Beyond Containment: Reconstructing European Security 9781685854874

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
List of Tables and Figures
Preface
Introduction
1 The Grand Strategy of Institutionalization
2 Building a New Security Architecture in Europe
3 Europe's Nascent Collective Security System
4 Democracies, Peace, and Paralysis
5 The United States and the Isolationist Impulse
Bibliography
Index
About the Book and the Author

Citation preview

BEYOND CONTAINMENT

BEYOND CONTAINMENT Reconstructing European Security : • Kim Edward Spiezio

LYN NE RIENNER PUBLISHERS

B O U L D E R L O N D O N

:

To Janice and Nicholas, my loves and my inspiration

Published in the United States of America in 1995 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 8LU © 1995 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Spiezio, K. Edward (Kim Edward), 1956— Beyond containment: reconstructing European security / K. Edward Spiezio p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-451-7 (alk. paper) 1. National security—Europe—International cooperation. I. Title. UA646.S648 1994 355'.03304—dc20 94-20271 C1P British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

@

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

CONTENTS

List of Tables and Figures

vii

Preface

ix

Introduction T h e Purpose o f the Study Europe and the United States: T h e Enduring Link Democracies D o n ' t Fight, but Can They Cooperate? T h e United States and Collective Security T h e Plan o f the Study 1

2

3

T h e G r a n d S t r a t e g y o f Institutionalization

5 7 8 13

T h e Concept of Grand Strategy

13

T h e Internal Architecture T h e Timing o f the Strategy

16 20

T h e Content of the Strategy T h e Clinton Administration Conclusion

26 29 33

B u i l d i n g a N e w S e c u r i t y A r c h i t e c t u r e in E u r o p e

37

T h e Security Problématique Arms Control Developing a "Strategic Partnership" with Russia

38 40 48

International Institutions Conclusion

51 64

Europe's Nascent Collective Security System T h e Nature o f Collective Security Systems T h e Benefits o f Collective Security

4

1 2 3

67 68 72

Collective Security and the Free Rider Problem

77

Major-Power Cooperation in P o s t - C o l d War Europe

81

Conclusion

84

Democracies, P e a c e , and Paralysis T h e Sources o f M a j o r - P o w e r Security

v

89 90

vi

Contents

Democracies and Involuntary Defection The Significance of the War in Bosnia Conclusion 5

T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d the Isolationist I m p u l s e The United States and Isolationism Isolationism and the Grand Strategy of Institutionalization Conclusion

Bibliography Index About the Book and the Author

98 106 110 115 117 127 133 137 151 157

TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables 2.1 2.2 2.3 4.1

C F E and C F E - 1 A Ceilings Distribution of Conventional Military Capabilities

43 44

I C B M s Inherited by the Successors to the Soviet Union Distribution o f Nuclear Weapons Among the Major

46

Powers of Europe, 1 9 9 2 Frequency of Issue-Areas as a Source of Armed Major-Power Conflict, 1 6 4 8 - 1 9 4 5

91

4.2 4.3

Distribution o f Capabilities in P o s t - C o l d War

4.4

Relative Capabilities of Europe's Major Powers, 1 9 9 2 Distribution of U . S . Society Among Four Types of

Europe, 1 9 9 2 4.5

Foreign Policy B e l i e f Systems, 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 8 6

95 101 102 104

Figure 3.1

T h e Prisoners' Dilemma

79

vii

PREFACE

T h i s book was written with two audiences in mind. First, I wanted to address students of U . S . foreign policy who are interested in better understanding the United States' response to the end o f the Cold War in Europe. It is not unusual to hear contemporary observers characterize the recent course o f U . S . foreign policy as essentially rudderless. In my view, however, this mistakes tactical maneuvering on the part o f both the Bush and Clinton administrations for the absence o f a coherent strategy. I seek to correct this misapprehension by outlining the fundamental features o f the United States' post-Cold War strategy in Europe, which I label "the grand strategy o f institutionalization." Second, I also wanted to engage international relations theorists in a debate over the implications democracy holds for the prospects for international security cooperation. T h e end o f the Cold War has prompted a number of scholars to call for the creation o f a collective security system in Europe. Few studies, however, consider how democratization on the part o f today's major powers may inhibit their ability to participate in this type o f regime. This is an issue that should be o f considerable interest to students o f U.S. foreign policy as well since multilateral security institutions play a critical role within the context o f U . S . post-Cold War strategy in Europe. B y taking up this question, I hope to spark further research into how the domestic factors associated with democracy can both facilitate and complicate the multilateral management o f international security problems. I also hope to stimulate a dialogue between international relations theorists and foreign policy analysts by demonstrating how theory and e m pirical studies can be used to clarify the problems and possibilities associated with statecraft. A strategy, like any form o f public policy, is fundamentally a type o f theory that reflects decisionmakers' beliefs about the nature o f cause-and-effect relationships in international politics. Hence, policy can and should be subjected to the same analytic criteria used in the evaluation o f any theory. There is no guarantee, of course, that this type o f rigorous analysis will lead to the selection o f an appropriate strategy. Indeed, the sheer unpredictability o f international and domestic ix

x

Preface

politics renders the concept of good j u d g m e n t highly suspect w h e n it comes to the conduct of a n a t i o n ' s foreign policy. T o f o r g o such an analysis, however, makes unclear how we might assess the relative merits of a strategy and risks placing ourselves at the mercy of the state and other socalled experts. Several people have played an important role in helping me bring this project to a s u c c e s s f u l conclusion. First and f o r e m o s t , I thank my w i f e , Janice, for b e i n g a source of encouragement and strength in my life. Without her unyielding moral support, I simply would have lacked the courage to persevere. C h a r l e s T a y l o r also deserves credit f o r lending me various types of institutional support during the year in which 1 wrote the m a n u script. Charles went to great lengths to provide me with an opportunity to complete this research. For this, I thank him very much. Substantively, this study is a reflection of the c o m m i t m e n t to theory and practice long espoused by my mentor, colleague, and friend, E d w a r d Weisband. E d w a r d ' s scholarship has been a constant source of inspiration to me. I can only hope that this work begins to approach the high standards he has helped to establish in the field of U.S. foreign policy studies. I also must acknowledge the contribution Charles Walcott m a d e in regard to the conclusion of this study. Quite useful c o m m e n t s were also received f r o m Patrick M o r g a n and C h a r l e s D o r a n : Both read the entire manuscript and m a d e valuable s u g g e s t i o n s . T h e same can be said of my editor, M a r t h a P e a c o c k . M a r t h a ' s gentle reassurances and o n g o i n g e n c o u r a g e m e n t w e r e of considerable importance to me. In a similar vein, our departmental secr e t a r i e s — M a x i n e , Terri, and K i m — d e s e r v e my u n r e s e r v e d thanks f o r helping to prepare various drafts of the manuscript. Last, but certainly not least, I a c k n o w l e d g e the contribution the students of Virginia T e c h have m a d e to this study. T h i s research is a direct outgrowth of my u n d e r g r a d u a t e teaching responsibilities in the areas of both U.S. foreign policy and international security. Virtually all of the m a terial contained in this study has been presented at one time or another to the students of PSCI 3 6 2 5 and 3734. Their questions and c o m m e n t s have played an invaluable role in helping me hone the analysis. For this service, I am in their debt. Kim

Spiezio

INTRODUCTION

U . S . foreign policy makers have responded to the end o f the Cold War in Europe by reviving their long-standing goal of transforming the European states system into a liberal international society. It is a vision o f Europe in which democracies, market-based economies, and international organizations c o m b i n e to form a regional political order wherein the e x e r c i s e o f state power is restrained by an interlocking network o f liberal norms and institutions located at the level o f both d o m e s t i c and international politics. T h e attractiveness o f this design lies in the possibilities it creates for enduring peace and prosperity in Europe. In essence, the emergence o f a liberal international society would transform one o f the most heavily militarized and conflict-prone regions o f the world into a pluralistic security community overlaid by a single, integrated e c o n o m y stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. Obviously, such a development would serve the security and the e c o n o m i c interests o f states located in both Europe and North America. In pursuit o f this goal, U . S . foreign policy makers have formulated a long-term, integrated strategy designed to facilitate the spread o f liberal values and institutions in Europe. As yet unnamed by public o f f i c i a l s , s c h o l a r s , or the media, the approach perhaps can best be c h a r a c terized as a grand strategy o f institutionalization. 1 In p r a c t i c e , the strategy consists o f two basic initiatives. First, the United States is e n deavoring to promote and consolidate the democratization and marketization o f state-society relations in countries located throughout the eastern half o f the European continent. S e c o n d , U . S . policymakers also are supporting efforts to broaden and deepen the role international institutions play in the management o f regional security, e c o n o m i c , and social issues. In combination, these initiatives represent an ambitious attempt to e s t a b l i s h an o v e r a r c h i n g normative and institutional f r a m e w o r k on the Continent that will serve, o v e r time, to l i b e r a l i z e the c o n s t i t u t i v e principles o f political a s s o c i a t i o n both within and a m o n g the states o f Europe.

1

2

Beyond Containment

The Purpose of the Study One purpose of this study is to document the emergence of the grand strategy of institutionalization in 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 0 and its subsequent embrace by the Clinton administration. This is done primarily through an analysis of public statements and policy p r o n o u n c e m e n t s m a d e by senior m e m b e r s of both the Bush and Clinton administrations. This portion of the study examines the strategic beliefs underlying the United States' response to the end of the Cold W a r and indicates h o w these beliefs c o m b i n e to f o r m a grand strategy that ultimately will t r a n s f o r m the European states system into a liberal international society. Another purpose of the study is to e x a m i n e some of the practical steps U.S. foreign policy m a k e r s have taken to implement the strategy. Here, particular attention is paid to the United States' e f f o r t s to d e v e l o p a new security architecture in Europe by b r o a d e n i n g and deepening the role international institutions play in the management of regional security affairs. This focus is warranted because multilateral security institutions (e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], the United Nations [UN], and the C o n f e r e n c e on Security and Cooperation in Europe [ C S C E ] ) are assigned a key role within the context of the grand strategy of institutionalization; to wit, these organizations are charged with the responsibility f o r managing the domestic and international conflicts that may arise during the process of liberalization in Eastern Europe and the f o r m e r Soviet Union. T h e study also raises a series of questions about the viability of multilateral security institutions in the p o s t - C o l d War era. Conceptually, Eur o p e ' s e m e r g i n g security architecture constitutes a nascent collective security s y s t e m . 2 While in principle this type of r e g i m e is well suited to carry out the order-keeping tasks envisioned by U.S. foreign policy makers, in practice multilateral institutions are characterized by a n u m b e r of well-known obstacles to cooperation that can limit their e f f e c t i v e n e s s as a tool for the m a n a g e m e n t of international security issues. Many analysts dismiss such concerns, however, by arguing that contemporary s y s t e m i c and d o m e s t i c conditions in E u r o p e should e n a b l e states to overcome the cooperation problems that have undermined collective security s y s t e m s in the past. Of the f a c t o r s cited in support of this claim, none is more important than the fact that all of the major powers of Europe currently are led by democratically oriented g o v e r n m e n t s . This is an unprecedented political development that presumably has established a domestic political foundation conducive to the multilateral m a n a g e m e n t of European security affairs. I challenge this conclusion by arguing that under certain systemic circ u m s t a n c e s d o m e s t i c political f a c t o r s can inhibit a d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t ' s ability to participate in a collective security system. I support this

Introduction

3

claim by presenting insights derived f r o m the international relations literature that suggest that c o n t e m p o r a r y s y s t e m i c and d o m e s t i c conditions may render a collective security system an unviable political option f r o m the standpoint of liberal states and societies. Hence, I c o n c l u d e that the multilateral institutions c o m p r i s i n g E u r o p e ' s nascent collective security system are likely to be plagued by repeated acts of b u c k - p a s s i n g on the part of the m a j o r powers. I also contend that this problem will be, in part, a c o n s e q u e n c e of the fact that these states are led by democratically oriented governments. The study concludes with a brief discussion of the implications the argument holds for the grand strategy of institutionalization and the f u t u r e of the European states system.

Europe and the United States: The Enduring Link Ultimately, this study seeks to m a k e a contribution to both our understanding of c o n t e m p o r a r y U.S. foreign policy and the literature on international c o o p e r a t i o n . T h e end of the Cold W a r has been greeted with a flood of b o o k s and articles c o n c e r n i n g the f u t u r e of U.S. foreign policy. Most of these analyses, however, have been largely normative in character. That is, the authors prescribe various steps policymakers should take in the n a m e of promoting U.S. interests. There is nothing wrong with this tack, but it d o e s divert attention f r o m the actual policies that the United States has been pursuing in regard to Europe. This is a serious oversight b e c a u s e , historically, the United S t a t e s ' role in international politics has been d e f i n e d primarily in relation to the European states system (Craig, 1977; R o s t o w , 1993). For e x a m p l e , after gaining independence, Americans defined themselves largely in opposition to Europe. T h e U.S. experiment was represented as a conscious attempt to break with European practices at the level of both d o m e s t i c and international politics (Schlesinger, 1986: 3 - 2 2 ) . C o n c e p t u a l l y , " A m e r i c a n i s m " w a s f r a m e d as a revolutionary alternative to the autocratic and militaristic practices long associated with the European states system (Paine, 1775/1938). This understanding of the United S t a t e s ' broader purpose in the international system, in turn, helped to spawn the distinctive strategy of isolationism (Crabb, 1986: 1 - 1 4 ) . Isolationism, of course, sought to insulate first the United States itself, and s u b s e q u e n t l y the entire W e s t e r n H e m i s p h e r e , f r o m the day-to-day machinations associated with E u r o p e ' s classical balance-of-power system. In doing so, the strategy was designed to provide breathing space for the growth and d e v e l o p m e n t of the United States ( W a s h i n g t o n , 1796/1940: 2 1 4 - 2 3 8 ) . At the s a m e time, h o w e v e r , isolationism w o u l d facilitate the promotion of new principles of international association that literally could

4

Beyond Containment

revolutionize the nature of international relations in the r e a l m of both e c o n o m i c s and security (see M o n r o e , 1 8 2 3 / 1 8 9 6 : 2 0 7 - 2 2 0 ) . T h i s p h a s e in U . S . f o r e i g n p o l i c y r e a c h e d its c l i m a x at the e n d of W o r l d W a r I. U n d e r the l e a d e r s h i p of W o o d r o w W i l s o n , the U n i t e d States m a d e its f i r s t c o n c e r t e d a t t e m p t to t r a n s f o r m the n a t u r e of the E u r o p e a n states s y s t e m ( O s g o o d , 1953). At the Versailles p e a c e c o n f e r e n c e , W i l s o n e n d e a v o r e d to lay the f o u n d a t i o n f o r a liberal international society in E u r o p e by e s t a b l i s h i n g a c o l l e c t i v e security s y s t e m that w o u l d r e p l a c e the b a l a n c e of p o w e r as the m a i n i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y of regional security ( L e v i n , 1968). U l t i m a t e l y , h o w e v e r , this r e v o l u t i o n a r y u n d e r t a k i n g w a s d e f e a t e d by a c o m b i n a t i o n of d o m e s t i c a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b s t a c l e s ( A m b r o s i u s , 1987), w h e r e u p o n the U n i t e d S t a t e s r e v e r t e d to its h i s t o r i c r o l e as a regional p o w e r w h o s e s e c u r i t y - r e l a t e d activities w e r e c o n f i n e d largely to the Western Hemisphere. F o l l o w i n g the e n d of W o r l d W a r II, the United S t a t e s ' s t a n c e t o w a r d the E u r o p e a n s t a t e s s y s t e m u n d e r w e n t a f u n d a m e n t a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n as U.S. f o r e i g n policy m a k e r s o p t e d to b e c o m e deeply i n v o l v e d in the m a n a g e m e n t of E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y issues ( D e P o r t e , 1986). R e s p o n d i n g to the c h a l l e n g e p o s e d by the Soviet U n i o n , the U n i t e d States b e c a m e an a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t in the E u r o p e a n s t a t e s s y s t e m ; a n d f o r the next f i v e d e c a d e s , the United S t a t e s ' role in international politics w o u l d be d e f i n e d largely in o p p o s i t i o n to the S o v i e t U n i o n . D u r i n g this p e r i o d , of c o u r s e , the g r a n d strategy of c o n t a i n m e n t stood as the c o n c e p t u a l c e n t e r p i e c e of U.S. statec r a f t ( G a d d i s , 1982). In 1989, this p h a s e in U.S. f o r e i g n policy c a m e to an a b r u p t a n d u n e x p e c t e d e n d . O v e r the last f o u r years, a series of r e v o l u t i o n a r y g e o p o l i t i cal d e v e l o p m e n t s have f u n d a m e n t a l l y t r a n s f o r m e d the E u r o p e a n states syst e m . T h e d i s s o l u t i o n of the S o v i e t U n i o n has u n l e a s h e d f o r c e s that h a v e destabilized political, e c o n o m i c , a n d military a r r a n g e m e n t s t h r o u g h o u t the C o n t i n e n t . H e n c e , f o r the third t i m e this c e n t u r y , the U n i t e d States is c o n f r o n t e d with the task of r e d e f i n i n g its role in E u r o p e . A s this brief r e v i e w s u g g e s t s , the f a t e of E u r o p e a n d the U n i t e d States are b o u n d by a transatlantic link that r e m a i n s as s t r o n g today as it w a s in the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . T h i s e n d u r i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p is a c o n s e q u e n c e of a s i m p l e , yet f u n d a m e n t a l , g e o p o l i t i c a l f a c t : H i s t o r i c a l l y , m o s t of t h e w o r l d ' s m a j o r military p o w e r s h a v e been located in E u r o p e . For all intents a n d p u r p o s e s , r e c e n t c h a n g e s h a v e not d i m i n i s h e d the v a l i d i t y of t h i s proposition ( W a l t z , 1993). H e n c e , the stability of this region of the w o r l d still holds e n o r m o u s c o n s e q u e n c e s for the United States a n d its p e o p l e . G i v e n the i m p o r t a n c e of t h i s t r a n s a t l a n t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p , the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' r e s p o n s e to the e n d of the C o l d W a r in E u r o p e d e s e r v e s c a r e f u l study. A s t a t e ' s selection of a g r a n d strategy holds e n o r m o u s c o n s e q u e n c e s for its o w n c i t i z e n s as well as f o r o t h e r m e m b e r s of the international c o m m u n i t y . By e m b r a c i n g a particular a p p r o a c h , a g o v e r n m e n t c o m m i t s itself

Introduction

5

to an e n d u r i n g c o u r s e of action that i n e v i t a b l y a f f e c t s the nature of statesociety r e l a t i o n s in its o w n c o u n t r y a n d p e r h a p s e v e n the character of the state itself. At the s a m e time, of c o u r s e , a s t a t e ' s g r a n d strategy will have s i g n i f i c a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the w a y it r e l a t e s to, a n d interacts w i t h , o t h e r countries. T h e s e are f a m i l i a r t h e m e s in the l i t e r a t u r e on U . S . f o r e i g n p o l i c y . In the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , f o r e x a m p l e , the s t r a t e g y of i s o l a t i o n i s m w a s j u s t i f i e d , in part, by c o n c e r n s a b o u t h o w a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n in E u r o p e ' s b a l a n c e - o f - p o w e r system might a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t the e v o l u t i o n of the state and its r e l a t i o n s h i p with U.S. society ( C r a b b , 1 9 8 6 : 3). 3 S i m i l a r c o n c e r n s h a v e b e e n v o i c e d in the p o s t - W o r l d W a r II era b y c r i t i c s of the g r a n d s t r a t e g y of c o n t a i n m e n t . S e e n f r o m t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , the pursuit of c o n t a i n m e n t has led to, inter alia, the g r o w t h of a " n a t i o n a l security s t a t e " as well as to p r e c i p i t o u s national e c o n o m i c d e c l i n e ( Y e r g i n , 1977; K e n n e d y , 1987: 3 4 7 - 4 3 7 ) . T h e international c o n s e q u e n c e s of the United S t a t e s ' security s t r a t e g i e s are, of course, the s u b j e c t of a v o l u m i n o u s literature. Isolationism a n d c o n t a i n m e n t both h a v e b e e n p r a i s e d by s o m e , and pilloried by o t h e r s , f o r the i m p a c t they h a v e had o n the historical e v o l u t i o n of international politics. T h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s i m p l y r e i n f o r c e the i m p o r t a n c e of u n d e r s t a n d i n g the p r o b l e m s a n d p o s s i b i l i t i e s i m p l i c i t in the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' g r a n d strategy of institutionalization.

Democracies Don't Fight, but Can They Cooperate? T h i s s t u d y a l s o s e e k s to m a k e a c o n t r i b u t i o n to the l i t e r a t u r e o n international c o o p e r a t i o n . M a n y t h e o r i s t s p r e s u m e that d e m o c r a c i e s are ideally s u i t e d to c o o p e r a t e in the r e a l m of s e c u r i t y ( e . g . , F l y n n a n d S c h e f f e r , 1 9 9 0 ) . D e m o c r a c i e s , f o r e x a m p l e , rarely f i g h t o n e a n o t h e r ( D o y l e , 1 9 8 3 ) a n d t h e i r political s y s t e m s are r e l a t i v e l y t r a n s p a r e n t ( C o w h e y , 1 9 9 3 ) . H e n c e , d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n s h o u l d s e r v e to a m e l i o r a t e m a n y of the c o n c e r n s a n d f e a r s that h a v e t e n d e d to inhibit i n t e r n a t i o n a l security c o o p e r a t i o n in the p a s t . M o r e o v e r , political h o m o g e n e i t y s h o u l d b e c o n d u c i v e to the e m e r g e n c e of a n o r m a t i v e c o n s e n s u s o n t h e part of s t a t e s a b o u t the " e s sential f e a t u r e s of a d e s i r a b l e international o r d e r " ( K u p c h a n a n d K u p c h a n , 1991: 146). In theory, this s h a r e d s e n s e of p u r p o s e s h o u l d serve to e n c o u r a g e a n d sustain security c o o p e r a t i o n on the part of d e m o c r a c i e s as well. In light of this, d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n on the part of the m a j o r p o w e r s w o u l d s e e m to establish a d o m e s t i c political f o u n d a t i o n c o n d u c i v e to the c o l l a b o r a t i v e a c t s that are essential to the s u c c e s s of m u l t i l a t e r a l security institutions. T h i s c o n c l u s i o n , h o w e v e r , g e n e r a l l y i g n o r e s the o b s t a c l e s d o m e s tic f a c t o r s can p o s e to international c o o p e r a t i o n . T h i s , of c o u r s e , is a blind spot that has characterized the study of international c o o p e r a t i o n for years ( M i l n e r , 1 9 9 2 : 4 8 8 - 4 9 5 ; E v a n s , J a c o b s o n , a n d P u t n a m , 1 9 9 3 ) . It is a

6

Beyond

Containment

potentially serious omission when assessing the prospects for security cooperation on the part of democracies. Democratization generally enhances the role domestic factors play in the formulation and implementation of public policy (Katzenstein, 1977; Krasner, 1978). Recent research indicates that this proposition holds in the realm of security policy as well as in other issue-areas (e.g., Evangelista, 1989; Barnett, 1990; R i s s e - K a p p e n , 1991, 1993; S n y d e r , 1991; K a t z e n stein and Okawara, 1993). T o pursue a given security strategy, d e m o c r a tic g o v e r n m e n t s need to m o b i l i z e and maintain public support. T h i s dimension of statecraft is crucial within the context of a democratic political system because liberal norms place the state in a subordinate position visà-vis society ( M a s t a n d u n o , Lake, and Ikenberry, 1989; Barnett, 1990). Hence, it is incumbent upon foreign policy m a k e r s to establish a clear linkage b e t w e e n their security-related activities and s o m e b r o a d e r social p u r p o s e . Put d i f f e r e n t l y , d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t s must legitimize their policy choices by explaining how and why these initiatives serve the " n a tional interest" (George, 1989). In the absence of this, it will be difficult for the state to justify its extractive d e m a n d s (e.g., men, m o n e y , and m a terial) to groups and individuals located in society. This is an important point within the context of the p o s t - C o l d W a r era because a collective security system depends heavily upon a minilateralist core of m a j o r - p o w e r c o o p e r a t i o n . It is the m a j o r powers, a f t e r all, w h o provide the bulk of the military capabilities that p r o v i d e the institution with its credibility as a deterrent to aggression. Hence, unless the m a j o r powers are willing and able to collaborate in the realm of security, this type of regime is likely to prove ineffective as a tool for the m a n a g e m e n t of international security problems (Morgan, 1993: 352). T h i s highlights a d i l e m m a that holds potentially important implications f o r multilateral security institutions in the p o s t - C o l d W a r era. T h e m a j o r powers of contemporary Europe are more secure f r o m external attack than states have ever been in the history of the interstate system. This unprecedented level of security stems principally f r o m three factors: the advent of nuclear weapons, the declining economic utility of territorial expansion, and the spread of d e m o c r a c y a m o n g the m a j o r p o w e r s . N o t i c e that these factors serve to diminish the likelihood of m a j o r - p o w e r conflict in Europe regardless of whether or not a collective security system is established. Hence, the security of the major powers is not contingent upon the existence of the regime; their political independence and territorial integrity are underwritten by a combination of technological and political developments that stand independent of any institutional arrangement. As a consequence, the existence of a collective security system is unlikely to enhance the security of the m a j o r powers to any significant degree.

Introduction

7

T h e political salience of this claim is c o m p o u n d e d by the fact that democratic governments need to generate and sustain domestic support if they are to actively participate in a collective security s y s t e m . Yet, how can the state c o n v i n c e m e m b e r s of its society to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of an institution that is unlikely to significantly enhance the security of their own country? Unfortunately, cooperation theorists and security analysts generally have failed to address this problem and the implications it holds for the likelihood of e n d u r i n g security cooperation on the part of the democratic major powers comprising post-Cold War Europe. T h e present study tackles this question by developing a theoretical arg u m e n t that links domestic political support f o r collective security institutions to the polarity of the international political system and the nature of military t e c h n o l o g y . In essence, the argument s u g g e s t s that the prospects f o r d e m o c r a t i c cooperation vary along with the nature of the international security environment confronting states. T o wit, under conditions of multipolarity and defense dominance, it will b e c o m e extremely difficult for d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t s to establish and maintain a viable system of collective security. Hence, unlike studies that link the future of multilateral security institutions to the relative decline of U.S. power or other factors located exclusively at the s y s t e m i c level of analysis (e.g., Calleo, 1987), the present study maintains that the fate of E u r o p e ' s nascent collective security system is more likely to be determined by the domestic political factors that currently characterize the major powers. Democracies may never fight, but this does not mean that they always will manifest domestic political support for participating in the multilateral m a n a g e m e n t of international security problems.

The United States and Collective Security This argument also has implications for the future of U.S. security policy in the p o s t - C o l d W a r era. Recently, Robert Jervis (1991/92: 41) has suggested that in order " t o predict the f u t u r e of world politics . . . [we must first] predict the f u t u r e of American foreign policy." If this is the case, the task w o u l d a p p e a r to be hopeless. Few subjects have attracted as m u c h scholarly attention, yet remained so impervious to the development of theory, as has U.S. foreign policy. The enormous literature on this subject is characterized by a heterogeneous assortment of conceptual frameworks, ad hoc h y p o t h e s e s , and discrete empirical f i n d i n g s s u g g e s t i n g a wide r a n g e of variables and causal processes that might be useful for explaining U.S. foreign policy o u t c o m e s (see Ikenberry, 1989; Kegley and W i t t k o p f , 1991). Unfortunately, these islands of theory have yet to be linked in any

8

Beyond Containment

theoretically m e a n i n g f u l or c o h e r e n t w a y . A s it stands, there is virtually n o c o n s e n s u s as to h o w w e might explain, let a l o n e predict, the c o u r s e of U.S. f o r e i g n policy ( G a d d i s , 1990). T h e present study d o e s not p r e t e n d to o f f e r a g r a n d theory of U.S. f o r eign p o l i c y . I n d e e d , it is p r o b a b l y i m p o s s i b l e to f o r m u l a t e such a t h e o r y . A m o r e realistic, and potentially p r o f i t a b l e a p p r o a c h is " t o s e a r c h for m o d els or theories that operate, hold, or are v a l i d only under certain explicitly p r e s c r i b e d c o n d i t i o n s " ( M o s t a n d S t a r r , 1 9 8 9 : 99). T h e a r g u m e n t l i n k i n g d o m e s t i c s t r u c t u r e s and c o l l e c t i v e security p r o v i d e s such an o p p o r t u n i t y . In p r i n c i p l e , it can a c c o u n t f o r v a r i a t i o n s in the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' s t a n c e t o w a r d c o l l e c t i v e security institutions by p o i n t i n g to s p e c i f i c s y s t e m i c f a c tors a n d the e f f e c t t h e s e f a c t o r s exert on the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' d o m e s t i c political p r o c e s s e s . On the b a s i s of this m o d e l , s o m e p r o b a b i l i s t i c s t a t e m e n t s can a l s o b e m a d e about the s t a n c e U.S. f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a k e r s are likely to t a k e w h e n it c o m e s to the task of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t m a n a g e m e n t in post-Cold War Europe. In e s s e n c e the theory predicts that, under existing s y s t e m i c c o n d i t i o n s , the United States is likely to a d o p t an isolationist a p p r o a c h w h e n it c o m e s to the security of c o u n t r i e s located in E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n d the f o r m e r S o viet U n i o n . T h i s is not to s u g g e s t that the U n i t e d States will seek to w i t h d r a w c o m p l e t e l y f r o m w o r l d a f f a i r s ; nor d o e s it m e a n that U.S. f o r e i g n policy m a k e r s will r e f u s e to play any m a n a g e r i a l role internationally. Isolationism w a s not c h a r a c t e r i z e d by these attributes in the 1 9 2 0 s and 1930s, and there is no reason to b e l i e v e that it w o u l d be in the f u t u r e either. A n isolationist a p p r o a c h , h o w e v e r , will i m p o s e s o m e i m p o r t a n t limitations u p o n the s e c u r i t y - r e l a t e d role the U n i t e d S t a t e s a s s u m e s in r e g a r d to p o s t - C o l d W a r E u r o p e . H i s t o r i c a l l y , i s o l a t i o n i s m h a s b e e n c h a r a c t e r ized by an u n w i l l i n g n e s s on the part of the U n i t e d States to e x t e n d b i n d i n g s e c u r i t y c o m m i t m e n t s to o t h e r c o u n t r i e s a n d a g e n e r a l r e l u c t a n c e to e n g a g e in military interventions o u t s i d e of the W e s t e r n H e m i s p h e r e ( T u c k e r , 1972). T h e a r g u m e n t a d v a n c e d in the present study s u g g e s t s that this is the stance that the United States is most likely to take in regard to Eastern Europe and the f o r m e r Soviet U n i o n . M o r e o v e r , the study also presents a n e c dotal e v i d e n c e that s u g g e s t s the Clinton a d m i n i s t r a t i o n already has b e g u n to m a n i f e s t such isolationist t e n d e n c i e s w h e n it c o m e s to the task of international security m a n a g e m e n t in the eastern half of the C o n t i n e n t .

The Plan of the Study I b e g i n w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n of the g r a n d s t r a t e g y of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n . C h a p t e r 1 lays out the internal a r c h i t e c t u r e of the strategy a n d a d v a n c e s a tentative e x p l a n a t i o n f o r both the t i m i n g a n d the c o n t e n t of this a p p r o a c h .

Introduction

9

T h e discussion also highlights the prominent role multilateral security institutions are supposed to play within the context of this ambitious attempt to transform Europe into a liberal international society. Chapter 2 chronicles the steps U.S. policymakers have taken to build a new security architecture in p o s t - C o l d W a r Europe. This portion of the analysis e x a m i n e s the United S t a t e s ' e f f o r t s to: (1) establish a new a r m s control r e g i m e in Europe, (2) d e v e l o p a strategic p a r t n e r s h i p with the Russian Federation, and (3) broaden and deepen the role international institutions play in the management of regional security affairs. Chapter 3 provides a theoretical discussion of the strengths and weaknesses associated with E u r o p e ' s nascent collective security system. As part of the analysis, I also examine arguments that purport to explain why democratization on the part of the major powers constitutes a d o m e s t i c political foundation favorable to the formation of a collective security system in p o s t - C o l d War Europe. C h a p t e r 4 presents a theoretical argument that links d o m e s t i c political support for collective security institutions to a set of factors located at the level of the international system. T h e a r g u m e n t incorporates insights derived f r o m the growing literature on state-society relations and the implications these factors have when it comes to the foreign policy behavior of d e m o c r a t i c states. T h e model is then applied to contemporary international c i r c u m s t a n c e s to indicate why prevailing s y s t e m i c and d o m e s t i c conditions are not conducive to the far-reaching acts of security cooperation that are called for within the context of multilateralism. It also explains w h y these factors are likely to exert their greatest effects in the case of the United States. C h a p t e r 5 operationalizes the concept of isolationism and p r e s e n t s e v i d e n c e that indicates the Clinton administration has begun to exhibit isolationist tendencies when it c o m e s to the m a n a g e m e n t of security problems in Eastern Europe and the f o r m e r Soviet Union. W e also consider the i m p l i c a t i o n s this stance may have f o r the United S t a t e s ' ability to exert l e a d e r s h i p in p o s t - C o l d W a r E u r o p e . T h e c h a p t e r concludeis with a discussion of the c o n s e q u e n c e s this d i l e m m a may hold f o r the f u t u r e of both the European states system and the United S t a t e s ' grand strategy of institutionalization. B e f o r e proceeding, I w o u l d like to point out that this study d o e s not formally test any particular theory of international politics or foreign policy; nor w a s it intended to advance s o m e new theoretical approach to the study of U.S. statecraft. Instead, the analysis uses existing theories as heuristic devices f o r assessing the p r o b l e m s and possibilities associated with the grand strategy of institutionalization. T h i s tack may disappoint s o m e readers given the importance scholars attach to the development and r e f i n e m e n t of theory. While I share in this c o m m i t m e n t to the pursuit of

10

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explanatory knowledge, the type of evaluative research presented here is nonetheless valuable (Vasquez, 1986). A s w e take stock of the field of security studies, it quickly b e c o m e s clear that one of its greatest strengths lies in its ability to expose erroneous beliefs about the nature of c a u s e - a n d - e f f e c t relationships in international politics. Over the years, researchers have done a masterful j o b of debunking a large n u m b e r of intuitively plausible h y p o t h e s e s c o n c e r n i n g the causes of war and peace. T h e importance of this contribution should not be underestimated. By analyzing the abductive assumptions, logical consistency, and empirical content of numerous theories, scholars have managed to reveal that much of what passes f o r k n o w l e d g e is little more than unsubstantiated beliefs and/or politically m o t i v a t e d myths p r o p a g a t e d by self-interested actors (Posen, 1984; Snyder, 1991). Over time, these revelations have tended to promote a more sophisticated perspective on the part of both scholars and statespeople in regard to the subject of national and international security. As a consequence, we all have b e c o m e more discriminating when it c o m e s to evaluating the relative merits of the various strategic beliefs w e encounter in the marketplace of ideas. Hence, by underscoring the limits of our k n o w l e d g e about the dynamics and processes associated with international politics, scholars play an invaluable role in informing public debates over the wisdom of various national security policies. This broader social purpose stands at the heart of the present study.

Notes 1. In a speech at Johns Hopkins University, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake characterized this approach as a "strategy of enlargement." The label, however, did not capture the imagination of the media. Hence, the term rarely is used in public debates concerning the Clinton administration's strategy in Europe. I prefer the term "institutionalization" because it more accurately reflects the United States' long-term goal in Europe. Analysts typically characterize grand strategies on the basis of their intended political effects (e.g., containment). In the present case, U.S. foreign policy makers hope to create a liberal international society in Europe by promoting liberal political and economic institutions at the level of both domestic and international politics. 2. This conceptualization is based upon Kupchan and Kupchan's (1991: 119) contention that any organization that "operates on the notion of all against one and relies on the collective action to resist aggression" can be categorized as a collective security institution. A s indicated in Chapter 3, NATO, CSCE, and the UN all are premised upon these principles. For a criticism of this approach as vitiating the concept of collective security, see Zelikow (1992: 2 7 - 2 8 ) and Betts (1992: 1 5 - 1 6 ) . The term "nascent collective security system" is borrowed from Robert Jervis's discussion of major-power concerts. In Jervis's usage ( 1 9 8 5 : 78), the concept

Introduction

11

r e f e r s to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t that c r e a t e s " s o m e e x p e c t a t i o n o f s u p p o r t f r o m third p a r t i e s " w h e n e v e r a s t a t e ' s s e c u r i t y is j e o p a r d i z e d . 3. Prior to W o r l d W a r II, the c o n v e n t i o n a l w i s d o m h e l d that i s o l a t i o n i s m w a s e s s e n t i a l t o b o t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' v i a b i l i t y as a d e m o c r a c y a n d the c o u n t r y ' s e c o n o m i c w e l f a r e . T h i s c o n v i c t i o n w a s r o o t e d in t h e b e l i e f that i s o l a t i o n i s m d i m i n i s h e d the p r o s p e c t s f o r foreign intervention in the political and e c o n o m i c a f f a i r s of the nation; the g r o w t h of militarism and escalating a r m a m e n t s expenditures; the loss of f r e e d o m s g u a r a n t e e d by the Bill of R i g h t s and other liberties; the e m e r g e n c e of presidential dictatorship and the consequent decline of Congress; a steadily mounting national debt; internal divisiveness and acute political factionalism; [and] e c o n o m i c retrogression. (Crabb, 1986: 3)

1 THE GRAND STRATEGY OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The United States' strategy toward post-Cold War Europe is premised upon three fundamental beliefs. First, democratization on a continental-wide scale will serve to pacify and stabilize the European states system at the level o f both domestic and international politics. Second, democratization entails a long-term process of evolutionary change that must be bolstered by corresponding economic reforms and an ongoing attempt to strengthen regional security. Third, these mutually reinforcing initiatives can best be supported by broadening and deepening the role international institutions play in the management of European political, economic, and security affairs. This chapter examines the key components of the grand strategy o f institutionalization as articulated by members of both the Bush and Clinton administrations. T h e purposes o f this discussion are: to document the emergence o f the strategy in 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 0 and its subsequent embrace by the Clinton administration; to outline the generative logic that weaves the internal architecture o f the strategy together; and to provide a preliminary explanation for both the timing and the content of the strategy. I begin, however, with a brief discussion o f grand strategy as an analytic concept.

The Concept of Grand Strategy A grand strategy can best be defined as an enduring program o f action designed to enhance state security through the coordinated use o f diplomatic, economic, and military instruments. 1 In the words of Paul Kennedy ( 1 9 9 1 : 5), " t h e crux o f grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the capacity o f the nation's leaders to bring together all o f the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term . . . interests." Analytically, a grand strategy can be characterized in terms of an internal architecture wherein discrete diplomatic, e c o n o m i c , and military

13

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Beyond

Containment

policies stand as interrelated c o m p o n e n t s of a single, overarching design (see George, 1989: 5 8 6 - 5 8 7 ) . On the basis of this conceptualization, analysts are able to specify the functional role each policy is to play in support of the s t a t e ' s strategic objectives and to indicate how the individual policy instruments are designed to relate to, and interact with, one another in pursuit of these goals. M o r e important, by s p e c i f y i n g the internal architecture of a grand strategy, analysts also can gain insights into the beliefs d e c i s i o n m a k e r s hold about the nature of cause-and-effect relationships in the realm of security. A grand strategy, like any form of public policy, can be treated as if it w e r e a type of theory: a m e a n s - e n d s chain that reflects the a s s u m p tions and beliefs held by p o l i c y m a k e r s (Posen, 1984: 13; George, 1993). Seen f r o m this perspective, a g r a n d strategy can be represented as m o r e than simply a c o m p l e x of policies; it also can be regarded as an interrelated set of propositions that " i d e n t i f i e s the o b j e c t i v e s that must be achieved to produce security and describes the political and military actions that are believed to lead to this g o a l " (Walt, 1989: 6). 2 Hence, to study the subject of grand strategy is to inquire into both the theory and the practice of a state's national security policy. A d m i t t e d l y , there are s o m e important methodological challenges associated with this task. Like all concepts, grand strategy is fundamentally a heuristic device analysts employ to impose a sense of order and coherence in regard to discrete p h e n o m e n a that might otherwise seem to be unrelated. Hence, w h e n scholars use the concept, there is always some risk that they will impute an underlying design, or logic, to a congeries of policies that the decisionmakers t h e m s e l v e s were either unaware of or never intended. 3 This, of course, raises the possibility that analysts may reach spurious conclusions about either the existence of a grand strategy or its substantive content. T h i s problem is exacerbated by the fact that governments rarely produce a single document, or strategic blueprint, that clearly and unambiguously outlines their overall national security strategy. As a result, scholars engaged in this type of research must rely principally upon "the process of deduction while sifting through the papers of those w h o actually participated in the process by which grand strategy w a s m a d e and carried o u t " (Hattendorf, 1991: 1 2 - 1 3 ) . Put differently, archival research traditionally has been an indispensable tool f o r the student of grand strategy. T h e evidence presented in this chapter has been derived largely f r o m primary documents released by the United States government. 4 For the student of contemporary U.S. foreign policy, there is little choice but to rely on such sources. In the present case, for example, very f e w of the internal d o c u m e n t s (e.g., m e m o r a n d u m s , reports, m e e t i n g transcripts) that w o u l d be useful f o r an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of U.S. strategy in Europe have been

Strategy of Institutionalization

15

d e c l a s s i f i e d a n d r e l e a s e d to the p u b l i c . M o r e o v e r , n o n e of the key m e m bers of the B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a v e yet to publish their m e m o i r s . 5 H e n c e , to u n d e r t a k e this t y p e of s t u d y , there are f e w practical a l t e r n a t i v e s but to rely on i n f o r m a t i o n r e l e a s e d by the g o v e r n m e n t itself. 6 O b v i o u s l y , a study b a s e d on this type of d o c u m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e must c o n f r o n t the i s s u e s of reliability a n d v a l i d i t y . P u b l i c o f f i c i a l s , of c o u r s e , h a v e b e e n k n o w n to use t h e s e m e d i a f o r a v a r i e t y of p u r p o s e s , i n c l u d i n g d e c e p t i o n . T h i s is an especially important c o n c e r n in the present c a s e since I rely heavily upon these s o u r c e s to infer d e c i s i o n m a k e r s ' beliefs about the m e a n s a n d e n d s of the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' p o s t - C o l d W a r strategy in E u r o p e . H e n c e , it is i m p o r t a n t to be clear about the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r o c e d u r e s to w h i c h I a d h e r e d in a n a l y z i n g these d o c u m e n t s . T h e r e are t w o b a s i c w a y s of a d d r e s s i n g t h e i s s u e s of r e l i a b i l i t y a n d validity raised by this t y p e of s t u d y . First, w e can a s s e s s the logical c o n s i s t e n c y of the p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s and p o l i c y p r o n o u n c e m e n t s m a d e by senior-level p o l i c y m a k e r s (e.g., presidents, national security a d v i s e r s , s e c retaries of state). A n a l y t i c a l l y , the plausibility of our c o n c l u s i o n s c o n c e r n ing the e x i s t e n c e and/or c o n t e n t of a grand strategy will increase if w e f i n d an o n g o i n g p a t t e r n of c o n v e r g e n t elite policy s t a t e m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g : ( 1 ) the nature of a s t a t e ' s security o b j e c t i v e s , and ( 2 ) the c o m b i n a t i o n of policy i n s t r u m e n t s n e e d e d to a c h i e v e t h e s e g o a l s ( K e g l e y , 1 9 8 7 : 2 5 8 - 2 6 0 ) . S i n c e a g r a n d strategy c o n s t i t u t e s an e n d u r i n g p r o g r a m of action, this t y p e of a n a l y s i s m u s t be d o n e a c r o s s m e m b e r s of the s a m e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as well as a c r o s s o n e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to the next. S e c o n d , w e can e x a m i n e the logical c o n s i s t e n c y that e x i s t s b e t w e e n the p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s m a d e b y s e n i o r - l e v e l p o l i c y m a k e r s a n d the s t a t e ' s actual f o r e i g n policy b e h a v i o r . T h i s a l s o s h o u l d be d o n e b o t h w i t h i n a n d across administrations. T h e "congruence procedure" (George, 1979: 105) p r o v i d e s an indication of the extent to w h i c h state p r a c t i c e c o r r e s p o n d s to o f f i c i a l policy p r o n o u n c e m e n t s . H e r e again, the reliability and validity of our c o n c l u s i o n s in regard to either the e x i s t e n c e or the c o n t e n t of a g r a n d strategy will be s t r e n g t h e n e d if w e f i n d an o n g o i n g pattern of f o r e i g n p o l icy activities that is consistent with c o n v e r g e n t elite policy s t a t e m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g the m e a n s a n d e n d s of the s t a t e ' s national security p r o g r a m . 7 B o t h of t h e s e p r o c e d u r e s h a v e b e e n u t i l i z e d in the p r e s e n t s t u d y . I h a v e e x a m i n e d nearly 5 0 0 d o c u m e n t s p e r t a i n i n g to U.S. policy in E u r o p e that h a v e b e e n r e l e a s e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s g o v e r n m e n t s i n c e J a n u a r y 1 9 8 9 . T h e s e i n c l u d e s p e e c h e s , the text of treaties a n d o t h e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t s s i g n e d by the U n i t e d States, p r e s s r e l e a s e s , a n d press c o n f e r e n c e t r a n s c r i p t s . E a c h d o c u m e n t w a s a n a l y z e d s e p a r a t e l y a n d then c r o s s r e f e r e n c e d in an a t t e m p t to a s s e s s the d e g r e e of elite c o n s e n s u s in r e g a r d to the m e a n s and e n d s of the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' p o l i c y t o w a r d p o s t - C o l d W a r E u r o p e . N e x t , the textual a n a l y s i s w a s s u p p l e m e n t e d b y a r e v i e w of the

16

Beyond Containment

diplomatic record as reported in the Washington Post and the New York Times. The goal here was to determine the extent to which the actual conduct of U.S. foreign policy has been consistent with the ideas expressed by senior-level policymakers. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of the results of this analysis. The evidence indicates that, since the end of 1989, U.S. foreign policy makers have been remarkably consistent when it comes to their public representations of the United States' strategy toward p o s t Cold War Europe. The following sections outline the key components of the grand strategy of institutionalization as articulated publicly by members of both the Bush and Clinton administrations.

The Internal Architecture The first public presentation of the basic conceptual framework that would guide the United States' response to the end of the Cold War in Europe was provided in a series of speeches delivered by then Secretary of State James Baker in the months following the fall of the Berlin Wall. 8 Of these, Baker's addresses before the Berlin Press Club (December 12, 1989) and the World Affairs Council (March 30, 1990) stand as the most comprehensive and coherent presentations of the strategy the United States would employ to "consolidate the fruits of this peaceful revolution and provide the architecture for continued peaceful change." 9 The seminal quality of these addresses is indicated by the nature of subsequent policy statements made by members of both the Bush and Clinton administrations. Despite occasional tactical differences over the implementation of the strategy, no senior-level policymaker has yet to challenge the overarching strategic design elaborated in these speeches. In light of the subsequent significance of these speeches, the discussion begins with a detailed analysis of the ideas contained in them. 10 "Beyond containment lies democracy" (AFP, 1990: 12). With these words, James Baker signaled the beginning of a fundamental change in the nature of the United States' strategic goals in Europe. To wit, the grand strategy of containment was being abandoned in favor of a "new mission: . . . the promotion and consolidation of democracy" (AFP, 1990: 12)." Instead of orienting U.S. foreign policy around the task of containing the expansion of Soviet power and influence, the United States would now devote its resources to the achievement of a new objective: the construction of a "democratic international society" in Europe (AFP, 1990: 17). In essence, the United States' long-range goal was to create a regional political order wherein "free men and free governments" would stand as the basic "building blocks" of the European states system (AFP, 1989: 300).

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In these speeches, Baker (AFP, 1989: 300; AFP, 1990: 1 2 - 1 3 ) characterized democratization as the key to the f u t u r e of p o s t - C o l d W a r Europe. The spread of liberal values and institutions would have a stabilizing and p a c i f y i n g e f f e c t at the level of both d o m e s t i c and international politics. Internally, democratic institutions would serve to legitimize the exercise of state authority in societies undergoing revolutionary changes. Similarly, liberal n o r m s would diminish the likelihood of d o m e s t i c political violence by g u a r a n t e e i n g the rights of all citizens, i n c l u d i n g minorities. Democratization, of course, also would serve to limit the potential for international conflict by constraining the s t a t e ' s ability to use force as a foreign policy instrument. These convictions were articulated most clearly in B a k e r ' s c o m m e n t s to the World A f f a i r s Council in Dallas. Democracy's reliance upon the individual is reciprocated by the individual's consent to the rule of democratic government. That government is, therefore, considered legitimate in the most basic political sense—both lawful and proper. . . . A democratic society also is characterized by the rule of law and by tolerance of diversity, a tolerance that protects individual rights from abuse, whether from an arbitrary minority or a tyrannical majority . . . There [also] is a self-renewal, a self-corrective element in the democratic process which allows us to overcome blunders and correct the c o u r s e . . . . [Hence] it can operate not only to ensure domestic progress but also to encourage international harmony. Free people cherishing democratic values are unlikely to go to war with one another. (AFP, 1990: 13) 1 2

While democratization was f r a m e d as central to the f u t u r e of the European states system, Baker also contended that political r e f o r m s and f r e e elections would not be enough to ensure the success of this undertaking in the eastern half of the Continent; the process of democratization had to be s u p p o r t e d by c o r r e s p o n d i n g e f f o r t s to p r o m o t e e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s and to strengthen regional security. T o underscore this point, Baker invoked the metaphor of "political geometry." Geometry teaches us that the triangle is the most solid configuration. The political geometry of successful democracy should teach us that a free society must be upheld by economic progress and basic security. War and poverty are the great opponents of democratic rules, democratic tolerance, and individual r i g h t s . . . . We must therefore build up the e c o n o m i c and security aspects of the new democracies even as the political base is put into place. . . . Only a strategy that buttresses democracy with e c o nomic reforms and greater international security can give us the strength for the tough transitions that will transform the revolutions of 1 9 8 9 into the democracies of the 1990s. (AFP, 1990: 12)

A s part of this discussion, B a k e r also revealed his conviction that these mutually reinforcing initiatives could best be achieved by broadening

18

Beyond Containment

and deepening the role international institutions play in the management of regional political, economic, and security affairs. During his address to the Berlin Press Club, Baker outlined the distinctive contribution that N A T O , C S C E , and the European C o m m u n i t y could make to the process of transf o r m i n g Europe into a democratic international society. 1 3 N A T O ' s principal mission, for example, would be to help create a regional security environment f r e e of intimidation and the threat of invasion (AFP, 1989: 301). This w a s to be d o n e by e n h a n c i n g N A T O ' s role as a forum wherein "nations cooperate to negotiate, implement, verify, and extend a g r e e m e n t s b e t w e e n East and W e s t " (AFP, 1989: 301). B a k e r expressed a particular interest in establishing " c o n s u l t a t i v e a r r a n g e m e n t s " whereby the m e m b e r s of N A T O and other states could engage in a continuing dialogue c o n c e r n i n g the m a n a g e m e n t of regional c o n f l i c t s and the pursuit of arms control initiatives in Europe (AFP, 1989: 301). C S C E , on the other hand, w a s to take the lead in p r o m o t i n g human rights and f r e e elections in the eastern half of the Continent (AFP, 1989: 304). In B a k e r ' s view, the institution's overarching mission would be "to make democracy the legitimizing principle for all of E u r o p e " (AFP, 1990: 16). At the s a m e time, however, Baker also envisioned C S C E playing an important role in the realm of security. Through its sponsorship of conferences relating to c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g measures in Europe, for e x a m p l e , C S C E could p r o m o t e greater transparency a m o n g m e m b e r states that, in turn, would bolster the prospects for international cooperation in the realm of security and in other areas (AFP, 1989: 303). Finally, the European C o m m u n i t y would be in the forefront of efforts to promote both the marketization and the democratization of Eastern European countries. In B a k e r ' s view, the C o m m u n i t y ' s role as a catalyst for change was critical. In essence, political and e c o n o m i c reforms were to be propelled by rewarding those states that "take steps toward democracy and e c o n o m i c liberty" with s o m e f o r m of associative status vis-à-vis the European Community (AFP, 1989: 302). Conceptually, the ideas contained in these speeches can be characterized in terms of a generative logic whereby a liberal international society e m e r g e s as a c o n s e q u e n c e of c o o r d i n a t e d e f f o r t s to: (1) p r o m o t e the democratization and marketization of state-society relations in countries located throughout the eastern half of the Continent, and (2) b r o a d e n and deepen the role international institutions play in the management of military, political, economic, and social issues in the region. Taken together, the initiatives represent an ambitious attempt to liberalize the constitutive principles of political association both within and b e t w e e n the states of Europe. In essence, the Bush a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s strategy toward p o s t - C o l d W a r E u r o p e w a s oriented to the goal of establishing a regional political order wherein the exercise of state p o w e r w o u l d be restrained by an

Strategy of Institutionalization

19

i n t e r l o c k i n g n e t w o r k of liberal n o r m s and institutions located at the level of both d o m e s t i c and international politics. T h e a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of this design lies in the p o s s i b i l i t i e s it c r e a t e s f o r p e a c e and prosperity in E u r o p e . History i n d i c a t e s that d e m o c r a c i e s rarely g o to w a r w i t h o n e a n o t h e r ( R u s s e t t , 1 9 9 3 ) . H e n c e , t h e r e are c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n s to b e l i e v e that d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n on a c o n t i n e n t a l - w i d e s c a l e w o u l d s e r v e to p a c i f y the E u r o p e a n s t a t e s s y s t e m . M o r e o v e r , by i n c o r p o r a t i n g E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n states f i r m l y into the liberal i n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c order, the s t r a t e g y also p r o m i s e s to u n l e a s h p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s and o p p o r tunities f o r international e x c h a n g e that c o u l d s e r v e to r e p r o d u c e the steady but m o d e r a t e e c o n o m i c g r o w t h that s t o o d at the c o r e of regional stability t h r o u g h o u t m o s t of the p o s t - W o r l d W a r II era. T h e s t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e s e p o t e n t i a l d e v e l o p m e n t s , f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t of the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' s e c u r i t y a n d e c o n o m i c interests, s h o u l d not b e u n d e r e s t i m a t e d . H i s t o r i c a l l y , w a r a n d r e v o l u t i o n in E u r o p e h a v e p o s e d the s i n g l e g r e a t e s t threat to the s e c u r i t y a n d w e l f a r e of the U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h e twentieth century s p e a k s e l o q u e n t l y to this point. For the past e i g h t y y e a r s , the stability of the E u r o p e a n states s y s t e m has b e e n j e o p a r dized by the imperialistic practices of a u t o c r a t i c states b e n t on i n c r e a s i n g the s c o p e of their p o w e r and i n f l u e n c e on the C o n t i n e n t . T h e United States has felt the c o n s e q u e n c e s of this o n g o i n g s t r u g g l e just as a s s u r e d l y as h a v e the states located in the r e g i o n . T h e m o s t c o n s p i c u o u s U.S. s a c r i f i c e s , of c o u r s e , can b e f o u n d in the b l o o d a n d m o n e y the U n i t e d States has s p e n t in d e f e n s e of E u r o p e a n stability. T h e e m e r g e n c e of a liberal international s o c i e t y in E u r o p e w o u l d lighten the d e m a n d s p l a c e d u p o n the U n i t e d States (and other states) c o n s i d e r a b l y by c r e a t i n g an e n v i r o n m e n t in w h i c h the r u l e of law p r e v a i l s o v e r the law of the j u n g l e . U n d e r s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the p o t e n t i a l f o r w a r a n d r e v o l u t i o n in E u r o p e s h o u l d d e c l i n e precipitously. G i v e n the data limitations m e n t i o n e d at the b e g i n n i n g of this c h a p t e r , w e p r e s e n t l y are u n a b l e to d o c u m e n t the d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e s s a s s o c i ated with the e m e r g e n c e of the g r a n d strategy of institutionalization at the e n d of 1989. In o r d e r to p r o v i d e a s a t i s f a c t o r y a c c o u n t of both the t i m i n g a n d the c o n t e n t of the s t r a t e g y , w e w o u l d n e e d a c c e s s to internal d o c u m e n t s that s i m p l y are u n a v a i l a b l e . W h i l e s t r a t e g y c a n b e r e g a r d e d as e s s e n t i a l l y a c o g n i t i v e p h e n o m e n o n , it is f o r m u l a t e d w i t h i n the c o n t e x t of political, e c o n o m i c , a n d social f a c t o r s that i n e v i t a b l y a f f e c t the d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e s s (see K e n n e d y , 1991). H e n c e , s t r a t e g i z i n g is by n o m e a n s a p u r e l y i n t e l l e c t u a l e x e r c i s e ; it is the p r o d u c t of an i n h e r e n t l y political p r o c e s s that c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d o n l y by e x a m i n i n g t h e r e l e v a n t a r c h i v a l materials. O n the b a s i s of the a v a i l a b l e e v i d e n c e , h o w e v e r , it is p o s s i b l e to a d v a n c e a t e n t a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r b o t h the t i m i n g a n d the c o n t e n t of the

20

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Containment

grand strategy of institutionalization. T h e f o r m e r can be attributed to the fall of the Berlin Wall, which the Bush administration appears to have interpreted as a sign of the Soviet U n i o n ' s irrevocable c o m m i t m e n t to f u n d a m e n t a l l y c h a n g e the status q u o in Europe. T h e content of the strategy may be a consequence of the lessons that U.S. foreign policy makers have derived f r o m the p o s t - W o r l d War II era. T h e f o l l o w i n g sections elaborate on both of these possibilities.

The Timing of the Strategy As the Bush administration took o f f i c e in January 1989, an air of uncertainty surrounded the future of U.S.-Soviet relations. During Ronald Reag a n ' s last years as president, there clearly had been an improvement in the overall tone of the s u p e r p o w e r relationship ( C a n n o n , 1991: 7 3 9 - 7 9 2 ) . Both sides, for example, had abandoned the harsh and sometimes i n f l a m matory rhetoric that had characterized relations since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Beginning in 1986, superpower summits became an annual event, supplemented by increasingly frequent public and private contacts between senior-level policymakers (Schultz, 1993). Moreover, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a set of diplomatic negotiations that held out the promise of far-reaching agreements in the realm of both arms control and regional conflict resolution. 1 4 Despite these encouraging signs, however, relatively few concrete acc o m p l i s h m e n t s had been realized by the time R o n a l d Reagan left o f f i c e . This is not to discount the importance of the 1987 INF (intermediate range nuclear forces) treaty, which abolished intermediate and short-range missiles armed with nuclear warheads; nor is it to dismiss the significance of the Geneva agreement, which paved the way for the Soviet U n i o n ' s withdrawal f r o m A f g h a n i s t a n . At the time, both of these b r e a k t h r o u g h s w e r e impressive a c h i e v e m e n t s . This should be a c k n o w l e d g e d , but at the s a m e time w e should not exaggerate the significance of these agreements. Neither treaty, for example, dealt directly with the f u n d a m e n t a l c o n flict of interest that had divided the United States and the Soviet Union since the end of World W a r II. This dispute, of course, centered on the political, military, and e c o n o m i c polarization of Europe. Since the late 1940s, Europe had been divided into two c o m p e t i n g blocs: a U . S . - l e d alliance a m o n g the states of Western Europe, and a Soviet-dominated sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The key institutional manifestations of this Cold W a r order were: (1) the division of G e r m a n y into two s o v e r e i g n states, (2) alliance polarization in the f o r m of the North Atlantic T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n ( N A T O ) v e r s u s the Warsaw Treaty Organization ( W T O ) , and (3) the organization of Europe into rival and relatively e x c l u s i v e

Strategy

of Institutionalization

21

e c o n o m i c blocs. As of the beginning of 1989, these essential structures of the Cold War order were still basically intact. If the s u p e r p o w e r s were going to f u n d a m e n t a l l y transform the nature of their relationship, revolutionary changes would have to occur in Europe. At the time, this point was not lost on observers. In an article published on the e v e of B u s h ' s inauguration, for example, Richard Nixon ( 1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9 : 199) w a r n e d that " t h e c a u s e s of the cold w a r — M o s c o w ' s d o m i n a t i o n of Eastern Europe and aggressive foreign policies around the world—still endure." T h e former president called on the Bush administration to make Europe its top foreign policy priority and to negotiate a political settlement with the Soviets that w o u l d lead to the liberation of Eastern E u r o p e . In N i x o n ' s ( 1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9 : 209) view, the Cold War had begun in this region of the world, and "it will not end until M o s c o w ' s satellites receive their independence." Similar sentiments were expressed by Michael M a n d e l b a u m , a political scientist who, at the time, was serving as the director of the Council on Foreign Relations' Project on East-West Relations. 1 5 The core of the cold war in Europe is Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. . . . Ending the cold war requires ending the Soviet threat to Western Europe which requires ending Soviet subjugation of Eastern Europe. . . . The principal requirement for the end of the cold war, in short, is self-determination for Eastern Europe. (Mandelbaum, 1989: 2 1 )

A c t i n g on this advice, h o w e v e r , w a s f r a u g h t with risks. T o seek the liberation of Eastern Europe was to challenge the vital interests of a m a j o r military power that, historically, had never hesitated to use force to maintain its position in the r e g i o n . U.S. p o l i c y m a k e r s had long been rhetorically critical of the Soviet U n i o n ' s presence in Eastern Europe. In practice, h o w e v e r , the United States typically had d o n e little to e f f e c t i v e l y challenge Soviet control in the region. Indeed, some scholars argue that a tacit security regime had e m e r g e d between the superpowers in regard to this issue (Kanet, 1990). At the core of this modus vivendi stood an unspoken agreement to respect each o t h e r ' s spheres of i n f l u e n c e within Europe (Gaddis, 1987: 4 8 - 7 1 ; Nye, 1987: 393). Hence, to seek the liberation of Eastern Europe risked not only provoking the Soviet leadership; it also could weaken a norm of behavior that presumably had served to stabilize U . S . - S o v i e t interactions at the heart of the most heavily militarized region of the world. This point leads to one additional consideration. T h e Cold War was, in many respects, a paradox. T h e superpowers and their respective allies had a s s e m b l e d the most f o r m i d a b l e military arsenals in the history of international politics. T h e y had a m a s s e d these capabilities in the n a m e of a

22

Beyond Containment

security strategy (i.e., deterrence) that sought to avoid war through the ultimate threat of nuclear annihilation. In the midst of this heavily militarized and highly competitive environment, however, the members of the European states system—both East and West—had become the unexpected beneficiaries of an unrivaled period of peace and prosperity in Europe. The post-World War II era constitutes the longest uninterrupted period of major-power peace in the history of international politics (Gaddis, 1987). Since the defeat of Nazi Germany, not a single war has occurred between or among any of the major powers of Europe. In fact, over the past five decades, there has been only one war (i.e., 1956, Russo-Hungarian) and but a single major military intervention (i.e., 1968, Czechoslovakia) on the Continent (Small and Singer, 1982: 91-95). 1 6 Despite its many perils, the Cold War era did stand as the most stable period in the history of the European states system (see Levy, 1983: 71-73). Admittedly, this stability was purchased at a considerable cost to the countries of Europe and North America. The Cold War order was characterized by unprecedented levels of militarization that had unfortunate socioeconomic consequences for the states and societies of both blocs (Kennedy, 1987: 395-437). At the same time, however, warfare is almost always more costly and destructive in terms of human and material resources than is even a heavily armed peace. This is especially the case within the context of a nuclearized system. Thus, we should not underestimate the significance of the Cold War's association with the long postwar peace. While obviously repugnant in many respects, the Cold War order was not the worst of all possible outcomes (Mearsheimer, 1990). An appreciation of this fact confronted the Bush administration with a dilemma. The challenge was to formulate an approach to the Soviet Union that was bold yet not unduly provocative. Somehow, U.S. strategy needed to combine elements of both revisionism and restraint. The trick, of course, was to formulate a policy that would challenge the status quo in Europe without sparking either a confrontation with the Soviets or the precipitous collapse of the institutional arrangements that had regulated European security affairs since the end of World War II. The task was further complicated by the uncertainty surrounding the Kremlin's attitude toward changes in Eastern Europe. In 1988, for example, Mikhail Gorbachev had made contradictory statements in public about the Soviet Union's role in the region. During a state visit to Yugoslavia in March, Gorbachev had expressed his "unconditional respect" for the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of that country as well as a more general commitment to "the independence of . . . socialist countries to define, for themselves, the paths of their own development" (quoted in Gati, 1988-1989: 104). Two months later, however, Gorbachev seemed to retreat from this position when he indicated to Washington Post reporters

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of Institutionalization

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that past Soviet interventions in Hungary and C z e c h o s l o v a k i a had been justified. By the end of the year, Gorbachev had returned to the themes he had sounded in Yugoslavia. During a major address before the United Nations General Assembly, Gorbachev reiterated his support for self-determination and the norm of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. 1 7 E v e r y o n e , and the s t r o n g e s t in the first i n s t a n c e , is required to restrict h i m s e l f and to e x c l u d e totally the u s e o f external f o r c e . . . . T h e c o m p e l l i n g n e c e s s i t y of the principle of f r e e d o m o f c h o i c e is a l s o clear to us. . . . T h i s o b j e c t i v e fact p r e s u p p o s e s respect for other p e o p l e ' s v i e w s and stands, t o l e r a n c e , a p r e p a r e d n e s s to s e e p h e n o m e n a that are d i f f e r e n t as not n e c e s s a r i l y bad or h o s t i l e and an ability to learn to live s i d e by s i d e w h i l e r e m a i n i n g d i f f e r e n t and not a g r e e i n g with o n e a n o t h e r o n e v e r y issue. ( Q u o t e d in S c h u l t z , 1 9 9 3 : 1 1 0 7 )

At the time, one analyst characterized the twists and turns of the Soviet leadership's public statements regarding Eastern Europe during 1988 in the following way: A c l o u d o f uncertainty h a n g s o v e r S o v i e t i n t e n t i o n s . On the o n e hand, G o r b a c h e v still a p p r o v e s of past S o v i e t interventions and he still s p e a k s o f p r o t e c t i n g the r e g i o n ' s " c o m m o n interests." On the other hand, Eastern European o f f i c i a l s . . . n o l o n g e r take it for granted that, in a c r i s i s , t h e y s h o u l d either e x p e c t or c o u n t o n M o s c o w ' s fraternal a s s i s t a n c e . (Gati, 1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9 : 1 0 2 - 1 0 3 )

T h i s was the b a c k d r o p against which the Bush a d m i n i s t r a t i o n took o f f i c e on January 20, 1989. Ronald R e a g a n had b e q u e a t h e d "a legacy of promise" to his successor (Schultz, 1993: 1130), but it was unclear whether the United States could translate this inheritance into a set of tangible a c h i e v e m e n t s that w o u l d f u n d a m e n t a l l y t r a n s f o r m the nature of U . S Soviet relations. T o accomplish this goal, significant revisions would have to be m a d e in the basic institutional f o u n d a t i o n of the Cold W a r order. How far the Soviet leadership w a s willing to go in this direction w a s a question few were able to answer. T h e Bush administration a t t e m p t e d to cope with this d i l e m m a by adopting a two-track policy toward the Soviet Union. On the o n e hand, the United States w o u l d initiate a series of "limited, reversible p r o b e s " designed to test G o r b a c h e v ' s willingness to accept changes in the status quo in Europe. 1 8 At the s a m e time, h o w e v e r , p o l i c y m a k e r s also w o u l d endeavor to reassure the Kremlin that the United States would not seek to exploit these c h a n g e s to unilateral U.S. a d v a n t a g e . 1 9 In this w a y , the Bush administration sought to promote change while also minimizing the risk of provoking a serious confrontation with the Soviet Union. 2 0

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T h e Bush administration began implementing this two-track policy toward the Soviet Union in the spring of 1989. U.S. e f f o r t s centered principally on the subject of conventional arms control in E u r o p e and support for the burgeoning reform m o v e m e n t s then under way in both Poland and Hungary. In combination, the initiatives were intended to mount a preliminary challenge to both the military and political status quo in Europe. D r a m a t i c reductions in the conventional forces fielded by both N A T O and the W a r s a w Pact were at the heart of the Bush a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s approach f o r t w o basic reasons. Such an achievement, of course, would diminish the threat that Warsaw Pact forces posed to the West. Perhaps more important, however, 2 1 massive conventional force reductions would entail a corresponding reduction in the Soviet U n i o n ' s military presence in Eastern E u r o p e , w h i c h , in turn, could serve to create a military e n v i r o n m e n t in the region c o n d u c i v e to the process of liberalization in Poland, Hungary, and other countries of the Soviet bloc. 2 2 W h i l e pursuing a conventional arms reduction agreement in Europe, the Bush administration also began to challenge the political status quo on the Continent. T h e opening gambit came in a major foreign policy address delivered by the president in Hamtramck, Michigan. Arms are a symptom, not a source, of tension. The true source of tension is the imposed and unnatural division of Europe. H o w can there be stability and security in Europe and the world as long as nations and peoples are denied the right to determine their own future? . . . The United States . . . has never accepted the legitimacy of Europe's division. We accept no spheres of influence that deny the sovereign rights of nations. . . . The cold war began in Eastern Europe, and if it is to end, it will end in this crucible of world conflict. (AFP, 1989: 3 1 8 - 3 1 9 )

In the n a m e of overcoming the polarization of Europe, Bush also announced that the United States was prepared to support the process of political and e c o n o m i c reform in Eastern Europe. Poland w a s to receive the l i o n ' s s h a r e of U.S. attention b e c a u s e "if P o l a n d ' s e x p e r i m e n t succeeds, other countries may f o l l o w " (AFP, 1989: 320). T h e president justified this approach by invoking a vision of a " E u r o p e whole and f r e e . " The West can now be bold in proposing a vision of the European future. W e dream of the day when there will be no barriers to the free movement of peoples, goods, and ideas. W e dream of the day when Eastern European peoples will be free to c h o o s e their system of government and to vote for the party of their choice in regular, free, contested elections. And w e dream of the day when Eastern European countries will be free to choose their own peaceful course in the world, including closer ties with Western Europe. And we envision an Eastern Europe in which the Soviet Union has renounced military intervention as an instrument of its policy—on any pretext. (AFP, 1989: 3 2 0 )

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As part of this presentation, however, Bush also was quick to point out that the Soviet Union itself would benefit from such changes in Europe. T h e S o v i e t U n i o n s h o u l d understand in turn, that a free, d e m o c r a t i c Eastern Europe as w e e n v i s i o n it w o u l d threaten no o n e and no country. S u c h an e v o l u t i o n w o u l d imply and reinforce the further i m p r o v e m e n t o f EastW e s t r e l a t i o n s in all d i m e n s i o n s — a r m s r e d u c t i o n , p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s , t r a d e — i n w a y s that e n h a n c e the s a f e t y and w e l l - b e i n g of all o f Europe.

(AFP, 1989: 320) Conventional Forces in Europe ( C F E ) and the " H a m t r a m c k c o n c e p t " were the centerpieces of the strategy of revisionism and reassurance that the Bush administration e m b r a c e d prior to the grand strategy of institutionalization. T h e timing of the latter, b e g i n n i n g with B a k e r ' s speech to the Berlin Press Club, can p e r h a p s best be attributed to the fall of the Berlin Wall on N o v e m b e r 9, 1989. Beschloss and Talbott (1993: 132) report that George Bush reacted to the East German g o v e r n m e n t ' s decision to allow its citizens to pass freely into West Germany by remarking: "If the Soviets are going to let the C o m munists fall in East G e r m a n y , t h e y ' v e got to be really s e r i o u s — m o r e serious than I realized." T h e c o m m e n t suggests that Bush interpreted this dev e l o p m e n t as an indisputable sign of G o r b a c h e v ' s willingness to accept f u n d a m e n t a l c h a n g e s in the essential structures of the Cold W a r order. Conceptually, the b r e a c h i n g of the Berlin Wall s e e m s to have been regarded by Bush and other m e m b e r s of the administration as an "irrevocable c o m m i t m e n t " (Stein, 1991: 4 2 - 4 3 ) that u n a m b i g u o u s l y signaled the Soviet l e a d e r s h i p ' s desire to o v e r c o m e the political polarization that had characterized the European states system since the late 1940s. This impression seems to have been reinforced during B u s h ' s subsequent m e e t i n g with G o r b a c h e v on D e c e m b e r 2 - 3 . B e s c h l o s s and Talbott ( 1 9 9 3 : 1 6 6 - 1 6 7 ) report that B u s h returned f r o m the Malta s u m m i t c o n vinced that " G o r b a c h e v w o u l d be a reliable partner . . . [whom] he could do business with." T h e president himself intimated as much during a press c o n f e r e n c e held at the conclusion of the summit: " W h i l e it is not for the United States and the Soviet Union to design the f u t u r e for Europeans or for any other people, I am convinced that a cooperative U . S . - S o v i e t relationship can, indeed, m a k e the f u t u r e safer and b r i g h t e r " (AFP, 1989: 385-386). This account of the timing of the grand strategy of institutionalization, however, sheds little light on its content. T h e Bush administration could have reacted to the fall of the Berlin Wall in a number of different ways. T o account for the approach the administration actually did take, w e need to locate the ideas underlying the strategy within the context of the U.S. diplomatic tradition.

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The Content of the Strategy The ideas underlying the Bush administration's response to the revolutions of 1 9 8 9 — d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n , marketization, and regional integration—are familiar themes within the context of twentieth-century U.S. statecraft. Indeed, some historians argue that U.S. foreign policy makers have been systematically promoting these ideas since W o r l d W a r I in an o n g o i n g attempt to construct a liberal-capitalist world order (Levin, 1968; Maier, 1981; Hogan 1984, 1987). Hence, one could account for the content of the grand strategy of institutionalization by simply pointing to this enduring pattern of U.S. strategic thought. While this may help to account for the general thrust of the Bush adm i n i s t r a t i o n ' s approach, it sheds little light on s o m e of the details of the strategy. Why, for example, did the Bush administration insist upon a multilateral approach when it came to supporting the process of liberalization in Eastern Europe? This choice was not inevitable. In the 1920s, for example, U.S. foreign policy m a k e r s tended to exhibit a p r e f e r e n c e for a more bilateral approach when it came to promoting liberal values and institutions in Europe ( L e f f l e r , 1979). M o r e o v e r , this a r g u m e n t cannot account for why the Bush administration preferred to broaden and deepen the role played by existing international institutions instead of advocating the creation of new ones. T h e r e are two perspectives that might help to explain these choices. One is rooted in the presumption that states are "habit-driven a c t o r s " (Rosenau, 1984). This would suggest that the Bush administration reacted to changes in the international environment by drawing upon a repertoire of p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g tools that had b e c o m e institutionalized within the United States government during the p o s t - W o r l d W a r II era. This would depict the grand strategy of institutionalization as a cybernetic-like, programmatic response, the content of which reflects those policy instruments that decisionmakers found to be the most familiar and, hence, readily accessible. T h e other approach, h o w e v e r , w o u l d suggest that the Bush administration's response was not simply an exercise in instrumental rationality. Seen from this perspective, the content of the strategy can be traced to the lessons U.S. foreign policy makers have learned about the intrinsic value of multilateralism and existing international institutions over the past five decades. T h e plausibility of the habit-driven actor hypothesis stems f r o m the unique w a y in which the Cold W a r order c o l l a p s e d . In the past, revolutionary geopolitical changes in Europe always had been occasioned by the outbreak of a catastrophic war a m o n g the m a j o r p o w e r s (Dehio, 1962; Holsti, 1991). T h e Thirty Y e a r s ' W a r , the N a p o l e o n i c Wars, and World Wars I and II stand as prime examples. Such conflicts traditionally served

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as c a t a l y s t s of c h a n g e by e f f e c t i v e l y d e s t r o y i n g the i n s t i t u t i o n a l f o u n d a tions of the e x i s t i n g o r d e r a n d r e d i s t r i b u t i n g p o w e r a n d i n f l u e n c e a m o n g states (Gilpin, 1981). In this w a y , m a s s i v e m a j o r - p o w e r w a r s h a v e p l a y e d a p e r v e r s e l y f u n c t i o n a l r o l e in the historical e v o l u t i o n of the E u r o p e a n states s y s t e m ( M o d e l s k i a n d M o r g a n , 1985). T h e c o l l a p s e of the C o l d W a r o r d e r w a s u n p r e c e d e n t e d in this r e g a r d . B e g i n n i n g in 1989, a series of f u n d a m e n t a l geopolitical c h a n g e s o c c u r r e d in E u r o p e , and yet at no point did the m a j o r p o w e r s s e e m c l o s e to w a r . Ind e e d , not a s i n g l e s e r i o u s m a j o r - p o w e r c r i s i s w a s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e p r o c e s s . H i s t o r i c a l l y s p e a k i n g , the c o l l a p s e of the C o l d W a r o r d e r w a s u n i q u e (Jervis, 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 2 ) ; the w o r l d ' s most f o r m i d a b l e military p o w e r s e n g a g e d in a p r o c e s s of p e a c e f u l c h a n g e (Carr, 1 9 3 9 : 2 0 8 - 2 2 3 ) . W h i l e this w a s o b v i o u s l y a w e l c o m e d e v e l o p m e n t , w e s h o u l d not und e r e s t i m a t e the c o m p l i c a t i o n s this p o s e d f o r the s t a t e s p e o p l e w h o w e r e f o r c e d to try to n a v i g a t e t h e s e u n c h a r t e d w a t e r s . P e r i o d s of r e v o l u t i o n a r y c h a n g e c a n be c o n c e p t u a l i z e d in t e r m s of t w o d i s t i n c t , yet i n t e r r e l a t e d , p r o c e s s e s : ( 1 ) the d e s t r u c t i o n of the status q u o , a n d (2) the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a new international o r d e r . In the past, m a s s i v e w a r s h a v e s e r v e d as b r e a k p o i n t s that, in practice, d i s e n t a n g l e a n d s e p a r a t e the p r o c e s s e s of d e s t r u c tion and c r e a t i o n . S u c h c o n f l i c t s basically d e c o m p o s e the p r o c e s s of r e v o l u t i o n a r y c h a n g e into t w o d i s c r e t e p h a s e s : w i n n i n g the w a r , a n d then c r a f t i n g a p e a c e settlement that will serve as the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f o u n d a t i o n of the n e w o r d e r . B y c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z i n g t h e p r o c e s s of c h a n g e , p r o l o n g e d p e r i o d s of m a j o r - p o w e r w a r also p r o v i d e g o v e r n m e n t s with an opportunity to d e v e l o p p l a n s f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i n g the p o s t w a r o r d e r . F o l l o w i n g the o u t b r e a k of W o r l d W a r II, f o r e x a m p l e , the U n i t e d S t a t e s g o v e r n m e n t i m m e d i a t e l y c r e a t e d a p o s t w a r p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s that w o u l d r e m a i n in p l a c e until the very e n d of the c o n f l i c t ( B u r l e y , 1993: 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 ) . T h i s o p p o r t u n i t y , h o w e v e r , w a s not p r e s e n t in the c a s e of the C o l d W a r o r d e r . N o o n e f o r e s a w the m o m e n t o u s c h a n g e s that w e r e a b o u t to u n f o l d in E u r o p e ( G a d d i s , 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 3 ) . H e n c e , s c h o l a r s a n d p o l i c y m a k e r s alike h a d given relatively little t h o u g h t to the p r o b l e m s a n d c h o i c e s that s u d d e n l y w o u l d b e t h r u s t b e f o r e t h e m . G o v e r n m e n t s , of course, are not k n o w n f o r their ability to inn o v a t e a n d q u i c k l y a d a p t to a set of r a p i d l y c h a n g i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l circ u m s t a n c e s ( K i s s i n g e r , 1 9 5 6 ) . T h i s p r o b l e m a p p e a r s to be p a r t i c u l a r l y a c u t e w i t h i n the c o n t e x t of d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t s w h e r e a c o m m i t m e n t to p l u r a l i s m a n d the f r e e e x c h a n g e of i d e a s c o m b i n e to p r o d u c e a d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e s s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by f r a g m e n t a t i o n , o v e r l a p p i n g j u r i s dictional b o u n d a r i e s , d i s c o r d a n t voices, and the need for c o n s e n s u s ( F r i e d berg, 1989). O n the b a s i s of t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , it s e e m s p l a u s i b l e to a r g u e that t h e c o n t e n t of the g r a n d s t r a t e g y of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n m a y h a v e b e e n

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primarily a consequence of the Bush administration's need to quickly respond to a series of unexpected developments. Put differently, the administration's emphasis upon multilateral efforts coordinated through N A T O , CSCE, and the European Community may not have been the result of a deliberative process wherein the relative merits of alternative approaches were discussed systematically but, rather, a consequence of the fact that the United States had to make some kind of response to the fall of the Berlin Wall and needed to do so in a hurry. In essence, the content of the grand strategy of institutionalization could represent a sublime example of satisficing. This interpretation, however, overlooks the o b v i o u s fact that the approach advocated by the Bush administration has a proven track record of success in Europe. Hence, the United S t a t e s ' response to the end of the Cold W a r in E u r o p e may have been more than simply an exercise in instrumental rationality; the content of the grand strategy of institutionalization may well be a reflection of the intrinsic value U.S. foreign policy makers have c o m e to attach to multilateral institutions. Following the end of World War II, U.S. foreign policy sought to promote liberal principles of political association in the interstate system by creating an array of multilateral e c o n o m i c and security institutions. As A n n e Burley (1993: 146) points outs, "the roots of contemporary multilateralism lie in one particular liberal s t a t e ' s vision of the world as a domestic polity, economy, or society writ large." Drawing upon lessons derived f r o m the Great D e p r e s s i o n and the international conflicts that o c c u r r e d during the 1930s, U.S. foreign policy makers endeavored to promote global peace and prosperity by establishing multilateral institutions that w o u l d serve as "specialized administrative organizations" for the m a n a g e m e n t of international economic, security, and social problems (Burley, 1993: 130). T h e onset of the Cold War, of course, confined the United States' efforts to promote multilateralism largely to the western half of the Continent. Even so, the United States continued to pursue this approach in regard to the countries of W e s t e r n Europe throughout the Cold W a r era. Over the past f i v e decades, these initiatives have led to a series of remarkable t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s in the region. In e s s e n c e , Western E u r o p e has evolved into a pluralistic security c o m m u n i t y : a g r o u p of countries characterized by a form of state sociality in which governments do not engage in coercive diplomacy or use force vis-à-vis one another. In light of this experience, it is p e r h a p s not surprising that the Bush administration w a s quick to r e c o m m e n d applying the same basic strategy in regard to the eastern half of the C o n t i n e n t . Secretary of State B a k e r m a d e this point explicit during a 1991 speech in Berlin: The integration of Western Europe within the EC [European Community] and NATO has virtually transcended all the old territorial disputes,

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irredentist claims, and ethnic grievances among and within its members. Euro-Atlantic integration has made it literally inconceivable that localized disputes could become a source for serious conflict. . . . If w e are to ensure comparable levels of peace and prosperity for Europe as a whole, comparable structures should be introduced to shape and develop interdependence among these countries. (Baker, 1991b: 6 2 )

Seen f r o m this perspective, N A T O , the European C o m m u n i t y , and C S C E represent more than simply functional international organizations; they also stand as concrete manifestations of a distinctively American (i.e., liberal) approach to p o s t - W o r l d War II international politics. Hence, there are good reasons to suspect that the content of the grand strategy of institutionalization can perhaps best be explained on the basis of the Bush administration's desire to build upon five decades of successful Western experience with the task of creating a liberal international society in Europe. As Patrick Morgan points out: What Western governments clearly have in mind today is applying the same formula for the same objectives in order to get the same results so as to resolve the same basic security problem. . . . This is to continue the erosion of old conflicts, prevent the emergence of new ones, and result in a pluralistic security community—making resort to force among the new participants as improbable as it has b e c o m e among those in the West. (Morgan, 1993: 3 4 5 - 3 4 6 )

The Clinton Administration T h e Clinton administration has continued to adhere to the basic conceptual f r a m e w o r k articulated by J a m e s B a k e r . W h i l e s o m e m o d i f i c a t i o n s have been introduced, these are primarily a d j u s t m e n t c h a n g e s "in the level of effort and/or in the scope of recipients" ( H e r m a n n , 1990: 5) rather than a fundamental redefinition of the means and ends of U.S. strategy in Europe. Indeed, the degree of continuity is remarkable. This section presents evidence in support of this claim. As a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton continually stressed the security benefits that w o u l d stem f r o m the spread of democracy. T h e following passage, for e x a m p l e , appeared in a major foreign policy speech that Clinton delivered at G e o r g e t o w n University in D e c e m b e r 1991. It w a s entitled " A New Covenant f o r American Security." D e m o c r a c i e s don't g o to war with each other. . . . D e m o c r a c i e s don't sponsor terrorist acts against each other. They are more likely to be reliable trading partners, protect the global environment and abide by international law. Over time, democracy is a stabilizing force. It provides

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non-violent means for resolving disputes. Democracies do a better job of protecting ethnic, religious and other minorities. And elections can help resolve fratricidal civil wars. (Clinton, 1991: 5)

Clinton expressed similar sentiments before a gathering of the Foreign Policy Association in New York. This time, however, Clinton (1992a: 8) stressed the need for "a global alliance for democracy as united and steadfast as the global alliance that defeated c o m m u n i s m . " He went on to suggest that "no national security issue is more urgent." The spread of free institutions will make foreign rulers more accountable to their people and check tyranny and external aggression. A s nations free their economies from bureaucratic control they will b e c o m e productive enough to satisfy more of their material wants and rich enough to buy more American goods and services. (Clinton, 1992a: 10)

Since taking o f f i c e , Bill Clinton has c o n t i n u e d to e m p h a s i z e this theme. Indeed, he and other members of the administration routinely characterize the promotion and consolidation of democracy as one of the "three pillars" of U.S. foreign policy (e.g., Clinton, 1993b: 5; Christopher, 1993e: 11). In his first appearance before the North Atlantic Council, for example, Secretary of State Warren Christopher (1993b: 54) reaffirmed the Bush adm i n i s t r a t i o n ' s conviction that " E u r o p e ' s long term security . . . requires that we actively foster the spread of democracy and market e c o n o m i e s . " T h e most comprehensive and coherent public presentation of the Clinton administration's security strategy, however, can be f o u n d in a speech delivered by National Security Adviser A n t h o n y Lake at the Johns H o p kins School of A d v a n c e d International Studies in W a s h i n g t o n . In w o r d s reminiscent of J a m e s Baker, Lake declared: The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement—enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies. . . . T o the extent that democracy and market e c o n o m i e s hold sway in other nations, our own nation will be more secure, prosperous and influential, while the world will be more humane and peaceful. (Lake, 1993: 41)

T h e internal architecture of the Clinton administration's strategy also bears a striking resemblance to the Bush administration's approach. It consists, first and f o r e m o s t , of e f f o r t s to p r o m o t e the d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n and marketization of state-society relations throughout Eastern E u r o p e and the f o r m e r Soviet Union. In L a k e ' s v i e w , the strategy will lead the United States to: help democracy and markets expand and survive in other places where w e have the strongest security concerns and where w e can make the

Strategy of Institutionalization

31

greatest d i f f e r e n c e . This is not a d e m o c r a t i c crusade; it is a p r a g m a t i c c o m m i t m e n t to see f r e e d o m take hold where that will help us the most. . . . T h e most important example is the f o r m e r Soviet Union. . . . If we can support and help consolidate democratic and market reforms in Russia and the other newly independent states, w e can help turn a f o r m e r threat into a region of valued diplomatic and economic partners. . . . The new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe are another clear example, given their proximity to the great democratic powers of Western Europe. (Lake, 1993: 42) Multilateral e c o n o m i c and security institutions a l s o f i g u r e p r o m i n e n t l y in the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s approach. A s L a k e e x p l a i n e d , It is beyond doubt that multilateral action has certain advantages: it can spread the costs of action, as in our efforts to support Russian reform; it can foster global support, as with our coalition in the Gulf War; it can ensure comprehensiveness, as in our export control regimes, and it can succeed w h e r e no nation acting alone, could have done so. . . . 1 would go further and state . . . that the habits of multilateralism may one day enable the rule of law to play a far more civilizing role in the conduct of nations, as envisioned by the founders of the United Nations. (Lake, 1993: 45) T h e C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s c o m m i t m e n t to multilateralism a l s o is ind i c a t e d by the e m p h a s i s p o l i c y m a k e r s attach to the c o n c e p t o f c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y . W h e r e a s the B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o n l y h i n t e d in t h i s d i r e c t i o n , B i l l C l i n t o n and his a d v i s e r s h a v e c a l l e d e x p l i c i t l y for the c r e a t i o n o f a v i a b l e s y s t e m o f c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y in order to deal w i t h r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n s in E u r o p e and e l s e w h e r e . A s a candidate, for example, Bill Clinton (1992a: 11) characterized the e n d o f the C o l d W a r as "a broader o p p o r t u n i t y . . . to r e i n v e n t the ins t i t u t i o n s o f c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y . " S i n c e that a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o o k o f f i c e , however,

Madeline

Albright—the

United States' Ambassador

to

the

U n i t e d N a t i o n s — h a s e m e r g e d as the p r e s i d e n t ' s principal s p o k e s p e r s o n in regard to this i s s u e . D u r i n g an a p p e a r a n c e b e f o r e a j o i n t s e s s i o n o f C o n g r e s s ' s u b c o m m i t t e e s o n E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y and i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , A l b r i g h t s t r e s s e d the i m p o r t a n c e o f e s t a b l i s h i n g a v i a b l e s y s t e m o f c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y to c o p e w i t h the d e m a n d s o f the p o s t - C o l d W a r era. If you were to search for one term that best describes the challenge conf r o n t i n g the n e w era, it is "collective security." The security threat to A m e r i c a — a threat that only collective security can ultimately m a n a g e — is a world where w e a p o n s of mass destruction proliferate and ethnic and religious conflicts trigger massive r e f u g e e f l o w s , e n o r m o u s e c o n o m i c dislocations, unacceptable human rights atrocities, environmental catastrophes and the senseless killing and m a i m i n g of civilians. T h a t world has already arrived. . . . The United States cannot possibly rise to this challenge without a viable system of collective security. . . . [Without it] the United States will stand exposed to an endless raid on its resources,

32

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its goodwill, its soldiers, and finally its territorial integrity or the territorial integrity of its allies. (Albright, 1993c: 65-66) Similarly, during a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in N e w York, Albright specifically linked multilateral security institutions to the administration's desire to create a "principled international community." A central goal of this administration is therefore to help create safeguards for a principled international c o m m u n i t y . . . . So, we in the United States must work energetically to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations and other multilateral organizations to conduct peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace enforcement, humanitarian security and similar operations. . . . Rules aren't rules if they're not enforced. This does not require that we serve as the world's policeman, only that there should be policemen and that we take a hand in assuring their effectiveness. (Albright, 1993a: 34) The difference between the Bush and Clinton administrations when it c o m e s to c o l l e c t i v e security, h o w e v e r , is more a matter of style than of substance. The principle o f c o l l e c t i v e security w a s also at the core of George Bush's vision of the " N e w World Order" emerging from the ashes of the Cold War. Consider, for e x a m p l e , the f o l l o w i n g c o m m e n t s that Bush made during a speech at Maxwell Air Force Base on April 13, 1991: Twice this century, a dream born on the battlefields of Europe died after the shooting stopped. The dream of a world in which major powers worked together to ensure p e a c e . . . . [The new world order] refers to new ways of working with other nations to deter aggression and achieve stability, to achieve prosperity, and, above all, to achieve peace. It is based on a shared commitment to four principles: peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and the just treatment of all peoples. (Bush, 1991a: 32; emphasis added) Bush returned to this theme during his 1 9 9 2 farewell address to the United Nations General A s s e m b l y : We have a unique opportunity . . . to forge . . . a genuine global community of free and sovereign nations—a community built on respect for principle, of peaceful settlement of disputes, fundamental human rights, and the twin pillars of freedom; democracy and free markets. . . . Meeting these challenges will require us to strengthen our collective engagement. It will require us to transform our collective institutions. . . . I welcome the Secretary-General's call for a new agenda to strengthen the United Nations' ability to prevent, contain, and resolve conflict across the globe. (Bush, 1992b: 59-60) Democratization, marketization, and regional integration: T h e s e are the ideas that stand at the core of the Clinton administration's approach to

Strategy of Institutionalization

33

p o s t - C o l d W a r Europe, just as they did for the B u s h administration. It is on the basis of this indisputable pattern of c o n v e r g e n t elite policy statements regarding the means and ends of U.S. foreign policy in Europe that we can feel confident in concluding that U.S. foreign policy makers have r e s p o n d e d to the end of the Cold W a r in E u r o p e by f o r m u l a t i n g a longterm program of action that can best be characterized as a grand strategy of institutionalization.

Conclusion The evidence presented in this chapter w a s intended to: (1) document the e m e r g e n c e of the grand strategy of institutionalization in 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 0 , (2) specify the internal architecture of the strategy, (3) d o c u m e n t the Clinton administration's subsequent embrace of the strategy, and (4) present a preliminary explanation for both the timing and the c o n t e n t of the strategy. This has been done primarily through an analysis of d o c u m e n t s released by the United States government. T h e evidence suggests that U.S. foreign policy makers have responded to the end of the Cold War in Europe by formulating a grand strategy designed to facilitate f a r - r e a c h i n g c h a n g e s in the n a t u r e of the European states system. T h e strategy consists of distinct, yet mutually reinforcing, political, e c o n o m i c , and military initiatives oriented around the overarching goal of p r o m o t i n g and c o n s o l i d a t i n g the spread of liberal norms and institutions throughout the Continent. In practice, the grand strategy of institutionalization seeks to replicate, on a continental scale, the r e m a r k a b l e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s that occurred in Western Europe during the Cold W a r . Ultimately, it is designed to facilitate the e m e r g e n c e of a liberal international society in E u r o p e that will lead to enduring peace and prosperity throughout the Euro-Atlantic region.

Notes 1. This definition builds on the notion of grand strategy advanced by Deibel (1992: 4 0 - 4 1 ) . 2. The analytic framework is similar in this regard to Robert Axelrod's ( 1 9 7 6 ) well-known work on cognitive mapping. Instead of focusing on the structure of individual belief systems, however, the present study addresses the internal architecture of a state's security strategy. 3. This problem has long plagued the revisionist school of U.S. foreign policy studies. These scholars typically posit the existence of U.S. grand strategy on the basis of their understanding of the reproductive requirements associated with a capitalist e c o n o m y . For a recent example of this scholarship, see McCormick (1989). A critique of the study, and revisionism in general, can be found in Gaddis (1990).

34

Beyond

Containment

4. There are relatively few secondary sources currently available on the Bush administration. Moreover, most of these studies focus primarily upon the United States' involvement in the Gulf War and/or Bush's call for a "New World Order" (e.g., Tucker and Hendrickson, 1992). While these matters are not irrelevant to the issues raised here, they also do not speak directly to the United States' strategy toward post-Cold War Europe. At present, the best secondary source on the Bush administration's response to the collapse of the Soviet Union is Beschloss and Talbott's (1993) At the Highest Levels. This source, however, plays a relatively modest role in the present analysis. In general, the book simply tended to corroborate conclusions I already had drawn from my examination of the primary materials mentioned above. By cross-referencing the information contained in this book with the primary materials obtained from the United States government, my confidence in the soundness of the interpretation presented here has been enhanced considerably. 5. James Baker has signed a contract to publish his memoirs; George Bush and Brent Scowcroft are collaborating on a book that is scheduled for release in 1995. 6. One, of course, could interview individuals who have participated in the decisionmaking process relating to the United States' strategy toward post-Cold War Europe. This tack has a well-known number of problems associated with it, however. From a methodological standpoint, interviews raise as many questions about reliability and validity as do publicly available documents. 7. Obviously, this two-step analysis will diminish, but not totally eliminate, the risk of arriving at spurious conclusions concerning the existence and/or content of a state's grand strategy. Given the data limitations noted above, however, there are few alternative sources of information that presently could be used to test the interpretation advanced in this chapter. As additional archival materials become available, researchers will have an opportunity to bring this data to bear on the present analysis. 8. East German authorities opened the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. Over the next four months, Baker discussed the future of U.S. policy in Europe during major speeches in Berlin (December 12), Brussels (December 15), Prague (February 7), and Dallas (March 30). 9. The quote here is by George Bush, and it appears on page 297 of the 1989 American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, an annual State Department publication (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office). Hereafter, this source will be cited as AFP, followed by the year of publication. 10. In structuring this portion of the analysis around two of B a k e r ' s more noteworthy speeches, I am adhering to a precedent established in many previous studies of U.S. grand strategy. It is not unusual for political scientists to focus upon a rather small number of especially significant documents (e.g., K e n n a n ' s long telegram, NSC 68) when presenting the results of this type of analysis. This approach is warranted because, typically, the goal of such studies is to outline the essential features of U.S. policy rather than to provide a comprehensive account of the available diplomatic record. For our purposes, Baker's speeches to the Berlin Press Club and the World Affairs Council are useful because they provide a relatively concise and comprehensive overview of the overarching strategic design that senior-level members of the Bush administration would continue to emphasize throughout the remainder of their time in office. 11. This point also was affirmed publicly by President Bush during his State of the Union address on January 31, 1990. Appearing before a joint session of Congress and a national television audience, Bush declared that

Strategy of Institutionalization

35

the revolutions of 1989 have been a chain reaction, changes so striking that it marks the beginning of a new era in the world's affairs. . . . Our aim must be to ensure democracy's advance, to take the lead in forging peace and freedom's best hope: a great and growing commonwealth of free nations. (AFP, 1990: 1-2)

12. Baker made the same basic points during a February 7, 1990, speech at Charles University in Prague: [Governments based on the consent of the governed are the first requirement for an enduring peace in Europe . . . because the principle of self-determination is the only basis upon which legitimate governments can stand. . . . Governments accountable to their people . . . will secure a Europe whole and free in a way armies of tanks never could. Democratic governments are far more likely to promote the well-being of their citizens than to pursue expansionist, aggressive aims. (AFP, 1990: 3 1 8 - 3 1 9 )

13. The United Nations did not figure prominently in the Bush administration's public discussions of European security affairs, and of the grand strategy of institutionalization, until after the Gulf War. Thereafter, George Bush frequently emphasized the contribution the UN could make in the realm of international security management. This theme has become even more pronounced since President Clinton took office. I discuss the United Nations, and its role in U.S. strategy, below. 14. The reference here is to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and negotiations relating to the settlement of conflicts in Central America, Southern Africa, and Southeast Asia. 15. The Council on Foreign Relations is the premier foreign policy association of the Eastern establishment. A brief history of the council can be found in Hyland (1992). 16. The wars involving Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia are interpreted here as a post-Cold War phenomenon. For present purposes, the temporal domain of the Cold War stretches from the end of World War II to the dissolution of both the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in the spring of 1991. 17. During the address, Gorbachev also announced unilateral arms reductions that would entail the demobilization of 500,000 men and 10,000 tanks on the part of Soviet military forces. 18. The use of limited reversible probes is a tactic that governments can employ to test another state's commitment to defend the status quo. This approach is attractive because it enables a challenger to initiate change while also minimizing the risk of provoking a serious confrontation; it also is particularly useful when a state is uncertain about how an adversary will react to a challenge to the status quo (see George, 1991: 381). 19. A strategy of reassurance stands as a natural complement to the tactic of limited, reversible probes. In essence, a reassurance strategy seeks to reduce the likelihood of conflict by signaling a government's intention to exercise restraint vis-à-vis an adversary (Stein, 1991: 31-38). The goal is to diminish an adversary's concerns that its weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and/or concessions will be exploited by others for unilateral advantage. In this way, a reassurance strategy can encourage an adversary to accept changes in the status quo that otherwise might be unacceptable. This strategy is particularly useful for states whose relationship has been characterized by decades of mutual hostility and mistrust (Stein, 1991: 33). Within the context of an enduring rivalry, a strategy of reassurance can facilitate a process of reciprocal tension reduction whereby adversaries can minimize the risk of misperception and miscalculation, build confidence in one another's intentions, and gradually redefine the way they relate to, and interact with, one another (Stein, 1991: 33).

36

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20. While this cautious approach can be attributed to the systemic context that confronted U.S. policymakers, it also may have been a product of George Bush's own personal political philosophy. According to Duffy and Goodgame, Bush is characterized by a deeply conservative worldview grounded in a set of fundamental doubts about the ability of government to shape the course of social and political events. Bush is . . . deeply skeptical of attempts by government to force the pace of human progress. Such efforts, Bush believes, are the height of hubris and folly and often bring unintended consequences. He believes that progress comes, when it comes, through glacial changes in attitudes. . . . Out of this skepticism of government grows a deep caution and fear of mistakes that Bush often expresses . . . as an overriding concern to "first, do not [i/c] harm" and "not make things worse." Bush exhibits what management gurus decry as a "bias for inaction." . . . When he does move it usually is in reaction to someone else's initiative—and there he excels. His reflexes, instincts, and tactical skills are first-rate. (Duffy and Goodgame, 1992: 65)

21. Obviously, we should not exaggerate the immediate operational significance of the reductions proposed by the United States and NATO. Given the Soviet Union's overwhelming conventional military advantage relative to the states of Eastern Europe, the Red Army would have remained quite capable of intervening throughout the region even after an agreement had been signed. Symbolically, however, the Soviets' willingness to reduce their military presence in the East would stand as an encouraging sign of the Kremlin's desire to downplay the role of force as an instrument of its foreign policy. 22. This point was implicit in Baker's address at the opening of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations in Vienna on March 6, 1989. W e shall never be able to set East-West relations on an irreversible course toward enduring improvement unless we deal with the huge conventional military imbalances in Europe. . . . It is this array of Soviet armed might that divides Europe against its will and holds European hopes hostage to possibly hostile Soviet intentions. (AFP, 1989: 272)

2 BUILDING A N E W SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN EUROPE

T h e deductive logic underlying the grand strategy o f institutionalization is persuasive. T h e r e are, for example, compelling reasons to believe that democratization on a continental scale would serve to stabilize and pacify the European states system (see Russett, 1 9 9 3 ) . Nor can one dispute the superior productivity and wealth-producing capacity o f marketbased e c o n o m i e s . Moreover, the p o s t - W o r l d War II era clearly testifies to the fact that multilateral institutions can function as effective tools for the management o f international e c o n o m i c , s o c i a l , and even security problems. T o be successful, however, a grand strategy must be capable of being translated into practice. T h e conceptual eloquence o f a strategic design will be o f little consequence unless it can be implemented within the context o f concrete historical circumstances. Hence, establishing the desirability o f a strategy is not enough; policymakers also must attend to its feasibility (George, 1 9 8 9 ; Howard, 1 9 9 1 : 3 6 ) . In recognition of this, this chapter chronicles the initial steps U . S . foreign policy makers have taken to implement the grand strategy o f institutionalization. T h e analysis centers principally on the United States' efforts to construct a new architecture for European security. T h e s e overtures have consisted o f : ( 1 ) a series o f arms control initiatives designed to diminish the level o f militarization on the Continent and to heighten the degree of military transparency between and among states; ( 2 ) an ongoing effort to develop a "strategic partnership" with Russia; and ( 3 ) a variety of proposals that would serve to broaden and deepen the role international institutions play in the management of regional security affairs. W h i l e implementing the grand strategy o f institutionalization clearly entails considerably more than simply building a new security architecture in Europe, no task is more pressing within the context o f the United S t a t e s ' strategy. As indicated below, U . S . foreign policy makers are striving to fill the security vacuum created by the collapse o f the Cold War

37

38

Beyond Containment

o r d e r by e x p a n d i n g the role m u l t i l a t e r a l r e g i m e s play in the E u r o p e a n states s y s t e m . T h e s u c c e s s of this e n t e r p r i s e , in turn, h o l d s i m p o r t a n t implications for the long-term s u c c e s s of the g r a n d strategy of institutionalization. T h e f o l l o w i n g section e l a b o r a t e s on this point.

The Security Problematique T o b u i l d a liberal i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y in E u r o p e , s i m u l t a n e o u s political and e c o n o m i c r e v o l u t i o n s will h a v e to o c c u r in about t w o d o z e n c o u n t r i e s located t h r o u g h o u t the e a s t e r n half of the C o n t i n e n t . T h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s will e n t a i l r e p l a c i n g h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c s t r u c t u r e s with m o r e liberal i n s t i t u t i o n s . It a l s o will i n v o l v e f u n d a m e n t a l n o r m a t i v e c h a n g e s in the way h u n d r e d s of m i l l i o n s of p e o p l e think about politics and m a r k e t s . In practice, the g r a n d strategy of institutionalization r e p r e s e n t s an e x e r c i s e in social e n g i n e e r i n g that will r e q u i r e the n a t i o n s and states of Eastern E u r o p e to r e d e f i n e their identities, interests, institutions, and principles of international political a s s o c i a t i o n . O b v i o u s l y , this t r a n s f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s will take years, if not d e c a d e s , to c o m p l e t e . D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n and m a r k e t i z a t i o n are e v o l u t i o n a r y p h e n o m ena that literally t a k e t i m e to g r o w a n d d e v e l o p ( H u n t i n g t o n , 1 9 9 1 ) . H e n c e , the e m e r g e n c e of a true liberal international society in E u r o p e lies s o m e d i s t a n c e in the f u t u r e . At p r e s e n t , the E u r o p e a n s t a t e s s y s t e m c a n best b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d as b e i n g in the midst of a transitional s t a g e that, in principle, c o u l d lead in any o n e of a n u m b e r of d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s . For the rest of this d e c a d e , a n d p e r h a p s b e y o n d , the c o u n t r i e s of Eastern E u r o p e and the f o r m e r Soviet U n i o n will be f a c e d with the f o r m i d a b l e task of r e s t r u c t u r i n g the nature of their state-society r e l a t i o n s on the b a s i s of liberal n o r m s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s . P r e v i o u s r e s e a r c h i n d i c a t e s that s u c h " w e a k l y institutionalized liberal r e g i m e s " are e s p e c i a l l y v u l n e r a b l e to international e c o n o m i c s h o c k s a n d r e g i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t s that h e i g h t e n national security c o n c e r n s ( S n y d e r , 1989: 6 - 7 ) . T h i s i m p l i e s that the U n i t e d States a n d its allies can m a k e an i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n to the p r o c e s s of liberalization in Eastern E u r o p e by: ( 1 ) m a i n t a i n i n g the relative o p e n n e s s a n d stability that h a s c h a r a c t e r i z e d the c a p i t a l i s t w o r l d e c o n o m y in the p o s t - W o r l d W a r II era, a n d ( 2 ) e s t a b l i s h i n g n e w r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y a r r a n g e m e n t s c a p a b l e of m a n a g i n g the d o m e s t i c a n d international c o n f l i c t s that m a y arise d u r i n g this l e n g t h y t r a n s f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s ( S n y d e r , 1 9 9 0 : 3 1 - 3 8 ; Van Evera, 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 1 : 5 0 - 5 7 ) . T h e i m p o r t a n c e of the latter point is u n d e r s c o r e d by a recent empirical study that f i n d s that new d e m o c r a c i e s are m o r e likely to b e c o m e i n v o l v e d in international c o n f l i c t than are l o n g - e s t a b l i s h e d d e m o c r a c i e s . A s the authors point out, the results of the a n a l y s i s s u g g e s t that

Security Architecture in Europe

39

to the extent that norms and institutions take time to develop, newly created democracies in Eastern Europe and elsewhere may still experience some significant amount of interstate conflict while their political systems are in the process of transition to democracy. (Maoz and Russett,

1993: 636) T h e political g e o g r a p h y of Eastern E u r o p e r e i n f o r c e s the potential imp o r t a n c e of this point. T h e r e are a p p r o x i m a t e l y t w e n t y states currently und e r g o i n g s i m u l t a n e o u s political a n d e c o n o m i c r e v o l u t i o n s in E u r o p e . T h e s e c o u n t r i e s also tend to be p a c k e d into a relatively c o n f i n e d g e o p o l i t ical s p a c e e x t e n d i n g f r o m P o l a n d to R u s s i a and f r o m Estonia to the f o r m e r Y u g o s l a v i a . H e n c e , a n u m b e r of t h e s e c o u n t r i e s s h a r e c o n t i g u o u s b o r d e r s . R e s e a r c h e r s h a v e f o u n d that c o n t i g u i t y can s e r v e as a t r a n s m i s s i o n belt, d i f f u s i n g c o n f l i c t f r o m o n e s t a t e to a n o t h e r ( M o s t a n d S t a r r , 1 9 8 0 ; S t a r r a n d M o s t , 1 9 8 3 ) . T h i s s u g g e s t s that E a s t e r n E u r o p e m a y be e s p e cially p r o n e to c o n t a g i o n e f f e c t s that increase the l i k e l i h o o d that c o n f l i c t s will e s c a l a t e h o r i z o n t a l l y . T h i s a l s o is likely to e x a c e r b a t e the s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n s of states located in the area. A s i n d i c a t e d a b o v e , insecurity can s e r v e to c o m p l i c a t e , retard, a n d p e r h a p s even derail the r e f o r m p r o c e s s in " w e a k l y institutionalized liberal r e g i m e s . " T h i s is a highly salient p r o b l e m in Eastern E u r o p e b e c a u s e the dissolution of the Soviet U n i o n has precipitated the c o l l a p s e of the international a r r a n g e m e n t s that had s e r v e d to r e g u l a t e security issues in this part of Eur o p e s i n c e the e n d of W o r l d W a r II. T h e S o v i e t U n i o n ' s s p h e r e of i n f l u e n c e in the r e g i o n a n d the W a r s a w T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n b o t h h a v e b e e n s w e p t a w a y by the revolutionary f o r c e s u n l e a s h e d by Mikhail G o r b a c h e v ' s " N e w T h i n k i n g . " T h i s , in turn, h a s led to the e m e r g e n c e of a t y p e of institutional v a c u u m in the eastern half of the C o n t i n e n t , a geopolitical z o n e of u n c e r t a i n t y a n d a m b i g u i t y c o n c e r n i n g the rights a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of states. A s S t e p h e n Van E v e r a p o i n t s out, it is not u n c o m m o n f o r international c o n f l i c t to e m e r g e under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Peace among states is most durable when spheres of influence, the "rules of the game," and the rights and responsibilities of all parties are clear. Dangers rise when they are ambiguous; each state then tends to define its own rights broadly and others' narrowly, and to dispute the others' definitions. Crises erupt as states issue threats and stage fait accomplis to force others to accept their own definition of their rights. (Van Evera,

1990-1991: 45) U . S . p o l i c y m a k e r s c l e a r l y are s e n s i t i v e to this p r o b l e m . T o w a r d the e n d of his p r e s i d e n c y , f o r e x a m p l e , G e o r g e B u s h ( 1 9 9 2 b : 6 0 ) c h a r a c t e r ized r e g i o n a l v i o l e n c e as " t h e g r e a t e s t threat to the d e m o c r a t i c p e a c e w e h o p e to b u i l d with Eastern E u r o p e , with R u s s i a a n d E u r a s i a , even m o r e so

40

Beyond

Containment

than economic deprivation." Similarly, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, President Clinton emphasized the importance of addressing the issue of Eastern European security: If w e d o not strengthen the c a p a c i t y to r e s o l v e c o n f l i c t a m o n g and within nations, t h o s e c o n f l i c t s w i l l s m o t h e r the birth o f free institutions, threaten the d e v e l o p m e n t o f entire r e g i o n s and c o n t i n u e to take i n n o c e n t l i v e s . (Clinton, 1993c: 51)

Since the late 1980s, U.S. foreign policy makers have attempted to address these concerns by: (1) promoting arms control agreements that would diminish the level of militarization in the region and heighten the degree of military transparency between and among states; (2) nurturing a "strategic partnership" with Russia; and (3) broadening and deepening the role international institutions play in the management of regional security affairs. The remainder of the chapter chronicles the steps the United States has taken in each of these directions.

Arms Control U.S. arms control efforts in Europe have centered on three basic goals: (1) achieving significant conventional force reductions, (2) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons within the Continent, and (3) establishing confidence-building measures to increase military transparency. This section examines the progress the United States has made in each area. Conventional

Force

Reductions

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations were a key component of the strategy of revisionism and reassurance pursued by the Bush administration during most of its first year in office. In 1990, these efforts came to fruition as the members of NATO and the WTO met in Paris to conclude an agreement that would lead to unprecedented conventional arms reductions throughout the Continent. The CFE treaty was signed on November 19, 1990, by the states comprising NATO and the WTO. A central goal of the negotiations was to achieve "significant reductions in key military capabilities that are designed for invasion" (AFP, 1989: 270; quote by Baker). To this end, the treaty limits five categories of military hardware that are especially useful for large-scale offensive operations: tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft. The treaty allots each signatory a specific national "entitlement" for each type of treaty-limited equipment (TLE). These ceilings represent the legally binding, maximum

Security Architecture in Europe

41

holdings a state may possess in each category once the treaty is fully implemented (see Arms Control Today, 1991). National entitlements were established on the basis of intra-alliance discussions. As alliances, N A T O and the W T O both were allowed to possess the same amount of TLE: 20,000 tanks; 30,000 armored combat vehicles; 20,000 artillery pieces; 2,000 attack helicopters; and 6,800 combat aircraft. The members of each alliance were then permitted to decide how their overall allotment would be distributed among themselves. The only constraint on the resulting distribution was the so-called sufficiency principle: No single member of an alliance would be permitted to hold more than two-thirds of the alliance-wide total in each category (Dean and Forsberg, 1992: 82). T h e CFE treaty was not affected by the dissolution of the W T O on March 31, 1991. Since each state had signed the agreement individually, the abrogation of the Treaty of Warsaw did not change their legal obligations under the terms of the CFE treaty. The dissolution of the USSR, on the other hand, necessitated a series of negotiations to determine how the Soviet U n i o n ' s entitlements would be distributed among the successor states. This matter was finally resolved in May 1992 at a summit involving Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union. The Tashkent Declaration apportioned the Soviet Union's entitlements under the treaty among Russia and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States on the basis of a complicated formula that included the geographical extent of the respective states, the length of their borders, and the size of their populations (International Institute for Strategic Studies [hereafter IISS], 1992: 240-241). On average, Russia acquired approximately 50 percent of the Soviet U n i o n ' s entitlements; Ukraine and Belarus received roughly 25 and 10 percent, respectively. In combination, these three states account for over 90 percent of T L E holdings allotted to the Soviet Union under the terms of the CFE treaty. While engaged in the CFE negotiations, the Bush administration also proposed significant reductions in the number of military personnel that the United States and the Soviet Union could deploy in Europe. The United States' opening gambit in regard to this initiative came in May 1989. During a N A T O summit in Brussels, President Bush proposed that the superpowers limit their military deployments in Europe to 275,000 soldiers. In his 1990 State of the Union address, Bush advocated even greater reductions suggesting that the superpowers diminish their military presence in the Continent to no more than 195,000 troops. Following the completion of the CFE treaty, members of N A T O and the W T O held a series of discussions in regard to this initiative. On July 10, 1992, these states issued a joint declaration concerning the deployment of military personnel in Europe. The CFE-1A agreement, known formally

42

Beyond Containment

as the C o n c l u d i n g A c t of the N e g o t i a t i o n on P e r s o n n e l S t r e n g t h of C o n ventional A r m e d F o r c e s in E u r o p e , c o n s t i t u t e s a n o n b i n d i n g c o m m i t m e n t on the part of the s i g n a t o r i e s to limit their m a n p o w e r d e p l o y m e n t s in the area c o v e r e d by the C F E treaty. T h e a g r e e m e n t c o n s i s t s of each g o v e r n m e n t ' s d e c l a r a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the m a x i m u m n u m b e r of military p e r s o n n e l it p l a n s on d e p l o y i n g in E u r o p e . U n l i k e the C F E t r e a t y , the c e i l i n g s c o d i f i e d in the C F E - 1 A a g r e e ment w e r e not s u b j e c t to negotiation; rather, each state w a s r e s p o n s i b l e for d e t e r m i n i n g its o w n p e r s o n n e l c e i l i n g . 1 W h i l e t e c h n i c a l l y the l i m i t s are n o n b i n d i n g , the a g r e e m e n t d o e s o b l i g a t e e a c h g o v e r n m e n t to n o t i f y the o t h e r s i g n a t o r i e s b e f o r e it e x c e e d s the ceiling c o n t a i n e d in the a g r e e m e n t . M o r e o v e r , each state has p l e d g e d to p r o v i d e the o t h e r p a r t i c i p a t i n g states with f o r t y - t w o - d a y s ' a d v a n c e notice b e f o r e it increases the strength of any g r o u n d f o r c e by m o r e than 1 , 0 0 0 men or calls u p m o r e t h a n 3 5 , 0 0 0 reservists (Fitzwater, 1992b: 45). T h e C F E treaty is to b e f u l l y i m p l e m e n t e d by J a n u a r y 17, 1 9 9 6 ; the c e i l i n g s s p e c i f i e d in the C F E - 1 A a g r e e m e n t a r e to b e m e t by N o v e m b e r 17, 1 9 9 5 . In c o m b i n a t i o n , t h e s e a g r e e m e n t s will y i e l d the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c o n v e n t i o n a l military c a p a b i l i t i e s listed in T a b l e 2.1. B o t h the C F E treaty and the C F E - 1 A a g r e e m e n t are of u n l i m i t e d dur a t i o n . H e n c e , in p r i n c i p l e , the h a r d w a r e and p e r s o n n e l c e i l i n g s s p e c i f i e d in the d o c u m e n t s are to r e m a i n in place f o r e v e r . At the t i m e , J a m e s B a k e r (AFP, 1 9 9 0 : 2 8 6 , 2 8 8 ) c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e s e a g r e e m e n t s as an a t t e m p t to " l o c k - i n a n e w p o s t - c o l d w a r military o r d e r " that w o u l d f a c i l i t a t e " t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a n e w , m o r e stable, and legitimate E u r o p e a n o r d e r . " C o m p a r e d with the conventional force deployments that characterized the European states system throughout m u c h of the Cold W a r era, the C F E and C F E - 1 A a g r e e m e n t s clearly represent u n p r e c e d e n t e d r e d u c t i o n s in the level of militarization on the C o n t i n e n t . Notice, h o w e v e r , that these a g r e e m e n t s also institutionalize an o v e r w h e l m i n g R u s s i a n a d v a n t a g e w h e n it c o m e s to the n u m b e r of conventional f o r c e s that states m a y deploy in the r e g i o n . T h e m a g n i t u d e of R u s s i a ' s p o s i t i o n r e l a t i v e to o t h e r s c a n b e s e e n m o r e clearly by c a l c u l a t i n g the p e r c e n t a g e s h a r e s of a g g r e g a t e military cap a b i l i t i e s that will b e held by e a c h of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g s t a t e s o n c e the a g r e e m e n t s are f u l l y i m p l e m e n t e d . W e a r r i v e at t h i s f i g u r e t h r o u g h the t w o - s t e p p r o c e s s outlined in Singer, B r e m e r , and S t u c k e y ( 1 9 7 2 ) . First, the p e r c e n t a g e s h a r e allotted to each c o u n t r y in t e r m s of m a n p o w e r a n d e a c h c a t e g o r y of T L E is d e t e r m i n e d . T h e n s u m e a c h c o u n t r y ' s p e r c e n t a g e shares across these c a t e g o r i e s and divide by the total n u m b e r of c a t e g o r i e s . T h e result is a positional picture of h o w c o n v e n t i o n a l military c a p a b i l i t i e s will b e distributed a c r o s s t h e s e twenty-six states by the b e g i n n i n g of 1996. T a b l e 2.2 reports the p e r c e n t a g e shares for each signatory in each category as well as the a g g r e g a t e p e r c e n t a g e of military c a p a b i l i t i e s to b e h e l d by each state.

Security Architecture

T a b l e 2.1

in Europe

43

C F E and C F E - 1 A Ceilings (to be met by J a n u a r y 1 7 , 1 9 9 6 )

State

Manpower

Tanks

ACV

ARTb

Hel. c

AC«1

Russia Ukraine Belarus Moldova Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia

1,450,000 450,000 100,000

6,400 4,080 1,800 210 220 220 220

11,480 5,050 2,600 210 220 220 220

6,415 4,040 1,615 250 285 285 285

890 330 80 50 50 50 50

3,450 1,090 260 50 100 100 100

Poland Romania Czech. Bulgaria Hungary

234,000 230,248 140,000 104,000 100,000

1,730 1,375 1,435 1,475 835

2,150 2,100 2,050 2,000 1,700

1,610 1,475 1,150 1,750 810

130 120 75 67 108

460 430 345 235 180

Turkey Germany France Italy Spain Britain U.S.

530,000 345,000 325,000 315,000 300,000 260,000 250,000

2,795 4,166 1,306 1,348 ' 794 1,015 4,006

3,120 3,446 3,820 3,339 1,588 3,176 5,372

3,523 2,705 1,292 1,955 1,310 636 2,492

43 306 352 142 71 384 518

750 900 800 650 310 900 784

Greece Netherlands Portugal Belgium Denmark Norway Canada

158,621 80,000 75,000 70,000 39,000 32,000 10,660

1,735 743 300 334 353 170 77

2,534 1,080 430 1,099 316 225 277

1,878 607 450 320 553 527 38

18 69 26 46 12 0 13

650 230 160 232 106 100 90

Source: IISS (1992: 244). Note: As of this writing Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia had not declared their personnel ceilings. a. ACV = armored combat vehicles. b. ART = artillery. c. Hel. = attack helicopters. d. AC = combat aircraft.

T h e t a b l e i n d i c a t e s that R u s s i a w i l l p o s s e s s a m o r e than 2:1 a d v a n t a g e o v e r its n e x t n e a r e s t c o m p e t i t o r s ( i . e . , the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d U k r a i n e ) w h e n it c o m e s t o c o n v e n t i o n a l m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h in E u r o p e . R u s s i a ' s a d v a n t a g e r e l a t i v e t o G e r m a n y , F r a n c e , B r i t a i n , a n d Italy w i l l b e o n the o r d e r o f 4 : 1 . T h e g r e a t e s t p o w e r i m b a l a n c e s , h o w e v e r , w i l l e x i s t in r e g a r d t o t h e B a l t i c S t a t e s a n d t h e c o u n t r i e s c o m p r i s i n g E a s t e r n E u r o p e . In e a c h c a s e , R u s s i a

44

Beyond

Table 2.2

Containment

Distribution of Conventional Military Capabilities (percentage shares to be held by individual countries by 1996) Aggregate

Manpower

Tanks

ACV a

ART b

Hel. c

AC d

21.0 9.5 8.9 7.4 6.3

25.9 4.4 8.0 6.2 9.5

16.4 10.2 10.4 10.6 7.1

19.2 8.8 8.4 5.8 5.2

16.8 6.5 10.6 7.1 9.2

22.3 13.0 8.3 7.7 1.1

25.6 5.8 8.1 6.7 5.5

France Britain Italy Poland Greece

5.6 5.1 4.7 3.8 3.7

5.8 4.4 5.6 4.2 2.8

3.3 2.6 3.4 4.4 4.4

6.4 5.3 5.6 3.5 4.2

3.4 1.7 5.1 4.2 4.9

8.8 9.6 3.6 3.3 7.0

5.9 6.7 4.8 3.4 4.8

Romania Belarus Czech. Spain Bulgaria

3.5 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.8

4.1 1.7 2.5 5.3 1.9

3.5 4.5 3.7 2.0 3.8

3.5 4.3 3.4 2.7 3.3

3.9 4.2 3.0 3.4 4.5

3.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7

3.2 1.9 2.6 2.3 1.7

Hungary Netherlands Belgium Portugal Norway

2.1 1.7 1.4 >1.0 >1.0

1.7 1.4 1.3 1.3 >1.0

2.1 2.0 >1.0 1.0 >1.0

2.8 1.8 2.0 >1.0 >1.0

2.1 1.6 >1.0 1.2 1.4

2.7 1.7 1.2 >1.0 >1.0

1.3 1.7 1.7 1.2 >1.0

Denmark Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova Canada

>1.0 >1.0 >1.0 >1.0 >1.0 >1.0

>1.0 >1.0 >1.0 >1.0 >1.0 >1.0

>1.0 >1.0 >1.0 >1.0 >1.0 >1.0

>1.0 >1.0 >1.0 >1.0 >1.0 >1.0

1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 >1.0

>.1.0 >1.0 >1.0 >1.0 >1.0 >1.0

>1.0 >1.0 >1.0 >1.0 >1.0 >1.0

State Russia U.S. Ukraine Germany Turkey

Source: Derived by author from data contained in IISS (1992: 244). Note: In calculating the relative shares of personnel strength within Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova have been excluded from the analysis. a. ACV = armored combat vehicles. b. ART = artillery. c. Hel. = attack helicopters. d. AC = combat aircraft.

will h o l d at least a 6 : 1 a d v a n t a g e in the s i z e of its r e l a t i v e c o n v e n t i o n a l military capabilities. For r e a s o n s s u g g e s t e d b e l o w , the U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s e x p r e s s e d r e l a tively little c o n c e r n a b o u t the p o w e r d i f f e r e n t i a l s i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d w i t h i n E u r o p e by the C F E a n d C F E - 1 A a g r e e m e n t s . In e s s e n c e , U . S . f o r e i g n

Security Architecture

in Europe

45

policy makers believe that the democratization of Russia will mediate the strategic significance of these conventional f o r c e imbalances. Preventing

Proliferation

U.S. foreign policy makers have been aggressively promoting the norm of nuclear n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n in Europe. T h e dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the e m e r g e n c e of four countries with strategic nuclear w e a p o n s located on their territories: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. In res p o n s e to this, the United States has e n d e a v o r e d to p e r s u a d e B e l a r u s , Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to transfer these w e a p o n s systems to Russia and to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. This policy was outlined by Secretary of State B a k e r in a m a j o r address delivered just four days after leaders f r o m Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine issued a joint statement declaring "that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . . . is ceasing its existence." W e do not want to see new nuclear weapons states emerge as a result of the transformation of the Soviet Union. . . . W e also want to see Soviet nuclear weapons remain under safe, responsible, and reliable control with a single unified authority. . . . For those Republics who seek complete independence, w e expect them to adhere to the Nonproliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states, to agree to full-scope IAEA [International A t o m i c Energy A g e n c y ] safeguards, and to implement e f f e c t i v e export controls in nuclear materials and related technologies. (Baker, 1991a: 20)

T h e strategic nuclear forces located in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan constitute the most f o r m i d a b l e long-range w e a p o n s y s t e m s ever produced by the Soviet Union. T a b l e 2.3 provides an overview of the ballistic missile capabilities that devolved to these countries f o l l o w i n g the b r e a k u p of the Soviet Union. In addition to their ballistic missile inventories, Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan also inherited long-range b o m b e r s capable of delivering nuclear w e a p o n s . 2 As of the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, U k r a i n e ( 1 , 6 6 2 ) a n d K a z a k h s t a n ( 1 , 4 1 0 ) each possessed more strategic nuclear w e a p o n s than France, China, and Britain c o m b i n e d (i.e., 1,100 weapons). T o promote the denuclearization of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, the United States has resorted to both financial and diplomatic measures. On D e c e m b e r 12, 1991, for example, Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act (i.e., the N u n n - L u g a r Act). T h e legislation established a $400,000,000 foreign assistance program for the express purpose of helping to dismantle the nuclear w e a p o n s of the former Soviet Union. On May 23, 1992, the United States took another step in this direction by persuading Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to sign the so-called Lisbon Protocol. T h e agreement established a legally binding c o m m i t m e n t on

46

Beyond

Table 2.3

Containment

ICBMs Inherited by the Successors to the Soviet Union

State

1CBM Type

Range (km)

Total No.

Warheads per Missile

Warhead Yield

Russia

SS-11 SS-13 SS-17 SS-18 SS-19 SS-24 SS-25 SS-19 SS-24 SS-18 SS-25

13,000 9,400 10,000 9,000 10,000 10,000 10,500 10,000 10,000 9,000 10,500

280 40 40 204 170 46 260 130 46 104 80

3 x MIRV a single RVC 4 x MIRV 10 x MIRV 6 x MIRV 10 x MIRV single RV 6 x MIRV 10 x MIRV 10 x MIRV single RV

lMTb 600KT d 500KT 500KT 500KT 100KT 750KT 500KT 100KT 500KT 750KT

Ukraine Kazakhstan Belarus

CEP (m) 1,100 1,800 400 250 300 200 200 300 200 250 200

Source: IISS (1992: 233). Note: Circular error probability (CEP) is a measure of a missile's accuracy relative to an aim point. The figure indicates "the radius of a circle around a target within which there is a 50 percent probability that a weapon aimed at that target will fall" (IISS, 1992: 236). a. MIRV = multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles. b. M T = megaton. c. RV = re-entry vehicle. d. KT = kiloton.

the part of t h e s e c o u n t r i e s to p u r s u e the path of n u c l e a r d i s a r m a m e n t . U n d e r the t e r m s of the p r o t o c o l , "all n u c l e a r w e a p o n s and all s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e a r m s " located on their territories are to be " e l i m i n a t e d " by the e n d of the 1 9 9 0 s . M o r e o v e r , the s i g n a t o r i e s are o b l i g a t e d " t o j o i n the N o n p r o liferation T r e a t y in the shortest p o s s i b l e t i m e . " A s the B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n e x p l a i n e d on the day of the s i g n i n g , the L i s b o n P r o t o c o l " c o n f i r m s a n d c o n s o l i d a t e s the n o n - n u c l e a r s t a t u s " of these states, l e a v i n g R u s s i a as the only n u c l e a r w e a p o n s state in Eastern E u r o p e ( B a k e r , 1 9 9 2 b : 5 4 ) . A s with the C F E a n d C F E - 1 A a g r e e m e n t s , the L i s b o n P r o t o c o l r e p r e s e n t e d an a t t e m p t to " l o c k i n " a n o t h e r p i e c e of E u r o p e ' s p o s t - C o l d W a r military o r d e r . In this case, h o w e v e r , U.S. f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a k e r s w e r e not looking to f u n d a m e n t a l l y c h a n g e the situation that h a d p r e v a i l e d in E u r o p e since the 1 9 6 0 s . T o the c o n t r a r y , the L i b s o n P r o t o c o l r e f l e c t s the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' u n d e r l y i n g c o m m i t m e n t to p r e s e r v e the n u c l e a r s t a t u s q u o in Eur o p e by p r e v e n t i n g any o t h e r states f r o m j o i n i n g the r e g i o n ' s l o n g - e s t a b lished n u c l e a r p o w e r s . A s of this w r i t i n g , both B e l a r u s a n d K a z a k h s t a n h a v e a c c e d e d to the N u c l e a r N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n T r e a t y as n o n - n u c l e a r w e a p o n s t a t e s . U k r a i n e , h o w e v e r , has b e e n reluctant to a g r e e to the e l i m i n a t i o n of all of the strate-

Security Architecture in Europe

47

g i c n u c l e a r w e a p o n s l o c a t e d on its territory. On N o v e m b e r 18, 1 9 9 3 , f o r e x a m p l e , the Ukrainian p a r l i a m e n t voted, 2 5 4 to 9, in f a v o r of retaining 4 8 p e r c e n t of the 176 b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s p r e s e n t l y d e p l o y e d in the c o u n t r y ( S h a p i r o , 1993: A 4 5 ) . In J a n u a r y 1994, h o w e v e r , U k r a i n e did sign a n o t h e r a g r e e m e n t with the United S t a t e s and R u s s i a r e a f f i r m i n g its p l e d g e to bec o m e a n o n - n u c l e a r state by the e n d of the d e c a d e ( D e v r o y , 1994: A l ) . A s of this writing, h o w e v e r , U k r a i n e has yet to a c c e d e to the n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n treaty. Confidence-Building

Measures

U.S. f o r e i g n policy m a k e r s h a v e s u p p l e m e n t e d their c o n v e n t i o n a l a n d nuclear a r m s control e f f o r t s by actively p r o m o t i n g c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g m e a s u r e s ( C B M s ) that will s e r v e to i n c r e a s e the d e g r e e of military t r a n s p a r e n c y b e t w e e n and a m o n g states. T h e p r e s u m p t i o n u n d e r l y i n g C B M s is that t r a n s p a r e n c y (i.e., o p e n n e s s ) can h e l p to r e d u c e the potential f o r military c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w h i l e a l s o b u i l d i n g c o n f i d e n c e in the b e n i g n i n t e n tions of f o r m e r a d v e r s a r i e s ( L a m b , 1988: 42). D u r i n g the B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s t e r m , U.S. e f f o r t s c e n t e r e d p r i n c i pally o n the s o - c a l l e d o p e n s k i e s initiative. T h i s r e f e r r e d to a p r o p o s e d multilateral a r r a n g e m e n t w h e r e b y p a r t i c i p a t i n g states w o u l d be p e r m i t t e d to c o n d u c t r e c o n n a i s s a n c e f l i g h t s o v e r o n e a n o t h e r ' s t e r r i t o r i e s (AFP, 1989: 365). In J a m e s B a k e r ' s v i e w , an open skies r e g i m e w o u l d s t r e n g t h e n E u r o p e a n security b e c a u s e [u]nder [this] approach, states will be able to see more clearly—literally—the actions and intent of others, whatever the time of day, whatever the weather. A state will not be able to practice and exercise for offensive, aggressive attacks with the help of a traditional ally—a closed society. Neighbors will be able to fly over troop movements, lowering the possibility of surprise attack. And by improving assessments of a potential adversary's capabilities and likely intentions, Open Skies can~reduce miscalculation and misperceptions—and in doing so, alleviate those fears that are oftentimes the source of escalating tensions. (AFP, 1990: 63) T h i s initiative ultimately m e t with s u c c e s s on M a r c h 24, 1992, w h e n the U n i t e d States, R u s s i a , a n d t w e n t y - t w o o t h e r c o u n t r i e s s i g n e d the O p e n S k i e s T r e a t y in Helsinki. T h e a g r e e m e n t c o m m i t s the s i g n a t o r i e s to " m a k e all of their territory a c c e s s i b l e to aerial o b s e r v a t i o n . " M o r e o v e r , e a c h s t a t e is r e q u i r e d to allow a f i x e d n u m b e r of a n n u a l r e c o n n a i s s a n c e f l i g h t s o v e r its territory, the precise n u m b e r to be d e t e r m i n e d on the b a s i s of e a c h part i c i p a t i n g s t a t e ' s g e o g r a p h i c s i z e . A s the l a r g e s t p a r t i c i p a n t s , b o t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d R u s s i a are o b l i g a t e d to a c c e p t f o r t y - t w o o b s e r v a t i o n f l i g h t s per year. T h e O p e n S k i e s T r e a t y also is to last in p e r p e t u i t y a n d is o p e n to a c c e s s i o n by all states. 3

48

Beyond Containment

Following the signing of the agreement, the Bush administration characterized the open skies regime as the most wide-ranging international confidence-building measure ever developed, covering the entire territory of North America and nearly all of Europe and the former Soviet Union. Its arrangements for observation flights . . . are innovative means to help promote openness and stability in Europe in these uncertain times. . . . The United States believes that the greater transparency in military activities brought about by such an agreement will help reduce the chances of military confrontation and build c o n f i d e n c e in the peaceful intentions of the participating states. (Fitzwater, 1992a: 38)

T h e United States also has supported C B M s negotiated under the auspices of the C S C E . On November 19, 1990, for example, the United States and thirty-three other states signed the C o n c l u d i n g D o c u m e n t of the Vienna Negotiations on C o n f i d e n c e and Security B u i l d i n g M e a s u r e s . T h e agreement c o m m i t s the signatories to annual information e x c h a n g e s concerning: (1) the content of their military budgets, (2) the planned deployment of m a j o r w e a p o n s y s t e m s , (3) the organization and d e p l o y m e n t of military personnel, and (4) any military exercise involving m o r e than 40,000 soldiers. 4 U.S. efforts to enhance transparency also have been undertaken within the context of N A T O and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council ( N A C C ) . Similarly, the United States has proposed a wide range of bilateral contacts with Russia in the n a m e of nurturing greater military o p e n ness on the part of the superpowers. These initiatives are discussed below. Conclusion U.S. a r m s control e f f o r t s in Europe since the end of the Cold W a r have been driven by a desire to create a military environment " f r e e of intimidation and the threat of invasion" (AFP, 1989: 273; quote by Baker). T o this end, the United States has endeavored to establish regional a r m s control arrangements that would lead to: (1) significant reductions in the level of militarization within the Continent, and (2) greater military transparency between and a m o n g states. These initiatives have been s u p p l e m e n t e d by ongoing U.S. efforts to establish a new "strategic partnership" with Russia and to strengthen the role international institutions play in the management of regional security affairs. W e turn now to a consideration of these efforts.

Developing a "Strategic Partnership" with Russia In theory, the grand strategy of institutionalization is a global enterprise designed to facilitate the e m e r g e n c e of "market d e m o c r a c i e s " around the

Security Architecture

in Europe

49

w o r l d . In practice, h o w e v e r , there is little doubt that d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n in Russia stands as the United S t a t e s ' n u m b e r o n e strategic priority (see Baker, 1991a; Lake, 1993: 42; Christopher, 1993f). Conceptually, U.S. p o l i c y m a k e r s have linked the success of Russian reform to four key U.S. interests. O n e of the most explicit discussions of this point can be f o u n d in a speech delivered by President Clinton to the A m e r i c a n Society of N e w s p a p e r Editors on April 1, 1993. A c c o r d i n g to the president, the d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n of R u s s i a will, first and f o r e m o s t , e n h a n c e U.S. security by e l i m i n a t i n g the risk of Russian aggression in Europe. Across most of our history, our security w a s challenged by European nations set on domination of their continent and the high seas that lie between us. . . . N o w , we could at last face a Europe in which no great power, not one, harbors continental designs. . . . The rise of a democratic Russia, satisfied within her own boundaries, bordered by other peaceful democracies, could ensure that our nation never needs to pay that kind of price again. (Clinton, 1993d: 2 1 )

A greatly diminished risk of Russian imperialism, in turn, will lead to additional benefits f o r the United States. It will, for e x a m p l e , enable the United States to f o r g o billions of dollars worth of d e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e s , thus allowing these monies to be redirected to the task of rehabilitating its e c o n o m y . Russian democratization also will create opportunities to expand Russo-American economic relations; this will translate into increased U.S. exports, more jobs, and continued e c o n o m i c growth (Clinton, 1993d: 21). In addition, h o w e v e r , d e m o c r a c y in Russia will e n a b l e the United States to establish a "strategic partnership" with its former adversary: a cooperative relationship based upon a c o m m o n c o m m i t m e n t to "global problem s o l v i n g " (Clinton, 1993d: 21). T h i s is of considerable importance to U.S. f o r e i g n policy m a k e r s b e c a u s e R u s s o - A m e r i c a n cooperation w o u l d s e e m to be a prerequisite for s t r e n g t h e n i n g the role international institutions play in the m a n a g e m e n t of international security issues in E u r o p e and elsewhere. This section examines the steps U.S. foreign policy makers have taken to establish a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation. T h e United States has a p p r o a c h e d this task by trying to establish a "basic political f r a m e w o r k of relations" (George, 1988a: 667) with Russia. T h e vehicle for doing so has been a series of joint declarations that specify the principles and norms guiding their relationship in the realm of security. Substantively, these d o c u m e n t s are analogous to the "basic principles agreement" that the United States and the Soviet Union concluded in 1972 ( G e o r g e , 1983: 1 0 7 - 1 1 6 ) . In e s s e n c e , U.S. f o r e i g n policy m a k e r s have p r o m o t e d these a g r e e m e n t s as an attempt to establish a n o r m a t i v e f r a m e w o r k that will shape the long-term evolution of Russo-American relations (Bush, 1992a: 18).

50

Beyond

Containment

Three such documents have been signed since the beginning of 1992: the C a m p David Declaration (February 1, 1992), the Charter f o r American and Russian Partnership and Friendship (also known as the Washington Charter) (June 17, 1992), and, most recently, the V a n c o u v e r Declaration (April 4, 1993). Of these, the W a s h i n g t o n Charter provides the greatest insights into the nature of a strategic p a r t n e r s h i p b e t w e e n the United States and Russia. The Charter for American and Russian Partnership and Friendship was signed by George Bush and Boris Yeltsin on June 17, 1992. T h e text: (1) s p e c i f i e s the basic principles underlying the c o u n t r i e s ' bilateral security relationship; (2) identifies the general goals and interests shared by the United States and Russia; and (3) provides the general outlines of a joint program of action that the two states will p u r s u e in the realm of international security management. 5 According to the Washington Charter, R u s s o - A m e r i c a n relations are based upon three fundamental principles: First, the two countries no longer regard each other as adversaries; instead, relations are to proceed on the basis of "mutual trust and respect." Second, the United States and Russia also reject coercive diplomacy as an e l e m e n t of their bilateral relations. Put d i f f e r e n t l y , the countries pledge "to settle disputes b e t w e e n them by p e a c e f u l m e a n s and to refrain f r o m the threat or use of f o r c e against the territorial integrity and political i n d e p e n d e n c e of each o t h e r . " Third, Russo-American relations also are based on the principle of indivisibility; both countries agree "that security is indivisible f r o m V a n c o u v e r to Vladivostok." As a corollary to this principle, the document also a f f i r m s that the United States and Russia possess a "special responsibility . . . f o r maintaining international peace and security." T h e text also s p e c i f i e s a set of goals and o b j e c t i v e s that the United States and Russia share in regard to the international political system: The United States of America and the Russian Federation reiterate their determination to build a democratic peace, one founded on the twin pillars of political and e c o n o m i c freedom. . . . B e g i n n i n g on the basis of their shared democratic values, the United States of America and the Russian Federation will unite in their efforts toward strengthening international peace and security, preventing and settling regional conflicts, and solving global problems. (FBP, 1992: 13)

In support of these goals, the Washington Charter outlines a series of steps that the United States and Russia will take in the area of international security management. T h e countries pledge, f o r example, to intensify their bilateral contacts in the name of "coordinating crisis prevention activities" and f u r t h e r i n g " a r m s control and d i s a r m a m e n t . " T h e United States and

Security Architecture in Europe

51

R u s s i a are also c o m m i t t e d to cooperation when it c o m e s to strengthening " i n t e r n a t i o n a l m e a n s o f c o l l e c t i v e e n g a g e m e n t . " S i g n i f i c a n t l y , this c o m mitment e m e r g e s within the context o f a passage addressing the s u b j e c t o f European security. [The United States and Russia] cannot accept another phase of European instability. . . . Therefore, mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and settlement and European peacekeeping must be strengthened if we are to adequately cope with future conflicts. To this end, the United States of America and the Russian Federation . . . support the strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic Community . . . [and] institutions like NACC, NATO, WEU [Western European Union] and CSCE. (FPB, 1992: 13) U l t i m a t e l y , the W a s h i n g t o n Charter e n v i s i o n s " b u i l d i n g a s t r a t e g i c partnership between the United States o f A m e r i c a and the Russian Federa t i o n . " S i n c e taking o f f i c e , the Clinton administration has c o n t i n u e d to w o r k toward this goal as w e l l . T h e V a n c o u v e r D e c l a r a t i o n , f o r e x a m p l e , r e a f f i r m s the W a s h i n g t o n Charter as the " b a s i s for relations b e t w e e n the two c o u n t r i e s . " T h e text also reiterates the s u p e r p o w e r s ' pledge to c o o p erate in the name o f improving " t h e p e a c e m a k i n g and p e a c e k e e p i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s o f the United Nations, the C S C E , and other appropriate regional o r g a n i z a t i o n s . " T o this end, the declaration also c o m m i t s the United States and R u s s i a " t o broaden [their] interaction and c o n s u l t a t i o n s . . .

in the

areas o f d e f e n s e and s e c u r i t y . " 6 A c o o p e r a t i v e relationship with R u s s i a is an essential c o m p o n e n t o f the United S t a t e s ' strategy for strengthening the role international institutions play in the management o f European security issues. T h e importance o f this fact will b e c o m e evident o n c e we e x a m i n e the practical steps U . S . foreign policy makers have taken to e n h a n c e the contribution international organizations can m a k e in the realm o f security.

International Institutions T h r e e institutions have figured most prominently in the United S t a t e s ' efforts to construct a new architecture f o r European security: C S C E , N A T O , and the U N . W h i l e other international institutions ( e . g . , the European C o m m u n i t y ) clearly have important roles to play within the overall design o f the grand strategy o f institutionalization, U . S . f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a k e r s have tended to e m p h a s i z e the potential value o f C S C E , N A T O , and the UN when it c o m e s to the task o f regional c o n f l i c t m a n a g e m e n t . T h i s s e c tion c h r o n i c l e s the initiatives the United S t a t e s has pursued in regard to each institution.

52

Beyond

Conference

Containment

on Security and Cooperation

in Europe

CSCE is a multilateral institution whose origins can be traced back to the heyday of U.S.-Soviet détente during the 1970s (Gartoff, 1985: 106-121, 463-489). Since the inception of CSCE, its negotiations have been dedicated to the goal of establishing principles, norms, and rules that would serve to regulate East-West relations in the areas of military transparency, economic and commercial exchange, science, the environment, and human rights (Maresca, 1988: 106-107). At present, fifty-two countries are members of CSCE. This includes the United States, Canada, and every state located in Europe. As the only true Pan-European institution operative within the Continent, CSCE has been at the center of the United States' strategy since the very beginning of the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the United States has introduced more innovations in regard to CSCE than has any other existing institution. As noted in the previous chapter, the Bush administration considered CSCE to be ideally suited to the task of promoting and consolidating democratic values and institutions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union {AFP, 1989: 302-304; citing Baker). Moreover, U.S. foreign policy makers hoped that CSCE could make a direct contribution in the realm of international conflict management through its activities relating to confidence-building measures and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Since 1989, U.S. foreign policy makers have consistently supported initiatives that would strengthen C S C E ' s ability to function in each of these areas. During a June 1990 address before the North Atlantic Council, for example, Secretary of State Baker outlined the United States' thinking in regard to the future of this institution. CSCE can serve the European c o m m o n interest best by acting as a forum where the states of Europe discuss common problems and concerns. I've called it the "conscience of the continent," a place where the political and moral consensus of the time can be shaped based on democratic values. C S C E . . . [is] uniquely suited for building consensus to meet Europe's major challenges: ensuring political legitimacy . . . strategic stability and predictability. (AFP, 1990: 2 6 6 )

Baker elaborated on this theme in October by proposing a number of specific steps that could be taken to "strengthen CSCE both politically and institutionally." The recommendations included: (1) a more regular process of consultation among member states; (2) the creation of a permanent secretariat; (3) the establishment of an "elections monitoring office"; and (4) the creation of a "conflict promotion center to promote confidence, predictability, and transparency through exchanges of military information and discussions of unusual military activities and to facilitate the conciliation of disputes" (AFP, 1990: 285).

Security Architecture in Europe

53

In N o v e m b e r 1990, C S C E m e m b e r s approved each of these proposals. T h e innovations are c o d i f i e d in the Charter of Paris f o r a New Europe, which was signed at the conclusion of the C S C E s u m m i t in France. T h e charter outlines an organizational structure designed to facilitate "the intensification of our consultations at all levels." T o this end, C S C E m e m bers established both a p e r m a n e n t bureaucracy and several specialized functional o f f i c e s . T h e Council of Foreign Ministers will serve as "the central f o r u m for political c o n s u l t a t i o n s within the C S C E p r o c e s s . " It is to meet regularly and at least once a year. Ad hoc sessions in response to "emergency situations" also are contemplated. This body is to be assisted by a C o m m i t t e e of Senior Officials (CSO), w h o "will prepare the meetings of the Council and carry out its decisions." A d m i n i s t r a t i v e support for both the council and the C S O is to be provided by a secretariat located in Prague. In addition, the charter also calls f o r the creation of three f u n c t i o n a l o f f i c e s . A C o n f l i c t Prevention Center ( C P C ) is to be e s t a b l i s h e d in Vienna " t o assist the Council in r e d u c i n g the risk of c o n f l i c t . " An O f f i c e of Free E l e c t i o n s ( O F E ) will be set up " t o f a c i l i t a t e c o n t a c t s and the exc h a n g e of i n f o r m a t i o n on e l e c t i o n s within p a r t i c i p a t i n g S t a t e s . " Finally, the d o c u m e n t also calls f o r the c r e a t i o n of a C S C E p a r l i a m e n t a r y assembly. In subsequent meetings, C S C E members have built upon this basic institutional f r a m e w o r k . On January 30, 1992, for example, state representatives agreed to e n h a n c e the jurisdictional s c o p e of both the b u r e a u c r a c y and the functional offices. T h e so-called Prague D o c u m e n t authorizes the council and the C S O to take action in response to " c l e a r , gross, and uncorrected violations of relevant C S C E c o m m i t m e n t s . . . [even] in the absence of the consent of the state in question." 7 This is a potentially important change because, previously, a government could prohibit C S C E i n v o l v e m e n t in its internal a f f a i r s by simply voting against such proposals. Historically, the C S C E d e c i s i o n m a k i n g process has operated on the basis of the unanimity principle (Maresca, 1985). Hence, in practice, each m e m b e r has possessed a veto over C S C E activities. T h e Prague D o c u m e n t suspends this principle under the extraordinary circumstances suggested above. Institutional innovations also were introduced in regard to the Conflict Prevention Center. T h e Prague D o c u m e n t establishes a Consultative Committee within the CPC, which is to serve as "a f o r u m for consultation and cooperation in conflict prevention and for cooperation in the implementation of decisions on crisis m a n a g e m e n t . " As part of this process, each m e m b e r is e n c o u r a g e d to bring to the c o m m i t t e e ' s attention any issue " w h i c h in its view has politico-military i m p l i c a t i o n s . " M o r e o v e r , the c o m m i t t e e is authorized to " e x e c u t e factf i n d i n g m i s s i o n s " relevant to the task of p r e v e n t i n g , m a n a g i n g , and

54

Beyond

Containment

resolving c o n f l i c t . In the n a m e of c a r r y i n g out these activities, the Consultative C o m m i t t e e is to meet regularly, at least once a month. C S C E ' s role in regard to international conflict m a n a g e m e n t was f u r ther e n h a n c e d in July 1992. T h e "Final A c t " of the Helsinki s u m m i t expands the jurisdictional scope of the institution further by r e a f f i r m i n g the principle that states are internationally a c c o u n t a b l e f o r their d o m e s t i c human rights practices. W e recognize our accountability to each other for complying with them [i.e., human rights standards]. . . . W e emphasize that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned [emphasis added]. 8

In keeping with this, the Final Act also calls upon the Council of Foreign Ministers to appoint a High C o m m i s s i o n e r on National Minorities w h o will be authorized to investigate and help resolve minority problems "that have the potential to develop into a conflict within the C S C E area." Perhaps more important, however, the Final Act also elaborates on the role C S C E can play within the context of European p e a c e k e e p i n g operations. This issue is a d d r e s s e d in a section entitled " C S C E and the M a n agement of C h a n g e . " C S C E peacekeeping activities may be undertaken in cases of conflict within or among participating States. Peacekeepers may supervise and help maintain cease-fires, monitor troop withdrawals, support the maintenance of law and order, and provide humanitarian and medical aid and assist refugees; they will not engage in peacemaking. C S C E peacekeeping requires the consent of the parties concerned . . . [and] will be initiated by consensus decision-making. (61)

T h e d o c u m e n t also establishes a Forum on Security Cooperation (FSC), which will serve as "the sole f o r u m for conventional arms control in Europe." T h e F S C ' s role is to facilitate dialogue pertaining to military issues, defense conversion, nonproliferation, regional disputes, C B M s , and arms control negotiations. F o l l o w i n g the completion of the Helsinki s u m m i t , Secretary B a k e r characterized the security-related provisions contained in the Final Act as "a four point structure to strengthen C S C E ' s ability to prevent crises and to manage crises that a r e n ' t prevented": There is a first early warning phase, which concentrates on human rights and democratic institution-building as a way to prevent conflicts before they develop. A second phase of political management focuses on steps

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to encourage an end to conflicts. A third phase brings in specific instruments such as fact-finding missions and mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes. A final phase involves formal peacekeeping operations if all other efforts fail. (Baker, 1992a: 6 3 ) 9

North Atlantic Treaty

Organization

NATO is a multilateral institution composed of sixteen states. Its origins can be traced back to the North Atlantic Treaty signed on April 4, 1949. NATO is an alliance based upon the principle of collective security. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty commits the signatories to regard an armed attack against any of the members as an attack against them all. Moreover, each member pledges to come to the assistance of allies under attack using "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force." In principle, Article 5 constitutes an unconditional and legally binding commitment on the part of NATO's members to respond to any and all acts of aggression perpetrated against any one of the signatories from whatever quarter. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy makers have consistently characterized NATO as an indispensable component of Europe's emerging security architecture (see, e.g., AFP, 1989: 296-298; AFP, 1990: 305-306; Clinton, 1992a). As noted previously, the United States has envisioned NATO playing a prominent role in facilitating an East-West dialogue in regard to both arms control and regional conflict management (AFP, 1989: 301; citing Baker).»» To fulfill this purpose, however, NATO would have to be adapted to the vicissitudes of the post-Cold War era. More than anything else, this would entail strengthening the alliance's "political dimension" (AFP, 1990: 252, 255). Secretary Baker elaborated on this point during a NATO ministerial meeting in June 1990. N A T O cannot only prevent war but can also build peace. . . . The way to build peace is to reassure the Central and Eastern Europeans and the Soviets that they will not be left out of the new Europe. . . . One way we can do this . . . is through a solid dialogue and even regular consultations, both military and political. (AFP, 1990: 266)

A preliminary step in this direction was taken at the July 1990 NATO summit in London. Article 4 of the so-called London Declaration explicitly acknowledged NATO's changing role in Europe. In the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbors. N A T O must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians, and Americans work together not only for the common

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d e f e n c e , but to build partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship."

T o this end, the declaration also called f o r the creation of institutionalized diplomatic contacts between N A T O and its f o r m e r adversaries. T o reflect the changing political role of the Alliance, we today . . . invite the U.S.S.R, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania to c o m e to N A T O , not just to visit but to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. This will make it possible for us to share with them our thinking and deliberations in this historic period of c h a n g e . . . . W e [also] are ready to intensify military contact . . . with M o s c o w and other Central and Eastern European capitals. (276)

A year later, this innovation w a s f o l l o w e d by a r e d e f i n i t i o n of N A T O ' s o v e r a r c h i n g security strategy in E u r o p e . T h e a l l i a n c e ' s new "Strategic C o n c e p t " w a s unveiled at the conclusion of a N A T O summit on N o v e m b e r 8, 1991. A c c o r d i n g to the R o m e Declaration, N A T O ' s f u n d a mental approach to European security would now consist of "three mutually r e i n f o r c i n g elements: dialogue; cooperation; and the m a i n t e n a n c e of a collective d e f e n c e capability." 1 2 As part of this strategy, the d o c u m e n t also called for "a qualitative step f o r w a r d " in terms of N A T O ' s relationship with the states of Eastern Europe and the f o r m e r Soviet Union. T o this end, the alliance outlined a series of p r o p o s a l s that w o u l d serve to d e v e l o p "a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues." At the centerpiece of this initiative w a s a call for the establishment of a North A t l a n t i c C o o p e r a t i o n Council: a f o r u m that w o u l d facilitate regularized d i p l o m a t i c contacts at the ministerial level. T h e North Atlantic Cooperation Council ( N A C C ) has b e c o m e the principal N A T O forum for East-West consultations and cooperation in the realm of security. In the view of Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger ( 1 9 9 2 : 116), N A T O and the N A C C constitute "the f o u n d a t i o n of a truly European-wide security system." 1 3 In his farewell address to the N A C C in D e c e m b e r 1992, Eagleburger outlined the United States' aspirations in regard to the N A C C and the future of European security. If the NACC, together with NATO, is to begin to realize its ultimate potential as a cornerstone of a European security system, it must develop a substantive agenda related to the real security challenges the new Europe faces t o d a y . . . . We think it is particularly important that we work closely within the N A C C on planning, training, and other preparations for peacekeeping operations. . . . If the security interests of Europe East and West

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are truly to b e c o m e indivisible . . . w e are all g o i n g to have to act as if this were the case by working together to confront threats to the peace and stability of this continent wherever they occur. . . . And as such habits and patterns of cooperation b e c o m e ingrained, this could contribute to transforming the composition of the Alliance itself. (Eagleburger, 1992: 116)

T h i s statement is significant in t w o respects. First, it r e a f f i r m s and b r o a d e n s N A T O ' s c o m m i t m e n t to participate in European p e a c e k e e p i n g operations. Second, it raises the issue of expanding N A T O ' s m e m b e r s h i p to include states located in Eastern Europe and the f o r m e r Soviet Union. Both points deserve a brief discussion. N A T O ' s w i l l i n g n e s s to undertake p e a c e k e e p i n g missions in E u r o p e w a s first articulated publicly in a c o m m u n i q u é issued on June 4, 1992: " W e are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the C S C E , including by making available Alliance resources and expertise." 1 4 E a g l e b u r g e r ' s statement, however, e x p a n d s on this c o m m i t m e n t by inviting Eastern European states to participate in p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s under the auspices of the N A C C . This invitation has been seconded by the Clinton administration. In a speech to N A T O ' s foreign ministers, for e x ample, Secretary of State Warren Christopher argued that W e should intensify and expand the work program for the N A C C and broaden its mandate. . . . The N A C C states should step up joint consultations, joint activities on peacekeeping . . . and joint exercises. (Christopher, 1993c: 23)

In the name of developing "a joint capability to act together in f u t u r e peacekeeping operations," the United States recently has decided to o f f e r the Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany, "as a f o r u m and training center for N A C C activities and other efforts to address the defense and security issues of the p o s t - C o l d W a r e r a " (Christopher, 1993a: 54). This proposal also is indicative of the Clinton a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s belief that The N A C C is becoming a central element in the growing web of security ties that binds us together. It is tangible proof that the security of N A T O members is linked to that of all states in Europe. . . . This sends a powerful signal of the resolve of the Euro-Atlantic community to respond e f fectively to new threats to peace, stability, and human rights. (Christopher, 1993a: 5 4 )

E x p a n d i n g N A T O ' s m e m b e r s h i p to include the countries of Eastern E u r o p e and the f o r m e r Soviet Union has proven to be a more nettlesome problem for U.S. foreign policy makers. Since the dissolution of the Soviet

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Union, several states have expressed an interest in b e c o m i n g full-fledged m e m b e r s of N A T O . They include, most prominently, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The alliance, however, has been reluctant to move in this direction presumably because of a concern that such a m o v e would inflame the domestic political situation in Russia (Drozdiak, 1993: A25). I n c o r p o r a t i n g Eastern European countries into N A T O could provide fodder for nationalist groups and coalitions seeking to enhance their political i n f l u e n c e inside Russia. N A T O e x p a n s i o n e a s t w a r d could be interpreted, f o r e x a m p l e , as a threat to Russian security. T h i s is an especially salient consideration in the case of Russia, given M o s c o w ' s historic fear of encirclement by the more prosperous and technologically advanced states of Europe. As Jack Snyder (1989: 6) points out, perceptions of a deteriorating security environment can "decisively strengthen the hand of imperialists, militarists, and protectionists in the domestic politics of a weakly institutionalized liberal regime." Such a d e v e l o p m e n t would, of course, have two u n f o r t u n a t e e f f e c t s . First, it could jeopardize the process of political and e c o n o m i c liberalization within Russia. Second, it could prompt Russian foreign policy makers to adopt a less cooperative, and perhaps even a more confrontational, approach toward the United States and other countries. Obviously, this outc o m e would seriously complicate the pursuit of the grand strategy of institutionalization in Europe as a whole. In light of this, the United States has not looked favorably upon proposals that w o u l d expand N A T O m e m b e r s h i p in the near future. T h e Clinton a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , for example, does support the principle of enlarging N A T O , but only "at an appropriate t i m e , " which p r e s u m a b l y will c o m e only near the end of this decade (if then) (Christopher, 1993c: 23). Indeed, the Clinton administration has m a d e it virtually impossible for Eastern European countries to join N A T O anytime soon by establishing certain "domestic eligibility requirements" that states must meet b e f o r e they can even be considered for admission. These criteria are part of a broader initiative that the Clinton administration calls "Partnership f o r P e a c e . " T h i s policy w a s approved by President Clinton on October 19, 1993 ( L i p p m a n , 1993: A 2 8 ) . It w a s subsequently e m b r a c e d by N A T O during the January 1994 summit in Brussels (Drozdiak and Williams, 1994: A l ) . In essence, Partnership for Peace establishes a process whereby states can become candidates for admission into N A T O . As explained by former Secretary of D e f e n s e Les Aspin (1993), the process basically consists of a lengthy probationary period followed by a formal review of a state's suitability for membership. As it presently stands, the policy consists of N A T O issuing an invitation to the t w e n t y - t w o states comprising the N A C C , "and other European states on which N A T O can a g r e e , " to sign a declaration indicating their willingness to enter into a p a r t n e r s h i p with the alliance. A c c o r d i n g to

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Aspin (1993: 2), "Each new partner would then identify the facilities, resources, and forces it is willing to make available to the Partnership, and the extent of its intention to participate in joint training, planning and operations." The partnership also would establish a commitment to consult in the event of emergencies: "Allies and partners would agree to consult whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of a partner state was threatened" (Aspin, 1993: 3). Partnership, however, would not entitle these states to protection under N A T O ' s collective security provision. Aspin (1993: 3) made this point explicit by stating: "Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty requires each member to regard an attack against one as an attack against all. The Article Five guarantee would not be extended to partners." Nor would partnership automatically entitle states to membership in NATO: Partners for Peace would not automatically become eligible for membership in NATO. . . . On the other hand, Partners for Peace would have an opportunity to work with N A T O to develop the principles, purposes and capabilities of N A T O members. While partnership is no guarantee of membership, active participation would likely be an essential condition of future N A T O membership. (Aspin, 1993: 3)

Ultimately, a state's eligibility for membership will be judged on the basis of its demonstrated c o m m i t m e n t to democracy, capitalism, and an active record of participation in N A T O ' s military endeavors (Aspin, 1993: 4). As this statement suggests, the decision to enlarge N A T O will not be made solely on the basis of external threats. To qualify for membership, states must be characterized, internally, by liberal values and institutions. Given the unprecedented challenges confronting the process of political and economic reform in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, this domestic eligibility requirement would seem to have the practical effect of rendering the question of N A T O membership moot for the foreseeable future. Over the last five years, U.S. foreign policy makers have supported initiatives that would serve to enhance N A T O ' s political role in Europe. This has led to a series of institutional innovations designed to establish new patterns of political association between the alliance and its former adversaries in the East. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Clinton administration's Partnership for Peace initiative constitute the most noteworthy achievements to date. The United

Nations

The United Nations is a general purpose international organization presently comprised of 185 m e m b e r s . Established on June 26, 1945, the

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UN was created primarily in the n a m e of maintaining international peace and security (Bennett, 1991: 53). This is reflected, for example, in Article 1(1) of the Charter, which states that the p u r p o s e s of the United Nations are: To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which lead to a breach of the peace. T o this end, the Charter establishes: (1) a Security Council, which is to exercise " p r i m a r y responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and s e c u r i t y " (Article 24[1]); (2) procedures relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter VI); and (3) an array of sanctions that can be invoked in response to a "threat to the peace" (Chapter VII). T h e Security Council stands as the United Nations' key decisionmaking f o r u m in regard to international security issues. Article 39 grants the Security Council the authority to "determine the existence of any threat to the p e a c e " and to " d e c i d e what m e a s u r e s shall be t a k e n " in response. M o r e o v e r , UN m e m b e r s are legally obligated to c o m p l y unconditionally with any and all Security Council decisions. This unprecedented c o m m i t ment is c o n t a i n e d in Article 25: " T h e M e m b e r s of the United N a t i o n s agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." T h e Security Council itself consists of five p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China) and ten n o n p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s w h o serve two-year terms. Each p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r also possesses a veto that can be exercised in regard to all s u b s t a n t i v e q u e s t i o n s (Article 27[3]). T o approve resolutions relating to such issues, the Security Council requires an affirmative vote of nine m e m b e r s as well as the concurring votes of each permanent m e m b e r . Throughout most of its history, the United Nations has played a rather limited role in the realm of international security m a n a g e m e n t . This can be attributed primarily to the Cold War, which inhibited the permanent m e m bers of the Security Council f r o m engaging in the far-reaching collaborative acts envisioned in the Charter. As a result, UN security-related activities have b e e n c o n f i n e d largely to the realm of mediation and p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s (Durch, 1993). W h i l e these m e a s u r e s certainly are not unimportant to the maintenance of international peace and security, they are a far cry f r o m the mandate established by the architects of this institution (Claude, 1959: 2 5 0 - 2 9 4 ) .

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Since the end of the Cold W a r , h o w e v e r , scholars and p o l i c y m a k e r s alike have expressed renewed interest in the United Nations as a tool for the m a n a g e m e n t of international security issues. This is true of U.S. f o r eign policy makers as well, especially under the Clinton administration. T o this end, the United States recently has advocated a series of institutional innovations that would serve to strengthen the United N a t i o n s ' capacities in the realm of security. T o date, f e w of these p r o p o s a l s have been acted upon by the UN; f e w e r still have been implemented. Even so, a brief examination of these r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s is warranted. U.S. foreign policy makers have c o m e to regard the United Nations as a " n e c e s s a r y c o m p l e m e n t " to regionally based security institutions in E u r o p e and e l s e w h e r e ( B u s h , 1992b: 60; Clinton, 1993c: 51). Perhaps more important, these initiatives also clearly reveal the extent to which collective security has e m e r g e d as o n e of the basic organizing concepts of the United States' approach to the p o s t - C o l d War era. Hence, a brief discussion of these proposals will shed additional light on the United States' e f f o r t s to address the security-related aspects of the grand strategy of institutionalization. U.S. interest in the United Nations was sparked by the U N ' s performance in regard to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In the eyes of U.S. foreign policy makers, this experience demonstrated that the permanent members of the Security Council were capable of cooperating within the context of a major international crisis; it also indicated that the UN could serve as an effective tool for mobilizing and coordinating a collective response to a serious security problem (Bush 1991a, 1991b, 1992b; Clinton 1992a, 1992b, 1993d). In essence, the U N ' s success in the Gulf War raised the possibility of establishing a viable system of collective security in the post-Cold War era. T h i s t h e m e w a s implicit in G e o r g e B u s h ' s vision of a " N e w W o r l d O r d e r " in which "solidarity against aggression," orchestrated through the United Nations, would b e c o m e a constitutive principle of international relations (AFP, 1990: 1 8 - 1 9 ; B u s h , 1991b: 72; 1992b: 59). T h e president elaborated on this point during an April 1991 address at Maxwell Air Force Base in M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a . The new world order . . . refers to new w a y s of working with other nations to deter aggression and achieve stability, to achieve prosperity, and, above all, to achieve peace. This order . . . got its first real test in the Gulf war. . . . By joining forces to defend one small nation, we showed that we can work together against aggressors in defense of principles. We must build on the successes of Desert Storm to give shape and m o m e n tum to this new world order. (Bush, 1991a: 3 2 - 3 3 )

T h e Clinton administration has c o n t i n u e d to e m p h a s i z e this t h e m e . W h e n r u n n i n g f o r the p r e s i d e n c y , f o r e x a m p l e , Bill Clinton (1992a: 11)

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pledged to build on the " D e s e r t Storm e x p e r i e n c e " as part of a more broadly based effort "to reinvent the institutions of collective security." This c o m m i t m e n t was r e a f f i r m e d by Warren Christopher during his c o n firmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In his o p e n i n g statement to the c o m m i t t e e , the secretary of state designate announced that "it will be our administration's policy to encourage other nations and the institutions of collective security, especially the United N a tions, to do more of the w o r l d ' s work to deter aggression, relieve suffering, and keep the peace" (Christopher, 1993e: 10). Since taking o f f i c e , however, M a d e l i n e Albright has emerged as the Clinton a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s chief s p o k e s p e r s o n in regard to the United Nations and the principle of collective security. In a m a j o r speech delivered to the Foreign Policy Association in N e w York, Albright f r a m e d the United Nations as being "at the center of a new p a r a d i g m " in international politics: an emerging order in which " m u c h , if not all, of the work needed to restore . . . failed states, to reform . . . defiant r e g i m e s , and to receive . . . new democracies falls into our lap at the United N a t i o n s " (Albright, 1993b: 30). A l b r i g h t ' s comment is instructive because it also provides an indication of the wide range of tasks that the Clinton administration associates with the concept of collective security. W h e r e a s , traditionally, the j u r i s dictional scope of a collective security system has been limited to defending states in the event of external attack, the Clinton administration's conception e n c o m p a s s e s a n u m b e r of activities that go b e y o n d merely deterrence and defense. Albright emphasized this point during an appearance b e f o r e a joint session of the House and Senate Subcommittees on Europe, International Security, and International Organization in May 1993. If there is o n e overall t h e m e that I w a n t to stress today, it is that c o l l e c tive security has broadened in theory and practice to e n c o m p a s s far m o r e than military r e m e d i e s to k e e p the p e a c e . . . . A n o t h e r d i m e n s i o n of c o l l e c t i v e security today is s t a t e - b u i l d i n g operations. . . . T h e role o f a m o d ern c o l l e c t i v e security s y s t e m in facilitating d e m o c r a c y h a s b e e n and w i l l c o n t i n u e to be essential. . . . A further d i m e n s i o n o f c o l l e c t i v e security is its vital role in protecting h u m a n rights, particularly the rights o f e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s and other groups. (Albright, 1 9 9 3 c : 6 6 - 6 7 )

T o t r a n s f o r m the UN into the centerpiece of a v i a b l e system of c o l lective security, U.S. foreign policy makers have promoted a series of initiatives that would "strengthen the United N a t i o n s ' ability to prevent, contain, and resolve conflict across the g l o b e " ( B u s h , 1992b: 60). Most of these r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s have centered on the United Nations' peacekeeping capabilities. During his farewell address to the General Assembly, for example, President Bush (1992b: 60) called upon m e m b e r states to provide

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the United Nations with the men, money, material, and organizational resources necessary for international peacekeeping missions. For the United States' part, Bush pledged that it would m o v e immediately to: (1) establish "a permanent peacekeeping curriculum in U.S. military schools," (2) m a k e U.S. bases and facilities available for multinational peacekeeping training and field exercises, and (3) increase U.S. "support for monitoring, verification, reconnaissance, and other requirements of U N peacekeeping operations" (Bush, 1992b: 60). T h e Clinton administration has c o n t i n u e d to w o r k toward the establishment of a " m o r e efficient and regularized system of p e a c e k e e p i n g " in the United Nations (Albright, 1993b: 32). T h i s c o m m i t m e n t is reflected, for e x a m p l e , in Presidential Decision Directive 13 ( P D D - 1 3 ) , which w a s signed by President Clinton on July 14, 1993. T h e directive indicates that the United States will e n d e a v o r to strengthen the United N a t i o n s ' peacek e e p i n g capabilities by: (1) d o u b l i n g the size of the U N ' s p e a c e k e e p i n g headquarters staff; (2) establishing a military intelligence division; (3) establishing an operations division f e a t u r i n g e n c r y p t e d c o m m a n d , control, and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s capabilities; (4) creating a rapidly deployable peacek e e p i n g headquarters team; and (5) p r o v i d i n g the United N a t i o n s with a standing airlift capability to facilitate the rapid deployment of peacekeeping forces (Gellman, 1993a: A l ) . P D D - 1 3 also revealed that the Clinton administration w a s willing to place U.S. military forces under the "operational c o n t r o l " of UN c o m m a n ders and that it would provide an inventory of the capabilities and materiel that the United States w o u l d be willing to m a k e a v a i l a b l e to the United N a t i o n s in support of p e a c e k e e p i n g missions ( G e l l m a n , 1993a: A l ) . T h e document does not, however, establish a f r e e s t a n d i n g c o m m i t m e n t to provide any specific military units to the United Nations. 1 5 In addition to these measures, the Clinton administration has promoted a n u m b e r of other initiatives to strengthen the United Nations (Albright, 1993b: 3 0 - 3 3 ) . Of these, the most politically significant recommendation concerns the United States' support for adding G e r m a n y and Japan to the Security Council as p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s (Clinton, 1992a: 12; Albright, 1993b: 32). This would establish an institutionalized f o r u m wherein all of the m a j o r powers of Europe (and Eurasia) w o u l d stand as relative equals. T h i s is a potentially important innovation given the Clinton administrat i o n ' s evident desire to push the U N ' s military activities beyond the realm of traditional peacekeeping. As permanent m e m b e r s , G e r m a n y and Japan also w o u l d be expected to a s s u m e a more active role in global peace and security e f f o r t s . This, in turn, could translate into greater G e r m a n and Japanese contributions in regard to the m a n p o w e r , material, and financial costs of UN operations (Clinton, 1992a: 12). I will return to this issue in Chapter 5.

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Conclusion O v e r the past f i v e y e a r s , U . S . f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a k e r s h a v e a t t e m p t e d to deal with the security v a c u u m resulting f r o m the c o l l a p s e of the C o l d W a r order by c o n s t r u c t i n g a new architecture for E u r o p e a n security. T h e United S t a t e s ' e f f o r t s h a v e c o n s i s t e d primarily o f : ( 1 ) a series of a r m s control initiatives d e s i g n e d to d i m i n i s h the level of m i l i t a r i z a t i o n on the C o n t i n e n t a n d to h e i g h t e n the d e g r e e of military t r a n s p a r e n c y b e t w e e n a n d a m o n g states; (2) an o n g o i n g e f f o r t to d e v e l o p a " s t r a t e g i c p a r t n e r s h i p " with R u s sia; and ( 3 ) a variety of p r o p o s a l s that w o u l d serve to b r o a d e n a n d d e e p e n the role i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions play in the m a n a g e m e n t of r e g i o n a l security a f f a i r s . In the next c h a p t e r , I e x a m i n e the p r o b l e m s a n d possibilities associated with the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' attempt to create a v i a b l e s y s t e m of c o l lective security in p o s t - C o l d W a r E u r o p e .

Notes 1. Germany stands as an exception to this statement. German troop strength was subject to negotiation within the context of the so-called Two-plus-Four talks. A ceiling on the size of German military forces is specified in the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany. The text of the agreement can be found in Foreign Policy Bulletin (November/December 1990) 1:2-4. 2. The aircraft are configured to carry both gravity bombs and nuclear-tipped cruise missiles (IISS, 1992: 235). 3. A fact sheet released by the White House regarding the treaty can be found in Foreign Policy Bulletin (May/June 1992) 2:38-39. 4. The text of the agreement can be found in AFP (1990: 289-292). 5. The text of the declaration can be found in Foreign Policy Bulletin (July/August 1992) 3:12-14. 6. The Vancouver Declaration was signed on April 4, 1993, by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at the conclusion of their first summit meeting. The text can be found in Foreign Policy Bulletin (May/June 1993) 3:27-28. 7. The text of this document can be found in Foreign Policy Bulletin (January/April 1992) 2:74-76. 8. The text of the Final Act can be found in Foreign Policy Bulletin (September/October 1992) 3:58-61. 9. Baker was quick to point out, however, that CSCE faced some inherent limitations when it came to the task of international conflict management in the region. These provisions give CSCE, for the first time, an orderly set of procedures to prevent and manage conflicts. In the end, of course, the resolution of problems within the EuroAtlantic community will depend upon the willingness of countries to use the instruments which the CSCE has devised and the commitment of countries to live by the principles for which CSCE stands. (Baker, 1992a: 63)

10. In addition to this functional role, U.S. foreign policy makers also have emphasized NATO's symbolic significance in the Continent. Seen from this perspective, NATO stands as an exemplar of a distinctively liberal form of political

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association and state sociality in the realm of security: to wit, a pluralistic security community that sets an important example for the countries of Eastern Europe. Baker stressed this point in his seminal address before the Berlin Press Club on December 12, 1989. N A T O may have its greatest and most lasting e f f e c t on the pattern of change by demonstrating to the nations of the East a fundamentally different approach to security. N A T O ' s four decades offer a vision of cooperation, not coercion; of open borders, not iron curtains. The reconciliation of ancient e n e m i e s , w h i c h has taken place under the umbrella of N A T O ' s c o l l e c t i v e security, offers the nations of Eastern Europe an appealing model of international relations. (AFP,

1989: 3 0 1 - 3 0 2 )

11. The text of the declaration can be found in AFP (1990: 275-278). 12. The text of the Rome Declaration can be found in Foreign Policy Bulletin (January/April 1992) 2:55-59. 13. Eagleburger succeeded James Baker as secretary of state in August 1992. 14. The Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council can be found in Foreign Policy Bulletin (July/August 1992) 3:61-63. 15. In its original form, PDD-13 also authorized U.S. military personnel to disobey UN orders considered to be illegal, outside the UN mandate, or militarily unsound (Gellman, 1993a: A l ) . This provision provoked criticism from both the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the UN's Undersecretary for Peacekeeping on the grounds that it constituted a veto that would render authoritative UN command impossible. The Clinton administration responded to this by eliminating the provision from a subsequent draft of PDD-13 (Gellman, 1993b: A32).

3 EUROPE'S NASCENT COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM

Multilateral security institutions play a p r o m i n e n t role in the United S t a t e s ' grand strategy of institutionalization. In essence, U.S. foreign policy makers look to C S C E , N A T O , and the UN to fill the security vacuum created by the collapse of the Cold War order in Europe. This multi-institutional design is to serve as the principal mechanism for managing the domestic and international conflicts that may arise during E u r o p e ' s transition to a liberal international society. C o n c e p t u a l l y , E u r o p e ' s e m e r g i n g security architecture constitutes a nascent collective security system. It is based upon the principle that security is indivisible a m o n g the countries c o m p r i s i n g the European states system. It also is premised on the belief that regional p e a c e and stability can best be m a i n t a i n e d through the multilateral m a n a g e m e n t of international security issues. It is the f r e e s t a n d i n g and unconditional c o m m i t ments contained in the North Atlantic Treaty and the United Nations Charter, however, that most closely resemble the key characteristic of a collective security system. In principle, both documents commit the respective members of these institutions to respond to any and all acts of aggression. In principle, a collective security system is well suited to carry out the order-keeping tasks envisioned by U.S. foreign policy makers. Such a system, f o r e x a m p l e , w o u l d establish a robust deterrent to aggression that should dramatically lower the likelihood of conflict in Europe. In practice, however, this f o r m of international organization is characterized by obstacles to cooperation that can limit its e f f e c t i v e n e s s as a tool f o r the management of international security issues. T o wit, a collective security system creates strong incentives for states to f r e e ride on the e f f o r t s of other m e m b e r s . This problem, in turn, can j e o p a r d i z e not only the effectiveness of the institution, but its durability as well. Many analysts contend, however, that contemporary conditions in Europe should enable CSCE, N A T O , and the UN to o v e r c o m e the collective action problems that have undermined multilateral approaches in the past.

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Of the f a c t o r s cited in support of this c l a i m , n o n e is m o r e i m p o r t a n t than the f a c t that all of the m a j o r p o w e r s of E u r o p e currently are led by d e m o cratically o r i e n t e d g o v e r n m e n t s . T h i s is an u n p r e c e d e n t e d political d e v e l o p m e n t that p r e s u m a b l y will s e r v e to e n c o u r a g e and s u s t a i n m a j o r - p o w e r security c o o p e r a t i o n in the p o s t - C o l d W a r era. T h i s p r o s p e c t is of e n o r m o u s i m p o r t a n c e to the f u t u r e of E u r o p e ' s n a s c e n t c o l l e c t i v e security s y s t e m b e c a u s e multilateral institutions d e p e n d h e a v i l y u p o n a m i n i l a t e r a l i s t c o r e of m a j o r - p o w e r c o o p e r a t i o n ( K a h l e r , 1992: 7 0 7 ; M o r g a n , 1993: 3 5 2 ) . In practice, a c o l l e c t i v e security s y s t e m is unlikely to b e politically v i a b l e u n l e s s the m a j o r p o w e r s are willing to c o l l a b o r a t e in the realm of s e c u r i t y ; h e n c e , the p r e s u m e d i m p o r t a n c e of t h e m a j o r p o w e r s ' e m b r a c e of d e m o c r a t i c v a l u e s a n d institutions. In e s s e n c e , the c o n v e n t i o n a l w i s d o m h o l d s that d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n h a s e s t a b l i s h e d a d o m e s t i c political f o u n d a t i o n c o n d u c i v e to the m u l t i l a t e r a l m a n a g e m e n t of E u r o p e a n security a f f a i r s . T h e p u r p o s e of this c h a p t e r is t w o f o l d . T h e first is to e x a m i n e the rela t i v e s t r e n g t h s a n d w e a k n e s s e s of a c o l l e c t i v e security s y s t e m . T h i s p o r tion of the analysis will highlight the m a n y a d v a n t a g e s a s s o c i a t e d with this type of international security institution; it a l s o will d i s c u s s the f r e e rider p r o b l e m that is inherent in all s y s t e m s of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y . T h e s e c o n d p u r p o s e of the c h a p t e r is to e x a m i n e the f a c t o r s d e e m e d n e c e s s a r y to t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a viable s y s t e m of c o l l e c t i v e security. A s part of this disc u s s i o n , I will e l a b o r a t e upon the theoretical l i n k a g e that p r e s u m a b l y e x ists b e t w e e n d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n a n d m a j o r - p o w e r c o o p e r a t i o n in the r e a l m of security.

The Nature of Collective Security Systems A c o l l e c t i v e security s y s t e m can b e s t b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d as an international r e g i m e d e s i g n e d to limit the f r e q u e n c y a n d severity of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n flict t h r o u g h a multilateral c o m m i t m e n t to o p p o s e any a n d all acts of a g gression. 1 In this section, I e x a m i n e the internal a r c h i t e c t u r e of a collective security s y s t e m and identify the n o r m a t i v e and i n s t r u m e n t a l d i m e n s i o n s of t h i s d i s t i n c t i v e t y p e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n s t i t u t i o n . I b e g i n w i t h a brief d i s c u s s i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e g i m e s a n d the r o l e t h e y play in international politics. A n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e g i m e c a n b e d e f i n e d as " p r i n c i p l e s , n o r m s , r u l e s , and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e s a r o u n d w h i c h actor e x p e c t a t i o n s c o n v e r g e in a g i v e n i s s u e - a r e a " ( K r a s n e r , 1 9 8 3 : l ) . 2 Its p u r p o s e is to m e d i a t e the c o l l e c t i v e action p r o b l e m s that can arise w h e n e v e r s t a t e s m u s t c o o r d i n a t e their p o l i c y c h o i c e s in o r d e r to a r r i v e at a m u t u a l l y d e s i r a b l e o u t c o m e (Stein, 1983: 1 2 0 - 1 2 7 ; Keohane 1989: 5 - 7 ; 1984: 8 5 - 8 8 ; Young, 1989:

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5 - 6 ) . 3 A regime performs this function by specifying principles, norms, and rules that serve as guidelines for making decisions under conditions of strategic interdependence (Stein, 1983: 132). Scholars are drawn to the study of international regimes by an underlying presumption that variations in the institutionalization of international politics can make a significant difference in terms of both state practices and systemic outcomes (Keohane, 1989: 2). This expectation is based upon two considerations. First, international regimes shape the way states relate to, and interact with, one another (Krasner, 1983: 1 - 5 ; Young, 1989: 32; Keohane, 1989: 33). Put differently, the principles, norms, and rules associated with a regime specify the "actions that members are expected to perform (or to refrain from performing) under appropriate circumstances" (Young, 1989: 16). In theory, these practices can range from extremely competitive and conflictual behaviors to highly cooperative and pacific patterns of association (Wendt, 1992; Caporaso, 1992). 4 Hence, the substantive content of a regime can affect the nature of state sociality and, by implication, the prospects for peace and stability in the international system. Second, international regimes also may influence the way states and societies develop over time. In joining a regime, a government may have to develop or acquire certain types of capabilities and/or skills in order to engage in the practices associated with the institution. Hence, participating in a regime can lead states and societies to develop certain material attributes, forms of expertise, and perhaps conceptions of self-interest that otherwise might not have emerged (Ashley, 1980: 10-50; 1984: 273-279). As a consequence, international regimes may play a constitutive role in the historical development of both states and societies (Keohane, 1989: 6; Dessler, 1989: 454-458; Wendt, 1992). Put differently, membership in an institution may shape not only the behavior of a state, but its identity as well. This presumption, of course, stands at the core of the United States' grand strategy of institutionalization. To help nurture the development of liberal values and institutions in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, U.S. foreign policy makers are striving to embed these states in a web of international economic and security regimes (e.g., CSCE, NACC, IMF [International Monetary Fund], GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], and the World Bank). In theory, this should serve to reinforce the process of liberalization within these countries by socializing them to liberal norms and procedures in both issue-areas. The regulatory and constitutive effects that international regimes exert in international politics help to account for the allure of a collective security system. If the institution can be established, it promises to deliver a relatively high degree of security at a greatly reduced level of militarization. This should serve to enhance state sociality by diminishing the degree

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of anxiety, suspicion, and rivalry that governments experience in regard to one another. It also should support the process of domestic liberalization by obviating the need for each state to maintain a large peacetime military establishment. In essence, collective security can promote the democratization and marketization of state-society relations by eliminating the security justifications for highly centralized g o v e r n m e n t s and the extractive d e m a n d s they place on their respective societies. B e f o r e turning to a more systematic consideration of the benefits associated with a collective security system, however, I need to specify the principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures that characterize the regime. This will establish a basic conceptual f r a m e w o r k that then can be used to assess the relative strengths and w e a k n e s s e s of the system. T h e remainder of this section is devoted to a discussion of this issue. A collective security system is based, first and foremost, on the principle that peace and security are indivisible a m o n g states. Hence, an act of aggression committed against one state is regarded as a latent threat to the security of all states ( R u g g i e , 1992: 571). This conceptualization, of course, suggests that the security of states is tightly coupled and highly interdependent. In this sense, a collective security system echoes the beliefs associated with the so-called d o m i n o theory (see Jervis and Snyder, 1991). Both perspectives agree that the fate of a single country can hold important implications for the other m e m b e r s of the international system. As a consequence, no act of aggression can be ignored or allowed to stand. T o do so w o u l d simply invite further acts of aggression. Collective security s y s t e m s also are p r e m i s e d on the notion that all states should participate in the management of international security problems. This norm follows naturally f r o m the strategic interdependence that characterizes state relations in the realm of security. Since an act of aggression constitutes a latent threat to the security of everyone, all states are expected to contribute to activities related to the maintenance of international peace and stability. T h e norm also is a c o n s e q u e n c e of the fact that "sovereign e q u a l i t y " stands as one of the basic ordering principles of a collective security system. Organizationally, the principle extends to each member of the r e g i m e equal rights and responsibilities w h e n it c o m e s to the making and implementation of decisions. S o v e r e i g n equality is j u s t i f i e d , both philosophically and legally, on the basis of sovereignty and the juridical equality this principle establishes a m o n g the m e m b e r s of the interstate system (Klein, 1974; Jackson, 1990). Hence, in a collective security system, all states are expected to contribute to efforts to manage international security problems. This norm is codified in the form of a rule that m e m b e r s of the institution are expected to adhere to unconditionally: Each state is committed

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to r e s p o n d to any and all acts of aggression ( T h o m p s o n , 1953; W o l f e r s , 1962: 1 8 1 - 2 0 4 ) . This constitutes an automatic and legally binding obligation that m e m b e r s must honor whenever and wherever aggression occurs. T h e logic underlying the rule, of course, is that a f r e e s t a n d i n g multilateral c o m m i t m e n t to o p p o s e aggression will serve to both deter and reassure states. The expectation of collective resistance to aggression is c o n c e i v e d as a deterrence threat to states which might be tempted to misuse their power and a promise of security to all states which might be subject to attack. The scheme is collective in the fullest sense; it purports to provide security for all states, by the actions of all states, against all states which might challenge the existing order by the arbitrary unleashing of their power. (Claude, 1962: 110)

Indivisibility and the multilateral a c c e p t a n c e of an unconditional obligation to abide by a generalized rule of behavior: T h e s e are the essential properties of a collective security system. C S C E , N A T O , and the UN all e m b o d y these characteristics. As noted p r e v i o u s l y , Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty explicitly c o m m i t s the signatories to respond to any and all acts of external aggression perpetrated against any of its m e m b e r s . Similarly, Article 1 of the UN Charter c o m m i t s states " t o take e f f e c t i v e collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and f o r the suppression of acts of aggression or other b r e a c h e s of the p e a c e . " W h i l e C S C E does not involve such a c o m m i t m e n t per se, the Charter of Paris does obligate states to abide " u n r e s e r v e d l y " by the " T e n P r i n c i p l e s " of international relations contained in the Helsinki s u m m i t ' s Final Act ( C S C E , November 21, 1990: 76). Obviously, a collective security system is a very d e m a n d i n g form of international association. In practice, it requires states to f o r g o "the temptation to define their interests narrowly in terms of national interests" (Caporaso, 1993: 56) and to m a n i f e s t a f o r m of e m p a t h y : a c o n c e r n for the w e l f a r e of other states even when their fate does not seem to have any direct b e a r i n g on the security or w e l l - b e i n g of o n e ' s own state ( K e o h a n e , 1984: 123). Put d i f f e r e n t l y , m e m b e r s h i p in a collective security system obligates a state to get involved in international c o n f l i c t s regardless of whether or not the crisis has direct and immediate implications for its own security. Hence, by j o i n i n g this type of institution, states dramatically e x p a n d the scope of their security concerns and responsibilities. This raises the obvious question of why states would want to participate in such a system. T h e a n s w e r to this lies in the c o n s i d e r a b l e b e n e f i t s a collective security system can confer on its members.

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The Benefits of Collective Security There are three principal benefits that a collective security system can deliver. First, it should dramatically lower the f r e q u e n c y of international conflict. S e c o n d , the r e g i m e also should p r o m o t e international c o o p e r a tion. Third, a collective security will establish a benign systemic environment that should facilitate the spread and consolidation of liberal values and institutions at the level of domestic politics. In this section, I elaborate on each of these points. A collective security system should diminish the f r e q u e n c y of international conflict b e c a u s e the multilateral security g u a r a n t e e associated with the r e g i m e should serve as a highly robust deterrent to aggression (Claude, 1962: 111). There are two basic reasons for this. First, the existence of a legally binding, and internationally recognized, security c o m mitment increases the likelihood that states will intervene in a conflict involving another m e m b e r of the institution (Siverson and King, 1979). 5 This, in turn, should diminish a w o u l d - b e a g g r e s s o r ' s uncertainty about whether or not the initiation of conflict would draw a response f r o m other m e m b e r s of the international c o m m u n i t y ( K u p c h a n and Kupchan, 1991: 125). By r e d u c i n g uncertainty, a collective security system also should decrease the probability of w a r s resulting f r o m miscalculation ( L e v y , 1989: 234). Second, this type of regime also c o n f r o n t s a would-be aggressor with the prospect of being opposed by a broadly based international coalition possessing preponderant military capabilities (Claude, 1962: 111). Under these circumstances, the resort to force should be unprofitable since a single state could never mobilize sufficient forces to defeat the coalition. 6 By dramatically lowering the expected utility of war, collective security systems thereby neutralize a factor that previous research has established as a necessary condition for the initiation of international conflict ( B u e n o de Mesquita, 1981). A s e c o n d benefit associated with a collective security system is that it should promote international cooperation since the regime ameliorates many of the risks states f a c e when participating in a collaborative undertaking. Theorists have identified t w o m a j o r factors that can inhibit international security cooperation: relative gains considerations and the fear of cheating (Grieco, 1988). 7 T h e concept of relative gains refers to the way the benefits of cooperation are distributed between and a m o n g participants (Waltz, 1979: 105; Grieco, 1988: 499). Ideally, one would hope that benefits are distributed equitably. 8 Yet, in practice, g o v e r n m e n t s must c o n sider the possibility that one state may benefit more than another. This, in turn, can create security concerns about the f u t u r e that block cooperation in the present.

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States fear that their partners will achieve relatively greater gains; that, as a result, the partners will surge ahead of them in relative capabilities; and, finally, that their increasingly powerful partners in the present could become all the more formidable foes at some point in the future. (Grieco, 1988: 499)9 S u c h c o n c e r n s , of c o u r s e , are e x a c e r b a t e d by the d i f f i c u l t i e s g o v e r n m e n t s f a c e w h e n it c o m e s to f o r e c a s t i n g in i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . T h e interstate s y s t e m is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a set of c o m p l e x i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s a n d linkages that o b s c u r e s b a s i c c a u s e - a n d - e f f e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p s in international p o l i t i c s ( J e r v i s , 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 2 : 4 0 - 4 2 ) . It is t h u s d i f f i c u l t f o r s t a t e s to estim a t e w h a t c o n s e q u e n c e s a p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e will h a v e as it r a m i f i e s t h r o u g h o u t the s y s t e m . T y p i c a l l y , the best a g o v e r n m e n t can d o is arrive at a p r o b a b i l i s t i c f o r e c a s t of w h a t is likely to o c c u r u n d e r a g i v e n set of conditions ( G a d d i s , 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 3 ) . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , tightly c o u p l e d s y s t e m s also are p r o n e to s h o c k s a n d r e v o l u t i o n a r y d e v e l o p m e n t s that can quickly lead to quite u n e x p e c t e d o u t c o m e s ( P e r r o w , 1 9 8 4 ) . S u c h structural uncertainty can r e n d e r g o v e r n m e n t s w a r y of c o o p e r a t i v e u n d e r t a k i n g s , e s p e c i a l l y in the realm of security w h e r e even " s m a l l e r r o r s can h a v e big c o n s e q u e n c e s " (Jervis, 1978: 175). T h e i n t a n g i b l e nature of security itself p o s e s an a d d i t i o n a l p r o b l e m in this r e g a r d . S e c u r i t y is p r i m a r i l y a s u b j e c t i v e p h e n o m e n o n that lacks c l e a r l y d e f i n e d e m p i r i c a l r e f e r e n t s ( W o l f e r s , 1 9 6 2 : 1 5 0 ) . T h i s m a k e s it very d i f f i c u l t to m e a s u r e the a m o u n t of security a c o u n t r y presently has or h o w m u c h it m a y h a v e in the f u t u r e (Jervis, 1983: 175). T h i s , in turn, severely c o m p l i c a t e s the analytical task of e s t i m a t i n g w h a t the relative gains f r o m i n t e r n a t i o n a l security c o o p e r a t i o n actually will b e , h o w the b e n e f i t s will b e d i s t r i b u t e d , a n d h o w the d i s t r i b u t i o n m a y a f f e c t a s t a t e ' s national security o v e r t i m e . A similar set of c o n c e r n s p r o m p t s d e c i s i o n m a k e r s to w o r r y about the p r o b l e m of c h e a t i n g . 1 0 T h i s c a n p o s e a t h r e a t to s t a t e s e c u r i t y if " o n e p l a y e r , by d e f e c t i n g , c a n r e a p r e w a r d s [that p l a c e ] t h e o t h e r p l a y e r at an i m m e d i a t e and o v e r w h e l m i n g d i s a d v a n t a g e " ( L i p s o n , 1 9 8 4 : 14). In p r a c tice, there are t w o d i m e n s i o n s to the p r o b l e m . First, d e c i s i o n m a k e r s must try to e s t i m a t e w h a t c o n s e q u e n c e s are likely to f o l l o w if a n o t h e r state d o e s in f a c t c h e a t . W i l l d e f e c t i o n p r o v i d e " i m m e d i a t e a n d o v e r w h e l m i n g " adv a n t a g e s , or will it lead to only m a r g i n a l b e n e f i t s a c c r u i n g o v e r a longer period of t i m e ? H e r e again, the uncertainties a s s o c i a t e d with f o r e c a s t i n g in international politics can lead d e c i s i o n m a k e r s to e x a g g e r a t e the potentially h a r m f u l e f f e c t s of d e f e c t i o n . " S e c o n d , g o v e r n m e n t s m u s t d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r their s u r v e i l l a n c e a n d m o n i t o r i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s will e n a b l e t h e m to d e t e c t d e f e c t i o n s in a t i m e l y f a s h i o n . Early w a r n i n g m o n i t o r s can d i m i n i s h s o m e of the risks a s s o c i a t e d w i t h c h e a t i n g by p r o v i d i n g g o v e r n m e n t s w i t h an o p p o r t u n i t y to detect a n d

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react to defections b e f o r e they can b e c o m e really d a m a g i n g (Stein, 1985: 615; Lipson, 1984: 16). Unfortunately, turbidity is the rule rather than the exception in international politics w h e n it c o m e s to assessing the intentions and behavior of states (Snyder and Jervis, 1992). 1 2 A collective security s y s t e m , h o w e v e r , should m e d i a t e states' concerns about relative gains and cheating. It does so by establishing a reassuring e n v i r o n m e n t that dramatically lowers the risk of being exploited. Relative gains considerations, f o r e x a m p l e , should be muted within this type of system b e c a u s e state security is no longer p r e m i s e d solely upon self-help capabilities. T h e security guarantees associated with the institution should render states much less sensitive to relative gains considerations b e c a u s e even a highly a s y m m e t r i c a l distribution of b e n e f i t s w o u l d not e n h a n c e the expected utility of conflict f r o m the perspective of a would-be aggressor. Similarly, the problem of cheating also would b e c o m e much less important within the context of a collective security s y s t e m . Even persistent violations of an agreement would not seriously jeopardize the security of states because the multilateral security c o m m i t m e n t provides g o v e r n m e n t s with such a wide margin of surplus security. A collective security system also should facilitate cooperation by promoting a relatively benign form of state sociality. In this type of system, states will regard one another with m u c h less anxiety, suspicion, and rivalry because governments no longer have to depend solely upon self-help measures to defend their political autonomy and territorial integrity. In this sense, the regime constitutes a f o r m of insurance that will enable states to take a more relaxed attitude toward the other m e m b e r s of the international c o m m u n i t y . By nurturing a more p a c i f i c pattern of international association, a collective security system can foster a sense of trust and c o n f i d e n c e on the part of states that should e n c o u r a g e them to e n g a g e in collaborative acts that would be unthinkable in a more highly competitive environment (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 134). Along the same lines, a collective security system also should enhance the prospects f o r international cooperation by providing states with an organizational setting that can facilitate international bargaining. This type of regime will necessitate the creation of a standing international organization since states will need a f i x e d base of o p e r a t i o n s and a p e r m a n e n t bureaucracy in order to manage the logistics associated with the mobilization and coordination of the m e m b e r s ' r e s p o n s e to an act of aggression (see Young, 1989: 4 6 - 4 7 ) . In principle, this organizational setting can be conducive to international cooperation in other issue-areas as well. An international organization can serve this purpose by: (1) routinizing consultative and c o m m u n i c a t i v e procedures; (2) disseminating information to its members; (3) providing state representatives with a ready-made f o r u m for exchanging views, identifying c o m m o n interests, and formulating mutually

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accepted arrangements; and (4) creating opportunities for establishing cross-issue linkages (Keohane, 1984: 1 0 0 - 1 0 3 ; Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 1 3 0 - 1 3 3 ; Martin, 1992). In e s s e n c e , a collective security s y s t e m can e n h a n c e t h e p r o s p e c t s f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n by i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g t r a n s p a r e n c y a n d habits of c o o p e r a t i o n . A third potential b e n e f i t of c o l l e c t i v e security s t e m s f r o m the c o n s t i tutive e f f e c t s the r e g i m e m a y exert on the internal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of states and societies. In principle, a collective security system s h o u l d facilitate the s p r e a d of liberal v a l u e s and institutions at the level of d o m e s t i c politics b e c a u s e it w e a k e n s the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r highly c e n t r a l i z e d f o r m s of g o v e r n m e n t s a n d the e x t r a c t i v e d e m a n d s they place on s o c i e t y . C o n c e p t u a l l y , the a r g u m e n t is b a s e d upon O t t o H i n t z e ' s w e l l - k n o w n c o n t e n t i o n : " T h e f o r m and spirit of the s t a t e ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n will not be d e t e r m i n e d solely by e c o n o m i c a n d social f o r c e s and c l a s h e s of interests, but p r i m a r i l y by the n e c e s s i t i e s of d e f e n s e a n d o f f e n s e " ( H i n t z e , q u o t e d in D e u d n e y a n d I k e n berry, 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 2 : 82).13 A c o l l e c t i v e security s y s t e m could a f f e c t the historical d e v e l o p m e n t of states a n d s o c i e t i e s principally by d i m i n i s h i n g the need f o r states to m a i n tain large p e a c e t i m e military e s t a b l i s h m e n t s . In the a b s e n c e of a c o l l e c t i v e security s y s t e m , states will e n g a g e in b a l a n c e - o f - p o w e r p r a c t i c e s ( C l a u d e , 1962: 9 3 ) . T h i s can inhibit the d e v e l o p m e n t of liberal v a l u e s a n d institutions w i t h i n a c o u n t r y b e c a u s e a highly c o m p e t i t i v e s y s t e m i c e n v i r o n m e n t can p r o m o t e the g r o w t h and c o n s o l i d a t i o n of a s t a t e ' s p o w e r vis-à-vis society (Tilly, 1975). In a b a l a n c e - o f - p o w e r s y s t e m , s t a t e s s e e k to e n s u r e their s e c u r i t y by a c q u i r i n g m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s s u f f i c i e n t to d e t e r , or d e f e n d a g a i n s t , a g g r e s s i o n ( W o l f e r s , 1962: 1 1 7 - 1 3 2 ) . Historically, s t a t e s h a v e a t t e m p t e d to a c h i e v e this s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e t h r o u g h a c o m b i n a t i o n of a l l i a n c e f o r m a tion a n d the internal m o b i l i z a t i o n of their o w n societal r e s o u r c e s ( W a l t z , 1 9 7 9 : 1 1 8 ) . T h e latter a p p r o a c h , of c o u r s e , can p r o f o u n d l y s h a p e the internal d e v e l o p m e n t of a c o u n t r y b e c a u s e internal m o b i l i z a t i o n c r e a t e s s t r o n g i n c e n t i v e s f o r the state to e x p a n d its p o w e r relative to society. T o f i e l d a n d m a i n t a i n its o w n military f o r c e s , a state n e e d s to extract m e n , m o n e y , a n d material f r o m s o c i e t y ( H u n t i n g t o n , 1 9 6 1 ) . T h i s e n c o u r ages the state to increase its a d m i n i s t r a t i v e capacity to m o n i t o r and p e n e trate society ( M a s t a n d u n o , Lake, a n d Ikenberry, 1989: 4 6 3 ; Barnett, 1990: 5 3 8 ) . T h i s a l s o c a n inhibit the d e v e l o p m e n t of l i b e r a l - c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e s , h o w e v e r , b e c a u s e it t e n d s to blur the b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n the p u b l i c a n d priv a t e s p h e r e s of e c o n o m i c w e a l t h that lies at the heart of this political f o r m a t i o n ( R u g g i e , 1983; C o x , 1 9 8 7 : 2 1 9 - 2 3 0 ) . M o r e o v e r , internal m o b i l i z a t i o n will e n c o u r a g e the s t a t e , a n d e s p e cially m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s , to p r o m o t e s e l f - s e r v i n g m y t h s d e s i g n e d " t o c o n v i n c e s o c i e t y to g r a n t t h e m the size, w e a l t h , a u t o n o m y , a n d p r e s t i g e

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that all bureaucracies s e e k " (Van Evera, 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 1 : 18). As part of this, a g o v e r n m e n t will be e n c o u r a g e d to e x a g g e r a t e the threat posed by other states and to emphasize the need for specialized knowledge (or expertise) in order to deal with the situation (Van Evera, 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 1 : 1 9 - 2 1 ) . As Barry Posen ( 1 9 8 4 : 4 5 - 4 6 ) points out, by m y s t i f y i n g the subject of national security, a state can insulate itself f r o m domestic criticism while simultaneously increasing its c h a n c e s of getting society to acquiesce to its resource demands. Obviously, this does not enhance the prospects for nurturing liberal-democratic norms and institutions premised on the principles of openness and accountability. A s t a t e ' s extractive demands, of course, are unavoidably linked to the nature of the international environment. T h e more threatening a c o u n t r y ' s security p r e d i c a m e n t a p p e a r s to be, the greater the c l a i m s the state will m a k e on society and the more likely it b e c o m e s that society will regard these d e m a n d s as legitimate (Herbst, 1990: 1 1 9 - 1 2 2 ) . A balance-of-power system tends to exacerbate security concerns because the social relations characterizing this system are defined largely in terms of anxiety, hostility, rivalry, and mistrust (Wendt, 1992). In this type of system, after all, states seek to e n s u r e their security basically by a d o p t i n g mutually threatening military postures. A collective security system, on the other hand, will create a relatively benign international environment that, in turn, can affect the course of the d o m e s t i c political struggle b e t w e e n state and society by eliminating the need for a high level of national military p r e p a r e d n e s s . As noted previously, the existence of an institutionalized c o m m i t m e n t to oppose any and all acts of aggression increases the likelihood that a state will receive assistance in the event that it is attacked. Hence, it becomes less essential f o r states to field and maintain large peacetime military establishments. By obviating this need, a collective security system will provide societies with a rationalization f o r limiting the power of government and the societal r e s o u r c e s to w h i c h the state legitimately can lay claim. T h i s should serve to promote the democratization and marketization of state-society relations since liberal values and institutions constitute the most effective and efficient means of restraining state power. In essence, democracy and the m a r k e t p l a c e establish a b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n the public and private spheres of wealth and p o w e r that systematically privilege society at the expense of the state (Ruggie, 1983; Cox, 1987: 2 1 9 - 2 3 0 ) . While the presence of a collective security is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the e m e r g e n c e of liberal-capitalist states, the existence of such a regime should increase the likelihood that such political formations will emerge. As the discussion in this section indicates, a collective security system is well suited to carry out the tasks envisioned by U.S. f o r e i g n policy

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m a k e r s . In principle, the r e g i m e w o u l d s e r v e to: (1) l o w e r the probability of international c o n f l i c t in E u r o p e , (2) p r o m o t e r e g i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n , a n d (3) support the process of liberalization in the c o u n t r i e s of Eastern E u r o p e and the f o r m e r Soviet Union. In practice, h o w e v e r , collective security systems are characterized by f o r m i d a b l e collective action p r o b l e m s that can seriously u n d e r m i n e their e f f e c t i v e n e s s . T h e next section takes u p this issue.

Collective Security and the Free Rider Problem A c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y s y s t e m is p r e d i c a t e d u p o n s t a t e s s h a r i n g a c o m m o n interest in p r e v e n t i n g the o u t b r e a k of c o n f l i c t ( B e t t s , 1 9 9 2 : 17). T h i s is a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r the f o r m a t i o n of such a s y s t e m s i n c e it u n d e r l i e s the w i l l i n g n e s s of states to m a k e an explicit c o m m i t m e n t to respond to any a n d all a c t s of a g g r e s s i o n . D e s p i t e t h e e x i s t e n c e of this c o m m o n interest, h o w e v e r , the s t a t e s p a r t i c i p a t i n g in a c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y s y s t e m will e n c o u n t e r c o l l e c t i v e action p r o b l e m s that r a i s e s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n s about the durability a n d e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n . T o w i t , c o l l e c t i v e security s y s t e m s c r e a t e s t r o n g i n c e n t i v e s f o r s t a t e s to f r e e r i d e o n the e f f o r t s of other m e m b e r s . T h i s section e x a m i n e s the f r e e rider p r o b l e m that is inherent in all c o l lective s e c u r i t y s y s t e m s . T w o f a c t o r s are p r i n c i p a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l d i l e m m a . First, c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y is f u n d a m e n t a l l y a n o n e x c l u d a b l e g o o d , w h i c h m e a n s , in p r a c t i c e , that f r e e riders c a n n o t easily b e p r e v e n t e d f r o m e n j o y i n g the b e n e f i t s of the institution. S e c o n d , the large n u m b e r of states b e l o n g i n g to a c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y o r g a n i z a t i o n m a k e s it p o s s i b l e f o r a m e m b e r to f r e e ride w i t h o u t j e o p a r d i z i n g the a c h i e v e m e n t of the c o l l e c t i v e g o o d . T h e e n s u i n g d i s c u s s i o n e l a b o r a t e s on these points and highlights the critical role that the m a j o r p o w e r s c a n play in t e r m s of overc o m i n g the f r e e rider p r o b l e m . I begin by s p e c i f y i n g t w o a x i o m s that c l a r i f y the d i l e m m a c o n f r o n t i n g all types of international organization, including collective security systems. A l : S t a t e s p a r t i c i p a t e in i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s in the n a m e of a c h i e v i n g s o m e goal, or s a t i s f y i n g s o m e interest, that c o u l d not be a c c o m p l i s h e d unilaterally. A 2 : " T h o u g h all of the m e m b e r s of the g r o u p . . . h a v e a c o m m o n interest in o b t a i n i n g this c o l l e c t i v e b e n e f i t , they h a v e n o c o m m o n interest in p a y i n g the cost of p r o v i d i n g the c o l l e c t i v e g o o d . E a c h w o u l d p r e f e r that the o t h e r s pay the entire c o s t " ( O l s o n , 1965: 21). T h e d i f f i c u l t i e s s t a t e s e n c o u n t e r in r e g a r d to c o l l a b o r a t i v e s i t u a t i o n s a l s o c a n b e i l l u s t r a t e d in t e r m s of t h e f a m i l i a r t w o - p e r s o n P r i s o n e r s '

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Dilemma. As Figure 3.1 indicates, both actors' dominant strategy is to engage in uncooperative behavior, regardless of what the other player does. If both actors pursue this strategy, of course, it will lead to an equilibrium outcome (i.e., both free ride), which is suboptimal from the standpoint of both. T o arrive at the Pareto-optimal o u t c o m e , the actors must agree to abandon their d o m i n a n t strategy and c o m m i t to a c o o p e r a t i v e a p p r o a c h . This still may not be enough to resolve the problem, h o w e v e r . As Lisa Martin (1993: 96) points out, even after a c o o p e r a t i v e solution has been arranged, collaborative situations create "strong temptations to defect . . . since defection results in immediate p a y o f f s " delivered at the expense of others. It is for this reason that states faced with a collaborative problem must take pains to " s p e c i f y strict patterns of behavior and insure that no one cheats" (Stein, 1983: 128). T h e P r i s o n e r s ' D i l e m m a highlights the mixed incentives states c o n front within the context of any collective security s y s t e m . On the o n e hand, the participants have a clear interest in seeing that the collective goal (i.e., peace and stability) is achieved. On the other h a n d , h o w e v e r , each state also would like the other m e m b e r s of the organization to bear the costs of producing the good. In this way, a noncontributor stands to maximize the net b e n e f i t s it receives f r o m belonging to the institution. T h i s temptation arises because organizations produce collective goods characterized by the property of nonexclusivity. Hence, "those w h o do not purchase or pay for any of the public or collective good cannot be excluded or kept f r o m sharing in the consumption of the g o o d " (Olson, 1965: 15). It is the n o n e x c l u d a b l e nature of public goods that creates such strong incentives to f r e e ride on the efforts of other states. It is this tension between the c o m m o n interest and individual p r e f e r ences that renders collective security systems inherently problematic. T h e incentives to f r e e ride will emerge most clearly, of course, w h e n it c o m e s to honoring the r e g i m e ' s c o m m i t m e n t to respond to any and all acts of aggression. Such undertakings will entail tangible costs for m e m b e r states in the form of men, money, and/or material. 1 4 Hence, by reneging on its c o m mitment to participate in such operations, a state stands to increase its benefits relative to the other m e m b e r s of the organization. Under such circ u m s t a n c e s , a f r e e rider w o u l d continue to e n j o y the b e n e f i t s of b e i n g a member of a collective security system (i.e., aggression is opposed) while bearing few of the costs associated with the provision of the good. All things being equal, the temptation to adopt this strategy will increase as the magnitude of the expected costs associated with a collective action increases. Moreover, there is relatively little that can be done to effectively sanction f r e e riders in this situation. Noncontributors, of course, could be expelled from the organization, but this would be counterproductive

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Figure 3.1 The Prisoners' Dilemma Actor B Contribute

Free Ride

Contribute

3,3

1,4

Free Ride

4,1

2,2

Actor A

Source: Derived from Stein (1983). Note: 4 = best payoff; 1 = worst payoff.

from the standpoint of the other members of the regime. Collective security is an "inclusive public good" in the sense that its value increases as more states participate in the regime (Olson, 1965: 40). As membership in the system grows, the pacifying effects of the multilateral security guarantee will spread as well. Hence, the benefits to be derived from this inclusive good will increase as the jurisdictional scope of the collective security system expands. Expelling free riders from the organization, however, would serve to contract the system's geographic scope. This could have the unintended consequence of increasing the degree of instability and conflict in the region. Since ostracized states would be deprived of the system's collective security guarantees, they could become inviting targets from the standpoint of a would-be aggressor. Thus, punishing free riders through expulsion could have the pernicious effect of increasing the potential for international conflict. Since the systemic costs associated with an act of aggression would almost certainly be greater than the institutional costs that result from free riding, states are unlikely to retaliate against noncontributors by expelling them from the organization. Short of expulsion, however, there is really no practical way of preventing states from enjoying the benefits that accrue from membership in a collective security system. 15 The free rider problem is inherent in all forms of international organization. The severity of the problem, however, will tend to vary along with the size of the organization. Certis paribus, larger organizations will create stronger incentives to free ride than will associations featuring fewer members. As Mancur Olson explains, this phenomenon is a consequence of the fact that

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when the number of participants is large, the typical participant will know that his own efforts will probably not make much difference to the outcome, and that he will be affected . . . in much the same way no matter how much or little effort he puts into [it]. . . . [Thus] the contribution that each participant will make toward achieving or improving these public goods will become smaller as the [group] becomes larger. (Olson, 1965: 53) In large voluntary associations, individuals will be tempted to f r e e ride because doing so is unlikely to seriously jeopardize the organization's ability to achieve the collective good. Collective security s y s t e m s are especially prone to this type of problem, of course, b e c a u s e they strive for universal membership. This ensures that a relatively large number of states will become m e m b e r s of the institution. While universal m e m b e r s h i p enhances the value of the collective good, it also increases the incentives for states to f r e e ride. Moreover, this problem tends to be exacerbated within the context of a collective security system because relatively minor military powers comprise the bulk of the institution's m e m b e r s h i p . In general, these states do not possess the military capabilities needed to m a k e a significant contribution to the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s success. In practice, this responsibility typically devolves to a relatively small s u b g r o u p of m a j o r military p o w e r s w h o s e active participation is essential to the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the syst e m ' s collective security guarantees. As a c o n s e q u e n c e , less p o w e r f u l members of the institution are faced with strong incentives to f r e e ride because their defection is unlikely to significantly diminish the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s e f f e c t i v e n e s s in responding to an act of a g g r e s s i o n . As this point suggests, collective security s y s t e m s create u n i q u e o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r the weak to exploit the strong in the realm of security (see Snidal, 1985). T h e collective action p r o b l e m s associated with a collective security system raise serious doubts about its e f f e c t i v e n e s s as a tool f o r the mana g e m e n t of international security a f f a i r s . T h e risk, of c o u r s e , is that if e n o u g h m e m b e r s p u r s u e a f r e e riding strategy, the organization may bec o m e incapable of producing the collective good (Olson, 1965: 44). This is the so-called tyranny of small decisions w h e r e b y rational behavior on the part of each individual leads to a collectively irrational o u t c o m e (Waltz, 1979: 108). T h i s possibility, in turn, may jeopardize not only the effectiveness of the institution, but its durability as well. Since there is no guarantee that m e m b e r s will be able to o v e r c o m e the collective action p r o b l e m s noted above, a state must remain sensitive to the risk that it may be abandoned if aggression does occur (Snyder, 1984: 466). This implies that, in practice, " s e l f - h e l p " may still have to be the guiding axiom of prudential statecraft even within the context of a collective security s y s t e m . Obviously, such a d e v e l o p m e n t w o u l d constitute a quite serious erosion of c o n f i d e n c e in the institution's ability to preserve

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the political autonomy and territorial integrity of its members. Such doubts, in turn, could weaken the regime and perhaps even threaten its very survival. International relations theorists argue that the " s h a d o w of the f u t u r e " has an important bearing on the w i l l i n g n e s s of states to c o o p e r a t e ( O y e , 1985: 1 3 - 1 4 ) . If g o v e r n m e n t s e x p e c t a r e g i m e to last, they p r e s u m a b l y will be m o r e likely to c o n t i n u e p a r t i c i p a t i n g in an institution. If, on the other hand, states have serious doubts about the durability of a cooperative arrangement, they may b e c o m e m o r e likely to defect. Certis paribus, the f r e e rider problem should serve to diminish states' c o n f i d e n c e in a collective security system. This may e n c o u r a g e d e c i s i o n m a k e r s to discount the f u t u r e and to f o c u s instead on s e c u r i n g short-term benefits. T o the extent that the m e m b e r s of the institution c o m e to e m b r a c e this attitude, multilateral cooperation should b e c o m e more difficult to a c h i e v e and sustain, thereby jeopardizing the durability of a collective security system. This section has outlined the f r e e rider problem inherent in all collective security systems. T h e discussion also has implied, however, that these p r o b l e m s may be o v e r c o m e if the m a j o r p o w e r s are w i l l i n g and able to collaborate in the realm of security. In practice, the viability of a collective security system depends heavily upon a minilateralist core of m a j o r - p o w e r cooperation ( M o r g a n , 1993: 352). It is the m a j o r p o w e r s , a f t e r all, w h o provide the bulk of the military capabilities that supply the institution with its credibility as a deterrent to aggression. Conceptually, the m a j o r p o w ers are to be regarded as a "privileged g r o u p " that is capable of providing the collective good even when the other m e m b e r s of the organization opt to f r e e ride (Olson, 1965: 4 9 - 5 0 ) . 1 6 H e n c e , m a j o r - p o w e r cooperation stands as a necessary, and perhaps a sufficient, condition f o r the effective f u n c t i o n i n g of a collective security system (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991). T h i s point is of e n o r m o u s i m p o r t a n c e to the f u t u r e of E u r o p e ' s nascent collective security system. Like all institutions of collective security, C S C E , N A T O , and the UN are all likely to be beset by the f r e e rider problem. This also suggests that their effectiveness as a tool f o r the m a n agement of regional security affairs ultimately will hinge upon the m a j o r p o w e r s ' willingness to engage in far-reaching acts of security cooperation. In the e y e s of m a n y observers, this b o d e s well f o r the construction of a collective security system in p o s t - C o l d W a r Europe. This optimism stems f r o m a belief held by a number of analysts that contemporary systemic and domestic conditions are highly f a v o r a b l e to cooperation on the part of the m a j o r powers. W e turn now to a consideration of this argument.

Major-Power Cooperation in Post-Cold War Europe Historically, major powers have been reluctant to cooperate in the realm of security for the reasons outlined above. This, in part, helps to explain why

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collective security systems rarely are established in international politics. Indeed, the major powers have expressed an interest in constructing such a system on only three occasions over the past five centuries (Jervis, 1985: 58). Many analysts contend, however, that recent revolutionary changes in the nature of international politics have created a unique opportunity to establish a viable system of collective security in E u r o p e (Mueller, 1989a; Chalmers, 1990; Flynn and S c h e f f e r , 1990; G o o d b y , 1991; Kupchan and K u p c h a n , 1991; Mueller, 1991; R o s e c r a n c e , 1992; Z e l i k o w , 1992). 1 7 Of the factors cited in support of this claim, none is more important than the fact that all of the major powers of Europe currently are led by democratically oriented g o v e r n m e n t s . This is an unprecedented political development that, theorists argue, should encourage the m a j o r p o w e r s to c o o p e r ate widely in the realm of security. In essence, the argument contends that democratization on the part of the major powers has established a domestic political foundation conducive to the multilateral m a n a g e m e n t of European security issues. In this section, I examine this hypothesis and the implications it holds for E u r o p e ' s nascent collective security system. I begin with a brief discussion of the conditions that international relations theorists deem necessary for the formation of this type of multilateral institution. T w o cognitive factors are routinely cited as necessary conditions for the construction and maintenance of a collective security system (Jervis, 1983: 1 7 7 - 1 7 8 ; 1985: 64; K u p c h a n and Kupchan, 1991: 1 2 4 - 1 2 5 , 146). First, d e c i s i o n m a k e r s must believe that war w o u l d lead to prohibitively high costs and, hence, must be avoided. Second, p o l i c y m a k e r s also must believe that unilateral measures will be inadequate to prevent the outbreak of international conflict. Only under conditions of mutual vulnerability and mutual d e p e n d e n c e will the m a j o r p o w e r s express an interest in security cooperation (George, 1988: 644). While necessary, these factors are far from sufficient to ensure the formation of a collective security system. l i ( As noted previously, relative gains c o n s i d e r a t i o n s can inhibit states f r o m c o o p e r a t i n g even w h e n the prospective arrangement promises to benefit each of the participants. Similarly, c o n c e r n s about cheating, c o m b i n e d with the p r o b l e m of turbidity, can block cooperation by increasing a s t a t e ' s fear of b e i n g exploited in a collaborative situation. T o overcome these obstacles, states must endeavor to reassure o n e another that: (1) they will honor the terms of the cooperative arrangement, and (2) they will not exploit the distribution of relative benefits in w a y s that would threaten the security of other states. It is primarily in regard to the task of reassurance that democratization enhances the prospects for cooperation on the part of the major powers. In theory, there are two principal reasons why d e m o c r a c i e s inspire c o n f i dence and trust a m o n g o n e another. First, d e m o c r a c i e s are characterized

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by certain attributes that constrain governments f r o m pursuing aggressive foreign policies (Snyder, 1991: 4 9 - 5 2 ) . Hence, democratic states are prone to adopt d e f e n s i v e strategies that render them less threatening to other m e m b e r s of the international system. As Deudney and Ikenberry explain, there are four principal reasons for this. First, the structure of the liberal state itself impedes aggressive action because of its numerous constitutional checks on major war-making, and because its extensive system of deliberation and consultation tends to filter out rash and extreme ideas. Second, democracy empowers the broad mass of people, w h o have the most to lose from war, and therefore tend to hold their states back from war-making. Third, the capitalist system of private ownership of wealth provides a continuing check on the ability of the state apparatus to generate revenues for public purposes of all sorts, including war-making. Fourth, the pacific tenor of liberal democratic political culture and the non-martial character of consumer society further reduces the probability of liberal aggression, particularly against a wellarmed state. (Deudney and Ikenberry, 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 2 : 8 5 - 8 6 )

Because democratic states are prone to adopt defensive strategies, democratization on the part of the major powers will tend to promote cooperation since it a m e l i o r a t e s the relative gains c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that might otherwise prompt them to worry about the distributional consequences of their joint u n d e r t a k i n g s . This is reinforced by the fact that d e m o c r a c i e s rarely go to war with one another (Russett, 1993). Given the pacific nature of d e m o c r a t i c d y a d s ( B r e m e r , 1992), it is unlikely that an asymmetrical distribution of benefits will rebound to a state's disadvantage in the realm of security. This heightens the prospects for cooperation because it enables g o v e r n m e n t s to adopt a longer-term perspective in which expectations of d i f f u s e reciprocity prevail over short-term considerations. 1 9 In essence, democratization tends to lengthen the " s h a d o w of the f u t u r e " by increasing the probability that pacific and cooperative f o r m s of international association will endure. T h e s e c o n d reason d e m o c r a c i e s inspire c o n f i d e n c e and trust a m o n g one another is that they are characterized by a relatively high d e g r e e of o p e n n e s s that m a k e s it easier f o r other g o v e r n m e n t s to monitor their adherence to an international agreement (Cowhey, 1993: 302). D e m o c r a c i e s facilitate transparency through their c o m m i t m e n t to the f r e e e x c h a n g e of ideas, a f r e e press, and open public debates (Van Evera, 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 1 : 27). This promotes cooperation because openness can: (1) reassure states about the benign intentions of others, and (2) heighten the probability that a state will be able to detect uncooperative behavior b e f o r e a d a m a g i n g defection can occur. Hence, the transparency associated with democratization on the part of the m a j o r p o w e r s should e n c o u r a g e them to c o o p e r a t e by d i m i n ishing the probability of, and the risks associated with, cheating.

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In addition to these benefits, democratization also can enable the major powers to arrive at a normative consensus concerning the "essential features of a desirable international order" (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 146). This can contribute to a shared sense of purpose that will encourage and sustain their cooperation. Kupchan and Kupchan (1991: 124) argue that political homogeneity is conducive to the formation of a collective security system because "the major powers of the day must have fundamentally compatible views of what constitutes a stable and acceptable international order." Along the same lines, Flynn and Scheffer (1990: 83) contend that democratization will serve to establish a common commitment on the part of the major powers to "transfer to the international level . . . the domestic system of conflict resolution used by democracies." Indeed, these authors contend that democratization is a necessary condition for the creation of a collective security system. The relationship between collective security and democracy is as direct as that between concert and monarchy. . . . The members of any workable collective security system must be democracies. . . . Otherwise, the system will always risk falling prey to authoritarian regimes that reject the established rules of conflict resolution. (Flynn and Scheffer, 1990: 8 3 ) 2 , )

In sum, democratic major powers appear to be ideal candidates for membership because their openness and their preference for defensive strategies mute the security concerns that traditionally have complicated the task of international security cooperation. At the same time, however, their shared commitment to the promotion of liberal values and institutions constitutes a normative agenda that can serve to rally such countries around a common social purpose. If this is the case, then contemporary conditions would appear to be highly favorable to the creation of a collective security system in post-Cold War Europe. Never before in the history of the European states system have so many of the major powers been characterized by liberal values and institutions at the level of their domestic political systems. The United States, Britain, France, and Germany, of course, are long-established and firmly rooted democracies; Russia can best be characterized as a "weakly institutionalized liberal regime" at present (Snyder, 1989: 6). This is an unprecedented political development that presumably has established a domestic foundation conducive to the multilateral management of European security affairs.

Conclusion Over the centuries, scholars and policymakers have spent an enormous amount of time and energy trying to devise ways of limiting the frequency

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and severity of international conflict (Hinsley, 1963). Indeed, o n e is tempted to characterize this task as the most pressing public policy problem in the history of international politics ( O s g o o d and T u c k e r , 1967: 3-40). In theory, a collective security system would resolve this problem by establishing a multilateral security guarantee that would serve as a highly robust deterrent to aggression. This is a very d e m a n d i n g form of international association, however, that creates strong incentives for states to f r e e ride on the e f f o r t s of others. T h e s e collective action p r o b l e m s , in turn, raise serious questions about both the e f f e c t i v e n e s s and the durability of the institution. Many analysts contend, however, that a viable system of collective security can be established in p o s t - C o l d War Europe because democratization on the part of the major powers will encourage these states to e n g a g e in f a r - r e a c h i n g acts of security cooperation. Hence, democratization will enable the major powers to act as a "privileged g r o u p " that can underwrite the institution's collective security guarantee regardless of whether or not the other m e m b e r s c o o p e r a t e . Seen f r o m this perspective, there are g r o u n d s f o r believing that the institutions c o m p r i s i n g E u r o p e ' s nascent collective security system will be able to s e r v e as e f f e c t i v e tools f o r the m a n a g e m e n t of regional security affairs. This argument, however, generally fails to consider how domestic politics can inhibit a state f r o m participating in a collective security system. This is a serious omission given the important role that public opinion and other factors play in democracies. In the next chapter, I will address these issues as part of a broader discussion of why contemporary s y s t e m i c and d o m e s t i c conditions are not c o n d u c i v e to the f u n c t i o n i n g of a collective security system in p o s t - C o l d War Europe.

Notes 1. Historically, states have attempted to cope with the security problems posed by the anarchic structure of the international political system by e n g a g i n g in balance-of-power practices. A s a tool for the management of international security affairs, however, balance-of-power systems are characterized by a number of quite serious limitations. For a discussion of the institution and its many problems, see Claude (1962: 4 0 - 8 7 ) . 2. Conceptually, there are two basic types of international institutions: conventions and regimes (Keohane, 1989: 4; Young, 1989: 13). A convention represents an "informal institution, with implicit rules and understandings, that shape the expectations of actors" (Keohane, 1989: 4). A regime, on the other hand, is an institution "with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international politics" (Keohane, 1989: 4). 3. Collective action problems, of course, are pervasive in the realm of security. This can be attributed to the fact that security is a relational phenomenon that

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inevitably i n v o l v e s s o m e d e g r e e o f s t r a t e g i c i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e b e t w e e n and a m o n g states ( B u z a n , 1 9 9 1 : 1 8 7 ) . T h i s point has long b e e n r e c o g n i z e d by international r e l a t i o n s t h e o r i s t s . T h e c o n c e p t o f the s e c u r i t y d i l e m m a , f o r e x a m p l e , n e a t l y illustrates the point ( H e r z , 1 9 5 0 ; J e r v i s , 1 9 7 8 ) . 4 . T h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s c h a r a c t e r i z i n g a b a l a n c e - o f - p o w e r s y s t e m , for e x a m ple, tend to b e d e f i n e d largely in t e r m s o f a n x i e t y , hostility, and mistrust ( W e n d t , 1 9 9 2 ) . T h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f this point is d i s c u s s e d b e l o w . 5 . S i v e r s o n and K i n g e x a m i n e d the e f f e c t that a l l i a n c e t i e s had upon the diffusion o f c o n f l i c t a m o n g states during the nineteenth and twentieth c e n t u r i e s . T h e a n a l y s i s r e v e a l e d that s t a t e s e x h i b i t a g r e a t e r t e n d e n c y to i n t e r v e n e in c o n f l i c t s w h e n an ally is involved in a dispute. T h i s c o n t a g i o n e f f e c t s u g g e s t s that the states b e l o n g i n g to a c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y s y s t e m should m a n i f e s t a s i m i l a r p r o p e n s i t y to c o m e to the a s s i s t a n c e o f a m e m b e r w h o has b e e n a t t a c k e d . A c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y institution is, after all, an a l l i a n c e writ large. 6 . T h e advent o f n u c l e a r w e a p o n s w o u l d s e e m to u n d e r m i n e the strength o f this d e t e r r e n t . H o w e v e r , two a d v o c a t e s o f c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y

a r g u e that

nu-

c l e a r i z a t i o n actually will s t r e n g t h e n the r e g i m e . Deterrence under collective security in a nuclear world would operate more strongly . . . [because] an aggressor would face an opposing coalition not only of preponderant conventional force but also of preponderant nuclear capability. (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 127) 7 . D o m e s t i c p o l i t i c s also can c o m p l i c a t e the task o f international c o o p e r a t i o n ( s e e P u t n a m , 1 9 8 8 ; E v a n s , J a c o b s o n , and P u t n a m , 1 9 9 3 ) . T h i s p o i n t will b e d i s c u s s e d in the f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r . 8 . A n e q u i t a b l e distribution o f b e n e f i t s should not b e c o n f u s e d with a s y m m e t r i c a l ( o r e q u a l ) distribution. T h e latter may not be a c c e p t a b l e if the participants are not starting f r o m the s a m e p o s i t i o n . 9 . G r i e c o ( 1 9 8 8 : 5 0 1 ) a r g u e s that a s t a t e ' s sensitivity to r e l a t i v e g a i n s i s s u e s will b e greatest when a g o v e r n m e n t finds i t s e l f in c i r c u m s t a n c e s " a p p r o x i m a t i n g a state o f w a r . " S p e c i f i c a l l y , G r i e c o h y p o t h e s i z e s that state s e n s i t i v i t y will i n c r e a s e : if the p r o s p e c t i v e p a r t n e r is a l o n g t i m e a d v e r s a r y ; if c o o p e r a t i o n y i e l d s b e n e f i t s that c a n e a s i l y e n h a n c e the i n f l u e n c e and/or c a p a b i l i t i e s o f the partner; if a s t a t e ' s own r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s already are d e c l i n i n g ; and if the c o o p e r a t i v e act i n v o l v e s issues r e l a t i n g to national s e c u r i t y . 1 0 . P u t n a m ( 1 9 8 8 : 4 3 8 ) d r a w s an important d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n " v o l u n t a r y " and " i n v o l u n t a r y " d e f e c t i o n . In the f o r m e r , a state d e f e c t s f r o m a c o o p e r a t i v e a r r a n g e m e n t b e c a u s e o f the s t r a t e g i c i n c e n t i v e s to c h e a t that are p r e s e n t in the structure o f the e x t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n . I n v o l u n t a r y d e f e c t i o n , on the other hand, r e s u l t s f r o m d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s that p r e v e n t a g o v e r n m e n t f r o m h o n o r i n g the terms o f an a g r e e m e n t with w h i c h it w o u l d o t h e r w i s e prefer to c o m p l y . M y u s e o f the term " c h e a t i n g " c o r r e s p o n d s to P u t n a m ' s c o n c e p t o f voluntary d e f e c t i o n . 1 1 . T h e risk, o f c o u r s e , is that d e c i s i o n m a k e r s will c o n c l u d e that they are inv o l v e d in a z e r o - s u m g a m e w h e r e i n e a c h g o v e r n m e n t is s e e k i n g to m a x i m i z e the relative d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n its o w n position and the positions held by o t h e r s . W h e n pure p o w e r m o t i v a t i o n s p r e v a i l , the p o t e n t i a l f o r c o o p e r a t i o n will d i m i n i s h q u i t e d r a m a t i c a l l y s i n c e r e l a t i v e g a i n s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s will then c o m e to the f o r e ( K r a s ner, 1 9 8 3 : 8 ) . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n f o l l o w s b e c a u s e " t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f mutual b e n e f i t e v a p o r a t e s . . . w h e n c o m p e t i t o r s play g a m e s o f ' s t a t u s ' o r ' d i f f e r e n c e ' " ( S t e i n , 1985: 607). 1 2 . A n a l y s t s h a v e long b e e n s e n s i t i v e to the p r o b l e m s that turbidity c a n c a u s e in i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . N o t e the f o l l o w i n g p a s s a g e f r o m M o r g e n t h a u ' s s e m i n a l

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discussion of the practical problems states encounter in regard to the balance-ofpower system. T h i s uncertainty of all p o w e r calculations not only makes the balance of power incapable of practical application but leads also to its very negation in practice. Since no nation can be sure that its calculation of the distribution of power at any particular m o ment in history is correct . . . the nation must try to have at least a margin of safety w h i c h will allow it to make erroneous calculations and still maintain the balance of power. T o that effect, all nations . . . must actually aim not at a balance . . . but at a superiority of power. . . . And since no nation can foresee how large its m i s c a l c u l a t i o n s will turn out to be, all nations must ultimately seek the maximum of power obtainable under the circumstance. (Morgenthau and T h o m p s o n , 1985: 2 2 7 - 2 2 8 )

13. This perspective on the sociology of the state and its place vis-à-vis society is far from universally accepted. Some development theorists, for example, agree with the basic theoretical premise of the argument but attach far more significance to a country's position within the world economy (e.g., Gerschenkron, 1963; Moore, 1966; Wallerstein, 1974). It is also possible, of course, to account for the nature of domestic structures on the basis of factors that are primarily endogenous to the country in question (see, e.g., Anderson, 1974). My purpose here is not to test the validity of Hintze's proposition but, rather, to simply point out that a collective security system could hold important implications for the nature of statesociety relations. 14. I do not address the issues associated with the formation of a collective security system because the institutions comprising Europe's emerging security architecture already have been established. These "sunk investments" have enabled states to avoid the start-up costs typically associated with the formation of international organizations. For our purposes, the more salient issue concerns the ability of CSCE, NATO, and the UN to act on their collective security guarantees. 15. There are, of course, a variety of social and economic sanctions that can be leveled at free riders (Olson, 1965: 60-65; Axlerod, 1986; Martin, 1992). When a member of an institution fails to honor its commitments, for example, the offender may be subject to a set of reputational and other costs that jeopardize its own interests (Keohane, 1984: 83). Theoretically, institutional membership should increase the costs of uncooperative behavior by providing other governments with both the opportunity and the "moral" authority to sanction uncooperative behavior. Technically speaking, however, unless a free rider is expelled from an institution it will still be able to receive a share of the collective benefits. 16. This conceptualization of the "privileged" role the major powers can play in a collective security system should not be confused with a concert-based security system. Conceptually, there are two fundamental differences between collective security and concert-based systems. Whereas collective security systems are characterized by universal membership and a legally binding commitment on the part of governments to respond to any and all acts of aggression, concert systems restrict membership to only the major powers and commit states to do little more than consult with one another in the event of an emergency (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991). 17. The most comprehensive list of these factors can be found in Kupchan and Kupchan (1991: 144-151). I limit my discussion to the subject of democratization on the part of the major powers because virtually every analyst cites this development as the one factor that has most dramatically increased the possibility of establishing a collective security system in Europe. 18. These factors may be necessary and sufficient in regard to the formation of a crisis management regime, however (George, 1988b: 581). If the costs associated

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with a r m e d conflict are e x p e c t e d to be prohibitively high, g o v e r n m e n t s will h a v e a clear incentive to try to p r e v e n t c o n f r o n t a t i o n s f r o m escalating. Under such circ u m s t a n c e s , adversaries will share a c o m m o n interest in c o n t a i n i n g a w a r - t h r e a t e n i n g crisis. This, in turn, will e n c o u r a g e states to try to c o o r d i n a t e their policies and b e h a v i o r s such that the c o m m o n aversion (i.e., w a r ) can be a v o i d e d . C r i s i s m a n a g e m e n t , however, constitutes a coordination problem rather than a collaborative g a m e (Miller, 1992). T h e latter is much m o r e d e m a n d i n g because such situations contain strong incentives to cheat (Stein, 1983: 128). 19. Under conditions of d i f f u s e reciprocity, "an a r r a n g e m e n t is expected by its m e m b e r s to yield a r o u g h e q u i v a l e n c e of b e n e f i t s in a g g r e g a t e and over t i m e " ( R u g g i e , 1993: 11). For a s y s t e m a t i c discussion of the d i f f e r e n c e s between d i f f u s e and strict reciprocity, see K e o h a n e ( 1 9 8 9 : 1 3 2 - 1 5 7 ) . 2 0 . T h i s is, of c o u r s e , a p a r a d o x i c a l a r g u m e n t . If the interstate s y s t e m w a s c o m p o s e d e x c l u s i v e l y of d e m o c r a c i e s , there p r e s u m a b l y w o u l d be no need for a collective security system. Nevertheless, it does highlight the s i g n i f i c a n c e analysts attach to d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n as a f a c t o r that can e n h a n c e the p r o s p e c t s of establishing a viable system of collective security.

4 DEMOCRACIES, PEACE, AND PARALYSIS

D e m o c r a c i e s may not fight one another, but can a group o f democratic major powers serve as the minilateralist core o f a nascent collective system in p o s t - C o l d W a r Europe? T h e answer to this question holds important implications for the United States' grand strategy of institutionalization and the future of the European states system. In this chapter, I argue that contemporary systemic and domestic factors are less conducive to the establishment of a collective security system in Europe than most analysts realize. T h i s counterintuitive claim is premised upon the realist assumption that a state's foreign policy behavior is driven, fundamentally, by a conception o f interests (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1 9 8 5 : 1 - 1 0 ; Keohane, 1 9 8 6 : 1 6 5 ) . Hence, the potential for international cooperation (as well as for conflict) is inextricably linked to the specific historical circumstances in which states find themselves embedded. On the basis o f this conceptualization, it b e c o m e s possible to argue that current conditions in Europe will inhibit the major powers from engaging in the collaborative acts that would be called for in a collective security system. T h i s conclusion follows from the simple fact that today's major powers are more secure than major powers have ever been in the history o f the European states system. Hence, participating in a collective security system would tend to increase the burdens borne by the major powers without yielding an equivalent increase in the level of their own national securities. T h e political salience of this is compounded by the fact that all of the major powers currently are led by democratically oriented governments. T o participate in a collective security system, democratic governments will need to mobilize and maintain public support. This dimension o f statecraft is crucial within the context o f democratic political systems because, as noted previously, liberal norms place the state in a subordinate position vis-à-vis society (Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, 1 9 8 9 ) . It is at this juncture that contemporary systemic and domestic conditions combine to

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diminish the prospects that the major powers will honor the security guarantee that lies at the core of a collective security system. T o wit, the benign nature of the m a j o r p o w e r s ' security e n v i r o n m e n t will m a k e it extremely difficult to generate and sustain d o m e s t i c political support f o r bearing the costs of multilateral undertakings that promise to yield negligible security benefits. This suggests that under current circumstances, Eur o p e ' s nascent collective security system is likely to be plagued by repeated acts of involuntary defection (Putnam, 1988: 438) on the part of the major powers. In essence, domestic political constraints will prevent d e m ocratic major powers from honoring their pledge to e n f o r c e the principles, norms, and rules associated with CSCE, N A T O , and the UN. T h e p u r p o s e of this chapter is to discuss the d i l e m m a s that c o n f r o n t the major powers, especially the United States, when it comes to the issue of E u r o p e a n security in the p o s t - C o l d War era. I f o c u s on the United States, to the relative neglect of the other major powers, because it constitutes the most p o w e r f u l m e m b e r of the institutions that E u r o p e ' s nascent collective security system comprises. As such, the United States could attempt to play a leadership role that might, in principle, salvage the regime. As I point out, however, the strongest incentives to f r e e ride are likely to be felt on the part of the United States. Hence, U.S. foreign policy makers are likely to be especially prone to adopt a buck-passing strategy when it c o m e s to the m a n a g e m e n t of security problems in Eastern Europe. Obviously, this holds potentially important implications for the f u t u r e of both the European states system and the grand strategy of institutionalization.

The Sources of Major-Power Security T h e m a j o r p o w e r s of p o s t - C o l d W a r Europe are more secure than states have ever been in the history of the European states s y s t e m . T h e r e are three basic reasons underlying this claim: the advent of nuclear weapons; the declining e c o n o m i c utility of territorial e x p a n s i o n ; and the spread of democracy a m o n g the major powers. Revolutionary changes in the nature of both military t e c h n o l o g y and e c o n o m i c production have c o m b i n e d to dramatically lower the expected utility of aggression. Democratization, on the other hand, imposes important restraints on a g o v e r n m e n t ' s ability to use force as an instrument of foreign policy. Taken together, these factors have diminished the probability of major-power war to its lowest point in the history of international politics. This section e x a m i n e s how each of these factors tends to enhance the security of the m a j o r powers. T h e nuclearization of the European states system increases stability at the level of the major powers by lowering the expected utility of war between and a m o n g these states. Given the d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s of nuclear

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w e a p o n s t e c h n o l o g y , the potential c o s t s of c o n f l i c t will a l m o s t a l w a y s o u t w e i g h the potential b e n e f i t s . 1 T h i s s h o u l d , in turn, breed c a u t i o u s and c o n servative f o r e i g n policy b e h a v i o r s on the part of the m a j o r p o w e r s that significantly d i m i n i s h the likelihood of w a r b e t w e e n and a m o n g t h e m (Jervis, 1989: 2 3 - 2 9 ) . At p r e s e n t , all but o n e of the m a j o r p o w e r s p o s s e s s this t y p e of military t e c h n o l o g y . T h e lone e x c e p t i o n , of c o u r s e , is G e r m a n y . 2 T h e n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s h e l d b y the U n i t e d S t a t e s , R u s s i a , F r a n c e , a n d B r i t a i n are listed in T a b l e 4 . 1 . 3

Table 4.1

Distribution of Nuclear Weapons Among the Major Powers of Europe, 1992 Country

Launchers

Warheads

U.S. Russia France Britain

1,239 1,857 116 64

8,772 9,537 436 96

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (1992: 25).

T h e r e l a t i v e p o w e r d i f f e r e n t i a l s r e f l e c t e d in T a b l e 4.1 r a i s e o b v i o u s q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e ability of B r i t a i n a n d F r a n c e to c o m p e t e w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d R u s s i a ( s e e B o b b i t t , 1988: 1 9 6 - 1 9 9 ) . P o l i t i c a l l y , h o w e v e r , the s i g n i f i c a n c e of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s s t e m s f r o m their ability to deter a g g r e s s i o n ; a n d this c a n b e d o n e e v e n if an arsenal is t e c h n i c a l l y not c a pable of s u r v i v i n g a p r e e m p t i v e strike. A s W a l t z ( 1 9 8 3 : 5 8 3 ; 1 9 9 0 ) argues, to initiate a c o u n t e r f o r c e a t t a c k a g a i n s t a s t a t e a r m e d w i t h n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , an a g g r e s s o r m u s t b e c o n f i d e n t that the o p e r a t i o n will r e n d e r the victim truly u n a b l e to retaliate in any m e a n i n g f u l w a y s i n c e e v e n a greatly d i m i n i s h e d n u c l e a r f o r c e w o u l d e n a b l e the victim to i m p o s e relatively high costs on an a g g r e s s o r . T h e logic s u g g e s t s that e v e n a relatively small nuc l e a r a r s e n a l c a n s e r v e as a u s e f u l d e t e r r e n t if a w o u l d - b e a g g r e s s o r h a s d o u b t s a b o u t its ability to c a r r y out a d i s a r m i n g f i r s t s t r i k e ( W a l t z , 1990: 7 3 8 ) . T h e d i f f i c u l t i e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h s u c h a m i s s i o n w e r e h i g h l i g h t e d during the recent G u l f W a r b e t w e e n Iraq a n d the U n i t e d N a t i o n s c o a l i t i o n . In this c o n f l i c t , a c o n s o r t i u m of the w o r l d ' s m o r e s o p h i s t i c a t e d b o m b e r s and attack a i r c r a f t (i.e., t h o s e of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , B r i t a i n , a n d F r a n c e ) c o n d u c t e d largely u n o p p o s e d s e a r c h - a n d - d e s t r o y m i s s i o n s against I r a q ' s relatively s m a l l i n v e n t o r y of m o b i l e S c u d l a u n c h e r s f o r o v e r a m o n t h . Y e t ,

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e n o u g h of these launchers s u r v i v e d to e n a b l e the Iraqi g o v e r n m e n t to carry out ballistic missile attacks against Israel and Saudi A r a b i a until the very end of the w a r . H e n c e , battlefield d o m i n a n c e on the part of the U n i t e d Nations coalition did not p r e v e n t Iraq f r o m t h r e a t e n i n g the societal assets of n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s . If Iraq h a d l o a d e d these m i s s i l e s with n u c l e a r w a r heads, it c o u l d h a v e i m p o s e d high c o s t s on Israel, Saudi A r a b i a , and other c o u n t r i e s e v e n w h i l e l o s i n g the w a r in a m i l i t a r y s e n s e . T h i s e x p e r i e n c e o b v i o u s l y h o l d s i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r any g o v e r n m e n t c o n t e m p l a t ing a p r e e m p t i v e attack against a state a r m e d with n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . In light of this, it s e e m s prudent to a s s u m e that n o n e of the m a j o r p o w ers could be highly c o n f i d e n t of c a r r y i n g out a d i s a r m i n g first strike against any of the n u c l e a r p o w e r s of E u r o p e . H e n c e , f o r a n a l y t i c a l p u r p o s e s , the United States, R u s s i a , Britain, and F r a n c e all p o s s e s s the political e q u i v a lent of a s e c o n d - s t r i k e capability. Put differently, these states are e m b e d d e d in a relationship that is c o m m o n l y r e f e r r e d to as mutual assured destruction ( M A D ) . T h i s f o r m of strategic i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e o b t a i n s if a n d only if: ( 1 ) states are u n a b l e to d e f e n d their societal assets f r o m n u c l e a r attack, and (2) states p o s s e s s the retaliatory c a p a b i l i t i e s to i m p o s e high c o s t s on an a g gressor (Jervis, 1989: 5 - 6 ) . U n d e r these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , p o w e r f u l incentives will exist f o r c a u t i o u s and c o n s e r v a t i v e b e h a v i o r on the part of states. T h i s c o n c l u s i o n is predicated upon t w o c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . First, given the d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s a n d the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of d e f e n s e , nuc l e a r w a r will b e u n w i n n a b l e in a n y m i l i t a r i l y or p o l i t i c a l l y m e a n i n g f u l s e n s e . S i n c e t h e p o s s i b l e b e n e f i t s of a g g r e s s i o n will be d w a r f e d by the risks and potential costs of nuclear c o n f l i c t , the primary p u r p o s e of n u c l e a r weapons b e c o m e s deterrence rather than offensive military applications ( B r o d i e , 1 9 4 6 : 17). S e c o n d , w h e n e v e r m a j o r military p o w e r s b e c o m e e m broiled in a d i s p u t e , there is a latent risk of u n i n t e n t i o n a l escalation to allout w a r (Jervis, 1989: 2 1 - 2 2 , 7 9 - 8 7 ) . T h i s existential threat r e i n f o r c e s det e r r e n c e a n d the n e e d f o r c o n s e r v a t i v e b e h a v i o r b e c a u s e of the h i g h absolute costs associated with nuclear conflict. Hence, "even a slight c h a n c e that a p r o v o c a t i o n c o u l d lead to n u c l e a r w a r will b e s u f f i c i e n t to deter all but the most highly m o t i v a t e d a d v e r s a r i e s " (Jervis, 1989: 38). A s a c o n s e q u e n c e , the n u c l e a r i z a t i o n of the E u r o p e a n states s y s t e m has s e r v e d to stabilize a n d p a c i f y r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n a n d a m o n g the m a j o r p o w e r s s u c h that the p r o b a b i l i t y of b o t h n u c l e a r a n d c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r is e x t r e m e l y l o w . T h e C o l d W a r era itself s p e a k s e l o q u e n t l y to t h i s p o i n t . D e s p i t e the h i g h l y c o m p e t i t i v e n a t u r e of the U . S . - S o v i e t rivalry a n d the p o l a r i z a t i o n of E u r o p e into c o m p e t i n g military a l l i a n c e s , the p o s t - W o r l d W a r II era w a s c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y the l o n g e s t u n i n t e r r u p t e d period of m a j o r p o w e r p e a c e in the history of international politics ( G a d d i s , 1987). N u c l e a r w e a p o n s h a v e c r e a t e d a military e n v i r o n m e n t in E u r o p e c h a r a c t e r i z e d by d e f e n s e - d o m i n a n c e . T h i s r e f e r s to a w o r l d in w h i c h "it is easier to protect a n d to hold than it is to m o v e f o r w a r d , destroy and t a k e "

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(Jervis, 1978: 187). U n d e r these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e r e is little to be g a i n e d , a n d m u c h to b e lost, b y initiating c o n f l i c t . H e n c e , f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t of the m a j o r p o w e r s , the e x p e c t e d utility of w a r has d i m i n i s h e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y . In K e n n e t h W a l t z ' s ( 1 9 9 0 : 7 4 0 ) v i e w , this l e a d s to the u n a v o i d a b l e c o n c l u s i o n that " t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of m a j o r w a r a m o n g s t a t e s h a v i n g n u c l e a r weapons approaches zero." F u n d a m e n t a l c h a n g e s in the nature of e c o n o m i c p r o d u c t i o n a l s o s e r v e to e n h a n c e the s e c u r i t y of the m a j o r p o w e r s in p o s t - C o l d W a r E u r o p e . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n s t e m s f r o m the f a c t that states stand to gain relatively little f r o m territorial e x p a n s i o n w i t h i n the c o n t e x t of a p o s t i n d u s t r i a l e c o n o m y (Gilpin, 1981: 2 1 9 - 2 2 3 ; R o s e c r a n c e , 1986: 1 2 3 - 1 3 3 ; M u e l l e r , 1 9 8 9 b : 2 2 1 - 2 2 3 ; K a y s e n , 1990: 5 3 - 5 7 ; V a n Evera, 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 1 : 1 4 - 1 6 ; K u p c h a n and K u p c h a n , 1991: 150; Jervis, 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 2 : 4 8 - 5 0 ) . H e n c e , there are f e w e c o n o m i c i n c e n t i v e s f o r the m a j o r p o w e r s to p u r s u e an e x p a n s i o n i s t f o r eign p o l i c y that w o u l d t h r e a t e n the political i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d territorial integrity of the states c o m p r i s i n g the E u r o p e a n states s y s t e m . C o n c e p t u a l l y , this a r g u m e n t h i n g e s upon the " c u m u l a t i v i t y of p o w e r r e s o u r c e s " ( H o p f , 1991: 4 7 7 - 4 7 8 ) . If an a g g r e s s o r can r e a l i z e s i g n i f i c a n t e c o n o m i c a n d / o r military b e n e f i t s f r o m s e i z i n g c o n t r o l of a n o t h e r s t a t e ' s t e r r i t o r y , t h e n the p r o b a b i l i t y of w a r s h o u l d i n c r e a s e . C o n v e r s e l y , if the e a s e w i t h w h i c h p o w e r r e s o u r c e s can b e e x t r a c t e d is l o w , then g o v e r n m e n t s b e c o m e m o r e likely to r e f r a i n f r o m territorial e x p a n s i o n . T h e c u mulativity of p o w e r r e s o u r c e s varies a l o n g with the nature of the f a c t o r s of production (i.e., land, labor, and capital) that underlie a s t a t e ' s military a n d e c o n o m i c c a p a b i l i t i e s in any g i v e n era. H i s t o r i c a l l y , s t a t e s h a v e b e e n e n c o u r a g e d to e x p a n d b e c a u s e of the critical r o l e that territorial c o n t r o l p l a y e d in r e g a r d t o t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y , wealth, and p o w e r of an e c o n o m y . T h i s w a s e s p e c i a l l y the c a s e w h e n agriculture c o n s t i t u t e d the p r e d o m i n a n t f o r m of e c o n o m i c p r o d u c t i o n ( G i l p i n , 1981: 1 1 0 - 1 1 5 ) . U n d e r this c i r c u m s t a n c e , states s t o o d to e n h a n c e their p o litical p o w e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y by i n c r e a s i n g their t e r r i t o r i a l e x t e n t ( K a y s e n , 1990: 49). E x p a n s i o n a l s o w a s e n c o u r a g e d by the relative e a s e with w h i c h the r e s o u r c e s of a c o n q u e r e d territory c o u l d be e x p l o i t e d b y an a g g r e s s o r . By s e i z i n g control of a piece of land, g o v e r n m e n t s c o u l d b e g i n e x t r a c t i n g r e s o u r c e s a l m o s t i m m e d i a t e l y ( G i l p i n , 1981: 111; K a y s e n , 1990: 49). T h e industrial r e v o l u t i o n , c o u p l e d with t h e g r a d u a l e m e r g e n c e of an integrated w o r l d e c o n o m y , h o w e v e r , s l o w l y b e g a n to w e a k e n the l i n k a g e b e t w e e n territorial control a n d e c o n o m i c s t r e n g t h ( K a y s e n , 1990: 5 3 - 5 7 ) . A s Robert Gilpin (1981: 1 3 2 - 1 3 3 ) points out, t h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s held out the possibility that " t h r o u g h s p e c i a l i z a t i o n a n d international trade an e f f i c i e n t s t a t e c o u l d g a i n m o r e t h a n t h r o u g h territorial e x p a n s i o n a n d c o n q u e s t s . " S u c h o p p o r t u n i t i e s h a v e b e c o m e e v e n m o r e p r o n o u n c e d as e c o n o m i e s m o v e into a p o s t i n d u s t r i a l era w h e r e i n i n f o r m a t i o n s t a n d s as the key to p r o d u c t i v i t y , w e a l t h , a n d political p o w e r ( R o s e n a u , 1990).

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Moreover, this emerging m o d e of production makes it relatively m o r e difficult f o r an aggressor to exploit the fruits of territorial expansion. T h e logic underlying this claim is s u m m a r i z e d by Stephen Van Evera. The shift toward knowledge-based forms of production in advanced industrial e c o n o m i e s since 1945 has reduced the ability of conquerors to extract resources from conquered territories. . . . T o d a y ' s high-technology post-industrial economies depend increasingly on free access to technical and social information. This access requires a free domestic press, and access to foreign publications, foreign travel, personal computers, and photocopiers. But the police measures needed to subdue a conquered society require that these technologies and practices be forbidden, because they also carry subversive ideas. Thus critical elements of the economic fabric now must be ripped out to maintain control over conquered polities. A s a result . . . control adds little to national power. (Van Evera, 1990-1991: 14-15)

T h e s e fundamental changes in the nature of e c o n o m i c production will serve to diminish the potential for territorial expansion on the part of the m a j o r p o w e r s in p o s t - C o l d W a r E u r o p e (Van Evera, 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 1 : 1 4 - 1 5 ; Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 150). This, in turn, also will reduce the likelihood that the major powers will pose a threat to one a n o t h e r ' s political i n d e p e n d e n c e and/or territorial integrity. In essence, the noncumulativity of p o w e r resources in contemporary Europe heightens the security of the m a j o r p o w e r s by lowering the e c o n o m i c incentives to seize and control territory. In combination, the nuclearization and postindustrialization of the European states system will serve to stabilize and pacify m a j o r - p o w e r relations b e c a u s e , under these circumstances, "the great powers gain neither more s e c u r e borders nor increased wealth by adding more t e r r i t o r y " ( G o l d g e i e r and McFaul, 1992: 4 8 4 ) . Hence, these f a c t o r s m i n i m i z e the likelihood of the m a j o r p o w e r s b e c o m i n g involved in territorially b a s e d disputes. This is important b e c a u s e , historically, territorial issues have been at the center of many of the conflicts that have occurred between and a m o n g the major powers. 4 T h e significance of this relationship can be highlighted using a data set recently compiled by K.J. Holsti (1991). It lists the primary issues associated with 177 international conflicts spanning the period 1 6 4 8 - 1 9 8 9 . Included in the data are thirty-six cases in which at least one major p o w e r participated on each side of a dispute. 5 Holsti ( 1 9 9 1 : 307) identified t w e n t y - f o u r discrete issues that have been associated with two or more of these conflicts. For the sake of simplicity, I have aggregated the data into seven basic issue-areas: territory, e c o n o m i c s , s y s t e m i c m a i n t e n a n c e , the creation of states and empires, the preservation of states and empires, the internal political structure of states, and minority rights. 6 By doing so, it is

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easier to i d e n t i f y the i s s u e - a r e a s most f r e q u e n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with the onset of m a j o r - p o w e r c o n f l i c t . T h e results of the a n a l y s i s are r e p o r t e d in T a b l e 4.2. T h e data c o n f i r m that territorial i s s u e s h a v e b e e n at the c e n t e r of m o r e m a j o r - p o w e r c o n f l i c t s than h a s a n y o t h e r i s s u e - a r e a . H i s t o r i c a l l y , d i s p u t e s c o n c e r n i n g the " c o n t r o l , a c c e s s to, a n d / o r o w n e r s h i p of p h y s i c a l s p a c e " ( H o l s t i , 1 9 9 1 : 3 0 7 ) h a v e been p r e s e n t in 6 9 percent of the a r m e d c o n f l i c t s that h a v e o c c u r r e d b e t w e e n a n d a m o n g the m a j o r p o w e r s . 7 W h i l e the s a l i e n c e of this issue-area c l e a r l y h a s b e e n d e c l i n i n g o v e r the past f o u r c e n t u r i e s , territorial disputes s t a n d as the o n e issue most f r e q u e n t l y associated with the outb r e a k of m a j o r - p o w e r c o n f l i c t in each of the p e r i o d s under o b s e r v a t i o n .

Table 4.2

Frequency of Issue-Areas as a Source of Armed Major-Power Conflict, 1648-1945

Issue-Area Territory Economics State creation Internal politics State preservation Systemic maintenance Minority rights

1648-1714

1715-1814

1815-1917

1918-1945

75% 100% 0% 50% 25% 38% 13%

83% 50% 17% 44% 28% 39% 0%

50% 17% 83% 0% 50% 33% 17%

33% 33% 0% 33% 100% 67% 0%

Source: Derived from Holsti (1991). Note: The twenty-four discrete issues identified by Holsti have been combined into seven distinct issue-areas as follows: 1. Territory: territory, strategic territory, boundaries. 2. Economics: navigation, resources, colonies, protection of nations/commerce. 3. State creation: liberation, secession, unification/consolidation, empire creation. 4. Internal politics: dynastic succession, government composition, autonomy, ideological liberation. 5. State preservation: maintenance of integrity and survival. 6. Systemic maintenance: defense of allies, enforcement of treaties, balance of power, maintenance of regional domination. 7. Minority rights: protection of religious and ethnic beliefs, ethnic unification/irredenta.

T h i s f i n d i n g r e i n f o r c e s the s i g n i f i c a n c e of n u c l e a r i z a t i o n a n d p o s t i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n as f a c t o r s that will s e r v e to e n h a n c e the s e c u r i t y of the m a j o r p o w e r s of E u r o p e . By d i m i n i s h i n g the e x p e c t e d utility of territorial e x p a n s i o n , t h e s e r e v o l u t i o n a r y c h a n g e s in the n a t u r e of m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y and e c o n o m i c p r o d u c t i o n d e c r e a s e the likelihood that the m a j o r p o w e r s will b e m o t i v a t e d to p u r s u e an e x p a n s i o n i s t f o r e i g n p o l i c y that w o u l d

96

Beyond Containment

pose a threat to the territorial integrity and political independence of other states. The prospects for peace and security in p o s t - C o l d War Europe also are heightened by the fact that all of the major powers of Europe currently are led by democratically oriented governments. This is an encouraging development because democracies rarely go to war with one another (Russett, 1993). Moreover, democracies are less likely to engage in acts of coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis one another (Maoz and Abdolali, 1989: 21-23). Hence, in terms of their social relations, democracies tend to interact with one another as if they were members of a pluralistic security community (Deutsch, 1988: 2 7 2 - 2 7 3 ) . In this type of systemic environment, the security of each state is enhanced because "fears of attack by one another are virtually nonexistent" (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 27). International relations theorists have advanced two basic explanations for the pacific nature of democratic dyads. The first is a normative model of democratic peace that attributes this systemic outcome to the political culture of democracy (see, e.g., Doyle, 1983, 1986). The other is a structural model that emphasizes the institutional constraints that make it difficult for a democratic government to use force as a foreign policy instrument (see, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1990; Rummel, 1983; Small and Singer, 1976). The normative model is premised on the assumption that the foreign policy behavior of states is shaped by the norms of political competition that characterize their domestic political systems (Maoz and Russett, 1993: 625). Hence, the democratic peace could be a function of liberal norms that emphasize the importance of resolving conflicts of interest without resorting to violence (Doyle, 1983: 230). As Maoz and Russett (1993: 625) point out, the political culture of democracy is characterized by a "live and let live" ethos that socializes the citizens of these states to the peaceful resolution of political disputes. 8 To the extent that governments apply these democratic norms to their international interactions, the result should be a relatively pacific pattern of political association in which conflicts of interest do not escalate to the use of military force (Maoz and Russett, 1993: 625). The structural model, on the other hand, attributes the democratic peace to a variety of institutional restraints that makes it difficult for a liberal regime to pursue an aggressive foreign policy vis-à-vis other democracies. This model is premised, first and foremost, on the fact that liberal regimes need to generate and sustain public support for their foreign policy initiatives (Doyle, 1983: 229). International action in a d e m o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m requires the m o b i lization o f both g e n e r a l p u b l i c o p i n i o n and o f a variety o f i n s t i t u t i o n s . . . . T h i s i m p l i e s that very f e w g o a l s c o u l d be presented to j u s t i f y f i g h t i n g

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wars in democracies. It also implies that the process of national mobilization for war in democracies is both difficult and cumbersome. (Maoz and Russett, 1993: 626) T h e s t r u c t u r a l m o d e l s u g g e s t s that i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t o r s will r e s t r a i n b o t h the o p p o r t u n i t y a n d the w i l l i n g n e s s of d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t s to e m p l o y f o r c e as a f o r e i g n policy i n s t r u m e n t , e s p e c i a l l y w h e n d e a l i n g with o t h e r d e m o c r a c i e s . In c o m b i n a t i o n w i t h t h e n o r m a t i v e m o d e l , the a r g u m e n t a l s o i m p l i e s that d e m o c r a c i e s will b e p r o n e to a d o p t d e f e n s i v e l y orie n t e d security strategies in w h i c h f o r c e s t a n d s as a w e a p o n of last resort to be u s e d p r i m a r i l y in the n a m e of s e l f - d e f e n s e ( D e u d n e y a n d I k e n b e r r y , 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 2 : 86). T h e s e a r g u m e n t s b o d e well for the security of the m a j o r p o w e r s c o m p r i s i n g the E u r o p e a n states s y s t e m . D e m o c r a c y is f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d in the U n i t e d States, Britain, France, and G e r m a n y . R u s s i a , of c o u r s e , is a n e w c o m e r to the d e m o c r a t i c tradition; at p r e s e n t , it can b e s t be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a " w e a k l y institutionalized liberal r e g i m e " ( S n y d e r , 1 9 8 9 : 6). In light of p r e v i o u s historical e x p e r i e n c e , o n e w o u l d e x p e c t d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n o n the part of the m a j o r p o w e r s to stabilize a n d p a c i f y the n a t u r e of their bilateral a n d m u l t i l a t e r a l i n t e r a c t i o n s . 9 T h i s s h o u l d s e r v e to f u r t h e r d i m i n i s h the l i k e l i h o o d of m a j o r - p o w e r c o n f l i c t in E u r o p e . T h i s section has r e v i e w e d three f a c t o r s that p r o v i d e t h e m a j o r p o w e r s of p o s t - C o l d W a r E u r o p e with an u n p r e c e d e n t e d d e g r e e of s e c u r i t y . R e v olutionary c h a n g e s in the nature of both military t e c h n o l o g y a n d e c o n o m i c p r o d u c t i o n h a v e c o m b i n e d to l o w e r the e x p e c t e d utility of territorial e x p a n s i o n . B y d i m i n i s h i n g the i n c e n t i v e s to p u r s u e an e x p a n s i o n i s t f o r e i g n p o l i c y , t h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s also m a k e it less likely that the m a j o r p o w e r s will p o s e a threat to o n e a n o t h e r ' s p o l i t i c a l i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d / o r territorial integrity. T h e stabilizing and pacifying effects associated with the nuclearization a n d p o s t i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n of the E u r o p e a n states s y s t e m are r e i n f o r c e d by the m a j o r p o w e r s ' e m b r a c e of liberal v a l u e s a n d institutions at the level of their d o m e s t i c politics. T h i s will e n h a n c e the security of the m a j o r p o w e r s b e c a u s e : ( 1 ) liberal n o r m s s o c i a l i z e d e m o c r a t i c l e a d e r s to r e s o l v e international d i s p u t e s w i t h o u t resorting to v i o l e n c e , a n d (2) institutional c o n s t r a i n t s limit t h e ability of d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t s to u s e f o r c e as an i n s t r u m e n t of their f o r e i g n policy. A s a c o n s e q u e n c e , d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n on the part of the m a j o r p o w e r s s h o u l d b r e e d a f o r m of state sociality c h a r a c terized by a p a c i f i c a n d c o o p e r a t i v e p a t t e r n of political a s s o c i a t i o n . In c o m b i n a t i o n , these f a c t o r s h a v e r e n d e r e d the m a j o r p o w e r s of c o n t e m p o r a r y E u r o p e m o r e s e c u r e than s t a t e s h a v e e v e r b e e n in the history of t h e i n t e r s t a t e s y s t e m . I n d e e d , the p r o b a b i l i t y of m a j o r - p o w e r w a r in Eur o p e w o u l d a p p e a r to be at its l o w e s t p o i n t s i n c e the s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y .

98

Beyond Containment

T h i s s u g g e s t s that the l o n g p e a c e that h a s c h a r a c t e r i z e d the E u r o p e a n states s y s t e m o v e r the past f i v e d e c a d e s is likely to e n d u r e for the f o r e s e e able f u t u r e . 1 0 It a l s o implies, h o w e v e r , that the m a j o r p o w e r s m a y f i n d it e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t to m o b i l i z e a n d maintain the d o m e s t i c political s u p p o r t n e e d e d to be an active participant in E u r o p e ' s n a s c e n t c o l l e c t i v e security system.

Democracies and Involuntary Defection T h e relative security of the m a j o r p o w e r s p o s e s a d i l e m m a f o r t h e s e states w h e n it c o m e s to participating in a collective security s y s t e m . T h e f a c t o r s cited in the p r e v i o u s section will serve to diminish the likelihood of m a j o r p o w e r c o n f l i c t in E u r o p e r e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r or not a c o l l e c t i v e s e c u rity s y s t e m is e s t a b l i s h e d on t h e C o n t i n e n t . H e n c e , the s e c u r i t y of t h e m a j o r p o w e r s is not c o n t i n g e n t u p o n the e x i s t e n c e of the r e g i m e . T o the c o n t r a r y , their p o l i t i c a l i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d territorial integrity are u n d e r written by a c o m b i n a t i o n of t e c h n o l o g i c a l and political d e v e l o p m e n t s that stand i n d e p e n d e n t of any institutional a r r a n g e m e n t . T h i s a l s o s u g g e s t s that a c o l l e c t i v e security s y s t e m is unlikely to e n h a n c e the security of the m a j o r p o w e r s to any s i g n i f i c a n t degree. Given the d i s i n c e n t i v e s to w a r that p r e s e n t l y exist on the part of the m a j o r p o w e r s , the security g u a r a n t e e s associated with the r e g i m e s h o u l d c o n t r i b u t e little, if a n y t h i n g , to the prevention of m a j o r - p o w e r c o n f l i c t . S e e n f r o m this pers p e c t i v e , a c o l l e c t i v e security s y s t e m c o n s t i t u t e s an additional layer of ins u r a n c e that the m a j o r p o w e r s of c o n t e m p o r a r y E u r o p e s i m p l y d o not n e e d in o r d e r to b e s e c u r e . W h i l e a c o l l e c t i v e security s y s t e m w o u l d yield only m a r g i n a l b e n e f i t s to the m a j o r p o w e r s , the r e g i m e w o u l d s i g n i f i c a n t l y e x p a n d the s c o p e of the m a j o r p o w e r s ' s e c u r i t y c o m m i t m e n t s a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . A s n o t e d p r e v i o u s l y , c o l l e c t i v e security s y s t e m s d e p e n d heavily u p o n a m i n i l a t e r a l ist c o r e of m a j o r - p o w e r c o o p e r a t i o n . In p r a c t i c e , it is the m a j o r p o w e r s w h o p r o v i d e a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e s h a r e of the military c a p a b i l i t i e s that u n d e r w r i t e the i n s t i t u t i o n ' s security g u a r a n t e e s . H e n c e , by p a r t i c i p a t i n g in a c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y s y s t e m , the m a j o r p o w e r s w o u l d b e c o m e j o i n t l y res p o n s i b l e f o r m a n a g i n g s e c u r i t y i s s u e s on a c o n t i n e n t a l - w i d e b a s i s . D e p e n d i n g u p o n the level of r e g i o n a l i n s t a b i l i t y , the c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h this t a s k c o u l d a d d s i g n i f i c a n t l y to the d e f e n s e b u r d e n s that the m a j o r p o w e r s m u s t bear. F r o m a rational c h o i c e p e r s p e c t i v e , a collective security s y s t e m , u n d e r c o n t e m p o r a r y c o n d i t i o n s , c o n f r o n t s the m a j o r p o w e r s w i t h the law of d i m i n i s h i n g r e t u r n s . T o wit, e a c h a d d i t i o n a l i n c r e m e n t of m a n a g e r i a l e f f o r t on their part is unlikely to yield an e q u i v a l e n t i n c r e a s e in the level of their

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o w n national securities. In essence, to participate in E u r o p e ' s nascent collective security system, the m a j o r powers must be prepared to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of an institution that will not significantly enhance the security of their own vital national interests. T h e salience of this fact is c o m p o u n d e d by the d o m e s t i c political structures that currently characterize the major powers of Europe. D e m o c ratization generally enhances the role domestic factors play in the f o r m u lation and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of public policy ( K a t z e n s t e i n , 1977; Krasner, 1978). Recent research indicates that this proposition holds in the realm of security as well as in other issue-areas (Evangelista, 1989; Barnett, 1990; S n y d e r , 1991; R i s s e - K a p p e n 1991, 1993; Katzenstein and O k a w a r a , 1993). 1 1 T h i s f i n d i n g holds potentially important implications for the major p o w e r s ' ability to serve as the minilateralist core of a collective security system. T o participate in such a system, democratic governments will need to generate and sustain domestic support. This is an essential task within the context of a liberal-capitalist r e g i m e because "the state must negotiate with domestic actors for access to [the] societally controlled resources" it needs to pursue a given course of action (Barnett, 1990: 535). Hence, the state must justify its extractive d e m a n d s by explaining how and why spec i f i c policy choices will e n h a n c e the n a t i o n ' s security. As A l e x a n d e r George puts it, policymakers operating within the context of a democratic political s y s t e m must e n d e a v o r to establish and maintain policy legitimacy. In practice, this entails a continuing effort to persuade an array of domestic actors that a particular policy is both desirable and feasible. It is at this j u n c t u r e that contemporary systemic and domestic conditions c o m b i n e to diminish the prospects for m a j o r - p o w e r participation in E u r o p e ' s nascent collective security system. Put simply, the extraordinarily benign nature of the m a j o r p o w e r s ' security environment will m a k e it difficult for these g o v e r n m e n t s to convince their respective societies that they should actively support the r e g i m e . Since the c a u s e - a n d - e f f e c t relationships linking the security of the major powers to the success of a collective security system are so tenuous under present circumstances, it bec o m e s less likely that d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t s will be able to c o n v i n c e domestic actors that participation in the regime is warranted. T h i s is not to suggest that d o m e s t i c factors will necessarily lead the major p o w e r s to boycott a collective security system, as the United States did in regard to the League of Nations during the 1920s. Rather, the argument simply contends that society will be unlikely to authorize the state to e x p e n d the manpower, m o n e y , and material resources needed to honor the unconditional security guarantee that lies at the core of the regime. In practice, h o w e v e r , this will vitiate the concept of collective security and render such a system politically unviable.

100

Beyond Containment

T h e a r g u m e n t also implies that E u r o p e ' s nascent collective security system is likely to be plagued by repeated acts of "involuntary d e f e c t i o n " on the part of the m a j o r p o w e r s . Robert P u t n a m ( 1 9 8 8 : 438) coined this term to refer to a situation in which domestic political constraints prevent a government f r o m honoring its international c o m m i t m e n t s . In the present context, involuntary d e f e c t i o n w o u l d constitute a b u c k - p a s s i n g strategy w h e r e b y the citizens of one m a j o r power seek to pass a l o n g the costs of collective security to other states and societies. Such a strategy, however, will j e o p a r d i z e the political viability of a collective security system by threatening to shatter the minilateralist core of m a j o r - p o w e r cooperation that underlies this type of regime. In practice, buck-passing is s y n o n y m o u s with the f r e e rider problem. Christensen and S n y d e r ( 1 9 9 0 ) argue that the incentive to adopt a buck-passing strategy will vary along with the severity of a state's security predicament. T o wit, "the less the vulnerability of states, the greater is the tendency to pass the b u c k " (Christensen and Snyder, 1990: 145). Conceptually, the authors link the vulnerability of states to two factors located at the systemic level of analysis: the polarity of the international system, and the nature of military technology. Within the context of this analytic f r a m e w o r k , Christensen and Snyder (1990: 147) c o n t e n d that the m a j o r powers are most likely to pursue a buck-passing strategy under conditions of multipolarity and defense-dominance. Both conditions characterize p o s t - C o l d W a r Europe. As noted previously, nuclear w e a p o n s technology promotes d e f e n s e - d o m i n a n c e because of the prohibitive costs associated with this type of m a j o r - p o w e r w a r f a r e (Jervis, 1978: 2 0 6 - 2 1 1 ) . Moreover, the dissolution of the Soviet Union has w e a k e n e d the geopolitical f o u n d a t i o n s of the b i p o l a r structure that characterized the European states system during the Cold W a r . W h i l e a true multipolar structure may have yet to emerge in Europe, the trend in this direction is unmistakable (Waltz, 1993; Kegley and R a y m o n d , 1993). Hence, the systemic conditions are ripe for the m a j o r p o w e r s to opt f o r a buck-passing strategy. Ironically, the strongest pressures to f r e e ride are likely to be felt on the part of the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t . T h e r e are three b a s i c reasons f o r this. First, the United States is not physically located within Europe. This is an important consideration because the salience of security problems tends to be inversely related to a s t a t e ' s geographical proximity to the source of the problem (Walt, 1987: 23; Buzan, 1991: 135). This suggests that U.S. observers will be more likely than their European counterparts to m i n i m i z e the significance of instability in p o s t - C o l d W a r Europe because such conflicts will b e v i e w e d as h o l d i n g few i m m e d i a t e and direct c o n s e q u e n c e s for the security of the United States itself. 1 2 In light of this attitudinal predisposition, o n e w o u l d expect there to be c o n s i d e r a b l e political support

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Peace, Paralysis

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within the United States for passing the buck for regional conflict management in Europe to the other major powers. This preference should be reinforced by the fact that the United States constitutes the most powerful member of the European states system. This suggests that the United States is likely to possess the military and economic strength to defend itself unilaterally from virtually any threat emanating from the region. This possibility is likely to further diminish the value of a collective security system in the eyes of domestic political actors located within the United States as well as their willingness to actively support the institution. T h e magnitude of the United States' capabilities relative to its next nearest competitors in Europe is reflected in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. The former reports data for eight states concerning the size of their respective populations, gross domestic product, d e f e n s e expenditures, and armed forces. The latter table indicates the relative shares of military and economic capabilities possessed by each of these states. 1 3

Table 4.3

Distribution of Capabilities in Post-Cold War Europe, 1992

Country

Population (millions)

GDP (trillions)

Defense Expenditures (millions)

Military Manpower (millions)

U.S. Russia Germany France Britain Italy Ukraine Poland

252 148 80 57 57 57 52 38

5,673 1,112 1,676 1,212 1,018 1,134 137 102

282 129 31 35 41 21 68 2

1,772 2,720 447 432 294 354 230 297

Source: 1ISS (1992: 13-92).

The last column of Table 4.4 reveals that the United States holds an at least 4:1 advantage over all but one of the members of the European states system. The lone exception, of course, is Russia. 1 4 Here, the U.S. advantage is merely 1.5:1. In a material sense, the analysis lends additional empirical support to the contention that the United States has emerged from the Cold War as the " w o r l d ' s only remaining s u p e r p o w e r " (Nye, 1990; Krauthammer, 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 1 ) . As Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson (1992) point out, however, the significance of this oft-repeated claim

102

Beyond

Table 4.4

Containment

Relative Capabilities of Europe's Major Powers, 1992 %

%

Country

Pop.

GDP

U.S. Russia Germany France Britain Italy Ukraine Poland

34 20 11 8 8 8 7 5

47 9 14 10 8 9 1 1

% Defense Exp. 46 21 5 6 7 3 11 1

% Military Manpower 29 41 7 6 4 5 3 4

% Total 39 23 9 8 7 6 6 3

Source: Compiled by author.

stems from more than simply the United States' ranking across some crude measures of national p o w e r . It also speaks to the historically u n p r e c e dented level of security that the United States has achieved in the p o s t Cold War era. Though threats to the nation's security still had to be anticipated in the post-cold war world, the seriousness of these threats seemed certain to be different from the threats of the last fifty years. Previously the threats had emanated from hostile great powers and encompassed not only a military but an ideological dimension. Following the cold war, the prospective military threats were those of middle and small powers, and no viable ideological challenges were discernible. The great threats to the nation's security—whether physical or ideological—had come to an end with the passing of the cold war. (Tucker and Hendrickson, 1992: 2)

T h e surplus security that the United States currently enjoys is likely to strengthen the temptation to adopt a buck-passing strategy when it c o m e s time to act upon the c o m m i t m e n t s associated with E u r o p e ' s nascent collective security system. For reasons suggested above, U.S. foreign policy makers are likely to have a difficult time m o b i l i z i n g d o m e s t i c political support for an active U.S. role in multilateral military operations that can do little to improve upon the United States' already impressive level of security. T h e g e o g r a p h i c distance separating the United States f r o m the source of regional instabilities in Europe will f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e the prospects for convincing domestic actors that U.S. security interests w a r rant the state's involvement in such conflicts. The preferences held by domestic groups and coalitions are of considerable importance to the conduct of U.S. security policy because the structure

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of the U.S. political system a f f o r d s m e m b e r s of society ample opportunities to influence the p o l i c y m a k i n g process ( R i s s e - K a p p e n , 1993: 2 4 1 242). This is the third, and final, reason why the United States is likely to pursue a buck-passing strategy in p o s t - C o l d W a r Europe. A c o u n t r y ' s domestic political structure can be characterized in terms of three basic factors: (1) the centralization of its political institutions and decisionmaking processes; (2) the polarization of society and the degree to which g r o u p s can be mobilized politically; and (3) the nature of the policy networks linking state and society (Risse-Kappen, 1993: 241). On the basis of this analytic f r a m e w o r k , a country can be located along a continuum of state-society relations that ranges from "state-dominated" to "societyd o m i n a t e d " structures. 1 5 In theory, a c o u n t r y ' s position along this continuum will provide an indication of the extent to which a state is likely to be sensitive and responsive to societal d e m a n d s and preferences in the realm of security (Risse-Kappen, 1991: 4 8 4 - 4 8 6 ) . Conceptually, the U.S. political system lies closer to the society-dominated end of the c o n t i n u u m ( I k e n b e r r y , Lake, and M a s t a n d u n o , 1988: 2 1 9 - 2 4 3 ) . Its institutions are f r a g m e n t e d both constitutionally ( H e n k i n , 1972) and bureaucratically (Allison, 1971). As a c o n s e q u e n c e , the U.S. government is characterized by a relatively decentralized decisionmaking p r o c e s s that provides n u m e r o u s actors with multiple points of access ( R i s s e - K a p p e n , 1993: 242). This creates a m p l e opportunities for societal g r o u p s and coalitions to channel their d e m a n d s into the political system (Destler, Gelb, and Lake, 1984). It also increases the likelihood that polic y m a k e r s will be sensitive and r e s p o n s i v e to p u b l i c preferences b e c a u s e the viability of a policy option often will hinge upon the ability of political elites to mobilize and maintain the support of actors located in society ( W a l t z , 1967; Cohen, 1973; Leigh, 1976; G e o r g e , 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 9 ; Snyder, 1991: 2 5 5 - 2 9 4 ; Deese, 1994). Hence, in theory, the structure of the U.S. political system should e n h a n c e the ability of societal g r o u p s and coalitions to influence policy o u t c o m e s in the area of security (Risse-Kappen, 1991: 493). T h i s is an important consideration w i t h i n the context of the present discussion because the actors comprising U.S. society are deeply divided when it comes to the use of force as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. T h i s fact renders a c o m m i t m e n t by the U n i t e d States to participate in a collective security system inherently problematic. In the absence of a national consensus in favor of contributing U.S. military forces to multilateral missions, the U.S. government is likely to f a c e strong incentives to opt for a buck-passing strategy in the n a m e of a v o i d i n g a contentious, and potentially costly, domestic political debate. T h e divisions characterizing U.S. society over the use of force are reflected in a recent study by E u g e n e Wittkopf (1990). Using data derived

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f r o m p u b l i c o p i n i o n s u r v e y s c o n d u c t e d by the C h i c a g o C o u n c i l on Foreign R e l a t i o n s d u r i n g the period 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 8 6 , W i t t k o p f ( 1 9 9 0 : 2 5 - 2 6 ) identifies f o u r distinct f o r e i g n policy belief s y s t e m s : i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t , c o n s e r v a t i v e , a c c o m m o d a t i o n i s t , and isolationist. M o r e o v e r , these a t t i t u d e s are e v i d e n t in the s t r u c t u r e of b e l i e f s h e l d by b o t h the g e n e r a l p u b l i c a n d the elite m e m b e r s of U.S. s o c i e t y ( W i t t k o p f , 1990: 116). A s W i t t k o p f ( 1 9 9 0 : 5 0 ) points out, t h e s e g r o u p s w e r e d i v i d e d on the b a s i s of their u n d e r l y i n g a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d : ( 1 ) c o m m u n i s m , ( 2 ) r e l a t i o n s with the Soviet U n i o n , and (3) the use of U . S . military f o r c e s a b r o a d . O b v i o u s l y , the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Soviet U n i o n has all but e l i m i n a t e d the first t w o issues as a s o u r c e of contention in U.S. f o r e i g n p o l i c y . T h i s s u g g e s t s that the use of f o r c e is likely to b e c o m e the d e f i n i n g issue of p u b l i c d e b a t e d u r i n g the p o s t - C o l d W a r era. If this is the c a s e , then the p r o s p e c t s for est a b l i s h i n g a national c o n s e n s u s in f a v o r of p a r t i c i p a t i n g in a c o l l e c t i v e security s y s t e m are b l e a k . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n s t e m s f r o m the f a c t that since the e n d of the V i e t n a m W a r , the p e o p l e of the U n i t e d S t a t e s h a v e b e e n g e n e r ally reluctant to s u p p o r t military i n t e r v e n t i o n s ( W i t t k o p f , 1 9 9 0 : 2 2 8 - 2 3 4 ) . T h e e n d u r i n g strength of this so-called V i e t n a m s y n d r o m e is reflected in T a b l e 4.5, w h i c h i n d i c a t e s h o w m e m b e r s of the g e n e r a l p u b l i c h a v e b e e n d i s t r i b u t e d a c r o s s the f o r e i g n p o l i c y belief s y s t e m s n o t e d a b o v e . In g e n e r a l , q u e s t i o n s p e r t a i n i n g to the use of f o r c e h a v e t e n d e d to pit intern a t i o n a l i s t s a n d c o n s e r v a t i v e s against a tacit a l l i a n c e of a c c o m m o d a t i o n ists and isolationists ( W i t t k o p f , 1990: 29). A s the p e r c e n t a g e s r e p o r t e d in T a b l e 4 . 5 s u g g e s t , t h e s e b l o c s h a v e b e e n a b o u t e v e n l y m a t c h e d o v e r the past t w o d e c a d e s .

Table 4.5

Distribution of U.S. Society Among Four Types of Foreign Policy Belief Systems, 1974-1986 (percentage)

Belief System Internationalist Conservative Accommodationist Isolationist

1974

1978

1982

1986

29 23 27 22

29 22 26 22

28 24 26 22

28 24 24 24

Source: Derived from Wittkopf (1990: 26).

T h i s b a l a n c e of societal f o r c e s , h o w e v e r , is unlikely to persist in the p o s t - C o l d W a r era ( Y a n k e l o v i c h , 1992: 9). C o n s e r v a t i v e s , in p a r t i c u l a r , are likely to b e c o m e m u c h m o r e s e l e c t i v e in their s u p p o r t f o r military int e r v e n t i o n s . D u r i n g the C o l d W a r , c o n s e r v a t i v e s t e n d e d to f a v o r the use of

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force b e c a u s e of their overriding concern with the threat of Soviet expansionism (Wittkopf, 1990: 2 9 - 3 2 ) . In the absence of this clear and present danger, it seems likely that conservatives will approach the question of intervention in m u c h the s a m e w a y that isolationists traditionally have. W h e n vital U.S. interests are at stake, and the use of force promises to be decisive in securing these interests, then conservatives and isolationists are both likely to support the deployment of U.S. military f o r c e s (Schneider, 1992: 6 3 - 6 4 ) . In situations that do not meet these criteria, h o w e v e r , neither g r o u p is likely to favor the use of force, especially if it entails getting involved in the internal affairs of another country (Jentleson, 1992). T h i s tacit alliance between conservatives and isolationists, c o m b i n e d with the a c c o m m o d a t i o n i s t s ' congenital opposition to the use of f o r c e , suggests that there is likely to be a solid majority of U.S. citizens w h o will not f a v o r military interventions as a standard operating p r o c e d u r e on the part of its government in the p o s t - C o l d W a r era. Given the openness of the U.S. political system, it also is likely that d e c i s i o n m a k e r s will be c o g nizant of these attitudes and responsive to them. Obviously, this does not bode well for active U.S. participation in Eur o p e ' s nascent collective security s y s t e m . T h e relative security of the United States in the p o s t - C o l d War era, coupled with the ability of societal actors to press their demands on the state, suggests that U.S. foreign policy makers will f a c e considerable domestic pressure to adopt a buck-passing strategy when it comes to the management of European security problems. Nor is the United States likely to be unique in this regard. All of the major p o w e r s of Europe are e m b e d d e d in the same relatively benign international security e n v i r o n m e n t . W h i l e Russia, G e r m a n y , France, and Britain certainly will be more sensitive to regional instabilities than will the United States (due to their geographic proximity), sensitivity is not the same as vulnerability (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 1 1 - 1 9 ) . And in the latter respect, the political independence and territorial integrity of these countries are more secure f r o m external attack today than they have ever been in their history. M o r e o v e r , all of the major p o w e r s c o m p r i s i n g the European security system are presently characterized by domestic political structures that afford societal g r o u p s and coalitions u n p r e c e d e n t e d o p p o r t u n i t i e s to influence the decisionmaking process. Under present circumstances, the m e m bers of these societies seem likely to d e m a n d that their r e s p e c t i v e g o v e r n m e n t s attend to an array of domestic problems that were allowed to fester d u r i n g the Cold W a r era, rather than e x p e n d r e s o u r c e s in military undertakings that can do little to enhance the security of their country. This combination of systemic and domestic factors is not e n c o u r a g i n g w h e n it c o m e s to the f u t u r e of a collective security system in p o s t - C o l d War Europe. T h e argument suggests that the regime is likely to be plagued

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by repeated acts of involuntary defection on the part of the major powers. This possibility, in turn, will serve to undermine both the credibility and the e f f i c a c y of the institutions c o m p r i s i n g E u r o p e ' s e m e r g i n g security architecture. Multilateral orders are more credible if countries believe the political leadership of the major power(s) is subject to significant domestic constraints on defecting from the rules of the multilateral order. . . . While other devices may also enhance credibility, domestic political factors are virtually indispensable. (Cowhey, 1993: 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 )

The Significance of the War in Bosnia T h e problems outlined in the preceding section have all b e c o m e manifest in the major p o w e r s ' response to the war in Bosnia. I c o n c l u d e this chapter with a brief discussion of the c o n f l i c t ' s significance as a harbinger of the dilemmas that the major powers are likely to confront when it comes to the multilateral m a n a g e m e n t of security problems in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. B o s n i a s t a n d s as a p a i n f u l r e m i n d e r that war has not b e c o m e o b s o lete even in E u r o p e . T h i s distressing fact should d i s a b u s e us of the notion that Western civilization has s o m e h o w progressed to the point where war has b e c o m e unthinkable. This h o p e f u l thesis has been advanced recently by s o m e international r e l a t i o n s theorists w h o a r g u e that war is f u n d a m e n t a l l y a social p r a c t i c e , a n a l o g o u s to d u e l i n g a n d slavery, that has been d e l e g i t i m i z e d t h r o u g h o u t m u c h , if not all, of the d e v e l o p e d world (Mueller, 1989b; Ray, 1989). T h e war in Bosnia provides stark evidence that this t r a n s f o r m a t i v e process is, at best, i n c o m p l e t e . Under the right circumstances, the men and w o m e n of contemporary Europe remain quite c a p a b l e of killing o n e a n o t h e r in the n a m e of a c h i e v i n g their political o b j e c t i v e s . S o m e o b s e r v e r s seek to o b s c u r e this point by attributing the war in Bosnia to ancient ethnic and religious animosities. T h i s shrouds the conflict in the mist of history and, hence, enables us to depict the war as an atavism holding little relevance f o r the f u t u r e of p o s t - C o l d W a r Europe. W h i l e c o m f o r t i n g , this stance is ultimately an act of m y s t i f i c a t i o n that seeks to diminish the w a r ' s significance by invoking a historical legacy of p r e j u d i c e and hatred that p r e s u m a b l y stands b e y o n d the pale of human control (Snyder, 1993). While there is indeed such a legacy, this should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the protagonists in this conflict have m a d e a conscious decision to c o m m i t horrific acts in the n a m e of f u r t h e r i n g their political

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interests. T h e atrocities a s s o c i a t e d with the w a r in B o s n i a — e t h n i c c l e a n s ing, r a p e as an i n s t r u m e n t of political i n f l u e n c e , the s y s t e m a t i c torture of u n l a w f u l l y i m p r i s o n e d f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l s , and r e p e a t e d a t t a c k s against u n d e f e n d e d c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n s — h a v e not h a p p e n e d s i m p l y b e c a u s e of a p r i m o r d i a l p r e d i s p o s i t i o n to v i o l e n c e . T h i s p a t h w a s c h o s e n d e l i b e r a t e l y by m e n and w o m e n w h o are as m u c h a p r o d u c t of m o d e r n i t y as they are an e c h o of the past. In the final analysis, the B o s n i a n c o n f l i c t , like so m a n y of the c o n f l i c t s that h a v e o c c u r r e d d u r i n g the c o u r s e of E u r o p e a n history, is f i r m l y r o o t e d in a set of rational c a l c u l a t i o n s a b o u t the political utility of v i o l e n c e , c o e r c i o n , intimidation, a n d terror. O u r interest in B o s n i a , h o w e v e r , s t e m s f r o m m o r e than its s t u n n i n g h u m a n c o s t s . T h e c o n f l i c t a l s o h a s a s y m b o l i c s i g n i f i c a n c e that h a s not b e e n lost on c o n t e m p o r a r y o b s e r v e r s . T h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t by S e c r e tary of S t a t e W a r r e n C h r i s t o p h e r is i n d i c a t i v e of t h e i m p o r t a n c e that s t a t e s p e o p l e a n d s c h o l a r s alike h a v e a t t a c h e d to the w a r in B o s n i a . This conflict may be far from our shores, but it is certainly not distant from our concerns. We cannot afford to ignore it.. . . The continuing destruction of a new United Nations member challenges the principle that internationally recognized borders should not be altered by force. . . . There is also a broader imperative here. The world's response in the former Yugoslavia is an early and crucial test of how it will address the concerns of the ethnic and religious minorities in the post-Cold War period. That question reaches throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union . . . and it reaches to other continents as well. . . . Bold tyrants and fearful minorities are watching to see whether "ethnic cleansing" is a policy the world will tolerate. (Christopher, 1993d: 76) G i v e n t h i s c o n c e p t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e s at s t a k e in B o s n i a , the f a i l u r e of C S C E , N A T O , the U N , a n d t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y to r e s o l v e t h i s c o n f l i c t has p r o v e n to be a d e e p l y f r u s t r a t i n g e x p e r i e n c e . N o r is B o s n i a an i s o l a t e d c a s e . T h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s a l s o h a v e b e e n u n s u c c e s s f u l in their att e m p t s to m a n a g e s i m i l a r c o n f l i c t s in C r o a t i a , A z e r b a i j a n , G e o r g i a , a n d T a j i k i s t a n . In e s s e n c e , multilateral m a n a g e m e n t h a s p r o v e n u n e q u a l to the task of d e a l i n g with E u r o p e ' s m o s t p r e s s i n g security p r o b l e m s . T h e s e repeated failures, of c o u r s e , can be attributed to a variety of f a c tors. S o m e are i n t r i n s i c to this p a r t i c u l a r t y p e of political v i o l e n c e . S u c h d i s p u t e s , f o r e x a m p l e , typically c e n t e r on intractable territorial c l a i m s a n d the political disposition of isolated e t h n i c c o m m u n i t i e s ; m o r e o v e r , the prot a g o n i s t s a l s o t e n d to b e h i g h l y m o t i v a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s d r i v e n , in part, by h y p e r n a t i o n a l i s m ( P o s e n , 1993). At the s a m e t i m e , h o w e v e r , international c o n f l i c t m a n a g e m e n t in p o s t - C o l d W a r E u r o p e c l e a r l y h a s b e e n c o m p l i c a t e d by t h e m a j o r p o w e r s ' u n w i l l i n g n e s s to use f o r c e in s u p p o r t of their d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s . T h i s p r o b l e m is m o s t e v i d e n t in the c a s e of B o s n i a .

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O v e r the past t w o years, the m a j o r p o w e r s h a v e taken c o n c e r t e d s t e p s to try to r e s o l v e the B o s n i a n c o n f l i c t on several d i f f e r e n t o c c a s i o n s (Steinb e r g , 1 9 9 3 ) . In M a y 1993, f o r e x a m p l e , the U n i t e d States, R u s s i a , B r i t a i n , a n d F r a n c e a n n o u n c e d a j o i n t action p r o g r a m d e s i g n e d " t o h e l p e x t i n g u i s h this terrible w a r and to a c h i e v e a lasting a n d e q u i t a b l e s e t t l e m e n t . " 1 6 T h i s initiative, like similar e f f o r t s o n the part of C S C E , N A T O , and the U N , ultimately was unsuccessful. A n u m b e r of a n a l y s t s a c c o u n t f o r this d i s a p p o i n t i n g p e r f o r m a n c e by p o i n t i n g to the m a j o r p o w e r s ' r e f u s a l to get directly i n v o l v e d in the B o s nian c o n f l i c t as military c o m b a t a n t s (e.g., R a m e t , 1 9 9 2 ; P f a f f , 1 9 9 3 ) . W h i l e the m a j o r p o w e r s h a v e been w i l l i n g to c o o r d i n a t e their p o l i c i e s in an a t t e m p t to r e s o l v e the w a r , t h e s e i n i t i a t i v e s h a v e b e e n l i m i t e d to the r e a l m of d i p l o m a t i c o v e r t u r e s and the a p p l i c a t i o n of e c o n o m i c s a n c t i o n s . At n o t i m e h a v e the m a j o r p o w e r s c o m e c l o s e to u s i n g f o r c e in an a t t e m p t to actually b r i n g the f i g h t i n g to an e n d . 1 7 T h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d j o i n t action p r o g r a m , f o r e x a m p l e , w a s a c o m p r o m i s e b a s k e t of initiatives a r r i v e d at f o l l o w i n g the failure of the m a j o r p o w e r s to a g r e e on a plan that w o u l d use f o r c e to c o e r c e the B o s n i a n S e r b s to a c c e p t a political s e t t l e m e n t ( W i l l i a m s , 1993a: A 4 0 ) . Put d i f f e r e n t l y , the m a j o r p o w e r s ' c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t s in r e g a r d to B o s n i a a n d o t h e r c o n f l i c t s in E u r o p e h a v e a l w a y s s t o p p e d short of direct military intervention. T h i s s e l f - r e s t r a i n t , h o w e v e r , has t e n d e d to e m a s c u l a t e d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s u n d e r t a k e n by the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , C S C E , a n d the E u r o p e a n C o m m u nity. In e s s e n c e , these institutions h a v e been d e p r i v e d of the c o e r c i v e ins t r u m e n t s that are s o m e t i m e s n e e d e d to i n d u c e c o m p l i a n c e w i t h the g e n e r a l i z e d principles of c o n d u c t that stand at the c o r e of multilateral ins t i t u t i o n s ( M a r t i n , 1993: 1 0 1 - 1 0 3 ) . H e n c e , in the c a s e of B o s n i a , the institutions comprising E u r o p e ' s nascent collective security system have b e e n p l a c e d in the a w k w a r d position of h a v i n g to a c c e p t territorial a g g r e s sion on the part of Serbia and C r o a t i a as the price to be paid f o r r e a c h i n g a s e t t l e m e n t ( P f a f f , 1 9 9 3 : 1 0 4 - 1 0 5 ) . In the w o r d s of o n e e m b i t t e r e d U N o f f i c i a l , this e x p e r i e n c e h o l d s a s o b e r i n g lesson f o r the f u t u r e of multilateral u n d e r t a k i n g s : " [ T ] h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y s h o u l d not i n t e r v e n e u n l e s s it is r e a d y to p a y a h i g h p r i c e in b l o o d a n d r e s o u r c e s " ( P r e s t o n , 1993: A 3 9 ) . T h e c o m m e n t is i n s t r u c t i v e b e c a u s e it h i g h l i g h t s the d i l e m m a a c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y s y s t e m is likely to f a c e r e p e a t e d l y in p o s t - C o l d W a r E u r o p e . T o wit, the r e g i m e is p r e m i s e d upon a level of m a j o r - p o w e r c o m m i t m e n t and c o o p e r a t i o n that m a y not be politically v i a b l e under c o n t e m p o r a r y s y s t e m i c and d o m e s t i c c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s is likely to be an e s p e c i a l l y n e t t l e s o m e p r o b l e m in s i t u a t i o n s such as B o s n i a w h e r e the m a j o r p o w e r s are c a l l e d upon to u n d e r t a k e s o - c a l l e d p e a c e e n f o r c e m e n t m i s s i o n s . T h i s , of c o u r s e , is s i m p l y a n o t h e r n a m e f o r m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n s c o n d u c t e d

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under the auspices of a multilateral institution. Since such initiatives represent the most potentially costly tool associated with the task of regional conflict m a n a g e m e n t , w e should expect this type of collaborative effort to generate the strongest incentives for the major p o w e r s to opt f o r a b u c k passing strategy. O b v i o u s l y , this possibility j e o p a r d i z e s both the e f f e c tiveness and the durability of E u r o p e ' s emerging security architecture. Given the pathetic performance of Western countries in the Bosnia crisis, the proposal suffers from a massive credibility problem. Why should anyone in Eastern Europe take such a guarantee seriously? Why should they believe that it was any more than a bluff, something done in the hope that the commitment itself would be an effective deterrence and with no serious intention of honoring it? (Harris, 1993: 4 3 )

M a t t e r s are f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e d in this regard by certain historical legacies that can inhibit the major powers f r o m assuming an active role in the m a n a g e m e n t of Eastern European conflicts. As J a m e s B. S t e i n b e r g points out, this has been a c o n t i n u i n g problem in the case of the w a r in Bosnia. B e c a u s e many states in the region had historical alliances or adversary relations with the parties to the Yugoslav conflict, their impartiality as mediators w a s questioned. Russia, France, and to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom were viewed as sympathetic to Serbia, while Germany's support for recognizing the independence of Croatia and Slovenia was attributed to past political, cultural, and religious ties. S o m e . . . even hinted darkly about German designs to establish a "Fourth Reich." (Steinberg, 1993: 6 1 )

This is an important consideration given the expansionist tendencies that G e r m a n y and the Soviet Union have exhibited in regard to Eastern Europe during the twentieth century. This imperial tradition, which actually dates back to the nineteenth century, is likely to m a k e the m e m b e r s of the European states system wary of actively encouraging G e r m a n y and Russia to deploy a significant number of their military forces in the region. Indeed, the United S t a t e s ' official position in regard to R u s s i a n p e a c e keeping operations within Europe is to oppose any mission that would create an opportunity f o r Russia to "suppress regimes or political groups that are hostile to R u s s i a " (Smith, 1993: A l ) . T h i s policy is outlined in Presidential Decision D i r e c t i v e 13 ( P D D 13), w h i c h w a s leaked to the press in August 1993. It indicates that the Clinton administration will not support United N a t i o n s ' resolutions that w o u l d a u t h o r i z e p e a c e k e e p i n g operations c o m p o s e d p r e d o m i n a n t l y of Russian forces; nor will the United States vote in favor of Russian requests f o r financial assistance in support of such operations (Smith, 1993: A l ) .

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PDD-13 even specifies six criteria that the Clinton administration will use to decide whether or not to support UN peacekeeping operations involving a significant number of Russian troops. As might be expected, the policy has drawn the ire of the Russian government. In a speech to the UN General Assembly, for example, Russia's foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, declared that when it comes to conflicts involving the countries comprising the former Soviet Union, "no international organization or group of states can replace our peacekeeping efforts" (Williams, 1993c: A25). Similar sentiments were expressed by Kozyrev in an op-ed piece that appeared shortly thereafter in the Washington Post. A d m i t t e d l y , p a r t n e r s h i p — a n d o v e r the l o n g term, a l l i a n c e — w i t h the U n i t e d States and the W e s t is a natural c h o i c e for a d e m o c r a t i c R u s s i a . B u t this d o e s not m e a n a c o n f l u e n c e . W e d o h a v e and shall c o n t i n u e to h a v e our s p e c i a l interests, d i f f e r e n t f r o m W e s t e r n interests and at t i m e s e v e n c o m p e t i n g . . . . [ W e w i l l not disregard] the s p e c i a l responsibility dev o l v i n g on R u s s i a in the Eurasian g e o p o l i t i c a l s p a c e . Protection o f legiti m a t e rights o f R u s s i a n - s p e a k i n g m i n o r i t i e s in the f o r m e r S o v i e t rep u b l i c s , the e c o n o m i c r e i n t e g r a t i o n o f the r e p u b l i c s and p e a c e - m a k i n g a c t i v i t i e s in c o n f l i c t areas: A l l o f t h e s e are an o b j e c t i v e n e c e s s i t y . ( K o z y r e v , 1993: C 7 ) 1 «

This discussion suggests that Germany and Russia may be asked to contribute fewer military forces to multilateral missions than will the other major powers. This also implies that the fate of Europe's nascent collective system is likely to hinge upon the willingness of the United States, France, and Britain to actively support the regime. Given the United States' reluctance to deploy ground forces in Bosnia, even in support of humanitarian relief efforts, the prospects for a major U.S. contribution in situations requiring the use of force are not encouraging. If anything, the United States appears poised to return to the free riding strategy that characterized its foreign policy during the first half of the twentieth century. I will address this issue and the implications it holds for the United States' grand strategy of institutionalization in the next chapter.

Conclusion "A democracy," de Tocqueville (1969: 229) once wrote, "finds it difficult to coordinate the details of a great undertaking and to fix on some plan and carry it through with determination in spite of obstacles." This aphorism frequently is invoked by scholars seeking to account for the sudden twists and turns of U.S. foreign policy (e.g., Kennan, 1951). But what implica-

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t i o n s d o e s this insight h o l d for a g r o u p o f d e m o c r a c i e s t h r o w n t o g e t h e r by the v i c i s s i t u d e s o f the p o s t - C o l d War era? T h i s is a critical i s s u e w i t h i n the c o n t e x t o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' grand strategy o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n b e c a u s e o f the i m p o r t a n c e U . S . f o r e i g n policy m a k e r s attach to multilateral institutions as t o o l s for the m a n a g e m e n t o f E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y affairs. T h e a r g u m e n t a d v a n c e d in this c h a p t e r s u g g e s t s that the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f E u r o p e ' s n a s c e n t c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y s y s t e m w i l l b e u n d e r m i n e d by the interaction b e t w e e n ( 1 ) the m a j o r p o w e r s ' relat i v e l y b e n i g n s e c u r i t y e n v i r o n m e n t , and ( 2 ) the d o m e s t i c s t r u c t u r e s that p r e s e n t l y c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e s e c o u n t r i e s . In e s s e n c e , this c o m b i n a t i o n o f s y s t e m i c and d o m e s t i c c o n d i t i o n s h e i g h t e n s the p r o b a b i l i t y that E u r o p e ' s e m e r g i n g s e c u r i t y architecture w i l l b e little m o r e than a f a c a d e e n g r a v e d w i t h s o l e m n p l e d g e s that lack practical s i g n i f i c a n c e .

Notes 1. Presumably, there are at least a few political goals worth dying for. I would characterize this as the "Patrick Henry s y n d r o m e . " The reference, of course, is to the apocryphal story of the American Revolutionary leader w h o defied his British captors with the well-known line, "Give me liberty or give m e death." In theory, such highly motivated individuals could find the costs of nuclear war to be outweighed by the potential benefits. 2. Germany renounced its right to manufacture, possess, or control nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the treaty relating to the unification of the country in September 1990. 3. For the purposes of this discussion, the nuclear weapons located on Ukrainian territory have been eliminated from the analysis. A s noted in C h a p t e r 2, Ukraine has pledged to become a non-nuclear state by the end of this decade. 4. There have been relatively few systematic studies of the role that issues play as a source of international conflict (Levy, 1989: 227). At present, the most c o m p r e h e n s i v e empirical analysis of the subject can be f o u n d in Luard (1986). Diehl and Goertz ( 1 9 8 8 ) have e x a m i n e d the relationship between territorial changes and militarized conflict. 5. Altogether, m a j o r powers have been involved in 122 of the cases contained in the data set. Since our interest here is limited to the subject of conflict between and a m o n g the m a j o r powers, I have ignored the 86 cases featuring a confrontation between a m a j o r power and a minor state. The states q u a l i f y i n g as m a j o r powers over the past four centuries have been identified on the basis of lists compiled by Levy (1983: 197) and Waltz (1979: 162). 6. The discrete issues comprising each issue-area are listed at the foot of Table 4.2. 7. It is also interesting to note that, historically, the major powers have tended not to get involved in armed conflicts over "minority rights" issues. T h i s issue-area also ranks last a m o n g the triggers associated with the outbreak of direct m a j o r power conflict. T h i s f i n d i n g should serve to allay concerns about a m a j o r - p o w e r confrontation emerging f r o m a dispute over issues pertaining to ethnic and/or religious minorities in the p o s t - C o l d War era.

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8. The violence plaguing U.S. society, of course, raises some doubts about this argument. In theory, liberal norms should exert their strongest effects within the United States, as it is the world's oldest and most firmly established democracy. Yet, U.S. citizens commit more acts of violence against one another than do the citizens of any other industrialized country. An explanation for this tendency is not intuitively obvious within the context of the peace-through-political-culture hypothesis. 9. For a critique of the peace-through-democratization thesis, see Mearsheimer (1990: 4 8 - 5 1 ) . In essence, Mearsheimer (1990: 50) argues that "history provides no clear test of [the] theory" that democratization on the part of the major powers will breed enduring peace and stability in Europe. This is a somewhat ironic position for Mearsheimer to take considering the significance he attaches to nuclear deterrence as the foundation for European stability during the Cold War era. As numerous scholars have pointed out, history provides few unambiguous tests of deterrence theory either (see Lebow and Stein, 1989). 10. Previous periods of long major-power peace within Europe occurred during 1815-1853 and 1871-1914. Unfortunately, no one has ever undertaken a systematic, comparative analysis of this phenomenon (Spiezio, 1992). As a result, we have yet to develop a theoretical framework that might account for this recurrent systemic outcome. This is troubling because, in the absence of a comparative analysis, it is logically impossible to establish cause-and-effect relationships in international politics (Most and Starr, 1989: 13). 11. The influence domestic factors exert appears to vary across issue-areas, but it is nonetheless present in all realms of public policy. 12. Historically, the most salient threat to U.S. security emanating from Europe has been posed by a major power's attempt to dominate the Continent militarily (Morgenthau, 1951/1989). Since contemporary conditions greatly diminish the probability that a major power will undertake such an aggressive and expansionist foreign policy, one could argue that there are few, if any, regional threats that could seriously jeopardize the security of the United States. 13. The analysis is based upon the widely used index of national power developed by Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972). 14. The analysis also lends further empirical support to Waltz's (1993: 52) recent contention that, despite the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the structure of the European states system can still best be characterized as bipolar. 15. In a "state-dominated" structure, the policymaking process is insulated from societal demands; hence, the state enjoys a high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis society. In a "society-dominated" system, on the other hand, the state is highly susceptible to public opinion because the decentralized nature of the decisionmaking process provides societal actors with opportunities to channel their demands into the political system (Risse-Kappen, 1991: 484-485). 16. The text of the joint action program can be found in Foreign Policy Bulletin (July/August 1993) 4:13-15. 17. NATO did pledge to enforce the no-fly zone that the United Nations established over Bosnia in October 1992. This has done little to enhance the credibility of the major powers' commitment to use force as an instrument of international conflict management, however. A recent UN report indicates that there have been 674 violations of the zone since N A T O was authorized to shoot down military aircraft over Bosnia. NATO commanders, however, have requested permission to use force on only one occasion (Preston, 1993: A10).

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18. This assertion of Russia's "special responsibility" in regard to the countries comprising the former Soviet Union is significant because Kozyrev is a member of the most pro-Western group inside of Russia (Arbatov, 1993: 9). Other groups vying to influence the course of Russian foreign policy tend to be much more nationalistic and hostile toward the West. The coalition led by Gennadiy Zhirinovsky, for example, "is devoted to the goal of revival of the Russian empire . . . [and is] prepared to reinstate the Soviet Union by military force" (Arbatov, 1993: 14). Zhirinovsky caused a stir throughout Europe when his Liberal Democratic Party received 23 percent of the vote in Russia's December 1993 parliamentary elections.

5 THE UNITED STATES AND THE ISOLATIONIST IMPULSE

T h e grand strategy of institutionalization represents an ambitious attempt on the part of the United States to nurture the development o f a liberal international society in Europe. T h e ultimate goal is to construct a regional political order wherein the exercise o f state power would be constrained by an interlocking network of liberal norms and institutions located at the level of both domestic and international politics. T h e attractiveness o f this design lies in its potential for creating the political foundation for an enduring era of peace and prosperity in Europe. In pursuit of this goal, U . S . foreign policy makers have taken steps to promote the democratization and marketization of state-society relations in countries located throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. At the same time, the United States also has supported efforts to broaden and deepen the role international institutions play in the management o f regional security, e c o n o m i c , and social issues. In combination, these initiatives represent the key components o f a long-term, integrated strategy designed to facilitate the emergence o f a common normative and institutional framework in Europe that, ultimately, will serve to liberalize the constitutive principles of political association both within and between states. T h e values and assumptions underlying the grand strategy of institutionalization have long been a part of the U . S . diplomatic tradition. They are reflected, for example, in Woodrow W i l s o n ' s famous Fourteen Points speech, which indicated how self-determination, open commerce, and collective security could serve to enhance the relative peace, stability, and welfare of p o s t - W o r l d War I Europe. T h e same celebration o f liberal values and institutions can be found in the " f o u r f r e e d o m s " that Presidents Roosevelt and Truman would cite as central to their efforts to reconstruct the European states system in the aftermath o f World War II ( M c C o r m i c k ,

1985: 3-62). T h e s e parallels are instructive because they also highlight a fundamental c h o i c e that stands before U . S . foreign policy makers in the

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p o s t - C o l d W a r e r a . For the third t i m e this c e n t u r y , the U n i t e d S t a t e s is c o n f r o n t e d with the task of r e d e f i n i n g the s e c u r i t y - r e l a t e d r o l e it will play in regard to the E u r o p e a n states s y s t e m . T h e past o f f e r s t w o m o d e l s of the direction that U.S. f o r e i g n policy m a k e r s c o u l d take. T h e first s t e m s f r o m the p o s t - W o r l d W a r II era and is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by active U.S. i n v o l v e m e n t in the d a y - t o - d a y m a n a g e m e n t of E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y a f f a i r s . T h e s e c o n d h a r k e n s b a c k to the interwar period w h e n the U n i t e d States r e f u s e d to ass u m e such b u r d e n s . In this c h a p t e r , I present e v i d e n c e that indicates that the U n i t e d States is on the v e r g e of a d o p t i n g an isolationist policy in r e g a r d to the c o u n t r i e s of E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n d the f o r m e r S o v i e t U n i o n . T h e a n a l y s i s s u g g e s t s that in the f u t u r e U . S . f o r e i g n policy m a k e r s are likely to a d o p t a b u c k p a s s i n g s t r a t e g y w h e n it c o m e s to the m a n a g e m e n t of s e c u r i t y i s s u e s in Eastern E u r o p e . T h i s a p p r o a c h , h o w e v e r , will not b e identical to the isolationism that c h a r a c t e r i z e d U.S. f o r e i g n policy d u r i n g the first half of the twentieth c e n t u r y . W h e r e a s in the past the United States a b s t a i n e d f r o m any military inv o l v e m e n t in E u r o p e , the e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d in this c h a p t e r s u g g e s t s that the U n i t e d States will r e m a i n active in this r e g i o n , but its m a n a g e r i a l activities will be limited to the w e s t e r n half of the C o n t i n e n t . T h a t is, the United States will remain a m e m b e r of N A T O , but it will not e x t e n d binding security c o m m i t m e n t s to countries located in the eastern half of the C o n t i nent; nor will the United States be an active participant in multilateral military interventions undertaken in this part of E u r o p e . In essence, U.S. foreign policy m a k e r s in the p o s t - C o l d W a r era will seek to c o m b i n e e l e m e n t s of both c o n t a i n m e n t and isolationism in their a p p r o a c h to E u r o p e a n security. O b v i o u s l y , this J a n u s - f a c e d a p p r o a c h holds important i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the f u t u r e of both the E u r o p e a n states s y s t e m and the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' g r a n d s t r a t e g y of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n . A s n o t e d p r e v i o u s l y , the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' p o s t - C o l d W a r s t r a t e g y is p r e m i s e d u p o n the s a m e b a s i c a p p r o a c h that it t o o k t o w a r d W e s t e r n E u r o p e in the d e c a d e s f o l l o w i n g the e n d of W o r l d W a r II. In both c a s e s , the United States has p r o m o t e d d e m o c r a c y , m a r k e t s , and international institutions as the keys to a c h i e v i n g p e a c e and prosperity in E u r o p e . T h e r e will be, of course, o n e f u n d a m e n t a l d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n then and n o w . A s a result of the C o l d W a r , the U n i t e d States w a s w i l l i n g to m a k e an e x p l i c i t c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y c o m m i t m e n t to the m a r k e t d e m o c r a c i e s of W e s t e r n E u r o p e . T h i s w a s c o d i f i e d in the N o r t h A t l a n t i c T r e a t y , w h i c h e x t e n d e d an u n c o n d i t i o n a l U.S. security g u a r a n t e e to the political a u t o n o m y a n d territorial integrity of its allies. In the p o s t - C o l d W a r e r a , h o w e v e r , the United States has r e f u s e d to m a k e a similar c o m m i t m e n t to the e m e r g ing m a r k e t d e m o c r a c i e s of E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n d the f o r m e r S o v i e t U n i o n . T h e m o s t U . S . f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a k e r s h a v e b e e n w i l l i n g to o f f e r is a

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"Partnership for P e a c e " that establishes a pledge on the part of the United States to consult with Eastern European g o v e r n m e n t s in the event of regional instability but stops far short of the b i n d i n g security c o m m i t m e n t the United States adopted in regard to the countries of Western Europe. T h e question, of course, is w h e t h e r or not the United S t a t e s ' unwillingness to underwrite the security of Eastern European countries will j e o p ardize the success of its long-term strategy in Europe. What implications will the a b s e n c e of a credible collective security f r a m e w o r k hold f o r the prospects of transforming the European states system into a pluralistic security c o m m u n i t y overlaid by a single, integrated market? T h e present chapter addresses this issue and assesses the c o n s e q u e n c e s that an isolationist stance toward Eastern Europe may hold for the future of the European states system under present systemic and domestic conditions. I begin by presenting evidence that indicates that the United States is on the verge of adopting an isolationist posture when it comes to the m a n a g e m e n t of international security issues in the eastern half of the Continent.

The United States and Isolationism "Isolationism" is a politically charged word that frequently is used without a great deal of analytical precision. It is a term of o p p r o b r i u m that typically is invoked in public debates in an attempt to paint an o p p o n e n t as hopelessly naive about the realities of contemporary international politics. In this caricature, isolationists are routinely depicted as individuals w h o w o u l d have the United States abstain f r o m all involvement with the o u t side w o r l d . It is this vision of an autarchic United States, insulated f r o m the vicissitudes of international politics, that presumably lies at the core of the isolationist agenda. Like all caricatures, however, this representation grossly exaggerates the practical implications that have been associated with an isolationist approach to U.S. foreign policy. T h e United States has practiced isolationism throughout most of its history (Crabb, 1986: ch. 1). Indeed, it w a s the dominant paradigm of U.S. foreign policy until World W a r II. During the reign of isolationism, however, the United States n e v e r attempted to withdraw c o m p l e t e l y f r o m international a f f a i r s . T o the contrary, the United States has been an active participant in international politics f r o m the very beginning of the Republic ( D e C o n d e , 1963). This is especially the case in regard to the United S t a t e s ' f o r e i g n e c o n o m i c policy ( W i l l i a m s , 1962). Hence, there is little empirical support for the contention that isolationism can be understood simply in terms of a desire for autarchy. Isolationism, however, does have special significance within the c o n text of the United S t a t e s ' approach to regional security issues outside of

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the W e s t e r n H e m i s p h e r e . A s R o b e r t T u c k e r ( 1 9 7 2 : 3 2 ) points outs, isolat i o n i s m h i s t o r i c a l l y h a s b e e n s y n o n y m o u s w i t h an u n w i l l i n g n e s s on the part of the U n i t e d S t a t e s " t o e n t e r t a i n c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s , n o t a b l y alliances, a n d u n d e r t a k e c e r t a i n a c t i o n s , n o t a b l y i n t e r v e n t i o n s . " Put d i f f e r ently, " t h e issue of isolationism c o n t i n u e s principally to turn, as it h a s alw a y s t u r n e d , on the w i l l i n g n e s s [of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ] to e n t e r i n t o . . . military c o m m i t m e n t s " ( T u c k e r , 1972: 3 6 - 3 7 ) . T h i s c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s u g g e s t s t w o e m p i r i c a l r e f e r e n t s that c a n b e used to a s s e s s the e x t e n t to w h i c h U.S. f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a k e r s are b e i n g g u i d e d b y the p r e c e p t s of i s o l a t i o n i s m : ( 1 ) an u n w i l l i n g n e s s to e x t e n d b i n d i n g security c o m m i t m e n t s to other states, and (2) an u n w i l l i n g n e s s to p a r t i c i p a t e in military i n t e r v e n t i o n s . In a d d i t i o n , T u c k e r also i d e n t i f i e s a c o g n i t i v e f a c t o r that h a s b e e n c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d with an isolationist p o s ture on the part of the U n i t e d S t a t e s . What distinguishes an isolationist outlook . . . is the conviction that sustained foreign involvement—and particularly one holding out the constant prospect of military intervention—poses a grave threat to America's institutions and well-being. An extreme sensitivity to, and consequently an obsessive fear of, the domestic effects of foreign policy has been one the hallmarks—perhaps the hallmark—of the isolationist outlook. (Tucker, 1972: 35) In its classical m a n i f e s t a t i o n , isolationism w a s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by an unw i l l i n g n e s s on the part of the U n i t e d States to: (1) establish p e a c e t i m e security c o m m i t m e n t s w i t h o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , (2) p e r m a n e n t l y station its military f o r c e s o u t s i d e of U . S . - h e l d territories, or ( 3 ) use f o r c e in s u p p o r t of the s t a t u s q u o in e i t h e r E u r o p e or A s i a (Art, 1991: 6 ) . At the s a m e t i m e , h o w e v e r , this posture did not p r e v e n t U.S. f o r e i g n policy m a k e r s f r o m t a k ing part in multilateral e f f o r t s to deal with international security p r o b l e m s . D u r i n g the interwar p e r i o d , f o r e x a m p l e , the U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s w i l l i n g : to p a r t i c i p a t e in multilateral a r m s control negotiations; to consult with o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t s in r e s p o n s e to c r i s e s ; to u n d e r t a k e d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s in the n a m e of r e s o l v i n g international c o n f l i c t s ; a n d e v e n to participate, on o c c a s i o n , in m u l t i l a t e r a l e c o n o m i c s a n c t i o n s i m p o s e d a g a i n s t states that h a d c o m m i t t e d acts of a g g r e s s i o n ( P a t e r s o n , C l i f f o r d , a n d H a g a n , 1991: 314— 332, 3 3 5 - 3 4 8 ) . T h r o u g h o u t this p e r i o d , h o w e v e r , U . S . f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a k e r s a l s o m a d e it c l e a r that the U n i t e d States w o u l d not g u a r a n t e e the political aut o n o m y or territorial integrity of any c o u n t r y ; nor w o u l d the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t e r v e n e militarily in E u r o p e or A s i a u n l e s s a n o t h e r m a j o r p o w e r a p p e a r e d to be on the verge of e s t a b l i s h i n g a p r e d o m i n a n t position within the r e g i o n ( T u c k e r , 1 9 7 2 : 2 8 ) . In e s s e n c e , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f r a m e d itself as the d e f e n d e r of last resort in r e g a r d to the s e c u r i t y of both t h e s e r e g i o n a l

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s y s t e m s . W h i l e isolationism did not c o m p l e t e l y rule out the possibility that the U n i t e d States w o u l d use f o r c e in s u p p o r t of its interests in E u r o p e a n d A s i a , it did s i g n i f i c a n t l y limit the r a n g e of s t r a t e g i c e x i g e n c i e s that w o u l d warrant such a response. A s this d i s c u s s i o n implies, it w o u l d not b e i n c o n c e i v a b l e for c o n t e m porary U.S. f o r e i g n policy m a k e r s to p a r t i c i p a t e in the multilateral institutions c o m p r i s i n g E u r o p e ' s e m e r g i n g security a r c h i t e c t u r e w h i l e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a d o p t i n g an i s o l a t i o n i s t a p p r o a c h to t h e m a n a g e m e n t of E u r o p e a n security a f f a i r s . In practice, such a policy w o u l d b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a tend e n c y on the part of U.S. f o r e i g n policy m a k e r s to p l e d g e their u n e q u i v o cal s u p p o r t f o r the principles, n o r m s , a n d rules that lie at the c o r e of these i n s t i t u t i o n s , w h i l e a l s o t a k i n g s t e p s to m i n i m i z e or r e d u c e the s e c u r i t y related c o s t s that the U n i t e d States has to b e a r in regard to these c o m m i t m e n t s . T h e r e m a i n d e r of this section p r e s e n t s e v i d e n c e that indicates that the U n i t e d States is i n d e e d m o v i n g in this d i r e c t i o n w h e n it c o m e s to the s e c u r i t y of c o u n t r i e s l o c a t e d in E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n d the f o r m e r S o v i e t Union. T h e r e are f o u r p i e c e s of e v i d e n c e that s u g g e s t that U . S . f o r e i g n policy m a k e r s are on the v e r g e of a d o p t i n g an isolationist stance t o w a r d c o u n tries l o c a t e d in the e a s t e r n half of the C o n t i n e n t . T h e f i r s t c a n b e f o u n d , ironically, in the Clinton a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s P a r t n e r s h i p f o r P e a c e p r o g r a m . A s d i s c u s s e d in C h a p t e r 2, this p r o g r a m is d e s i g n e d to p r o m o t e " a practical w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p " b e t w e e n N A T O a n d t h e o t h e r m e m b e r s of the E u r o p e a n states s y s t e m ( C h r i s t o p h e r , 1994: C 7 ) . P r e s i d e n t Clinton ( 1 9 9 4 : A l l ) a l s o has f r a m e d this initiative as a clear d e m o n s t r a t i o n of " A m e r i c a ' s c o m m i t m e n t to E u r o p e ' s s a f e t y a n d s t a b i l i t y . " Y e t , the p r o g r a m a c t u a l l y c o n t r i b u t e s little to the security of c o u n t r i e s l o c a t e d in Eastern E u r o p e and the f o r m e r Soviet U n i o n . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d its N A T O allies, f o r e x a m p l e , are u n d e r n o o b l i g a t i o n to d e f e n d the political a u t o n o m y or territorial integrity of t h e s e s t a t e s . N o r is t h e r e any c o m m i t m e n t to u l t i m a t e l y a d m i t t h e s e s t a t e s to N A T O at s o m e point in the f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e . At the s a m e time, h o w e v e r , these " p a r t n e r s " will be e x p e c t e d to m a k e a material contribution to N A T O p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s in E u r o p e ( C h r i s t o p h e r , 1 9 9 3 b : 55). T h i s c r e a t e s an o b v i o u s o p p o r t u n i t y f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o p a s s a l o n g t h e c o s t s of these m i s s i o n s (especially in the f o r m of m a n p o w e r ) to Eastern E u r o p e a n states. S e e n f r o m this p e r s p e c t i v e , the f o l l o w i n g c o m m e n t by f o r m e r S e c retary of D e f e n s e L e s A s p i n takes on a d d e d s i g n i f i c a n c e .

Partnership for Peace requires that partners make a real contribution. It doesn't just ask what NATO can do for its new partners, it asks what the new partners can do for NATO. Security consultations, for instance, will be available to active partners, those who make a contribution and

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involve themselves in the multinational activities NATO. (Aspin, 1993: 4; emphasis added)

that are the heart of

T h e exploitative potential implicit in the p r o g r a m is e n h a n c e d considerably, of course, by the fact that the U n i t e d States (in c o n j u n c t i o n with its allies) will j u d g e the eligibility of p r o s p e c t i v e m e m b e r s , in part, o n the basis of "each c a n d i d a t e ' s ability—as d e m o n s t r a t e d through P a r t n e r s h i p for P e a c e — t o take on the m u t u a l d e f e n s e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of m e m b e r s t a t e s " ( C h r i s t o p h e r , 1994: C7). In e s s e n c e , this initiative p r e s e n t s U.S. f o r e i g n policy makers with the best of both worlds. It entitles them to put c l a i m s on the resources held by Eastern E u r o p e a n states without r e q u i r i n g the United States to establish a b i n d i n g c o m m i t m e n t to the security of these c o u n t r i e s . A s e c o n d p i e c e of e v i d e n c e can be f o u n d in the C o m b i n e d J o i n t T a s k F o r c e , w h i c h w a s c r e a t e d by N A T O d u r i n g its J a n u a r y 1 9 9 4 s u m m i t in B r u s s e l s . In e s s e n c e , this institutional i n n o v a t i o n will p e r m i t the U n i t e d States to abstain f r o m N A T O p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s in Eastern E u r o p e . T h e task f o r c e p r o v i s i o n f r e e s m e m b e r states f r o m any o b l i g a t i o n to c o n tribute t r o o p s to a N A T O m i s s i o n u n d e r t a k e n o u t s i d e of W e s t e r n E u r o p e ( W i l l i a m s a n d H o c k s t a d e r , 1994: A 1 6 ) . H e n c e , the United S t a t e s w o u l d be entitled to participate in the d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e s s relating to such m i s s i o n s , but it a l s o w o u l d be u n d e r n o o b l i g a t i o n to p r o v i d e U . S . f o r c e s in the n a m e of i m p l e m e n t i n g the decision. O b v i o u s l y , the C o m b i n e d Joint T a s k F o r c e a g r e e m e n t c r e a t e s yet a n o t h e r o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s to a d o p t a b u c k - p a s s i n g s t r a t e g y w h e n it c o m e s to the task of international c o n f l i c t m a n a g e m e n t in E a s t e r n E u r o p e . T h i s possibility has not g o n e u n n o t i c e d . A n u n n a m e d , senior-level B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l w a r n e d that the a r r a n g e m e n t c o u l d " t u r n out to b e a d i s g u i s e f o r c o v e r t A m e r i c a n w i t h d r a w a l " f r o m the a l l i a n c e ' s n e w l y e s t a b lished m a n d a t e f o r p e a c e k e e p i n g in E u r o p e ( D r o z d i a k , 1 9 9 4 : A 3 2 ) . S i m i lar s e n t i m e n t s w e r e e x p r e s s e d by at least s o m e m e m b e r s of t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t . In f a c t , o n e f o r e i g n s e r v i c e o f f i c e r , not s p e a k i n g f o r attribution, c h a r a c t e r i z e d the e n t i r e s u m m i t as " a d i s g u i s e f o r U.S. w i t h d r a w a l f r o m E u r o p e " ( W i l l i a m s , 1994: A 3 2 ) . T h e s e c o n c e r n s are w a r r a n t e d b e c a u s e the task f o r c e a g r e e m e n t basically i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e s the f r e e r i d i n g b e h a v i o r that the U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s e x h i b i t e d in regard to the w a r in B o s n i a . O v e r the past t w o y e a r s , several m e m b e r s of N A T O h a v e p r o v i d e d g r o u n d f o r c e s in s u p p o r t of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s ' p e a c e k e e p i n g a n d h u m a n i t a r i a n e f f o r t s in B o s n i a . F r a n c e a n d Britain h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d t h e largest c o n t i n g e n t s ( a p p r o x i m a t e l y 6 , 0 0 0 a n d 2 , 5 0 0 troops, respectively); lesser c o n t r i b u t i o n s h a v e c o m e f r o m c o u n t r i e s s u c h as C a n a d a , S p a i n , the N e t h e r l a n d s , a n d Italy. U . S . f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a k e r s , h o w e v e r , h a v e r e f u s e d to deploy any g r o u n d f o r c e s in the c o u n t r y until a f t e r a p e a c e s e t t l e m e n t has b e e n a r r a n g e d . 1 In the m e a n t i m e , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' c o n t r i b u t i o n has b e e n l i m i t e d to the p r o v i s i o n of c a r g o

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p l a n e s a n d f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t that have been used to deliver h u m a n i t a r i a n relief s u p p l i e s a n d to h e l p e n f o r c e the no-fly z o n e o v e r B o s n i a . T h e C o m b i n e d J o i n t T a s k F o r c e a g r e e m e n t w o u l d p e r m i t the U n i t e d States to d u p l i c a t e this " d i v i s i o n of l a b o r " in all s u b s e q u e n t p e a c e k e e p i n g and p e a c e e n f o r c e m e n t m i s s i o n s u n d e r t a k e n by N A T O . In p r i n c i p l e , h o w e v e r , the a g r e e m e n t g o e s e v e n f u r t h e r than t h a t : It f o r m a l l y e x c u s e s the U n i t e d S t a t e s f r o m c o n t r i b u t i n g any military f o r c e s to N A T O o p e r a t i o n s o u t s i d e of W e s t e r n E u r o p e . A s such, it p r o v i d e s U.S. f o r e i g n policy m a k e r s with a l e g i t i m a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n for not b e a r i n g the c o s t s of international c o n f l i c t m a n a g e m e n t in Eastern E u r o p e . A third p i e c e of e v i d e n c e can be f o u n d in a series of m a j o r a d d r e s s e s d e l i v e r e d by P r e s i d e n t Clinton and other senior-level p o l i c y m a k e r s in Sept e m b e r 1 9 9 3 . T h e s p e e c h e s w e r e intended to o u t l i n e the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' approach to UN p e a c e k e e p i n g operations. T h e y also reveal, h o w e v e r , that the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n is d i s t a n c i n g itself f r o m the g e n e r a l i z e d p r i n c i p l e s of c o n d u c t that lie at the c o r e of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . In an a d d r e s s to the General A s s e m b l y , f o r e x a m p l e , President Clinton e x h o r t e d t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s to b e c o m e m u c h m o r e s e l e c t i v e w h e n it c o m e s to a c t i n g u p o n the security-related r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s s p e c i f i e d in A r ticle 1 of the C h a r t e r . The United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts. If the American people are to say yes to UN peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no. (Clinton, 1993c: 52) T h e p a s s a g e is s i g n i f i c a n t b e c a u s e it r e p r e s e n t s an o b v i o u s d e p a r t u r e f r o m the p r i n c i p l e of unconditionality that s t a n d s as the h a l l m a r k of a c o l lective security s y s t e m . A s John G e r a r d R u g g i e ( 1 9 9 3 : 11) points out, this t y p e of institution is b a s e d upon a c o m m i t m e n t to action that m e m b e r s are e x p e c t e d to a b i d e by " w i t h o u t regard to the p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c interests of the p a r t i e s or the s t r a t e g i c e x i g e n c i e s that m a y e x i s t in any s p e c i f i c o c c u r r e n c e . " T h e p r e s i d e n t ' s c o m m e n t , h o w e v e r , s u g g e s t s that the U n i t e d States will e s c h e w this f r e e s t a n d i n g c o m m i t m e n t in f a v o r of a c a s e - b y - c a s e app r o a c h that d i f f e r e n t i a t e s s i t u a t i o n s on the b a s i s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s e v a l u a t i o n of their relative i m p o r t a n c e to the m a i n t e n a n c e of international peace and security.2 A similar t h e m e w a s s o u n d e d by A n t h o n y L a k e d u r i n g a m a j o r foreign policy a d d r e s s d e l i v e r e d at J o h n s H o p k i n s U n i v e r s i t y . L a k e c o n c l u d e d his d i s c u s s i o n of the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s g r a n d strategy by e l a b o r a t i n g on the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' attitude t o w a r d m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m . Let me say a word about the current doctrinal debate on multilateralism. . . . For any official with responsibilities for our security policies, only one overriding factor can determine whether the U.S. should act multi-

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laterally or unilaterally, and that is America's interests. W e should act multilaterally when doing so advances our interests—and w e should act unilaterally when that will serve our purpose. (Lake, 1993: 4 4 - 4 5 )

While this axiom of prudential statecraft certainly makes intuitive sense f r o m the standpoint of a d o m e s t i c audience, it also is at o d d s with the principled c o m m i t m e n t s that accrue to the m e m b e r s of a collective security system. As noted in Chapter 3, this type of regime "requires its participants to r e n o u n c e temporary a d v a n t a g e s and the temptation to d e f i n e their interests narrowly in terms of national interests" ( C a p o r a s o , 1993: 56). T h e speeches cited above, h o w e v e r , constitute a public renunciation of these norms of behavior. They also provide an indication that U.S. foreign policy m a k e r s will orient t h e m s e l v e s to the institutions c o m p r i s i n g E u r o p e ' s nascent collective security system on the basis of a utilitarian calculation of the relative costs and b e n e f i t s a p r o p o s e d multilateral undertaking holds for the national interests of the United States. T h e fourth, and final, piece of e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t i n g that the United States will adopt an isolationist s t a n c e toward Eastern E u r o p e can be found in the mood of its people. National mood is an elusive, but a potentially useful, concept that refers to the underlying values, assumptions, and beliefs that characterize a society at any given historical moment (Almond, 1960). Its political s i g n i f i c a n c e s t e m s f r o m the law of anticipated reactions, which holds that d e c i s i o n m a k e r s will f o r g o certain foreign policy options if they think the public is likely to withhold support for, or actively oppose, an initiative (Kegley and W i t t k o p f , 1991: 253, 300). This argument parallels V. O. K e y ' s (1961) contention that mass opinion can influence the policymaking process by establishing certain parameters that can serve as a constraint on a g o v e r n m e n t ' s ability to act both domestically and internationally. Assessing the national mood of a society is laden with methodological challenges. Survey data compiled since the end of the Cold War, however, indicate that the people of the United States have b e c o m e deeply c o n cerned about their e c o n o m i c security and remain wary of military interventions, especially when they entail involvement in the internal affairs of other countries (Schneider, 1992). Writing on the eve of the 1992 election, for example, pollster Daniel Yankelovich noted that over the past year the public's level of anxiety has been rising steadily. What worries Americans is that the economy is growing stagnant or declining (75 percent), that Japan is ahead of the United States in terms of its ability to compete (77 percent) and that as a consequence the American standard of living is in grave danger. The main source of voters' anxiety is not the recession as such, . . . they fear that something is fundamentally wrong with the U.S. e c o n o m y . (Yankelovich, 1992: 2)

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This is not to suggest that economic concerns are prompting a desire on the part of U.S. citizens to withdraw from international politics. Indeed, the latest (1990) Chicago Council on Foreign Relations survey reveals that 61 percent of the general public believes that it is important for the United States to continue playing a leadership role in world affairs (Schneider, 1992: 41). 3 Hence, the issue is "not whether the United States should be involved abroad, but how that involvement should be pursued" (Wittkopf, 1990: 27; emphasis added). And, when it comes to this instrumental question, the U.S. population exhibits a clear preference for reducing the United States' share of the costs associated with the task of managing international security problems. The Chicago Council survey, for example, indicates that the majority of the general public is in favor of cutting back the amount of military (73 percent) and economic (61 percent) assistance that the United States grants to other countries (Schneider, 1992: 56). This represents a 10-15 percent increase over the number of U.S. citizens favoring aid reductions in the 1986 survey. Moreover, a plurality of the general public also supports further reductions in U.S. defense spending as part of a broader effort to shrink the size of the federal government's budget deficit (Schneider, 1992: 55). These preferences can be linked, at least in part, to an underlying belief that security-related expenditures jeopardize the health of the United States' economy. In a 1988 survey conducted by the Americans Talk Security (ATS) Project, 1,004 registered voters were asked if the United States damages its economy by spending money to defend other countries. A resounding 86 percent of the respondents agreed with this proposition (ATS, 1988: 84). This sentiment also is reflected in the fact that 81 percent of the people were in agreement with the statement that the United States "can't afford to defend so many nations" (ATS, 1988: 101). It is clear that most of the voters surveyed regard Japan and the countries of Western Europe as the primary beneficiaries of the United States' efforts in the realm of security. Of the respondents in the ATS poll (1988: 89), 84 percent agreed that Japan and Europe "are winning the economic competition" because of the billions that the United States spends to defend them. This perception also would seem to underlie the general public's contention that the United States' allies can and should do more to provide for their own security (ATS, 1988: 100). Surveys indicate that the United States' people also are reluctant to support the use of military forces abroad, especially if the mission threatens to be lengthy, costly, and indecisive (Jentleson, 1992: 72). It is interesting to note that the United States' success in the Gulf War had little appreciable effect on the public's appetite for military interventions. In a poll taken two days after the end of the war, for example, 60 percent of the

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respondents indicated that this experience had not increased their willingness to support the use of U.S. military forces in an attempt to solve international problems (Schneider, 1992: 64). A majority of the people also are not in favor of becoming involved, militarily, in the internal affairs of other countries. In a CBS News-New York Times poll conducted in March 1991, 60 percent of the people surveyed expressed their opposition to U.S. involvement in such situations (reported in Schneider, 1992: 66-67). Overall, the data contained in these surveys indicate that the public's current attitude toward the use of force has not changed significantly from what it has been throughout the post-Vietnam era (see Wittkopf, 1990: 174-181). As this discussion suggests, the mood of the U.S. people currently is characterized by a deeply entrenched wariness about its country's involvement in military interventions and a relatively more recent concern about the future of U.S. economic strength. In combination, these anxieties have dampened the public's willingness to have the United States serve as the world's police in the post-Cold War era (Yankelovich, 1992: 9). This also has prompted a number of U.S. citizens to express an interest in enhancing the role international institutions play in the management of international security problems (Yankelovich, 1992: 10-11). In the 1990 Chicago Council survey, for example, a plurality of both the general public and the elite opinion-makers were in favor of strengthening the United Nations to this end (Schneider, 1992: 42-43). Public support for a multilateralist solution to the problem of international conflict management, however, should not be confused with a willingness on the part of the people to bear a disproportionate share of the costs associated with these institutions. In fact, there are reasons to suspect that the allure of these institutions lies in their capacity to serve as a redistributive mechanism whereby the United States actually can diminish the size of its contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. This has certainly been a popular theme with Bill Clinton. As a presidential candidate, for example, Clinton frequently stressed the need for a more equitable burden-sharing arrangement on the part of the United States and other members of the UN. America needs to reach a new agreement with our allies for sharing the costs and risks of maintaining peace. While Desert Storm set a useful precedent for cost-sharing, our forces still did most of the fighting and dying. W e need to shift that burden to a wider coalition of nations of which America will be a part. (Clinton, 1991: 5)

In a speech to the Foreign Policy Association, Clinton returned to this theme and elaborated on the policies he would pursue as president in an

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attempt to redistribute the United States' share of the costs associated with collective security. W e can make these institutions more effective and sustainable by reapportioning the burden of collective security. . . . We should seek to reduce our 3 0 percent financial share of U.N. peacekeeping operations to the 25 percent w e pay for the U . N . ' s regular budget. . . . Japan and Germany should be made permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. And we should seek larger contributions from those with the greatest interest in particular e f f o r t s . . . . We [also] should look to our alliances to take a more active role in the defense of their own regions. (Clinton, 1992a: 12)

Since taking o f f i c e , the Clinton administration has c o n t i n u e d to e m phasize the value of international institutions as redistributive mechanisms that can lighten the security b u r d e n s borne by the U n i t e d States in the p o s t - C o l d W a r era (Albright 1993b: 32; 1993a: 3 3 - 3 5 ) . During his Senate confirmation hearings, f o r example, Secretary of State designate Warren Christopher announced that the United States will not turn [our] blood and treasure into an open account for the use of the rest of the world. . . . It will be our administration's policy to encourage other nations and the institutions of collective security, especially the United Nations, to do more of the world's work to deter aggression, relieve suffering, and keep the peace. (Christopher, 1993e: 10)

Moreover, the Clinton administration has m a d e it clear that the United States is unlikely to be a frequent participant in multilateral military interventions. National Security Adviser Anthony Lake m a d e this point explicit in his aforementioned address at Johns Hopkins: While there will be increasing calls on us to help stem bloodshed and suffering in ethnic conflicts, and while we always will bring our diplomacy to b e a r . . . there will be relatively f e w intra-national ethnic conflicts that justify our military intervention. (Lake, 1993: 4 4 )

Additional evidence, of course, can be found in the United States' approach to the conflicts in Bosnia and Somalia. As noted above, the United States has r e f u s e d to intervene at all in the Bosnian war. This is a striking decision on the part of the Clinton administration because, as Lake (1993: 42) himself acknowledges, the conflict is being fought in the heart of a region that is of critical i m p o r t a n c e to the success of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s "strategy of e n l a r g e m e n t . " T h e S o m a l i a n case, h o w e v e r , may be even more instructive when it c o m e s to assessing the United States' attitude toward military interventions in the p o s t - C o l d W a r era. In essence, the Somalia situation demonstrates how sensitive the people of the United States

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and C o n g r e s s h a v e b e c o m e to t h e c o s t s of u s i n g f o r c e a b r o a d in a f f a i r s w h e r e vital U . S . interests are not directly at stake. O n O c t o b e r 3, 1 9 9 3 , a c o n t i n g e n t of U . S . A r m y R a n g e r s w a s a m b u s h e d by m e m b e r s of a S o m a l i a n militia on the streets of M o g a d i s h u . In the e n s u i n g b a t t l e , t w e l v e U . S . s o l d i e r s w e r e k i l l e d , e i g h t y s e r v i c e m e n w e r e w o u n d e d , a n d at least o n e pilot w a s taken p r i s o n e r . T h e e n g a g e m e n t s p a r k e d an i m m e d i a t e c o n f r o n t a t i o n b e t w e e n the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and m e m b e r s of C o n g r e s s o v e r the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' i n v o l v e m e n t in S o m a l i a . T h e o p p o s i t i o n w a s led by S e n a t o r R o b e r t B y r d , w h o p r e v i o u s l y had s i g naled the d e p t h of his u n e a s e o v e r the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' p o l i c y in r e g a r d to the c o n f l i c t in S o m a l i a d u r i n g a S e n a t e d e b a t e on S e p t e m b e r 8. Mr. President, it is becoming increasingly unclear as to what useful purpose is being served by the presence and operation of these forces in Somalia. . . . The cost to the United States of this mission is 44 million a month—that is, about a half-billion dollars a year. . . . The Congress never considered, was never asked, and certainly has never approved of United States participation in [this mission], . . . U.N. Security Council resolutions have never, and should never serve as a substitute for the responsibility of this institution [i.e., Congress] to affirmatively approve placing U.S. forces into hostile situations. 1 see in the front of this Chamber the U.S. flag. I do not see in front of this Chamber the UN flag. (Byrd, 1993: 20) T h e death of t w e l v e U.S. soldiers w a s e n o u g h to p r o m p t S e n a t o r B y r d to call f o r the w i t h d r a w a l of all U . S . f o r c e s f r o m S o m a l i a by the e n d of 1993. T h e incident also led s i x t y - f i v e m e m b e r s of the H o u s e of R e p r e s e n tatives to send a letter to President Clinton d e m a n d i n g an e n d to the United S t a t e s ' i n v o l v e m e n t in the U N m i s s i o n ( D e w a r , 1 9 9 3 a : A 3 9 ) . P e r h a p s most i m p o r t a n t , the crisis a l s o m o t i v a t e d several s e n a t o r s to p r o p o s e resolutions that w o u l d h a v e r e q u i r e d the p r e s i d e n t to o b t a i n explicit c o n g r e s sional a u t h o r i z a t i o n b e f o r e U . S . t r o o p s c o u l d p a r t i c i p a t e in f u t u r e m u l t i lateral p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s ( M a r c u s a n d D e w a r , 1 9 9 3 : A l ) . U l t i m a t e l y , t h e s e r e s o l u t i o n s w e r e a b a n d o n e d in f a v o r of a c o m p r o mise position that s i m p l y " u r g e s " President Clinton to s e e k c o n g r e s s i o n a l a p p r o v a l b e f o r e U.S. t r o o p s are u s e d in s u p p o r t of f u t u r e U N o p e r a t i o n s ( D e w a r , 1 9 9 3 b : A l ) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the b a c k l a s h g e n e r a t e d by the loss of a d o z e n U . S . lives in S o m a l i a p r o v i d e s a s t a r t l i n g i n d i c a t i o n of h o w s e n s i tive C o n g r e s s a n d the p e o p l e are to the costs of military intervention w h e n vital U.S. interests are not at stake. W e also s h o u l d n o t e that this d o m e s tic political o p p o s i t i o n u l t i m a t e l y did lead the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to r e v e r s e its policy in regard to the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' i n v o l v e m e n t in the S o m a lian c o n f l i c t . O n O c t o b e r 7, P r e s i d e n t Clinton a n n o u n c e d that "all A m e r i can t r o o p s will b e out of S o m a l i a n o later than M a r c h the 3 1 s t [ 1 9 9 4 ] " ( C l i n t o n , 1 9 9 3 a : 34).

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T h i s section has presented e v i d e n c e that indicates that the United States is exhibiting isolationist-like tendencies when it c o m e s to the task of international conflict management in Eastern Europe. In both words and deeds, U.S. foreign policy makers have repeatedly signaled their unwillingness to: (1) establish binding security c o m m i t m e n t s to the countries of Eastern Europe and the f o r m e r Soviet Union, or (2) participate in military interventions within the C o n t i n e n t . A s noted above, this approach to regional security issues in Europe corresponds closely to the foreign policy practices that historically have been associated with isolationism in U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, the Clinton administration's inclination to refrain f r o m assuming new security-related burdens in Europe is reinforced by an underlying sense of economic insecurity on the part of the people of the United States. This pervasive feeling of anxiety has prompted societal groups and coalitions to demand that the United States government devote the bulk of its attention and resources to an array of pressing d o m e s t i c problems. In essence, the end of the Cold War has elevated s o c i o e c o n o m i c concerns to the top of the United S t a t e s ' f o r e i g n policy a g e n d a . Within this context, additional security responsibilities on the part of the United States w o u l d constitute an unwelcome distraction that might also jeopardize the s t a t e ' s capacity to address the fears and concerns of its people. This sentiment, of course, is shared by President Clinton, w h o s e victory in the 1992 election was due, in no small part, to his realization that " i t ' s the economy, stupid." C l i n t o n ' s (1991: 2) conviction that the United States is "a military giant crippled by economic weakness and an uncertain f u t u r e " has prompted his administration to s u b o r d i n a t e security issues to the task of " m o b i l i z i n g our country for the global e c o n o m i c competition that is the hallmark of this new a g e " (Clinton, 1992b: 14). Indeed, Secretary of State Christopher (1993e: 10) has pledged that the administration will " h a r n e s s our diplomacy to the needs and o p p o r t u n i t i e s of A m e r i c a n industries and w o r k e r s " in the p o s t - C o l d W a r era. A s Robert T u c k e r (1972: 35) points out, the economization of the U.S. foreign policy agenda also has been closely associated, historically, with the e m e r g e n c e of an isolationist approach on the part of the United States.

Isolationism and the Grand Strategy of Institutionalization To mention isolationism, of course, is to invoke historical memories of the calamities that befell Europe, Asia, and the rest of the world w h e n the United States adopted this approach in the 1920s and 1930s. T h e interwar period stands as perhaps the darkest episode in the history of U.S. foreign

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policy. By shunning involvement in European and Asian security affairs, the United States undeniably did contribute to a s e q u e n c e of e v e n t s that culminated in the deadliest war in world history—a global conflict leading to the deaths of tens of millions of people. Understandably, this experience has had a lasting effect upon the way scholars and statespeople alike think about isolationism. In essence, this approach to the issue of regional security in E u r o p e (and e l s e w h e r e ) has b e c o m e s y n o n y m o u s with the height of folly and irresponsibility on the part of U.S. foreign policy makers (Morgenthau 1951/1989: 6 3 7 - 6 4 0 ) . It is for this reason that the term "isolationist" is regarded as one of the most damnable labels in the lexicon of U.S. political discourse. Hence, we must be careful when using this term to characterize the Clinton administration's approach to post-Cold War Europe. That is, we should not exaggerate the scope of the isolationist impulse in contemporary U.S. foreign policy. There is no evidence to suggest, for example, that the Clinton administration is on the verge of abrogating the United States' commitment to NATO; nor are U.S. foreign policy makers contemplating the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from the Continent. President Clinton made this clear in a speech he delivered during the January 1994 N A T O summit in Brussels. I have c o m e here today to declare and to demonstrate that Europe remains central to the interest of the United States. . . . That is why I am committed to keeping roughly 100,000 American troops stationed in Europe. . . . It is not habit, but security that justifies this continuing c o m mitment by the United States. (Clinton, 1994: A l l )

T h e r e are f e w reasons to doubt the sincerity of the United S t a t e s ' c o m m i t m e n t to N A T O or the security of its long-standing Western European allies. In its approach to the security of countries located in Eastern Europe and the f o r m e r Soviet Union, however, the Clinton administration is exhibiting quite definite isolationist tendencies. A n d this is a matter of c o n s i d e r a b l e i m p o r t a n c e within the context of the United S t a t e s ' g r a n d strategy of institutionalization because these are the countries that must be transformed if Europe is to become a genuine "democratic international society." As it stands, however, it would appear that these states and societies will have to navigate the twin processes of democratization and marketization bereft of the collective security guarantees that the United States extended to the countries of Western Europe during the post-World War II era. C o n c e p t u a l l y , this highlights an important point about the role systemic f a c t o r s play in s h a p i n g the conduct of U.S. f o r e i g n policy. T h e United States has been promoting democratization, marketization, and integration as the solution to E u r o p e ' s enduring security problems throughout the twentieth century. Yet, it w a s only in the p o s t - W o r l d W a r II era that U.S. foreign policy makers opted to play an active role in the day-to-

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d a y m a n a g e m e n t of E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y i s s u e s . T h i s era, of c o u r s e , w a s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by b i p o l a r i t y . T h i s w a s a s y s t e m i c c o n t e x t that e n c o u r a g e d the United States to m a k e a legally b i n d i n g a n d f r e e s t a n d i n g c o m m i t m e n t to the security of c o u n t r i e s located in W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n d e l s e w h e r e . 4 A s K e n n e t h W a l t z has a r g u e d , bipolarity e x e r t s this e f f e c t b e c a u s e in a bipolar world there are no peripheries. With only two powers capable of acting on a world scale, anything that happens anywhere is potentially of concern to both of them. Bipolarity extends the geographic scope of both powers' concern. It also broadens the range of factors included in the competition between them. (Waltz, 1979: 171) T h e structural e f f e c t s associated with bipolarity stand in s h a r p contrast to the security i m p l i c a t i o n s that c o n f r o n t s t a t e s w i t h i n the c o n t e x t of a m u l t i p o l a r structure. W h e n three or m o r e m a j o r p o w e r s exist, the clarity of the threat e n v i r o n m e n t states m u s t deal w i t h d i m i n i s h e s c o n s i d e r a b l y . T h i s h e i g h t e n s uncertainty on the part of d e c i s i o n m a k e r s about " w h o is a d a n ger to w h o m , a n d w h o can b e e x p e c t e d to deal w i t h threats a n d p r o b l e m s " ( W a l t z , 1979: 170). Put d i f f e r e n t l y , m u l t i p o l a r i t y d a m p e n s a s t a t e ' s w i l l i n g n e s s to u n d e r t a k e m a n a g e r i a l tasks r e l a t i n g to the m a i n t e n a n c e of international p e a c e and security b e c a u s e in this s y s t e m i c e n v i r o n m e n t " d a n g e r s are d i f f u s e d , r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s unclear, a n d d e f i n i t i o n s of vital interests e a s ily o b s c u r e d " ( W a l t z , 1979: 171). 5 T h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a r e r e l e v a n t t o the p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n b e c a u s e history r e v e a l s that U . S . f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a k e r s h a v e a l w a y s o p t e d f o r an isolationist a p p r o a c h to E u r o p e a n security issues under c o n d i t i o n s of m u l tipolarity. H e n c e , w e s h o u l d not be s u r p r i s e d that the Clinton a d m i n i s t r a tion is e x h i b i t i n g this t e n d e n c y in r e g a r d to t h e c o u n t r i e s of E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n d the f o r m e r S o v i e t U n i o n . T h i s p r e d i s p o s i t i o n is b e i n g d r i v e n b y s t r u c t u r a l f a c t o r s that h a v e e x e r t e d q u i t e s i m i l a r e f f e c t s t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u r s e of U.S. history. T h i s i m p l i e s , of c o u r s e , that the d i l e m m a s c o n f r o n t i n g t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w h e n it c o m e s to the i s s u e of E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y in t h e p o s t - C o l d W a r era d o not s t e m f r o m the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s n a ï v e t é or its failure to internalize the lessons derived f r o m the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' d i s a s t r o u s e x p e r i e n c e w i t h i s o l a t i o n i s m in t h e 1 9 2 0 s a n d 1 9 3 0 s . N o r is it a r e f l e c t i o n of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s inability to a r t i c u l a t e a c o h e r e n t v i s i o n of t h e f u ture. Rather, the d i l e m m a c o n f r o n t i n g the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n is r o o t e d in a c o m b i n a t i o n of s y s t e m i c a n d d o m e s t i c f a c t o r s (i.e., m u l t i p o l a r i t y , d e f e n s e - d o m i n a n c e , a n d a s o c i e t y - d o m i n a t e d policy n e t w o r k ) that c r e a t e s s t r o n g i n c e n t i v e s f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s to a d o p t a b u c k - p a s s i n g s t r a t e g y w h e n it c o m e s to the m a n a g e m e n t of s e c u r i t y i s s u e s in E a s t e r n E u r o p e . T h i s p r o b l e m w o u l d exist r e g a r d l e s s of w h o w a s e l e c t e d p r e s i d e n t in t h e 1 9 9 2 election.

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This also suggests that U.S. aspirations are likely to far exceed the resources the United States is actually willing to c o m m i t w h e n it c o m e s to implementing the grand strategy of institutionalization. T h e e x i s t e n c e of such a gap between the means and the ends of strategy is nothing new, of course, within the context of U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, this type of insolvency has been a problem since the earliest days of the R e p u b l i c (Lippm a n n , 1943; H u n t i n g t o n , 1 9 8 7 - 1 9 8 8 ) . In recent years, h o w e v e r , the m e a n s - e n d s g a p has reached epic proportions in the United States. As Robert Tucker points out, this may well be Ronald R e a g a n ' s most enduring legacy as president. There is perhaps no more venerable tradition in American foreign policy than that of willing ambitious ends while refusing to entertain the necessary means. What distinguished Mr. Reagan in this respect w a s that he carried a very old tradition to new heights. To an extent that is probably without precedent, he has severed the connection between ends and means in foreign policy. What is more, it is this very disjuncture that has formed the essential element of his reconstituted domestic base. From the outset, the great appeal of the president's policies w a s that they demanded so little of the public while promising so much. . . . [Reagan] has transformed what had been a predisposition not to pay for the American position in the world into something close to a fixed resolve not to do so. If there is a consensus today in foreign policy, this must be regarded as its central tenet. (Tucker, 1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9 : 27; emphasis added)

T h e r e are signs that Bill Clinton is f o l l o w i n g in R e a g a n ' s f o o t s t e p s ( S a m u e l s o n , 1994: A 1 9 ) . 6 T h e president has articulated a vision of the United States, and of the world, that is more ambitious than any administration's since Franklin Roosevelt's. After two years in o f f i c e , however, it r e m a i n s unclear w h e t h e r the current United States g o v e r n m e n t possesses either the capacity or the competence to effect such f u n d a m e n t a l c h a n g e s at h o m e or abroad. T h i s unavoidably raises a question about the Clinton a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s ability to exert leadership at the level of both d o m e s t i c and international politics. This is a matter of considerable importance within the context of the United S t a t e s ' grand strategy of institutionalization b e c a u s e recent research indicates that leadership is an indispensable factor w h e n it c o m e s to the creation of regimes and durable international political orders (Rapkin, 1987; Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990; Young, 1991). I conclude the section with a brief discussion of this issue and the implications U.S. isolationism may hold for the prospects of building a "democratic international society" in Europe. Oran Young (1991) has elaborated on the critical role that leadership plays in regard to the success of institutional innovation by d e v e l o p i n g a typology that highlights the distinctive contribution d i f f e r e n t f o r m s of

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leadership m a k e to the process of r e g i m e f o r m a t i o n . Intellectual leaders, for example, provide the ideas and k n o w l e d g e that explain why a particular institutional a r r a n g e m e n t w o u l d be u s e f u l for dealing with a s p e c i f i c collective action problem (Young, 1991: 2 9 8 - 3 0 0 ) . 7 Entrepreneurial leaders, on the other hand, m a k e an invaluable contribution to the politics of regime creation through their ability "to foster integrative bargaining and to put together deals that w o u l d o t h e r w i s e e l u d e " g o v e r n m e n t s ( Y o u n g , 1991: 2 9 3 - 2 9 5 ) . Finally, structural leaders can facilitate the task of institutional innovation by either: (1) b e a r i n g a disproportionate share of the costs associated with the r e g i m e ' s operation, or (2) manipulating its material resources in w a y s that coerce other states into subsidizing the regime (Young, 1991: 289-291).« Y o u n g (1991: 303) hypothesizes that at least two f o r m s of leadership must be exercised if states are to create a viable international institution. A recent study by Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) provides empirical support f o r this proposition, but the analysis also suggests that structural leadership is an absolutely necessary condition f o r the creation of a durable international order. Put d i f f e r e n t l y , r e g i m e f o r m a t i o n may entail d i f f e r e n t types of leadership, but historical e x p e r i e n c e indicates that a structural leader must be present if the effort to create an international institution is to succeed (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990: 3 1 4 - 3 1 5 ) . T h e authors base this conclusion on several case studies taken f r o m the twentieth century. Of interest here is their analysis of the United S t a t e s ' e f f o r t s to rebuild the European states system in the a f t e r m a t h of World W a r s I and II. In both cases, the fate of the United States' postwar strategy hinged on the willingness of U.S. f o r e i g n policy m a k e r s to supplement their intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership with tangible o f fers of e c o n o m i c and military assistance to the countries of Europe (Ikenberry and K u p c h a n , 1990: 2 9 5 - 3 0 7 ) . In e s s e n c e , previous historical experience indicates that when it comes to the promotion of liberal values and institutions in Europe normative persuasion is insufficient to drive the socialization process. Elites in secondary states come to believe in the norms and ideals articulated by [U.S. foreign policy makers] only in junction with the provision of material incentives or through the imposition of those norms via direct intervention. (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990: 3 1 4 )

This discussion highlights the importance of the means-ends gap that has c o m e to characterize U.S. foreign policy over the past decade; it also underscores the significance of the isolationist tendencies that the United States is e x h i b i t i n g in regard to the c o u n t r i e s of Eastern E u r o p e and the f o r m e r Soviet Union. In essence, both issues are indicative of an unwillingness on the part of U.S. foreign policy m a k e r s to exercise the type of

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leadership that has proven to be decisive in past U.S. attempts to transform Europe into a "democratic international society." This possibility, of course, was forewarned in May 1993 by Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff, who was quoted as saying that the Clinton administration "expects to withdraw from many foreign policy leadership roles customarily assumed by the U.S." (Williams and Goshko, 1993: A l ) . While this position was quickly disavowed by Warren Christopher (1993f), actions do speak louder than words. And in this sense, the recent course of U.S. foreign policy has been consistent with T a r n o f f ' s contention that [w]e simply don't have the leverage, w e don't have the influence, the inclination to use military force. W e don't have the money to bring positive results anytime soon. (Williams and Goshko, 1993: A l )

The United States' unwillingness to exert structural leadership in regard to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union raises the obvious question of who will take on this responsibility. Given the combination of systemic and domestic factors confronting Germany, France, and Britain, it seems unlikely that they—singularly or in combination—will be enthusiastic about the prospects of assuming the role of structural leader in Europe. Indeed, only Russia has expressed an unequivocal commitment to the task of international conflict management in Eastern Europe. As noted previously, the Russian government already has asserted a "special responsibility" in regard to peacekeeping operations in the countries comprising the former Soviet Union. More recently, Foreign Minister Kozyrev has indicated his support for maintaining a Russian military presence in at least some of these republics. In a January 1994 interview with the Washington Post, Kozyrev suggested that Russia "should not withdraw from those regions which have been in the sphere of Russian interest for centuries" (Hiatt, 1994: A21). Russia also has signed a collective security agreement with six other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Hiatt, 1992: A16). Hence, Russia is formally committed to defend Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan from external attack. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that Russia would be willing to expand the scope of its managerial efforts to include countries located in Eastern Europe as well. Such a development is bound to raise security concerns on the part of the United States and its Western European allies. An assertive Russia, however, is not necessarily a bad thing. Historically, the stability of the European states system has been enhanced considerably when Russia has assumed an order-keeping role in the eastern region (Bunce, 1993). It is not by coincidence that two of the longest uninterrupted periods of major-power peace in Europe (i.e., 1815-1853 and 1871-1914) have been

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characterized by an active Russian role in the day-to-day m a n a g e m e n t of Eastern European security affairs. This stability, of course, has been purchased at a considerable cost to the states and societies comprising this region. T h e Russian tradition is not rooted in the liberal values and institutions that characterize the " W e s t . " A n d until Russia b e c o m e s a firmly established market democracy, it will be difficult to estimate what conseq u e n c e s the e x p a n s i o n of Russian i n f l u e n c e in Eastern E u r o p e will hold for the United States' grand strategy of institutionalization.

Conclusion It is c u s t o m a r y for b o o k s such as this to c o n c l u d e either by s p e c u l a t i n g about the c o u r s e of f u t u r e events or by o f f e r i n g a set of policy prescriptions that w o u l d address the p r o b l e m s outlined in the study. H o w e v e r , given the f o r m i d a b l e problems associated with the task of f o r e c a s t i n g in international politics (Jervis, 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 2 ; Gaddis, 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 3 ) , I will break with this tradition in f a v o r of a m o r e modest a p p r o a c h : outline the outstanding issues raised in this study and reiterate their significance f r o m the standpoint of both U.S. foreign policy and international relations theory. " P o l i t i c s , " Max W e b e r once wrote, "is a strong and slow boring of hard b o a r d s " (quoted in Gerth and Mills, 1946: 128). T h e practitioners of the grand strategy of institutionalization would do well to keep this axiom in mind. T h e collapse of the Soviet Union, c o u p l e d with the b a n k r u p t c y of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has created a unique opportunity for the promotion of liberal values and institutions in Europe. T h e success of this effort, however, is not foreordained by some unassailable f o r c e of historical e v o l u t i o n . Such liberal conceit is no more d e f e n s i b l e than the s m u g n e s s that Marxists used to exhibit in regard to the f u t u r e of international politics. T h e r e is nothing inevitable about the direction that the European states system ultimately will take in the p o s t - C o l d W a r era. Like virtually all political phenomena, the fate of Europe lies more in the realm of choice than of necessity. This conviction underscores the importance I have attached to the p r o b l e m s and possibilities associated with the task of i m p l e m e n t i n g the grand strategy of institutionalization. T h e United S t a t e s ' p o s t - C o l d W a r strategy represents an ambitious attempt to transform the way hundreds of millions of people define their identities, interests, institutions, and principles of international political association. O b v i o u s l y , this transformative process will take years, if not d e c a d e s , to c o m p l e t e , just as it did in the case of Western Europe. T h e potential benefits, however, are enormous. If successful, the strategy w o u l d lay the d o m e s t i c political foundation for the e m e r g e n c e of a liberal international society in Europe. This would not only benefit Europeans. It also would serve U.S. security and economic

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i n t e r e s t s by d i m i n i s h i n g the p o t e n t i a l f o r w a r a n d r e v o l u t i o n in E u r o p e . S u c h a d e v e l o p m e n t w o u l d e n a b l e the U n i t e d S t a t e s t o f o r g o the c o s t l y m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n s and high levels of d e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e s that h a v e c h a r a c t e r i z e d U.S. policy t h r o u g h o u t m u c h of the twentieth century. M o r e over, m a r k e t i z a t i o n and regional integration p r o m i s e to c r e a t e new o p p o r tunities f o r the e x p a n s i o n of U.S. e x p o r t s to the C o n t i n e n t . T h i s is of c o n s i d e r a b l e i m p o r t a n c e g i v e n the r o l e that i n t e r n a t i o n a l e x c h a n g e h a s a s s u m e d as a catalyst for g r o w t h and d e v e l o p m e n t on the part of the U.S. economy. T h i s v i s i o n , of c o u r s e , is t i n g e d w i t h an u n d e n i a b l e e l e m e n t of W i l s o n i a n u t o p i a n i s m . T h e g r a n d strategy of institutionalization e n v i s i o n s a w o r l d in w h i c h a u t o c r a c y , m i l i t a r i s m , i m p e r i a l i s m , a n d w a r h a v e b e e n r e d u c e d to the level of historical c u r i o s i t i e s ; a w o r l d in w h i c h the law of the j u n g l e h a s b e e n r e p l a c e d b y the r u l e of law; a w o r l d that u l t i m a t e l y s t a n d s b e y o n d the pale of p o w e r politics. O b v i o u s l y , it is relatively easy to d i s m i s s this vision as yet a n o t h e r m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the s y s t e m i c i n n o c e n c e that h a s c h a r a c t e r i z e d U . S . f o r e i g n p o l i c y s i n c e the e a r l i e s t d a y s of the Republic. S u c h c y n i c i s m must be t e m p e r e d , h o w e v e r , by an a p p r e c i a t i o n of the r e m a r k a b l e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s that o c c u r r e d in W e s t e r n E u r o p e d u r i n g the p o s t - W o r l d W a r II era. T h i s e x p e r i e n c e s u g g e s t s that w h i l e the c o n s t r u c tion of a liberal i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y in E u r o p e is d i f f i c u l t , it is not i m p o s s i b l e . H e n c e , the vision o u t l i n e d by the B u s h a n d C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a tions r e p r e s e n t s m o r e than s i m p l y a n o t h e r b o u t of w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g on the part of U . S . f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a k e r s . It is an a p p r o a c h that is r o o t e d , ultim a t e l y , in f i v e d e c a d e s of s u c c e s s f u l W e s t e r n e x p e r i e n c e . T o a c k n o w l e d g e the possibilities of a c h i e v i n g s i m i l a r t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s in E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n d the f o r m e r S o v i e t U n i o n is not to a r g u e that the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' p o s t - C o l d W a r s t r a t e g y is d e s t i n e d to s u c c e e d d u e to the sheer w e i g h t of the W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n m o d e l . T h e political, e c o n o m i c , a n d social c h a l l e n g e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e p r o c e s s of l i b e r a l i z i n g f o r m e r c o m m u n i s t c o u n t r i e s are s i m p l y t o o d a u n t i n g to h a v e a g r e a t deal of c o n f i d e n c e w h e n it c o m e s to p r e d i c t i n g the ultimate o u t c o m e of this transitional stage of d e v e l o p m e n t . W h i l e the Zeitgeist of i n t e r n a t i o n a l politics c l e a r l y lies in the direction of d e m o c r a c y a n d m a r k e t s , w e h a v e seen these w a v e s of liberalization crest and r e c e d e b e f o r e ( H u n t i n g t o n , 1 9 9 1 ) . A g a i n , there is n o t h i n g i n e v i t a b l e a b o u t the p o w e r of l i b e r a l i s m as a w o r l d h i s t o r i c a l f o r c e . A s w i t h any ideology, there are a l w a y s a l t e r n a t i v e s p o s s e s s i n g their own hegemonic pretensions. T h i s is t o s u g g e s t that t h e f a t e of the E u r o p e a n s t a t e s s y s t e m is unlikely to be d e c i d e d a n y t i m e s o o n . D u r i n g this i n t e r r e g n u m , h o w e v e r , the U n i t e d States clearly has an o p p o r t u n i t y to i n f l u e n c e the c o u r s e of e v e n t s . W h i l e U . S . f o r e i g n policy m a k e r s can s u p p o r t the p r o c e s s of liberalization

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in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in a number o f different ways, we should not overlook the important contribution collective security institutions made to the transformation o f Western Europe into a pluralistic security community during the post-World War II era. A reassuring environment can have a significant and long-lasting effect upon the nature o f states and societies. No nation should appreciate this more than the United States. E u r o p e ' s nascent collective security system has the potential to provide the Continent's weakly institutionalized liberal regimes with the sense o f security they will need in order to b e c o m e firmly rooted market democracies. T o be effective, however, the multilateral institutions comprising Europe's emerging security architecture also will require sustained U.S. leadership. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the Clinton administration possesses the skill or the will to meet this demand either at home or abroad. Leadership is in short supply in the contemporary United States; we have been reduced to a nation o f managers. This point also raises an issue that should be of considerable interest to international relations theorists. Democracy is a powerful force in contemporary international politics. Scholars have long recognized this fact, and we are quite right to emphasize the many benefits associated with the spread of liberal values and institutions. At the same time, however, we should not minimize or ignore the more troubling implications associated with the advance of democracy. While it is true that democracies rarely go to war with one another, it is not at all clear that democracies can cooperate in the realm o f international security management. I have attempted to underscore this point through an extended discussion o f the factors that may inhibit today's democratic major powers from actively supporting Europe's nascent collective security system. T h e present study, however, has done little more than scratch the surface o f this question. B e f o r e we j u m p to any conclusions about the (in)ability o f democracies to engage in far-reaching acts of international security cooperation, we need to investigate a considerably broader range o f cases. Such an effort could make a valuable contribution to our understanding of the future of world politics. W e have entered an era that is unprecedented in the history o f the interstate system. Never before have so many of the world's major powers been characterized by liberal norms and institutions at the level of their domestic politics. There are, o f course, compelling reasons to believe that this development should significantly improve the prospects for global peace and prosperity. W e would be remiss, however, if we did not acknowledge that democratic political systems are characterized by a degree of parochialism and self-centeredness that creates an inherent tension among the members of a liberal society. It would

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be surprising to find that such problems d o not e x i s t at the level of international relations.

Notes 1. The United States, however, has sent 500 soldiers to Macedonia in an attempt to deter Serbia from invading the country. 2. The Clinton administration's turn toward a policy of selective engagement becomes even more remarkable if it is contrasted with the plea for unconditionality contained in a speech delivered by Ambassador Albright to the Council on Foreign Relations in June: If the Security Council is to speak and act on behalf of the entire world community, its e f f o r t s cannot be confined to only those issues of greatest consequence to its richer members. (Albright, 1993a: 34)

3. In contrast, only 55 percent of the general public in the 1974 survey thought it was important for the United States to continue playing a leadership role in world affairs (Schneider, 1992: 41). 4. Hence, the United States' efforts to transform Western Europe into an integrated, pluralistic security community during the Cold War era cannot be attributed primarily to some ideological predisposition "to remake the world in the American image" (Burley, 1993: 129). Rather, U.S. efforts in regard to this region were driven largely by the strategic exigencies associated with the emerging bipolar confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union (Weber, 1992). 5. As noted previously, the incentives to shirk managerial responsibilities in a multipolar system also will increase if the balance of military technology is seen as favoring the defense (Christensen and Snyder, 1990). 6. This makes intuitive sense since the Reagan years demonstrate that a president can make exaggerated promises to the people, and repeatedly fail to make good on such commitments, without suffering retribution at the polls. Ironically, this appears to be one lesson that George Bush did not learn during his tenure as vice president. While it is always risky to account for an electoral outcome on the basis of a single factor, it seems clear that Bush's defeat in the 1992 election was primarily a result of his refusal to make any meaningful promises in regard to "fixing" the economy or leading the United States out of the recession (Duffy and Goodgame, 1992: 273-274). 7. In Young's analytic framework, leaders typically are individuals. In the case of intellectual leadership, however, an "epistemic community" presumably could serve in this capacity as well. For a discussion of epistemic communities and the role they can play in the process of regime formation, see Haas (1992). 8. This conception of leadership corresponds closely to the one found in the literature on hegemonic stability theory (see Keohane, 1989: 7 4 - 1 0 0 ; Modelski, 1978; Gilpin, 1981; Snidal, 1985).

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. 1992a. "Foreign Policy Association Speech, April 1, 1992." Foreign Policy Bulletin (November/December) 3:8-12. . 1992b. "Los Angeles World Affairs Council Speech, August 13, 1992." Foreign Policy Bulletin (November/December) 3:12-17. . 1993a. "President Clinton's Television Address, October 7, 1993." Foreign Policy Bulletin (November/December) 4:32-34. . 1993b. "President-Elect Clinton's Remarks to the Diplomatic Corps, January 18, 1993." Foreign Policy Bulletin (January/April) 3:4-6. . 1993c. "President's Address to U.N. General Assembly, September 27, 1993." Foreign Policy Bulletin (November/December) 4:49-53. . 1993d. "President's Speech to American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 1, 1993." Foreign Policy Bulletin (May/June) 3:21-24. . 1994. "A New Security—Built on Integration." Washington Post (January 10): p. A l l . Eagleburger, L. 1992. "Address Before North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, December 18, 1992." Foreign Policy Bulletin (January/April 1993)3:116. Fitzwater, M. 1992a. "Open Skies, March 24, 1992." Foreign Policy Bulletin (May/June) 2:38-39. . 1992b. "White House Statement on CFE-1A Agreement." Foreign Policy Bulletin (September/October) 3:44-45. Kozyrev, A. 1993. "And Now: Partnership with Russia's Democrats." Washington Post (October 10): p. C7.

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Lake, A. 1993. "National Security Advisor Lake at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, September 21, 1993." Foreign Policy Bulletin (November/December) 4:39-46. U.S. Department of State. 1989. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents (AFP). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. . 1990. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Treaties and International Commitments " C a m p David Declaration, February 1, 1992." Foreign Policy Bulletin (January/April) 2:48-49. "Charter for American-Russian Partnership and Friendship, June 17, 1992." Foreign Policy Bulletin (July/August 1993) 3:12-14. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). November 17, 1990. "Concluding Document of the Vienna Negotiations on CBSMs." American Foreign Policy: Current Documents. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, pp. 289-292. . November 21, 1990. "Charter of Paris for a New Europe." Foreign Policy Bulletin (January/April 1991) 1:75-80. . January 30, 1992. "Prague Document." Foreign Policy Bulletin (January/April) 2:74-76. Bulletin . July 10, 1992. "Helsinki Summit Declaration." Foreign Policy (September/October) 3:58-61. "Joint Announcement of Five-Nation Action Program, May 22, 1993." Foreign Policy Bulletin (July/August) 4:13-16. "Joint Understanding on Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms." Foreign Policy Bulletin (July/August 1992) 3:14-15. North Atlantic Council. July 6, 1990. "London Declaration." American Foreign Policy: Current Documents. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, pp. 275-278. . November 8, 1991. "Rome Declaration." Foreign Policy Bulletin (January/April 1992) 2:55-58. . June 4, 1992. "Oslo Communique." Foreign Policy Bulletin (July/August) 3:61-63. "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, November 19, 1990." Arms Control Today (1991): 21. "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, September 12, 1990." Foreign Policy Bulletin (November/December) 3:1-4. "Vancouver Declaration, April 4, 1993." Foreign Policy Bulletin (May/June) 3:27-28.

INDEX

Albright, Madeline, 31, 32, 62, 136/i2 Americans Talk Security Project, 123 Armenia: military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44tab; Russian commitment to, 132 Arms control, 9, 18, 20, 24, 25, 32, 35/i74, 35/i77, 36/i27, 37, 40-48, 55; Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength, 42; confidence building measures in, 47-48; Conventional Forces in Europe, 25, 36n22, 40-45; sufficiency principle, 41; treaty-limited equipment, 40-41. See also Weapons. Aspin, Les, 58 Azerbaijan, 107; military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44tab Baker, James, 16, 17, 28, 29, 34/i5, 34/iS, 34nlO, 35nl2, 36n22, 42, 45, 47, 52, 54, 64/i$>, 65/170, 65nl3 Balance-of-power systems, 5, 75, 76, 85/i7, 86/i4, 87/172 Belarus, 41; and Lisbon Protocol, 45; military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44tab; nuclear capabilities, 45, 46tab Belgium: military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44tab Berlin Press Club, 16,18, 25, 34«70, 65/.70 Berlin Wall, 20, 25, 28, 34/iS Bipolarity, 129, 136n4 Bosnia, 35/i76, 106-110, lll/i77, 120, 121, 125 Bulgaria: military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44tab; relations with North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 56 Bush, George, xi, 2, 13,18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32, Mn4, 34n5, 34«9, 34/i77, 35nl3, 36n20, 39, 40, 46, 50, 52, 61, 62-63,136/i6

Camp David Declaration, 50 Canada: military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44tab CFE. See Conventional Forces in Europe Charter for American and Russian Partnership and Friendship, 50 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 53, 71 China: nuclear capabilities, 45; in United Nations, 60 Christopher, Warren, 30, 57, 62, 107,125, 127, 132 Clinton, Bill, xi, 2, 8, 9, 13, 29-33, 35nl3, 40, 49, 57, 61-62, 64/i6, 119, 121, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130 Cold War: causes of, 21 ; as period of stability, 22, 92; U.S. response to ending, 1, 2 Combined Joint Task Force (NATO), 120, 121 Commonwealth of Independent States, 41 Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength, 42 Concluding Document of the Vienna Negotiations (CSCE), 48 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2, 10/i2, 18, 28, 29, 48, 51, 52-55, 64/i9, 67, 69, 87/i73; Committee of Senior Officials, 53; Concluding Document of the Vienna Negotiations, 48; Conflict Prevention Center, 53; Council of Foreign Ministers, 53, 54; failure in Bosnia, 107, 108; Forum on Security Cooperation, 54; High Commission on National Minorities, 54; Office of Free Elections, 53; peacekeeping activities, 54, 55; and promotion of transparency, 18; United States support for, 52-55 Conflict: as catalyst of change, 26-27; domestic, 2; ethnic, 29, 31, 54, 106, 125;

151

152

Index

and institutional vacuums, 39; international, 2, 8, 17, 35*74, 38, 54,64/i9, 68, 72, 77, 79, 82, 118, 127; interstate, 39; intervention in, 86/i5; issue areas in, 95tab; liklihood of involvement in, 38; major-power, 98; management, 8, 55, 64«9, 107, 109, 127; peaceful settlement of, 32; prevention, 51, 53; regional, 18, 20, 55; religious, 31, 106; resolution, 20, 51, 54, 60, 96; territorial issues in, 94-95 Containment, 4, 5, 16, 30,116 Conventional Forces in Europe, 25, 36n22, 40-45; Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength, 42 Cooperation: distribution of benefits of, 72-73; domestic politics in, 86n7; international, 72; major-power, 6, 68, 81-84, 98-106; obstacles to, 5-7, 9, 67, 72-73, 77-81; potential for, 89; and power motivations, 86/i77; regional, 77; in security issues, 5-7 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 35n76 Council on Foreign Relations, 21, 32, 35/i75, 136«2 Croatia, 35/i76, 107 CSCE. See Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Czechoslovakia, 22, 23; military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44iab; relations with North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 56, 58 Decisionmaking: and cause-and-effect, 14; centralized, 103; and public opinion, 111a75, 122; societal influence on, 105, 122 Democracy: among major powers, 90, 97; constraints on aggressive policies, 82-83; cooperation in, 5-7; defensive strategies of, 83; effect on collective security, 9; foreign policy in, 9; and international security, xi; liklihood of involvement in conflict, 38; market, 30, 48; and national interests, 6; political culture of, 96; role of domestic factors in policymaking, 6; security benefits of, 29-30; threats to, 39; transition to, 39; transparency in, 83 Democratization, 32, 38, 70, 76, 82; and collective security, 83-84; consensus making in, 84; in Eastern Europe, 18, 115;

in Europe, 17; promotion of, 30; and public policy, 99; and security systems, 87n77; and the shadow of the future, 83; system stabilization with, 13 Denmark: military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44/afc Domino theory, 70 Eagleburger, Lawrence, 56, 57, 65nl3 Economic: assistance, 123, 131; competition, 123; exchange, 52; growth, 19; institutions, 10/i7; liberalization, 58; policy, 117; production, 93, 95, 97; reform, 13, 17, 18, 24, 59; sanctions, 108, 118; shock, 38 Economy: capitalist, 33n3, 38; European, 1; high-technology, 94; market-based, 1,18, 37 Elections: free, 17, 18; Office of Free Elections (CSCE), 53 Estonia, 39 Europe: arms control in, 9; collective security in, xi, 3, 67-85; democratic governance in, 2, 17, 82, 96, 97; domestic political order, 2; economy in, 1; integration in European Community, 28-29; level of existing security, 6; military personnel in, 41-42; nuclear status quo in, 46; polarization of, 20; reductions in militarization, 42; relations with United States, 3-5,10/i7; state systems in, 3, 4, 13, 27, 38; superpower spheres of influence, 21 ; transformation of, 1 Europe, Eastern: democratization in, 18, 30, 115; incorporation into liberal economic order, 19; and international political association, 38; liberalization in, 2, 26, 38, 69, 77; marketization in, 18, 115; power imbalances in, 43; relations with North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 56, 58, 119; security problems in, 9; U.S. role in, 1 European Community, 18, 28; failure in Bosnia, 107; and integration of Europe, 28-29; role in Eastern Europe, 18 Expansion, territorial, 6 Foreign policy: accommodationist, 104, 105; bilateral approach, 26; conservative, 104-105; of democracies, 9; expansionist, 95; force as instrument of, 90, 96, 97,103, 104, 105; habit-driven actor hypothesis, 26-28; internationalist, 104; isolationist, 104, 105; judgment in, xii; predicting,

Index

153

7 - 8 ; revisionist approach, 33«3; Russian, 58, 113nl8; U.S., xi, 1, 3-5, 7-8, 10«/, 26, 37, 110-111, 115, 127133

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 56, 58 Hypemationalism, 107

Foreign Policy Association, 30, 62 Forum on Security Cooperation, 54 Fourteen Points, 115 France, 110; contributions to peacekeeping activities, 120; military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44tab, lOliab, 102tafc; nuclear capabilities, 45; nuclear weapons distribution in, 91, 91 tab; and structural leadership, 132; in U.N., 60 Free riding, 67, 77-81, 87«75, 90, 99, 120

IMF. See International Monetary Fund INF. See Intermediate range nuclear forces treaty

GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 69 Geneva Agreement, 20 Georgia, 107; military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44tab; Russian commitment to, 132 Germany, 25, 110; division of, 20; lack of nuclear capability, 91; military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44tab, 64nl, 10\tab, 102tab, 111 u2; and structural leadership, 132; in United Nations, 63, 125 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 22, 23, 25, 35«77, 39 Grand strategy of institutionalization, xi, 1, 2, 3, 9; and Clinton administration, 29-33; description of, 13-33; implementation of, 37-38; internal architecture of, 16-20, 33«2, 37-64; and isolationism, 127-133; and membership in international regimes, 69; multilateral institutions in, 67; strategy content, 26-29; timing of, 20-25 Great Britain, 110; military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44tab, lOltab, 102tab; nuclear capabilities, 45; nuclear weapons distribution in, 91, 91 tab; and structural leadership, 132; in United Nations, 60 Greece: military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44tab Gulf War, 31, 34n4, 35nl3, 91, 123; United Nations in, 61 Hamtramck concept, 25 Helsinki summit, 71 Hungary, 22, 23, 24; military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44tab; relations with

Institutions: destruction of, 27; development of, 38-39; economic, 10«/, 31; fragmentation of, 103; liberal, 1, 10n7, 17, 19, 33, 38, 59, 69, 72, 75, 76, 97, 133; multilateral, 2, 3, 28, 31, 37, 52, 55, 67, 119; obstacles to cooperation, 2; political, 10/1.7, 103; role in regional security, 2; security, 31, 32 Institutions, international, 1, 2, 9, 13, 18, 26, 116, 124; Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2, 10«2, 18, 28, 29, 48, 52-55, 67, 69, 87«73; conventions, 85/i2; efforts in Bosnia, 106-110; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 69; International Monetary Fund, 69; North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 30, 48, 51, 56-57, 69; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2, 10«2, 18, 20, 28, 29, 40, 41, 48, 51, 55-59, 67, 87«73; regimes, 85«2; role in conflict management, 51-63; types of, 85«2; United Nations, 2, 10/i2, 23, 31, 32, 35«;.?, 40, 59-63, 67, 87nl3; World Bank, 69. See also individual institutions. Intermediate range nuclear forces treaty, 20 International Atomic Energy Agency, 45 International Monetary Fund, 69 Isolationism, 3, 5,8, 9, 11 «J, 104,105,115-136 Italy: contributions to peacekeeping activities, 120; military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44tab, 101 tab, 102tab

Japan: competitive abilities, 122, 123; in United Nations, 63, 125 Kazakhstan: and Lisbon Protocol, 45; nuclear capabilities, 45, 46tab; Russian commitment to, 132 Kozyrev, Andrei, 110, 113«7S, 132 Lake, Anthony, 10«;, 30, 31, 121, 125 Leadership, 130-133, 136n7 League of Nations, 99 Lisbon Protocol, 4 5 - 4 6

154

Index

London Declaration, 55-56 Marketization, 38, 70, 76; in Eastern Europe, 115 Market(s): democracy, 48; reform, 31 Militarization: decrease in, 40, 42; levels of, 37; and membership in international institutions, 69 Military: assistance, 123, 131; budgets, 48; capabilities, 6, 40; exercises, 48; imbalances, 36/i22; intervention, 22, 23, 24, 104,105, 108, 116, 118, 122, 123, 124, 125,126, 136/1.7; personnel, 41; power, 4, 21; preparedness, 76; technology, 7, 91, 95, 97, 99; transparency, 37, 40, 47-48, 52, 64 Moldova: military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44tab Multilateralism, 9, 26, 31 Multi polarity, 129 NACC. See North Atlantic Cooperation Council NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization Netherlands: contributions to peacekeeping activities, 120; military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44tab New World Order, 32, 34n4, 61 Nixon, Richard, 21 North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 30, 48, 51,56-57,69 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2, 10n2, 18, 20, 28, 29, 40, 41, 48, 51, 67, 87/175, Ill/i77; changing role of, 55-56; Combined Joint Task Force, 120, 121; failure in Bosnia, 107, 108; London Declaration, 55-56; membership issues, 57, 58, 59, 119; Partnership for Peace, 58, 59; peacekeeping activities, 57, 119,121; reduction in field forces, 24; relations with Eastern Europe, 56,119; role in security environment, 18; Rome Declaration, 56; security role of, 55-59; "Strategic Concept," 56; U.S. commitment to, 128 Norway: military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44tab Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 45, 46 Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, 45 Nunn-Lugar Act, 45 Open skies initiative, 47-48

Partnership for Peace program, 58, 59, 117, 119, 120 Poland, 24, 39; military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44rafc, 101 tab, 102tab; relations with North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 56, 58 Policy: of deterrence, 22; economic, 117; feasibility of, 37; and grand strategy, 13-16; institutionalization of, 26; legitimacy, 99; networks, 103; public, 6, 99; and public opinion, 122; reassurance, 35/i79; security, 6, 7-8 Political: autonomy, 74, 116, 118; competition, 96; contiguity in, 39; geometry, 17; homogeneity, 5, 84; institutions, 10//7; liberalization, 58; management, 54; polarization, 25; power, 93; reform, 17,18, 24, 59 Politics: domestic, xii, 1, 8,10/i7, 13,17, 72, 86/i7, 90, 96, 97, 103,130; international, xi, xii, 1, 4, 7, 10/i7, 13, 17, 29, 50, 62, 68, 69, 85/i7, 130 Portugal: military ceilings, 43tab; military strength, 44tab Power: differentials, 91; expansion of, 75; limitations, 76; military, 4, 21; misuse of, 71; noncumulativity of, 94; political, 93; redistribution of, 27; regional, 4; restraint of, 18; state, 1, 18; and territorial expansion, 93 Prague Document, 53 Prisoners' Dilemma, 77-78, 79/ig Production: economic, 93, 95, 97; factors of, 93; knowledge-based, 94 Reagan, Ronald, 20, 23, 130, 136n9; dismantling of, 45; distribution of, 91, 91 tab; export control of, 45; and majorpower security, 90; mutual assured destruction from, 92; preventing proliferation of, 40, 45-47 Western European Union, 51 WEU. See Western European Union Wilson, Woodrow, 4, 115 World Affairs Council, 16,17, MnlO World Bank, 69 World War I, 4, 26 World War II, 4, 26 WTO. See Warsaw Treaty Organization Yeltsin, Boris, 50, 64/t6 Yugoslavia, 39, 107 Zhirinovsky, Gennadiy, 113/i7S

ABOUT THE BOOK AND THE AUTHOR

T h i s study advances a novel argument about the difficulties the major powers of Europe are likely to encounter in attempting the multilateral management of regional security problems. S p i e z i o contends that democratic powers are poorly suited to participate in a collective-security regime because they are characterized by domestic political constraints that would inhibit them from honoring the commitments associated with such a regime. Thus, Europe's nascent collective security system is likely to be plagued by repeated acts of buck-passing. This possibility, in turn, holds important implications for the future of both the European state system and the U.S. p o s t - C o l d War strategy o f promoting democratization, marketization, and regional integration in Europe. Kim Edward Spiezio

is assistant professor of political science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

157