Cuban Foreign Policy Confronts a New International Order 9781685851583

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Tables
Preface
1 Introduction: Cuba and the Struggle for Political Space in the 1990s
Part 1 THE TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP: CUBA, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES
2 Implications of the Gorbachev Era for Cuban Socialism
3 Economic Relations Between Cuba and Eastern Europe: Present Situation and Possible Developments
4 The Future of Cuban-US Relations: A Cuban View
5 US-Cuban Relations: The View from Washington
Part 2 CUBA'S RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD
6 Cuba and Africa: Thirty Years of Solidarity
7 Cuba's International Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean: Toward a New Stage?
8 Cuba's Role as Mediator in International Conflicts: Formal and Informal Initiatives
9 Cuban Development Aid: South-South Diversification and Counterdependency Politics
10 Exporting the Educational Revolution: The Cuban Project to Become a World Educational Power
Part 3 CUBA'S RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY
11 Western Europe and Cuba's Development in the 1980s and Beyond
12 Canada-Cuban Relations: A Brief Overview
13 Cuba's Canadian Connection: The Northern Door Opens Wider
Part 4 CONCLUSION
14 Confronting the Challenge of a New International Order
Selected Bibliography
About the Contributors
Index
About the Book

Citation preview

Cuban Foreign Policy

Confronts a New International Order

Cuban Foreign Policy

Confronts a New International Order

edited by

H. Michael Erisman John M. Kirk

Lynne Rienner Publishers • Boulder & London

Published in the United States of America in 1991 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1991 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cuban foreign policy confronts a new international order / edited by H. Michael Erisman and John M. Kirk Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-239-5 (alk. paper) I. Cuba—Foreign relations—1959- I. Erisman, H. Michael. II. Kirk, John M., 1951F1788.C8271991 327.7291—dc20 91-8351 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

Contents

List of Tables Preface 1

vii IX

Introduction: Cuba and the Struggle for Political Space in the 1990s H. Michael Erisman and John M. Kirk

1

Part 1 THE TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP: CUBA, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES 2 3 4 5

Implications of the Gorbachev Era for Cuban Socialism Rhoda Rabkin Economic Relations Between Cuba and Eastern Europe: Present Situation and Possible Developments José Luis Rodriguez The Future of Cuban-US Relations: A Cuban View René J. Mujica Cantelar US-Cuban Relations: The View from Washington Wayne S. Smith

21

53 63 77

Part 2 CUBA'S RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD 6 7

Cuba and Africa: Thirty Years of Solidarity Armando Entralgo González and David López González Cuba's International Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean: Toward a New Stage? Luis Suárez Salazar

v

93

107

vi 8 9 10

Contents

Cuba's Role as Mediator in International Conflicts: Formal and Informal Initiatives Donna Rich Cuban Development Aid: South-South Diversification and Counterdependency Politics H. Michael Erisman Exporting the Educational Revolution: The Cuban Project to Become a World Educational Power Mark Richmond

119 139 167

Part 3 CUBA'S RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY 11 Western Europe and Cuba's Development in the 1980s and Beyond Gareth Jen kins 12 Canada-Cuban Relations: A Brief Overview Richard V. Gorham 13 Cuba's Canadian Connection: The Northern Door Opens Wider John M. Kirk

183 203 207

Part 4 CONCLUSION 14

Confronting the Challenge of a New International Order H. Michael Erisman and John M. Kirk

215

Selected Bibliography About the Contributors Index About the Book

225 229 233 241

Tables

1.1 Cuban Trade with Selected Countries

11

7.1 Cuban Trade with Latin America and the Caribbean

112

9.1 Cuban Developmental Aid Personnel Abroad

153

11.1 Cuban Exports to Market Economy Countries, 1986

187

11.2 Plants Available for Joint Ventures

191

11.3 Cuban Imports from Main Trading Partners, 1980-1988

198

11.4 Cuban Exports to Main Trading Partners, 1980-1988

199

11.5 Cuban Imports of Selected Industrial Products and Main Western Countries of Origin

200

vii

Preface

If, as Shakespeare said, the world is indeed a stage, then revolutionary Cuba must be recognized as one of most unique players to stride before its footlights in the post-World War II period. Conventional wisdom tells us that small states must by default be consigned to bit parts; they form the backdrop or the chorus against which the great powers mesmerize with their starring roles. Occasionally one of these supporting actors will be accorded a brief moment in the international spotlight and may perhaps even exert a significant impact on the course of the drama, only to return to its normal state of relative obscurity. Cuba, however, under the charismatic and often controversial leadership of Fidel Castro, has refused to remain quietly in the wings. Instead, it has emerged as one of the very few developing countries that routinely pursues a high-visibility agenda on a truly global scale, infuriating some elements while being closely scrutinized and even lauded by others for its audacity. After thirty years of this fascinating and often tumultuous revolutionary experience, Havana is at what may very well prove to be the most important crossroads it has ever faced regarding its role and status on the international scene. Admittedly, academics are prone to overuse this analogy, if for no other reason than to create the impression that their work must be considered unusually significant because of the momentous events with which they are dealing. It does not, however, require much imagination to see that Havana truly is confronting a new and in some respects very dangerous world as it enters the 1990s. Practically all aspects of its foreign affairs are either already in flux or at least under pressure to change. For example, the Revolution has long relied on the USSR and the Eastern European nations for crucial economic-military aid, but these arrangements are now being revised and in some cases may be discarded entirely as perestroika sweeps through the Soviet bloc. Under these conditions Havana will have to face the challenge of developing and pursuing much more effectively such other dimensions of its foreign policy as its Latin American-Third World and Western European ties. Also to be addressed is the question of US-Cuban relations in a post-Cold War ix

X

Preface

environment; will the general lessening of East-West tensions translate into major normalization initiatives, or will the traditional pattern of confrontation persist and perhaps even intensify? Our basic purpose in this book is to probe such contemporary issues while still presenting a broad overview of Cuban foreign policy that will serve to provide a larger conceptual-historical context for the analyses. The central theme is, of course, the international challenges confronting the Revolution as it enters its fourth decade. These challenges arise not only from the radical restructuring occurring in the Soviet bloc, but also are related to economic exigencies that the island is facing, as well as the phenomenon of generational change as younger cohorts begin to come of political age and establish their leadership credentials. The genesis of this work can be traced to an unusual event that took place in November 1989 in the quiet Nova Scotian city of Halifax on Canada's Atlantic coast. Following two years of feverish planning, several protracted negotiating sessions in Cuba, and a successful funding campaign (as well as several bomb and assassination threats), a veritable feast of that peculiar field of study known as Cubanology commenced. A p proximately six hundred participants came from around the world— literally from A (Australia) to Z (Zimbabwe). The high-powered Cuban delegation, comprising over thirty prominent scholars as well as several government officials, was the largest ever to attend an academic conference in North America. A s might be expected when a wide variety of experts are gathered together for four solid days to grapple with often contentious topics, the debate was vigorous, with a broad spectrum of viewpoints emerging and sometimes clashing. This situation could have swirled out of control, for the Cuban Revolution has historically displayed a capacity to unleash unusually strong passions. Instead, one was invariably exposed to the refreshing spectacle of ideological opponents treating one another with consideration and politeness. It is hoped that this spirit of dialogue and openness that prevailed in Nova Scotia and that we have tried to incorporate here will translate into much greater understanding of the island's revolutionary process—warts and all. In pursuit of this end, we have included here updated versions of some of the best material presented at the conference. A concerted effort has been made to assure not only that the contributors represent a wide diversity of backgrounds and perspectives, but also that topics that have frequently been ignored in other works (e.g., Cuba's developmental aid programs, its mediation efforts, and its Western European and Canadian ties) are covered. The material is divided into three main sections—Havana's superpower relations; its Latin American and Third World relations; and its relations with various nations of the North Atlantic community—that essentially correspond to the primary state-centric dimensions of the Revolution's

Preface

xi

foreign policies. The Halifax Conference was made possible largely because of the generosity of the following sponsors: the Ford and MacArthur foundations (which were the main underwriters); the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada; the World Peace Foundation; the Canadian Association of Latin American and Caribbean Studies; and St. Mary's and Dalhousie universities (both of Halifax). Equally important was the army of volunteers whose dedication in the face of constant surprises went far beyond the normal call of duty. Inevitably, the shorthand label that will be attached to this work is the "Erisman-Kirk book," an understandable practice that unfortunately will obscure the immense contributions of the others involved. While most books demand a team effort, such was particularly the case in this instance, since the contemporary nature of the material made it imperative to move very quickly from conceptualization to publication (a process that was greatly facilitated by the advice and assistance of Lynne Rienner, whose reputation as a person unusually supportive of serious scholarship is in our opinion well deserved). Thus, while realizing that the recognition provided here is in no way commensurate with their professional skills and their contributions to this endeavor, we would like to extend our special thanks for their invaluable assistance to Wanda Hebb at Dalhousie University in Halifax and to Laura Wilburn, Beth Cappa, Jennifer Brown, and Jamie Messer of the Political Science Department at Indiana State University in Terre Haute. Moreover, a debt of considerable magnitude is owed to our families, who have endured the disruptions that this project has imposed on their lives with great patience and understanding. H. Michael Erisman John M. Kirk

1 Introduction: Cuba and the Struggle for Political Space in the 1990s H. Michael Erisman John M. Kirk States, like human beings and even animals, abhor the prospect of being caged in any way. Governments recognize, of course, that it is necessary for them to accept some restrictions on their freedom of action (e.g., the rules of behavior incorporated into international law) and are generally willing to do so as long as the limitations apply in roughly equal measure to everyone. But to be expected or especially somehow forced to assume a burden markedly beyond the norm is almost inevitably viewed as intolerable. This problem has always been particularly acute for smaller countries (such as Cuba) when they operate at the international level, where the power differentials can be substantial and thus where they will tend to be highly vulnerable to the hegemonic impulses often displayed by the strong. Smaller countries usually are, therefore, extremely concerned about, and highly sensitive to, the issue of the maneuvering room available to them, the basic idea being that they want to maximize it, since they fully realize that, to play upon the title of a book by Juan Arevalo, 1 those sardines who swim too close to the sharks are likely to be eaten. The notion of maximizing what might be called a country's political space has manifested itself in various ways in the literature on international relations, one good illustration being the classical school of geopolitics with its stress on such concepts as spheres of influence. Within this tradition one finds such controversial figures as Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer, whose writings made a great impression on the leaders of the German Third Reich and to a considerable extent formed the foundation upon which the Nazis developed the theory of Lebensraum that was used to rationalize Hitler's conquest of his neighbors. On the Anglo-Saxon front, two of the best-known geopolitical thinkers of the twentieth century were Alfred Thayer Mahan, a US naval officer whose emphasis on the importance of sea power had a significant impact on the defense and foreign policies of Theodore Roosevelt, and the British geographer Halford Mackinder, who formulated and popularized the famous Heartland Theory. 2 In the latter half of the 1900s, the control of physical space was a crucial theme in the Containment Doctrine that dominated the US and

1

2

Introduction

Western European security agendas throughout much of the post-World War II period, the assumption being that containment of Soviet power as well as Communist ideology within their postwar territorial boundaries would lead eventually to the unraveling of the Bolshevik Revolution.3 Although such geopolitical models are considered outmoded in many quarters today, governments nevertheless still often display concern (which is not always articulated precisely) about the political space available to them. In most cases, however, particularly when dealing in a Third World or less-developed country (LDC) framework, the issue is not spatial in the classical geopolitical sense of the term; the goal is not, in other words, the acquisition of foreign territory or spheres of influence. Rather, the focus tends to be on a decisionmaking conceptualization wherein maximizing one's foreign policy alternatives is heavily emphasized. In particular, no country wants to be put into a position where its options are being severely restricted or even dictated from abroad, since that, according to William Appleton Williams, would essentially translate into incorporation within an informal empire in the sense that "the weaker country is not ruled on a day-to-day basis by resident administrators or increasingly populated by emigrants from the advanced country, but it is nevertheless an empire. The poorer and weaker nation makes its choices within limits set, either directly or indirectly, by the more powerful society and often does so by choosing between alternatives actually formulated by the outsider."4 Inevitably, smaller states find themselves operating to some degree within the shadows that larger actors cast across the global stage. One obvious move to counteract the potential liabilities inherent in this situation would be to try to nurture a multifaceted network of international ties, the ultimate aim of the L D C being to push back as far as possible the constraining socioeconomic-political boundaries within which it must function. To the extent that this diversification strategy is successful, its practitioners will in effect have enlarged their political space. Certainly much of Cuba's political history, at least with respect to its ties with the outside world, can be seen as a tumultuous and at times even tragic quest for political space. For centuries the island was smothered under Spanish colonialism, which was finally broken in 1898. Independence, however, did not prove to be a fulfillment of the country's nationalistic aspirations, for it still found itself buffeted by winds emanating from various foreign centers. The United States, of course, has always posed a problem, intervening in Cuba's independence struggle, establishing a neoimperial relationship that persisted until Fidel Castro marched triumphantly into Havana in January 1959, and then subsequently adopting an unremittingly hostile stance in an effort to strangle the Revolution. Cuba's relations with the other Cold War heavyweight—the Soviet

Introduction

3

Union—have been much more complex, involving elements of both fraternal cooperation and latent concern about the possible risks of becoming too tightly locked into an association with any single country or military-economic bloc (e.g., the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [CMEA or COMECON] states). In any case, whether Havana has liked it or not, the hard realities are that its dealings with the two superpowers have to a great extent established the broad boundaries within which its overall foreign policies have had to operate for over thirty years. In other words, these two sets of linkages have usually played the crucial roles in delimiting the political space available to Havana on the international stage. Functioning within these parameters, Cuba has adopted a number of strategies to try to reduce (or push back) the superpowers' constraints on its overseas options and thereby increase its freedom of action. Havana's quest for greater political space has, as might be expected, traversed both peaks and valleys; there have been periods when the island's vistas appeared quite broad and others when the political walls seemed to be closing in. Certainly the situation as the Revolution enters the 1990s can be seen as more akin to the latter than the former scenario, with the Cubans themselves as well as outside observers painting often apocalyptic pictures of the country's future as the impact of the economicpolitical changes that have been sweeping through Europe in general and the Soviet bloc in particular ripple out into the larger global arena. For example, during separate visits to Cuba in the summer of 1990, each editor was frequently told by prominent Cubans in both academic and governmental circles that the country was facing the greatest crisis in its entire history. Although differing in their opinions regarding the most appropriate response, there did seem to be a general consensus that the international playing field was being radically altered in a manner not only detrimental but indeed very dangerous to the Revolution's interests, and that decisive action was necessary to halt the erosion of the political space that Havana had worked so hard (and often successfully) to develop over the years. Conceivably Cuba might be able (as some suggested to the editors) to ride out the storm by instituting various austerity measures and other stopgaps, but the majority sentiment seemed to be that a more proactive stance was required. In short, to apply the terminology being used in this analysis, Havana must once again concentrate on expanding its political space in order to be able to exert more control over its destiny. Addressing this topic in a manner that truly does justice to its importance is, to say the least, extremely challenging; the dynamics of Cuba's quest for political space are complex, and the roots of the whole process can be traced deep into the country's past. Recognize, therefore, that what follows here does not claim to be an exhaustive treatment of the subject. Instead, we seek only to provide what is admittedly an introductory

4

Introduction

framework for such a discussion by attempting to pinpoint some of the main strategies Havana has tried to employ in its efforts to expand its maneuvering room (linking these, where applicable, to the island's evolving relations with the superpowers); and probing in a preliminary fashion the potential impact on Cuba's foreign policy of the radical changes (at both the political-strategic and economic levels) that have been occurring in the global order of the early 1990s, with special emphasis on the implications involved for the various scenarios Havana has pursued in trying to protect or enhance its political space. In other words, we want to investigate how viable these approaches may now be, given the new international order that seems to be emerging. Many of these issues will be explored (either explicitly or implicitly) in much more detail in the ensuing chapters.

In Pursuit of Political Space: An Overview Cuba has, of course, experimented with a number of different strategies in its attempts to enlarge its political space. More often than not, their implementation has overlapped; it has not, in other words, normally been the case that Havana has concentrated almost exclusively on pursuing one particular approach for a while and then has (for whatever reason) dropped it in favor of another. Instead, as befits a country that has developed a considerable degree of sophistication in foreign affairs,5 Cuba has tended to treat these various options as distinct threads in a policy tapestry that can be woven together in different ways at different times or as the focus on issue-areas shifts. What the analyst usually confronts, therefore, is not a zero-sum exercise in decisionmaking, but rather a foreign policy fabric of subtle hues whose configuration changes depending on the emphasis that Havana places on the individual components within the overall menu of available options. The four basic space-enhancing strategies which Cuba has employed over the years (with some rough indication as to when they emerged or were especially prominent) are: (1) proletarian internationalism, which has essentially involved efforts to promote or consolidate radical socialist revolutions and was perhaps more vigorously pursued in Latin America during the 1960s; (2) forging the Soviet-East European connection, a process that reached fruition in the early 1970s and has in certain respects been a somewhat double-edged sword in Havana's policy arsenal; (3) South-South normalization initiatives, which emerged as a strong current in the early 1970s and perhaps reached its zenith in the late 1970s-early 1980s; and (4) overtures toward Western Europe and Canada, which have with a few exceptions elicited favorable responses, although in recent

Introduction

5

years the island's debt problems as well as its lack of enthusiasm for glasnost and perestroika have been complicating factors. The following capsule summaries are not intended to be definitive, but rather seek only to highlight some of the primary characteristics of each approach to maximizing Cuba's room to maneuver on the international stage. Proletarian

Internationalism

Proletarian internationalism, along with the closely related concept of antiimperialism, refers essentially to the contention that Marxists have an obligation to help their ideological brethren in other countries to seize power and to consolidate their revolutions. This theme is deeply embedded in the Communist ethos, having been first popularized by Marx in his call for the workers of the world to unite and perhaps most dramatically put into practice by the international brigades of the Spanish Civil War. From a Fidelista perspective, such solidarity inevitably translates into a parallel commitment to antiimperialism, since the hegemonic pretensions of nations like the United States are seen as one of the main obstacles to revolutionary change. Proletarian internationalism quickly emerged as, and still is, a central thread in Cuba's foreign policy, although admittedly the emphasis on it has varied over the years. In the 1970s, for example, it was certainly an element contributing to Havana's decision to become militarily involved in Angola, while in the 1980s this spirit manifested itself in the assistance which Cuba extended to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, Maurice Bishop's New Jewel revolution in Grenada, and the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN) insurgents in El Salvador. In many respects, however, the 1960s were the heyday of Fidelista proletarian internationalism, with Latin America being the major theater of operations. While purely ideological concerns were undoubtedly influencing Cuban policymakers, so also were security considerations, rooted in the island's evolving relations with the superpowers. Havana's ties with the United States had begun to deteriorate almost immediately following Castro's triumph. Determined to rid the international body politic of the Cuban virus, Washington was able increasingly to isolate the Revolution by persuading—if that is the proper word—all the countries in the Western Hemisphere (except Mexico and Canada) and many others elsewhere to sever practically all their ties with the island. Such Yankee hostility as well as other factors (e.g., philosophical affinity) led Havana to begin to establish its Moscow connection in the early 1960s. Yet, despite receiving increasing amounts of Soviet economic and military aid, Castro continued to have serious doubts (which the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 only served to fuel) about the Kremlin's willingness actually to use its

6

Introduction

armed forces to help defend the island against a US attack. Compounding these misgivings about the USSR's reliability as an ally was the serious ideological dispute that characterized the Cuban-Soviet relationship during much of the 1960s. It would, therefore, appear that Havana's maneuvering room and concomitantly its sense of security were diminishing at this point. Within this context Cuba's proletarian internationalism can be seen in part as a mechanism to protect and even, it was hoped, to expand its threatened political space. Theoretically, by supporting the campaigns of insurgents to seize power (especially in the Western Hemisphere), Havana could at least hope that Washington would have to spread its counterrevolutionary efforts over a wider front, thereby not being able to concentrate solely or even mainly on the island. Ideally, of course, Cuba stood to gain new allies and new foreign policy options to the extent that its revolutionary compatriots succeeded in their armed struggles. Ultimately, however, this scenario unraveled as the Latin American guerrilla offensives of the 1960s were smashed. Consequently Havana, still confronting the specter of US-sponsored isolation, shifted its attention to mending its Soviet-bloc fences. Forging the Soviet-East European Connection Cuba's evolving relationship with the Soviet Union (as well as the Eastern-bloc countries) was complex and often tumultuous throughout most of the 1960s. On the one hand, Havana clearly saw a Russian connection as a very useful and indeed even necessary counterweight to the immense pressure that Washington was putting on the Revolution in an effort to isolate and ultimately destroy it. In effect, Castro's government was under both military (e.g., the Bay of Pigs) and economic (e.g., the trade embargo) siege by the United States; in both areas the operating space required to protect its interests and perhaps even assure its survival was rapidly disappearing. Thus, to the extent that the Soviet bloc represented an alternative to Cuba's old (and fast-disappearing) economic networks as well as a source of security assistance, pragmatism as well as ideological principles suggested a turn to the East. Forging the link to the East did not, however, always go smoothly. Certainly the 1962-1968 era was one of intense growing pains in the Havana-Moscow connection, with both sides fluctuating between attraction and aversion. The Cubans—whose history had repeatedly driven home the danger of becoming too dependent upon, and therefore vulnerable to, any single external power center—wanted maximum latitude in defining the exact terms of the relationship. The Soviets, on the other hand, were wary of anything that implied an open-ended commitment on

Introduction

7

their part. Thus, while willing to provide substantial economic assistance, the Kremlin was loath to take any action that suggested unconditional political or military support, apparently because it felt that the Fidelistas were too prone to take unacceptable risks in confronting the United States and were trying to push their revolutionary agenda ahead too fast both at home and abroad. Consequently the disagreement between the two became increasingly acrimonious; the ideological battle that exploded during 1966-1968 over the question of armed struggle in Latin America was symptomatic of the deeper fissures in the relationship. Inexorably, however, the logic of Havana's increasingly precarious international position along with the sluggishness of the island's economy, which was not responding as hoped to the Fidelistas' developmental planning formulae, dictated a reassessment of the country's Russian link. Ironically this process of reconciliation began on a rather sour note, for in what seemed to be a none too subtle reminder of Cuba's economic vulnerability and hence the danger of overantagonizing the USSR, the deliveries of vital Soviet oil supplies to the island were delayed in early 1968. Although the Kremlin insisted that the disruptions were due purely to logistical problems, and Havana never publicly disputed this explanation, many observers considered the whole episode to be politically motivated. In any case, the convergence of all these factors helped to produce the watershed event for Cuba-Soviet reconciliation—Fidel's endorsement of Moscow's August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent Brezhnev Doctrine. Admittedly Castro's approval was equivocal; it was given rather grudgingly and was accompanied by various criticisms of Soviet-style communism. Nevertheless, many people, including some elements of the European intellectual left who had previously been strongly supportive of the Revolution, were outraged by what they felt was a crass Cuban sellout. A different and certainly more benign picture emerges, however, when viewing the situation from the perspective of the surrounded and embattled Fidelistas. Specifically, as William LeoGrande notes, "the principle of the irreversibility of socialist revolutions and the willingness of the USSR to risk international crisis and opprobrium to support that principle constituted the linchpin of Cuban national security. Thus the Cubans probably viewed the intervention with assurance rather than trepidation."6 In short, such assertiveness in defense of Marxism was what the Cubans had wanted for some time, and hence they understandably were willing, with some reservations, to support it. Although Havana still refused to embrace the Kremlin's position on some issues,7 reconciliation nevertheless proceeded swiftly, with cooperation in the economic field (where relations between the two countries has always been fairly good) leading the way. Concurrent with increases in the USSR's already considerable aid following the disruptive 1970 sugar

8

Introduction

harvest (when the Fidelistas unsuccessfully tried to bring in an unprecedented 10 million tons and in the process seriously unbalanced the economy), Cuba introduced various reforms that brought its developmental plans more in line with the Soviet model. This rapprochement culminated in 1972 when the island became the first non-European nation to be accepted as a full member in the CMEA, which was roughly the Eastern bloc's counterpart of the European Economic Community, or E E C . This move toward greater economic integration, combined with concurrent increases in military aid and collaboration, served as the crucible within which the strong links were forged that would characterize Cuban-SovietEast European relations over the next two decades. South-South

Normalization

Initiatives

As in most other Marxist (and indeed some non-Marxist) countries, the Cuban Revolution's foreign relations have always operated at two basic levels: conventional state-to-state dealings on the one hand and then what might be called party-to-party contacts on the other, although the latter category is somewhat imprecise, since the convergence of the party and the government within the Cuban political system can create a situation wherein the linkages involved might better be characterized as state-toparty. In any case, given this dualism, the island's attitude to any particular country could conceivably be rather ambivalent; Havana could at the formal state level be maintaining correct and even cordial ties with a government while simultaneously on the party side of the equation encouraging indigenous revolutionaries to overthrow it. Usually, however, the Cubans have preferred (in terms of general policy as well as in specific instances) to decide which of the two approaches seems most appropriate and then devote most of their attention to pursuing it. During the 1960s, as we indicated in discussing proletarian internationalism, Havana's emphasis was at the party level in the Western Hemisphere; it concentrated on providing moral, material, and other forms of support to the armed struggles of pro-Fidelista guerrillas. There were, of course, some deviations from this norm, the Mexican case being the main example because Mexico refused to embrace Washington's virulent anti-Cuban policies. But in sub-Saharan Africa and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the Middle East such exceptions were in fact the rule. While willing to help nurture the efforts of some insurgent movements to seize power (e.g., from the racist apartheid regime in South Africa), Havana was primarily concerned with normalizing its conventional state relations. Such initiatives included not only the standard elements—establishing diplomatic ties and promoting trade—but in quite a few instances also saw Cuba venturing into the virtually uncharted waters (at least for

Introduction

9

most Third World countries) of developmental aid and military assistance programs. Eventually the concept of South-South normalization also moved to the forefront of Cuba's Latin American agenda, with Havana proclaiming its willingness during the 1970s to cooperate with "progressive" regimes that were seriously committed to domestic reform and internationally to an independent foreign policy (which in Fidelista terms meant not operating as a US client-state). Adopting this more moderate line, the island established diplomatic ties with the following hemispheric countries during the early 1970s: Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago in 1972; Argentina in 1973; Venezuela in 1974; and Colombia in 1975. Chilean-Cuban relations were normalized in 1970 when Salvador Allende assumed the presidency in Santiago but were once again ruptured when he was overthrown in 1973. This new respectability led to growing sentiment to lift the sanctions imposed on Castro's government by the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1964. Peru first advanced this proposal in 1972, and it was finally adopted in 1975. A watershed event in Cuba's South-South exploits came in 1976 when, at its Sri Lanka summit conference, the Nonaligned Movement unanimously selected Havana as the site for its next gathering. To be so chosen is not merely a symbolic honor. Rather, by virtue of acquiring such responsibilities as setting the summit's agenda, writing its draft resolution (which usually becomes the organization's basic policy guideline for the next several years), and serving as the bloc's chief international representative until the next triannual meeting, the host government acquires considerable prestige and potential influence on the global stage. Consequently, when Cuba officially became head of the Movement in 1979, the occasion in effect represented its acceptance into the innermost circles of Third World leadership. Admittedly, this stature was subsequently undermined when Havana's Moscow connection caused it to become enmeshed in the controversy surrounding the USSR's war in Afghanistan, a situation that Cuba itself complicated by voting against a January 1980 UN resolution, supported by the vast majority of developing countries, condemning the Kremlin's intervention. By the late 1980s, however, such problems seem to have dissipated considerably, as evidenced by the fact that Havana's bid for a seat on the UN Security Council received a very warm Third World reception. Cuba had mounted a similar campaign in the early 1980s but failed because of strong US opposition and the fallout from the Afghan crisis. This time, despite yet another major counteroffensive on Washington's part, Havana won easily. Indeed, when the ballots were counted on October 18 Cuba emerged with the largest number of votes ever tallied in such a Security Council election—146 out of a possible 156.

10

Introduction

Essentially, then, it appears that the South-South normalization dimension of Cuba's foreign policy had not only stabilized as the Revolution prepared to enter the 1990s, but was in many respects remarkably robust. Overtures

To Western

Europe

The Western European (and Canadian) dimensions of Cuban foreign affairs have tended to receive relatively little attention by most analysts, primarily one suspects because they have not involved the patterns of crisis and melodrama that have often characterized other aspects of the island's international agenda. Yet, when assessing Havana's situation in terms of the political and especially the economic maneuvering room available to it, Western Europe and Canada simply cannot be ignored, for they have traditionally served as the Revolution's main access points to the highly developed market sectors of the global economy. Such gateways are vital because Cuba has never—despite its commitment to a radical socialist model of development involving a complex system of tight centralized control, and its increased incorporation into the CMEA framework—displayed any serious inclination to remove itself entirely from the capitalist-dominated world market. To the contrary, says Jorge Dominguez, Havana "has sought to join rather than avoid the world market; the only exception was the early 1980s, when Cuba disengaged from the non-Communist world market and deepened its dependence on the USSR and other CMEA countries In the second half of the 1980s Cuba... sought to resume its links with the world market economy, though limited in its capacity to trade by its own domestic economic problems." 8 Table 1.1 provides some indication of the general trends in the island's trade relations with six key Western European nations—Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, France, West Germany, and England—as well as Canada and Japan. Clearly the 1980s witnessed a major erosion in the amount of economic space provided by the E E C and Canada. But by the end of the decade Havana was making overtures that indicated a strong interest in expanding and strengthening these ties. Serious questions can, of course, be raised as to whether significant progress in this direction is likely given the prevailing economic and political winds. Nevertheless, it seems fairly clear that Havana is anxious to explore the possibilities. Political factors have inevitably impinged upon Cuba's trade relations with Western countries (e.g., the French kept Havana at arm's length during the early 1960s because Cuba sympathized with the Algerian independence forces; West Germany reacted similarly once the Fidelistas established cordial ties with the German Democratic Republic). Generally, however, Cuba has preferred to try to push such considerations into the background and concentrate instead on doing business. Such prag-

11

Introduction Table 1.1 Cuban Trade with Selected Countries

1958

1965

1975

1980

1985

10.8 2.2 6.4

9.4 0.7 3.1

9.7 2.2 7.5

4.5 2.9 2.8

4.9 0.5 1.3

9.4 2.3 0.6

14.4 1.8 0.5

19.2 3.2 11.6

10.8 2.4 3.9

6.3 0.7 2.7

Percentage of exports to: Western European Nations Canada Japan Percentage of imports from: Western European Nations Canada Japan

Source: Cuban statistics in Jorge I. Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 192-193.

matism is graphically illustrated in its evolving links with Spain. After a somewhat stormy beginning in the early 1960s, which saw the Castro and Franco governments embroiled in a number of disputes, it became apparent to both countries that reconciliation would serve their mutual self-interest, and consequently, as part of this process, a three-year trade treaty was signed in 1963. Subsequently commerce between Castro's Marxist revolution and Franco's vehemently anti-Communist, fascistic regime flourished, with Spain becoming the island's premier trading partner in Western Europe. In a symbolic gesture that underscored the importance of its Madrid connection in its efforts to maximize its economic space, Havana observed a period of official mourning when Franco, one of the most widely despised dictators of his time, died in 1975. These cooperative relations have, despite occasional political disagreements, by and large been maintained with the democratic Spanish leadership that succeeded Franco. The primary factor complicating Cuban-Western European commerce from the mid-1980s on was the Revolution's growing debt problems. Indeed, in a somewhat ironic twist, these difficulties were in part a function of Havana's success in countering Washington's efforts to isolate it completely from the market sectors of the global economy. Although Cuba had traditionally experienced some deficits in its Western trade, it had been able to handle them prior to the 1980s and hence preserve its creditworthiness. But then the recession raging through the Third World finally engulfed the island, and Havana found itself confronted with an increasingly unmanageable hard-currency debt. In August

12

Introduction

1982 Cuba initiated negotiations with its market-economy creditors (most of whom were Western European banks and governments) about rescheduling its debt payments. A series of such agreements were reached during 1982-1986, which relieved some of the immediate pressure on the island. Nevertheless, in July 1986 Havana unilaterally suspended all interest and principal payments on its hard-currency obligations, while it attempted to arrange a more favorable long-term package. Although some individual deals were concluded as stopgaps, there was no comprehensive accord, and hence the impasse continued, with Cuba falling deeper into arrears as its Western debt escalated from approximately $3 billion in late 1986 to $6 billion in 1990.9

Into the 1990s The relative tranquility that Cuba had enjoyed in its Soviet-East European connection for approximately two decades was shattered in the late 1980s and early 1990s as upheaval swept through the socialist camp. Communist governments with whom the Fidelistas had cultivated a complex web of beneficial relations were driven from power throughout most of Eastern Europe and replaced by regimes that displayed little sympathy for the Revolution and little interest in helping it; the German Democratic Republic, which had been one of Havana's closest trading partners, simply disappeared from the map as Germany was reunified; and the CMEA, which was a lucrative source of developmental aid for the Cubans and also provided privileged access to Eastern European markets, was seriously weakened as a mechanism for facilitating economic cooperation and may be on the verge of unraveling entirely. Standing at the epicenter of this tumult is the USSR, which has been not only buffeted by developments on its borders, but also wracked by its own internal crises. The shock waves of these convulsions have rippled through the larger global community, radically transforming the international order. Although all countries will have to adjust to this new playing field, Cuba is a somewhat special case. Specifically, because of its extremely close and in some respects unique ties with the Soviet bloc, the changes that have occurred and still are occurring there have grave implications for the island's status and role on the world stage. Certainly Havana's ability to protect and enhance its political space is not likely to benefit from these developments. In particular, their potential impact on the dynamics of the island's superpower relations raises questions as to how effectively Cuba will now be able to use its Moscow connection as a counterweight against US hostility, for it could be argued not only that the USSR's relative strength and thus its deterrent

Introduction

13

capabilities have been diminished somewhat, but also that the propensity that it has already displayed to shift its basic posture toward the West from latent confrontation to active reconciliation is being strongly reinforced by the disintegration of the Russian camp. What the Cubans must fear is that under such conditions the Kremlin might very well be willing to abandon them to assure continued US-Soviet détente (and also, perhaps, to devote more attention to restructuring the increasingly weak Russian economy). Havana is not, in principle, opposed to a Washington-Moscow rapprochement. What it has long demanded, however, is that any process involving the amelioration of Cold War tensions must include all countries, not simply the superpowers and possibly their European allies. Indeed, a growing warmth would undoubtedly be welcomed by the Fidelistas, since it implies normalization of their relations with the United States and hence the opening of a whole new spectrum of political and especially economic space. The prospects for such a scenario seem, however, to be extremely dim. Washington thus far has been much more inclined to try to use the Kremlin's problems and its desire for Western aid as leverage to promote anti-Cuban sentiment in the USSR, 10 the idea being to drive a permanent wedge between the two countries. Clearly, then, it makes little sense within such a context to expect that Havana's Soviet-East European connection can serve as a major vehicle for helping the Cubans to protect or enhance their political-economic space. Rather, the instability that currently characterizes Eastern Europe's situation represents the single most important variable contributing to the foreign policy crisis Havana now confronts. Turning to the Third World, contradictions have always existed between Havana's two basic strategies (party-oriented proletarian internationalism and state-centric normalization) for increasing its maneuvering room on a South-South axis. As a general rule, Cuba has found it difficult to operate vigorously at both levels simultaneously. In the 1960s, for example, its vanguard role in promoting Fidelista radicalism generated a reluctance in many quarters to establish or maintain truly cordial ties. Somewhat similar attitudes could be detected in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the main concern this time being Havana's participation in the Angolan and Ethiopian wars, as well as the security assistance it provided in an effort to help consolidate the revolutions of Nicaragua's Sandinistas and Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement in Grenada. In most instances (especially since the 1960s) the Fidelistas have, when forced to choose, usually opted to accord top priority to normalization. Looking ahead to the 1990s, there seems to be little reason to assume that this policy hierarchy will change dramatically. One should not, on the other hand, expect Cuba to forsake entirely any internationalist forays.

14

Introduction

Rather, it will almost certainly be inclined to continue its already wellestablished pattern of highly selective fraternal assistance, extending significant aid only to those insurgent movements it feels have a good chance to win their armed struggles (e.g., the FMLN in El Salvador and, should the political dialogue prove fruitless and violence once again become necessary, the African National Congress in South Africa) and to consolidate their revolutions once they have come to power. Overall, however, such initiatives are likely to continue to be fairly rare occurrences. Havana's quest for Third World space within the context of normalized state relations has paid significant dividends over the years, and in some important respects this arena continues to have potential. There may, for example, be good prospects for increased trade; Cuba can, in certain areas such as health care, pharmaceuticals, education, agronomy, and construction—where the Revolution has reached a relatively high level of achievement and expertise—provide goods and especially services to other Third World countries as effectively and often more inexpensively than can the developed nations. Havana has also been experimenting with joint ventures to attract foreign investors, including those from the LDCs. Indeed, given the inclination of Cuba's CMEA partners (including the USSR) to phase out subsidies in their trade with the island and to begin to demand payment in hard currency (which is in very short supply in Havana), a greater interest in, and emphasis on, South-South relations by the Fidelistas seems almost inevitable. But to what extent could Cuba implement this space-enhancing strategy successfully? Here again Havana's deteriorating Soviet-bloc relations enter the picture. Cuba has in the past been extremely effective in capitalizing on its CMEA connection, particularly its highly favorable ties with the USSR and the German Democratic Republic, in order to strengthen its capacity to pursue an ambitious South-South agenda. In effect, Cuba was tapping Eastern European resources to stabilize its economy and thereby put itself in a better position to devote serious attention to the Third World. As the 1990s dawned, however, the CMEA component of this equation was being radically altered (if not totally eliminated). Exactly how debilitating this development may be is unclear, but undoubtedly it will complicate Cuba's Third World agenda by limiting the resources necessary to carry it out as well as, perhaps, contributing to a situation in which the time and energy that otherwise might have been expended on foreign affairs is redirected inward, toward adjusting to retrenchment and austerity. Another imponderable involves the degree to which the LDCs may be interested in responding, or able to respond positively, to Havana's overtures. The harsh reality is that many Third World nations, burdened by massive foreign debts and developmental deterioration that has often set them back several decades, may be much more concerned with North-

Introduction

15

South rather than South-South relations. That being so, the island may very well find itself rather low on their priority lists. Moreover, even in those instances wherein a government might be inclined to maintain or expand its Cuban ties, economic problems may render it susceptible to counterpressure coming from Washington or some other hotbed of antiFidelista sentiment. In either case there is a high probability that solidarity with Havana would fall victim to the exigencies of accommodation with the metropolitan centers of power on the world stage. Where Cuba's quest for political-economic space is likely to experience the least instability in making the transition to the 1990s is the Western European-Canadian front. The dynamics of its relations here have for the most part functioned independently of its dealings with both the USSR and the United States. Hence, upheaval in the Soviet bloc has not adversely affected Cuba's Western European-Canadian links, nor is there any reason to think that these countries, which have for the most part refused to support the US campaign against the Revolution, will be any more receptive to Washington's blandishments in the foreseeable future. Thus, they seem to represent potentially fertile fields for Cuba to broaden its international operating space. While there is little to suggest that Havana is in any serious danger of seeing its Western European connections decline precipitously in the near future, there are two pieces in the evolving mosaic that might hinder any significant expansion. The first involves the complex issue that has come to be known as "Europe 1992." Basically this term refers to the date when all members of the E E C have agreed to merge their separate national economies into a single entity with a common currency and uniform polices regarding foreign trade. While this new Western European economic order is emerging in a much more orderly fashion than its counterpart in the East, it nevertheless poses some uncertainties for nations such as Cuba. One cannot accurately predict the impact of these changes on existing "special" North-South trade arrangements and on the ease of future access to the European market for Third World exports. Access is especially relevant to Havana's ability to enhance its politicaleconomic space through a Western European strategy. Cuba's second problem is, obviously, its European debts; until they are liquidated or at least are being managed efficiently, the Fidelistas may very well find it difficult to convince Western Europeans to extend the credits that the island would in most cases need to finance its E E C imports (which are likely to assume greater importance because Havana can no longer be assured that its old CMEA suppliers of machinery and other similar finished goods will be able or willing to deliver). In general, then, although it does not appear that Havana's Western European-Canadian connection is in serious disrepair or danger of unraveling, there do appear to be

16

Introduction

some short-term obstacles to any major enhancement of the politicaleconomic space available in this quarter.

Conclusion Perhaps more than any time since the early days of the Revolution, before Havana had consolidated its Soviet-Eastern European linkages as a counterweight against Washington's attempts to isolate the island and thereby force it into a highly vulnerable position, Cuba finds itself as it enters the 1990s with its maneuvering room—so assiduously cultivated over the years—being heavily threatened. No longer can the Fidelistas be confident that the fairly wide-ranging political-economic space they enjoyed in the 1970s and even in the more difficult 1980s will be available. Instead, the international playing field has been, and very well may continue to be, reshaped in ways detrimental to the island's traditional desire to avoid being forced to operate within narrow parameters and quite limited policy options. The sentiments various Cubans expressed to us about a crisis being at hand certainly seem to have considerable validity. Whatever one may think of the Revolution, the historical record definitively establishes not only that it has never shirked a challenge, but also that it has demonstrated a remarkable ability to overcome what often have appeared to be insurmountable odds. Responding effectively to the tumultuous world of the early 1990s undoubtedly constitutes one of the severest tests in the Fidelistas' long history of crisis and confrontation. In the following chapters we do not pretend to be able to answer definitively whether or not Havana will once again be able to triumph. What we do provide, however, is an in-depth analysis of the dynamics and evolving nature of a foreign policy whose ability to conquer adversity has repeatedly surprised both its friends and its enemies. Whether it can do so again remains to be seen.

Notes 1. Juan José Arévalo, The Shark and the Sardines (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1961). 2. A good summary of the classical theories of geopolitics can be found in James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1990), pp. 58-67. 3. The intellectual genesis of the containment doctrine can be found in George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Policy 25 (July 1947): 566-582. The article was originally attributed to "Mr. X" because Kennan

Introduction

17

was an active Foreign Service officer at the time it was published and thus preferred to use a pseudonym. 4. William Appleton Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Dell, 1962), pp. 47-48. 5. For a discussion of maturity (or sophistication) in analyses of Cuba's foreign relations as well as in the policies themselves, see H. Michael Erisman, "Cuban Foreign Policy: The Question of Maturity of Analysis," Latin American Research Review 25, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 217-230. See also Jorge I. Domínguez, "Cuba in the International Arena," Latin American Research Review 23, no. 1 (1988): 196-206. 6. William LeoGrande, "Cuban-Soviet Relations and Cuban Policy in Africa," paper presented at the 1979 conference of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, p. 6. 7. For example, at a June 1969 gathering of Communist parties in Moscow, the Cuban delegation of observers criticized the USSR's antiimperialist policies for not being forceful enough and refused to sign the conference's final joint declaration. 8. Jorge I. Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989) p. 185. 9. Some estimates put Cuba's hard-currency debt as high as $8 billion as of 1990; see, for example, Update on Cuba (September 17,1990), p. 9, which cites the Journal of Commerce (August 7,1990) as the source of this figure. However, the figure most commonly mentioned by outside observers is $6 billion. 10. Bush administration officials have repeatedly tried to prod the Kremlin into either using its influence to press Castro to accept US preconditions for normalization of relations (e.g., switching to a market economy and holding open, internationally monitored elections) or abandoning Cuba completely. The tactics used to promote these ideas range from polite diplomatic suggestions to barely concealed bribery. The former approach was employed by Bernard Aronson, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, when he stated at a May 1990 conference in Miami that "we hope the Soviet Union will see the fundamental contradiction between its new thinking and its contribution of $5 billion a year in assistance to Cuba, where human rights are being violated." See CubalNFO 2, no. 10 (June 4,1990): 5. Vice-President Dan Quayle has sometimes been more blunt, as when he seized the opportunity during a June 1990 meeting to ask Soviet President Gorbachev to "do his very best" to convince Fidel to institute major reforms. See CubalNFO 2, no. 11 (June 22,1990): 4. President Bush has, however, often preferred to go directly for the jugular, as illustrated when, in response to Western European declarations stressing the need to help shore up the sagging Soviet economy, he insisted that Moscow's continuing aid to Havana constituted a major obstacle to any US help for the USSR. See CubalNFO 2, no. 12 (July 19, 1990): 3-4.

Part One THE TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP: CUBA, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES

19

2 Implications of the Gorbachev Era for Cuban Socialism Rhoda Rabkin

Mikhail Gorbachev's call to rethink socialism has met with a complex and ambivalent response from the socialist bloc, with domestic political dynamics being the most important determinant of attitudes toward his reform initiatives. Even before the collapse of the Berlin Wall in the autumn of 1989, the desire of Communist elites in the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Poland to create modern, dynamic, world-competitive economies had triggered a new set of political pacts between them and their people. But in Cuba, as in North Korea and China (and also in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania before massive public protest toppled hard-line Communist leaders), the political conditions for a liberalizing revision of the state-society relationship are lacking. Castro has long believed that Gorbachev's changes are more likely to destroy socialism than to save it. He has described recent political changes in Eastern Europe as "very sad," a view that has been taken up and repeated by other top Cuban leaders.1 Without denying the need for improvement in socialist institutions, Fidel has rejected the applicability of liberalizing reforms to Cuba. "Why must the so-called reforms be along capitalist lines?" he has asked.2 Castro's rejection of Gorbachev-style reform is in some ways surprising, for he has at times been a rather unorthodox Communist himself. His disputes with conventional Soviet thinking, particularly in the 1960s, with regard to foreign policy, internal politics, and economic management earned him a reputation as a maverick. Why, then, has Castro not welcomed a dynamic, innovative leader in the Kremlin more warmly? The answer is not really mysterious. Gorbachev's success in reducing EastWest tensions means a corresponding decline in the value of Cuba as a strategic asset to the USSR. No doubt Castro's militant support for revolutionary causes around the world derives from his faith in socialism

This article was first published in Studies in Comparative Communism (Guilford, Eng.: Butterworth-Heinemann) 23, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 23-26, and is reproduced with permission.

21

22

The Triangular Relationship: Cuba, the USSR & the US

as a means of combating exploitation and poverty in Third World countries. But Havana's military contribution to Russia's foreign policy objectives, which has cost thousands of Cuban lives, also accounts substantially for the favored economic treatment the island has received from the Soviet Union.3 Havana cannot be indifferent to such developments because it is heavily dependent upon Moscow for trade, economic developmental aid, and military assistance. Cuban leaders also find various ideological aspects of Gorbachev's thinking deeply disturbing. In particular, the Soviet Union is, from the Cuban point of view, in the process of abandoning socialist principles. The problem is not that the Soviets are pressing the Fidelistas to do likewise, but rather that Gorbachev's endorsement of "pluralism" has led not only to wholesale defections from the Communist camp, but also to a loss of ideological clarity and coherence among those still claiming loyalty to the political legacy of Marx and Lenin.4 Of equal concern, perhaps, is that Moscow's repudiation of the Brezhnev era subtly legitimizes a more critical attitude to questions of leadership inside Cuba itself. These developments are profoundly unsettling to a regime that has often sought to associate itself with the prestige of the Soviet bloc.

Policy Continuity in the Gorbachev Era Gorbachev's policies, both at home and abroad, have brought dramatic departures from previous Russian patterns of conduct. In pursuit of his ultimate goal, the renewal of Soviet socialism, he has presided over a radical pluralization of foreign policy debate within the USSR.5 Culminating with the acceptance of German reunification, Gorbachev's disposition to abandon traditional geopolitical and strategic definitions of Moscow's national interest is nothing short of breathtaking. But his approach to relations with Havana, at least up till now, demonstrates a concern to preserve continuity that has often been lacking in other areas. Cuba is not Afghanistan or Angola, client-states whose domestic instability has required the Kremlin's support for open-ended military engagements that have been costly in terms of money and lives as well as international prestige. Nor, for that matter, is Cuba like East Germany, a client-state that depended upon the menace of Soviet troops to maintain its socialist identity.6 Despite increasing friction between the two parties, Gorbachev and his associates have treated Castro with considerable restraint and delicacy; there are sound strategic and political reasons for doing so. Ninety miles from Florida, Cuba provides the Kremlin with military resources that are unique and some that are probably irreplaceable: for example, a huge, sophisticated base (the Lourdes installation) for gather-

Implications of the Gorbachev Era for Cuban Socialism

23

ing electronic intelligence, and facilities for long-range reconnaissance aircraft that can then operate along the US eastern seaboard. Washington's determination to counter Moscow's naval presence in the Caribbean has complicated US strategic planning and has raised defense expenditures.7 Also, until recently, Havana furnished a resource unobtainable from any other Soviet partner—soldiers available for the projection of Russian power in Africa. With the Cuban withdrawal from Angola, this particular contribution is of diminished significance, but Havana has nevertheless probably earned some lasting credit for it. In addition, Cuban friendship offers the USSR less-tangible, but still important, ideological benefits. By presenting itself as a model of social progress and equitable development, Havana brings prestige to the socialist cause. The US mass media generally portray Cuban socialism as an economic failure, kept in being only by massive transfers of Soviet aid. In Latin America and elsewhere, however, achievements in providing basic nutrition, employment, health care, and education have created a favorable image of the Cuban revolution—whatever the source and scale of its external funding—among many intellectuals, political leaders, and ordinary people. Thus the Cuban connection bolsters the Kremlin's progressive image in Third World capitals.8 For all of these reasons, a deliberate Soviet-initiated rupture between the two countries is unlikely. The most probable outcome of the current difficult period in their relations is that the two countries will, after a period of behind-the-scenes bargaining, restructure their association in ways beneficial, although also less intimate, for both. But the adjustment period will be a difficult and uncomfortable one for both parties. And because we are dealing with Castro, not an ordinary world leader but a master of political maneuver and surprise, the outcome is still, to a degree, uncertain. As outlined above, the Gorbachev era has threatening implications for three major aspects of the Cuban-Soviet connection—the economic, the strategic, and the ideological. We can now explore in greater detail the conflicting interests and perceptions of both governments in these three areas. We will then consider some alternatives that Havana might pursue in the wake of a loosened relationship. Economic Dimensions

of the Soviet-Cuban

Relationship

Like other countries in the Western hemisphere, Cuba is experiencing a hard-currency balance of payments crisis. This may seem surprising, given that approximately 85 percent of the island's imports in recent years have come from the socialist countries. Nevertheless, trade with the capitalist countries has been necessary because in many instances the socialist bloc

24

The Triangular Relationship: Cuba, the USSR & the US

has been unable to provide raw materials, machinery, or technology as cheaply or in as high a quality as can the West. Official growth figures from the first half of the 1980s indicated a robust Cuban economy. The reported annual average growth rate of 7 percent was extraordinary, particularly when we consider that the rest of Latin America was experiencing serious recession.9 This reported rate is somewhat misleading, however, not only because output figures were not properly corrected for inflation, but also because growth was financed by unsustainable sources: aid from the Soviet Union and debt to Western creditors.10 In the second half of the 1980s Havana's balance of payments difficulties curbed her ability to import from the capitalist trading area, with harmful effects on the rate of growth. In 1986 Cuba reported that growth had slowed to less than 1 percent.11 In December 1986 Castro announced that hard-currency imports for the coming year would have to be curtailed to half their 1986 level. In 1987 the island actually experienced a negative growth rate of 3.2 percent. The economy posted a 2.3 percent expansion in 1988, which was respectable but did not recoup the losses from 1987.12 Havana's hard-currency debt stood at $6.4 billion in 1988, 13 while its hard-currency exports averaged somewhat over $1 billion per year from 1983 to 1987. This debt-to-export ratio of approximately six to one is by no means the worst in Latin America. 14 Nevertheless, it underscores the significance to Cuba of having an additional source of aid from the Soviet bloc. Havana's poor trade profile with capitalist countries has been partially offset by trade with the socialist countries, where special agreements have provided the island preferential terms. For example, in 1979 Moscow paid forty-four cents per pound of sugar (five times the world price) and supplied Cuba with petroleum at $12.80 a barrel, which was roughly one-third the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC's) price.15 In 1984 Castro told the Cuban public that, had the country exported its 7 million tons of sugar that year at the prevailing market rates, the revenue would not even have financed a quarter of its oil-import bill at world prices.16 There is a difficult methodological issue involved in trying to determine the extent of the Soviet sugar subsidy. The size of the subsidy is not simply the difference between the Soviet and world market price for sugar times the volume traded, since less than one-fifth of total world sugar production is sold at so-called market prices. The world market "for most producers constitutes a residual outlet after domestic requirements and exports to preferential markets are met." 17 One researcher, using the US import-quota price to value sugar instead of the much lower market price, found that between 1976 and 1982 Cuba received a subsidy of about $1.5 billion annually.18

Implications of the Gorbachev Era for Cuban Socialism

25

The usual estimate of the size of total Soviet economic transfers to Cuba during the 1980s is from $4 to $5 billion a year. This estimate includes the value of the sugar and nickel subsidies, CMEA-price sales of petroleum to Cuba, low-interest developmental loans, and military aid. It is no easy matter to estimate what this transfer represents as a proportion of the island's gross national product (GNP) since Cuba does not use the standard capitalist national accounting system, nor is the official exchange rate of the peso to the dollar a market rate.19 Cuba reports that its gross social product for 1987 was 27 billion pesos while the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency estimated Cuban GNP at US $26 billion for 1985. If we accept these figures, then a ballpark estimate is that the Soviets during the 1980s have provided economic aid equivalent to 15 or 20 percent of the island's national product each year. This subsidy has been significant not only in relation to the Cuban economy, but also when looked at from Moscow's point of view. The cost of annual Russian aid to Cuba can also be considered in relation to the Kremlin's total domestic budget deficit in 1988 of about Rub 100 billion. The deficit itself is thought by US analysts to constitute about 9 percent of the USSR's GNP.20 Total Cuban debt to the socialist bloc has been variously estimated, but an official Cuban source reported a figure of $10 billion in 1987.21 In 1990, breaking a long silence on the topic, the Soviet newspaper Isvestia reported that Havana owed the Soviet Union Rub 15 billion, or US $24 billion at the official exchange rate.22 Even before Gorbachev became general secretary, the Soviets had signaled their desire for more responsible, efficient economic management on Cuba's part. Under pressure from their own chronic farm problems and hard-currency shortages in an era of soft energy prices, the Kremlin was understandably reluctant to go on absorbing Havana's economic losses indefinitely. Until 1984 the Soviets had quietly tolerated Cuban failures to meet sugar-export contracts. More than once, when world sugar prices climbed, Havana left the socialist countries short in order to sell to nations that paid in hard currency. In 1984, however, the Soviets began to insist that Cuba fulfill its contractual commitments. In the Soviet-Cuban trade agreement signed in 1984, Havana agreed to strict fulfillment of contracts, and it has taken this obligation seriously. In both 1984 and 1985 Cuba used scarce hard currency to buy $100 million worth of sugar on the world market to meet export commitments to the USSR, while in 1989 it bought 500,000 tons from Thailand for delivery to the Soviet Union. Some commentators have speculated that the Kremlin will use economic pressure to bring Cuba into conformity with Gorbachev's new line. Castro has denied this, saying, "If perestroika were to use pressure, it would not be perestroika."23 Strictly speaking, Fidel is correct in his

26

The Triangular Relationship: Cuba, the USSR & the US

characterization of Gorbachev's approach to intrabloc relations. The Soviet leader has repeatedly stated that the international Communist movement does not require uniformity24 and Moscow has shown considerable sensitivity to national differences that are relevant to the reception of reforms. Until its ouster by a massive protest movement, the East German regime, although it made no secret of its distaste for the Gorbachev reforms, was treated respectfully in the Soviet press. By contrast, Ceausescu's Romania, the poorest and most repressive country in Europe, was subject to more criticism.25 To judge from Soviet press coverage of Cuba, the Kremlin has no inclination to brand Castro's government corrupt or incompetent, although articles criticizing the island's poor economic growth did appear in a Soviet magazine (New Times) in August and October 1987 (with a response by Cuban leader Carlos Rafael Rodriguez). In March 1990 a rather sarcastic television report alluded to Cuba's ideological rigidity on the evening news program "Vremya." 26 Given the profound differences between Castro and Gorbachev, it is quite remarkable how little evidence there is of Soviet economic pressure on Havana. Perhaps Moscow policymakers are sensitive to the danger that heavy-handed pressure might backfire. In the words of a Soviet expert on Cuba, Sergo Mikoyan, "Fidel is very honest and very intelligent, but also very stubborn and unpredictable. . . . He does not do anything under pressure."27 Castro has gone out of his way to assure his people that the Soviet Union has behaved honorably to Cuba: "The USSR is making great efforts to fulfill its economic agreements, just as we are doing, in spite of the problems they have."28 There was, however, a mutually agreed reduction in the price that Moscow paid for Cuban sugar in 1987.29 Moreover, Castro implied that the Russians had established a ceiling on aid when he told the Cuban public in early 1987, "It's hard to conceive of having more resources or more foreign help; from now on anything additional must undoubtedly come from our work, intelligence, and effort. Nothing will be easy."30 Cuban sources express concern, but not yet indignation, about the Kremlin's economic policies. The December 1989 report of Havana's planning minister cited "delays in the arrival of external supplies, both hard currency and socialist," after "climate problems," as causes of the island's economic difficulties for the year.31 In early 1990 tardy delivery of Russian wheat led to cuts in bread rations and some increases in food prices. Such problems may arise not from any calculated political intention, but rather from the general disruption that perestroika has fostered. Reverse trade flows have also been adversely affected, with Havana citing a lack of Soviet ships for the failure of its citrus products to reach the USSR.32 Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Cuba's representative to the January 1990

Implications of the Gorbachev Era for Cuban Socialism

27

meeting of the CMEA, pronounced the results of the discussions "satisfactory." 33 Recently a Soviet diplomat in Havana denied that there was any intention to curtail trade, but also said that the Fidelistas would need to adapt to dealing with newly independent enterprises.34 The Kremlin, disappointed with Cuban sugar performance, is reportedly making longrange plans to tap other supplies of sweeteners, but in view of the island's difficulties in increasing exports this is only prudent from an economic point of view.35 The diversification of Soviet sugar imports, however, would not necessarily harm Havana's interests. Cuba's position as the sugarbowl of the socialist bloc, although advantageous in some respects, has also limited its ability to earn hard currency. "Cuba's free market sales dropped substantially during the 1980s. In 1984 Cuba sold about one-third less sugar on the free market than it had in 1979." 36 One other very important aspect of Havana's Russian connection is the quantity and terms on which the Soviets sell oil to Cuba. Despite the predictions of many Western experts since the late 1970s, Moscow did not cut back petroleum supplies during the 1980s. This contrasts with the Kremlin's treatment of another of its loyal allies—Bulgaria—even before the Gorbachev era. The share of Soviet oil in Bulgarian energy exports dropped by 50 percent between 1983 and 1984, with Bulgarian earnings from sales in the West decreasing almost as much.37 For 1986-1990, the Kremlin agreed to sell Havana about 10 or 13 million metric tons (MT) of petroleum each year at a special CMEA price. Cuba did not consume the entire Soviet allocation; by agreement with Moscow, Havana reexported what it did not use, for hard currency at the world price. Cuba reexported about 2.6 million MT of Russian oil in 1984, and 3 million MT in 1985, earning almost half a billion pesos each year from 1983 through 1985. By 1985, however, because of falling rates, the gap between the CMEA and the world price had disappeared. In 1986 and 1987 the Soviet C M E A price was actually higher than the world market price.38 Compounding these problems, there is also circumstantial evidence of a 1988-1989 reduction in these supplies to Cuba.39 Castro is, of course, extremely concerned about these reduced petroleum supplies. In a major March 1990 speech to the Federation of Cuban Women, he speculated grimly: "The Soviet Union hasn't fallen into the hands of counterrevolutionaries, and we hope it won't. The Soviet Union hasn't disintegrated and we hope it won't. No civil war has broken out in the Soviet Union and we hope it won't—yet dangers, real dangers, are lurking." He then went on to warn that, if Russian oil deliveries declined from 12 million to 8 million tons, the island would enter what he called a "special period in time of peace." 40 What this phrase implies was demonstrated when Havana held, in March 1990, a one-day rehearsal of emergency measures designed to conserve fuel; ships were unloaded by

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The Triangular Relationship: Cuba, the USSR & the US

hand, garmentworkers used foot-pedals to sew clothing, and families cooked their meals over wood fires. It seems unlikely that such exercises are designed primarily to engender a "siege mentality." Instead, they probably reflect genuine concern about the level of future Soviet aid. Apart from any interest the Kremlin might have in pressing Cuba into line on perestroika, the fact is that Moscow, for purely economic reasons, is increasingly reluctant, and even unable, to subsidize its foreign allies. This sentiment was exemplified by an economist, Nikolai Shmelyov, who during a June 1989 Supreme Soviet debate advocated deep cuts in aid to countries in Latin America.41 Foreign Minister Edvard Shevardnadze, in his October 1989 report to the Supreme Soviet, responded to such critics by pointing out that the Cubans "supported us at the most difficult times—let us be blunt—even when we were in the w r o n g . . . . If we wish to change something—and changes are certainly necessary in many cases—then talks must be held with the other side regarding the new conditions. . . . Unilateral measures cannot fail to affect the country's reputation and faith in its word."42 From Havana's point of view, of course, it is ominous that Shevardnadze defended aid to Cuba by invoking the value of continuity in foreign policy, but not by describing the island's current value to the Soviets or by describing the Kremlin's obligations to an LDC. Cuban-Soviet

Friction over Foreign Polici/

As with economic issues, Cuban-Soviet conflict over strategic priorities predates the Gorbachev era. Conflict over how much support should be given to revolutionary causes in the Western Hemisphere goes back to the 1960s. Such controversy was muted for most of the 1970s, largely because there were so few promising revolutionary opportunities in Latin America. At the end of the decade, however, with the triumph of the Sandinistas, the New Jewel experiment in Grenada, and the insurgency in El Salvador, the question of support for revolutionaries and revolutionary governments took on new urgency. The Cubans were very unhappy over the Soviet role, or "nonrole," in Grenada in October 1983. Castro had tried to forestall a coup against Maurice Bishop that was plotted by a pro-Soviet faction of the Grenadan leadership. The Cubans also lost thirty lives resisting US intervention there, while the Soviets confined themselves to low-key denunciations of the US action. Castro was also reportedly unhappy with Soviet weakness in opposing US intervention in Nicaragua. After a Soviet tanker was damaged by a US mine in Puerto Sandino, a Soviet flotilla en route to Nicaragua turned around, contrary to Castro's advice to President Konstantin Chernenko. 43 Gorbachev's new thinking implies a lesser priority for revolutionary

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29

movements. The brief references to Third World countries in his report to the Twenty Seventh Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union ( C P S U ) in February 1986, contrast sharply with the celebration of new Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Brezhnev years: "The problems arising for our friends in the newly independent states," the Gorbachev report notes soberly, "are not simple."44 The Soviets, it can be argued, have long pursued a two-track policy of support for revolutionary causes and pursuit of good relations with established governments, with regular oscillations in emphasis concerning which of these two foreign policy goals should have priority.45 Western analysts agree, however, that there has been a decline since the early 1980s in Soviet enthusiasm for revolutionary client-states in the Third World, 46 pointing as an example to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's comment in July 1988 that "class struggle" must be subordinated in the nuclear age to principles of nonaggression and respect for national sovereignty. Another Politburo member, Igor Ligachev, vigorously dissented from this view and affirmed the continuing relevance of class criteria for Soviet foreign policy, but an October 1988 leadership shake-up downgraded Ligachev. The new Politburo member responsible for ideology, Vadim A . Medvedev, then told a 1988 gathering of political scientists from Communist countries that "universal issues" such as peace should outweigh class struggle in the formulation of foreign policy.47 In a speech during his visit to Cuba in April 1989 Gorbachev described the achievements of his diplomacy: "Impressive advances," he said, "have been made both in the easing of the nuclear threat and in the political solution to military conflicts, plus in increasing and strengthening trust between states belonging to different social systems and political alliances."48 H e also renounced interventionism in behalf of revolutionary causes, although he left the door open to defensive measures against counterrevolutionary intrusions: " W e are resolutely against any theories or doctrines used to justify the export of revolution or counterrevolution."49 Castro has been openly critical of Gorbachev's foreign policy, not so much for its theoretical formulation as for its manner of implementation. Fidel does not see himself as exporting revolution; he conceives of himself as countering US interference in the Western Hemisphere and as opposing South African intervention in Africa. Social conditions, not low levels of military aid to insurgents, are in his view responsible for revolutionary struggles; or, as he said a few years ago, "Cuba cannot export revolution, but the US cannot prevent it." Castro has criticized Gorbachev's policies, however, for showing insufficient firmness against US military involvement in the Third World. The Soviets, he has suggested, have sought to deepen détente between the

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The Triangular Relationship: Cuba, the USSR & the US

superpowers at the expense of the interests of the world's poor countries in confrontation with imperialism.50 During Gorbachev's visit to Cuba, Fidel publicly questioned whether the Kremlin's restraint had evoked reciprocal concessions from the United States. "We don't have any indication," he said, as Gorbachev waited his own turn to speak, "that the imperialists have adopted this new international thinking." Castro went on to complain that Washington reserved the right to supply arms to the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and to maintain anti-Sandinista rebel forces in Honduras. Subsequently he characterized the December 1989 US intervention in Panama as "a slap in the face and a humiliation for the Soviet peace policy."51 One instance of Moscow's exerting influence on Cuba to conform to the policy of reducing regional tensions was in Angola. In December 1988 Havana and Luanda, with Soviet encouragement, agreed to the phased withdrawal of all the estimated fifty thousand Cuban troops in Angola by July 1991 in exchange for a South African promise of independence for Namibia.52 In June 1989 Angolan president José Eduardo dos Santos abandoned his previous position of no negotiations with UNITA and arranged a precarious cease-fire with Jonas Savimbi. These agreements followed a relative intensification of the Angolan conflict. The United States in 1986 (after a ten-year hiatus) began providing military assistance of approximately $15 million per year to the rebel UNITA forces, including Stinger ground-to-air missiles.53 Against Cuban advice, the Soviets in the summer of 1987 backed a massive anti-UNITA offensive in southern Angola. South Africa then sent three thousand troops to stem the assault and forced the Angolans back to their stronghold in the town of Cuito Cuanavale. Havana responded by dispatching emergency reinforcements of about fifteen thousand troops in November 1987, which played a major role in preventing the capture of Cuito Cuanavale.54 Cuban troops then for the first time pushed close to the Namibian border. Fidel described Moscow's role in the reinforcement as minimal: "And this last effort we made exclusively with our own means, just like when our internationalist mission in Angola started, it was our ships that carried the men and material over there; and on this last occasion we did it alone."55 Castro, however, perhaps exaggerates the solitariness of Cuban efforts in Angola. Although credit for the effective military strategy and fighting belongs to Cuba, the four hundred tanks (more than the total South African tank force), two hundred MiG-23s, BM-21 rocketlaunchers, and HIND helicopters used in the Cuban push into southern Angola were originally supplied by the USSR. The aggressive deployment of Cuban troops probably contributed to South African flexibility in the subsequent three-sided (Cuba, South Africa, and Angola) negotiations on Namibia, under US mediation. The

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31

Angolan government, for its part, agreed for the first time in June 1988 to negotiate the withdrawal of Cuban troops without prior assurances that the United States would halt aid to UNITA. 56 From the US perspective, Gorbachev's policies on Central America, an area of prime concern to the United States (and to Castro), have shown too little of the new thinking that has helped to diminish regional conflicts elsewhere in the world.57 US perceptions, however, are not necessarily the most accurate ones. One can argue that the USSR has pursued, especially after the US intervention in Grenada, an opportunistic, but essentially cautious, long-term strategy in the region. In the early 1980s Moscow classified Nicaragua as a "socialist-oriented" country. After 1983, however, Soviet sources tended to describe it only as a "democratic" and "progressive" state.58 Although the Kremlin professed solidarity with the Sandinistas, there was no military commitment to come to Nicaragua's defense against direct US intervention.59 The Soviets endorsed the Contadora process, including the Arias peace plan, agreed to by Central American presidents in 1987, which embraced the goal of democratization in Nicaragua. Moscow did not, however, exert the strong pressure on the Sandinistas that US policymakers wanted. Both Oscar Arias and the US State Department asked the Soviets to intercede with Castro and the Sandinistas to end support for the Salvadoran insurgents and to demilitarize and democratize Nicaragua.60 As late as 1989, when asked why Gorbachev's new thinking was not more in evidence in Latin America, a Soviet official answered: "I would say the main responsibility is yours. How can we talk about cutting the Nicaraguan defenses when you [the United States] have the 82nd Airborne sitting in Honduras?" 61 Most estimates of Soviet military aid to the Sandinistas came from US government sources, and it is likely that they are exaggerated for political purposes (i.e., to persuade Congress to fund the contras). The trend, however, showed strong upward movement during the 1980s. Nicaraguan arms imports, most of which came from the USSR and Cuba, totaled $350 million in 1984, $270 million in 1985, and $575 million in 1986. 62 The transfer of Soviet-made MI-24 gunships and other combat helicopters during 1985 produced a rapid shift in the military balance in favor of the Nicaraguan government.63 An estimate put Nicaragua's arms imports from the USSR at $500 million to $1 billion in 1987 and $515 million in 1988.64 The Soviet position regarding military aid to the Sandinistas turned more accommodating of the United States in the spring of 1989. At his 1986 Reykjavik meeting with Ronald Reagan, Gorbachev reportedly said that the Kremlin would stop military aid to Nicaragua only when the Pentagon halted its own Central American programs. But in May 1989 Gorbachev sent President George Bush a letter in which he claimed to

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The Triangular Relationship: Cuba, the USSR & the US

have ceased supplying the Sandinistas with military equipment since the end of 1988. US officials believed, however, that the U S S R continued to supply nonlethal items, such as uniforms and trucks, with Cuba and other Eastern-bloc countries transshipping Soviet arms and equipment to the Sandinistas.65 Although Moscow was reliable in meeting the military needs of the Sandinistas, it was less forthcoming with regard to economic aid. According to the Czechoslovakian ambassador to Managua, total Soviet-bloc aid was $425 million in 1987. 66 A Nicaraguan official, Henry Ruiz, minister of foreign cooperation, stated that 1988 economic aid from the socialist bloc totaled about $300 million, which suggests a reduction from the previous year. 67 In any case foreign aid did not avert a severe economic crisis. A study commissioned by the Nicaraguan government found that per capita output had fallen by one-quarter since 1980 and living standards by 60 percent in the same period. 68 Although the Kremlin strongly supported the Sandinistas against the military challenge posed by the US-armed contras, its policy also put Managua under strong economic pressure to compromise with its domestic opposition and no doubt helps explain Sandinista acquiescence to the February 1990 elections that produced an opposition victory. 69 The Soviets have the potential to induce more moderation in Havana's foreign policy, as their actions in Africa suggest. They have not, however, as yet exerted the strong leverage that would be needed to convince the Cubans (and Sandinistas) to refrain from covert acts of solidarity with the insurgents in El Salvador. 70 Moscow's role in Central America, mediated through Havana's sponsorship of clandestine arms shipments, is a much more indirect involvement than its former collaboration to maintain Cuban troops in Africa. For this very reason, however, it is somewhat more difficult for the Russians to restrain the Fidelistas. Also, no doubt, the U S S R has simply been reluctant to press an old friend as forcefully as is necessary to produce results. Ideological Divergence Like economic tensions and foreign policy disagreements, ideological divergence between the Soviet Union and Cuba predates the Gorbachev era. During the 1960s Castro viewed the Soviet Union as insufficiently revolutionary. Ideological consciousness and political awareness, he argued, were more important than appeals to individual economic aspirations for motivating workers and for building the material and moral foundations of a Communist society.71 The pursuit of economic efficiency through material incentives, in his view, posed the danger of regression toward capitalism. In the early 1970s, however, after his policies had

Implications of the Gorbachev Era for Cuban Socialism

33

negative economic consequences, Fidel officially recanted his "heretical" interpretations of Marxism. In a public self-criticism he accused himself of "revolutionary immaturity" and excessive idealism. In light of his renewed attack on market experimentation in the 1980s, however, one must question the depth of his conversion to liberalizing economic reforms. This time around Castro has not directly accused the Soviet leadership of "revisionism" or the restoration of capitalism. Nevertheless, the depth and seriousness of the ideological discord is unmistakable, even though after the first year of Gorbachev's rule Fidel seemed to be moving Cuba toward a restructuring along Moscow's lines. In May 1986 Castro introduced his own reform program, which he called rectification. Earlier, then Politburo member Ligachev attended the Cuban Communist party's Third Congress and praised the Cubans for their serious efforts to address economic problems. But since 1986 the Soviet reform process has deepened, and Ligachev's criteria are no longer the most relevant ones. The rectification program initially presents the appearance of an initiative to revitalize socialism. Close scrutiny of it, however, reveals a traditional hard-line crackdown, not perestroika. Rectification calls for increasing the role of the center in setting economic priorities and for expanding the party's supervision to ensure that these decisions are carried out. Some observers see rectification as a completely wrongheaded response to the problems of the Cuban economy. The historical experience of socialist countries (e.g., the Soviet Union under its New Economic Program, the People's Republic of China under the policies of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, and even Cuba itself during the 1970s) indicates, they argue, that market mechanisms, not centralized allocation of resources, are the most potent means of stimulating economic efficiency and growth.72 There is obviously a great deal to be said for this point of view. On the other hand, there is also much evidence that exposing a command economy to market forces of supply and demand generates important unwanted side effects, including price inflation, conspicuous corruption, and public discontent. Moreover, when reform is halfhearted, producing a capitalist-socialist hybrid (as in Hungary during the 1980s), it is far from clear that the results are superior to the more traditional form of centralized economy. In a speech explaining the need for rectification, Castro described the effects of halfhearted economic liberalization in Cuba during the 1970s and first half of the 1980s: Enterprises tried to become profitable by theft, swindles, swindling one another. What kind of socialism were we going to build along those lines? What kind of ideology was that? A n d I want to know whether these

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The Triangular Relationship: Cuba, the USSR & the US

methods weren't leading us to a system worse than capitalism, instead of leading us toward socialism and communism. That almost universal chaos in which anyone grabbed anything he could . . . these things were becoming habitual and generalized. If this is not combatted energetically the masses start to get skeptical, discouraged and demoralized, and the ideas and objectives of our revolutionary process become discredited. 73

The clear point of Castro's remarks is that implanting market mechanisms within socialism produces negligible gains in efficiency and weakens the political legitimacy of a socialist regime. The economic difficulties experienced by Cuba during the 1970s and 1980s, described with such vividness by Castro, are, of course, merely a particular instance of a general problem. Wherever ruling Communist elites have sponsored market-oriented, decentralizing economic reforms, bureaucratic coordination has persisted, often in new institutional forms. The pervasiveness of this outcome, despite the great variation in size, level of development, and culture of the socialist countries, strongly suggests a universal cause. According to the work of Hungarian economist Janos Kornai, state socialism itself is responsible for the bureaucratic, anticollective logic of the collectivist economy.74 Under conditions characterized by public ownership and planning, allocation is in practice achieved, despite theoretical pronouncements favoring autonomy for enterprises, through bargaining between those entities and state officials. Out of self-interest, individual firms seek "easy" plan targets and then attempt to compensate further for their productive deficiencies by petitioning officials for credit, labor, raw materials, preferential prices, and so forth. Managers and state officials "succeed" in meeting planned goals—often at the expense of society in general. The public character of the economy thus opens the way to multiple forms of waste, corruption, and collusion against the common welfare.75 The situation is aggravated by state-controlled prices, since the authorities then justifiably fear the irrational outcomes of voluntary market transactions based on arbitrary prices. Given the absence of political commitment to make the Cuban economy sufficiently market-based, rectification—in essence an austerity program to force a cut in consumption through intensified central controls—might indeed be a realistic short-term strategy to address Havana's balance of payments problem. Castro's effort to tighten labor discipline is, from this point of view, a move in the right direction. Facilitating central control are extensive demotions and personnel changes that have dramatically decreased the job security of local party and government officials and economic managers.76 It is even possible that Fidel's centralization of investment could bring a more restrained approach to investment planmng.77

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35

Castro's austerity program has been successful in curbing consumption. From 1984 through 1987, a Cuban researcher reports, consumer purchases of food, clothing, and household appliances were stagnant.78 A lack of goods in the stores, not lack of cash, was responsible for the austerity. Because of strict new rules on bonuses, average monthly wages dropped from 203 pesos in 1987 to 182 pesos by mid-1988. Nevertheless, figures from 1984 through 1989 show strong growth in savings, with too few goods available to soak up purchasing power.79 Even the government does not want pesos; under a new program Cubans sell family jewelry to the state in order to buy Western goods in special stores. Despite rhetorical similarities between the rectification campaign and Cuba's 1960s economic radicalism, current policies are not as extreme (either in respect to egalitarianism or coercion) as Soviet War Communism, the Chinese Great Leap Forward, or Cuba's own "Guevarist" period in the late 1960s. Castro defends rectification as restoring a proper balance (perhaps a synthesis, to use a dialectical term) between idealism and materialism in economic policy: "We have lived through the experience—we've lived through two experiences, the one before and now this one, the two of them; we've seen the negative consequences of both of them and we could see even some positive things in both." 80 Rectification has been accompanied by concern to avoid disruptive labor mobilizations, to cut down on time spent in meetings, and to strengthen incentives in agriculture by organizing workers into "production brigades."81 In basic industry and tourism experiments are under way to allow more managerial discretion at the enterprise level.82 In contrast to the 1960s, when the link between individual productivity and individual pay was all but severed, Castro has reaffirmed the need to connect base wages to worker output: "We can't give up paying salaries according to the amount produced, work norms, or the socialist formula of getting paid according to quantity and quality of work." 83 Moreover, workers in priority sectors singled out for Fidel's personal attention (sugar, construction, and tourism) receive special material incentives.84 Castro argues that Cuba need not choose between the ruthless pressures of market mechanisms and the bureaucratic distortions of central planning. Instead, rectification looks to heightened central prioritizing from above, supported by intensified political work and political supervision from below, to work the island out of its hard-currency crisis. In 1990 increased intraparty democracy became a new element of rectification.85 But Castro does not even pretend to have presented a comprehensive or profound analysis of the problems characteristic of centrally planned economies: Rectification implies making more accurate use of the system and

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mechanisms we have now, an economic management and planning system which... was a horse, a lame nag with many sores that we were treating with Mercurochrome and prescribing medicines for it, putting splints on one leg—in short fixing up the nag, the horse. I said that the thing to do now was to go on using that horse, knowing its bad habits, the perils of that horse, how it kicked and bucked, and try to lead it on our path and not go wherever it wishes to take us But we'll see how far we get, even riding on the old nag full of sores, but correctly led, for as long as we don't have anything better than the old nag.86 Rectification is thus, as Castro implicitly admits here, not a consistent reform strategy at all. It is a patchwork solution that does not address the long-term illogic of the bureaucratic centralist economy. It is not only Gorbachev's policy of economic restructuring, perestroika, that Castro rejects, but also glasnost. A firm principle of Cuban socialism is that government must control the dissemination of information. Even before glasnost, however, another factor, the onset of broadcasting by Radio Marti in May 1985, had stimulated greater openness in the island's media. If only to compete for an audience, Cuban broadcasting stepped up efforts to keep the country's population informed. For example, whereas defections by top officials were once ignored, recent cases, such as that of Bay of Pigs hero Rafael del Pino in May 1987, were followed by elaborate public explanations. The Cuban press has also been increasingly willing to report on violations of the legal rights of ordinary citizens by officials. Social problems, such as teenage pregnancy, the AIDS danger, and worker absenteeism, are also discussed. A popular monthly periodical, Opina, regularly airs consumer complaints. Negative reporting remains, however, a sensitive issue. In 1986 Castro attended a meeting of the journalists union where the press complained of the "mystery syndrome," an attitude on the part of officials aimed at hiding shortcomings and difficulties in Cuban life. Castro argued that, since "the Cuban people have been in and are still in a state of war," one could not expect the sort of unbridled criticism that "one might find in French, British, or US newspapers." 87 Fidel professed satisfaction with recent improvements in the Cuban media. He told a 1987 meeting of journalists, "These days newspapers are my main source of information, even though I receive many other kinds of information. And I couldn't say that a year ago." 88 But he clearly believes that defense of socialism is an essential part of the journalistic mission, as indicated by his comments at a 1987 party meeting: "No one should imagine that anyone on his own can write an article calling into question the role of the state, the party, the laws, but especially the party." 89 And though he has not said that the new Soviet policy of glasnost is wrong, Castro has indicated that it is inappropriate to Cuba: " W e have to keep in mind our location. W e aren't

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in the Black Sea, but in the Caribbean. We aren't 90 miles from Odessa but 90 miles from Miami."90 Castro defends his rejection of Gorbachev-style reforms as a response to the particular circumstances of Cuba: "It never occurred to us to think that we had simply to copy what the Soviets do, nor has it occurred to the Soviet leadership that we have to copy what they are doing."91 But at the same time he invokes far-reaching ideological justifications that transcend the Revolution's peculiarities, arguing, for example, with considerable logic and persuasiveness, that market mechanisms are detrimental to the socialist ethos. In some respects he is perhaps more farsighted in his understanding of the practical requirements and theoretical implications of "restructuring" socialism than is Gorbachev: Apparently we thought that by dressing a person up as a capitalist we were going to achieve efficient production in the factory and so after a fashion we started to play at being capitalists. Because it is only under socialism that you could dress up an administrator as a capitalist; if you wanted to make a capitalist out of him, you'd have to make him the owner of the factory and nothing else, return to the capitalist system, find a super-efficient street vendor and make him the owner of the p l a c e . . . . When there's no competition, if the motivation prompting the owner in a capitalist society to defend his personal interests is out of the question, what is there to substitute for this? Only the cadres' individual sense of responsibility, not just the collective's sense of responsibility, the role played by the cadres. The man who is in charge there must be a Communist . . . a revolutionary. 92

Castro's emphasis on the incompatibility of state ownership and market mechanisms should not be dismissed as the product of his extremist temperament. Similar conclusions have been reached reluctantly by other longtime observers of efforts to decentralize command economies.93 It remains to be seen whether efforts at reform in other countries will culminate in economic systems that are still recognizably socialist. In the spring of 1989 Castro began to prepare the Cuban public for the possible restoration of capitalism in former socialist strongholds through such moves as subtly hinting during Gorbachev's April visit that the Soviet leader's policies would lead to the abandonment of socialism: "If a socialist country wants to build capitalism we must respect its right to build capitalism, . . . the principle of unrestricted respect for the sovereign will of each people and country is a golden rule of MarxistLeninist principles."94 Some months later, in his Twenty-Sixth of July address, Fidel described the likely outcome of elections in Poland and Hungary as "victory for antisocialist forces" and speculated, "Are we perhaps witnessing peaceful transition from socialism to capitalism? This

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is possible; we're not against it. We defend each country's and each Party's sacred right to independence."95 In the same speech he entertained the notion that the socialist community itself might disappear, while simultaneously vowing that Cuba would never return to capitalism. Finally, in March 1990, Castro stated the obvious: "What has, in fact, taken place is the collapse of the socialist camp."96 Fidel's program, which charges off in a direction opposite to the line taken by Gorbachev, indicates his ability, at least in domestic policies, to set his own course. But developments in the socialist world inevitably exert an impact on Cuba. Ideological contamination is a real concern. In August 1989 a Granma editorial charged the Soviet weekly Moscow News and the monthly Sputnik with "justifying bourgeois democracy as the highest form of popular participation and with a fascination for the US way of life." Granma reported that these journals would no longer be imported. Cuban media coverage of glasnost and perestroika has been very circumspect. But the failure to report fully on Soviet developments is no solution because the news trickles in anyway through Radio Marti, foreign travel, and students returning from the Soviet Union.97 Despite Castro's reservations about Gorbachev-style reforms, many Cubans, especially students and the young, Russian-trained specialists, are reportedly very interested in glasnost and perestroika. In 1987 and 1988 copies of the still-legal Moscow News were quickly bought up by information-hungry readers.98 A small protest demonstration even broke out when a showing of the Soviet documentary "Is it Easy to be Young?" was canceled (it was later broadcast on television). Fidel personally met with journalism students to discuss their concerns about the way that Havana has been responding to Soviet developments.99 In a move indicating that youth was being targeted as a group with whom the party had to develop closer links, its Central Committee elevated Roberto Robaina, the thirtyone-year-old leader of the Union of Young Communists, to the position of Politburo alternate in February 1990. While Gorbachev's reform program has proved destabilizing to Marxist-Leninist regimes in Europe, various factors (besides crude censorship and outright political repression) have functioned to counteract such an impact in the Cuban case.100 Perhaps most important is that, in contrast to the former Communist governments in Eastern Europe, the Castro regime is not a product of Soviet imposition. Havana's historical national antagonist is not Russia, but the United States. Moreover, countervailing social forces, which have contributed significantly to liberalization in other Communist societies, are weak in Cuba. Specifically, Catholicism has never enjoyed a strong hold over popular religiosity there, and since the notorious arrest of Heberto Padilla in 1971, writers and intellectuals profess their loyalty to Castro's leadership or they emigrate (Reinaldo

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Arenas, José Triana, Antonio Benítez Rojo, and César Leante). For those dissidents unprotected by international reputation, there is always arrest and prison. To judge by Castro's slighting references to "technocrats," Cuba's professional and administrative class probably contains many members with significant reservations about his policies. These elements, however, lack any popular spokesman. Likewise the small private farming sector has proved no match for state authority. In May 1986 Fidel announced an end to free-market sales of food (legal since 1980) under which, he claimed, a few private farmers and speculators reaped enormous profits with little public benefit. The once influential promarket leadership of the private farmers organization was completely replaced. Despite an adverse impact on food output, there has been no public outcry. This contrasts with Hungary, where in the wake of policies that discouraged private food production the leading antimarket Politburo member was demoted.101 Havana also benefits from low expectations, for while Eastern Europeans tend to contrast their mediocre life-style to the booming economies of Western Europe, and the Chinese compare themselves to the "Four Tigers" (Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore), the Cubans (encouraged by Castro) are most likely to measure their situation against that of their Latin American neighbors who have had to contend with a pattern of socioeconomic regression during the 1980s. 102 The economic status of the ordinary Cuban citizen, although not improving, is in many respects secure and tolerable, thanks to social policies (low rates of inflation and unemployment as well as free education and health care) that might be sacrificed in a more capitalist path of development.103 According to Fidel, Cubans may not have luxuries, but no child is without a home, food, or a school. Obviously, however, absolute declines in living standards, especially of the magnitude envisioned by the "special period in time of peace," would quite likely produce considerable discontent. Finally, there is the crucial factor of leadership. Castro has led the Cuban Revolution for more than thirty years, and there is no apparent alternative to his leadership. During the summer of 1989 the arrest and execution of one of the Revolution's top military heroes demonstrated Castro's willingness to act ruthlessly to preempt any such development.104 Despite much speculation concerning his health, Fidel appears every bit as energetic, combative, and loquacious as ever. He is still the maximum leader, hero, and symbol of national aspirations to many Cubans, for whom his mystique transcends mundane issues of performance. He is Cuba's leading government official and, simultaneously, the government's leading critic, presiding over a system wherein corruption and favoritism is a way of life (from top officials whose political standing determines the lavishness of their housing and foreign buying sprees down to the shop

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clerks who tell their friends before shipments of scarce goods go on sale) while also being the chief scourge of corruption, as he proved by arresting his minister of the interior and cracking down on illegal vendors in the streets.105 Belief in Fidel's charisma and sagacity has waned among the bettereducated, more critical younger generation that has come into being since the Revolution.106 Castro and other leaders have counterattacked by frequently denouncing the "hypercritical" and "fainthearted." Moreover, the government has also reportedly acquired antiriot helicopters for the first time. But creeping disillusion should not be confused with an explosive or prerevolutionary situation.

Alternatives: Castro as Third World Champion? Fidel does not have many attractive options for expressing his rejection of glasnost and perestroika. Cuba is not in a position to go its own way as an independent Communist state, on the model of North Korea,107 for heavy dependence upon trade, to say nothing of its exposed position as an outpost of socialism on the doorstep of the United States, precludes the development of an autarkic model of socialism.108 Nor is there any significant advantage in coalescing with North Korea and Beijing to form an antiperestroika front, although Castro has launched some initiatives in this direction109 (e.g., plans for his first visit to China were announced in fall 1989). One possibility, of course, is merely to hunker down and wait for the replacement of Gorbachev. Such a strategy, however, fails to engage the aspects of change in the Soviet Union that are likely to persist, regardless of which strand of leadership dominates. The nationalist tensions and economic weakness in the USSR revealed during the Gorbachev era are not likely to abate instantly with his political demise. These factors militate against a return by Moscow to the aggressive, expansionist behavior of the late 1970s. Moreover, as noted above, the Kremlin's impatience with the high cost of aid to Cuba and doubt about the value of promoting Third World revolutions had emerged even before Gorbachev burst onto the scene. Consequently, some adjustment in Havana's policies would seem to be more prudent than waiting for a return to the status quo ante. One avenue that Castro has begun to explore is a reorientation of his ideology from a preoccupation with Marxism-Leninism and East-West conflict toward more emphasis on nationalism, antiimperialism, and North-South affairs. Castro moved in this direction in December 1988 when he said, rather bitterly, "There are two kinds of survival and two

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kinds of peace, the survival of the rich and the survival of the poor; the peace of the rich and the peace of the poor. That is why the news that there may be peace, that there may be detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, does not necessarily mean that there is going to be peace for us."110 In his effort to explain the dismaying defections from the socialist cause in Europe, Fidel has sought to portray the main political fault lines as North-South rather than East-West: "Now imperialism is inviting the European socialist countries to join it in this colossal plunder. . . . The prize promised by imperialism is a share of the plunder wrested from our peoples, the only way of building capitalist consumer societies."111 He has also tried to press Havana's Third World leadership aspirations by taking a radical position in favor of the cancelation of debt to Western bankers. Here, he appears to enjoy some Russian support.112 In certain respects the loosening of the Soviet-Cuban relationship actually presents a welcome opportunity for Castro to advance what has long been a diplomatic goal for him—assuming a vanguard role among the developing nations. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan removes an issue that had weakened Cuba's bid for Third World leadership. Havana's withdrawal from Angola (and subsequently the announced pullout from Ethiopia) may also enhance its prestige by reducing its controversial military presence in Africa. The loosening of the Soviet-Cuban relationship does not, however, necessarily presage an increase in Havana's Third World influence and in some respects even works against it. Cuba's leadership credentials have always rested on two premises: first, the superiority of its internal development model; and second, its militant support for revolutionaries and revolutionary regimes around the world. The Revolution's socioeconomic achievements, however, have always been financially underwritten by large infusions of Russian aid, as have its major military undertakings abroad. Havana's ability to provide solidarity in military terms has been undercut now that Gorbachev has made improved relations with the West a more important foreign policy objective than spreading socialism. Without the prestige of serving as a key link between developing countries and the economic and military resources of the Soviet bloc, Castro's initiatives may be more frequently disregarded in Third World capitals.113 Moreover, as the Kremlin's subsidies are gradually curtailed, the performance of the Cuban economic model may also be put in question. As ties to the socialist bloc attenuate, Havana is strengthening its relations with other Latin American governments. Castro has always argued that Cuba belongs naturally to Latin America. In 1972 he promised that the island would, eventually, rejoin the community of hemispheric nations: "In the future, we will be economically integrated with Latin

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A m e r i c a . . . . But that will take time. We can't make plans based on an integration that could take 10,15, 20,25, 30 years—the last for the most pessimistic."114 Fidel clearly is heavily committed to this diplomatic offensive. In 1988, for example, he invited numerous Latin heads of state to visit Havana, while on the other hand he attended presidential inaugurations in Ecuador and Mexico as well as in Venezuela in 1989. He has had some success in strengthening ties with such important countries as Argentina, Brazil, and petroleum-exporting Ecuador. 11S In fall 1989 Havana was nominated by countries in the Latin American group for a UN Security Council seat beginning in 1990. Many hemispheric countries favor Cuba's reintegration into Latin America. The Group of Eight (formed by Colombia, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Mexico) said in November 1987 that the island should be invited to rejoin the OAS. Their primary motivation seems to be a desire to persuade Havana to conform to regional practices of diplomatic behavior and to reduce its interest in destabilization of hemispheric regimes. The Cuban press reported favorably on this action.116 Although there has been little follow-up, this was still an obvious change from the days when Castro vowed never to rejoin the OAS, which he used to characterize as the US Ministry for Colonies. Moderation, which means not intervening in their domestic affairs, seems to be the price that Latin American governments are asking in return for a rapprochement. Cuban leaders have embraced such moderation, at least on the rhetorical level. In Venezuela, for instance, Castro told journalists, "It is incorrect to establish socialism as an immediate objective in our countries." He went on to explain that before there would be socialism, Latin Americans should struggle for unity and integration of their foreign policies, especially on economic issues.117 But even in such areas there seems to be as much potential for conflict as for harmony. Castro is unhappy that his proposals for a debtor's cartel are not heeded by Latin governments, and they are annoyed that Havana works with leftist unions and social organizations to bring pressure on them to default. There also continues to be the problem of Cuba's involvement with guerrilla movements. Chile in 1988 accused Havana of recruiting Chileans for guerrilla training. Even the Colombian government, which has tried to maintain diplomatic links, has not been exempt from Cuban solidarity activities. Recognizing these ties, Bogotá asked Havana to intercede for the release of former presidential candidate Alvaro Gómez Hurtado, kidnapped in June 1988 by M-19 guerrillas.118 Because of suspicion concerning its activities in Central America, Cuba was excluded from the Support Group for the Contadora process. Consequently it is still premature to speak of its complete diplomatic reintegration into Latin America.

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Realignment? Even as Havana seeks to preserve a role of Third World leadership, the most promising direction seems to be an evolution toward more-amicable relations with capitalist countries in both the developed and the less developed world. In pursuing such an agenda, there would obviously be great economic benefit in normalizing relations with the United States. Given Castro's deep-seated aversion to US influence, however, it is extremely unlikely that a somewhat looser Soviet-Cuban relationship will culminate in Havana's wholesale defection (on the model of Anwar Sadat) from its Moscow connection. Moreover, whenever Fidel has attempted to mobilize the Cuban people during a difficult period, his appeals to nationalist, anti-US sentiments have increased; indeed sometimes his attacks have turned virtually hysterical, with frequent comparisons of US leaders to Nazis. Quite apart from ideological considerations, the potential for economic complementarity is in Cuba's case greater with the USSR than the United States. The Soviet Union needs large sugar imports, while the United States, which in recent years has turned increasingly to corn sweeteners, has no economic reason to subsidize or even encourage Cuban sugar imports. In 1987 Washington's support price was about twenty-one cents per pound (triple the world market price of seven cents), but the United States brought in a mere 600,000 short tons from Latin America and the Caribbean, while the 1988 figures were about 1 million short tons at quota prices from all foreign sources.119 By contrast, the Soviet Union paid thirty cents per pound of Cuban sugar during 1976-1980 and possibly thirty-five cents in 1981-1985 for an average 3.7 million tons per year.120 Volume is also high because the island provides an estimated 30 percent of the USSR's annual consumption.121 Underlying the relatively low level of US sugar imports is the political strength of the domestic producer lobby, which generally works in concert with corngrowers. US consumers would almost certainly profit from the dismantling of the indigenous sugar industry, combined with imports at, or near, a market price. Havana, however, would not necessarily find this situation advantageous, for its benefits would depend on where the world market price finally settled and on the consistency with which potential competitors renounced domestic subsidies. Under conditions approximating free trade, Cuba, as a low-cost operator, would almost certainly enjoy a strong competitive edge.122 The history of twentieth-century sugar trade, however, does not encourage optimism about the establishment of a free-trade regime. Nevertheless, better ties with the United States, quite apart from sugar, would be of substantial benefit to Cuba. For instance, a more

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normal diplomatic climate would allow Havana to reduce its very significant expenditures on defense. Also, the Fidelistas have made a major commitment to developing tourism, and certainly US vacationers could bring in a considerable quantity of hard currency. Finally, US firms could supply the island with certain products (medicines, insecticides, etc.) at better prices than other countries. The value of such economic relations would, of course, also rise relative to a leveled-off or declining Soviet aid effort. In many respects, Castro would prefer the predictable USSR of Brezhnev to the unsettling situation of today. But he has no reason to rupture his ties with his longtime ally. Even in the Gorbachev era the Kremlin is more indulgent of Fidel's caudillo-style socialism than any US administration would likely be. Compared to the United States, the Soviet political process also has allowed for a relatively stable management of sugar exports, leaving Cuba somewhat protected from the year-to-year gyrations inflicted on the rest of the Caribbean by the US Congress. Nevertheless, Gorbachev's innovative approaches to economics, internal politics, and diplomacy have clearly diminished the previous convergence of interests between Moscow and Havana.

Concluding Reflections Although the Kremlin has disavowed any intention of imposing Gorbachev-style reform on Cuba, developments in the USSR nevertheless affect the options open to the Revolution's leadership. First, the Gorbachev era means that Cuba can no longer trade its value as a strategicmilitary partner, advancing socialist revolution and Moscow's influence in the Third World in return for ever-increasing infusions of Soviet aid. Second, the pluralization of Soviet ideological discourse places Castro on the intellectual defensive in justifying economic and political centralism to his own population. Beyond this, however, the direct implications are limited. How effectively Communist societies use the opportunity to restructure socialism depends upon the quality of their leadership and the nature of the social forces that participate in the search for new solutions. In Cuba, as in North Korea, political leadership is personalistic, dominated by one key individual and his coterie. There is no sign of collective leadership in Havana or evidence of ongoing factional activity in the party over economic policy. Officials considered "technocratic" and "economistic" by Fidel Castro find themselves politically marginalized. Other potential opposition forces are also weak, with little sign of an independent intelligentsia, autonomous worker or peasant organizations, or influential religious institutions.

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Proposals for economic reform in Cuba are inconsistent with Castro's understanding of socialism. Fidel has staked his legitimacy on "equitable development," not the refinement of the "consumer society." Indeed, despite a poor record for economic growth, the island's social welfare indicators (such as employment, health care, education, etc.) remain at the forefront of Latin America. In the past Castro's developmental goals seemed to meet with the approval of broad elements of Cuban society. There are numerous signs, however, that many citizens have begun to believe that the costs of the current economic model, with its highly restricted consumption possibilities and its obvious waste of labor and other resources, are too high. Politics controls economic policy in Cuba; but public opinion, in the absence of open debate, only indirectly influences politics. There is no sign of "leadership drift" in Havana; Castro's rectification program offers a decisive (even if ultimately ineffectual) response to the island's economic and ideological malaise. 123 Thus it appears that economic conditions and popular discontent must worsen significantly before the Cuban political elite undertakes a restructuring consistent with the Gorbachev era.

Notes 1. New York Times, November 9, 1989, p. 12. See speeches in Granma Weekly Review (December 10,1989): 1,989, and Granma, December 29,1989, p. 3. 2. Granma Weekly Review (December 17,1989): 2. 3. More than two thousand Cubans died in Angola; Granma Weekly Review (December 17,1989). 4. Gorbachev still claims to adhere to this legacy. See his comments to a CBS interviewer: "Those who reject our Socialist past I view with contempt"; New York Times, July 14,1990. 5. Stephen Sestanovich, "Inventing the Soviet National Interest," The National Interest 20 (Summer 1990): 3-16. 6. Helmut Kohl's generous financial arrangements with the Soviet Union also no doubt helped to ease the surrender of East Germany to the Western sphere. The United States, faced with an intractable fiscal deficit, is not in a position to offer financial carrots in return for Soviet abandonment of Cuba. US efforts to persuade North Atlantic Treaty Organization members to condition aid to the Soviet Union on an end to subsidies of Cuba were not successful. See Granma, July 12,1990. 7. Jaime Suchlicki, "Soviet Policy in Latin America: Some Implications for the United States," Journal of Inter American Studies and World Affairs 29, no. 1 (Spring 1987): 40. 8. Or, as Soviet Latin American expert Sergo Mikoyan expressed it: "I think we have two special cases, Vietnam and Cuba. Both are connected to heroic struggle and romanticism We would not want to betray them. There are such

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things as dignity"; Caribbean Insight (July 1990). 9. Per capita gross domestic product for the region (in constant 1980 dollars) dropped from $2,036 in 1980 to $1,897 in 1985. See UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Statistical Yearbook1988, table 115, pp. 184-185. 10. For an analysis of the relationship between Cuban growth figures and price inflation of about 3 percent annually, see Jorge Pérez-Lopéz, "Cuba's Economy in the 1980s," Problems of Communism (September-October 1986): 19. 11. Economist Intelligence Unit, Cuba 1 (1989): 2. 12. Granma, December 6, 1986, supplement, p. 6; Economic Intelligence Unit, Cuba 3 (1988): 2; and Caribbean Insight (January 1989): 7. 13. Economic Intelligence Unit, Cuba 3 (1988): 2. Pleading distress, Cuba successfully renegotiated reduced payments on debt service to Western banks for 1983-1986. 14. Several countries—Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Peru—had even higher levels of debt relative to exports in 1987. See James W. Wilkie, ed., Statistical Abstract of Latin America (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center Publications, 1989), table 2703, "IMF Data on Value of Merchandise Exports," pp. 693-694, and table 2800, "Total Public and Private External Debt (1987)," p. 738. 15. Robert Pastor, "Cuba and the Soviet Union: Does Cuba Act Alone?" in The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean, ed. Barry B. Levine (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983), pp. 199—200. 16. Granma, January 4,1985, p. 5. 17. G. B. Hagelberg, "Sugar in the Caribbean: Turning Sunshine into Money," in Caribbean Contours, ed. Sidney Mintz and Sally Price (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 100. 18. Richard Turits, "Trade, Debt, and the Cuban Economy," in Cuba's Socialist Economy: Toward the 1990s, ed. Andrew Zimbalist, Jr. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), pp. 169,176. For an alternative calculation, see Jorge I. Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), app. B, pp. 290-293. 19. According to the official exchange rate, one Cuban peso is worth $1.25 in US currency. 20. New York Times, April 23,1989, p. 14. 21. Granma Weekly Review (March 29,1987): 11. 22. New York Times, March 8,1990, p. 14. However, as Cuban economist José Luis Rodriguez observes, Cuba "did not receive these resources in dollars, nor is it conceivable that we pay the debt in dollars." See Caribbean Insight (June 1990). The official exchange rate is 1.6 rubles to the dollar. 23. Granma, December 5,1988, p. 6. 24. "Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," in Soviet Foreign Policy Documents—1986, ed. Darshan Singh (New Delhi, India: Sterling Publishers, 1988), p. 74. 25. Thomas M. Cynkin, "Glasnost, Perestroika, and Eastern Europe," Survival 30, no. 4 (July-August 1988): 310-331. 26. New York Times, March 8,1990.

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27. Caribbean Insight (July 1990). 28. Granma Weekly Review (March 18,1990). 29. Since 1976, the price paid by the Soviets for Cuban sugar has been adjusted yearly according to a price index of goods that Cuba imports from the Soviet Union. The agreed reduction in the price went from Rub 915 to Rub 850 per ton (Caribbean Insight [January 1987]: 3). This price still seemed to provide a tidy profit for the Cubans. Cuba's minister of the sugar industry estimated the cost of producing a ton of sugar in 1988 was 212 pesos; see Granma, July 9,1988, p. 3. 30. Granma Weekly Review (January 11,1987): 2,5. 31. Ibid. (December 29, 1989): 4. By contrast, the Cuban press loudly denounced the unilateral decision of a Hungarian enterprise to raise prices 20 percent for bus parts; see ibid. (October 1,1989): 9. 32. New York Times February 7, 1990, p. 10. The Finns, with whom the Soviets would undoubtedly like to increase trade, report: "Perestroika has clearly caused problems. The pattern of our trade with the Soviets was established over many years, and now that pattern has changed dramatically"; see ibid., January 16.1989, p. D5. 33. Granma, January 11,1990, p. 1. 34. New York Times, January 11,1989, p. 10. 35. Economist Intelligence Unit, Cuba 1 (1988): 12, and 2 (1988): 10. 36. Carl Henry Feuer, "The Performance of the Cuban Sugar Industry," in Zimbalist, Cuba's Socialist Economy, p. 79. 37. Washington Post, November 8,1985. Even before this, in 1976, the North Koreans also suffered from abrupt changes in Soviet petroleum-pricing policy. See Pong Lee, "The Korean People's Democratic Republic," in The New Communist Third World, ed. Peter Wiles (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 313. 38. Jorge F. P£rez-L6pez, "Cuban Hard-Currency Trade and Oil Reexports," in Socialist Cuba: Past Interpretations and Future Challenges, ed. Sergio Roca (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988), pp. 130,135,141. 39. This, or merely the lower world price, may account for Cuban Central Bank figures that in June 1989 suggested a drop of $200 million in oil revenues; see New York Times, February 7,1990, p. 10. For 1985-1987 the Soviets reported exports to Cuba of an average of Rub 1.2 billion worth of petroleum each year; see Economist Intelligence Unit, Cuba 3 (1988): 2, and 2 (1989): 9. In 1985 Cuba imported 200,000 barrels per day (b/d) from the Soviet Union, produced fourteen thousand b/d domestically, and sold two thousand b/d; see Washington Post, February 4,1985, p. 14. This compares to Soviet production in 1989 of about 12 million b/d, of which it exported about 20 percent; see New York Times, August 10.1990, p. D6. Beginning in January 1991 the Eastern European countries will be required to pay for Soviet petroleum with hard currency. 40. Granma Weekly Review (March 18,1990). 41. Ibid. (June 25,1989): 11. Shmelyov is affiliated with the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada. His comments, reported in both the Soviet and Cuban press, left no doubt that he had Cuba and perhaps Nicaragua in mind. 42. Foreign Broadcast Information Service—SOV—89-204, October 24, 1989, p. 46. 43. Washington Post, March 24,1985, pp. 1,33.

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44. "Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Congress," in Singh, Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, pp. 73-74. 45. Francis Fukuyama, "Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy," Problems of Communism (September—October 1987): 1-13. 46. Ibid., p. 13. Extreme disillusionment with the costs of Soviet involvement in promoting Third World socialism was expressed by academic specialists in International Affairs (Moscow) (August 1988). Although Gorbachev has not expressed himself in such blunt terms, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze came close in mid-1987. See quotations in Stephen Sestanovich, "Gorbachev's Foreign Policy: A Diplomacy of Decline," Problems of Communism (January-February 1988): 2-3. 47. New York Times, October 6,1988, p. 1. 48. Granma Weekly Review (April 16,1989): 3. 49. Ibid, p. 4. 50. New York Times, January 11,1989, p. 1. 51. Granma Weekly Review (April 16,1989): 2, and (December 31,1989): 3. 52. The Soviet interest in diffusing the Angolan conflict is described in New York Times, June 6,1988, p. 8. The initial Cuban condition of a ban on US aid to UNITA was not met, nor was the initial Cuban timetable of four years for withdrawal. See Caribbean Insight (July 1988) and New York Times, July 16,1988, p. 3. For additional details supporting this view of the constructive Soviet role, see Geoffrey Berridge, "Diplomacy and the Angola/Namibia Accords," International Affairs (London) 65, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 463-479. 53. New York Times, June 26,1989. 54. Ibid, July 28,1988, p. 13, and December 14,1988, p. 14. 55. Granma Weekly Review (July 23,1989): 7. 56. New York Times, June 23,1988, p. 3. 57. Ibid, March 30,1989, p. 1. 58. Robert Leiken, "Fantasies and Facts: The Soviet Union and Nicaragua," Current History (October 1984): 315, 317; C. G. Jacobsen, "Soviet Attitudes Towards Aid to and Contacts with Central American Revolutionaries," in Vital Interests: The Soviet Issue in US Central American Policy, ed. Bruce Larkin (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), pp. 300-302. Classifying Nicaragua is not easy. Daniel Ortega describes Nicaragua's economy as "a freemarket one, in a revolutionary state that is socialist-oriented"; New York Times, June 16,1988, p. 9. 59. Indeed, despite Cuba's recognized status as a socialist state, there is no known Soviet pledge to come to Cuba's aid in such an eventuality. Cuban national defense doctrine, especially since the 1983 invasion of Grenada, is based on its own resources. See Granma Weekly Review (February 4,1985). Castro has said that Cuba lacks the means to send military support should the United States blockade Nicaragua; see Fidel Castro, Fidel Castro Speeches 1984-1985 (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1985), p. 168. 60. In March 1989 Costa Rica's foreign minister said, "It is time for the Soviets to suspend any military aid to Nicaragua in order to contribute to the creation of an environment propitious to a peace settlement in Central America." See New York Times, March 30,1989, p. 13.

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61. Ibid., April 2,1989, p. 14. 62. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 97,113,129. 63. New York Times, July 10, 1986, pp. 1, 10; Marc Edelman, "SovietNicaraguan Relations and the Contra War," in Larkin, Vital Interests, p. 363. 64. Stephanie G. Neuman, "Arms, Aid and the Superpowers," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1988): 1048; New York Times, May 17,1989, p. 9. The United States estimated that in 1987 aid to Angola cost the USSR $1 billion. See New York Times, June 6,1988, p. 8. 65. The US government has produced different estimates of the level of aid; see New York Times, September 19, 1989, p. 14. US intelligence agencies concluded that 1989 shipments had fallen from 1988 levels by about 20 percent; see New York Times, October 5 and 16,1989. 66. Ibid., August 20,1987. 67. Economist Intelligence Unit, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama 3 (1988): 14. According to the same official, another 20 percent of 1988 economic aid to Nicaragua came from outside the socialist bloc. For another report of reduced Soviet-bloc aid, see New York Times, October 4,1989, p. 7. 68. New York Times, July 6,1989, p. 6. 69. Arguably, the Soviets pursued a parallel policy on Angola, where they claimed a domestic political solution could be found "very easily" once the issue of foreign intervention was removed. See ibid., June 6,1988, p. 8. 70. See ibid., March 17, 1989, p. 10, for a report on the recent supply of Soviet-made AK-47s to FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador, and Wall Street Journal, March 31,1989, p. 15, for supply of Soviet-made antipersonnel mines and ammunition. The issue came up at the December Malta summit; President Bush placed most of the blame on Castro and the Sandinistas. See New York Times, December 4,1989, p. 12. In 1990 Nicaraguan President Violeta Chamorro expressed frustration that she had been unable to halt arms shipments flowing through her country to El Salvador; see New York Times, June 20,1990. 71. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970s, rev. ed. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978), p. 19. 72. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The Cuban Economy in the 1980s: The Return of Ideology," in Roca, Socialist Cuba, p. 83. 73. Granma Weekly Review (December 14,1986) supplement, p. 11. 74. See "The Hungarian Reform Process," in Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism, ed. Victor Nee and David Stark (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 43-46. 75. Janos Kornai coined the term soft budget constraint to refer to this phenomenon; see ibid., p. 45. 76. Granma Weekly Review (December 14,1986): 8. Efficiency may also gain if the demoted are replaced by better-educated, more technically qualified professionals. Frank T. Fitzgerald emphasizes, and perhaps overemphasizes this point, given little or no data on the fired versus the promoted; see "The Reform of the Cuban Economy, 1976-86," Journal of Latin American Studies 21, p. 2 (May 1989): 302-303.

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77. This is less likely, however, because Castro has been heavily involved in planning for many years and therefore contributed much to overly ambitious past plans. See José Luis Llovió-Menéndez, Insider: My Hidden Life as a Revolutionary in Cuba, tran. Edith Grossman (New York: Bantam, 1988), p. 350. 78. Caribbean Insight (May 1988). 79. Economist Intelligence Unit, Cuba 2 (1989): 12. 80. Granma Weekly Review (December 14,1986) supplement, p. 12. 81. Granma Weekly Review (February 9,1986): 4; Granma, November 1, 1988, p. 3, and November 4,1988, p. 1. 82. Caribbean Insight (April 1989). 83. Granma Weekly Review (December 14,1986) supplement, p. 12. Performance-related financial incentives in Cuba averaged only 10.6 percent of the basic wage in 1985 (before rectification), a low proportion by comparison to other Communist countries. The comparable figure for East Germany is 55 percent, and for the Soviet Union 36 percent. See Andrew Zimbalist, "Incentives and Planning in Cuba," Latin American Research Review 24, no. 1 (1989): 84. Union leaders in Cuba have complained that ceilings on bonuses curb productivity; see Caribbean Insight (November 1988). 84. New York Times, January 11,1989, p. 10; Caribbean Insight (December 1987) and (January 1988). 85. Rules guiding the selection of local party leaders were changed to require secret balloting for party base organizations with more than fifteen members; see Granma, January 6,1990, p. 1. 86. Granma Weekly Review (October 18,1987): 5-6. 87. Ibid., November 2,1986, p. 2. 88. Ibid., August 2,1987, p. 3. 89. Ibid., January 25,1987, p. 2. 90. Times of the Americas, November 30,1988, p. 4. 91. Granma, August 1,1988, p. 6. 92. Granma Weekly Review (December 14,1986): pp. 12-13. 93. See Wlodzimierz Brus, "Evolution of the Communist Economic System: Scope and Limits," in Nee and Stark, Remaking Economic Institutions, p. 271: "It was wrong to underestimate the question of property rights in the blueprints of economic r e f o r m . . . . A mixed economy, both in the sense of a larger share of nonstate enterprises and in the sense of greater diversification of ownership relations with the state sector, seems to me much more conducive to a marketoriented economic reform than the structure that has evolved so far." 94. Granma Weekly Review (April 16,1989): 2. 95. Ibid., August 6,1989, p. 2. 96. Ibid., March 18,1990. 97. In 1988 more than six thousand young Cubans were studying in the USSR; see Granma, October 14,1988, p. 6. Allegedly in response to the initiation of broadcasts from "TV Marti," Cuba began jamming Radio Marti in May 1990. 98. W. Raymond Duncan, "The Odd Partners," Wilson Quarterly 12, no. 5 (Winter 1988): 82. 99. Cuba: Political Executions and Human Rights: Annual Report by the Cuban Committee for Human Rights (Havana, December 1987), transcribed and

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distributed by Of Human Rights, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., p. 7. 100. There is no lack of political repression, however. For details on the unabated persecution of all opponents, see New York Times, April 1 and 5,1989, August 6 and 10,1989, March 13 and April 22,1990. In June 1990 Czech President Vaclav Havel wrote Fidel Castro to protest the lengthy prison sentences handed down to seven advocates of liberal reforms in Cuba; see Wall Street Journal, July 2,1990, p. A8. 101. Szelenyi in Nee and Stark, Remaking Economic Institutions, p. 225; Rhoda Rabkin, Cuban Politics: The Revolutionary Experiment (New York: Praeger, 1990), ch. 4. 102. For Cuba's superior record in health and education, see John Sheahan, Patterns of Development in Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 45-47. 103. From the early 1970s through the first half of the 1980s Cubans experienced a gradual improvement in living standards. 104. There was surely more to the Ochoa case than an issue of simple criminality. But there is no evidence that the executed General Arnaldo Ochoa had actively plotted Castro's overthrow or that he had advocated Gorbachev-style changes in Cuba. His political challenge was only potential. 105. Interior Minister Abrantes was arrested for corruption, along with many of his subordinates, at the end of July 1989. This arrest is in line with the observations on military-police tensions, given before the Ochoa case, by defector Rafael del Pino. See interview in Mirta A. Ojito, Rafael del Pino: Biographical Notes (Coral Gables, FL: Research Institute for Cuban Studies, n.d.) p. 34. Conspicuous corruption at the Interior Ministry was known and resented, not only by the regular military but by much broader currents in society; see the call of Council of State member Lidia Tablada Romero for further investigations, Granma Weekly Review, (July 23,1989): 4. 106. For elaboration, see Rhoda Rabkin, "The Aging of the Revolution," in Roca, Socialist Cuba, pp. 47-53. 107. Kim il Sung inherited an economy almost completely isolated from the world market, with a strong industrial base and an unusually diverse and rich stock of natural resources. 108. Imports in the 1980s have equaled the value of one-quarter of the national product—the same share as in the prerevolutionary period. See Cuba's Financial Crisis: The Secret Report from Banco Nacional de Cuba (Washington, DC: The Cuban-American National Foundation, 1985), p. 12, and Economist Intelligence Unit, Cuba 4 (1985): 2. 109. In early 1986, after addressing the Twenty-Seventh Soviet party Congress (at which Gorbachev expressed only muted support for wars of national liberation), Castro stopped off in North Korea, where both countries pledged to continue material support for movements of national liberation. See R. Bruce McColm, "Castro's Ambitions and the New Winds from Moscow," Strategic Review 14, no. 3 (Summer 1986): 55. Cuba was also one of the few countries in the world to join North Korea in a boycott of the summer 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul. 110. New York Times, January 11,1989, p. 1.

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111. Granma Weekly Review (December 17,1989): 2. 112. New York Times, April 4, 1989, p. 12. Gorbachev included in his December 1988 address to the UN General Assembly a call for Western banks to be more lenient with Third World borrowers. Gorbachev did not, however, use the occasion of his visit to Cuba to cancel the Cuban debt to the Soviet Union. 113. Fidel Castro did not attend the Belgrade NonAligned meeting in September 1989, where anti-US sentiments were very muted, but sent his brother Raul instead. 114. Granma Weekly Review (August 6,1972). 115. There is also a program of health cooperation with Bolivia and Ecuador and agreements with Ecuador and Brazil for the exchange of students. 116. Granma Weekly Review (December 20,1987): 1. 117. Granma, February 6,1989, p. 8. 118. His release was arranged after Castro's mediation; see Wall Street Journal, July 29,1988. Some years earlier, the kidnaped brother of Colombian President Betancur was quickly released after Castro's appeal; see New York Times, November 24,1983, p. 7. 119. Times of the Americas, December 28, 1988, p. 1; New York Times, November 2,1986, p. F4; and Wall Street Journal, November 5, 1987, p. 36. In recent years the EEC has paid about nineteen cents per pound for about 1.5 million tons from African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries. 120. Jorge F. Pérez-López, "Sugar and the Cuban Economy: An Assessment" (Coral Gables, FL: Research Institute for Cuban Studies, University of Florida, 1987), pp. 59-60. Soviet officials have indicated that they are hoping to adjust the price formula for valuing Cuban sugar to reflect world price movements; see Economist Intelligence Unit, Cuba 2 (1989): 9. 121. Caribbean Insight (May 1990). 122. Hagelberg, "Sugar in the Caribbean," p. 94. See also, Feuer, "Performance of Cuban Sugar Industry," p. 80. 123. See articles on leadership drift in Studies in Comparative Communism 22, no. 1 (Spring 1989).

3 Economic Relations Between Cuba and Eastern Europe: Present Situation and Possible Developments José Luis

Rodriguez

In attempting to analyze the principal factors that have contributed to revolutionary Cuba's development, it is necessary to take into account a variety of factors, including the insertion of Cuba into the international socialist division of labor and the level of economic collaboration received from the socialist countries.1 I seek here to analyze the (substantial) importance of these factors for the economic development of Cuba. Cuba's economic relations with CMEA members in essence guaranteed it a process of increased production during the last thirty years, assuring the island a stable market and just prices for its exports, as well as the basic supplies needed for its development. Moreover, the financing provided by the socialist countries to assist national development played a decisive role in the process of accumulation since 1959. Of crucial importance in these relations is, without any doubt, the role played by the Soviet Union.2

An Evaluation of the Past During 1959-1988, commercial trade with the Soviet Union represented 60.3 percent of Cuba's total external trade. This was covered by a series of credits leading to a commercial imbalance of 11.5 billion pesos, which between 1963 and 1982 resulted in Cuba's benefiting—in terms of such trade—to the tune of some 136.2 percent. From the point of view of developmental assistance, Cuba received from the Soviet Union approximately 3.8 billion pesos between 1960 and 1985, some 80 percent of which has been invested in the country's industrial development. Moreover, until 1986 the Soviet Union collaborated in some 360 economic projects (197 of which were in the industrial sector), and there are a further 289 in various stages of completion (eighty-one of these are also industrial projects).3 During the present five-year plan of Cuban-Soviet cooperation, some 174 projects are expected, of which sixty-one fall within the industrial sector. The results of Soviet economic collaboration can be seen in various 53

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products that are vital for the country's development. The enterprises created by the Soviet Union, for example, are responsible for some 15 percent of gross industrial production. To cite some pertinent statistics, these enterprises produce fully 100 percent of Cuba's sheet metal, as well as cane-harvesting machines, televisions, and radios; 90 percent of steel and 70 percent of national electricity; 60 percent of textiles and thread; and some 50 percent of the country's mechanical products.4 If one examines the extent of economic collaboration with the remaining members of CMEA, their contribution to Cuban development is equally outstanding. Among the areas of the Cuban economy that have most benefited from this type of assistance are agriculture (especially with respect to irrigation technology), which has been greatly assisted by Bulgaria; machine construction and energy production (Czechoslovakia); telecommunications and transportation (Hungary); shipbuilding (Poland); petroleum production (Romania); and construction material (German Democratic Republic). In addition, all these countries have contributed in a general sense to the development of the sugar industry and other basic industries. We can summarize this vast cooperation with some important statistics: In 1988 some 87 percent of Cuba's trade was with the socialist countries—who also provided 80 percent of all foreign investment in Cuba between 1959 and the beginning of the 1990s.5 In addition, between 1959 and 1988 the socialist countries of Europe, through their credits to Cuba, accounted for a commercial imbalance of some 2 billion pesos.6 Socialist assistance from C M E A members has also taken on the form of technical assistance. In 1990, for example, the program of geological prospecting (which analyzes fully 50% of the most promising zones in Cuba) has been carried out thanks to the participation of several socialist countries.7 From the perspective of assisting the Cuban work force, in just those centers built in Cuba with Soviet assistance some 240,000 specialists have been trained between 1967 and 1987. 8 One of the key elements in this collaboration among the socialist nations is the financial conditions established for these projects—a consideration that has been indispensable for Cuban development. Of prime importance have been the generous commercial credits, which totaled some 13.5 billion pesos between 1959 and 1988. Regarding the credits granted by the USSR, several factors have been characteristic: the postponement of payment for up to 100 percent of face value; interest rates that, as a norm, have not exceeded 4 percent; amortization periods of twelve years; and a system of barter to pay for these credits.9 Also of major importance have been credits designated specifically for Cuban national development. Unlike the already generous commercial credits noted above, the developmental credits have carried interest rates of only

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55

2 percent and amortization periods of some twenty-five years (the postponement of payment for up to 100% of face value and a system of barter—as for the commercial arrangements noted above—are also features of these credits).10 In addition, credits granted by the other socialist countries have also been obtained on favorable terms. A further illustration of Soviet generosity can be seen in the conditions offered Cuba to refinance its loans. In December 1972, for example, an agreement was reached to extend the amortization of payment of all debts thus far incurred. A thirteen-year grace period was granted, allowing the debt to be paid within twenty-five years, and it was agreed that during the grace period no interest charges would be incurred.11 Later, in 1984, it was agreed by both parties that "the debt the Cuban government was to begin paying in 1986 was not to affect the balance of payments during the five-year period beginning that year, since it had been the object of favorable refinancing."12 These financial arrangements have been made within the context of an international situation that has proved to be extremely difficult for Cuba, and have benefited the island's economy substantially. The figures that outline the external debt owed by Cuba to European members of C M E A are not officially available in Cuba. Soviet sources indicate, however, that as of November 1989 Cuba's debt to the USSR amounted to Rub 15.49 billion, or 17.2 billion pesos. Of this amount, 61.6 percent stems from the commercial imbalances during 1972-1989 and 38.4% to development credits.13 While there is no data available on the extent of the Cuban debt with Eastern Europe, it is known that it is substantially less than that owed to Moscow. It is, of course, important to underline the fact that the impact of this debt on the Cuban economy is completely different from hard-currency debts, especially in regards to amortization credits, interest rates, and general loan conditions. Another form of financial assistance from the socialist countries has come from the issuing of preferential payments for Cuban exports.14 In the case of the Soviet Union the prices of Cuban exports have been indexed since 1976 to the prices of Soviet imports, with the objective of seeking to eliminate the disturbing effects of deteriorating terms of exchange. As a result of this process, however, several authors from different perspectives have claimed that this system has worked to Cuba's disadvantage since 1980, and that in effect a deterioration in terms of exchange totaling 28 percent has resulted.15 If these calculations are correct, then some 66 percent of Cuba's external debt to the Soviet Union during the last ten years can be explained by this deterioration in the terms of exchange.16 An important factor in Cuban economic development arose in 1972, when Cuba became a member of the CMEA. This progression from a

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bilateral to a multilateral arrangement was important because among CMEA's objectives is a desire to achieve a similar level of development among all member-states. The measures adopted within this process of socialist integration that have had the most significant importance for Cuban economic development since 1972 are: an agreement to create a production capacity of thirty thousand MT of nickel and cobalt with an investment of some 600 million pesos (twenty-ninth session of CMEA, 1975); the extension to Cuba of preferential measures granted to less developed member-countries (thirtieth session, 1976); a multilateral agreement to assist the development of science and technology in Cuba until 1990 (thirty-fourth session, 1980); several agreements concerning the integral development of sugar and citrus production in Cuba, with investments of 800 and 595 million pesos, respectively (thirty-fifth session, 1981); the participation of Cuba (until the year 2000) in the Integral Program for Scientific and Technical Progress of C M E A members, especially in regard to the fields of biotechnology and electronics (forty-first session, 1985); and the approval of the Special Integral Program of Multilateral Collaboration by the European members of the organization with Cuba (forty-fourth session, 1988). 17 In general, Cuba's presence within this process of socialist economic integration was an active one—as illustrated by the fact that by 1985 Cuba belonged to eighteen international commissions of the C M E A and participated in 195 of the five hundred accords signed (i.e., some 39%). As can be appreciated, this collaboration of the socialist nations in Cuba's socioeconomic development has been the indispensable complement to internal efforts at development. And, while some researchers have argued that this relationship has resulted in heavy subsidizing and a generally negative impact on the Cuban economy, others have contended that the capacity of accumulation and growth generated between 1959 and 1988 refute this position.18 What is beyond all doubt, however, is that the results obtained from this international collaboration contrast quite dramatically with those resulting from economic relations with capitalist countries before 1959—and especially in regard to trade with the United States. The extent of trade with C M E A members is quite substantial, and in certain regards quite economical for those countries. Cuba, for example, supplies 35 percent of sugar consumed by the East European members of C M E A at prices that—even though they are preferential—are nevertheless greatly lower than the cost of sugar would be for those countries if produced from sugar beet. (In the case of the Soviet Union the amount of sugar provided is approximately 30% .)19 Also significant is the provision to these countries of citrus products and nickel: With regard to the Soviet Union, Cuban supplies of these products represent 40 percent and 20 percent, respectively, of domestic demand. In both these cases Cuba's

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availability as a supplier saves these countries hard currency (which they would have to use if required to purchase these products elsewhere). Finally, it is important to note that in recent years an increasing amount of highly competitive products in the electronic and biotechnology fields have been sold.20

Current Problems and Future Perspectives In addition to significant success in this economic relationship, the development of economic relations with the C M E A countries has also resulted in several difficulties. Cuba, for example, failed to live up to commitments of planned exports to these countries—especially toward the middle of the 1980s. To a large extent this was due to fundamental difficulties in the production sector, although there were also errors in the economic policies applied to this area. In addition, as was mentioned above, there seems to have been a deterioration in the terms of exchange that affected Cuba adversely during this decade and that goes against the basic concept of trade among socialist nations. Moreover, the tendency to extend the period for foreign investments and projects in Cuba has encouraged an irregular flow in supplies and, in some cases, technical problems—as well as errors in planning.21 A further major factor has been the deficiencies in Cuba's own policies on foreign investment, especially in the period before 1985. (Recently academics from the Soviet Union have analyzed these causes, reaching similar conclusions about these deficiencies).22 A careful and detailed study of the current difficulties in economic collaboration between Cuba and the C M E A nations is necessary in order to evaluate how this relationship will evolve. A clear division needs to be made between those countries in Eastern Europe that have rejected socialism and those—like the Soviet Union—that continue to defend that system. With the first group, future economic relations will have to be adjusted according to the parameters laid out for trading with capitalist nations, with all the difficulties and limitations such a fact of life implies for Cuba. With the second group, and particularly with regard to Cuba's ties with the Soviet Union, several elements can be indicated that to a certain extent will contribute to finding a solution for economic difficulties. It is, of course, worth emphasizing that in the current international context those essential principles that determine the nature of economic relations between socialist countries are still strongly valid. Among those principles, one of the most important is the development of collaborative relations based upon a combination of shared political interests. This

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context in turn makes for the most appropriate solutions for economic and social problems faced by each member-nation, in accordance with its possibilities and with the principle of mutual benefit for all. In the case of Cuba the search for definitive solutions to a combination of problems that have badly affected its economic development began in the mid-1980s, with the signing of a series of long-term bilateral accords of collaboration with the Soviet Union (1984), Poland (1985), and Bulgaria (1986). On the multilateral level the agreements adopted at the 1984 Summit of C M E A and at the forty-fourth Council session in 1988 laid the groundwork for a solution and appropriate responses to these problems. However, political changes in Poland and Bulgaria in 1989, together with agreements reached at the forty-fifth session of C M E A in January 1990, quite clearly reduced the possibilities of resolving Cuba's difficulties— notwithstanding prior agreements. The complex economic relationship in which Cuba and the Soviet Union have engaged since 1985 is also a major factor that needs to be addressed, for it imposes objective limitations to the solutions for diverse problems that are being sought both by Havana and by Moscow. The resulting tense economic situation also precisely coincides with processes of profound change in the social and economic policies of both Cuba and the Soviet Union. In both cases, the leaders of these countries hold as a starting point the understandable, and totally just, concept that every nation should discover its own methods to resolve its difficulties, and pursue its own path of development. Understandably, therefore, different approaches and strategies have been pursued. Such changes as are being undertaken in each socialist state have an effect on the others—and, of course, those with closer ties will feel a greater impact as each introduces these reforms. This has led to the current situation of Cuba's having to participate in new forms of economic collaboration with the Soviet Union, while at the same time on the domestic front it maintains an economic policy that—for various reasons—cannot be the same as that being developed in the USSR. It is important to bear in mind that this current situation does not prevent both nations finding appropriate solutions—providing that the essential principles of socialism on which this relationship is based are not altered. (Conversely, the widespread introduction by any one of the C M E A countries of capitalist economic policy would leave few options for meaningful bilateral relations.) It is, of course, fundamentally important to remember that in an economy based upon market principles the business sector cannot resolve strategic problems affecting the country. Therefore, in the Soviet case, if it were deemed necessary to ensure the supply and distribution of essential resources such as sugar, citrus products, and nickel, intervention at the

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59

state level would be indispensable in order to ensure the supply of these Cuban exports in exchange for Soviet products.23 This general principle was outlined by Prime Minister Nikolai I. Rizhkov in his report to the Soviet Congress of Deputies in December 1989. It is also crucial to keep in mind that new forms of economic collaboration are being utilized, such as the establishment of direct ties between enterprises in both countries and the creation of other joint businesses. And, while Cuba's level of development (and lack of managerial skill for such projects) inhibits a speedy transition to these new mechanisms of economic collaboration, several important steps have been taken to encourage these developments. In April 1987, for example, an agreement was signed that allows the establishment in Cuba of joint Cuban-Soviet enterprises, and by late 1989 there were already nine such projects under way (with formal accords having been signed for four of these). 24 In May 1988 an agreement was concluded that provided opportunities for direct economic ties between Cuban and Soviet enterprises. Some forty-eight projects are presently under discussion, and in 1989 agreement was reached on seventeen of these. In sum, by the end of 1989 Cuban enterprises had achieved a solid track record of supporting these new forms of collaboration; 173 joint projects had been or were actively being considered, with seventy-four having been approved by that point.

Conclusion It is clear that the economic collaboration between Cuba and the countries of Eastern Europe has been absolutely indispensable for Cuba's achievement of its current level of development, notwithstanding the efforts undertaken on the domestic front to encourage this process. This, however, also possessed a reciprocal element, since Cuba contributed to the solution of some major problems of those nations. [Editors' note: The medical care given in 1990 to some one thousand Soviet children in the wake of the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor is perhaps the most dramatic recent example of this collaboration.] Having said that, the collaboration between Cuba and those nations that continue on a socialist development path (and especially the Soviet Union) is clearly insufficient and limited. The need thus seems apparent to improve this relationship— although the basis for any solution to these difficulties should surely be the respect for certain essential principles of socialism that should not be abandoned by fellow socialist nations. In undertaking this analysis, we should also examine the economic difficulties through which both Cuba and the Soviet Union are currently passing—and which clearly inhibit some necessary solutions. The process-

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es of change in current economic reform programs in both countries will undoubtedly create short-term difficulties but will also increase the eventual effectiveness of economic collaboration. Nevertheless, it is possible for both countries to identify mechanisms that may permit a readjustment in these forms of collaboration. The signing in April 1990 of a bilateral agreement on commercial exchange for the year along with the creation of a commission to study the development of economic ties between 1991 and 1995 are clearly steps in this direction. With regard to potential solutions to Cuba's economic difficulties, in addition to the introduction of new mechanisms of economic collaboration to encourage efficiency, several other features will be of key importance in achieving this goal. The efficiency of the economy (which will improve the quantity and quality of Cuban exports to the CMEA countries) is crucial to these reforms. Also of fundamental importance is the fulfillment by the Soviet Union of long-term commitments to economic collaboration. Finally, it is necessary to identify and develop new spheres of international economic collaboration, especially in matters of biotechnology and the electronics industry, but also in the service sector—including medical services and tourism. These are the challenges that must be confronted if Cuba is to develop its economic relations with the socialist community.

Notes 1. In the text, this term is used specifically in relation to those European countries that are members of CMEA. 2. For further information, see José Luis Rodríguez, "Las relaciones económicas Cuba-URSS, 1960-85" in Temas de Economía Mundial 17 (1986); Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, Anuario estadístico de Cuba, 1988, pp. 410, 412; and CEPAL, Notas para el estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe, 1988, Cuba LC/MEX/L.118 (October 3,1989), p. 31. 3. The Soviet Economy During the Last Seventy Years (Moscow: Editorial Finanzas y Estadísticas, 1987), p. 651 (in Russian). 4. See Victor Alvarez, "Colaboración soviética: influencia en el desarrollo industrial cubano," Colaboración Internacional 1 (1989): 14; and Rodríguez, "Relaciones económicas Cuba-URSS." 5. See the May 1989 issue of the Banco Nacional de Cuba's Informe Económico, p. 7; and A. D. Bekarevich, "Cuba y el CAME: el camino de la integración," in Cuba: 25 años de construcción del socialismo (Moscow: Redacción Ciencias Sociales Contemporáneas, 1986), pp. 117,121,124. 6. Author's estimate, based on Cuban statistics. 7. M. Manasov, ed., Cuba in the International Socialist Division of Labor (Moscow: Editorial Nauka, 1986), p. 132 (in Russian).

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8. Trabajadores, February 18,1988, p. 2. 9. See Banco Nacional de Cuba, Informe Económico (August 1982): 15. 10. Ibid. See also A. D. Bekarevich and N. M. Kujartev, The Soviet Union and Cuba: Economic Collaboration (Moscow: Editorial Nauka, 1973), pp. 189-264 (in Russian). 11. See Fidel Castro, La Revolución de Octubre y la Revolución Cubana: Discursos 1959-1977 (Havana: Ediciones del D O R del CC del PCC, 1977), pp. 220-233. 12. See Banco Nacional de Cuba, Informe Económico, (February 1985): 3. 13. Data on the Cuban debt was taken from the March 2 issue of Izvestia, and on the division of this debt both from the sources indicated in note 1 and from a cable issued from Moscow by the EFE agency on March 20,1990. 14. These levels of preferential payment vary from country to country. For example, in 1982 a ton of crude sugar was sold to Romania for 368.4 pesos and to the Soviet Union for 658.12 pesos. In these cases the preferential payment, in comparison with the prices paid by capitalist nations, was 2.17 and 3.87 times, respectively. For a broader treatment of these preferential payments, see José L. Rodríguez, "Un enfoque burgués del sector extemo de la economía cubana," Cuba Socialista 14 (March-April 1985): 90-92. 15. See A. Zimbalist and C. Brundenius, The Cuban Economy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 152; and Jorge I. Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 87. 16. This calculation is based upon data obtained from the sources cited in note 1, and from the author's estimates for 1989. 17. Information for this section was derived from the work of A. D. Bekarevich, "Cuba y CAME: el camino de la integración"; Julio Díaz Vázquez, Cuba: integración económica socialista y especialización de la producción (Havana: Editorial Pueblo y Educación, 1986), pp. 134-143; and José L. Rodríguez, "La integración de Cuba al CAME. Resultados y perspectivas," TP-FAR 4 (1988): 28-29. 18. See L. Theriot, Cuba Faces the Economic Realities of the 1980s (Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce, 1982); and C. Mesa-Lago and F. Gil, Soviet Economic Relations with Cuba, International Studies Institute Working Paper, no. 5 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1988). For a critical analysis of these interpretations, see José L. Rodríguez, Crítica a nuestros críticos (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1988), ch. 3. 19. In 1980 the Soviet Union purchased sugar from Cuba at a rate of 759.19 pesos per MT (i.e., $540 at the official exchange rate), yet in the Soviet Union costs per MT of domestic sugar were $988.2. See Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, Anuario estadístico de Cuba, 1987, p. 588; and Landell Mills Commodities Studies, A World Survey of Sugar and HFCS. Production Costs, vol. 1, p. 11. Also useful in this regard is Julio D. Vázquez and Z. González, "Los convenios de especialización agrícola de Cuba con los países miembros de CAME," Economía y Desarrollo 3 (1988): 148-149. 20. The exportation of technical and computing technology more than doubled between 1985 and 1988, while that of electronic components increased

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almost sevenfold. See Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, Anuario estadístico de Cuba, 1988, p. 269. 21. See, for instance, the article by A. Kamorin, "¿Qué es lo que ha frenado la puesta en explotación del combinado de níquel?" Economía y Desarrollo 3 (May-June 1987). 22. See, for example, A. Kamorin, "Tropicalized Exports; or, Why Soviet and Cuban Partners No Longer Understand Each Other," Izvestia, July 29,1989; and "Despite Our Experience, We Also Export Both Successes and Our Problems," Pravda, April 9,1990 (both in Russian). 23. An interesting analysis of the convenience of the Soviet Union's buying Cuban sugar can be seen in the recent work of G. B. Hagelberg, "The Sugar Side of Perestroika," International Sugar and Sweetener Report 122, no. 6 (February 8, 1990). 24. This section is based upon personal estimates and information obtained from various state offices. For further information, see also J. D. Vázquez, "Cuba-URSS: nueva modalidad de integración," Economía y Desarrollo 1 (1989).

4 The Future of Cuban-US Relations: A Cuban View René ]. Mujica

Cautelar

Thinking about the twenty-first century generally causes us to exalt the "good things to come." We give full rein to our noblest aspirations and at times dream about a future in which the most generous desires of humanity are realized. Among these goals are the arrival of a lasting peace among nations and the eradication of the nuclear threat; the development of free and independent nations; victory over hunger, poverty, discrimination, and other forms of injustice; new discoveries in medicine and technology that will lead to cures for disease; the conservation of the globe's natural habitat; and the expansion of the frontiers of our cosmos. If we base our analysis on the progress in general realized by mankind in the twentieth century, all these objectives are unquestionably within the world's grasp. Yet, while we may feel spiritually uplifted by this human potential, we must admit too that the obstacles to be overcome are formidable. Among other matters, there is such an unequal distribution among nations and individuals of the benefits of these twentieth century victories that our modern civilization is awash with corruption and a general avoidance of responsibilities. The planet on which we live is becoming increasingly finite and indivisible—at the same time that a new global fragmentation is occurring between those who possess power and wealth and those who are excluded from its benefits. Lofty-sounding concepts such as development, democracy, environmental protection, freedom, human rights, international cooperation, and self-determination are debased when used in rhetorical contexts and manipulated to serve political ends. Another potent force is the rapid development of the international mass media—controlled by a mere handful of (wealthy) nations and individuals—a factor that underlines the flow of information (or misinformation) in one direction only, threatening to multiply the contradictions and conflicts instead of helping to resolve them. If we add to this equation political and ideological intolerance, the desire to exercise political hegemony, messianic pretensions, and the indifference or arrogance of 63

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some of the leading actors, then we can indeed imagine just how uncertain the future is for our planet. It seems clear, then, that a political will—on a global basis—is required if we are to deal constructively with the conflicts that exist between nations. Ideally we need to find solutions for these problems or, when this proves impossible, at least a manner to deal with such problems on a basis of fairness and understanding. If we were to set this as a goal, then the 1990s could indeed lead to major developments. Conversely, any unbalanced approach could well generate new sources of confrontation, removing the possibilities of international cooperation to resolve the most urgent global problems. The future seems to be mired in ambiguity. On the one hand there is a clear tendency to promote a relaxing of international tensions, as is seen most clearly in the relations between the superpowers. Political and economic cooperation between the industrialized countries also has grown dramatically. On the other hand, however, for the foreseeable future it is clear that Third World nations—despite their pressing difficulties—will remain relatively marginalized from the direct benefits that result from these positive currents. Certainly the economic crisis that asphyxiates developing countries has not received any serious reply from the industrialized world. There is no firm evidence that the concept of global coexistence (which is implicit in this relaxing of tensions between both superpowers) will be extended to assist small, underdeveloped nations. In the case of the United States, this is seen most clearly in its policy on Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Panama. 1 It remains to be seen whether this attitude will change in this decade— although the experience of the 1980s hardly offers any encouragement. On the contrary, the interventionist mentality and actions have become more arrogant and manifest. The US Congress (as if it really did possess overseas colonies) has systematically authorized (and at times has even demanded) military intervention in the Third World. Meanwhile, the immensely powerful media have showered praise on each demonstration of strength. Caught in the middle, of course, is public opinion—which in most cases has been dragged along in the wake of this pressure and is largely lacking alternative sources of information, although in some cases it has offered significant resistance.2

The Case of Cuba Against this backdrop, let us consider the prospects for Cuban-US relations in the 1990s. In order to do so it is necessary first, however, to summarize the essential characteristics of US conduct toward Cuba since

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1959. During these three decades no less than nine US administrations under eight different presidents have maintained an invariable policy of more or less open hostility, as well as a fierce economic blockade, and have persistently tried to isolate Cuba politically and diplomatically—particularly from the rest of Latin America. No other country in the world has received such treatment (nor for so long) from Washington.3 This can be explained by the fact that the Cuban Revolution not only destroyed the myth of US omnipotence in the hemisphere (a myth that had been meticulously developed for some 150 years) but also has maintained this challenge. On an external level Cuba's actions represented the beginning of the end of Washington's domination over Latin America, as well as sending a clear message to the rest of the world." Also, on an internal plane they constituted a traumatic blow against what could be called the "psyche of hegemony" (in essence the result of a lack of significant challenge to Washington's power in Latin America since World War II). This myth of omnipotence was deeply rooted in North American society—particularly among the powerful classes—and Cuba's arrival was understandably seen as a threat. 5 As a result, the first objective set by the United States was the task of destroying the Revolution, and, while the experiences at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and during the Missile Crisis in 1962 showed that this would not prove so easy as had been anticipated, the goal was nonetheless retained as the principal strategy of US policy on Cuba. If destruction was not immediately possible, the alternative scenario revolved around blockading the island—until the Revolution was dismantled. Both objectives have remained invariable up to the present. While the destruction of the Cuban Revolution by Washington has become increasingly difficult, the siege of Cuba has acquired a greater and more permanent relevance—particularly in light of Cuba's vastly increased international role. By the mid-1970s, though, it appeared as if—under the Ford and Carter administrations—these two fundamental objectives could undergo significant changes.6 Such optimism was, however, short-lived. With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the US political system shunned the policies of the previous decade and adopted a new conservative program that affected virtually all areas of domestic and foreign policy. An immediate effect of this process was the hardening of US policy on Cuba, which could be seen in a variety of ways: the brusque increase of anti-Cuban rhetoric (which reached an unprecedented level of vulgarity); the drastic reduction of "people-to-people" contacts as a result of severe restrictions on US citizens seeking to travel to Cuba, lack of encouragement of exchanges for academic, artistic, or simply humane reasons, and systematic denial of visas to Cuban citizens who sought to travel to the United States for these reasons; the constant organization of

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slanderous propaganda campaigns designed to compromise the prestige and international acceptance of Cuba, both in regard to bilateral relations with other countries and in multilateral fora and organizations; praise for the sectors of the extreme right of the Cuban community in the United States and official support for its role as the alleged representatives of the community's interests vis-à-vis Cuba—as well as utilizing it in propaganda campaigns orchestrated by the various administrations; the systematic attempt to close down all breaches (real and imagined) in the economic blockade; the organization of a vast misinformation campaign to create obstacles to Cuba's attempt to renegotiate its external debt and in addition encourage harsher terms from creditors; insidious acts to foment discord between Cuba and other Latin American nations, thereby preventing Cuba's incorporation within regional political and economic projects; and finally (as in the 1960s), the attempt to establish a pro-US counterrevolutionary opposition within Cuba, with the intention of eventually destroying the Revolution. (In this last endeavor it has used subversive radio transmissions—on the medium-wave band—both through commercial radio stations in Florida and the shamefully named "Radio Marti,") In sum, the Reagan administration almost completely overturned the rather timid progress realized in bilateral relations during the Carter presidency.7 Some observers, unaware of the structural dimension in the transformation of North American capitalism between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s, assumed that these changes resulted specifically from the Reagan policy. They therefore believed that a more constructive policy from the Bush administration in regard to its Cuba policy would be possible. In reality, however, the new administration has merely continued the battle plan against the Cuban Revolution. This can be clearly seen in both the rhetoric and the actions of this administration.8 Such actions clearly reveal that there is no interest in a change of policy; rather, there exists the determination to continue—and perhaps to increase—the hostile policy cultivated by Reagan. Among the new approaches pursued by the Bush administration, one can cite several developments—the intensified efforts to tighten up the economic blockade even more; 9 increased measures virtually to freeze people-to-people contacts—especially in denying visas to Cuban citizens invited by private institutions in the United States;10 and, worst of all, the illegal television programs broadcast from a transmitter in the Florida keys, both a subversive action directed against the government of Cuba and a clear violation of international law—that have understandably provoked a serious conflict between Cuba and the United States.11 Similarly, the Bush administration has significantly increased military maneuvers around Cuba—while claiming that they are merely "routine" exercises. These, however, are understandably interpreted in Havana as

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threatening actions. For example, during the Global Shield operations in 1989 and 1990 US planes practiced massive bombing raids. Departing from the United States, these planes stopped just short of Cuban air space, merely a few minutes before reaching the potential major targets in western Cuba (including Havana), and then flew back to their bases. It is also significant that in 1990—for the first time—the Global Shield war games were held simultaneously with other military exercises, such as the traditional Ocean Venture and Defex (held at the US naval base in Guantanamo). All this took place in early May off the Cuban coast— large-scale simulations using elite units from all branches of the armed forces. Havana considered the implications to be so serious that a countermaneuver (Cuban Shield) was immediately activated. It is difficult to believe that the Bush administration could take such significant decisions without realizing the danger of these volatile situations exploding. Significantly, the US public was, once again, kept in the dark about these developments. The new administration also redoubled its efforts to depict the Cuban government as a gross and systematic violator of human rights. It conducted a spurious campaign based upon falsehoods and deliberate fabrications that its powerful media, through a campaign of misinformation and propaganda, have spread throughout the world. Thanks to this and to enormous pressure placed upon numerous governments (with the support of a mixture of Western allies and some new regimes in Eastern Europe), the United States obtained a partial victory at the forty-sixth session of the U N Human Rights Commission. There, with the approval of only a minority of its members (nineteen in favor, twelve against, with twelve abstentions), Washington succeeded in pushing through a resolution designed to keep the human rights situation in Cuba under permanent study. The transparent objective of this maneuver is, quite simply, one of converting the international community and the United Nations into accomplices and instruments of its hostility to Cuba. This has been, and continues to be, the fundamental objective of US policy—and thirty-one years later there is little apparent change in the official goals. It is important to note that there have been some minor victories in the realm of common sense, since in recent years there have also been cases of successful negotiations between both parties. Such, for example, is the case of the migration agreement that was signed in December 1984.12 Another case of successful negotiations were the discussions over southern Africa, in which the dialogue developed in a multilateral context and led to the signing in New York of a tripartite agreement among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa on December 22,1988. 13 These, however, tend to be the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, the "Baker memorandum" of the end of March 1989 clearly shows that

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the United States will agree to negotiate with Cuba only when it concerns a specific, immediate interest for Washington. In other words, this concept excludes by its very definition both a series of global negotiations on fundamental concerns that divide both countries (and, by extension, potential solutions to these problem areas) and negotiations designed to focus on more-specific matters that affect both Cuba and the United States.14 In future bilateral relations one expects that the United States will continue the traditional practice of trying to induce the desired behavior from Cuba—a policy to be realized through coercive measures such as political, diplomatic, and economic pressure. To date, US policy has been characterized by its well-organized, coherent, and continuous nature: It is not, then, merely the sum of disparate actions over three decades by nine successive administrations. And, most ominously of all, the basic approach seems to have changed remarkably little during all this time—with minuscule significance being accorded to the fact that during this entire period its policy has not caused Cuba to abdicate its fundamental positions. It is also important to emphasize that this policy has not taken place in a political vacuum, since Cuba has also been a major factor in the generation of these differences between the two countries. The first of these Cuban actions to cause friction was the abrupt breaking of the neocolonial relationship that the United States had imposed upon Cuba until 1958. From the Cuban perspective, this was an act of legitimate self-defense. Subsequently two basic categories of actions taken by the Cuban government were ill-received in Washington: (1) those designed to counteract and frustrate hostile US strategic objectives; and (2) those undertaken by Cuba as an independent and sovereign nation. Both actions (which frequently overlap) were pursued in both internal and foreign policy, and were based upon international law and established political practice. At the same time Cuba has always maintained a willingness to talk with and negotiate with the United States, but only based upon a relationship of legal equality, mutual respect for sovereignty and independence, and reciprocal benefits.15 Such a foundation for negotiation, universally recognized by the international community, has still not been accepted by the United States in its dealings with Cuba. In this regard it is important to recognize that, while actions taken by Cuba may have contributed to the many differences between both countries, the US position has been one of fundamentally rejecting any legitimate rights and perspectives on the Cuban side. For obvious reasons, this wholly negative approach to bilateral relations has made it virtually impossible for both nations to discuss their differences according to the norms accepted by the international community. The use (or threat) of force constitutes a denial of these

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norms and is to be universally repudiated. This, sadly, has been the dominant note in US policy on Cuba. It is also important to emphasize the way in which different US administrations have employed a variety of rationalizations and emphasized various aspects of this relationship, according to both the conditions of the moment and their strategic interests. There have also been brusque shifts in the US approach—as happened between the late 1970s and the 1980s. It is important to underline the fact, however, that in the mid-1970s a context did evolve that showed that it was possible for US policy to change; while no change did subsequently materialize, the hint of it shows that with mutual respect a change (bringing benefits to both countries) is possible.16 Despite that brief respite in tension, the fundamental aspect of US policy on Cuba continues to be Washington's refusal to recognize the Cuban people's right to independence, sovereignty, and self-determination. Indeed, in their search for an appropriate model for a US approach to the "Cuban question," the US political elite has in essence still not overcome the same interpretation of Cuba it held from 1898 to 1958. The miserable results of that policy of US "guardianship" on the Cuban people are well known and clearly represent the antithesis of Cuba's national aspirations and rights. In no way can this old-fashioned policy serve as the base for the resolution of bilateral differences in the 1990s. US Expectations Why, then, do US policymakers maintain such an anachronistic policy, such a rigid focus, on Cuba? Moreover, what exactly frustrated the incipient improvement of relations with Cuba that was seen in the mid1970s? The reply to these questions has a lot to do with US expectations of Cuba. In formulating foreign policy, expectations are always important because they indicate the viability both of the basic principles on which the theory is based and of the policy's very objectives. In addition, expectations are based upon perceptions (correct or not) of the reality under study—and clearly the policymakers' subjectivity plays a major role in this analysis. US policy on Cuba is based upon a fundamental perception that the revolutionary process is reversible. This is the view of the Bush administration in the early 1990s, as it was of policymakers throughout the 1980s. There are three basic factors that contribute to this underlying concern about Cuba: (1) the structural readjustment of North American capitalism since the end of the 1970s; (2) changes in the international

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political context (and specifically within the Soviet Union and the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe); and (3) the US interpretation of the internal situation in Cuba. The first of these has to do with changes within the international and national economic orders during the 1970s. Domestically, the economic policy that had basically been in existence since the time of the New Deal finally disappeared, while in the international context US influence increasingly lost out to commercial competition based in Western Europe and the Far East. A related influence was the crisis in the US nuclear strategy as the Soviet Union gradually drew abreast with its competitor. These factors, coming on the heels of the defeat in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal, provoked a crisis of values. It was at this point that a "new" conservative philosophy was born, as the United States came to resolve this moral crisis. The ensuing readjustment (which in theory was an economic "rescue package," but which in practice affected all spheres of US social life) led to the conservative program of the Reagan administration—and, with minor changes, is still being employed by its successor. One facet of this readjustment had to do with ideological changes in North American society. Traditional "liberal" and "conservative" labels largely lost their meaning, and conservative philosophy held sway—especially in regard to foreign policy and national security concerns. Indeed, throughout the 1980s (and probably for the foreseeable future), Washington's policy on Cuba was modeled by right-wing think tanks whose suggestions have tended to reinforce the traditional US hostility.17 The second factor is related to dramatic shifts in the international context. Coincidentally, the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have occurred precisely at the time that conservative thought has experienced such a meteoric rise in the United States. Historically this mind-set has perceived the socialist system as being intrinsically evil, almost the "anti-Christ" (for example, Ronald Reagan often referred to the Soviet Union as the Evil Empire). Accompanying this pseudotheological analysis has been a spirit of religious crusade, and a conviction—based upon political "faith"—that socialism would be overcome and wiped from the face of the earth. North American conservatives have thus viewed the changes in various East European countries as unquestionable symptoms of the rout of the socialist system and the confirmation of their long-held beliefs. Such an interpretation has become the keystone of US foreign policy and has generated an evident euphoria in the ruling elite—as was seen in President Bush's comment in his speech to the United Nations on September 25,1989, that "the fundamental battle between rival systems has been won by the democratic free-market nations." Consequently, if socialism is perceived as being caught in a terminal

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crisis, then according to this theory Cuba—given its socialist nature and its close ties with the Soviet Union—must obviously face the same fate. This is especially so, goes the argument, given the extraordinary pressure being imposed upon Cuba by Washington on the one hand, and, on the other, the friction between Moscow and Havana—with their different interpretations of socialism (perestroika and la rectificación). As a result, the US government is encouraged to seek to deepen its economic blockade against Cuba and to attempt to foment differences in Cuban-Soviet relations, thereby reinforcing the effect of these measures. The third and last factor to take into consideration is the interpretation held in Washington of the internal state of Cuba. In this regard, critics often refer to the situation of the Cuban economy. Even though the Cuban economy has fared far better than that of other developing countries during the 1980s, it has been affected by several external variables over which it has little control. These include, for example, the high cost of servicing the external debt, the deterioration in terms of exchange, and low prices on the world market for several of its principal exports (sugar and petroleum by-products). Cuba's agricultural products have also suffered because of extreme weather conditions, although far more serious was the impact of the economic planning system used in the 1970s—one that was based largely upon the experience of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. As a necessary response to these economic factors (and because of the need for national political development), Cuba has been involved since 1986 in an original program to develop its own socialist system based upon a campaign to rectify the errors of the previous decade. This process, whose development precedes the Soviet perestroika, has characteristics that distinguish it quite radically from the approach being taken in other socialist countries. Conservative policymakers and theoreticians in the United States have calculated that the tensions resulting from this combination of factors now offer new opportunities to foment internal subversion in Cuba. They also believe that, with the replacement of Cuban President Fidel Castro, a political crisis will result in Cuba—one that will lead to a government that will not only be more malleable by Washington but that might well reverse the revolutionary process. Now, they believe, is the right time to exploit the situation by applying pressure on Cuba. It is significant that while the United States has heretofore always insisted that the major obstacle to improved relations was Cuba's external policies, spokesmen of the Bush administration—and the president himself—now emphasize that Cuba should bring about internal political and economic reforms before Cuban-US relations can improve. As can be seen, it is the combination of these three factors that tend to support the maintenance of these same US strategic objectives during

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the 1990s. They are, it is important to note, in essence the same objectives that have been held for the last three decades. One should not, therefore, expect any major changes in the bilateral relationship during this decade; Washington will undoubtedly maintain the same level of pressure against Havana.

Final Comments At this stage it appears quite improbable that in the 1990s there will be any significant change in US policy on Cuba—a change that nevertheless is needed in order to resolve the historical differences between them. Instead it seems that in the year 2000 the leaders of both countries— whoever they may be—will face the same basic dilemma as today, although there will undoubtedly be some new areas of discussion that will have arisen. What could have been a joint contribution to the resolution of global problems, on the eve of a new century full of promises for humanity, will thus not have materialized. Meanwhile, the Cuban Revolution will have reached its fortieth anniversary. According to the most optimistic scenario, some unforeseen development may occur, changing US perceptions of Cuba and leading subsequently to a bilateral dialogue. It seems highly unlikely that the first factor in our earlier analysis—the present influence of conservative philosophy over US policy on Cuba—will change in the short run, at least if we examine the similar platforms of both Democrats and Republicans. One possible influence in the future, however, could stem from the impact of a serious economic recession, compounded perhaps by support from progressive sectors of the Democrats—although at present this is only a theory. In addition, policymakers might also be influenced by alterations on the international stage. For example, the development and maturation of dramatic changes in the socialist countries could evolve in directions that are neither foreseen nor desired by the United States. It is also important to remember that the serious problems afflicting the majority of countries on the periphery of the capitalist system will not disappear—even though they may be selectively ignored. Moreover, the current interpretation of dominant economic and political tendencies in the world today held by the US political elite could prove to be quite erroneous in a few years' time. Sooner rather than later, then, we may see the fall from grace of this neo-Hegelian and delirious notion that a "homogenous and universal" state, based upon the example of the pattern for current industrialized capitalist nations as represented by the United States, is the only manner of governing.18

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From the Cuban perspective, there is nothing to indicate that US expectations concerning developments there will be fulfilled. Certainly there is no feeling of political crisis. Cuban society is undergoing a period of readjustment, which could of course create certain tensions, yet the predominant feeling is one of optimism and faith in the future. Part of this readjustment consists of developing the original and autochthonous elements of the Cuban revolutionary experience, which in the long run could mean that this period will prove to be one of the most creative in its history. With an industrial base created by the Revolution and a healthy, educated population, Cuba is fully prepared to channel its own efforts into the socioeconomic development of the country. The Cuban population still maintains a high level of commitment to the revolutionary process, with the result that the attempt to foment a significant internal opposition is not feasible. Nor is there a division between the generation of revolutionary leaders and that of future leaders, who will face Washington's conduct with just as much firmness and conviction as their predecessors. This is largely because they have been formed in a tradition of struggle against US claims and behavior, and of the defense of legitimate Cuban rights—a tradition that dates back to the end of the nineteenth century. In sum, the only realistic—and possible—solution to these deeply rooted divisions requires that Washington recognize Cuba's sovereignty and independence, and drop the attempt to impose the traditional neocolonial model it has supported for so long. This model still serves as the ideological underpinnings both of its policy on Cuba and of its strategic objectives. Finally, if the United States and Cuba are to improve their bilateral relationship, Washington needs to accept the concept of juridical equality between the two nations, as well as the concepts of reciprocal respect and mutual benefit as the basis upon which the differences between both countries could be negotiated.

Notes 1. The common characteristic of all these "conflicts" is the intervention of the United States in the internal affairs of those countries with the objective of imposing on them political formulae decided in Washington. In other words, it is an attempt to perpetuate the subordination of those countries to the political, economic, and military interests Washington capriciously decides are "of strategic importance" or "vital" to US security. The invasion of Panama in December 1989, along with its ridiculous justification, is a prime example of this approach. 2. The most notable case of resistance by US public opinion in recent years has been its consistent opposition to military intervention against the Nicaraguan

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revolution by the US government—as seen in the creation, financing, and directing of the mercenary army known as the contras. 3. There is no comparable case in modern times: The United States is the strongest military power ever to exist, while Cuba—a small country, geographically close—has successfully managed to resist its pressures for some thirty years. 4. There is no doubt that Cuba's example had a major impact on revolutionary processes in Nicaragua and Grenada, on the revival of the struggle for national liberation in El Salvador, and on the process, initiated by Omar Torrijos, to regain sovereignty over the Panama Canal. 5. The violence implicit in the exercise of this hegemony has meant, therefore, that some form of rationalization has been required to explain this conduct to the North American people. Such was the role of the doctrine of Manifest Destiny, until it fulfilled its political mandate. The so-called Good Neighbor policy can be considered a more benign form of the same phenomenon. During the Cold War period, the so-called Doctrine of National Security continued this role. The essence of all these policies—that is, the US decision to arrogate for itself the "duties" and "rights" it possesses toward all the nations of the hemisphere—has remained constant. 6. During this time the administration of Gerald Ford started some preliminary negotiations with Cuba and undertook several initiatives to loosen some aspects of US policy. The administration of James Carter that followed continued this process, establishing "interests sections," yet it was in the closing years of his presidency that a withdrawal from these fresh initiatives started. 7. Practically the only remaining vestiges of these reforms are the interests sections, whose role as a vehicle for communication between the two governments has been limited both by the negative climate established by Washington and by specific decisions taken there to limit these channels of dialogue. 8. One has only to read President Bush's speeches on Cuban matters to appreciate this fact. One address in particular—given in Washington before representatives of the Cuban-American right—on the occasion of the eightyseventh anniversary of the May 20,1902, transferral of power from US military intervention (1898-1902) to leaders of the "false republic" is worth studying. (The symbolism of this date is also important, since it signaled the first US-imposed government in Cuba.) Another revealing document (which was not intended for public consumption) is the confidential telegram known as the Baker memorandum, which was sent by the secretary of state in late March 1989 to a number of US embassies. For an analysis from the Cuban perspective of this document, see the interview with Carlos Aldana Escalante, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Cuba, in the July 1989 issue of Areito. 9. To appreciate the extent of these efforts, see the text of the declaration of R. Richard Newcomb (director of the Office of Control of Foreign Activities of the Treasury) presented on August 2, 1989, before a joint session of the subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations, International Economic Policy, and Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives. The fact that legislation concerning the economic blockade is based on the Trading with the Enemy Act indicates

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clearly the manner in which even today the government conceives the legal context of its policy on Cuba—despite the fact that there is no armed conflict between the two countries. 10. Under the Bush administration the denial of visas to Cuban citizens involved in such exchanges is greater than ever and in fact has become virtually a ritual practice. Dozens of academics, journalists, musicians—including the legendary Aragón band—have been punished in this way. 11. For a clear exposition of the Cuban position, see the interview with Carlos Aldana Escalante in Areito (July 1989). These transmissions are in contravention of the International Convention of Telecommunications (Nairobi, 1982) and the regulations of the International Union of Telecommunications (IUT). In successive judgments taken between April and June 1990 both the International Frequency Registrations Board and the Administrative Council of the IUT found that transmissions by the so-called TV Marti were in clear violation of international law and of the relevant regulations. They therefore demanded that the United States adhere to these stipulations—to which they are a signatory nation. Numerous individuals, groups, and international organizations have also condemned this US policy. 12. Protesting Radio Marti transmissions in 1985, the Cuban government suspended the migration agreement, renewing it toward the end of 1987 following a US commitment to discuss an equitable distribution of medium-wave transmissions between both countries. This was based upon the principle of a free exchange of ideas and information. Absolutely nothing resulted from these discussions, and US negotiators have studiously avoided dealing with the matter. 13. For a detailed analysis of this point, see Charles W. Freedman, Jr., "The Angola/Namibia Accords," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1989). 14. An example of this policy is the agreement on drug trafficking by means of sea and air routes in which territorial jurisdictions overlap. Despite the importance the United States grants to its campaign against narcotics, its attitude to Cuba's initiative in this regard—both before and after the Ochoa-La Guardia trial—has been quite unreceptive. By contrast, in June 1990 Cuba and Mexico signed such a bilateral accord—which poses the question as to why the United States still refuses to follow suit. 15. See in this regard the appropriate section of the official Program of the Communist party of Cuba, as well as the relevant reports presented at the party's first, second, and third congresses. 16. One theory, perhaps plausible in the light of subsequent experience, is that the United States was pursuing this change for purely tactical reasons. According to this line of thought, the United States would have eventually developed this "normalization" of relations into some sort of Trojan horse, combating the revolutionary process from within. The brief duration of this experiment precludes any solid appreciation of its goals or political base. 17. See, for example, the following publications by the Heritage Foundation: National Security Record (July 1981); Backgrounder (September 12, 1983, and May 14,1990) (the latter, significantly, was subtitled "Preparing for a Post-Castro Cuba"); Issues '88: A Platform for the U.S., vol. 2, Defense and Foreign Policy Programs, ed. Mark B Liedl; Mandate for Leadership III: Policy Strategies for the

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1990s, pt. 3: Foreign Policy and National Defense (1989). Also illustrative are Committee of Santa Fe, Una nuevapolitico interamericanapara los ochenta (1980) and Santa Fe II: una estrategia para América Latina en los noventa (1988); and, finally, Georges A. Fauriol, The Third Century: U.S. Latin American Policy Choices for the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies 1988). 18. See Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989).

5 US-Cuban Relations: The View from Washington Wayne S. Smith

The world has undergone startling changes over the past few years; the Cold War has suddenly come to an end, the Berlin wall is down, Germany has been reunified, and the East-West factor has by and large been removed from regional conflicts. Where once there was confrontation between two camps, there is now a growing spirit of cooperation and of settling disagreements through discussions and diplomatic accords. That is true of most of what once would have been called Cold War relationships. It is not true, however, of US-Cuban relations. There, the trend is in the other direction. Tensions have reached a level of intensity not seen since the 1960s, and Washington has ruled out not only any thaw in the relationship, but even any diplomatic process aimed at resolving continuing disagreements. Early on, the Bush administration claimed this negative reaction on its part resulted from Havana's unwillingness to change or to demonstrate what Washington considered to be good faith. According to Secretary of State James Baker in a March 1989 memorandum to US diplomatic posts, Cuba had "steadfastly failed to offer any concrete proposals of its own to satisfy long-standing and well-known United States concerns." And what were those concerns? In hearings before the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs on August 2, 1989, State Department officials essentially repeated positions taken by the US government over the past thirty years—positions that emphasized foreign policy issues as the central US complaints vis-à-vis Cuba. Cuba's commitment to the export of armed revolution remained undiluted, these officials lamented, as did its military ties with the Soviet Union. Hence, they said, there could be no softening of US policy on the island. This seemed to be a reiteration of the conditions for improved relations that US administrations had long been putting forward: that Cuban troops begin to come out of Africa; that Havana halt its support for guerrillas and other subversive groups in Latin America; that Soviet presence and influence in Cuba—especially of a military nature—be significantly reduced; and finally that Havana improve its record of respect 77

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for human rights, most immediately by releasing political prisoners. Note that none of the prerequisites had to do with purely internal affairs—human rights were, and are, a universal priority. US administrations had carefully steered away from any suggestion that Cuba's internal arrangements should be on the negotiating agenda. Rather, the line long taken by US diplomatic representatives, me among them, was that Havana's socialist system was its own affair and was not the cause of US concerns. Those, rather, were activated by Cuban foreign policy lines that in one way or another threatened, or at least clashed with, US interests. It was these positions—plus an alleged intransigence in the human rights field—about which the Bush administration complained during most of 1989. According to President Bush, in a speech in Miami on August 16, 1989, we had simply seen no changes whatsoever in Castro's policies, whether international or internal.1 But was this really the case? As of the middle of 1989 had there truly been no alterations whatever? Let us examine those policies in the four areas indicated above, that is, those long described as at the core of US concerns regarding Cuba.

Cuban Troops in Africa Most Cuban troops were out of Ethiopia before the issuance of the Baker memorandum in March 1989, and, as the result of a tripartite agreement brokered by the United States and signed by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa in December 1988 (also before the Baker memorandum), they had begun leaving Angola as well. Thus, the question of Cuban troops in Africa was soon to have been fully resolved to Washington's satisfaction. In view of this, it is simply incredible that both President Bush and Secretary of State Baker could suggest that there had been no change on Havana's part in those areas of most concern to the United States. Africa had certainly been one of them, had it not? Cuban diplomats negotiated seriously and constructively to remove Africa from the list of contentious issues. They did so, to be sure, in pursuit of their own security goals in southern Africa—assuring Angola's borders in particular. A secondary consideration, however, was the salutary impact all of this was expected to have on relations with Washington. The Cubans did not disguise the fact that they wanted improved relations with their northern neighbor. Quite understandably, they had thought that an agreement in southern Africa would help. They had thought they were addressing one of the "long-standing and well-known United States concerns" and were surprised to learn from the Baker memorandum that this apparently was not the case.

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Cuban Support for Revolution in Latin America During most of the 1960s Castro's stated goal was to turn the Andes into Latin America's own Sierra Maestra, the mountains from which he had launched his Revolution. In the Second Declaration of Havana, in 1962, Castro virtually declared war on the other governments of the hemisphere and vowed to lend support to guerrillas anywhere and everywhere. There was only one way to deal with the imperialists and their "sepoy" governments in Latin America, he maintained, and that was through the barrel of a rifle. Accordingly, Castro rejected the very idea of East-West détente and chided the Soviets for their naïveté in pursuing it. Changing circumstances, pressure from the Soviets, and the failure of his own tactics induced Castro to begin moderating his stance sometime around 1968. More than two decades later it is clear that his position has shifted sharply from what it had been. Rather than aiming to turn the Andes into another Sierra Maestra, Castro now concedes that there are not likely to be any more Cubas in the hemisphere; the conditions for such a development simply do not exist. Nor do conditions exist even for armed revolution, except in the case of one or two countries. At an international conference of Communist and revolutionary parties in Havana, in 1982, Cuban theoreticians argued that conditions for armed struggle—which would justify material support on Havana's part—existed only in El Salvador and Guatemala. Guatemala was removed from the list after the elections there in 1985. Since then, in no other country is there evidence that Cuba is providing material support to guerrillas. And even in El Salvador, Havana has indicated its preference for a negotiated solution. Rather than trying to overthrow the other governments of the hemisphere, as was his wish during the 1960s, Castro is now reaching out to establish diplomatic ties and to increase his influence through them. Rather than foment revolution, Castro's goal is to play a larger—and more traditional—role in inter-American affairs. In response to this metamorphosis, government after government has normalized its Cuban connection. Castro now enjoys full diplomatic and trade relations with the majority of Latin American countries, and others—notably Colombia— may soon join the list. Thus, while the US government is insisting that Cuban tactics have not changed, the former targets of those tactics believe otherwise. If they still felt threatened by Havana's policies, they would not have resumed conventional diplomatic links, would not have voted overwhelmingly to elect Cuba to the U N Security Council in 1989, and would not be moving, as they are, eventually to reintegrate the island into the OAS. The rationale of those Latin America nations that wish to bring Cuba back into the fold (an effort led principally by the so-called Rio Group—

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Mexico, Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, and Peru) is clear and quite sophisticated. They believe that they can exert greater moderating influence on Havana if it is again part of the family than if it remains excluded. Even with respect to Central America, Cuba's views are more moderate than they are reputed to be; in fact, they do not differ in any fundamental way from those of the USSR. Although it is true that the Cubans, unlike the Soviets, have not forsworn material assistance to the Salvadoran rebels (FMLN), this is because Castro believes that any such move on his part must be matched by a reciprocal gesture from Washington. The difference with Moscow is over tactics, not strategy; this was pointed up clearly during the FMLN offensive last fall, with the Kremlin opposed to providing support and the Cubans insistent on reserving the right to give it. At the strategic level, however, both Moscow and Havana agree that negotiated solutions are eminently desirable in El Salvador, as elsewhere. Whatever Castro may think of Gorbachev's internal reforms, he does not disagree with the Soviet leader's emphasis on peaceful solutions to regional conflicts. Gorbachev has rejected export of revolution as a policy, but so for all practical purposes has Castro. It is simply not correct to say that he refuses to give up this commitment. Castro will, of course, always insist that he is a revolutionary, and the Cuban Constitution requires Havana to express solidarity with national liberation movements. But how such sentiment is expressed is the crucial question, and if viewed from this perspective, Cuba's position is little different from that of other members of the Nonaligned Movement, all of whom, according to the criteria for membership, must demonstrate sympathy for national liberation movements. As José Viera, a senior member of the Cuban Foreign Ministry, explained in 1987, "how Cuba indicates its solidarity will depend upon a case-by-case analysis and often will take the form of statements expressing moral support, or of votes for solidarity resolutions in the United Nations. These do not in any way violate international norms. Indeed, however Cuba elects to articulate its solidarity with national liberation movements, it will always act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the norms of international law."2 One may argue that Havana is not always so fastidious. The provision of material assistance to the Salvadoran guerrillas, for example, even if only in marginal quantities, would violate international norms. But it is one thing to violate the law and another to hold oneself above it. Cuba may be guilty of the first but not of the second. It does not claim a "right" to export revolution. And in sometimes skirting international law, it is hardly alone. The United States for years backed the contras in their efforts to overthrow the government of Nicaragua—a government that Washington recognized and with which it maintained full

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diplomatic relations. That, too, was a violation of international norms, one deemed so serious that it was eventually condemned by the World Court. The United States has also supported guerrillas seeking to unseat established governments in Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia. The political rationale for such policies may or may not be sound. The point in raising these cases is not to argue the question one way or the other; it is simply to suggest that Cuba may feel as justified in assisting insurgents in El Salvador as does the US in various other countries. That still leaves El Salvador as a contentious matter between Washington and Havana. However, the best way to resolve this disagreement is through a negotiated political settlement, not by striking aggrieved poses and issuing unilateral demands. Indeed, discussions that included Cuba could have been especially useful in Central America. When in February 1989 the Soviet Union suspended all military shipments to Nicaragua (having already ceased assistance of any kind to the guerrillas in El Salvador), Moscow stressed that a true and lasting solution to the arms-supply question could only come about as the result of mutual restraint and agreement. It called for multilateral negotiations—which would include the United States—to reach such accords. The Bush administration was not interested. For its part, Havana promised Moscow in 1989 that no weapons it received through Soviet aid programs would be transshipped to irregular forces in Central America. It also stated that it was continuing military assistance to the Sandinistas in the absence of US assurances of respect for Nicaraguan sovereignty. At the same time, however, Havana indicated to Washington that it was willing to discuss the whole arms-supply question, either bilaterally or in a multilateral forum, with a view to working out an accommodation acceptable to all sides. Again, the Bush administration was not interested—or, in any event, never responded to the Cuban demarche. And yet, the United States certainly wished to halt the flow of weapons into the area, especially any that might have been going to the Salvadoran guerrillas. The discovery in November 1989 of ground-to-air missiles aboard a plane that crashed in El Salvador after taking off from Nicaragua gave new urgency to that objective, even though the missiles in question turned out not to have been manufactured in the Soviet Union, as the State Department at first asserted. But if the point was to halt the arms flow, the methods tried by the Reagan and Bush administrations over an entire decade had little effect. A multilateral diplomatic effort to limit all outside involvement and provide means of international verification might have been far more effective. Unfortunately, it was never tried. To a large extent, the whole issue is now moot. Thanks to a cooperative initiative that was pursued—the Central American peace plan launched by then-President Óscar Arias of Costa Rica—elections were

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held in Nicaragua on February 26,1990, and were won by an opposition coalition led by Violeta Chamorro. The Sandinistas accepted the outcome and, with some stops and starts, peacefully turned power over to the new government, which is strongly pro-Western and has no interest in maintaining military ties with the Soviet Union or Cuba. Although the Central American peace plan is working, new steps are needed to continue the momentum. The Central American states ought now to encourage both sides in El Salvador toward a negotiated settlement that addresses socioeconomic inequities and political repression as well as the need for the guerrillas to lay down their arms. Cuba should be engaged in the exercise—at least to the extent of securing its commitment to refrain scrupulously from interference in El Salvador's internal affairs and to respect the outcome of the bargaining. This is feasible, especially if Havana is urged by the Latin American community to undertake such obligations. What the United States has not yet learned is that, rather than simply protest Cuba's actions, it is more important to engage Havana in the diplomatic process so as to change its behavior. Cuba has consistently indicated its readiness to come to the negotiating table—in other words, to begin that diplomatic process. Washington has just as consistently refused. That is a strange reaction if the US government is genuinely interested in resolving the question of Havana's "interventionist" policies in the hemisphere.

Reduction of Cuban-Soviet Ties One of the most basic US objectives with respect to Cuba was to reduce the Kremlin's presence and influence there, and especially to undermine Cuban-Soviet military ties. Moscow insists that it will not abandon Havana. Even so, economic dislocations at home have resulted in painful shortfalls in Soviet deliveries. The trend in Cuban-Soviet trade will almost certainly be downward. Indeed, it can be said in general that never have the two been so amenable to moderating their traditionally strong ties. This is not only because of a distinct lack of affinity between Castro and Gorbachev; more basically, it results from the fact that each side has less and less to gain from the relationship. Moscow may once have seen Cuba as a model for other Latin Americn states and as confirmation that a socialist future was possible in the region, but, having retired from the revolution business, it no longer has any real interest in that notion. It might not even welcome the emergence of other socialist states in Latin America and certainly would not pay their bills. The Cuban developmental paradigm, depending as it does upon large-scale infusions of Soviet

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assistance, has thus become virtually irrelevant. Havana is of sharply declining military value to the Kremlin. There are no Soviet missiles, bombers, or nuclear weapons of any kind on the island. Russian submarines carrying nuclear missiles do not operate from Cuban ports; none has even entered a Cuban harbor since 1974. The USSR does operate a large electronic surveillance station at Lourdes, just outside Havana. At the moment that facility is a vital means of monitoring Washington's compliance with arms-control agreements. But as U S Soviet détente—and trust—deepen, and should the two countries work out other verification arrangements, Lourdes could in time become superfluous. As for the deployment of Cuban troops to Third World trouble spots, which in the past has often served Soviet interests, this too has become an anachronism. Future interventions would likely damage Gorbachev's reform effort at home and his diplomatic offensive abroad. Nor would such interventions enhance Havana's image in the Nonaligned Movement, which has become increasingly centrist. Indeed, as one analyzes Cuba's foreign policy goals, one might conclude that Havana's links with the Soviets have become a net political detriment. Castro, who is no longer the outcast of the hemisphere and in fact is now poised to play a larger role within it, could well find his association with the Kremlin an impediment to realizing that aspiration. Similarly, Havana's Moscow connection calls into question the legitimacy of its credentials as a nonaligned state, which will be a continuing liability in Fidel's quest for a preeminent leadership position in the Movement. That Castro fully understands this and has attempted to shift his position accordingly is evidenced by the fact that at the 1979 Nonaligned Movement Summit Conference in Havana he dropped the whole idea of a natural alliance between the USSR and the nonaligned nations and has not tried to promote it since. Yet, despite Havana's declining value to the Soviet Union and despite the obvious differences of opinion and style between Gorbachev and Castro, the Kremlin does not appear prepared simply to abandon its Caribbean ally. The Kremlin is not even trying to force the Cubans to conform; instead it has generally adopted the same hands-off attitude that it has displayed concerning developments elsewhere in what was formerly the socialist bloc, as exemplified by its reaction to events in Eastern Europe. Moscow wants Cuba to make better use of Soviet economic assistance, but it will not insist on perestroika as the means to that end. Why this continuing, although declining, commitment to Cuba? There are essentially three reasons. First, as already noted, Havana remains an important link in the Soviet intelligence chain. Second, Cuba really costs the USSR very little. Although an aid figure of some $5.5 billion a year is

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frequently cited, careful scrutiny reveals that more than 70 percent of that figure consists of subsidies for Cuban sugar. Moscow acquires sugar at a price set well above the going world market rate, with the difference being counted as a subsidy. But this outlay exists only on paper. The Kremlin does not pay in hard cash; rather, it extends credits against which Havana acquires Soviet goods—goods that often could not be disposed of elsewhere. Thus, at minimal real cost, Moscow is granted access to the installation at Lourdes plus a guaranteed supply of Cuban sugar, nickel, and citrus products. Some would call it a bargain. Finally, despite its present difficulties, the USSR remains a great power not without pride. It is therefore unlikely to withdraw its support from an ally of thirty years' standing without clear assurances that the United States will not take advantage of the situation. But Washington has done the very opposite; it has raised tensions to their highest level since 1962 and has acted in such a way as to suggest that it might indeed exploit any cracks in Havana's security shield. What is clear, then, is that while much has changed on the CubanSoviet front, any significant disengagement on Moscow's part hinges on stabilization of the US-Cuban relationship. Soviet diplomats are emphatic on that score. Their country may wish to cut back on aid to Havana, they say, but it will continue normal weapons replenishment and upgrading so long as there is some clear threat to the island from Washington. The recent transfer to the Cuban air force of a number of MiG-29 aircraft is a case in point. The United States protested this transaction, calling it provocative and unnecessary. The Cubans and the Soviets, however, point to Washington's unchanged posture on Havana as prima facie evidence that it was indeed justified. As one Soviet diplomat put it recently, "Cuba seems to be such an emotional issue in the United States that we never know what [Washington] might do. If one listens to the rhetoric [in Washington], one must assume that direct military action against Cuba is not excluded—especially not in the wake of [the US] invasion of Panama." So while Moscow's need for the Lourdes facility and its wish not to disrupt the island's economy rule out any immediate Soviet withdrawal, were it not for continuing US inflexibility a significant scale-down leading eventually to the end of the Soviet-Cuban alliance as we have come to know it for the past thirty years might be possible. This should be welcomed by all three sides of the triangle—Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Havana would have more latitude to articulate an independent foreign policy within its natural milieu, the Third World; the Kremlin's costs, risks, and responsibilities would be lessened; and Washington would certainly be more comfortable with a reduced Soviet presence so near its shores. But all that is impeded by present US policy.

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Increased Respect for Human Rights In the area of human rights there has been progress—on some issues quite a lot, on others little at all. Freedom of the press, free elections, and the free expression of dissent remain either unknown or severely limited in Cuba. Most political prisoners, on the other hand, have been paroled, and conditions in the island's prisons have improved dramatically as a result of reforms initiated in the mid-1970s. The Carter administration helped bring about the largest release of political prisoners. Guided by the assumption that they could accomplish more by discussing the matter than by making demands, Carter officials began conversations in 1978 that led eventually to freedom for almost five thousand political detainees. Over the past decade most of those remaining have been let go at the behest of such figures as Cardinal John O'Connor, Senator Edward Kennedy, Jacques Cousteau, and Jesse Jackson. By the end of 1989 fewer than three hundred political prisoners remained behind bars. Until recently there were other encouraging developments in the area of human rights. Beginning in the mid-1980s independent human rights organizations were grudgingly permitted to operate on the island. Members of Americas Watch, the Red Cross, and the US Congress were given access to Cuban peniteniaries and allowed to interview inmates, both common criminals and political prisoners. And in late 1988 Castro accepted the visit of a UN inspection team. As with negotiations in southern Africa, Havana thought that progress on the human rights front might help lay the groundwork for improved relations with the United States. When it did not, something of a retreat or crackdown began that by the summer of 1990 resulted in the arrest of most human rights leaders and, ironically for an ally of Moscow, in the banning of the Soviet publications Sputnik and Moscow News. It would be wrong to argue that the Bush administration's rejection of any thaw in US-Cuban relations caused this crackdown. A more immediate cause was doubtless Castro's wish to warn that glasnost would not be tolerated in Cuba. Washington's intransigence did, however, remove an important incentive to continue movement in the right direction. Members of the nongovernmental Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation told me during a visit in April 1990 that such hard-line stances against Havana were decidedly counterproductive in terms of advancing the cause of human rights. As one of them explained, "So long as [this policy] continues, there will be no space for groups such as ours to operate." Of course, no omission on the part of the Bush administration excuses

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the imprisonment of human rights activists. As Castro's fears of encirclement have grown, he has lashed out in an almost irrational way at anything resembling a dissident voice. He must come to understand that there are international norms that must be respected—not because the United States says so but because the global community demands it.

Moving the Goal Posts To review, then: the Bush administration's claim that Castro's policies had not changed was simply unfounded. Cuban troops were already coming out of Africa; Havana had moderated its position in Latin America and offered to negotiate the whole question of arms supply in Central America; dramatic reductions in the island's Soviet ties had become an open possibility, were it not for new tensions in US-Cuban relations; and finally, Havana had improved its record in the human rights field (though later a crackdown unfortunately occurred). In the final analysis, whether or not Havana's positions had changed probably mattered little. The Bush administration, it seems, did not wish to enter into negotiations and certainly did not wish to allow any thaw in relations. Denying that Cuban policies had changed was a means of justifying its refusal to explore the possibilities for any détente. Even had Havana addressed all four areas of US concern beyond any shadow of a doubt, other caveats would have been found. In other words, the goal posts would have been moved. Indeed, as 1989 turned into 1990 the Bush administration began to do just that, for the world situation was undergoing an almost astounding metamorphosis and the old conditionalities were no longer persuasive. If overseas issues had been at the core of professed US misgivings, the Soviet connection was at the epicenter. The presence of Cuban troops in Africa might have been viewed as an unimportant distraction had it not been for Havana's friendship with Moscow. Likewise, had the Cubans not been in the socialist camp, Washington might have been more relaxed about their activities in Latin America. And while the island itself could not threaten the US, Soviet weaponry positioned there conceivably could do so. Thus, the United States tended to assess Cuba's international agenda solely within the context of its global competition with the Kremlin. At least, it did so until the latter part of 1989. At that point it apparently concluded that the Russian threat was no longer a binding glue for its Cuba policy. No wonder; by then the Cold War was clearly over. Gorbachev had pronounced the World Revolution to be at an end. Soviet foreign policy was no longer to be based on concepts of class struggle, but rather on the "universality" of mankind and on the need for peace and an international rule of law. Although it will take years for Washington and Moscow to

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develop a trusting relationship and to dismantle the nuclear arsenals they have had pointed at one another over the past four decades, they are now moving to do just that. Thus, the old view that a potential threat to US security resided in the very warp and woof of the Cuban-Soviet relationship becomes obsolete. If the Kremlin has respected the 1962 KennedyKhrushchev Understanding all these years (i.e., by not repositioning offensive weaponry in Cuba), certainly it will continue to do so now. Indeed, Moscow has already gone well beyond the provisions of that understanding, one example being its obvious disinterest (as part of its retreat from the whole concept of World Revolution) in extending material or even moral support to Latin American insurgents. If Cuba has continued such efforts on a limited scale in, say, El Salvador, it has done so on its own, not as a surrogate of the Soviet Union. In sum, rather than being at the core of US concerns with respect to Cuba, the island's relationship with the USSR has taken on an entirely different, a benign, even a positive coloration. Instead of seeing, or professing to see, the Russian bear as dangerous, Washington is now insisting that Havana accept the Kremlin's advice, that it follow Gorbachev's lead by instituting reforms along the lines of perestroika and glasnost. In other words, Soviet influence is now seen as good, not bad. Clearly implicit in the US position over the years was the thought that if what was perceived as the threatening nature of a nearby Soviet presence were somehow muted (either through dissolution of the HavanaMoscow link or the evolving nature of the Soviet Union itself), the way might then be open for dramatically improved relations between the United States and Cuba. That has now happened. The alliance has not been dissolved, but because of changes in the USSR itself and in its foreign policy, it has become unthreatening. One would expect, then, a relaxation on the part of the United States. The way ought to be open to that improvement in relations that Washington always said was blocked by the Soviet factor in the equation. Quite the opposite has happened, however. Washington has raised tensions and has put forward a new and very different set of conditions for improving relations with Havana. Speaking on March 19, 1990, President Bush departed from the rule of all past presidents and demanded changes solely in Cuba's internal arrangements, rather than in its foreign policies, as the price for normalization. What the US now wants to see, Mr. Bush insisted, is: the establishment of a freemarket economy (i.e., by extension, the abolishment of the socialist system); the holding of free elections; and a reduction of the country's armed forces.3 Why the shift? Essentially, because the United States has come to believe that it may now be possible to achieve what had been its maximum goal—indeed, one that until now had been placed at the extreme edge of

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the possible—that is, the end of socialism and of the Castro regime in Cuba. Washington has never been prepared to bargain seriously with Havana, and certainly not on the basis of mutual respect. It has not, in short, been willing even to consider an accommodation acceptable to both sides. Perhaps Cuba is too emotional an issue for that to have been feasible. The controlling image for most US political leaders has been one of a tiny nation that used to be a US protectorate but that for thirty years has defied Washington and gotten away with it. Nothing is more likely than that to induce irrationality in a superpower. In addition, the Bush administration is strongly influenced by the most ultra-conservative elements in the Cuban-US community. The very thought of negotiating with Castro is anathema to these people and thus also to the Bush administration. Still, Washington might have been prepared to accept a Castro who could be viewed as "tamed." It was not enough, for example, that he be willing to compromise on the question of supplying arms to Central America. Rather, he would have been required to halt any activities without corresponding moves from the US side. And that would have been true across the board. Only a Castro who had retired behind the beach barricades of his own island—a Castro who had in effect given up his foreign policy, his so-called internationalism—might have been acceptable. Now, not even that is enough. With the fall of Communist governments in Eastern Europe, the defeat of the Sandinistas at the polls, and the reform even of the Marxist-Leninist system in the Soviet Union, the United States has been encouraged to think Cuba may be the next domino to fall. Issues related to Havana's foreign policy, and to human rights, have thus been put aside in favor of the end of socialism itself. Is even this a serious bargaining position? Assuming that Cuba moved in the direction of a market economy and agreed to hold fully democratic elections, would the Bush administration then favor a thaw with the Castro government—assuming for a moment that the latter won those elections? Probably not; inclusion of the last condition—is the reduction of Cuba's armed forces before there can be any accommodation with the United States—strongly suggests that these demands also were designed as nonstarters. It is, after all, totally unrealistic to ask Havana to reduce its defenses without assuarances that Washington will not take advantage of the situation, a guarantee that the White House obviously has not the slightest intention of giving. The latest Bush package, then, seems to be in keeping with the timeworn practice of putting forward impossible prerequisites for discussions—since, in fact, the United States does not wish to negotiate with Cuba. It simply wants what would amount to Havana's capitulation. This may have tragic consequences. A Castro who is given no way out, who is backed into a corner, is likely to be a very dangerous

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adversary indeed. Cuba is not Romania. Popular disgruntlement is growing, but a significant percentage of the population now supports and probably will continue to support Castro. Should internal pressures reach a moment of critical mass at some point in the future, it would likely be with a deeply polarized society and with the armed forces also divided. One would then have all the ingredients for an appalling bloodbath. Meanwhile, the world has turned upside down, and the U S - S o v i e t Cuban equation with it. It is no longer the Russian threat that impedes a relaxation of tensions between the United States and Havana. That problem has disappeared. But, in a rather strange inversion of the equation, it is now Cuba itself that is portrayed as the danger—and as a major impediment to US-Soviet détente. On a number of occasions the Bush administration has suggested that continuing assistance to Havana indicates a residual aggressiveness on Moscow's part that makes it difficult to establish full rapport. 4 Although it is manifestly in the interest of the United States to see Gorbachev and his reforms succeed in the Soviet Union, the Bush administration, at least as of the July 1990 Houston Economic Summit, was reluctant to provide any concrete aid to that effort on grounds that ongoing Russian support for Cuba rendered it an "incompatibility." 5 What will be the Kremlin's response? Given the growing turmoil in that country, no one can predict the future with any certainty or precision. Despite the fact that its assistance to Havana costs the U S S R very little, the popular perception in the Soviet Union is that it represents a heavy drain on already overtaxed resources. That is the political reality with which Moscow must deal, that is, of a growing demand for the lessening of that aid. Thus, whatever Mikhail Gorbachev's own wishes and calculations may be, Soviet-Cuban ties could be subject to drastic reductions over the next f e w years. That is a distinct possibility. But even should it work out that way, what is a certainty is that present U S policy will have impeded rather than encouraged such reductions. Ironically, while bringing about Moscow's withdrawal from Cuba used to be a top-priority item for Washington, the current U S agenda seems designed to force the Soviets to stay on as long as possible and to see to it that any change on the island takes place under the most difficult and bloodiest circumstances. T h e stage is set for a Greek tragedy.

Notes 1. See the text in The Miami Herald, August 17,1989. 2. As stated to a US delegation visiting Havana in November 1987. 3. Gil Klein, "Bush Lays Down His Conditions for Normal Relations With

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Cuba," The Washington Times, March 20,1990. 4. See Martin McReynolds, "Soviet Support for Cuba Still Irritant for US," The Miami Herald, April 10,1990, p. 8A. 5. See The Washington Times, July 6,1990, p. A9.

Part Two CUBA'S RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD

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6 Cuba and Africa: Thirty Years of Solidarity Armando Entralgo González David López González

In the US and in other parts of the Western world Cuban policy on Africa has often been criticized. Over the past decade and a half especially, numerous official statements, academic studies, and the media have tended to distort Havana's objectives and the impact of its actions on Africa. From a quick review of the abundant Western literature on the subject, several common misperceptions emerge. The first one is that Cuba's policy on Africa is a "disproportionate" one, the underlying assumption being that Cuba, a small Third World country with limited means, should not undertake actions comparable to that of a great power. But as the record of nonaligned meetings prove, there seems to be no concern—quite the contrary—among other underdeveloped countries in different continents with respect to Havana's African policies. A second hypothesis is that Cuba's connections in Africa were abnormal from the start because they were inconsistent with its historical role as a purely Latin American state operating solely within Washington's traditional hemispheric realm of influence. Therefore Havana's strong presence in Africa was seen as unnatural and even disruptive. Moreover, Cuban policy on Africa was misrepresented as purely "reactive," stemming from its "isolation" in the Western Hemisphere. Again, a simple review of the record during thirty years of undertakings easily demonstrates that Cuba's links with Africa since 1959 have been consistent with respect to Havana's foreign policies and continued regardless of the conjunctural state of its relations with Latin America or other regions of the world. The final misrepresentation with which we will deal is a corollary of a sort, flowing from the two assumptions previously pointed out. If Cuba's African policy is regarded as "disproportionate," "antinatural," "reactive," and "disruptive," then, as its critics simplistically conclude, it is pursued in the framework of interests other than Cuba's, in the framework of a total policy decided elsewhere. In other words, it is not perceived as an independent policy, but rather as a policy closely associated with the interests of the USSR. This "dependency" corollary, however, quickly lost

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ground in the light of evidence appearing in the latter half of the 1970s. But in the late 1980s it reappeared with force from a different perspective—interpretations that Havana was "forced" by the USSR to accept the terms of the Agreements on Southwestern Africa or claims that it should align its African and other policies to the "new mentality" of Soviet foreign policy are both sustained on the same unproven dependency assumptions. A comparison of declarations and actions of thirty years of revolutionary Cuba's African policy would be most enlightening. Such an exercise allows for the formulation of the hypothesis that actions have been consistent with the principles that have been enunciated, and that the latter have remained valid from 1959 to the present time. This does not mean that adjustments or adaptations to particular circumstances have not been introduced, but that on the whole Cuban official statements with regard to Africa for the past thirty years show an evident pattern of consistency in every aspect of policymaking. Links between Cuba and Africa are about to enter their fifth century, being almost as ancient as the ties between the island and Europe. During that span of time human contacts were so intense that African culture contributed significantly to the formation of Cuban culture and to the integration of the Cuban nation as well. Nonetheless, prior to 1959 relations between Cuba and Africa were quite limited during the twentieth century. A hasty conclusion to be drawn, then, is that intense relations henceforth are a combined product of the cultural background on the one hand and the massive decolonization of Africa between 1957 and 1960 on the other. But evidence seems to point in a different direction, since Latin America—including those Latin countries with a heavy black influence— established insignificant relations with Africa in the 1960s and even in the 1970s. If we recall that those Latin American countries had an orientation similar to that of Cuban governments prior to 1959 and that the official Latin American world—with the exception of Cuba—was comparatively late in adhering to the Nonaligned Movement, we begin to find the clues leading to a more objective answer. What motivated the development of intense relations with Africa after 1959 was the nature of Cuban foreign policy, the principles on which it is based, and the receptiveness that it encountered throughout a continent that was regaining its political independence but still suffered the effects of several centuries of colonial rule. Going back to the question of continuity and consistency of Cuba's African policy, it would be convenient briefly to summarize and review its underlying general principles, the characteristics of its much ignored civilian cooperation programs, and the circumstances in which its military presence occurs. The principles of Havana's policy toward Africa are clearly put forward in many fundamental documents of the Cuban

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Revolution. They can be summarized as follows: 1. Denunciation of colonialism and support for national liberation struggles: for example, from the first statements by the new representative of the revolutionary government to the United Nations in 1959, Cuba's solidarity with the cause of the Algerian patriots was made evident. Moreover, Havana repeatedly condemned the Portuguese colonial presence during the entire period of its existence. 2. Denunciation of institutionalized racism in southern Africa in the form of apartheid in South Africa, its extension to Namibia, and its expression in the Rhodesian regime: Havana's support for the nationalist movements in the three countries was made known early on. 3. Denunciation of the neocolonial policy of the leading capitalist powers in Africa: this principle has been applied with regard to the firm solidarity with Patrice Lumumba's cause and with the countries of the Casablanca Group since its inception in 1961. The Cuban revolutionary government identified this group of countries as the most committed to the struggle for real decolonization and for positive nonalignment. 4. Support for antiimperialist unity among African states: this solidarity contributed to the the creation, in 1963, of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), whose main goal was to eradicate powerful colonial-racist remnants and neocolonial interference. These aims were consistent with those of the Cuban revolutionary government, and Havana therefore offered active and unlimited support for African unity regardless of the OAU's limitations (particularly in its first years of existence). 5. Establishment of diplomatic relations and mutually beneficial collaboration with any member of the OA U, irrespective of its political regime: relations were first established with the governments of the Casablanca Group and later with Congo-Brazzaville and Tanzania. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, in conjunction with the search for converging interests worldwide, diplomatic ties and collaborative links were developed with a considerable number of countries that were very active in the United Nations and in the Nonaligned Movement. It must be remembered that during all these years Cuba lacked, and still lacks, the capacity that would allow it great volumes of commercial exchange or financing for large-scale projects with its African counterparts. However, in connection with the principles previously stated, the revolutionary government developed an increasingly strong policy of cooperation (referred to in Cuban terms as proletarian internationalism). While the military aspect of Havana's collaboration with the African countries—and particularly the presence of its troops—monopolized the attention of Western mass media from 1975 on, civilian aid has been more

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continuous and extensive than its military counterpart in terms of its economic worth, the variety of its forms, and the growing number of beneficiary countries. The main characteristics of Cuban civilian collaboration are: 1. Concentration

in specialties in which Cuba has achieved

notable

progress, essentially health and education: Havana sent its first group of doctors and other health personnel to Africa (specifically, to Algeria) in 1963. Since then, civilian collaboration has expanded and diversified. But health and education continue to be the two favored spheres. In the 1980s the number of African scholarship students in Cuba exceeded thirteen thousand, a substantial number in absolute terms and even more so relative to the island's total population. 2. Grants without profit motive or conditionality:

the departure of the

first Cuban doctors for Algeria occurred just when the exodus of this professional group from the island forced the new revolutionary government to stretch its resources while launching its domestic projects to increase mass access to these services. That being so, this aid was intended as an act of solidarity having a positive local impact; it was not designed as a revenue-generating arrangement, nor was it an attempt to place excess personnel abroad. Havana's civilian collaboration was generally offered free of charge until 1977. In 1978 it began to charge modest sums for some of these programs (mainly to oil-exporting countries whose incomes gave them ability to pay). But the essential principle was not altered. Most African countries, which suffer from serious economic problems, continued to receive assistance free of charge. In general the host government covers the Cuban technicians' lodging and food expenses and gives them a modest per diem fee. The living conditions of these internationalists are much more austere than those of typical foreign technicians; therefore the host country can afford them more easily. At the beginning of the 1980s, when the economic crisis struck Africa hardest, most of the countries that were being charged small sums were given waivers. The most important case in terms of the amount of aid offered was Angola, which from 1983 on was again exempted from payment. Cuba's main gain from this type of collaboration lies essentially in the ideological and professional development of its specialists, because they face particularly difficult working conditions that they must overcome. 3. Ability

to respond quickly to urgent needs and to adapt to local

conditions: on occasion Havana's granting of civilian assistance even preceded the formal establishment of cooperative agreements, as was the case with Algeria (1963), Guinea-Conakry (1965), Congo-Brazzaville (second half of the 1960s), and Angola (1976), among others. Further-

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more, aspects such as the modest life-style of the Cuban cadres and the special programs adapted to the needs of the African students on Cuba's Isle of Youth point to the serious effort on Havana's part to adjust its collaboration to the requirements of the recipients. 4. Good local acceptance and compatibility in the spirit of South-South cooperation: the above-mentioned peculiarities have made Cuban cooperation very popular in Africa; local sources have often described it as an exemplary model of collaboration among developing countries. Nevertheless, much of the West's attention focused on the military aspect of the assistance. But here, too, it would be fitting to recall its origins and patterns of occurrence. The most common manifestation involved the training of African cadres. Sometimes this led to small numbers of Cuban advisors being posted on African soil. In truly unusual circumstances military collaboration has led to the dispatch of combat forces. Although their appearance in Algeria in 1963 to assist that country in its war with Morocco—the first example of this exceptional situation—did not give rise to much controversy, more than a decade later the provision of a similar kind of assistance, albeit of larger proportions, to the governments of Angola and Ethiopia remained in the headlines for several years. Regarding Angola, the nature and extent of Havana's commitment have been thoroughly explained from the Cuban perspective. Solidarity with the Angolans' revolution was built on the basis of a shared history of oppression, rebellion, and heroism. But an outstanding factor was the way in which African governments, as well as African public opinion, accepted both the amount and the nature of Cuban assistance. In general, this military support was perceived in Africa as an active example of the defense of the juridical principles contained in the U N Charter and reaffirmed in that of the OAU, especially the exercise of the right to self-determination and the protection of national sovereignty in the face of aggression against Angola by the South African racist regime. In the case of Ethiopia, which faced an invasion from Somalia in 1977-1978, some of the factors of the Angolan scenario were not present. But African objections were not raised in this instance either, owing to the fact that here another fundamental, very sensitive principle, peculiar to the OAU, was involved: that which precludes the use of force to change the borders inherited from colonialism. Of course, this does not include governments such as that of Somalia (feeling directly affected by Cuban actions) and others that contributed to the incorporation of some territory into Ethiopia. But the truth is that no significant objections were made, and pan-African sentiment readily and clearly accepted Havana's policies. In fact, the Cuban presence received important support, publicly stated, from governments ideologically quite distant from Cuba.

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The arrival of Cuban military contingents on African soil and their presence in Angola and Ethiopia for more than a decade allows for specific conclusions to be drawn concerning the circumstances in which such moves can take place and the principles governing them: 1. Such deployments can occur following the breakdown of negotiations or the violation of a pledge or an agreement by one of the parties, which then opts for a quick military victory, unlawfully crossing internationally recognized boundaries. Often, Havana's initiatives that make clear its commitment to encourage peaceful solutions have been ignored, even when these gestures may imply concessions on the part of friendly forces. 2. Cuba will reply favorably to the request of an African country only when that move has general support among the governments of the continent and has been accepted by the OAU. Respect for, and defense of, the objectives and principles of the OAU have been at the heart of Havana's concerns. 3. A Cuban presence develops only in response to situations involving other countries. Both the continued behavior pattern of its troops within the borders of the host country and the circumstantial fluctuations of the size of its contingent according to the situation prove the point. 4. The duration of Cuban forces' stay depends on the sovereign decision of the host government and does not in any way hinder continued negotiations between the conflicting parties who seek a lasting solution that will make said presence unnecessary. In all the cases of conflict in which a military presence has been maintained the host government has entered into negotiations of its choice—bilateral or multilateral, with or without Cuban participation—with a view to a definitive and honorable settlement for all parties involved. The recent evolution of the conflict in southern Africa, given its particular complexity, is probably the best example of this modus operandi. In the early 1980s the prospect for just solutions to the problem of Namibia and the generalized crisis in South Africa receded. From the viewpoint of Havana and the majority opposition forces in South Africa, as well as the OAU, the paralysis stemmed in good measure from the attempts to establish a link between the independence of Namibia and the presence of Cuban military forces in Angola, the first being conditioned on prior unilateral cessation of the second. Moreover, according to Havana and the African governments, the impasse was further complicated by the renewed and strong Western support for the South African regime and the considerable overt assistance granted to the Angolan counterrevolution after 1985, two matters in which the US government

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played a leading role. Taking stock of the most recent years, the crucial element to be considered when analyzing future prospects is the fact that, contrary to many Western predictions, the Front-Line States facing South Africa resisted pressure and acts of aggression of exceptional dimensions. Havana's response to this situation, while controversial in some quarters, enjoyed a growing endorsement in Africa and in other parts of the world. Even Western sources that initially criticized the "intransigence" of the Angolan and Cuban positions later conceded that the joint communiqués and common actions showed signs of "realism" and "flexibility," despite the fact that the principles underlying those policies remained unchanged. Some of the milestones on the road to the definition of common Angolan-Cuban positions bear this point out. After the signing of the Lusaka Accords between Angola and South Africa with the mediation of the United States (accords that were delayed repeatedly by Pretoria), a Cuban-Angolan joint communiqué was issued in March 1984. It stated the principles that could have served as a basis, at that stage, for a "negotiated, fair and honorable" agreement among all the parties. Negotiated, fair, and honorable are three key words to be taken into account to understand all the public positions taken by Havana before and after this date. However, shortly afterward, the resumption of the arms supply to U N I T A by the United States stopped the talks that had been going on for many months between Washington and Luanda. Subsequently, just when Angola and Cuba were compelled to reinforce their military defenses because of the increase in South African acts of aggression, the two governments formed a joint delegation, which participated in talks in Luanda with a US team on January 28 and 29,1988. According to the editorial published in Cuba's daily newspaper Granmal Angola and Cuba maintained that the indispensable conditions for a settlement were: • The cessation of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Angola (which was expressed in US and South African logistical aid to UNITA) • The withdrawal of South African forces that had systematically raided Angola • Implementation of Resolution 435 of the U N Security Council that called for Namibia's independence • International guarantees that there will be no more attacks on Angola The editorial went on to note that, upon reaching an agreement on these points, Havana and Luanda would be prepared to implement a "timetable

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for a gradual withdrawal of the Cuban internationalist contingent until all our combatants are repatriated." As in other statements that elaborated on the Cuban positions, the editorial added that these are based on international law, on the UN Charter, and on successive UN Security Council resolutions. However, numerous ambiguities still remained with regard to the positions of other actors involved in the conflict, thereby giving rise to a good number of doubts about the prospects for a quick negotiated peace accord. Toward late 1986 and early 1987 there were indications that some type of revision in Washington's stance was under way that might later facilitate the resumption of talks in the search for a settlement. It remained to be seen, however, whether this change of attitude was sufficiently widespread in US policymaking circles (even assuming that the shift reflected something more than a characteristic posture of a government nearing its end). With this perspective in mind, Luanda and Havana waited to see whether US diplomacy could at this time take the initiative and make decisive progress along the difficult road to an agreement in the few months remaining in Ronald Reagan's presidency. Such doubts were reinforced by Pretoria's intransigence. Toward the end of 1987, when preparations were being made for a dialogue between the joint Angolan-Cuban and US delegations, the South African army launched an attack deep into Angolan territory. This was undoubtedly the most important act of aggression since 1976. In addition, in an unprecedented action, high officials of the apartheid regime for the first time confirmed that their intention was to block an imminent UNITA military defeat. These events seriously threatened progress in the negotiations that seemed about to begin. The massive South African invasion forced Angola and Cuba to proceed with a major reinforcement that increased the number of Cuban troops in Angola to approximately fifty thousand. It also meant the urgent deployment of advanced military technology to Angola. In the diplomatic field, South Africa jeopardized what remained of Washington's so-called constructive engagement policy, since its actions cast doubt on the presumed US ability to exercise a "moderating influence" on Pretoria. In the above-mentioned Granma editorial alternative scenarios were foreseen, in each of which the stances adopted by South Africa and the United States would be decisive. It observed that "the solution now depends, fundamentally, on the position adopted by the government of the United States" regarding noninterference in the internal affairs of Angola and the firmness with which it committed itself to a political solution. This proposition was based on the conviction that "South Africa could not defy the entire world community if the United States were to

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join in the unanimous demand for implementation of Resolution 435." The editorial does not rule out the possibility of Pretoria's seeking a military solution. This option, although latent, nevertheless posed a real threat that had to be taken into account. In such a scenario, however, the editorial predicted that the final outcome could very well be "the swan song of the odious apartheid regime," and for that reason it represented a much costlier risk for South Africa, "much more than what it would have to grant in order to find a negotiated solution, as has been urged upon" all the parties. The second scenario, according to the editorial, revolved around a negotiating process that would make unlikely the occurrence of the first. In line with the principles that have characterized nearly a quarter of a century of the Cuban Revolution's policy with respect to Africa, Havana stressed diplomacy as the only course of action that could lead to a satisfactory settlement for all the parties. With Cuba's many years of experience, based on excellent links with the African continent and with complete confidence in the future, the editorial concluded that "a solution in a relatively short time is, in reality, objectively possible." During the first months of 1988 the South African offensive against Cuito Cuanavale was stopped. Angolan, Cuban, and Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) troops carried out a counteroffensive that took their forces well to the south near the Namibian border. The reaction to these developments unleashed within South Africa itself was among the main reasons why Pretoria decided, for the first time, to try to negotiate a just and lasting agreement that would encompass all of southwestern Africa. The four-party discussions, begun in London in May 1988, ended with the signing of peace accords for southwestern Africa on December 22,1988, at UN headquarters in New York. These meetings were proof of the joint Cuban-Angolan delegation's willingness to negotiate in spite of "the deliberate hesitations and arrogant stands of the South Africans and, at times, of the inconsistencies of the mediator [the US government], an unmistakable ally of South Africa." 2 The speech of Isidoro Malmierca, Cuba's minister of foreign relations, at the signing of the Tripartite Agreement was especially clear when he referred to Havana's assessment of the importance of this settlement and the circumstances that had brought it about. He stated that "at long last it may be possible that the illegal occupation of Namibia may end and that this land may cease to be a South African colonial dependency and become instead a sovereign and independent country." Together with the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola, this creates "some of the fundamental bases to guarantee the security of the People's Republic of Angola and to permit the Angolan people to find the means and the

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ways to solve the conflicts that have led to a fratricidal war." 3 Days later, Fidel Castro expressed his views on these developments: "The most wonderful outcome is to have reached all the goals that we set for ourselves without shedding even one drop of blood beyond what was necessary in order to solve the difficult military situation that appeared at the end of the past year. Though great were the accomplishments of the Cuban internationalist troops and of the courageous Angolan fighters on the battlefields, great, too, were the accomplishments in the diplomatic realm." He went on: "We have negotiated seriously and we have reached a serious accord." 4 From Cuba's point of view, the signing of the Tripartite Agreement "successfully ends one of the most glorious pages" of Cuban history.5 In summary, for the Cubans, the return of their fifty thousand troops from Angola represents the successful culmination of what was a watershed event during the last thirty years of relations between the island and Africa. At the same time, it was a good opportunity to reaffirm the principles, objectives, and actions of Havana's policy on Africa. Cuban leaders have underlined that, once all the soldiers are back, "humanity will have witnessed the loyalty to principles that explain and encourage the policy of solidarity of the Cuban Revolution." 6 For Cubans, this aid "represented a modest but certain contribution to the struggle of the African peoples against colonialism, racism, and apartheid,"7 and, at the same time, the "opportunity to honor our debt with Black Africa, one of the roots of the Cuban nation." 8 Cuban loyalty to these principles determined the firm decision to remain on African soil for as long as was needed, actively helping to strengthen the sovereignty of a sister nation against foreign aggression. The same commitment to principle was evident in Cuba's unwavering readiness to search for lasting settlements to the complex conflicts by means of discussions "in close and creative brotherhood with the government of Angola, both acting fully independently and with the resolute will to favor a negotiated solution."9 This sustained, firm position eventually affected the "will of all parties" to the conflict—mainly South Africa and the United States—and thus was the indispensable element facilitating an agreement acceptable to all those participating in the deliberations. The Cuban government in particular rejects the versions that "grossly simplify what has happened, trying to present it as a simple understanding between the great powers, as if the rest of us were only the obedient implementors of their plans."10 In response to analyses that concluded that Havana wanted to perpetuate its presence in Angola and therefore presented the withdrawal of its troops as a "failure" of its alleged aspirations, Cuba's leaders have reiterated what they have invariably stated since 1975:

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We did not go to the People's Republic of Angola in search of economic benefits, nor to defend strategic interests to which, as a small Third World country, we cannot aspire. Cuba does not leave behind in that sister nation military bases or properties of any kind, or rights over Angola's riches. As we said twelve years ago, from Angola we will take only the love and the respect of its long-suffering and heroic people and the remains of the sons of the people of Cuba who fell defending Angola's sovereignty and integrity against external aggression and apartheid. 11

The Front-Line States, the OAU, the Nonaligned Movement, and other important international actors have understood and welcomed not only the actions carried out by Cuba in 1975, but also its policy on Africa in general. Thus, a growing number of countries are willing to accept Havana's offer, presented by its minister of foreign relations, Isidoro Malmierca, in the following terms: " W e will work without fail to achieve peace and security in southwestern Africa and in any other part of the world where we may make a contribution to the opening and the consolidation of the potential [for] independence and development for all the peoples without a nation. Toward those ends, we will be ready to work with all those prepared to undertake real and specific actions, in the absence of a search for hegemony and of the ambition to profit." 12 More than a year after the signing of the Agreements on Southwestern Africa, Havana has honored its commitments. In December 1989 nationwide ceremonies took place on the occasion of the return and reinterment of the remains of internationalist military and civilian personnel who, according to an early Cuban tradition, had originally been buried where they had fallen. The withdrawal of Havana's troops from Angola and the repatriation of military personnel continued as scheduled and in many instances was actually slightly ahead of the agreed timetable. Several attacks by UNITA inflicted fatal casualties, thereby causing a temporary halt for several weeks, beginning in late January 1990, in the scheduled return of Cuban military personnel. By late May, however, the withdrawals totaled 34,801, and by early June the figure had gone up to 34,883." The eighth meeting of the Joint Commission established by the Brazzaville Protocol in order periodically to review the implementation of the agreements of December 22,1988, was held in Havana on June 4, 1990, and was revealing with regard to Cuban attitudes vis-à-vis its commitments on African matters. The brief communiqué issued at the end of the meeting stated that Havana's representatives reported on the withdrawal of its troops from Angola in compliance with the Cuban-Angolan bilateral agreement. With respect to Washington's continued assistance to UNITA, on the other hand, the document established that "an

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exchange of opinions and views took place regarding statements of the Angolan delegation about the continuation of interference in its internal affairs."14 Ongoing US aid to UNITA and the related risk of new attacks by it on Cuban troops still stationed in Angola appeared to be the main concerns of the participants in the meeting. After the closing of the session, the Angolan vice-minister for foreign affairs, Venancio da Moura, and Alcibiades Hidalgo, member of the Cuban delegation to the eighth session, held a press conference in which the former declared that US interference in Angola's internal matters, a violation of principles and agreements established by the New York accords, should cease so that Washington could undertake "a more constructive role" in the region. Hidalgo, on the other hand, explained that Havana had stated at the meeting that the time lost during the one-month delay in its withdrawal (a consequence of UNITA assaults that produced a temporary halt in late January) could be recovered, and thus the deadlines foreseen for the third and fourth stages of the return of Cuban soldiers to their homeland might be met. He added, however, that this would be possible only if there were no renewed raids. Furthermore, he repeated the traditional Cuban conviction that when the Angolan people attain a solution to their internal conflicts, and, most important, when these really become internal ones, "we shall be truly on the road to lasting peace in Southern Africa." 15 Representatives of all parties in the eighth meeting publicly expressed an optimistic view on the outcome of discussions. US Under Secretary of State for Africa Herman Cohen expressed his satisfaction with the "moderation" that characterized the meeting.16 But perhaps the most significant part of his statements to the press was his assessment of Cuban attitudes. Mr. Cohen acknowledged that Havana was playing a constructive role in Africa, that "Cubans are honoring their commitments," and that the return of Cuban forces that had achieved their mission in Ethiopia was also a positive factor.17 By mid-1990 a number of analysts were suggesting that the return of Havana's troops stationed in Angola and Ethiopia, as well as other new factors emerging in the world, would have an unfavorable impact on Cuban-African relations, their bottom line being that the intensity of those ties would dramatically diminish in the near future. It is true that these ties will have to adapt to changing circumstances. But the record of creativity, of designing new and imaginative trends, allows us to predict that the firm solidarity established over three decades will not cease when it is most needed, and that the diverse factors uniting Cuba with African countries will find a base on which to continue toward new dimensions in the coming years.

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Notes 1. "¿Cuál sería la esencia de una solución negociada a los problemas de Angola y Namibia?" Granma, February 4,1988, p. 1. 2. "La historia de África será diferente antes y después de Cuito Cuanavale," Granma, December 23,1988, editorial on p. 2. 3. "Cuando el último combatiente internacionalista retorne a su patria, la humanidad habrá sido testigo del la lealtad a los principios que explican la política solidaria de la revolución cubana"; speech by Isidoro Malmierca, minister of foreign relations, in Granma, December 23,1988, p. 7. 4. "Efectuado el VIII pleno del Comité Central," Granma, December 16, 1988, p. 1. 5. Ibid. 6. "Cuando el último," p. 7. 7. "La historia de África," p. 2. 8. "Cuando el último," p. 7. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. "Militares cubanos regresan de Angola," TASS 072, Havana, June 2, 1990; and "Denuncia vicecanciller angolano injerencia de Estados Unidos en los asuntos internos de su país," Granma, 3d ed., June 5,1990, p. 2. 14. "Incorporado Namibia como miembro pleno de la Comisión Conjunta," Granma, 3rd ed., June 5,1990, p. 1. 15. "Denuncia vicecanciller angolano." 16. "Cuba reafirma que prosequirá su retiro de Angola," by Pascal Fletcher, Reuter, Havana, June 4,1990. 17. "Funcionario norteamericano reconoce papel de Cuba," PL-085; "Un fonctionnaire U.S. reconnaît le rôle positif de Cuba en Afrique," APS 137/107; "Estados Unidos rinde reconocimiento a Cuba," TANJUG, ORP 110, Havana, June 5,1990.

7 Cuba's International Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean: Toward a New Stage? Luis Suarez Salazar I am attempting here to analyze Cuban relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. In an earlier study four basic periods were indicated. 1 The first of these was termed the "reinsertion of Cuba in Latin America and the Caribbean" and included the period 1959 (year of the revolutionary victory) to 1962 (when the Castro government was expelled from the OAS after its political model was deemed "incompatible" with the bases of the inter-American system). The central characteristic of Havana's policy on the hemisphere at that time was the radical modification of its previously automatic alignment with the United States—a facet of behavior that had characterized Cuba's foreign affairs since its putative independence. The second period—which I had termed the period of official isolation of Cuba in the hemisphere—runs from 1962 to 1970. That period was characterized by the rupture of ties by Latin American and Caribbean nations—the sole exceptions being Mexico and Jamaica, who refused to recognize the validity of the OAS decision collectively to suspend diplomatic, economic, and cultural links with the island. Cuba's relations with the continent then largely revolved around two factors: the first entailed multiple nongovernmental actors (particularly those who desired to produce radical economic, social, and political transformations in their respective countries), while the other involved the question of dependency upon the United States (a phenomenon shared by the region's governments). From 1970 on, following the election of the Popular Unity government in Chile, this situation, while not diss /pearing completely, nevertheless did begin to change. This was due to »vo developments—shifts in the continental political scene and the creation of a constructive foreign policy by Havana. This led not only to the reestablishment of official relations with many countries and the modification (in 1975) of the 1964 OAS resolution, but also to the broadening of Cuban ties—despite ideological differences—with a variety of social and political actors in the hemisphere. This brief interregnum was bounded by the revolutionary victories in Grenada and Nicaragua in 1979, and by the celebration in Cuba—with 107

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unprecedented Latin American and Caribbean participation—of the Sixth Summit of the Nonaligned Movement. This period, lasting from 1970 to 1979, can be termed the stage of both the erosion of the economic blockade and the virtual end of the island's diplomatic isolation. As a result of these events, a process involving consolidation between Cuba and the region took place. Despite some setbacks (especially regarding Caribbean relations), the consolidation of Havana's ties with regional countries grew to such an extent that official Latin American requests for Cuba to be readmitted to the OAS were increasingly heard. Such a step would obviously imply a modification of the existing official anti-Cuban limitations, such as the 1962 dictates and the interpretation at that time of the so-called Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (also known as the Rio Treaty). For some time the political leadership in Havana received such suggestions with indifference, but by late 1988 (when he attended the presidential inauguration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari in Mexico) President Fidel Castro stated Cuba's disposition to return to the OAS if the countries of the region "considered it to be useful."2 This declaration should be seen in the context of other official visits by the Cuban president at that time. In August 1988 he visited Ecuador, and then Venezuela in February 1989, reiterating during the latter trip the points made in Mexico and encouraging the efforts at regional harmony undertaken by the Group of Eight. Developments such as these obviously prepared the way for a new stage of relations with Latin America and the Caribbean.3 The essential characteristics of this period would be the broadening of these ties and the eventual reintegration of Cuba into the OAS even if the remaining restrictions of the Rio Treaty were not applied.4 Subsequent events on the hemispheric and global stages have, however, cast a dark shadow on this promising scenario. The US invasion of Panama in December 1989 and the electoral defeat of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua in March 1990 have understandably had a negative impact on Cuba's relations in the hemisphere. Together with an increase in US hostility to the island, they incorporate new elements of tension in Havana's official and unofficial links with the continent. Consequently, there is an era of new possibilities, and of great challenges, facing Cuba in its regional relations.

Objectives and Bases of Cuban Policy There are several basic elements in Cuban policy that deserve attention:

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1. In both theory and practice, Cuban foreign policy on Latin A m e r i c a and the Caribbean strongly embraces the concept of latinoamericanismo and rejects that of panamericanismo—a notion dear to the dominant sector in the United States since the end of the nineteenth century and articulated in conjunction with that sector's Latin counterparts immediately after World War II. 2. Havana has called for unity, integration, and collaboration in Latin America and the Caribbean (latinoamericanismo), which implies the necessity to confront the problem of US hegemony over the continent and has as its ultimate goal the construction of a community of nations united in a common commitment to obtain the independent development of the region. Accordingly, during the past thirty years Cuba has encouraged all efforts designed to harmonize positions taken by the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean even when (as in the case of events organized by the Caribbean Community [CARICOM] and the Group of Eight) it was not invited to participate in them. 3. Since the revolutionary victory, Havana has devoted special attention to the task of promoting radical modifications in the patterns of dependency that serve to reinforce Washington's economic, political, ideological, and military domination over Latin America and the Caribbean. This has led Cuba to support all attempts by countries in the region to retain control over their natural resources and to encourage all actions by Third World nations in their efforts to develop a New International Economic Order. This commitment to eliminate the remnants of colonialism (in particular the situation of Puerto Rico and Panama), together with an energetic condemnation of any form of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the region's countries, has remained constant. 4. Havana's conviction that Latin America and the Caribbean have to base their development upon profound structural transformations (in economic, political, and social spheres) has led it to support all processes for change that it sees as benefiting the people of the region—regardless of their socialist character or lack thereof. This is important to note because, even though the Cuban experience has shown the viability of socialism as an alternative model, Havana's solidarity has not depended upon a similar approach. 5. Consistent with its view that the needs of the masses must be given priority, Cuba has supported the struggle of all social and political sectors in the hemisphere to overthrow reactionary dictatorships. Its position regarding the coalition that brought about the electoral defeat of Augusto Pinochet in Chile (and its respect for the government of Patricio Aylwin) is essentially the same as that adopted in the similar cases of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay (and likewise will be applied when appropriate

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to its relations with Paraguay and Haiti). 6. Havana has historically expressed its solidarity with all the peoples of Latin America who are committed to programs of change of a democratic, revolutionary, and antiimperialist nature. This sentiment has, however, been greatly misunderstood—being widely presented as a "messianic" obsession to "export" its Revolution. Such interpretations are ignorant of the fact that revolutions simply cannot be exported, but rather arise from the development of specific internal contradictions in each country. Overlooked in the process are the limitations on military aid to which Cuba is subjected as well as the predominantly civilian nature of its assistance. The dozens of Cuban military advisors who worked in Nicaragua, for example, are often mentioned by Havana's detractors, while the many thousands of Cubans who worked in the educational, public health, and construction fields are routinely ignored. Similarly, in Grenada it was the twenty-eight Cuban military advisors—and not the contingent of construction workers, teachers, and medical staff who contributed to the socioeconomic development of that small Caribbean island—upon whom media attention was focused at the time of the US military invasion. 7. Such fraternal ties with those interested in revolutionary change in Latin America and the Caribbean have not, however, impeded Havana from maintaining cordial relations with all the governments of Latin America and the Caribbean who—independently of their political, economic, or social system—observe norms of mutual respect and nonintervention between nations and have adopted a fair attitude to Cuba. Cuba's relations with Mexico and the Argentine military dictatorship are two examples of this phenomenon. In some circumstances, when the conflictive nature of the internal process could place in doubt Havana's observance of the norms of international law or principles of mutual respect, it has refrained from formalizing relations. Perhaps the clearest illustration here was Cuba's position in the face of the favorable gestures taken by President Virgilio Barco of Colombia to prepare the way for the reestablishment of diplomatic ties. Although Havana retained channels of dialog with his government (as had been the case with his predecessor, Belisario Betancur), it did not accept the Colombian proposals for reestablishing official relations. 8. The lack of diplomatic recognition has not, however, been an obstacle to the development of official types of relationships between Cuba and several nations in the region—as has been the case with Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and most recently, Jamaica. Moreover, Havana has extended humanitarian aid as a form of basic human solidarity to a variety of countries facing natural disasters. Assistance was, for instance, given to Peru at the time of its 1970 earthquake and to Somoza's

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111

Nicaragua after the 1972 earthquake. (The continued—and badly needed—help provided to Nicaragua during the Chamorro presidency is but the latest example of such internationalist programs.) 9. Despite the aggression that has surrounded US-Cuban ties and the confrontational nature of the island's relations with Latin America in the 1960s, Havana has always expressed its disposition to seek negotiated, political solutions to conflicts in the region. 10. For Cuba, the struggle for peace is the most important task in the current international context. It rejects, however, anything that might suggest that the policy of peaceful coexistence—the "new thinking" in international relations—between states or indeed between superpowers with opposing social systems, should lead to the division of the world into "zones of influence." Nor does Cuba accept that this peaceful coexistence at the intergovernmental level should be equated with coexistence between exploiters and the exploited. Finally, Havana cannot condone the idea that, in order to reach a negotiated settlement on so-called regional conflicts, nations should be denied the right to choose their own independent form of political, economic, and social development. 11. Finally, both in theory and in practice Cuban foreign policy has insisted that an indissoluble relationship has to exist between world peace and the development of countries in the so-called Third World.

Present Relations and Future Perspectives Without any doubt, the consistency of Cuba's hemispheric policies (despite temporary setbacks, as occurred in the early 1980s) has contributed both to the erosion of the US blockade and to the strengthening of the many bonds that exist between the island and Latin America. To a lesser extent, this has also been true on the Cuban-Caribbean front.5 Previously, all the arguments and actions of the anti-Cuban campaign organized by Washington had some influence over most countries in the region. Today, by contrast, Havana has developed diplomatic ties, or at least discreet lines of communication, with almost all the nations of South America—the sole exception being Paraguay. In the so-called Caribbean Basin, it has relations, to differing degrees, with Panama, Nicaragua, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Barbados, Jamaica, and the Bahamas, while also keeping open channels of dialogue with the Dominican Republic. In North America it has maintained stable and fruitful connections with Mexico and Canada. Currently Cuba has commercial arrangements with twenty-one countries in the region; in the last decade, as can be seen in Table 7.1, there have been significant increases in these trade patterns. In addition, Havana not only has agreements for scientific and

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Table 7.1 Cuban Trade with latin America and the Caribbean (in Thousands of Pesos) Selected Countries

1958

ALADI 85,736 Chile 2,518 Mexico 5,987 Peru 325 Argentina 2,265 Venezuela 69,002 Other Latin American nations 5,639 Commonwealth 3,195 345 Nicaragua Other Carribean 2,850 nations CARICOM 1,763 Rest of America 14,341

1970

1975

1980

1985

1987

1988

4,557 4,418 118 12 — —

159,637 — 28,080 17,796 105,567 6,167

252,544 — 208,337 19,046 15,347 5,271

292,002 5 79,034 2,977 193,706 3,585

234,791 10 74,020 5,922 125,581 20,619

335,669 15 112,951 9,188 129,200 50,718

9 1 —

2,027 2 —

4,543 5,623 83

2,695 28,509 23,494

8,639 38,284 37,919

33,597 31,188 30,823

1

2 7,887

5,540 5,989

15 226

365 6,730

365 2,188

356

7,439

41,810

3,596

26,234

22,449

Source: Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, Annuario estadístico de Cuba, 1988. Note: ALAT)l=Associación Latinoamericana de Integración (Latin American Association).

Integration

technical collaboration with ten other hemispheric nations, but also regularly participates in meetings of Latin American ministers of culture and information, while likewise seeking to deepen its cultural links with the Caribbean. It is also important to note that Latin American nations have generally concluded that Havana should be readmitted to the OAS and that this organization should modify the 1962 agreement that denounced the incompatibility of the "Cuban political model" with the foundations of the inter-American system. In late 1989 the Group of Eight, meeting in lea, Peru, issued a specific statement to this effect—one that was immediately received warmly by the Cuban government. Havana has, of course, long played a positive role in all other Latin American organizations (where the United States does not have the veto power it wields in the OAS)—a fact illustrated by the unanimous support it received from the Latin American and Caribbean bloc in 1989 for its bid to occupy—despite strenuous US opposition—one of the two regional seats in the UN Security Council. This episode underlines the increasingly similar positions held by Cuba and the Latin American and Caribbean countries concerning the most difficult issues facing the hemisphere, the principal

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ones being the question of nonintervention and the right to self-determination, the external debt, the drug threat, and North-South cooperation. Often Havana's sentiments (similar to those held by the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean) are at odds with Washington's policies. It is also worth noting that, unlike during the first years of the Cuban Revolution, there is now a feeling of harmony among several key hemispheric actors in the social and political realms. Moreover, there is a growing conviction that there is a pressing urgency to address the lack of equitable and symmetrical relations, in economic, political, diplomatic, and military matters, between the United States and its southern neighbors. In other words, the so-called exportation of revolution by Cuba has managed to earn it more recognition among Latin American and Caribbean nations than that achieved by the United States with its paranoid hostility to the Revolution. Indeed, one could even say that in its eagerness to isolate Cuba it is the United States and its allies who are becoming isolated, with the blockade increasingly seen as a failure. President Fidel Castro's visits to Ecuador and Mexico in 1988, Venezuela in 1989, and Brazil in 1990, together with Cuba's multiple ties to the region, clearly show this reality. The basic explanation for the failure revealed by this turn of events can be found in the incapacity of the dominant groups in the United States to offer real solutions to the economic, social, political, diplomatic, and geopolitical problems that today constitute the troubled agenda of US relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. The continuity of objectives, and indeed of methods, found in the Bush presidency (e.g., the Brady Plan, military intervention in Panama, punitive actions in the drug war— despite rhetoric that Washington would collaborate with the countries involved) offer little hope for change. This situation obviously opens up space for Cuban initiatives designed to offer significant alternatives, thereby legitimizing Havana's position while emphasizing the difference of interests between the United States and the countries south of the Rio Grande. This is not to say, however, that there are not problems facing Cuba in its attempt to improve its hemispheric relations. Chief among these, as has traditionally been the case, is the paranoid anti-Cuban policy cultivated by the U.S. political elite. In its first year the Bush team launched an extensive campaign that threatened the sovereignty and national security of the island. Among the barometers of its malevolent intentions were the memorandum circulated by the State Department to all US embassies, indicating that there would be no moderation of the existing hard-line policy toward Havana (March 1989); the continued public support shown by the president to both the right-wing sectors of the Cuban

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community in the United States and the insignificant nucleus of political dissidents on the island (May 1989); the encouragement of illegal Cuban immigration (which contrasts with official arguments that explain why Washington will not fulfil the quotas officially agreed upon in the immigration treaty); the increase in military maneuvers (such as the Ocean Venture and Global Shield exercises) held in the Caribbean and near the Cuban coast (April-May 1990); recent incidents at the Guantánamo naval base, as well as the expansion of US forces stationed there (December 1989-May 1990); the attack on a Cuban-operated merchant vessel in international waters on the pretext of fighting the "drug war"; and the continued rejection of Havana's proposals for joint operations designed to interdict drug trafficking between South America, the Caribbean, and the United States. Finally, the Bush administration has persisted in sending illegal television signals to Cuba, with the express interest of subverting the island's political system. This latter action—the poorly named TV Marti—could well provoke a military confrontation between the two countries if allowed to continue unchecked. It is clear, then, that Washington is determined to tighten the economic, political, and diplomatic blockade. Its policies will thus remain constant for the foreseeable future—threatening Havana with force, seeking to stimulate internal dissent, and working to produce the ideological isolation of the Cuban Revolution, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean. While it is evident that many countries of the region are determined to avoid the exclusionary postures of the 1960s, there are those that are vulnerable to US pressure and others (especially in Central America) that seem to be voluntarily cooperating. Some of them (such as Costa Rica) have expressed their opposition to Havana's readmittance to the OAS, while others (such as the government of Guillermo Endara in Panama) have threatened to withdraw diplomatic recognition.6 Violeta Chamorro's election in Nicaragua, whatever it may portend bilaterally, may also have a negative impact on Cuban relations with Central America, complicating the original intentions of the Rio Group (formerly the Group of Eight) to modify the 1962 resolution of the OAS. The political changes that have taken place in Nicaragua and Haiti have been manipulated by Washington in an effort to isolate Cuba diplomatically by portraying it as the "last dictatorship" in a hemisphere where democratically elected regimes now predominate. Other developments in Central America are likely to be used to try to undermine Cuba's international standing. The US government, together with its regional allies, is clearly intent on utilizing the atmosphere resulting from the defeat of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua to obtain unilateral concessions from El Salvador's FMLN (and eventually the Guatemalan National Revolution-

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ary Unity [URNG]) in an attempt to annihilate these groups. Otherwise, assuming that peace talks will, unfortunately, be unsuccessful and that these conflicts will drag on for the foreseeable future, it is then that considerable anti-Cuban sentiment could be generated by presenting Havana as "the obstacle" to a negotiated settlement. It is also possible that Cuba's ties with the FMLN and with the U R N G could be employed by Washington to isolate it; the same could also be the case if the current difficulties in Nicaragua should lead to hostilities. What would happen, for example, if civil war were to break out again in Nicaragua? Would the United States intervene, now legitimized by a request from the elected government? This is difficult to forecast, although without any doubt it would complicate matters immensely and have a very negative impact on Havana's hemispheric relations. A second strategy that could be implemented to underline contradictions between Cuba and its hemispheric neighbors has to do with very basic economic facts of life. Many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are financially and economically dependent upon the United States and upon international capital. This dependency has been borne out on numerous occasions, not the least of which involves the problem of external debt. Although there is not the shadow of a doubt—as Fidel Castro indicated several years ago—that the Latin debt is unpayable (and uncollectible), there is still not a clear political will, particularly among those hemispheric members with the greatest burdens, to change the financial rules of the game imposed by international capital and the imperialist powers. Given the social cost of such adjustments, political destabilization is inevitable. As happened in Venezuela in 1989, and in Argentina, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic, authoritarian and repressive actions will be the official reply to the people's demands. This could understandably place Cuba on the horns of a serious dilemma involving, on the one hand, its traditional solidarity with the popular interests and the political parties and trade unions that protect them and, on the other, its desire to maintain cordial intergovernmental relations. Another fact worth noting stems from the ongoing loss of sovereignty by the region's governments caused by the growth of transnational capital. This could seriously complicate Havana's economic ties with Latin America because the United States could put pressure on these governments to alter their relationship with the island (or indeed follow any other acceptable initiative). Such an approach would clearly have a negative impact on the multilateral ambitions not only of Cuba, but also other sectors in Latin America and the Caribbean (including elements of the dominant classes) who are working to bring about the integration of all the continent's countries. The combined effect of all these phenomena (social cost of the

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structural adjustment, denationalization and privatization of the economies of Latin America, lack of political will by the dominant classes to contest this tendency) could reinforce the necessity to encourage efforts to bring about radical, revolutionary changes. Such a development, while opening up new possibilities for Cuban policy, could also bring about the reemergence of areas of conflict between the island and its Latin American neighbors. Referring to this situation in his recent trips to both Mexico and Brazil, Fidel Castro spoke of his hopes that such transformations would come about peacefully, without major upheavals. That, however, does not depend upon Cuba's desires, but rather upon the capacity of imperialism and the local dominant classes to implement the drastic metamorphosis needed to overcome the current crisis and thereby open new options for independent development. All of these tendencies briefly outlined above are contributing to a highly dynamic situation in the continent and, by extension, in Cuba's dealings with it. Given this context, will some major change crystalize, thus permitting a new stage to emerge—one that will be qualitatively superior in encouraging reciprocal relations? Or, by contrast, will there be regression, as happened in the early years of the 1980s? Should a new stage not emerge, this does not necessarily mean that regression would automatically ensue. Nor does it mean that relations would automatically deteriorate. Certainly Cuba's status vis-à-vis the other nations of the hemisphere would not revert to the unfortunate state of affairs encountered in the 1960s or even the early 1980s. Quite simply, too many dramatically negative events would have to take place for this to occur once again. The basis for this forecast is that, despite everything, the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean (even their dominant sectors) have little interest in a radical modification of their ties with Havana and even less in greater tension between it and the United States. This interpretation can be gleaned from the rejection by the Rio Group (and even Canada) of US designs to transmit illegal television signals to Cuba. Allowing this to happen would be a dangerous precedent for them all. It can also be confirmed by several official Latin American offers to mediate the search for a negotiated settlement of the differences between Havana and Washington. This latter point is worth reflecting on. Undoubtedly some proponents of such a strategy are hoping that, behind the scenes, more or less "gradual" changes would occur in the island's political system. At the same time, they are aware that a major crisis in Cuban-US relations could—as happened in the 1960s—eventually have a negative impact on the internal political stability of some countries. Perhaps, too, regional leaders realize that the defeat of Cuba (if such an eventuality were possible) could once

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again place them in a very dangerous position by revitalizing Washington's hegemonic aspirations. A continent with just one pole of influence does not, therefore, appear in most quarters to be a very good idea. One must also recognize that Havana's posture on a host of issues is much closer to the hemispheric norm than is admitted by US power brokers, and that such a situation is beneficial to both the domestic and foreign policies of the region's present governments. In internal matters this rapprochement constitutes a source of political legitimacy for some regimes, while externally the Cuban positions (which by definition are more radical) open up room to negotiate with the United States, thereby providing political space that otherwise might well not exist. In so doing, this contributes to the preservation of a relative autonomy that was obtained with some difficulty. From Havana's perspective the need to maintain and indeed increase ties with Latin America and the Caribbean is quite obvious. Not only is the region the island's natural neighbor, friend, and trading partner, but it also plays a major role in the dynamics of Cuban-US relations. It likewise represents a reservoir of potential support to overcome the difficulties that could result from deteriorating trade relations with Eastern Europe. Consequently the Cuban government has begun to outline a variety of avenues that could be followed in order to increase its economic integration into the hemisphere. To cite but one example, Fidel Castro's proposal to launch joint ventures on the island with private Brazilian investors (and, by extension, from other Latin countries) raised possibilities that heretofore had not been seriously assessed. Such an initiative also offers a practical solution to the contradictions often encountered by Cubans in their pursuit of regional integration. These reciprocal interests, when combined with the common culture and history of the region, seem to represent a solid foundation for—at least— the normal development of Cuban relations with Latin America and the Caribbean during the last decade of this century.

Notes 1. See Luis Suárez Salazar, "La política de la Revolución Cubana hacia América Latina y el Caribe: notas para una periodización," Cuadernos de Nuestra América 3, no. 6 (July-December 1986): 137-180. 2. See "Transcripción de la conferencia de prensa del Comandante Fidel Castro, presidente de los Consejos de Estado y de Ministros de Cuba," Mexico City, Chaultepec Hotel, December 1988 (edited on December 10,1988, in Mexico by the Centro de Estudios sobre América). 3. See Luis Suárez and Aurelio Alonso Tejada, "Relaciones exteriores de Cuba en 1988: hacia una nueva etapa," in A la espera de una nueva etapa, comp. Heraldo Muñoz (Caracas: Editorial Nueva Sociedad-PROSPEL, 1989).

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4. The OAS is often confused with the Rio Treaty, yet it is possible to be a member of the OAS and at the same time not be a signatory nation of the treaty. Cuba could thus return to the OAS without ratifying the treaty. Indeed, Cuba's rejection of the Rio Treaty in 1959 was perhaps the first significant act undertaken by the Revolution's foreign policy. 5. Many of the ideas concerning Cuban-Caribbean relations are derived from the research of my colleague Gerardo Conzález, a specialist in the Caribbean Department of the Centro de Estudios sobre América. 6. The Cuban government has not officially recognized the Panamanian government that resulted from US intervention in Panama, although it retains a diplomatic and consular mission there. The Panamanian government expelled the Cuban ambassador, and so technically Cuba is represented by a chargé d'affaires. The relations, in sum, are hardly encouraging.

8 Cuba's Role as Mediator in International Conflicts: Formal and Informal Initiatives Donna Rich Recent strains between Havana and Moscow demonstrate once again the flaws of the Soviet-surrogate thesis of Cuban foreign policy and the danger of treating the island merely as a Soviet proxy. Far from simply being the Kremlin's puppet, Cuba has played a complex role in the Third World. Havana's international stature today derives not only from the military aid and developmental assistance it provides, but also from sophisticated diplomacy in the international arena. In the past decade these diplomatic initiatives have formed a significant and frequently overlooked aspect of Cuban foreign policy, one that has successfully advanced the Revolution's interests. We will here examine Havana's role as mediator in international conflicts, assessing its performance from a historical perspective and examining several case studies involving Cuban arbitration. The notion that Havana has played a mediating role arouses objections on both sides of the Florida straits, although for different reasons. In the United States many observers deny Cuba has been active in conflict resolution because such a characterization is inconsistent with the prevailing view of Havana as a meddlesome troublemaker. When Cuba's diplomatic initiatives have been publicized, they have either been scorned by US officials as cynical attempts to achieve sinister goals or simply ignored.1 Washington's failure to recognize the diversity of these forays is due in part to its interest in maintaining the image of Cuba as an instigator of international instability in order to justify the continuation of a hardline policy against the Revolution. In recent interviews in Havana, Cuban officials also objected to the notion that Havana has mediated international conflicts because they believe that a mediator must be a neutral party and that mediators by nature impose external solutions to conflicts.2 They, on the other hand, rightly point out that Cuba, let alone any other country, is rarely politically neutral, and since neutrality is fundamental to their notion of mediation, they reject the suggestion that they have played such a role. Moreover, external solutions to regional conflicts run counter to the most important tenet of Cuban foreign policy: self-determination. This concept, along 119

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with its corollary of antiimperialism, has been a key component of Havana's international perspective since the early days of the Revolution. The roots of Cuba's antiimperialist stand are found in the decades from 1893 to 1959 when the United States routinely meddled in its domestic affairs, supporting corrupt politicians who then often collaborated in exploiting the island's natural and human resources. Postrevolutionary foreign policy is predicated on preventing such interventionism from ever happening in Cuba, or elsewhere in the Third World, again. Cuban officials believe that their policy of self-determination would conflict with any attempt at mediation because mediation is viewed as equivalent to meddling, which Havana categorically shuns.3 I take a broader view, defining a mediator as an intermediary who attempts to settle differences between two or more conflicting parties. Normally, then, such solutions are not imposed from the outside (as the Cubans contend), but rather are merely suggestions for peacefully resolving crises, and may or may not be accepted. Therefore, mediation is not inherently incompatible with self-determination, since ultimately the disputing countries decide whether or not to embrace the terms of the agreement provided. Furthermore, mediation does not necessarily imply neutrality; it simply demands that the outside party be someone other than a direct participant in the conflict. For example, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger played a mediating role when he conducted shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East in 1973, and Chester Crocker was a mediator in southern Africa. In both cases the United States was not a front-line combatant, yet neither diplomat purported to be neutral. William Zartman, an expert on mediation, suggests that some bias is actually helpful in carrying out a such a role: "It is also increasingly clear that, while mediators need to be dedicated to the search for a jointly acceptable solution, they need not be free of ties to either of the parties; 'biased' mediators may often be what is needed since their ties provide them with a basis for leverage over the parties, but the concomittant assumption is that they will be able to deliver the agreement of the party to which they are closest." 4 Cuba appears to fit Zartman's profile, for its long-standing ties to at least one of the antagonists in each example below seem to have facilitated its efforts. When we look at the case studies of Havana's role as mediator, it is useful to remember that little is usually known about the specifics involved. This is especially true when dealing with Cuba because of the government's secretive nature; official documents or records of "who said what to whom" are unavailable or nonexistent. Nevertheless, as Zartman points out, the basic dynamics are simple: "Mediators must help parties see that there is a common present condition that is more painful than

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possible futures, and a common future outcome that is preferable to the real present or to other attainable f u t u r e s . . . . The mediator must be a repository of a trust that is absent between the two parties, and must convince them to use and then dispose of his services as a crutch."5 He also suggests that this approach works best early on in the conflict because once stalemate becomes the norm the protagonists will often be inclined either to live with it or resort to escalation to break the impasse.6 In several of the case studies below, Cuban mediation did in fact come before the conflict actually erupted. Finally, it should be noted that while Havana's rate of successful conflict resoution is low, such statistics should not be equated with failure. Instead, Cuba has often gained international prestige as an honest broker even when its intermediary efforts have not solved the problem.

Mediation and Cuban Foreign Policy Every country's foreign policy is predicated on its national security concerns. Through time, the conceptualizations involved change, and countries alter their plans accordingly. In the first decade following Castro's takeover Havana's agenda revolved around the threat of a largescale US invasion as well as numerous covert attempts to infiltrate the island and overthrow the government. Although makers of Cuban foreign policy today still identify Washington as their principal adversary, they believe that US hostility now takes the form of attempts to isolate the island from the international community diplomatically and economically. Thus Havana's scenario has evolved to counter what is viewed as this neoimperialism, with one of the newer elements being its attempts to mediate conflicts. Mediation was not a significant aspect of Cuban foreign policy until the 1970s. In the 1960s, Havana's goal was to promote revolution throughout the Western Hemisphere. The rationale for this was simple: Fearing a US invasion, the besieged Fidelists believed the best way to ensure their government's survival was to support aspiring revolutionary movements in Latin America that, if able to seize power, would reciprocate and would be friendly, thereby making US intervention less popular. By 1968, however, Cuba's enthusiasm for armed struggle had faded, for several reasons. In 1967 Che Guevara was killed in Bolivia. His death demoralized the Cuban leadership and was a pointed reminder that after six frustrating years, there were no other successful revolutions in the hemisphere.7 Also, Havana's efforts to foment revolution were at odds with Moscow's commitment to peaceful coexistence in Latin America.

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This policy was instrumental in helping the Kremlin to establish normal relations with the majority of the hemisphere's countries. Unwilling to jeopardize their newly won respectability, the Soviets tried to use economic pressure to moderate Cuban radicalism.8 Then, in 1968, the Peruvian military, brandishing a leftist platform, seized power, suggesting to Havana that there were alternative avenues toward revolution besides a strategy based on the foco theory of guerrilla warfare.9 A t this point the Cuban economy was in shambles, and Castro believed he needed to husband the island's scarce resources rather than spending heavily on promoting elusive revolutions in the hemisphere.10 Because of these setbacks and Havana's changing perception of the threat posed by the United States, Cuba embarked in the early 1970s on a more sophisticated, less costly foreign policy that relied less on promoting armed struggle in Latin America and more on diplomacy in international organizations. In both the Nonaligned Movement and the Group of Seventy-seven, it found opportunities to promote its ideas in a less provocative fashion. While Havana did not abandon military aid programs completely, beginning in the mid-1970s it concentrated less on aiding leftist insurgencies and more on aiding existing friendly governments that requested assistance. For example, in 1975, the young Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola ( M P L A ) government requested Cuban military support in its war against South African-backed internal opposition. Castro, a longtime friend of the M P L A , responded immediately with men and arms. Consequently Cuba's international prestige improved on almost all fronts: The O A U heralded its support for the M P L A while the Nonaligned Movement, meeting in Sri Lanka in 1976, approved its actions and chose Havana as the site of the organization's Sixth Nonaligned Summit, which meant that Cuba served as chair of the Movement from 1979 until 1983, when India was elected to the position.11 Basically, then, by the 1980s Havana was less concerned with a direct threat against its territory and was able to use its new position as a Third World leader to conduct a complex foreign policy that relied on a combination of military strength, civilian assistance programs, and diplomatic initiatives. Overall there have been fourteen cases involving Cuban mediation, all occurring since 1977. The situations vary significantly in nature, and Havana's initiatives fall into two broad categories: informal efforts to resolve disputes; and assuming a formal role as intercessor in international conflicts. Cuba has acted informally to resolve disputes when one of the parties is not a seated, internationally recognized government; and when the problems are domestic, that is, between insurgent groups or fractions within a progressive government. The informal mediation efforts are marked by their discreet, if not secretive nature. Ten of the fourteen

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instances fall into this informal category. F o r example: • In Nicaragua, Cuba tried to prevent the split between the Sandinistas and Edén Pastora 12 • In Ethiopia, Cuba tried to mediate between the Ethiopian government and the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON) 1 3 • In southern Africa, Cuba helped convince S W A P O to accept the U N resolution on Namibia 14 • Cuba attempted to persuade the Iranian government to release the US hostages in 1979 15 There is one unconfirmed report that would fall into this category as well: In Grenada, Cuba allegedly attempted to mend relations between Bernard Coard and Maurice Bishop in the days leading up to Coard's attempted coup. 16 Since space limitations preclude a lengthy analysis of each initiative, several illustrative case studies (including Havana's efforts in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Ethiopia) will be probed in depth. The second category—in which Cuba functions in a formal or official capacity—entails two types of activity. The first involves situations wherein Havana's activities are sanctioned by the sparring governments, although they are not performed under the auspices of an international organization. This type of mediation was employed prior to the onset of war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1978 and before the clash known as Shaba II—the 1978 Katangan invasion of southern Zaire. In both instances Cuba acted before full-scale hostilities broke out. In short, Havana tried to prevent war (both of these crises will be more fully analyzed later). The second type of formal mediation includes disputes that Cuba has attempted to resolve as an outgrowth of its involvement in an international organization. Two confrontations fall into this category: the Iran-Iraq War; and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border conflict.17 In both cases it is unlikely that Cuba would have chosen to mediate if it had not been serving as chair of the Nonaligned Movement.

Informal Initiatives El Salvador and Nicaragua—revolutionary movements. As indicated previously, Cuba has helped to forge coalitions among guerrilla factions in Nicaragua, E l Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and the Middle East, the main thrust being to encourage the various insurgent groups to unite despite their differences.18 The most divisive issue has usually been strategy. 19 According to one Central Committee official, Havana places high importance on unity because "Cuba has learned from its own struggle that unity is essential if you want to achieve something... if you're going

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to wage a successful war, you have to combine the struggle and build bridges throughout the society to increase efficiency."20 For example, four months prior to Anastasio Somoza's overthrow in Nicaragua, Fidel Castro reportedly spent nearly forty-eight hours over a four-day period helping to hammer out a basis for cooperation among factions within the FSLN. As a result of these meetings, a unified FSLN directorate was established, composed of three members from each faction. Shortly thereafter the Sandinistas forced Somoza out.21 In December 1979, six months after the Sandinista victory, three of El Salvador's main guerrilla groups gathered in Havana and created a coalition, the FMLN. 22 A few weeks later, three Guatemalan guerrilla organizations signed a unity accord forming the U R N G at a meeting attended by a Cuban official.23 To defuse possible accusations that Havana is intervening in the internal affairs of such national liberation movements and trying to control their political agendas, Cuban officials stress that their commitment to self-determination remains paramount. They insist that Havana never demands that the divided groups merge and never conditions material support on unification. In fact, one speculated that the Salvadoran guerrilla factions would have continued to receive aid even if they had not coalesced to form the FMLN. Cuban officials point out that they have "fluid communications" with the various leftist forces within each country, which helps them in coalition building. One explained that "Cuba can help unify groups because it has relations with Marxists, nationalists, and Latin Americanists. Since we have relations with all of them, we are in a position to persuade them." 24 A Cuban official observed that Havana's prodding of the FMLN was reinforced by "two other great teachers of unity—the Nicaraguan experience and the United States." He said, "The experience of the Nicaraguan revolution impacted heavily on El Salvador because the FSLN proved that victory was elusive until all opposition forces joined together." Still, US military aid was probably a powerful catalyst in convincing the Salvadoran leftists to unify because once the Salvadoran army had obtained US resources and training it became a more formidable opponent. Insurgent groups recognized unification was the only way that victory would be attainable.25 Cuban officials reiterated on several occasions that Havana generally promotes the largest antigovernment alliance possible. For example, it now supports a coalition in El Salvador that includes such non-Marxist elements as the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) and the Christian Democrats. 26 Cuba has devoted considerable energy to fostering revolutionary unity because it believes that such movements operate more effectively than disparate groups working toward vaguely similar goals.27 Similarly,

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it feels that divisions within progressive ranks generally benefit conservative opponents, such as the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala, Somoza in prerevolutionary Nicaragua, and Israel in the case of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Havana is also inclined to mediate because it recognizes that by not taking sides it avoids the risk of ending up on the losing end of a sectarian conflict.28 Finally, because Cuba has maintained good relations with all leftist factions, it finds itself in a unique position to play the middleman. Nicaragua and Ethiopia—progressive governments. Cuba has also mediated disputes within progressive governments. In Nicaragua, for example, immediately after Edén Pastora split with the Sandinista government in 1982 and went into exile, a Cuban official tried to convince him to return to Managua.29 According to sources in Havana, this person was acting informally, not on orders from the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist party.30 The official had been friendly with Pastora before the separation and felt that he may have left Nicaragua because of personality clashes rather than serious political differences.31 Believing that unity was essential and that divisions benefited the opposition (in this case the United States), the Cuban offered himself as a mediator. As it turned out, the problem lay in substantive policy disputes that had led Pastora to abandon the Sandinista Directorate.32 In February 1977 a somewhat similar situation arose in Ethiopia. MEISON had been at odds with the Ethiopian government since Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam emerged as leader of the Dergue in 1977. This was because MEISON espoused a policy of regional autonomy for Eritrea, a position that Mengistu rejected. (Eritrea, a northern province of Ethiopia, had long sought to win its independence from Addis Ababa, a cause that Havana supported.) The Cuban ambassador in Addis Ababa, José Pérez Novoa, brought Dr. Negede Gobeze of MEISON back from exile in hopes of merging progressive Ethiopian movements with the revolutionary government and increasing civilian representation in Mengistu's military-dominated regime.33 There are several versions describing how Ambassador Novoa brought Gobeze back to Ethiopia. Cubans claim that Novoa had spoken with a Dergue official who independently sanctioned Gobeze's return, but problems developed because the Ethiopian had acted independently and did not get high government approval for this controversial act.34 The New York Times simply reported that "Western sources" said Ambassador Novoa "smuggled" Gobeze into the country, implying that Havana did not even attempt to obtain authorization from the Ethiopian government.35 Finally, Jorge Domínguez writes that Cuban sources claim that Ambassador Novoa "made a mistake" and that his actions "were not part

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of Cuba's policy which was to support the unity of all revolutionary forces." Whichever version is correct, it is clear that Havana tried to promote unity through dialog among the progressive forces in Ethiopia. There is a slightly more complex analysis of the Gobeze affair, which stresses that beyond attempting to consolidate divergent forces within the Ethiopian government Cuba was trying to mediate in the decades-old dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Although Castro has said that he supports "a political solution to the problem of nationalities in Ethiopia," Cuba officially maintains that it never pushed the Dergue to negotiate with the Eritreans. 36 Various political and ideological factors have contributed to Havana's determination to avoid direct military involvement in Ethiopia's war against Eritrea. On the one hand, for example, Cuba's fraternal ties to the Eritrean secessionists were well established long before its friendship with the Dergue. Thus, even though Havana's primary allegiance shifted to the Ethiopian government after Mengistu came to power, it has refused to be drawn into fighting against the rebels it once backed.37 Also, many of Cuba's Third World allies, particularly militant Arab states, support factions of the Eritrean movement. Iraq, in fact, denied supply planes bound for Ethiopia the use of its air space.38 Finally, there are in the Eritrean camp those who have long and enthusiastically embraced Fidelist-style revolution.39 Admittedly the deployment of Cuban troops against Somalia freed up Ethiopian forces to be used in Eritrea, but nevertheless it appears that Havana has not played, and certainly does not want to play, a direct military role in Ethiopia's war with Eritrea. 40 Cuban officials maintain that they have not even attempted to mediate between the brawling sides in this war (let alone fight in it) because of the complexity of the issues. Western diplomats, however, reported seeing Eritrean representatives in Havana concurrent with a visit from Mengistu in April 1978.41 This reinforces speculation that Castro was indeed trying to mediate between the two groups. If this is the case, Cuban officials may have felt that Negede Gobeze was a perfect intermediary and brought him back to Addis Ababa to push for a solution to the Eritrean question. The dates coincide perfectly to support this proposition; Mengistu was in Havana in April 1978, and Gobeze arrived in Addis Ababa in May 1978. In summary, it is clear that Cuba did attempt to fuse the different factions within the Ethiopian government. It is also highly probable that Havana attempted to find a negotiated solution to the conflict between the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean secessionists. Cuba had been a longtime supporter of the Eritreans and now found itself in the position of supporting a government that was openly hostile to them. The best way out of this delicate situation would have been to find a diplomatic resolu-

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tion to the conflict. Formal Initiatives The Ethiopian-Somalian conflict. On a slightly more sophisticated level of mediation, Cuba interceded to try to prevent war from breaking out between Ethiopia and Somalia. Although its actions were sanctioned by both countries, Havana was not operating under the aegis of any formal international organization. These efforts came when a simmering dispute over the Ogaden territories began to heat up in March 1977. Cuba was, of course, a longtime ally of the Somalian government of Siad Barre, but it also had recently developed close relations with the emerging revolutionary regime in Addis Ababa. The Ogaden conflict dates from the mid-1940s, when the European powers, who routinely divided Africa without regard for ethnic or linguistic borders, established an artificial frontier that divided the Ogaden region between Ethiopia and Somalia. Somalia has since claimed the area, but the O A U has upheld the colonial boundaries set forth in the Berlin Accords in order to discourage constant territorial disputes. The Ethiopian revolutionary move leftward and its burgeoning material support from the Soviet Union disturbed Somalia. Recognizing the exigency of the moment, pro-Western states, including Egypt, the Sudan, and Saudi Arabia, attempted to woo Mogadishu away from Moscow. 42 Fidel Castro arrived in Africa in the midst of this superpower shuffle and urged Somalia and Ethiopia to resolve their differences around a negotiating table. While in the Horn of Africa, he traveled back and forth between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa advocating the formation of an "antiimperialist federation" composed of five radical states in the Red Sea region (Ethiopia, South Yemen, autonomous Ogaden, autonomous Eritrea, and Somalia). 43 Siad Barre said that such an arrangement could be discussed only after the Ogaden territories gained independence, a condition Mengistu rejected. The summit ended with a Somali promise not to strike militarily pending further negotiations. However, Barre did not keep his word. In mid-July forty thousand regular Somali troops invaded the Ogaden. Shortly thereafter, Cuba dispatched military advisors to Ethiopia and later sent combat troops. 44 Castro had four major interests in attempting to preempt a full-scale war between Somalia and Ethiopia. First, as noted earlier, Havana believes conflicts dividing progressive (or socialist-oriented) countries benefit conservative (or pro-Western) states. Somalia was a longtime ally of Cuba, and therefore Castro wanted to prevent it from slipping out of the progressive camp. Furthermore, Cuban officials believed there was a powerful coalition of conservative oil-rich Arab states waiting to capitalize

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on instability in the region and to win Somali support. Mediation was an obvious and potentially effective counter to such manuevers. 45 Second, mediation allowed Havana to try to keep an old compatriot— Somalia—while simultaneously expanding its influence in a new territory—Ethiopia. Juggling friendships with both nations was difficult because of their long-standing animosity, but Cuba nevertheless persisted with the hope that it could thereby escape the unenviable prospect of having to take sides. 46 There was, of course, another choice—the avoidance option: Havana could have remained totally aloof. Mediation, however, is a more dynamic policy that offers the intercessor an opportunity to display peacemaking skills, thus improving its international prestige. Damián Fernández suggests correctly that even when negotiation fails the mediator's prestige need not suffer but may even be enhanced by the leadership demonstrated. 47 Third, Cuba enjoyed Soviet backing for its role as middleman in this conflict because Moscow and Havana shared similar, if not identical, interests. In fact, shortly after Castro left the Horn of Africa, Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny also embarked on shuttle diplomacy between the Somalian and Ethiopian capitals to reinforce and possibly even conduct negotiations based on Castro's proposals. 48 Cuba, however, as a leader in the Third World, often enjoys more credibility among other developing nations than does its superpower counterpart. In this respect, Havana also acquires some leverage over the Kremlin, since Moscow recognizes the Fidelists are better suited to mediate between Third World countries 49 Following the two leaders' trips to the Horn, Soviet and Cuban policy toward that region began to be more closely synchronized. 50 Finally, Havana's role in trying to forestall war in the Horn earned it unusual international acclaim. Rather than being portrayed as an instigator of conflict, Cuba was seen as a peacemaker. The Washington Post even went so far as to liken President Castro's attempts to mediate to "Kissinger-style shuttle diplomacy."51 Moreover, Havana's efforts to prevent a territorial conflict from emerging also received the support of the O A U , which, as stated earlier, supports all current African boundaries. Angola. Like the Somali-Ethiopian case, Shaba II was a situation wherein Cuba tried to curb an emerging conflict. And as in the Horn of Africa, this clash also centered around a territorial dispute. Since 1960 the Katangans had struggled for the independence of their province (now called Shaba) from Zaire. In March 1977 a group of Katangans based in Angola invaded Shaba, and Zaire immediately charged that Havana played a key role in the affair. Cuba denied the accusation, which died down quickly, primarily because President Jimmy Carter largely ignored Zaire's allegations.52 The

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following year, on May 14,1978, the Katangans staged a similar attack. This time, however, Washington supported Zaire's claims of Cuban involvement. A heated public debate ensued between Presidents Carter and Castro. Havana maintains that it did not support the Shaba II invasion and indeed actively tried to prevent it (US government documents made public at the time corroborate this).53 Its first initiative was launched in February 1978 when Cuban Political Bureau member Jorge Risquet asked President Agostinho Neto of Angola to curtail the activities of the Shaba exiles.54 Neto was unable to comply because he was being treated for an illness in the USSR and therefore had less influence over the Katangan exiles; and the area in which the Katangans were operating was large and difficult to patrol.55 The second action by the Cuban government to avert Shaba II occurred in the first week of May, when Castro summoned Lyle F. Lane, chief of the US Interests Section in Havana, to his office and informed Lane that he had heard "rumors" of a possible invasion of Zaire by the Katangans. Castro asserted that neither Cuba nor Angola had anything to do with it. Moreover, Fidel offered to cooperate in trying to prevent the invasion and to disarm the Katangans.56 Castro later said that never before in his career had he informed Washington in advance of the outbreak of a skirmish. Lane reported to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, quoting Fidel as saying he was "disturbed" by the rumors.57 The State Department then instructed Lane to express appreciation for Castro's notice but to warn him that it would be a matter of "gravest concern" if Cuba played a role in the conflict.58 After this secret exchange, President Carter publicly accused Fidel of training and arming the rebels as well as coordinating the invasion.59 Havana vehemently denied the charges, and Carter then modified his stance, suggesting that the Cubans had known about the Katangans' plans and "obviously did nothing to restrain them from crossing the border." 60 In June the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reviewed the evidence and concluded that it did not support the administration's allegations.61 But still President Carter continued, although more temperately, to accuse Castro of involvement in Shaba II, insisting that Fidel could have done "much more to prevent the recent Katangan invasion of Zaire." The conflict was finally resolved in mid-July when Havana helped bring about a rapprochement between Angola and Zaire, and Cuban forces cooperated with Angolans in disarming the Katangans and moving them away from the border areas.62 Havana had a variety of motivations for attempting to prevent the Katangans from invading southern Zaire for a second time. First, the Cubans felt that a war against Zaire in mid-May 1978 was particularly ill-

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timed since it would divert world attention from a South African attack in early May on a Namibian guerrilla camp in southern Angola in which hundreds were reported killed.63 Given such problems on Angola's southern border, where its troops were already involved in support of Luanda's forces, Havana wanted to avoid a multifront war. Second, support for the Katangan rebels would have seriously complicated Cuba's relations with other African countries precisely because the Katangans were trying to alter already established borders, something the O A U vehemently opposed. Third, the Cubans were concerned that a Kantangan invasion would provide a pretext for Western intervention in Zaire, thereby raising the possibility of additional support for the forces opposed to President Neto in Angola. These elements had been particularly active the previous year and had even staged an abortive coup. By warning Washington of the impending invasion, Castro hoped to ward off US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support for Zaire by proving that he was not involved in instigating the trouble.64 Nevertheless, France, Belgium, and the United States did send troops and supplies to Zaire following the Shaba incursion. Finally, and perhaps most important, Cuba and the United States had entered a period of détente the previous year. President Carter had cautiously begun normalizing relations between the two countries. The Ethiopian embroilment had crippled the immediate possibility of reestablishing full diplomatic ties, and Havana feared that a second Shaba would destroy it altogether (as in fact it did). Thus Cuba, intent on improving relations with Washington, would have preferred to avoid such superfluous engagements. The Iran-Iraq War. The final case study focuses on the Iran-Iraq War. This is perhaps the most complex of Havana's initiatives because Cuba was simultaneously acting as chair of the Nonaligned Movement and trying to advance its own foreign policy interests. Moreover, it is the only instance in which Havana will concede that it played a mediating role.65 Although the conflict between Iran and Iraq is of long standing, the recent round of fighting began in 1980. Between 1975 and 1979 the two nations coexisted in relative harmony under the Algiers Accord, which had resolved various territorial disputes between them, allowed for shared navigation rights along the contested Shatt-al-Arab, and led to the cessation of Iranian support for Iraq's Kurdish rebels. The agreement also stipulated that the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who resided in Iraq, either had to cease his political activities or leave the country. He chose the latter option, although only five months before the shah was driven from power. With the shah's ouster and Khomeini's subsequent rise to power, the delicate Algiers agreement was immediately threatened because the ayatollah called for exporting Islamic fundamentalism to all

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Muslim nations. This was particularly threatening to Iraq because of its geographic proximity, vulnerable borders, and large Shiite population.66 Iraq began the feud anew by bombing Iranian territory on September 22,1980. Cuban officials maintain that Baghdad was acting in response to Iranian provocations, including an attempt to assassinate high officials in the Iraqi government.67 Three days after the attack began, Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca arrived in Baghdad offering intermediary services in the search for a peaceful solution to the war. In the ensuing months he made between ten and fifteen trips to the region, speaking on a number of occasions with the presidents of Iran and Iraq.68 In addition to this "shuttle diplomacy," Havana, acting in its capacity as chair of the Nonaligned Movement, established a committee in November 1980 composed of four nonaligned nations (Yugoslavia, India, Zambia, and itself) to seek a peaceful resolution.69 Four main factors led Cuba to intercede in the conflict. The primary consideration revolved around its responsibility to the Nonaligned Movement (which included both Iran and Iraq as members). When the war erupted in 1980, Havana was serving as the organization's leader. Reflecting its commitment to the "promotion of world peace," the Movement's charter, written at the Belgrade Conference in 1961, stresses that it is "essential that the Nonaligned countries should participate in solving outstanding

international

issues concerning

peace and security

in the

world" (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Movement's bylaws hold its president responsible for "taking all necessary steps to maintain contacts among member states."70 Had it not been for these obligations, said a member of the Cuban Communist party's Central Committee and former ambassador to Iraq, Havana probably would not have attempted to mediate, since the hatred involved ran so deep and the issues were so complex that a solution looked hopeless from the start.71 Another important reason for Cuba's intercession stems from a basic premise of its foreign policy, which posits, as stated above, that conflicts dividing the Third World inherently benefit conservative, or pro-US, states and hence must be avoided. It follows, therefore, that progressive Arab nations (e.g., South Yemen, Iraq, and Libya) must form a unified coalition against their reactionary counterparts (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and North Yemen). Havana may have hoped that, with the ouster of the shah, Iran would be inclined to switch camps and to settle its differences with Baghdad in the process. A third element motivating Cuba's mediation efforts was the prospect they presented of forging a new relationship with Iran without jeopardizing Havana's cordial ties with Baghdad. Given Khomeini's immense popularity at home, as well as the position of regional power long enjoyed by Iranian rulers, Cuba may have seen the change of personnel in Teheran

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as an opportunity to establish strong links with a key player in Middle Eastern affairs, and apparently concluded that mediation represented a better means to this end than did neutrality. Finally, despite failing to stop the war, Havana gained recognition and international prestige through its peacemaking mission. Reports of Malmierca's "shuttle diplomacy" appeared in major newspapers around the world, including the New York Times.72

Conclusion To summarize, there have been at least eight major reasons why Cuba has sometimes assumed the mantle of international mediator: 1. As chair of the Nonaligned Movement, it was fulfilling its responsibility to resolve conflicts among member nations 2. It believes that disputes dividing Third World nations generally benefit "imperialists," most often the United States, and thus security considerations demand that they be quickly resolved 3. It recognizes that conflict resolution is a perfect way to keep old friends while simultaneously expanding its influence into new areas 4. Mediation is a pragmatic policy that allows Havana to avoid ending up on the losing side of a dispute 5. Its initiatives have coincided on occasion with Soviet policy and therefore bolstered its value as an ally in the USSR's eyes 6. It has hoped that mediation would help to improve its relations with the United States 7. It has maintained strong fraternal links with a broad range of governments and therefore finds itself in a unique position to play middleman in conflicts that divide them 8. It has attempted to use mediation to improve its international prestige Mediation, however, also has its disadvantages. It requires great flexibility and a careful juggling of interests on the part of the interlocutor. Although in the best of all worlds it allows one to maintain good relations with both quarreling nations, mediators are often accused of playing favorites. Being an intermediary in a rift can offer higher risks than being neutral because the mediator has a higher stake in the settlement; failing to resolve a conflict may reflect poorly on the middleman. Although Cuba's success rate, if determined by the number of conflicts it has actually resolved, is not high, Havana has achieved many of its

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goals in the process. It has, for example, enhanced its international status. The New York Times and the Washington Post (among other leading newspapers) reported its intermediary role in the Iran-Iraq War, the Ethiopian-Somali conflict, and Shaba II. This is significant for Havana, which has tried to overcome its early image as troublemaker and the Western press's ongoing tendency to portray it as a "meddler" and "fomentor" in international conflicts. It is difficult to predict what the future holds for Cuba as mediator. Its formal peacemaking efforts occurred between 1977 and 1982, roughly the same years that it headed the Nonaligned Movement; it mediated two important conflicts primarily because of its responsibility as chair. Havana's reputation in the Movement may, however, be on the decline, in part because the organization is now led by Yugoslavia, a traditional Cuban rival, and in part because moderate rather than radical elements are now the dominant membership bloc. Cuba's prestige in the Third World may also be slipping because of its stalwart refusal to introduce any economic restructuring similar to what is occurring in the Soviet Union and much of Eastern Europe. Since these changes are supported by many developing nations, Havana's reluctance to embrace them somewhat discredits its claim to be "a Third World leader" and could also undermine its ability effectively to mediate disputes within that camp. On the other hand, Cuba was elected to a prestigious seat on the U N Security Council in October 1989, a position that could conceivably enhance its credibility among the LDCs. If Havana uses its new position wisely and if it reconsiders its resistance to glasnost and perestroika, it could continue to enjoy the recognition it so painstakingly developed during the last decade. It is clear that Havana is responsive to the changing world and remains determined to play a significant role therein. It has modified its earlier, radical policies enough to be considered a serious actor in the field of conflict resolution. In September 1989 the Cuban Foreign Ministry advised the Salvadoran rebels to form a coalition with the Christian Democratic party, something that Cubans say would have been inconceivable only a short while ago.73 And, also in September, the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist party hosted representatives of the South African government, something those very same officials would have scoffed at only months before.74 If Havana continues to demonstrate such flexibility and thereby maintains its credentials, mediation will probably become an increasingly attractive pragmatic policy option. Indeed, as the political configuration of the world stage is being drastically rearranged and the pieces fall haphazardly into place, mediation may allow Cuba to avoid being forced to choose sides—and quite possibly the wrong side—as this works itself out.

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Notes In preparing this chapter, I spent a week in Havana in September 1989. I conducted five interviews with regional specialists from the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist party. Because the interviews were off the record, I have noted them only with the date. The other interviews from Havana are fully sourced. 1. For example, after the US press reported Cuba's attempts to prevent Shaba II from erupting, President Carter still continued to accuse Cuba of involvement. See New York Times, May 20,1978, p. 1, May 26,1978, p. 1, and June 7,1978. 2. Interviews with Cuban Communist party Central Committee officials, September 5,6, and 7,1989. 3. Ibid.; interview with Luis Suárez, director, Centro de Estudios sobre América, September 6,1989, in Havana. 4. William Zartman, "Conflict Reduction: Prevention, Management, and Resolution," paper prepared for Brookings Institution conference on Conflict Resolution in Africa, Washington, DC, October 15-18,1989, unpaged. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Michael Mazarr, Semper Fidel, America and Cuba 1776-1980 (Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1988), p. 362. 8. Peter Shearman, The Soviet Union and Cuba (London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), pp. 20-22. 9. Wayne Smith, The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations Since 1957 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), p. 92. 10. Ibid. 11. William M. LeoGrande, Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980, Policy Papers in Latin America, no. 13 (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1980), p. 19. 12. Interview with Central Committee official, September 5,1989. 13. Washington Post, April 27,1978, p. A24. 14. Smith, Closest of Enemies. 15. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), December 3,1979, p.Ql, from Agence France Press, Paris; interview with Wayne Smith, who was the conduit for Cuba's offer, Washington, DC, November 1,1989. 16. New York Times, May 14,1984, p. 8. 17. For information on Cuba's mediation efforts in the AfghanistanPakistan conflict, see New York Times, March 28,1980, p. A13, April 10,1980; FBIS, April 2,1980, p. Q12, April 7,1980 (Afghan section), p. CI, and, April 22, 1980, p. Q5. 18. US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report, May 2,1979, "Cuban Aid to Central American Guerillas"; William LeoGrande, "Cuba and Nicaragua," in The New Cuban Presence in the Carribbean, ed. Barry B. Levine (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), p. 46; interview with Central Committee official, September 5,1989.

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19. Interview with Central Committee official, September 5,1989. 20. Ibid. 21. CIA report, May 2,1979, "Cuban Aid to Central American Guerillas"; Carla Anne Robbins, The Cuban Threat (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), p. 248. 22. New York Times, March 21, 1982, p. 23; H. Michael Erisman, Cuba's International Relations: The Anatomy of a Nationalistic Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), p. 138. 23. Michael Erisman, Cuba's International Relations, p. 138, reports the meeting took place in Managua in November 1980. 24. Zartman, "Conflict Reduction." 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Interview with Central Committee official, September 7,1989. 28. Damián Fernández, Cuba's Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), p. 84. 29. Interview with Cuban Central Committee official, September 5, 1989; interview with Wayne Smith in Washington, DC, October 23,1989. 30. Interview with Cuban Central Committee official, September 5,1989. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. David and Marina Ottaway, AfroCommunism (New York: African Publishing, 1985), p. 148. 34. Interview with Cuban Central Committee official, September 5,1989. 35. New York Times, May 26,1978, p. A8; see also Washington Post, May 30,1978, p. A12. 36. Interview with Cuban Central Committee official, September 5,1989. 37. Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 134. 38. Washington Post, June 22,1978, p. A21. 39. Ibid. 40. New York Times, June 15,1978, p.l. 41. Washington Post, April 27, 1978, p. A24. The specific quotation is: "Diplomatic sources in Havana have also reported that representatives of the Eritrean rebels are also visiting Havana and may be negotiating with Mengistu, using Castro as a mediator." 42. LeoGrande, Cuba's Policy in Africa, p. 37; Facts on File, April 9,1977. 43. New York Times, March 16, 1977 and November 14, 1977, p. 8; Washington Post, March 18,1977, p. 19; LeoGrande, "Cuba and Nicaragua," p. 131; Nelson Valdés, "Cuba in the Horn of Africa," in Cuba in Africa, ed. Carmelo Mesa-Lago and June S. Belkin, Latin American Monograph and Document Series, no. 3 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 1982), p. 68. 44. New York Times, November 15,1977, p. 1, November 17,1977, p. 1, and December 17,1977, p. 1. 45. Interview with Central Committee official, September 1989; New York Times, March 16,1977. 46. New York Times, November 14,1977, p. 8. 47. Fernández, Cuba's Foreign Policy in the Middle East, p. 84. 48. New York Times, November 14,1977, p. 8.

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49. LeoGrande, Cuba's Policy in Africa, p. 30, sums up this argument in a discussion of Cuba's gains from its intervention in Angola: "While Cuba's actions in Angola strengthened its relationship with the USSR, they also served to expand the parameters of Cuban independence vis-à-vis its principal ally. By greatly extending Cuban influence and prestige in Africa, Angola made Cuba a more valuable spokesman for socialism among the nonaligned nations. Cuba's advocacy of socialism as the only possible solution to underdevelopment is in itself politically and ideologically valuable to the USSR." 50. Ibid., p. 39; LeoGrande, "Cuba and Nicaragua," p. 137; New York Times, March 24,1977, p. A6, and April 7,1977, p. 12. 51. Washington Post, March 18,1977, p. 19. 52. LeoGrande, Cuba's Policy in Africa, p. 24. 53. New York Times, June 10,1978, p. 1. 54. Jorge Domínguez, "Political and Military Limitations and Consequences of Cuban Policies in Africa," in Mesa-Lago and Belkin, Cuba in Africa, pp. 121, 138; Granma Weekly Review (May 28,1978): 1. 55. New York Times, June 11,1978, p. 1; Washington Post, June 10,1978, p. 1, and June 14,1978, p. A18. 56. Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 137; New York Times, June 11,1978, p. 1; Washington Post, June 10,1978, p. 1; Erisman, Cuba's International Relations, p. 93. 57. New York Times, June 11,1978, p. 1; Washington Post, June 10,1978, p. 1. 58. New York Times, June 14,1978; Washington Post, June 14,1978, p. A18. For the best account of this incident, see Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 137. 59. New York Times, May 20,1978, p. 1. 60. New York Times, May 26,1978, p. 1, June 1,1978, pp. 1-2; Washington Post, June 14,1978, p. A8; Granma Weekly Review (May 30,1978): 2. 61. New York Times, June 10,1978, p. 1. 62. Ibid., July 16, 1978; Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 141; William M. LeoGrande, "Cuban-Soviet Relations and Cuban Policy in Africa," in Mesa-Lago and Belkin, Cuba in Africa, p. 32; and interviews with Central Committee officials, September 7,1989. 63. Washington Post, June 14,1978, p. 1. 64. Ibid., June 13,1978, p. 1, and June 14,1978, p. 1. 65. In the conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Havana had to juggle carefully several of its interests. Although Cuba had sheepishly endorsed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, as chair of the Nonaligned Movement (whose majority of members condemned the move in a UN General Assembly vote), President Castro sought a political solution to the conflict that would guarantee to all states of the area their sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. It would also provide a solution to Cuba's own dilemma: balancing its role as a Soviet ally with its responsibilities as chair of the Movement. Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca traveled back and forth between Kabul and Islamabad offering Havana's assistance as chair. Although its attempts to mediate in this case failed, Cuba's efforts enabled it to improve its image as an independent actor that had suffered after it supported the Soviet move into Afghanistan in the

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United Nations. For more information, see New York Times, March 28,1980, p. A13, and April 10, 1980; FBIS, April 2, 1980, p. Q12, April 7, 1980 (Afghan section), p. CI, and April 22,1980, p. Q5. 66. Interview with Central Committee official, September 7,1989. 67. Ibid. 68. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, September 24, 1980, p. Q l , November 3,1980, p. Ql, November 13,1980, p. Q l , and December 9,1980, p. Q l ; Facts on File, November 28, 1980; interview with Cuban Foreign Ministry official, September 7,1989. 69. New York Times, November 3, 1980, p. 19, and March 15, 1981, p. 6; FBIS, March 2,1982, p. Q2. 70. Odette Jankowitsch and Karl Sauvent, The Third World Without Superpowers: The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries, vol. 1 (New York: Oceana Publications, 1978); see the preface. 71. Interview with Central Committee official, September 7,1989. 72. New York Times, November 3, 1980, p. 19, November 19, 1980, p. 12, and December 17,1980, p. 5. 73. Interview with Cuban Central Committee official, September 5,1989. 74. Ibid., September 7,1989.

9 Cuban Development Aid: South-South Diversification and Counterdependency Politics H. Michael

Erisman

It is now widely accepted that Cuba occupies a special niche in the pantheon of nations, for it is perhaps the only developing country that has not only embraced, but also carried out rather effectively a foreign policy comparable in geographical scope and functional diversity to the international agendas pursued by the world's larger powers. Even the most cursory survey of the record reveals that Havana has, for example, been a key player in Latin American affairs from practically the first day of the Revolution's triumph; that its troops spearheaded the drive to victory in two African wars; that it rose to the very pinnacle of leadership in the Movement of Nonaligned Nations; and that it has exerted a significant impact on the foreign policies of both superpowers, remaining a constant thorn in Washington's side for thirty years while also developing a rather unique relationship with the Soviet Union, wherein the currents of cooperation and dissension have often intermingled in a complex and sometimes confusing fashion. In short, revolutionary Cuba has emerged, to borrow Jorge Dominguez's description, as a small country with a great power's foreign policy.1 Certainly a primary aspect of Havana's stature as a member of the inner circle of global influential has been its foreign assistance programs. Indeed, such pursuits have been a key element in transforming Cuba's image abroad to one more akin to that of a developed than a Third World country. There has, however, been a unidimensionality in Western circles' and particularly in Washington's perception of Cuban aid. Specifically, attention has for the most part centered on Havana's military efforts, which initially concentrated on helping guerrilla movements in the Western Hemisphere. Subsequently Havana expanded its repertoire to include conventional military assistance missions whose main duties were to supply logistical support and training to the host nations, most of whom were located in sub-Saharan Africa. This African involvement reached its pinnacle when Cuba dispatched combat forces to Angola and Ethiopia in the 1970s, where in both cases they played a decisive role in assuring victory for Havana's allies. Such high-visibility forays into the realm of 139

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security affairs and regional conflict tended to generate an atmosphere in which Cuban foreign aid (or internationalism, which is the preferred Fidelista term) has been viewed in almost purely military terms by outside observers. Because of this, very little serious research has been done on the developmental dimensions of Havana's foreign aid endeavors.2 But for those who take the trouble to look, it soon becomes clear that Cuba has, despite its small population and its lack of any significant natural-resource base, created a remarkable package of socioeconomic programs to help stimulate modernization in Third World nations, which in some respects rivals and even surpasses the efforts of the world's more highly developed countries. By the mid-1980s, for instance, Havana was sending one civilian aid worker abroad for every 625 of the nation's inhabitants, the comparable US figure being approximately one Peace Corps volunteer or Agency for International Development (USAID) employee per 34,700 US citizens. Moreover, during the 1984/85 academic year, twenty-two thousand scholarship students from eighty-two LDCs were attending high schools and universities in Cuba. In the United States, on the other hand, the federal government provided only seven thousand university scholarships for the Third World in 1985. A similar pattern emerges with respect to the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies: In 1979 Cubans represented 19.4 percent of all Soviet-bloc economic technicians working in the Third World, even though the island's population constituted only 2.5 percent of the combined USSR-Eastern EuropeanCuban total. 3 Proportionately, then, it would appear that Cuba's developmental aid efforts compare very favorably with those of the two superpowers. Unfortunately, detailed information concerning the exact number of Cuban developmental aid personnel currently operating in specific overseas posts is not readily available.4 Estimates for the early 1980s ranged from sixteen thousand serving in twenty-two Third World countries in 1983 to slightly more than twenty thousand in thirty-seven nations in 1985.5 In 1986, however, the US Department of State reported that the overall total had dropped to 11,650, which is a decline of almost 40 percent from its 1985 figure.6 What can be pinpointed with reasonable accuracy (as of late 1989) are those states that have recently been the major recipients in terms of the number of Cubans that they host; ranked in rough descending order of priority, they are Angola, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. The three functional areas into which Havana has funneled most of its cadres have been construction (7,900 in 1979), education (4,500 in 1982), and health (2,500 in 1985). 7 The agency primarily responsible for executing Cuba's developmental aid policies is the Comité Estatal de Colaboración Económica (CECE, or State Committee for Economic Cooperation), which was established

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in November 1976 to provide a center of coordination for programs that had previously been scattered among a rather wide array of bureaucratic jurisdictions. The committee has nine basic subdivisions, each of which enjoys a certain degree of operative autonomy in its day-to-day activities. Working in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Ministry of Foreign Commerce, and the Cuban National Bank, CECE oversees much of the external assistance the island receives as well as that which it disburses.8 The heavy emphasis Havana has placed on developmental assistance clearly justifies according it a much more prominent place in Cuban foreign affairs studies than has heretofore been the case. It seems, then, to make sense not only to examine the civilian dimension of Cuban internationalism in its ownright,but also in terms of its interface with, and impact upon, some of the broader parameters of the Revolution's international agenda. Thus I will first seek to put Havana's developmental aid programs within a larger policy context, the key contention being that they can be best understood as an integral component of the Revolution's efforts to implement a counterdependency strategy involving diversification of its political-economic relationships on a South-South axis and the acquisition of increased North-South bargaining power. Supplementing this counterdependency scenario, some attention will then be focused on other factors that have been suggested as motivations for Cuban developmental internationalism (highlighting in particular ideological considerations and the lure of potential economic benefits). Finally, the performance and potential of Havana's civilian assistance projects will be assessed.

Counterdependency Politics as a Conceptual Framework for SouthSouth Diversification and Developmental Aid There has always been a significant South-South dimension to revolutionary Cuba's foreign policies. Soon after assuming control, Castro began to redefine the island's political personality not only in terms of embracing Marxism, but also with respect to characterizing it as a Third World rather than purely Latin American country. This latter change was not merely semantic; it also had concrete policy implications, as evidenced by the fact that Cuba was the only country in the Western Hemisphere to become a charter member of the Movement of Nonaligned Nations when it was organized in 1961. At first, Havana's approach to South-South relations tended to be dominated by ideological considerations, which led it to concentrate primarily on establishing solidarity with guerrilla movements (especially

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in Latin America) that were struggling to seize power and secondarily on helping incipient radical regimes to consolidate their positions. Later, however, more-conventional state-to-state ties began to take precedence, with Cuba becoming very active in such multilateral LDC fora as the Nonaligned Movement9 and the Group of Seventy-seven. In both cases it has played a leading role in promoting the New International Economic Order (NIEO) concept. More recently Havana has made the Third World debt a major item on its South-South agenda.10 Such policy initiatives have been complemented by what appears to be a concerted effort over the past year or so by the Cuban press to give rather high visibility to the idea of South-South cooperation, strongly hinting that it is the wave of the future for such progressive states as Cuba. This campaign has included not only numerous articles featuring Havana's expanding trade and technical exchanges with individual developing countries, but also more general commentaries extolling the feasibility and potential benefits of a stronger South-South axis.11 While South-South collaboration has normally been presented by the Cubans and others as a vehicle for generating economic growth, it likewise can be seen as an element in the larger, much more complex phenomenon of counterdependency politics. Admittedly, this concept has not been a central theme in most existing analyses of Havana's behavior in the global arena.12 The position taken here, however, is that the fundamental dynamics of the island's foreign policy across a broad spectrum of issueareas (including developmental aid) take place within a framework in which counterdependency aspirations have a major, if not always a clearly articulated, impact. One of Cuba's most enduring traits has, of course, been its vulnerability to external domination. Spain was the first great power to exploit this weakness, ruling the island in an often brutal fashion from 1511 to 1898. The United States subsequently established a neocolonial relationship with Havana that endured until 1959. These harsh historical realities have generated an extremely strong nationalist tradition that rejects as totally unacceptable the idea of any country's (including the Soviet Union's) incorporating the island in any way, shape, or form into its sphere of influence. This legacy can be seen in Fidel's visceral distrust of relying on foreigners and their experiences for guidance. "It is always best," he has said, "to make one's own mistakes [rather] than making the mistakes of others. At least that way we'll be independent blunderers."13 Such attitudes have engendered within the Cuban collective psyche an intense determination to move out from under the specter of dependency that looms over practically all small nations. Dependency refers to a situation entailing exogenous penetration of a Third World country's economic, political, and sociocultural dynamics

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that is so pervasive that ultimately critical decisionmaking power is acquired and exercised by outsiders. When that happens, the developing country loses control over vital aspects of its domestic and international policies. Dependency tends to emerge first in the economic realm as a residue of colonialism or, perhaps, as a result of allowing unrestricted private investment from abroad, habitually accepting large amounts of aid from a limited number of donor governments, or running up a large debt. In any case, once such mechanisms, which allow a foreign center to flex its economic muscles, are in place, political power—defined here as the capacity to determine the allocation of vital resources and values in a society—has also clearly changed hands, since some macroeconomic choices are now being made externally. In short, political dependency has evolved as a natural corollary to the economic variety. The essence of counterdependency politics is to take preventive action to assure that such a chain of events does not transpire. For small nations like Cuba with limited resources, total self-reliance would not appear to be a viable counterdependency alternative in the foreseeable future. Recognizing that they exist in an increasingly integrated world, controlled dependence might be a more realistic goal for LDCs to set for themselves. The notion of dependence does, of course, take into account the interplay and consequences of imbalances within the international system. However, whereas dependency raises the prospect of the weaker party's suffering debilitating losses of sovereignty and thereby becoming extremely susceptible to foreign exploitation, controlled dependence projects a scenario wherein participants have the ability, although admittedly not in equal proportions, to affect the fundamental nature of their relationships. James Caporaso explains the distinction by characterizing dependency as "the absence of actor autonomy" and dependence as "a highly asymmetric form of interdependence." 14 The pivotal difference between the two concepts can be found in the perceived degree of external vulnerability involved. While each paradigm concedes that countries such as Cuba will inevitably be subjected to outside pressure, dependence does not envision the acquisition of economic, political, or sociocultural domination by a more powerful nation. Instead, what is often suggested is that a Third World country can minimize its exposure to any single foreign source of influence wielding by expanding its available developmental-diplomatic space through diversifying its international relations. Diversification entails nurturing a multifaceted network of external linkages in order to push back as far as possible the constraining socioeconomic-political boundaries within which an L D C must operate. Such an endeavor can, of course, occur on a vertical (i.e., North-South) as well as on a horizontal (or South-South) plane. Havana, for example, has

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experimented with both options, attempting to increase its trade with Western Europe and Japan while simultaneously seeking to maximize its cooperative ties with other developing states. The counterdependency implications of such diversification are substantial. The most obvious potential benefit with regard to developmental planning is the possibility of enhancing one's capacity to draw on multiple sources of outside governmental aid, thereby reducing the risk that such assistance can be manipulated to maneuver the recipient into a position of dependency. Moreover, in a broader sense, cultivating a wide range of international contacts should strengthen a Third World nation's control over its socioeconomic destiny by providing it with more developmental alternatives or models from which to choose. But perhaps the most important aspect of diversification is the opportunity it offers for an L D C to gain significant bargaining power for use in its dealings (economic and otherwise) with those countries normally considered to be the paramount actors on the world stage. Bargaining power, according to Caporaso, is "the power to control the outcome of specific events."15 Applied to the realm of counterdependency politics, it can be seen as the ability of a developing nation to negotiate the terms of its relationships with others, particularly the metropolitan centers whose expertise at manipulating imbalances in the international system almost invariably leads them to be perceived with some trepidation in Third World circles. Indeed, the assertive use of bargaining power represents in many respects the crucial test of whether an L D C can legitimately be said to enjoy effective rather than just formal sovereignty, the distinction being that formal sovereignty can be seen as merely the de jure acquisition of independence and its symbolic trappings, while effective sovereignty refers to the country-in-question's exercise of a significant degree of de facto authority over both its internal and external affairs. Y e t even when such a transition has been made, most developing nations will continue to be confronted with the problem of power differentials (especially when functioning in a North-South context, where it is likely that they will be weaker parties regardless of whether they are acting individually or collectively) and therefore will probably find it useful to reduce their vulnerabilities through diversification. In the Cuban Revolution's case the concept of bargaining power flowing from diversification has had the greatest analytical relevance when applied to the nexus between the island's South-South policies and its preglasnost relations with the USSR. The essence of this interface involved a campaign on Havana's part to serve as the key link (or broker) between the socialist community and the nonaligned countries, the basic idea being that the Fidelistas would gain increased leverage with Russia by enhancing their Third World influence. Cuba's penchant for employing

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a South-South strategy to enlarge its political space is deeply rooted, two early illustrations from the 1960s being Havana's efforts to spark revolutionary upheavals in the Western Hemisphere that, if successful, would have provided it with a solid core of radical pro-Castroite governments as allies against the United States, and its attempts to promote ideological pluralism in the Communist world by forging coalitions with what it perceived to be kindred states such as North Vietnam. It was, however, in the 1970s and particularly with respect to Havana's intensifying leadership aspirations in the Nonaligned Movement that the linkage factor became a major element in the Cuban foreign policy equation. At this point, says William LeoGrande, "as Cuba emerged as a leader of the Movement, Cuba's value to the Soviet Union as a broker between the Third World and the socialist camp expanded tremendously."16 Other examples of Havana's activities along these lines were its military assistance initiatives, its eagerness to play a vanguard role in confronting the Latin American debt crisis, and (as will be examined here in more detail) its developmental aid programs. As Cuba's Third World stature rose, so also did its stock in the Kremlin's eyes, thereby theoretically putting it in a much stronger position to procure political-economic concessions from Moscow on a wide range of issues affecting the island's foreign and domestic affairs. Indeed the record does suggest that, much more than most other members of the Soviet bloc, Havana enjoyed considerable leeway in formulating and implementing its own distinctive international agenda.

South-South Diversification: Ideological and Economic Dimensions of Cuban Developmental Aid Single-factor analyses of the motivations underlying any country's behavior abroad almost always prove inadequate. Consequently, while emphasizing the counterdependency impulses behind Cuba's use of civilian assistance projects as a vehicle for South-South diversification, some attention needs to be devoted here to two other variables—ideological considerations and the lure of economic benefits—that have been mentioned, by such observers as Susan Eckstein, as having had a significant impact on Havana's determination to inject a major developmental aid component into its foreign policy. The ideological foundations of Cuban foreign policy rest to a great extent on the concept of proletarian internationalism, a theme that surfaced early in the revolutionary era and has occupied a prominent place on Havana's international agenda ever since. Defined as a commitment to help one's ideological brethren in other countries to seize power and to consolidate their regimes, it is deeply embedded in the Communist ethos,

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having first been popularized by Karl Marx in his famous call for transnational class solidarity to destroy capitalism (Workers of the World Unite!). As dedicated Marxist-Leninists, Cuba's leaders have sought to make proletarian internationalism a central norm of their society; its spirit has permeated such landmark proclamations as the Second Declaration of Havana (1962), wherein Castro eloquently pleaded the case for armed struggle in Latin America as well as pledging his country's enthusiastic support, and its ongoing relevance has been repeatedly stressed. For example, the official governmental policy statement adopted by the First Congress of the Cuban Communist party in 1975 asserted that "the starting point of Cuba's foreign policy . . . is the subordination of Cuban positions to the international needs of the struggle for the national liberation of the peoples. . . . In this historic period our people have honored and will continue to honor, firmly and without hesitation, the principles of proletarian internationalism and our duties to the world revolutionary movement." 17 Concrete manifestations of such sentiments during the 1980s can be seen in Cuba's efforts to help the MPLA government in Luanda, Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement in Grenada, and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Initially the Cubans tended to be purists in their approach to proletarian internationalism, insisting that strict ideological criteria based on a Fidelista interpretation of Marxism-Leninism had to be satisfied in order to be eligible for their aid. Beginning in the late 1960s, however, they became more ecumenical. Rather than relying on the narrow standards of the past, which had tended to limit its circle of potential collaborators to like-minded radicals, Havana became much more flexible in defining its friends, giving higher priority to antiimperialist credentials than to philosophical orthodoxy. Accordingly, it proclaimed its willingness to cooperate with noncommunist "progressives" who were strongly committed to promoting socioeconomic reform and especially to pursuing independent foreign policies (which in Cuban terms means that one cannot be formally aligned with, or consistently supportive of, the United States). Thus, while not abandoning its pledge to support revolutionary movements, Havana opened the door to normalizing its relations with a broad spectrum of governments. This tolerance for ideological diversity was soon reflected in the island's developmental assistance programs, in which by the late 1970s, says Jorge Domínguez, Cuba's "core allies" (roughly defined as those regimes or groups that share Havana's political values) constituted a minority of the total recipients.18 It would appear, then, that the impact of ideological considerations on Cuba's developmental aid policies has over the years tended to diminish, although certainly not to disappear. Such an ideological interpretation of Fidelista internationalism is not

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particularly difficult to make and generally will not generate much controversy, if for no other reasons than that the Cubans themselves have always heavily emphasized this dimension of their foreign policies, and that there seems to be some good empirical evidence to support that viewpoint. When, however, the spotlight shifts to analyses revolving around the idea of economic aggrandizement, the picture becomes much murkier. Certainly Havana does not endorse such an interpretation of its behavior19 and opinion among Cubanologists is sharply divided as to whether a significant cause-effect relationship can be demonstrated. The short-term economic roots of Havana's developmental aid activities can be seen as being grounded in the island's growing need for hard currency, which became increasingly difficult for it to acquire as its trade concentrated more and more on the Soviet bloc. Put in its simplest terms, Cuba has for years been living on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, most of its exports have gone to the USSR and Eastern Europe. 20 T o some extent, this situation stems from the economic warfare Washington has waged against the Revolution. In its zeal to undermine Castro's power, the United States halted practically all commerce with the island and influenced many other countries to do likewise. Cut off from traditional markets for its exports, Cuba was forced to look elsewhere for buyers and ultimately found them in the socialist camp. These ties, which at first could perhaps be seen as a temporary marriage of convenience, were transformed into a long-term commitment when Havana decided to join C M E A (basically the Soviet-bloc counterpart to the European Common Market) in July 1972. This move was undoubtedly advantageous in the sense of guaranteeing Cuba customers for its products. On the other hand, there were two serious liabilities involved. First, the socialist countries could not satisfy all the island's import needs in terms of goods and services, which meant that Havana had to continue to purchase these items on open international markets. Second, because its CMEA partners paid for their purchases in inconvertible (i.e., soft) currency, Cuba could not use the revenue generated by its Eastern-bloc transactions to finance its other imports. These aspects of Cuban-CMEA trade have been an important, although certainly not the only, reason why the island has seen the debt it owes to Western creditors grow precipitously over the past few years, becoming so serious that Havana announced in mid-1986 that it was suspending payment while it tried to negotiate more-favorable refinancing arrangements. In short, Cuba's trade patterns have engendered a serious cash-flow problem when it comes to hard currency, and hence Havana is always looking for ways to alleviate it. One possible alternative, some have said, is its civilian aid programs, since some hosts do pay for the services rendered by Cuban doctors, educators, construction workers, and other professionals. According to this perspective, then, Havana's

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developmental internationalism is not motivated primarily by revolutionary idealism or some other factor, but rather by the prospect of earning some of the hard cash necessary to begin to resolve its debt- and importfinancing difficulties. Taking a longer-term perspective, it has also been suggested that a main purpose of Cuban developmental assistance projects is to generate a reservoir of goodwill on which Havana may eventually be able to capitalize in order to expand and diversify its foreign commerce. If, so this scenario goes, Cuba plays a role in helping Third World nations to achieve economic growth, it is not unreasonable to think that Havana would hope to derive some benefit from that progress, and that its aid recipients would be favorably inclined, given the positive nature of their prior dealings with Cuba, to expand and deepen their ties with the island. Since, however, it can be assumed that they no longer need Cuban developmental assistance, this association would in all likelihood take the form of increased commerce. Havana's aid programs could thus be seen as an investment of human capital that Cuba hopes will ultimately pay highly compounded trade dividends.

The Nature and Evolution of Cuba's Developmental Aid Programs Cuba, unlike the highly industrialized nations, simply does not have the funds to underwrite the costs of major modernization projects in the Third World. Consequently, its developmental assistance efforts have always been labor- rather than capital- intensive, Havana's basic strategy being to commit whatever human resources are necessary to get its initiatives off to a strong start and especially to conduct training so that local cadres will be able to take charge as quickly as possible. While Cuba has tended to concentrate on construction, education, and health care, since it has large pools of highly trained professionals in those fields on which it can draw, it has also provided help in such diverse undertakings as community development, agronomy and animal husbandry, communications, transportation, cultural affairs, applied marine biology and fishing, tourism, trade union organization, and sports. In-country programs are supplemented by the educational opportunities in Cuba that Havana makes available through its extensive scholarship programs, the most innovative and ambitious operating on the old Isle of Pines, where prior to the Revolution the main inhabitants were prisoners (including, for a short time, Fidel himself). In a symbolic as well as a practical gesture, the Cubans transformed the former penal colony, now rechristened the Isle of Youth, into an educational showcase that by 1985 was hosting approximately twelve thousand foreign students in

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addition to a large Cuban contingent. Every Third World delegation, whose members are chosen by their governments and range from twelve to twenty in age, has its own schools, each of which costs Havana about 1.2 million pesos per year to operate.21 The main curricular emphasis is on vocational skills relevant to their nation's developmental plans. In this manner, the Cubans contribute to assuring a steady supply of trained personnel who should be able to assume responsibility for the projects Havana's internationalists have launched back in their home countries. The process by which individual Cubans are recruited to serve a developmental stint abroad involves both moral and material incentives, the influence of each factor obviously varying from case to case. Undoubtedly an element of self-interest may come into play, for the government does try to encourage participation by offering overseas workers better salaries and pension benefits than those available to their counterparts who remain at home. Moreover, on their return to the island internationalists often receive such bonuses as priority in housing assignments, special access to scarce consumer goods, and enhanced prospects for Communist party membership.22 Nevertheless, taking into account the hardships involved, the disruption of one's personal life as well the separation from family and friends, and the danger that must often be confronted (e.g., Cuban developmentalists working in isolated regions were prime targets for the Nicaraguan contras, and several were murdered), there does appear to be considerable validity to Havana's position that the overwhelming majority of those stepping forth are genuine idealists who are selflessly responding on the basis of such larger principles as proletarian internationalism and Cuban patriotism. Certainly it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to explain the kind of enthusiasm and dedication epitomized by the thirty thousand teachers (a number proportionately equivalent to 750,000 US citizens) who in 1980 answered Havana's call for volunteers to go to Nicaragua primarily in terms of crass egocentrism. Initially Cuban developmental aid was supplied on a completely gratuitous basis, although the host government was normally expected to assume responsibility for the Fidelistas' minimal living expenses23 and for furnishing the logistical support necessary for the projects. Even these limited obligations could, of course, be waived if Havana decided that they created undue hardship for the recipients or if there were good diplomaticideological reasons for an exemption. Beginning in 1978, however, Cuba began to charge some countries—particularly oil producers and others whose financial status warranted it—for services rendered. For example, a contract worth US $150 million was signed in September 1979 whereby Havana would provide construction workers and technical assistants to help Libya build houses and highways. Similarly, the Cuban Construction Enterprise concluded a US $50 million deal with Angola in November

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1979 involving fifty apartment complexes and three bridges. But despite the introduction of this compensatory factor, Cuban spokesmen insist that, in the final analysis, "the essential internationalist principles on which such aid had been based from the beginning remained unchanged. Those . . . countries suffering under economic difficulties continued to receive assistance free, and others were subsequently exempted from having to pay when faced with adverse economic conditions." 24 In any case, even when remuneration is involved, Cuban personnel represent a significant bargain for their Third World employers in comparison to comparable technicians dispatched by the Western developed countries or most international organizations. Basically, then, what Cuba offers are relatively low-budget operations that nevertheless can have a significant socioeconomic impact.

The Formative Years of Cuban Developmental Internationalism,

1963-1975

The Revolution first ventured into developmental internationalism in May 1963 when Havana dispatched a medical mission of thirty-five doctors/dentists and twenty-three nurses/technicians to Algeria. This move was taken in conjunction with Cuba's efforts to help Algeria in its border conflict with Morocco. Havana had instituted a military assistance program that involved supplying tanks and other modern arms to Ahmed Ben Bella's radical socialist government, but Algeria lacked the trained personnel to use them effectively. Consequently Cuba decided to deploy combat units from its regular forces, including an armored battalion that arrived on October 28, 1963. But, because a cease-fire was signed on October 30, these troops never entered the fighting, and most were withdrawn shortly thereafter. The only other country during the 1960s that was a significant recipient of Cuban civilian aid was North Vietnam. Although detailed summary data regarding specific projects and the total number of internationalists involved are not readily available,25 Havana's commitment was hardly a token gesture, but rather represented a major initiative on its part at that particular time, given its relative inexperience in providing developmental assistance and the fact that much of its foreign policy attention had to be devoted to the ongoing deterioration in the middle and late 1960s of its relations with both superpowers. In any case, it is clear that the Cubans felt a special bond to the North Vietnamese, seeing them as fellow combatants struggling in the front-line trenches against US imperialism and as independent Communists who shared the Fidelistas' reluctance to adhere rigidly to the Moscow or Beijing line within the socialist community. Consequently Havana was anxious to demonstrate its solidarity with North Vietnam by sending civilians to help alleviate the suffering the Vietnamese were experiencing.

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Aid

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During the early 1970s the Cubans began to interject a new geographical dimension into their aid programs—the Western Hemisphere. Focusing initially on Peru, Havana furnished disaster relief in 1970 to help the country recover from an earthquake even though there were no formal diplomatic ties between the two nations. Later, in May 1971, Cuba sent a construction brigade to Peru to help build six hospitals in the mountainous northern region. Subsequently, Cuban developmental internationalism received its warmest hemispheric reception in Jamaica following Michael Manley's election as prime minister in 1972. Although a democratic socialist rather than a Marxist, Manley nevertheless displayed a strong affinity for the Cuban Revolution. Relations between the two islands were fully normalized in 1972, and thereafter Manley indicated a growing inclination to look favorably on the Cuban socioeconomic model. Havana responded enthusiastically, extending substantial moral and material support to encourage what it perceived to be Kingston's progressive proclivities. Indeed, by 1975 there were more Cuban civilian aid specialists posted to Jamaica than to any other country in the world. The Maturation

of Cuban Developmentalism,

1975-1980s

The period 1975-1979 witnessed a virtual explosion of Cuban activity on a number of South-South fronts. In the diplomatic realm, for instance, Havana continued the practice initiated in the early 1970s of trying to expand its circle of normalized state-to-state relations and of becoming increasingly involved in a rather broad spectrum of functional international organizations. It soon became apparent, however, that the Fidelistas were not interested in simply being participants in Third World affairs, but rather had serious aspirations to play a vanguard role (which would reach a symbolic pinnacle in 1979 when Cuba was chosen to lead the Nonaligned Movement). Not only did Castro begin to travel abroad more extensively, but Havana also hosted a growing stream of dignitaries from the LDCs who were invited to the island for state visits and consultations. This summitry paid large political dividends by providing excellent opportunities to showcase the Revolution's impressive achievements in socioeconomic development and above all by guaranteeing an ongoing dialogue through which Cuba could generate Third World support for its foreign policies. Even more audacious were Havana's military exploits. Although Cuba had occasionally dispatched small troop contingents abroad prior to 1975 and also had begun to operate some military training missions, its decision to become heavily involved in the Angolan conflict demonstrated beyond any doubt whatsoever that it now had the capability to project

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significant military power thousands of miles from its shores and hence had truly become a country to be reckoned with on the international stage. In November 1975, responding to calls for assistance from Angola's beleaguered radical left-wing regime headed by Agostinho Neto, large numbers of Cuban combatants began to appear on the scene. Ultimately this expeditionary force, whose size peaked at around fifty thousand in the 1980s, would have a major impact on the politics of southern Africa, assuring the survival of the Angolan Revolution and serving as a crucial bargaining chip in the negotiations that took place in the late 1980s between Havana, Luanda, and Pretoria (South Africa) that, among other things, paved the way for Namibia's independence. Subsequently, in 1977-1978, Cuban units would also be sent to Ethiopia to help Addis Ababa defeat a Somalian invasion. As a result of these and other initiatives, the number of Cubans involved in overseas military missions increased at least tenfold over the roughly forty-two hundred who were posted abroad in 1975. The expansion and diversification that were occurring in other sectors of Havana's South-South relations during the late 1970s were likewise operative in its developmental aid programs, which, as indicated in Table 9.1, grew by 140 percent in terms of personnel in the three-year period covering 1977-1979 and by almost 300 percent from 1977 to 1981. Undoubtedly one factor lending added momentum to this phenomenon in the early 1980s was the Afghan imbroglio, where Havana found itself in the extremely uncomfortable position of trying to walk a political tightrope between its alliance with Moscow and its desire to maintain its good standing in the nonaligned community. The problem, of course, was that the developing countries were outraged by, and overwhelmingly opposed to, the December 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, while the Kremlin expected support from the socialist camp. Initially, at least from a South-South perspective, Cuba stumbled badly when it tried to explain its vote against a January 1980 UN resolution condemning the USSR by insisting that its ballot did not represent approval of Moscow's actions, but rather was motivated by opposition to Washington's exploitation of the crisis for Cold War purposes. Few if any Third World governments found this argument convincing. Consequently, Havana's prestige was badly tarnished in the eyes of many nonaligned LDCs, and its SouthSouth diversification strategy was jeopardized. Under such conditions developmental aid programs became increasingly attractive as a means for Cuba to maintain a viable South-South axis, since they tended to shift attention away from Havana's Moscow connection (in contrast to military internationalism, in which the Cuban-Soviet link stood out prominently because Havana usually needed considerable Russian logistical support to mount any significant operations and espe-

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Table 9.1 Cuban Developmental Aid Personnel Abroad 1977

1978

Mideast and North Africa Algeria 25 50 Iran Iraq 375 415 Libya 400 Mauritania Morocco 100 500 South Yemen Syria Western Sahara Other Total 500 1,365 Percentage Change +173.0 Vfrica Angola 4,500 8,500 Benin Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Congo 20 Equitorial Guinea 150 Ethiopia 150 500 Ghana Guinea 35 Guinea-Bissau 85 45 Madagascar Mali Mozambique 100 400 Nigeria 140 Sâo Tomé y Principe Seychelles 200 Tanzania 425 Uganda Zambia 20 Zimbabwe 1,090 Other Total 5,390 10,970 Percentage Change +103.5 ^atin America Bolivia Colombia Grenada Guyana Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua

100

1979

1981

1984

1986

100

250 3,500

275

100

400

100 100 15

1,350 1,000 300

5,000 50 150

15 200 100 75

2,750 +101.5

8,950 + 225.5

3,575 4,465 -50.2

6,500

6,500

6,000

13 140 450

1,000

200 40 25

125

600

1,000

50

1,000 40 240 75 35 10 900 5

200 20 150

80

290 8,398 -23.4

760 9,435 + 12.3

350 65 525 1,800

4,000

345 8,960 -5.0

490 -89.0

6,000 35 15 15 10 15 85 10 1,100 35 25 85 5 15 900 5 60 20 25 10 15 55 8,540 -5.7

5

5 5

60

50

5,300

15 2,500

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Cuba's Relations with the Third World

Table 9.1 continued 1977 Panama Peru St. Lucia Other Total Percentage Change

1978

1979

1981

1984

1986 30

10 12 80 190

Asia Afghanistan Laos Sri Lanka Vietnam Other Total Percentage Change Total for all 5,890 12,525 Percentage Change forali +112.6

2,752 +1,348.4

640 4,640 +68.6

55 5,420 +16.8

100

2,605 -51.9

10

250 5 75 325

100 -69.2

100 100 0.0

15 - 85.0

14,225

23,125

18,945

11,650

+13.6

+ 62.6

-18.1

-38.5

Note: When a range of figures is given in the sources, which is common when estimates are being presented, or when two sources give different figures, this table uses the average of the highest and lowest figures available. Sources'. The 1977-1979 figures come from H. Michael Erisman, Cuba's International Relations: The Anatomy of a Nationalistic Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 78-79. The 1981 figures come from US Department of State, Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World, 1981 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1983), pp. 20-21. The 1984 figures come from US Department of State, Warsaw Pact Economic Aid to Non-Communist LDCs, 1984 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1986), p. 16. The 1986 figures come from US Department of State, Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDCs: Holding Their Own in 1986 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1988), p. 12.

cially to maintain them over an extended period). This did not mean that Havana was permanently abandoning the idea of sending members of its security forces (including combat units) overseas. To the contrary, it still strongly reserved the right to have military missions abroad and to help others defend themselves against aggression. However, with the military aid option least temporarily discredited by the Kremlin's war in Afghanistan, it is hardly surprising that Cuba made the developmental component a mainstay of its South-South agenda in the early 1980s. The post-1981 reduction in the number of Cubans posted overseas indicated in Table 9.1 should not be taken as symptomatic of any major reassessment or downgrading of Havana's commitment to developmental

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internationalism. Instead, it can be explained primarily in terms of economic considerations or political exigencies. The cutback of the Middle Eastern contingent in 1984 and 1986 can, for example, probably be attributed at least in part to the completion of contracts arranged when petrodollars were flowing into Arab coffers and to the relative scarcity of such funds to underwrite new projects as the bottom fell out of the oil boom in the early to mid-1980s. In the Nicaraguan case, which represents the Fidelistas' other main demobilization in 1986, a large Cuban presence constituted a potential political liability in the sense that it could be used to generate support for Washington's anti-Sandinista crusade and also could have unduly complicated the Contadora peace process that both Havana and Managua were trying to promote. Thus it served the larger diplomatic interests of both the Sandinistas and the Cubans for Havana to assume a lower profile by reducing both its military and developmental aid contingents in Nicaragua.

Conclusion: Performance and Prospects Cuba, like other countries throughout Latin America and the Third World, found itself sailing in stormy economic seas during much of the 1980s. In particular, its chronic hard-currency shortage became even more severe as the island was buffeted by a series of body blows. For example, sugar prices on the international market plummeted to the point where they hovered around only one-half of production costs; the decline in petroleum prices undermined Havana's ability to procure convertible funds by selling its surplus Soviet-supplied oil, a practice that previously had been a mainstay of its export earnings; and finally, the declining strength of the US dollar against Western European and Japanese currencies ate into the purchasing power of the island's dollar reserves. Cuban sources, says Julie Feinsilver, concluded that such setbacks cost the country at least $600 million (US) in 1986 alone and severely hampered its ability to meet its debt obligations to Western creditors.26 Given the pressing need to address such problems, it is naturally tempting to conclude that generating revenue has become the primary function of Cuba's developmental internationalism. There appears at first glance to be some solid grounds for making such an assumption, since LDC demand for the expertise Havana can offer (especially in the medical and construction fields) remains strong, and Cuba certainly enjoys a competitive edge regarding rates charged in comparison to most other providers. Unfortunately, solid data concerning the profits actually realized are rather hard to come by—some estimates of gross hard-currency revenues, which apparently include money

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generated by military assistance contracts, mention $50 million in 1977 and $100 million in 1980.27 Obviously these figures are not insubstantial. However, the reduction of Havana's overseas contingents beginning in the mid-1980s, combined with the diminished capacity of Third World states to pay for services rendered, suggests that the subsequent earnings would be lower. Moreover, the offsetting costs must be considered. As Sergio Roca has noted, "the deployment . . . of thousands of qualified technical personnel . . . has represented a heavy drain on the Cuban economy. Often because trained personnel were assigned to internationalist duties, domestic economic sectors suffered output losses and faced bottlenecks, and policy initiatives experienced delays in implementation."28 In short, Roca is contending that domestic productivity and development, including sectors with the potential to generate hard currency or to lessen Cuba's need for it, may very well have been adversely affected by assigning some of the island's most skilled people to extended tours of duty abroad. If such variables were factored into the overall equation, the contribution made by developmental assistance contracts to alleviating the country's cash-flow difficulties would undoubtedly have to be revised downward and might very well prove to be marginal at best. In the final analysis, then, it does not seem valid to portray Cuban developmentalism basically as a remedy for the island's hard-currency crisis. Admittedly every little bit helps, but to the extent that civilian aid exerts a significant economic impact, the more likely scenario revolves around its long-range prospects for helping to promote more-extensive, diverse patterns of South-South commerce. The opinion among observers on the viability of developmental assistance as a mechanism for helping to widen Cuban-Third World trade has been mixed. The consensus during the late 1970s seemed to be that Havana's South-South exchanges constituted such a small proportion— roughly 5 percent—of the island's overall trade that they did not merit much attention when analyzing the impact of foreign commerce on the Cuban economy. At this rate, if a hypothetical and very optimistic projection were made that foresaw a 50 percent increase in Havana's SouthSouth trade, and if its civilian aid activities were given credit for one-half of that gain, the growth in the island's overall foreign commerce attributable to developmental internationalism would be only a rather paltry 1.25 percent. But such speculation may be meaningless, even as an illustration, if in reality, as Susan Eckstein indicates, there was actually an inverse relationship in the late 1970s between receiving assistance from, and expanding trade with, Cuba.29 But in the 1980s, according to Jorge Domínguez, the situation changed, with South-South commerce becoming a much more important element in the Cuban economy. He reports, for instance, that by 1980-

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1981 Africa had surpassed the E E C as a customer for the island's exports. Moreover, by the mid-1980s some LDCs had become especially lucrative to Havana as sugar markets, since they were buying at rates sometimes significantly higher than the prevailing real world market price. Using 1986 as a sample year, the percentage excess being paid by some developing nations was Angola, 12 percent; Iraq, 17 percent; Algeria, 8 percent; Egypt, 26 percent; and Vietnam, 49 percent.30 Such data strongly suggest that the South-South axis must now be seen as rivaling in some respects the North-South dimension in Cuba's trade profile. Domínguez did not, however, probe in any detail the possibility of a causal relationship between these developments and the proliferation of Havana's developmental assistance programs. Thus it still remains to be proved that aid initiatives designed to help Third World countries to get firmly on their economic feet do in fact generate greater Cuban-Third World trade. What all these mixed signals indicate is that the jury is still out with regard to the economic consequences of Cuban developmentalism—no clear pattern has emerged to establish unequivocally that Havana reaps significant material rewards (in either the long or short run) from its aid programs, and indeed there may be some grounds for arguing that there is actually red ink on the bottom line. But if one moves away from a strict cost-accounting analysis revolving around such dollars-and-cents measures of success as trade balances or unit profits and looks instead at the economic dynamics of Cuban developmental assistance in more general terms that stress their interface with Havana's broader foreign policy agenda, the picture begins to take on a markedly different coloration. Here the crucial question is not what the bottom line of the balance sheet reads, but rather: What contribution has developmental aid made to the larger process of counterdependency politics? The main impetus for dependency is usually unidimensionality in a developing nation's economic relations, which simply means that it tends to carry on practically all of its important transactions with a single metropolitan center. An obvious antidote is, of course, multidimensionality. It is within this latter context that Cuban developmentalism can be seen as a counterdependency mechanism, for by helping the island to expand and diversify (i.e., make more multilateral) its South-South ties Havana's aid programs have enlarged its economic maneuvering space and thereby theoretically rendered it less susceptible to penetration or domination by any single pole of exogenous power. But perhaps more important than simply providing Cuba alternative avenues to explore in configuring its economic networks, cordial South-South relations in the developmental assistance field could very well, as proponents of functional integration have long contended,31 spill over into the sphere of political cooperation. Such a transference would, of course, help to solidify

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Havana's credentials as a member in good standing of the Third World community and should bolster its capability to mobilize LDC support for its foreign policy initiatives. It is this political dimension of developmentalism that is crucial to Cuban counterdependency strategy, for it will be the pivotal factor in the equation that will determine the amount of diplomatic space and bargaining power available to Havana as it seeks to negotiate the terms of its relationships with the main actors on the global stage. One obvious implication of a strong South-South link on Havana's part is the greater sense of security that it can provide to Cuba vis-à-vis its old nemesis, the United States. Although Havana has always relied mainly on its Moscow connection for a deterrent against the United States, it has never received an ironclad guarantee that the Kremlin would respond militarily if Washington ever decided to attack the island. Consequently Cuba has always been willing to seize whatever other opportunities might present themselves to deal with the United States from a position of greater strength. Developmental internationalism can make some contributions along these lines by helping to enhance Havana's status among the LDCs and thereby increase the costs that Washington would incur in terms of an adverse Third World reaction should it resort to strong-arm tactics against the island. In other words, just as the Soviet Union found its influence among the developing nations badly damaged by its invasion of Afghanistan, so also would the United States find itself in a similar situation should it decide to flout Third World sensitivities by opting for confrontation with Cuba. In effect, then, developmental aid programs can, by consolidating Havana's South-South axis, help to engender a climate conducive to a negotiated settlement of US-Cuban differences, which is exactly what the Fidelistas want. Also, the more leverage that Havana acquires in Third World affairs, the greater the likelihood that its position on international issues (e.g., the LDC debt crisis) will gain support and be incorporated into the Third World agenda for North-South negotiations. To the extent that Washington and its allies address these points within the context of a general dialogue on North-South problems, they would in a sense likewise be discussing the terms of their relations with Cuba. Havana could then be said to have acquired "collective bargaining power" in its dealings with the United States and other Western-bloc countries. As is the case with the United States, the diversification and strengthening of Cuba's Third World ties implicit in its developmental aid programs may also give Havana more political space in which to maneuver as it seeks to maximize its control over the general nature and specific details of its Moscow connection. The essence of the interface between this South-South dimension of Cuba's foreign policy and its dealings with

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the Kremlin has in the past revolved around Havana's ability to function as a broker between the Soviet bloc and the developing nations. The three-step chain of logic involved here is as follows: (1) anything—including successful developmentalism—that contributes to Cuba's influence in Third World affairs and its prospects for playing a leadership role therein represents political capital on which Havana can draw to enhance its linkage capabilities; (2) any increase in Cuba's linkage capabilities serves to make it a more valuable ally in Moscow's eyes; and (3) improving its stature as a Soviet ally translates into a stronger negotiating position for Havana when working out the terms of its relationship with the USSR. Moreover, there is an additional potential bonus involved in the sense that any concessions that Havana may procure from the Kremlin as a result of its successes in Third World politics could give it an even greater ability to operate effectively on a South-South axis and thereby derive even more bargaining power relative to the Soviet Union. To clarify this idea, consider the aid the Russians have provided to subsidize the island's economy. Without such help, it is questionable whether Havana would have been able to sustain its own foreign assistance programs at their usual highpowered levels. However, contends Sergio Roca, not only did Moscow generally maintain its commitment to Cuba's economic well-being, but there is evidence that Cuba was able to up the ante of Soviet support by playing its Third World cards. Specifically, he says, "Cuba's increased leverage and strengthened bargaining position with the USSR [a result of Havana's African exploits] have been and will be useful in the resolution of key economic issues involving trade and aid agreements, oil supplies, and debt repayment." 32 In effect, then, what has been happening is that Havana has skillfully manipulated the Third World-Soviet interface of its foreign policy in such a way as to shift at least part of the burden of underwriting its counterdependency initiatives onto Moscow's shoulders, an accomplishment somewhat akin to getting your opponent in a political race to finance your campaign. A rather recent demonstration of Cuba's bargaining skills occurred in connection with Secretary-General Gorbachev's April 1989 visit to the island. Prior to his arrival, many outside observers had predicted that he would read the riot act to Castro and try to whip the recalcitrant Fidelistas into line behind his new thinking about international as well as domestic issues with blatant threats to restrict the flow of future Soviet assistance. What may have transpired behind closed doors remains to be seen. The public posture of the two parties was, however, generally conciliatory and included the announcement of a twenty-five-year friendship treaty wherein the USSR endorsed some key elements in Havana's North-South agenda, one example being Moscow's acceptance of the idea that superpower defense expenditures rendered unnecessary by arms-control agree-

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ments should be applied to alleviating Third World underdevelopment.33 Although developmental internationalism has proved itself a viable vehicle for advancing Cuba's counterdependency interests on both its US and Russian fronts, there are some potential problems that must be addressed in assessing its future prospects. Certainly the counterpressures the United States can bring to bear, especially in the Western Hemisphere, should not be underestimated. The US invasion of Grenada in 1983 destroyed what Havana hoped would be a showcase in the eastern Caribbean for its developmental efforts, and subsequently Suriname, concerned that Washington might now be inclined to move against it in retaliation for the cordial relations it had developed with Cuba, asked Havana to recall some of its civilian internationalists. Cuba also lowered its profile in Nicaragua in the mid-1980s by withdrawing some of its aid personnel because it feared that the Reagan administration would be able to use their presence to mobilize support for its hard-line procontra policies and perhaps even as a pretext for intervening with regular US military forces. Changing Third World political conditions have also occasionally bedeviled Havana's foreign aid programs, as was demonstrated in Jamaica when Edward Seaga, a staunch anti-Communist who would prove to be one of the Reagan administration's most trustworthy allies in the Caribbean Basin, won the island's 1980 general elections and promptly expelled all Cubans shortly after moving into the prime minister's office. Similar setbacks occurred in Kampuchea, Somalia, and Chile during the 1970s. Currently Latin America seems to be the Third World region that is the prime candidate for such right-wing renaissances, for it has a long tradition of repressive military regimes that very well may reassert itself if the moderate civilian governments that now control most of the hemisphere's nations prove unable to cope with the staggering socioeconomic problems that are spreading misery and despair from the Rio Grande to Cape Horn. Just as Washington's hostility often complicates Havana's developmental and South-South initiatives, so also at times can Moscow's friendship or indifference. Certainly there have been and continue to be Third World nations who are very leery of hosting Cuban internationalists because of Havana's ties with Moscow, fearing that the Fidelistas are little more than Soviet spear-carriers, and hence that permitting a Cuban presence would render their country vulnerable to Russian penetration or subversion. In other words, what is at work here is a surrogate-thesis mentality that calls for total avoidance of Havana's developmental aid programs on the grounds that they are in reality Soviet Trojan horses. And even if the more moderate, less threatening image that Gorbachev has cultivated abroad has helped to alleviate such trepidation somewhat, Cuba still has to worry about whether the USSR has become more sensitive regarding the negative side effects that unilateral action on its

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part can have on its allies. Moscow has a history of going its own international way in a manner that can be highly detrimental to Cuban interests, perhaps the best example being the havoc the Kremlin's invasion of Afghanistan (which was launched without any forewarning to the Cubans) wreaked on Havana's efforts to consolidate its leadership of the Nonaligned Movement. Overshadowing all these potential complications, however, is the general disarray that has come to characterize the island's Soviet-CMEA relations in the early 1990s. This situation, as emphasized in Chapter 1, will almost surely (at least in the short run) limit Cuba's capability to mount or maintain aid programs, for not only will its access to external resources that previously could be applied directly to supporting these efforts be reduced, but also the curtailment of the Revolution's socialist-bloc subsidies could create such serious internal problems that the Fidelistas will have to devote practically all of their time, energy, and personnel to the domestic front. In short, Cuban developmental assistance could very well find its horizons considerably narrowed by the new economic-political order emerging in Eastern Europe. Finally, some skeptics have questioned whether the Cuban public or even the government will be willing to continue to support the diversion of highly skilled people to overseas projects while there are still major developmental issues at home that demand attention. For instance, they ask whether Havana can realistically be expected to keep sending large numbers of its best construction workers and engineers abroad while the island is still facing a serious shortage of good housing for its own citizens. The Cubans have, of course, been willing to make such sacrifices in the past, but the fact remains that there are domestic exigencies that to some extent conflict with, and may in some quarters undermine support for, ambitious aid programs in the future. Despite such problems, the overall balance sheet seems to be positive, especially when viewed from a broad counterdependency perspective. By diversifying and strengthening the nation's South-South ties, developmentalism has enhanced Havana's opportunities to acquire the most crucial commodity in counterdependency politics—the bargaining leverage necessary to be able to negotiate the terms of its North-South relations from a position of relative strength. Consequently, in contrast to its traditional vulnerability to external penetration and domination, revolutionary Cuba has thus far managed to meet many of the challenges of the modern interdependent world by orchestrating its overseas agenda in such a way as to maximize its prospects for maintaining a posture of controlled dependence and effective sovereignty within the contemporary international order. While there very well may be occasional setbacks as conditions change, the long-range pattern will almost undoubtedly see, given the counterdependency impulses rooted in Havana's political personality,

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developmental aid remaining an important dimension of the island's foreign policy and its status as a uniquely influential actor on the global stage. Notes 1. This characterization can be found in Jorge I. Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 7, which is the most recent general survey of Cuban foreign policy published in the United States. Other works attempting to provide a broad overview of Havana's international relations are Carla Anne Robbins, The Cuban Threat (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983); H. Michael Erisman, Cuba's International Relations: The Anatomy of a Nationalistic Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985); and Pamela S. Falk, Cuban Foreign Policy: Caribbean Tempest (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1986). 2. The only significant studies published in the United States that take Cuban developmental aid as a main focus of attention are Susan Eckstein, "Cuban Internationalism," in Cuba: Twenty-Five Years of Revolution, 1959-1984, ed. Sandor Halebsky and John M. Kirk (New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1985), pp. 372-390; Donna Rich, "Cuban Internationalism: A Humanitarian Foreign Policy," in The Cuba Reader: The Making of a Revolutionary Society, ed. Philip Brenner et al. (New York: Grove Press, 1989), pp. 405-413; Julie M. Feinsilver, "Cuba as a 'World Medical Power': The Politics of Symbolism," Latin American Research Review 24, no. 2 (1989): 1-34; and Sergio Diaz-Briquets and Jorge Pérez-López, "Internationalist Civilian Assistance: The Cuban Presence in SubSaharan Africa," in Cuban Internationalism In Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. Sergio Diaz-Briquets (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1989), pp. 48-77. 3. These figures come from Feinsilver, "Cuba as a 'World Medical Power,'" pp. 12,15. 4. The CIA published annual summaries with country breakdowns in the late 1970s but discontinued the practice in the early 1980s. The agency refused a telephone request by the author for its most recent data, with no explanation given as to why it could not be provided. The most recent US government publication that contains some useful tables (although the data are not current, 1986 being the most recent year reported) is US Department of State, Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDCs: Holding Their Own in 1986 (Washington, DC: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1989). Data sometimes appear in Cuban publications such as Granma and Colaboración Internacional, but they tend to be fragmentary rather than taking the form of tables that summarize the total scope of Havana's developmental aid efforts. During a June 1990 research trip to the island, the author interviewed Miguel Figueres Pérez (an official of the CECE) and was informed that data about Cuban developmental aid personnel such as country totals and specific programs or assignments are considered classified information by the Cuban government, and therefore the author's request for summary statistics could not be satisfied.

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5. The 1983 figures are from Feinsilver, "Cuba as a 'World Medical Power,'" p. 11, and the 1985 totals can be found in Rich, "Cuban Internationalism," p. 406. 6. See US Department of State, Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs: 1986, p. 12. Comparing this source with US Department of State, Warsaw Pact Economic Aid to Non-Communist LDCs, 1984 (Washington, DC: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, May 1986), p. 16, the largest reductions in Cuban aid personnel from 1984 to 1986 were in North Africa "Other," 3,575 to O; Nicaragua, 5,300 to 2,500; and Guinea, 240 to 25. 7. See Eckstein, "Cuban Internationalism," p. 347, for construction; Rich, "Cuban Internationalism," p. 407, for education; and Feinsilver, "Cuba as a 'World Medical Power,'" p. 12, for health. 8. For more information on CECE's structure, functions, and intragovernmental relationships, see Marlene Gómez, "Una entrevista singular," Colaboración Internacional 3/86 (June-September 1986): 2-3. 9. For more details, see H. Michael Erisman, "Cuba and the Third World: The Nonaligned Nations Movement," in The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean, ed. Barry B. Levine (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 149-170. 10. This topic is analyzed in H. Michael Erisman, "Cuban Foreign Policy and the Latin American Debt Crisis," in Cuban Studies 18, ed. Carmelo Mesa-Lago (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), pp. 3-18. 11. See, for example, Carlos Bastista Moreno, "South-South Trade: Utopian?" Granna Weekly Review (March 9,1986): 10. 12. The only two studies that have delved in any depth into the applicability to revolutionary Cuba of the dependency concept are William LeoGrande, "Cuban Dependency: A Comparison of Pre-Revolutionary and Post-Revolutionary International Economic Relations," Cuban Studies 9, no. 2 (July 1979): 1-28; and Robert A. Packenham, "Capitalist Versus Socialist Dependency: The Case of Cuba," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 28, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 59-92. In each case the main concern is to examine whether the Cuban-Soviet relationship fits the dependency mold rather than to focus on the larger issue of the overall counterdependency dimensions of the Revolution's foreign policy. Packenham is inclined to view the Havana-Moscow link in dependency terms, while LeoGrande rejects the idea. Some observers who have probed the validity of the Cuban surrogate thesis have clearly been influenced by dependency analysis but have not incorporated it into their work as a main theme. See, for example, Robert Pastor, "Cuba and the Soviet Union: Does Cuba Act Alone?" in Levine, New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean, pp. 191-210; or W. Raymond Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985). 13. Quoted in Eduardo Galeano, "A Work of This World," Granma Weekly Review (January 22,1989): 3. 14. For a more detailed discussion, see James A. Caporaso, "Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis," International Organization 32, no. 1 (Winter 1978): 13-43. 15. James A. Caporaso, "Introduction to the Special Issue of International Organization on Dependence and Dependency in the Global System," Interna-

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tional Organization 32, no. 1 (Winter 1978): 4. 16. William LeoGrande, "The Dilemmas of Cuban Policy in the Third World," manuscript, 1981, p. 8. 17. Fidel Castro, "Main Report to the First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party," Gramma Weekly Review (January 4,1976): 10. 18. Jorge I. Domínguez, "Political and Military Limitations and Consequences of Cuban Policies in Africa," in Cuba in Africa, ed. Carmelo Mesa-Lago and June S. Belkin, Latin American Monograph and Document Series, no. 3 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1982), p. 119. It should be noted that Domínguez includes in his calculations recipients of Cuban military aid as well as those receiving developmental assistance, which tends to blur the picture a bit because Havana is much more likely to restrict its military aid to its core allies. Separating the recipients according to the kind of aid they are given would show that ecumenicalism is most prevalent in Cuba's developmental aid programs. 19. For an excellent example of the Cuban perspective on Havana's Third World policies, see Armando Entralgo González and David González López, "Cuban Policy Toward Africa," in Subject to Solution: Problems in Cuban-U.S. Relations, ed. Wayne S. Smith and Esteban Morales Domínguez (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), pp. 47-57. 20. According to "Cuba Weathers a Difficult Year," Caribbean Insight 11, no. 1 (January 1988): 7, 90 percent of Cuba's foreign trade in 1987 was with centrally planned economies (i.e., the Soviet bloc). 21. Rich, "Cuban Internationalism," p. 407, reports that in 1985 there were twenty-four such schools serving at least three hundred foreign students each. The Cuban government covers all the expenses for food, lodging, education, medical care, pocket money, and travel. Havana also assumes all the costs involved in providing instructors from the students' home countries to offer courses dealing with their nation's language, history, geography, and culture. 22. For additional details on the monetary and related rewards accruing to Cuban internationalists, see Sergio Roca, "Economic Aspects of Cuban Involvement in Africa," in Mesa-Lago and Belkin, Cuba in Africa, p. 172. 23. Comparing the Cubans' modest life-style to that of aid personnel from the superpowers, Gerald J. Bender, "Angola, the Cubans, and American Anxieties," Foreign Policy 31 (Spring 1978): 10-11, reports that, according to one African official, "when the Soviets arrive here, they usually demand rooms in the best hotels or well-furnished houses with air conditioning and new stoves and refrigerators. . . whereas we can put five or six Cubans in a hot one-bedroom apartment with mattresses on the floor and we will never hear a complaint." 24. Entralgo González and González López, "Cuban Policy Toward Africa," p. 50. 25. This lack of information regarding Havana's activities in North Vietnam is symptomatic of the larger gap that exists in Cuban studies with respect to the island's relations with, and policies toward, Far Eastern countries. There is no indication that any major descriptive or analytical work whatsoever has been done on the Asian dimension of Cuban foreign policy. 26. Feinsilver, "Cuba as a 'World Medical Power,'" p. 21. 27. Eckstein, "Cuban Internationalism," pp. 379-380. George Volsky,

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(Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), p. 76, says that according to some reports host countries in Africa paid $1,500 per month for the services of each Cuban doctor in 1978, while Havana spent only $200 on the physician's personal expenses along with a $300 salary disbursed to the family, which remained in Cuba. Thus, he says, Havana cleared $1,000 per month on each for a 1978 total of approximately $10 million for the eight hundred Cuban physicians in Africa. 28. Roca, "Economic Aspects of Cuban Involvement in Africa," p. 175. 29. Eckstein, "Cuban Internationalism," p. 379. 30. Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, p. 234. 31. For details concerning the functionalist theory of integration, see such pioneering works as Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964); and David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966). 32. Roca, "Economic Aspects of Cuba's Involvement in Africa," p. 166; for details regarding the gains Cuba made on these key economic issues, see ibid., pp. 166-168.

33. See Article 6 of the official text of the treaty published in Granma Weekly Review (April 16,1989): 5. This idea was initially proposed by Castro as part of his plan for helping to resolve the Third World debt crisis. The full transcripts of the two major speeches made by Castro and Gorbachev to commemorate the visit can also be found in this issue of the Granma Weekly Review, pp. 2-4.

10 Exporting the Educational Revolution: The Cuban Project to Become a World Educational Power Mark Richmond In an influential article published in 1978, Jorge Domínguez succinctly expressed a perception that formed the starting point of numerous studies of Cuba's foreign relations and international entanglements: "Cuba is a small country, but it has a big country's foreign policy."1 Dominguez's observation was a response to what he later called "Cuba's irruption into world affairs" 2 in the mid-1970s. Attempts to explain this striking phenomenon have had to address not only Havana's dramatic military interventions abroad, notably in Angola and Ethiopia, but also the Revolution's burgeoning civilian as well as military assistance programs directed toward fellow developing countries. 3 Castro, meanwhile, emerged as an authoritative voice articulating Third World perspectives on a variety of controversial subjects, such as the debt crisis. The improbability that a country of Cuba's dimensions, limited resources, geographical location, and level of development could play such an active and sometimes decisive role in world affairs encouraged some analysts to see the island wholly or essentially as the puppet, proxy, or surrogate of the Soviet Union. This interpretation, however, has been largely discredited in academic circles on the grounds that it seriously underestimates Havana's autonomy in the area of foreign policy and fails to account satisfactorily for known examples of independent Cuban initiatives.4 Delivering a double surprise in the shape of its successful, largescale interventions abroad and its scope for autonomous action, Havana's foreign policy also manifested at least two other distinctive characteristics: (1) the evidently important role played by ideological factors; and (2) the utilization of somewhat unorthodox methods and approaches. My aim here is to explore a particular project associated with Cuba's educational revolution in the light of the considerations outlined above. The academic marriage, liaison, or at any rate flirtation between the disciplines of international relations and educational studies may be perceived as neither desirable nor proper. In the case of postrevolutionary Cuba, however, such a pairing is justified by virtue of that country's unusually ambitious practice of what might be called educational 167

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diplomacy. The use of educational institutions, resources, personnel, achievements, and contacts for the purpose of pursuing foreign policy objectives is not unique to Cuba, of course, nor was it absent from the Castro government's repertoire of policy instruments during the first decade or so of the postrevolutionary period. However, from the mid1970s on it became evident from several of Castro's pronouncements as well as from a range of government actions that educational diplomacy was being promoted more strongly, and that this development was intended to transform Cuba into a "world educational power" by the turn of the century. In some quarters such an ambition might be dismissed summarily as unrealistic or as rhetorical nonsense, a curious but soon-to-be-forgotten piece of revolutionary whimsy. In January 1989, however, in a speech commemorating the anniversary of his victorious entry into Havana thirty years earlier, Castro declared that "conditions have been created for us to be a real educational power," 5 an achievement paralleling similar success in the area of health.6 To support his statement, he referred to a number of accomplishments and trends in the educational sector: a teaching force of over 270,000; a ninth-grade education as the nation's average level; the creation of exact-sciences senior high schools; and the spread of computer studies in higher education and pedagogical institutes and, imminently, to all secondary schools in Cuba. Clearly, as far as Castro is concerned, the project to turn Cuba into a world educational power is alive and well and rests upon a solid foundation of progress and achievement. It is worth noting that the indicators he mentions are not merely quantitative, but refer also to the kind and level of instruction that has been created, particularly its scientific-technological character and its currency with contemporary educational trends in the world at large. Whether one accepts these claims of excellence or not, it is evident that a singular and fascinating attempt is being made to derive significant national benefits, through a variety of international links and programs, from one of the success stories of recent Cuban history, namely, the educational revolution.7 It has to be recognized, however, that the notion of a world educational power is neither conventional nor amenable to precise definition (one suspects, in fact, that it is a concept largely of Castro's own making). In terms of its connotations, it suggests leadership, prominence, authority, influence, prestige, respect, and achievement. For analytical purposes, however, three main dimensions of meaning may be discerned within Cuban usage and practice. First, there is the idea of Cuban's education achieving a high world ranking in relation to various comparative indicators that are taken to show that the Revolution's educational performance has surpassed that of many other countries, especially those of

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Latin America and the Third World. Occasionally Castro maintains that Cuba has attained a rather sweeping superiority, as when he proclaimed that "socialism has put us in first place in the field of education in this hemisphere." 8 At other times he highlights success in a particular sphere or aspect of education; for example, he recently asserted that Cuba is "the country with the highest per capita rate of foreign students in the world." 9 As noted earlier, Castro is particularly proud of his country's advances in science education. Other indicators regularly invoked include staff-to-student ratios; literacy rates; budgetary allocations per student; enrollment, promotion, and graduation rates; average number of years of schooling; rates of dropout and repetition; and enrollment ratios between primary, secondary, and higher levels. The last criterion has been particularly useful for showing how the gap between Cuba and the developed capitalist states has narrowed, a trend that gives much satisfaction to the regime's leaders by furnishing a clear propaganda message: "Our current enrollment distribution presents an educational situation much more similar to that of developed countries evidencing that it is indeed possible to solve the social problems and structural deformations which characterize underdeveloped countries."10 Moreover, even the types of problems facing the island's educational system convey a backhanded compliment to the Cuban authorities, for those difficulties generally concern the quality of education at a time when so many other countries are still struggling to overcome massive quantitative deficiencies.11 A second way of understanding the notion of a world educational power is to recognize that a certain form of excellence or a distinctive model may emerge that acquires some measure of world significance. This model may attract international interest, commendation, and admiration. It may be imitated by other countries, in whole or in part; alternatively, it may fulfill a kind of exemplary role, illustrating what can be achieved or what might be done, relevant to the experience, needs, or hopes of other nations. In the Cuban case its model is one that speaks directly to developing countries keen to create educational systems that meet the requirements of social and economic development, national identity, and mass mobilization. Certain features of the Cuban model or experience may command special attention: programs (e.g., the Literacy Campaign); institutions (e.g., the schools in the countryside); operative principles (e.g., the combination of productive work and study); orientation (e.g., socialist education in a developing country); or relevance (e.g., applied scientifictechnological research in agronomy, medicine, and biotechnology). On the basis of these and other features of the educational revolution, Cuba has assumed, or been accorded, a role of leadership, especially in Third World circles. Finally, the idea of a world educational power conveys some notion

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of real influence being exerted or substantial assistance being offered on an international level. Specifically, this may refer to the world availability of the island's educational revolution through various methods of sharing its benefits with other countries. Havana has, for instance, organized extensive aid programs whereby it offers its educational expertise, experience, personnel, resources, and facilities to non-Cubans; alternatively, the educational revolution may become available through its output, that is, Cuba's skilled and professional human resources. Thus, Havana endeavors to reveal its status as a world educational power through its actual delivery of educational and education-based services to other countries and their populations. The point of delivery may be the recipient states or Cuba itself. Clearly, the educational project to which Cuba has committed itself displays ambition of a perhaps remarkable kind. However, it is important to see this endeavor as a complex, multifaceted affair and, in particular, to avoid placing an excessive emphasis on quantitative indices alone. For example, it is possible that the number of foreign higher-education students in Cuba (just over four thousand in 1986) might be seen as trivial in the light of the following considerations: today, there are about 1 million foreign students in the world; of these, 370,000 study in the United States, while four countries (Britain, France, West Germany, and the Soviet Union) each host over fifty thousand foreign students.12 Such a comparison is unfair, of course, for it obscures how Cuba's aid in this area is unusually high given the country's level of development, wealth, and population. For Castro, however, this corrective may not go far enough, on the grounds that an essential aspect of Cuba's position as an educational power is not only the numbers of foreign students, but also the kind of education they receive. Before exploring the reasons why Havana may have set itself the task of becoming a world educational power, it may be useful to examine the chief methods and approaches through which the Cuban style of educational diplomacy is expressed. Some of these techniques are quite conventional and are certainly not peculiar to Cuban practice, but others are more unusual in character. In the case of both conventional and unconventional methods, the Revolution's educational diplomacy may also reveal itself as distinctive through the sheer relative scale of the programs or through the orientation bestowed by the larger project. One technique used by the Cuban authorities to advertise (and to secure international recognition of) their educational achievements is the regular supply of data and official reports to such bodies as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) that, says Castro in apparent response to those who might impugn Havana's integrity, "are familiar with the seriousness of our statistics."13

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Moreover, Cuban educational specialists and students regularly attend conferences and congresses abroad; students, especially, participate in international sporting, cultural, and scientific events, success at which is taken to bring credit not only to themselves but also to the Revolution and its educational institutions. Cuba also hosts a considerable number of international meetings and conferences. In late November 1988, for example, the first Ibero-American Conference on Education, attracting ministers and top educational officials from eighteen countries, was held in Havana. On such occasions visiting specialists often are shown around showcase educational establishments. The same fate may also await visiting political leaders; trips to the international schools on the Isle of Youth are not unusual. Cuba also provides some material aid to other countries in the form of books, furniture, and equipment. Occasionally it will donate an entire school to another country; in March 1987, for instance, it was announced that Havana was presenting a well-equipped polytechnical school to the Dominican Republic at a cost of $2.8 million.14 Indeed, in some circumstances Cuba puts together a comprehensive package of educational aid, as occurred during the early years of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua: Cuba helped design and implement the educational system by providing scholarships for Nicaraguans to study in Cuba, supplying professors and primary school teachers, and providing advice in the design of programs. By July 1980, Nicaragua and Cuba had signed an educational cooperation agreement providing for the services of 1,000 Cuban primary school teachers, 40 university professors, and scholarships for 3,000 Nicaraguans to study in Cuba. As a result, the Minister of Education, Carlos Tunnermann, could announce that Nicaragua would develop educational programs based upon the Cuban model.15

In the mid-1980s it was reported that about 150 Cuban lecturers were working each year in higher-education centers in developing countries, while every year over 120 teachers and scientists from these nations went to the island to study at postgraduate levels or to undertake training.16 A particularly noteworthy feature of Cuba's educational aid has been its dispatching of voluntary teachers and student teachers to fulfil their internationalist duty abroad, especially in Africa and Central America. According to Castro, over twenty thousand primary and secondary teachers have completed such missions in over forty countries.17 These examples illustrate a pronounced feature of Havana's civilian aid programs in general, namely, their people orientation. Rather than revolving around money or materials, Cuban assistance normally (although not always) involves personnel—teachers, doctors, engineers,

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technicians, skilled workers. These, in turn, represent the output of the island's educational system. This orientation, moreover, means that the aid tends to be received directly, through person-to-person human services, rather than at second hand and impersonally. Perhaps the most vivid expression of this phenomenon are the scholarship programs for foreign students to study inside Cuba itself. In view of its importance, not least for revealing the expanded role of educational diplomacy from the mid-1970s on, a somewhat fuller analysis of this scheme will now be offered. According to data supplied to UNESCO, there were 4,075 foreign students enrolled in Cuban institutions of higher education in 1986. 18 Remarkably, there were at the same time another twenty thousand foreign students, drawn from over eighty countries (mostly African) enrolled in primary, secondary, and polytechnical schools. In August 1987 it was estimated that there would be twenty-six thousand foreign students on the island the following year.19 One recent visitor believes that there are now about thirty thousand foreign students attending Cuban educational institutions.20 Approximately 60 percent are being schooled on the Isle of Youth where, in April 1988, there were over sixteen thousand pupils from thirty-seven countries: 1,922 in primary school; 9,151 in junior high; 1,975 in preuniversity institutes; 2,305 in polytechnical schools; and over seven hundred at the Pedagogical Institute.21 The educational experiment on the Isle of Youth, which was inaugurated in 1977, was from the outset designed largely around the idea of facilities devoted to particular nationalities. Today, for example, there are seven Angolan schools with a total enrollment of 3,581 pupils and four Mozambican schools with 2,231 students enrolled. There are also institutions for pupils from Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, the Congo, Ghana, Namibia, Nicaragua, and North Korea. On the tenth anniversary of the experiment there were ten primary schools, twenty-two junior high schools, ten senior high schools, and six polytechnic schools.22 In the last, pupils of different nationalities are mixed together while undertaking various training courses to become middle-level technicians and skilled workers. Mention should also be made of the Vanguardia de La Habana senior high school, which is distinctive for being the only unit of its kind on the Isle of Youth attempting to create an integrated form of multinational education. This coeducational institution has an enrollment of nearly five hundred students from eleven countries.23 An interesting recent development has been the establishment during the 1986/87 academic year of the Higher Pedagogical Institute for foreign students on the Isle of Youth. A branch of the Pedagogical Institute of the University of Havana, this institution offers five-year teacher-training courses mainly in scientific subjects. The initial intake of approximately five hundred students from Zimbabwe and Angola is expected to grow to

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an enrollment of two thousand eventually, perhaps with students from other countries participating. A novel feature of this program is the plan for the instructors to undertake their practice-teaching in the relevant schools for African students on the Isle of Youth. 24 While the pattern has displayed some variation over the years, African countries have consistently supplied a clear majority of the foreign students in Cuban educational institutions (at least over the past decade). In 1987 over fifteen thousand out of the seventeen thousand foreign students on the Isle of Youth were African.25 At the higher levels about two-thirds of the foreign students in 1976 were Africans. By the early 1980s this proportion had fallen to just below 50 percent, but then rebounded to 66 percent by 1986. This recovery was marked by an increase from 697 Africans in 1979 to 2,687 in 1986, with one country, Ethiopia, increasing its contingent of higher-education students from sixteen to 887 during those years.26 A noticeable development in the early 1980s was the rapid growth in the number of university students entering Cuba from North America, which effectively means Central America and the Caribbean as far as Havana is concerned. In 1976 there were just fifty-eight North American students in Cuba (just 4.9 percent of the overseas total), but this figure rose to 693 (25.4 percent) in 1982. These increases reflect, of course, important developments in the region, with Havana demonstrating an ability to react quickly to the changes and the new opportunities they presented. Thus, for example, no Grenadian students were recorded as studying in Cuba during 1979, but by 1980 there were thirty-five, and two years later the number rose to ninety-one. Similarly, only three Nicaraguan students attended Cuban universities in 1978; one year after the overthrow of the Somoza regime ninety Nicaraguans were enrolled. There was, however, an absolute and relative decline in the numbers of higher-education students entering Cuba from Central America and the Caribbean as the 1980s wore on, a trend no doubt reflecting changes in the political complexion and sensitivities of the region as well as, perhaps, the impact of the growing scholarship programs offered by the Soviet-bloc countries.27 The great majority of foreign students pursuing courses of study in postrevolutionary Cuba arrive from Third World nations, typically as a consequence of a bilateral agreement between Havana and each sending country. Most of these students receive free scholarships from the Cuban government at an estimated cost of $40 million.28 By and large, Havana appears much more concerned to reward its friends than to placate its enemies. However, it has also used these scholarships as a means of establishing friendly contact with a broad range of states. Thus, since the early 1960s students from at least 102 nations have studied in Cuban

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institutions of higher learning.29 For many of these countries, the acceptance of these offers may have little more than a symbolic value. On the other hand, for some small or poor countries or for nations (especially those in Africa with limited secondary or higher-education facilities), Cuba's educational aid may represent an important contribution to national development. In some instances, as in the case of refugees acceptable to the Castro government such as Chileans, Uruguayans, Namibians, and Palestinians, the scholarships may be vital to personal survival. When political circumstances change, as they have in Namibia, the years of investment in the education of refugees (in some individual cases from primary schooling right through to higher education) may be put to the test. There has, for example, been a reverse exodus to their homeland of many of the fifteen hundred Namibian refugee students who had been living and studying in Cuba for several years.30 Although there is much more that could be said on the subject of Havana's programs for foreign students, they are clearly a vital and revealing feature of the effort to become a world educational power. As noted earlier, their significance is not limited to the numbers of students involved, but also includes a range of other considerations. Specifically, the typical fields of study of foreign students tend to be practical and applied, such as agronomy, medicine, engineering, education, economics, and veterinary science.31 Cuban higher education thus presents itself as highly relevant to the real developmental needs of Third World societies. Moreover, the problem of brain drain is claimed to be minor in the case of Cuba's foreign students. Such factors are designed to add further dimensions to the island's status as a country at the forefront of efforts to solve the problems of developing nations. The fact that Cuba is itself a Third World state is central to the marketing of its role as an educational power. If we now turn our attention to the task of understanding and explaining why Havana has taken on this role, it is important to reemphasize that it is an unusual ambition. It is one thing to utilize the techniques of educational diplomacy, but it is quite another to dedicate those methods to the achievement of a perhaps eccentric self-imposed goal. Certainly, if the country in question is facing enormous problems of its own deriving from its underdevelopment and its complex external relations with other states, one might be forgiven for concluding that the whole project is wrongheaded. Those very problems and relations, however, may provide the central clues for solving this puzzle. Postrevolutionary efforts to advance Cuba's rate and level of development have by no means enjoyed equal measures of success; economic performance, for example, has been noticeably patchy and often disappointing. In two areas of policy, however, Cuba's social revolution has

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registered remarkable progress, namely, in health and education. Achievements in both areas have attracted considerable international acclaim and have also won popular approval and support at home. As advertisements for the Revolution as a whole, especially in terms of their people orientation, the health and education sectors have been of immeasurable value to the island's leaders. Attaining the status of an educational power, particularly in the eyes of developing countries, gives Havana international respectability, legitimacy, and pride that its enemies would like to deny it. Moreover, despite the country's reliance on the aid and friendship of the Soviet Union over the years, Cubans can point to their achievements in health and education as unquestionably their own, born of their own efforts and struggle. Consequently, to make education and educational diplomacy significant elements in the nation's external relations is a clear way of declaring the autonomy and cubanidad of its foreign policies. This whole scenario would, of course, have been untenable had Cuban education languished under unresolved problems. In this light, it is important to recognize Havana's timing in launching its ambitious desire to become an educational power. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the island's educational system was troubled by a number of weaknesses, especially high rates of dropout and repetition as well as low rates of enrollment in certain age groups. By the mid-1970s, however, corrective measures appeared to have overcome the worst aspects of these difficulties. This success was consolidated and built upon by a systemwide reform of programs, curricula, textbooks, and teaching-learning strategies (the perfeccionamiento) that gave every promise of leading Cuba's educational revolution toward new heights of achievement. Thus, at precisely the moment that Havana's opportunities for exerting influence in world affairs were greater than at any time since 1959, the educational system matured. In effect, it became available and a major source of strength for the regime as a prestigious achievement for a Third World country; as a model for other countries to admire or imitate; and as a source of skilled, well-educated, and professional manpower whose employment on internationalist missions or overseas contracts would earn political and economic rewards for their homeland. Cuba's leaders, of course, have long maintained that the country's developmental aid programs, including those concerning education, were an expression of internationalism and solidarity. While there is growing acceptance that the ideological element within Cuban policymaking and policy outcomes is important, such sentiments alone cannot adequately account for the stepping-up of Havana's overseas commitments in the mid-1970s, if only because they have always been a significant component in the policy process in postrevolutionary Cuba. Hence other considera-

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Cuba's Relations with the Third World

tions, such as the opportunity to reduce the island's isolation, win new friends and supporters, earn foreign exchange, relieve domestic employment pressures, and gain prestige for its leaders, must also be brought into the picture. In addition, the Castro factor should not be overlooked, for Fidel's energy, determination, and authority undoubtedly are bound up closely with the educational project. With regard to the Isle of Youth experiment, it has been argued that "the schools are a quintessential reflection of Castro's complex personality. In this instance, his burning desire to occupy a place in the world history books has combined with his obsessive belief in the importance of education and an instinctive solidarity with those whom he sees as worse off."32 An excessive focus on Fidel's personality, however, may be misleading, for it may suggest that the scholarship programs for foreign students are closer to his heart than his head. This may not only underestimate his capacity for hardheaded shrewdness, but it may also distract attention from other important variables. After all, even Castro's personality, however much it may have imprinted itself on Cuban society, must accommodate to the realities and relationships that structure Havana's ties with other states. Indeed, the whole question of Cuba's ambition to become a world educational power cannot be understood without reference to the matrix of major international debates, issues, and relationships that, together with the island's domestic developments, defines its opportunities for survival and prosperity. Thus, Cuban foreign policy must address three major crosscutting themes: the relationship between developed and developing socialist states; the wider question of NorthSouth linkages; and the possibilities for South-South cooperation. The interconnections between these themes serve as sources of both constraint and opportunity as far as Havana is concerned. In particular, Castro has had to learn how to play a convoluted game of leverage in which he must endeavor to gain advantages for himself and his country. Accordingly, plans for the island to become an educational power are best seen as part of his strategy of increasing Havana's leadership role in the South. By giving aid to developing countries, Castro may build up support, but he may also be in a stronger position to press his claims against the island's main benefactor, the Soviet Union. The more Cuba donates to the South, the more it may be able to obtain from the East. This is not to say, however, that there is a simple quid pro quo whereby Moscow agrees to support Castro in direct proportion to his assistance to developing countries. "Although the massive flow of Soviet aid to Cuba over the years has, indirectly, made the schools [on the Isle of Youth] possible, Moscow has never had a hand in this aspect of Castro's third world diplomacy. Indeed . . . Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev... might well wonder if this kind of

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activity is wildly over-ambitious for a small Caribbean nation."33 Clearly, Castro has cultivated close ties with the Third World not simply at the behest of the Kremlin, but also for his own reasons (e.g., his desire to use those links as an instrument of leverage on the Soviet bloc so as to extract more assistance and security for Cuba and to extend his own frontiers of autonomy). In this light, aid to other developing nations may not only establish Havana's internationalist credentials and win or consolidate useful friendships abroad, but may also serve to enhance its value to the USSR. The campaign to turn the island into an educational power, therefore, may now begin to look less eccentric. However, a number of practical criticisms might be leveled against this endeavor. It might, for instance, be seen as too expensive for a country of Cuba's size and resources. It should be noted, on the other hand, that Havana's educational diplomacy has been conducted during a period of considerable economic difficulty, and the cost of some elements, such as the foreign student scholarships, has risen during this time; clearly, therefore, Cuba is concerned with more than narrow economic calculations. But overshadowing such considerations rooted essentially in the domestic side of the equation is the possibility (probability?) that even more damage to the strategy will come from changes in the international system that may reduce Havana's opportunities to exercise significant power. Also, the ideological flavor of Cuban education can be expected to limit its appeal, a problem not faced by health (at least not to the same extent). In sum, the educational project is not without problems, limitations, and drawbacks, but it likewise is an imaginative, innovative, and highly visible exploit that suits Castro's style and therefore is unlikely to be abandoned. Indeed, even in his absence the structure of the international framework within which Cuba must function may be such that the role of world educational power will endure. Notes 1. Jorge I. Domínguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 57, no. 1 (1978): 83. 2. Jorge I. Domínguez, "Cuba in the International Arena," Latin American Research Review 23, no. 1 (1988): 196. 3. See Susan Eckstein, "Structural and Ideological Bases of Cuba's Overseas Programs," Politics and Society 11, no. 1 (1982): 95-121. 4. See Peter Shearman, The Soviet Union and Cuba (London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987). 5. Fidel Castro, "Speech at the Main Ceremony to Mark the 30th Anniversary of the Entry into Havana, 8 January 1989," Granma Weekly Review (January

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29,1989): p. 4. 6. For an analysis of Cuba's health revolution, see Julie M. Feinsilver, "Cuba as a 'World Medical Power': The Politics of Symbolism," Latin American Research Review 29, no. 2 (1989): 1-34. 7. For a recent overview of Cuba's educational revolution, see A. Padula and L. M. Smith, "The Revolutionary Transformation of Cuban Education, 1959-1987," in Making the Future: Politics and Educational Reform in the United States, England, the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, ed. E. B. Gumbert (Atlanta: Georgia State University Center for Cross-Cultural Education, 1988), pp. 117— 139. 8. Fidel Castro, "Speech of 16 April 1981," in Fidel Castro Speeches, vol. 2, ed. M. Taber (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1983). 9. Fidel Castro, "Speech at the Closing Session of the 5th Congress of the Young Communist League, 5 April 1987," Granma Weekly Review (April 19, 1987): 13. 10. G. Jiménez, "Current Total Enrollment: 3 Times Greater Than 1959," Granma Weekly Review (January 29,1984): 4. 11. For a discussion of Cuba's "quality of education" problems, see M. Richmond, "Educational Change in Postrevolutionary Cuba: A Critical Assessment,^" International Journal of Educational Development 7, no. 3 (1987): 191-204. 12. See P. G. Altbach, "The New Internationalism: Foreign Students and Scholars," Studies in Higher Education 14, no. 2 (1989): 125. 13. Castro, "Speech at the Main Ceremony," p. 2. 14. See Granma Weekly Review (March 15,1987): 1. 15. T. Schwab and H. Sims, "Relations with the Communist States," in Nicaragua: The First Five Years, ed. T. W. Walker (New York: Praeger, 1985), p. 448. 16. A. Pérez Rodríguez, "Experiencia en la colaboración de los CES de Cuba con los CES de los países socialistas," La Educación Superior Contemporánea 2, no. 50 (1985): 172. 17. Fidel Castro, "Discurso... en la Clausura del XI Seminario Nacional de Educación Media, 5 de febrero de 1987," Educación 17 (April-June 1987): 26. 18. UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1988 (Paris: UNESCO 1988), table 3.12. 19. A. Martínez, "2,361 Foreign Students Graduate in Cuba," Granma Weekly Review (August 9,1987): 10. 20. R. Graham, "Castro's Drive to Educate the World," Financial Times, April 1-2,1989, p. 1. 21. See "Supplement: The Isle of Youth," Granma Weekly Review (April 24, 1988). According to Graham, "Castro's Drive," there are now eighteen thousand foreign students on the Isle of Youth. 22. M. Castañeda, "Treasure on Isle of Youth," Granma Weekly Review (May 17,1987): 12. 23. See "Supplement: The Isle of Youth." 24. Ibid. 25. M. Rojas, "History and Geography of Multiple Lands," Granma Weekly Review (February 15,1987): 3. 26. These and the other statistics in this section have been taken from

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UNESCO, Statistical Yearbooks (Paris: UNESCO, 1980-1988). 27. See W. Norris, "US Fails Test in the Caribbean Class War," Times Higher Education Supplement (January 29,1988): 11. 28. Graham, "Castro's Drive." 29. Author's calculations, based on UNESCO, Statistical Yearbooks, 19801988. 30. C. A. Garcia and D. Rosero, "Namibians in Cuba: Ready to Return," Refugees 68 (1989): 13-14. 31. See CRESALC/UNESCO, La educación superior en Cuba (Caracas: CRESALC/UNESCO, 1985), p. 88. 32. Graham, "Castro's Drive." 33. Ibid.

Part Three CUBA'S RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

181

11 Western Europe and Cuba's Development in the 1980s and Beyond Gareth

Jenkins

Thirty years after its Revolution, the main lines of Cuba's future development appear more uncertain than at any time since the consolidation of Fidel Castro's regime in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Many of the initial aims have been achieved, in particular the creation of a welfare state, unique in the Third World, that has resulted in a healthy, educated population with adequate nutritional standards. But the very success of Cuba's "basic needs" approach is making increasingly urgent the need for an answer to the question, "What next?" During the 1980s Washington's embargo continued to hinder the island's development, but more through restricting access to trade and investment relations with the United States directly than through hampering its commerce with other Western countries. The main exception was the success of the Reagan administration in bullying West European, Japanese, and Canadian steel makers into excluding Cuban nickel from their exports to the United States. On the other hand, in the middle of the decade the embargo began to break down as Havana reestablished relations with most of Latin America, thus ending more than twenty years of regional isolation during which only Mexico and Canada had refused to withdraw diplomatic recognition. Cuba's relations with Western Europe in the 1980s therefore began to approach the pattern of other Latin American countries. Indeed Havana even developed a debt problem; its hard-currency debt per capita amounted to some $600 by the end of 1988. Cuba had, of course, achieved a measure of stability in its foreign trade relations during the 1970s. In particular, long-term agreements with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ensured stable markets for its sugar and a reliable, if in many instances inefficient, source of technology. The boom in world sugar prices in the middle of the decade provided windfall revenues that allowed Havana to turn to Western Europe, Canada, and Japan for industrial supplies, including the purchase of a number of state-of-the-art manufacturing facilities.1 Also, improved relations with the Peronist government in Argentina brought an additional and unexpected bonus when Buenos Aires pressed

183

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Cuba's Relations with the North Atlantic

Community

Washington to allow US subsidiaries based in Argentina to export to Cuba, thus opening up a loophole in the trade embargo that in 1975 was ratified by the Treasury Department as applicable to all US subsidiaries based in third countries. Over the coming years this was to prove an important conduit not only of parts for prerevolutionary US equipment in Cuba, but also for new equipment in a wide range of industrial sectors.2 Paradoxically, then, the United States had by the early 1980s once again become the island's leading hard-currency trading partner, although transactions were carried out solely through third countries. Although these developments permitted Havana to benefit from significant injections of Western technology, its economy nevertheless remained overly dependent on CMEA supplies in the eyes of Cuban economists. In 1980 and 1981 its imports from Western Europe, Canada, and Japan combined (which included US subsidiary trade) amounted to 19.5 and 18.1 percent (respectively) of the overall total, with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe accounting for 75.5 and 77.3 percent; nearly all the remaining 5 percent of imports during both years came from China and Latin America (for statistics on trading activities during the 1980s, see Tables 11.3-11.5 in the Statistical Appendix to this chapter). These ratios, occurring within a context where Western credits were available on a scale previously unknown, were close to what officials (whose target seemed to be 30% non-CMEA trade) considered ideal at the time. But when the island's economy slowed and finally went into recession in the mid-1980s, the Western connection began to unravel as credits dried up and overall commerce declined precipitously. For instance, Western Europe's share of Cuban imports fell from 13.4 percent in 1981 to a low for the decade of 6.3 in 1988. The overall Western total remained above 11 percent between 1984 and 1986 as a result of large purchases from Japan, but the subsequent debt-rescheduling impasse caused that figure to drop to 8.2 percent in 1987 and 7.9 in 1988. These changes on the non-CMEA side of the equation were a major factor behind an increase in the socialist bloc's position from 77.3 percent in 1981 to 84.9 in 1988. To some degree the erosion of Havana's trade with the West was offset by increased hard-currency imports from other Latin American countries, particularly Argentina and Mexico. These amounted to 331.9 million pesos in 1988 (55.7% of the value of Western imports) compared with 68.2 million pesos in 1981 (when they were only 7.4% of the value of Western imports). The published Cuban trade statistics do not reveal the extent to which these figures represented crucial manufacturing equipment and parts, but certainly a large proportion would be direct substitutes for Western goods. As relations have improved, particularly since 1986, Latin America has come to offer an alternative source for some products such as cars and buses for the tourist sector. They also include substantial

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quantities of items supplied by US third-country subsidiaries. The largest single component of imports from the West is complete industrial facilities. In 1988,93.5 million pesos out of a total of726.3 million pesos spent in this area went to Western companies, with the largest supplier being Spain (50.6 million pesos) followed by Italy, Japan, and France. West Germany, Canada, Sweden, and Austria have all won some business during the 1980s, but Britain remained largely out of the picture. Italy, in particular, has increased its involvement over the last five years. The health sector came into its own during the 1980s, as indicated by the growth and structure of imports. The value of raw material imports increased by 229 percent between 1980 and 1988, reflecting the development of Cuba's own pharmaceutical industry, which now accounts for 85 percent of domestic needs and even exports to other developing countries, particularly in Latin America. Western companies typically supply 60-70 percent of the remaining requirements, with West Germany and Italy accounting for roughly a third. Despite growing import substitution, Havana's demand for medicines and pharmaceuticals has continued to grow rapidly, with the costs of foreign medicines increasing from 13.3 million pesos in 1980 to 48.2 million pesos in 1988. According to the published statistics, Western Europe's direct share of the 1988 total was only about 15 percent while Canada represented 3.3 percent. However, the big Western pharmaceutical concerns are able to operate from other countries in the region—Glaxo from Panama, Hoffmann-La Roche from Costa Rica, for example. In 1987 more than $19 million of all medicines and pharmaceuticals combined were sent to Cuba straight from Western Europe. Havana's hard-currency spending on all health care related products (including hospital and laboratory equipment) is currently close to $150 million a year. Agrochemicals are another important hard-currency import. Western countries accounted for 35.4 million pesos out of total imports of 68.8 million pesos in 1988, with Switzerland, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and France being the key sources in recent years. The other main categories of imports are machinery, construction equipment, and transport equipment. Cuba's success in developing an agricultural machinery industry, particularly sugarcane harvesters, is evident from its low level of imports—around 15-20 million pesos a year. Spain and, to a lesser extent, Sweden and Italy are the only Western countries that continue to provide new agricultural equipment. However, the legacy of a previous era is still felt in the area of spare parts for agricultural equipment, for which overseas purchases are running at more than three times the level for new equipment (Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom are the main Western suppliers in this sector). Heavy transport and construction equipment imports have grown rapidly throughout the

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Community

1980s and should expand even faster in the future as the island's tourism program develops. Spain and Japan have been the leading Western players in this field, followed by the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. The main factors governing Havana's ability to acquire the convertible currency (or its equivalent) necessary to purchase Western products have been the level of its sugar and nickel sales in non-CMEA markets; its reexports of Soviet petroleum not required for domestic consumption, which for the time being have come to an abrupt halt; foreign revenues generated by citrus fruits and juices, seafoods and tobacco products; tourism income, which has been increasing at approximately 10 percent a year; and Western official and commercial bank credits, which were available in reasonable quantities up until 1984/85, but have since dried up. Although sugar and its derivatives account for around 75 percent of all overseas sales on a peso basis, during the 1980s they typically generated only around $300 million a year in hard currency, since most were committed to the USSR. Havana does not regularly publish reports that break down its exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe according to whether they were purchased in C M E A or convertible currencies. However, State Statistical Committee data for 1986 show that in addition to 626 million pesos of hard cash acquired through trade with marketeconomy countries (see Table 11.1), Cuba also sold 41 million pesos of sugar and 229 million pesos of reexports to socialist countries. These were paid for in convertible funds, thus generating total visible hard-currency revenues of 896 million pesos. The most important West European customers for Cuban products over the years 1980-1988 were Spain, with total purchases of 713 million pesos; France, 446 million pesos; Switzerland, 410 million pesos; West Germany, 286 million pesos; Italy, 263 million pesos; and the United Kingdom, 201 million pesos. Of the other Western countries, Havana's annual exports to Canada fell from an average of 117 million pesos in 1980/81 to an average of 39 million pesos from 1982 to 1988, largely as a result of US pressure on Canada to reduce imports of Cuban nickel. Japan, on the other hand, maintained high levels of purchases throughout most of the period, totaling 799 million pesos between 1980 and 1988. Spain's primary trade commodity from Cuba is tobacco for the Canary Islands industry—accounting for 44 percent in 1987—followed by seafoods (25%), coffee (12%), and fuel and oil (12%). France buys mostly processed food—43 percent of the total in 1987—followed by agricultural food products (33%), and energy and minerals (23%). Swiss imports consist of tobacco (70%), sugar (10%), and seafoods (9%), while West Germany focuses on semifinished goods (37% ), food products (33% ), and beverages and tobacco (18% ). The Italian emphasis is on food (66% ) and

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Table 11.1 Cuban Exports to Market Economy Countries, 1986 (in Millions of Pesos) Value

Percent

Sugar Seafood products Coffee Cigars Leaf tobacco Nickel sinter oxide Naphtha Molasses Other products

223.6 125.5 42.6 35.7 28.6 26.5 22.3 10.3 111.0

35.7 20.0 6.8 5.7 4.6 4.2 3.6 1.6 17.8

Total

626.1

100.0

Source: Cuba Business 1, no. 2 (December 1987): p. 6; compiled on the basis of Comité Estatal de Estadísticas statistics, Havana.

metal items (19%). Hidden in the official trade statistics are quite substantial transactions with the United States. Under the embargo legislation, American corporations can apply to the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Treasury Department for a license to trade with Cuba through third-country subsidiaries. A recent study3 shows that, between 1982 and 1987,1,279 applications were approved (an average of 213 per year), which in turn resulted in exports to Cuba of between $693 million and $406 million of grain, wheat, and other consumables, and $287 million of industrial and other nonconsumables; also included were $869 million of imports from the island, with sugar (60.1%) and naphtha (34.7%) heading the list. The most important intermediary during the 1982-1986 period was the United Kingdom, which accounted for $480 million out of total trade of $1,307 million, followed by Switzerland ($239 million), Canada ($211 million), Bermuda ($165 million), Argentina ($103 million), Panama ($27 million), France ($25 million), and Spain ($23 million).4 Attempts have been made since the summer of 1989 by Senator Connie Mack and other US congressmen from Florida to pass legislation that would effectively remove this loophole in the embargo and prohibit US companies from dealing with Cuba through third parties. The chances are that it will be successful sooner or later, since in the present political climate there are few US politicians prepared to speak out in favor of trade with Havana. To this authorized triangular arrangement must be added an unknown amount of commerce that US corporations engage in through

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Cuba's Relations with the North Atlantic

Community

companies not registered as subsidiaries. This avenue has been a more or less open secret for years. One of the revelations that emerged as a result of the drug-trafficking scandal that hit Cuba in June 1989 was the existence of the secret department MC within the Ministry of the Interior, authorized by the government to break the US embargo, particularly in the fields of electronics and health care products. It was this agency that the La Guardia brothers used as a cover for their dealings with the Medellin drug cartel, transhipping cocaine to Florida in International Business Machines (IBM) computer boxes via the Varadero military airport. By the mid-1980s Havana's imports from market economy countries were running at around $1.2 billion a year, still somewhat below the $1.5 billion that the Cubans estimate as necessary for various production sectors to operate efficiently. After the onset of the economic crisis in 1986 these hard cash purchases dropped to an average of $936 million in 1987/88, leaving industry limping for lack of materials, equipment, and spare parts. Under the circumstances it is extraordinary that the island has managed to increase its convertible-currency exports so rapidly. Sales to market economies grew by an unprecedented 24.7 percent in 1988, with seven key nations accounting for most of the increase: West Germany (up 44.6 million pesos); Japan (up 31.5 million); the UK (up 29.1 million); Algeria (up 21.2 million); Italy (up 13.3 million); Sweden (up 11.5 million); and Iraq (up 11.5 million). Havana is in this respect following the trend of many developing countries that are squeezing more exports out of their economies in an effort to promote growth and escape from debt. The 1989 United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report, for example, shows that while Third World exports rose by 13 percent in 1988, in many instances such progress occurred mainly through shifting output away from domestic markets rather than through greater investment. This also seems to have been the case in Cuba. In a recent interview Vice-Minister for Foreign Trade Manuel Estefania reviewed Havana's efforts to promote overseas sales.5 The plan covers some 150 items, including such established commodities as cigars and lobsters for which new marketing campaigns have been devised and others that are "nontraditional," such as software, biotech products, coffee, cocoa, citrus fruits, textiles, sugar by-products, and agricultural machinery. The nickel and citrus categories in particular offer major opportunities for immediate expansion. Although final figures were not available when this analysis was being written (late summer 1990), trade between the East European countries and Cuba declined markedly during 1990, with much of the slack being taken up by closer ties on Havana's part with the USSR. However, it is

Western Europe and Cuba's Development

189

certain that as intra-CMEA transactions shift over to payment calculations based on world market prices and convertible currencies CubanSoviet commerce will shrink. The Kremlin is likely to want its dealings with Havana to be on a clearing-account basis, for otherwise the Cubans could take their dollars from sugar, citrus, and nickel exports and, having purchased oil from the Soviets, use the remainder to buy industrial supplies in the West. This would put a brake on the speed with which the island's trade with Moscow will decline, but it is nevertheless reasonable to expect it to fall from approximately 75 to 50 percent of the total over the space of two to three years. By that time, of course, contracts may very well be negotiated not only with individual Russian enterprises, but also with the various Soviet republics individually. If these assumptions are correct, we can expect to see Cuba's links with Western companies increase substantially in the early 1990s. This will require substantial modification in the organization and performance of its foreign trade bureaucracy. It is also likely to spur Havana into acquiring more Western management expertise and seeking industrial joint ventures more energetically, following the successful example of the tourism sector.6 The need for these changes has been acknowledged by the president of the Cuban Chamber of Commerce in an interview published in Trabajadores, a national newspaper, although there remains substantial resistance to foreign investment among industrial planners.7 The Foreign Trade Ministry launched a campaign in 1988, aimed principally at West Germany and Japan, to attract joint industrial ventures. A West German business delegation led by the honorary president of the country's Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHT), Otto Wolff von Amerongen, visited Havana in October 1988 to discuss commercial prospects and possible investments in Cuba. This initiative was heralded by the Communist party daily newspaper Granma, which characterized the Wolff group as the highest-powered ever to have come from the Federal Republic and favorably reported him as saying that West Germans were interested not only in joint manufacturing investments, but also in collaborative marketing projects. He mentioned in particular the food-processing sector (e.g., citrus fruit concentrate and fish products), sugarcane by-products, and tourism as areas for future cooperation. This positive Cuban press coverage was, however, subsequently played down by the German business community, which doubted that it signified any major improvement in the potential for trade between the two countries. Such skepticism was reinforced by the fact that the delegation's discussions highlighted the problem of identifying specific product lines offering realistic short-term prospects for cooperation. Indeed the meetings were unable to come up with any concrete joint venture proposals, despite Havana's interest in promoting such arrangements and

190

Cuba's Relations with the North Atlantic Community

Herr Wolffs long personal experience with the concept as a pioneer of West German trade with the Soviet Union and China in the 1950s. The conditions suggested by Havana for joint venture operations are seen as quite reasonable by West German businessmen, but the island does not seem especially attractive to them either as a market in its own right or as an export platform to other Latin American countries. Cuba is simply too low a priority for most of them to strive to overcome the institutional and practical obstacles involved, the sole exception being the tourism sector. Moreover, as the job of unifying the two Germanies has come to absorb so much of the attention and energy of the West German business community, its interest in Third World nations such as Cuba has waned still further. Another factor complicating this scenario has been Havana's foreign debt problem, which has led to a loss of credibility in the eyes of West German companies, many of whom have had to wait two to three years for payments. Some major firms have stopped dealing with Cuba except for cash, leading to withdrawal from the market by such giants as BASF. However, others (e.g., medical equipment suppliers such as Siemens) continue to do good business. One possible way to finesse such cash-flow difficulties is compensation deals—the exchange of goods for goods. These have been tried by West German corporations in the past, notably by chemical suppliers such as Hoechst and Bayer who have taken such Cuban products as canned tuna in lieu of hard currency. Such arrangements, however, have frequently broken down because of the lack of availability of suitable products (in terms of either quantity or quality) for Havana to put into the countertrade equation. Cuba continued its joint venture diplomacy when Chamber of Commerce President Julio Garcia Oliveras visited West Germany in June 1989 as a guest of the DIHT. He presented a list of twelve existing factories (see Table 11.2) prepared by the Foreign Trade Ministry as part of an exercise to analyze ways foreign capital could help the island. These are all plants contracted from Western Europe and Japan between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s that are working well below capacity as a result of shortages of equipment and parts, poor management, or lack of access to export markets. Dr. Oliveras's list provides an important snapshot of the industrial development problems Cuba faced at the end of the 1980s and its need for greater integration into the global economy. Havana has also been trying to woo Japanese investment. Japanese companies have been active in Latin America since the early 1970s and have annually accounted for some 10-12 percent of foreign sales to the region since then. The opportunities for increasing that share substantially are limited while the continent remains in recession and the debt problem is unresolved. However, as Japan has emerged as a major exporter of

Western

Europe aniJ Culm's I

Ifi'iio/mii'iil

191

Table 11.2 Plants Available for Joint Ventures Stainless Steel Parts and Equipment Plant Contracted On stream Supplier Initial investment cost Requirements

1976 1979 Komatsu, Japan $11 million Raw materials, spare parts, tools

Semiconductor and Integrated Circuit Factory Contracted On stream Supplier Initial investment cost Requirements

1978 1982 Piher Semiconductores S.A., Spain $21.91 million Raw materials, spare parts, tools

Automotive Battery Factory Contracted On stream Supplier Initial investment cost Requirements

1975 1978 Sumitomo Yuasa, Japan $30 million Raw materials

Medical Equipment Plant Current utilization Requirements

60 percent Raw materials, components

Candy Factory Contracted On stream Supplier Initial investment cost Requirements Electical Apparatus Plant Requirements Paper Plant from Bagasse On stream Supplier Requirements Bagasse Board Plant Contracted On stream Supplier Initial investment cost Requirements Dyes and Paints Plant Current utilization Requirements

1975 1978 Otto Hensel, West Germany $5 million Packaging paper, cellophane, colorings, spare parts, flavorings Electronic components, connecting and mounting pieces 1984 Creusot-Loire, France Raw materials, bagasse pulp 1976 1980 Bison-Werke, West Germany $17 million Chemical products, spare parts 60 percent Raw materials, spare parts

192

Cuba's Relations with the North Atlantic

Community

Table 11.2 continued Textile Mill Complex Contracted On stream Supplier Initial investment cost Requirements

1975 1980 Mitsubishi, Japan, and Picagnol, Belgium $145 million Textile fibers, chemical products and colors, spare parts

Fats and Grease Plant Requirements

Basic oils, additives

Flat Textiles Plant Supplier Requirements

West Germany Textile fibers, designs

Source: Presented by Cuban Chamber of Commerce to West German Assoc. of Chambers of Commerce, June 1989.

capital, more and more of its firms have been investing directly in Latin America. The prospects for Japanese involvement in joint ventures in Cuba were discussed when the Japan-Cuba Economic Commission met in Havana in March 1989. Few specific details have emerged, but it seems that Cuban officials particularly tried to interest the Japanese in the tourism sector. Like the Germans, however, the Japanese have been reluctant to go beyond courtship to engagement. Yutaka Kobayashi, Havana representative of Mutsume Trading, has been typical in this respect.8 One of the main problems, he said, was that Havana was not prepared to allow foreign ownership of land, even though it was now making agreements for the fifty-fifty ownership of joint venture companies. He thought that without the direct stake that landownership would provide Japanese companies would remain wary. The Cuban government's joint venture law of 1982—Decree No. 50—-remains in force without modification. It is quite permissive in its scope, but its very open-endedness may have contributed to foreign companies' skepticism. The decree covers both the construction of new facilities and the leasing of existing ones. In exceptional cases it was envisaged that the outside partner might be allowed to own 50 percent or more of the share capital, consisting of financial or other assets, or both. Legally constituted joint enterprises are independent of the Cuban state. According to a brief published by the Chamber of Commerce, "the enterprise will have absolute freedom in appointing its board of directors and managerial personnel, defining the production plan, setting prices and

Western Europe and Cuba's Development

193

drawing up sales plans, exporting and importing directly, deciding how many people will be hired and selecting them, signing contracts with national and foreign entities, choosing the accounting system which it considers best and determining its financial policy." Also, the regulations allow such entities to carry out all their operations in freely convertible currency. The foreign partners may repatriate their share of profits or the liquidation of the association, or both, while foreign specialists and executives may remit two-thirds of their salaries. Taxes are set at 30 percent on net profits but may be temporarily waived. In its brief the Chamber of Commerce draws attention to such considerations as "Cuba's recognized social stability and its very extensive system of education The joint enterprise may ask the Cuban contracting entity to replace a worker who is undisciplined or unproductive." Later it points out that because of state social provisions wage rates "are usually lower than those in other countries." Yet despite Havana's efforts (which have generally been applauded in foreign business circles) to create a legal infrastructure supportive of joint ventures, up until 1988 only ten or so had been established. Three were with Dutch partners, set up to market tobacco leaf and cigarettes, metals and nickel, while three others involved Spanish coparticipation. The reason more deals were not concluded in the early 1980s may have been because the political will did not fully exist in Havana. There were certainly many foreign proposals put forward, although given the difficulty of agreeing on their likely profitability they were mostly in the form of subcontracting arrangements. The more general problem Cuba has had with outside entrepreneurs has been the difficulty it has encountered in trying to convince them that the island has something special to offer. Social stability, low wages, minimal inflation, and an adequate social infrastructure are only part of the story. Foreign investors also need good transportation, communications, access to regional markets, and the confidence that their operations will not be bogged down in local red tape. Havana's case has been less convincing on these counts, although its growing integration with other Latin American markets may begin to tip the balance. Despite solid relations with a fairly broad range of European companies, by the end of the 1980s Cuba still had only token links with the E E C . As a member of the CMEA, it established formal diplomatic relations with the E E C for the first time in September 1988, and ambassadors had been exchanged by May 1989. Officials in Havana have expressed optimism that this will open the way for important discussions with the E E C on commerce and finance, although little had been achieved as of late August 1990. Cuba will not be able to establish trade agreements with the E E C until Spain fully phases out its preferential bilateral agree-

194

Cuba's Relations with the North Atlantic Community

ments with the island as part of its transition to full E E C membership. Nevertheless, more funding could be available in the form of E E C credit lines for specific industrial projects, since European businesses can apply to Brussels for loans concerning ventures that have Cuban approval. Cuba has received EEC assistance in the past, but the amounts have been small; between 1979 and 1985 it received only $13.2 million out of a total E E C aid package of $678.3 million to Latin America. Net receipts from individual EEC member-countries have also been slight, amounting to $163.2 million between 1980 and 1985 compared to $28,941 million for Latin America as a whole. Nearly all of this came from France and Italy; flows from Belgium, Denmark, and the United Kingdom were in fact negative over this period.9 However, Havana's utilization of E E C tariff concessions available under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) has increased. The proportion of Cuba's dutiable exports to the E E C for which it receives GSP concessions expanded from 31 percent in 1976 to 64 percent in 1985 (when 24% of all the island's hard-currency sales were under the GSP). Luigi Boselli, the EEC's ambassador to Latin America, told Granma in late 1988 that the moves toward greater Latin American integration, the efforts of hemispheric foreign ministers to have Castro's government readmitted to the OAS, and the entry of Spain and Portugal into the E E C all contributed to opening new avenues for cooperation between the E E C and Cuba. "Latin America," he said, "can only be of importance if it accomplishes a certain degree of integration. Individually, none of its countries will have real importance. Our interest is in having poles other than those of the United States and the Soviet Union. Latin America could well be another such pole."10 Certainly two interrelated variables exerting a significant impact on evolving Cuban-EEC relations have been Washington's ongoing hostility to the Revolution and Havana's growing debt problem. By the late 1970s the US trade embargo had essentially become little more than an irritant, although it pushed up the cost of imports for Cuba and denied it access to its main natural market and source of investment. Washington also tried to dissuade private Western banks from lending to Cuba, and there is evidence that it had some success, although exactly how much is open to dispute, since in banking so much hinges on discreet influence. The French bank Crédit Lyonnais organized a large deutsche mark syndicated loan in 1979 despite opposition from the United States. On the other hand, White House pressure was probably behind the cancelations of a $30 million Swiss franc loan by Singer and Friedlander in November 197911 as well as a DM 150 million Eurocredit package in March 1981 that was being organized by Crédit Lyonnais for a group of Arab banks. In late 1981 Havana secured a 57.5 million French francs loan in a deal managed by

Western Europe and Cuba's Development

195

Société Générale for the purchase of transport equipment. More credits followed, enabling French exports to Cuba to rank second only to Spain's among West European countries during the 1983-1985 period. For example, in early 1983 the French government provided funds for the purchase of food and machinery worth $27 million, and in October it extended further credits worth f 12 million. Shortly thereafter and probably not fortuitously, Renault won a contract worth £8 million to supply the island with heavy trucks.12 Despite the advent of the Thatcher government in 1979, with its widely publicized special relationship with the Reagan administration, the English have for the most part not allowed ideology to stand in the way of trade with Cuba. In 1981 the Export Credits Guarantee Department underwrote a £5 million loan by the Midland Bank to allow British exporters to receive cash payments for capital goods, and the following May Morgan Grenfell headed a consortium that raised £19 million. Midland Bank established a £30 million credit line for British exports to the island in July 1985, and in January 1986 backed a five-year agreement between Goodwood (a private sector trading company set up for the purpose) and Havana with the aim of increasing bilateral trade by £350 million. Nevertheless, representatives of the English business community have often complained that Whitehall's restrictions are tighter than they need be, which some observers attribute to appeasement of the United States on London's part (although in the absence of documentation this has to remain conjecture). Cuba has not, however, been able in recent years to finesse the debt issue as easily as the US trade embargo. Havana first sought to renegotiate its obligations in March 1982 and immediately found that US officials were working behind the scenes to undermine its efforts.13 Nevertheless, an agreement was reached in March 1983 with Japan and ten European governments to reschedule 95 percent of $413 million due between September 1982 and December 1983 for repayment over eight and a half years with a three-year grace period. Commercial bank creditors agreed to similar terms on $468 million the following month. Subsequent US sabotage efforts also failed, and Cuba was able to reschedule an additional $254 million in short-term loans from Western governments at a Paris Club meeting in July 1984, and $100 million with commercial banks in December 1984. u In each case Havana received somewhat less favorable treatment than countries such as Mexico and Argentina, but again it is difficult to assess the extent to which this was the result of US pressure. Matters came to a head in May 1986 when Cuba suspended payments on all its hard-currency debt except for short-term trade-related liabilities. Within two weeks, however, the National Bank told Western creditors that it would continue to make interest (although not principal) payments.

196

Cuba's Relations with the North Atlantic Community

The banks were not, however, impressed with Havana's efforts to maintain some semblance of creditworthiness and thus rejected its proposal for revising its entire 1986 package (Cuba had suggested a rollover that would provide for repayment over twelve years with an initial six-year grace period). The Paris Club ultimately did agree to reschedule 95 percent of the $116 million principal falling due in 1986 and to consider 1987 maturities at a later date. But shortly thereafter Havana began to fall behind in repaying its short-term commercial obligations (the category that it had previously exempted from its suspension announcement). This general pattern would continue in subsequent years, with both sides putting various proposals and counteroffers on the negotiating table. But regardless of the specifics involved in these initiatives, they tended to flounder on a basic conceptual discrepancy revolving around Havana's insistence that the island would not be able to achieve steady growth (and thereby be in a position to satisfy its creditors) without new loans from the West to finance imports, and the reluctance of the Paris Club as well as Western commercial banks to extend such assistance unless there was a major restructuring of the Cuban economy, which they felt was the real key to improving productivity. The result was, for the most part, stalemate. Under the Bush administration pressure on Havana has risen dramatically after signs of relaxation during the last year of Reagan's presidency. Since the collapse of the E a s t E u r o p e a n regimes, Washington's policy (insofar as the government is not just responding to the exile community) appears to be to do everything short of military intervention to encourage the fall of Fidel Castro, including going even so far as to indicate to the Kremlin that it must halt its military-economic subsidies to Havana if it expects to receive US aid. Thus the island's future is once again being played out in the context of a contest between the great powers. Assuming, however, that the main thrust of Moscow's foreign policy continues (which is likely even if, for instance, Boris Yeltsin were to succeed Gorbachev), it is probable that the Soviets will in any case seek to convert their Cuban connection into a relationship based more on comparative advantage, with both sides revising substantially the prices at which their products are traded. Barring a catastrophe in either country, and provided that Havana is able to address its acute problems of work organization and declining labor productivity, there could be a renewed period of economic expansion in Cuba after two or three years. Turning to the United States side of the equation, it seems inconceivable that ten years hence the US will still be maintaining an embargo against Cuba—although many observers said the same thing in 1980. If relations are reestablished, with the island's economy in relatively good health and with a strong centralized administration intact, this could

Western Europe and Cuba's Development

197

provide a major developmental boost as the costs associated with foreign trade (transportation, communications, credit, insurance, etc.) are cut and new investment flows in. If, however, normalization occurs within a context of economic collapse, then one can envisage the country's hardwon social infrastructure disintegrating and the reemergence of the kind of poverty that is characteristic of the region. Either way, the prospects for many West European companies would not appear to be good. Some of the stronger internationally based firms would no doubt be able to protect their Cuban interests, but the smaller ones would be likely to find themselves squeezed out within a year or two—especially if, as one study15 suggests, US entrepreneurs could capture 50 percent of the island's market within two years. This, however, assumes that the volume of Havana's transactions with the West remains constant. But should the more optimistic scenario sketched above prevail, and the economy be stimulated by its renewed association with the United States, Europeans could actually benefit, since they would have a larger pie from which to extract their commercial slice. Indeed under such conditions it is quite conceivable that their gross trade with Cuba would grow even if their percentage share declined somewhat. In short, less in some respects could very well turn out to be more in others.

Notes 1. For an excellent survey of this period, see George Lambie, "Western Europe and the Embargo: Trade Relations in the '70s," Cuba Business 3, no. 5 (October 1989): 5-7. 2. Ibid. 3. Donna Rich and Kirby Jones, Opportunities for US-Cuban Trade (Washington, DC: Cuban Studies Program, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, June 1988). 4. Ibid. 5. Cuba Business 3, no. 1 (February 1989): 5-6. 6. For a discussion of foreign investment in the development of the tourism sector, see Gareth Jenkins, "Beyond Basic Needs: Cuba's Search for Stable Development in the 'Eighties," in Cuba in Transition: Crisis and Transformation in the 1990s, ed. John M. Kirk et al. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991). 7. Interview with Julio García Oliveras, "Una nueva batalla de la Revolución: la lucha en el mercado mundial," Trabajadores (June 26,1990): 4. 8. Cuba Business 3, no. 2 (April 1989): 5-6. 9. Instituto de Relaciones Europeo-Latinoamericanas (IRELA), "Economic Relations Between the European Community and Latin America: A Statistical Profile," Working Paper, no. 10 (Madrid: IRELA, 1987). 10. Cuba Business 2, no. 6 (December 1988): 2. 11. Morris H. Morley, Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and

198

Cuba's Relations with the North Atlantic Community

Cuba, 1952-1986 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 278. 12. Ibid, p. 351. 13. Ibid, p. 340. 14. Ibid, p. 342. 15. Rich and Jones, Opportunities for US-Cuban Trade.

Statistical Appendix Table 11.3 Cuban Imports from Main Trading Paitneis, 1980-1988 (in Millions of Pesos) 1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

118.8 31.5 28.0

105.2 58.9 41.1

33.7 32.4 24.3

100.3 37.0 18.9

98.3 34.7 62.3

93.9 25.0 43.2

54.4 22.3 54.9

48.1 18.4 45.8

27.2 14.0 75.9

82.9

99.3

54.0

64.6

91.4

81.6

85.5

52.5

57.4

France Netherlands Italy West Germany United Kingdom Spain Sweden Switzerland Western Europe

77.2 139.1 37.2 39.8

62.8 163.0 37.0 50.2

49.7 95.2 31.9 17.3

92.6 107.0 16.7 31.9

92.2 107.7 31.5 21.4

105.1 176.9 23.8 22.7

78.9 147.4 20.5 23.6

70.2 165.4 13.5 36.7

59.7 146.1 12.0 31.9

609.6

686.6

371.7

506.4

586.4

624.3

560.6

489.5

478.7

Japan China

182.2 105.2

160.3 139.0

136.0 218.8

85.2 152.6

217.4 244.8

219.2 227.9

264.6 121.7

106.5 100.8

88.6 175.9

USSR Eastern Europe Canada Argentina Mexico Other American Countries Total

2,903.7 3,233.9 3,744.4 4,245.3 4,782.4 5,418.9 5,337.6 5,446.0 5,364.4 3,494.2 3,951.5 4,659.6 5,234.0 5,784.8 6,507.0 6,297.4 6,530.0 6,432.5 111.0 15.2 22.8

79.0 17.8 11.0

47.3 12.5 15.9

37.3 83.1 23.0

56.5 146.9 72.7

58.8 193.3 77.1

53.4 162.3 29.7

33.0 124.3 72.1

28.6 127.5 108.0

56.2

39.4

35.1

62.3

42.5

50.3

52.1

65.0

96.4

4,627.0 5,114.0 5,530.6 6,222.1 7,227.5 8,035.0 7,596.1 7,583.7 7,579.8

Source: Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, Anuario Estadístico de Cuba (Havana, 1988).

199

Western Europe and Cuba's Development

Table 11.4 Cuban Exports to Main Trading Partners, 1980-1988 (in Millions of Pesos) 1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

25.2 9.5 31.7

45.3 9.7 27.2

45.3 16.5 26.2

61.6 35.7 23.4

34.0 50.0 19.0

63.0 45.2 21.8

47.9 38.6 28.2

57.6 42.1 36.1

66.9 52.7 49.4

16.8

13.6

44.3

68.2

14.3

15.7

11.9

28.4

73.0

France Netherlands Italy West Germany United Kingdom Spain Sweden Switzerland Western Europe

14.8 46.4 3.5 73.2

16.0 64.1 14.8 23.9

24.3 88.0 3.1 55.4

30.6 93.9 3.1 34.6

15.0 64.5 2.6 39.2

27.4 101.8 2.9 68.7

17.0 88.2 6.5 53.9

13.4 84.9 7.8 48.7

42.5 81.5 18.9 12.2

325.5

323.0

337.7

357.0

272.6

382.8

315.5

336.6

430.0

Japan China

112.0 115.6

118.6 215.9

71.2 306.1

69.7 214.7

50.1 203.0

78.6 157.8

111.4 58.4

77.2 85.5

109.2 226.3

2,253.5 2,357.5 3,289.6 3,881.8 3,952.2 4,481.6 3,935.9 3,868.7

3,683.1

2,661.3 2,927.6 3,851.0 4,521.7 4,686.4 5,161.5 4,627.2 4,689.2

4,518.2

USSR Eastern Europe

Canada 115.0 Argentina 0.1 Mexico 185.6 Other American Countries 26.1 Total

119.9

46.2 43.7

39.2 0.1 17.2

43.5 0.7 10.7

32.2 0.4 1.9

37.2 1.2 1.7

36.8 1.2 2.0

38.5 1.7 4.9

17.1

50.4

56.3

38.4

41.6

41.6

53.0

—

—

64.7 13.6

3,966.7 4,223.8 4,933.2 5,534.9 5,476.5 5,991.5 5,321.5 5,402.1 5,518.3

Source\ Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, Anuario Estadístico de Cuba (Havana, 1988).

200

Cuba's Relations with the North Atlantic Community

Table 11.5 Cuban Imports of Selected Industrial Products and Main Western Countries of Origin (by Quantity and Value in Millions of Pesos) 1980

1985

1987

1988

Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Pharmaceutical raw materials Japan United Kingdom Italy West Germany France Netherlands Switzerland Denmark

17.7 0.7 1.5 2.0 3.1 0.4 1.2 0.7 -

Medicines United Kingdom Canada West Germany Switzerland Agrochemicals (Tons) West Germany Switzerland United Kingdom Italy France Japan Tires (Thousands) Japan Spain Austria

13.3 1.0 0.5 -

0.3 26.4 8.2 4.7 2.6 0.3 -

-

1.1

2.9

32.1 3.9 4.7 3.0 0.2 2.8 1.2

513.5 59.1 7.3 2.9

35.7 4.6 0.3 0.2

678.2 126.3 1.4 3.3

60.5 17.5 18.6 7.0 0.4

Steel laminates (Thousands of Tons) 517.5 114.3 Japan 7.0 3.6 West Germany 8.3 4.0 Spain 4.0 1.3 Complete plants France Italy Sweden Austria Spain Japan West Germany Canada

535.5 3.3 0.1 3.3 0.6 32.5 3.4 0.1 0.1

31.7 3.1 1.3 3.4 8.4 2.8 1.0 0.5 0.9

34.6 1.8 2.1 4.3 7.0 1.7 1.8 1.7 0.6

40.6 1.4 1.8 5.9 7.0 2.0 1.0 1.3 0.6

34.9 1.5 0.9 1.7 0.6

40.7 0.9 0.8 2.2 2.1

48.2 1.4 1.6 2.2 2.2

64.5 9.4 15.4 7.0 0.6 4.1 3.1

24.6 1.1 3.9 1.4 0.4 1.5 0.2

76.9 3.8 25.9 7.6 1.0 5.8 1.0

20.9 0.1 3.4 0.7 0.9 1.1

68.8 0.7 22.9 4.6 2.8 4.3 0.1

58.0 5.5 0.3 0.1

652.6 61.1 0.4

54.9 2.6 0.1

529.7 44.2 1.0

51.0 4.2 0.1

-

-

-

-

767.5 234.0 7.4 5.8 21.0 8.3 44.5 12.3

686.5 205.3 1.9 1.5 0.7 0.5 2.1 1.5

696.4 212.5

733.8 16.8 2.9 0.7 3.2 43.6 10.3 1.7 3.4

721.8 11.0 8.4 0.3 1.2 54.3 5.6 2.2 0.8

726.3 4.9 25.2

-

-

8.3 1.8

7.5 1.3

_

-

50.6 10.2 1.7 0.9

201

Western Europe and Cuba's Development

Table 11.5 continued 1980

1985

1987

1988

Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Agricultural machinery (Units) 6,091 Spain 437 Italy 100 Sweden 1,165

13.3 0.6 0.1 1.3

3,608 304 155

57

Bulldozers (Units) Italy Japan

423 25 148

11.5 1.1 6.5

616 50 158

35.1 2.6 9.0

196

Excavators and cranes (Units) 482 Japan -

20.1

381 61 291

Motorized trailers (Units) 190 Spain 139 Japan Sweden -

-

5.6 3.9 -

-

-

7 91

16.3 2.4 -

4,588 157 1 40

22.4 3.9 0.1 0.5

4,241 286 8

8.5

385 35 42

21.0 3.9 4.7 26.4

-

-

1

0.1

24.5 3.8

385 17

25.5 2.2

380

13.8

214

11.4

367

-

0.1 3.0

-

10 4

-

0.8 0.3

Agricultural equipment parts Spain Italy United Kingdom

36.6 11.1 1.1 2.0

68.8 12.9 3.3 0.1

65.2 10.7 0.6 1.1

Construction equipment parts Japan France Spain Italy

21.8 2.2 3.4 1.6 1.7

36.0 5.2 0.4 1.1 1.2

23.7 4.1 0.7 1.6 0.7

Railway equipment parts Canada United Kingdom Spain France

14.6 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.2

19.5 1.0 0.4 0.8 0.2

14.8 0.3 0.7 1.0 0.4

Trucks (Units) Spain Japan

8,223 852 1,025

Motorized equipment parts Japan Spain United Kingdom France Italy

84.5 10,579 12.5 996 11.9 60 110.2 10.6 9.8 3.0 2.2 1.9

-

-

-

27 -

19.2 0.9 0.1 -

-

20.9 -

1.5 -

59.7 6.2 2.1 0.5

21.4 0.3 0.9 2.4 0.2

154.8 13,043 139 12.7 500 3.4

230.9 11,267 77 5.1 15.5 -

211.7 3.0

164.2 12.1 9.5 0.4 1.2 3.4

169.5 14.3 7.0 0.5 0.4 2.4

151.4 3.2 7.8 0.7 0.4 0.6

-

Source: Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, Anuario Estadístico de Cuba (Havana, 1987). Notes: These statistics show only the more important Western sources for each type of industrial product listed. •• Not applicable or not available; - Zero or insignificant.

12 Canada-Cuba Relations: A Brief Overview Richard V. Gorham

I am pleased to have this opportunity to attend this conference which is reviewing various aspects of Cuba thirty years after its revolution and to provide you with a brief overview of Canada-Cuba relations from the government's point of view. Briefly stated, Canada's relations with Cuba over the past three decades have been, and continue to be, correct, cordial and as close as can be expected between two nations which have important differences on foreign policy issues, security questions, political and economic structure, and political philosophy. Cuban diplomatic representatives have often told me that Fidel Castro frequently describes relations between Cuba and Canada as representing a model for relations between the nations of different political and social systems. My response on such occasions has always been that such a description is probably accurate, but one must never forget that the political social systems are different—indeed, very different. Canada, for instance, is not a non-aligned nation. On the contrary, we are an ally of the United States in the military defence of North America against a possible threat by the Soviet Union. We are also an ally of our N A T O partners in the military defence of Western Europe against a possible threat by the Soviet Union. Cuba, on the other hand, claims to be a non-aligned nation which is a close associate, if not formally a military ally, of the Soviet Union and has been a supporter of disruptive armed revolutionary causes in Central and South America and in Africa. Thus, in foreign policy terms and in security considerations, there is a Editors' note: Richard V. Gorham is special advisor and roving ambassador for Latin America, Canadian Department of External Affairs. These remarks regarding Canadian-Cuban relations were made by Ambassador Gorham at the international conference on Cuba held in Halifax, Nova Scotia, November 1-4,1989. Because Ambassador Gorham was speaking in his official capacity, no changes— substantive or stylistic—have been made by the editors in the text of this contribution.

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very clear difference between us. That difference therefore represents a barrier beyond which the development of closer bilateral relations is not feasible. In terms of our domestic political structure, and our social and economic policies, there are also fundamental differences between Canada and Cuba which impede the development of the type of close relations which we can enjoy with nations of an ideological basis similar to our own. These differences between us are a fact of life well known to all and I do not need to labor the point. Much more important, I believe, is to focus on the fact that in spite of these differences, our bilateral relations with Cuba have always been correct and cordial—indeed, friendly and close up to the point where our differences impede further proximity. Canada first established diplomatic relations with Cuba on March 16, 1945—14 years before the Cuban Revolution. We have never broken those relations and the Canadian Embassy had been constant in Cuba for the past 44 years. We have consistently had good trade relations with Cuba and we have never imposed a trade embargo on that country. We do, however, prevent Canada from becoming an illegal back door for goods of USA origin prohibited of export from the United States to Cuba by USA policy from passing through Canada to Cuba. Last year our exports to Cuba valued 224.5 million dollars. In previous years they have been substantially higher, but Cuba's financial resources have suffered limitations which have forced them to reduce the volume of the imports. We do hope, however, that with a positive change in their economic situation that their purchases of our goods will increase. Last year we imported goods from Cuba worth 84.7 million dollars, which represents a 64.6% increase over last year. This growth is an encouraging trend which indicates that as Cuban goods become competitive in price and quality, they can find a place in our open market. Our trading relations are carefully monitored by a Joint Committee on Economic and Trade Relations, the most recent meeting of which was held in Canada in May, 1989. In addition, there are periodic exchanges of official visits in regard to our ongoing cooperation in the fields of agriculture and fisheries. There has been a modest level of cultural exchanges between us which we would be glad to see increase to the extent that our respective resources permit. There have also been useful sports exchanges and some cooperation in the area of public health. Over the last few years there has been a steady increase in the number of Canadian tourists to Cuba—I believe over 60,000 last year. I expect that this will increase as Cuba's capacity to receive and accommodate tourists increases.

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Thus, despite our fundamental differences, I believe our bilateral relations are developing as well as can be expected. We do have one current irritant which I hope can be resolved on the basis of cooperative discussions. I refer to the matter of Human Rights—in particular to a few cases where Canadians of Cuban origin would like to have members of their families join them in Canada. This is a situation very heart-rending and poignant for the families involved who have our whole sympathy and support. I hope that our ongoing discussions with the Cuban authorities in this matter will achieve the same agreeable solutions that we have enjoyed in respect to similar situations regarding China, the Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Europe. Some movement on Cuba's part in this regard would have a very salutary effect on our bilateral relations. To sum up, we value our relations with Cuba as I believe they value their relations with Canada. We hope that they will continue to develop and improve to the extent that conditions and our differences permit. Over the past few months we have been reviewing our relations with the countries of Latin America with a view to according those relations a higher priority and accepting that Canada is a nation of the Americas in more than a mere geographic sense. Just a few days ago Prime Minister Mulroney announced that we will be seeking membership in the Organization of American States and that we will be pursuing other initiatives over time to cooperate more closely with the nations of our hemisphere to solve problems which are facing us all. Cuba is an important nation in the Americas and can play a positive role in the resolution of regional problems. As we look to the future, we see positive trends of more pragmatism and less ideological rigidity in domestic policies and relations between states of different systems throughout the world and within our hemisphere which indicate positive prospects for cooperation. We encourage Cuba to play an active role in this process and we look forward to working with Cuba in this regard. Participants in these discussions over the next few days will no doubt focus on various aspects of these changes and what sort of effect they will have on Cuba's relations with Canada and with other countries. We will be following these discussions with interest. I can assure you that the Government of Canada will be prepared to respond to any practical ways and means that can be identified that can enhance hemispheric cooperation and Canada-Cuba Relations.

13 Cuba's Canadian Connection: The Northern Door Opens Wider John M. Kirk

Flying into the new air terminal at Varadero or Havana is probably the first experience most travelers have of Canadian-Cuban cooperation. A stroll along the beaches of East Havana or Varadero will then undoubtedly present the opportunity to see some of the more than sixty thousand Canadian tourists—66,724 in 1989—who fly to the island for their annual escape from the Great White North, hinting perhaps at the potential for joint tourism ventures. While bilateral trade is small in comparison with that between Cuba and its trading partners in Eastern Europe, it is quite significant for Havana, as Ottawa gradually seems to be appreciating. Canadian trade with Cuba has increased quite steadily since the early 1960s, although it has been badly affected by Havana's lack of hard currency since 1986. Canadian imports from the island increased from $13 million in 1960 to $58.9 million in 1970, although its exports to Cuba increased only from $7.2 million to $9.5 million. It was during the Trudeau period that the most dramatic increase in bilateral commerce was seen, reaching an impressive $452.4 million of Canadian exports and $96.5 million of Cuban exports in 1981. During this time Canada quickly surpassed Japan, France, and Spain as the island's principal non-Communist trading partner. The main Canadian products involved have been grain— largely wheat—and some engineering and minor chemical products, while Cuba's primary exports have been raw sugar, shrimp, lobster, tobacco, and rum. Although commercial relations are still good, bilateral trade declined steadily throughout the 1980s: In 1989 Canada exported $154 million of goods to Cuba and imported $62.1 million. In the immediate future, unless Havana's convertible-currency resources improve dramatically, it is likely that this gradual decrease will continue.1 Political events in the Soviet Union, coupled with demands from former CMEA partners for payment in hard cash, will also have an impact on Cuba's available funding. In April 1990 Louise Frechette, Canada's assistant deputy minister of external affairs, visited Havana for a week. She held discussions with Fidel Castro for three hours, as well as with Vice-President Carlos Rafael 207

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Community

Rodríguez, José Fernández, and senior officials of the Central Committee, the Ministries of External Affairs and Foreign Trade, the National Bank, the CECE, and Intur (the tourism institute). Ms. Fréchette also addressed students at the Institute of International Relations. At the end of her stay she noted that "we've always had good relations with Cuba and we propose to improve them even more." 2 Much was made of the visit of such a high-ranking Canadian government official just a few months after the visit to Canada of Cuban Deputy Minister of External Affairs Ricardo Alarcón (now Cuba's ambassador to the United Nations). A press conference held shortly before the Fréchette trip by Joe Clark (Canada's secretary of state for external affairs, who subsequently received an official invitation to visit Havana) fueled speculation. Clark talked about Ottawa's interest in seeking to thaw the frosty relationship between Cuba and the United States, stressing that he had raised the issue of Cuba's isolation with both Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State James Baker. "Canada can't solve the contest between Cuba and the United States," he said, "but we may well be able... to create some room where the principal actors may move." 3 Somewhat critical both of Fidel Castro's outspoken distaste for the changes occurring in Eastern Europe and of TV Martí ("I don't think those broadcasts are very helpful," he noted), Mr. Clark seems to be signaling interest in mediating areas of bilateral contention between Washington and Havana whenever these governments are prepared to negotiate. At the same time, however, Ottawa is prepared to adopt a radically different stance toward Cuba than is Washington. Most recently this policy was seen in the energetic rejection in November 1990 of the Connie Mack amendment, which was adopted by the US Congress and prohibited foreign (e.g., Canadian) subsidiaries of US corporations from trading with Havana. Business between Canadian-based subsidiaries of U.S. companies and Cuba amounted to some $22 million in 1989, yet it was largely for political reasons that the Canadian government reacted so vigorously in its denunciation of the Mack amendment. Secretary Clark threatened to invoke the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (passed by Parliament in 1984) if the Mack Amendment were to become law,4 leading the Toronto Globe and Mail to publish an indignant editorial in its November 3,1990, issue: "Canada Confronts a Big Mack Attack." Moreover, Clark ordered firms to ignore the US bill, again emphasizing differences in the Canadian and US positions on Cuba. Clearly, despite the Mulroney government's headlong rush to embrace free trade with Washington, there are still some significant differences in foreign policy between the two countries. While this renewed interest from Canada in Cuba—and, indeed, in

Cuba's Canadian Connection

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Latin America as a whole—has caused speculation about its motives, in many ways this is the continuation of Ottawa's policy since the early 1960s. Canada and Mexico were the only countries of the hemisphere who refused to join the economic blockade against Cuba after the latter's expulsion from the OAS. Under the leadership of John Diefenbaker and Lester Pearson, Ottawa resisted for many years substantial pressure from Washington to break ties with Havana. Fueled by a spirit of economic nationalism, a particular mutual dislike between John F. Kennedy and Diefenbaker, and a desire to expand trade with Cuba in the face of the US blockade, Canada withstood US lobbying, as it also did with its notably independent policy on China. Havana's decision to compensate all Canadian businesses for nationalized property and interests—unlike the attitude adopted about many US corporations— also helped to strengthen these nascent ties. Diefenbaker's resistance to pressure from Washington during the 1962 Missile Crisis clearly underlined the nationalistic stance of the Canadian government—and its fundamental disagreement with US policy on Cuba. The Trudeau period saw a renewal of this economic nationalism. Convinced that it made sense to maintain diplomatic relations with any de facto government, regardless of ideology, providing that basic human rights were respected, Pierre Trudeau expressed his profound disagreement about Cuba with a variety of US presidents from Nixon to Reagan. His 1976 visit to the island, which significantly was the first by a NATO head of state, underlined this distinctive policy. It was during the Trudeau years that direct flights were initiated from Montreal and Toronto to Cuba. Cuban consulates in Toronto and Montreal were expanded, a Cuban tourism office was opened in Toronto, a trade commission and trading company (Galax Inc.) were opened in Montreal, and a base for the Cuban fishing fleet was established in Halifax. Ramón Castro, the elder brother of Fidel, visited Canada buying thousands of head of Holstein for the island's cattle program, and tourism was developed for the Ontario and Quebec markets. Tourism has since expanded significantly, with direct charter flights from many smaller cities. Five years ago, to cite one example, flights were inaugurated between Halifax, Nova Scotia—with a local population of only 200,000—and Cienfuegos. But this brief historical sketch does not wholly explain Canada's current stance. The government of Brian Mulroney, who had an excellent working relationship with Ronald Reagan, is well known for its conservative, continentalist policy, as seen clearly in its free-trade deal with the United States. Ottawa's refusal in early 1990 to condemn the US invasion of Panama also showed that, when it was deemed to be in Canada's best interests, the Mulroney administration would continue to support Washington's position.

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Cuba's Relations with the North Atlantic Community

So why does Ottawa pursue rapprochement with Havana? One hypothesis is that it is seeking to act as Washington's proxy in Latin America, particularly in the light of the increasing anti-US sentiment there. US influence in the region has fallen as the result of a number of factors, which include its support for Britain during the Malvinas/Falklands crisis, despite OAS commitments to Argentina; attempts by the Reagan administration to derail the Contadora and Arias peace processes; US funding for the contras; the recent invasion of Panama; and US policy on narcotraffic in the region. According to this theory, Canada, which only joined the OAS in January 1990, will act as Washington's agent in Latin America. One aspect of this "hidden agenda," it is rumored, is that Ottawa will maintain diplomatically correct relations with Havana so that the Bush administration will have a readily available intermediary should it need at some point to communicate with the Cuban government. Moreover, while the United States concentrates on the dramatic events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Canada can "mind the store" by increasing its role in Latin America. The other main theory is both less dramatic and more probable— namely, that Canada, wary of Bush's intent to change a Canadian-US free-trade pact into one uniting all the Americas, is desperately seeking to discover Latin America and thereby protect its commercial interests. The flurry of activity with Havana, then, would be merely one dimension of a multifaceted agenda for the entire hemisphere. Moreover, given the growing pan-Hispanism in the OAS and the increasing demand by powerful lobbies that Cuba be readmitted, Ottawa is thus adopting a pragmatic approach to an inevitable development. Given the tradition of cordial relations between Canada and Cuba, Ottawa is merely showing that it supports this policy—and largely for reasons of self-interest. Joe Clark touched on this position in February in a speech at the University of Calgary. He noted that "some of the current problems in Latin America could become more manageable if Cuba were brought back into the family of hemispheric nations." Similarly, during her visit to Havana, Louise Fréchette emphasized that Ottawa favors Havana's reentry into the OAS: "It is important that the conditions are created for Cuba to be reintegrated into the OAS as a member of the western hemisphere." 5 The main tenet of this theory is that Canada's future is tied to its commercial relationships in the Americas. The development of trading blocs in Asia and Western Europe, and the upheaval in Eastern Europe, have convinced the Ottawa mandarins that Canada's future is inextricably linked with both the United States (hence free trade) and Latin America. Canada's decision to enter the OAS—after many decades as a permanent observer—was quite dramatic. Announced, perhaps significantly, by Prime Minister Mulroney while he was visiting the Bush summer home

Cuba's Canadian Connection

211

in Maine, the concept goes totally against forty years of Canadian policy. Nevertheless, Joe Clark expressed his commitment to the move in his address to the University of Calgary. He concluded by noting that "Mikhail Gorbachev has called for a 'common European home.' I think it's time that we in North America begin to think—and act—in terms of a common hemispheric home." So what can be expected from this bilateral relationship? There will probably not be any dramatic developments, largely because Cuba does not have the hard currency to increase its purchases from Canada and because the latter has little to gain from any significant fresh diplomatic initiatives. That is not to say that the solid working relationship will deteriorate, for it understandably behoves both Ottawa and Havana to maintain good diplomatic and commercial ties. Should the OAS push for Cuba's readmission, Canada would undoubtedly be called upon to take a leading role in negotiating with Washington. It is difficult to foresee any drastic change in the relationship between Ottawa and Havana. The political and economic impact of the army of more than sixty thousand Canadian tourists who descend on Cuba's beaches every year, combined with Fidel Castro's observation many years ago that these bilateral ties represent the model to follow between societies with different ideologies, suggests that it will continue to be "business as usual." Notes 1. Surprisingly, this anticipated trend did not develop in early 1990. In fact, quite the opposite occurred—compared to the corresponding period in 1989, Cuban-Canadian trade for the first six months of 1990 expanded by an overall 34 percent. Looking specifically at the export figures, Canada's six-month shipments to the island rose from $79.54 million (1989) to $92,211 million (1990), while the comparable Cuban export figures went from $25,485 million (1989) to $44,839 million (1990), an increase of 75.9 percent. For details, see Martin Hachtoun, "Cuba-Canada: Considerable aumento comercial y buenas perspectivas," Granma Weekly Review (November 18, 1990): 8. Whether this positive trend will continue over the long run remains, of course, to be seen. 2. Globe and Mail (Toronto), April 27,1990, p. A4. 3. Ibid., April 14,1990, p. A7. 4. The bill that included the Mack amendment was vetoed by President Bush on November 17,1990. His action was not in response to the amendment per se; indeed, he indicated that he strongly supported the policy the amendment advocated. His veto was prompted by language in the bill regarding export controls that he interpreted as an unacceptable restriction on presidential powers. In early 1991, faced with a renewed attempt in the Congress to restrict trade with Cuba by the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies, Canadian Attorney-General Kim

212

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Community

Campbell noted that if such a bill were to become law, the Canadian government would "issue an order blocking its application in Canada." See "Ottawa opposes U.S. restrictions on Cuban trade," Globe and Mail, February 21,1991, p. 35. 5. Granma Weekly Review (May 6,1990): 9.

Part Four CONCLUSION

213

14 Confronting the Challenge of a New International Order H. Michael Erisman ]ohn M. Kirk Revolutions are almost invariably messy, confusing affairs; they are born out of chaos as the old order disintegrates, and then they must navigate the uncharted waters of attempting to build and consolidate a new society, often making numerous mistakes along the way. In the process they suffer an almost constant barrage of criticism, being denounced both by ideological foes whose hatred is unremitting and by former supporters who have somehow lost the faith, often because their unrealistically high expectations have not been fulfilled or because they do not wish to travel the political paths that have been chosen. Compounding this already high confusion quotient is the fact that these dramas occur against a fluid international backdrop where the configurations of power are never static and the rules of the game may be rewritten on little, if any, notice. It is such reality with which the Cuban Revolution has had to live, a fact that in itself is not particularly surprising or unique. What is unusual, however, is Havana's success in overcoming these obstacles and adapting to what has often been a hostile environment without compromising its basic revolutionary principles. Confronted with an implacable foe in Washington, which has done everything short of an all-out invasion to make their life miserable, the Fidelistas have not only managed to survive for over thirty years, but more remarkably have transformed a basically resource-poor Third World nation into a trendsetter in such areas as health, education, and distributive justice, as well as into a highly influential actor on the global stage. But now, as the uncertain 1990s unfold, the central issue is not maintaining or increasing the island's developmental m o m e n t u m . R a t h e r , the greatest concern is whether serious socioeconomic retrogression will occur, as has already been the case in much of Latin America during the 1980s. These questions can to some extent be addressed by making adjustments in domestic policies, a process that has already begun. Among the austerity measures that have been introduced are that one of the island's three operating nickel plants has been closed to conserve energy; farmers are being urged to shift from machinery to draft animals wherever pos215

216

Conclusion

sible; gasoline supplies for government vehicles have been slashed 50 percent, while a comparable 30 percent decrease has been imposed on private transportation; and plans have been formulated to reduce the government bureaucracy drastically by reassigning thousands of Havana office workers to factory and agricultural jobs in the countryside.1 The primary roots of the crisis lie, however, in the international sphere, the main problems being the cataclysmic transformations occurring in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well as the winds of recession that have been battering the developing nations throughout the 1980s and show no signs of abating significantly in the foreseeable future. Certainly, as we have tried to demonstrate throughout this book, Havana finds itself in a position as it enters the 1990s where its maneuvering room on the world stage may be severely threatened by the new, emergent global order. The rules are, in other words, being rewritten in a manner that could be extremely detrimental to the Revolution's interests and, say some observers, perhaps even to its very survival. It is probably not an exaggeration to suggest that the Fidelistas may be confronting their greatest challenge since the early days when they were struggling to consolidate their power against the fury of the Colossus of the North. Today, as was similarly the case then, the walls seem to be closing in. A key task confronting the island's leaders, therefore, is to retool their international agenda so as to expand and diversify it. This is, in a general sense, the confrontation alluded to in this book's title and the main theme we have tried to explore in our macrosurvey of Havana's foreign affairs. To conclude this effort, we offer the following brief observations on some of the prospects and options for Cuban policy in the 1990s (recognizing, of course, that such speculation is an extremely risky business even in times of relative tranquility, which hardly is a characteristic of the contemporary Cuban situation). Unfortunately, the Fidelistas' ability to deal with the challenges of the 1990s are in some respects dependent upon factors over which they have little or no control, the key wild card here being the evolving situation in Eastern Europe and especially the USSR. It appears, at least as far as economic aid and other forms of fraternal support are concerned, that Havana can pretty well write off the Eastern European countries. While some possibilities for trade may remain, such transactions are likely to be on terms far less attractive and profitable to Cuba (e.g., world market prices and payment in hard currencies) than was previously the case. Moreover, the Eastern Europeans have indicated their preference that future arrangements be made within the context of bilateral relations, where Havana's bargaining position would not be particularly strong, rather than within the more friendly multilateral confines of CMEA, where the standard operating procedure has been to extend the island

Confronting the Challenge of a New International Order

217

preferential treatment. Indeed CMEA already appears for all practical purposes to be terminally comatose, with most of its members making little effort to conceal their desire to see it formally disbanded as they pursue their quest for greater economic-political links to the West in general and the E E C in particular. The Kremlin's posture regarding future ties with Cuba is more murky than is the case in the Eastern European capitals. So far Gorbachev has not taken any precipitous action. Aid levels have been reduced and more cutbacks may occur, but overall it appears that Moscow has tried (admittedly not always successfully) to carry out this process in a manner that is minimally disruptive to Cuba. Nor, at least as 1990 drew to a close, has Gorbachev displayed any serious inclination, despite some vociferous criticism of ongoing subsidies from elements within the Soviet Communist party and the society at large,2 to cut Havana totally adrift. In short, as long as Gorbachev remains in control, the Kremlin will probably try to cushion as much as possible the disequilibriating impact on the island of the past and the almost inevitable future changes in the nature and dynamics of the Cuban-Soviet connection. All bets would, of course, be off should his grip on power slip, for a post-Gorbachev USSR could very well be much less accommodating to Havana. As opposed to the Soviet-East European situation, where Cuba is to a great extent a spectator and therefore must essentially wait to see what transpires, there are other arenas where it could adopt much more proactive stances that might serve at least to minimize its potential loss of existing political space and ideally open some previously unexplored territory. It could, for example, launch some new initiatives in its ongoing efforts to normalize its relations with the United States.3 Admittedly, the prospects for any significant breakthrough on this front are not particularly promising given the numerous countercurrents operating within Washington. Beyond what seems to be an ideological and perhaps even personal aversion to détente on Bush's part, the administration has found that intransigence on this issue is a convenient way to placate the radical right wing of the Republican party, which has never fully accepted the president's conservative credentials. Moreover, the influence wielded by the vehemently anti-Castro Cuban lobby (led by the Cuban American National Foundation, or CANF) within both the White House and the halls of Congress should not be underestimated. CANF emerged as a major player during the 1980s; it enjoyed a special relationship with the Reagan administration that helped to nurture it to the point where it became a force to be reckoned with in Florida politics as well as in making foreign policy dealing with Latin American affairs in general and Cuba in particular. Certainly neither Bush nor any of his close associates has to this point (late 1990) demonstrated any willingness to take actions that

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could conceivably incur CANF's wrath (which can rather easily be done, since the organization considers anything short of all-out hostility to Castro to be the equivalent of high treason). Finally, even if the above considerations are discounted, Bush might nevertheless feel that an unprecedented opportunity exists that simply must be exploited in order for him to achieve something that has eluded all seven of his immediate predecessors—a solution to the "Cuban question" on Washington's terms. This position is predicated on the assumption that the West has won the Cold War and that communism is in retreat everywhere, having been most graphically repudiated in Eastern Europe and throughout the Western Hemisphere (e.g., the February 1990 elections in Nicaragua that drove the Sandinistas from power). Castro, so this argument goes, cannot continue to swim against this current; he is not only becoming increasingly alienated from the world community, but also from younger, more moderate elements within Cuba who are much more attracted to Western-style liberalism than to Fidelismo. Thus he can, it is concluded, be brought down by a carefully orchestrated campaign of external political-economic pressure. In essence, then, what this perspective anticipates is some kind of Cuban variation of the Allende, Ortega, or even Ceausescu debacles. Although many observers (including some within the US government) see this scenario as being based more on wishful thinking than solid analysis, it nevertheless has enough strong advocates both within the Bush administration and in influential political circles (e.g., CANF) to increase the likelihood that Washington will maintain its hard-line posture no matter what normalization initiatives Havana may float. A potentially much more productive space-enhancing alternative (at least for the immediate future), which Havana has already begun to explore, involves increasing its emphasis on South-South linkages, particularly with regard to trade and related commercial ventures. An obvious problem that arises when contemplating expanded trade with other developing nations is the lack of demand for traditional Cuban products; very few LDCs represent dynamic markets for items such as sugar, rum, tropical fruits, nickel, or even cigars, which have historically represented the backbone of the island's exports. Thus, while any increase whatsoever in Third World sales would be welcomed (especially if conducted in hard currency, thereby enhancing Havana's ability to service its foreign debt and to purchase crucial Western manufactured goods), the key to transforming South-South trade into a vigorous growth component of Cuba's economic program is the development on its part of new product lines. Recognizing biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and health services as particularly promising areas, Havana has established a Center for Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering that has already made important progress in creating several varieties of interferon and streptokinase (a

Confronting the Challenge of a New International Order

219

heart attack drug).4 The commercial LDC market potential of such research activities was recently demonstrated when Brazil purchased large quantities of a meningitis B vaccine developed at the center. Perhaps one of Havana's most novel experiments is its efforts to combine two of the island's major resources—its potential as a vacation destination and its high degree of medical expertise—into a "health tourism" industry, the idea being to attract tourists from the Third World and elsewhere by offering medical services that either are not available in their home countries or can be obtained in Cuba at considerably lower prices, while at the same time providing a low-cost Caribbean holiday. To help raise the investment capital necessary for these and other ambitious projects, as well as to obtain marketing expertise that is often sorely lacking in Cuba, Havana has—as noted by Gareth Jenkins in Chapter 11—markedly liberalized its laws concerning joint ventures.5 Although, as was probably anticipated and indeed intended, the strongest response to these reforms has come from the more industrialized Northern societies, they have also generated interest on a South-South plane from such major developing nations as Mexico, Brazil, and Libya. Other Third World countries, such as Iran and Venezuela, while not yet prepared to enter into formal joint ventures, have signed agreements for wide-ranging economictechnical collaboration programs6 that Havana clearly hopes will serve as vehicles to promote future trade relations. Unfortunately, however, Cuba's prospects for expanding its commerce can become entangled in, and undermined by, a vicious circle reminiscent of Joseph Heller's famed catch-22. In a nutshell, the dilemma is that there are countries that are reluctant to trade unless Havana makes significant progress in servicing the debt it owes them, and this in turn makes it more difficult for Cuba to do so, since meeting its obligations demands greatly increased amounts of export revenue. This phenomenon is, of course, most likely to be set into motion by the Western industrialized states because they are the island's primary creditors, but Third World countries can also sometimes enter the picture. In June 1990, for example, Peru announced that it was suspending a trade pact with Cuba because of Havana's failure to make a $5.2 million payment on its debt to Lima.7 Similar difficulties have arisen with such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico.8 While these problems are not insurmountable, they do help to create a financial and psychological climate that is hardly conducive to strengthening Cuba's South-South relations. One major theater of diplomatic and especially economic action that has recently begun to receive much more attention from Havana is the Far East, particularly its two powerhouse nations of Japan and the People's Republic of China. Traditionally, Asian affairs have been ac-

220

Conclusion

corded a rather low priority on the Revolution's international agenda, the major exception to this rule being the strong affinity that the Cubans have displayed for the Vietnamese Communist movement that was founded and for years led by the legendary Ho Chi Minh. During the 1960s and 1970s, for example, Havana demonstrated its admiration by extending the Vietnamese whatever support it could during their national liberation struggle against the United States and its allies. The Fidelistas also tended to look upon Vietnam as one of the few Third World members of the Communist community that could be considered their "natural ally" in the sense that it shared their commitment to stubborn ideological independence. Move beyond this Hanoi connection, however, and one finds few strong links. Some contacts were established with Beijing during the Revolution's early days, but they quickly fell victim to the close CubanSoviet ties that emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s.9 Also, Havana has maintained long-term ties with North Korea that occasionally have appeared to be quite cordial (e.g., as when Cuba boycotted the Seoul Olympics to protest the decision not to allow Pyongyang to serve as cohost), but in general the relationship could be more accurately described in diplomatic terms as "correct" rather than "close." While the quest for greater political-ideological space appears to have been the primary driving force behind Havana's Far Eastern initiatives in the past, economic considerations (i.e., diversification of trade/aid partners) are more likely to dominate the equation in the 1990s. Cuba has been placing heavy emphasis on expanding its relations with China (a market of over 1 billion people) and Japan (a leading source of investment capital and technological expertise). Throughout 1990 there was constant traffic between Havana and Beijing as various delegations explored the prospects for increased trade and economic cooperation. In October, for instance, it was announced that an agreement was being finalized for the Chinese to provide technical assistance in the construction of bicycle and fan factories in Cuba.10 As a result of such activity, the island had by the end of 1990 emerged as the China's most important trading partner in Latin America.11 While China is only beginning its emergence as one of Havana's Asian economic partners, Japan has long played such a role (as indicated in Table 1.1). Indeed, trade between the two islands has routinely exceeded the comparable Cuban-Canadian figures and has often rivaled the volume generated by some of Havana's main Western European contacts. The issue with regard to Japan is not, therefore, creating brand-new economic space, but rather expanding upon and diversifying the solid foundation that already exists. In particular, the Fidelistas would like to see entrepreneurs from Japan as well as some of the so-called Asian Tigers (e.g., Singapore) take advantage of the opportunities created by Cuba's

Confrontingthe Challenge of a New International Order

221

joint venture laws and thereby increase the Revolution's access to badly needed investment capital, state-of-the-art production technology, and management-marketing skills. There has even been some indication that Fidel may make an official state visit to Japan sometime in the near future in order to help promote such collaboration. If so, it will almost surely be interpreted as a signal that a major Far Eastern offensive has been launched in Cuba's campaign to enhance its economic maneuvering room on the international stage. The final option that Cuba might explore is the possibility of joining the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) Group and thereby becoming involved in the Lomé process. The genesis of the ACP Group can be traced to England's decision to join the E E C . London's pending entry sent shock waves through the Third World members of the British Commonwealth, who feared that their privileged access to English markets would be jeopardized. Consequently, when given the opportunity (under the provisions of the January 1972 Treaty of Accession that ushered London into the E E C ) to establish an institutionalized association with the entire E E C , the developing Commonwealth nations formed the ACP Group to serve as their agent. ACP membership was quickly expanded to include the former colonies of other European powers (especially France), and the forty-six participating governments then proceeded to enter into discussions in pursuit of a comprehensive new relationship with the E E C . The result was the 1975 Lomé I Convention, which has subsequently been renegotiated every five years—Lomé II in 1980, Lomé III in 1985, and Lomé IV in 1990.12 While the Lomé experience has not always lived up to the initial ACP expectations, and perhaps should not have been expected to, it nevertheless represents a major accomplishment on the part of the Third World nations—specifically, the acquisition and exercise of collective bargaining power within the context of periodic negotiations over the exact terms of at least some important aspects of the North-South economic relationship. As a former colony of one of the E E C countries (Spain), Cuba appears to have the necessary credentials to join the A C P and become a party to the Lomé accords. Such a move could contribute significantly to Havana's efforts not only to stabilize, but it is hoped also to expand, its trade/aid links with Western Europe. Perhaps even more intriguing, however, are the possibilities that arise with respect to restructuring some of Havana's badly battered CMEA ties. Practically all of the Eastern European nations want, as part of their transformation toward more-Western-style market economies, to become incorporated in some capacity into the E E C framework. The former German Democratic Republic has, of course, already gained entry as a result of reunification with an existing E E C member. The remaining CMEA countries, especially the more developed ones such as Czechoslovakia,

222

Conclusion

Hungary, and possibly Poland, will almost undoubtedly have to wait for several years before any action is taken on their behalf, and even then associate rather than full membership is most likely. In any case, should some version of this Cuban-ACP and C M E A - E E C scenario transpire, it could very well provide a useful mechanism for Havana to get its Eastern European relations on a much more even keel. The Cuban Revolution has in the past displayed a remarkable ability to trim its sails to shifts in the political-economic winds and make the ensuing stormy passage relatively unscathed. In the 1990s, however, it may be facing a hurricane of unprecedented proportions that will test as never before its survival instincts and abilities. This drama will, of course, be played out on both the domestic and global stages. Of the two arenas, however, it is probable that the more decisive challenge will be to Havana's ability to confront successfully the new international order that is evolving as we enter the 1990s.

Notes 1. For more details concerning these and other austerity measures, see the following issues of CubalNFO-. 2, no. 14 (September 7,1990): 4; 2, no. 16 (October 5, 1990): 4-5; and 2, no. 17 (October 19, 1990): 3-4. CubalNFO is published bimonthly by the Cuba Policy Project of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University (Washington, DC) and is perhaps the best available source in the United States for capsule summaries of events in Cuba. 2. The Moscow News has been one of the most vociferous sources of Soviet criticism of Cuba, castigating Castro for his reluctance to embrace the concepts of glasnost and perestroika as well as serving as one of the main fora for those who want the USSR to distance itself from, if not sever practically all its relations with, its Caribbean ally. Such virulent anti-Cuban attitudes probably contributed significantly to Havana's announcement in August 1989 that it was prohibiting the Moscow News (along with another Russian magazine called Sputnik) from being circulated in Cuba. Even some mainstream Soviet publications have called for a major reassessment of Moscow's Havana connection. For example, the Miami Herald (October 3, 1990) reported that Pravda, the official newspaper of the USSR's Communist party, stated in an October 2,1990, editorial that it was time to rethink the country's relationship with Cuba and particularly to alter it from one of "philanthropy to collaboration." 3. For analyses and suggestions, see Philip Brenner, From Confrontation to Negotiation: U.S. Relations with Cuba (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988); Wayne S. Smith and Esteban Morales Domínguez, eds., Subject to Solution: Problems in Cuban-U.S. Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988); and Jorge I. Domínguez and Rafael Hernández, eds., U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 1990s (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989). 4. See "Cuba Liberalizes Foreign Investment Policy," CubalNFO 2, no. 20

Confronting the Challenge of a New International Order

223

(December 14,1990): 4. 5. See note 4 and "Doing Business with Cuba," Granma Weekly Review (October 7,1990): 8; "Joint Ventures in Cuba," Granma Weekly Review (November 25,1990): 12. 6. Regarding Iran, see "New Cooperation with Cuba in Medicine and Pharmaceutical Products," Granma Weekly Review (December 16,1990): 5. On Venezuela, see Update on Cuba (September 17,1990): 9. 7. "Peru Suspends Trade with Cuba," CubalNFO 2, no. 12 (July 19,1990): 4-5. 8. Reported in Update on Cuba (September 17, 1990): 8. In this article, special attention is given to the recommendation made by the Colombian government on June 25 to the effect that Colombian exporters should suspend all transactions with Cuba because Havana had recently announced that it could not for the time being make any payments on the trade debt it owed to Colombia. 9. For information and analyses concerning Cuban-Chinese relations during this period, see Cecil Johnson, Communist China and Latin America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); and Daniel Tretiak, Perspectives on Cuba's Relations with the Communist System: The Politics of a Communist Independent, 1959-1969 (Ann Arbor, MI: Xerox University Microfilms, 1975). 10. "Chinese Official in Cuba," CubalNFO 2, no. 17 (October 19,1990): 4. 11. Reported in Update on Cuba (October 10,1990): 6. The total value of Cuban-Chinese trade for 1990 was put at $420 million as of October, the expectation being that the trend would be sharply upward in the future. 12. For information about the Lomé process, see John Ravenhill, Collective Clientelism: The Lomé Conventions and North-South Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); and Ellen Frey-Wouters, The European Community and the Third World: The Lomé Convention and its Impact (New York: Praeger Special Studies, Praeger Publishers, 1980). By 1985 the ACP's ranks had grown from the original forty-six members to sixty-six participants.

Selected Bibliography

Books (1980-1990) Balari, Eugenio R., Cuba-USA (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1895). Bender, Lynn Darceli, Cuba vs. United States: The Politics of Hostility, 2d ed., completely rev. (San Juan, PR: InterAmerican University Press, 1981). Brenner, Philip, From Confrontation to Negotiation: US. Relations with Cuba (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988). Castro, Fidel, Fidel Castro Speeches, 1984-1985: War and Crisis in the Americas, ed. M. Taylor (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1985). Diáz-Briquets, Sergio, ed., Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1989). Domínguez, Jorge I., To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). Domínguez, Jorge I., and Rafael Hemánadez, eds., U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 1990s (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989). Duncan, W. Raymond, The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence (New York: Praeger, 1985). Erisman, H. Michael, Cuba's International Relations: The Anatomy of a Nationalistic Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985). Falk, Pamela S., Cuban Foreign Policy: Caribbean Tempest (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986). Fernández, Damián, Cuba's Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988). Frederick, Howard H., Cuban-American Radio Wars: Ideology in International Telecommunications (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing, 1986). González, Edward, Castro, Cuba, and the World (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1986). Gottemoeller, Rose E., The Potential for Conflict Between Soviet and Cuban Policies in the Third World (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1981). Grinevich, E. A., Washington Versus Havana (Moscow: Progress, 1988). Hinckle, Warren, The Fish is Red: The Story of the Secret War Against Castro (New York: Harper and Row, 1981). Katz, Mark N., The Soviet-Cuban Connection (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1984). Kopilow, David J., Castro, Israel, & the PLO (Washington, DC: Cuban American National Foundation, 1985). LeoGrande, William M., Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980. Policy Papers in Latin America, no. 13 (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1980).

225

226

Selected

Bibliography

Levine, Barry B., ed., The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983). López Segrera, Francisco, Cuba y Centroamérica (Mexico City: Claves Latinoamericanas, 1986). Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, and June S. Belkin, eds., Cuba in Africa. Latin American Monograph and Document Series, no. 3 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 1982). Montaner, Carlos Alberto, Cuba, Castro, and the Caribbean: The Cuban Revolution and the Crisis in Western Conscience (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1985). Moore, Carlos, Castro, the Blacks, and Africa (Los Angeles: Center for AfroAmerican Studies, University of California, 1988). Morley, Morris H., Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952-1986 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Newson, David D., The Soviet Brigade in Cuba: A Study in Political Diplomacy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). Payne, Richard J., Opportunities and Dangers of Soviet-Cuban Expansion: Toward a Pragmatic U.S. Policy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988). Pérez, Louis A., Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990). Portillo, Julio, Venezuela-Cuba. Relaciones diplomáticas, 1902-1980 (Caracas: Editorial Arte, 1981). Robbins, Carla Anne, The Cuban Threat (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983). Roy, Joaquin, Cuba y España:precepciones y relaciones (Madrid: Playor, 1988). Shearman, Peter, The Soviet Union and Cuba (London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987). Smith, Wayne, The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations since 1957 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987). Smith, Wayne S., and Esteban Morales Domínguez, eds., Subject to Solution: Problems in Cuba-U.S. Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988). Tokatlian, Juan G., ed., Cuba y Estados Unidos: dos enfoques (Bogotá: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1984). Welch, Richard E., Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985).

Articles (1980-1990) Banks, Howard, "A Friend in Tokyo," Forbes 138 (November 3,1986): 38-39. Bayloyra, Enrique A., "Adventure or Enterprise? Cuba's Foreign Policy," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 31 (Winter 1989): 193-207. Brenner, Philip, "U.S.-Cuban Relations: Normality Is Possible," Christianity and Crisis 48 (October 24,1988): 364-368. Castro, Fidel, "On Grenada," Monthly Review 35 (January 1984): 11-29. "Cuba's Socialist Economy Toward the 1990s," World Development 15 (January 1987): 1-180. Cuddy, Edward, "America's Cuban Obsession: A Case Study in Diplomacy and Psycho-History," The Americas 43 (October 1986): 183-196.

Selected

Bibliography

227

Diaz Ruiz, Antonio, "Reagan Versus Cuba," World Marxist Review 30 (May 1987): 112-118. Domínguez, Jorge I., "Cuba in the 1980s," Foreign Affairs 65 (Fall 1986): 118-135. , "Cuba in the International Arena," Latin American Research Review 23, no. 1 (1988): 196-206. , "US-Cuban Relations in the 1980s: Issues and Policies," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 27 (February 1985): 17-34. Duncan, Raymond W., "Castro and Gorbachev: Politics of Accommodation," Problems of Communism 35 (March-April 1986): 45-57. , "The Odd Partners," Wilson Quarterly 12 (Winter 1988): 75-83. Erisman, H. Michael, "Cuba and the Third World: The Sixth Nonaligned Nations Conference," Caribbean Review 9, no. 1 (Winter 1980): 21-25. , "Cuban Foreign Policy: The Maturity of Analysis Question," Latin American Research Review 25, no. 1 (1990): 217-220. , "Cuban Foreign Policy: Post-Dependency Impulses and Security Imperatives," Harvard International Review (January 1987): 33-36. Falk, Pamela S„ "Cuba in Africa," Foreign Affairs 65 (Summer 1987): 1077-1097. , "Washington and Havana," The Wilson Quarterly 12 (Winter 1988): 64-74. Feinsilver, Julie M., "Cuba as a 'World Medical Power': The Politics of Symbolism," Latin American Research Review 24, no. 2 (1989): 1-34. Fernández, Damián J., "Cuban Foreign Policy: Scholarship and Double Standards," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 28 (Summer 1986): 147-53. , "Fiction and Nonfiction: Problems in the Study of Cuban Foreign Policy," Latin American Research Review 25, no. 3 (1990): 237-247. Fitzgerald, Frank T., "The 'Sovietization of Cuba Thesis' Revisited," Science & Society 51 (Winter 1987/88): 439-457. González, Edward, "The Cuban and Soviet Challenge in the Caribbean Basin," Orbis 29 (Spring 1985): 73-94. Gunn, Gillian, "Will Castro Fall?" Foreign Policy 79 (Summer 1990): 132-150. Kapcia, Tony, "Cuba After Thirty Years: The Gorbachev Visit and After," Contemporary Review 255 (August 1989): 68-74. Kaufman Purcell, Susan, "Cuba's Cloudy Future," Foreign Affairs 69 (Summer 1990): 113-130. Kline, Michael, "Castro and 'New Thinking' in Latin America," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 32 (Spring 1990): 83-118. Landau, Saul, "Understanding Revolution: A Guide for Critics," Monthly Review 39 (May 1987): 1-13. Morley, Morris H., "Reinterpreting the State-Class Relationship: American Corporations and U.S. Policy Toward Cuba," Comparative Politics 16 (October 1983): 67-83. Packenham, Robert A., "Capitalist Versus Socialist Dependency: The Case of Cuba," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 28, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 59-92. Prevost, Gary, "Cuba and Nicaragua: A Special Relationship," Latin American Perspectives 17 (Summer 1990): 120-137. Rich, Donna, "The Cuban Trade Embargo," Christianity and Crisis 48 (October 24,1988): 355-356. Riefe, Robert H., "Gorbachev, Castro and National Liberation in Latin America," The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 14 (Fall 1989): 259-282. Smith, Tony, " 'The Spirit of the Sierra Maestra': Five Observations on Writing

228

Selected

Bibliography

About Cuban Foreign Policy," World Politics 41 (October 1988): 98-119. Smith, Wayne S., "Castro's Cuba in the Third World," Christianity and Crisis 48 (October 24,1988): 368-371. ———, "Critical Junctures in U.S.-Cuban Relations: The Diplomatic Record," Diplomatic History 12 (Fall 1988): 463^81. Wiarda, Howard J., "Cuba and U.S. Foreign Policy in Latin America: The Changing Realities," World Affairs 150 (Winter 1987/88): 205-217. Zimbalist, Andrew, "Cuba's External Economy: Reflections on Export Dependence, Soviet Aid and Foreign Debt," Comparative Economic Studies 30 (Summer 1988): 21-46.

About the Contributors

H. Michael Erisman is professor and chair of the Political Science Department at Indiana State University in Terre Haute, Indiana, USA. He is the coeditor (along with John Martz) of Colossus Challenged: The Struggle for Caribbean Influence, editor of The Caribbean Challenge: U.S. Policy in a Volatile Region, and author of Cuba's International Relations: The Anatomy of a Nationalistic Foreign Policy. His Post-Dependency Politics in the CARICOM Caribbean is forthcoming from Lynne Rienner. He has written numerous journal articles and book chapters focusing on Caribbean international affairs in general and Cuban foreign policy in particular. His current research interests focus on Cuba's developmental aid programs and its evolving relations with the Far East. John M. Kirk is professor of Latin American studies at Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. He is the author of José Martí, Mentor of the Cuban Nation, and Between God and the Party: Religion and Politics in Revolutionary Cuba. He is also the coeditor of Cuba: Twenty-Five Years of Revolution, 1959-1984, Central America in Crisis: Democracy, Development and Change, and Transformation and Struggle: Cuba Faces the 1990s. Armando Entralgo González is director of the Center for Studies on Africa and the Middle East (CEAMO) in Havana. He possesses doctorates from both the University of Leipzig and the University of Havana. A former Cuban ambassador to Ghana, he has published several books and articles on contemporary Africa since 1960. David López González is deputy-director of the Center for Studies on Africa and the Middle East (CEAMO) in Havana. He is the author of Etiopía: la oposición contrarrevolucionaria. He is currently involved in research on national and international political strategies in southern Africa. Richard Gorham is a Canadian career foreign service officer and was 229

230

About the Contributors

ambassador to China from 1984 to 1987. Between 1987 and 1990 he was permanent observer of Canada to the OAS, and roving ambassador for Latin America. In addition, he is special advisor to the secretary of state for external affairs on Latin American Affairs. Gareth Jenkins is an economic consultant based in London. He has worked on problems of East-West trade since the late 1970s, and has since 1987 published the newsletter Cuba Business. His contribution to this book forms part of a longer study written for a forthcoming book to be published by the Centre for Caribbean Studies at the University of Warwick, UK, of which he is a visiting fellow. René J. Mujica Cantelar is a Cuban foreign service officer with extensive experience in Cuban-US matters. He worked as part of the Cuban delegation to the United Nations (1970-1973) and was deputy chief of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington (1977-1986). Since 1990 he has been minister-advisor to the Cuban delegation at the UN Security Council. Rhoda Rabkin received her Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1983 and is the author of Cuban Politics: The Revolutionary Experiment. Her work on Cuban affairs and on inter-American relations has appeared in various anthologies and scholarly journals. She has taught at Cornell University and is currently visiting professor at the Catholic University of Chile, where she is conducting research on the relationship between political parties and political economy in postauthoritarian Chile. Donna Rich is research analyst for the Cuba Policy Project at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where she is a doctoral candidate. She has written on Cuban foreign policy and is a coeditor of The Cuba Reader. She also worked as an analyst on the Cuban Missile Crisis Project at the National Security Archive and is currently editor of CubalNFO, a fortnightly publication on Cuba. Mark Richmond is senior lecturer in Sociology at Humberside Polytechnic, Hull, England. He has written a number of articles and conference papers on several aspects of Cuban education. He is currently engaged in a comparative study of democratization and educational policy in postFranco Spain and contemporary Chile. José Luis Rodriguez is vice-director of the Center for Research into World Economy (CIEM) in Havana. He obtained his doctorate at Latin American Institute in Moscow. Among his recent publications Dos ensayos sobre las economía cubana, Erradicación de la pobreza

the the are en

About the Contributors

231

Cuba (with G. Carriazo), La economía internacional: problemas actuales, Crítica a nuestros críticos, and Estrategia del desarrollo económico de Cuba. Luis Suárez Salazar is the director of the Center for Studies of the Americas ( C E A ) in Havana. He is also the editor of the center's journal Cuadernos de Nuestra América and has published widely both on U S Cuban relations and on Cuba's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. Wayne S. Smith teaches Latin American Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC, where he is also the director of the Cuba Policy Project. A veteran of twenty-four years in the US Foreign Service, his last position was chief of the US Interests Section in Havana (1977-1982). He is the author of The Closest of Enemies and coedited (with Esteban Morales Domínguez) Subject to Solution: Problems in Cuban-U.S. Relations. He is also the author of numerous journal articles and book chapters on Cuban affairs and US foreign policy.

Index

A A CP (see Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Group) Addis Ababa, 126 Afghanistan, 9,22,41,81,151,154,158, 161 Afghanistan-Pakistan border conflict, 123 Africa, 8,77,81 and Cuba, 93,94,95-97,98 Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) Group, 221 Agency for International Development (USAID), 140 Agricultural machinery industry, Cuba, 185 Agrochemicals, Cuban imports, 185 A I D {see Agency for International Development) Algeria, 97,150,157 Algiers Accord, 130 All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON), 123,125 Allende, Salvador, 9 Americas Watch, 85 Angola, 13,22,30,41,96,150,157,172 peace settlement, 30-31, 67, 78, 94, 99-100,103-104,140 Antiimperialism, 5,120,146 Arévalo, Juan, 1 Argentina, 9,109,183,195 Arias, Oscar, 81 Arias (Oscar) peace plan, 210 Asian Tigers, 220-221 Ayatollah (see Khomeini) Aylwin, Patricio, 109 B Baker, James, 77 Baker Memorandum, 67,77,78

Barbados, 9 Barco, Virgilio, 110 Barre, Siad, 127 Barter arrangements, 190 Bay of Pigs, 65 Belgium, 130 Berlin Accords, 127 Berlin Wall, 21,77 Bermuda, 187 Betancur, Belisario, 110 Biotechnology, 60 as a Cuban export commodity, 218 Bishop, Maurice, 5,13,28,123 Bolshevik Revolution, 2 Brady Plan, 113 Brain drain, 174 Brazil, 109,219 Brazzaville Protocol, 103 Brezhnev Doctrine, 7 British Commonwealth, 221 Bulgaria, 27,58 Burkina Faso, 172 Bush, George and Cuba, 31,217-218 and the Cuban American National Foundation, 217-218 C Cambodia, 81,160 Canada, 116,183 and the Connie Mack amendment (US), 208 and Cuba, 204,207,208,209 Cuban policies, motives behind, 209-211 and human rights in Cuba, 205 and Latin America, 210 and OAS, 205,210-211 tourism to Cuba, data, 207 US-Cuban differences, 208

233

234

Index

as a US proxy in Latin America, 210 Canary Islands, 186 CANF (Cuban American National Foundation), 217-218 Caporaso, James, 143 Caribbean Basin, 111 Caribbean Community (CARICOM), 109 C A R I C O M (see Caribbean Community) Carter, Jimmy, 128 Casablanca Group, 95 Castro, Fidel glasnost and perestroika, 21-22,26, 29-30,32-40,111,133 and Latin American countries, 113 leadership qualities and style, 39-40, 44 overthrow of, 218 US-Soviet détente, 29-30 Castro, Ramón, 209 Catholic church, 38-39 C E C E (see Comité E s t a t a l de Colaboración Económica) Chamorro, Violeta, 82 Chernenko, Konstantin, 28 Chernobyl nuclear reactor, 59 Chile, 9,42,107,160 China (People's Republic), 21, 33, 40, 219 and Cuba, 220-221 Christian Democrats (El Salvador), 124,133 C M E A (see Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) Cohen, Herman, 104 Colombia, 9,42,110,219 Comité Estatal de Colaboración CECE or State Committee for Economic Cooperation, 140-141 COMECON (see Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) Congo, 172 Congo-Brazzaville, 95 Connie Mack amendment (US), 208 Contadora Process, 31,42,155,210 Controlled dependence, 143,161 Costa Rica, 114 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), 2, 8, 10, 14, 15, 25,27,53,54-55 and Cuba, 54,56

Cuban membership in, 55,146 disintegration of, 217 members and possible E E C membership, 221-222 Counterdependency politics, 142,157162 bargaining power, 144,158,159,161 diversification, 143 Cousteau, Jacques, 85 Containment Doctrine, 1 CPSU, 29 Cuba and the ACP Group, prospects for joining, 221-222 and Africa, 95-98,122,139-140,150, 151-152 African policies, 93-94,95 African scholarship students in, 173 and Angola, 30-31, 41, 78, 97, 99100,102-103,104,122,151-152 and Asia 219-221 austerity measures, 27-28,215-216 and Canada, relations with, 10-12, 15-16,183 Central American policies, 80-82 and the CMEA countries, 55 and counterdependency politics, 142,143,144 and developing nations, trade with, 14,148,156-157,218-219 developmental aid, 140,150-155 and Eastern Europe, 8, 10, 12, 14, 21-22, 23-28, 54, 56-57, 58-60, 147, 161, 183, 188-189, 216-217, 221-222 economic conditions, 23-24, 35, 39, 71,155 educational aid programs, 170-171 educational diplomacy, 174-177 educational system, 168, 169, 172173,175 and the EEC, 144,193-194 Ethiopia conflict, 41,78,97,127-128, 152 Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, 125-126 Ethiopian-Somalian conflict, 127128 foreign policy, 145-146,147-148 foreign scholarship programs, 140, 148-149,170,172-174 hard currency debt problems, 11-12, 15,24,25,147-148,155,183,190,

Index

195-196,219 hard currency trade, 27, 147, 157, 185,186-187,188 and international drug trade, 188 Iran-Iraq war, 130-132 and Japan, 144,190-191,192 and joint ventures, 189-190,192-193 and Latin America, 7, 8, 28-29, 4142,79-82,110-111,115,116,117, 121-122,145,146,151,155,160, 171,184-185,203 Latin American policies, 107-111 Latin American scholarship students in, data, 173 and the Lomé conventions, 221-222 Nicaragua, mediation efforts in, 124, 125 and the Nonaligned Movement, 9, 83, 108, 122, 131, 133, 141, 45, 151,152-154,161 and proletarian internationalism, 56,8,13,140,141-142,145-146 scholarship students in, data, 172-173 Shaba II invasion, mediation efforts in, 128-130 South-South relations, 8-10, 13-15, 40-42, 83,122,133,141-142,144145, 151, 152-154, 157-162, 176177,218-219,221-222 and the Soviet Union, 2-3, 5-8, 10, 12-13,14,21-40,43,44,53-57,5860, 82-84,144-145,147,152-154, 157-160, 160-161, 176, 183, 188189,196,217 and Third World debt, 142,219 trade patterns, 183,184,190 and the United States, 2, 5, 6, 13, 43-44, 68, 72-73, 77, 86-89, 158, 160,196-197,217-218 and Western Europe, 10-12, 15-16, 147,157 Cuban American National Foundations (CANF), 217-218 Cuban Commission on Human Rights, 85 Cuban Communist Party, First Congress of, 146 Cuban Missile Crisis, 5,65,165,209 Cuito Cuanavale, battle of, 30,101 Czechoslovakia, 7,21,221-222 D da Moura, Venancio, 104

235

de Gortari, Salinas Carlos, 108 del Pino, Raphael, 36 D e m o c r a t i c R e v o l u t i o n a r y Front (FDR, El Salvador), 124 Dependence, 143 Dependency, 93-94,107,115,157 defined, 142-143 Détente, 64,79,217 Developmental aid programs and Cuban economy, impact on, 156,161 and Cuban-Third World Trade, stimulus for, 156 labor versus capital intensive, 148, 171-172 personnel recruitment, 149 as revenue producers, 149-150, 155156 Dissidents in Cuba, 39,85-86,113-114 Dominquez, Jorge, 10, 125, 139, 146, 167 Dominican Republic, 110,171 dos Santos, Eduardo, José, 30 Drug trade, 113,114,188,210 E East

Germany (see German Democratic Republic) E a s t e r n E u r o p e (see Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) Economic reforms, command versus market models, 33-34,37,58-59 Educational diplomacy, 170,174,175177 defined, 168 E E C (see European Economic Community) Egypt, 127,157 El Salvador, 5,14,28,31,32,79,80,82, 87,114 Endara, Guillermo, 114 England, 10 (see also Great Britain) Eritrea, 125,126 Estefania Manuel, 188 Ethiopia, 13,41,140,172 Ethiopian-Somalian conflict, 127 Europe 1992,15 E u r o p e a n E c o n o m i c Community (EEC), 8,10,15,221 and the ACP Group, 221 and CME A members, possible EEC membership, 221-222

236

Index

economic aid to Cuba, 194 loans to Cuba, data on, 194 F Falklands Crisis, 210 Farabundo Marti Front for National L i b e r a t i o n (El Salvador, FMLN), 114,115,124,133 Fernández, Damián, 128 Fernández, José, 208 Fidelista, 5,16 FMLN (see Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation) Foco theory of guerrilla warfare, 122 France, 10,130,186 Franco, Francisco, 11 Frechette, Louise, 207 Front-Line States, 103 FSLN (see Sandinista Front for National Liberation) Functional integration, 157-158 G Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 194 Geopolitics, 1 contemporary conceptualization, 2 German Democratic Republic, 10,12, 14,21,22,26 Ghana, 172 Glasnost, 5,85,87,133 Global problems, 63-64 Global shield military maneuvers, 67, 114 Gobeze, Negede, 125 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 21,22,25,89,170 Great Britain, 186 and Cuba, 195 and the EEC, 221 Grenada, 5, 13, 28, 31, 107, 110, 146, 160,173 Grenfell, Morgan, 195 Group of Eight, 42,108,109,112,114 Group of Seventy-Seven, 122 Guantanamo naval base, 114 Guatemala, 79 Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), 114,115,124 Guevara, Che, 121 Guyana, 9 H Haiti, 110,114

Haushofer, Karl, 1 Heartland Theory, 1 Health tourism, 219 Hidalgo, Alcibiades, 104 Higher Pedagogical Institute, 172 Honduras, 30,31 Houston Economic Summit (1990), 89 Human Rights Commission, 67 Human rights in Cuba, 85-86 Hungary, 21,33,37,39,222 I India, 131 Industrial facilities, Cuban acquisition of, 185 Informal empire, 2 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (see Rio Treaty) Intur (Cuban Tourism Institute), 208 Iran, 219 Iran-Iraq war, background to, 130-131 Iraq, 131,157 and Ethiopian conflict, 126 Islamic fundamentalism, 130-131 Isle of Pines, 148 Isle of Youth, 148,172,173,176 Italy, 186 J Jackson, Jesse, 85 Jamaica, 9,107,110,151,160 Japan, 10,186,188,195,219 and Cuba, 192,220-221 Japan-Cuba Economic Commission, 192 Joint ventures, 14, 117, 189-190, 192, 193 and Cuba's South-South relations, 219 Jordan, 131 K Kampuchea (see Cambodia) Katanga, 128,129,130 invasion of, 123,128-129 Kennedy, Edward, 85 Kennedy-Khrushchev Understanding (1962), 87 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 130 Kissinger, Henry, 120 Kobayashi, Yutaka, 192 Kornai, Jonas, 34

Index Kurds, 130 Kuwait, 131 L LDC (less developed country), 2, 14, 28,142,144 Lane, F. Lyle, 129 LaRoche, Hoffman, 185 Latin America debt crisis, 115 transnational capital and multinational corporations, 115 Latinoamericanismo, 109 Lebensraum, theory of, 1 LeoGrande, William, 145 Libya, 131,150,219 Ligachev, Igor, 29 Lomé Conventions, 221 Lourdes facility, 84 Lusaka Accords (see Angola, peace settlement) M Mack, Connie, 187 Mackinder Harford, 1 Malmierca, Isidoro, 101,103,131 Malvinas/Falklands crisis, 210 Manley, Michael, 151 Marx, Karl, 5,146 Mediation defined, 119-120 disadvantages of, 132 Medvedev, A. Vadim, 29 MEISON (see All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement) Mengistu, Haile Mariam, 126 Mexico, 8,107,183,195,219 Middle East, 8 Minh, Ho Chi, 220 Morocco, 97,150 Moscow News, 38,85 Mozambique, 140 MPLA (see Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) Mulroney, Brian, 205 N Namibia, 30, 95, 98, 99, 101,123,151, 172 NATO (see North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Neoimperialism, 121

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Neto, Agostinho, 129,152 New Deal, 70 New International Economic Order (NIEO), 109,142 New Jewel Movement (see Bishop, Maurice; Grenada; New Jewel Revolution) New Jewel Revolution, 5, 13, 20 (see also Grenada) Nicaragua, 5,13, 31, 80,107,110,140, 146,149,155,160,171,172,173 elections in, 32,81-82,108,114,218 NIEO (see New I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economic Order) Nonaligned Movement, 80,83,94,122 and Cuba's African policies, 93,103, 122 Normalization, 8-10,13-14,40,42,107108,146,151 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 130,203 North Korea, 21,40,172,220 North-South bargaining power, 141 North-South cooperation, 112 North Vietnam, 145,150-151,157,220 North Yemen, 131 Novoa, José Pérez, 125 O OAS (see Organization of American States) O A U (see Organization of African Unity) Ocean Venture military maneuvers, 67, 114 O'Connor, Cardinal John, 85 Office of Foreign Assets Control (United States), 187 Ogaden, 127 Oliveras, Julio Garcia, 190 OPEC (see Organization of PetroleumExporting Countries) Organization of African Unity (OAU), 95,97,98,103,122,127,128 Organization of American States (OAS), 42,79,112,114,205 Cuba's attitudes toward, 79-80,108, 112 Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC), 24 P Palestine Liberation Organization

238

Index

(PLO), 125 Panama, 30,108,109,114,210 Panamericanismo, 109 Paraguay, 110, 111 Paris Club, 195,196 Pastora, Edén, 123,125 Peace Corps, 140 Peaceful coexistence, 111, 121 Perestroika, 5,25,28,33,83,87,133 Peru, 9,151,219 Pharmaceuticals as a Cuban export commodity, 218219 Cuban imports, 185 Pinochet, Augusto, 109 P L O (see Palestine Liberation Organization) Podgorny, Nikolai, 128 Poland, 21,31,58,222 Political space, 158,218 concept of, 1-2 Cuba's search for, 2-3, 6,12,13,16, 117,145,218,220 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), 122,146 (see also Angola) Popular Unity (Chile), 107 Proletarian internationalism, 5-6, 13, 149 Puerto Rico, 109 R Radio Marti, 36,66 Ratzel, Friedrich, 1 Reagan, Ronald, 31,209 Rectification program, 33-36,71 Red Cross, 85 Rhodesia, 95 Rio Group, 79-80,114,116 Rio Treaty, 107 Risquet, Jorge, 129 Rizhkov, Nikolai, 59 Robaina, Roberto, 38 Rodriquez, Carlos Rafael, 26,207-208 Romania, 21,26 Roosevelt, Theodore, 1 Ruiz, Henry, 32 S Sandinistas, 32 (see also Nicaragua) Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN), 5, 14, 80, 114, 124

(see also Nicaragua) Saudi Arabia, 127,131 Seaga, Edward, 160 Second Declaration of Havana (1962), 79,146 Self-determination, 119,120 Seoul Olympics (1988), Cuban boycott of, 220 Shaba II invasion, background to, 128129 Shaoqi, Liu, 33 Shevardnadze, Edward, 208 Shmelyov, Nikolai, 28 Somalia, 97,160 Somoza, Anastasio, 173 South Africa, 14,29,30,97,98,130 Angola conflict, role in, 99-100 apartheid, 95 South Yemen, 127,131 Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), 101,123 Sovereignty, effective versus formal, 144,161 Soviet-surrogate thesis, 119,160 Soviet Union and Angolan conflict, 30-31 Central American policies, 31-32, 80,81 and Cuba, 24-25,26,27-28,55-56,59, 82-84,89,128,217 foreign scholarship programs, 140 and Latin America, 28-29, 80, 81, 121-122 national interests and Cuba, 22-23, 83-84 and Nicaragua, 31-32 and the Third World, 28-29,41 and the United States, 13,29-30 Spain, 10,11,186 Spanish Civil War, 5 Sputnik, 38,85 State Committee for Economic Cooperation (CECE), 140-141 Sudan,127 Sugar, 186 Suriname, 160 S W A P O (see S o u t h West A f r i c a People's Organization) Sweden, 10 Switzerland, 10,186 T Tanzania, 95

Index

Thailand, 25 Trinidad and Tobago, 9 TV Marti, 114,208 U UNCTAD (see United Nations Commission on Trade and Development) UNESCO (see United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) UNITA (see Union for Total Independence of Angola) Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 99,100,103,104 United Kingdom (see Great Britain) United Nations Charter, 97,100 Security Council, 9,79,99,101,112, 133 and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, 152 United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 188 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 170-171,172 United States and Angolan conflict, 30-31,81,98100,103-104 Central American policies, 80-81 and Cuba, 43-44,65-68,69-73,77-78, 87-89,113-115,119,183,194-195, 196,217-218 and Cuban-Soviet tensions, 13, 71,

239

89,196 and détente, 64 foreign scholarship programs, 140 Gorbachev's Central American policies, 31 and Latin America, 210 socialist bloc, 70-71,86-87 subsidiaries, 187,208 trade embargo,, 184,187-188 U R N G (see Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) Uruguay, 109 USAID (Agency for International Development), 140 USSR (see Soviet Union) V Venezuela, 9,219 Viera, José, 80 Vietnam (see North Vietnam) Vietnam war, 70 W Watergate scandal, 70 West Germany, 10,186 Williams, William Appleton, 2 World educational power, 168-170 XYZ Xiopeng, Deng, 33 Yugoslavia, 131,133 Zaire, 128,129,130 (see also Katanga, invasion of) Zambia, 131 Zartman, I. William, 120 Zimbabwe, 172

About the Book

After thirty years of what has been an often tumultuous revolutionary experience, Cuba appears to be at a crossroads in its international relations. As its traditional alliances with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries have become increasingly tenuous, other dimensions of its international agenda, especially in the Third World and Western Europe, have gained new importance. There is also the question of US-Cuban relations in the post-Cold War world: will the general lessening of East-West tensions translate into major initiatives to normalize relations, or will the traditional pattern of confrontation perhaps intensify? This book addresses such immediate issues within the broader context of Cuban foreign policy overall. The authors explore the challenges Cuba faces in the international arena as the revolution enters its fourth decade— challenges related not only to the process of restructuring that is occurring in the Soviet bloc, but also to the economic problems that the island is facing and to the phenomenon of generational change as younger individuals rise through Cuba's leadership ranks.

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