South African Foreign Policy Review: Volume 4, Ramaphosa and a New Dawn for South African Foreign Policy 9780639763910

Table of contents :
Contents
List of figures and tables
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Acronyms and abbreviations
PART 1 Introducing the New Dawn
CHAPTER 1 A New Dawn for South Africa’s Foreign Policy?
PART 2 The New Dawn: Reimagining Ideas, Norms, and Identity
CHAPTER 2 South African Foreign Policy and the Search for Ontological Security
CHAPTER 3 To Be or Not To Be? Is South Africa a Good International Citizen?
CHAPTER 4 The Art of Reconciling Power and Morality: South Africa’s Norm Entrepreneurship Under Cyril Ramaphosa
PART 3 Constructing the New Dawn: Architecture, Actors, and Instruments in South African Foreign Policy
CHAPTER 5 Parliament and International Agreements: A Systems Perspective on Foreign Policy Oversight
CHAPTER 6 The Youth and South African Foreign Policy: Influencers or Passive Observers?
CHAPTER 7 South Africa’s Maritime Diplomacy
CHAPTER 8 South Africa’s Defence Diplomacy: A Viable Instrument of Foreign and Security Policy
CHAPTER 9 Towards the Urbanisation of Foreign Policy in South Africa?
CHAPTER 10 South African Foreign Policy, COVID-19, and Health Diplomacy: Sunset or a New Dawn?
PART 4 Searching for a Niche in the New Dawn: South Africa in the World
CHAPTER 11 South Africa’s Quest for Continental Peace and Security
CHAPTER 12 Women, Peace and Security and the African Continental Free Trade Area: Consolidating the Nexus in South Africa’s Foreign Policy
CHAPTER 13 South Africa’s Economic Diplomacy in Africa
CHAPTER 14 South African Engagement in Club Governance: A Boon for Economic Diplomacy
CHAPTER 15 South Africa’s Candidature Diplomacy
CHAPTER 16 Constituting a Post-Hegemonic World Order? Canada, South Africa, and the Fragility of ‘Middlepowerism’
CHAPTER 17 Conflicting Perspectives and Cooperative Connections: South African–US Relations During the Ramaphosa Administration
PART 5 Conclusion: A New Dawn Deferred?
CHAPTER 18 The New Dawn in a Turbulent Geopolitical Landscape: South Africa, Africa, and the Global Balance of Forces
Contributing authors
Index

Citation preview

The South African Foreign Policy Review Volume 4 Ramaphosa and a New Dawn for South African Foreign Policy First Published in 2022 by AISA Press Private Bag X41 Pretoria 0001 South Africa ISBN: 978-0-7983-0536-5 © Copyright Human Sciences Research Council 2022 No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission from the copyright owner. To copy any part of this publication, you may contact DALRO for information and copyright clearance. Any unauthorised copying could lead to civil liability and/or criminal sanctions.

Tel: 010 822 7469 (from within South Africa); +27 (0)10 822 7469 Fax: +27 (86) 648 1136 Email: [email protected] Postal Address: PostNet Suite #018, PO Box 9951, Sandton, 2146, South Africa www.dalro.co.za Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at in this book are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Africa Institute of South Africa. Thank you to GroundUp and Ashraf Hendricks for the cover photo. Link to the original image: https://www.groundup. org.za/media/uploads/images/photographers/Ashraf%20Hendricks/WEF_goverment/WEF-1983HR.jpg Project Manager: Samantha Hoaeane Editing: Simone van der Merwe Proofreading: Lara Jacob Design and Layout: Nazley Samsodien Cover Design: Nazley Samsodien Printing: xxxxxx The HSRC is committed to cutting-edge research that supports development nationally, in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and in Africa. Our commitment to the dissemination of that research demonstrates the remarkable and measurable impact of our work. For more information, contact the Human Sciences Research Council at Private Bag X41, Pretoria 0001, South Africa. Visit our website at http://www.hsrc.ac.za

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 2

2022/11/10 00:03

This book is dedicated to the memory of Francis A. Kornegay Jr. (1944–2021), a colleague and friend who provided a critical voice in the foreign policy community through his search for social justice and global equality.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 3

2022/11/10 00:03

Contents List of figures and tables

vi

Forewordvii Acknowledgementsviii Acronyms and abbreviations

ix

PART 1 Introducing the New Dawn 

1

CHAPTER 1

A New Dawn for South Africa’s Foreign Policy?

3

Lesley Masters, Jo-Ansie van Wyk, and Philani Mthembu

PART 2 The New Dawn: Reimagining Ideas, Norms, and Identity

19

CHAPTER 2

South African Foreign Policy and the Search for Ontological Security21 Bianca Naude CHAPTER 3

To Be or Not To Be? Is South Africa a Good International Citizen?

38

Suzanne Graham CHAPTER 4

The Art of Reconciling Power and Morality: South Africa’s Norm Entrepreneurship Under Cyril Ramaphosa

61

Marcel Nagar

PART 3 Constructing the New Dawn: Architecture, Actors, and Instruments in South African Foreign Policy 

85

CHAPTER 5

Parliament and International Agreements: A Systems Perspective on Foreign Policy Oversight

87

Natalie Leibrandt-Loxton CHAPTER 6

The Youth and South African Foreign Policy: Influencers or Passive Observers? 

111

Sven Botha CHAPTER 7

South Africa’s Maritime Diplomacy 

132

Lisa Otto CHAPTER 8

South Africa’s Defence Diplomacy: A Viable Instrument of Foreign and Security Policy

151

Faith Mabera

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 4

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 9

Towards the Urbanisation of Foreign Policy in South Africa?

176

Fritz Nganje and Odilile Ayodele CHAPTER 10

South African Foreign Policy, COVID-19, and Health Diplomacy: Sunset or a New Dawn?

196

Jo-Ansie van Wyk, Lesley Masters, and Philani Mthembu

PART 4 Searching for a Niche in the New Dawn: South Africa in the World

217

CHAPTER 11

South Africa’s Quest for Continental Peace and Security

219

Cheryl Hendricks CHAPTER 12

Women, Peace and Security and the African Continental Free Trade Area: Consolidating the Nexus in South Africa’s Foreign Policy

236

Nadira Bayat and David Luke CHAPTER 13

South Africa’s Economic Diplomacy in Africa

253

Christopher Vandome CHAPTER 14

South African Engagement in Club Governance: A Boon for Economic Diplomacy

275

Arina Muresan CHAPTER 15

South Africa’s Candidature Diplomacy

299

Jo-Ansie van Wyk CHAPTER 16

Constituting a Post-Hegemonic World Order? Canada, South Africa, and the Fragility of ‘Middlepowerism’

323

David R. Black and David J. Hornsby CHAPTER 17

Conflicting Perspectives and Cooperative Connections: South African–US Relations During the Ramaphosa Administration

345

Christopher Williams

PART 5 Conclusion: A New Dawn Deferred?

369

CHAPTER 18

The New Dawn in a Turbulent Geopolitical Landscape: South Africa, Africa, and the Global Balance of Forces

371

Philani Mthembu and Francis Kornegay

Contributoring authors 

385

Index393

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 5

2022/11/10 00:03

List of figures and tables

FIGURES Figure 1: The open-system model93 Figure 2: A GST input–output model for Parliament’s engagement with international agreements96 Figure 3: Matrix situating defence diplomacy in the military–diplomatic nexus of foreign policy instruments154

TABLES Table 1: Parliament’s committee engagement with the SADC-EPA during the fifth Parliament98 Table 2: The fifth Parliament’s diplomatic engagements on the SADC-EPA at the ACP–EU JPA101 Table 3: The fifth Parliament’s diplomatic engagement with the SADC-EPA at SA–EU IPMs102 Table 4: Three tiers of interaction114 Table 5: A summary of programmes enacted by DIRCO aimed at facilitating youth participation115 Table 6: Assessing South Africa’s maritime domain136 Table 7: South African joint military exercises and operations during the presidency of Cyril Ramaphosa (2018 to the present)164 Table 8: Number and location of South African defence attachés as of July 2020165

vi

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 6

2022/11/10 00:03

Foreword South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy has enabled the country to regain  its rightful status as a member of the international community. Guided by its principled foreign policy and values, the country has made strong inroads regarding the realisation of the African Agenda. South Africa contributed to some of the early reforms regarding global governance and supported the establishment of new African institutions to enhance the continent’s coordination and agency. As a committed multilateralist, South Africa will continue to engage on matters of global concern to the common benefit of humanity. Volume 4 of South African Foreign Policy Review records these principles and values in action. It continues to contribute to the consideration of South Africa’s foreign policy, global developments, and our domestic aspirations.  Volume 4’s focus on the New Dawn is commendable, as it encapsulates the aspirations of and the challenges faced by the government of President Cyril Ramaphosa. During his presidency, the country has led the African Union Commission, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Moreover, since the declaration of the global Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 South Africa has been an ardent campaigner for global vaccine equity. We have experienced the goodwill of humanity during these trying times and trust that this common global experience will enable the creation of a just and equitable global system, especially in the face of new challenges arising from geopolitical tensions in Europe and elsewhere. 

Ambassador Welile Nhlapo

vii

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 7

2022/11/10 00:03

Acknowledgements The first volume of South African Foreign Policy Review was published in 2012, with this being the fourth in the series. As editors, we are grateful to several individuals and institutions that have contributed to the realisation of this volume. We are grateful to the Ambassador Welile Nhlapo of South Africa for writing the Foreword to this volume. Since the first volume, the series has been supported by the ministry and officials of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), and we are grateful for their engagement and feedback. South African Foreign Policy Review has greatly benefited from the generous support of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and its Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA), the publisher of the series. In this regard, we extend our gratitude to Mmakwena Chipu, Samantha Hoaeane and team for their substantial contribution to the volume. The Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), which established this series in 2012, has generously supported the editors and authors throughout the process. We are grateful to Dr Philani Mthembu, Executive Director of the IGD, for his leadership in this process. We would like to extend our appreciation to the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - South Africa for their generous contribution in supporting the publication of this book. As partners of the IGD, they have been with the South African Foreign Policy Review initiative from the beginning. Several anonymous peer reviewers have added valuable comments on earlier drafts of this volume. This had added to the scope and quality, for which the editors remain grateful. A special word of gratitude to all contributing authors, who have generously given of their valuable time to produce original research that contributes to the corpus on South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy and diplomacy. Finally, our sincere appreciation goes to the readers and students of this volume and its predecessors. Besides your time and feedback, your continued and future support of this series is of particular importance. Your engagement adds to the robustness of the important conversation on South African foreign policy, diplomatic practice, and international relations.

viii

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 8

2022/11/10 00:03

Acronyms and abbreviations 4IR

Fourth Industrial Revolution

AfCFTA

African Continental Free Trade Area

AGOA

Africa Growth and Opportunity Act

AISA

Africa Institute of South Africa

ANC

African National Congress

ANCYL

African National Congress Youth League

APRM

African Peer Review Mechanism

APSA

Africa Peace and Security Architecture

ARF

African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund

AU

African Union

BRICS

Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa

CAR

Central African Republic

CDC Africa

Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa)

COMESA

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

COSATU

Congress of South African Trade Unions

CSIR

Council for Scientific and Industrial Research

DA

Democratic Alliance

DBSA

Development Bank of Southern Africa

DIRCO

Department of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa)

DRC

Democratic Republic of the Congo

DTI

Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa)

dtic

Department of Trade Industry and Competition (South Africa, formerly DTI)

EAC

East African Community

EFF

Economic Freedom Fighters

EPAs

economic partnership agreements

EU

European Union

G20

Group of Twenty

G7

Group of Seven

GDP

gross domestic product

HIV and AIDS human immunodeficiency virus and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome HSRC

Human Sciences Research Council

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

IBSA

India, Brazil, and South Africa

ICC

International Criminal Court

ICT

information and communications technology

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 9

ix

2022/11/10 00:03

IGD

Institute for Global Dialogue

IMF

International Monetary Fund

IORA

Indian Ocean Rim Association

ISAMUM

International South African Model United Nations

MPs

Members of Parliament

MTSF

Medium-Term Strategic Framework

NA

National Assembly

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCCC

National Coronavirus Command Council

NCID

National Institute for Communicable Diseases

NCOP

National Council of Provinces

NDB

New Development Bank

NDP

National Development Plan

NEPAD

New Partnership for Africa’s Development

NGOs

non-governmental organisations

NOCPM

National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions

NYDA

National Youth Development Agency

OAU

Organization of African Unity

PSC

Peace and Security Council (African Union/AUPSC)

R2P

Responsibility to Protect

RECs

regional economic communities

SABYA

South African BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) Youth Association

x

SADC

Southern African Development Community

SAIIA

South African Institute of International Affairs

SANDF

South African National Defence Force

SDGs

Sustainable Development Goals

SMME

small, medium and micro enterprises

SOE

state-owned enterprise

SONA

State of the Nation Address

TICAD

Tokyo International Conference on African Development

UAE

United Arab Emirates

UK

United Kingdom

UN

United Nations

UNDP

United Nations Development Partnership

UNFCCC

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly

UNSC

United Nations Security Council

USA

United States of America

WEF

World Economic Forum

WHO

World Health Organization

WTO

World Trade Organization

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 10

2022/11/10 00:03

Introducing the New Dawn

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 1

2022/11/10 00:03

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 2

2022/11/10 00:03

Lesley Masters, Jo-Ansie van Wyk, and Philani Mthembu

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1

A New Dawn for South Africa’s Foreign Policy?

South Africa’s ‘new’ foreign policy (post 1994) was forged during the country’s transition towards participatory governance. Although there was initial engagement from across political parties, government, and society in shaping foreign policy, participation has since vacillated between efforts that support wider engagement and those that have seen deeper centralisation.1 These trends are not, however, unique to the South African context. While democracy creates a space for participation in shaping public policy, foreign policy as a public policy in the main continues to be removed from scrutiny, despite its role in representing the established practice, norms, and values that guide a country’s external engagement. In other words, foreign policy is more than just what a country does (implementation, representation through a network of embassies); rather, it is what that country is. As the three previous volumes of South African Foreign Policy Review have set out, there has been continuity and change in the structure, norms, values, and application in practice of South Africa’s foreign policy over the course of the transition from the country’s apartheid past. The purpose of this fourth volume is to further the discussion of these elements in the development of the country’s foreign policy, bringing to the fore emerging trends in foreign policy (as an institution) and considering the role of the actors (the various institutions) involved. In this way it aims to offer an opportunity to reflect on the quality of this key area of public policy. This chapter begins by (re)situating foreign policy as public policy in a democratic South Africa, considering the importance of scrutiny and the need to review foreign policy in its domestic context, an approach which is at the heart of this series. The second section considers the challenges facing foreign policy, including the diversification of issues and actors, and the impact this has had on both foreign policy decision-making and implementation. This sets the context for a discussion of Ramaphosa’s ‘New Dawn’, as outlined in his first State of the Nation Address (SONA) as South African president in 2018, and the implications this has had for South African foreign policy.2

3

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 3

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 1

FOREIGN POLICY AS PUBLIC POLICY While the political rhetoric has focused on the idea of participatory governance in public policy, foreign policy continues to remain on the periphery of the public policy discourse in South Africa. This is not limited to the South African experience. As Ingram and Fiederlein argue, the gap between public and foreign policy has been linked to the lack of a natural constituency for foreign policy and to perceptions that it is beyond the scope of public policy interest.3 Since 1988, when these shortfalls were highlighted,4 globalisation and the growing number of participatory democracies have led to the rebuttal of elements of this argument. Global connectivity has seen the policy division between the domestic and international spheres blurred. Indeed, issues such as environmental degradation appear in both domestic and international policy agendas, with, as Lentner points out, ‘increasing numbers of groups that reach across international boundaries, and [that] participate in the process of making policy, both foreign and domestic’.5 This link between the domestic and international, often referred to as ‘intermestic’, is not new, but it does remain undervalued in foreign policy analysis. Today, domestic constituencies have an interest in issues such as global public health, sustainable development, food security, trade relations, and investment, amongst others. As Morin and Paquin point out, approaches to foreign policy may have highlighted an emphasis on state security, but this agenda has expanded to include other concerns, such as economic growth, health, energy, social issues, and environmental concerns.6 In other words, today’s foreign policy is ‘multisectoral’, including norms and values that focus on a range of issues, such as ‘promoting cultural diversity, respecting human rights, prohibiting chemical weapons, restricting agricultural subsidies, conserving fish stocks in the ocean and so forth’.7 This multisectoral approach also includes foreign policy practices, an aspect that this fourvolume South African Foreign Policy Review series has been attempting to highlight. The chapters in this book point not only to the growing agenda and the complexity of the issues that foreign policy decision makers grapple with on a daily basis, but also to the routinised symbolic and actual practices of South African foreign policy since the end of apartheid, most notably since President Cyril Ramaphosa assumed power. Given the link between domestic and foreign policy, the idea that foreign policy lacks a constituency falls short. Lentner argues that with due allowance for bureaucratic specialization, at high levels the same agents deal with both domestic and foreign affairs; many of the same constituents are affected by both even though certain obvious expectations –

4

like the difference between exporters and domestic sellers of products – need to

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 4

2022/11/10 00:03

arise in society to participate in shaping policy, regardless of issue.8

The result is that when it comes to foreign policy processes, there are a growing number of non-state and sub-national actors that are looking to shape decision-making in line with their own priorities and interests. Some, such as cities and sub-national regions, have even gone as far as developing their own foreign policy positions (a point made in Chapter 9 in this volume). As foreign ministries face constraints on resources, and are drawn into international negotiations that require increasingly specialised subject knowledge and astute negotiation skills, the scope for an expanded field of players is apparent. This, arguably, goes well beyond Allison and Halperin’s version of the bureaucratic politics model and the ‘pulling and hauling’ of positions between different ministries9 to include pulling and hauling across diverse interests of states, sub-national actors, and non-state actors. The challenge is not that there is a lack of interest in foreign policy or no constituency, but rather that there are competing and multiple foreign policy constituencies. This is a pertinent but under-researched aspect in

A NEW DAWN FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY?

be stressed; the same tax base supports policies in both arenas; and pressures

the South African context, especially as it transpired in the foreign policy dimension of state capture during the presidency of Jacob Zuma. The full extent of this foreign policy dimension is not covered in this volume, as several of the reports of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector Including Organs of State (the Zondo Commission) had already been released as the volume went to print.10

THE FRAGMENTATION OF FOREIGN POLICY The overhaul of South African foreign policy from its apartheid past has seen an international repositioning of the country, along with the necessary rethinking and redeveloping of the institutions supporting the country’s international ambitions.11 Given the proliferation of South Africa’s international engagements, the diversity of issues on the international agenda, and the increasingly limited resources needed for an expanding international programme, participation in international negotiations has extended to include other line departments. The challenge is that the addition of multiple institutions engaged in foreign policy has seen the fragmentation of international engagement. As Eddy Maloka, former special advisor to the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, points out, ‘fragmentation is not uncommon since specialised departments other than DIRCO [the Department of International Relations and

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 5

5

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 1

Cooperation] must lead some foreign policy areas’.12 This is true for the role of departments such as Trade, Industry and Competition (dtic), which leads on trade negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (DFFE), which leads on aspects such as South Africa’s negotiations in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This focus is central to the second section of this volume, which showcases the role of other actors in South Africa’s international relations. The problem has been in addressing the impact of fragmentation in the pursuit of foreign policy priorities, particularly where it has given rise to differences in translating principles into practice. As Hamill argues, foreign policy ‘ideals were imperfectly translated into practice given the myriad priorities of the new government, and its need to expand trade and investment ties to bolster domestic reconstruction’.13 Here the ‘pulling and hauling’ of multiple interests has derailed foreign policy from above, where there has been disagreement between political elites.14 Examples are evident across the different government administrations, for instance the case of South Africa’s decision to intervene in Lesotho on behalf of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1998 and the extradition, since 1994, of Rwandan genocidaires residing in South Africa.15 Here disagreement between departments ‘exposed the serious gaps in preparedness, as well as the lack of cooperation and coordination between the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA, DIRCO since 2009) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)’.16 In responding to challenges of coordination and coherence, South Africa has sought to address bureaucratic fragmentation through creating departmental clusters. In the case of the example above of the intervention in Lesotho in 1998, the government established the National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM). The NOCPM continues to play a role in shaping South Africa’s participation in international peace missions, such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, and Burundi.17 This cluster system of governance, while useful in providing links between departments, has not overcome all competing departmental interests. For instance, due to financial constraints the Treasury has at times refused to support positions taken by DIRCO in multilateral forums, and despite commitments to provide troops, DIRCO has ‘been at loggerheads’ with those in security and defence when it comes to the actual capacity for South Africa to provide such support.18 Fragmentation, a lack of coordination, and the principles of cooperative government and inter-governmental relations, as outlined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, remain perennial issues. In fact, the Presidency, under Cyril Ramaphosa, refers

6

to these issues (specifically fragmentation and a lack of coordination) as

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 6

2022/11/10 00:03

Moreover, the cluster system was effectively overshadowed by the National Coronavirus

Command

Council

(NCCC)

and

other

inter-ministerial

committees that were established with the declaration of the National State of Disaster due to the Covid-19 pandemic on 15 March 2020, effective from 18 March 2020. Fragmentation and the challenges of coordination have been increasingly visible in the growing role of cities, provinces, and even municipalities in international relations. This has presented an additional coordination challenge for DIRCO, as it is faced with the task of coordinating not only national departments and ministries through the cluster system consisting of seven clusters, but also sub-national state actors in their pursuit of domestic and international relations priorities.20 This is an increasingly important task in minimising duplication while also ensuring that subnational state actors have clear guidelines on how to negotiate and engage in twinning agreements that align with the country’s overall foreign policy orientation and priorities. Fragmentation of foreign policy within government has seen derailment

A NEW DAWN FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY?

some of the ‘key risks’ in advancing South Africa’s international relations.19

from above with the increasingly public differences on foreign policy positions among the political elites. For instance, while South Africa supports a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, the African National Congress (ANC), as the dominant and ruling political party, has clearly lent support to the Palestinian position.21 It was also an ANC position that led to the initial government decision to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC) based on solidarity and Pan-Africanism, rather than this approach being initiated by DIRCO. It is not just derailment from above that has played a part in shaping foreign policy decision-making. Nincic points to the problem of foreign policy ‘disruption from below’, which focuses on the role played by popular pressure in challenging foreign policy positions.22 In the South African context this includes examples such as the Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC) challenging the government’s lack of response and failure to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir (in line with South Africa’s commitment under the Rome Statute of the ICC) during his attendance of an African Union (AU) summit in Johannesburg in 2015.23 In June 2021, to name another example, the SALC and Open Secrets brought an application before the High Court requesting a review of South African arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE); the application alleged that both these states used South African arms in Yemen, resulting in a humanitarian crisis.24 The UN Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen implicated both Saudi Arabia and the UAE in this regard.25 This and other court cases raised questions around Pretoria’s role

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 7

7

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 1

as a ‘good international citizen’, its foreign policy priorities and interests, and its decision-making given increased court action by civil society on foreign policy decisions.26 Despite pockets of wider participation in shaping foreign policy, as in most democratic countries there are periods in which foreign policy has been squarely located within the executive. For South Africa this includes foreign policy decisions such as the recognition of China over Taiwan, the quiet diplomacy approach on Zimbabwe, and the decision to join the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) group – all policy decisions that were driven from the Presidency.27 Centralisation and limited participation of institutions during the Zuma administration saw foreign policy increasingly aligned to the president’s priorities around economic diplomacy and South–South cooperation.28 Indeed, as Zuma’s tenure came to a close there was concern regarding the distinct democratic deficit in foreign policy, a point echoed by the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation, which sought to play a greater oversight role over South African foreign policy. The expectation was that the Ramaphosa administration would present a ‘new dawn’, addressing the decline of South Africa’s credibility as a good international citizen in international relations and the centralised nature of foreign policy decision-making (also see Chapter 3 in this volume). However, foreign policy featured very little in Ramaphosa’s election campaigns, both in the 2017 ANC leadership race (the so-called CR17 campaign) and in the 2019 general elections.29 Given the need to rebuild South Africa’s economy following a decade of corruption and mismanagement, the emphasis in foreign policy has remained centred on economic diplomacy. This is evident in Ramaphosa’s declaration at the 2018 and 2019 annual meetings of the World Economic Forum (WEF) that South Africa was ‘open for business’ and ready to engage with the world.30 Foreign policy continuity is also present in South Africa’s engagement in multilateral platforms, such as the AU and the negotiations on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), as well as BRICS and its development bank, the New Development Bank (NDB). Ramaphosa’s focus on extending economic relations with Africa, particularly given the significance of Africa as a trading partner, is strategic.31 This is the focus of chapters 13 and 14 in this volume. There has been little indication of any significant change in the role played by state and non-state institutions in shaping and implementing foreign policy.32 Hamill argues that Ramaphosa’s ‘narrow margin of victory in the ANC leadership contest in December 2017, as well as the strength of stridently anti-Western elements within the ANC, would constrain his ability to re-orient foreign policy’.33 Ramaphosa himself has limited historical

8

connection to the country’s international relations, besides his engagement

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 8

2022/11/10 00:03

Martti Athisaari,34 in Northern Ireland regarding disarmament following the Good Friday Agreement; and his tenure as AU Special Envoy for South Sudan. The need to move the country away from its declining international image is certainly at the forefront of his agenda. The question is: Who will implement these plans? The foreign policy bureaucracy and participation by the domestic constituency were significantly undermined during the previous administration. The centralised nature of South Africa’s foreign policy during the Ramaphosa presidency remains unclear, with Luthuli House (the ANC headquarters), Parliament, and the foreign ministry possibly competing with the Presidency in this terrain. Whether fragmentation is further evident in by intra-ANC factionalism and cadre deployment in government and as diplomats, or pitted against centralisation within foreign policy and the constitutional prescription of the South African president as the foreign policy decision-maker-in-chief. There is also the need to ensure that capacity and budgetary allocations are better aligned with the priorities of the country in order to improve the Ramaphosa administration’s ability to implement its ‘New Dawn’ and

A NEW DAWN FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY?

as South African deputy president (2014–2018); his role as peace envoy, with

declared priorities. Domiro points out that ‘[u]nder the previous Minister of International Relations and Co-operation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, DIRCO not only underperformed in achieving its strategic objectives, it also mismanaged millions of rands. Unauthorised expenditures amounted to approximately million rand ($3.39 million).’35 This has been aggravated by the shrinking budget for international relations.36 Ramaphosa’s ‘New Dawn’ suggests efforts aimed at addressing the problems facing foreign policy and the institutions that shape and implement it. Given South Africa’s (over-) extended international participation in the world, meeting foreign policy priorities will increasingly have to be achieved with a smaller budget and a range of state and non-state actors. Especially when South Africa had a total of 122 foreign missions at the beginning of Ramaphosa’s presidential tenure, by May 2021 this number had been reduced to 102, following the closure of ten missions halfway through his tenure.37

A NEW DAWN FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY? During his first SONA in February 2018, Ramaphosa announced that ‘a new dawn’ was upon South Africa.38 This was aimed at addressing the corrupt practices that transpired during the Zuma administration, following reports from the Public Protector and the Zondo Commission, and the internecine tension in the ruling party that resulted in Zuma’s resignation on 14 February 2018. In subsequent statements, Ramaphosa has reiterated the

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 9

9

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 1

New Dawn metaphor. While this signalled a move away from the actions of the previous administration, as noted above, it did not precede a fundamental move away from foreign policy principles and priorities. For instance, one of the immediate illustrations of the New Dawn was Ramaphosa’s strong emphasis on attracting foreign direct investment to stimulate economic development and social delivery. The New Dawn became intricately linked to, amongst other issues, an emphasis on economic diplomacy, a series of international investment conferences, and the appointment of four investment envoys: Trevor Manuel, Mcebisi Jonas, Jacko Maree, and Phumzile Langeni. This volume seeks to explore the notion of a New Dawn and what it means for foreign policy and its implementing institutions in the context of the Ramaphosa administration. The discussion also includes the practice of South Africa’s foreign policy. Whereas the notion of Ubuntu, introduced during the Zuma era, continues to underpin the normative base of South Africa’s foreign policy, the New Dawn approach builds on this base as the foreign policy doctrine of Ramaphosa. Typically, a foreign policy doctrine refers to ‘a set of ideas, beliefs, values, and opinions, exhibiting a recurring pattern, that competes deliberately as well as unintentionally over providing plans of action for public policy making, in an attempt to justify, explain, contest, or change the social and political arrangements and processes of a political community’.39 There are recurring patterns of deliberate decisions and policy initiatives that fall within the idea of a New Dawn as a foreign policy doctrine. For example, most of the more than 60 Cabinet Statements of the Ramaphosa presidency that had been issued by early 2022 repeated the New Dawn narrative around economic diplomacy, espousing ‘plans of action’ to meet national development goals.40 Hence, this volume considers the notion of a New Dawn in the foreign policy context and whether it signals a departure, change, realignment, and reconsideration of the country’s international relations. This should be read in the context of Ramaphosa’s wide-ranging announcements pertaining to state reconfiguration and creating a ‘capable state’ to realise the New Dawn.41 Moreover, a ‘capable state’ should have diplomatic representatives who are above reproach. The litany of incidents of poor behaviour by South African diplomats has done reputational damage to the country. In June 2020 Ramaphosa signed into law South Africa’s Foreign Service Act 26 of 2019 – the first of its kind – which is set to administer South African’s foreign service and its diplomatic representatives.42 In addressing the questions of norms, identity, and practice, this volume is structured according to three main themes. Part II imagines the normative base, values, and identity associated with the New Dawn; Part III considers the role of actors in conceptualising, constructing, and

10

operationalising the New Dawn; and Part IV assesses South Africa’s

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 10

2022/11/10 00:03

questioning the relevance, appropriateness, and consequences of the New Dawn in the foreign policy context. A major disrupting factor in the realisation of the New Dawn has been the global Covid-19 pandemic. This calls for a detailed analysis of South Africa’s health diplomacy, which is addressed in Chapter 10; furthermore, the impact of the pandemic is evident across the contributions to this volume. The global and national impact of Covid-19 is still unfolding and will require further analysis. However, in reference to the Cabinet Statements, for example, the tone of the Ramaphosa government changed significantly after the declaration of a National State of Disaster in South Africa on 15 March 2020.43 Initial government estimates and expectations have been significantly adjusted – issues that this volume has not been able to capture completely but that will undoubtably be unpacked in subsequent volumes. An illustration of areas that will need further enquiry is the country’s health diplomacy, which accelerated to a new gear, especially during Ramaphosa’s tenure as chairperson of the AU and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in 2020.

A NEW DAWN FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY?

application of foreign policy for a New Dawn. The volume concludes by

STRUCTURE OF THIS VOLUME In line with the focus of the South African Foreign Policy Review series, this volume gives specific attention to reviewing changes, continuity, and, where possible, resilience and uncertainties in South African foreign policy. In building on previous volumes, the contributions to this book consider the transition from Jacob Zuma’s administration (2009–2018) to the tenure of Cyril Ramaphosa (since 2018). It is hoped that the analysis in the chapters will allow readers to reflect on what a New Dawn may mean for participatory governance and its impact on the quality of South African foreign policy as public policy. The volume certainly highlights the diversity of domestic interests, which has resulted in the pursuit of equally diverse policy areas within South African foreign policy. A foreign policy review such as this is ever-expanding, and the editors have taken a deliberate decision not to focus on areas that have recently received extensive and exquisite scholarly attention. This includes relations with China, which has been ably addressed by co-editors Chris Alden and Yu-Shan Wu in South Africa–China Relations: A Partnership of Paradoxes (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021). Moreover, the Institute for Global Dialogue (one of the publishers of this volume) has a dedicated programme on South– South relations. We also attempted to add to and complement the focus areas found in, for example, the volume co-edited by Daniel Bradlow and

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 11

11

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 1

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, Values, Interests and Power: South African Foreign Policy in Uncertain Times (Pretoria University Law Press, 2020). Part II of this volume gives attention to the developing ideas, norms, and identity of the Ramaphosa administration’s foreign policy. In Chapter 2, Bianca Naude considers the role of South Africa as it engages in the international environment, and why there appears to be a contradiction between foreign policy practice, on the one hand, and principles based on the idea of ontological security, on the other. This is followed, in Chapter 3, by what Suzanne Graham points to as areas of continuity in South Africa’s foreign policy, including the focus on multilateralism and the idea of the country’s role as a good international citizen. Given the questions concerning South Africa’s decisions on the ICC, on the intervention in the Central African Republic (CAR), and on voting in the UN Security Council (UNSC) on Libya, the international perception of the country is in the spotlight and calls for critical reflection. In Chapter 4, Marcel Nagar addresses the promise of a New Dawn through the idea of norm entrepreneurship, considering the dereliction of South Africa’s ‘duties as a norm entrepreneur’. The chapter considers Ramaphosa’s efforts in reinvoking South Africa’s moral image, linked to the need to rebuild a broken economy. Having considered developments in foreign policy norms and principles, Part III of the volume moves towards reviewing the role of selected actors in shaping and implementing foreign policy. The focus is on elements that have not been represented in previous iterations of this series and the chapters in this part aim to highlight the diversity of constituencies that have a stake in foreign policy decision-making. In Chapter 5, Natalie Leibrandt-Loxton begins this discussion by addressing the role of Parliament in foreign policy decision-making. This chapter gives attention to the challenges of foreign policy capacity within Parliament, particularly to how information is shared between committees and delegations and the impact thereof on the oversight role of South Africa’s legislature. Although it does not address an exhaustive list of areas, this fourth volume reflects on an expanding foreign policy agenda by including an innovative discussion on the role of the youth, maritime diplomacy, defence diplomacy, sub-national diplomacy, and health diplomacy. As Chapter 6 in this volume points out, despite the role of the youth being mentioned in the White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy, it has not been given much consideration. Through his exploratory analysis, Sven Botha sets the context for this discussion and points to areas of development in engagement by state and non-state actors. The chapter highlights the challenges facing both the youth and institutions of foreign policy in ensuring sustained and inclusive engagement.

12

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 12

2022/11/10 00:03

(through the Zuma-era Operation Phakisa) and South Africa’s engagement with groups such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). In her chapter on maritime diplomacy (Chapter 7), Lisa Otto highlights the opportunities for foreign policy implementation as regards the maritime environment. This includes demonstrating areas where South Africa has begun to engage in maritime initiatives; however, the chapter argues for further analysis in order to shape the country’s approach to the maritime domain and fulfil its foreign policy priorities. The underutilisation and lack of consideration of areas for promoting foreign policy is an issue picked up by Faith Mabera in her analysis of the country’s defence diplomacy (Chapter 8). Given South Africa’s continental (and global) ambitions in peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping and security, this chapter highlights the role of the South African armed forces as a tool and actor in Pretoria’s diplomatic arsenal. In Chapter 9, Fritz Nganje and Odilile Ayodele point to the role of mass urbanisation in shaping foreign policy participation. Given the dominant role played by large cities as economic, political, and social hubs, the authors

A NEW DAWN FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY?

A further area of development has been the idea of the ‘blue economy’

argue that national government’s ambivalence towards the involvement of cities and other sub-national government actors hinders the development of a well-coordinated and ‘urban-conscious’ foreign policy that could also enable rural development and welfare. In the final chapter of Part III (Chapter 10), Jo-Ansie van Wyk, Lesley Masters, and Philani Mthembu address South Africa’s health diplomacy. Although the Covid-19 pandemic has brought the country’s health diplomacy to the fore, this is not a new area of engagement for Pretoria. The chapter highlights the range of international forums South Africa participates in. It also explores the challenges brought about by the link between domestic and foreign policy approaches when shaping a coherent foreign policy response to health, especially in the context of the global Covid-19 pandemic, which has been a defining feature of the Ramaphosa presidency thus far. The pandemic has both enabled and disabled South Africa’s foreign policy aspirations and will remain a considerable determining factor, internationally, in the post-pandemic era. Part IV adopts a regional approach towards unpacking South Africa’s engagement with Africa – through developments in peace and security, the AfCFTA, economic relations, multilateral engagement, and ‘club diplomacy’ – and explores the idea of ‘middlepowerism’ and the country’s changing but perennially ambivalent relations with the USA, especially under the Trump administration. In assessing South Africa’s role in peace and security on the continent, in Chapter 11 Cheryl Hendricks argues that the country’s influence and impact are being eroded. Here the link between the domestic

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 13

13

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 1

and the foreign is highlighted in terms of internal capacity to meet external commitments. In addition to peace and security, the economic agenda continues to remain central to South Africa’s foreign policy engagement with Africa. Chapters 12 and 13 give recognition to this through unpacking Pretoria’s role in shaping the AfCFTA, particularly as regards the pillars of intra-African trade, peace and security, and women’s economic empowerment; South Africa’s economic diplomacy in Africa; and the role of multilateral clubs in shaping economic diplomacy aspirations. Building on the discussion on peace and security linked to development from the previous chapter, in Chapter 12 Nadira Bayat and David Luke argue for greater integration of peace and security and intra-African trade in order to address gender equality and sustainable development. Given the continued emphasis of the Ramaphosa administration on economic diplomacy, in Chapter 13 Christopher Vandome questions the role of South Africa’s economic diplomacy in the African context. He argues that despite the rhetoric, there appears to be no coordinated or coherent approach to economic diplomacy when it comes to Africa. This aspect confirms the fragmentation and lack of cooperation in South African foreign policy and its architecture. Economic diplomacy, while being an area of continuity between the Zuma and Ramaphosa administrations, does exhibit distinctions in how it is approached and practised. This is true when it comes to the foreign policy principle of multilateralism, a point assessed by chapters 14 and 15. Linking economic diplomacy and multilateralism, Arina Muresan addresses the role of club diplomacy, from South Africa’s role in the BRICS group to its participation in the G20 and the WEF. South Africa has not just participated in multilateral forums; rather, it has sought to establish a leadership role in addressing questions of global governance. This is a point picked up in Chapter 15, where Jo-Ansie van Wyk unpacks South Africa’s pursuit of leadership positions within multilateral forums and organisations, comparing the country’s pursuit of a leadership role in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the AU, the AfCFTA, and the International Labour Organization (ILO). Following on the discussion of the identity, principles, and practice of multilateralism in foreign policy, in Chapter 16 David R. Black and David J. Hornsby return to the idea of South Africa’s role in the world, linked to the idea of ‘middlepowerism’. The chapter deftly considers the role of Canada’s and South Africa’s approaches as middle powers and investigates whether cooperation between the two could support collaboration in order-building internationalism. Across the border from Canada, the Trump administration’s parochial turn saw a move towards US unilateralism in international relations. Given the historical relations between South Africa and the USA, Christopher Williams, in Chapter 17, addresses the perceptions of South African and

14

American officials and how this has shaped relations going forward.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 14

2022/11/10 00:03

to the idea of a New Dawn as change and continuity, locating the country within a changing geopolitical landscape that calls for greater internal capacity and coordination in order to navigate through an international landscape facing multiple and conjunctural crises. Chapter 18 looks towards the current and future strategic landscape, and explores actions the country can take to ensure that Ramaphosa’s New Dawn is translated into tangible steps that pave the way for the country’s continued importance in global affairs. It also highlights the importance of regional integration in recalibrating and rejuvenating South Africa’s role in Africa and the world.

CONCLUSION The Ramaphosa administration’s foreign policy has presented both continuity and change from that of his predecessors. The Covid-19 pandemic may well turn out to be the distinguishing factor, as it serves to cause disruption in domestic and global affairs from above and below.

A NEW DAWN FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY?

In the final part of the volume, Philani Mthembu and Francis Kornegay turn

Although this volume does not focus on decision-making in relation to disasters such as the Covid-19 pandemic, this remains an issue that will continue to receive attention. In fact, in May 2021 the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation recommended to the minister that a South African foreign policy review be conducted to adjust and adapt to the global post-pandemic era.44 South Africa’s transition to democratic governance opened the space for further consideration of the position of foreign policy as public policy. The contributions in this volume demonstrate the country’s multisectoral areas of engagement in the international milieu. This creates scope for the participation of a range of stakeholders in support of foreign policy principles and priorities. Yet, in order to support these aims, there needs to be further engagement on what these principles and priorities are, as there should be in any area of public policy. Given the impact of the global Covid-19 pandemic both domestically and in the external environment, there is an opportunity to build on foreign policy as public policy in order to strengthen a democratic South Africa, and Ramaphosa’s New Dawn.

15

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 15

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 1

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1 Masters, L. 2012. ‘Opening the “black box”: South African foreign policy making.’ In South African Foreign Policy Review, Volume 1, edited by C. Landsberg and J.-A. van Wyk. Pretoria: AISA and IGD. 2

Ramaphosa, C. 2018. ‘2018: State of the Nation Address.’ 16 February. https://www.gov. za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2018-state-nation-address-16-feb-2018-0000 (Accessed 16 February 2022).

3 Ingram, H. M. and Fiederlein, S. L. 1988. ‘Traversing boundaries: A public policy approach to the analysis of foreign policy.’ The Western Political Quarterly 41(4): 725– 745, p. 726. https://doi.org/10.2307/448491. 4 Ingram and Fiederlein, ‘Traversing boundaries’, p. 726. 5 Lentner, H. H. 2006. ‘Public policy and foreign policy: Divergences, intersections, exchanges.’ Review of Policy Research 23(1): 169–181, p. 177. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1541-1338.2006.00191.x. 6 Morin, J. and Paquin, J. 2018. Foreign Policy Analysis: A Toolbox. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 6. 7 Morin and Paquin, Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 6. 8 Lentner, ‘Public policy and foreign policy’, p. 174. 9 Allison, G. T. and Halperin, M. H. 1972. ‘Bureaucratic politics: A paradigm and some policy implications.’ World Politics 24 (Spring): 40–79. Supplement: Theory and Policy in International Relations. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010559. 10 Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector Including Organs of State (Zondo Commission). 2022. Commission of Inquiry into State Capture Report: Part 1, Vol. 1: South African Airways and Its Associated Companies. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202201/ judicial-commission-inquiry-state-capture-reportpart-1.pdf (Accessed 16 February 2022); Zondo Commission. 2022. Commission of Inquiry into State Capture Report: Part 2, Vol. 1: Transnet. https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/download/file/fid/2437 (Accessed 16 February 2022); Zondo Commission. 2022. Commission of Inquiry into State Capture Report: Part 2, Vol. 2: Denel. https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/download/file/fid/2438 (Accessed 16 February 2022); Zondo Commission. 2022. Commission of Inquiry into State Capture Report: Part 4, Vol. 3: The Capture of Eskom. https://www.statecapture.org. za/site/files/announcements/656/State_Capture_Commission_Report_Part_IV_Vol_III. pdf (Accessed 9 May 2022); Zondo Commission. 2022. Commission of Inquiry into State Capture Report: Part 4, Vol. 4: The Capture of Eskom. https://www.statecapture.org.za/ site/files/announcements/657/State_Capture_Commission_Report_Part_IV_Vol_IV.pdf (Accessed 9 May 2022). 11 Van Wyk, J.-A. 2019. ‘From apartheid to ubuntu: Transition, transaction and transformation in South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign ministry.’ South African Journal of International Affairs 26(3): 413–434, p. 413. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2019.1 661281. 12 Maloka, E. 2019. When Foreign Becomes Domestic: The Interplay of National Interests, Pan-Africanism and Internationalism in South Africa’s Foreign Policy. Johannesburg: Ssali, p. 22. 16

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 16

2022/11/10 00:03

14 Nincic, M. 1992. Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Fallacy of Political Realism. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 5. 15 UN International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. 2021. ‘Prosecutor Brammertz’s Address to the UN Security Council.’ Press Release, 13 December. https://www.irmct.org/en/news/prosecutor-brammertzs-address-un-security-council (Accessed 20 December 2021). 16 Van Wyk, ‘From apartheid to ubuntu’, p. 8. 17 Van Wyk, ‘From apartheid to ubuntu’, p. 8. 18 Maloka, When Foreign Becomes Domestic, p. 22. 19 The Presidency. 2020. ‘Annual Performance Plan 2020/2021.’ Pretoria: The Presidency, p. 38. https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/download/file/fid/1891 (Accessed 9 May 2022). 20 The clusters are infrastructure development; economic sectors and employment; governance and administration; human development; social protection and community development; international cooperation, trade, and security; and justice, crime prevention, and security. South African Government. 2021. ‘Government clusters.’ https://www.gov.za/government-clusters (Accessed 14 June 2021). 21 Masters, L. 2015. ‘South Africa’s parliamentary diplomacy and soft power.’ Strategic Review for Southern Africa 37(2): 74–93. https://doi.org/10.35293/srsa.v37i2.244.

A NEW DAWN FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY?

13 Hamill, J. 2019. ‘The reality of South Africa’s foreign policy under Ramaphosa.’ IISS, 8 February. https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/02/south-africa-foreign-policyramaphosa (Accessed 17 July 2020).

22 Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy, pp. 5–15. 23 Masters, L. and Landsberg, C., eds. 2015. ‘Al-Bashir and the crisis in South Africa’s foreign policy: Problems and prospects.’ Proceedings Report, 22 July 2015. SARChI Chair in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study, supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung South Africa. 24 SALC (Southern Africa Litigation Centre). 2021. ‘South African arms trade case: Human rights organisations ask the courts to review decisions to export arms to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.’ 7 June. https://www.southernafricalitigationcentre. org/2021/06/07/south-african-arms-trade-case-human-rights-organisations-ask-thecourts-to-review-decisions-to-export-arms-to-saudi-arabia-and-the-united-arabemirates/ (Accessed 14 June 2021). 25 United Nations Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen. 2020. ‘Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014.’ A/HRC/45/6, 28 September. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/ HRCouncil/GEE-Yemen/2020-09-09-report.pdf (Accessed 14 June 2021). 26 Klaaren, J. and Halim, D. 2020. ‘Foreign policy under the constitutions.’ In Values, Interests and Power: South African Foreign Policy in Uncertain Times, edited by D. Bradlow and E. Sidiropoulos. Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, pp. 28–53; Fritz, N. 2020. ‘The courts and foreign policy powers.’ In Values, Interests and Power: South African Foreign Policy in Uncertain Times, edited by D. Bradlow and E. Sidiropoulos. Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, pp. 54–73. 27 Masters, ‘Opening the “black box”’; Masters, L. 2017. ‘South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy making and the role of the president.’ Politeia 36(1): 1–21. 28 Maloka, When Foreign Becomes Domestic. 17

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 17

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 1

29 Spector, J. B. 2019. ‘South Africa’s foreign affairs goes missing in action in the 2019 election.’ Daily Maverick, 6 May. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-05-06south-africas-foreign-affairs-goes-missing-in-action-in-the-2019-election/ (Accessed 12 December 2019). 30 Omarjee, L. 2018. ‘SA “on a roll” at Davos, says upbeat Ramaphosa.’ Fin24, 25 January. https://www.news24.com/fin24/Economy/sa-on-a-roll-at-davos-says-upbeatramaphosa-20180125 (Accessed 17 July 2020); Business Day. 2019. ‘SA tells Davos that the country is open for business.’ 24 January. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/ world/2019-01-24-watch-sa-tells-davos-that-the-country-is-open-for-business/ (Accessed 17 July 2020). 31 Fabricius, P. 2018. ‘Can Ramaphosa revitalise South Africa’s foreign policy? From Israel to Morocco and the ICC, how the ANC’s new leader will interpret party policy is unclear.’ ISS Today, 11 January. https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/can-ramaphosa-revitalisesouth-africas-foreign-policy (Accessed 16 February 2022). 32 Spector, ‘South Africa’s foreign affairs goes missing in action’. 33 Hamill, ‘The reality of South Africa’s foreign policy under Ramaphosa’. 34 Merikallio, K. and Ruokanen, T. 2015. The Mediator: A Biography of Martti Athisaari. London: C. Hurst & Co. 35 Domiro, N. 2019. ‘South African foreign policy under the Ramaphosa government.’ Future Directions International, 28 May. http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/southafrican-foreign-policy-under-the-ramaphosa-government/ (Accessed 17 July 2020). 36 Pandor, N. 2021. ‘Minister Naledi Pandor: International Relations and Cooperation dept. budget vote 2021/22.’ 20 May. https://www.gov.za/speeches/minister-naledipandor-international-relations-and-cooperation-dept-budget-vote-202122-21 (Accessed 14 June 2021). 37 Pandor, ‘International Relations and Cooperation dept budget vote 2021/22’ . 38 Ramaphosa, ‘2018 SONA’. 39 Daghrir, W. 2020. ‘Trump’s foreign policy doctrine of uncertainty.’ E-International Relations, 29 June. https://www.e-ir.info/2020/06/29/trumps-foreign-policy-doctrineof-uncertainty/ (Accessed 28 May 2021). 40 See the list of Cabinet Statements at https://www.gov.za/speeches. 41 DPME (Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation). 2019. ‘Reconfiguration of government.’ 14 June. https://www.dpme.gov.za/news/Pages/NMOGovernment.aspx (Accessed 28 May 2021); Ramaphosa, C. 2021. ‘From the desk of the president.’ The Presidency, 1 March. http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/from-the-desk-of-the-president/ desk-president%2C-monday%2C-1-march-2021 (Accessed 28 May 2021). 42 South African Government News Agency. 2020. ‘President signs new legislation into law.’ 5 June. https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/president-ramaphosa-signs-newlegislation-law (Accessed 14 June 2021). 43 See, for example, the list of Cabinet Statements at https://www.gov.za/speeches. 44 Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation. 2021. ‘Report of the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation on Budget Vote 6: International Relations and Cooperation.’ 19 May. https://pmg.org.za/tabled-committeereport/4593/ (Accessed 28 May 2021).

18

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 18

2022/11/10 00:03

The New Dawn: Reimagining Ideas, Norms, and Identity

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 19

2022/11/10 00:03

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 20

2022/11/10 00:03

Bianca Naude

CHAPTER 2

South African Foreign Policy and the Search for Ontological Security

INTRODUCTION South African politics and society have metamorphosed since 1994 and, some argue, this is reflected in the degree of change observable in the state’s foreign policy orientation, priorities, and actions. South Africa is known for ‘schizophrenic’ foreign policy choices and unpredictable behaviour.1 Among the questions surrounding the country’s foreign policy that have enjoyed scholarly attention in recent years is: How can a state such as South Africa – that has carved out an identity in international politics as a champion of human rights and a vanguard in the fight for dignity, respect, and recognition for all the people of the world – flout, on a regular basis, international conventions that uphold these very same values?2 The state has similarly been criticised for its apparent reluctance to intervene in deteriorating human rights situations in neighbouring countries, as well as for recent votes against resolutions of the UN Security Council (UNSC) on the protection of civilian lives in Syria and elsewhere.3 From an economic perspective, South Africa’s tendency to posture aggressively against trading partners of the Global North, who contribute significantly to the country’s development through trade, foreign direct investment, and official development aid, seems counterintuitive.4 On the African continent, South Africa is often seen as a bully with hegemonic aspirations, exhibiting very little of the Ubuntu spirit that it promotes as a national value.5 While it certainly is true that South African foreign policy has undergone important changes over the past three decades,6 South Africa’s relationships with other international actors are characterised more by consistency than by change. Despite promises to reinvigorate relations with partners from the Global North (also see Chapter 17 in this volume) or to continue to strengthen friendly relations with states of the Global South, in practice South Africa’s relationships with significant others follow strikingly similar trends across administrations: former imperial powers are generally treated with suspicion and kept at a distance, while states with which South Africa shares an identity as former colony are both idealised and devalued.7 Whereas Ramaphosa’s ‘New Dawn’ may have brought hope for ‘new thinking’ and a meaningful change in South Africa’s international

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 21

21

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 2

relations,8 this chapter argues that even when it is crucial to a state’s survival and prosperity, relationships and relational routines are difficult to transform, because they provide actors with a sense of existential security. This contribution on South African foreign policy unpacks the relationships that the state maintains with other actors in the realm of international politics to explain why South Africa appears to act against its self-defined national interest in defiance of a hard-won identity, and why it is seemingly so difficult to achieve real change in the state’s foreign relations. Arguing that foreign policy is a means through which states mediate existential anxieties that arise from everyday interactions with significant others, the chapter adopts an ontological security perspective to explain the need for both enemies and allies in times of stability and crisis, as well as the reasons why states often act against expectations that are based on rational-choice assumptions about state behaviour. Interrogating the processes that contribute to the construction of identities which ultimately condition foreign policy actions, as well as the identity narratives that collectives draw on to maintain a constant feeling of a ‘security of being’9 through the conduct of foreign relations, the chapter approaches states as collectives of people whose existence cannot be essentialised or reduced to the private actions, decisions, and whims of an elite group of government officials. The state, in this approach, is an embodiment of the collective will of the South African people, who narrate their communal life through government officials and state discourses. The chapter proceeds in three parts: the next section discusses literature on ontological security in the field of international relations. Against the backdrop of the ontological security approach, the following sections examine the self–other images embedded in South African foreign policy, offering a brief discussion of why these images look the way that they do and how they continue to impact on the state’s international engagements. The contribution concludes with some final remarks and observations. It is important to note here that the chapter does not offer a descriptive overview of South African foreign policy, nor does it offer a behind-the-scenes look at the machinations of South African foreign policy decision-making. Instead, it provides an interpretive framework against which to understand foreign policy issues, objectives, agendas, and strategies, such as those discussed in parts III and IV of this volume. While foreign policy analyses generally aim to identify and explain both continuity and change in a state’s foreign relations, this chapter focuses exclusively on explaining what can be seen as a reluctance across the Mbeki, Zuma, and Ramaphosa administrations to transform the state’s relationships with other international actors.

22

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 22

2022/11/10 00:03

The idea that ‘identity lies at the core of national and transnational interests [and that] it is crucial for an understanding of international behaviour, practices, institutions, and change’ has become a part of mainstream scholarly discourse in international relations and foreign policy analysis over the past 30 years.10 Importantly, constructivists have contributed the understanding that what a state sees as strategically important – its ‘national interest’ – and the way in which it acts within the international sphere in order to achieve or maximise this interest are determined by perceptions and interpretations of political reality that are rooted in the relationships that states maintain with one another.11 Relationships determine how states see themselves, how they see other states and even non-state actors, and, based on these understandings of their roles in the social world, what they expect from the world in which they function. In other words, relationships form the basis of the processes through which state identities are constituted, and according to which states tailor their foreign policy actions.12 An important element of the process of identity construction is the routinisation of relationships, identities and social roles, actions, and expectations.13 Routinised relationships, ontological security theorists have argued, are crucial for the maintenance of stable identities and, eventually, for minimising existential anxieties, because they establish trust in self, other, and the future by reinforcing a perception of predictability in and control over the world that allows actors to ‘answer questions about doing, acting, and being’.14 The perception of ‘certainty’ that accompanies habitual cognitions and actions,

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SEARCH FOR ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY

IDENTITY, ONTOLOGICAL (IN)SECURITY, AND THE NEED FOR ENEMIES AND ALLIES

that are themselves reinforced when they produce the results that the actor anticipates they will, provides actors with a sense of security. This ‘security’ is not the physical security of the body (or the territory or citizens of a state), as Mitzen explains, but rather relatively stable understandings of the ‘subjective sense of who one is’.15 When an actor experiences a subjective sense of certainty that a social (inter)action will produce a specific result, then that actor will feel certain that they know themselves, and that they know how to act in a given situation to achieve a desired outcome.16 Having confidence that one knows how to act, crucially, helps mediate potentially paralysing existential anxiety.17 Uncertainty about oneself, one’s environment, and one’s relationships, by contrast, induces ‘a deep incapacitating state of not knowing […] how to get by in the world’.18 Feeling like they are in control of themselves and their environments makes actors feel like they have agency. And, because agency is so critical to actors, they become attached to relationships and social

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 23

23

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 2

practices that allow them to maintain this feeling of ‘agential capacity’, which reinforces a feeling of certainty about who the actor is.19 It is important to underscore that actors do not necessarily seek out relationships and practices that are positive or safe; routinised relationships and practices are often characterised by negative interactions and emotions. The key, really, is predictability and certainty that an interaction with a significant other will produce a specific result, for which an actor can prepare. Of course, as Mitzen argues, significant others do not always act predictably, and so it is necessary for an actor to sometimes step outside of their ‘preferred’ or ‘ideal’ role or identity, and to respond to a situation in a manner that may contradict the image that the actor has tried to project of themselves to the outside world.20 Complementary to Mitzen’s account of ontological security in international relations, Kinnvall observes that actors have a deep need for ‘a consistent feeling of biographical continuity where the individual is able to sustain a narrative’ about themselves in the world.21 An important source of security for individuals is their membership of a group with which they identify positively and which shapes their self-esteem. The need to maintain positive self-esteem drives individual group members to improve the status of their ‘in-group’ and to maintain clear boundaries between the ‘in-group’ and ‘out-groups’ – boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’.22 Here, the notions of enemies and allies become important. Groups, like individuals, make allies of some out-groups that they consider to be most ‘like us’, by attributing to these ‘friendly others’ certain qualities that are collectively considered ‘good’ – qualities like honesty, integrity, cleanliness, and loyalty. This process necessarily also involves attributing ‘bad’ qualities to other out-groups that are considered ‘strangers’ or even ‘enemies’, and thereby creating a psychological distance between the ‘good us’ and ‘bad them’.23 It is essential for actors to have significant others with whom they are able to identify or from whom they can differentiate themselves. A loss of boundaries that separate self from other dissolves identities, inspiring feelings of a loss of self – a state of ontological insecurity.24 A second source of ‘existential continuity’ for actors are the stories about the past that continue to feed current identity concepts – what is known in large-group psychology as ‘chosen traumas and chosen glories’. Chosen traumas are those traumatic events from a collective’s past that continue to feature in the social discourse – memories of past humiliations and defeats that continue to shape a group’s identity and that continue to cause the members of the group significant pain, while chosen glories are those glories that the group continues to mythologise and celebrate, and

24

that continue to serve as a sense of pride for the group’s members.25 Chosen

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 24

2022/11/10 00:03

continuity and comfort, while also serving as a psychological framework against which to interpret new traumas and glories, simultaneously validating inherited feelings of hatred, humiliation, vengeance, pride, and glory, and justifying subsequent actions.26 Globalisation and the unique realities of modern international politics, Kinnvall argues, have ushered in a period of uncertainty for political communities across the world, ‘challenging simple definitions of who we are and where we come from’ and pushing individuals to rally around the collective identity of the group in order to mediate feelings of vulnerability and existential anxiety.27 The movement of people, goods, and information across increasingly porous borders challenges existing security structures, status claims, and other privileges long reserved for citizens of the nationstate, transforming or even eliminating traditional power hierarchies, social ties, values, and norms. Similarly, the spread of Western neoliberal ideology across the globe since the end of the Cold War has transfigured collective identities, causing individuals to ‘feel bereft and alone in a world in which [they] lack the psychological support and the sense of security provided by more traditional settings’.28 The state of ontological insecurity that results from the changing global political landscape causes societies to seek a return to an imagined past that they ‘reconstruct’ for themselves through the use of symbols and cultural reference points that allow them to find comfort in their collective history – their chosen glories and chosen traumas.29 Why does this matter? As discussed above, Kinnvall argues that globalisation and modernisation are likely to continue to contribute to increased levels of ontological insecurity and existential anxiety, pushing states to harvest inherited feelings of humiliation, hate, vengeance, pride,

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SEARCH FOR ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY

traumas, like chosen glories, allow people to feel a degree of existential

and glory from their chosen traumas and chosen glories, feelings that reinforce fabricated enemy images attributed to others in a process designed to strengthen the perception of possessing one stable identity.30 If this is so, it is important for scholarship of a state’s foreign policy to not only render explicit the symbols and stories that characterise self and other in a state’s foreign relations, but to also examine the chosen traumas and glories that states rely on as frameworks from which to approach foreign policy decision-making, diplomatic strategy, and international engagement. Doing this would allow us to make predictions about the responses that might arise from an actor in search of ontological security, and to understand why an actor might behave contrary to expectations rooted in rational choice theories about the behaviour of international actors.31 Consequently, the remainder of this contribution explores the notions of collective identity, belonging, and shared traumas and glories as important determinants of South African foreign policy choices and behaviour.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 25

25

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 2

WHAT FOREIGN POLICY TELLS US ABOUT THE ONTOLOGY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE The idea that a state’s foreign relations are shaped by historical processes is encapsulated in the address delivered by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Naledi Pandor, to the diplomatic corps at the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) on 4 June 2019. She iterated that ‘it’s important for you [to remember] that we are driven to some degree by our history […] by who we are […] and what we seek to become’.32 So, we know that in order to fully understand South African foreign policy, we need to know how the state sees itself and what the state aspires to be in the future. These concepts are, of course, rooted in the history that underlies the state’s international engagements. But, what can we say about South Africa as an actor in international affairs? What do we know about the ontology of the South African state? In DIRCO’s strategic plan for 2020–2025, as in the White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy,33 South Africa is described as ‘a multifaceted, multicultural and multiracial country that embraces the concept of Ubuntu as a way of defining who we are and how we relate to others […] we affirm our humanity when we affirm the humanity of others’ (emphasis added).34 These values were reiterated and expanded upon in a welcoming speech to African heads of mission at a conference held at DIRCO on 28 January 2020, where Minister Pandor remarked that ‘South Africa has showed firm resolve in its foreign policy, fairness, justice, equality and respect for practices by focusing on its core values of human dignity […] South Africa is viewed as a powerful progressive alternative able to articulate the concerns and interest of the marginalised and vulnerable’ (emphasis added).35 From these statements, it is clear that South Africa sees itself as inclusive, humane, respectful, tolerant, fair, just, powerful, progressive, and cosmopolitan – an example to the rest of the world (also see Chapter 3 in this volume).36 It describes itself as a ‘bridge-builder’ between North and South,37 as well as an influential leader of the ‘marginalised and vulnerable’ Global South.38 These values are inspired by struggle heroes like Nelson Mandela, who have served as the source of morality that South Africa seeks to emulate in its international relations and that it wishes to spread to the rest of the world. Indeed, at a virtual meeting of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on the occasion of the recognition of two laureates of the Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela Prize on 20 July 2020, Minister Pandor made the following illustrative statement: ‘As we celebrate Madiba’s remarkable life we call on all nations of the world, developed and developing alike, to emulate Nelson Mandela’s values of tolerance, dialogue, respect, unity

26

and reconciliation and to embrace his qualities of humility, forgiveness

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 26

2022/11/10 00:03

the country takes pride in its foreign policy efforts as a means to carry its national values of inclusivity, humanity, respect, tolerance, fairness, and justice out into the world and hopefully inspire change, South Africa feels burdened by the expectations of peers and frustrated by the realities of international politics: ‘The historic leadership role our nation is about to embark on […] is a significant responsibility for South Africa to assume particularly given the challenging times confronting the world of nations […] Imposing international challenges and responsibilities will exact a toll on South Africa’s leadership capacity.’40 In addition to these positive self-concepts, South Africa does also see itself as a victim. In her remarks at the debate of the State of the Nation Address (SONA) in Cape Town on 19 February 2020, for example, Minister Pandor exclaimed that South Africa’s ‘positive aims for Africa do not come accompanied by many friends’,41 while former Minister Lindiwe Sisulu wrote in the introduction to DIRCO’s 2018 Foreign Policy Journal that South Africa ‘can continue to be the moral compass of the world and we need to. We continue to fight against injustice, because we have to. We who have suffered so much, can ill afford suffering in any part of the world’.42 While there is certainly a sense of victimhood that derives from what South Africa sees as a ‘highly unstable, unsafe and precarious space [characterised by] growing global social inequality and deteriorating living conditions […] as well as the baneful practice of unilateralism and its concomitant, war baiting’,43 this victimhood is rooted in wounds from the distant past – the trauma of colonialism and apartheid – as has been argued elsewhere.44 The identity constructs discussed above also inform what South Africa envisages for the future – for itself, for peers, and for the world. In line with

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SEARCH FOR ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY

and compassion and his dedication to the service of humanity.’39 While

the findings of the 2012 National Development Plan (NDP), for example, the 2020–2025 DIRCO strategic plan iterates South Africa’s vision for itself, for the continent, and for international politics: In 2030, South Africa, informed by its national interests, is a globally competitive economy, and an influential and leading member of the international community. South Africa promotes and contributes to democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and peace and security, within a safe, peaceful and prosperous Southern African Region and Africa, as well as a fair and just world (emphasis added).45

Minister Pandor similarly outlined South Africa’s vision for the future of international politics and the driving force behind South Africa’s foreign policy efforts in her welcome address to DIRCO Principals at the Department on 4 June 2019: ‘We are driven by our aspirations […] that the world can be a better place. Our aspiration that Africa can develop. Our aspiration that

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 27

27

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 2

the fact that we are free, and the fact that so many were with us, side by side, as we walked to that freedom, means we must walk with others.’46 An identity as victim of Western exploitation and principled and progressive leader on the road to a ‘better and safer world’ is one that South Africa shares with members of its in-group, which comprises Africa and the rest of the Global South. South Africa identifies positively with these states, and so seeks not only to maintain its routinised relationships of solidarity and goodwill with these actors, but to ‘deepen’, ‘strengthen’, ‘expand’, and ‘intensify’ these relations, ‘supporting’ and ‘uplifting’ peers through their interactions and ‘harnessing’ opportunities for mutual growth.47

RELATIONS WITH ALLIES FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH Right in the innermost circle of South Africa’s in-group are the state’s African neighbours, whom we are told occupy a central position in the country’s foreign policy. Furthermore, South Africa narrates itself as ‘African’ in spirit and flesh through, for example, the narrative of a shared past and a common destiny, as is evident in President Cyril Ramaphosa’s remarks on accepting chairmanship of the African Union (AU) for 2020: ‘Fellow African leaders, we salute you. Through your leadership you have sown the seeds for meaningful African unity […] Our people await the harvest of our work. As glorious as is our past, so too will be our future’ (emphasis added).48 Africa and its people are not merely ‘fellows’, however. South Africa considers them ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’, ‘sons’ and ‘daughters’ – family – as is exemplified by Ramaphosa’s welcoming message at the presidential inauguration on Africa Day, 25 May 2019: We are profoundly grateful to you for choosing to celebrate Africa Day among us, giving further poignancy to South Africa’s transformation from a pariah state to a full and valued member of the family of African nations […] Today, we reaffirm our determination to work with our sisters and brothers across the continent to realise the African Union’s vision of Agenda 2063. To build the Africa that we all Africans [sic] want.49

The NDP similarly captures South Africa’s need for belonging when it iterates the mantra, ‘Who are we? We are Africans. We are an African country. We are part of our multinational region. We are an essential part of our continent.’50 Reminiscent of Thabo Mbeki’s 1996 ‘I am an African’ speech, which asserted, ‘I am an African […] born of the peoples of the continent of Africa. The pain […] of my continent is a blight that we share’, these discourses reveal a deep desire for South Africa to be seen 28

and accepted as an African country – a part of the African continent.51

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 28

2022/11/10 00:03

for ontological security because ‘home […] constitutes a spatial context in which routines of human existence are performed [and] where people feel most in control of their lives’.52 However, the assertions highlighted above are not merely affirmations of South Africa’s geographical location at the tip of the African continent. They are examples of claims to a positive identity that South Africa shares with African peers, symbolised by a glorious past, and preserved in the mythologised figures of African heroes like Pixley ka Isaka Seme, Ngũgũ wa Thiong’o, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, and Steve Biko.53 Stories about a glorious past and the trauma of colonialism that South Africa shares with African peers define the South African identity and continue to feed the state’s self-esteem. Indeed, when faced with criticism about its shortcomings as an international actor, South Africa dips into its reservoir of historical glories and traumas to regain its self-esteem and justify its decisions, as is illustrated in South Africa’s response to, for example, xenophobic attacks on African citizens residing within the country’s borders. Speaking at an African Diaspora Engagement event in Pretoria on 20 September 2019, following a spate of xenophobic attacks in South Africa, Minister Pandor observed: The events that occurred just a few short weeks ago are regrettable and embarrassing for a country with the a proud liberation history and an association with [African] heroes and heroines […] These leaders had a vision. They wanted to see the liberation of black people from all forms of bondage, humiliation and degradation. They wanted to see black people regardless of borders, being treated with respect and dignity.54

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SEARCH FOR ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY

Spatial belonging, and the concept of ‘home’ in particular, is important

Faced with criticism from African neighbours about its ‘shameful’ behaviour towards fellow Africans, South Africa draws on the painful memory of its colonial past and its mythologised heroes and heroines to reiterate its identity as an African actor, ‘humiliated and degraded’ through colonial expansion, who desires a future in which Africans are treated equally with respect and dignity – just like the rest of Africa. While South Africa reconfirms its commitment to Africa and the African identity, it also justifies the occurrence of xenophobic violence in stating that ‘the violence and hatred we witnessed points to the need for increased attention to developing African consciousness and promoting the ideals of African unity as the foundation for African development’, simultaneously setting a new task for future engagements with Africa.55 South Africa further bases its own identity on its likeness to the states of the Global South and the institutions designed by these states – including

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 29

29

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 2

the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping and the BRICS bank, the AU, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). These states and institutions are equally considered the historical victims of colonialism and Western hegemony who continue to be marginalised and oppressed in global affairs by the great powers. While the Global South has historically been considered to lag behind in terms of development and economic growth, the growing influence of the rising powers on international politics has transformed the global power hierarchy to the extent that some speculate that China and Russia have stepped in to fill the void left by an increasingly isolationist, inward-looking USA. South Africa has been looking for ways to benefit from relations with these ‘new winners’ of global politics. The state’s relationship with emerging powers cannot be reduced to bandwagoning or pragmatism, however. The relationship between South Africa, China, and India extends back to the 1955 Bandung Conference, if not further,56 while the country has maintained close relations with Russia since the period when the latter provided aid to the ANC in its struggle against apartheid.57 An alignment of the state’s foreign policy with the foreign policies of the emerging powers allows South Africa to overcome the feelings of shame and humiliation that it has felt as a result of being seen as part of the sickly, impoverished, and hopeless ‘Third World’.58 More importantly, tying its positive identity to the rising powers allows South Africa to take ownership of its agency in international affairs – a privilege it had long been denied by colonialism.59

RELATIONS WITH ENEMY OTHERS FROM THE GLOBAL NORTH South Africa’s relationship with the Global North, which includes those institutions that South Africa considers to have been designed by the former colonial powers and that continue to perpetuate a system of oppressive rule internationally – the UN and its organs, especially the UNSC; the International Criminal Court (ICC); the Bretton Woods Trio; and the European Union (EU) – is defined by the country’s traumatic colonial past and by its experience of apartheid as an extension of colonial administration on the continent.60 The state’s identity is based on its difference from the colonial other, as its moral and political opposite. In her address at the 2020 SONA debate, for example, Minister Pandor described the Global North as ‘self-interested’, ‘greedy’, and ‘voracious’,61 while DIRCO’s Annual Report 2018/19 describes South Africa’s relations with Western Europe prior to Ramaphosa’s election into presidency as ‘moribund’ – dead or in a terminal state of decline.62 The borders that separate the positive South African self, 30

and the ‘good’ members of its in-group, from the ‘bad’ Global North are

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 30

2022/11/10 00:03

minister’s foreword to the 2018/19 annual report, which describes South Africa’s foreign relations as ‘bridging work’ that seeks to ‘challenge the false dichotomy between civil and political rights championed by countries of the North and economic, social and cultural rights championed by the countries of the South’ (emphasis added).63 In contrast to South Africa’s efforts to ‘maintain, expand, and strengthen’ relations with friendly others from the Global South, the state’s engagements with the Global North are about ‘transforming or reforming’, ‘reinvigorating’, ‘revitalising’, ‘leveraging’, and ‘utilising’ relations to achieve its vision for the future by ‘benefitting’ from ‘channelling’ these states’ wealth, resources, and influence to the Global South.64 For example, DIRCO’s Annual Report 2018/19 states: Strategic formations of the developed countries […] are engaged to garner support for the African Agenda, including New Partnerships for Africa’s Development projects and the Agenda of the South. These are countries usually considered to have influence in the global arena and also with resources that can be channelled to the developing world.65

In spite of pledges to transform, reform, reinvigorate, and revive relations with the Global North, discourse surrounding South Africa’s foreign policy betrays an underlying desire to ‘continue’ to ‘maintain’ unchanged relations with Europe and the USA, who ‘remain major actors in the international system and substantial sources of development assistance and foreign direct investment’.66 This ambivalence is not just the result of a pragmatic response to needing the Global North’s money; South Africa does not fundamentally

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SEARCH FOR ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY

maintained through the use of discursive binaries, as is exemplified in the

seek to change its relationship of enmity towards the North, since it is this enmity that serves as a sense of ontological security for the state. It is because the South African identity is constructed against the Western identity that the maintenance of the borders that separate South Africa from the Global North is essential for the country’s ontological security. Without a binary ‘negative other’ from which to differentiate itself, South Africa’s identity would be difficult to define. South Africa’s ‘Africanness’, ‘anti-imperialist/anti-colonial identity’, or ‘communitarian beliefs’ take on meaning only once we differentiate it from ‘Europeanness’, ‘Americanness’, ‘imperial/colonial identity’, or ‘atomistic individualism’. While we might question whether the state’s aggressive anti-Western posturing could be harmful for its economic position, the loss of its enmity towards the Global North would risk dissolving the state’s identity in its entirety – which is a much more unsettling scenario. 31

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 31

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 2

CONCLUSION States, in their foreign relations, seek to maintain their relationships with significant others through routines and narratives that provide a sense of ‘existential continuity’ – a feeling of ontological security. Relationships become routinised through the stories that actors internalise about themselves, about others, and about history. These narratives are preserved in the chosen traumas and the chosen glories that underlie an actor’s understanding of the world that (s)he lives in, and the people that (s)he shares this world with. Routines make actors feel safe and provide a blueprint for future actions, like foreign policy decisions and diplomatic engagements, while actors return to chosen traumas and chosen glories to feed their self-esteem when faced with criticism. Based on this framework for understanding foreign relations, this chapter has presented a discussion of the borders that delineate the South African ontology in relation to the ontologies of both friendly others and enemy others. The chapter considered the historical relationships within which these identities are based, touching on some of the chosen glories, traumas, and mythologised heroes and heroines that feed South Africa’s self-esteem and inspire the state’s vision for itself and the realm of international politics. In addition to telling us what the South African ‘being’ is and how this being is produced through similarities to and differences from significant others, the identity claims expounded on in this chapter also offer us a framework for interpreting South Africa’s foreign policy actions and strategies – particularly the African Agenda, the developing world agenda, the global transformation agenda, and the BRICS strategy – even when these decisions and actions appear paradoxical or potentially harmful to the national interest.67 South Africa’s positive relations with the Global South in general, and with its African ‘family’ in particular, are based in a past characterised by the trauma of colonialism and the memory of a heroic struggle for freedom, dignity, and respect. This relationship is founded on notions of solidarity, goodwill, and gratitude, and South Africa’s developing world agenda and African Agenda are a performance of the state’s commitment to maintaining and strengthening these relations. Issues affecting Africa and the Global South take precedence in South African foreign policy, because they are essential for maintaining a sense of security in terms of the state’s geographical, cultural, and historical belonging, and because this allows South Africa to reassure members of its in-group that it ‘has their backs’ in international politics.

32

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 32

2022/11/10 00:03

sentiments and its resistance to Western hegemony in global affairs. Yet, while we might have hoped to see an effort to transform these relationships positively with the advent of Ramaphosa’s ‘New Dawn’ and the appointment of new senior diplomats, South Africa is not likely to engage in serious efforts to radically change these relations, since the routine of enmity also reinforces the feeling of ontological security for the state. Indeed, three years into Naledi Pandor’s appointment to the position of Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, we see a renewed fervour in South Africa’s commitment to the global transformation agenda, along with a continuation of the defiant stance towards international power hierarchies and the accompanying frigidity towards dominant powers that characterised South African foreign relations under the guidance of Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane during the Zuma administration. What this chapter has not done is to consider why enmity, which is usually directed towards the out-group, is sometimes turned inwards to members of the in-group. While a significant part of the chapter was dedicated to discussing South Africa’s positive relationships with its African ‘family’, recurring instances of xenophobic violence directed towards African migrants living in the South African territory, and the government’s apparent reluctance to own up to and apologise for these attacks, should force us to question how kinship can turn into enmity almost overnight, and what this means for an actor’s search for ‘one stable identity’. Indeed, if the theory holds that states have a desperate need for a strong, continuous identity, and if Kinnvall is correct in her view of globalisation as a destabilising force in international politics, then South Africa’s foreign relations, especially its relationships with neighbouring

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SEARCH FOR ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY

The South African ontology is further defined by the state’s anti-Western

states, are likely to get much more complicated over the next few decades.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1 See Habib, A. 2009. ‘South Africa’s foreign policy: Hegemonic aspirations, neoliberal orientations and global transformation.’ South African Journal of International Affairs 16(2): 143–159. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220460903265857; Jordaan, E. 2010. ‘Fall from grace: South Africa and the changing international order.’ Politics 30(1): 82–90; Neethling, T. 2012. ‘Reflections on norm dynamics: South African foreign policy and the no-fly zone over Libya.’ South African Journal of International Affairs 19(1): 25–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2012.670381. 2 See Smith, K. 2016. ‘South Africa and the responsibility to protect: From champion to sceptic.’ International Relations 30(3): 391–405. https://doi. org/10.1177/0047117816659596. 33

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 33

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 2

3 Nathan, L. 2008. ‘Anti-imperialism trumps human rights: South Africa’s approach to the Darfur conflict.’ Crisis States Working Papers Series 2, 31. London School of Economics; Nathan, L. 2013. ‘African solutions to African problems: South Africa’s foreign policy.’ WeltTrends 21: 48–55; Lipton, M. 2009. ‘Understanding South Africa’s foreign policy: The perplexing case of Zimbabwe.’ South African Journal of International Affairs 16(3): 331–346. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220460903495181. 4 See, for example, Olivier, G. 2012. ‘South Africa’s foreign policy towards the global North.’ In South African Foreign Policy Review, Volume 1, edited by C. Landsberg and J.-A. van Wyk. Pretoria: AISA and IGD, pp. 193–194. 5 See, among others, Alden, C. and Schoeman, M. 2013. ‘South Africa in the company of giants: The search for leadership in a transforming global order.’ International Affairs 89(1): 111–129. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12007; NPC (National Planning Commission). 2012. National Development Plan 2030: Our Future – Make It Work. Pretoria: NPC, p. 238. https://www.gov.za/documents/national-development-plan2030-our-future-make-it-work (Accessed 24 May 2022). 6 See, among others, Masters, L. 2017. ‘South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy making and the role of the president.’ Politeia 36(1): 1–21; Gqiza, L. and Ogunnubi, O. 2010. ‘Change or consistency? A historical overview of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy.’ Strategic Review for Southern Africa 41(2): 114–128. 7 For a more detailed discussion, see Naude, B. 2022. Revisiting State Personhood and World Politics: Identity, Personality and the IR Subject. London: Routledge. https://doi. org/10.4324/9781003216131. 8 Hendricks, C. and Majozi, N. 2021. ‘South Africa’s international relations: A new dawn?’ Journal of Asian and African Studies 56(1): 64–78, p. 75. https://doi. org/10.1177/0021909620946851. 9 See Kinnvall, C. and Mitzen, J. 2020. ‘Anxiety, fear and ontological security in world politics: Thinking with and beyond Giddens.’ International Theory 12(2): 240–256, p. 240. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297192000010X. 10 Adler, E. 2013. ‘Constructivism in international relations: Sources, contributions, and debates.’ In Handbook of International Relations, edited by W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B. A. Simmons. London: Sage, p. 127. 11 See, among many others, Wendt, A. 1992. ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics.’ International Organization 46(2): 391–425; Guzzini, S. 2000. ‘A reconstruction of constructivism in International Relations.’ European Journal of International Relations 6(2): 147–182; Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, S. 2001. ‘Taking stock: The constructivist research program in International Relations and Comparative Politics.’ Annual Review of Political Science 4: 391–416; Laffey, M. 2000. ‘Locating identity: Performativity, foreign policy and state action.’ Review of International Studies 26(3): 429–444, p. 431. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210500004290; Lebow, R. N. 2008. ‘Identity in International Relations.’ International Relations 22(4): 473–492. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117808097312. 12 Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’, p. 397. See also Holsti, K. 1970. ‘National role conceptions in the study of foreign policy.’ International Studies Quarterly 14(3): 233–309. https://doi.org/10.2307/3013584. 13 Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’, p. 398.

34

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 34

2022/11/10 00:03

15 Mitzen, ‘Ontological security in world politics’, p. 344. 16 Mitzen, ‘Ontological security in world politics’, p. 345. 17 Kinnvall, ‘Globalisation and religious nationalism’, p. 746; Mitzen, ‘Ontological security in world politics’, p. 346. 18 Mitzen, ‘Ontological security in world politics’, p. 345. 19 Mitzen, ‘Ontological security in world politics’, p. 347. 20 Mitzen, ‘Ontological security in world politics’. 21 Kinnvall, ‘Globalisation and religious nationalism’, p. 747. 22 Kinnvall, ‘Globalisation and religious nationalism’, pp. 749–752. 23 See, on this point, Volkan, V. D. 1985. ‘The need to have enemies and allies: A developmental approach.’ Political Psychology 6(2): 224–243. https://doi. org/10.2307/3790902. 24 Kinnvall, ‘Globalisation and religious nationalism’, p. 754. 25 A detailed discussion can be found in Volkan, V. D. 2014. Psychoanalysis, International Relations, and Diplomacy: A Sourcebook on Large-Group Psychology. London: Karnac, pp. 20–36. 26 Kinnvall, ‘Globalisation and religious nationalism’, p. 755. 27 Kinnvall, ‘Globalisation and religious nationalism’, p. 742. 28 Giddens, A. 1991. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 33; quoted in Kinnvall, ‘Globalisation and religious nationalism’, p. 744. 29 Kinnvall, ‘Globalisation and religious nationalism’, p. 744. 30 Kinnvall, ‘Globalisation and religious nationalism’, p. 757.

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SEARCH FOR ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY

14 Kinnvall, C. 2004. ‘Globalisation and religious nationalism: Self, identity, and the search for ontological security.’ Political Psychology 25(5): 741–767, p. 746. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00396.x. See also Steele, B. J. 2008. Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State. London: Routledge, pp. 58–59; Mitzen, J. 2006. ‘Ontological security in world politics: State identity and the security dilemma.’ European Journal of International Relations 12(3): 341–370, p. 342. https:// doi.org/10.1177/1354066106067346.

31 See, on the shortcomings of rational choice theories of international behaviour, Wendt, A. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 115–122; also Mitzen, ‘Ontological security in world politics’, pp. 350–351. 32 Pandor, G. N. M. 2019. ‘Address by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Naledi Pandor, during an event to welcome the new DIRCO Principals, Tuesday 4 June 2019.’ DIRCO. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2019/pand0604. htm (Accessed 28 July 2020). 33 DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation). 2011. Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy (Final draft). Pretoria: DIRCO, p. 4. https://www.gov.za/documents/white-paper-south-africanforeign-policy-building-better-world-diplomacy-ubuntu (Accessed 24 May 2022). 34 DIRCO. 2020. Strategic Plan 2020–2025. Pretoria: DIRCO, p. 81. http://www.dirco.gov. za/department/strategic_plan/index.htm (Accessed 22 May 2022). 35 Pandor, G. N. M. 2020. ‘Welcome remarks by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Dr Naledi Pandor, at the DIRCO-hosted Africa Heads of Mission 35

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 35

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 2

Conference, OR Tambo building, Pretoria, 28 January 2020.’ DIRCO. http://www.dirco. gov.za/docs/speeches/2020/pand0128.htm (Accessed 4 August 2020). 36 DIRCO. 2018. Foreign Policy Journal: Reflecting on 2018. Pretoria: DIRCO, p. 9. 37 See, for example, DIRCO. 2019. Annual Report 2018/19. Pretoria: DIRCO, p. 66. https:// www.gov.za/documents/department-international-relations-and-cooperation-annualreport-20182019-23-oct-2019-0000 (Accessed 24 May 2022); DIRCO, Strategic Plan 2020–2025, p. 20; Ramaphosa, M. C. 2018. ‘Address by President Cyril Ramaphosa at the South African Heads of Mission Conference, OR Tambo Building, Tshwane, 23 October 2018.’ DIRCO. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2018/cram1023.htm (Accessed 5 August 2020). 38 See, for example, DIRCO, Annual Report 2018/19, pp. 9, 11; DIRCO, Strategic Plan 2020–2025, p. 5; Pandor, ‘Welcome remarks at the DIRCO-hosted Africa Heads of Mission Conference’. 39 Pandor, G. N. M. 2020. ‘Remarks by H. E. Dr. Naledi Pandor, Minister of International Relation and Cooperation at the informal meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on the occasion of the formal recognition of the two United Nations Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela Prize laureates and annual observance of the Nelson Mandela International Day, 20 July 2020 (Virtual meeting).’ DIRCO. http://www.dirco.gov.za/ docs/speeches/2020/pand0720.pdf (Accessed 4 August 2020). 40 Pandor, ‘Welcome remarks at the DIRCO-hosted Africa Heads of Mission Conference’. 41 Pandor, G. N. M. 2020. ‘A better Africa and a better world.’ Speech at the SONA debate. Cape Town, 19 February. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2020/pand0219.pdf (Accessed 4 August 2020). 42 DIRCO, Foreign Policy Journal, p. 9. 43 Pandor, ‘Welcome remarks at the DIRCO-hosted Africa Heads of Mission Conference’. 44 Naude, B. 2019. ‘Justice and restitution as themes of South African foreign relations: The search for ontological security.’ South African Journal of International Affairs 26(3): 443–448. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2019.1663759. 45 DIRCO, Strategic Plan 2020–2025, p. 8; see also DIRCO, Building a Better World, p. 18. 46 Pandor, ‘Address to welcome new DIRCO Principals’. 47 These signifiers are used regularly in DIRCO documents describing its diplomatic strategy in engaging with the states of the Global South. See, for example, DIRCO, Annual Report 2018/19, pp. 43, 45, 48, 86, 91–92; DIRCO, Strategic Plan 2020–2025, pp. 10–12, 14, 50; DIRCO, Building a Better World, pp. 20–23. 48 Ramaphosa, M. C. 2020. ‘Acceptance Statement by South African President H. E. Cyril Ramaphosa on assuming the Chair of the African Union for 2020, 33rd Session of the African Union Assembly, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 09 February 2020.’ DIRCO. http:// www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2020/cram0209.htm (Accessed 2 April 2020). 49 Ramaphosa, M. C. 2019. ‘Address by President Cyril Ramaphosa on the occasion of the Presidential Inauguration, Tshwane, 25 May 2019.’ DIRCO. http://www.dirco.gov. za/docs/speeches/2019/cram0525.htm (Accessed 28 July 2020). 50 NPC, National Development Plan 2030, p. 12. 51 Mbeki, T. 1996. ‘I am an African.’ Thabo Mbeki Foundation. https://www.mbeki. org /2016/06/01/i-am-an-african-speech-by-president-thabo-mbeki-8-may-1996/ (Accessed 28 March 2020).

36

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 36

2022/11/10 00:03

53 See, notably, Pandor, G. N. M. 2019. ‘Speech by Minister Naledi Pandor, MP, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation on the occasion of the African Diaspora Engagement held at DIRCO Conference Centre on 20 September 2019.’ DIRCO. http:// www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2019/pand0920.htm (Accessed 28 July 2020); Ramaphosa, M. C. 2018. ‘Address by H. E. President Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa to Members of the Diplomatic Corps on the occasion of Africa Day, 25 May 2018, Sefako Makgatho Presidential Guesthouse, Pretoria.’ DIRCO. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/ speeches/2018/cram0525.htm (Accessed 2 April 2020); Rampahosa, ‘Acceptance statement on assuming the chair of the AU’. 54 Pandor, ‘Speech on the occasion of the African Diaspora Engagement’. 55 Pandor, ‘Speech on the occasion of the African Diaspora Engagement’. 56 DIRCO, Building a Better World, p. 3. See also, Acharya, A. 2016. ‘Studying the Bandung Conference from a Global IR perspective.’ Australian Journal of International Affairs 70(4): 342–357. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2016.1168359. 57 Filatova, I. 2015. ‘Third time lucky? Establishing diplomatic relations between Russia and South Africa.’ South African Journal of International Affairs 22(4): 447–462. https:// doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2015.1115369; Geldenhuys, D. 2015. ‘The comprehensive strategic partnership between Russia and South Africa.’ Strategic Review for Southern Africa 37(2): 118–145. 58 See, on this point, Matthews, S. and Solomon, H. 2003. ‘The necessity of a challenge to Western discourses by the African renaissance.’ Acta Academica 35(2): 148–168. 59 Naude, ‘Justice and restitution’, pp. 446–448. 60 See, for example, Nathan, L. 2005. ‘Consistency and inconsistencies in South African foreign policy.’ International Affairs 81(2): 361–372, p. 367. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00455.x. 61 Pandor, ‘Address at the SONA Debate 2020’. 62 DIRCO, Annual Report 2018/19, p. 47. 63 DIRCO, Annual Report 2018/19, p. 9. 64 See, for example, DIRCO, Annual Report 2018/19, pp. 47–48, 66, 103–104; DIRCO, Strategic Plan 2020–2025, pp. 5, 20, 51–52; DIRCO, Building a Better World, pp. 24–25, 31–33.

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SEARCH FOR ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY

52 Kinnvall, ‘Globalisation and religious nationalism’, p. 747.

65 DIRCO, Annual Report 2018/19, p. 103. 66 See DIRCO, Annual Report 2018/19, p. 103. Also see DIRCO, Building a Better World, pp. 31–33; Pandor, G. N. M. 2019. ‘Statement by Dr Naledi Pandor on the occasion of the General Debate of the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, United Nations, New York, 28 September 2019.’ DIRCO. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/ speeches/2019/pand0928.htm (Accessed 10 August 2020). 67 For more on these strategic foreign policy agenda items, see, among others, DIRCO, Building a Better World, pp. 19, 24, 32.

37

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 37

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 3

To Be or Not To Be? Is South Africa a Good International Citizen? Suzanne Graham Countries embody signs, beliefs, values […] about what they stand for in the global system […] As such, countries carry – or project – a ‘persona’ that expresses their identity, ideas, values, and norms.1

INTRODUCTION Under President Cyril Ramaphosa, South Africa’s projected image internationally remains steadfastly glued to the advantages of multilateralism and inclusive foreign politicking. These concepts have been bandied about as descriptive of ‘good international citizenship’. This emerging concept is often used interchangeably with other concepts such as state identity, aspirations, values, and roles. However, as will be outlined later in this chapter, although it may encompass all of these things, the concept is connected with several specific characteristics. The concept of good international citizenship is visible in international relations literature that examines international society and the role of like-minded states within it. The notion of an international community or society of states has its critics. Beeson, for example, contends that ‘it is at best an aspirational cliché, at worst a misleading description of something that has yet to be adequately defined, let alone realised’.2 In order for an international society to function effectively, a rules-based system needs to be in place where states voluntarily sign up in order to benefit from its advantages. But sometimes ‘the rules’ and independent state behaviour are at odds with each other, and the debate around universal norms versus sovereign actions complicates the international system. It is a subjective exercise to label a state as good, bad, or somewhere in-between, as this must surely depend on the prevailing worldview, context, history, foreign policy drivers, and state behaviour in international affairs. Nevertheless, many would agree that despite the tension that exists between realist state-centrism and liberal idealism, a state’s international reputation is dependent upon how it perceives itself and how it is perceived by other states. The former can be applied through Holsti’s typology of national role conceptions, which is primarily based on ‘how policymakers view the role their nations should play in international affairs’.3 In terms 38

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 38

2022/11/10 00:03

upon its policies and actions and how those policies and actions are perceived. That is, a state can be characterised as a good international citizen if it is seen to be such. Although there is no universal definition, in a predominantly liberal global order there is sufficient consensus4 to suggest that a good international citizen is a state that abides by international legal principles, values its membership within a world community and is committed to its obligations thereto, and actively promotes universal norms (for example, human rights) – all as a natural extrapolation of its domestic values and ideas.5 States may invest in being and being seen to be a good international citizen for a number of reasons. Principle among these are the enhancement of a state’s international reputation, which can have substantive economic and security benefits in the short and long term, and reciprocity: ‘Foreign policymakers are no more immune to ordinary human instincts than anyone else, and if I take your problems seriously, you are that much more likely to help me solve mine.’6 Sorrell contends that how a nation is perceived ‘outside its borders is critical to its success. Smart, thoughtful and responsible administrations pay attention to image and reputation, because a better image contributes towards more foreign direct investment, more tourism and a “made-in” or “created-in” premium’.7 Being seen to be a good international citizen is also not about promoting a particular state’s values as better than another state’s values or selling a ‘superior brand of morality’ globally.8 Rather, it is about the instinct that recognises that national interest and global interest are aligned in foreign policy planning and decision-making; as the world shrinks, transnational

TO BE OR NOT TO BE? IS SOUTH AFRICA A GOOD INTERNATIONAL CITIZEN?

of the latter, what makes a state a ‘good citizen’ of the world is dependent

problems exist for everyone in every corner of the globe, and states need to start taking the lead in setting an example for others in their declarations and actions to resolve these problems. Of course, being a good international citizen could have its downsides. After all, states may find it difficult to create global expectations that have to be met continuously, and as governments change and ideologies change the priority list of national interest may differ. Normative complexities may exist as domestic contexts do not always match foreign goodwill; consider xenophobic tensions in South Africa, a state which is also a public advocate of African solidarity. Furthermore, states may not have the resources or capacity to consistently project a moral image as well as act on promises or commitments made, and the nature of global problems may be so overwhelming that without full buy-in from many other states, a good international citizen may be unable to contribute much on its own. The question that arises now is: Under President Ramaphosa, can South Africa be characterised as a good international citizen? 39

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 39

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 3

DEFINING A GOOD INTERNATIONAL CITIZEN: ‘BEING’ OR ‘BEING SEEN TO BE’? Theoretically, good international citizenship reflects a mix of realism and idealism. Evans contends that whereas traditional realism assumes that the pursuit of aggressive self-interest is often in opposition to the promotion of human rights globally, good international citizenship is in itself ‘an exercise in enlightened self-interest: an expression of idealistic pragmatism’; it is not a foreign policy approach ‘equivalent of boy scout good deeds’.9 In addition, whereas idealism recognises an assumed synchronicity of moral principles underlying actions in world politics, proponents of the concept of good international citizenship acknowledge that at times ‘terrible moral choices have […] to be made’.10 Graham argues, ‘Metaphorically, realism beats a path for the state, rationalism defines a middle road in international politics, and cosmopolitanism attempts to change the world for the better through the moral unity of human society.’11 The phrase ‘good international citizenship’ is widely attributed to Gareth Evans, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1988 to 1996.12 In a March 1990 speech on foreign policy and good international citizenship, Evans defined the concept as ‘the area of foreign policy in which community values most influence the pursuit of national interests’ and as an idea which ‘cannot be fully understood without reference to the community’s self-image, and what it judges to be its guiding principles’.13 Before this, however, in a 1967 speech, Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson spoke of Canada being held in high esteem by other states in the world, saying that his country was a ‘good international citizen worthy of trust and capable of leadership’.14 Pearson believed in participatory internationalism and active multilateralism in dealing with shared global problems. Good international citizenship has captured the interest of academics and analysts over the years. There are those who argue that a state embodying good international citizenship must actively seek to improve the world around it, thereby making a positive contribution to overcome global challenges, and that it must also be a proponent of multilateral cooperation.15 Brysk refers to ‘good Samaritans’ in global politics who conduct humanitarian internationalism not as occasional altruistic acts but as a ‘pattern of persistent principled politics’.16 Other scholars refer to middle-power states as being ideally situated in the power rankings of international affairs, respected by major and minor powers, to become custodians of ‘emerging international norms and the forgers of new norms’ and to pave a path way forward for the community of states.17 Key to good

40

citizenship must also be evidence of a dedicated effort to strengthen the

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 40

2022/11/10 00:03

to maintaining the status quo, but could mean challenging outdated rules or forging new norms upon which the majority of states in international society agree. Some scholars have adapted this concept to case studies of specific states. Karli, for example, examined Turkey’s contribution to international society as a trading nation upholding the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO).18 Lightfoot used this citizenship framework to investigate Australia’s role in global environmental governance, specifically in the World Summit on Sustainable Development, in an effort to ascertain whether the country prevented positive change or built coalitions as a good international citizen.19 British foreign policy in 1998, under a Labour government, is explored by Wheeler and Dunne, who note a change in the foreign policy terminology that was used, including the incorporation of phrases such as ‘internationalism’, ‘promoting democracy’, ‘a people’s diplomacy’, ‘promotion of values’, and ‘confidence in national identity’.20 The use of this wording links directly to the projection of a new global foreign policy under Labour that would be guided by an ethical dimension as well as protection for the environment and goals of security and prosperity for all states. In a more recent study, Gilmore examined the British government’s use of an ‘ethical’ foreign policy under a coalition government.21 This mix of idealistic and realistic intentions in the global arena matches the theoretical fusion evident within good international citizenship literature. South Africa too has been examined in terms of its good international citizenship role. Graham briefly assessed South Africa’s good international

TO BE OR NOT TO BE? IS SOUTH AFRICA A GOOD INTERNATIONAL CITIZEN?

rules governing the international order. This does not necessarily equate

citizenship role between 1994 and 2008 under presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki consecutively. This study suggests that under those two presidents, South Africa found the fusing of realist and idealist assumptions just as difficult as other states on the global stage.22 Geldenhuys later explored a specific aspect impacting on South Africa’s good international citizenship, namely the Republic’s links with ‘deviant states’ and their human rights records: Zimbabwe, Sudan, Libya, Cuba, and Myanmar. This study found that although South Africa’s record as a good global citizen remained patchy, there had been ‘positive movement towards greater conformity with the demands of this role’.23 Four years later, Geldenhuys revisited this overarching area of study, this time highlighting South Africa’s weak domestic governance record as reflecting negatively on its international reputation. This research considered the prospect that despite a weakening moral and political currency domestically under President Jacob Zuma, South Africa could continue to aspire to international leadership, especially in Africa, but that maintaining regional power and influence and 41

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 41

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 3

pushing national interests would be the drivers of foreign policy decisionmaking with ‘pragmatism increasingly trumping moralism’.24 Gilmore argues that three areas need balancing in order to review consistency in foreign policy decisions: global stability, national interest promotion, and ‘vulnerable non-citizens’. He offers the chance to consider the value of good international citizenship as a narrative or ‘framework of dialogue’, wherein it is accepted that all elements in a state’s foreign policy are driven by self-styled ethical choices, obligations, and responsibilities.25 A small pool of literature breaks down the concept of good international citizenship into areas of special responsibility to which states must commit. Dunford and Neu, for example, argue that in the face of humanitarian crises, good international citizens have an important choice to make – whether or not that includes actioning a responsibility-to-protect (R2P) response – but that they should not ignore how intervention practices already underway are contributing to crises in the first place. For these authors the study of good international citizenship should, therefore, also include preventative diplomacy, and granting asylum to refugees as a result of atrocity crimes, for example.26 Similarly, Souter highlights the link between good international citizenship and asylum in light of humanitarian intervention and the potential outcome of refugee flow.27 Another study investigates the notion of the ‘heightened responsibility’ that the UK and Australia, both of which have been dancing around the concept of good international citizenship for decades, have in responding to the rise of Islamic State as a consequence of their involvement in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.28 Ralph and Souter argue that states have general responsibilities, which would refer to those responsibilities associated with being part of an international society of states bound by a set of rules and norms; however, special responsibilities are held by specific states ‘towards other states or individuals on account of certain interactions, relationships or connections between them’.29 Pert sums up those attributes that could be regarded as good international citizenship based on activities regarded globally as good international citizenship activities, beyond the minimal standards, or obligations expected, in international behaviour. In other words, this view determines good international citizenship in terms of ‘actions taken’, and not necessarily as a ‘state of being’. In other words, it is not something a state is (the political authority), but rather what a state does (political action). These attributes are (a) active support for, and adherence to, international law and multilateralism; (b) global ‘good deeds’; (c) enthusiastic participation in global tasks; and (d) global leadership in the form of acting as a role model for others.30 A good international citizen may exhibit one or more of these attributes. Moreover, states do not have to fit into any particular state

42

category in order to make the cut. Small, middle-power, and superpower

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 42

2022/11/10 00:03

Africa, for example, has a unique combination of an oppressive history, a democratic rebirth, and the memory of Mandela – or ‘Madiba magic’31 – that continues to inform its foreign policy globally and that explains why the international community continues to watch South Africa with interest. Eze refers to ‘empathetic cosmopolitanism’ as being ‘a particularly South African worldview’ and to the importance of open-minded, inclusive decision-making as ‘registers of Mandela’s global citizenship’.32 President Ramaphosa refers to this uniqueness as part of South Africa’s DNA.33

SOUTH AFRICA’S INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP UNDER PRESIDENT RAMAPHOSA In a 2020 Best Countries Report, which ranks states according to global public perceptions on a number of qualitative characteristics – that is, ‘impressions that have the potential to drive trade, travel and investment and directly affect national economies’ – South Africa ranks 39th out of 73 states.34 This reflects a mediocre view of South Africa, which, according to the report, is three spots behind Egypt in the continental rankings. South Africa’s reputation since 1994 has been scarred through its friendship with so-called rogue states, arms controversies, the use of mercenaries, immigration troubles, xenophobic attacks, maladministration of stateowned enterprises (SOEs), and corruption. For example, in 2019, South Africa was ranked 70th out of 198 states on Transparency International’s

TO BE OR NOT TO BE? IS SOUTH AFRICA A GOOD INTERNATIONAL CITIZEN?

states may all contribute as good citizens of the globe in unique ways. South

Corruption Perception Index, receiving a poor score of 44 out of 100 (where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is clean).35 In another example, in 2017 South Africa ranked 64th out of 162 states in the Human Freedom Index, which measures personal, economic, and civil freedoms in states.36 In this index South Africa falls behind the other sub-Saharan African states of Mauritius, Cabo Verde, Botswana, and Seychelles. On 16 February 2018, during his first State of the Nation Address (SONA), President Ramaphosa declared to the people of South Africa, and interested observers worldwide, that South Africa’s government would use 2018 to reinforce their ‘commitment to ethical behaviour and ethical leadership’. He added that in honouring the 100th anniversary of the birth of former South African President Nelson Mandela, a noted icon of ‘goodness’, he and his government would devote ‘every action, every effort, every utterance to the realisation of [Mandela’s] vision of a democratic, just and equitable society’.37 This speech followed a decade of increasing loss of public faith in the credibility of South Africa’s public institutions, endless corruption scandals, and evidence of weak state capacity under former President Jacob Zuma.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 43

43

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 3

Two months later, in a campaign to alert the world to a changed, trustworthy South Africa, President Ramaphosa declared the Republic’s drive to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) as a major part of South Africa’s foreign policy at the Commonwealth Business Forum Banquet in London.38 In addition, in December 2018, the then Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Lindiwe Sisulu, announced that South Africa’s ‘diplomats across the world have done a great deal of work in promoting and protecting the image of South Africa […] as an investment and tourism destination’.39

ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR, AND ADHERENCE TO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MULTILATERALISM In the final years of President Zuma’s second term, the South African government declared its intentions to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC).40 The ICC’s purpose is to prosecute individuals accused of serious crimes, for example against humanity, and crimes against peace. Before Ramaphosa was sworn in as president, the International Crimes Bill had been tabled by the Zuma government. This Bill states that ‘South Africa wishes to give effect to the rule of customary international law which recognises the diplomatic immunity of heads of state in order to effectively promote dialogue and the peaceful resolution of conflicts wherever they may occur, but particularly [in Africa]’.41 However, the process of leaving the ICC was halted in early 2017, as the High Court of Gauteng (Tshwane) found that the government’s decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute was unconstitutional. The South African Parliament had not authorised this decision and it was therefore null and void. Initially, South Africa’s intention to leave the ICC was met with mixed responses. Whereas some saw the action as an unwillingness on the part of the Republic to take a firm stance against fellow African leaders accused of grave atrocities, others applauded South Africa for standing up to a so-called biased institution that targeted certain individuals and ignored others. Although Obed Bapela, the head of the ANC’s international relations committee at the time, argued that it was the best decision for South Africa to choose Africa over the ICC, the resulting perception that South Africa buckles to others and does not lead on the continent was evident in foreign policy analyst circles.42 Indeed, Lalbahadur and Sidiropoulos succinctly note that ‘the narrative of African sovereignty that is aimed at asserting African dignity […] has actually become not the dignity and rights of ordinary African citizens but those of African leaders and the elite’.43 Regardless of this domestic debate, South Africa’s moral authority took a knock, especially in the eyes of human rights groups. Freedom House’s project director for South Africa, Paul Graham, referred to the impending 44

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 44

2022/11/10 00:03

and the international justice system. Graham also urged the rest of Africa not to follow suit, as that would ‘weaken the international commitment to end impunity and to establish the international rule of law’.44 Human Rights Watch similarly criticised South Africa’s government for what it termed a ‘startling disregard for justice from a country long seen as a global leader on accountability for victims of the gravest crimes’.45 In light of the above, however, years later this Bill had reappeared only once in the line-up of National Assembly Bills in October 2019 as part of a procedural, blanket revival of Bills that had been on hold prior to the election in May. With no obvious attempt to move on this Bill, even though at the time of writing it was technically still under consideration in Parliament, President Ramaphosa may be distancing the country from such an action, especially since it would be in opposition to his ‘goal of re-shaping South Africa’s foreign policy around the core values of multilateralism, accountability and good governance’.46 The message Ramaphosa has been sending the international community and investors since taking the helm is that South Africa is committed to the rule of law. Withdrawal from the ICC would be contrary to this message; therefore, the president’s inaction on this could work in South Africa’s favour and steer the country back in the direction of good international citizenship in relation to this attribute. As such, South Africa remains a full member of the ICC in terms of international law. In 2021, Justice and Correctional Services Minister Ronald Lamola indicated that there were notable developments taking place related to the ICC, namely the adoption of an understanding which ‘provides for a process for

TO BE OR NOT TO BE? IS SOUTH AFRICA A GOOD INTERNATIONAL CITIZEN?

withdrawal as a serious error that would undermine human rights defenders

states to consult with the ICC in relation to a request for cooperation’ and the AU’s approach to reforming the ICC ‘from within rather than through withdrawals’, and that these would impact South Africa’s decision on its membership going forward.47 South Africa actively fulfilled its duty as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) (2019–2020).48 In 2019, though, its image was tarnished somewhat in the eyes of human rights groups, amongst others, when it voted against a US resolution recognising Venezuela’s opposition leader Juan Guaidó as interim president. Instead, South Africa argued that the electoral process which resulted in the re-election of President Nicolas Maduro, whose government has been accused of human rights violations against the Venezuelan people, should be respected.49 South Africa supported inclusive political dialogue in Venezuela, but it could not support the US resolution, as it ‘reflected a serious bias and partiality which goes against South Africa’s Constitution and foreign policy, as well as the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations’. Instead, South Africa supported a proposed Russian resolution on the Venezuelan situation because it was

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 45

45

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 3

a ‘reaffirmation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations on the peaceful settlements of international disputes, as well as the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence for the provision of humanitarian assistance’.50 South Africa has made nuanced changes in its voting method on the UNSC. Unlike in previous terms, where it was usual for South Africa to side with Russia and China (the Permanent 2) against the UK, France, and the USA (the Permanent 3), this term revealed a state more inclined to act with an independent voice in seeking solutions that address the problem at hand. It seemed to be judging each decision on a case-by-case basis and in practical terms became a ‘“swing” state […] neither consistently aligned to the interests of the P3 nor the P2’.51 For example, it was due to South Africa’s efforts that a unified position on Sudan came from the African members (South Africa, Côte d’Ivoire, and Equatorial Guinea, referred to as the African 3), countering German and UK pressure to issue a public statement on Sudan before the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) could meet on the issue. Moreover, once Sudan had been suspended from the AU by the PSC, South Africa was better able to bring the African position together ‘and resist Russia and China’s opposing position on the renewal of the UN’s peacekeeping mission in Darfur. One source told the ISS that the A3 approach was key, as it “left Russia and China isolated in their sovereignty argument, which certainly shakes things up in the council”.’52 In respect of multilateralism it is fair to say that South Africa actively supports this foreign policy tool in many forums. In November 2019, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Naledi Pandor reasserted the South African government’s strong belief ‘that a purposive system of multilateralism is necessary to deal with the global challenges we face. We are all interdependent in an ever-globalising world and can ill afford the pursuit of narrow self-interests’.53 The previous year, South Africa chaired the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping. It hosted the 10th BRICS Summit, the IORA Ministerial Meeting, and the Council of Ministers Meeting of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In mid-2018, SADC nominated South Africa to represent Africa and serve as a non-permanent member on the UNSC for the 2019–2020 cycle, and the AU endorsed the nomination. This was South Africa’s third term on the UNSC in a little over a 10-year period. In response to the nomination, President Ramaphosa confirmed South Africa’s firm commitment to rules-based multilateralism, to the UN Charter, and to the importance of the body, whilst expressing a deep concern for ‘the emergence of unilateralism and its attendant threat to the international rules-based system’. He also took the opportunity

46

to reinforce South Africa’s position that global governance architecture,

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 46

2022/11/10 00:03

reflect twenty-first-century realities.54 In DIRCO’s Strategic Plan 2020–2025, Director-General Kgabo Mahoai refers to particular priorities that South Africa has emphasised in its role as a global citizen. Amongst these are ‘compliance, commitment and implementation of its international human rights and humanitarian obligations’.55 There is evidence to suggest that Ramaphosa’s administration is committed to this ideal. After South Africa voted in support of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the human rights situation in Myanmar in December 2018, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Lindiwe Sisulu declared that the vote was ‘a demonstration of a new dawn in South African foreign policy and a return to its founding principles of standing against human rights violations’.56 Ramaphosa had referred to a ‘New Dawn’ in South Africa in his February 2018 SONA, in reference to a positive re-start for the Republic.57 Since then, the phrase has often been used by interested observers to characterise Ramaphosa’s initial months in the role. A consistent line on South Africa’s renewed commitment to upholding human rights globally under President Ramaphosa’s administration became evident on various public platforms. This was especially true in December 2018 when Ramaphosa gave the keynote address on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) at Constitution Hill, Johannesburg. At this event Ramaphosa stated that South Africa’s Constitution was based on the ‘need to protect the inalienable right of every human being’ and that this belief extended

TO BE OR NOT TO BE? IS SOUTH AFRICA A GOOD INTERNATIONAL CITIZEN?

including multilateral institutions such as the UNSC, needs to transform to

towards all peoples of the world as ‘human rights are universal, they are not relative’.58 This is a strong statement to make, but it does indicate to the international community a strategic move away from the perception of a confused and inconsistent international human rights foreign policy under former presidents Mbeki and Zuma.59 The real test, however, will be whether Ramaphosa will be able to ‘walk this talk’ for the remainder of his presidency. South Africa’s closest neighbours in the southern African region, for example eSwatini and Zimbabwe, have continued to commit human rights abuses, but traditionally South African leaders have preferred quiet diplomacy tactics to address concerns. Taking on a public leadership role by condemning fellow Africans on domestic issues has not been an avenue of choice. During its first ever stint as a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 2007, South Africa failed to vote in favour of a resolution condemning human rights abuses in Myanmar, citing technical reasons, among others. As a result, democratic South Africa’s human rights reputation was severely damaged, which created the perception of a confused foreign policy that was

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 47

47

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 3

failing to act on Nelson Mandela’s very public declaration of the Republic’s aim to promote human rights from 1994 onwards. History was in danger of repeating itself in November 2018, when South African diplomats abstained on a similar resolution at the UN, again because of the Republic’s policy of avoiding taking a stand on country-specific human rights resolutions. Growing criticism referred to inconsistency, as, just a few months earlier, President Ramaphosa had promised that the Republic’s foreign policy would be guided by Mandela’s values. Subsequently, the Republic’s long-standing policy changed, as Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Lindiwe Sisulu declared that ‘in future each such vote will be decided on a case-by-case basis and would require the approval of herself and senior management in Pretoria’.60 South Africa voted in favour of the resolution in the UNGA a month later. The explanation concerning the Republic’s vote on the Myanmar resolution, provided during the December 2018 UNGA meeting by South Africa’s representative Lyle Davidson, offered a more nuanced and mature approach than explanations on previous votes on similar resolutions. He noted South Africa’s adherence to international law principles in its respect for the territorial integrity of states within the international system and the country’s preference for promoting dialogue in dispute resolution, including as regards human rights abuses. He referred to South Africa as being ‘on guard at all times’ against any attempts to destabilise countries or change regimes through country-specific human rights draft resolutions in the UNGA. However, unlike in previous years (in January 2007, for example), South Africa chose to support the resolution because of deep concern over the human suffering of the Rohingya people and the deteriorating human rights situation in Myanmar. He stated that ‘South Africa’s foreign policy will continue to be anchored in respect for the promotion and protection of human rights’.61

GLOBAL LEADERSHIP AND ENTHUSIASTIC PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL TASKS Despite the lack of permanency for non-P5 members in the UNSC, the platform is an important opportunity for these states to lead the international agenda, with specific themes or focus points being brought to the fore during each state’s month as UNSC president. In October 2019, during South Africa’s term as rotating president, the Republic emphasised its ongoing theme of ‘Continuing the Legacy: Working for a Just and Peaceful World’. This theme was in honour of former President Mandela’s philosophy and legacy, namely that conflict should be resolved through peaceful means wherever possible. In December 2017, UNGA Resolution 72/243 was adopted, mandating the holding of the ‘Nelson Mandela Peace Summit’, a high-level plenary 48

on global peace, the following year in honour of what would have been

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 48

2022/11/10 00:03

further catapulted into the global limelight when, during the UNGA’s 73rd session, member states recognised the forthcoming decade (2019–2028) as the Nelson Mandela Decade of Peace.62 According to DIRCO’s Annual Report 2018/19, the ministry would use this opportunity whilst serving on the UNSC ‘to reposition the country and to reclaim and reassert its role as a key player in international affairs’.63 It is apparent from DIRCO’s strategic plans and annual reports that South Africa believes it is a leader in, and of, Africa. The repeated endorsement by African states of South Africa’s membership of the UNSC reaffirms this belief, and South African foreign policy makers are taking this role seriously. At an open event in New York in 2018, President Ramaphosa announced that the Republic was ‘determined to use every means at [its] disposal, including [its] participation in global forums, to advance the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and to consolidate regional integration’.64 In its 2018/2019 annual report, DIRCO’s accounting officer (i.e. Director-General) at the time, Kgabo Mahoai, declared that ‘Africa remained the focal point of South Africa’s foreign policy, which means that all the foreign policy work done by DIRCO had in addition to the promotion of South Africa’s national priorities, also as objective the promotion and realisation of the African Agenda as well as the [AU’s] Agenda 2063’.65 South Africa wants to concentrate its energy on the upliftment and transformation of the continent and through its efforts contribute to an integrated, peaceful, and prosperous Africa that will become a global player in international affairs, as opposed to a continuous sight of suffering and recipient of global support in various ways.

TO BE OR NOT TO BE? IS SOUTH AFRICA A GOOD INTERNATIONAL CITIZEN?

Mandela’s 100th birthday. In addition to this summit, South Africa was

It is interesting to note, however, that South Africa’s leadership role in Africa’s promotion is not welcomed by all on the continent. South Africa has been accused of being ‘condescending to other African countries’, of trying to assume the moral high ground on certain international issues impacting Africa, and of acting in a ‘patronizing way’ in advising other African states.66 Since 1994, and especially under the leadership of Thabo Mbeki as president, South Africa has drawn on its soft power to take on the role of an international norm entrepreneur and has been ‘successful in getting its ideas adopted in Africa’.67 This is true when reflecting on South Africa’s role in the development of ‘institutions of continental governance’, for example the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in the AU, the PSC, the principle of non-indifference, and common norms in the form of sovereignty as responsibility.68 However, South Africa’s efforts at leading on the continent have been met with resistance and suspicion by other African states – Nigeria for one, who perceived South Africa’s approach as ‘un-African’ and ‘pro-Western’.69 Nevertheless, South Africa was formally elected by African heads of state to take on the chair of the AU for 2020. This election was last minute, as the role

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 49

49

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 3

was originally destined for eSwatini, which had to withdraw due to ‘capacity constraints’.70 DIRCO’s Deputy Director-General of Global Governance and Continental Agenda, Ambassador Mxolisi Nkosi, declared that there was ‘a lot of excitement and expectation about South Africa being at the helm of the AU’.71 However, there were also some reservations. Tanzania’s Donald Deya, chief executive officer of the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU), argued that there was a general view ‘that if it is South Africa, these are people we can talk to, to get things done’ to restore faith in the implementation phase of AU policy across the continent. On the other hand, former deputy chief of staff at the AU, Hesphina Rukato, voiced concerns over South Africa’s challenges with xenophobia and having to lead by example when it came to the fight against gender-based violence.72 Deya also pointed out that the AU chairship meant that all eyes would be focused on what that country said and did; in others words, it ‘requires moral authority because you cannot persuade a sister state to become something that you, yourself, are not’.73 The above is especially relevant in light of the xenophobic incidents that have frequently broken out in in South Africa since 1994. Incidents such as the looting of small businesses and violent attacks against mainly African foreign nationals are in contradiction to the South African government’s public declarations that it aims to protect and advance Africa’s interests. It represents a failure by the government to ‘walk the talk’. However, what is interesting to note for the purposes of this chapter is the government’s strategic foreign policy response to the 2019 attacks in the Gauteng and KwaZuluNatal provinces, and its attempts to repair the related reputational damage. In what Kotzé describes as a ‘charm offensive’, President Ramaphosa wasted no time in speaking out ‘against criminality and violence’, insisting that ‘South Africans are not xenophobic, not against nationals from other countries, we welcome people from other countries’.74 In support of this refrain, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Naledi Pandor expressed regret and shame at the intolerance and division displayed in South Africa during her speech at the 74th UNGA session in September 2019 in New York. Drawing on South Africa’s ‘proud history of struggle and international solidarity support’, Pandor responded to the events by reassuring the international community of the South African government’s commitment to bringing the criminals involved to justice, and to addressing mismanagement within the Republic’s immigration administration. Rather instructively, Pandor went on to reinforce South Africa’s commitment to Africa, to work with all countries of the continent to ensure that we [the government of South Africa] implement our development strategies and use them to create increased economic opportunities for all our people so that we diminish feelings

50

of resentment and antipathy. Working with civil society we will build bridges

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 50

2022/11/10 00:03

of friendship and Pan Africanism.75

By being direct and by not ignoring the domestic challenges, President Ramaphosa’s government has shown leadership and taken ownership of its responsibilities. As Kotzé contends, ‘instead of averting tensions [the government] has sought to shape perceptions’.76 The South African government has indicated that its responsibility is not just to contribute towards but to create and to ‘capacitate democratic and developmental institutions in the region, on the continent and in the Global South’.77 It is also obvious to the government that, in discharging its international responsibilities on behalf of the country, it aims to build a role as an influential actor and partner and to use any leverage to advance South African and African interests. It is true that over the past 28 years South Africa has been appointed to leadership positions in various UN bodies (also see Chapter 15 in this volume) and, as such, has been part of decisions related to economic and social development, human rights and humanitarian affairs, and peace and security.78 Therefore, even if it may be self-imposed, South Africa’s foreign policy goals and ambitions are intertwined with those of a prosperous, peaceful, and developing Africa.

GLOBAL ‘GOOD DEEDS’ Brysk is correct when she states that since 1994 South Africa has ‘burst from its isolation to emerge as a global citizen’.79 The Republic took every

TO BE OR NOT TO BE? IS SOUTH AFRICA A GOOD INTERNATIONAL CITIZEN?

that allow all who live in South Africa to reach out to each other to build bonds

opportunity to demonstrate to the world its rebirth as a democratic state and its intention to become a global player promoting the normative values espoused by its first president, Nelson Mandela. It became involved in global problems, signing treaties and conventions, hosting conferences, and chairing groupings, on issues such as landmines, nuclear non-proliferation, peace and security, non-discrimination and anti-racism, HIV/AIDS, conflict diamonds, African prosperity, sustainable development, and the Global South, amongst others. As chair of the IORA in 2018, South Africa introduced the IORA–Nelson Mandela Be the Legacy Programme in Durban, South Africa. This scholarship programme is in honour of Mandela’s ideals, especially his global vision ‘to change the world for the better’, and it has the potential to support young minds within 22 states bordering the Indian Ocean, with implications beyond individual development. In the long term, this programme aims to ‘create a strong and growing base of young people in the Indian Ocean Region that understand and support the need to safeguard an Indian Ocean that is safe, secure and develops sustainably’.80 51

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 51

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 3

In a further nod to Mandela, the UN convened a summit on 24 September 2018 in honour of the centenary of his birth. Over 100 state leaders and civil society representatives paid tribute to Mandela’s compassion, forgiveness, and humility, as well as his commitment to peace and democracy. UN Secretary-General António Guterres referred to Mandela as a global citizen ‘whose legacy must continue to guide the international community’.81 The South African government donated a statue of Mandela to the UN, and many states voiced their belief in Mandela as an ongoing symbol of hope and peace.82 The UN has also created the Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela Prize and instituted Nelson Mandela International Day to promote community service. Although some might cynically conclude that South Africa’s global image in the past two years is improving only by association, as it relies predominantly on global goodwill in memory of its first democratic president, the fact remains that South Africa would be failing in its soft-power diplomacy if it did not showcase its most dependable, and nearly universally liked, asset – the memory of Nelson Mandela and the values that he represented. In 2019, DIRCO spokesperson Clayson Monyela declared that the Republic has not been afraid to speak out in response to global challenges, especially in relation to food security, sustainable development, and climate change – and now also in relation to international public health challenges.83 DIRCO was proud to announce that after successful talks between the South African government and the World Food Programme, ‘an agreement was reached for South Africa to host [one] of the largest UN Humanitarian Response Depot[s] (HRD)’.84 In relation to climate change, South Africa’s Minister of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries, Barbara Creecy, announced in early 2020 that the Republic was a ‘responsible global citizen’ that would not ‘shrink from its responsibility to address’ climate change challenges.85 South Africa is a coal-dominated country and as such ‘is a significant global emitter of green-house gases’.86 Creecy indirectly admonished US President Donald Trump for withdrawing the USA from the Paris Accord, and stated that all states have ‘a common moral responsibility to future generations to honour our mutual commitments and our differentiated responsibilities to fight the causes and consequences of climate change’.87 South Africa ratified the Paris Agreement on Climate Change in November 2016 and in 2019 the South African government implemented a carbon tax which will be rolled out in phases. When the Covid-19 pandemic, caused by the highly contagious novel coronavirus, broke out worldwide in early 2020, the South African government was praised by the World Health Organization (WHO) in April 2020 for its efforts in slowing down transmission. The WHO drew global attention to the Republic’s ‘meticulously crafted approach to stay

52

ahead’ of the virus’ spread.88 As chair of the AU, President Ramaphosa took

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 52

2022/11/10 00:03

that although the pandemic has affected both developed and developing countries, ‘it’s the latter who are expected to suffer the most’, as this pandemic has ‘amplified dangerous and growing inequalities’ between different countries. He spoke out for the continent and its needs, whilst also emphasising global solidarity and the value of universal health.89 Ramaphosa also announced South Africa’s continued support for the WHO as the key guide for countries across the globe as they fight the disease; naturally, as AU chair at the time, he was the main point of engagement between Africa and the WHO. Vandome contends that President Ramaphosa has shown ‘remarkable’ leadership during the Covid-19 crisis and that he has ‘emerged as a key focal point for Africa-wide responses’ and as ‘an impressive voice for the global south’.90 In June 2020, Ramaphosa also launched, in his capacity as AU chair, the Africa Medical Supplies Platform (AMSP), to make it easier, equitable, and more efficient for African governments to acquire the necessary quality supplies required to deal with the pandemic.91 The Republic’s health diplomacy during this pandemic (also see Chapter 10 in this volume) can be seen as an example of South Africa’s good international citizenship. Despite these positive comments in praise of the president’s actions, however, the South African government was criticised by the UN for using heavy force against citizens during the early stages of the national lockdown (a period of imposed isolationist strategies intended to counter the spread of the virus and delay its peak). The government also faced a backlash from various stakeholders within civil society against draconian

TO BE OR NOT TO BE? IS SOUTH AFRICA A GOOD INTERNATIONAL CITIZEN?

the opportunity at the 73rd World Health Assembly (WHA) to highlight

measures to prevent the spread of the virus. Global perceptions of South Africa’s speed and efficiency in instituting the measures needed to prevent the spread of the disease by closing its borders, for example, are very good. Vandome compares this to former President Thabo Mbeki’s ‘disastrous response to the HIV crisis’, which ‘cast a long shadow over his legacy, [of which] Ramaphosa has taken note’.92 South Africa is a lesson to the world, some say, in acting fast and hard.

CONCLUSION It is worth noting that President Ramaphosa has had to address many unresolved issues left over from Zuma’s terms in office, including a tainted reputation due to domestic scandals. Ramaphosa has only been in the top position since February 2018 and it may therefore be too soon to judge South Africa’s global good citizenship under his leadership; however, there are some points worth reflecting on that indicate strategic statements

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 53

53

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 3

and actions aimed at projecting a ‘New Dawn’-like image for the Republic. Like a phoenix rising from the ashes, Ramaphosa and his government have sought to piggyback off the centenary celebrations of the birth of former President Nelson Mandela and the valued global memory and norms represented by Mandela. It has utilised these in all of its multilateral platforms to recentre South Africa globally as a country valuing peace, harmony, and goodwill. Speeches, shared stories, statues, and scholarships, all in honour of Mandela, have helped to launch South Africa back into the positive light radiating from this iconic figure. This has afforded Ramaphosa the opportunity to recast South Africa’s global image after the increasingly tainted hue of a corrupt, mismanaged, and crumbling government under Zuma. South Africa’s government, under President Ramaphosa, has actively attempted through multiple public declarations to convey the image of a good citizen intent on playing an active role in the world and on making the world, and Africa within it, a better place to live. In practical terms this equates to an improved reputation for the Republic, which will have a long-term impact on South Africa’s economic and political stability and on the southern African region – as long as the momentum can be kept up. South Africa has not shied away from its leadership responsibilities – regionally, continentally, and globally – and, especially in light of the unexpected global pandemic, the government has responded to global challenges with good intentions. It is also important to note, however, that South Africa’s leadership role is self-imposed in many respects and not always accepted or respected on the continent. Nevertheless, President Ramaphosa has, so far, managed to walk the delicate line of solidarity with his African counterparts without overstepping it, whilst also chairing the AU, bolstering South Africa’s commitment to human rights issues, representing the continent at the UNSC, and keeping South Africa within the ICC. Under Ramaphosa, South Africa’s government appears to be conforming to the good international citizenship attributes of active support for, and adherence to, international law and multilateralism; global leadership in the form of being a role model for others; enthusiastic participation in global tasks; and global ‘good deeds’. It is fair to say at this stage that South Africa’s current administration is attempting to contribute proactively in all of these areas. But actions have consequences, and perhaps not always the intended ones. South Africa will have to prioritise resolving national challenges if it is to carry out its global role with sufficient capacity and resources in order to make a sustainable difference going forward. If it is to take the New Dawn into a brighter day, South Africa will need to actively lead on addressing human rights abuses in its neighbourhood and more widely; work on corruption and maladministration in its domestic

54

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 54

2022/11/10 00:03

and demonstrate that idealist goals and realist goals are linked and equally important in its foreign policy decision-making. Finally, it will have to keep up the momentum in following Mandela’s values in its global involvement.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1 Qobo, M. 2017. ‘Africa’s foreign policy and nation branding: Regional leadership and its discontents.’ Strategic Review for Southern Africa 39(1): 9–28, p. 9. https://doi. org/10.35293/srsa.v39i1.319. 2 Beeson, M. 2015. ‘Being a good international citizen.’ The Conversation, 11 June. https:// theconversation.com/being-a-good-international-citizen-43137 (Accessed 25 March 2020). 3 Holsti, K. J. 1970. ‘National role conceptions in the study of foreign policy.’ International Studies Quarterly 14(3): 233–309, p. 235. https://doi.org/10.2307/3013584. 4 Souter, J. 2016. ‘Good international citizenship and special responsibilities to protect refugees.’ The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 18(4): 795–811. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148116659607. 5 Geldenhuys, D. 2011. ‘Dealing with “deviants”: Testing South Africa’s good international citizenship.’ Strategic Review for Southern Africa 33(2): 1–26. 6 Evans, G. 2017. ‘Good international citizenship: Values and interests in foreign policymaking.’ 27 August. http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech580.html (Accessed 13 August 2020). 7 Sorrell, M. 2015. ‘Foreword.’ In Best Countries: Defining Success and Leadership in the Twenty-First Century, by J. Gerzema and D. Reibstein, p. 7. US News, BAV Consulting, and the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. https://www.usnews.com/ static/documents/best-countries/Best-Countries.pdf (Accessed 10 August 2020).

TO BE OR NOT TO BE? IS SOUTH AFRICA A GOOD INTERNATIONAL CITIZEN?

governance, as this has a wider impact on economic stability in the region;

8 Gerzema, J. and D. Reibstein. 2015. Best Countries: Defining Success and Leadership in the Twenty-First Century. US News, BAV Consulting, and the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. https://www.usnews.com/static/documents/best-countries/ Best-Countries.pdf (Accessed 10 August 2020). 9 Quoted in Karli, M. 2007. ‘Turkey, the UN and the WTO: The emergence of a trading nation and a good international citizen.’ Turkish Policy Quarterly (Winter): 59–77, p. 64. 10 Bull, in Wheeler, N. J. and Dunne, T. 1998. ‘Good international citizenship: A third way for British foreign policy?’ International Affairs 74(4): 847–870, p. 848. https://doi. org/10.1111/1468-2346.00048. 11 Graham, S. 2008. ‘Gold star or bottom of the class: Is South Africa a good international citizen?’ South African Journal of International Affairs 15(1): 87–97, p. 87. https://doi. org/10.1080/10220460802217983. 12 Evans, G. 1989. ‘Australian foreign policy: Priorities in a changing world.’ Australian Outlook 43(2): 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718908444991; Evans, G. and Grant, B. 1991. Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s. Carlton: Melbourne University Press.

55

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 55

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 3

13 Evans, G. 1990. ‘Foreign policy and good international citizenship.’ Address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Gareth Evans, Canberra, 6 March, p. 1. http:// www.gevans.org/speeches/old/1990/060390_fm_fpandgoodinternationalcitizen.pdf (Accessed 20 March 2020). 14 Pert, A. 2012. ‘The good international citizenship of the Rudd government.’ Australian Yearbook of International Law 30: 93–145, p. 93. https://doi.org/10.1163/ 26660229-030-01-900000005. 15 Siniver, A. and Cabrera, L. 2015. ‘“Good citizen Europe” and the Middle East peace process.’ International Studies Perspectives 16: 210–228. https://doi.org/10.1111/ insp.12037. 16 Brysk, A. 2009. Global Good Samaritans: Human Rights as Foreign Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 14. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381573.001.0001. 17 Youde, J. R. and Slagter, T. H. 2013. ‘Creating “good international citizens”: Middle powers and domestic political institutions.’ Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 14(2): 123–133, p. 132. 18 Karli, ‘Turkey, the UN and the WTO’. 19 Lightfoot, S. 2006. ‘A good international citizen? Australia at the World Summit on Sustainable Development.’ Australian Journal of International Affairs 60(3): 457–471. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710600865713. 20 Wheeler and Dunne, ‘Good international citizenship’. 21 Gilmore, J. 2015. ‘Still a “force for good”? Good international citizenship in British foreign and security policy.’ The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 17: 106–129. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-856X.12032. 22 Graham, ‘Gold star or bottom of the class’. 23 Geldenhuys, ‘Dealing with “deviants”’, p. 20. 24 Geldenhuys, D. 2015. ‘The weak domestic base of South Africa’s good global citizenship.’ South African Journal of International Affairs 22(4): 411–428, p. 424. https://doi.org/10. 1080/10220461.2015.1123648. 25 Gilmore, ‘Still a “force for good”?’. 26 Dunford, R. and Neu, M. 2019. ‘The responsibility to protect in a world of already existing intervention.’ European Journal of International Relations 25(4): 1080–1102. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119842208. 27 Souter, J. 2016. ‘Good international citizenship and special responsibilities to protect refugees.’ The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 18(4): 795–811. 28 Ralph, J. and Souter, J. 2015. ‘A special responsibility to protect: The UK, Australia and the rise of Islamic State.’ International Affairs 91(4): 709–723. https://doi. org/10.1111/1468-2346.12339. 29 Ralph and Souter, ‘A special responsibility to protect’, p. 711. 30 Pert, ‘The good international citizenship of the Rudd government’. 31 Geldenhuys, D. 2010. ‘South Africa: The idea-driven foreign policy of a regional power.’ In Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests, and Strategies of Regional Powers, edited by D. Flemes. Farnham: Ashgate. 32 Eze, C. 2017. ‘Empathetic cosmopolitanism: South Africa and the quest for global citizenship.’ Strategic Review for Southern Africa 39(1): 236–255, p. 236. https://doi. org/10.35293/srsa.v39i1.329.

56

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 56

2022/11/10 00:03

34 US News & World Report LP. 2020. Best Countries 2020: Global rankings, international news and data insights. US News, BAV Consulting, and the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, p. 3. This is an annual report undertaken by the US News & World Report, the WPP Group’s BAV Consulting, and the Wharton School. 35 Transparency International. 2020. ‘Corruption Perceptions Index.’ https://www. transparency.org/en/cpi/2019/results (Accessed 13 August 2020). 36 Vásquez, I. and Porcˇnik, T. 2019. ‘The Human Freedom Index 2019: A global measurement of personal, civil, and economic freedom.’ https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/ files/human-freedom-index-files/cato-human-freedom-index-update-3.pdf (Accessed 13 August 2020). 37 Ramaphosa, C. 2018. ‘State of the Nation Address by President of the Republic of South Africa, Mr Cyril Ramaphosa.’ The Presidency, 16 February. http://www.thepresidency. gov.za/speeches/state-nation-address-president-republic-south-africa%2C-mr-cyrilramaphosa (Accessed 4 May 2020). 38 Ramaphosa, C. 2018. ‘Keynote Address by President Cyril Ramaphosa at the Commonwealth Business Forum Banquet, Guildhall, London, United Kingdom.’ The Presidency, 17 April. http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/keynote-addresspresident-cyril-ramaphosa-commonwealth-business-forum-banquet%2C-guildhall%2C (Accessed 3 May 2020). 39 DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation). 2018. ‘International Relations and Cooperation on South Africa’s role in multilateral arena in 2019.’ 24 December. https://www.gov.za/speeches/south-africa-continue-play-significant-rolemultilateral-arena-2019-24-dec-2018-0000 (Accessed 20 May 2020). 40 For a brief explanation of the context behind the Zuma administration’s decision, see Graham, S. 2019. ‘A plurality of voices? Domestic sources of South Africa’s foreign policy.’ In South African Foreign Policy Review, Volume 3, edited by L. Masters and J.-A. van Wyk. Pretoria: AISA and HSRC.

TO BE OR NOT TO BE? IS SOUTH AFRICA A GOOD INTERNATIONAL CITIZEN?

33 CFR (Council on Foreign Relations). 2018. ‘A conversation with Cyril Ramaphosa.’ 24 September. https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-cyril-ramaphosa (Accessed 5 May 2020).

41 Quoted in Fabricius, P. 2019. ‘Is Ramaphosa still kicking the ICC can down the road?.’ ISS Today, 15 November. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-ramaphosa-still-kicking-theicc-can-down-the-road (Accessed 15 May 2020). 42 Lalbahadur, A. and Sidiropoulos, E. 2016. ‘A blow to South Africa’s soft power: Leaving the ICC.’ SAIIA, 24 October. https://saiia.org.za/research/a-blow-to-south-africas-softpower-leaving-the-icc/ (Accessed 12 May 2020). 43 Lalbahadur and Sidiropoulos, ‘A blow to South Africa’s soft power’. 44 Freedom House. 2016. ‘South Africa: Withdrawal from ICC undermines international justice.’ Press release, 20 October. https://freedomhouse.org/article/south-africawithdrawal-icc-undermines-international-justice (Accessed 16 May 2020). 45 The Guardian. 2016. ‘South Africa to quit international criminal court.’ 21 October. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/21/south-africa-to-quit-internationalcriminal-court-document-shows (Accessed 15 May 2020). 46 The Guardian., ‘South Africa to quit international criminal court’.

57

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 57

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 3

47 Maqhina, M. 2021. ‘SA still discussing its membership in ICC.’ IOL, 31 July. https:// www.iol.co.za/news/politics/sa-still-discussing-its-membership-in-icc-e1d199a8-4a4546ad-a7ce-82490ace4f1c (Accessed 11 January 2022). 48 De Carvalho, G. 2019. ‘South Africa proves its mettle on the UN Security Council.’ ISS Today, 22 July. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africa-proves-its-mettle-on-theun-security-council (Accessed 13 August 2020). 49 Powell, A. 2019. ‘Venezuela an issue between allies US and South Africa.’ VOA, 12 March. https://www.voanews.com/a/venezuela-an-issue-between-allies-u-s-andsouth-africa/4825647.html (Accessed 12 August 2020). 50 DIRCO. 2019. ‘South Africa reaffirms support in Venezuela at the UN Security Council.’ 28 February. https://www.gov.za/speeches/south-africa-reaffirms-support-inclusivepolitical-dialogue-venezuela-un-security-council (Accessed 12 August 2020). 51 De Carvalho, ‘South Africa proves its mettle on the UN Security Council’. 52 De Carvalho, ‘South Africa proves its mettle on the UN Security Council’. 53 Pandor, N. 2019. ‘UNGA 74: Through our differences, we should find strength and not division.’ Ubuntu 19: 26–29, p. 26. http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/ubuntu/2019/ ubuntu.html (Accessed 2 April 2020). 54 Ramaphosa, C. 2018. ‘SA elected to serve on the UNSC – Cyril Ramaphosa.’ Politicsweb, 8 June. https://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/sa-elected-to-serve-on-the-unsc--cyrilramaphosa (Accessed 18 May 2020). 55 DIRCO. 2020. Strategic Plan 2020–2025. Pretoria: DIRCO, p. 10. http://www.dirco.gov. za/department/strategic_plan/index.htm (Accessed 8 April 2020). 56 Sisulu, L. 2018. ‘Media Statement, South Africa to continue to play significant role in the multilateral arena in 2019.’ DIRCO, 24 December. http://www.dirco.gov.za/ docs/2018/rsa1224.htm (accessed 18 May 2020). 57 Ramaphosa, C. 2018. ‘”A new dawn” – President Cyril Ramaphosa’s maiden SONA in full.’ Mail & Guardian, 16 February. https://mg.co.za/article/2018-02-16-a-new-dawnpresident-cyril-ramaphosas-maiden-sona/ (Accessed 27 July 2020). 58 Ramaphosa, C. 2018. ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa: 70th Anniversary of Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’ SAHRC, 7 December. https://www.sahrc.org.za/index. php/sahrc-media/speeches/item/1703-president-cyril-ramaphosa-70th-anniversary-ofuniversal-declaration-of-human-right (Accessed 7 May 2020). 59 During Nelson Mandela’s tenure as president, he too faced challenges in ‘walking the talk’ of norm promotion and enforcement. Mandela’s continued friendly relations with Indonesian President Suharto and Cuba’s Fidel Castro raised eyebrows amongst human rights groups globally. 60 Fabricius, P. 2018. ‘South Africa will reverse its vote on Myanmar.’ Daily Maverick, 23 November. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-11-23-south-africa-willreverse-its-vote-on-myanmar/ (Accessed 13 August 2020). 61 UNGA. 2018. ‘Seventy-third session, 65th plenary meeting.’ UNGA Official Records, 21 December. https://undocs.org/en/A/73/PV.65 (Accessed 21 May 2020). 62 DIRCO. 2019. Annual Report 2018/19. Pretoria: DIRCO. http://www.dirco.gov.za/ department/report_2018-2019/annual_report2018_2019.pdf (Accessed 15 May 2020). 63 DIRCO, Annual Report 2018/19, p. 12. 64 CFR, ‘A conversation with Cyril Ramaphosa’.

58

65 DIRCO, Annual Report 2018/19, p. 11.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 58

2022/11/10 00:03

67 Geldenhuys, D., quoted in Marthoz, J.-P. 2012. ‘The challenges and ambiguities of South Africa’s foreign policy.’ NOREF report, September, p. 8. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/15 3069/1d25c90556f0a6f66548551220c882e8.pdf (Accessed 13 August 2020). 68 Geldenhuys, quoted in Marthoz, ‘The challenges and ambiguities of South Africa’s foreign policy’, p. 8. 69 Geldenhuys, quoted in Marthoz, ‘The challenges and ambiguities of South Africa’s foreign policy’, p. 8. 70 Du Plessis, C. 2019. ‘How South Africa got the AU chair.’ News24, 17 February. https:// www.news24.com/citypress/news/how-south-africa-got-the-au-chair-20190217 (Accessed 13 August 2020). 71 Swart, M. 2020. ‘South Africa takes over as AU chair: What to expect.’ Al Jazeera, 11 February. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/south-africa-takes-au-chairexpect-200209131603484.html (Accessed 20 May 2020). 72 Swart, ‘South Africa takes over as AU chair’. 73 Swart, ‘South Africa takes over as AU chair’. 74 Kotzé, K. 2019. ‘South Africa: Attempts at continental diplomacy.’ Global Risk Insights, 10 October. https://globalriskinsights.com/2019/10/south-africa-attempts-atcontinental-diplomacy/ (Accessed 10 May 2020). 75 Pandor, N. 2019. ‘Minister Naledi Pandor: General Debate of the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly.’ 28 September. https://www.gov.za/speeches/ statement-dr-naledi-pandor-occasion-general-debate-74th-session-united-nationsgeneral (Accessed 15 May 2020). 76 Kotzé, ‘South Africa: Attempts at continental diplomacy’.

TO BE OR NOT TO BE? IS SOUTH AFRICA A GOOD INTERNATIONAL CITIZEN?

66 Mangwiro, I. 2020. ‘South Africa’s possible withdrawal from the International Criminal Court: Implications for human rights and Zimbabwe.’ Conflict Trends 2020(1). Accord, May 8. https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/south-africas-possible-withdrawalfrom-the-international-criminal-court/ (Accessed 13 August 2020).

77 DIRCO, Strategic Plan 2020–2025, p. 5. 78 DIRCO, Strategic Plan 2020–2025. 79 Brysk, Global Good Samaritans, p. 172. 80 IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association). 2020. ‘The IORA–Nelson Mandela Be the Legacy Programme.’ https://www.iora.int/en/flagship-projects/the-iora-nelson-mandela-bethe-legacy-programme (Accessed 19 May 2020). 81 UNGA. 2018. ‘Nelson Mandela Peace Summit unanimously adopts declaration, resolving to “move beyond words”, redouble efforts towards peaceful, prosperous, fair world.’ UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 24 September. https://www.un.org/ press/en/2018/ga12060.doc.htm (Accessed 25 May 2020). 82 UNGA, ‘Nelson Mandela Peace Summit unanimously adopts declaration’. 83 Monyela, C. 2019. ‘South Africa is reasserting its role and place among the community of nations.’ Daily Maverick, 18 June. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-0618-south-africa-is-reasserting-its-role-and-place-among-the-community-of-nations/ (Accessed 15 May 2020). 84 Monyela, ‘South Africa is reasserting its role and place’. 85 Creecy, B. 2020. ‘Minister Barbara Creecy on climate change.’ 18 February. https:// www.gov.za/speeches/south-africa-will-not-shrink-its-responsibility-address-climatechange-18-feb-2020-0000 (Accessed 19 May 2020).

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 59

59

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 3

86 Duncan, J. 2019. ‘Carbon tax in South Africa – No longer just hot air.’ Mail & Guardian, 23 August. https://mg.co.za/article/2019-08-23-00-carbon-tax-in-south-africa-no-longerjust-hot-air/ (Accessed 19 May 2020). 87 Creecy, ‘Minister Barbara Creecy on climate change’. 88 Brandt, K. 2020. ‘WHO praises South Africa’s efforts to curb spread of Covid19.’ EWN, 23 April. https://ewn.co.za/2020/04/23/who-praises-south-africa-s-efforts-to-curbcovid-19 (Accessed 20 May 2020). 89 Madia, T. 2020. ‘Developed world must work with Africa on Covid-19 – Ramaphosa.’ News24, 18 May. https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/developed-worldmust-work-with-africa-on-covid-19-ramaphosa-20200518 (Accessed 25 May 2020). 90 Vandome, C. 2020. ‘COVID-19 in South Africa: Leadership, resilience and inequality.’ Chatham House, 7 May. https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/covid-19south-africa-leadership-resilience-and-inequality (Accessed 26 May 2020). 91 Tralac. 2020. ‘COVID-19: African Union Chair, President Ramaphosa launches the Africa Medical Supplies Platform, Africa’s unified continental response to fight the pandemic.’ 19 June. https://www.tralac.org/news/article/14674-covid-19-african-unionchair-president-ramaphosa-launches-the-africa-medical-supplies-platform-africa-sunified-continental-response-to-fight-the-pandemic.html (Accessed 13 August 2020). 92 Vandome, ‘COVID-19 in South Africa’.

60

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 60

2022/11/10 00:03

Marcel Nagar

CHAPTER 4

The Art of Reconciling Power and Morality: South Africa’s Norm Entrepreneurship Under Cyril Ramaphosa

INTRODUCTION Eager to relinquish its past image of an isolated, racially oppressive apartheid state and hostile agent of regional economic and military destabilisation and domination, the newly democratic South Africa emerged in 1994 as a bastion of liberal human rights and democratic values on the African continent and in the world at large. During its initial post-apartheid period, South Africa went to great lengths to establish itself as a moral leader by promoting norms guiding appropriate standards of state conduct and humanitarian interventions on the continent and across the globe.1 South Africa’s commitment to norm promotion, coupled with its high degree of international legitimacy (grounded in its celebrated negotiated transition to democracy, universal respect and admiration of Nelson Mandela, and its heralded Constitution of 1996), earned it the revered status of a ‘transnational norm entrepreneur’ in its early post-apartheid years.2 However, under the administration of President Jacob Zuma (2008–2018), in particular, South Africa suffered from severe moral degeneration and became increasingly derelict in its duties as a transnational norm entrepreneur. During this period, South Africa’s foreign policy became increasingly inward-looking and failed to uphold its commitment to human rights and democratic principles.3 Upon assuming office in February 2018, President Cyril Ramaphosa hailed the advent of a ‘New Dawn’ for South Africa. He vowed to reverse the moral decay that had accumulated within the government under the leadership of his predecessor, by reverting back to the norms and values espoused by Mandela and Thabo Mbeki (who ‘remains the doyen of South Africa’s foreign policy’ by virtue of his introduction of African Renaissance philosophy4). An 11-member review panel, appointed by the then International Relations and Cooperation Minister, Lindiwe Sisulu, on 15 May 2018 to assess South Africa’s foreign policy, and led by the then Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, Aziz Pahad, revealed: ‘The country has not sufficiently played the role it was expected to play or should have played in engaging a number of international issues.’5 Hence, Ramaphosa has 61

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 61

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 4

committed South Africa’s foreign policy to the pursuit and promotion of democracy, human rights, justice, and good governance norms. This chapter critically interrogates Ramaphosa’s state-led norm entrepreneurship. It frames its study and central discussion within a strategic social constructivist approach to foreign policy analysis, which stresses the importance of strategic political and economic imperatives informing the construction and promotion of moral normative frameworks. The chapter argues that Ramaphosa’s efforts to reinvoke South Africa’s moral image and role as a transnational norm entrepreneur are inextricably tied to and motivated by the country’s most pressing economic objective – that of rebuilding its broken economy following years of gross mismanagement, corruption, and state incompetence and malevolence. Through the theoretical lens of strategic social constructivism, this chapter illustrates Ramaphosa’s ability to reframe South Africa’s national image – tainted by its short-term history of corruption, scandal, state capture, and neglect of human rights – to reflect its former position as a respected and responsible moral citizen of the international community which safeguards and promotes democratic and human rights norms. Ramaphosa does so with a view to engender the admiration – and ultimately solicit the support of – international actors that are key to South Africa’s economic development. By promoting norms of democracy, human rights, justice, and good governance, Ramaphosa seeks to change the international community’s perception of South Africa. This is important when appealing to foreign investors in that it builds investor confidence, thereby shaping their preferences and guiding their behaviour and actions in a manner that would best serve South Africa’s interests – that is, through increased inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and bilateral assistance, both of which are vital determinants of South Africa’s economic growth. Likewise, Ramaphosa is attentive to the need for South Africa to revert to its conflict mediation role on the African continent through its promotion of peace and security, given that regional stability is indispensable to the achievement of socio-economic development on the continent and at home. The analysis conducted in this chapter will show the ways in which Ramaphosa has acted as a transnational norm entrepreneur through exemplifying the four main elements of state-led norm entrepreneurship: (a) by reframing the state’s identity and the international and national interests articulated in its foreign policy around a particular normative issue that deeply appeals to the global audience; (b) by leveraging his individual identity, global status, and clout as a foreign policy actor to confront pre-existing foreign policy norms in bringing about global normative transformation and political action; (c) by establishing effective

62

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 62

2022/11/10 00:03

tools and networks in the global promotion and dissemination of the state’s normative frameworks; and (d) by identifying and exploiting political windows of opportunity to establish and promote the state’s articulated norms. In assessing the extent to which Ramaphosa, acting as a norm entrepreneur, has truly pursued a ‘moral’ foreign policy, this chapter will show his strategic promotion of norms of democracy, human rights, justice, and good governance to be motivated by economic imperatives and constrained by power politics at home vis-à-vis South Africa’s close trade ties with human rights violators (China, Russia, and Brazil) as well as the anti-Western and anti-democratic sentiments in his own ruling party. As the following analysis will show, this has ultimately led to foreign and domestic policy decisions and outcomes which have undermined a moral foreign policy with an emphasis on democratic, human rights, justice, and good governance norms. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the conceptual definitions and the theoretical framework which underpin this chapter. It defines the concepts of ‘norms’ and ‘state-led transnational norm entrepreneurship’ and outlines the strategic social constructivist theoretical approach to foreign policy analysis. The second section critically assesses South Africa’s norm entrepreneurship. It does so by firstly providing a brief overview of the rise and fall of South Africa’s status as a transnational norm entrepreneur under the three former democratically elected presidents – Mandela (1994–1999), Mbeki (1999–2008), and Zuma (2008–2018). Thereafter, it critically evaluates Ramaphosa’s engagement with norm entrepreneurship and his attempt to reinstall South Africa’s moral foreign policy through his diplomatic efforts at global, continental, regional, and local levels. The concluding section summarises the main arguments of the chapter and provides a final word regarding the state of South Africa’s norm entrepreneurship on the continent and beyond. The discussions conducted and conclusions arrived at in this chapter contribute to the immense literature on South African foreign policy by drawing out the intersection between morality and power in foreign policy. It does so by showing the ability of Ramaphosa to tap into South Africa’s provocative historical source of moral normative power, amassed by Mandela, and to use it as a tool to boost the country’s soft-power arsenal in pursuit of its economic diplomacy.

THE ART OF RECONCILING POWER AND MORALITY: SOUTH AFRICA’S NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP UNDER CYRIL RAMAPHOSA

and cohesive organisational platforms and engaging in a mix of policy

63

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 63

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 4

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL DEFINITIONS AND DEBATES KEY CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS Norms Finnemore and Sikkink generally define a ‘norm’ as ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’.6 Phrased differently, norms refer to a ‘legitimate behavioural claim’,7 ‘intersubjective understandings’ concerning appropriate behaviour,8 or ‘collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity’.9 Norms can be classified as either domestic or international. While domestic norms set standards of appropriate behaviour for actors within a given nation-state, international norms, operating within the global arena, outline standards of appropriate behaviour for states and international actors.10 International norms establish predictability and regularity in the behaviour of state and non-state actors, which is essential for maintaining order and stability in the international system.11 International norms do not emerge perchance; the actions of a ‘norm entrepreneur’ are vital in bringing domestic norms onto the international scene, a phenomenon to which this section now turns to.

State-led transnational norm entrepreneurship States are seldom identified within international relations norm theory literature as norm entrepreneurs or norm breakers. More often, states are perceived as obstinate actors who need to be painstakingly persuaded to change their behaviour and the status quo.12 However, Davies and True argue that states in fact have a greater role to play within the normative cycle than previously suggested. For them, ‘powerful state agents can (also) be moral norm entrepreneurs and explicate the foreign policy acts that make them significant agents of international socialization’.13 Powerful foreign policy leaders are able to use their influence and reputation to reframe and redefine their state’s national identity and interests within its foreign policy, according to their articulated norms. Davies and True outline four elements of state-led norm entrepreneurship. Firstly, state-led norm entrepreneurs need to reframe the state’s identity and the international and national interests articulated in its foreign policy around a particular normative issue that deeply appeals to the global audience. They do so by tapping into the state’s moral obligation and resolve, with the intent of shaping global audiences’ attitudes, perceptions, and understanding of the particular normative issue thereby soliciting global political action and normative change. The second element refers to the ability of the norm entrepreneur to leverage his/her individual identity, global status, and clout as a foreign policy actor to confront pre-existing 64

foreign policy norms in bringing about global normative transformation

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 64

2022/11/10 00:03

the capacity of the norm entrepreneur to establish effective and cohesive organisational platforms and engage in a mix of policy tools and networks in the global promotion and dissemination of its normative frameworks. Lastly, the fourth element of state-led norm entrepreneurship is the ability of the state to identify and exploit political windows of opportunity to establish and promote its articulated norms.14

A STRATEGIC SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH: BRIDGING THE RATIONALIST–CONSTRUCTIVIST GAP The strategic social constructivist theoretical approach is used in this chapter to interrogate South Africa’s transnational norm entrepreneurship under Ramaphosa. This approach brings together realism’s pragmatic appreciation of the role of power and constructivism’s emphasis on intellectual constructs to provide a comprehensive approach to foreign policy analysis. To start with, social constructivists hold ‘the belief that foreign policy is and should be guided by ethical and legal standards’.15 As a theory, it stresses the importance of ‘ideologies, identities, persuasion, and transnational networks’ in international relations and draws attention to shifting norms in politics.16 Its theoretical assumptions are grounded in the belief that reality is a social construct – comprising social rules, ideas, and intersubjective meanings – which informs our common knowledge.17 Ideas form the basic elements of the international system; the structure of the international system is consequently determined by the diffusion and distribution of ideas.18 According to social constructivism, power is acquired by individuals and/or groups who successfully persuade others to subscribe to their norms.19 Norm emergence is viewed as occurring as a result of new principles or strategies employed by norm entrepreneurs.20 Strategic social constructivism challenges and, to an extent, resolves the

rationalism–constructivism

schism

prevalent

in

contemporary

theoretical debates on international relations, in which constructivism is regarded as separate and far removed from rationalism/materialism. It does so by illustrating the interconnectivity and complex relationship between norms and rationality, social construction and strategic bargaining, and, moreover, realist materialism and constructivist idealism. Strategic social construction employed by norm entrepreneurs conjoins what March and Olsen refer to as the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (agents acting according to prescribed standards of expected behaviour) with the ‘logic of consequence’ (agents employing strategy to realise their goals).21 It highlights the fluidity

THE ART OF RECONCILING POWER AND MORALITY: SOUTH AFRICA’S NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP UNDER CYRIL RAMAPHOSA

and political action. Thirdly, and closely linked to the second element, is

between the two seemingly diametrically opposed strands of international relations theory – realism and constructivism. For example, it is entirely

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 65

65

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 4

possible for a norm entrepreneur to deploy rational strategy in the pursuit of a normative goal. Conversely, it is also within the realm of possibility for a norm entrepreneur to base its actions on a socially constructed norm in the pursuit of material interests.22 In illustrating the links between realism and constructivism, Carr famously observed that ‘it is utopia to ignore the element of power, it is an unreal kind of realism which ignores the element of morality in any world order’.23 In reconciling realism and constructivism, Carr dismisses the dichotomy between power and morality in international relations by concluding that ‘political action must be based on a coordination of morality and power’.24 A key distinction must be made here between norms and morals: While the former refers specifically to standards of appropriate behaviour, the latter explicitly involves value judgements concerning what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ behaviour.25 Regardless of this distinction, there remains a connection between the two concepts: each norm contains an innate judgement of what is considered appropriate: ‘a quality of “oughtness” and shared moral assessment’.26 For social constructivists, then, norm entrepreneurs lay the moral foundation of public opinion and seek to channel it towards what is regarded as the moral ‘good’.27 While moral judgements are highly subjective, Nye maintains that they are inescapable when evaluating foreign policy. In contrast to the realist perspective, which affords no place for the public’s moralism within foreign policy, Nye asserts that value judgements and trade-offs are inherent in articulating and defining foreign policy objectives.28 Morality therefore holds a key place in foreign policy and norm entrepreneurship. One can determine the extent to which a foreign policy is deemed ‘moral’ by ‘weighing and balancing the intentions, the means, and the consequences’.29 The analysis below will show the ways in which Ramaphosa, in acting as a norm entrepreneur, is using South Africa’s foreign policy to strategically reframe the country’s national image by reverting back to Mandela’s sense of morality, with an emphasis on human rights, democratic, justice, and good governance norms. Ramaphosa’s strategy is motivated by the need to expand South Africa’s trade and investment relations in an effort to bolster economic growth and reconstruction (also see chapters 13 and 14 in this volume). In assessing the extent to which Ramaphosa, acting as a norm entrepreneur, has truly pursued a ‘moral’ foreign policy (also see Chapter 3 in this volume), the remainder of this chapter will show his strategic promotion of democracy, human rights, justice, and good governance to be motivated by economic imperatives and constrained by power politics at home. As the following analysis will show, this has ultimately led to foreign and domestic policy decisions and outcomes which have undermined a

66

moral foreign policy.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 66

2022/11/10 00:03

Ramaphosa boasted an impressive résumé upon being sworn in as president of the Republic of South Africa on 15 February 2018. As chief negotiator of the African National Congress (ANC) he had played an important role in South Africa’s democratic transition. He had served as deputy president of South Africa for four years (2014–2018) and boasts a strong background in political activism and trade unionism as well as a successful business career. As president, he has repeatedly and firmly committed himself to a rulesbased international order.30 Therefore, in line with one of the key elements of state-led norm entrepreneurship, Ramaphosa’s political credentials, coupled with his immense global influence, make him well suited to the task of transnational norm entrepreneurship. However, given his narrow victory in the December 2017 ANC leadership elections (52 vs. 48 per cent against rival Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma), in charting a new, morally grounded course in South Africa’s foreign policy, Ramaphosa is, to an extent, internally constrained by those in his own party who harbour anti-Western sentiments and favour autocratic African governments.31 Furthermore, Ramaphosa’s most pressing policy priority is the restructuring of South Africa’s domestic economy so that it serves the country’s poor – a priority which has been deemed to be at loggerheads with the imperatives of a moral foreign policy.32 This is because Ramaphosa’s expansion of investment and trade ties (bilaterally and within multilateral forums such as the BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa] grouping of emerging markets) has put South Africa in the precarious position of partnering with countries (such as China, Russia, and Brazil) that do not historically have good human rights track records. A comprehensive interrogation of South Africa’s norm entrepreneurship under Ramaphosa necessitates a brief synopsis of the rise and fall of South Africa’s norm entrepreneurship during the administrations of Mandela, Mbeki, and Zuma.

THE RISE AND FALL OF SOUTH AFRICA’S NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1994–2018) Inspired in part by its celebrated Constitution of 1996, as well as its legacy of anti-apartheid activism, South Africa’s initial foreign policy under President Mandela came to be regarded as a ‘human rights crusade’ and was ‘initially infused with notions of human rights activism’.33 In assuming its role as a transnational norm entrepreneur, South Africa, under the Mandela and the early Mbeki administrations, aimed to promote international norms guiding

THE ART OF RECONCILING POWER AND MORALITY: SOUTH AFRICA’S NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP UNDER CYRIL RAMAPHOSA

NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP UNDER RAMAPHOSA

state conduct founded on its successful and unique democratic transition and moral standing in the global community.34 In line with the definition of

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 67

67

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 4

state-led transnational norm entrepreneur South Africa leveraged its newly garnered international legitimacy and influence to reframe and redefine its identity as ‘one of the de facto leaders of the African continent’, according to its articulated domestic human rights and democratic norms.35 During Zuma’s decade in power, South Africa suffered from moral degeneration and shifted away from its role as a norm entrepreneur with foreign policy based on human rights. Hence, South Africa’s foreign policy under Zuma was marred by several pitfalls which undermined its commitment to the pursuit of human rights, democracy, justice, and good governance. On the international front, South Africa’s voting behaviour at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) signalled a further departure from its human rights-centred foreign policy, as diplomats either abstained or voted against resolutions geared towards safeguarding human rights in Syria, Iran, and North Korea.36 South Africa’s initial announcement that it would withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC) – after its refusal to detain Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir during his visit to the country in 2015, despite a warrant issued for his arrest by the ICC – was another move that put South Africa on the receiving end of international contempt.37 South Africa has since revoked its original decision to withdraw, after the North Gauteng High Court ruled that the move was unconstitutional.38 At the regional level, Zuma’s decision to strip the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal of its human rights mandate in an effort to protect Zimbabwe – whose land reform programme had violated the SADC Treaty – was an additional stain on South Africa’s human rights record.39 Back at home, events such as the killing of 34 mineworkers by police in August 2012, in what came to be known as the Marikana Massacre; Zuma’s practice of xenophobia denialism in the wake of the 2015 attacks on foreigners; and the increasingly ‘corrupt personalisation of foreign policy’40 (expressed in the politicisation of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation [DIRCO] through the ANC’s policy of cadre deployment) further detracted from South Africa’s regional and global moral standing. While cadre deployment predates the Zuma administration, the growth in corruption and factionalism within the ANC intensified and also changed the nature of cadre deployment to what has been described as ‘faction deployment’ – appointments within government and preferential treatment were given to ANC cadres who fell directly within the pro-Zuma camp.41 All these factors worked together to undermine and undo the image of South Africa as a transnational norm entrepreneur, founded on human rights, justice, good governance, and democratic norms.

68

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 68

2022/11/10 00:03

Since stepping into office, Ramaphosa has had no shortage of chairmanships on key global, continental, and regional multilateral bodies. South Africa chaired SADC in 2018, assumed a seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) between 2019 and 2020, and chaired both the African Union (AU) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in 2020. The sequencing and convergence of South Africa’s chairing of these multilateral bodies certainly emboldened Ramaphosa with ample platforms for norm promotion and placed the country in a unique position to establish greater ties and synergy between global, continental, and regional multilateral bodies. Ramaphosa’s numerous chairmanships have illustrated his capacity as a norm entrepreneur to use various organisational platforms and engage in a mix of policy tools and networks in the global promotion and dissemination of human rights, democratic, justice, and good governance norms. In acting as a transnational norm entrepreneur, Ramaphosa has exploited his various chairmanships as windows of opportunities to promote human rights as well as good governance and democratic rights. Upon assuming a seat as a non-permanent member on the UNSC for 2019–2020, South Africa committed itself to using its position to focus on and further African issues, such as South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Moreover, it sought to solicit a UN–AU partnership to further the AU’s ‘Silencing the Guns’ initiative; it tabled a resolution on women, peace, and security (WPS); and it highlighted conflict mediation.42 South Africa’s first presidency month on the UNSC, which ended on 31 October 2019, showed that it had much more work to do if it was to make inroads in its objectives – particularly in tabling and leading Resolution 2493 on the financing of AU-led peace operations by the UN and on WPS. It was clear, then, that South Africa had to prioritise building greater coordination between the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), the three African members of the UNSC (A3), and the AU, as well as closer and more effective relations between the PSC and the UNSC, if it was to truly realise its African agenda on the UNSC.43 Throughout South Africa’s two-year term, the country combined its ‘institutional memory’ (amassed from its previous two stints on the Council) with its ‘active and proactive public-diplomacy approach’ to pursue its continental obligations.44 South Africa was most vocal when it came to African files, such as the DRC, South Sudan, and Libya, in which it advocated for greater inclusion of the AU within these peace processes. However, South Africa’s willingness to participate wholeheartedly in non-African files during its term on the Council was called in question. For example, it remained mute

THE ART OF RECONCILING POWER AND MORALITY: SOUTH AFRICA’S NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP UNDER CYRIL RAMAPHOSA

REVIVING SOUTH AFRICA’S STATUS AS A TRANSNATIONAL NORM ENTREPRENEUR

on the issue of increasing unimpeded humanitarian access in Syria and did little to promote unity among the elected members (E10) of the UNSC.45

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 69

69

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 4

This suggests that Ramaphosa’s ability to act as a moral entrepreneur may extend only as far as the African continent. Nevertheless, Ramaphosa’s ability to show the AU leaders his dedication to advancing Africa’s agenda on the UNSC stood him in good stead during his 2020 AU chairmanship. Beyond its term on the UNSC, South Africa’s response to the 2022 Russian war in Ukraine has sent a myriad of mixed signals regarding its role as a norm entrepreneur. On the one hand, Ramaphosa has been severely criticised for South Africa’s decision to abstain from voting on three UN resolutions which would see the end of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and its permanent seat on the UNSC and allow for humanitarian access to be provided to Ukraine.46 Ramaphosa’s inaction appears to contradict the conduct of a moral entrepreneur given Russia’s gross violation of human rights and of Ukraine’s sovereignty. At the time of writing, Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, had claimed the lives of 2 345 civilians and seen 12 million people flee their homes in search of safety.47 The question that arises is whether South Africa’s existing trade deals with Russia (which will be discussed below) may have influenced its stance and robbed Ramaphosa of the opportunity to emulate Mandela as a laudable international peacemaker. On the other hand, Ramaphosa has used the war as a chance to call for democratic reform of the UNSC by criticising the Council as ‘outdated and unrepresentative’. He has stated, ‘The conflict has exposed the inability of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to fulfil its mandate of maintaining international peace and security.’ For Ramaphosa, the UNSC largely serves the interests of the permanent members (P5) and, in the context of the Ukrainian war, has allowed them ‘to shape global politics through aggression and other coercive measures like the imposition of unilateral sanctions’.48 In this instance, Ramaphosa has indeed acted as a norm entrepreneur by attempting to drive global normative transformation for the benefit of all states by advocating a more democratic and inclusive UNSC. As chair of the AU in 2020, South Africa’s promotion of human rights, justice, good governance, and democratic norms was interlaced within three thematic areas articulated by Ramaphosa.49 The first theme, titled ‘Silencing the Guns’, was an initiative to end all ‘wars, civil conflicts, genderbased violence, violent conflicts and preventing genocide in the continent by 2020’ in order to create a stable environment conducive to Africa’s socioeconomic development.50 The second theme focused on greater African economic integration through effecting the punctual implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The third theme sought to enhance democratic governance on the continent through the operations of the APRM. Ramaphosa also showed remarkable leadership as AU chair in

70

soliciting a cooperative African response to the global Covid-19 pandemic.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 70

2022/11/10 00:03

and Prevention (Africa CDC) and the private sector in Africa, launched a Covid-19 Response Fund, raising R321 million in financial commitments to finance a coordinated continental strategy to combat the effects of the novel coronavirus in Africa (also see Chapter 10 in this volume).51 The AU Bureau has also proposed an economic stimulus package to assist African economies during and in the aftermath of this crisis period.52 Under the leadership of Ramaphosa, South Africa has made headway in promoting democratic, good governance, justice, and human rights norms at the UN. Departing from its previous position on Myanmar, in December 2018, South Africa reversed its vote in the UNGA in favour of a resolution that would assist in ending the human rights violations experienced by the Rohingya people.53 Both openly at the UN and separately in private bilateral talks, South Africa has condemned the ‘externally imposed regime change efforts’ in Nicaragua, Chile, Bolivia, and Venezuela and called for solutions grounded in democratic principles.54 Ramaphosa’s unveiling of the Mandela statue at the UN in 2018 showcased his efforts at transnational norm entrepreneurship.55 On this occasion Ramaphosa, drawing on one of the main elements of state-led norm entrepreneurship, was able to use the unveiling of the statue as an opportunity to promote human rights and democratic norms by appealing to the UN delegates through their enduring admiration of Mandela. It further served as an opportunity for Ramaphosa to realign, reframe, and revert South Africa’s foreign policy back to its morally acclaimed national identity. This was expressed in Ramaphosa’s speech, in which he referred to Mandela as a ‘symbol of the world’ and commented that ‘this statue will remain a constant reminder to the international community of the dedication of Nelson Mandela to the mission of the United Nations and will be a constant affirmation of South Africa’s commitment to continue to contribute to a better world for all’.56 Ramaphosa’s diplomatic efforts have also been interlaced with South Africa’s pressing economic imperatives. Upon becoming president, Ramaphosa set out to strengthen bilateral relations and expand South Africa’s bilateral trade portfolio by placing a greater focus on building economic partnerships. One of the earlier and most significant events was when South Africa was invited to the 44th Group of 7 (G7) Summit, held on 8–9 June 2018 in Quebec, Canada, following the country’s seven-year-long absence from this economic forum, which consists of some of the most economically powerful countries in the world and their investors.57 Again, Ramaphosa used his invitation to the 45th G7 Summit, held in Biarritz, France, on 24– 26 August 2019, to market South Africa and the continent as a favourable investment

THE ART OF RECONCILING POWER AND MORALITY: SOUTH AFRICA’S NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP UNDER CYRIL RAMAPHOSA

The AU, working together with the Africa Centres for Disease Control

destination by calling upon the world’s leading economies to partner with Africa in exploring economic opportunities that will support the AU’s Agenda

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 71

71

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 4

2063 and Africa’s digital transformation in the wake of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR).58 Ramaphosa’s economic diplomatic efforts at the G7 were complemented by active norm entrepreneurship. He urged the G7 leaders to cooperate in ‘silencing the guns in Africa’ and in eliminating barriers that discriminate against women – two themes that would, as noted above, later form part of his UNSC and AU chairmanships in 2019 and 2020. He also used the opportunity to individually engage and deepen relations with several key leaders, such as UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada, as well as UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, President Sebastian Pinera of Chile, and former Prime Minister of Italy Giuseppe Conte.59 South Africa’s more recent participation at the 47th G7 Summit, held on 11–13 June 2021 in Cornwall, UK, saw Ramaphosa appeal to the developed nations to provide financial assistance to ‘ensure equitable access to tests, treatments, and vaccines in the fight against COVID-19’ for underdeveloped countries. He further encouraged G7 members to ‘support the TRIPS waiver on patents for COVID-19 vaccines’ to increase the production and minimise the cost of vaccine production globally. To this end, Ramaphosa successfully leveraged his role as a transnational norm entrepreneur in soliciting a pledge of 1 billion vaccine doses from the G7 countries over the period of 2021–2022.60 At the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VII), held from 28–30 August 2019, Ramaphosa seized the occasion to engage Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe bilaterally. The two leaders ‘agreed to cooperate in the maritime sector and in the protection of the marine environment; to investigate a possible expansion of access to the Japanese market for South African citrus producers, and the expansion of training programmes for South Africans in both countries’.61 Given that socio-economic development is an inalienable human right, in Ramaphosa’s relations with Japan he has included norm entrepreneurship in trade negotiations. Elsewhere in Asia, Ramaphosa has also deepened ties with China, describing the relationship between Africa and China as having arrived at a ‘golden age’ of mutual cooperation that benefits both equally.62 He silenced arguments equating China’s economic involvement in Africa to ‘new colonialism’ by noting that China ‘wants to open up access to its market for value-added products from Africa’.63 However, South Africa’s trade ties with China arguably undermine its moral foreign policy objectives, given the incidents of racism and discrimination levelled at African people by Chinese people on the continent.64 Ramaphosa should guard against rising too quickly to the defence of China in Africa at the expense of the human rights of those closest to him at home.

72

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 72

2022/11/10 00:03

from 23–24 October 2019. Ramaphosa used the summit as a chance to warm South Africa’s bilateral trade relations with Russia and returned to the continent with a commitment from Russian President Vladimir Putin that Russia would double its trade with Africa over the next five years.65 At the time of writing, in 2022, if South Africa’s abstention from the UN vote on the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine, amidst the onslaught of economic sanctions aimed at Russia, was indeed rooted in preserving its trade interests – as alluded to above – then the country has certainly sided with the ‘underdog’ in the ‘economic and financial war’ between Russia and the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Figures for 2021 indicate that South Africa’s trade with Russia amounted to R15.7 billion, an insignificant amount in comparison with trade with NATO, which totalled R1.131 trillion.66 Nevertheless, siding with its close non-aligned ally China, South Africa is maintaining that the conflict should be resolved through dialogue and peace talks – a somewhat contentious position to take given the loss of life and the fact that Putin does not appear ready to sit at the negotiating table. At the 11th BRICS Summit, held from 13 to 14 November 2019, Ramaphosa stressed the importance of greater BRICS–Africa relations in realising the AfCFTA (also see Chapter 12 in this volume). He noted that the successful implementation of the AfCFTA would open avenues for BRICS investment partners to contribute to infrastructure development on the continent.67 He used this moment to engage in norm entrepreneurship by emphasising that deeper BRICS–Africa relations ‘speak to the promotion of peace and security, advancing industrial capacity and economic integration, and champions a people-centred approach to sustainable development’.68 Here, again, Ramaphosa has espoused a moral foreign policy agenda by promoting justice and good governance norms within economic diplomacy. He achieved this through emphasising the necessity of a people-centred approach, which upholds human rights, to economic development. Ramaphosa has also developed strong bilateral ties with Germany, beginning when he visited the country on 30 October 2018 for the Group of 20 (G20) Investment Summit and the G20 Compact with Africa Conference. There, Ramaphosa met individually with Chancellor Angela Merkel and encouraged greater German investment and bilateral assistance in South Africa. More significantly, at their meeting Merkel agreed to intensify cooperation with South Africa on the UNSC, where both countries would be serving their terms during the period of 2019–2020.69 Ramaphosa’s close bilateral relationship with Europe’s biggest economic power, Germany, has stood South Africa in good stead both politically and economically, and

THE ART OF RECONCILING POWER AND MORALITY: SOUTH AFRICA’S NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP UNDER CYRIL RAMAPHOSA

Another significant event was the first Russia–Africa Summit, held in Sochi

was reaffirmed during Merkel’s visit to Pretoria from 5–7 February 2020. The talks between Merkel and Ramaphosa included topics that ranged from

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 73

73

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 4

‘international, regional, political and economic issues as well as bilateral cooperation in civic and educational areas’.70 Ramaphosa also engaged in strengthening bilateral relations in Africa. In early December 2019, he embarked on a diplomatic tour of West Africa and met with President Alpha Condé of Guinea, President Nana AkufoAddo of Ghana, and President Faure Gnassingbé of Togo. These working visits were geared at promoting increased trade and investment between South Africa and these three countries, given that a number of local firms have a significant footprint in the West African region.71 Among the key South African businesses operating in Ghana are MTN, AngloGold Ashanti, Shoprite, Goldfields, Standard Bank, First National Bank, Barclays/Absa, Multichoice, and South African Airways (SAA).72 Major players based in Guinea and Togo include MTN, WBHO, AngloGold Ashanti, Gateway Africa, Plan Africa Holding Guinea SARL, and UBU Holdings.73 In similar fashion to his appearance at the 2019 G7 Summit, Ramaphosa also used his working visits in West Africa to promote justice and good governance norms in engaging these three presidents on matters of African peace and security. South Africa’s bilateral relations with Israel have not had a similar level of success, following the recall of the South African ambassador in May 2018 and the downgrading of its embassy in Tel Aviv to a liaison office in early 2019. This decision by South Africa came in the aftermath of the death of 52 Palestinian protestors at the hands of the Israeli military on 14 May 2018.74 South Africa’s response to Israel highlights the interplay between domestic politics and the economic and ethical considerations of South Africa’s foreign policy. This bold move by Ramaphosa can be viewed as a bid to garner political support in the lead-up to the May 2019 general elections – given the historical solidarity that South Africa has with Palestine, stemming from the support it received from the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) during its anti-apartheid struggle.75 This further illustrates how Ramaphosa has acted as a norm entrepreneur: by reaffirming South Africa’s principles and the norm of solidarity with Palestine, a norm which is closely associated with Mandela’s legacy.76 South Africa’s condemnation of Israel for its disproportionate use of force against civilian protestors may also be viewed in line with South Africa’s newly reoriented moral foreign policy, which safeguards human rights. However, condemning Israel in this manner, nevertheless, leaves open avenues for trade between the two countries. This is an important economic factor to consider, given that South Africa remains Israel’s largest trade partner in Africa. In keeping with the theme of human rights and justice norms, and turning to the southern African region, there has been much talk of the possibility of Ramaphosa spearheading a revival of the SADC Tribunal. This follows the

74

suspension of the SADC Tribunal in 2014 and the subsequent 2018 ruling

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 74

2022/11/10 00:03

which ordered Ramaphosa to withdraw South Africa’s signature from the 2014 protocol.77 Ramaphosa withdrew South Africa’s signature from the 2014 protocol during the 39th SADC Summit, held in Tanzania on 17–18 August 2019.78 Suggestions have been made that Ramaphosa must leverage his leadership within the region to reinstate the SADC Tribunal along with its original mandate, which grants SADC citizens and residents the right to seek justice from a regional court in the event of human rights violations in their home country.79 Such a step by Ramaphosa would undoubtedly be met with hostility and resistance from the SADC leaders – all of whom were in favour of and signatories to the 2014 protocol. If Ramaphosa managed to challenge and persuade the remaining SADC leaders to withdraw their country’s signatures from the 2014 protocol and support a reopening of the tribunal, this would be reminiscent of Mandela’s boldness in confronting African dictators in the defence of human rights and democracy on the African continent. If Ramaphosa were to be successful in driving the reinstatement of the SADC Tribunal, it would signal a victory for regional human rights and justice, and give credence to South Africa’s role as an effective transnational norm entrepreneur in the region. Also within the region, the controversial outcome of the DRC’s elections on 30 December 2018 presented an opportune moment for Ramaphosa to promote democratic norms and confront the prevalence of electoral fraud in the region and on the continent. However, despite overwhelming criticism of the fairness of the elections – from the UK, France, the AU, and SADC (who initially called for a recount, but subsequently asked the international community to respect the electoral outcome and sovereignty of the DRC), as well as from DRC opposition supporters – Ramaphosa recognised the electoral outcome as credible by congratulating the winner, Félix Tshisekedi.80 While Ramaphosa in his own personal capacity has no commercial ties to the DRC, former President Zuma’s nephew, Khulubuse Zuma, owns DRC mining concessions.81 Commentators have suggested that this move by Ramaphosa was not grounded in economic motives, but rather driven by the need to unite the ANC by bringing the pro-Zuma faction closer within the fold.82 If this is accurate, Ramaphosa effectively sacrificed an opportunity for crucial norm entrepreneurship within the region in favour of entrenching his political power at home. While Ramaphosa may have missed an opportunity for norm entrepreneurship in the DRC, he did play a crucial role as SADC facilitator for reform in brokering an agreement to create the statutory National Reforms Authority in Lesotho in July 2019. In so doing, Ramaphosa demonstrated,

THE ART OF RECONCILING POWER AND MORALITY: SOUTH AFRICA’S NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP UNDER CYRIL RAMAPHOSA

by South Africa’s High Court, upheld on appeal by the Constitutional Court,

in part, his commitment to peace, security, and stability in the southern African region. Unfortunately, the same level of dedication was not extended

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 75

75

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 4

to South Africa’s neighbour, Zimbabwe, whose economy and government is currently in crisis. Having refused the R1.2 billion requested by Zimbabwe in 2018, Ramaphosa went further to announce the termination of the Zimbabwean Exemption Permit (ZEP) by December 2022.83 This move by Ramaphosa can be viewed as an effort to lessen the strain that Zimbabwean migrants place on the South African government – lest an influx of refugees into South Africa, following the reopening of its borders in February 2021, spurs on another wave of uncontrollable xenophobic violence.84 While Ramaphosa may indeed be acting in the best interests of South Africa, his unwillingness to assist in tackling Zimbabwe’s political and economic woes calls into question his role as a transnational norm entrepreneur. The credibility of South Africa and its ability to truly assume the role of a transnational norm entrepreneur depend on its ability to uphold and safeguard human rights – particularly those of the most vulnerable groups in society – in the context of the global Covid-19 pandemic. Indeed, Ramaphosa’s response to the pandemic in South Africa has been a true test of his moral leadership. South Africa has been praised for its ‘ruthlessly efficient fight against the coronavirus’.85 Ramaphosa has been internationally commended for showing ‘formidable leadership’ by decisively ushering in one of the most stringent 21-day national lockdowns worldwide, beginning on 26 March 2020.86 Following the worsening of the pandemic, Ramaphosa was further commended for his decision on 9 April 2020 to extend the initial lockdown period for a further 14 days and for formulating a Covid-19 response which reconciles human rights and economic imperatives by prioritising ‘both lives and livelihoods’ (also see Chapter 10 in this volume).87 Upon closer inspection, the South African government’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic has arguably leaned more towards ruthlessness than efficiency: There have been reports that members of the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) acted unconstitutionally while enforcing the regulations, by inflicting violence, torture, and excessive force on civilians.88 In June 2020, reports emerged of deaths as a consequence of armed forces and police brutality during the lockdown period – which stood in stark contrast to the seven recorded deaths from Covid-19 at the time.89 The number of civilian deaths at the hands of police and the military rose to nine on 10 April 2020, following allegations that a 40-year-old man was beaten to death by a soldier in the Alexandra township. The figures from June 2020 saw the total number of civilians killed by police rising to 10.90 The number of complaints of gender-based violence also rapidly increased during the lockdown period in South Africa, with a total of 2 300 registered complaints and 148 suspects

76

charged between 27 and 31 March 2020.91 The poor treatment of homeless

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 76

2022/11/10 00:03

African government. Homeless people from Cape Town, for example, were gathered and housed in tents at the Strandfontein sports ground for the duration of the national lockdown, where they lived in squalid conditions resembling a ‘concentration camp’, not conducive to proper social distancing and with little to no basic amenities.92 Concerns have also been raised about the need for greater inclusion of foreign migrants and refugees in South Africa’s response to Covid-19.93 South Africa, being a regional migration hub, is home to approximately 4.2 million migrants from neighbouring countries, many of whom are irregular in terms of documentation status, have poor knowledge of their health rights, and may be reluctant to seek out medical attention from the state in the event that they display symptoms of Covid-19.94 Traces of xenophobia have also been noticeable in the government’s discriminatory treatment of immigrant-owned ‘spaza’ shops. Police effectively shut down the operations of all immigrant-owned spaza shops in townships following a statement by Minister of Small Business Development Khumbudzo Ntshavheni that only spaza shops owned by South Africans would be allowed to conduct trade during the period of national lockdown.95 Likewise, the government’s Covid-19 response has discriminated against immigrants employed in the informal sector and those who own small, medium, and micro enterprises (SMMEs), as on the basis of their citizenship, they are not eligible to receive relief packages from the state.96 Elements of xenophobia displayed in the South African government’s domestic response to Covid-19 detract from any gains that it makes in its African and moral foreign policy.97 In urging the South African government to safeguard the human rights of vulnerable groups during the Covid-19 pandemic by adopting a more rights-centred approach, Dewa Mavhinga, southern Africa director at Human Rights Watch, noted, ‘The challenges of this crisis are no reason to diminish protection of fundamental rights.’98 On 4 April 2022, South Africa’s National State of Disaster, which had been in place since the initial outbreak of Covid-19 in March 2020, was lifted. This followed the roll-out of vaccinations, through which 33.3 per cent of the population had been fully vaccinated.99 Yet, the lifting of the national state of disaster has shown that Ramaphosa has struggled to effectively prioritise both ‘lives and livelihoods’ in his Covid-19 response. Covid-19 has certainly exacerbated South Africa’s already high unemployment, poverty, and inequality rates – a trend which the government has had little success in reversing. Between January 2020 and January 2022, South Africa’s unemployment rate rose from 29.1 to 35.3 per cent.100 Unemployment is most

THE ART OF RECONCILING POWER AND MORALITY: SOUTH AFRICA’S NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP UNDER CYRIL RAMAPHOSA

people during the 21-day lockdown has also generated criticism of the South

pronounced among South Africa’s youth (between the ages of 15 and 24), recorded at 66.5 per cent.101 Figures from the UN’s 2020 Human Development

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 77

77

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 4

Report (HDR) show that 18.9 per cent of the population – which roughly translates to 11 million people – live on less than US$1.90 a day (or R28 a day and approximately R800 per month).102 Compounding these figures is pervasive inequality. South Africa continues to be characterised by a dual economy in which wealth is concentrated within the minority white population. It remains one of the most unequal countries in the world, with a consumption expenditure Gini coefficient of 0.67, last recorded in 2018.103

CONCLUSION This chapter’s account of Ramaphosa has revealed the seemingly discreet yet critical role of soft power and passive moral norm promotion as a function of economic statecraft. The above analysis of Ramaphosa’s engagement with norm entrepreneurship and ethical foreign policy has illustrated his ability to pursue economic diplomacy which is embedded in a strong normative construct of human and democratic rights. Since assuming office, Ramaphosa has made great strides in reclaiming South Africa’s status as a norm entrepreneur, while simultaneously pursuing the country’s economic agenda. He has exploited many a multilateral and bilateral forum in his pursuit of economic diplomacy softened by provocative moral norm promotion. He also sought to harness greater institutional capacity to realise his development, human rights, governance, and peace and security objectives by striving to form partnerships between multilateral institutions which connect Africa with the world. While Ramaphosa’s foreign policy has suffered from shortcomings in that it has arguably been constrained by internal party considerations and has at times been mute on non-African issues, his diplomatic activity has shown the persuasive pull which morality as a strategy exercises in the pursuit of national interests. Moreover, the early years of his tenure have proven that there exists no dichotomy between ethical foreign policy and the economic prerequisites for inclusive socio-economic development. Human-centred and inclusive socioeconomic development embraces democratic and human rights norms to form a virtuous cycle.  On a final note, while much of the world, and indeed South Africa’s political landscape, has dramatically changed since the country’s democratic transition in 1994, our heralded 1996 Constitution has not – it continues to enshrine the same human rights and liberal democratic norms and values today as it did upon the advent of our democracy. More importantly, Chapter 5 of the Constitution confers the same sweeping presidential powers to 78

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 78

2022/11/10 00:03

Mandela in 1996. Ramaphosa is well equipped, perfectly positioned, and, in the wake of a global pandemic, ongoing intractable conflicts, and the global crisis of democracy, needed now more than ever to re-light and carry the torch for human rights and liberal democratic norms, on the African continent and around the world. Ramaphosa’s ability to equally safeguard the human rights of the most vulnerable at home, on the continent, and the world at large will be the ultimate litmus test in determining whether he is a sincere moral entrepreneur and not, in fact, a dishonest salesperson.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1 Louw-Vaudran, L. 2016. ‘Is South Africa a norm entrepreneur in Africa?’ Policy Brief 94. Pretoria: ISS. 2 Landsberg, C. 2018. ‘The domestic imperatives of South Africa’s foreign policy.’ In Foreign Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Security, Diplomacy and Trade, edited by A. Adebajo and K. Virk. New York: I. B. Tauris. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350986480. ch-001. 3 Louw-Vaudran, ‘Is South Africa a norm entrepreneur in Africa?’. 4 Amusan, L. 2018. ‘An adventure into twenty years of South Africa’s post-apartheid national interest.’ Journal of African Foreign Affairs 5(3): 87–102, p. 88; Ramaphosa, C. 2018. ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa: 2018 State of the Nation Address.’ https://www.gov. za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2018-state-nation-address-16-feb-2018-0000 (Accessed 10 May 2022). 5 Domiro, N. 2019. ‘South African foreign policy under the Ramaphosa government.’ Future Directions International, 28 May, p. 3. http://www.futuredirections.org.au/ publication/south-african-foreign-policy-under-the-ramaphosa-government/ (Accessed 17 July 2020). 6 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. 1998. ‘International norm dynamics and political change.’ International Organization 52(4): 887–917, p. 891. https://doi.org/10.1162/ 002081898550789. 7 Florini, A. 1996. ‘Evolution of international norms.’ International Studies Quarterly 40(3): 363–389, p. 365. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600716. 8 Björkdahl, A. 2002. ‘Norms in international relations: Some conceptual and methodological reflections.’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 15(1): 9–23, p. 15. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570220126216. 9 Risse, T. and Ropp, S. C. 1999. ‘International human rights norms and domestic change: Conclusions.’ In The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, edited by T. Risse, S. C. Ropp, and K. Sikkink. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 236. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511598777. 10 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, p. 893. 11 Geldenhuys, D. 2008. ‘South Africa’s international norm entrepreneurship.’ Acta Academia 40(2): 1–27.

THE ART OF RECONCILING POWER AND MORALITY: SOUTH AFRICA’S NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP UNDER CYRIL RAMAPHOSA

bring effective moral leadership on Ramaphosa today as it bestowed upon

79

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 79

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 4

12 Risse, T. and Sikkink, K. 1999. ‘The socialization of human rights norms into domestic practices: Introduction.’ In The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, edited by T. Risse, S. C. Ropp, and K. Sikkink. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511598777. 13 Davies, S. E. and True, J. 2017. ‘Norm entrepreneurship in foreign policy: William Hague and the prevention of sexual violence in conflict.’ Foreign Policy Analysis 13(3): 701–720, p. 701. https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orw065. 14 Davies and True, ‘Norm entrepreneurship in foreign policy’. 15 Snyder, J. 2004. ‘One world, rival theories.’ Foreign Policy 145 (Nov.–Dec.): 52–62, p. 59. https://doi.org/10.2307/4152944. 16 Snyder, ‘One world, rival theories’, p. 60. 17 Carlsnaes, W. 2008. ‘Actors, structures, and foreign policy analysis.’ In Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, edited by S. Smith, A. Hadfied, and T. Dunne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 93. 18 Snyder, ‘One world, rival theories’. 19 Snyder, ‘One world, rival theories’, p. 60. 20 Hoffman, J. A. 2003. ‘Reconstructing Diplomacy.’ The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 5(4): 525–542. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-856X.00118. 21 March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. 1998. ‘The institutional dynamics of international political orders.’InternationalOrganization52(4):943–969.https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550699. 22 Barkin, S. 2009. ‘Realism, constructivism, and international relations theory.’ APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, p. 2. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1451682 (Accessed 30 April 2022.) 23 Carr, E. H. 1939. The Twenty Years’ Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. New York: Harper and Row, p. 235. 24 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 97. 25 Karayiannis, A. D. and Hatzis, A. N. 2007. ‘Morality, social norms and the rule of law as transaction cost-saving devices: The case of ancient Athens.’ European Journal of Law and Economics 33(3): 621–643. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1000749. 26 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, p. 892. 27 Kertzer, J. D., Powers, K. E., Rathbun, B. C. and Iyer, R. ‘Moral support: How moral values shape foreign policy attitudes.’ The Journal of Politics 76(3): 1–16. 28 Nye, J. 2019. ‘What is moral foreign policy?’ Texas National Security Review 3(1): 96–108. 29 Nye, ‘What is moral foreign policy’, p. 98. 30 Jonker, D. 2020. ‘Darias Jonker: South Africa’s foreign policy priorities adrift in a new world order.’ News24, 10 May. https://www.news24.com/news24/Analysis/dariasjonker-south-africas-foreign-policy-priorities-adrift-in-a-new-world-order-20200507 (Accessed 30 April 2022). 31 Hamill, J. 2019. ‘The reality of South Africa’s foreign policy under Ramaphosa.’ IISS, 8 February. https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/02/south-africa-foreign-policyramaphosa (Accessed 30 April 2022). 32 Hamill, ‘The reality of South Africa’s foreign policy under Ramaphosa’. 33 Van Nieuwkerk, A. 2012. ‘A review of South Africa’s peace diplomacy since 1994.’ In South African Foreign Policy Review, Volume 1, edited by C. Landsberg and J.-A. van Wyk. Pretoria: AISA and IGD, pp. 86, 97.

80

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 80

2022/11/10 00:03

35 Alden and Le Pere, ‘South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy’, p. 283. 36 Calland, R. and Temin, J. 2018. ‘Can South Africa return to the global stage?’ CSIS, 17 December. https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-south-africa-return-global-stage (Accessed 10 May 2022). 37 Calland and Temin, ‘Can South Africa return to the global stage?’. 38 BBC. 2017. ‘South Africa revokes ICC withdrawal after court ruling.’ 8 March. https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39204035#:~:text=South%20Africa%20has%20 revoked%20its,ICC%20pursued%20%22regime%20change%22 (Accessed 30 April 2022). 39 Fabricius, P. 2019. ‘Will South Africa fight for the SADC Tribunal’s revival?’ Daily Maverick, 6 September. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-09-06-willsouth-africa-fight-for-the-sadc-tribunals-revival/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 40 ‘The unwinding of South Africa’s foreign policy.’ 2017. Strategic Comments 23(8): i–ii. https://doi.org/10.1080/13567888.2017.1378018. 41 Makgoale, O. 2020. ‘It’s ANC faction deployment, not cadre deployment.’ City Press, 29 January. https://www.news24.com/citypress/voices/its-anc-faction-deployment-notcadre-deployment-20200124 (Accessed 30 April 2022). 42 De Carvalho, G. and Singh, P. 2019. ‘SA ends its first big act on the UNSC.’ ISS, 29 October. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/sa-ends-its-first-big-act-on-the-unsecurity-council (Accessed 30 April 2022). 43 De Carvalho and Singh, ‘SA ends its first big act on the UNSC’. 44 De Carvalho, G. and Singh, P. 2021. ‘Lessons from South Africa’s term to the UN Security Council.’ https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/lessons-south-africas-termun-security-council (Accessed 10 May 2022). 45 De Carvalho and Singh, ‘Lessons from South Africa’s term’. 46 Nathan, L. 2022. ‘Russia’s War in Ukraine: How South Africa blew its chances as a credible mediator.’ The Conversation, 13 April. https://theconversation.com/russias-warin-ukraine-how-south-africa-blew-its-chance-as-a-credible-mediator-181101 (Accessed 10 May 2022). 47 BBC News. 2022. ‘Ukraine War: 60 people killed after bomb hits school, Zelensky says.’ 8 May. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61369229 (Accessed 10 May 2022). 48 The Africa Report. 2022. ‘South Africa’s Ramaphosa criticised over Ukraine, slams “outdated” UN body.’ 7 April. https://www.theafricareport.com/192257/south-africasramaphosa-criticised-on-ukraine-slams-outdated-un-body/ (Accessed 10 May 2022). 49 Phaswana,F.2020.‘StrategicchoicesforSouthAfrica’sleadershipin2020.’SAIIA,21February. https://saiia.org.za/research/strategic-choices-for-south-africa-as-it-enters-2020/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 50 AU (African Union). 2020. ‘Silencing the Guns.’ https://au.int/en/flagships/silencingguns-2020 (Accessed 30 April 2022). 51 Mvumvu, Z. 2020. ‘Ramaphosa impressed by Africa’s response to Covid-19 pandemic.’ Sunday Times, 6 April. https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2020-04-06-ramaphosaimpressed-by-africas-response-to-covid-19-pandemic/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 52 Mvumzu, ‘Ramaphosa impressed by Africa’s response’.

THE ART OF RECONCILING POWER AND MORALITY: SOUTH AFRICA’S NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP UNDER CYRIL RAMAPHOSA

34 Alden, C. and Le Pere, G. 2004. ‘South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy: From reconciliation to ambiguity?’ Review of African Political Economy 31(100): 283–297. https://doi.org/10.1080/0305624042000262293.

81

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 81

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 4

53 Sisulu, L. 2019. ‘Keynote Address by L. N. Sisulu, MP, Minister of International Affairs and Cooperation to the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Johannesburg, 3 April 2019.’ DIRCO. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2019/ sisu0403.htm (Accessed 30 April 2022). 54 Pandor, N. 2019. ‘SA foreign policy drawn from principles of human rights.’ Sowetan, 4 December. https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2019-12-04-sa-foreignpolicy-drawn-from-principles-of-human-rights/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 55 Mothata, W. 2018. ‘President Ramaphosa unveils Mandela statue at the UN.’ SABC, 24 September. https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/president-ramaphosa-unveilsmandela-statue-at-un/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 56 Mothata, ‘President Ramaphosa unveils Mandela statue at the UN’. 57 CNBC Africa. 2018. ‘The significance of SA’s invite to the G7 Summit.’ 7 June. https:// www.cnbcafrica.com/videos/2018/06/07/the-significance-of-sas-invite-to-the-g7summit/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 58 South African Government News Agency. 2019. ‘President Ramaphosa urges G7 to partner with Africa.’ 27 August. https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/presidentramaphosa-urges-g7-partner-africa (Accessed 30 April 2022). 59 SA Government News Agency, ‘President Ramaphosa urges G7 to partner with Africa’. 60 Reuters. 2021. ‘S. Africa’s President Ramaphosa urges G7 nations to plug COVID-19 funding gap.’ 13 June. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/safricas-presidentramaphosa-urges-g7-nations-plug-covid-19-funding-gap-2021-06-13/ (Accessed 10 May 2022). 61 DIRCO. 2019. ‘President Ramaphosa departs TICAD VII after successful working visit to Japan.’ 29 August. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2019/ticad0830.htm (Accessed 30 April 2022). 62 Africanews. 2018. ‘Africa–China relations “Golden Age” – Ramaphosa.’ 6 September. https://www.africanews.com/2018/09/06/china-africa-relations-enters-golden-ageramaphosa// (Accessed 30 April 2022). 63 Africanews, ‘Africa–China relations “Golden Age” – Ramaphosa’. 64 Nagar, M. 2020. ‘A historical political economy approach to Africa’s economic development: A critique of Mkandawire’s interests and incentives, ideas, and institutions.’ In The Palgrave Handbook on Africa’s Political Economy, edited by S. Oloruntoba and T. Falola. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-3-030-38922-2_12. 65 Poonia, N. 2019. ‘Ramaphosa welcomes Russia’s commitment to double trade with Africa.’ SABC, 23 October. https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/ramaphosa-welcomesrussias-commitment-to-double-trade-with-africa/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 66 De Wet, P. 2022. ‘If SA is taking sides in an economic war, it has chosen R16 billion over R1.131 trillion.’ Business Insider, 4 March. https://www.businessinsider.co.za/south-africaschoice-in-the-russian-economic-war-vs-trade-volume-2022-3 (Accessed 11 May 2022). 67 The South African. 2019. ‘BRICS: Ramaphosa hopes AfCFTA will be revolutionary for Africa’s investment future.’ 14 November. https://www.thesouthafrican.com/ news/brics-ramaphosa-what-is-afcfta-revolutionary-africa-investment-future/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 68 The South African, ‘BRICS: Ramaphosa hopes AfCFTA will be revolutionary’.

82

69 DIRCO. 2018. ‘President Ramaphosa concludes a successful visit to Germany.’ 31 October. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2018/germ1031.htm (Accessed 30 April 2022).

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 82

2022/11/10 00:03

71 Omondi, J. 2019. ‘President Ramaphosa embarks on a tour of West Africa.’ CGTN, 4 December. https://africa.cgtn.com/2019/12/04/president-ramaphosa-embarks-on-atour-of-west-africa/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 72 Patel, R. 2019. ‘Ramaphosa on three-nation West African tour.’ Inside Politics, 4 December. https://insidepolitic.co.za/ramaphosa-on-three-nation-west-african-tour/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 73 Patel, ‘Ramaphosa on three-nation West African tour’. 74 Oneko, S. and Schwikowski, M. 2019. ‘Israel and South Africa: A “downgraded” relationship?’ Mail & Guardian, 9 April. https://mg.co.za/article/2019-04-09-israel-andsouth-africa-a-downgraded-relationship/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 75 Oneko and Schwikowski, ‘Israel and South Africa’. 76 Abo Rezeg, A. 2019. ‘South Africa’s “model” for Palestine: Mandela grandson.’ 29 April. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/south-africa-model-for-palestinians-mandelagrandson/1465023 (Accessed 30 April 2022). 77 Fabricius, ‘Will South Africa fight for the SADC Tribunal’s revival?’. 78 Phooko, M. R. and Nyathi, M. 2019. ‘The revival of the SADC Tribunal by South African courts: A contextual analysis of the decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa.’ De Jure Law Journal 52(1): 415–432. https://doi.org/10.17159/2225-7160/2019/v52a21. 79 Fabricius, ‘Will South Africa fight for the SADC Tribunal’s revival?’. 80 Hamill, ‘The reality of South Africa’s foreign policy’; Salihu, N. 2019. ‘Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.’ Accord, 2 September. https://www.accord.org.za/ conflict-trends/elections-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 81 Allison, S. 2018. ‘Can southern Africa save the DRC?’ Mail & Guardian, 13 April. https://mg.co.za/article/2018-04-13-00-can-southern-africa-save-the-drc/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 82 Allison, ‘Can southern Africa save the DRC?’. 83 Mhaka, T. 2022. ‘It’s time for the SADC region to hold Zimbabwe to account.’ Al Jazeera, 19 January. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/1/19/sadc-cannot-continue-toignore-zanu-pfs-many-failings (Accessed 12 May 2022). 84 Fabricius, P. 2019. ‘Mboweni: South Africa plans to help bail out Zimbabwe.’ Daily Maverick, 21 January. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-01-21-mbowenisouth-africa-plans-to-help-bail-out-zimbabwe/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 85 Harding, A. 2019. ‘South Africa’s ruthlessly efficient fight against coronavirus.’ BBC, 3 April. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52125713 (Accessed 30 April 2022). 86 Harding, ‘South Africa’s ruthlessly efficient fight against coronavirus’. 87 Ramaphosa, C. 2020. ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa: Extension of the Coronavirus COVID-19 lockdown to the end of April.’ The Presidency, 9 April. https://www.gov.za/ speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-extension-coronavirus-covid-19-lockdown-endapril-9-apr-2020-0000 (Accessed 30 April 2022). 88 Maughan, K. 2020. ‘Ramaphosa defends police and SANDF in Covid-19 crackdown.’ Business Live, 3 April. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2020-04-03ramaphosa-defends-police-and-sandf-in-covid-19-crackdown/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 89 Maughan, ‘Ramaphosa defends police and SANDF in Covid-19 crackdown’.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 83

THE ART OF RECONCILING POWER AND MORALITY: SOUTH AFRICA’S NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP UNDER CYRIL RAMAPHOSA

70 Fabricius, P. 2020. ‘Economic power in Pretoria: Merkel and Ramaphosa meet.’ Daily Maverick, 6 February. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-02-06-economicpower-in-pretoria-merkel-and-ramaphosa-meet/ (Accessed 30 April 2022).

83

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 4

90 Trippe, K. 2020. ‘Pandemic policing: South Africa’s most vulnerable face a sharp increase in police-related brutality.’ Atlantic Council, 24 June. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ blogs/africasource/pandemic-policing-south-africas-most-vulnerable-face-a-sharpincrease-in-police-related-brutality/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 91 Human Rights Watch. 2020. ‘South Africa: Set rights-centered COVID-19 measures.’ 7 April. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/07/south-africa-set-rights-centered-covid19-measures (Accessed 30 April 2022). 92 Nowicki, N. and Stent, J. 2020. ‘Covid-19: Police use rubber bullets to stop homeless people leaving camp.’ GroundUp, 7 April. https://www.groundup.org.za/article/covid-19police-use-rubber-bullets-quell-riot-cape-town-homeless-camp/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 93 Mbiyozo, A.-N. 2020. ‘Covid-19 responses in Africa must include migrants and refugees.’ Daily Maverick, 8 April. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-04-08-covid-19responses-in-africa-must-include-migrants-and-refugees/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 94 Mbiyozo, ‘Covid-19 responses in Africa must include migrants and refugees’. 95 GroundUp. 2020. ‘Covid-19 xenophobia alert: Police shut immigrant-owned spaza shops after Minister’s statement.’ Daily Maverick, 27 March. https://www.dailymaverick. co.za/article/2020-03-27-covid-19-xenophobia-alert-police-shut-immigrant-ownedspaza-shops-after-ministers-statement/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 96 Ramalekana, N. and Fredman, S. 2020. ‘Government SME relief package unfairly discriminates against non-citizens.’ Daily Maverick, 2 April. https://www. dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-04-02-government-sme-relief-package-unfairlydiscriminates-against-non-citizens/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 97 Lalbahadur, A. 2020. ‘COVID-19’s impact on South Africa’s relations with Africa.’ SAIIA, 2 October. https://saiia.org.za/research/covid-19s-impact-on-south-africas-relationswith-africa/ (Accessed 30 April 2022). 98 Human Rights Watch, ‘Set rights-centered COVID-19 measures’. 99 Our World in Data. 2022. ‘Coronavirus (COVID-19) vaccinations.’ https://ourworldindata. org/covid-vaccinations?country=ZAF (Accessed 12 May 2022). 100 Trading Economics. 2022. ‘South Africa Unemployment Rate.’ https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate (Accessed 12 May 2022). 101 World Bank. 2022. ‘The World Bank in South Africa.’ https://www.worldbank.org/en/ country/southafrica/overview#1 (Accessed 12 May 2022). 102 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2020. ‘Human Development Reports: South Africa.’ http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ZAF (Accessed 12 May 2022). 103 World Bank. 2022. ‘The World Bank in South Africa’.

84

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 84

2022/11/10 00:03

Constructing the New Dawn: Architecture, Actors, and Instruments in South African PARTForeign 2 Policy

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 85

2022/11/10 00:03

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 86

2022/11/10 00:03

Natalie Leibrandt-Loxton

CHAPTER 5

Parliament and International Agreements: A Systems Perspective on Foreign Policy Oversight

INTRODUCTION President Cyril Ramaphosa first addressed the South African Parliament as the country’s head of state on 16 February 2018, after being elected to complete former President Jacob Zuma’s term following the latter’s resignation.1 While this transition transpired during the fifth Parliament, Ramaphosa was re-elected following the country’s 2019 national and provincial elections, which culminated in the establishment of the sixth Parliament.2 During his first address, he associated his tenure with a ‘New Dawn’ that would leave behind ‘the era of diminishing trust in public institutions and weakened confidence in our country’s leaders’. He vowed to fight corruption in the public and private sectors and boost the economy through sourcing new domestic and foreign investment worth US$ 100 billion (R1.2 trillion).3 As the arm of state constitutionally mandated to oversee executive action – and, by extension, to ensure that government’s domestic and foreign policies are implemented as intended – the sixth Parliament has a key role to play in realising this vision. Parliament will need to showcase its commitment to ‘strengthening oversight and accountability’, as stipulated in its Strategic Plan for Parliament 2019 to 2024.4 This is significant when considering revelations concerning its oversight shortcomings during previous administrations.5 Realising the ‘New Dawn’ will require a Parliament that conducts strong oversight to boost investor confidence among both local and foreign sources. Concerning the latter, the sixth Parliament must improve its oversight over the executive’s pursuit of South Africa’s foreign policy objectives, notably regarding the negotiation and implementation of international agreements concluded with foreign investment partners. As stated by the chairperson of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), Mr Amos Masondo, member of Parliament (MP), during Parliament’s 2019 Budget Vote debate, Parliament must afford international agreements the same priority as domestic legislation, both prior and after ratification.6 Parliament can do this in two distinct yet interlinked ways. The first is through the committee system, pre and post ratification, in line with Parliament’s traditional involvement in international relations. The second is through the various manifestations of parliamentary diplomacy

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 87

87

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 5

that assist MPs in executing their domestic constitutional mandates on issues that are of common concern internationally.7 While the link between these approaches has been established,8 evidence of how these approaches have been coordinated to enhance Parliament’s oversight over international agreements is limited. This chapter therefore aims to explore this coordination and interrogate how information-sharing between Parliament’s committees and delegations can be improved to enhance its oversight of international agreements. This question emanates from the rationale that improved information-sharing will lead to enhanced foreign policy oversight, thus serving as a key stimulant for boosting South Africa’s credibility among foreign partners as a favourable investment destination. To this end, Parliament’s engagement with the Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the SADC EPA States, of the other part (henceforth the SADC-EPA) during the fifth Parliament is used as a case study. This agreement was selected due to Parliament’s engagement with it through the committee system and through parliamentary diplomacy. The analysis is based on data generated from available and relevant committee and delegation reports, with supplementary insights from parliamentary officials. The chapter, firstly, reflects on the link between the work of committees and delegations concerning international agreements, establishing both as key information sources and illustrating the need for information-sharing between them. This is followed by a discussion on general systems theory (GST) as the analytical framework used to ascertain Parliament’s current rules, policies, structures, and procedures – that is, its system – related to international agreements. Parliament’s practical engagement with the SADC-EPA is then explored to assess the functioning of the system in practice. The chapter concludes with findings and recommendations for Parliament to consider during the Ramaphosa administration and beyond.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES AND DELEGATIONS: THE NEED FOR INFORMATION-SHARING Scholars and practitioners of international relations agree that foreign policy remains dominated by the executive branch, with limited involvement by legislatures.9 The executive negotiates and concludes international agreements on a wide range of policy questions, such as immigration, health, trade, human rights issues, and environmental concerns, previously decided upon domestically. On the other hand, parliaments traditionally approve these agreements for ratification and oversee their post-ratification 88

implementation.10 As the Covid-19 pandemic and international vaccine

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 88

2022/11/10 00:03

consequences for constituencies and citizens, who, thanks to higher education levels and increased access to information, are taking a keen interest in international questions and foreign affairs.11 As their elected representatives, MPs are therefore increasingly expected to approach their national mandates from a global point of view. This requires them to bring domestic, regional, and international politics together, regardless of which policy areas they engage with.12 In respect of international agreements, this means robust parliamentary oversight over the executive both pre and post ratification to avoid perceptions of a rubber-stamping role for legislatures.13 Parliaments have a range of oversight tools at their disposal: ‘(i) committees and special commissions of inquiry; (ii) review of appointments and power to censure/impeach/dismiss; (iii) chamber proceedings; questions and interpellations; and (iv) chamber, or plenary, debates’.14 These may entail activities such as tabling motions for debate, adopting resolutions, considering recommendations and reports, conducting committee hearings, and exercising control over the budgets of government departments.15 These activities enable parliaments to ensure the implementation of policies, as developed by government and approved by Parliament. They also assist in enhancing transparency in government processes to improve policy delivery and bolster public trust.16 Oversight tools are applied to all policy areas, including foreign policy. Parliaments, particularly those in parliamentary systems such as the one found in South Africa, are therefore able to influence foreign policy in indirect ways. This indirect influence is often underestimated.17 Sections 42(3), 55(2), 56, and 69 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provide for Parliament’s oversight mandate over executive action, while Section 231(2) articulates its role in respect of international agreements.18 Combined, they provide the constitutional basis for parliamentary oversight over government action concerning international agreements. In practice, however, some challenges have been observed. These include the constrained role of the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation (PCIRC) of the National Assembly (NA) in the approval of agreements, and the executive’s lack of accountability to it. Other challenges are the NCOP’s deferring of foreign policy making to the executive, and the lack of foreign policy oversight on the part of the NCOP’s

PARLIAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON FOREIGN POLICY OVERSIGHT

negotiations have shown, many of these agreements have direct, tangible

Select Committee on Trade and International Relations (SCTIR) due to the ruling-party majority.19 Two reasons have been suggested for this scenario. Firstly, the lack of understanding – on the part of both the executive and the legislature – of Parliament’s oversight role concerning international agreements has, in turn, limited the latter’s efforts to develop the necessary institutional capacity for it.20 Parliament’s Oversight and Accountability Model, for

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 89

89

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 5

instance, recommends the development of an oversight mechanism for international agreements, but does not provide details on the necessary modalities.21 Secondly, both Ahmed and Hudson ascribe Parliament’s reduced role to a lack of political will; Parliament appears to willingly accept its exclusion from foreign policy decisionmaking, notwithstanding its constitutional powers in this respect. This is due to ‘its self-image as an overseer of executive action on the one hand, and as an enabler of executive action on the other’.23 Some of the remedial recommendations proposed by scholars include (a) the establishment of a dedicated committee on international agreements to scrutinise all agreements before approval; (b) MPs keeping themselves informed of negotiations and using the oversight tools at their disposal; (c) Parliament implementing a more complex oversight model; and (d) MPs accompanying ministers to negotiations.24 Ahmed also proposes preratification collaboration between the two branches, led by the executive.25 This is to ensure one central point for international engagement as well as accountable foreign policy decision-making. Monnakgotla, on the other hand, emphasises that Parliament cannot play the dual role of negotiator and overseer.26 In other words, MPs cannot form part of executive-led negotiating teams while mandated to oversee the executive’s implementation of the same agreements they contributed to and approved. Of significance to this discussion, however, is the agreement among scholars that MPs should keep abreast of issues on the international agenda to enhance Parliament’s constitutionally embedded oversight role.27 In this respect, parliamentary diplomacy can assist. Parliamentary diplomacy refers to individual or collective actions by MPs aimed at ‘catalyzing, facilitating and strengthening the existing constitutional functions of parliaments through dialogues between peers on countless open policy questions across continents and levels of governance’.28 These exchanges enable parliaments to share knowledge and experiences in order to strengthen the execution of their domestic legal mandates, such as law-making and oversight of the executive branch. These dialogues occur in various forms through bilateral and multilateral engagements, including regular parliamentary exchanges aimed at knowledge-sharing and conflict resolution; receiving and sending parliamentary delegations; election observation to promote democracy; and administrative and technical cooperation between parliamentary administrations.29 There have also been discussions between South African MPs and representatives of foreign executive branches to enhance economic cooperation between their countries through parliamentary involvement.30 This increasing international agency of Parliament can boost its oversight

90

of international agreements through the information that its diplomatic

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 90

2022/11/10 00:03

traditional parliamentary oversight processes and that of parliamentary diplomacy,31 echoing what Redei views as ‘the mutual reinforcement of parliamentary oversight and parliamentary diplomacy’.32 Simply put, this means that enhanced parliamentary oversight will lead to more efficient parliamentary diplomacy, and vice versa.33 Taking full advantage of this link, however, requires efficient information sharing between all relevant parliamentary actors. The South African Parliament experiences challenges in harnessing the link between committee oversight and parliamentary diplomacy. This is due to poor coordination between committees and the Parliamentary Group on International Relations (PGIR), the multi-party committee mandated to provide strategic guidance to South Africa’s parliamentary diplomacy.34 By employing a systems approach, the next section investigates Parliament’s existing processes to identify the causes of these coordination and information-sharing challenges.

A GST APPROACH TO INFORMATION-SHARING BETWEEN COMMITTEES AND DELEGATIONS While groups in organisations are encouraged to share information, this may prove challenging in bureaucratic organisations, where information flows are strictly controlled. Most political organisations, including parliaments, have strict rules on how their information should be handled and exchanged.35 This may hamper information-sharing, preventing groups from developing integrated solutions to challenges before them.36 Information-sharing is crucial for political decision-making, as it reduces uncertainty and can be strategically framed and used towards achieving a particular outcome.37 Two types of information assist in this respect – technical information and political information.38 Technical information entails empirical knowledge – that is, knowledge that may reduce uncertainty of policy outcomes, that assesses the extent of a policy problem, or that measures the potential impact of policy decisions. Political information is concerned with the preferences of other stakeholders,

PARLIAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON FOREIGN POLICY OVERSIGHT

delegations are exposed to. Stavridis appreciates this link between

such as their positions about a certain policy issue, how strongly they feel about it, and any fall-back positions they may have.39 Within the context of parliaments, MPs are key sources of empirical and political information due to the privileged access associated with their positions and activities. This view resonates with the informational perspective on legislative committees, which regards committees’ key purpose as acquiring and

distributing

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 91

information

to

reduce

policy

uncertainty

about

91

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 5

legislative proposals before parliaments.40 As delegations serve as smaller representations of parliaments, with the purpose of sharing information with their peers, this chapter considers this perspective relevant to them as well. The informational perspective views it as beneficial for committees to specialise in specific policy areas, as this enhances their capacity for effective oversight.41 Likewise, the specialisation of delegations through consistent attendance of bilateral or multilateral meetings also holds specialisation advantages for parliaments. These platforms expose MPs to information they otherwise may not have access to in their domestic contexts. In the case of South Africa, such exposure has included direct engagement between MPs and officials and political office-bearers from foreign executive branches.42 Parliaments must therefore consider both committees and delegations as specialised sources of information that can reduce policy uncertainty, and devise their oversight strategies accordingly. Interrogating the South African Parliament’s internal informationsharing on international agreements necessitates considering its relevant rules, policies, structures, and processes as part of a system – that is, ‘an organised or complex whole; an assemblage or combination of things or parts forming a complex or unitary whole’.43 GST serves as a useful tool due to the theory’s focus on ‘developing a systematic, theoretical framework for describing general relationships of the empirical world’.44 As Katz and Kahn explain, ‘systems theory is basically concerned with problems of relationships, of structure, and of interdependence rather than with the constant attributes of objects’.45 Developed by Ludwig von Bertalanffy for the physical sciences, GST has been adopted in various disciplines of the social sciences.46 The theory views organisations as operating in open systems, meaning that they are greatly affected by and dependent on their external environment, which, in turn, may also form part of a larger system.47 Moreover, organisations comprise internal sub-systems that require continuous alignment as the organisation evolves. In short, GST views organisations as systems that comprise sub-systems and that form part of larger systems, for instance the industry an organisation belongs to, the political system, or society. Figure 1 illustrates Katz and Kahn’s open-system model for organisations

92

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 92

2022/11/10 00:03

the external environment.

Environment All the elements outside the system that have the potential to affect all or part of the system

Input Resources are taken or received from the external environment

Throughput The process of conversion or transformation of resources within a system

Output The work of the system, exported back into the environment

Feedback A continuing source of information concerning the relationship with the external environment used to make the necessary changes in order to survive and to grow

Figure 1: The open-system model

The input may include all resources from the system’s external environment, such as people or groups of people with demands, capital, or skills. Throughput refers to the effective and efficient transformation process(es) that inputs undergo in order to be transformed into outputs – the system’s end goal. The end goal may be products, profits, or services. The system does not operate in isolation from its external environment – the source of all its inputs – hence the transformation of its inputs is very much affected by its environment.48 Finally, feedback refers to information about the outputs or throughput that is relayed back into the system as inputs; this, in turn, may necessitate changes in the throughput approach or final output. Such feedback can be either positive or negative; the latter would indicate that

PARLIAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON FOREIGN POLICY OVERSIGHT

and its basic components, namely input, throughput, output, feedback, and

the system is deviating from its initial path and that there is a need for readjustment towards a steady state.49

93

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 93

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 5

THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT’S INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS SYSTEM Section 231(2) of the Constitution, and the rules of the NA and the NCOP, articulates Parliament’s role in the ratification of agreements, subject to approval by both Houses. According to Section 231(3), this excludes ‘agreements of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the national executive’.50 Such agreements, regarded as ‘without major political or other significance [and with] no financial consequences [or impact on] domestic law’,51 must still be tabled in the Houses timeously,52 and their implementation is still subject to parliamentary oversight. In the NA, a minister submits a Section 231(2) agreement and its accompanying explanatory memorandum to the Speaker for tabling and referral to the relevant portfolio committee for consideration. The committee interrogates the agreement and may invite the relevant government department for a briefing on it. Following deliberations, the committee decides to either recommend or reject approval, and duly tables a report on its recommendation before the House for adoption.53 In the NCOP, written instruments tabled in the House, including Section 231(2) international agreements, must be referred to the relevant select committee by the chairperson of the NCOP. Following the committee’s consideration of an agreement, it reports to the NCOP and recommends rejection or approval.54 While the parliamentary rules articulate these referral and reporting processes, there are no provisions concerning the referral of tabled committee reports to the PGIR as the coordinating structure of Parliament’s diplomatic engagements. This means that where committees may have interrogated international agreements that have also been under discussion through parliamentary diplomacy, this information would not have been formally shared with the PGIR, its specialised sub-structural focus groups,55 or delegations. Evidently, there is a rules-based gap that obstructs information-sharing between committees and the PGIR. Concerning parliamentary diplomacy, a senior parliamentary official interviewed on 19 March 2020 explained that after Parliament’s participation at an international engagement, a delegation report must be prepared, stipulating the meeting’s adopted resolutions and other recommendations for follow-up. These may include oversight strategies concerning a particular international agreement, as agreed upon by the parliaments of the countries present at the meeting. Moreover, according to Parliament’s administrative reporting and audit requirements encapsulated in its annual performance plan (APP), delegation reports must be submitted within eight working days for political processing by the PGIR. Thereafter, the PGIR may propose that

94

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 94

2022/11/10 00:03

structures, and/or that a debate be scheduled.56 Delegation reports containing insights on an international agreement should therefore be referred to the relevant parliamentary committee(s) for consideration pre or post ratification. However, neither the parliamentary rules nor Parliament’s policies guide such referral; hence, tabled delegation reports published in Parliament’s Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports (ATC) are not required to specify where, how, and within which timeframe international recommendations should be referred. This presents a rules-based gap that obstructs information-sharing between the PGIR and committees. To assist in coordinating Parliament’s committee oversight and diplomacy work, the Joint Rules of Parliament dictate that the PGIR must meet annually with all members involved in parliamentary diplomacy as well as the chairpersons of the committees dealing with foreign affairs and trade and industry. This is to determine strategy and evaluate the international relations of Parliament.57 While this is one rules-based platform for information-sharing between committees and delegations, the PGIR is known to experience challenges in meeting regularly.58 A parliamentary official interviewed on 20 March 2020 observed that although the fifth Parliament’s PGIR resolved to meet once a quarter to improve its work processes, by that point it had not been able to adhere to this decision. This resolution has also not been incorporated into the Joint Rules, presenting a gap related to formalised and more frequent information-sharing among PGIR members, including key committee chairpersons. When applying the GST approach, it is clear that Parliament’s current international agreements system is experiencing challenges in the feedback and throughput components. The current feedback component is limited to only one joint committee and PGIR engagement per year, with no other formalised information-sharing opportunities. The current throughput component also does not provide for additional information-sharing rules, policies, or engagements, other than the same annual joint meeting. Parliament’s system of engaging with international agreements can be presented as shown in Figure 2. In addition to the rules-based gaps discussed, there are other practical challenges that committees experience when it comes to the oversight of

PARLIAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON FOREIGN POLICY OVERSIGHT

the report be tabled before the Houses, that it be referred to parliamentary

international agreements. The five-year review reports of the PCIRC during the fourth and fifth Parliaments, specifically, reported on its challenges in monitoring agreements.59 Similarly, the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry (PCTI) has noted its inability to access information concerning both the negotiation and implementation of agreements, and the insufficient time available for evaluation and public engagement before recommendation 95

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 95

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 5

for approval.60 Moreover, the need for coordination among committees dealing with cross-cutting matters is highlighted in the legacy reports of the PCTI and the NCOP’s SCTIR.61 Regarding delegations, the irregularity of PGIR meetings has limited this group’s ability to timeously consider and process delegation reports and to share information and formulate strategy between itself and committee chairpersons.62 From a GST perspective, these challenges collectively necessitate a review of the system’s throughput and feedback components. The following section applies the GST approach to Parliament’s engagement with the SADC-EPA as a case study, to showcase the practical implications of the above-mentioned shortcomings and identify remedial measures.

Environment (Multilateral or bilateral parliamentary diplomacy meetings, negotiations by executive, implementation by executive, committee meetings, constituents’ demands)

Input • Presiding officers • Ministers • Committee members • Committee support personnel • Delegation members • Delegation support personnel • PGIR committee • PGIR support personnel • Delegation reports • Committee reports

Throughput • Rules of procedure Ů Tabling and referral of delegation reports to presiding officers and/ or relevant structures Ů Tabling of committee reports to Houses Ů House debates Ů Annual PGIR meeting • Annual performance plan (APP) Ů Reports tabled within eight days

Output Oversight over international agreements

Feedback • Rules of procedure Ů Annual PGIR meeting • Post-ratification committee oversight

Figure 2: A GST input–output model for Parliament’s engagement with international agreements

96

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 96

2022/11/10 00:03

After more than 10 years of negotiations between the countries and regions of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) and the European Union (EU), the SADC-EPA was signed on 10 June 2016 between the EU and six countries belonging to the Southern African Development Community (SADC), namely Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, eSwatini, South Africa, and Mozambique.63 The economic partnership agreements (EPAs) signed by the EU and various ACP countries are trade and development agreements aimed at contributing to sustainable development and poverty reduction through trade and investment (also see Chapter 13 in this volume). They are designed to suit regional environments, taking into account each region’s socio-economic situation, and they include provisions on assistance for ACP countries.64 While the SADC-EPA was negotiated as a group, individual countries maintained national competence for the negotiations and subsequent ratification.65 Parliament’s engagement with the SADC-EPA occurred through both the committee and parliamentary diplomacy streams of its international relations work. In terms of the committee approach, the SADC-EPA was tabled before Parliament for approval in terms of Section 231(2) of the Constitution, after which it was referred to the SCTIR and the PCTI, both of which recommended approval by their respective Houses in August 2016.66 Implementation of the agreement commenced on 10 October 2016.67 The EPAs also enjoyed regular attention through numerous manifestations of South Africa’s parliamentary diplomacy, including (but not limited to) at meetings of the ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA); the ACP–EU JPA’s Committee on Economic Development, Finance, and Trade; and the SA–EU inter-parliamentary meetings (IPMs). Available evidence reveal that at meetings of the ACP–EU committee and the JPA, the state of play of the EPAs remained a standing item under which delegations could obtain and share information, amongst themselves and with resource persons, on the status of the negotiations and progress on implementation. They were also able to engage directly with colleagues from the executive branch who were involved in the negotiation and implementation of the EPAs, such as the European Commission and the ACP–EU Council of Ministers.68 These meetings therefore serve as key

PARLIAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON FOREIGN POLICY OVERSIGHT

PARLIAMENT’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE SADC-EPA

opportunities for delegations to source EPA-related information relevant to the oversight work of parliamentary committees. Table 1 provides details of the fifth Parliament’s committee engagement with the SADC-EPA through the PCTI, SCTIR, and PCIRC (up to the end of March 2019, when Parliament dissolved for the 2019 general elections). 97

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 97

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 5

Table 1: Parliament’s committee engagement with the SADC-EPA during the fifth Parliament69 Committee and details

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019 (end of March)

Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry (PCTI) Number of briefings from Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)

2

2

6

5

1

1

Number of committee reports tabled

2

1

1

0

0

0

Number of committee reports referred to PGIR/ACP–EU JPA and/or SA–EU focus groups and/or delegations

0

0

0

0

0

0

Meetings with PGIR/ACP–EU JPA and/or SA–EU focus groups and/or delegations

0

0

0

0

0

0

Meetings with any foreign delegations

0

0

0

0

0

0

Select Committee on Trade and International Relations (SCTIR) Number of briefings from DTI

1

1

1

0

1

0

Number of committee reports tabled

0

0

1

0

0

0

Number of committee reports referred to PGIR/ACP–EU JPA and/or SA–EU focus groups and/or delegations

0

0

0

0

0

0

Meetings with PGIR/ACP–EU JPA and/or SA–EU focus groups and/or delegations

0

0

0

0

0

0

Meetings with any foreign delegations

0

0

0

0

0

0

Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation (PCIRC) Number of briefings from DTI and/ or Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)

0

0

2

1

0

0

Number of committee reports tabled

0

0

0

1

1

0

Number of committee reports referred to PGIR/ACP–EU JPA and/or SA–EU focus groups and/or delegations

0

0

0

0

0

0

Meetings with PGIR/ACP–EU JPA and/or SA–EU focus groups and/or delegations

0

0

0

0

0

0

Meetings with any foreign delegations

0

0

1

0

0

0

98

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 98

2022/11/10 00:03

one briefing meeting per year where the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) updated it on developments concerning the SADC-EPA. Most of these meetings occurred during 2016 and 2017, due to the agreement’s ratification in the latter part of 2016. Available evidence also indicates that four PCTI reports related to the SADC-EPA were tabled from 2014 to 2016, with no further reports tabled for the remainder of the fifth Parliament. Significantly, no evidence could be found of the PCTI’s tabled reports being referred to the PGIR, the ACP–EU JPA, or SA–EU focus groups and/or delegations. The available evidence also does not indicate any PCTI engagements on the SADC-EPA with the PGIR or its focus groups or delegations, or any foreign delegations under the ambit of parliamentary diplomacy. A parliamentary official, via email correspondence on 21 February 2020, observed that there had been no relationship between the committee and the delegations, despite the committee chairperson at the time serving as chairperson of the SA–EU delegation. While the chairperson may have therefore had access to information emanating from her diplomatic engagements, this information had not been transferred to the rest of the committee. As regards the SCTIR, available evidence points to it receiving at least one DTI briefing on the SADC-EPA each year from 2014 to 2016 and in 2018, with no evidence of any briefings in 2017. The committee submitted one tabled report in 2016, which recommended approval. As in the case of the PCTI, available evidence indicates that the committee had not referred any of its reports to the PGIR, the ACP–EU JPA, or SA–EU focus groups and/or delegations. Moreover, no evidence could be found of the committee having any engagements on the SADC-EPA with the PGIR, the ACP–EU JPA, or SA– EU focus groups and/or delegations, or any foreign delegations under the ambit of parliamentary diplomacy. The PCIRC also had engagement with the SADC-EPA in 2016 and 2017. Most significantly, the committee held two briefing meetings in 2016, during which it received updates on the agreement from both the DTI and DIRCO, while at another meeting in the same year, it met with a delegation from the UK under the ambit of parliamentary diplomacy. Amongst other issues, the latter meeting focused on parliamentary oversight of international agreements such as the SADC-EPA, notably in terms of

PARLIAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON FOREIGN POLICY OVERSIGHT

According to Table 1, during the fifth Parliament the PCTI held at least

their practical impact on citizens. The South African MPs explained that each parliamentary committee had its own oversight approach, although there are instances where they collaborate on cross-sectional matters.70 However, as indicated before, evidence from committee reports points to such collaboration between committees not having occurred optimally; this meeting, at which neither the PCTI, the SCTIR, nor the PGIR were present, 99

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 99

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 5

serves as a practical case in point. A joint meeting with all committee and PGIR stakeholders involved in Parliament’s engagement with the SADC-EPA would have assisted in sharing information among them for use in their respective capacities. When considering these committee experiences from a GST approach, what becomes evident is a disconnect between the work of committees and delegations when they consider the same international agreement. Evidently, formalised information-sharing processes between committee and diplomacy stakeholders during the throughput and feedback phases of the system are required. In a bureaucratic institution like Parliament, these should be provided for in the parliamentary rules and/or policies in terms of (a) the referral of relevant committee reports to the PGIR (and its focus groups and/or delegations) within prescribed timeframes; (b) the stipulation of referral details in tabled reports; (c) joint sessions with relevant committees and PGIR focus groups and/or delegations, as required; and (d) some MPs serving on committees and delegations as specialists and additional stewards of information-sharing and feedback. These findings are reiterated when considering the fifth Parliament’s diplomatic engagements on the SADC-EPA at meetings of the ACP–EU JPA Standing Committee on Economic Development, Finance and Trade, and full JPA sessions. Table 2 provides details of the meetings South African delegates attended in each year of the fifth Parliament (up to end of March 2019), the date that their respective reports were tabled for adoption, and whether or not these reports were referred to parliamentary committees. Delegations attended at least one JPA or committee meeting related to the SADC-EPA for each year of the fifth Parliament, with the majority attended in 2016 and 2017 (around the time the SADC-EPA was signed and ratified). All of these culminated in the tabling of a delegation report. Only two of these reports were tabled within less than six months of the activity (highlighted in grey). The remainder of the reports took more than six months to be tabled, with one taking one year. This is one of the practical consequences of the PGIR’s lack of regular meetings, resulting in information that may have been useful to committees not being tabled and, hence, remaining stuck with delegations. Moreover, no evidence could be found of reports being referred to committees. As in the case of available committee reports, tabled PGIR reports did not indicate how, where, and within which timeframe recommendations must be referred. From a GST perspective, these shortcomings in the system’s throughput and feedback phases resulted in less effective information-sharing and oversight (output) over the SADC-EPA negotiations and post-ratification implementation.

100

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 100

2022/11/10 00:03

*

*

*

Nov.

Delegation reports referred to parliamentary committee(s)

Date of delegation reports tabled

Meetings with ACP–EU JPA

Delegation reports referred to parliamentary committee(s)

Date of delegation report tabled

Meetings with ACP–EU JPA Standing Committee on Economic Development, Finance and Trade

Year 2014

*

*

2015

March

*

*

June

*

*

2016

October

June 2017

No

June

June 2017

No

Dec.

June 2017

No

June

Sept. 2017

No

2017

March Oct.

June 2018

No

Dec.

June 2018

No

2018

Oct.

April 2019

No

*

*

*

2019

*

*

*

*

*

*

July 2017

No

Notes: • The asterisks (*) indicate a lack of information. • Reports tabled less than six months after the activity are highlighted in grey.

Similar trends emerged when analysing the activities of the SA–EU IPMs, which provided an opportunity for South African MPs to share knowledge and experiences with their EU counterparts. This includes how to ensure improved parliamentary oversight over agreements concluded under the SA–EU strategic partnership. South Africa’s trade with the EU under the SADC-EPA was one of the core issues discussed during the fifth Parliament, with the IPMs serving as platforms to facilitate occasional discussion between the DTI and the European Commission.72 Table 3 summarises the number of SA–EU IPM engagements during the fifth Parliament, the dates delegation reports were tabled, and whether or not these reports were referred to committees. As in the case of the data depicted in Table 2, this is based on available information.

PARLIAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON FOREIGN POLICY OVERSIGHT

Table 2: The fifth Parliament’s diplomatic engagements on the SADC-EPA at the ACP–EU JPA71

101

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 101

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 5

Table 3: The fifth Parliament’s diplomatic engagement with the SADC-EPA at SA–EU IPMs73 Year

Date of SA–EU IPM

Date of delegation report tabled

Delegation reports referred to parliamentary committee(s)

2014

 *

* 

 *

2015

June

*

*

2016

April

April 2017

No

2017

April

July 2017

No

2018

April

 *

* 

October

 *

* 

2019 (until end of March)

No meeting

*

*

The asterisks (*) indicate a lack of information.

Table 3 illustrates that five IPMs were held during the fifth Parliament – at least once a year from 2015 to 2018. Of these, two delegation reports were tabled. One of the reports was tabled one year after the activity, while the other took three months. No evidence could be found of either report being referred to parliamentary committees, or of them specifying any referral requirements or timeframes. According to Madalane, there had also been no engagement between the SA–EU delegation, the PGIR, and/or its SA–EU focus group during the fifth Parliament.74 Evidently, opportunities for information-sharing among delegations and committees were limited, showcasing the need for rules-based interventions. This finding reiterates that committees have not benefited from Parliament’s diplomatic activities where international agreements were discussed.

CONCLUSION Realising

President

Ramaphosa’s

New

Dawn

will

require

strong

parliamentary oversight of the executive’s formulation and implementation of South Africa’s domestic and foreign policies. Regarding the latter, Parliament’s oversight of international agreements will be crucial in curbing corruption and boosting the state’s credibility among potential foreign investors, actions which the president views as key catalysts for the New Dawn’s development-oriented goals. This is particularly significant in light of ongoing revelations of state capture and Parliament’s oversight challenges during the Zuma administration. 102

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 102

2022/11/10 00:03

between the two streams of Parliament’s international relations work – oversight through parliamentary committees and parliamentary diplomacy – can be improved. Through considering the unique yet complementary roles of both, the analysis utilised the informational perspective on legislative committees to illustrate that delegations participating in parliamentary diplomacy are also key information sources that can reduce policy uncertainty on international issues before legislatures. Like committees, delegations benefit parliaments, as their attendance at diplomatic meetings exposes them to information that parliaments otherwise might not have access to. This enhances parliaments’ oversight capacity, provided that effective information-sharing occurs between delegations and committees. Conversely, information from committees to delegations should inform the latter’s information-sharing and sourcing strategies under parliamentary diplomacy to, in turn, boost committee oversight nationally. To assess the South African Parliament’s practical experiences in harnessing this link, GST was used to review Parliament’s current international agreements system, as well as its practical engagement with the development-oriented SADC-EPA during the fifth Parliament. The analysis revealed a disconnect and a lack of information-sharing between committees and delegations due to the absence of rules or policy guidelines stipulating information-sharing modalities. The following rules-based information-sharing enablers are proposed: (a) minimum timeframes within which delegation reports must be tabled for adoption; (b) the reciprocal referral of relevant tabled committee and delegation reports within established minimum timeframes, specifying referral details; (c) regular joint information-sharing sessions between committee and diplomacy stakeholders; and (d) some MPs serving as specialists and informationsharing stewards on both relevant committees and delegations. Parliament’s adoption of information-sharing enablers would enhance the link between committees and delegations concerning the oversight of international agreements, boosting the role of the legislature in ensuring the state’s adherence to international commitments. Such credibility is of utmost importance to realising the investment goals and subsequent developmental imperatives of the Ramaphosa administration’s New Dawn. Future research

PARLIAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON FOREIGN POLICY OVERSIGHT

To this end, this chapter sought to investigate how information-sharing

on parliaments’ processing of international resolutions agreed to under parliamentary diplomacy, notably their methods of subsequent engagement with the executive, would shed further light on the role of delegations as key information sources and tools of foreign policy oversight.

103

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 103

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 5

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1 Al Jazeera. 2018. ‘ANC’s Cyril Ramaphosa elected president of South Africa.’ 15 February. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/15/ancs-cyril-ramaphosa-elected-president-ofsouth-africa (Accessed 20 January 2022). 2 Merten, M. ‘South Africa’s 6th Parliament: Cyril Ramaphosa elected president while the ANC factional bombs detonate in full view.’ Daily Maverick, 22 May. https://www. dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-05-22-cyril-ramaphosa-elected-president-while-theanc-factional-bombs-detonate-in-full-view/ (Accessed 20 January 2022). 3 Ramaphosa, C. 2018. ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa: 2018 State of the Nation Address.’ 16 February. https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2018-state-nationaddress-16-feb-2018-0000 (Accessed 20 January 2022). 4 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2020. Strategic Plan for Parliament 2019 to 2024. Cape Town: Parliament, 27 February, p. 25. https://www.parliament.gov.za/ storage/app/media/StratPlan/6/Draft_Strategic_Plan_of_Parliament_2019-2024_V7_ ES.pdf (Accessed 24 January 2022). 5 Ferreira, E. ‘Parliament owes South Africa an apology on state capture – Modise.’ Mail & Guardian, 19 April. https://mg.co.za/politics/2021-04-19-parliament-owes-south-africaan-apology-on-state-capture-modise/ (Accessed 24 January 2022). 6 Masondo, A. 2019. ‘Parliament budget vote speech by NCOP Chairperson Hon. Mr Amos Masondo, NCOP Chamber, 16 July 2019 at 14h00.’ https://www.gov.za/speeches/ chairperson-amos-masondo-parliament-budget-vote-201920-16-jul-2019-0000 (Accessed February 2022). 7 Ahmed, A. 2009. ‘The role of Parliament in South Africa’s foreign policy development process: Lessons from the United States’ Congress.’ South African Journal of International Affairs 16(3): 291–310; Jancˇicˇ, D. 2015. ‘The soft power of parliamentary diplomacy.’ Diplomat Magazine, 7 June. https://diplomatmagazine.eu/2015/06/07/the-soft-power-ofparliamentary-diplomacy/ (Accessed March 2020). 8 Ahmed, ‘The role of Parliament’; Jancˇicˇ, ‘The soft power of parliamentary diplomacy’; Masters, L. 2015. ‘South Africa’s emerging parliamentary diplomacy and soft power.’ Strategic Review for Southern Africa 37(2): 74–93. https://doi.org/10.35293/srsa. v37i2.244; Leibrandt-Loxton, N. 2018. ‘South Africa’s parliamentary diplomacy 1994–2018: Developing international agency as a soft power tool.’ PhD diss., University of Johannesburg. 9 Ahmed, ‘The role of Parliament’; Raunio, T. 2014. ‘Legislatures and foreign policy.’ In The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies, edited by S. Martin, T. Saalfeld, and K. W. Strøm. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Jancˇicˇ, D. 2015. ‘Transatlantic regulatory interdependence, law and governance: The evolving roles of the EU and US legislatures.’ Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 17(1): 334–359. https://doi.org/10.1017/ cel.2015.16; Schütze, R. 2017. ‘Parliamentary democracy and international treaties.’ Global Policy 8(S6): 7–13. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12485. 10 Beetham, D. 2006. ‘Parliament and democracy in the twenty-first century: A guide to good practice.’ Inter-Parliamentary Union. http://archive.ipu.org/dem-e/guide. htm (Accessed March 2020); Bajtay, P. 2015. ‘Shaping and controlling foreign policy: Parliamentary diplomacy and oversight, and the role of the European Parliament.’ Directorate-General for External Policies, European Parliament. https://www.europarl.

104

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 104

2022/11/10 00:03

11 Raunio, T. 2016. ‘Refusing to be sidelined: The engagement of the Finnish Eduskunta in foreign affairs.’ Scandinavian Political Studies 39(4): 312–332. https://doi. org/10.1111/1467-9477.12071. 12 Weisglas, F. and De Boer, G. 2007. ‘Parliamentary diplomacy.’ The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 2: 93–99. https://doi.org/10.1163/187119007X180494; Raunio, ‘Refusing to be sidelined’. 13 Sheldon, M. 2016. ‘Strengthening Parliament’s oversight role during international trade negotiations: A grounded theory approach.’ MA diss., University of Cape Town. 14 Pelizzo, R. and Stapenhurst, F. 2012. Parliamentary Oversight Tools: A Comparative Analysis. New York: Routledge, p. 32. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203151228. 15 Gusy, C. 2007. ‘Parliaments and the executive: Old control rights and new control contexts in Germany.’ In Constitutionalism and the Role of Parliaments, edited by K. S. Ziegler, D. Baranger, and A. W. Bradley. Oxford: Hart Publishing; Bajtay, ‘Shaping and controlling foreign policy’. 16 Yamato, H. 2007. Tools for Parliamentary Oversight: A Comparative Study of 88 National Parliaments. Inter-Parliamentary Union. http://archive.ipu.org/PDF/publications/ oversight08-e.pdf (Accessed February 2020). 17 Martin, L. 2000. Democratic Commitments. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 18 Republic of South Africa. 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. https://www. gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996 (Accessed March 2020). 19 Banjo, A. 2009. ‘A review of Parliament–foreign policy nexus in South Africa.’ Journal of Politics and Law 2(3): 61–70. https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v2n3p61; Nganje, F. 2015. ‘Intergovernmental relations on foreign affairs in South Africa: A twenty-year review.’ Strategic Review for Southern Africa 37(2): 52–73. https://doi.org/10.35293/srsa. v37i2.242. 20 Sheldon, Strengthening Parliament’s oversight role’. 21 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2009. Oversight and Accountability Model. https://pmg.org.za/policy-document/119/ (Accessed March 2020). 22 Ahmed, ‘The role of Parliament’; Hudson, H. 2010. ‘Continuity and change: An evaluation of the democracy–foreign policy nexus in post-apartheid South Africa.’ Journal of Contemporary History 35(2): 108–130. 23 Ahmed, ‘The role of Parliament’, p. 305. 24 Ahmed, ‘The role of Parliament’; Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2009. Report of the Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament. https://www.gov.za/sites/ default/files/gcis_document/201409/panelassessparl.pdf (Accessed February 2020); Hudson, ‘Continuity and change’. 25 Ahmed, ‘The role of Parliament’.

PARLIAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON FOREIGN POLICY OVERSIGHT

europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/549045/EXPO_STU(2015)549045_EN.pdf (Accessed February 2020).

26 Monnakgotla, R. 2019. ‘An activist or a toothless Parliament? South African Parliament’s National Assembly Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation.’ MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch. 27 Monnakgotla, ‘An activist or a toothless Parliament?’; Sheldon, ‘Strengthening Parliament’s oversight role’.

105

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 105

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 5

28 Jancˇicˇ, cited in Stavridis, S. and Jancˇicˇ, D. 2016. ‘Introduction: The rise of parliamentary diplomacy.’ In Parliamentary Diplomacy in European and Global Governance, edited by S. Stavridis and D. Jancˇicˇ. Leiden: Brill, p. 6. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004336346. 29 Stavridis and Jancˇicˇ, ‘Introduction: The rise of parliamentary diplomacy’. 30 Leibrandt-Loxton, ‘South Africa’s parliamentary diplomacy 1994–2018’. 31 Stavridis, S. 2016. ‘Conclusions: Parliamentary diplomacy as a global phenomenon.’ In Parliamentary Diplomacy in European and Global Governance, edited by S. Stavridis and D. Jancˇicˇ. Leiden: Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004336346. 32 Redei, L. 2015. ‘The European Parliament as a diplomatic precedent setter: The case of parliamentary relations with Kosovo.’ In The European Parliament and its International Relations, edited by S. Stavridis and D. Irrera. London: Routledge, p. 279. 33 Stavridis, ‘Conclusions: Parliamentary diplomacy as a global phenomenon’. 34 Ahmed, ‘The role of Parliament’. 35 Krehbiel, K. 2004. ‘Legislative organization.’ The Journal of Economic Perspectives 18(1): 113–128. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533004773563467; Yang, T.-M. and Maxwell, T. A. 2011. ‘Information-sharing in public organizations: A literature review of interpersonal, intra-organizational and inter-organizational success factors.’ Government Information Quarterly 28(2): 164–175. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2010.06.008; Brandsma, G. J. 2013. ‘Bending the rules: Arrangements for sharing technical and political information between the EU institutions.’ In Agency and Influence Inside the EU Institutions, edited by R. Servent, A. Busby, and A. Busby. European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) 1(17). 36 Yang and Maxwell, ‘Information-sharing in public organizations’. 37 Brandsma, ‘Bending the rules’. 38 Sabatier, P. 1978. ‘The acquisition and utilization of technical information by administrative agencies.’ Administrative Science Quarterly 23(3): 396–417. https://doi. org/10.2307/2392417. 39 Sabatier, ‘The acquisition and utilization of technical information’; Brandsma, ‘Bending the rules’. 40 Mickler, T. 2017. ‘Committee autonomy in parliamentary systems: Coalition logic or congressional rationales?’ The Journal of Legislative Studies 23(3): 367–391. https://doi. org/10.1080/13572334.2017.1359941. 41 Brandsma, ‘Bending the rules’. 42 Leibrandt-Loxton, ‘South Africa’s parliamentary diplomacy 1994–2018’. 43 Johnson, R., Kast, F. and Rosenzweig, J. 1964. ‘Systems theory and management.’ Management Science 10(2): 367–384, p. 367. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.10.2.367. 44 Johnson et al., ‘Systems theory and management’, p. 369. 45 Katz, D. and Kahn, R. 1966. The Social Psychology of Organizations. New York: John Wiley & Sons, p. 18. 46 Von Bertalanffy, L. 1973. General System Theory (Revised edition). New York: George Braziller. 47 Ramosaj, B. and Berisha, G. 2014. ‘Systems theory and systems approach to leadership.’ ILIRIA International Review 4(1): 59–76; Chikere, C. and Nwoka, J. 2015. ‘The systems theory of management in modern day organizations: A study of Aldgate Congress Resort Limited Port Harcourt.’ International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications 5(9): 1–7.

106

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 106

2022/11/10 00:03

49 Kast, F. and Rosenzweig, J. 1972. ‘General systems theory: Applications for organization and management.’ Academy of Management Journal (December): 447–465. https://doi. org/10.5465/255141. 50 Republic of South Africa, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 51 Botha, N. J. 2005. ‘National treaty law and practice: South Africa.’ In National Treaty Law and Practice: Dedicated to the Memory of Monroe Leigh, edited by D. B. Hollis, M. R. Blakeslee, and L. B. Ederington. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, p. 588. 52 Republic of South Africa, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 53 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2016. Rules of the National Assembly. https:// www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Rules/NA/2016-09-28_NA_RULES.pdf (Accessed February 2020). 54 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2008. Rules of the National Council of Provinces. https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Rules/NCOP/Rules_of_ NCOP_9th_edition.pdf (Accessed April 2020). 55 PGIR focus groups must advise the PGIR and drive the agenda of the bodies they mirror within Parliament. See Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2006. ‘Policy Perspectives and Operational Guidelines for Parliament’s Involvement and Engagement in International Relations.’ https://static.pmg.org.za/docs/2006/060322irpolicy.htm (Accessed 25 May 2022). 56 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2011. Joint Rules of Parliament. https:// www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/JointRules/joint-rules-a51.pdf (Accessed March 2020). 57 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2011. Joint Rules of Parliament. 58 Leibrandt-Loxton, ‘South Africa’s parliamentary diplomacy 1994–2018’. 59 PCIRC (Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation). 2014. ‘Fiveyear Review of the Activities of the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation (May 2009 – March 2014).’ Cape Town: Parliament of the Republic of South Africa; PCIRC. 2019. ‘Report of the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation on its activities undertaken during the 5th Parliament (May 2014 – March 2019).’ Cape Town: Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 60 PCTI (Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry). 2014. ‘Report of the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry on Its Activities Undertaken During the 4th Parliament (May 2009 – March 2014), Adopted on 12 March 2014.’ Cape Town: Parliament of the Republic of South Africa; PCTI. 2019. ‘Report of the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry on Its Activities Undertaken During the Fifth Parliament (May 2014 – March 2019).’ Cape Town: Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 61 PCTI, 2019 Report; SCTIR (Select Committee on Trade and International Relations). 2019. ‘Legacy Reports: Economic Development and Trade and Industry.’ https//pmg. org.za/committee-meeting/28768/ (Accessed February 2020).

PARLIAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON FOREIGN POLICY OVERSIGHT

48 Weihrich, H., Cannice, M. and Koontz, H. 2010. Management: A Global and Entrepreneurial Perspective. 13th ed. New Delhi: Tata McGraw Hill; Chikere and Nwoka, ‘The systems theory of management in modern day organizations’.

62 Leibrandt-Loxton, ‘South Africa’s parliamentary diplomacy 1994–2018’. 63 Tralac (Trade Law Centre). 2020. ‘SADC–EU Economic Partnership Agreement Documents and Resources.’ https://www.tralac.org/resources/by-region/sadc/sadc-eueconomic-partnership-agreement.html (Accessed February 2020). 107

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 107

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 5

64 European Commission. 2020. ‘Economic Partnerships.’ https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/ countries-and-regions/development/economic-partnerships/ (Accessed February 2020). 65 Zamfir, I. 2017. ‘Economic Partnership Agreement with the Southern African Development Community (SADC).’ European Parliament briefing, September. https://www.europarl. europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/608686/EPRS_BRI(2017)608686_EN.pdf (Accessed April 2020). 66 PMG. 2016. ‘ATC160817: Report of the Select Committee on Trade and International Relations on the Economic Partnership Agreement between the SADC EPA States, of the one part, and the European Union and its member states, of the other part, dated 17 August 2016.’ https://pmg.org.za/tabled-committee-report/2799/ (Accessed November 2019); PMG. 2016. ‘ATC160824: Report of the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry on the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the South African Development Community (SADC) EPA states, of the one part, and the European Union and its member states, of the other part, dated 24 August 2016.’ https://pmg.org.za/tabled-committeereport/2803/ (Accessed February 2020). 67 Tralac, ‘SADC–EU Economic Partnership Agreement Documents and Resources’. 68 European Parliament. 2013. ‘Rules of Procedure of the ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly.’ https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/dacp/about/rules-of-procedure (Accessed April 2020); ACP–EU JPA Committee on Economic Development, Finance and Trade. 2014. ‘Draft Agenda. Meeting Saturday 29 November 2014, 10:00 – 13:30. Strasbourg.’ https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/acp/ oj/1037/1037847/1037847en.pdf (Accessed April 2020); Delputte, S., Fasone, C. and Longo, F. 2016. ‘The diplomatic role of the European Parliament’s standing committees, delegations and assemblies: Insights from ACP–EU Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation.’ In Parliamentary Diplomacy in European and Global Governance, edited by S. Stavridis and D. Jancˇicˇ. Leiden: Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004336346; Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2017. ‘Report of the South African Delegation to the 45th Session of the ACP Parliamentary Assembly and the Inter-sessional Meetings of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly.’ Cape Town: Parliament of the Republic of South Africa.

108

69 PMG. 2014. ‘Minister & Deputy Minister on Trade Policy and Trade Agreements.’ https:// pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/17502/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2014. ‘Minister on DTI’s 2013/14 Annual Report and 1st Quarter 2014/15 performance.’ https://pmg.org. za/committee-meeting/17533/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2014. ‘ATC140715: Report of the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry on Budget Vote 36: Trade and Industry, dated 11 July 2014.’ https://pmg.org.za/tabled-committee-report/2176/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2014. ‘ATC141027: Budgetary Review and Recommendation Report of the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry, dated 24 October 2014.’ https://pmg.org. za/tabled-committee-report/2175/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2014. ‘Department of Trade and Industry on South Africa’s Trade Policy and Strategy Framework (TPSF).’ https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/17371/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2015. ‘Minister on State of Nation Address impact on DTI mandate; DTI Strategic Plan 2015/16; 3rd Quarter performance; Plastic Sector progress report.’ https://pmg.org. za/committee-meeting/20514/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2015. ‘Southern African Customs Union (SACU) & revenue sharing formula: Status report.’ https://pmg.org.za/ committee-meeting/21205/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2015. ‘ATC151022: Budgetary Review and Recommendation Report of the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry, dated 20 October 2015.’ https://pmg.org.za/tabled-committee-report/2549/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2015. ‘Department of Trade and Industry on its 2014/15

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 108

2022/11/10 00:03

PARLIAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON FOREIGN POLICY OVERSIGHT

Annual Report.’ https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/21740/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2016. ‘Trade Negotiations: Status report; Trade Facilitation Agreement in Protocol amending Marrakesh Agreement establishing WTO.’ https://pmg.org.za/ committee-meeting/22019/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2016. ‘Minister on State of Nation Address & DTI mandate; WTO 10th Ministerial Conference outcome; Unilever engagement.’ https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/22051/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2016. ‘Department of Trade & Industry on its 2016 Annual Performance Plan & 3rd quarter 2015 performance, with Deputy Minister.’ https://pmg.org.za/committeemeeting/22148/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2016. ‘SADC–EU Economic Partnership Agreement: Briefing.’ https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23118/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2016. ‘Local public procurement: Auditor-General input; DTI on its 4 Quarter 2015/16 performance.’ https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23161/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2016. ‘Minister & DTI on its 2015/16 Annual Report; Auditor-General on Department’s Audit outcomes.’ https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23245/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2016. ‘ATC160824: Report of the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry on the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the South African Development Community (SADC) EPA states, of the one part, and the European Union and its member states, of the other part, dated 24 August 2016.’ https://pmg.org. za/tabled-committee-report/2803/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2016. ‘National Gambling Policy; SADC-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA): DTI briefing.’ https://pmg.org. za/committee-meeting/23081/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2016. ‘ATC160817: Report of the Select Committee on Trade and International Relations on the Economic Partnership Agreement between the SADC EPA States, of the one part, and the European Union and its member states, of the other part, dated 17 August 2016.’ https://pmg.org.za/ tabled-committee-report/2799/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2016. ‘Brexit impact: DIRCO & Institute for Global Dialogue; SA–EU & EU–SADC Economic Partnership Agreements: Foreign Policy impact; African Renaissance Fund 4 quarter 2015/16 performance.’ https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23170/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2016. ‘SA Parliament’s oversight over Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs): Meeting with the UK Parliament.’ https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23297/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2016. ‘SADC-EU Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations impact on SA Foreign Policy; South African Jews for a Free Palestine (SAJFP) on current Palestine/ Israel political situation.’ https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23224/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2017. ‘ATC171018: Budgetary Review and Recommendation Report of the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation, dated 18 October 2017.’ https://pmg.org.za/tabled-committee-report/3139/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2017. ‘Trade update.’ https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/25502/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2017. ‘Minister of Trade and Industry on SONA and Budget 2017.’ https://pmg. org.za/committee-meeting/24047/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2017. ‘DTI & National Regulator for Compulsory Specifications on Quarter 3 performance.’ https://pmg.org. za/committee-meeting/23945/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2017. ‘Sugar cane growers’ dispute: DTI progress report.’ https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/25624/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2017. ‘Poultry industry: Public hearings; BBBEE Commission Annual Performance Plan.’ https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/24242/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2018. ‘Southern African Customs Union (SACU); with Minister of Finance & Deputy and Minister of Trade and Industry.’ https://pmg.org.za/committeemeeting/27037/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2017. ‘DIRCO + African Renaissance Fund 2016/17 Annual Report, with Minister.’ https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/25200/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2018. ‘Department of Trade and Industry 2018/19 Annual

109

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 109

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 5

Performance Plan.’ https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/26523/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2018. ‘ATC181024: Budgetary Review and Recommendation Report of the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation, dated 24 October 2018.’ https://pmg.org.za/tabled-committee-report/3567/ (Accessed May 2022); PMG. 2019. ‘International & regional trade agreements: Status report.’ https://pmg.org.za/ committee-meeting/27985/ (Accessed May 2022). 70 PMG. 2016. ‘SA Parliament’s oversight over Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs): Meeting with the UK Parliament.’ https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23297/ (Accessed 12 May 2022). 71 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2014. ‘Analytical Report of the ACP Parliamentary Assembly and the ACP–EU JPA.’ Cape Town: Parliament; Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2015. ‘Analytical Report of the ACP Parliamentary Assembly and the ACP–EU JPA.’ Cape Town: Parliament; Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2015. ‘Draft Delegation Participation Report: 37th Session of the ACP Parliamentary Assembly and Inter-Sessional Meetings of the ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly. Brussels, Belgium.’ Cape Town: Parliament; Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2017. Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports [No. 86-2017]. Cape Town: Parliament; Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2017. Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports [No. 92-2017]. Cape Town: Parliament; Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2017. Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports [No. 119-2017]. Cape Town: Parliament; Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2018. Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports [No. 75-2018]. Cape Town: Parliament; Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2019. Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports [No. 43-2019]. Cape Town: Parliament. 72 Madalane, Z. 2019. ‘South Africa – European Union (SA–EU) Inter-Parliamentary Meetings (IPMs).’ Cape Town: Research Unit, Parliament. 73 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2017. Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports [No. 93-2017]. Cape Town: Parliament; Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2017. Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports [No. 86-2017] Cape Town: Parliament; Madalane, ‘SA–EU IPMs’. 74 Madalane, ‘SA–EU IPMs’.

110

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 110

2022/11/10 00:03

Sven Botha

CHAPTER 6

The Youth and South African Foreign Policy: Influencers or Passive Observers?

INTRODUCTION John Siko posits that the foreign policy of South Africa is subject to various forces seeking to impress their preferences upon it, albeit to differing degrees.1 These forces include the media, academia, business, Parliament, the ruling party, individual government departments, and the head of state. Despite constituting one-third of South Africa’s population2 and 43 per cent of South Africa’s registered electorate,3 the youth (aged 13–35, according to the National Youth Commission Act 19 of 1996) are not included in the list of influencers. The youth are also a key priority for the Ramaphosa administration, as was noted in President Cyril Ramaphosa’s first State of the Nation Address (SONA) in 2018, in which he announced a youth summit aimed at confronting youth unemployment.4 These realities beg the question: What influence do the youth have within the realms of foreign policy decision-making and implementation? This chapter aims to answer this question by employing an exploratory analysis that combines desktop research and qualitative interviews with relevant actors from both the public and civil society sectors. It will be argued that while efforts at engaging the South African youth have been made from both sides, interaction is more evident than influence. First, a brief literature review is conducted, with research motivations. The central argument is then made by exploring the nature of the roles played by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and key civil society actors, such as the South African BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) Youth Association (SABYA); the International South African Model United Nations (ISAMUN); and the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), with a particular focus on the Youth@SAIIA Programme. The influence of young people and youth leagues and or their wings within South Africa’s three largest political parties is then briefly discussed. Finally, the findings of this exploration are analysed and discussed, followed by a concluding section that sets out the limitations of this study and discusses several contextual policy recommendations. 111

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 111

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 6

MOTIVATIONS, APPROACHES, AND CHALLENGES The youth constitute a significant demographic of South Africa’s population, in both general and electoral terms. This, however, is not the only motivation for the research that forms the basis of this chapter. Three additional motivations exist. Firstly, the youth will come to play critical roles in peacemaking and peacebuilding. Research by Cilliers forecasting conflict trends in Africa up to 2030 concludes that ‘Africa will remain turbulent because it is poor, young and badly governed, but also because it is growing and dynamic’.5 Additionally, a report from the World Bank concludes that an all-inclusive approach encompassing dialogue, socio-economic reform, and reform of state institutions is essential to prevent violence and pave the pathway to peace.6 Both these findings emphasise that the youth, or more specifically the youth bulge, are part of the problem and must therefore be part of the solution. The Youth Envoy of the African Union (AU) has already attempted to formulate an all-inclusive approach by launching an online poll asking African youths to share their thoughts on the Silencing the Guns by 2020 campaign (SGC) (also see Chapter 11 in this volume). The SGC places African youth at its centre through an intergenerational leadership initiative aimed at making sure that young Africans and their perspectives and insights are not only seen but heard too.7 A series of online conferences and webinars have taken place to help ensure meaningful participation in the AU’s quest to end all inter- and intra-state conflicts and genderbased violence by 2020, a campaign which is still ongoing. For example, in July 2019 the Office of the AU’s Youth Envoy (in conjunction with the SGC Unit) convened an event on the role of the youth in the SGC on the side of the African Regional High-Level Conference on Counter-Terrorism and the Prevention of Violent Extremism. A month later, the Office of the AU’s Youth Envoy hosted a conference titled ‘Young People Reimagining Today’s Politics’. As a three-time occupant of a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC), South Africa has invaluable experience which it can use to advance the SGC, something which the Republic acted upon when it occupied the presidency of the UNSC in October 2019, a point which will be returned to below. Secondly, the youth can offer fresh insights into contemporary problems. These insights are imperative, as the needs and ideas of young people are often ‘seen but not heard’ by policy makers, who then make decisions without consulting the constituency and demographic for which the policy is intended.8 As of 2017, 32 African states had a national youth policy, while 14 did not. Two had a draft national youth policy, and six had an unclear stance on their national youth policy.9 Encouragingly, South Africa has a

112

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 112

2022/11/10 00:03

participation in the policymaking process is severely limited due to dwindling infrastructure and unequal access to quality education.11 The struggle for meaningful participation by the South African youth is further impeded by the ‘perception problem’. The general perception of the youth changes depending on the circumstances: During times of peace, economic growth, and reform the youth are seen as a resource, whereas in times of economic crisis and political instability, they are perceived to be a danger or a burden.12 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the participation of the youth in public and foreign policymaking processes helps develop crucial skills such as intellectual and emotional intelligence. Both of these skillsets help to advance an individual’s standing and progress. Teaching these skills to young people is a way to expose individuals to a collaborative environment and mature topics, such as climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and (counter-)terrorism, among others, thereby exposing them to ideas and perspectives drastically different from their own. Such encounters can teach them to accommodate differing perspectives and enable them to sharpen their debating, reasoning, and cultural sensitivity skills. For influence to be exerted, an interaction must first exist between two or more elements; this interaction can be direct or indirect. The meaning and measurement of interaction is discipline-dependent.13 In the realm of political science, interaction is usually paired with qualitative research methods.14 Due to the lack of literature on youth and foreign policy in South Africa, coupled with the fact that the research that this chapter is based on has a small sample size, a qualitative approach was chosen. It is worth mentioning that this gap in the literature is not unique to South Africa, as an inadequate investigation of the youth–foreign-policy nexus and youth diplomacy appears to be a global phenomenon. Modaber argues that the inclusion of the youth in diplomatic practice (youth diplomacy) is advantageous for a sending state, as long-standing and stable relationships

THE YOUTH AND SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY: INFLUENCERS OR PASSIVE OBSERVERS?

National Youth Policy (2015–2020 and 2020–2030).10 Sadly, however, youth

with youth-centric civil society actors enable a government to project a better image to the international community, thereby yielding greater soft power.15 Youth diplomacy has become commonplace among some European states,16 and the concept has begun to gradually gain traction in other parts of the world too. For example, following the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings of 2011, the USA and the European Union (EU) made the youth pivotal recipients of foreign assistance. The USA focused on key areas such as peace and security, democracy and education, and social services, and the EU on programmes to support democratic governance, the rule of law and mobility, and capacity development for civil society.17 Given that the youth have been framed as a demographic that desires liberal regime change, 113

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 113

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 6

host governments should be encouraged to adopt policies that see young people as agents of change by including them in the agenda setting, policy implementation, and policy evaluation processes.18 In 2019, Stephenson employed youth diplomacy on behalf of the Australian government, aimed at 3  000 individuals in Southeast Asia. She found that practising youth diplomacy has three distinct advantages: young people can reach audiences that diplomats cannot; they can attract the interest of audiences with greater ease; and they have more time and energy to convey a message multiple times within a shorter period, thereby driving down the overall costs of programmes whilst also increasing their impact.19 The literature review conducted above, albeit brief, confirms the suitability of qualitative analysis, as it is most likely to undercover insights of greater depth and context. It is also worth mentioning that few of the studies cited above sought to explain the type of interaction between governments and the youth within the youth–foreign-policy nexus, a clear gap which this chapter will attempt to fill within the South African context. Table 4 presents the three-tier categorisation of interaction employed in this chapter. The categorisation specifically concerns itself with how the state and civil society attempt to enable young people to become foreign policy influencers and implementers. From this perspective, civil society is regarded as a tool or mechanism used by young people to enter the foreign policy space and participate therein. This approach was chosen due to the fact that civil society actors often provide young people with essential resources and skillsets that they do not have the resources to acquire themselves and that allow them to participate meaningfully.20

Table 4: Three tiers of interaction Level of interaction

Description

Primary

There are no attempts at interaction by DIRCO or by civil society.

Secondary

Attempts at interaction have been made by both the state and civil society. However, the frequency and quality of interaction are such that young people do not wield sufficient influence.

Tertiary

Clear and ongoing attempts to engage the youth are made by both the state and civil society. The influence of the youth is continuously felt in the realms of diplomacy and foreign policy.

114

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 114

2022/11/10 00:03

THE PUBLIC SECTOR: DIRCO As the ministry occupied with international relations, DIRCO addresses questions of foreign policy decision-making and implementation. DIRCO’s White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy acknowledges that the youth bulge in the Global South presents economic and social opportunities in terms of both the skillsets in the labour market and the depth of the tax pool. However, these opportunities are not fully harnessed due to the nonprovision of skills development and youth employment.21 Alongside South Africa’s National Youth Development Agency (NYDA), DIRCO engages with the South African youth through roadshows at schools and universities. These interactions are designed to provide young people with ‘the opportunity to influence and shape foreign policy’.22 In addition to the roadshows, DIRCO has a youth category within the Ubuntu Diplomacy Awards, an instrument in South Africa’s public diplomacy. The youth category is aimed at recognising young South Africans for their contribution(s) to the promotion of the country’s national interests and values. In 2020, the Youth Ubuntu Diplomacy Award was awarded to Ms Michelle Nkamankeng, (South) Africa’s youngest author, who had published a total of four books, the first one at the age of seven. Media personality Trevor Noah won the Ubuntu Arts and Culture Award (Youth Category) in that year.23 In addition, in 2020 DIRCO had eight programmes aimed at young South Africans. Table 5 illustrates a series of internal engagement mechanisms focused on youth outreach and youth capacity building.

Table 5: A summary of programmes enacted by DIRCO aimed at facilitating youth participation24 Name of programme

THE YOUTH AND SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY: INFLUENCERS OR PASSIVE OBSERVERS?

YOUTH AND FOREIGN POLICY ACTORS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Status at the time of the interview (2020)

Graduate internship

72 interns enrolled

External learnership

Suspended due to financial constraints

Internal learnership

No officials enrolled

Career exhibitions

Suspended due to Covid-19

Career counselling

Telephonic counselling provided

Student counselling (university level) and debates on critical international relations concepts

Suspended due to Covid-19

Primary school pupil counselling

Suspended due to Covid-19

Take a Girl and Boy Child to Work

Suspended due to Covid-19 115

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 115

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 6

DIRCO’s branch for public diplomacy plays an essential role in implementing the mechanism when it comes to adopting an outward approach, and hosts the annual DIRCO Open Day. Various high schools are invited to identify learners who appear to have an ardent interest in international relations, politics, law, and/or economics. The selected learners are then invited to DIRCO, where they have the opportunity for face-to-face interactions with diplomatic practitioners and attend lectures on diplomatic practice delivered by both South African and foreign diplomats.25 DIRCO also acknowledges the importance of tapping into the talent pools at the Republic’s universities. University students are invited to the DIRCO Open Day and the annual Diplomatic Fair, which provides them with the opportunity to network with diplomats from across the world. University students are also invited to weigh in on DIRCO’s annual budget speech. DIRCO’s branch of public diplomacy invites university students to write an essay on one of three foreign policy topics. The essays are assessed by a panel of experts and the winning essay(s) are incorporated into the minister’s budget vote speech; the author(s) of the winning essay(s) are invited to Parliament to watch the minister deliver the speech.26 Another method of outreach is Ubuntu Radio. Radio host Tali Munzhedzi of DIRCO’s Ubuntu Radio is responsible for hosting the weekly ‘Big Debate’ feature, during which young people are given the opportunity to register their opinions on the international relations issues being discussed.27 Ad hoc celebrations or activities are held by DIRCO from time to time. For example, in 2018 former Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Lindiwe Sisulu celebrated Youth Day at the Grace Bible Church in Soweto, Gauteng, an event during which she emphasised the importance of international relations in securing meaningful economic opportunities in an effort to mobilise young South Africans to empower themselves.28 In April 2019, former Deputy Minister Reginah Mhaule hosted a youth outreach programme at Hebron in the Madibeng local municipality in the Northwest province. The aim of the programme was to expose the Hebron community to opportunities offered by DIRCO.29 Deputy Minister Alvin Botes hosted a virtual Youth Day event on 9 June 2020 which focused on the nexus between the youth and diplomacy during the Covid-19 pandemic. DIRCO was joined by the Department of Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities, the UN Youth Development Agency, SAIIA, and the UN Population Fund.30 DIRCO’s acknowledgement and inclusion of the youth goes beyond the country’s borders. South Africa has used its position in various multinational organisations to advance the causes of the youth. As chair of the AU in 2020, South Africa hosted a virtual panel discussion to celebrate Africa Day. The AU’s youth envoy, Aya Chebbi, was a panellist at

116

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 116

2022/11/10 00:03

make meaningful contributions to the attainment of the AU’s development blueprint, Agenda 2063, as well as the fight against Covid-19.31 The office of the AU’s youth envoy conducted a series of consultations across 45 African states on challenges faced by African youth during the Covid-19 pandemic. Ms Chebbi delivered feedback to all African youth ministers on 17 June 2020; she also outlined a series of recommendations that African governments should undertake to assist their youth demographic in areas such as education, health care, civil society, and employment.32 South Africa has promoted youth participation and cooperation within the BRICS bloc33 via the BRICS Youth Summit and the BRICS Youth Energy Agency. The BRICS Youth Summit formally came into being in 2015 when the BRICS countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) underpinning a collective commitment to the BRICS Youth Summit Action Plan, which outlined a framework for economic, political, humanitarian, scientific, and technological cooperation among the youth.34 For its part, South Africa hosted the BRICS Youth Summit from 16 to 18 July 2018 at the Zebula Estate in Bela Bela, Limpopo, via the NYDA and the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME, in the Presidency). The summit was the fourth of its kind and was convened under the theme ‘Radical Economic Transformation: Making the New [BRICS] Development Bank Work for Youth’. A key focus of this summit was the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR). Following the summit, all BRICS member states committed to:35 ■

developing policies to respond to the 4IR

■

increasing research output pertaining to the 4IR while further ensuring that the relevant communities have access to the research conducted

■

reducing the prices of technological products to make them more

THE YOUTH AND SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY: INFLUENCERS OR PASSIVE OBSERVERS?

this event and used the platform to address ways in which the youth could

accessible to a greater percentage of each state’s population ■

tabling and passing legislation to aid the development of the 4IR

■

incorporating information and communication technology (ICT) into housing infrastructure

■

confronting poverty and inequality whilst accommodating the 4IR.

Given that a masterful grasp of technology is required in the time of the 4IR, young people are the ideal demographic for both implementation and participation, as they are often au fait with the latest technological innovations and are thus more comfortable using technology.36 In addition to the BRICS Youth Summit, the BRICS Youth Energy Agency provides a further opportunity for youth participation and integration.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 117

117

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 6

In 2019, the Agency invited teams of young scientists from all BRICS member states to contribute to the BRICS Youth Energy Outlook. In August of the same year, the NYDA and the BRICS Youth Energy Agency signed an agreement establishing formal representation, intended to help facilitate collaboration between the youth of the BRICS countries.37 Lastly, South Africa has used its position as the president of the UNSC to advance the AU’s SGC against the backdrop of the UN Youth, Peace and Security Agenda. This resulted in the issuing of a UNSC presidential statement which outlines six strategies aimed at enabling African youth to advance the SGC. For its part, South Africa focuses on five pillars in advancing the Youth, Peace and Security Agenda:38 1. Participation: The acknowledgement that the youth are agents of change and are thus central to policies pertaining to development, job creation, and development. 2. Protection and Prevention: Creating an environment for young people in conflict-ridden areas that enables them to make positive contributions to the economy as well as society as a whole. 3. Partnerships,

Disengagement,

and

Reintegration:

Using

the

Continental Framework for Youth, Peace and Security (developed by the AU Peace and Security Council [PSC]), the Republic acknowledges the importance of establishing meaningful relationships with both youth and youth organisations to ensure that a ‘youth perspective’ is present in peacemaking and peacebuilding processes. 4. UNSC Reform: A call to young (South) Africans to champion institutional reform, particularly of the UNSC, to not only include a permanent African voice but to also channel effectiveness and efficacy. 5. Empowerment of Young Women: An ongoing concern that the majority of youth programmes predominantly focus on young men, thereby neglecting the plight of young girls, particularly in relation to gender-based violence. The final call on the above list has somewhat solidified, with Deputy Minister Alvin Botes co-hosting the International Youth Day virtual dialogue on 12 August 2020 – on ‘Silencing the Guns in Our Lifetime: A Peace and Security Agenda’ – with UN Women and the embassies of Switzerland and Norway. The dialogue was facilitated in the hope that it would help to mobilise the youth to yield their full potential in implementing peace, security, and sustainable development, with particular emphasis being placed on UNSC Resolution 2250.39 118

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 118

2022/11/10 00:03

The African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) has often disagreed with its parental organisation on its stances on foreign policy. Key examples include disagreement on regime change in Botswana in 201140 and South Africa’s position on the no-fly zone over Libya in 2011 while serving on the UNSC; as regards the latter, the ANCYL posited that a peaceful political solution would have been a better approach.41 The Democratic Alliance (DA) does not mention the youth or their importance in its foreign policy document published in November 2013.42 However, it should be noted that under former Premier Helen Zille, the provincial government of the Western Cape (the only province under opposition control) acknowledged the importance of the youth by using opportunities yielded by BRICS cooperation to aid youth development.43 Given that these two phenomena occurred less than a year apart, it seems to fair to conclude that the DA updated its foreign policy to be more inclusive and aware of the youth. The present scope of the Western Cape’s International Relations Strategy, coupled with the continuing presence of the DA government in the province, could suggest that the aforementioned strategy is still, for the most part, favourable with the current administration. Finally, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) have released little information to the public on their foreign policy stances and priorities. Past attempts by the author to engage the EFF on foreign policy matters have been unsuccessful. Most recently, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) published an occasional paper in 2019 in which the foreign policy stances of various political parties were reflected upon. The information was obtained during an event hosted by the Foundation, at which political parties were invited to share their perspectives on foreign policy with young South Africans. The paper found that there was a divergence between party rhetoric and party manifestos.44 It should be noted that the EFF did not

THE YOUTH AND SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY: INFLUENCERS OR PASSIVE OBSERVERS?

THE YOUTH AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA’S POLITICAL PARTIES

attend this event, despite being invited to do so,45 which further suggests that the EFF has no clear view on foreign policy for South Africa.

CIVIL SOCIETY SAIIA Founded in 1934, SAIIA has been committed to incorporating youth perspectives into its work since 1994, but it was not until SAIIA’s 75th anniversary in 2010 that the position of youth development officer was created.46 This transition eventually resulted in the formal establishment of 119

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 119

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 6

the Youth@SAIIA Programme, which is administered by Desireé Kosciulek and her team. At the time of writing, the Programme had four active strands:47 1. Negotiations and debates: The Programme has hosted a series of institutional simulations, including Model UN, Model AU, Model SADC, Model BRICS, and Model Legislature. The increased focus on Africa’s international organisations is meant to encourage a greater emphasis on African issues, while the inclusion of the legislative simulation is meant to entice young people to think how their local government is addressing key issues such as the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 2. Young Researchers’ Programme: This programme hosts young researchers at high school and university level – as well as outside of these settings, provided that they are between 14 and 24 years of age. The objective of this undertaking is to help develop the research skills of fledgling researchers. Participants are given an issue to focus on and are then expected to draft policy recommendations; the authors of the most impressive outputs are invited to present their findings and have their work published on SAIIA’s website. 3. The annual Young Leaders’ Conference (YLC): The YLC takes place over a seven-day period, in which young people are given the opportunity to participate in dialogues and negotiations on key issues in international relations. Unlike other mechanisms, the YLC offers young people the opportunity to present their own views on issues related to their country of origin. 4. The Youth Policy Committee (YPC): The YPC was found by alumni of the YLC in an attempt to establish a network between various youth actors and SAIIA. At present, the YPC has 12 working groups, the most active of which are those on gender and climate issues. The Youth@SAIIA Programme has enjoyed some laudable successes, including the establishment of a formal exchange programme between South African universities and Howard University in Washington, DC, as well as the compilation of the UNICEF Youth Advocacy Guide in 2019.48 In terms of the programme’s relationship with the government, it appears to have collaborative relationships with various spheres of government, including at municipal level, where the programme delivered leadership workshops with school learners. With reference to DIRCO, Kosciulek indicated that youth engagement, particularly with the younger age groups, could be further developed with DIRCO. Kosciulek further noted that successful collaboration with DIRCO largely rested on the fostering of

120

personal relationships, and that this can be challenging.49

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 120

2022/11/10 00:03

South African Youth for International Diplomacy (SAYID) was formed in 2010 by Tribute Mboweni, following her participation as South Africa’s first official delegate to the Youth 20 (Y20) Summit. SAYID was to cooperate with DIRCO on the recruitment and training of future Y20 delegates. This arrangement remained in place until 2016, when it was decided that the NYDA would assume control of all the processes in 2017.50

SABYA SABYA was founded in 2017 with the key objective of helping to build the capacity of young (South) Africans so as to enable them to assist BRICS member states to make progress towards the UN SDGs and the AU’s Agenda 2063. SABYA aimed to connect ordinary South Africans to BRICS affairs by hosting a series of workshops across Africa.51 SABYA is the brainchild of Raymond Matlala (a consultant and civil society leader within the realm of youth, diplomacy, and foreign policy), who identified the need to create a forum for youth engagement on the BRICS bloc. This need emerged as existing platforms for engagement (DIRCO; the NYDA; and the Ministry in the Presidency for Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities) did not have a BRICS desk tasked with youth engagement.52 SABYA’s membership has grown substantially to include young people from other African countries as well as from beyond the continent.

ISAMUN The Model United Nations mechanisms have played a massive role, with SAIIA hosting the high school programme while the South African Model United Nations Association administers the university-level programme.

THE YOUTH AND SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY: INFLUENCERS OR PASSIVE OBSERVERS?

SAYID

ISAMUN was founded by Raymond Matlala following the identification of two further gaps. Firstly, there was an opportunity in the market to allow civil society actors and early-career professionals to also participate in the Module United Nations programme. Secondly, the founder soon established that no South Africans were chairs or co-chairs at any Model United Nations conferences he attended. The lack of a South African presence in these key positions was due to a lack of capacity, and it was hoped that ISAMUM would help close this capacity gap. The inaugural ISAMUN conference was meant to take place in 2020, but was postponed due to Covid-19. It is also worth mentioning that DIRCO has offered to host SABYA and ISAMUN workshops to aid these organisations in their work, but this had also not yet taken place by the time this information was obtained via interview.53

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 121

121

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 6

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION With the roles and contributions of the various selected platforms outlined, it now becomes necessary to determine the level of youth interaction in and youth influence on foreign policy affairs. An understanding of the public’s opinions can help to determine if the responsibility for meaningful engagement of the country’s youth in foreign policy affairs (or the lack thereof) should rest with a single actor, as is the case in South Africa (DIRCO), or if multiple actors should shoulder some of the responsibility. This is an important issue which will also help to elucidate the forthcoming recommendations. A small number of surveys have been conducted in this regard. The results of a survey conducted by Van der Westhuizen and Smith suggest that South Africans want the country to assume a leading role on the African continent, with 66 per cent of respondents indicating that the country should help resolve conflicts in Africa, 65 per cent agreeing that other African states should view South Africa as a leader in Africa, and 63 per cent indicating that South Africa should give aid to other African states. A total of 51 per cent of the respondents were young people (aged 15–34).54 A 2015 survey by Roberts, Struwig, Gordon, and Bohler-Muller found that ‘the South African public [are] relatively ill-informed about international affairs’. However, these scholars further conclude: ‘Although many participants lacked knowledge of world events, almost all were able to express a preference on foreign policy issues.’55 A more recent survey by Steyn-Kotze and Bohler-Muller confirms that ‘South Africans remain ill-informed about international affairs’.56 These findings are consistent with grassroots interactions Raymond Matlala has had with young people. Matlala indicates that some of the young people he has spoken to did not know what the BRICS acronym stands for; in fact, they often thought that Matlala was referring to building materials.57 It should be noted that the surveys by Roberts et al. and by Steyn-Kotze and Bohler-Muller do not specify the ages or age groups of their sample. However, it seems fair to assume that young people would constitute the majority of the respondents, given that South Africa has experienced a fairly consistent population growth rate over the last decade.58 DIRCO has also attracted negative publicity due to misconduct by South African diplomats serving overseas as well as profligate expenditure. Some examples of the former include the Twitter storm unleashed by Zindzi Mandela-Hlongwane when she posted controversial tweets on land reform in South Africa while serving as South Africa’s ambassador to Demark,59 or Shirish Soni misrepresenting his academic qualifications whilst on deployment in Italy.60 An example of profligate expenditure emerged in October

122

2020 when it was claimed that DIRCO spent R118 million on a building in

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 122

2022/11/10 00:03

implications of such occurrences for a young person’s willingness to pursue a diplomatic career are unclear, it is logical to assume that a postgraduate student or early-career professional considering a diplomatic career would follow developments at DIRCO and could, in doing so, be dissuaded from this particular career choice given the negative publicity. Another contributing factor to the disinterest in foreign policy issues amongst the youth is the missteps made by the Republic when responding to international youth events. For example, at the Y20 conference hosted by Argentina in 2018, South Africa had no official representation for most of the conference, with one delegate not able to attend and another arriving on the last day. This resulted in Matlala being appointed to the position of the delegate by the NYDA. A similar incident occurred in 2017, when Russia invited South Africa to send approximately 200 delegates to the World Festival of Youths and Students. South Africa only managed to send between 43 and 47 delegates, with most being political appointees. Another notable example is the unpreparedness of the 2019 Y20 delegation to Japan.62 All of the above are indicative that while South Africa has made an effect to engage the youth in its foreign policy discourse, there are many obstacles to overcome, including continual disinterest, the weak image of diplomacy as a profession, and poor support for and representation by South Africa’s youth delegates at key international forums. As an antidote to the public’s ignorance regarding foreign policy matters, two of the surveys discussed earlier recommend that the South African Council on International Relations (SACOIR), a mechanism established by DIRCO in June 2015 to encourage engagement on foreign policy matters with various stakeholders,63 have its mandate and structure clarified and implemented to full capacity so as to increase public participation.64 The role of the SACOIR has been set out as follows:

THE YOUTH AND SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY: INFLUENCERS OR PASSIVE OBSERVERS?

New York that was found to be unsuitable following the purchase.61 While the

SACOIR was established as a consultative platform for South African thinktanks, academics, and other relevant representatives of civil society to interact with DIRCO on the development and implementation of South Africa’s foreign policy. It has since been disbanded, and there are ongoing discussions to revive structured engagement with the think-tank[s], academic communities and other related role-players.65

While it is concerning that this platform has been ‘disbanded’, it is encouraging to see that discussions pertaining to the revival and resumption of such engagement are on the agenda. What would be a significant step is creating space for the youth to have a voice in such a forum. 123

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 123

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS This chapter explored the youth’s levels of interaction with and influence on South Africa’s foreign policy. Due to the small sample size, an exploratory qualitative approach was used. It was found that the youth have a secondary-level interaction with South Africa’s foreign policy (see Table 4 earlier in this chapter). This means that both the state and civil society have made an effort to engage with the youth on foreign policy matters, but, at present, young people have relatively more interaction with foreign policy than influence on foreign policy. South Africa has clearly acknowledged the importance of the youth within the context of foreign policy and international relations more broadly; however, this acknowledgement has not always translated into firm and sustainable action or clear impact. For its part, civil society has come to play a supporting role in making sure that the youth have the knowledge, capacity, and means to engage in the foreign policy discourse, often having to fill the gaps left by the state; this is particularly the case with SABYA and ISAMUN, which supported African engagement on BRICS and on the forum for Model United Nations. The findings of this research further suggest that DIRCO struggles to establish and sustain meaningful cooperation with civil society; SAYID’s withdrawal from the training of youth delegates, SABYA’s and ISAMUN’s ‘resource relationship’ with DIRCO, and SAIIA’s dependency on personal relationships within DIRCO are all indicative of this. The continued involvement of other government agencies and departments – such as the NYDA; the Department of Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities; and the DPME – in youth events pertaining to foreign policy and international relations suggests that DIRCO, despite its foreign policy mandate, is only there to build a bridge between the youth and these government departments.

LIMITATIONS It is important to acknowledge the two main limitations of this research and make recommendations for future research. Firstly, as has already been mentioned, the sample size employed in this research was rather small, which may bring the reliability of the findings into question. And while this point certainly has merit, the high-profile nature of the participants suggests that their combined wealth of experience can compensate for the small sample size. It is hoped that this chapter will encourage additional civil society actors to engage the youth in foreign policy matters and to come forward to support and discuss their activities and share their experiences, both with the youth and with the academic community. As such, future research 124

would need to focus on the expansion of the sample size of actors involved in

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 124

2022/11/10 00:03

should be considered to help keep track of the various actors over time. Secondly, this chapter had to rely on an explorative approach, which means that levels of interaction and influence were not measured against a set of predetermined variables; as a result, the researcher relied on people’s personal experiences in the field. While these experiences are invaluable sources of information, they do not lead to quantifiable results. As such, the database recommended above should also focus on the development of an even set of variables that can be used to measure the processes of interaction and influence as complementary processes.

RECOMMENDATIONS Given that the youth are a demographic of growing importance in South Africa, there are several policy recommendations that should be considered by the various actors involved in facilitating interaction between young people and the country’s foreign policy. Firstly, in terms of the government, the following recommendations can be made: ■

DIRCO as a central actor in engaging the youth: DIRCO has been found to act as a bridge between the youth and other government departments. DIRCO should instead play a leading role in the recruitment and training of youth delegates to international forums. Given its capacity limitations, it is imperative that DIRCO collaborate with civil society on this.

■

The youth as agents, not policy objectives: Linked to the above, young people and their participation are often viewed as the objectives or goals of a policy. Instead, strides should be made to ensure that young people become agents of policy and not simply goals or objectives. In aid of this recommendation, future research should also attempt

THE YOUTH AND SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY: INFLUENCERS OR PASSIVE OBSERVERS?

the youth–foreign-policy nexus; in addition, the construction of a database

to access the nexus between the youth and economic/commercial diplomacy, with the aim of determining if the Republic’s economic and commercial diplomacy helps to reduce youth unemployment. ■

Public image matters: DIRCO should note, with grave concern and urgency, that its public image matters. Revelations of misdeeds on the part of disgraced diplomats in recent years suggest that not enough is being done to ensure a more comprehensive vetting process of all diplomatic deployments. The youth of the Republic need positive role models on the international stage if they are going to consider meaningful participation in foreign affairs.

■

Better public relations: DIRCO and the NYDA should appoint diplomats and youth delegates on a merit-based system to ensure

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 125

125

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 6

maximal and meaningful participation and representation. The merit-based system should focus on competency, integrity, diversity, emotional maturity, critical thinking, and the ability to collaborate. Additionally, allegations about profligate expenditure should be responded to and, where possible, expenditure records should be made available to debunk such claims. ■

Follow-up: Linked to the previous point, DIRCO has undertaken several programmes and activities that are youth-centric. However, the impact of these programmes and activities remains largely unreported. DIRCO should release follow-up statements for each programme and activity undertaken, with particular emphasis on key partners and stakeholders, successes, and lessons learnt. Follow-up reporting will also aid research in this regard, as academics might be able to use this information to make more meaningful recommendations for diplomatic training, programme design, and foreign policy.

■

The re-establishment of a consultative forum: DIRCO should, with haste, work towards re-establishing a consultative forum. The proposed forum should consist of the following representation: former ambassadors in good standing, civil society organisations involved in international relations, think tanks, a pool of South African academics, a pool of African academics (outside of South Africa), a pool of academics from outside of Africa, organisations focused on the promotion of gender responsiveness, youth organisations focused on international relations, a pool of established and fledgling businesspersons, and any other professionals deemed necessary for the attainment of specific foreign policy goals (economic diplomacy or science diplomacy).

■

Youth events outside of exam season: Youth Month occurs during the month of June in commemoration of the youth uprising of 16 June 1976. However, this month is also exam time for many young people, which may prevent them from participating meaningfully in youth events. As a result, DIRCO should instead plan youth events outside of exam season to ensure that meaningful participation can become a primary focus among the youth. The holding of events throughout the year, at regular intervals, could also encourage young people to participate more often, as it could be seen to confirm that they are an important demographic.

■

The high school curriculum: School subjects such as Life Orientation, History, and English should be revised to ensure sufficient coverage of world events and how they have a collective impact on the global society.

126

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 126

2022/11/10 00:03

A formal collaboration protocol: DIRCO and the NYDA should establish a formal collaboration protocol so that civil society actors become less reliant on personal relationships within the government to establish partnerships.

The following recommendations are related to civil society: ■

Learn to collaborate: Actors in the civil society sector should learn to combine their resources to yield more impactful results. For example, the Youth@SAIIA Programme should consider collaborating with ISAMUN so that the best practices pertaining to the Model United Nations Programme are brought to the surface and shared. This should also help to build the much-needed capacity for youth delegates, as once SAIIA participants ‘outgrow’ their initial programme, they could be moved on to ISAMUN to continue their work.

■

Look for partners in education: Apart from SAIIA, the other civil society actors have few or no partners in education. As such, they should seek to sign MoUs with high schools and institutions of higher learning to ensure a resource pool and talent pool from which to draw. This will help to ensure a steady flow of participants for civil society programmes, thus providing school leavers and university students with the opportunity to build their professional networks before they enter the world of work.

■

Establish a resource fund: Civil society actors within the youth– foreign-policy nexus should come together to establish and collectively administer a resource fund so as to enable young people from rural areas to participate and take advantage of opportunities to the same degree as their urban counterparts.

THE YOUTH AND SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY: INFLUENCERS OR PASSIVE OBSERVERS?

■

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1 Siko, J. 2016. Inside South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Diplomacy in Africa from Smuts to Mbeki. London: I. B. Taurus. 2 Statistics South Africa. 2019. ‘SA population reaches 58,8 million.’ http://www. statssa.gov.za/?p=12362#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20mid%2Dyear,and%20 8%2C80%20million%20females (Accessed March 2020). 3 IEC (Electoral Commission of South Africa). 2021. ‘Registration statistics as of 21 Jan 2021.’ https://www.elections.org.za/content/Voters-Roll/Registration-statistics/ (Accessed January 2021). Due to the way the IEC presents its statistics, this percentage is based on data that include the complete age bracket (30–39 years of age). 127

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 127

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 6

4 Ramaphosa, C. 2018. ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa: 2018 State of the Nation Address.’ 16 February. https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2018-state-nationaddress-16-feb-2018-0000 (Accessed 20 January 2022). Also see Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2018. A New Dawn: President Cyril Ramaphosa sworn in at Parliament. Session: The Official Newsletter of the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa Issue 1. https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Publications/ InSession/2018-01/final.pdf (Accessed 21 December 2021). 5 Cilliers, J. 2018. ‘Violence in Africa: Trends, drivers and prospects to 2023.’ ISS Africa Report 12, August, p. 13. https://issafrica.org/research/africa-report/violence-in-africatrends-drivers-and-prospects-to-2023 (Accessed 6 May 2022). 6 World Bank. 2018. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/publication/pathways-forpeace-inclusive-approaches-to-preventing-violent-conflict (Accessed April 2020). 7 AU (African Union). 2020. ‘Youth Silencing the Guns Intergenerational Dialogues: Policy Report 2020.’ https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/39577-doc-oye_stg_ policy_report_2020_1.pdf (Accessed December 2020). 8 Mampane, S. 2019. ‘Youth development through participation in decision making: A case of South Africa – development and participative decision making.’ In Participation of Young People in Governance Processes in Africa, edited by J. Kurebwa and O. Dodo. Hershey: IGI Global: p. 47; UN. 2003. ‘World Youth Report 2003’. https://www.un.org/ development/desa/youth/world-youth-report/world-youth-report-2003.html (Accessed April 2020). 9 Corrigan, T. 2017. ‘Getting youth policy right in Africa.’ Africa Portal, 11 August. https:// www.africaportal.org/features/getting-youth-policy-right-africa/ (Accessed March 2020). 10 The author wishes to note that South Africa’s National Youth Policy is not the only youth-centric policy document enacted by the government. For a full list of policies and strategies, see University of Cape Town Library. ‘Youth: Government resources: Library guide: Policies and strategies.’ https://libguides.lib.uct.ac.za/GovtPubs/Youth/ SouthAfrica/Policies (Accessed December 2020). 11 Chamisa, S. F. and Shava, E. 2016. ‘Youth involvement in policymaking: A case of South Africa.’ Journal of Social Sciences 49: 165–174, p. 168. https://doi.org/10.1080/0971892 3.2016.11893609. 12 Mtwesi, A. 2014. ‘An overview of youth policy.’ The Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation 74: 37–41. 13 Wang, X., Elston, R. C. and Zhu, X. 2010. ‘The meaning of interaction.’ Human Heredity 70(4): 269–277. https://doi.org/10.1159/000321967. 14 Brambor, T., Clark, W. R. and Golder, M. 2006. ‘Understanding interaction models.’ Political Analysis 14(1): 63–82. https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpi014. 15 Modaber, R. 2016. ‘Role of youth diplomacy in governments’ foreign relationships by using YNGOs capacity (youth-non-governmental organisations).’ Journal of Politics and Law 9(2): 219–231, p. 226. https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v9n2p219. 16 Modaber, ‘Role of youth diplomacy’. 17 Huber, D. 2017. ‘Youth as a new foreign policy challenge in the Middle East and North Africa: A critical interrogation of the European Union and US youth policies in Morocco and Tunisia.’ European Foreign Affairs Review 22(1): 111–128, pp. 113, 114.

128

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 128

2022/11/10 00:03

19 Stephenson, E. 2020. ‘Youth-led diplomacy: Big opportunity for big impact.’ The Interpreter, 2 March. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/youth-led-diplomacybig-opportunity-big-impact (Accessed January 2021). 20 Kosciulek, D. Head of Programme, Youth@SAIIA Programme, SAIIA. MS Teams Interview, July 2020. 21 DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation). 2011. Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy. Pretoria: DIRCO, pp. 17, 18. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/ foreignpolicy0.pdf (Accessed 5 May 2022). 22 DIRCO. Email correspondence, June 2020. 23 DIRCO. 2020. ‘Ubuntu Awards celebrate excellence in diplomacy.’ Ubuntu 20. http:// www.dirco.gov.za/department/ubuntu/ubuntu_issue20.pdf (Accessed May 2020). 24 Table 5 does not provide a full list of programmes enacted by DIRCO. Instead, it focuses on the programmes that are youth-centric, as identified during an online interview with DIRCO in July 2020. 25 DIRCO, email correspondence, June 2020. 26 DIRCO, email correspondence, June 2020. 27 DIRCO, email correspondence, June 2020. 28 DIRCO. 2018. ‘Minister Sisulu to celebrate Youth Month at the Grace Bible Church.’ Media advisory, 15 June. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2018/media0615.htm (Accessed December 2020). 29 DIRCO. 2019. ‘Deputy Minister Reginah Mhaule to host Youth Outreach Programme.’ Media invite, 24 April. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2019/media0425.htm (Accessed December 2020). 30 DIRCO. 2020. ‘Deputy Minister Botes to host a webinar on diplomacy and the youth in the age of COVID-19 pandemic.’ Media statement, 9 June. http://www.dirco.gov.za/ docs/2020/diplomacy_youth0609.htm (Accessed January 2021). 31 DIRCO, email correspondence, June 2020. 32 For a full statement of recommendations, see AU. 2020. ‘Statement of the AU Chairperson’s Special Envoy on Youth, Ms Aya Chebbi to African youth ministers.’ 17 June. https://au.int/en/speeches/20200617/statement-au-chairpersons-special-envoyyouth-ms-aya-chebbi-african-youth (Accessed September 2020).

THE YOUTH AND SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY: INFLUENCERS OR PASSIVE OBSERVERS?

18 Huber, ‘Youth as a new foreign policy challenge’, pp. 127, 128.

33 The BRICS bloc was founded in 2006, with South Africa joining the bloc on 13 April 2011. The BRICS countries, as will be partly illustrated by this chapter, cooperate on a whole range of issues with the aim of promoting a collective agenda for emerging and middle powers. 34 DIRCO, email correspondence, June 2020. 35 DIRCO, email correspondence, June 2020. 36 Stephenson, ‘Youth-led diplomacy’. 37 DIRCO, email correspondence, June 2020. 38 DIRCO, email correspondence, June 2020.

129

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 129

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 6

39 DIRCO. 2020. ‘Deputy Minister Botes to address virtual dialogue on Silencing the Guns.’ Media statement, 11 August. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2020/youth0811.htm (Accessed December 2020); UNSC Resolution 2250 was the brainchild of Jordan and was introduced in 2015 to introduce young people into the international peace and security discourse. 40 Shivambu, F. ‘Why we disagree with the ANC on Botswana – ANCYL’. Politicsweb, 2 August. https://www.politicsweb.co.za/party/why-we-disagree-with-the-anc-onbotswana--ancyl (Accessed January 2021). 41 Shivambu, F. 2011. ‘ANCYL: Statement by Floyd Shivambu, African National Congress Youth League spokesperson, on the situation in Libya (21\03\2011).’ Polity, 21 March. https://www.polity.org.za/print-version/ancyl-statement-by-floydshivambu-african-national-congress-youth-league-spokesperson-on-the-situation-inlibya-21032011-2011-03-21 (Accessed January 2021). 42 Democratic Alliance. 2013. ‘DA green paper on resetting SA foreign policy: Balancing human rights with our national interest.’ Emailed to the author. 43 Western Cape Provincial Government. 2013. Western Cape International Relations Strategy. September. https://www.westerncape.gov.za/sites/www.westerncape.gov.za/ files/international-relations-strategy.pdf (Accessed December 2020). 44 Mnguni, L. 2019. ‘South African political parties face the world in an election year – 2019: Reflecting on manifestos and their take on forging policy.’ FES (Friedrich Ebert Foundation) South Africa Occasional Paper Series. https://www.fes-southafrica.org/ topics/international-relations-and-foreign-policy/ (Accessed December 2020). 45 Mnguni, ‘South African political parties face the world in an election year’. 46 Kosciulek, interview, July 2020. 47 Kosciulek, interview, July 2020. 48 Kosciulek, interview, July 2020. 49 Kosciulek, interview, July 2020. 50 Matlala, R. Chairperson of the South African BRICS Youth Association, founder and Director-General of ISAMUN. Skype interview, July 2020. 51 SABYA (South African BRICS Youth Association). 2020. ‘About us.’ http://sabya.org.za/ about (Accessed June 2020). 52 Matlala, interview, July 2020. 53 Matlala, interview, July 2020. 54 Van der Westhuizen, J. and Smith, K. 2015. ‘Pragmatic internationalism: Public opinion on South Africa’s role in the world.’ Journal of Contemporary African Studies 33(3): 318–347, p. 343. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2015.1108001. 55 Roberts, B. J., Struwig, J., Gordon, S. and Bohler-Muller, N. 2015. ‘Contemporary South African foreign policy: Public knowledge, benefits and preferences.’ HSRC Policy Brief, 25 August, p. 4. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11910/1986. 56 Steyn-Kotze, J. and Bohler-Muller, N. 2018. ‘Soft power and foreign policy priorities: South African views.’ HSRC Policy Brief, 8 October, p. 5. http://hdl.handle. net/20.500.11910/12732. Policy brief emailed to the researcher on 8 June 2020. 57 Matlala, interview, July 2020.

130

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 130

2022/11/10 00:03

59 The Citizen. 2019. ‘Zindzi Mandela lashes out at “tumbling white cowards” and “shivering land thieves”.’ 15 June. https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/socialmedia/2143542/zindzi-mandela-lashes-out-at-trembling-white-cowards-andshivering-land-thieves/ (Accessed May 2020); The author wishes to indicate that while freedom of speech is recognised, Ms Mandela should have acted with greater diplomatic tact on social media given her position and status. 60 Wa Africa, M. and Ngoepe, K. 2020. ‘SA’s ambassador to Italy recalled over “irregularities”.’ IOL, 12 January. https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/sas-ambassadorto-italy-recalled-over-irregularities-40463679 (Accessed May 2020). 61 Masondo, S. 2020. ‘DIRCO paid R118m for a piece of land in New York that turned out to be an “unsuitable” old building.’ News24, 28 October. https://www.news24.com/ news24/southafrica/investigations/dirco-paid-r118m-for-a-piece-of-land-in-new-yorkthat-turned-out-to-be-an-unsuitable-old-building-20201028 (Accessed October 2020). 62 Matlala, interview, July 2020. 63 The author wishes to note that DIRCO has also established a Former Ambassadors’ Forum. However, the forum is not included in the discussion in this chapter, as it does not expressly engage with the youth. 64 PMG (Parliamentary Monitory Group). 2016. ‘South African Council on International Relations (SACOIR); SA Association of Former Ambassadors: DIRCO briefing.’ 16 March. https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/22248/ (Accessed December 2020); Steyn-Kotze and Bohler-Muller, ‘Soft power and foreign policy priorities’; Roberts et al., ‘Contemporary South African foreign policy’. 65 DIRCO, email correspondence, June 2020.

THE YOUTH AND SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY: INFLUENCERS OR PASSIVE OBSERVERS?

58 World Bank. 2020. ‘Population growth (annual %): South Africa.’ https://data. worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?end=2019&locations=ZA&start=2010&view =chart (Accessed March 2020).

131

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 131

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 7

South Africa’s Maritime Diplomacy Lisa Otto

INTRODUCTION The oceans are a place of central importance to the global economy, with the vast majority of the world’s trade traversing them, rendering them of geopolitical importance. Other maritime-related economic activities, including fisheries, offshore oil and gas, and coastal tourism, for example, are significant contributors to the economies of many states. In recent years, the oceans have garnered more attention for the potential they offer as a next frontier of economic development. From a political perspective, the oceans have long been used as a tool for states to project power and assert dominance, as was seen historically in the form of conquest, and as continues to play out in geostrategic battles over territory, islands, and shipping lanes. With the climate changing, the oceans have an important place on the political agenda; for this reason states are working to mitigate rising sea levels, prevent the decimation of fish stocks and ocean biodiversity, and curb the use of the ocean (inadvertently or otherwise) to dump waste. South Africa boasts a coastline of nearly 3 000 kilometres that borders three oceans and offers access to a vast ocean territory, spanning southwards towards the Prince Edward Islands roughly 1 000 nautical miles from Port Elizabeth.1 The country also submitted a continental shelf claim in 2009 to substantially expand this territory.2 Indeed, it has a history in which the sea played a key role given its colonial past, which has shaped the sociopolitical fabric of contemporary South Africa. Despite these facts, the maritime domain does not have a central place in South African politics or economics, and even less so in its foreign policy or diplomatic engagement. The maritime seems to sit at the periphery of domestic concerns and diplomatic practice and has, as such, been afforded little academic attention vis-à-vis other forms of diplomacy. This chapter therefore intends to build on the existing literature and sketch out the placement of the maritime within the foreign policy and diplomacy of South Africa, considering the post-1994 period broadly. It does so by first conceptualising maritime diplomacy and then providing a general assessment of South Africa’s engagements in the maritime domain, before specifically considering its maritime diplomacy. It categorises these

132

activities according to ocean, tracing the platforms in which South Africa

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 132

2022/11/10 00:03

in which Pretoria has engaged. Having considered maritime diplomacy across the democratic dispensation, the chapter concludes with a brief assessment of the Ramaphosa era, to bring the analysis to the present day.

MARITIME DIPLOMACY: A CONCEPTUALISATION Diplomacy can broadly be seen as an output or instrument of foreign policy – the actions taken by a state’s representatives abroad to advance the country’s foreign policy. Of course, there are many areas of diplomatic practice, of which maritime diplomacy can be considered one. However, Van Nieuwkerk and Manganyi highlight that there is a paucity of work

SOUTH AFRICA’S MARITIME DIPLOMACY

has practised maritime diplomacy and referencing the chief maritime issues

around defining maritime diplomacy. They note that ‘remarkably, maritimeoriented concepts of foreign policy or diplomacy do not readily appear in the literature’, indicating a literature gap between the two fields of study.3 In surveying the literature, it seems that Van Nieuwkerk and Manganyi are correct. Few scholars engage with ‘maritime foreign policy’ or ‘maritime diplomacy’ as ideas; rather, these concepts are explored as fluid extensions of the existing conceptualisation of ‘foreign policy’, ‘diplomacy’, and ‘naval diplomacy’ in relation to country case studies or historical events. Naval diplomacy is itself a well-established concept, leading scholars to lean on it to extrapolate to maritime diplomacy. According to Widen, naval diplomacy refers to ‘the use of naval force as a political instrument short of war’, including ‘all forms of coercive diplomacy by naval means, as well as different kinds of passive and subtle demonstrations of naval power’.4 It does not, however, consist of all non-belligerent tasks performed by a navy, nor all instances of the use of naval force for political reasons. Widen further clarifies the need to distinguish naval diplomacy from ‘gunboat diplomacy’, deeming the latter narrow and ‘more aggressive’, usually through use of intimidation by a greater power against a weaker one.5 Manicom moves beyond naval diplomacy, and although he does not define maritime diplomacy, he describes it as including a range of activities that build confidence between states, especially those which might otherwise be belligerents, thereby enhancing regional peace and security.6 Gindarsah and Priamarizki also steer clear of a definition but use the term to reference the resolution of maritime boundary disputes in the context of Indonesia – for which, being an archipelagic state, maritime borders are inseparable from national interest.7 La Mière is one of few scholars to explicitly define maritime diplomacy; however, he offers only a brief interpretation: ‘the management of international relations through the maritime domain.’ He distinguishes

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 133

133

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 7

between the use of diplomacy to assuage sea-based tensions, for example through the use or development of international legal instruments; instead, he explains that maritime diplomacy constitutes the use of maritime assets to manage interstate relations.8 Further to this, maritime diplomacy can be either persuasive or coercive, depending on whether ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ diplomatic tools are employed. This is the same understanding that Busiega bases his definition on.9 Van Nieuwkerk and Manganyi expand on Le Mière’s work by expressing that, ultimately, maritime foreign policy can be understood as ‘the intent of a nation to preserve, protect and promote its maritime interests as reflected in its national interest doctrine or philosophy, often codified in a constitution or national policies’.10 Maritime interests thus stem directly from national interests and can span activities relating to the protection and/or enhancement of maritime assets. Maritime interests stem from four strategic interest areas: trade, investment, and economic growth; defence and security; soft power; and development cooperation. Maritime diplomacy, meanwhile, references the behaviour and actions taken by a state in order to serve these maritime interests through the use of tools of soft and hard power, depending on how the state assesses what the circumstances call for. Maritime diplomacy may thus be employed at various levels in the political, economic, and security domains, and may often be strategic in nature.

SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS MARITIME DOMAIN: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE To assess the nature of South Africa’s engagement in maritime diplomacy, it is pertinent to first locate its maritime interests and how these are currently reflected in its domestic engagement with the maritime domain. South Africa did not, at the time of writing, have a maritime security strategy,11 nor any consolidated policy outlook on its maritime domain and how it wishes to sustainably exploit and develop ocean resources to serve its interests, despite its involvement in strategy development at regional and continental levels. In the absence of this, one may turn to a number of departmental policies and strategies, but there are arguably two initiatives that speak to the maritime domain across departments: one is Operation Phakisa (OP), and the other is the road map for the country’s maritime future produced by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). OP is an ‘all-of-government’ initiative, launched as an arm of the National Development Plan (NDP), that aims to harness the ‘blue economy’ – what Findlay describes as a sustainable ocean economy12 – and thereby tackle two of South Africa’s most pressing challenges: slow economic growth and 134

high rates of unemployment. Five criteria have been used in the selection of

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 134

2022/11/10 00:03

to GDP and job creation, relevance to the marine eco system, geo-political, security and environmental implications, institutional and logistical capacity requirements for […] growth [and, finally,] novelty’.13 OP consists of projects under ‘labs’, in the oceans economy, health, education, mining, biodiversity economy, agricultural, land reform and rural development, and chemicals and waste economy.14 It has projects than run under each one of these labs, which, it is envisaged, will see results brought through the ‘Big Fast Results’ methodology. Meanwhile, A Research, Innovation and Knowledge Management Road Map for the South African Maritime Sector: Charting a Course to Maritime Excellence by 2030 (hereafter the Road Map) was published in 2016 following a collaborative process between the South African Maritime Safety

SOUTH AFRICA’S MARITIME DIPLOMACY

growth and delivery areas of the initiative, namely ‘potential contribution

Authority (SAMSA), the Department of Science and Technology (DST), and the South African International Maritime Institute (SAIMI), facilitated by the CSIR. The document is intended to ‘set the agenda’ for a way forward for both the maritime and marine sectors by setting out the necessary actions to achieve maritime excellence,15 but cannot necessarily be considered a policy document. It highlights eight objectives:16 1. A recognition of the country’s maritime culture and learning from its maritime history 2. An enabling governance framework 3. Efficient coordination, collaboration, and knowledge sharing and the encouragement of investment and development 4. Sustainable utilisation and protection of natural resources 5. A relevant, targeted, and well-functioning multidisciplinary research, innovation, and knowledge management system 6. Sustained economic growth and structured financing of maritime initiatives 7. The prioritisation of safety, security, and military protection of South African waters 8. Recognition and presence at the national, regional, and international levels. Vreÿ notes that the relationship between OP and the Road Map ‘finds expression in normative linkages’, as indicated in the Road Map’s objectives, notably the second, fourth, and seventh objectives.17 Van Nieuwkerk and Manganyi detail a number of other sources for the country’s approach to the maritime domain at the domestic level, citing the NDP, the Comprehensive Maritime Transport Policy (CMTP), the Defence Act 42 of 2002, and regular Defence Reviews.18 Surbun also refers to the

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 135

135

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 7

2011 White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy.19 The NDP, now largely defunct as a result of neglect by successive administrations, had charted a course for policy to meet key socio-economic objectives, notably serving the broad ideals of improving standards of living, reducing the Gini coefficient, and creating jobs. OP finds expression in these ideals and is intended to serve them.20 The CMTP, meanwhile, sees international cooperation and diplomacy in the maritime sphere as an outcome; it notes that foreign policy has a key role to play in promoting the maritime transport industry. The Defence Act and regular Defence Reviews, for their part, naturally address the maritime with respect to the navy, its actions, and its assets, with the 2015 Defence Review noting that the navy’s assets are inadequate. This is particularly concerning given that the armed forces increasingly play a foreign policy role, as is discussed later herein.21 As for the White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy, the word ‘maritime’ is mentioned twice, first with reference to the Indian Ocean Rim and the need for a maritime security policy for the continent and, secondly, with reference to concern around rising sea levels.22 Further, the Ministerial Review Panel, in their 2019 review of the country’s foreign policy, make no mention of the maritime or ocean elements of foreign policy.23 In order to better understand the policy objectives captured in the abovementioned documents, it is worth providing a brief summary of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in South Africa’s maritime domain. This is summarised in Table 6, in the interests of brevity.

Table 6: Assessing South Africa’s maritime domain Strengths • Long coastline and vast maritime domain • Geostrategic location

Opportunities • The establishment of new oceanbased economic sectors • Further development of existing oceanbased economic sectors, from tourism to shipbuilding, oil and gas, and aquaculture • Job creation

Weaknesses • Poor maritime domain awareness • Poorly capacitated security institutions • Policy deficits • Negative assessments of progress in OP Threats • Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing • Smuggling and trafficking • Irregular migration

136

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 136

2022/11/10 00:03

South Africa’s re-emergence on the international stage in 1994 ‘marked a significant sea change in approach […] as South Africa began to redefine its position internationally’ and regionally.24 Indeed, then Minister of Environmental Affairs Edna Molewa noted in 2017 a specific interest in expanding the country’s focus beyond the terrestrial environment by drawing attention to the neglected opportunities available in the country’s maritime domain.25 South Africa is party to a wide range of different international agreements and a member of several multilateral organisations that pertain to the sea – commitments and ties both inherited from the apartheid dispensation and entered into in the democratic era – but how well has Pretoria used these platforms and mechanisms to serve

SOUTH AFRICA’S MARITIME DIPLOMACY

SOUTH AFRICA’S MARITIME DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT

its maritime diplomacy?

THE SOUTHERN OCEAN Whilst this chapter limits its analysis to post-apartheid South Africa’s maritime diplomacy, it would be remiss not to note the involvement of the country in the seas to its southernmost reaches by way of the Antarctic Treaty. The Treaty emerged after negotiations, initiated by the USA and including all countries actively involved in this polar region, during which it was established that the continent would be used only in the interests of peace and science. South Africa signed the treaty in 1959. It came into effect in 1961, and has since then grown in membership. South Africa’s involvement on Antarctica has continued post-apartheid, with its strategic interest expanding beyond geopolitical concerns to include environmental ones.26 Nonetheless, Antarctica remains on the periphery of South Africa’s foreign policy, despite the potential it has to advance the key pillars thereof, ‘most notably those of multilateralism and a more equitable global order, projecting its stature on the world stage, and the Africa Agenda’.27 Indeed, South Africa’s engagement with the icy continent remains largely scientific, with several expeditions since 1959 and the most recent permanent base being built in 1997. The Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) notes that research focuses on physical science, oceanography, engineering science, biological science, and meteorology.28 The research is often led by university-based teams, who may in turn cooperate with foreign colleagues, but this engagement does not have an overtly diplomatic character. There have been historical and strategic reasons for South Africa’s involvement. Van der Watt notes that the post-apartheid dispensation was motivated to continue scientific activities but that, ultimately, the continent has been neither a public nor a political priority for the country.29

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 137

137

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 7

THE INDIAN OCEAN South Africa’s maritime diplomacy is most extensive in the area of defence and security, particularly in the Indian Ocean.30 This spans its perhaps bestknown maritime initiative, Operation Copper, as well as its participation in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), its involvement with IBSAMAR (India-Brazil-South Africa Maritime), and in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping. The rest of this section discusses these as well as a number of smaller initiatives.

SADC In 2012, during Jacob Zuma’s presidency, South Africa signed a trilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Mozambique and Tanzania, under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), to patrol and police the waters of the Mozambican Channel with a view to thwarting a perceived threat posed by the southward spread of Somali piracy. The resultant Operation Copper involved joint patrols, military exercises, training, surveillance, the sharing of information, and legal arrangements for hot pursuit, arrest, search, and seizure. The operation was put to the test in April 2012 when it worked with European Union (EU) forces to ward off an attack by Somali pirates in Tanzanian waters, but has since not been called on to respond to further incidents.31 Of course, where SADC is concerned, South Africa has also played a leading role in the development of the region’s maritime security strategy, adopted in 2011. At the time of writing, the strategy remained classified and is therefore not available for public scrutiny. However, numerous conversations with people familiar with this document have elucidated that the strategy has a strong anti-piracy focus. Piracy thus seems to be the foremost concern for southern Africa and South Africa, which has led on this front. Otto has argued that this speaks to a limited understanding of the maritime challenges in the region’s littoral, and is a missed opportunity to bring together states in securing the oceans from many other real threats, such as IUU fishing, smuggling, and trafficking.32

IORA Aside from SADC, the role that South Africa plays in IORA is arguably its other big maritime focus from a diplomatic point of view. Anil Sooklal, erstwhile Deputy Director-General for the Branch Asia and Middle East at the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), 138

explains that this is because ‘IORA is the  foremost organisation  in  the

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 138

2022/11/10 00:03

the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Australasia’.33 As a result, this ocean region poses plentiful opportunities for socio-economic development. Indeed, South Africa played a key role in the establishment of IORA, as it was founded following a visit by then President Nelson Mandela to India in 1995, during which he expressed a need for an organisation in this region to spur socio-economic cooperation. Earlier links can be drawn to the predemocratic era, with then President F. W. de Klerk’s 1991 visit to Mauritius, during which he expressed the need for an economic union between South Africa and the Indian Ocean islands.34 South Africa held the position of chair of IORA between 2017 and 2019. It focused on the theme ‘Uniting the Peoples of Africa, Asia, Australasia and the Middle East through Enhanced Cooperation for Peace, Stability

SOUTH AFRICA’S MARITIME DIPLOMACY

Indian Ocean, an ocean that provides critical sea trade routes connecting

and Sustainable Development’, intending to prioritise maritime safety and security, improve resilience and disaster risk management responses, and enhance fisheries management.35 The communiqué issued after the meeting of the Council of Ministers in which South Africa became the chair recognised a need to improve regional cooperation and integration (resulting in an MoU for the promotion of small and medium enterprises). This underpinned a number of key areas which the association committed itself to working on: gender equality and women’s empowerment, the blue economy, and security challenges.36 Of these, the latter two spoke most closely to South Africa’s priorities, whilst all three also speak to African Union (AU) foci, mentioned below. Benkenstein notes that the position of chair gave South Africa an opportunity to revitalise an organisation that had lost its lustre and that showed poor performance in driving regional cooperation. Whilst he acknowledges that the chosen areas of priority spoke to South African strengths, he argues that the country’s best chance at a lasting legacy was in ‘strengthening the institutional structure and procedures of IORA’.37 This is an effort that Walker and Reva believe Pretoria was working towards with the series of workshops hosted in Durban between July and August 2018.38 Much of the activity that some have attributed to South Africa’s role as chair, notably the establishment of a number of working groups, in fact stems from the action plan of the 2017 Jakarta Accord, while beyond this South Africa was tasked with establishing IORA’s cooperation with the AU.39 On this count, Van Nieuwkerk avers that it is ‘seductive’ to think that Pretoria has the ability to exert additional influence in this and other fora by virtue of its membership of many international groupings, and that such thinking dismisses a realistic reading of the country’s ‘capacity to exercise power and influence’.40 Indeed, in many ways its relations have

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 139

139

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 7

been symbolic: participation in groups and committees, the deployment of nationals as staff members at IORA headquarters, and an internship programme named after Mandela.

IBSAMAR Flemes and Vaz note that in terms of security cooperation in IBSA,41 IBSAMAR has been the most salient tool.42 The IBSAMAR exercises began in 2008, and of the six held thus far, five have been hosted by South Africa. IBSAMAR VII was also scheduled to be carried out in South African waters in 2020,43 but this was halted by pandemic-related restrictions. Exercises are set to resume in 2022.44 IBSAMAR offers South Africa ‘the potential […] to serve its bi-coastal SADC maritime security and oceans governance agenda within the continental framework’ of the Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) 2050 of the AU.45 Available evidence, however, does not suggest that South Africa has utilised it in this way, as little more seems to come from the arrangement than consistent joint exercises. The frequency of South Africa hosting these exercises can likely be put down to it representing the geographical halfway point between India and Brazil, and is thus a matter of convenience more than indicating particular influence. Furthermore, with BRICS being a more prominent grouping with a wider remit, Pretoria is likely to invest its limited resources in this group rather than in IBSA; BRICS, given its overlapping membership with IBSA, coupled with the inclusion also of the big powers Russia and China, can offer ‘more bang for its buck’.

BRICS Indeed, BRICS is an important grouping for South Africa from a strategic foreign policy point of view. The NDP notes that South Africa’s membership of BRICS speaks to one of four key objectives in the formulation of the country’s foreign policy, namely to use its inclusion in this grouping to deepen integration with the other member countries. This is perhaps because the grouping is seen as offering an opportunity for the recognition of South Africa’s role as an emerging African economy, and as such allows the country to position itself favourably on the global stage.46 Vreÿ explains that South Africa used ‘early, but underdeveloped, maritime logic’ to underpin the reasoning for its inclusion in the grouping, describing itself as a gateway to the continent, anchored by its existing involvement in IBSA.47 Beyond South Africa using a maritime angle here to its benefit, Kornegay describes an attempt by South Africa to match 140

IBSAMAR with a ‘BRICSMAR’ equivalent as ‘abortive’. He further avers that

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 140

2022/11/10 00:03

how to navigate the country’s BRICS and IBSA relationships as well as a lack of geostrategic conceptualisation of South Africa’s position within the IBSA–BRICS equation’.48 Nonetheless, South Africa did host a joint naval exercise with BRICS counterparts Russia and China in November 2019 – Exercise Mosi.49 One might question whether this can be considered a BRICS initiative, given that there was no participation by India and Brazil (also IBSA members). Indeed, Fabricius notes that the exercise ‘raised eyebrows’ among Western states, with concerns that the country could be switching its military allegiance, particularly given other recent exercises with Russia. While Fabricius sees this as an exaggeration, he calls the exercise a ‘BRICS-lite’ activity and cites Olivier, who says the exercise focused on ‘low-hanging fruit’

SOUTH AFRICA’S MARITIME DIPLOMACY

this demonstrated a lack of synergy between key governmental players ‘on

in its simulations.50

Indian Ocean Naval Symposium The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) is a voluntary mechanism aimed at increasing cooperation for the achievement of maritime stability, established by India in 2008.51 It has 35 members – a broader membership than IORA – with membership open to navy chiefs. South Africa has been keenly involved and has co-chaired the maritime security working group.52 Kannegiesser-Bailey’s assessment is that the symposium’s contribution to security in the region has been ‘underwhelming’,53 while Roy-Chaudry argues that it suffers from ‘ad hocism’ and is ‘far less than the sum of [its] parts’.54 Navy officials, however, often speak fondly of the symposium and perhaps, if nothing else, it offers the opportunity for dialogue between members of the navy in a setting that is not specifically geared towards patrols and exercises.

Indian Ocean Zone of Peace Declaration Initiated by Sri Lanka in 1971, the Declaration was to render the Indian Ocean a ‘zone of peace’, with the intention of halting great powers’ naval expansion in the Indian Ocean and putting a stop to the development of naval and military bases there.55 This has, of course, not meant much in practice, as the quest for territorial reach and power projection has continued, with China and India facing off for dominance, while the USA and the UK both have used and continue to use and develop military bases in the Indian Ocean.56 South Africa reiterated its support for a zone of peace in 2017 at the IORA Council of Ministers meeting, quoting Oliver Tambo, who in 1993

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 141

141

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 7

said: ‘The ANC adds its voice to […] other littoral States in demanding that the Indian Ocean be declared a zone of peace – free of foreign military and naval bases, nuclear arms and other instruments of war that endanger peace and security.’57 Pretoria has not, however, used its bilateral relationships to petition for the closure of military bases, and the Indian Ocean is no closer to being a zone of peace.

THE ATLANTIC OCEAN Where the Atlantic Ocean is concerned, South Africa signed the Benguela Current Convention, a treaty between itself, Angola, and Namibia which intends to ‘promote a coordinated regional approach to the long-term conservation, protection, rehabilitation, enhancement and sustainable use of the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem, to provide economic, environmental and social benefits’.58 South African is thus also a member of the Benguela Current Commission. The countries involved have committed to cooperate on a number of strategic areas: tackling IUU fishing, working towards the sustainable use of ocean resources for mutual benefit, encouraging the participation of youth and women in the Benguela current ecosystem, responding jointly to oil spill emergencies, attending to new developmental demands with a cooperative outlook, and harnessing the blue and oceans economies.59 Whilst the Commission meets regularly, there is little substantive evidence of concrete action in these strategic areas. Further, an early example of maritime diplomatic engagement in the Atlantic Ocean by the post-1994 dispensation is Mandela’s deployment of the SAS Outeniqua to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1997 to provide a platform for talks between President Mobutu Sese Seko and rebel leader Laurent Kabila. The talks were largely unsuccessful and are described as having been poorly managed, if nonetheless a bold move by a revered statesman.60 Subsequent to this, South Africa has been involved further north in the Atlantic via a number of initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea, with the navy being active there since about 2012. In October 2013, the SAS Spioenkop was deployed for training exercises, stopping in ports along the Atlantic seaboard northwards to Senegal.61 It has participated in numerous such joint patrols and exercises since, although the chief of the South African Navy, Vice Admiral Mosiwa Hlongwane, has noted that South Africa’s naval capacity is diminishing given the need for urgent refits for its frigates and submarines, an issue that has also been raised in numerous Defence Reviews.62 South Africa is also party to the 1986 Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA), with this commitment being reaffirmed in 1995.63 According to Lalbahadur, Grobbelaar, and Du Plessis, the ZPCSA has 142

created opportunities for further collaboration with Brazil (which Pretoria

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 142

2022/11/10 00:03

Argentina and Uruguay), specifically regarding the exploitation of oil and gas, thus strengthening the need for maritime security cooperation.64 However, the ZPCSA has by no means been deployed as a prominent tool in the bilateral relationship with Brazil.

OTHER INITIATIVES AIMS 2050 is the maritime strategy adopted by the AU in 2012. It broadly recognises opportunities presented by the African maritime domain for wealth creation, and as such centres on human capital development and the enhancement of standards of living. Maritime challenges and opportunities are recognised as common and the strategy thus aims to operationalise a

SOUTH AFRICA’S MARITIME DIPLOMACY

works with in BRICS, IBSAMAR, and ATLASUR, the latter also involving

cooperative plan of action towards combating challenges and harnessing opportunities.65 Walker, however, explains that inertia as a result of a dearth of financial and human resources means that maritime security work at the organisation is at risk of marginalisation.66 South Africa, for its part, has done little to operationalise the strategy. An integrated approach at a regional level tends to fare better in West Africa, perhaps because maritime threats there are more pervasive and costly to littoral economies, while in southern Africa, the work of SADC in this sphere remains limited.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND MEMBERSHIPS In the apartheid era, South Africa participated in a number of global instruments pertaining to the maritime domain, which democratic South Africa inherited. Pretoria has also become party to a number of other instruments since 1994. South Africa is a member of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) which is the UN’s maritime body, and is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the central source of international maritime law. However, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to detail these exhaustively or to consider the extent to which commitments have been met.

ASSESSING SOUTH AFRICA’S MARITIME DIPLOMACY: INTO THE RAMAPHOSA ERA At the start of President Cyril Ramaphosa’s tenure, it was predicted that South Africa’s foreign policy priorities would focus on economic diplomacy,67 with Hamill noting that Ramaphosa would ‘prioritise commercial ties’68

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 143

143

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 7

and Cilliers making the same forecast.69 After all, the president inherited a country in the economic doldrums, following a decade of plunder by his predecessor. This anticipated focus has been borne out by his endeavours to raise trillions of rands in investment, an effort to which much of his attention was dedicated in the early years of his presidency. The long-term negative economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic is likely to strengthen the need for economic and commercial diplomacy during his tenure. What about the maritime domain? Whilst numerous economic opportunities lie in wait at sea, the maritime sphere has not been a key focus for Ramaphosa, much in the same way that it has not been so for presidents who have come before him. If OP was to be a domestic legacy project for Zuma, Ramaphosa’s legacy is located elsewhere, and the initiative has thus not received any particular attention from the head of state; neither does the operation identify diplomacy as an opportunity to leverage its relationships to serve its purposes. While South Africa has no shortage of engagements pertaining to the maritime domain, it is not clear that this has specifically facilitated the application of a coordinated or strategic maritime diplomatic practice. If one were to use La Mière’s definition of maritime diplomacy, as detailed earlier, much of this engagement would be discounted as not specifically constituting maritime diplomacy, as it does not expressly involve the deployment of assets. Using a broader understanding of maritime diplomacy, one might conclude that South Africa is spread too thin, having made a wide array of commitments, but with little to show in terms of actualising them. Maritime diplomacy, furthermore, has not in itself been prioritised but is instead kept alive under the country’s foreign policy pillars: it remains a subsidiary tool in Pretoria’s diplomatic toolbox and happens as a consequence of the deployment of other tools. An overstretched portfolio with constraints on time, capacity, and finances does not aid this; thus, we see continuity rather than change in this regard during the current presidency. Pretoria’s participation in SADC and IORA remains motivated by its foreign policy emphasis on regional engagement, rather than by considerations of the blue economy or maritime security imperatives, while its relationship with the AU falls under its ‘Africa First’ objective. Likewise, its BRICS and IBSA involvement is prompted by the objective of promoting South–South cooperation. Participation in these various international fora also serves to advance the image of South Africa as a leader on the continent and a go-to partner in Africa – an image that the country works hard to maintain. As the maritime domain is not a priority area for the country’s foreign policy and diplomacy in and of itself, neither is it so for President Ramaphosa.

144

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 144

2022/11/10 00:03

It is clear from this discussion that South Africa is not expressly au fait with the purposeful deployment of maritime diplomacy as a tool to serve its national interest, despite the intersection between its immediate interests and the opportunities emanating from the sea. Some of its engagement is inherited from pre-democracy dispensations, while much of the remainder largely has regional participation at its core. Going forward, however, there are a number of ways in which Pretoria could clarify its stance on the maritime domain, which would in turn illuminate the areas in which it could prioritise maritime diplomacy. Perhaps most importantly, South Africa should finalise its maritime security strategy, make this public, and demonstrate how it has been

SOUTH AFRICA’S MARITIME DIPLOMACY

CONCLUSION

integrated both with the country’s foreign policy outlook and in its existing security framework. This should then be integrated with its broader foreign policy engagements – immediate opportunities to this effect are available, for example by considering how maritime assets can be deployed to counter ongoing insecurity in northern Mozambique, presumably under the auspices of SADC. Further, policy needs to be explicit regarding how the maritime domain relates to the country’s national interest, which in itself suggests the need to dust off the NDP and then commit to taking its implementation seriously. This will make plain the threats, opportunities, resources, and deficits that the country is facing, in turn allowing for these to be located within the national interest and thereby illuminating the best platforms and relationships to prioritise and leverage to serve this national interest given the country’s limited human and financial capacity. Further to this, the SADC maritime security strategy should be updated and declassified and opened to public scrutiny to the extent possible, and the bloc should then put forward a coherent plan as to how it will contribute to operationalising AIMS 2050. This would give Pretoria the opportunity to have more meaningful relationships within the various fora mentioned, and indeed also bilaterally with partners within these structures. Further to a process such as this, Pretoria would need to assess its budget and take into account the impacts of the declining commitments made to the Department of Defence and the consequent diminishment of its naval capacity for diplomatic engagement. How can South Africa deal with the real threats to its maritime domain and offer a cogent approach to maritime security? Are there lessons that can be learnt from the implementation of various instruments, such as the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code? How can it harness blue economy opportunities in ways that benefit both commercial stakeholders and coastal communities? Can it leverage partnerships to access the

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 145

145

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 7

necessary technologies for the improved management of its maritime domain and its ability to patrol and police it? How can it use its expansive maritime domain to anchor its role as a ‘gateway’ to Africa? These are the kinds of questions that South African policy makers and strategic thinkers will need to ask themselves if they are truly to cast their gaze seaward and harness the sea’s bounty.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1 GCIS (Government Communications and Information System). 2016. South Africa Year Book 2015/16. Pretoria: GCIS. https://www.gcis.gov.za/content/resourcecentre/sa-info/ yearbook2015-16 (Accessed 5 May 2022). 2 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. 2017. ‘Outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline: Submissions to the Commission: Submission by the Republic of South Africa.’ Updated 27 September. https://www. un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_zaf_31_2009.htm (Accessed 26 August 2020). 3 Van Nieuwkerk, A. and Manganyi, C. 2019. ‘South Africa’s maritime foreign policy: A conceptual framework.’ Scientia Militaria 47(2): 1–15, p. 4. https://doi. org/10.5787/47-2-1281. 4 Widen, J. J. 2011. ‘Naval diplomacy: A theoretical approach.’ Diplomacy & Statecraft 22(4): 715–733, p. 719. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2011.625830. 5 Widen, ‘Naval diplomacy’, p. 719. 6 Manicom, J. 2013. ‘Canada’s return to East Asia: Reengagement through maritime diplomacy.’ CIGI, 22 February. https://www.cigionline.org/articles/canadas-return-eastasia-re-engagement-through-maritime-diplomacy (Accessed 6 March 2020). 7 Gindarsah, I. and Priamarizki, A. 2015. ‘Indonesia’s maritime doctrine and security concerns.’ S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Policy Report, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 9 April. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/ idss/indonesias-maritime-doctrine-and-security-concerns/#.XxlbOpMzbEY (Accessed 5 May 2022). 8 La Mière, C. 2014. Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Drivers and Challenges. London: Routledge, pp. 7–8. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203555590. 9 Busiega, J. N. 2016. ‘Harnessing maritime security and resource exploitation: Role of maritime diplomacy in Kenya.’ MA diss., University of Nairobi. http://erepository. uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/97478/Busiega%20_Harnessing%20Maritime%20 Securit y %20A nd%20Resource%20Exploitation%20Role%20Of %20Maritime%20 Diplomacy%20In%20Kenya.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (Accessed 5 May 2022). 10 Van Nieuwkerk and Manganyi, ‘South Africa’s maritime foreign policy’, p. 4. 11 The Department of Transport is currently working on the development of such a strategy, but its contents and expected completion date are classified.

146

12 Findlay, K. 2020. ‘Oceans and blue economies.’ In Global Challenges in Maritime Security: An Introduction, edited by L. Otto. Cham: Springer Nature, p. 17. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-3-030-34630-0_2.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 146

2022/11/10 00:03

14 DPME (Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation). 2020. ‘Operation Phakisa.’ https://www.operationphakisa.gov.za/Pages/Home.aspx (Accessed 6 March 2020). 15 Funke, N., Claassen, M., Nortje, K. and Meissner, R. 2016. A Research, Innovation and Knowledge Management Road Map for the South African Maritime Sector: Charting a Course to Maritime Excellence by 2030. CSIR Report No. CSIR/NRE/WR/ ER/2016/0044/A. Tshwane: CSIR. http://www.waternet.co.za/aquarius/docs/CSIR_SA_ Maritime_Road_Map_DevV3_final.pdf (Accessed 5 May 2022). 16 Funke et al., A Research, Innovation and Knowledge Management Road Map, pp. 15–37. 17 Vreÿ, ‘Operation Phakisa’, p. 92. 18 Van Nieuwkerk and Manganyi, ‘South Africa’s maritime foreign policy’. 19 Surbun, V. 2019. ‘Charting South Africa’s global maritime foreign policy and its global and regional memberships in the maritime realm.’ Scientia Militaria 47(2): 17–49. https://doi.org/10.5787/47-2-1282; DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation). 2011. Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy. Pretoria: DIRCO. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/ gcis_document/201409/foreignpolicy0.pdf (Accessed 5 May 2022).

SOUTH AFRICA’S MARITIME DIPLOMACY

13 Vreÿ, F. 2019. ‘Operation Phakisa: Reflections upon an ambitious maritimeled government initiative.’ Scientia Militaria 47(2): 85–103, p. 91. https://doi. org/10.5787/47-2-1285.

20 DPME, ‘Operation Phakisa’. 21 Van Nieuwkerk and Manganyi, ‘South Africa’s maritime foreign policy’, p. 9. 22 DIRCO, Building a Better World. 23 DIRCO. 2019. ‘Media briefing on the Ministerial Panel Report.’ Foreign Policy Review, 17 April. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2019/foreign_policy_review_report0417.pdf (Accessed 5 May 2022). 24 Surbun, ‘Charting South Africa’s global maritime foreign policy’, p. 21. 25 Surbun, ‘Charting South Africa’s global maritime foreign policy’. 26 Sidiropoulos, E. and Wheeler, T. 2016. To the Ends of the Earth: Antarctica, the Antarctic Treaty and South Africa. Research Report 23, 14 April. Johannesburg: SAIIA. https:// saiia.org.za/research/to-the-ends-of-the-earth-antarctica-the-antarctic-treaty-andsouth-africa/ (Accessed 5 May 2022). 27 Sidiropoulos and Wheeler, To the Ends of the Earth, pp. 32–33. 28 DEA (Department of Environmental Affairs). 2019. ‘Antarctica and southern oceans islands.’ https://www.environment.gov.za/projectsprogrammes/antarctica_ southernoceans_islands (Accessed 26 March 2020). 29 Van der Watt, S. M. E. 2012. ‘Out in the cold: Science and the environment in South Africa’s involvement in the sub-Antarctic and Antarctic in the twentieth century.’ PhD diss., Stellenbosch University. https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/20055 (Accessed 5 May 2022). 30 Van Nieuwkerk and Manganyi, ‘South Africa’s maritime foreign policy’. 31 Otto, L. 2014. ‘South Africa and anti-piracy: Pragmatic foreign policy or misguided intervention?’ African Armed Forces Journal November: 30–34. 32 Otto, L. 2019. ‘South Africa’s Operation Phakisa: Development without security?’ Scientia Militaria 47(2): 69–84. https://doi.org/10.5787/47-2-1284.

147

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 147

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 7

33 Sooklal, A. 2020. ‘SA and the IORA.’ Politicsweb, 10 March. https://www.politicsweb. co.za/opinion/south-african-and-the-indian-ocean-rim-association (Accessed 26 March 2020). 34 Allen, C. H. 2011. ‘Regional cooperation and the Indian Ocean Rim.’ Indian Journal of Asian Affairs 12(1): 1–18. 35 Benkenstein, A. 2018. ‘South Africa’s Indian Ocean Rim Association legacy: A more inclusive and open IORA.’ Policy Briefing 175, 2 July. Johannesburg: SAIIA. https://saiia. org.za/research/south-africas-indian-ocean-rim-association-legacy-a-more-inclusiveand-open-iora/ (Accessed 5 May 2022). 36 Benkenstein, ‘South Africa’s Indian Ocean Rim Association legacy’. 37 Benkenstein, ‘South Africa’s Indian Ocean Rim Association legacy’. 38 Walker, T. and Reva, D. 2018. ‘Africa’s chance to boost maritime security in the Indian Ocean.’ ISS Today, 17 August, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africas-chance-to-boostmaritime-security-in-the-indian-ocean (Accessed 26 March 2020). 39 Kannegiesser-Bailey, A. 2018. ‘Can South Africa achieve greater maritime security as chair of the Indian Ocean Rim Association?’ https://stopillegalfishing.com/press-links/ can-south-africa-achieve-greater-maritime-security-as-chair-of-the-indian-ocean-rimassociation/ (Accessed 25 May 2022). 40 Van Nieuwkerk, A. 2018. ‘South Africa and the Indian Ocean: Assessing strategic interests and roles.’ Wits School of Governance News, 24 October. https://www.wits. ac.za/news/sources/wsg-news/2018/south-africa-and-the-indian-ocean-assessingstrategic-interests-and-roles.html (Accessed 6 April 2020). 41 IBSA refers to a trilateral forum between India, Brazil, and South Africa, based on economic and cultural similarities and geared towards cooperation on economic, development, and democracy-related issues. It serves Pretoria’s South–South cooperation foreign policy pillar. 42 Flemes D. and Vaz, A. C. 2011. ‘Security policies of India, Brazil and South Africa: Regional security contexts as constraints for a common agenda.’ GIGA Working Paper No. 160. Hamburg: German Institute for Global and Area Studies. https://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/Data_Integrity_Notice.cfm?abid=1780208 (Accessed 6 April 2020). 43 Wingrin, D. 2012. ‘Rough seas delay Ibsamar III naval exercise.’ DefenceWeb, 16 October. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/sa-defence/sa-defence-sa-defence/rough-seas-delayibsamar-iii-naval-exercise/ (Accessed 26 March 2020); DefenceWeb. 2014. ‘Ibsamar IV set for October.’ 22 September. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/sa-defence/sa-defence-sadefence/ibsamar-iv-set-for-october/?catid=111%3Asa-defence&Itemid=242 (Accessed 26 March 2020); Daily News and Analysis. 2016. ‘“Exercise IBSAMAR” between India, South Africa, Brazil begins on Friday.’ 18 February. https://www.dnaindia.com/india/ report-exercise-ibsamar-between-india-south-africa-brazil-begins-on-friday-2179427 (Accessed 26 March 2020); Financial Express. 2018. ‘IBSAMAR VI: India, Brazil & SA navies train to build interoperability.’ 2 October. https://www.financialexpress.com/ defence/ibsamar-vi-india-brazil-sa-navies-train-to-build-interoperability/1334334/ (Accessed 26 March 2020). 44 DefenceWeb. 2022. ‘Ibsamar 2022 date set.’ DefenceWeb, 22 March. https://www. defenceweb.co.za/featured/ibsamar-2022-date-set/ (Accessed 9 May 2022).

148

45 Kornegay, F. 2015. ‘South Africa and the Global South in critical perspective: 1994– 2014.’ In South African Foreign Policy Review, Volume 2, edited by L. Masters, S. Zondi, J.-A. van Wyk and C. Landsberg. Tshwane: AISA, p. 238.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 148

2022/11/10 00:03

47 Vreÿ, F. 2017. ‘A blue BRICS, maritime security, and the South Atlantic.’ Contexto Internacional 39(2): 351–371, p. 355. https://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-8529.2017390200008. 48 Kornegay, ‘South Africa and the Global South in critical perspective’, p. 237. 49 Wingrin, D. 2019. ‘Sea phase of international naval exercise commences.’ DefenceWeb, 28 November. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sea-phase-of-internationalnaval-exercise-commences/ (Accessed 27 August 2020). 50 Fabricius, P. 2019. ‘South Africa’s military drills with Russia and China raise eyebrows.’ ISS Today, 29 November. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africas-military-drillswith-russia-and-china-raise-eyebrows (Accessed 27 August 2020). 51 Kannegiesser-Bailey, ‘Can South Africa achieve greater maritime security’. 52 Roy-Chaudry, R. 2018. ‘Strengthening maritime cooperation and security in the Indian Ocean.’ IISS, 6 September. https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/09/maritimecooperation-indian-ocean (Accessed 6 April 2020). 53 Kannegiesser-Bailey, ‘Can South Africa achieve greater maritime security’.

SOUTH AFRICA’S MARITIME DIPLOMACY

46 Surbun, ‘Charting South Africa’s global maritime foreign policy’, p. 23.

54 Roy-Chaudry, ‘Strengthening maritime cooperation and security’. 55 Pinto, M. C. W. 1985. ‘Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.’ Journal of the National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency of Sri Lanka 32, p. 1. 56 Otto, L. 2020. ‘Introducing maritime security: The sea as a geostrategic space.’ In Global Challenges in Maritime Security: An Introduction, edited by L. Otto. Cham: Springer, pp. 4–6. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34630-0. 57 DIRCO. 2017. ‘Country statement and opening remarks by Minister Nkoana-Mashabane.’ IORA 17th Meeting of the Council of Ministers, Durban, South Africa. http://www.dirco. gov.za/docs/speeches/2017/mash1018.htm (Accessed 27 March 2020). 58 Surbun, ‘Charting South Africa’s global maritime foreign policy’, pp. 33–34. 59 Surbun, ‘Charting South Africa’s global maritime foreign policy’. 60 Duke, L. 1997. ‘Mandela lauded for a long shot.’ The Washington Post, 6 May. https:// www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/05/06/mandela-lauded-for-a-longshot/0e6c733d-58f4-4f12-8e0b-04e301e4f650/ (Accessed 27 August 2020). 61 Otto, ‘South Africa and anti-piracy’. 62 Cloete, K. 2019. ‘South African navy falling behind other navies in Africa.’ Engineering News, 15 July. https://m.engineeringnews.co.za/article/south-african-navy-fallingbehind-other-navies-in-africa-2019-07-15 (Accessed 6 March 2020). 63 Surbun, ‘Charting South Africa’s global maritime foreign policy’. 64 Lalbahadur, A., Grobbelaar, N. and Du Plessis, R. 2015. ‘South Africa’s foreign policy priorities for the 21st century: A closer look at the potential for cooperation in the South Atlantic zone.’ SAIIA, 19 May. https://saiia.org.za/research/south-africas-foreignpolicy-priorities-for-the-21st-century-a-closer-look-at-the-potential-for-co-operation-inthe-south-atlantic-zone-2/ (Accessed 6 March 2020). 65 AU (African Union). 2012. 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy. AU Version 1.0. https://cggrps.com/wp-content/uploads/2050-AIM-Strategy_EN.pdf (Accessed 5 May 2022). 66 Walker, T. 2017. ‘Reviving the AU’s maritime strategy.’ ISS Policy Brief 96, 8 May. https://issafrica.org /research/policy-brief/reviving-the-aus-maritime-strateg y (Accessed 5 May 2022). 149

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 149

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 7

67 Kornegay, F. 2018. ‘Scoping South Africa’s 2018 foreign policy.’ Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 14(2): 227–229. https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2018.1473950; Ebrahim, S. 2018. ‘Ramaphosa’s foreign policy priorities.’ IOL, 23 February. https://www.iol.co.za/ news/opinion/ramaphosas-foreign-policy-priorities-13445642 (Accessed 6 April 2020). 68 Hamill, J. 2019. ‘The reality of South Africa’s foreign policy under Ramaphosa.’ IISS, 8 February. https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/02/south-africa-foreign-policyramaphosa (Accessed 6 April 2020). 69 Cilliers, J. 2017. ‘South Africa’s prospects under Cyril Ramaphosa.’ Report for the Hanns Seidel Foundation, South Africa, 22 December. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=3096955 (Accessed 5 May 2022).

150

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 150

2022/11/10 00:03

Faith Mabera

CHAPTER 8

South Africa’s Defence Diplomacy: A Viable Instrument of Foreign and Security Policy

INTRODUCTION Contemporary thinking on the use of armed force in international politics, the growing recognition of the saliency of smart power strategies, and the evolution of diplomacy have catapulted defence diplomacy to the forefront of debates on military strategy, foreign policy, and defence policy. While armed force and diplomacy have traditionally occupied polar ends in the spectrum of statecraft tools, defence diplomacy essentially encapsulates a fusion of the violent-coercive and pacific-persuasive elements of foreign policy.1 In spite of the growing emphasis on defence diplomacy as a strategic asset and tool of foreign policy, particularly in the post-Cold War era, there has been a paucity of research on its conceptual parameters, strategic implementation, and evolution in practice in the South African context. Accordingly, this chapter seeks to build on to the seminal works of Edmonds and Mills and of Du Plessis in advancing a contemporary, comprehensive, and analytical assessment of South Africa’s defence diplomacy.2 Given that Du Plessis’s analysis of South Africa’s defence diplomacy covered the period under presidents Nelson Mandela (1994–1999) and Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008), this chapter presents an appraisal of the nature, scope, and utility of defence diplomacy under the Jacob Zuma administration (2009–2018) and the current administration under President Cyril Ramaphosa since 2018. The first section of the chapter outlines the conceptual framework of defence diplomacy and its scope within scholarly literature on defence and diplomacy. Secondly, South Africa’s defence diplomacy is analysed in the context of the democratic transition that underpinned the re-emergence of the military instrument as part of the country’s post-apartheid integrated foreign policy outlook. The chapter concludes with a critical evaluation of the relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency of South Africa’s defence policy in delivering strategic imperatives and foreign and security policy objectives. Edmonds and Mills underscore the ‘role of the armed forces in operations other than war to achieve national and foreign objectives abroad’ as the essence of defence diplomacy,3 whereas Du Plessis asserts a pragmatic view of defence diplomacy in the South African context as a ‘military adjunct to

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 151

151

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 8

diplomacy rather than a distinct type of diplomacy’.4 Taken together, the ‘South African school of defence diplomacy’ may be seen as one of equivocal interpretation, especially when viewed in light of the overlaps between the military and diplomatic instruments of foreign policy, influenced by ‘circumstances, resource availability, moral and legal constraints, political intent, will and commitment’.5 The conceptual and definitional ambiguity surrounding defence diplomacy is also related to the blurring of lines (in practice) between the related concepts of defence policy and national security policy or national security strategy. In the parlance of South African security and defence officials, national security has been invoked to mean anything from threats to the state, government, institutions, and population, to the broader concept of human security, which encompasses political, community, personal, food, health, economic, and environmental dimensions (also see Chapter 11 in this volume). Consequently, the lack of consensus on the definition of national security in the public sphere has not only undermined policy coherence within the security sector,6 but also exposed the urgent need for a South African National Security Strategy7 (NSS) as an overarching framework for ‘redefining and refining the concepts, values, policies, practices and architecture involved in South Africa’s approach to security’.8 For conceptual clarity, this chapter adopts the definition of national security policy (henceforth security policy) as the ‘official description of how a state aims to provide for its own security and that of its population’,9 including a clear formulation of the conditions for national security that a state aims to establish over a specific time period; a description of values and principles that should undergird the implementation of strategy; and clear identification of a state’s security priorities drawn from the domestic context, the changing strategic environment, and multilateral obligations and commitments such as the promotion of human rights and pacific settlement of disputes.10 On the other hand, defence policy is a subset of national security policy and is defined as a ‘series of guidelines, principles and frameworks that link theory (National Security Policy) to action (Defence Planning, Management and Implementation)’.11 Defence policy is aimed at performing four related functions: (a) shaping the direction of military efforts in line with an integrated and coherent policy; (b) enhancing the civilian oversight of the military; (c) promoting transparency, accountability, and public access to information on defence spending and policy implementation; and (d) reassuring allies and neighbours about shifts in capabilities and posture while also factoring in considerations of deterrence and intimidation towards adversaries.12 Insofar as defence policy overlaps with foreign policy, defence diplomacy can be associated

152

with the ‘shaping’ objective of defence policy, wherein the military is

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 152

2022/11/10 00:03

policy in international relations.

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AS A STRATEGIC TOOL OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY Defence diplomacy has often been presented as an oxymoron of sorts, bringing together two seemingly incommensurable concepts – armed force and diplomacy. Military force has traditionally been employed as the ultima ratio in politics,13 whereas diplomacy concerns negotiations, the pacific settlement of disputes, the exchange of information, state-to-state persuasion, and the maintenance of friendly relations among nations.14 As one of the tools of a state’s foreign and security policy, a nuanced analysis of defence diplomacy must recognise the interrelated relationship between ‘diplomacy as a category of practice and diplomacy as a category of analysis’.15 Moreover, this necessitates an understanding of the salience of questions of ends, ways, and means in effecting the strategic foreign policy imperatives of states. As one of the instruments of foreign policy, alongside economic, psychological, and military instruments, diplomacy has also evolved in tandem with shifts and developments in international relations. According to Cooper, Heine, and Thakur, there has been a five-fold change in diplomacy that has influenced theory and practice; the changes are (a) the proliferation of numbers and types of actors; (b) the expansion of scope beyond traditional high-politics issues; (c) multiplication in levels of diplomatic engagement; (d) evolution in the apparatus and machinery of foreign policy relations; and (e) changes in the modes and types of diplomacy.16 Diplomacy is essentially contested, often presented simultaneously as ‘a particular activity, a tool of statecraft and a sub-specialty of political science’.17 Spies offers an operational definition of diplomacy as ‘a peaceful and continuous process of communication, involv[ing] international relations among states or other collectivities on the basis of intermediation,

SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: A VIABLE INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

engaged as an instrument of soft power to advance foreign and security

reciprocity and formal representation’.18 In a broader context, the relationship between the various instruments of foreign policy can be presented along a utility spectrum which ranks them, on the one hand, from diplomatic to economic, psychological (armed propaganda), and military measures, and on the other hand from suasion to coercion (see Figure 3), in accordance with international norms and legal prescriptions regarding the pacific settlement of disputes and limitations on the use of force.19 In practice, the integrated approach to military and diplomatic tools of statecraft in the realisation of strategic outcomes has a direct bearing on a state’s application of its various power resources to

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 153

153

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 8

promote its interests in international relations. Hence, for Nye, who defined power as ‘the ability to affect others to achieve the outcomes you want’, the growing interdependence among actors and the interconnections between civilian and military approaches to security have elevated the centrality of three conceptions of power in international politics: hard power, economic power, and soft power.20 Such a behavioural outlook on power takes into account the broader spectrum of power resources in influencing preferred outcomes in three major ways: coercion (sticks), incentives (carrots), and attraction or persuasion (soft power). For instance, in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, the hard power of military force must be backed up by a soft-power strategy in order to win the hearts and minds of the population. As such, a more pragmatic power conversion strategy for an effective foreign policy agenda is smart power, which combines hard and soft power resources, underpinned by sound contextual intelligence to guide implementation at the tactical level.21 Defence diplomacy presents a causal pathway for the use of the military as a source of soft power through direct means such as military-to-military training exercises, contacts, educational exchanges, the appointment of defence attachés, and defence cooperation agreements. The military can also be utilised under the indirect model of soft power, premised on a nexus between the military and public diplomacy, through activities such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions and enhancing civil– military relations to build trust, promote common interests, and enhance transparency about defence relations, thereby underscoring the view of the military as a strategic asset and tool for both foreign and security policies.22

Cooperation–Suasion Influence • Latent suasion (deference) • Active suasion (persuasion) • Preventive diplomacy • Defence diplomacy (non-coercive)

Deterrence • Balance of power • Projection of force • Preventive deployment

Diplomatic mode

Military mode

Suasion • Diplomatic sanctions • Naval diplomacy (non-coercive)

Compellence • Coercive diplomacy: military threats and use of force (sticks) combined with positive inducements (carrots) • Gunboat diplomacy

Conflict–Coercion

154

Figure 3: Matrix situating defence diplomacy in the military–diplomatic nexus of foreign policy instruments23

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 154

2022/11/10 00:03

The conceptual ambiguity around defence diplomacy has resulted in a plurality of definitions, leading to variations at both strategic and tactical levels. According to Cheyre, defence diplomacy is the ‘employment, without duress, in time of peace, of the resources of Defence to achieve specific national goals, primarily through relationships with others’.24 This dovetails with Cottey and Forster’s definition of defence diplomacy as ‘the peacetime cooperative use of armed forces and related infrastructure (primarily defence ministries) as a tool of foreign and security policy’.25 Muthanna uses ‘military diplomacy’ and ‘defence diplomacy’ interchangeably to refer to ‘the use of peaceful military diplomacy as a tool of national foreign policy’.26 Du Plessis narrows the definition of defence diplomacy, postulating it as ‘the use of military personnel, including service attachés, in support of conflict prevention and resolution’.27 Overall, defence diplomacy comprises a wide range of activities, including:28 ■

promoting bilateral and multilateral cooperation in military relations, defence, and security through the deployment of defence attachés

■

establishing contacts between senior military and civilian defence officials

■

signing defence cooperation agreements

■

engaging in joint bilateral and multilateral training exercises

■

training military and civilian defence personnel

■

engaging in contacts and exchanges between military personnel and units and ship visits

■

providing expertise and advice on the democratic control of armed forces, defence management, and technical development areas

■

providing assistance in humanitarian and disaster relief missions

■

supporting security sector reform in partner countries and capacitybuilding in military operations.

SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: A VIABLE INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

THE CONCEPT OF DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: ORIGINS, DEBATES, AND EVOLUTION

Building on broader conceptualisations of defence diplomacy, Tan and Singh have outlined two functions of defence diplomacy. The first is a pragmatic function that emphasises the building of mutual trust and cooperation among entities, for example the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), formed in 1994, and the ShangriLa dialogue, established in 2002. The second facet of defence diplomacy is transformative; it is focused on enhancing the interoperability of militaries and supporting the broader democratisation of civil–military relations, for instance the Partnership for Peace of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 155

155

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 8

(NATO), which facilitated political and military cooperation between NATO and countries of Central and Eastern Europe that were formerly part of the Soviet bloc.29 Moreover, defence diplomacy is operationalised across multiple levels. The first level entails the engagement of political principals, ministers, chiefs of defence, and senior officials. The second level comprises military academies, defence colleges, research and development (R&D) institutions, and think tanks associated with ministries of defence. The third level entails engagement with civil society groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in order to promote transparency around strategic defence engagements and bolster civil–military relations.30 Dovetailing with the emergence of modern diplomacy in the context of an evolving, anarchical international society and order, defence and security have also been subject to the sea change in global politics, with both transformational and pragmatic implications for the political-institutional and normative frameworks within which they operate. For instance, the classic categories of practice for defence diplomacy included intelligence and information gathering on the armed forces of host nations, facilitating arms sales, and supporting tasks related to the balance of power and the avoidance of war.31 However, from the 1990s onwards, a number of developments altered the nature and conduct of military cooperation – beyond the realpolitik role of counterbalancing, deterrence, and maintenance of alliances – to embrace broader security and foreign policy goals.32 The ‘new defence diplomacy’ has evolved in response to three fundamental shifts in the international security landscape. First, the broadening of the security agenda, to include both traditional and non-traditional security challenges, has necessitated shifts in strategic orientation and policy making. Second, the widening of national and international security agendas has also been compounded by the transnational character of security challenges and threats, stemming from complex interdependence and globalisation processes. Such interconnectedness demands collective and pragmatic solutions hinged on multilateral diplomacy and institution-building. This has been evidenced by the increase in multilateral forums and institutions, at both global and regional levels, focused on a plethora of defence and security policy issues. The third shift is the evolution in the role of the military in the post-Cold War period. Contemporary militaries have expanded their missions beyond a primary focus on warfighting to incorporate activities categorised as operations other than war (OOTW), which include humanitarian and disaster relief efforts, peacekeeping operations, joint training and exercises, and the promotion of civil–military relations.33 Distinct from classical defence diplomacy, ‘new defence diplomacy’ has three key roles. The first role is ‘strategic engagement’, which entails the

156

maintenance of diplomatic relations with potential and actual adversaries;

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 156

2022/11/10 00:03

the third is training and building the peacekeeping capabilities of partner countries.34 In a different sense, the peacetime cooperative engagement of militaries is contextualised in the globalisation of Western forms of military organisation, underpinned by the historical and political avatars of empire and the two world wars. Due to the training of colonised armed forces in service of imperial interests, the Eurocentric international organisation of force remained the dominant model of bureaucratic, disciplined militaries well after independence, as former colonial powers maintained relations with their former colonies, maintaining basing rights and engaging in joint exercises and educational visits. From the historical perspective of international military relations, via its focus on foreign sponsorship to establish local forces and conduct training, defence diplomacy can be seen as a contemporary euphemism for the management of the struggle to ‘constitute armed forces from foreign populations for political projects of local, regional and global order-making’.35 The positioning of defence diplomacy in the historical context of international hierarchy takes into account the dyadic relationships in defence relations, while highlighting the enduring tensions between the representation and governance functions of ‘new diplomacy’.36 Pertinent to Africa, the pre-colonial history of the continent points to wide-ranging diplomatic activity among political entities and the maintenance of relations through ‘negotiations of treaties, delimitation of trade frontiers, settlement of disputes and potential crises argued away’.37 The conduct of relations was delegated to designated representatives of African rulers, who were often referred to as ‘messengers’, ‘linguists’, or ‘heralds’, and who were entitled to diplomatic immunity, regulated by a regionalised system of customary law. Hence, rather than presenting diplomacy as a concept foreign to Africa, ‘the sophisticated, political organization of pre-colonial Africa, ranging from empires and kingdoms to city-states and chieftaincies’ advanced ‘a rich tapestry of relations and was facilitated by abundant trade and the existence of customary law’.38 The uptake of defence diplomacy as a ‘strategic necessity’ and ‘strategic

SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: A VIABLE INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

the second is the promotion of democratic civil–military relations; and

asset’39 for a state’s foreign and security policy objectives and priorities increasingly points to its utility as ‘a bridge between politically derived (and often interchangeable) ends, the ways selected to achieve these ends, and the military means’.40 Therefore, for governments and policy makers who seek to maximise the strategic-level benefits of defence diplomacy, it is imperative to adopt a coherent and pragmatic approach to contemporary defence planning and military strategic thinking. Furthermore, in light of the interlinkages between diplomacy, the deployment of whole-ofgovernment resources and military assets, and the employment of hard and soft power as mutual enablers of foreign policy goals, an effective approach

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 157

157

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 8

to defence policy should be underpinned by a fusion of strategy and planning, and the acknowledgement of the political and historic contexts and the relevance of non-military considerations.41

SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: IN-BETWEEN THE VIOLENT-COERCIVE AND PACIFIC-PERSUASIVE? The task of defence diplomacy, as a pivotal instrument of a state’s policy, is to fuse the mailed fist of armed force, on one end of the statecraft spectrum, with the velvet glove of diplomacy on the opposite end, in a coherent, mutually enabling, and strategic manner. South Africa’s approach to defence diplomacy is grounded in the cognisance of not only the complex post-Cold War security environment, but also the strategic utility of the military in support of its foreign policy priorities, ‘its international status, strategic posture and its inescapable continental responsibilities’.42 The main reference documents pertinent to South African defence diplomacy are the 2011 White Paper on Foreign Policy; the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; the 2015 Defence Review; the 1994 White Paper on Intelligence; and the 2012 White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions. Common themes across these documents include the prioritisation of the African agenda as a key pillar of foreign policy, with implications for shared prosperity and security in an interconnected landscape; the acknowledgement of a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) external environment; the interlinkages between domestic and foreign policies; and the imperative for an integrated and coordinated whole-of-government approach in the promotion and protection of South Africa’s vital national interests.

AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY South Africa’s contemporary defence relations and military cooperation post apartheid has to be viewed in light of the monumental transition to democracy in 1994. Prior to the transformation of defence diplomacy and the demilitarisation of the state, the security policy under apartheid was primarily state-centric and focused on regime security and state survival. The ‘Total Strategy’ policy adopted by the apartheid government prioritised low-intensity warfare, incursions, and cross-border interventions aimed at destabilising the neighbouring Frontline States, which were perceived as a major threat to the apartheid state.43 The democratic transition embraced a human-security-centred approach to defence and security, overseeing 158

a radical reorientation of defence posture, doctrine, and operations; the

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 158

2022/11/10 00:03

states; a commitment to respect for international law and prescriptions on the use of force; and the re-emergence of the military instrument in South Africa’s contemporary foreign policy. South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy orientation is also premised on the prioritisation of soft power, informed by the country’s interest in projecting itself as a ‘good international citizen’ following the democratic transition. Moreover, the soft power leitmotif in South Africa’s foreign policy has influenced, inter alia, its bridge-building role between North and South; its image as a champion for the interests of Africa and the Global South; its advocacy for multilateralism and protection of the rulesbased international order; its contribution to and participation in peace diplomacy; and its role as a norm entrepreneur in the establishment of a range of multilateral institutions such as the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).44 The 2015 Defence Review is the main defence policy document that informs South Africa’s defence trajectory over a 15-year time frame. The document is set out according to five strategic planning milestones, aimed at (a) arresting the decline in critical capabilities; (b) reorganising and rebalancing the defence force; (c) developing a sustainable defence capability appropriate to South Africa’s international status (interim endstate); (d) enhancing ‘the Defence Force’s capacity to respond to emerging threats’ (end-state); and (e) defending the Republic ‘against an imminent or dire threat’.45 The 2015 Defence Review allocates an entire chapter to defence diplomacy in the context of political and strategic objectives with respect to regional and continental peace and security.46 Whereas the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review were largely aimed at realising the transformational goals of the democratic transition pertinent to the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), an evolving strategic environment and domestic imperatives necessitated a rethink of the long-term policy and strategy agenda for defence. The

SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: A VIABLE INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

prioritisation of peaceful relations and military cooperation with other

2015 Defence Review covers issues such as force design, strategic posture, the democratisation of civil–military relations, force generation, defence expenditure, defence management systems, and future defence and procurement strategies.47 It sets out the defence policy according to four strategic defence goals and 13 strategic tasks, informed by national security strategy, national interest, and foreign policy. The four goals include (a) defending and protecting South Africa, which includes deterrence, defence, and protecting vital interests; (b) safeguarding South Africa, including protection of borders and critical infrastructure; (c) promoting peace and security, which entails bolstering strategic influence through defence

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 159

159

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 8

diplomacy and participation in international peace missions; and (d) developmental and other ordered tasks, which cover treaty obligations, ordered presidential tasks, and assistance to civil authority, among others.48 The 2015 Defence Review has not managed to escape criticism, with some detractors pointing to its failure to address the capacity–expectations gap with respect to defence capabilities;49 its predisposition to an outsized focus on a budget-driven, prescriptive-rational strategic management model as opposed to a dynamic, interests-driven, outside-in approach;50 and its insistence on an outdated strategic outlook that is out of touch with the actual short-term and medium-term tasks of the SANDF.51 The centrality of the continental and regional agenda in South Africa’s foreign policy outlook, aimed at ‘a better Africa in a better world’, is premised on the pillars of:52 ■

economic and regional integration

■

the development–peace nexus

■

the promotion of democracy

■

good governance and human rights

■

the commitment to the prevention and peaceful resolution of conflict

■

participation in and contribution to multilateral institutions at the regional, continental, and global levels

■

the development of peaceful regional and continental partnerships and relations.

Furthermore, the military–diplomatic nexus at the core of South African defence diplomacy is outlined in the 2015 Defence Review as follows: South Africa’s contribution to the prevention and resolution of conflict will be enhanced through an integration of its diplomatic, military and other efforts, in a complementary manner, and in instances supported by appropriate military capabilities, that strengthen South Africa’s capacity to influence international developments. This requires a defence diplomacy capability whose strategy and main effort focus on those national priorities where defence can add the most value. Defence diplomacy efforts will further centre on fostering long-standing relationships with key African states and other strategic partners.53

The integrated governance approach to foreign policy and national security is also reflected in the organisation of government’s interdepartmental decision-making processes into clusters. Accordingly, the centrality of the military instrument in foreign policy was reflected in the inclusion of the Department of Defence (DOD) in the International Relations, Peace 160

and Security (IRPS) cluster, later renamed the International Cooperation,

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 160

2022/11/10 00:03

national security decision-making and security sector reform governance, under President Mbeki a National Security Council (NSC) was established in 2000 to coordinate the intelligence and security sector as well as liaise with and in-between Cabinet clusters pertinent to national security issues. The NSC operates at the executive level. It is chaired by the president and comprised of the deputy president and the ministers and senior officials of the core departments of Police, Defence, International Relations and Cooperation, Home Affairs, Justice and Constitutional Development, and Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, as well as National Treasury and the State Security Agency (SSA).55 In spite of its envisaged role as an overarching national security coordination structure and the body responsible for keeping track of South Africa’s ‘enduring key interests’, under the Zuma administration the NSC was rendered defunct due to impediments to its mandate, capacity, and organisational integrity as a result of ‘neglect or politicisation and factionalisation’.56 On the basis of the findings of the 2018 High Level Review Panel on the SSA, chaired by former Minister Sydney Mufamadi, which included a recommendation for the urgent development of an NSS following public and parliamentary consultation, in 2019 President Ramaphosa announced the re-establishment of the domestic and foreign branches of the intelligence services. According to the notice gazetted on 10 March 2020 (No. 43083),57 the reconstituted NSC is responsible for the approval of the NSS and for coordination between the intelligence- and security-related functions, and is backed by the South African National Security Secretariat (SANSS), made up of the security advisor to the president, the coordinator for intelligence (the chair of the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee [NICOC]), and the director-generals of the respective ministries.

SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE DIPLOMACY STRATEGY Aligned to the country’s broader political and strategy goals, the 2015

SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: A VIABLE INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Trade and Security (ICTS) cluster.54 As part of the enhanced coordination of

Defence Review situates defence diplomacy within a layered defence approach with three priorities: (i) Firstly, to influence the international security agenda through integrated diplomacy efforts and the pursuit of national objectives. (ii) Secondly, through strategic engagement of the UN and the African Peace and Security Architecture, to (1) Pursue defined multilateral security objectives. […] (iii) Thirdly, the pursuit of strategic bilateral objectives.58

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 161

161

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 8

More specifically from a defence planning perspective, defence diplomacy is synchronised with Goal 3, ‘Promote peace and security’, as part of the four strategic defence goals and thirteen strategic tasks as identified by key decision-makers, namely the ICTS cluster and the Presidency in accordance with the Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) 2014–2019 and the annual Government Programme of Action.59 The promotion of peace and security broadly entails the promotion of strategic influence, which includes the following priorities:60 ■

Shaping the multilateral security agenda

■

Contributing to multilateral security structures

■

Forging regional and continental partnerships

■

Developing defence relations further afield

■

Implementing confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs)

■

Engaging in defence industry cooperation and deploying defence attachés.

Complementary to Task 8, the following priorities, among others, are included under the umbrella of Task 9, ‘Contributing to peace and stability’: interventions under grave circumstances, peace missions and post-conflict development, reconstruction of the security sector, general military assistance missions, and regional security initiatives such as maritime security and anti-piracy operations.61 In light of the strategic guidance provided by the defence diplomacy strategy, the SANDF is presented in the Defence Review as a crucial instrument in support of South Africa’s soft power projection, including as regards emphasising peace diplomacy, promoting multilateralism, and protecting national interests. Hence, South Africa emphasises both the pragmatic and transformative functions of defence diplomacy, with a view to not only ‘building strategic depth in its own regional backyard’62 but also ‘forging long-standing relationships with African states and other strategic partners’ and promoting peace diplomacy at regional, continental, and global levels.63

SOUTH AFRICA’S BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DEFENCE ENGAGEMENTS Based on a comprehensive assessment and contextualisation of the complex and evolving regional and global security environment, the 2015 Defence Review aptly stresses the utility of defence diplomacy in support of foreign policy ambitions and priorities, and particularly the role of international defence engagements in generating net diplomatic gains and building 162

collective regional security and mutual trust. The 2015 Defence Review

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 162

2022/11/10 00:03

Development Community (SADC) to be the focal point of its international defence engagements.64 Consequently, South Africa prioritises the secondment of its personnel to positions in the SADC’s Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and as contributions to the SADC Standby Force. At the continental level, South Africa supports the AU and its peace and security mechanisms, particularly the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and its pillars (the Military Staff Committee, the Continental Early Warning System, and the African Standby Force [ASF]). As a leading norm entrepreneur on the continent with a mixed record in peace diplomacy, South Africa’s imprint on peace and security initiatives has been the subject of much controversy, with views swinging between admiration and consternation. For instance, the formation of the African Capacity for Immediate Responses to Crises (ACIRC) in 2011, following championing by South Africa, was hailed as a useful stop-gap measure for rapid deployment in the face of delayed ASF operationalisation. Critics, on the other hand, saw the ACIRC as a duplication of the AU intervention mechanism and an overreach of South Africa’s role at the helm of AU peace and security.65 At a multilateral level, South Africa has been an active troop-contributing country (TCC) to UN peace missions, underpinned by political, economic, security, and normative rationales.66 South Africa’s deployment to UN peace missions (including experts, police, and staff) as of August 2020 amounted to 1 151 personnel across three missions: the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and the AU–UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM), located within DIRCO, has oversight over the coordination, management, and evaluation of SANDF deployment to peace missions.67 In addition to enhancement of South Africa’s strategic influence through active participation in a range of multilateral defence and security fora, the SANDF also conducts military assistance operations. An example is Operation

SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: A VIABLE INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

pointedly asserts South Africa’s engagement with the Southern African

COPPER, an anti-piracy operation in the Mozambique Channel deployed in support of SADC maritime security and in line with South Africa’s commitment to promoting regional security as a core priority of Pretoria’s foreign policy.68 Joint multinational military exercises are also a crucial dimension of South Africa’s international defence engagement, with the objective of building mutual trust, improving skills, enhancing interoperability of forces, and deepening cooperation with key African and global strategic partners (see Table 7). Examples include Exercise ATLASUR XI, a biennial maritime exercise between South Africa and Uruguay, and Exercise IBSAMAR between Brazil, India, and South Africa, aimed at strengthening maritime cooperation

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 163

163

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 8

and combating piracy in the southern Indian Ocean and Atlantic Ocean. Other notable regular bilateral exercises are Exercise Oxide (South Africa and France), Exercise Good Hope (South Africa and Germany), and Exercise Shared Accord (South Africa and the USA).69 The SANDF did not participate in any joint military exercises with foreign forces during 2020 and 2021, as a result of the global Covid-19 pandemic.70

Table 7: South African joint military exercises and operations during the presidency of Cyril Ramaphosa (2018 to the present)71 Year 2018

Exercise/Operation

Countries involved

Exercise ATLASUR XI (naval exercise, 31 August to 21 September)

Brazil, Uruguay, South Africa

Exercise IBSAMAR VI (naval exercise, 1–13 October)

India, Brazil, South Africa

Exercise UTULIVU IV (29 October to 9 November)

Command post exercise for the ACIRC in Uganda

Exercise UMODZI (1–18 October)

SADC Standby Force command post exercise

Operation COPPER

SADC-initiated maritime patrol mission in the Mozambique Channel The South African Navy has been involved in Operation COPPER since the SAS Mendi commenced patrols in January 2011.

2019

2020–2021

Exercise MOSI (naval exercise, 21–30 November)

China, Russia, South Africa

Operation MISTRAL (South African contribution to MONUSCO)

UN peace support operation in the DRC

SANDF participation in international military exercises was put on hold due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

In November 2019, South Africa, Russia, and China participated in Exercise MOSI, the first trilateral exercise among the navies of the three partners. Exercise MOSI raised questions about Pretoria’s military allegiance with reference to traditional Western partners and whether the exercise was indicative of a strategic inclination towards the BRICS countries.72 On a related note, a month before this trilateral exercise – which has been labelled a ‘proto-BRICS military drill’73 – Russia sent two Aerospace Forces Tupolev TU-160 bombers as part of an official visit under Russia– South Africa defence cooperation. Historically, the bulk of South Africa’s strategic partnerships have been with NATO countries, given alignment across doctrines, logistics, and equipment. Rather than narrowly viewing defence engagement with emergent non-Western partners through lenses of 164

geopolitical competition, Pretoria’s broadened pattern of engagement since

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 164

2022/11/10 00:03

policy objectives and military requirements.74

DEPLOYMENT OF DEFENCE ATTACHÉS South Africa maintains a significant network of 44 defence attachés (see Table 8), with 10 offices in SADC countries making up the largest proportion of deployment.75 According to the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the main roles of a defence attaché include promoting his/ her country’s military and security interests, acting as a liaison between his/her country and the military of the host country, and acting as military and security adviser to his/her ambassador and embassy staff, among others.76 South Africa prioritises professional competence, knowledge of host country, military knowledge, operational experience, and ability to champion foreign policy and national interests as critical skills in the selection of its defence attachés. Moreover, as of 2021 South Africa was host to 59 resident defence attachés and advisor corps, with majority representation from African states.77

Table 8: Number and location of South African defence attachés as of July 202078 Region

Number of attachés

Location of attachés

SADC

10

Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, eSwatini, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe

Rest of Africa

13

Algeria, AU, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda

Rest of the world

21

Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Cuba, France, Germany, India, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, People’s Republic of China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE), UK, UN, USA, and Vietnam

SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: A VIABLE INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

2019 should be read as a pragmatic balancing strategy in service of foreign

Emphasising the function and relevance of South African defence attachés, former Minister of Defence and Military Veterans Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula has drawn on their pivotal role in bolstering the country’s international defence engagement and their broader contribution to foreign policy objectives. Minister Mapisa-Nqakula also issued a stern warning to errant defence attachés against tarnishing the country’s image and promised swift disciplinary action for those who fall short of the desired standard.79 Overall, in light of Pretoria’s international profile as an emerging middle power with lofty ambitions in the promotion of peace and security, the 44 165

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 165

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 8

defence attachés represent only a small fraction of the 104 foreign missions that South Africa maintains globally.

EVALUATING SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: RELEVANCE, EFFECTIVENESS, AND PROSPECTS Having broadly outlined South Africa’s defence diplomacy blueprint and its positioning in the context of strategic defence planning and foreign policy priorities, a fundamental question comes to the fore: How effective is defence diplomacy in delivering strategic imperatives and priorities as a pivotal instrument of foreign policy? This evaluative question is linked to inter-related sub-questions based on the broad categories of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and economy.80 Similarly, Baldino and Carr propose four interlinked questions that can serve as a useful framework for the evaluation of a defence diplomacy strategy: What does the conduct of defence diplomacy pathways seek to create, under what conditions and where (in specific terms)? How does the performance of these activities complement existing domestic concerns and broader national interests? How can the implementation, management and expansion of defence diplomacy be undertaken in an efficient and resilient manner, and how can we best evaluate and scrutinize such investments and outcomes? and What are the potential risks and supplementary regional consequences that such defence outreach activities and outlets will pose?81

RELEVANCE Is there an ongoing need for defence diplomacy? In the DOD’s Annual Performance Plan 2019, defence diplomacy is highlighted as ‘the fundamental component in South Africa’s conflict prevention and conflict resolution strategy’.82 Furthermore, the DOD’s annual report for 2018/19 notes that ‘diplomacy actions by the DOD varied between focussed efforts and indirect actions that had a defence diplomacy impact’ and that the ‘benefits of international military cooperation gave impetus to the defence diplomacy of the DOD’.83 A more recent development is the approval in 2020 of the Defence International Affairs Policy, which outlines the position of the DOD in its approach to and conduct of international affairs in pursuit of governmental 166

foreign policy objectives.84

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 166

2022/11/10 00:03

Are the objectives of defence diplomacy consistent with government and defence policy priorities? Using performance indicators derived from the outcomes in the MTSF 2014–2019, aimed at achieving Vision 2030 as stipulated in the National Development Plan (NDP) and relevant to the defence mandate, the DOD supported MTSF Outcome 3 (‘All people in South Africa are and feel safe’) and Outcome 11 (‘Creating a better South Africa and contributing to a better and safer Africa in a better world’). Pertinent to defence diplomacy, the SANDF supported MTSF Outcome 11 via participation in Operation MISTRAL, which is South Africa’s commitment to MONUSCO, comprised of 1 138 personnel and force structure elements such as SANDF specialist contingent, Force Intervention Battalion Group, and a composite helicopter unit. The SANDF also participated in Operation COPPER, an anti-piracy programme in support of the Mozambican government and the SADC Maritime Security State Action Plan.85 However, in spite of the high degree of alignment between defence diplomacy and strategic foreign policy and defence policy priorities, one of the biggest obstacles to compliance across the board is the challenge of budgetary constraints.86 For instance, South Africa’s participation in international peace missions has been hampered by ageing SANDF equipment, a shortage of serviceable equipment, a lack of strategic airlift, a shortage of qualified personnel, and disqualification from deployment due to breaches of the code of conduct.87 Multinational military exercises have also been affected by cost-cutting measures by the SANDF, leading to the reduction of targets to a single joint interdepartmental, inter-agency, and multinational (JIIM) military exercise for the financial year 2019/20. This stands in contrast to 2018, which saw four multinational exercises, including ATLASUR XI, UTULIVU (IV), IBSAMAR, and UMODZI.88

How effective are the defence policy and diplomacy approaches with respect to establishing and strengthening partnerships?

SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: A VIABLE INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

EFFECTIVENESS

One of the main objectives of defence diplomacy is the establishment and strengthening of bilateral and multilateral partnerships underpinned by defence cooperation agreements. During the 2018/19 review period, the DOD concluded bilateral agreements with the DRC, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Norway, the UK, Indonesia, and Vietnam.89 In addition to strengthening defence engagement, defence cooperation agreements have also served as a pathway for promoting the defence industry, ensuring 167

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 167

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 8

access to strategic markets for South African armaments, and boosting joint procurement programmes. The South African defence industry has been commended for its competitive advantage in terms of price and quality of products and ‘its independence as an alternative to non-aligned/non-NATO defence clients’.90 In view of reduced levels of South African defence spending, maintenance and growth of the country’s defence industrial base will increasingly depend on a mutually beneficial relationship with the SANDF as its primary client. The SANDF’s range of defence diplomacy activities can be leveraged for access to emerging and mature markets, given its participation in diverse geographical and tactical conditions. On the other hand, by marketing the unique technical capabilities and competitiveness of its defence industry in the context of defence cooperation agreements and dialogue platforms, the SANDF can serve as an enabler for increased foreign direct investment, exports, R&D capacity, and overall gross domestic product (GDP) growth.91 Hence, defence sector experts have urged the DOD to support exports and train attachés to market the South African defence industry.92 As far as external partnerships are concerned, the South African defence industry should also capitalise on opportunities to liaise with major manufacturers such as MBDA and Rheinmetall, which have approached Denel for collaborative ventures. Equally important is government support of the defence industry, from the DOD, DIRCO, and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). In sum, South Africa’s defence diplomacy activities can serve as a valuable tool in propping up the local defence industry while also leveraging competitive advantages for strategic partnerships, investments, and economic growth in line with national interests.

EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY Are defence diplomacy activities being delivered efficiently? In 2019, the defence budget stood at R50 billion, which amounted to 1 per cent of GDP. The shrinking budget is a worrying trend that has elicited criticism of the increasing mismatch between the stated defence ambition and the available resources, with implications for short-term, medium-term, and long-term objectives. For Esterhuyse and Louw, the decline in funding is just one symptom of the wider dysfunctionality and misaligned departmental policy and military strategy.93 Arguably, at the root of the problem is decisionmakers’ inclination towards a funding-driven defence strategy rather than a mandate-driven one, with adverse effects on expected defence trajectory, force design, force development, and defence capability.94 During a media 168

briefing on the Defence Budget Vote 2019/20, Minister Mapisa-Nqakula

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 168

2022/11/10 00:03

Defence Force has become progressively unsustainable in terms of declining defence allocations and we’ve now reached a point where the Republic must decide on the kind of Defence Force it wants and can afford.’95 In addition to the failure to incorporate capability-based planning into strategic defence planning, the strategic ineptitude of the DOD can also be attributed to an inadequate strategic management model and a dysfunctional organisational culture. The preferred strategic model of the DOD has leaned towards a budget-driven, inside-out approach, which has accentuated ‘observation and analysis of the environment, followed by the identification of internal strengths and weaknesses, and external threats and opportunities; development of strategic plans and action on strategic plans, including implementation and execution of strategies.’ Furthermore, the organisational culture stifles feedback loops between its external (foreign and domestic) and its internal institutional environments, coupled with an intolerance for self-criticism and a tendency on the part of decision-makers to be ‘overly optimistic and deliberately inoffensive to political sensitivities’.96 Thus, the result of the DOD’s bottom-up strategic management approach, with its inordinate emphasis on the ‘known’ elements of defence planning, has been increased bureaucratisation of the strategy process, hampering long-term adaptability, organisational learning, and overall functional effectiveness.97 The 2015 Defence Review, which has been hailed as ‘the gold-standard policy for defence planning’,98 is essentially a product of the budget-driven, inside-out strategic management model of the DOD. Consequently, the misalignment between ambition and capacity, and the shrinking budget, has rendered the envisaged defence trajectory unrealistic and the level of defence ambition untenable in the face of the current strategy and policy dilemma.99 An additional setback to the plan to arrest the decline of the SANDF within the available resource allocation100 is the failure to peg the defence budget on the recommended 40:30:30 ratio (between funding of personnel, operating costs, and capital).101 Instead, what has emerged is

SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: A VIABLE INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

highlighted the dire straits of defence funding in view of the shortfalls: ‘The

an inflated wage component in the defence budget, amounting to over 60 per cent of total expenditure, in spite of a year-on-year reduction in human resources as a result of natural attrition.102 The defence diplomacy strategy, which takes its lead from the Defence Review, is not exempt from the strategic missteps and shortage of resources stemming from a shrinking budget. The resultant cost-cutting measures inevitably impact the scale and regularity of defence diplomacy activities such as military exercises, as well as deployment of defence attachés. As such, the policy crossroads at which the DOD finds itself will require hard choices, such as scaling back the force size to manageable levels, realigning

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 169

169

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 8

the growth core concept in accordance with operational necessity, and upscaling the defence budget to levels commensurate with foreign policy objectives and international obligations.103

CONCLUSION South Africa’s defence diplomacy is a pivotal element of its integrated approach to foreign policy, economic policy, and defence policy. Given the country’s international posture and the prioritisation of soft-power currency in its foreign policy orientation, policy makers and strategists would be remiss to discount the added value of defence diplomacy in promoting strategic influence and contributing to the realisation of foreign policy priorities and security objectives. Such a pragmatic outlook on defence diplomacy should be premised not only on a dynamic, conceptdriven, and effects-based approach to the strategy process of formulating and implementing defence diplomacy, but also on the transformative and pragmatic implications for the political-institutional and normative frameworks within which defence diplomacy operates. Hence, the suite of activities that define South Africa’s defence diplomacy – such as the deployment of defence attachés, engagement in joint training and military exercises, and participation in international peace missions – should be underpinned by a coherence across strategic, operational, and tactical levels in order to contribute to net gains in diplomatic engagement. Finally, the strategic-level benefits of defence diplomacy should be predicated on the complementarity of this concept with traditional diplomatic efforts, an adaptive approach to the changing conditions of practice, and the broadening of its scope of meaning.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1 Du Plessis, A. 2008. ‘Defence diplomacy: Conceptual and practical dimensions with specific reference to South Africa.’ Strategic Review for Southern Africa 30(2): 87–119, p. 89. 2 Du Plessis, ‘Defence diplomacy’; Edmonds, M. and Mills, G. 1998. Beyond the Horizon: Defence, Diplomacy and South Africa’s Naval Opportunities. Johannesburg: SAIIA, CDiSS. 3 Edmonds and Mills. Beyond the Horizon, p. 106. 4 Du Plessis, ‘Defence diplomacy’, p. 87. 5 Du Plessis, ‘Defence diplomacy’, p. 90. 170

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 170

2022/11/10 00:03

7 An NSS was drafted in 2013, but it has been classified as top secret and has not been subjected to processes of consultation with the public and Parliament. 8 The Presidency. 2018. 2018 High Level Review Panel Report on the State Security Agency, p. 3. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-levelreview-panel-state-security-agency.pdf (Accessed 22 October 2020). 9 DCAF (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces). 2015. ‘National Security Policies.’ SSR Backgrounder Series, p. 2. https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/ files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_9_National%20Security%20Policies.11.15.pdf (Accessed 22 October 2020). 10 DCAF, ‘National Security Policies’, p. 3. 11 DCAF. 2020. ‘Defence Policy.’ https://securitysectorintegrity.com/defence-management/ defence-policy/ (Accessed 22 October 2020). 12 Taylor, T. 2018. ‘Defence as policy.’ In Routledge Handbook of Defence Studies, edited by David J. Galbreath and John R. Deni. New York: Routledge, p. 8. https://doi. org/10.4324/9781315650463-2. 13 Waltz, K. N. 1967. ‘International structure, national force, and the balance of world power.’ Journal of International Affairs 21(2): 215–231, p. 216. 14 Barston, R. P. 2014. Modern Diplomacy (4th ed.). Milton Park: Routledge, p. 1. https:// doi.org/10.4324/9781315832890; CSIS (Centre for Strategic and International Studies). 1998. Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age: A Report of the CSIS Advisory Panel on Diplomacy in the Information Age. Washington, DC: CSIS. 15 Sending, O. J., Pouliot, V. and Neumann, I. B. 2011 ‘The future of diplomacy: Changing practices, evolving relationships.’ International Journal 66(3): 527–542, p. 531. https:// doi.org/10.1177/002070201106600301. 16 Cooper, A. F., Heine, J. and Thakur, R. (eds). 2013. The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 49. https://doi.org/10.1093/ oxfordhb/9780199588862.001.0001. 17 Balzacq, T., Charillon, F. and Ramel, F. (eds). 2020. Global Diplomacy: An Introduction to Theory and Practice. Translated by William Snow. London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 2. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28786-3. 18 Spies. Y. K. 2019. Global Diplomacy and International Society. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 8. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95525-4. 19 Du Plessis, ‘Defence diplomacy’, p. 90.

SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: A VIABLE INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

6 Engelbrecht, L. 2008. ‘Civil security a “useful concept”.’ Defenceweb 23 December. https://w w w.defenceweb.co.za/securit y/civil-securit y/civil-securit y-a-usef ulconcept/?Itemid=281 (Accessed 22 October 2020).

20 Nye, J. S. 1990. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books, p. 154. 21 Nye, J. S. 2013. ‘Hard, soft, and smart power.’ In The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, edited by A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, and R. Thakur. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199588862.013.0031. 22 Swistek, G. 2012. ‘The nexus between public diplomacy and military diplomacy in foreign affairs and defense policy.’ Connections 11(2): 79–87, p. 80. https://doi. org/10.11610/Connections.11.2.06. 23 Adapted from Du Plessis, ‘Defence diplomacy’, p. 96. 171

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 171

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 8

24 Cheyre, J. E. 2013. ‘Defence diplomacy.’ In The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, edited by A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, and R. Thakur. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 370. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199588862.013.0021. 25 Cottey, A. and Forster, A. 2004. ‘Reshaping defense diplomacy: New role for military cooperation assistance.’ Adelphi Paper No. 365, Oxford University Press for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, p. 6. 26 Muthanna, K. A. 2011. ‘Military diplomacy.’ Journal of Defence Studies 5(1): 1–15, p. 2. 27 Du Plessis, ‘Defence diplomacy’, p. 92. 28 Cottey and Forster, ‘Reshaping defense diplomacy’, p. 7; Drab, L. 2018. ‘Defence diplomacy: An important tool for the implementation of foreign policy and security of the state.’ Security and Defence Quarterly 20(3): 57–71, p. 66. https://doi. org/10.5604/01.3001.0012.5152. 29 Tan, S. S. and Singh, B. 2012. ‘Introduction.’ Asian Security 8(3): 221–231, p. 221. https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2012.723916. 30 Drab, ‘Defence diplomacy’, p. 62. 31 Barkawi, T. 2011. ‘“Defence diplomacy” in north-south relations.’ International Journal 66(3): 597–612, p. 598. https://doi.org/10.1177/002070201106600305. 32 Cottey and Forster, ‘Reshaping defense diplomacy’, p. 8. 33 Cottey and Forster, ‘Reshaping defense diplomacy’, p. 7; Tan and Singh, ‘Introduction’, p. 225. 34 Cottey and Forster, ‘Reshaping defense diplomacy’, p. 6. 35 Barkawi, ‘“Defence diplomacy” in north-south relations’, p. 612. 36 Barkawi, ‘“Defence diplomacy” in north-south relations’, p. 599. 37 Irwin, G. W. 1975. ‘Precolonial African diplomacy: The example of Asante.’ The International Journal of African Historical Studies 8(1): 81–96, p. 82. https://doi. org/10.2307/217487. 38 Spies, Y. K. 2018. ‘African diplomacy.’ Wiley Encyclopedia of Diplomacy, 27 February. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118885154.dipl0005. 39 Baldino, D. and Carr, A. 2016. ‘Defence diplomacy and the Australian defence force: Smokescreen or strategy?’ Australian Journal of International Affairs 70(2): 139–158, p. 151. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2015.1113229. 40 Gray, C. S. 2014. Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 50. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701842.001.0001. 41 Gray, Strategy and Defence Planning, p. 26. 42 DOD (Department of Defence). 2015. South African Defence Review 2015. Pretoria: DOD. Chapter 2, para. 128. 43 Stott, N. 2002. ‘From the SADF to the SANDF: Safeguarding South Africa for a better life for all?’ Violence and Transition Series 7. Johannesburg: CSVR, p. 4. 44 Smith, K. 2012. ‘Soft power: The essence of South Africa’s foreign policy.’ In South African Foreign Policy Review, Volume 1, edited by C. Landsberg and J.-A. van Wyk. Pretoria: AISA and IGD, p. 73. 45 DOD, South African Defence Review 2015, Chairperson’s overview, para. 39. 46 DOD, South African Defence Review 2015, Chapter 7; see particularly para. 11. 47 DOD, South African Defence Review 2015, Introduction, para. 28.

172

48 DOD, South African Defence Review 2015, Figure Overview-1, page iv.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 172

2022/11/10 00:03

50 Esterhuyse, A. and Louw, G. 2018. ‘The practice of strategy: South African defence in stasis.’ Defense & Security Analysis 34(1): 53–72, p. 65. https://doi.org/10.1080/147517 98.2018.1421403. 51 Stupart, J. 2019 ‘South Africa’s defence policy in need of a resupply.’ Africa Portal, 8 July. https://www.africaportal.org/features/south-africas-defence-policy-need-resupply/ (Accessed 25 April 2020). 52 DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation). 2011. Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy. Pretoria: DIRCO. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/foreignpolicy0.pdf (Accessed 5 May 2022). 53 DOD, South African Defence Review 2015, Chapter 7, para. 11. 54 Masters, L. 2012. ‘Opening the “black box”: South African foreign policy-making.’ In South African Foreign Policy Review, Volume 1, edited by C. Landsberg and J.-A. van Wyk. Pretoria: AISA and IGD. 55 Engelbrecht, ‘Civil security a “useful concept”’. 56 The Presidency, ‘2018 High Level Review Panel Report on the State Security Agency’, p. 96. 57 Government of South Africa. 2020. Gazette Vol. 657, No. 43083, 10 March 2020. www. saflii.org/za/gaz/ZAGovGaz/2020/173.html (Accessed 6 May 2022). 58 DOD, South African Defence Review 2015, Chapter 3, para. 59. 59 DOD. 2019. Annual Performance Plan 2019. Pretoria: DOD, p. 216. https://static.pmg.org. za/Defence_APP_2019_WEB.pdf (Accessed 2 June 2022). 60 DOD, South African Defence Review 2015, Chapter 7, paras 16–27. 61 DOD, South African Defence Review 2015, Chapter 7, para. 35. 62 Wesley, M. 2011. ‘Session 3: Defence diplomacy.’ 13th Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO), 4–10 August 2011. Singapore, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. 63 DOD, South African Defence Review 2015, Chairperson’s overview, para. 23. 64 DOD, South African Defence Review 2015, Chapter 7, para. 22. 65 Bizos, A. 2015. ‘To protect or to intervene? Contesting R2P as a norm in South Africa’s foreign policy.’ SAIIA Policy Insights No. 17, 1 June, p. 3. https://saiia.org.za/research/ to-protect-or-to-intervene-contesting-r2p-as-a-norm-in-south-africa-s-foreign-policy/ (Accessed 6 May 2022).

SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: A VIABLE INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

49 Cilliers, J. 2014. ‘The 2014 South African Defence Review: Rebuilding after years of abuse, neglect and decay.’ ISS Policy Brief No. 56, 25 June. https://issafrica.org/ research/policy-brief/the-2014-south-african-defence-review-rebuilding-after-years-ofabuse-neglect-and-decay (Accessed 25 April 2020).

66 Mabera, F. 2018. ‘South Africa’s profile as peacekeeper: In keeping with the times?’ African Security 11(3): 223–251. https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2018.1520798. 67 UN Peacekeeping. 2020. ‘Summary of Contribution to UN Peacekeeping by Country, Mission and Post: Police, UN Military Experts on Mission, Staff Officers and Troops 31/08/2020.’ https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/03_country _and_mission_28.pdf (Accessed 22 October 2020). 68 DOD. 2019. 2018/19 Department of Defence Annual Report. Pretoria: DOD, p. 40. https:// www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202002/dod-annual-report-fy2018-19final-web-layout.pdf (Accessed 6 May 2022).

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 173

173

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 8

69 DOD, 2018/19 Department of Defence Annual Report, p. 44; Defenceweb. 2019. ‘Only one SANDF joint international exercise scheduled for 2019/20.’ 13 May. https://www. defenceweb.co.za/featured/only-one-sandf-joint-international-exercise-scheduledfor-2019-20/ (Accessed 5 May 2020). 70 Defenceweb. 2021. ‘No defence force exercises in 2021.’ 22 January. https://www.defenceweb. co.za/featured/no-defence-force-exercises-in-2021/ (Accessed 26 January 2021). 71 DOD, 2018/19 Department of Defence Annual Report, pp. 43–44. 72 Fabricius, P. 2019. ‘South Africa’s military drills with Russia and China raise eyebrows.’ ISS Today, 29 November. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africas-military-drillswith-russia-and-china-raise-eyebrows (Accessed 15 May 2020). 73 Fabricius, ‘South Africa’s military drills with Russia and China raise eyebrows’. 74 DOD, South African Defence Review 2015, Chapter 7, para. 23. 75 DOD, 2018/19 Department of Defence Annual Report, p. 64. 76 DCAF. 2007. ‘Defence Attachés.’ DCAF Backgrounder 07/2007. https://www.files.ethz. ch/isn/38583/dcaf-backgrounder-defence-attaches.pdf (Accessed 10 May 2020). 77 DOD. 2021. 2020/21 Department of Defence Annual Report. Pretoria: DOD, p. 24. https://www.gov.za/documents/department-defence-annual-report-20202021-28sep-2021-0000 (Accessed 6 June 2022). 78 DOD, 2018/19 Department of Defence Annual Report, p. 64. 79 Cronje, J. and Helfrich, K. 2019. ‘Defence minister expects more from SA defence attachés.’ Defenceweb, 16 October. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/defenceminister-expects-more-from-sa-defence-attaches/ (Accessed 10 May 2020). 80 The questions are adapted from: Canadian Chief Review Services. 2013. ‘Evaluation of defence policy and diplomacy.’ November. https://www.canada.ca/en/departmentnational-defence/corporate/reports-publications/audit-evaluation/evaluation-defencepolicy-diplomacy.html (Accessed 5 May 2020). 81 Baldino and Carr, ‘Defence diplomacy and the Australian defence force’, p. 151. 82 DOD, Annual Performance Plan 2019, p. 75. 83 DOD, 2018/19 Department of Defence Annual Report, p. 20. 84 DOD. 2020. Adjusted Annual Performance Plan 2020. Retabled 20 July 2020. http://www. dod.mil.za/document/ReportsNav/Reports/Annual%20Performance%20Plan/2020/DOD%20 Adjusted%20Annual%20Performance%20Plan%202020.pdf (Accessed 2 June 2022). 85 DOD, 2018/19 Department of Defence Annual Report, p. 20. 86 For the 2020/21 financial year, the defence budget stood at R52.4 billion, with a nominal R22.9 billion reduction in defence allocation over a five-year period from 2017 and a baseline reduction scenario for defence of 5 per cent for 2020, 6 per cent for 2021, and 7 per cent for 2022, equivalent to an additional reduction of R9.6 billion from 2020 to 2022. See Mapisa-Nqakula, N. 2020. ‘Minister of Defence and Military Veterans Budget Speech, responses by IFP, EFF & DA.’ Briefing, 23 July. https://pmg.org. za/briefing/30772/ (Accessed 20 0ctober 2020). 87 PMG (Parliamentary Monitoring Group). 2018. ‘International peacekeeping operations: SANDF & DIRCO briefing.’ 2 March. https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/25896/ (Accessed 6 May 2022). 88 Defenceweb, ‘Only one SANDF joint international exercise scheduled for 2019/20’. 89 DOD, 2018/19 Department of Defence Annual Report, p. 49.

174

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 174

2022/11/10 00:03

91 Martin, G. 2019. ‘SA defence industry needs to sell itself.’ Defenceweb, 4 November. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/industry/industry-industry/sa-defence-industry-needsto-sell-itself/ (Accessed 6 May 2022); Janes, J. H. S. 2018. ‘SA defence technology highlighted at AAD despite low defence budget.’ Defenceweb, 18 September. https://www. defenceweb.co.za/joint/military-art-a-science/sa-defence-technology-highlighted-ataad-despite-low-defence-budget/ (Accessed 27 April 2020). 92 Martin, ‘SA defence industry needs to sell itself’. 93 Esterhuyse and Louw, ‘The practice of strategy’, p. 54. 94 DOD, Annual Performance Plan 2019, p. 39. 95 Mapisa-Nqakula, N. 2019. ‘Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula: Media briefing on Defence and Military Veterans Dept Budget Vote 2019/2020.’ 17 July. https://www.gov. za/speeches/pre-budget-vote-media-briefing-17-jul-2019-0000 (Accessed 4 May 2020). 96 Esterhuyse and Louw, ‘The practice of strategy’, p. 61. 97 Esterhuyse and Louw, ‘The practice of strategy’, p. 64. 98 Stupart, ‘South Africa’s defence policy in need of a resupply’. 99 Stupart, ‘South Africa’s defence policy in need of a resupply’. 100 DOD, South African Defence Review 2015, Chairperson’s overview, para. 39. 101 DOD, South African Defence Review 2015, Chairperson’s overview, para. 47. 102 Defenceweb. 2019. ‘SANDF personnel take 60% plus of the budget in salaries.’ 20 November. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sandf-personnel-take-60-plus-ofthe-budget-in-salaries/ (Accessed 5 May 2020). 103 Stupart, ‘South Africa’s defence policy in need of a resupply’.

SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: A VIABLE INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

90 Cronje, J. 2019. ‘SAAMDEC aiming for positive growth of SA defence exports.’ Defenceweb, 6 September. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/industry/industry-industry/ saamdec-aiming-for-positive-growth-of-sa-defence-exports/ (Accessed 25 May 2020).

175

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 175

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 9

Towards the Urbanisation of Foreign Policy in South Africa? Fritz Nganje and Odilile Ayodele

INTRODUCTION It is perhaps a trite observation that foreign policy and diplomacy have undergone significant transformations over the past couple of decades. This is evident mostly in the expansion of the foreign policy agenda and the explosion of actors that are today considered part of the diplomatic business. The new forms of diplomatic engagement that are emerging, including digital diplomacy, paradiplomacy, and citizen diplomacy, also bear testament to an evolving foreign policy and diplomatic landscape. The drivers of this change are plenty and range from complex global interdependence, which has contributed to blurring the lines between domestic and foreign affairs (both from a policy and institutional perspective), to domestic political reorganisation in many countries, which has allowed citizens to continuously push the boundaries of democratic control over extra-territorial affairs. However, from a spatial perspective, it is mass urbanisation and the corresponding reorganisation of the global economy around cities that have had the greatest effect on the transformation of the environment in which states and other actors conduct their foreign policies in the twenty-first century. By virtue of their newfound status as the command-and-control centres of a globalising neoliberal capitalist economy, cities and other metropolitan areas have become important attractions for a variety of domestic and external actors pursuing diverse and sometimes competing goals. As primary sites for the manifestation of pressing global challenges such as climate change, poverty, wealth inequality, and crime, cities have also become indispensable for global efforts to address these challenges. Not surprisingly, internationalisation has increasingly become an integral part of the development strategies of city governments. As cities once again gravitate towards the centre of world affairs, urban issues and concerns have assumed prominence in global policy discourses, with many states and other international actors adjusting their foreign policies to the exigencies, opportunities, and challenges of an urban age. This chapter analyses the current trajectory of South Africa’s foreign policy against the backdrop of the urban infiltration of international affairs 176

and the influence of the ‘global cities’ phenomenon. We argue that, with

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 176

2022/11/10 00:03

finds itself at the coalface of the globalisation-of-cities phenomenon and the resulting urbanisation of international relations. However, a lingering ambivalence at the national level towards the international involvement of cities and other sub-national governments continues to stifle prospects for a well-coordinated and institutionalised urban-conscious foreign policy. In such an environment, the prospects of an ineffective, inefficient, and fragmented foreign policy and diplomacy have grown steadily. The remainder of the chapter is organised into five sections. The next section locates the analysis in the academic discourse on the role of socalled global cities in urbanising international relations. This is followed by a contextual discussion of the developmental mandate of South Africa’s cities, and the globalisation efforts of these cities in pursuit of this mandate. The section before the conclusion reflects on the opportunities, challenges, and prospects for an urban-conscious foreign policy in South Africa.

GLOBAL CITIES AND THE URBANISATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS The international involvement of cities, defined as geographical spaces around which significant political and socio-economic life is organised, is not an entirely new phenomenon. It has evolved in relation to changes in the structure of the international system and the relative significance

TOWARDS THE URBANISATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA?

some of the most globally connected cities on the continent, South Africa

and influence of cities in it. Prior to the modern inter-state system, when city-states such as Athens and Venice enjoyed the status of fairly independent political units, cities were full diplomatic actors in their own right. They engaged in regular exchanges with one another to represent and negotiate their interests, and developed customs that, arguably, constitute the foundations of modern diplomatic practices among sovereign states.1 However, in the heyday of the Westphalian system, the fortunes and reputations of cities became inextricably tied to the nation-state project, with the result that cities became reduced to little more than the industrial and growth engines of national economies.2 As nation-states moved to consolidate their sovereignty and monopolise the diplomatic space, the role of cities in international affairs became muted. The ‘sister cities’ or ‘city-twinning’ phenomenon that developed in the aftermath of the Second World War hardly had any material impact on the foreign policies or diplomatic conduct of states, but was nonetheless significant. To the extent that these transnational exchanges emphasised commonalities and advocated peaceful coexistence among cities and other localities in sometimes hostile nation-states, the internationalisation of cities embodied a symbolic challenge to the divisive and exclusionary logic of the inter-state

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 177

177

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 9

system.3 Some dimensions of the contemporary international involvement of cities have precedents in these developments. Consider, for example, the global activism of the Mayors for Peace, a transnational movement of more than 8  000 cities that was established in 1982 to press for the abolition of nuclear weapons.4 The ascendancy and consolidation of neoliberalism as the organising principle of the post-war US-led global order created conditions in both the Global North and the Global South for the emergence of a new category of cities whose fortunes are not tied to the fate of their respective states. Against the backdrop of the restructuring of global capitalism, far-reaching technological advances, as well as the fragmentation, decentralisation, and internationalisation of the state, these so-called global cities have become the strategic nodes of an increasingly globalising economy. What is more, as Kangas argues, the very concept of global cities has assumed the status of a dispositif, with the power to fashion the world in the image of free-market capitalism.5 As will be demonstrated in the rest of this chapter, their growing material wealth and power means that global cities have increasingly adopted a proactive role in world affairs, with a view to representing local interests at the global level. The re-emergence of cities as significant international actors with major impact on global politics and foreign policy can also be attributed to rapid urbanisation and the devolution of governance responsibilities and authority from national to sub-national governments. The rapid growth of cities over the past few decades, particularly in the developing world, has been accompanied by the urbanisation of global challenges such as poverty, inequality and social exclusion, crime, migration, and environmental degradation. Put differently, in the twenty-first century the agenda of international relations has not only been expanded considerably, but also increasingly urbanised. With cities playing host to the world’s pressing development challenges, a large portion of the agenda of global politics and governance has focused on urban issues. The increasing salience of the urban agenda in world politics also means that city governments and other city actors are now critical stakeholders in global governance, and that urban dynamics cannot be ignored in global policy debates. At the national level, the interplay between urbanisation and the aspiration of attaining global city status has become even more significant in the context of pervasive decentralisation policies, which have seen cities across the world increasingly taking on responsibilities that were hitherto reserved for their national governments. Relative domestic autonomy over issues such as the promotion of economic development and environmental protection has encouraged cities to break free from the diplomatic tutelage

178

of their central governments and become assertive global players in their

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 178

2022/11/10 00:03

economic transformation, the globalisation of cities can best be understood as the outcome of a complex interplay of transnational, national, and local forces and dynamics, in what Genis ¸ describes as ‘a new politics of placemaking in a transnational era’.6 It is also from this perspective that the globalisation of cities assumes prominence in the conduct of foreign policy in the twenty-first century. As cities become sites of transnational attraction and contestation, and as they hold out prospects for national socio-economic development, it has become imperative for national development plans and their external relations strategies to incorporate an urban perspective. Foreign policy, in this context, cannot shy away from embracing the opportunities of urbanisation and the globalisation of cities, while attempting to mitigate the adverse effects of these dynamics on a coherent diplomatic presence and efforts to achieve national development priorities. An urbanconscious foreign policy would in turn require fundamental changes to the institutional framework, as well as the substance and style of a country’s diplomacy. At the very least, there should be better alignment between the national foreign policy vision and diplomatic activities of the country and the internationalisation strategies and priorities of its globalising cities. More fundamentally, in an age of rapid urbanisation and the globalisation of cities, the urban agenda becomes a foreign policy priority, and urban dynamics and perspectives provide a critical backdrop for foreign policy

TOWARDS THE URBANISATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA?

own right. Thus, rather than being seen exclusively as a product of global

formulation and implementation.

CITIES AND DEVELOPMENTAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA Cities are the engine rooms of municipalities; in post-apartheid South Africa, they fulfil the additional role of addressing historical racial inequalities in development. The role South Africa plays on the international stage means that its cities are a focal point; however, what is more, with the projected increase in urban dwellers by 2050, development planning must be more agile. The UN-Habitat estimates that around 80 per cent of South Africa’s population will be living in urban centres by 2050.7 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, changed the framework of local government in South Africa. As Parnell and Pieterse aptly affirm, the nature and role of local government were transformed, putting municipalities at the apex of development efforts; moreover, municipalities act as ‘the major conduit for poverty alleviation, social and economic rights, [and as] enabler[s] of economic growth’.8 Chapter 7 of the Constitution creates three categories of municipalities. Category A refers to metropolitan municipalities,

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 179

179

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 9

situated in urban centres with deep economic linkages; they are responsible for local government functions and command impressive budgets. There are eight Category A municipalities.9 Olver explains that metropolitan municipality budgets are more extensive than those of many provinces and national departments – ‘sufficient to attract the attention of private service providers and less scrupulous operators interested in a market for public influence and contracts’.10 There are 226 Category B municipalities (local municipalities) and 44 Category C municipalities (district municipalities). Category B and C municipalities are primarily responsible for capacity building and planning.11 The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 lays out the criteria for determining which areas can host the various types of municipalities. These distinctions were created for ease of administration and to deal with the challenges of merging the former racially segregated authorities. In effect, the radical transformation of local government fulfils the constitutional mandate of creating a developmental local government within a larger developmental state.

WHAT IS A DEVELOPMENTAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT? In a ‘developmental state’, a term attributed to Johnson,12 the state is at the apex of macroeconomic determinations, which means that it not only defines and directs the economic agenda within the country, but also ensures that it gathers the technical capacity to realise its goals within this framework. Much of the literature around the developmental state, and the model that South Africa purports to aspire to, focuses primarily on the East and South Asian model. The model of developmental local government is not a new model, and several countries have adopted it to respond to challenges caused by pursuing a purely capitalistic-driven sub-national government. An example highlighted by Binza points to Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, and Finland) that moved towards a developmental model in response to various socio-economic pressures.13 The Nordic model of local government involves decentralised decision-making and the provision of welfare services such as care for the elderly, early childhood education, city planning, waste handling, sports facilities, and water. The Nordic model was developed organically and does not follow a plan set by national government.14 By the 1990s, the developmental local government model had drastically changed, particularly in East and South Asia, because of endogenous and exogenous pressures. In the South African case, there has been a lot of debate as to whether the country is indeed a developmental state, or if the predominant model is even suitable for the South African context. At the heart of these debates 180

is the inherent tension between the continued practice of cadre deployment

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 180

2022/11/10 00:03

spheres. The need to redress injustices of the past and the desire to have a technical class that follows the state’s agenda have been overrun by evidence of patronage networks and the failure to meet the basic needs of citizens. These failures overshadow the successes of the state. Nowhere is this more evident than at the local government level, particularly in the cities. President Cyril Ramaphosa has, at several junctures, stressed the need for a technocratic civil service and lamented the current incapacity based on patronage networks and the lack of appropriate skills.15 Even though Chapter 13 of the National Development Plan (NDP) speaks to the professionalisation of the civil service, there are still gaps regarding capacity. The Ramaphosa administration gazetted the draft ‘National Implementation Framework towards the Professionalisation of the Public Service’ in 2020.16 The Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI) correctly points out that the draft framework does not have a sufficient monitoring and evaluation rubric to ensure that skilled civil servants are appointed.17

RESOURCE DRIVERS FOR DEVELOPMENTAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT Even though there appears to be a divergence between the poverty alleviation and economic growth mandates placed on local governments, particularly in the larger cities (such as Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban), there is a need for inter-city partnerships at a local level. As Nel and Binns point

TOWARDS THE URBANISATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA?

by the ruling ANC and the technical competencies needed in all government

out, as the shift to developmental local government is accelerating, there is room for smaller cities and towns to learn from the experiences of much larger metros.18 Turok and Habiyaremye offer possible mechanisms for addressing the economic gaps between territories, learnt from the Chinese approach to local government: Decentralised initiatives are rarely sufficient to catch up with more advanced regions, but places arguably stand a better chance of prospering by working together on joint problem-solving, capacity-strengthening and other economic development tasks. Instead of acting as insular regions competing for jobs, investments, and talent, this approach draws on the values of reciprocity and cooperation. Thriving cities accept some responsibility [to assist] more impoverished areas in overcoming their negative development paths because their fortunes are ultimately connected, and both areas stand to gain.19

However, the potential for following a developmental local government model in South Africa is hampered by deep social fractures and economic weaknesses. The fault lines in the social contract between the state and citizens have been laid bare. The Auditor-General’s 2018/2019 local

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 181

181

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 9

government audit report uncovered accounts of maladministration.20 Referring to this report, Nzo bemoans the insidious nature of patronage networks in South Africa and how they have compromised service delivery and eroded public service ethics.21 Indeed, there is a salient argument to be made about the state’s failure to meet its aspiration of providing developmental local government, as articulated in various policy documents and the Constitution. The continued subversion of resources, and the failure to build up capacity or appropriately implement local economic development (LED) initiatives, makes the achievement of a developmental local government unlikely.

WHY IS DEVELOPMENTAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT EVEN NECESSARY? Cities are administrative and cultural hubs, but they are also, importantly, economic hubs. In a globalised world, cities function as ‘organising nodes’ on the global value chain (GVC).22 Positioning on the GVC can have significant benefits for the productivity and income of cities and their inhabitants. For South Africa, which describes itself as a developmental state, harnessing resources and improving economic prospects are key to achieving its economic agenda. Furthermore, a developmental local government and a developmental foreign policy, at both local and national level, correspond to the aspirations espoused in the Constitution and the NDP. In discussing a developmental foreign policy at the national level, Landsberg and Georghiou stress that ‘a developmental foreign policy’s credibility will be measured and determined by the extent to which it helps to foster development and industrialisation’.23 Arguably, a developmental local government – and, by extension, its developmental diplomacy and foreign policy – should foster economic development and social cohesion whilst facing the legacy of past injustices and contemporary social challenges exacerbated by decades of misdevelopment. Beyond implementing LED initiatives and building up capacity, one of the building blocks of the internationalisation of South Africa’s cities is correcting the legacy of apartheid spatial development, or spatial apartheid. The persistence of spatial apartheid in the new democratic dispensation has ensured that socio-economic development has continued to be distorted. The primary ‘face’ of poverty continues to be black and living on the periphery. Although more black South Africans have entered the middle class, this has done little to change the prevailing development legacy; finances, in addition to race, continue to be the prevailing factor in pushing the poor to the margins.24 Spatial apartheid continues to bedevil South African cities, and the result of the continued structural constraints, as Turok contends, is that 182

‘[the] separation between places of work and residence renders urban labour

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 182

2022/11/10 00:03

costs of transport for commuters and service delivery for taxpayers’.25 The lack of agility in addressing existing structural impediments has serious implications for internationalisation efforts and for developing substantiable cities suited to the twenty-first century. Cities must speak to the aspirations of their citizens, and ensuring sustainable growth goes beyond concerns about resources and getting into pole position on the GVC. It speaks to the future of the city and the state, and how government caters for its citizens.

THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF SOUTH AFRICA’S GLOBAL CITIES Cities are at the precipice of global politics; they are at the coalface of global macro issues and the point at which much of the national government’s policy directions are felt. For instance, a national decision to pursue an international showcase event, such as a sports world cup, or to accede to instruments such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), is felt acutely at the city level. Global cities are characterised by their dynamism and their level of integration into the global economy. Although cities have become important in international politics, as Rosenau observes, they will not ‘replace states as centres of power’.26 Many cities on the African continent, however, do not fit the contemporary description of a ‘global city’ as defined

TOWARDS THE URBANISATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA?

markets less efficient, marginalises poor black communities and adds to the

by Sassen and others.27 In the South African context, only Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban could be described as global cities. These cities have developed international economic linkages to such an extent that they may be considered meaningful nodes in the global economy.28 Therefore, city administrators are left with the challenges of, firstly, how to pursue their interests in the face of a wider ecosystem that is engaged with at a higher level and, secondly, how to leverage their position to meet national development goals. Simply put, how do cities use their international relationships in order to give life to the aspirations articulated in their respective local development plans? In the South African case, the picture is further complicated by the combination of a complex local government administration arrangement and contentious inter-political party relationships.

WHAT DRIVES INTERNATIONALISATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN CITIES? The internationalisation of cities, or even local government at large, is not explicitly catered for in South Africa’s international relations or local government framework. Although Section 231 of the Constitution allows

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 183

183

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 9

sub-national governments to engage internationally, there has been no solid framework to guide their activities. In 1999, the national government created Municipal International Relations: A Policy Framework for South Africa (MIR), as the government had recognised the value in local communities developing partnerships with other communities from different states. The primary purpose of the MIR was to meet the developmental agenda of local government, including poverty alleviation.29 As Peyroux explains, the implementation of the MIR was not as successful as expected, because it was largely ‘ceremonial’ and was difficult to execute.30 Particularly in the climate change governance arena, the interplay between city, province, and national government plays a large role in the city’s international relations efforts. The entry of the  Foreign Service Act 26 of 2019 and the publication of Guidelines and Procedures for Conclusion of International Arrangements, Twinning Agreements and Memoranda of Cooperation by Provincial and Local Government in 202031 promise to create synergy between the different levels of government. In a virtual presentation to the Select Committee on Security and Justice, the Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Candith Mashego– Dlamini, explained the procedure that will need to be followed before any form of international arrangement can be signed:32 1. The draft document must be made available to the Directorate of International Provincial Protocol in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). 2. The Directorate will obtain a legal opinion from the Office of the Chief State Law Adviser. 3. The Chief State Law Adviser will scrutinise the draft text of the arrangements from an international law point of view to ensure that it is non-binding. Cities have been visible in international debates on climate change and adaptation. This is understandable, as it is at the city level that climate change effects are felt most acutely; however, there is no formal mechanism supporting international engagement by local government on climate change and other environmental issues.33 Leck and Simon explain that discourse around the environment and development in South Africa is steeped in misunderstandings and antipathy towards creating and maintaining socalled ‘green spaces’, as this is seen as being an elitist or middle-class endeavour. As the authors acknowledge, environmental issues are mired in historical baggage from the apartheid era and the deep economic inequality that still exists in the country.34 It is against this background that the City

184

of Durban in KwaZulu-Natal has found itself at the forefront of national and

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 184

2022/11/10 00:03

also initiated their own individual climate adaptation strategies. In 2011, Durban hosted the 17th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP17) and developed citywide climate change and mitigation strategies. The Environmental Planning and Climate Protection Department (EPCPD) and the Energy Office (EO) of the eThekwini metropolitan municipality introduced Durban’s Climate Change Strategy. In 2000, the eThekwini metropolitan municipality was established. Durban is a city within the municipality, which also includes several towns; however, the name eThekwini is sometimes used to refer to Durban.35 The city has been involved with external networks such as the C40 Cities climate action group (a network of 97 megacities), Rockefeller 100 Resilient Cities, Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI, a network committed to sustainable urban development), and United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG). These international partnerships have been critical but have not been without issues. For instance, Durban exited the 100 Resilient Cities programme two years before it collapsed because of a fundamental disagreement with the programme’s approach. The EPCPD felt that the interpretation of resilience had to be grounded in local needs.36 Essentially, there was a difference in opinion on which approach would be appropriate for the African context. This experience in climate change governance is instructive for other international city engagements. Individual arrangements must be responsive to the needs of the city; a ‘copy and paste’ approach would not

TOWARDS THE URBANISATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA?

international climate change engagement. However, the other metros have

be suitable for the local context.37 The Constitution, as well as the local government framework, gives cities a degree of autonomy in developing their international relations strategies, with economic and cultural considerations often being the primary driver of cities’ external relations. Yet, there are tensions between local government and national government. As Dietrichsen and Van Niekerk explain, even though DIRCO’s guidelines expect a level of cooperation between all government levels, in practice that is not what happens. They further explain: ‘DIRCO and other national departments (such as trade and industry, tourism and agriculture) each develop their own strategic plans, which are not considered by provinces and cities when developing their strategic plans and priorities.’38 As a result, each of the cities, particularly in the significant metropoles, has its own distinctive character. Before its first international relations policy was adopted in 2012, the City of Johannesburg’s international engagements were ad hoc and not adequately planned.39 The city’s 2016 international relations policy replaced the 2012 policy, and by the time of writing was still in force. The city’s international relations approach rests on the following geographic foci, modelled on the national foreign policy: a distinct focus on Africa,

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 185

185

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 9

South–South relations (of which BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa] relations are inclusive), and fostering North–South ties.40 As much as economic considerations are essential, the emphasis on fostering closer relations within the Global South reflects the engagements and relationships that the city chooses to pursue.41 The City of Cape Town, which is led by the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), has taken a different approach to its international relations strategy. In 2015, the city adopted its strategic international relations policy (which was updated in 2021). The pillars on which the city’s 2015 international relations rested were business enhancement partnerships, governance improvement partnerships, and social development partnerships.42 As a result, the partnerships and engagements that the city prioritises have been primarily focused on the Global North. The city’s five-year integrated development plan (IDP) for 2017–2022 continues the idea of the ‘positioning of Cape Town as a forward-looking competitive business city’.43 Herein lies a source of tension between the city and national government, as the latter would prefer the prioritisation of the Global South. The DA often complains that the national government neglects to promote Cape Town as a tourism destination. This is but one example of the contentious relationship between the ANC and DA-led sub-national governments. In terms of tourism, for example, Cape Town ‘initiated independent tourism promotion and capitalized on opportunities for marketing’.44 These promotion efforts can easily be construed as the city attempting to divorce itself from the rest of the country and undercut the national government’s agenda of transforming the socio-economic legacy of apartheid. Although investment and employment are in line with the national government’s agenda, it is important that relationships and engagements do not contradict national policy. The antagonistic relationship between opposition-led sub-national governments and the national government needs to be addressed systematically. For instance, Cape Town frames itself as a ‘global city’, different from its sister cities in the country.45 Arguably, this separation is rooted in the battles between the ANC and the opposition DA, and can lead to dire consequences for residents in cities. This played out during Herman Mashaba’s tenure as mayor in Johannesburg (2016–2019). Mashaba, a DA mayor, stymied the international relations strategy put in place for the city by previous ANC administrations. Arguably, the changes rendered the city’s international engagements during his tenure ineffective. The apparent driver of these changes had more to do with political posturing than with what would have been beneficial for the city.

186

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 186

2022/11/10 00:03

The ambitions of South African cities – at least the large metropolitan cities – to be counted among the world’s globalising cities is not in doubt, and neither is the observation that through their largely autonomous internationalisation efforts, some of these cities have, over the years, demonstrated significant potential for global actorhood. Since the dawn of democracy, the nexus between city diplomacy and urban development strategies has also become stronger. However, the same cannot be said of the link between urbanisation and the globalisation of South African cities on the one hand and the conduct of the country’s foreign policy on the other hand. There is indeed official acknowledgement of both the increasing urbanisation of international affairs and the strategic role that South African cities stand to play at the interface of global and domestic affairs. However, this is yet to translate into national foreign policy thinking and a framework that is attuned to the urban pressures and influences of modern diplomacy and international affairs. Despite the rhetoric to the contrary, the weak coordination between the internationalisation of cities and Pretoria’s foreign policy has persisted across all post-apartheid administrations. As home to some of the most economically developed and globalised cities on the continent, South Africa is strategically placed to benefit from the urbanisation of international relations, from both an economic and a

TOWARDS THE URBANISATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA?

URBANISING FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA: OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES, AND PROSPECTS

political perspective. As regional economic hubs that also play a critical role in connecting the region to global markets, cities such as Johannesburg and Cape Town have the potential to leverage their global connectedness to promote their economic interests and competitiveness, and thus contribute to the economic development objectives of the national foreign policy. As Cornelissen documents, South Africa’s major cities have since the late 1990s demonstrated great entrepreneurialism in pursuit of global economic competitiveness, taking advantage of the national government’s neoliberal economic orientation, and in some instances positioning themselves as local champions of Pretoria’s regional economic development frameworks, such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).46 Similarly, as discussed above, most South African metropolitan cities have developed a significant international actorhood that has given them privileged access to a number of global governance forums. These include the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and UNHabitat, as well as transnational municipal networks such as the UCLG and the C40 Cities climate leadership group. The participation of cities such as Durban, Johannesburg, and Cape Town in these forums not only contributes to addressing their respective governance and development challenges, but

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 187

187

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 9

has also been used in some cases to champion causes that are aligned to Pretoria’s foreign policy positions on issues such as climate change and development finance. If the global cities phenomenon, in which South African cities are actively involved, holds great prospects for localising foreign policy and enhancing Pretoria’s international diplomacy, it also poses major risks to the integrity of the country’s foreign policy and national development efforts if not managed effectively. By localisation of foreign policy, we are referring to the efforts intended to root foreign policy in the experiences, interests, and aspirations of a country’s citizens.47 As it is largely a product of neoliberal capitalist restructuring, the globalising city is as much a site for the reproduction of the ills of an unequal global economic system as it is an engine of economic growth. As Sassen argues, the global city gives concrete form to the contradictions, exploitation, socio-economic exclusion, and general poverty that have become associated with the expansion of modern-day capitalism.48 It is for this reason that scholars such as Kangas and Geniş invite us to see the globalisation of cities not as a mere process of global economic transformation but also as a conscious project whose trajectory and outcomes are dependent on the balance of power at multiple scales.49 Seen this way, there is a case to be made that, especially in the context of the legacy of socio-spatial injustices in South African cities, the twin processes of urbanisation and the globalisation of cities pose major challenges to efforts at socio-economic redress in the absence of a concerted national effort to shape how these cities engage with the outside world. It is no wonder that in South Africa’s major cities, the internationalisation of what Nijman calls the global private city50 – the economic backdrop that allows transnational capital to be rooted in the city – far outpaces and tends to be disconnected from the international activities of the global public city – that is, the internationalisation of the city government. The international activities of the global private city are also not always aligned to the urban development strategies and priorities articulated by the city government. The need for a system-wide and cautious approach to the urbanisation and globalisation of cities becomes even more apparent when considering the subtle ways in which the international agency of the global public city, infused as it is with progressive rhetoric of socio-economic transformation, can become assimilated into the dominant market framework. This comes with the possibility of undermining national development goals and priorities. For example, Bouteligier shows how transnational municipal networks such as the C40 – to which major South African cities belong, and which are often touted as more inclusive, flexible, and efficient global governance mechanisms – have become new sites for reinforcing inequality

188

in the global political economy.51 In particular, the C40 has been accused

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 188

2022/11/10 00:03

subtly coerce them into embracing neoliberal environmental policies that have been rejected by the national governments of these cities.52 Thus, without a coordinated diplomatic approach that is sensitive to the opportunities and challenges of an urban age, the globalisation of South African cities risks fragmenting the national foreign policy and undermining the associated objective of broad-based socio-economic transformation. The argument here is not that the various post-apartheid administrations have been oblivious to the global economic and diplomatic opportunities and challenges associated with rapid urbanisation and the phenomenon of the global city. It is equally not our contention that South Africa’s foreign policy has over the years shied away from engaging in the urban dimension of international affairs. This consciousness has been demonstrated in the many instances in which national government departments, including DIRCO, have reached out to and collaborated with their city counterparts on a range of transnational urban issues. These include trade and investment promotion, climate change negotiations, and the SDGs and the New Urban Agenda. For instance, in the area of climate change negotiations, the national government has tapped into the scientific expertise and practical experience available at the local government level to strengthen its negotiating capacity on issues of climate adaptation within the framework of the UNFCCC. What is more, the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) has also increasingly included city representatives in its official negotiating

TOWARDS THE URBANISATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA?

of using the financial and technical support it provides to African cities to

delegations to the conference of the parties (COP) of the UN – although with a lingering sense of patronage, often expressed in the adoption of a gatekeeping role.53 Likewise, the Department of Human Settlements has been working closely with key South African cities to implement the New Urban Agenda, adopted in October 2016 under the auspices of the UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III).54 However, rather than speak to a coordinated and institutionalised foreign policy and diplomatic approach, these examples represent exceptions in a dominant orientation where the globalisation of the country’s cities evolves almost in parallel to the national foreign policy and diplomatic efforts. For the most part, foreign policy on key urban issues is made without genuine consultation with cities, the actors which would ultimately be required to implement such policy and which often have a better grasp of the issues around which international diplomacy is conducted. In instances where national government departments have felt the need to take on board the perspectives of city governments, the effectiveness of this engagement has often been curtailed by its paternalistic approach, which is born out of an enduring reluctance at the national level to decentralise the foreign policy and diplomatic space.55 This is not an argument for a free-for-all

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 189

189

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 9

approach to South Africa’s international relations, in which cities and other sub-national actors are allowed to engage in transnational activities without any guidance or accountability. To the contrary, there is a need for more proactive and concerted leadership at the national level in both guiding and facilitating the internationalisation activities of the country’s cities in the interest of the national development effort. As the political fallout from the 2016 visit to Taiwan by the then DA Tshwane mayor suggests, many of the misgivings over democratising the conduct of foreign policy in a manner that is consistent with current changes in the diplomatic environment stem from the prevailing party-political system in the country. The ruling ANC has consistently expressed support for a more coordinated and institutionalised inclusion of South Africa’s municipalities in the conduct of the country’s foreign policy, as a strategy to realise the objectives of developmental local government. However, its historical aversion to a decentralised polity, coupled with a national bureaucracy that continues to see international diplomacy in predominantly Westphalian terms, means that an attitude of ambivalence continues to define how the national government engages cities on foreign policy issues. With the ANC progressively losing control of the governance of the country’s major cities, and even ANC-run cities becoming more assertive, there are strong prospects that this lingering ideological and political obstacle to an effective intergovernmental framework on international relations will usher in an era of foreign policy fragmentation in South Africa. As Soldatos argues, in the domestic context, the multiplicity of diplomatic actors does not necessarily result in multiple foreign policy positions. Policy fragmentation often results from the absence of effective institutional structures and processes at the national level, which affords sub-national actors the opportunity to represent and defend their foreign policy interests.56

CONCLUSION As cities continue to move closer to the centre of international politics, South African cities must, as a developmental necessity, develop a global outlook. Moreover, global issues such as transnational crime, terrorism, and migration are political footballs whose effects are experienced at a city level. The prominence of South Africa’s national and regional development corridors means that the number of people settling in cities is bound to increase. Additionally, cities are reflective of more profound debates around national identity and, as such, are sites of political contestation. Cities are politically contested sites in large part because of their ‘gateway’ 190

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 190

2022/11/10 00:03

because of their economic and financial prowess in the region.57 A shift in how the country approaches the urbanisation of foreign policy in South Africa is necessary to address the profound socio-economic challenges in the country. It is not clear whether the developmental state model is one that South Africa should still pursue. However, whether or not South Africa can become a developmental state with effective developmental local government will depend on whether it can commit to a truly decentralised system of government. South Africa’s developmental aspirations are buoyed by its constitutional mandate and the international mandate of the NDP, and international agreements such as the SDGs. The National Planning Commission (NPC) has acknowledged that South Africa will likely not meet its 2030 development targets.58 The reality is that South Africa’s cities and local governments have a two-fold issue on their hands: the need to address the socio-economic development deficits on the ground and the need to be internationally competitive. South African cities do not operate in a vacuum; the nature of global society and South Africa’s position on the international stage mean that South Africa’s developmental agenda cannot be permanently overlooked. The Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 saw the introduction of South Africa’s Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan.59 The intention of the plan is to resuscitate the economy post the pandemic through high-impact

TOWARDS THE URBANISATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA?

status. Cape Town, Durban, and Johannesburg are arguably gateway cities

interventions, including aggressive infrastructure investment, strategic localisation, and reindustrialisation. As the country’s economic engines, cities would be expected to play a key role in the implementation of this plan, making it even more imperative for their globalising efforts to remain sensitive to domestic development challenges. There has been an apparent lack of synergy between the three levels of government, particularly on international relations. The new policies adopted during Ramaphosa’s tenure hope to change that. The Foreign Service Act makes provision for a revitalised consultative forum for provinces and local government to account to DIRCO directly when entering into or signing international arrangements. The revival of this forum promises better coordination; however, for international relations at the local government and provincial level to be beneficial, DIRCO needs to be involved in the formulation of sub-national international relations strategies. This would ensure that each province and municipality maximises its international relationships. It would also prevent a situation in which a city, or province, positions itself as being separate from the state and therefore working in opposition to the state’s purposes.  191

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 191

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 9

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1 Van der Pluijm, R. 2017. City Diplomacy: The Expanding Role of Cities in International Politics. The Hague: Clingendeal, p. 5. 2 Curtis, S. 2011. ‘Global cities and the transformation of the international system.’ Review of International Studies 37(4): 1923–1947, p. 1927. https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0260210510001099. 3 Joenniemi, P. 2014. ‘City-twinning as local foreign policy: The case of Kirkenes-Nickel.’ EU Borderscapes Working paper 8, pp. 3–4. http://www.euborderscapes.eu/fileadmin/ user_upload/Working _Papers/EUBORDERSCAPES_Working _Paper_8_ Joenniemi. pdf (Accessed 4 June 2022); Zelinsky, W. 1991. ‘The twinning of the world: Sister cities in geographic and historical perspective.’ Annals of the Association of American Geographers 81(1): 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8306.1991.tb01676.x. 4 Mayors for Peace. 2021. ‘Member cities.’ http://www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/ members/index.html (Accessed 10 March 2021). 5 Kangas, A. 2017. ‘Global cities, international relations and the fabrication of the world.’ Global Society 31(4): 531–550. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2017.13 22939; Curtis, S. 2016. ‘Cities and global governance: State failure or a new global order?’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies 44(3): 455–477. https://doi. org/10.1177/0305829816637233; Sassen, S. 2005. ‘The global city: Introducing a concept.’ Brown Journal of World Affairs 11(2): 27–43. 6 Genis¸, S ¸. 2007. ‘Globalisation of cities: Towards conceptualising a new politics of placemaking in a transnational era.’ Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences 6(1): 59–77, p. 60. 7 UN-Habitat. 2020. ‘UN Habitat Sub-Saharan Africa Atlas.’ https://unhabitat.org/sites/ default/files/2020/07/atlasroaf_v02_final-compressed.pdf (Accessed 21 May 2021). 8 Parnell, S. and Pieterse, E. 2002. ‘Developmental local government.’ In Democratising Local Government: The South African Experiment, edited by S. Parnell, E. Pieterse, and M. Swilling. Cape Town: UCT Press, p. 82. 9 South African Government. 2021. ‘Local government.’ https://www.gov.za/aboutgovernment/government-system/local-government (Accessed 10 March 2021). 10 Olver, C. 2018. ‘Patronage and politics in a South African city: A case study of Nelson Mandela Bay.’ Area Development and Policy 3(3): 275–292, p. 279. https://doi.org/10.10 80/23792949.2018.1440971. 11 South African Government, ‘Local government’. 12 Johnson, C. 1981. ‘Introduction: The Taiwan model.’ In Contemporary Republic of China: The Taiwan Experience, 1950–1980, edited by J. C. Hsiung. New York: Praeger; Johnson, C. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975. California: Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804765602; Johnson, C. 1999. ‘The developmental state: Odyssey of a concept.’ In The Developmental State, edited by M. Woo-Cummings. New York: Cornell University Press. 13 Binza, M. 2010. ‘Developmental local government in the 21st century: Implementing local economic development as a new mandate.’ Administratio Publica 18(4): 241–260, p. 244.

192

14 Sellers, J. M., Lidström, A., and Bae, Y. 2020. Multilevel Democracy: How Local Institutions and Civil Society Shape the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108672337.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 192

2022/11/10 00:03

16 National School of Government. 2020. ‘A National Implementation Framework towards the Professionalisation of the Public Service.’ Government Gazette No. 44031, 8 December. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202012/44031gon1392.pdf (Accessed 17 March 2021). 17 PARI (Public Affairs Research Institute). 2021. ‘Professionalising the public service: Submission on the draft implementation framework.’ 26 February. https://pari.org. za/professionalising-the-public-service-submission-on-the-draft-implementationframework/ (Accessed 21 May 2021). 18 Nel, E. and Binns, T. 2003. ‘Putting “developmental local government” into practice: The experience of South Africa’s towns and cities.’ Urban Forum 14(2): 165–184, p. 181. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12132-003-0009-6. 19 Turok, I. and Habiyaremye, A. 2020. ‘Territorial collaboration: A novel way to spread prosperity.’ Regional Studies 54(12): 1776–1786, p. 1778. https://doi.org/10.1080/00343 404.2020.1807490. 20 Auditor-General South Africa. 2020. ‘Not much to go around, yet not the right hands at the till.’ Consolidated general report on the local government audit outcomes 2018–2019. Tshwane: Auditor-General South Africa. https://www.agsa.co.za/Portals/0/Reports/MFMA/ 201819/GR/MFMA%20GR%202018-19%20Final%20View.pdf (Accessed 10 March 2021). 21 Nzo, T. 2020. ‘Patronage and lack of ethics creates a culture of impunity in municipalities.’ Daily Maverick, 13 July. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2020-0713-patronage-and-lack-of-ethics-creates-a-culture-of-impunity-in-municipalities (Accessed 10 February 2021).

TOWARDS THE URBANISATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA?

15 Ramaphosa, C. 2020. ‘Address by President Cyril Ramaphosa at the SALGA National Members Assembly.’ 3 December. https://www.gov.za/speeches/salga-national-membersassembly-3-dec-2020-0000 (Accessed 17 March 2021); Ramaphosa, C. 2021. ‘More stringent vetting of councillors at underperforming municipalities – Ramaphosa.’ Polity, 25 January. https://www.polity.org.za/article/more-stringent-vetting-of-councillors-atunderperforming-municipalities-ramaphosa-2021-01-25 (Accessed 17 March 2021).

22 Friedman, J. (1986) 1997. ‘The world city hypothesis.’ In World Cities in a World System, edited by P. Knox and P. Taylor. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 319. 23 Landsberg, C. and Georghiou, C. 2015. ‘The foreign policy and diplomatic attributes of a developmental state: South Africa as a case study.’ South African Journal of International Affairs 22(4): 479–495, p. 482. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2015.1124805. 24 Boyle, L. and Michell, K. 2018. ‘A management concept for driving sustainability in marginalised communities in South Africa.’ Urban Forum 29(2): 185–204. https://doi. org/10.1007/s12132-017-9329-9. 25 Turok, I. 2021. ‘Urbanization, agglomeration, and economic development in South Africa.’ In The Oxford Handbook of the South African Economy, edited by A. Oqubay, F. Tregenna, and I. Valodia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 647. https://doi. org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192894199.013.28. 26 Rosenau, J. 1995. ‘Governance in the twenty-first century.’ Global Governance 1(1): 13–43, p. 27. https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-001-01-90000004. 27 Sassen, ‘The global city’. 28 Lemanski, C. 2007. ‘Global cities in the South: Deepening social and spatial polarisation in Cape Town.’ Cities 24(6): 448–461. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2007.01.011.

193

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 193

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 9

29 Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development. 1998. The White Paper on Local Government. 9 March. Pretoria: Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development; Van Rooyen, E. 2008. ‘Municipal international relations in South African local government.’ African Journal of Public Affairs 2(1): 15–24. 30 Peyroux, E. 2018. ‘Building city political agency across scales: The Johannesburg international relations strategy.’ In The City as a Global Political Actor, edited by S. Oosterlynck, L. Beeckmans, D. Bassens, B. Derudder, B. Segaert, and L. Braeckmans. London: Routledge. 31 DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation). 2020. Guidelines and Procedures for Conclusion of International Arrangements, Twinning Agreements and Memoranda of Cooperation by Provincial and Local Government. Pretoria: DIRCO. http:// www.dirco.gov.za/chiefstatelawadvicer/documents/guidelines_procedures_conclude_ provincial_arrangements.pdf (Accessed 12 March 2021). 32 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2020. ‘Select Committee on Security and Justice (NCOP) 14 October 2020.’ YouTube, 14 October. https://youtu.be/sOrmwFyl2sY (Accessed 9 May 2022). 33 Anonymous interviews with officials in the cities of Tshwane and eThekwini, via Zoom and Skype, 9 and 13 July 2020 respectively; Anonymous interviews with officials of the South African Cities Network (SACN), via Microsoft Teams, 9 July 2020. 34 Leck, H. and Simon, D. 2018. ‘Local authority responses to climate change in South Africa: The challenges of transboundary governance.’ Sustainability 10(7): Art. 2542. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10072542. 35 eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality. n.d. ‘Geography, history and economy.’ https://municipalities.co.za/overview/5/ethekwini-metropolitan-municipality (Accessed 15 March 2021). 36 Anonymous interviews with an official in the City of eThekwini, via Skype, 13 July 2020. 37 Anonymous interviews with an official in the City of eThekwini, via Skype, 13 July 2020. 38 Dietrichsen, P. and Van Niekerk, G. 2020. ‘City diplomacy in a changing world of international relations.’ In City Diplomacy Papers 1, pp. 4–13. Johannesburg: SACN, p. 9. 39 Indlela Growth Strategies. 2016. Assessment of the City of Johannesburg’s (CoJ) international relations approach and emerging geographical areas of focus. Unpublished document by the City of Johannesburg, received by the author via email on 23 August 2016. 40 Indlela Growth Strategies, Assessment of CoJ’s international relations approach. 41 City of Johannesburg. 2020. Draft Integrated Development Plan 2020/2021. Johannesburg: City of Johannesburg. https://www.joburg.org.za/documents_/Documents/Intergrated%20 Development%20Plan/IDP%202021-23/ITEM%2004%20ANNEXURE%20IDP.pdf (Accessed 10 March 2021). 42 City of Cape Town. 2015. Strategic International Relations (Policy Number 12187). Cape Town: Office of the Executive Mayor. 43 City of Cape Town. 2017. Five-Year Integrated Development Plan: July 2017 – June 2022 – as amended for 2020/2021. https://www.cogta.gov.za/cgta_2016/wp-content/ uploads/2020/12/Cape-Town-IDP2017-22_Review_and_Amendments_2020-21-IDP.pdf (Accessed January 2021).

194

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 194

2022/11/10 00:03

45 Nkula-Wenz, L. 2018. ‘A closer look at the role of international accolades in worlding Cape Town’s urban politics.’ In The City as a Global Political Actor, edited by S. Oosterlynck, L. Beeckmans, D. Bassens, B. Derudder, B. Segaert, and L. Braeckmans. London: Routledge. 46 Cornelissen, S. 2006. ‘“Entrepreneurial regions”? The foreign relations of South African cities and provinces. In In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy After Apartheid, edited by W. Carlsnaes and P. Nel. Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue. 47 Hocking, B. 1993. Localizing Foreign Policy. London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-1-349-22963-5. 48 Sassen, ‘The global city’; Sassen, S. 2019. ‘Researching the localizations of the global.’ In The Oxford Handbook of Global Studies, edited by M. Juergensmeyer, S. Sassen, and N. Steger. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/ oxfordhb/9780190630577.013.46. 49 Kangas, ‘Global cities’; Genis¸, ‘Globalisation of cities’. 50 Nijman, J. E. 2016. ‘Non-state actors and the international rule of law: Revisiting the “realist theory” of international legal personality.’ In Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law, edited by C. Ryngaert. London: Routledge, pp. 224–225. 51 Bouteligier, S. 2013. ‘Inequality in new global governance arrangements: The North– South divide in transnational municipal networks.’ Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 26(3): 251–267, pp. 262–263. https://doi.org/10.1080/135116 10.2013.771890. 52 Bouteligier, ‘Inequality in new global governance arrangements’. 53 Anonymous interviews with officials in the cities of Tshwane and eThekwini and the SACN, via Zoom and Skype respectively, 9 July 2020.

TOWARDS THE URBANISATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA?

44 Beukman, E. F. 2017. ‘Return of the city state? An assessment of city international relations.’ Southern California International Review 7(2): 90–109, p. 104.

54 Anonymous interviews, cities of Tshwane and eThekwini and the SACN, 9 July 2020. 55 Anonymous interviews, cities of Tshwane and eThekwini and the SACN, 9 July 2020. 56 Soldatos, P. 1990. ‘An explanatory framework for the study of federated states as foreignpolicy actors.’ In Federalism and International Relations, edited by J. Michelmann and P. Soldatos. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 37. 57 Scholvin, S. 2020. ‘Articulating the regional economy: Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg as gateways to Africa.’ African Geographical Review 39(2): 162–174. https://doi.org/10.1080/19376812.2019.1664915. 58 NPC (National Planning Commission). 2020. ‘Economic Progress towards the National Development Plan’s Vision 2030: Recommendations for course correction.’ Pretoria: NPC. https://www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/assets/Documents/Review%20 of%20Economic%20Progress%20NPC%20Dec%202020.pdf (Accessed 21 January 2021). 59 The Presidency. 2020. ‘Building a new economy: Highlights of the reconstruction and recovery plan.’ https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202010/buildingnew-economy-highlights-reconstruction-and-recovery-plan.pdf (Accessed 15 March 2021).

195

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 195

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 10

South African Foreign Policy, Covid-19, and Health Diplomacy: Sunset or a New Dawn? Jo-Ansie van Wyk, Lesley Masters, and Philani Mthembu

INTRODUCTION Health policy and governance featured early on in President Cyril Ramaphosa’s tenure. Besides being married to a medical doctor, Tshepo Motsepe, Ramaphosa appointed three medical doctors – Zweli Mkhize,1 Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and Aaron Motsoaledi – to posts in the 2019 national Cabinet. Both Dlamini-Zuma and Motsoaledi had served as health ministers in previous administrations. Keen on institutionalising universal health coverage through a National Health Insurance (NHI) for South Africa, Ramaphosa hosted a Presidential Health Summit in 2018, followed by a Presidential Health Compact in 2019. Health issues have also featured in all his State of the Nation Addresses (SONAs).2 However, in March 2020, Ramaphosa’s health agenda was captured by the global Covid-19 pandemic, caused by the novel coronavirus that first emerged in Wuhan, China, in late 2019. On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared Covid-19 a global pandemic.3 The unprecedented global spread and high numbers of deaths of Covid-19 affected all states. South Africa was not left unscathed, a development that has had significant implications for the foreign policy of the Ramaphosa administration, and its health diplomacy. The pandemic soon morphed into one of the defining features of – and challenges to – President Ramaphosa’s ‘New Dawn’, initiated at the commencement of his tenure. South Africa’s first public statement on the outbreak of the virus (23 January 2020) reported ‘no cause for panic’; no cases had been reported in the country, the government had activated response teams, and no restrictions regarding travel to China were being implemented.4 A second statement followed on 1 February, reassuring South Africans of the government’s continued monitoring of events and consultations with the WHO. It also referred to a group of South African students based in Wuhan, who had been moved from the city and placed under quarantine elsewhere in China.5 This picture changed rapidly, with Ramaphosa declaring a National State of Disaster on 15 March 2020 and initiating a countrywide 21-day lockdown, which commenced on 27 March 2020. At the time, 61 South Africans had

196

tested positive for Covid-19.6 The initial 21-day lockdown was extended

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 196

2022/11/10 00:03

of 2020. With increased vaccination rates, lower alert levels followed in 2021 and 2022. The global pandemic has shone a light on the complexities of balancing domestic and international priorities in working ‘to achieve a better life for [South Africa’s] people both at home and in a regional and continental context’.7 While South Africa was quick to react domestically through a strict lockdown programme, gaining the country international praise, it continues to face domestic unhappiness with the enforcement of rules related to the pandemic. These have ranged from cases of inappropriate use of force, to governance and oversight failures related to the public procurement system. Some of these governance challenges have led to serious allegations of corruption in the procurement of personal protective equipment (PPE) and other goods and services related to the pandemic. Addressing challenges at the domestic level is necessary in order to ensure that domestic weaknesses do not undermine what is possible in foreign policy. While South Africa’s domestic response to the pandemic has sparked discussion and debate across policy areas, this chapter focuses on the foreign policy implications for the country and South Africa’s response to the pandemic. It remains uncertain whether the pandemic will be the sunset or sunrise of the New Dawn narrative as the pandemic-induced global terrain evolves. Given the impact of the pandemic nationally and internationally, South Africa will need to be ready to address the changing international context and the post-Covid-19 world. The chapter proceeds with an overview of South Africa’s participation in health diplomacy, followed by a discussion on health diplomacy against the background of South Africa’s African Agenda. The penultimate section emphasises South Africa’s foreign policy and health diplomacy in the context of its foreign policy ambition to be a ‘good global citizen’ in a postCovid-19 world. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the country’s foreign policy and health diplomacy in the context of the global pandemic.

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY, COVID-19, AND HEALTH DIPLOMACY: SUNSET OR A NEW DAWN?

in late April and remained in place at high alert levels for the remainder

SOUTH AFRICA’S GLOBAL HEALTH DIPLOMACY IN PRACTICE South Africa is not new to international engagement on health. Health diplomacy as diplomacy sui generis includes engagement between actors in managing the global governance of health. While there are those who call for health diplomacy in protecting what is seen as a global public good, it is also linked to individual countries’ foreign policy aims, as is seen, for instance, in the link between funding for research on infectious diseases and the 197

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 197

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 10

protection of health security, or the provision of health care as development aid in shaping relations between donor and recipient countries.8 While the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, enshrines basic human rights such as the right to bodily and psychological integrity (Section 12) and access to health care services (Section 27), the country continues to face persistent domestic challenges in redressing past healthrelated injustices. This has been compounded by high rates of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (TB), intergenerational poverty, and apartheid urban planning – challenges which are juxtaposed with leading advances in medicines worldwide and leading health care systems in the private sector. While the country continues to address its two-tier health care system, it does place South Africa in a position where it can both engage developing countries in addressing regional and global challenges, and participate with credibility in advanced scientific forums on disease prevention and control (e.g. HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB). This feeds into the idea of South Africa as a bridge-builder, which initially set South African foreign policy along the middle-power path. This was, for example, evident during French President Emmanuel Macron’s state visit to South Africa on 28 May 2021, when he showered praise on the scientific community in South Africa during an address at the University of Pretoria on vaccine production. His comments were particularly directed towards South Africa’s advanced genome sequencing research, which allowed countries across the globe to make better informed decisions once new variants of the Covid-19 virus were discovered.9 One of the earliest milestones in post-apartheid South Africa’s health diplomacy was the Nelson Mandela–Fidel Castro Medical Training Programme, established by the two leaders in 1996. The agreement was subsequently renewed twice (in 2012 and 2019). By early 2020, Cuba had trained 1 200 South African medical students.10 Drawing on these existing relations, upon South Africa’s request, a Cuban medical brigade arrived in the country on 27 April 2020 to assist in South Africa’s response to the pandemic. The date of arrival was significant, as it was Freedom Day in South Africa, commemorating the country’s first democratic elections in 1994. Upon their arrival, Cuba’s support for the South African liberation struggle was reiterated.11 This theme – solidarity – became one of the hallmarks of South Africa’s health diplomacy vis-à-vis the global pandemic. In addition to bilateral relations, the multilateral emphasis within foreign policy is mirrored in South Africa’s approach to health diplomacy. South Africa was a founder member of the WHO in 1947, although it lost its voting rights in 1964 due to apartheid.12 Having rejoined in 1994, the country continues to participate in the forum. South Africa was also the host of the UNAIDS Conference in 2000. Although this was the 13th meeting

198

of the parties, it was the first time that this conference was hosted by a

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 198

2022/11/10 00:03

international conversation on the HI virus and to highlight the challenges of its spread in Africa.13 In addressing continental health challenges, the period 2014 to 2016 saw South Africa supporting the provision of humanitarian assistance amounting to R32.5 million to Ebola-affected African states, including Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone.14 South Africa’s health diplomacy further manifests in its involvement in the multilateral MOSASWA (Mozambique, South Africa, and Swaziland [now eSwatini]), a cross-border initiative that aimed to accelerate the elimination of malaria.15 Other initiatives include South Africa’s proactive role in ensuring that countries in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping implement the resolution on establishing a BRICS vaccine research and development centre, which was agreed to during South Africa’s chairmanship of the grouping in 2018.16 South Africa has also demonstrated its support for the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), while South Africa’s National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD) has played an important supporting role in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region and in supporting other African countries dealing with communicable diseases.17 There is also evidence of South Africa’s use of health diplomacy in shaping international norms in global approaches to health and foreign policy. In 2007, for example, along with Brazil, France, Indonesia, Norway, Thailand, and Senegal, Pretoria was part of the establishment of the Global Health and Foreign Policy Initiative, which resulted in the Oslo Ministerial Declaration. Here the foreign ministers set out that ‘health is one of the most important, yet still broadly neglected, long-term foreign policy issues of our time’ and that ‘health as a foreign policy issue needs a stronger strategic focus on the international agenda’.18 In 2008, these sentiments were adopted by the UN General Assembly Resolution 63/33 (2008) on global health and foreign policy, which recognises the ‘close relationship

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY, COVID-19, AND HEALTH DIPLOMACY: SUNSET OR A NEW DAWN?

developing country, an opportunity South Africa used to begin an open

between foreign policy and global health and their interdependence’.19 The Covid-19 pandemic has shone a light on the importance of securing access to medicines and medical equipment. With developed countries acquiring much of the necessary PPE and vaccinations, more needs to be done to address Africa’s common position. As chair of the AU during 2020, Ramaphosa has been central in negotiating the African Vaccine Acquisition Task Team (AVATT), endorsed by the AU.20 This has underpinned the urgency in accelerating the agreed Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for Africa (PMPA), adopted in 2007, and the development of an African Medicines Agency (AMA).21 South Africa is not, however among the 11 countries that have signed the treaty for the AMA, and only Rwanda has submitted

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 199

199

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 10

its instrument of ratification at the AU Commission.22 The emphasis on multilateralism also saw South Africa join the COVAX facility and contribute US$19.2 million to the Vaccine Alliance.23 Working with the WHO and their COVAX partners enabled the South African consortium (Biovac, Afrigen Biologics and Vaccines, a network of universities, and the Africa CDC) to set up the first hub for Covid-19 vaccine technology transfer.24 South Africa’s proactive engagement in health diplomacy has, however, not always been straightforward, and at times South Africa has come under close scrutiny for the wrong reasons. During the Thabo Mbeki administration, when the country was facing a national HIV/AIDS crisis, it took an NGO, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), to push for a response from the government in order to make antiretroviral drugs available. This raised questions regarding Mbeki’s competencies as an international statesman, despite his myriad accomplishments in other areas of foreign policy. In addition, the situation highlighted the link between domestic policy and international standing, as South Africa was increasingly seen as an outlier due to its handling of the HIV/AIDS crisis.25 Diplomatic relations between Nigeria and South Africa also came under pressure following a diplomatic spat over yellow fever vaccinations, after the authenticity of the vaccination certificates presented by travellers from Nigeria to South African were questioned by customs authorities in South Africa.26 With Africa being central to South Africa’s foreign policy, bilateral and multilateral approaches to health diplomacy will increasingly occupy a place in the country’s diplomatic toolbox.

FOREIGN POLICY, SOLIDARITY, AND PAN-AFRICANISM: COVID-19 AND THE ‘OTHER’ Domestic responses to the Covid-19 pandemic, and the ensuing international crisis, are illustrative of the impact that internal challenges have in shaping a country’s foreign policy. In South Africa, President Ramaphosa constituted an inter-ministerial task team as well as the National Coronavirus Command Council (NCCC).27 With the president having declared a National State of Disaster under the National Disaster Management Act 53 of 2005, the NCCC soon became a site of contestation. Opposition parties and civil society organisations accused it of lacking democratic oversight and challenged its transparency and inclusivity in formulating recommendations and implementing stringent regulations regarding the fight against the pandemic. A further controversial element of the response to the pandemic, especially in the early stages of lockdown, was the domestic deployment of 200

73 000 members of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF).28 This

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 200

2022/11/10 00:03

restrictions, although images of violent attacks on the public, especially the poor, soon surfaced on social media, denting the confidence of the public in the government’s response, especially in terms of the need to securitise the implementation of the various pandemic-related restrictions. As the country went into lockdown in March 2020, the rating agency Moody’s downgraded South Africa to a sub-investment grade.29 Full ‘junk status’ was confirmed with the country’s second lockdown rating, this time by Fitch, in April 2020.30 These downgrades only compounded the economic challenges that predated the pandemic, and, together with the impact of Covid-19 on public finances, they have had a negative effect on Ramaphosa’s foreign policy emphasis in securing foreign direct investment. However, when announcing the extension of the 21-day lockdown on 21 April 2020, Ramaphosa also announced the largest ever South African social relief and economic support programme, totalling R500 billion (10 per cent of South Africa’s gross domestic product [GDP]).31 Subsequent economic interventions by the Ramaphosa government followed. In October 2020, for example, Ramaphosa announced the Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan, to address the negative effects of the pandemic on the South African economy by focusing on, for example, employment, infrastructure development, and energy security.32 Besides the economic impact of the pandemic, it is evident that domestic responses amongst state and non-state actors have had significant foreign policy implications. These include, for example, the imposition of travel bans and restrictions and concerns about health- and migration-related human rights, particularly as South Africa led the African Union (AU) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (ARPM) in 2020. The declaration of a National State of Disaster on 15 March 2020 also saw South Africa impose an immediate travel ban on foreign nationals of high-risk countries, including Italy, Iran, South Korea, Spain, Germany, the USA, the UK, and China, and the cancellation of visas to visitors from these states.33

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY, COVID-19, AND HEALTH DIPLOMACY: SUNSET OR A NEW DAWN?

was aimed at ensuring people remained at home in line with government

Similarly, South African citizens were advised to refrain from ‘all forms of travel to and through’ the European Union (EU), USA, UK, China, Iran, and South Korea, with Spain, Germany, France, and Switzerland later added to the list.34 South Africa also repatriated a significant number of South Africans from Europe, the USA, Latin America, and Asia. In April 2020, a total of 2 313 South Africans were stranded abroad due to the outbreak of Covid-19.35 The repatriation of South African students from Wuhan in China, for example, was facilitated by a multidisciplinary team of ministers (Health, Social Development, Police, Home Affairs, International Relations and Cooperation, and Defence), supported by the National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS).36

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 201

201

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 10

The restrictive measures applied to tackle the spread of infections during the pandemic brought to the fore the notion of ‘Fortress South Africa’, at odds with the country’s stated outward focus on the region, the continent, South–South relations, North–South relations, and global governance.37 The impact of Covid-19 on South Africa’s foreign policy will continue to manifest even as countries look towards lifting restrictions. This includes questions around the free movement of people and goods within the SADC region. Not only did South Africa impose travel bans on foreign (and South African) citizens, it repatriated a significant number of citizens of other African states, raising concerns about the country’s asylum, refugee, and immigration policies. Besides outbreaks of xenophobia, including online through coordinated social media campaigns, South African deportations have continued unabated during the pandemic. In May 2020, for example, South Africa deported 900 foreigners hailing from Lesotho, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.38 In fact, one of the earliest responses to the pandemic was South Africa’s erection of a 40-km border fence along the South Africa–Zimbabwe border, immediately securitising the pandemic response to migration and straining relations with Zimbabwe, amongst other countries.39 Besides the border fence, the national Border Management Authority (BMA), which was approved by President Ramaphosa and entered into force on 21 July 2020, aimed to: ■

contribute to the socio-economic development of the Republic;

■

ensure effective and efficient border law enforcement functions at ports of entry and the border;

■

contribute to the facilitation of legitimate trade and secure travel;

■

contribute to the prevention of smuggling and trafficking of human beings and goods;

■

prevent illegal cross-border movement;

■

contribute to the protection of the Republic’s environmental and natural resources; and

■

protect the Republic from harmful and infectious diseases, pests and substances.40

Given these aims, the BMA, according to some, supports the notion of ‘Fortress South Africa’ and is evidence of the country’s perceived and manifest xenophobia.41 In early 2022, the activities of Operation Dudula (meaning ‘to push’) – a civil society campaign that started in 2021, ostensibly to remove drug lords from Johannesburg buildings and neighbourhoods – took on a more xenophobic tone. The resultant attacks on foreign nationals have raised 202

concerns about the health and well-being of asylum seekers, migrants,

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 202

2022/11/10 00:03

foreigners.42 On the one hand, South Africa is touted as having a very progressive refugee and asylum policy, as refugees are not placed in camps and are allowed to work, study, and open businesses. On the other hand, its immigration policy comes under fire from South Africans because of this, and due to inefficient implementation of border management policies and the documentation of economic migrants especially. This has, at times, led to both spontaneous violence and organised criminal violence directed at foreign migrants. South Africa’s ability to address some of those contradictions at home will perhaps go a long way in the country’s path towards a forward-looking and proactive foreign policy based on further regional integration. However, if the country is not able to bring its citizens on board with its foreign policy orientation, it will be the domestic population that prevents a more ambitious and outward-looking foreign policy from materialising. What has, however, been of great interest is South Africa’s social relief package. In 2020 the High Court in Pretoria ruled in favour of asylum seekers and refugees not being excluded from the social package rolled out by the Department of Social Development.43 Since the roll-out of the vaccination campaign in the country will not exclude migrants, not even those who are undocumented, authorities have alluded to using the vaccination roll-out as an opportunity to also document those who remain undocumented.44 The concerns linked to South Africa’s treatment of African migrants and refugees presented a challenge as well as an opportunity for foreign policy principles and pillars, particularly as President Ramaphosa assumed the role of AU chairperson during 2020. When it came to leadership in the AU, Ramaphosa was swift to respond to the pandemic. Embracing his position as the AU chair, President Ramaphosa convened a teleconference of the Bureau of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the AU on 26 March 2020, ahead of the G20 Leaders’ Summit teleconference. The Bureau consisted of

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY, COVID-19, AND HEALTH DIPLOMACY: SUNSET OR A NEW DAWN?

refugees, and stateless people in South Africa and citizens’ attitudes to

presidents Boubacar Keïta (Mali), Uhuru Kenyatta (Kenya), Félix Tshisekedi (Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC]), and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (Egypt). The Bureau agreed on a coordinated continental response and established a continental anti-Covid-19 fund, to which Bureau members immediately contributed US$12.5 million as seed funding. The Bureau further agreed to contribute US$4.5 million to the Africa CDC to enhance its capacity to fight the pandemic. Besides this, the Bureau also called on the G20, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the African Development Bank, and other regional institutions to assist the continent through various debt relief initiatives that consider the economic impact of the pandemic.45 203

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 203

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 10

A second meeting of the Bureau followed on 3 April 2020. Besides members of the Bureau, presidents Paul Kagame (Rwanda), Macky Sall (Senegal), and Emmerson Mnangagwa (Zimbabwe), and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed attended the meeting. President Emmanuel Macron of France, WHO Director-General Tedros Ghebreyesus, and the head of the CDC made presentations to the Bureau. The Bureau agreed on the establishment of ‘humanitarian and trade corridors in a spirit of African solidarity and integration’, and continental ministerial coordination committees on health, finance, and transport to coordinate the comprehensive continental strategy.46 A call was made for the ‘immediate lifting of all economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe and Sudan’ so that they can fight the pandemic, as the Bureau considered these sanctions ‘intolerable and inhumane in the present context’. The Bureau also discussed the Sahel region, which needed ‘special attention in the light of terrorist activity’, and expressed ‘solidarity’ with countries in the region. There was an acknowledgement of international partners; Macron was thanked for his ‘strong support’ for the continent during a recent Extraordinary G20 Summit, and China was commended for its commitment and ‘solidarity with Africa’.47 In June 2021 South Africa was invited to attend the G7 Summit in Cornwall, England, where the country took the opportunity to address the gap in access to Covid-19 vaccinations between developed and developing countries. With the South African identification of the Omicron variant on 24 November 2021, a further emergency meeting of the G7 was called, to which Ramaphosa was again invited. Here he reiterated the increasing economic implications for developing countries as developed countries sought to re-impose travel restrictions.48 In his capacity as AU chairperson, President Ramaphosa appointed Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (Nigeria), Donald Kaberuka (Rwanda), Tidjane Thiam (Côte d’Ivoire), Trevor Manuel (South Africa), Abderrahmane Benkhalfa (Algeria), and Mbaya Kankwenda (DRC) as special envoys of the AU to mobilise international support from the EU, the G20, and international financial institutions for Africa’s efforts to address the economic challenges resulting from the pandemic.49 According to Ramaphosa, these envoys had ‘extensive engagements’ with the G20, the World Bank, and the IMF, which resulted in these entities deploying ‘significant financial resources’ for Africa’s Covid-19 response.50 Ramaphosa also appointed a seventh special envoy, Strive Masiyiwa, who coordinated private sector support for the procurement of PPE and other supplies for the continent in terms of the Africa Medical Supplies Platform (AMSP), another AU initiative introduced by Ramaphosa during his AU leadership.51 In November 2020, as AU chairperson, Ramaphosa established the AVATT

204

to secure African access to vaccines, for which approximately US$13 billion

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 204

2022/11/10 00:03

to coordinate an African response that pooled resources to gain better and more equitable access to health equipment and products needed to tackle the pandemic. This has continued despite the country no longer chairing the AU. South Africa’s health diplomacy leadership was also recognised when the DRC, as the AU chair in 2021, elected President Ramaphosa as Africa’s ‘Champion for the Covid-19 vaccine strategy and acquisition by AU Member States’ in continued efforts to coordinate the continent’s response, including through vaccine acquisitions and the roll-out of vaccines once they are made available.52 Following this, Ramaphosa took another AU-endorsed decision by establishing the Commission on African Covid-19 Response.53 In supporting access to vaccines, South Africa has also led efforts at the World Trade Organization (WTO), together with India, since October 2020 to implement a waiver on intellectual property rights related to the production of vaccines.54 This is aimed at allowing other countries to produce generic vaccines to counter the existing global shortfall. While these efforts were earlier rebuffed by important developed countries, they have gained additional support from African counterparts and from countries in the Global South and Global North, including actors such as the African Group, Bolivia, Egypt, eSwatini, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Kenya, the Least Developed Country (LDC) Group, Maldives, Mozambique, Mongolia, Namibia, Pakistan, South Africa, Vanuatu, Venezuela, the USA, and Zimbabwe.55 South Africa’s leadership regarding the waiver and its ability to garner global support for the cause reflect another important ambition of South Africa’s foreign policy: global equity and agency. These initiatives and successes notwithstanding, South Africa’s foreign policy of Ubuntu and the Ramaphosa administration’s notion of a ‘New Dawn’ have been severely tested since the start of the pandemic in 2020. Domestic interests and decisions have had foreign policy implications for the country’s international standing as a human rights campaigner, and for its focus on the principles of solidarity and Pan-Africanism. South Africa’s search for status

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY, COVID-19, AND HEALTH DIPLOMACY: SUNSET OR A NEW DAWN?

needed to be raised. South Africa’s position as AU chair allowed the country

as a ‘good global citizen’, a major underpinning of its foreign policy, remains under pressure as a new post-pandemic world is in the making.

FOREIGN POLICY, COVID-19, AND BEING A GOOD GLOBAL CITIZEN On the global stage, South Africa’s foreign policy sets out the country’s role as being a good global citizen (also see Chapter 3 in this volume).56 Although there are conceptual questions around what this means, in practice it has been linked to the country’s engagement within the rules-based order in furthering democracy in global governance. The effects of Covid-19

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 205

205

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 10

have highlighted the already existing fractures in global governance and multilateralism, and seen strained relations in global geopolitics, including the rise of nationalism, populism, unilateralism, and growing authoritarianism. This has been on display through the UK decision to leave the EU (Brexit), the rise of nationalist parties across Europe, the election of Donald Trump in the USA in 2016, and increased pressure on democracy across the world. It has also been visible through the vaccine nationalism on the part of Europe and the USA, who have not played a proactive role in ensuring equitable access to vaccines for the Global South, leaving a gap for countries such as India, Russia, and China to play a leading role in the production and distribution of vaccines. If being a good global citizen is measured against the foreign policy principles of multilateralism and promoting international cooperation, then South Africa has played its role. At the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020, Pretoria made positive strides in working within multilateral forums to shape cooperative action in addressing the pandemic. The swift response in locking down the country saw South Africa hailed as an international example of best practice (although implementation raised concerns), while lessons from the HIV/AIDS pandemic allowed the country to play a key role in contributing to the international discussions on global health governance. At the peak of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, South Africa saw around 1 000 deaths a day. Lessons learnt include the need for responding swiftly, providing a clear and unambiguous message from government, working in partnership with state and non-state actors, and placing the science above politics.57 Internationally, Covid-19 has seen states turning inwards in their response to the pandemic. Certainly, the unilateralism seen among the EU member states stands in stark contrast to the role of the Union as the bastion of regionalism, actions which subsequently elicited an apology from the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, for the limited support and coordination.58 In contrast, South Africa has championed the importance of multilateral cooperation in addressing global governance during the pandemic. This approach is underpinned by continued calls from Pretoria for a rules-based ‘just and equitable world order’.59 The impacts of Covid-19 will be more severe for the most vulnerable, and in line with its foreign policy principles, South Africa has sought to challenge the unilateral approaches taken by developed states at the expense of developing countries. This is evident in the South African response to the US withdrawal of funding from the WHO, where Ramaphosa was clear in reaffirming Africa’s appreciation for Ghebreyesus’s leadership as WHO Director-General ‘from the very earliest stages of this unprecedented

206

global health crisis’.60 US President Donald Trump’s announcement that

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 206

2022/11/10 00:03

due to the Organization’s failure to respond to the Covid-19 outbreak in China, was followed by a vitriolic attack against the WHO and its African Director-General. In response, President Ramaphosa used his statement at the 73rd Session of the World Health Assembly in May 2020 to reaffirm South Africa’s ‘full support for the World Health Organization, which has been key in guiding the international response to the pandemic’.61 This statement was further used to highlight the centrality of Africa in South Africa’s foreign policy. As chair of the AU, Ramaphosa set out the plight of Africa as one of the world’s most vulnerable regions, but went on to highlight that the AU as a collective was looking to take ‘very deliberate steps to respond to the scourge’.62 As the 2020 AU chair, Ramaphosa has reinvigorated South Africa’s active position within the regional organisation. The rhetoric from South Africa points towards the importance of continued regional engagement, with Ramaphosa noting: ‘We are integrally involved in forging a common approach across the continent, ensuring that we mobilise resources and develop strategies to ensure that no country is left behind.’63 This includes working with countries across the continent in establishing a Covid-19 response fund, initiating support for the Africa CDC, and re-emphasising the need for developed countries to support developing countries in addressing the twin challenges of the health and economic crises.64 South Africa’s multilateral regional approach has also seen Ramaphosa’s support for the continent-wide measure of establishing the AMSP to manage the large-scale procurement, coordination, and distribution of Covid-19 medical supplies to AU countries.65 This multilateral focus expanded to other regions, including the countries of the Caribbean and the Pacific. At the 1st Extraordinary Inter-Sessional Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS), held on 3 June 2020, Ramaphosa indicated that multilateralism was the most effective instrument to promote

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY, COVID-19, AND HEALTH DIPLOMACY: SUNSET OR A NEW DAWN?

his administration would cancel financial support to the WHO, ostensibly

solidarity and further cooperation between the states. As he pointed out, there is a need for ‘a decisive, effective and collective response to this global crisis, [through which] we will not only be safeguarding the lives, health and well-being of our people, but […] also […] proving the relevance and value of bodies like the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States’.66 While the emphasis of South Africa’s international engagement is squarely on multilateralism in assuming the role of a good international citizen, bilateral relations are proving a more challenging place for the diplomacy of Ubuntu.67 Despite the disappointment expressed by South Africa’s former health minister, Zweli Mkhize, in the US decision during the Trump presidency to withdraw support from the WHO,68 South Africa

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 207

207

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 10

has received an increase in aid (R250 million) from the USA in its efforts to address the pandemic.69 Although Ramaphosa had the opportunity to engage Trump, and noted that the former US president was ‘impressed’ with the way South Africa had managed the pandemic, this bilateral exchange was not used as an opportunity to discuss the role of the WHO, global governance, or the US withdrawal of funding.70 The latter is, however, back on the agenda given the efforts of Joe Biden’s administration (since 2021) to restore US credibility in multilateral fora. Relations with China have also been affected. South Africa’s White Paper on Foreign Policy highlights the link between international engagement and the pursuit of the country’s own socio-economic development, setting out that ‘the political, economic and social rights and interests of South Africans will be a determining factor’.71 Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, economic rights were the focus of government in its relations with China, with considerable focus on economic diplomacy. The pandemic has, however, pitted social rights (health, well-being) against economic priorities, obliging governments to perform a complex balancing act in attempting to ensure the physical and mental well-being of their populations while addressing economic regression. Once the scope of the outbreak in China became known, it was a South African company that mobilised to donate facial masks to the Chinese government, while the South African government facilitated the transport of supplies to China.72 Despite deepening relations between Africa and China, the pandemic has raised questions around the prospect of a reduction of financial assistance, given pressures on the Chinese economy. This followed initial concerns around the reluctance of China to endorse a G20 position on suspending Africa’s debt payments, although China later announced its support for this.73 In addition, issues of racism and discrimination towards Africans in Guangzhou, China, in 2020 pointed to the gap that exists between the political rhetoric and perceptions at the domestic level.74 In an effort to mitigate these concerns, South Africa, as the 2020 chair of the AU, pursued engagement through the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in order to leverage opportunities for Africa to access knowledge and resources.75 South Africa’s efforts to bring countries together have shone a positive light on the country internationally; however, the question is whether it can sustain this role. Challenges in the way the government has managed Covid in the domestic context may undermine South Africa’s ability to achieve this. These challenges include the government-imposed lockdowns and the rules associated with them, which were seen to undermine democratic values and principles. Lessons from the initial mishandling of the HIV/ AIDS pandemic have not always been drawn on; these could have helped

208

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 208

2022/11/10 00:03

the government, little engagement with non-state actors, centralisation and opaque decision-making by the NCCC, and politics creeping into the science. Widespread corruption in the public sector – exposed by a Special Investigating Unit (SIU) probe of public spending on PPE, price inflation, and fraud – has further compromised South Africa’s pandemic response and international credibility.76 Similarly, South Africa’s solidarity with the Global South, most notably Cuba, also came under scrutiny due to the SANDF’s irregular procurement of the Cuban Covid-19 immune booster Heberon® Alpha R 2B (Human Recombinant Alpha 2B Interferon). Political sensitivities regarding South Africa–Cuban relations, national security, and procurement processes may have been the reasons behind Parliament’s deferment of its deliberation of the matter in January 2022.77 Towards the end of 2021, a new variant of the coronavirus, Omicron, was detected in South Africa, and on 26 November 2021 it was declared a ‘variant of concern’ by the WHO.78 As the variant was detected across the globe, South Africa experienced a sense of xenophobia and global isolation, as Omicron was soon dubbed the ‘South African variant’ and new stringent travel bans were reinstituted against South Africa. This was a reality check for South Africa’s foreign policy and the perceived goodwill regarding the country. Responding to these travel restrictions, which were mostly imposed by countries of the Global North, South Africa’s sub-text referred to international discrimination and punitive measures against a developing state: ‘This latest round of travel bans is akin to punishing South Africa for its advanced genomic sequencing and the ability to detect new variants quicker. Excellent science should be applauded and not punished. The global community needs collaboration and partnerships in the management of the COVID-19 pandemic.’79 It is the country’s ability to decisively deal with the domestic weaknesses in governance that will determine its ability to project a progressive foreign policy abroad and maintain its standing as a good international citizen;

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY, COVID-19, AND HEALTH DIPLOMACY: SUNSET OR A NEW DAWN?

to prevent pitfalls such as contested and ambiguous messaging from

failure to correct these negative practices at home will hinder the country’s potential role in Africa and the world beyond the current Covid-19 pandemic. These efforts may benefit from discussions and positions on South Africa’s national interests emerging from DIRCO.80 South Africa has long been mindful not to articulate and define its national interests as a response to apartheid-era policies, and to counter accusations against its African Agenda, which has been regarded as driven by self-interest rather than by Pan-Africanism.

209

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 209

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION The diplomacy of Ubuntu provides the framework for building cooperative and collaborative international relations. The commitment to ‘internationalism, pan-Africanism, South–South solidarity [and] the rejection of imperialism, colonialism and other forms of oppression’81 is facing challenges in the form of new divisions of power and inequality in social justice, highlighted by the international spread of the Covid-19 pandemic. The issue here is not just inequality in access to health care and medicine, but also unequal access to the necessary research and development. Upholding the principles of multilateralism will be necessary in a world where the Covid-19 pandemic has seen states turning inwards and undertaking unilateral action to protect human security. South Africa is already an active participant in global health diplomacy, with its position in developing research and approaches to tackle disease and poverty offering the country the opportunity to occupy the international space as a bridge between developed and developing countries. As the White Paper on Foreign Policy sets out, ‘in a rapidly evolving global environment, South Africa will more frequently be faced with key strategic decision points which could determine success or failure’.82 The dynamic global circumstances in which the world currently finds itself create the scope for South Africa to pursue an active role in shaping the future international agenda and focus. In line with Ramaphosa’s New Dawn approach, this includes the ability to be a dynamic actor in the immediate region and globally, through presenting solutions, offering policy initiatives, and developing and supporting institutions. While South Africa was quick to react domestically by instituting its own lockdown, initially gaining the country international praise, there have been ongoing challenges in the enforcement of rules under the Disaster Management Act. The occasional incidents of disproportional use of force (mostly directed at poor communities) have raised eyebrows domestically and internationally and undermined South Africa’s ability to present solutions, especially in the face of serious allegations of corruption in the procurement of PPE. The White Paper on Foreign Policy notes that ‘foreign policy is not an abstract matter separate from domestic policies and as such South Africa ensures that these inform its foreign policy’.83 In practice, attention will need to be given to the domestic level of the two-level game, lest domestic limitations (political instability, economic depression, social unrest) undermine what is possible in foreign policy, signalling an end to the New Dawn narrative. In this case the mantra that ‘foreign policy starts at home’ will have a particular resonance for South Africa’s future international

210

positioning. In May 2021, the Portfolio Committee on International Relations

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 210

2022/11/10 00:03

Africa’s foreign policy and ‘how it will relate to the post COVID-19 pandemic world order’.84 Clearly, South Africa needs to be mindful of the post-pandemic international challenges it will face, while health matters will continue to remain on the South African foreign policy agenda. Furthermore, as the country moves towards the establishment of the National Health Insurance, the link between health governance at home and foreign policy will shape the future of the country’s health diplomacy.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1 In June 2021 Mkhize was placed on special leave by President Ramaphosa following accusations of graft linked to Covid-19 tenders. Mkhize was replaced by Dr Mathume ‘Joe’ Phaahla on 5 August 2021. 2 Ramaphosa, C. 2018. ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa: 2018 State of the Nation Address.’ 16 February. https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2018-state-nationaddress-16-feb-2018-0000 (Accessed 11 May 2020); Ramaphosa, C. 2019. ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa: 2019 State of the Nation Address.’ 7 February. https://www.gov. za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2019-state-nation-address-7-feb-2019-0000 (Accessed 11 May 2020); Ramaphosa, C. 2019. ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa: State of the Nation Address 2019.’ 20 June. https://www.gov.za/speeches/2SONA2019 (Accessed 10 May 2022); Ramaphosa, C. 2020. ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa: 2020 State of the Nation Address.’ 13 February. https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa2020-state-nation-address-13-feb-2020-0000 (Accessed 11 May 2020); Ramaphosa, C. 2021. ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa: 2021 State of the Nation Address.’ 11 February. https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2021-state-nation-address11-feb-2021-0000 (Accessed 1 March 2021). Ramaphosa, C. 2022. ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa: 2022 State of the Nation Address.’ 10 February. https://www.gov.za/ speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2022-state-nation-address-10-feb-2022-0000 (Accessed 16 February 2022). 3 WHO (World Health Organization). 2020. ‘WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19.’ 11 March. https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/ detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid19---11-march-2020 (Accessed 6 May 2020); WHO. 2010. ‘What is a pandemic?’ https://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/frequently _asked_questions/pandemic/en/ (Accessed 14 April 2020).

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY, COVID-19, AND HEALTH DIPLOMACY: SUNSET OR A NEW DAWN?

and Cooperation (PCIRC) called on the minister to conduct a review of South

4 Department of Health. 2020. ‘Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), No cause for panic.’ DIRCO, media statement, 23 January. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2020/corona_ virus0127.pdf (Accessed 6 May 2020). 5 Minister of Health. 2020. ‘Statement by the Minister of Health Statement on the Coronavirus.’ DIRCO, media statement, 1 February. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2020/ corona_virus0202.htm (Accessed 6 May 2020). 6 Ramaphosa, C. 2020. ‘Statement by President Cyril Ramaphosa on measures to combat COVID-19 pandemic.’ DIRCO, 15 March. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2020/ cram0315.pdf (Accessed 6 May 2020).

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 211

211

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 10

7 DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation). 2011. Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy. Pretoria: DIRCO, p. 1. https://www.gov.za/documents/white-paper-south-african-foreign-policybuilding-better-world-diplomacy-ubuntu (Accessed 10 May 2022). 8 Feldbaum, H. and Michaud, J. 2010. ‘Health diplomacy and the enduring relevance of foreign policy interests.’ PLoS Med 7(4): e1000226. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal. pmed.1000226. 9 Mokhoali, V. 2021. ‘Macron backs SA’s battle to have Africa manufacture Covid vaccines.’ Eyewitness News, 29 May. https://ewn.co.za/2021/05/29/macron-backs-sa-sbattle-to-have-africa-manufacture-covid-vaccines (Accessed 11 June 2021). 10 Ramaphosa, ‘2020 State of the Nation Address’, 13 February. 11 Pandor, N. 2020. ‘Remarks by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Dr Naledi Pandor, on the arrival of Cuban Medical Brigade at Waterkloof Air Force Base, 26 April.’ http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2020/pand0426.htm (Accessed 11 June 2021). 12 DIRCO. 2004. ‘World Health Organisation.’ http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/ inter/who.htm (Accessed 11 June 2021). 13 UNSC (UN Security Council). 2000. ‘UN Security Council Resolution 1308 (2000) on the Responsibility of the Security Council in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: HIV/AIDS and International Peace-keeping Operations.’ UNAIDS, 17 July. https://w w w.unaids.org /sites/default /f iles/sub_landing /f iles/20000717_un_ scresolution_1308_en.pdf (Accessed 24 May 2021). 14 DIRCO. 2015. ‘Department of International Relations and Cooperation on its 2nd and 3rd quarter 2014/15 performance.’ PMG, 4 March. https://pmg.org.za/committeemeeting/20107/ (Accessed 14 April 2020); Ensor, L. 2014. ‘South Africa slaps ban on visitors from Ebola zone.’ Business Day, 22 August 2014. https://www.businesslive. co.za/bd/national/health/2014-08-22-sa-slaps-ban-on-visitors-from-ebola-zone/ (Accessed 14 April 2020). 15 IOL. 2017. ‘Malaria Day: Strong cross border collaboration is key to elimination.’ 10 November. https://www.iol.co.za/lifestyle/health/malaria-day-strong-cross-bordercollaboration-is-key-to-elimination-11946510 (Accessed 12 May 2020). 16 DIRCO. 2018. ‘Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations, 27 September 2018, New York.’ Media Statement, 27 September. http://www.dirco.gov. za/docs/2018/brics1001.htm (Accessed 11 June 2021). 17 NICD (National Institute for Communicable Diseases). 2020. Annual Overview 2019/20. Johannesburg: NICD, pp. 13, 22, 23, 69. https://www.nicd.ac.za/wp-content/ uploads/2021/07/NICD-AnnualOverview-2019_20.pdf (Accessed 30 May 2022). 18 Ministers of foreign affairs of Brazil, France, Indonesia, Norway, Senegal, South Africa, and Thailand. 2007. ‘Oslo Ministerial Declaration. Global health: A pressing foreign policy issue of our time.’ The Lancet 369(9570): 1373–1378, p. 1373. https://doi. org/10.1016/S0140-6736(07)60498-X. 19 UNGA (UN General Assembly). 2009. ‘Resolution 63/33 (2009). Global health and foreign policy.’ A/RES/63/33. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/642456?ln=en (Accessed 30 May 2022).

212

20 AU (African Union). 2020. ‘Statement on AU vaccines financing strategy.’ Bureau of the Chairperson, 8 November. https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20201108/statement-auvaccines-financing-strategy (Accessed 24 May 2021).

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 212

2022/11/10 00:03

22 AU. 2020. ‘African Medicine Agency (AMA) Treaty.’ Social Affairs, 5 February. https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20200205/african-medicine-agency-ama-treat y (Accessed 24 May 2021). 23 South African Government. 2020. ‘Health on securing South Africa’s COVAX participation as Solidarity Fund concludes down payment.’ 22 December. https:// www.gov.za/speeches/health-securing-south-africa%E2%80%99s-covax-participationsolidarity-fund-concludes-down-payment (Accessed 26 January 2022). 24 WHO. 2021. ‘WHO supporting South African consortium to establish first mRNA vaccine technology transfer hub.’ News Release, 21 June. https://www.who.int/news/ item/21-06-2021-who-supporting-south-african-consortium-to-establish-first-covidmrna-vaccine-technology-transfer-hub (Accessed 26 January 2022). 25 Masters, L. 2017. ‘South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy making and the role of the president.’ Politeia 36(1): 1–21. https://doi.org/10.25159/0256-8845/3094. 26 Eboh, C. 2012. ‘Nigeria, South Africa feud over yellow fever jabs.’ Reuters, 7 March. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-south-africa-feud-over-yellowidUSTRE8261VV20120307 (Accessed 1 March 2021). 27 Pitjeng, R. 2020. ‘COVID-19: What exactly is the National Command Council?’ Eyewitness News, 4 May. https://ewn.co.za/2020/05/04/covid-19-what-exactly-is-thenational-command-council (Accessed 1 March 2021). 28 Ramaphosa, C. 2020. ‘Statement by President Cyril Ramaphosa on escalation of measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.’ DIRCO, 23 March. http://www.dirco.gov. za/docs/speeches/2020/cram0323.pdf (Accessed 6 May 2020). 29 Ramaphosa, C. 2020. ‘Message by President Cyril Ramaphosa on COVID-19 pandemic.’ DIRCO, 30 March. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2020/cram0330.htm (Accessed 6 May 2020). 30 Fitch Ratings. 2020. ‘Fitch downgrades South Africa to “BB”: Outlook negative.’ 3 April. https://www.fitchratings.com/research/islamic-finance/fitch-downgrades-south-africato-bb-outlook-negative-03-04-2020 (Accessed 11 May 2020). 31 Ramaphosa, C. 2020. ‘Statement by President Cyril Ramaphosa on further economic and social measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.’ 21 April. http://www. presidency.gov.za/speeches/statement-president-cyril-ramaphosa-further-economicand-social-measures-response-covid-19 (Accessed 11 May 2020).

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY, COVID-19, AND HEALTH DIPLOMACY: SUNSET OR A NEW DAWN?

21 Le Pere, G. 2020. ‘COVID-19 and South Africa’s foreign policy.’ SAIIA Policy Briefing No. 201, 31 July, p. 5. https://saiia.org.za/research/covid-19-and-south-africas-foreignpolicy/ (Accessed 30 May 2022).

32 Ramaphosa, C. 2020. ‘Address by President Ramaphosa to the Joint Sitting of Parliament on South Africa’s Economic Recovery Plan.’ 15 October. https://www. gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-south-africa%E2%80%99s-economicreconstruction-and-recovery-plan-15-oct (Accessed 11 June 2021). 33 Ramaphosa, C. 2020. ‘Statement by President Cyril Ramaphosa on measures to combat COVID-19 pandemic.’ DIRCO, 15 March. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2020/ cram0315.pdf (Accessed 6 May 2020). 34 Minister of International Relations and Cooperation. 2020. ‘Travel advisory in response to COVID-19 pandemic.’ DIRCO, 17 March. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2020/corona_ virus0317.pdf (Accessed 6 May 2020).

213

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 213

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 10

35 DIRCO. 2020. ‘Dirco welcomes the first group of repatriated South Africans.’ 3 April. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2020/corona_virus0403.pdf, (Accessed 6 May 2020). 36 DIRCO. 2020. ‘NATJOINTS Update on the repatriation process of South African citizens residing in Wuhan.’ Media statement, 4 March. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2020/ corona_virus0305.htm (Accessed 6 May 2020). 37 DIRCO. Building a Better World. 38 Ngqakamba, S. 2020. ‘Public Works Department finalising procurement of Lindela Repatriation Centre.’ News24, 11 May. https://www.news24.com/news24/ southafrica/news/public-works-dept-finalising-procurement-of-lindela-repatriationcentre-20200511 (Accessed 11 May 2020). 39 Zanker, F. L. and Moyo, K. 2020. ‘The corona virus and migration governance in South Africa: Business as usual?’ Africa Spectrum 55(1): 100–112, p. 104. https://doi. org/10.1177/0002039720925826. 40 Republic of South Africa. 2020. Act No. 2 of 2020: Border Management Authority Act, 2020. Government Gazette. Vol. 661, No. 43536. No 799, 21 July 2020, Preamble, p. 2. 41 Bornman, J. 2020. ‘SA’s border bill another anti-migrant development.’ New Frame, 5 March. https://www.newframe.com/sas-border-bill-another-anti-immigrant-development/ (Accessed 11 June 2021). 42 Marupeng, P. 2020. ‘Fear grips foreign nationals as Dududa wave rages.’ Sowetan Live, 16 February. https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2022-02-14-fear-gripsforeign-nationals-as-dudula-wave-rages/ (Accessed 16 February 2022). 43 Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town and Another v Minister of Social Development and Others (22808/2020) [2020] ZAGPPHC 308; 2021 (1) SA 553 (GP). 18 June 2020. http:// www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2020/308.pdf (Accessed 1 March 2021). 44 Cassette, J. and Xaba, G. 2021. ‘Undocumented foreign nationals/persons in South Africa to also benefit from the Covid-19 vaccine rollout: Nuances to be alive to.’ Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyer Pro Bono and Human Rights Alert, 15 February. https://www. cliffedekkerhofmeyr.com/en/news/publications/2021/Probono/pro-bono-and-humanrights-alert-15-february-undocumented-foreign-nationals-persons-in-south-africa-toalso-benefit-from-the-covid-19-vaccine-rollout-nuances-to-be-alive-to-.html (Accessed 11 June 2021). 45 AU. 2020. ‘Communique of the Bureau of the Assembly of the African Union (AU) Heads of State and Government Teleconference on COVID-19, held on 26 March 2020.’ DIRCO, 26 March. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2020/au0326.pdf (Accessed 6 May 2020). 46 AU. 2020. ‘Communique of the African Union (AU) Bureau of Heads of State and Government teleconference meeting held on 03 April 2020.’ DIRCO, 3 April, pp. 2, 3. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2020/au0404.pdf (Accessed 6 May 2020). 47 AU, ‘Communique, teleconference meeting held on 3 April 2020’, p. 4. 48 Harrison, V. 2021. ‘Omicron variant: G7 to hold emergency COVID meeting as Japan closes its borders.’ The Guardian, 29 November. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2021/nov/29/omicron-variant-g7-to-hold-emergency-covid-meeting-as-japancloses-its-borders (Accessed 26 January 2021). 49 DIRCO. 2020. ‘African Union Chair, President Cyril Ramaphosa, appoints Special Envoys to mobilise international economic support for continental fight against COVID-19.’ Media statement, 12 April. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2020/au0412.htm (Accessed 6 May 2020).

214

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 214

2022/11/10 00:03

51 Ramaphosa, ‘Handover statement, 34th Ordinary Session of the Heads of State and Government of the AU’. 52 AU. 2021. ‘34th AU Summit strives to ensure that, as a continental body, no country is left behind in the COVID-19 responses “as we enhance integration”.’ Press release, 6 February. https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210206/34th-au-summit-strives-ensurecontinental-body-no-country-left-behind-covid (Accessed 11 June 2021). 53 South African Government. 2021. ‘Presidency on the appointment of President Ramaphosa as African Union Champion on Coronavirus COVID-19 and establishment of Commission on African COVID-19 Response.’ 24 June. https://www.gov.za/speeches/ presidenc y-appointment-president-c yril-ramaphosa-african-union-championcoronavirus-covid (Accessed 16 February 2022). 54 WTO (World Trade Organization). 2021. ‘Waiver from certain provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for the prevention, containment and treatment of Covid-19. Revised Decision Text.’ IP/C/W/669/Rev.1. 25 May. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc. aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669R1.pdf&Open=True, (Accessed 11 June 2021). 55 WTO, ‘Waiver from certain provisions of the TRIPS Agreement’. 56 DIRCO, Building a Better World, p. 11. 57 Du Plessis, C. 2020. ‘How South Africa’s action on Covid-19 contrasts sharply with its response to Aids.’ The Guardian, 27 May. https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2020/may/27/how-south-africas-action-on-covid-19-contrasts-sharplywith-its-response-to-aids-coronavirus (Accessed 22 June 2020). 58 Henley, J. 2020. ‘EU offers “heartfelt apology” to Italy over coronavirus response.’ The Guardian, 16 April. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/16/eu-offersheartfelt-apology-italy-coronavirus-response-herd-immunity (Accessed 12 May 2020). 59 DIRCO, Building a Better World, p. 6. 60 AU. 2020. ‘African Union reaffirms its unwavering support to the WHO.’ 8 April, p. 1. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2020/au0408.pdf (Accessed 6 May 2020). 61 Ramaphosa, C. 2020. ‘Remarks by the President of the Republic of South Africa and the African Union Chair, during the 73rd Session of the World Health Assembly, 18 May 2020.’ DIRCO. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2020/cram0518.htm (Accessed 24 June 2020).

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY, COVID-19, AND HEALTH DIPLOMACY: SUNSET OR A NEW DAWN?

50 Ramaphosa, C. 2021. ‘Handover statement by President Cyril Ramaphosa on the occasion of the 34th Ordinary Session of the Heads of State and Government of the African Union.’ AU, 6 February, p. 3. https://au.int/sites/default/files/speeches/39954sp-handover_remarks-_au_chair-assembly.pdf (Accessed 11 June 2021).

62 Ramaphosa, ‘Remarks during the 73rd Session of the World Health Assembly’. 63 Ramaphosa, ‘Remarks during the 73rd Session of the World Health Assembly’. 64 Ramaphosa, ‘Remarks during the 73rd Session of the World Health Assembly’. 65 DIRCO. 2020. ‘Media Statement: AU Chair to provide public update on continental strategy to fight COVID-19.’ 17 June. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2020/au0617.htm (Accessed 23 June 2020). 66 Ramaphosa, C. 2020. ‘Speaking notes for the 1st Extraordinary Inter-Sessional Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS), 3 June 2020.’ DIRCO, 3 June, p. 2. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/ speeches/2020/cram0603.pdf (Accessed 24 June 2020). 67 DIRCO, Building a Better World, p. 2. 215

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 215

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 10

68 BBC News. 2020. ‘Coronavirus: Backlash after Trump signals US exit from WHO.’ 30 May. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-52862588 (Accessed 23 June 2020). 69 Cilliers, C. 2020. ‘Ramaphosa: Trump wanted to speak to me. He was “most impressed” with SA.’ The Citizen, 24 April. https://citizen.co.za/business/business-news/2274144/ ramaphosa-trump-wanted-to-speak-to-me-he-was-most-impressed-with-sa/ (Accessed 23 June 2020). 70 Cilliers, ‘Ramaphosa: Trump wanted to speak to me’. 71 DIRCO, Building a Better World, p. 10. 72 Minister of Health, ‘Statement on the coronavirus’. 73 Marks, S. 2020. ‘Coronavirus ends China’s honeymoon in Africa.’ Politico, 17 April. https://www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus-ends-chinas-honeymoon-in-africa/ (Accessed 11 May 2022); Preuss, H. 2021. ‘China helps African countries with debt relief.’ IOL, 25 January. https://www.iol.co.za/the-star/opinion-analysis/china-helpsafrican-countries-with-debt-relief-9ca82ad5-bcd1-4a74-909a-6e88a99e1696 (Accessed 1 March 2021). 74 Marks, ‘Coronavirus ends China’s honeymoon in Africa’. 75 DIRCO, ‘AU Chair to provide public update on continental strategy to fight COVID-19’. 76 SIU (Special Investigating Unit). 2021. ‘Investigation into the procurement of, or contracting for goods, works and services, including the construction, refurbishment, leasing, occupation and use of immovable property, during, or in respect of the National State of Disaster, as declared by Government Notice No. 313 of 15 March 2020, by on or behalf of state institutions.’ https://www.siu.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/ R23_of_2020_Final_report_on_matters_finalised_for_public_release_05022021.pdf (Accessed 1 March 2021). 77 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2022. ‘Committee on Defence and Military Veterans defers discussion on SANDF procurement of Cuban medicine.’ Media statement, 26 January. https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/media-statement-committeedefence-and-military-veterans-defers-discussion-sandf-procurement-cuban-medicine (Accessed 16 February 2022). 78 WTO. 2021. ‘Update on Omicron.’ 28 November. https://www.who.int/news/item/28-112021-update-on-omicron (Accessed 16 February 2022). 79 DIRCO. 2021. ‘South Africa’s response to travel restrictions imposed by several countries.’ Media statement, 27 November. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2021/covid-19_1127.htm (Accessed 16 February 2022). 80 DIRCO. 2022. ‘DIRCO and ARF 2021/22 Quarter 1 and 2 performance, with Deputy Minister.’ 2 February. https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/34188/ (Accessed 16 February 2022). 81 DIRCO., Building a Better World, p. 11. 82 DIRCO., Building a Better World, p. 19. 83 DIRCO., Building a Better World, p. 4. 84 PCIRC (Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation). 2021. ‘Report of the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation on Budget Vote 6.’ PMG, 19 May. https://pmg.org.za/tabled-committee-report/4593/ (Accessed 11 June 2021).

216

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 216

2022/11/10 00:03

Searching for a Niche in the New Dawn: South Africa in the World

PART 2

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 217

2022/11/10 00:03

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 218

2022/11/10 00:03

Cheryl Hendricks

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 11

South Africa’s Quest for Continental Peace and Security

South Africa is a significant African actor in the sphere of peace and security at international, continental, and regional levels. It is an initiator and proponent of Agenda 2063 of the African Union (AU) and is committed to promoting and implementing the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Both frameworks highlight peace and security as one of their objectives: Aspiration 4 of Agenda 2063 calls for a ‘peaceful and secure Africa’,1 while Goal 16 of the SDGs enjoins states to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development’.2 South Africa has been a participant in key international institutions, in which it often represents Africa as a whole. For example, it has served three terms as a non-permanent member on the UN Security Council (UNSC) (2006–2007, 2010–2011, and 2019–2020), joined BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in 2010, is a member of the G20, and has been invited to attend G7 meetings (also see chapters 3 and 14 in this volume). The country continues to play an active role in agenda setting and implementation support for both the AU and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), especially in relation to conflict management. President Cyril Ramaphosa became the chairperson of the AU in 2020 and simultaneously chaired the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC). Since August 2021, South Africa has been the chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation. The theme of the AU under the presidency of Ramaphosa was ‘Silencing the Guns: Creating Conducive Conditions for Africa’s Development’. The Covid-19 pandemic interrupted the implementation of both this agenda and the priorities which South Africa had set for itself at the AU, for example enhancing UN–AU cooperation, implementing the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), promoting gender equality, advancing the green economy, promoting good governance, and ending conflicts. Its attention as chair was focused on combating the health crisis through acquiring the necessary personal protective equipment (PPE), vaccines, and funding for social protection to alleviate the impact of lockdown measures in Africa.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 219

219

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 11

South Africa spearheaded a coordinated AU response to Covid-19 and was announced as AU champion by the AU Heads of State and Government in February 2021 (also see Chapter 10 in this volume). South Africa is the country that has been most affected by the pandemic in Africa. As of 9 February 2022 it had recorded 96  502 Covid-19-related deaths. The lockdown measures have had an enormous impact on the growth of its economy and on its already high unemployment rates. Largescale unrest (mass looting) beset the country in July 2021, leading to the deaths of more than 350 people. This revealed to the world not only the dark underbelly of South African society, but also the lack of capacity of its security sector and the factionalism within the ruling party, which many believed to have fuelled the unrest. These and many other internal challenges have cast doubt on South Africa’s ability to lead on peace and security matters on the continent. Yet, under President Ramaphosa, the government has emphasised the need to reposition South Africa as a credible and active leader on the continent. In its January 8th statement in 2022, the ANC identified conflict countries in Africa which it would support, namely eSwatini, Lesotho, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Libya, Sudan, and South Sudan. However, it is unclear what conflict management role South Africa will play in these countries and, given the number of both old and new international actors in peace and security on the continent, where it can best make its contribution. Changes in the nature of conflicts, types of conflict actors, and the forms of response mechanisms required to deal with conflict in Africa have occurred over the last two decades, necessitating new approaches to conflict management. The spread of violent extremism, now present in all regions in Africa; the escalation of transnational crime; the increase in organic hashtag protests in response to physical and structural violence; the intensification of local-level conflicts, spurred on by climate change and demographic changes; a resurgence of the coup phenomenon; and the remilitarisation of many African societies are indicative of the need to go back to the drawing board in relation to conflict management on the continent. The peace and security architectures at international, continental, and regional levels have become increasingly inappropriate to respond to the current peace and security challenges. They are often centred on expensive, yet still wholly inadequately resourced, short-term military interventions, whereas many of the conflict situations require rapid political intermediation (relationship building and mediation efforts employed by a variety of actors to avert armed conflict) and long-term structural reforms. South Africa has set itself the task of enabling a closer working relationship between the UNSC and the AU Peace and Security Council

220

(PSC), as discord and differing agendas between the two bodies do not bode

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 220

2022/11/10 00:03

over who should lead on peacekeeping initiatives, and differing positions on Libya, Burundi, and Sudan.3 As important as the strengthening of the relationship between the UNSC and the AUPSC is, the differences between UNSC members are just as great and often impede quick responses to conflict. The reform of the UNSC itself therefore remains a priority. There is thus a need for critical reflection on our peace and security architectures and forms of conflict management, and this chapter argues that South Africa should play a leadership role in this regard. Through an analysis of South Africa’s engagement in peace and security on the continent, this chapter teases out its approach to conflict management, the agendas for its tenures at the UNSC and the AU, and its implementation challenges. It argues that South Africa remains an important actor in the sphere of peace and security, but that its influence and impact have steadily been eroded. South Africa should concentrate on playing a convening role on peace and security issues on the continent. In so doing, it could provide thought leadership that enables more adaptable peace and security architectures and innovative and context-relevant strategies that bring a closer coherence between vision, policy, and practice and take into account the changing nature of our conflicts. To date there has been little impact in meeting the goals of the AU’s ‘Silencing the Guns by 2020’ campaign and in promoting just, peaceful, and inclusive societies in Africa. South Africa also

SOUTH AFRICA’S QUEST FOR CONTINENTAL PEACE AND SECURITY

well for conflict management. In the past there have been disagreements

has women, peace, and security as one of its priority areas and although there are pockets of excellence in this regard, much engagement remains at a rhetorical level (also see Chapter 12 in this volume). Better progress has been made on promoting the AfCFTA and on continental science and technology innovation, because of the concerted attention that South Africa’s has paid to these aspects. The same kind of determination and focus is necessary for its intervention in peace and security.

SOUTH AFRICA’S PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA South Africa sees its own peace and security as interconnected with that of its neighbours. It has sought to influence the continental peace and security agenda and respond to conflict situations in Africa. South Africa has the second largest economy in Africa (after Nigeria). In terms of military strength, it ranks 26th globally; on the continent it comes after Egypt, which ranks 12th globally.4 Post 1994 South Africa had both ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’ capability (the latter because of the nature of its transition to democracy, its emphasis on human rights and reconciliation, and the stature of its leaders) to be a norm and agenda setter on peace and security.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 221

221

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 11

Indeed, South Africa engaged in conflict management and reconstruction efforts in several African countries, such as Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. It has also been instrumental in the development and functioning of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). South Africa represented Africa in the UNSC (as part of the A3) for 2019 to 2020, its third term on the UNSC. It is a lead voice in forums such as the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Tokyo International Conference on Africa’s Development (TICAD), which also have peace and security dimensions. It represents Africa in global intergovernmental mechanisms, in which it is often positioned as a bridge-builder to Africa for the international community. It is therefore a representative voice for the continent in many strategic international forums. The 2011 White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy defines its foreign policy approach as underpinned by the spirit of Ubuntu: ‘that we affirm our humanity when we affirm the humanity of others’. The White Paper further notes that the international community expects it to ‘play a leading role in championing values of human rights, democracy, reconciliation and eradication of poverty and underdevelopment’.5 During the administrations of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, South Africa repositioned itself as a ‘good global citizen’, a key continental actor, and leader on the African Renaissance programme – vital to which was an emphasis on development, peace, and security (also see Chapter 3 in this volume). It emphasised its ‘soft power’ as an enabler to broker peace and used its ‘hard power’ to back the implementation of peace agreements (through peacekeeping deployments) or as guarantee for the safety of those engaged in peace talks (as was the case in Burundi). Advocating for ‘African solutions to African problems’, it was at the forefront of asserting African agency in conflict management, promoting local ownership of peacebuilding processes, and utilising multilateralism as the means to pursue its African Agenda. It was these principles that underpinned the extensive investment in constructing both the governance and the peace and security architectures that currently exist on the continent. South Africa had indeed become, as aptly stated by Van Nieuwkerk, ‘the interlocutor – and destination – of choice’ for those seeking to cut deals through mediation.6 Many have, however, lamented that during the Jacob Zuma administration (9 May 2009 to 14 February 2018) South Africa’s influence, credibility, and capacity for peace and security engagements on the continent declined and its overall approach to the continent shifted. Cilliers

222

highlights that Zuma ‘sought to firmly tilt South Africa towards China

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 222

2022/11/10 00:03

peace diplomacy towards economic diplomacy, and it seemed to then show a preference for bilateral arrangements (or a ‘go it alone’8 approach rather than consensus-seeking multilateral engagements – its intervention in CAR is an example of this). Its contributions to peacemaking and peacekeeping and broader thought leadership on peace and security for the continent seemed to decline. Indeed, Cohen opined that South Africa’s foreign policy was reflecting domestic politics: ‘duplicitous, Machiavellian and surrounded by a vague odour of corruption’.9 South Africa’s UNSC vote on Libya in 2011, during its second term on the Council, also did not stand it in good stead continentally, nor did its voting behaviour on other resolutions informed by human rights resonate with the international community. Moreover, the xenophobic attacks in the country, particularly those of 2008, 2015, and 2019, displayed a disjuncture between government pronouncements of an African Agenda and the local disposition towards other Africans in South Africa, especially in its townships. Post the Zuma administration there has therefore been a perceived need to refocus on the African Renaissance and to reaffirm South Africa’s leadership on the continent. In 2018, then Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Lindiwe Sisulu established a Ministerial Review Panel, chaired by former Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad. The panel chair noted that

SOUTH AFRICA’S QUEST FOR CONTINENTAL PEACE AND SECURITY

and Russia’.7 South Africa’s attention shifted to BRICS and FOCAC, from

the country has not sufficiently played the role it was expected to play, or should have played in engaging a number of international issues [and] that there have been missteps which have reversed earlier gains that the country registered. As a result strategic opportunities were missed resulting in the decline of South Africa’s influence regionally, continentally and globally.10

President Cyril Ramaphosa, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Naledi Pandor, and former Minister of Defence and Military Veterans Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula have iterated the need for pathcorrective measures for South Africa’s international relations. Minister Pandor, outlining South Africa’s foreign policy in 2019, noted that ‘Africa and its peaceful progress and development are at the heart of our policy and will remain so. It is our intention to play a more proactive role in enhancing our peace-making role into a partnership for stability and sustainable peace’.11 Minister Mapisa-Nqakula, in her remarks at the UN headquarters in March 2019, recommitted South Africa to peacekeeping and the envisaged reforms in that sphere as well as ‘to the comprehensive measures in all aspects of mediation, peacekeeping, the protection of civilian [sic], post conflict recovery and peacebuilding, all underpinned by political solutions

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 223

223

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 11

to any conflict situation’.12 After the 2019 xenophobic attacks, President Ramaphosa despatched envoys to various African countries to carry the message that he regrets what has happened and to assert that South Africa is not xenophobic. However, recent utterances by politicians in the context of the local government elections of 2021 and, in general, remarks made as political parties gear up for national elections are indicative of a strong and persistent anti-foreigner sentiment in South Africa. In 2020, South Africa was in a prime position to match its words with deeds because of its level of representation in the UNSC and at the AU. When joining these institutions, it outlined its key priority areas. As regards the UNSC, these revolved around prioritising diplomacy, mediation, and peacebuilding through inclusive dialogue, national unity, and reconciliation; promoting the AU’s agenda of ‘Silencing the Guns’ by 2020; ensuring effective partnerships between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations; promoting the women, peace, and security agenda; and continuing with its quest to transform the nature and functioning of the UNSC itself.13 For its year at the helm of the AU it prioritised the AfCFTA, good governance and democracy, ‘Silencing the Guns’, and women’s empowerment.14 It specifically wanted to concentrate on peace processes in South Sudan and Libya. In addition, the strategic plan for 2020–2025 of the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF) (located within the Department of International Relations and Cooperation [DIRCO]) highlights that ‘South Africa must lead continental efforts aimed at resolving conflicts in South Sudan, Libya, Somalia, the Sahel region and the remaining conflicts in part of the eastern DRC’.15 In 2022 the DRC seemed to slip off the list of countries that South Africa would prioritise, while Mozambique, eSwatini, Sudan, and Ethiopia were added. These are countries in which major conflicts have recently (re-)erupted: violent extremism in Mozambique, large-scale political protests in eSwatini, a military coup in Sudan, and armed conflict in Ethiopia. As South Africa took up its seat at the UNSC in 2019, Minister Sisulu announced in a media interview: South Africa holds the view that emphasis should be placed on the preventative diplomacy approach in addressing conflicts and its root causes and to assist countries emerging from conflict, from relapsing. In this context South Africa will work towards promoting political processes and addressing the pivotal nexus between security and development.16

Deputy Minister Luwellyn Landers highlighted the country’s continued support for political dialogue and multilateralism, and that South Africa has ‘maintained its principled position of calling on some countries and 224

regional groups not to interfere in internal processes of a sovereign state

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 224

2022/11/10 00:03

changes of government’.17 Reflecting on South Africa’s term at the UNSC, in January 2021 Minister Pandor ‘highlighted the need for inclusive context specific security sector reform and governance approaches that address the needs of the entire population with the active involvement of women and youth as well as civil society actors’.18 At the inaugural meeting of the AU Contact Group on Libya, President Ramaphosa highlighted the Group’s approach to the conflict, noting the need to provide political leadership and coordination on international efforts, calling for inclusive dialogue and ‘Libyan ownership of this process without the interference of external actors’ and for the ‘unification and integration of the Libyan armed forces’.19 South Africa therefore continues to emphasise inclusive political dialogue over military interventions as a cornerstone of its approach to peace and security. This has been its stance since the advent of democracy and it draws heavily on the country’s own experience of reconciliation and transition. Before appraising South Africa’s interventions and approach to peace and security, it is worthwhile elaborating on the context in which it has tried to implement its peace and security agenda.

PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

SOUTH AFRICA’S QUEST FOR CONTINENTAL PEACE AND SECURITY

[speaking about Venezuela] or to be used as a tool for unconstitutional

The Institute for Economics and Peace’s Global Peace Index 2020, International IDEA’s report titled The Global State of Democracy 2019, and the Tana Forum’s State of Peace and Security in Africa 2020 indicate a deterioration in the levels of peacefulness, a decline in the quality of democracy, and the growth of hybrid democracies, as well as persistent violent conflict. Of the 38 countries that fall into the categories ‘low’ to ‘very low’ in terms of peacefulness on the Global Peace Index 2020, 16 are in Africa. These countries are primarily those representing the longstanding conflicts that have occupied the conflict management agenda of the AU and UN for some time, for example the DRC, CAR, Sudan, South Sudan, Libya, Nigeria, Mali, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Burundi, and Zimbabwe. A key finding of the Global Peace Index 2020 is ‘a world in which the tensions, conflicts, and crises that emerged in the past decade remain unresolved’.20 International IDEA’s report highlights that although there has been a sea change in democratisation post 1990, 59 per cent of African countries are still either hybrid democracies (37 per cent) or non-democracies (22 per cent).21 The report also highlights that democratic consolidation in Africa is challenged by continued violent conflict, as we see a relapse into militarism, coup attempts, and civil unrest.22 The Tana Forum report highlights that Africa’s hotspots remain unstable; ‘the geography of violence continues

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 225

225

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 11

to shift, for the most part, away from their previous epicentres’ and the situation in Libya can be characterised as ‘one step forward, two steps backwards’. Moreover, the AU’s engagement in Libya was seen as consigned to humanitarian responses and as ‘playing second fiddle as new centres of diplomatic activities, with often mutually exclusive selfish interest, converge in Istanbul, Berlin and Moscow rather than in Addis Ababa’.23 The rise in violent extremism and local-level conflicts in Africa has been disconcerting and has thwarted any possibility of ‘silencing the guns’ in the near future. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), now more commonly referred to as the Islamic State (IS), has established operations in Africa, with a concomitant emergence of ‘provinces’ across the continent. Al-Qaida has had a presence on the continent for many years. We now have the Islamic State of West Africa, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, Islamic State of Algeria, Islamic State of Libya, Islamic State of the Sinai (Egypt), Islamic State of Somalia, and Islamic State of Central Africa (operating in DRC and Mozambique). They compete with al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya, Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM). Violent extremism has therefore spread both in terms of the number of actors (both violent extremists and the international actors countering their presence) and their presence in almost all regions of the continent. The spread of violent extremism to Mozambique has been particularly worrying for southern Africa. An intervention force has been deployed to assist the government of Mozambique, namely the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). South Africa has committed 1 500 personnel, including the force commander of the mission. Alongside violent extremist groups are Mai-Mai formations (in areas like the eastern DRC) and other local forms of militia, engaged in what have become known as ‘farmer and herder conflicts’, as well as transnational criminal networks and other more traditional rebel movements. There has been a mushrooming of regional security mechanisms and bilateral security arrangements to counter violent extremism. These are supposed to complement the UN and AU peacekeeping interventions as well as national security forces, for example the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin, the G5 Sahel Joint Forces, and Operation Barkhane. France, the USA, Germany, China, Turkey, and many other traditional and non-traditional security actors have a military presence in these conflict zones. Yet, these peace support operations and the accompanying frameworks to counter violent extremism have been limited in their effectiveness in stemming the growing tide of extremism on the continent. From January to August 2020, Africa experienced 1 168 terrorist attacks – 18 per cent more than the previous year.24 These attacks

226

further increased in 2021. Moreover, the spread of violent extremism to

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 226

2022/11/10 00:03

is disconcerting, primarily because SADC does not have the requisite experience or strategies in place to deal with these forms of violence. The emergence of these ad hoc regional mechanisms and bilateral agreements for military support, which often only receive the ‘blessing’ of the AU after they are a fait accompli, are themselves an indication of the lack of faith in APSA to adequately deal with the challenge. APSA is in need of reform if it is to remain relevant in the foreseeable future. We have also recently seen a return of the coup phenomenon in Africa, with an unprecedented five coups in the space of 18 months. This is indicative of a turn in the political landscape of Africa towards more and more unelected governments, the increasing seizure of power through violence, and a seeming inability to effectively counter the trend. Banning these countries from the AU is not a sufficient deterrent against authoritarian creep. Important, too, is the outbreak of civilian protests against security sector brutality, especially the security sector’s actions in implementing Covid-19 measures. The #EndSars campaign (mass protests against police brutality in Nigeria) is a good example of this and highlights the continued need for security sector reform in many African countries. The next section teases out to what extent South Africa has engaged in trying to meet the peace and security priorities it established for itself as chair of the AU.

SOUTH AFRICA’S QUEST FOR CONTINENTAL PEACE AND SECURITY

southern Africa, with the spate of attacks in the DRC and Mozambique,

THE ROAD TO FAILURE IS PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS It is laudable to see the Ramaphosa administration reassert the need for principled engagement, affirm human dignity for all, and reprioritise the African agenda. It has reiterated the need for development, peace, and security on the continent; it has identified which countries it wants to engage in terms of peacebuilding and its preferred strategies for doing so. South Africa was widely castigated in 2011 for voting in favour of UNSC Resolution 1973, which authorised the protection of civilians in Libya by ‘any means necessary’25 and paved the way for the airstrikes led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). South Africa soon opposed the external intervention and called for inclusive political dialogue, but it had already lost ground in terms of integrity and on advocacy for the peaceful settlement of this conflict. Its return to the UNSC and its tenure as chair of the AU provided it with yet another opportunity to engage on Libya and perhaps to redeem the credibility it had earlier forfeited. Again, South Africa’s call – and that of the AU – has been for inclusive political dialogue. 227

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 227

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 11

The AU, however, seemed to be caught on the back foot when it came to Libya, as other external actors held discussions in Berlin in January 2020. The AU was invited by Chancellor Angela Merkel, as but one more player in the growing number of actors, to come and discuss the forging of consensus among themselves. The Peace and Security Council Report, published by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in February 2020, outlined some of the challenges that the AU had to confront, including ‘convincing Libyan belligerents to turn to the continent for a solution’, the fact that it was not perceived as neutral given previous ties with Gaddafi and neighbouring African countries hosting both foreign forces and some Libyan warring factions, and the lack of a common position on how to respond to the conflict.26 Neither the AU nor South Africa, as its chair, have taken the lead in the Libyan peace talks. These have essentially been spearheaded by the UN Mission in Libya, under the stewardship of Stephanie Williams. The UN undertook a process of ceasefire negotiations, from February 2020, leading to the signing of an agreement in October and to the political dialogue in Tunisia in November. A roadmap was agreed upon and elections were to be held on 24 December 2021,27 but the deadline was missed. It is highly unlikely that elections will resolve the very many political and security challenges facing this country. One of the resolutions of the 33rd AU Summit, held in February 2020, was that the AU organise a national inter-Libyan reconciliation conference, a recommendation that had emanated from the Berlin conference in January. The AU Contact Group on Libya (South Africa, as chair of the AU, was a member), which met in March 2020 in the Republic of the Congo, decided to have the conference in July 2020 in Addis Ababa. Ramaphosa stated in the Contact Group meeting: ‘In this, the year that the African Union has dedicated to Silencing the Guns in Africa, we must be at the forefront of efforts to bring the warring parties together […] We must be firm and resolute that Africa’s problem must be resolved by Africans.’28 Clearly, however, the AU Contact Group has not been in the forefront of the ceasefire agreements or the political dialogue. When the Group met in May 2020, the members decried ‘foreign interference’, a concern echoed by South Africa at the UNSC in July of that year. The AU Contact Group seems to have been largely a spectator, albeit screaming from the sidelines, in the conflict management process for Libya. Differing parties to the conflict in Libya have signed many peace deals in the past, so only time will tell if this agreement will be honoured. South Africa’s contribution to this development seems to be located more as a member of the UNSC ensuring that the AU is kept in the loop, rather than that of championing the process. South Africa also committed itself to ensuring the ‘Silencing of the

228

Guns’ in South Sudan by 2020. It has a long association, party-to-party and

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 228

2022/11/10 00:03

in talks and post-conflict reconstruction efforts since the days of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The conflict that erupted in 2013, two years after South Sudan’s independence, has seen approximately 50  000 people killed and hundreds of thousands being internally displaced.29 South Africa’s Deputy President, David Mabuza, was appointed by Ramaphosa as the special envoy for South Sudan, and he has played a role in facilitating talks between the two ‘big men’, Riek Machar and Salva Kiir, in order to ensure the operationalisation of the transitional government agreed to in the power-sharing agreement of 2018. Both parties were apparently unhappy with the initial proposal by Mabuza for outside arbitration on a key point of disagreement, namely the number of federal states and their boundaries.30 However, agreement was eventually reached that South Sudan would have only 10 states and a transitional government was sworn in, yet again, in February 2020. This conflict, too, has generated many peace deals that have been reneged on, and time will tell how sustainable this latest agreement will be. South Africa has therefore been constructive in influencing the implementation of the Revitalised Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan. There are, however, many other intercommunal conflicts and rebel groups in South Sudan, so it is doubtful that this transitional government will bring peace. It is also unlikely that a transitional government made up of these forces, all of whom have

SOUTH AFRICA’S QUEST FOR CONTINENTAL PEACE AND SECURITY

between the two governments, with South Sudan and has been engaged

committed large-scale atrocities and who have thrived on corruption, will be stable and become a champion of democracy. Conflict management in South Sudan harks back to the well-known definition of insanity: ‘doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result’. Are the mechanisms that have been put in place this time sufficient to ensure sustainable peace and sufficient structural reform so that the peace brings the dividends of prosperity to the majority of the population? And will these mechanisms be implemented? The agreement calls for five vice-presidents, a series of joint boards and commissions, and a reconstituted Transitional National Legislative Authority. The report by the chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee does not inspire much hope that the structures and processes agreed to are being effected. It notes that none of the 187 activities agreed to during the transitional period have been executed, and there is an ongoing lack of funds for their implementation.31 South Africa has not sufficiently engaged on issues of violent extremism in the Sahel, and has now been forced to confront the same form of conflict dynamic in Mozambique. Here, too, even though South Africa has extended support to the country, its engagement must be far more robust. Rwanda was asked by Mozambique to assist, and its troops have largely been at

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 229

229

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 11

the coalface of confronting violent extremists. South Africa and SADC, through which it has deployed, require the necessary capacity – human and financial – to present a meaningful counter-terrorism offensive. South Africa and SADC are better placed to lead on the development of effective and holistic strategies to prevent violent extremism in the region, but for this they need to harness the wide-ranging security expertise in the region (both in the security sector and in civil society) and draw on the experiences and lessons learnt from other regions in Africa that have been dealing with this phenomenon for more than a decade.

REVISITING SOUTH AFRICA’S ROLE IN PROMOTING PEACE AND SECURITY Clearly, South Africa has been engaging on peace and security issues on the continent, but is it doing enough? Does it have a coherent strategy and the capacity to undertake conflict management? And is it, working through the AU, able to shift the locus of peacemaking in African conflicts back to APSA? Can it resuscitate the belief in the ability to deliver on ‘African solutions to African problems’? Beyond practising quiet diplomacy and multilateralism, calling for inclusive political dialogue and conflict prevention, and deploying an eversmaller number of peacekeepers, there is no coherently thought-through conflict management strategy or framework which spells out how South Africa will engage in prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding on the continent. Indeed, neither does it have a National Security Strategy (NSS) for conflict management within its own borders. The White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions is dated, as it was approved in 1998, in an entirely different conflict context.32 South Africa’s interventions are therefore often ad hoc and rely on a modus operandi developed in the 1990s, which may no longer be appropriate for current conflict challenges. Calling for transitional governments and political dialogues may have been what was needed in conflicts when there were clearly identifiable groups with principled agendas who were being excluded. However, many of the current conflicts do not display these features; some groups have no interest in being included in current government structures, whilst others splinter and fracture in a bid to gain positions in state structures, which remain the primary sites of accumulation. South Africa, in its stated objectives as chair of the AU, selected the two conflicts – Libya and South Sudan – that are the most difficult to intervene in because of their protracted nature. However, South Africa could have 230

done far more in the quest to bring peace and security to these conflicts.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 230

2022/11/10 00:03

common positions at the UNSC, but it did not engage robustly enough in Africa to produce innovative strategies and undertake intermediation, or to loudly echo an African position and reassert the AU’s authority to lead on interventions. Ramaphosa’s administration highlights the aspiration to re-engage in peace and security even as it leans more towards economic matters. There is a clear preference for ensuring the implementation of the AfCFTA rather than investing intellectual, human, and financial resources in attempts to ‘silence the guns’. It has not brought together its intellectual capital to discern how best it could meet its objectives, nor has it invested in generating the expertise necessary for conflict management. Further, continuous budget cuts to the Department of Defence have led to a ‘state of decline’ of its security apparatus engaged in peacekeeping. Although DIRCO does run annual training programmes on conflict prevention and mediation, primarily for women, it is not clear how those trained are being utilised. South Africa delayed the hosting of the summit on ‘Silencing the Guns’ from May 2020 to December 2020. It was then decided to extend the implementation of the Roadmap (the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by the Year 2020) to 2030. Clearly, if there is no thought leadership on peace and security, in 2030 we will see it being delayed to 2063 – this the continent and its people can ill afford. The way in which South Africa demonstrated leadership at the AU in

SOUTH AFRICA’S QUEST FOR CONTINENTAL PEACE AND SECURITY

South Africa may have done well in terms of having the A3 articulate

dealing with the response to the Covid-19 pandemic is what is required for it to make its mark once again in the sphere of continental peace and security. It set up the necessary structures and held many engagements continentally so that there was a united front. It made the collective appeal for PPE, funding, and debt relief. President Ramaphosa has received widespread acclaim for his stewardship on the issue. Although traversing the domain of peace and security means walking through far murkier waters, South Africa is slowly regaining credibility at the AU and internationally. It is therefore in a position to convene the conferences necessary to generate a consensus on how to approach peace and security more innovatively in the foreseeable future – that is, the principles, values, norms, structures, and processes required to deal with current and future conflict contexts – and on where flexibility is required. The conference(s) will need to explore the challenges and limitations of ‘African solutions to African problems’ and determine the corrective measures that need to be put in place for the AU to be at the forefront and for South Africa to be able to provide strategic leadership. South Africa also noted that it would be championing the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda of the UNSC. It progressed in terms of developing and adopting its National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2020 to 2025 and it sponsored another WPS resolution, UNSC Resolution 2493,

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 231

231

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 11

in October 2019 (the 10th one), when it acted as the rotating chair of the UNSC. South Africa could have done much more to reinvigorate discussions on and address challenges of implementation of the WPS agenda, and its prioritisation of this issue has yet to move from stated objectives to practice. In short, South Africa has not demonstrated the requisite leadership on the WPS agenda – much like its engagement with peace and security at large. There is no critical engagement with current strategies, as it simply ‘follows the crowd’ – a far cry from when it led the agendas on peace and security and on women, peace, and security at the turn of this century.

CONCLUSION South Africa seeks to re-establish itself as a credible actor in continental affairs, including on peace and security issues. Although it is moving in the right direction, it needs to do much more than it has thus far. It needs to move beyond speeches and declared positions to actively convene AU and SADC member states to think through new approaches to peace and security on this continent. If during the Mbeki era the focus was on building up the continental security architecture – such as the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise, the Peace and Security Fund, the APRM, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and so forth – the quest should now be for effective, efficient, and context-appropriate conflict management strategies that can respond to current peace and security challenges. Moreover, South Africa needs to begin at home and have its own internal critical conversations about the drivers of its peace and security challenges and the best ways to address these. This can then inform a broader conflict management strategy for its engagement on the continent. South Africa’s greatest challenge is located in its domestic realm, where it is experiencing economic and military decline, high unemployment and crime rates, increased gender-based violence, systemic corruption that was exacerbated during lockdown, political factionalism, and unrest. Moreover, its citizens and leaders are divided on the Pan-African agenda, as seen in the rise of xenophobic sentiments and attacks, and the louder echoes of ‘What’s in it for us?’ in state corridors. In conclusion, South Africa has an important convening and thought leadership role to play in Africa, but its credibility and legitimacy will depend on its ability to arrest its own deterioration on the peace and security front and to change the attitudes of many of its citizens towards others on the continent.

232

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 232

2022/11/10 00:03

1 AUC (African Union Commission). 2013. ‘Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want (popular version).’ 10 June, p. 2. https://au.int/Agenda2063/popular_version (Accessed 11 May 2022). 2 UN. 2015. Sustainable Development Goals. Goal 16. https://sdgs.un.org/ (Accessed 12 February 2021). 3 See ICG (International Crisis Group). 2019. ‘A tale of two councils: Strengthening AU-UN co-operation.’ Report No. 279, June. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/279-tale-twocouncils-strengthening-au-un-cooperation (Accessed 11 May 2022). 4 BusinessTech. 2022. ‘South Africa’s military srength in 2022 vs the world.’ 24 January. https://businesstech.co.za/news/trending/552770/south-africas-military-strength-in2022-vs-the-world/ (Accessed 10 February 2022). 5 DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation). 2011. Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy. Pretoria: DIRCO, p. 4. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/ foreignpolicy0.pdf (Accessed 10 November 2020). 6 Van Nieuwkerk, A. 2012. ‘A review of South Africa’s peace diplomacy since 1994.’ In South African Foreign Policy Review, Volume 1, edited by C. Landsberg and J.-A. Van Wyk. Pretoria: AISA and IGD, p. 84. 7 Cilliers, J. 2019. ‘South Africa’s power capabilities: Looking to the future.’ In South African Foreign Policy Review, Volume 3, edited by L. Masters and J.-A. van Wyk. Pretoria: AISA, p. 256. 8 Vreÿ, F. and Esterhuyse, A. 2016. ‘South Africa and the search for strategic effect in the Central African Republic.’ Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies 44(2): 1–27.

SOUTH AFRICA’S QUEST FOR CONTINENTAL PEACE AND SECURITY

NOTES AND REFERENCES

9 Cohen, T., 2013, cited in Vreÿ and Esterhuyse, ‘South Africa and the search for strategic effect’, p. 6. 10 Pahad, A. 2018. ‘Media briefing on the Ministerial Panel report.’ Foreign Policy Review, 17 April, p. 4. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2019/foreign_policy_review_report0417. pdf (Accessed 10 June 2022). 11 Pandor, N. 2019. ‘SA foreign policy drawn from the principles of human rights.’ Sowetan Live, 4 December. https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2019-12-04-saforeign-policy-drawn-from-principles-of-human-rights/ (Accessed 11 May 2022). 12 Mapisa-Nqakula, N. 2019. ‘Remarks by the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans Ms NN Mapisa-Nqakula of South Africa at the Peacekeeping Ministerial – Uniformed Capabilities, Performance and Protection, held at the UN Headquarters on 29 March 2019, New York.’ Geneva: UN, p. 1. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/southafricatraining-capacity-building-peacekeeping-ministerial.pdf (Accessed 10 June 2022). 13 DIRCO. 2018. ‘Minister Sisulu arrives in New York ahead of UNSC elections.’ Media statement, 7 June. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2018/unsc0607.htm (Accessed 10 November 2020). Also see the leaflet titled ‘Continuing the legacy: Working for a just and peaceful world’, which can be found at http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/unsc/ booklet/unsc_booklet.pdf (Accessed 12 February 2021).

233

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 233

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 11

14 Magcaba, B. 2020. ‘Priorities Ramaphosa will focus on as AU Chair.’ SABC News, 12 February. https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/priorities-ramaphosa-will-focus-onas-au-chair/ (Accessed 10 November 2020). 15 DIRCO. n.d. African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF) Strategic Plan 2020–2025. Annual Performance Plan 2021–2022. Pretoria: DIRCO, p. 23. http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/african_renaissance2020_2025/arf2020-2025_ app2021-2022_revised.pdf (Accessed 10 June 2022). 16 Mabaya, N. 2019. ‘Peace and stability in Africa a priority as South Africa joins the UNSC.’ News 24, 2 January. https://www.news24.com/News24/peace-and-stabilityin-africa-a-priority-as-south-africa-joins-the-un-security-council-20190102 (Accessed 11 May 2022). 17 Landers, L. 2019. ‘Creating a secure and peaceful world: Key priorities during South Africa’s tenure in the UNSC’. Public lecture, Cape Town, 22 February. 18 Pandor, N. 2021. ‘Address by Dr Naledi Pandor, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, on the occasion of the Chatham House London Virtual Engagement, 20 January 2021.’ http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2021/pand0120.htm (Accessed 10 February 2022). 19 Ramaphosa, C. 2020. ‘Statement by President Cyril Ramaphosa at the Inaugural Meeting of the African Union Contact Group on Libya, Oyo, Republic of the Congo, 12 March 2020.’ http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2020/cram0312.htm (Accessed 11 May 2022). 20 IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace). 2020. Global Peace Index 2020: Measuring Peace in a Complex World. Sydney: IEP, p. 7. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/ resources/?type=research (Accessed 11 May 2022). 21 International IDEA. 2019. The Global State of Democracy: Addressing the Ills, Reviving the Promise. Stockholm: International IDEA, p. 7. https://www.idea.int/publications/ catalogue/global-state-of-democracy-2019 (Accessed 11 May 2022). 22 International IDEA. 2019. The Global State of Democracy, p. 72. 23 IPSS Tana Forum Secretariat. 2020. ‘Executive Summary of the State of Peace and Security in Africa Report.’ Addis Ababa: Tana Forum, p. 5. https://media.africaportal. org/documents/Tana2020_SPSA_Summary.pdf (Accessed 15 November 2020). 24 ISS Africa. 2020. ‘ISS: Counterterrorism in Africa must adapt to new realities.’ Defenceweb, 4 November. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/security/national-security/iss-counterterrorism-in-africa-must-adapt-to-new-realities/ (Accessed 11 November 2020). 25 UNSC. 2011. ‘Resolution 1973. S/RES/1973 (2011).’ 17 March. https://www.un.org/ securitycouncil/s/res/1973-%282011%29 (Accessed 11 May 2022). 26 ISS. 2020. ‘Africa’s place in resolving Libya’s quagmire.’ Peace and Security Council Report, 19 February. https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/africas-place-inresolving-libyas-quagmire (Accessed 11 May 2022). 27 UNSMIL (United Nations Support Mission in Libya). n.d. ‘Libyan Political Dialogue Forum.’ https://unsmil.unmissions.org/libyan-political-dialogue-forum (Accessed 12 February 2021). 28 Ramaphosa, ‘Statement at the inaugural meeting of the African Union Contact Group on Libya’.

234

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 234

2022/11/10 00:03

30 Fabricus, P. 2020. ‘David Mabuza irks both sides in South Sudan mediation.’ Daily Maverick, 20 January. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-01-20-davidmabuza-irks-both-sides-in-south-sudan-mediation/ (Accessed 11 May 2022). 31 ‘Report of the Chairperson on the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee on the Status of the Implementation of the Revitalised Peace Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan for the Period 1 July to 30 September 2020.’ Report 008/20, Juba, South Sudan. https://www.jmecsouthsudan. com/index.php/reports/rjmec-quarterly-reports/171-rjmec-quarterly-report-to-igad-onthe-status-of-implementation-of-the-r-arcss-from-1st-july-to-30th-september-2020/ file 32 Department of Foreign Affairs. 1998. White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions. Pretoria: DFA. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/ gcis_document/201409/peacemissions1.pdf (Accessed 12 February 2021).

SOUTH AFRICA’S QUEST FOR CONTINENTAL PEACE AND SECURITY

29 See, for example, ICG. n.d. ‘South Sudan.’ https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/hornafrica/south-sudan (Accessed 10 June 2022).

235

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 235

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 12

Women, Peace and Security and the African Continental Free Trade Area: Consolidating the Nexus in South Africa’s Foreign Policy Nadira Bayat and David Luke

INTRODUCTION The start of 2020 heralded a propitious beginning for South Africa, as the country assumed the position of chair of the African Union (AU), while serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) (2019–2020). Coinciding with this dual leadership role were four defining initiatives with particular significance for the African agenda as the cornerstone of South Africa’s foreign policy: the historic Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the AU theme ‘Silencing the Guns by 2020: Creating Conducive Conditions for Africa’s Development’, and two notable anniversaries related to women, peace, and security. The latter were the 25th anniversary of the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995), an agenda for women’s empowerment emanating from the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, China, and the 20th anniversary of UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000), the first resolution adopted by the UNSC on strengthening the role of women in peace and security. All four milestones brought to the fore powerful and mutually reliant themes of trade, peace and security, development, and gender equality. They provided a stark reminder that sustainable development is impossible in countries marked by conflict, war, and threatening pandemics, while reinforcing the importance of women’s equal participation in building more inclusive economies and societies, grounded in peace and stability. Coinciding with the AfCFTA, the ‘Silencing the Guns’ by 2020 initiative, and the milestone women’s peace and security anniversaries is a defining global crisis, termed by the UN Secretary-General ‘the worst human and economic crisis in a lifetime’.1 The Covid-19 pandemic caused unparalleled challenges, including the postponement of the highly anticipated start of trade under the AfCFTA to 1 January 2021. This postponement was but one of the many casualties of the pandemic. Covid-19 has caused colossal setbacks for sustainable development in Africa, undoing progress that had been made by many African countries on a range of development goals, 236

including gender equality as a fundamental human right and a crucial

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 236

2022/11/10 00:03

security, human rights, development, and trade – as an enabler of a strong and resilient economy – is recognised in South Africa’s foreign policy. As far back as 2001, former President Thabo Mbeki remarked that a precondition for development is ‘the attainment of peace, security, democracy, human rights and a sound economy’.2 This refrain continued over the years, culminating in the identification of peace and security, sustainable development, and gender equality as the three pillars that South Africa chose to promote as chair of the AU in 2020 and as a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 2019–2020.3 In 2020, South Africa also presided as chair of the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Peace and security, continental integration, economic development, trade and investment, gender equality, women empowerment, and strengthening cooperation between the AU and UN were identified as priorities on South Africa’s continental agenda.4 These pillars were not built on abstractions, but reflect South Africa’s national identity, with an emphasis on the country’s values, people, and history, and what South Africa is willing to stand for and what it seeks to change. That South Africa sees the pillars of peace and security, sustainable development, and gender equality as interlinked and interdependent is not in doubt. Included among South Africa’s strategic objectives on peace, security, and development is a commitment to advancing women’s empowerment, gender equality, and gender mainstreaming in South Africa, Africa, and the developing world, with emphasis on further strengthening the implementation of the UN Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda.5 The latter was established by UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) and seeks to empower women in efforts aimed at preventing and ending conflict and

WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA

dimension of sustainable development. The nexus between peace and

building and sustaining peace. South Africa’s commitment to advancing the pillars of peace and security, sustainable development, and gender equality as the foundation for collective security and well-being is not in question either. As South Africa assumed its two-year term on the UNSC on 2 January 2019, then International Relations and Cooperation Minister Lindiwe Sisulu reiterated the importance of peace and stability as a catalyst for economic development and poverty alleviation in Africa. Of particular importance was South Africa’s commitment to a preventative diplomacy approach to address conflicts and their root causes, and to prevent conflict relapse.6 What is less apparent in South African foreign policy is an integrated response that addresses, through deliberate actions, the various intersectional challenges that arise under the key pillars of intra-African trade, peace and security, and women’s economic empowerment as an intrinsic component of gender equality and sustainable development. 237

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 237

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 12

The overall premise of this chapter is that South Africa’s Pan-African vision and compelling foreign policy priorities place the country in a unique position to champion an integrated and holistic approach that links inclusive intra-African trade under the AfCFTA to the WPS Agenda and to gender equality and women’s economic empowerment goals more broadly. The chapter examines the role of the AfCFTA in anchoring the pillars of intra-African trade, peace and security, women’s economic empowerment, and sustainable development through the WPS Agenda. It illustrates how linking economic empowerment interventions identified in South Africa’s AfCFTA National Strategy to those in South Africa’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2020–2025 would advance South Africa’s preventative diplomacy approach and efforts in post-conflict reconstruction and

peacebuilding,

while

strengthening

effective

and

meaningful

implementation of the WPS Agenda. Ultimately, a holistic and integrated approach is intrinsically linked to a better Africa and a better world. As such, it is firmly in the South African national interest.

WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY Guided by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, South African foreign policy is informed by national interests, as well as principles and values that define South Africa’s national identity. These include, inter alia, a commitment to promote and protect human rights, democracy, and respect for international law.7 The Bill of Rights, enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality, and freedom. In accordance with Section 9(3), the state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, and sex. While not explicitly defined, national interests are interpreted as rooted in South Africa’s domestic agenda and intrinsically linked to Africa’s stability, unity, and prosperity.8 South Africa’s strategic vision, as outlined by President Cyril Ramaphosa in his State of the Nation Address (SONA) on 20 June 2019,9 reflects a commitment to achieving a developmental state as envisioned in the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030, Our Future: Make It Work. Central to that vision is the goal of addressing the challenges of inequality, poverty, unemployment, and economic growth, as well as a commitment to achieve the seven priorities outlined in the Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) 2019–2024:10 1. A capable, ethical, and developmental state 238

2. Economic transformation and job creation

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 238

2022/11/10 00:03

4. Consolidating the social wage through reliable and quality basic services 5. Spatial integration, human settlements, and local government 6. Social cohesion and safer communities 7. A better Africa and world. Building on the national interest theme, Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Alvin Botes remarked that South Africa’s national interest is to ‘eradicate poverty, to confront joblessness and to reduce inequality’.11 The Strategic Plan 2020–2025 of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) identifies specific focus areas that are aligned with and seek to give effect to the seven priorities outlined in the MTSF 2019–2024.12 Grouped thematically, these strategic focus areas include a number of priorities aimed at building a better South Africa, a better Africa, and a better world.13 Cognisant of the intrinsic link between the national interest and Africa’s stability, unity, and prosperity, South Africa has placed the advancement of the African agenda at the centre of its foreign policy trajectory. In ‘building a better Africa’ South Africa articulates a number of thematic priorities, which include enhanced regional integration with balanced trade with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and support for the AfCFTA.14 The promotion of a peaceful and secure Africa framed South Africa’s strategic objectives as a non-permanent member of the UNSC for 2019–2020 and as 2020 chair of the AU. Following South Africa’s successful bid to serve in the UNSC for the 2019–2020 term, President Ramaphosa declared in his statement of 8 June 2018 that South Africa’s tenure would be guided by ‘[a] commitment to resolve regional, global and

WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA

3. Education, skills, and health

international conflicts and promote inclusive growth as part of the effort to ensure a better Africa in a better world’.15 Addressing the root causes of conflict, including inequality and underdevelopment, according to the president, would be central to these efforts. As South Africa initiated its two-year term on the UNSC on 2 January 2019, then International Relations and Cooperation Minister Lindiwe Sisulu reiterated the importance of peace and stability as a catalyst for economic development and poverty alleviation in Africa. In that regard, the minister underscored South Africa’s commitment to a preventative diplomacy approach in order to address conflicts and their root causes and to prevent conflict relapse.16 Included among South Africa’s strategic objectives on peace, security, and development is a commitment to advance women’s empowerment, gender equality, and gender mainstreaming in South Africa, Africa, and the developing world, with emphasis on further strengthening implementation of the WPS Agenda.17 Established by the

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 239

239

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 12

landmark UNSC Resolution 1325, adopted in October 2000 and followed by nine further resolutions,18 the WPS Agenda seeks to empower women in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) is particularly important in drawing attention to the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women, while affirming that women’s equal participation in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding contributes to the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. In spite of the progress made, a number of gaps have been identified across all areas of the WPS Agenda. Implementation by UN member states has not been consistent, and women continue to be excluded from peace and other decision-making processes.19 Advancing women’s economic and financial inclusion, addressing the scourge of gender-based violence, and ensuring a focus on accountability in terms of global gender commitments were among the priority issues listed by President Ramaphosa upon assuming the chair of the AU for 2020.20 To advance economic empowerment opportunities for women as part of the new Decade of African Women’s Financial and Economic Inclusion, the president stressed the need for establishing preferential trade and customs regimes for women, as well as preferential public procurement legislation to advantage women-owned businesses. There was also a recognition that attaining women’s financial inclusion and economic empowerment required investing in solutions that go beyond micro-finance, to target the ‘full range of constraints women face in growing their businesses’.21 Central to President Ramaphosa’s message was the importance of identifying more practical and sustainable ways of empowering African women in ways that go ‘beyond the clichés and pronouncements made from podiums’.22 In his address at the 13th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly on the AfCFTA on 5 December 2020, President Ramaphosa emphasised the need to ‘use the AfCFTA to advance the empowerment of Africa’s women, [as] one of the most important objectives of Agenda 2063’.23 To support this objective, the president recommended strengthening women’s participation in a continental economy by ensuring there is greater public procurement earmarked for women-owned businesses, as well as providing support for women-owned small, medium, and micro enterprises (SMMEs) and cooperatives in both local and regional economies. In his closing statement at the 14th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly on Silencing the Guns on 6 December 2020, President Ramaphosa underscored the inextricable link between greater intra-African trade and industrialisation through the AfCFTA, peace, and economic development. Recognising that women are held back by violence and conflict, the president emphasised advancing regional and global efforts to transform the conditions that women and

240

girls experience in conflict, and highlighted the protection of women’s right

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 240

2022/11/10 00:03

wider human development in conflict-afflicted areas.24 Most crises and violent conflicts on the continent are driven by a number of factors, the most significant of which include poverty, economic hardship, violation of human rights, exclusion, inequalities, and marginalisation.25 Although the tide has receded, there are some African countries that are still afflicted by violent conflict. Post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) and peacebuilding are amongst the biggest challenges that confront African countries emerging from conflicts.26 Economic empowerment forms a critical component of post-conflict peacebuilding. Women’s economic empowerment notably contributes to the effectiveness of post-conflict economic activities and economic growth, and leads to improvements in the quality and social outcomes of economic recovery measures and policies as well as to sustainable development.27 The need to prioritise women’s economic empowerment in the aftermath of conflict was recognised by the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). In its 2013 Declaration, the Commission reiterated the need for UN member states to assist post-conflict countries in ‘creating favourable conditions that can generate decent jobs for women, nurture their business skills, encourage them to join the workforce, and deliver the financial services that these women need, both in the formal and informal sectors’.28 Evidence emerging from a small-scale livelihood initiative in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) shows how empowering women in North Kivu through economic independence has enabled them to fully enjoy their rights.29 The fast growth and success of several of the world’s economies that began their ascent from the ashes of conflict has been attributed to women’s increased role in production, trade, and entrepreneurship.30 Notwithstanding the evidence, women’s

WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA

to safety in both conflict and non-conflict situations as fundamental to

equal engagement in post-conflict employment remains challenging and their numbers in post-conflict employment remain low. Data from postconflict countries reveal that women receive a very small percentage of jobs in employment generation programmes.31 South Africa’s foreign policy does reflect a link between women’s empowerment (including economic empowerment), sustainable development, and peace and security. This is illustrated as a means of strengthening implementation of the WPS Agenda towards the realisation of building a better world. What appears to be missing in South Africa’s foreign policy approach, however, is an integrated response to address intersectional challenges related to these key pillars. A holistic and integrated approach that prioritises women’s economic opportunities in non-conflict situations and in the wake of conflict goes beyond addressing the drivers of conflict to address the drivers of peace and stability. It promotes gender equality as a pre-requisite for inclusive socio-economic growth and development, and

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 241

241

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 12

reinforces effective implementation of the WPS Agenda during the AU’s new Decade of African Women’s Financial and Economic Inclusion.

ADVANCING GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT IN INCLUSIVE AFCFTA IMPLEMENTATION The enduring linkages between trade, peace and security, and gender equality as a fundamental dimension of sustainable development are clearly demonstrated through the AfCFTA. Established as one of the flagship projects of the AU’s Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want, the AfCFTA seeks to accelerate the growth of intra-African trade, which is fundamental for sustainable economic development, employment generation, and the effective integration of the continent into the global economy.32 The AfCFTA is being built and implemented through various phases of negotiations: Protocols on Trade in Goods, Trade in Services; and Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes have been negotiated in Phase 1. Preparatory work for negotiations on Phase II Protocols to the AfCFTA Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights, Competition Policy, Investment, Digital Trade; and Women and Youth in Trade have commenced.33 A single market created under the AfCFTA Agreement, which connects approximately 1.3 billion people across 55 countries, with a gross domestic product (GDP) of US$2.5 trillion, is expected to bring considerable benefits to African countries, including South Africa.34 The Agreement envisages boosting intra-African trade through the gradual elimination of tariffs and the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade – on both goods and services – as well as the implementation of effective trade facilitation measures. Notably, the AfCFTA paves the way for export diversification and encourages a move away from extractive commodities – including high-value oil and minerals, which have traditionally accounted for most of Africa’s exports – towards a more balanced and sustainable export base.35 Using the AfCFTA to move away from extractive exports, which can be particularly vulnerable to instability and conflict, to value-added products holds considerable opportunities for providing alternative livelihoods that can be a critical pathway out of conflict, while helping to secure more sustainable and inclusive trade. Notwithstanding the benefits, AfCFTA gains will not be automatic. The AfCFTA is a continental agreement, but implementation will take place at the national level. Maximising gains from the AfCFTA, according to the Secretary-General, Wamkele Mene, requires complementing tariff reductions with policies that improve trade-related infrastructure and address non-tariff bottlenecks to intra-African trade, including cumbersome 242

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 242

2022/11/10 00:03

take deliberate actions to make the AfCFTA work.36 South Africa signed the Agreement Establishing the AfCFTA on 1 July 2018 and deposited its Instrument of Ratification on 10 February 2019.37 The start date of trade under the AfCFTA, initially set for 1 July 2020, had to be postponed to 1 January 2021 due to Covid-19. Overall, the crisis has had a disproportionately negative socio-economic impact on women. Evidence demonstrates that women and men have been affected differently, depending on the sector of the economy in which they work, their access to labour and social protection, and their care responsibilities.38 All types of violence against women and girls, particularly domestic violence, has intensified, highlighting the fact that violence is not limited to the battlefield, but also occurs in homes.39 Threats to women and girls’ physical security are more numerous in fragile and conflict-affected countries and post-conflict settings. As a critical source of economic independence, and through the creation of better jobs in trade, the AfCFTA presents considerable opportunities for empowering women in their various economic roles and for achieving gender equality. Opening borders offers women-owned businesses the opportunity to access new African export markets and to increase their earnings, while boosting the demand for manufactured goods allows women-led SMMEs to supply inputs to larger export-oriented companies and to link to reconfigured regional value chains. It is expected that agriculture, manufacturing, and services will gain new trade opportunities through the AfCFTA.40 Women represent about 50 per cent of the labour force in the agricultural sector and play a key role in agricultural production.41 In stimulating demand for intra-African food imports and in providing women

WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA

customs  procedures and excessive regulations. State parties will need to

producers and entrepreneurs with expanded access to regional food markets, the AfCFTA can support a predominantly women-led sector. Smallholder female farmers, in particular, could benefit from integrating their activities into regional agricultural value chains and higher-value-added agroprocessing, as well as from opportunities to participate in the production of high-value agricultural commodities for continental export markets. The development of export-oriented manufacturing, as part of African countries’ broader industrialisation goals, can create new opportunities for female employment in traditionally female-dominated sectors, such as textiles and clothing, as well as in higher value-added jobs in the more male-dominated, capital-intensive sectors. A 2020 World Bank study on the economic and distributional effects of the AfCFTA estimates that wages will grow slightly faster for women than for men as output expands in key female-labour-intensive industries. By 2035, wages for women are expected to increase 10.5 per cent with respect to the baseline, compared

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 243

243

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 12

with 9.9 per cent for men. The World Bank study does, however, clarify that these are upper-bound estimates; there is thus a need for complementary policy reforms to support labour mobility and equality of opportunities, especially for female workers.42 Likewise, the AfCFTA can drive the African services economy, a key sector, with the potential to create more jobs and promote decent work for women. While AfCFTA market liberalisation will open up important trade and economic opportunities, it will have different impacts on women and men, and within groups of women and men in African countries. Women play an active role as entrepreneurs, workers, producers, and small-scale and informal cross-border traders in agriculture, manufacturing, and services. Yet, for each role, gender differences in equality of opportunities place women at a considerable disadvantage, with consequent implications for women’s equal participation in the AfCFTA. Accordingly, for the AfCFTA to promote and attain sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development, as one of the general objectives of the Agreement,43 implementation must be undertaken with attention paid to various forms of inequalities, including gender inequality. The Agreement Establishing the AfCFTA does not contain a dedicated trade and gender chapter with corresponding gender-explicit provisions that require AfCFTA state parties to facilitate women’s participation in trade. Gender equality considerations are, however, recognised in the AfCFTA Agreement. The Preamble of the Agreement contains explicit reference to the importance of gender equality for the development of international trade and economic cooperation, while Article 3(e) specifies that the AfCFTA aims to ‘promote and attain sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development, gender equality and structural transformation’.44 Likewise, Article 27(d) of the AfCFTA Protocol on Trade in Services makes explicit reference to improving ‘the export capacity of both formal and informal service suppliers, with particular attention to micro, small and medium-sized operators and women and youth service suppliers’.45 In addition, there are a number of provisions in the AfCFTA Agreement – although not gender-specific – that are of relevance to women in their various roles. While not targeted at women directly, these provisions could be leveraged to boost women’s economic participation in the AfCFTA.46 The AfCFTA has the potential to expand women’s economic opportunities and outcomes, but these gains will not be automatic. Delivering on the promise of the AfCFTA will require an inclusive approach to implementation that seeks to effectively operationalise gender equality considerations across the AfCFTA Agreement.47 One way for South Africa to achieve this objective is through a gendersensitive approach to implementation and, more specifically, through

244

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 244

2022/11/10 00:03

implement the AfCFTA Agreement. Gender mainstreaming is a contextspecific strategy that assesses the differentiated implications for women and men arising from AfCFTA market liberalisation.48 Central to this is a strong understanding of how women contribute to and participate in trade in their different economic roles. Gender mainstreaming seeks to identify priority sectors and markets where opportunities exist for women’s economic empowerment, as well as non-traditional sectors and products with high export growth and employment creation potential. It can also help to identify regional value chains with positive socio-economic impact – especially in creating productive employment and decent jobs in the aftermath of Covid-19. Emphasis is placed on examining potential AfCFTA-related risks and gender-specific constraints for women, who tend to be disproportionately affected by trade barriers and persistent gender inequalities in key economic sectors. Intrinsic to mainstreaming is the need for meaningful engagement of a broad constituency of civil society and the private sector, specifically women’s business associations and women’s groups. Grassroots women’s organisations will play a particularly important role in ensuring that implementation of the AfCFTA Agreement reflects the interests, needs, and visions of women, especially more vulnerable groups, who are often the hardest to reach. Despite its critical role, trade policy alone will not address the various gender equality issues that must be taken into account to ensure women’s access to decent work and productive employment in the context of the AfCFTA. Targeted domestic policies and complementary measures that address and remove structural barriers to gender equality are required. There will be a number of economic empowerment interventions

WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA

gender mainstreaming in South Africa’s AfCFTA National Strategy to

identified through the gender mainstreaming process that can inform the design of gender-responsive AfCFTA policy reforms and complementary measures. For instance, the process can help to identify targeted trade facilitation measures that act as catalysts for trade, particularly for smaller women-owned and women-led SMMEs and larger export firms. Gender mainstreaming can also help to identify educational policies and specialised professional and technical training that should be put in place to support women to access higher-skilled jobs, move into more competitive sectors, and leverage new trade and business opportunities created by the AfCFTA. Building the evidence base for these policies will require increased investments in gender-disaggregated data.

245

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 245

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 12

LINKING THE WPS AGENDA AND THE AFCFTA Covid-19 has clearly illustrated the need for deliberate and targeted actions to address the intersectional challenges related to intra-African trade, peace and security, development and gender equality (also see Chapter 10 in this volume). One way for South Africa to effectively integrate these pillars is through linking the AfCFTA to the WPS Agenda and to gender equality and women’s economic empowerment goals more broadly. As noted above, the WPS Agenda seeks to empower women in efforts aimed at preventing and ending conflict and building and sustaining peace. Notwithstanding progress, a number of challenges and gaps have been identified across all areas of the WPS Agenda. While full implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) is the duty of multiple stakeholders, UN member states have the primary responsibility to ensure that global commitments and obligations on women, peace, and security are integrated into domestic policies, laws, planning, and budget processes. However, as mentioned earlier, implementation by member states has been inconsistent, and women continue to be excluded from peace and other decision-making processes.49 Central to the full implementation of the WPS Agenda is the development of UNSC Resolution 1325 national action plans. These plans provide an opportunity for national stakeholders to identify priorities, determine responsibilities, allocate resources, and initiate strategic actions within a defined timeframe.50 South Africa has long championed the WPS Agenda, and has prioritised this Agenda both during previous terms on the UNSC as well as in its most recent term. Under the rotational presidency of the UNSC in October 2019, South Africa spearheaded an open debate on the theme ‘Towards the successful implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda: Moving from commitments to accomplishments in preparation for the commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of UNSC Resolution 1325’.51 Resolution 2493  was passed unanimously, following long and difficult negotiations led by South Africa. Despite the prominence given by South Africa to women, peace, and security, South Africa’s muchanticipated National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2020 to 2025 was officially launched only in March 2021.52 This National Action Plan is framed around the following four pillars of the WPS Agenda: Participation, Prevention, Protection, and Relief and Recovery, with seven priority areas and 21 specific strategic objectives. While reference is made to ‘empowering women and comprehending their needs’ as a distinct priority area under the Prevention pillar,53 the South African National Action Plan does not include women’s economic empowerment and corresponding measures to promote women’s active and

246

full participation in the economy. Yet, there is strong recognition in the

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 246

2022/11/10 00:03

to identify sustainable solutions to the challenges that women continue to confront in situations of conflict and non-conflict. This includes addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity, such as poverty, unemployment, economic hardship, and the marginalisation of vulnerable groups, among which women are disproportionately represented. South Africa’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security does not reflect women’s economic empowerment and the drivers of economic empowerment, which also include intra-African trade, as a distinct priority area under the Prevention pillar. This omission creates a gap and a missed opportunity to reinforce the intrinsic link between accelerating women’s economic outcomes as a key component of conflict prevention and a pre-condition for sustainable and lasting peace.  Advancing a targeted strategy of gender mainstreaming in South Africa’s AfCFTA National Strategy can actively promote the inclusion and empowerment of women in the AfCFTA. To avoid a siloed response and to ensure policy coherence, further consideration should be given to linking economic empowerment interventions, identified through the process of gender mainstreaming in South Africa’s AfCFTA National Strategy, to South Africa’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. An integrated and holistic approach that enables South African women to equally participate in and gain from new trade and economic opportunities created by the AfCFTA would contribute to the realisation of the seven priorities outlined in the MTSF 2019–2024. Because economic empowerment forms a critical component of post-conflict peacebuilding, an approach that advocates women’s inclusion in the aftermath of conflict would advance South Africa’s post-conflict reconstruction and development, and peacebuilding

WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA

Plan and in South African foreign policy circles more broadly of the need

efforts. A holistic approach would further support South Africa’s efforts to address the root causes of conflict and, in so doing, would serve as a foreign policy tool of preventative diplomacy and resilience. Last but not least, this approach would help to bridge the false dichotomy that often exists between intra-African trade on the one hand and peace and security processes, gender equality, and sustainable development on the other. In reflecting on new and innovative efforts towards full implementation of the WPS Agenda, there are considerable opportunities to ensure the meaningful participation of women in all levels of peace processes. Beyond domestic implementation and as part of continental and international engagements on the WPS Agenda, South Africa could draw attention to the need for including women peacebuilders in efforts to implement the AfCFTA Agreement, including in post-conflict economic recovery efforts. Recognising the critical importance of women’s participation specifically in post-conflict environments, a 2015 global study on the implementation

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 247

247

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 12

of UNSC Resolution 1325, titled Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing Peace, notes that it is often women peace advocates on the ground who are instrumental in stitching the fabric of society back together after conflict has ripped it apart.54 In general, economic recovery programmes for women are limited to micro-credit and micro-enterprises, while  largescale reconstruction is dominated by men  and overwhelmingly benefits men.55 As part of post-conflict reconstruction activities and in the context of a country’s AfCFTA national strategy, women peacebuilders could assist in identifying livelihood opportunities for women that extend into traditionally male-dominated sectors, while drawing attention to trade, societal, educational, and business-related barriers that undermine women’s economic activities in general, and a country’s trade potential in particular. Specifically, women peacebuilders could highlight the increased risks confronting female informal cross-border traders, as well as barriers to be addressed through gender-responsive trade facilitation measures, to release the economic and peacebuilding potential of cross-border trade. Likewise, women peacebuilders could identify skills development and specialised training required to build women’s technical expertise and trading capacity in order to maximise the benefits of the AfCFTA.

CONCLUSION This chapter recognises that South Africa is strategically placed to influence implementation of the WPS Agenda in Africa and globally. It has sought to underscore the obvious, but nonetheless often overlooked, connections between the key pillars of intra-African trade, peace and security, and women’s economic empowerment as an intrinsic component of gender equality and sustainable development. The analysis argues for (a) anchoring gender equality and women’s economic empowerment at the centre of the AfCFTA and WPS Agenda, to support the powerful reinforcement and effective implementation of both agendas; (b) adopting a harmonised approach that covers the full range of women’s economic empowerment interventions identified in South Africa’s AfCFTA National Strategy and integrates those interventions with South Africa’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2020 to 2025; and (c) ensuring the meaningful participation of women peacebuilders in the identification and implementation of inclusive interventions that contribute to women’s economic empowerment in all sectors of a post-conflict economy. Shaping Africa’s peace, security, and socio-economic development agenda in the wake of a ‘New Dawn’ requires creative and bold steps, which must 248

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 248

2022/11/10 00:03

women in ways that President Ramaphosa urged must go ‘beyond the clichés and pronouncements made from podiums’.56 In the shadow of the Covid-19 pandemic, and with the implementation of the much-celebrated AfCFTA on 1 January 2021, the 2020 milestone initiatives – the AU ‘Silencing the Guns’ theme, as well as the 25th anniversary of the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the 20th anniversary of UNSC Resolution 1325 – cannot be allowed to fade from our collective conscience. An integrated and holistic approach that links inclusive intra-African trade under the AfCFTA to the WPS Agenda, and to gender equality and women’s economic empowerment goals more broadly, will promote women’s sustainable peace and security at the national, continental, and global level. Championing such an approach would drive inclusive gains across the sustainable development agenda, and extend beyond clichés and pronouncements made from podiums.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1 ECOSOC (United Nations Economic and Social Council). 2020. ‘Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals. Report of the Secretary-General.’ UN Doc. E/2020. Para. 3, p. 2. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1627573 (Accessed 11 May 2021). 2 Mbeki, T. 2001. ‘Speech delivered by the President of South Africa, Mr. Thabo Mbeki at the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, 2 October 2001.’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/s_africa/pv0110/speech.html (Accessed July 2020). 3 DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation). Strategic Plan 2020– 2025. Pretoria: DIRCO. http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/strategic_plan_2020_2025/ strategic_plan_revised_2020_2025.pdf (Accessed July 2020).

WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA

include identifying practical and sustainable means of empowering African

4 DIRCO, Strategic Plan 2020–2025. 5 DIRCO, Strategic Plan 2020–2025. 6 Mabaya, N. 2020. ‘Peace and stability in Africa a priority as SA joins United Nations Security Council.’ IOL, 19 January. https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/peace-andstability-in-africa-a-priority-as-sa-joins-united-nations-security-council-18663368 (Accessed August 2020). 7 Sisulu, L. 2019. ‘Minister Lindiwe Sisulu: Remarks at the South African Institute of International Affairs.’ 3 April. https://www.gov.za/speeches/south-african-instituteinternational-affairs-4-apr-2019-0000 (Accessed 11 May 2022). 8 DIRCO, Strategic Plan 2020–2025. 9 Ramaphosa, C. 2019. ‘State of the Nation Address by President Cyril Ramaphosa, Parliament, Cape Town, 20 June 2019.’ DIRCO. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/ speeches/2019/cram0620.htm (Accessed June 2020).

249

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 249

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 12

10 DPME (Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation). 2020. Medium Term Strategic Framework: 2019–2024. Pretoria: DPME. https://www.dpme.gov.za/ k e y fo c u s a r e a s /o u t c o m e s S i t e / M T S F_ 2 019_ 2 0 24 / 2 019 -2 0 24% 2 0 M T S F % 2 0 Comprehensive%20Document.pdf (Accessed July 2020). 11 Botes, A. 2019. ‘Budget Vote Speech of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation delivered by Deputy Minister Alvin Botes, Cape Town, 11 July 2019.’ DIRCO. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2019/bote0711.htm (Accessed 11 May 2022). 12 Sisulu, ‘Remarks at the South African Institute of International Affairs’. 13 DIRCO, Strategic Plan 2020–2025. 14 DIRCO, Strategic Plan 2020–2025. 15 Ramaphosa, C. 2018. ‘Speech delivered by President Ramaphosa following the UN Security Council Elections.’ DIRCO, 8 June. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2018/ cram0608.htm (Accessed 11 May 20200). 16 Mabaya, ‘Peace and stability in Africa a priority’. 17 DIRCO, Strategic Plan 2020–2025. 18 These are resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019), and 2493 (2019). See, in this regard, UN Women. n.d. ‘Women, peace and security resolutions.’ https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/peaceand-security/global-norms-and-standards#_WPS_resolutions (Accessed 11 May 2022). 19 Mlambo-Ngcuka, P. 2019. ‘Remarks by UN Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of UN Women, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, at the UN Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security in New York.’ UN Women, 29 October. https:// www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2019/10/speech-ed-phumzile-open-debate-onwomen-peace-and-security (Accessed 11 May 2020). 20 Ramaphosa, C. 2020. ‘Acceptance statement by President Cyril Ramaphosa on assuming the Chair of the African Union for 2020.’ AU, 9 February. https://au.int/en/ speeches/20200209/acceptance-statement-south-african-president-he-cyril-ramaphosaassuming-chair (Accessed June 2020). 21 South African Government News Agency. 2020. ‘AU champions women empowerment in 2020.’ 10 February. https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/au-champions-womenempowerment-2020 (Accessed October 2020). 22 Ramaphosa, ‘Acceptance statement on assuming the Chair of the AU’. 23 Ramaphosa, C. 2020. ‘Opening statement by African Union Chairperson President Ramaphosa at the 13th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly on AfCFTA.’ The Presidency, 5 December. http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/opening-statementafrican-union-chairperson-president-ramaphosa-13th-extraordinary-session-auassembly-afcfta (Accessed December 2020). 24 Ramaphosa, C. 2020. ‘Closing statement by African Union Chairperson President Ramaphosa at the 14th Extraordinary Session on Silencing the Guns.’ The Presidency, 6 December. http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/closing-statement-africanunion-chairperson-president-ramaphosa-14th-extraordinary-session-silencing-guns (Accessed December 2020). 25 AU (African Union). 2016. African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by 2020: Lusaka Master Roadmap. Lusaka: AU. https://au.int/sites/ default/files/documents/38304-doc-1_au_roadmap_silencing_guns_2020_pdf_en.pdf (Accessed September 2020).

250

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 250

2022/11/10 00:03

27 UN. 2013. ‘Declaration: Women’s economic empowerment for peacebuilding.’ UN Doc. PBC/7/OC/3, para. 4. 26 September. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/758029?ln=es (Accessed 11 May 2020). 28 UN, ‘Women’s economic empowerment for peacebuilding’, para. 10. 29 CGA (Center for Global Affairs) of the School of Professional Studies at the New York University and the GNWP (Global Network of Women Peacebuilders). 2020. ‘Gendersensitive provisions in peace agreements and women’s political and economic inclusion post-conflict.’ Research report. https://gnwp.org/wp-content/uploads/GNWP-NYU_ ResearchReport2020-final-web.pdf (Accessed December 2020). 30 UNGA (General Assembly) and UNSC (Security Council). 2010. ‘Women’s participation in peacebuilding: Report of the Secretary-General.’ A/65/354–S/2010/466, paras 7,3. https://www.unwomen.org/en/docs/2010/9/women-in-peacebuilding-report-2010 (Accessed 13 May 2022). 31 UNGA and UNSC, ‘Women’s participation in peacebuilding’. 32 The 18th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in January 2012, adopted a decision to establish an Africa-wide free trade area (the AfCFTA) by an indicative date of 2017. 33 AfCFTA Secretariat. 2022. ‘Press release for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Council of Ministers responsible for trade.’ Twitter, 30 January, 3:16 pm. https:// twitter.com/AfCFTA/status/1487806904881582085/photo/1 (Accessed 2 February 2022). 34 ATPC (African Trade Policy Centre) and AU Commission. 2019. ‘African Continental Free Trade Area: Questions and answers.’ Addis Ababa: UN ECA. https://repository.uneca. org/handle/10855/43253 (Accessed 11 May 2020). 35 Luke, D. and MacLeod, J., eds. 2019. Inclusive Trade in Africa: The African Continental Free Trade Area in Comparative Perspective. London: Routledge. https://doi. org/10.4324/9780429401121. 36 Mene, W. K. 2020. ‘Statement by Secretary-General H. E. Wamkele Keabetswe Mene at the Official Commissioning and handing over of the African Continental Free Trade Area Secretariat.’ AU, 17 August. https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20200817/secretarygeneral-statement-handover-ceremony-afcfta-buildings (Accessed August 2020).

WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA

26 AU. 2017. ‘Main successes of the AU in Peace and Security, challenges and mitigation measures in place.’ 27 January. https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20170127/mainsuccesses-au-peace-and-security-challenges-and-mitigation-measures-place (Accessed September 2020).

37 Tralac. 2022. ‘Status of AfCFTA ratification.’ 3 May. https://www.tralac.org/resources/ infographic/13795-status-of-afcfta-ratification.html (Accessed 12 May 2020). 38 ILO (International Labour Organization). 2021. ‘An uneven and gender-unequal COVID-19 recovery: Update on gender and employment trends 2021.’ October. https:// www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/documents/publication/wcms_824865. pdf (Accessed 5 June 2022). 39 UN-Women. n.d. ‘The shadow pandemic: Violence against women during COVID-19.’ https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/in-focus-gender-equality-in-covid-19response/violence-against-women-during-covid-19 (Accessed August 2021). 40 UN ECA (Economic Commission for Africa). 2019. Assessing Regional Integration in Africa: Aria IX. Addis Ababa: UN ECA. https://archive.uneca.org/sites/default/files/ PublicationFiles/aria9_report_en_4sept_fin.pdf (Accessed 5 June 2022). 251

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 251

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 12

41 FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) and AU. 2018. ‘Leaving no one behind.’ http://www.fao.org/3/CA1506EN/ca1506en.pdf (Accessed August 2020). 42 World Bank. 2020. The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34139 (Accessed 5 June 2022). 43 See in this regard, Article 3(e) of the General Objectives of the Agreement Establishing the AfCFTA, which can be found at https://au.int/en/treaties/agreement-establishingafrican-continental-free-trade-area (Accessed 11 May 2020). 44 Bayat, N. 2021. Advancing gender-equitable outcomes in AfCFTA implementation. UN ECA White Paper, May, p. 8. https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/ keymessageanddocuments/22May_Final_WhitePaper_Advancing_gender_equitable_ outcomes.pdf (Accessed 1 June 2021). 45 Bayat, Advancing gender-equitable outcomes in AfCFTA implementation, p. 8. 46 Implemented with a gender lens, various provisions in the AfCFTA Agreement could help to mitigate trade and other barriers that impede women’s access to economic opportunities and participation. See, in this regard, Bayat, Advancing gender-equitable outcomes in AfCFTA implementation. 47 This would entail mainstreaming gender across all AfCFTA protocols and their associated annexes and appendices, which form an integral part of the AfCFTA Agreement. For a more detailed explanation, see Bayat, N. Forthcoming. ‘Towards a whole agreement approach to gender mainstreaming in the AfCFTA.’ Policy brief due to be published in 2022 by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Geneva. 48 The approach to gender mainstreaming in AfCFTA national strategies has been designed in accordance with specific components and elements, set out in the UN ECA’s proposed AfCFTA National Strategy Framework. For a more comprehensive overview of the process for gender mainstreaming in AfCFTA National Strategies, see Bayat, Advancing gender-equitable outcomes in AfCFTA implementation. 49 Mlambo-Ngcuka, ‘Remarks at the UN Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security’. 50 UN Women. 2015. Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. Geneva: UN Women. https://wps.unwomen.org/ (Accessed 11 May 2022). 51 UN Doc. S/2019/801, United Nations Security Council, 8 October 2019. 52 Republic of South Africa. 2020. National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2020 to 2025. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202103/southafrican-national-action-plan-women-peace-and-security.pdf (Accessed 11 May 2022). 53 See, in this regard, Priority Area 2.3: Empowering women and comprehending their needs, in National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security: 2020–2025, p. 75. 54 UN Women, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing Peace. 55 UNSC. 2019. ‘Women and peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General.’ UN Doc. S/2019/800. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/s-2019-800. php (Accessed 11 May 2022). 56 Ramaphosa, ‘Acceptance Statement on assuming the Chair of the AU’.

252

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 252

2022/11/10 00:03

Christopher Vandome

INTRODUCTION President Cyril Ramaphosa has taken a more pragmatic approach to

CHAPTER 13

South Africa’s Economic Diplomacy in Africa

international issues than his predecessors. Driven by pressing economic domestic concerns, his administration has prioritised the pursuit of investment and trade over ideologically motivated political relationships. This includes revitalising the Afrocentric foreign policy and economic diplomacy strategy. Successful economic diplomacy on the continent requires a commitment to creating mutual benefit with strategic partner countries and working in cooperation with the private sector. Structural power advantages have given rise to perceptions of South African regional hegemony which, in reality, have not been fulfilled.1 In fact, a self-awareness of its ‘big brother’ image has often stifled diplomatic efforts. Without an explicit or effective strategy to bring benefits to its domestic economy, South Africa has relied on domestic rewards falling into place as a by-product of its political engagement.2 This stands in contrast to the state-backed economic push by other emerging markets such as China, Turkey, and South Korea. Supporting regional development is critical for growing South Africa’s own moribund economy. While this has ostensibly been pursued through multilateral bodies and focused on issues such as regional infrastructure development, it has often been at odds with the realpolitik of South Africa’s bilateral relations. African states’ economic growth and development trajectories are diverging. South Africa’s immediate neighbours and partners across the continent are an important source of economic resilience and potential growth, and the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) could be a game changer (also see Chapter 12 in this volume). Yet the crux of South Africa’s regional economic policy continues to be its apparent support for regional integration, whilst simultaneously implementing protectionist policies and being accused of taking a mercantilist attitude towards the region. South Africa’s economic relationship with its neighbours and the wider region will be of critical importance as the country recovers from the global and domestic economic shock caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, which has accelerated pre-existing economic decline. In the wake of the 2008 global downturn, African trading partners were a source of resilience for

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 253

253

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 13

South Africa, and they could be so again. However, this is dependent on a coordinated and cohesive strategy towards the continent, complemented by country-specific strategies for key partners. This chapter presents an analysis of South Africa’s economic relationships in Africa. It argues that, despite the political rhetoric, South Africa has never developed an effective economic diplomacy strategy as part of its Africa Agenda. The government and the ruling party regularly refer to ‘economic diplomacy’ in policy documents as an umbrella term to include any form of international or regional economic policy. The Ramaphosa regime has advocated better implementation of existing policy, with some new initiatives. Yet, due to the absence of deeper consideration of the process of relationship management and an articulation of who those relationships should be with, including domestic non-state partners and priority countries identified for advancing trade and investment relationships, South Africa’s economic engagement with the continent is more a by-product of proximity and commercial competitive advantage than of government leadership. Whilst there have been efforts towards building economic diplomacy capability within the diplomatic corps, initiatives to bring in new investment and deepen trade relationships have been centralised within the office of the presidency and a small network of advisors. Ramaphosa’s attempts to revitalise the nation’s external economic relationships have focused on attracting global investment into South Africa. However, the marketing of his presidency as a moment of critical change for the country quickly wore thin. Regional developmental aspirations continue to be pursued through multilateral forums but undermined by the complexities of bilateral political relationships and individual interests. This chapter concludes that developing a detailed economic diplomacy strategy for the continent, including non-state actors and with country-specific strategies for key partners, could be critical for a regional post-Covid-19 recovery.

SOUTH AFRICA’S PLACE IN A CHANGING AFRICAN ECONOMIC CONTEXT South Africa’s economic engagement is determined by proximity and commercial competitive advantage. South Africa is the most complex economy in Africa, though no longer the largest. It has a developed manufacturing base and commercial agricultural sector, as well as a significant service sector and deep capital markets. However, it is geographically distant from the other big African economies and areas of fastest growth – the flight time from Johannesburg to Lagos is not much 254

different to the time from Lagos to London. Africa’s output is concentrated

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 254

2022/11/10 00:03

complex and not consistent.3 Demographic change, urbanisation, and technological advancement are challenging thinking on inclusive economic growth across the continent. Digitally connected citizens have been pushing for change, while competing international actors are giving African leaders and governments more options and potential agency in their international relations. The faces of leadership have changed as long-serving presidents have stepped down or been removed. Within the Southern African Development Community (SADC), liberation movements have managed their own transitions while retaining power. In Angola, José Eduardo dos Santos stepped down in 2017 after 38 years in power, and in Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe was removed from power in 2017 after 37 years in power. Their replacements, João Lourenço and Emmerson Mnangagwa respectively, have declared their economies ‘open for business’, a mantra echoed by President Mokgweetsi Masisi in Botswana. Ramaphosa too has adopted this slogan and his appearance at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos alongside Lourenço and

SOUTH AFRICA’S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA

in a few dominant countries; the growth patterns across Africa are more

Mnangagwa linked these leaders in a narrative of spearheading a ‘fullscale revolution’ in southern Africa.4 South African foreign direct investment (FDI) on the continent is concentrated within its immediate neighbours: 26 per cent of all South Africa’s outward FDI is in SADC countries, with a further 11 per cent elsewhere on the continent.5 This has been attributed to push factors of domestic market saturation, policy uncertainty, low growth rates, and a rigid labour market, as well as pull factors such as geographic proximity and potentially high rewards.6 The South African government has actively supported this outward investment through reduced exchange controls and incentive schemes. South Africa is an important trading partner for other southern African countries. From 2000 to 2019 South Africa’s trade with the rest of Africa increased from R33 billion to R487 billion.7 Although 80 per cent of South Africa’s trade is with partners outside of the continent – China, Germany, the USA, the UK, and Japan are its top five trading partners – other countries in the region are more dependent on the South African market.8 Most of South Africa’s trade with the continent is within southern Africa, and with Nigeria, which is an important source of oil. However, South Africa remains a top export destination and route to international markets for Botswana, eSwatini, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.9 In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, as South Africa suffered a recession deeper than many of its international trading partners, its trade with the rest of the world fell. Imports from Africa fell, but not nearly as much, and its exports to other African markets rose. Regional economies were less exposed to international headwinds, the fall in the value of the

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 255

255

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 13

rand meant that South African goods became more competitive, and the achievement in 2008 of the SADC Free Trade Area meant 85 per cent of goods were tariff-free. South Africa’s trade with the rest of Africa rose, from around 10 per cent to nearly 20 per cent of its trade, and subsequently remained at this level.10 South Africa has an overall trade deficit, importing more than it exports, but with Africa it maintains a considerable surplus, driven by exports of manufactured and value-added goods. It is the only market in which South Africa has a competitive advantage for beneficiated goods. This is an important source of resilience, but also of political animosity. SADC countries, with their own industrialisation aspirations, are suspicious of South Africa’s regional trading intentions. Former president of Botswana Ian Khama repeatedly criticised the trade imbalance, and in January 2017 was quoted in The Economist chiding President Jacob Zuma and accusing South Africa of stifling industrialisation in the region, ‘treating its neighbours as little more than a market place for exports’.11 In response, in an interview in February 2017, former Minister of Trade and Industry Rob Davies argued that South Africa was supporting industrialisation through regional integration and noted that with some countries the trade balance was shifting.12 The push north has been spearheaded by the large conglomerates and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that dominate the domestic market. Of the Africa Report’s top 500 companies in Africa, ranked by turnover in 2021, around 30 per cent were South African, predominantly in the top half of the table and almost all with a regional presence outside South Africa. Almost exclusively South African private firms and SOEs topped the list, including Eskom, Sasol, Shoprite, MTN, Bidfood, and Sanlam.13 After the rapid expansion and initial success of South African companies in Africa, challenges emerged due to tough business environments and increasing competition from other key emerging economies across the continent. South African firms have also been the first to suffer backlash in host countries due to political tensions between home and host country, and have in some cases caused reputational damage for South Africa.14 For a long time, the complex relationship between big business and government in South Africa has been dogged by legacy issues from the pre-democratic period and debates around racial and transformation issues. This has largely prevented the development of a conducive relationship for cooperation in economic diplomacy.15 Yet the development of an economic diplomacy strategy can draw on lessons from these experiences. Corporations are already implementing different investment strategies and risk mitigation policies for different regions on the continent.16

256

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 256

2022/11/10 00:03

ambitions of industrialisation. State power producer Eskom has been a key driver of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) – the shared electricity grid linking all mainland SADC countries – with around 80 per cent of the operating capacity, and accounting for around 76 per cent of peak demand.17 And yet this support of the region results in a net loss. In September 2019 Public Enterprises Minister Pravin Gordhan announced that Eskom was owed R632 million by three state-owned power utilities in the SADC region – the Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO) owed R89 million, Electricidade de Mocambique R221 million, and the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) R322 million.18 In September 2020 Eskom’s debt amounted to R488 billion and the organisation is in the process of being restructured.19 State logistics firm Transnet has also been an important interlocutor in the creation of regional transport and trade corridors; however, attempts to push further into the continent, particularly as a maintenance service provider and an original equipment manufacturer, have been quelled by declining sales, which fell to US$10.9  million in

SOUTH AFRICA’S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA

South Africa’s beleaguered SOEs have provided support for regional

2019 compared to US$16.7 million in 2018. South Africa’s SOEs formed the bedrock of the ‘developmental functionalist’ approach to regionalism in the late 1990s, which centred on establishing economic interdependence to secure regional political cooperation.20 While SOEs remain of significant economic importance, domestic political pressure has limited their potential for regional leverage. South Africa is important for small, medium, and micro-enterprises (SMMEs) within regional value chains, yet the scale of these relationships is little understood. SMMEs across South Africa represent more than 98 per cent of businesses, employ 50–60 per cent of the country’s work force across all sectors, and are responsible for a quarter of job growth in the private sector.21 Johannesburg attracts migrant workers, whose financial remittances and exporting of low-cost goods are often a backbone of regional resilience and protection of livelihoods, especially for Zimbabwe, for example. There may be important lessons for Pretoria from across the region in how to better engage with the continent, for example reviewing Johannesburg as both a formal and informal economic hub city against the experience of Lagos and Nairobi.

257

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 257

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 13

SOUTH AFRICA’S GOVERNMENT-LED ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: DEFINITION AND ARTICULATION South Africa’s economic strength is critical for pursuing regional objectives, and its economic diplomacy should be at the top of its foreign policy ‘tool kit’. Arguments advocating South African continental hegemony22 have been repeatedly challenged,23 with critics pointing to South Africa’s lack of military and diplomatic capacity, as well as its commitments to noninterference and its interpersonal and inter-party political relationships and obligations rooted in the apartheid struggle that constrain its actions in the region. However, successive administrations have failed to develop a holistic and inclusive economic diplomacy strategy for the continent in partnership with private sector and other non-state actors. Economic diplomacy is the process through which countries engage with other countries, partners and stakeholders to ‘maximize their national gain in all the fields of activity, including trade, investment and other forms of economically beneficial exchanges, where they enjoy comparative advantage; it has bilateral, regional and multilateral dimensions, each of which is important’.24 It is often interpreted in the South African context to be any diplomatic action which has potential economic benefit for the country.25 Economic diplomacy is not restricted to the actions of governments. There are a great variety of both state and non-state actors involved: ministries of foreign affairs; SOEs; business, associations of industry, and chambers of commerce; the financial sector; and soft power actors such as universities, business schools, and think tanks, and the tourism industry.26 However, a country’s ability to fully exercise its economic diplomacy is often constrained by three mutually reinforcing tensions: between politics and economics, between international and domestic pressures, and between government and other forces.27 The central question in the South African context is whether government can more effectively mobilise and utilise non-state actors, especially businesses.28 Economic diplomacy has been established as a priority of South Africa’s foreign relations in order to expand the country’s economic links to Africa and the world, but successive governments have been criticised for conceptual ambiguity in poorly defining and executing economic diplomacy, especially as it pertains to the government’s Africa Agenda. This is complicated by the fact that the country’s relationship with the continent is complex and it is virtually impossible to disentangle the economic from the political and altruistic actions from those driven by self-interest.29 South Africa is often seen as pursuing mercantilist economic aspirations, seeking to maximise its export value and inward investment. But regional industrialisation is

258

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 258

2022/11/10 00:03

this should also be a foreign policy objective. Thabo Mbeki’s ‘clear and unflinching’ interest in international relations, with a strong ideological spine based on solidarity with the developing world and advancing their interests on the global stage, meant that although South Africa was an active foreign policy player, decision-making and policy formulation were done almost entirely by Mbeki himself.30 As an ‘economic diplomat’, his focus was on the creation of the framework for Pan-African economic integration. Mbeki was particularly influential in the creation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). He was one of the main promoters of the initiative, which was launched in Abuja in 2001 and adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2002 as its framework for supporting development in Africa. He took on a personal stake in its advocacy. However, the initiative lost momentum on the continent due to perceptions of its adherence to the Washington Consensus creed, and international support quickly subsided due to NEPAD’s inability to resolve governance issues on the continent. This was particularly the case for

SOUTH AFRICA’S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA

in South Africa’s own interest as well. Creating the partnerships to achieve

concerns on Zimbabwe, another personal project of Mbeki. In a post-Mbekiera review of South African economic diplomacy, Qobo contends that the country failed to develop a coherent economic diplomacy aligned to its normative foreign policy agenda, and that ‘economic diplomacy needs to be viewed as complementary rather than contradictory to a normative commitment to human rights and Africa’s development’.31 While Mbeki enjoyed playing the statesman, his successor, Jacob Zuma, was far less of a foreign policy president. South Africa joined the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping in 2011, while Zuma developed the relationship with China and continued the call for a more representative and equitable governance structure in global multilateral institutions. But the country’s relationship with its continent went into decline. Worsening domestic relations with business also weakened the scope for developing a more holistic and inclusive economic diplomacy in partnership with non-state actors. The desire to engage with the private sector is echoed throughout the key frameworks and policies of the Zuma administration, but with little detail given on how this would be implemented. The 2011 White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy, approved by Cabinet in December 2012, noted that ‘successful economic diplomacy requires a close partnership with government, business, and labour’.32 The White Paper built on the multiple frameworks published by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in the preceding years, most importantly the 2010 South African Trade Policy and Strategy Framework, 259

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 259

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 13

which pointed to the ‘significant scope to increase the involvement of other stakeholders, including the private sector’ in economic diplomacy.33 However, there was little detail on what mechanisms would be introduced to achieve this.34 The policy did not add to the direction towards the continent that South Africa had previously taken, with observers noting that the Zuma administration had effectively placed into ‘care and maintenance’ what had been created in the Mbeki era. However, Cabinet and Parliament involvement in the creation of the policy did mark a shift from Mbeki’s centralised approach. Zuma viewed diplomats as ‘our foremost marketing and promotion officers’.35 An economic diplomacy strategic framework was produced by DIRCO and the DTI and used as a conceptual guide by the Diplomatic Academy to provide economic diplomacy training to South African diplomats.36 Diplomats were instructed on how to pursue market access for South African products, promote and attract investment into South Africa, and promote the national brand for attracting business and tourism. The 2012 National Development Plan (NDP) recognised the perception of South Africa as a regional bully and that policy makers had a weak grasp of regional geopolitics.37 The NDP recommended a study into South Africa’s position within continental geopolitics, although no such study has yet been undertaken. The plan advocated engagement with private sector actors for the valuable contribution they might make towards more technical negotiations; it recommended ‘strengthen[ing] economic diplomacy and build[ing] effective partnerships with the private sector and state-owned enterprises’.38 This desire to make policy formation and implementation more inclusive was reflected in the creation of the South African Council on International Relations (SACOIR), which was established to provide a consultative forum for the regular review of South Africa’s foreign policy. However, many analysts were frustrated by how long this took to come to fruition.39 As part of a multi-stakeholder consultation process on South Africa’s commitment to the African Union (AU) Agenda 2063, businesses revealed their desire to have a more constructive relationship with government on policy formulation and implementation, for investment packages for regional and continental development, and for partnerships that are actively monitored.40 However, their assessment of the continent as a market was varied. They pointed to the lack of infrastructure, and viewed it as predominantly a consumer market rather than a productive one. Despite the rhetoric and policy formulation, the Zuma administration did little to advance South Africa’s economic position on the continent or leverage that position for political gains. Positive advances towards regional economic integration were counterbalanced by political realities, and

260

Zuma’s tenure was plagued by incidents of domestic xenophobic violence

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 260

2022/11/10 00:03

in attacks on South African businesses across the continent. Former DIRCO Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane flagged the implementation of the Tri-Partite Free Trade Area (FTA) between SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the East African Community (EAC), a forerunner of the AfCFTA, as a success story for the administration.41 However, beyond this achievement, under the Zuma administration South African influence declined across the continent. The development of a coherent economic diplomacy as part of the Africa Agenda has been undermined by conflict and contradictions within government and a breakdown in the relationship between business and government. Efforts towards the inclusion of non-state actors and capacity building within DIRCO fell flat due to the lack of strategic vision from the executive.

ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA UNDER RAMAPHOSA: NEW DOG, OLD TRICKS

SOUTH AFRICA’S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA

that undermined regional economic and political relationships, and resulted

Cyril Ramaphosa’s ascension to presidential office in 2018 was met with significant international expectation that he might bridge the divisions between business and government and rejuvenate the nation’s international and regional foreign policy ambitions. There was a refreshed tone on regional economic diplomatic efforts, while keeping in line with the broad policy objectives of the NDP, which Ramaphosa had helped to formulate. However, like his predecessors, domestic economic priorities and successive political battles have left him overstretched; this has highlighted the need to engage with a broader set of stakeholders to achieve South Africa’s newly stated international and regional economic ambitions. In 2018, under then Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Lindiwe Sisulu, the administration conducted a foreign policy review. The review panel was tasked with engaging a broad range of stakeholders to respond to changing domestic, regional, continental, and global politics and socio-economic issues, challenges, and demands. The panel echoed the self-critical sentiments of the NDP, namely the decline of South Africa’s external influence and negative national politics. The panel’s report, published in April 2019, indicated a renewal of South Africa’s continental economic ambitions, recalling the country’s, or rather Mbeki’s, central role in the African Renaissance and NEPAD. The report repeats the oft-stated ambition to include a wider selection of stakeholders in policy formation and execution. The panel concluded that in ‘assessing how South Africa’s peers conduct their work in economic diplomacy, it became clear that 261

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 261

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 13

the country is not using its economic potential and its inherent natural resources optimally’.42 The review stopped short of offering detailed recommendations, but it did illustrate a renewed appetite for a greater role for South Africa in the regional and global economy. In his State of the Nation Address (SONA) after the national elections in June 2019, President Ramaphosa committed the government to pursuing ‘a better world and Africa’. In addition to the opportunity created by the AfCFTA, the speech prioritised the development of cross-border value chains in key sectors such as energy, mining and mineral beneficiation, manufacturing, infrastructure, and agro-processing. The president also stated that the new administration intended to strengthen relationships with Nigeria, Egypt, and Kenya as anchor countries for advancing its goals.43 The new approach outlined in SONA 2019 was buttressed by newly appointed Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Naledi Pandor in her first Budget Vote Speech to Parliament in July 2019, in which she stated: ‘We will reiterate the centrality of the African continent [and] focus increasingly on economic diplomacy.’44 The administration has voiced an approach that views South Africa and its neighbours as part of integrated supply chains, and has named key partners. This indicates a more considered and strategic approach to regional integration, beyond vague commitments in support of infrastructure projects and trade regimes. However, despite the new tone, much of South Africa’s regional economic engagement thus far has remained rooted in past precedent. Ramaphosa has relied on a close circle of advisors, and has created advisory councils for key issues. Upon entering office, Ramaphosa appointed four investment envoys to campaign for attracting investors to boost South Africa’s economy: former finance minister Trevor Manuel, former deputy finance minister Mcebisi Jonas, former CEO of Standard Bank Jacko Maree, and business leader Phumzile Langeni.45 Their objective was clear: to achieve Rampahosa’s R100 billion investment target. Several other private sector advisors buttressed official envoy positions, indicating a thawing of government–business relations. In the context of pervasive underperformance, many business leaders viewed working with government as a necessity for domestic economic revival. In addition to these envoys, Ramaphosa assembled an Economic Advisory Council, announced in September 2019 and consisting of several key figures from the Mbeki era, including some with expertise on foreign policy.46 One important area of development under the Ramaphosa administration has been the introduction of the new Foreign Service Act 26 of 2019, paving the way for professionalism and improved accountability and efficiency, as well as training for diplomats. South Africa’s diplomatic service has been

262

criticised for its political appointees in ambassadorial positions, and weak

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 262

2022/11/10 00:03

One aspect of this is that overseas ambassadors will become heads of mission in the fullest sense. Therefore, instead of overseas representatives for the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (dtic) reporting back to Pretoria, they will now be overseen by the ambassador or High Commission that heads the mission, thus streamlining the economic functions of the mission. Since 2018, DIRCO, the dtic, and other departments have participated in an annual Economic Diplomacy Forum, which seeks to improve coordination at national and sub-national levels, as provincial governments and cities also participate in this training initiative. Xenophobic attacks have blighted Ramaphosa’s presidency, as they did those of his predecessors, and continue to sour the nation’s relationship with the region. In response to attacks in 2018, Ramaphosa affirmed: ‘Our fortunes are linked to those of our fellow African nations […] rather than retreating into a laager, we must embrace African integration and the benefits it will bring.’48 The economic strain of the Covid-19 lockdown has once again brought tensions to the fore, and the political rhetoric of ‘putting

SOUTH AFRICA’S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA

ministerial leadership.47 The Act places economic diplomacy as a priority.

South Africa first’ by prioritising citizens for work opportunities runs the risk of sparking further violence.

MULTILATERAL CONTRADICTIONS AND BILATERAL REALITIES Regional bodies have progressed, albeit slowly, towards objectives for economic integration and development, impeded by funding and capacity deficits. Partners have been sceptical of South Africa’s motivations in regional trade negotiations, viewing Pretoria as having the intention to gain market access for South African products, but with little return for other countries. Non-tariff barriers and trade frictions remain a significant constraint to fully integrated regional economic activity. Since the AU was launched in Durban in 2002, South Africa has been a driving force of the organisation’s ambition to achieve continental economic integration, although this has been met with scepticism from other African states. South Africa has been, at times, a controversial force within the AU.49 The most important regional economic change has been the creation of the AfCFTA. The primary objective is to ‘create a single market for goods, services, facilitated by movement of persons in order to deepen the economic integration of the African continent’, in accordance with the Pan-African vision enshrined in Agenda 2063.50 It commits countries to 90 per cent tariff-free trade and to the reduction of non-tariff barriers. Progress on the agreement has been hampered by key players’ reluctance to open their borders to inward competition – especially Nigeria. However, despite this, progress has been fast in comparison to other continental

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 263

263

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 13

trade initiatives.51 Although South Africa was not one of the 44 (out of 55) countries that signed the framework agreement in Kigali in March 2018, citing the need for domestic consultation, it has subsequently signed and ratified the agreement. The country lobbied hard to have a South African – Wamkele Mene – as the Secretary-General of the AfCFTA Secretariat. Ramaphosa has personally championed the AfCFTA, calling it ‘a new dawn’ for the continent.52 However, South Africa has not signed the AU Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, and has shown little intention of doing so. The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic led to the postponement of the AU Summit that was to be hosted by South Africa on 30 May 2020. The summit was eventually held virtually in November that year. There was much to discuss before the operationalisation of the AfCFTA Agreement came into effect in January 2021, including encouraging trade negotiators to complete their bargaining on tariff reductions, rules of origin, and other necessary regulations.53 However, the pressing concerns of the pan-continental pandemic response took precedent at the meeting. South Africa remains a vocal proponent of the Agreement, and in November 2021 hosted the Intra-African Trade Fair in support of increasing regional trade. However, since chairing the continental organisation its diplomatic efforts towards finalising negotiations over trade concessions and trading rules have waned. Pretoria has supported SADC’s regional developmental objectives, but its market integration efforts have been relatively unsuccessful.54 The ambitious 15-year Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, launched in 2003, led to the creation of a free trade area, established in 2008. However, none of the plan’s other goals – a customs union, common market, and common currency by 2018 – have been achieved. Funding and capacity shortfalls in the secretariat and implementing bodies have no doubt stalled progress. More significant challenges include overlapping memberships, asymmetric development trajectories, and persistent trade frictions stemming from poor infrastructure and significant no-tariff barriers, including the harmonisation of standards and establishment of soft infrastructure and systems.55 Businesses complain that while it can take three days to transport goods from Cape Town to Johannesburg, a distance of 1  400  km, it can take three weeks to move goods from Johannesburg to Lusaka, a distance of 1 600 km.56 Overland cross-border freight prices are higher in southern Africa than in other regions of the world.57 SADC has also been ineffective as a forum for dispute resolution. For example, Zimbabwe imposed an import ban on a range of products under its Statutory Instrument 64 of 2016. South Africa challenged the ban both bilaterally and through SADC, but it was only domestic pressure and severe

264

food shortages that eventually pressured the Zimbabwean government into

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 264

2022/11/10 00:03

South Africa’s own development challenges means that ‘it may be too much to demand consistency from the country’s region-building efforts’.59 South Africa has been a contradictory representative of the region. It stalled the signing of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the European Union (EU) and SADC – the EU–SADC EPA – as it was reluctant to lose the beneficial position it maintained under the current Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) (also see Chapter 5 in this volume). However, it almost unilaterally led the negotiations with the UK in what eventually became the post-Brexit SACU+M (the Southern African Customs Union, comprised of South Africa, Botswana, eSwatini, Lesotho, and Namibia, plus Mozambique) trade deal, despite the efforts of South African officials and political leaders to bring other partners to the fore.60 South Africa’s ability to exercise effective economic diplomacy within SADC and SACU to boost regional trade and economic integration has been neutered by political realities. Pretoria has not been able to use its structural power and economic leverage to make the type of political impact in the

SOUTH AFRICA’S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA

a policy reversal two years after the ban was imposed.58 The enormity of

region that would in turn deliver economic benefits. The crisis in Zimbabwe has long been a thorn in the regional body’s side, as the country’s economic collapse was costly for the region.61 Regional political leaders have attributed a multitude of economic costs to the crisis in Zimbabwe: financial aid and support, unpaid debts for infrastructure usage, and the negative impact on regional currencies. In an interview in 2019, then Minister of Finance Tito Mboweni would not put a figure to the debt.62 As chair of SADC in 2019, Ramaphosa called for the lifting of international sanctions on Zimbabwe, subscribing to Harare’s line that its problems were externally created, contrary to what many see as Ramaphosa’s own personal view.63 Beyond its immediate neighbours, South Africa’s bilateral relationships on the continent have focused on political and often personal, rather than economic, objectives. Relationships are controlled out of the office of the Presidency and many of these have been shrouded in controversy and heavily criticised. The links between South African peacekeeping missions and politically connected individuals obtaining post-conflict mining concessions has been scrutinised. For example, Louw-Vaudran argues that ‘the real reason behind South Africa’s military intervention in CAR is still a mystery, but there are strong indications that ANC politicians had their sights on diamond and gold deals in the country’.64 This was not a strategic move by the state to advance the nation’s economic interests on the continent, marking a departure from its previous hesitation to do so; instead, the motivations were apparently more individualistic. A Mail & Guardian investigation uncovered mining deals acquired by individuals linked to senior ANC officials, such as Mbeki’s spy chief, Billy Masethla.65

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 265

265

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 13

Elsewhere on the continent, Louw-Vaudran further notes accusations against ANC-linked business elites and politicians, such as Tokyo Sexwale, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Despite the above allegations, it is also important to note that ‘there is no public evidence of private business directly benefitting from South Africa’s role in peacekeeping’.66 South Africa’s later involvement in the DRC aroused further suspicion that then President Zuma’s commitment to the Grand Inga III project was in exchange for business deals in the DRC for his nephew.67 The Congo Research Group, an independent research unit, recommended South Africa drop support for the project, noting that in November 2018 even the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Energy – which includes members of the ruling ANC – pressed the government to cancel its purchase of Inga III power and instead invest in domestic power generation, which would be cheaper and more reliable and create more jobs.68 However, Ramaphosa has maintained the nation’s commitment. Issues of family involvement and transparency have also permeated Ramaphosa’s regional relationships. His own background, social group, and family have left him exposed to being implicated based on their involvement in the region. Pretoria had to smooth relations with Gaborone after Ramaphosa’s sister-in-law, businesswoman Bridgette Radebe, was involved in supporting a candidate in the Botswana election in 2019.69 South African Minister of Energy Jeff Radebe, Bridgette Radebe’s husband, has also had to face criticism on the lack of transparency around a R1  billion oil deal with South Sudan that ‘raised eyebrows’ in government circles.70 The Export Marketing and Investment Assistance (EMIA) Scheme, initially the Export Marketing and Assistance Programme, was a key policy reform of the 1990s. Through this scheme the dtic assists South African exporters who wish to make contact with foreign buyers with a view to conclude new export orders. More recently, a spate of missions have been undertaken to deepen trading relationships, such as to the DRC in 2017 and to Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Mozambique, and Uganda in 2019. In Mozambique, the dtic is keen to position South African firms so that they can capitalise on the projected gas boom. These initiatives present an important opportunity to move trade promotion beyond just the big firms, and to create space for SMMEs. Chambers of commerce and business organisations are critical in this regard. In a step towards strategic plans for priority countries, a South Africa–Zambia comprehensive economic cooperation strategic framework (2021–2026) was created following a virtual stakeholder engagement process in 2020. The strategy recognised the importance of Zambia as the bridgehead of the north–south corridor and thus a critical stepping stone into the rest of the continent.

266

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 266

2022/11/10 00:03

lieu of more substantial economic support or direct bilateral assistance. Between 2003 and 2015, South African companies invested US$1.29 billion in Zimbabwe, principally in banking, agriculture, mining, and retail. There are estimated to be more than 300 South African companies operating in Zimbabwe, in extractives and in the wider economy. The South African government has sought to mobilise private sector investment to ‘level the playing field’ with its northern neighbour, as the government has not had the financial resources or political capital to be able to provide direct financial support to the crippled economy. However, the continued economic crisis in Zimbabwe has caused problems for South African businesses in the country. The monetary policy statement of February 2019, and the subsequent reintroduction of a non-externalisable Zimbabwe dollar, has meant that South African companies are unable to repatriate profits and have been turning to DIRCO for support in the country.

THE NIGERIA–ANGOLA PIVOT

SOUTH AFRICA’S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA

South Africa has promoted trade facilitation with Zimbabwe, seemingly in

South Africa’s most neglected bilateral relationship in Africa is with Nigeria. The relationship is strategically important, as South Africa imported oil to the value of US$3.9 billion from Nigeria in 2018, and this is on the increase. South Africa’s historic and once strong relationship with Nigeria, especially under Mbeki, took a downturn under Zuma. This started from the outset, when Zuma broke with precedent and chose Angola rather than Nigeria as his first state visit – a move seen by Abuja as a snub and by analysts as a pivoting of South Africa’s priority strategic partnership on the continent. South African companies have entered the Nigerian market in search of growth, with many achieving significant success, to the anger of local firms. The relationship has also been troubled by the repeated xenophobic attacks in South Africa. However, there have been recent attempts to improve the relationship. The Bi-National Commission (BNC) has been in place since 1999, and there are 32 Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) between the two countries that need to be implemented to improve the trading relationship. At the ninth session of the BNC in Pretoria in 2019, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari urged the South African government to relax its regulatory framework and make it easy for Nigerian companies to do business in the country. President Ramaphosa apologised for violent attacks on Nigerians in South Africa. He also emphasised that 100 South African companies have invested in Nigeria, and that South Africa is the largest purchaser of Nigerian products in Africa. This was followed by a reciprocal visit in December 2021 when Ramaphosa made a state visit to Nigeria for the 10th session of the BNC. It is important to note the contrast in

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 267

267

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 13

the nature of the businesses that constitute this relationship. Larger South African corporations have invested in Nigeria, whereas in South Africa it is mainly smaller Nigerian businesses and entrepreneurs that are investing and running SMMEs; it has been harder for larger Nigerian corporations to thrive in the South African market.71 The relationship with Nigeria is critically important, but needs significant work. There is significant opportunity to underpin South Africa’s emerging strategic political relationship with Angola with increased commercial connections. South Africa imported oil worth US$1.3  billion from Angola in 2018.72 Like Zuma, Ramaphosa also made Angola his first state visit after his inauguration. At the time, Ramaphosa was chair of SADC and João Lourenço was chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. The new Angolan president, Lourenço, and Jacob Zuma had also undertaken reciprocal visits in 2017. Efforts to bolster the political relationship are replicated in the area of economic diplomacy, as the two countries signed a Joint Commission for Cooperation (JCC) in 2000, with the first meeting taking place in 2003. A South Africa–Angola Chamber of Commerce was formed in 2003. However, these initiatives did not amount to much, due to the significant political rivalry between Dos Santos and Mbeki.73 This changed in 2009, when Zuma chose Angola for his first state visit as South Africa’s president. Reciprocal visits between Zuma and Dos Santos resulted in over 33 bilateral agreements by 2017 across a wide range of sectors, including trade and industry, energy, science and technology, and sport. Improved political cooperation brought some gains in trade. South Africa imports goods worth R18 billion from Angola, while exporting just above R8 billion, but there is desire from both sides to gain more from the relationship.74 A trade mission from South Africa visited Angola in September 2019, an occasion during which South Africa’s representative, Ambassador Fanie Phakola, said: ‘It is only you as businesspeople who can make it happen […] Government will stand ready to provide support where necessary.’75 The mission to Angola was a particularly significant step in the government’s mobilisation of the private sector in support of political and diplomatic efforts.

CONCLUSION Ramaphosa’s rhetoric of a new economic relationship with the continent has not been matched by decisive action to move the country beyond the decline of the Zuma era. While Ramaphosa himself has been rightly lauded for his handling of the Covid-19 pandemic in his role as AU chair, South 268

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 268

2022/11/10 00:03

free movement of people attained has not matched the commitment to the AfCFTA. Even though South Africa’s primary trading relationships are not in Africa, regional trade is especially important for value-added products and vital for resilience against international economic shocks. Policy frameworks for continental economic integration are hampered by the realities of non-tariff barriers and trade and business frictions. Presidential ambitions have continued to be hindered by realpolitik within multilateral institutions and in South Africa’s bilateral relations. South Africa’s tendency to oversimplify the political and economic contexts of its northern neighbours has left it ill-prepared to strategically engage with a rapidly changing continent. South Africa has supported integration in regional multilateral forums, but its bilateral relationships have been based on party-political allegiances, crisis responses, and access to strategic economic resources. In this context, efforts towards training DIRCO staff have fallen flat. Domestic political factors have prevented the diplomatic corps from properly benefiting from partnerships to harness the power of

SOUTH AFRICA’S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA

Africa’s regional relationships continue to be beset by xenophobia, and the

South Africa’s non-state economic diplomats. South Africa has been unable to leverage its economic strength to exert political influence in the region, something which could have brought greater mutual economic benefit. There is a need for real commitment towards cooperation and coordination with the various actors that represent South Africa in Africa. This requires a framework to set out how government works with multiple stakeholders. The framework should be complemented by the implementation of the NDP’s recommendation of a geopolitical study of South Africa’s position within Africa. It should also identify key regional partners – such as Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia, and especially Nigeria – and determine what will be done to bolster economic relations. A new approach to economic diplomacy on the continent must emphasise transparency. The country’s ambitions for multilateral bodies and bilateral trading relationships must be set out to clarify its intentions to regional partners. Bilateral commissions are important means to deepen relationships beyond political actors. The Ramaphosa administration will need to build real trust with the private sector and with other governments on the continent if its new tone is to translate into true material benefit. This benefit must be defined not just as improving terms of trade and inward investment, but as generating mutual value with regional partners and recognising that regional industrialisation is also beneficial for South Africa.

269

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 269

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 13

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1 Alden, C. and Schoeman, M. 2015. ‘South Africa’s symbolic hegemony in Africa.’ International Politics 52: 239–254. https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2014.47. 2 Zondi, S. 2012. ‘Options for guiding the future conduct of SA Inc on the African continent.’ South African Foreign Policy Initiative, Policy brief no. 13, Open Society Foundation for South Africa. 3 Between 2009 and 2013, 13 African states had an average growth rate in the top 30 in the world. Between 2014 and 2018, there were 11 African states in the top 30. However, only four countries were consistent across both time periods – Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, and the DRC. Twelve Africa countries were consistent in achieving average growth rates of over 4 per cent over both time periods, and of those only the DRC, Mozambique, and Tanzania were from the SADC region. World Bank Data. 2020. https://data.worldbank.org/ (Accessed 4 February 2021). 4 Pilling, D. 2018. ‘Southern Africa faces a full-scale revolution.’ Financial Times, 24 January. https://www.ft.com/content/8b28e91e-0037-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5 (Accessed 21 October 2020). 5 South African Reserve Bank Data. For further discussion on South Africa’s outward FDI stock, see Games, D. 2017. ‘South Africa’s economic engagement in sub-Saharan Africa: Drivers, constraints and future prospects.’ Chatham House research paper, November. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/201711-02-south-africa-economic-engagement-games-final.pdf (Accessed 4 February 2021). 6 Vickers, B. and Cawood, R. 2018. ‘South Africa’s corporate expansion towards an “SA Inc.” approach in Africa.’ In Foreign Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Security, Diplomacy, and Trade, edited by A. Adebajo and K. Virk. London: I. B. Tauris. https://doi. org/10.5040/9781350986480.ch-005. 7 dtic (Department of Trade, Industry and Competition). 2020. [Trade statistics.] http:// tradestats.thedti.gov.za/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx (Accessed 4 February 2021). 8 dtic, [Trade statistics]. 9 See individual country profile pages at UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development). 2020. ‘Country Profile.’ UNCTADSTAT. https://unctadstat.unctad.org/ countryprofile/en-gb/index.html (Accessed 4 February 2021). 10 dtic, [Trade statistics]. 11 The Economist. 2017. ‘Between rocks and hard places: Botswana feels the South African pinch.’ 14 January. https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/01/14/ botswana-feels-the-south-african-pinch (Accessed 4 February 2021). 12 Interview by the author with Rob Davies, South African Minister of Trade and Industry. 21 February 2017, Chatham House. 13 Africa Report. 2022. ‘Top 500 Companies in Africa.’ No. 119, April–May–June 2022. Paris: Africa Report.

270

14 Liesl Louw-Vaudran recounts an interview with a business consultant who likened these pioneers to the Voortrekkers: Louw-Vaudran, L. 2016. South Africa in Africa: Super Power or Neocolonialist. Cape Town: Tafelberg, p. 137. She further elaborates on the reputational damage that white South Africans have inflicted through their treatment of citizens of other African countries following their post-1994 exodus to the continent.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 270

2022/11/10 00:03

16 For example, Nedbank tailored its Africa strategy to each region. In SADC and East Africa, the bank sought ownership, management, and control of banks, expanding its presence to banks in five countries and two representative offices in Kenya and Angola. In Central and West Africa, it adopted a partnership model, acquiring a shareholding of 21 per cent in Ecobank in 2014. 17 SAPP (Southern African Power Pool). 2018. Southern African Power Pool Annual Report 2018. Harare: SAPP. http://www.sapp.co.zw/sites/default/files/30955_Sapp%20 Annual%20Report%202018.pdf (Accessed 21 October 2020). 18 Maqhina, M. 2019. ‘African power utilities owe Eskom more than R600m in outstanding payments.’ IOL, 7 November. https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/african-powerutilities-owe-eskom-more-than-r600m-in-outstanding-payments-36815087 (Accessed 21 October 2020). 19 IOL. 2020. ‘Eskom debt increases to R488Bn. 3 September. https://www. i ol .c o. z a / n e ws / p ol it ic s /e s k om - d e b t -i n c r e a s e s - t o -r48 8bn - 4 d e 610 3f-76 0 9 42ab -8925-5240492d06a7#:~:t ext=Power %20uti lit y %20Esk om%20t old%20 Parliament,towards%20principal%20debt%20and%20R39 (Accessed 21 October 2020). 20 Stephan, H. 2006. The Scramble for Africa in the 21st Century: A View from the South. Cape Town: Renaissance Press.

SOUTH AFRICA’S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA

15 Siko, J. 2014. Inside South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Diplomacy in Africa from Smuts to Mbeki. London: I. B. Tauris, p. 158. https://doi.org/10.5040/9780755619221.

21 Rajagopaul, A., Magwentshu, N. and Kalidas, S. 2020. ‘How South African SMEs can survive and thrive post COVID-19.’ McKinsey and Company, July 2020. https://www. mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Middle%20East%20and%20 Africa/How%20South%20African%20SMEs%20can%20survive%20and%20thrive%20 post%20COV ID%2019/How-South-A frican-SMEs-can-sur vive-and-thrive-postCOVID-19.pdf (Accessed 21 October 2020). 22 Habib, A. and Selinyane, N. 2006. ‘Constraining the unconstrained: Civil society and South Africa’s hegemonic obligations in Africa.’ In In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy After Apartheid, edited by W. Carlsnaes and P. Nel. Midrand: IGD. 23 Hamill, J. 2018. Africa’s Lost Leader: South Africa’s Continental Roles Since Apartheid. Abingdon: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429260933. 24 Rana, K. 2017. ‘Economic diplomacy: The experience of developing countries.’ In The New Economic Diplomacy, 4th edition, edited by N. Bayne and S. Woolcock. Abingdon: Routledge, p. 207. 25 Confidential interview with official from Department for International Relations and Cooperation. November 2019, Pretoria. 26 Bayne, N. and Woolcock, S. 2017. ‘What is economic diplomacy?’ In The New Economic Diplomacy, 4th edition, edited by N. Bayne and S. Woolcock. Abingdon: Routledge, p. 1. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315555188; Rana, ‘Economic diplomacy’, p. 207. 27 Bayne and Woolcock, ‘What is economic diplomacy?’, p. 4. 28 Grant Makokera, C. 2015. ‘South African economic diplomacy: Engaging the private sector and parastatals.’ Institute for Security Studies Paper 280. February 2015. https://issafrica.org/research/papers/south-african-economic-diplomacy-engaging-theprivate-sector-and-parastatals (Accessed 10 June 2022); Vickers, B. and Ajulu, C. 2008. ‘South Africa’s economic diplomacy: Trade and investment promotion.’ IGD. Report prepared for the Presidency, March. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?do i=10.1.1.483.7513&rep=rep1&type=pdf (Accessed 21 October 2020).

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 271

271

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 13

29 Muller, M. 2002. ‘South Africa’s economic diplomacy: Constructing a better world for all?’ Statecraft and Diplomacy 13(1): 1–30, p. 23. https://doi.org/10.1080/714000304. 30 Siko, Inside South Africa’s Foreign Policy, p. 245. 31 Qobo, M. 2010. ‘Refocusing South Africa’s economic diplomacy: The “African Agenda” and emerging powers.’ South African Journal of International Affairs 17(1): 13–28, p. 14. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461003763833. 32 DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation). 2011. Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy. Pretoria: DIRCO, p. 28. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/ foreignpolicy0.pdf (Accessed 21 October 2020). 33 DTI (Department of Trade and Industry). 2010. A South African Trade Policy and Strategy Framework. Pretoria: DTI, p. 24. 34 The strategy was published after the 2008 financial crisis and recognises that the global crisis highlighted South Africa’s economic vulnerability to external shocks. It also warned that the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union (EU) and SADC countries could undermine regional integration by establishing a series of different and sometimes incompatible trade regimes between the EU and members of SADC, thus requiring a more stringent approach to regional integration. 35 Allison, S. 2016. ‘Think again: Peeking behind South Africa’s diplomatic curtain.’ ISS Today, 20 October. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/think-again-peeking-behind-southafricas-diplomatic-curtain (Accessed 21 October 2020). 36 PMG (Parliamentary Monitoring Group). 2012. ‘SA strategy in driving economic diplomacy: Department of International Relations & Cooperation briefing.’ 19 September. https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/14911/ (Accessed 12 May 2022). 37 NPC (National Planning Commission). 2012. National Development Plan 2030: Our Future – Make It Work. Pretoria: The Presidency. https://www.gov.za/documents/ national-development-plan-2030-our-future-make-it-work (Accessed 12 May 2022). 38 NPC, National Development Plan 2030, p. 241. 39 Louw-Vaudran, South Africa in Africa. 40 DIRCO. 2015. ‘AU Agenda 2063: Voices of the African People – A call to action.’ October. Pretoria: DIRCO. http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/agenda2063/au_agenda_2063_ report.pdf (Accessed 21 October 2020). 41 Nkoana-Mashabane, M. 2016. ‘Our foreign policy: Moving SA forward through diplomacy.’ City Press, 21 December. https://www.news24.com/citypress/Voices/our-foreignpolicy-moving-sa-forward-through-diplomacy-20161221-2 (Accessed 12 May 2022). 42 DIRCO. 2019. ‘Media briefing on the Ministerial Panel Report.’ Foreign Policy Review, 17 April, p. 11. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2019/foreign_policy_review_report0417. pdf (Accessed 21 October 2020). 43 Ramaphosa, C. 2019. ‘State of the Nation Address 2019.’ The Presidency, 20 June. https://www.gov.za/sona2019 (Accessed 21 October 2020). 44 Pandor, N. 2019. ‘Minister Naledi Pandor: Media briefing on International Relations and Cooperation Dept Budget Vote 2019/20.’ 11 July. https://www.gov.za/speeches/mediastatement-dr-naledi-pandor-11-jul-2019-0000 (Accessed 21 October 2020). 45 SABC. 2018. ‘Ramaphosa appoints four special envoys on investment.’ 16 April. https:// www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/ramaphosa-appoints-four-special-envoys-investment/ (Accessed 21 October 2020).

272

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 272

2022/11/10 00:03

47 Qobo, M. 2018. ‘A new era for South Africa’s foreign policy.’ Daily Maverick, 13 March. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-03-13-a-new-era-for-south-africasforeign-policy/ (Accessed 21 October 2020). 48 Ramaphosa, C. 2019 ‘Address by President Cyril Ramaphosa at the Joint Sitting of Parliament on the crisis of violence in South Africa, National Assembly, Cape Town.’ The Presidency, 18 September 2018. https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/addresspresident-cyril-ramaphosa-joint-sitting-parliament-crisis-violence-south-africa%2C (Accessed 30 May 2022). 49 Pretoria exerted pressure on regional states to support the election of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as the chairperson of the AU Commission, going against the unwritten agreement that no major continental power would do so. This particularly annoyed the Nigerians, and caused lasting damage to South Africa’s continental relations.

SOUTH AFRICA’S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA

46 Presidency of the Republic of South Africa. 2019. ‘President appoints Economic Advisory Council.’ 27 September. http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/ president-appoints-economic-advisory-council (Accessed 21 October 2020). Examples include Vusi Gumede, a former chief policy analyst in the Mbeki administration, and Alan Hirsch, who had worked on economic policy in the Presidency. The council also included senior private sector figures. Although the mandate of the advisory council was unclear, its membership indicated that a policy revival of Mbeki-era internationalism was perhaps on the cards.

50 AU (African Union). 2018. ‘Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area.’ Addis Ababa: AU Commission. Article 3(a). https://www.tralac.org/documents/ resources/cfta/1963-agreement-establishing-the-afcfta-consolidated-text-signed-21march-2018/file.html (Accessed 21 October 2020). 51 The agreement came into force on 30 May 2019 for the 24 countries that had deposited their instruments of ratification, and the operational phases were launched in Niamey, Niger, on 7 July 2019. However, the target for countries to commence trading under the AfCFTA by July 2020 was postponed due to the Covid-19 pandemic. 52 The Economist. 2018. ‘Why Africa’s two biggest economies did not sign its landmark trade deal.’ 29 March. https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/03/29/ why-africas-two-biggest-economies-did-not-sign-its-landmark-trade-deal (Accessed 21 October 2020). 53 Fabricius, P. 2020. ‘Africa’s free trade agreement gets locked down for the year.’ Daily Maverick, 24 April. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-04-24-africas-freetrade-agreement-gets-locked-down-for-the-year/ (Accessed 21 October 2020). 54 Saunders, C. and Nagar, D. 2018. ‘South Africa and the Southern African Development Community.’ In Foreign Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Security, Diplomacy, and Trade, edited by A. Adebajo and K. Virk. London: I. B. Tauris, p. 267. https://doi. org/10.5040/9781350986480.ch-011. 55 Nkhonjera, M. and Roberts, S. 2020. ‘Regional integration and industrial development in southern Africa: Where does South Africa stand?’ In Values, Interests and Power: South African Foreign Policy in Uncertain Times, edited by D. Bradlow and E. Sidiropoulos. Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, p. 152. 56 Confidential interview with anonymous senior business leader. January 2020, London. 57 Nkhonjera and Roberts, ‘Regional integration and industrial development’, p. 152. 58 It is also worth noting that the views from within South Africa were not unified, as Minister Lindiwe Zulu spoke publicly in favour of protectionism and the import ban.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 273

273

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 13

59 Saunders and Nagar, ‘South Africa and the SADC’, p. 259. 60 Confidential interview with official from the DTI. February 2017, London. 61 By 2008, Zimbabwe’s GDP was a little over half what it had been in 1998, having fallen from US$12.1 billion to US$6.7 billion. Over the same period, Zambia grew from US$3.5 billion to US$17.9 billion, and the overall mainland SADC economy grew from US$209 billion to US$480 billion. If Zimbabwe had achieved the regional average of 5 per cent growth, the mainland SADC economy would have been almost 3 per cent larger by 2008, without even accounting for multiplier effects from cross-border trade and investment. 62 Fabricius, P. 2019. ‘Mboweni: South Africa plans to help bail out Zimbabwe.’ Daily Maverick, 21 January. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-01-21-mbowenisouth-africa-plans-to-help-bail-out-zimbabwe/ (Accessed 21 October 2020). 63 Ramaphosa subsequently called for lifting of sanctions in 2020, but in a very different context during the Covid-19 pandemic. 64 Louw-Vaudran, South Africa in Africa, p. 157. 65 Louw-Vaudran, South Africa in Africa. 66 Louw-Vaudran, South Africa in Africa, p. 158. 67 Fabricius, P. 2020. ‘SA advised to cancel its commitment to giant DRC hydroelectric power project, says new report.’ Daily Maverick, 20 March. https://www.dailymaverick. co.za/ar ticle/2020- 03-20-sa-advised-to-cancel-its-commitment-to-giant-drchydroelectric-power-project-says-new-report/ (Accessed 21 October 2020). 68 Congo Research Group and Resource Matters. 2019. ‘Inga III: Kept in the Dark – How the world’s largest hydro-power site is being negotiated behind closed doors.’ October 2019. https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/GEC_ResourceMatters_Inga-III_EN_final-2.pdf (Accessed 30 May 2022). 69 Du Plessis, C. 2019. ‘Ramaphosa acts to smooth relations with Botswana after Bridgette Radebe controversy.’ Daily Maverick, 21 April. https://www.dailymaverick. co.za/article/2019-04-21-ramaphosa-acts-to-smooth-relations-with-botswana-afterbridgette-radebe-controversy/ (Accessed 21 October 2020). 70 Omarjee, L. 2019. ‘Radebe: We are pursuing an oil deal with South Sudan and it’s all above board.’ Fin24, 28 March. https://www.fin24.com/Economy/radebe-we-arepursuing-an-oil-deal-with-south-sudan-and-its-all-above-board-20190328 (Accessed 21 October 2020). 71 Nagar, D. and Paterson, M. 2012. ‘Nigeria/South Africa economic relations.’ In ‘The Eagle and the Springbok: Strengthening the Nigeria/South Africa Relationship.’ Centre for Conflict Resolution policy brief, by D. Nagar and M. Paterson, 20 August. 72 Resource Trade Earth. 2020. [Statistics]. https://resourcetrade.earth/?year=2018&expo rter=24&importer=710&units=value&autozoom=1 (Accessed 4 February 2021). 73 The Angolan government felt that the ANC under-appreciated their role in fighting apartheid, and Dos Santos was annoyed by Mbeki’s efforts to foster a peace agreement in Angola. In turn, Mbeki was alarmed by Angola’s support for Laurent Kabila’s attempt to overthrow Mobutu Sese Seko in the DRC. 74 dtic, [Trade statistics]. 75 South African Government News Agency. 2019. ‘SA, Angola work to strengthen trade relations.’ 11 September. https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sa-angola-workstrengthen-trade-relations (Accessed 21 October 2020).

274

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 274

2022/11/10 00:03

Arina Muresan

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 14

South African Engagement in Club Governance: A Boon for Economic Diplomacy

Thus far, President Cyril Ramaphosa’s term has been contextualised by various crises. The exposure of and fall-out from mass corruption linked to the Zuma administration’s patronage and kleptocracy, referred to as ‘state capture’, have emphasised the need to urgently re-craft an image of South Africa as a trusted investment destination and to attract new capital to address financial woes. In early 2018, kleptocracy and state capture had reached its peak, and as Jacob Zuma resigned on 14 February, damage control to the image of South Africa and the ruling ANC took precedence. Against this backdrop, Ramaphosa was seen to be South Africa’s last hope of reinvigorating investor confidence by curbing public spending, implementing fiscal reforms, and re-establishing a healthy state-owned enterprise (SOE) environment. The South African economy was entering into a technical recession and investor confidence was wavering, with Standard & Poor’s downgrading South Africa to junk status in 2019, and Moody’s following suit in 2020 during South Africa’s nationwide lockdown to combat the spread of Covid-19. South Africa’s economic outlook faces numerous challenges for the remainder of Ramaphosa’s first term, with a projected GDP annual growth rate of 1.94 per cent in 2022, anticipated growth of 1.4 per cent in 2023 and 2024,1 and an anticipated increase in unemployment and government debtto-GDP ratio given additional Covid-19 relief loans. When Ramaphosa took over in 2018, many South Africans and world leaders hoped that his business acumen would save the country before it entered ‘business rescue’ status and reinvigorate the ethical ideals that South Africa had espoused.2 Ramaphosa’s State of the Nation Addresses (SONAs) have focused on economic development and diplomacy in an effort to revive an economy under severe pressure. The first annual investment conference pledged to generate R1.2 trillion over five years; the remainder of 2018 recorded an inflow of R70  billion.3 The 2019 SONA again placed importance on bringing international investment to South African businesses to improve the economic climate; at that point Ramaphosa anticipated R300 billion to contribute to South Africa’s economic growth.4 The February 2020 SONA, coming just before the Covid-19 pandemic hit

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 275

275

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 14

South Africa, contained promises that the state would hunker down and actively link Ramaphosa’s presidency to infrastructure as a key driver, complemented by private sector and other investment.5 The following SONA, held in 2021, reiterated these plans and emphasised the potential of small, medium, and micro-enterprises (SMMEs) to fit within larger investment value chains, and stated that R183 billion had flowed into South Africa from previous pledged amounts.6 In this context, economic diplomacy has been a pivotal tool during Ramaphosa’s tenure as president. Ministries supporting South Africa’s foreign affairs actors – including the executive leadership such as the president, the deputy president, and Cabinet ministers; the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO); the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (dtic) (formerly the DTI); and National Treasury, to name a few – play a pivotal role in reaffirming confidence in South Africa as a capable international partner. While global trends show a growing preference among right-wing actors for a more inward-looking agenda, multilateralism and international institutions are under immense pressure and sensitive to intricacies of economic interdependence in the global economic and financial regime. South Africa’s capacity to act is hampered by severely overstretched resources, especially as its nostalgic international image as a poster child for achieving peaceful democratic change despite immense political tensions is coming into question.7 Yet South Africa’s foreign policy continues to engage clubs that could unlock lobbying potential to improve the country’s economic conditions. However, there is a concern that South Africa has too many commitments that do not resonate on a practical level with its domestic needs.8 This chapter explores the role of ‘clubs’ as part of the economic diplomacy solution in South Africa’s vision. It questions whether clubs are providing more opportunities in terms of meeting foreign policy objectives than engagement in the larger multilateral platforms. This chapter discusses club governance as an analytical framework, and engages in a desktop analysis of sources that explain South Africa’s commitment to international clubs and multilateralism. The discussion explores South Africa’s role in managing domestic and international expectations on platforms such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) partnership, initially grouped together as the world’s fastest growing emerging markets,9 and the Group of 20 (G20), consisting of the world’s leading economies and established in 2008 to deal with the financial crisis. Further, the chapter investigates how South Africa has engaged its club status on broader economic and commercial platforms, such as the World Economic Forum (WEF), during Ramaphosa’s tenure since 2018.

276

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 276

2022/11/10 00:03

Club governance, not to be confused with the classical definition of ‘club diplomacy’, which is a subset of global governance, borrows a number of norms and practices from the multilateral institutions that have defined global governance. It may materialise as a formalised association, forum, grouping, or partnership that may not have a secretariat but that provides a platform for recognised discussions. Diplomacy used to be limited to a select or elite group of practitioners. While the parameters of diplomacy in practice have changed to be more inclusive of power sharing among actors and methods of engaging diplomatically,10 the exclusivity of a club can still play a vital role. Countries pursue their interests in a form of minilateralism, and while norm nurturing and norm building play a role in the narrative, this hybrid form of diplomacy sidesteps the conundrums of ideological and foreign policy values versus pragmatic gains. The politics of exclusion in diplomatic history have been a common practice throughout history.11 According to Kemp Spies,12 diplomacy in general is perceived to preserve and disseminate foundational values of institutions, promote universal values over arbitrary state interests, play a mitigating role, and entrench intrinsic pacifism, which is based on the idea of reciprocity among actors. These values are still very much vested in the legitimacy of formal authorities or governments. Club governance has gained more prominence because of the growing ambiguity of multilateralism and the impact of great-power politics on the deliberations of international institutions in favour of national strategies and regional geopolitics.13 Handy explains that the concept of club governance emerged in the 1970s as a response to global change, the changing nature of diplomacy, and the inability of multilateral institutions to react or mobilise fast enough. However, participation has been limited to the ‘strongest’ or those

SOUTH AFRICAN ENGAGEMENT IN CLUB GOVERNANCE: A BOON FOR ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF CLUBS AND THE ROLE OF EMERGING POWERS IN CURRENT ECONOMIC REALITIES

with the most ‘promise or potential’ based on diplomatic and economic influence in their respective region and the world. In the African context, the expectation is that because there are fewer actors in the mini-lateral environment, this should allow African actors to develop institutional diplomatic competencies that lead to success in achieving African agency in decision-making and implementation while instilling merit and discipline.14 Tsingou describes clubs in the international economic system that express and pre-empt interests collectively in a macro system, and that are lobbied by specialised and transnational actors, which further drives the reputation

277

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 277

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 14

of the club. However, the exclusive nature of the practices of clubs leads outsiders to question their legitimacy:15 ■

Clubs feed into the discourse of international elitism, where elites are self-selected and limited to similar categories.

■

Clubs pursue the material interests of their members, who capture the process of knowledge creation within the club’s epistemic community.

■

Policy supported by ‘specialised’ actors is replicated and limited in its capacity to achieve reform.

■

Although the club may be based on reciprocity, power asymmetries still exist. This gives club governance an image of exclusivity based on belonging and contributing to clubs that are considered legitimate.

In a prevailing context of global power asymmetries, clubs are useful because they can be norm developers and drivers. It is pragmatic for foreign affairs actors to be in a space where these conversations are held. If clubs are indeed instrumental in impacting global discourses, this would dovetail strategically with South Africa’s niche role of ‘bridge-builder’, and the country may find further expression for its national objectives. Therefore, access to clubs is useful, and although a club does not have the authority to make binding international decisions, it has a different use in promoting multilateralism, namely bringing thematic issues to official platforms and guiding conversations through normative responses. As a middle power,16 South Africa endeavours to push for more reform of distribution of power in the world, regions, and clubs. This becomes ever more important as the dynamics of the Covid-19 pandemic and the subsequent fall-out may shift power dynamics further, and tiered relationships of hegemonic paradigms from the twenty-first century may not be fit for purpose. While it is unclear what a post-Covid-19 reality will look like, the role of clubs in this environment may prove to be invaluable. President Ramaphosa’s Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan is oriented towards mobilising local industry for infrastructure development in its Covid-19 recovery future. In this recovery, trade policy will continue to factor in industrial development.17

WHERE DO MINI-LATERALISM AND CLUB GOVERNANCE FIT IN SOUTH AFRICA’S ECONOMIC AGENDA? South Africa defines its role in multilateral environments as that of a bridgebuilder,18 which positions South Africa as both a middle and emerging power 278

in terms of its niche contributions to the international arena in clubs (also

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 278

2022/11/10 00:03

the White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy of 2011, and the subsequent Foreign Service Act 26 of 2019 action South Africa towards economic diplomacy as one of the pivotal tools for achieving national objectives, specifically those that relate to improving its socio-economic outlook. South Africa’s vision, according to the NDP, is a synergised government and workforce that can incorporate all persons effectively and guide them to contribute towards a robust country, while taking into account the complex challenges of present-day South Africa. Foreign policy is inextricably linked to this vision, and the notion of serving both roles (as middle and emerging power) is further highlighted, but the need to develop as an emerging power is emphasised more strongly in the NDP. Chapter 7, titled ‘Positioning South Africa in the world’, recommends nurturing South Africa’s potential to exert its influence to achieve its national objectives by linking them to economic diplomacy that can be used actively in respective clubs. More specifically: how can South Africa employ assets more strategically, professionalise the foreign service, create conditions for a stronger relationships with the private sector, champion trade and investment, streamline border policy, promote synergy with other national departments and institutions that engage in foreign policy, and strengthen human security?19 In support of this, throughout his presidency Ramaphosa has echoed the urgent priority of addressing the bleak economic outlook. Efforts to this end have been amplified through the use of partnerships to prioritise economic diplomacy and have benefited from strategic support through the newly appointed Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC) (also see Chapter 13 in this volume). The Council consists mostly of academics who have expressed critical opinions of South Africa’s ruling party and its economic and foreign policy, but who also have experience representing South Africa at the WEF, G20, or BRICS through multi-track diplomacy.20 After Thabo Mbeki’s Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS) was disbanded

SOUTH AFRICAN ENGAGEMENT IN CLUB GOVERNANCE: A BOON FOR ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

see Chapter 16 in this volume). The National Development Plan (NDP) of 2012,

by the Zuma administration,21 the renewed interest in incorporating presidential advisors in critical policy debates signalled a commitment to finding inclusive solutions that underscore the need for socio-economic structural change and the demand for international reform, while also remaining committed to an international neoliberal order. The sustained inclusion of additional non-governmental actors, such as academics or researchers, businesspeople, and civil society actors through multi-track diplomacy on these various platforms contributes to additional feedback and is a trust-building exercise designed to strengthen cooperation between government and non-government actors. In terms of the White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy and the Foreign Service Act, submitted and implemented by DIRCO, the wording

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 279

279

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 14

surrounding the department’s role supports a great degree of flexibility in achieving its foreign policy goals in this regard. What is interesting is how the White Paper describes South Africa’s intentions as a middle and emerging power, specifically regarding multilateralism – to strengthen and lead the multilateral system in resolving common challenges while ensuring transformation to create more support for diverse voices.22 DIRCO’s role is also to pursue and nurture, on behalf of the South African state, such opportunities as are considered fundamental building blocks for other economic diplomacy activities, like trade. Clubs like the G20, the Major Economies Forum (MEF), the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) bloc, the IBSA (India–Brazil–South Africa) Dialogue Forum, and BRICS are more dynamic mechanisms and platforms, but they cannot replace existing multilateral institutions and further promote South African aspirations. The dtic, another key contributor to South African economic diplomacy on international platforms, also contributes content and logistical assistance, as well as interdepartmental cooperation through training.23 The economic diplomacy strategy is further laid out in the South African Trade Policy and Strategy Framework of 2010,24 and the White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy expresses that these endeavours are geared towards its domestic objectives; however, neither of these documents explain how departments will work, inter alia, to ensure that an economic diplomacy strategy directly benefits all South Africans. The success of this strategy can generally be gauged by ‘external economic management, policy management, the role of non-state actors, recipients and donors of economic aid, investment promotion and regional diplomacy’.25 South Africa has been clear in determining policy provisions (as noted in the White Paper on Foreign Policy, the NDP, and the South African Trade Policy and Strategy Framework), namely including more non-state actors (the change in diplomacy to include academia, business, and civil society in summits and side activities), increasing investment and trade promotion (publicly attended investment expos or roadshows), and disclosing certain diplomatic activities (such as summits and meetings). In practising South African economic diplomacy, the business community should play a significant role in drawing a practical link between South Africa’s economic diplomacy agenda and club engagement in order to promote national interests. However, this engagement is currently structured according to issues and in an ad hoc manner. There is room to streamline this interface, which would positively impact on how information is exchanged, create regular opportunities for government policies to be monitored and evaluated, and ensure more policy certainty and trust between government, non-government actors, and external partners.26

280

South Africa’s businesses are mostly categorised as small businesses and

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 280

2022/11/10 00:03

business environment is oriented towards foreign policy is skewed. There is an urgent need to fully incorporate a labour base, while business structures need to be more organised and prepared with an international relations strategy in order to respond on a broad policy level and engage to their fullest potential in economic diplomacy.27 South African SOEs can be key in launching positive relationships between the state and business, because of established economic diplomacy strategies and partnerships in Africa and abroad that have been successful in linking state interests and business profit in an international strategy.28 However, their current state and the extent of mismanagement discredit these achievements. The policy environment exists for South Africa to mobilise its international partnerships for economic gains; however, there may a gap in its ability to groom its implementors of economic diplomacy, which is the business sector.29 This, coupled with South Africa’s aspirations of playing a bridge-building role and contributing to normative debates, may be creating an environment where it fails to achieve a balance between bringing home pragmatic economic gains and representing an African agenda. The following section will explore South Africa’s club engagements through economic diplomacy activities across the G20 and BRICS platforms and investigate whether closer relationships with club members can be further engaged on in larger platforms like the WEF.

SOUTH AFRICA’S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN CLUB GOVERNANCE Actualising national objectives is linked to South Africa’s narrative as an earnest bridge-builder among international partners.30 Its ability to operate within the global normative framework and link countries together in a common understanding has been a point of modality since its re-entry

SOUTH AFRICAN ENGAGEMENT IN CLUB GOVERNANCE: A BOON FOR ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

thus cannot compete on an international level – yet. The extent to which the

into the international system in the post-apartheid era. However, scholars have pointed out that the link between big politics and actualising national objectives is not clear and, further, that there are separate narratives. Critics point out that South Africa, as a middle power, does not have the capability to drive policy reform to support a country in dire need of structural change and that, at the end of the day, South Africa has crafted a role for itself to manage crises with ‘difficult’ partners based on the needs of the developed world, and so some countries may see South Africa as a political and economic gateway to Africa.31 However, when middle and emerging powers are recognised in such environments, they use multilateralism in order to better achieve priorities. The G20, IBSA, and BRICS are noteworthy examples of clubs that are key

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 281

281

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 14

to South Africa communicating its economic diplomacy and commitment to Africa, as its membership comes with the understanding that South Africa links club members to African issues and engagements. There is a need to better link South Africa’s engagement in clubs, how actively economic diplomacy is pursued, how it can be utilised to impact South Africa’s national priorities – especially during a time of economic crisis – and what kind of relevance membership will bring to South Africa’s engagement if there are few evident material linkages to its domestic priorities. South Africa’s positioning in this regard is viewed as a strategic opportunity to specifically advocate the development and growth of Africa and Africans, so recognition as an emerging power from Africa on such platforms is key.32 Are clubs providing more opportunities in terms of meeting foreign policy objectives?

THE G20, THE AFRICA ADVISORY GROUP, AND THE COMPACT WITH AFRICA The G20 finds itself in a geo-economic reality that now (more than ever) requires that systemic issues be addressed.33 As a club, the G20 enjoys a high degree of exclusivity, and the opportunity to be included as a member is of strategic importance to South Africa in terms of accessing opportunities to address national priorities, maintain the status quo in favour of the multilateral norms established, and also promote reform. A prevailing issue is that the G20 is self-appointed, an issue that carries an amount of resentment, and South Africa – the only African country to have membership – is by no means the largest African economy or sole representative of African interests globally.34 South Africa acknowledges the sensitivities around this position and mitigates this through wider consultation with African stakeholders.35 Another consistent critique is that South Africa is punching above its weight given its middle-power status. However, the G20 fits within South Africa’s economic diplomacy strategy, which is supported through its use of multilateral and existing financial institutions, and further links back to South Africa’s African Agenda.36 Moreover, in the era of Covid-19 a structure like the G20 is already oriented towards dealing with economic crises. The G20 may be considered the most illustrious of global clubs, and as 11 of the 20 members (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey) are middle and/or emerging powers, it shows that there is an opportunity for greater diffusion even if the structure remains elitist. The G20 process is a larger club and South Africa has learnt from the process, while continuously bringing in the African Agenda. For example, at the 2018 G20 Summit in Argentina, South Africa emphasised its commitment to strengthening 282

multilateralism, the rule of international law, sustainable development,

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 282

2022/11/10 00:03

the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).37 And at the 2019 Summit in Osaka, Japan, President Ramaphosa specifically sought support for the Compact with Africa (CwA) agenda in order to secure financial support for infrastructure development in Africa. As chair of the African Union (AU) and NEPAD president, he convened the standing trilateral meeting of African Leaders with Egypt and Senegal, on African priorities.38 In terms of trade, South Africa’s engagement as a middle and emerging power has contributed to strengthening the multilateral system and nurturing bilateral relationships that address national priorities. Trade and investment are the highest priority for cooperation; however, a challenge emerges related to the scale of South African businesses, as large businesses in South Africa can be compared to medium or even small businesses among G20 partners. This directly impacts existing trade agreements in terms of what is viable to produce and sell to G20 markets, and it can be an opportunity to make businesses aware of the challenges and to design policy geared towards developing business for a competitive scale. Trade discussions with the G20 have been dominated by the trade war between China and the USA.39 Therefore, South Africa needs to manage its expectations in the context of growing protectionist behaviour by stronger powers, like the USA and the UK, that threatens the spirit of multilateral consensus and the purpose of the G20. While Ramaphosa’s initiatives have included the active pursuit of investment, the G20 summits are more about how to manage leadership in this international context rather than having a direct impact through the various working groups. Finance ministers have met on the sidelines of the G20 summits to discuss the impact of the impasse on World Trade Organization (WTO) appointments and the implications for international trade norms. While South Africa’s inputs may not be a deciding factor in global trade norms, it is in its best interest to be part of this discussion and

SOUTH AFRICAN ENGAGEMENT IN CLUB GOVERNANCE: A BOON FOR ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

and the peace and security agenda thanks to its non-permanent seat at

promote the multilateral potential for smaller economies, including itself. South Africa’s engagement in the G20 complements its bilateral relationships. In 2018, Ramaphosa’s delegation to Buenos Aires sought to use the G20 to ‘promote and strengthen interests of the African continent and of the South’.40 This was further emphasised in 2019 at the G20 trade ministers’ meeting in Tokyo, where South Africa’s expectations were that the platform would be an opportunity for constructive dialogue, specifically linking its economic performance to trade.41 While the Covid-19 pandemic has forced actors to be more urgent in addressing the health and economic crisis, South African Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition Ebrahim Patel re-emphasised compatibility for South Africa’s strategic sectors in 283

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 283

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 14

the context of global trade and recovery.42 South Africa’s bilateral trade relationships have benefited from closer diplomatic relations, but South Africa’s imports still outweigh its exports, which presents an opportunity to address national priorities of generating more employment and development through export opportunities. In terms of furthering development through the G20 partnership, the formal G20 Finance Track initiative is co-chaired by South Africa and Germany through the Africa Advisory Group. It falls under the CwA, which is coordinated by the African Development Bank (AfDB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank Group, and has the potential to engage the public sector actively in securing investment partners in Africa.43 The CwA, an initiative started during Germany’s chairmanship of the G20 in 2017, was created to attract investment based on African countries’ own reform agendas, and specifically focuses on private sector investment and technical assistance. To date, 12 countries have joined the CwA: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, and Tunisia. However, what is needed is a more holistic approach to investment that incorporates soft infrastructures like educational and vocational projects.44 Moreover, the compact does not necessarily take into account country-specific challenges, heightened by the securities structure, in equity and bonds, of the financing model that the CwA follows; the impact on public pensions and non-profit cooperatives; and those SMMEs that cannot qualify for benefits from the CwA. It seems as if the partnership is skewed in favour of the private sector and does not promote reform in how partnerships are structured.45 South Africa’s co-leadership role in this has been to encourage and facilitate dialogue between countries where requested. Part of this bridge-building happened through South Africa’s initiative to host the African Investment Forum in 2018, which brought together financial institutions like the AfDB Group, the Africa 50 Infrastructure Fund, the African Export–Import Bank, the European Investment Bank, the Africa Finance Corporation, the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank. The forum generated US$67.7 billion in tabled investments and US$46.9 billion in investor interest secured,46 and dovetailed with other WEF and BRICS initiatives for investment. Part of South Africa’s challenge is to change the perception of Africa while attempting to secure investment; however, investment alone does not reform the underlying perception of Africa, and the CwA remains an initiative that attempts to reform African finance and governance from the outside in, without asking Africans how to approach development issues.47

284

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 284

2022/11/10 00:03

in South Africa’s favour. While South Africa contributes to working groups and the multi-track diplomatic landscape on key issues, it is not easy to quantify South Africa’s engagement in the G20. It is possible that its role as reformer is limited to narrative in a bid to slowly improve conditions in Africa through the encouragement of further investment and the construction of infrastructure. With the resources of a middle power, South Africa is not able to both effectively promote pragmatic economic gains in increasing trade volumes and represent Africa on the G20. There is scope for change that could be led by South Africa; however, it attempts to champion too much as the sole African representative in the group. Whereas other African countries are only granted observer status, it bears the additional bureaucratic responsibility of annual ministerial and technical meetings. One of the more interesting issues taken up by Ramaphosa at the 2020 G20 Summit in Riyadh was the impact of illicit financial flows and capital flight as a major impediment to development in Africa. According to a 2020 report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on illicit financial flows, the volume of African wealth leaving the continent amounted to an average of US$88.6 billion, or 3.7 per cent of Africa’s GDP, an amount which could contribute immensely to closing the financing gap for Covid-19 relief and recovery.48 In addition, a report on trade misinvoicing, commissioned and tabled at the G20 Development Working Group,49 can also complement the G20’s efforts on African development by drawing attention to who should bear more responsibility in determining the correct value of African commodities, products, or services. Looking to 2021 and beyond, the Italian presidency continued work on illicit financial flows. While this has been a significant cooperative achievement for the G20, and one which South Africa advocated, there was an expectation that South Africa would be a stronger advocate for the negative impact on African debt. The Debt

SOUTH AFRICAN ENGAGEMENT IN CLUB GOVERNANCE: A BOON FOR ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

It is difficult to determine to what extent power in the G20 has been diffused

Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), which allowed up to 73 low-income countries to reschedule their debt, is a welcome development, provided that these countries are able to orient their governance towards Covid-19 relief.50 With Zambia’s 2020 default on its Eurobonds debt, a restructuring of debt would be more in Africa’s favour.51

THE BRICS GROUP AND THE BRICS NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK BRICS can be considered a club due to its exclusive, invitation-only membership. In 2009, the first BRIC summit, in Yekaterinburg, showed that the countries involved recognised the utility of emerging powers coming together to work towards their own vision of a global economy

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 285

285

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 14

while pragmatically improving their material gains through a strategic partnership. And South Africa’s inclusion in BRICS in 2010 has been strategic to promoting its emerging middle-power status in the world, and even more so its lobbying aimed at being identified as ‘a regional powerhouse with global ambitions’.52 The BRICS group is not immune to power asymmetry dynamics, and in terms of material capabilities South Africa is the weakest, but it provides an interesting bridge to Africa. The alliance does not have a secretariat, as the chair revolves annually, and the partnership is fundamentally based on promoting economic growth and stability while maintaining an equal respect for members of the club. The BRICS countries, who are members of the G20 and UN, can be considered disruptors to global geopolitics due to their emerging power potential. The criticism that BRICS is an anti-Western establishment, due to China’s and Russia’s perspectives on historical structural power and their growing global footprint and stature,53 has made South Africa’s traditional partners wary of its membership of BRICS. There is a perception that South Africa will be more aligned to BRICS partners (specifically China and Russia) due to its close political, economic, and anti-apartheid struggle ties to these countries.54 And amidst China–USA or Russia–Europe tensions in the G20,55 there may be concerns about potential coalitions forming within a group that already engages on a mini-lateral scale. South Africa has had to carefully manage perceptions of its membership of BRICS. It considers BRICS as a formation with immense potential to bring change to the global political arena and general economic outlook. But it is important to remember that the BRICS countries are still pragmatic actors and that they have bilateral and competing interests. It was anticipated that South Africa’s role would not make a significant contribution to the economic trajectories of the BRICS group, due to the size of its economy, the high cost of living in the country, and the unskilled labour force. Therefore, its potential lay more in its ability to share norms and act as a conversation starter and bridge-builder thanks to its principleminded participation in global governance.56 South Africa is consistent in dovetailing its agenda with meetings on these platforms, which are frequently scheduled at ministerial or departmental level during the G20 summits. For example, in 2018 President Ramaphosa chaired an informal meeting of BRICS leaders related to their contribution to the G20 Summit of that year.57 This was of particular importance, as South Africa had hosted the 10th BRICS Summit that same year in Johannesburg. The timing of the summit also aligned with other significant diplomatic events, like South Africa chairing the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and its non-permanent

286

membership of the UNSC, which followed in 2019–2020.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 286

2022/11/10 00:03

ment South Africa’s economic development agenda through improving trade, investment, and general socio-economic conditions. More specifically, at ministerial levels the meetings between BRICS finance ministers and central bank governors, finance deputies, heads of revenue authorities, trade ministers, and foreign or international affairs ministers dealt with economic diplomacy on a high level by creating the necessary institutional frameworks for further cooperation and trade amongst the BRICS countries. This was further complemented by senior official and sectoral meetings, including the Sherpas and Sous-Sherpas, the Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues (CGETI), the BRICS Bond Fund, customs experts, the labour and employment group, the mechanism related to intellectual and property rights, the working group on e-commerce, the working group on trade promotion, and the business council or forum.58 While intra-BRICS trade has increased steadily over the last decade (albeit dipping in 2016), South Africa needs to bring a greater balance between its imports from and exports to BRICS countries; in 2020 its imports from BRICS stood at R317 billion (US$19 billion), whereas exports were at R222 billion (US$13.77 billion).59 BRICS trade does not surpass that of traditional partners, and the European Union (EU) has remained South Africa’s largest trade partner.60 This shows that there has not been a shift in preference towards BRICS, but also that there is an opportunity to improve this by diversifying exports to BRICS countries. Africa, as a focal point on the BRICS agenda, has been central to the partnership since the BRICS outreach dialogue was initiated by South Africa at the 2013 Durban Summit. While the general outreach mechanism has been interpreted regionally by each BRICS member, the BRICS group – through South Africa – has been more inclusive of Africa than the G20 process. In making use of the BRICS partnership more strategically, South Africa is encouraged to be a bridge for Africa and BRICS countries to form more

SOUTH AFRICAN ENGAGEMENT IN CLUB GOVERNANCE: A BOON FOR ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

The 10th BRICS Summit had a number of key points, all of which comple-

nuanced relationships in terms of natural resources, banking, financial, communication, and transportation networks.61 For example, the 2013 summit included Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Egypt, Senegal, and Uganda in the BRICS Leaders–Africa Dialogue Forum. In the following five-year cycle, the summits hosted by Brazil, Russia, and India (2014–2016) focused on regional outreach, while China took a BRICS+ approach and focused on regional integration groupings of the Global South. Following that, in 2018 South Africa included leaders from Botswana, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Angola, Zambia, Namibia, Senegal, Gabon, Togo, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, as well as Jamaica, Argentina, and Turkey. The expansion of BRICS to work with regional arrangements

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 287

287

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 14

provides practical opportunities to improve bilateral cooperation. However, more than that, the inclusion of the AU, the Southern Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur or MERCOSUR) (given the difficulties experienced by the Union of South American Nations [UNASUR]), the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Bay of Bengal Initiative Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) is key for the BRICS countries and South Africa to cooperate on and influence the reform of global governance.62 In addition to its bilateral relationships with BRICS countries, and further engagement as a grouping on the margins of other fora, South Africa has also diversified its investment through the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), the NDB Africa Regional Centre (ARC), and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). These contribute to institutionalised financial and investment facilities and further the effectiveness of BRICS. The South African National Treasury cancelled one loan to the value of R7 billion in November 2021, but by 2022, 11 projects had been approved by the NDB, to the value of approximately R84 billion (a drop in South Africa’s debt of R4.2 trillion as of 2022), of which Eskom was to receive a sizeable portion to stabilise the national electricity grid.63 The ARC was the first NDB regional centre to open in order to assist South Africa to put forth more bankable projects and act as a point of contact once membership was opened up, which garnered immense interest from African countries wanting to join the bank. While membership expansion has been under discussion, the NDB is first testing the waters in how investment through the bank can be rolled out formally. The Lesotho Highlands Water Project, a bilateral project between South Africa and Lesotho, signed in 1994 and heavily financed by foreign investment, also received finance from the NDB in March 2019 for Phase II.64 This can be seen as the first NDB–Africa project, as the NDB only expanded membership in 2021, to include Bangladesh, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Uruguay.65 In addition, the NDB is also an example of South Africa’s reform agenda, because it shows how country systems can be interpreted along the lines of WTO guidelines and international law on a smaller scale that takes into account country-specific needs. While this satisfies fiscal requirements and the unique context of the country receiving the loan, it does not take into account the values that the country promises, and South Africa specifically promises democratic and humanistic values through its Constitution and White Paper on Foreign Policy. The potential of country systems is thus impacted severely due to the need for more transparency on the part of the NDB and the South African government, and more disclosure to the South African public.66 Critics of BRICS express that

288

South Africa has the potential to get more from the partnership; while this

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 288

2022/11/10 00:03

potentials that may not have immediate material outcomes.67

DOVETAILING AGENDAS AT LARGE FORA: THE WEF The WEF is an international organisation for public–private cooperation. It is not a club, because it is not exclusive; attendance and beneficiation are open to all who can afford to attend, and those who have innovative potential and capital are able to come together.68 The WEF is worth discussing because it is the largest recurring economic diplomacy arena, used for the presentation of emerging trends, bilateral networking, further political engagement on the sidelines by BRICS and G20 members, and further economic diplomacy engagements. Invitations to key persons like politicians, philanthropists, and celebrities are free, and businesses can buy invitations and annual memberships. South Africa’s participation in this regard serves a number of purposes, namely to pursue national objectives through networking; to present a positive, investor-friendly picture of the country; and to represent its African agenda, oriented towards growth and development, at the annual January meeting in Davos, Switzerland, and at the WEF on Africa (WEFA), usually held later in the year. The WEF’s annual agenda is decided thematically, and investment is driven accordingly. While this does not necessarily determine or limit the agendas of the BRICS countries and the G20, these clubs take cognisance of the resources that are dedicated and what is taking place in the world. Ramaphosa has been the face of the South African economy since he attended the annual Davos conference on President Zuma’s behalf in 2018. At the time, South Africa’s credibility was facing substantial pressure due to the kleptocracy surrounding Zuma’s administration and calls for his resignation. Ramaphosa thus seemed the most stable choice, given his experience in business and politics, to provide hope that South

SOUTH AFRICAN ENGAGEMENT IN CLUB GOVERNANCE: A BOON FOR ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

is evident through the trade deficit, it is important to acknowledge other

Africa’s economy and governance are friendly to investors.69 Since 2018, South Africa has been increasingly systematic in its economic diplomacy approaches by gauging the international context. In 2018, for example, the theme of the 10th BRICS Summit, hosted by South Africa, was ‘BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution’. This idea was reiterated at the 2019 WEF conference, under the theme ‘Globalization 4.0: Shaping a Global Architecture in the Age of the Fourth Industrial Revolution’. Team South Africa has been strategic in its economic diplomacy agenda and in who is chosen to represent the country at the WEF, sending its biggest players in finance (Nedbank, ABSA, the DBSA, Investec, Standard Bank, Old Mutual, and First Rand) and business leaders in telecommunications and mineral exploration (Sasol,

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 289

289

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 14

African Rainbow Minerals, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Naspers, MTN, and AngloGold Ashanti) to network at Davos in 2020.70 In 2020, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Naledi Pandor explained that tourism should be a significant focal point of South Africa’s economic diplomacy strategy, because interest in South Africa sparked by the tourism and hospitality industry was generally followed by more investment opportunities. In addition, it is an industry that is already well established and may easily generate more employment opportunities. The then Minister of Finance Tito Mboweni acknowledged the urgency for Eskom and other SOEs to stop haemorrhaging resources and to move to fiscal sustainability and manage debt overall. While Mboweni noted that the South African delegation was successful in their contributions to Davos in 2020, they were not expecting a high return on investment, and rather chose to reassure the international business community that there is keen awareness in South Africa of the challenges and of the urgent need for reform.71 While it is arguable that this was Team South Africa’s last appeal to delay further downgrading, this strategy was also based on the expectation of a credit downgrading of South African investment confidence by Moody’s. The direct impact is that South Africa will wrestle with structural reform and an increased government debt burden during a time of global economic uncertainty with fewer investment opportunities. Economic diplomacy in this case is an increasingly valuable tool, but difficult to actualise. This is where South Africa may depend on its bilateral connections and standing in the G20 and BRICS to lend to its potential and credibility. The WEFA is a noteworthy sub-conference because of its aims to strengthen institutions, contribute to improved trade and regional economic integration, improve public–private partnerships (PPPs), and develop better labour conditions, skills, and domestic value chains.72 While the WEF has been criticised for not dedicating enough attention to Africa on the agenda each January, the continent does receive the required support at regional agenda level. The link between South Africa’s economic diplomacy and its foreign policy focus on the African Agenda is most active, as South Africa has hosted the WEFA six times in the last 10 years.73 In 2017, the WEFA Summit was hosted in Durban following the 5th BRICS Summit, and was attended by leaders from Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, and Senegal. This high-profile event was specifically aimed at stimulating public–private collaboration, and deliberations at the Forum pledged to come up with suitable collaboration models by 2020. In closing, then Deputy President Ramaphosa expressed that Africa should exercise greater agency in its economic activity and that leadership needs to actively encourage a solutions-based approach to African economic challenges.74

290

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 290

2022/11/10 00:03

BRICS Summit, and hosted key leaders and business and industry experts. The WEFA Summit reflected on South Africa’s BRICS theme, ‘Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution’, and anchored economic diplomacy principles in the agenda of restoring investor confidence; contributing to policies for inclusive growth, especially in the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR); leading in PPPs; and improving the industrial manufacturing base across Africa.75 At the 2019 summit, Ramaphosa reiterated his optimism for Africa’s rise.76 The 2019 agenda reflected the importance of the 4IR, with a focus on Agenda 2063, the AU’s masterplan for African transformation, and ‘Silencing the Guns’ by 2020, the AU’s ambitious commitment to silencing illegal weapons in Africa. The agenda further emphasised improving financial access for African startups, digitising Africa and the African e-commerce agenda, as well as not forgetting the importance of entrepreneurship in biodiversity. Lastly, the Forum established the African Risk Resilience Platform, which mitigates and anticipates climate- and disease-related policy challenges. This new foundation is partnered by the WEF and the AU to capacitate the private sector in strengthening health security.77 South Africa is proving to be adept in knowing what types of structures have the potential to support its political narrative, but more and more there is a disconnect in terms of how South Africa is able to relate its performance on a practical and quantitative level. For example, during South Africa’s participation in Davos in 2020, Team South Africa had to answer difficult questions regarding immense mistrust, based on the findings from the Judicial Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector Including Organs of State (the Zondo Commission) and the state’s track record of bailing out failing SOEs.78

SOUTH AFRICAN ENGAGEMENT IN CLUB GOVERNANCE: A BOON FOR ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

In 2018, the WEFA Summit convened in Johannesburg, leading up to the 10th

CONCLUSION Economic diplomacy may reflect more tangible outcomes after activities like summits, ministerial meetings, or trade and investment expos have taken place. And while South Africa runs a trade deficit,79 importing more than it exports, and while it is unclear when and in what form investments materialise, it is important to consider the intangible results that can boost South Africa’s reputation abroad as a capable partner. There is a synergy in South Africa’s economic diplomacy agendas across clubs, but there needs to a stronger emphasis on what can be achieved functionally in terms of trade and investment within clubs. Politically, South Africa delivers on being a bridge-builder and progressive middle ground in the BRICS and G20

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 291

291

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 14

fora. But without impetus at the interdepartmental level for cooperative governance, as well as cooperation between government and businesses, it appears that these platforms will continue to contribute only superficially to South Africa’s engagement and maintain relevance by playing to the pageantry of diplomacy but leaving tangible commitments unprioritised. Due to the current socio-economic climate, it is increasingly difficult to make ordinary South Africans understand how international relations and cooperation at the WEF, G20, and BRICS relate to domestic politics in tangible terms, and it seems that South Africa is over-stretching its resources in an unrealistic manner. However, that does not mean that the intangible commitments, some of which may materialise financially in years to follow, are not important. Club governance is growing in importance, as it offers more frequent opportunities for cooperation, both multilaterally and bilaterally. This will be useful to South Africa, because it will be able to use existing frameworks that give clubs added confidence for discussing solutions. Although the elitist nature of clubs has come under scrutiny, clubs provide the opportunity to focus efforts on economic diplomacy and concentrate on regional development, as seen with BRICS, the G20, and WEFA, which are tailored to finding economic diplomacy solutions. The WEF may not seem like a traditional club due to the large numbers that flock annually to Davos. But South Africa’s engagement with the WEF, reflected in its G20 and BRICS agendas, is an opportunity to re-emphasise reform narratives and pursue economic diplomacy. This dovetails well with the more practical implications of South Africa’s membership of the G20 and BRICS. The challenges at the G20 may be temporary; however, in general the room for reform in engaging Africa may come about in a quiet fashion. There is more opportunity within the BRICS group to propel certain reformist points and grow and domesticate the BRICS agenda. South Africa is using its status as an emerging power incrementally to achieve reform; it recognises the immense need to achieve a global economy that is inclusive in participation and benefit, but it is also mindful of how it needs to navigate the current global economic regime, which still has vested interests in the functioning of well-established hierarchies. South Africa’s current strategy thus consists of attempting to improve conditions in Africa through economic diplomacy and emphasising a particular reform narrative in a manner that builds dialogue among countries. While this approach attempts to manage a number of expectations, shifts in African geopolitical dynamics, such as the finalisation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and further continental integration, will have an impact on future economic engagement with Africa. The rise of African

292

emerging powers may influence dynamics and take away from South

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 292

2022/11/10 00:03

taking a back seat in the forefront would allow South Africa to focus on its relationships with other African countries, while still having a significant impact on economic diplomacy, which will remain the approach of choice for the remainder of Ramaphosa’s tenure as president.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1 IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2022. ‘World Economic Outlook Database. Download WEO data: April 2022 edition.’ https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/ weo-database/2022/April (Accessed 14 June 2022); Trading Economics. n.d. ‘South Africa GDP growth rate.’ https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/gdp-growth (Accessed 15 June 2022). 2 Sguazzin, A. and Henderson, R. 2019. ‘Ramaphoria is all but over as business leaders run out of patience.’ Business Day, 10 July. https://www.businesslive.co.za/ bd/national/2019-07-10-ramaphoria-is-all-but-over-as-business-leaders-run-out-ofpatience/ (Accessed 6 December 2020); Winning, A. and Bavier, J. 2019. ‘Ramaphosa “last hope” for SA, Chinese diplomat says.’ Reuters, 29 July. https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-safrica-china-idUSKCN1UO1XG (Accessed 6 December 2020). 3 Ramaphosa, C. 2018. ‘State of the Nation Address by President of the Republic of South Africa, Mr Cyril Ramaphosa.’ The Presidency, 16 February. http://www.thepresidency. gov.za/state-of-the-nation-address/state-nation-address-president-republic-southafrica%2C-mr-cyril-ramaphosa (Accessed 6 December 2020); Ramaphosa, C. 2019. ‘State of the Nation Address by Cyril Ramaphosa, Parliament.’ The Presidency, 7 February. http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/state-of-the-nation-address/state-nationaddress-president-cyril-ramaphosa%2C-parliament (Accessed 6 December 2020). 4 Ramaphosa, ‘State of the Nation Address’. 5 Ramaphosa, C. 2020. ‘State of the Nation Address by Cyril Ramaphosa, Parliament, Cape Town.’ The Presidency, 13 February. http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/state-of-thenation-address/state-nation-address-president-cyril-ramaphosa%2C-parliament%2Ccape-town-0 (Accessed 6 December 2020). 6 Ramaphosa, C. 2021. ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa: 2021 State of the Nation Address.’ 11 February. https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2021-state-nationaddress-11-feb-2021-0000

SOUTH AFRICAN ENGAGEMENT IN CLUB GOVERNANCE: A BOON FOR ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

Africa’s quiet impact. This could benefit South Africa’s image in Africa –

7 See NPC (National Planning Commission). 2012. National Development Plan 2030: Our Future – Make it Work. Pretoria: The Presidency. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/ gcis_document/201409/ndp-2030-our-future-make-it-workr.pdf (Accessed 25 October 2020). 8 Lalbahadur, A. and Van Niewkerk, A. 2020. ‘South Africa’s security interests in Africa: Recommendations for the 2020s.’ In Values, Interests and Power: South African Foreign Policy in Uncertain Times, edited by D. Bradlow and E. Sidiropoulos. Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, pp. 114–115. 9 Wilson, D. and Purushothaman, R. 2003. ‘Dreaming with BRICs: The path to 2050.’ Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 99, 1 October. https://www.goldmansachs. com/insights/archive/archive-pdfs/brics-dream.pdf (Accessed 7 December 2020).

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 293

293

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 14

10 Kelley. J. R. 2010. ‘The new diplomacy: Evolution and revolution.’ Diplomacy and Statecraft 21(2): 286–305, p. 286. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2010.482474. 11 Kemp Spies, Y. 2019. Global Diplomacy and International Society. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 73. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95525-4; De Alwis, A. 2016. ‘A new age of minilateralism: Potential solutions for the South China Sea conundrum.’ Diplomatic Courier, 7 June. http://www.diplomaticourier.com/2016/06/07/new-age-minilateralismpotential-solutions-south-china-sea-conundrum/ (Accessed 7 December 2020). 12 Kemp Spies, Global Diplomacy and International Society, p. 15. 13 Cooper, A. F. 2015. ‘G20 middle powers and initiatives on development.’ In MIKTA, Middle Powers and New Dynamics of Global Governance: The G20’s Evolving Agenda, edited by M. Jongryn. New York: Palgrave, p. 33. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137506467_3. 14 Handy, P. 2010. ‘Towards African “club governance”?’ African Security Review 19(3): 71–75, p. 73. https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2010.521449. 15 Tsingou, E. 2014. ‘Power elites and club-model governance in global finance.’ International Political Sociology 8(3): 340–342, p. 340. https://doi.org/10.1111/ ips.12066; Tsingou, E. 2015. ‘Club governance and the making of global financial rules.’ Review of International Political Economy 22(2): 225–256, pp. 227–232. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/09692290.2014.890952. 16 Neethling, T. 2017. ‘South Africa’s foreign policy and the BRICS formation: Reflections on the quest for the ‘right’ economic-diplomatic strategy.’ Insight on Africa 9(1): 39–61, p. 43. https://doi.org/10.1177/0975087816674580. 17 The Presidency. 2020. The South African Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan. Pretoria: The Presidency. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202010/ south-african-economic-reconstruction-and-recovery-plan.pdf (Accessed 30 November 2020). 18 Mashego-Dlamini, C. 2019. ‘Keynote Address by Ms Candith Mashego-Dlamini, Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, on the occasion of the DIRCO-UN Seminar on “South Africa in the Multilateral World,” DIRCO, O. R. Tambo Building, 10 December 2019.’ DIRCO. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2019/mdla1210.htm (Accessed 17 November 2020). 19 NPC, National Development Plan 2030. 20 The Presidency. 2019. ‘President appoints Economic Advisory Council.’ 27 September. http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/president-appoints-economicadvisory-council (Accessed April 2020); The Presidency. 2019. ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa arrives in Japan for G20 Summit.’ 27 June. https://www.gov.za/speeches/presidentramaphosa-arrives-japan-g20-summit-27-jun-2019-0000 (Accessed April 2020). 21 Gumede, V. 2017. ‘Presidencies and policy in post-apartheid South Africa.’ Politeia 36(1): 1–17, p. 1. 22 DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation). 2011. Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy, 13 May 2011. Pretoria: DIRCO. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/ foreignpolicy0.pdf (Accessed April 2020). 23 PMG (Parliamentary Monitoring Group). 2012. ‘SA strategy in driving economic diplomacy: Department of International Relations & Cooperation briefing.’ 19 September. https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/14911/ (Accessed April 2020).

294

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 294

2022/11/10 00:03

25 Rana, K. S. 2007. ‘The experience of developing countries.’ In The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-Making and Negotiations in International Economic Relations, edited by N. Bayne and S. Woolcock. Aldershot: Ashgate, p. 8. 26 Grant Makokera, C. 2015. ‘South African economic diplomacy: Engaging the private and parastatals.’ ISS (Institute for Security Studies) Paper 280. February 2015. https:// media.africaportal.org/documents/Paper280.pdf (Accessed April 2020). 27 Grant Makokera, ‘South African economic diplomacy’; PMG. 2016. ‘Department of Small Business Development on its 2016 Strategic and Annual Performance Plan.’ 15 March. https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/22207/ (Accessed April 2020). 28 Grant Makokera, ‘South African economic diplomacy’. 29 Muresan, A. 2020. ‘Optimising South African economic diplomacy.’ Global Insight 139. http://www.igd.org.za/jdownloads/IGD%20Reports/FORMATTED%20Policy%20Brief.%20 Optimising%20South%20African%20commercial%20diplomacy_edited%20akb_Nov%20 2020.pdf (Accessed 7 December 2020). 30 German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). 2016. ‘Emerging power or fading star? South Africa’s role on the African continent and beyond.’ 7 December. https://www.die-gdi.de/veranstaltungen/details/south-africasrole-on-the-african-continent-and-beyond/ (Accessed 7 December 2020); Qobo, M. 2017. ‘Africa’s foreign policy and nation branding: Regional leadership and its discontents.’ Strategic Review for Southern Africa 39(1): 9–28, p. 14. https://doi.org/10.35293/srsa. v39i1.319; Calland, R. and Müller, M. 2020. ‘How South Africa and Germany can help the world.’ Mail & Guardian, 30 January. https://mg.co.za/opinion/2020-01-30-howsouth-africa-and-germany-can-help-the-world/ (Accessed 7 December 2020). 31 Qobo, M. 2012. ‘Chasing after shadows or strategic integration? South Africa and global economic governance.’ In South African Foreign Policy Review, Volume 1, edited by C. Landsberg and J.-A. van Wyk. Pretoria: AISA and IGD. 32 DIRCO, Building a Better World; NPC, National Development Plan 2030. 33 Berger, A., Cooper, A. F. and Grimm, S. 2019. ‘A decade of G20 summitry: Assessing the benefits, limitations and future of global club governance in turbulent times.’ South African Journal of International Affairs 26(4): 493–504, pp. 496–497. https://doi. org/10.1080/10220461.2019.1705889; Cooper, ‘G20 middle powers and initiatives on development’, p. 33.

SOUTH AFRICAN ENGAGEMENT IN CLUB GOVERNANCE: A BOON FOR ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

24 DTI (Department of Trade and Industry). 2010. A South African Trade Policy and Strategy Framework. Pretoria: DTI. May 2010. https://www.tralac.org/files/2012/12/ Trade-Policy-and-Strategy-Framework-2010.pdf (Accessed 16 November 2020); DTI. 2012. A South African Trade Policy and Strategy Framework: An Update. 12 November. Pretoria: DTI. https://static.pmg.org.za/140711south_african_trade_policy_and_ strategic_framework_2012.pdf (Accessed 16 November 2020).

34 Members of the G20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, the USA, and the EU. 35 African News Agency. 2019. ‘Working visit to G20 Summit in Japan successful, says Ramaphosa.’ Engineering News, 30 June. https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/ working-visit-to-g20-summit-in-japan-successful-says-ramaphosa-2019-06-30/ rep_id:4136 (Accessed 7 December 2020). 36 DIRCO, Building a Better World. 295

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 295

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 14

37 The Presidency. 2018. ‘President Ramaphosa concludes G20 Argentina visit.’ 1 December. https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-ramaphosa-concludes-his-g20-argentina-visit1-dec-2018-0000 (Accessed April 2020). 38 The Presidency. 2019. ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa arrives in Japan for G20 Summit.’ 27 June. https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-ramaphosa-arrives-japan-g20-summit27-jun-2019-0000 (Accessed April 2020). 39 Rosenfeld, E. 2019. ‘Trump says he agreed with Xi to hold off on new tariffs and to let Huawei buy US products.’ CNBC, 29 June. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/29/us-chinatrade-war-trump-and-xi-meet-at-g-20-summit-in-osaka.html (Accessed 7 December 2020). 40 South African Government News Agency. 2018. ‘SA to use G20 Summit to promote country.’ 29 November. https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sa-use-g20-summitpromote-country (Accessed 8 December 2020). 41 South African Government News Agency. 2019. ‘SA to participate in key G20 Trade Ministers’ meeting.’ 7 June. https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sa-participatekey-g20-trade-ministers%E2%80%99-meeting (Accessed 8 December 2020). 42 Patel, E. 2020. ‘South African Remarks at the Second Extraordinary G20 Trade and Investment Ministers Meeting on 14 April 2020.’ dtic, 15 May. http://www.thedtic.gov. za/south-african-remarks-at-the-second-extraordinary-g20-trade-and-investmentministers-meeting-on-14-april-2020/ (Accessed 8 December 2020). 43 Floyd, R., Kapoor, K. and Senne, L. 2019. ‘G20 Compact with Africa.’ Task Force 5: Cooperation with Africa Policy Brief, Think 20, 31 March. https://t20japan.org/wp-content/ uploads/2019/03/t20-japan-tf5-2-g20-compact-with-africa.pdf (Accessed April 2020). 44 Mabera, F. 2019. ‘Africa and the G20: A relational view of African agency in global governance.’ South African Journal of International Affairs 26(4): 583–599, pp. 583–589. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2019.1702091. 45 Reisen, H. 2017. ‘The G20 “Compact with Africa” is not for Africa’s poor: The Finance Framework.’ 8 June. https://shiftingwealth.blogspot.com/2017/06/the-g20-compactwith-africa-is-not-for.html (Accessed April 2020). 46 Africa Investment Forum. 2021. ‘The Africa Investment Forum – Crowding in billions in investment interests and impacting quality of life at scale.’ 23 November. https://www. africainvestmentforum.com/index.php/news/news/africa-investment-forum-crowdingbillions-investment-interests-and-impacting-quality-life (Accessed 16 June 2022). 47 Chakrabarty, M. 2019. ‘G20’s compact with Africa: How beneficial for Africa is it really?’ Observer Research Foundation, 28 June. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/g20scompact-with-africa-how-beneficial-for-africa-is-it-really-52528/ (Accessed April 2020). 48 Akiwumi, P. 2020. 2020. ‘Curbing illicit financial flows to finance sustainable development in Africa.’ UNCTAD, 21 October. https://unctad.org/news/curbing-illicitfinancial-f lows-finance-sustainable-development-africa#:~:text=UNCTAD%20 estimates%20that%20%2488.6%20billion,in%20source%2C%20transfer%20or%20use (Accessed 8 December 2020). 49 Siridopoulos, E. 2020. ‘G20 and Development.’ SAIIA, 18 November. https://saiia.org. za/research/g20-and-development/ (Accessed 8 December 2020). 50 World Bank. 2022. ‘Debt Service Suspension Initiative.’ 10 March. https://www. worldbank.org /en/topic/debt/brief/covid-19-debt-ser vice-suspension-initiative (Accessed 14 May 2022).

296

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 296

2022/11/10 00:03

52 Schoeman, M. 2015. ‘South Africa as an emerging power: From label to “status consistency”?’ South African Journal of International Affairs 22(4): 429–445, pp. 429–430. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2015.1119719. 53 Rej, A. 2018. ‘For BRICS to reshape world order, should avoid anti-west politics.’ Observer Research Foundation, 30 June. https://www.orfonline.org/research/42842-for-brics-toreshape-world-order-should-avoid-anti-west-politics/ (Accessed 8 December 2020). 54 eNCA. 2018. ‘SA’s Ramaphosa reinforces Brics relations with China, Russia.’ 23 March. https://www.enca.com/south-africa/sas-ramaphosa-reinforces-brics-relations-with-chinarussia (Accessed 8 December 2020); Van Heerden, O. 2020. ‘Is BRICS falling apart, brick by brick?’ Daily Maverick, 29 July. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2020-07-29is-brics-falling-apart-brick-by-brick/ (Accessed 8 December 2020). 55 Fukushima, G. S. 2020. ‘The G20’s uncertain future.’ East Asia Forum, 20 November. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/11/20/the-g20s-uncertain-future/ (Accessed 8 December 2020). 56 Nel, P. 2020. ‘South Africa, BRICS, and global governance: How SA tried to change the world and succeeded in changing itself.’ In The Political Economy of the BRICS Countries, Volume 2: BRICS and the Global Economy, edited by S. Y. Kim. New Jersey: World Scientific. https://doi.org/10.1142/11330-vol2. 57 DIRCO. 2018. ‘Informal BRICS leaders’ meeting on the margins of the G20 Summit Buenos Aires, Argentina, 30 November 2018.’ Media statement, 30 November. http:// www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2018/brics1130.htm (Accessed April 2020); DIRCO. 2018. ‘10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration.’ http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2018/ brics0726.pdf (Accessed April 2020). 58 DIRCO, ‘10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration’. 59 dtic. n.d. [SIC trade data]. http://tradestats.thedti.gov.za/ReportFolders/reportFolders. aspx (Accessed April 2020). 60 dtic. 2020. ‘Trade Agreements.’ http://www.thedtic.gov.za/sectors-and-services-2/1-4-2trade-and-export/market-access/trade-agreements/ (Accessed 7 December 2020). 61 NPC, National Development Plan 2030. 62 Lissovolik, Y. 2018. ‘BEAMS of the Sunrise: A Look at BRICS 5-Year Cycles.’ Valdai Discussion Club, 14 June. https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/beams-of-the-sunrise-alook-at-brics-5-year-cycles/ (Accessed 8 December 2020).

SOUTH AFRICAN ENGAGEMENT IN CLUB GOVERNANCE: A BOON FOR ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

51 Whitehouse, D. 2020. ‘Zambia’s default shows new approach needed for Chinese debt.’ The Africa Report, 17 November. https://www.theafricareport.com/50798/zambiasdefault-shows-new-approach-needed-for-chinese-debt/ (Accessed 8 December 2020).

63 Cokayne, R. 2021. ‘Sanral’s R7bn “Brics bank” loan stopped by National Treasury.’ Moneyweb, 31 January. https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/sanrals-r7bnbrics-bank-loan-stopped-by-national-treasury/ (Accessed 14 May 2022); NDB (New Development Bank). 2022. ‘List of all projects: South Africa.’ https://www.ndb.int/ projects/list-of-all-projects/?country_name=5 (Accessed 25 January 2022). 64 NDB. 2019. ‘Projects: Lesotho Highlands Water Project Phase II. https://www.ndb.int/ lesotho-highlands-water-project-phase-ii/ (Accessed 8 December 2019). 65 Pandor, N. 2019. ‘Address by Dr GNM Pandor, Budget Vote Speech, Department of International Relations and Cooperation, on 11 July 2019 at 14h00 at the National Assembly, Parliament.’ DIRCO. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2019/ pand0711a.htm (Accessed April 2020); NDB. 2021. ‘NDB admits Egypt as new member.’ 297

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 297

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 14

Press release, 29 December. https://www.ndb.int/press_release/ndb-admits-egypt-asnew-member/ (Accessed 25 January 2022). 66 Oxfam and CER (Centre for Environmental Rights). 2021. ‘Briefing Paper: Information Disclosure and Grievance Mechanisms of the NDB.’ March. https://www.oxfam.org.za/ wp-content/uploads/2021/05/oxfam-ndb-full-report-web.pdf (Accessed 25 January 2022). 67 Van Heerden, ‘Is BRICS falling apart, brick by brick?’. 68 WEF (World Economic Forum). 2020. ‘Our mission.’ https://www.weforum.org/about/ world-economic-forum (Accessed April 2020). 69 Fin24. 2018. ‘Ramaphosa to be the face of SA economy at Davos.’ 10 October. https://w w w.fin24.com/Economy/ramaphosa-to-be-the-face-of-sa-economy-atdavos-20180110 (Accessed April 2020). 70 BusinessTech. 2020. ‘The full list of South Africans going to Davos in 2020.’ 21 January. https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/367514/the-full-list-of-southafricans-going-to-davos-in-2020/ (Accessed April 2020). 71 South African Government News Agency. 2020. ‘Mboweni: WEF 2020 a success for SA.’ 24 January. https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/mboweni-wef2020-success-sa (Accessed April 2020). 72 WEF. 2017. ‘WEFA: Achieving Inclusive Growth through Responsive and Responsible Leadership.’ 19 May. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_AF17_Report.pdf (Accessed April 2020). 73 In 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2018, and 2019. 74 WEF, ‘WEFA: Achieving Inclusive Growth through Responsive and Responsible Leadership.’ 75 WEF. 2018. ‘World Economic Forum to convene leaders in Johannesburg to shape inclusive, sustainable future for South Africa.’ News Release, 15 June. https://www. weforum.org/press/2018/06/world-economic-forum-to-convene-leaders-in-johannesburgto-shape-inclusive-sustainable-future-for-south-africa/ (Accessed April 2020). 76 WEF. 2019. ‘WEFA: Shaping Inclusive Growth and Shared Futures in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.’ 6 September. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_AF19_ Report.pdf (Accessed April 2020). 77 WEF, ‘WEFA: Shaping Inclusive Growth and Shared Futures in the Fourth Industrial Revolution’. 78 Radio 702. 2020. ‘The Money Show’s Bruce Whitfield interviews CNN’s Richard Quest at the 2020 World Economic Forum in Davos.’ 24 January. https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=xQnNn9svVX4 (Accessed 8 December 2020); eNCA. 2020. ‘Richard Quest speaks to eNCA at the WEF in Davos.’ 22 January. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=od0ln195XwY (Accessed 8 December 2020). 79 South African Market Insights. 2020. ‘South Africa’s trade data page.’ 4 April. ccehttps://www.southafricanmi.com/south-africas-trade-data-page.html (Accessed 8 December 2020).

298

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 298

2022/11/10 00:03

Jo-Ansie van Wyk

INTRODUCTION For South Africa, the allure of leading an intergovernmental organisation

CHAPTER 15

South Africa’s Candidature Diplomacy

(IGO) has not diminished since President Thabo Mbeki’s tenure as the inaugural African Union (AU) chairperson (2002) and the country’s three tenures as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) (2007–2008, 2011–2012, and 2019–2020). Leading an IGO bestows a state with authority, influence, status, and prestige. This is something to which South Africa aspires. Mbeki’s foreign policy assertiveness resulted in the country leading several IGOs, but caused rivalry in Africa and continental resistance against South African international aspirations. In response, South Africa adopted a number of diplomatic strategies to counter this, including changing its foreign policy narrative from acting on behalf of Africa to promoting African interests and that of the Global South; taking on a larger peacemaking and peacekeeping role on the continent; opting to become a donor state in Africa; and fielding candidates for international leadership positions on behalf of, and thus endorsed by, the continent. Hence, South Africa has made efforts to coordinate the identification, nomination, and promotion of South Africa and/or its candidates. These efforts (identification of vacancies, nomination of South Africans, and their promotion for election or appointment), coordinated by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), included the formulation of a policy and national criteria for the support of South African candidates, and the establishment of a database of South African experts in March 2007.1 Scholarship on South Africa’s foreign policy predominantly excludes consideration of the role and impact of campaigning efforts for leadership positions in IGOs in shaping decision-making. This chapter therefore begins an exploratory analysis of South Africa’s candidature diplomacy through illustrative case studies.2 These cases exclude the candidatures of South African presidents to lead multilateral organisations and South Africa’s three successful campaigns to serve as a non-permanent member on the UNSC. Instead, the chapter presents illustrative case studies regarding the candidature of South African government officials to lead the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the AU Commission (AUC) (as chairperson, deputy chairperson, and commissioners), the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat, and the International Labour Organization (ILO).

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 299

299

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 15

These cases span three presidencies (Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, and Cyril Ramaphosa) and share commonalities such as South Africa’s leadership aspirations, the high cost of these aspirations, and resistance thereto. The chapter is aligned to the focus of this volume of South African Foreign Policy Review – that is, the Ramaphosa’s administration’s foreign policy and diplomacy – and presents South Africa’s candidatures in this context. The chapter begins by addressing the allure of international leadership and the significance of the leadership of IGOs, before unpacking the case studies and providing conclusions.

THE ALLURE OF LEADING INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS Candidature diplomacy aims to achieve the appointment or election of a citizen of a state to an executive position in an IGO. States expect a return on their financial membership contribution, and the efficient governance of an IGO. By fielding a citizen as a candidate, the expectation is that his/her election will enhance the status, prestige, and influence of that particular state. In nominating a citizen, a state not only demonstrates its aspirations to shape international relations but expects the advancement of its national interests. Another reason why states nominate their citizens is the so-called nationality principle – that is, the belief that the best leader is ‘one of us’.3 Besides self-interest, domestic concerns also motivate nominations. One of these is patronage, whereby an individual is either politically rewarded or exiled from the domestic political scene. Another domestic expectation is that formal international leadership is a symbol of international influence for domestic audiences and for Parliament (which approves budgets).4 Therefore, South Africa justifies its candidature diplomacy as an expression of its national interests, identity, status, and prestige. Typically, states use two instruments to succeed in their candidate diplomacy: diplomatic lobbying and vote-trading.5 Vote-trading can take two forms: vote-buying and logrolling. Vote-buying involves either offering or receiving a financial incentive for a vote (incentive) or threatening a state through financial instruments such as aid, investment, or loans (coercion). Logrolling involves exchanging votes within a particular IGO (internal logrolling) or exchanging a vote in one institution for a vote in another institution (external logrolling).6 The next three sections present the illustrative candidatures selected. In each case, the position and significance of the candidature are presented before South Africa’s foreign policy aspirations are explained. Each case focuses on South Africa’s campaign strategy by assessing the quality of the 300

candidate, the nationality principle, the history, the process of garnering

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 300

2022/11/10 00:03

position, and the election process.

DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE IAEA The IAEA Director-General (DG) is appointed by the IAEA Board of Governors, with the approval of the General Conference of all members.7 As head of the IAEA, the DG is the world’s top nuclear bureaucrat, overseeing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear disarmament, and nuclear non-proliferation. The decision in 2008 to nominate Abdul Minty to lead the IAEA was post-1994 South Africa’s first candidature to lead an IGO.8 Minty’s unsuccessful candidature, however, taught South Africa valuable lessons, contributing to the country’s approach in securing three stints on the UN Security Council.

SOUTH AFRICA’S CANDIDATURE DIPLOMACY

regional and African endorsements, logrolling and incentives for the

OPPORTUNITY AND RATIONALE Egyptian Mohamed ElBaradei’s 12-year tenure as IAEA DG ended in 2009. As his term neared its conclusion, board members intensified their search for a ‘consensus candidate’ capable of bridging divisions between developed and developing states.9 South Africa’s arguments for Minty’s candidature emphasised the country’s unique identity as a ‘founder member of the IAEA’ that had voluntarily denuclearised and the ‘most advanced country in the nuclear field on the African continent’, the role of the IAEA as a promoter of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, diplomatic practice (preference for multilateralism as the ‘only sustainable road’ to address global issues), and the qualifications of Minty himself.10 Minty is an experienced international anti-apartheid and anti-nuclear activist and his post-apartheid credentials include leading South African delegations to conferences on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), representing South Africa on the IAEA Board of Governors, serving on the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (2001–2002), and chairing the Nuclear Suppliers Group.11

CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION South Africa submitted Minty’s nomination to the IAEA on 27 November 2008. By then, Minty had already begun campaigning and had South Africa’s confirmation that it would be ‘doing what is necessary’ to support his candidature.12 Highlighting the importance of the Agency, Minty outlined his vision to maintain the ‘impartiality and integrity’ of the

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 301

301

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 15

IAEA and to improve its human, financial, and technical resources and operation.13 Initially, Minty made few references to developing countries’ right to nuclear energy, but later reiterated that he would be ‘vigilant’ that developing states are not denied this right. The latter is a position that has often resulted in diplomatic confrontation between South Africa and nuclear weapon states (NWS) on the Board, especially regarding South Africa’s support of Iran’s nuclear programme.14 After three rounds of voting, Japan’s Yukiya Amano, preferred by industrialised states, beat Minty. This decision was supported by developing states in the March 2009 run-off, but did not achieve the required two-thirds majority.15 After this defeat, Minty met with the US ambassador to Vienna, Gregory Schulte, expressing his disappointment ‘with the lack of any Western support’ for his candidature. Minty reminded Schulte of South Africa’s support for the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and also expressed his unhappiness with ‘disinformation’ surrounding the DG election campaign. Minty also issued a threat to the US ambassador, stating that the new South African government (i.e. after the May 2009 elections) would review its policies with the IAEA.16 The IAEA reopened the nomination process, which resulted in the nomination of five candidates, including South Africa’s re-nomination of Minty.17 On two occasions (5 and 14 May 2009), the South African foreign minister wrote to US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, requesting US support for Minty’s candidature.18 All five candidates made presentations to the board on 26 May 2009. A closed board meeting followed, on 9 June 2009, during which a secret informal ‘straw poll’ (a non-binding poll) was conducted on the five candidates to indicate to member countries if their prospects of success were declining or not. A third round of nominations opened after the straw poll, as again no candidate obtained the required two-thirds majority. Amano, Minty, and Luis Echávarri from Spain were nominated, but the final round of voting on 2 July 2009 was contested between Amano and Minty.19 The final round was preceded by intense US and Japanese lobbying to secure an Amano victory over Minty by attempting to ‘convert’ the so-called Minty 12 (the states supporting Minty). Particular focus was said to have been on Russia, Brazil, and India.20 In accepting defeat after the final (secret) vote on 2 July 2009, Minty admitted that the election process had been ‘a long drawn out and hard fought campaign’ and declared South Africa’s support for Amano’s tenure as DG.21 For DG Ayanda Ntsaluba of the Department of Foreign Affairs (as it was at the time), ‘doing what is necessary’ eventually amounted to more than R3 million.22

302

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 302

2022/11/10 00:03

Campaigning for international leadership positions is politically and financially costly and time-consuming. South Africa requested AU endorsement for Minty’s candidature ‘on condition that the current Director General [Egyptian Mohamed ElBaradei] would not stand’ as a gesture of African solidarity.23 ElBaradei served as IAEA DG from 1997 until 2009, and had he campaigned for another tenure, he might have been a very popular candidate who could have rendered South Africa’s candidature unsuccessful. Minty’s candidature was eventually endorsed by the AU Summit held in Egypt in July 2008. In September 2009, ElBaradei announced that he would not be available for another term.24 Between South Africa announcing Minty’s candidature (12 September 2008) and the final election (2 July 2009), Minty travelled on 63 international and two domestic flights, amounting to R756  565.56, to promote his

SOUTH AFRICA’S CANDIDATURE DIPLOMACY

VOTE-TRADING AND COST OF CAMPAIGN

candidature, the cost of which eventually amounted to R3  308  587.43.25 Besides the financial cost, the election was an extremely political process that involved diplomatic efforts by the USA and Japan for Amano’s candidature, Russia’s withdrawal of its support for Minty, African states failing to realise their promised support for Minty, and some vote-trading (Japan’s promise of a ‘dowry’, in the form of financial aid, to the IAEA; South Africa’s letter requesting US support; and South Africa’s vote in favour of and abstention that supported Iran at the IAEA and UN respectively).26 Ultimately, South Africa’s identity and unique nuclear experience, Minty’s personal background and credentials as a disarmament activist, and the country’s role as a bridge between developed and developing countries were not enough to ensure the election of the country’s candidate as the DG. Despite South Africa campaigning for Minty, Western countries with nuclear capabilities supported the Japanese candidate; in this case, Minty’s activist credentials may have worked against him. Developing countries, on the other hand, preferred a ‘moderate G-77 candidate’, namely Minty, who was ‘intensely opposed by most advanced nuclear members’.27 Another aspect which may have prevented Minty’s election was South Africa’s ongoing support of Iran’s nuclear programme at the time, accusations of vote-trading between South Africa and Iran, and the investment US$31.6 billion in Iran by the South African company MTN.28

OUTCOME Despite Minty’s unsuccessful bid for the position of DG, South Africa’s aspiration to lead IGOs did not wane. In 2010, the DIRCO Secretariat of the Candidatures Committee was established as government’s focal point

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 303

303

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 15

to manage and lobby for South African candidatures. From 2009 to 2010, DIRCO lobbied bilaterally for support of South African candidatures for seven positions in international organisations.29 In addition, Cabinet approved South Africa’s 2013 policy on and criteria for South African candidatures, published in a document titled Measures and Guidelines for the Enhanced Coordination of South Africa’s International Engagements.30 These initiatives, and the state’s International Candidatures Strategy, produced some success. An indication of the competitive nature of these leadership campaigns is the fact that, during 2012 and 2013, South Africa received 53 diplomatic representatives requesting South Africa’s support of their candidatures to lead IGOs.31 By 2013, South African experts had been elected to lead various UN organs and agencies.

LEADING THE AU COMMISSION The highest decision-making body of the AU is its Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which determines the organisation’s policies, priorities, and programme and monitors the implementation thereof. The Assembly also elects the chairperson and deputy chairperson of the AUC. The latter serves as the secretariat of the AU and consists of an elected chairperson, a deputy chairperson, six commissioners, and staff. The AUC chair serves for a four-year term, renewable once, as the AU’s chief executive officer and chief accounting officer. Directly responsible to the AU Executive Council, the chairperson’s other functions include leading the Commission’s meetings and other deliberations, promoting the AU and improving its performance, preparing the AU budget, administering the AU, and liaising with member states and regional economic communities.32

OPPORTUNITY AND RATIONALE Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, besides serving in other Cabinet portfolios, served as Thabo Mbeki’s foreign minister (1999–2008) and was involved in the transition of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the AU. As the chairperson of the meeting in Durban in 2002 where the AU was established, Dlamini-Zuma was no stranger to the AU. During her tenure as foreign minister, she also chaired several AU meetings on Comoros (2007 and 2008) and, for example, led the AU’s ministerial meeting on postconflict reconstruction and development in Sudan (2008). South Africa, under the leadership of former President Jacob Zuma, announced Dlamini-Zuma’s candidature for the position of AUC chair late 304

in 2011. Whereas some argued that her candidature was Zuma’s move to

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 304

2022/11/10 00:03

Africa explained her candidature as an expression of South Africa’s ‘commitment to the political and socio-economic development of the continent and its promotion of AU principles, goals and objectives’.33

CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION Dlamini-Zuma’s candidature was presented to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Summit in August 2011 in Angola, where SADC endorsed her as ‘a consensus candidate of the South [of the continent]’.34 At the January 2012 SADC Summit, it repeated its support for Dlamini-Zuma, but SADC members of the West and the Central African region opposed her endorsement.35 However, SADC continued to endorse DlaminiZuma’s candidature and launched a continental diplomatic campaign for her candidature by establishing three campaign teams.36 The composition of

SOUTH AFRICA’S CANDIDATURE DIPLOMACY

redeploy his ex-wife away from the South African political scene, South

these teams highlighted intra-continental and intra-SADC divisions on the future chairperson of the AUC. The teams did not include representatives of any French-speaking SADC member, and Tanzania was the only East African state included. However, targeted states included French-speaking, West, North, Central, and East African states, including SADC states. South Africa and SADC used three arguments to campaign for DlaminiZuma. First, the principle of rotation and regional representation in the AU, and the historical dominance of francophone West and Central African states in continental leadership positions, necessitated a successful southern African candidate.37 Since the establishment of the OAU in 1963, most OAU secretary-generals and, after 2002, AUC chairpersons were from francophone West or Central Africa (Guinea,  Cameroon,  Togo,  Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Gabon), except when East African Salim A. Salim was the chair.38 Since the establishment of the OAU in 1963, southern Africa had fielded only three candidates: Vernon Mwaanga of Zambia (1974), Theo-Ben Gurirab of Namibia (2002), and Inonge Mbikusita-Lewanika of Zambia (2008). There was push-back to South Africa’s position, with the argument that traditionally the position should be occupied by one of the smaller states. South Africa responded to the argument that big African states (e.g. South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya) should not stand for top positions at the AU by reiterating there ‘is no such agreement at the AU’, and that so-called big states are not necessarily stronger and more influential. It also argued that ‘new influential economic and political players are emerging in other regions, notably Eastern and Southern Africa’.39 Pretoria re-affirmed that its candidate was a southern African – and not a South African – candidate.40 Nigeria,  Ethiopia,  and  Rwanda led the continental

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 305

305

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 15

campaign against South Africa. However, during the final round of voting in July 2012, Nigeria and Ethiopia were ‘not there and Rwanda was under pressure from the UN’.41 The second argument centred on gender.42 The campaign pointed out the appropriateness of electing a woman during the AU Decade for Women (2010–2020), and argued that as AU members have adopted the AU Gender Policy on Gender Parity, it would send a ‘strong continental signal […] that African women must be given an equal opportunity to make a positive contribution’ to the AUC.43 Support for Dlamini-Zuma would achieve this.44 Finally, the campaign emphasised AU improvement and reform, effectively discrediting the incumbent and Dlamini-Zuma’s opponent, Jean Ping.45 Besides this, it was argued that Dlamini-Zuma would also be able to improve coordination between SADC, the AU, and other regional economic communities (RECs).46 The AUC elections took place during the January 2012 AU Summit. After four rounds of voting, neither candidate obtained the requisite 36 votes (two-thirds). To address the deadlock, Ping’s tenure was extended until the next Summit (July 2012), when another election was scheduled. Mindful of continental tensions and divisions, the AU Summit established an Ad-hoc Committee of Eight Heads of State and Government (C8), consisting of one member state per region – Algeria (north), Angola (southern), Chad (central), Côte d’Ivoire (west), and Ethiopia (east) – and with Benin as the AU chair. South Africa and Gabon also formed part of this committee, as they fielded candidates. SADC mandated its chairperson, President Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, to represent it on the C8.47 The C8 first met informally on 18 February 2012 and then formally on 17 March 2012 in Benin; both meetings were attended by President Zuma.48 The C8 decided that South Africa and Gabon should meet to reach a mutually acceptable decision on the matter, and report back to the next C8 meeting (14 May 2012). Subsequent to the meeting on 14 May, South Africa reconfirmed its endorsement of DlaminiZuma as the SADC candidate, and stated that ‘all regions should be given an opportunity’ to lead the AUC.49 As the July 2012 summit drew closer, the competition between the candidates intensified.50 On 6 July, South African media reported on Ping’s presence in the country and his intentions to withdraw from the race. For Ping, the report was an ‘outright fallacy and fabrication’ and the ‘latest in a series of malicious lies and innuendoes’ to discredit him and undermine his re-election.51 South Africa responded by emphasising that southern Africa fielded a southern African candidate and that the region wants AU transformation and performance.52 Voting was scheduled for the July 2012 summit. Similar to January 2012, it took several rounds (five) of voting in

306

July 2012 to elect Dlamini-Zuma as the AUC chair.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 306

2022/11/10 00:03

For South Africa, success came at a price. DIRCO, for example, admitted that it did not expect such a long campaign and that ‘international lobbying for the position was intense’, citing France, the USA, and Nigeria as opponents to Dlamini-Zuma’s candidacy.53 DIRCO implemented the SADC Lobbying Strategy for their candidature and campaigned on Dlamini-Zuma’s behalf.54 The costs of lobbying for the election in January 2012 amounted to R6 million, but an additional R6 million had to be budgeted for lobbying until July 2012.55 However, as is discussed below, South Africa spent far more than R12 million to succeed. South Africa’s success was ascribed to cheque book diplomacy, votebuying, and vote-trading during the campaign.56 It was also symptomatic of the excesses of the Zuma administration, compared to the focus on South African exceptionalism during the Mbeki administration. Excluding SADC’s

SOUTH AFRICA’S CANDIDATURE DIPLOMACY

VOTE-TRADING AND COST OF CAMPAIGN

efforts, South Africa participated in 55 high-level engagements with the continent during 2011 and 2012.57 South Africa’s African activities during this period were extensive and included several incentives (vote-buying) to the continent, such as:58 ■

dispatching special envoys

■

the establishment of bilateral relations

■

the elevation or upgrading of bilateral relations, and the establishment of bilateral mechanisms

■

incoming state visits

■

joint commission and counterpart meetings

■

outgoing visits by the president, deputy president, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, and her deputies

■

investment, loans, and humanitarian aid

■

consultations and speeches

■

engagements with SADC

■

supporting UN action

■

negotiations with the C8.

South Africa spared no effort or cost to achieve success. The campaign confirmed resistance to South Africa’s aspirations on the continent, a matter that was seemingly resolved through vote-trading and vote-buying.

307

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 307

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 15

OUTCOME In 2013, DIRCO released South Africa’s Policy on the Nomination and Election of Candidates to International Organisations. This policy details, inter alia, the criteria for a ‘consistent and coordinated South African approach in respect of the nomination, support for and election of candidates in elections to international organisations’.59 These criteria include:60 ■

South Africa’s foreign policy priorities

■

positions where South Africa’s capacity or skills could make a demonstrable impact

■

the Africa Group’s position on equitable geographical distribution of candidates/positions in the UN System, the AU, and other international and regional organisations

■

identification of the most suitable candidate from the region and promotion of such candidacy in order to serve the interests of South Africa, the sub-region, and Africa as a whole.

The policy also states that ‘in recommendations in determining the strategic positions where South Africa can play a role, the Committee on Candidatures shall be guided by recommendations received from line departments, multilateral missions and delegations attending conferences or sessions of the UN system, the AU and other international and regional organisations’.61 South Africa’s leadership ambitions are clear – that is, the nomination and election of candidates should be in South Africa’s national interests. Second, South Africa’s endorsement of or support for a candidate of another state involved the negotiation of a reciprocal agreement, involving an ‘arrangement’ between South Africa and another country, or between regional groups/electoral groups.62 The Policy on the Nomination and Election of Candidates to International Organisations outlines three criteria for reciprocal agreements:63 1. If there is no agreed clean slate within the electoral group – that is, when the number of vacancies are ‘more than or equal to the number of candidates and the candidatures have been endorsed by the relevant electoral groups’64 2. Whether a reciprocal agreement complies with election criteria, whether previous/other commitments exist, the importance of the organisation, and the need for support 3. Whether the agreement serves a South African strategic purpose. 308

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 308

2022/11/10 00:03

and prefers that ‘reciprocal agreements shall not be entered into too far ahead of time’.65 South Africa’s intention to gain maximum benefits is evident. It is thus mindful of the realpolitik associated with the nomination, endorsement, and election of candidates. The ‘arrangement’ between South Africa and other actors is defined as ‘mutual support and/or exchange of votes’.66 However, South Africa’s support is, for example, dependent on the importance of the organisation and whether it serves South Africa’s ‘strategic purpose’. South Africa is also calculating in not entering into an agreement too early, perhaps due to the country’s intention to gain maximum benefit from such an agreement. This is also evident in the disclosure of South Africa’s endorsement and support to ‘obtain the maximum strategic benefit from the support offered to other states’.67 South Africa’s declared foreign policy on Africa (i.e. advancing African

SOUTH AFRICA’S CANDIDATURE DIPLOMACY

South Africa is also mindful of the timing of reciprocal agreements

interests) is captured in its policy on the nomination and election of candidates. South Africa’s nomination and support for a candidate will be ‘informed by the AU endorsement process’. This process entails South Africa’s presentation of its candidate to the AU Ministerial Committee on Candidatures through the AUC, at least two months before the AU Executive Council’s sessions, for consideration by the Council.68 Dlamini-Zuma’s tenure as AUC chair produced mixed results.69 Besides calls for reforms relating to the functions and election of the AUC chair, Dlamini-Zuma is widely credited for the AU’s Agenda 2063, with the AfCFTA being one of its flagship projects (also see Chapter 12 in this volume).70 Some of South Africa’s investment in her candidature and tenure produced results. President Cyril Ramaphosa was elected as the AU chair for 2020, a position the country last held in 2002 when then President Thabo Mbeki served as its inaugural chair. Ramaphosa has also served as the chair of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (2020–2021).

INAUGURAL SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE AFCFTA Expected to create the world’s largest free trade area, the AfCFTA was launched during an AU Summit in Rwanda in March 2018. Comprising 55 African states, the AfCFTA will promote intra-African trade, create a continental market with more than one billion people with a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of approximately US$3.3 trillion, and attract investment.71 South Africa signed the AfCFTA Treaty in July 2018, and ratified the Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement between SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the East

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 309

309

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 15

African Community (EAC) in October 2018 – both events that occurred during President Ramaphosa’s tenure and constitute some of the early successes of his ‘New Dawn’ economic diplomacy. Leading the AfCFTA, albeit in a bureaucratic rather than a political capacity, has been of prime importance to South Africa. The mandate of the AfCFTA Secretary-General is, amongst others, to lead the secretariat, headquartered in Ghana, implement the AfCFTA Agreement, and provide technical support.72 The Secretary-General is thus in charge of the full operationalisation of the free trade agreement. The election of a South African candidate will not only add to the country’s continental status and prestige, but can also contribute to the African agenda of the Ramaphosa presidency and its focus on economic diplomacy.

OPPORTUNITY AND RATIONALE Wamkele Mene is a former Chief Director of African Economic Relations at the South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), a former chairperson of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Committee on International Trade and Financial Services, and South Africa’s chief negotiator at the AfCFTA talks. Unlike the two earlier case studies, where candidates were nominated, Mene, along with another 120 Africans, applied for the position once it had been advertised.

APPOINTMENT PROCESS The AUC delegated a technical selection panel of African trade ministers, which included South Africa’s Minister of Trade and Industry, to assess the 121 applications received. The six finalists were from Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Morocco.73 Hereafter, the technical panel identified and ranked three candidates, all diplomats, in order of their ranking: Wamkele Mene (South Africa), Faustin Luanga (DRC), and Cecilia Akintomide (Nigeria).74 The DRC candidate, Faustin Luanga, was an economic adviser to DRC President Joseph Kabila and a DRC negotiator for the AfCFTA, while Cecilia Akintomide of Nigeria was a practising lawyer, had extensive experience in the private sector, and was a former vice-president and general secretary of the African Development Bank (AfDB).75 Simmering Nigerian–South African competition for and tensions about continental leadership and influence surfaced in the appointment-turnedelection of the AfCFTA Secretary-General. In response to continental preference expressed for Mene, Nigeria attempted to block his appointment, refused to 310

withdraw its candidate, and insisted that the position should be up for election

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 310

2022/11/10 00:03

more suitable for the position than Mene. Besides this, Nigeria argued that it was promoting a female candidate in view of Ramaphosa’s acceptance speech of his chairpersonship of the AU focusing, inter alia, on women’s empowerment on the continent.77 The DRC followed suit and also refused to withdraw its candidate, resulting in tense discussions described as a ‘bitter fight’ in the AU Executive Council of Foreign Ministers.78 Some AU members expressed their opposition to the Congolese and Nigerian candidates, as both countries had at the time not yet ratified the AfCFTA Treaty but wanted to lead a free trade area.79 Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari did not attend the AU Summit in Kigali where the AfCFTA Treaty was opened for signature, stating that his government required time for consultations.80 Nigeria finally signed the agreement on 7 July 2019 but, on 20 August 2019, banned imports from all neighbouring states (Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cameroon, and Niger), effectively

SOUTH AFRICA’S CANDIDATURE DIPLOMACY

and not appointment.76 Nigeria argued that Akintomide, their candidate, was

ignoring the principle of free trade as espoused by the AfCFTA. Nigeria argued that it was acting due to security concerns.81 Some members were concerned by South African dominance on the continent, with Ramaphosa leading both the AU and the APRM.82 Failing to reach a decision, the Council of Foreign Ministers deferred the decision to the next day and the Heads of State and Government Summit, when it was put to a vote rather than being determined by the AU’s conventional method of decision by consensus. It was suggested that the South African, Nigerian, and Congolese presidents meet to resolve the issue. However, the meeting did not happen and, with tensions rising, voting was viewed as an option to resolve the issue.83 South African officials insisted that Nigeria had conducted a political battle over a technocratic decision that eventually required more than three days of deliberations from 7 February 2020.84 Old continental splits resurfaced as most West African states supported the Nigerian candidate, and southern Africa and East Africa predominantly supported South Africa’s Mene.85 One explanation that has been provided for Nigeria’s position is the country’s concerns about South Africa’s domination of intra-African trade: South Africa accounts for almost 34 per cent, whereas Nigeria accounts for 9 per cent.86 In a move reminiscent of the campaign for Dlamini-Zuma to lead the AUC, Nigeria raised the question of gender to promote its female candidate.87 The Nigerian delegation referred to Ramaphosa’s acceptance speech as the new AU chair in January 2020, during which he argued for more female representation in the AU.88 In contrast, South Africa argued that it had ratified the AfCFTA Treaty, while Nigeria and the DRC had not. South Africa again argued the rotational principle – that since West Africa is host to the AfCFTA headquarters in Ghana, the Secretary-General should be from another

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 311

311

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 15

African region.89 The winner would have to receive 33 out of 55 votes (a twothirds majority). Hence, seven rounds of voting by African heads of state and government followed days of ‘intense’ South African and Nigerian lobbying.90 Mene finally won the election. The DRC withdrawal and, perhaps, vote for the South African candidate may have been rewarded by the election of President Félix Tshisekedi as the first vice chair of the AU (2020), and thus the AU chair for 2021.91 Some of the reasons for Mene’s successful election became clear during this swearing-in ceremony on 18 April 2020, when references were made to his capability and effectiveness.92

LEADING THE ILO Mene’s election success may have served as one of South Africa’s motivations for fielding a candidate to lead the ILO, which was to elect a new DG in March 2022. Barely three months after Mene’s election, in May 2020, South Africa’s campaign for Mthunzi Perry-Mason Mdwaba for the position of DG of the ILO commenced and was set to be launched on 25 June 2021 in Geneva, Switzerland. Mdwaba is an academic, businessman, chairperson of the board of the state entity Productivity SA, and a former vice DG of the ILO. South Africa formally nominated and lodged papers in support of Mdwaba  on 14 September 2021.93 According to South Africa, Mdwaba has the ‘requisite set of skills, experience, knowledge and competence’ and, equally importantly, ‘the understanding and tripartite multi-constituency’ to lead the ILO.94 The South African’s candidature was also endorsed by both the AU and SADC.95 However, within a month of Mdwaba’s nomination, the South African Cabinet decided to terminate its support for him.96 On 4 October 2021, Mdwaba’s campaign issued a statement referring to South Africa’s ‘mysterious withdrawal’ of his candidature, stating that he had not been consulted with or informed of the decision beforehand; the matter was complicated by South Africa’s silence on its decision. South Africa suffered reputational damage in the context of a multilateral institution, diplomatic leadership, and domestically, as, for example, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) is a major partner of the ruling party’s Tripartite Alliance. Moreover, the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), a labour– business–government entity, had also supported Mdwaba’s nomination. Mdwaba’s candidature was, seemingly, complicated from the start. His campaign launch, scheduled for July 2021 in Switzerland, was cancelled without a public explanation.97 Moreover, according to Mdwaba, government ringfenced R8 million for his candidature, but he received no funding to 312

campaign internationally.98 Mdwaba also blamed Minister of Employment

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 312

2022/11/10 00:03

did not support Mdwaba’s Productivity SA report to government. According to Mdwaba, he had heated exchanges with the minister, whom he knows from when they were both students at the University of the Witwatersrand. Moreover, the minister refused to sign off on Productivity SA’s performance agreement, as Mdwaba remained critical of government’s employment creation and labour policies.99 South Africa’s withdrawal of Mdwaba’s candidature, however, did not terminate the candidature. Mdwaba claimed that as he ‘ha[d] never been nominated by the South African government, this should not be confused with the country’s submission of his candidacy to the ILO’.100 Besides this, SADC and the AU endorsed Mdwaba’s candidature, and he was also nominated by six other state and four non-state ILO members, rendering his candidature still intact.101 At the time of writing (February 2022), Mdwaba was actively campaigning for the position.

SOUTH AFRICA’S CANDIDATURE DIPLOMACY

and Labour Thulas Nxesi for government’s decision, claiming that Nxesi

The reasons for the Ramaphosa government’s decision on Mdwaba’s candidacy remain vague, and may include personal and ideological differences. Responding to the withdrawal of South Africa’s support for Mdwaba, Statistician-General Pali Lehohla, formerly a senior government official, blamed government for ‘undermining’ Mdwaba’s candidature and referred to a ‘deeper issue of South Africans’ deployment strategy to international organisations’. According to Lehohla, a ‘disproportionately minuscule number of South Africans [are] taking up responsibilities in the global multilateral system, be it at the AU or the UN’. Lehohla explained that the multilateral system allows for a country’s participation in its global civil service framework and bureaucracy, which has diplomatic benefits that South Africa seems to disregard. First, having a citizen occupy such a position delivers pride to the country. The second benefit is that a state’s own context and experience form the basis for mutual empathy, informing and influencing alignment and exposure to global bureaucracies and enabling individuals, upon the end of their tenure, to bring back experience, exposure, and influential networks benefiting government.102 Mdwaba’s candidature and its termination occurred parallel to another effort by the Ramaphosa administration to lead an international organisation, but this time in the context of Africa.

AU LEADERSHIP ASPIRATIONS REDUX Ramaphosa’s leadership of the AU and APRM during 2020 may have been a motivation for the nomination of South African candidatures for more AU positions. South Africa was an architect of the APRM and has been leading

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 313

313

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 15

its secretariat, with former advisor to the South African foreign minister Eddy Maloka as the chief executive of the ARPM secretariat. Maloka has been credited for resuscitating the APRM. This incumbent’s advantage in the AU system, as well as South Africa’s foreign policy aspirations, may have been the motivating factor for fielding four candidates for AU positions in 2020. In August 2020, South Africa nominated two men – Maloka and DIRCO deputy director for Africa and former ambassador to the AU Ndumiso Ntshinga – for the position of deputy chairperson of the AUC.103 South Africa’s third nomination was for the newly created position of Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security; it nominated Ambassador Kingsley Mamabolo, Acting Joint Special Representative for Darfur and head of the UN–AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The fourth South African nomination, for the position of Commissioner for Education, Science, Technology and Innovation, was Molapo Qhobela, chief executive of the National Research Foundation (NRF).104 In October 2020, when Parliament questioned the decision to nominate men for the AUC deputy chairperson position, DIRCO, as the line function department, explained that it had issued an advertisement in July 2020 inviting South Africans to apply. It received five applications, from three men and two women. Parliament was also concerned about South Africa fielding two male candidates for the same position.105 According to DIRCO, only two candidates (both male) met the requirements, and both names were approved by Cabinet. DIRCO also explained that, given the six vacant AU commissioner positions, South Africa decided to field as many candidates as possible. However, parliamentarians criticised DIRCO’s failure to nominate women for international leadership positions, a position disputed by Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Candith Mashego-Dlamini.106 South Africa’s nomination of two candidates for the AUC deputy chairperson position was unprecedented, but both candidates were endorsed by SADC. However, in November 2020, a 26-page whistle-blowing report emerged from the APRM, alleging mismanagement, nepotism, favouritism, and corruption. This resulted in an internal investigation into, amongst other matters, Maloka’s and his deputy’s conduct.107 Although the outcome of the investigation was not conclusive, the AU invited tenders for a forensic and performance audit of the APRM and other agencies in September 2021.108 Besides this reputational setback for South Africa, it also became clear that the incumbent chairperson of the AUC, Moussa Faki Mahamat from Chad, was likely to be re-elected for a second two-year term. This left South Africa in a conundrum. New AU regulations stated that if the chairperson is male, the deputy chairperson of the AUC has to be female, a requirement

314

South Africa should have taken into account when nominating Maloka and

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 314

2022/11/10 00:03

announced the withdrawal of its candidates due to the gender rule, which allowed other SADC countries’ candidates to contest the leadership race.109 This diplomatic miscalculation by South Africa raised questions about its candidature policy and strategy and – given, for example, the investigation into Maloka’s APRM leadership – the vetting of candidates, as well as the country’s commitment to gender parity. The latter is of particular relevance to the Ramaphosa era, as he has vocally committed his tenure as AU chairperson to the empowerment of women. Besides withdrawing their candidates from the deputy leadership race, a clear diplomatic failure, both South Africa’s other candidates, Molapo Qhobela and Kingsley Mamabola, failed to get elected. This cast a shadow over the country’s foreign policy, status, and prestige, despite Ramaphosa’s leadership of the AU and the country’s Africa-focused foreign policy.

SOUTH AFRICA’S CANDIDATURE DIPLOMACY

Ntshinga, both men. At the SADC Summit in December 2020, South Africa

CONCLUSION This chapter addressed the gap in scholarship on South Africa’s leadership aspirations and campaigns to lead IGOs. These aspirations, a declared foreign policy objective, have produced mixed results. Some candidatures have been successful, whereas others were withdrawn or failed. South Africa’s leadership aspirations have been met with international and African opposition and accusations of hegemony, raising questions about South Africa’s international status and credibility. Accusations of votebuying and vote-trading have also been made. The cases presented, albeit different, share commonalities and, more importantly, have foreign policy implications. South Africa’s strategy often involved the nationality principle, the rhetoric of its unique history and identity, diplomatic lobbying, and logrolling and incentives (vote-buying and vote-trading). South Africa has spent significant financial amounts on lobbying campaigns, investments that predominantly produced nonmaterial gains such as status and prestige. Candidatures have been tests for the country’s continental and international credibility. For example, African IAEA board members were suspected of not voting for Minty, the election and appointment of both Dlamini-Zuma and Mene took several rounds of voting, and the other cases ended in failure and withdrawal. South Africa’s international credibility was also questioned, but the country’s efforts at candidature diplomacy seem to have produced some results, especially illustrated by its three terms on the UNSC. Continental leadership rivalries and differences persist, as is evident from linguistic power blocs and hegemonic rivalry between, for example, South Africa and Nigeria.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 315

315

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 15

Finally, the cases illustrate the country’s increased ambitions and its concomitant bureaucratic adaption to operationalise these ambitions. DIRCO has established entities and developed policies and criteria for candidatures which were adopted by Cabinet. In other words, where Minty’s candidature was ad hoc, subsequent candidatures have become institutionalised and a foreign policy priority. It remains to be seen how these aspirations will be affected by the global Covid-19 pandemic, which has coincided with President Ramaphosa’s tenure as chair of both the AU and APRM during 2020. It is likely that the pandemic will have a significant effect on South Africa’s future candidature diplomacy. Some of the first casualties of this emerged in early 2021, when South Africa’s four candidates failed to win seats on the AUC.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1

DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation). 2008. Annual Report 2007–2008. Pretoria: DIRCO, pp. 44, 84, 107. http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/ report_2007-2008/annualreport07-08.pdf (Accessed 15 April 2020).

2

This chapter draws on and expands on Van Wyk, J. 2020. ‘Candidature diplomacy: South Africa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s candidature to chair the AU Commission, 2011–2012.’ South African Journal of International Affairs 27(3): 317–338. https://doi.or g/10.1080/10220461.2020.1832912.

3

Kahler, M. 2001. Leadership Selection in the Major Multilaterals. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, pp. 13–15.

4

Kahler, Leadership Selection in the Major Multilaterals, pp. 13–16.

5

Eldar, O. 2008. ‘Vote-trading in international institutions.’ The European Journal of International Law 19(1): 3–41. https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chn001.

6

Eldar, ‘Vote-trading in international institutions’, pp. 5–6.

7

IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). 1989. Statute as Amended up to 28 December 1989. Vienna: IAEA. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/statute.pdf (Accessed 20 April 2020).

8

DFA (Department of Foreign Affairs). 2008. ‘Background on the nomination of Ambassador Abdul Samad Minty for the position of Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.’ http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/minty/ mintyiaea.doc (Accessed 23 April 2020).

9

Westall, S. 2009. ‘Candidates set to woo votes in murky IAEA election.’ Reuters, 13 May. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-iaea-election/candidates-set-woovotes-in-murky-iaea-election-idUSTRE54C56K20090513 (Accessed 15 April 2020).

10 DFA. 2008. ‘South Africa submits nomination of Ambassador Abdul Minty to the IAEA.’ Statement, 27 November. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2008/iaea1128.html (Accessed 15 April 2020). 11 DFA, ‘Background on the nomination of Ambassador Abdul Samad Minty’. 316

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 316

2022/11/10 00:03

13 Minty, A. 2009. ‘Statement by Ambassador Abdul Samad Minty, South Africa’s Governor to the IAEA Board of Governors at the IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Vienna, 4 March 2009.’ DIRCO. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2009/IAEA0305.html (Accessed 15 April 2020). 14 Minty, A. 2008. ‘Statement by Ambassador Abdul Samad Minty, South Africa’s Governor on the IAEA Board of Governors at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, Vienna, Austria, 1 August.’ https://www.gov.za/statement-ambassador-abdul-samad-minty-south-africa% E2%80%99s-governor-iaea-board-governors-international (Accessed 20 June 2022); Minty, A. 2008. ‘Media briefing by Ambassador Abdul Minty on his candidature for the post of Director-General of the IAEA. Pretoria, South Africa, 12 September.’ http://www.dfa.gov. za/docs/speeches/2008/ntsa0912.html (Accessed 24 January 2011); Onderco, M. 2016. ‘A battle of principles: South Africa’s relations with Iran.’ Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 54(2): 252–267, p. 260. https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2016.1151168.

SOUTH AFRICA’S CANDIDATURE DIPLOMACY

12 Ntsaluba, A. 2008. Media briefing; Minister of International Relations and Cooperation. 2010. Reply to Question No 708. Internal Question Paper No 7 of 15 March 2010 (NW832E). Questions and Replies of the National Assembly. 6 September. https://www.parliament. gov.za/storage/app/media/Docs/han_r_na/527143_1.pdf (Accessed 16 April 2020).

15 Heinrich, M. and Westall, S. 2009. ‘Elections for IAEA chief stalls after three rounds.’ Reuters, 26 March. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-iaea-election/election-foriaea-chief-stalls-after-three-rounds-idUSTRE52O7P220090326 (Accessed 23 April 2020). 16 Schulte, G. 2009. ‘IAEA/DG Race: Candidate need apply.’ Cable from US Ambassador to Vienna, Austria, 6 April. Canonical ID: 09UNVIENNA141_a. https://wikileaks.org/ plusd/cables/09UNVIEVIENNA141_a.html (Accessed 23 April 2020). 17 DFA. 2009. ‘South Africa to re-nominate Ambassador Abdul Samad Minty for the position of Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).’ Statement, 26 April. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2009/iaea0428.html (Accessed 23 April 2020). 18 United States (Pretoria Embassy). 2009. ‘SAG notes to SECSTATE requesting support for Minty at IAEA.’ Cable from US Embassy Pretoria. 29 May. Ref: 09PRETORIA1072. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0905/S01245.htm (Accessed 23 April 2020). 19 IAEA. 2009. ‘Board selects Japan’s Yukiya Amano as IAEA Director General.’ 2 July. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/board-selects-japan%C2%B4s-yukiya-amanoiaea-director-general (Accessed 23 April 2020). 20 Schulte, G. 2009. ‘IAEA/DG Race: Amano makes strong showing in straw poll but victory not in hand.’ Cable from US Ambassador to Vienna, Austria. 9 June. Canonical ID: 09UNVIENNA268_a. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09UNVIEVIENNA268_a. html (Accessed 23 April 2020). 21 Minty, A. 2008. ‘Statement by Ambassador Abdul S Minty to the Second Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Geneva, Switzerland, 29 April.’ http:// www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2008/mint0429.html (Accessed 24 January 2011). 22 News24. 2010. ‘Minty’s bid to head IAEA cost R 3m.’ 6 September. https://www.news24. com/SouthAfrica/News/Mintys-bit-to-head-IAEA-cost-R3m-20100906 (Accessed 16 April 2020). 23 Ntsaluba, A. 2008. Notes following media briefing. 24 Stott, N. 2008. ‘South Africa’s Abdul Samad Minty nominated for IAEA DirectorGeneral.’ ISS Today, 19 November. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africas-abdulsamad-minty-nominated-for-iaea-director-general (Accessed 28 June 2022). 317

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 317

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 15

25 Parliament. 2010. ‘R3.3m spent on Abdul Minty’s campaign to be IAEA chief – Minister.’ Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Reply to Question No 1. Internal Question Paper No 7 of 1 September 2010. https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/ r33m-spent-on-abdul-mintys-campaign-to-be-iaea-chi (Accessed 16 April 2020). Efforts to obtain a list of these 63 countries (mentioned in Hansard) from DIRCO, Parliament, and the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) were unsuccessful. 26 The Guardian. 2010. ‘US embassy cables: UN nuclear chief promises to take a low-profile role on Iran.’ 2 December. https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cablesdocuments/216128 (Accessed 23 April 2020); Schulte, ‘IAEA/DG Race: Candidate need apply’; Schulte, ‘IAEA/DG Race: Amano makes strong showing in straw poll but victory not in hand’; United States (Pretoria Embassy), ‘SAG notes to SECSTATE requesting support for Minty at IAEA’; Meyer, W. and Powell, I. 2012. ‘Minister confirms Iran vote was to help MTN.’ IOL, 26 August. https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/ minister-confirms-iran-vote-was-to-help-mtn-1369707 (Accessed 23 April 2020). 27 Westall, ‘Candidates set to woo votes in murky IAEA election’; Hibbs, M. and Persbo, A. 2009. ‘The ElBaradei legacy.’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 65(5): 10–23, p. 22. https://doi.org/10.2968/065005002. 28 Meyer and Powell, ‘Minister confirms Iran vote was to help MTN’. 29 DIRCO. 2010. Annual Report 2009–2010. Pretoria: DIRCO, pp. 52–53, 75. http://www. dirco.gov.za/department/report_2009-2010/annualreport2009-2010.pdf (Accessed 12 April 2020). 30 DIRCO. 2013. Measures and Guidelines for the Enhanced Coordination of South Africa’s International Engagements. Pretoria: DIRCO, p. 39. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2013/ measures_guidelines_book.pdf (Accessed 1 November 2019). 31 DIRCO. 2013. Annual Report 2012–2013. Pretoria: DIRCO, p. 66. 32 AU (African Union). 2020. ‘The AU Commission.’ https://au.int/en/commission (Accessed 26 April 2020). 33 DIRCO. 2012. ‘Press statement by Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, on the Chairpersonship of the African Union Commission, 18 January 2012, Bela-Bela Municipal Chambers, Bela-Bela.’ http://www. dirco.gov.za/docs/2012/au0118.html (Accessed 26 March 2020); also see Munusamy, R. 2012. ‘Zuma vs Dlamini-Zuma: A wildcard gamble for Mangaung.’ Daily Maverick, 22 June. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-06-22-zuma-vs-dlamini-zumaa-wildcard-gamble-for-mangaung/ (Accessed 26 April 2020). 34 Matjila, J. 2012. ‘Presentation to Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation.’ 8 August. https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/14659/ (Accessed 28 June 2022). 35 Matjila, ‘Presentation to Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation’. 36 PMG (Parliamentary Monitoring Group). 2012. ‘Summary of meeting of Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation. 7 August.’ https://pmg.org.za/ committee-meeting/14659/ (Accessed 4 April 2020). 37 The Presidency. 2012. ‘AU Commission Chairpersonship.’ Press statement, 13 July. http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/content/african-union-commission-chairpersonship (Accessed 6 April 2020). 38 Matjila, ‘Presentation to Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation’.

318

39 Kgwete, N. 2012. ‘The case for Nkosazana.’ PoliticsWeb, 12 July. https://www. politicsweb.co.za/documents/the-case-for-nkosazana (Accessed 4 November 2019).

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 318

2022/11/10 00:03

41 Matjila, ‘Presentation to Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation’. 42 The Presidency, ‘President Zuma returns from the African Union Heads of State and Government Ad Hoc Committee Meeting’. 43 Namibia Economist. 2012. ‘SADC re-endorse Zuma.’ 27 April. https://economist.com. na/1514/headlines/sadc-re-endorse-zuma/ (Accessed 4 November 2019); see also SADC (Southern African Development Community). 2012. Report of the Executive Secretary: Activity Report of the SADC Secretariat 2011–2012. Gaborone: SADC Secretariat, pp. 54, 65. https://www.sadc.int/files/1613/7243/4333/SADC_ES_Report_2011-2012_web.pdf (Accessed 4 November 2019). 44 Matjila, ‘Presentation to Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation’. 45 The Presidency, ‘President Zuma returns’. 46 SADC, Report of the Executive Secretary, pp. 54, 65. 47 Kgwete, ‘The case for Nkosazana’. 48 The Presidency, ‘President Zuma returns’; South African Government. 2012. ‘President Jacob Zuma to visit Benin on African Union (AU) business.’ 17 February. https://www.gov. za/president-jacob-zuma-visit-benin-african-union-au-business (Accessed 28 June 2022); AU. 2012. ‘Communique of the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State and Government of the African Union on Elections of Members of the African Union Commission.’ 17 March. https://au.int/sites/default/files/pressreleases/24828-pr-communique_du_comite_ad_ hoc_-_cotonou_17_march_2012_-_en.pdf (Accessed 28 June 2022).

SOUTH AFRICA’S CANDIDATURE DIPLOMACY

40 The Presidency. 2012. ‘President Zuma returns from the African Union Heads of State and Government Ad Hoc Committee meeting.’ 18 March. http://www.dirco.gov.za/ docs/2012/au0319.html (Accessed 28 June 2022).

49 GCIS (Government Communication and Information System). 2012. ‘Statement on the Cabinet Meeting of 16 May 2012.’ 17 May. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2012/ cabinet0516.html (Accessed 7 April 2020). 50 Molele, C. 2011. ‘SA treading carefully in bid for top AU position.’ Mail & Guardian, 18 November. https://mg.co.za/article/2011-11-18-sa-treading-carefully-in-bid-for-topau-position/ (Accessed 6 April 2020). 51 Ping, J. 2012. ‘Press Statement by Dr. Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, in response to an article titled, “At Last, SA may get its woman into AU post,” published in The Sunday Times of South Africa, on Sunday, 8 July 2012.’ News Ghana, 10 July. https://newsghana.com.gh/press-statement-by-dr-jean-pingchairperson-of-the-african-union-commission-in-response-to-an-article-titled-at-lastsa-may-get-its-woman-into-au-post-published-in-the-sunday-t/ (Accessed 6 April 2020). 52 The Presidency, ‘President Zuma returns’. 53 Molele, ‘SA treading carefully in bid for top AU position’. 54 Moodley, A. 2012. ‘Department of International Relations and Cooperation 2011/2012 Annual Report.’ Presentation to the Select Committee on Trade and International Relations, 21 November. https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/15287/ (Accessed 28 June 2022). 55 PMG. 2012. ‘Summary of meeting of NCOP Trade and Industry, Economic Development, Small Business Development, Tourism Employment and Labour.’ 20 November. https:// pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/15287/ (Accessed 4 April 2020). 56 Matjila, ‘Presentation to Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation’; Christie, S. 2012. ‘Vote lobbying lands SA in hot water.’ Mail & Guardian, 31 May. https:// mg.co.za/article/2012-05-31-vote-lobbying-lands-sa-in-hot-water/ (Accessed 7 April 2020). 319

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 319

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 15

57 DIRCO. 2012. Annual Report 2011–2012. Pretoria: DIRCO, p. 65. 58 Van Wyk, ‘Candidature diplomacy: South Africa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s candidature’. 59 DIRCO, Measures and Guidelines, p. 39. 60 DIRCO, Measures and Guidelines, pp. 51–52. 61 DIRCO, Measures and Guidelines, p. 51. 62 DIRCO, Measures and Guidelines, p. 42. 63 DIRCO, Measures and Guidelines, pp. 49–50. 64 DIRCO, Measures and Guidelines, p. 41. 65 DIRCO, Measures and Guidelines, p. 50. 66 DIRCO, Measures and Guidelines, p. 42. 67 DIRCO, Measures and Guidelines, p. 50. 68 DIRCO, Measures and Guidelines, p. 47. 69 News24. 2017. ‘Dlamini-Zuma’s failures, achievements as AU Commission Chair.’ 25 January. https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/dlamini-zumas-failures-achievements-as-au-commission-chair-20170125 (Accessed 26 April 2020). 70 Maru, M. T. 2012. ‘Rethinking and reforming the African Union Commission elections.’ African Security Review 21(4): 64–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2012.722338; News2, ‘Dlamini-Zuma’s failures, achievements as AU Commission Chair’. 71 DIRCO. 2019. Annual Report 2018/19. Pretoria: DIRCO, p. 87. http://www.dirco.gov.za/ department/report_2018-2019/annual_report2018_2019.pdf (Accessed 7 April 2020). 72 AU. 2020. ‘Swearing in of the Secretary General of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat.’ Media advisory, 19 March. https://au.int/en/ newsevents/20200319/swearing-secretary-general-african-continental-free-tradearea-afcfta (Accessed 15 April 2020). 73 Olivier, M. 2020. ‘African Union: Behind-the-scenes battle for leadership of AfCTA.’ The Africa Report, 10 February. https://www.theafricareport.com/23211/african-unionbehind-the-scenes-battle-for-leadership-of-the-afcfta/ (Accessed 28 June 2022). 74 Fabricius, P. 2020. ‘Was the tussle for AfCFTA Secretary-General an omen?’ ISS Today, 14 February. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/was-the-tussle-for-afcfta-secretarygeneral-an-omen (Accessed 27 March 2020). 75 GhanaWeb. 2020. ‘Here are the 3 shortlisted Candidates for Secretary General of AfCTA; no Ghanaian is included.’ 8 February. https://www.ghanaweb.com/ GhanaHomePage/africa/Here-are-the-3-shortlisted-candidates-for-General-Secretaryof-AfCFTA-no-Ghanaian-is-included-860209 (Accessed 28 June 2022). 76 Ogundipe, S. 2020. ‘South African emerges first AfCFTA secretary general.’ Premium Times, 10 February. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/376739-just-insouth-african-emerges-first-afcfta-secretary-general.html (Accessed 27 March 2020). 77 Hunter, Q. 2020. ‘Nigeria-SA tensions play out over top post for African free trade area.’ Times Live, 10 February. https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2020-02-10-sa-nigeriatensions-play-out-over-top-post-for-african-free-trade-area/ (Accessed 12 March 2021). 78 Hunter, Q. 2020. ‘South African wins bitter fight with Nigeria over top AU job.’ Times Live, 10 February. https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2020-02-10-sas-wamkele-menewins-bitter-fight-with-nigeria-over-top-au-job/ (Accessed 27 March 2020).

320

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 320

2022/11/10 00:03

80 Fin24. 2018. ‘Ramaphosa signs declaration on African free trade region.’ 21 March. https://www.fin24.com/Economy/sa-signs-african-free-trade-agreement-20180321 (Accessed 13 April 2020). 81 Journal NG Online, ‘Why Nigeria lost bid for AfCFTA top job’. 82 Olivier, ‘African Union: behind-the-scenes battle for leadership of the AfCFTA’. 83 Lakemfa, O. 2020. ‘Big Brother Nigeria still a toddler in African-politics.’ Vanguard, 15 February. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/02/big-brother-nigeria-still-a-toddlerin-african-politics/ (Accessed 27 March 2020). 84 Fabricius, P. 2020. ‘SA beats Nigeria to the top job in African Continental Free Trade Area.’ Daily Maverick, 11 February. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/202002-11-sa-beats-nigeria-to-top-job-in-african-continental-free-trade-area/ (Accessed 26 March 2020); Fabricius, P. 2020. ‘Ramaphosa hoist with his own petard over free trade agreement post.’ Daily Maverick, 10 February. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ article/2020-02-10-ramaphosa-hoist-with-his-own-petard-over-free-trade-agreementpost/ (Accessed 10 April 2020).

SOUTH AFRICA’S CANDIDATURE DIPLOMACY

79 Fabricius, ‘Was the tussle for AfCFTA Secretary-General an omen?’; Hunter, ‘South African wins bitter fight with Nigeria over top AU job’; Journal NG Online. 2020. ‘Why Nigeria lost bid for AfCFTA top job.’ 13 February. http://www.journalngonline. com/2020/02/13/why-nigeria-lost-bid-for-afcfta-top-job/ (Accessed 27 March 2020).

85 Fabricius, ‘Ramaphosa hoist with his own petard over free trade agreement post’. 86 Fabricius, ‘Was the tussle for AfCFTA Secretary-General an omen?’ 87 Fabricius, ‘Ramaphosa hoist with his own petard over free trade agreement post’. 88 Ramaphosa, C. 2020. ‘Acceptance Statement by South African President H. E. Cyril Ramaphosa on assuming the Chair of the African Union for 2020.’ AU, 9 February. https://au.int/en/speeches/20200209/acceptance-statement-south-african-presidenthe-cyril-ramaphosa-assuming-chair (Accessed 10 April 2020); Fabricius, ‘Ramaphosa hoist with his own petard over free trade agreement post’. 89 Lakemfa, ‘Big Brother Nigeria still a toddler in African politics’. 90 Fabricius, ‘SA beats Nigeria to the top job in African Continental Free Trade Area’; Ogundipe, ‘South African emerges first AfCFTA secretary general’. 91 Lakemfa, ‘Big Brother Nigeria still a toddler in African politics’. 92 AU. 2020. ‘Newly sworn-in AfCFTA Secretary General, Wamkele Mene, undertakes to serve Africa with resolute determination.’ Press release, 18 April. https://au.int/ en/pressreleases/20200418/newly-sworn-afcfta-secretary-general-wamkele-meneundertakes-serve-africa (Accessed 12 March 2021). 93 DEL (Department of Employment and Labour). 2021. ‘South Africa formally submits the candidacy of the SADC and African Union endorsed Prof Mthunzi Mdwaba as next International Labour Organisation Director General.’ Statement, 21 September. https://www.labour.gov.za/south-africa-formally-submits-the-candidacy-of-thesadc-and-african-union-endorsed-prof-mthunzi-mdwaba-as-next-internationa (Accessed 31 January 2022). 94 DEL, ‘South Africa formally submits the candidacy’. 95 DEL, ‘South Africa formally submits the candidacy’. 96 Mahlakoana, T. 2021. ‘After R8m campaign, SA revokes support for Mthunzi Mdwaba for ILO DG position.’ Eyewitness News, 4 October. https://ewn.co.za/2021/10/04/afterr8m-campaign-sa-revokes-support-for-mthunzi-mdwaba-for-ilo-dg-position (Accessed 31 January 2022).

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 321

321

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 15

97 South African Government. 2021. ‘Employment and labour on the launch of the candidacy campaign of Prof. Mthunzi Mdwaba for ILO position.’ 22 June. https://www. gov.za/speeches/employment-and-labour-launch-candidacy-campaign-prof-mthunzimdwaba-2022-elections-ilo-22 (Accessed 3 February 2022). 98 Business Day. 2021. ‘SA “revokes” support for Mthunzi Mdwaba’s bid to lead the International Labour Organization.’ 4 October. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/ national/2021-10-04-sa-revokes-support-for-mthunzi-mdwabas-bid-to-lead-theinternational-labour-organization/ (Accessed 31 January 2022). 99 Mkentane, L. 2021. ‘Mthunzi Mdwaba implicates Thulas Nxesi in withdrawal of support for ILO race.’ Business Day, 8 October. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/ national/2021-10-08-mthunzi-mdwaba-implicates-thulas-nxesi-in-withdrawal-ofsupport-for-ilo-race/ (Accessed 31 January 2022). 100 Mdwaba. 2021. ‘Professor Mthunzi Mdwaba has never been nominated … .’ @ Mdwaba4ILODG Tweet (9:34), 4 October. https://twitter.com/Mdwaba4ILODG/ status/1448552789395783681 (Accessed 31 January 2022). 101 Mdwaba for ILO DG Campaign. 2021. ‘South Africa’s mysterious withdrawal of its nomination for Prof Mthunzi Mdwaba as International Labour Organisation (ILO) Director General.’ Media release, 4 October. https://twitter.com/Mdwaba4ILODG/ status/1445012273630748673/photo/1 (Accessed 31 January 2022). 102 Lehohla, P. 2021. ‘Lessons for government in making Mthunzi Mdwaba’s nomination to International Labour Organisation useless.’ IOL, 17 October. https://www.iol. co.za/business-report/opinion/lessons-for-government-in-making-mthunzi-mdwabasnomination-to-international-labour-organisation-useless-1f81bd01-bf10-4dfa-ba905616c0b17851 (Accessed 31 January 2022). 103 Du Plessis, C. 2020. ‘Why SA had to “embarrassingly” withdraw its candidates for an AU Commission position.’ News24, 8 December. https://www.news24.com/news24/ southafrica/news/why-sa-had-to-embarrassingly-withdraw-its-candidates-for-an-aucommission-position-20201208 (Accessed 31 January 2022). 104 Du Plessis, C. 2020. ‘SA makes a push for top African Union Commission posts.’ Daily Maverick, 9 August. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-09-09-sa-makes-apush-for-top-african-union-commission-posts/ (Accessed 3 February 2022). 105 PMG. 2020. ‘Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation Meeting Summary, 21 October.’ https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/31263/ (Accessed 16 February 2022). 106 PMG, ‘Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation Meeting Summary’. 107 Awedoba, A., Kamski, B., Melber, H. and Sebudubudu, D. 2021. ‘Sub-Saharan Africa.’ In Africa Yearbook Volume 17: Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2020, edited by A. Awedoba, B. Kamski, H. Melber and D. Sebudubudu. Leiden: Brill, pp. 9–10. 108 AU. 2021. ‘Requests for proposals, Procurement No: AUC/OIO/C/001.’ September. https:// www.nepad.org/file-download/download/public/132173 (Accessed 3 February 2022). 109 Du Plessis, C. 2020. ‘Why SA had to “embarrassingly” withdraw its candidates’.

322

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 322

2022/11/10 00:03

David R. Black and David J. Hornsby

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 16

Constituting a Post-Hegemonic World Order? Canada, South Africa, and the Fragility of ‘Middlepowerism’

Canada and South Africa, like other middle-range states in world affairs (or middle powers), are facing extraordinary challenges that are tightly bound to growing uncertainties about world order. In the past, Canadian and South African foreign policy actors have relied on multilateral institutions to mediate, stabilise, and ideally resolve situations of deep uncertainty and insecurity and have, in turn, been active supporters and enablers of the work of these multilateral institutions and processes.1 But what happens when world order is in disarray, and/or when the states that have played key enabling roles are confronting deep uncertainties? This is the situation facing today’s middle powers, including Canada and post-apartheid South Africa. Both have played prominent roles as established and emerging middle powers, respectively, in the era of late globalisation, but both now face a core dilemma over whether to vigorously engage with efforts to reconstitute a post-hegemonic global order, or to draw inwards to address acute and mounting internal vulnerabilities. Even before the unprecedented stresses of the Covid-19 pandemic, both had been diminished and ‘wounded’ by their particular legacies of colonialism and the structural challenges facing their political economies. Given the unprecedented internal and external stresses they are now experiencing, how might they most effectively participate in efforts to reconstitute global institutions and world order? How might their choices influence order-building prospects? And how might they associate with each other in the process? We will argue that a reformed orientation towards multilateral processes and institutions, involving more selective and pragmatic engagements linked to the critical task of overcoming the structural flaws of the post-war order and helping to constitute a reformed alternative, would best serve their needs, interests, and ethical commitments. In short, this orientation could form the foundation for a ‘new dawn’ in South African (and Canadian) foreign policies – although the choices required to adopt it are far from assured. Although the role of middle powers and ‘middlepowerism’ has been debated for decades, there is widespread evidence that at least some

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 323

323

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 16

middle-range states have played key order-building roles in an array of historical ‘world orders’. As conceptualised by Cox, these roles are not top-down and architectural – roles that are more typically associated with major powers – but rather bottom-up and ‘lapidary’, ‘building […] stone upon stone, a structure that grows out of the landscape’.2 They are not intrinsic to particular states, but rather adhere to a shifting cluster of political communities as a reflection of their material interests, ideas, and institutions – ‘a role in search of an actor’.3 This middle-power role may be more conservative and oriented towards the status quo, seeking to stabilise an existing world order, or more reformist and even counterhegemonic, seeking to reconfigure the prevailing ‘rules of the game’ in ways that are more inclusive and broadly acceptable. In recent times, this distinction has been linked by Jordaan to ‘established’ (Global North) and ‘emerging’ (Global South) middle powers respectively.4 But both tendencies are ultimately necessary if orders are to be established, sustained, and reconstituted in the face of successive (and often overlapping) economic, geostrategic, social, and ecological shocks. The importance of these roles should not be overstated – middle powers are by definition secondary actors in world affairs – but neither should they be discounted. They are, in short, necessary but not sufficient to the process of (re-)constituting world orders. In this chapter, we begin by summarising the evidence for, and limitations of, Canada’s and South Africa’s middle-power roles in the post-World War II and post-apartheid eras respectively. We focus on Canada and South Africa in part because their parallel settler-colonial histories produce fruitful and insightful comparisons, but also because they are often seen as exemplars of ‘established’ and ‘emerging’ middle powers respectively. These middle-power categories are sometimes seen as incompatible, but we see them as being, in fact, essential to the production of world orders – especially when they are in processes of ferment and transition.5 We then outline the growing evidence for the apparent decline in their capacity and willingness to engage in the international activism that these roles require, and the more recent challenges they face as the institutional and normative foundations of the post-war order fall into disarray. In this chapter, our concern is not with the desirability of the post-war liberal international order, or (in Cox’s terms) the Pax Americana.6 Like all such historical arrangements, it has had both admirable and unjust features, and is (as understood through Cox’s historicist method) inherently transitory. Rather, we are interested in how Canada and South Africa are likely to respond to the twin challenges of unprecedented domestic stresses and growing international uncertainty. We consider what the repercussions of international retreat would be, and argue that the adoption of a more outwardly oriented role would better

324

serve both their domestic and international interests – although this is far

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 324

2022/11/10 00:03

possibility of a sustainable ‘new dawn’ in its international role. Finally, we explore the possibility that these two countries might be able to collaborate productively, should Canadians and South Africans choose to recommit to order-building internationalism in an increasingly post-hegemonic context.

CANADA AND SOUTH AFRICA AS MIDDLE POWERS As noted above, post-apartheid South Africa and post-war Canada have often been characterised as quintessential middle powers.7 The roles associated with this standing were seen, in turn, as the basis for their relatively prominent and activist approaches to world politics. In Canada’s case, this role was long under-theorised and oversold. Nevertheless, it was associated, broadly, with a strong commitment to the institutional trappings of the rules-based post-war liberal order, leading former Minister of Foreign Affairs Joe Clark to assert, ‘No other major power has Canada’s institutional reach.’8 In short, Canadian foreign policy makers emerged from the adolescent isolationism and the Great Depression of the 1930s, followed by the appalling carnage of World War II, with a shared understanding that actively engaging in efforts to foster a more stable and inclusive global order reflected a ‘hardheaded calculation of the (Canadian) national interest’.9 Over time, Canada was associated with various ordersustaining innovations, including large-scale UN peacekeeping (through the UN Emergency Force in 1956), efforts to enable orderly decolonisation and sustain/create institutions like the ‘new’ (post-imperial) Commonwealth and la francophonie in the 1960s and 1970s, and the practices associated with the ‘human security agenda’ (such as peacebuilding, the Ottawa Treaty [Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention], and the Responsibility to Protect [R2P]) in the 1990s. One of the most prominent, and mythologised, instances of Canadian ‘middle-power internationalism’ was, in fact, its activist role in the diplomacy surrounding the demise of apartheid in South Africa during the 1980s and early 1990s10 – a role which earned former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney the Order of the Companions of O. R. Tambo for ‘friendship shown to South Africa’.11 While Canada’s middle-power role was often perceived as making it, among Western governments, relatively friendly towards countries of the Global South and even-handed in the Cold War between East and West, this perception was misleading – though from a Western perspective usefully so. In short, Canada was always firmly aligned with its major

CONSTITUTING A POST-HEGEMONIC WORLD ORDER? CANADA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE FRAGILITY OF ‘MIDDLEPOWERISM’

from assured. In South Africa’s case, such an orientation may open up the

Western allies and thus a status quo country – albeit one that was also committed to the pragmatic adaptation of the prevailing order in ways

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 325

325

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 16

that sought to ameliorate its more destructive features and brought the Canadian government into alignment with a shifting array of collaborators on various instances of ‘niche diplomacy’.12 In this sense, it was able to serve as the benign face of Western hegemonic interests, as it arguably did in the case of apartheid South Africa and, later, the G8’s Africa Action Plan.13 It also made common cause with globally reformist governments like that of Nelson Mandela’s post-apartheid South Africa on, for example, the successful global effort to negotiate a convention to ban anti-personnel landmines (the Ottawa Process) and the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1995. South Africa, on the other hand, has carved a middle-power trajectory that is rooted in common conceptions of middle power but differentiated in terms of focus and impact (also see Chapter 14 in this volume). For the South Africa that emerged out of apartheid and the transnational antiapartheid struggle there was a keen desire, expressed most forcefully by then President Mandela, to define an international role that placed human rights and democracy at the centre of foreign policy decision-making.14 South Africa’s position as a moral actor within international affairs was solidified by its relatively peaceful transition from racial authoritarianism to a democratic dispensation in 1994 (also see the chapters in Section I of this volume). Particularly in the 1990s, this led to a highly diffused pattern of multilateral activism, including broad international negotiations (often in close alignment with Canada) on, for example, the Ottawa Treaty (AntiPersonnel Landmines Convention), the indefinite extension of the NPT, and the Kimberley Process on conflict diamonds. South Africa has regularly won the confidence of peers in the UN, occupying a rotating seat on the Security Council (UNSC) three times, in 2007–2008, 2011–2012, and 2019–2020. It has played leadership roles in international negotiations and efforts to address climate change and biodiversity, and has been a proponent of the multilateral trading system. It has been a critical member of the G20 group, as the only African state in this multilateral forum. It has hosted major international sporting events, such as the FIFA World Cup in 2010 and the International Rugby Board World Cup in 1995. Together, these initiatives and practices reinforced its position as a good international citizen and committed multilateral actor. From the beginning, however, this moral authority also rested on a strong sense of regional commitment to advance the common cause of other African states – reflecting, in part, the democratically elected government’s sense of historic obligation to the African states that had supported the anti-apartheid struggle as well as a desire to project a new, Africa-centred identity that clearly distinguished it from its racist predecessor. Since 1994,

326

the South African government has sought to represent African regional

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 326

2022/11/10 00:03

Union (AU), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). For South Africa, regional integration and leadership have been seen as particularly important in addressing its traditional position within the semi-periphery of the world economy. Here, regional frameworks to advance trade, economic development, and status claims were relied upon to exert power and influence in a world order that was considered inhospitable, if not antagonistic, to the interests of developing states. In South African foreign policy, therefore, regional integration is treated as offering an opportunity to accelerate development, and simultaneously as a means to increase power and influence as a step towards reforming global economic rules and structures.15 In this sense, South Africa has traditionally been considered an ‘emerging middle power’ due to its need to engage in and with multilateral institutions to advance its interests, including the need for economic development, a moral identity as a state that promotes and protects human rights, and a keen sense of regional obligation and leadership in sub-Saharan Africa. However, over the course of the last 28 years, South Africa’s role as a middle power has shifted towards a more explicitly revisionist position, with an increasing tilt to a more clearly articulated and committed proSouth and counter-hegemonic orientation, as explored in the next section.

THE (PARTIAL) UNRAVELLING OF MIDDLEPOWERISM IN CANADA AND SOUTH AFRICA Despite these well-established patterns of variations on middle-power internationalism, both Canada and South Africa have undergone an erosion of these orientations in the past 15 to 20 years. This section outlines some of the manifestations of this erosion, raising important questions about whether their internationalist proclivities can be rejuve-nated or whether we are seeing a long-term shift in their international roles.

CANADA Long before the recent ructions in the multilateral domain, linked to (among other things) the Trump administration’s belligerent ‘Americafirstism’ and China’s increasingly aggressive challenge to the institutional manifestations of Western hegemony, there were early signs of declining Canadian commitment to the good multilateral citizenship associated with middlepowerism. This became evident as far back as the 1990s

CONSTITUTING A POST-HEGEMONIC WORLD ORDER? CANADA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE FRAGILITY OF ‘MIDDLEPOWERISM’

interests in various multilateral institutions, including the UNSC, the African

when, impelled by fiscal austerity, the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien made deep cuts to the Canadian foreign affairs, defence, and development

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 327

327

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 16

cooperation budgets, thereby undercutting the essential means for international engagement at a time when unprecedented demands were being made through the peacebuilding agenda, global poverty and inequality were increasing, and growing evidence of environmental stress was coming to light. The result was characterised by Nossal as ‘pinchpenny diplomacy’: a situation wherein ‘this rich, safe, and well-endowed community [had] grown to begrudge international activism, to constantly cry poor, and to whinge (quite implausibly) that it cannot afford to spend more on international affairs’.16 The image of Canadian international activism was revitalised by the turn towards ‘human security’ championed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy in the late 1990s and early 2000s.17 The ‘human security agenda’ resulted in several hallmark initiatives, including the Landmines Treaty and the R2P doctrine noted above, as well as key diplomatic contributions to the negotiation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and a new emphasis on the Protection of Civilians (POC) in peacekeeping. But even these prominent initiatives were thinly resourced, leading many to question whether Canada’s human security agenda was ‘walking the talk’.18 Moreover, these apparently cosmopolitan initiatives were largely disavowed when the Conservative government of Stephen Harper took office in 2006. For most of the next decade, Canada pursued what it portrayed as a more ‘serious’ and realistic foreign policy that privileged a tight circle of Canada’s ‘closest friends and allies’, including leading Western powers and Israel. This era also saw an explicit pivot towards Latin America, which was viewed as offering greater potential for economic opportunity. At the same time, the Harper government frequently expressed deep scepticism towards more inclusive manifestations of multilateralism (notably associated with the UN) and the related need for diplomatic engagement with a diverse array of states, which it derided as ‘going along to get along’.19 The government of Justin Trudeau, which took office in 2015, promised a reversion to systematic and sustained engagement with multilateral institutions and processes, rhetorically asserting that ‘Canada’s back’.20 But despite the goodwill it initially enjoyed internationally, the Trudeau government has lacked direction on what it was back for. It did not undertake a foreign policy review, did not restore a discursive emphasis on human security, and did not substantially reinvest in development cooperation or peace operations. Its major peacekeeping deployment, to Mali in 2018–2019, was noteworthy for its careful ringfencing in terms of timeframe, risk, and (minimal) resource allocation.21 It did adopt the highprofile Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) and, more vaguely, articulated a commitment to a feminist foreign policy. However, while

328

the former, in particular, brought real policy changes, it did not bring a

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 328

2022/11/10 00:03

understanding of the changes and challenges in the prevailing global order was not effectively articulated.22 These trends should not be overstated; after 2015 Canada did engage more actively and constructively in multilateral processes in an array of areas (environment, development finance, peace operations). However, the sense of unfulfilled promise that had come to hang over the Trudeau government’s foreign policy was graphically manifested when its highprofile campaign for a seat on the UNSC in 2021–2022 was defeated by Norway and Ireland in June 2020 – the second time in a decade that a Canadian bid for a seat has been repudiated. Underpinning this slow but steady erosion in Canada’s engagement with multilateral institutions and processes were two deeper internal challenges and a set of novel external challenges, paralleling similar stresses in South Africa. First, Canada’s sense of moral authority or ‘license’ to engage internationally has been compromised by the country’s growing preoccupation with its own history of settler colonialism and the structural inequalities and injustices that have resulted. In short, ‘settler Canadians’ are being compelled to confront the degree to which their relative good fortune has rested on a foundation of displacement and exploitation, principally but not only of the country’s Indigenous ‘First Nations’.23 This affects Canada’s propensity to engage globally in two ways. First, there is a widely held view that Canada and Canadians must finally reckon with the resulting inequities and injustices, in ways that will demand deep political focus and sustained resource commitments. There is a strong sense, then, that Canada must spend a great deal more time ‘fixing’ its own international relationships with First Nations. Related to this is a growing sense that much of what has been done by Canada in the world beyond its borders is properly understood as colonial, particularly as it relates to the Global South.24 This claim has been most pointed in relation to the role of the Canadian extractive sector, but it is also now widely repeated in relation to Canadian development cooperation efforts, undermining the political case for reinvesting in what is still typically referred to as ‘foreign aid’. In addition, there is a sense of deep uncertainty and vulnerability concerning the material foundations of Canadian prosperity, and therefore the country’s ability to expend resources on international affairs. This is linked to the extractivist heritage of Canadian settler colonisation – a heritage shared with South Africa. In short, while Canada has a relatively rich and diversified political economy, at its core lies an enduring reliance on natural resources and resource extraction.25 This is reflected in the

CONSTITUTING A POST-HEGEMONIC WORLD ORDER? CANADA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE FRAGILITY OF ‘MIDDLEPOWERISM’

significant reinvestment in policy capacity, while its connection to a broader

country’s longstanding, if eroding, reliance on forestry, fisheries, hydroelectric power, mining, and above all hydro-carbons, underpinning an

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 329

329

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 16

unhealthy reliance that Haley terms the ‘carbon trap’.26 This reliance is unevenly distributed nationally, leading to structural conflicts between different provincial jurisdictions in Canada’s decentralised federal political system. Moreover, as national and international alarm over climate change mounts, and with it pressure to decarbonise the global economy, uncertainty over the traditional material foundations of the Canadian economy also grows. With decline and displacement becoming more prevalent in Canada’s extractive sectors, it becomes harder to make the case that the Canadian government should devote scarce resources to the demanding challenges of multilateral renewal, which are often portrayed as coming at the expense of the needs of vulnerable Canadian workers and corporations. Together, these deep challenges undermine the ethical, material, and reputational foundation for Canadian international activism.

SOUTH AFRICA For much of the past almost three decades since the advent of democracy, it has been possible to consider South Africa’s position as a middle power, emerging or otherwise, to be relatively stable. More recently, however, years of regular economic growth have been pinched by growing fiscal pressures associated with increased government expenditure, a small taxpayer base, and persistent challenges of poverty and corruption. There is also evidence that South Africa’s commitment to key facets of middlepowerism, namely a belief and engagement in multilateralism and good international citizenship, has been eroding. Internal difficulties associated with moral leadership and changes to the material foundations of the South African economy, namely an over-reliance on extractive industries, reinforce the sense of a partial unravelling of South Africa’s position as a middle power. Evidence that South Africa’s commitment to multilateralism is eroding can be found in its chequered record of success and substantive engagement in such areas as human rights, security, and peacebuilding and in its advocacy for other states in the Global South. Indeed, South Africa’s position as a representative of sub-Saharan African interests is persistently and increasingly contested as it grapples with the fallout of xenophobia towards other Africans and legacies of (regional) hegemonic behaviour. In the area of human rights, South Africa’s record has been inconsistent at best. The recent policy flip-flops on matters such as the treatment of Rohingya peoples in Myanmar and South Africa’s membership of the ICC are prominent examples of the relative decline of human rights in South African foreign policy. This is only reinforced when one considers the silence, or over-use of quiet diplomacy, by South African officials on 330

human rights abuses in eSwatini, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Tanzania,

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 330

2022/11/10 00:03

solidarity politics between erstwhile liberation movements in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), this trend stands in contradiction to official policy positions on the need to actively safeguard human rights.27 South Africa’s position on the Russia–Ukraine conflict reinforces the country’s retreat from a foreign policy premised on human rights. Despite clear evidence of widespread human rights abuses and war crimes against Ukrainian non-combatants by Russian soldiers in the context of its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, South Africa’s reticence to condemn and hold Russia to account is stark. Official narratives that South Africa is playing a mediation role in the conflict have not yet been borne out in reality and appear increasingly unlikely, as Ukraine will be disinclined to see South Africa as an honest broker given its silence concerning Russian aggression and alliance with Russia through the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping. Similarly, South Africa’s middle-power orientation appears to be unravelling in the domain of peace operations (also see Chapter 11 in this volume). The 2012 White Paper on South Africa’s Participation in International Peacekeeping Missions can be seen as an important signifier of the country’s commitment to good international citizenship and to growing its capacity to participate in important aspects of peacebuilding, such as mediation, negotiation, and post-conflict reconstruction. Throughout South Africa’s democratic experience since 1994, successive ANC-led governments have been committed to liberal peacekeeping and peacebuilding practices. For example, Lalbahadur and Rawhani chart this commitment through an analysis of South Africa’s peacebuilding efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from Mandela through to the end of the Jacob Zuma administration.28 Indeed, South Africa’s position as a peacebuilder on the continent is well documented. However, challenges in implementation and realisation have grown, as manifested in operational shortfalls such as a shortage of skilled personnel and outdated equipment, a lack of sufficient and sustainable funding, and in some instances policy incoherence (e.g. UNSC Resolution 1973 on Libya).29 Recently, South Africa’s position in protracted armed conflict – for example partnering with the South Sudanese government despite its use of child soldiers – has often been at odds with its earlier, robust commitments to human rights and protection of civilians, reflecting both its increasingly sceptical stance towards ‘Western’ institutional norms and practices and its limited capacity to engage.30 Underpinning the steady erosion of South Africa’s engagement with multilateral challenges, and of its capacity to address these challenges, are

CONSTITUTING A POST-HEGEMONIC WORLD ORDER? CANADA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE FRAGILITY OF ‘MIDDLEPOWERISM’

for example. Whilst some commentaries suggest that these retreats reflect a

two deeper internal challenges. The first relates to an eroding ethical and reputational foundation – a decline in moral authority – that stems from an

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 331

331

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 16

inability to address critical social problems such as poverty,31 xenophobia,32 gender-based violence,33 homophobia,34 and a growth in corruption and the ills of a rentier state.35 The promise of a post-apartheid era anchored by restitution for the injustices of the past and a foundational commitment to ‘a better life for all’ has largely dissipated. In seeking to displace responsibility for its failure to mitigate these persistent manifestations of internal oppression, the government and other political actors have increasingly sought to scapegoat particular racial groups, like foreign black Africans and white and Indian South Africans. The growth in institutionalised xenophobia in South Africa is reflected in the inclusion of a provision to restrict the types of jobs foreign workers can secure in earlier versions of the Township Economic Development Bill by the Gauteng Provincial Legislature. Despite the ultimate removal of Clause 7 from this Bill, its initial inclusion reflects an attitude and sentiment that pervades political and social institutions.36 This has heightened social tensions and divisions in ways that further erode prospects for an inclusive, multicultural South Africa. The second underpinning challenge relates to the eroding material foundations of the South African economy and the ability of the government to allocate resources to address both internal social problems and external obligations and aspirations. Long before the Covid-19 pandemic, which has further exacerbated the economic woes of South Africa, critical sectors such as the extractive and industrial/manufacturing industries were in long-term decline, resulting in a failure to provide decent employment to many, if not most, South Africans. Whilst the financial sector continues to be robust, its unwillingness to invest in South African job creation and growth reflects a lack of confidence in the government.37 In the eyes of private enterprise, the ANC government has squandered valuable resources and opportunities by tolerating and even enabling the decline in parastatal corporations that are necessary to create the conditions for economic growth, such as energy generation (Eskom), water management (various metropolitan water boards), transport (South African Airways [SAA], Transnet, and the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa [PRASA]), and defence technology and manufacturing (Denel).38 Financial support for the conduct of foreign affairs is also under pressure. In 2020, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) underwent a base budget cut of R317 million as part of the response to the economic cost of Covid-19, and budget revisions to the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF) were deferred, affecting targets on various continental initiatives critical to South Africa’s peace and security work.39 This reflects a broader concern around the cost of South Africa’s foreign engagements and whether they represent an efficient and

332

appropriate use of limited government resources under present conditions.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 332

2022/11/10 00:03

costs the fiscus R866 million per year in membership fees and associated expenses.40 DIRCO maintains 122 diplomatic missions around the world, resulting in significant capital and labour costs that have long been a source of frustration amongst observers.41 In sum, like Canada, the ethical and material foundations for the activism required for good international citizenship are in short supply and apparently diminishing.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE EROSION OF THE POST-WAR WORLD ORDER For both South Africa and Canada, the internal pressures for international retrenchment have been reinforced by growing external pressures associated with the eroding foundations of the post-war liberal order. To reiterate, this is not a comment on the legitimacy or desirability of this order, which, despite its achievements, has been associated with widening global inequalities, intensified resource exploitation, ecological unsustainability, and persistent zones of human insecurity in some of the most marginalised regions of the decolonising world. In short, this is an order that is ripe for reform. Our objective is to highlight the pressures associated with its erosion on erstwhile middle powers, and the risks and dangers should this trend continue without a systematic effort to reform and reconstitute it. There is no need to delve into the markers of erosion at length, since they are widely recognised and debated. Rather, our task is to lay out some of the ways in which they pose particular challenges to middle powers like South Africa and Canada. For Canada, the most disorienting challenge is the rapid degeneration of the USA’s hegemonic role (understood in neoGramscian terms) in the post-war order, a role which strongly informed Canadian international activism. Canada’s economic dependence on and sociocultural interpenetration with the USA are well known. The USA accounts for the vast majority of Canada’s exports and imports, for example.42 As long as the USA was the principal (if problematic) underwriter of the global order, there was no structural contradiction between a policy orientation committed to strengthening that order and maintaining a strong relationship with the USA. As the latter, especially during the Trump administration, became increasingly and aggressively parochial, however, the Canadian government was forced to expend large amounts of time and resources on managing frictions in the relationship, often at the expense of devoting time and attention to broader collective challenges.43 Similarly, if Canada’s middle-power role was substantially concerned

CONSTITUTING A POST-HEGEMONIC WORLD ORDER? CANADA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE FRAGILITY OF ‘MIDDLEPOWERISM’

Currently, South Africa belongs to 26 multilateral institutions, which

with serving as a relatively benign Western interlocutor with non-Western and post-colonial countries of various ideological stripes, the increasing

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 333

333

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 16

assertiveness of counter- or anti-hegemonic powers globally has made this role increasingly uncomfortable, if not untenable. In this respect, Canada has found itself increasingly whipsawed between its largest and second-largest trading partners, the USA and China, with the latter under Xi Jinping becoming more openly coercive and punitive in its approach towards diplomatic and economic ‘partners’.44 The same could be said about Canada’s relations with other dissenters from dominant liberal political and human rights norms, including Russia and Saudi Arabia, both of which Canada has had vexing confrontations with, over (for example) Crimea, Chechnya, human rights abuses, the assassination of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and now, most acutely, the war in Ukraine. In this conflict (and in stark contrast to South Africa’s position), Canada has foreclosed any effort to serve as an ‘honest broker’ seeking to mediate; instead, it is ‘all in’ with Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This approach is partly explained by the fact that Canada is home to the third largest concentration of Ukrainians in the world (after Ukraine and Russia), with 1.4 million Canadians of Ukrainian descent. Finally, in this atmosphere of growing polarisation and pushback against the integrative trajectory of post-1990 globalisation, including the resurgence of authoritarianism, the still-fragile machinery of global governance – including but extending beyond institutions linked to the UN – has come under increasing stress. Renewed polarisation within the UNSC is just the tip of the iceberg for an institutional assemblage that is central to efforts to address collective challenges yet feeble in its ability to do so, as has been exemplified by the much-maligned role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic. Since much of the work of middle powers historically (including both Canada and South Africa) was aimed at buttressing and building the capacity of these manifestations of inclusive multilateralism, while working with and through them to address wicked transnational challenges (of health, environment, migration, food security, and peacebuilding amongst others), the growing political vulnerability of these institutions poses an acute dilemma for middle powers. Should they work with other, more or less like-minded, actors in efforts to support, renew, and/or remake these institutions, or should they cut their losses and seek shelter in their immediate regional environs and/or with their most proximate major power ‘friends’? For its part, in this increasingly polarised context South Africa, particularly under the Zuma presidency, shifted from its initial uneasy balancing of relationships with the Global South and broadly multilateralist tendencies, involving an effort to act as a bridge between North and South, to a decisive tilt towards the South.45 This was reflected in its clear (and

334

necessary) prioritisation of relations with Africa, and with the BRICS

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 334

2022/11/10 00:03

orientation. The trend was reinforced by the foreign policy of Ubuntu, adopted by Cabinet in 2012 after the release of a white paper that called for South Africa’s international positioning to be premised on ‘collaboration, cooperation and partnership rather than […] conflict or the use of force’.46 It was also reflected in a normative stance that increasingly privileged an ethics of Global South solidarity and soft anti-imperialism, while downplaying the emphases on human rights and democracy that had been privileged in Mandela’s 1993 Foreign Affairs blueprint for South Africa’s future foreign policy and prioritised in the immediate post-apartheid years.47 There were a number of pivotal issues and instances that pushed South Africa in this direction, including its sense of betrayal when Western UNSC members overstepped the objectives of UNSC Resolution 1973 (which South Africa had initially supported) to engineer regime change in Libya, and growing African dismay over the ICC’s virtually exclusive targeting of Africans for indictment. Successive South African governments, like other counterparts in the Global South, were also deeply frustrated by the apparent futility of efforts to reform the ‘commanding heights’ of the post-war multilateral order, including the UNSC and the Bretton Woods institutions, to better reflect the demographic, diplomatic, and economic balance between South and North. The situation further deteriorated when governments like Canada’s, which had been one of South Africa’s key partners on important diplomatic initiatives in the 1990s, became patently disinterested in sustaining a strong bilateral partnership under the Harper Conservative government, in office from 2006–2015.48 But South Africa’s growing tilt towards the Global South also reflected the increasing disavowal of ‘rainbowism’ within South Africa, and the fact that this tilt was better suited to the Zuma regime’s propensity for politicised deal-making with peers in the Global South. This, in turn, aligned with the growing trend towards ‘state capture’, enabled by the deep factionalism within the ruling ANC, which emphasised internal accumulation and undermined the moral authority of South Africa’s government both internally and externally.

CONSTITUTING A POST-HEGEMONIC WORLD ORDER? CANADA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE FRAGILITY OF ‘MIDDLEPOWERISM’

countries beyond it, in contrast to the country’s apartheid-era Western

335

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 335

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 16

OPTIONS FOR EMBATTLED MIDDLE POWERS: CANADA AND SOUTH AFRICA In the face of these unprecedented stresses on the activist foreign policy proclivities of both South Africa and Canada, emanating from inside and outside both countries, there are growing pressures to turn inwards and adopt a more narrowly self-interested orientation. Indeed, a growing cluster of scholarly voices are taking this line. In Canada, for example, in the influential ‘national newspaper’ the Globe and Mail, Ibbitson has argued: ‘The world is growing dark. Our political leaders continue to defend a rulesbased international order that is crumbling, putting Canada’s safety and prosperity at risk. So say the school of realists [...] who are impatient with the Pearsonian platitudes that still dominate Canadian foreign policy.’49 The impetus towards what Ibbitson calls ‘strategic retrenchment’ surely resonates in a South Africa struggling with profound and deepening economic, developmental, social, and political weaknesses and divisions, which many South Africans would (not without reason) ascribe largely to its long history of racial exploitation and its continued enmeshment in the deeply unequal structures of the crumbling global order. Yet neither country can address their mounting internal challenges without more effective transnational processes of mutual support and problem solving. These processes must address both material and ethical imperatives. Materially, prospects for structural transformation and renewal of their economies, for example, demand transnational norms, rules, and institutions to regulate and support more socially and ecologically sustainable extractive sectors, whilst requiring and supporting transformations away from reliance on destructive extractivist dependence. Ethically, their internal histories of race-based exploitation and injustice, and more recent instances of xenophobia, can only be addressed by adopting a less sanctimonious and more pragmatic and dialogic approach to rights reform, in which processes of internal reconciliation and redistribution are connected to new forms of transnational human rights engagement and support. Materially and ethically, growing pressures of more and less forced migration, which are creating mounting tensions but also opportunities domestically, can only be effectively and sustainably managed through transnational responses to the forces driving unprecedented rates of migration. Finally, responding effectively not only to the current Covid-19 pandemic but also to the inevitability of future transnational health emergencies will depend on intensified sharing of information, resources, and good practices, driven by the fundamental priority of sustaining human security in ways that also ameliorate histories of inequity. This is

336

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 336

2022/11/10 00:03

influence the future legitimacy of governments in both countries. In this context, marked by increasingly scarce public resources, deep internal challenges, and urgent transnational demands, a ritualistic commitment to sustaining old multilateral institutions will not achieve what is required nor win public and political support in either South Africa or Canada. Rather, efforts should be directed towards meeting the external requirements of middle-power states where they are at, in terms of the most pressing issues and challenges they confront. In practice, this means more emphasis on relatively flexible multi-stakeholder ‘coalitions of the willing’ within, beside, and beyond existing institutions. This is not a new idea or practice; an early exemplar was the Kimberley Process to regulate and ‘govern’ the trade in conflict diamonds. Beyond this, it echoes the much earlier emphasis on building global order through an assemblage of ‘functional’ arrangements.50 That said, what is required goes a step further, where the loose functional arrangements envisioned through informal assemblages are connected to the critical work of imagining normatively preferable futures51 and linking pragmatic responses to the longer-term goal of reframing the foundations of world order. Practically speaking, this means difficult choices, involving the abandonment of some international institutional attachments and the reform or reactivation of others. But how can this be done, considering the explicit needs and increasingly constrained capabilities of middlepower states like South Africa and Canada? Ultimately, what is required is a clearly articulated foreign policy framework that captures material and ethical aspirations whilst also incorporating a pragmatic assessment of institutional relevance in terms of urgent existing issues. Much of this work is likely to occur through deepened regional arrangements, along with bridging frameworks that link regional and multilateral levels and emphasise functional, issue-specific demands. Paradoxically, this trend could imply the proliferation, rather than the winnowing, of institutional arrangements, which could spread the already overstretched capabilities and contributions of middle-power states even more thinly. In this relatively fluid and dynamic context, the current array of middle-power states would have to accept an absence of comprehensiveness. They would not be able to participate in all or even most international institutions and initiatives, which would impose hard choices on inveterate joiners like South Africa and Canada. The current context of unprecedented demands and renewed fiscal stress would impose a heightened degree of discipline on their international policy decision-making. To be sustainable, these choices would need to be grounded in both their

CONSTITUTING A POST-HEGEMONIC WORLD ORDER? CANADA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE FRAGILITY OF ‘MIDDLEPOWERISM’

both a basic security imperative and a core ethical responsibility that will

material structures and needs, and their ethical foundations – understood 337

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 337

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 16

from a position of humility focused on the urgent work of fostering more equitable and just societies both domestically and internationally. Moreover, middle-power states and their non-state collaborators would need to expect and prepare for a greater degree of institutional fluidity, with initiatives emerging relatively quickly to meet particular needs and, in some cases, falling almost as quickly into obsolescence. There would be a constant process of experimentation and evaluation of institutional utility, with some achieving a high degree of durability and others not. Helpful examples of what this might look like include the establishment of the IBSA (the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum) arrangement in 2003. It was strategic, focused, and oriented towards a developmental objective that reflected a shared identity between the three states, but then became a bridge to the relatively more formalised institutional arrangement of BRICS. A similar example in a more focused thematic domain is the Human Security Network (HSN), jointly initiated by Canada, Austria, and Norway, with South Africa as a key member, in 1999.52 The HSN brought shared focus to a diversified agenda of unconventional security issues, many of which were picked up and carried forward by other institutions long after the network had declined into disuse.

CONCLUSION: WHAT IS THE MIDDLE POWER OF TOMORROW? As Cox argued many years ago, the historical process of building, sustaining, and supplanting world orders cycles through phases of relative stability and dynamism.53 Today, we are clearly in a ‘moment’ of transition (although the length of this moment is unclear), in which the middle-power role will be much more focused on adapting to and enabling change than facilitating stabilisation. Paradoxically, however, this process of navigating change requires a clear understanding of the priorities and identities of participants – an anchoring international policy framework that guides action.54 This is something that both Canada and South Africa currently lack, and need to establish through broad-based foreign policy reviews. It also has implications for how we think about and train the diplomats who will be the ‘engineers’ of the process.55 A key facet of the post-hegemonic world order is acknowledging that we are all grappling with internal contradictions and challenges. For Canada and South Africa, along with other middle powers, this also requires a humbler disposition. Whereas both approached their international roles in the past from a presumed position of moral authority, more recent events have forced both to confront the continuing impact of the structural 338

injustices on which they were historically constituted. No longer can

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 338

2022/11/10 00:03

is disconnected from the realities of their internal politics. Pretensions of ideational purity – or moral virtue – cannot serve as a plausible basis for building something new. South Africans and Canadians alike are grappling with challenges of justice and inclusion. The middle powers of the future must therefore link their efforts to assist with ‘ordering the world’ to the parallel requirement to re-order themselves. For Canada and South Africa, this means addressing the deep structural inequalities and contested identities that persist from their own foundations in and continuing entanglements with colonialism, apartheid, and xenophobia. The middle power of tomorrow must also approach its international engagements from a position of deep material and increasing security vulnerabilities. In a situation where traditional foundations of wealth and prosperity are unsustainable, a middle power’s international policies require an emphasis on supporting sustainable transitions towards more inclusive economies that hold out the prospect of relatively rapid improvements in material conditions for traditionally marginalised citizens. In the external domain, the challenge is about creating new arrangements involving a shifting matrix of state and non-state participants. As noted above, this requires a degree of nimbleness and an acceptance of contingency, involving both temporary governance arrangements and more or less deep reforms to pre-existing ones. Arrangements have to work in the present context and be sufficiently flexible to change and evolve. We have noted a number of initiatives that reflect this requirement, such as the Kimberly Process, the IBSA–BRICS transition, and the HSN. But we are cognisant that this may need to take shape in ways not previously experienced or imagined. While this task could be presumed to reflect a narrow and pragmatic version of self-interests, and indeed needs to meet pressing national requirements, it also needs to be connected to the larger and longer-term process of addressing the structural inequities that have been embedded and exacerbated by the current hegemonic order, in order to imagine something new. In particular, it needs to be centrally concerned with diminishing inequities within and beyond participants in the re-ordering process, and strengthening our collective ability to address urgent issues of common concern (e.g. global health, migration, poverty, environmental sustainability, rights abuses). The overarching task is not one of grabbing and holding, as reflected in narrowly instrumental approaches to selfinterest, but of solving and advancing well-being within and among the constituents of the global order. Ultimately, we also need to recognise that the middle powers of today

CONSTITUTING A POST-HEGEMONIC WORLD ORDER? CANADA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE FRAGILITY OF ‘MIDDLEPOWERISM’

middle powers project an image of themselves in multilateral settings that

may not be the middle powers of tomorrow: South Africa, Canada, and/or both may play a renewed order-constituting role, or may find themselves

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 339

339

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 16

slipping further towards declining relevance and increased insularity. Which trend predominates will depend on both capabilities and choice. The adoption of an engaged, order-building role depends on intentionality and on the ability to build an internal coalition in support of international activism. As noted at the outset of this chapter, middlepowerism is best understood as ‘a role in search of an actor’, and new actors/allies will emerge that should be recognised and engaged. These will undoubtedly be both non-state and state-based. Whilst we have suggested that the concept of middle power needs reconsideration and revision, there are some things that remain consistent: Middle powers almost never act alone; their effectiveness depends on forging both formal and informal relationships and collaborative initiatives; and the notion of middle power itself encompasses differences of material capabilities and normative orientations, as captured by Jordaan in the distinction he draws between traditional and emerging powers.56 With these considerations in mind, South Africa and Canada have the potential to productively engage in a limited range of shared strategic initiatives in areas of overlapping interest and vulnerability. These could include key functional issues, such as initiatives concerning environmentally and socially sustainable governance practices for extractive sectors, building on previous initiatives like the Kimberly Process; joint initiatives on forced migration, where both have important regional and international roles to play; ongoing opportunities for collaborative work on sexual and reproductive health and rights, which both countries have prioritised; and the challenges of post-colonial truth and reconciliation, where Canada has important lessons to learn from the South African experience. More architecturally, shared initiatives could also include strategically chosen processes of multilateral institutional reform to address structural inequities in global governance. An obvious but by no means isolated example would be the reform and strengthening of global health institutions, in which the Covid-19 pandemic has exposed deep inequities and, in Canada’s case, shameful racial residues57 that contribute to counterproductive impacts for both countries. Canada’s steadfast refusal to support South Africa’s call for a Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) waiver for Covid-19 vaccines at the WTO indicates that much work needs to be done in this space to bring the two countries closer together. We have explored the potential for joint initiatives elsewhere.58 But South Africa and Canada also have much to gain through more informal processes of information sharing and mutual education concerning what the acute problems of international affairs look like, and what they demand, from their historically overlapping but structurally and regionally distinct

340

‘positionalities’. While there is no assurance that these opportunities will

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 340

2022/11/10 00:03

re-commitments to the more far-reaching processes of multilateral reform that we have argued both countries would ultimately benefit from.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1 See, for example, Nel, P., Taylor, I. and Van der Westhuizen, J., eds. 2001. Between Hegemony, Counter-Hegemony, and Post-Hegemony: Multilateralism in South Africa’s Foreign Policy Since 1994. Aldershot: Ashgate Press; Van Wyk, J. 2019. ‘From apartheid to Ubuntu: Transition, transaction and transformation in South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign ministry.’ South African Journal of International Affairs 26(3): 413–434, p. 419. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2019.1661281; Murray, R., ed. 2016. Seeking Order in Anarchy: Multilateralism as State Strategy. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press. 2 Cox, R. 1989. ‘Middlepowermanship, Japan, and future world order.’ International Journal 44(4): 823–862, p. 829. https://doi.org/10.1177/002070208904400405. 3 Cox, ‘Middlepowermanship, Japan, and future world order’, p. 829. 4 See Jordaan, E. 2003. ‘The concept of a middle power in international relations: Distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers.’ Politkon 30(2): 165–181, pp. 167–169. https://doi.org/10.1080/0258934032000147282; Jordaan, E. 2017. ‘The emerging middle power concept: Time to say goodbye?’ South African Journal of International Affairs 24(3): 395–412. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2017.139421. In the latter article, Jordaan argued that the counter-hegemonic tendencies of ‘new’ or ‘rising’ states from the Global South are incompatible with the order-sustaining role of established middle powers, leading him to suggest that the idea of ‘emerging middle powers’ should be jettisoned. We do not agree, for reasons that will be explored in this chapter. 5 Jordaan, ‘The emerging middle power concept: Time to say goodbye?’ 6 Cox, ‘Middlepowermanship, Japan, and future world order’. 7 Jordaan, ‘The concept of a middle power in international relations’; Black, D. and Hornsby, D. 2016. ‘Living up to expectations: Canada and South Africa in the era of the Global Markets Action Plan.’ Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 22(1): 12–25. https://doi. org/10.1080/11926422.2015.1129633; Black, D. and Hornsby, D. 2017. ‘South Africa’s bilateral relationships in the evolving foreign policy of an emerging middle power.’ In South African Foreign Policy: Identities, Intentions, Directions, edited by D. Black and D. Hornsby. London: Routledge. 8

Clark, J. 1988. ‘Canada’s new internationalism.’ In Canada and the New Internationalism, edited by J. Holmes and J. Kirton. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, p. 4.

9 Holmes, J. 1984. ‘Most safely in the middle.’ International Journal 39(2): 366–388, p. 369. https://doi.org/10.1177/002070208403900208. 10 Freeman, L. 1997. The Ambiguous Champion. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; Black, D. 1997. ‘Addressing apartheid: Lessons from Australian, Canadian, and Swedish policies in southern Africa.’ In Niche Diplomacy: Midddle Powers After the Cold War, edited by A. Cooper. London: Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25902-1_6; Manulak, D. 2020. ‘“An African representative”: Canada, the Third World, and South

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 341

CONSTITUTING A POST-HEGEMONIC WORLD ORDER? CANADA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE FRAGILITY OF ‘MIDDLEPOWERISM’

be seized, doing so would help reinforce foreign policy re-orientations and

341

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 16

African apartheid, 1984–90.’ The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 49(2): 366–399. https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2020.1783474. 11 Canadian Press. 2015. ‘Brian Mulroney feted in South Africa for governments antiapartheid efforts.’ CTVNews, 20 April. https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/brian-mulroneyfeted-in-south-africa-for-government-s-anti-apartheid-efforts-1.2335923 (Accessed 23 May 2020). 12 Cooper, A., ed. 1997. Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War. London: Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25902-1. 13 Black, D. 2015. Canada and Africa in the New Millennium: The Politics of Consistent Inconsistency. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Chapter 2. 14 Mandela, N. 1993. ‘South Africa’s future foreign policy.’ Foreign Affairs 72(5): 86–97. https://doi.org/10.2307/20045816. 15 Jordaan, ‘The concept of a middle power in international relations’, p. 176. 16 Nossal, K. 1998/99. ‘Pinchpenny diplomacy: The decline of “good international citizenship” in Canadian foreign policy?’ International Journal 54(1): 88–105, p. 104. https://doi.org/10.2307/40203357. 17 McRae, R. and Hubert, D. 2001. Human Security and the New Diplomacy. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press; Maclean, S., Black, D. and Shaw, T. 2006. A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms. Aldershot: Ashgate. 18 Riddell-Dixon, E. 2005. ‘Canada’s human security agenda: Walking the talk?’ International Journal 60(4): 1067–1092. https://doi.org/10.1177/002070200506000411. 19 See Nossal, K. R. 2013. “The liberal past in the conservative present: Internationalism in the Harper era.” In Canada in the World: Internationalism in Candian Foreign Policy, edited by H. Smith and C. Turenne Sjolander. Don Mills: Oxford University Press Canada. 20 The Canadian Press. 2015. ‘“We’re back” Justin Trudeau says in message to Canada’s allies abroad.’ National Post, 20 October. https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/wereback-justin-trudeau-says-in-message-to-canadas-allies-abroad (Accessed May 23, 2022). 21 Fisher, M. 2019. ‘Canadian peacekeepers returning home from Mali feeling under utilized.’ Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 9 September. https://www.cgai.ca/ canadian_ peacekeepers_returning _home_from_mali_feeling _under_utilized (Accessed December 2020). 22 Tiessen, R. 2019. ‘What’s new about Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy? The problem and possibilities of “more of the same”.’ SPP Research Paper 12:44, School of Public Policy, University of Calgary. https://www.cgai.ca/whats_new_about_ canadas_feminist_international_assistance_policy_the_problem_and_possibilities_ of_more_of_the_same (Accessed 18 May 2022). 23 Midzain-Gobin, L. and Smith, H. 2020. ‘Debunking the myth of Canada as a noncolonial power.’ American Review of Canadian Studies 50(4): 479–497. https://doi.org/1 0.1080/02722011.2020.1849329. 24 Butler, P. 2015. Colonial Extractions: Race and Canadian Mining in Contemporary Africa. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442619951; Engler, Y. 2015. Canada in Africa: 300 Years of Aid and Exploitation. Black Point: Fernwood. 25 Andrews, N. and Grant, J. A., eds. 2020. Corporate Social Responsibility and Canada’s Role in Africa’s Extractive Sectors. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. https://doi. org/10.3138/9781487517038.

342

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 342

2022/11/10 00:03

27 ISS (Institute for Security Studies). 2020. ‘Why is SADC slow to intervene in political crises?’ PSC Report, 26 August. https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/why-issadc-slow-to-intervene-in-political-crises (Accessed October 2020). 28 Lalbahadur, A. and Rawhani, C. 2017. ‘South Africa’s peacebuilding in the DRC: Convergence and dissonance with the liberal model.’ South African Journal of International Affairs 24(4): 523–545. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2017.1417906. 29 Mabera, F. 2018. ‘South Africa’s profile as peacekeeper: In keeping with the times?’ African Security 11(3): 223–251. https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2018.1520798. 30 Tryens-Fernandes, S. 2018. ‘South Africa secures seat on UN Security Council for third time.’ Human Rights Watch, 11 June. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/11/southafrica-secures-seat-un-security-council-third-time (Accessed October 2020). 31 Stats SA (Statistics South Africa). 2019. ‘National Poverty Lines 2019.’ Statistical Release P01310.1, 29 July. http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03101/P031012019. pdf (Accessed October 2020). 32 Human Rights Watch. 2020. ‘South Africa: Widespread xenophobic violence.’ 17 September. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/17/south-africa-widespreadxenophobic-violence (Accessed October 2020). 33 Stats SA. 2020. ‘Crimes against women in South Africa, an analysis of the phenomenon of GBV and femicide.’ 30 July. https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/1_ Stock / Events_Institutional /2020/womens_charter_2020/docs/30- 07-2020/A _ Statistical_Overview_R_Maluleke.pdf (Accessed October 2020). 34 De Greef, K. 2019. ‘The unfulfilled promise of LGBTQ Rights in South Africa.’ The Atlantic, 2 July. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/07/ southafrica-lgbtq-rights/593050/ (Accessed October 2020). 35 Friedman, S. 2020. ‘How corruption in South Africa is deeply rooted in the country’s past and why that matters.’ The Conversation Africa, 28 August. https://theconversation. com/how-corruption-in-south-africa-is-deeply-rooted-in-the-countrys-past-and-whythat-matters-144973 (Accessed October 2020). 36 BusinessTech. 2020. ‘Gauteng’s plans to restrict jobs for foreign workers: What you need to know.’ 28 September. https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/436219/gautengs-plansto-restrict-jobs-for-foreign-workers-what-you-need-to-know/ (Accessed October 2020). 37 Wood, S. 2020. ‘What will it take to improve SA’s private sector investment climate?’ Daily Maverick, 7 July. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-07-07-what-willit-take-to-improve-sas-private-sector-investment-climate/ (Accessed October 2020). 38 Omarjee, L. 2019. ‘SA’s public enterprises: Millions wasted and almost no permanent CEOs.’ Fin24, 10 June. https://www.news24.com/fin24/Economy/sas-public-enterprisesmillions-wasted-and-almost-no-permanent-ceos-20190610 (Accessed October 2020). 39 Singh, P. 2020. ‘COVID-19 exposes the high cost of SA’s foreign affairs.’ ISS Today, 6 October. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/covid-19-exposes-the-high-cost-of-sas-foreignaffairs?fbclid=IwAR3DAJhhxmytNRmXiDocSrbX2hd2Wb0sXiLgYFvgpAZfDldXxYRYr 79hK70 (Accessed October 2020). 40 Singh, ‘COVID-19 exposes the high cost of SA’s foreign affairs’.

CONSTITUTING A POST-HEGEMONIC WORLD ORDER? CANADA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE FRAGILITY OF ‘MIDDLEPOWERISM’

26 Haley, B. 2011. ‘From staples trap to carbon trap: Canada’s peculiar form of carbon lock-in.’ Studies in Political Economy 88(1): 97–132. https://doi.org/10.1080/19187033.2 011.11675011.

41 Singh, ‘COVID-19 exposes the high cost of SA’s foreign affairs’. 343

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 343

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 16

42 Government of Canada. 2020. ‘Canada’s state of trade 2020.’ https://www.international. gc.ca /gac-amc/publications/economist-economiste/st ate-of-trade-commerceinternational-2020.aspx?lang=eng (Accessed December 2020). 43 The best example of this is the exceptional effort required of the Canadian foreign policy apparatus to renegotiate the then North American Free Trade Agreement (now the US– Mexico–Canada agreement, or USMCA) in the shadow of President Donald Trump’s threat to tear it up – to end up at a place very close to where the negotiations began. On the trend among the USA and other contemporary ‘great powers’ towards a normative preference for the ‘right to dominate’, see Paris, R. 2020. ‘The right to dominate: How old ideas about sovereignty pose new challenges for world order.’ International Organization 74(3): 453–489. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000077. 44 Vanderklippe, N. 2020. ‘The wall and the way forward: Finding a new relationship with China.’ The Globe and Mail, 19 September. 45 See Black and Hornsby, ‘South Africa’s bilateral relationships’. 46 Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). 2011. Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy. Pretoria: DIRCO, p. 4. https://www.gov.za/sites/www. gov.za/files/foreignpolicy_0.pdf (Accessed 29 May 2018). 47 Mandela, ‘South Africa’s future foreign policy’; Mavhinga, D. 2018. ‘Ramaphosa should help restore SA’s moral high ground.’ Mail & Guardian, 21 March. https://www.hrw.org/ news/2018/03/21/ramaphosa-should-help-restore-sas-moral-high-ground (Accessed December 2020). 48 See Black and Hornsby, ‘Living up to expectations’. 49 Ibbitson, J. 2020. ‘Canadian gothic: A bleak world has left our foreign policy out of step with the times.’ Globe and Mail, 17 July. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/ opinion/article-canadian-gothic-a-bleak-world-has-left-our-foreign-policy-out-of-step/ (Accessed December 2020). 50 For example, Ashworth, L. and Long, D., eds. 1999. New Perspectives on International Functionalism. London: Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-27055-2. 51 Cox, R. W. 1981. ‘Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations theory.’ Millennium 10(2): 126–155. https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298810100020501. 52 See Axworthy, L., Vollebaek, K., Kuhnle, S. and Peou, S. 2014. ‘Introduction: Human security at 20 – Lysoen revisited.’ Asian Journal of Peacebuilding 2(2): 143–149. 53 Cox, ‘Social forces, states and world orders’; Cox, ‘Middlepowermanship, Japan, and future world order’. 54 This often takes the form of a White Paper. 55 Stairs, D. 2001. ‘Architects or engineers? The Conservatives and foreign policy.’ In Diplomatic Departures: The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984–93, edited by N. Michaud and K. Nossal. Vancouver: UBC Press. 56 Jordaan, ‘The concept of a middle power in international relations’. 57 See, for example, Naidoo, J. 2021. ‘Shame on you Canada – your racial bias is showing.’ Daily Maverick, 12 December. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2021-1212-shame-on-you-canada-your-racial-bias-is-showing/ (Accessed 18 May 2022). 58 Black and Hornsby, ‘Living up to expectations’, 19–22.

344

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 344

2022/11/10 00:03

Christopher Williams We value our relationship with the United States. We benefit a lot from it, and

CHAPTER 17

Conflicting Perspectives and Cooperative Connections: South African–US Relations during the Ramaphosa Administration

hopefully they do, too […] Despite what has been tweeted in the past, the relationship has not been negatively affected. But we would like to have it strengthened. — President Cyril Ramaphosa, 20181

INTRODUCTION When Cyril Ramaphosa took over as president of South Africa in February 2018, relations between his country and the USA were ‘correct’, but not especially friendly.2 Six months later, the US Embassy in Pretoria produced an Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for South Africa that stated: ‘By forging a strategic partnership with South Africa across economic, political, social, and security spectrums, we can advance the interests of both our countries, but this will require a fundamental change in the mindset of our counterparts in South Africa.’3 This chapter begins with a look back at how previous observers have assessed the ties between Pretoria and Washington over the last quarter century. This sheds light on the trajectory of the relationship between South Africa and the USA as well as the factors that have limited cooperation between the two states. The chapter finds that previous observers have focused on the ups and downs of the relations between Pretoria and Washington, but paid insufficient attention to the differing mindsets or worldviews that divide South African and American officials. With these differing worldviews as context, the chapter then discusses developments in the relationship during Ramaphosa’s presidency and assesses whether the ‘tremendous opportunities to broaden US engagement in South Africa’ identified in the ICS have been taken advantage of.4 Specifically, it examines three important areas of the bilateral relationship: trade and investment, health, and security. While cooperation in these areas cannot completely overcome the differing worldviews of policy makers in Washington and Pretoria, successful

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 345

345

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 17

collaboration will benefit both countries and likely create a spill-over effect that could broaden and deepen US–South African interactions. The chapter concludes with a brief analysis of US–South African relations during the Covid-19 pandemic, and what the two countries’ approaches to this crisis portend about the development of relations in the years ahead.

A QUARTER CENTURY OF HOPING FOR MORE Since South Africa became a non-racial democracy in 1994, dozens of reports, articles, and chapters have been written on relations between South Africa and the USA. The general theme of this body of research is that although South Africa and the USA have developed fruitful collaborations in many areas, the relationship is one that is working, but not warm. Broderick described relations between the USA and South Africa during the Mandela administration as ‘characterised by a peculiar mix of tentative cooperation punctuated by instances of strident argument’. He concluded that ‘the relationship [was] undergoing a process of consolidation’ despite the fact that there were ‘areas of divergence that have not been fully resolved’.5 The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), ratified in 2000, is a good example of this pattern of cooperation and conflict. AGOA has significantly boosted South African exports to the USA by allowing many goods to enter duty free and is, on balance, considered a success by both American and South African officials. However, it has at times contributed to friction. As AGOA was being debated in Congress, Nelson Mandela described the proposed legislation as ‘not acceptable’.6 More recently, US and South African officials clashed over whether US poultry imports to South Africa should be subject to an anti-dumping tariff.7 A stipulation of AGOA is that member states must abolish barriers to US trade.8 During the presidencies of Thabo Mbeki and George Bush, cooperation continued between the USA and South Africa on many levels. Mbeki emphasised that ‘South Africa enjoyed very good relations’ with the Bush administration, yet also noted that ‘differences’ certainly existed.9 Bridgman identifies the US-led war in Iraq, the Bush administration’s unilateralism, and its tough approach to Robert Mugabe’s regime in Zimbabwe as issues that ‘caused more than a ripple in the bilateral relationship’.10 In addition, Mbeki’s diffident approach to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, even if it did not directly cause friction with the USA, was at odds with the Bush administration’s unprecedented and proactive President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which helped stem the crisis in Africa.11 Differences in the South African–US relationship widened during the 346

Zuma administration. American diplomats in Pretoria were concerned

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 346

2022/11/10 00:03

Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO).12 At the same time, South Africa tilted decisively towards the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping and its locus of power in Beijing. Furthermore, relations were periodically upset by the manifestation of what Baker and Lyman describe as ‘an anti-American undercurrent [that] runs throughout the ANC (African National Congress) and its allies in the Government’.13 In 2014, South Africa’s Deputy Defence Minister, Kebby Maphatsoe, claimed that the country’s widely respected Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela, was a CIA spy seeking to destabilise South Africa.14 The international relations discussion document prepared for the ANC’s 2015 National General Council used rhetoric redolent of the Cold War to accuse the USA of pursuing an ‘aggressive foreign policy to advance its national interests’. It stated, ‘In most instances [the USA] has been supporting undemocratic changes of government as an instrument to serve its global agenda.’15 In 2016, Gwede Mantashe, the Secretary-General of the ANC at the time, alleged that the USA was plotting regime change in South Africa through a student exchange programme.16 Despite these sensational accusations, substantive collaboration continued between the USA and South Africa on a range of issues during the Zuma years. In fact, in 2010 the two countries signed a Strategic Dialogue Agreement that sought to structure cooperation in a number of sectors, including ‘health, education, food security, law enforcement, trade, investment, energy, and nonproliferation’. As part of this strategic dialogue, South African and American officials meet at an annual bilateral forum to

SOUTH AFRICAN–US RELATIONS DURING THE RAMAPHOSA ADMINISTRATION

about a lack of access to, and understanding of, their counterparts at South

discuss the many areas in which the two states cooperate.17 The overall relationship, however, is less than the sum of its many cooperative parts. Gerrit Olivier, a former South African ambassador to Russia, commented: Taking account of the multiplicity and substance of American involvement in South Africa – diplomatic, strategic, trade, investment, development aid, culture, health, science and technology – and the regularity and density of bilateral transaction flows, more than with any other country, the relationship should qualify as a ‘special’ relationship which is not the case.18

Weissman has argued that the ‘complicated’ relationship between South Africa and the USA ‘might best be characterized as that of “independentminded friends”’. However, he conceded ‘that a certain shadow began to fall over this friendship in 2015–2016’ due to increased corruption in South Africa and differences between Washington and Pretoria over how to resolve conflicts in Africa.19 Similarly, Carroll wrote, ‘Relations between the two countries have stalled, if not soured.’ He observed that the ‘US–South

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 347

347

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 17

African relationship has fallen far short of its potential across the entire spectrum of mutual interests’.20 For many American scholars and policy makers, there is a tragic nature to US–South African relations – a sense that two powerful states, which share democratic values, have failed to fully take advantage of what they have in common.21 These commentators often ascribe the enduring uncertainty in the relationship between post-apartheid South Africa and the USA to a difficult history. While the US admonished apartheid South Africa in some instances, at other points the USA accommodated and even aided the apartheid government. On the other hand, the USA provided only tepid and tardy support for the ANC. This history, combined with the ANC’s close cooperation with Moscow for many decades during the Cold War, helps explain a reflexive distrust of the USA amongst some in South Africa’s ruling party. Advocates of closer relations between the USA and South Africa emphasise different elements of this history. They point out that the American people strongly supported the anti-apartheid movement, and pushed their government to change its policy towards South Africa. The result of this activism was the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, passed by the US Congress in 1986. This legislation included serious sanctions against South Africa and is viewed by some as an important blow against the apartheid system.22 Those who believe US–South African relations have the potential to be stronger argue that because of the anti-apartheid movement in the USA there are strong people-to-people connections across civil society, religious, and educational organisations that could be used to bolster diplomatic ties.23 In addition to discussing this fraught history, most studies on US–South African relations argue that specific policy differences on key international issues – the USA’s unilateral and aggressive approach to Iraq during the Bush administration, or South Africa’s friendly ties with states the USA considers enemies, such as Cuba, Iran, and Libya – set back relations (also see Chapter 2 in this volume). Another enduring foreign policy disagreement between South Africa and the USA is the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. While the USA supports Israel in international fora such as the UN, South Africa has been a vocal supporter of the Palestinian cause. Recently, the divide between the USA and South Africa on this issue has widened. While the Ramaphosa administration downgraded relations with Israel to a liaison office in 2019, the Donald Trump administration acknowledged Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and lobbied Arab states (in some cases successfully) to forge ties with Israel.24 These foreign policy disputes are real and relevant; however, they are a symptom rather than a source of the enduring tension in the US–South African relationship. A more fundamental cause is the dramatically differing

348

worldviews of policy makers in Washington and Pretoria.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 348

2022/11/10 00:03

that are grounded in historical understandings shot through with symbolic significance touching on questions of cosmology, ontology, and morality’.25 While the formation of worldview is a complex process, the report and resolutions emanating from the ANC’s 54th National Conference, held at NASREC, Johannesburg, in December 2017, provide a window into what the party believes are key elements of a state’s worldview. These elements include the state’s fight for its independence, how the state believes the international system ought to be organised, and how the state believes it ought to act within the international system. A key paragraph in the conference report and resolutions reads: ‘Growing economic powers, especially China, India and Brazil, have a perspective that is informed by their respective struggles. They are inclined to acting multilaterally and therefore share our commitment to rebuilding and transforming all the institutions of global governance.’26 Similarly, Eddy Maloka, a former advisor in the South African foreign ministry, believes that Western and non-Western countries hold ‘competing views of the world’. He distinguishes between the liberal world order that is supported by Western states, and a ‘better world’ (emphasis in the original), as advocated by non-Western states, ‘that is transformed and liberated from Western domination’.27 This ‘transformation of global governance’, as the ANC calls it, has been an enduring objective of South African foreign policy since the democratic transition in 1994.28 In sum, the US foreign policy establishment believes the post-World War II liberal order should be maintained and expanded, while South African

SOUTH AFRICAN–US RELATIONS DURING THE RAMAPHOSA ADMINISTRATION

Katzenstein describes worldviews as ‘offer[ing] conceptions of possibilities

leaders view it as needing substantial revision, if not an outright overhaul. This difference in perspective on how the world ought to be organised is a fundamental source of tension between the USA and South Africa, and a core reason why relations have been ‘cordial’ (which, as one former US diplomat pointed out, is diplomatic shorthand for ‘cool’), but not close.29 Disagreement on the current world order occurs at a high level, which allows South African–US cooperation to proceed in a number of areas of mutual interest, such as health, investment, and trade. However, it is more than conceptual, and often concretely affects South African and US policies on security and global governance issues. It is no accident that South Africa is one of the states in the UN whose votes coincide least often with those of the USA.30 While former President Trump’s ‘America First’ approach to international relations and his disdain for international institutions magnified the differences between how the USA and South Africa view global politics, it was not the primary cause of these differences.31 349

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 349

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 17

Despite this underlying constraint on South African–US ties, when President Ramaphosa took office early in 2018 there was potential to improve and expand cooperation between the two states in a number of important areas. The core objectives of the US Embassy’s ICS for South Africa include increasing collaboration on security and law enforcement to counter transnational threats, increasing prosperity and good governance in South Africa, and advancing public health and human rights in the country.32 The remainder of this chapter provides a survey of the broader diplomatic relations between the USA and South Africa during Ramaphosa’s tenure, and then assesses cooperation along some of the specific dimensions laid out in the ICS to assess whether these opportunities for improvement have been exploited and what factors continue to impede relations.

RAMAPHOSA AND A ROCKY RESET WITH THE USA Relations between the USA and South Africa have improved during Cyril Ramaphosa’s presidency. Strengthening ties with the USA fits well with Ramaphosa’s strategic objective of increasing investment in South Africa to help the country deal with the problems of inequality, low growth, and high unemployment.33 During Ramaphosa’s tenure South Africa has continued to pay considerable attention to BRICS, but there has been a subtle shift towards increased interaction with the USA and Europe. Not long after Ramaphosa became president, Khulu Mbatha, who would soon become a foreign policy advisor to Ramaphosa, expressed concern that the Zuma administration ‘seemed to be saying BRICS was South Africa’s new home at the expense of old established political and economic alliances’.34 Early in 2019, Ferial Haffajee, one of South Africa’s top political commentators, noted that ‘Ramaphosa had attempted to balance the geopolitical axis between East and West’ during his first year in office.35 In April 2019, DIRCO unveiled a report from a foreign policy review panel that had been initiated not long after Ramaphosa took power. At the release of the report one of the review panel members, Ayanda Ntsaluba, a former Director-General of DIRCO, stated that South Africa was ‘unapologetically a country of the South’, but added that the idea of ‘South Africa as a bridge builder (between the global North and South) should be revived’.36 Despite these positive signs, US State Department officials noted only minor improvements in the overall tone of relations during Ramaphosa’s first year in office. It was only after Naledi Pandor replaced Lindiwe Sisulu as Minister of International Relations and Cooperation in May 2019 that 350

US officials perceived a concerted effort from the South African side to

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 350

2022/11/10 00:03

Pandor delivered a budget speech in which she observed that ‘American businesses continue to invest in South Africa to create employment and reverse the frontiers of poverty’. She also lauded the ‘excellent trade relationships’ between the USA and South Africa and said that South Africa was ‘determined to expand them for increased growth and job creation’.38 Pandor’s positive assessment of the US–South African relationship and her enthusiasm to develop ties with the USA was part of what State Department officials described as a South African ‘charm offensive’ towards the USA.39 Despite the positive trajectory in the US–South Africa relationship during Ramaphosa’s time in office thus far, the road towards better relations has been rocky. An important reason is the demeaning commentary and domineering approach of Ramaphosa’s counterpart for the first three years of his first term – former US President Donald Trump. Just before Ramaphosa entered office in 2018, Trump allegedly wondered aloud why the USA should welcome immigrants from ‘shithole countries’ in Africa during a discussion on immigration reform with a group of US lawmakers.40 In August 2018, Trump tweeted, ‘South African Government is now seizing land from White Farmers’, and instructed his Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, to ‘closely study the South Africa land and farm seizures and expropriations and the large scale killing of farmers’.41 These invasive and inaccurate comments elicited a strong rebuke by Ramaphosa, who stated, ‘Trump, stay out of our issues, and we will not get involved in your issues in America.’42 He later added, ‘South Africa belongs to all the people who live here in South Africa, it does not belong to Donald Trump; he can keep

SOUTH AFRICAN–US RELATIONS DURING THE RAMAPHOSA ADMINISTRATION

deepen relations.37 Less than two months after she took charge of DIRCO,

his America, when I meet him I will tell him.’43 The following month the two presidents did meet, but the conversation apparently focused on golf rather than land reform. When Ramaphosa recalled this conversation, he stated, ‘I did not sense a negativity that could in the end lead to frosty relations between the two countries.’44 While better than an angry confrontation, a double negative in relations does not amount to positive ties. US Embassy officials in Pretoria have wisely limited their comments on land reform to how it should be conducted rather than the final outcome of such reforms. For example, Lana Marks, the former US Ambassador, expressed confidence that land reform was proceeding ‘within the confines of the law’ and stated that she was ‘optimistic’ about the process.45 However, senior US officials continued to interpose themselves more directly in South Africa’s debate on land reform. During a speech at the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UN ECA) in February 2020, then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated, ‘South Africa is debating an amendment to permit the expropriation of private property without compensation. That would be disastrous for that economy and most importantly for the South African

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 351

351

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 17

people.’46 While such sentiments might be shared in private, publicly pronouncing a position on such a sensitive domestic issue is viewed in South Africa as an unhelpful intrusion and injures US–South Africa relations. Trump’s disruptive tweet on South Africa’s land reform process and his derogatory statement about African countries damaged the image of the USA and its leader in South Africa. The Pew Research Center has asked South Africans on several occasions over the last decade whether they had ‘confidence’ in various world leaders. When Barack Obama was president of the USA, 72–77 per cent of South Africans, depending on the year, responded in the affirmative. During Trump’s presidency, that number hovered between 39 and 42 per cent. This steep decline is commensurate with the deterioration of the USA’s image in South Africa during Trump’s tenure. While an average of 68.5 per cent of South Africans viewed the USA favourably during Obama’s time in office, that number dropped to an average of 53.3 per cent during Trump’s presidency.47 Trump’s outbursts were not representative of what most American diplomats thought about South Africa. In response to Trump’s erroneous tweet about land reform, the US Embassy in Pretoria sent a cable to Washington, correcting the president’s statement on the issue. The cable stated that US Embassy officials found ‘no evidence that murders on farms specifically target white people or are politically motivated’.48 Many senior American diplomats, including former Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan (who visited South Africa in March 2019) and former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy (who visited in June 2019), seemed genuinely committed to deepening cooperation between South Africa and the USA.49 Their boss in the White House at the time, however, did not make that effort easy. Despite the Ramaphosa administration’s intention to foster closer ties with the USA, South African actions have also contributed to tension in the relationship. In 2019, DIRCO statements expressed the ministry’s ‘disappointment’ and ‘displeasure’ that a memo composed by Western embassies (including the USA’s), laying out some of the critical steps South Africa needed to take to facilitate foreign investment, was sent to Ramaphosa’s office rather than through ‘established diplomatic channels’.50 This public demonstration of unhappiness contributed to unnecessary friction between the USA and South Africa. In fact, the memo was part of an informal engagement between one of Ramaphosa’s investment envoys and several foreign missions.51 Furthermore, the document had been received by officials in the Presidency seven months prior to DIRCO’s protestations, without causing any furore. As Spector commented, what the incident underscored was ‘that there remains a well of suspicion about the

352

intentions of western countries, vis-a-vis South Africa’.52

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 352

2022/11/10 00:03

what Barnes and Satariano, in The New York Times, described as the ‘Trump administration’s aggressive campaign to prevent countries from using Huawei and other Chinese telecommunications equipment’.53 The US effort to block Huawei’s expansion due to concerns about the company’s close connections with the Chinese government was seen as a threat by South African telecommunications companies, which view access to Huawei systems and products as vital to the development of the country’s existing and future networks.54 Based on these concerns, Ramaphosa stated, ‘[South Africa] cannot afford to have our own economy be held back because there is this fight that the US is having.’ He continued, ‘The US has been unable to imagine a better future [...] They are clearly jealous that a Chinese company called Huawei has outstripped them.’55 While Ramaphosa’s resistance to US efforts to blacklist Huawei was in line with the responses of many other countries, his description of the US as ‘jealous’ was undiplomatic and unnecessarily antagonised the USA.56 The Huawei controversy exhibited the types of behaviour that limit US–South African cooperation: a heavyhanded American approach towards blocking Huawei that was directive rather than deliberative, and a South African response that featured a highprofile public rejection when a more subtle refusal would have sufficed. The differing worldviews of American and South African officials help explain the twists and turns in the South African–US relationship since Ramaphosa took office. Trump’s disparaging comments, which would have disturbed even the best of relationships, were especially destabilising when viewed through the lens of Western attempts to dictate internal

SOUTH AFRICAN–US RELATIONS DURING THE RAMAPHOSA ADMINISTRATION

Another area of contention between the USA and South Africa was over

South African matters – in this case, land reform. Even when the USA attempts to contribute constructively in South Africa, for example the Embassy’s input to Ramaphosa’s envoy regarding how South Africa can attract foreign investment, these interventions are viewed with suspicion. Differing worldviews magnify divisions and increase the chances of misunderstandings between Pretoria and Washington. Presidential pronouncements grab headlines, suggest the principles that guide a state’s action, and sometimes offer insight on specific policy concerns. However, they are not the only way to gauge the bilateral relations between two states. The substratum of interstate relations is often less sensational, but not necessarily less significant. It is at this working level that US–South African relations succeed in a number of ways. The following sections explain this type of cooperation during the Ramaphosa years.

353

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 353

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 17

TRADE AND INVESTMENT Economic interchange has long been an important part of the US–South African relationship. The USA has consistently been the largest source of foreign investment in South Africa since its transition to democracy in 1994. That trend continued in 2019, with US$7.8 billion flowing from the USA to South Africa, an increase of 6.8 per cent from the previous year.57 Trade in goods between the two states in 2019 totalled US$12.9 billion. While this amount makes South Africa the USA’s largest trading partner in Africa, it is down from its highest point of US$16.7 million in 2011.58 AGOA serves as a potent catalyst for South African exports to the USA. In 2019, 16 per cent of South Africa’s total exports to the USA, amounting to US$1.2 billion, entered duty free because of AGOA.59 Key South African sectors, such as motor vehicle production, citrus fruit, and wine, have all benefited from the access provided by AGOA. AGOA, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), and US commitments to the World Trade Organization (WTO) combine to give South African exports unprecedented access to the US – ‘only approximately 3% of [South African] products are subject to US import duties’.60 In 2018, South Africa’s ambassador to the USA, Mninwa J. Mahlangu, stated, ‘AGOA underpins [a] strong and growing mutually beneficial trade and investment relationship between South Africa and the US.’ He noted that the programme ‘enabled South Africa to increase exports of value-added products to the USA, thereby contributing positively toward our national imperatives to boost industrialization and create jobs’.61 South Africa also serves as an important regional hub for US businesses. With assistance from an active American Chamber of Commerce, more than 600 American companies operate in South Africa.62 US companies are an important source of jobs for a South African economy that is bedevilled by persistently high levels of unemployment. The US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) reported, ‘In 2018, South Africa-based majority-owned affiliates of US MNEs [multinational enterprises] employed more than 132,900 people.’63 Despite the enduring importance of the US–South African economic relationship, South Africa’s National Development Plan (NDP), released in 2012, took a dim view of US economic importance. This was understandable. The National Planning Commission (NPC), which produced the NDP, began its work in 2010 as the USA was struggling through a major recession brought on by the financial crisis that began in 2008. Projected sluggish growth in the USA over the following decade, and the ‘relative decline in the economic weight’ of the USA (as the NDP put it), led the NPC to suggest that South Africa ‘re-orient trade to emerging markets’.64 Over the course of the ensuing

354

six years the Zuma administration adhered closely to this recommendation

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 354

2022/11/10 00:03

BRIC partners (also see Chapter 14 in this volume).65 Although Ramaphosa was deputy chairperson of the NPC and declared in June 2019 that the NDP was South Africa’s ‘lodestar’, he seems less committed to a turn towards the emerging economies of the Global South than his predecessor was.66 The Ramaphosa administration has continued to fully engage with the BRICS countries and other emerging powers; however, it has also seriously focused on economic interchange with the West. In September 2018, Ramaphosa used his trip to the UN General Assembly in New York to encourage investment from the USA. He told an audience at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) that ‘one after the other of issues that businesspeople have raised with us we are addressing. We are being very proactive and being […] constructive because we want South Africa to, once again, be an attractive destination for investment’.67 From Washington’s perspective, Ramaphosa’s election was encouraging for future economic exchange between the two countries. When Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan met South Africa’s foreign minister Lindiwe Sisulu in May 2018, he ‘welcomed President Ramaphosa’s new government and his commitment to transparency, and expressed optimism that an improved business environment would open doors to prosperity for both countries’.68 Similarly, the US State Department’s 2019 investment climate report on South Africa described Ramaphosa’s efforts to improve the investment environment in South Africa as ‘encouraging’, although it added that ‘the challenges [South Africa faces] are enormous’.69 The USA seems closely attuned to Ramaphosa’s focus on attracting

SOUTH AFRICAN–US RELATIONS DURING THE RAMAPHOSA ADMINISTRATION

by increasing its focus on emerging economies, particularly South Africa’s

new investment. During his trip to South Africa, Nagy announced that ‘US companies are investing in President Ramaphosa’s goal of raising 100 billion US dollars in new investments over five years’ and cited commitments by US firms such as McDonalds, Proctor and Gamble, Microsoft, and Amazon to increase outlays and begin new projects in South Africa.70 US State Department officials described ‘increasing bilateral trade and investment [as] the number 1 priority’ and a ‘mutually beneficial’ element of the US– South African relationship.71 Even if Ambassador Marks’ goal of making South Africa one of the USA’s top 20 trading partners is farfetched, the sentiment behind this objective augurs well for the economic relationship between the two countries.72 Another positive sign is the new US initiative, Prosper Africa, which seeks to facilitate trade and investment between Africa and the USA by coordinating and modernising ‘how the US government supports private sector trade and investment opportunities’ on the continent.73 While the initiative is in its 355

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 355

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 17

infancy and judgements regarding its efficacy are premature, the focus on increased economic activity between the USA and Africa is encouraging. While economic interchange between the two countries is, on balance, a positive element of the relationship, problems do arise. In March 2018, the Trump administration imposed steep tariffs on steel and aluminium imports into the USA. Discussions between US and South African officials led to more than half of South African steel and aluminium products being exempted from the tariff in October 2018, but South Africa did not receive the country-wide exemption that was granted to other states, including Canada, Brazil, and Mexico.74 Aside from the direct and deleterious impact of the Trump administration’s imposition of tariffs on some South African imports, the Ramaphosa government also disagrees with these tariffs at a broader level. In September 2018, Ramaphosa decried ‘the rise of trade protectionism’, which ‘threatens the multilateral trading system’, and described ‘the growing challenge to important multilateral arrangements’ as one of a series of ‘disturbing global developments’.75 In 2019, concern emanating from a private sector coalition of US copyright-based industries, which had proposed that South African legislation would not provide adequate security for US copyright holders, led the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) to announce that it would ‘review South Africa’s eligibility to participate in its GSP’.76 Since GSP status is required to qualify for the AGOA programme, the ramifications of South Africa being stripped of its GSP status (and thus its ability to participate in AGOA) are significant. The USTR’s review prompted a flurry of meetings between US and South African officials in an effort to resolve the dispute over the proposed legislation. These meetings seem to have been constructive, but a final decision on South Africa’s GSP status is outstanding.77 In a January 2020 interview, Ambassador Marks stated that South Africa was ‘taking [the GSP review process] very seriously and cooperating very positively’. She was adamant that South Africa would lose neither its GSP nor its AGOA privileges.78 The GSP review has prompted criticism of the USA in South Africa – specifically, that GSP access is used inappropriately as leverage by US industry ‘to protect its own IP [intellectual property] interests’.79 When the entire GSP programme lapsed at the end of 2020 with no new legislation authorised, the review of South Africa’s place in the programme stalled. The reauthorisation of the GSP (or a similar programme) by Congress, along with a successful completion of the review process that sees South Africa remaining part of the GSP, would eliminate a source of strife between the two states and lead to a steadier economic relationship in the years ahead.

356

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 356

2022/11/10 00:03

The most positive and arguably productive area of US–South African cooperation in the last 15 years has been US efforts to assist South Africa in the fight against HIV/AIDS. The scale of this effort is impressive: the USA contributed US$6.26 billion to fight HIV/AIDS in South Africa through PEPFAR between 2004 and 2018.80 Both South African and American officials appreciate the importance of this effort. Deputy Secretary of State Sullivan called PEPFAR the ‘bedrock’ of relations between the two countries.81 In July 2019, foreign minister Pandor labelled the USA South Africa’s ‘strategic partner in the fight against HIV and Aids’ and called US assistance ‘instrumental’.82 However, continued PEPFAR assistance at the level South Africa has long enjoyed is not guaranteed. In January 2019 the US Global AIDS Coordinator, Dr Deborah Birx, cited ‘several fundamental problems in PEPFAR’s core treatment program in South Africa’, including ‘extremely poor performance in ensuring every person who is started on treatment is retained’.83 She described the ‘full expenditure of PEPFAR resources without improvement of results’ as ‘unacceptable’.84 As a result, the Trump administration initially decided to slash PEPFAR’s budget in South Africa in the 2019–2020 period.85 Facing a sharp drop in support, the South African government and civil society groups swung into action. South African civil society reiterated their long-standing claim that the country’s health department did not possess sufficient human resources capacity to efficiently deliver care to all those suffering from HIV/AIDS. Long queues and delays in receiving care at

SOUTH AFRICAN–US RELATIONS DURING THE RAMAPHOSA ADMINISTRATION

PEPFAR: THE BEDROCK

clinics, insecurity while waiting in these queues, as well as surly and slow service were all problems that contributed to poor patient retention rates.86 In response, the South African government launched Operation Phuthuma to find lost patients and better retain existing ones. It promised to hire thousands of additional support staff to expedite and better organise treatment services.87 As a result of these efforts the PEPFAR programme provided South Africa with a significant increase in funding for 2019–2020, rather than the initially proposed decrease.88 Deliberations and discussions between South African civil society, the South African government, and US PEPFAR personnel illustrate how the political values South Africa and the USA share can facilitate cooperation. The process for determining PEPFAR funding, for example, was influenced by health activists, who engaged in frank and at times critical dialogue with Birx and other PEPFAR officials in Johannesburg throughout March 2019. These substantive consultations ensured that controversial but crucial topics, such as the PEPFAR programme’s limited success in holding the South African government and other implementing partners accountable, were addressed.89

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 357

357

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 17

PEPFAR has also assisted in South Africa’s efforts to contain the Covid-19 pandemic. PEPFAR funding contributes to strengthening South Africa’s health system – a system that has been sorely tested during the pandemic. Ambassador Marks stated that PEPFAR’s continuing efforts to ‘develop lab and clinic systems, modeling and surveillance’ have ‘proven critical to South Africa’s current COVID-19 response’,90 and that the USA has been able to expeditiously aid South Africa thanks to existing PEPFAR infrastructure.91 For example, more than 5  000 PEPFAR-supported health care workers engaged in Covid-19 community screening programmes in 2020.

SECURITY COOPERATION The ICS states that a ‘revitalized South African security sector, including law enforcement agencies, border security, and military, has the potential to export stability and economic development throughout the region’.92 To this end, the USA has staged several law enforcement training sessions in which South African security officials have been involved. Over the course of the 2017–2018 and 2018–2019 financial years, members of the South African Police Service (SAPS) attended 15 different conferences or training sessions hosted by the USA on topics such as combating cybercrime, drug trafficking, and the illegal wildlife trade.93 Cooperation also occurred between the two countries’ militaries. Since 2003, members of the New York National Guard and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) have held an annual series of meetings, including a joint training exchange programme.94 There has also been cooperation between the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and US Customs and Border Protection. The SARS 2018–2019 annual report states that workshops sponsored by the USA helped to ‘develop the skills and knowledge of officials’ and enhanced ‘customs co-operation between the two countries’.95 Interchanges at this working level help build a positive rapport between the US and South African security sectors, and facilitate cooperation on a range of transnational security threats. South African–US collaborative efforts to resolve conflicts in Africa, once an area of ‘productive cooperation’ between the two states, according to Weissman,96 have decreased over the last decade, but that is not necessarily because of bad relations between Pretoria and Washington. Piers Pigou, the International Crisis Group’s Senior Consultant for Southern Africa, argues that during the Zuma administration ‘South Africa stepped back from its post-apartheid role as a diplomatic powerhouse – with a particular commitment to preventing and mitigating mass violence – on the African continent’ due to a host of internal problems, including widespread 358

corruption and economic malaise.97 The Ramaphosa administration’s focus

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 358

2022/11/10 00:03

left it little time to play a major role in African peacemaking. Meanwhile, the Trump administration simply took less of an interest in Africa. It reduced American military and intelligence personnel on the continent while allocating further resources to competition with China and Russia.98 Neglect by the USA and South Africa’s preoccupation with its own domestic challenges suggest that in the near term Pretoria and Washington’s cooperation on conflict resolution in Africa will be limited.

CONCLUSION South African–US relations are not as testy as they sometimes appear, and not as warm as they could be. The interaction between the two states in response to the Covid-19 pandemic illustrates the duality of this relationship. On the one hand, the USA has offered, and South Africa has warmly welcomed, assistance and supplies to combat Covid-19. In May 2020 the USA donated 720 000 protective masks and 1 000 ventilators to South Africa.99 The value of US assistance to South Africa’s fight against Covid-19 during just the first five months of the pandemic totalled more than R767 million.100 Despite this assistance, the USA and South Africa do not agree on how the pandemic should be dealt with at a global level. In particular, the Trump administration’s decision to cut funding to the World Health Organization (WHO) elicited criticism from DIRCO, which stated that the South African

SOUTH AFRICAN–US RELATIONS DURING THE RAMAPHOSA ADMINISTRATION

on reversing the rot in government and ending the economic recession has

government was ‘very concerned and alarmed’ by American actions.101 When Trump later announced his intention to pull the USA out of the WHO, the South African Health Minister, Zweli Mkhize, described the decision as ‘unfortunate’.102 Another point of friction related to the Covid-19 crisis was American criticism of South Africa for accepting Cuban doctors to help with Pretoria’s fight against the pandemic. Then Secretary of State Pompeo said Cuba was exploiting its medical workers, and that any country using these workers without paying them directly was ‘helping the Cuban government turn a profit on human trafficking’.103 The mix of collaboration and conflict that characterises South African–US interactions during the pandemic demonstrates how competing worldviews prevent substantial bilateral cooperation between the two states from blossoming into the type of strategic partnership that South Africa enjoys with China or India. This fundamental difference in worldviews is an enduring characteristic of the relationship between Washington and Pretoria, and limits the development of relations between the two countries. Nonetheless, 359

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 359

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 17

personalities and particular policies still play a critical role in the degree to which this difference divides the two states. To the extent that leaders matter, the US–South African relationship has been beset by the invidious irony that the tenures of two leaders who were genuinely invested in building a real partnership between their countries – Barack Obama and Cyril Ramaphosa – did not coincide. As Kornegay wrote, Jacob Zuma, Ramaphosa’s predecessor, ‘conveyed a cold war anti-imperialist divide between a South Africa-aligned BRICS and the US and the West as if BRICS were the alliance it is not. Now Ramaphosa, having launched his economic diplomacy offensive, hits the wall of Pax Americana’s Trumpian impulsiveness’.104 Trump’s flagrant unilateralism and ‘America first’ rhetoric flew in the face of the ‘better world’ Pretoria hopes to help build. The Joe Biden administration, however, could be very different. There is a good chance that Biden will engage with some of the issues that matter most to South Africa (and Africa more generally), such as climate change, global health, forced migration, and food security.105 And, Biden will likely address these issues in a more collaborative fashion than Trump. While serving as vice president, Biden spoke of ‘deepening partnerships’ with African leaders in government and civil society to ‘contribute to the continent’s increasingly bright future’.106 While he believes the USA should ‘continue to lead’ internationally (a belief most ANC officials do not hold), the way Biden advocates the USA leading will be a dramatic departure from the foreign policy approach of the Trump administration.107 On the South African side, the need for Ramaphosa to attract investment, boost trade, and retain support for South Africa’s health systems has only deepened due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The rationale for intensifying his administration’s early efforts to improve relations with the USA is therefore stronger now than it was when he took office. The USA and South Africa will continue to have conflicting perspectives on major issues, such as the fairness and effectiveness of the existing international order. But the Biden administration’s multilateral approach to international affairs (at least compared to that of its predecessor), combined with the enduring interests South Africa and the USA share in regards to trade, investment, health, and security, has the potential to blunt some of the disagreements the USA and South Africa have. The result might very well be warmer ties than these two states have enjoyed for some time.

360

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 360

2022/11/10 00:03

1 Tepperman, J. 2018. ‘Where there has been wrongdoing there will be accountability.’ [Interview with Cyril Ramaphosa.] Foreign Policy, 27 September. https://foreignpolicy. com/2018/09/27/where-there-has-been-malfeasance-and-wrongdoing-there-will-beaccountability-south-africa-cyril-ramaphosa-corruption/ (Accessed 5 April 2020). 2 Campbell, J. 2018. ‘U.S.–South Africa bilateral relationship faces difficult road ahead.’ Council on Foreign Relations, 22 May. https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-south-africabilateral-relationship-faces-difficult-road-ahead (Accessed 4 April 2020). 3 USMSA (US Mission South Africa). 2018. ‘Integrated Country Strategy: South Africa.’ 22 August, p. 2. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/South-Africa.pdf (Accessed 12 April 2020). 4 USMSA, ‘Integrated Country Strategy: South Africa’, p. 2. 5 Broderick, J. 1998. ‘The United States and South Africa in the 1990s.’ SAIIA Research Report No. 8. Johannesburg: SAIIA, p. 31, 34, 49. https://www.africaportal.org/ publications/the-united-states-and-south-africa-in-the-1990s/ (Accessed 20 March 2020). 6 Apple Jr., R. W. 1998. ‘Clinton in Africa: The overview; From Mandela a gentle admonishment.’ The New York Times, 28 March. https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/28/ world/clinton-in-africa-the-overview-from-mandela-a-gentle-admonishment.html (Accessed 2 June 2020). 7 Bavier, J. 2018. ‘US poultry industry to urge retaliation if South Africa ends quota.’ Reuters, 24 August. https://agoa.info/news/article/15511-us-poultry-industry-to-urgeretaliation-if-south-africa-ends-quota.html (Accessed 9 May 2020). 8 Office of the US Trade Representative. n.d. ‘African Growth and Opportunity Act AGOA.’ https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/african-growthand-opportunity-act-agoa (Accessed 3 May 2020). 9 Mbeki, T. 2014. ‘Mbeki: Suggestions of SA–US conflict are a fabrication.’ Mail & Guardian, 2 October. https://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-02-mbeki-us-sa-relations-wereok/ (Accessed 19 March 2020).

SOUTH AFRICAN–US RELATIONS DURING THE RAMAPHOSA ADMINISTRATION

NOTES AND REFERENCES

10 Bridgman, M. 2004. ‘South Africa and North America.’ In Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future, edited by E. Sidiopoulos. Johannesburg: SAIIA, p. 250. 11 Weissman, S. 2018. ‘South Africa and the United States: A pragmatic friendship.’ In Foreign Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa, edited by A. Adebajo and K. Virk. London: I. B. Tauris. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350986480.ch-014. 12 Interview with US State Department official, 12 December 2019, Washington, DC. 13 Baker, P. and Lyman, P. 2008. ‘South Africa: From beacon of hope to rogue democracy?’ The Stanley Foundation, Working paper, December, p. 17. https://www.academia. edu/55168211/South_Africa_From_Beacon_of_Hope_to_Rogue_Democracy?from_ sitemaps=true&version=2 (Accessed 18 May 2022). 14 Mail & Guardian. 2014. ‘Madonsela accused of being a CIA spy.’ 8 September. https://mg.co. za/article/2014-09-08-madonsela-accused-of-being-a-cia-spy (Accessed 3 May 2020). 15 ANC. 2015. ‘National General Council Discussion Documents.’ Umrabulo, special NGC edition, p. 161. https://www.tralac.org/images/docs/7939/anc-national-general-council2015-discussion-documents.pdf (Accessed 6 April 2020).

361

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 361

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 17

16 Maromo, J. 2016. ‘USA plotting regime change in SA: ANC.’ IOL, 19 February. https:// www.iol.co.za/news/politics/usa-plotting-regime-change-in-sa-anc-1987226 (Accessed May 2020); Powell, A. 2016. ‘South Africa’s ANC accuses US of pushing “regime change”.’ Voice of America, 16 May. https://www.voanews.com/a/african-nationalcongress-cia-regime-change-allegations/3332165.html (Accessed 6 May 2020). 17 Page, S. 2010. ‘U.S.–South Africa Strategic Dialogue.’ Special Briefing, 14 April, Washington, DC. https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/af/rls/spbr/2010/140260.htm (Accessed 3 October 2020); see also USMSA. 2019. ‘South Africa–United States Strategic Dialogue: 10th Annual Bilateral Forum.’ 27 September. https://za.usembassy.gov/south-africa-united-statesstrategic-dialogue-10th-annual-bilateral-forum-abf/ (Accessed 5 October 2020). 18 Olivier, G. 2012 ‘South Africa’s foreign policy towards the Global North.’ In South African Foreign Policy Review, Volume 1, edited by C. Landsberg and J.-A. van Wyk. Pretoria: AISA, p.185. 19 Weissman, ‘South Africa and the United States’, pp. 311, 331. 20 Carroll, A. 2017. ‘Forging a new era in US–South African relations.’ Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, Africa Center, 28 November, pp. 18, 9. https://www.atlanticcouncil. org/in-depth-research-reports/report/forging-a-new-era-in-us-south-african-relations/ (Accessed 5 April 2020). 21 Spector, J. B. 2019. ‘US National Security Council’s Africa man, Cyril Sartor, on investment, funding and ties with SA and the continent.’ Daily Maverick, 3 June. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-06-03-us-national-security-councilsafrica-man-cyril-sartor-on-investment-funding-and-ties-with-sa-and-the-continent/ (Accessed May 2020). 22 Mbeki, M. 2020. ‘African Americans and Africa: Past to present.’ Introductory Remarks at an event hosted by the African Centre for the Study of the United States at the University of the Witwatersrand, 17 February. 23 Interview with US State Department official, 12 December 2019, Washington, DC. 24 Oneko, S. and Schwikowski, M. 2019. ‘Israel and South Africa: A “downgraded’ relationship”?’ Mail & Guardian, 9 April. https://mg.co.za/article/2019-04-09-israeland-south-africa-a-downgraded-relationship/ (Accessed 7 October 2020); Underwood, A. 2018. ‘The controversial US Jerusalem embassy opening, explained.’ Vox, 16 May. https://www.vox.com/2018/5/14/17340798/jerusalem-embassy-israel-palestiniansus-trump (Accessed 8 October 2020); Al Jazeera. 2020. ‘Explainer: Where do Arab states stand on normalizing Israel ties?’ 22 September. https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2020/9/22/explainer-where-do-arab-states-stand-on-normalising-israel-ties (Accessed October 8 2020); BBC News. 2020. ‘Sudan–Israel relations agreed, Donald Trump announces.’ 24 October. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54554286 (Accessed 29 October 2020). 25 Katzenstein, P. 2018. ‘The second coming? Reflections on a global theory of international relations.’ The Chinese Journal of International Politics 11(4): 373–390, p. 387., https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poy012. 26 ANC. 2017. ‘54th National Conference: Report and Resolutions.’ Johannesburg: ANC, p. 53. https://www.polity.org.za/article/54th-national-conference-report-and-resolutions2018-03-26 (Accessed April 2020). 27 Maloka, E. 2019 When Foreign Becomes Domestic. Johannesburg: Ssali Publishing House, p. ix.

362

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 362

2022/11/10 00:03

29 Campbell, J. 2018. ‘UN voting report could upset U.S.–South Africa relationship.’ CFR, 4 May. https://www.cfr.org/blog/un-voting-report-could-upset-us-south-africarelationship (Accessed April 2020). 30 Campbell, ‘UN voting report could upset U.S.–South Africa relationship’. 31 Stremlau, J. 2017. ‘An early diagnosis of Trump’s impact on US–Africa relations and on sustainable democracy in the US and Africa.’ SAIIA Special Report, October. https:// www.africaportal.org/publications/early-diagnosis-trumps-impact-us-africa-relationsand-sustainable-democracy-us-and-africa/ (Accessed 13 March 2020). 32 USMSA, ‘Integrated Country Strategy: South Africa’. 33 Ramaphosa, C. 2018. ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa: 2018 State of the Nation Address.’ 16 February. https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2018-state-nationaddress-16-feb-2018-0000 (Accessed 7 March 2020). 34 Mbatha, K. 2018. ‘A South Africa at home with the world.’ City Press, 27 May. https:// w w w.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/a-south-africa-at-home-with-theworld-20180525 (Accessed 13 March 2020). 35 Haffajee, F. 2019. ‘Cyril Ramaphosa’s relations with the West sour on eve of State of the Nation Address.’ Daily Maverick, 3 February. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ article/2019-02-03-cyril-ramaphosas-relations-with-the-west-sour-on-eve-of-state-ofthe-nation-address/ (Accessed 12 April 2020). 36 Fabricius, P. 2019. ‘Pahad Panel: Missteps noted, but no overhaul of SA foreign policy on the cards.’ Daily Maverick, 17 April. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/201904-17-pahad-panel-missteps-noted-but-no-overhaul-of-sa-foreign-policy-on-the-cards/ (Accessed 13 March 2020).

SOUTH AFRICAN–US RELATIONS DURING THE RAMAPHOSA ADMINISTRATION

28 ANC, ‘54th National Conference: Report and Resolutions’, p. 53. It is unclear what this transformation entails. Ikenberry, for example, argues that ‘China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it’. Ikenberry, J. 2011. ‘The future of the liberal world order.’ Foreign Affairs 90(3): 56–62, 63–68, p. 57.

37 Interview with US State Department official, 12 December 2019, Washington, DC. 38 Pandor, N. 2019. ‘Address by GNM Pandor, Budget Vote Speech, Department of International Relations and Cooperation, on 11 July 2019 at 14:00 at the National Assembly, Parliament.’ DIRCO. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2019/pand0711a. htm (Accessed 13 May 2020). 39 Interview with US State Department official, 12 December 2019, Washington, DC. 40 Fram, A. and Lemire, J. 2018. ‘Trump: Why allow immigrants from “shithole countries”?’ AP News, 11 January. https://apnews.com/fdda2ff0b877416c8ae1c1a77a3cc425/Trump:Why-allow-immigrants-from-’shithole-countries’ (Accessed 13 May 2020). 41 Dwyer, C. 2018. ‘Here’s the Story Behind That Trump Tweet on South Africa – And Why It Sparked Outrage.’ NPR, 23 August. https://www.npr.org/2018/08/23/641181345/ heres-the-story-behind-that-trump-tweet-on-south-africa-and-why-it-sparked-outra (Accessed 24 May 2022). 42 The Citizen. 2018. ‘Ramaphosa tells Trump: Keep your America. Stay out of our issues.’ 28 August.https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/2001547/ramaphosa-tells-trump-keepyour-america-stay-out-of-our-issues/ (Accessed 14 April 2020). 363

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 363

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 17

43 SABC News. 2018. ‘Pres Ramaphosa hits back at Trump.’ YouTube, 26 August. https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Br79-44EHA (Accessed 14 April 2020); SABC News. 2018. ‘Ramaphosa hits back at Donald Trump on land tweet.’ 25 August. https:// www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/ramaphosa-hits-back-at-donald-trump-on-land-tweet/ (Accessed 14 April 2020). 44 Fabricius, P. 2018. ‘Ramaphosa resorts to golf diplomacy to reach Trump.’ Daily Maverick, 27 September. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-09-27-ramaphosa-resortsto-golf-diplomacy-to-reach-trump/ (Accessed 5 May 2020). 45 Fabricius, P. 2020. ‘US ambassador’s ambition: Lift SA into top 20 of US trade partner.’ Daily Maverick, 31 January. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-01-31-usambassadors-ambition-lift-sa-into-top-20-of-us-trade-partners/ (Accessed 4 May 2020). 46 Pompeo, M. 2020. ‘US Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo’s remarks at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.’ US Embassy in Ethiopia, 19 February. https://et.usembassy.gov/u-s-secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeos-remarks-at-theunited-nations-economic-commission-for-africa/ (Accessed 18 April 2020). 47 Wike, R., Poushter, J., Fetterolf, J. and Schumacher, S. 2020. ‘Trump ratings remain low around globe, while views of U.S. stay mostly favorable.’ Pew Research Center, 8 January. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/01/08/little-trust-in-trumps-handlingof-international-affairs/(Accessed 3 May 2020). 48 Gramer, R. and Lynch, C. 2018. ‘In tacit rebuke, U.S. Embassy in South Africa rejects Trump tweet.’ Foreign Policy, 29 August. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/29/in-tacitrebuke-u-s-embassy-in-south-africa-rejects-trump-tweet/ (Accessed 17 April 2020). 49 USMSA. 2019. ‘Deputy Secretary Sullivan Travels to South Africa.’ 12 March. https:// za.usembassy.gov/deputy-secretary-sullivan-travels-to-south-africa-and-angola/ (Accessed April 2020); Nagy, T. 2019. ‘The enduring partnership between the United States and South Africa.’ [Speech] 21 June, Johannesburg. https://za.usembassy.gov/ the-enduring-partnership-between-the-united-states-and-south-africa/ (Accessed 8 April 2020). 50 DIRCO. 2019. ‘Statement on the Memorandum by Embassies of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland.’ 3 February. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2019/rsa0203.htm (Accessed 12 May 2020); DIRCO. 2019. ‘Statement following meeting between DIRCO and the country representatives of Switzerland, UK, Germany, Netherlands and USA.’ 4 February. http://www.dirco.gov. za/docs/2019/rsa0204.htm (Accessed 12 May 2020). 51 Fabricius, P. 2019. ‘Investor countries’ June 2018 memo to Pretoria sparks February 2019 diplomatic incident.’ Daily Maverick, 4 February. https://www.dailymaverick. co.za/article/2019-02-04-investor-countries-june-2018-memo-to-pretoria-sparksfebruary-2019-diplomatic-incident/ (Accessed 13 May 2020); Marianne, M. 2019. ‘The Investors’ Memo: Anatomy of self-inflicted damage.’ Daily Maverick, 5 February. https:// www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-02-05-the-investors-memo-anatomy-of-selfinflicted-damage/ (Accessed 13 May 2020). 52 Spector, J. B. 2019. ‘Diplomacy: The art of the impossible.’ Daily Maverick, 5 February. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-02-05-diplomacy-the-art-of-theimpossible/ (Accessed on 14 May 2020). 53 Barnes, J. and Satariano, A. 2019. ‘US campaign to ban Huawei overseas stumbles as allies resist.’ The New York Times, 17 March. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/17/us/ politics/huawei-ban.html (Accessed 9 May 2020); also see Van Standen, C. 2020. ‘Africa

364

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 364

2022/11/10 00:03

54 Sanger, D., Barnes, J., Zhong, R. and Santora, M. 2019. ‘In 5G race with China, U.S. pushes allies to fight Huawei.’ The New York Times, 26 January. https://www.nytimes. com/2019/01/26/us/politics/huawei-china-us-5g-technology.html (Accessed 10 May 2020). 55 Hunter, Q. 2019 ‘“We can’t be held back by US jealousy”, says Ramaphosa on Huawei sanctions.’ Sunday Times, 5 July. https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-07-05-wecant-be-held-back-by-us-jealousy-says-ramaphosa-on-huawei-sanctions/ (Accessed 10 May 2020); Fabricius, P. 2019. ‘Washington rejects Ramaphosa’s jibe that it is “jealous” of Huawei’s 5G technology.’ Daily Maverick, 12 July. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ article/2019-07-12-washington-rejects-ramaphosas-jibe-that-it-is-jealous-of-huaweis5g-technology/ (Accessed 10 May 2020). 56 Macpherson, D. 2019. ‘Comment during Debate on Vote 34 and 25 – Trade and Industry and Economic Development.’ Hansard: Proceedings of the Mini-Plenary – National Assembly. 11 July. https://pmg.org.za/hansard/30097/ (Accessed 12 May 2020). 57 DIRCO. ‘South Africa–United States relationship.’ http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/ bilateral/usa.html (Accessed 5 June 2022). 58 Cook, N. 2020. ‘South Africa: Current issues, economy, and U.S. relations.’ Congressional Research Service, 17 September, p. 27. 59 Cook, ‘South Africa: Current issues, economy, and U.S. relations’. 60 Trade Law Centre. n.d. ‘AGOA: South Africa.’ https://agoa.info/images/documents/15718/ southafricaagoanaumann112019.pdf (Accessed 18 May 2020). 61 Mahlangu, M. 2018. ‘Oral submission to the U.S. International Trade Commissions’ public hearing on “US trade and investment with sub- Saharan Africa investigation”.’ 23 January. https://www.tralac.org/images/docs/12619/usitc-hearing-on-us-trade-andinvestment-with-sub-saharan-africa-oral-submission-by-amb-mninwa-j-mahlangusouth-africa-23-january-2018.pdf (Accessed 18 May 2020). 62 Cook, ‘South Africa: Current issues, economy, and US relations’.

SOUTH AFRICAN–US RELATIONS DURING THE RAMAPHOSA ADMINISTRATION

could be the winner as the US attempts to stifle Huawei.’ SAIIA, 24 February. https:// saiia.org.za/research/africa-could-be-the-winner-as-the-us-attempts-to-stifle-huawei/ (Accessed 9 May 2020).

63 USBEA (United States Bureau of Economic Analysis). n.d. ‘South Africa: International trade and investment country facts.’ https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ factsheet.cfm?Area=436&UUID=a1d69ab4-1a4c-405a-908e-5bcecde6b2e8 (Accessed 21 May 2020). 64 NPC (National Planning Commission). 2012. National Development Plan 2030: Our Future – Make it Work. Pretoria: The Presidency, pp. 31, 113. https://www.gov.za/documents/ national-development-plan-2030-our-future-make-it-work (Accessed 12 March 2020). 65 Calland, R. and Temin, J. 2018. ‘Can South Africa return to the global stage?’ CSIS, 17 December. https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-south-africa-return-global-stage (Accessed 13 April 2020). 66 Fin24. 2019. ‘Ramaphosa calls for ANC policy certainty, says NDP “is our lodestar”.’ 9 June. https://www.fin24.com/Economy/ramaphosa-calls-for-anc-policy-certainty-saysndp-is-our-lodestar-20190609 (Accessed 9 April 2020). 67 Ramaphosa, C. and Altman, R. 2018. ‘A conversation with Cyril Ramaphosa.’ CFR, 24 September. https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-cyril-ramaphosa (Accessed 3 May 2020). 365

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 365

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 17

68 USMSA. 2018. ‘Deputy Secretary Sullivan’s meeting with South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Lindiwe Sisulu.’ 22 May. https://za.usembassy. gov/press-release-deputy-secretary-sullivans-meeting-with-south-african-minister-ofinternational-relations-and-cooperation-lindiwe-sisulu/ (Accessed 13 April 2020). 69 USDoS (United States Department of State). 2019. ‘Investment climate statements: South Africa.’ https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-investment-climate-statements/ south-africa/ (Accessed 13 May 2020). 70 Nagy, ‘The enduring partnership between the United States and South Africa’. 71 Interview with US State Department official, 12 December 2019, Washington, DC. 72 Fabricius, ‘US ambassador’s ambition’. 73 Nagy, T. 2019. ‘How US’s Prosper Africa plan can benefit businesses on the continent.’ Business Day, 28 June. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2019-06-28-how-ussprosper-africa-plan-can-benefit-businesses-on-the-continent/ (Accessed 15 April 2020). 74 Fabricius, ‘US ambassador’s ambition’; DTI (Department of Trade and Industry). 2018. ‘South Africa welcomes product exclusion for some steel and aluminum products from the Section 232 duties.’ Tralac, 25 October. https://www.tralac.org/news/article/13621south-africa-welcomes-product-exclusion-for-some-steel-and-aluminium-productsfrom-the-section-232-duties.html (Accessed 14 April 2020). 75 Ramaphosa and Altman, ‘A conversation with Cyril Ramaphosa’. 76 AGOA. 2019. ‘US announces a review of South Africa’s place in its biggest preferential trade scheme (GSP).’ AGOA.info. 26 October. https://agoa.info/news/article/15680-usannounces-a-review-of-south-africa-s-place-in-its-biggest-preferential-trade-schemegsp.html (Accessed 11 May 2020); Naumann, E. 2020. ‘South Africa under GSP country review: What implications for preferential exports to the United States?’ Trade Brief US20TBo1/2020. Stellenbosch: Tralac. https://www.tralac.org/news/article/14355 (Accessed 9 May 2020). 77 Daniels, L. 2020. ‘United States still looking to “punish” South Africa for Copyright Bill.’ Daily Maverick, 12 May. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-05-12-unitedstates-still-looking-to-punish-south-africa-for-copyright-bill/ (Accessed 19 May 2020). 78 Fabricius, ‘US ambassador’s ambition’. 79 Thopacu, H. 2020. ‘Validating South Africa’s copyright reform through the lens of US GSP: The need to abolish reciprocal requirements.’ SAIIA Policy Insights 84, May, p. 2. https://saiia.org.za/research/validating-south-africas-copyright-reform-through-thelens-of-us-gsp-the-need-to-abolish-reciprocal-requirements/ (Accessed 2 June 2020); see also Nicholson, D. 2020. ‘Written submission to the US Trade Representative with regard to the SA Copyright Amendment Bill.’ 16 January. http://infojustice.org/wp-content/ uploads/2020/01/Nicholson-GSP-Comment-January-2020.pdf (Accessed 12 April 2020). 80 Cook, ‘South Africa: Current issues, economy, and US relations’. 81 Fabricius, P. 2019. ‘US insists relations with SA can survive differences.’ Daily Maverick, 18 March. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-03-18-us-insistsrelations-with-sa-can-survive-differences/ (Accessed 9 April 2020). 82 Pandor, ‘Budget Vote Speech’. 83 Birx, D. L. 2019. ‘Information memo for Chargé Lapenn: FY 2019 PEPFAR planned allocation and strategic direction.’ USDoS, 16 January, p. 1. https://www.state.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/08/South-Africa.pdf (Accessed 13 April 2020). 84 Birx, ‘Information memo for Chargé Lapenn’, p. 2.

366

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 366

2022/11/10 00:03

86 Yawa, A. and Rutter, L. 2020. ‘People’s COP shows US where to spend HIV money.’ Daily Maverick, 3 March. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-03-03-peoples-copshows-us-where-to-spend-hiv-money/ (Accessed 18 March 2020). 87 Tswanya, Y. 2019. ‘US to continue funding HIV treatment in SA.’ IOL, 2 May. https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/us-to-continue-funding-hiv-treatment-insa-22349954 (Accessed 9 May 2020); Sokutu, B. 2019. ‘U-turn on Aids grant saves day.’ The Citizen, 30 April. https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/the-citizenkzn/20190430/282140702797205 (Accessed 9 March 2020). 88 USMSA. 2019. ‘Government welcomes PEPFAR HIV funding commitment.’ 12 June. h t t p s : / / z a . u s e m b a s s y. g o v / g o v e r n m e n t - w e l c o m e s - p e p f a r- h i v - f u n d i n g c om m it ment /#:~:t e x t=T he % 20 C OP19 % 20f und i ng % 20 i s % 20 i n,P E P FA R% 20 funding%20of%20%24678%20million.&text=PEPFAR%20and%20the%20South%20 Africa,treatment%20programmes%20for%20South%20Africans (Accessed 18 April 2020). 89 Russell, A., Rutter, L., Milanga, M. and Kavanagh, M. 2019. ‘Raising the stakes for PEPFAR accountability.’ Health Gap, 1 April. https://healthgap.org/3358-2/ (Accessed 9 April 2020). 90 Singh, K. 2020. ‘US donates aid to SA to strengthen fight against Covid-19.’ https:// za.usembassy.gov/us-donates-aid-to-sa-to-strengthen-f ight-against-covid-19/ (Accessed 13 May 2020). 91 Fabricius, P. 2020. ‘US gives SA $8.4m to fight Covid-19 – with more likely to come.’ Daily Maverick, 20 April. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-04-20-usgives-sa-8-4m-to-fight-covid-19-with-more-likely-to-come/ (Accessed 22 April 2020). 92 USMSA, ‘Integrated Country Strategy: South Africa’, p. 3. 93 SAPS (South African Police Service). 2018. Annual Report 2017/2018. Pretoria: SAPS. https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annualreports_arch.php (Accessed 14 April 2020); SAPS. 2019. Annual Report 2018/2019. Pretoria: SAPS. https://www.saps. gov.za/about/stratframework/annualreports.php (Accessed 14 April 2020).

SOUTH AFRICAN–US RELATIONS DURING THE RAMAPHOSA ADMINISTRATION

85 Cook, ‘South Africa: Current issues, economy, and US relations’; Green, A. 2019. ‘What’s behind PEPFAR’s funding cut threats?’ DevEx, 11 June. https://www.devex.com/news/ what-s-behind-pepfar-s-funding-cut-threats-95053 (Accessed 14 April 2020).

94 Phillips, A. 2019. ‘NY National Guard, South Africa hold annual defense meeting.’ US Army, 13 November. https://www.army.mil/article/229754/ny_national_guard_south_ africa_hold_annual_defense_meeting (Accessed 29 May 2020). 95 SARS (South African Revenue Service). 2019. Annual Report 2018/2019. Pretoria: SARS, p. 51. https://www.gov.za/documents/south-african-revenue-service-annual-report20182019-7-oct-2019-0000 (Accessed 14 April 2020). 96 Weissman, ‘South Africa and the United States’. 97 Pigou, P. 2020. ‘South Africa can reclaim its role as a diplomatic powerhouse in Africa.’ Mail & Guardian, 1 April. https://mg.co.za/africa/2020-04-01-south-africa-can-reclaimits-role-as-a-diplomatic-powerhouse-in-africa/ (Accessed 13 April 2020). 98 Barnes, J. 2019. ‘US intelligence agencies prepare to pull back officers from Africa.’ The New York Times, 30 December. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/30/us/politics/ intelligence-cia-africa-terror.html (Accessed 11 May 2020); Cooper, H., Gibbons-Neff, T., Savage, C. and Schmitt, E. 2019. ‘Pentagon eyes Africa drawdown as first step in global troop shift.’ The New York Times, 24 December. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/30/ us/politics/intelligence-cia-africa-terror.html (Accessed 11 May 2020). 367

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 367

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 17

99 USMSA. 2020. ‘US government donates 720,000 protective masks to South African government.’ 15 May. https://za.usembassy.gov/u-s-government-donates-720000protective-masks-to-south-african-government/ (Accessed 16 May 2020). 100 USMSA. 2020. ‘The United States expands ventilator support to South Africa to battle COVID-19.’ 6 July. https://za.usembassy.gov/press-release-the-united-states-expandsventilator-support-to-south-africa-to-battle-covid-19/ (Accessed 9 July 2020). 101 DIRCO. 2020. ‘South Africa expresses concern at the President of the United States of America’s announcement to cut funding to the WHO.’ 15 April. http://www.dirco.gov. za/docs/2020/usa0415.pdf (Accessed 19 April 2020). 102 Evans, J. 2020. ‘Coronavirus: Trump’s stance on WHO “unfortunate”, says Zweli Mkhize.’ News24, 30 May. https://www.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/ News/coronav ir us-tr umps-st ance- on-who -unfor t unat e-says-z weli-m k hi ze20200530?isapp=true (Accessed 1 June 2020). 103 AFP. 2020. ‘“Profiting from the pandemic’ – US politician slams SA for taking Cuban doctors.’ 29 April. https://www.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/profiting-fromthe-pandemic-us-politician-slams-sa-for-taking-cuban-doctors-20200429 (Accessed 9 October 2020). 104 Kornegay Jr., F. 2018. ‘Can South Africa navigate Trumpian cascades?’ Institute for Global Dialogue, 27 May. https://www.igd.org.za/research/foreign-policy-analysis/ infocus/11865-can-south-africa-navigate-trumpian-cascades (Accessed 8 May 2020). 105 Stremlau, J. 2020. ‘Africa’s wish list of what might change under a Biden presidency.’ The Conversation, 10 March. https://theconversation.com/africas-wish-list-of-whatmight-change-under-a-biden-presidency-133253 (Accessed 20 March 2020). 106 Biden Jr., J. 2016. ‘Building on success.’ Foreign Affairs, September/October. https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-08-07/building-success (Accessed 12 May 2020). 107 Biden, ‘Building on success’; Biden Jr., J. 2020. ‘Why America must lead again.’ Foreign Affairs, March/April. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/ why-america-must-lead-again (Accessed 12 May 2020). While the ANC viewed the election of Donald Trump as a ‘reversal of progress achieved under the Obama administration’, it noted that ‘even under President Obama, there was no substantive change in policy with regards to either the economic system or foreign policy of the US as a superpower’. See ANC, ‘54th National Conference: Report and Resolutions’, p. 53.

368

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 368

2022/11/10 00:03

Conclusion: A New Dawn Deferred?

PART 2

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 369

2022/11/10 00:03

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 370

2022/11/10 00:03

Philani Mthembu and Francis Kornegay

TOWARDS A NEW DAWN: WILL GEOPOLITICS ENABLE OR HINDER ITS REALISATION?

CHAPTER 18

The New Dawn in a Turbulent Geopolitical Landscape: South Africa, Africa, and the Global Balance of Forces

South Africa will have to engage decisively in the conduct of strategic geopolitical power diplomacy if it is to realise its goals of ushering in a new dawn, one marked by the country regaining the ‘punching above its weight’ momentum on the international scene it once enjoyed. The challenge here is compounded by a global pandemic in the form of Covid-19 and the predicament of South Africa’s weakened domestic economic situation. Added to this is the recent unrest in the country in July 2021 that affected parts of Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, coupled with intelligence failures and a defence force increasingly under strain through consistent budget cuts in recent years. Combined, these developments make the coming years something of a ‘do or die’ period that, if not decisively acted upon, will place the country in a disadvantageous diplomatic position on the continent and internationally for years to come. This is because of the unfavourably aligned global balance of forces working against progressive internationalism and how this antiprogressive alignment is unfolding on the continent of Africa, including within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). South African foreign policy actors will have to contend with the interrelated diplomacies of Morocco, Israel, and France interacting with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt in navigating a changing international strategic landscape. They will also have to contend with Russia’s re-engagement with Africa and an increasingly confrontational relationship between China and the USA. This will have to involve working with a select group of strategic countries on the continent, chosen using clear criteria. These countries may not necessarily hold the same positions as South Africa on all key continental and global matters, but they will be important in taking forward key strategic objectives. Diplomats in Pretoria and abroad will thus have to ensure that the general shift against progressive internationalism in the international strategic landscape does not entrench itself on the African continent, placing progressive forces on the defensive. The ongoing deliberations about admitting Israel as an observer in the African Union (AU) speaks to a strategic landscape that is

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 371

371

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 18

seeing progressive movements and governments on the back foot as their traditional positions are undone by proactive diplomatic overtures, backed up by the use of material resources through trade and investment deals and development cooperation agreements on the African continent. This has seen the AU defer the matter by a year and elect a group of countries, including South Africa, to review the matter and make a recommendation to be adopted by the continental body. Occasional displays of disagreement and even anger will not restore South Africa’s diplomatic prestige and influence; instead, what is required is a consistent application of the full repertoire of diplomatic tools, coordinated by an action-oriented Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO); Presidency; intelligence agency; Department of Defence; Department of Tourism; Department of Home Affairs; and Department of Trade, Industry, and Competition (dtic). Coordination with sub-national actors and non-state actors will also be required in order to achieve more with less resources. The evolving geopolitical environment has basically been hostile to some of South Africa’s key national interests within southern Africa and in Africa as a whole. This means that Pretoria and Luthuli House will have to quickly adapt and balance a diplomacy emphasising historical and contemporary solidarity with a more power-political posture of hard-nosed strategy and leveraging calculus in order to ensure that solidarity is backed up with material actions in line with the country’s strategic objectives. As such, this closing chapter attempts to sketch out the global balance of forces currently in play and how they align with geopolitical dynamics within Africa itself. It builds on an Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) policy brief titled ‘SA, Africa & the global balance of forces: Combining solidarity with strategic action’, written in 2020 by Philani Mthembu together with the late Francis Kornegay, whose contribution to the work of the IGD has been immense over the years. The chapter constitutes one of the last research papers Kornegay had been working on, and has been expanded on and revised posthumously. The efforts towards a realisation of Ramaphosa’s ‘New Dawn’ will take place against the backdrop of a prevailing South African diplomatic culture that fears coming across to neighbours in the region and beyond as ‘hegemonic’ – when, in fact, what may be called for in this environment is the nuanced application of solidarity backed up by the smart use of power and carrot-and-stick diplomacy. The country’s hesitation, and even reluctance at times, to advocate the values it champions domestically in the African and international landscape will only lead to a diminished role in international relations, especially with growth rates of important African countries outstripping those of South Africa. This will have an impact on the country’s ability to operationalise on the international scene what has

372

been referred to domestically as a ‘New Dawn’.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 372

2022/11/10 00:03

landscape, there is a need for an assessment of the state’s capacity and the diplomatic tools available for implementing foreign policy priorities. This will enable a coordinated approach to international relations, especially on the African continent, which means ensuring that the manner in which the country’s social, political, and economic resources are deployed aligns to the strategic objectives of the country. This has become increasingly important, as strategic provinces and cities are sometimes governed by different political parties, accelerating the need to find agreement on the broad parameters of the country’s foreign policy and national interests. In an environment of growing political competition at home, a multi-party and multi-stakeholder consultative process, outlining South Africa’s national interests and aspirational role in the world, will have to take place. As the governing party, the ANC must lead this process at the political level in order to ensure better coordination within the party and amongst government departments at the national and sub-national level involved in international relations. Despite an economy faced with multiple challenges, the country still possesses various diplomatic assets to drive its overall foreign policy objectives. However, in order to increase the impact of the various diplomatic tools available, there will have to be better coordination at the national and sub-national levels, including how the country uses its development finance instruments through structures such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), the African Renaissance Fund (ARF), and various other government departments. It will also have to better coordinate the international relations work of provinces, cities, and various state agencies and enterprises (see the chapters in Part III of this volume). This requires an approach that proactively works with non-state actors operating at track two and track three diplomacy to ensure that foreign policy and the strategic orientation of the country are discussed with a broader section of society. However, as seen during the Covid-19 pandemic, while consultation with scholars, universities, NGOs, the private sector, and communities is important in the policy process, decisions ultimately have to be taken by elected officials who apply their minds to the information they receive from multiple sources. While South Africa is going through a process of trimming the number of foreign representatives through embassies, high commissions, and consul-general offices, the country still has a large diplomatic footprint in the world, and this can be used to good effect in navigating a global order that challenges many of the values and aspirations of progressive internationalism. However, in line with efforts to assess the tools and capacity of the state, it will be important

THE NEW DAWN IN A TURBULENT GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE: SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA, AND THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF FORCES

In order for South Africa to strategically navigate the changing geopolitical

373

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 373

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 18

to ensure that foreign missions have the requisite capacity to navigate a changing global landscape.

THE UNFOLDING GLOBAL STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE: A SHIFT TO THE RIGHT? The global balance of forces, since at least 2016, when Donald Trump was elected US president, represents an international right-wing antiglobalist ascendancy. This has largely remained in place, despite the new administration led by Joe Biden coming into power in the USA, since it has proved difficult to reverse or change the policy direction of the disruptive Trump presidency (also see Chapter 17 in this volume). This shift towards economic nationalism has also permeated the global response to the Covid-19 pandemic, in which nationalism continues. It is not only the USA where we have seen this trend towards populism; European countries, including the UK, have seen growing nationalist sentiments that often trump the multilateral approach. Furthermore,

the

movement

towards

populism

and

economic

nationalism has unfolded as a trend that transcends the West, reflected in the internal dynamics of some of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries. While not yet explicitly affecting state-tostate relations, these trends do pose important questions for the ANC’s international relations, especially in terms of party-to-party relations, as former allies have in recent years been removed from power. It also poses questions for South Africa and its ability to remain focused on realising a new dawn within a geopolitical landscape that is putting the country in a disadvantageous position. South Africa itself has not been immune to populist trends at a societal level, as new social actors emerge on social media and through community organisations that seek to ‘put South Africa first’, in reference to the presence of undocumented foreign nationals and high unemployment rates. Despite some of the changes at the domestic level, BRICS remains of strategic value to South Africa. The establishment of the African Regional Centre (ARC) of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) has already been operationalised and the bank is now accepting new members, with Egypt being the most recent country to join (also see Chapter 14 in this volume). What needs to be explored is South Africa’s capacity to utilise the ARC, along with the DBSA, to finance strategic regional projects on the continent, especially in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the broader SADC region. South African corporations, both large and small, will need 374

to be more consciously involved in such a strategy, especially through the

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 374

2022/11/10 00:03

eventually lend outside of BRICS countries, creating an opportunity for South Africa to lead a BRICS Africa Strategy, with the development finance of the NDB forming an important part of the operationalisation of such a strategy. In Europe, the traditional centre-left social-democratic parties have been struggling for some years now, as centrist and right-wing movements have been on the ascendancy, spurred on by the migration crisis caused by USled wars in the Middle East. The important development of a new coalition government in Germany, led by the social democrats, must, however, be inserted into the analysis of the European landscape as an important victory for social democrats after years of being on the back foot. In the process, the European Union (EU) finds itself in a ‘squeeze play’ between the USA and Russia on the one hand, and the USA and China on the other hand, especially with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the continuing technology war with China. This has especially been the case following an era where former President Trump’s ‘America First’ approach had put the country at odds with its traditional transatlantic allies in Europe, forcing them to think about moving towards greater strategic autonomy. To compound matters, Europe is simultaneously seized with the matter of Brexit and its implications. Some of the tensions between the transatlantic allies became quite visible in the heart of Europe, as the Trump administration had made it difficult and costly for Russia and Germany to complete the construction of the Nord Stream energy project. Despite a new administration in the White House, Germany remained under pressure from the USA to suspend or cancel the project, which has now happened as a result of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and sanctions imposed on Russia. The state of Israel adds yet another dimension to a complex and evolving international landscape, as Tel Aviv seeks to improve relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, while making economic and diplomatic inroads in the broader African continent. This same status-quo threat perception on the part of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi extended to their tensions with Qatar and its relations with Iran, which earned Doha the assault on its security in the form of the Trump-backed embargo against it by the Saudis and the UAE. Turkey has come to Qatar’s defence amid the untenable pressure of the Saudis and Emiratis, who have also been forced on the retreat in their campaign against the Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen. However, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have shifted their attention elsewhere into the Maghreb and northeast Africa, along with Egypt, again in competition with the other non-Arab pro-Muslim Brotherhood power, Turkey, which has vastly grown its diplomatic and economic footprint in Africa. In the northeast African Horn, the democratic revolutions in Ethiopia and especially Sudan have attracted intense interest from the Saudis and

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 375

THE NEW DAWN IN A TURBULENT GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE: SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA, AND THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF FORCES

BRICS Business Forum. There is already an expectation that the NDB will

375

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 18

Emiratis, offset in Khartoum by the latter’s accommodation of Ankara with a basing presence on Suakin Island. These pressures, however, also include leverage by the USA, linked to Sudan being taken off its State Sponsors of Terrorism List, a move which has yielded results for the USA in the form of Khartoum normalising its relations with Israel. The assassination attempt on Sudan’s prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, also demonstrates the lengths that others have been prepared to go to in order to destabilise Sudan’s democratic transition (also see Chapter 11 in this volume). These efforts eventually led to the resignation of Hamdok, in a move that tilted the balance of power towards the military in Khartoum, thus reversing earlier efforts to democratise and see through a process leading to civilian rule. This remains an area for closer examination in light of Ethiopia’s own internal conflict, which has drained valuable resources and prevented a more outward-looking posture in the region. These dynamics surrounding Sudan’s post-Bashir transition are further complicated by the Ethio-Egyptian tug-of-war over the future of the River Nile, given Addis Ababa’s progress on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The fact that Washington inserted itself into mediating on the GERD between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan, in spite of recently being rebuked by Addis for being biased towards Cairo, further reflects the US–Egypt–Saudi– UAE sub-alignment within the broader regional and global alignment. Yet, Beijing appears less committed – if not strategically noncommittal – in these dynamics as they play out in the Horn and elsewhere in Africa. The situation continues to be complicated by the ongoing conflict in Tigray between the central government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which it has designated a terrorist organisation. South Africa’s new dawn thus takes places in an increasingly complex and competitive African and geopolitical landscape, an environment in which a risk-averse foreign policy establishment may be forced to take more risks and to rethink certain positions or actions in foreign policy. China appears similarly on the side lines as one moves further from Africa’s northeast, west into the Maghreb. Here, the internationalised civil war in Libya has become the epicentre of these resource-motivated alignment/counter-alignment dynamics, overshadowing that other bone of regional contention affecting the integrity of the AU, Western Sahara.

However,

the

same

Franco-Moroccan

regional

calculus

informing intransigence in resolving Western Sahara in a manner that would satisfactorily address the AU’s self-determinative and regional integrationist imperatives is interrelated with the dynamics surrounding the Libyan conflict. The Biden administration has not reversed the Trump administration’s recognition of Morocco’s claims over Western Sahara, 376

which was done in exchange for Morocco normalising its relations with

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 376

2022/11/10 00:03

navigate, given the close ties between the country and the Polisario. The geopolitical power struggle over Libya replicates Syria in as much as it comes down to ‘point-counterpoint’ between Russia and Turkey, with Egypt even threatening war with Ankara over its military aid to the UNbacked Government of National Accord (GNA) – all in violation of the UN arms embargo. Meanwhile, these various actors are making mad dash scrambles for allies, clients, and influence in Africa within an AU landscape partitioned at the Saharan Sudano–Sahelian fault-line dividing the North African Maghreb from the rest of the continent. All these dynamics add layers of complexity to South Africa’s strategic calculus, challenging the ANC and government to come up with strategies of navigating a changing geopolitical landscape through the various diplomatic tracks. In such a changing landscape, where even traditional allies are taking positions not in line with South Africa’s interests, expressions of solidarity on their own will not be enough to ensure the success of South Africa’s foreign policy. Indeed, solidarity will have to be backed up with material action, leveraging the country’s various diplomatic tools at both political and economic levels.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S NEW DAWN: TOWARDS A PROACTIVE STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT? In the absence of a proactive strategic engagement on the part of South Africa, foreign policy actors from both the Global North and Global South holding a different orientation to that of the country will continue to rapidly make headway in their economic and ‘soft power’ diplomacies throughout Africa, including in South Africa. Given the adopted policy resolutions of the ANC’s 54th National Conference in 2017, the country has had to navigate coordinated moves by Morocco and Israel, with the Saudis and the UAE more focused on the Horn–Red Sea nexus. These forays present incredibly high stakes against the backdrop of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and its prospects. Adding more urgency to this picture is the prospect of the AU chairship of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the context of the DRC receiving prime strategic targeting by Israel, whereas in spite of everything invested by South Africa in the DRC, going back to the presidency of Nelson Mandela, there is reportedly little to show for it in terms of an inter-African balance of forces favourable to Pretoria. The fact that a South African, Wamkele Mene, was chosen as SecretaryGeneral of the AfCFTA, headquartered in Accra, is, however, a positive reflection of South Africa’s continuing role on the continent, especially as

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 377

THE NEW DAWN IN A TURBULENT GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE: SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA, AND THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF FORCES

Israel. This is yet another matter South African diplomacy will have to

377

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 18

it involved beating back a late bid by Nigeria to place one of its own as inaugural AfCFTA Secretary-General (also see Chapter 15 in this volume). However, Morocco and Israel are spearheading a diplomatic offensive on the continent, with the aim, among other things, of mobilising anti-selfdetermination momentum against the Sahrawis and the Palestinians, thus running counter to Pretoria aspirational progressive internationalist agenda. This creates the need for some stocktaking on which AU member states are among the more diplomatically and geopolitically reliable when it comes to South African efforts to promote a Pan-African agenda of continental strategic autonomy, which involves navigating the diverse range of external pressures vying for geopolitical-economic leverage within the hyper-fragmented inter-African landscape. This has become much clearer following the AU meeting of the Executive Council and the AU Summit in 2022, which discussed the question of Israel’s observer status and decided to defer the final decision by another year. Within the SACU–SADC sub-continental region, the democratic regime in Namibia would appear especially strategic, as Windhoek is a member of SACU as well as SADC and there is a history of allied relations with the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) going back to the liberation struggle. Non-SACU SADC members Zimbabwe and Mozambique, both heavily interdependent with, as well as dependent on, South Africa, fall within this post-liberation orbit as well. Moreover, South Africa has an increasing regional security interest in resolving Mozambique’s quasiIslamist insurgency in the Cabo Delgado province, which is threatening to expand the African Indian Ocean littoral Islamist terror threat from the Somali coast southward into SADC. Within SADC, Morocco has sought, through Rabat’s economic diplomacy, to influence Zambia to derecognise the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), although Zambia quickly denied that it had derecognised Western Sahara, instead stating that Morocco rejoining the AU created an opportunity to resolve the decolonisation of Western Sahara. Lesotho was in a similar position, with reports claiming it had derecognised SADR, before it clarified its position in response to domestic pressure. eSwatini has also been a target of Morocco’s economic and political diplomacy in recent years, creating a challenge for South Africa in how to enforce the SADC and AU position on Western Sahara now that Morocco is part of the AU and thus bound by its positions. The manner in which the relationship between Morocco and South Africa evolves will thus remain of great importance to the changing geopolitical landscape in Africa, while efforts to normalise relations with Rwanda will also need to be closely monitored. It will be especially important to monitor whether economic relations amongst actors

378

in the private sector improve even while political relations remain uncertain.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 378

2022/11/10 00:03

the eastern and southern African wing of the AfCFTA within the ‘Cape to Cairo’ tripartite FTA between the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), SADC, and the East African Community (EAC). This economic geography of fledgling trade integration should inform what needs to become another critical focus for South Africa in how it addresses the challenges of the global landscape and their impact on Africa, including the SACU–SADC region, and in interacting with the cultivating of allies in continental affairs focused on accelerated regional integration and upholding existing AU positions on Western Sahara and Palestine. South African must recalibrate its Africa strategy and ensure coordination and consistency in its implementation.

ADAPTING TO A CHANGING AFRICAN LANDSCAPE With South Africa’s chairship of the AU and its role on the UN Security Council (UNSC) as a non-permanent member having come to an end, it is only natural to contemplate the country’s role beyond its term on the UNSC. The country recently exited as chair of the AU, to be replaced by the DRC. Given the role South Africa has traditionally played in the DRC, one would expect synergy in the two country’s foreign policies; however, this has not been the case in recent times, and levels of engagement have declined at both state and non-state levels. It thus remains to be seen whether South Africa’s New Dawn will also translate into a new dawn in relations with the DRC. The 2018 elections in the DRC, which saw President Félix Tshisekedi rising to power, has also heralded changes in the country’s foreign policy. This has been signalled through the DRC’s support for initiatives that do not necessarily align with South Africa’s principles and interests on the continent and beyond. Whether on the GERD negotiations between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan, where President Tshisekedi has voiced support for Egypt, or on the DRC’s changing position on Israel, a departure from the traditional position voicing strong support and solidarity with Palestine, South Africa’s and the DRC’s foreign policies have gradually diverged. This is arguably a trend that has been underway in southern Africa and on the African continent, where South Africa increasingly finds itself in a landscape not necessarily aligned with some of its traditional international relations positions. South Africa’s economy has also not recovered since the global financial crisis of 2008, and its role and influence in Africa and the world have arguably declined in a manner that largely correlates with the country’s internal social, economic, and political challenges. This begs the question whether the new dawn will have to be deferred or whether

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 379

THE NEW DAWN IN A TURBULENT GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE: SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA, AND THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF FORCES

Such preoccupations are critically geostrategic in the context of stabilising

379

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 18

the domestic efforts at self-correction and building a capable state will translate into positive gains at the international level. What remains clear, however, is that South Africa’s ability to navigate an increasingly complex and competitive geopolitical landscape will have an impact on the country’s ability to achieve its new dawn. With much of the emphasis on the need to grow the economy and attract investment, South Africa will be contending with new actors that are having an impact on Africa’s political and economic outlook. One of these players is Rwanda, which has grown its role and influence on the continent, including through transforming the country domestically and playing a reformist role in the efforts to modernise the AU. With the Ramaphosa administration having declared its intent to move towards a normalisation of relations, and the respective foreign ministers having met, it remains to be seen whether the two countries can work through their differences and build mutual trust to forge a developmental and strategic relationship based on both values and pragmatism. The changing views on Western Sahara have also signalled a changing landscape on the African continent, one in which Morocco has gradually grown its support base since re-entering the AU, including countries such as Zambia, which has also recently invited the US African Command (AFRICOM) to open an office in the country after a change of power in the recent elections. Indeed, many of the traditional international relations positions of African countries have undergone a change in recent years, correlating with the period of time that South African foreign policy and influence have been declining. South Africa’s role in a changing African and global landscape will thus have to adapt to a significantly different landscape than the one that greeted the country during the early period of democracy, or the period of Pan-African institution-building that accompanied the African Renaissance period of President Thabo Mbeki. Due to the worsening economic conditions catalysed by the Covid-19 pandemic, the country will have to adapt to this changing landscape with even more limited resources (also see Chapter 10 in this volume). It will thus be called on to be more efficient and to do more with less. An important position that the country occupied in August 2021 is that of chair of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security of SADC, tasked with keeping peace and security in the region. It has thus had to apply itself to the unfolding security threats in Mozambique while remaining involved with trying to normalise relations between Zimbabwe and the world and ensuring an inclusive dialogue leading up to the Zimbabwean national elections in 2023. Indeed, the fact that the government of Mozambique initially chose to work with private army contractors instead of seeking a

380

coordinated regional response will be a factor for South Africa to address

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 380

2022/11/10 00:03

in Zimbabwe, dialogue will have to continue to ensure that the country’s international partners are satisfied enough with the promised reforms in the country to achieve the normalisation of ties between Zimbabwe and the world. South Africa will also have to be involved at a bilateral level with the Kingdom of eSwatini on the ongoing political and social unrest in order to find mechanisms for an inclusive dialogue in the country, while continuing to support Lesotho to achieve its own political reforms and development objectives. In addressing issues of peace and security, South Africa will have to be proactive and visible in tackling issues of development and governance, which play an integral role in safeguarding peace and security in the region (also see Chapter 11 in this volume). Indeed, there can be no new dawn in South Africa if the region in which it operates does not see a sustained period of economic and social development and prosperity.

TOWARDS A RECALIBRATED FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH South Africa’s weakened economic conditions are forcing the country to reconfigure and recalibrate its foreign policy architecture. This will force the country to make better use of existing resources, to adopt digital tools to both reduce costs and reach a wider group of stakeholders, and to ensure a continuous system of training – one that sees a more systematic engagement across government at national and sub-national levels and in terms of the engagements between the state and non-state actors involved in foreign policy. A key catalyst here will be the Foreign Service Act 26 of 2019, which aims to build a professional diplomatic corps to navigate the country through a changing international landscape. On the international front, the current administration has had the opportunity to (re-)engage the world and articulate a vision of what type of foreign policy it seeks to pursue. At the top of the agenda has been the importance of economic diplomacy as part of efforts to revive the economy, attract investment, and, importantly, find new markets for South African products. This will be important as the country seeks to ensure a sustainable recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic. What has become increasingly clear from a research and policy perspective is that besides articulating a coherent foreign policy, South Africa needs to contextualise its foreign policy behaviour within a broader geostrategic and grand-strategy perspective and narrative. It also has to take into account ongoing key trends that have an impact on the country. Rather than merely reacting to global events, an intricate understanding of longer-term trends is necessary, as is the putting

THE NEW DAWN IN A TURBULENT GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE: SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA, AND THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF FORCES

and correct. Given South Africa’s vocal support for the lifting of sanctions

381

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 381

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 18

in place of an efficient and effective state apparatus that allows the country to benefit from and be best prepared for these trends. While the state continues to be the central foreign policy actor, it is also important to note that contemporary diplomacy involves not only the first track related to state-to-state relations, but also intricate linkages at the track two and track three diplomatic levels. Every major summit, whether it be BRICS, the G20, or the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), now involves various diplomatic tracks taking place alongside state-tostate relations. Even within the state, various sub-national actors have increasingly gained prominence in the conduct of international relations. Provinces, cities, and municipalities are thus important actors, and various parliamentary committees have increasingly sought to play a greater role in the oversight and conduct of foreign policy. This means that besides state actors at the national and sub-national levels, non-state actors such as think tanks, universities, trade unions, private companies, civil society, and political parties have become increasingly important players in international relations. If the current administration wishes to usher in a New Dawn for the country, it will have to work with these multiple actors in order to achieve more with less resources. This will also form an integral part of efforts to build a capable state that works well internally in terms of coordination and that also works strategically with non-state actors in the interests of the country at large.

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION In a very real sense, amid the global dynamics manifest within the geopolitical affairs of a fragmented Africa subjected to an unprecedented ‘scramble’ for the continent’s resources and markets, South Africa can only defend against such pressures by accelerating the pace of regional integration within the SACU–SADC boundaries, of which South Africa is the epicentre. Embarking on such a southern Pan-African journey within the ‘Cape to Cairo’ wing of the AfCFTA means ‘battening down the hatches’ in terms of a regional geopolitical consolidation of forces within the SACU–SADC region. In this process, South Africa must begin the protracted leveraging of its objective hegemony for the construction of a closer and more integrated regional community, which may eventually progress into a regional political federation, thereby limiting the scope for external powers to manoeuvre themselves into the affairs of a major portion of the continent. This will require that senior respected diplomats be consistently deployed to southern Africa to demonstrate the importance the country places on the 382

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 382

2022/11/10 00:03

succeed in advancing the country’s strategic interests. Indeed, southern Africa can be seen as constituting part of South Africa’s core interests in its geopolitical calculations, as incursions into this region that act against the country’s foreign policy interests hurt its core ability to exercise agency in international relations. This should not be interpreted as a naked geopolitical power play as much as a more nuanced strategy of applying material actions and resources to solidarity efforts and ensuring a cohesive and expanded geopolitical community comprising the greater southern Africa. There are multiple ways to speed up regional integration, and it will be important to ensure that countries can integrate ‘at their own pace’ given the strategic economic and resulting geopolitical leverage South Africa enjoys over SACU and SADC member states, yet chooses not to exert. This is largely due to the notion of not wanting to appear ‘hegemonic’ or come across as the region’s ‘Big Brother’; however, in fact such inhibitions only prolong the stagnating predicament of a major political geography within the fragmented African landscape and emboldens those with opposing interests to South Africa. Indeed, much of the rest of SACU and SADC have arguably become adept at exploiting these peculiarly South African inhibitions to their advantage in their understandable ambivalence regarding South Africa and how they relate to this country as the most developed on the continent. Further integration would ensure that the region evolves into a highly integrated southern African community, with SACU as the catalyst. This would transform SACU into a ‘community union’ that, through accession mediated by a regionalised African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), evolves into an expanding political community encompassing nonSACU members of SADC as well. This must form an integral part of the current administration’s championing of a New Dawn at home and abroad.

CONCLUSION Only through a consolidation of the African balance of forces on the continent generally, and in southern Africa in particular, will South Africa empower itself to better navigate the external pressures emanating from the current global balance of forces that, at this point in time, are not aligned as favourably to South Africa as they once were. Whether South Africa can muster the geopolitical imagination – let alone the political imagination – to take the country’s post-apartheid transition to the next Pan-African level of regional political integration remains to be seen.

THE NEW DAWN IN A TURBULENT GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE: SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA, AND THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF FORCES

region. These diplomats will also have to be well equipped if they are to

383

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 383

2022/11/10 00:03

CHAPTER 18

This will require a more strategic approach in navigating power dynamics within the region, in Africa as a whole, and globally. This does not necessarily mean abandoning principles of solidarity and progressive internationalism, or adopting a cheque book diplomacy approach. However, it does require coming to terms with the fact that ‘solidarity’ on its own is woefully insufficient as a tool of statecraft in the exercise of diplomacy, and navigating South Africa’s ambivalent relations with much of the rest of Africa. It means overcoming the self-imposed feelings of guilt over a history of southern African destabilisation – for which Afrikaner nationalism must be held to account. The current unfavourable global balance of forces, coupled with South Africa’s difficult economic predicament, means that a more creatively hard-nosed approach to the rest of Africa and the rest of the world is urgently required.

384

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 384

2022/11/10 00:03

Contributing authors

■

Odilile Ayodele

Odilile Ayodele is a senior researcher at the Institute for Pan-African Thought and Conversation (IPATC) and a research associate with the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg. She holds a DLitt et Phil in Political Studies from the University of Johannesburg, and an MA in International Relations from the University of the Witwatersrand. She completed her postdoctoral research fellowship at the SARChI Chair: African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the University of Johannesburg. Odilile is currently the convenor of the South African Association of Political Studies (SAAPS) research committee on international relations and diplomacy. She is also an associate editor and book review editor of the Journal of BRICS Studies, as well as the book review editor of the African Journal of Political Science. Her current research projects centre on global technopolitics, including the digital component of subnational diplomacy, the international relations of technology, and digital diplomacy in Africa. ■

Nadira Bayat

Nadira Bayat has over 25 years of wide-ranging expertise in the United Nations (UN) and the South African government, across key policy areas on the sustainable development agenda, including trade, gender and development and peace and security. Nadira has recently joined the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as Economic Affairs Officer. Previously, Nadira worked on the gender dimension of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), as gender and trade expert with UN Women and with the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), where she led the approach to gender mainstreaming in AfCFTA national strategies. Prior to joining the ECA, Nadira was programme director at Global Economic Governance (GEG) Africa, a policy research and stakeholder engagement programme focusing on African sustainable development priorities. Nadira has held various positions in other UN entities, including at the International Court of Justice, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. She has also served as Counsellor for Multilateral Affairs at the Embassy of South Africa in Washington, DC. Nadira has a background in international law and holds two LLMs, 385

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 385

2022/11/10 00:03

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS

including one in International Legal Studies from American University Washington College of Law. ■

David R. Black

David Black is Professor and Chair of Political Science and Lester B. Pearson Professor of International Development Studies at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Canada. He has longstanding research interests in Canadian involvement in sub-Saharan Africa; Canadian development cooperation policies and practices; and post-apartheid South African foreign policy, particularly in Africa. Other research interests include sport in global politics and development, and disability and global development. His current research includes a project funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) on the new politics of ‘partnership’ in Canadian development cooperation. His publications include Canada and Africa in the New Millennium: The Politics of Consistent Inconsistency (2015, Wilfred Laurier University Press); Rethinking Canadian Aid (2016, University of Ottawa Press, co-edited with Stephen Brown and Molly den Heyer); and South African Foreign Policy: Identities, Intentions, and Directions (2016, Routledge, co-edited with David Hornsby). ■

Sven Botha

Sven Botha holds a BSocSci in Political and International Studies (summa cum laude) from Monash University and a BA Honours (Politics and International Relations) with distinction and MA (Politics) with distinction, both from the University of Johannesburg. He is currently pursuing a PhD in Politics at the University of Johannesburg, where he specialises in the mapping of global counter-terrorism actors. Sven is an assistant lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg. His research interests include terrorism, counter-terrorism, gender, foreign policy, diplomacy, security issues in the Global South, and early career development in the social sciences. ■

Suzanne Graham

Suzanne Graham is Associate Professor  of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg. She is also Vice Dean: Teaching & Learning in the Faculty of Humanities (2021–2024). Her doctoral thesis focused on South Africa’s voting behaviour in the UN from 1994 to 2008. Suzanne is co-president of the Regional Integration and Social Cohesion (RISCRISE) Consortium, headquartered at the University of Johannesburg. 386

She specialises in international relations and foreign policy. 

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 386

2022/11/10 00:03

Cheryl Hendricks

Cheryl Hendricks is the executive director of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR). From July 2018 to September 2021 she was executive head of the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA) in the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). She was appointed as a professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Johannesburg in April 2013 and served as head of the department from 2014 to 2017. Cheryl spent many years working at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), first as programme head for the Southern

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS

■

Africa Human Security Programme and then as senior research fellow in the Conflict Management and Peacebuilding Division. She has also worked at the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) and at the University of the Western Cape. She holds a PhD in Government and International Relations from the University of South Carolina and an MA in Southern African Studies from the University of York. She has a wealth of knowledge and expertise in the areas of conflict management (conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, and peacebuilding); women, peace, and security; and African regional security architectures. She has published widely on these topics and engages a range of policy makers, academics, researchers, and civil society actors on these issues. ■

David J. Hornsby

David J. Hornsby is a professor in the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, and Associate Vice-President (Teaching and Learning). Formerly based at the University of the Witwatersrand in the Department of International Relations, David’s research focuses on South African and Canadian foreign policy, science in the international political economy, and higher education studies. ■

Francis Kornegay

Francis Kornegay was a senior research fellow at the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD). He was also a member of the international editorial board of the Journal of the Indian Ocean Region and a past fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center of Scholars. He had an MA in African Studies from Howard University and an MA in International Public Policy from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. Kornegay served two stints in the US Congress as a professional staffer, developing financial sanctions legislation on South Africa, among other things. He established the Research and Evaluation Unit for the African Development Foundation, an independent US 387

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 387

2022/11/10 00:03

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS

agency. In South Africa, he served as the country director of the AfricanAmerican Institute (AAI) and was involved in electoral support activities. His research focused on South–South cooperation, on which he wrote and published extensively. ■

Natalie Leibrandt-Loxton

Natalie Leibrandt-Loxton is a researcher at the South African Parliament’s International Relations and Protocol Division. She is also a research associate for the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Johannesburg. She supports parliamentary delegations representing South Africa at bilateral and multilateral inter-parliamentary meetings through analysing international policy frameworks and drafting motions for debate and resolution. These diplomatic experiences inform her current academic interest in exploring novel approaches to the conduct of parliamentary diplomacy. She received her DLitt et Phil degree in Politics and International Relations from the University of Johannesburg in 2019 and has published on the strategic value of bilateral and multilateral parliamentary diplomacy as tools of soft power. Her current research interests – both as parliamentary official and as legislative scholar – are focused on improved internal and external processes related to parliamentary diplomacy for optimal strategic impact. ■

David Luke

David Luke is a professor in practice and strategic director at the Firoz Lalji Centre for Africa. Specialising in African trade policy and trade negotiations, David has decades of experience in policy advisory services, managing and catalysing research, building partnerships, and training and capacity development for the private sector and government. This experience stems from an extensive career spanning a tenured appointment at Dalhousie University in Halifax and assignments at the African Union (AU), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), with postings in Harare, Pretoria, Geneva, and Addis Ababa.  At the UN ECA’s African Trade Policy Centre, David and his team were instrumental in the preparation of the protocols that make up the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement. His PhD in African Political Economy is from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) and his MSc and BSc are from the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research and teaching interests lie in the role of trade in development, trade and inclusion, and trade and sustainability. 388

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 388

2022/11/10 00:03

Faith Mabera

Faith Mabera is a senior researcher at the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), where she oversees the Foreign Policy Analysis Programme. She holds a BPolSci in International Studies and an MA in International Relations (cum laude) from the University of Pretoria. Her research interests include the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, African diplomacy, foreign policy analysis, African peace and security issues, norms dynamics in international relations, and global governance. She is also a regular commentator on South African media covering foreign

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS

■

policy issues, geopolitical trends, and international politics pertinent to South Africa and Africa. She is a co-editor of the book Africa–China Cooperation: Towards an African Policy on China? (2020, Palgrave). ■

Lesley Masters

Lesley Masters is a senior lecturer at Nottingham Trent University and a senior research associate at the University of Johannesburg (SARChI Chair in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy). Before moving into academia, Lesley was a senior researcher at the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) in Pretoria, responsible for the management of projects on foreign policy and diplomacy. She received her PhD in International Relations from the University of Leicester. Her research continues to focus on foreign policy, global governance, and international diplomacy. ■

Philani Mthembu

Philani Mthembu is executive director at the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), an independent foreign policy think tank based in Pretoria. Prior to joining the IGD, he pursued a joint doctoral programme (Dr rer pol) with the Graduate School of Global Politics, Freie Universität Berlin, and the School of International Studies at Renmin University in Beijing. The focus of his dissertation (magna cum laude) was on the rise of emerging powers as sources of development cooperation in Africa. He co-founded the Berlin Forum on Global Politics (BFoGP), a non-profit organisation dedicated to the promotion of academic, expert, and public understanding of global politics. While completing his MA in International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, he headed the academic development programme for first-year students and was elected as the first independent candidate on the Student Representative Council (SRC). His recent publications include China and India’s Development Cooperation in Africa: The Rise of Southern Powers (2018, Springer), a co-edited book titled From MDGs to Sustainable Development Goals: The Travails of International Development (2017, IDG and UNISA), a co-edited book titled 389

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 389

2022/11/10 00:03

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS

Africa and the World: Navigating Shifting Geopolitics (2020, MISTRA), and a co-edited book titled Africa–China Cooperation: Towards an African Policy on China? (2020, Palgrave). ■

Arina Muresan

Arina Muresan is a senior researcher at the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), where she contributes to various programmatic areas on geopolitical dynamics, diplomacy, and foreign policy analysis. She leads the flagship South Africa in the World project, which reflects on annual South African foreign policy and diplomacy activities. She has a keen interest in issues of trade and economic and commercial diplomacy, China’s engagement in Africa, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping, and African leadership dynamics.  ■

Marcel Nagar

Marcel Nagar is a postdoctoral research fellow at the National Research Foundation (NRF) SARChI Chair: African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the University of Johannesburg. She obtained her BSocSci, BSocSci (Honours), and MSocSci degrees specialising in International Relations and Public Policy and Administration from the University of Cape Town. She holds a DLitt et Phil in Political Studies from the University of Johannesburg. Her research interests lie in developmental states and African political economy. ■

Bianca Naude

Bianca Naude lectures in politics and international relations at the Qwaqwa campus of the University of the Free State. She holds a PhD in Politics from the University of Cape Town, an MA in Advanced European and International Studies from the Centre International de Formation Européenne, and an MA in Political Science from the University of Lyon II. Her research interests include international relations theory, psychoanalysis in international relations, philosophy of the social sciences, and research methodology. Bianca’s recent publications include articles and chapters in edited academic volumes on the quest for ontological security in South Africa’s foreign relations, South African foreign policy as a tool for resistance against Western hegemony in international affairs, and the role of emotions in South African foreign policy. She has further contributed papers on ontological security approaches to international terrorism, the possibilities of a theory of state personality, and Othering as a theoretical tool for understanding social discrimination and xenophobia. Her current research focuses on state personhood, narcissism, 390

and ego defences in world politics.

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 390

2022/11/10 00:03

Fritz Nganje

Fritz Nganje is Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Johannesburg. He was a researcher in the Africa Programme of the Pretoria-based Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) from 2011 to 2014. He obtained a PhD in Political Studies from the University of Johannesburg in 2013, based on a thesis that analysed the international relations of the South African provinces of Gauteng, North-West, and the Western Cape. His main research interests are the foreign relations of sub-national governments, otherwise known as paradiplomacy; South

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS

■

Africa’s foreign policy and diplomacy in Africa; and issues of peace, human security, and governance in Africa. He has received a C2 rating from the National Research Foundation (NRF) and currently serves as associate editor of Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies. ■

Lisa Otto

Lisa Otto is a senior researcher with the National Research Foundation (NRF) SARChI Chair in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the University of Johannesburg and is co-editor-in-chief of African Security Review. She holds a PhD in Political Studies from the University of Johannesburg and an MA in International Peace and Security from King’s College London. She has specialised in African issues, particularly those related to conflict and security as well as foreign affairs and political risk. Her research interests have largely revolved around nontraditional threats to security, and she has developed specific expertise in maritime security.  ■

Christopher Vandome

Christopher Vandome is a senior research fellow with the Chatham House Africa Programme. His research focuses on the political economy and international relations of southern Africa, as well as regional peace and security, environmental issues, and extractive industries. He has worked closely with governments, the private sector, and civil society in Africa, and in 2017 undertook a secondment to a leading international mining company to provide support in defining the company’s Africa strategy. Christopher has presented his research at numerous conferences and events in the UK and southern Africa, and is a regular media commentator and writer on political issues in the region. He has an MA from the University of Cape Town and is currently a PhD candidate in International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand.

391

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 391

2022/11/10 00:03

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS

■

Jo-Ansie van Wyk

Jo-Ansie van Wyk is a professor of international politics at the University of South Africa (UNISA). She has published widely on South Africa’s foreign policy and international relations, among other issues, and has received a C3 rating from the National Research Foundation (NRF). She is the secretary of the South African Association of Political Studies (SAAPS) and has completed consultancies for, inter alia, UNESCO, the World Bank, and the African Commission on Nuclear Energy.  ■

Christopher Williams

Christopher Williams is a postdoctoral research fellow and adjunct lecturer in the International Relations Department at the University of the Witwatersrand. He holds an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University and a PhD in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.  His dissertation examined South African peacemaking during the Nelson Mandela administration, with a particular focus on how South Africa’s own negotiated transition influenced its later conflict resolution efforts in Africa.  In 2018 Christopher was a Bradlow Fellow at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).  His work has been published in African Studies,  African Security, South African Journal of International Affairs, and South African Historical Journal. 

392

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 392

2022/11/10 00:03

Index Please note: Page numbers in italics refer to figures or tables. Ad-hoc Committee of Eight Heads of State and Government (C8) 306, 307 AfCFTA see African Continental Free Trade Area Africa Advisory Group 284 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) 2050 140, 143, 145 African countries, conflict management in 222, 225–227 economic integration 70, 259 landscape, adapting to a changing 379–381 solidarity 39, 204, 303 unity 28, 29 African Agenda 32, 49, 222, 227, 236, 239, 282, 289, 290 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement 242, 243, 244, 245 benefits of 242, 243–244 and BRICS 73 ‘Cape to Cairo’ wing of 379, 382 and DRC 310, 311, 312 economic and distributional effects of 243–244 effect of Covid-19 on 236, 243, 264 establishing/launching of 236, 242, 243, 244, 264, 309, 379 and export diversification 242 and gender equality 238, 240, 241, 242–245, 246, 248 gender mainstreaming in 245, 247 implementation of 70, 231, 242–245, 253 inaugural Secretary-General of 309–312, 377 linking WPS Agenda to 246–248, 249 National Strategy 238, 245, 247, 248 and peace and security 236, 237, 238 and peace processes 247–248 and phases of negotiations 242 promoting of 221 prospects of 377 Ramaphosa’s engagement with 73 role of 238, 240, 242, 243 support for 239 Treaty 309, 311 and women’s economic empowerment 238, 240, 243, 245, 247, 248 African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and GSP status 356 privileges 356 ratification of 346 and SA exports to USA 354

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 393

African National Congress (ANC) and cadre deployment 68 corruption within 68 and factionalism 9, 68, 335 and governance of major cities 190 leadership race 8, 67 and USA 347, 348, 360 African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) 119 African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 161, 163, 222, 227, 230 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) audit of 314 and Covid-19 201 and good international citizenship 49 and norm entrepreneurship 69, 70, 159 and Ramaphosa’s chairmanship 219, 237, 309, 311, 313 and regional integration 383 whistle-blowing report from 314 African Regional Centre (ARC) 288, 374 African Renaissance Fund (ARF) 224, 332, 373 programme 61, 222, 223, 261 African Union (AU) and chairship of DRC 377, 379 and DRC 203, 204, 205, 224, 225 establishment of 304 and Israel 371–372, 378 leadership aspirations redux 313–315 and Morocco 378, 380 and norm entrepreneurship 69, 70, 71 and peace and security 227–230 Ramaphosa as chair of 69, 70, 71, 72, 313 South Africa as chair of 49–50, 53 African Union Commission (AUC) and AfCFTA 310 deputy chairperson of 314 leading the 304–309 and SA’s candidature diplomacy 299, 304–309 African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) 46, 49, 69, 220, 221 Afrocentric foreign policy, and economic diplomacy 253 Agenda 2063 (of AU) 28, 49, 72, 117, 219, 241, 242, 260, 263, 291 agriculture, and new trade opportunities through AfCFTA 243, 244 America First’ approach 349, 360, 375 Angola and BRICS 287

393

2022/11/10 00:03

INDEX

and SA economic diplomacy in Africa 255, 267, 268 SA’s political relationship with 267–268 Antarctic Treaty 137 Antarctica, SA engagement with 137 anti-colonial identity 31 anti-globalist ascendancy 374 anti-imperialism 335, 360 anti-imperialist identity 31 anti-piracy operations 138, 162, 163, 167 anti-Western posturing/sentiments (in ruling party) 31, 33, 63 armed conflict in Ethiopia 224 and impact on women 240 SA’s position on 331 Atlantic Ocean, and maritime diplomacy 142–143 atomistic individualism 31 Australia, in terms of good international citizenship 41, 42 autocratic African governments 67 Bandung Conference (1955) 30 Best Countries Report (2020), SA’s ranking 43 Biden, Joe 208, 360, 374, 376 bilateral relations in Africa, and norm entrepreneurship 74, 75, 76 Botes, Alvin 116, 118, 239 Brexit 206, 375 BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and AfCFTA 73 Business Forum 374, 375 and club governance 276, 280, 281, 285–289, 292 and DRC 287 expansion of 287 and IBSA 141, 338, 339 and marine diplomacy 138, 140–141, 142, 144 and moral foreign policy 67, 73 and multilateralism 46, 67 and norm entrepreneurship 67, 73 perceptions of SA’s membership of 286 Ramaphosa’s engagement with 67, 73 and SA’s health diplomacy 199 and SA’s identity 30 and SA’s maritime diplomacy 140–141 SA-USA relations 350, 355, 360 strategic value to SA 374, 375 Summit (2019) 73 and WEF 289, 291 Youth Energy Agency 117–118 and youth engagement/participation 117–118, 119, 121 Youth Summit (2018) 117, 286, 287, 289 British (UK) foreign policy, in terms of good international citizenship 41, 42 Bush, George 346, 348

394

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 394

cadre deployment 68 Canada and ‘middlepowerism’ 323 and ‘niche’ diplomacy 326 and China 334 and dependence on USA 333 and international activism 328, 329, 330 and international citizenship 40 and Israel 328 as middle power 325, 327–330 and multilateral institutions 323 and Ukraine 334 candidature diplomacy, and DIRCO 299, 303–304, 307, 308, 314, 316 Cape Town 181, 183, 186, 187, 191 ‘Cape to Cairo’ wing of AfCFTA 379, 382 Central African Republic (CAR), military intervention in 222, 223, 265 Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa) 71, 199, 200, 203 China and BRICS 30, 286, 287 and cooperation with Africa 208, 222, 223, 382 and Covid-19 196, 201, 208 economic involvement in Africa 72 and human rights 67 and India 30 and relationship with SA 30, 208 and SA defence diplomacy 164, 164, 165 and SA maritime diplomacy 141 SA trade ties with 72 and trade war with USA 283, 359, 371 and UNSC 46 and Western hegemony 327 chosen glories 24–25, 29, 32 traumas 24–25, 29, 32 cities, and developmental local government in South Africa 179–183 City of Cape Town, 181, 183, 186, 187, 191 City of Johannesburg 181, 183, 185, 186, 187, 191 civil society and DIRCO 120, 124, 125, 126, 127 as foreign policy actor 119–121, 124, 125, 126, 127 climate change 52, 176, 184, 185, 189, 220, 326, 330 club governance and African Advisory Group 282–285 and BRICS 276, 280, 281, 285–289, 292 and Compact with Africa 282–285 concept of 277 and DIRCO 276, 280 and economic diplomacy 279, 280, 281–291 and G20 282–285 and legitimacy 278 and multilateralism 277, 278, 281, 282 in SA’s economic agenda 278–281

2022/11/10 00:03

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 395

Darfur, peacekeeping mission in 46 defence budget 168, 169, 170 attachés, deployment of 155, 162, 165–166, 165, 169, 170 defence diplomacy change in 153 concept of 155–158 and deployment of defence attachés 165–166, 165 effectiveness of 167–168 efficiency and economy of 168–169 evaluation of SA’s 166–170 integrated approach to foreign and security policy 158–161 in military-diplomatic nexus of foreign policy instruments 154 range of activities of 155 relevance of 166 and SA’s bilateral and multilateral engagements 162–165, 164 and SANDF 159, 160, 162, 168 as strategic tool of foreign and security policy 153–154, 154 SA’s approach to 158–166, 164, 165 strategy 161–162, 166, 169 defence industry cooperation 162, 167 marketing of 168 and SANDF 168 defence policy 151, 152 document 159 effectiveness of 167–168 functions of 152 priorities 167 and SANDF 167 Defence Review (2015) and budget constraints 169 criticism of 160 and defence diplomacy 158, 159, 161, 169 and defence engagements 162–163 and defence priorities 161 and maritime diplomacy 136 and military-diplomatic nexus 160 and SADC 163 and SANDF 160, 162 Democratic Alliance (DA) 119, 186, 190 democratic consolidation in Africa 225 democratic governance 15, 113 in Africa via APRM 70 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and AfCFTA 310, 311, 312 and AU 203, 204, 205, 224, 225 and AU chairship 377, 379 and AU conflict management 224, 225 and BRICS 287 conflict management in 224, 225 elections (2018) 75, 379 and Israel 377, 379

INDEX

and WEF 289–291 cluster system, of governance 6, 7 Committee of Eight Heads of State and Government (C8) 306, 307 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 261, 309, 379 Compact with Africa (CwA) 73, 283, 284 conflict and insecurity, causes of 247 conflict management in African countries 222, 225–227 agenda of AU and UN 225 and current peace and security challenges 232 and democratic consolidation in Africa 225 in DRC 224, 225 in Libya 224, 225, 226, 228 and relationship between UNSC and AUPSC 221 and SA’s peace and security agenda 221, 222 SA’s role in 219, 220, 221, 230, 231, 232 in South Sudan 229 strategy 232 see also peace and security conflict resolution in Africa 358, 359 and defence diplomacy 166 and parliamentary diplomacy 90 and WPS Agenda 240 Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 312 Constitution, Section 231(2) of the 89, 94 constructivism, and realism 65, 66 constructivist idealism 65 continental agenda, priorities on South Africa’s 137 geopolitics, and economic diplomacy 260 governance, institutions of 49 security architecture 232 cosmopolitanism 40, 43 Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) 134, 135 Covid-19 and APRM 201 and economic diplomacy 208 effect on sustainable development in Africa 236–237 and good international citizenship of SA 52–53 impact on women 243 and moral foreign policy 77 and multilateralism 206, 207, 210 and norm entrepreneurship 71–72 and Ramaphosa’s response 70, 71–72 and SANDF 76, 200, 209 Creecy, Barbara 52 Cuba links/relations with 41, 209, 348, 359 and SA’s health diplomacy 198, 359

395

2022/11/10 00:03

INDEX 396

and SA’s norm entrepreneurship 75 and Palestine 379 Ramaphosa’s engagement with 75 and SA’s economic diplomacy 266 and SA’s maritime diplomacy 142 SA’s peacebuilding efforts in 331 UN peace support operation in 164 violent extremism in 226, 227 and women’s economic empowerment 241 Denel 168, 332 Department of Defence (DOD) 145, 160, 166, 167, 168, 169, 231 Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 6, 302 see also DIRCO Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (DFFE) 6 Department of International Relations and Cooperation see DIRCO Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 98, 99, 101, 259, 260, 310 Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (dtic) 6, 263, 266, 276, 280, 372 deportations, of foreigners 202 Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) 284, 373, 374 developmental local government, in South Africa and cities 179–183 definition of 180–181 and economic gaps between territories 181 the need for 182–183 resource drivers for 181–182 developmental state, 180, 182, 191, 238 DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation) and African Agenda 49 Annual Report 2018/19 30, 31, 49 budget cut 332 and candidature diplomacy 299, 303–304, 307, 308, 314, 316 and club governance 276, 280 and cooperation between departments 185 and cooperation with civil society 120, 124, 125, 126, 127 coordination challenges for 6, 7 and economic diplomacy in Africa 259, 260, 261, 269 and financial support 332, 333 and global challenges 52 and negative publicity 122, 123, 125 politicisation of 68 programmes enacted by 115, 115, 116, 126, 231 relations with Global North 30–31 relations with Global South 31 and SADC-EPA 98, 99 and SANDF deployment to peace missions 163 and South African–US relationship 347, 350, 351, 352, 359

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 396

Strategic Plan 2020–2025 26, 27, 47, 49, 224, 239 and unauthorised expenditures 9 and urbanisation of foreign policy 185, 189, 191 and youth participation 115–118, 115, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126–127 see also Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Dlamini-Zuma, Nkosazana 67, 196, 304, 305, 306, 307, 309 domestic constituencies, interests of 4 economy, and moral foreign policy 67 norms 64 domestic policy decisions and outcomes 63, 66 link between foreign policy and 4–5 and international standing 200 Durban 181, 183, 184–185, 187, 191 East African Community (EAC) 261, 310, 379 Economic Advisory Council 262, 273, 279 economic diplomacy in Africa 259, 260, 261–268, 269, 310 and Afrocentric foreign policy 253 and club governance 279, 280, 281–291 and continental geopolitics 260 and Covid-19 208 and crisis in Zimbabwe 265 definition of 258 and DIRCO 259, 260, 261, 269 and DRC 266 and economic engagement in Africa under Ramaphosa 261–268, 310 and Foreign Service Act (26 of 2019) 262–263, 279 government-led 258–261 and Mbeki as ‘economic diplomat’ 259 and moral foreign policy agenda 73, 78 and multilateralism 276, 280, 281, 282 and National Development Plan (NDP) (2012) 260, 279, 280 and Nigeria-Angola pivot 268–269 and Ramaphosa’s administration 261–268, 276, 310, 381 and regional developmental aspirations 254 and regional industrialisation 258, 259 and SA’s peace and security agenda 223 and SA’s place in changing African economic context 254–257 and SA’s regional trading 256 and SOEs 258, 281 and South African Trade Policy and Strategy Framework (2010) 259–260, 280 stakeholders in 258, 260, 280 strategic framework 260, 280 and transparency 269 and White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy (2011) 259, 279, 280 and Zuma administration 259–261 Economic Diplomacy Forum 263

2022/11/10 00:03

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 397

forced migration 336, 340, 360 foreign affairs, financial support for conduct of 332 missions, number of 9 and security policy, integrated approach to 158–161 foreign policy approach, recalibrated 381–282 constituencies 4–5 link between domestic policy and 4–5 fragmentation of 5–9 multisectoral approach to 4–5 New Dawn for 8, 9–11 gap between public policy and 4 priorities 6 as public policy 3, 4–5, 11, 15 Foreign Service Act (26 of 2019), and economic diplomacy 262–263, 279 foreigners, deportations of 202 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 208, 222, 223, 382 Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) 72, 117, 289, 291 G7 (Group of Seven) Ramaphosa’s engagement with 71, 72 Summit (2018) 71 Summit (2019) 71–72, 74 Summit (2021) 72, 204 G20 (Group of Twenty) and African debt 285 and AU 203, 204 and BRICS 286, 289, 290 Compact with Africa Conference 73 and Covid-19 203, 204 and illicit financial flows 285 Investment Summit 73 markets 283 Ramaphosa’s engagement with 73 and SA’s bilateral trade relationships 283, 284 SA’s membership of 282, 283 SA’s engagement with 285, 326 summits 282, 283 gender equality and AfCFTA 238, 240, 241, 242–245, 246, 248 and SA continental agenda 237 and sustainable development 237 and women’s economic empowerment 238, 239, 240, 241, 248 and WPS Agenda 246, 248 gender mainstreaming, and AfCFTA 237, 244, 245, 247 gender-based violence, and good international citizenship 50–51 general systems theory (GST) 88, 91–93, 95, 96, 96, 100 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 354, 356 geopolitical power diplomacy 371–374

INDEX

economic engagement in Africa under Ramaphosa 261–263, 310 multilateral contradictions and bilateral realities 263–267 and Nigeria-Angola pivot 267–268 Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) 119 economic nationalism 374 economic partnerships, building of 71–72 economic partnership agreements (EPAs) 88, 97, 265 see also SADC-EPA emerging powers and current economic realities 277–278 and multilateralism 281, 282 and role in global governance 277–278 and SA identity 30 rise of African 292, 293 empathetic cosmopolitanism 43 enemy images, and national identity 25 Eskom SADC debt owed to 257 and SAPP 257 eSwatini and SA’s health diplomacy 199, 205, 220 and SA’s human rights foreign policy 47, 330, 381 and SADC-EPA 97 and AU 224 eThekwini metropolitan municipality 185 Ethio-Egyptian tug-of-war 376 Ethiopia, 220, 224, 287, 305, 306, 375, 376, 379 European Commission 97, 101, 206 European Union (EU) and centrist and right-wing movements 375 and SA relations 30 and SA trade 287 and SADC-EPA 88, 97, 98, 99–102, 101, 102, 265 and unilateralism 206 and youth 113 Exercise MOSI 141, 164, 164 export diversification 242 export-oriented manufacturing, development of 243 extractive exports 242 industries/sectors 330, 332, 336, 340 extremism (violent) countries experiencing 224 in Mozambique 226 regional security mechanisms to counter 226, 227, 230 rise in 226 in southern Africa 224, 226, 227, 229, 230 spread of 220, 226 fifth Parliament, and SADC-EPA 88, 95, 97–103, 98, 101, 102 food security 52, 334, 347, 360

397

2022/11/10 00:03

INDEX 398

geopolitics, and economic diplomacy 260 Germany bilateral ties with 73–74, 255 and CwA 284 and defence diplomacy 164, 165 new coalition government in 375 Ghana 74, 284, 290, 311 global challenges and DIRCO 52 and good international citizenship 52 global cities 176 internationalisation of SA’s 183–186 phenomenon 186, 188, 189 and urbanisations of foreign affairs 177–179 global citizenship and health policy 205–209 Mandela’s 43 global governance architecture 46–47 and club governance 277 effect of Covid-19 on 205–206 forums 187 of health 197, 198 and middlepowerism 334 and role of emerging powers in current economic realities 277–278 and SA’s role 286, 288 structural inequities in 340 transformation of 46, 349 and urban dynamics 178, 188 global ‘good deeds’, and good international citizenship 51–53 global health diplomacy in practice 197–200, 219 Global North, DIRCO relations with 30, 31 Global South DIRCO relations with 31 solidarity 209, 210 global strategic landscape 374– 377 and proactive strategic engagement 377–379 globalisation of cities 177, 179, 187, 188, 189 and middle powers 323, 334 and national identity 25, 33 and security challenges 156 of Western forms of military organisation 157 good international citizenship advantages of 39 applications of 41 and areas of special responsibility 42 attributes of 42–43 Australia in terms of 41, 42 British (UK) foreign policy in terms of 41, 42 concept of 38, 42 definition of 39, 40

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 398

disadvantages of 38, 39 and health diplomacy 53, 205–209 and international reputation 39, 41 key to 40–41 literature on 40–42 South Africa in terms of 41–42, 43, 53, 54 in terms of action taken 42 government-led economic diplomacy, definition and articulation 258–261 Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) 376, 379 Gross domestic product (GDP) 168, 201, 242, 275, 285, 309 Group of Seven see G7 Group of Twenty see G20 GST input–output model for Parliament’s engagement with international agreements 96, 96 health diplomacy and Covid-19 200–209 as foreign policy issue 199 and multilateralism 199, 200, 207 Nelson Mandela–Fidel Castro Medical Training Programme 198 and Pan-Africanism 205, 209 in practice 197–200, 219 and SA’s good international citizenship 53, 205–209 SA’s approach to 198–199 HIV and AIDS 51, 53, 198, 200, 206, 208, 346, 357 Huawei 353 Human Freedom Index, SA’s ranking 43 human rights decline of 330–331 and SA’s good international citizenship 41, 44–45, 47–48, 54 and SA’s norm entrepreneurship 62, 63, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72 humanitarian internationalism 40 IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) and BRICS 140, 141, 338, 339 Dialogue Forum 280, 338 and IBSAMAR 140 IBSAMAR (India-Brazil-South Africa Maritime), and marine diplomacy 138, 140, 142, 163, 164 identity and African heroes 29 concepts of 24 construction of 22, 23 and emerging powers 30 and Global South 29, 30, 31 and Global North 31 and historical glories and traumas 29 South-Africa’s 27–31 and Western identity 31 illicit financial flows 285 immigrant-owned spaza shops 77

2022/11/10 00:03

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 399

of SA under Ramaphosa 43–53 and UNSC membership 46, 47, 48, 49 International Criminal Court (ICC) 7, 30, 328, 330, 335 purpose of 44 and SA’s membership 44, 45, 54, 68, 330 Zuma administration’s intended withdrawal from 44, 45, 68 International Labour Organization (ILO), leading the 312–313 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 203, 204, 284 International Relations and Cooperation, Department of see DIRCO International South African Model United Nations (ISAMUN) 111, 121, 124, 127 internationalisation in SA cities, drivers of 183–186 internationalism 40, 41, 210, 325, 371, 373, 384 intra-African trade and AfCFTA Agreement 242–243 and gender equality 238, 240, 241, 242–245, 246, 248 intra-BRICS trade 287 IORA–Nelson Mandela Be the Legacy Programme 51 Iraq invasion of (2003) 42, 346, 348 Islamic State of 226 Islamic State rise of 42 and operations in Africa 226 Israel and African Union 371–372, 378 and Canada 328 and DRC 377, 379 in international landscape 375 and Morocco 371, 376, 377, 378 SA’s bilateral relations with 74, 348 and Sudan 376 and USA 348 Israeli-Palestinian conflict 7, 74, 348 Japan and CwA 283 and IAEA 302, 303 SA’s trade negotiations/relations with 72, 255 Johannesburg 181, 183, 185, 186, 187, 191 joint military exercises and operations during the presidency of Ramaphosa 164 164 Joint Rules of Parliament 95 Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector Including Organs of State see Zondo Commission land reform in Zimbabwe 68 in SA 122, 135, 351, 352, 353 Lesotho intervention in (1998) 6

INDEX

immigration policies 202, 203 reform 50, 351 troubles 43 imperial/colonial identity 31 inclusive political dialogue 45, 225, 227, 230 India-Brazil-South African Dialogue Forum (IBSA) 140, 141, 338, Indian Ocean, and marine diplomacy 138, 141 Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) 141 Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) 30, 46, 51, 138–140, 144 Indian Ocean Zone of Peace Declaration 141–142 industrialisation, regional 258, 259 information-sharing (among delegations and committees) 88, 91, 100, 103 GST approach to 91–96, 93, 96 Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) 372 institutionalised xenophobia, growth in 332 international human rights, and international citizenship of South Africa 47–48 law, and international citizenship of South Africa 44–46 norms 64 organisations, allure of leading 300–301 peace missions, SA’s participation in 6, 160, 163, 167, 170, 230 policy 4, 337, 338 relations theory 65 reputation, and good international citizenship 39, 41 right-wing anti-globalist ascendancy 374 international agreements and the Constitution 89, 94 and the executive 88 GST input–output model for Parliament’s engagement with 96, 96 and parliamentary diplomacy 87–88, 94 and parliamentary oversight 89–97, 99 international agreement system, of SA Parliament 94–96, 96 see also SADC-EPA International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 299, 301–304 international citizenship and APRM 49 and challenges around xenophobia and gender-based violence 50–51 and climate change 52 and Covid-19 52–53 and global ‘good deeds’ 51–53 and health diplomacy 53, 205–209 and international human rights 47–48 and international law 44–46 and multilateralism 46–47 and normative values of Nelson Mandela 51, 52, 54 and SA’s leadership role in Africa 49, 50, 51

399

2022/11/10 00:03

INDEX 400

Ramaphosa’s engagement with 75 Lesotho Highlands Water Project 288 liberal (world) order 325, 333, 349 Libya and AU 225, 226, 227, 228, 230–231 conflict management in 224, 225, 226, 228 internationalised civil war in 376, 377 and peace talks 228 and UNSC 222, 223, 227, 231 and UNSC Resolution 1973 on 227, 331, 335 Maloka, Eddy 5–6, 314, 315, 349 Mandela, Nelson foreign policy under 67, 326 global citizenship of 43 honouring ideals/values of 48–49, 51–52, 54 norm entrepreneurship under 67–68 normative values of 51, 52, 54 SA’s international citizenship role under 41, 222 as source of morality in SA’s international relations 26 statue at the UN of 71 as symbol of hope and peace 52 and UNGA 48–49 and USA relations 346 manufacturing development of export-oriented 243 and new trade opportunities through AfCFTA 243, 244 Mapisa-Nqakula, Nosiviwe 165, 168–169, 223 marine sector, agenda for 135 maritime foreign policy 134 sector, Road Map for 135 maritime diplomacy assessing SA’s 143–144 conceptualisation of 133–134 definition of 133–134, 144 and DRC 142 see also maritime diplomatic engagement; maritime domain maritime diplomatic engagement (SA’s) 137–143 and AIMS 2050 143 and Atlantic Ocean 142–143 and BRICS 140–141 and IBSAMAR 140 and Indian Ocean 138, 141 and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) 141 and Indian Ocean Zone of Peace Declaration 141–142 and international legal instruments and membership 143 and IORA 138–140 and SADC 138 and Southern Ocean 137 see also maritime diplomacy

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 400

maritime domain assessing South Africa’s 136, 136 and diplomatic engagement 137–143 and foreign policy 132 perspective of 134–136 policy perspective on 134–136, 136 Road Map for 135 maritime security 140, 141, 143, 162, 163 strategy 134, 138, 145 Mashaba, Herman 186 materialism 65 see also rationalism Mbeki, Thabo and African Renaissance 61, 380 and Bush administration 346 as ‘economic diplomat’ 259 human rights foreign policy under 47 ‘I am an African’ speech of 28 and national security reform 161 and NEPAD 259 norm entrepreneurship under 49, 67–68 and peace and security 222, 232 and response to HIV crisis 53, 200 SA’s international citizenship role under 41, 49, 222 Mboweni, Tito 265, 290 Mdwaba, Mthunzi Perry-Mason 312, 313 Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) 2014–2019 162, 167 Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) 2019–2024 238, 239, 247 Members of Parliament (MPs) 88, 89, 90, 91, 92 Mene, Wamkele 242, 264, 310, 311, 312, 377 Merkel, Angela 73, 228 middle power South Africa as 325, 326, 327, 333–334 of tomorrow 338–341 middle powers options for embattled 336–338, 339, 340 order-building role of 323, 324 middle-power internationalism 325, 327 middlepowerism erosion of 327–333 and multilateralism 328, 330 order-building role of 323, 324 military operations/exercises, by SANDF 163–164, 164, 167 organisation, Western forms of 157 mini-literalism in SA’s economic agenda 278–281 Minty, Abdul 301, 302, 303, 315 modernisation, and national identity 25 moral authority, decline in SA’s 331–332 moral foreign policy and BRICS 67, 73 and China 72 and Covid-19 77 and domestic economy 67

2022/11/10 00:03

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 401

for foreign policy 8, 9–11 origin of phrase 47, 87 New Development Bank (NDB) 8, 30, 288, 374, 375 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 31, 159, 187, 232, 259, 261, 283 Nigeria and AfCFTA 311 and Angola 267–268 and candidature diplomacy 305, 306, 310, 311, 312 protests against police brutality in 227 SA’s bilateral relationship with 262, 267–268 and SA trade 255 and SA’s health diplomacy 200 Nigeria-Angola pivot, and economic diplomacy 268–269 Nkoana-Mashabane, Maite 9, 33, 261 Nkosi, Mxolisi 50 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 30 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 156, 200, 373 non-tariff barriers 242, 263, 264, 269 Nord Stream energy project 375 norm entrepreneurship and APRM 69, 70, 159 and AU 69, 70, 71 and bilateral relations in Africa 74, 75, 76 and BRICS 67, 73 and Covid-19 71–72 and DRC 75 and key conceptual definitions 64 and Lesotho 75 main elements of state-led 62, 64–65 and moral foreign policy 63 and morality 66 under Ramaphosa 67–78 reviving South African’s 69–78 rise and fall of South Africa’s (1994–2018) 67–68 and Russia’s war in Ukraine 70, 73 social constructivist theoretical approach to 65–66 state-led transnational 64–65 and trade relations with Russia 73 and United Nations 71 and UNSC 69, 70 norms compared to morals 66 definition of 64 and national identity 64 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 73, 155–156, 227, 334 nuclear energy 301, 302 ontological insecurity 24, 25 security 23, 24, 25, 29, 31, 32, 33 ontology of South African State 26–32

INDEX

and economic diplomacy 73, 78 and norm entrepreneurship 63 and Palestine 74 moralism 42, 66 morality, and norm entrepreneurship 66 Morocco 284, 310, 378, 380 and Israel 371, 376, 377, 378 Mozambique, violent extremism in 224, 226, 227, 229 multilateral activism 326, 327, 333 challenges, SA’s engagement with 331–332 multilateralism and BRICS 46, 67 and club governance 277, 278, 281, 282 and Covid-19 206, 207, 210 and economic diplomacy 276, 280, 281, 282 and emerging powers 281, 282 eroding of SA’s commitment to 330 and erosion of post-war liberal order 334 and health diplomacy 200 and IAEA 301 and international citizenship of South Africa 46–47 and middlepowerism 328, 330 and reshaping SA’s foreign policy 45, 46, 54 and SA’s peace and security agenda 222, 224, 230 and security policy 159, 162 Myanmar 41, 47, 48, 71, 330 Namibia 97, 142, 255, 265, 287, 305, 378 National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2020 to 2025 246–247, 248 National Assembly (NA) 45, 89, 94 National Coronavirus Command Council (NCCC) 7, 200, 209 National Council of Provinces (NCOP) 87, 94 National Development Plan 2012 (NDP), and economic diplomacy 260, 279, 280 national identity 41, 64, 71, 190, 237, 238 National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD) 199 National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) 6, 163 National Reforms Authority in Lesotho 75 National Security Strategy (NSS) 152, 161, 230 National Youth Development Agency (NYDA) 115, 117, 118, 123, 125, 127 Nelson Mandela–Fidel Castro Medical Training Programme 198 neoliberal capitalist economy 176, 188 economic orientation of SA government 187 environmental policies 189 ideology 25 order 178, 279 New Dawn

401

2022/11/10 00:03

INDEX 402

and relations with Global North 30–32 and relations with Global South 28–30 open-system model 92, 93, 93 Operation COPPER 138, 163, 164, 167 Operation Dudula 202, 203 Operation Phakisa (OP) 134–135, 136, 144 order-building internationalism 325 Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (of SADC), 219, 222, 268, 380 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 304, 305 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 304 see also African Union (AU) Palestine and AU 379 and DRC 379 historical solidarity of SA with 74 and moral foreign policy 74 Pan-African agenda 232, 378 Pan-Africanism 7, 200–205, 210 Pandor, Naledi and continental peace and security 223, 225 and economic engagement in Africa 262 and immigration admiration 50 and multilateralism 46 and ontology of the SA state 26, 27, 29, 30 on tourism 290 and US relations 350–351 parastatal corporations, decline in 332 Paris Accord 52 Parliament international agreement system of 94–96, 96 and engagement with the SADC-EPA 97– 102, 98, 101, 102 parliamentary committees and delegations 88–91 parliamentary diplomacy description of 90 and engagement with SADC-EPA 97, 99 and international agreements 87–88, 94 and parliamentary oversight 91, 103 Parliamentary Group on International Relations (PGIR) 91, 94–95, 96, 96 and SADC-EPA 98, 99, 100 parliamentary oversight and international agreements 89–97, 99 and parliamentary diplomacy 91 and SADC-EPA 100, 101 Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation 8 participatory internationalism 40 Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) 332 Pax Americana 324, 360 peace operations 331 processes, women in 247–248 peacebuilding efforts, in DRC 331

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 402

peace missions and defence diplomacy 158, 162 participation in 6, 160, 167, 170, 230 and SANDF 163, 167 peace and security and AfCFTA 236, 237, 238 in Africa 225–230 architecture 161, 220, 221, 222 challenges (SA’s current) 220, 232 and AU 69, 163, 219, 227–230, 231 and inclusive political dialogue 45, 225, 227, 230 and norm entrepreneurship 69 priorities, meeting of 227–230 promotion of 162, 165, 230–232 SA’s agenda for 221–225 SA’s role in promoting 230–232 and strategic influence 162 and UNSC 69, 70, 220, 221, 283 and violent conflict in Africa 225–227 and women’s empowerment 241, 242–245 see also conflict management; Women, Peace and Security Agenda Peace and Security Council (PSC), of the AU 46, 49, 69, 118, 220, 221 piracy 138, 163 populism 206, 374 Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation (PCIRC) 89, 95, 97, 98, 99, 211 Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry (PCTI) 96, 95, 97, 98, 99 post-war liberal/world order implications of erosion of 333–335 and multilateralism 334 pragmatism 30, 40, 42, 380 President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 346, 357–358 Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC) 262, 279 preventative diplomacy 42, 224, 237, 238, 239, 247 progressive internationalism 371, 373, 384 public policy gap between foreign policy and 4 foreign policy as 3, 11, 15 public sector as foreign policy actor 115–119, 115 Putin, Vladimir 73 Ramaphosa, Cyril and AfCFTA 73 assessing maritime diplomacy under 143–144 and bilateral relations in Africa 74, 75, 76 and bilateral relations with Israel 74 and bilateral ties with Germany 73–74 and BRICS 67, 73 and building of economic partnerships 71–72

2022/11/10 00:03

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 403

SA’s trade with 63, 67, 70, 73 South African defence attachés in 165 and Turkey 377 and UNSC 45, 46 and USA 375 and Venezuela 45 Russia–Africa Summit 73 Russia–Ukraine conflict, SA’s position on 70, 331 Rwanda 6, 199, 204, 229, 230, 305, 306, 378, 380 SACU–SADC region 378, 379, 382 see also Southern African Customs Union; Southern African Development Community SADC-EPA and DIRCO 98, 99 and fifth Parliament 88, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 101, 102, 102, 103 Parliament’s engagement with 97–102, 98, 101, 102 and PCIRC 97, 98, 99 and PCTI 96, 95, 97, 98, 99 and SCTIR 96, 97, 98, 99 science diplomacy 126 Secretary-General of AfCFTA and appointment process 310–312, 377–378 mandate of 310 opportunity and rationale 310 security architecture 161, 232, 387 mechanisms 163, 226, 227, 230 policy, and multilateralism 159, 162 see also safety and security Select Committee on Trade and International Relations (SCTIR) 89, 96, 97, 98, 99 Silencing the Guns (AU’s) and club governance 291 and continental peace and security 219, 221, 224, 226, 228, 231 and norm entrepreneurship 69, 70, 72 and women, peace and security 236, 240, 249 and the youth 112, 118 Sisulu, Lindiwe 27, 44, 47, 48, 116, 223, 224 sixth Parliament 87 small, medium, and micro-enterprises (SMMEs) 77, 240, 243, 245, 257, 266, 276 social constructivism 65 SONA see State of the Nation Address South Africa in a changing African economic context 254–257 in terms of good international citizenship 41–42, 43, 53, 54 and erosion of middlepowerism 330–333 and government-led economic diplomacy 258–261 and identity 21, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and multilateral activism 326, 327, 333 as middle power 325, 326, 327, 333–334

INDEX

chairmanship of APRM 219, 237, 309, 311, 313 chairmanships on multilateral bodies 69, 219, 309 as chair of AU 69, 70, 71, 72, 311, 313 and Covid-19 52–53, 70, 71–72 and DRC 75 and economic diplomacy 261–268, 276, 310, 381 economic engagement in Africa under 261–268, 310 and G20 73 and G7 71, 72 international citizenship of SA under 43–53 and international human rights 47–48 and international law 44–46 and Lesotho 75 and multilateralism 46–47 norm entrepreneurship under 67–78 résumé of 67 at Russia–Africa Summit 73 and SADC Tribunal 74–75 and SA’s leadership role in Africa 49, 50, 51 and trade negotiations with Japan 72 and United Nations 71 and UNSC membership 46, 47, 48, 49 and Zimbabwe 76 rationalism 65 see also materialism realism, and constructivism 65, 66 realist materialism 65 recalibrated foreign policy approach 381–282 regional developmental aspirations, and economic diplomacy 254 economic communities (RECs) 306 economic integration, and SOEs 260 integration 49, 382–383 security mechanisms 163, 226, 227, 230 trading, and economic diplomacy 256 regional industrialisation and economic diplomacy 258, 269 and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 256, 257 Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 42, 389 right-wing anti-globalist ascendancy 374 movements in Europe 375 Russia and alignment with SA via BRICS 286, 331 and Canada 334 and Europe 286 and IAEA 302, 303 and invasion of Ukraine 70, 73, 331, 375 joint military exercises with SA 164, 164 and NATO 73 and naval exercises with SA 141 relations with SA 30

403

2022/11/10 00:03

INDEX 404

as representative of sub-Saharan African interests 330 South Africa–Cuban relations 209 South African Airways 332 South African BRICS Youth Association (SABYA) 111, 121, 124 South African Council on International Relations (SACOIR) 123, 260 South African defence attachés 154, 155, 162, 165–166, 165, 169, 170 South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) 111, 121, 124, 127 South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and budgetary constraints 167, 169 and Covid-19 76, 200, 209 and defence diplomacy 159, 160, 162, 168 and defence policy priorities 167 and 2015 Defence Review 160, 162 and DIRCO 6, 163 and marketing of the defence industry 168 military operations/exercises 163–164, 164, 167 and peace missions 163, 167 and US relations 358 South African Trade Policy and Strategy Framework (2010) 259–260, 280 South African Youth for International Diplomacy (SAYID) 121, 124 South Africa–USA relationship, and DIRCO 347, 350, 351, 352, 359 South Sudan and AU 225, 230, 231 conflict management in 224, 225, 229 UN Mission in 163 and UNSC 69, 224 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 265, 374, 378, 383 Southern African Development Community (SADC) and AfCFTA 378, 379 and candidates for AUC deputy chairperson 314, 315 and conflict management 219 and dispute resolution 264 Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between EU and 265 and endorsement of Dlamini-Zuma as AUC candidate 305, 306, 307 Free Trade Area 256 liberation movements in 255, 331 and maritime security 138, 140, 145, 163, 167 Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) 226, 227 Ramaphosa as chair of 265, 268, 286 regional developmental objectives of 264 and regional integration 239, 264, 265, 382, 383 and SA’s defence engagements 163, 164, 165, 165 and SA’s economic diplomacy 265

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 404

and SA’s health diplomacy 199, 202 and SA’s maritime diplomacy 138, 140, 144, 145 and SAPP 257 Treaty 68 Tribunal 74, 75 and Tripartite Free Trade Area 261, 309, 310 and violent extremism 226, 227, 230 Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) 257 Southern Ocean, and marine diplomacy 137 state capture and SA’s national image 62, 275 and multiple foreign policy constituencies 5 and trend towards Global South solidarity 335 State of the Nation Address (SONA) in 2018 3, 9, 43, 47, 111 in 2019 238, 262, 275 in 2020 27, 30, 196, 275–276 in 2021 276 state-led norm entrepreneurship 62, 64–65 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) bailing out failing 291 and economic diplomacy 258, 281 maladministration of 43 and regional economic integration 260 and regional industrialisation 256, 257 and WEF 290 strategic framework, and economic diplomacy 260, 280 Strategic Plan 2020–2025 26, 27, 47, 49, 224, 239 Sudan democratic revolution in 375, 376 dynamics of post-Bashir transition in 376 and Israel 376 and support from South Africa 220, 224 and UNSC 46 sustainable development and continental peace and security 219 and Covid-19 236, 237 and EPAs 97 and gender equality 237 and international citizenship 51, 52 and maritime diplomacy 139 people-centred approach to 73 and women’s economic empowerment 238, 239, 240, 241, 248 and WPS Agenda 238, 240, 241, 242 and the youth 118, 120 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 120, 121, 183, 189, 219 tariffs and Agenda 2063 263 on imports to USA 356 reductions 242, 256, 263, 264 terrorist attacks, in Africa 226–227 Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) 72

2022/11/10 00:03

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 405

assistance in fight against HIV/AIDS 346, 357–358 Canada’s dependence on 333, 334 and conflict resolution in Africa 358, 359 and cooperation with SA 346, 349, 350 and Covid-19 358, 359, 360 deterioration of image in SA 352 differences on international issues 246, 248, 360 and DIRCO 347, 350, 351, 352, 359 and economic nationalism 374 and the EU 375 foreign policy establishment 349 and G20 283, 286 hegemonic role, degeneration of 333 and Israel 348 and Mbeki administration 346 and Paris Accord 52 and PEPFAR 356–358 and post-war liberal order 333, 349 and Ramaphosa’s presidency 350–353 and SA trade and investment 354–356 and SANDF 358 and security and global governance issues 349, 350 and security cooperation with SA 358–359 South African exports to 346 and Sudan 376 and support of WHO 207, 208 trade and investment 354–356 and trade war with China 283, 371 and vaccine nationalism 206 and war in Iraq 346, 348 and wars in Middle East 374 and Zuma administration 346–349, 350 UNSC Resolution 1325, national action plans 246 UNSC Resolution 1973 (on Libya) 227, 331, 335 urbanisation of foreign affairs 177–179 of foreign policy, and DIRCO 185, 189, 191 value-added products 72, 242, 243, 256, 269, 354 Venezuela 45, 46, 71, 225 violent conflict in Africa 225–227 violent extremism countries experiencing 224 in DRC 226, 227 in Mozambique 226 regional security mechanisms to counter 226, 227, 230 rise in 226 in southern Africa 224, 226, 227, 229, 230 spread of 220, 226 Western forms of military organisation 157 hegemony, in global affairs 30, 33, 326, 327 identity 31, 325, 326 neoliberal ideology, spread of 25

INDEX

Trade Policy and Strategy Framework, South African (2010) 259–260, 280 trade protectionism 356 traditional realism 40 transnational norm entrepreneurship 64–65, 69–78 Transnet 257, 332 Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, SA’s ranking 43 transparency, and economic diplomacy 269 Tripartite Free Trade Area 261, 309, 379 Trump, Donald ‘America First’ approach of 349, 360, 375 and Canada 327, 333 and climate change 52 and Chinese telecommunications equipment 353 and conflict resolution in Africa 358, 359 and Covid-19 206, 207, 208 derogatory statements from 351, 352, 353 differences with SA 349 on immigration reform 351 and Israel 348 on land reform in SA 351, 352 and PEPFAR 357 and Ramaphosa 351 and SA’s GSP status 356 tariffs on imports 356 and unilateralism 360 and Western Sahara 376–377 and WHO 207, 359 Ubuntu Diplomacy Awards 115 Ubuntu 10, 26 diplomacy of 207, 210 policy of 205, 222, 335 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 6, 187, 189 unilateralism 27, 46, 206, 346, 360 United Kingdom (UK) 46, 72, 75, 99, 141, 167, 206, 255, 265, 274 United Nations and norm entrepreneurship 71 peace support operation in DRC 164 Ramaphosa’s engagement with 71 vote on Russian invasion of Ukraine 70, 73 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and honouring Mandela 49 and Myanmar 47, 48, 71 Resolution 72/243 48–49 SA’s voting at 68, 71 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) South Africa as member of 46, 47, 48, 49 and international citizenship of South Africa 46, 47, 48, 49 and norm entrepreneurship 69, 70 relationship with AUPSC 221 United States of America (USA) and AGOA 346 and apartheid government 348

405

2022/11/10 00:03

INDEX 406

Western Sahara 376, 377, 378, 379, 380 White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy (2011) 259, 279, 280 Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda linking AfCFTA to 238, 246–248, 249 and women’s economic empowerment 246 pillars of 246 establishment of 237 implementation of 232, 237, 238, 239, 240, 247 resolutions 231, 232, 240 women peacebuilders 247, 248 provisions in AfCFTA of relevance to 244 wages for 243–244 women’s economic empowerment and AfCFTA 238, 240, 243, 248 and DRC 241 and National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 246–247, 248 and peace and security 241, 242–245 World Bank 112, 203, 204, 243, 244, 284 World Economic Forum (WEF) 289, 290, 291 World Health Organization (WHO) and Covid-19 52, 196, 200, 209, 334, 359 SA’s membership of 198 SA’s support for 53, 206, 207 and Trump administration 206, 207, 359 world orders, process of (re-)constituting 324 World Trade Organization (WTO) and African regional interests 327 and Covid-19 205, 340 and dtic 6 and G20 283 and the NDB 288 and SA exports to USA 354 xenophobia denialism 68 and deportations 202 and government response 77, 202, 223, 224, 263 growth in institutionalised 332 and international citizenship of South Africa 50–51 xenophobic, attacks/violence 29, 33, 43, 50, 76, 223, 224, 263 Youth Energy Agency, BRICS 117–118 youth engagement/participation and BRICS 117–118, 119, 121 and DIRCO 115–118, 115, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126–127 and foreign policy interaction 114, 114, 124 Youth, Peace and Security Agenda 118 Youth@SAIIA Programme 111, 120, 127 Youth Summit, BRICS (2018) 117, 286, 287, 289 Zimbabwe and Covid-19 202, 204 crisis in 265 debt owed to Eskom by 257

SA_Foreign Policy Review_Vol4_masterset.indb 406

and deportations 202 economic costs of crises in 265, 267 and human rights 41, 47, 68 and NEPAD 259 normalisation of ties between world and 380, 381 quiet diplomacy approach on 8, 330 Ramaphosa’s response to economic crisis in 76 and sanctions 204, 265, 381 and SA’s human rights foreign policy 47 and SA’s response to migrants from 76, 202 South African companies in 267 trade facilitation with 267 Zondo Commission 5, 9, 291 Zuma administration centralisation and limited participation of institutions under 8 corrupt practices during 9, 43, 275 defence diplomacy under 161 and economic diplomacy 259–261 and economic diplomacy in Africa 259, 260, 261, 266, 267, 268 and Global South 334, 335 human rights foreign policy under 47 and ICC 44, 45, 68 moral degeneration under 61, 68 Parliament’s oversight challenges during 102 and peace and security on the continent 222, 223 SA’s norm entrepreneurship during 68 and USA relations 346, 347, 354, 360

2022/11/10 00:03