natural increase was insignificant and accounted for 1% per year until the mid-1840s. According to the Regulations of 1808, an additional way to “multiply” the troops was the voluntary enrollment of Kazakhs and Kalmyks in its composition. Half a century later, the problem with women had not been solved. The tsar’s decree of May 23, 1808, “On the settlement of impoverished Kazakhs within Russia and on allowing Russian subjects to buy children from them” enabled “all Russian subjects of free fortunes to buy and exchange Kyrgyz children on the line” (Decree of Emperor Alexander I to the Orenburg military governor 1808). A decree of 1825 forbade “buying Kyrgyz, Kalmyks, and other Asians, but, to replenish the lack of women in Western Siberia, it is allowed to exchange female children from nomads”. For a “foreign woman” for 40 years they gave 12 rubles, for a Kazakh girl—2 bulls, 2 bricks of tea, red skin, and a quarter of cereal. “There are descendants of Kyrgyz, Kalmyks, Bashkirs and Mordovians among the Cossacks. In general, deviations from the Russian type to the Mongolian are not uncommon. This is explained by the fact that for a long time there were extremely few Russian

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women on the Siberian border lines and the Cossacks married foreigners. The influence of the Kyrgyz population was expressed in another way: almost all the Cossacks of the Gorky and Irtysh lines very often use the Kyrgyz (Kazakh.—A.M.) language in conversation and adopted some customs from the Kyrgyz” (Akishev et al. 2008). Hence the ethnic heterogeneity of the Siberian Cossacks. In addition to Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, it included Turks (Tatars, Kazakhs), Mordovians, and others. Often the main source of replenishment of the Siberian Cossacks was a mechanical increase in its numbers due to massive forced enrollments. Similar events were held several times. Thus, for example, in 1813–1814 and 1831–1834, the army was replenished with several hundred Polish prisoners of war. The Cossacks were generously given the lands of the Kazakhs, while it was believed that the seizure of land from the Kazakhs did not have a negative impact on anyone due to the presence of vast territories. For example, the Decree “On the allocation of land to the stanitsa’s Cossacks” dated April 14, 1824, says: “… the village Cossacks, sending service in remote places and not receiving any other allowance, all the more have the right to supply them with lands. The committee stated: although the Charter on the city Cossacks does not specifically mention the allotment of land plots to the stanitsa Cossacks, but as in the same Decree it is generally accepted as a rule to constantly install all Cossacks with the allotment of land to them in those places where they correct their permanent service,—that due to the large number of free lands in Siberia does not entail any difficulties, this by itself applies to the Cossacks of the village” (On the allotment of land to the village Cossacks 1830: 254–255). By a decree of the Senate dated March 17, 1832, state-owned peasants began to be resettled to the Orenburg line, classifying them as Cossacks. Thus, the Cossack estate, which served in the Kazakh Steppe, was artificially created by including peasants, exiles, people of different classes, and criminals, as well as by recruiting representatives of different peoples (Bashkirs, Kalmyks, Meshcheryaks, Kazakhs, and others). In 1840, the “Regulations on the conversion to the Cossack estate of some volosts of the Chelyabinsk and Troitsk districts” were published. In addition, all the peasants of the Novolineiny district turned to Cossacks. By the way, part of the state peasants of the Upper Urals, Troitsk, Chelyabinsk counties moved with enrollment in the Orenburg Cossack

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army. The peasants were reluctant to leave their homes. The peasants of Kundrovinskaya, Upper and Nizhne-Uvelskaya volosts of the Trinity district (8750 people) revolted. Perovsky asked for permission to completely drive out from the land all the peasants who did not want to enroll in the Cossacks. The tsar responded to the refusal of the peasants to rank among the Cossacks with a decree of May 4, 1843, stating that all state-owned peasants were sour in the Cossacks. In the summer of 1843, the uprising of the peasants was suppressed by the forces of 4 thousand soldiers with 2 guns (Bekmakhanov 1947: 141–142). E. Bekmakhanov points out that the resettlement to the New Line also took place in connection with the abolition of the internal Cossack cantons. “The Cossacks refused to move to the New Line, referring to the decrees of Peter I, who allegedly promised them freedom and self-government. Regardless of this, the government, with the help of military detachments, resettled 2,877 Cossack families to Novaya Liniya, according to the stories of old-timers, during the resettlement, some families were not even allowed to ‘take kalachi out of the oven’” (Bekmakhanov 1947: 141). After the departure of Kenesary Khan to the south and his death, as well as during the period of the military-economic colonization of the Kazakh steppe, peasants were enrolled in the Siberian army (1846, 1849– 1851, 1856, 1858–1860). In 1861, the number of the Cossack population of the Siberian army reached 93,000 people, more than a quarter of them were former state peasants. The last case of forced enrollment in the Siberian Cossacks occurred in 1861 (at the beginning of the twentieth century, peasant settlers would strive to enroll in the Cossack estate in order to receive a large plot of land). In 1867, the Semirechensk army was formed from the Siberian Cossacks. In a word, the Cossacks were mummers, and yesterday’s serfs with a slave psychology were hiding under the Cossack uniform. This explains the lack of military honor, the robbery of the civilian population, the seizure of the best land, looting, etc. by the pseudo-Cossacks. The Cossack population of the army ethnic structure became more complex as a result of the mass enrollment of peasants. The researchers note that “The rate of natural increase in these years was still low (on average 1.24%), which was associated with a high level of infant mortality. By the end of 1866, the number of Siberian Cossacks increased to 109 thousand people” (Akishev et al. 2008).

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Ethnographer, researcher of Siberia N.M. Yadrintsev (1842–1894) wrote in a book (1892) about the appearance of a mixture of the newcomer Russian population with the local one. He notes: “Such a mixture has been going eastward since a very long time, under the influence of various historical circumstances. It began immediately with the conquest of Siberia… Looking even at a few Siberian documents of the first half of the eighteenth century, we find enough indications in them of the closest and continuous everyday communication and physiological mixing of Russians with Asians, especially Tatars, Kyrgyz and Kalmyks” (Yadrintsev 1892: 90–91). In the first edition of this work in 1882, N.M. Yadrintsev testified: “Siberian Cossack teams deliberately go to Kalmyk and Kyrgyz uluses or yurts in order, according to the acts, to capture Kalmyk and Kyrgyz women, girls and children in full, and the Siberian provincial office ‘gave the taken people to them to share’” (Yadrintsev 1882: 12). Further, he proposes measures to preserve the “superior race”: “A significant number of foreigners affecting the Russian nationality in some parts of Siberia, which can weaken its racial and cultural qualities, involuntarily makes one consider the necessity to ensure it from weakening and absorption by constant renewal and reinforcement of the superior race through colonization” (Yadrintsev 1892: 93). Also: “With such a tendency of the Siberian Russian population to merge with foreigners, it is necessary to study what consequences, both physical and moral, this merger leads to. It is necessary to investigate what bad consequences come from a mixture with an inferior race, weaker and developed in extremely poor natural conditions” (Yadrintsev 1882: 25). N.M. Yadrintsev notes that not only the physiological impact but also the cultural one, affected the Russian settlers: “The Russian colony learned not only the physical type and mental characteristics of the foreigner, but even perceived his culture. These changes did not constitute isolated and accidental facts, but were reflected in the entire mass of the Russian population in the East. Crashing into the environment of the foreign population, the Russians mostly became foreigners along the outskirts, and from the outskirts, to a greater or lesser extent, this influence extended to the entire mass of the population, so that foreign blood stained the Russian nationality even where it was not in direct contact with foreigners” (Yadrintsev 1892: 94–95). The mothers of many Cossacks were Kazakh women, which was reflected in their physiological appearance. N.Ya. Konshin wrote in 1899:

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“On the other hand, among the Semiyar Cossacks it is also not difficult to meet dark-skinned, black-haired people with narrow eyes and wide cheekbones…” (Local historians of East Kazakhstan. Konshin Nikolay Yakovlevich 2009: 12). In the 1880s—the first half of the 1890s, few of the settlers in the Kazakh steppe agreed to join the Cossack army. While there were many who left it in connection with the appearance of some categories of Cossacks the opportunity to legally leave the army. In the 1890s, when lands were given out (a Cossack was given 30 acres of land), the number of those willing to join the ranks of the Siberian Cossacks increased markedly, and whole groups of new settlers were enrolled in it. As you can see, the Cossacks grew by providing Kazakh land. The evil irony is that the more land was taken from the Kazakhs, the larger the number of Cossacks became. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, with the increased shortage of land, those who were willing to join the Cossacks were denied this. In 1900–1915 the rate of natural growth of the Siberian Cossacks reached 2.13%. The low rate was explained by “high mortality associated with crop failures, the lack of necessary sanitary conditions in the villages, and the low level of medical care” (Akishev et al. 2008). In 1916, the number of Siberian Cossacks was 172 thousand people. Obviously, these people were only called Cossacks, but they enjoyed all the privileges that belonging to the Cossacks gave. This is, primarily, getting an allotment of good land, which was taken from the Kazakhs and transferred to the possession of the Cossack army. The topic of contacts with the Steppe aroused the interest of many travelers, ethnographers, orientalists, officers, governors. V. VelyaminovZernov, V.V. Grigoriev. G.F. Gaines, V.A. Perovsky, G.N. Potanin, N.Ya. Konshin, A. Mashkeev, and many others. By the way, V.A. Perovsky and many others called the Kazakhs not “Kyrgyz-Kaisaks”, but the Horde, in their writings they wrote “Cossack hordes”. The authors left their observations on the impact that the Kazakhs had on the Cossacks and settlers. A distinctive feature of the Yaik Cossacks was not only a mixture of Asian and European features (mixed marriages created a “special Cossack type, which subsequently distinguished them from other peoples of the northwestern Russian principalities”), borrowing many phenomena of life, creating a military community, knowledge of the language and traditions of the Kazakhs, but also in the fact that they served the khans

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of the White Horde. It was during this period of service as part of the nomadic troops that they learned the techniques of steppe warfare (raids, horse avalanche attacks, detour maneuvers), patrol duty, reconnaissance, ambush, the use of pikes, Kazakh horses, and the practice of having clockwork horses (o-two-horse). Later, in the seventeenth century, the Yaik Cossacks began to serve the Russian Tsar Mikhail (1613–1645). The Cossacks gradually adapted to the natural conditions of the Steppe, recognized the area through communication with the indigenous people. G.N. Potanin: “From the incessant stay in the steppe, they know it well, are accustomed to its monotonous elevations and have the same ability not to get lost in it, like the Kyrgyz himself, while a soldier is able to get lost, moving half a mile away from the main road. Finally, they are the same riders as the nomadic Kyrgyz, and, living in constant relations with them, they are well acquainted with their customs and all military tricks” (Potanin 2006: 317). Baron P.K. Uslar, who traveled along the Siberian Line and the Kazakh Steppe in 1840–1843, wrote in the article “Four Months in the Kyrgyz Steppe”). “In order to get rid of mosquitoes, the Cossacks who are on the steppe made a fire from dung and wet grass in the summer for the night, so that the picket turns into a perfect smokehouse. After a few minutes, however, I got used to the smoke… No matter how capable the Cossacks are of all the duties of military life, they cannot replace the Kyrgyz for reconnaissance. The latter possess in this respect a kind of marvelous sharpness. Having noticed a trace, they stop, look at it in all details and then tell you with confidence; when people passed here, how many there were, whether they were friends or foes, why they were traveling, etc. The linkage of these conclusions is as amazing as the insight of Cuvier, who recreated a whole antediluvian animal from a small petrified bone… In addition to sending chalganchs, we placed observation pickets from the Kyrgyz, who also surpass the Cossacks in this matter, on all the Ulutau heights. Firstly, the narrow, barely noticeable eyes of the Kyrgyz can clearly see objects in such a distance, where we see absolutely nothing, and in this respect, we cannot compare with them. Secondly, the Kyrgyz have the art of positioning themselves in such a way that they can see everything around them and at the same time remain completely invisible themselves. The very way of life develops in them these talents, so precious for outpost service” (Uslar 1848). N.M. Yadrintsev writes: “From the very moment of the conquest, the tendency of Russians to imitate many foreign customs was already

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revealed. Then, when living together with foreigners, borrowed habits were further developed” (Yadrintsev 1882: 32–33). He notes: “No less Russians were subjected to foreign influence in other areas, for example, in Western Siberia, on the border of the Kyrgyz steppe, where the Cossacks, not only did they switch to cattle breeding in places, but borrow clothes, customs, language from the Kyrgyz. These morals penetrated even into the environment of the officer class. Sometimes officers appear in towns completely turned around… As they say, the Russian population in the Turkestan region also acquires a similar Asian coloration” (Yadrintsev 1882: 42). As a result of living in the same territory and active contacts, the Cossacks borrowed a lot from the economy, life, and material culture of the Kazakhs. G.N. Potanin in “Notes on the Siberian Cossack Host” of 1867 notes: “The Kyrgyz language is not only not neglected, but is considered colloquial; many Kyrgyz customs have also been adopted: for example, the Cossacks willingly drink kymys and eat horse meat… Near the Koryakovskaya village, the strongest interaction of the Russian and Kyrgyz spirit takes place. Not far from the Koryakovskaya village, there is another village—Yamyshevskaya, in which in the past such a rapprochement was made between the two peoples that both races partly mixed here… faces and you can hear the song, which is a mixture of the Kyrgyz language with Russian. All the surrounding Kyrgyz made many borrowings from Russian life and even many live in dugouts, at least in winter, and the local Cossacks, in turn, are subject to the strong influence of the Kyrgyz, follow their fashions in dress and prefer the Kyrgyz language to their own in their home life (Potanin 2006: 306–307). In 1876 F.N. Usov writes: “In the clothes of the Cossacks there is a lot of oriental, adopted from the Kyrgyz and Tatars… The Cossacks liked the oriental paper robe most of all, they wear it at any time: on weekdays and holidays, rich and poor. Even while serving in detachments, in camp gatherings, etc., the Cossack, at the first opportunity, puts on a robe, which he smartly ties with an ordinary Russian belt, forming a lot of folds behind. In addition, on holidays, the Cossacks wear camisoles (beshmets) made of paper fabric and the same narrow trousers, cloth, knitted and nanke cossacks, as well as a particular dress; during working hours, Kyrgyz sewing Armenians. In winter, sheepskin coats and sheepskin coats, ergaks made of whole horse meat, wool up (genus dahi), leather or plush chambars (wide trousers), which run into boots. In summer, on

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the head is a uniform Cossack cap with a visor and a cockade, or a civilian cap with a visor; in winter, mutton choppers, and on the road Kyrgyz sheepskin malakhai with a sharp top and with blades covering the ears” (Usov 1879: 270–271). The Cossacks of the Irtysh region wore fox borik, and in winter— Kazakh tymak. Among the Cossacks, boots of Kazakh work—saptamaetik and felt stockings kiiz-baipak were widely used. “The old men from the Cossack villages who wore the ‘saptama-etik’ argue that such Kazakh boots in the conditions of East Kazakhstan and the Irtysh region are the most convenient type of footwear, since felt stockings protect well from severe frosts, and leather boots worn on the ‘baipak’ do not missed dampness even during slush… Many Cossacks made ‘irimshik’ and ‘kurt’ from milk in the Kazakh way and used them for food. All layers of the Cossack population of the Irtysh region, in most cases, to some extent, also drank tea in the Kazakh way, that is, sitting on the floor at a round and low table of Kazakh work” (Argynbaev 2007). Researchers note how earlier settlers differ from newcomers. Oldtimer peasants are residents of the Akmola and Semipalatinsk regions: “The living conditions in the new land contributed to the development and consolidation of these qualities (decisiveness, energy), which is what distinguishes them from recent newcomers from European Russia” (Russia. A complete geographical description of our Fatherland 1903: 198). The overwhelming majority of the Siberian Cossacks are peasants, appointed to be Cossacks against their will or representatives of different ethnic groups who enrolled in the Cossacks for selfish reasons. The Cossacks absorbed, first of all, the serf Russian peasantry, then the Asian element (Bashkirs, Tatars, Kazakhs, Kalmyks). This is not an ethnic group and not a social class, but driven peasants, resettled from different places, recruited into the service (of the colonial authorities) for the opportunity to rob the local population, to receive a plot of land.

4.7 Who Raised the Industry in Kazakhstan and for Whom Was It Raised? Does the imposed myth that the Russians created industry for the Kazakhs make us think about its origins and foundations? The Russian Empire began industrialization only after 1861. Russia of that period exported raw materials and agricultural products, and in this respect did not go

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far from the Steppe. Since 1861, the Russian Empire pursued a targeted policy to attract foreign investment. In the south of Russia, the first metallurgical plants appeared in the 1870s on the basis of workshops owned by German citizens, specializing in the production of agricultural implements and machines (Shcherbakov 2002). Since the 1880s, the French and Belgian capital had been actively involved in the development of the South Russian steel and coal industries, mechanical engineering, metalworking, and urban transport. British investors invested in the textile industry and extractive industries. German capital was invested in the electrical and chemical industries, in the field of mechanical engineering, coal, and steel industries respectively. The French were engaged in the production of cement, mining, and smelting of copper, and also worked in water supply and sewerage enterprises. The development of oil fields, the development of mines began in Russia and Kazakhstan at about the same time, and this was mainly done by foreign companies. “Researcher B.F. Brandt in a number of his works emphasizes that the successful development of the oil industry in Russia since the mid. 70s XIX century, is associated exclusively with the activities of Robert Nobel… Starting from 1886, the French banking house ‘The Rothschild Brothers’ began to take an active part in the development of the industry in the form of direct investment, which bought shares of the Caspian-Black Sea Oil and Trade Society” (Bekmakhanova 1986: 11). In the Caspian Sea, companies with foreign participation (British, German, French) were represented in the oil industry: the Ural-Caspian Oil Society, Emba-Caspian, Nobel Brothers Partnership, Emba, Ural Oil, etc. In 1899, an oil gusher gushed at the Karashungul field being developed by the Nobels. In 1911, the British “Ural-Caspian Oil Society” began deep drilling at Dossor, Makat, and Isken. The extraction of 17,000 tons of oil from a depth of 225–226 meters and its specific gravity of 0.866 was the reason for the issuance of shares on the stock exchange in London for 5 million pounds, intended for the development of Caspian oil. Enterprises in the coal, oil, and copper ore industries of Kazakhstan were created mainly at the expense of foreign capital and foreign entrepreneurs. Russian industrialists directed their capital mainly to factory enterprises for the processing of agricultural raw materials and to trade. At the end of the nineteenth century, mining, which had been in crisis and stagnant, began to pass into the hands of foreign capital. The Karaganda field was sold to the French and finally to the British.

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Company was established to operate the copper smelter of the Spaso-Voskresensky and Uspensky copper mines. In the Altai mining district, gold deposits were developed by the Americans. The Austrian prince Turn-Takme owned deposits of non-ferrous ores in Ridder and Zyryanovsk. In Karaganda and Ridder, the British Urquhart and Lessing were engaged in mining. The oil fields in Guriev belonged to the Frenchman Nobel (Bekmakhanova 1986: 193–194). Foreigners created industry for the Russian Empire. It is inappropriate to say that the Russians raised the industry for the Kazakhs. Industrial enterprises were created by foreigners Both in Russia and in Kazakhstan in one era. “From the beginning of the twentieth century. There had been a steady increase in the number of foreign companies. In the period from 1869 to 1896, 71 foreign enterprises had been registered in Russia and by the beginning of the twentieth century, according to official data, there had been 136 enterprises created by foreign entrepreneurs in the country. By 1914, over 300 of them operated in the Russian Empire. At the same time, 170 of them were established between 1901 and 1914. Foreign investors played an active role in the activities of 1,232 joint ventures” (Tsechoeva 2012). Thus, for example, in 1868 in Tyumen, an English citizen G.E. Wardropper founded an iron foundry. Here, another iron foundry was founded in 1863 by the Englishman E.E. Gullet. It produced steam engines, assembled steamships and barges, manufactured equipment for mills, mines, distilleries and sawmills. Foreign capital was channeled into the sphere of trade, in particular, into the sale of agricultural machinery and the purchase of agricultural products. However, mainly, in the mining industry, in the marine industries in the Far East and the construction of railways. Half of the agricultural machines sold in Siberia fell to the share of the American “International Harvesting Machinery Company” (Vasilyeva 2004). In the mining industry of Siberia, there were 30 purely foreign enterprises, 10 Russian-foreign joint-stock companies, 18 foreign joint-stock companies (of which 17 were English), and 6 Russian joint-stock companies with the participation of foreign capital. Swiss-born industrialists, the Stuck brothers, participated in the financing of cheese factories in Altai. The first place in terms of investment was occupied by British capital, operating in mining, butter-making, river navigation, and forestry. American investors acted together with the British in the mining of the

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Steppe region, occupied a dominant position in the trade in agricultural machinery, and invested in railway construction and other industries (Goryushkin 1995). With the outbreak of the First World War, the activities of foreign entrepreneurs in Russia were limited. Since 1915, the government began a liquidation policy against German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Turkish enterprises. During the revolution, the Soviet authorities nationalized the property of foreign companies located in Russia. In response, a boycott followed: a refusal to buy Soviet gold, issue loans against it, and transport Soviet goods. After the revolution and civil war, the country was destroyed, and the government was forced to turn to foreign companies for help. Could the Bolsheviks in the Soviet period raise the industry of Kazakhstan? Let us consider this question. During the NEP period, a number of enterprises were leased to foreign firms in the form of a concession (sometimes by the same ones from whom they were nationalized). According to E. Sutton, as of 1925–1926, 330 concessions of the first (i.e. without acquiring ownership rights) and second types (“mixed” in the ratio: 50 × 50, later 51 × 49) were granted, as well as in the period 1929–1930s—134 concessions of the third, purely Soviet type (a contract for technical assistance, i.e. the sale of knowledge, technical patents, design solutions, technology transfer) (Sutton 2017). Later, these profitable enterprises were nationalized by the communists. It is important that the concessions covered almost all sectors of the economy; new technologies and methods of work were introduced. Let us turn to the information of E. Sutton: “All Soviet truck production technology and a significant part of Soviet truck production equipment came from the West, mainly from the United States. Although some elementary production lines and individual machine tools and machines for the production of automobiles are made in the Soviet Union, they are copies of Western machine tools and machines and are always outdated in their design… Many large American firms played an important role in the creation of the Soviet production of trucks. Ford Motor Company, A.J. Brandt Company, Austin Company, General Electric, Swindell-Dressier, and others provided technical assistance, designs, and sold equipment… The first group used models, technical assistance, and parts and components from the Ford-built Gorky Automobile Plant (GAS is the designation of the model). The second group of plants used models, parts, and components of the A.J. Brandt restored ZIL plant

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in Moscow… Therefore, this plant was called the BBH-ZIL plant after these three companies involved in its reconstruction and expansion in the 1930s: A. J. Brandt, Budd, and the Hamilton Foundry” (Sutton 2017: 30). “In 1929, the old Miemza concession factory, a former tsarist factory, received complete equipment from the Ansonia Clock Company of New York … This factory became the Second State Moscow Watch Factory (MChZ), which began operating due to American and German engineers, and was adapted to production of military products” (Sutton 2017: 52). “In 1920, the entire Deuber-Hampton Company plant in Canton, Ohio, was transferred to the Soviet Union and put into production by forty American engineers and technicians. Until 1930, all watch components used in the Soviet Union were imported from the USA and Switzerland. These new manufacturing facilities of American origin made possible the production of fuses and precision gears for military purposes” (Sutton 2017: 51). This book by E. Sutton contains information about American deliveries until the mid.-1980s. In the 1940s, Soviet industry was given the opportunity to modernize through Lend-Lease. “Since 1943, metals began to arrive in significant quantities from abroad. The resulting lead was 54% of domestic production, zinc—50%, molybdenum—186%, nickel—49%, aluminum—56%, tungsten—110%, rolled brass—114%… In 1943, the national economy was shipped 11,418 metal cutting machines received from abroad, a significant part of which was universal for small and medium machine building and special for aircraft construction and ammunition production. The percentage of imports to domestic production of machine tools was 55%, presses—103%, hammers—239%… Largely due to the supply of the rails, the railway track in the western part of the country was restored. In 1943, 109 thousand were imported, which accounted for 95% of the domestic production of rails that year, next year—267 thousand tons, 3 times more railway rails than the Soviet industry produced. Along with the supply of raw materials and supplies, the Soviet Union received various types of weapons, military equipment and equipment. In total, by the middle of 1945, the Red Army received 312.6 thousand foreign-made vehicles… The most numerous class of ships that came under Lend-Lease were torpedo boats. 78 boats of the ‘Higgins’ and ‘Vosper’ types took an active part in the hostilities at the final stage of the war. In total, during the war years, sailors from the Far East received

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128 ships in US ports… Soviet specialists had the opportunity to get familiar with modern designs, some technical solutions became the basis for domestic developments” (Laptev 2004). The next stage of industrialization in the USSR was carried out at the expense of reparations. Germany paid them with material, intellectual and labor resources. According to the historian M.I. Semiryaga, 2885 different factories and plants, 96 power plants, about 340 thousand various machine tools, 200 thousand electric motors, various scientific and laboratory equipment, steam locomotives and wagons, civil and military ships, equipment for the Central telephone exchange of Moscow, which functioned until the 1980s. Military plants were exported: the production of toxic substances, synthetic materials, chemical and metalworking plants, car building, and repair. In addition, machines for the production of gramophone records, woodworking and cheese-making, weaving, cement, and other industries were also taken out. Advanced technological lines and entire production facilities with technical documentation were exported from Germany to the USSR. For example, the factories of the German firms “Telefunken”, “Lorenz”, “Osram”, “Koch and Sterzel”, “Radio-Mende”, etc. Large tank, artillery, and shipbuilding plants, as well as factories for the production of ammunition and military engineering were transported technology. For example, specialized shipyards in Bremen and Stettin and factories for the production of torpedoes, engines, and submarine fire control systems were dismantled. M. Semiryaga (1995) emphasizes that the restoration of the Dneproges and other power plants in record time became possible thanks to almost 100 power plants exported from Germany. Factories were exported that produced products that were not produced in the Soviet Union: perlon, rayon, and synthetic rubber. Altogether in Germany, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Manchuria, more than 4000 industrial enterprises were dismantled and exported to the USSR. According to the historian M. Semirayga, equipment for the Central telephone exchange of Moscow, which functioned until the 1980s. In addition, 1337 German enterprises were dismantled and removed from Poland, 206 from Austria, 54 from Czechoslovakia, 11 from Hungary. In total, 1,118,000 thousand pieces of equipment were received. Military plants were exported: the production of toxic substances, synthetic materials, chemical and metalworking plants, car building, and

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repair. In addition, machines for the production of gramophone records, woodworking and cheese-making, weaving, cement, and other industries were also taken out. In total, the USSR completely or partially dismantled and removed 4389 enterprises. According to M. I. Semiryaga, in 1945 there were 570– 580 thousand machine tools in the USSR, and a significant part of them were obsolete. The USSR itself produced only 290 thousand machine tools in the 1946–1950s. Thanks to the machine tools exported from Germany in the early 1950s, the fleet amounted to 1 million 507 pieces. The Soviet Union did not have scientists and technical personnel of such qualifications who could work on German equipment, with technical documentation, and continue scientific research and technical development. Therefore, about 200 scientific and technical bureaus, fifty experimental workshops and laboratories were created in the Soviet zone of Germany. Thousands of German scientists, engineers and technicians worked in them. In July 1946, a total of more than 14,000 Soviet scientists and engineers arrived in Germany to study the experience of their German colleagues. In the period from May 1945 to September 1947, several thousand (data vary) German specialists, along with their families, were taken to the USSR. Among them: nuclear scientists, rocket scientists, chemists, aircraft builders, opticians. These specialists were returned to Germany from the end of 1949 until 1958. To give an idea of the scale of intellectual “assistance” in the development of Soviet production, we list only a few figures: 300 scientists and specialists who participated in the nuclear program of the Third Reich; about 800 “Junkers” and BMW engineers and technicians, 6000 rocket science technicians, approximately 4000 submarine design and construction specialists; 16 German weapons designers (among them Hugo Schmeisser). Thus, the idea of who created the industry in Russia becomes obvious. Perhaps in Kazakhstan, with the help of foreign capital, industry was created by the hands of Russian workers? Let us consider as an example the number of workers at industrial enterprises of Kazakhstan in the tsarist period and the period of the USSR (before the Kazakhs were forced out of the industry to employ immigrants). The “Report on the activities of private mining in the Semipalatinsk region in 1860” states that in the number of employees and workers was 1200 people in the gold mines of this area, namely from the Great Russian provinces—11 people; from the Siberian provinces—1189

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people, including: male burghers—66, female burghers—14, male peasants—6, female peasants—2, male commoners—2, Kazakhs male—1084. Those Kazakhs made up 90.3% of the total number of workers and employees in the gold mines in the Semipalatinsk region in 1860 (Report on the activity of the private mining industry in the Semipalatinsk region 1860). On August 19, 1854, 13 pits were drilled in the upper reaches of the Karaganda, Bokpa-Karasu, Kokpekty and Maikuduk rivers. Owners: Ushakov, then Ryazanov. The first workers were recruited in the Urals from among the serfs. In 1857 there were 27 of them, and Kazakhs—25 people. 1862: from Russia—74 workers, Kazakhs—117 (almost 1.5 times more). In 1879, out of 245 miners, Kazakhs made up 196 people, in 1885 Kazakhs increased to 238 people (Russian workers—60 people). In addition to these Kazakhs employed in coal mining, the Kazakh population (100%) was engaged in the transportation of goods between the Spassky plant, Karaganda, the Uspensky mine, and to the railway in Petropavlovsk. From 1886 to 1896, mining was suspended. After the resumption of production at the Ryazanov fields, work was still carried out using the old methods. 170 miners worked at the Uspensky mine, including 164 Kazakhs (96%). 522 people worked at the Karaganda mine, 496 of them were Kazakhs (95%). At the Spassky plant, the number of workers is 202, of which 143 are Kazakhs (71%). In July 1904, the mines of Uspenka, Spassk, and Karaganda were leased and then sold to the French, who almost immediately resold the coal mines, the Uspensky mine, and the copper smelter to the British. In September 1904, six British and American engineers arrived in Karaganda and Spassk. In October 1904, Frank reported: “1,300 people have been hired, and there will be about 2,500 with contractors. We have 500 wagons and 1,000 oxen to transport coal and ore, and in winter there will be 600 camels”. Contractors were carriers (Kazakhs) on oxen and camels, and their number was more than 1000 people. Spassk had 3000 inhabitants in 1914–1916. Among the employees, there are 1500 Kazakhs and 300 Russians. The workers, as a rule, were Kazakhs, and the masters, assistants, foremen were Russians. Were the Russians perhaps better prepared for technical work?

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From Fell’s memoirs: “A Russian character of a high standard: patient, polite, respectful, sympathetic and not malicious… The main drawback is uncontrollable drunkenness from moonshine full of fusel oils to cologne and formalin. Another serious shortcoming is the lack of purposefulness. If a Russian promises to fulfill your request ‘now’, then it will be tomorrow, and if he says ‘tomorrow’, then it will never be fulfilled” (Popov 2015). From Wardell’s memoirs: “About 120 people worked in Sary Su, of which 20 were Russians. They were hired as employees, foremen, artisans. As a rule, they were not very educated. But, in their own opinion, usually the Russian knew everything and was offended when something was explained to him. After a detailed briefing, he often did something completely different, being sure that he knew better than his instructor, or that the instructor meant something completely different from what he said. Being very sociable, he liked to spend a lot of working time idling and smoking with his friends” (Popov 2015). In the years following the revolution, industry in the region almost did not develop. In the 1930s, along with the local population, they began to involve prisoners in the mines; in the 1940s—prisoners of war (for example, the prisoners of war of the Spassky camp put into operation mines No. 105, 106, 38 (with an enrichment plant), they also participated in the construction of the mine named after Kostenko). By the way, the trust “Karagandaugol” received under Lend-Lease 3 electric excavators of the company “Bikiras Eri”. The operation of one such excavator made it possible to extract 100 wagons of coal per day. In the post-war years, a policy of ousting and not hiring Kazakhs and some representatives of deported peoples was carried out in the mines (due to which it was possible to survive in the post-war famine). Heads of mines, directors of collective farms prevented the employment of male migrants: Ingush, Chechens, etc. (Special settlers of the Karaganda region: Collection of documents and materials 2007). Another example is the Kounrad deposit and the Balkhash copper smelter. Since 1931, American engineers worked and came to consult in Balkhash. The names of Howard, Beale, Calder, Mürherter, and Oxnom are mentioned. “Until 1934, most of the work, including the most laborintensive earthworks, was done by hand. In 1933, the construction site had only one winch, one belt conveyor, one stone crusher, one gravel washer. The first steam excavators, cranes, concrete mixers began to arrive at the beginning of 1934, and then in limited quantities …” (Pinegina

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1963: 43–44). “The problem of providing personnel for engineering and technical workers turned out to be especially difficult… Indeed, in 1930, the entire non-ferrous metallurgy industry of the USSR had 346 engineers and 458 technicians” (Pinegina 1963: 69). In 1932, Kazakhs made up 77.5% of the workers at the plant. This percentage increased significantly due to the fact that the Kazakhs who lived around Balkhash were left without livestock and arrived at the plant in large quantities. A small percentage of workers are Komsomol workers who arrived on the order from enterprises in Ukraine and Russia. In addition, the labor of KarLag prisoners was used. After the end of the war, the labor of prisoners of war was also used at the industrial facilities of Balkhash. Thanks to lend-lease during WWII, 50 American “Armstrong”, “Jill” and German “Menk-Gambork” drilling rigs, a “Bucyrus” excavator, “Studebaker”, “Willis”, “Dodge” vehicles appeared at the Kounrad mine. American crushers “Makkuli” functioned at the Balkhash plant (Popov 2010). Before Lend-Lease, since 1936, the first Soviet heavy excavator M-IV-E (Uralmashzavod) was used at the mine, the prototype of which was the American Marion excavator. In the light of even a very brief statement, the myth that “the Russians raised industry for the Kazakhs, built factories and factories” is ridiculous. The technical, intellectual component was provided by the West, human resources—at first for the most part by the Kazakhs themselves, later—by prisoners, prisoners of war, deportees, etc. Shouldn’t we admit that the industry in the Russian Empire and the USSR was created and modernized by the West? I hope that answers will be found to questions about how much raw materials were exported from Kazakhstan during the Soviet period in exchange for the fact that Russia shared the industries it inherited from the West or left evacuated enterprises in Kazakhstan, since it itself was modernized at the expense of industries exported from Germany; where did the “stuffing” of the plants and factories located in Kazakhstan go after the collapse of the Union, with whose permission the “red directors” removed the equipment. After 1991, many enterprises were dismantled and taken to Russia under the leadership of the so-called “red directors”, who during the Soviet period were appointed by Moscow. Almost 50% of Kazakhstan’s industry was under the jurisdiction of the union ministries. The enterprises employed mainly residents of industrial centers, among which the

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percentage of Kazakhs was negligible. Therefore, the training of national personnel was limited. The issue of environmental protection did not bother anyone, the air was polluted, and the number of patients with silicosis and other occupational diseases was growing rapidly. Environmental consequences affected almost all industrial regions of Kazakhstan. Add to this are the plight of the Semipalatinsk test site, the drying up Aral Sea, and Lake Balkhash. Kazakhstan was a raw material appendage of the USSR. It remains in this position to this day.

4.8

Who Were Cities in Kazakhstan Built for and Who For?

The well-known neglect of the authorities to the issues of nation-building, the consolidation of a civil nation, has led to the fact that until now the interpretation of many issues of our recent historical past has become a stumbling block, sometimes widening the gap between individual representatives of different ethnic groups. The situation is aggravated by the promotion of the propaganda of the northern neighbor, reanimating and promoting the old myths about the bright, blissful Soviet reality and the unparalleled equality of peoples. However, through the pathetic rhetoric, voluntarily or involuntarily, slips the imperial spirit, a claim to paternalism and almost a demand for gratitude from the Kazakhs. In the heat of discussions, common stereotypes are used about the benefits that the Soviet government allegedly brought to the Kazakhs. Among other “gifts”, “cities built for the Kazakhs” are mentioned. Let us consider a myth that sounds like this: “We have built cities for you”. The invariably used form of the first-person plural pronoun “we” is quite eloquent. By “we” probably refers to those who still live in the USSR, and not in today’s Kazakhstan. Contrasting one’s group (“we”) with others (“you”) indicates positioning oneself as a separate subject, not related to those to whom the message is addressed. The wording “we built cities for you” contains a certain intention: to remind about the service/assistance rendered, to achieve gratitude, to position oneself as a benefactor, an older brother (read, imperial), bringing the benefit of the colonized people. The statement, as a rule, is used by “Soviet people” as an allegedly indisputable argument when their opponents try to present a different view of what happened during the years of Soviet power, which is painfully

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perceived by some of our compatriots (or not compatriots?). At the same time, it is about the same facts of the past, in which nothing new has appeared (this will not happen before the opening of the archives), but new interpretations, different from the propaganda-Soviet ones, cause sharp rejection. Any discussion is useful in that it gives rise to new meanings, which is especially valuable for a society that for a long time was imposed on the only, ideologically correct reading of the reality phenomena. A rudiment of the Soviet past: not only should the opinion be the same for everyone but it must also be necessarily “Soviet”. It is so colonial: not recognizing the voice of the other, not wanting to know that he, who was colonized in the past, has his own view of the recent past. Let us turn to the cities that appeared in the Steppe during the period of colonization and Soviet power: who built them and for whom? It should be noted that the Russian Empire built fortresses on the territory of Kazakhstan, which were strongholds of tsarism, served as outposts of colonialism, and were inhabited by the Cossacks. Then, next to the fortresses and under their protection, villages of settlers arose. Merchants who traded with the Steppe built their houses in the fortresses. Merchants, Cossacks, and settlers (in Uralsk, Karkaralinsk, Semipalatinsk, Verny, etc.) built houses exclusively for themselves. The tsarist administration built administrative buildings for a few officials, as well as adobe buildings for schools and prisons. These “cities” were settlements with several stone or wooden private houses, cathedrals, and mosques, and otherwise differed little from large villages and Cossack villages. Thus, for example, in Uralsk, city buildings (mansions, a church) were erected in 1821–1831 by the Italian Michele Delmedino and in 1831–1842 by the German Heinrich Gopius; in Verny at the end of the nineteenth century—the beginning of the twentieth century, several city buildings appeared, which were built by A.P. Zenkov, Frenchman Paul Gourde, K. Borisoglebsky; in Karkaralinsk in 1849–1853 a two-storey mosque was erected; in Semipalatinsk—mosques, a cathedral, a church, merchants’ mansions. Mosques and churches were built with donations. Consider the example of the birth of an industrial city (not on the basis of a fortress or a Cossack village). At the beginning of the twentieth century, 10 stone and adobe barrack houses were built in Karaganda for workers, employees, and a police officer. Kazakhs working in industry lived in yurts or dugouts. The first three brick houses made of baked red clay in Karaganda were built by the British in 1907–1909. They housed

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the administration of coal mines, a hospital, a school, and rooms for employees. In addition to these three buildings, the British built in Karaganda the first railway (narrow gauge) for industrial needs, 40 kilometers long: Karaganda—Spassk (Popov 2015). In the first decades of Soviet rule, barracks were built exclusively in industrial centers, whose population grew due to the attraction of labor to the mines and mines. In 1930, during the period of the resumption of active coal mining by exiled (dispossessed) citizens, the creation of temporary dwellings such as adobe semi-dugouts began. The construction of urban-type houses began in Karaganda, when prisoners of war appeared: Germans, Japanese, Baltics, etc. For example, by the forces of prisoners of War of the Spassky camp No. 99 were built and commissioned a trauma hospital, a summer theater and residential buildings in Karaganda (many are still standing). They also participated in the construction of the Palace of Miners, the city tram line, asphalted highways, etc. Another example: Balkhash. In 1931, on the eastern shore of Bertys Bay, the first house made of reeds (construction management and hospital) appeared against the backdrop of hundreds of Kazakh yurts. In the summer of the same year—several adobe barracks. The entire coast was dotted with dugouts, and this settlement was called Kopay-gorod. The depth of the dugouts ranged from 0.5 to 1.5 meters. Middle-class people built low walls above the ground made of adobe bricks (reeds and clay), boards, and other improvised building materials. Basically, dugouts were completely dug out in the ground and were covered with wood from above. In 1933, the first hospital with 50 beds was opened. In 1935, a bakery, a bath and laundry plant, and a club were put into operation. Around the construction site of the future plant, several workers’ settlements grew up: Severny, Central, Naberezhny, numbering up to a hundred barracks. Barracks remained the main type of building. Back in 1935, it was considered good luck if only 2 families lived in one room of the barracks. The barracks were liquidated only in the early 1980s. In January 1936, the first multi-storey building was put into operation in Balkhash (the population of the city at that time was 30 thousand people). City houses in Balkhash and Kounrad began to be built by the forces of prisoners of war in December 1945. City houses began to be massively built only in the 1960s. In 1958, a major reconstruction of the plant

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began. People began to come to Balkhash (to the copper-smelting plant and construction) to earn money, including former (more precisely, failed) virgin lands. The housing problem was acute. Back in the late 1920s, Soviet architects studied the experience of the German architect Ernst May: “…in 1927, in order to study the experience of housing construction of individual quarters and entire workers’ settlements, a delegation of representatives of a number of large Soviet construction organizations that were at that time sent to Germany the main developers of housing for workers…—typified and standardized mass development, both in terms of planning solutions, and in terms of structures and installation method” (Konysheva et al. 2011). Ernst May came to the USSR in 1930 as a designer, an expert, and also gave numerous lectures to architects. After his arrival, in a short time, “building plans for a dozen socialist cities are being prepared: Shcheglovsk, Kuznetsk, Leninsk, Prokopyevsk, Magnitogorsk, Stalingrad, Nizhny Novgorod Avtostroy, Karaganda, etc.” However, the German architect was faced with the limited technical and technological capabilities of the customer country. A year after the departure of E. May from the USSR, in 1933–1934, he will be criticized for “‘too simplified’, too ‘functional’ architecture, reproached for the ‘dullness of line building’ that damages the ‘artistic design of the city’… He will be condemned for refusing to apply the artistic-imaginative tracing-paper of forms of classical architecture introduced from above, for the fundamental unwillingness to design the perimeter development of quarters, for the refusal to create ‘architectural ensembles’, etc.” (Konysheva et al. 2011). Despite this, the idea of cheap panel housing for workers returned in 1954, when it was decided to abandon the construction of expensive “stalinok”, the construction of which N. Khrushchev considered wasteful. In 1959, Soviet architects visited Le Havre to study the French experience in the construction of panel houses (engineer R. Camus, designer O. Perret). A contract was signed with Camus for the supply of a panel production line. Soviet architects simplified the “Camus system”, and so the notorious “Khrushchev” was born. S.O. Khan-Magomedov notes that Khrushchev “helped break the stereotype of the communal apartment, which caused bewilderment among those foreigners who first learned about this phenomenon of ours”. Also: “Then (starting from the 1960s) it was a social revolution. Many thousands of families discovered for the first time that the forced uniting of several families in an apartment,

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which is characteristic of our country, is not a natural organization of the household, but an abnormal interference in the structure of family life” (Khan-Magomedov 2006). In 1960, throughout the Union, they began to massively build “Khrushchevs”—the dream of a Soviet person (“Stalins” were intended for the party nomenklatura and other Soviet elites). It was then that the city residents of the barracks began to be given apartments, which makes them nostalgic today. Thus, many towns proper (rather than barrack-and-adobe settlements) began to be built in the 1960s; it was during the period when the Kazakh population was not the largest part of the population of the republic, and much smaller—among the inhabitants of cities. V.V. Kozina points out: “In 1959, the degree of urbanization of the two main ethnic groups in the region (Kazakhs and Russians) had opposite trends… The share of Kazakhs in the population of cities began to be only 12.7%, while in rural areas—42.1%. On the contrary, Russians made up the majority of urban residents—52.3%, in the countryside their share was 29.6%. Urbanization trends were observed among all other ethnic groups inhabiting Central Kazakhstan, except for the Germans, whose share among the inhabitants of urban and rural settlements was 10.5 and 12.2%, respectively” (Kozina 2010: 16). Khan-Magomedov S.O. points out that “in the 1950s, the housing crisis became even more aggravated due to the fact that a stream of collective farmers who received passports and were looking for work poured into the cities—the problem of limited workers arose” (KhanMagomedov 2006). The issue, as has happened more than once, was resolved by resettling people in Kazakhstan, away from the cities of the western part of the USSR. Of the 2 million people who arrived in the virgin lands in the period from 1954 to 1962, after the failure of the virgin epic, some moved to cities where it was possible to make good money at industrial enterprises. “At the same time, the organizational recruitment of labor for industrial enterprises of Kazakhstan continued. For 1954–1960 more than 300 thousand people arrived from outside the republic, and in 1961–1965 ‘orgnabor’ grew to 500 thousand people… In 1965–1975 another 115 thousand people arrived in Kazakhstan for industrial facilities” (Kuzembayuly and Abil 2006: 322). They became residents of the cities under construction. Kazakh youth were encouraged to stay and work in the countryside.

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So for whom were cities built in Kazakhstan and who lived in them? It should be emphasized that the cities (residential buildings, objects of culture and life, roads, etc.), in which the vast majority of the Kazakhs did not live, were built at the expense of the bowels of the Kazakh land. Apartments were given to those who lived and worked in the city. Those who received apartments, leaving the country in the 1990–2010s, sold them to the Kazakhs. Thus, the Kazakhs paid twice for apartments in the cities: the first time—during their construction at the expense of the republic, and the second time—from their own pocket. For the most part, these apartments are “Khrushchev”, the term of operation of which expired just in time for the 2000–2010s.

4.9

Destroyed Virgin Land

Discussions about the Soviet past, which now and then arise in the vast Kazakh segment of the Internet, revive the rhetoric of Soviet newspapers, which hid failures, blunders, and mistakes behind victorious reports. This vicious practice is used today by the current government, and in an even worse version, when the implementation of the next state program is simply stated without a report, demonstration of its results or analysis. One of the Soviet myths concerns the “virgin lands upturned”. This campaign is presented as a feat of the Soviet people and an undoubted boon for the Kazakhs. In fact, the scale of this grandiose adventure and the subsequent quick and no less massive failure can amaze anyone. But the stereotype about the “feat” is alive, everyone remembers the “billion poods of bread”, and the final result remained known only to a few initiates, therefore it was “modestly” silent about it. The consequences for Kazakhstan were also not advertised, which affected many aspects of the life of the Kazakhs and directly influenced the subsequent processes of forced cultural assimilation, the loss of language, and the negative transformation of national identity. In 1949, an agricultural development plan was adopted, and in 1954, the development of virgin lands began. J.Sh. Shayakhmetov was skeptical about Khrushchev’s policy of raising virgin lands, noting that the creation of a grain economy would be carried out at the expense of the decline in animal husbandry in the republic, i.e. plowing large areas will damage livestock. “Faced with a ‘misunderstanding’ of his idea about the development of virgin lands by Shayakhmetov and members of the Bureau of the Central

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Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, and then with open ‘sabotage’ of his instructions, Khrushchev began to act in the old apparatus way: at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of this republic, and then at the congress, he ostracized dissidents, replaced Kazakhstani leaders as soon as possible, and in violation of the established canons, he did not even nominate representatives of the indigenous nationality to these posts: Belarusian P.K. Ponomarenko (first secretary) and who replaced I.I. Afonova Ukrainian L.I. Brezhnev (Second Secretary)” (Zelenin 1998). The II Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, held in July 1954, was also attended by the Minister of Agriculture of Latvia A.A. Nikonov (future authoritative agricultural economist, director of the Agrarian Institute of the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences). He noted: “Just elected to the post of first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan… lashed out at Kazakh soil scientists, accusing them of nationalism for presenting such a soil map, from which it follows: not all virgin lands can be plowed… Following thoughtless commands, we will soon get an explosion of dust storms, we will lose the arable layer over vast areas”. Later he summed up: “The process of developing virgin lands went rapidly, all the structures of the party, the Komsomol and the state were included in it, but in this euphoria, the voice of scientists, unfortunately, drowned, which played an ominous role: nature always avenges violence against it… And you just had to listen to the soil scientists. They know the land better than Komsomol and party workers” (Zelenin 1998). S.Sh. Kaziev points out: “Ponomarenko sharply criticized Kazakh soil scientists for their criticism of virgin plowing, accusing them of nationalism… Local regional party leaders were also attacked for their lack of zeal in implementing Khrushchev’s program. During the three months that followed the February Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, all six former regional leaders of the virgin regions were removed from their posts” (Kaziev 2014: 57–58). In the first years of the development of virgin lands, the results were impressive: in 1954, the USSR collected 85.5 million tons of grain (including 27.1 million tons from virgin lands), and in 1960 already 125 million tons (including 58.7 million tons). In total, over the years of developing virgin lands in Kazakhstan, more than 597.5 million tons of grain were produced.

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However, after a few years, the productivity of virgin lands dropped sharply. To hide the failure of the plans of the sixth five-year plan (1956– 1960), a seven-year plan was planned (1959–1965), the tasks and plans of which also failed to be fulfilled. With the planned production growth of 70%, the real growth was only 15%. At first, it was supposed to develop 13 million hectares of land. However, in pursuit of high performance, vast territories were plowed up: “By August 1954, 6.5 million hectares were plowed in Kazakhstan. By the beginning of 1955, the area of cultivated land had grown by 8.5 million hectares, and 90 new state farms were created. In total, during the years of virgin lands development (1954–1960), 25.5 million hectares were plowed” (Kuzembayuly and Abil 2006: 317). The lack of a scientific approach to the issue led to negative consequences. The plowing of vast territories has led to a violation of the ecological balance. Soil erosion increased, and humus was weathered. In addition, pastures have been significantly reduced, leading to a shortage of meat and dairy products. Similar barbarous exploitation of the land has already happened in Kazakhstan during the period of resettlement under the Stolypin reform. A.A. Kaufman wrote that the settlers rapaciously used the natural fertility of the virgin lands. So, the peasants plowed the virgin land for 3–4 years, until it gave a good harvest, then they abandoned the plowed land and moved to a new plot. So, using the fertile virgin lands, squeezing all the juice out of it, and spending a minimum of effort, the settlers quickly left the areas allocated to them and moved further deep into the steppes. After such “managing”, there were huge wastelands overgrown with weeds. That is why the settlers opposed the allocation of permanent allotments to them, trying to grab a new piece of virgin land. That is, on a disproportionately large scale, Khrushchev did the same thing that the first settlers did with the land: for several years they harvested rich land and left it, gradually overgrown with weeds (not a cultivated field and no longer a pasture). Khrushchev wanted to get “as much bread as possible, but also spend as little time as possible getting this bread”. As a result of the monstrous use of virgin lands, many lands were withdrawn from economic circulation for 20–30 years. During the first 5-year period, 25% of all funds allocated in the USSR for agriculture (about 20 billion rubles) were directed to the uplift of virgin lands in Kazakhstan, Siberia, the Urals, and the Volga region. In

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the early years, the harvest was often lost due to the lack of granaries and elevators. After 2–3 years from the beginning of the virgin lands, indignation began to be heard due to working and living conditions: the lack of roads and social infrastructure, the lack of normal housing and cultural institutions. Already in 1962–1963, the efficiency of arable land cultivation fell sharply; in lean years, even the sowing fund could not be collected. In addition, as a result of violation of the ecological balance and soil erosion in 1962–1963 dust storms were commonplace. In 1965, the virgin epic quietly ended. By the way, having a vast territory, but in the absence of a competent approach, the USSR bought grain throughout its history. So, for example, in 1960, 200 thousand tons of grain were bought (due to the sale of 17.8 million tons of oil); over a 10-year period (1976–1985), more than 308 million tons were purchased for more than 50 billion dollars; in 1985— 44.2 million tons of grain (also thanks to the export of 117 million tons of oil). How did the brief virgin epic affect the demography of Kazakhstan? “The Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU developed a project for the resettlement of 50 thousand families in the republic, but these plans were overfulfilled in a short time. Only from Moscow and the Moscow region, 54 thousand people arrived in Kazakhstan, from Ukraine—93 thousand, from Belarus—more than 100 thousand people. From 1954 to 1962, more than 119.5 thousand families arrived from the Western republics. Most of the settlers arrived in the northern regions, in which the mechanical population growth amounted to 83% from 1939 to 1959. The population of the Tselinograd region from 1953 to 1955 increased 96 times, Kustanai—26 times. In total, in 1954–1962, about 2 million people arrived in the virgin lands” (Kuzembayuly and Abil 2006: 321–322). From 1939 to 1959, the population of the republic increased by 3 million 216 thousand people (52.8%) and amounted to 9 million 295 thousand people (mechanical population growth in 1959 alone was 83%). If during this period the population of the USSR grew by 9.5%, then in Kazakhstan—by 52.8%. According to V.I. Kotov, of the 2 million who arrived in the Kazakh SSR, the main part was from the RSFSR (69.3%), Ukraine (21.3%), and Belarus (4.3%) (Kotov 2001).

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Along with qualified machine operators and Komsomol volunteers, hunters for the “long ruble”, demobilized youth from the army, representatives of the underworld (arrested during raids in Odessa “raspberries”), and former prisoners came to develop the virgin lands. Under what conditions did the virgin land volunteers come? They were delivered to their destination free of charge, provided financial assistance in the amount of 500–1000 rubles for a family and 150–200 rubles for each of its members. They issued loans for housing construction (35% of this amount was repaid at the expense of the state) and the purchase of livestock. In addition, virgin lands were exempted from agricultural tax for a period of 2–5 years. In addition, in the second half of the 1950s, those who left their homeland during the years of the civil war and collectivization were allowed to return. About 200 thousand people entered from China (East Turkestan and Harbin), most of whom were Kazakhs. Among other nationalities were Russians, Tatars, Dungans, and Uighurs. According to the 1959 census, there were 2 million 787 thousand Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, i.e. only 30% of the total population of the republic. In addition to virgin lands, more than 300 thousand people arrived in 1954–1960 to work at industrial enterprises of Kazakhstan; in 1961– 1965—500 thousand people; in 1965–1975—115 thousand people (Kuzembayuly and Abil 2006: 322). Only by the mid-1970s did the flow of immigrants begin to weaken. There has been an increase in the Kazakh population. And at the same time, the reverse migration to the western republics of the USSR, where a demographic decline was recorded, began to pick up pace. So, in 1970, 35 thousand people left Kazakhstan. Their number grew, reaching 95 thousand people in 1988. Thus, the departure from Kazakhstan took place even before the collapse of the Union, and on a significant scale. What were, so to speak, the intangible, immeasurable in numbers consequences of the virgin lands? National features in the development of virgin lands were not taken into account. The virgin lands believed that they were going “to the desert where no man’s foot had set foot”, that they were “the first to develop vast areas of ownerless lands”. It has become the norm to disdain the Kazakhs, their language, traditions and culture. G. Azimbay notes that “The virgin epic and the great construction projects in Kazakhstan served as a powerful impetus for the deepening

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of colonization. A surge in colonization sentiments occurred during the period of development of virgin and fallow lands in Kazakhstan in 1954– 1956… However, an atmosphere of equality was not expected. The press is full of information about negative phenomena among the Kazakhs. The materials of the plenums of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Kazakhstan are full of harsh peremptory criticism of the Kazakhs. The interpretation of these phenomena was unequivocally patronage on the part of the Russian civilizing mission in relation to the unreasonable and backward Kazakhs, who, due to a number of shortcomings, should not manage either the fate of their land, or even their own fate” (Azimbay 2002). The collapse of the virgin adventure posed new tasks and required quick solutions in order to avoid the indignation of the huge mass of displaced and unsettled people. They rushed to cities where they could make good money (industry), get an apartment, etc. During this period, there was an increase in cities (“Khrushchev” began to appear by 1960) and their mass settlement by immigrants. The flight from the virgin lands and, in general, from state farms led to the need to use the labor of the army and townspeople in agriculture. So, for example, during the harvesting work in 1968, 16 thousand combine operators and several thousand military personnel were sent to Kazakhstan. The use of the labor of pupils and students (the so-called agricultural work) has become traditional. The virgin epic was reflected not only in the demographic situation in the republic, but also led to an aggressive policy of Russification of the Kazakhs under the slogan of creating an international society. However, internationalization was based on the reduction, infringement of the Kazakh language, and culture due to the dominance of the Russian language, planting the Russian mentality and traditions. As a result of a sharp increase in the Russian-speaking population, the situation of the Kazakh language and culture has deteriorated significantly. Before the influx of virgin lands, many representatives of different nations living in Kazakhstan spoke the Kazakh language. Now Kazakh newspapers have begun to close, the circulation of newspapers and books in the Kazakh language has decreased. In public places, in the economy, and in office work, the Russian language was used. There was a gradual reduction, narrowing of the scope of the Kazakh language. 95% of books and 70% of TV shows were published in Russian. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Russian language became the main language of the university and

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science, and a general reduction in the number of schools with the Kazakh language of instruction began. As a result, there was a situation when in the late 1970s–1980s, about a third of the Kazakhs did not know their native language. A national cultural catastrophe was approaching. Without exception, all the negative consequences of the Khrushchev adventure associated with virgin lands are still being felt.

4.10

“Golden Age” of the USSR, or Comes with Ice Cream

Concluding the conversation about imperial and Soviet false stereotypes, it should be emphasized that they could possibly have remained a kind of halo sanctifying the past, if not for the attempts to again draw us into a new dubious association, if not for the desire of the authorities to impose on us the practice of “soviet” in the form censorship, lies about imaginary achievements, punitive bodies, corruption, etc. It becomes dangerous to be deceived about the reality of the Soviet past, and it is fraught with the threat of falling back into colonial dependence and totalitarianism. Myths about a happy life in the USSR, designed to convince the independent republics to return to the bosom of Russia, are built on stamps about free apartments and vouchers to a sanatorium, delicious ice cream for 15 kopecks, friendship between peoples, and the absence of corruption. Let us leave out of the conversation the fact that those who are nostalgic for the USSR do not mention the famines, dekulakization, the Great Terror, totalitarianism, censorship, etc. Even the benefits and achievements of the USSR that they enumerate are built on the shaky foundation of Soviet and current Russian propaganda. The period loudly called the “golden age of the USSR” in fact contains only 20 years from the mid-1960s to 1987. I believe that it is about this time that today someone remembers today with nostalgia. It is this 20year period that is often defined as one of the brightest in the history of the USSR, when it reached its highest peak. It is difficult to argue with the fact that it really was “lighter” compared to previous years of wars, collectivization, famine, political repressions, deportations of peoples, etc. However, the question is of interest: what was its heyday? Describing this period, historians note “the absence of serious upheavals in the political life of the country”, as well as an increase in the level and quality of life of the country’s population. But what about the following: confrontation in the Cold War and the arms race associated

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with it, the Iron Curtain and ideological propaganda, the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia, and the war in Afghanistan? In addition, dozens of terrorist attacks, hijackings, protests, and the emigration of writers, doctors, musicians, athletes, etc. On August 21, 1947, a decree was issued on the formation of the Semipalatinsk test site. The Semipalatinsk nuclear test site functioned from 1949 to 1989. During this time, more than 450 tests were carried out, during which about 600 nuclear and thermonuclear devices were blown up. Of these, there were approximately 30 ground and at least 85 air. The total power of the charges dropped on the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site from 1949 to 1963 is 2200 times greater than the power of the atomic bomb dropped by the USA in 1945 on Hiroshima. The Semipalatinsk test site occupied a huge area of 18,500 square meters km (about 80 countries and city-states of the world have a smaller territory). It was known for the fact that the local population lived on its lands during all the years of testing, which was not allowed by any country in the world conducting nuclear tests. The consequences of this monstrous crime against the people are still felt today. With the advent of L. Brezhnev to power, the state security agencies stepped up the fight against dissent (the 1965 trial of Daniel-Sinyavsky and others). A decisive turn towards curtailing the remnants of the “thaw” occurred after the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia (1968). It was during this decade that a dissident movement arose, which was severely suppressed by the state security agencies until the beginning of 1987. Of course, as under N. Khrushchev, they were no longer imprisoned for a joke, but even under L. Brezhnev there were those convicted under “anti-Soviet” articles (Power and dissidents: From the documents of the KGB and the Central Committee of the CPSU 2006). Works of literature and cinema were censored by the curating authorities. In the same “golden” 20th anniversary, punitive psychiatry flourished. During the Perestroika period, the process of exposing the crimes of the Soviet totalitarian regime and the recognition of international legal norms on human rights led to the release of hundreds of thousands of dissidents from places of detention. 776 thousand patients of psychiatric clinics were taken off the register. In 1988, 5 psychiatric hospitals were liquidated, and 16 psychiatric hospitals of a special type of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs were transferred to the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Health (Prokopenko 1997).

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Crime in the USSR grew steadily. The dynamics of registered crime in the USSR is as follows: 1961—0.9 million, 1970—1.0 million, 1980— 1.5 million, 1990—2.8 million, 1991—3.1 million. A steady increase in the consumption of alcoholic beverages per capita was recorded: from 1.9 liters in 1952 to 14.2 liters in 1984. Growth by 7 times. In the mid-1960s, about 10–15 thousand inhabitants of the RSFSR died annually from alcohol poisoning, in the early 1970s more than 20 thousand people, in 1980 more than 30 thousand people, in 1984 this figure reached 38, 5 thousand people (Klinova 2009: 63). The communists tried to fight drunkenness. The ban on the sale of alcohol in 1958 led to the practice of drinking alcoholic beverages on the street, provoking a massive initiation of people to alcohol, a decrease in public morality and the formation of a loyal attitude towards drunkenness. The growth of alcoholism by the mid-1980s forced M.S. Gorbachev to introduce “dry law”. Bottom line: “…in the second half of the 1980s, as a result of the introduction of the Prohibition and the inaccessibility of legal alcohol, the consumption of alcoholic surrogates increased, which, due to their high toxicity, greatly complicated the course of the disease. There was also an increase in the consumption of more dangerous psychoactive substances, especially among adolescents, which led to the rapid development of alcoholism or drug addiction in the future” (Morogin and Kostina 2013). There was an increase in the number of suicides: 17.1 cases per 100 thousand of the population in 1965 and 29.7 cases in 1984 (Klinova 2009). Alcoholism and crime began to spread among the Kazakhs. In terms of the scale of the negative consequences, this supposedly prosperous period, called the “golden age”, did not become for the Kazakhs either salvation or a pause in the long process of colonization, since the process of losing the language, traditions, and real history of the people took place. And the physical destruction of the people continued. As the undoubted victories of the “golden age” is called the increase in the standard of living of people. However, this increase in well-being was observed only in relation to poverty and devastation after the civil war, expropriation, collectivization, dispossession, famine, the exile of entire peoples to new unsettled places, wars, as well as the post-war devastation of the 1940s–1950s. Dependence on exports of minerals has led to a lack of reforms in the economy Signs of this were not only the backlog in

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knowledge-intensive industries, poor product quality, inefficient production, and low labor productivity. Throughout the years of the existence of the USSR, the problem of providing the population with housing, food, and the significant food imports associated with this remained unresolved. The most acute problem was the shortage (even of essential goods), which gave rise to the “seller’s economy”, the concept of cronyism, and rampant corruption. One of the myths persistently promoted against the backdrop of total corruption in countries that once belonged to the Soviet Union says that there was no corruption in the USSR. Probably, in the view of the authors of this narrative, such an image of the USSR can become attractive in the conditions of people being tired of corruption and its destructive impact. Under this sauce, the image of Stalin is created, who was supposedly modest in everyday life and harsh towards violators of the law. The phrase “Stalin is not on you, he would put things in order” becomes one of the slogans under which a positive image of the USSR and the idea of its revival are being promoted. And not a word is said about what methods Stalin put in order. By the way, he never put things in order. Moreover, it was the methods of Stalin and his clique that armed the Soviet corrupt officials. Corruption in Russia has a long history, and it did not start with the Bolsheviks with their methods of expropriation, dispossession, etc., but was a legacy of tsarist Russia. During the period of the formation of the Muscovite state (sixteenth–seventeenth centuries), the governorship and voivodship were kept on feeding. The voivode appointed to the position did not receive a salary, but the territory for “feed”: he ruled this territory, judged the population, collected taxes and “fed” himself. This opened up endless opportunities for robbing the population, and the fact that the period of “feeding” was limited pushed them to large-scale extortions, bribes, and quick enrichment. The nobles asked the sovereign “to let go to the voivodeship to feed” (Obolonsky 2011). Thus, the population is accustomed to seeing in power people who feed on positions. Bribery was a common thing. The introduction of the “Table of Ranks” (1722) became a method of regulating the activities of the bureaucratic apparatus. The concepts of honor, personal dignity, and authority were replaced by rank. In Russia, there was a sophisticated “culture of bribery”, an established system of extortion and a list of issues resolved for a bribe. Abuse of office was

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a common practice. A cumbersome management system that concentrates power on numerous levels of the bureaucratic system, remoteness from the central government, the poverty of the lowest level of officials working in the field, the lack of responsibility to the population, etc.—all contributed to the flourishing of corruption. The officials brought up in Russia in this way then formed the colonial administration sent to the Steppe. On feeding, they quickly corrected their position. The preservation of more rational and effective management measures based on Kazakh customary law did not give the colonial officials the opportunity to “feed”. That is why, despite the numerous memorandums of the commissions on the expediency of preserving the traditional norms of law and the social structure of the Kazakhs, the Russian system was introduced, vicious, cumbersome, and absurd in the conditions of the Steppe. But she allowed, according to the Russian tradition, to conduct business through bribery and bribes. In November 1917, the former bureaucratic institutions were liquidated in Russia. The Bolsheviks were supposed to create a state without a professional bureaucracy. However, by 1920, more than half of the Communists made up the state apparatus, becoming officials of Soviet institutions. The desire to subordinate the entire life of the country to total control required a large number of employees. In 1921, the bureaucracy in Soviet Russia amounted to 5.7 million people (in the Russian Empire in 1913—253 thousand officials) (Obolonsky 2011). One of the first decrees of the Soviet government was the Decree “On Bribery” of May 8, 1918. Already on December 21, 1919, the Decree “On the fight against speculation, theft in state warehouses, forgery and other abuses of office in economic and administrative bodies” was issued. The Criminal Code of the RSFSR of 1922 provided for liability for giving and receiving a bribe, mediation in bribery, and involvement in bribery. The nomenklatura principle in the USSR took shape by the end of the 1930s and lasted until the collapse of the Soviet empire. Quite quickly, in the ruling stratum, convinced communists were replaced by party critters, careerists who skillfully used the “correct” slogans. In the period from 1937 to 1939, the party nomenclature was updated twice, in some places—three times. They mowed down all independent thinkers. Thus was created the code of the Soviet bureaucracy—unreasoning obedience to the strong. At first glance, it seems that with the tough and inhuman policy pursued in the USSR, with the practice of arrests for theft of several

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ears of corn, with the risk for any person to end up in the millstones of a totalitarian system, a large-scale, extensive system of abuses of official position, financial fraud, and corruption is unthinkable. However, things were different. “According to the data of A. Shlyaposhnikov, in 1932 in the Russian Federation the number of those convicted for committing malfeasance in comparison with 1928 increased almost five times. The proportion of those convicted for malfeasance in the total mass of convicts also increased sharply. If in 1928 it was 3.1%, then in 1932 it rose to 33%” (Bogdanov and Orlov 2009: 37). It should be noted that a criminal-ideological component was added to the practice of the tsarist period—feeding on positions. The Bolsheviks were confident in their right to confiscate, expropriate, redistribute wealth, dekulakize and confiscate. Recall that the first policy used by the Bolsheviks to rule the country was the policy of War Communism (1918–1921). Its implementation, among other things, implied the nationalization of industry, the state monopoly on food, prodrazvedka, equalization in the distribution of material wealth, etc. The slogan “rob the loot” paved the way for a policy of requisitions and confiscations, which grew into widespread robbery and plunder. Privileges, or the system of “feeding”, took shape immediately: at first, it was decent food (against the background of hungry years), a “warm place” (rear, headquarters), and medical care. In the first years of Soviet power, this was expressed in the abuse of official position during confiscations, arrests, and bribery. Officials used the confiscated for personal enrichment. “The revolutionary authorities created numerous actually predatory structures—barrage detachments on transport, hunting for “pouchers”, food detachments, engaged in virtually pure banditry everywhere. The most significant confiscations during the years of the Civil War were undertaken by units of the active army. A special role in the Bolshevik expropriations was played by power structures, especially the Cheka, which enjoyed exclusive rights and was the least accessible for control” (Teplyakov 2009: 205). To sell the things confiscated during the arrest from the “enemies of the people”, special shops functioned, in which employees of internal organs purchased confiscated things at a bargain price. In the middle and late 1940s, the main facts of corruption among the NKVD officers were associated with “trophy property” confiscated in Europe and Manchuria, and embezzlement of millions of rubles.

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Corruption did not bypass the foreign intelligence of the state security agencies, which spent the funds allocated for “operational purposes” for their own needs. Later, a clearly ranked system of privileges was created. Housing was built for the nomenclature, medical and sanatorium services were guaranteed, separate food supplies were provided, dachas were issued, etc. Officials at a lower level were content with food sets, access to scarce goods, the opportunity to receive housing and sanatorium vouchers out of turn. Let us name just a few facts that demonstrate how corruption grew and changed in the USSR. Under Stalin, bribes were taken both in money and in products for not being prosecuted for embezzlement and embezzlement, including property confiscated from kulaks, NEPmen, and bais. In 1948, as part of a big case, the chairman and 6 members of the Supreme Court of the USSR were removed from work. They were charged with the reduction of punishment for bribes and the release of criminals. In the period 1948–1949, 3 closed trials took place in the USSR, indicating that the entire Soviet judicial system was stricken with corruption from top to bottom. The USSR Prosecutor’s Office uncovered numerous facts of bribery, abuse, merging with criminal elements and unjust sentences. In Moscow, 111 people were arrested, including 28 judges. The system of mutual responsibility and relationships established over the years went to the judiciary of Kyiv, Krasnodar, Ufa. Corruption among officials has acquired enormous proportions (see the courts of the 1980s). The system of nepotism increased the importance of kinship and created a hereditary bureaucracy. So, for example, the son and son-in-law of L. Brezhnev were members of the Central Committee of the CPSU. A similar system took shape in the entire vertical: in the Central Committee of the republics, regional committees, and city committees, where the children of the nomenklatura received positions and promotions. The central authorities used the corruption crimes of the lower and especially officials from the national republics to gain loyalty, obedience and humility. At any moment it was possible to start an anti-corruption case against a disobedient satrap from anybody, any level, any of the republics. Thus, the shortage of elementary things has turned into a tool for earning money, and bribery has become a guarantee of loyalty, a mechanism for being integrated into the system. It was not possible

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to destroy this vicious system without touching the foundations of statehood. Another attempt was made by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the USSR “On strengthening the criminal liability for bribery” of February 20, 1961. The next round of development of corruption fell on the Brezhnev period. The scale of bribes grew. It was no longer food or things. It was the turn of the construction of private country houses with the stolen money, which were registered for children or grandchildren. There was no sphere that would not be affected by corruption. In the course of the sensational “Azerbaijani case” (1969), the prices for acquiring public positions became known: it cost 30 thousand rubles to become a judge, and 100 thousand rubles to become a district committee secretary. In Moscow, the position of a store manager is from 10,000 to 30,000 rubles, depending on the volume of trade. These are the prices for the average salary in the country—100–120 rubles per month. In the 1970s and 1980s, with a total shortage of many goods, corruption permeated all levels of trade. The meaning of the expressions “from under the counter”, “by pull”, “from the back door”, “on call”, “get it”, “scarce goods” are well known to those who lived at that time. Not a single seller was left out of the scheme. There was no such branched, smoothly working mechanism in any other branch of the national economy. The economy of the USSR was a “seller’s economy”. Friendship with sellers was valued because they were “sitting on a deficit”. It is no coincidence that the first high-profile corruption case of the early 1980s was the “caviar case”. Through the Okean store in Sochi, black caviar was illegally sold abroad in large cans marked with Pacific herring. Then there was the Mosprodtorg case, in which the director of the Eliseevsky grocery store Yu. Sokolov, the director of the Moscow Vneshposyltorg store Avilov, and others were arrested. The Eliseevsky case became the largest embezzlement case in Soviet trade. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the “cotton case” thundered—one of the most high-profile anti-corruption investigations. The scale of theft and bribes amounted to tens of millions of rubles. The arrests of the defendants in the case were in Uzbekistan and Moscow; 800 criminal cases were initiated, in which more than 4 thousand people were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, accused of postscripts, bribes, and embezzlement, already beyond the scope of their own cotton “business”. The Supreme Court of the RSFSR also uncovered facts of bribery along with other abuses. The factor of nepotism became the basis for

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the formation of a criminal group. More than 5000 officials were fired in the Shchelokov case, and about 1500 people were sentenced to real terms. There was corruption in health care, in the distribution of benefits in trade unions, and so on. And, finally, not only positions but also titles, orders, and even gold stars of the Hero of Socialist Labor turned into a commodity. With the light hand of M. Gorbachev, the period preceding Perestroika began to be called the “period of stagnation”. It was stagnation not as something stopped in its development, not just stagnation. Stagnation took the form of decline, and degradation, in which persecution and persecution simply took less radical forms (without hunger, concentration camps, and mass executions). Willingly or involuntarily emerging parallels with today are not accidental at all. This is where modern corruption comes from. Trade in titles, orders, and place. Trade in everything you can get your hands on. There is nothing to be surprised. The current government is a continuation of the same system. What about the ice cream? Yes, it really cost 15 kopecks. Probably, for those who are still nostalgic about him, this is sufficient compensation for freedom, a decent life, and rights.

4.11

Conclusion

The chapter examines and deconstructs the myths formed in the colonial and Soviet periods, the purpose of which was to devalue the culture, traditions, and way of life of the Kazakhs and convince them of the benefits that Russia brought to the Steppe. This material touches on only a small part of the existing such myths, which are still used and relayed by the Imperials. However, the myths proposed for consideration are the most common and allow us to judge the general direction of such myth-making.

Glossary Aksakal (lit. aksakal—white-bearded) the elder of the clan, family, honorary, respected person. Asharshylyk (lit. famine) an artificially created famine of 1921–1923 under the conditions of war communism and a famine of 1931–1933,

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which occurred as a result of the expropriation of livestock, collectivization, the forcible sedentarization of Kazakhs, and the suppression of armed resistance to the policy of Soviet power. Aul is a traditional rural-type settlement, a community of close relatives, a camp among the Turkic peoples. Bai is a wealthy, socially responsible person who headed a clan or subgenus. Barymta (“belonging to me”; “what is mine”) is one of the most universal institutions and important links in the entire system of Kazakh customary law. Barymtach a person appointed to carry out barymta, i.e. collection of fines imposed by the court. Biy (lit. to know, to rule) is an authoritative person, a judge, an expert on Kazakh society, its structure, the system of customary law, traditions, and the history of the people. The Bolsheviks the radical wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party, carried out a coup in October 1917. Borik is a traditional Kazakh headdress with a soft crown and fur trim. Chalganchi is a guide, scout of traces, an expert in the steppe. Clockwork horses spare horses; nomads, going on a long journey, always had 2–3 spare horses, which were changed as needed, giving rest to the horse that was tired on a long journey. Discharge Cossacks peasants of Siberian villages, temporarily mobilized to the border line to carry out guard duty, build fortresses, cultivate state arable land, transport Dneproges Dnepro Hydroelectric power station. Dispossession the policy of ousting capitalist elements in agriculture, the elimination of the kulaks as a class (1925–1932). Expropriation compulsory alienation, seizure of property. Feeding the unwritten right to collect taxes from the local population and feed on them. Felt a dense material made of felted wool, which has low thermal conductivity, allows air to pass through, and is used to cover yurts. Foreman (Desyatsky) in tsarist Russia, an elected person in the village, who performed the duties of a policeman. Irimshik a sweet fermented milk product, in consistency between cheese and cottage cheese. Jute is a mass death of livestock due to the inability to get pasture during pasture icing or heavy snowfall.

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Kalym is a material property, most often in the form of cattle, which is presented by the groom’s side to the father, the family of the betrothed bride. Most often, kalym formed the basis or compensated for part of the dowry that the bride received (yurt, utensils, livestock, jewelry, clothes). Kenesary-khan (1802–1847) a direct descendant of Shyngyskhan, the last Kazakh khan, commander, and leader of the national liberation movement (1837–1847) against Russian colonization. Khan the title of the monarch, ruler, and sovereign person among the Turkic peoples. Kiiz-baypak felt stockings worn under high boots; were made of thin, soft felt and sewn together from a single piece with one seam. Koshma a felt carpet made of sheep or camel wool. Kun a fine, compensation for the injury or murder of a person. For the murder of a person, the death penalty was supposed, but under certain conditions, the payment of a fine was also practiced, after which the victims refused to take revenge. Kulak (russain) wealthy peasants using hired labor. Kurt is a high in calories salty sour-milk product with a long shelf life, made from curdled, pressed, and heat-cured milk. Kymys is a long-term storage fermented milk drink made from mare’s milk that is healthy. Kyrgyz Kirghiz, Kyrgyz-Kaisaks, Horde, and foreigners are ethnonyms that were used to call the Kazakhs in the Russian Empire instead of using their real name. Mosprodtorg Moscow food trade. NEPman is a private entrepreneur, merchant of the era of the New Economic Policy (1921–1929). NKVD People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Orgnabor organizational recruitment is a method of state management of labor resources and their movement (concentration, relocation); attracting mainly workers to industrial enterprises. O-two-horse with two horses. Posad people an estate in feudal Rus’, the trade and craft population of cities and urban-type settlements (posad, settlement). Prodrazverstka (food requisitioning) the policy of forcibly withdrawing from the peasants the surplus of their products in favor of the army; was held from 1916 to 1921. Raspberry (slang) is a thieves’ den, a gathering of thieves.

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Saptama-etik leather high boots with felt lining, covering the knees. Saukele a cone-shaped headdress of a bride. Stanitsa’s Cossacks Cossacks permanently residing in a village (administrative rural unit, Cossack village, farm) and carrying guard, escort, police service no further than 150 miles (1 verst—1.06 kilometers) from the location of their village. The retired lower ranks of the garrison battalions and their families were transferred to the stanitsa Cossacks in Siberia. Steppe Territory in 1882–1917, the unofficial name of the north-eastern part of Kazakhstan with the administrative center in Omsk, including Akmola, Semipalatinsk, and until 1898 Semirechensk regions. Tekemet is an ornamented felt carpet made by pressing wet wool of different colors. The Cheka (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission) is a special body for combating counter-revolution and sabotage, endowed with special powers to combat class enemies. The Cossacks (from the Turkic “Cossack”—a free man) the military class in Tsarist Russia, who served on the outskirts of the Russian Empire. The district order a government office, on behalf of which all orders of state power should be issued, judicial functions should be carried out, etc. Through the district orders, the power functions of representatives of the local elite were gradually selected. The Eliseyskoye Affair is a major corruption case involving the Moscow grocery store Eliseyskiy. The headman is the elected head of the rural community. The Irtysh line is part of the Russian fortified border fortresses, built in the eighteenth century on the border with the Steppe. The total length was 290 km. Togyz (lit. nine) a fine paid in the form of nine heads of cattle. There was a “ladder” of fines: payment twice for a nine, three times for a nine, etc.; size depending on the type of livestock: camels, horses, bulls, etc. Tymak is a winter fur headdress with elements that tightly cover the ears and neck. Yurt a portable frame dwelling with felt covering among nomads.

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CHAPTER 5

Overcoming the Consequences of Colonization

This chapter is devoted to reflections on the consequences of colonization and the measures that should be taken to overcome them. In addition, the direct connection of many of the current problems of Kazakhstan with colonization and totalitarianism is explained. Since the colonization of the second period (the era of the USSR) was aggravated by the totalitarian Soviet system, the consequences of these phenomena should be considered as a whole. That is, the process of not only decolonization, but also de-Sovietization should be carried out. The need to comprehend the consequences of colonization and totalitarianism is not speculative, and does not aim at purely historical research or a statement of what happened. Comprehension has a practical component, namely, it allows you to find answers to many questions related to the recent past and present of the Kazakhs, identify vulnerabilities and those points where the colonialists directed destructive blows, and also to outline areas of work for the decolonization, de-Sovietization of Kazakhstan and the thinking of the Kazakhs.

5.1

Collective Trauma

The doubts that historical events, especially traumatic experiences, have a significant impact on the identity of a nation are gone. The study of trauma (trauma studies), as a scientific direction, began to take shape © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Mustoyapova, Decolonization of Kazakhstan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5207-6_5

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in Europe after WWII, and has been developing especially intensively in recent decades. Researchers have contributed to understanding the principles of collective memory, which is especially relevant for a post-traumatic society. Unfortunately, the tragic history of the twentieth century (world and civil wars, the revolution, the crisis of 1929, genocides, political repressions, concentration camps, deportations, the Holocaust, etc.) led to the appearance of a considerable number of collective traumas. In a number of countries, with varying degrees of success, attempts were made to work with this material in order to help the nation get out of the psychological, mental, value, and humanitarian crisis. In the 2000s, a series of publications by researchers who actively develop the theory of trauma appeared: J. Alexander, A. Neal, R. Eyerman, D. LaCapra, E. Santner, K. Erickson, L. Hinriksen, and many others. Their theory is based on the analysis of the experience of collective traumatic experience in Europe, the USA, and Japan, its development and results. Researchers talk about the need to preserve the memory of traumatic events and work with collective trauma, since the traumas of parents and grandfathers, which were not processed by them, are included in the personal unconscious of their descendants. These studies give us an understanding of what is happening to us today and how our vulnerabilities or even our views, actions, values, and choices are connected and dependent on the suppressed experience of the past, and the tragic events of the past century. The modern interpretation of the term “trauma” implies not only individual, but also collective trauma, which is caused by social, and political circumstances and is associated with previous generations, “inherited” by subsequent ones as part of collective memory. A. Neil writes that national traumas are created by personal and collective reactions to exceptional events that affect the institutional structure of society and lead to radical changes within a short period of time (Neal 1998). That is why the causes of trauma must be considered, their consequences minimized, and society must reconsider its ethical values, sometimes even legislation. An event is perceived as traumatic if its action leads to a sharp shift, distortion, destruction of the previously harmonious, familiar meanings of the community, self-positioning, self-esteem, lifestyle, and value system. This bias is found in people’s doubts about who they are, whether they are correct, their values, lifestyle, and cultural heritage. Cultural trauma

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undermines the established collective identity and calls into question its fundamental properties. This process of loosening the identity of the nomads lasted a century and a half, affecting several generations, each of which was increasingly detached from its roots, culture, drifting towards the Russian, under the guise of Soviet, identity. Trauma is a violation of the normality of being. This is expressed by the disorganization of the orderly, harmonious, habitual world of the community. Trauma occurs when the, as it seemed before, a reliable boundary between the possible and the impossible is violated, which is conveyed by the capacious concept of “transgression” (literally, “going beyond”). Violation of the boundaries of what is acceptable plunges a person or community into the horror of what was unimaginable until recently. This experience is difficult to express in the usual language means, precisely because what happened goes beyond the usual, familiar experience. This new, previously unseen experience had no language yet. That is why silence, self-isolation, and taboo often becomes a reaction to trauma. A traumatic event is a violation of the idea of a person, or society about the impossible, unacceptable (mass famine, terror). This impossible suddenly becomes possible, happened, and strikes at the human psyche and the mental health of the nation. The events of the twentieth century that took place in Kazakhstan led precisely to radical changes not only in the way of life of the Kazakhs, but also in the system of values, the nature of social relations, etc. We are talking about a whole series of political and social cataclysms that led to cardinal changes, the breakdown of the usual idea of being, which could not but affect the moral, psychological state of the nation. N. Smelser distinguishes between psychological and cultural trauma. In the first case, when trauma strikes an individual, personal mechanisms of overcoming, protection, and further adaptation must be involved. In the second case, the trauma threatens the foundations of culture as a collective and, more broadly, national identity. The scientist writes: “We may now advance a formal definition of cultural trauma: a memory accepted and publicly given credence by a relevant membership group and evoking an event or situation which is (a) laden with negative affect, (b) represented as indelible, and (c) regarded as threatening a society’s existence or violating one or more of its fundamental cultural presuppositions” (Smelser 2004: 44). Throughout the twentieth century, a number of such traumatic events happened to the Kazakhs, each of which transgressed the boundaries of

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the possible, imaginable. It is difficult for society to survive such events, to overcome them without breaking down, without losing a part of itself. R. Eyerman notes that cultural trauma refers to a more abstract and indirect concept of collective identity, including religious and national identities (Eyerman 2013: 124). The Kazakh nation suffered too many traumas in a short period of time, which actually fell to the lot of 2–3 generations: the seizure of land from the Kazakhs in favor of the Cossacks and peasant migrants; the uprising of 1916; the Russian civil war, which left a bloody trail in the Steppe “white” and “red”; two famines in the early 1920s and 1930s; forced sedentarization; political repressions that destroyed the educated stratum of the nation; The Second World War; cultural assimilation; The Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, the territory of which was 18,500 sq. km, where 468 tests were carried out over 40 years (1949– 1989) (more than 600 nuclear and thermonuclear devices were blown up). Meanwhile, the undermining of several fundamental cultural prerequisites of society threatens to radically transform its identity and even poses a threat to the existence of society. In this case, says N. Smelser, society must take action: “It stands to reason that a historical event with penetrating if not overwhelming significance for a society will also constitute a major situation to be coped with on the part of many individuals in the society, even if it does not constitute a personal trauma for them. I have in mind the imposition – by virtue of their very occurrence – of a need to give a definition to Nazism and the Holocaust in Germany, the ending of slavery in the United States, the imposition of Soviet-dominated communist rule in Poland…” (Smelser 2004: 48). All of these events caused traumas that changed the psychology and values of the people. The memory of a traumatic event is associated with intense negative affect, sometimes with disgust, shame, or instilled guilt. And then the collective memory works as an erasing one, making something immutable doubtful, for example, the former values or worldview, previously considered significant for the integrity of the affected community. R. Ayerman writes: “Cultural trauma as a discourse is also characterized by the fact that the established collective identity is shaken and its foundations are called into question” (Eyerman 2013: 125). A whole series of traumatic blows made it impossible to realize what had happened and its consequences since one traumatic event was superimposed on another. Moreover, a significant part of these events was tabooed, erased from memory, and the people were placed in conditions

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where the retransmission of the trauma experienced and the facts associated with it was fraught with the risk of punishment. Thus, not only the traumatic events themselves, but also the ban on narrations about them influenced the transformation of value orientations, the idea of good and evil, and, therefore, were reflected in the identity of the people. The people were silent but retained the collective memory of what happened, the stories of grandfathers were passed on from generation to generation in families. Today, many archives are being opened in Kazakhstan, which makes it possible to significantly supplement these narratives. The collective memory of Asharshylyk, forced sedentarization, the Great Terror also formed the collective identity of the Kazakhs, in which, of course, there is a traumatic component. One cannot but agree with the words of R. Eyerman: “As a cultural process, trauma is linked to the formation of collective identity and the construction of collective memory” (Eyerman 2004: 60). Probably, this collective memory did not allow the Kazakhs to be completely brainwashed by the Soviet ideology, the difference between the official version of history and the events that were preserved in people’s memory was too noticeable. The authorities preferred to resort to tabooing certain topics, destroying the intellectual heritage of the repressed, erasing their names in books, and continued to convince the people how much happiness the USSR brought them. Speaking about the people of Kazakhstan, we should also mention the collective trauma experienced by different communities of our compatriots during the period of forced resettlement after the dispossession and deportation of peoples in the 1930–1940s. Moreover, these events took place against a general traumatic background—wars, political repressions, exile in camps, etc. This traumatic experience is still hushed up. We have turned the page of history, hoping to leave the past in the past, hoping that it will not repeat itself, thinking that it no longer requires our reflection. A. Neil insists that it is impossible to reject, neglect, and ignore the traumatic experience, which otherwise inevitably leads to a state of anxiety, anger, fear, and depression as an individual and society. Moreover, the trauma experienced distorts ideas between order and chaos, good and evil, deprives society of stability, and undermines social norms. The purpose of returning to traumatic experiences is to restore the psychological health of the community. The first step towards this is to eliminate social repression by regaining the memory of the event.

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Repression and silence are exactly what happened to the Kazakhs as a result of the authorities’ ban on mentioning the famine of the early 1930s, political repressions, and also because of people’s fear and rejection of traumatic experience, i.e. the desire to avoid difficult memories that can bring torment, feelings of fear, pain, and powerlessness. In the essay “Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma” J. Alexander speaks about the role of the symbolic construction of trauma in the formation of collective identity. He believes that by constructing cultural traumas, social groups and national communities establish the presence and source of psychological pain and discomfort. Awareness of cultural trauma should lead to its elaboration. “Cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways” (Alexander 2004: 1). The process of working through trauma consists in its emotional experience, its interpretation, management of it. Moreover, the recognition of the facts, the awareness of the trauma, and the willingness to overcome its consequences suggests that society does not consider itself a victim, but takes responsibility for itself. J. Alexander writes about this: “It is by constructing cultural traumas that social groups, national societies, and sometimes even entire civilizations not only cognitively identify the existence and source of human suffering but ‘take on board’ some significant responsibility for it” (Alexander 2004: 1). The current generation of Kazakhs is ready to do what the past generations could not do for many reasons. The memory of the event and its design in the form of a narrative (memoirs, memoirists, documentaries, and feature films, works of art, etc.) eliminates repression, silence, and allows pent-up feelings to gain expression and awareness. Such an action has not only a moral and healing effect, namely, it leads to an increase in self-esteem and integrity subjected to defeat but also contributes to the experience of affect, catharsis, and public discussion. Since identity is a process, its construction is connected not only with current events but also with the past, the reconstruction of events that have not yet received awareness and evaluation and continue to have a traumatic effect. Thanks to “pronunciation”, discussion, and mental and emotional processing of the trauma, the broken collective identity is

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restored. During the period of trauma representation, the collective identity undergoes revision and is associated with the present. “‘Experiencing trauma’ can be understood as a sociological process that defines a painful injury to the collectivity, establishes the victim, attributes responsibility, and distributes the ideal and material consequences. Insofar as traumas are so experienced, and thus imagined and represented, the collective identity will become significantly revised. This identity revision means that there will be a searching re-remembering of the collective past, for memory is not only social and fluid but deeply connected to the contemporary sense of the self. Identities are continuously constructed and secured not only by facing the present and future but also by reconstructing the collectivity’s earlier life” (Alexander 2004: 22–23). The natural passing of a traumatized generation does not mean the disappearance of its traumatic experience. This experience continues to have an impact at various levels on subsequent generations. Elaboration is necessary for those who have to live. They should not carry the burden of trauma into the future. But just turning the page won’t work. The bottom line is that if the older and middle generations understand where our problems, complexes and fears come from, then young people do not realize where the negative legacy comes from, which manifests itself in judgments, actions, the passivity of the community, the punitive nature of law enforcement agencies, the dependence of the court, in the external and domestic policy of the state. Young people are bewildered by the state of society. They ask questions to which they do not find answers because the topic of the consequences of colonial oppression still remains taboo in society. But it is there that you can find answers to many questions regarding the current state of society. Young people cannot change that part of society that is in the thrall of colonial thinking if the people of the older and middle generations are not themselves ready and able to change. It is easier for young people to leave than to change a stagnant society or find themselves in a swamp of its mentality, complexes, stereotypes, phantoms of the past. You can wait another half century until the people change. But by that time, today’s youth will be involuntarily bound, permeated with our unexperienced, unprocessed traumas. In this case, displaced ethical values, imposed views on one’s own past, interpretation of historical events, assessment of historical figures, and low self-esteem will forever be imprinted on the mentality and identity of the people. This is where the main problem lies—we will be cut off from our real history, our ancestors.

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It will be a different nation, not connected with its centuries-old historical past. And this will happen due to the evil will of the colonialists, if we do not acquire subjectivity and do not regain our voice. Yes, the way of life of the Kazakhs has changed, by violent means, at the cost of destroying almost half of the number of Kazakhs, they have made them settled. But this does not mean that the Kazakhs should abandon themselves as a people with their mentality, worldview, history, and system of moral coordinates. Having changed from a horse to a car, having changed a yurt for an apartment building, a person should not give up his own “I”. The official power of 30 years of independence is removed from talking about the consequences of the colonial period, from the need to overcome the colonial legacy. N. Smelser writes about such a situation: “The collectivization of coping responses is rarely, however, achieved by a proclamation by political leaders. It frequently involves these, of course, but it is more often a developing process of collective groping, negotiation, and contestation over the proper historical meaning to be assigned, the proper affective stance to be adopted, the proper focus of responsibility, and the proper forms of commemoration… Most often the establishment of a collectivity’s responses to a trauma is a matter of bitter contestation among groups, sometimes over long periods of time and often without definitive settlement” (Smelser 2004: 49). In our situation, the reason for the removal of the government from the topical conversation for society, from the beginning of the active process of decolonization lies in the fact that it is the flesh of the Soviet system. There was no change of elites, no lustration was carried out. Law enforcement agencies still retain a punitive focus. Hence the continuation of the practice of governing the country in the metropolis/colony format. In Kazakhstan, the discussion about decolonization, its mechanisms, and consequences were started in public discussions on social networks. The discussion was driven by current events: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, launched in 2014; gaining momentum under the influence of the propaganda of the Russian media “immortal regiments”, glorifying the Second World War and Stalin; more and more often sounding slogans about the restoration of the USSR; claims of Russia on the territory of Kazakhstan voiced at different levels; the increasing presence of Russia in the politics and economy of Kazakhstan, etc. This immediately caused a split and determined the parties opposing each other.

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LaCapra begins his essay “History and Memory after Auschwitz” with the questions: “Do some events present moral and representational issues even for groups not directly involved in them? Do those more directly involved have special responsibilittes to the past and the way it is remembered in the present? Can – or should – historiography define itself in a purely scholarly and professional way that distances it from public memory and its ethical implications? Should it, on the contrary, ground itself on memory as its matrix and muse?” (LaCapra 1998: 1). Answering the questions posed by LaCapra, it should be noted that in Kazakhstan there are groups for which the events of the past present moral problems, although they are not direct participants in those tragic events. These groups are represented by: (1) descendants of those who suffered during Asharshylyk; they also speak on behalf of those who died and did not leave offspring, thereby interrupting the centuries-old history of their birth; on behalf of those who were forced to emigrate during the Holodomor; descendants of those repressed during the Great Terror; (2) children and grandchildren of the Bolsheviks and the Soviet nomenklatura who do not want the actions of their grandfathers and great-grandfathers to be made public; (3) part of the Russian population, who perceive any attempts to expose the role of tsarism and Soviet Moscow as a personal reproach, associating themselves with Russia; (4) people who are nostalgic for the USSR and still see Russia as their “elder brother”, without whom they cannot imagine the future of Kazakhstan; and (5) government officials who avoid problematizing the issue of decolonization, still being in a mental dependence on Russia, which leads to the political and economic dependence of Kazakhstan. As you can see, the split line runs between those who want decolonization and desovietization, and those who are still in captivity of imperial or colonial thinking. The groups represented are not responsible for what happened, because they were not participants in those events, did not make decisions, did not make choices or crimes. However, responsibility begins when some believe that the dead, the repressed deserve to be aware of their tragedy, to pay tribute to their memory, to restore their honest names, and the people must decide that this will never happen again. This should not be just a decision, but measures aimed at ensuring that subsequent generations, through education, the policy of memorization, and the power of art, learn the tragic lessons of the past. This is the responsibility to the past.

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The responsibility of others begins when they come out in defense of the totalitarian system, colonization, continuing to adhere to the imperial ideology, chauvinism, and dreaming of the restoration of the USSR. And in this case, we are talking not just about the conservation of the former, colonial, and Soviet, interpretations of events and the history of the Kazakhs, but about the restoration of this past in new historical conditions. The question of the attitude of professional historians towards these processes and the public discussion is fundamentally important. Among historians, separate groups can also be distinguished: (1) those who distance themselves from the formulation of ethical questions, assessments and adhere to a restrained academic description, relying on accessible archives (a significant part of which remains closed); (2) young scientists who are more courageous in their assessments and new interpretations; (3) scientists of the older generation, representatives of the Soviet historical school, who prevent a new reading of the history of the Kazakhs, which threatens to devalue their many years of work to promote the interpretation determined by the Soviet ideology. At the same time, some historians turn to the baggage of collective memory. There are projects to collect memories and stories, for example, families who survived Asharshylyk or descendants of the repressed. As an important factor, one should note the inertia of the Soviet version of Kazakh history and the active presence in the information space of Russian media broadcasting colonial and Soviet narratives and influencing part of the audience. It is also necessary to note such a fact as the preservation in Kazakh families of the history of the family in several generations (from seven or more generations of ancestors). The stories of childbirth are closely intertwined and become additional sources of collective memory. There are initiatives to reconstruct the history of the people through the history of the tribes that make up the nation. Thus, the traditional monopoly, exclusive control of historians over the interpretation of the past, which had recently taken place, as P. Nora (2005). put it, has undergone changes. In our case, these changes were due, among other things, to the collapse of the Soviet historical school and, with its distortions, a tendentious, ideologically permeated interpretation. Thus, the collective memory of the people took its place in shaping the history of the country.

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However, often we are dealing with a substitution of representation. R. Eyerman points to this circumstance: “Mass-mediated experience always involves selective construction and representation, since what is visualized is the result of the actions and decisions of professionals as to what is significant and how it should be presented” (Eyerman 2004: 62). “Working on the past” is being replaced by an artificially constructed narrative and interpretation in the interests of one political force or another. This can lead to complex consequences when the collective memory undergoes splitting. E. Santner calls this phenomenon “narrative fetishism”. As an example, we can cite what is happening today in the Russian Federation (and partly in our country) with the narrative about the Second World War: propaganda creates a lighter context, places the accents it needs, creating a kind of light version without a complete picture. As a result, instead of working through the traumatic experience, society is presented with a triumphant picture that forms a certain attitude towards the event. E. Santner writes: “By ‘narrative fetishism’ I mean the construction and use of a narrative, the conscious or unconscious goal of which is to erase the traces of that trauma or loss, which, in fact, gave life to this narrative… Both narrative fetishism and grief is a response to loss, a response to a past that refuses to go away due to its traumatic impact. The work of mourning is the process of processing and getting used to the reality of loss or traumatic shock by remembering them… In contrast to the work of mourning, narrative fetishism is the way in which the inability to mourn or the denial of mourning plots traumatic events… Narrative fetishism frees a person from the need to rethink their identity in ‘posttraumatic’ conditions; in narrative fetishism, ‘fasting’ has been postponed indefinitely” (Santner 2009: 392). In such cases, the processing of the traumatic experience is postponed indefinitely, while the trauma continues its impact. The representation of “narrative fetishism” is what distracts from the essence, the cause of the problem. Among such events, we observe the colonial experience, the consequences of forced sedentarization, political repressions, and atomic explosions. Fear of the past (countries, nations, parties, authorities) and the desire to avoid its assessment leads to new mistakes, omissions, and vulnerabilities. We are fully convinced of this now. The unfinished is repeated. Already the current difficulties, the poverty of the people are being

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covered up by the construction of Astana, the EXPO, the largest pavilion in the UAE, the alleged existence of a space program, etc. The problem of the struggle for meanings, which R. Eyerman mentions, remains relevant. Speaking out the trauma, restoring history outside the Soviet ideological framework, encounters an obstacle on the part of those who are nostalgic for the Soviet Union and associate themselves with Russia. They see actions aimed at forming a new interpretation of national history as attempts to accuse them of colonization, repression, forced sedentarization, and cultural assimilation of the Kazakhs. It is difficult for this group to part with the habitual idea that Russia brought only good and civilization, for some of them it is difficult to part with the former dominant position. For them, the issue of identity is also relevant, associated with a new status LaCapra not dominant, but equal. This work on oneself requires effort and time, but the main condition is the readiness to hear the voice of the Other, to free oneself from myths, stereotypes, and false grandeur. On the other side of the discussion are those who need to understand the history of the twentieth century, and what happened to their ancestors, which weakened the Kazakhs. They are ready to change and change the country, they stand up for the true independence of Kazakhstan without the guardianship of “big brothers”. This second group understands that colonization is not the past. Colonization and its consequences still continue to determine our present, our life, have a negative impact on the identity of our citizens, and determine the political and economic dependence of Kazakhstan. It should be noted that the line of demarcation in the struggle of meanings is not based on nationality, but rather on a generational basis and belonging to power structures. Addressing the collective traumatic experience takes on special significance, given that it will have a beneficial effect on the present and future of the team. According to D. LaCapra, historical writing is the study of trauma, i.e. its awareness and mitigation of its impact in the present and future. One of the conditions is “reconciliation” with the past—not an escape from a traumatic experience, not a displacement of trauma into the subconscious, but an acceptance of what happened. In the essay “History and Memory after Auschwitz”, D. LaCapra writes that working through trauma does not mean a complete redemption of the past or healing of its wounds. But in the historical dimension of trauma, one can work to change what caused it, because they are social, political and economic

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in nature. The purpose of this is an attempt to prevent its resumption (LaCapra 1998). This is the main thing—to exclude the causes, grounds, conditions that can lead to a recurrence of a traumatic event. Alas, the Kazakhs have not escaped this bitter experience—repetition: political, economic, information dependence, repressive orientation of law enforcement agencies, political prisoners, executions of peaceful protesters, persecution of people for dissent and for advocating the expansion of the spheres of use of the Kazakh language, etc. In our case, we are talking about “the trauma in a past related to – even in a sense still bound up with live issues in, but not repeatedly relived or conflated with – the present” (LaCapra 2016: 377). Until now, the past has had an impact on the present—the authorities, the Soviet format of elections, the suppression of freedom of speech, the executions and torture of people who took part in a peaceful rally in 2011, 2022. These are re-experienced traumas associated with new tragic events. It is no coincidence that what is happening to us today, namely the return of negative manifestations of the history of the past—political persecution, censorship, the role of propaganda, the influence of law enforcement agencies on power, the survival of the people, the difficult situation of large families, unhealthy ecology, etc. Silencing the source, the causes of the injury did not allow to eradicate the reasons for its occurrence. What causes social apathy, depression, insecurity, uncertainty about the path of development, etc., has its own explanation. We did not work through the traumatic experience of the twentieth century, did not evaluate it, did not develop collective immunity, and, as a result, we again found ourselves in the likeness of the tragic twentieth century. Without assessing the past, we did not define mistakes and crimes, we did not outline the aspirations to prevent such a thing from happening again, we did not approve the unshakable values, the violation of which led to the catastrophes of the twentieth century. We have not protected ourselves from repeating the negative experience of the past. Collective unconsciousness leads to the return of the trauma, the repetition of the same traumatic experience, because its causes are not recognized, the conditions are not eliminated. It is no coincidence that today in a number of countries that have gone through the experience of Soviet totalitarianism, signs of 1937, the year of the Great Terror, are found in the present.

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An important component of the problem of working through past traumatic experiences is to preserve the psychological health of the nation, to protect it from demoralization, and to level ethical standards. J. Alexander writes: “The aim is to restore collective psychological health by lifting societal repression and restoring memory. To achieve this, social scientists stress the importance of finding – through public acts of commemoration, cultural representation, and public political struggle – some collective means for undoing repression and allowing the pent-up emotions of loss and mourning to be expressed” (Alexander 2004: 7). Evidence that society has not yet done the necessary work is the shooting of protesters in January 2022, the subsequent torture of thousands of people, and the concealment of police crimes. These are the practices of the totalitarian past, which, alas, has again revealed its sinister face in new historical conditions. The current Kazakhs are ready to perceive their history with all its tragedies, losses, and mistakes, and therefore they persistently turn to the past. This is not a reason for expressing grievances and expressing negativity, not an obsession with the past and avoiding the present. A clear, truthful past is a willingness to accept it in its entirety, to realize the reasons for one’s defeats and the origins of one’s weakness, to assess the potential that has been preserved, and finally to understand the mechanisms of transformation of national identity in order to accept one’s present self. Another important point should be emphasized. We have lost the ability to see ourselves in a historical context. This ability was part of our national consciousness. People who are included in a broad historical context and have historical memory are much more resistant to any stressful influences, or post-traumatic disorders. A person who recognizes himself as a part of a big world, with a long history, correlates his life with the life of his ancestors, the country, and major historical events. Against the background of these events, knowledge about the experiences of the people, and their own private failures seem less significant and therefore do not cause injury, they are experienced more easily. Moreover, a person seems to prolong his life with the time of the people, country, and clan. This positive need, which gives a sense of roots, and stable historical ties, allows you to see your life as part of something larger. Among the Kazakhs, the historicity of their being and worldview was artificially lost (selected) in the twentieth century, interrupting the centuries-old continuity of generations.

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The restoration of this important property for any nation can be facilitated by the study of the tragic, traumatic experience of the twentieth century, the awareness of which will minimize its consequences. For three generations we have been going to ourselves, returning to our former self, to the Kazakhs, as they were before the breaking of the national ethical code, before the breaking of identity. Through working through the trauma, we will understand what happened to the people, to grandfathers and great-grandfathers, and where our vulnerability comes from. Collective memory is expressed in the community’s actions to reconstruct its past, which is reflected in the essence of value orientations, behavioral norms, and cultural preferences, and finally, gives an awareness of oneself and one’s place in history.

5.2 Asharshylyk of the 1920s–1930s, or They Came Out of the Famine The famine of the early 1920s was caused not so much by crop failure as by the consequences of the policy of “war communism”, the surplus appropriation. The number of starving people in Kazakhstan in the early 1920s was 2.3 million people, and about 1 million people died of starvation and disease. The main goal of the policy of war communism was to obtain food from the peasants. Even before the often-mentioned crop failure, within the framework of the food dictatorship of 1918, a massive surplus appropriation was carried out, taking almost everything from the peasants. In 1918–1920, a series of hunger riots began in the Volga region: in March 1919, the Chapan rebellion broke out, in February 1920, the Pitchfork uprising, etc. Uprisings also began in Kazakhstan. They were suppressed not only by military force but also by hunger: people exhausted from hunger had no time to fight for freedom, power and land. Soviet historians attributed the famine of the early 1920s to drought and the associated crop failure. In fact, this was not the only or even the main reason. The civil war, the policy of war communism, and the total requisitioning left people in the countryside without anything. Even despite the famine in the steppe, which was already on a huge scale, they continued to demand food from Kazakhstan. On March 23, 1920, a decree “On the mandatory supply of livestock for meat” was adopted, and cattle were taken away from Kazakh cattle breeders, dooming them to starvation. “Since Akmola and Semipalatinsk

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provinces were considered relatively prosperous, up to 80% of all surpluses went to the food troops, 4 million poods of bread as part of the food tax and 24.5 thousand poods of butter. The resulting products (grain, butter, meat) were sent to the center of the country: Moscow, Petrograd, Samara, Kazan, Saratov, etc. On the personal instructions of Lenin, Moscow and Petrograd became the main transport base for the continuous delivery of bread by rail: from 60 to 100 wagons of bread were sent to Moscow daily, and the distribution of bread to the local population was strictly prohibited … As a result of this policy, according to the estimates of the Akmola province, on At the end of March 1921, 472,000 people died, which accounted for about 50% of the population of the province” (Kozybaeva et al. 2021: 152). L. Gryvennaya notes: “The 1920 allocation plan for the Kirrepublic was 25 million 460 thousand pounds of meat and fat” (Gryvennaya 2022: 82). Failure to comply with the requirements of the authorities threatened the nomads with the requisition of cattle, arrest, and transfer to the court of a revolutionary tribunal. The peak of the famine came in the autumn of 1921—the spring of 1922. The famine covered 35 provinces: Kazakhstan, the Volga region, Ukraine, Crimea, Bashkiria, partly the Urals, and Western Siberia. In 1921, Russia appealed to the whole world with an appeal to help the starving people of the Volga region. Assistance to the starving Russia continues to come from Kazakhstan. The researchers note: “If by January 1, 1916 there were 28 million 777 thousand cattle (large and small) in Kazakhstan, then by January 1, 1922 this figure was 11 million 391 thousand. As you can see, the reduction in livestock amounted to 17 million 386 thousand or 60.4%. Of these, horses were reduced by 63%, sheep and goats – by 63.5%, cattle – by 40.5%, camels – by 33%. The state of animal husbandry in the western regions of Kazakhstan was worse than the republican level. For example, in the Ural province, the number of cattle from 2 million 577 thousand 170 in 1917 fell to 307 thousand 535 in 1922, i.e. up to 83%. And in the Bukeevskaya province, the number of livestock was reduced by half. There is no need to say that cattle was the main source of food for the Kazakhs, depriving the cattle, the Soviet government pushed the Kazakhs to certain death” (Sarsenov et al. 2022: 29). In order to get help for the starving, it was necessary to prove to Moscow that there is a famine in Kazakhstan. From the republic continued to demand the supply of meat. “The primary task of the

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Kazakh CEC was to prove to the Center the fact of famine in the territory of Kazakhstan and determine its scale in order to remove the need to pay food taxes from the starving regions. By November 1921, the Kazakh People’s Commissariat of Lands, the Kazakh People’s Commissariat of Food and the Administration of Kazakhstan found that five of the seven provinces of the Kazakh SSR were in famine” (Kozybaeva et al. 2021: 152). In March 1922, the chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Kazakh Republic, S. Mendeshev, informed Stalin that in some villages the number of deaths from starvation was in the hundreds, and in distant villages whole families perished. Thus, a petition was sent to Moscow to recognize the Orenburg, Ural, Aktobe, Bukeev, Kustanai provinces, and Adayevsky district as starving and to remove the state tax in kind from them. “According to the Kyrstatupravlenie, almost half of the population of the republic was starving (of the total number – 4,781,263 people). S. Mendeshev in the summer of 1922 at the session of the KazCEC reported about 2 million 832 thousand starving people. In the Ural province, 99% of the inhabitants were starving, in Orenburg – 80%, in Kustanai – 74.5%, in Akmola – 40%. The famine was especially terrible in the Kazakh villages, left without livestock. Pomgol’s report at the KazCEC in July 1922 stated: ‘From May 1 to July 15, 1922, the number of starving people in the Akmola region ranges from 400,000 to 450,000. Information received from the field indicates that the situation of the population is catastrophic. So, for example, in the districts of Petropavlovsk, Kokchetav, Moganalinsky and Aklinsky districts of the Atbasar district, the population is already doomed to starvation. In some places people eat surrogates and carrion, there are cases of cannibalism’” (Schmidt 2018: 48). In the Steppe, jute often happened, so for a long time there was a custom to provide shelter and food to any person, neighboring clans came to the rescue, sharing livestock or providing pastures. But never because of natural disasters did hunger acquire such proportions that half of the population starved. In Kazakhstan, the number of homeless children was growing rapidly. “The dynamics of their growth in the republic is as follows: November 16, 1921 – 100 thousand, December 1 – 128.873, January 1, 1922 – 158.564 and March 1, 1922 – 408.202” (Sarsenov et al. 2022: 32). M.M. Kozybaeva, A.I. Kudaibergenova, and R.Zh. Baydaly cites official data, according to which in the cities of Kazakhstan “during this period, up to 50 children were collected from the streets every day. At

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various times, it was found that homeless children were concentrated in large numbers: in Kostanay – 890 people, in Poltaratsk – 300 people, in Kazaly – 160 people, in Turkestan – 180 people, in Perovsky – 100 people, in the city of Arys – 200 people” (Kozybaeva et al. 2021: 153). Hundreds of thousands of Kazakh children in orphanages are evidence that tens of thousands of families of their relatives (ata-zhurt, nagashizhurt, villages of the same kind, etc.) died of starvation. But the children who ended up in the orphanage were inspired by the idea that the Soviet government had saved them. These children, brought up in orphanages, will be thrown into the millstones of World War II. Could the help organized by the Bolsheviks save the starving people? In the report of the RCP(b) the Kyrgyz bureau dated October 7, 1921, it is reported that 3 canteens for 400 people were opened in Petropavlovsk, in Akmolinsk—for 250 people, Atbasar—for 300 people, Kokchetav— for 600 people. Total for 5150 people. In October 1922, a canteen was opened for children in Akmolinsk, where up to 500 meals a day were prepared. In 1923, an orphanage for 70 children was opened. In February 1923, there were 105 dependent children in the “Children’s Home” and 125 people aged 4–70 years in the “House of the Peasant”. In order to “avoid the spread of the epidemic and their accumulation at railway stations”, the free movement of starving people from one province to another was prohibited. Those. sometimes people who could have been saved were left in their places of residence for virtually certain death. Help for children in the KASSR began to be provided by the Central Commission of the KazCEC in April 1922. By November alone, the number of homeless children was determined—more than 400,000. Evacuation to prosperous provinces was allowed—4 trains with children every month. Thus, 17,496 children were evacuated to the Turkish Republic, Ukraine, and other regions of the country. Orphanages and orphanages were organized in the cities. The number of orphanages and institutions was increased to 455. There were 60,000 children in them. Significant assistance to the starving in Kazakhstan (as well as in Russia) was provided by foreign organizations. The largest of these was the American Relief Administration. At first, she helped only children and the sick, then the adult starving population was also covered by help. “It was thanks to them that from November 1921 to March 1922, 125 wagons with food, clothing and other warm clothes were delivered from Moscow. They created a network of canteens for the starving in the city of Orenburg, then in the Orenburg and Aktobe provinces. The Ural

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department of the organization began similar work in January 1922, and in the Kostanay province – from June. In the Ural province, they allocated an additional 60,000 rations for starving adults, by June 15 another 180,313 rations, and organized meals in 90 canteens for 165,979 children. In Bukeevskaya province, they provided 4,500 rations” (Sarsenov et al. 2022: 32). Hot meals were distributed in hospitals, rest homes, places of detention. In addition, 9 wagons of medicines were delivered, 10,000 suits, 4750 blankets, etc. were distributed. Given the scale of the famine, the aid was not enough. V. Schmidt notes that “negotiations were started with the Catholic mission of the Pope in Russia. Representatives of this mission gave their consent to provide assistance to 20,000 and, if necessary, up to 30,000 children in the disaster areas. In a special telegram dated December 5, 1922, sent to Orenburg from Moscow, it was said: ‘The Catholic mission received the consent of the Pope of Rome to take 20,000 dependent children in the area of the city of Orenburg, and also agreed to the delivery of medicines and food’” (Schmidt 2018: 47). Norwegian polar explorer F.V.-Ya. Nansen, shocked by the extent of the famine in Soviet Russia, set up a committee to help the faminestricken. The Nansen Mission to Kazakhstan handed over 4052 boxes of canned food and crackers, as well as two mobile outpatient clinics with medicines to help children. 49 canteens, 17 dispensaries, and 3 hospitals were opened in the Steppe. K.M. Murzakhodzhaev notes: “However, other organizations also provided assistance. Among them are the Red Cross society, the International Workers’ Committee, created at the initiative of the Comintern in Berlin in 1921, the Quakers organization, formed in England and Wales, etc. Almost all of them opened food stations, supplied orphanages with the necessary supplies, and supported the starving in every possible way” (Murzakhodzhaev 2021: 9). Through the Red Cross, food and medical assistance were provided to 14,000 people in villages and nomad camps in the Orenburg, Aktobe, Kustanai, and Bukeev provinces. In the northern regions of Kazakhstan, the situation was no less critical. “In archival documents, one can find information that people ate each other from hunger, that is, then cannibalism and the abduction of children were widespread. For example: ‘The food situation in the Kustanai province is critical, these orders are not carried out by the

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Kirnarkomprod. During March–April, the province did not receive a single carload of bread, employees and workers are not supplied for three months, orphanages, hospitals and shelters are doomed to starvation, the starving population of the province is dying, cannibalism appears’” (Murzakhodzhaev and Konkabaeva 2021: 169). Pomgol’s forces gathered help for the starving. “So, thanks to the combined efforts, 5 canteens were organized in Petropavlovsk, and in 10 months (until July 1, 1922) 590,000 free meals were distributed, of which 309,000 were intended for children. In just 10 months of his work (from August 23, 1921 to July 1, 1922), Gubchekapomgol collected 42,664 poods of bread, 10,872 poods of meat and fish, 166 poods of butter, 3,529 poods of vegetables and other products 1240 heads of cattle” (Kozybaeva et al. 2021: 155). Canteens were also opened in other cities of northern Kazakhstan: in Kokchetav—5, in Atbasar—3, in Akmolinsk—3. In the northern counties, the number of starving people was 440,397, including 150,000 people in Petropavlovsk, 114,000 in Kokchetav, 110,000 in Atbasar, and 66,397 in Akmola (Murzakhodzhaev and Konkabaeva 2021). Despite the help, “during the famine of 1921–1922, 648,777 people died of starvation in the western provinces alone, which is 29.5%. The victims of famine in the west of Kazakhstan were: in the Aktobe province 159 thousand people (39.1% of the Kazakh population), in the Ural province 70 thousand (22.9% of the Kazakh population), in the Bukeev province 33 thousand (14.6% of the Kazakh population) in Adayevsky district there are 3 thousand people (2.6% of the Kazakh population)” (Sarsenov et al. 2022: 32). L. Gryvennaya writes about the losses of the Kazakh population in the period 1920–1923: “Of these, the Kazakh population died on the basis of the agricultural census of 1920 and 1923—414 thousand people (18.5% of the total Kazakh population); in relation to the entire population from 1920 to 1923, the percentage of population loss is called—19.1%, including rural—21.5%; by the end of 1921—the beginning of 1922, it was reported that ‘the number of the starving population of the KSSR extends to 1309 thousand souls, which is 59% of the total number of starving provinces’. In the West Kazakhstan provinces in November 1921, the number of starving people was 63.4%, by April 1922 their number reached 93% of the total population. The western provinces of the KSSR found themselves in a more distressed situation also due to the migration

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of immigrants from the central provinces of Russia and the Volga region” (Sarsenov et al. 2022: 83). The famine did not end in 1923. In April 1924, famine engulfed the Karaganda, Nurinsky, Zakharovsky, Asan-Kaiginsky, Sary-Arkinsky, SarySuysky, Korgalzhinsky regions, i.e. areas inhabited mainly by the Kazakh population, as well as Akmolinsk and its environs. Thus, almost 50% of the Kazakhs were starving in the Baganalinsky district, in May 1924 the number of starving people in Akmola district was about 30 thousand people. It is terrible to imagine in what state (physical, psychological, mental) the Kazakhs emerged from the famine of the early 1920s. It was not just the horror of the experience, not just an awareness of the scale of the catastrophe, but also a clear understanding of what the new government represents. The second Asharshylyk of 1931–1932 was brought about by a new adventure of the Soviet authorities—expropriation, collectivization and at the same time violent sedentarization of the Kazakhs, as well as the struggle of the communists with the resistance of the Kazakhs against the Soviet authorities. The date of the defeat of the main forces of the Basmachi is called 1926. However, numerous uprisings of the sarbazes on the territory of Kazakhstan resumed already in 1928 in response to the tough policy of collectivization. It is important to emphasize that the resistance did not begin during the Asharshylyk period of the early 1930s (when its terrible consequences were already obvious and there were no resources for armed resistance), but after the Asharshylyk of the 1920s, and especially with the start of the process of expropriation with the aim of forced collectivization. Already taught by the terrible experience of the famine of the 1920s, the Kazakhs at the first sign of a new weaning of property (livestock) rose to fight against the Soviet regime. Collectivization was to be completed in 1932. The understanding of what was conceived by the authorities, the threatening threats, and its terrible consequences came immediately. Already at the end of 1928, the first arrests of opponents of collectivization began: Alashorda residents A. Baitursynov, M. Dulatov, Zh. Aimauytov, M. Zhumabaev. Collectivization, which according to the plan was supposed to happen gradually, began to rapidly accelerate. “If in 1928 in Kazakhstan 2% of all farms were collectivized, then by April 1, 1930 – 50.5%, and by October 1931 – about 65%… So, say, in the Urals and Petropavlovsk Districts at

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that time in the collective farms there were more than 70% of the farms available there. No less steep parabola was written out by collective-farm dynamics in other regions of the region. Therefore, it is not surprising that by the beginning of the autumn of 1931 there were 78 districts in the republic (out of 122), where collectivization covered from 70 to 100% of households” (Kozybaev et al. 1992: 4). The Kazakhs were not going to give away their livestock and again be exposed to the danger of starvation. So, “during only two grain procurement campaigns (1928–1929 and 1929–1930) and only in three districts (Akmola, Petropavlovsk and Semipalatinsk), as a result of the application of Articles 107 and 61 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, 34,120 people were convicted and brought to administrative responsibility 22.307 farms. In addition, fines were collected and property was confiscated for more than 23 million rubles; livestock – 53.4 thousand heads, grain stocks – 631 thousand pounds, various buildings – 258 units” (Kozybaev et al. 1992: 6). Also: “Only in the first year of this anti-constitutional norm in Kazakhstan, 33,345 people were convicted, of which 7,728 collective farmers and 5,315 individual workers (as stated in the reports). According to sources, in the second half of 1931, i.e. before the adoption of the law, 79 people were shot in cases related to procurement” (Kozybaev et al. 1992: 7–8). How did collectivization take place? Hundreds of farms within a radius of up to 200 or more kilometers were drawn to one place, they were collective farms. People were sent to the “settlement points” under police escort. Livestock was taken from them and accumulated in one place. Cattle confiscated from the beys, who were sent outside the region or republic, were also sent here. It was not possible to feed the herds, herds and flocks gathered in a limited space. Cattle began to die, part of it was massively slaughtered on the spot. In 1933, out of 40 million heads of cattle (before the confiscation began), only a tenth remained. “Animal husbandry has suffered unprecedented losses. The dynamics of the catastrophe that happened here looked as follows. In 1928, there were 6,509 thousand heads of cattle in the republic, and in 1932 only 965 thousand. Even on the eve of the war, in 1941, the pre-kolkhoz level was not restored (3,335 thousand heads). The figures for small livestock are even more striking: out of 18,566,000 sheep in 1932, only 1,386,000 remained (before the war itself, the herd had barely approached 8 million heads). Of the horse population, which was determined in 1928 in the amount of 3516 thousand, 3200 thousand physically dropped out (in

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1941—885 thousand heads). Camel breeding, a traditional industry for the region, practically ceased to exist: by 1935, only 63,000 camels remained, while in 1928 there were 1,042,000 heads” (Kozybaev et al. 1992: 20). As a result, a famine struck the whole of Kazakhstan. The auls were starved to death so that they could not help the sarbaz with food and horses, so that the auls would not leave with the sarbaz across the cordon. Simultaneously with collectivization, a campaign was carried out for the forcible sedentarization of the Kazakhs. “As the sources show, the campaign to settle nomadic and semi-nomadic households had the following dynamics. In 1930 – 87.136 farms, in 1931 – 77.508, in 1932 – 77.674 and in 1933 – 242.208” (Kozybaev et al. 1992: 16). In 1933, there was nothing to roam with, the Kazakhs were left without livestock. During collectivization, 372 mass demonstrations and uprisings took place in the republic, and about 80 thousand people took part in them. Major performances took place practically throughout the entire territory of the republic. Their peak was in 1929–1931. The armed uprisings of the sarbazes were eliminated in 1933, that is, this happened only when the Steppe was broken by Asharshylyk. Turar Ryskulov, deputy chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR, reported to Stalin in a letter dated March 9, 1933, classified as “Secret”, the following: “In the report of the Moscow detachment (Society) The Red Cross, which is currently working in the Aktobe region, reports that Kazakhs in areas such as Turgay are engulfed by famine and epidemic. The hungry feed on garbage, eat the roots of wild plants, small rodents. ‘The dogs and cats of this group are completely eaten, and the rubbish heaps around their huts are full of boiled dog bones and small rodents’. They report about cases of corpse-eating… According to the testimony of the chairman of the Kzyl-Orda district executive committee, 15–20 percent of the population remains in this area in most village councils. In the Balkhash region (according to the local OGPU) there was a population of 60 thousand, 12 thousand people migrated, 36 thousand people died and 12 thousand Kazakh people remained. In the Karatal region last winter, half of the population died during the forced resettlement of three Kazakh auls to another place. In the same area (according to the testimony of the local OGPU) in December and ten days of January 1933, 569 people died of starvation, more than 300 corpses were picked up during the same time at the Ushtobe station, the Karatalstroy site and the rice farm. In 1931, there

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were 5300 farms in the Chubartavsky district, and as of January 1, 1933, 1941 farms remained. In the Karkaraly region in May 1932 there were 50,400 people, and by November 15,900 people remained, and in the regional center 15–20 people died every day (from the information of the Regional Committee)” (Famine in the Kazakh steppe 2012: 170–171). T. Ryskulov wrote about the catastrophic situation with street children, citing a fragment of the report of the Aktobe Red Cross detachment on Kazakh children: “Children are in the most terrible condition. The child population under the age of 4 years died out without exception, if left without parents. In orphanages, etc., I had to see children from the age of 4, younger age only with their parents, and even then they were extremely exhausted. The population of orphanages is completely covered with diarrhea. Usually, in an orphanage with a population of 100–150 people, 1–2, or even 3 children die, the number of which is immediately replenished due to new admissions. The orphanage population is threatened with complete extinction” (Famine in the Kazakh steppe 2012: 172). Further, Ryskulov reports on homeless children: “In December and early January (that is, in the very cold), 1,100 homeless children were transferred back to the regions (from where the population fled) from Karaganda in the order of purge (which was carried out in relation to adults). Up to 450 homeless children accumulated in Kyzyl-Orda in January. 300 children were collected from one station Ayaguz” (Famine in the Kazakh steppe 2012: 172). Ryskulov’s information with many figures was confirmed by a letter from Mirzoyan to Stalin dated March 29, 1933: “In all regions, it is in a state of migration (with the exception of those outside the republic), that is, they left their places and moved to other districts, regional centers, railway stations of about 90,000 households, with a total population of about 300,000 souls… at least one hundred thousand Kazakh households are actually starving at masses In connection with migrations, homelessness has taken on significant proportions. Most farms that are in a state of migration leave their children at stations, cities and regional centers. To date, 57,000 homeless children have been picked up and hastily placed in orphanages” (Famine in the Kazakh steppe 2012: 196–197). Thus, Asharshylyk, organized in 1931–1932, became a consequence, a response to the armed resistance of the people. In fact, Asharshylyk, organized on a vast territory, became a method of fighting against the tactics of the steppe war, where auls were bases: sarbazes came from here, who hid here if necessary, auls were supplied with food, horses, etc.

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But, most importantly, these villages were mobile. How could the Soviet government fight them? It could have been a long, exhausting war, even despite the superiority of the Red Army in numbers and weapons. From abroad, the sarbaz could receive help from the Kazakhs who had previously migrated. The simplest and fastest solution to the problem was the gathering of auls into “settlement points” under supervision, the selection of livestock (mainly horses), the isolation of auls in a certain territory, depriving them of contacts with the warring sarbazes. Simultaneously with collectivization, measures were taken to eliminate the bayst as a class. In 1929, more than 3000 “kulak-bay” farms were liquidated, some people were shot or sent to concentration camps for periods of 3–10 years, about 6800 people were evicted from the republic. During the establishment of Soviet power, the communists tried to split the Kazakh society, pushing, as they saw it, class antagonists—rich and poor. However, the quantitative ratio of the settled Sharua and the proletariat was negligible in comparison with the bulk of the Kazakhs, who maintained a nomadic and semi-nomadic way of life. And the nomadic community continued to maintain the traditional structure, where bai and biy were not exploiters, but the heads of a clan, subgenus, aul. These collectives, united according to the kinship principle, jointly owned ancestral pastures and livestock. so-called. ordinary Kazakhs, in whom the Soviet government hoped to find supporters, resisted the expropriation, because it was not the bay that lost the cattle, but the whole aul, (sub)genus. The Soviets never managed to convince the Kazakhs that the bai was a class enemy, because for the Kazakhs, bai, and biy were not just wealthy people, but leaders who were responsible for their relatives. They were in charge of economic and economic affairs, migrations, litigation, observance of customs, marriage, and marriage of young people, sending to study and paying for it, aces, etc. Bai, biy for members of the clan, the village was a close relative (such among the Kazakhs is considered to be kinship up to the seventh generation). The principles of class division and class hostility did not work here. The communists, realizing the futility of their attempts to push the members of one branched family, neighboring auls, and clans, simply physically destroyed or expelled beys and biys and, thereby, decapitated the clans. The situation with hunger was aggravated by the brutal suppression by the Red Army units of the attempts of the population to avoid the

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confiscation of all livestock. When part of the villages and clans began to migrate, trying to save their livestock, Red Army detachments were sent to intercept them in order to destroy these supposedly Basmachi gangs. At the same time, the nomads were ordinary peaceful people who tried to escape from hunger. They migrated to China and Mongolia by birth, auls, led by their bays and biys, who led people, bearing responsibility for their fate and lives. Bais did not leave alone without their relatives (migration was always carried out by auls). The border guards also stopped the resettlement, often simply destroying entire villages with machine-gun fire. Thus, Asharshylyk in Kazakhstan in 1932–1933 was not just a disaster, but part of the class struggle and tactics of the Soviet government against the armed resistance of the Kazakh Sarbaz. In fact, the organization of the famine was a continuation of the civil war. Why is Asharshylyk a man-made phenomenon, organized on a certain territory? Because famine, in general, was covered by the areas of residence of the Kazakhs, the resistance of the Sarbaz. And, moreover, there was no famine in neighboring villages and cities. The people had food. So the starving people could be saved. But for 2 years this did not happen. Until the uprisings of the Sarbaz were suppressed … (cf.: famine in Ukraine in a strange way covered precisely the areas of resistance, and in Russia, the North Caucasus—the areas of settlement of the resisting Cossacks). Assistance to the starving began to be provided only in 1933. During the period of collectivization and even during the years of the peak of the famine in Kazakhstan, hundreds of thousands of people fled from dispossession, were sent to deportation (From the history of deportations 2012), to KarLag (Shaimukhanov and Shaimukhanova 1997). “The number of those exiled to Kazakhstan in 1930–1933. amounted to 317 thousand people. Fleeing from dispossession, another 150–175 thousand families fled here from the border regions. In terms of the concentration of deported peasants, Kazakhstan was in third place after the Urals and Siberia” (From the history of deportations 2012: 32). Karlag was created on December 19, 1931, on the basis of the OGPU KazITlag created in 1930. In the first year of the camp’s existence, the contingent numbered 10,400 people. At the end of 1933, the number reached 24,148 people (GULAG 2000).

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Scientists also note a decrease in the number of representatives of other ethnic groups: “Ukrainians from 859.4 thousand to 658.1, Uzbeks – from 228.2 thousand to 103.6, Uighurs – from 62.3 thousand to 36.6. In this difficult hard times, representatives of these peoples were forced to leave their homes and move to more prosperous areas in terms of food – Siberia, Uzbekistan” (Kozybaev et al. 1992: 29). As a result, during 1931–1933, according to preliminary data, about 2 million Kazakhs died of starvation; about 1 million people were forced to migrate to China, Mongolia, Iraq, and Afghanistan (more than half of them did not return). The number of Kazakhs in the territory of Kazakhstan has almost halved. Demographer A.N. Alekseenko notes: “Thus, taking into account all possible amendments, the loss of the Kazakh population amounted to 1840 thousand people or 47.3% of the ethnic group in 1930. The Kazakhs of the east of the republic suffered the most. Losses here amounted to 379.4 thousand people or 64.5% of the ethnic group in 1930. In this region, the most significant migration was observed, primarily to the border regions of the Russian Federation and China. More than half of the representatives of the ethnic group were lost in Northern Kazakhstan – 410.1 thousand people or 52.3%. Western Kazakhstan lost 394.7 thousand Kazakhs or 45.0% of the ethnic group, South – 632.7 thousand or 42.9%. The smallest losses were in Central Kazakhstan – 22.5 thousand people or 15.6% of the ethnic group of this region” (Alekseenko 2000). Thus, Asharshylyk of 1932–1933 not only ruined the Kazakhs, but also dealt a terrible blow to their psychology and mentality, creating the basis for a sharp change in their national identity. If after the first Asharshylyk in the early 1920s the people were still capable of active resistance, then after the second, which happened 10 years later, the people were finally broken. The arranged genocide was “sweetened” by the fact that in 1936 Kazakhstan from an autonomous republic became a union republic. During the period of national disengagement in 1924, Kazakhstan was denied the status of a union republic, although then it more than met (territorially, demographically) the requirements. Now that after Asharshylyk, Kazakhstan has reduced many indicators (the number of Kazakhs has halved, hundreds of thousands have migrated to other regions and countries), Moscow did not risk anything. The people were half physically destroyed, did not make up the majority on their territory, were psychologically

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broken, armed resistance was suppressed, hundreds of thousands of men were killed, the leaders of the people (clans) were arrested or deported.

5.3 Broken by Starvation, or the Consequences of Asharshylyk Realizing the scale and number of victims of Asharshylyk in the early 1920s and 1930s, it should be understood that these tragic events became the basis for the breakdown of national identity, led to changes in the mentality of the Kazakhs, distorted value orientations, and affected their self-esteem and level of socialization. The scale and content of the tragedy are measured not only by monstrous human casualties, but also by radical changes at the level of identity, psychology, and morality. Asharshylyk not only destroyed half of the population, but also dealt an almost fatal blow to the survivors, forever changing them. The two Asharshylyks experienced within one decade, could not but affect the psychology of the people, their identity, self-esteem, social pessimism, etc. The consequences of Asharshylyk, which affected the nation for more than half a century and some of which have not yet been overcome: . a sharp and significant (half) reduction in the number of people over a short period; . demolition of the traditional way of life and management; . devaluation of traditional values; . the confusion of the Kazakhs from ignorance of how and with what to earn a living; . the fertility of the past economic experience of the people; . complete destruction of the village; the settlers saw the poor people (not suspecting how wealthy the nomads were with their herds and flocks), which affected their assessment and attitude towards the Kazakhs; . suppression of the freedom-loving spirit of the people and the very ability to resist; having put the population of recalcitrant regions on the brink of survival, or even completely destroying millions of people, the authorities forced them to give up resistance. It was the breaking of the backbone of the nation;

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. the division of a single people as a result of the forced migration of its significant part; . fear of government officials as a result of totalitarian policies, political repressions and punitive measures to influence the population; . establishment of vertical social ties instead of traditionally horizontal ones; . silence about the tragic events, i.e. the displacement of the memory of Asharshylyk from the consciousness of millions of people due to (1) the prohibition by the authorities of the mention of him, because it was a guarantee of hiding their crimes; (2) fear and rejection from memory in order to avoid difficult memories that can bring torment, feelings of fear, pain, guilt and powerlessness; . the mechanism of delayed memory of events that traumatize the historical consciousness of the people leads to relative oblivion or displacement, hence the silence about Asharshylyk of three generations as a defensive reaction; . selective memory or a subconscious desire to talk about a lesser evil, reflected in the fact that, speaking about the famine, the older generation seemed to mean only the famine of the war and post-war years (1940s), although the two Asharshylyks were much more terrible in scale and the number of victims; . subconscious fear of hunger; people who survived Asharshylyk have been collecting crumbs from the table all their lives; they no longer starved, but in the subconscious, the fear of hunger, which cost the lives of their relatives, sat firmly; . poverty policy; Communists for 70 years have not been able to fully feed the people, they could not give people economic freedom, because this would give them independence from power. Until now, the authorities are afraid of an independent society and by all means puts it into economic dependence. Such vices of representatives of the authorities, as exorbitant enrichment by criminal means, also come from Asharshylyk; . destruction of the microcosm of the village and its sacredness for the Kazakhs; the black shadow of Asharshylyk fell precisely on the village, which became a place of fear, risk, hence the desire to leave the village to places that guarantee the avoidance of the threat of hunger (the city). The aul was the essence, foundation, cradle, wealth of the Kazakhs, and became a place of punishment, avoidance, backwardness;

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. representation of everything Kazakh as backward, patriarchal-feudal; everything Kazakh fell here indiscriminately, allegedly second-rate Kazakh culture, customs, music, language, etc.; . refusal to uphold the primordial national rights of the people (language, history, national pride) as a consequence of the accusation of nationalism; . a national minority on their own land and the vulnerability associated with it; . low self-esteem; . prone to addictive behavior; . fear of the future; . lack of initiative; . a tendency to a depressed inner state or social pessimism. Asharshylyk dramatically changed or distorted important constituent elements of the Kazakh identity. Among them: aul and Steppe—a cradle; strength of family ties; the main wealth is the clan (people, land, livestock); a sense of the Motherland (land) and responsibility for it, the concept of justice; independence and freedom; the nomadic lifestyle itself, traditional professional specializations, and many others. Historical memory is closely connected with the formation of not only individual, but also collective (sociocultural) identity, with the moral aspects of the past. Manipulations with the imposition of a false assessment of the people are criminal, because it is manipulations with national identity, capable of destroying a nation, destroying its fundamental characteristics and features. A misjudgment of the past leads to a misjudgment of oneself in the present. A false past leads to a false present. The people cannot understand: why are we different from our ancestors? How did we become like this? Answers to these questions can be given by historians, sociologists, and psychologists. And here it is important not so much to know the tragic pages of the past as to understand the consequences of what happened. The bottom line is that overcoming the consequences by oblivion, voluntary or involuntary silence is impossible. The consequences of the past, especially the tragic ones, always have a huge impact on the present, and at least partial overcoming of them is impossible without understanding, pronouncing what exactly happened. It is important not only to learn the truth about the past, but also to realize its negative consequences.

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Only then will we be free from them and, moreover, will we understand ourselves today. Understanding the tragedy that happened to the people will significantly reduce its depressive state, even out self-esteem, and see that many weaknesses are not inherent qualities of the nation, but the consequences of attempts to destroy the people, their national dignity, their love of freedom, their culture and traditions. Often a person’s low self-esteem is not a consequence of his real vulnerability, inferiority, or insecurity, but something that was instilled into his people by the method of physical destruction and propaganda. If now we do not talk about the consequences of the two artificial famines experienced by the people, then the consequences caused by it will not be associated with the experienced collective trauma, and the next generations will be perceived as inherent qualities, norms of behavior, values of the people. The people will have complexes, vulnerabilities, the origin of which the descendants will not understand, because the origins of these complexes will be lost, forgotten. The danger is that the mental consequences of the famine will be perceived not as a consequence of specific tragic events, but as traits of the national character allegedly inherent in the Kazakhs. Hence our current excessive pride in any domestic sports star, singer, or hero of the past. The nation, on a subconscious level, wants rehabilitation, otherwise, the broken spine threatens to finally break the body. But real rehabilitation is possible only under one condition: to see, to understand the consequences of the tragedy. In other words, we need to return to where we partially lost ourselves in order to understand who we are, what is happening to us. This is also necessary in order to, if possible, restore the lost features of one’s identity, get rid of superficial ones, and rehabilitate the village.

5.4 The Guillotine of Political Repression, or the Headless People When we talk about the victims of political repressions, it should be understood that repressions continued in Kazakhstan throughout the years of Soviet power, from 1917 to the end of the 1980s. In 1917–1920, a struggle was waged against the national intelligentsia, the founders of the Alash Orda party, as well as the political associations Shara-i-Islamiya and Turkestani Mukhtariat. On May 29, 1925, Stalin wrote: “But I am strongly opposed to non-party intellectuals were admitted to the cause of struggle on the

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political and ideological front. I am against the fact that non-party intellectuals are engaged in the political and ideological education of the Kyrgyz (Kazakh. – A.M.) youth. We did not take power in order to leave the political and ideological education of the youth to bourgeois non-Party intellectuals. This front must be left entirely and without a trace to the communists” (Great censorship 2005: 98). This letter became an indication for the start of punitive measures against the Kazakh intelligentsia. In September 1925, Goloshchekin was sent to the post of first secretary of the Kazkraykom of the CPSU (b). With his arrival in Kazakhstan, the persecution of dissidents—Alashorda and nationalists began. In 1927–1929, some state and public figures were removed from the republic, others were removed from their posts. At the end of 1928, the first arrests of opponents of collectivization began. They were A. Baitursynov, M. Dulatov, Zh. Aimauytov, M. Zhumabaev, and others, who foresaw the terrible consequences of the policy pursued by the communists. In total, 44 people were arrested on false charges in 1928—former leaders of Alash Orda. In 1930, another 40 people from among the Kazakh intelligentsia were arrested (Kh. Dosmukhamedov, Zh. Dosmukhamedov, M. Tynyshbaev, Zh. Akpaev, A. Ermekov, and others). Some of them were deported outside the republic, some were sent to prisons and camps, and some were shot. Then the persecution of representatives of the party-Soviet elite began, the old guard of the Bolsheviks, who opposed the policy of “Little October” Goloshchekin. T. Ryskulov, S. Sadvokasov, S. Seifullin, and others were hit. Under political repression in the period 1929–1931 were the rebels of numerous uprisings against the Soviet regime. 5551 people were convicted, 883 of them were shot. The participants in the speeches tried to migrate en masse with their families to Turkmenistan, Karakalpakstan, Afghanistan, and China. On the borders, the auls were met by detachments of the OGPU and the Red Army; survivors of skirmishes or under direct execution under escort were returned to their former place of residence. At this time, the campaign of complete collectivization intensified. How many of the rebel villages survived in Asharshylyk is hard to say. Perhaps, as if in punishment, it was the rebel areas that suffered the main losses, making up a significant part of those who were destroyed by man-made famine.

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In the 1930s, the Soviet government took on those who understood the criminal essence of Asharshylyk, committed by it during the civil war, collectivization, and were able to tell the world the truth about it. In Kazakhstan, those who dared to ask questions about the tragedy, demand justice and punishment of those responsible, criticize, and fight against the policy of extermination of the Kazakh people pursued by the center fell under the blows of the “hammer and sickle”. They, according to Stalin, should have been destroyed. Thus, the Kazakh intelligentsia fell under the blow of totalitarianism. In the final period of Asharshylyk, in 1933, Stalin wrote in a telegram to the first secretary of the Kazkraykom of the CPSU (b) L. Mirzoyan: “The next task of the Kazakh Bolsheviks is to, fighting Great Russian chauvinism, concentrate fire against Kazakh nationalism and deviations towards it. Otherwise, it is impossible to defend Leninist internationalism in Kazakhstan… The struggle against local nationalism must be intensified in every possible way in order to create conditions for planting Leninist internationalism among the working masses of the nationalities of Kazakhstan” (Bolshevik of Kazakhstan 1937: 52). Yezhov reported that all national cadres, all Kazakh communists were infected with national deviationism, that there were no sound party forces among them. Consequently, in order to eradicate nationalism and “create conditions for the planting of Leninist internationalism”, it was necessary to destroy the entire Kazakh intelligentsia, public figures, and the initiative, passionate part of the nation. The communists destroyed methodically. This is the only thing they were able to do purposefully, planned, in cold blood, producing results beyond the plan. The legal framework for the upcoming mass repressions of 1937–1938 was created in advance. The peak of political repression occurred in 1937–1938—the so-called “The Great Terror”. The number of those arrested in Kazakhstan amounted to 103 thousand people, of which 25 thousand were shot. Among them were those who continued to resist the Soviet regime, and the old guard of revolutionaries, and ardent communists (almost half of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan), as well as the educated part of the Kazakh people, which made up most of the repressed (writers, poets, scientists, cultural figures, religious figures). Executions of the intelligentsia were blasphemously called “the highest measure of social protection”, and concentration camps—“a place of social prevention”.

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Repressions covered almost all segments of the population. T. Ryskulov, N. Nurmakov, S. Khodzhanov, U. Kulumbetov, O. Isaev, O. Zhandosov, A. Dosov, A. Asylbekov, Zh. Sadvakasov, S. Safarbekov, T. Zhurgenov, and many others. The most prominent figures of culture and science were repressed: A. Bokeikhanov, A. Baitursunov, M. Dulatov, A. Ermekov, H. Dosmukhameduly, M. Tynyshbayuly, M. Zhumabaev, S. Seifullin, I. Zhansugurov, B. Mailin, S. Asfendiyarov, Zh. Shanin, K. Kemengerov and others. Among those arrested and shot in 1937–1938. There were many aksakals aged 75–85. Why was it necessary to arrest, exile, and execute old people? In addition, shezhireshi fell under repression, who, along with the aksakals, were bearers of the memory of the people, their history, moral values, traditions, they were experts in the land (territory, borders, nomadic routes, etc.). Among the repressed were religious figures, as well as folk healers, and healers. In early 1938, Stalin’s brother-in-law S.F. became the head of the state security of Kazakhstan. Redens. He beheaded the entire leadership of Kazakhstan in 10 days (from February 25 to March 13, 1938). The military collegium sentenced 650 people to death, including: Chairman of the Supreme Council of the 1st convocation Kulumbetov, chairman and secretary of the Council of People’s Commissars, 7 people’s commissars, all chairmen of regional executive committees, secretaries of regional committees, the prosecutor of the republic, the chairman of the Supreme Court, and writers. Those. those who understood what was happening during the period of collectivization, Asharshylyk, and the deportation of peoples, were repressed. And so they were dangerous. Then tens of thousands of ordinary communists and cultural figures were shot. Thus, an entire nation was beheaded, leaving a body with a broken back—the people. He survived long and painfully. Then they finished off the rest, mowed down the surviving or newly emerging Kazakh intelligentsia, capable of independently thinking or defending the interests of the people. In the mid-1940s–early 1950s, political repressions swept the field of science, literature and art. The thesis of “bourgeois nationalism” was again revived among the national intelligentsia. So, the reason for the next wave of repression was the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan in 1947. “On gross political mistakes in the work of the ‘Institute of Language and Literature of the Academy

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of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR’”. They were accused of nationalism: A. Zhubanov, B. Suleimenov, E. Ismailov, M. Auezov, and others. The views of historians of Kazakhstan A. Margulan and E. Bekmakhanov, whose interpretations of Kazakh history ran counter to the official version, were declared pseudo-scientific. The President of the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR K. Satpayev and the outstanding writer M. Auezov suffered. A number of biologists, physicians, and geologists were expelled from scientific institutions and universities. Kazakh writer Anuar Alimzhanov wrote bitter words about the colonial period in 1993: “It is true that tsarist Russia and the totalitarian regime kept us, as a nation, as a people, very skillfully and subtly kept away from machine tools and technology. We were excommunicated from technical, space, construction professions, we were kept away from diplomacy, neither politicians, nor statesmen, nor military specialists were trained, although Russification was in full swing. Even schools in the Kazakh language were closed, and there was not a single secondary and higher educational institution where they would teach in Kazakh. Both our land and our people had to fulfill the same role: to remain a raw material appendage of Russia – colonial Russia, and then the totalitarian regime…”. According to Turar Ryskulov, one of “the honored leaders of the October Revolution” Ivan Tobolin at a meeting of the Turkestan Central Executive Committee in 1920 stated bluntly, that the Kazakhs “as economically weak from the point of view of the Marxists, will still have to die out…”. And they killed us until 1938. Millions died. From artificially created hunger, from the forcible removal of everything that the Kazakh had—a yurt and a horse—who was denied even basic medical care. But it is impossible to kill all the people. In addition, shepherds, shepherds, cheap labor were needed… The motto of the totalitarian regime was permanent and requiring unconditional fulfillment: “Kazakh youth to be shepherds!” (Alimzhanov 2015: 404–405). Among lies and propaganda, lonely voices still continued to be heard, voices trying to defend the dignity, history, language of the people. In the 1960s and 1970s, persecution was organized against writer I. Yesenberlin, beloved by the people. The publication of each of his historical novels was worth the struggle, accompanied by persecution. It’s not just about his historical novels. About I. Esenberlin’s novel “A Boat Crossing the Ocean” (1971), censorship wrote: “The author raises the question: does the development of virgin lands bring happiness to the people, the construction of new industrial regions, and gives a distorted

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picture of the modern history of Kazakhstan. It raises the question of the need to rehabilitate the Alash Orda figures Magzhan Zhumabaev, Akhmet Baitursynov” (Suleimenov 2001: 5). Only in 1987, a year after Zheltoksan, whose participants were severely punished for their impudence to demand rights (to the national language, culture, etc.), did the process of rehabilitation of tens of thousands of leaders of the nation repressed in the 1920–1930s begin.

5.5 Political Repressions, or the Steppe---the Territory of Captivity Concentration camps are the cornerstone of Communist Party policy. Through the concentration camps, the Communist Party solved all ideological, economic, political and other issues. Censorship, terror, concentration camps are the three pillars of the USSR. Without this, the country would not exist not only during its inception, but also until the very end of its existence. Methods and forms changed, but the essence remained the same. In 1918, Lenin reacted to the mutiny that broke out in Penza in a telegram as follows: “…carry out a merciless mass terror against the kulaks, priests and White Guards: lock up the doubtful in a concentration camp outside the city” (Lenin 1970: 143–144]. So in the Union, with the “light” hand of the leader, the “concentration camp policy” began to take shape. A special Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR of September 5, 1918 stated: “…in this situation, securing the rear through terror is a direct necessity; …it is necessary to cleanse the Soviet Republic of class enemies by isolating them in concentration camps. All persons connected with the White Guard organizations, conspiracies and rebellions are subject to execution” (GULAG 2000: 15). In February 1919, G. Sokolnikov, proposed to use the Cossacks as a labor force at industrial facilities in return for their mass execution. The camps multiplied, improved, and gradually covered the territory of the country with a network. In Kazakhstan, it is no coincidence that forced industrialization, collectivization, sarbaz uprisings, Asharshylyk, concentration camps, political repressions and, later, deportations of peoples turn out to be interconnected. The point is the simultaneity and interdependence of these events.

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The concentration camps covered a huge territory in the middle of the Steppe, blocking nomadic routes, the movement of sarbaz from east to west and from north to south, thereby eliminating the possibility of resuming resistance in a vast territory. Collectivization, political repression and deportation of peoples made it possible to seize livestock and land, to provide industry with cheap labor. In 1929, Stalin approved a plan to create a network of forced labor camps throughout the country. In May 1930, a resolution “On the organization of the Kazakh ITLAG” was adopted. And already in December 1931, on the basis of the state farm “Gigant” of the OGPU-KazITLAG in the territory of Nurinsky, Telmansky, Zhanaarkinsky districts, the Karaganda labor camp was created. The goals of the camp were to form a large food base and provide cheap (in fact, free) labor for the developing coal and metallurgical industry—the Karaganda coal basin, the Zhezkazgan and Balkhash copper smelters. Both goals were achieved, but they did not stand up for the price. 161 thousand hectares of arable and hay fields were allocated for the territory of the Karlag. Its length was 300 km from north to south and 200 km from east to west. Outside this territory, there were 2 more branches—Akmola and Balkhash. The territory allotted for Karlag was liberated by the forces of the NKVD troops, because. 4 thousand Kazakh families with a population of 80 thousand people lived there, as well as 7 villages with 1.2 thousand German, Russian, Ukrainian families in the amount of 22 thousand people (descendants of those who moved to the Kazakh steppes in 1907–1910 as part of the Stolypin reforms). In 1930–1931, the process of their forced eviction took place. Germans, Russians, and Ukrainians were resettled in the Telmansky, Osakarovsky and Nurinsky districts of the Karaganda region (Shaimukhanov and Shaimukhanova 1997). The Kazakhs refused to move. They earned quite enough for a living without collective farms (the association of close relatives into one or two auls was an effectively functioning collective farm) or without being hired on industrial facilities. We know what happened to most of the Kazakhs, who refused to leave their ancestral lands, settle down, and be hired en masse at industrial facilities. In response, forced collectivization began, the requisition of livestock, which soon led to famine. Pay attention to the date of the creation of the Karlag, a sharp acceleration in the years of 1929–1931 of the collectivization process, carried out

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in a short time, the forcible eviction of the local population from the territory of residence and the beginning of Asharshylyk. By the way, the cattle taken from the Kazakhs living in this territory were transferred to the specially created organization “Vostok-meat” of the “Giant” state farm, i.e. concentration camp. Their livestock, in order not to lose it completely, according to the plan of the organizers, the Kazakhs were to follow to the concentration camp. Many Kazakhs, left without livestock, simply died in the Steppe. Whoever could, reached Karaganda, Balkhash, and got a job in the construction of mines, mines, and factories. They worked 12 hours a day for a cup of gruel and a ration of bread. It was in this way that many nascent industrial giants (in Karaganda, Balkhash, Zhezkazgan) were provided with cheap labor, later they were provided with workers at the expense of a contingent of concentration camps, deportees, prisoners of war, convicted after being in German captivity. Only by the mid-1950s, new settlers came to industrial enterprises in large numbers, who remained in Kazakhstan after the failure of the adventurous campaign to raise virgin lands. In addition, at the height of the famine, in May 1931, 189 thousand people were deported to Kazakhstan, of which 150 thousand were placed on the territory of the current Akmola, Karaganda, Pavlodar, Kokshetau regions. By 1937, the number of people deported to Kazakhstan amounted to 360 thousand people. The question arises: if famine raged in the Steppe, why were people resettled here? The fact is that hunger (lack of food) did not exist, it was organized in the “right” places: where it was necessary to suppress the resistance of the sarbaz, “liberate” the territory, attract/move gratuitous labor to industrial facilities, seize cattle for the Karlag state farms. Thus, Karlag occupied supposedly empty lands. In the territories liberated from the Kazakh villages, camp facilities were erected: barracks, stockyards, barracks of the VOKhR, and commandant’s offices, tens of thousands of prisoners appeared. Despite the existence of a ban on using saman from burial grounds for construction, the prisoners dismantled the old buildings. This was reported by the first secretary of the district committee of the party Zh. Suleimenov: “In the process of building the Karlag branch in the district in the tracts of Ortau, Alabas, Zhaydak-su, Karlag workers destroyed the graves of Kazakh noble people. The grave of the son of the famous

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batyr Zhidebay Syzdyk, dozens of graves were destroyed, turned into a barnyard”. The territory of Karlag expanded rapidly: at first, Karlag was given 120 thousand arable land and 41 thousand hay areas, in 1941 its territory was already 1 million 780 thousand 650 hectares, in 1950—2 million 87 thousand 646 hectares (or 20 thousand 876 sq. km). Over the years of the existence of the Karlag (1931–1953), over 1 million people were imprisoned in it. But in addition to Karlag, StepLag, PeschanLag, Lugovoi existed on the territory of Central Kazakhstan. Throughout Kazakhstan, there were 22 camps, in fact, in all cities. The creation of concentration camps and colonies on a vast territory destroyed traditional forms of management (the Soviets were never able to grow such a quantity of livestock as was achieved by nomads in transhumance), destroyed many Kazakh customs and traditions (because the very environment of their existence and a significant part of their carriers; the survivors were instilled with the idea of the backwardness of these traditions), disrupted the ecological balance (for example, in the Balkhash region, saxaul forests and three-meter reed thickets were rapaciously cut down, which led to an increase in sandstorms, shallowing of the lake), caused famine, epidemics, demographic decline (in particular, natural population growth), etc. The once free Steppe, where the spirit of freedom reigned, where from time immemorial there were no prisons, was turned into a territory of captivity for many peoples. Speaking of political repressions, we usually mean the years 1937– 1938, while their history is much longer in time and, in fact, occupies almost the entire history of the existence of the Soviet totalitarian system. Even after the end of decades of repression, political investigation, the KGB authorities, dissidents, psychiatric hospitals for dissidents, censorship (and, as a result, samizdat), etc., continued to exist. Odious legal norms originate in political repressions—special meetings, troikas (since 1935), and deuces (since 1937). Vyshinsky’s notorious reforms are along the same line: crimes of counter-revolutionary activity are considered without the participation of prosecution and defense; objective evidence of guilt is not needed; confession suffices for condemnation; the court cannot establish objective truth, and therefore its purpose is not to search for truth, but to establish the likelihood of guilt. All that was left was to knock out a confession. Death sentences

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were handed down sometimes in 10 minutes. Hence—torture, confessions, self-incrimination, exposure, denunciations, rejections of fathers, brothers, husbands, and wives. “Conviction by the album”, practiced in 1937–1938, did not require a judicial review at all and allowed them to be sent to be shot in batches. During that period, approximately 10–12% of the repressed were sentenced to death. In the Karaganda region, 38% of all convicts were sentenced to death. In terms of social composition, 39% of them accounted for employees and the intelligentsia, i.e. educated sections of the population. Example: during the period of consideration of cases for the rehabilitation of convicts in 1990, employees of the state security department and the prosecutor’s office of the Karaganda region concluded that out of 1670 criminal cases considered by twos, threes, and special meetings, only 4 had indisputable evidence of guilt. The accusations were often absurd. For example, according to the conclusion of the “troika” of the NKVD in Karaganda, the director of the radio was tried for “infecting cattle with anthrax through the air”; 34 employees of the Karaganda regional communications department were shot for “terror by telephone”, which consisted of plugging high-voltage current into the telephone network, as well as spreading the plague by radio. Cases against “criminals” were opened not as they arose, but by order. So, in May 1937, the first secretary of the Karaganda regional party committee, K. Pinkhasik, criticized the Balkhash district committee for the fact that “so far not a single enemy of the people has been exposed in Balkhash”. After this criticism, critical materials began to appear on the pages of the newspaper “Pribalkhashskaya Pravda” about the sabotage of the leaders of Pribalkhashstroy. Then, in 1937, the campaign for the adoption of “counter plans” began. It was organized by the highest party bodies and was of a massive, one-time nature. In November 1937, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Kazakhstan asked to increase the number of repressed people in Kazakhstan by 600 people in the 1st category (execution) and 1000 people in the 2nd category (sentence: 10 years or more). The operation was carried out in 45 days; instead of the court, cases were considered by “troikas”, executions had to be carried out immediately (virtually without investigation, trial, defense, or appeal). Political repressions touched all the peoples of the USSR, all social strata. The ethnic composition of the USSR almost halved in half a

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century: from 194 in 1926 to 101 in 1979. 93 nations have disappeared from the historical arena. Pierre Almara data: “62 million people were killed in the USSR in 1917–1987, 35 million in ‘Communist China’ in 1948–1987, 21 million in Germany in 1933–1945, and 6 million in Japan in 1936–1945” (Isvestia 1997). According to the calculations of the Russian historian R. Medvedev, from 1927 to 1953, 40 million people were repressed in the USSR, some of them died, and some survived (Medvedev 1998). Kazakhstan was turned into the territory of camps and colonies, forbidden zones, which were fenced with barbed wire, marked with watchtowers: Karlag, Zhezkazganlag, Steplag, Ozerlag, Aktyublag, ALZHIR, Peschanlag, subordinate to the GULAG, as well as UITLK with 70 camp departments and colonies in the department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In Kazakhstan, in fact, there was not a single region, not a single city or large settlement where there would be no separation of camps or colonies.

5.6

Consequences of Mass Political Repressions

Large-scale political repressions, which destroyed almost the entire educated layer of the people, claimed the lives of tens of thousands of its passionate representatives, do not end with the cessation of grandiose terror, mass arrests, and executions. They affect the psychology of the people for a long time, are reflected in the behavioral code, are expressed in the distortion of its value orientations, are preserved in self-censorship, and remain a heavy legacy in the system of work of a number of government bodies, education, the penitentiary system, etc. As you can see, this has been going on for three or four generations. So long, because there was no rehabilitation of awareness, repentance, overcoming the consequences. Purposeful forgetting is a defensive reaction observed in participants of relatively recent events or their descendants. The reluctance to revise, and reinterpret history is connected with the fact that it makes a person reconsider his own past life, and see the fallacy (if not reprehensibility) of knowledge, assessments, positions, and actions. And this is fraught with the need for restructuring, changing one’s identity. Add to this the internal conflict that arises in the event of a confrontation with the

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parental heritage. Although it is difficult to see an insurmountable circumstance here, given the fact that the generation of parents and grandfathers lived in other, one might say, extreme conditions for life—in the conditions of a totalitarian state, in conditions of aggressive ideology and relative isolation from the rest of the world. It is more than strange to discover in modern man the vision that was inspired by our grandfathers and fathers. Previously, a certain assessment and attitude to what was happening were the result of suggestions by all the forces of state propaganda, due to the need to achieve submission, and the adoption of a punitive system. But what is the reason for the current persistence of people in their readiness to see only one side of Soviet reality, avoiding the whole picture? Only inner fear. Fear, which is deeply connected with mentality, identity, psychological state. This phenomenon had been studied quite well by scientists, especially in the period of post-war European society: T. Adorno, P. Ricoeur, and others. T. Adorno argued that events, and facts that caused feelings of guilt and shame and from which the psyche wanted to get rid of, were supplanted by crossing out memories and, thus, the denial of the past: “There is horror in the mind, from which people could suffocate if the mechanisms of its displacement did not work” (Adorno 2003: 352). Today we are dealing with the so-called. delayed memory. Someone hoped that the future would come without recourse to the past, its understanding, and evaluation. But that doesn’t happen. The past catches up with us in our present. And what we have today is always a consequence of our yesterday. This fear of the past (countries, nations, parties, authorities) and the desire to avoid its assessment leads to mistakes, omissions, and vulnerability. We are fully convinced of this now. The current Kazakhs are ready to perceive their past with all its tragedies, losses, mistakes, and therefore they persistently turn to the past. This is not a reason for expressing grievances and expressing negativity, not obsession with the past and avoiding the present. A clear, truthful past is a willingness to accept it in its entirety, to realize the reasons for one’s defeats and the origins of one’s weakness, to assess the potential that has been preserved, and finally to understand the mechanisms of transformation of national identity in order to accept one’s present self. Sometimes people are at a loss about the circumstances in which they are (lack of unity and mutual understanding in society, the relevance of

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the issue of emigration for certain people, and many others), and yet this confusion is a consequence of the unwillingness to comprehend the past, to understand the nature current government, see the roots of many current conflicts. Without understanding the causes of problems, it is impossible to resolve them; without understanding the prerequisites, it is impossible to fully understand what is happening in the country today. Eighty years have passed since the mass political repressions of the 1930s, but all these decades and until now, its consequences have affected us, our lives: . the destruction of the educated layer of the nation cleared the way for propaganda “processing” of the surviving part of the people in the direction necessary for the authorities, made it possible to introduce into the mass consciousness the idea of the backwardness of the people, their traditions, language, culture; . the destruction of the bearers of the historical memory of the people—aksakals, shezhireshi—affected the gap, incl. mental, generations and the connection of Kazakhs with the history of their family, ancestors, which allowed the authorities to promote the falsified history of the people; . the deprivation of the people of national leaders made it possible to turn it into an obedient mass, broken by hunger and repression; allowed almost without resistance to conduct a campaign to close Kazakh schools, reduce the scope of the use of the Kazakh language; left the people without those who could show the way to preserve the nation and its identity; . two changes of the alphabet in a little over one decade (Arabic— Latin—Cyrillic), along with the destruction of the book stock of private and public libraries, deprived subsequent generations of the opportunity to get acquainted with the history of the people through written sources; the older generation, who spoke Arabic, did not have the opportunity to read large volumes of literature in Cyrillic and, thereby, resist the distortions, lies, propaganda that poured into the minds of the younger generations in the Soviet school; . the fact that in many surviving auls there were mainly women and children, led to the breaking of the tradition of male education, blocking the behavioral code of the male rider; the transfer of value and behavioral patterns from a man to a boy was interrupted (among the Kazakhs, only men were engaged in the upbringing of boys);

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. the imposition of the previously unprecedented practice of refusing the name of the father or grandfather by the Kazakhs in order to avoid repressions subsequent to the arrest of the father led to a significant mental breakdown, accompanied by instilling a sense of shame for the father, while traditionally among the Kazakhs, pride in the name of the family, ancestor, father was an element of national identity and served as a measure actions of a man, kept him from unworthy behavior; . an increase in orphanages, where children were brought up in isolation from their people and their culture and traditions (whereas previously the Kazakhs’ orphaned children were raised by relatives); . a change in the norms of social behavior, which now dictated: not to stand out, not to take the initiative (whereas earlier, especially in boys, these qualities were encouraged); . the dominance of dullness, a faceless mass, anonymous people and their methods of destroying any extraordinary personality, individuality, distinguished by intelligence, demeanor, ability to speak, think independently (whereas in the Steppe bright, charismatic, artistic, even outrageous sal-seri were the favorites of the people, and each clan was proud that it gave the people a batyr, akyn, healer, moreover, each clan had its own special distinctive features in the musical performing style, clothing, attributes of yurts, decorations of horses, saddles, etc.); . forcing people to remain silent (threat of arrest, dismissal from work), not to criticize (not agreed upon from above), not to express dissatisfaction, not to have their own opinion that differs from the general line of the party, and, as a result, the lack of pluralism of opinions (which contradicted traditions of aitys, date, faith of the Kazakhs in the power of the word); . instilling the idea of the inadmissibility of mentioning the national (language, traditions, customs, lifestyle, history, heroes, culture, etc.), hence the rooting of the stereotype about the reprehensibility and danger of nationalism, supposedly opposed to tolerance, respect for other peoples; the very desire to realize their own national identity, history, pride in their culture and language was etched out in people; . a change in attitude to work, the forced nature of which washed out the initiative, left no room for the desire to work for one’s own good; communists during the period of industrialization achieved

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high results, sacrificing hundreds of thousands of human lives, not realizing that a person would achieve great results by voluntary, creative work; the habit of postscripts, exaggerated plans and their failures; tradition of falsifications in the conduct of criminal cases; in law enforcement practice—accusatory bias, perjury, tampering with the evidence base; the appearance in the Stalin era of a special type of leaders who were formed in the spirit of the postulates of strengthening the class struggle, in an atmosphere of searching for enemies of the people, as well as performers who mastered the methods of violence and coercion, involved in the until recently encouraged terror, vitally connected with the system that nurtured them; the unpredictability of the totalitarian regime, the illogicality of terror with its repressive campaigns, lawlessness, as well as people’s awareness that everything is unreliable, temporary, unsteady, led to the habit of people to live for today, without thinking about the future, hence the desire to appropriate here and now, while in power, while at the feeder; swagger and arrogance of an official, originating in the former power of an official or owner of shoulder straps over a person, his life, his freedom; distrust, fear of representatives of power, a man in uniform; the omnipotence of the party nomenclature; striving to build one dominant party; unanimous vote; high, often falsified, % of votes in elections for the ruling party, the incumbent president; “patronage” of bodies over the mosque, church; the functioning of the state media solely as a means of propaganda.

Thus, after political repressions, the methodical erasure of the mental code and traditional moral values continued, the destruction of the national identity of the Kazakhs, expressed in forced cultural assimilation, falsification of its history, reduction in the scope of the use of the Kazakh language, belittling its traditions and culture. When we ask questions: what is wrong with us, why are we different from our freedom-loving ancestors?—we should remember the two

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Asharshylyks and the political repressions that fell to the lot of two generations in a row. And this happened in the very recent past, which our grandfathers found. We did not come from nowhere. In many ways, we are mentally from the totalitarian past. We cannot change it, but we can try to overcome its negative effects. If the rehabilitation of the nation does not take place in the very near future, then the consequences of Asharshylyk and political repressions will be finally and irrevocably imprinted on the mentality of the nation, on self-identity, and will determine our reality. Just like it’s happening now.

5.7

Voice of the Other and Public Consensus

Similar to the West, sometimes diametrically opposed forces have achieved public consensus while avoiding the total “party line” and criminal prosecution for dissent? Moreover, we are not talking about the indispensable acceptance of the opponent’s position on certain issues, but about the desired possible coexistence in the presence of different views. The secret of success is in recognizing the Other and his voice. Western society has overcome the notion of the Other, in whom it has learned to see an equal to itself and recognize its right to its autonomy, individuality, own opinion, and assessment of the phenomena of life. The Soviet ideology at one time deprived the voice of millions of people, dozens of ethnic groups and social groups. Propaganda (party) spoke for them, i.e. took their votes. For example, in Soviet Kazakhstan, everyone who could express the opinion of the people was repressed in the 1930s, often deprived not only of the right to vote but also of life (Alashorda, biy, shezhireshi, etc.). Thus, the Communists, having appropriated the voice of the Other, spoke on behalf of many nations, deciding for them what is good for them and what is evil. This inertia persists in the unpreparedness, inability of the authorities to hear the voice of those who have a different opinion, and even in the authorities’ fear of a lack of unanimity. Symbolically, this is expressed in the recent more than 90% in the elections. Rethinking and creating a more complete picture of what happened earlier and what is happening today is possible only by including the voice of the Other, often the opposite side, the opponent: the repressed, the loser, the colonized, the deported, the minority, the oppressed, or, finally,

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those whose health and lives paid for the nuclear superiority of the Soviet countries. The first step is to strive for the return of “voices”, to be ready to give a voice to the Other, which becomes almost the only way to avoid his marginalization, his suppression and appropriation of his voice. For us, this is a topical issue, given the fact that we need to build a single civil nation within which each ethnic group would be comfortable, each ethnic group or social group would be sure that they would be heard and understood. The concept of the Other or the concept of Otherness is the presence of the Other, its consciousness, knowledge, experience, will, desires, perceived by people. Hence the need to take into account the point of view of the “Other” in one’s behavior. This process of mutual understanding and acceptance is based on knowledge of the historical experience and attitudes of the Other. In the presence of different attitudes towards the recent past society, it is important to adhere to the principle of intersubjectivation, the essence of which lies in the ability of people in the process of communication to correlate their point of view with someone else’s—to take into account, compare, reconcile different views on events. Intersubjectivity is based on the idea of reality, which is constructed taking into account the opinions of different people (many Others), on the knowledge of each other’s historical experience. And here the voice of the Other is important. The success of communication is ensured by the exchange of thoughts, feelings, semantics of symbols, which are conditioned by the experience of the past. You should “let others be”, respect their otherness, stop trying to appropriate their voice, include them in your history in some role prescribed for them, make them comfortable for your picture of the world. In the history of the USSR, there was no place, for example, for the Alash Horde, deportees, victims of nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test site, etc. They were literally and figuratively deprived of their voice, could not speak for themselves, could not tell their story, the story of the Other. Subordinate or voiceless are forced to wear a “mask” or be presented under the guise of the mask that was imposed on them. Through the efforts of the Bolsheviks, the Alashordans turned into Japanese spies, and they were simply thrown out of history, their names were crossed out, and their heritage was destroyed. Sarbazes, who rebelled against the collectivization and forced sedentarization carried out by the Soviet authorities,

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became Basmachi—bandits, raiders, and their descendants were taught to see enemies in their grandfathers. The dispossessed were declared class enemies and opponents of Soviet power. The deported people turned into collaborators and accomplices of the enemies of the Soviet regime. For half a century, the voices of the inhabitants of the Semipalatinsk test site were not heard, drowned out by the bravado of the USSR as the first nuclear power. During the period of perestroika, many of these groups were rehabilitated and… we again did not hear their voices. The voices of the Zheltoksanovites and the victims of nuclear tests that had been heard were again muffled. Where are the novels, film adaptations, songs, museums designed to relay the voices of those who were previously deprived of the right to give their own version of history, an assessment of what happened to them? Until now, 30 years after the collapse of the USSR, the heirs of that ideology are afraid of the voice of the Other, trying to drown it out. In Kazakhstan, this is a persistent rejection by a part of the population of any new interpretations of the historical past; in the Russian Federation, it is the threat of criminal prosecution for attempts to give an interpretation that is different from the propaganda—Soviet one. Those who do not want, are not ready to hear the Other, his voice is frightening because it is alternative in nature, it is based on a critical approach, and it demonstrates a departure from the dominant canon. Those who are denied the right to vote are marginalized, directly and indirectly forced out, and not allowed to write themselves into the history of the country. The time has come for them to get out of their position “inside” someone else’s discourse and convey their own meanings, to become not a darkened background of history, but its center. Only in this way will we acquire the full history of our country without omissions and cuts. Our understanding of the history of Kazakhstan should contain more than other voices. By including the voices of the Others, we will expand the boundaries of history, and instead of a flat, one-sided view of it, we will get, figuratively speaking, a 3D image. The vicious practice of silence, and concealment of the “other side of the coin” continues in the recent history of Kazakhstan. For example, Zhanaozen was deprived of the right to vote. The authorities, promising to hear, actually censor the voices of Others, creating an informational noise, imposing their own dominant agenda through the media and other

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means. This is a dead end path. Suppression of voices means that the problem is simply driven deeper. Why is the voice of any Other important? Because it is a form of copresence and a way of expressing its own norm, which can be understood, accepted, supported by the majority of society. You can accept the Other, unite with him only by allowing him to be, to be present. And this presence should be complete, and not be driven into certain limits, not be presented in a certain mask and role by someone. Relationships within society are always associated with existential tension, the need to accept or be in an uncomfortable situation when a person does not agree with the opinion of the Other on all issues. And then a certain contract comes to the rescue, a public consensus, which is built on ordinary courtesy, etiquette, norms of behavior designed to mitigate potential collisions, conflicts based on differences of opinion, to avoid insults, intentionally or involuntarily touching on pain points. Such social practice serves as a kind of buffer and provides the possibility of gradual convergence or conflict-free coexistence with the Other. Another more effective method is empathy for the Other, the ability of people to imagine themselves in the place of another person, accept his feelings, experience emotions similar to him, understand his condition, due to his personal experience or the negative experience of his people. An emotional reaction to the pain of another person or people leads to an understanding of the causes of his experiences, knowledge of his history. This acceptance can take place only if there is a medium, a channel of transmission—narration, presentation, the voice of the Other. Empathy is an effective means of achieving solidarity based on shared emotional unity. And then the desired consensus is built on a commonality of experiences, assessments, values. R. Eyerman writes about a process of mediation involving alternative strategies and alternative voices: “It is a process that aims to reconstitute or reconfigure a collective identity, as in repairing a tear in the social fabric. A traumatic tear evokes the need to ‘narrate new foundations’, which includes reinterpreting the past as a means towards reconciling present/future needs” (Eyerman 2004: 63). The question arises: why in our society the voice of the Other strengthens the intransigence of opponents and leads to a weakening of consensus? Alas, some of the country’s citizens are still not ready, do not want to hear the voice of the Other, and this is due to the ideological attitude to the rejection of a different opinion, dissent. The reason for

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this lies in the habit of having one view of facts and phenomena, which does not allow for plurality, polyphony. Soviet fictitious unanimity was ensured not only by constructing a onesided, flat picture of the world but also by hushing up alternative points of view, possible interpretations of events. The suppression of certain facts that prevailed in the historical and political discourses today has led to a deviation from the objective history of Kazakhstan. Avoidance, as a principle of exclusion, allows you to avoid uncomfortable, painful topics, code or avoid clichés instead of serious research and open scientific discussions. It is still the same technique: by means of silence, deprive the Other of his own voice. The danger lies in the fact that today we are seeing trials based on differences in political views. This is a continuation of the repressive practice in the spirit of totalitarianism with its demands to comply with the unified system of views permitted by propaganda. It all starts with individual trials between opponents but threatens to gradually return the flywheel of the state totalitarian machine. Returning to the topical issue for us of considering the recent historical, it should be noted that we cannot avoid a new view, the voice of the Other, precisely because the previous interpretation of events was based on the dominant discourse and marginalized, excluding the voices of many Others. For example, the study by the Kazakhs of their own past and historical experience in order to get rid of its negative consequences encounters resistance. The point is those who are still not ready to hear the voice of the Kazakhs, who during the Soviet period were denied the right to have their own view of their own history (censorship, bans, courts, stigmatization of the enemy, seizure of circulation). It is difficult to imagine a situation in which the Nazis would prevent the peoples of Europe from realizing the consequences of the Second World War for the reason that it offends them or shows them in an unfavorable light. Today it is problematic to imagine how the former European metropolises would have forbidden the once colonized peoples to analyze and evaluate the colonial past. This did not happen, because both the Nazis and the former colonizers recognized the Other’s right to his own voice. As a result, everyone benefited from this, gradually overcoming the negative consequences of a common history. The problem is not that new facts of the historical past are being revelaed; new views are being formed on certain events and persons. The

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problem is that people are not ready to see the other side of events, to doubt their previous views, to change them under the influence of new knowledge, to look at history through the eyes of others, to hear the voice of the Other. After more than half a century of imposing views, interpretations, assessments about ourselves and the world on us, we should learn not only to form our own opinion (sometimes different from the dominant or promoted by the authorities), but also the ability to hear the Other. This is the path to the formation of a collective “we” in the new historical conditions of post-colony, post-totalitarianism. “Collective identity refers to a process of ‘we’ formation, a process both historically rooted and rooted in history. While this common history may have its origins in direct experience, its memory is mediated through narratives that are modified with the passage of time and filtered through cultural artifacts and other materializations that represent the past in the present” (Eyerman 2004: 74). For example, do we hear the voices of deported peoples; descendants of the dispossessed and exiled to Kazakhstan, etc.? Without their voices, we will not know their picture of the world, we will not experience their experience together, we will not achieve solidarity based on a common history, values, and so on. History, more precisely, the interconnectedness of the histories of different ethnic groups, can become the phenomenon around which a broad public consensus is being built. The ability to hear the voice of the Other is by no means limited to questions of the historical past. She will teach us dialogue in the present, including dialogue between people and government. Dialogue without censorship, repression, trials, and prisons. The ability to hear will allow us to hear the voices of the oppressed, abused, deprived of certain opportunities, prisoners, and finally all those who are sometimes labeled as “marginal groups”, but they are such only as long as we ourselves do not hear them, pushing them aside to the periphery of our life, our society. Collectively shared experiences and meanings, affects and catharsis unite people. And the first condition for reaching a consensus is sound voices.

5.8

Conclusion

This chapter examines the tragic consequences of the colonization of Kazakhstan, which are reflected in the identity of the Kazakhs, influenced their self-esteem, and partly transformed their values. These consequences

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are exactly what requires rethinking and minimizing the impact on today’s Kazakhstan. In this regard, the chapter examines the collective trauma experienced by the Kazakhs. The question is also raised about the need to work out collective traumas, which will be a step towards the improvement of the nation and the achievement of public consensus.

Glossary Alash Orda (1917–1920) a party created in 1917 by educated, progressive-minded Kazakhs who dreamed of a democratic path for the development of Kazakhstan, aiming to achieve autonomy and end the colonial policy. Aksakal (lit. aksakal—white-bearded) the elder of the clan, family, honorary, respected person. Akyn is a poet-improviser. Asharshylyk (lit. famine) an artificially created famine of 1921–1923 under the conditions of war communism and a famine of 1931–1933, which occurred as a result of the expropriation of livestock, collectivization, the forcible sedentarization of Kazakhs, and the suppression of armed resistance to the policy of Soviet power. Ata-zhurt relatives from the side of the father. Aul is a traditional rural-type settlement, a community of close relatives, a camp among the Turkic peoples. Batyr the title that the Kazakhs gave to a person for his military merits. Basmachi (from Turkic basmak—to raid, to attack) a term filled with negative semantics was used by Soviet ideologists and historians to refer to the rebels of the Muslim peoples of Central Asia who opposed the establishment of Soviet power. Biy (lit. to know, to rule) is an authoritative person, a judge, an expert on Kazakh society, its structure, the system of customary law, traditions, and the history of the people. The Bolsheviks the radical wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party, carried out a coup in October 1917. Chapan rebellion one of the major uprisings of peasants against the Bolsheviks in the spring of 1919 in the Simbirsk and Samara provinces. GULAG Main Directorate of Corrective Labor Camps. ITLAG corrective labor camp. Jute is a mass death of livestock due to the inability to get pasture during pasture icing or heavy snowfall.

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Kantar (lit. January) peaceful rallies in a number of cities of Kazakhstan demanding a change in kleptocratic power, social policy, etc., ending with the execution of peaceful protesters and bystanders, cars on the streets of cities, followed by the torture of eight thousand people and trials of participants in the rallies. KASSR Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. KarLag Karaganda camp. KazCEC is the central executive committee of the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. KazITlag Kazakh labor camp. Kazkraykom VKP(b) Kazakh Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Kyrgyz Kirghiz, Kyrgyz-Kaisaks, Horde, and foreigners are ethnonyms that were used to call the Kazakhs in the Russian Empire instead of using their real name. Kyrrepublic Kyrgyz (Kazakh) Autonomous Republic within Russia (1920–1925). Kyrstatupravlenie is the Kyrgyz (Kazakh) statistical office. Nagashi-zhurt relatives on the mother’s side. OGPU United States Political Administration; special security agency of the USSR. PeschanLag Sand camp. Pitchfork uprising a peasant uprising in February–March 1920 on the territory of the Ufa, Samara, and Kazan provinces. Pomgol help the hungry. Pribalkhashstroy construction department of the Balkhash Copper smelting Plant. RCP(b) Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). RSFSR the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Sal-seri poets, musicians; a kind of aesthetes and dandies—trendsetters in performing musical skills, clothing and accessories, courtship etiquette, etc. Saman raw brick made of clay soil with the addition of straw and other fibrous plant materials. Sarbaz is a soldier, warrior, fighter. Shara-i-Islamiya (lit. Islamic Council) a socio-political organization in Turkestan (1917–1918). Sharua impoverished pastoralists who were employed by wealthy pastoralists. The Sharua retained their nomadic way of life, their

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freedom, in case of injustice they could migrate, for the offence, they could steal the cattle of the offender. StepLag Steppe camp. The CEC is the central executive committee. The Great Terror is the period of mass political repressions of 1937– 1938. The policy of war communism is the policy of the Bolsheviks during the civil war (1918–1921), which was expressed in the nationalization of large and medium-sized industry, the prohibition of private trade, the state monopoly on agricultural products, the curtailment of commodity-money relations, equalization in the distribution of material wealth, etc. The “Reds” (workers’ and peasants’ Red Army) are the armed forces that participated in the seizure and retention of power in Russia by the Bolsheviks. Troika organ of administrative (extrajudicial) repression under republican, regional and regional administrations (August 1937–November 1938). They consisted of three people—the head of the regional People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the secretary of the regional committee of the Communist Party, and the prosecutor. Turkestani Mukhtariat Turkestan autonomy, declared in 1917 and existed for two months. UITLK management of labor camps, a division of the Gulag in the regional and regional centers of the USSR (1930–19650s). VOHRovtsy an employee of the paramilitary guard. “White” (White Army) the collective name of the armed formations that were part of the movement for the liberation of Russia from the Bolsheviks, and anti-Soviet governments during the years of the civil war in Russia (1917–1922). Yurt a portable frame dwelling with felt covering among nomads. Zhanaozen (lit. new river) the name of the city in the western region of Kazakhstan, where mass strikes of oil workers took place in 2011, culminating in provocation on Independence Day and the shooting of workers, subsequent torture, murder and trials of strike participants. Zheltoksanovtsy participants in the uprising of student youth in December 1986.

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References Adorno, T.V. (2003). Negative dialectics. M.: Scientific World. Alekseenko, A.N. (2000). The population of Kazakhstan in 1926–1939. Computer and historical demography. Ed. V.N. Vladimirov. Barnaul. Alexander, J.C. (2004). Toward a theory of cultural trauma. Cultural trauma and collective identity. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1–30. Alimzhanov, A. (2015). The last meeting, or the lessons of I. Esenberlin. Esenberlin I. Thoughts, speeches, diaries, letters. Almaty: BPKA. Bolshevik of Kazakhstan. (1937). No. 1. Eyerman, R. (2004). Cultural trauma: Slavery and the formation of African American identity. Cultural trauma and collective identity. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 60–111. Eyerman, R. (2013). Social theory and trauma. Sociological Review. No. 12 (1), 121–138. Famine in the Kazakh steppe. (2012). (compiled by S. Abdirayymov, I.N. Bukhonova and others). Almaty: Kazakh University. From the history of deportations. (2012). Kazakhstan 1930–1935: Collection of documents. Almaty: LEM. Great censorship: Writers and journalists in the Land of the Soviets. 1917– 1956. (2005). Under the general. ed. acad. A. N. Yakovleva; Comp. L. V. Maksimenkov. M.: MFD: Mainland. Gryvennaya, L. (2022). Revolts and famine of 1921–1922 in Kazakhstan: Political and social reaction to the anti-people policy of the Bolshevik government. Otan tarihi. No. 3 (99), 78–86. GULAG (Main Directorate of Camps) 1918–1960. (2000). Ed. acad. A.N. Yakovlev; Comp. A.I. Kokurin, N.V. Petrov. (Russia. XX century. Documents). M.: MFD. Isvestia. (1997). October 30. Kozybaeva, M.M., Kudaibergenova, A.I., Baydaly, R.Zh. (2021). Famine of 1921–1922 in Kazakhstan and its consequences (based on materials from Northern Kazakhstan). Otan tarihi. No. 4 (96), 149–157. Kozybaev, M.K., Abylkhozhin, Zh.B., Aldazhumanov, K.S. (1992). Collectivization in Kazakhstan: The tragedy of the peasantry. Alma-Ata. LaCapra, D. (1998). History and memory after Auschwitz. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. LaCapra, D. (2016). Trauma, history, memory, identity: What remains? History and Theory. No. 55 (October), 375–400. Lenin, V. Complete Works (1970). T. 50: Letters October 1917–June 1919. Ed. 5th. M.: Publishing house of political literature. Medvedev, R.A. (1998). Our claim to Stalin. Moscow news. November 27.

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Murzakhodzhaev, K.M. (2021). Some issues requiring attention when studying the problem of famine in Kazakhstan in 1921–1922 (based on the documents of the State Archive of the Aktobe region). Social sciences in the modern world: political science, sociology, philosophy, history: Sat. Art. based on materials of the LI International Scientific and Practical Conference “Social Sciences in the Modern World: Political Science, Sociology, Philosophy, History”. No. 10 (43). M.: Ed. “Internauka”, 6–11. Murzakhodzhaev, K., Konkabaeva, A. (2021). Some aspects of the famine in Kazakhstan in 1921–1922: In archival documents and written materials. Otan tarihi. No. 4 (96), 166–172. Neal, A.G. (1998). National trauma and collective memory: Major events in the American century. Armonk, NY: Sharpe. Nora, P. (2005). World celebration of memory. Emergency ration. No. 2. Santner, E. (2009). History beyond the pleasure principle: Reflections on the representation of trauma. Trauma: points. Sat. Art. M.: New Literary Review, 389–407. Sarsenov, A.S., Kayrgalieva, G.K., Alipova, D.Zh. (2022). Famine of 1921– 1922 in Western Kazakhstan: Causes and consequences. Bulletin of Atyrau University named after Khalel Dosmukhamedov. No. 64 (1), 24–34. Schmidt, V. (2018). The tragedy of Kazakhstan in the 1920s. Hunger and its consequences. East akhriv. No. 1 (37), 40–50. Shaimukhanov, D.A., Shaimukhanova, S.D. (1997). Karlag. Karaganda: National Agency for Press and Mass Information of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Smelser, N.J. (2004). Psychological trauma and cultural trauma. Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 31–59. Suleimenov, O. (2001). Foreword. Esenberlin I. A boat crossing the ocean: A novel. Almaty.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

For the last one and a half centuries of their history, the Kazakhs have not just been followed, but every choice was made for them, their present and future was determined. Not only their life but also type of management, lifestyle, and system of moral norms was determined instead of and for the Kazakhs. To say more, they were explained how they should have related to their own centuries-old past and their ancestors’ path. The imposed interpretation and assessment were not just negative, but were also built on a deliberately distorted and tendentious basis. For many decades, we Kazakhs had been deprived of the opportunity to interpret historical facts as they appeared to us, and had been forced to be content with what passed through censorship, what fit within the framework of ideology and did not contradict the only acceptable reading of our past history. Not a single generation of our people has grown up on a flawed version of historical events. Thus, a partial loss of the identity could not be avoided. If the generally accepted, often negative, assessment of the nomadic civilization as a whole is added to that, the question of people mental breakdown and their culture depreciation as well as values arises. The practice of colonialism invariably predetermined the image of the other for the Kazakhs. The time has come for us to present ourselves, to interpret our own history. This is important for understanding that no ideal recipe, model from the outside will be optimal for us, since our © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Mustoyapova, Decolonization of Kazakhstan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5207-6_6

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being must be conditioned by our own history, philosophy, traditions, mentality, and values. We need to create our own meanings, which is especially important given our long experience of being influenced and destroyed by others. We must consider our present through the prism of our country’s history and the functioning of society. A sociologically conditioned approach to the analysis of historical events will enable us to understand what impact past events have on our society today, what is happening to our society now and why, and what can help us gain our own viability. With the beginning of a new era of restored independence, the new values formation, the attitude towards the past naturally changes, especially covering such difficult periods as colonization, wars, totalitarianism, the destruction of the traditional way of life, and the national identity distortion. The most important thing is the fact that the history of our past must be comprehended in terms of its conditioning by local identity, social relations, culture, climate, etc. References to the way of life, norms of community life, morality, and laws of the Soviet period are an appeal to the artificially constructed society of a short historical period, when national identities—everything that makes peoples unique—were subjected to breaking, deliberates distortion, and negative interpretation. The one and a half century colonial and Soviet-colonial periods can serve us neither as a model nor as a starting point against the backdrop of the centuries-old history of the people. The path based on the patterns and practices of the Soviet past will again lead us on false paths, away from ourselves. This path is unacceptable precisely because the Soviet period was one of the most tragic in the history of the Kazakhs. The confusion, hesitation, and desire to choose a certain support point, observed today, including in other cultures and, more broadly, in other states, is the result of ignorance of one’s own history, the loss of spiritual connection with the past of one’s people. Hence the lack of confidence and the potential of the people, which is still found in some people who are in captivity of colonial myths, sometimes even unconscious humiliation of their nation. If one is aware of the moral imperatives, the worldview of the nomads, their attitude to nature, the social equality that existed among the nomads, freedom of speech, justice, etc., then it becomes obvious that these are the very goals and values we are looking for, which we value and which we are trying to return to.

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Despite the time gap, which was due to the colonial-Soviet period, the entire previous century of the existence of the Kazakhs did not leave without a trace, the heritage of their ancestors was not lost. It was preserved in historical sources, in the memory of the people, materialized in traditions, economic experience, folk wisdom, and moral values. If the culture, traditions, and values of the people are crossed out, then the entire previous period of its existence and the experience it has accumulated are also crossed out. As a person gains experience and becomes himself during his life, so the people, over the centuries of existence, acquire their own identity, enshrined in culture. Without our foundation, we will cease to be a nation, and only reliance on the values and traditions shared by the people can guarantee its harmonious development. New time begins with new meanings and ideas. In order to do this, it is necessary to critically review the previous ones. If the meanings, goals, and values do not change, then we remain in the paradigm of the past system—Soviet, totalitarian, colonial. Changing the vector of the country’s development, first of all, it is necessary to free from the burden and, even more so, mistakes, crimes, and traumas of the past. Recognition of mistakes, defeats, guilt, as well as awareness of the totalitarian regime criminality—these are the first necessary steps for the improvement of the nation. The nation must pass all this through itself, give its past an objective assessment, and only after that there is a chance for it to renew itself. After the collapse of the USSR, many so-called post-Soviet countries did not evaluate their own past (the exception, perhaps, is the Baltic countries), there was no critical reflection on the crimes of power, awareness of the evil scale caused to the peoples, and the desire to prevent such a thing from happening again. That is why revanchist sentiments on the part of Russia today can be observed today, which are no longer limited to nostalgia for the “great USSR” and militaristic rhetoric, but carry war and real threats to the territorial integrity of neighboring countries. No matter how stalemate the current economic situation in Kazakhstan may seem to us, in fact, it can be resolved, perhaps even in a short, foreseeable period. The situation with the mental, value break that runs through our society appears to be more dangerous. The economy can be revived, the capital withdrawn from the country can be returned, but for a long time to come, the process of decolonization, de-Sovietization that was not carried out in time, as well as the current complete surrender of

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the information space of Kazakhstan to Russia, will respond in the most negative way for a long time to come. All that the people can do and is doing (in the absence of the political will of the country’s leadership) is to try to independently understand their own recent past and, most importantly, to see its negative manifestations in our present. Today, the Kazakhs are ready to accept their past with all its tragedies, defeats, traumas, and therefore they persistently turn to the past. This is not a reason for expressing grievances and expressing negativity, not focusing on the past and avoiding the present. A clear, truthful past is a willingness to accept it in its entirety, to realize the origins of one’s defeats, to appreciate the potential that has been preserved, and finally to understand the transformation mechanisms of national identity in order to accept one’s present self. All this will become the basis for the correct choice of the future path. Undoubtedly, we are fully aware of what weakened our people and nearly destroyed us, but we also know what is capable of reviving us. Enough time has passed since almost mortal wounds were inflicted on the people. The people are alive, and it is unreasonable and unforgivable to say that today we are not able to accept the challenges of the time, because our people were subjected to destruction. This book attempts to pose an urgent problem for Kazakhstan and substantiate the need for a large-scale decolonization process. This topic is still waiting for its researchers in various fields of science: philology, political science, sociology, history, cultural studies, economics, jurisprudence, psychology. We have been instilled a lot of false ideas about ourselves, and it does not matter if the reason for this is ignorance of the world of nomads, its superficial and, possibly, imposed perception, or a conscious desire to deprive the descendants of nomads of faith in their own potential. However, these ideas turned out to be so tenacious that they continue to influence that annoyingly low self-esteem, which can be observed today. This is the long trail of colonization. That is why a significant part of this book is devoted to deconstruction and debunking a number of colonial myths. Colonial or, on the other hand, imperial thinking of some representatives of society and the desire to decolonize others, different interpretations of the recent historical past are today becoming a stumbling block and the cause of dramatic, but quite predictable disputes and conflicts.

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The reasons for the discrepancies in the Soviet past and the sad consequences lie in the fear of some and, on the contrary, the readiness of others to see the true face of our history. Fear is due to the nature of events that can traumatize not only historical consciousness, but also affect self-esteem and identity. Hence, the processes of voluntary and in voluntary oblivion or ousting from the memory of a whole series of tragic events, as well as an attempt to give them a justifying interpretation. The restoration of national identity is impossible without breaking and rejecting the imposed stereotypes about nomads and colonial ideology (in our case, also totalitarian). One of the ways to this is the reconstruction of the past, the awakening of the self-consciousness of the people, selfesteem, as well as the development of the potential of the nation. Without understanding the origins of the problems, it is impossible to resolve them, just as it is impossible to fully understand what is happening in the country today. On this path, there is a reassessment not only of history, but also of literature, yesterday’s idols, false values, loud slogans, the state of law enforcement agencies, the situation with human rights, etc. It is impossible not to pass this path. Another road is already leading us to neo-colonization. Alas, in Kazakhstan the process of colonization of consciousness does not stop, covering new generations. The authorities let this process take its course. It contributes to the aggressive penetration of Russian propaganda into the information field of the country, and with it, sometimes frankly chauvinistic views and militaristic rhetoric. The authorities not only did not ensure the proper development of the country, but also preserved the state of colonization. At this time, the majority of the people independently go through the process of decolonization of thinking. The conflict between the people and the authorities, among other things, lies in this mental difference, in values, goals, and ideas about the future development of the country. Another important aspect should be noted. In Kazakhstan, over the course of a century (from the middle of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century), there were several large waves of resettlement, first as a result of the resettlement policy of tsarist Russia, which was aimed at exporting part of the population from Central Russia and Ukraine to Kazakhstan, then as a result of repressive the policy of the communists, as well as resettlements to raise virgin lands. Some of the settlers in the pre-revolutionary period moved to Kazakhstan in search of a better life. The settlers enjoyed the support of the tsarist administration.

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This category, as well as virgin lands, received certain economic and other preferences. This circumstance determined their attitude towards Kazakhstan as a place where they can count on a privileged position in comparison with the indigenous population. In the post-Soviet/postcolonial period, it was not necessary to count on special conditions, and this caused a reverse wave of emigration. The other part—the deported ethnic groups—were forcibly resettled, with the use of punitive measures. These resettlements were accompanied by huge human losses, the most severe conditions of survival, and moral trauma. Forced eviction from their native places to Kazakhstan could not but affect the ambivalent attitude towards the place of expulsion. Forced residence in a certain area, forced labor, and the implementation of all the rules associated with being in the status of partially disenfranchised, the lack of clear terms of punishment for entire ethnic groups affected the mental health of the so-called “punished peoples”, their changed identity. These are injuries that largely remained unspoken. Unfortunately, due to historical circumstances, Kazakhstan was perceived by some ethnic groups as a place of political exile, concentration camps, deportation, was associated in the minds and memory of people with the deprivation of their homeland, political and civil rights, and the loss of loved ones. Circumstances, conditions of transportation, of course, affect the perception of the country of resettlement, as well as the especially reverent attitude of people towards their historical homeland, from which they were forcibly separated. Some of them took the first opportunity to return to their historical homeland. Some remained, and their somewhat detached or indifferent attitude to what is happening in Kazakhstan can be explained precisely by the history of their involuntary, forced settlement in the country. Such issues (emigration, diaspora residence, multicultural identity) have long been the subject of scientific research in the world, but in Kazakhstan the authorities do not think about the importance of addressing these problems, including with the aim of creating a single civil nation. The issue of nation-building is important, complex, its significance is undeniable and it is determined by the fact that the existence of a single civil nation is the key to the country’s success. And on the path of nation-building, the process of decolonization/deSovietization is one of the important and necessary steps. Any future is built on the present and the past. This is the law of history. The fortress of what we are building today and will be completed by the next generations

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tomorrow will depend on the foundation. The foundation is the past of the people. If it is successful and full of victories, then the future based on it, as a rule, is bright and reliable. However, the past is not always (or not in all historical periods) prosperous. Moreover, it can be so tragic that it throws the country back and sometimes weakens the people so much that they are unable to make an effort to break free from the captivity of the negative past. Therefore, in order to secure the foundation and move forward, it is necessary to overcome and minimize the tragic consequences of the past. The present is an opportunity to change the legacy of the past and lay a sound foundation for the future. What weakened the Kazakhs in the twentieth century, what are the negative consequences of colonization? These questions are important because the answers to them actually determine the current directions of action for the country. Even a cursory glance makes it clear that how little has been done in Kazakhstan to overcome the consequences of colonization, moreover, the country is pursuing a policy that exacerbates colonial practices. The Kazakhs were methodically deprived of their national identity, language, history, culture, and ethical values. Their restoration is proceeding spontaneously, through the initiatives of civil society, individual cultural and scientific figures. The authorities are not ready to ensure the full functioning of the state language, open archives, get rid of the rudiments of Soviet propaganda, update textbooks, etc. The demoralization of society continues due to corruption, violation of the law by those who are called upon to protect it. Recall that during the period of colonization, the seizure of land in favor of resettlement centers, to the royal treasury, then to Soviet collective farms, led to the fact that the Kazakhs were left without fertile land with natural irrigation and their rich pastures. With the restoration of the country’s independence, the situation has not changed. Until now, the people are left without land, which is now seized by the oligarchs, nouveau riche, and officials. During the colonial period, Kazakhstan was and still remains a source of raw materials. To date, diversification of production has not been carried out, including minimizing the “additional raw materials” component. The profit from the sale of raw materials does not reach the people; it has not made high-quality medicine, education, safe roads, etc. accessible to them.

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In two Asharshylyks, the losses of the Kazakhs amounted to more than half of their numbers. Until now, a program of powerful support for motherhood has not been adopted, many large families do not have housing, and children have equal opportunities for development. In other words, all kinds of measures have not been taken to ensure demographic growth in order to make up for the colossal losses of the people in the twentieth century. The high birth rate is the merit of the people. At the same time, the authorities do not provide children with the necessary number of schools, grants for higher education, and young people with jobs and opportunities for self-realization. At least four generations of Kazakhs, starting in the 1920s, lived from hand to mouth, in conditions of malnutrition and a shortage of necessary products. This is a blow to the gene pool. Until now, we have a significant number of families, and therefore children, are malnourished, save on food by buying low-grade food. Alas, today a half-starved existence for a certain part of the population is a common occurrence. This is a blasphemous position for a people who survived two famines, as a result of which they lost half of their numbers. This is cynicism, given the fact that Kazakhstan is a rich country. In addition, food independence of Kazakhstan has not been achieved. The poverty of the Soviet period and today in the supposedly independent oil Kazakhstan for many citizens is still relevant. The economy is being built based on the needs of the oligarchy, officials, and Russia (the Eurasian Economic Union is absolutely unprofitable for Kazakhstan). The health of the nation was undermined not only by poverty in the USSR, but also by nuclear explosions for half a century at the Semipalatinsk test site. Thanks to its functioning, the Soviet nuclear program developed. People affected by nuclear weapons tests are not paid sufficient compensation to receive the necessary treatment, and no funds are invested in improving the ecology of the region. Moreover, there is still no environmental program in the country. During the Soviet period, the inland Aral Sea and Lake Balkhash became shallow. Virgin lands for 3–4 decades withdrew millions of hectares of land from circulation. Industry, as in the Soviet period, continues to poison our cities with harmful emissions from industrial enterprises. Kazakhstan continues to give away millions of hectares of land for Russian military training grounds, allowing launches of rockets on heptyl instead of reclaiming the land and giving it to pastures for pastoralists.

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The entire color of the nation was repressed in the 1930s. These are tens of thousands of educated people, writers, poets, musicians, teachers, and engineers. Considering the losses in science, literature, and development of education in the Kazakh language, the main emphasis should be placed on the formation of a highly educated nation. However, for thirty years the country has been carrying out reforms in education and experiments with textbooks without stopping. A considerable number of teachers who are educating new generations of children are subject to Soviet ideology, are carriers of colonial or imperial consciousness. Schools still celebrate Soviet holidays, and the ideology of teachers is formed under the influence of Russian television. To this should be added insufficient funding for science and low salaries for teachers. This indicates that the government does not count on human capital, and therefore does not seek to develop it. During the colonial period, the Kazakhs were deprived of the right to own weapons so that they would not be able to defend themselves. Until now, Kazakh officers are trained in Russia, being mentally, ideologically completely dependent on the Russian army. The uprisings of the Kazakhs throughout the colonial period were served with particular cruelty, the strength of the army, executions, followed by executions and imprisonment. Until now, people who go out to peaceful rallies against the policy of the authorities are killed, imprisoned, or shot (Zhanaozen 2011; Kantar 2022). In the 1920s–1930s, due to war, famine, and resistance to the Soviet regime, more than a million Kazakhs were forced to leave their homeland. This also affected the fact that the Kazakhs before the restoration of independence were not the most significant part of the population on their land. The return of the Kazakhs to their historical homeland was to become one of the important components of the demographic policy. The repatriation program was launched in the 2000s, but was curtailed at the whim of Nazarbayev’s son-in-law—Kulibayev—after the events of 2011 in Zhanaozen, since a significant number of participants in the protest 8-month peaceful stand on the square were repatriates. During the period of tsarist colonization, the Kazakhs were deprived of the right to have representation in the State Duma of Russia. The two State Dumas of Tsarist Russia, to which the Kazakhs were elected, were dissolved after the very first session. In the Soviet period, elections were predetermined, the people obediently “unanimously” voted for the appointed candidates. Today, in independent Kazakhstan, taking into

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account the non-democratic system of elections invented by the authorities, Kazakhs are in fact also deprived of the right to elect and be elected. The votes are counted in the same way as under Stalin, i.e. the election results are determined by the one that counts the votes. The Soviet totalitarian regime did not put human rights in anything. This distorted the ideas of the Soviet people about law, morality, and justice. Until now, the practices of totalitarianism have not been destroyed in Kazakhstan, a repressive apparatus is functioning in the person of the police and courts dependent on the authorities. People are deprived of a number of civil rights, they are persecuted for their political views and opposition to the authorities. Ideologically, Kazakhstan is under the influence of the former metropolis of Russia, since the information field is completely given to it. The opportunity to get into power structures is open not to capable, intelligent, and patriotic people, but only to those who are loyal to the government and its colonial policy in spirit. Kazakhstan is still de facto in colonial dependence. This dependence has not been overcome in politics, economics, ideology, education, the military sphere, etc. The decolonization of thinking in Kazakhstan began in the bowels of the people, until it penetrated into power. And therefore, the process of decolonization is yet to come to Kazakhstan. We cannot avoid it, because we live not only in a critical period for our country, but also in an era of change in the entire world order (political, technological, economic, informational). It is impossible to enter a new life with old luggage covered with cobwebs, mold and exhaling a suffocating stench that poisons our life and relationships between people. We live in an era of change. And, therefore, we must be ready for change. And they don’t start with buying a new iPhone or the latest brand of car, but with a change of mind. Demographic, civilizational, political, intellectual, mental, moral, and other losses of the people in the twentieth century should become the basis for striving to make up for lost time and missed opportunities for the development of the people and the country.

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Glossary Kantar (lit. January) peaceful rallies in a number of cities of Kazakhstan demanding a change in kleptocratic power, social policy, etc., ending with the execution of peaceful protesters and bystanders, cars on the streets of cities, followed by the torture of eight thousand people and trials of participants in the rallies. Zhanaozen (lit. new river) the name of the city in the western region of Kazakhstan, where mass strikes of oil workers took place during 2011, culminating in provocation on Independence Day and the shooting of workers, subsequent torture, murder and trials of strike participants. Nazarbayev N.A. President of the Republic of Kazakhstan from December 16, 1991 to March 20, 2019.

Index

A Absolutism, 103, 104, 109 Agriculture, 23, 25, 27, 64, 125–127, 133–135, 137–141, 145, 146, 208, 211 Animal husbandry, 27, 206, 246, 252 Another, 2, 4, 16–20, 25, 37, 51, 57, 60, 68, 69, 74, 76–79, 83, 85, 88, 91, 92, 102, 108, 109, 111, 112, 114, 117, 121, 124, 125, 137, 143, 149, 152–155, 171, 176, 180–183, 185, 190, 193, 199, 203, 205, 219, 234, 237, 241, 244, 248, 249, 253, 256, 262, 279, 291 Antagonism, 77, 97, 98, 101, 109 Anti-colonial, 19, 28–30, 35, 52, 168 Arabic, 50–53, 77, 273 Aristocracy, 102, 103, 106, 115, 119 Artificially, 34, 43, 52, 62, 86, 88, 125, 185, 220, 241, 244, 265, 282, 288

Asharshylyk, 25, 42, 43, 54, 62, 125, 142, 171, 220, 235, 239, 240, 245, 247–251, 253, 268, 276 Asia(n), 18, 25, 49, 62, 95, 96, 126, 137, 144, 172, 174, 184–187, 188–191, 282 Assimilation, 25, 28, 29, 50, 55–57, 61, 69, 73, 74, 79, 87, 119, 131, 206, 234, 242, 275

B Backwardness, 9, 12, 16, 47, 71, 73, 74, 77, 112, 158, 159, 259, 269, 273 Benefits, 18, 21, 22, 49, 133, 134, 201, 212, 220 Bolshevik, 27–30, 51, 53, 54, 64, 71, 72, 96, 97, 99, 100, 109, 124, 126, 142, 180, 194, 215–217, 221, 239, 248, 262, 263, 277, 282–284

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Mustoyapova, Decolonization of Kazakhstan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5207-6

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INDEX

C Cattle, 18, 53, 97, 100, 105, 126–128, 133–142, 151, 162–165, 165–168, 180, 190, 222, 223, 245, 267–270, 284 Censorship, 4, 16, 34, 45, 50, 52, 72, 80, 81, 104, 212, 243, 262, 265, 266, 269–271, 280 Civilization, 12–16, 20, 48, 60, 89, 90, 109, 133, 236, 242, 287, 296 Closeness, 92, 93, 112 Collectivization, 19, 40, 42, 43, 62, 126, 210, 212, 214, 221, 238, 251–253, 255, 256, 262–264, 266, 267, 277, 282 Colonized, 10, 12, 16, 17, 20, 21, 25–30, 33–38, 40, 47, 56, 67, 75–77, 81, 89, 132, 201, 202, 276, 280 Colonizer, 10, 16, 17, 25, 33–35, 40, 47, 69, 71, 76, 89, 131, 133, 280 Colony, 9, 12, 18, 20, 25, 34, 36–39, 46, 56, 73, 77, 85, 96, 168, 175, 176, 187, 238, 269, 271 Complex, 3, 4, 8, 11, 13, 38, 41, 73, 79, 82, 83, 119, 132, 138, 186, 237, 241, 261, 292 Concentration camps, 80, 220, 232, 255, 263, 266–269, 292 Confiscation, 52, 217, 252, 256 Cooperation, 93, 95, 169 Corruption, 74, 75, 83, 89, 212, 214–218, 223, 293 Cossack, 18, 21, 23, 25, 49, 99, 114, 116–119, 124, 132, 133, 136–138, 141–143, 145, 146, 150, 151, 156, 162, 168, 170, 180, 182–191, 202, 223, 234, 256, 266

Culture, 2, 4, 5, 9–17, 19–21, 27–30, 32–35, 40, 41, 45–48, 50–53, 54–61, 64, 67, 69, 71–73, 77, 83–89, 90, 92, 94, 95, 103, 110, 133, 137–139, 181, 187, 190, 206, 211, 215, 220, 233, 260, 261, 264, 266, 273–275, 287–289, 293 D Decolonization, 1–3, 5, 7, 8–12, 27–41, 56, 61, 62, 67, 75, 78, 81, 122, 131, 231, 238, 239, 289–292, 296 Deconstruction, 31, 34, 68, 90, 132, 290 Default, 42, 76, 79 Democratic, 16, 62, 64, 126, 221, 282 Deportation, 26, 46, 74, 235, 256, 264, 267, 292 Desovietization, 1, 239 Destruction, 9, 10, 14, 27–29, 31, 38, 45, 51, 67, 68, 71, 72, 81, 86, 112, 113, 120, 125, 159, 167, 169, 214, 232, 258–261, 273–275, 288, 290 Dichotomy, 14, 17, 20 Discrimination, 3, 5, 17–19, 38, 46, 48, 56, 64 Dominance, 4, 9, 10, 14, 16, 35, 38–40, 47, 48, 50, 51, 57, 58, 78, 110, 211, 274 E Earth, 54, 92, 102, 105, 113, 124, 134, 182 East, 3, 12, 13, 17, 31, 34, 39, 64, 74, 76, 77, 90, 95, 124, 134, 140, 172, 187, 188, 191, 193, 195, 210, 257, 267

INDEX

Ecology, 3, 32, 243, 294 Economics, 11, 105, 290, 296 Elite, 19, 27–30, 41, 46, 52, 64, 70, 72, 74, 108, 114, 170, 223, 262 Emigration, 26, 75, 175, 176, 213, 273, 292 Empire, 23, 35–39, 47, 50, 63, 73, 77, 95, 119, 127, 154, 158, 168, 191–193, 200, 202, 216, 222, 223, 283 Enemy, 51, 99, 100, 126, 255, 270, 280 Exploiter, 96–101, 151, 255 Expropriation, 19, 42, 62, 71, 100, 109, 126, 171, 214, 215, 217, 221, 251, 255, 282 F Famine, 19, 21, 22, 26, 43, 62, 125, 133, 137, 180, 199, 212, 214, 220, 233, 234, 236, 245–254, 256, 259, 261, 262, 267–269, 282, 294, 295 Feudalism, 96, 97 Fighting, 254, 263 G Generation, 3–5, 12, 33, 34, 42, 51, 55, 61, 68–72, 73–75, 80–83, 86, 94, 97, 98, 101, 107, 108, 110, 124, 132, 174, 182, 232–235, 236–240, 242, 244, 245, 255–261, 271–273, 276, 287, 291–295 Genus, 98, 108, 109, 126, 190, 221 Government, 2, 10, 18–23, 27–29, 35, 48, 50, 54, 73, 76, 80, 100, 113, 114, 116–119, 132, 142, 154, 162, 167–170, 186, 194, 201, 206, 216, 220, 223, 238, 239, 246, 248, 251, 255, 256,

301

259, 263, 271, 273, 281, 295, 296 H Hierarchy, 15, 17, 32, 91, 101–108, 110, 111, 124 History, 2–3, 7–12, 15, 17, 20, 27–30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 39–41, 42–46, 49–54, 55, 62, 67, 68, 75–81, 85–87, 95, 101–104, 118, 122, 123–125, 126, 132, 152, 209, 212, 214, 215, 221, 232, 235, 237–245, 256, 260, 264, 265, 269–278, 280, 281, 287, 288 Husbandry, 27, 206, 246, 252 I Identity, 2, 9–11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 27–29, 33–35, 36–47, 49, 57–61, 67–72, 73–75, 78, 81, 83, 87, 88, 125, 131, 132, 206, 231–238, 241, 242, 244, 245, 258–261, 271–275, 279, 281, 293 Ideological, 4, 8, 10, 11, 28–31, 36–41, 41–47, 54, 59, 61, 72–76, 78–85, 97, 124, 152, 161, 213, 217, 242, 262, 266, 279 Independence, 3, 5, 7, 9–11, 19, 26, 29, 30, 33, 53, 56, 57, 59, 74, 77, 79, 83, 85, 87–89, 108, 113–115, 117, 151, 170, 238, 242, 259, 260, 288–293 Industrialization, 191, 196, 266, 274 Industry, 26, 54, 58–60, 135, 138, 141, 191–195, 197–201, 202, 211, 217, 253, 267, 284, 294 Information, 31, 39, 57, 59–61, 92, 93, 95, 96, 112, 142, 152, 171,

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194, 195, 211, 240, 243, 247, 249, 254, 290, 291, 296 Interpretation, 8–10, 11–16, 42, 53, 72, 77, 78, 97, 151–153, 167, 171, 201, 211, 232–236, 237, 240–242, 278–280, 287, 288, 291 Intolerance, 93, 103

L Language, 3, 5, 10, 13, 19, 27–31, 35, 48–57, 72–75, 78, 80, 86–89, 93, 95, 103, 109, 133, 153, 156, 180, 185, 188, 190, 206, 210, 214, 233, 243, 260, 265, 266, 273–275, 293, 295 Latin, 51, 52, 95, 103 Literature, 7, 35, 40, 47, 50, 51–52, 58–61, 78, 81–89, 100–104, 127, 146, 152, 213, 264, 273, 291, 295

M Manipulation, 13, 16, 41–45, 260 Memory, 8, 11, 41–47, 52, 70, 72, 76, 78, 101, 117, 119, 122, 123, 232, 233, 235, 259–260, 264, 272, 281, 289–291, 292 Metropolis/Metropolises, 9, 10, 25, 26, 36–39, 56, 60, 71, 124, 238, 296 Middle Ages, 14, 51, 94, 96, 101–104, 164 Minority, 73, 99, 110, 260, 276 Modern, vii, 2, 4, 17, 20, 23, 27–31, 46, 51–52, 58, 74, 80, 88, 195, 220, 232, 266, 272 Modernization, 9, 20, 29, 45, 50, 72, 87, 132, 159

Myth, 4, 14, 25, 34, 79, 107, 122, 131–133, 141, 180, 191, 200, 201, 206, 215, 220, 288, 290

N Nationalism, 2, 28, 52, 53, 207, 260, 263, 274 Nomad, 14, 94, 99, 110, 131, 170, 246 Nomadic, 89–93, 110, 111, 115, 120, 121, 124, 127, 131–134, 139, 143, 149, 152, 157, 162, 167, 172–176, 178, 182, 253, 260 Nomenclature, 30, 216, 218, 275

O Openness, 92–94, 112, 164 Opposition, 16, 17, 31, 37, 38, 41, 49, 83, 91, 92, 103, 296 Otherness, 93, 277

P Pastures, 63, 71, 97–100, 107, 108, 111, 116, 120–121, 126, 127, 135, 141, 143, 144, 151, 170, 208, 221, 247, 255, 282, 293, 294 Pedigree, 102, 103, 107, 108 Philosophy, 12–16, 29, 77, 86, 90, 112, 288 Political repression, 28, 44, 52, 171, 212, 232, 234–236, 241, 259, 261–267, 269–273, 275, 276, 284 Population, 3, 22–30, 34, 48, 69, 70, 80, 102, 119, 124, 134, 137, 141, 146, 147, 150, 160, 167, 168, 177, 181–185, 186, 187, 190, 191, 198–199, 203, 205, 209–213, 213–216, 221, 222,

INDEX

239, 245–251, 253–259, 264, 267–270, 278, 291, 292, 294, 295 Postcolonial, 2, 31, 32, 47 Power, 1, 5, 9–16, 26–43, 57, 62, 67–73, 81, 95, 97, 100–107, 109, 111–116, 196, 201, 202, 213, 215–217, 221, 223, 238, 239, 242, 243, 245, 255, 259, 261, 262, 274–278, 282–284, 289, 296, 297 R Reconstruction, 2, 41, 68, 97, 195, 203, 236, 291 Religion, 28, 49, 92–96, 101, 102, 125 Responsibility, 3, 4, 40, 70, 79, 100, 101, 109, 157, 166, 169, 178, 182, 216, 218, 236–240, 252, 256, 260 Rethinking, 2, 8, 9, 76, 79, 82, 83, 102, 276, 282 Revolution, 10, 12, 37, 42, 56, 96, 101, 103, 108, 112, 149, 194, 199, 204, 223, 232, 265 Russification, 29, 49, 53, 71, 73, 119, 150, 211, 265 S Sedentarization, 19, 20, 43, 62, 71, 126, 132, 142, 221, 234, 235, 241, 242, 251, 253, 277, 282 Self-identity, 11, 276 Serfdom, 21, 26, 40, 97, 100, 104, 133, 144, 160, 173 Settlers, 20–26, 71, 116, 118, 119, 123, 124, 131–136, 137–139, 141, 145, 146, 151, 156, 170, 186–188, 191, 199, 202, 208, 209, 258, 268, 291

303

Slave, 96, 102, 172, 182, 183, 186 Slavery, 69, 78, 102–104, 179, 234 Starvation, 178, 245, 247, 248, 250, 252, 253, 257 Steppe, 5, 15, 18, 19, 21, 48–50, 53, 64, 72, 90, 92–94, 95, 98, 99–114, 115, 116, 119, 122, 123, 131, 133, 134, 136–146, 150–158, 160, 165–172, 178–180, 182–192, 194, 202, 208, 216–220, 221, 223, 234, 245, 247, 249, 253, 254, 260–266, 267–269, 274 Stereotype, 3–5, 10–13, 16, 17, 20, 32–39, 47, 68, 74, 77, 78, 81, 90, 112, 131, 132, 151, 152, 171, 172, 201, 204, 206, 212, 237, 242, 274, 291 Suppression, 2, 34, 48, 56, 62, 76, 126, 162, 170, 221, 243, 255, 258, 277, 278, 280, 282 T Territory, 11, 18, 19, 22, 23, 28, 53, 63, 64, 67, 70, 71, 73, 75, 92–95, 97, 98, 108, 111, 112–124, 132, 141, 149, 182, 190, 202, 209, 213, 215, 234, 238, 246–253, 254–261, 271 Tolerance, 93, 94, 96, 103, 112, 274 Totalitarianism, 3, 7, 27, 45, 80, 81, 83, 85, 212, 231, 243, 263, 280, 288, 296 Tradition, 2, 9, 12–16, 27–29, 45, 50–51, 56, 58, 68–72, 73, 85, 92, 93, 100, 101, 103, 114, 152, 164, 172–176, 210, 214, 216, 220, 261, 264, 269, 273, 275 Transformation, 2, 9, 14, 20, 29, 34, 36, 38, 40, 62, 68–70, 73, 112, 118, 120, 155, 167, 168, 181, 206, 235, 244, 272, 290

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INDEX

Trauma, 3, 7, 8, 44, 45, 68, 85, 231–236, 238–242, 243, 261 Tsarism, 10, 30, 76, 114, 116, 132, 167, 169, 170, 202, 239

U Uprising, 9, 18–20, 26, 30, 35, 42, 79, 101, 115, 118, 121, 162, 186, 234, 245, 251, 253, 256, 262, 266, 282–284, 295 USSR, 1, 2, 18, 19, 26, 27, 29, 30, 46, 54, 55, 57, 62, 86, 87, 97, 100, 119, 124, 132, 196, 197, 200, 201, 204–212, 212–216, 218, 219, 222, 231, 235, 238–240, 266, 270, 271, 277, 278, 283, 284, 289, 294

V Virgin land, 18, 25, 26, 29, 43, 73, 74, 137, 138, 203–210, 268, 291, 294

Voice, 13, 44, 45, 75–77, 81, 86, 90, 106, 132, 202, 207, 238, 242, 265, 276–282 W War, 2, 10, 19, 26, 38, 42–44, 53, 62, 78, 79, 84, 102, 112–115, 121, 125, 127, 163, 168, 170, 176, 185, 194, 196, 199, 200, 203, 210, 213, 214, 220, 234, 238, 241, 245, 252, 254, 256, 259, 263, 268, 280, 282, 284, 289, 295 West, 4, 12, 13, 17, 18, 24, 31, 34, 38, 39, 58, 64, 76, 77, 81, 82, 84, 95, 118, 124, 134, 137, 194, 200, 250, 267, 276 Western, 3, 5, 12, 13, 21–24, 39, 48, 52, 64, 77, 97, 117, 134, 135, 140, 145, 151, 184, 190, 194, 195, 205, 209, 210, 246, 250, 257, 276, 284, 297 Worldview, 5, 15, 16, 20, 47, 78, 90, 110, 112, 127, 234, 238, 244, 288