Covid-19 in Africa: Governance and Containment: Governance and Containment 3031361385, 9783031361388

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements and Dedication
About this Book
Contents
Notes on Contributors
Abbreviations
List of Figures
List of Maps
List of Tables
Chapter 1: Governance, Containment and the Covid-19 Pandemic
Global Health, the State and Containment Politics
Governance, Containment and Regional Perspectives
Bibliography
Part I: Governance and Containment Measures
Chapter 2: Coronavirus Disease: Screening and Care Pathways in Nongre-Massom Health District in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso)
Introduction
Methodologies
Findings
Locations of Covid-19 Screening Centres
Residence or Origin of People Tested
Localising the Users of Kossodo Screening Centre
Screening and Perceptions
Screening Issues: Reasons for Screening, Restrictions and Care Pathways
Discussion
Conclusion
References
Chapter 3: Covid-19 and the Politics of (Im)Mobility in Uganda
Introduction and Conceptual Approach
Covid-19 in Uganda
Pandemic-Related Politics of (Im)Mobilities
Partisan Politics
Contradictory State Visibility
Structural Mistrust and Corruption
Subaltern Strategies
Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 4: Beyond Paradoxes: The South African Military Involvement in the Fight against Covid-19
Introduction
Methodologies
The Perennial Crisis of Credibility of the South African Military and the Fight against Covid-19
The SANDF and Covid-19 Pandemic Warfare
The SANDF International Commitment and the Response to Covid-19
Civil–Military Relations, Africa’s Code of Honour, Ubuntu, and the Army–Society Bond
Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 5: Urban Governance and Covid-19 Response in Nigeria: Who Is Left Behind?
Introduction
Managing Cities: The Role of Multi-Governance Frameworks
The Interface of Nigeria’s Political Economy and Multi-Governance Structures
The Nigerian Multi-Level Governance Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic
Multi-Sectoral Health Response
Multi-Sectoral Education Response
Multi-Sectoral Communication Response
Multi-Sectoral Social Welfare Response
Discussion: Covid-19 Has Accentuated Governance Faultlines in Nigeria
Vertical Governance Dimension
Horizontal Governance Dimensions
Conclusion: Bridging Governance Gaps for Pandemic Response and Management
Bibliography
Chapter 6: “Subsistence Fishermen Don’t Exist”: The Subtleties of Categories and Accessing the Water during a Covid-19 Lockdown
Ancient Origins
Subsistence Fishermen Don’t Exist
A Tale of Two Towns
Covid-19 and the Level 5 Lockdown
Conclusion
References
Chapter 7: Yoruba Language and Infodemic Management: The Covid-19 Experience
Introduction
Language and Outbreak
Methodological Considerations
Data Presentation and Analysis
Conclusion
Bibliography
Part II: Regional Perspectives
Chapter 8: Covid-19 Containment in East Africa: Science-based Strategies or Traditional-based Strategies?
Introduction
Methodology
Theory
Covid-19 Containment Strategies in East Africa
Peoples’ Reactions towards Covid-19 Containment Strategies in East Africa
The Impact of Covid-19 Containment Strategies in East Africa
Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 9: East African Community Partner States’ Response to Truckers as High-Risk Group in the Context of Covid-19
Introduction
Theoretical Framework
Methodology
Haulage Truck Drivers (aka Truckers) as a Covid-19 High-Risk Group
Collaborative Approach by EAC States to the Problem of Truckers as Core Population
State Sovereignty and Covid-19 Containment in East Africa
Effects of the Measures Undertaken by States
Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 10: The Making of Marginal Multilateralism During Covid-19 Response among EAC States: Perspectives from Discursive Institutionalism
Background
Methodology and Theoretical Framework
Constriction of EAC Multilateral Space During Covid-19 Response
Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 11: The Covid-19 Pandemic in Africa, Local Responses, and Regional Strategies: The West African Case
Introduction
Regional Effort Dynamics, Space Organization and Spatial Order Construction
Covid-19 and Local Realities: Between Rational and Moral Choices
Negotiating the Economic and Political Impact, Risks and Costs of the Covid-19
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

AFRICAN HISTORIES AND MODERNITIES

Covid-19 in Africa: Governance and Containment Edited by Susan Arndt · Yacouba Banhoro Taibat Lawanson · Enocent Msindo Peter Simatei

African Histories and Modernities Series Editors

Toyin Falola The University of Texas at Austin Austin, TX, USA Matthew M. Heaton Virginia Tech Blacksburg, VA, USA

This book series serves as a scholarly forum on African contributions to and negotiations of diverse modernities over time and space, with a particular emphasis on historical developments. Specifically, it aims to refute the hegemonic conception of a singular modernity, Western in origin, spreading out to encompass the globe over the last several decades. Indeed, rather than reinforcing conceptual boundaries or parameters, the series instead looks to receive and respond to changing perspectives on an important but inherently nebulous idea, deliberately creating a space in which multiple modernities can interact, overlap, and conflict. While privileging works that emphasize historical change over time, the series will also feature scholarship that blurs the lines between the historical and the contemporary, recognizing the ways in which our changing understandings of modernity in the present have the capacity to affect the way we think about African and global histories. Editorial Board Akintunde Akinyemi, Literature, University of Florida, Gainesville, USA Malami Buba, African Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin, South Korea Emmanuel Mbah, History, CUNY, College of Staten Island, USA Insa Nolte, History, University of Birmingham, USA Shadrack Wanjala Nasong’o, International Studies, Rhodes College, USA Samuel Oloruntoba, Political Science, TMALI, University of South Africa, South Africa Bridget Teboh, History, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, USA

Susan Arndt  •  Yacouba Banhoro Taibat Lawanson Enocent Msindo  •  Peter T. Simatei Editors

Covid-19 in Africa: Governance and Containment

Editors Susan Arndt University of Bayreuth Bayreuth, Germany Taibat Lawanson Department of Urban and Regional Planning University of Lagos Lagos, Nigeria

Yacouba Banhoro University of Joseph-Ki-Zerbo Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso Enocent Msindo History Department Rhodes University Makhanda, Eastern Cape, South Africa

Peter T. Simatei African Cluster Centre Moi University Eldoret, Kenya

ISSN 2634-5773     ISSN 2634-5781 (electronic) African Histories and Modernities ISBN 978-3-031-36138-8    ISBN 978-3-031-36139-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36139-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: RZAF_Images / Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Acknowledgements and Dedication

This work is the outcome of research conducted within the Cluster of Excellence—“Africa Multiple” at the University of Bayreuth, funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany's Excellence Strategy—EXC 2052/1—390713894. The editors are grateful for the generous support that made a part of our work possible. The funder is not responsible for opinions expressed in the two volumes of this research on Covid-19 in Africa. Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence is an undertaking involving at least five Cluster locations (namely the University of Bayreuth, Rhodes University, University of Joseph Ki-Zerbo, University of Lagos, and Moi University) and several research partners (see https://www.africamultiple. uni-­bayreuth.de/en/index.html). As a global community of scholars of African Studies under the key goal of ‘Reconfiguring African Studies’, we sought to make sense of and represent Africa in the moment of flux and the uncertainty of Covid-19. We are therefore grateful for the collective efforts of all our collaborators and cooperating partners who contributed towards this project. Working on this volume has been both an interesting and challenging exercise. It was interesting because of the audacity to research on something that was still evolving and uncertain. It was challenging in that data kept changing as new information became available. As such, our work focused mainly on the first year and a half of the pandemic, and thus we are aware of potential questions that we might not have answered.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND DEDICATION

Secondly, something tragic happened. A valued member of our scholars, Professor Kenneth Kaunda Oluoch, who was a respected professor of International Relations and Chair of the Department of History, Political Science, and Public Administration at Moi University, sadly died in March 2022 before this work was published. We respected his wish to have his chapter published, and therefore we are publishing it posthumously in our Volume on Governance, Containment and Regional Perspectives. We dedicate this work to his tireless efforts to promote scholarly debates on issues of regional integration in the East African Community.

About this Book

Our two volumes on Covid-19  in Africa document how the Covid-19 pandemic affected Africa, featuring manifestations and responses at both citizen and institutional level. In doing so, the volumes address political and structural processes on the one hand and cultural and epistemological dimensions on the other. Through multidisciplinary foci, ranging from history, sociology, anthropology, linguistics, and public health to political science, geography, communication, and urban studies, the two volumes offer knowledge about the challenges posed by Covid-19 from individual to supra-national scales. The chapters adopt various methodologies including empirical, media, and policy analysis to highlight how the pandemic affected people, locales, and key sectors, as well as nuanced responses across social, economic, and governance spectrums. From health to communication, education, mobility, and even policing, the book presents notions of human agency and community solidarity and reflections on institutional (in)capacity—as well as the tensions between citizen and state, and local versus globalised contexts of public health response. Using Covid-19 as an entry point, the book examines the preparedness of African people, places, and governments to address complex humanitarian crises of the twenty-first century.

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About this Book

Volume 1 addresses the social and economic ramifications of Covid-19 for Africa. It consists of thirteen chapters. Volume 2 (this volume), with eleven chapters, explores issues of governance and containment and the regional dimensions of Covid-19 in Africa. This collection represents our attempt to examine Africa’s reaction and responses to Covid-19 particularly in the moment of shock in 2020, when little information existed about the nature of the disease, and when governments, guided by the World Health Organization, which equally was learning about the pandemic, took extraordinary measures as a part of their response strategy.

Contents

1 Governance,  Containment and the Covid-19 Pandemic  1 Susan Arndt, Yacouba Banhoro, Taibat Lawanson, Enocent Msindo, and Peter T. Simatei

Part I Governance and Containment Measures  11 2 Coronavirus  Disease: Screening and Care Pathways in Nongre-Massom Health District in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) 13 Fernand Bouma Bationo and Edwige Dayangnewende Nikiema 3 Covid-19  and the Politics of (Im)Mobility in Uganda 33 Paddy Kinyera and Martin Doevenspeck 4 Beyond  Paradoxes: The South African Military Involvement in the Fight against Covid-19 55 Komlan Agbedahin 5 Urban  Governance and Covid-19 Response in Nigeria: Who Is Left Behind? 81 Oluwafemi Olajide, Taibat Lawanson, and Damilola Odekunle

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Contents

6 “Subsistence  Fishermen Don’t Exist”: The Subtleties of Categories and Accessing the Water during a Covid-19 Lockdown119 Dominique Santos 7 Yoruba  Language and Infodemic Management: The Covid-19 Experience141 Abisoye Eleshin

Part II Regional Perspectives 159 8 Covid-19  Containment in East Africa: Science-based Strategies or Traditional-based Strategies?161 Victoria Boniface Makulilo and Hussein Kapuya 9 East  African Community Partner States’ Response to Truckers as High-Risk Group in the Context of Covid-19191 Kenneth K. Oluoch 10 The  Making of Marginal Multilateralism During Covid-19 Response among EAC States: Perspectives from Discursive Institutionalism213 Bramwel Matui 11 The  Covid-19 Pandemic in Africa, Local Responses, and Regional Strategies: The West African Case235 Saliou Dione Index259

Notes on Contributors

Komlan  Agbedahin is a research associate in the Department of

Sociology at Rhodes University, South Africa. He is also a fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies, and his research focuses on the Cult of Mediocrity and Development Antinomies in the Global South. Susan  Arndt  is Professor of English and African Literatures at the University of Bayreuth, Germany. She has published on sexism, racism and intersectionality. Recently, she published Sexismus, Geschichte einer Unterdrückung (2020), Rassismus. Eine viel zu lange Geschichte (2021), and Koloniales Erbe. Wie Kolonialismus die deutsche Sprache prägt (2021). Arndt also works on postcolonial perspectives on Shakespeare and African resources of his work. Arndt is Principal Investigator of the Cluster of Excellence “Africa Multiple” and director of the doctoral college on Intersectionality Studies at the University of Bayreuth. Yacouba  Banhoro  is a lecturer in Contemporary History and Health History at Joseph Ki-Zerbo University in Ouagadougou, where he has been teaching since 2007. He is also the Director of the Joseph Ki-Zerbo Africa Cluster Centre of the Africa Multiple Centre of Excellence. He is researching the history of global health and Africa. Fernand Bouma Bationo  is a researcher and professor of socio-anthropology of health and social protection in the Sociology Department at Joseph Ki-Zerbo University. He is a member of the Interdisciplinary Research Laboratory in Social Sciences and Health, the Dynamic Laboratory of Spaces and Societies, and the Africa Multiple Cluster of xi

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Excellence in African studies. His work focuses on sexual and reproductive health, social inequalities in access to care, mother and child health, the socio-ecology of health through the concept of “One Health”, and alternative medicine. Saliou Dione  is an associate professor of African and postcolonial studies in the Department of Anglophone Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, at Cheikh Anta Diop University of Dakar Senegal. His research interests include society, politics, culture, Pan-Africanism, postcolonialism, African oral and written literatures, comparative literature, gender, sex, sexuality(ies), migration, developmental issues, language, and globalization. Martin  Doevenspeck is Professor of Political Geography at the Geographical Institute at the University of Bayreuth. His research interests are at the intersection between migration studies and political geography, with a focus on forced (im)mobilities, conflicts, and borders. Abisoye  Eleshin  is a research fellow at the Institute of African and Diaspora Studies, University of Lagos. He is a principal investigator with the Lagos African Cluster Centre. His research focuses on African language documentation and culture. Hussein  Kapuya  is Assistant Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Dar es Salaam University College of Education, and a doctoral candidate in the Public Health programme at Umeå University in Sweden. His research interests are in environmental governance, public health, and service delivery. Paddy  Kinyera is a postdoctoral fellow in the Research Section “Mobilities” of the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence at the University of Bayreuth. His research explores the (im)mobility dimensions of mega (oil) infrastructure projects in East Africa. Taibat Lawanson  is Professor of Urban Management and Governance at the University of Lagos, Nigeria. Her research focuses on the interface of social complexities, urban realities, and the quest for spatial justice. She is a principal investigator with the Lagos African Cluster Centre. Victoria  Boniface  Makulilo  is a lecturer at the University of Dar es Salaam. She has published articles in areas of politics, democracy, elections, participation, and financing of higher education. Her research

  NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 

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interests are policy analysis, financing of higher education, party politics, gender, democracy, human rights, and elections in Africa. Bramwel  Matui is a senior lecturer in Political Science and Public Administration and Chair of the Department of History, Political Science, and Public Administration at Moi University. He investigates identity politics in public policy and development processes. He is a principal investigator at the Moi University’s African Cluster Centre. Enocent Msindo  (PhD, Cambridge University) is a historian and Dean of the Faculty of Humanities at Rhodes University. He is also Director of the Rhodes University African Studies Centre, the home of the Rhodes African Cluster Centre of the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence. He has scholarly interests ranging from studies of marginalized communities, medical history, and information policy to leadership in Africa out of which he has published widely. Edwige  Dayangnéwendé  Nikièma  is a health geographer, professor, and researcher in the Geography Department of Joseph Ki-Zerbo University (Ouagadougou). Her research focuses on the vulnerabilities of populations, particularly the relationships between environmental and/or geographical conditions and the health of populations. Damilola  Odekunle is a lecturer and doctoral candidate in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Lagos, Nigeria. Her research interests are in community development, urban competitiveness, and resilience. Oluwafemi  Olajide is a lecturer in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Lagos, Nigeria. His research focuses on the intersections of governance and urban development within the domains of livelihoods, poverty, informality housing rights, participation, and social movement. Kenneth K. Oluoch  (1961–March 2022) was Principal Investigator at the Moi African Cluster Centre and the Chair of the Department of History, Political Science, and Public Administration at the School of Arts and Social Sciences at Moi University. He was an associate professor of International Relations, with research interests in conflicts, peace building, statism, and regionalism. His chapter, which he submitted to us and revised before his death, is hereby published posthumously.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Dominique  Santos is a senior lecturer in Anthropology at Rhodes University. Her scholarly work explores the intersections of music, play, dreaming, and heritage practices with intimate experiences of self, space, and social change. She is interested in the place of dreaming and Indigenous Knowledge systems as speculative methodology when working with life stories, archives, and heritage sites. Peter  T.  Simatei (PhD, University of Bayreuth) is a professor of Comparative Literature and Culture at Moi University, Kenya, where he is also Director of the Moi University African Cluster Centre. He teaches African Literature, African Drama, Diaspora Literatures and Literary Theory, and African Cinema in the Department of Literature, Theatre, and Film studies of Moi University. He has been a German Research Council (DFG) Post-doctoral Fellow (Postcolonial Studies Program) at the University of Munich and a fellow of the Five College African Scholars programme at the University of Massachusetts, USA. He is also an alumnus of Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung, Germany. Simatei has published in journals in Africa, Europe, and the US on African literature and popular culture. He is the author of The Novel and the Politics of Nation-Building in East Africa (2001).

Abbreviations

AEEMCI AEMN AEMUD AFEMIB Africa CDC AMSCI ANEEMAS

Association of Muslim Students and Students of Côte d'Ivoire Association of Muslim Students of Niger Association of Muslim Students of the University of Dakar Association of Women in the Mining Sector of Burkina Faso African Union’s Africa Centre for Disease Control Association of Sunni Muslims of Côte d'Ivoire National Agency for the Supervision of Artisanal and Semimechanized Mining Operations ARM Alliance for a Responsible Mine ATR African Traditional Religion BCG Calmette-Guerin Bacillus BNAF National Brigade for the Fight against Gold Fraud CDVR Truth and Reconciliation Dialogue Commission CEI Independent Electoral Commission CES Economic and Social Council CIN Islamic Council of Niger CNS National Security Council CODIS Council of Sunni Imams COMUDO Muslim Community of Plateau Dokui CONAPEM National Cooperative of Craftsmen and Small Mine Operators CONARIV National Commission for Reconciliation and Compensation for Victims COSIM Higher Council of Imams, Islamic Affairs and Mosques Covid-19 Corona Virus Disease-2019, or simply coronavirus. CSO Civil Society Organization EC Executive Committee

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ABBREVIATIONS

EPI EUNUN EVD FCT FDS GAT 2 GDP GII GMT H1N1 HIV-AIDS

expanded vaccination programme Union of Nigerien Students at the University of Niamey Ebola Virus Disease Federal Capital Territory Defence and Security Forces Gesprächsanalytisches Transkriptionssystem 2 Gross Domestic Product Gender Inequality Index Greenwich Mean Time Swine flu human immunodeficiency virus-acquired immunodeficiency syndrome ICN Islamic Council of Niger INSERM National Institute of Health and Scientific Research IMF International Monetary Fund JEMCI Muslim Youth of Côte d'Ivoire KAP knowledge, attitude, and perception LCI La Chaîne Info LGA Local Government Area NASFAT Nigerian Transnational Organisation NATO National Transport Owners NCDC Nigeria Centre for Disease Control NDDC Niger Delta Development Commission NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations NPHI National Public Health Institutes ODJ Youth Democratic Organisation ONASSIM National Office of Mining Site Security Orcade Organization for Capacity Building and Development PASRES Programme Appui Stratégique à la Recherche Scientifique PIs Principal Investigators PRN President of the Republic of Niger RAIDA Rally of Islamic Associations for Development and Appeal SARS Special Anti-Robbery Squad SARS-CoV-2 severe acute respiratory syndrome—Coronavirus 2 SDG Sustainable Development Goal SOPs Standard Operating Procedures SOTRA Société des Transports Abidjanais SSA Sub-Saharan Africa

 ABBREVIATIONS 

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SYNORARTRAB/SYNEMAB Union of Artisanal Mining Operators of Burkina Faso TM Traditional Medicine TVA Value Added Tax UAM Abdou Moumouni University of Niamey UNAAMB National Union of Mining Artisans of Burkina UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund WAHC West African Health Community WAHO West African Health Organization WHO World Health Organization WIID World Income Inequality Database

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1

The Covid-19 Screening Centre at CMA Kossodo (Photograph of the reception area for users and blood samples taken at the Medical Centre. 2020). Source: The authors. 2020 19 Fig. 2.2 Reasons (in %) for screening at the Kossodo Medical Centre. Source: Field surveys. 2020 24 Fig. 3.1 Key timeline in the evolution of Uganda’s mobility regime in the context of Covid-19 37 Fig. 3.2 Uganda’s apparatus of biosecurity to govern im/mobility in the context of Covid-19 39 Fig. 3.3 NRM-supported mass political mobilisation in Pader ahead of the 2021 General Elections (Photo: P. Kinyera, 7 January 2021) 43 Fig. 3.4 Covid-19 checkpoint in Kitgum where the 14-year-old child and his caretakers were intercepted for violating presidential directives (Photo by P. Kinyera, May 2020) 46 Fig. 5.1 Multi-level governance horizontal and vertical interactions. Source: Adapted for Jänicke, M. (2015). Horizontal and Vertical Reinforcement in Global Climate Governance 86 Fig. 5.2 Confirmed Covid-19 cases—Nigeria (February to November 2020). Source: the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC): https://covid19.ncdc.gov.ng/state/ 91 Fig. 5.3 Peculiar Covid-19 responses across the 36 states in Nigeria. Source: Author, 2020. Collated from different platforms online 109 Fig. 11.1 Representation of the coordination work in the ECOWAS region through information and best practices sharing 240 Fig. 11.2 Evolution of Coronavirus in Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal 248

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List of Maps

Map 2.1 Map 2.2 Map 2.3

Administrative structure of the City of Ouagadougou (Source: see map) - see original, and replace this one with original on file 16 Region of residence of users of the Kossodo Covid-19 Screening Unit 20 Breakdown by health district of screenings in the Centre Region 21

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List of Tables

Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 5.4 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3 Table 8.1 Table 8.2 Table 8.3 Table 8.4 Table 8.5 Table 8.6 Table 8.7

Multi-sectoral health response to Covid-19 pandemic Multi-sectoral education response to Covid-19 pandemic Multi-sectoral information management response to Covid-19 pandemic Multi-sectoral social welfare response to Covid-19 pandemic List of Covid-19 information banners according to organisation in Lagos, Nigeria Language spread, Lagos, Nigeria Languages used on the banners Case reporting on early days of Covid-19 in East Africa from March to April 2020 Financial assistance to support East African countries to fight Covid-19 from March to April 2020 Covid-19 mitigating measures in East African countries from March 2020 Reporting of Covid-19 cases in East Africa from March to November 2020 Citizens’ views on measures taken by governments towards Covid-19 from March to April 2020 Government debt in the East Africa region in 2019 Impact of Covid-19 on projected GDP growth in East Africa in 2020

94 96 100 105 150 151 152 168 170 172 178 180 184 184

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CHAPTER 1

Governance, Containment and the Covid-19 Pandemic Susan Arndt, Yacouba Banhoro, Taibat Lawanson, Enocent Msindo, and Peter T. Simatei

Global Health, the State and Containment Politics In general, governance entails managing public affairs within and beyond the nation-state, and with the reciprocity of state and non-state actors.1 Health governance by its very nature involves a multiplicity of interests

1  Adshead, Maura and Quinn, B. (1998). The Move from Government to Governance: Irish development policy’s paradigm shift, Policy & Politics, 26(2), 209–225.

S. Arndt University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany e-mail: [email protected] Y. Banhoro University of Joseph-Ki-Zerbo, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Arndt et al. (eds.), Covid-19 in Africa: Governance and Containment, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36139-5_1

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globally, as well as locally at state and non-state level. The Covid-19 pandemic occasioned sets of international responses by the World Health Organization (WHO) which created broad frameworks for containing and combating the virus. These broad protocols were shared across the world for states to implement, supposedly taking into cognizance their local contexts. One measure that ultimately had severe repercussions for humanity was the politics of containment as countries suddenly imposed lockdowns.2 Since the expansion of HIV/AIDS in the early 1980s which Washington classified as a security threat, not only for the USA but also for United Nations, many diseases which could potentially become pandemics (SARS, Avian influenza, H1N1, Ebola) have been upgraded to the level of global security threat, to be contained.3 From this, we infer the growing obsession with state cordon politics and its tentacles into the health sector. By conceiving of health emergencies as global security threats, the political overrides health expertise.4 Once health emergencies are politicised, the atmosphere becomes ripe for the politics of extremism to dictate how citizens must behave, where and when they can move, what they may consume or not, and so on.

2  World Health Organization. 2020. Considerations for quarantine of individuals in the context of containment for coronavirus disease (Covid-19): interim guidance, 19 March 2020. World Health Organization. https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/331497 3  Adrian Flint. 2011. HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa: Politics, Aid and Globalization. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 118–122. 4  See, for instance, the WHO’s use of the notion of ‘health security’, a sure sign of its belief in the closer relationship between health and politics. See WHO. Health Security, at https:// www.who.int/health-topics/health-security#tab=tab_1 and WHO. 2021. Building health systems resilience for universal health coverage and health security during the Covid-19 pandemic and beyond: WHO position paper, 19 October 2021, at https://www.who.int/ publications/i/item/WHO-UHL-PHC-SP-2021.01 accessed 21 December 2022.

T. Lawanson Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] E. Msindo (*) African Studies Centre, Rhodes University, Makhanda, Eastern Cape, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] P. T. Simatei African Cluster Centre, Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya

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In modern politics, containment came into vogue in the politics between the US and the USSR after World War II.5 We are of course aware that human containment may be as old as the history of centralised state systems, going back to the early classical period. The US used containment politics in its international policy to tame the USSR, supposedly to weaken growing socialism in favour of Western capitalisms post World War II.6 Other measures included the US promoting the doctrine of collective security for the states that faced menacing USSR threats.7 Thus, in the Cold War period, containment was a tool for governance used by the US to deal with the USSR’s competitive politico-economic and ideological system. The context of bipolarity suggested two warring state powers engaging in public management of global security.8 After the Cold War, in the early 1990s, states as actors in world affairs gave way to increasingly powerful Western-orientated and Western-funded global governance entities or organisations, the IMF, the UN and, in terms of health, the World Health Organization being key. Connected to these are global developmental ideologies and agenda that gave impetus to the operation of such entities. With the rise of global pandemics such as HIV/AIDS overrunning state capabilities, mostly in Africa, global health governance bodies found their increasing relevance, and opportune moments to direct and perhaps dictate global health protocols. In theory, with tightening global health governance in the aftermath of the HIV/AIDS crisis, which has seen the multiplication of new global health actors, and private and public partnerships (UNAIDS, GAVI Alliance, Global Funds, etc.), one would assume that the world would be better off in terms of pandemic preparedness. In practice, however, this is far from being the case. Covid-19 tested the capacity of these new governance frameworks and negatively impacted efforts towards shared planetary solutions. The securitisation of Covid-19 decentred horizontal relations and enacted a vertical order in which the state took a central role, and non-­ state actors were sent on partial leave. Arguably, even the state in Africa found little room to manoeuvre in the light of the paranoia and fear 5  John Baylis, Steve Smith and Smith Owens. 2011. The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. Fifth edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 56–57 6  Baylis. 56–57. 7  Baylis. 57. 8  Maura, Adshead and Brid Quinn, cited above.

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generated by the gigantic WHO health propaganda machinery. State interventions were justified as extraordinary measures. In this context, horizontal relations of state and non-state collaboration were marginalised, albeit not wholly jettisoned, but operated differently from country to country. This shows that governance can be conceptualised as typologies that operate in a continuum from powerful variants to fragile ones. This volume demonstrates that like other sites of governance, Covid-19 enacted multiplicity, duplicity and multivocality as the global actors of health systems interacted with state, regional and local actors to contain the virus. Covid-19 therefore opened spaces for uncertainty, fractured relations and contestations, not only between state and non-state actors, but also within the state itself as state institutions and governing structures experienced frustrations with the regime of controls, imposed by the same state. For instance, a government department responsible for trade and/ or tourism would report frustrations at prolonged lockdowns which threatened the economic sector. In such instances, the state became a victim of its compliance to the global order. Some of these space displacements and contestations are highlighted in several chapters in this volume. Another key point that emerges from the chapters in this volume is that state multilateralism also suffered space displacement in the containment of Covid-19. In many African countries, national governments assumed overriding powers over disease control and usually did little to collaborate with their regional neighbours and subnational units. In emergencies like Covid-19, multilateralism within regional bodies is likely to be ‘benched’ and self-help by each state privileged. This realist posture of states during emergencies may be underpinned by state and integration laws that allow self-help to thrive. The recourse to purely state based solutions undermined  multilateralism and created possibilities for  tensions and blatant violation of regional rules in regional highways like the northern and central corridors in the East African community. Suspension of multilateralism could yield suboptimal outcomes such as lack of reciprocity and poor welfare for transnational workers, and could potentially lead to diplomatic rows. The chapters in this volume provide evidence that national and city governance structures varied in their humanitarian responses to the pandemic. Hopefully, future pandemics can be handled with better, more collaborative and more responsive approaches.

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Governance, Containment and Regional Perspectives This volume discusses measures taken by some African countries to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic. It exposes the governance challenges that became evident as governments tried to control human movement and to coordinate their various organs of the state. It also examines the regional dimension of the pandemic particularly in terms of policing and trade networks. According to global health protocols, human containment, screening and contact tracing are key components of pandemic governance. In African countries where there were only a few screening facilities in the first year of the pandemic, states were usually funded by the World Health Organization for their testing and contract tracing programmes. Chapter 2, by Bationo and Nikiema, evaluates the use of testing centres by mapping the geographical origins of people coming for testing at one of those health centres at a district in Ouagadougou, the capital city of Burkina Faso. Bationo and Nikiema found that most of the ordinary inhabitants of the district did not use the screening centres, leaving the state with limited knowledge on the extent of Covid-19 infections in the region. There was no general curiosity to know their Covid-19 status. Those who acquiesced to screening for Covid-19 were mainly those who intended to travel, as they had no option except to produce evidence of Covid-19 testing. Chapter 3, by Paddy Kinyera and Martin Doevenspeck, explores the politics of (im)mobility in Uganda during the Covid-19 pandemic, emphasising how the immobilisation of people impacted livelihoods. As the privileges of mobility during the pandemic were enjoyed by a select few, ordinary people in Uganda found ways of breaching the limitations imposed on their ability to move by creatively engaging state security forces that manned road and other transport networks in the country. A key contribution here is the emphasis on the resilience and agency of the underdogs in the face of uncertainty within a strong securitised state. Further south, Komlan Agbedahin, in Chap. 4, examines the role of the South African military in the ‘fight’ against Covid-19. He emphasises the dangers of blurring the ‘social distance’ that should ordinarily exist between the army and the citizens. He identifies the challenges of poor coordination and questionable ‘military professionalism’ in the face of their sometimes-violent human control efforts in the townships during the pandemic.

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In Chap. 5, Oluwafemi Olajide, Taibat Lawanson and Damilola Odekunle assess the Covid-19 response in Nigeria―highlighting the governance dimensions (interface of various stakeholders) and implications for sustainable development (pandemic containment in the immediate term and resilience-building for the future). Evidence from this study reveals insufficient coordination, accountability and engagement across multiple sectors, driven by diversity of motives and underlying socio-­ economic and infrastructural gaps. Lawanson, Olajide and Odekunle also observe extensive capacity gaps at the local government level, with attendant consequences for citizen response to pandemic protocols. In Chap. 6, we return to South Africa, where Dominique Santos examines the state’s imposition of restrictions on access to rivers and the sea for recreational and subsistence fishing. She argues that restrictions had unintended but not unforeseen consequences, as they imposed a serious food security situation on subsistence fishing communities. Santos’s work demonstrates a salient point: that regardless of tight restrictions imposed by the state, fishermen found ways of evading these restrictions to maintain their relationship with their waters as that relationship was key to their food security and everyday livelihoods. It provides another reading of the South African landscape that enables us to argue that whereas in some townships, the government was able to show its might using the army, as Agbedahin (Chap. 4, this volume) demonstrates, state power further away from the centre was not as tangible as the state imagined of itself. With the declaration of state emergencies during the pandemic, the state in Africa, like elsewhere, struggled to communicate and to convince its restless populations that could not understand why prolonged emergencies were being sustained and why they should fear a ‘flu’, now named Covid-19. In Chap. 7, Abisoye Eleshin reflects on the challenges of information communication during the pandemic, particularly where information or health guidelines were translated from a hegemonic language to one that is used in African localities. This is a significant issue, considering that most of Africa is rural, and, in many places, the functional language is not a European one, and medical terms are largely foreign. Abisoye Eleshin discusses the difficulties caused by the cultural translation of health information into Yoruba. The banners and other sources of public health information about Covid-19 were so badly translated that it created an infodemic, or more aptly, serious miscommunication of the intended health-related message. He argues that adequate handling of information and communication during outbreaks requires, among other factors,

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terminology development and translation to avoid risks of miscommunication. Covid-19 containment measures have also tested the integrity and resilience of regional integration efforts. We take some case studies from East Africa and the Economic Community of West African States to illustrate this point. The shock and unpreparedness of governments in East Africa were exposed when it became clear that the epidemic was spreading into the region. At least in 2020, there was no collective regional approach towards dealing with Covid-19. Different countries adopted different approaches: Uganda and Rwanda opted for a science-based strategy informed by surveys; Kenya and South Sudan employed a disjointed strategy mixed with ‘law and order’ in response to the public health crisis; Tanzania and Burundi followed an ‘open strategy’. In Chap. 8, Victoria Makulilo and Hussein Kapuya examine the impact of these different strategies on the economies and livelihoods of the people of East Africa. Their findings suggest that the funding levels from the WHO were dictated by the extent to which countries adhered to WHO guidelines. For its tradition-based strategies Tanzania received much less funding from donors compared to Uganda and Rwanda, which employed more science-based strategies that pleased their donors. However, their findings reveal that science-based strategies have had an adverse impact on the national economies and individual citizens’ well-being in contrast to those countries that took a relaxed approach and did not enforce stringent lockdown measures. Regional trade has been severely impacted by Covid-19, as have certain employment sectors, particularly the transport and logistics sector. In Chap. 9, Kenneth K. Oluoch examines the impact of Covid-19 on member states of the East African Community (EAC), focusing on regional trade, which is dominated by the road transport haulage business. Of the six member states of the EAC, only Kenya and Tanzania have access to the Indian Ocean. As such, trucks are important in transporting goods from the ports into those landlocked countries of the EAC. However, truck drivers are identified as high-risk persons due to their itinerant nature across the region, thus affecting trade within the EAC. Thus, Oluoch analyses the response by governments of East African states in addressing the problem of truckers and the movement of goods in the region during the height of the pandemic. He concludes that there was insufficient coordination among the regional EAC partners to deal with the problem, leaving

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states to take individual approaches, and this impacted regional cooperation and trade during the pandemic. In Chap. 10, Bramwel Matui examines how the WHO protocols on Covid-19 challenged state individualism and offered possibilities for deepening multilateral cooperation in dealing with the pandemic in the East African Community. Instead of seizing the opportunity, individualist state imperatives appeared to have become further entrenched. States resorted to self-help due to the inherent weakness of regional multilateralism and the nature of the WHO’s protocols, which elicited different reactions in different countries. Turning to West Africa, Saliou Dione, in Chap. 11, explores how ECOWAS states exercised their own agency in response to the Covid-19 pandemic and how lessons learnt from this experience could reshape new models of regional cooperation and ways of finding solutions in a global sphere marked by inequality, stereotypes against African countries and the undermining of African agency in healthcare. Using Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria as his case studies, Dione analyses the similarities and differences in terms of how the member countries of ECOWAS have reacted to the Covid-19 pandemic regionally and nationally. He explores how countries have worked collaboratively within the regional health bodies such as the West African Health Organization and the Regional Centre for Surveillance and Disease Control to mitigate the adverse impact of the pandemic. From the local to the transnational, the chapters in this volume have demonstrated how multi-level governance frameworks either enhance or impede efforts at addressing health emergencies and their unintended consequences.

Bibliography Adshead, Maura, and B.  Quinn. 1998. The move from government to governance: Irish development policy’s paradigm shift. Policy & Politics 26 (2): 209–225. Baylis, John, Steve Smith, and Smith Owens. 2011. The globalization of world politics: An introduction to international relations. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Flint, Adrian. 2011. HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa-politics - aid and globalization. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. WHO. 2021. Building health systems resilience for universal health coverage and health security during the Covid-19 pandemic and beyond: WHO position paper, 19 October 2021 at https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/ WHO-­UHL-­PHC-­SP-­2021.01. Accessed 21 Dec 2022.

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———. Health Security, at https://www.who.int/health-­topics/health-­security# tab=tab_1 World Health Organization. 2020. Considerations for quarantine of individuals in the context of containment for coronavirus disease (Covid-19): Interim guidance, 19 March 2020. World Health Organization. https://apps.who.int/iris/ handle/10665/331497

PART I

Governance and Containment Measures

CHAPTER 2

Coronavirus Disease: Screening and Care Pathways in Nongre-Massom Health District in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) Fernand Bouma Bationo and Edwige Dayangnewende Nikiema

Introduction Detected for the first time in Wuhan (People’s Republic of China) on 17 November 2019, the coronavirus infection (Covid-19) eventually spread all over the world. It became a pandemic and a “public health emergency of international concern” in March 2020. During a press briefing on 11

F. B. Bationo (*) Sociology Department, Joseph Ki-Zerbo University, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso E. D. Nikiema Geography Department, Joseph Ki-Zerbo University, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Arndt et al. (eds.), Covid-19 in Africa: Governance and Containment, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36139-5_2

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March 2020, the Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO) Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus1 declared the novel coronavirus (Covid-19) outbreak to be a global pandemic (WHO, 2020). By 19 November 2022, 637,486,228 cases were confirmed, with 6,617,009 deaths worldwide (Our World in Data, 20 November 2022).2 The migratory flows of populations and commercial exchanges by means of transport led to the rapid spread of the disease throughout the world. The spread of Covid-19  in sub-Saharan Africa was an additional concern because the continent already bears around 70% of the global HIV burden (Nachega et al. 2020). In 2020, Burkina Faso ranked seventh among the countries affected by the Covid-19 pandemic in Africa. The risk became global and restrictive measures were enforced to manage a societal phenomenon as everyone became vulnerable.3 The social and economic vulnerability caused by Covid-19 led to the adoption of public health policies in many countries. By 27 April 2020, sub-Saharan Africa was still the least Covid-19-affected region, with 28,848 cases of infection and 1112 deaths.4 In the early months of 2020, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa did not have sufficient and appropriate diagnostic capacity to report positive coronavirus cases. Screening was one of the techniques that countries could develop to further contribute to the fight against the large-scale spread of Covid-19. Preventive measures have been recommended, but the social and economic contexts did not facilitate the adoption and application of these measures. Moreover, Covid-19 containment measures were perceived by the participants to be too drastic and demanding on

 Speech by the Director General of the World Health Organization. 2020.  Our World in Data Website.2022. ISSN International Centre. The ISSN register at http://www.issn.org (accessed on 20 December 2022). 3  Lavergne, Cécile. 2019. Tous vulnérables. La vie des idees.fr. https://laviedesidees.fr/+vulnerabilite-+.html. Accessed 15 November 2020. 4  Nguimkeu, Pierre and Sosson Tadadjeu. 2020. Why is the number of Covid-19 cases lower than expected in Sub-Saharan Africa? A cross-sectional analysis of the role of demographic and geographic factors. World Development 2021; 138:105251. doi:10.1016/j. worlddev.2020.105251 [Free Access Article] [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]. Accessed 27 April 2020. 1 2

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them.5 This raised questions about the role of the social space in enabling political and economic participation.6 To prevent the spread of Covid-19, public policies and public health specialists recommended restrictions to break the chain of contamination of this “new social problem”.7 Among the strategies to fight against the coronavirus in Burkina Faso was the “mandatory” screening of individuals committed to international travel (air and land). Screening is not a new strategy specific to the fight against Covid-19. It has been advised to combat the spread of several epidemics or pandemics, the most recent being HIV/AIDS. These cyclical epidemics of emerging or re-emerging pathologies give rise to debates about the efficacy of screening and the care pathways for people who test positive for Covid-19. The challenge lies in understanding how the paths of screening and care for Covid-19 patients were negotiated and perceived.

Methodologies The study site is the Centre Health Region (Région sanitaire du Centre), home to the City of Ouagadougou, which is not only the capital of Burkina Faso, but also the regional capital of the Centre Region and the capital of Kadiogo Province. Burkina Faso has 13 regions and 45 provinces. The Centre Health Region covers an area of 51,800 hectares divided into 12 districts and 55 geographical sectors (see Map 2.1). The site is bordered to the north by the rural municipalities of Pabré and Loumbila, to the east by the Saaba Municipality, to the south by Koubri and Komsilga Municipalities, and finally to the west by Tanghin Dassouri Municipalities. Ouagadougou is a city at the crossroads of international routes to Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Togo and Niger. This makes it a high-risk area for Covid-19. The city is at the heart of an intense mixing of populations from diverse backgrounds.

5  Bationo, Bouma Fernand, Mariam Congo and Donon Serge Namé. 2020. Penser le risque, négocier sa vie dans un contexte de coronavirus. Échanges, Numéro spécial Covid-19 1: 180–203. 6  Fassin, Didier. 2006. Souffrir par le social, gouverner par l’écoute. Une configuration sémantique de l’action publique. Politix 1: 73, 137–157. 7  Castel, Robert. 1999. Les métamorphoses de la question sociale. Une chronique du salariat. Paris: Gallimard.

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Map 2.1  Administrative structure of the City of Ouagadougou (Source: see map) - see original, and replace this one with original on file

The Centre Region has five health districts covering the six rural districts and the urban district of Ouagadougou. The five health districts are Boulmiougou, Nongre-Massom, Sig-Noghin, Baskuy and Bogodogo (see Map 2.1).8 This research combined quantitative and qualitative approaches, based on the collection and processing of statistical and documentary data and field surveys data. Secondary data were identified by a literature review through various sources and documents. Various books/academic and institutional reports and academic papers were used. These data relate to aspects of the coronavirus disease. We collected data from individual interviews carried out with people received for screening at the Centre and with health personnel and from our direct observations. The statistical data are from screening data at Kossodo Screening Centre from June to November 2020. 8  The study was carried out in the City of Ouagadougou with a population of 2,453,496 inhabitants (2019 General Population and Housing Census).

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The collection of socio-anthropological data was conducted partly at the screening centres and sometimes by telephone for those we could not contact directly. Data collection was made possible thanks to research permission from the Ministry of Health. Health protocols were observed during the interviews with the users who agreed to participate in the study. The selection of participants was done at the screening site by the health personnel involved in the data collection. This presented to the users the objectives of the study and the modalities of their voluntary participation to obtain their oral consent. A total of 55 users participated in the study. These were made up of 18 women and 37 men who constituted 32.72% and 67.27% of the sample respectively. They were aged between 18 and 52 and were from various socio-professional backgrounds. Their places of residence or origin were also diverse. Among the 55 users interviewed, 54 participants lived in the different health sectors/districts of the City of Ouagadougou, and one participant came from a province located about 100 kilometres from Ouagadougou. It appears from the quantitative data provided by the Medical Centre, which manages the surgical branch of Kossodo (2253 cases detected), that 60% of the users questioned are male and 40% female. Ages range from six months to 88 years. On the whole, the participants in the study expressed themselves freely with regard to the collaboration, patience and trust established between them and the researchers. The data processing was done through a categorisation of the data to verify the research hypotheses. Thematic maps of the study area (administrative and health divisions of Ouagadougou and Centre Region) were produced. They result from information received from Kossodo Screening Centre, integrated into a geographical database at the level of the Centre Health Region, and managed under a Geographic Information System, through QGIS. The findings obtained during this study give a snapshot of the use of screening and the care pathways (only one positive person encountered) from one out of five health municipalities in the District of Ouagadougou. This study therefore makes no claim to generalisation, although the users of the screening test come from all five municipalities.

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Findings Locations of Covid-19 Screening Centres If the City of Ouagadougou offered screening in several centres in December 2020, this was not the case in the early months of the pandemic. The setting up of Covid-19 screening centres in the 13 regions was done gradually, initially at the level of the Centre and Hauts-Bassins health regions. In the Centre Region, the Tengandogo University Hospital Centre was the first screening centre that also offered medical care. Here, samples were taken before being sent to laboratories. In addition to Tengandogo, now focused on medical care, there is now a centre in each health district, as well as units at Ouagadougou International Airport, the urban medical centre of Dassasgho, the Yalgado Ouédraogo University Hospital Centre, and the Medical Centre, within the surgical section of Kossodo. The Kossodo Screening Unit (Fig. 2.1) was set up in June 2020 with the technical support of the World Health Organization. Built from non-permanent materials, the screening unit is located on the west side within the grounds of the Medical Centre, Kossodo. At the main entrance of the CMA a sign indicates the location of the screening unit. Residence or Origin of People Tested From the very first Covid-19 cases in Burkina Faso, all eyes focused on Ouagadougou, a city with a population of just over 2 million inhabitants, with a density of 903 inhabitants per kilometre.9 This high density makes it difficult for the government to totally confine the population. The socio-economic characteristics of the city, namely the predominantly young population and a dominant informal sector (more than 70% of the active population in urban areas in Burkina Faso), meant that widespread screening was required to help estimate the extent of the pandemic. However, arrangements were only made for screening either on request or for suspected cases, contact cases or travellers returning from outside national borders (e.g. at Ouagadougou International Airport).

9

 PopulationData. Net. https://www.populationdata.net. Accessed 27 April 2020.

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Fig. 2.1  The Covid-19 Screening Centre at CMA Kossodo (Photograph of the reception area for users and blood samples taken at the Medical Centre. 2020). Source: The authors. 2020

Localising the Users of Kossodo Screening Centre Having been one of the first Covid-19 screening centres, the Kossodo Screening Unit continuously welcomes people wanting to know their Covid-19 serological status. Since the establishment of the unit (June 2020), 2253 tests have been carried out there and recorded in the medical records (Medical Centre Data, November 2020). Mandatory pandemic management and reporting requirements include place of residence and reasons for screening on a form to be completed. The spatial distribution of the places of residence of users who came for screening at the Kossodo unit was processed and mapped as shown in Map 2.2. Saturation by region of the national map shows that users of the Kossodo unit come from several different regions: 11 regions out of 13. Only the Cascades and the Southwest have no residents who have been

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Map 2.2  Region of residence of users of the Kossodo Covid-19 Screening Unit

screened at the Kossodo unit. The majority of people who were screened come from the Centre Health Region in a very large proportion (92%) and only 8% are from 10 health regions. But what is the distribution of screenings in the Centre Region? Map 2.3 shows the distribution of cases detected by the Kossodo unit. This is a distribution in the health areas of the five districts that make up the Center Health Region: Baskuy, Bogodogo, Boulmiougou, Nongre-­ Massom and Sig-Noghin. The screenings carried out at Kossodo Centre, concerning Centre Region, come variously from the five health districts: Sig-Noghin 5%, Baskuy 6%, Boulmiougou 6%, Bogodogo 23% and Nongre-Massom 60%. The data show that the vast majority of participants who came for screening were from the Nogre Massom health district. This district is home to the screening unit which is the focus of this chapter.

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Map 2.3  Breakdown by health district of screenings in the Centre Region

Screening and Perceptions This chapter does not attempt to elaborate theories relating to the concept of screening. The definition used here is that of Morrison (1992), taken up by Guessous et al. (2010: 1390): ‘Screening is the examination of asymptomatic individuals to determine their likelihood of having the condition being screened for. Individuals whose probability of being affected is sufficiently high are then subjected to complete diagnostic investigations. Individuals with the condition are then treated’.10

The following are some of the perceptions related to the technical aspects of the test and the reception of users at the centre:

10  Guessous, Idris, Fred Paccaud and Jacques Cornuz. 2010. Dépistage: Principes et méthodes. Revue Médicale Suisse 6: 1390–4.

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It’s unpleasant. I had already come for my first test because they postponed my flight by the way, the first time it was in the nose, now I came, we go through the mouth, it’s not so bad in any case. (Female participant, 18) All the formalities went without any problem, the only two remarks I will make is that there was no privacy in terms of the information given; the people who were behind me in the queue were literally right next to me when I was asked to repeat my phone number very loudly, revealing sensitive information very loudly; I was a little embarrassed about that, and second point, I’ve never taken the test in my life, I didn’t know how it was happening, I was a little planted there, not really knowing where to go, how the gentleman greeted me ‘what do you want? ‘, I wanted to do a test… I think he is a little stressed so we too are stressed when we arrive, it is a bit complicated. (Female participant, 39) In general, I think that screening is a good thing insofar as it provides information on the evolution of this infectious disease; and according to this, arrangements are made by health workers. It’s a good thing, it is even to be encouraged in fact, I would say that even the competent authorities must make available to health workers the means they need to follow up this screening even more in the most distant localities; there I moved from one province to Ouagadougou mainly to do this test. If there were in my province or in other localities perhaps, it would be even more advantageous for them. The province where I come from, there is no laboratory to do this test, we should have deployed teams on site; it would have been even better. (Male participant, 32) I thought we were going to do it in the nose, but finally they did it in the throat, it suits me well, there is no problem it suits me well. There are no particular concerns, I believe I understood that in any case doing this in the nose or in the throat is not a very pleasant test, so that’s how it is. (Female participant, 39) Frankly speaking, it’s stressful since you’re there you don’t know if it’s positive or if it’s negative. And you are asking yourself a lot of questions right now. For example, on the eve of the test, you cannot sleep. Because, you don’t know what your results will be. (Female participant, 30) As it is a dangerous disease, when you come for the test you are a little scared, because you don’t know how the results will be, it can be positive so that makes us a little anxious. (Female participant, 18)

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One respondent observes communication difficulties with regard to the reception and orientation of users: I think the guidance side helps a lot of people who have never done the test, I did one, for example if I come back I won’t be in the same situation because I know we’re checking in then we go to this area [hangar] to wait, then we go to this area there for the sample, etc., it could be either an arrow written on the panel or a physical guide from someone who at the reception says: “okay are you registered? If “no” you go there, are you registered? If “yes” you go there, etc. If not that we are a little lost, it is the first time in any case that we have done it. (Female participant, 32)11

The findings show that the screening test is not confidential, but this was not an obstacle for users. “I did not hide to come to the centre to take the test. The coronavirus is not like AIDS. I met other people”. What were some of the reasons for using the Covid-19 screening test? Screening Issues: Reasons for Screening, Restrictions and Care Pathways The data provided by the Medical Centre show that 66% of users took the test for travel reasons, compared to 19% for voluntary use, 12% for control cases and only 3% for contact cases (see Fig.  2.2). However, what was often reported as voluntary testing was sometimes linked to certain companies asking employees to be tested for collective protection measures. Some people were screened for travel purposes. The use of the screening test is linked to the requirements of socio-professional mobility, as shown in Fig. 2.2 (66% for travel). The following is what emerges from the comments made by the users interviewed: Well, this is for the trip, first they require a test, I have to go to Tunisia, so they require a negative test as long as we don’t have that we can’t travel, that’s why I’m here [Medical Centre] this morning to take the test. (Male participant, 18) The first reason is as I said, as it is in the context of a trip; it is for a mission outside Burkina, in Niamey. So here it is! Given the State rules imposed in 11  Interviews were conducted at the Medical Centre between 8 a.m. and 11 a.m., the time for blood sample taking.

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autres 0%

cas contact 3% contrôle 12%

cas suspect 0%

voyage 66%

volontaire 19%

Fig. 2.2  Reasons (in %) for screening at the Kossodo Medical Centre. Source: Field surveys. 2020 the sub-region, it is necessary to take the test before taking the plane or before making a trip. It is within the framework of my work. (Male participant, 32) I am a humanitarian in fact, I work in NGOs, the reason for my visit is for the Covid-19 levy in particular, I have to travel by Wednesday, and I am required to have this Covid-19 certificate, this is why I am visiting the centre. (Male participant, 32) Yes, since the test is mandatory to take the plane, as I have to go back to Benin on Saturday, that’s why I came to take the test. I did it from Cotonou so to leave also you have to do it before taking the plane. (Male participant, 50)

The use of screening is not always voluntary (19%). It is subject to the compulsory nature of international travel. This is a regional or international government measure imposed to limit the spread of the virus in the host country:

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Screening is free and voluntary. However, in my opinion, as long as we do not sensitise the population, they will always refuse to do so. When they have a travel plan they will come to do it. If not, doing it voluntarily, no. At one point, we felt pressure on people, but the government let go. (Female participant, 30)

Others tested voluntarily, so that they could know their status. The Covid-19 screening test was also a preventive measure for some of the users questioned. This type of appeal gives 19% of the data from the Medical Centre: It’s always good to take the Covid test to get an idea of your situation. Since you don’t know when you can get the disease, don’t wait until it’s going to reach a critical state, you’ll get up to go and have the test, it’s always good to have an idea of your situation. (Male participant, 34) Because it will avoid many cases of contamination, especially since it’s free so you can come and get tested at any time if you hesitate, if you have small symptoms. (Female participant, 18, 2nd test).

In other cases, some tested as a precaution in situations where they had either come into contact with those who had tested positive or where those who tested were defined as population at risk. The use of the test for control cases was noted in the data provided by the Medical Centre (12%): Well, it’s to be reassured, because where I’m doing my internship there have been positive cases of Covid-19, so it’s to reassure me and then better take my precautions. (Female participant, 22) I have been in contact with a person who was infected by coronavirus. Ok, I’m sure... what’s it called, a control? I did it 7 days ago already, it was negative, now I did it I think it will be negative again. It’s just to reassure myself. (Male participant, 44) I am potentially in contact; it means that at work someone has tested positive, so it means that he asks us all to test ourselves before returning to work. (Female participant, 39) Really, I was in contact with a person who was infected; so I decided to come and do the test because you never know; and also not to contaminate others… (Student participant, 19)

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When we enquired about screening facilities, the participants appreciated the availability of screening tests as a means of detecting the virus, but they were aware that the preventative measures remained effective in combatting the spread of the virus. At our home, as soon as we arrive, we wash our hands, we wear surgical masks or the muffler when we go out; when we arrive we throw it directly. Outside the house with friends, we try not to be too close, a metre distance we try to respect it; it’s not easy but we try anyway and we are always with our masks. Try to live with the disease while respecting the restrictions because you can’t stop it all at once, but you can try to live with it by respecting the preventative measures. (Female participant, 18) Today, what we know is the respect of the gestures, the rules of prevention which are dictated, that everyone knows it is only that; there is not yet a vaccine for us to say that we must get vaccinated and therefore we fall back on respecting the rules better known by all because there is so much awareness that is made on this matter, so almost everyone knows you have to wash your hands, you have to wear the masks, you have to stay a little away from each other, avoid large gatherings, that’s all, that you have to respect all that. (Male participant, 50)

The people we interviewed also expressed the view that testing centres were accessible and that there was enough information about the location of such centres. This knowledge of the testing centres was important to encourage community support for the screening tests. Because we have a doctor at work who gave us the list of places where we could take the test, I would normally have gone to Yalgado compared to my place of work. Now, there are disturbances in Yalgado related to the staff doing sit-ins, so we were advised to come here instead. (Female participant, 39) It was my manager who recommended me to come here, because he did it for him when he had to travel and then I came. It must be said that I first went to a CSPS where I found that the date of delivery of the results did not suit me and he advised me to come here, that I could have the results today. (Male participant, 30) I had wanted to do the test at the public health laboratory which is in Bogodogo there, and when I got there they said they had a lack of reagents,

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so they had scheduled me for Tuesday, and I was trying to see if I’m still going to wait, it won’t be easy; so, I also wrote to a friend, a colleague who also made a trip, it was him that I asked if he knew the centre where the Covid-19 test was done and he sent me a list of centres and CMAs, and in the list I asked someone who knows well here and he told me about this centre. (Male participant, 32) Someone gave me the information; through the list taken in a photo he sent me, one can see the hospitals that do this. (Female participant, 20) In any case, the CMA, I asked my friend, I say I want to do the test, because I have been in contact with someone who is infected and then he told me that at CMA from Kossodo here, I can do it, and then I said to myself ok, there’s no problem, it’s not far from where we live, so I’ll go and do it. (Female participant, 39)

When we asked health personnel about the care pathways for those who were infected, they indicated to us that care pathways depended on the level of infection of users who tested positive for Covid-19. People who tested positive for Covid-19 without signs of seriousness were encouraged to stay at home while respecting the restrictions. Cases deemed serious were referred to Tengandogo Hospital for medical treatment. Of the 55 users who we interviewed, only one person tested positive for Covid-19: This is not my first time; I took the test more than five times; I’ve done this before and got tested positive. They confined me to the house for fourteen days. They prescribed me medicine. And I followed the treatment. With the treatment I came back to do the test eight days after I was declared negative. On the fourteenth day I came back it was still negative. Therefore, I thank God. By the grace of God, I’m fine. (Female participant, 30). Frankly, in my opinion, this is poorly managed. When you isolate someone, you have to reassure yourself that the person is in the right conditions so as not to contaminate others. You can’t isolate someone when the person has no money on them. She did not stock up on food during those 14 days. They tell her to isolate herself, how does she do it? How does she eat? Nobody knows. How does she get out of it? Nobody knows. They only come to give you medication and how do you do the rest? (Female participant, 30)

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Discussion The findings show a gender difference in participants who took a Covid-19 test. Seventy-one per cent of people who were screened were male. This difference from our findings is due to the methodological approaches used in collecting the information and the reasons for international travel, which apply more to men than to women. The use of the Covid-19 screening test is linked to the social mobility of individuals for international travel. The request is neither systematic nor voluntary for most users. This was the case for HIV/AIDS where the use of the test was neither systematic nor voluntary for reasons of stigmatisation, discrimination and even social inequalities in access to care. Voluntary recourse to the screening test is therefore not an exception.12 The social perceptions of Covid-19 analysed by the authors show that these are strongly linked to the voluntary request for the Covid-19 test13: Since it’s a dangerous disease, when you come for the test you’re a little scared, because you don’t know how the results will be, it can be positive, so that makes us a little anxious. (Female participant, 18) Well, I came to take the test, in life you have to be always ready for what happens. He [company manager] asked for this test to avoid rapid contamination of the disease between company employees. (Male participant, 35)

The setting up of screening units/centres was done gradually as in the case of HIV/AIDS infection. Reference health facilities first benefited from the establishment of screening units. For HIV/AIDS, it is the National University Hospital Centre Yalgado Ouédraogo (Chun-Yo) and for Covid-19, it is the University Hospital Centre of Tengandogo. In addition, attendance at Covid-19 screening centres is not marked by the same stigma as HIV/AIDS screening centres, to which people come after taking precautions not to be seen by known people. This led users to visit centres far from their residence, or even outside their locality or province.  Faye, Sylvain Landry. 2015. L’”exceptionnalité” d’Ebola et les “réticences” populaires en Guinée-Conakry. Réflexions à partir d’une approche d’anthropologie symétrique. Anthropologie et santé. Accessed 10 December 2020. 13  Bationo, Bouma Fernand, Mariam Congo and Donon, Serge Namé. 2020. Penser le risque, négocier sa vie dans un contexte de coronavirus. Échanges, Numéro spécial Covid-19 1: 180–203; Palé, Augustin. 2020. Analyse des discours sociaux sur la Covid-19 au Burkina Faso. Échanges, Numéro spécial Covid-19 2: 560–575. 12

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When it came to Covid-19 testing, none of the participants noted fear or acts of stigmatisation or discrimination in relation to Covid-19 screenings. This was due to the mode of transmission, which exposes all sections of the population, without distinction of age, sex, income, social or geographical origin. As for HIV/AIDS, three elements can be highlighted in the context of screening: information, access to screening centres and governance concerning Covid-19.14 The findings demonstrate another way of experiencing stigma with regard to the prevention measures that the Covid-19-positive individual must respect. This form of stigma linked to Covid-19 is part of a process that begins with the positive results of the screening test, which means that it is not neutral as noted.15 Getting tested is an obstacle course, and being declared positive for Covid-19 means a person carries a risk and is someone of whom we must now be wary in social relations, for example isolation and social distancing, including in their household. The individual enters a process of permanent negotiation to adapt to the rules of sociability while respecting the restrictions. Isolation was perceived by some users as a form of stigmatisation regarding the imposed living conditions: When you isolate someone, you must reassure yourself that the person is in the right conditions so as not to contaminate others. You can’t isolate someone when the person has no money on them, or they did not stock up on food during those 14 days. We tell them to isolate, to isolate themselves, how do they do it? How do they eat? Nobody knows. How do they get out of it? Nobody knows. They only come to give you medication and how do we do the rest? (Female participant, 30)

The care pathways, as described by health personnel and users, are not an extraordinary situation. It is the state of health of the user that determines the course of care. In the event of serious signs noted by health personnel, the patient is admitted to a referral centre (Tengandogo Hospital) for medical care. If necessary, they are kept at home (isolation and adoption of prevention measures) to observe changes in behaviour.

14  Temah, Chrystelle and Temah, Tsafack. 2009. Les déterminants de l’épidémie du VIH/ SIDA en Afrique subsaharienne. Revue d’économie du développement 17: 73–106. 15  Benoist, Jean. 2007. Logiques de la stigmatisation, éthique de la destigmatisation. L’Information psychiatrique 83: 649–54.

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However, for some users who have been ill, care cannot be limited to taking medication alone.

Conclusion The use of voluntary Covid-19 screening was not common within the community. The reasons for the use of screening relate more to international health obligations than to the will of individuals to protect themselves from the disease. Our findings show that the reasons for travel occupy an important place in the decision to resort to screening. However, we also note that screenings were carried out under the duress of company officials to preserve the health of employees, but this situation often happens when an agent tests positive and declares it to the company’s officials. Questions remain about how the care pathways manage individuals who test positive for Covid-19. Isolation is the first prevention measure that patients must respect, while other measures may be recommended regarding living conditions (common courtyards, number of people in the household, contact cases before screening, etc.). However, the findings show that care cannot be limited to the administration of medicine alone but must integrate the food and nutritional dimension because the absence of food could worsen the state of health of the infected person, especially in a socially and economically precarious situation like Burkina Faso. Screening is certainly a means of combatting the spread of the virus, but it cannot replace preventative measures. The use of vaccines is certainly a considerable asset in the fight against the spread of Covid-19, but it is necessary to continue applying prevention measures in certain social situations.

References Bationo, Bouma Fernand, Mariam Congo, and Donon Serge Namé. 2020. Penser le risque, négocier sa vie dans un contexte de coronavirus. Échanges, Numéro spécial Covid-19 1: 180–203. Benoist, Jean. 2007. Logiques de la stigmatisation, éthique de la destigmatisation. L’Information psychiatrique 83: 649–654. Coulibaly, Brakissa and Péga Tuo. 2020. Facteurs de risque de propagation de la maladie à coronavirus (Covid-19) en Côte d’Ivoire. Kafoudal, La Revue des sciences sociales de l’Université Peleforo Gon Coulibaly, pp 10–26.

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Desclaux, Alice, Desgrées du Loû, and Anabelle. 2006. Les femmes africaines face au sida. Population & Sociétés 428: 1–4. Fassin, Didier. 2006. Souffrir par le social, gouverner par l’écoute. Une configuration sémantique de l’action publique. Politix 19 (73): 137–157. Faye, Sylvain Landry. 2015. L’“exceptionnalité” d’Ébola et les “réticences” populaires en Guinée-Conakry. Réflexions à partir d’une approche d’anthropologie symétrique. Anthropologie et santé. Accessed 10 Dec 2015. Guessous, Idris, Fred Paccaud, and Jacques Cornuz. 2010. Dépistage: principes et méthodes. Revue Médicale Suisse 6: 1390–1394. Lavergne, Cécile. 2019. Tous vulnérables. La vie des idees.fr. https://laviedesidees. fr/+-­vulnerabilite-­+.html. Accessed 15 Nov 2020. Nachega, Jean, Moussa Seydi, and Zumla Alimuddin. 2020. The late arrival of coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) in Africa: Mitigating pan continental spread. Clinical Infectious Diseases 71 (15): 875–878. Nguimkeu, Pierre, and Sosson Tadadjeu. 2020. Why is the number of Covid-19 Cases lower than expected in sub-Saharan Africa? A cross-sectional analysis of the role of demographic and geographic factors. World Development 2021 138: 105251. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105251. Accessed 27 April 2020. Nikiema, Dayangnéwendé Edwige, and Georges Compaoré. 2015. Structuration urbaine et santé à Ouagadougou. Les Cahiers du CBRST 7: 434–457. Nkodia, Arkadit, Jeandria Nicy Nkodia, Bazebizonza Tchiguina Carmel, Tchiguina Nkodia, Dieu-Veill Nkodia Medry, and Hardy. 2020. Caractéristiques Épidémiologiques et Dynamique Spatio-Temporelle de la Pandémie à Covid-19 en République du Congo. Health Sciences and Disease 21 (12): 39–45. OMS. 2020. Opening Remarks by the WHO Director-General during the press briefing on Covid-19 March 2020. https://scholar.google.com/ scholar?q=WHO+Director-­General%E2%80%99s+opening+remarks+at+the+medi a+briefing+on+COVID19+-­March+2020+. Accessed 15 Dec 2020. Palé, Augustin. 2020. Analyse des discours sociaux sur la Covid-19 au Burkina Faso. Échanges, Numéro spécial Covid-19 2: 560–575. Temah, Chrystelle, and Tsafack Temah. 2009. Les déterminants de l'épidémie du VIH/SIDA en Afrique subsaharienne. Revue d'économie du développement 17: 73–106.

CHAPTER 3

Covid-19 and the Politics of (Im)Mobility in Uganda Paddy Kinyera and Martin Doevenspeck

Introduction and Conceptual Approach When in May 2020 one of the authors drove from his home village in Northern Uganda to the nearest town (about 20 km), he came upon two roadblocks, so-called Covid-19 checkpoints, that were set up at the peak of the pandemic panic. The first one was in his village, where he was known to security staff, and he was not required to show any documentation. When he reached the town where nobody knew him personally, the police asked him for a ‘Movement Order’—a document only issued by the Resident District Commissioner (RDC). Since he did not have such an order, he was told to wait. After about 20 minutes one officer came to him and asked what he had to offer so that they could let him go. A single note of UGSH. 5000 (about euros 1.25) was enough to clear the way.

P. Kinyera (*) Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence, University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany e-mail: [email protected] M. Doevenspeck Department of Geography, University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Arndt et al. (eds.), Covid-19 in Africa: Governance and Containment, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36139-5_3

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In the course of the so-called mobility turn as a rejection of a purely transport science perspective and a focus on the manifold implications of ever-increasing mobility for society, complex movements, cycles and networks of people, ideas and goods are considered in a relational perspective. And a central, albeit mostly implicit, message of mobility studies is that movement is essentially normal and good. Mobility here stands for dynamics of freedom and progress, demonstrated by individuals placing themselves in spaces of stasis and movement. This would not normally need confirmation, but this short vignette of the local dynamics of the pandemic-related restrictions and their subversion illustrates once again that mobility is a resource that, due to different and uneven options, can be accessed to varying degrees. Mobility as a context-specific ensemble of movement, representations of this movement and concrete mobile practices is political.1 Who moves furthest, fastest, most often and who does not move, and for what reasons? When does immobility become a privilege? What constitutes mobility and immobility for various groups and why? Is immobility or mobility forced or voluntary? The significance of these issues in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic was, and continues to be, globally redefined by government-imposed lockdowns with quarantine, stay-home orders, bans on entering public spaces, travel restrictions and border closures. The identification and separation of sick and healthy bodies, control through spatial closure, and the blockage of potentially dangerous flows and movements are centuries-old governmental strategies of infection containment, now called biosecurity. And, with Covid-19, a kind of state-inspired biosecurity that calls for restricting and controlling mobility re-emerged as a global model to respond to the pandemic and contain its spread. However, both the impacts of immobilization on livelihoods and the privileges of mobility are distributed unevenly across countries, sites and populations.2 The situation within Uganda is no exception. People 1  Tim Cresswell. 2010. Towards a politics of mobility. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 28: 17–31; Matthias Leese and Stef Wittendorp. 2017. Security/Mobility: Politics of movement. Manchester: Manchester University Press; Judith A Nicholson and Mimi Sheller. 2016. Race and the Politics of Mobility, Transfers 6(1): 4–11. 2  Mimi Sheller. 2016. Uneven mobility futures: a Foucauldian approach. Mobilities 11: 1, 15–31. 10.1080/17450101.2015.1097038; Kevin Hannam, Mimi Sheller and John Urry. 2006. Editorial: Mobilities, Immobilities and Moorings. Mobilities 1(1): 1–22. 10.1080/17450100500489189; Nina Glick Schiller and Noel B. Salazar. 2013. Regimes of Mobility Across the Globe. Journal of Ethnic Migration Studies 39(2): 183–200.

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evidently experienced the effects of these new im/mobility regimes in highly uneven ways and demonstrably developed different strategies to respond to local translations of global responses to the pandemic. A second well-known aspect is the political instrumentalization of emergencies such as this,3 a sort of ‘authoritarian pulse’ unearthed by the health crises.4 Politicians and political entrepreneurs not only shaped their political practices around narratives of the pandemic, they refused to accept any kind of responsibility for the crisis, while strengthening their grip on power in order to increasingly pursue their own interests at the expense of the wellbeing of the population and the political freedoms of those with opposing views. In this chapter we bring together these two dimensions of the pandemic, the politics of (im)mobility and the political instrumentalization of the pandemic. While pandemic-related global inequalities and the geopolitics of blame and generosity, as well as the amplification of illiberal tendencies, are certainly discussed,5 relatively little is known about how people in rural parts of Africa perceived and experienced the restrictions or privileges of the im/mobility regimes brought about by the pandemic. In general, we know little about how the politics of the pandemic played out in very concrete places and how people actively dealt with them, that is, how they creatively navigated or even subverted them. We relive the concrete experiences of communities in Uganda’s rural north in the early days of the pandemic—a subaltern approach that undertakes a more sustained engagement with concrete sites, actors and voices that were entangled in the institutional management of the spread of Covid-19. The concept of a mobility regime usually summarizes the governance of international migration that is characterized by the sharp contrast of free movement in and from the Global North on the one hand and sedentarist imaginations relating to a Global South on the other, where movement is controlled, sanctioned and generally undesired, especially if these

 Francis Fukuyama. 2020. The pandemic and political order. Foreign Affairs 99: 26.  Stephen Simon. 2020. Subtle connections: pandemic and the authoritarian impulse. Survival 62:3, 10.1080/00396338.2020.1763615. 5  Debra Mesch et al. 2020. Covid-19, Generosity, and gender: How giving changed during the early months of a global pandemic. 3 4

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movements target the North.6 The study of mobility regimes explores “… the relationships between the privileged movements of some and the co-­ dependent but stigmatised and forbidden movement, migration and interconnection of the poor, powerless and exploited”.7 We deploy (im)mobility regimes on a national level to understand them as constituted by a specific set of actors, networks of communication, institutions, technologies, practices, and geometries of power and knowledge through which movement is contained within national borders or, more generally, through which im/mobilities have been governed in the context of the pandemic; and the ways the targeted subjects responded. Thinking of the relations of mobility and stasis as both an outcome and the shaping of a regime means to reveal the entangled power relations at work in state–society relations. In what follows, we first give an overview of the Covid-19 crisis and government responses in Uganda. Then we empirically assess different political dimensions of governing (im)mobilities during the pandemic and the subaltern responses, before summarizing the Covid-19 (im)mobility regime in the country.

Covid-19 in Uganda Although the actual timeline for Covid-19 started in late 2019 (Fig. 3.1), the waves of pandamic-narratives and associated precautions began to be felt in Uganda in February 2020 when Ugandans encountered news of the virus through the media. Within the country, warnings were issued, particularly targeting Ugandans who traded with China, to suspend any planned travel. The speed of the spatial spread of the virus, and its lethal effects around the world, sent exceptionally alarming signals to countries like Uganda. In taking precautions in response to these signals, the ministry of health issued the first set of restrictions, targeting international flows. Travellers to the country from what were framed as ‘category 1’ countries, comprising Italy, France, China, Japan, Netherlands, Germany and Spain, had to be subjected to a 14-day quarantine in places 6  Nina Glick Schiller and Salazar Noel B. 2013. Regimes of mobility across the globe. Journal of Ethnic Migration Studies 39: 2)183–200; Rey Koslowski. 2011. Global mobility regimes: A conceptual framework. In Global Mobility Regimes, ed. Rey Koslowski, 1–25. New  York: Palgrave Macmillan. 10.1057/9781137001948_1; Joris Schapendonk et  al. 2020. Re-routing migration geographies: migrants, trajectories, and mobility regimes. Geoforum 116:211–16. 10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.06.007. 7  Schiller and Salazar, ‘Regimes of Mobility Across the Globe’, 6.

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Fig. 3.1  Key timeline in the evolution of Uganda’s mobility regime in the context of Covid-19

determined by the state. On 21 March 2020, Uganda registered the first infection, a national returning from Dubai,8 which sent the country into multidimensional pandemic panic. The general fear within the population, imagining death by Covid-19, as well as knowing the lack of capacity in the country’s healthcare system to contain mass infections, compelled many Ugandans to voluntarily adjust to social practices that became widely known as the ‘new normal’. With the confirmation of the first Covid-19 case, the government closed international borders. This delivered Uganda’s population into the midst of two kinds of survival struggle: the struggle against the spread of the virus and the struggle to remain economically afloat. The first case prompted a clear state response (Rwengabo, 2020). A series of executive directives were issued which, on the one hand, dissocialized the population through the social-distancing campaign and, on the other, immobilized the population. Institutional ‘lockdown’ started, consequently producing a field of power that drew the population closer to the gaze of apparatuses of government that were rolled out with coercive intensity, the effect of which created a pattern for contentious state– society relations, as well as subaltern enactments of mobility regimes. These enactments revolved around moments of popular critique; of institutional weakness, unpreparedness, misdemeanour and corruption; of mass contestations and of demonstrable impulses of a kind of 8  Ronald Olum and Felix Bongomin. 2020. Uganda’s first 100 Covid-19 cases: trends and lessons. International Journal of Infectious Diseases 96:517–18. 10.1016/j.ijid.2020.05.073.

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‘authoritarian governmentality’ that eventually shaped the state-centred and biopolitical mentalities in Uganda’s struggle against Covid-19. Pandemic-Related Politics of (Im)Mobilities The decision on the global scale to control movement, and state-level reiteration of the need for citizens to remain immobile, has been largely based on public health reasoning. However, enforcing immobility considering this reasoning had to involve what Michel Foucault terms governmentalization through state-type power,9 bringing the power of government to bear on the population in tri-dimensional units of reason, technique and authority to govern both movement and stasis. In what follows, we analyse how both movement and stasis in Uganda became governmentalized in the bid to control the spread of Covid-19. We observe that the state in Uganda effectively brought its power to bear on different mobility needs of the population by creating an assemblage of hierarchical governmental apparatuses of biosecurity10 that became known as the Covid-19 Taskforce (Fig. 3.2). By examining the structural interrelations within the taskforce, we are able to empirically engage with the architecture of state power that rendered the pandemic a reason for the state to stretch the limits of its right to govern and overrule individual liberties.11 Moreover, the overbearing state-type power laid the foundation for what we conceptualize as subaltern responses that we shall examine in a later section. Restrictions on movement in Uganda in the context of Covid-19 were guided by the Public Health Act 1935, CAP 281. Not only does the Act define the circumstances under which relevant state authorities act in the light of public health risks, it also identifies the units and technologies of state power that are responsible for managing such risks: it is the Minister of Health that is vested with such powers. Based on this, Uganda’s Minister of Health, Jane Ruth Aceng, issued a series of guidelines ranging from the 9  Michel Foucault. 1997. The Politics of Truth, eds. Sylvere Lotringer and Lysa Hochroth. New York: Semiotext(e). 26–29. 10  Mimi Sheller. 2016. Uneven mobility futures: A Foucauldian approach. Mobilities 11:1, 15–31. 11  Michel Foucault. 1997. The politics of truth; Michel Foucault. 2008. The birth of biopolitics. Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Alexander J. Means. 2022. Foucault, Biopolitics, and the Critique of State Reason. Educational Philosophy and Theory 54(12):1968–1969, 10.1080/00131857.2021.1871895.

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Fig. 3.2  Uganda’s apparatus of biosecurity to govern im/mobility in the context of Covid-19

globally recommended methods of self-care such as handwashing, social distancing and controlled sneezing, to measures that were meant to monitor both the inflow of people into the country and movements within the country. The measures issued by the Minister were amplified by a series of presidential directives, the most significant being the lockdowns, that were enforced by a hierarchical power structure—the apparatus of biosecurity (Fig. 3.2) known as the National Covid-19 Taskforce (hereafter, NCT). The inception of the NCT, coordinated by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), was an institutional attempt to structurally order the mechanisms for responding to the pandemic. In the logic of the state, this delivered a well-calculated two-dimensional approach to, on the one hand, providing the scientific reasoning behind the restrictions to movement, and, on the other hand, deploying different technologies of power to enforce the restrictions. The technical dimension was supplied by scientists who mainly operated in the background. At the forefront was the political dimension, linked to the office of the president. Whereas one can argue that the two-dimensional approach was meant to rally the population to

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self-govern by adhering to the rules issued by the state, enforcing the rules by coercive organs of the state such as the military and—in the case of Uganda—a militant police force produced contradictory situations, therefore shifting public perception of the virus as well as of the measures put in place to fight it. In highlighting these perspective-changing contradictions, we would like to cite three key moments that constituted the politics of (im)mobilities during the pandemic: moments of partisan politics, moments of contradictory state visibility, and moments of structural mistrust and corruption. Partisan Politics The partisan political gesture is clear for anyone to see. When I, a political leader from the opposition, decided to support my people with the most basic thing—food, I could receive a draconian charge of ‘attempted murder’. Ironically, the Minister of Health was captured on TV in the middle of a crowd, canvassing for votes—but pretending to be popularising the wearing of masks… Because she belongs to the ruling NRM party, she commits no offence. What else can this be if not taking advantage of the [Covid] situation?12

Elsewhere, issues of national concern in Uganda tend to get woven into the practice of partisan politics. Uganda’s restrictions on movement at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic cannot be understood without looking at the political orientation of the actors. The point to begin with is the constitution of the NCT: the guidelines issued by the Minister of Health, and the directives issued by the president, were enforced through very restricted political structures at subnational levels. The close coordination between the office of the president and the Resident District Commissioners (RDCs) substantiates this claim. The role of the District Health Officers is well known to be technical. The RDCs, on the other hand, are political figures appointed by the president with somewhat unpredictable roles, being in a way ‘the local eyes and ears’ of the president. One of their strategic tasks is to mobilize the population to support government programmes and, above all, to ensure the population’s loyalty to the president. The RDCs were the subnational political officers responsible for categorizing movements as essential or otherwise and consequently allowing  Interview, Kampala, April 2020.

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or prohibiting them. Moreover, RDCs, in the context of the fight against Covid-19, are the sole power vested with the authority to secure the (im) mobility of the communities in their different areas of jurisdiction by issuing what have been commonly known as ‘Movement Orders’ (MOs). The MOs instructed the officers at the roadblocks to accord the bearer ‘quick access’ to emergency centres, often medical facilities. Because the RDC is both a person and an office, many of the MOs were issued in electronic form. The caveat in the electronic MOs that demanded ‘physical verification’—officers to physically inspect and determine that the ‘emergency’ was a genuine one13—produced the most contentious situations. Here, the RDC gives instructions, but leaves room for foot soldiers to inspect all mobile bodies carrying MOs. The foot soldiers operated with the delegated power of the RDC to cancel the MOs should they discover falsifications. It is at the point of verification—the moment of determining falsified MOs from truthful ones—where the power to govern mobility becomes entangled with the power to be mobile, thereby producing spaces of socioeconomic and socio-political transactions. Individuals who were personally known to the RDCs called them directly to request to travel even when such travel would be unacceptable under the pandemic emergency guidelines. The socio-political ties with people in power meant that one could carry with them the power to be mobile, but the lack of such ties meant one needed to develop alternative approaches in the quest for mobility. At the roadblocks, however, some individuals without any form of MOs, or any visible emergencies, were observably able to move. One had to find a ‘talking point’: a few thousand shillings on many occasions jeopardized the operationalization of the presidential directives, what we conceptualize in a later section as moments of institutional corruption. Another critical moment that defines the politics governing movement in Uganda during the pandemic is the political context. The Covid-19 pandemic came at a time when Uganda was gearing up for the 2021 general elections. As a political tradition, party primaries (preliminary elections to determine party flag-bearers for different electoral positions) were conducted. In the context of Covid-19, the president, having directed the ‘scientification’ of social activities (e.g. weddings, burials, prayers), decreed 13  The ‘emergency’ is discussed beforehand between the bearer and the RDC in a telephone conversation, or explained via telephone by a designated authority, such as the In-charge of a Police Station.

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that campaigns and elections, which would inevitably take on dynamic social complexions, should, in this season, be ‘scientific’. There was no clear definition of what was meant by ‘scientific’ but the intention was to reduce the possibility of mass gatherings which were known to be the leading factor in the spread of the virus. At the peak of the NRM primaries, however, these directives seemed to have been rendered defunct or simply exceptionalized. Minister of Health Aceng, the politico-technical brains behind many of the presidential directives to immobilize the population, was caught on camera in the middle of a large crowd as she launched the distribution of face masks, yet neither she herself nor her supporters were wearing masks.14 Not only was she accused of drawing large crowds—flouting the rules of social distancing and staying home/staying safe—but also of using local NRM-linked politicians and security officials to popularize the wearing of masks instead of using health workers. Aceng’s action was initially defended, but later an apology was issued by ICT Minister Judith Nabakooba. In the same context, in April 2020, in the central district of Mityana, the area member of parliament, Francis Zaake, a member of the opposition, was arrested by police for trying to distribute food relief to his ‘starving’ supporters.15 The power to provide relief to Ugandans whose daily livelihoods depend on movement was ring-fenced to be the duty of the NCT, dominated by political actors from the ruling NRM. In giving these directives, the president constricted the interaction space that Covid-19 produced for political actors opposed to the political establishment. This also applied to the issuance of ‘Movement Orders’. Individuals closer to the establishment easily obtained movement orders from the RDCs, or stickers from the Ministry of Works and Transport. Clearly, the Covid-19 pandemic skewed the political playing field in favour of the ruling party, making immobility, in this context, a privilege of the ruling class. Governing and restricting movements in the context of the pandemic was a way of governing the mobility and visibility of politically hopeful individuals who intended to challenge those loyal to the NRM party for political seats in the forthcoming elections. Mass political 14  Daily Monitor. 2020. Minister under fire for ‘flouting’ Covid-19 preventive measures. Nation Media Group. 12 July. 15  Daily Monitor. 2020. Virus lockdown: MP Zaake arrested for distributing relief food. Nation Media Group. 19 April.

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mobilizations by the NRM continued even when it was expected that the party, being the one in power, would respect its own biosecurity regulations. Although President Museveni, the flag-bearer for the NRM party, only met with key party officials at district level, the party facilitated post-­ meeting gatherings at village levels. As long as the meeting was attended by those loyal to the NRM, police did not interfere. In Acholibur, Pader district, for example, an NRM-leaning politically motivated women’s group, Mon Aye Paco (literally: Women are the Home), organized a last-gasp political rally that was attended by hundreds of people (Fig. 3.3). All dressed in yellow, the women demonstrated their loyalty to the NRM, drawing key party figures from the district to applaud and facilitate the initiative. Had this been a gathering of members of a different political party, police would have reined in and dispersed the crowd as was the case in Kitgum with supporters of presidential candidate Robert Kyagulanyi (Bobi-Wine), 20 kilometres away from the venue of this rally. Arguably, the ruling political class instrumentalized the pandemic to regulate the political space. This privileged both the ruling party and the opposition in different contexts. Whereas to the NRM, the pandemic leveraged the dispensation of coercive forces of the state on a defiant population, it also created a new propaganda space that was exploited by the opponents of NRM candidates, many of whom lost the elections.

Fig. 3.3  NRM-supported mass political mobilisation in Pader ahead of the 2021 General Elections (Photo: P. Kinyera, 7 January 2021)

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Contradictory State Visibility …whenever the power to protect the population is concentrated in the hands of untechnical and insolent state operatives, society ends up with the unnecessary kinds of violence we have been seeing. Bad enough, the attempt to resist and criticise such acts of violence only brought about more instances of disrespect and violence….16

The power to govern mobility and stasis during the pandemic on a global scale drew on a variety of sites of authority for different purposes. From the laboratories to the hospitals and to national borders, different domains of power played different roles to ensure that the lethal effect of the virus was contained. These state-designed multi-stakeholder interventions, the evident extension of the power of government to domains outside of state systems, are clear indications of the multidimensional inter-relationality of the practice of governing. Although nation states took political decisions to regulate the flow of people across borders, the enforcement of these regulations, in many countries, involved more than just state power. Put simply, governing the pandemic has not exclusively been a state-centred affair. However, particularly in developing countries such as Uganda, the call by the population for more state intervention, not only to protect them from Covid-19 but also from the effects posed by precautionary measures, highlights the extent of state power, as well as how the state is perceived and, therefore, the relations it has with the population. In the case of Uganda, the state–society relations in the context of the pandemic have been the subject of broad-based critique. In a policy paper published by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Sabastian Rwengabo17 suggests that the centrality of the Ugandan state in handling the pandemic implies trajectories of state–society relations built around dichotomies of cooperation versus conflict; trust versus mistrust; coercive versus voluntary support. He points out that the coercive capabilities of the state, if not well deployed, may meet resistance that tends to ‘render even the most well-meaning […] state measures futile’ (pg. 9). We would like to take up this very argument: the problem that we identify with the pandemic-related state-engineered restrictions to movement is not  Interview, Kitgum, May 2020.  Sabastian Rwengabo. 2020. Covid-19  in Uganda: Toward A National Strategy on Complex Public Health Emergencies. Kampala: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. 16 17

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necessarily in their centrality, but in the kinds of roles the state plays. Put differently, how and when the state becomes visible is what should count in influencing state–society relations. Adding to Rwengabo’s observation, we do not want to underestimate the role played in the resultant state―society relations by the manner of state visibility—relations marred by moments of disobedience and violence. For adequate claims to be made in the light of this, there is the need to problematize state visibility: In what ways was the Ugandan state visible in the restrictions of movement during Covid-19? The diagrammatized apparatus of power (Fig.  3.2) partly answers the question, as does the empirical vignette drawn from the conversation with a public figure in Kitgum, northern Uganda (cited above). The Ugandan state prioritized the deployment of coercive forces to contain the population, which in many cases resulted in incidents of disobedience and violence. When President Yoweri Museveni issued executive directives, military personnel were sent out onto the streets with unclear instructions. This transformed the effort to pass on life-saving information regarding the virus into a contentious power struggle between the civilian population and the armed forces. Here, instead of state centrality and visibility coming in the form of interventions in healthcare services, such as rolling out massive tests and sensitization programmes and provision of relief services to immobilized citizens, it came in the form of unreasonable brutality in keeping people immobile. The general logic of lockdown and a blanket ban on mass movements was to contain the virus, and therefore protect and save lives. Any person who became sick with anything else during the pandemic, and required medical attention from a health facility, was required to first call and speak to the RDC on the phone, rather than go to see the doctor. An experience from Uganda’s northern district of Kitgum gives an example of the illogicality of this directive. In April, at the peak of the pandemic-related lockdown, a 14-year-old child from a village in Acholibur Town council in Pader district became ill. His relatives, desperate to save his life, decided to ride on a motorcycle to take him to a hospital in Kitgum. As part of the RDC-led enforcement of presidential directives, the rider, the patient and the caretaker were all blocked at a roadblock (Fig. 3.4) from accessing the hospital. The condition of the child rapidly deteriorated at the roadblock, at which point a police officer decided that the trio could continue and see a doctor. A few minutes after reaching the hospital, the doctors said it was too late: the patient convulsed and died.

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Fig. 3.4  Covid-19 checkpoint in Kitgum where the 14-year-old child and his caretakers were intercepted for violating presidential directives (Photo by P. Kinyera, May 2020)

In a nutshell, the political dimension of restricting movement in the context of Covid-19 in Uganda caused the spheres of professional doctors to be curtailed by state operatives who know too little or nothing about medical emergencies. From the story of this 14 year old, the excessive effort to protect life instead led to a loss of life, yet this is just one scenario among thousands of others. State operatives—the armed forces, constituting foot soldiers—as illustrated in the diagrammatized apparatus of power, (Fig. 3.2) often abused their power. For day-time movements, the roadblocks, located at specific entry and exit points of a major trading centre, town or city (as in Fig. 3.4), were spaces for contention. Highly problematic was the mobile curfew-­ enforcing unit, comprising mainly UPDF soldiers supported by Local Defense Units who rendered the state visibility a demonstration of coercion.

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Continuously brutalized by the armed forces, some communities designed strategies to equal the coercion. The flow of violence became two-way: from the armed forces to the population, and from the population to the armed forces. In Bibia sub-county, Amuru district, a UPDF soldier lost an eye after being attacked by a group of people as he “enforced curfew directives”.18 A similar incident also happened in Mityana, a district in central Uganda; these are just a few cases amongst many in other parts of the country. Structural Mistrust and Corruption The governing of mobility in Uganda during the pandemic featured multiple instances of mistrust and levels of bribery. The pandemic situation and the lockdown measures were, on the one hand, hurtful to the economy on all scales of measurement, but, on the other hand, were an opportunity for enrichment for some. In this context, our focus is on the mistrust that pushed parts of the Ugandan population, particularly in the rural areas, to question the very nature of Covid-19, and on the grafts associated with the interface between defiant aspirations and struggles to be mobile and the injunctions that worked against these aspirations. We pose two guiding questions: Where did the mistrust come from? In what ways did the regulation of movement favour corruption? When institutional measures were undertaken in March 2020 to control the spread of the virus in the country, the citizens took it as part of the proper public health concern and intervention by the state. Amidst threats to livelihoods for an indefinite period of time, Ugandans still considered the guidelines to be an appropriate biopolitical intervention to care for their health. The first concern regarded the quarantine measures, which also included Ugandans returning from abroad. For all their good intentions, the guidelines required that all travellers returning from abroad be quarantined for 14 days at their own expense, at a cost of USD 100 per day. For an average Ugandan, USD 1400 for two weeks is exorbitant. Ugandans began to question who had been assigned the quarantine deals, because the choice of where to be quarantined was not individualized. Reports of emergency centres owned by government officials or their relatives heated up the discussion further. In some cases, people were 18  Daily Monitor. 2020. UPDF soldier loses eye while enforcing Covid-19 curfew. Nation Media Group. 12 April.

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kept in quarantine centres for more than 14  days, therefore increasing their expenses. If we think of this from a social status point of view, the daily costs of being quarantined were calculated based on the assumption that whoever is able to travel is able to meet the USD 100/day bill. When Ugandans began to question the politics of quarantine, trust in this biosecurity intervention (of separating potentially sick bodies from the healthy population) began to wane and the governmentalization of the pandemic was rendered contentious. From the perspective of the mostly impoverished rural Ugandans who depend on daily micro-movements, Covid-19 and the associated lockdown increased the difficulties of making a living. “Our routine is very much predictable. The head of the family has to leave home in the morning and return in the evening, giving an assurance that tomorrow will be okay…”.19 The pressure on households instigated subaltern counter-­ strategies that sought to challenge the immobility aspect of the so-called new-normal. Although the government made efforts to support the ‘grounded citizens’ who subsisted on daily earnings with rationed food supplies, this support did not reach everywhere and to everyone who was deprived of the right to livelihood. Moreover, where foodstuff—packed and marked ‘Operation Wealth Creation’—was supplied, it was simply not enough to sustain even the smallest household for the cumulative lockdown period. The feeling of mistrust in the government continued to grow among the population, and the call for the lockdown measures to be eased became explicit. Families that had moved to the city but were now out of work because of the lockdown measures struggled to return ‘home’. As the state struggled to keep the population safe from the pandemic, it hurt the micro-economies and the social ties that kept these economies afloat. As a result, the population devised subaltern measures to keep moving, even when it was illegal to do so. The struggle for individuals and families that were locked down outside their homes is what brings us to the ‘moments of graft’. The offices of the RDCs which issued movement orders, the printing rooms where the vehicle-­movement stickers were made at the Ministry of Transport, and the roadblocks where these movement warranties were checked, validated and legitimized became new spaces of negotiation where social status and financial bargains determined (im)mobility. Individuals who were  Interview, Kitgum, May 2020.

19

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desperate to travel, but whose intended travel would fall into the category of the “inessential”, resorted to trade-off agreements with officials in each of these centres of govern-mobility.20 From buying special vehicle stickers at a cost determined by how far one wanted to travel (between euros 80 for movements within the city and euros 150 for upcountry movements for periods up to 14 days); to directly soliciting and paying for daily Movement Orders from the RDCs; to moving with enough hard cash to pay out at checkpoints, movement restrictions demonstrated the transformation of pandemic-related mobility restrictions into fragmented economies of governing mobilities—moments of institutional graft, that is, institutional actors taking advantage of the situation to satisfy their own interests. When the restrictions on public transportation were partially lifted, the transporters colluded with the traffic police officers manning the roadblocks to flout the half-capacity guideline. Therefore, the enforcement of this guideline produced a space for the traffic police officers to receive daily pay-offs from the transporters. Evidently, the moments of mistrust and graft became intertwined, making the whole practice around containing the spread of Covid-19  in the Ugandan population a game of conflicting interests. The population came to understand that the institutions that were created to govern its mobility had become absorbed in working towards their own individual interests, resulting in an atmosphere of subaltern defiance. Subaltern Strategies The strategies of flouting the mobility guidelines mainly featured institutional actors within the NCT. This does not mean that the transactions were only institutional in nature. The population, understanding the nature of the NCT, exploited all possibilities to continue to be mobile. In this section, we briefly explore some of these subaltern responses adapted to the institutional dynamics. The population became aware that the institutional actors could be compromised in multiple ways, which links their strategies to the core elements within the constituted apparatus of biosecurity, the NCT. The very first point is the pay-for-way strategy. Under this strategy, the would-be contraveners of lockdown measures pay their way at the 20  Ole Jørgen Bærenholdt. 2013. Governmobility: The powers of mobility. Mobilities 8(1):20–34. 10.1080/17450101.2012.747754.

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roadblocks. The empirical experimentation undertaken by one of the authors in Uganda’s northern district of Kitgum is a good example. In the first few days of the lockdown, there was a demonstrated will to enforce the directives, in many cases with unnecessary brutality. After a couple of weeks, the situation changed, when roadblocks became spaces of mobility transactions with people paying officials to remain mobile. In one way, this could be considered as a trickle-down effect of the top-­ level mobility transactions in which officials responsible for printing and issuing vehicle stickers sold them to undeserving individuals. To show seriousness, all offenders identified to be people of ‘low class’ would be taken directly to police cells where they secretly paid their way out. As the payments were made, a victim narrates, “the officials tell you that you are a stubborn offender … that the matter could have been cleared at the roadblock. We learnt in the process that one does not necessarily have to stay home but move prepared to pay for their way”.21 Another offender released from a police cell stated that the pay-offs did not have to necessarily be money: “…for the LDUs, sometimes all they want are cigarettes, or even a bottle of Chief-Waragi… when you do that and they know you always give them such things, they will not disturb you on a day you don’t have”.22 However, the pay-for-way strategy was determined by financial capacity, so it was not a strategy for everyone. Another kind of privileged subaltern response was structural defiance— going consciously against the rules by working through and taking advantage of the structural loopholes. It should be noted that the lockdown was in fact a lockdown for everyone, including state security agents. One way to subvert the lockdown, at least for those who had a private vehicle or could borrow one from a friend or relative, was to take a police or military officer in the vehicle with them. This kind of alliance created a symbiotic power relation between the officers who would have loved to visit their families in the countryside, but did not have their own private vehicles, and those who had vehicles but were forbidden to move. The car owners opposed the power structures to govern movement, and formed interdependent alliances, appearing as drivers of the officers often in uniform. If the officer could drive, s/he took to the steering whenever a roadblock was close. In this way, private car owners continued to travel in defiance even when the restrictions were at their peak, but only through  Post-observation interview: 8 April 2020, Kitgum.  Interview: 10 May 2020, Acholibur.

21 22

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symbiotic alliances formed with individuals within the structural apparatus of security. Like the strategy of pay-for-way, this also depended on whether or not one owned or was able to access a private car. The third, and most-­ used, strategy was the remodelling and/or re-routing of journeys. It was no longer a case of speed to reach wherever one planned to go, but one of reaching the planned destination by all means and ways. Over the last two decades, motorcycles have become the dominant mode of transport in the rural areas, and the most flexible and fastest way to travel in the urban areas. As part of the pandemic restrictions, the motorcycle-based passenger service commonly known as boda-boda was also suspended. The president directed that boda-boda riders should find alternative uses for their motorcycles, such as transportation of goods within a specific timeframe. Where the riders failed to find goods to ferry, they still carried passengers but took routes that made it easy to avoid the restrictive technologies of state power. However, some motorcycle owners still paid their way through the roadblocks. In other cases, people simply changed their mode of moving. They resorted to cycling and walking or jogging since these were not much affected by the mobility regulations. Cyclists and pedestrians were only affected by curfew time. They could go as far as they wanted, but not before 6.30 in the morning and not after 7  in the evening. Pedestrians, particularly those who would have been caught violating presidential curfew rules, ended up paying for their ‘freedom’ or immediately bribing the security operatives to prevent being beaten and/or arrested. When an individual was at risk of being caught out using the wrong mode of transport at the wrong time, for instance using a motorcycle beyond the designated time, rerouting the journey, that is, the circumvention of state operatives by taking less policed routes, such as rural footpaths, became the most appropriate strategy. This especially applied in circumstances where such individuals did not have the resources to pay their way out of or through the roadblocks. However, this required people to understand ways around their spaces of movement. This reminds us of the spatial limits of state power—its inability to be uniformly operable and visible everywhere, but also its being circumvented. This strategy worked better in the rural areas than in the cities and major urban areas where mobility infrastructure enabled the foot soldiers to reach almost everywhere.

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Conclusion In this chapter we analysed Uganda’s security apparatus that was deployed to govern (im)mobility in the context of Covid-19, at the peak of the first phase of the pandemic. We demonstrated how partisan politics, contentious state visibility, structural mistrust and graft and subaltern coping strategies were linked to the politics of (im)mobility regarding the political instrumentalization of the pandemic. This has helped build an understanding of how the Covid-19 related (im)mobility regime in Uganda developed; how it was maintained;  what social technologies there were that facilitated it; and what types of social imaginings sustained it. The Ugandan political leadership developed a panicky patchwork of biopolitical interventions with significant political ramifications. From March 2020, when Uganda’s response to the pandemic started (Fig. 3.1), it was predominantly President Museveni who publicly announced the measures for containing the spread of the virus. His dominant involvement set the tone of the Covid-19 interventions at all levels. Most importantly, it defined the power narratives by which the guidelines were enforced—the main concern being the presidential directives rather than the virus. Rather than employing technical civil guidance, local structures linked to the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) imposed an ‘enforcement’ linked to power relations. The effect of this was to apply the containment of mobility and the regulation of stasis, often violently, in a context in which Uganda’s immobilization was inseparably connected to the general elections in early 2021. The power arrangements of biosecurity that were constituted in the early stages of the pandemic showed that the immobilization structure had been fused with national (partisan) politics. It was, on the one hand, a desperate search for credit for the ruling party, a political instrumentalization to control the 2021 general elections, and, on the other, a strategic deployment of the rule of the state of exception to immobilize the political opposition. Our empirical observations of a regulatory and surveillance administration re-shaped by the responses to the pandemic revealed an (im)mobility regime characterized by the politics of closure, containment and entrapment. State-led biopolitical interventions established new borders and rebuilt old ones reconfirming power inequalities and underlining the socially differentiated ability to move and to have access to opportunities for movement as a major stratifying force within a tense state–society

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relationship. To maintain a degree of control, the regime relied on old technologies of containment  using prisons and penitentiaries. This was complemented by simple and frustrating practices such as long waits, high application fees in movement-license processing, and a multitude of bureaucratic barriers. However, subversions of the state-driven  biopolitical interventions at virtually all levels were also typical of the regime. The contradictions in the enforcement of presidential directives underlined the fact that the new regime of (im)mobility was a test of the state’s limits in bringing a categorically coercive power to bear on the population, and provoked the population into finding ways to evade, contend with and respond to such powers. Subjects, as targets of biosocial profiling, used networks of communication, subaltern powers and knowledge, through which movement is enabled. The comprehensive negotiability of movement allows for a political economy of enrichment that was of immense significance for maintaining the (im)mobility regime. Uganda is generally known for effective institutional interventions to combat health crises, with HIV in the 1980s and 1990s and Ebola in the 2000s as examples. However, for Covid-19 measures, the state gradually slipped out of favour among the population to the extent that even the most well-intentioned biopolitical programmes were viewed as strategies for regime survival. In many ways, mobility regulations and other forms of restrictive measures to contain Covid-19 were viewed in the same way. The situation was not helped when the state deployed all possible instruments of power (some of which were unnecessarily coercive) to guard against the population’s possibility of endangering itself by being mobile. The progressive and long-term impacts of these restrictions on mobility, and especially on regional cross-border movements, ought to remain the subject of further investigations.

Bibliography Bærenholdt, Ole Jørgen. 2013. Governmobility: The powers of mobility. Mobilities 8 (1): 20–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/17450101.2012.747754. Cresswell, Tim. 2010. Towards a politics of mobility. Environment and planning D: Society and Space 28: 17–31. Foucault, Michel. 1997. In The politics of truth, ed. Sylvere Lotringer and Lysa Hochroth. New York: Semiotext(e). ———. 2008. The birth of biopolitics. Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Fukuyama, Francis. 2020. The pandemic and political order. Foreign Affairs 99: 26. Hannam, Kevin, Mimi Sheller, and John Urry. 2006. Editorial: Mobilities, immobilities and moorings. Mobilities 1 (1): 1–22. https://doi. org/10.1080/17450100500489189. Koslowski, Rey. 2011. Global mobility regimes: A conceptual framework. In Global mobility regimes, ed. Rey Koslowski, 1–25. New  York: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137001948_1. Leese, Matthias, and Stef Wittendorp. 2017. Security/mobility: Politics of movement. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Means, Alexander J. 2022. Foucault, biopolitics, and the critique of state reason. Educational Philosophy and Theory. 54 (12): 1968–1969. https://doi.org/1 0.1080/00131857.2021.1871895. Mesch, Debra, Una Osili, Tessa Skidmore, Jon Bergdoll, Jacqueline Ackerman, and Jeannie Sager. 2020. Covid-19, generosity, and gender: How giving changed during the early months of a global pandemic. Indianapolis: Women's Philanthropy Institute. Nicholson, Judith A., and Mimi Sheller. 2016. Race and politics of mobility. Transfers. 6 (1): 4–11. Olum, Ronald, and Felix Bongomin. 2020. Uganda’s first 100 Covid-19 cases: Trends and lessons. International Journal of Infectious Diseases 96: 517–518. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2020.05.073. Rwengabo, Sabastian. 2020. Covid-19 in Uganda: Toward a national strategy on complex public health emergencies. Kampala: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Schapendonk, Joris, Ilse van Liempt, Inga Schwarz, and Griet Steel. 2020. Re-routing migration geographies: Migrants, trajectories and mobility regimes. Geoforum 116: 211–216. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.06.007. Schiller, Nina Glick, and Noel B. Salazar. 2013. Regimes of mobility across the globe. Journal of Ethnic Migration Studies. 39 (2): 183–200. Sheller, Mimi. 2016. Uneven mobility futures: A Foucauldian approach. Mobilities 11 (1): 15–31. https://doi.org/10.1080/17450101.2015.1097038. Simon, Stephen. 2020. Subtle connections: Pandemic and the authoritarian impulse. Survival 62: 3. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1763615.

CHAPTER 4

Beyond Paradoxes: The South African Military Involvement in the Fight against Covid-19 Komlan Agbedahin

Introduction In False Start in Africa,1 a translated version of his book L’Afrique Noire est Mal Partie, the agronomy engineer, environmentalist and sociologist René Dumont (1966) argued that African nations started off on the wrong foot. His analysis of the state of Africa, which centred on the economy, development and agriculture, presented a grim picture of the African continent. Dumont’s work, although a macro analysis, revealed that most institutions (including the army), asynchronously, also started off on the wrong foot. Notwithstanding the scheming intention of some leaders to use the military to achieve their political projects, there is evidence that 1

 Dumont, René. 1966. False start in Africa. New York: Praeger.

K. Agbedahin (*) Department of Sociology, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Arndt et al. (eds.), Covid-19 in Africa: Governance and Containment, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36139-5_4

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most armies in Africa are still haunted by the pervasive influence of colonial legacies. Questionable asymmetric military cooperation and assistance coupled with the praetorian nature of most armies have impeded African armies from being the armies of the people.2 In addition, so-called armies of liberation easily became praetorian armies, hindering the smooth army―society relationship. The tidal wave of recent terrorist attacks and the spate of coups and counter coups, especially in some Francophone countries in West Africa,3 suggest the need to constantly examine the appropriateness of the role of military institutions for contemporary society. This is what this chapter seeks to achieve. South Africa, despite its peculiarities, is no different. The Covid-19 pandemic has brought to the fore the question of the domestic relevance of the South African military. The decision to write this chapter arose from an interest in knowing the extent of domestic relevance of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) members and the nature of the military―society relations during a public health crisis, with a focus on the Covid-19 pandemic. Accordingly, this chapter examines the prospects and paradoxes of military involvement in the fight against the coronavirus pandemic in South Africa. From the outset of the Covid-19 outbreak, it has been debatable whether the military should be involved in the fight against this ‘invisible enemy’. Leadership deficit, coordination problems, inadequate training and questionable ‘military professionalism’ account for pessimistic views in this regard. In terms of logistics, security and medical roles, this chapter seeks to explore how this public health crisis has provided the military with an unequalled opportunity to rediscover, reimagine and reinvent itself to ensure its domestic relevance and draw nearer to the mother society, its  Sankara, Thomas. 2016. Thomas Sankara speaks. Cape Town: Kwela Books.  See, for example, Akinwotu, Emmanuel. 2022. Contagious coups: what is fuelling military takeovers across west Africa? https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/07/ contagious-coups-what-is-fuelling-military-takeovers-across-west-africa. Brooke-Holland, Louisa. 2022. Burkina Faso: Second coup of 2022. London: The House of Commons Library. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/ CBP-9633/CBP-9633.pdf. Koné, Fahiraman Rodrigue. 2022. Burkina Faso’s junta is under pressure to deliver on security promises. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/burkina-fasos-junta-under-pressure-todeliver-on-security-promises. Moderan, Ornella, and Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné. 2022. What caused the coup in Burkina Faso? https://issafrica.org/iss-today/what-caused-the-coup-in-burkina-faso 2 3

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first client, in Huntington’s terms.4 The chapter tries to unveil the symbolic meaning of the military involvement and lessons learned to tackle future Complex Humanitarian Emergencies. It argues that while initial critical observations are justifiable on the strength of the complicated history of African armies, and the problematic transition of the South African military from apartheid to the democratic era, a more objective appraisal of the military involvement may be possible during more advanced stages of the pandemic. Successful later operations might alter initial perceptions of the role of the military. The experience soldiers gained during peacekeeping missions as part of operations against Ebola and cholera could be an asset now. To avoid a reductionist interpretation or understanding of the role of the military in the fight against epidemics and pandemics in contemporary Africa, a courageous revision of ontologies and epistemologies currently guiding enquiries into the African military is required. Methodologically, this study used document analysis as a qualitative research method. Accordingly, data sources included background papers, memoranda, books, articles, brochures, newspapers, press releases, survey data, radio and television programme scripts, public records and reports. The South African president’s assertion that a “post-war style of state-­ led economic reconstruction”5 will be required to ensure a post-Covid-19 recovery corroborates other warlike metaphors used by leaders around the world: “this pandemic is not a war”, according to the German president,6 while the French President asserted that “we are at war”.7 These war-­ related metaphors suggest the military could play key roles in the fight against the pandemic.8 During epidemics and pandemics, the military has played diverse roles including security, logistical support, manpower and

4  Huntington, Samuel. 1957. The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil–military relations. London: Harvard University Press. 5  Merten, Marianne. 2020. Covid-19 ‘a dark cloud with a silver lining’: A post-war style of state-led economic reconstruction. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-06-19Covid-19-a-dark-cloud-with-a-silver-lining-a-post-war-style-of-state-led-economicreconstruction/#gsc.tab=0. Accessed 15 July 2020. 6  Breitenbauch, Henrik. 2020. How military strategy can aid the response to Covid-19. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28714/how-military-strategy-can-aidthe-response-to-Covid-19. 7  Ibid. 8  Ibid.

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medical support.9 In South Africa, more than 76,000 members of SANDF were deployed in the first wave of the pandemic to assist,10 and an unknown number for now will be deployed for the second wave. The views of the military involvement are diverse and often pessimistic, owing to the problematic transition of the military from apartheid armed groups and forces to the post-apartheid-era army. Inappropriate training, excessive use of force, leadership tussles, discrimination and legitimacy questions have all contributed to ‘professionalism’ challenges. This chapter seeks to interrogate these pessimistic views and propose pathways for an army that is closer to civilians. To understand the pessimistic views, the chapter discusses the dynamics of the involvement of the military in the fight against Covid-19. To date, this has revolved around professionalism, civil–military relations, social distance, peacekeeping procedures in terms of experience, Africa’s code of honour and Ubuntu.

Methodologies The pandemic has influenced the way research can take place. Some traditional qualitative data collection methods such as face-to-face interviews have become almost impossible to use in compliance with safety protocols and regulations; innovative ways of doing research and ensuring data quality are thus being explored.11 There is evidence that the Covid-19 pandemic has led to changes in research approaches and methods, without 9  See, for example, Kohn, Sivan, Daniel J. Barnett, Alex Leventhal, Shmuel Reznikovich, Meir Oren, Danny Laor, Itamar Grotto and Ran D. Balicer. 2010. Pandemic influenza preparedness and response in Israel: A unique model of civilian-defence collaboration. Journal of Public Health Policy 31: 256–269. Arie, Sophie. 2014. Only the military can get the Ebola epidemic under control: MSF head. BMJ 349: g6151. doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g6151. Marcus, Jonathan. 2020. Coronavirus: Five things the military can do during pandemic. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-51984199. Gibson-Fall, Fawzia. 2020. Coronavirus: how to avoid military responses becoming double-edged swords. https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-how-to-avoid-militaryresponses-becoming-double-edged-swords-135262. 10  Madisa, Kgothatso. 2020. Why the war on Covid-19 needs an extra 73,180 soldiers. https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2020-04-23-why-the-war-on-Covid-19needs-an-extra-73180-soldiers/ 11  Link, Michael W. 2020. How can we collect critical data during the Covid-19 Pandemic? https://www.abtassociates.com/insights/perspectives-blog/how-can-we-collect-criticaldata-during-the-Covid-19-pandemic

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necessarily altering research aims. This methodological shift necessitates more creative and innovative strategies hinging on compelling “experiences and reflections”.12 Research methods in themselves have always been creative but research during this global public health crisis requires more creativity. The researcher is no longer in full control of the research process. However, this does not imply that the credibility of the findings is undermined; rather a “playing with methods”13 is required to see which one is most suitable under unusual circumstances. Methodologically, qualitative research methods, especially document analysis, have been used for the research in this chapter. Accordingly, the focus has been on secondary data, including background papers, memoranda, books, articles, brochures, newspapers, press releases, radio and television programme scripts, survey data, public records and reports.14

The Perennial Crisis of Credibility of the South African Military and the Fight against Covid-19 There is evidence that in situations of disasters and public health crises such as epidemics and pandemics, militaries have played vital roles across the globe.15 The nature and magnitude of such involvement vary according to the nature of threats and contexts.16 The primary aim is to abate the 12  Herbert, Mary Brenda. 2020. Creatively adapting research methods during Covid-19. International Journal of Social Research Methodology. https://ijsrm.org/2020/08/06/ creatively-adapting-research-methods-during-Covid-19/. 13  Ibid. 14  Hodder, Ian. 2000. The interpretation of documents and material culture. In Handbook of qualitative research, ed. Norman K. Denzin, and Yvonna S. Lincoln, 703–715. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Rapley, Tim. 2007. Doing conversation, discourse and document analysis. London: Sage. Bowen, Glenn A. 2009. Document analysis as a qualitative research method. Qualitative Research Journal 9: 2, 27–40. 15  Kohn et al., Pandemic influenza preparedness. Agbedahin, Komlan. 2019. The Haiti Cholera Outbreak and Peacekeeping Paradoxes. Peace Review 31: 2, 190–198. 16  See, for example, Hays, J. N. 2009. The burdens of disease: epidemics and human response in western history. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Agbedahin, Komlan. 2012. Young veterans, not always social misfits: a sociological discourse of Liberian transmogrification experiences. Unpublished PhD thesis, Rhodes University, Grahamstown. Transparency International 0.2020. Corruption and the Coronavirus. https://www.transparency.org/en/ news/corruption-and-the-coronavirus#.

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plight of mankind. This is true of the current pandemic. In cases such as Sri Lanka, the response to the Covid-19 crisis, at the outset, was highly militarised and based on political calculations; the military were fully in control of the response operations, such as screening operations and the management of quarantine centres.17 In Italy and Spain, in addition to other roles, the military was in charge of the collection of dead bodies. The removal of corpses by the military in Bergamo (‘Italy’s Wuhan’)18 and the removal and collection of coronavirus corpses from care and retirement homes in Spain19 are cases in point. In South Africa, the SANDF participated in medical operations such as testing and screening for Covid-19.20 They also contributed to ensuring security with the police and to providing other forms of logistical assistance. Surprisingly, the SANDF troops were deemed ill prepared to contribute significantly. Some military scholars have cautioned against military involvement becoming a “double-edged sword”.21 The SANDF troops have not been trained sufficiently or appropriately for missions on public health crises, because of the civil–military gap.22 In addition, cases of 17  Nandakumar, Thusiyan. 2020. A military mindset: Sri Lanka’s response to the coronavirus pandemic. https://thepolisproject.com/militarization-of-medicine-sri-lankas-responseto-the-coronavirus-pandemic/#.XuDlWEUzbIU. 18  Marsi, Federica. 2020. Coronavirus: Army drafted in to help move corpses from ‘Italy’s Wuhan’. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/coronavirus-italy-armydeaths-corpses-bodies-bergamo-cases-a9411401.html. Accessed 25 March 2020. Mee, Emily. 2020. Coronavirus: Italian army called in as crematorium struggles to cope with deaths. https://news.sky.com/story/coronavirus-italian-army-called-in-to-carry-awaycorpses-as-citys-crematorium-is-overwhelmed-11959994. 19  BBC News. 2020. Coronavirus: Spanish army finds care home residents ‘dead and abandoned’. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52014023. 20   Brandt, Kevin. 2020. 38 SANDF medical teams assisting in the fight against COVID. https://ewn.co.za/2020/05/20/38-sandf-medical-teams-assisting-in-thefight-against-Covid-19-across-sa. 21  Gibson-Fall, Fawzia. 2020. Coronavirus: how to avoid military responses becoming double-edged swords. https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-how-to-avoid-militaryresponses-becoming-double-edged-swords-135262. 22  Bailie, Craig. 2020. South Africa’s military is not suited for the fight against Covid-19. Here’s why. https://theconversation.com/south-africas-military-is-not-suited-for-thefight-against-Covid-19-heres-why-138560. Heinecken, L. 2019. South Africa’s post-apartheid military: Lost in transition and transformation. Cape Town: UCT Press. Heinecken, Lindy. 2020. Covid-19: South Africa’s neglected military faces ‘mission impossible’. https://theconversation.com/Covid-19south-africas-neglected-military-faces-mission-impossible-133250.

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­ ilitary brutality at the outset of the lockdown23 have contributed to the m unprofessional image of the military. This illustrates how military involvement is fraught with ethical challenges.24 More recent studies have highlighted additional factors accounting for the lack of readiness of SANDF troops to contribute meaningfully to the response to the Covid-19 crisis. For instance, “the large variance between defence policy, military capabilities, and real operational demands stems from the lack of effective prioritisation of defence”; the African National Defence Force (SANDF) has not been able to comply with defence policy; the policy has been inappropriate or the contextual relevance of such policy is questionable; and “the schizophrenic organisational culture of the defence force.25 This is partly due to the problematic transition and reintegration of the army. SANDF members themselves are aware of the weaknesses of the military. The findings of a study of the influence of the application of change management in defence policy on the improvement of the current SANDF effectiveness26 has revealed that participants from SANDF army service want changes in the roles of SANDF members and their professionalism. Some respondents believed that the SANDF should become involved in secondary role tasks, such as anti-poaching, disaster relief, disease control, border protection and ruralRural security to a great extent. Many respondents felt that, at the time, the SANDF did not apply the principle of appointing the most competent person for the job correctly, nor was career management based on competence, performance, skills and seniority (experience). Many respondents were not adequately satisfied with the current display of professionalism in the SANDF and deemed it ineffective and inefficient.27

The transition from the apartheid-era armed groups or forces to a post-­ apartheid army (SANDF) has been marred by flaws and inconsistencies 23  Powell, Cathleen. 2020. Rule of law has moved centre stage in lockdown: what it is and why it matters. https://theconversation.com/rule-of-law-has-moved-centre-stage-inlockdown-what-it-is-and-why-it-matters-139045. 24  Messelken, Daniel, and David Winkler. 2018. Ethical challenges for military health care personnel: dealing with epidemics. New York: Routledge. 25  Pietersen, Jaco, Pieter Steyn and Jan Meyer. 2020. The role of change management in improving policy effectiveness in the SANDF. Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies 48:2, 111–137. 26  Pietersen et al., The role of change management, 131. 27  ibid.

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revolving around race, discrimination and competence; this has created dissatisfaction and lack of cohesion affecting proper functioning of the army. The following are interview excerpts28 which put this into perspective. There have been complaints about alleged racism and harassment of black soldiers. For example, black soldiers in the Western Cape complained about racism and harsh measures which were taken against them on the grounds of maintaining standards. A soldier commented, It means black soldiers are ridiculed and ostracised by some of their white counterparts. What it is ultimately geared at is lowering the morale of former members of MK and APLA to force us out… Already many people have left the army because of racism and harassment, and there are many more who are thinking of leaving right now (Mail & Guardian, 10–16 January 1997). Other serious allegations included the charge that white officers had deliberately driven a truck into a group of MK and APLA combatants in retaliation for the fact that a white soldier was hit on the head with a stone. (The Star, 28 February 1995). There are concerns that the organisational culture has not changed and that the SANDF lacks respect for cultural differences and diversity. For example, white officers ordered a former MK combatant who was wearing a black button on his sleeve, to show he was in mourning, to remove the nonsense (The Star, 6 October 1995). A former MK combatant commented, “The fact that there are blacks in the defence force should impact on the fundamentals. The whole system should align to a new reality and reflect on that reality. You can’t just continue to have koeksister parties every month. (Interview with MK soldier, 1996). The fact that training has remained largely unchanged is a source of discontent. The training is the same thing as the SADF. What does it mean for society? This is an opportunity which shouldn’t be missed. Things are unfrozen; once they are frozen things are solid and they can’t change. If training is as usual and it is the same old people who trained people in Angola and

28  Interview extracts from Motumi, Tsepe, and Penny Mckenzie. 1998. After the war: Demobilisation in South Africa. In From defence to development: redirecting military resources in South Africa, ed. Jacklyn Cock and Penny Mckenzie, 181–207. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.

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who have the worst views about blacks, then that is scary. (Interview with MK soldier, 1996).

The challenges of the SANDF at its formative stage, which are common to most postcolonial armies in Africa, were echoed by other scholars. As Mills (1999:87) pointed out, “the SANDF today faces stakes and uncertainties remarkable even in an era marked by rapid reorientation of national militaries”. These challenges revolve around funding, the longstanding debatable domestic function of the military, particularly the contentious role of combating crime, the defence industry and peace support operations.29 With regard to funding, the South African Department of Defence is one of the ministries with the “highest costs” (R137.7 million for 2019/20220), compared to the National Treasury (with the then lowest ministerial cost of R4.4 million)”; yet, it is considered underfunded in a period of Covid-19-related budget crunch.30 Drugs and ill discipline are also ills affecting SANDF troops. Former SANDF Chief General Solly Shoke, in a farewell address to the troops of the South African Air Force, advised them “Don’t do drugs and don’t fraternise”. The General also “decried the lack of discipline among soldiers in general and cautioned senior officers to stop fraternising with subordinates by enticing them with money and gifts”. Specifically, regarding drugs, he pointed out: “I cannot issue weapons of war to soldiers who indulge in ‘nyaope’.31 I cannot entrust a person who is high on drugs with the responsibility of carrying a gun”.32 An early work of some military scholars covering the period of 23 March to 31 May 2020 dissects the legality and procedures of the deployment of the SANDF troops to join the fight against Covid-19, and

29  Mills, Greg. 1999. The South African National Defence Force: Between downsizing and new capabilities. Naval War College Review 52: 1, 78–98. 30  defenceWeb. 2021a. Mapisa-Nqakula’s Ministry one of the most expensive in Cabinet. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/mapisa-nqakulas-ministry-one-of-the-mostexpensive-in-cabinet/. 31  A narcotic substance, typically comprising heroin, marijuana and other substances, smoked as a recreational drug in some parts of South Africa according to https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/nyaope. 32  defenceWeb. 2021b. Shoke warns SANDF against drugs and fraternisation. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/shoke-warns-sandf-against-dr ugsandfraternisation/.

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pinpoints the governance antinomies which characterise this deployment, and how these could be rectified.33 Despite the complexities enveloping the role of SANDF troops in the fight against Covid-19, there are prospects: the wealth of experience of former SANDF peacekeepers during the fight against epidemics has prepared some of them to help in the current context.

The SANDF and Covid-19 Pandemic Warfare Three major types of military involvement in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic in the first six months of the outbreak have been identified: the minimal technical military support; the blended civil–military responses; and the military-led responses.34 So far, the SANDF response to the pandemic can be categorised as a blended civil–military response. This type of military involvement focuses on “Civilian leadership-military support in organisation and logistics; air repatriations, border controls, mobile testing, quarantine and lockdown enforcement, emergency field hospitals”.35 During his 2021 Armed Forces Day address, the President of South Africa, the Commander in Chief of SANDF, acknowledged the SANDF troops’ heroic involvement in the fight against Covid-19. As he pointed out: Through the invaluable work you have done and continue to do during this pandemic, you have demonstrated that the SANDF can be relied on in good and bad times, in times of peace and times of war, in times of stability and prosperity, and in times of crisis.36

To the families of the soldiers who lost their lives in the line of duty, he said: We owe them a debt of gratitude and convey our deepest condolences to their loved ones. We honour these men and women in uniform, who con33  Bester, Petrus C, Sonja Els and Laetitia Olivier. 2020. “Deployment of the South African National Defence Force for Covid-19: A Case Study on Governance”. Africa Journal of Public Sector Development and Governance 3 (1): 105–131. 34  Gibson-Fall, Fawzia. 2021. Military responses to Covid-19, emerging trends in global civil-military engagements. Review of International Studies 47: 2, 155–170. 35  Ibid. 36  SAnews.gov.za. 2021. President commends SANDF role in Covid-19 fight. https:// www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/president-commends-sandf-role-Covid-19-fight.

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tinue to put their lives on the line to defend our nation, and to contribute to peacekeeping and peacebuilding on our continent.

He underscored various aspects of the troops’ involvement: The SANDF undertook mercy missions to repatriate our citizens abroad, who were fearful and wanted to be reunited with their families. The SA Army Engineers Corps helped deliver clean drinking water to vulnerable communities. What touched us perhaps the most as the nation was the sight of SANDF members helping the elderly to carry their groceries, walking alongside young people making their way home, and many other instances that showed our armed forces at their best.37

The SANDF’s deployment to combat the spread of Covid-19 is “the largest deployment” in the post-apartheid era.38 A total of 8119 personnel comprising regular force members, reserve forces and auxiliary services members were deployed to curb the spread of the virus, under Operation Notlela. The multifarious contribution of the troops revolves around security, the enforcement of the National Disaster Management Act, logistics (e.g. establishment of field hospitals), engineering, sanitation and direct medical assistance (scanning, testing, screening).39 The military as a profession of professions was in evidence throughout this operation. Although the figures may not be accurate, there is evidence that “The SANDF conducted 12452 roadblocks, 7800 vehicle-check-points and 35000 patrols”.40 The SANDF troops have been involved in safeguarding borders between South Africa and Zimbabwe, Eswatini, Mozambique and Botswana.41

37  The Presidency. 2021. Message by President Cyril Ramaphosa, Commander-In-Chief of the South African National Defence Force, on the occasion of Armed Forces Day. https:// www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/message-president-cyril-ramaphosa%2Ccommander-chief-south-african-national-defence-force%2C-occasion-armed-forces-day. 38  SANews. 2021. 8000 SANDF personnel deployed during the pandemic. https://www. defenceweb.co.za/sa-defence/sa-defence-sa-defence/8000-sandfpersonnel-deployedduring-pandemic/. 39  defenceWeb, Shoke warns SANDF. 40  SANews, 8000 SANDF personnel deployed. 41  Department of Defence. 2020b. Defence on Coronavirus Covid-19 successes for July. h t t p s : / / w w w. g o v. z a / s p e e c h e s / d e f e n c e - c o r o n a v i r u s -C o v i d - 1 9 - s u c c e s s e s july-4-aug-2020-0000.

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During the lockdown, the troops also prevented contraband such as alcohol, cigarettes, narcotics and clothing items and smuggling, as well as recovering stolen vehicles and livestock.42 The SANDF has air defence and maritime capabilities and landward capabilities for security, and can provide direct support to the police services and other entities of government.43 For instance, it has been recorded that Along the borders of Kwazulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Limpopo, and Eastern Cape dagga weighing over 1648, 857 kg to the value of 3555.309 million was confiscated. Narcotics with a street value of R2, 4 million were seized and handed over to customs officials and the police. Linked to these narcotics and contraband, 38 people have been apprehended. A total of 12 vehicles were recovered and handed to SAPS.44

In addition to the military health elements, there are a range of capabilities that have been deployed, including but not limited to engineers for bridge building and water purification in various communities.45 Logistically, the SANDF has used various vehicles for its operations including “troop carriers, diesel and water bunkers, cargo and recovery trucks, field workshops, ambulances and military police vehicles”. The South African Air Force used “a medium transport fixed wing aircraft, four light transport fixed wing aircraft, four medium transport rotary wing aircraft, and four light transport rotary wing aircraft for Notlela… These aircraft are believed to include the C-130 Hercules, C212, Oryx and A109”.46 In his presentation made to the Joint Standing Committee on Defence on 27 August, the Chief of the Joint Operations Division of the SANDF highlighted key aspects of how the 8076 SANDF members deployed in Operation Notlela contributed to the fight against Covid-19. The troops assisted with food parcel distribution, water purification, decontamination  Ibid.  defenceWeb. 2020. In the eye of the storm – Defence against the pandemic. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/government-affairs/in-the-eye-of-the-storm-defenceagainst-the-pandemic/. 44  Department of Defence, Defence on Coronavirus. 45  defenceWeb, In the eye of the storm. 46  Martin, Guy. 2020. SANDF highlights its contribution to Operation Notlela. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sandf-highlights-its-contribution-tooperation-notlela/. 42 43

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services, patrols, screening, testing, scanning, Covid-19 awareness education, and other joint operations with government departments.47 Practically, this first assessment of the troops’ deployment revealed that about 165 medical staff members were deployed with the SANDF in all the provinces of South Africa; they performed “thermal scans on the population during patrols, vehicle check point and roadblocks”, and at least 700,000 people were scanned; almost 550,000 people were screened.48 A total of 39 SANDF primary health care teams comprising 185 members (36 doctors, 84 nurses and 65 auxiliary staff) have been deployed to all nine provinces to support the National Department of Health with its mass screening and testing initiative. The teams make use of tented primary health care facilities which enable them to screen and test those members of the population that would otherwise have had to be transported to such screening and testing venues. These teams are deployed in both urban and rural areas or to areas where no infrastructure exists.49 For instance, in the Gauteng province, the SANDF members assisted in establishing ICU and hi-care facilities. The military personnel were involved in administrative roles for “data capturing of medical records at 15 overburdened hospitals in the province”. A similar data capturing function was carried out in the Eastern Cape’s Cecilia Makiwane Hospital.50 The robust presence of SANDF troops in Charlotte Maxeke Hospital epitomises the robust contribution of the military in the fight against the pandemic. As Martin (2020) pointed out: With Charlotte Maxeke, the SANDF is assisting with the general running of the hospital including the provision of scanning orderlies, drivers, porters, HR administration, finance administration, Q-marshalls, cleaning and sanitising services, and safety and security services.51

The SANDF Engineers supplied clean water to communities for Covid-19 and home usage, after joint water purification between the SANDF Engineers and the Department of Water and Sanitation

 Martin, SANDF highlights.  Ibid. 49  Ibid. 50  Ibid. 51  Ibid. 47 48

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countrywide.52 The SANDF also provided communities with clean water and participated in the construction of bridges in remote communities.53 The Defence Works Formation and the South African National Energy and Development Institute jointly implemented a water treatment project at AFB Hoedspruit in Limpopo. One goal of this project was to contribute to stopping the spread of Covid-19.54 A total of 180 engineers from the South African National Defence Force are deployed to all nine provinces in support of the Department of Water and Sanitation. The team provides water purification support and distribution to the areas where there is a dire need for drinking water. A total of 16.4 million litres of water has been purified, of which 15 million litres has been delivered to the needy over the last three months.55 In their report titled “Water, Sanitation, Hygiene, and Waste Management for the Covid-19 Virus”, the World Health Organization and the United Nations Children’s Fund pointed out that: The provision of safe water, sanitation and hygienic conditions is essential to protecting human health during all infectious disease outbreaks, including the Covid-19 outbreak. Ensuring good and consistently applied WASH and waste management practices in communities, homes, schools, marketplaces and health care facilities will further help to prevent human-to-human transmission of the Covid-19 virus.56

The medical assistance contribution of the SANDF regular and reserve forces was to support the South African National Department of Health, using the expertise of the regular and reserve forces and volunteers of the  Department of Defence. 2020b. Defence on Coronavirus Covid-19 successes for July. h t t p s : / / w w w. g o v. z a / s p e e c h e s / d e f e n c e - c o r o n a v i r u s - C o v i d - 1 9 - s u c c e s s e s july-4-aug-2020-0000. 53  SANews. 2021. 8000 SANDF personnel deployed during pandemic. https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/8000-sandf-personnel-deployedduring-pandemic. 54  defenceWeb. 2020d. Water treatment upgrade on the way for AFB Hoedspruit. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/logistics/water-treatment-upgrade-on-the-way-for-afbhoedspruit/. 55  Martin, Guy. 2020. SANDF highlights its contribution to Operation Notlela. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sandf-highlights-its-contribution-to-operationnotlela/. 56  World Health Organization and United Nations Children’s Fund. 2020. Water, sanitation, hygiene and waste management for the Covid-19 virus. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-2019-nCoV-IPC-WASH-2020.4. 52

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South African Military Health Services. The focus was on “primary health care teams for screening, testing and tracing purposes across the country; mass quarantine sites in KZN, Western Cape, Gauteng and Limpopo; decontamination teams, to mention but a few”.57 They are also supporting the Department of Health in the vaccine roll-out through “air transport and airport facilities”.58 SANDF professionals such as doctors and nurses were actively involved in the fight in testing and screening.59

The SANDF International Commitment and the Response to Covid-19 Despite their domestic Covid-19-related commitment, the SANDF troops are still deployed internationally. SANDF members are currently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as part of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). They are leading the Force Intervention Brigade, and, together with troops from Tanzania and Malawi, are fighting to neutralise the “negative forces”.60 The South African troops are still in DRC to fulfil South Africa’s obligations towards the United Nations.61 Recently, the President extended the deployment of 957 SANDF personnel to its largest peace support mission in the DRC from 1 April 2021 to 31 March 2022. This commitment of South Africa to MONUSCO, which aims to protect the civilian population from negative forces and ensure the stabilisation of the country and the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, is known as ‘Operation Mistral’.62 Concomitantly, Operation Copper, a South African commitment to the Southern African Development Community to tackle crime and piracy at sea along the Mozambican coast, has been extended for the same period. As the Commander in Chief pointed out, “Due to the fact that maritime piracy remains a threat to all countries sharing borders with the western Indian

 defenceWeb, In the eye of the storm.  SANews, 8000 SANDF personnel. 59  Department of Defence, Defence on Coronavirus. 60  defenceWeb, In the eye of the storm. 61  defenceWeb. 2021c. Ramaphosa authorises extension of SA’s continental military deployments. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/ramaphosa-authorises-extensionof-sas-continental-military-deployments/. 62  Ibid. 57 58

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Ocean, the SANDF will continue deterring and preventing piracy in the Mozambique Channel”.63 It is worth mentioning that peacekeeping missions are often fraught with complicities, ambiguities, and inconsistencies.64 Accordingly, the economics of peacekeeping are also complex and not easily examined.65 Such operations are usually characterised by inconsistent processes of appointment to higher positions in missions, with ensuing corruption and fraud, and lobbying.66 Peacekeeping missions have unintended and uneven social, political, financial and environmental costs and opportunities for troop-receiving countries. The phenomenon of ‘ECOMOG babies’ born by local women in Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone often involving peacekeeping missions,67 as well as the negative roles of peacekeepers in the cholera outbreak in Haiti in 2010,68 typify the drawbacks of peacekeeping missions. Despite this, peacekeeping missions offer both troop-contributing nations and the recipient countries some benefits, a return on investment in economic terms. I argue that, in addition to financial and logistical benefits, peacekeeping offers peacekeepers a wealth of potential experience, which, for lack of a better term, I call here ‘peripheral peacekeeping proceeds’. Such skills, if methodically harnessed, could aid troop-contributing countries in diverse ways. I present a brief discussion of this, to show how peacekeeping missions could prepare troops to respond to crises in their countries of origin. The involvement of former peacekeepers of SANDF in the fight against Covid-19 constitutes a litmus test in this regard. In other words, how has peacekeeping empowered SANDF troops to be domestically relevant? How do peacekeepers profit

 Ibid.  Akonor, Kwame. 2017. UN peacekeeping in Africa: A Critical Examination and Recommendations for improvement. Cham: Springer. 65  Hentges, Harriet, and Jean-Marc Coicaud. 2002. Dividends of Peace: The Economics of Peacekeeping. Journal of International Affairs 55: 2, 351–367. Carnahan, Michael, William, and Gilmore. Scott 0.2006. Economic impact of peacekeeping. Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations. 66  Aoi, Chiyuki, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur. 2007. Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. 67  Aning, Kwesi. 2007. Unintended consequences of peace operations for troop-contributing countries from West Africa: The case of Ghana. In Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations, Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur, eds. 133–155. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. 68  Agbedahin, The Haiti Cholera. 63 64

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from “other people’s wars”69 to help their home countries tackle the current pandemic? Although the study of these peacekeeping procedures has not been topical, a recent study done on the prospect of the military educational role of deployed troops in South Africa in response to the Covid-19 pandemic70 could be a good starting point. During its Operation Notlela, designed to fight the pandemic in South Africa, some SANDF former peacekeepers who drew on their experiences from peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia, where they were exposed to the Ebola crisis in DRC and Liberia, played educational roles in communities where they were deployed in South Africa, to curb the spread of the coronavirus.71 An understanding of what constitutes a public health threat is very important and should precede the actual operations to mitigate its effect. By discussing the importance of education in tackling epidemics and pandemics, these authors have tried to highlight how peacekeeping procedures can be used in domestic operations if the military is given the opportunity. Other skills could also be used from the military profession.

Civil–Military Relations, Africa’s Code of Honour, Ubuntu, and the Army–Society Bond It is inevitable that the military will be involved in the fight against pandemics owing to the complex nature of such public health threats. The Israeli military, for instance, played a leading role in the management of the influenza A H1N1 pandemic in 2009. This success story was possible because of civil–military, civilian–military and civilian–defence cooperation or relations (CMR) which are concerned with the relationships between the army and the rest of the society, its ‘primary client’.72 One key question raised is who controls the military. Because of the power of the military, CMR has always been under threat. 69  Doss, Alan. 2020. A peacekeeper in Africa: Learning from UN Interventions in Other People’s wars. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2. 70  Agbedahin, Adesuwa V., and Komlan Agbedahin. 2020. Prospect of military educational roles during public health crises: Lessons from the Covid-19 Pandemic in South Africa. Southern African Journal of Environmental Education 36: 3, 1–15. 71  Agbedahin and Agbedahin, Prospect of Military Educational Roles. 72  Kohn et al., Pandemic influenza preparedness.

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Just as the military must protect the polity from enemies, so must it conduct its own affairs so as not to destroy or prey on the society it is intended to protect. Because the military must face enemies, it must have coercive power, the ability to force its will on others. But coercive power often gives it the capability to enforce its will on the community that created it. A direct seizure of political power by the military is the traditional worry of civil–military relations theory and a consistent pattern in human history.73 It has been established that smooth civil–military relations should be based on military professionalism, and many studies have presented the criticality of military professionalism, a cardinal aspect of military studies.74 Although military professionalism is not discussed in depth in this chapter, its primary function aims to reduce the distance between the military and society.75 This distance between the army and society is a form of social distance. Social distance is concerned with the nature and degree of relationships between individuals and groups. Brief explanations provided by eminent scholars76 have highlighted aspects of social distance, physical distancing, classism and the role played at times by institutions. Synoptically, social distance connotes ideas of ‘nearness’ or ‘farness’. The concept has been used to study race relations in the United States. Contra social distancing, social distance is concerned with experiences of familiarity through ‘nearness and intimacy’, or unfamiliarity or ‘strangeness’, suggesting farness and difference. Such familiarity or unfamiliarity applies to people’s everyday experience of being accepted or rejected in/by social groups (e.g. religious, ethnic, occupational, national).77 Strangeness or estrangement

73  Feaver, Peter D. 1999. Civil-military relations. Annual Review of Political Science 2: 211–241. 74  See, for example, studies by Siebold, Guy L. 2001. Core issues and theory in military sociology. Journal of Political & Military Sociology 29: 1, 140–159; Caforio, 2006 Crabb, Tyler, and David R Segal. 2018. Comparative systems of analysis: Military sociology in the United States and Europe. Handbook of the sociology of the military, Giuseppe Caforio and Marina Nuciari, eds. 61–86. Cham: Springer. Heinecken, South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Military. 75  Van der Mullen. 2000. 76  For example, Simmel. 1950. Hodgetts, Darrin, Ottilie Stolte, Alan Radley, Chez Leggatt-Cook, Shiloh Groot and Kerry Chamberlain. 2011. ‘Near and Far’: Social Distancing in Domiciled Characterisations of Homeless People. Urban Studies 48 (8): 1739–1753. 77  ibid.

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does not connote physical farness.78 An individual can be physically closer but socially distanced from other members of a group, while another individual who is physically far can be socially closer. It follows that social proximity is not necessarily equivalent to physical proximity. The degree of the sense of belonging or acceptance dictates social proximity or social distance. Whether the discrimination is interpersonal or institutional, it is alienating and dehumanising and does not work towards the desired post-­ Covid-­19 social compact. Rather, it works against social cohesion. The aim here is not to discuss the details of social distance but to explore how social distance between the military and society could impinge on the former’s involvement in the fight against Covid-19. In his speech at a mass rally in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso on 26 March 1983 titled, “Who are the enemies of the people?”, Thomas Sankara, as prime minister of the Council of Popular Salvation, asserted, “Down with those who are against the bonds between the army and the people!”.79 Beyond any political calculations, such an assertion has implications for the relationship between soldiers and the masses. These ‘bonds’ are, in modern terms, what military scholars refer to as civil–military relations. Smooth civil–military relations are in the interest of both the military and the rest of the society. Paradoxically, while the military are expected to be professional when discharging their duties, civilians hardly understand and play their roles, to ensure the expected cordial relations. I argue that, for the bond between army and society to be functional, not a state, but an action or actions, it must be based on relevant African philosophies and values. The focus in this chapter is on the ‘African code of honour’80 and ‘Ubuntu’.81 The smooth relationship between the military and the rest of the society could be ensured through the recovery of the African code of honour.82 This code would free the military from the unnecessary multifaceted entanglements (professional constraints and ethos) which have estranged many professions from their historical contexts. In order to clarify these conditions, this chapter discusses the centrality of the African code of honour and Ubuntu, thereby pointing to how the Covid-19 pandemic offers  Simmel, 1950.  Sankara, Thomas, Sankara speaks, 35. 80  Nwolise, The fate of women, children and the aged. 81  Hailey, John. 2008. Ubuntu: a literature review. London: Tutu Foundation. 82  Mugumbate, Jacob, and Andrew Nyanguru. 2013. Exploring African Philosophy: The Value of Ubuntu in Social Work. African Journal of Social Work 3: 1, 82–100. 78 79

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the army a unique opportunity to draw closer to its primary client, the mother society. These societal philosophical principles could help the military deal with its internal challenges, and those in relation to the society. The code of honour of any society is a set of moral principles accepted by a society for ensuring good personal character, justice, equity and fairness in interpersonal and intergroup relations, inculcating a strong sense of what is morally right in order to produce people of honour, good behaviour, truthfulness, and great reputation. This code is often stronger than law as people are honour bound to do certain things even when the law does not require them to do so.83

Similarly, Africa’s code of honour is a corpus of generally accepted principles guiding, regulating, and propelling individual and group attitude, action and behaviour in all spheres of human interaction, along the path of moral uprightness, honour, good personal character, truth, justice, equity, fairness, humaneness, trust, confidence, and Godliness. This code was not written but it existed, and when people deviated from or violated it, they were sanctioned accordingly. It was expressed in proverbs, and idioms, and practised as part of the customs and traditions of different African societies on whose social values the code was based.84

From these two definitions, it is obvious that values to ensure cordial relations between professional groups and the rest of the society in Africa are embedded in Africa’s code of honour. With regard to the relations between the army and society, one could argue that both the military and civilians have roles to play to ensure a peaceful country. In terms of the fight against Covid-19, if the military, in addition to its direct involvement in medical operations, is to ensure the security of civilians, this must be done in a mutually respectful manner. “The people’s army” is an army “that genuinely wants to link up with the people”,85 and this is what civilians want. At the same time, the onus is on civilians to also facilitate the work of the military and not always consider the military as strangers. Soldiers are also members of society with a mandate which is ultimately in the interest of the society.  Nwolise, The fate of women, children and the aged, 6–7.  Ibid., 7. 85  Sankara, Thomas, Sankara speaks, 26–27. 83 84

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Africa’s code of honour requires all citizens to behave in a certain manner regardless of their civilian or military status. Exoneration of the military does not imply blind support for the military involved in crimes, corruption, unprofessional behaviour, extrajudicial killings, or ethnic and xeno-ethnic killings. The expectations for the military tend to outweigh the expectations for civilians. One may argue that many civilians do not really know the role of the military and may see this as limited to the use of force and weapons, whereas in reality the military profession is a ‘profession of professions’. Africa’s code of honour requires more effort in educating civilians on what the military profession stands for. Knowledge of the military profession by civilians would contribute to their involvement in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic. Ubuntu is an African philosophy with varying names in different countries. Since this chapter focuses on South Africa, the term ‘Ubuntu’ is used. It has many definitions, but according to Archbishop Desmond Tutu86 it connotes “the essence of being human, and that it is part of the gift that Africa will give the world … I am human because I belong. It speaks about wholeness. It speaks about compassion”. For Nyahu, it is “the fountain from which many actions and attitudes flow”.87 Ubuntu also refers to ‘African humanism’, and many African leaders have used this philosophy in their anti-imperial or anti-colonial campaigns.88 Ubuntu aims to ensure freedom and well-being for all. Ubuntu, translated from Zulu, means “I am because of who we all are”, that is, “being self through others”.89 Whether in theology,90 management91 or politics,92 the concept of Ubuntu connotes humanism, “a social and humanistic ethic”,93 an important concept in a chapter which deals with civil–military relations. To be human is to affirm one’s humanity by recognizing the humanity of others and, on that basis, establish respectful human relations with them… [Ubuntu refers to] sympathy, compassion, benevolence, solidarity,  Cited in Hailey, Ubuntu, 2–3.  Ibid., 3. 88  Gaylord in Hailey, Ubuntu. 89  Mugumbate and Nyanguru, The Value of Ubuntu, 82–83. 90  Tutu in Hailey, Ubuntu. 91  Mbigi, Lovemore. 1997. Ubuntu: The African dream in management. Randburg: Knowledge Resources. 92  Mandela, Nelson. 1994. A long walk to freedom. Boston: Little Brown. 93  Mugumbate and Nyanguru, The Value of Ubuntu, 84. 86 87

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­ ospitality, generosity, sharing, openness, affirming, available, kindness, carh ing, harmony, interdependence, obedience, collectivity and consensus. … values life, dignity, compassion, humaneness harmony and reconciliation.94

I contend that owing to the deficiencies embedded in the SANDF, upholding Africa’s code of honour and Ubuntu, at individual or collective level, could smooth civil–military relations; if both civilians and the military are aware of their roles and hold mutual respect, this should guide their actions and relationships.

Conclusion In this chapter, I have argued that despite the problematic transition of the South African military from apartheid to the South African National Defence Force, the troops deployed, contrary to deeply pessimistic views, could play a significant role in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic. Evidence provided in this chapter shows that beyond ensuring security, the troops can play many roles, including education. Some of these skills are also dividends of peacekeeping operations. The effectiveness of military involvement will depend on meaningful bonds between the military and society. These bonds, in the context of South Africa, require both civilians and soldiers to uphold Africa’s code of honour and the African philosophy of Ubuntu. The onus is on governments to rethink the conditionalities and possibilities of an army owned by society. In other words, there is a need to shift from the ‘South African army’ to ‘our army’. This will also reduce the distance between various racial groups comprising the military, and between the military and society. The Joint Operations Division provided an objective appraisal of the SANDF troops’ involvement in the fight against Covid-19: “It is clear that the SANDF has the will and capacity to respond to national disasters at short notice and when called upon. The SANDF, however, needs to revisit resourcing of critical capabilities and enablers to enable rapid and effective response”.95 Arundhati Roy (2020) alluded to the inevitable societal alterations brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic, and argued that the ‘pandemic is a portal’. She pointed out that:  Mugumbate and Nyanguru, The Value of Ubuntu, 85.  Martin, 2020. SANDF highlights.

94 95

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Whatever it is, coronavirus has made the mighty kneel and brought the world to a halt like nothing else could. Our minds are still racing back and forth, longing for a return to ‘normality’, trying to stitch our future to our past and refusing to acknowledge the rupture. But the rupture exists. And in the midst of this terrible despair, it offers us a chance to rethink the doomsday machine we have built for ourselves. Nothing could be worse than a return to normality. Historically, pandemics have forced humans to break with the past and imagine their world anew. This one is no different. It is a portal, a gateway between one world and the next.96

Without a doubt, the Covid-19 pandemic offers the SANDF a unique opportunity to draw closer to its mother society and a chance to prove or confirm its domestic relevance.

Bibliography Agbedahin, Komlan. 2012. Young veterans, not always social misfits: A sociological discourse of Liberian transmogrification experiences. Unpublished PhD thesis, Rhodes University, Grahamstown. ———. 2019. The Haiti cholera outbreak and peacekeeping paradoxes. Peace Review 31 (2): 190–198. Agbedahin, Adesuwa V., and Komlan Agbedahin. 2020. Prospect of military educational roles during public health crises: Lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic in South Africa. Southern African Journal of Environmental Education 36 (3): 1–15. Akinwotu, Emmanuel. 2022. Contagious coups: what is fuelling military takeovers across west Africa? https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/ feb/07/contagious-­coups-­what-­is-­fuelling-­military-­takeovers-­across-­west-­ africa. Accessed 19 Nov 2022. Akonor, Kwame. 2017. UN peacekeeping in Africa: A critical examination and recommendations for improvement. Cham: Springer. Aning, Kwesi. 2007. Unintended consequences of peace operations for troop-­ contributing countries from West Africa: The case of Ghana. In Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations, ed. Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning, and Ramesh Thakur, 133–155. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. Aoi, Chiyuki, Cedric de Coning, and Ramesh Thakur. 2007. Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

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CHAPTER 5

Urban Governance and Covid-19 Response in Nigeria: Who Is Left Behind? Oluwafemi Olajide, Taibat Lawanson, and Damilola Odekunle

Introduction Over the past few decades, the urban discourse has emphasised a change from government to governance, and the centrality of interactions between different levels and across multiple actors in promoting efficiency in urban processes. This theoretical shift is also emphasised in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), as Goal 16 calls for efficient multi-level

O. Olajide (*) • D. Odekunle Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] T. Lawanson Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria Lagos African Cluster Centre, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Arndt et al. (eds.), Covid-19 in Africa: Governance and Containment, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36139-5_5

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governance structures through the development of effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. One such area where governance interactions are required is in emergency response—especially related to health and socio-economics. Prior to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, Nigeria experienced emergency situations with the Ebola virus in 2014, and recurrent outbreaks of Lassa fever and yellow fever. Covid-19, however, occasioned a different governance challenge due to its global nature, high virulence and the associated political economy impacts. The World Health Organization (WHO) suggests that the associated impacts of health emergencies can be mitigated through better preparedness and more effective management.1 Governance is therefore central to both preparedness and response. Since January 2020 when the news of the pandemic came to global attention, the Nigerian government—at local, state and federal level—has responded with various strategies to flatten the curve of the disease and cushion the impacts. However, feedback from academic and practice circles shows that some of the policy responses have weaknesses and, taken together, are not commensurate with the magnitude of the problem.2 In African cities, civil society actors usually step into bridge government capacity gaps.3 This situation is common in Lagos4 and other Nigerian cities, and therefore it is necessary to interrogate the various multi-level governance (MLG) dimensions of Covid-19 response and how governance interactions can mediate urban service delivery and effective response to this health emergency. We argue that the Covid-19 outbreak amplifies already existing gaps in service delivery across many sectors, including education, health, social

1  World Health Organization. 2019. Health Emergency and Disaster Risk Management Framework. https://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/preparedness/health-emergency-­ and-disaster-risk-management-framework-eng.pdf?ua=1. 2  Dixit, S., Ogundeji. Y. and Onwujekwe, O. 2020. How well has Nigeria responded to Covid-19? Brookings Institute Future Development report. https://www.brookings.edu/ blog/future-development/2020/07/02/how-well-has-nigeria-responded-to-covid-19/. 3  Myers, G. 2011. African cities: Alternative visions of urban theory and practice. New York, London: Zed Books. 4  Lawanson, T. 2020. What is Covid-19 teaching us about food vulnerability and ‘People as Infrastructure’? https://www.oxfordurbanists.com/oxford-urbanists-­monthly/2020/5/ 25/what-covid19-is-teaching-us-about-food-vulnerability-and-people-as-infrastructure.

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protection and information management—the key response sectors for Covid-19 containment.5 The theoretical underpinning of this chapter is based on the notion of governance, as distinct from government. Governance is the coordinating mechanism of both the public and private resources to achieve common goals, and central to its functioning is the extent of interaction among multiple stakeholders at different levels and across multiple sectors. 6 However, MLG indicates that governance processes and interactions are structured and maintained in a complex way by institutions at multiple levels.7,8 In the context of Nigeria, existing understanding of the implications of MLG interactions in emergency response is oversimplified—and the efforts of non-governmental actors are often unrecognized and/or under-reported. To fill this knowledge gap, this chapter deploys an MLG framework in exploring the implementation of Covid-19 response in Nigeria—highlighting the governance dimensions (interface of various stakeholders) and the implications for sustainable development (pandemic containment in the immediate term and resilience building for the future). We draw on various sources of data including desk studies, academic and popular media, and social media analytics to empirically advance the aim of the study. For social media, we limited our analysis to the microblogging site Twitter, given the large number of publicly available conversations provided in real time, and its status as a preferred medium for information dissemination and socialisation during the lockdown. Twitter has proven to be a valuable resource for curating the interactions and perceptions of various stakeholders responding to the pandemic in Nigeria. The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses the conceptual and theoretical underpinning of multi-level governance and its role within the context of urban management and sustainable

5  OECD 2020. The territorial impact of Covid-19: Managing the crisis across levels of government. http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/the-territorial-impactof-covid-19-managing-the-crisis-across-levels-of-government-­d3e314e1/. 6  Jessop, B. 1999. The rise of governance and the risks of failure: The case of economic development. International Social Science Journal 50: 29–45. 7  Brenner, N. 2004. New State spaces: Urban governance and the rescaling of statehood. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 8  Jessop, B. 2006. State- and regulation-theoretical perspectives on the European Union and the failure of the Lisbon Agenda. Competition & Change 10: 2, 141–161.

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development. The third section discusses the interface of Nigeria’s political economy and multi-governance structures, highlighting both opportunities and the pre-existing socio-economic and governance challenges. In section four, we analyse the Nigerian multi-level governance response to the Covid-19 pandemic, focusing on health, education, communication and social welfare. Following this, we discuss how Covid-19 has accentuated governance gaps across vertical and horizontal dimensions, exposing those who are left behind across health, education, communication and social welfare sectors. The final section reflects on how governance gaps can be bridged for effective pandemic response and management.

Managing Cities: The Role of Multi-Governance Frameworks Cities are engines and drivers of economic growth, and centres of innovation and population agglomeration.9 When effectively managed, they provide access to a large pool of productive human resources, income generating opportunities, improved infrastructure and social services, and a huge market for goods and services.10 When poorly managed, they produce intense socio-spatial inequalities which can become a threat to human well-being and a harbinger of disaster.11 Good governance plays a vital role in annexing the opportunities of cities and addressing their complex multi-sectoral challenges.12 In fact, governance and sustainable development are closely interlinked, particularly for leveraging cities’ opportunities and charting pathways for sustainable urban futures. This is promoted severally in the New Urban Agenda 9  UNECA 2020. ECA: The economic impact of Covid-19 on African cities likely to be acute through a sharp decline in productivity, jobs & revenues. https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/coronavirus/eca-economic-impact-covid-19-african-cities-likely-beacute-through-sharp-decline-­productivity. 10  Kessides, C. 2005. The urban transition in Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications for economic growth and poverty reduction (Africa region working paper series no. 97). Washington D.C.: World Bank. 11  Olajide, O.  Lagos makes it hard for people living in slums to cope with shocks like Covid-19. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/lagos-makes-it-hard-for-peopleliving-in-slums-to-cope-with-shocks-like-covid-19-138234. 12  Borgström, S. 2019. Balancing diversity and connectivity in multi-level governance settings for urban transformative capacity. Ambio 48:5, 463–477.

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(NUA),13 and considered key to the successful implementation of the SDGs.14 SDG 11 proposes approaches to achieve safe, sustainable, resilient, and inclusive cities, SDG 16 promotes strong, effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels, while SDG 17 advocates for partnerships to strengthen the means of implementation of SDGs. Governance is based on cooperation among diverse actors for resource allocation,15 and central to its functioning is the extent of interaction among multiple actors.16 These interactions occur in a multilayered environment, often referred to as multi-level governance.17 This process often involves multiple interactions among multiple actors at different levels and across sectors and sometimes with overlapping and conflicting interests (see Fig. 5.1). At the city scale, it provides the mechanisms through which opportunities and resources can be annexed across all levels of government, and in collaboration with private sector and civil society organisations in responding to urban shocks. At the core of MLG are principles of participation, collaboration, devolution and decentralisation of powers.18 MLG emphasises the importance of engaging actors across organisational, institutional and sectoral boundaries to address complex problems—sharing of responsibilities vertically (between actors at different levels of government, such as national,

13  United Nations 2016. Quito declaration: New urban agenda. http://habitat3.org/wp-­ content/uploads/NUA-English.pdf. 14  United Nations 2016. Habitat III Policy Paper 4: Urban governance, capacity and institutional development https://uploads.habitat3.org/hb3/Habitat%20III%20Policy%20 Paper%204.pdf. 15  Sattler, C., Schröter, B., Meyer, A., Giersch, G., Meyer, C. and Matzdorf, B. 2016. Multilevel governance in community-based environmental management: A case study comparison from Latin America. Ecology and Society 21:4, 24. 16  Torfing, J., Pierre, J., Peters and B.G., Sorensen, E. 2011. Interactive governance: Advancing the paradigm. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 17  Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. 2001. Types of multi-level governance. European Integration Online Papers. 5. 10.2139/ssrn.302786. 18  Leck, H. and Simon, D. 2013. Fostering multiscalar collaboration and co-operation for effective governance of climate change adaptation. Urban Studies, 50, 1221–1238; Leck, H. and Simon, D. 2018. Local authority responses to climate change in South Africa: the challenges of transboundary governance. Sustainability 10: 2542; Pieterse, E., S. Parnell and S. Croese 2017. The 2030 Agenda: Sustainable Urbanisation and the research-policy interface  – issues for the G20 (Bonn: GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit).

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Fig. 5.1  Multi-level governance horizontal and vertical interactions. Source: Adapted for Jänicke, M. (2015). Horizontal and Vertical Reinforcement in Global Climate Governance

regional and local) and horizontally (among different types of actors such as public sector, private sector, civil society and academia).19 Drawing on various studies, Sattler et  al. note that MLG enhances effective interactions among various actors who leverage their different technical and financial resources for quality leadership and decision making.20 It is also a complex interaction, intensified by heterogeneity of the actors and diversity of motives of the actors, often resulting in overlap of functions and implementation quagmires. Therefore, central to effective service delivery and emergency response is the extent of coordination among multiple stakeholders at different levels and across multiple sectors and the level of accountability built into the system.21 This chapter thus draws on the concept of MLG in evaluating responses to the Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria—espousing its relevance as a coordinating mechanism of both public and private resources to achieve common goals 22—in this case effectively addressing Covid-19 pandemic

19  Bache, I., and Flinders, M. 2004. Multi-level governance. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. 20  Sattler, C., Schröter, B., Meyer, A., Giersch, G., Meyer, C. and Matzdorf, B. 2016. Multilevel governance in community-based environmental management: A case study comparison from Latin America. Ecology and Society, 21: 4, 24. 21  Jessop, B. 1999. The rise of governance and the risks of failure: The case of economic development. International Social Science Journal 50: 29–45. 22  Rhodes, R. A. W. 1997. Understanding governance: policy networks, governance, reflexivity and accountability. Buckingham: Open University Press).

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impacts in Nigeria. To this end, we contextualise MLG as the capability of the state to promote sound policies and regulations for efficient service delivery and livelihood security, while deploying effective emergency response and collaborations between public and private institutions, and civil society. Having presented the theoretical underpinning of the chapter, the next section focuses on the political economy and governance structure of Nigeria, highlighting pre-existing socio-economic and governance gaps and the implications for Covid-19 pandemic response.

The Interface of Nigeria’s Political Economy and Multi-Governance Structures Nigeria is a federal republic operating a system of government with three constitutionally recognised levels—federal, state (36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, FCT) and local (774). Each level has the constitutional responsibility to provide basic human services at various scales.23 For example, all three levels of government have education and health mandates, with the private sector and civil society organisations also participating. While both the federal and state governments are relatively autonomous, the local governments which are largely controlled by state governments are financially and technically incapacitated, and thus often unable to perform their basic constitutional responsibilities.24 With cities being the epicentre of the Covid-19 pandemic, local governments, which are the closest to city dwellers, are unable to adequately respond,25 and thus the channel to link the state and federal governments’ provisions with local communities remains broken. Over the last twenty years, Nigeria has faced widespread humanitarian and socio-economic challenges and what can be considered an epidemic of

23  Khemani, S. 2001. Fiscal federalism and service delivery in Nigeria: The role of states and local governments. http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/ March2003Seminar/FiscalFedReport.pdf. 24  Lawanson,T., Oyalowo, B. and Nubi, T. 2021. Delivering the global urban development agenda in Lagos, Nigeria – A local lens is needed. In Nubi. T, Anderson, A, Lawanson T. and Oyalowo. B., eds. Housing and SDGs in Africa. Singapore: Springer. 25  UN-Habitat 2020. UN-Habitat Covid-19 Response Plan. Nairobi: United Nations Settlements Programme. UN-Habitat.

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multidimensional poverty and inequality,26 being consequences of political economy and governance failures.27 About 44% of the population live in extreme poverty with complex and interconnected deprivations across multiple areas of basic needs, including health, education, income, housing and access to information.28 In fact, Nigeria is described as the poverty capital of the world with about 86.9 million people living in severe poverty, which is about 50% of the entire population.29 Recent statistics show that Nigeria also has the highest number of out-of-school children in the world with about 13 million children,30 and a combined unemployment and underemployment rate of about 56%,31 though with the exclusion of those who work in the informal economy. The manifestation of multidimensional poverty and inequality in Nigeria reinforces urban challenges.32 About 69% of urban residents live in slum-like conditions,33 lacking access to adequate housing and primary health care, water and sanitation, and information required to protect themselves from Covid-19 infection.34 Multidimensional poverty is a direct consequence of poor governance, characterised by corruption and lack of transparency, accountability, 26  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) (2019). MPI - More Nigerians are multidimensionally poor than a decade before 2017. https://www.ng.undp.org/content/nigeria/en/ home/presscenter/pressreleases/2019/new-data-challenges-traditional-notions-of-rich-­ and-­poor-.html. 27  Agunbiade, M. E. and Olajide, O. A. 2016. Urban governance and turning African cities around: Lagos case study. Partnership for African Social and Governance Research Working Paper No. 019, Nairobi, Kenya. https://www.pasgr.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ Urban-Governance-and-Turning-African-Cities-Around_Lagos-Case-StudyF.pdf. 28  ActionAid Nigeria. 2018. National Social Investment Programmes (NSIP): 2018 Third Party Monitoring Report. Abuja. ActionAid Nigeria. 29  Panchal, K. 2020. The poverty capital of the world: Nigeria. Borgen Magazine. https:// www.borgenmagazine.com/the-poverty-capital-of-the-world-nigeria/. 30  ActionAid Nigeria 2018. National Social Investment Programmes (NSIP): 2018 Third Party Monitoring Report. Abuja. ActionAid Nigeria. 31  Financial Nigeria 2020. Nigeria’s unemployment rate jumps to 27.1 per cent http:// www.financialnigeria.com/nigeria-s-unemployment-rate-jumps-to-27-1-per-cent-news­2188.html. 32  UNDP-Nigeria 2009. Human Development Report Nigeria 2008–2009: Achieving Growth with Equity. Abuja: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Nigeria. 33  https://mirror.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/13282_1_596004.pdf. 34  Lawanson, T. 2020 Lagos size and slums make stopping the spread of Covid-19 a tough task. https://theconversation.com/lagos-size-and-slums-will-make-stopping-the-spread-ofcovid-19-a-tough-task-134723.

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capacity and equity in resources management and allocation.35 These are defining features of the Nigerian governance interactions,36 resulting in inability to provide adequate infrastructure and urban services, economic opportunities and decent living for the majority of the population. While Nigeria has demonstrated capacity for economic growth, it has demonstrated lack of capacity in transparency, responsibility and accountability necessary to translate the economic gains into reduction of poverty and inequality.37 The government—at all levels—failed to leverage revenue from the oil boom to provide the infrastructure and social services necessary for sustainable development and building what can be referred to as pre-pandemic resilience.38 Nigeria largely demonstrates a weak supportive environment and average capacity across many global development indicators, particularly relating to eradication of poverty and hunger, universal education and health.39 In fact, indicators suggest that the country has not shown concrete evidence of having the right environment and governance capacity to achieve many of the SDGs, particularly in the area of developing strong institutional capacity to address endemic challenges, especially at local levels.40 Lack of reliable disaggregated data is also a persistent hindrance to evidence-based decision making as well as effective distribution of resources, especially to the most vulnerable and marginalised citizens.41 35  Handley, G., Higgins, K., Sharma, B., Bird, K. and Cammack, D. 2009. Poverty and poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview of the Issues. London. Overseas Development Institute (ODI). 36  UNDP-Nigeria 2009. Human Development Report Nigeria 2008–2009: Achieving Growth with Equity. Abuja. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Nigeria. 37  World Bank 2019. Nigeria on the move: A journey to inclusive growth - moving toward a middle-class society. Nigeria systematic country diagnostic June 2019. http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/891271581349536392/pdf/Nigeria-on-the-MoveA-­Journey-to-Inclusive-Growth-Moving-Toward-a-Middle-Class-Society.pdf. 38  UN-Habitat. 2020. UN-Habitat Covid-19 Response Plan. Nairobi: United Nations Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat). 39  National Bureau of Statistics 2012. Review of the Nigerian Economy in 2011 and Economic Outlook for 2012–2015. Abuja: National Bureau of Statistics. 40  Lawanson. T., Oyalowo, B. and Nubi, T. 2021. delivering the global urban development agenda in Lagos, Nigeria – A local lens is needed. Nubi. T, Anderson, A, Lawanson T and Oyalowo. B (eds) Housing and SDGs in Africa. Singapore: Springer. 41  Agunbiade, M., Olajide, O.A. and Akindeju, O. 2019. SDGs and geospatial information perspective from Nigeria-Africa. In A. Rajabifard ed. Sustainable development goals connectivity dilemma: land and geospatial information for urban and rural resilience. Boca Raton. CRC Press.

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In Nigeria, the burden of poor governance falls disproportionately on people living in poverty—especially in cities. Poor urban households are unlikely to have savings, assets or mechanisms that would enable them to cope with the sudden loss of income and economic shock caused by Covid-19 containment measures. They are also largely underrepresented in the current National Social Protection registry. The next section examines the Nigerian Covid-19 pandemic response across the key areas of concern—health, education, information management and social welfare—within and between public and private institutions, focusing on the interplay of governance regimes and the effects on everyday urban citizens.

The Nigerian Multi-Level Governance Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic Nigeria recorded her Covid-19 index case on February 27, 2020.42 As at November 2020, all of the country’s 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory had confirmed cases (63,305 infections and 1163 fatalities),43 with Lagos having the highest incidence (40%) of reported cases (see Fig. 5.2). Even though, so far, Covid-19 is less of a public health crisis in Nigeria compared to other countries like South Africa and the United States,44 it has had quite an adverse socio-economic effect on households across the country. The various containment strategies (lockdown and movement restrictions, school closures, etc.) have resulted in a situation where in many urban low-income communities, informal workers lost their jobs and savings, children’s learning was disrupted and precarious housing/ living conditions were made worse by lack of infrastructure required for

42  Mwai, P. 2020. Coronavirus: What’s happening to the numbers in Africa? Retrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53181555, November 12. 43  The Nigeria Centre for Disease Control. 2020. Covid-19 in Nigeria. Retrieved 2020, November 15, 2020, from https://covid19.ncdc.gov.ng/. 44  Harmon, A., Tompkins, L., Burch, A. and Kovaleski, S. 2020. With 11 million cases in the U.S., the coronavirus has gotten personal for most people. Retrieved from The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/15/us/coronavirus-us-cases-deaths.html.

Fig. 5.2  Confirmed Covid-19 cases—Nigeria (February to November 2020). Source: the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC): https://covid19.ncdc.gov.ng/state/

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social distancing and proper sanitation.45,46 About seven million Nigerians were predicted to experience food shortages due to Covid-19-related food system disruptions,47 with serious well-being consequences for urban poor households who, unlike rural households, largely consume what they can buy from the market.48 The threat of a fast-spreading (potentially killer) virus has resulted in a measure of collaboration among Nigerian institutions. The pandemic seems to have triggered governance of necessity across the country as public and private institutions, civil society organisations, faith-based organisations, and local and international agencies are all stepping forward to implement various strategies to combat the pandemic and its impacts. The federal government inaugurated a Presidential Task Force (PTF) to coordinate and oversee Nigeria’s multi-sectoral inter-governmental efforts to contain the spread and mitigate the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria. State governments also set up emergency operations centres to oversee the preparation, coordination and management of response activities for public health events. Only 23 states in the country had State Public Health Emergency Operations Centres (PHEOCs) prior to the Covid-19 outbreak. There is no evidence of local government-led apparatuses for emergency management in Nigeria. The private sector, under the auspices of the Coalition Against Covid-19 (CACOVID), collaborated with the federal government, the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) and the WHO to provide technical and operational support and advocacy through awareness drives, while the Victim Support Fund (VSF), another private sector-led initiative, was at the forefront of supporting internally displaced persons and vulnerable

45  Onyekwena, C. and Ekeruche, M. A. 2020. Understanding the impact of the Covid-19 outbreak on the Nigerian economy. Retrieved April 8, 2020, from https://www.brookings. edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/04/08/understanding-the-impact-of-the-covid-19outbreak-on-the-nigerian-economy/. 46  Ajibo, H. 2020. Effect of Covid-19 on Nigerian socio-economic well-being, health sector pandemic preparedness and the role of Nigerian social workers in the war against Covid-19. Social Work in Public Health: 35:7, 511–52. doi:10.1080/19371918.202 0.1806168. 47   Nwagbara, C. 7 million Nigerians, 13 states to experience food shortageFAO. Nairametrics. https://nairametrics.com/2020/03/20/7-million-nigerians-toexperience-food-shortage/. 48  Okoye, D. and Adniran, A. 2020. Effective targeting of Covid-19 Aid in Nigeria. Retrieved from http://cseaafrica.org/effective-targeting-covid-19-aid-in-nigeria/.

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families across Nigeria.49 Local organisations across the nation also supported the most vulnerable members of their communities, especially in the wake of the lockdown. Though the Covid-19 pandemic responses in Nigeria cut across various sectors and governance levels, we focus on interventions relating to health, education, information management and social protection in urban areas, as these are the most affected by the pandemic. Multi-Sectoral Health Response In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, the WHO developed various guidelines and precautionary measures. The guidelines and control measures include testing, contact tracing, isolation centres for infected persons, regular hand washing, social distancing, and lockdown and travel/ movement restrictions. In Nigeria, the government also adopted many of these protocols (see Table 5.1). Since February 2020, about 69 molecular laboratories for conducting Covid-19 tests have been set up,50 while PHEOCs were extended to 23 states. Presently, Jigawa, Adamawa, Taraba, Imo, Abia, Ekiti, Oyo and Ogun states are yet to set up an EOC. Lagos state decentralised testing to the local government areas, siting testing centres at various local government secretariats. Given Nigeria’s fragile health infrastructure status (0.8 hospital beds per 1000 population51), hospital beds for isolation and treatment are grossly inadequate. Since February 2020, about 112 Covid-19 testing and treatment/isolation centres (about 5000 beds) have been commissioned across the country,52 mostly donated by the private sector in Lagos (1000 beds), Kano (500 beds), Rivers (210 beds), FCT Abuja (200 beds), Enugu 49  Onyeji, E. and Adebowale-Tambe. 2020. Interview: Covid-19 palliatives worth N2 billion distributed to 12 states – VSF Official. Premium Times. https://www.premiumtimesng. com/health/health-features/424347-interview-covid-19-palliatives-worth-n2-billion-­ distributed-­to-12-states-vsf-official.html. 50  The Nigerian Centre for Disease Control. 2020. Government Laboratories. Retrieved from https://covid19.ncdc.gov.ng/laboratory/#!. 51  Home Office. 2018. Country policy and information note Nigeria: medical and healthcare issues https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1094261/download. 52  Adebowale, N. 2020. Covid-19: Nigeria may use schools, hotels as isolation centres – Minister. Premium Times. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/395073-­ covid-­19-nigeria-may-use-chools-hotels-as-isolation-centres-minister.html.

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Table 5.1  Multi-sectoral health response to Covid-19 pandemic Federal government

State government

Local government

Private/civil society

PTF on Covid-19 established to coordinate national multisectoral response National Emergency Operation Centre activated (EOC) by the Federal Ministry of Health and NCDC Collaborated with the WHO and Africa Centres for Disease Control (Africa CDC) to support states with medical supplies, logistics, training, risk communications and other response activities

Lagos state and Kaduna state established Incident command centres and issued Infectious Diseases Regulations 22 states activate EOC Some states constructed isolation centres within their state capitals Lagos state local communities. For example, Lagos set up isolation centres in the 20 Local Government Areas

No Local government-­ led intervention

Donated N29 billion to the Central Bank as at June 2020 to support medical intervention and construction of isolation centres

NCDC activated 32 federal government and military molecular testing laboratories

30 molecular testing laboratories activated in 22 states as well as isolation centres

Individual organisations donated isolation centres in some state capitals Private sector-run isolation centre in Lagos The Catholic Church donated all their 425 hospitals as isolation centres Operates four private and four NGO-­ owned molecular testing labs

Source: Author, 2020. Collated from different platforms online

(200 beds) and Borno (200 beds). It is instructive to note that most of the isolation centres are temporary structures, and hence will not be integrated into the nation’s health care system post-pandemic. Infectious diseases are usually not within the purview of private hospitals.53 However, the poor state of the public health system and the relatively poor response rate of Covid-19 helplines resulted in a situation in which many patients resorted to self-care or seeking treatment in private 53  Amoran, O. and Onwube, O.O. 2013. Infection control and practice of standard precautions among healthcare workers in northern Nigeria. Journal of Global Infectious Diseases 5:4, 156–63.

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hospitals ill equipped to respond to the public health emergency, thus putting the medical practitioners and other patients at risk.54 Eventually, Lagos State Government decided to accredit some private hospitals for Covid-19 care55 and also incorporated tele-medicine services.56 It is estimated that the average cost for Covid-19 treatment in Nigeria ranges from $750 for a hospital stay of six days to $13,000 for 23-day intensive care hospitalisation.57 The national minimum wage is about $75 (N30, 000) monthly and only 1.5% of Nigeria’s over 200 million population has access to health insurance.58 Multi-Sectoral Education Response In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, restrictions on public gatherings were instituted globally, leading to the premature closure of all schools in Nigeria. Education sector Covid-19 response strategies are highlighted in Table 5.2. According to UNESCO,59 the closure of schools affected 36.4 million primary and secondary school learners across Nigeria. Various states provided some form of alternative learning platform (television, radio or internet), except for Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, Cross River, Gombe, Plateau and the FCT.60 54  Alabi, M. 2020. Nigerian doctors condemn use of private hospitals for coronavirus management. Premium Times. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/388775-­ nigerian-­doctors-condemn-use-of-private-hospitals-for-coronavirus-management.html. 55  Obinna, C. 2020. Lagos accredits 3 private hospitals to manage Covid-19. Vanguard. caseshttps://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/06/lagos-accredits-3-private-hospitalsto-manage-covid-19-cases/. 56  Olagunju, A. 2020. Changing the face of Covid-19 response in Nigeria through Telemedicine. Science Communication Hub Nigeria. https://www.scicomnigeria.org/ covid-19/Changing-the-face-of-Covid-19-response-in-Nigeria-through-Telemedicine. 57   Blurb Team. 2022. Analysis: Nigeria’s likely cost per treatment for Covid-19. Nairametrics. https://nairametrics.com/2020/04/08/analysis-nigerias-likely-cost-pertreatment-for-covid-19/. 58  PWC. 2019. Sustainability of state health insurance schemes in Nigeria beyond the launch. https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/assets/pdf/sustainability-state-health-insurancenigeria.pdf. 59  UNESCO. 2020a. Covid-19 educational disruption and response. May 19. Retrieved June 1, 2020, from https://en.unesco.org/Covid-19/education response. 60  TEP Centre. 2020. Learning in a pandemic: Nigeria’s response to teaching and learning during the Covid-19 pandemic. https://education.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ Learning-in-a-Pandemic-Report_TEP-NESG_2020.pdf.

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Table 5.2  Multi-sectoral education response to Covid-19 pandemic Federal government

State government

Local government

Private/civil society

Announced closure of all learning institutions in March 2020 Provided guidelines for resumption from October Publicised distance learning programmes which were implemented by 31 states Developed the Nigeria Education Sector Covid-19 Response Strategy incorporating Home Learning Programme (LHP)

Some states provided learning alternatives using radio, television learning programmes and internet-based learning platforms

No local government-­ led intervention

Partnered with various government agencies to launch e-learning solutions. Donated devices to aid distance learning Private schools transitioned to online learning platforms

Some states collaborated with the private sector to deploy online capacity building workshops for teachers to equip them with remote teaching skills using mobile devices and computers

Collaborated with the Federal Ministry of Education to provide remote learning resources and platforms for students, teachers and parents

Source: Author, 2020. Collated from different platforms online

Tertiary institutions were also closed, though private universities immediately transitioned to online learning platforms,61 a situation many students found difficult to cope with.62 In October 2020 when the federal government confirmed school re-opening, about 1.8 million students at federal universities were yet to return to school—due to a nationwide strike action by the Academic Staff Union of Universities since March 2020, protesting poor funding and lack of prioritisation of the educational sector.63  Oyediran, W., Omoare, O., Owoyemi, M., Adejobi, A. and Fasasi, R. 2020. Prospects and limitations of e-learning application in private tertiary institutions amidst Covid-19 lockdown in Nigeria. Heliyon 6: 11, 1–8.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2020.e05457. 62  Olasunkanmi, I. 2020. Nigerian university students find online learning painful: here’s why. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/nigerian-university-students-findonline-learning-painful-heres-why-143919. 63  Wahab, A. 2020. Tracking the problems of tertiary education in Nigeria. Vanguard. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/10/tracking-the-problems-of-tertiary-educationin-nigeria/. 61

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The Nigerian educational sector is perennially underfunded, with only 6.9% of the 2020 federal budget allocated to education, a far cry from the 15–20% international benchmark recommendation.64 This funding gap was evident during the Covid-19 pandemic as public schools across all cadres were ill prepared and largely ill equipped to transition to online learning. Incidentally, a nationwide study revealed that over 70% of the Covid-19 education sector interventions were funded through international donations and private sector partnership programmes. With funding support from the UNICEF Office in Nigeria, the Federal Ministry of Education and the Universal Basic Education Commission developed the Nigeria Education Sector Covid-19 Response Strategy,65 incorporating plans for the Learn at Home Programme (LHP). Through the LHP, a partnership was formed with educational technology companies to launch virtual learning opportunities including mobile classrooms, e-learning toolkits and virtual learning platforms. This situation was similar at the state level where the Lagos State Government (LASG), through crowdfunding, was able to distribute 10,000 radios to students in slum and rural communities,66 while Microsoft supported the state government in training 18,000 teachers with remote teaching skills.67 In Ogun state, the state-run television station dedicated the 9–11 am and 1–3 pm slots to educational programmes and deployed the Ogun Digital Classroom (Ogun Digiclass), while Taraba and Ekiti states distributed printed learning materials to aid independent homeschooling. The private sector (mobile service providers) also provided free data access to many virtual learning platforms and resources during the Covid-19 lockdown period. In spite of its potentials, however, the e-learning initiative did not make a significant impact as the strategy did not acknowledge the existing 64  UNICEF Regional Office for Eastern and Southern Africa. 2019. Guidelines for Developing an Education Budget Brief. https://www.unicef.org/esa/sites/unicef.org.esa/ files/2019-04/Guidelines-Developing-a-Education-Budget-Brief-March-2019.pdf. 65  Federal Ministry of Education. 2020. E-learning resources. Retrieved from the Federal Ministry of Education. http://education.gov.ng/e-learningresources/. 66  Kazeem, Y. 2020. Nigerian schools are being forced to rethink their digital limits and education models in a pandemic. Quartz. https://qz.com/africa/1882896/nigerianschools-adopt-online-learning-amid-covid-19/. 67  Akoni, O. 2020. Covid-19 lockdown: Lagos partners Microsoft, ATB on digital training for teachers. Vanguard. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/04/covid-19-lockdownlagos-partners-microsoft-atb-on-digital-training-for-teachers/.

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educational and/or digital divide in which children are disproportionately impacted based on geographic location (rural) and socio-economic status (poor).68 According to a Twitter user, @yopeiorg: ‘The impact of Covid-­19 on the education system exposed the education divide in Nigeria. Children in rural and underserved communities in Nigeria are being left behind as they are not equipped to adapt or transition to the new methods of learning’.69 Many households do not have adequate access to the necessary platforms to support e-learning, as a result of prohibitive cost, lack of technical know-how, low penetration and poor quality of internet access. According to the spokesman for the National Universities Commission: ‘Even if the (government-owned) universities have the capacity for online learning, most of the students don’t have smartphones’.70 Even though children from more affluent homes could afford the cost of a device (laptop or smartphone), tuition/access fees for learning platforms, reliable internet connection, electricity (either from grid or generating set) and a quiet room to study, this became prohibitive as household incomes were negatively impacted by the lockdown. The cheapest internet plan across all service providers, 6gig per week, costs about $4, which is only sufficient for 26 hours of video conferencing on Microsoft Teams (a popular e-learning platform) at a usage pattern of 225  MB per hour,71 whereas the average school week is about 30 hours, without considering extra time spent on research and assignments. In many low-income communities, residents who were teachers volunteered to hold alternating classes with not more than ten children in a classroom at a time, while churches were converted into temporary schools.72 This was an ad hoc arrangement in order not to breach the 68  Lawanson, T. and Udoma-Ejorh, O. (2020). How smart is smart city Lagos? Willis, K. (Ed.), Aurigi, A. (Ed.). The Routledge Companion to Smart Cities. London: Routledge. 69  Yopei [@yopeiorg]. 2020. Twitter, https://twitter.com/yopeiorg/status/12790840 22233288704, July. 70  Lawal, I. 2020. When will public varsities embrace e-learning? Guardian. https:// guardian.ng/features/education/when-will-public-varsities-embrace-e-learning./. 71  Pal, R. 2020. Data consumed for 1-hour of video conferencing on Skype, Microsoft team, Google Hangout, Slack? https://www.themobileindian.com/news/how-much-datais-consumed-for-1-hour-of-video-conferencing-on-skype-microsoft-team-­google-hangoutslack-30319. 72  Heinrich Böll Stiftung Nigeria. 2020. Mistakes made, and lessons learned. https:// ng.boell.org/en/mistakes-made-and-lessons-learned.

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social gathering protocols. However, it proved insufficient to meet the learning needs of most children sustainably. To bridge the learning gap between public schools and their better prepared private counterparts, LASG restricted private schools from officially commencing the third term of the 2019/2020 session online and from conducting assessment tests and examinations online. In Kano state, there was an outright ban on online schooling by the state government. During the Covid-19 lockdown period, no specific provisions were made for the learning needs of children with special needs or disabilities across the entire country. Early childhood education (kindergarten) was suspended. The lockdown also deprived many children from poor households, although some schools provided social protection benefits such as the school feeding programme. Following the re-opening of schools, many parents were no longer able to afford to pay school fees as they had lost their income opportunities during the lockdown. There was also an increase in teenage pregnancy and school drop-out rates, thus increasing the population of out-of-school children. Nigeria has the highest number of out-of-school children in the world with an estimated 10.5 million children between the ages of five and 14 not receiving an education. Multi-Sectoral Communication Response There is global consensus on the basic self-protection protocols for the prevention of transmission of the coronavirus, that is, personal hygiene including regular handwashing, restriction on social gatherings/physical distancing and movement restrictions.73 According to the Director General of the Nigerian Centre for Disease Control: ‘The most important tool as far as the pandemic is concerned is citizens’ compliance with prevention measures. It is in the hands of all of us’.74 However, these protocols can only be adhered to if pandemic-related public health messaging and information management is effective. 73  World Health Organization. 2022. Covid-19 transmission and protective measures. https://www.who.int/westernpacific/emergencies/covid-19/information/transmission-­ protective-­m easures#:~:text=%2D%20Clean%20your%20hands%20often,touched%20 objects%20and%20surfaces. 74  Adepoju, P. 2020. Politics gets in the way of Nigeria’s Covid-19 response. https://www. devex.com/news/politics-gets-in-the-way-of-nigeria-s-covid-19-response-97720.

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Table 5.3  Multi-sectoral information management response to Covid-19 pandemic Federal government State government

Local government

Provided daily updates on infection rates

Some states provided weekly updates on infection rates

No local government-led intervention

Rolled out public health advisory and sensitisation campaigns—focus on online engagement.

States launched awareness campaigns (talk shows, jingles and TV animations, graphic designs of people wearing face masks)— both online and across TV and radio platforms

Private/civil society

Some universities analysed the data and made it simpler for the public Created automated offline and online platforms for information dissemination about the pandemic Organised some Launched integrated community-level/ sensitisation house-to-house campaigns sensitisation Sponsorship of radio campaigns jingles and TV adverts in various languages including Igbo and English

Source: Author, 2020. Collated from different platforms online

The Nigerian government across levels led a series of health advisories and sensitisation campaigns (see Table 5.3). The major mode of information dissemination on Covid-19 was online—via websites and/or social media. Less targeted were the offline campaigns of public sensitisation through radio and television channels, local community advocacy and person-to-person communication. In addition to the federal government and NCDC websites, many state governments also launched COVID-dedicated websites. In Ekiti state, the governor stated on April 23, 2020: ‘Our COVID19 Hub has gone live on http://covid19.ekitistate.gov.ng. The site provides access to relevant information on the management of Covid-19 in Ekiti State, Nigeria and the globe’.75 The effectiveness of this approach proved to be poor as Ekiti

75  Fayemi, K. 2020. Our COVID19 Hub has gone live on http://covid19.ekitistate.gov. ng. Twitter, https://twitter.com/kfayemi/status/1253325576351301633.

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state only has 16% internet penetration.76 Many residents were sceptical about the reality of Covid-19, as public channels of communication were not accessible, nor was the government running any sustained information dissemination on the pandemic. The private sector through CACOVID also committed substantial funds to information dissemination, though it focused on a global audience through satellite television, rather than the local Nigerian populace. @Emmylexxz tweeted: Why is CACOVID advertising on CNN …. Like how many households in Nigeria get access to DSTV?’ The Nigerian Broadcasting Commission estimates that 37. 3 million households in the country have access to television, with only four million of these having access to digital television. The dominant platforms for accessing news among Nigerians are the radio and word of mouth. Focusing on information dissemination through television was considered to be a non-priority, as @olufemisp tweeted: ‘I’m watching ads sponsored by CACOVID on CNN, TVC and hearing their dope jingles on top radio stations. Yet we have no test kits, isolation centres lack mosquito nets while people have zero palliatives. Great way to spend billions…’. Telecommunication companies contributed to public messaging via regular SMS messages to mobile phones. COVID hotlines were also provided for citizens in all states to call in to report Covid-19-related issues, though only Nasarawa, Adamawa, Borno, Jigawa, Delta, Ondo and Lagos states had toll-free lines. The general complaint across most states was that the hotlines were not efficient: @CeaserSixtus tweeted, ‘Hotline indeed, A patient was presented to own (our) facility on Friday evening with signs of Covid-19 infection after numerous calls and promises that your team were coming, no one showed up leading to another loss of life. Be proactive in all states and make moves to ease minds pls’. @AsakeMcIng1 also tweeted at the Lagos State Health Commissioner: ‘@ProfAkinAbayomi Honourable Commissioner, please intervene, save me from contracting Covid - 19! Contacted Lagos hotline about a suspected case in my house. 30+ hours still waiting for a call or text or visit after texting name, address & phone as instructed’.

76  Okwumbu-Imafidon, R. 2020. Fayemi set to activate the digital economy with N5billion broadband infrastructure. Nairametrics. https://nairametrics.com/2020/05/24/fayemiset-to-activate-digital-economy-with-n5billion-broadband-infrastructure/.

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On August 16, @Itunnu_A tweeted: ‘I need Lagos State to explain to me why the covid hotline has been disabled’.

Interestingly, as at this date, the Lagos State Government state approach had transitioned to a home-based care option, for which an efficient telephonic system is crucial. The information dissemination approach not being fit-for-purpose may have also given rise to public apathy as well as the spread of fake news in the wake of the pandemic and lockdown. According to @voicesofyouth: ‘Beyond this pandemic is an “infodemic”, a lack of adequate information, fake news and misinformation. In Nigeria, we have seen this before with Ebola and we know how damaging it can be’.77 Some people considered Covid-19 to be a scam.78 For example, @chinwe_mariah tweeted: ‘Everything needs to go back to normal, businesses, schools, churches etc. It is obvious, Covid-19 in Nigeria is just a scam #StopCovidLies’.79 Shockingly, this position was also reiterated by some state governments. The Kogi State Governor stated that: ‘Nigerians were ill-advised, confused, and misdirected…now we have COVID, glorified malaria’.80 Also damaging was the position of the Cross River governor, who publicly recommended protocols different from the WHO-prescribed pandemic prevention/protection measures, stating that: Because I’m a professor of science and I know how this virus moves; I know its etiology, I know its transmissibility, I know its antigenicity; because I do, I know that once you put on this mask, you already have been protected. You don’t need social distancing when you are properly protected because

77  Voices of Youth [@voicesofyouth]. 2020. Twitter, https://twitter.com/voicesofyouth/ status/1258079436274110466. 78  Onapajo, H., and Adebiyi, J. 2020. ‘Covid-19 is a big scam’: Citizens’ distrust and the challenge of combating Coronavirus in Nigeria. Retrieved from The Republic: https://republic.com.ng/february-march-2020/distrust-nigeria-coronavirus/. March 30.. 79  Mariah, C. [@chinwe_mariah]. 2020. Twitter, https://twitter.com/chinwe_mariah/ status/1265200950484099079. 80  Onyeji, E. 2020. Covid-19: Controversial Kogi goes 120 days without infection, death. Premium Times. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/423628-covid-­19controversial-kogi-goes-120-days-without-infection-death.html.

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your mucal glands that secrete the mucus and the mucins already forms a network of coats to attack the virus.81

The actions of Kogi and Cross River state governments have been vehemently rebuffed by the state chapters of the Nigerian Medical Association, who accused the state governments of refusing to test and turning a blind eye to patients with Covid-19 symptoms82,83 In April 2020, there were various accounts of multiple unexplained deaths in both verified and unverified media outfits in Kano. The state government attributed the cause of the sudden deaths to hypertension, diabetes, meningitis and acute malaria, and not Covid-19, directing health operatives to conduct verbal autopsies (due to the Islamic burial tenets, which require the quick burial of a deceased person) on those who had died. The Federal Minister of Health subsequently reported that 60% of those deaths were attributable to the Covid-19 virus. 84 These situations highlight the politicisation of the pandemic and poor inter-governmental collaboration. Furthermore, the claims and counterclaims, refusal to test and reliance on informal data gathering rather than scientific testing to determine the cause of Covid-19 suspected deaths point to broader issues of poor emergency preparedness, lack of adequate and accurate data, and also lack of public trust. According to @abdulhamied_AA: ‘One of the reasons why many people don’t take the Covid-19 campaign seriously in Nigerian is lack of cooperation by NCDC and state governments’. 85

81  Ifop, F. 2020. Covid-19: Once you put on a mask, you don’t need social distancing – Gov Ayade. The Paradise. https://paradisenews.ng/49313/covid-19-once-you-put-on-amask-you-dont-need-social-distancing-gov-ayade. 82   Sahara Reporters [@SaharaReporters] (2020). Twitter, https://twitter.com/ SaharaReporters/status/1280009607071621122. 83  Ujah, I. 2020. Covid-19: NMA to Prosecute Kogi, Cross River Health Commissioners over alleged unethical conduct. This Day. https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2020/ 07/12/covid-19-nma-to-prosecute-kogi-cross-river-health-commissioners-over-allegedunethical-­conduct/. 84  Adebayo, B. 2020. Over half of April’s unexplained deaths in Nigeria’s Kano state due to coronavirus, health minister says. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/09/africa/nigeria-­ spike-­in-deaths-covid/index.html. 85  Abdulhamied [@Abdulhamied_AA]. 2021. Twitter, https://twitter.com/Abdulhamied_ AA/status/1259770453314482178.

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Multi-Sectoral Social Welfare Response The lockdown and movement restrictions occasioned by Covid-19 caused a cessation of almost all economic activities in Nigeria.86 This resulted in intense socio-economic impacts for the economy. Many private enterprises significantly reduced salaries and/or retrenched staff.87 Similarly, over 80% of the estimated 200 million Nigerians who work in the informal economy faced extreme disruptions to their economic activities without guaranteed incomes or social protection.88 According to @Reuters: ‘A lockdown in Nigeria to save people from the coronavirus is destroying livelihood of people working in the country’s informal sector’.89 Nationwide, this resulted in many urban poor households almost becoming destitute.90 The need for social support was reiterated by many Nigerians including @bulamabukarti, who tweeted that: ‘Nigeria’s lockdown to prevent Covid-19 outbreak is good, but it is unsustainable unless govts devise ways of helping people with their basic needs. You can’t expect families with nothing to eat to continue to stay home. For them, while Covid-19 is a threat, hunger is a reality’.91 A series of social welfare responses were thus instituted as a buffer (see Table 5.4). The social welfare response was generally inept, with citizens accusing both state and federal governments of politicising the process.92 In many cases, those most in need were unable to access support. This can be 86  Olarewaju, K. 2020. Covid-19: Nigeria announces lockdown of major cities. Retrieved from Anadolu Agency: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/covid-19-nigeria-announceslockdown-of-major-cities/1784358#. 87  Olatokewa, A. 2020. The economic repercussion of Coronavirus pandemic on Nigerians. Retrieved from Pulitzer Center: https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/economic-repercussioncoronavirus-pandemic-nigerians. 88  Ayeni, T. 2020. Nigeria VS Coronavirus: Hardest hit least helped, informal workers. Retrieved from The African Report: https://www.theafricareport.com/29074/nigeria-vscoronavirus-hardest-hit-least-helped-informal-workers/. 89   Reuters [@Reuters]. 2020. Twitter, https://twitter.com/Reuters/status/124790 9568283361280. 90  Ajibo, H. 2020. Effect of Covid-19 on Nigerian socio-economic well-being, health sector pandemic preparedness and the role of Nigerian social workers in the war against Covid-19. Social Work in Public Health 35: 7, 511–522. 91  Bukarti, B. [@bulamabukarti]. 2020. Twitter, https://twitter.com/bulamabukarti/ status/1243505070248988677. 92  Eranga, I. 2020. Covid-19 Pandemic in Nigeria: palliative measures and the politics of vulnerability. Int J MCH AIDS, 9(2): 220–222.

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Table 5.4  Multi-sectoral social welfare response to Covid-19 pandemic Federal government

State government

Local government

Private/civil society

Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development launched the disbursement of four-month grants of N20,000 ($52) to the poorest households Federal Government released 12,500 tonnes from the National Strategic Food Reserve

States distributed stimulus packages including food packs to political supporters, vulnerable populations and state government workers

No local government-­ led intervention

The Federal Government instituted moratorium on loans and other economic subsidies including interest rate reduction for MSMEs and big businesses Central Bank also announced the creation of a N50 billion targeted credit facility for households and SMEs

Some states launched mobile community markets Some states provided tax holidays and launched SME Support funds to support local businesses

Donated food palliatives to state governments for distribution to citizens Faith-based organisations distributed palliatives to the vulnerable Civil society actors and local philanthropists distributed palliatives Leveraged technology to initiate a farmers helpline to connect farmers and food suppliers VSF donated N1 billion for IDPs and poorest communities Some developers gave rent relief to tenants

Source: Author, 2020. Collated from different platforms online

largely ascribed to the poor participation of the local government system, which is the system of government closest to the people. The African Union Economic Social Cultural Council in Nigeria underscored the need for administrative autonomy for local government councils to ensure even distribution of Covid-19 palliatives, especially within the vulnerable groups.93

93   AU-ECOSOCC Nigeria [@NigeriaAu]. 2020. Twitter, https://twitter.com/ NigeriaAu/status/1256489130231574530.

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According to the Federal Ministry Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development, distribution was based on the National Social Register, with the minister stating that: ‘At the onset of the pandemic, the National Social Register (NSR) contained data of over 2.6 million poor and vulnerable households, representing over 11 million individuals in the 34 States and the FCT. With the accelerated registration and rapid expansion, the NSR has, as at June 30, grown to 3.7 million, equivalent to 15.5 million individuals in the 36 states and FCT’.94 This number is grossly inadequate as over 87 million Nigerians live below the poverty line. Furthermore, the criteria and processes of identification of poor and vulnerable households remain controversial.95 @Connected_devt tweeted that: ‘There is seemingly an available National Social Register. The process of development has been on since 2016. As it stands, it’s not comprehensive enough to cater for the conditional cash transfer disbursement, there is no information on how those not captured can receive such funds’.96 There was also the fact that the states at highest risk were not prioritised in the palliative distribution. @utdjoeb tweeted: ‘Really weird, they started disbursing in states that didn’t have a confirmed case’. Regarding support for the urban poor, the only statement made was from the minister who stated that: ‘We’re also going to focus on the urban poor by using their verified BVN accounts to get them; that is, people that have an account balance of N5,000 and below’.97 As of November 2020, there is no evidence that this has happened yet. However, an identification exercise of informal workers was done in Oshogbo, the Osun state capital, in August 2020, to capture data on potential beneficiaries of a N30,000 grant from the National Social Investment Programme. Out of about four million informal workers in the state, 350,000 workers were registered. The consultants overseeing the data capture then requested that the number be streamlined to 2500  in October 2020 and further to 1250  in 94  NAN. 2020. FG enrols 15.5  m persons in the national social register. Guardian. https://guardian.ng/news/fg-enrolls-15-5m-persons-in-national-social-register/. 95  Ekeruche, M.A. 2020. Assessing Nigeria’s economic response to Covid-19. Economy. https://www.stearsng.com/article/assessing-nigerias-economic-response-to-covid-19. 96  Connected Development [CODE] [@Connected_de]. 2020. Twitter, https://twitter. com/Connected_dev/status/1252253007875629056. 97  Olaniyi, M. 2020. Palliatives are for those with less than N5,000 Bank Account  — FG. Daily Trust. https://dailytrust.com/palliatives-are-for-those-with-less-than-n5000-bankaccount-fg.

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November 2020, so that politicians could empower their followers with the other 1250. The Federal Ministry Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development also decried lack of cooperation by some of the state governors, as vulnerable Nigerians did not receive the palliatives sent to them through state government channels. Interestingly, by October 2021, warehouses full of CACOVID-branded and National Strategic Reserve food items were discovered and raided by citizens in several state capitals98 including Lagos, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja, Osun, Taraba, Kwara, Kaduna, Adamawa, Plateau and Cross River states, among others. As @JibrinIbrahim17 tweeted: ‘In Lagos, Jos, Abuja, Ilorin and Calabar, #Palliatives were in warehouses while the masses are hungry. Someone needs to explain why they were not distributed’.99 Some of the palliatives were also found in the possession of politicians. For example, a member of the Lagos State House of Assembly, @SOBAgunbiade, tweeted: ‘For my birthday on 25th October 2020, I have sent out, through my Media Team, notice of my intention to give support to 50 widows who have already been nominated by different groups in a programme christened Widow’s Mite for Widows. Also, to distribute to some vulnerable and indigent individuals across the three local councils of my constituency, some palliative materials donated by the state and federal governments, as well as myself’.100 The citizen-led support structures were paradoxically more impactful. Alternative channels of food support emerged, from households providing an extra plate for indigent neighbours, to residents’ associations supporting lower-income adjacent communities. At a larger scale, NGOs and faith-based organisations provided support in cash and kind to both host communities and government. Organisations such as the Lekki Food

98  Obiezu, T. 2020. Nigerians justify massive looting of Covid-19 supplies. Retrieved December 7, 2020. VOA News. https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/ nigerians-justify-massive-looting-covid-19-supplies. 99  Ibrahim, J. [@JibrinIbrahim17]. 2020. Twitter, https://twitter.com/JibrinIbrahim17/ status/1319954383430471683. 100  Agunbiade, S.O.B. [@Sobagunbiade]. 2020. The violent attack on my house: Thank you Ikorodu. Twitter, https://twitter.com/Sobagunbiade/status/1319899102486908929.

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Bank and Feed the Streets Lagos101 leveraged social media to crowdsource support and/or identify those in need. The health, education, communication and social welfare dimension of Covid-19 response in Nigeria has highlighted many gaps in the governance framework. These will be discussed in the following section.

Discussion: Covid-19 Has Accentuated Governance Faultlines in Nigeria Due to governance action, inaction and/or wrong action (see Fig. 5.3), we identify the following categories as being left behind across health, education, communication and social welfare sectors in the wake of the Covid-19 lockdown in Nigeria: the urban poor, school children, people living with disabilities, the politically neutral and the local government system. The interactions between state and non-state actors in response to the pandemic and attendant lockdown in Nigeria have revealed numerous gaps between and across governance dimensions. These gaps intersect variously, making the implementation of an effective national Covid-19 response more difficult, despite massive resources mobilised from both the public and private sector. These are discussed below. Vertical Governance Dimension There have been gaps in coordination, cooperation and collaboration among the different levels of government and their agencies: Effective management of a health emergency requires a strong institutional response framework. Even though various government agencies and ministries have had to work together since the pandemic started, there have been many cases highlighting lack of coherence and coordination. A clear example is the social welfare response, while in the case of testing and patient care, there has been outright working at cross purposes on the parts of Kogi and Cross River states. There was almost no collaboration between the local government and the state and federal governments, and hence the many challenges at the 101  Akinwotu, E. 2020. ‘We needed to do more’: volunteers step up in lockdown Lagos. The Guardian. https://amp.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/may/02/weneeded-to-do-more-volunteers-step-up-in-lockdown-lagos?twitter_impression=true.

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Fig. 5.3  Peculiar Covid-19 responses across the 36 states in Nigeria. Source: Author, 2020. Collated from different platforms online

local scale. The local government system lacks autonomy and the capacity to perform her constitutional mandate due to the failure of the federal and state governments to ensure devolution of power. This lack of autonomy affects effective functioning and hinders partnership with the right stakeholders to affect community development. Local governments are the best platform to collaborate with in the identification of the most vulnerable citizens, the development of the National Social Register, the distribution of palliatives, and also to identify and mobilise local initiatives that will help cushion the effect of the Covid-19 pandemic. The Covid-19 response at the federal level also did not take into consideration the lived realities of actors at sub-national units. For example,

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the decision to shut down schools and transition to online learning did not consider the digital and educational divide among states. The decision to prioritise information dissemination via digital online channels also contributed to the public apathy to the coronavirus as well as the proliferation of fake news. Also, during the national lockdown in which interstate travel restrictions prevailed, while trucks of recognised FMCG corporations were allowed free movement across state borders, trucks for small-­ scale (informal) farmers’ access to farms and markets were impeded,102 and their ability to supply produce was severely hindered, resulting in shortages at local food markets. Horizontal Governance Dimensions Governments in Nigeria have always been plagued by a lack of public trust due to the deficit of transparency and accountability. In the case of Covid-19 response, though the federal and state governments announced cash donations and material support from various stakeholders including the international community, there has been a lack of openness about how these donations were expended, as only eight states—Ogun, Katsina, Lagos, Ebonyi, Oyo, Ondo, Kaduna and Ekiti—have published on their websites financial statements on the amount raised and spent so far.103 Collaboration between state and non-state actors is also weak as the various governments do not readily acknowledge the value communities and civil society organisations bring to the table. Therefore, the necessary contextualised approach required for addressing Covid-19 fell below par. The social welfare response systems led by civic groups, faith-based organisations and even the VSF to the most vulnerable Nigerians were more impactful, targeted at individuals most in need and beneficial to the various local communities, compared with the larger-scale palliative distribution schemes organised by government, which fell short. The monitoring and evaluation of the Covid-19 response has also been sub-optimal. The composition of the Presidential Task Force on Covid-19, 102  Adeshokan, O. 2020. Coronavirus: Food insecurity fallout from Nigeria’s lockdown. The Africa Report. https://www.theafricareport.com/27676/coronavirus-food-insecurityfallout-from-nigerias-lockdown/. 103  Daily Dispatch. 2020. Covid-19: Publish details of funds received from donors-budget tells governors, as palliatives hit N213bn. https://www.dailydispatchnewspaper.com/ covid-19-publish-details-of-funds-received-from-donors-budgit-tells-governors-as-­ palliatives-­hit-n213bn/.

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for example, is made up of only representatives of government agencies, with the exclusion of non-state actors. The focus of the taskforce has also been on implementation without commensurate evaluation of the effectiveness of the actions being taken. The civil society organisations (especially Budgit, TrackaNG and Connected Development) have therefore taken over this task. For example, corruption in the cash transfer programme in local communities was escalated to the anti-corruption agencies by Tracka,104 while in the case of Lagos state, where the database of the Lagos State Residents’ Registration Agency was relied upon for social welfare to the elderly, there has been no follow-up exercise to confirm how many residents did receive the care packages. These gaps are further exacerbated by some integrated structural limitations of the Nigerian governance system, that is, lack of accurate data and political interference. The lack of accurate data is a major challenge to effective governance in Nigeria. There is a general paucity of contextualised decentralised data on almost every issue. As such, generic rather than targeted interventions are preferred. The poor responses regarding health sector interventions and even the palliative distribution are indicative of this. For instance, the National Social Register remains controversial, while the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs considered Nigerians who recharge their mobile phones with 100 naira and have a less than 5000 naira bank balance as those who qualify for palliatives.105 Prioritising rural areas and states with lower infection rates was also indicated. This arbitrary contextualisation leaves out millions of the working poor in cities, many of whom were made redundant by the lockdown regulations. In Lagos, only those registered with the state’s Residents’ Registration Agency were considered for the social welfare response, leaving out a preponderant proportion of slum residents who were not registered, simply because they live in houses that do not have street numbers. Political interference has contributed to the limited impact of the Covid-19 response. The personalisation of social welfare response by politicians in Osogbo and Lagos typifies the political patronage system that 104   TrackaNG [@TrackaNG]. 2020. https://twitter.com/TrackaNG/status/12809790 91731161089. 105  Njoku, L., Ebiri, K., Olumide, S., Musa, N. and Agboluaje, R. 2020. Why controversy over FG’s Covid-19 palliatives persists. The Guardian. https://guardian.ng/news/whycontroversy-over-fgs-covid-19-palliatives-persists/.

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pervades Nigerian governance, and clearly ensured that those who needed support most were unable to receive it. The sabotage of the Covid-19 testing and health care interventions by the Cross River and Kogi state governments deliberately endangered the lives of their citizens. In Lagos, rather than focusing on enhancing inclusive local health systems to respond to the public health emergency, the Lagos State Government licensed private health facilities to cater for the city’s elite, based on political pressure. Multi-level governance gaps have been established through these studies. They must be effectively addressed in order to achieve sustainable development and effectively respond to any future occurrence of pandemic. Some strategies for achieving this will be discussed in the next section.

Conclusion: Bridging Governance Gaps for Pandemic Response and Management This chapter has highlighted the gaps in multi-level governance systems in Nigeria. The chapter establishes the weak pre-pandemic resilience due to poor basic infrastructure in the country, and how the Covid-19 pandemic and lockdown has exacerbated the challenges of daily life for many Nigerians. It is apparent that the targets and indicators of the SDGs for health, education and poverty alleviation will not be adequately addressed unless something decisive is done. We therefore recommend the following strategic approaches. Firstly, in responding to any crisis or emergency, effective governance interactions and coordination matter—from information management, to infrastructure deployment to social protection interventions. Therefore, the local–state–federal government interface should be enhanced by engendering power devolution and capacity building for the local government system. This is especially important because the key to the control of any emergency is an effective localised strategy. Co-production among government and non-state actors should be encouraged. Institutional actors should, therefore, be equipped with the relevant skills to interact with multiple actors across scale. Second, disaster preparedness and effective response management are urgently required. Building a city’s resilience starts from providing basic infrastructure to upscaling critical infrastructure in the health, education and social services sectors. Digital and educational divides should be

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dismantled through provision of the infrastructure and training required for various categories of Nigerians to access these services. Emergency hotlines, for example, should always be manned by qualified personnel who are able to provide support and/or required information to citizens. Thirdly, inclusive development that advocates for and implements targeted intervention programmes for identified vulnerable groups is key. Social protection policies and programmes that transcend political divides should be prioritised and deployed in a manner that takes into consideration the peculiarities of local contexts. For example, programmes should be developed to address the school drop-out rates, support people living with disabilities, and enable universal medical care and even the provision of equitable palliative distribution. These are urgently required to cushion the devastating socio-economic impacts of the pandemic. Fourthly, governance decision making should be based on accurate data, and therefore data collection approaches should also be decentralised. To achieve this, collaborations are encouraged with stakeholders including knowledge institutions and local communities who have the technical skills and lived experiences respectively. Finally, lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic response should provide the basis for generating strategic pathways to addressing the systemic inequities in Nigerian political economy and multi-level governance structures. The access to national resources based on dichotomies between the rich and the poor, the urban and the rural, the political and non-aligned should be reconfigured to ensure that citizenship is the basic requirement for a good quality of life in the country. In conclusion, this chapter has identified key gaps in the urban governance framework for Nigeria, highlighted how Covid-19 exacerbated the effects of these gaps on everyday citizens, and attempted to conciliate these gaps by advancing strategies that leave no one behind.

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Oyediran, W., O.  Omoare, M.  Owoyemi, A.  Adejobi, and R.  Fasasi. 2020. Prospects and limitations of e-learning application in private tertiary institutions amidst Covid-19 lockdown in Nigeria. Heliyon 6 (11): 1–8. Pieterse, E., S. Parnell, and S. Croese. 2017. The 2030 agenda: Sustainable urbanisation and the research-policy interface – Issues for the G20. Bonn: GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit). Rhodes, R.A.W. 1997. Understanding governance: Policy networks, governance, reflexivity, and accountability. Buckingham: Open University Press. Sattler, C., B. Schröter, A. Meyer, G. Giersch, C. Meyer, and B. Matzdorf. 2016a. Multilevel governance in community-based environmental management: A case study comparison from Latin America. Ecology and Society 21 (4): 24. ———. 2016b. Multilevel governance in community-based environmental management: A case study comparison from Latin America. Ecology and Society 21 (4): 24. The Nigeria Centre for Disease Control 2020. Covid-19  in Nigeria. Retrieved 2020, November 15, 2020, from https://covid19.ncdc.gov.ng/. The Nigerian Centre for Disease Control. 2020. Government Laboratories. Retrieved from https://covid19.ncdc.gov.ng/laboratory/#! . Torfing, J., J. Pierre, B.G. Peters, and E. Sorensen. 2011. Interactive governance: Advancing the paradigm. Oxford: Oxford University Press. UNDP-Nigeria. 2009. Human development report Nigeria, 2008–2009: Achieving growth with equity. Abuja: United Nations development programme. Abuja: UNDP. UNECA. 2020. ECA: The economic impact of Covid-19 on African cities likely to be acute through a sharp decline in productivity, jobs & revenues. https:// www.un.org/africarenewal/news/coronavirus/eca-­e conomic-­i mpact-­ covid-­19-­african-­cities-­likely-­be-­acute-­through-­sharp-­decline-­productivity . UN-Habitat. 2020. UN-habitat Covid-19 response plan. Nairobi: United Nations Settlements Programme. UN-Habitat. UNICEF Regional Office for Eastern and Southern Africa. 2019. Guidelines for Developing an Education Budget Brief. https://www.unicef.org/esa/sites/ unicef.org.esa/files/2019-­04/Guidelines-­Developing-­a-­Education-­Budget-­ Brief-­March-­2019.pdf . United Nations 2016a. Quito declaration: New Urban Agenda. http://habitat3. org/wp-­content/uploads/NUA-­English.pdf . ——— 2016b. Habitat III Policy Paper 4: Urban Governance, Capacity and Institutional Development https://uploads.habitat3.org/hb3/Habitat%20 III%20Policy%20Paper%204.pdf . United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI). 2019. MPI  - More Nigerians are multidimensionally poor than a decade before 2017. https://www.ng.undp. org/content/nigeria/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2019/new-­data-­ challenges-­traditional-­notions-­of-­rich-­and-­poor-­.html.

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CHAPTER 6

“Subsistence Fishermen Don’t Exist”: The Subtleties of Categories and Accessing the Water during a Covid-19 Lockdown Dominique Santos

Ancient Origins People have obtained sustenance from the waters of the narrow peninsula that runs between two tidal rivers and the estuaries where they meet the ocean for a very long time. Now known as Kenton-on-Sea, with a foundational mythology stretching back less than 200 years, humans have actually made homes, dreamt and subsisted here with the waters for at least 15,000 years, as coastal archaeological evidence, including the presence of

D. Santos (*) Department of Anthropology, Rhodes University, Makhanda, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Arndt et al. (eds.), Covid-19 in Africa: Governance and Containment, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36139-5_6

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middens between the Kariega and Bushman’s Rivers, are testament to.1 Conservative estimates consider there may be more than 3000 of these shellfish processing sites along the west and south coasts of South Africa, with only 1000 documented at any length.2 If the middens along this stretch of coast have anything to teach us for the purpose of this chapter which considers the impact of the Covid-19 lockdown on more recent fishers on this land, then it is to always take foundational mythologies built on colonial expansion as fragments of much larger and more complex histories and stories. In March 2020, as the world plunged deeper into the crisis of a global pandemic, South Africa declared one of the strictest lockdowns, prohibiting all but the most essential services. One of the earliest side effects of this Level 5 lockdown, and the constraint on economic activity, both formal and informal, was a crisis of access to food for the many in South Africa who live on or below the poverty line. The contrast between the kinds of lockdowns being experienced by those with means and those without led some to speak of a ‘dual lockdown’, throwing into stark relief the glaring economic disparities that exist in contemporary South Africa. Utilising the notion of the ‘pandemicscape’3 to theorise the emerging sociality of the Covid-19 world, and the existing societies it is built on, this chapter maps the intimacies and intricacies of the lockdown’s impact on the community of Kenton-on-Sea, where ties to the water are key to local identities. Indeed, much literature on subsistence fishing, while rich in theory and statistics, does not consider the emotional, spiritual and recreational sustenance of subsistence activities.4 I suggest that well-being, historical consciousness and eating are all very much in relationship, and ‘subsistence’ as a term masks the richness of engagements with the water, 1  Davies, O. 1971. Pleistocene shorelines in the southern and south-eastern Cape Province, Part 2. Southern African Humanities 21; Deacon, H.  J. 1976. Where hunters gathered: A study of Holocene stone age people in the Eastern Cape. Man. Claremont: South African Archaeological Society. 2  Parkington, J. 2006. Shorelines, Strandlopers and shell middens: Archeology of the Cape Coast. Cape Town: Creda Communications: 9. 3  O’Kane, D. and Boswell, R. 2018. ‘Heritage’ and ‘cultural practice’ in a globalized disaster: A preliminary thematic analysis of documents produced during the Ebola epidemic of 2013–2015. Globalizations 15: 5, 622–635. 4  Hauck, M., Sowman, M., Russell, E., Clark, B. M., Harris J. M., Venter, A., Beaumont, J. and Maseko, Z. 2002. Perceptions of subsistence and informal fishers in South Africa regarding the management of living marine resources. South African Journal of Marine Science, 24: 1.

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emphasising feeding the physical body to the exclusion of other ‘feeding’ which is taking place, arguably a key aspect of why such practices have been sustainable for so long. As the pandemicscape shapes sharper contours of socio-economic disparity, rooted in the settler-colonial project and its aftermath of apartheid, this research undertook to make visible the stories and relationships, both contemporary and historical, which shape claims to the contested commons of Kenton-on-Sea, and emerging social contracts. Using an oral narrative approach and ethnography in the small South African coastal town of Kenton-on-Sea in the Eastern Cape province, this chapter reflects primarily on the experiences of Xhosa-speaking subsistence fishers who had their access to the water refused during the early days of the Level 5 lockdown in South Africa. In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the lockdown was one of the strictest in the world, implemented in blunt and sometimes violent ways. Refusal of access to the commons of local rivers and the oceans placed an immediate threat to local food security for those who obtained additional protein and cash income from the water. This chapter makes a preliminary map of negotiations that took place at the local level between fishing folk, community workers, local police and private security companies to regain access to the commons in this small community. Ultimately, the success of accessing water again while restrictions on movement were in place relied on the continued informalisation of the activity, and resistance to official recognition of the existence of ‘subsistence fishermen’. Thus, while access to the water was obtained, it required an agreement to stay invisible and ‘not exist’ by those whose lives are intertwined with the water but are not formally permitted to do so. At the same time, I acknowledge the intertwined nature of food security, the water and spiritual well-being. This is in relationship with the land and water, following Country et al.5 in which the elemental world is an authorial authority in and of itself, expressing discontent with conditions— a worldview held by many fishers I interviewed, who commented on the lack of fishing success during the hard lockdown, as an indicator of spiritual displeasure emanating from the Kariega River itself. Covid-19 restrictions, issues of access to land, and spiritual obligations to water beings and ancestral entities in the water are all in relationship, an ongoing process of 5  Country, B., Wright, S., Suchet-Pearson, S., Lloyd, K., Burarrwanga, L., Ganambarr-­ Stubbs, M., Ganambarr, B. and Maymuru, D. 2015. “Working with and learning from Country: decentring human authority”, Cultural Geographies 22: 2: 269–283.

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negotiation as fishers speculate on how best to access the water and assess conditions that will affect fishing success and personal safety, both in and out of Covid-19 lockdowns.

Subsistence Fishermen Don’t Exist Xolani Katu’s house is a small shack in Sqaga, an informal settlement on the east side of Ekuphumleni Township, which lies north of the highway that divides it from its wealthier neighbour, the holiday town of Kenton-­ on-­Sea. Under one municipality and the same postcode, the two neighbourhoods of this community lie in stark contrast, like much of South Africa, where the inequality index is one of the highest in the world. Driving in on the highway, one can see how it cuts through two highly differentiated spatial locations. On one side, large verdant plots expressing a variety of highly individualised housing styles; on the other side, rows of dormitory reconstruction and development programme housing lined with dirt track roads. As in much of South Africa, spatial inequalities are highly racialised, a legacy of separate development apartheid social engineering and colonial-era legislation that amplified racial differences and entrenched in them differential access to resources. For Xolani, fishing from the river permits him some measure of food security and access to a small alternative income in addition to periods of labouring employment or piece jobs, giving some, if limited, agency to walk away from labour conditions he finds constraining when he wishes to. The Kariega River is also a place of rest and respite, one he enjoys going to, and where he has developed a deep emotional and sensory connection to the water and the animals living in it. He connects his own well-being and the emotional state with which he approaches the water with success in catching. As he tells me after I fail to catch any fish on a trip to the river with him, “You must have an open heart when you go fishing. Otherwise the river will not open up to you”. Other fishers interviewed echo these sentiments of personal well-being, fishing success or failure, and connection to ancestral and spiritual entities associated with the water, Before you go to the sea or the river there must be something that you say, whether by heart or vocally. The thing is that there are homesteads and people there (under the water). You may find yourself dragging out a cow of the river or even a mermaid from there, maybe because you just woke up

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and did not communicate. As a child of umXhosa you are obliged to communicate with your ancestors before you take your equipment and go for fishing.

A few days into the Level 5 lockdown, Xolani arrived at my house on the outskirts of Ekuphumleni Township. We knew each other through my role as a customer for his surplus fish. He was out of breath and distressed, holding a broken fishing rod. He explained that staff from a private local security firm had ‘chased’ him from the river, breaking his rod in the process. In great distress, he asked how he was expected to live without being able to fish. I directed him to the community kitchens as a place where he could access food, but the cruel irony of the situation where a week previously he had been selling surplus and was now dependent on charity, was apparent, as was the violence with which lockdown regulations were being enforced, with little compassion or explanation for those most affected. As a member of an Ekuphumleni-based community development forum running the community kitchens, I began a protracted appeal to local police and security urging them to exercise restraint and compassionately interpret Government Gazettes. Xolani knew very well that my English-­ accented command of the language of power here would be helpful for the case of fishing folk like him to be heard. A series of Government Gazettes began trickling through as the ‘hard lockdown’ was extended, and then mutated into a series of levels of control with 5 being the most severe and 1 the least. As Level 5 transitioned into Level 4, the clarifying of the position of those living at subsistence level, from fishers to street traders, whose precarious livelihoods were left utterly exposed by lockdown restrictions that presumed some level of access to surplus for the purposes of a temporary retreat from economic life, sought to address the draconian first phase of the Level 5 lockdown. As amendments filtered through with regard to fishing, the lack of clarity over the category of ‘subsistence fisher’ was apparent, as was the continuing emphasis on permission for any kind of fishing activity. In a final message sent via our group chat where these negotiations were taking place at physical distance, it was informally confirmed that fishers from the township would be ‘left alone’, though their status remained unclear and uncertain. At a 2020/2021 Strategic Plan presentation to the Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Minister for Environment, Forestry and Fisheries Barbara Creecy responded to questions about why subsistence fishers could not fish. The Marine Living Resources Act covers three categories

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of fishing people—commercial fishers, small-scale fishers and recreational fishers. There is no category called ‘subsistence fishermen’ in the Act. If there is no such category under law, then there is no dispensation under any regulations for small fishing people. Minister Creecy stated that she understood there are people who fished for food using recreational licences, and occasionally sold surplus, though these sales were not allowed by law. Further, under Level 5 and 4 regulations, none of this activity was permitted. She went on to state that she recognises that some who use recreational licences do so to feed themselves and others as an issue of food security, so would consider permitting recreational fishers under Level 3.6 The lack of clarity around the status of subsistence fishers, despite much consultation to include them within the auspices of the 1994 Marine Resources Act,7 is stark and mirrored in the informality of response to requests for access at the local level in Kenton-on-Sea. The restoration of access to the river by those township-dwelling folk who access the water for food and minimal sales of such catches was done so without precise formal recognition by the Department of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries of the existence of a category of people who could be classed as ‘subsistence fishers’. This mirrors what Mather8 identified as the tensions within the extensive reforms that have swept through South Africa’s fishing sector since 1994, which, guided by goals of sustainability, have largely succeeded in increasing international competitiveness, but have not been able to reconcile these outcomes with social sustainability and increasing legal access to fishing resources for previously disadvantaged groups. Yet, to consider social sustainability as a kind of desirable end goal in itself, universally understood and morally neutral, is deeply limiting of the kinds of worldviews and positions at play.

6   South African Department Environment, Forestry and Fisheries. 2020. National Assembly Internal Question Paper No. 13 of 2020. https://www.dffe.gov.za/sites/default/ files/parliamentary_updates/pq727of2020regulations_covid19subsistencefishing.pdf. Accessed 16 December 2020. 7  Branch, G. M., Hauck, M., Siqwana-Ndulo, N. and Dye, A. H. 2002. Defining fishers in the South African context: subsistence, artisanal and small-scale commercial sectors. South African Journal of Marine Science 24: 1; Hauck et al. 2002. Perceptions of subsistence and informal fishers in South Africa. 8  Mather, C. 2007. Sustainability and fisheries reform in post-apartheid South Africa. Geography 92: 3: 221–230. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40574336. Accessed 5 January 2021.

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Social sustainability comes with an implicit commitment to foreground and prioritise formal and legislatively managed relationships between communities and business, as articulated by global bodies such as the United Nations. In the UN Global Compact,9 social sustainability is defined as primarily about managing the quality of engagements between commercial interests and communities. This is not always welcomed, as evidenced by the sentiments expressed by fishing folk in Ekuphumleni. Distrust in any process that is managed by agents perceived to be in alignment with government or corporate interests is frequently expressed by fishers here, a response arguably rooted in the historical conditions which produced this community, and whose inequities in terms of freedom to access the commons of land and water expropriated by colonial land grabs continue to permeate lives and livelihoods. Indeed, taking seriously the diversity of experiences which inform local fishers’ worldview, including interactions with non-human entities and distrust of state processes, is something an anthropological viewpoint can articulate because it takes seriously the need to take account of diverse ways of encountering and understanding conceptual frames such as ‘social sustainability’, which are far from neutral in their myriad applications. As Brightman and Lewis10 point out, amongst the many definitions of sustainability, a common thread is that they usually derive from a Euro-­ American tradition of managing natural resources, grounded in an ontological frame that objectifies nature, separating it from the human realm. The imperatives of this ontological frame, in which nature is inert, separate and open to extractive practices which can then be conceptualised as ‘sustainable’ or not, mean that the term sustainable can be mobilised to legitimise a variety of practices, some of which are deeply destructive, or have been imposed on communities via coercive historical processes. The case of fishing permits, as articulated in the community case study presented here, is an example of what on the surface is an important resource management tool, but one which has emerged out of violent incorporation into legislative frameworks which prioritise an extractive relationship to an inert natural world and are skewed in favour of social bodies which 9  United Nations Global Compact. 2021. Social Sustainability. https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/our-work/social. Accessed 5 January 2021. 10  Brightman, M. and Lewis, J. 2017. Introduction: The anthropology of sustainability: beyond development and progress. In The anthropology of sustainability, ed. Brightman M. and Lewis J. Palgrave Studies in Anthropology of Sustainability. New  York: Palgrave Macmillan: 1.

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can skilfully speak the language of this way of knowing. These facts are not lost on the interlocutors engaged with here, though they may not articulate their critical engagement with these processes in ways which are legible within the ontological frame from which these processes arise. In this sense while local police and private security firms in Kenton-on-­ Sea could informally agree to stop harassing those attempting to access the water for this reason, the refusal to acknowledge subsistence fishers in the statements made by the minister exposed the precarity of those who fall outside of the legal frames of reference which govern resource control in South Africa. There was a tacit requirement to ‘not exist’, while still practising the craft of obtaining food from the water under the radar. Thus, this informal local reprieve was in effect a continuation of a historical situation in which fishers who were neither recreational nor commercial accessed the water as invisible actors when undetected or tolerated, and as poachers or law breakers when under the scrutiny of landowners and officials. Fishers’ accounts show that the impact of exclusion from the water in the initial phases of the Level 5 lockdown was severe and required targeted intervention to be semi-resolved in a social context of increasing food security crisis. However, the exclusion was not inconsistent with pre-­ lockdown issues over access to the water through confrontations with local landowners whose properties have river frontage, and issues with police enforcing the use of permits to fish. In the brief period during which access to the water was completely denied, and enforced with the presence of police and private security, appeals were made to authorities on the basis of the moral figure of the subsistence fisherman needing to ensure food security for the community they are embedded in. Once this access had been granted, the pre-lockdown tensions around communal resource use and tensions with notions of private property, as well as imperatives to obtain documentation in the form of permits as evidence of the ‘right’ to fish re-asserted themselves. The kinds of informal access which were eventually granted were precarious and fragile, telling us much about the constraints and contestations around access to the commons which have followed the enclosures of the settler-colonial and apartheid era. It is these historical contexts which continue to shape and form the emerging social contracts of the pandemicscape. In this sense, the various claims and attachments to place articulated through connection to the water, which validate narratives of belonging by disparate sectors of the community, can be explored.

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The history of accessing the commons in South Africa is utterly intertwined with the social and environmental impact of the advent of colonial settlement, both in the core and on the periphery, and in the expansion of global extractive capitalism and uneven positioning within the new world order it produced.11 The undermining of indigenous knowledge systems, land enclosures and increasing dependence on participation in the cash economy through coercion and as a mechanism of survival or alternative to existing social regimes transformed the social and environmental landscape. There is a notable convergence here of historical and contemporary configurations of the relationship between diversely articulated settlers descended and indigenous through a series of wars as the colony established in the Western Cape expanded to the East.12 These tensions are in relationship with the ongoing informalisation of fishing as livelihood, or partial livelihood. It manifests as unwillingness to participate in regimes of bureaucratisation—the issuing of free subsistence fishing permits or the purchase of recreational licences, which are viewed as unfair or corrupted impositions by those interviewed who fit the criteria of ‘subsistence fishers’.13 The moral figure of the noble subsistence fisher recedes into a more complex articulation as the subjects who fish in ways which can be seen as subsistence in nature deploy multiple economic strategies and do not consistently adhere to the legislation designed to accommodate them, making their own pragmatic economic and social decisions about accessing the water and sustaining their lives. These pragmatic and often precarious ways of living alongside and with the estuary and ocean have arguably sustained the emotional, physical, social and spiritual resiliencies required to survive the ravages of settler-colonialism and apartheid which have utterly remade the social and environmental fabric of the region in the last 300 years. It is these historical contexts which continue to shape and form the emerging social contracts of the pandemicscape. In this sense, the various claims and attachments to place articulated through connection to the water, which validate narratives of belonging and the right to access the commons, can be explored. Now, let me tell you about the warthog meat, and the story this tells. 11  Weaver, J. 2003. Great land rush and the making of the modern world, 1650–1900. Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt804f5. Accessed 18 December 2020. 12  Mosert, N. 1992. Frontiers: The epic of South Africa’s creation and the tragedy of the Xhosa People. New York: Knopf: Random House. 13  Branch et al. 2002. Defining fishers in the South African context; Hauck et al. 2002.

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A Tale of Two Towns The first delivery of the warthog meat came in Week 2 of what would come to be known as the ‘hard’ lockdown. South Africa implemented one of the strictest lockdowns in the world in March 2020, when rising Covid-19 infections prompted the government to declare a state of disaster, implementing punitive restrictions on the movement of people and their activities. Game reserves had been shut down. The life blood of foreign tourists, coming to experience the Africa of their imaginations, had had its artery abruptly severed. Tourism was not on the narrow list of essential services designated by the South African government. The warthog was delivered for use in the Ingcungcu Community Kitchens in the township of Ekuphumleni, adjacent to the wealthy holiday village of Kenton-on-Sea. The organisation had issued calls for food aid in the days preceding the start of the lock-down, organising last minute meetings to design and print posters appealing for donations, request a local supermarket to display them and host a trolley for food items. The economy of Kenton-on-Sea, mirroring that of wider South African society, is one in which inequality is the most profound marker of the social world within which economic players move. South Africa is known for the stark contrasts which mark the spatial parameters of this situation, as the juxtaposition of shacks and mansions masks the subtle tones of difference between sectors of the community and amplifies a sense of ‘them’ and ‘us’ which remains profoundly racialised in those communities where European-descended people are concentrated. Kenton-on-Sea is a textbook case, reflecting the economic and social legacies of apartheid segregation policies, and the unresolved aftermath of the social chaos unleashed by colonial wars and land grabs. It is a community utterly divided on the basis of the race and class categories that were generated by the colonial-­ apartheid eras, and has competing foundation myths which reflect this. In the white-settler narrative, the town emerged out of the habit of white farmers from the surrounding areas driving their wagons to the relief of the coast for rest and relaxation at the time of year which also held one of their most important ritual occasions, Christmas.14 These extended summer encampments happened on British Crown land following the 14   Bezuidenhout, G.J.W. 2017. Land, church, forced removals and community on Klopfenstein farm in the District of Alexandria, Eastern Cape c. 1972–1979. Unpublished MA Thesis. Rhodes University: 6.

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Wars of Dispossession, which had wrested territorial control from Ndlambe’s amaXhosa, as well as Khoe groups,15 and were sold in the late 1800s as South Gorah farm. From the 1930s, estate agents bought South Gorah, dividing it into plots, marketing what had now become Kenton-­ on-­Sea as a ‘Seaside Playground’. White people who had holidayed at the farm for years were given the first option to purchase.16 The coming of the R72 and its two bridges in the 1960s, crossing the Bushman’s and Kariega Rivers respectively, ended the relative isolation of the peninsula between the two rivers, making the conditions right for expansion of the holiday resort of Kenton.17 The town grew in prosperity as the scale of its natural beauty saw more development, giving rise to a village of beautifully appointed holiday homes ranging from simple cottages to elaborate mansions, many of which stay vacant for much of the year as their owners pursue their social and economic lives in the cities of South Africa. Street names in the town reflect the celebration of this heritage with streets named after the original settler farming families, whose descendants continue to hold wealth and land in the area, as well as locations of British summer idyls like Devon, Cornwall and Somerset. The very name Kenton-on-Sea is a play on the English county of Kent, the ‘garden of England’. The counternarrative to this foundational mythology comes from across the highway in the township of Ekuphumleni. The name can be translated from the isiXhosa as ‘Our Place of Rest’, and it encodes a story of resistance to attempts to resettle the inhabitants of this township to permit speculation on the glorious, and valuable, sea views of its location. Ekuphumleni’s origins lie in the arrival in the 1960s of around five families, who created a transit camp in the area now known as Kariega Heights, close to the then much smaller, but growing, Kenton-on-Sea. Drawn from neighbouring farms, or evicted from them, these families came looking for opportunities as domestic workers for the expanding white population of the town, drawn for holidays or retirement by the pristine natural beauty of the coast. With the building of the bridge which would eventually become the literal and metaphoric barrier between white Kenton-on-Sea 15  Peires, J. 1982. The House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa People in the Days of Their Independence. Berkeley: University of California Press. 16  Meiring, J. and Richards, S. eds. 2008. The Kenton story (Kenton-on-Sea: Self-Published); Bezuidenhout. 2017: “Land, Church, Forced Removals and Community”: 7. 17  Meiring, J. and Richards, S. 2008. The Kenton Story: 42; Bezuidenhout. 2017: 9.

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and African Ekuphumleni, and expansion of the white town in the 1960s, these families were moved to the top of the hill on the other side of the new highway. They were joined by others drifting in from the countryside as mass evictions took place on surrounding farms. Population growth was not matched with formal recognition and so the status of the new community remained transitory, excluding residents from the installation of infrastructure such as standpipes being carried out in Kenton-on-Sea at that time. By the 1980s, the population was sizable, but the growing popularity of the white town for wealthy retirees, second homeowners and holiday makers meant increasing concern about the presence of the ‘emergency camp’, whose homes commanded 360-degree views of the ocean and river. The growing transit camp which supplied the white town with its domestic labour force was built on prime property. Plans were made by the apartheid-­era municipality, supported by the white ratepayers’ association, to relocate residents to the newly established township of Marselle on the opposite side of the Bushman’s River.18 This was close enough to supply the cheap labour required by the town and leave the desirable land with its breathtaking views open for development. In a focus group with Ekuphumleni-based subsistence fishers, held to discuss the impact of the Level 5 lockdown, the discussion about denial of access to the water during that period quickly turned into a broader discussion about access to land and water historically. Attempts to relocate those seen as occupying the ‘transit camp’ to Marselle at this critical moment in Kenton-on-Sea’s development was a key area of discussion. In this way, an alternative and expanded history of Kenton-on-Sea to the one depicted in holiday brochures emerged: We spoke with our parents about this Marselle. They informed us that they had heard it was not good land or healthy. It was built on a marsh. So, we decided that we would not leave our homes. We knew the whites wanted the land we had because of its value. For those who wished to go we would not stop them. The government promised them proper houses, and some were eager to accept this and move from the shacks. The rest of us would not move.

The decision to resist relocation meant the start of a protracted battle with the authorities. As another resident, a local fisher, recalls,  Bezuidenhout. 2017: 221–222.

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Kenton was meant to be the town for White people only and not Blacks. All the people now staying at Marselle, Glenmore were all forcibly removed from here. People struggled (Toyi-toyi protests) to get that place now called Ekuphumleni which was established after democracy in 1994. Some people agreed to relocate but others refused to go. Like here we’ve got people who had been jailed during the Apartheid era, one had to get permission to visit the location, more especially if you were involved in activism/politics. There was a time that almost all men were arrested and put into the old Police Station next to Middle Beach. Men were regarded as troublesome than women and hence they would always be under arrest.

Residents held out, and the coming of democracy in 1994 saw their refusal to leave rewarded with the official declaration of the township of Ekuphumleni. The name itself was significant, emerging out of a ground­up community consultation process, and translatable from the isiXhosa as ‘Our Place of Rest’. In 2016, following delays which were met with service delivery protests in Ekuphumleni, a major house building programme was concluded, with over 500 RDP houses constructed, bringing Ekuphumleni’s borders right up to those of Kenton-on-Sea, a conscious act of town planning designed to undermine the racialised spatial separations of apartheid-era planning through spatial integration.19 The complex competing narratives of belonging and land, and the proximity of these sections of the community to each other, speak to the uneasy social contract forged in the Eastern Cape following the wars of the 1800s.20 This paternalistic, precarious and exploitative contract formed between white farmers and their workers covered access to the basic necessities required to reproduce the cheap labour of the rural black and brown workforce. This rural workforce was part of those early camping holidays to the coast which laid the groundwork for the making of the holiday resort of Kenton, setting up the provisions and tents prior to the arrival of farmers and their families and cooking and cleaning while they were there, later generations becoming the domestic workers, gardeners and construction workers who continue to supply the labour requirements of a wealthy holiday town.21 19  Ngxwashula, N. 2020. The Effect of Integration of Affordable/Low-Cost Housing Into Urban Areas of Property Values. Unpublished MSc. Nelson Mandela University: 45. 20  Bundy, C. 1979. The rise and fall of the South African peasantry. London: James Currey; Peires. 1982. The House of Phalo; Mosert. 1992. Frontiers. 21  Bezuidenhout. 2017: 9.

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Covid-19 saw this social contract reasserted as a moral dilemma for mostly white employees and potential benefactors in the town. Would employers ‘do the right thing’ and pay domestic workers even though they were not coming to clean? What about the young men who obtained subsistence walking door to door to ask for ‘piece jobs’ of washing cars or giving a day of labour. Underlying all of this and expressed in white-­ dominated local social media forums, was an anxiety about the threat of violent social unrest should the already precarious situation for many African inhabitants of the area deteriorate. The sharp racialised divisions between population groups expressed themselves in a lumpen fashion as white civil society groups organised the delivery of food parcels to every home in Ekuphumleni, regardless of socio-economic status. Social media posts on ratepayer forums of grainy mobile phone footage showing dressing gown-clad residents being woken at 2 am to receive parcels acted as proof of benevolent charity. Simultaneously, as ‘gifts’ of food such as the warthog meat were received from privatised commons, where access would not be restricted or policed due to the legal privilege of ownership, those commons of the water which remained public were utterly restricted. This was a strange paradox in which the descendants of those who had obtained the land through colonial expansion several generations earlier gift food to the descendants of those whose customary rights to the same land had been eroded in the same process, and who now found themselves prevented from accessing the resources of common land and water due to their lack of title with regard to claim to land. Being confined to home in this context meant very different things depending on what home was. A large private estate teeming with game and river frontage, or a small township plot? Fishers reflecting on the lockdown located the exclusions from the commons then as part of these wider access issues to land, water and resources, and changes in social circumstances which disrupted systems of resource sharing. As a fisher in his late 30s puts it, summarising a discussion: Everyone here is telling the same thing. U Tata is telling the truth in all what he has said. We are putting our baits down there in that lake, but then that water is very clean and running fast and as such cannot get much from there. We therefore have to go up further up and negotiate our way alongside the lake/river as we have no boats, and get closer to the farms where we grew up. That is where the fish take a bite. There is a corner where we find it

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convenient to fish, but there is a White farmer who just does not want to see us there because he claims that that is also part of his property/land. That is where I used to fish when we were staying at the farm and I would get quite a lot of big fishes and take home. We did not sell fish then at the farm, but it was simply for family consumption. We are now staying in a township and hunger is rife and life is hard. At the farm we would be given food ration and there would be battering or exchange of food amongst farm workers, [e.g.] for maize exchange you could get mealie meal. Here in the township you cannot even ask for a bowl of maize from your neighbour. There is a lot of unemployment here and that is one big problem we undergo. So, we are all telling the same thing here.

The discussion continues as other fishers share experiences of encountering threats of violence from white landowners, and the inefficiency of municipal authorities to ensure that river frontage commonage is still accessible. In this way, prevention of access to the commons of the water is enmeshed both in Level 5 restrictions and other, more long-lived, issues of access. The farmer simply tells us that he has got dogs. One other time that young man came along carrying a Rifle/gun and told us that even if we could dive into the water, we would not be able to come out and die without trace, as his dogs are very vicious. There is a permanent spot on the Kariega where we are always chased away, there is plenty of fish there. The only problem there, is that you are not able to access it freely and also racism. I do not fear to tell you that the White farmer there is a racist. His house is far away from the fishing place and also his boundary does not reach the river bends, and the river bends area where we catch fish belongs to the Municipality. But then, our authorities do not take any action to remedy this.

Covid-19 and the Level 5 Lockdown During the Level 5 restrictions to accessing the water, fishers spoke of being prevented from accessing the river by authorities alongside being historically denied access; pre-pandemic conflicts with white landowners over access to the water line were reignited as landowners used restrictions to enforce their interpretation of the boundary of private land. Fishers also expressed how fish seemed more elusive during the Level 5 lockdown,

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corroborating the sense expressed by most fishers interviewed that a state of relaxation, an open heart and the cooperation of ancestral and water spirits are required for success. Fishing under Level 5 conditions, illegally, hidden in the bushes, with the threat of equipment being confiscated and fines, does not support the conditions required for good fishing. As a fisher in his mid-30s, who has lived in Ekuphumleni most of his life, puts it: We depend on the water for our livelihood. Well, during this Level 5 period there were no chances of fishing, but some of us did take that risk of sneaking in. We would be turned back when already there, and our rods and prawn pumps confiscated. We never received any support whatsoever, we have been oppressed all the way till now that it seems there will be some reprieve. There fish were not there during this period, sometimes one would get only one fish, and meanwhile you would be the breadwinner at home. We were really suffering during this period, due to unemployment, not able to catch fish and no money to sustain yourself.

Listening to this, an older fisher nods his head and tells the story of how he came to be in Kenton, linking the historical conditions of precarity on surrounding farms since the wars with both the poor conditions for fishing in Level 5 and his own sense of anger at the ongoing oppressive conditions the community must live with, and the importance of the water to alleviating those conditions: So, it has always been a hard life for me, I was born in Patterson in 1963 and grew up there. My father was chased away from the farm, and we relocated to Peddie, where I schooled. My family was suffering, and my father was unemployed. That is why I am sometimes filled with anger when I am under oppression. My father passed on within 3 years of his stay at Peddie and my mother followed him after 4 years. We were then living under those hard difficult conditions until I relocated to Kenton-On Sea in 2004. Still here in Kenton it is pretty much the same, that is starvation, rife unemployment. Basically, living in poverty, but there is that lagoon where we are able to make some kind of living and sustain ourselves. Then when the Lockdown came it made life extremely hard for me, in fact for most people here in Kenton. Firstly, there were no fishes during that lockdown period, even someone who sneaks in would maybe catch one fish or none. Everyone at home would be expecting a good catch and if not, then they would sleep on empty stomachs. So, it has always been very difficult for us, and also the introduction of the Covid-19 relief fund that the Government is providing

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the people. It is still hardly accessible to some. So, we have always been exposed to extreme conditions here.

There is agreement amongst all interviewed that the risks were essential to take to continue to fish, even where it appeared that the lockdown produced conditions which made the fish ‘not bite’. The dependence on the lagoon and river as a food source was too great to not do so. Thus, pragmatic decisions were made in assessing the respective risks of encounters with police or hunger: During the Level 5 lockdown period I went on fishing, maybe three times or four. I used to fish from this river, this is my uncle, we used to help each other, we used to fish there. There, you had to watch the spot, the fishing spot. We have got this bridge, you have to make sure when you are fishing from your spot, you see the boat, because they (the police) are using a blue rubber duck, like you see it from about hundred metres from you. There are plenty of bushes there at echwebeni (lagoon). So, when you see that boat, you have to hide yourself amongst the bushes. This means that you have to leave your rods and baits just there. They would sometimes suspect that there is someone hiding around there, but you would remain hiding. But that situation is not nice, because sometimes maybe a big fish catches the bait and pulls your rod and all into the river. So, which means you have lost. Those rods that you have lost were of utmost essential importance to you as a fishing person. This would leave you with no choice as you are afraid of the police and simply had to hide from them.

Others emphasised a combative element with the police, whose own willingness to enforce the law was tempered by issues of comfort or the effort required to do so, while fishers enjoyed some sense of game play and mastery of the elements in their efforts to stay with the water: Yes, we did go there (to the water) and we did not run away from the police when they came. We instead went for a small island within the river. They would not take off their clothes and come to us. We invited them to come and catch us but in vain. We eventually decided to access the place at night when they would not be there.

When reprieve came in the latter half of the extended Level 5 lockdown, and it was acknowledged that those who depended on the water as a source of food and were licensed to do so should be permitted to fish,

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other pragmatic decisions on where to direct limited resources were made. These kinds of decisions preceded the pandemic and are indicative of the tensions at play with the legal requirements to conform to legislation to stay on the right side of the law, and allocate resources, as well as perceptions of corruption and inconsistency embedded in systems to allocate free subsistence licences. A fisher described the intersections of perceived corruption regarding the allocation of free subsistence licences, the requirement for fishing permits and his own assessment of where his resources would be best allocated: Those subsistence licences are going to be availed or issued just before the vote dates come. All along during these 5 years these licences are not issued. Just when we are about to vote for Ramaphosa these are now going to be issued. You will see/hear the campaigners driving around with a hailer announcing that the licences are going to be available or issued. That is another problem we are having here … like, not everyone will get these licences, they are issued to certain individuals, who may even be holding jobs, and not just everyone or those that deserve them. Secondly, for instance during the 5 years or 4 years not everyone is affording. I am unemployed, employment chances are very slim. Like for instance, here in Kenton, for a man who stays here and does not have a fishing rod, that man is regarded as a “useless” man. We are all dependent on that lagoon, but during the past 4 years we are just being harassed because we do not have the permit. The R78.00 to buy a Fishing Permit from the Post Office we do not afford. That R78.00 would instead be enough to buy the White Star brand 10 kg mealie meal to put into one’s kitchen cupboard. These are some of the problems we are faced with.

While reassessment of pandemic restrictions saw the eventual reprieve for local subsistence fishers to return to the water, ongoing concerns which preceded the pandemic and its restrictions continued to play out. As Hauck and Sowman22 have pointed out, the history of fisheries management in South Africa contributes greatly to negative perceptions of the kind expressed by Kenton’s fishers towards fishing regulations, and those who enforce them. There is a legacy of mistrust of authorities, originating in the colonial era and consolidated in the time of apartheid, where access 22  Hauck, M. and Sowman, M. 2001. Coastal and fisheries co-management in South Africa: An overview and analysis. Marine Policy 25: 3, 173–185. https://econpapers.repec. org/article/eeemarpol/v_3a25_3ay_3a2001_3ai_3a3_3ap_3a173-185.htm.

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to marine resources favoured white large-scale operators, and drove small-­ scale black fishers further into marginal legal positions, or illegal ones.23 Further, management strategies during the apartheid era were highly centralised and top-down, resulting in little consultation with the fishers, a confrontational policing strategy and the alienation of local communities.24 This legacy was very clearly carried over into the management and policing of small-scale fishers during the initial Level 5 lockdown in Kenton-on-Sea, and more generally in interactions with authorities.

Conclusion Contemporary disputes in Kenton-on-Sea over access to the commons of the water and the requirement to be permitted in order to fish must be contextualised within the aftermath of recent historical events. The last 250 years in the land now known as the Eastern Cape have seen the introduction of notions of private property and legal bureaucracy as a means of allocating and controlling resources, within a social frame which privileged participation by ‘white’ communities and was enforced with the confrontational apparatus of state authority. Those ‘children of the soil’ whose ancestors were brought via conquest, complicitness and pragmatism into these new modes of land allocation and resource governance continue to find ways to negotiate their uneven incorporation into these systems, and access the water, both in and out of the pandemicscape. Local subsistence fishing folk in Kenton-on-Sea locate the lockdown restrictions on their access to the water in a wider historical arc of racialised dispossession from the land and its resources, resentment of the requirement to obtain permits to fish, and fatigue over perceived corruption in the allocation of free subsistence fishing permits and the ability to transition from subsistence to small-scale commercial operations. Strategies have developed over several generations in the post-conflict context of the Eastern Cape to ensure continued, if fragmented and precarious, access to resources from the land and water. This is in tension with more recently introduced notions of private property ownership and centralised bureaucracy, which were deployed in the context of the Covid-19 Level 5 lockdown to ensure continued access to resources regarded as a birthright by 23  Hersoug, B. and Holm, P. 2000. Change without redistribution: an institutional perspective on South Africa’s new fisheries policy. Marine Policy 24: 3, 221–231. 24  Hauck et al. 2002: 472.

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those interviewed. The legacies of settler-colonial legislation and land grabbing, contemporary corruption, and perceptions of corruption and barriers to participation in the formal economy where stark choices must be made between using cash for permits and using cash for food combine to make this an ongoing issue where efforts to sustain selves and family through accessing natural resources run the risk of criminalisation, and must rely on the benevolent discretion of authorities rather than full legal protection. The unwillingness of fishers to fully comply with existing regulations while continuing to fish and ‘playing games’ with the authorities to do so is a lived response to uneven incorporation into a system of governance with roots in conquest. This chapter, while limited in its scope, demonstrates through experiences and stories of the fishers how the South African Covid-19 hard lockdown, and its aftermath, magnified existing tensions and contradictions several centuries in the making, which will continue to play out in the region for the foreseeable future.

References Bezuidenhout, G.J.W. 2017. Land, church, forced removals and community on Klipfontein farm in the district of Alexandria, Eastern Cape c. 1972–1979. Unpublished MA Thesis. Grahamstown: Rhodes University. Branch, G.M., M. Hauck, N. Siqwana-Ndulo, and A.H. Dye. 2002. Defining fishers in the South African context: Subsistence, artisanal and small-scale commercial sectors. South African Journal of Marine Science 24 (1): 475–487. Brightman, M., and J. Lewis. 2017. Introduction: The anthropology of sustainability: Beyond development and progress. In Palgrave studies in anthropology of sustainability, ed. M. Brightman and J. Lewis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Bundy, C. 1979. The rise and fall of the South African peasantry. London: James Currey. Country, B., S.  Wright, S.  Suchet-Pearson, K.  Lloyd, L.  Burarrwanga, M. Ganambarr-Stubbs, B. Ganambarr, and D. Maymuru. 2015. Working with and learning from country: Decentring human authority. Cultural Geographies 22 (2): 269–283. Davies, O. 1971. Pleistocene shorelines in the southern and south-eastern Cape Province (Part 2). Southern African Humanities 21: 225. Deacon, H.J. 1976. Where hunters gathered: A study of Holocene stone age people in the Eastern Cape. Man. Claremont: South African Archaeological Society.

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Hauck, M., and M. Sowman. 2001. Coastal and fisheries co-management in South Africa: An overview and analysis. Marine Policy 25 (3): 173–185. https:// econpapers.repec.org/article/eeemarpol/v_3a25_3ay_3a2001_3ai_3a3_ 3ap_3a173-­185.htm. Hauck, M., M.  Sowman, E.  Russell, B.M.  Clark, J.M.  Harris, A.  Venter, J. Beaumont, and Z. Maseko. 2002. Perceptions of subsistence and informal fishers in South Africa regarding the management of living marine resources. South African Journal of Marine Science 24 (1): 463–474. Hersoug, B., and P. Holm. 2000. Change without redistribution: An institutional perspective on South Africa's new fisheries policy. Marine Policy 24 (3): 221–231. Mather, C. 2007. Sustainability and fisheries reform in post-apartheid South Africa. Geography 92 (3): 221–230. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40574336 Accessed 5 Jan 2021. Meiring, J., and S.  Richards, eds. 2008. The Kenton story. Kenton-on-Sea: Self-Published. Mosert, N. 1992. Frontiers: The epic of South Africa's creation and the tragedy of the Xhosa people. New York: Knopf: Random House. Ngxwashula, N. 2020. The effect of integration of affordable/low cost housing into urban areas of property values. Unpublished MSc. Port Elizabeth: Nelson Mandela University. O’Kane, D., and R. Boswell. 2018. ‘Heritage’ and ‘cultural practice’ in a globalized disaster: A preliminary thematic analysis of documents produced during the Ebola epidemic of 2013–2015. Globalizations 15 (5): 622–635. Parkington, J. 2006. Shorelines, Strandlopers and shell middens: Archaeology of the Cape Coast. Cape Town: Creda Communications. Peires, J. 1982. The house of Phalo: A history of the Xhosa people in the days of their independence. Berkeley: University of California Press. South African Department Environment, Forestry and Fisheries. 2020. National Assembly Internal Question Paper No. 13 of 2020. United Nations Global Compact. 2021. Social sustainability. https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-­is-­gc/our-­work/social. Accessed 5 Jan 2021. Weaver, J. 2003. Great land rush and the making of the modern world, 1650–1900. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j. ctt804f5. Accessed 18 Dec 2020.

CHAPTER 7

Yoruba Language and Infodemic Management: The Covid-19 Experience Abisoye Eleshin

Introduction The emergence of the coronavirus in China in 2019 and its spread to other geographical spaces of the world has created a global crisis. The World Health Organization (WHO), the universal body that oversees the activities involving health and medical health dissemination throughout the world, consequently branded the outbreak a pandemic. This necessitates stakeholders, including government and non-governmental organisations, to take various steps to reduce the effect of the virus the world over. One of the means made available by stakeholders is the spread of information on how the virus operates. The essence of this information is to create awareness to the public through the appropriate and readily-­ available means. This process is recognised by the WHO, as such, but an excessive amount of information made available to the public during an

A. Eleshin (*) Institute of African and Diaspora Studies, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Arndt et al. (eds.), Covid-19 in Africa: Governance and Containment, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36139-5_7

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outbreak is termed an infodemic.1 The management of an infodemic is very crucial to the indigenous people of a society, especially those who depend largely on the information that stems from authoritative sources.2 In this kind of situation, one of the resources to be taken very seriously is language-use. Therefore, this research is an attempt to consider how the infodemic was managed vis-à-vis language-se during the outbreak of the coronavirus among the residents of Lagos State, Nigeria. It should be noted that pandemic outbreaks are not new to the world, and there have also been outbreaks of diseases in African communities. In all of these, language can be said to be at the centre of any communication procedure in any speech community.3 It is expected that language is specifically and stylistically utilised to contribute to the efforts at stemming, fighting and mitigating an outbreak. Also, language has been used in specific ways for documentation through rhetoric, tropes, proverbs and other literary devices. However, there are procedures and patterns that communication should follow to achieve comprehension among language users during the outbreak of a pandemic. This is one of the targets of this research. Lagos State is a cosmopolitan city with a population of about 22 million people. Lagos is, largely speaking, a Yoruba speech community. Although there are many other language groups that have migrated to Lagos at some point in history, the Yoruba language is still regarded as the lingua franca of the city. English and Pidgin English, as well as Igbo and Hausa, are other languages in communication media that are widely utilised by the public in Lagos. However, it should be noted that there are many residents of Lagos who do not understand either English language or Pidgin English. As such, this is the target population for this study— those whose main language of communication is Yoruba and are unable to effectively communicate or process information from other tongues. This serves as a good platform to establish the socio-economic profile of this category of people, as well as regarding literacy and access to government information through media. 1  World Health Organization. 2005. Outbreak communication. Best practices for communicating with the public during an outbreak. Report of the WHO Expert Consultation on Outbreak Communications held in Singapore, 21–23 September 2004. 2  Carr, A. 2021. Drowning in the Infodemic: Management in the Time of Covid-19. (n.p.): CFSC Publishing. 3   Sirbu, A. 2015. The Significance of Language as a Tool of Communication. 10.21279/1454864x.

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The Nigerian government announced a lockdown in Lagos and Abuja, the epicentre of Covid-19, on 30 March 2020. In the first week of May 2020, the government announced partial easing of the lockdown to enable reopening of some public facilities and businesses, including governmental and non-governmental organisations. However, many other public places such as hospitals and other medical facilities, institutions of learning and religious organisations initially remained closed. When these organisations were reopened, there were various strategies employed by stakeholders to minimise the effect of the coronavirus in Lagos. One of these strategies involves creating awareness through texts printed on banners and displayed in front of their buildings. The texts were meant to create awareness for the people who would be having any form of transaction with them. The languages used to create awareness on the banners and their methodology of dissemination is part of the focus of this research. The interrogations raised in this study include whether the Yoruba speech community of Lagos was sufficiently considered in terms of communication dissemination during the Covid-19 outbreak. If not, what is the implication for this kind of misdeed in a cosmopolitan city like Lagos? As Covid-19 is still evident all over the world, how can the right adjustment to this misdeed help to stem the effect of the virus? Suggestions and comments regarding the above questions will be presented in this chapter. Even though the official language of Lagos State is English, it is still considered a multilingual speech community with different groups of people speaking different tongues. Therefore, the scope of this study covers the language choice and the stylistic pattern used for the texts on the banners to communicate to the public. Furthermore, since Yoruba is the indigenous language of the people of Lagos, this research covers the use of the Yoruba language for the purpose highlighted above in a part of Lagos State. The data were collected between May and July 2020, signalling when the lockdown was eased in the study areas.

Language and Outbreak We won’t achieve zero Ebola cases in Congo until we get language right— Marzoto, M.

The above statement is credited to Mia Marzoto, Senior Advocacy Officer at Translators Without Borders, in The New Humanitarian, a print media channel with news sources on humanitarian crises, in their

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publication that focuses on Ebola virus disease in the Democratic Republic of Congo (December 2019). Note that Ebola virus disease ravaged the Sub-Saharan African terrain between 2014 and 2016. Although the virus has been successfully attacked in all the affected West African countries, the Democratic Republic of Congo is still struggling with the total eradication of the virus. The New Humanitarian has identified the mismanagement of indigenous language for information dissemination of issues relating to the virus disease as the major hindrance to the efforts at stemming the scourge of Ebola virus disease. One of the questions to be asked is how vital the language of a particular environment is in the management of an outbreak. And does such language have the capacity to meet the WHO standard for information dissemination during an outbreak? At this point, it is pertinent to examine the definition of an outbreak and then consider what role language could play in stemming its effect in a particular speech society. An outbreak is a sudden occurrence of an event.4 As defined by the WHO, an outbreak is the occurrence of disease cases in excess of normal expectancy. Strong coordination is essential at all times to ensure that all resources and stakeholders are working effectively together to control the outbreak. The WHO is often expected to lead the international response to support national health authorities.5 The World Health Organization identifies and categorises the successful management of infodemics into three areas: 1. Monitoring and identifying the spread of information during a pandemic 2. Analysing the information through the language of communication 3. Control and mitigation measures utilised on the information during a pandemic, which is also termed infodemology This study is concerned with the first area, which involves monitoring and identifying the spread of the information through language-use. Infodemic is a coinage derived by combining info from information and demic from pandemic. The essence of an infodemic, around indigenous speech communities that make use of languages other than English (or  BBC English Dictionary. London: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd.  World Health Organization. 2018. Managing epidemics: key facts about major deadly diseases. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2018. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO. 32. 4 5

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French), is not just translation. However, translation is a vital aspect of this process. Other analytical points include development of terms and, most importantly, the creative discourse in and around the period of the epidemic. It is important for us to note that every language-user has the innate ability to use and create acceptable expressions and structures in their language.6 As such, native speakers of a language have been seen to use their language creatively to address issues relating to pandemics. Since the indigenous language under study is Yoruba, it is important that I present the capabilities of the language through its development and empowerment. The evaluation of the role played by use of language during a disease outbreak in Africa has not been given considerable attention. This might be as a result of the manner in which language-use and its relevance in society has been relegated to the utilisation of diverse fields as a solution to human problems. It might also be that language scholars have identified the notion that there is no tangible therapeutic usefulness of indigenous language during any health hazard in a society. This notion is not limited to linguists but also applies to the various health and social workers who have not been specific on how language could contribute to the attempt to fight health crises and outbreaks.7 As such, in comparison with the use of other fields of study like medicine, sociology, philosophy and even history, language has been used sparingly to stem the scourge of global outbreaks, and especially in Africa.8 The analysis of language and crisis management that has been carried out ranges from roles played by a particular language in stemming an outbreak in a particular community in time, to the general roles of any language at any given period.9 One observation in the documentation relating to language and outbreak management is that language scholars have identified that the 6  Adegbile, J. and O.  Alabi. 2005. Proficiency and Communicative Competence in L2: Implications for Teachers and Learners. International Journal of African & African American Studies Vol. IV, No. 2, Jul 2005. 7  Whalen, D., M. Moss and D. Baldwin. 2016. Healing through language: Positive physical health effects of indigenous language use. F1000Research. 5. 852. 10.12688/ f1000research.8656.1. 8  Chituyami, M. and D.  Salihu. 2016. Strategies Used to Contain Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in Nigeria: A Lesson to Other Developing Countries. In Journal of Biology, Agriculture and Healthcare ISSN 2224-3208 (Online) Vol.6, No.14. 9  Mackinova, M., P. Kopinec, J. Holonic and J. Stanciak. 2019. Language Communication Skills in Health and Social Care Workers. In Iran J Public Health. 2019 Apr; 48(4): 773–774.

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distinctiveness of language is a determining factor in how a language is to be employed in stemming an outbreak. The role played by indigenous languages in early detection of epidemics using Malay, a South Asian language, was examined,10 and the study establishes that, overall, internet search results that are limited to only English-language sources may lead to missed opportunities in global outbreak monitoring efforts. What this suggests is that indigenous languages have an important part to play in the monitoring and mitigation of disease outbreaks. The study reported that most epidemics of the South Asian region have native terminologies in the Malay language. It has been observed that indigenous languages could be very useful in early detection of epidemic outbreak, which will in turn help in curtailing their spread.11 As much as native languages have been used for monitoring efforts in early epidemic detection, the question to be raised is if the languages have been sufficiently equipped to pass the important message of epidemic outbreak to language users. More significantly, these native languages would have to rely solely on a WHO-endorsed foreign language, which in most cases is almost always English. Since terminology development is considered to be an appendage of translation studies,12 I query in this study how the indigenous language has been able to capture and represent the semantics of the source terminology considering the translation parlance that “there is no perfect translation”. This might suggest that terminology development, which has the capacity of indigenising the details of a particular outbreak, might not be enough to comprehensively explain an outbreak to indigenous language users. The World Health Organization has standard practices expected of a communication process during an outbreak. In terms of the appropriateness of the language to be used for proper dissemination of information during an outbreak, if care is not taken, there could be a lot of misinformation and miscommunication on the concept of the outbreak.

10  Sulaiman, F., S. Yanti, D. Lesmanawati, T. Trent, C. MacIntyre and A. Chughtai. 2019. Language-Specific Gaps in Identifying Early Epidemic Signals – A Case Study of the Malay Language. In Global Biosecurity, Vol. 1. No. 3. 11  Sulaiman et al., 2009. 12  Yusuff, L. 2008. Lexical Morphology in Yoruba Language Engineering. Thesis submitted to the School of postgraduate Studies, University of Lagos, Nigeria; Eleshin, B. 2020. Machine Translation and Yoruba, Matters Arising. In UNILAG Journal of Humanities. Vol. 8, No. 2., pp 88–104.

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In the past, there was a much more organised African traditional medium of disseminating information, although it may not be very robust when compared to what currently exists.13 Now, with the advent of diverse social media platforms, media windows are numerous but not appropriately coordinated for proper language usage because languages are being used haphazardly without following standard best practices. For instance, in a way, certain features of the Yoruba language have made it easy for the language to handle pandemics; for instance, Yoruba is very good with pun, and the tonal distinctiveness of the language has also made it possible for it to be used to seamlessly disseminate information to all quarters. Perhaps the major challenge of language use during a disease outbreak is reaching out to certain categories of people in society, including semi-­ literates and non-literates. Their total and genuine understanding of the outbreak is essential. A vital question to be asked in this regard is: Where do these sets of people obtain their information from? Observations from the information gathered show that the first medium is hearsay. This is natural because most of these people do not have the luxury of time for proper news media, and thus they have to rely on what someone heard from someone else, who also heard the information from another unconfirmed source. This category can be considered the point of dispersion, and when dispersing the news they might add or remove some vital aspect of the information. Also, many non-English speakers in Lagos have radios and there are dedicated radio stations for local Nigerian languages specifically in Lagos and across the nation in general. One of the concerns raised by this research is the need for creation of awareness of concepts surrounding the Covid-19 pandemic using indigenous languages, especially the Yoruba language for Yoruba language speakers. For instance, it is assumed that non-literates and semi-literates would have difficulties in fully understanding terms such as pandemic, epidemic, outbreaks, epicentre, isolation, quarantine, index case, infodemic, virus, vaccines, and many other terminologies that are not used in day-to-day communication. It is thus crucial that this group of people be considered when organising the communication pattern that relates to the Covid-19 pandemic in Lagos by providing the terms in Yoruba and displaying them for community consumption.

 Ajikobi, D. 1999. The Symbiosis. Lagos: Prompt Books.

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The impetus for the choice of an indigenous language, and specifically the Yoruba language as the language of analysis for this research, is that 13% of this population of 20 million people are non-English speakers.14 This means that there are about 2.6 million people in Lagos who do not understand information on Covid-19 as written in English. Furthermore, even though 87% of the population of the state is literate in English, many still prefer to access information using the indigenous language. According to an expression credited to Nelson Mandela, former South African President, as quoted by Gearan (1996:vi) in At Home in the World: The Peace Corps Story, “If you talk to a man in a language he understands, that goes to his head, but when you speak to a man in his language, that goes to his heart”. This statement by Mandela reflects the relationship of a language speaker to not just the language they speak, but their indigenous language; it explains how  much the indigenous language of a speaker can appeal to them. Thus, Africans, like any other natural language users, have an emotional attachment to their indigenous languages, and in an emergency, as seen with the Covid-19 outbreak, indigenous languages will be more effective in communicating the urgency of care, mitigation strategies and required community interventions. The dynamic status of language is what positions it as one of the most creative and important creatures of nature. Language evolves. The attempts and efforts of language users to elevate their language to be able to meet the challenges of various developmental procedures is a key factor in the process of language development, evolution and empowerment.15 Over the decades, the Yoruba language has witnessed different levels of development, in a bid to meet the realities of a particular period. The Yoruba language was reduced to writing at the coming of the colonialists in the early nineteenth century.16 In the many efforts to elevate it to the level of other written languages, the Christ Missionary Society was a major player as it funded workshops and conferences as well as publications

14  Lagos State Literacy Survey. 2011. Lagos Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget. On behalf of Lagos State Agency for Mass Education Secretariat, Alausa, Ikeja. 15  Bamgbose, A. 1986. How the Past Influences the Present. In Yorùbá: Language in Transition. Odunjo Memorial Lecture Series. 16  Bowen, T. 1885. A Grammar and Dictionary of the Yorùbá Language (Smithsonian Contribution to Knowledge, 10) Smithsonian Institution; Shaw, T. 1974. The pre-history of West Africa. In Ajayi, J. F. and Michael C. (eds.). New York: Columbia University Press, 764.

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including Yoruba-English and English-Yoruba dictionaries, all in the twentieth century. One of the reasons for this reduction is the ambition of the language to meet colonial demands of the western format of documentation and record keeping. Whether or not this act has helped develop the language has been a controversial topic among scholars. Since then, Yoruba has undergone modification among language scholars.17 These modifications include orthography development, terminology development and metalanguage reports.18 It should be noted that universal occurrences have been seen to be one of the reasons for language development and evolution. This is realised through the development of new terminologies that are either derived from existing morphemes or given a semantic connotation, or through loaning of new words from the source language and domesticating them in the lexicon of the target language by making sure the rules of the language are employed in the process. All of the procedures explained above are essential to adequately communicate to locals who rely on indigenous language for information dissemination. The major objective is to ensure proper information-transfer and bridge any communication gap that might arise from the new situation. During an outbreak, there is an established procedure of information spread approved by the World Health Organization. It behooves the world language users to strictly abide by such procedure.

Methodological Considerations Data gathering for this study was based on mixed research methodology which involved qualitative and quantitative research strategies. Data gathering was carried out in three Local Government Areas of Lagos State, namely, Lagos Island, Lagos Mainland and Shomolu Local Government. Some of the locations covered include Idumota and Isale Eko (Lagos Island LGA), Yaba and Alago Meji (Lagos Mainland LGA) and Shomolu and Bariga (Shomolu LGA). These locations were chosen because these 17  Abraham, R. 1958. A Dictionary of Modern Yorùbá. London: University of London; Rowlands, E. 1969. Teach Yourself Yoruba. London: English Universities Press Ltd; Bamgbose, A. 1986. How the Past Influences the Present. In Yorùbá: Language in Transition. Odunjo Memorial Lecture Series. 18  Awobuluyi, O. 1990. Yorùbá Metanlanguage Vol. II. Ibadan: University Press Ltd.

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areas can be considered to be the commercial nerve centre and the location of various facilities owned by both government and non-­governmental organisations in Lagos. These places can also be regarded as the indigenous parts of the state, consisting of people with different educational backgrounds, including non-literates and semi-illiterates. Three research assistants were sent out to these places to take pictures of banners containing sensitising expressions regarding the mitigation of Covid-19, as displayed in front of public and private facilities. The facilities that were visited included places of worship, hospitals, educational institutions, and hotels and recreation centres. Aside from the images that were captured, interviews were carried out in order to be able to examine the level of understanding of the texts displayed on the banners. In all, fifty-­ four banners with various texts relating to the coronavirus were captured across the three local government areas under review. The number of banners written in the Yoruba language is examined and compared with the number of people who understood the messages on the banners.

Data Presentation and Analysis There were a total of fifty-four banners captured from different facilities across the three Local Government Areas that constitute the research area. Table 7.1 shows the breakdown of the representation of the facilities In the organisational chart represented in Table 7.1, religious organisations, mostly consisting of churches, are most represented with sixteen counts, followed by educational institutions with thirteen counts. The number of banners for hospitals and medical organisations, which amounts to eleven, is understandable. However, some of the hospitals and medical Table 7.1  List of Covid-19 information banners according to organisation in Lagos, Nigeria S/N

Facilities

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Government buildings and offices Hospitals and medical facilities Open marketplaces Educational institutions Religious organisations Banks and corporate businesses Total

No of banners 4 11 5 13 16 5 54

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facilities were closed during the outbreak because they were not authorised or well equipped to treat patients that had contracted the virus, and by extension, patients with other ailments were not given fair treatment. Next is marketplaces and banks and corporate organisations with five counts each. Government buildings and offices have four counts. The spread of the frequency could be explained by the fact that religious organisations are numerous within these three Local Government Areas. Also, the organisations were given strict instructions before they were allowed to engage in their usual worship process, and thus worshippers needed to be warned to comply with the instructions. The frequency accrued to educational institutions is understandable since schools were expected to join in the sensitisation of the general public about the spread of the virus and the necessary efforts put in place to curtail the spread. Marketplaces needed to be reopened on time. However, the level of awareness through the medium under study is not encouraging, as very few open markets organised themselves to display banners with texts to create awareness for buyers and sellers. Corporate organisations, especially banks, can be compared with open markets because the people need to have access to their money. The easing of lockdown, at first, did not include government parastatals, so the few banners that were captured from this category were from police stations and local government offices. Three different linguistic codes are used for the fifty-four banners collected for the study. Table 7.2 shows the language spread of the texts on the banners. Clearly, English is the language most used for the texts on the banners, which could be due to the fact that it is the official language of the country. The breakdown of the banners with Yoruba text is such that five were found in government hospitals while the remaining one was used by a

Table 7.2 Language spread, Lagos, Nigeria

S/N Language 1. 2. 3.

English Yoruba Pidgin Total

Frequency 46 6 2 54

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church. Two of the fifty-four banners were written in Pidgin English and these were captured in open market spaces. Islam and Christianity are the two major religions of the Nigerian people, and this is evident in the number of religious organisations and their Covid-19 awareness processes through banner displays in the study areas. Regarding the use of Yoruba in these religious centres, it was surprising that only one centre out of the sixteen made use of the Yoruba language on the banners that were displayed. Note that most of these worship centres make use of the Yoruba language in their worship process, either through direct usage or through translators. Even in the case of the non-­ English-­ speaking centres, which mostly include mosques, the banners were displayed using the English language. The above shows a serious gap in the sensitisation process with the use of the Yoruba language for the non-English-speaking population of Lagos. Furthermore, out of the eleven medical facilities that were visited, only five, all government owned, displayed Yoruba-language banners. This should call for serious concern because a sizable number of patients who visit government-owned medical facilities are non-literates who are most likely to be non-English users. The percentage breakdown of the use of the three languages, that is, English, Pidgin and Yoruba, for awareness through the displayed banners is represented below (Table 7.3): Apart from the observation of the number of banners with Yoruba texts for Covid-19 awareness, it is also very important to attempt a discourse analysis of the Yoruba texts on the banners, as compared with the use of English. This is necessary so as to examine the social contexts of the banners and how their texts have been able to effectively create vital awareness about the Covid-19 pandemic for the Yoruba-speaking population of the study area. There are six banners that displayed Yoruba language texts—five of the banners were used in government hospitals while one was displayed at the entrance of a church. Four of the six banners are presented and analysed below. Table 7.3  Languages used on the banners 3a. b. c.

English Yoruba Pidgin English

– – –

85.1% 11.1% 3.8%

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1a) Ẹ káàbọ̀    Welcome  b) Pa araà re ̣ mọ́, wà ní ìlera    Keep yourself, be in good health   c)  Lo ìbòmúbẹnu    Use mask  d) Fi ọs ̣ẹ fọ ọwọ́ rẹ̀ lábẹ́ omi tí ó ń ṣàn    Use soap to wash your hands under running water   e)  Fi àlàfo sáàrin ìwọ àti ẹnìkejì    Leave space between you and the next person   f)  Fi oògùn a-pa-kòkòrò pa ọwọ́ rẹ    Use sanitiser to rub your hands The texts in (1a–f) were written on a banner at the entrance of a church. The first impression of the texts is that the orthography of the language is carefully respected, especially with the use of tones (Yoruba being tonal language). There are six different entries on the banner. The first entry is a welcome message to the people who are expected in the building. The other five entries are different instructions on the best ways to mitigate the spread of the Covid-19 virus. The first instruction, which is translated as Keep yourself, be in good health, is a general instruction on the need for everyone to stay healthy. It not only speaks to the Covid-19 pandemic, but also relates to other diseases. It serves as the premise on which the remaining instructions rest, that is, if you keep to yourself and adhere to the remaining five instructions, you will be in good health. The first direct instruction relating to Covid-19 is the need to use a mask, which is termed ìbomúbẹnu (literally translated to: what is used to cover the nose and mouth). Referring to a mask as ìbomúbẹnu is a sharp digression from how masks have been popularly termed, that is, ìbòmú (what is used to cover the nose). Representing a mask as in (1c) is vital to one of the processes of the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic since it is expected that the mask should cover the nose and the mouth. Another instruction is presented in (1d), which is translated to: use soap to wash your hands under running water. It is not enough to wash the hands; it should be done under running water, which is presented as flowing water in the source language since the tap water system is not indigenous to Yoruba. In the next instruction, the worshippers are instructed to leave space between them and the person sitting next to them. I observe that the space to be left between two people is not specified, whereas there should be a specification. This instruction is not properly presented because if the space left between two people is not up to the standard prescribed by the

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Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (the government agency in charge of the fight against Covid-19), there will be a risk of the spread of the virus. The last instruction on the banner states that fi oògùn a-pa-kòkòrò pa ọwọ́ rẹ, which I translate to: use sanitiser to rub your hands. Sanitiser here is presented as oògùn a-pa-kòkòrò. This can be very misleading and dangerous to non-English speakers, those whom the message is meant for. The word oògùn a-pa-kòkòrò can be literally translated to insecticide, whereas some insecticides are not to be handled with bare hands as they are poisonous. Also, the word oògùn should not have been used because even though sanitiser is meant to kill the virus, it should have been referred to as a liquid that kills viruses and not a drug that kills insects. Since viruses cannot be seen with the naked eye, a better term for it in Yoruba is kòkòrò àìlèfojú-lásán-rí (lit. insects that the naked eyes cannot see). Generally, on the analysis of the words on the banner in (1), there are structural and cultural implications to the presentation, which is that there is an introductory part of the message which includes the welcome greeting (1a), followed by the aim of the whole discourse (1b) and then all the steps to be taken in order to achieve the main objective of the discourse (1c–f). Furthermore, culturally, Yoruba people believe strongly in protocol of greetings, and this is represented in the popular saying ẹni tí kò kíni kú ilé pàdánù ẹ kàábọ̀, translated as “the person that does not greet us when they arrive will not be accorded a welcome greeting”. Since the first entry on the banner is a welcome greeting, visitors to the organisation are more likely to pay keen attention to the other instructions. Most of the other banners displayed, whether in English or any other language, did not take this cultural aspect into cognizance. The tendency for people to pay more attention to an inscription that says You are welcome, please use your mask is higher than for the inscription No face mask, no entry. Now I present other banners with Yoruba words as seen in government hospitals. 2a) Arun Covid wa looto    Covid is real b) Ilera re dowo re, fo o mo     Your health is in your hands, wash it clean c) Maa lo ibomu re ̣ ni gbogbo igba     Use your mask always There are three entries on the banner, as presented above. The first entry addresses a very serious and controversial topic, the fact that a

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certain percentage of the population, especially the non-literates, do not believe that the Covid-19 virus truly exists. Therefore, the entry provides a form of confirmation to the people that, truly, Covid-19 does exist. The literal translation of the entry is “truly, Covid exists”. The arrangement of the expression clearly shows that there has been some doubt among the people on the existence and realness of the virus. This is followed with the comment that it is the responsibility of every individual to take care of their health. However, a case of ambiguity can be spotted in the structure. The highlighted pronoun in the sentence Ilera re dowo re, fo o mo (in bold) could either refer to ilera or to owo. It is more likely that the verb fo (wash) will select the object owo than ilera. Therefore, what the entry means is: Ilera re dowo re, fo owo (re) mo, (transl.—Your health is in your hands, wash (your) hands clean). It is a popular parlance that the fate of everyone’s health lies in their hands, and the second entry is therefore advice to the people to make sure that the hands that are responsible for their health are washed clean. The third entry is an express instruction that the mask should always be used in order to avoid contracting the virus. The major limitation of the texts in (2a–c) is that the language is not properly written with the correct orthography of Yoruba and there are also no tone marks on the words. The data presented in (3 and 4) are also from of instruction printed on banners at Government hospitals. 3a) Lo ibomu re ki o to wole     Use your nose-mouth mask before you enter.  b) Fi alafo silẹ laarin iwọ ati ẹni to wa ni ẹgbẹ rẹ     Leave a space between you and the person beside you. 4) Lo ibomu re ki o to wole     Use your nose-mouth mask before you enter. The instructions in (3a) and (4) are the same. In fact, this structure is the most popular of all the instructions printed on banners displayed in public buildings. Although this is the most basic instruction that could be given to the people to reduce the spread of the virus, it is not as engaging as the earlier examples in (1, 2 & 3b). Also, the Yoruba language used is not properly presented as there are no tone marks on the words.

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Conclusion It has been established in this study that the Yoruba language, which is the indigenous language of the Yoruba people in Lagos, has not been adequately utilised in line with the standard of the World Health Organization on infodemic management. The WHO identifies monitoring and identifying the spread of information through language use as an effective way of creating awareness on Covid-19. This is what I have examined in this study through the analysis of the language on banners and signage, using three different Local Government Areas of Lagos State. The expressions on the banners and signage are supposed to be for the consumption of the general public, especially non-literates and non-English speakers. If the information on banners is not well channelled, this will create a form of infodemic. Since some members of the public already have doubts about the existence of the virus in Lagos; information through words printed on banners could provide clearer information to the people about the virus. The expressions on the banners are meant to pass a message to not only the visitors to the public facilities that have been identified in this study, but also to passersby. It is expected that adequate Yoruba language expressions that address the Covid-19 issues in the form of warning and instruction should be made available for the general public. This is necessary as it has been established, according to the best practices for communicating with the public during an outbreak, that language, if adequately and specifically utilised, can play a vital role in reducing the impact of a pandemic in a speech community.

Bibliography Abraham, R. 1958. A dictionary of modern Yorùbá. London: University of London. Adegbile, J., and O. Alabi. 2005. Proficiency and communicative competence in l2: Implications for teachers and learners. International Journal of African & African American Studies IV: 2. July. Ajikobi, D. 1999. The symbiosis. Lagos: Prompt Books. Awobuluyi, O. 1990. Yorùbá Metanlanguage II. Ìbàdàn: University Press Ltd. Bamgbose, A. 1984. How the past influences the present. In Yorùbá: Language in Transition. Odunjo Memorial Lecture Series. BBC English Dictionary. London: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd. Bowen, T. 1885. A grammar and dictionary of the Yorùbá language (Smithsonian contribution to knowledge, 10). Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution.

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Carr, A. 2021. Drowning in the Infodemic: Management in the Time of Covid-19. n.p: CFSC Publishing. Chituyami, M., and D. Salihu. 2016. Strategies used to contain Ebola virus disease (EVD) in Nigeria: A lesson to other developing countries. Journal of Biology, Agriculture and Healthcare. ISSN 2224-3208 (Online) 6: 14. Christiansen, M., and N.  Chater. 2008. Language as shaped by the brain. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31: 489–508. Eleshin, B. 2020. Machine translation and yoruba, matters arising. UNILAG Journal of Humanities 8 (2): 88–104. Gearan, M. 1996. The spirit of service. In At home in the world: The peace corps story. Washington, DC: Library of Congress Catalog. ISBN 0-9644472-1-5. Lagos State Literacy Survey. 2011. Lagos Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget. On Behalf of Lagos State Agency for Mass Education Secretariat, Alausa, Ikeja. Mackinova, M., P.  Kopinec, J.  Holonic, and J.  Stanciak. 2019. Language communication skills in health and social care workers. Iranian Journal of Public Health 48 (4): 773–774. Marzoto, M. 2019. We won’t achieve zero Ebola cases in Congo until we get language right. The New Humanitarian. www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2019/12/03/ebola-­epidemic-­Congo-­language-­communication Oketch, O. 2006. Language use and mode of communication in community development projects in Nyanza Province, Kenya. Unpublished Doctor of Philosophy. Cape Town: Department of Linguistics, University of the Western Cape. Rowlands, E. 1969. Teach yourself Yoruba. London: English Universities Press Ltd. Shaw, T. 1974. The pre-history of West Africa. In History of West Africa, ed. J.F. Ajayi and C. Michael. New York: Columbia University Press. Sirbu, A. 2015. The significance of language as a tool of communication. Scientific Bulletin 18 (2): 405. https://doi.org/10.21279/1454-­864x. Sulaiman, F., S. Yanti, D. Lesmanawati, T. Trent, C. MacIntyre, and A. Chughtai. 2019. Language-specific gaps in identifying early epidemic signals  – A case study of the Malay language. Global Biosecurity 1: 3. Whalen, D., M. Moss, and D. Baldwin. 2016. Healing through language: Positive physical health effects of indigenous language use. F1000Research 5: 852. https://doi.org/10.12688/f1000research.8656.1. World Health Organization. 2005. Outbreak communication. Best practices for communicating with the public during an outbreak. Report of the WHO Expert Consultation on Outbreak Communications held in Singapore, 21–23 September 2004. ———. 2018. Managing epidemics: key facts about major deadly diseases. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2018. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO. Yusuff, L. 2008. Lexical morphology in Yoruba language engineering. Thesis Submitted to the School of Postgraduate Studies. Lagos: University of Lagos.

PART II

Regional Perspectives

CHAPTER 8

Covid-19 Containment in East Africa: Science-based Strategies or Traditional-based Strategies? Victoria Boniface Makulilo and Hussein Kapuya

Introduction When it became evident that Covid-19 was becoming a global pandemic, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared it a public health emergency of international concern by March 2020.1 It also developed a comprehensive response to Covid-19. Several guidelines to effectively fight Covid-19 were issued across the world. These included restrictions 1  Lone, Shabir Ahmad and A.  Ahmad. 2020. Covid-19: An African Perspective. Emerg Microbes Infect 9:1300–1308. https://doi.org/10.1080/22221751.2020.1775132.

V. B. Makulilo (*) University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM), Dar es Salaam, Tanzania H. Kapuya Dar es Salaam University College of Education, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Arndt et al. (eds.), Covid-19 in Africa: Governance and Containment, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36139-5_8

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on movements and public gatherings; ensuring access to safe testing and treatment; countering disinformation and misinformation; isolating cases; tracing sources; quarantine; developing safe and effective vaccines and therapies, as well as providing appropriate clinical care for the victims to reduce mortality rate.2 The WHO further summoned 400 world-class disease control experts via virtual and real platforms to research the possible causes of the virus and suggest the way forward to contain it.3 These scientific measures and strategies were clearly distinguished from those which are based on traditional culture and religious foundations such as prayers, steam inhalation and traditional herbs. The global promotion of the measures and strategies to fight the Covid-19 pandemic eventually motivated many countries across the world to apply them as suggested by the WHO. Some African countries followed those measures and others followed their own path. However, the WHO warned member states categorically over the use of drugs of unknown ability.4 The discouragement against traditional-based strategies/measures to fight Covid-19 was higher following the decision of Madagascar to introduce and distribute its own traditional medicine to several fellow African states like Guinea Conakry, Equatorial Guinea, and Guinea Bissau, while other countries like Tanzania and Liberia were humbly waiting for their share.5 Despite enormous efforts made by the WHO to discourage the use of traditional-based measures while emphasizing science-based measures, the containment of Covid-19  in East Africa is highly varied. Uganda and Rwanda opted for a science-based strategy (informed by surveys); Kenya employed a science-based strategy mixed with a “law and order” approach in response to the public health crisis; Tanzania and Burundi followed a traditional-based strategy; and South Sudan employed a mixed strategy. 2  WHO. 2020. WHO supports scientifically proven traditional medicine, WHO Africa. https://www.afro.who.int/news/who-supports-scientifically-proven-traditional-medicine. Accessed 15 May 2020. 3  Dongxiao, Chen. and Z. Haibing. 2020. International Cooperation for the Coronavirus Combat: Results, Lessons and Way Ahead. http://brisbane.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/ zts/f2019ncov/202003/P020210524278116910876.pdf. Accessed 20 June 2021. 4  Xiao, Y. and M. E. Torok, 2020. Taking the right measures to control Covid-19, The Lancet, Infectious Diseases, 20:523–524. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20) 30152-3. 5  Shaltami, Osama Rahil. 2020. Covid-19: WHO cautions against the use of traditional herbs in Africa. Department of Earth Sciences Faculty of Science. Benghazi University, Libya.

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This chapter aims to understand these variations of measures in response to Covid-19 containment in East African countries. It focuses on examining both the impact of these measures on the economy and on the lives of ordinary poor citizens of East Africa. Ordinary poor citizens depend very much on subsistence economies (based on small-scale farming, small businesses, fishing, etc.). They constitute the majority population of East Africa.

Methodology This is a comparative study of six East African countries, namely Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan. The countries were purposely selected based on two main reasons. First, they all form a regional economic community known as the East African Community (EAC) whereas there is a joint and coordinated EAC response to Covid-19 pursuant to Article 118 of the EAC. However, the variations in Covid-19 containment had political implications for the economies of the countries as well as for the unity of the East African Community. Second, they are all developing countries whose urban citizens are poor and depend heavily on subsistence activities such as hawking, selling food on streets, motorcycle taxi (boda-boda) driving and many other small businesses in big cities. Therefore, the choice of measures for Covid-19 containment had major implications for the lives of these citizens. Six cities in East African countries (i.e. Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Kampala, Kigali, Bujumbura and Juba) were selected based on the following reasons: they are big cities with major airports connecting these countries to the rest of the world; they are the most populated cities where the spread of Covid-19 was much higher than in other cities; and they constitute informal settlements (communal living and high density of urban areas) where access to services such as health information and facilities is a challenge. The nature of these cities suggests very specific measures for Covid-19 containment. The study aimed to answer three main questions. First, how did the governments respond to the Covid-19 pandemic? Second, how did ordinary poor people respond to measures and the conduct of the government in response to the Covid-19 pandemic? Third, what is the impact of both science-based and traditional-based strategies on Covid-19? To answer those questions, the study used a documentary review of both qualitative and quantitative data through library research. Data were collected from official websites, verified Instagram accounts, Twitter accounts, and

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Facebook accounts, and interviews accessed from YouTube and other verified social media accounts. This was because the Covid-19 pandemic had made it difficult for data collection through field work. The data included statistical reports, political discussions on GDP and economic growth, socio-economic activities, health care systems, and poverty reduction before and after the Covid-19 pandemic. Targeted people and institutions were decision makers (heads of state, ministers, etc.); ordinary poor citizens; donor countries; the WHO; and health personnel from the six cities under study. They were purposively selected to provide relevant data (on strategies, measures, statistics, impact of Covid-19).

Theory Institutionalism Theory is used to guide the examination of choice and implementation of science-based and/or traditional-based strategies in fighting the Covid-19 pandemic in East Africa. It is argued that institutionalism shapes public administration realities and processes.6 According to Scott,7 these processes (i.e. rules, norms and routines) are recognized as authoritative guiding principles for social behaviour. Institutionalists argue that institutions are central in explaining the success or failure of the implementation of any programme or even an outbreak of a pandemic like Covid-19. Institutions either empower or constrain human actions. They are very significant because they influence norms, beliefs, and actions and thus shape the outcomes. Therefore, the rate at which nations can notice and respond to the outbreak of a pandemic can be determined by their institutional capacity.8 The study used rational choice and sociological and political institutionalisms to understand variations of strategies in containing Covid-19 in East Africa. Rational choice institutionalism assumes that actors are rational and make their decisions following logical calculations that inform 6  Thoenig, Jean-Claude. 2003. Institutional theories and public institutions: Traditions and appropriateness. in Handbook of Public Administration. Peters Guy and Jon Pierre, eds. 127–148. London: Sage Publications. 7  Scott, W.  Richard. 2005. Institutional Theory: Contributing to a theoretical research program. In Great minds in management: The process of theory development. Oxford, UK: University Press. 8  Mo Ibrahim Foundation. 2020. Covid-19 in Africa: a call for coordinated governance, improved health structures and better data, https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/sites/default/ files/2020

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their wide range of choices.9 In relation to Covid-19 control, East African governments were to implement science-based or traditional based strategies after careful and logical calculations of the costs and benefits of each strategy. Africa has the lowest capacity in providing critical health care. Handling Covid-19 patients using a science-based approach requires hospitals to have sufficient ventilation, electricity, and oxygen, conditions which are too expensive for Africa to afford.10 In addition, Africa has a ratio of one conventionally trained doctor for every 40,000 people and one traditional healer for every 500 people. Thus, rational actors would automatically prefer the use of traditional healers over science-based alternatives. Moreover, even if the means and ways through which the virus spreads are similar across the world, their speed and pattern vary from one place to another due to various factors such as climatic conditions and average age composition in a given area.11 Africa, for instance, has few cases of coronavirus compared to other regions due to several factors such as climatic conditions and average age composition of its people, which is the lowest globally.12 It is irrational to contain Covid-19 through universal strategies; rather each country has an exceptional situation, which suggests the need for each nation to prudently design its own responses appropriate for its own socio-economic ecology. Although this approach leads to a better understanding of variations of Covid-19 containment in East Africa, it is limited in that individuals are not machines and hence their rationality is subject to other relationships which prevail in their settings.13 Political Institutionalism focuses on how state structures and institutions shape the political actions and even outcomes of political actors and organizations.14 The main assumption is that macro-level political ­institutions shape political actors and politics by posing constraints on 9  Schmidt, V. A. 2014. Institutionalism. Wiley Online Library https://onlinelibrary.wiley. com/doi/full/10.1002/9781118474396.wbept0513 2014. 10  Kaseja, Neema. 2020. Why Sub-Saharan Africa needs a unique response to Covid-19, World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/03/why-sub-saharan-­ africa-needs-a-unique-response-to-Covid-19/. Accessed 5 March 2020. 11  Mo Ibrahim Foundation, Covid-19  in Africa: A Call for Coordinated Governance, Improved Health Structures and Better Data, 2020, https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/sites/ default/files/2020. 12  Mo Ibrahim (Ibid). 13  Simon, Herbert A. (Feb., 1955). A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 69, (1): 99–118. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884852. 14  Amenta, E. and K. M. Ramsey. 2010. Institutional theory. In Handbook of Politics: State and Sociology in Global Perspective, Leicht, K. T and Jenkins, J. C., eds. 17–38.

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freedom which consequently determine the course of actions and decisions.15 These actors are seen as working within institutional constraints and constraints on resources and other means of action which tend to influence weak state policies. On that basis, institutions can be weak or strong depending on the political-administrative relationship between systems and subsystems within a single embracing system.16 This therefore means that state actors’ actions and events of operation are conditioned by the macro-political institutions in which they exist. Since effective fighting against Covid-19 depends on adequate resources such as funds and experts, Africa’s capacity to fight Covid-19 is very weak due to the presence of fragile health systems and many overcrowded slums.17 It is also difficult for Africa to effectively fight Covid-19 due to the prevalence of several other diseases such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, Ebola, injury, and cancer, which means there is no room for Covid-19 patients to be absorbed in hospitals in most parts of the continent.18 The use of science-­based strategies in Africa depends on the support (financial assistance, food, medicines, etc.) given by regional/international organizations and donor countries. These organizations include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and USAID. It is argued that science-based strategies were implemented by those East African governments which received support. Sociological institutionalism holds that, apart from formal institutions, informal institutions such as religious values and culture also shape the behaviour of actors. Such institutions tend to socialise and influence members of a particular group to create meaning for their actions from the institutional ecology in which they are set.19 According to this approach, 15  W. Riggs, Fred. 1980. The ecology and context of public administration: A comparative perspective. Public Administration Review 40: 107–115; Amenta, E. 2005. State-centered and political institutionalist theory: retrospect and prospect. In Handbook of Political Sociology: States, civil societies, and globalization. Jonak, et  al., eds. 96–114. Cambridge University Press, New York. 16  Riggs (op.cit). 17  Cara, Anna. 2020. Africa should prepare for the worst with virus, WHO says. National Catholic Reporter, The Independent News Source. https://www.ncronline.org/news/ africa-should-prepare-worst-virus-who-says. Accessed 20 March 2020; Mo Ibrahim Foundation (op.cit). 18  Kaseja (op.cit); BBC News. 2020. Corona virus: Why lockdowns may not be the answer in Africa. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52268320. Accessed 20 April 2020. 19  Nilsson, Jens. 2018. What Logics Drive the Choices of Public Decision-Making. Doctoral Thesis. Political Science. Lulea University of Technology.

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actors tend to legitimise their actions with prevailing culture.20 Unlike rational choice which views actors as rational, sociological institutionalism sees actors as operating within a framework conditioned by the norms of the society.21 This is very useful in explaining the fight against Covid-19 that was based on either faith or traditional practices (commonly referred to as traditional strategies). Specifically, the approach makes it easier to also understand the choice of “mixed strategies” in fighting Covid-19 among East African governments. For instance, the implementation of traditional health measures as well as religious measures alongside science-­ based measures was clearly evident in East African containment strategies. For instance, while some religious groups complied with the science-­ based measures (e.g. closing church services), others insisted that their places of worship would remain open to the public, against government directives.22 These attitudes of keeping beliefs during tough times are entrenched in the teachings of both the Bible and the Quran. The Quran, for instance, guides Muslims to ask for God’s mercy and grace in difficult situations as only God’s grace and mercy can deliver them from these situations.23 Similarly, the Bible requires Christians in tough times to commit their way to the Lord, and to trust in him for he can act against any challenging situation.24 This kind of teaching had an impact in fighting the pandemic in this region where many public leaders were placing religion ahead of health.25 A good example is the Tanzanian government.

Covid-19 Containment Strategies in East Africa The study found that there was a disparity in the strategies used in East Africa despite the WHO’s strong emphasis on the use of science-based strategies. The reasons for such disparity were ineffective collaboration among East African Community member states, the amount of aid received by each country, prioritization of economy; prioritization of the  Riggs (op.cit).  Parsons, Wayne. 1995. Public policy: An introduction to the theory and practice of policy analysis. Cheltenam: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 22  Chiliswa, Zac. 2020. Is religion helping or hurting Africa’s fight against Covid-19? Democracy in Africa. Democracy in Africa (DIA). http://democracyinafrica.org/religion-­ helping-­hurting-africas-fight-Covid-19/. Accessed 8 June 2020. 23  Quran 3:160. 24  The Holy Bible, Psalm 37:5. 25  Chiliswa (op.cit). 20 21

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right to life and right to health, and prioritization of general elections. As of 30 March 2020, Covid-19 had spread to all EAC member states except South Sudan. Table 8.1 shows a total of 172 confirmed cases in five member states of the EAC. Table 8.1 shows that Kenya has the highest number of confirmed cases, followed by Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania. In contrast, Burundi shows the lowest number of confirmed cases and South Sudan has no cases reported. Generally, there were already 172 confirmed cases in the region in just 18 days. This situation was very alarming for the EAC and they had to meet and deliberate as quickly as possible. A joint meeting of ministers of health and ministers responsible for EAC Affairs was convened on 25 March 2020 by the EAC Secretariat to deliberate on joint and coordinated EAC responses to the Covid-19 pandemic pursuant to Article 118 of the EAC. Key interventions and activities for implementation were guided by the directives and decisions of the joint meeting. These directives included: to conduct research on Covid-19; provide additional contingency funds; strengthen information sharing through press conferences and other channels; establish a surveillance system; implement mandatory quarantine for 14 days; develop a regional strategy for accessing coronavirus testing kits; facilitate communication between member states; minimise cross-border movement of people while facilitating free movement of goods and services; establish a linkage between the national task force and the EAC Secretariat; and establish a mechanism to facilitate movement of surge capacity and medical countermeasures across borders.

Table 8.1  Case reporting on early days of Covid-19 in East Africa from March to April 2020 Country Burundi Kenya Rwanda South Sudan Tanzania Uganda Total

Confirmed cases

Non-confirmed cases

2 50 70 0 19 33 172

0 19 16 0 6 10 51

Source: East Africa Community Covid-19 Response Plan, 27 April 2020

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These directives and decisions are aligned with the WHO guidelines. Their effective implementation depends very much on availability of funds. The study shows a large gap in the amount of funds received by each EAC member state. Arguably, the differentiation in amount received by EAC member states influenced leaders to shift their attention from agreed directives and decisions to other measures (and focuses). Those who received a bigger share of funds emphasized science-based measures (in the name of protecting the right to life and right to health) and those who received small amounts emphasized traditional-based measures (in the name of promoting the economy and general elections). At this point, each member state implemented a strategy that seemed best for the country and the people. Tables 8.2 and 8.3 show the amount of financial support received by each member state and the measures employed by each state to mitigate Covid-19. Table 8.2  Financial assistance to support East African countries to fight Covid-19 from March to April 2020

Burundi Kenya

Rwanda

Amount received

Funding institution(s)

Funding support details

$14.43 million $1 billion $752.717 million €190.573 million GBP 1.1 million

IMF

• mitigate Covid-19

IMF WB ADB WFP EU (ECHO) UK Aid and Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation

$390.83 million

IMF WB ADB USAID

• cash transfers and nutrition support • economic recovery • support farmers’ income • protective equipment • laboratory capacity • trainings • strengthen health system • risk support communication • innovative scientific research • strengthen health system • harness digital solutions • fiscal response • trainings • surveillance • refugees (continued)

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Table 8.2  (continued) Amount received

Funding institution(s)

Funding support details

South Sudan

$170.523 million

IMF WB ADB USAID

Tanzania

$85.39 million €7.5 million DKK 5 million

IMF ADB USAID Ireland Novo Nordisk Foundation

Uganda

$977.96 million €17,500 GBP 4 million

WB ADB UK Aid Medical Research Council/ UK Research and Innovation USAID Sweden Denmark Gauff Foundation in Africa

• urgent balance of payments • mitigative Covid-19 • strengthen health system • respond to health crisis • trainings • medical equipment • mitigate socioeconomic and health impacts • strengthen laboratory capacity • support people with diabetes • risk support communication • surveillance and contact tracing • cash transfers for livelihoods • economic recovery • medical equipment • trainings • coordination • support farmers’ income • protective equipment • laboratory capacity • research • refugees • strengthen national health system • risk support communication • innovative scientific research

Source: Authors’ compilation from IMF, WB, ADB, EU, USAID, UK Aid, World Food Programme, US Embassy Tanzania, Danish Royal Embassy, Embassy of Ireland, 2020

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Table 8.3 shows, on one side, that Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda received more funds for effective implementation of various measures (i.e. tax measures, employment related-measures, economic stimulus measures and other measures). On the other side, South Sudan and Tanzania, which received a small amount of funds, implemented only a few selected measures. In addition, Table 8.3 shows that some measures were implemented across all member states and other measures were implemented differently among them. For instance, various reports indicated that the governments of Rwanda and Uganda stand out in the way they effectively strengthened and improved their pandemic response capacity throughout the phases. They engaged 200 survey teams to conduct a rapid assessment exercise to establish the prevalence of Covid-19 among communities. According to Mugo,26 Uganda and Rwanda undertook what were referred to as near perfect public health measures immediately. Their decision to employ lockdown in the early days of the outbreak is said to have assisted them in slowing down the spreading rate of the virus to about 40% in just one week of the establishment of lockdown. In addition, lockdown enabled both Rwanda and Uganda to curtail infections beyond localities where Covid-19 was first reported. Under WHO guidelines, lockdown measures made Uganda and Rwanda safer compared to Tanzania, which completely ignored the lockdown based on protecting the economy. The President of Tanzania, Dr John Pombe Magufuli, vehemently rejected the lockdown measure despite great pressure to impose lockdown from the main opposition party Chadema and the civil society. On several occasions the President insisted on the need to let businesses open throughout the country for economic reasons and as a reaction to what he viewed as an over-estimation of the severity of the Covid-19 pandemic.27 His response on the national television channel TBC was “there are calls to lockdown Dar es Salaam. We will 26  Mugo, Mugo Patrick. 2020. Covid-19 Response: What Uganda and Rwanda got right and what Kenya, Tanzania and Burundi Didn’t. Elephant. https://www.theelephant.info/ features/2020/06/18/Covid-19-response-what-uganda-and-rwanda-got-right-and-what-­­ kenya-tanzania-and-burundi-didnt/. Accessed 20 August 2020. 27  Awami, Sammy. Tanzania’s John Magufuli-the man vowing to defeat coronavirus and imperialism. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52983563. Accessed 18 June 2020; I.T.U.C Africa. 2020. Tanzania’s Approach to Fighting Covid-19-Saving the economy for the people or not acting to their detriment? Newsletter, Tanzania, http://www. ituc-africa.org/Tanzania-s-Approach-to-Fighting-Covid-19-Saving-the-economy-for-thepeople-or.html. Accessed 17 April 2020.

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Table 8.3  Covid-19 mitigating measures in East African countries from March 2020 Country Burundi Kenya

Tax measures

EmploymentEconomic stimulus Other measures related measures measures  • prayers No information No information No information  • 100% tax relief  • government  • cutting the  • social follow income workers were Monetary Policy distancing earners (persons asked to work Committee  • mandatory earning gross from home lowers monetary 14-day monthly income where possible policy rate and quarantine of up to KES reducing cash  •international 24,000 USD reserve ratios flight 226)  • industry specific suspension  • payment of packages (e.g.  • evening additional $5 m available to curfews income for a the tourism  • land border person earning industry) restrictions monthly income  • bank fees for  • partial of KES 24,000 money transfers lockdown  • decrease the top were waived  • three days pay-as-you-earn national (PAYE) prayers  • decrease of the value-­added tax rate from 16% to 14% with effect from 1st April 2020  • decrease of the resident corporate income tax from 30% to 25%  • reduction of the top PAYE rate from 30% to 25% (continued)

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Table 8.3  (continued) Country

Tax measures

Employmentrelated measures

Economic stimulus measures

Rwanda

 • suspension of Tax audit  • extension of financial statements  • Rwanda Revenue Authority waived the down payments requirements  • extension to fill returns  • land border restrictions  • extension of financial statement certifications

 • encourage use NIL of digital channels and contactless mobile payments  • zero charges on all transfers between bank accounts and mobile wallets  • zero charges on mobile money transfers  • evening curfews  • land border restrictions

Other measures  • mass screening and testing  • wear masks at all times  • social distancing  • mandatory 14-day quarantine  • international flight suspension  • evening curfews  • land border restrictions  • 14 days total lockdown  • closure of markets  • schools closed  • public and private transport prohibited  • meetings in public spaces banned (continued)

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Table 8.3  (continued) Country

Tax measures

Employmentrelated measures

Economic stimulus measures

Other measures

South Sudan

NIL

NIL

NIL

Tanzania NIL

NIL

NIL

 • social distancing  • mandatory 14-day quarantine  • international flight suspension  • evening curfews  • land border restrictions  • traditional remedies  • social distancing  • mandatory 14-day quarantine  • international flight suspension  • land border restrictions  • importation of traditional remedies from Madagascar  • prayers (continued)

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Table 8.3  (continued) Country

Tax measures

Employmentrelated measures

Economic stimulus measures

Other measures

Uganda

 • encouragement  • businesses to  • Mobile Network  • social of use of online reschedule Operators and distancing services their National commercial  • mandatory  • two months Social Security banks to increase 14-day extension to file Fund daily transactions quarantine corporation tax contributions and wallet size  • international returns limit; reduce fees flight  • waiver of on mobile money suspension penalty and transactions and  • evening interest upon other digital curfews voluntary payment charges  • land border disclosure  • provide restrictions  • 15 days exceptional  • three days of extension to file liquidity national monthly returns assistance prayers of PAYE

Source: Authors’ compilation from KPMG, 2020

never do that. This is our main port city and accounts for around 80% of government revenue”. He went further to state that “the economy must come first”. He advocated for faith-based measures like prayers and traditional medicines as perfect measures to fight the virus. He said, “Covid-19 is satanic and cannot live in the body of Jesus Christ—it will burn instantly”. He consequently called for three days of national prayers (on 16 April 2020) and in a later stage asked Tanzanians to use traditional herbs. President Magufuli and several ministers including the Prime Minister Kassimu Majaliwa on different occasions had been encouraging people to use traditional herbs to cure the signs of the virus. This was a move to prove to the whole world that other strategies than those suggested by the WHO could work in Africa.

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The President, in a televised speech, declared to the public that his own daughter who had tested positive for Covid-19 had been cured by the use of steam therapy and juice made of a mixture of lemon, ginger, and onions.28 Local herbs were widely promoted by both health experts and herbalists, who went a step further and prepared and shared video clips that showed how to prepare the herbs and use them on various social media including WhatsApp, YouTube, and Clouds Media. Suleiman Jaffo, the Minister of State, Local, and Regional Administration. advised that whenever a person experienced symptoms related to Covid-19 such as sore throat, a dry cough, or chest pain s/he should drink herbal juice. Also, the minister insisted on use of steam produced by a combination of neem tree leaves, mango tree leaves, orange tree leaves, and African onion leaves to protect themselves.29 In principle, Tanzania opted for a traditional strategy that did not compromise the country’s economy. Burundi opted for a faith-based strategy at the expense of conducting a general election. Burundi’s key leaders wanted their people not to fear Covid-19 and required them to proceed with their activities noting that God would intervene and protect Burundians.30 The measures in South Sudan were “mixed” due to its political landscape. While partial lockdown was preferred, traditional-based measures were implemented widely. Every Sudanese household was encouraged by both medical personnel and traditional medicine devotees to have a Galad, a traditional medicine made from an Acacia nilotica for treating the symptoms of Covid-19.31 In Sudan, Galad is used in combination with alhaba al-swada mixed with burning coal to burn the bad spirit away, and this is normally done together with the recitation of various verses of the holy Quran. The situation was not very different from Kenya. National prayers  Said, Khalifa. 2020. A problem of denial: why Tanzania could lose the war against Covid-19. Elephant. https://www.theelephant.info/features/2020/05/29/a-problem-ofdenial-why-tanzania-could-lose-the-war-against-­­Covid-19/. Accessed 29 May 2020. 29  BBC Swahili. 2021. Waziri Jafo: Tunaanza Kampeni ya Nyungu Juma Zima. https:// www.bbc.com/swahili/habari-55870231. Accessed 30 January 2021. 30  Mugo (op.cit) 31  Abdelmagid, Azza. 2020. How Sudanese are fighting Covid-19 with Traditional Medicine (Garad). 500 Words Magazine. https://500wordsmag.com/science-and-­ technology/health/how-sudanese-are-fighting-Covid-19-with-traditional-medicine-garad/. Accessed 4 September 2020. 28

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and traditional remedies were encouraged amidst strong emphasis on partial lockdown, social distancing, hand washing, and mass testing. According to Xinhua,32 clinical evidence in Kenya affirmed that the use of Traditional Chinese Medicine is more effective in fighting the virus. However, lack of official recognition of traditional herbs confused some Kenyans on their efficacy.33 A variation of measures employed by EAC member states had jeopardized joint efforts in fighting the Covid-19 pandemic in the region. For example, while some member states (e.g. Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda) emphasised mass testing, lockdown, curfews, and wearing masks, other states (e.g. Tanzania and Burundi) were encouraging their citizens to live their normal lives as if there was no pandemic. At some point the governments of Tanzania and Burundi started behaving differently. The reporting of Covid-19 cases stopped in Tanzania from 29 April 2020 and reporting in Burundi became irregular. The decisions and actions of Tanzania and Berundi departed from what was agreed by the joint meeting of the EAC. For instance, the two countries did not attend virtual EAC meetings and their leaders could not be reached. Raila Odinga (late President Magufuli’s best friend) told BBC Swahili News that “President Yoweri Museveni and President Paul Kagame have attempted to speak to President Magufuli without success”. He went further to state that “Magufuli’s response to Covid-19 is ill-advised”. Table 8.4 shows the reporting of Covid-19 cases in all member states. Table 8.4 shows reporting of Covid-19 in East Africa since the first case was reported. Both Tanzania and Kenya reported several cumulative cases as well as deaths. As of 12 November 2020, Tanzania reported zero new cases (implication: there is no Covid-19) while Burundi reported just one case. The situation seems different in other member states, for example Kenya reported the highest numbers of new cases. Interestingly, even the “best practices” (i.e. Rwanda and Uganda) reported comparatively higher numbers, that is, 5319 cumulative cases and 7985 cumulative cases respectively. The arguments behind high and low numbers are multiple and worth discussing.

32  Huaxia. 2020. Kenyans embrace home-based remedies to boost immunity amid Covid-19 risks. XinhuaNet. https:// www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-08/01/c_139257423.htm. Accessed 1 August 2020. 33  Gathara (op.cit).

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Table 8.4  Reporting of Covid-19 cases in East Africa from March to November 2020 Country

Reporting

Kenya

919 new reported cases, 66,723 cumulative cases, 23 new reported deaths 1203 cumulative deaths, 44,081 cumulative recovered, 21,439 active cases 224 new cases, four new reported deaths, 143 cumulative deaths, 7985 cumulative recovered, 304 active cases Seven new cases, 5319 cumulative cases, zero new reported deaths, 41 cumulative deaths, 4974 cumulative recovered, 304 active cases 20 new reported cases, 2980 cumulative cases, zero new reported deaths, 59 cumulative deaths, 2673 cumulative recovered, 298 active cases One new reported case, 624 cumulative cases, zero new reported deaths, one cumulative death, 559 cumulative recovered, 64 active cases Zero new reported cases, 509 cumulative cases, zero new reported deaths, 21 cumulative deaths, 180 cumulative recovered, 308 active cases

Uganda Rwanda South Sudan Burundi Tanzania

Source: WHO AFRICA REGION, 12 November 2020

First, the reporting of Covid-19 cases depended on the number of tests conducted. Governments which conducted fewer tests like those of Tanzania and Burundi had low numbers of cases reported. Second, this concerned the availability and effectiveness of test kits. The then President Magufuli of Tanzania claimed that test kits were faulty after following the results of tests conducted on samples of fruits and goats to become positive for Covid-19.34 He discredited test kits and was suspicious of an imperialist conspiracy involving Tanzania and Africa. Consequently, Tanzania stopped releasing Covid-19 data from 29 April 2020.35 In contrast, massive testing was possible in Rwanda due to the introduction of advanced devices (Smart Anti-Epidemic Robots) and an effective and quick contact tracking system.36 Third, the political landscape was critical for determining the number of tests and cases to be reported. For example, there were difficulties in

 Awami (op.cit).  Devermont, J. and H. Marielle. 2020. Implications of Tanzania’s bungled response to Covid-19. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/implications-tanzanias-bungled-response-Covid-19. Accessed 26 May 2020. 36  Witter, Arielle. 2020. 5 Countries that took proactive action on Covid-19. ONE Blog. https://www.one.org/international/blog/proactive-action-countries-Covid-19-­­ response/. Accessed 20tAugust 2020. 34 35

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conducting tests in South Sudan due to ongoing conflicts which promoted massive movements.37 Lastly, all countries generally believed in “national prayers”. All presidents subsequently called for three days of prayers. The strong faith in prayers made ordinary citizens avoid Covid-19 tests.

Peoples’ Reactions towards Covid-19 Containment Strategies in East Africa There were mixed reactions of ordinary citizens to the various measures and strategies employed by governments in East Africa. Generally, most of the negative reactions were directed towards science-based strategies and the positive reactions were directed towards traditional-based strategies. Generally, people reacted negatively to measures that were difficult to implement in the African environment (where poverty is rampant, majority poor citizens depend on agriculture and small businesses for survival, health facilities are poor, etc.). A poll was conducted in 12 African countries to collect people’s views on their governments and how these governments succeeded in mitigating Covid-19. Four countries from East Africa were among the countries examined. Table 8.5 shows the results of the poll for East African countries. Table 8.5 shows that Kenya has not done enough to mitigate Covid-19. This is due to violence that was already being inflicted on citizens by police before their curfew had even started.38 There was also widespread disbelief about the Covid-19 pandemic in Kenya. The claims were that there was no Covid-19 in Kenya and that the government was using Covid-19 funds for other purposes. Kenya’s Parliamentary Budget Office had warned about a significant portion of stimulus package allocations not being pandemic-related and that is was “contrary to PFM regulations”.39 This study documented a number of both positive and negative reactions with their subsequent responses from the government. 37  Dzinmarira, T., M. Dzobo and I. Chitungo. 2020. Covid-19: A Perspective on Africa’s capacity and response. J Med Virol. 92:2465–2472. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ doi/10.1002/jmv.26159. 38  Human Rights Watch. 2020. Kenya: Police brutality during curfew, several dead, others with life-threatening injuries. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/22/kenya-police-­ brutality-during-curfew. Accessed 29 April 2020. 39  Tyce, Mathew. 2020. Kenya’s response to Covid-19, effective states and inclusive development. https://www.effective-states.org/kenyas-response-to-Covid-19/. Accessed 29 April 2020.

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Table 8.5  Citizens’ views on measures taken by governments towards Covid-19 from March to April 2020 Country

Rating

Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda

2.9 4.4 3.5 4.0

Key 1: Strongly Disagree ------ 5: Strongly Agree Source: Tyce, 29 April 2020

(a) Defiance There were open resistance to lockdown, curfews, restrictions on public gatherings, restrictions on public and private transport, and wearing of masks. This resistance occurred in big cities like Kampala, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and Juba. For example, citizens protested their government’s failure to support them through lockdowns in Uganda.40 In Kenya, security services threw people into quarantine centres if they exhibited symptoms or if they broke curfew. They eventually emerged with outsized bills for the cost of the stay in cramped, unsanitary quarters.41 In Dar es Salaam, citizens appeared in large numbers in big markets like Kariakoo, Manzese, and Mbagala despite the government’s call to maintain social distance and wear masks in public places. The Kenyan and Ugandan governments responded to this resistance with excessive use of force including beating, shooting, and arbitrarily detaining people. (b) Low Turnout for Free Testing Covid-19 testing was not free in East Africa. Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi charged USD 50; South Sudan and Tanzania charged USD 75 and 100 respectively; and Kenya charged USD 18.89. Even after Kenya 40  Green, Andrew. 2020. Argument: If African Governments Won’t Act, the People Will. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/26/if-african-governments-wont-act-the-people-­ will/. Accessed 26 May 2020. 41  Green, Andrew. 2020. Kenya’s decision to cancel its school year will reverberate across Africa. World Politics Review, Newsletter. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/kenya-s-­ decision-to-cancel-its-school-year-will-reverberate-across-africa/. Accessed 8 August 2020.

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offered free testing in hotspots and densely populated areas of Kawangware and Eastleigh, there was still a low turnout.42 One of the reasons for this was fear among people that if they tested positive, they would face the heavy burden of quarantine. (c) Escaping Quarantine Facility Citizens escaped the quarantine facility when they found an opportunity to do so. The facilities were cramped, unsanitary, and not suitable for living. Connie Mwana from Kenya said, “When you go to those quarantine facilities, the chances of contacting Covid-19 are high, because of the way people are staying in the facilities. For example, sanitation is not good, people are sharing washrooms, picking individuals and taking them by force to these quarantine facilities has made people fear”.43 In Uganda, in March 2020, six Chinese individuals were arrested and taken to Nakawa Court in Kampala where they were convicted of being guilty of disobeying regulations, an act likely to spread coronavirus.44 Similarly, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, several people who were quarantined at a hospital escaped, alleging poor care in areas ranging from health services to food. In addition, quarantine facilities were too expensive for ordinary people to afford. For instance, they were quarantined in city hotels in Nairobi, Kampala, Dar es Salaam, and Kigali. As a result of these negative reactions most governments decided to use government buildings like hostels. Magufuli Hostels were used in Dar es Salaam and Kenyatta University Hostels were used in Kenya.

42  Ombuor, 2020, Low Turnout as Kenya Offers Free Testing in Feared Coronavirus Hotspots. VOA 2 April 2020, accessed at https://www.voanews.com/Covid-19-pandemic/ low-turnout-kenya-offers-free-testing-feared-coronavirus-hotspots. 43  Ombuor, Rael. 2020. Low Turnout as Kenya Offers Free Testing in Feared Coronavirus Hotspots. VOA. https://www.voanews.com/Covid-19-pandemic/low-turnout-kenya-­ offers-free-testing-feared-coronavirus-hotspots. Accessed 23 April 2020. 44  Athumani, Halima. 2020. 6 Chinese, 2 Ugandans Accused of Evading Covid-19 Quarantine in Uganda. VOA. https://www.voanews.com/a/science-health_coronavirus-­ outbreak_6-chinese-2-ugandans-accused-evading-covid-quarantine-uganda/6186258. html. Accessed 23 April 2020.

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(d) Positivity towards Hand Washing and Hygiene Promotion Hand washing and hygiene promotion was very widespread in all six countries. Messages circulated through all sorts of media to the extent that people responded positively. For instance, every place that offers services in Dar es Salaam, Kampala, Kigali, Nairobi, Juba, and Bujumbura had a hand washing facility and every person had to wash their hands before receiving any kind of service. Maitabel Achieng Okumu from Nairobi said, “today everyone knows the beauty of hand washing and thus people have gone to an extent—even the boda-boda riders—the guys who are riding motorcycles—have their hand washing facility”.45 In South Sudan, the Zam Zam group designed sinks operated by three-foot pedals. Similarly, hand washing stations were set up and there were several teams trained for educating the public on the proper way to wash their hands.46 The same practices were observed in Kariakoo market in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Nakasero market inKampala, Uganda; and Kigali, Rwanda. (e) Positivity towards Prayers and Traditional Medicines or Therapies Prayers and traditional medicines/therapies are very common in Africa. Ordinary citizens across East Africa have strong faith in prayers and/or traditional medicines/therapies. Government recognition of prayers and traditional medicines/therapies is viewed very positively by many people in low-income areas. The call for three days of national prayers was humbly accepted by many citizens. National prayers were conducted first in Tanzania on 17 April 2020,47 followed by Kenya on 9 October 2020,48

 Powell, Anita. 2020. ‘Wash Your Hands’ is tough message across africa. VOA. https:// www.voanews.com/science-health/coronavirus-outbreak/wash-your-hands-toughmessage-­­across-africa. Accessed 15 October 2020. 46  Relief International. 2020. Hand-washing-prevents-Covid-19-and-saves-lives. https:// www.ri.org/hand-washing-prevents-Covid-19-and-saves-lives-heres-how/. Accessed 15 October 2020. 47  VOA. 2020. Tanzania President Declares 3  Days National Prayers to Help Defeat Coronavirus. https://www.voanews.com/a/Covid-19-pandemic_tanzanian-presidentdeclares-­3-days-national-prayer-help-defeat-coronavirus/6187740.html. Accessed 17 April 2020; Silver, C. T. and J. Wu. 2020. The First Confirmed Case of Covid-19 in Tanzania: Recommendations based on Lesson Learned from China. Tropical Medicine and Health https://doi.org/10.1186/s41182-020-00214-x. 48  Diramakini. 2020. Kenyan President Declares 3 Days of National Prayer to Help Defeat Coronavirus in Kenya. https://www.diramakini.co.tz/2020/10/kenyan-president-­ declares-3-days-of.html. Accessed 15 October 2020. 45

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and then by Uganda on 25 June 2021,49 with Burundi also urging citizens to intensify prayers. Interestingly, no one wore a face mask during prayers in Burundi.50

The Impact of Covid-19 Containment Strategies in East Africa Covid-19 affected East African countries unevenly. The effects depended on the mechanisms and strategies employed by each specific country. A wide range of strategies were employed by EAC member states, as demonstrated in Table 8.3. The study observed that science-based strategies have had an adverse impact on the national economy as well as individual citizens’ well-being. In contrast, traditional-based strategies have had a positive impact on the national economy and individual citizens’ well-being. (a) The Impact of Science-based Strategies The study found that science-based strategies have had a far-reaching impact on the national economy and individual citizens’ well-being. First, there has been slow growth of the economy due to lockdowns, flight suspension, private and public transport restrictions, and so on. In addition, EAC member states have borrowed large amounts from donors to curtail the impact of Covid-19 while they are still paying off massive debts, as clearly shown in Tables 8.6 and 8.7. Table 8.7 shows slow economic growth in those countries that employed lockdowns/curfews, flight suspension, and border restrictions for a long period of time (i.e. Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, South Sudan). In contrast, those like Tanzania that employed flight suspension, border restriction, and closing of schools and higher learning institutions for a short period of time had the highest economic growth in the EAC region. The impact is severe for those countries with slow economic growth plus 49  Uganda Media Centre. 2021. STATE HOUSE: Museveni Declares Public Holiday for Covid-19 National Prayers. https://www.mediacentre.go.ug/media/museveni-declares-­ public-holiday-Covid-19-national-prayers. Accessed 22 July 2021; Olum, R. and F. Bongomin. 2020. Uganda’s First 100 Covid-19 Cases: Trends and Lessons, Int J Infect Dis 96: 517–518. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2020.05.073. 50  Taarifa. 2020. Burundi Intensifies Prayers to Fight Covid-19. Taarifa Rwanda. https:// taarifa.rw/burundi-intensifies-prayers-to-fight-covid19/. Accessed 20 April 2020.

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Table 8.6  Government debt in the East Africa region in 2019 Country

Total debt/GDP percent

External debt/GDP percent

63.5 61.6 49.1 34.4 37.7 43.6

14.3 32.1 42.3 – 26.2 29.2

Burundi Kenya Rwanda South Sudan Tanzania Uganda

Source: IMF Regional Economic Outlook—Sub-Saharan Africa 2019

Table 8.7  Impact of Covid-19 on projected GDP growth in East Africa in 2020 Country

Burundi Kenya Rwanda South Sudan Tanzania Uganda

Pre-Covid-19

3% 6% 8% 7.4% 6.4% 6.2%

With Covid-19 baseline scenario

Worst-case scenario

−5.2% 1.4% 4.2% −0.4% 5.2% 2.5%

−5.8% 0.6% 2.9% −3.6% 4% 1.6%

Source: African Development Bank, April 2020

massive debts and current loans (as shown in Tables 8.7, 8.6, and 8.2 respectively). Second, predictions of economic growth for Tanzania have astonished other member states and instilled political fears within the Community. The issue of truck drivers who were regularly detected positive for Covid-19  in border areas; bilateral border restrictions with Tanzania; restriction of Tanzanian flights to Kenya; and circulated information about increasing numbers of Covid-19 cases in Tanzania were claimed to be political. Ultimately, the relationship among member states within the Community has been affected. Third, this situation increased the gross violation of human rights. Violations of the right to health, the right to life, the right to education, the rights of children, women’s rights, and freedom of movement were widespread in countries with lockdowns, restrictions, and closure of services like schools, food, bars, gyms, and sports activities. For example,

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sexual violence against women increased during the lockdown in Kenya. Jane Thiomi, the LVCT group leader for assisting girls and women, during an interview with VOA on 24 June 2020, disclosed that her organization received about 120 complaints per month related to sexual violence against women before lockdown, but with the introduction of the measure the complaints rose to about 800 per month. On 26 March 2020, members of the Local Defence Unit used wires and sticks to beat people in downtown Kampala, including vendors selling fruit and vegetables and motorcycle riders, in downtown . On 28 March 2020, six police officers shot at a group of people in Bududa, Uganda, to enforce the ban on public gatherings.51 There were also several reports of child pregnancies and early marriages because of lockdowns/curfews in Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda. Also, Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya were among the nations where police shot people to death during the enforcement of the measure.52 Four, the restrictions led to increased poverty, unemployment, and social problems. The informal sector in Kenya employs more than 80% of its population and thus lockdown jeopardized this sector greatly. Seven hundred and forty thousand Kenyans lost their jobs amid pandemic.53 According to World Food Programme (WFP),54 poor urban families usually live hand to mouth and rely on informal day-to-day employment. They have no food reserves and therefore after months of containment measures, including lockdowns in some areas, their ability to cope is being stretched to the limit. In Kenya, a group of women who had been earning their living by doing business along the coast, especially with tourists, lost

51  Human Rights Watch. 2020. Uganda Respect Rights in Covid-19 Response: Ensure Security Forces Refrain from Violence, Abuse. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/02/ uganda-respect-rights-Covid-19-response. Accessed 5 April 2020. 52  Moore, W.  Gyude. 2020. Curfews are a safer plan than total lockdowns to slow Covid-19’s spread in informal economies. Centre for Global Development. https://qz. com/africa/1836458/curfews-not-lockdowns-will-slow-Covid-19-spread-in-africa/. Accessed 12 April 2020. 53  Wasike, Andrew. 2021. 740,000 Kenyans Lost Jobs Amid Pandemic: Kenya’s Economy was Adversely Affected by Pandemic, says Treasury Minister. TÜRKIYE. https://www. aa.com.tr/en/africa/740-000-kenyans-lose-jobs-in-2021-amid-pandemic/2360508. Accessed 14 September 2021. 54  WFP. 2020. WFP and Kenya Government Launch Cash Transfer for Families Impacted by Coronavirus in Mombasa. NEWS. https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-and-kenya-­governmentlaunch-cash-transfers-families-impacted-coronavirus-mombasa. Accessed February 2021.

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their customers due to the outbreak of Covid-19.55 In Uganda, some of the merchants who were interviewed by CGTN Africa indicated that the limitations on importation of goods from other countries, especially China, led to the scarcity and rising prices of commodities such as shoes, coaches, scholastic materials and auto spare parts.56 In another interview, some small traders from Kariakoo market in Dar es Salaam indicated that the pandemic had seriously reduced the importation of goods such as shoes and clothes, which led to shortage and increasing prices of such commodities57 In Rwanda, artists, during an interview with CBN Africa, indicated that the suspension of gatherings for entertainment due to Covid-19 limited their opportunity to earn money.58 (b) The Impact of Traditional-based Strategies Despite the negative stereotypes about traditional herbs for fighting the pandemic, it is widely agreed that traditional herbs are of great use where there are very few well-trained health care workers as is the case in Africa, where there is one doctor for every 40,000 patients and one witch doctor for every 500 patients.59 In addition, in most of the East African countries religion was used in the fight against the pandemic. To some extent religion in countries like Tanzania and Kenya contributed to the public health challenge in defiance of states’ public health directives.60 In these countries, despite the government directives on maintaining social distance, 55  Lau, J., S. Sutcliffe, M. Barnes, E. Mbaru, I. Muly, N. Muthiga, S. Wanyanyi and J. E. Cinner. 2021. Covid-19 Impacts on Coastal Communities in Kenya. Mar Policy 134: 104803. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104803. 56  Fugazza, Marco. 2020. Impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic on Commmodities Exports to China, UNICTAD Research Paper No. 44. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-­ document/ser-rp-2020d3_en.pdf. Accessed 10 October 2021. 57  The Citizen. 2021. KariakooTraders Lament Low Sales. 11 April 2021, accessed at https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/kariakoo-traders-lament-low-sales­2699858. Accessed 11 May 2021. 58  CBN Africa. 2020. OECD, Culture Shock: Covid-19 and the Cultural and Creative Sectors. https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/culture-shock-Covid-­19and-­the-cultural-and-creative-sectors-08da9e0e/. Accessed 8 September 2020. 59   Gathara, Patrick. 2020. Mobilise traditional African medicine against Covid-19. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/377f6249-0317-4757-b12c-d126f1ac460f. Accessed 20 September 2020. 60  Chiliswa, Zac. 2020. Is Religion Helping or Hurting Africa’s Fight Against Covid-19? Democracy in Africa. http://democracyinafrica.org/religion-helping-hurting-africas-fight-­­ Covid-19/. Accessed 8 June 2020.

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some religious leaders refused to close prayer houses and thus threatened the public efforts to contain the spread of the virus.61 Traditional-based strategies have had a more positive impact on the national economy and on individual citizens in many respects. The strategies are less expensive and easier to apply. They created job opportunities through selling of traditional herbs. Apart from creating growth of markets for traditional herbs (like ginger, lemons, neem leaves, etc.), the strategies reduced fear and created hope that the virus could be treated.

Conclusion Covid-19 was released in East Africa through Kenya, while member states were unprepared to fight the pandemic. The unpreparedness of governments to contain Covid-19 led to a disparity of responses despite the WHO’s emphasis on the use of science-based strategies. This was primarily due to ineffective collaboration of EAC member states; the amount of donor aid received; and prioritization of the economy or general election over the right to life and right to health. Countries that received small amounts of funds from donors preferred traditional-based strategies and countries that received large amounts of funds were obliged to employ science-based strategies. The findings of this study revealed that science-­ based strategies have had an adverse impact on national economies and individual citizens’ well-being when compared to traditional-based strategies.

Bibliography Amenta, E. 2005. State-centered and political institutionalist theory: Retrospect and prospect. In Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies and Globalization, ed. T.  Jonak et  al., 96–114. New  York: Cambridge University Press. Amenta, E., and K.M. Ramsey. 2010. Institutional theory. In Handbook of Politics: State and Sociology in Global Perspective, ed. K.T.  Leicht and J.C.  Jenkins, 17–38. New York: Springer. Chiliswa, Zac. 2020. Is Religion helping or hurting Africa’s fight against Covid-19? Democracy in Africa (DIA). http://democracyinafrica.org/religion-­helping-­ hurting-­africas-­fight-­Covid-­19/. Accessed 8 June 2020.

 Chiliswa (Ibid.).

61

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Devermont, J. and H. Marielle. 2020. Implications of Tanzania’s bungled response to Covid-19. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). https://www.csis.org/analysis/implications-­t anzanias-­bungled-­r esponse-­ Covid-­19. Accessed 26 May 2020. Dongxiao, Chen. and Z. Haibing. 2020. International cooperation for the coronavirus combat: Results, lessons and way ahead. http://brisbane.china-­consulate. gov.cn/eng/zts/f2019ncov/202003/P020210524278116910876.pdf. Accessed 20 June 2021. Dzinmarira, T., M. Dzobo, and I. Chitungo. 2020. Covid-19: A Perspective on Africa’s capacity and response. Journal of Medical Virology 92: 2465–2472. https://doi.org/10.1002/jmv.26159. Fugazza, Marco. 2020. Impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on commodities exports to China, UNICTAD Research Paper No. 44. https://unctad.org/system/ files/official-­document/ser-­rp-­2020d3_en.pdf. Accessed 10 Oct 2021. Green, Andrew. 2020. Argument: If African governments won’t act, the people will. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/26/if-­african-­governments-­wont-­ act-­the-­people-­will/. Accessed 26 May 2020. Human Rights Watch. 2020a. Kenya: Police brutality during curfew, several dead, others with life-threatening injuries. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/22/ kenya-­police-­brutality-­during-­curfew. Accessed 29 Apr 2020. ———. 2020b. Uganda respect rights in Covid-19 Response: Ensure security forces refrain from violence, abuse. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/02/ uganda-­respect-­rights-­Covid-­19-­response. Accessed 5 Apr 2020. I.T.U.C Africa. 2020. Tanzania’s approach to fighting Covid-19-saving the economy for the people or not acting to their detriment? Newsletter, Tanzania. at http://www.ituc-­africa.org/Tanzania-­s-­Approach-­to-­Fighting-­Covid-­19-­ Saving-­the-­economy-­for-­the-­people-­or.html. Accessed 17 Apr 2020. Lau, J., S. Sutcliffe, M. Barnes, E. Mbaru, I. Muly, N. Muthiga, S. Wanyanyi, and J.E. Cinner. 2021. Covid-19 Impacts on coastal communities in Kenya. Marine Policy 134: 104803. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104803. Lone, Shabir Ahmad, and A.  Ahmad. 2020. Covid-19: An African perspective. Emerging Microbes & Infections 9: 1300–1308. https://doi.org/10.108 0/22221751.2020.1775132. Mo Ibrahim Foundation. 2020. Covid-19 in Africa: A call for coordinated governance, improved health structures and better data. https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/sites/default/files/2020. Accessed 15 May 2021. Nilsson, Jens. 2018. What logics drive the choices of public decision –making. Doctoral Thesis. Luleå: Political Science, Lulea University of Technology. Olum, R., and F. Bongomin. 2020. Uganda’s first 100 Covid-19 cases: trends and lessons. International Journal of Infectious Diseases 96: 517–518. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.ijid.2020.05.073.

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Parsons, Wayne. 1995. Public policy: An introduction to the theory and practice of policy analysis. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. Relief International. 2020. Hand-washing-prevents-Covid-19-and-saves-lives. https://www.ri.org/hand-­washing-­prevents-­Covid-­19-­and-­saves-­lives-­heres-­ how/. Accessed 15 Oct 2020. Riggs, W., and W. Fred. 1980. The ecology and context of public administration: a comparative perspective. Public Administration Review 40: 107–115. Schmidt, V.  A. 2014. Institutionalism. Wiley Online Library. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/9781118474396.wbept0513. Scott, W.  Richard. 2005. Institutional theory: Contributing to a theoretical research program. In Great minds in management: The process of theory development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Shaltami, Osama Rahil. 2020. Covid-19: WHO cautions against the use of traditional herbs in Africa. Benghazi: Department of Earth Sciences Faculty of Science, Benghazi University. Silver, C.T., and J. Wu. 2020. The first confirmed case of Covid-19 in Tanzania: recommendations based on lesson learned from China. Tropical Medicine and Health 48: 25. https://doi.org/10.1186/s41182-­020-­00214-­x. Simon, Herbert A. 1955. A behavioral model of rational choice. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 69 (1): 99–118. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884852. Thoenig, Jean-Claude. 2003. Institutional theories and public institutions: Traditions and appropriateness. In Handbook of Public Administration, ed. Peters Guy and Jon Pierre, 127–148. London: Sage Publications. WHO. 2020. WHO supports scientifically proven traditional medicine, WHO Africa. https://www.afro.who.int/news/who-­supports-­scientifically-­proven-­ traditional-­medicine. Accessed 15 May 2020. Xiao, Y., and M.E. Torok. 2020. Taking the right measures to control Covid-19. The Lancet, Infectious Diseases 20: 523–524. https://doi.org/10.1016/S14733099(20)30152-­3.

CHAPTER 9

East African Community Partner States’ Response to Truckers as High-Risk Group in the Context of Covid-19 Kenneth K. Oluoch

Introduction By the time the WHO declared Covid-19 a global health pandemic, several East African states had not reported any cases. Tanzania, for instance, reported the first Covid-19 case on March 16, 2020,1 while Kenya This chapter is published posthumously. The editors are forever indebted to Professor Oluoch, who had already submitted this chapter and had submitted it to the publisher before he passed away in March 2022. Professor Peter Simatei (of Moi University) generously worked on the final edits of this chapter in honour of his departed colleague, a former member of Moi’s African Cluster Centre. 1  Clifford Silver Tarimo and Jian Wu. “The First Confirmed Case of Covid-19 in Tanzania: Recommendations Based on Lessons from China”. Tropical Medicine and Health, published April 26, 2020.

K. K. Oluoch (*) Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Arndt et al. (eds.), Covid-19 in Africa: Governance and Containment, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36139-5_9

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reported its first case on March 15, 2020.2 As in other parts of the world, the pandemic caused significant public health concerns in East Africa. The fact that coronavirus can be spread easily from those infected or surfaces caused a public health scare. The initial response by the governments within the East African Community reveals that the pandemic was a significant public health issue and a primary national security concern. In East Africa, the first Covid-19 cases were those who had travelled from some of the world’s epicentres of the pandemic, such as China, Italy, Britain, and Spain, or the United States. At this stage, the infections in East Africa were primarily within the main cities or major entry ports. However, soon there were local community transmissions.3 This chapter examines the response of East African states to the problem of long-­ distance truckers as the core group regarding Covid-19 infections. In the study, ‘truckers’ refers to truck drivers and their crews.

Theoretical Framework Analysis of the response of the East African states to the problem of truckers as a high-risk group for Covid-19 infection requires the application of relevant theories. Both liberalism and realism are relevant in discussing this topic. Liberalism is more appropriate when considering the cooperation forged by the East African Community member states. However, considering the public health and security concerns that inform the responses of each state, the realist approach would be more applicable. Realism, as we know, is not a cohesive theory. In its broadest sense, it encompasses classical realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism.4 According to Donnelly, although definitions of realism differ in detail, the various realism theories share a resemblance.5 First, realism emphasises the constraints in politics imposed by human selfishness. Hans Morgenthau

2  Mark Nanyingi. “The Evolution of the Covid-19 Pandemic in Kenya”. Royal School of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, https://rstmh.org/news. Accessed February 2022. 3  Ministry of Health of Kenya, 2020. 4  Dougherty, James and Robert Pfaltzgraff. 2010. Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. Longman: New York. 5  Burchill, Scott, Andrew Linklater, and Jack Donnelly et al. 2021. Theories of International Relations. Third Edition, Macmillan: New York.

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argues that politics is deeply embedded in human nature, which is essentially selfish.6 This is the concept of egoism. Second, central to realism is the anarchy that characterises the international system. There is no world government as such, and each state must rely on its survival capability. Survival constitutes a crucial goal of the state. As such, states must adopt self-help strategies anchored in their power. It is therefore assumed that national interest will tend to guide the behaviour of the state. Although the realist scholars of the twentieth century based their arguments on military threats and counterbalancing to ensure their security, a study of Covid-19 reveals that it is a new threat to nation-states, the East African nations included. Besides being a public health threat, Covid-19 is a serious national security threat. It is a highly infectious disease that has political and economic ramifications. As of November 2020, less than a year since China reported the first cases, almost 60 million people had been reportedly infected, while more than 1.41 million people had died from the pandemic worldwide.7 As of late May 2021, the global Covid-19 positive cases had risen to 167,500,000, while the resultant deaths were almost 3, 500,000.8 Although Africa’s fatalities from the pandemic have been lower than those of countries such as the United States, India, Brazil, Britain, Spain, Italy, and China, the East African states have also faced spikes that follow the global trends. This became a concern to policymakers. The Covid-19 pandemic strikes at the core of highly trained personnel, including medical personnel. The pandemic has negatively impacted individual nations’ economies, with large segments of those in the informal employment sector being rendered jobless. The tourism and hospitality industry, one of the leading sectors of Kenya’s economy, suffered immensely and is yet to recover. A pandemic that impacts negatively on the national economy has the potential to cause political

6  Morgenthau, Hans, Kenneth Thompson, and David Clinton. 2005. Politics Among Nations. McGraw Hill: New York. 7   World Health Organization Report, November 2020. https://www.who.int/ publications/m/item/weekly-operational-update%2D%2D-30-november-2020. Accessed December 24, 2022. 8  World Health Organization, May 31, 2021. https://www.who.int/publications/m/ item/weekly-operational-update-on-Covid-19-31-may-2021. Accessed December 24, 2022.

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instability. Therefore, the pandemic makes East African nations vulnerable to instability due to the economic and interlinked social challenges it poses. Taking a realist approach, states in East Africa tended to be inward looking, exhibited by their closure of their ports of entry. Unfortunately, this was detrimental to regional trade. It also undermined the potential for regional cooperation at least to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic.

Methodology Covid-19 being a new phenomenon, this study relied on primary sources and other secondary sources. This includes newspaper reports, television news, government reports, and government briefs, particularly in Kenya. Kenya’s Ministry of Health held daily Covid-19 briefs, and the President’s office addressed the populace monthly on the status of Covid-19. These reports were critical in informing this study. The study also used informal interviews with ordinary citizenry and truck drivers in Kenya. The ordinary citizens were selected randomly and were critical in giving their experience regarding the issue under inquiry. The truck drivers were at the centre of the inquiry. For the truck drivers, I concentrated on Turbo in Uasin Gishu County, designated as one of the stopovers and testing centres for truck drivers travelling from Kenya into Uganda and back via the border town of Malaba. Truck drivers would stay here for days before proceeding with their journey. I managed to sample a few of them through snowballing. Furthermore, I utilised participatory observation within Turbo and along Uganda Road in Uasin Gishu County in Kenya. The analysis is done qualitatively. In the next section, I discuss truckers as a core group in the spread of Covid19.

Haulage Truck Drivers (aka Truckers) as a Covid-19 High-Risk Group Epidemiological studies often come up with population groups that are core in the transmission of diseases. Truckers have been associated with spreading diseases over a long period, and scholars and policymakers identified them as the core group in the transmission of HIV/AIDS in East

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Africa.9 A core group is a subgroup with a higher prevalence or incidence of infections.10 Long-distance truck drivers traverse the East African region from the ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam. They transport goods into the landlocked countries of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and back to the coastal cities. A study on the impact of truck drivers in the transmission of coronavirus in Uganda noted that most of those diagnosed with Covid-19 were truck drivers, making up about 71.8 per cent of new cases. They became the most frequently diagnosed group and, therefore, a core group for Covid-19 in Uganda.11 Evidence from contract tracing showed that truck drivers were responsible for significant initial local transmissions. The same pattern was experienced in Rwanda and South Sudan. Most of the truckers entering the hinterland are from Kenya and Tanzania. As such, Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan viewed truckers from Kenya and Tanzania as the potential source of Covid-19 infections, while Kenya, on the other hand, viewed truckers from Tanzania as a major source of infections. Countries in East Africa thus viewed truckers as super-spreaders of coronavirus in the region. As such, states tended to view truckers from outside their borders as a major source of transmission. The vulnerability of truck drivers can be understood from the long distances they have to drive, at times passing through the localised epicentres, and the people they contact. They cover several hundred kilometres from the coastal cities to the hinterland of East Africa. Truck drivers are at higher risk of infection with Covid-19 than the general population. Most truck drivers are generally young, below forty years of age, and thus are likely to be asymptomatic to Covid-19. As such, they may not necessarily feel sick from the virus but are potentially carriers and transmitters. A study among 3805 truckers in Kenya found that 55.9 per cent had paid for sex within six months of 2020, while 46.6 per cent had regular sexual partners along their routes in addition to a wife or girlfriend at

9  Oluoch, Ken. 2012. HIV/AIDS in Africa and Globally: Reconciling Public Health and Human Rights. Lambert Academic Publishing: Saarbrucken. 10  Francis Bajinirwe, Jonathan Izudi, and Stephen Asiimwe. 2020. “Long Distance Truck Drivers and the Increasing Risk of Covid-19 Spread in Uganda”. International Journal of Infectious Diseases. Vol. 98. September 2020, p.  191–193. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. ijid.2020.06.085. 11  Ibid.

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home.12 This population is highly mobile and traverse countries, spending nights in temporary locations, which makes them quite exposed and, at the same time, at high risk of spreading coronavirus. Identifying truckers as super-spreaders of the virus impacted negatively on regional trade. Individual states within the region responded to the truckers’ situation by closing national borders. Due to the disproportionate number of infections at the points of entry into Kenya, President Uhuru Kenyatta ordered the closure of its borders with Tanzania and Somalia, except for cargo. Kenya also instituted compulsory Covid-19 testing at its borders with the two countries. Tanzania immediately responded by banning trucks and other vehicles from Kenya from entering its territory. While it is true that the first Covid-19 cases in East Africa were recorded at the ports of entry, Covid-19 quickly spread through the popular trucking routes and the border towns of Namanga and Isebania on the Kenya-­ Tanzania border, and Busia and Malaba on the Kenya-Uganda border. Reports revealed the same pattern in the inland stations where the truck drivers spent their nights. This was a development that was accentuated by night curfews imposed by governments in several states within the region. This made it necessary for trucks to stop at designated places by evening in Uasin Gishu and Nakuru counties in Kenya. The crisis of Covid-19 has led to member states of the East African Community imposing restrictive measures on truckers. States adopted border testing within the region, which often revealed many Covid-19 cases among truckers. The fact that truckers are often associated with the spread of the virus has had ripple effects. Besides being denied entry into a member country of the East African Community when they test positive, they also become victims of stigmatisation by the general population and the governments of the states within the region. This study established that there are cases where truckers are denied the chance to purchase essentials such as bottled water or food in places such as Busia. A national government official in Uasin Gishu County in Kenya, while advising the locals to take care of themselves, made pronouncements that would legitimise discrimination against truck drivers. The local media quoted him as warning the locals against mixing freely or even hosting them in their hotels. While the administrator was primarily concerned about the public 12  Daily Nation, May 18, 2020. https://issuu.com/dailynation/docs/dn_18052021. Accessed December 24, 2022.

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health of the residents of his county, such public pronouncements, especially coming from a senior government official, have far-reaching consequences, particularly regarding how the locals view these drivers. They are likely to be generalised as the super-spreaders of the virus. This was counterproductive, for it created a wrong perception that members of the Community were not carriers of coronavirus, while the drivers were treated as pariahs. The approaches that the governments within the region undertook concerning truckers often reflected the type of government. Uganda is known for having a history of handling epidemics successfully during the long reign of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. It adopted measures that enabled it to tackle HIV/AIDS in the 1990s when it was a global pandemic.13 The government of Uganda also initiated measures to protect Ugandans from the effects of Ebola when the deadly disease was ravaging the neighbouring DRC several times during the early part of the twenty-first century. It is evident that President Museveni initiated the measures to minimise the rate of Covid-19 infections. However, these measures reflect the authoritarian political system that characterises his administration. Museveni imposed strict border controls in which all truck drivers had to prove that they had negative Covid-19 tests carried out within a specified period, failure of which they had to be tested at the border. In October 2020, Uganda introduced mandatory tests for truckers from Kenya before they could be allowed to enter its territory. This was irrespective of whether they had been tested or not.14 Furthermore, as the Ministry of Health of Kenya officials points out, there was a problem of non-compliance among some truckers, thus compelling the government of Uganda to impose mandatory Covid-19 testing for all truckers. As a rule, truck drivers were expected to possess Covid-19-free certificates before they could enter Uganda and traverse the region. Only those who tested negative were allowed into the country. President Museveni further decreed that truck drivers who tested positive for Covid-19 be included in the tally of their country of origin. Such measures raise fundamental issues regarding the principles and spirit of the East African Community, as shall be discussed in detail later in this chapter.

 Oluoch, Ken, 2012.  Patrick Mugo. What Uganda and Rwanda got Right That Kenya, Tanzania and Burundi did not https://www.theelephant.info. Accessed December 24, 2022. 13 14

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Like Uganda, Rwanda, another East African state with strongman leadership, has taken strict measures to control Covid-19. In that country, for instance, police and customs officials escorted truck drivers from the point of entry to their destination,15 an action meant to deter their interaction with the local population, implying that they are suspected to be virus carriers. Others were made to transfer their cargo at warehouses built in border areas. While such measures have helped to control the number of those who are infected in the country, they curtailed the fundamental rights of truck drivers and led to their stigmatisation and discrimination. Although President Pombe Magufuli’s government was lukewarm in handling Covid-19, Tanzania still tested returning drivers into Tanzania and isolated them for at least seven days.16 While the Tanzanian government said little about Covid-19, truck drivers from Tanzania tested positive for Covid-19  in the neighbouring countries of Kenya, Uganda,and Rwanda. Such action led to these drivers being treated with suspicion in these countries. They were presumed to be positive unless they were tested and had negative results for the virus. This poses the danger of prejudice against truckers. Since truckers are considered key in the transmission of coronavirus, they are often treated with prejudice. Truckers who transport essential goods to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, the DRC, and South Sudan have been harassed and attacked while simultaneously facing difficulties in crossing the borders. The truck drivers I spoke to alleged hostility towards them by the police, soldiers, and other government officials in several countries within the region.

15  The East African. “Rwanda: High Costs, Delays as Rwanda Truckers Stopped Over Covid-19”. September 23, 2020. 16  For information on Covid-19 and truck drivers between Tanzania and Kenya, see: Gesami, Brigid, The Effectiveness of the East African Community Response to Covid-19 (April 18, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4086667 or https://doi. org/10.2139/ssrn.4086667; Vanguard. 2020. ‘Faulty’ tests of truck drivers: Tanzania accuses Kenya of sabotage. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/05/faulty-tests-of-truck-drivers-tanzania-accuseskenya-of-sabotage/.

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Collaborative Approach by EAC States to the Problem of Truckers as Core Population This section analyses the collaborative approach by member states of the East African Community in addressing the problem of truckers regarding Covid-19. The East African Community was established through a treaty of 1999 by the original three member states, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. The treaty came into force in 2000.17 Article 5 of the treaty states its objectives, which are relevant to this discussion. It aimed to attain sustainable growth and development among the partner states. The treaty also aimed to achieve equitable economic development through cooperation. And finally, it aimed at strengthening and consolidating the longstanding political, economic, social, cultural, and traditional ties and the association among the partner states. Essentially, the treaty emphasises cooperation and mutual trust among the partner states. As such, tackling the problem of a public health crisis that affects the region and the globe such as Covid-19 required concerted effort among the member states of the East African Community. The Community has since doubled its membership, after Rwanda and Burundi joined in 2007, and South Sudan in 2016. The original member states signed the East African Customs Union Treaty in 2004, which became effective in 2005. The East African Common Protocol was signed in 2009 and became operational the following year. The member states of the regional body also signed a common currency protocol. The Community also aims to attain political federation. Following the initially recorded cases of Covid-19 in East Africa, member states of the East African Community came together to deliberate on ways of containing the pandemic without interfering with trade within the region. As pointed out above, truckers were identified as high risk for Covid-19 infection. The ministers of health of the member states issued a joint statement on Covid-19 containment. Member states agreed to continue implementing mandatory quarantine for fourteen days for travellers to avoid imported cases.18 They also agreed to adopt strict screening

17  Biswaro, Joram Mukama. 2012. The Quest for Regional Integration in the Twenty First century- Rhetoric Versus Reality: A Comparative Study. Mkuki Wa Nyota Publishers: Dar es Salaam. 18  See: Gesami, Brigid. 2022; Vanguard. 2020.

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procedures at the borders. The latter laid grounds for controlling the pandemic among those crossing borders, including truckers. Ministers for Health in the East African Community issued a joint statement on Covid-19 response in East Africa. Partner states were to implement a 100 per cent exit and entry screening for all persons crossing the border. The partner states agreed to establish a surveillance system to monitor truck crew health and enable contact tracing.19 They were also to strengthen information sharing and to continue contact tracing for potential exposure to Covid-19. In the spirit of regional cooperation, they resolved to facilitate the free movement of goods and services in the region. The communiqué directed partner states to ensure that vehicles carrying goods had only one crew member to facilitate smooth border crossing and that the crew was in good health. When a crew member was quarantined for testing positive for Covid-19, operators were to make necessary arrangements to have a backup crew. On May 12, 2020, the East African heads of state had a virtual consultative meeting to discuss the problem of Covid-19 in the region.20 The leaders commended ministers responsible for health, trade, transport, and East African affairs for their initiative in adopting a regional approach to the Covid-19 pandemic in the region. The heads also received reports of joint meetings of the ministers of the departments mentioned above. In addition, they commended partner states, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the African Centres for Disease Control and Prevention for efforts undertaken towards addressing the Covid-19 pandemic. This was particularly important in stressing the importance of regional and international cooperation in addressing the pandemic. Africa’s Centres for Disease Control (CDC) was formed in 2016 under the African Union to support member countries’ health institutions in responding quickly and effectively to health threats. It aims at strengthening the capacity and capability of Africa’s public health institutions in responding to the threat of diseases.21 Its formation was prompted by the Ebola outbreak that affected countries in West Africa as well as the DRC

 MoH, Kenya, 2020.  East African Community Secretariat. “Report on EAC Heads of State Consultative Meeting”, Arusha, Tanzania, May 12, 2020. 21  Africa CDC. https://africacdc.org/about-us/our-history/. Accessed December 24, 2022. 19 20

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and Uganda.22 Africa CDC has played a crucial role in providing leadership on the continent in the war against Covid-19. It set up Trace, Test, and Track (CDC 3-Ts) in its five regional centres on the continent. In addition, Africa CDC receives and updates Covid-19 data from the African states, including total Covid-19 cases, deaths, and recoveries. More recently, it has been on the frontlines in securing Covid-19 vaccines for distribution to the member states. It also created an African Medical Support Platform to support governments in supplying and distributing vaccines and essential equipment. The heads of EAC partner states also stressed the need for information sharing and that ministers would adopt an East African Community digital surveillance and tracking system. Member states were also to engage bilaterally in addressing cross-border challenges. These are particularly relevant to the question of truck drivers and Covid-19 in East Africa. That the heads of state noted slowdown experienced by various economic sectors within the region is significant in this study since the truck drivers are among the arteries of regional trade. Also specific to the truckers is that the heads of state directed focal persons to immediately work on a regional mechanism for Covid-19 testing, certification, and monitoring of truck drivers and report back to the heads. It is therefore important to point out that the heads of state consultative meeting provided some policy direction on how the member states of the East African Community could work together in addressing the pandemic, in this case regarding the truckers and regional trade. The consultative meeting was a landmark in the cooperation among the East African states in addressing the problem of Covid-19. The fact that only four out of six states were represented at the consultative meeting is highly revealing. Heads of state of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan attended the forum. However, Tanzania and Burundi gave it a wide berth, choosing not to be represented even by lower-ranking state officers. The absence of the two countries could be anticipated based on their presidents’ positions regarding Covid-19. President Joseph Pombe Magufuli of Tanzania downplayed the seriousness of Covid-19 in his country by being critical of even basic protocols such as wearing masks. He openly criticised those who advocated for 22  CDC. “The Africa CDC was Crucial in Responding to Covid-19 Pandemic”, April 13, 2021. https://www.theafricareport.com/79586/the-africa-cdc-was-crucial-in-respondingto-the-Covid-19-pandemic/. Accessed December 24, 2022.

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restrictions on gatherings at religious places, arguing that people needed divine intervention against such pandemics. Further, he allowed for the importation of traditional medicine that Madagascar had popularised to treat Covid-19 patients effectively, despite a warning by the WHO that the world health body had not approved such concoctions. He took a critical position on the WHO-provided guidelines, arguing that these were irrelevant in Africa. While countries such as Kenya have adopted daily press releases on Covid-19, Tanzania has not reported any Covid-19 cases since May 2020. At a church service, the Tanzanian President declared that his country was free from the virus. How is this possible when this is a global pandemic that is affecting other countries within the region? The ACT-Wazalendo opposition leader criticised the official stance of the Tanzanian government, arguing that the government was seriously under-reporting Covid-19 cases by seven times.23 Tanzania’s neighbours, the African Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, and the World Health Organization have been critical of its approach to Covid-19. They argued that the East African state’s approach to the pandemic could adversely impact the region.24 This criticism could partly have been responsible for the boycott of the heads of state conference by Tanzania’s President. Tanzania’s Covid-19 cases have stood at 509 for one year, third from the lowest. Compared to Kenya’s, which is 168,925 and ranks seventh within the African continent, this is a significant disparity for immediate neighbours.25 Other EAC partner state cases are Uganda (44,074), Rwanda (26,780), South Sudan (10,677), and Burundi (4568).26 Burundi, under President Pierre Nkurunziza, took a lukewarm approach to the pandemic. After his wife tested positive for Covid-19 infection, and after he died from what was announced to be a heart attack, but suspected to be Covid-19, his successor declared Covid-19 to be a serious threat to the nation. But despite this, no serious measures have been undertaken by the government of Burundi to counter the problem. In Tanzania, it was not until after the death of Magufuli that the 23   African Business. “Tanzania Risks Pariah Status in Covid-19 Response”. Covid19africawatch.org Tanzania, May 27, 2020. 24  Peter Mwai and Christopher Giles. “Corona Virus in Tanzania: What do we know?” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52723594, June 19, 2020. 25  World Health Organization. “Number of Covid-19 Cases in the African Continent”, May 31, 2021. 26  Ibid.

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government of his successor, Samia Suluhu Hassan, identified Covid-19 as a public health problem. However, based on personal experience on a recent visit to Tanzania, the public do not consider Covid-19 a serious public health issue. Essential public health protocols for prevention and containment of Covid-19, such as social distancing, wearing masks, frequent hand washing, and avoiding handshakes, are largely absent in public places. We were quickly identified as non-Tanzanians because of our masking. A discussion with a few Tanzanians in their thirties revealed that they believed that Covid-19 is an old person disease, as one confidently pointed out in Kiswahili, hiyo Covid-19 ni ugonjwa ya wazee (“Covid-19 is a disease of the elderly”). Another one pointed out that Vile Rais Pombe Magufuli alisema coronavirus haiko kwa nchi hii, tuko na tumaini haiko (“Since [the late Tanzanian] President has declared that coronavirus is not a problem in this country, we believe that that is actually the situation”). Since the EAC aims to attain political federation, one would expect that it has institutions that specifically deal with public health issues such as Covid-19. However, these are absent, and member states have to collaborate as independent nations. Furthermore, although the heads’ consultative meeting in May 2020 agreed to have regular meetings, these have not been forthcoming. It is noteworthy that the collaborative approach among the East African Community member states is significant in tackling the pandemic. For instance, the East African ministers for Health, Transport, and East African Community Affairs adopted a regional electronic cargo and drivers’ tracking system in May 2020. Through this system, the command centre at the EAC secretariat can track drivers and their crews through an app on their phones. In addition, the regional states agreed to upload Covid-19-free certificates that could be available to stakeholders, valid for fourteen days. This facilitated movement of truckers within the region. Member states agreed to have designated accredited health facilities to screen and test truck drivers for Covid-19. As such, EAC partner states decided to follow the WHO-prescribed screening, testing, and certification procedures of truckers. However, despite the collaborative approach among the member states, the Covid-19 pandemic has exposed how sovereignty undermines attempts at regional integration in Africa.

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State Sovereignty and Covid-19 Containment in East Africa The concept of state sovereignty is fundamental in defining the characteristics of modern states. Sovereignty was an essential feature of international relations anchored in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648.27 Sovereignty defines the very existence of a state. Both the United Nations charter and the Organization of African Unity spelled out the need for respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity.28 As much as the discussions above reveal some cooperation among the East African states in confronting Covid-19, each state largely attempts to contain the pandemic in its own way. The fact that this is a public health issue with national security dimensions makes state action crucial to ensure its national security and the safety of its people. Each state has developed its Covid-19 guidelines based on the concept of sovereignty. Kenya’s response is a classic case of state response to Covid-19. Immediately after the country recorded the first case of Covid-19, President Uhuru Kenyatta directed several measures. Travel from countries with coronavirus cases was to be restricted, and only Kenyan citizens and permanent residents were eligible to return to the country. Those arriving were to self-­ quarantine or be quarantined in government facilities. He ordered schools, colleges, and universities closed indefinitely, and the country adopted a work-from-home policy. As the number of those infected continued to rise, the government of Kenya pursued more restrictive and harsher measures. It ordered the closure of places of social gatherings, such as places of worship, restricted the number of those who could attend funerals and weddings, banned political gatherings, and closed bars, restaurants, and gyms. It also imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew. Curfews were renewed almost every month, and the government soon restricted movements into and out of counties such as Nairobi, Mandera, and Mombasa. Later it eased movements to these counties while imposing restrictions of movement on localised areas with high infection rates, such as Eastleigh in Nairobi and Old Town in Mombasa. The Kenya-Somalia and Kenya-Tanzania borders were closed for human movements except for cargo transport trucks when it became 27  Dougherty, James and Robert Pfaltzgraff. 2010. Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. Longman: New York. 28  See UN Charter and OAU Charter, and Biswaro, 2012.

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evident that human movements from the neighbouring countries were a risk factor for Covid-19 infections. As the number of those infected increased, some officials, such as the Governor of Mombasa County, favoured total lockdown. However, what the national government opted for amounted to a partial lockdown. In March 2021, due to the third wave of Covid-19, the government of Kenya again imposed a partial lockdown, placing five counties, Nairobi, Machakos, Kiambu, Kajiado, and Nakuru, under lockdown. Once again, it closed down all learning institutions for face-to-face learning. Many restrictions similar to those of March 2020 were invoked, and night curfews were extended. In its protocol for controlling Covid-19 at ground crossings and along the transport corridors, the Ministry of Health of Kenya developed guidelines for managing truckers crossing the borders and along transport corridors.29 Among the requirements were that the truckers were to have Covid-19-negative results and an attestation letter issued within forty-­ eight hours before travel. They were required to test after every fourteen days. At the border points, a valid Covid-19 test certificate was required of them. Those not fulfilling this requirement would be required to take tests and wait for the results before being allowed to cross the border. The Ministry of Health of the Kenya government developed a protocol based on International Health Regulations 2005, whose purpose and scope is to prevent, protect against, control, and provide a public health response to the international spread of diseases without interfering with trade.30 To this end, the Ministry of Health of Kenya established testing and sample collection centres, particularly at the entry points of Lunga Lunga, Taveta, Namanga, Busia, Malaba, Isebania, and Moyale. It also established inland testing and sample collection centres at Nairobi, Kisumu, Nakuru, Eldoret, Kwale, Wajir, Migori, Machakos, and Marsabit. Mombasa was also a significant testing and sample collection centre. Truckers must get their Covid-19 results before they embark on their journey. At the border points, truck drivers and their crews were expected to produce valid Covid-19-free certificates and should exhibit no fever, sneezing, or difficulty breathing, the symptoms of Covid-19. They also 29  Ministry of Health, Kenya. “Protocol for Control of Covid-19 at Ground Crossing and Along the Transport Corridor” www.health.go.ke 2020/05. 30  Ministry of Health, ibid.

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had to fill out a self-quarantine declaration and register for online monitoring. In addition, the truckers were only allowed to stop at designated areas and lodge at designated hotels. All these measures were part of the containment measure to curb the virus’s spread by truck drivers. In an attempt to contain the spread of Covid-19 from truckers, the government of Rwanda ordered truckers from Tanzania to turn over their vehicles to Rwandan drivers in a system of relay driving. They were alternatively required to offload the merchandise into Rwanda trucks.31 Truckers and truck owners protested such arrangements. The measures did not work very well in the context of the East African Common Market Protocols. Due to the tensions and protests that the requirements raised, Tanzania and Rwanda worked out a deal in which trucks transferred cargo at the border. An exception was made for trucks carrying perishable goods or petroleum products.32 Rwanda, alongside Uganda, imposed a nationwide lockdown and allowed only trucks ferrying cargo into its territory from other countries within the region. Since authorities viewed truck drivers as among the high-risk groups for the spread of Covid-19, they adopted stringent measures to stop potential infections by truckers. The government instituted surveillance to monitor their health and behaviour en route to their destinations and prevent them from interacting with community members. Rwanda also adopted an electronic cargo tracking system to monitor the trucks. While some of these measures are based on public health rationale, they demonstrate how jealously countries safeguard their interests at the expense of regional trade and integration interests. An impasse over Covid-19 testing between Tanzania and Rwanda further illustrates this.33 Both countries’ authorities decided not to accept Covid-19 test certificates from their partner state. The fact that it would take four to seven days to get the results to their owners slowed down trade between the countries. It is also a demonstration of a lack of trust in the systems of neighbouring countries. It illustrates egoism among the member states of the Community, thus hindering the member states from achieving the goals of both the customs union and the common market 31  Andrew Mold and Anthony Mveyange. 2020. The impact of the Covid-19 crisis on trade: Recent evidence from East Africa. Policy Brief, Africa Growth Initiative, July 2020. 32  Mold and Mveyange, ibid. 33  The East African. “Rwanda: High Costs, Delays as Rwanda Truckers Stopped Over Covid-19”. September 23, 2020.

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protocol. Achieving regional integration often requires that member states cede some loyalty to the regional body. However, the behaviour of states with regard to the issue under interrogation reveals that they are inward in their approach and selfish. The measures taken by each state demonstrate the need for each state to perform its fundamental roles as a sovereign entity to protect its people and integrity. I now turn to the consequences of these measures for the truckers and trade among the East African Community member states.

Effects of the Measures Undertaken by States The measures taken by East African states to control Covid-19 have had several consequences. While it is essential to point to the positive aspect, there are also adverse consequences for truckers and regional trade. In Kenya, for instance, the steps taken to control Covid-19 had some success when by September 2020 it was evident that the infection rate was increasing to a five per cent positivity rate. The positivity rate refers to the number of those who test positive for Covid-19 as a percentage of the total sample. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), a consistent positivity rate of five per cent or less for two consecutive weeks would lead to the flattening of the curve. Based on this pattern, the Kenyan government, for instance, opened up its system to some extent. However, this partial opening up resulted in a higher number of infections, with a daily positivity rate ranging between 10 and 15 per cent during much of October and November 2020. Furthermore, there was a surge in the fatality rate from Covid-19-related illnesses. Therefore, it is right to argue that the controls, including those on truckers, impacted the positivity rates towards flattening level. However, some observers have argued that the approach taken by Kenya was more of a law-and-order approach than one based on public health measures and was therefore less effective.34 The ruthlessness by which the curfew was imposed, particularly during the first months of its imposition, called into question whether the implementers were interested in containing the virus or if they were more interested in maintaining law and order.

34  Patrick Mugo. 2020. “What Uganda and Rwanda got Right That Kenya, Tanzania and Burundi didn’t”. https://www.theelephant.info.

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Reports by the truckers themselves reveal harassment in the neighbouring countries. Truckers from Tanzania and Kenya complained of harassment in Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan. In some cases, they are expelled for being found to be Covid-19 positive, and in some cases, on mere suspicion. Kenyan truckers who tested positive for Covid-19 complained of being quarantined in unfavourable and costly conditions.35 Covid-19 has proven to have aggravated diplomatic tensions, particularly between Kenya and Tanzania. When Kenya’s President closed the country’s borders with Tanzania and Somalia—except for movement of cargo—Tanzania, through the local, provincial administrators, barred any vehicles from Kenya, including those carrying goods, from entering its territory.36 Kenya, through its High Commissioner to Tanzania, downplayed the magnitude of the problem but the fact that hundreds of trucks carrying goods could be stranded at the border towns of Namanga, Lunga Lunga, and Isibania for several days demonstrated the kinds of challenges that existed to achieving the objectives of the East African Common Market Protocols. The situation has not been better on the Kenya-Uganda border. In June and again in September 2020, the government of Uganda instituted compulsory testing for all truck drivers and their crews, regardless of whether they had been tested. In both cases, this caused a crisis at the border towns of Namanga and Busia. Truckers complained that the new border tests cost them a lot of money, in addition to the fact that the results would take several days before being released. The effect of this was that there were lines of trucks extending for over fifty kilometres for several days during both periods. These created fertile ground in the border towns for Covid-19 infections. There were media reports of some informal settlements where truck drivers spent their nights waiting for clearance. In addition to food vendors, prostitutes soon found thriving business among the stranded truckers, thus putting the border towns at higher risk of Covid-19 infections. The locals would disregard the public health protocols and mix freely with the truckers. The boda boda (motorbike) operators who carried the truckers from one point to another at the border were also identified as high-risk groups.  Bajunirwe, et al. 2020.  President Uhuru Kenyatta’s address about the state of Covid-19  in Kenya. https:// www.ingsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/National-Address-by-President-of-Kenyaon-Covid-19.pdf. Accessed December 24, 2022. 35 36

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Financially, truckers incurred huge costs. The massive traffic jams were costly in terms of time and finances and the truckers incurred considerable costs for regular testing. The fact that they spent extra days at the borders also had financial implications. Truck owners also incurred huge losses with regard to the transportation of perishable goods. Further, they have increasingly become victims of corrupt practices by law enforcers in Kenya and Uganda. As in other parts of the world, Covid-19 has led to economic stagnation in East Africa. The restrictions that include cessation of movements or lockdown adopted in Uganda and Rwanda have significantly impacted the region’s economies. The World Bank points out that Covid-19 has taken a toll on economic activity in sub-Saharan Africa, putting a decade of hard-­ won economic progress at risk. This is pushing the region into its first recession in twenty-five years.37 The World Bank has estimated that the regional GDP is expected to contract by 6.5 per cent. In Tanzania, for instance, the pandemic is expected to cut GDP at least in half and increase poverty. Covid-19 has slowed down the movement of goods and curtailed the movements of people across East Africa. It has created numerous non-­ tariff barriers contrary to the East African Customs Treaty and Common Market Protocols. The 1991 Abuja Treaty had aimed to promote the economic, social, and cultural development and integration of Africa.38 In 2018, forty-seven African states signed the Kigali Declaration to launch the African Continental Free Trade Area to deepen economic integration in Africa. With Covid-19 slowing down the process of integration of the East African Community and creating unnecessary tensions between the member states, it undermines the process of continent-wide economic integration.

Conclusion Covid-19 has caused the worst threat to humanity and nation-states in recent memory due to the highly infectious nature of coronavirus and its level of fatality. Nations and the international system closed down due to the Covid-19 pandemic. At domestic levels, governments adopted 37  Albert G. Zentack, Cesar Calderon, Gerald Kambiu, and Megumi Kubota, “Effects of Covid-19 on Trade in Africa”. Africa Pulse, No 22, Fall 2020. 38  Biswaro, 2012.

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measures ranging from the cessation of movements and curfews to partial and total lockdowns. These were all aimed at containing the spread of the pandemic. In East Africa, truckers were identified as among the core population as far as Covid-19 infections are concerned. As such, the East African states, collectively and individually, have adopted guidelines to ensure that while trade continues within the region, the impact of truckers in spreading the virus is contained. There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from the findings. First, while the measures are based on public health rationale and have an impact in controlling the pandemic at the border crossings, trade within the East African region has slowed down significantly. Furthermore, truckers incur significant monetary losses due to the costs associated with testing and other medical expenses and the slowed movements by the measures adopted by the states. In addition to viewing truckers as core or high-risk populations, it’s also important to point out that they also become vulnerable to infection due to their exposure. Furthermore, truckers are also victims of harassment, prejudice, and xenophobia in neighbouring countries. Second, Covid-19 has exposed the weaknesses that the East African Community faces. As a regional body aiming at political federation, member states would be expected to launch concerted efforts in their approach to the pandemic. However, a study of truckers in the context of Covid-19 reveals the underlying fissures between the member states of the East African Community. The numerous non-tariff barriers linked to the measures adopted to contain the pandemic demonstrate the difficulties of achieving the provisions of both the customs union treaty and the common market protocol. The diplomatic attritions that resulted from the border controls between Kenya and Tanzania, and Rwanda and Tanzania, for instance, are illustrative of the problems that affect the East African regional body. Third, the threat posed to public health systems and national security reveals that even though regional and international cooperation are significant in tackling common problems, states rely on their capabilities and measures in confronting problems that threaten them. As such, realism remains dominant in explaining state behaviour in the international system.

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Bibliography Biswaro, Joram Mukama. 2012. The quest for regional integration in the twenty first century- rhetoric versus reality: A comparative study. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki Wa Nyota Publishers. Burchill, Scott, Andrew Linklater, Jack Donnelly et al. 2021. Theories of international relations. 3rd edn, Macmillan: New York. Dougherty, James, and Robert Pfaltzgraff. 2010. Contending theories of international relations: A comprehensive survey. New York: Longman. Mold, Andrew and Mveyange, Anthony. 2020. The impact of the COVID-19 crisis on trade: Recent evidence from East Africa. Policy Brief, Africa Growth Initiative, July 2020. Morgenthau, Hans, Kenneth Thompson, and David Clinton. 2005. Politics among nations. New York: McGraw Hill. OAU. 1963. Organization of African Unity Charter. OAU, Addis-Ababa. Oluoch, Ken. 2012. HIV/AIDS in Africa and globally: Reconciling public health and human rights. Saarbrucken: Lambert Academic Publishing. UN. 1945. United Nations organization charter. New York: UN.

CHAPTER 10

The Making of Marginal Multilateralism During Covid-19 Response among EAC States: Perspectives from Discursive Institutionalism Bramwel Matui

Background The interest in space as an object of inquiry in the social sciences and humanities is traced to the works of Lefebvre, Foucault and Soja: these were critical social theorists, mostly geographers, who questioned knowledge production that privileged temporality and marginalized space.1 To these theorists, space is produced through social inclusions and exclusions. This chapter examines the making of marginal multilateralism in the Northern 1  Skordoulis, Constantine and Eugenia Arvanitis. 2008. Space conceptualization in the context of postmodernity: theorizing spatial representations. The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 3:66,): 105–113.

B. Matui (*) Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Arndt et al. (eds.), Covid-19 in Africa: Governance and Containment, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36139-5_10

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Corridor among the East African Community (EAC) states in their response to the Covid-19 global pandemic. The three founder states of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, which are the subject of this study, signed the treaty establishing the EAC on 30 November 1999, and the treaty came into force on 7 July, 2000 when the three states ratified the treaty.2 Since then four other countries, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, have acceded to the treaty. The EAC Customs Union came into effect in 2005, and the Common Market came into operation in 2009.3 The major drivers of integration are “common security concerns, trade dependence, sociocultural linkages such as media and Kiswahili language, a shared colonial history, pressures from forces of globalisation, and a history of the old EAC”.4 Also, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan are landlocked countries and all require Kenyan and Tanzanian seaports. In addition, Tanzania needs the Kenyan service sector to develop hers; the country, in addition, needs to revive its tourism sector through interlinkages with the Kenyan tourist processes that are more global.5 But the treaty establishing the EAC is a power entanglement―both integration and resistance to integration co-exist therein. The treaty encourages “collective institutions for development, and the implementation of common defence and foreign policy” which is aimed towards integration, but it also calls for “respect for non-interference in the internal matters of each state”.6 The clause on respect for non-interference helps the states to constrict the multilateral space. This space constriction occurs when the clause interacts with each state’s past and recent memory of selfleading to a culture of state rivalry. This is not surprising; African foreign policy tends to be realist; it privileges state interests, even within regional integration space.7 2  Wandia, Mary A.W. 2008. The role of national interest in regional integration: the case of Kenya in the East African Community 2000–2007. MA Thesis, The Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi; and African Union. 2022. East African Community (EAC). https://au.int/en/recs/eac. Accessed 22 October 2022. 3  Calabrese, Linda and Andreas Eberhard-Ruiz. 2016. What types of non-tariff barriers affect the East African community.? London: Overseas Development Institute. ODIl.2017. Resolving the unresolved non-tariff barriers in the East African Common. Second and final Report (University of Sussex, Institute of Development Studies and Overseas Development Institute). 4  Wandia, “The Role of National interest”, 81. 5  Ibid, 2. 6  Ibid. 7  Ibid, 10.

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The three EAC states, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, relate with their different autobiographical identities in the Northern Corridor: the Corridor is one of the important capillaries of the EAC Customs Union and Common Market. These identities interface in the Corridor, enmeshing both liberalism and rivalry in state relations. Kenya became a settler economy where the state policy articulated accumulation processes and legitimation of colonial rule; thus, African bourgeoisie and a strong export manufacturing base developed in the British colony.8 The post-colonial Kenyan Sessional Paper Number 10 of 1965, although entitled African Socialism and its Application to Planning, was a capitalist document underpinned by state intervention.9 Kenyan EAC liberalism  sometimes articulates state weakness in enforcing formal institutions: this leads to omission of rivalry acts to the EAC space. This bureaucratic weakness in Kenya has roots in both colonial and post-colonial states. The Kenya Colony was a prefectural state: the policy was to “trust the man on the spot” in Nairobi, due to delay in ship dispatches from London. Also, London could not fully understand the nature of issues in each colony.10 The same discretionary policy guided the relationship between the Secretariat in Nairobi and the field officers: diverse local conditions of the Kenyan colony required “on the spot” discretion.11 Tanzania treats the EAC as a threat to its internal ecology of self. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and the Tanganyika African National Union authored the Arusha Declaration in 1967.12 The Declaration made Tanzania a socialist egalitarian society; the country also embraced self-­ reliance. Although Tanzania liberalized from 1992 due to global second wave democratization, egalitarianism and self-sufficiency have been key planks of her foreign policy.13 Tanzania has experienced place-­displacement in the liberal EAC space because of its autobiographical identity. Tanzania 8  Odhiambo Mbai, C. 2003. Public service accountability and governance in Kenya since independence Afr. (j. polit. sci. 8 (1): 113–145 and Berman, Bruce. 1990. Control and crisis in colonial Kenya: the dialectic of domination. Nairobi: EAEP. 9  Chipembere, H.B.M. 1976. Kenyan and Tanzanian Socialism (A Comparative Study). Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies 7: 1, 97–113. 10  Berman, “Control and crisis in colonial Kenya”, 76. 11  Ibid, 80. 12  Ressler, R. Ilana. 2006. What went right in Tanzania: how nation building and political culture have produced forty-four years of peace. Honours, International Politics and the African Studies Certificate Georgetown University. See also H.B.M Chipembere, Kenyan and Tanzanian Socialism. 40. 13  Ressler, “What Went Right in Tanzania?” 6, 10.

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fears “instability from other members, she fears labour takeover through domination by foreign capital, and she fears labour from Kenya for Kenya’s capitalist class is significant; besides, the country fears a rise in crime rates that can increase if borders are opened to citizens of neighbouring EAC states”.14 Additionally, Tanzania is paranoid about projects that strengthen the Northern Corridor, which connects the EAC to the Kenyan coast. For example, between 2013 and 2016, the countries of Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda, dubbed ‘the coalition of the willing’, supported fast tracking of joined road and railway infrastructure in the Northern Corridor. Tanzania and Burundi became bystanders in these regional projects. Tanzania’s relation with the EAC is that of cooperation that co-exists with conflict. For Uganda, the EAC is a space for realist ecology of self: Uganda developed its public philosophy of militarism in colonial and post-colonial times.15 Kaguta Museveni took over the reins of power in Uganda when he was a socialist, but he later changed to a market liberalist.16 But the military, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) party mandarins and the business class soon came to be involved in primitive capital accumulation. Uganda also accepted international capital by coercing domestic labour to forego equity concerns. Thus, the liberalism that Uganda enacted in the post-1986 period was articulated with state authoritarianism, and sometimes with corruption and militarism at its core; this negated the logic of technocratic liberalism.17 Even when Uganda accepted multi-­ party politics to operate from 2005, this was seen as a public relations exercise for external partners and the domestic constituency, including the military, whose nerves had been frayed by the politics of agitation for the multi-party political order.18 After the government allowed the operation of multi-party politics, opponents of the NRM, like Kizza Bezigye, who were securitized as foreign agents of Rwanda, were detained.19 In

 Wandia, “The Role of National Interest”, 2.  Boehm, Sophia. 2011. The politics of American aid and conflict in Northern Uganda. Insights 5: 1 1–34. 16  Green, Elliot. 2010. Patronage, district creation and reform in Uganda. Studies in Comparative International Development volume 45:1,:83–103. Sjögren, Anders. 2013. Between Militarism and Technocratic Governance State Formation in Contemporary Uganda. Kampala: Fountain Publishers. 17  Ibid, 261. 18  Ibid, 253. 19  Ibid, 262. 14 15

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addition, the judiciary that is supposed to be independent was checked by the military as had occurred in 2005 and 2007.20 During the 1990s, the US listed the Lord’s Resistance Army a terror group, and it furnished Uganda with arms to fight this insurgent group; the arms were extended, through Uganda, to the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement in South Sudan to fight the Khartoum regime: the Khartoum regime was seen as a terrorist pivot in the Horn of Africa.21 Thus, militarization of foreign policy, that is, aggressive neo-realism in international relations theory, came to characterize Uganda after the end of the Cold War. This is what I call military rivalry culture in international politics. Baligidde notes: This philosophy characterised Uganda’s aggressive posture towards its neighbours in the 1990s. The Uganda military have intervened on three occasions: in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan. Uganda overtly and covertly did this to accomplish her foreign policy objectives22

Methodology and Theoretical Framework Published secondary works, newspapers and government documents are examined to analyse the constriction of the EAC multilateralism in the Corridor. Discursive institutionalism or structural idealism guides the interpretation of data: the theory treats ideas as structures that underpin international politics. Alexander Wendt calls it the cultural theory of international politics, and the theory has three cultures of anarchy: Kantian (friendship), Lockean (rivalry) and Hobbesian (enmity).23 The theory recognizes two interactive discourses: background ideational abilities and foreground ideational abilities.24 The former refers to how ideas have been  Ibid.  Ibid, 262. 22  Baligidde, Samuel H. 2012. Diplomacy for development or doom? Epistemological reflections on Uganda’s recent foreign policy achievements and blunders, Estudios Internacionales 171:20–44. 23  Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social theory of international politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 24  Schmidt, Vivien. 2010. Reconciling ideas and institutions through discursive institutionalism. In Ideas and politics in social science research, Daniel Béland, Robert Henry Cox eds.: 47–64; Szalai András. 2014. The Persuasiveness and Institutionalization of Defense Rationalist Ideas on nuclear strategy, 1948–1963 (PhD Thesis, Budapest, Hungary). 20 21

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formed and hegemonized in the minds of agents who reproduce them. The latter concerns how agents deploy discursive strategies to change existing institutions. The three cultures signify three pathways to pursue political goals in inter-state cooperation: friendship connotes the internalization of legitimacy; rivalry implies the attempt to avoid certain costs; while enmity entails cooperation because of the fear of coercion.25 My view is that EAC member states have entered cooperation on the culture of rivalry. The rivalry exists because each state re-combines liberal and illiberal technologies of power. It is Collier Stephen26 who posited intermixing technologies of power as an analytical tool, something that is relevant for my study.

Constriction of EAC Multilateral Space During Covid-19 Response I argue here that power entanglement in multilateral spaces could be in sites where Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) are salient. I use the Northern Corridor as an example of this geography of power entanglement during the EAC response to Covid-19. This power entanglement is assumed to occur in a time of emergency such as the Covid-19 pandemic, although the issue also occurs in non-emergency times. The East African Act on Elimination of NTBs (2015) Section 13 part 1 states that a state can “take temporary measures that would otherwise amount to an NTB, where the temporary measures are in the interest of: defence and security, public safety or public health”.27 In part 3 of the section, the Act states that a state would inform other partner states of the measures and the dates on which they would come into effect.28 The Northern Corridor is the preferred corridor in the EAC.  The Central Corridor that connects Dar es Salaam and Kampala is more expensive by 50 per cent than the Northern Corridor.29 The EAC countries implemented two self-help strategies against Covid-19 pandemic. This  Ibid, 250.  Collier, Stephen J. 2009. Topologies of power Foucault’s analysis of political government beyond ‘governmentality’. Theory, Culture & Society 26: 6, 78–108. 27  East African Community. 2015. The East African Community Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers Bill. Bill Supplement No. 2 to the East African Community Gazette No. 1 of 23 January. 28  Ibid. 29  Winters et al., “Resolving the unresolved non-tariff barriers”, 20. 25 26

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gave a burst to rivalry impulses which marginalized multilateralism. The two strategies were the denial strategy adopted by Tanzania and Burundi and the acceptance strategy pursued by Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda. Here my concern is the response by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, which are founding states of the EAC. In the acceptance and denial strategies, liberal technologies of power, which made the Northern Corridor a multilateral space, co-existed with illiberal technologies of power that marginalized multilateralism. I examine this next. The Tanzanian denial policy towards WHO Covid-19 protocols was drawn from the background ideational ability of Tanzania as a self-reliant and omniscient state. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere authored the Arusha Declaration of 1967 that championed socialism and self-reliance; this document that was a discursive technology of power defined good citizens as those who were subjects of the state: the citizens were supposed to do the bidding of the government without question.30 But since the 1990s, following the introduction of multi-party politics in the country, and this is reflected in the school textbooks since 2001, the concept of good citizenship did shift to one who participates in “the process of political change”.31 But under President Pombe Magufuli, it appears that authoritarianism and the view of citizens and non-citizens as subjects of the state gained ascendency especially since 2016.32 The President, after clinching the Presidency in 2015, carried himself as an iconic statesman: by championing zero tolerance towards corruption, by being intolerant towards public wastage, by privileging economic diplomacy, and by concentrating power in the presidency rather than the CCM Party.33 This authoritarianism co-existed with cynicism towards external ideas: these ideas were seen as interference with Tanzania’s self-reliance. For instance, when the suspected outbreak of Ebola occurred in the country, the WHO34 reported on 18 September 2019 that Tanzania had not shared the clinical data of negative tests in the Tanzanian laboratories with the  Ressler. “What went right in Tanzania?” 54.  Ibid, 54. 32  Beaumont, Peter. 2019. Alarm over cases of disease with Ebola-like symptoms in Tanzania. The Guardian 23 September. 33  Kwayu, Aikande Clement. 2020. Tanzania’s Covid-19 response puts Magufuli’s leadership style in sharp relief. The Conversation 31 May. 34  WHO. 2019. Cases of undiagnosed febrile illness  – United Republic of Tanzania. Disease Outbreak News 21 September, at https://www.who.int/csr/don/21-september2019-undiag-febrile-illness-tanzania/en/. Accessed 16 October 2020. 30 31

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WHO; nor did the country cooperate with the WHO to verify the results and carry out contact tracing. The tests were prompted by the death of a PhD researcher with Ebola-like symptoms in Dar es Salaam, the capital of Tanzania, after the researcher had done a study in Tanzania and Uganda: there had been reports of deaths from Ebola disease in Uganda around that period.35 The outbreak of Covid-19 converged with the rising authoritarianism, so that the disease escalated along with state authoritarianism. Tanzania with her rejection of external influences has always projected herself as a social insider to matters of internal wisdom and self-sufficiency in development36 compared to other EAC states, especially Kenya that is viewed by Tanzania as more externally oriented. Tanzania rejected the WHO protocols to manage the Covid-19 pandemic: this jeopardized the containment measures of other states within the EAC and beyond. For example, Reuters on 15 May 202037reported that Zambia closed Nakonde border to prevent cross-border human traffic with Tanzania following 76 of her citizens testing positive for Covid-19 near that border. Thus, Tanzania exhibited a power entanglement in which she supported the EAC Customs Union and Common Market, a liberal posture, but resisted it at the same time through rejection of WHO protocols that the rest of the EAC states, except for Burundi, accepted. Tanzania preferred a religious approach from Tanzanian clergy to pray for the country to overcome the pandemic.38 In addition, Magufuli procured a herbal concoction from Madagascar whose efficacy was doubted by the WHO.39 Additionally, on 30 April 2020, Magufuli suspended the daily updates on Covid-19 infections and morbidities.40 Next, on 8 June 2020, the President is reported to have told worshippers in a Sunday church service in Dodoma that God had heard prayers and brought an end to Covid-19 in Tanzania.41  Beaumont, “Alarm over cases of disease”.  Magoti, Iddy Ramadhani. 2020. Responding to the Covid-19 Pandemic in Tanzania: The role of solidarity, national unity, and peace. Kujenga Amani. 2020. 9 July. https:// kujenga-amani.ssrc.org/2020/07/09/responding-to-the-Covid-19-pandemic-in-tanzaniathe-role-of-solidarity-national-unity-and-peace/. Accessed 25 October 2020. 37  Mfula, Chris. 2020. Zambia reopens border with Tanzania to cargo after Covid-19 closure. Reuters 15 May. 38  Magoti, “Responding to the Covid-19 Pandemic in Tanzania”. 39  Frey, Adrian. 2020. Tanzania gets Madagascar’s anti-coronavirus drink disputed by WHO. Club of Mozambique 3 May. 40  BBC. 2020. Coronavirus: John Magufuli declares Tanzania free of Covid-19. 8 June https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52966016. Accessed 20 November 2022. 41  Ibid. 35 36

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In addition, the President caused apathy towards the use of masks by praising the clergy and people who did not use masks; he argued that masks could be the conveyor belt of coronavirus from abroad.42 Finally, in early 2021 as the first Covid-19 vaccines were rolled out to protect the population from the pandemic, Magufuli was reported on 6 February 2021 to have rejected these vaccines ostensibly because there was no coronavirus in Tanzania, despite the contrary evidence.43 On 12 March 2021, it was reported that President Magufuli had disappeared from the public eye since 27 February and it was rumoured that the President had been hospitalized on account of Covid-19, although sources within the Tanzanian state denied this.44 President Magufuli was reported dead from heart complications on 17 March 2021 and again the rumour was that he had died from Covid-19 complications.45 In civil religion lenses, Tanzania abdicated her legitimate statecraft role: in civil religion doctrine, state priests in democracies are supposed to pursue their pastoral care of the state population, without delegating their role to religious organizations or any non-state actor.46 Suluhu Hassan, the former Vice President to Magufuli, who took over the reins of power thereafter, signalled a departure from Magufuli’s policy: she articulated a mild form of self-sufficiency policy that recognized external medical advice. On 7 April 2021, she was quoted as saying: “We will do medical research which will tell us the scope of the problem and advise us about what the world is recommending as well as our own expertise”.47 In this chapter the concern is with Tanzania’s response to Covid-19 during Magufuli’s tenure. The act of Tanzanian resistance based on self-sufficiency can be seen on her conflict with Kenya at the entry border towns in Namanga, Isabania

 Ibid.  BBC 2021. Coronavirus in Tanzania: The country that’s rejecting the vaccine. 6 February. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55900680. Accessed 20 July 2021. 44  Miriri, Duncan and Nyasha Nyaungwa. 2020. ‘He’s OK’: Tanzania denies Magufuli sick with Covid-19. Reuters 12 March. 45  The Economist. 2021. John Magufuli, Tanzania’s Covid-denying President, dies aged 61. 20 March: https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/03/18/johnmagufuli-tanzanias-covid-denying-president-dies-aged-61. Accessed 10 August 2020. 46  Matui, Bramwel. 2019. Practicing civil religion in Uhuru Kenyatta’s First Term pentecostalized presidency in Kenya. International Journal of Business and Social Science 10:7, 78–87. 47  Odula, Tom. 2021. Tanzania’s new president changes policy on Covid-19, AP. 7 April. 42 43

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and Holili in Taita Taveta and those in Lungalunga in Kwale.48 Kenya constructed herself as the bastion of internationalism: to her WHO rules on Covid-19 mattered for EAC space. Kenya and Tanzania rivaled over the EAC space regarding containment of Covid-19. On 19 May Business Daily49 reported that Kenya prevented 200 Tanzanian and Somali truck drivers from entering Kenya after these drivers, who did not have Covid-19-­ free certificates, were tested by Kenya at the border and were found to be Covid-19 positive. This came on the heels of the then President Uhuru Kenyatta ordering the closure of the Kenyan borders with Somalia and Tanzania on 16 May 2020, although trucks with drivers with Covid-19-­ negative certificates were allowed to cross the borders.50 The Tanzanian Mara County Commissioner cited this as hostility from the Kenyan border authorities: he ordered that Kenyan truck drivers, even with Covid-19-free certificates, be barred from entering Tanzania.51 Meanwhile, EAC Chair Paul Kagame of Rwanda, on 12 May 2020, convened a virtual meeting for EAC heads of state to develop a consensus on the Covid-19 rules, but Tanzania and Burundi boycotted the meeting, arguing that the meeting only concerned Northern Corridor states.52 The virtual meeting issued a communiqué in which the ministers of Health, Transport and EAC Affairs were appointed to develop regional instruments for Covid-19 testing, certification and monitoring of truck drivers.53 Thus, Tanzania must have interpreted the EAC call for regional protocols to manage Covid-19 as a threat to Tanzania’s practice of self-­ sufficiency in development. The response to Covid-19 in Tanzania echoed Tanzania’s threatening EAC ecology of self that co-existed with her liberal EAC practices. This is because Tanzania houses the EAC headquarters in Arusha. But overall, since 2009, it is Tanzania that has imposed more “tax like and quality/safety measures” than any EAC state.54 48  Munda, Constant. 2020. Corona row threatens Sh61 billion Tanzania, Kenya trade. Daily Business 19 May; Mutambo, Aggrey. 2020. Kenya shuts Tanzania, Somalia borders over Covid-19, The EastAfrican 16 May. 49  Munda. “Corona row threatens Sh61 billion Tanzania, Kenya trade”. 50  Ibid. and Mutambo. “Kenya shuts Tanzania, Somalia borders over Covid-19”. 51  Munda. “Corona row threatens Sh61 billion Tanzania, Kenya trade”. 52  Mutambo. “Kenya shuts Tanzania, Somalia borders over Covid-19”. 53  East African Community. 2020. Heads of state consultative meeting of the East African community communiqué. 12 May 2020. https://www.eac.int/communique/1725communiqu%C3%A9-heads-of-state-consultative-meeting-of-the-east-african-community. Accessed 25 October 2020. 54  Ibid, 4.

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The acceptance strategy of Kenya, in response to Covid-19 and its outcomes, resonated with Kenya’s background ideational construct as a liberal state that is sometimes affected by bureaucratic inefficiency, as already discussed. Kenya did enact a power entanglement where liberalism co-­ existed with bureaucratic inefficiency. When the first Covid-19 case was diagnosed in March 2020, the country avoided a total lockdown to allow economic activities to thrive, and allowed truck drivers from the EAC to deliver supplies through the entirety of the Northern Corridor in the country.55 But Kenya, being a newcomer in tackling epidemics, revealed a weakness in Covid-19 management. For example, on 6 May, the Star56 reported that truck drivers in Mombasa, Kenya’s seaport, complained of few Covid-19 testing facilities, which led to massive delays in trucks commencing travel. The delays also led to pileup of cargo in Mombasa Port, which added to the transport costs, and this became part of NTBs that violated the spirit and letter of the EAC integration. Tanzania also complained that drivers with Covid-19-free certificates in the last 14 days from Tanzania were retested by Kenyan authorities at the border; this reveals Kenya exhibiting rivalry towards Tanzania. Moreover, some with negative test certificates tested positive; this implies a range of issues. There was lack of trust and institutional coordination among member states.57 The aforementioned resonates with how the Northern Corridor in Kenya has operated even in non-Covid-19 times. The Northern Corridor connects Mombasa to Kampala and other EAC countries.58 The importance of this infrastructure to the EAC led to enactment of several multilateral measures in the Corridor to facilitate regional flows. These measures were harmonization of customs procedures amongst partner states, operationalization of one-stop border points, and the reduction of the number of weighbridges along the corridors. This enhanced efficient integrative trade flows along the corridors. A truck that took more than 20 days between Mombasa and Kampala would now take around 10 days. The time between other EAC cities like Kampala and Kigali and Nairobi and Kampala was reduced as well. But even with these enhancements of port efficiency, and 55  Tyce, Matthew. 2020. Kenya’s response to Covid-19, Effective States and Inclusive Development 29 April: https://www.effective-states.org/kenyas-response-to-Covid-19/. 56  Mwita, Martin. 2020b. Trucks backlog at borders to be cleared in a week’s time  – CS. The Star, 6 May. 57  Ibid; Muhumuza, Rodney and Tom Odula. 2020. Africa’s essential truckers say they face virus stigma. CTV News 7 June. 58  ODI 2017, “Resolving the unresolved non-tariff barriers”, 17.

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processes within the Corridor, NTBs continued to constitute forces of resistance to the trade flows between the ports and destinations. Weighbridges were still a menace; police roadblocks and associated corruption still existed and delays at border points were still chronic.59 Although infrastructure along the Northern Corridor had improved considerably, trucks still operated at non-efficient speeds.60 In addition, Kenya had introduced phytosanitary standards as part of NTBs against goods from the EAC states for safety reasons. Moreover, Kenya required that day-old chicks imported from Uganda could only enter the Kenyan market via Kenyan agents who had to subject the chicks to risk assessment first before releasing them to the market.61 In retaliation, Uganda required that Kenyan beef, bovine semen and other animal products that were barred from entering the Ugandan market around 1997 could only be removed if Kenya submitted a risk assessment report.62 In addition, Tanzania did complain that Kenya required that Tanzanian milk should be subjected to tests despite the milk having been certified by the Tanzanian Bureau of Standards.63 The second NTB that Kenya used was the 60 per cent duty on Tanzanian milk.64 Also, the Kenya Dairy Board used quantity restrictions by allowing only a quarter of the agreed Tanzanian milk to enter the Kenyan market.65 In the same vein, Kenyan authorities that authorize external goods to enter Kenya are numerous and do not have test facilities at the exit and entry points.66 Moreover, Kenya’s Mombasa Port is congested and goods to Uganda experience lengthy processes to be cleared; there are also demurrage charges after a certain period of time.67 Last but not least, the many police roadblocks that sometimes unjustifiably stopped commercial vehicles to neighbouring countries violated the rules of the EAC Customs Union.68 The NTBs escalate prices of goods and subvert the liberal trade policies of the EAC Customs Union that Kenya is a signatory to.  Ibid, 17, 26–27.  Ibid, 27. 61  Wandia, “The Role of National interest”, 85. 62  Wandia, “The Role of National interest”, 21. 63  Ibid, 85. 64  Ibid, 85. 65  Ibid, 86. 66  Ibid, 84. 67  Ibid, 86. 68  Ibid, 88. 59 60

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Uganda’s acceptance strategy towards WHO Covid-19 protocols, and its outcome, was realized in the background ideational ability of Uganda as a country where politics is militarized, although epidemics are efficiently handled. Since 2018, Uganda has had more experience than Kenya and Tanzania in dealing with epidemics, such as Ebola, yellow fever, measles and Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever.69 Uganda did roll out a more aggressive anti-AIDs campaign that won global praise.70 This shaped Uganda’s more assiduous response to Covid-19. The WHO did report that even before Uganda diagnosed a first Covid-19 case, the country, based on this previous experience of epidemic containment, had already put in place commendable preparations to deal with the pandemic.71 Uganda argued that the fight against Covid-19 was a mwananchi (Swahili for ordinary persons) war,72 an idea whose coordinative discourse was the NRM bush wars that catapulted Museveni to power in 1986. In this militarized view of Covid-19, highly populated slum areas were securitized and cordoned off; emergency and relief work on the pandemic was centralized around the Covid-19 National Task Force; and those outside this group who tried to offer relief work were criminalized as “attempting murder”.73 By 17 June, half of the 507 Covid-19 cases in Uganda were truck drivers from the coastal states of Kenya and Tanzania.74 The latter 69  Kaitiritimba, Robinah. 2020. An effective response to Covid-19 is an inclusive response: the case of Uganda, Uganda National Health Consumers’ Organisation (UHC 2–30) 13 July: https://www.uhc2030.org/news-and-stories/blog/an-effective-response-to-Covid19-is-an-inclusive-response-the-case-of-uganda-555370/. Accessed 20 August 2020; Mugo, Patrick. 2020. Politics Covid-19 Response: What Uganda and Rwanda Got Right and What Kenya, Tanzania and Burundi Didn’t. The Elephant - Speaking truth to power, 18 June. 70  Parkhurst, Justin O. 2002. The Ugandan success story? Evidence and claims of HIV-1 prevention. The Lancet 360 (9326): 78–80, 6 July 2002; Tumushabe Joseph. 2006. The Politics of HIV/AIDS in Uganda. Social policy and development programme paper No 28: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. 71  WHO. 2020. Uganda Uses Recent Outbreak Experience to Prepare for Coronavirus. 18 March. https://www.afro.who.int/news/uganda-uses-recent-outbreak-experience-preparecoronavirus. Accessed 16 October 2020. 72   Banjwa, Adventino. 2020. Dilemmas in Uganda’s ‘War of the Mwananchi’ Against Covid-19. May: https://www.kas.de/documents/280229/8800435/Dilemma s+in+Uganda%E2%80%99s+%E2%80%98War+of+the+Wananchi%E2%80%99+against+Co vid-19.pdf/b9cf0011-35b1-fbad-1ab6-248bc66add32?t=1591868005338. Accessed, 27 November 2022. 73  Ibid:4. 74  Muhumuza and Odula, “Africa’s Essential Truckers”.

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two states were viewed by the former as less prudent in the management of epidemics.75 It is Uganda’s projection of meticulous self that could have played out as a dispute between her and Kenya; Uganda did not accept the Covid-19-­ free certificates from truck drivers issued by Kenya76; Ugandan test results also took a long time to be released.77 Possibly the Ugandan officials were not aware of the resolution on reciprocity in recognition of the Covid-19 certificates because communication between policy makers and implementers of decisions was wanting in the EAC.78 There was also a possibility that by the time Kenyan drivers were crossing the border, the delays due to bureaucratic inefficiency in Kenya had made the test results obsolete; media reports had reported such a scenario.79 But there is a possibility that Uganda as a country that did not exhibit technocratic liberalism80 was motivated by financial interests; tests from thousands of truck drivers could have easily become a source of large amounts of revenue. Uganda has a policy of taxing non-Ugandan trucks in contravention of the EAC market and customs protocols.81 The result is that trucks destined for Uganda at Malaba border point in Kenya stretched for more than 40 kilometres as they awaited clearance into Uganda.82 Militarization of politics as a Ugandan public philosophy came to be re-enacted in the Northern Corridor as it engendered the policy solutions used on truck drivers.83 Due to soaring Covid-19 numbers in Kenya, drivers of trucks crossing over from Kenya to Uganda were securitized as carriers of coronavirus in the Northern Corridor sites: these were sites outside Kenya but within the EAC states of Uganda, Rwanda and South Sudan.84  Banjwa, Dilemmas in Uganda’s war of the Mwananchi pp.5.  Mwita, “Kenyan truck drivers”. 77  Muhumuza and Odula, “Africa’s Essential Truckers”. 78  Calabrese and Eberhard-Ruiz. What types of non-tariff barriers 2016, 4. 79  Emojong, Osere. 2020. Truckers want Covid-19 retesting time extended to 30 days. The Star 27 October . 80  Sjögren, “Between Militarism and Technocratic Governance”, 261. 81  Winters et al., “Resolving the unresolved non-tariff barriers”. 13. 82  Mwita. “Kenyan truck drivers consider boycotting”. 83  However, the Northern Corridor was not the only securitized place in Uganda. In fact, people who violated the Covid-19 protocols were securitized and high levels of force were used as reported by Human Rights Watch (2020). 84  Mwita. “Kenyan truck drivers consider boycotting”; Wasike Andrew. 2020. East African truckers face backlash from Covid-19. Africa 17 May 2020. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/ africa/east-african-truckers-face-backlash-from-Covid-19/1843735. Accessed 20 May 2022. 75 76

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For instance, in Uganda, both Ugandan and non-Ugandan drivers complained that the police, the military and governments were harsh and cruel to them. This narrative suggests that the militarization and securitization of politics generally in Uganda was the discursive background of the complaints of drivers. In fact the Ugandan army coordinated the police, the army and the Local Defense Unit,85 to enforce the Covid-19 health protocols.86 In Uganda, Kenyan truck drivers were not allowed to go beyond the Nelson Mandela Stadium in Kampala.87 The Northern Corridor in Uganda became a geography of power entanglement: sites of common market yet experiencing resistance to regional integration. It even became a problematic part of Ugandan territory, part of the territory seen as the origin of disease insecurity. The securitization caused untold suffering to truck drivers who could not access food joints, accommodation facilities, parking areas and medical care on their journeys that now took several weeks from the initial maximum of four days.88 But Uganda’s realist power game that intermixed with liberal regional practices can be seen in other domains as well. On the boundary issue at Migingo, President Museveni, while in Dar es Salaam, averred that “Migingo was in Kenya but the water around it was Ugandan”.89 This rhetoric of place revealed that President Museveni, due to the large size of Lake Victoria in Uganda than Kenya, viewed Uganda as an insider more than Kenya to Lake Victoria. The rhetoric of place enacted by President Museveni was a foreground ideational ability calculated to surpass the treaty establishing the East African Community that required member states to respect state sovereignty. Additionally, Uganda levied an excise duty of US$50 to trucks from other EAC countries.90 On top of this, in 2016, Uganda, just as Tanzania did, levied a 25 per cent tax on imports  This is an armed community-policing paramilitary group.  Human Rights Watch. 2020. Uganda: Respect Rights in Covid-19 Response 2 April. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/02/uganda-respect-rights-Covid-19-response. Accessed 5 May 2020. 87  The EastAfrican. 2020. Drivers standoff turns EAC states relations on its head. The EastAfrican 9 May 2020. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/drivers-standoffturns-eac-states-relations-on-its-head-1440994. Accessed 10 August 2020. 88  Business Daily. 2020. Harrowing tales of truck drivers stuck on the road. Business Daily 2 June: https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/shipping-logistics/harrowing-tales-of-truck-drivers-stuck-on-the-road-2291526. Accessed 16 October 2020. 89  Nzila, Dee. 2016. Is it true Migingo Island in Kenya but waters in Uganda? The Standard 29 April. 90  Winters et al., “Resolving the unresolved non-tariff barriers”, 17, 26–27. 85 86

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such as “juices, ice cream, chocolate, sweets and chewing gums, claiming Kenya had used zero-rated industrial sugar imports to produce them”.91 Thus, marginalization of multilateralism in the EAC during the response to Covid-19 was not unique; during the Covid-19 response the problem only became more visible.

Conclusion The response to Covid-19 engendered escalation of NBTs because the EAC is a space constructed by heterogeneous technologies of power that have contradictory outcomes. The EAC is still a project in the making, and success in its integration requires its states to undergo transformation in governance cultures from Lockean cultures of rivalry towards Kantian cultures of friendship. Regulatory power emanating from the EAC NTBs Elimination Act (2015) is important in this transformation. This study has also contributed to an understanding of what a heterogeneous view of Wendt’s culture of rivalry might look like at a particular time. Rivalry can be the result of non-effective liberal regionalism as exhibited by Kenya, defensive rivalry as in Tanzania, or the militarized rivalry that is associated with Uganda. But this image of each state was not completely hegemonic: each state image articulated with other state practices. The EAC state is thus an arena of intermixing of technologies of power as posited by Collier Stephen.92 Apart from the response to Covid-19 that is a recent case of power entanglement in the EAC space, upon reflection, it is possible to present other cases of how such EAC states’ intermixture led to the marginalization of the EAC space. I give two such cases: the EAC space in colonial times and in the early post-colonial state and the failure of the EAC Treaty in 1977. In the colonial period the EAC space was knit by market regulations but these were subverted by the discursive technologies and practices of territorial sovereignty. The colonial East African territories of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania had a jointly administered Customs Union by 1947, and a joined Monetary Union by 1939; the territories also cooperated in

91  Anyanzaw, James. 2019. NTBs and disputes blamed for the slowdown in trade among East African states. The EastAfrican, 27 February. 92  Collier. Topologies of Power (2009), 79–80.

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common services in the transport and communications sectors.93 This implies that transport and communication corridors were important multilateral spaces. This colonial initiative was coordinated once at the end of the year by informal governance dubbed ‘The Governors’ Conference’,94 a technology of power that privileged territorial identity over regional identity. In 1947, the Colonial Government replaced this conference with the East African High Commission, a permanent regional institution, but the regional liberal practices co-existed with the colonial government common external tariff regulations that benefited the more industrialized white-settled Kenya.95 In 1960, Uganda and Tanganyika felt displaced from the EAC space and called for reforms to have a win-win EAC space.96 Due to pressure from the United Nations Trusteeship Council, Britain was to grant independence to Tanganyika on 9 December 1961. In June 1960, Nyerere stated that he was willing to postpone Tanganyika’s independence so as to allow a federal government with Kenya and Uganda.97 Thus, in early post-colonial times, Tanzania did not regard the EAC space as a threatening ecology, as she did later. But the British deployed a territorially discursive technology of power by arguing that by the date of Tanganyika’s independence, Uganda and Kenya would not be ready.98 In Uganda, the Kabaka of Buganda and Milton Obote’s Democratic Party emboldened the British territorially discursive technology of power by arguing that Uganda was not ready for the federation.99 Thus, in late colonial times, Uganda’s leading elites felt that the EAC space was more threatening to their aspirations. A new authority, the East African Common Services Organization, was established to safeguard the common services as Tanganyika waited for the other two territories to attain independence and negotiate federal arrangement.100 The Nairobi Declaration occurred on 5 June 1963101; this was after Uganda had attained independence in 1962 and Kenya had attained 93  Mgaya. John A. 1986. Regional integration: The case of the East African integration. MA Thesis, Department of International Relations, the Australian National University. 94  Ibid:4. 95  Ibid:5–6. 96  Ibid:7–8. 97  Ibid:8. 98  Ibid:13. 99  Ibid:13. 100  Ibid:9. 101  Ibid:13.

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i­nternal self-government on 1 June 1963. The leaders from the three countries pledged to establish a political federation. To implement the declaration, a working party from the three countries was established. But this working party fractured on how far each country should cede sovereignty: Uganda wanted a weak federal arrangement, while Kenya and Tanzania preferred an arrangement where states would cede more sovereignty. Thus, again Uganda elites were more paranoid about the EAC political space than Tanzania. The fracture within the working party occurred in the context of the liberal regional practices that co-existed with the colonial state arrangements that favoured Kenya in industrialization and trade flows. Thus, Ugandan and Tanzanian grievances were part of the mix, although Ugandan paranoia, as already stated, was greater than Tanzania’s. The mistrust that resulted spurred each state to pursue unilateral customs and monetary arrangements which eroded the previous regional institutional gains.102 To deal with the grievances of Uganda and Tanzania, in April 1964, the leaders from the three countries met in Kampala and followed up in January 1965 with another meeting in Mbale.103 But Kenya, seeing the deteriorating relations, did not ratify the Kampala Declaration. Thus, Nyerere decided to act unilaterally by imposing import restrictions and import quotas on goods from Kenya; the federation dream was on its deathbed. But despite this, on 6 June 1967, the East African Cooperation was signed in Kampala, Uganda.104 This treaty, by surpassing the regulations that favoured Kenya for win-win trade and industrial development, became a forefront coordinative discourse to bring about change. The treaty adopted the following measures.105 Firstly, the tax transfer system enabled Tanzania and Uganda to levy some internal tariffs against Kenya to protect industrial development in the former countries. Secondly, the East African Development Bank was established to finance industrial development in the EAC, with more privilege given to Tanzania and Uganda. Thirdly, the treaty came up with a strategy to rectify industrial imbalance by redistributing industries to the three countries. Finally, the treaty sought to decentralize the four EAC corporations: the headquarters of the East African Airways and the East African Railways  Ibid:13.  Ibid:13. 104  Ibid:27. 105  Ibid:45–60. 102 103

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Corporation were retained in Nairobi, while the East African Post and Telecommunications Corporation headquarters was moved to Dar es Salam in Tanzania, as Kampala became the headquarters of the East African Post and Telecommunications Corporation. But the background coordinative discourse of Kenya as an industrial hub in the region, which was inherited from the colonial state and which favoured Kenya, worked against the new measures taking root. Kenya rejected negotiations to have common market industries, and although Kenya accepted the decentralization of the corporations, this was not followed by substantive operational implementation,106 and this shows the operation of the inefficient bureaucracy in Kenya. Kenya implemented the regional discursive technologies of power with her own sovereign discourses of power that collided with and marginalized the EAC regimes of power. The grievance of Kenyan dominance in the EAC space became an important basis for the collapse of the EAC in 1977.107

Bibliography African Union. 2022. East African Community (EAC). https://au.int/en/recs/ eac. Accessed 22 Oct 2022. Baligidde, Samuel H. 2012. Diplomacy for development or doom? Epistemological reflections on Uganda’s recent foreign policy achievements and blunders. Estudios Internacionales 171: 20–44. Banjwa, Adventino. 2020. Dilemmas in Uganda’s ‘War of the Mwananchi’ Against Covid-19. May: https://www.kas.de/documents/280229/8800435/Dilem mas+in+Uganda%E2%80%99s+%E2%80%98War+of+the+Wananchi%E2% 80%99+against+Covid-­1 9.pdf/b9cf0011-­3 5b1-­f bad-­1 ab6-­2 48bc66add3 2?t=1591868005338. Accessed 27 Nov 2022. Berman, Bruce. 1990. Control and crisis in colonial Kenya: The dialectic of domination. Nairobi: EAEP. Boehm Sophia. 2011. The politics of American aid and conflict in northern Uganda. Insight 5 (1): 1–34. Calabrese, Linda, and Andreas Eberhard-Ruiz. 2016. What types of non-tariff barriers affect the east African community? London: Overseas Development Institute.

 Ibid:58.  Verhaeghe, Elke and Craig Mathieson. Understanding the East African Community and its transport agenda. Informal adaptation in regional trade and transport cooperation: European Centre for Development Management. 2017. 2. 106 107

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Chipembere, H.B.M. 1976. Kenyan and Tanzanian socialism (A comparative study). Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies 7 (1): 97–113. Collier, Stephen J. 2009. Topologies of power Foucault's analysis of political government beyond ‘governmentality’. Theory, Culture & Society 26 (6): 98–108. Emojong, Osere. 2020. Truckers want Covid-19 retesting time extended to 30 days. The Star, October 27. Frey, Adrian. 2020. Tanzania gets Madagascar’s anti-coronavirus drink disputed by WHO. Club of Mozambique, May 3. Green, Elliot. 2010. Patronage, district creation and reform in Uganda. Studies in Comparative International Development 41 (1): 83–103. Human Rights Watch. 2020. Uganda: Respect rights in Covid-19 Response April 2. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/02/uganda-­respect-­rights-­ Covid-­19-­response. Accessed 5 May 2020. Kaitiritimba, Robinah. 2020. An effective response to Covid-19 is an inclusive response: the case of Uganda, Uganda National Health Consumers’ Organisation (UHC 2–30) 13 July: https://www.uhc2030.org/news-­and-­ stories/blog/an-­effective-­response-­to-­Covid-­19-­is-­an-­inclusive-­response-­the-­ case-­of-­uganda-­555370/ . Accessed 20 Aug 2020. Kwayu, Aikande Clement. 2020. Tanzania’s Covid-19 response puts Magufuli’s leadership style in sharp relief. The Conversation May 31. Matui, Bramwel. 2019. Practicing civil religion in uhuru Kenyatta’s first term pentecostalized presidency in Kenya. International Journal of Business and Social Science 10 (7): 78–87. Mgaya, John A. 1986. Regional integration: The case of the east African integration. An MA Thesis. Canberra: Department of international relations, the Australian National University. Odhiambo Mbai, C. 2003. Public service accountability and governance in Kenya since independence. African Journal of Political Science 8 (1): 113–145. ODI. 2017. Resolving the unresolved non-tariff barriers in the East African common. Second and final Report. Brighton: University of Sussex, Institute of Development Studies & Overseas Development Institute. Parkhurst, Justin O. 2002. The Ugandan success story? Evidence and claims of HIV-1 prevention. The Lancet 360 (9326): 78–80. Ressler, R. Ilana. 2006. What went right in Tanzania: How nation building, and political culture have produced forty-four years of peace. Honours. Washington, DC: International Politics and the African Studies Certificate Georgetown University. Schmidt, Vivien. 2010. Reconciling ideas and institutions through discursive institutionalism. In Ideas and politics in social science research, ed. Daniel Béland and Robert Henry Cox, 47–64. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sjögren, Anders. 2013. Between militarism and technocratic governance state formation in contemporary Uganda. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

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Skordoulis, Constantine, and Eugenia Arvanitis. 2008. Space conceptualization in the context of postmodernity: Theorising spatial representations. The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (66): 105–113. Smith, Neil, and Setha Low. 2006. Introduction: The imperative of public space. In The politics of public space, ed. Smith Neil and Setha Low. New  York: Routledge. Szalai, András. 2014. The persuasiveness and institutionalization of Defense rationalist ideas on nuclear strategy, 1948–1963., PhD Thesis. Budapest: Policy and International Relations. Tumushabe, Joseph. 2006. The politics of HIV/AIDS in Uganda. Social policy and development programme paper No 28:. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Tyce Matthew. 2020. Kenya’s response to Covid-­ 19, effective states and inclusive development, April 29: https://www.effective-­states.org/ kenyas-­response-­to-­Covid-­19/. Wandia Mary, A.W. 2008. The role of national interest in regional integration: The case of Kenya in the East African Community 2000–2007. MA Thesis. Nairobi: The Institute of Diplomacy, and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi. Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social theory of international politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. WHO. 2019. Cases of undiagnosed febrile illness – United Republic of Tanzania. Disease Outbreak News, 21 September at https://www.who.int/csr/don/21-­ september-­2019-­undiag-­febrile-­illness-­tanzania/en/. Accessed 16 Oct 2020. ———. 2020. Uganda uses recent outbreak experience to prepare for Coronavirus. 18 March, https://www.afro.who.int/news/uganda-­uses-­recent-­outbreak-­ experience-­prepare-­coronavirus. Accessed 16 Oct 2020.

CHAPTER 11

The Covid-19 Pandemic in Africa, Local Responses, and Regional Strategies: The West African Case Saliou Dione

Introduction Having originated in China, the Covid-19 pandemic spread rapidly throughou the world, eventually reaching Africa, and particularly West Africa. However, there is, at current, relatively little academic literature on the topic of West African regional responses to epidemics or pandemics, and indeed to regional health cooperation more generally. The few exceptions in this respect include Sylvain Laundry Faye, who surveys that while social distancing, as a preventive measure against Covid-19, can be understood as a response to an anxiety expressed by the Senegalese, with

S. Dione (*) Cheikh Anta Diop University of Dakar, Dakar, Senegal © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Arndt et al. (eds.), Covid-19 in Africa: Governance and Containment, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36139-5_11

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its social and cultural acceptability to be demonstrated.1 Since this study, attitudes of mistrust and resistance have been observed in various forms: collective prayers in mosques organized by recalcitrant Imams or Muslim prayer leaders; the staging of religious events with large numbers of clandestine returns of Senegalese migrants from countries with the highest transmission cases; bars and nightclubs remaining open; the persistence of individual trips etc. For him, these attitudes are not new and are reminiscent of those qualified in Guinea as ‘reluctance’ during the Ebola epidemic. In a country where the majority of the population is 90 percent dependent on the informal economy, banning mobility is one way to create another ‘social drama’ that is more serious than the pandemic. Jurandir Fernandes outlines the regional response to Covid-19 whereas Peterson K. Ozili shows that Nigeria had the highest number of Covid-19 cases in West Africa and the third highest cases in Africa between March and April.2 He analyses how the arrival Covid-19 and the imposition of lockdown restrictions have negative socio-economic consequences for African countries, also emphasizing that the current national health systems could not respond to the growing number of infected patients who require admission into intensive care units. They suggest that Nigeria should explore available collective measures and intervention to address the pandemic. Ahmadou Aly Mbaye et  al examines how the Covid-19 crisis is testing the mechanisms for managing the commercial debt of developing nations.3 For them, since the announcement of the first of Covid-19 confirmed cases, returns and risk premiums in secondary markets have reacted strongly to the uncertainty created by the pandemic. As a result, if still persistent, this situation may lead to cascading faults in the near future. 1  Sylvain, Laundry, Faye. 2020. La distanciation sociale au Sénégal, un remède au Covid-19 qui a du mal à passer. https://theconversation.com/la-distanciation-sociale-au-senegal-unremede-au-covid-19-qui-a-du-mal-a-passer-134810, March 29, 2020. 7.17 pm. 2  Jurandir, Fernandes. 2020. Latin America Week. https://www.uitp.org/news/latinamerica-week-2020-jurandir-fernandes-outlines-the-regional-response-to-covid-19. See also Peterson, K. Ozili.2020. “Covid-19 in Africa: socio-economic impact, policy response and opportunities”. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy. 3  Ahmadou, Aly, Mbaye, Babacar, Sène, and Cheikh, Ahmadou, Bamba, Diagne. 2020. L’épineuse question de la dette privée des pays africains dans le contexte de Covid-19. L’épineuse question de la dette privée des pays africains dans le contexte de Covid-19. https://theconversation.com/lepineuse-question-de-la-dette-privee-des-pays-africains-dans-le-contexte-ducovid-19-138318. Accessed 17 March 2020.

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Like most African countries, those of the fifteen member countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been hit hard by the coronavirus pandemic due to the processes of globalization, which have promoted mobility. Not only is the spread of the disease much slower there than in most other parts of the world, but the number of deaths is also significantly lower, according to official statistics provided by the Regional Center for Surveillance and Disease Control (RCSDS). Covid-19 has swept across the globe and every nation has put in place response strategies to deal with the emergency. When the virus first emerged on the African continent, there were many fears about Africa’s ability to cope with the pandemic of the century given the overall state of nations’ health system and of the economic situation in many countries on the continent. How have Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria reacted to the pandemic on the health and economic levels? To respond to this question, the chapter offers a comparative analysis of how the three countries have reshaped their post-Covid-19 economic and health models in the context of power politics and globalization. The responses provided by Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria are almost identical, in principle thanks to the coordination efforts of the African Union (AU), the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and organizations such as the West African Health Organization (WAHO), the Regional Center for Surveillance and Disease Control (RCSDC), and the World Health Organization country offices. Adopting postcolonialism and Afrocentricity as theories, whose aim is to look at the pandemic from an African-centred perspective, the chapter brings to light how the three countries have worked collaboratively to build an Africa’s exceptionality in the Covid-19 fight in relation to their prevailing sociological, political, cultural, economic, social, and religious realities.

Regional Effort Dynamics, Space Organization and Spatial Order Construction West Africa is a region that has poorly resourced healthcare systems. This has made it difficult for individual countries to cope with an epidemic such as Covid-19. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Covid-19 pandemic has brought out old stereotypes and postulates of allegedly under-medicalized, pre-modern [West] Africa where poverty and a supposed scientific underdevelopment condemn Africa and Africans to medical impotence.

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The essentialism-based paradigmatic discourse justified the World Health Organization’s Secretary General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesu’s prediction of catastrophe with more than 3 million deaths in Africa over the pandemic. That also led French researchers Camille Locht from the French National Institute of Health and Medical Research (INSEM) and Jean-Paul-Mira, the head of the Paris-based Resuscitation Department at Cochin Hospital, when discussing the advisability of testing a vaccine against the disease in Africa, to describe the continent as an area “where there are no masks, no treatments, no intensive care units,” and arguing “because we know that they are highly exposed and do not protect themselves.”4 Another similar observation came from Melinda Gates, the wife of the Microsoft tycoon, Bill Gates, who stated that she could not sleep at night thinking about the likely impact Covid-19 would have in Africa, and the “corpses that will soon litter the streets.”5 However, in their modern and contemporary history, West African countries have been confronted several times, during and after the colonial period, with the experience of epidemics linked to various discoveries and treatment of many diseases such as malaria, trypanosomiasis, smallpox, syphilis, tuberculosis, and Ebola, have kept vivid memory of the multidimensional responses that were brought to those pathological challenges. The history of the epidemics and biomedicine demonstrates the long experience and extensive experience of researchers, caregivers, and ordinary people. In addition, the experience of crises, especially health crises, is much stronger in Africa than in Western countries.6 Therefore, Africans have been actors, exercising methods of appropriation and implementation that are as ‘modern’ and effective as in the rest of the world. During and after the colonial periods, they played an essential role in the discovery and treatment of many diseases, including such as malaria, trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), smallpox, syphilis, tuberculosis, plague, and, in more recent terms, Ebola.7 West African countries under ECOWAS have then used their past health strategic skills and experiences in epidemics and pandemic management to mitigate the Covid-19 health crisis. 4  Cyrille, Isaac, Sibille. 2020. https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/4/3/ french-doctors-consider-testing-coronavirus-vaccine-on-africans. April 03, 2020. 15.17. 5  CNN, 10 April 2020. 6  Florence, Bernault. 2020. Some lessons from the history of epidemics in Africa. https:// africanarguments.org/2020/06/05/some-lessons-from-the-history-of-epidemics-inafrica/ June 2020 7  Randal, Packard. 2007. The making of a tropical disease: a short history of malaria. Baltimore. John Hopkins University Press.

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Thus, since July 2020, the West African region has seen a sustained decline in new cases of Covid-19 despite early disease prediction models that have painted a very grim picture of how the pandemic could affect lives and economies in the area. One of the first explanations for this development is the regional collaboration that has been initiated among ECOWAS member countries within the WAHO, that has been operating for 33  years. This regional health organization was set up following a merger of surveillance health structures from the Yaounde-based Francophone Organization for Coordination and Cooperation in the Control of Major Endemic Diseases (OCCGE) set up in 1963 and the Lagos-based Western African Health Community (WAHC) in 1972. Since its inception by ECOWAS heads of states, the WAHO has been working hard to protect the health of the people of the region. Pooling resources and establishing cooperation for a collective and strategic fight against the Covid-19 have been one its strategies to that end. As an organization that is aware of the boundaryless nature of disease and of the prevailing unequal development in the West African sub-African region in the areas of health and disease control, it has acted as forums, which has enabled it to collect and share information and the best practices. It has also implemented a collaborative work strategy with many international organizations, such as the World Health Organization, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), among others. In addition to the WAHO, the region has also put in place the Regional Center for Surveillance and Disease Control (RCSDS), which has been very active in the prevention and control of the disease in the ECOWAS region. It has performed early warning tasks, and disseminated Covid-19-­ related-information, thereby facilitating public communication, and building the region’s capacities against the outbreak. As early as January 2020, the WAHO was on a high alert after West African countries decided not to repatriate their citizens from China’s Wuhan. At the time this was considered the best option because of the possible risk of easily spreading the virus across the region. The organization was already conscious about the potential consequences of the virus in West African countries and, consequently, started serving them a weekly epidemiological bulletin that included information on the pandemic outbreak. For the purposes of coordination, weekly online meetings were held between ECOWAS health directors, directors of national laboratory services to discuss situation updates, challenges, and country needs. To widen its scope for intervention, it put the Regional Rapid Response Team (RRRT) on standby should

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there be a need for active communication and real-time collaboration.8 On January 27, 2020, the regional health organization released its first public statement on the novel coronavirus that had emerged in China in which it informed the West African citizens about the ongoing measures destined to protect the region and offered guidance as to what they should do to protect themselves.9 The statement referred to the WHO risk assessment for regions in West Africa as it also recalled the WAHO’s initial efforts in fostering regional coordination and cooperation through timely information the sharing of best practice, and the upgrading of surveillance capacities in member states. The document further insisted on the need to increase networking between state-owned and private health laboratories to allow all citizens in West African states to have access to testing. At that time, only one suspected case with fever had been detected in the ECOWAS region; this individual had been detained at Abidjan airport and promptly isolated but later tested negative (Fig. 11.1).10

Fig. 11.1  Representation of the coordination work in the ECOWAS region through information and best practices sharing

8  Cf. “ECOWAS provides support to member states in the fight against the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) Pandemic”, Statement, Abuja, March 21, 2020, 1–2. 9  “WAHO Statement 2 on the Outbreak of the Novel Coronavirus in China”, Press release, Bobo-Dioulasso, February 1, 2020. 10  “WAHO Statement on the Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus in China”, Press release, Bobo-Dioulasso, January 27, 2020, 1.

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Throughout February 2020, WAHO undertook various coordination actions with many health stakeholders in the region to share information and expertise about the Covid-19 pandemic. To that end, several public statements were issued, respectively on February 1, 13, and 28, 2020, a joint press briefing held on February 17 with the Nigerian Minister of State for Health, and an emergency meeting of the Assembly of Health Ministers convened on February 14. On February 1, WAHO reported that the WHO had declared the Covid-19 outbreak a ‘public health emergency of international concern,’ updating the WHO risk assessment outside China to “high” (compared with “very high” in China at the same time). That was the basis on which ECOWAS member states were urged to locally beef up their airport surveillance, especially regarding direct flights from and to China, which was the epicenter of the pandemic at this time. This move was aimed at delaying and slowing down the spread of the virus across the region. Moreover, together with the Regional Center for Surveillance and Disease Control (RCSDC), the regional health body began to support the increase of regional reference laboratories dedicated to testing for Covid-19 from two to five after acknowledging their limited numbers.11 Another high-level regional coordination meeting was convened in on February 14, 2020 in Bamako, the Malian capital, to provide space for the Assembly of Health Ministers to urgently discuss, coordinate, and harmonize regional preparations and responses that included “surveillance, case management, infection prevention and control, laboratory and risk communication”.12 Based on joint assessments of the needs and challenges ahead, WAHO was tasked with working towards developing common regional guidelines13 and a strategic cost regional preparedness plan for governments based on member states’ priorities, partners, and the private

11  “WAHO Statement 2 on the Outbreak of the Novel Coronavirus in China”, Press release, Bobo-Dioulasso, February 1, 2020. 12  “WAHO Statement 2 on the Outbreak of the Novel Coronavirus in China”, Press release, Bobo-Dioulasso, February 1, 2020. 13  Cf., Novel Coronavirus (Covid-19), ECOWAS Ministers of Health in Emergency Meeting in Bamako.” Press release, Abuja, February 13, 2020.

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sector to support.14 The organization also popularized the outcomes of the ministerial emergency meeting that called for collective actions in the ECOWAS area by drawing on the lessons learned during the Ebola pandemic and other outbreaks the area had experienced up to that point. The initiative took place after the first Covid-19 case was reported on February 14 in Egypt. As early as the first case was reported in Africa, and later on in West Africa on February 28 in Nigeria, testing was already available in Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone. To widen the testing capacities in the region, WAHO initiated diagnosis training for laboratory personnel from The Gambia, Nigeria, and Ghana in collaboration with the Dakar-based leading testing centre ‘Institute Pasteur.’ In addition to the training session, each participant received 100 test kits (with the exception of Nigeria, which went back with 200).15 In addition to the test training session, the regional health organization organized epidemiological capacity-building training courses for some member countries and then provided support in establishing medical emergency teams. To further build up the capacities of ECOWAS member countries to prepare themselves and be ready to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic, WAHO organized a simulation exercise in Abuja on March 5, 2020. The exercise was aimed at rehearsing and deploying the regional organization’s Regional Rapid Response Teams (RRRTs) and upgrading the provision of critical supplies such as diagnosis kits, specimen transportation kits, and personal protective equipment (PPEs). Indeed, the ECOWAS commission, for its part, gave additional funds for an emergency basis of 50,000 test kits and equipment for member states.16 In regional efforts to curb the spread of the pandemic, a technical working group of reference laboratories were gathered at a meeting with the Africa Task Force for Novel Coronavirus (AFCOR) to discuss support coordination for laboratory testing and to supply chains in member countries. Under the advice of WAHO, the ECOWAS Commission issued its first statement about the measures to be taken to prevent and contain the spread of Covid-19. Therefore, WAHO and RCSDC have played a 14  Cf. ECOWAS Health Ministers, “Final Communiqué”, Emergency meeting, Bamako, 14 February 2020. 15  https://www.WAHOoas.org/web-ooas/en/actualites/gambia/WAHO-afenet-andgambian-ministry-health-are-strengthening-field-epidemiology (accessed September 17, 2020). 16  “ECOWAS Provides Support to Member States in the Fight Against the Spread of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (Covid-19) Pandemic”, Statement, Abuja, March 21, 2020 p. 2.

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critical role in providing advice, information and guidance on the management of Covid-19  in the region. The two health bodies have also been very active in working toward an epidemic-free area thanks to their working together with member states and partners, and paving the way for the adoption, by the Assembly of Health Ministers, of a ‘Regional Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response to Pandemics’ pegged at USD 51 million17 and another one dubbed the ‘Strategic Plan for Institutional Communication.’ A manual of procedures was also made available to all ECOWAS 15-member regional groups as part of the regional and national initiatives, thereby instituting a weekly communication process among them. Therefore, it was through the ECOWAS, WAHO and RCSDC-led regional and interregional coordination framework that Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria have developed novel, significant, autonomous, and flexible initiatives to respond to Covid-19 in their respective countries. However, these regional bodies have a number of limitations despite their important involvement and efforts made in strategizing against the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic. The capacities of WAHO and RCSDC in terms of planning and monitoring and evaluating need to be improved in order to be better equipped to avoid and face future pandemics. Health research and access are essential for the two regional bodies to be better known to political, scientific community, partners and the public. This provides the evidence needed for appropriate public health action, timely policies, and planning strategies. In order for this to become a reality, they need to reinforce their financial and information-disseminating capacities to reach out to the grassroots population. Unfortunately, the quality of health information in the West African region is relatively poor, making it difficult to judge past successes or failures in this field of health and to adjust accordingly. In contrast to other parts of the world, the present-day regional health needs in West Africa are not fully grounded in solid research. The lack of health workers in the region is a problem yet to be resolved. Staff shortage, plus an uneven geographic distribution of health professionals, leads to a lack of evidenced-based policies. These are desperately needed for the countries of the region to achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3 which aims to “ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.” Regional health research, 17  ECOWAS Commission, “ECOWAS Measures to Prevent and Contain the Spread of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (Covid-19)”, Statement, Abuja, March 16, 2020.

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as key to building strong health systems, is needed to combat health threats that know no national borders, as evidenced by Covid-19 and Ebola. The world is moving toward a more integrative agenda on achieving universal healthcare and the West African region should not be left behind. To this end, health programs should now involve key stakeholders not only in the health sector, but also in other sectors, such as transport, education, and environment.

Covid-19 and Local Realities: Between Rational and Moral Choices Although the first confirmed Covid-19 cases occurred later in West Africa than in Europe and the United States of America, once they were detected, the expansion in numbers was rapid. Senegal, which is one of the first countries in French-speaking Africa to be affected by the pandemics, showed sharp increases in the number of cases soon after the initial cases were confirmed. The country recorded its first three cases of community transmission on March 21, showing more cases in this country than in the 119 confirmed ones as early as March 27. It was also in the same month when Ghana’s Greater Accra, Ashanti and Upper West regions and Nigeria’s Lagos recorded their earliest confirmed cases and initial responses from their respective governments. In Ghana, the two cases were officials who flew back from Norway and Turkey. Indeed, the stability and measures were guided by the three countries’ public health and economic-related challenges the pandemic was posing to their national governments as early as it entered the three nations. Faced with the crisis, they are exposed by the poor level of adequate capacities in intensive care units and the high prevalence of factors favouring the spread of the virus. Even if the results of medical research have indicated that the elderly are more likely to die from the disease whereas the youths are likely to contract it, they have indicated that all forms of physical human contact through hugging, touching, conversation not respecting a minimum distance of 2 meters are likely to cause transmission of the virus. Therefore, the number of transmission cases is logically much dependent on the prevailing social norms in the three West African countries where the average size of household is sometimes very big. While social distancing is key in any attempts to mitigate the pandemic, the social interaction system in the area, the intrinsic informal nature of the West African production system

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poses a significant risk to the success of confinement and social distancing policies.18 The state has little control of the complex economic ecosystem of small informal stakeholders who are self-employed individuals, household entrepreneurs and other forms of micro- and macro-businesses leaders operating in the agricultural, industrial, and services sectors. To mitigate the spread of the virus in this context, WAHO that was tasked with working toward developing common regional guidelines suggested member states apply a partial lockdown policy that considered their local realities. These activities are often low-productivity, poorly mechanized, and highly labour-intensive added to artisanal fishing, in vegetable and fish markets, slaughterhouses and other open-air markets, public transport systems, small restaurants, processing units for fish and other primary products which were classified as high contamination risks. To make their strategies efficient and to reduce the negative impact on their economies, the governments of Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria tailored responses to their local realities. In Ghana, joint meetings among major stakeholders were conducted as were training sessions for teachers and other professionals on how to handle suspected cases of novel Covid-19. In Senegal and Nigeria, the heads of states talked to their populations, announcing the measures against the spread based on the information by WAHO and RCSDS that were tasked with working toward developing common regional guidelines. All three of these West African countries banned all public gatherings to lower transmissions. Beaches, basic, junior and senior high schools as well as universities, both public and private, were closed and a state of emergency and a curfew instituted to stop the spread of Covid-19. Whereas in Ghana BECE and WASSCE candidates could remain in school under social distancing protocols, in Senegal and Nigeria, they had to stay at home and online courses were provided to them via their state-owned television services in some instances. Unlike Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria adopted a partial lockdown of their major cities. The partial lockdown of Ghana’s Accra and Kumasi, and of Nigeria’s Lagos and Abuja, took effect on the same day, on March 30, 2020. Traveling to and from the three West African countries was strongly discouraged with non-admittance of travellers, except for their respective citizens and people with resident permits who sought to enter the country. The residents of the two countries were instructed to stay at home and 18   Ahmadou, Aly, Mbaye. 2020. https://wascal.org/publications/leveraging-oncovid-19-response-funds-to-support-livelihoods-in-africa/

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only to leave their houses for critical outings like going to the bank or purchasing food and medicine. After a few weeks Ghana lifted its lockdown policy; this was followed by Nigeria, sparking criticism from the population’s elites among the media and health professionals. The only people who were exempt from those restrictions were professionals involved in the production, distribution of food, beverages, pharmaceuticals, medicine, media and telecommunications. The partial or full stay-at-home initiative allow a slowing of the spread of the Covid-19 virus and disinfection exercises were carried out in markets, which were seen as places of gathering likely to spread the virus. As such, initiatives to fumigate all schools and public places were similarly launched in the three countries. In efforts to mitigate the spread of the pandemic, they instituted the local production of masks for their citizens instead of seeking to import them from China or Western countries. As part of the health strategies in Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria, mobile testing centers were made available at identified Covid-19 hotspots. Senegal constructed an additional Intensive Care Unit (ICU), equipped many of their hospitals, and increased hospital bed facilities to welcome the newly contaminated patients. The wearing of facial masks was made mandatory and institutions were required to beef up safety measures in efforts to halt the spread of Covid-19 pandemic, especially among health workers. Additionally, the governments distributed testing kits and other kits to Covid-19 testing facilities and provided laboratory equipment and supplies in order to improve the testing capacity of the three nations. In Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria, the indications of a Scientific Committee made of healthcare workers, medical university professors (epidemiologists, virologists, cardiologists, neurologists, bacteriologists, and pulmonologists), health experts, decision-makers, among others, whereby political action feeds on scientific knowledge, are being followed. The strategy is that of containment; once a case is detected, they are isolated and treated, but all their contacts are quarantined, more precisely for fourteen days with periodic testing. The country-level Scientific Committees are responsible for providing guidance, orientations, and advice to the local authorities; these, in turn, make decisions that tally with local socio-demographic, economic, and cultural realities. Because of the difficulty in banning informal activities in the three ECOWAS countries, due to their sprawling nature, their governments have deemed it wiser to institute a gradual resumption of some activities. Prior to that, well-­targeted campaigns for strict observance of barrier gestures were put forward to accompany the

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gradual opening. Unlike in developed countries, the informal phenomenon is present in the West African region where both the public and private formal sectors employ very few people, leaving the vast majority of African workers in the informal sector. However, this phenomenon feeds on the relative weakness of the state and the coexistence between the formal institutions inherited from colonization and those drawn from African customs and traditions. The Covid-19 measures that were adopted in West Africa accounted for the fact that the majority of Senegalese, Ghanaians, and Nigerians live from hand to mouth and therefore find themselves in a situation of great vulnerability. Thus, confining them would be tantamount to letting them die slowly. In this way, protecting those who control almost all food production and distribution chains would contribute in protecting them and preserving livelihoods, but at the same time avoiding a break in these chains that would lead to prices rise as also ways of limiting the impact of the virus on social and economic life as well as inspiring the expansion of their domestic capacities and deepening their self-reliance. As a matter of fact, in Ghana the government launched the GH Covid-19 tracker app in addition to the use of Veronica buckets which are also used for hand washing. Both Senegal and Ghana invented automated and mobile hand washing machines to stem the spread of the virus. The former also initiated the one-dollar testing kit whereas the latter has become the first country to resort to drone aircraft in the fight against the pandemic through the transport of Covid-19 samples. The governments of Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria have faced challenges in their responses to the Covid-19 outbreak. Widespread breaches of safety measures have been reported despite extensive public communication campaigns. However, they were all able to set up resilient response plans that enabled them to manage the health crisis well. As a result, their management was recognized internationally. This is evidenced by Senegal’s rank at the second place in the Foreign Policy Global Rankings, which examined the way in which 36 countries dealt with the coronavirus. The number of deaths over Covid-19 remains very limited in the three West African countries, which goes counter to earlier predictions that forecasted that at the end of the pandemic, Africa would have some of the worst consequences of this Covid-19 pandemic. African countries, in general, and particularly the West Africa ones, have poor health systems and this remains a source of concern, particularly in

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the event of an increase in outbreaks.19 Nevertheless, they have good physicians, scientists, health experts who have recognized and longstanding experience in pandemic management. In the WHO Africa region, between 83,000 and190,000 people could die of Covid-19 and 29 million to 44 million could get infected in the first year of the pandemic if containment measures fail, are yet to happen as shown below in the chart about the Coronavirus evolution in Ghana (cases 92,562—recovered 90,196— deaths 779), Nigeria (cases 165,055—recovered 155,041—deaths 2063), and Senegal (cases 40,295—recovered 39,021—deaths 1107) dated Friday, April 29, 2021 (Fig. 11.2). The data released on Friday, April 29, 2021 by the World Health Organization show that after a sudden acceleration in the number of cases that was observed at the end of May 2020, the contaminations slowed down again in early April 2021, which means that the ‘peak’ that some scientists and WHO officials had announced for September 2020 was yet to take place. That was also due to the efficient and coordinated strategies and measures taken at the regional level by the three ECOWAS member countries. Experience and knowledge sharing at the regional and

Coronavirus Evoluon in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal 180000 160000 140000 120000 100000 80000 60000 40000 20000 0

cases

recovered Ghana

deaths

Nigeria senegal

Fig. 11.2  Evolution of Coronavirus in Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal 19  Ohia C, Bakarey AS, Ahmad T. COVID-19 and Nigeria: putting the realities in context. Int J Infect Dis: IJID: Off Publ Int Soc Infect Dis. 2020;95: 279–281. DOI: https://doi. org/10.1016/j.ijid.2020.04.062

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continental levels also accounted for the contamination slowdown. In fact, even though the measures taken by the governments of the three West African nations have been efficient so far, their effects have, however, affected very unfortunately and disproportionately the most vulnerable layers of their societies, thereby requiring other steps to better negotiate the mitigation of the impact.

Negotiating the Economic and Political Impact, Risks and Costs of the Covid-19 The COVID-19 pandemic has had devastating consequences. Many people have lost family and friends, and particularly health workers who have lost their lives in their valiant efforts to contain the virus and treat the sick. What the pandemic has revealed most starkly are the shortcomings of healthcare systems across the globe and the huge social costs of an economic model that prioritizes markets and profits over people’s health and wellbeing. Covid-19 is exactly the kind of crisis that not only weak economies like those of Africa are ill-equipped to solve, but also neoliberal capitalist economies of the West. As the coronavirus spread globally, the weaknesses of the multistate system were exposed. Institutions such as the United Nations were unable to act and the WHO became deeply politicized due to the calculated efforts by the American and European governments to weaken any genuine attempts at dealing with the virus from countries of the Global South. Across the globe, containment measures added to the loss of human life and other effects of the Covid-19 pandemic have generated considerable economic and social shocks. In fact, they have had a profound negative impact on individuals, communities, and societies by bringing social and economic life to a virtual standstill. In fact, the Covid-19 pandemic has generated unprecedented economic challenges many countries across the global community have to take up or perish. Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria are no exception to that rule. Consequently, their respective governments have put forward a leadership strategy that unites the spirits of their citizens and arouses collective actions. In Nigeria, for instance, as the outbreak intensifies, the West African economic giant’s services, trade, and financial sectors, which contribute 30 percent to GDP, suffered significant disruptions. As a result, jobs were lost in both the formal and informal job markets, exacerbating unemployment rates that were already high. Nigeria is Africa’s largest oil

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producer, home to the largest natural gas reserve on the continent and world’s fifth-largest exporter of liquefied natural gas. Consequently, the decline in oil prices by 55 percent just before the pandemic was an economic shock to Ghana and Nigeria, two oil-producing countries, because of the sector’s contribution to their economies, amounting to 65 percent and 90 percent of their governments’ total export revenues, respectively.20 Although Nigeria is the continent’s leading crude-oil producer, production, which has already been affected by sporadic supply disruptions, has significantly worsened. This means that during the peak of the pandemic, the Federal pegged the budget of oil prices at US$57 per barrel and production at 2.18 million barrels per day, marking a decline of 48 percent of expected revenue from oil sales per month, has reduced the country’s fiscal revenue by close to US$10 billion and export earnings by US$19 billion. 21 As such, fiscal space has been significantly narrowed, thus affecting the government’s ability to provide emergency responses. Like Nigeria, Senegal is very open to foreign trade with imports and exports that respectively occupied 37.7 percent and 22.8 percent of GDP in 2019, respectively. The country’s oil exportation activity, which is due to start in 2021, has been also affected by disruptions of oil and gas exploration activities and the decline in world trade activity and the disruption of value chains.22 Given that Ghana is an import-driven economy, Covid-19 has had a significant adverse impact on the country’s international trade and reserves. As the pandemic’s situation is persisting longer than expected, the economy is suffering from a significant decline in government revenue and expenditure, resulting in job losses as have been recorded in both Senegal and Nigeria. The new situation has, in turn, eroded the economic gains achieved in recent years and significantly slowed down Ghana’s rate of economic development. Considering the current developments, the government estimates a slump in projected GDP growth for 2020 at 2.6 percent, which is significantly lower than budgeted GDP growth of 6.8

20  Revenue contribution from EITI Nigeria country report 2017 and export percentages calculated from UNNCTAD States database, 2019. 21  ECA – Economic Impact of the Covid-19 on Africa. 22  UNDP. 2020. Impact de l’activite socio-economique de la pandemie de Covid-19 au Senegal, 7.

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percent for the year.23 Added to that, the additional borrowing and related expenses that will be incurred are likely to increase the debt risks of Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria. The unplanned increase in expenditure, particularly in the health sector, could adversely affect the fiscal deficit of Ghana. The country’s government has estimated that events unfolding because of Covid-19, even with some mitigating measures, will result in a deficit of 6.6 percent of revised GDP, which is higher than the de facto fiscal rule of 5 percent established by the Fiscal Responsibility Law.24 Similarly, with regard to Ghana and Nigeria, the country of teranga (hospitality), Senegal, which had recorded a drop of income among the working group before Covid-19 entered the country on March 2, has now seen its active workers in the informal sector, who represent 84 percent of the working group, being more affected than those in the formal sector. The situation is causing an additional precariousness in a country with a weak social safety net. Declining growth in major trading and financial partner economies, including China, has also affected demands for Senegalese, Ghanaians, and Nigerians. Curfews, restrictions and consolidation movement, and closure of land, sea and air borders have also disrupted their forecasted economic growth. On the one hand, that has led to a decrease in participation in the labor market, the underutilization of capital, and long-term impacts on productivity; on the other hand, it has brought about a fall in domestic demand with direct consequences for the retail sector. The latter’s forecasts have been based on an overall decline in activity, resulting in a drop in the margins generated by traders on products from several sectors of activity. In addition, border closure measures at national and global levels have hit the tourism sector of Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria with its related activities of accommodation and catering services. According to the Senegal-based National Agency of Statistics and Demography (ANDS, May 2020), forecasts in tourism activity show a fall (45 percent for Senegal alone) which puts at risk thousands of jobs in these sectors. Therefore, the outlook for prompt tourism recovery in these three countries remains uncertain. 23  Economic impact of Covid-19 on the economy of Ghana (2020). 3. https://www2. deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/gh/Documents/about-deloitte/ gh-economic-Impact-of-the-Covid-19-Pandemic-on-the-Economy-of-Ghana 24  Economic impact of Covid-19 on the economy of Ghana (2020). 3. https://www2. deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/gh/Documents/about-deloitte/ gh-economic-Impact-of-the-Covid-19-Pandemic-on-the-Economy-of-Ghana

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However, given the negative impact of Covid-19 on the economies of Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria, their respective governments have initiated, on the one hand, public spending strategies to support businesses and livelihood and, on the other hand, implemented economic measures aimed at softening the financial fallout. Therefore, Senegal has announced a response program known as ‘Force Covid-19’ which is designed to limit the effects of the pandemic at the micro level in the country. President Macky Sall’s government has released funds to support the private sector and the poor households. Among the measures, there are tax exemptions or moratoriums for bigger companies, and direct transfers in the form of food supply, including a two-month water waiting and power bill payment. Up to 1 million poor households have received about US$110 worth of food under the resilience scheme. All those involved in the informal sector working in industry, commerce, transport, and services, and Senegalese in the Diaspora, whose revenues and remittances have fallen dramatically, have also been supported under what has been termed the Senegalese government-initiated ‘Diaspora Force Covid-19’under the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ghana has followed the same trend. Thus, President Nana Akufo-­Addo’s government has allocated approximately US$540 million to alleviate the social and economic implications caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. The initiative has been part of a program dubbed ‘Coronavirus Alleviation Program (CAP)’ aimed at engaging the pharmaceutical industry, supporting small and medium-sized businesses, upgrading district and regional hospitals, as well as ensuring availability of testing kits, equipment, and beds across Ghana. Like Senegal’s scheme, Ghanaian authorities have covered individual’s electricity and water costs since April, with 100 percent for the very poor and 50 percent for all others. A US$17 billion plan, known as ‘Ghana Coronavirus Alleviation & Revitalization of Enterprises Support Programme (Ghana CARES)’, is also in the pipeline. In Nigeria, the most important industries, particularly airline, retail, hospitality, oil and gas, and other service-related sectors, have been adversely impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic. Muhammadu Buhari’s government, like those of his counterparts in the two West African countries (Senegal and Ghana), has also set out several measures to tackle the impact of the coronavirus. To that end, it has established a US$121 billion fund to support the country’s economy, targeting poor households, micro and small businesses that are affected by the pandemic. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) cut interest rates and granted a moratorium on the repayment of principal. The US$52 transfer program

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to poor and vulnerable households have also been implemented to support livelihoods. The governments of Senegal, Ghana, and Senegal are juggling budgetary constraints and large external gaps, which have required them to resort to international financial institutions such as the African Development Bank (AfDB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB), and other bilateral and multilateral financial partners. The Covid-19 micro- and macro-levels impact being beyond their economic and financial capacities, they have expressed the need to for greater debts reliefs to better materialize their respective support programs, assure a good economic recovery, and get back on course toward political and economic development, and reforms.

Conclusion In their modern and contemporary history, African societies in general, and West African ones in particular, have been confronted several times, during and after the colonial periods, with the experience of epidemics linked to various discoveries and treatment of many diseases such as malaria, trypanosomiasis or sleeping sickness, smallpox, syphilis, tuberculosis, plague and, recently, Ebola. The populations have therefore kept a vivid memory of the multidimensional responses that were brought to those pathological challenges. Unfortunately, the WHO has either willingly, or out of ignorance or oblivion, poured into essentialist speeches, predicting 3 million deaths, when the Covid-19 pandemic would reach the African continent. In fact, the organization is proving right postcolonial theorists who gave unearthed various power mechanisms [biopolitics] that are present within the neo/colonial settings aimed at consolidating the political authority of the neo/colonizers and utilizing political power to regulate and control the bodily autonomy of the neo/colonized subjects. In fact, the WHO’s discourses of catastrophe simply naturalize and pathologize ‘African subjects.’ How Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria, as ECOWAS member countries, have reacted to the Covid-19 pandemic in health and economic terms may differ from one African country to another, from one region to another, but there are many similarities in the four-level health strategy: continental, regional, national, and community. The chapter has shown how the three West African countries have resorted to the best lessons learned from the past and implemented struggle strategies that consider their sociological,

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political, cultural, economic, social, and religious realities, thus providing relevant and effective regional, national and state and community responses against the Covid-19 pandemic. In Africa, the response of countries to the continental nest is almost similar thanks certainly to the AU, at the global level the WHO and in relation with other states at the international level (China), albeit amidst contradictions and biased discourses. At the continental level (AU), the Africa Task Force for the Novel Coronavirus, at the regional level (WAHO and RCSDC) under the umbrella of the ECOWAS, and at the national level (states and related structures) have also played key roles in strategizing against the pandemic. The strategies initiated by the three West African nations can serve as enough accounts for why the WHO’s predictions of catastrophe are yet to happen. The Covid-19 pandemic has not finished showing [us] the damage it has caused and will cause on all fronts. It has knocked out [our] savings, demanded the breakdown of [our] usual social interactions, paralyzed education systems (middle, secondary, university education, etc.). To have testing capacities across the West Africa region, solidarity and pooling of technical platforms as well as human resources have been necessary since Africa imports almost everything and does not produce locally what it needs for diagnosis, sanitation and medicines. Because of its contagious nature, the shared strategy is to limit or even suspend the movement of individuals. Thus, the borders have been closed, measures such as curfew; ‘target confinement’ or lockdown in the two West African countries, Ghana and Nigeria, and self-lockdown strategy for Senegal has been taken to lessen and cut the chain of transmission in the region. Therefore, the chapter has demonstrated the regional coro-solidarity spirit that has been prevailing since the pandemic subsequently arrived in Africa, accounting for the similarities in the responses provided by the three countries. Organizations such as the AU, which has given a continental nature to the responses, whereas ECOWAS has provided an informed regional aspect. As soone as the pandemic broke out, ECOWAS brought together all the health ministers of the region for an exchange of strategies with the intention of adopting a West African strategy against Covid-19. The health advice, guidance, and orientation of the WHO, whose indications, though sometimes marred with contradictions and followed by most world governments, have given it a global dimension. At the state level, the governments of Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria have set up local scientific committees composed of medical university professors, sociologists, anthropologists, medical doctors, economists, healthcare engineers,

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psychologists, lawyers, and technicians, among others, who have provided them with indications since they believe that political actions are nourished by scientific knowledge, thus finding local solutions to local problems. The strategies adopted by the three countries’ respective scientific committees are those of containment; once a case is detected, it is isolated and treated, but, in addition, all of its contacts are quarantined, more precisely in the fortnight with periodic testing. To deal with the dire impact of Covid-19 on African economies and societies, the three West African governments initiated strategic public spending response programs in order to support livelihoods and migrant workers, and to limit the effects of the pandemic on poor households and women who are the most vulnerable strata. Indeed, the chapter has brought to light the similarities and differences in economic responses that are seasoned with continental and national initiatives to plead for debt cancellation renegotiation to support the needy populations and businesses that are impacted by the crisis that have frozen the world and put whole swathes of the economy at a standstill. After the relaxation of the restrictive measures taken in the fight against the spread of Covid-19 with the reopening of places of worship, businesses, commerce and schools, the governments of Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria have also projected themselves in the post-Covid-19 era as a catalyst for end to the decolonization process in Africa. In addition to revealing devastating effects on countries, communities, and households, the virus has shown new development-­ related identities. As the epicenter of the pandemic moved from China to Europe and now to the US, highlighting the weakness of Western neoliberal and neo-colonial systems and that of the Global North as a whole, the Covid-19 pandemic has revealed that only the Global South is not susceptible to infectious epidemics. In so doing, the chapter has demonstrated that the pandemic is fast disrupting the colonial and neocolonial perspective which argues that healthcare systems in Africa are the only ones always overwhelmed by outbreaks. It has further shown that austerity measures and a lack of investment anywhere in the world cripple healthcare systems. Thus, what the pandemic has unearthed most starkly are the shortcomings of healthcare systems across the globe and the huge social costs of an economic model that prioritizes markets and profits over people’s health and wellbeing. No country in the world, perhaps with the exception of China, was prepared to deal with this virus, thus proving that Covid-19 is exactly the kind of crisis that [our] neoliberal capitalist economy is ill-equipped to solve. As the Coronavirus spreads globally,

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people from every part of the world have witnessed the failures of the multistate system. Institutions such as the United Nations have been unable to act and institutions like the WHO have become deeply politicized due to the calculated efforts by some Western countries and the US government to weaken any genuine attempt at diplomacy and human rights advocacy. Nonetheless, faced with the contours of the new economic deal because of the Covid-19 pandemic, there is need for African nations in general and West African ones in particular to rebuild new South–South cooperation models and renegotiate North–South cooperation strategies based on a win–win partnership and not on economic in-dependency. This is relevant and urgent for them because the pandemic has revealed that inter-state dependency is a reality. Therefore, in many ways, the pandemic presents an opportunity for Senegalese, Ghanaian, Nigerian peoples to see themselves differently, and for the world to consider them as partners in finding solutions to complex problems such as Covid-19. Just as Western governments are now realizing the mistake they have made in outsourcing the production of everything to China—from masks to ventilators— African governments in general too should make sure that their nations are self-sufficient in key industries essential to national security, safety, and health. We have seen recently the African Union mobilizing resources to confront the Covid-19 pandemic, with all its member countries speaking with one voice, and in a recent teleconference expressing the need and urgency to adopt unity in finding common solutions and securing debt cancellations. Such initiatives are encouraged in times of crisis, but they should be the rule.

Bibliography Anaemene, Banjamin Uchenna. 2013. Health diplomacy and regional integration in west Africa: The west African health organization’s experience. Journal of International Studies 9: 59–65. Bappah, H.Y. 2015. Human security in practice: Securing people from the threat of epidemic  – What can we learn from the ECOWAS response to Ebola? Strategic Review for Southern Africa 37 (1): 190–199. Bernault, Florence 2020. Some lessons from the history of epidemics in Africa. https://africanarguments.org/2020/06/05/some-­lessons-­from-­the-­history-­ of-­epidemics-­in-­africa/June2020

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Economic impact of Covid-19 on the economy of Ghana 2020. 3. https://www2. deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/gh/Documents/about-­d eloitte/ gh-­economic-­Impact-­of-­the-­Covid-­19-­Pandemic-­on-­the-­Economy-­of-­Ghana. ECOWAS Health Ministers, “Final Communiqué”, Emergency meeting, Bamako, February 14, 2020. Faye Sylvain Laundry. 2020. La distanciation sociale au Sénégal, un remède au Covid-19 qui a du mal à passer. https://theconversation.com/la-­distanciation-­ sociale-­au-­senegal-­un-­r emede-­au-­covid-­19-­qui-­a-­du-­mal-­a-­passer-­134810, March 29, 2020. 7.17pm. Herpolsheimer, Jens. 2020. ECOWAS and the Covid-19 pandemic: Regional responses and African inter-regional cooperation, 4–14. Leipzig: Leipzig Research Centre Global Dynamics, Leipziger Universitätsverlag. ReCentGlobe Working Paper 42. Mbaye, Amadou Aly 2020. https://wascal.org/publications/leveragingon-­covid-­19-­response-­funds-­to-­support-­livelihoods-­in-­africa/. Mbaye, Ahmadou Aly, Sene, Babacar, Diagne, Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba (2020). L’épineuse question de la dette privée des pays africains dans le contexte de Covid-19. https://theconversation.com/lepineuse-­question-­de-­la-­dette-­ privee-­des-­pays-­africains-­dans-­le-­contexte-­du-­covid-­19-­138318, March 17, 2020. 8.08pm. Niane, Diatou Thiaw 2020. La résilience au Sénégal: le concept face au contexte ! https://www.seneplus.com/opinions/la-­r esilience-­au-­senegal-­le-­concept-­ face-­au-­contexte. April 27, 2020. Novel Coronavirus Covid-19, ECOWAS Ministers of Health in Emergency Meeting in Bamako.” Press release, Abuja, February 13, 2020. Ohia, Chinenyenwa, Adeleye S. Bakarey, and Tauseef Ahmad. 2020. COVID-19 and Nigeria: Putting the realities in context. International Journal of Infectious Diseases. 95: 279–281. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2020.04.062. Onzivu, W. 2006. Globalism, regionalism, or both: Health policy and regional economic integration in developing countries, an evolution of a legal regime. Minnesota Journal of International Law 15 (1): 111–187. Ozili, Peterson K. 2020. Covid-19  in Africa: Socio-economic impact, policy response and opportunities. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3574767. Packard, Randal. 2007. The making of a tropical disease: A short history of malaria. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. UNDP. 2020. Impact de l’activite socio-economique de la pandemie de Covid-19 au Senegal.

Index1

A African Union (AU), 200, 237, 254, 256 Africa Task Force for Novel Coronavirus (AFCOR), 242 Afrocentricity, 237 Airport surveillance, 241 Anarchy, 193, 217 Apartheid, 57, 58, 76, 121, 122, 126–128, 130, 131, 136, 137 Asymmetric military cooperation, 56 Authoritarianism, 216, 219, 220 Authoritarian pulse, 35 Autobiographical identities, 215 B Biopolitical interventions, 47, 52, 53 Biosecurity, 34, 38, 39, 43, 48, 49, 52 Border closures, 34, 251 Botswana, 65 Bribery, 47

Bureaucracy, 137, 231 Burkina Faso, 5, 14–30, 73 Burundi, 7, 162, 163, 168, 176–178, 180, 183, 195, 198, 199, 201, 202, 214, 216, 219, 220, 222 C Case management, 241 Cash economy, 127 income, 121 Catastrophe, 238, 253, 254 Civil-military gap, 60 Civil religion, 221 Civil society, 82, 86, 87, 132, 171 Clinical care, 162 Code of honour, 58, 71–76 Cold War, 3, 217 Collective security, 3 Colonialism, 127 Colonial legacies, 56

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Arndt et al. (eds.), Covid-19 in Africa, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36139-5

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INDEX

Common market, 206, 210, 227, 231 Communal living, 163 Communication, 6, 23, 36, 53, 84, 99–103, 108, 142–144, 146, 147, 149, 168, 226, 229, 239–241, 243, 247 Community policing, 227n85 workers, 121 Complex Humanitarian Emergencies, 57 Contact tracing, 5, 93, 200, 220 Containment, 1–8, 34, 52, 83, 161–187, 199, 203–207, 222, 225, 246, 255 measures, 7, 14, 90, 185, 206, 220, 248, 249 strategies, 90, 167–187 Contemporary Africa, 57 Coordination problems, 56 Core group, 192, 194, 195 Coronavirus/Covid-19, 1–8, 14–30, 33–53, 55–77, 81–113, 120–122, 128, 132–138, 141–156, 161–187, 191–210, 213–231, 235–256, 240n8 Cosmopolitan, 142, 143 Coup, 56 Customs union, 206, 210 D Data analysis, 150–155 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 69, 71, 144, 195, 197, 198, 200, 214, 217 Disease control experts, 162 Disinformation, 162 Document analysis, 57, 59 Domestic relevance, 56, 77 Dynamics of freedom, 34

E EAC Customs Union, 214, 215, 220, 224 East African Community (EAC), 4, 7, 8, 163, 167–169, 177, 183, 187, 191–210, 213–231, 231n107 Ebola, 2, 53, 57, 71, 82, 102, 120n3, 143, 166, 197, 200, 219, 220, 225, 236, 238, 242, 244, 253 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 7, 8, 237–243, 240n8, 246, 248, 253, 254 Economic growth, 84, 89, 164, 183, 184, 251 Egoism, 193, 206 Emergency fund, 242 response, 82, 83, 86, 87, 250 situation(s), 82 Emotional attachment, 148 English language, 142, 146, 151, 152 Eswatini, 65 Ethnography, 121 External ideas, 219 F Faith-based organisations, 92, 107, 110 Fatalities, 90, 193, 207, 209 Financial assistance, 166, 169–170 Fishing, 6, 120–125, 127, 133–137, 163, 245 communities, 6 Food security, 6, 121, 122, 124, 126 Food shortages, 92 Forecast, 251

 INDEX 

G Gambia, 242 Geopolitics, 35 Ghana, 8, 237, 242–255 Global developmental ideologies, 3 Global extractive capitalism, 127 Global health actors, 3 Global inequalities, 35 Globalization, 214, 237 Global responses, 35 Global security threat, 2 Governance, 1–8, 29, 35, 64, 81–113, 137, 138, 228, 229 Government information, 142 measures, 24 H Hausa language, 142 Hawking food, 163 Health emergency, 2, 8, 13, 82, 95, 108, 112, 161, 241 governance, 1, 3 information, 6, 163, 243 propaganda, 4 rights, 168, 169, 184, 187 systems, 2n4, 4, 94, 112, 166, 210, 236, 237, 244, 247 Herbs, 162, 175–177, 186, 187 High density, 18, 163 Historical, 73, 120, 121, 125–127, 134, 137 Horizontal relations, 3, 4 Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), 2, 3, 14, 15, 28, 29, 53, 166, 194, 197

261

I Igbo language, 142 Immobility, 34, 38, 42, 48 Inadequate training, 56 Indigenous knowledge systems, 127 Indigenous language, 143–149, 156 Inequalities, 8, 28, 52, 84, 88, 89, 122, 128 Infection, 5, 13, 14, 27, 28, 37, 88, 90, 101, 111, 128, 171, 192, 195–197, 199, 202, 204–208, 210, 220, 241 containment, 34 Infectious disease, 22, 68, 94, 193 Infodemic, 6, 102, 141–156 Informal economy, 88, 104, 236 sector, 18, 104, 185, 247, 251, 252 settlements, 122, 163, 208 trade, 231n107 workers, 90, 106 Informalisation, 121, 127 Information management, 83, 90, 93, 99, 100, 112 sharing, 168, 200, 201 Institutional capacity, 89, 164 Institutionalism theory, 164 International concern, 13, 161, 241 International relations, 204, 217 International system, 193, 209, 210 Isolation, 29, 30, 93, 94, 101, 129, 147 K Kenton-on-Sea, 119–122, 124, 126, 128–131, 134, 137

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Kenya, 7, 162, 163, 168, 171, 176, 177, 179–187, 191, 193–199, 201, 202, 204, 205, 207–210, 208n36, 214–216, 215n8, 219–231 L Land enclosures, 127 Languages, 6, 123, 126, 141–156, 214 use, 142, 144, 145, 147, 156 Leadership deficit, 56 Liberalism, 192, 215, 216, 223, 226 Liberal posture, 220 Lingua franca, 142 Literacy, 142 Livelihoods, 5–7, 34, 42, 47, 48, 87, 104, 123, 125, 127, 134, 247, 252, 253, 255 Local and international agencies, 92 Local police, 121, 123, 126 Local translations, 35 Lockdown, 2, 4, 7, 34, 37, 39, 45, 47–50, 61, 64, 66, 83, 90, 93, 97–99, 102, 104, 108, 110–112, 119–138, 223, 236, 245, 246, 254 Logistics assistance, 60 security, 56 Long-distance truckers, 192 M Marine resources, 137 Markets, 84, 92, 110, 151, 152, 180, 182, 186, 187, 206, 210, 216, 224, 226–228, 231, 236, 245, 246, 249, 251, 255 Medical research, 221, 244

Military brutality, 61 counterbalancing, 193 involvement, 55–77 professionalism, 58, 72 society relations, 56 threats, 193 Miscommunication, 6, 7, 146 Misinformation, 102, 146, 162 Mobility movement, 34, 35 privileges, 5, 34, 35 turn, 34 Mortality rate, 162 Movement restrictions, 49, 90, 93, 99, 104 Mozambique, 65 Multilateralism, 4, 8, 213–231 Multi-level governance (MLG), 8, 81–87, 84n12, 90–108, 112, 113 N National interest, 193 National security, 192, 193, 204, 210, 256 Nation-state, 1, 44, 193, 209 Neoliberal, 249, 255 Nigeria, 6, 8, 81–113, 142, 150, 151, 236, 237, 242–255, 250n20 Non-interference, 214 Northern Corridor, 213–216, 218, 219, 222–224, 226, 226n83, 227 Notlela, 66 O Observation, 16, 45, 52, 57, 145, 147, 152, 194 Opposing views, 35 Oral narrative, 121

 INDEX 

Outbreak, 6, 14, 56, 64, 68, 70, 82, 92, 104, 141–149, 151, 156, 164, 171, 186, 200, 219, 220, 239, 241, 247–249, 255 Oxygen, 165 P Pandemic containment, 1–8, 83, 220, 248 outbreak, 14, 64, 141, 142, 147, 164, 239 Pandemicscape, 120, 121, 126, 127, 137 Peacekeeping missions, 57, 70, 71 Personal protective equipment (PPEs), 242 Pidgin, 152 Pidgin English, 142, 152 Police, 33, 40, 42, 43, 45, 49, 50, 60, 66, 121, 123, 126, 135, 151, 179, 185, 198, 224, 227 Political entrepreneurs, 35 Political freedoms, 35 Political instrumentalization, 35, 52 Politicisation, 103 Politics entrepreneurs, 35 freedom, 35, 166 practices, 34, 35 Postcolonialism, 237 Post-colonial states, 215, 228 Poverty, 88–90, 106, 112, 120, 134, 164, 179, 185, 209, 237 Power, 3, 4, 6, 35–39, 41–46, 50–53, 71, 72, 85, 109, 112, 123, 193, 216, 218, 219, 221, 225, 227–229, 231, 237, 252, 253 entanglement, 214, 218, 220, 223, 227, 228 Praetorian armies, 56

263

Prayers, 41, 162, 175, 176, 179, 182–183, 187, 220, 236 Precarious housing, 90 Presidential task force (PTF), 92, 110 Preventive measure, 14, 25, 42n14, 235 Private sector Private security companies, 121 Privileges, 34, 35, 42, 132, 214, 230 of mobility, 5, 34 Protein, 121 Protocols, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 17, 58, 93, 99, 102, 154, 199, 201, 203, 205, 207, 208, 210, 219, 220, 222, 225–227, 226n83, 245 Public affairs, 1 Public gatherings, 95, 162, 180, 185, 245 Public health crises, 7, 56, 59, 60, 90, 162, 199 emergency, 13, 95, 112, 161, 241 Public sector, 86 Q Qualitative research, 57, 59 Quarantine, 2n2, 34, 36, 47, 48, 60, 64, 69, 147, 162, 168, 180, 181, 199 measures, 47 R Realism, 192, 193, 210 Reductionist interpretation, 57 Reference laboratories, 241, 242 Regional cooperation, 8, 194, 200 Regional economic communities (RECs), 163, 237 Regional integration, 7, 203, 207, 214, 227

264 

INDEX

Regional organization, 242 Regional resilience, 7 Regional trade, 7, 194, 196, 201, 206, 207, 231n107 Religion institution, 229 organisation, 143, 150–152 Religious foundation, 162 Religious organisations, 143, 150–152, 221 Reopening, 96, 143, 255 Resilience building, 83 Resource control, 126 Restrictions, 6, 15, 23–27, 29, 34–36, 38–40, 44, 45, 49–51, 53, 95, 99, 121, 123, 128, 133, 136, 137, 161, 180, 183–185, 202, 204, 205, 209, 224, 230, 236, 246, 251 Risk, 7, 14, 15, 25, 29, 38, 51, 95, 106, 134, 135, 138, 154, 191–210, 224, 236, 239–241, 245, 249–253 communication, 7 Rural, 6, 15, 16, 35, 47, 48, 51, 67, 92, 97, 98, 111, 113, 131 Rwanda, 7, 162, 163, 168, 171, 177, 178, 180, 182, 183, 185, 186, 195, 198, 199, 201, 202, 206, 208–210, 214, 216, 217, 219, 222, 226 S Sanitation, 68, 88, 92, 181, 254 School closures, 90, 95, 184 Screening centres, 5, 17–20, 28, 29 procedures, 200 Securitization, 3, 227 Self-reliance, 215, 219, 247

Self-sufficiency policy, 221 Semi-literates, 147 Senegal, 8, 237, 242–255 Service delivery, 82, 86, 87, 131 Settler-colonialism, 127 Settler economy, 215 Shut down, 110, 128 Small businesses, 163, 179, 252 Small scale farming, 163 Social distancing, 29, 37, 39, 42, 72, 92, 93, 102, 177, 203, 235, 244, 245 Social media, 83, 100, 108, 132, 147, 164, 176 Social protection, 82–83, 93, 99, 104, 112, 113 Social welfare, 84, 90, 104–108, 110, 111 Socio-economic disparity, 121 Socio-economic profile, 142 South Africa, 6, 56, 58, 60, 65, 67, 69, 71, 75, 76, 90, 120–122, 120n4, 124, 126–129, 136 South Sudan, 7, 162, 163, 168, 171, 176, 179, 180, 182, 183, 195, 198, 199, 201, 202, 208, 214, 217, 226 Specimen transportation, 242 Speech community, 142–144, 156 Stakeholder interactions, 83 State actors, 3, 4 control, 4 cordon politics, 2 of emergency, 245 intervention, 4, 44, 215 -led economic reconstruction, 57 and non-state actors, 1, 4, 108, 110 weakness, 215 Stay-home orders, 34 Steam inhalation, 162

 INDEX 

Subsistence economies, 163 Subsistence fishermen, 119–138 Surveillance system, 168, 200 Sustainable development, 6, 83, 84, 89, 112 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), 81, 85, 89, 112, 243 T Tanzania, 7, 69, 162, 163, 168, 170, 171, 171n27, 176–178, 180–184, 186, 191, 195, 196, 198, 198n16, 199, 201–203, 206, 208–210, 214–216, 215n12, 219–225, 219n32, 219n33, 220n39, 227–231 Target population, 142 Technical working group, 242 Tensions, 4, 124, 126, 127, 136–138, 206, 208, 209 Terrorist attacks, 56 Testing centres, 5, 26, 93, 194, 242, 246 kits, 101, 168, 178, 242, 246, 247, 252 laboratory, 241, 242 Thematic analysis, 120n3 Therapy, 162, 176, 182–183 Tracing sources, 162 Trade informal, 231n107 Traditional culture, 162 Traditional herbs, 162, 162n5, 175, 177, 186, 187 Traditional medicine (TM), 162, 175, 176, 182–183, 202 Translation, 6, 7, 35, 145, 146, 155 Travel restrictions, 34, 110

265

Truck drivers/truckers, 7, 184, 191–210, 198n16, 222, 223, 223n57, 225–227 Twitter, 83, 98, 163 Typologies, 4 U Ubuntu, 58, 71–76 Uganda, 5, 7, 33–53, 162, 163, 168, 171, 177, 180–183, 185, 186, 194, 195, 197–199, 201, 202, 206, 208, 209, 214–217, 217n22, 219, 220, 224–230, 226n83, 227n89 Urban areas, 18, 51, 93, 163 Urban/ity citizen, 51, 90, 163 city, 51 governance, 4, 81–113 government, 81, 85, 108 management, 83 urban areas, 18, 51, 93, 163 V Vaccine, 26, 30, 69, 147, 162, 201, 221, 238 Ventilation, 165 Vice President, 221 Virtual consultative meeting, 200 Vulnerability, 14, 195, 247 W War-like, 57 Water costs, 252 governance, 137 Weak environment, 89

266 

INDEX

West Africa, 8, 56, 200, 235–237, 240, 244, 247, 254 West African Health Organization (WAHO), 8, 237, 239–243, 245, 254 White-settler narrative, 128 World Health Organization (WHO), 2–5, 2n4, 7, 8, 14, 18, 68, 82, 92, 93, 141, 144, 146, 149, 156, 161, 162, 162n5, 164, 167, 169, 171, 175, 187, 191, 200, 202, 207, 219,

220, 220n39, 222, 225, 237–241, 248, 249, 253, 254, 256 Y Yoruba speech community, 142, 143 Z Zimbabwe, 65